Contested Memories and Reconciliation Challenges

Japan and the Asia-Pacific on the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II

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Cover: U.S. troops stand as a Japanese flag is lowered for the last time on the grounds of the Governor General of Korea’s building after the Japanese surrender its territorial rule over the Korean peninsula to U.S. military forces in Korea in September 1945. The flag had been flown since Japan’s annexation of Korea in August 1910. Photo courtesy of the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. Researched by Toyomi Asano.
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Words can be a powerful tool to rally a nation and bring people together under a united vision. But words can also be divisive, and lead to the opening of old wounds and create new ones.

The eyes and ears of much of Asia will be on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe when he delivers a speech in August 2015 to commemorate 70 years since the end of World War II. It will undoubtedly be the most scrutinized of Abe’s public addresses to date, a fact that has not escaped the Prime Minister’s Office as experts have been assembled months in advance to advise him on the broader strategy and the appropriate wording for the occasion.

Clearly, Tokyo recognizes that Abe’s post-war commemorative statement will be closely scrutinized abroad as well as at home, and the audience in neighboring China and South Korea will be particularly sensitive to Abe’s every sentence and every body movement, as well as what is not mentioned. It must therefore not simply be an occasion for Japan to reflect on its achievement to secure political stability and economic prosperity over the past seven decades, successfully shedding its militaristic past. Rather, it should be seized as an opportunity for Abe to demonstrate Japan as a thought leader as well as an economic and political power in an Asia that is undergoing rapid change.

Even his staunchest critics would agree that Abe has succeeded in putting an end to the revolving door of Japanese premiers which plagued the country for nearly seven years from 2006 until he took office for the second time in December 2012. His economic policies to jump-start growth have led to a surge in share prices, and boosted corporate earnings. The prime minister has also begun taking the first steps to bring sweeping change to Japan’s security strategy in light of the shifting military realities in the Asia-Pacific region. But while Washington has welcomed Tokyo’s push to reinterpret Japan’s pacifist constitution and inch up its defense spending, such moves have further fanned the flames of anger in China and South
Korea regarding Japan’s actions during World War II. Granted, tensions over historical memory have been manipulated by both Beijing and Seoul to strengthen national unity and divert attention from more divisive domestic issues, Tokyo must nonetheless acknowledge the fact that its militaristic past continues to plague its role as a regional leader moving forward.

At the same time, there is growing concern in Japan that Abe is facing a no-win situation, where no new expression of apology or remorse will be enough. Certainly, the fact that the Korean and Chinese media lashed out against Abe following his speech to the U.S. Congress in April 2015 did little to reassure those Japanese who are already facing apology fatigue. In his address to U.S. lawmakers, the Japanese prime minister not only stressed the strong partnership between the two countries, but he also expressed remorse for Japan’s actions during World War II against the United States, including the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and concluded that the bilateral relationship has been able to overcome such historic hurdles. He also stated that at a joint press conference with President Barack Obama that he would uphold the Kono statement of 1993 which expressed remorse for the Japanese military forcing women to work in military-operated brothels. For the Korean and Chinese public, however, the fact that he did not mention Japanese aggression in the Asia-Pacific and the plight of the so-called “comfort women” who were coerced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during the war at his Congressional speech was objectionable, even though Abe’s target audience was U.S. legislators.

There are thus two broad questions, namely: Are there indeed words or policies that the Japanese premier can pursue that will resolve the diplomatic impasse over memories of war and occupation? Is there the political will in South Korea as well as in China to want to move forward on the history issue?

In March 2015, a conference was held at the Wilson Center bringing together scholars from Japan, South Korea, China, and the United States to discuss why Japan’s apologies regarding its actions during World War II have not been enough to assuage its neighbors, and to propose policies that could lead to a breakthrough in the deadlock. This collection of essays is a result of that event.

In “The Rocky Road from Normalization to Reconciliation,” Seton Hall University’s Zheng Wang emphasizes the need for sincerity from Prime
Minister Abe in addressing history issues, and argues that Japan should not tout its post-war achievements without first addressing the victims of Japanese aggression with humility and remorse. He also calls for both China and Japan to reform their respective educational programs for history, and resume their joint history research efforts.

The School for International Training Graduate Institute's Tatsushi Arai, meanwhile, calls for creating opportunities for the three countries to work together on specific projects of historical significance in “Meeting Reconciliation Challenges in China-Japan-Korea Relations.” He also noted the importance of trilateral engagement and reciprocation in ceremonies of remembrance.

As for American University’s Ji-young Lee, she stressed the need for Japan not to backtrack from its earlier statements of remorse on the one hand, and for South Korea to acknowledge Tokyo’s efforts to improve bilateral relations in her essay, “Historical Memory and Reconciliation: A South Korean Perspective.” She also pointed out that Seoul needs to pay attention to the voices of more moderate legislators as well as opinion-makers in Japan.

Gilbert Rozman, editor-in-chief of the Asan Forum, meanwhile, notes that Washington should discourage assertions about history that complicate cooperation in support of a positive vision of a U.S. rebalance to Asia in “The U.S. Role in Asia’s ‘History War’”.

Meanwhile, Toyomi Asano of Waseda University argues that the United States can play a key role in the history dispute by establishing forums for discussions. In “National Sentiments in Japan and Controversy over Historical Recognition,” he adds that greater use of soft power and leveraging culture to develop public empathy on all sides is a prerequisite for mutual understanding.

As the oftentimes all too emotional discussions over historical guilt continues to rage on in East Asia, this publication is a call for thoughtful analysis of why relations are reaching a boiling point today, and how tensions could be cooled. This publication is, in short, an articulation of deep passion and high hopes from all participants for the four countries to reach a lasting resolution to the ongoing conflict over history in one of the world’s most populous and dynamic regions. The inspiration of this work and the conference that was its genesis comes from Tatsushi Arai and Zheng Wang. Their commitment to taking a rational yet compassionate
approach to find concrete solutions to one of the most politically sensitive issues in East Asia today is truly an inspiration. Not only do they represent superb scholarship, but they also personify true and lasting friendship between Japanese and Chinese academics on a topic where it is all too easy to disagree. Their work has been supported from their early days as scholars as they were both tutored by Kevin Avruch, dean of the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution Resolution (S-CAR) at George Mason University. This publication would not have been possible without institutional support from Seton Hall University’s Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, as well as from George Mason University’s S-CAR and its Point of View research and retreat center.

The Wilson Center’s Asia Program would also like to thank Mary Ratfliff, Kathy Butterfield, and Angelina Fox for all their time, effort, and patience to produce this publication.

Washington DC
June 2015

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The Rocky Road from Normalization to Reconciliation: China-Japan Relations on the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II

Zheng Wang

SUMMARY

Seventy years after the end of World War II, the ghost of conflict still haunts international relationships in East Asia. The lack of real post-war reconciliation and effective peacebuilding within the general public between China and Japan is the true cause of the current animosity. The stakes for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 70th anniversary speech is very high as it has the potential to either open a new chapter for reconciliation with Korea and China, or to inflict serious damage on relations with Japan’s neighbors that will be long lasting. Without addressing the underlying roots of hostility, the two nations will be unable to build a normal relationship.

1. THE CENTRAL BARRIER FOR RECONCILIATION

Historic issues are still the major barrier for the normal relationship between Japan and China, Japan and Korea.

- The divergent understandings of the past conflict have deeply affected the national identity formation and nation building for these countries.
Historic consciousness, particularly regarding the sense of humiliation relating to the war experience, has been the crux of the nationalism experienced by these nations in East Asia.

There is a bad feedback-loop in East Asia wherein the lack of sincere apology from the majority of the Japanese society only acts to further frustrate many Chinese and Koreans, this in turn only makes them angrier. This fervent emotion from their neighbors makes many Japanese even more reluctant to admit their past wrongdoings and to apologize.

2. PRIME MINISTER ABE’S 70th ANNIVERSARY SPEECH

Three suggestions can be made to the prime minister for his speech:

- **Attitude is more important than words.** Sincerity is key. The audience of the speech should be focused on China and Korea, not Japan. The speech itself should convey the true sincerity of the Japanese and the Prime Minister himself of his understanding of the war 70 years ago.

- **Post-war orientation is the wrong track.** There is no point in shining a light on Japan's post-war accomplishments without first addressing Japan’s victims with an admission of guilt and remorse. Shifting the focus of the speech from a reflection of the war to Japan's postwar period contributions may provoke anger from the audience of the speech.

- **Commit to a peaceful future.** A very important part of Mr. Abe’s speech should address people’s doubts about his administration’s vision for the future of Japan as a pacifist nation.

3. FUTURE RECONCILIATION AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES

To create conditions for long-term reconciliation, this article has two suggestions to the two countries.
As many problems between China and Japan are deeply rooted in history, it is extremely important for the people of both countries to be aware of other side’s perceptions and understandings of history.

Both China and Japan should begin to conduct history education reform, and should resume their joint history research and joint history textbook projects.

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SEVEN DECADES IS NOT A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, and today’s world is significantly different in almost all aspects compared with the time that has past since the end of World War II. However, after 70 years, the ghost of war still haunts international relationships in East Asia. Historic problems are the central issue in the international relations of East Asia. While Japan and the China normalized relations in 1972, this was an arrangement by a few top leaders meant to satisfy each party’s political and economic interests. The lack of real post-war reconciliation and effective peacebuilding within the general public between the two societies is the true cause of the current animosity. The historic issues are still the major barrier for the normal relationship between Japan and China, and Japan and Korea. The divergent understandings of the past conflict have deeply affected the national identification and nation building for these countries. Historic consciousness, particularly regarding the sense of humiliation relating to the war experience, has been the crux of the nationalism experienced by these nations in East Asia. These historic issues have also been frequently utilized in these states by politicians and elite members of society as tools for political mobilization, and various other purposes.

A major challenge for the bilateral conflict over the next decade is to deal with historical issues and promote real reconciliation between two peoples with deep historical grievances and misperceptions. Identity-based conflict is different from interest-based conflict, and conflict management tactics like negotiation and mediation are often ineffective in resolving conflict based on historical memory. Another major challenge is that the rise of nationalism in China and Japan has removed the incentive for governments to make compromises. To address these challenges, people need to explore a new approach in dealing with conflicts deeply rooted in history and memory.

THE CENTRAL BARRIER FOR RECONCILIATION

A 2014 public opinion poll surveying both Japanese and Chinese respondents provides answers as to the central barrier for reconciliation between the two sides. The 10th annual opinion poll, jointly conducted by the China Daily and Genron NPO each year since 2005, reveals some of the most striking facts about Sino-Japanese sentiments. The poll indicates that over 93 percent
of Japanese respondents and nearly 87 percent of Chinese respondents hold an unfavorable or negative impression toward the other nation. It is difficult to find such a staggering high level of negative attitudes between neighbors, outside perhaps Israel/Palestine and U.S./USSR during the height of the Cold War. Based on the survey, one of the most common reasons for the “unfavorable impression” of Japan among the Chinese public was “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of invasion of China” at 59.6 percent. On the other hand, in the reasons why the Japanese respondents have an “unfavorable” impression of China, “Criticism of Japan over historical issues” (52.2 percent) and “China’s actions are incompatible with international rules” (55.1 percent) were the two prominent answers.

Even more difficult is finding this extreme of mutual dislike between major powers. One of the most alarming facts of this survey is that more than half of the Chinese respondents (53.4 percent) and almost a third (29 percent) of Japanese respondents believe that military conflict between China and Japan is imminent within a few years or in the near future. Compared with the same joint poll of last year, the fear of a sudden military conflict is increasing in both countries.

These survey results also reveal a big perception gap between the two countries. From the perspective of many Chinese, a core issue in all the historic problems in East Asia revolves around Japan’s attitude, reflection, and understanding regarding its own actions during World War II. That is why “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of invasion of China” was listed as one of the major reasons why the Chinese respondents of the survey hold a negative impression of Japan. However, even though the Japanese do not have historical remorse toward China, a large number of Japanese respondents think that it is the Chinese history education and domestic politics that give rise to the existing history issues between Japan and China.

Over the past 70 years, many Japanese political leaders have expressed their regrets about Japan’s behavior during war, apologized to Japan’s neighbors, and admitted to its invasion and violence in the region. However, for a great majority of Chinese and Korean people, they still have not considered that Japan’s apology is sincere, and many of their people still feel anger about the perceived lack of Japanese indignity and sorrow when it comes to the
past. During the seven decades, quite frequently the Japanese remarks and behaviors have fueled strong protests in China and South Korea. To many Chinese, as the survey results has indicated, the lack of a sincere Japanese apology is the central barrier for real normalization and reconciliation.

Since 1945, Japanese society has experienced a major transformation and has become a peace-loving country. Japan’s economic growth has made it possible for Tokyo to contribute greatly to international development and Japan has made very positive contributions to international society, especially in the realm of economic development, including assisting in China’s reform and opening up in the 1980s. This in turn has played a major role in China’s own economic development in the last quarter century. However, though Japanese society has experienced a peaceful transformation, the understanding about history, especially about its role in the war 70 years ago, has not progressed and adapted as much as other areas of social activities. Due to its history education, today’s young generations in Japan know very little about the war, and therefore very often take an indifferent attitude towards other country’s historic consciousness.

On the other hand, history education and social narratives in China have made the younger generations possess a very strong outlook about the war. As an integral part of the Chinese Communist Party’s reform package since the collapse of Soviet Union and East European countries, the government abandoned the communist ideology and began to stress the shared sense of Chinese national identity, history, and culture. In the Chinese classroom, for example, the curriculum is heavily loaded with the contents of national humiliation. A state-run national “patriotic education campaign” is conducted from kindergarten through college. In many Chinese cities, there are numerous museums, monuments, and historical sites that were established in memory of the Sino-Japanese War. All these sources of memory have made forgetting impossible.2

It is wrong, however, to assume that Chinese nationalism is just a “top-down” imposition manipulated by the state. Chinese nationalism is a complicated social phenomenon that cannot be explained simply through education or government manipulation. Moreover, a state’s “official nationalism” is often largely dependent on the degree of “social nationalism” shared by all citizens. States must become social nations if they are to
successfully mobilize nationalist behavior amongst the population. Many of today’s Chinese share a strong collective historical consciousness regarding the country’s “century of humiliation.” This historical consciousness has been a central element in shaping Chinese national identity.\textsuperscript{3}

It is also wrong to focus only on patriotic education and blame it entirely for the Chinese attitude towards Japan. This kind of interpretation is even dangerous because it will not help reconciliation between the two countries. It will also make Japan lose an opportunity to reflect on its own approach to history and history education. Conflict is always mutual. Without reflection of one’s own behavior and responsibility, it will not help the realization of conflict resolution and reconciliation. In fact, oversimplification has been a major reason for many misunderstandings between the Chinese and the Japanese. When people have difficulty understanding others, the tendency is to use oversimplified notions, concepts or generalizations when thinking about the other side. The patriotic education without a doubt is government propaganda in China, but the contentions of history education are not fiction. While the full picture of history may not be presented, the violence and war crimes were real and affected millions of Chinese families.

This huge gap of perceptions, understanding, and emotion has become the root for the divergent understanding, remarks, and behavior. There is a bad feedback-loop in East Asia wherein the lack of sincere apology from the majority of the Japanese society only acts to further frustrate many Chinese and Koreans. This in turn, only makes them angrier. Fervent emotion from their neighbors makes many Japanese even more reluctant to admit their past wrongdoings and to apologize. Without understanding this background, we cannot understand why nearly seventy years after the end of the conflict, these same historical issues still restrain Chinese–Japanese relations. To some extent, the tension between the two neighbors is actually a clash of history education—people of the two countries have quite different attitudes and approaches towards history and history education.

**PRIME MINISTER ABE’S 70TH ANNIVERSARY SPEECH**

Under the current context of relationships in East Asia, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 70th anniversary speech, which he will deliver on August 15th
2015, has been drawing a lot of attention from the international society. The stakes for this speech become very high—it has the potential to either open a new chapter for reconciliation with Korea and China, or to inflict serious damage on relations with Japan’s neighbors that will last a long time. In fact, Prime Minister Abe has been dedicating a great deal of political capital in preparing this speech. He even formed a 16-member advisory committee to help him draft it. It is quite unusual for a leader to garner so much attention for a speech so far in advance.

Japan’s neighbors, especially China and Korea, have also been attentively watching what Abe will say, especially to see if there will be any backtracking of Japanese government position on the past conflict. Since coming to power, Abe has never clearly admitted Japan’s colonial rule and invasion of Asia during World War II. He is also pushing forward a revision to the Japanese constitution regarding Japan’s defense capability, further raising tension over his hawkish tendencies. Since having consolidated his powerbase in a landslide December 2014 election, many wonder what an emboldened Abe may say. There is concern that Abe will backtrack from the basic principles of apology that past Japanese leaders have made in similar commemoration speeches in 1995 and 2005.

If Abe considers Japan’s neighbors as the main audience for this speech, rather than using it for domestic consumption or for addressing the concerns of the United States, this article has the following three suggestions for the prime minister:

(1) Attitude is more important than words

Sincerity is key to this speech as the main audience is the victims of the war. Paying too much attention to the words of the speech is the wrong approach; what is more important is that the speech itself conveys the true sincerity of the Japanese and the prime minister himself of his understanding of the war 70 years ago. Simply, it is about whether Abe is genuine in what he says, knowing and understanding the past actions and giving a clear and true apology for Japan’s wartime crimes and reflecting upon them. There are many ways recent Japanese politicians have worked around using the terms ‘apology’ and ‘aggression,’ this is why attitude is paramount in this particular speech.
(2) Post-war orientation is the wrong track

Speeches usually focus on the future, but for this particular speech, looking to the future is the wrong track because Japan and its neighbors have never fully achieved real reconciliation during the 70 years since the end of the war. Without sincere reflection of the past there will not be real reconciliation, and without reconciliation there is no positive future for the relationships between Japan and its neighbors. There is no doubt that Japan has made an invaluable contribution to the international community and has already transformed from a war machine to a peace-loving country. However, the Japanese should also realize there is a major contradiction between its own self-image and how its neighbors perceive their country. Where some Japanese consider the wartime wrongdoings as acts conducted by their ancestors and having no connection to the current populous, many from Japan’s neighboring countries see this in a completely different light. They view a sincere apology and reflection by the Japanese government and people as an important precondition for normalization and reconciliation. So, shifting the focus of the speech from a reflection of the war to Japan’s postwar period contributions may provoke anger from the audience of the speech. There is no point in Abe shining a light on Japan’s post-war accomplishments without first addressing Japan’s victims with an admission of guilt and remorse.

(3) Commit to a peaceful future

Addressing people’s doubts about his administration’s vision for the future of Japan as a pacifist nation should be a critical part of his speech. The administration’s campaign for constitutional reform has generated many interpretations and concerns in international society. Some Chinese are even interpreting the proposed changes to Article 9 of Japan’s constitution as a revival of militarism. Abe should therefore use clear language to explain to the international community what kind of country Japan aspires to be, especially about the commitment to future international peace.

Delivering this speech will certainly be a difficult task for Abe. Not in formulating the language or speaking the phrases, but because of the lack of consensus inside Japanese society regarding the nation’s past. The outside world should perhaps subdue its expectations for this speech, but for Prime Minister Abe, after his recent consolidation of power, this may be a good
opportunity to write a new chapter with Japan’s neighbors and reopen the unfinished reconciliation process.

Conflict rooted in historic perceptions and understanding is different than interest based conflict. So many years after the war, countries in East Asia have not found an effective way to bring light over the historic shadows and fix their relationships. In the past whenever there was a crisis or tension between these countries, historic issues would make them more sensitive and dangerous. But people have never really made efforts to address the deep sources of the conflict. So whenever there was conflict and tension they just tried to make political and security arrangements to try and solve their problems. The huge common interests between the countries usually played a role in managing the conflict without further escalation. But they have never really made efforts to address the sources of the conflict. To this extent, Prime Minister Abe’s speech in August could have very significant consequences, both positively and negatively, but Abe’s speech is mainly symbolic. If we want to make a major change in the relationship, the two countries must find a way to restart the unfinished reconciliation process. And the reconciliation process cannot be a talk-down procedure, just organized by political leaders and societal elites; rather there must be a movement for building peace at the grassroots level.

FUTURE RECONCILIATION AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES

Compared with the reconciliation process in Europe after World War II, such as between Germany and France and Germany and Poland, reconciliation in East Asia has been a particularly difficult challenge. In the time since the war, the relationships between Japan and China have experienced ups and downs, and realized a high level of economic cooperation and frequent exchange between peoples. To some extent they have already realized normalization. Over a brief period of time the China-Japan bilateral relationship even experienced very significant and positive exchanges and positive interactions. For example, in the 1980s, the China–Japan relationship was very close and very friendly, and was even being referred to as a “honeymoon” between the two countries. During this period the two governments had very good relationship and interaction, including frequent visits between leaders and very positive interactions
among the populations. Japan also provided a large, long-term, low-interests loan of 470 billion Japanese yen starting in 1984. This funding proved extremely important to China’s early economic reforms and development.

Unfortunately, in recent years, the historic issues have resurfaced to the point of playing an even more negative role compared to any time since the end of the war. Recent events have witnessed further escalation when, in September 2012, the Japanese government’s purchase of a set of contested islands in the East China sea generated a huge response in China. Indicative of the high emotions involved, anti-Japan demonstrations occurred in over 100 Chinese cities. In 2013, the situation grew even tenser with both sides taking offensive actions that further escalated tensions. China’s 2013 announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone that encompasses the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine have brought the bilateral relationship to its lowest point since normalized relations began.

It is no doubt that China-Japan relations have entered a very unstable phase. Conflicting historical memories and the absence of real reconciliation in the post war period play a powerful role in the insecurity that characterizes East Asia today, contributing to a lack of regional co-operation on the political level. It is urgent for the two Asian powers to find ways to get out of this historically established deadlock, prevent conflict escalation, and manage conflicts peacefully. While the recent meetings between Prime Minister Abe and President Xi are positive signs, the past history of the Sino-Japanese relationship has already demonstrated that without changing public opinion and meaningful educational reform in both societies, other political mechanisms, such as diplomatic meetings between political leaders, are likely to be top-down and will have only a limited impact on improving relationship between the two countries.

While people often discuss historical problems in the bilateral relations of China and Japan, they normally only take history as a background issue of the current tension and refrain from taking any actions. All too often, people overlook the importance the role of history education and social narrative play in international relations. They also believe that any change to the historical narrative and history education takes a long time to see any result; therefore it is impractical to address these issues as a part of the
solution. This is an important reason why tensions and hostility between the two Asian neighbors have lasted so long. Without addressing the underlying roots of hostility, the two nations will be unable to build a normal relationship. To create conditions for long-term reconciliation, this article has two suggestions to the two countries.

PROPOSAL #1

As many problems between China and Japan are deeply rooted in history, it is vital for the people of both countries to be aware of other side’s perceptions and understandings of history.

Both sides need to take some time to replay the events that are causing tension and gain perspective on the reasons for the relationship’s deterioration as the first step to improve their relationship. Without knowing exactly what the other side’s perspective is and reasoning behind the perspective, it is impossible to find a solution. As a special phenomenon of this conflict, the two sides have large perception gaps on many issues. Misperception caused misunderstanding and then led to misjudgment.

For the people of China and Japan, the brutal war and this part of history have left many sensitive historical symbols between the two countries. These symbols can be reactivated deliberately or unintentionally, and can cause major tensions or even conflict between the two countries. This has been the fundamental reason why the bilateral relationship has always been fragile and dangerous. Indeed, historical issues and interpretations of the past have been the major barriers to a real reconciliation between the two neighbors. China and Japan should be able to bring these suppressed differences of perception to the surface. Even though it may be quite difficult for both to agree, they should recognize the main differences and reasons behind the other’s understandings and claims.

Over the past 30 years, analytic problem solving workshops, sustained dialogue programs, and other interactive conflict resolution techniques have been practiced in many of the world’s hot spots—from Northern Ireland and the Balkans to the Middle East and Afghanistan. However, the application of conflict resolution practices and theories in China-Japan
relations is still uncommon. For example, bilateral friendship organizations at national and local levels exist in both China and Japan, but many have government backing and are headed by retired senior officials. Thus, such groups dare not upset the current leadership, forcing them to apply mainly traditional and minimally effective methods, such as delegations and conferences. In addition, rising nationalism has made reconciliation a sensitive undertaking, especially in China where domestic pressure has affected organized actions for peace and reconciliation. The current political climate impedes projects such as these in China and Japan.

Many conflict resolution attempts in the past have focused excessively on governments, top leaders and policy makers who are often constrained by their political environment. For the purpose of better understanding each other’s perspectives, China and Japan must establish a range of alternative channels of dialogue. Both countries needs more people, especially the mid-level leaders, to participate in the process of candid dialogue. Without dialogue the misunderstandings between the two countries would accumulate so that it would be even more difficult to resolve in the future. Following this direction, China and Japan should promote a dramatic increase in contact and exchange between mid-level leaders and key civilian counterpart groups. For example, Chinese and Japanese representatives, including those considered “hardliners” on each side, should begin meeting behind closed doors with competent facilitators. These meetings should continue at regular intervals for a period of several years. Considering the tendency of each country’s media to demonize the other, a journalists’ exchange program should be implemented to permit reporters and commentators to spend time living among the people in the other country.

PROPOSAL #2

Both China and Japan should begin to conduct history education reform, and should resume their joint history research and joint history textbook projects.

The future reconciliation between the two countries will largely depend on whether citizens of the two countries, especially the policy makers and
educators, can realize that history education is not just one of the normal subjects at school. It plays an important role in constructing a nation’s identity and perceptions. Without addressing this deep source and tough obstacle, it will be impossible for the two countries to find a path to sustainable coexistence. At the same time, if textbooks and other narratives of history can become a source of conflict, then the reform of history education and the revision of textbooks should also be able to contribute to reconciliation and conflict resolution.

Although textbooks masquerade as a neutral and legitimate source of information, political leaders as well as elites often have a vested interest in retaining simplistic narratives. However, when history textbooks are compiled based on the assumption that they should be about one’s ancestors, they are often imbued with ethnocentric views, stereotypes, and prejudices, making it difficult to avoid the glorification or demonization of particular groups.

With a group of people with strong historical consciousness, history education no doubt plays a major role. However, the Chinese government needs to rethink its history education program based upon the long-term consequences it can have. Chinese educators need to realize that their current curriculum and approach to teaching history are currently influenced greatly on nationalism and ethnic animosity. So while a country has the right to institute the teaching methods and messages it wants, there can be negative implications. On top of this, popular culture and media in China has seen an upswing of unregulated and excessive violent wartime imagery that has greatly altered and influenced younger viewers. In an increasingly interconnected world it becomes vital that educators offer a more broad perspective to help make sense of past events and cultivate global citizenship.

For Japan, there is an increasing need to create historic education that includes a self-critical account of its aggressive and destructive past that also outlines its shift into a constructive future. In order to construct such awareness-building on a nationwide level the Japanese must realize that denial of past events will not only hamper reconciliation with its neighbors, but also undermine the moral foundations on which the Japanese liberal democracy has been built since the end of the Second World War.
It’s always easier for people outside to say that a group of people should move forward and to forget past grievances, however, for the group themselves, historical memory of past humiliation is actually the key element of constructing national identity. A new narrative, or “national story”, is first not easily created, and then to change “stories” and “narratives” would almost mean to re-create a nation and would take a long time. It is not realistic to expect a brand new master narrative or national story to be created out of nothing, especially without the reform of national narrative and history education.

Looking forward, the governments and civil society organizations on both sides should actively support joint history research and prioritize resource allocations to promote it. More specifically, there should be national and bi-national initiatives to review history textbooks and produce new ones based on rigorous scholarly discussion and public dialogue. Elites of both countries should realize that, without meaningful educational reform in both countries eventually, other political mechanisms, such as diplomatic meetings between political leaders and other official exchanges between countries, are likely to be top-down and will have only a limited impact on building peace and understanding.

Precedents of historical reconciliation in such contexts as Franco-German and U.S.-Japan relations suggest that the enduring mistrust between Chinese and Japanese societies is not an inevitable destiny that must bind them forever. The two nations can make efforts together to turn the present tensions into an opportunity and take a decisive step toward much-needed historical reconciliation.

NOTES
Meeting Reconciliation Challenges in China-Japan-Korea Relations: Japanese Policy Options and Civil Society Initiatives

Tatsushi Arai

SUMMARY

Contested meanings of East Asia’s wartime history stand in the way of reconciliation between China, Japan, and Korea. There are three dilemmas concerning East Asia’s reconciliation challenges, namely: (1) how can the three countries carry out more open and honest dialogues on history but remain constructive; (2) how can each of the three societies honor its distinct history but simultaneously promote mutual respect; and (3) how can the three societies transmit their distinct narratives and memories of history to future generations while preventing mistrust from deepening across generations? Recommendations for policymakers and civil society leaders to respond to these three questions presented in this article. They focus primarily on Japanese actions and include implications for China and Korea:

- Redefine and expand social space for diplomatic and civil society exchanges between the three societies to tackle reconciliation challenges more systematically.

- Invest in building government and civil society leaders’ capacities to analyze the roots of collective traumas and identity conflicts objectively, facilitate reconciliation processes, and apply the skills to national and regional policymaking.
● Work continuously to identify and collaborate on concrete projects of historical significance. Jointly implement, for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which requires women’s participation in all phases and aspects of peace processes and calls for the elimination of gender-based violence.

● Seek and accept invitations to annual national ceremonies of remembrance. Reciprocate and institutionalize such visits between the three societies, including at the highest level.

● Revise social studies and history textbooks that encourage students to uncritically adopt official positions on contested territorial claims. Instead, introduce more critical historical analysis and creative problem-solving skills and facilitate educational policy dialogues between the three societies about best practices and challenges.

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INTRODUCTION: CONTEXTUALIZING EAST ASIA’S RECONCILIATION CHALLENGES

This year marks the seventieth anniversary of the end of the World War II. However, depending on whose perspectives one takes, the year 2015 has different historical meanings. Table 1 lists a number of ways the Japanese empire was involved in different countries and territories across the Asia-Pacific.

While Japanese people generally remember the end of the war on August 15 each year and conventionally associate it to the tragic events of 1945 in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Okinawa, people in other Asia-Pacific nations affected by the Japanese invasion and colonial rule remember the significance of 1945 differently. In China, for example, September 3 marks an anniversary of the 1945 Chinese victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, which started with the Marco Polo Bridge incident, which involved a Japanese-Chinese exchange of fire, on July 7, 1937. From the Chinese perspective, therefore, 2015 marks not only the seventieth anniversary of the nation’s victory, but also the seventy-eighth anniversary of the beginning of the War of Resistance against Japan. Moreover, in Korea, August 15 is the Victory over Japan Day, or the Restoration of Light Day. In Korea, 2015 is not only the seventieth year of liberation from Japanese colonial rule, but also the ninety-sixth anniversary of the March First Independence Movement, which played a catalytic role in Korea’s liberation.

Importantly, these anniversaries and their underlying historical discourses in China, Korea, and other Asian countries that Japan once invaded or colonized rarely gain as much visibility and prominence in Japanese public discourses as Japanese people’s own sufferings during the war. There is a sharp contrast in the nature of commemorative experiences between Japan and the other Asian countries that suffered from the Japanese empire’s military actions. These divergent historical experiences arose due in part to the significant gap between the mindset of a former aggressor and those of victims. However, a less conspicuous and perhaps more difficult gap to bridge is a difference between the historical consciousness of a former colonizer and the colonized.

As Park Yuha argues in her book Teikoku no Ianfu [Comfort Women of the Empire], Japanese colonial rule employed not only outright aggression, forced labor, and forced prostitution, but also such less overt means as the institutional protection of Japanese and local commercial agents actively
taking advantage of the exploitive colonial system of control. Consequently, there were colonial subjects who “volunteered” to serve their colonial masters’ material and sexual needs against the backdrop of structural deprivation that Japan’s colonial exploitation created and sustained. Korean and Chinese memories of triumph and liberation, therefore, reflect not only the historical experiences of their ancestors killed by the Japanese aggression, tortures, and executions, but also their experiences of forced submission, institutionalized coercion, and humiliation. Conceptually, the former represent collective memories of direct, physical violence while the latter correspond more closely to the memories of structural violence (institutionalized denial of access to opportunities and resources) as well as cultural violence (cultural influence justifying violence). On the contrary, mainstreamed Japanese memories of their sufferings, supported by recurring commemorative events, reflect their own experiences of direct physical violence, exemplified by the use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Battle of Okinawa.

Annual reenactments of diverse remembered histories in Japan, China, Korea, and other Asian countries continuously reproduce the respective nations’ accepted narratives of history. These narratives, in turn, reinforce the victim-offender dichotomy, as well as the patterns of remembering and

Table 1: The Japanese Empire’s Activities in the Asia-Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME PERIODS</th>
<th>AREAS</th>
<th>TYPES OF VIOLENCE EXERCISED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879–</td>
<td>Ryukyu Islands</td>
<td>Annexation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895–1945</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Colonial rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904–05</td>
<td>Sakhalin South, Russia</td>
<td>War and annexation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910–45</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Colonial rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931–45</td>
<td>Manchuria (Northeast China)</td>
<td>Colonial rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937–45</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Invasion and war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941–45</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Invasion, war, and colonial rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

forgetting that enable them to internalize the differentiated national experiences of direct, structural, and cultural violence. Reconciliation challenges that the Japanese public and policymakers must examine more deeply, therefore, include how to understand Korean, Chinese, and other Asian nations’ lived and remembered histories of Japanese colonialism, including the less familiar history of structural and cultural violence.

THE THREE DILEMMAS

Given this historical and conceptual background, this article explores how to meet reconciliation challenges in China-Japan-Korea relations, with emphasis on the roles that Japanese policymakers and civil society leaders can play in the medium to long terms. Its distinct focus on the trilateral relations against the background of the broader Asia Pacific context seeks to find more constructive and effective ways of relationship-building between Japan, on the one hand, and China and Korea, on the other. It is hoped that lessons learned from the China-Japan-Korea relations will be of general relevance to the broader Asia Pacific context, especially for Tokyo’s relationships with Okinawa, Taiwan, and North Korea.

As a matter of principle, a range of measures for East Asia’s relationship-building explored in this article take into consideration the prevailing mode of political realism and deterrence, which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s April 2015 address to the joint session of the U.S. Congress affirmed when he advocated a “U.S.-Japan alliance of hope” to cope with the Asia Pacific region’s territorial disputes and mounting security concerns. However, the proposed measures also advocate the need to face the underlying historical roots of political distrust that continuously justifies deterrence strategies and the resulting security dilemmas. These measures mainstream human security, that is, a United Nations-supported paradigm of policy-oriented practices aimed at realizing freedom from want and fear and overcoming the known limitations of traditional state-centered security.

To foster conditions for regional reconciliation from the viewpoint of human security, this article poses three thematic questions that correspond to the long-standing dilemmas in East Asia’s identity politics:
1. How can policymakers, civil society leaders, and other influential stakeholders advocating opposing views on Japan’s past military actions and colonial rule come to understand the perspectives of the others while ensuring that their candid exchanges of opposing views will not unnecessarily polarize their public opinions?

2. How can Chinese, Japanese, and Korean societies honor their distinct historical memories of the war while simultaneously promoting mutual respect?

3. How can the three societies transmit their distinct national histories to their future generations in such a way that their acts of transmission do not also pass mutual distrust and resentment onto future generations?

Answering these questions requires a higher consciousness than the existing commitment within each society to upholding their hitherto non-negotiable positions. Such higher consciousness must be guided by a long-term vision of reconciliation, defined as a sustained, ever-evolving process of self-reflective learning and relationship-building in which contested memories of the divisive past, incompatible world views, and polarized identities become more tolerable and acceptable to one another.

In After Violence: 3R, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Resolution, Johan Galtung argues that reconciliation requires the two complementary conditions of closure (farewell to revenge) and healing (overcoming trauma and guilt). Responses to the three dilemmas explore concrete steps that the three societies can jointly or independently take to realize closure and healing.

**QUESTION 1**

How can the three societies carry out candid yet constructive dialogues?

The rise of the Korean public protests against the Japanese attitude on the issue of comfort women, the widespread Chinese protests against the Japanese nationalization of the contested islands in the East China Sea, and the concerned Japanese politicians’ and citizens’ counter-protests to these
Korean and Chinese movements represent well-established patterns of conflict escalation in East Asia. Due in part to the significant media coverage of these emotionally charged activities, senior political figures’ comments and gestures in response to these activities, especially those of Japanese prime ministers, contribute powerfully to either escalation or de-escalation of tension. While constructive public discussion on how each country’s top leaders should act with respect to historical memory and identity will continuously be important, there must also be equally serious discussion within each society and across these societies in terms of the need to pay greater attention to more diversified actors, channels, and types of relationship-building. Insights from contemporary peace research and conflict resolution practice suggest alternative ways of thinking about what these East Asian countries can do to diversify and expand hospitable social spaces in which the different sides of the controversy can meet and carry out more authentic dialogues.

In *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, John Paul Lederach, a leading scholar-practitioner in peace building, advocates identifying and developing “mediative social space,” which aims at transforming protracted historical conflict. The term mediative suggests overcoming the inherent limitations of more conventional mediation processes, which typically encourage representatives of conflicting groups to carry out controlled, time-bound negotiation processes under the guidance of mutually acceptable mediators. Contrary to mediation, however, mediative social processes involve developing a broad range of diverse social platforms of relationship-building, both formal and informal, that enables constituents within and across conflict-affected societies to interact with one another and orchestrate more constructive, humanizing relationships. In this context, mediative processes do not necessarily require impartial mediators. Instead, mediative processes are led by actors who come from within the respective conflict-affected societies and seek to transcend their exclusive in-group commitments.

One way of practicing mediative processes in East Asia is to identify and develop diverse social spaces for intra- and international relationship-building capable of facilitating more authentic, humanizing exchanges on contested historical memories and reconciliation challenges. Table 2 suggests one way of envisioning such social spaces. The table consists of
multiple domains of social interaction, from legal to educational/cultural, in the rows and multiple levels (Tracks I, II, and III) of social actors in the columns.

The three tracks of intra- and international relationship-building suggest that there is a social hierarchy within each country. The multiple tracks also suggest that different levels of actors have their distinct yet complementary roles to play in building relationships across social divides within each country, as well as between the countries. The unique role and nature of each track are described as follows:

- Track I consists of national government leaders, officials, and institutions acting on behalf of their respective countries and peoples at the macro political level.

- Track II consists of mid-level societal actors such as mayors and municipal governments, influential public intellectuals, former ministers and military officials with significant visibility, artists and athletes with national fame, leading companies and industrial groups, and media organizations with broad public outreach.

- Track III consist of grassroots activists and civil society organizations on a relatively small scale.

Table 2: A Bird's-Eye View of Social Spaces for Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TRACK I</th>
<th>TRACK II</th>
<th>TRACK III</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial/Material</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational/Cultural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is worth noting that this multi-layered framework of relationship-building supports and overlaps with the Korean-led Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, a broad-based regional confidence-building process that President Park Geun-hye has actively promoted since coming into office in 2013.

The five domains of activities listed in the rows are described as follows:

• The *legal* domain relates to courts’ and tribunals’ judicial judgments on culpability, responsibility, and restitution.

• The *political* domain is concerned with political and diplomatic acts that make or break international ties, support or denounce historical facts and principles, and exercise various other forms of political influence.

• The *financial and material* domain encompasses issues related to compensation that judicial decisions and political arrangements necessitate, as well as matters related to development and humanitarian assistance that replaces or supplements compensation.

• The *moral* domain provides the context of symbolic expressions exemplified by words and deeds used in rituals and during visits to historical sites, which appeal to deep-rooted religious and spiritual values.

• The *educational and cultural* domain concerns the development of history textbooks, museum exhibits, expressions of popular culture, and other tangible and intangible carriers used to preserve and transmit collective historical memory and consciousness, including through intimate caretaker-child relation.

The five domains overlap significantly. For example, political acts necessarily imply moral judgments; financial compensations often result from judicial judgments. Moreover, this list of five domains alone cannot cover all kinds of mediatative social spaces required to address reconciliation challenges in East Asia comprehensively. Despite these limitations, the above table, which consists of fifteen social spaces, offers a useful framework of
thinking that enables policymakers and civil society leaders to ask fifteen sets of questions about how to promote relationship-building within each East Asian country and between different countries.

Take the question of comfort women as an example. The current Korean-Japanese dispute over this issue revolves around whether Japan’s imperial army forced women from Korea and other places under Japanese colonial rule to provide sexual service to Japanese soldiers; whether the Japanese government owes former Korean comfort women apologies on the basis of this historical understanding; and whether the Japanese government, despite Korea’s 1965 renunciation of Japan’s obligation to provide compensation, must still compensate for the victimized Korean women. In other words, this dispute, which became most conspicuous in the early 1990s through Korean women’s and their supporters’ legal claims against the Japanese government, gained visibility in the legal and financial/material domains at the Track I level, with far-reaching implications for other social spaces in Korea-Japan relations. While prominent civil society organizations and political leaders on the opposing sides of the political spectrum within each society either support or denounce the credibility and righteousness of such a legal claim, the two societies’ capacities to establish a more multi-faceted understanding of the roots of the dispute, let alone their readiness to carry out a more inclusive conversation, have been severely compromised.

The above table invites actors and stakeholders in the dispute on comfort women to ask at least fifteen sets of questions about what to do about this issue, preferably through deeply reflective, exploratory, and participatory dialogues. These questions include, but are not limited to:

• What do the fifty-three surviving former comfort women in Korea (as of March 1, 2015) really desire and need in order to honor their lives most meaningfully? How can both Korean and Japanese societies listen to and understand these women’s diverse and genuine needs for healing, transcending the political controversies surrounding this issue? (The moral domain, mainly in Track III.)

• What roles can influential Korean and Japanese media organizations play in communicating diverse and authentic needs and concerns
of key stakeholders on both sides to meet the two societies’ essential reconciliation challenges? (The political and educational/cultural domains combined, at Track II.)

- What can the Korean and Japanese governments do on their own or jointly to advance women’s rights regionally and globally in both wartime and peacetime, while applying hard lessons learned from the history of comfort women’s plight? (The legal and political domains at Track I.)

Irrespective of the exact questions that Korean and Japanese stakeholders may choose to ask, the underlying rationale of the proposed framework is to overcome both the polarized relationships and oversimplified mutual images of “us” vs. “them” and the good vs. the evil by introducing different angles and voices that can help restore more complex, humanizing images of each other. This basic principle of mediative capacity-building is applicable not only to other contentious issues in Korea-Japan relations, but also to no less challenging relationships between China and Japan.

The second set of activities for facilitating an authentic yet constructive exchange between polarized East Asian constituents is to make a more concerted effort between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean societies to build practical skills in dialogue facilitation, reconciliation, and conflict resolution. To create mediative processes and face the kind of difficult questions presented earlier, both governments and civil society organizations on all three sides must significantly expand their capacities to handle seemingly intractable conflicts peacefully. However, it must be noted that there are currently only three Japanese universities that offer degrees, all at the graduate level, in conflict resolution and/or peace studies, and there is currently no peace and conflict studies degree program in China or Korea. (There are, however, at least two Chinese and three Korean universities that offer courses in these subjects as of March 2015.) The dearth of advanced skill-building institutes and opportunities for conflict resolution and peace building in East Asia stands out in sharp contrast to the rapid proliferation of some five hundred university programs (degrees, concentrations, and certificates included) throughout the world, with a great majority of these programs located in North America and
Europe. Moreover, there is a conspicuous deficit in the availability of skill-building opportunities in which government and civil society leaders, professionals, and university students can learn how to analyze social conflict systematically, how to facilitate conflict resolution and reconciliation dialogues and processes, how to deal with collective traumas, and most importantly, how to incorporate these questions and skills into public policymaking and diplomacy.

Regardless of the opposing political views that Chinese, Japanese, and Korean advocates and adversaries in the public disputes over history may hold, they will all benefit from acquiring greater skills in carrying out difficult conversations and resolving seemingly intractable conflicts. Each country’s political endorsement and financial assistance to promote nonpartisan capacity-building in conflict resolution is urgently needed. Bilateral and trilateral capacity-building initiatives that bring together opposing sides of the political spectrum and train co-leaders capable of facilitating difficult conversations should also be considered, learning from historical precedents in such conflict-affected societies as South Africa and Northern Ireland.

QUESTION 2

How can Chinese, Japanese, and Korean societies honor their distinct histories while simultaneously promoting mutual respect?

While each nation’s sustained commitment to honoring the sacrifices made during the war and colonial rule must be respected, such a national commitment to remembering the past must not exacerbate historical divides and jeopardize the security and livelihood of future generations. To reverse and transcend the cycle of polarization and mistrust, a search for mutually beneficial super-ordinate goals and concrete joint projects must continuously be carried out in earnest in order for the three governments and societies to work together. The development of some fifty trilateral intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, including some twenty mechanisms at the ministerial level, presents a promising basis to build on for this purpose. Moreover, the Japan-China-Korea Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat established in September 2011 can play an especially important
role in exploring joint initiatives of universal value that simultaneously honor and transcend polarizing national differences.

Concretely, in addition to implementing the action plans that the three sides’ foreign ministers already adopted with respect to nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula, cyber security, air pollution, global environment, youth exchange, and other issues (see the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean foreign ministers’ joint press conference in Seoul on March 21, 2015), a joint initiative for advancing women’s rights in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 adopted in 2000 will be of special historical significance. It is important to note in this context that China, as a permanent UNSC member and as the host of the catalytic Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, has a distinct global responsibility and leadership role to play in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. It is also important to note that in 2014, Korea issued its national action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 while Japan also already made significant progress toward the completion of its own national plan. With respect to Japan’s commitment to UNSCR 1325, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s address at the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 2014 strongly endorsed his administration’s support for UNSCR 1325. He reiterated Japan’s pledge of over three billion dollars for international assistance over a three-year period to advance the status of women, reported on the fivefold increase in Japan’s financial contribution to UN Women in 2013, and announced the establishment of a UN Women Tokyo office in 2015. In addition to highlighting these concrete steps that Japan is taking, Prime Minister Abe expressed his government’s determination to “lead the international community in eliminating sexual violence during conflicts.”

While it will undoubtedly require all three sides to take more time and greater efforts to arrive at mutually satisfactory ways of honoring former comfort women’s sacrifices, working on concrete joint projects aimed at mainstreaming gender equity in all phases of conflict, as well as at preventing gender-based violence in both wartime and peacetime, will constitute a significant step in the right direction in terms of applying hard lessons learned from history.

Another important way of honoring each society’s history and simultaneously fostering mutual respect is for the three societies to build formative
historical experiences together. One of the ways in which the sharing of historical experiences becomes possible over time is to organize regularly scheduled reciprocal visits by high-level officials and influential civil society leaders to other East Asian nations’ commemorative events. Concretely, drawing on the precedents of Germany’s proactive foreign policy of reconciliation (Lily Gardner Feldman. 2012. *German’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation*.), Japanese parliamentarians and high-level officials, up to prime ministers, should consider expressing their collective will to their Chinese counterparts to jointly participate in annual Nanjing Massacre (1937) memorial ceremonies on December 13 and/or other important national ceremonies that Chinese leaders consider appropriate. Similarly, Japanese leaders should also consider attending Korea’s annual national events of historical significance in order to pay tribute to the victims of the Japanese military actions and colonial rule. Active participation of high-level government leaders and civil society representatives from China, Korea, and other countries in the Asia-Pacific in annual Hiroshima and Nagasaki memorial services on August 6 and 9, respectively, can in turn build transnational bonds of friendship. If these reciprocal visits are regularly held and publicized without prejudice, over time, cumulative effects of these shared commemorative experiences can pave the way for the three countries to consider hosting joint annual ceremonies designed to honor all the lives lost during the Second World War and to renew their collective resolve never to fight again. Other interested countries in the Asia-Pacific may be invited as appropriate.

**QUESTION 3**

How can the three societies transmit their distinct national histories to future generations without sustained mistrust?

While the second question tackled how to develop and reframe historical memory constructively, this third and final question focuses on how to transmit historical memory across generations. A search for constructive ways in which society transmits collective historical memory from generation to generation requires identifying influential carriers of memory, namely, symbols, rituals, and stories. These carriers of memory can serve
as powerful means by which members of a given historical community pass both traumatic and glorifying images of their lived experiences to future generations. National anthems, prayers, children’s songs, and public holidays exemplify such powerful carriers of collective memory that play a catalytic role in intimate caretaker-child relationships as well as in leader-follower relationships. Therefore, to foster political conditions for historical reconciliation, former adversaries must create, identify, and mainstream carriers of collective memory that can facilitate deeper self-reflection, healing, and closure to cycles of mistrust and revenge.

One of the most influential carriers of war-related memory in East Asia is history textbooks and textbook guidelines. In Japan, for example, there exists a long-standing debate on an appropriate content of social studies textbooks that can accurately describe Japan’s wartime actions and at the same time, instill self-confidence and national identity in students’ minds.

The 2014 results of the official reviews of social studies textbooks for middle school students, which the Japanese ministry of education released in April 2015, show that there is a significant increase in the number of textbooks that affirm Takeshima and the Senkaku as Japan’s inherent territories in the forthcoming editions, compared to the last editions approved in 2010. Table 3 summarizes the comparison between the 2010 and 2014 editions:

Descriptions of the territorial issues must comply with the new textbook guidelines established under the Abe administration. Under the current guidelines, many of the approved 2014 textbooks, including the ones generally viewed as moderate and orthodox, point out Korea’s illegal occupation of Takeshima and deny the existence of a territorial dispute with China in terms of the Senkaku Islands. While these descriptions of the territorial issues present what the Abe administration views as facts beyond doubt, they fail to examine the complexity of Japan's wartime actions and their lasting impact on Japan’s neighboring countries. These descriptions thus tacitly discourage Japanese students to ask why Korea and China came to dispute Japan’s official positions in the first place. Most importantly, these descriptions, which label the Korean and Chinese positions as illegal and/or unjustifiable, inculcate in uninformed young students’ minds a general impression that Korean and Chinese people are irrational by nature.
While social studies textbooks should inform students of the official Japanese positions, they must also encourage them to think more critically and empathetically about why the differences of official positions arose in the first place. The textbooks should also encourage and prepare students to become active contributors to peaceful resolutions of these conflicts as they grow up. Possible ways in which these challenges can be overcome include introducing exercise questions that encourage creative problem solving, suggest student-led role plays for conflict resolution dialogue, and share examples of peaceful resolutions of similar territorial disputes in other parts of the world. Since time for instruction and space of writing are limited, an insertion of concise text boxes in textbooks and/or supplementary tips in teachers’ guides should practically help realize the suggested revisions. Incorporating the proposed alternative ways of thinking promotes the Abe administration’s educational policy of “active learning,” which seeks to overcome traditional emphasis on rote memorization and instead promote a real-world application of knowledge through student-centered participatory learning.

The essential role of critical, creative, and empathetic thinking that this example of social studies education illustrates applies more broadly to other subjects of historical importance that shape students’ understandings of Japan’s destructive past and its path to a more peaceful, democratic society. For regional confidence building, sustained systematic exchanges between Japanese, 

Table 3: Number of Japanese middle school textbooks affirming Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TAKESHIMA</th>
<th>THE SENKAKU ISLANDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>3 out of 4 4 out of 4</td>
<td>1 out of 4 4 out of 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>1 out of 7 5 out of 8</td>
<td>1 out of 7 4 out of 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Education</td>
<td>5 out of 7 5 out of 6</td>
<td>3 out of 7 5 out of 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(This table is an English translation of the Japanese original adopted from the electronic version of the Mainichi Shimbun on April 7, 2015.)
Chinese, Korean, and other Asian countries’ educators and policymakers will be useful to facilitate their sharing and mutual learning about each society’s best practices and challenges in history and social studies education.

In conclusion, three major issues must be addressed, namely: (1) how to carry out candid exchanges of opposing views on history yet remain constructive, (2) how to honor distinct national history yet promote co-existence, and (3) how to transmit diverse country-specific lessons from history yet prevent their differences from causing conflict. A range of responses, from government-sponsored skill-building for reconciliation dialogues to alternative methods of social studies education, seek to realize a fundamental shift in the way of thinking that has long sustained the self-reinforcing cycles of fear and mistrust in East Asia. The proposed steps to realize such a shift can help create a more reassuring and less threatening atmosphere in which sincere apologies and forgiveness will be more forthcoming. With these future possibilities in mind, the three societies can make the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II as an opportunity to face their reconciliation challenges with renewed vigor and greater social responsibility.

NOTES

2. See http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/North_Asia/res_eng.pdf, especially pp. 16–19
3. See Georgetown University’s website at https://justiceandpeace.georgetown.edu/resources/graduateprograms.
SUMMARY

Why is Japan not trusted by a majority of South Koreans today, despite having apologized several times? Despite Japan's prior apologies, a lack of progress and the vicious cycle in South Korea-Japan relations should be understood in conjunction with the domestic political context and social norms within Japanese and South Korean societies. In the minds of the South Korean public, Japan's nationalist discourse dominates their images of Japan, making it challenging for them to believe that Japan has transformed itself into a new country after the end of World War II. This “no talk with Abe” policy stems from a doubt on the part of South Korea that Prime Minister Abe and his administration would likely either backpedal or contradict what the Japanese government has said earlier. Seoul is likely to interpret Prime Minister Abe’s speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of the World War II in the broader context of Japan's overall stance on history, rather than simply focusing on the wording. South Korea will likely continue to rest their judgement on Tokyo’s handling of various historical issues, making it a precondition for a future-oriented relationship.

LOOKING TO ABE’S AUGUST SPEECH

- Do not backpedal from the Japanese government’s earlier statements. The trustworthiness of Prime Minister Abe’s speech will be determined not only by the content of his speech, but more comprehensively by Japan’s overall approach toward historical issues.
In Japan-South Korea relations, the history question will likely remain a precondition for future-oriented Seoul-Tokyo relationships.

Politically motivated and overly strong reactions as well as words by South Korea will hurt Japan-South Korea relations.

Seoul should acknowledge Tokyo’s efforts toward improving bilateral relations.

FOR JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RECONCILIATION

Seoul should consider the social norms internal to Japan when it comes to history issues.

Pay attention to the role of moderates in Japanese politics.

Both South Korean and Japanese leaders need political courage for future-oriented relationships

FOR REGIONAL RECONCILIATION

Japan should pay close attention to the links that Asian neighbors make between Japan’s stance on the history issue and Japan’s constitutional revision debate.

The rise of China highlights the need for much more engagement to discuss and communicate regional players’ views on Asia’s future.

Ji-Young Lee is an assistant professor of international relations at American University.
INTRODUCTION

Five decades have passed since Seoul and Tokyo normalized diplomatic relations, and since then, Japanese leaders have offered apologies to South Korea on several occasions for Japan’s past wrongdoings. In addition to the 1993 Kono statement, the 1995 Murayama statement, and most recently, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, on the 60th anniversary of the end of World War 2 in 2005, expressed Japan’s remorse and apology, and mentioned South Korea and China for the first time in a statement. On the 100th anniversary of Japan’s annexation of Korea in 2010, Prime Minister Naoto Kan offered an apology, expressing the “feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for the tremendous damage and suffering,” and acknowledged for the first time that the annexation was forced.

The question therefore is why these apologies have not been working with South Korea. Why does South Korea still have difficulty believing that Japan in the 21st century is a different country than the one that colonized the Korean peninsula a long time ago? To many policymakers and analysts, the sorry state of Seoul-Tokyo bilateral relations now—exemplified by a lack of summit meetings between South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—is perplexing. Further, Japan observers voice concern that there is an increasing apology fatigue and Korea fatigue among Japanese policymakers and analysts, which does not bode well for already difficult and yet very important bilateral relations.

This is a brief analysis of issues of historical memory and reconciliation from a South Korean angle. Reconciliation is not simply a matter of Japan’s apologies, but there should be consideration of the political contexts of both societies in which such apologies take place. Rather, the political contexts of both societies in which such apologies take place need to be accounted for. Tracing the patterns of bilateral relations over the last ten years shows that the intended effect of Japan’s apologies has largely been offset by Japanese leaders’ remarks and government actions that were perceived as contradicting the apologies.

PARK’S “TRUSTPOLITIK” AND SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS

A sense of pessimism in Seoul-Tokyo relations today has much to do with President Park’s refusals to hold summit meetings with Prime Minister Abe,
against the backdrop of Abe’s stance on history. In order to make sense of South Korea’s Japan policy under the Park administration, there is a discernable pattern of a vicious cycle in the recent history of South Korea-Japan relations. Over the past decade, when a new leader comes into office either in Japan or South Korea, the two governments enter the first phase, in which they agree to forge a future-oriented relationship. Then the second phase begins when what constitutes a provocation by Japan in the eyes of South Koreans leads to South Korean protests, including expression of regrets, cancellations of meetings, and suspensions of various bilateral initiatives. This then leads to the third phase where the relationship is stalled until there is a change of administration on either side. This has been the broad pattern in the last three presidencies of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) in South Korea.

Where President Park Geun-hye differs from her predecessors is that she has refused to take the step into the first phase of this cycle. She was inaugurated in February 2013, not long after Prime Minister Abe’s own inauguration in December 2012, with “trustpolitik” as the central theme of her foreign policy endeavors. “Trust” in her trustpolitik, or trust-building policy formula refers to an end goal, in which South Korea and its diplomatic counterparts enjoy a degree of mutual respect and a belief in integrity in each other’s goodwill. Once reaching this goal of having built

![Figure 1. Vicious cycle in Japan-South Korea relations](image-url)
trust and a kind of internal solidarity, such trust-based relationships will have the resilience that can overcome occasional crises and changes in external environment without damaging the relationships. “Trustbuilding,” therefore, is a guiding principle of her foreign policy initiatives, including toward Japan. While Seoul pursues economic and security interests in its relations with its counterparts, its actions themselves should be geared toward building such trust. Under the Park administration, South Korean diplomatic activities are considered stepping stones for building trust with other countries in a long run.

Japan’s nationalist discourse and Prime Minister Abe’s stance on history do not sit well with President Park’s vision for trustpolitik. According to her trustpolitik logic, taking the first step of promising for a future-oriented relationship with Japan under the Abe administration will only likely contribute to the further weakening of the current level of trust that exists in bilateral relations. Her tenure as South Korean president actually coincides with Prime Minister Abe’s second term in office from 2006 to 2007. Her refusal to meet with Prime Minister Abe thus far stems from her concerns about the worsening of Seoul-Tokyo relations after their summit meeting, in light of Prime Minister Abe and his administration’s likely handling of the Kono statement and other history issues.

When Prime Minister Abe first came into office in 2006, his decision to visit China and South Korea and to hold summit meetings raised cautious hope in Seoul. In October 2006, before the House of Representative Budget Committee, he acknowledged the war responsibility of his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi and accepted earlier government statements apologizing for Japanese colonial rule and aggression. But by March 2007, Abe’s position on the comfort women issue had shifted, concluding there was no hard evidence that the women were forced. Similarly, Nariaki Nakayama, representing 120 lawmakers who believe the Kono statement went too far, remarked comparing the military brothels during the war to a college cafeteria run by private contractors.1 Upon Prime Minister Abe’s return to the center stage of Japanese foreign policy in 2012, he showed gestures of conciliation toward Seoul and sent his envoys to meet with President Park in the hope of improving relations with Seoul. But Seoul was not convinced that Japan would be different this time. Other
episodes during the current Abe administration have confirmed that sus-
picion, including Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto’s remarks advocating a
comfort women system in May 2013, and Finance Minister Taro Aso’s
remark on “learning from their [Nazi]’s techniques” regarding Japan’s
constitutional revision in July 2013.

This dynamic holds a key to understanding Park’s “no talk with Abe”
policy. The question of the desirability of this position aside, as much as
Prime Minister Abe’s words and actions reflect the more broad national-
ist discourse within Japanese society, President Park’s decision not to hold
summit meetings rests on a collective belief that South Korea holds as a
society. Many pundits have linked President Park’s refusal to meet with
Prime Minister Abe with her domestic politics calculations, especially in
light of her father Park Chung-hee’s legacy that was considered pro-Japan.
While this may be the case, treating her actions as purely motivated by do-
mestic politics or approval ratings is a mistake. Such a view fails to consider
the broader and powerful social norms at work in South Korea, especially
related to Japan, which governs the range of behavior that a South Korean
leader can do in its relations with Japan in the first place. For South Korea,
the enormity of impact that the colonial period had on the society as a
whole makes it very difficult to accept the logics, behavior, and remarks
by Japan’s conservative nationalists, including Prime Minister Abe, because
they collide with South Korea’s own sense of national pride and identity.
Therefore, viable steps toward reconciliation between South Korea and
Japan require an understanding of the political processes that are specific
to Korean and Japanese societies, which are informed by their own notions
about what is acceptable and appropriate in relations with the other.

ANTICIPATING ABE’S 70TH YEAR ANNIVERSARY SPEECH

The aforesaid vicious cycle forms the background against which South
Koreans will view Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming statement commemorat-
ing the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. Japanese leaders’ apol-
gies and efforts for improving relations have in the past been accompanied
by actions and remarks which were perceived by most South Koreans as
contradicting the spirit of the apologies. Take Prime Minister Koizumi for
example. In 2005 in the midst of an upward spiral of diplomatic tension over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets issue, textbooks, and the controversy over Yasukuni visits, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed deep remorse for Japan’s aggression against Asian countries at the Asia-Pacific summit in Jakarta. But his statement failed to improve bilateral ties, because some 80 Japanese lawmakers visited Yasukuni shrine on the day of Koizumi’s apology. A major South Korean daily retorted, “Is this an apology?” In other words, Japan’s apologies have not been effective in the past, because Japan’s apologies, while meant to mend ties with South Korea, have been accompanied by equally or more powerful countervailing nationalist remarks and actions by senior Japanese officials.

In light of Japan’s past experiences of apologies vis-à-vis South Korea, there are three suggestions for Prime Minister Abe to consider with regards to his speech commemorating the 70th year anniversary of the World War II.

• Do not backpedal from the Japanese government’s earlier statements. Do not use evasive language.

• In South Korea, the trustworthiness of Prime Minister Abe’s speech will be determined not only by the content of his speech, but more comprehensively by his and his senior government officials’ actions and words. Nationalist remarks and/or action before or after Prime Minister Abe’s speech will most likely offset the intended reconciliation effect of the speech.

• Seoul is likely to demand addressing various historical issues as a precondition for future-oriented Seoul-Tokyo relationships. Bilateral cooperation on various practical issues areas such as the Free Trade Agreement negotiations may make progress without going through the history issues, but likely face limits due to political resistance within South Korea.

Also, three suggestions for South Korea to consider regarding Prime Minister Abe’s speech.
It is important to acknowledge that Japan has made many important international contributions through the United Nations and other international institutions, and that postwar Japan has been a force for international peace.

Generally speaking, politically-motivated and/or overly strong reactions and words against Japan will hurt South Korean interests.

Seoul should acknowledge Tokyo’s efforts toward improving bilateral relations. President Park should keep open channels of dialogue with Prime Minister Abe.

TOWARD RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SEOUL AND TOKYO

In light of recent South Korea-Japan relations, both governments face a dilemma in their foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the other, as they have to walk a tight rope between the need to improve relations with the other on the one hand, and the need to respond to their governmental needs, societal pressures and nationalism on the other. Following are suggestions for enhancing bilateral ties.

1. Seoul should find ways to address the history question in ways that consider the social norms internal to Japan.

Seoul and Tokyo’s efforts to make a breakthrough and to depart from the existing vicious cycle should begin with an acknowledgement that they hold different notions about what is legitimate. Prime Minister Abe’s historical revisionism has received particular attention and criticism internationally, but it is important to note that his stance is a reflection of the broader nationalist discourse in contemporary Japan. In this nationalist discourse, the role of the state and patriotism play a powerful role in envisioning an ideal Japan. Such remarks and actions as Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni shrine, or Prime Minister Abe’s remarks on the comfort women issue are as much internally-driven and domestically directed, rather than directed in opposition to South Korea or China, per se.
2. Pay attention to the role of moderates in Japanese politics

In South Korea, it has typically been the nationalist conservatives and their remarks that tend to receive more immediate and intense attention, especially by popular media outlets. However, it is important for South Korea to keep in mind that Prime Minister Abe’s stance on history is not the only view within Japan. Greater attention should be paid to the role that more moderate voices play. For example, former President of the Liberal Democratic Party Yohei Kono has said, “I don’t want the Liberal Democratic Party to go any further to the right… Right now, I’m seeing more ultra-right politics than conservative politics.” It is the voices of moderates like Tomiichi Murayama, Kono Yohei, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama that have made the case for Japan’s need to forge friendly relations with other Asian countries.

3. Both South Korean and Japanese leaders need political courage.

The longer Seoul and Tokyo maintain the first phase of the cycle, the more likely that relations will improve. For this, leaders of both countries need political courage, sometimes to stand against the opposing pressures to fall into the second phase of the cycle. When President Lee Myung-bak and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda came into office, South Korea-Japan relations had one of the greatest chances of being successful. Strong political will on the part of both Seoul and Tokyo was palpable in the beginning; Fukuda led a delegation from Tokyo to visit Seoul to attend Lee’s inauguration, while Lee declared that Seoul would not seek an apology to prevent the past from becoming an obstacle for the future. But both Fukuda and Lee could not pass the Dokdo/Takeshima islets test. President Lee had contributed to the worsening of the bilateral relations by visiting Dokdo/Takeshima islets in August 2012.

4. Give credit to positives in Japan-South Korea relations.

Despite much pessimism, Japan-South Korea relations have come a long way from the time when diplomatic relations were normalized in 1965. It is important that the two sides highlight and give more credit to a series of positive developments and episodes that they witnessed in recent years in their bilateral relations. They include an agreement to develop mines for
rare earth elements in third countries, which are key ingredients of their high-tech exports; joint history research projects first launched by Prime Minister Koizumi and President Kim Dae-jung in 2001; currency swap deals (established in 2001, expired in 2015); the initiation of free trade negotiations in 2003; the institutionalization of Seoul-Tokyo-Beijing tripartite summit meetings, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in 2011; deepening interdependence of the two economies; military-to-military cooperation in the area of search-and-rescue naval exercises in recent years; Japanese civil society’s support for Korean victims of World War II.

TOWARDS REGIONAL RECONCILIATION

In order to create and maintain the kind of political momentum that is required for successful reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific, it is important that regional players creatively link their efforts to the pursuit of more tangible national interests. For that, two specific proposals can be made regarding the debate about Japan’s constitutional revision, and regional security architecture with the rise of China.

1. Japan should pay close attention to the links that Asian neighbors make between Japan’s stance on the history issue and Japan’s constitutional revision debate.

The question of Japan’s constitutional revision is directly tied to historical memories and reconciliation in the region. Those who argue in favor of constitutional revision within Japan have been drawing heavily from the nationalist discourse. South Korea and China are therefore concerned that advocates of revision may adopt a revisionist view about Japan’s role in World War II and about Japan’s decision to go to war. Prime Minister Abe and other senior government officials’ nationalist remarks that drew on this discourse have fueled the suspicion within Seoul and Beijing about Japan’s future intentions. What this means is while it is possible that Prime Minister Abe may pursue constitutional revision based on the belief of peaceful postwar Japan, South Korea and China are worried about Japan returning to its prewar days.
2. The rise of China highlights the need for more engagement to discuss and communicate the regional players' views on Asia’s future.

Tokyo needs to devise a clear, concrete Asia policy that goes beyond the economic and security realms, with a goal toward working together with China along with other players to ensure their shared vision for Asian regional architecture. In addition to existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of cooperation, Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo should further invest in, develop, and institutionalize tripartite summit meetings. When the time is ripe, these tripartite meetings can offer a mechanism through which these three countries could address jointly the history question. In the meanwhile, they can work to avoid taking differences in historical memories as a sign of hostile intentions. Toward that goal, South Korea, Japan, and China should increase the level of exchanges at all levels—track one (government-to-government), track two, track one and a half, and track three, especially through youth and sister-city exchanges. Joint history research and textbook projects, despite difficulties, should go on.

NOTES

The U.S. Role in Asia’s “History War”

Gilbert Rozman

SUMMARY

The Obama administration has reluctantly been drawn into the vortex of what some are calling the “history war” in Northeast Asia. In 2015, this conflict is reaching a climax with much anticipation surrounding speeches, statements, commemorations, and diplomacy that could intensify emotional accusations or start countries on a path to reconciliation. As Tokyo and Seoul spar over history, they have upped their public relations budgets to outflank the other on the battlefield of U.S. public and official opinion. Beijing has tried to isolate Japan over history in the hope that this could divide alliances and distract attention from its own historical challenges to the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Unable to remain aloof, Washington should be careful not to side with plans for retribution or to cause blame to shift to itself. Instead, it should articulate a positive vision, including of more recent history and of an inclusive community consistent with the rebalance to Asia. At the same time, it should quietly discourage assertions about history that complicate cooperation in support of this vision. Its response must start with Tokyo, strive for more trilateral coordination with Seoul, and prioritize a broad-ranging regional outlook.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

● Tread with care in historical memory appeals

● Assert a vision in praise of postwar successes

● Respect Japan’s postwar achievements
Welcome realism as international responsibility

Rekindle the U.S.-Japan-ROK Spring 2014 hopes

Refocus Korea on a broader historical vision

Counter the Chinese and Russian narratives

Offer an inclusive vision for China and Russia

Articulate a vision for the “rebalance to Asia”

Integrate various dimensions of national identity

Link a regional vision to an international one

Conceptualize an Indo-Pacific community

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PRESSED BY TOKYO AND SEOUL TO TAKE A STAND and confronted by Beijing and Moscow with rival visions, Washington is in need of a vision for the Indo-Pacific region to buttress its rebalance to Asia. This Indo-Pacific Vision would reaffirm U.S. understanding of the victory of freedom over totalitarianism in World War II, add a self-congratulatory assertion of pride over how U.S. occupations contributed to the vitality and freedom of Japan and South Korea, offer congratulations to Japan and South Korea on their achievements in the Cold War era, and articulate a clear agenda for shared values with allies and partners and inclusive values beckoning to China and Russia in a new era. Rather than yield to appeals aimed more at retribution than reconciliation, Washington is in a position to present its own vision—parallel to Obama’s Selma anniversary vision for forging an inclusive America consistent with the winding path of its history. This means steering Abe away from revisionism by stressing joint pride in postwar Japan, steering Park away from a narrow view of history through a broader approach and trilateralism, and countering the narratives of Moscow and Beijing in their 70th anniversary galas by reaffirming universal values and hopes for genuine Asian reconciliation. The legacy of the Obama era is best encapsulated in a wide-ranging vision that overshadows the dark historical memories that increasingly have been staining bilateral relations across Asia. Abe’s revisionism—justifying imperialist and wartime conduct and deploring “victor’s justice” and use of the history card to recall Japan’s atrocities—is the centerpiece in 2015, but others are also using historical memory in ways that damage reconciliation.

Barriers to regional reconciliation
Reconciliation refers to finding common ground so that historical memories do not stand in the way of increased trust, seeking to assuage the just concerns of others.

Reconciliation sets a high bar for what could be accomplished or even set in motion in 2015. It signifies, at a minimum, charting a path that shows promise for leading to mutual understanding and acceptance. Whereas it was long desired in the United States that Japan would “embrace defeat,” China would acknowledge communism as historically passe rather than historical destiny, and South Korea would choose to be forward-looking in
preparation for reunification, the opposite was occurring between 2013 and 2014 more than at any other time since the end of the Cold War. In anticipation of the 70th anniversary commemorations of the triumphs of 1945, the mood is less about reconciliation than retribution. If in 1995 and 2005 anniversaries in Asia did not seem to require a U.S. role, pressure is building for Washington to show its hand.

Despite Barack Obama’s eloquent evocation of the Selma march as an inspiration to the world as well as to new generations of Americans, he stands a greater chance of arousing a backlash in Beijing, Tokyo, or Seoul by taking a strong stand than of being recognized as a beacon of hope. The United States must tread with great care when it comes to historical memory, values deemed to be universal, and even leadership.

For Washington, the most significant barrier to reconciliation is China’s rejection of the international and regional order and determination to demonize Japan as well as the United States and to use coercion, as in the South China Sea, without, at present, crossing a line that would evoke a strong response. This is not perceived as a just response to Japan’s provocations over history—although they deserve rebuke in the view of major newspapers—but as an identity card to legitimize the communist party and a security card to weaken Japan’s ties with South Korea and possibly the United States. This barrier is linked to a wide-ranging narrative contrasting the evil history of Western imperialism with the just history of harmonious sinocentrism, or the disruptive impact of humanitarian intervention and universal values with the stabilizing impact of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and of regional integration consistent with neighborhood tradition and economic interests. Many see China as taking advantage of North Korea’s threatening behavior and the U.S. need for cooperation on weighty global matters as well as increasing economic leverage to advance a divisive strategy directed at regional reordering rather than regional reconciliation. Japan’s revisionism unfortunately serves China’s strategy. Abe’s repeated hints about his real intentions, omissions of critical words of contrition, and failure to offer reassurances about his priorities spare China from scrutiny.
Messages Washington should deliver to Japan

Washington is being bombarded with appeals for action. Japanese are requesting that Abe be welcomed as a leader who is putting the finishing touches on apologies and U.S. leaders should make clear to South Korea that it should drop the history card and recognize that Japan has apologized enough, and to China that its use of history as a cynical means to isolate Japan wins no sympathy. South Koreans are urging the Obama administration to pressure Abe to stick to past statements and textbook acknowledgments of Japan’s wrongdoing, doubling down on its reaction after Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013. Russia’s celebration in May and China’s in September 2015—just before Xi’s planned visit to Washington—call for U.S. support as a fellow victor committed to defending such fruits of victory, as the postwar division of Europe and the pacific constitution of Japan. In contrast to past commemorations, the United States cannot remain on the sidelines, but it also must reject all of these pleas, which are premised more on retribution than on a spirit of reconciliation. Its response necessarily starts with Japan. Abe visited Washington in April and is the primary focus of the concerns being raised by Japan’s neighbors.

More than any of these states, the United States respects postwar Japan as a country committed to peace, enthusiastic for democracy, and gradually recognizing the need for a realist foreign policy. Celebrating these achievements—a tribute to the U.S. occupation as well as to the character of the Japanese people and its institutions—is the starting point for a joint statement by Obama and Abe in parallel with new joint defense guidelines, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, and a speech by Abe devoid of revisionism on critical historical themes. In this way, the United States can help to craft the message for Japan as well as the U.S.-Japan alliance, as a foundation for reconciliation in 2015. No doubt, U.S. pressure will persist against Abe spoiling this atmosphere, but few are optimistic that this will suffice to do more than limit the damage he is likely to cause. The U.S. stance is not that the constitution is sacrosanct, but that the Tokyo Tribunal, San Francisco Peace Treaty, and Japan’s normalization with neighbors remain valid. Abe is testing the limits of what Washington regards as acceptable—mostly by what he
omits—attempting to avoid crossing its red lines on history and forging a mood of strong security and economic cooperation that overshadows fall-out over history. Contested voices in Japan amplify reservations registered in Washington if they are couched in a constructive manner supportive of Japan’s overall national interests.

A careful balance is needed in the message publicly transmitted to Abe. Chiding the revisionist thrust of recent Japanese thinking without directly pointing at Abe needs to be managed with caution. Affirming the universal values shared with Japan in the postwar order can serve a similar purpose while also aligning the two states against challenges to these values from North Korea, Russia, and China, albeit not in a way that suggests polarization is pressed from this side of the divide. Values deserve to be a major component of U.S.-Japan relations along with security and economic ties. In this dimension too, U.S. leadership is ideal, not just putting out fires set by others. Yet, to champion values, as Obama must for any U.S. vision to be taken seriously, demands refusing to remain silent in the face of clear affronts and carefully seizing opportunities in the critical 70th anniversary year to reaffirm universal ideals. The visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Japan in March 2015 serves as a timely reminder. The fact that Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida discounted any parallels between Japan and Germany in the war redounds to Japan’s discredit. Merkel was careful not to criticize Japan while accentuating how Germany has achieved real reconciliation. Obama too can present a positive narrative of what makes the United States proud, leaving Abe to fend off persistent questions about the revisionist muddle into which he has led his country. Only Japan does not see the war parallels.

Messages the United States should deliver to South Korea, China, and Russia

A more difficult challenge is to rekindle the momentum of the spring of 2014 toward trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK coordination, when a downward cycle of no summits, sharp mutual accusations, and plunging public opinion toward each other was arrested by a three-way meeting in The Hague at the insistence of Obama. If President Park Guen-Hye had visited the United States as scheduled, there was a chance to diminish the renewed coolness
between her and Abe as well as the continuing public vitriol, perhaps with an eye to a fall three-way summit when Obama goes to Asia. Ideally, there would be a return to the nearly successful 2012 Japan-ROK talks on a formula for dealing with the “comfort women” issue, while increased security trilateralism regarding North Korea is under way. On the themes of national identity prospects are dim. Expectations are best kept low to avoid a downward spiral. In responding to Seoul’s appeals, Washington’s emphasis is likely to be that security trumps history, and that however justified complaints about Abe’s revisionism may be, emotional reactions in defiance of Japanese realism or in deference to China are at odds with a positive narrative about postwar Japan and an affirmation of both universal values and strategic thinking that reaffirm essential lessons of history. In contrast to claims that Seoul is the champion of such values, the U.S. message is that despite transgressions by Abe, Seoul must not become so obsessed with values focused on history as to lose its grasp on a broader range of values and the overall regional struggle under way.

One point essential to convey to South Korea is that Japan in 2015 is fundamentally different from Japan in 1945. To suggest otherwise is to play into China’s hands and to deny the achievements of postwar Japan, including the U.S. role in realizing them. Another point is that failing to understand U.S. and Japanese concerns about China, as if the only issue is how to keep China’s cooperation on North Korea, is a big problem, even if others should understand South Korea’s hesitation about criticizing China.

Wendy Sherman’s February 27 warning against seeking cheap applause by vilifying a former enemy, which leads to paralysis rather than progress—was interpreted in South Korea as siding with Japan. Instead, it should be viewed as a signal that recent demonization of Japan has gone too far and Washington is anxious for efforts on both sides toward reconciliation. It is particularly important to recognize Japan’s realist reorientation—critical to U.S. rebalancing and even to the defense of South Korea. Washington should make sure to explain that it is not ignoring revisionism in Japan. Rather, it is prioritizing the issue differently, while striving for a vision that is helpful in steering Japan along a different path, which Seoul should be encouraging. Americans naturally sympathize with South Korea’s message on “comfort women” and some other issues,
but Seoul’s recent public relations campaign against Tokyo in the United States is backfiring, just as Tokyo’s parallel campaign has been a disaster.

As we are bound to be reminded in 2015, Beijing and Moscow are basking in 1945 commemorations in order to reassert “communist” values hostile to universal ones. Mao and Stalin are heroic figures again not only as leaders who are credited with the victories over Naziism/imperialism and Japanese militarism/imperialism, but as the architects of Cold War resistance to Western and U.S. hegemonism (a negative term with connotations of imperialism and unequal domination), which threatened to impose an alien civilization on their countries. China’s historical memories aimed at Japan are much more expansive than many realize. Russia’s historical memories targeting the West may seem to be limited to the European theater, but they blame Japan as well and create a huge opening for joining China in joint celebrations and in joint expression of opposition to the existing U.S.-led world order and value system. In early 2015, when Abe was wooing Putin as talk continued for a visit to Tokyo by Putin some time this year, some forgot the long-standing antagonism over the 1945 territorial settlement that still prevents Moscow and Tokyo from agreeing on a postwar peace treaty, but the likelihood is high that this deep rift will be reopened. China would greatly welcome clear Russian endorsement of its thinking on Japan.

Facing China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and Russia’s flagrant acts to overturn the arrangements in Europe following the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy cannot view Northeast Asia in isolation, obsessing about Abe’s revisionist longings or even the challenge of sustaining a coalition against North Korea. U.S. memories of 1945 focus on the victory of free and democratic states able to forge a new world order against authoritarian states. Even more so, memories of the Cold War center on the ultimately successful struggle of the “free world” against the authoritarianism of communist states. Japan’s role as a vital partner in the latter struggle supersedes its negative image as an enemy in the former struggle. Praising postwar Japan helps to vindicate the entire U.S. Cold War agenda, including the occupation’s success in the democratization of that country, which contributed to its economic miracle. Praising South Korea’s economic miracle and eventual democratization serves to affirm this narrative as well. Japan’s belated embrace of international responsibility as a realist state, which looks at actual
threats without succumbing to idealism or pacifism indifferent to international responsibilities to contribute to global security, is a welcome addition to the self-congratulatory U.S. story, whereas it is at odds with the stories being told in South Korea, China, and Russia. Dragging Washington into the whirlwind of remembrances of Asia in the 1940s induces it to highlight its own narrative—as champion of free people, free markets, and freedom from aggressive moves of any state to dominate Asia—which puts pressure on Seoul as on Tokyo, since many Koreans are influenced by rhetoric that is cynical about U.S. ideals and so focused on finding a way forward with Pyongyang that they overlook other dangers.

**Broader international relations message that Washington should convey**

As Obama's second and final term as president approaches its end, he is more likely to be concerned about his legacy than any other postwar U.S. president. His speech at Selma on March 7 interpreted the United States’ troubled journey to greater inclusiveness with an eye to shaping domestic policy, ranging from voting rights to gay marriage. The competing pressures from Japan and South Korea to wade into their feud and the sharpening rhetoric in Russia and China to challenge U.S. leadership and values leave Obama with little choice but to articulate a vision for his “rebalance to Asia.”

It could be developed by the leading Asia experts in the National Security Council and State Department, although it remains unclear what senior figure is so inclined.

The sequence of visits by foreign leaders to Washington and the many milestones envisioned for U.S.-Japan relations in 2015 put Japan in the forefront. While success is far from guaranteed, Obama is likely to eschew direct criticism, as occurred after Abe’s Yasukuni Shrine visit, for a positive approach that seeks to steer Japan onto the path of a joint vision for the Indo-Pacific region and the evolution of Asia from 1945 to the present and ahead to a new era. With Kim Jong-un invited to Moscow to celebrate with Putin in May, and Putin and Xi likely to find common cause in their celebrations over the spring and summer, the more cohesion there is in the U.S.-Japan-ROK vision, the better it will be for countering a rival vision and striving to prevent polarization, despite the warnings by some that this would contribute to it.
Narrowing national identity to focus on evocative historical symbols can best be countered by articulating a wide-ranging vision, steeped in history but also forward looking, that grasps the multi-dimensional nature of identities. In East Asia, there is a need to recognize the reemergence of an ideological struggle, the challenge of views ranging across diverse historical periods, and the intensity of claims presented as a clash of civilizations.¹ At the center of a U.S. vision, of course, must be a framework of an Asia-Pacific community and Indo-Pacific community within the international community, combined with a framework for inclusiveness, prioritizing civil society with global linkages capable of balancing state-centered power. It is important not to be merely reactive to provocative remarks and actions, which lead to the United States putting out fires as others fill the vacuum as its authority is slipping, but to advocate and stand behind a vision, preferably with an official of high stature seen as its proponent within the Obama administration. Lack of such leadership in his second term has too often led to an image of reacting to developments in East Asia. The rebalance to Asia lingers as a theme from the first term, which is ever more in need of reinforcement through a clear-cut vision and a delegated spokesperson.

A critical component of a possible new doctrine is a wide-ranging view of the Indo-Pacific region on the rise, where Japan’s role from the East China Sea to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean has been constructive since the 1950s and is poised to be increasingly so in partnership with Australia, India, and a maritime cluster of Southeast Asian states, which can cooperate without being held hostage to the lack of ASEAN unanimity. The old, narrow Northeast Asian vision of regionalism is being eclipsed. Another component is an integrated view of security—as in the Cold War of the highest priority—economic regionalism based on rule-making through the TPP, and universal values respectful of Asian diversity but not China’s assault on such values. In this perspective, Japan is the priority, anticipating that revisionism can be controlled and overcome by a combination of forces: the good judgment of the Japanese people, as they become better informed; the steadfast determination of the United States with a positive message to Japan and a clear vision; the joint response of Japan’s partners; the focus kept on the national identity struggle with China requiring a coordinated message to try to persuade China or, if needed, to
be able to counter it; and the realization in South Korea that its just case against the revisionist shift in Japan can best be pursued in a less strident and more strategic manner, still prodding the United States while embracing the new U.S.-led strategy.

NOTE

National Sentiments in Japan and Controversy over Historical Recognition:
The Development and Prospects for the Murayama Statement

Toyomi Asano

SUMMARY

The close relationship between Japan’s expanding security commitments and the challenging issue of reconciliation with Asian countries can be traced back to the 1990s, specifically the 50-year anniversary of World War II. The 1995 Murayama statement, Japan’s formal apology for colonial rule and invasion, was the result of a miraculous political situation from 1993 to 1996. During that time, a coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) was led by Tomoiichi Murayama of the SDPJ, and the LDP’s liberal faction strongly supported Murayama’s initiative. That ultimately led to the Murayama statement. The LDP’s support for Murayama derived from the Japanese liberals’ recognition that in order to enhance Japan’s international role in sending its Self-Defense Forces as part of peacekeeping operations, expressing apology through a formal declaration would be indispensable to gain full acceptance from Japan’s Asian neighbors. However, coping with emotional reactions from Japan’s domestic society proved to be more difficult. Koizumi Junichiro’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine were intended to pacify Japan’s domestic reaction to the Murayama statement, but Koizumi also stood by the Murayama statement apologizing to Asian victims. In short, Koizumi pursued two political objectives: on one hand, he pursued domestic goals by mourning for Japanese soldiers, and on the international front, he tried to adhere
to Japan's prior apologies. But because Class A war criminals' spirits were interred in Yasukuni, Asian countries reacted with distrust. This distrust eventually came to be linked with small disputed islands as symbols of each nation's respective emotions.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The United States can play a key role in ensuring historical understanding between East Asian nations by encouraging forums for constructive discussions. Even if there are no concrete results, such forums would make it possible to disconnect the manipulation of history to stoke the flames of territorial disputes.

- The U.S. pivot to Asia should be full-fledged, and the country should change its position from a passive mediator to a positive one. Until now the United States has tried to behave as a mediator in the bilateral relations among East Asian countries only when there are severe troubles and volatility but it is time for the United States to get Asian nations to commit to each other emotionally as a positive mediator. For example, the United States should hold an international ceremony linked with the historical events which are meaningful to Asian countries including Japan and South Korea, linked not only with its national values but also such international values as women's dignity, human rights, and democracy. However, in order for the universal values to be supported by each nation's national values, with conflicting national values conciliated eventually, the forums of constructive discussions should be managed with American intellectuals strongly committed to those discussions.

- The findings of intellectual discussions should then be shared with the broader public through cultural efforts. Producing television programs or novels that would encourage empathy by both Koreans and Japanese could lead to greater understanding and sympathy on both sides. It is also crucial to encourage the stories of those who have experienced the war to be heard across Asia. A permanent foundation should be established to coordinate international cultural policies such as planning
international historical ceremonies, arranging each nation’s domestic cultural matters including textbooks when these matters might lead to conflict, and taking care of senior war victims. The foundation should serve as a symbol of reconciliation through cooperation between the United States, Japan, South Korea and perhaps China and Taiwan.

While regional history should be built step by step in cooperation with scholars, based upon this foundation, the new regional history’s vision should be simultaneously translated into mass cultural products such as novels, films and dramas. This international foundation should also coordinate awards or festivals to accelerate the process of translation into mass culture. Conflicts between national emotions should be marginalized and substituted with more sophisticated forms of historical memory coordinated by this foundation.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the focuses of Prime Minister Abe’s speech to a joint session of U.S. Congress in April 2015 was how he would express his apology to Asian countries for Japan’s colonial rule during World War II. During his visit to Washington, Abe expressed his intent to adhere to previous cabinet statements, including the 1995 Murayama statement.

This article examines the historical origins of the Murayama statement not only from its political context from the 1990s, but also by analyzing the close relationship between Japan’s expanding security commitments and the political challenge of reconciliation with Asian countries, which continues to be an issue in the Japanese leadership’s security-related public statements, including Abe’s speech to the U.S. Congress where he proposed a new set of guidelines for U.S.–Japan defense cooperation.

Domestic politics have prevented Japan from reconciling with its Asian neighbors by elucidating a political structure at both the international and domestic levels. Assessing the domestic political dynamics would help explain the political rationale for the prime minister’s decision to visit Yasukuni Shrine, which in turn has impacted how Japan’s apologies for aggressions during World War II are interpreted by Asian Victims.

The 1990s in Northeast Asia could be seen as a challenging era for international relations because of the rise of democratic movements in several countries and the emergence of contentious historical issues between Japan and China as well as South Korea. Divisive issues such as history textbooks, the Yasukuni Shrine, and comfort women were hotly debated during the 1990s as democratization in South Korea fostered the growth of transnational civil societies supporting war victims’ human rights.

Because of the birth of these civil society movements, the 1990s became a challenging time for reconciliation at a national level, while the 1960s and 1970s were more appropriately regarded as a period of state-level reconciliation between East Asian governments. This was exemplified by normalization treaties between Japan and Korea in 1965, and between Japan and China in 1972.
MURAYAMA’S INITIATIVE FOR A NEW NATIONAL RECONCILIATION FRAMEWORK

The Murayama statement of August 1995 was based on cooperation between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). The process of drafting the Murayama statement was the result of a rapprochement between the SDPJ and the LDP in an era of political transition: in 1993, the long-ruling LDP lost power until regaining the prime minister’s seat in January 1996. In the process of its return to power, the LDP successfully persuaded the SDPJ to separate from an anti-LDP coalition which had formed the Morihiro Hosokawa and Tsutomu Hata cabinets (August 1993–June 1994) and make a new coalition with the LDP in June 1994, which formed the Murayama cabinet (June 30, 1994–January 1996).

There were several reasons that this new coalition was formed. The most important was that even for the LDP, historical recognition had been regarded as an important issue for persuading neighboring countries to accept a new enhanced security role for Japan after the end of the Cold War. This was particularly true during Kiichi Miyazawa’s tenure as premier from November 1991 to August 1993. As nations across Asia democratized, the Japanese approach to this history issue was closely watched. Furthermore, the development of transnational civil society accelerated this recognition as a result of democratization, as shown by the case of a Korean ex-comfort woman who was invited to Japan by Japanese lawyers and activists.

Knowing the political situation could be helpful to understand the sensitive power balance between the LDP and the SDPJ. On one side was the LDP, which had been politically supported by the Families’ Society of the War Dead in Japan as the party sought a new international framework for Japanese activities such as peacekeeping operations to be acceptable across Asia. On the other side was the SDPJ, which had advocated a disarmament and neutrality policy since 1951, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed. Reconciliation with Asian countries through tangible compensation and an absence of military bases in Japan were important preconditions for the SDPJ’s policy of neutrality in the 1960s and 1970s, by which Japan would ostensibly become more independent from the United States in both security and economic terms. For the SDPJ, a kind of soft power derived from morality with no arms and shared trust with Asian peoples.
would be the most important factor for Japan’s security. Even in the SPDJ’s traditional policy, an idealistic security vision of a non-military state was linked with the issue of reconciliation with Asian countries. However, by the 1990s, LDP-led normalization with China and the end of the Cold War between the United States and the USSR led the SDPJ to abandon the idea of both abrogating the security treaty with the United States and doing away with the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

The two parties’ policies seemed to start to converge, becoming ever more complementary starting with the Kiichi Miyazawa cabinet, the end of which opened a new transition period for the reformation of Japanese politics. It was one year later when Murayama became the SDPJ’s first premier in the 46 years since 1948, when the SDPJ lost power under occupation.

The Murayama cabinet was formed based on a three-party agreement with the LDP, SDPJ and the Sakigake (a small, new party) on June 29, 1994. Under this agreement, they were to address the history issue within a year, ahead of the 50-year anniversary of the war in 1995, by drafting policies regarding the war and colonization which would be persuasive to Japan’s Asian neighbors. This agreement was formulated and accepted by the LDP, who wanted to induce the SDPJ to make a new coalition. Under this three-party agreement the LDP and the SDPJ promised to jointly pronounce an apology on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II.

The three-party agreement was based on a common agenda for the expression of regret and apology [‘hantei’ and ‘shazai’] for Japan’s invasions of and colonial rule over Asian peoples. The parties intended to issue “a new resolution of the Japanese Diet in order to express the national will for peace in the future and express regret for the War according to national conscientiousness.” However, this agreement was nothing but the result of a hastily-made political coalition. The SDPJ had enjoyed a position of strength over the LDP, who had been voted out of power in August 1993. The LDP was on the edge of self-destruction, the danger of which hastened their quick decision to accept all of the SDPJ’s political agenda.

Until that time, the SDPJ’s basic policy toward history was to make contemporary Japan more responsible for its pre-war national activities, including not only wartime atrocities but also colonial rule. Murayama, when he finally decided to have the SDPJ join the three-party agreement and become
the prime minister, thought that the coalition had reason to exist and that it could accomplish what Japan as a nation must do for the 50th observance of the war’s end. He also commented that as the SDPJ’s chairperson, he was strongly resolved to behave according to the appropriate tradition of the SDPJ at this critical stage. In January 1996, he quickly passed the seat of prime minister to the LDP leader, recognizing that his mission had ended, though the LDP-SDPJ coalition continued for another year.

THE LDP’S APPROACH TO THE COMMEMORATION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR’S END

Both the SDPJ’s and LDP’s policies, and particularly the ex-Prime Minister Miyazawa’s faction’s basic policies, were important to the development of the LDP-SDPJ coalition established by the three-party agreement, which finally crystalized as the 1995 Murayama Statement.

The LDP’s basic position on historical issues involved strong Japanese contributions to international public goods through means such as peace keeping operations (PKOs) and overseas development assistance (ODA). These policies began with the Takeshita cabinet (November 1987–June 1989) when the three targets of Japan’s new diplomacy were pronounced: cooperation for peace, cultural exchange and ODA. In fact, by 1992 the governmental budget for ODA had rapidly increased to 50 billion dollars, twice as much as that in 1988. What kind of contribution Japan should and could give to the international community had been a serious issue since rising trade friction with the United States following the rapid expansion of the Japanese economy at the end of the 1980s. The Gulf War in January 1991 forced Japan to consider the issue of international contribution seriously.

The Miyazawa cabinet had already taken actions to counter anticipated Asian distrust, supporting the establishment of a law regarding collaboration with the United Nations’ PKO. On January 24, 1992, at the first initial speech in the Diet, Miyazawa proposed that historical issues should be intertwined with international community-building projects such as APEC and ASEAN. Miyazawa’s proposal represented the first time a Japanese prime minister tried to relate historical issues to international cooperation.
Until then, emphasizing historical issues usually meant opposing the security treaty with the United States in line with the SDPJ’s vision of Japan as a demilitarized neutral country.

In order to conceptualize the LDP’s new policy, Miyazawa created a “council for investigating relations in the twenty-first century between Japan and the Asia-Pacific region” in May 1992. At the opening session of this council, Miyazawa in his capacity as its organizer proposed that “Japan as a nation in the Asia-Pacific region must be proactive in contributing to the peace and prosperity in this region.” He also stated, “as far as historical issues, it goes without saying that we must exercise ourselves to sympathize deeply with the way the others in this region feel about wartime experiences. It is important to consider how Japan may develop as a nation with honor and pride.” Miyazawa’s approach seemed nothing less than that of the SDPJ, adjusting national emotions to harmonize with those of its Asian neighbors.

In December 1992, the council submitted a report to the Miyazawa cabinet defining the history issue and outlining a concrete direction toward its settlement. The issue of history was summarized as: 1) for Japanese people both on an individual level and as a nation to recognize the ‘perpetrator activities’ of imperial Japan before and during World War II; 2) how to compensate for the losses; and 3) how to educate subsequent generations.

Finally, it concluded that “the essential problem of what is called the issue of ‘disposition of the war’ lies in Japanese domestic society,” and continued by saying, “it is necessary both for each Japanese citizen to acknowledge the facts of historical events both during and before the war, and for Japan, as a nation, to acknowledge their exact disposition in regards to the war. After such arguments are developed, we should form a national consensus on what we ought to do as a nation.” Even now, the same thing may be said: that the future reconciliation of Japan with its neighbors is dependent on a national consensus among Japanese, which is still yet to be accomplished in 2015.

The 1992 Miyazawa cabinet had already proposed that a national consensus was indispensable for compensating Asian neighbors. The three-party agreement in 1994 might be regarded in part as an effort to fulfill such a new national consensus, though it was limited to a political dimension and was quite ambiguous in 1994.
MURAYAMA’S COMMITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE-PARTY AGREEMENT

Because the SDPJ was a minor party compared to the LDP, the LDP’s support was indispensable even under the three-party agreement. Murayama first wanted to pass a resolution for the 50-year anniversary of the war in the Diet to handle these historical issues. But in July 1995, many Diet members, even among the LDP, boycotted this resolution, which should have served to express the united will of the Japanese people. One month later, in August 1995, Murayama tried to make a formal pronouncement of the cabinet position on this issue. Murayama was determined to resign at any moment if the LDP failed to accept his proposal to publicly speak about historical issues on August 15, 1995 in his capacity as the prime minister.

Until becoming prime minister, Murayama had worked mainly with the Labor Committee in the Diet. He sympathized with the miserable situation of Japanese repatriates and orphans who had been left behind in China and only returned to Japan in the 1970’s after normalization with the Chinese government in 1972. It could be said that Murayama’s practical experiences in the Labor Committee had supported his determination and that his sympathy to Asian neighbors was an extension of his sympathy for these Japanese orphans.

Yohei Kohno protected Murayama in his capacity as president of the LDP and Foreign Minister in the era of a joint Murayama cabinet under the three-party agreement, though anti-Murayama emotions concerning historical issues did exist among LDP members. However, Murayama ordered two other LDP ministers of the joint cabinet to resign due to public or informal comments on historical issues contrary to the three-party agreement and Murayama’s statement on August 15, 1995. One was Shin Sakurai, head of the environmental agency in the Murayama cabinet, who commented publicly on August 12, 1994, that “Japan did not intend to provoke war. We should not imagine that only Japan was guilty. Moreover, Asian countries became independent from European colonial powers because of Japan’s actions.” The other dismissed official was Takami Etoh, head of the Management and Coordination Agency, who informally said to a journalist in October 1995 that Japan carried out many admirable projects in its colonies and that annexation of Korea was not forceful, but
legitimate. Both of these cabinet members were forced to resign soon after these incidents. This showed that it was difficult to attain a national consensus for an apology rooted in perpetrator’s responsibility and trans-generational sympathy for Asian victims.

In fact, Murayama also mentioned this issue of new consensus among Japanese society in his pronouncement. However, before the establishment of a consensus in the Diet or the enlargement of the political consensus to the mass level, heated debates started in the news media. In January 1995, philosophical historian Norihiro Kato suggested that it is indispensable to first console unknown Japanese war dead before praying for Asian victims, and this stance provoked intense debates. The main opponent of this argument was Tetsuya Takahashi, a scholar of French philosophy who argued that mourning for victims in neighboring Asian nations must come first, because outdated nationalism was intertwined with attitudes such as those represented by Kato.²

Heated debates arose not only among scholars but also among citizens engaged in grassroots movements. Among the most influential was the “Japan Society for History Textbook Reform [Atarashii Rekishi Kyoukasho wo Tsukuru Kai],” a grassroots organization which was formed in 1996 by teachers and proposed that history textbooks be written with the aim of making children take pride in Japanese history. It labeled the Murayama Statement as “masochistic” and “self-punishment.”

In any event, this issue of how to honor the Japanese and non-Japanese souls lost during the war gives us a point of reference to understand the development of these historical issues. Even after Murayama resigned in January 1996 and left his office to the new LDP leader Ryutaro Hashimoto, the new premier continued to support support the Murayama statement. The SDPJ also cooperated with the LDP under Hashimoto because the LDP had never held half of the seats of the lower Diet on its own, at least until the end of 1996.

Hashimoto even wrote a personal letter to comfort women who accepted money both for sympathy from the Japanese people and for medical and social welfare services from the Japanese government.³ Hashimoto’s letter was surprising because he had been a governor of the Families’ Society of the War Dead [Nihon Izoku Kai], which staunchly supports visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine. This fact shows that in the same way that Murayama’s sympathy derived from Japanese orphans, Hashimoto’s derived from sympathy to Japanese who lost family members in the war.

THE POLITICAL INCENTIVE TO WORSHIP AT THE YASUKUNI SHRINE AND ITS COMPATIBILITY WITH OFFERING A SINCERE APOLOGY

The rapid formulation of the Murayama statement; the resolution in the Diet; and particularly the establishment of a new foundation, the Asian Women’s Fund, provoked serious debates. The domestic consensus that was deemed necessary in the Miyazawa report and presupposed in the Murayama Statement never materialized. On the contrary, Japanese society has been divided over these historical issues.

As the Japanese government’s first attempt to confront these historical issues with meaningful compensation, the Asian Women’s Fund was established in June 1995 with cooperation between government and the populace. Some civilians were made council members; others were temporarily hired with salaries from the governmental budget. It was a collaborative project between government and civil society. However, the more innovative the Asian Women’s Fund became, the more heated the debates around it grew. The fund was criticized by both the left and the right. The left demanded direct national compensation for individuals and the right regarded comfort women as prostitutes and formal reparation as completely finished. Civil society itself was essentially split over this foundation: some civil society activists ignored others who worked with the foundation as collaborators with the government.

Subsequent cabinets had championed the framework of the Murayama Statement until Abe’s speech to the U.S. Congress in 2015. However, the story of this statement itself has been deeply connected with prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. After the Murayama Statement itself evoked serious political problems in both domestic and international politics, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (April 2001–September 2006) tried to chase two aims simultaneously. While going to the Yasukuni Shrine every year starting on August 13, 2001 until August 15, 2006 in order to pray for the
souls of Japanese war dead, he held that he seriously endorsed the Murayama Statement. This political position was pronounced in August 2005 as the “Koizumi Statement” at the 60-year anniversary of the end of the war. He even cried at a Korean prison in Seoul made during the colonial age, sympathizing with Korean political prisoners, when he was invited to Seoul by President Roh Moo-hyun in October 2001. However, the tension between standing by the Murayama Statement which apologized for colonial rule and the war while praying to Japanese pre-War days’ soldiers at the Yasukuni Shrine exacerbated Chinese and Korean distrust of Japan’s commitment to reconciliation, particularly since Class A war criminals are enshrined at Yasukuni.

The crucial point in understanding the situation of the Japanese construction of war responsibility policy discourse vis-à-vis Asian neighbors lies in the problem of whether the Murayama Statement and the activity of praying in Yasukuni Shrine are compatible. Murayama commented in 2007 that these can never be compatible, because the souls of those Class A war criminals who were formally responsible both for the planning of the war and the mobilization and suffering of its Asian victims are regarded to be a part of Yasukuni’s soul as a whole. Neighboring countries’ natural emotions might be the same, which evoked serious distrust of other Japanese expressions of regret.

On the contrary, Koizumi and perhaps Hashimoto regarded these two issues as compatible, particularly when Koizumi as prime minister visited Yasukuni in October 2005 and gave the Koizumi statement in August 2005.

During the fragile period of the mid-2000s, cultural exchange projects were expected to play an important role in the process of reconciliation begun by the Murayama Statement. Originally the Murayama Statement aimed to issue a true apology and express regret, through which harmonious order between sets of national emotions and memories could be reached. In fact a Japan-South Korea summit joint declaration on June 7, 2003 pronounced, “Japan-ROK cooperation toward the future” should entail “deep mutual understanding, warm friendship and vigorous exchange of people and culture between people from various fields and generations of both countries, particularly between young people”.

Even on the question of how to separate the issues of Yasukuni and praying for soldiers and expressing regret to Asian victims, many opinions have been expressed. However, the arguments that worship at the
Yasukuni Shrine is a Japanese cultural tradition and that all spirits are immune from any guilt after death might not be persuasive enough to members of other cultures, while separating the spirits of Class A war criminals is impossible following the spiritual theory of the shrine, because the Yasukuni Shrine is already regarded as a civil religious association, separated from governmental control during the occupation era. A political split between Koizumi and Roh Moo-hyun seems to have derived from a cultural gap concerning the compatibility of visiting Yasukuni and apologizing to Asian victims. This issue of compatibility was connected to cultural and human values.

Furthermore, historical issues have recently been tied to territorial issues. Reacting to Koizumi’s approach to history and the publication of new Japanese textbooks in which disputed islands were claimed as a part of Japanese sovereign jurisdiction, on April 26, 2006 a statement by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun suggested that the territorial dispute has come to be regarded as the same test of the Japanese people’s historical recognition, like the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine. Perhaps the same could be said of China since the dispute over the contested islands in the East China Sea heated up in 2010. In this situation the concept of territory as a sacred place of the nation is closely related with the emotional development of each nation, including Japan.

CONCLUSION

Japan first imported a modern nation-state system from the West at the end of the 19th century, and then converted itself into an empire, provoking Asian nationalism centered on anti-Japanese sentiments. After two or three generations, an unhealthy spiral of conflict between nationalisms intertwined with territorial issues poses a very difficult obstacle to national-level reconciliation.

Under this situation, moving reconciliation forward by social and cultural means seems important. Political means should be used to indirectly support these cultural exchanges. It is important to situate each nation in a regional relational framework formed by joint cultural cooperation supported by governmental policies.
A new regional framework of collective reconciliation can be created to reconcile differing national emotions. National emotions are inclined to be influenced not only by national memories, but also by such universal values as democracy, human rights and the dignity of women. A nation’s self-determination is linked with human dignity, while one person’s liberty requires the freedom of a nation.

Separating emotionally charged national narratives from universal values of human rights and dignity is difficult in East Asia, however, because the nations themselves have been formed by historical interactions between states which generated shared national memories. This is particularly problematic in democracies, when each nation as a whole is supposed to be a subject of a sovereign state.

Cultural policy cooperation in accordance with both national and international context seems indispensable. The U.S. pivot to Asia must include cultural policies under a multilateral cooperative framework. In particular, a U.S. led commemoration ceremony supported by a new security framework with a detached position from each nation’s sentiments seems to be expected and appropriate for the pivot.

NOTES

1. Tomiichi Murayama, Murayama Tomiichi no shougen roku: Jishasa renritsu seiken nojisso [Testimonies of Tomiichi Murayama: On the true nature of the three-party coalition], Shinseisha, 2011.

2. The books on this debate include the following: Norihiro Kato, Haisen Kouron [Reflections on the lost war], Koudansha, 1997; Kato, Sengo teki shiko [A way of thinking in the post-war era], Koudansha, 1999; Kato, Kanousei to shiteno senso [A possible post-war era], Iwanami Shoten, 1999; Tetsuya Takahashi, Sengo sekinin ron [Discussion on post-war responsibility], Koudansha, 1997; Takahashi, ed., National hisutorii wo koete [Transcending national history], The University of Tokyo Press, 1998; Takahashi, ed., Rekishi ninshiki ronso [Debates over the contested understandings of history], Sakuhinsha, 2002.


Appendix: Select Official Statements on History by the Japanese Government

Following is a list of selected official statements that reflect Japan’s positions on history and its relationships with neighboring Asia-Pacific nations. These statements consist of two kinds: (1) Japanese leaders’ statements on history and (2) bilateral agreements, joint declarations, and other documents that define Japan’s bilateral relationships with other countries in terms of their understandings of history. The selected statements are listed as follows:

(1) JAPANESE STATEMENTS

1993  Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study of the Issue of “Comfort Women”
1995  Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War’s End”
1995  Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History
2005  Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the 60th Anniversary of the End of the War
2010  Statement by Prime Minister Naoto Kan on the 100th Year of the Conclusion of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty
2014  Remarks by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Australian Parliament
2015  Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress: “Toward an Alliance of Hope”

The quoted portions of the texts that follow highlight views on history that Japanese leaders and/or the leaders of other countries expressed.
(2) JOINT STATEMENTS, AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS

1965  Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea
1972  Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China
1978  Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China
1998  Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development
2002  Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
2003  Japan-Republic of Korea Summit Joint Statement: Building the Foundations of Japan-ROK Cooperation toward an Age of Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia
2007  Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China at the Japanese Diet for Friendship and Cooperation

The quoted portions of the texts that follow highlight views on history that Japanese leaders and/or the leaders of other countries expressed.

(1) JAPANESE STATEMENTS

Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study of the Issue of “Comfort Women”

August 4, 1993

The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime “comfort women” since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study.
As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment.

We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.

As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched [sic] related thereto.
Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End”

August 15, 1995

The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions.

The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the countries of Europe.

Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the Asia-Pacific region- indeed, in the entire world- it is necessary, more than anything else, that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries.
Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end, we should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future.

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.

Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of those who perished.

It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow.

Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History

June 9, 1995

The House of Representatives resolves as follows:

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, this House offers its sincere condolences to those who fell in action and victims of wars and similar actions all over the world.

Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out those acts in the past, inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House express a sense of deep remorse.

We must transcend the differences over historical views of the past war and learn humbly the lessons of history so as to build a peaceful international society.

This House expresses its resolve, under the banner of eternal peace enshrined in the Constitution of Japan, to join hands with other nations of the world and to pave the way to a future that allows all human beings to live together.

Full text adopted from: http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/address9506.html

Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the 60th Anniversary of the End of the War

August 15, 2005

On the 60th anniversary of the end of the war, I reaffirm my determination that Japan must never again take the path to war, reflecting that the peace and prosperity we enjoy today are founded on the ultimate sacrifices of those who lost their lives for the war against their will.

More than three million compatriots died in the war- in the battlefield thinking about their homeland and worrying about their families, while
others perished amidst the destruction of war, or after the war in remote foreign countries.

In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Sincerely facing these facts of history, I once again express my feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology, and also express the feelings of mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, in the war. I am determined not to allow the lessons of that horrible war to erode, and to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world without ever again waging a war.

After the war, Japan rebuilt itself from a devastated land owing to the ceaseless efforts of its people and the assistance extended by many countries, and accepted the San Francisco Peace Treaty, being the first step of its reversion to the international community. Japan has resolutely maintained its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means and not by force, and proactively extended material and personnel assistance for the sake of the peace and prosperity of the world through official development assistance (ODA) and United Nations peace keeping operations.

Japan’s post war history has indeed been six decades of manifesting its remorse on the war through actions.

The post war generations now exceed 70 percent of Japan’s population. Each and every Japanese, through his or her own experience and peace-oriented education, sincerely seeks international peace. Today, many Japanese are actively engaged in activities for peace and humanitarian assistance around the world, through such organizations as the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, and have been receiving much trust and high appreciation from the local people. Exchange with Asian countries in a wide variety of areas, such as economy and culture, has also increased on an unprecedented scale. I believe it is necessary to work hand in hand with other Asian countries, especially with China and the Republic of Korea, which are Japan’s neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, to maintain peace and pursue the development of the region. Through squarely facing the past and rightly recognizing the history, I intend to build a future-oriented cooperative relationship based on mutual understanding and trust with Asian countries.
This year marks a significant juncture for the Japan-Republic of Korea relationship. In August precisely one hundred years ago, the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty was concluded, making the beginning of the colonial rule of thirty six years. As demonstrated by strong resistance such as the Samil independence movement, the Korean people of that time was deprived of their country and culture, and their ethnic pride was deeply scarred by the colonial rule which was imposed against their will under the political and military circumstances.

I would like to face history with sincerity. I would like to have courage to squarely confront the facts of history and humility to accept them, as well as to be honest to reflect upon the errors of our own. Those who render pain tend to forget it while those who suffered cannot forget it easily. To the tremendous damage and sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology.

Guided by such understanding, I will build a future-oriented Japan-Republic of Korea relationship by placing the next one hundred years to come in my prospect. I will continue in all sincerity conducting such humanitarian cooperation as the assistance to ethnic Koreans left in Sakhalin and the assistance in returning remains of the people from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, in response to the expectations of the Korean people, I will transfer precious archives originated from the Korean Peninsula that were brought to Japan during the period of Japan’s rule through the Governor-General of Korea and the Government of Japan possesses, such as the Royal Protocols of the Joseon Dynasty.
Remarks by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Australian Parliament

July 8, 2014

Now, ladies and gentlemen, when we Japanese started out again after the Second World War, we thought long and hard over what had happened in the past, and came to make a vow for peace with their whole hearts. We Japanese have followed that path until the present day. We will never let the horrors of the past century’s history repeat themselves. This vow that Japan made after the war is still fully alive today. It will never change going forward. There is no question at all about this point. I stand here in the Australian legislative chamber to state this vow to you solemnly and proudly.

Our fathers and grandfathers lived in a time that saw Kokoda and Sandakan. How many young Australians, with bright futures to come, lost their lives? And for those who made it through the war, how much trauma did they feel even years and years later, from these painful memories? I can find absolutely no words to say. I can only stay humble against the evils and horrors of history. May I most humbly speak for Japan and on behalf of the Japanese people here in sending my most sincere condolences towards the many souls who lost their lives.

There is a story from 1968 that pulls at my heartstrings even now. Australia invited a Japanese woman to come here. Her name was Matsue Matsuo, and she was 83 years old. She accepted Australia’s invitation and, in memory of her son, poured Japanese sake into Sydney Bay. Her son was on a small submarine that had sunk in Sydney Bay during an attack on Australia. The people of Australia kept his valour in memory so many years, and brought over the brave soldier’s mother from Japan. This is so beautifully open-minded. “Hostility to Japan must go. It is better to hope than always to remember.” These are the words of Prime Minister R.G. Menzies when he restarted Australia-Japan ties after the war.

Again speaking both for Japan and for the Japanese people, I wish to state my great and whole-hearted gratitude for the spirit of tolerance and for the friendship that Australia has shown to Japan. We in Japan will never forget your open-minded spirit nor the past history between us.

Source: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0708article1.html
Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress: “Toward an Alliance of Hope”

April 29, 2015

Before coming over here, I was at the World War II Memorial. It was a place of peace and calm that struck me as a sanctuary. The air was filled with the sound of water breaking in the fountains. In one corner stands the Freedom Wall. More than 4,000 gold stars shine on the wall. I gasped with surprise to hear that each star represents the lives of 100 fallen soldiers. I believe those gold stars are a proud symbol of the sacrifices in defending freedom. But in those gold stars, we also find the pain, sorrow, and love for family of young Americans who otherwise would have lived happy lives. Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Corregidor, Coral Sea….

The battles engraved at the Memorial crossed my mind, and I reflected upon the lost dreams and lost futures of those young Americans. History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone. With deep repentance in my heart, I stood there in silent prayers for some time. My dear friends, on behalf of Japan and the Japanese people, I offer with profound respect my eternal condolences to the souls of all American people that were lost during World War II.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the gallery today is Lt. Gen. Lawrence Snowden. Seventy years ago in February, he landed on Iōtō, or the island of Iwo Jima, as a captain in command of a company. In recent years, General Snowden has often participated in the memorial services held jointly by Japan and the U.S. on Iōtō. He said, and I quote, “We didn’t and don’t go to Iwo Jima to celebrate victory, but for the solemn purpose to pay tribute to and honor those who lost their lives on both sides.” Next to General Snowden sits Diet Member Yoshitaka Shindo, who is a former member of my Cabinet. His grandfather, General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, whose valor we remember even today, was the commander of the Japanese garrison during the Battle of Iwo Jima. What should we call this, if not a miracle of history? Enemies that had fought each other so fiercely have become friends bonded in spirit. To General Snowden, I say that I pay tribute to your efforts for reconciliation. Thank you so very much.
Post war, we started out on our path bearing in mind feelings of deep remorse over the war. Our actions brought suffering to the peoples in Asian countries. We must not avert our eyes from that. I will uphold the views expressed by the previous prime ministers in this regard.


(2) JOINT STATEMENTS, AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS

Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea

Signed on June 22, 1965

Japan: Etsusaburo Shiina, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Shinichi Takasugi

Republic of Korea: Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dong Jo Kim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Considering the historical background of relationship between the peoples and their mutual desire for good neighborliness and for the normalization of their relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty;

Recognizing the importance of their close cooperation in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations for the promotion of their mutual welfare and common interests and to the maintenance of international peace and security; and

Recalling the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 and the Resolution 195 (III) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1948;

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty on Basic Relations …… (the rest omitted).

Source: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_on_Basic_Relations_between_Japan_and_the_Republic_of_Korea

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Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China

September 29, 1972

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan and Chairman Mao Tse-tung of China, along with relevant ministers from both sides

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding “the three principles of the restoration of relations” put forward by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.


Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China

August 12, 1978

Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua

The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

Source: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html
Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development

November 26, 1998

President Jiang Zemin of China and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan

Both sides are of the view that Japan and China share a history of friendly exchanges spanning more than 2,000 years, as well as a common cultural background, and that it is the common desire of the peoples of the two countries to continue this tradition of friendship and to further develop mutually beneficial cooperation.

Both sides believe that squarely facing the past and correctly understanding history are the important foundation for further developing relations between Japan and China. The Japanese side observes the 1972 Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 15 August 1995 Statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this. The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from the history and adhere to the path of peace and development. Based on this, both sides will develop long-standing relations of friendship.

Source: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html

Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership toward the Twenty-first Century

October 8, 1998

President Kim Dae Jung of Korea and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan

The two leaders shared the view that in order for Japan and the Republic of Korea to build solid, good-neighborly and friendly relations in the twenty-
first century, it was important that both countries squarely face the past and develop relations based on mutual understanding and trust.

Looking back on the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea during this century, Prime Minister Obuchi regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact.

President Kim accepted with sincerity this statement of Prime Minister Obuchi’s recognition of history and expressed his appreciation for it. He also expressed his view that the present calls upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.

Further, both leaders shared the view that it was important that the peoples of both countries, the young generation in particular, deepen their understanding of history, and stressed the need to devote much attention and effort to that end.


Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration

September 17, 2002

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan and Chairman Kim Jong-II of the DPRK National Defense Commission

The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.

Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic cooperation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as
humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the normalization talks.


Japan-Republic of Korea Summit Joint Statement: Building the Foundations of Japan-ROK Cooperation toward an Age of Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia

June 7, 2003

President Roh Moo Hyun of Korea and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan

In accordance with the spirit of the “Japan-Republic of Korea Join Declaration—A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century,” announced in October 1998, the leaders shared the recognition that both Japan and the ROK must keep past history in mind, and based on that, advance together to develop a future-oriented mutual relationship in the 21st century.

The leaders shared their resolve to continue to deepen the trust and friendship between the countries and to develop the relationship to a higher level while sustaining the momentum of goodwill and friendship between Japan and the ROK built up through the Year of Japan-Republic of Korea National Exchange and the success of the Japan-Korea World Cup Soccer tournament in 2002.

To consolidate our friendship and cooperation, we need to draw lessons from the unfortunate days of the past. As we all know, the over 2,000 years of friendly contacts between the Chinese and Japanese peoples were once interrupted by a traumatic and unfortunate period of over 50 years in modern times. The war of aggression against China launched by Japan inflicted untold sufferings on the Chinese people, causing tremendous loss of life and property. The trauma it caused to the Chinese people was beyond description. This war was also a devastating and painful experience to the Japanese people, and it is still fresh in the memory of the elderly people. As we review the past, we are keenly aware that peace and friendship between China and Japan are vital for our countries and the well-being of our peoples. What a country or a nation has learned in the course of its development, whether in a positive way or negative way, is an invaluable asset. What we have learned from our own historical experiences and lessons is something we have learned which is far more direct, profound and effective. If a nation with great cultural tradition can learn from its past, it shows that it is full of confidence in its future. ……

We, the Chinese Government and people, have all along taken a forward-looking approach. We believe that we need to take history as a mirror to guide the growth of our ties in the future. By stressing the importance of drawing the lessons from history, we do not mean to perpetuate hatred. Rather, we want to secure a better future for our relations. Since the normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Japan, the Japanese Government and leaders have on many occasions stated their position on the historical issue, admitted that Japan had committed aggression and expressed deep remorse and apology to the victimized countries. The Chinese Government and people appreciate the position they have taken. We sincerely hope that the Japanese side will act as it has stated and honor its commitment. Peace will bring benefit to China and Japan, while confrontation can only do harm to them. We should carry forward the friendship between the two peoples from generation to generation. This is in keeping
with the historical trend and meets the desire of the two peoples, and it is also what Asia and the international community hope to see.


Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests”

May 7, 2008

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan and President Hu Jintao of China

The two sides resolved to face history squarely, advance toward the future, and endeavor with persistence to create a new era of a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” between Japan and China. They announced that they would align Japan-China relations with the trends of international community and together forge a bright future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world while deepening mutual understanding, building mutual trust, and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between their nations in an ongoing fashion into the future.

Source: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html
About the Contributors

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Contested Memories and Reconciliation Challenges: Japan and the Asia-Pacific on the 70th Anniversary of the End of World War II

Edited by: Tatsushi Arai, Shihoko Goto, and Zheng Wang