Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants, outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grassroots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

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Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institute's German History in Documents and Images Project Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman, Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaecker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

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Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri, as well as the Wilson Center’s Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.

Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009
# The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

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Part One:  
The Peace Movement
In the following article, political scientist Bernd Guggenberger analyzes the protest movement of the previous years. He explores its motivations and strategies, as well as the reasons behind its apparent loss of momentum in the mid-1970s. On the basis of this analysis, Guggenberger predicts a “revived Biedermeier era,” referring to a period in the early nineteenth century when people – at least publicly – made a turn away from politics and towards private life.

The Return to Reality

Where is the protest movement going? A definite answer to this question is impossible, if for no other reason than our temporal and spatial proximity to this phenomenon. The discernible approaches, motivations, and directions are too diverse and ambiguous: the development also proceeded too breathlessly; the passage of time left so many things outdated, things that the culturally-critical social sciences had already deemed all but “certain knowledge.”

One only has to remember the theory of the “end of ideologies,” which was proclaimed with missionary zeal until well into the 1960s. What remained of it when one took stock of things at the end of that decade? Not only did a new right-wing party establish itself here in the Federal Republic in the mid-1960s in the wake of the economic recession; a “New Left” also emerged, and as a worldwide movement at that. Its criticisms were ignited precisely by the anti-ideology stance of industrial society, the complacency of the older generation, the sobriety and everyday pragmatism of the politicians, and the general quest for affluence [Wohlstandsorientierung] that was prevailing everywhere.

What remains when we look back at the “doctrines” of the early 1970s today? And when we think of slick formulas such as re-ideologization, polarization, anarchy, and class struggle?

Today, in 1975, is the ideological permeation of broad areas of social life, indoctrination and political polarization, class struggle and anarchy still the central issue in schools and universities?
What is immediately obvious to everyone is that, outside the walls of our universities, and in large part even within them, things have gotten noticeably quieter. Gone is the pure excitement, the hectic revolutionizing, the outpouring of emotions. Gone, too, is the lightness, the optimism, the brilliant carefreeness that was thoroughly characteristic of this collective escape from the despised world of the fathers. Initially, the spokespeople of the “New Left” included many more artists and poets than politicians and functionaries of organizations. This has changed fundamentally. No longer does the talented loner, the critical, well-read, original, sharp-tongued, articulate individualist dominate the scene, but rather the – often meticulously tidy – wooden, but well-prepared, narrow-minded dogmatist of an SED-friendly “Marxism-Leninism.”

With the new “Spartacist” formation (and some other large and small groups that call themselves Communist), the revolution has lost its “cosmopolitan” flair. It has become provincial, petty-minded, bigoted, and is mostly consumed by arguments about the proper exegesis of each respective text that promises liberation. It no longer feels responsible for all the world’s problems, but contents itself – sometimes in a way that is almost pushy and petty – with the articulation of “student interests.” At first glance, this new student generation doesn’t seem all that different from the older, “quiet,” or “skeptical” generation of the 1950s and early 1960s, which, from time to time, also “took to the battlefield” with neatly printed cardboard placards to protest increases in streetcar fares and cafeteria prices.

Despite all of the revolutionary slogans that remain (and can still be seen on university walls today), it is hard to overlook the fact that there is hardly anyone who still seriously believes in revolutionary interpretations of current situations. The revolution has been put on ice, and the revolutionaries are taking a breather. This “breather” served above all to push the revolution off the public stage. It is taking place once again – here in this country with typical German thoroughness – in auditoriums, in lecture halls, and at meetings of SPD leftists. The unusual sobriety actually points more to exhaustion than to a deceptive calm before a new storm. The revolutionaries are tired, sad, disillusioned. In the end, it is more draining to be against everything than to totally subordinate yourself to one idea, one mission, or one commitment, to dedicate yourself fully to one thing.

What the antiauthoritarian “New Left” never really managed to find, however, was precisely this sense of security and identification that springs from dedication to a cause. They never found a clear-cut theme, their own distinct purpose. For a while, they seemed to have found it in a concern for the Third World, in dealing with war, need, hunger, and suffering on the margins of the affluent world. Identification with the revolutionaries of the Third World promised guidance and a boost to one’s own revolutionary efforts. By feigning participation in a worldwide, unified front of the oppressed, they gained courage and at the same time found a purpose and a direction for their own rebellious desires again. And they saw themselves as an important factor in the global struggle.

It was precisely the more far-sighted and critical theorists of the “New Left” who saw how much secret safeguarding of interests, how much “private” interest accompanied this orientation, how
unsustainable this strategy would thus be in the long run. Failure in the real world of politics and the accompanying frustration, the relapse into discouragement and desperation were not hard to prognosticate. On top of that, the political developments in Cuba, China, and Vietnam also made their own contribution. What had begun so full of hope, what had suddenly made the world seem so “young” again: the rediscovery of humanity, the feeling of being connected globally, the return to individuality, spontaneity, and the power of the human will to move mountains – all of this went off like fireworks. The antiauthoritarian exuberance has dissipated. People are finding a new point of orientation somewhere between subculture and party Communism.

The promising revolt against the constraints of the alienating world of technology and science was just a short flirt with freedom. All of a sudden, among the supporters of sub-culturalism, a privatistic cultural pessimism started to appear from behind the well-justified criticism of industrial society. The blind and desperate flight from reality and the future led to the total exclusion of any all-connecting social reference to the rest of the world.

The situation looks a little different on the “other side,” among the champions of an orthodox cadre strategy. Here, it is not the return to the individual person that offers evidence of capitulation in the face of the real tasks and problems that industrial society poses to socially imaginative citizens, regardless of their political orientation; instead, it is the “escape” into believing in the security-bestowing Marxist historical philosophy of the nineteenth century. Partaking of a more than century-old understanding of structure and law, which leads to an avowal of the social teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has less to do with “criticism” and “intellectual freedom” than with a deeply rooted need for security, safety, and a clear orientation with regard to the origins and goal, the meaning and future course of history. Believing in a law of history that works behind the participants’ backs and ultimately remains inaccessible to them always also involves some fear of freedom and some fear of the infinite openness and uncertainty of historical existence.

So what remains; what should remain? What is there to preserve beyond all the fronts and factions?

First and foremost, the protest of the young generation did away with a host of long-outdated taboos once and for all. What had often been regarded as unspeakable up to that point was called by name, without hesitation. Language and general behavior have become freer, if not always also more tolerant; but on the whole there was an increase in openness and the willingness to engage in criticism. This can certainly be entered as a win on the overall balance sheet, even if the “losses” cannot be ignored: a persistent lack of understanding of the need for governance, rash denouncements of “the formal,” of “superficiality” in social relations, of tradition in particular, and a general readiness to rebel that prevents authority from being able to be experienced as a source of enrichment and self-enhancement as well.
What was new and often unfamiliar: a basic, underlying moral sensitivity to need and misery, to the disenfranchised and oppressed, a sense of the one-ness of the world, of universal concern no matter where evil should emerge. But unconditional side-taking turned all too easily into aggression, knowledge into know-it-allness, and justifiable criticism into sweeping accusation.

And yet: the sometimes downright hectic “openness” to the problems of the time and the day would not fail to leave a lasting impression. Most of the problems that were raised were not the fantasies of pessimists or hysterics; they were about the basic survival of humanity. It was definitely not superfluous to point urgently, again and again, to the errors and weaknesses of our system, to imminent hunger catastrophes, psychological threats, the situation in the Third World, the self-destructive arms race, and a lot more. These things were not new in the sense that no one had ever recognized them or given them precise names. But they were brought into the public eye, the veil of indifference was torn away, and the disastrous adjustment to misery and worldly catastrophe was prevented, sometimes dramatically – this is certainly the unquestionable contribution of this movement. All of this is the original moral and emancipatory achievement of the “New Left.”

But what will happen now? To be sure, the comparatively less spectacular “long march through the institutions” that we are experiencing now is not a carefully planned and systematically implemented strategy of overcoming the system by “treading softly.” The revolution of yesterday and today is taking place partly in radio studios, newspaper editorial offices, publishing houses, educational institutions, political party groups, and the headquarters of associations. This definitely has something to do with political strategy, but far more with the transitory status of the mostly student rebels and the psychological constitution of the movement as a whole. After the relatively unproductive theoretical assault, most are now concerned with the concrete application and practical testing of system critique. Effective work in the neighborhood and the workplace, social involvement among apprentices and pupils, project-related teamwork in small groups – in the present phase of development all of this ranks far ahead of the distant goals of the revolution and is regarded as more important and more meaningful than comprehensive theoretical analyses and sweeping diagnoses of the era [Zeitdiagnosen].

What we are presently experiencing is a new, totally unfamiliar “modesty” with respect to political demands: an orientation toward what is closest at hand, toward whatever is directly important to one’s life at the present time. It is a concentration on whatever seems just within the realm of the politically possible.

This return to modesty is no coincidence. It is part of a larger and more general shift in direction: the “limits to growth,” an appeal to a moderating reason that cannot be ignored. The energy crisis, with its long-term repercussions for the stability of the entire global economy, has been a decisive factor in raising general awareness of the risks facing our planet. We are beginning to realize that the pathological cycle of the arms race, that the global resources, environmental, and food crises, that the stultification of cities, the social, cultural, and psychological crises that find expression in neuroses, drug addiction, asocial behavior, crime, and increasing suicide
rates, that all of these indicators of decline and self-destruction ineluctably force humanity to confront the question of survival.

The reality of crises and the growing awareness of crises also influence the development of the protest movement. In contrast to older social-revolutionary movements, this movement, from its very beginning, was not the product of shortage but rather of abundance. Therefore, the crisis of this affluent society [Wohlstandsgesellschaft] is also its very own crisis, because only a prospering society can afford the “luxury” of a protest against affluence and its consequences. The end of the ideology of growth and prosperity also means the end of the manifestations that ignited the protest.

Added to this is the growing pressure that rising student numbers are exerting on universities. The practice of numerus clausus, which students in all disciplines will certainly be faced with soon, has already led students to worry so much about their own university admission and major that they barely have any leftover energy for other activities.

Because of this additional pressure, the protester sees himself as being entirely caught up, for the very first time, in a situation that has been ruled an overall crisis. He shares in the general fear of the future and experiences the doubt and uncertainty that plagues everyone. It can therefore be expected that his reactions will not deviate substantially from those coming from his social environment. He, too, will initially react to the dreaded situation of a general shortage of means by restricting his expectations and demands, also – and particularly – in the area of politics. He will be prepared to live with contradictions and compromises in a way that he would not be during times of carefree prosperity.

So, as for the prognosis for the further development of the protest movement: for the near future, a new Biedermeier era is more likely than a new chapter in the great battle for freedom. It remains to be seen whether our epoch, whether the heirs to the former protest generation, in particular, find their way to that “happiness based on melancholy” that literary historian Paul Kluckhohn attributed to the historical Biedermeier era in the period leading up to the March Revolution of 1848. Traces of worn-out, hypochondriac, privatist tendencies, a good dose of thinking about individual security, and the tendency to approach the inevitable with resignation – albeit without panic – are in any case easy to make out in current guiding models.


Translation: Allison Brown
The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture

HELMUT SCHMIDT

The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lectures have been established as a tribute to the Institute's first Director. The 1977 Lecture was delivered by Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 28 October 1977.

In his address the Chairman of the Institute's Council, Professor Ernst van der Beugel, welcomed the speaker as follows: 'Mr Chancellor, to govern implies a keen sense of priorities, the priority you have chosen in delivering the second Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, is a very high tribute to Alastair’s memory and a great privilege for this Institute. Our welcome is twofold. We, of course, welcome you as Head of Government of the Federal Republic. We are, however, proud to welcome you also as Helmut Schmidt, member of this Institute since 1959. In welcoming you as Federal Chancellor, we would like to express our conviction that what happens in the Federal Republic will, to a very great extent, determine the fate of Europe and of the Western Alliance. We admire your achievements; we trust your policies; we share your concerns; you inspire our confidence, not in the least with regard to that central moral problem of Government: to strike a just and effective balance between freedom and authority. In welcoming our member, Helmut Schmidt, we think of the many intellectual contributions you have made to the work of this Institute by preparing papers and by participating in our discussions. In spite of the enormous burden of your high offices – Parliamentary Leader of your Party, Federal Minister of Defence, Federal Minister of Finance and, finally, Federal Chancellor – you have always found time for this Institute.

Alastair was primarily a scholar, but, at the same time, deeply interested in acts of policy. ... It is, therefore, more than fitting that a man of action, dedicated to the conceptional basis on which policy should rest, honours with his Lecture this afternoon, the scholar, who never lost his link with concrete acts of policy'.

It is a privilege and a challenge for me to deliver to you today the 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture.

I consider it a very special privilege because in this way I can pay tribute to Alastair Buchan and at the same time indicate my appreciation and admiration for the work carried out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Alastair was a brilliant thinker on subjects concerning war and peace. He was an outstanding journalist. He was also a good pedagogue. When I first participated in an international meeting organized by the IISS there were several working groups among which was one on nuclear strategy and another on conventional warfare. I had volunteered for the latter but Alastair said, 'No, you go to the first one because this is what you have to learn'. And so I did. He was the fine Director of the Institute when I became a member 18 years ago; I came to be his friend because I shared his deep concern about maintaining world peace and global security as a major pre-requisite for human freedom and happiness.

At the same time I consider it a challenge to try to analyse within the short space of this memorial lecture some important aspects of Western security. I know that there are many in the audience today who have devoted more time and intellectual power to the dimensions of Western security about which I propose to speak: strategic and political aspects on the one hand, economic and social aspects on the other.

New Dimensions of Security

In preparing for this lecture I picked up again Alastair Buchan's book Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s. It is an important and a very thoughtful book in which Alastair analysed the structure of world politics only five years ago. His main concern was with the balance of power

between the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union and China. Brilliant thinker though he was, he did not at that time devote much attention to the economic, the social and the internal aspects of Western security, which I will discuss today as new dimensions of security. These aspects do not replace the earlier models of balance and imbalance of power around the globe. But I believe that they must be added to those concepts which, in time, they will change and modify. I know, of course, that Walter Bagehot once stated: ‘One of the greatest pains of human nature is the pain of a new idea’. Yet I believe that it is in the best interest of a tradition established and promoted by Alastair to try to understand these new dimensions of security now rather than to discover in the future that we made the wrong decisions because we failed to understand them and take them into consideration.

What are these new dimensions? First, economic development. By this I mean the necessity to safeguard the basis of our prosperity, to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials, and the need for a monetary system which will help us to reach those targets. There was a feeling not too long ago that we had few problems in this field. However, the oil crisis, the phasing out of the Bretton Woods agreement, world-wide inflation, unemployment and inadequate economic growth, have together changed the picture and have created widespread feelings of insecurity.

Second, social security. By this I mean the necessity to achieve and maintain social peace at home, making goods and jobs available for our people and at the same time telling them bluntly that there are limits to what the state can do for them. It is in this connection that I would like to congratulate my friends Jim Callaghan and Denis Healey on their success in fighting inflation and restoring confidence in Sterling. The battle is not yet over, but you, the British, have come a long way since last year and I firmly believe that the outlook is good.

Third, domestic security. By this I mean the necessity to strengthen and defend our society against terrorists whose sole aim is to destroy its fabric with acts of brutal killing and kidnapping. You have had your share of terrorist activity in this country and you have faced up to it. Now we in Germany are faced with a different, but equally ugly, form of terrorism. So are the Dutch and other nations. We are determined to put an end to it without sacrificing the liberal qualities of our society. In connection with this I would like to point to and applaud the work done by the IISS in analysing terrorism, and I want to urge more international co-operation to stop terrorist activities.

J. B. Priestly in his book The English quotes himself – because he believes his idea is important, and I fully agree – to the effect that foreigners often only see the walls around the gardens of Britain and fail to appreciate the beauty of what lies within them. Here indeed is one of the main reasons why many foreigners misjudge Britain and the British. But in the framework of this lecture the analogy has another application: in the past we have all worked towards maintaining and mending our outward defences but have possibly neglected the economic structure of our gardens, the importance of the well-being of its plants and the threats to their roots. Therefore, while I do not mean to suggest that we should drop our guard of outward defence, I shall devote most of this lecture to the internal considerations of Western security. I shall concentrate on the economic dimensions, but first I shall analyse some current strategic and political issues.

The Necessity of Arms Control
Most of us will agree that political and military balance is the prerequisite of our security, and I would warn against the illusion that there may be grounds for neglecting that balance. Indeed, it is not only the prerequisite for our security but also for fruitful progress in East-West detente.

In the first place we should recognize that – paradoxical as it may sound – there is a closer proximity between a hazardous arms race, on the one hand, and a successful control of arms, on the other, than ever before. There is only a narrow divide between the hope for peace and the danger of war.

Second, changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the
disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons.

Third, because of this we must press ahead with the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) as an important step towards a better balance of military power in Europe.

No one can deny that the principle of parity is a sensible one. However, its fulfilment must be the aim of all arms-limitation and arms-control negotiations and it must apply to all categories of weapons. Neither side can agree to diminish its security unilaterally.

It is of vital interest to us all that the negotiations between the two super-powers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic weapons should continue and lead to a lasting agreement. The nuclear powers have a special, an overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the other hand, we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO’s deterrence strategy.

We are all faced with the dilemma of having to meet the moral and political demand for arms limitation while at the same time maintaining a fully effective deterrent to war. We are not unaware that both the United States and the Soviet Union must be anxious to remove threatening strategic developments from their relationship. But strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. So long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The Alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one, and to prevent any developments that could undermine the basis of this strategy.

At the meeting of Western heads of State and Government in London last May I said that the more we stabilize strategic nuclear parity between East and West, which my Government has always advocated, the greater will be the necessity to achieve a conventional equilibrium as well.

Today, again in London, let me add that when the SALT negotiations opened we Europeans did not have a clear enough view of the close connection between parity of strategic nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and tactical nuclear and conventional weapons on the other, or if we did, we did not articulate it clearly enough. Today we need to recognize clearly the connection between SALT and MBFR and to draw the necessary practical conclusions.

At the same meeting in May I said that there were, in theory, two possible ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact states. One would be for the Western Alliance to undertake a massive build-up of forces and weapons systems; the other for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level. I prefer the latter.

The Vienna negotiations have still not produced any concrete agreement. Since they began the Warsaw Pact has, if anything, increased the disparities in both conventional and tactical nuclear forces. Up to now the Soviet Union has given no clear indication that she is willing to accept the principle of parity for Europe, as she did for SALT, and thus make the principle of renunciation of force an element of the military balance as well.

Until we see real progress on MBFR, we shall have to rely on the effectiveness of deterrence. It is in this context and no other that the public discussion in all member states of the Western Alliance about the ‘neutron weapon’ has to be seen. We have to consider whether the ‘neutron weapon’ is of value to the Alliance as an additional element of the deterrence strategy, as a means of preventing war. But we should not limit ourselves to that examination. We should also examine what relevance and weight this weapon has in our efforts to achieve arms control.

For the first time in history arms-control negotiations are being conducted when there exists a weapon capable of destroying all living things. Failure of such negotiations can no longer be compensated for by banking on military victory. That is why it is of such crucial importance that all should realize the seriousness of the Vienna negotiations, and why results must be achieved there. I would like to list seven ‘musts’ and ‘must nots’ for these negotiations:

1. Both sides, all participants in the MBFR negotiations, must state their willingness to bring the negotiations to a positive con-
clusion and to be party to reductions on an equal basis.

2. Priority must be given to the aim—and it must be achieved without delay—of preventing any further increase in the military confrontation, and thus dispelling apprehensions.

3. The threat of a surprise attack must be eliminated.

4. The confidence-building measures voluntarily agreed at the cscE must be accepted with binding effect.

5. It must remain the principal objective of MBFR to achieve, by means of reductions, a balance of forces at a lower level.

6. Force reductions must be oriented to the principle of parity and must be verifiable. Parity and collectivity must be recognized as the fundamental and determining principles.

7. The capability of both Alliance systems to organize their defence must not be impaired.

We should also consider whether it is necessary to extend the confidence-building measures beyond the agreed scope. Even if we should achieve conventional parity within the MBFR reduction area, this will still fall considerably short of parity of conventional forces in Europe as a whole. This is underlined by the fact that the Soviet Union has substantially increased her strategic reinforcement capabilities and could rapidly bring forwards forces concentrated outside the reduction area whereas American forces, if reduced in MBFR, would be cut off from Europe by the Atlantic.

Since the West formulated its double strategy of deterrence and detente ten years ago, progress along the road to detente has been respectable. The ‘Ostpolitik’ of the Federal Republic of Germany, based firmly on the Alliance, has promoted and helped to shape this development. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has been another step towards stability and security in Europe. Berlin, once a major source of crisis, is not the problem it was. Security in Europe has been reinforced by bilateral agreements in which the parties undertake not to resort to force.

The American commitment to Europe no longer stems solely from rights and obligations arising from World War II. Rather, that commitment rests on the security interests of the United States and Western Europe alike. The Soviet Union and her allies have explicitly recognized this fact by putting their signatures to the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki. For us in Germany, the German question remains open; we are called upon to achieve the reunification of Germany. But the German question cannot, and must not, have priority over peace. This is a contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to stability in Europe.

World Economy and Security
The need for deterrence and detente cannot, however, detract from the fact that a sound economy—and for me this includes full employment just as much as social justice—is the foundation of all security. This is true in two ways: unless our economy flourishes we can maintain neither the military equilibrium nor the stability of our free and democratic institutions. The Western economies have been profoundly shaken by the serious recession following worldwide inflation, the collapse of the international monetary system, and the oil crisis. Today our primary task is to restabilize the economic foundations of the democratic state and thus not least the foundations of our common security policy. Let me stress what Henry Kissinger said in his 1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture before this Institute:

A world that cries out for economic advance, for social justice, for political liberty and for a stable peace needs our collective commitment and contribution.8

Today, just as in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the economic and military aspects of our security policy are again on a par with each other. In 1947 George Marshall called for a working economy to establish the political and social conditions under which free institutions can exist. That task presents itself anew today under different conditions. Since the end of World War II the Western democracies, favoured by constant economic growth, have experienced the full effects of democratic equality; they have transformed themselves into open societies with more social justice. For the individual citizen, the State is today the guarantor of social

security and social justice. Never before has the working population had so large a share of the nation's economic prosperity.

We have to ask ourselves, however, whether this redistribution process has not cut profits unreasonably and thus caused the decline in investment and capital expenditure in recent years. One cause of our economic problem - that of insufficient investment and capital expenditure - lies, I believe, in the greater risks for companies arising from the faster rate at which the world economic structure is changing, rising oil and energy prices, and the partial saturation of important markets in the industrial countries.

Owing to the development of the social security network, public expenditure in this area has risen at a faster rate from year to year than the gross national product. Today we have, I believe, reached the load limit in many of our countries, at least for the time being.

On top of this, the developing countries are stepping up their demands on the Western industrial world. They demand both full control over their raw materials and higher prices; they demand more development aid; they demand the biggest possible share of the benefits of Western investment in the Third World; and they demand unrestricted access for their industrial products into our markets. In the last analysis, these are claims on the gross national product of the Western industrial countries.

For years the Western countries have been exposed to the pressure of inflation, the result of excessive demands on their GNP. It was the monetary crisis of 1971 that exposed challenges, which existed earlier, in concrete form. In the following years inflation was fuelled by an unprecedented boom in the commodity sector, and ultimately by the price policy of the OPEC cartel. All this led to a structural upheaval in the global balances of payment network, to a structural upheaval in world trade, in world demand and thereby in employment.

The dangers of inflation are still with us today. Throughout the world, the days of cheap energy and raw materials are over: prices are very likely to continue to rise in real terms, and this means relative to the price of the goods which the industrial countries manufacture and export.

The answer to our problems cannot lie in dismantling our social achievements, in rolling back social progress. The stability of liberal democracy depends on the extent to which we can secure greater social justice. If the Federal Republic of Germany is today enjoying considerable stability it is because she has made social justice a broad reality.

There are three problems which the West will have to resolve in the economic sector, not least for the sake of its security.

The first is to construct and safeguard a liberal, flexible and hence working world economic system. The international economic order we created after 1945 enabled the Western democracies - and also some developing countries - to expand their economies at a speed and with a constancy which have no parallel in economic history. Through their free trade and capital transactions the Western countries have grown more and more into one vast market. The ever-increasing international division of labour was, and still is, the main source of progress and prosperity. National economies have thus become increasingly interdependent. But this interdependence, of a hitherto unknown degree, has not only provided stronger impulses for growth in an expanding world economy, but has also now led to greater inflation and recession. The effects of the world recession have been greatest for those countries whose economic structure is least flexible and whose political management has been least able to adjust to the new situation. This crisis has deepened the disparities between the Western countries. It has exacerbated the divergence of rates of inflation, and created payments imbalances which have grown steadily worse.

The recession has thus become a great threat to our world economic system: the tendency to try to solve problems unilaterally with protectionist measures has increased, and is increasing daily. We must ward off this threat in a united effort.

Protectionism offers no solutions. World economic interdependence has led to a synchronization of economic fluctuations between all nations. Where, as in the countries of Western Europe, exports in important branches of industry account for half or more of total production, no single country can free itself from the vortex of world economic recession by its own efforts. In practice, nations have lost their economic autonomy. An attempt to return to unilateral national measures would be
disastrous. The only way out is through closer economic co-operation.

The Western democracies are about to embark on this road. Since the beginning of the recession we have successfully intensified our efforts to co-ordinate economic policy. We have agreed to pursue growth and full employment without repeating the old inflationary mistakes.

To achieve this consensus is essential. Let me make this point clear: there are no economic panaceas which can be recommended to, or prescribed for, governments by majority decisions, as it were. Each government must, in consultation with its partners, take those steps which take into account the special situation of its country.

In this joint effort a major aim must be to restore foreign trade equilibrium. The present payments imbalances originate only partly from the oil price explosion. In the three years 1974-6, the accumulated OPEC surplus amounted to 145 billion US-dollars, whereas the deficit countries were in the red on current account to the amount of 210 billion. The oil price explosion can, therefore, explain only part of the deterioration of the global balance of payments network.

The current account deficits of the oil-consuming industrial and developing countries in relation to OPEC cannot be rectified by traditional instruments of adjustment. The prime remedy is to consume less oil. Other measures are the development of alternative sources of energy and the stepping up of exports to the oil-exporting countries in line with their own development and the increase in their capacity to absorb goods from the industrial oil consumers.

In the meantime we must provide adequate facilities for financing these deficits but in a way which does not delay the reduction of non-oil deficits. The creation of the Witteveen facility is an important step to this end.

Today, the structural modification caused by the progressive international division of labour coincides with other structural changes, such as in demand, or technical changes on the supply side. This has no doubt led to an aggravation of the employment situation and a strengthening of protectionist forces.

However, we must realize that trade policy cannot serve as a national instrument for creating jobs. Such a solution could only have short-term success – that is, only until such time as the trade partners take countermeasures. These considerations apply to Europe in particular. The European Community, being the world’s biggest exporter and importer, depends on open markets. To yield to protectionist temptations would be suicidal for Europe.

Markets must be kept open for industrial exports from the Third World as well. The Western countries need co-operation with the Third World on a basis of trust, and it is in their own uppermost interest to integrate the developing countries fully into the system of world trade.

What is more, in view of saturation in our own markets, the markets of the developing countries with their unlimited demand potential could become an important pillar of our future growth. However, if one wants to export one must import as well. We should therefore enable the developing countries, by more imports and greater transfers of capital, to buy more from us.

The OECD countries have so far, on the whole, withstood the temptation of protectionism and kept their markets open. This success is of crucial importance. It contrasts our present situation with that of the 1930s when the Western countries, by destroying free world trade, drove each other into a state of permanent depression and permanent unemployment.

As far as my own country is concerned, we are resolved to continue to keep our markets open. On 1 July 1977 the West-European Free Trade Zone was implemented. It is the world’s largest free trade area for industrial products. The open system of world trade must be maintained.

Access to Raw Materials
The second major task which confronts us is to ensure our raw material and energy supplies. Let us bear in mind that whereas the Eastern industrial countries are self-sufficient as a group, at least in raw material and energy supplies for the time being, the West, apart from foodstuffs, consumes more raw materials and oil than it produces. The Western countries depend on massive imports from the Third World.

There are thus two sources of danger for our raw material supplies. These supplies can be endangered, for one thing, by the outbreak of war or civil war in Third World regions, and, for another, by insufficient production due to insufficient investment in the Third World.

We have all been conscious of the first source
of danger since the Middle East war of 1973 and the oil crisis. Another region which is of vital importance to the security of our raw material supplies and which has become a trouble spot in international affairs is Southern Africa.

Conflicts in the Third World give the Soviet Union an opportunity to expand its influence. Imagine the implications for Western economic security if the Soviet Union, with South Africa and Rhodesia, as her allies, were to monopolize, for example, world chromium supplies. To avert the dangers arising out of Third World instability the West has to pursue a policy aimed at the peaceful solution of conflicts and a peaceful conciliation of interests in those regions.

The conflicts in the Middle East and Southern Africa have long attracted the attention of Western foreign policy. The United States is making every effort to mediate in the Israel-Arab conflict. Europe supports this by an effort of its own and by its willingness to play an active part in the economic reconstruction and development of the region following a peace settlement.

In Rhodesia, London and Washington in particular are trying to bring about a peaceful transfer of power to the black majority; in Namibia the five Western members of the Security Council are trying to find a solution. The Federal Republic of Germany is playing an active part there. The Western powers are endeavouring to convince South Africa of the need for fundamental and rapid reforms.

Even if political stability can be assured, however, one can only import what has been previously produced. Here lies the second source of danger for our raw material supplies. Raw material investment in developing countries is no longer financed and promoted as it once was. In the mining sector in particular, exploration and prospecting in the Third World have largely come to a standstill. There can be no doubt about the long-term consequences. Henry Kissinger warned at UNCTAD IV against an explosion of raw material costs - he should rather have said prices - should the current investment trends continue. The lead-time for large-scale mining projects is six to eight years and sometimes more. In other words, the said danger to our raw material supplies does not hit us today - but it is today that we must act.

The indispensable co-operation between industrial and developing countries in the exploitation of raw material resources must be restored and intensified. To provide stable and close co-operation between industrialized and developing countries it is, I believe, necessary and justified that guarantees for those private investments should be given by the host countries. This should become a general rule and, in the framework of the North-South dialogue, a necessary quid pro quo.

How should we ensure our energy supplies? If there is a cardinal problem for the economic security of the West, it is that of energy. More than half of the Western world's energy requirements is at present being met by mineral oil. But we must face a fact which no policy can change: this is the exhaustion of world oil reserves which is now becoming apparent. Recent studies by the OECD, MIT and Exxon agree that predictable oil supplies may not even suffice to cover requirements in the 1980s. And I am afraid this fundamental fact will not be notably changed even by the new oil fields which you in Britain have discovered in the North Sea.

The main consequence is that the wasteful use of energy, of which we have made a habit, must stop. We must be quick to make decisive progress on energy conservation and the development of new types of energy.

In this situation the industrial countries cannot afford to forego any option for energy policy. This is particularly true for nuclear energy. But I would add that a key role in this respect falls to the United States who uses half of the energy consumed by the Western world. It is therefore in our interest that President Carter should be successful with his energy conservation programme.

Trade with the East

The third major task of Western security policy in economic terms is to establish balanced and stable economic relations with the Communist state trading countries of the East.

Since 1970 East-West trade has practically quadrupled. The Federal Republic of Germany is the most important Western trade partner of each of the Communist Eastern countries. This strong intensification of trade and co-operation is the result of political detente and also of the economic interests of both sides. The economies of the Communist East have reached a stage of
development where their growth also depends more and more on an increase in productivity. That is why the East has a strong and lasting interest in importing Western technology.

The East, due to its large potential of raw materials and energy, affords the West the possibility of diversifying, to a certain extent, its raw material and energy imports. At the same time it offers markets which are especially attractive for the West because they are not, or not fully, involved in the synchronization of Western business cycles. In 1975, for instance, due to the world recession, German exports dropped by almost 4 per cent in nominal terms whereas the exports to the Soviet Union rose by 46 per cent, thus making a valuable contribution towards improved use of capacities and a better employment situation in my country.

Who, then, derives the greater benefit from East-West trade? There are critics in the West who say that the West, by its technology exports, indirectly helps the Soviet military build-up. Critical voices in the East will probably object that helping the West to preserve jobs is supporting the capitalist system. I believe that these conflicting arguments in themselves indicate that East-West trade benefits both sides. And so, after all, it should and must be.

A couple of decades ago the American writer Ambrose Bierce said: 'Calamities are of two kinds: misfortune to ourselves and good fortune to others'. I do not think that this applies in modern economic conditions of interdependence. I would say today: economic misfortune to others will cause calamity to ourselves. And good fortune to others will also cause good fortune to ourselves.

If the Western countries act jointly, the development of trade relations and of industrial co-operation with the East can, I am convinced, be essential for both our own economic security and the safeguarding of peace.

Another urgent task I have often mentioned is to get the East to assume a constructive role in the North–South issue. So far, the Soviet Union and her allies have supported verbally the demands of the developing countries, but as regards financial support they have been trying to pin the responsibility entirely on the West. The development aid of the East is negligible compared with its economic potential, and even more so compared with Western contributions.

In 1976, for instance, the amount of official development assistance transferred by the Federal Republic of Germany alone was two and a half times as high as the total transfer made by the Soviet Union plus all the other Eastern bloc countries together. Or to give you another example: the official development assistance of all the OECD countries in 1976 was 27 times as high as that of the Comecon countries including the Soviet Union.

The integration of the Eastern countries into the world economic system has already progressed so far that they can feel the direct impact of inflation and recession in the Western industrial countries. They should recognize, therefore, that world economic stability is in their own interest. But this stability, and ultimately the stability of world peace, can no longer be ensured unless hunger and distress in the Third World are overcome. This is a goal which requires the joint efforts of all industrial countries. The Eastern bloc countries can no longer retain the role of disinterested onlookers in the North–South dialogue, limiting their support to the supply of military weapons.

**Terrorism**

Finally, let me say a few words about the deep shock we have all felt over the last four weeks as a result of terrorist action. The focal point of the events themselves was my country, but from day to day it became increasingly clear to people in all corners of the world that terrorism is not a problem of exclusively German concern but an international problem of global dimension.

In my country, we have experienced with gratitude what it means in such a situation when other countries rally round with advice, with active assistance. And it has been an exercise and a very fine experience in practical solidarity. During those days, gestures were made, I feel, for co-operation among the world's nations and for a common stand, a common effort to overcome the plague of international terrorism with its contempt for human life and with its aim of destroying democratic society.

I would like to express the hope that this terrible experience will prompt the United Nations to adopt quickly the convention which we have proposed against the taking of hostages. Nobody today can any longer make light of terrorist violence as the work of people who
have simply been led astray by allegedly political motives, and on top of that grant them political asylum. Jonathan Carr in the Financial Times wrote the other day: 'The German terrorist cannot really be classed with any political wing. If they can be compared to anything it is to Dostoievski's devils, people who by their own admission are ready even to throw acid into a child's face if it will help their cause. What is that cause? Beyond destroying society it is impossible to say'. I think he is right. Moreover, the effect is not only on domestic politics. In extreme circumstances terrorism might even trigger off international conflict.

Therefore, we should act together to confront the blindness of terrorist killers with the steadfastness of our democratic convictions. Let us together continue to defend human dignity and human rights as inviolable and inalienable values; and let us defend the right to live and to enjoy personal freedom, rights we all identify as inalienable principles.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have tried to outline the dimensions of a policy aimed at establishing and maintaining a state of affairs in which our free democratic institutions can survive and prosper.

The industrial democracies of the West produce 65 per cent of the world's goods and their share in world trade is 70 per cent. They are the motive force of world economic growth and technological progress. The power and moral superiority of our belief in the freedom and dignity of Man is evident.

This is why, inspired by a constructive will for reform, all of us endeavour perpetually to renew democracy. Only in this way can we remove weaknesses, obsolete conditions, and injustices.

The industrial democracies of the world must further intensify their co-operation: in the European Community, in the Atlantic Community and in the Trilateral Community formed by Europe, North America, and the Pacific region embracing Japan, Australia and New Zealand. This cohesion is of crucial importance for peace, for economic growth and the cause of freedom, justice and human dignity.

No less decisive, however, is the relationship between the two big powers, because on them depends how much of the surface of our globe will be covered by the policy of detente and to what extent its substance will be strengthened by a policy aimed at preserving peace. We feel encouraged by the statements made by the two leading personalities of both sides.

Jimmy Carter gave the assurance that in the search for world peace the United States will be found in the forefront and stand by her commitment to the freedom of Man. The following passage from his speech before the United Nations on 4 October 1977 appears to me to be of particular significance.

We must look beyond the present, and work to prevent the critical threats and instabilities of the future. If the principles of self-restraint, reciprocity and mutual accommodation of interests are observed, then the United States and the Soviet Union will not only succeed in limiting weapons, but will also create a foundation for better relations in other spheres of interests.

Leonid Brezhnev said early this year:

The allegations that the Soviet Union goes beyond its defence requirements and is seeking military superiority to be able to deal the first blow are malicious and unfounded.

And in the same speech Brezhnev rightly stated:

There is no more burning and vital task than that of making peace durable and indestructible.

He added:

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we shall not be found wanting.

In our quest for security and peace in Europe and world-wide, we shall take the two statesmen by their word. For, in the last resort, the survival of mankind depends on the strengthening of world peace.

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8 The Financial Times, 24 October 1977, p. 16.

4 Address by President Carter to the UN General Assembly, 4 October 1977 (us).

A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR ENERGY
A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT
AND NUCLEAR ENERGY

September 22 - October 1, 1979
by Everett Mendelsohn

For two weeks in late September and early October, 1979
a delegation called together by the American Friends Service Committee
visited the Soviet Union. The intent of the group was to discuss the
nuclear arms race and the relations between military and civilian uses
of nuclear energy. Members of the group included a number of activists
directly involved in nuclear disarmament projects and others with long
interest in nuclear warfare, disarmament and nuclear energy issues:

Dr. Helen Caldicott
Dr. William Sloan Coffin
Dr. Arthur Macy Cox
Martha Daniels
Dr. William Harris
Dr. Everett Mendelsohn
Wendy Mogey
Terry Provance
Pam Solo

Our discussion centered around six issues: (1) Cuba, the Soviet
interpretation of what Cuba means for the current SALT discussions,
and ratification procedures in the Senate and what the Soviets think
it means for the development of U.S. policy; (2) the SALT treaty itself,
the ratification process in the Senate, and Soviet views regarding the
implications of potential failure to ratify the treaty; (3) what comes
after SALT, especially initiatives for capping the arms race; (4) Euro-
strategic weapons and the decisions that NATO will be making in the
next two and one-half months concerning their deployment; (5) talking
to the Soviets about what it means to talk to Americans; and (6)
nuclear energy, particularly focusing on weapons proliferation, waste
disposal, health matters, and alternative perspectives for energy.

Overall Evaluation:

Having made a number of visits in the last decade and a half to the Soviet Union to discuss political and disarmament issues, I found on this visit a greater flexibility in mind, a greater willingness to explore approaches that were not theirs, than I had found at any previous time. The involvement of increasing numbers of people in discussions of this sort with Americans and other European shows. Their ability to hear our ideas, reflect on them, as well as to expound their own ideas, was impressive. This confirms a view which a number of others, particularly those in and around Pugwash, have had, that there is the beginning of a substantial, knowledgeable, disarmament-oriented community within the Soviet intellectual and policy world, and particularly among senior advisors to the Soviet government. The frankness we had in our discussions, however, means that we really cannot attribute statements directly to many people by name. Instead, we are able to list the people with whom we talked and to describe the different issues we talked about and the kinds of responses we found in general terms.

Cuba and SALT

Let me turn first to the Cuba issue. We discussed this issue at two places—one, the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, which is one of the Institutes of the Academy of Sciences, which are not only scholarly, but from which several members (including its Director) are very senior advisors to the Soviet government. We talked with them in groups, and on one or two occasions, on an individual basis. Further, we talked directly with two high-ranking members of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, both of whom had been deeply involved in the SALT negotiations at the very highest levels.

Cuba worries them, and the American response to Cuba worries them. It worries them because they see the issue of Cuba and the question of troops there as unrelated to the SALT negotiations except in the most general way. They felt that the American reaction to what was purportedly discovered is a contrived reaction; they felt that the issue was being used by hawks as a way of undermining the credibility of SALT within the Senate. They were particularly disturbed by the fact that it was the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Frank Church, who broke the issue and broke it in as negative a manner as possible. They were worried by the sharp positions people took—"SALT ratification is not possible unless the Soviets change their current position," said Frank Church. "The status quo will mean the defeat of SALT," said the Carter administration in one of its early briefings.

Within the course of our discussion in the Foreign Ministry they gave their explanation of the Cuban situation in the following terms. At the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, there had been between 25,000 and 30,000 Soviet troops and the beginnings of missile emplacements. During the negotiations that took place at that time the Soviet Union agreed to cut down their troops and to withdraw missiles on a reciprocal basis. At the same time, the U.S. cut back troop emplacements and withdrew its forward base missile system from Turkey. The reciprocity was in the agreement and in the signed documents at the time. Their feeling is that at the moment this reciprocity is being undercut.
I would stress here the extent to which reciprocity is an important concept for the Soviets; they came back to it over and over again in the discussion. It was on this basis that they felt something else was happening in the current situation beyond the actual problem of troops. They pointed out that there are approximately 2500 Soviet troops involved, they say, in training missions, and 1300 Soviet civilian personnel involved in back-up, training, and support systems. They point out that these 2500 troops are comparable to the number of U.S. troops stationed at the Guantanamo Naval Base on Cuban soil. Further, they note that these 2500 troops and civilian advisors, while they rotate in and out, have been in Cuba constantly since 1962, and they point out that American intelligence has known this constantly since 1962. They have had neither opportunity to hide this nor reason to do so, and they list a number of documents and statements made by U.S. intelligence over the years showing that the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba has been known and monitored all along. With this in mind, then, they wonder what will come next from the U.S. political arena and they expressed real fears that this may undermine the SALT ratification procedures. I confess that we couldn't help but be in general agreement with their sense of total disillusionment of the introduction of the Cuba issue into the middle of the SALT ratification process.

SALT Ratification - Soviet Perspectives

Let me turn to SALT and indicate who it was that we talked to on this issue. In addition to the Foreign Ministry and the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, we talked to members of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, the senior editor of Izvestia, who is well known as a personal advisor to Brezhnev as well as being one of the senior columnists and commentators in the Soviet political system, a former admiral, with connections to the Ministry of Defense. We also had conversations on the issue with several political officers at the U.S. Embassy.

There is little doubt that SALT looms large in the Soviet perspective and that they place great importance on its ratification without substantial amendment. They feel that if the treaty must go back to renegotiation, the process may be thoroughly undercut. They see a lack of leadership in directing SALT through the Senate, and this concerns them. They wonder about whether the U.S. is indeed serious about arms control or whether SALT is being used as a pretext for further advancement of arms, and they point out that the Senate is insisting on a 5% increase in arms spending for next year.

Equality

A couple of issues involved in SALT are important to underline. First, the concept of equality. SALT II, as no prior U.S.-Soviet agreement does, includes an agreement that the weapons capabilities on both sides now have reached equality. To the Soviets this was a terribly important step, for in their view, as long as they were seen as the second-rate power, they were in position to be manipulated. Having announced equality and written it into the treaty, they now claim that there is a new position from which to move toward more general arms reduction rather than just arms control.

Soviet Data:

A second item which is terribly important from the U.S. point of view is that the treaty gives real numbers. For the first
time in a signed treaty with the Soviets there are accounting systems. We know how many missiles they have in place and of what sort. That both the Soviets and the U.S. have agreed on the actual numbers of weapons in existence gives a base line from which any future negotiations can take place. In the past this has been a difficult issue, but in this case the Soviets have given the numbers that we have always said are necessary. Further, the treaty includes the full expectation of verification. Both sides believed that they had confidence in their own inspection and verification systems.

If SALT Fails

What if SALT fails? Certainly this was the major question on the minds of the Soviets with whom we talked, and in our minds as well. None of us in our delegation is a vigorous supporter of SALT itself, but all are vigorous opponents of its defeat, and this was communicated to our hosts. SALT, we felt, does not go nearly far enough in stopping the arms race; on the contrary, it allows continued escalation. On the other hand, the defeat of SALT in the current political situation could well mean not only a turn-back in political terms, a turn-back to Cold War attitudes (which, after all, is exactly what the opponents of SALT in the Senate and outside are calling for), but could also trigger a substantial addition to the arms race. This addition could be very dangerous in that it would involve the deployment of countercruise weapons and the concomitant adoption of a "first-strike" strategy. Both sides seem able to move to these weapons in the very near future (in the U.S. the MX system and in the Soviet Union the continuing MIRVing of missiles, for example). These weapons, if deployed, become more difficult to verify or inspect and may increase the illusion that fighting a nuclear war is possible, and under certain circumstances necessary. A failure to ratify SALT at this time would almost certainly provide strong incentives for each side to achieve weapons superiority rather than the current equality. These factors would substantially increase the difficulties in negotiating any future treaty and would mean that the overall level of weapons deployed would be increased. The instabilities created by potential weapons inequalities, probable first-strike capacity, and decreased verifiability could add a significant new element of insecurity to a world already insecure and unstable enough.

A Nuclear Moratorium

In our discussions with the Soviets, we tried out several of our own ideas, exploring their responses to several elements of the political program we are developing for the U.S. The first of these was the idea of a moratorium on the deployment, testing, and production of nuclear weapons. We see these as linked, but separable in terms of negotiation.

Freeze and Deployment

The proposal addressed most directly was that of a freeze of deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. We felt that we wanted to urge a freeze at the earliest possible moment, perhaps even a commitment to it before SALT was ratified, and certainly immediately after. This is particularly important given the nature of countercruise weapons and the time frame of SALT. SALT puts a limit on certain weapons until 1981, after which the long-range cruise missiles, ground and sea-launched and mobile ballistic missiles could be deployed if controls had not been extended through negotiation. The move to new weapons allowed by the treaty has negative consequences in terms of the nature of the weapons (countercruise capacity of some), in terms of the nature of the verifiability of the mobile systems.
and in terms of escalating of the arms race. We, therefore, see the next two years as critically important. With equality in place, with the numbers of weapons now recorded, with verifiability agreed to by both the Soviet Union and the United States, we are at a perfect place to put a cap on the arms race in strategic weapons, at least at the point of their deployment. This represents the last opportunity for ending the arms race.

Such a freeze speaks to some of the fears that people have. A major fear expressed in the Senate has been that the SALT agreement, as it now stands, allows the Soviets to increase substantially the number of missiles. This is because they will deploy more MMV'd ICBM's. The Senate SALT opponents say that this means the Soviets can not only go past us, but achieve a kind of counter force ability within the treaty's terms itself which would put the U.S. at a disadvantage in a war. A freeze would prevent this from happening. It would also prevent the deployment of the MX and Trident II by the U.S. These are counterforce weapons. We were pleased by the interest shown in this proposal. At no point did we get a really negative response; at some places we got good, hard, intelligent, knowledgeable questions about what the implications would be both for SALT and after. We received strong affirmative response in the Foreign Ministry.

Total Ban on Testing

We explored the other elements of a moratorium, including a total ban on the testing of weapons. Such a ban is now possible with both nations having in principle said they are for it. However, the United States' desire to continue testing of very small weapons may be a problem. A total test ban at this point would be another significant way of cutting off the development of new weapons systems before they can be deployed. A ban on testing can be handled easily through existing verification systems, requiring some black box monitoring, but not the complex monitoring systems which we thought necessary twenty years ago when we first began discussions with the Soviets on this issue. I believe a ban on testing represents a significant political item for the American disarmament agenda in the near future.

Ban on Production

The third element of moratorium was a ban on production of nuclear weapons. Stopping producing weapons not only releases resources for human and social needs, but it also means that the whole momentum of arms research and development activities would be phased down. When the production component of R. and D. is dropped out, the research component also tends to slow.

Verification

Problems of verification are real, however, and we directly addressed this issue with the Soviets. To verify a production ban reassures on-site inspection of a kind that we have not been able to negotiate with the Soviets to date. We raised the question of whether on-site inspection is possible and their response was "why not?" When we referred to the difficulties encountered in the past, they responded, "To the extent that you are really serious about a full ban on production, to that extent the amount of inspection that can be carried out on Soviet territory will also become more serious, right to the total limit." This response came from three different sources, indicating that part of our fear of not being able to reach agreement on inspection issues needs to be thoroughly re-examined. This included human on-site inspectors, as well as black boxes.
They linked any freeze and any moratorium to what to them looks like a major new threat coming through NATO.

**Euro-Strategic Weapons**

The speeches of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig in September 1979 backed President Carter’s proposal that NATO must decide in December to put in place a series of new weapons, medium range missile systems, the Pershing II and the cruise ground-launch systems, which would be based in Europe and have the capability of reaching the Soviet Union from Europe. Kissinger argued that these weapons are needed to give NATO the capability of waging “limited nuclear wars.”

To the Soviets this represents a major escalation of the arms race in that it makes their cities and their weapons targets. The argument made by Kissinger and Haig is that we need more bargaining chips in our discussions with the Soviets. If we wish to avoid this escalation through NATO, we have only two and one-half months during which intense effort must be made to make sure that NATO does not go this route. The Soviets make the point that we should negotiate a cut in the Euro-strategic systems that now exist—the SS-20, the Backfire Bomber, and the missiles on the U.S. side implanted in Germany—instead of going on to new weapons.

**Background on the SS-20**

The history of the European weapons controversy begins with Kissinger’s deal with the Russians, that if they would leave the U.S. Forward Base missiles (carried by planes from aircraft carriers and Britain based bombers) out of the SALT II negotiations, in turn he would give them favored nation trade status. This deal was undercut by the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the trade bill, and the Russians responded by beginning deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire Bomber system targeted at Europe. These Soviet weapons, however, replaced older Soviet missiles (SS-4 and SS-5). Should we not push for reduction in both the SS-20 and backfire on their side and in our forward base missile system on our side rather than move into a new round of missile and counter missile, particularly of this medium range strategic form that is being proposed?

Two high Soviets, with whom we talked, saw a Soviet willingness to enter into discussion on reduction of these European systems rather than seeing NATO move ahead in putting them in place (Leonid Brezhnev’s October 6 speech in Berlin confirmed our own glimpsings). Many of those we talked to saw a reason to reduce their SS-20 Backfire system and our forward base system, if we were willing to do so. However, they note the additional difficulty represented by China and France. An independent Chinese and French nuclear capacity represents a direct threat to the Soviets. They urged a joint U.S.-Soviet approach to persuade China and France to join negotiations.

**Military Cuts - Budget Data**

Returning directly to one concept which they and we both discussed and which they have previously advanced is the idea of the reduction of defense budgets through a mutual 10% cut. We discussed the realities of such a notion with them and indicated that to ensure that a 10% cut occurs, there is need to have the proper data to measure it. Just as the SALT agreement can ensure what’s going on because of the data given, so too to ensure a 10% reduction, you need the data, which means better budget data. We explored with them the ways of gaining this information—data which they traditionally do not give out. They said, however, that these kinds of statistics can be made available progressively as the seriousness of the reduction discussions grows. And they pointed directly to SALT as a precedent for more
forthcoming attitudes. They said that the difficulty they have had was with what they called established patterns in the past, but indicated their belief that these could be altered.

**Economic Conversion**

We raised the issue of economic conversion or, as they called it, reconversion from arms production to civilian production in our conversations. We suggested that were they, and we, to become involved in serious reconversion studies, taking sectors of the arms economy and indicating the ways in which they could be reconverted into civilian productive sectors, that this would provide "confidence building" steps. Each side could see the other thinking seriously about reconverting their economy in real segments to civilian uses in terms of time, numbers, people, etc.

**Overall Assessment on Disarmament**

How serious are the Soviets about disarmament? This is hard to assess in that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have substantially increased their armaments every year since 1945 and we have seen little in the way of a pull-back. SALT I led to seven years of an arms race which quadrupled the number of nuclear weapons in possession on each side. During both the SALT I and SALT II negotiating processes, the Soviets very significantly increased their nuclear capacity, substantially catching up with the U.S. and gaining a functional equality. On the other hand, we did in 1962 negotiate a ban on nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, we did negotiate a SALT I treaty successfully, and we did negotiate a SALT II treaty successfully. As we look at the Soviet record in these, it's, if anything, somewhat more forthcoming than ours. Our technicians have taken the lead at almost every turn in the development of new weapons, while the Soviets generally have been responders. I would conclude that the Soviets are serious about disarmament if they feel immediate threats are removed, particularly in terms of U.S. superiority which had been maintained up until the SALT II treaty, and if what they see as the threat in the east from China can be removed by bringing China into a broader negotiating system.

**Soviet - U.S. Communications**

Let me turn to the issue of the Soviets' talk to the U.S. In our discussions we were able to hear a whole series of very thoughtful, direct, specific comments on problems like a freeze and moratorium, problems like Euro-weapons, problems of getting data on budget cuts, and on reconversion models. Our question was, how can this kind of discussion which we were able to have be made available to the American public? Traditionally, Soviet press conferences are canned. A sloganspewing statement is put out as the words of President Brezhnev, or one of the other senior officials, and there is little room for interaction and for the kind of probing which we found in our meetings. We talked to over 100 Soviet scientists, government people, advisors, and scholars, and many of these are extremely interesting in exchanges because they are flexible, knowledgeable about their system and ours. We urged them to be more forthcoming in their exchanges. We felt that the U.S. press ought to be sought out more by the Soviets and we felt that the Soviet Union had a lot to gain by allowing thoughtful and analytical people to talk to the U.S. press and to come to the United States for talks.

**The U.S.S.R. and Nuclear Energy**

Now to the final issue: nuclear energy. We visited the Soviet atomic energy installation at Novovoronezh, the largest in the
Soviet Union. We also met with the Deputy Director, and several of
his associates, of the State Committee on Atomic Energy, which
represents the equivalent to the Atomic Energy Commission in the U.S.
We visited with a group at the Institute for Chemical Physics of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences. We visited with several members of
the very well known radium laboratory at the University of Leningrad.
We visited with others in the University of Leningrad. We talked with
a number of staff members of the Ministry of Health particularly con-
cerned with radiation issues.

Commitment and Proliferation

We found an almost complete commitment to a strong nuclear
energy policy. The Soviets are optimistic about being able to achieve
the nuclear energy capacity that they want and they are optimistic
about being able to solve any problems attendant on it. We raised what
seems to us the most critical problem of nuclear energy—namely,
proliferation of nuclear weapons through materials diverted from
civilian uses. We cited the nations which have not directly been
given bombs or bomb-making capacity by the super powers, but which
have diverted technology or materials to gain actual nuclear weapons
capacities--India, Pakistan, probably Brazil, probably South Africa,
probably Israel. The Soviets were also concerned about this. However,
they were quite sure that their own management of their systems was
sufficiently tight, that there could be no diversion from it. They
were fairly confident that in the reprocessing that they were engaged
in for materials which came to them from other countries (they are
one of the major enrichment and reprocessors of fuels for nuclear
plants) and in the plants that they export they had control. We asked
were they confident, however, in the ability of the International

Atomic Energy Agency, of which they were one of the major establishers,
to handle the problem of proliferation. The answer from the State
Committee on Atomic Energy was a very simple "no." They were not
certain. When we talked about what this meant, the furthest they
would go was to say that we need some more direct Soviet-U.S.
cooperation on tightening up the whole area of civilian uses and diver-
sions of civilian nuclear materials which could be used for weapons
construction. In spite of the problems, however, they were committed
to continuation of nuclear energy reactors. They point out, however,
that their interest and worry about proliferation led them to alert
the U.S. intelligence system of South Africa's growing capacity to
make bombs. They pointed to this as indication of their good faith
in opposing proliferation.

The Problem of Waste Disposal

We talked at length with people at all these places about
the problem of waste disposal and handling of waste. They admitted
at once that it was a critical question. Their general response,
however, was one of technological optimism. They felt they could
handle it and that technology would, if not today, certainly in the
future, solve all the many unsolved problems that we raised with them.
They pointed with satisfaction to their system of storing radioactive
waste materials in multi-barrier systems within geological formations.
They noted a large amount of experimentation with vitrification (that
is, enclosing the waste in solid vitreous blocks), but they are not
using that system yet. France is the only country that has begun
doing it, but still on a very small level. They also noted that
their civilian nuclear energy program is small by comparison to that
of the U.S. or Western Europe. They have only 12 to 15 plants in
operation, and although they have more in planning, the amount of waste coming from their civilian system is small.

When asked about how waste from military production and production capacity facilities were handled, they said they didn't know. And it was quite clear that if they did know, they wouldn't tell us, and a complete curtain was drawn between discussion of civilian systems and military systems. This differs from the greater openness with which both civilian and military problems can be explored in the United States. This was not possible, at least by people like us, within the context of the Soviet Union.

Health and Safety

We then explored issues of health and medical genetic problems. They are aware of the issues; they participate in the International Commission for Radiation Protection and have their representatives on the Commission. However, it is fair to say that there was no crack in their agreement that they do safety well and that really there is no problem of radiation safety in the Soviet Union. They felt they could meet all the issues that we raised with them.

On the other hand, I think it is fair to say that the data they gave us at the nuclear energy establishment we visited of the whole body radiation received by workers in the plant was much too optimistic to be true. It just doesn't meet with any of the technological realities which we know of from the operation of plants anywhere else in the world. And having seen their plant, while it was nice, it certainly was not that much more tightly constructed than the others we know of, and therefore I think we have to say that their optimism may be shielding a series of other issues or problems.

They shared with us their studies on environmental effects of radiation in the concentric circles around their plants and they said their studies show no environmental contamination whatsoever. Again, looking at data like that suggests that we are not getting the whole story. Radiation just does not behave in that way, however careful they may be. They pointed out over and over again that not being a system depending on economic competition, but one depending on planned and staged development, they weren't forced to race ahead the way a private corporation in the U.S. might. Perhaps, but nonetheless their total optimism really seemed problematic to us.

Again, data from workers involved in manufacturing of weapons, or from areas around weapons manufacturing facilities, were totally unavailable.

Alternative Energy

We had one fascinating discussion on alternative energy futures with the group at the Institute of Chemical Physics. These were people who had been engaged in a number of Pugwash discussions. They knew what the issues under discussion were, both in the West and in the Soviet Union and had some very inventive approaches. They were particularly thoughtful and innovative in energy conservation. One of the points that one of their senior figures made is that they believed they should be developing new energy sources, particularly solar energy. There is experimentation and developmental work going on in this field, and it was his feeling that by the end of the century a fairly significant solar capacity will be developed. I was impressed by the extent to which this man really knew the numbers, the amounts of energy which could be gained from these different systems when used
in different ways. He was also very aware of the amounts of energy used in the various productive systems, the production of the goods, services, transport, etc., that a society uses. He was not talking in vague generalities, but he was pointing to very well researched ideas. His major thrust was that what had to occur now was a substantial move to conserve on energy in the production of goods, services, and transport. And he analyzed sectors of the economy and indicated ways in which there could be very substantial savings in the interim as new non-nuclear energy sources are developed. He said when he looks at the energy needs versus availability, the problem of an energy shortage is a problem of only one generation. Unfortunately, he said, it's our generation. He believed that a generation hence we will have new sources in place and, in addition, will have transformed the nature of our productive techniques to ensure substantially less energy use.

In other discussions they pointed to the potential for expanded use of their proved gas and coal reserves so that the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future will not be a net importer of energy resources. In the course of one discussion, the claim was advanced that in the next five-year plan there will be a substantial increase in budgeting for gas and coal use at the expense of nuclear energy. This was information given to us by a strong proponent of nuclear energy.

U.S.-Soviet Similarities

One of the things I think we can conclude is that the general discussion by those involved in nuclear energy in the Soviet Union is strikingly similar to that in the United States. Technological optimism abounded. There was a blindness to the longer-range problems and to the extent to which when uncertainties multiply--uncertainties of proliferation, of waste, radiation, health--the rate of development ought to decrease.

We explored with them the idea of a moratorium of nuclear energy development, particularly in light of weapons proliferation problems, but met a generally negative response. We pointed also to health and safety elements which might be served by such a moratorium. The idea received a positive hearing only in the group who were seriously looking at alternative energy futures.

Conclusion

The discussions were wide-ranging, remarkably frank, and most important, suggestive of areas for specific political action and education. Particularly on issues of nuclear disarmament, the Soviets were very forthcoming and helped identify places where new initiatives could well lead to positive Soviet responses. On the planned deployment of new Eurostrategic weapons in NATO, we discovered not only their concern, but also proposals which might serve to reduce the nuclear threat in Europe rather than increase it. They were markedly positive to the concept of a freeze on deployment and production of all strategic nuclear weapons immediately after SALT II ratification. They firmly backed the need to move rapidly to SALT III negotiations so that another long hiatus between treaties does not become a period of arms escalation. They shared the concern for nuclear weapons proliferation, but held back from linking it to a slowed pace of development of civilian nuclear energy. The group felt that exchanges of the sort achieved were very valuable and hoped that they might be extended beyond the narrow circle of participants currently involved. The group encouraged the Soviets to move openly to engage the U.S. press in candid exchange.
After World War II, the AFSC was concerned to begin to ease the suspicions and tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1949 Quaker scholars and businessmen travelled from Philadelphia to Washington, New York, and Lake Success (headquarters of the UN) to make contacts with anyone who could offer an opportunity to bring rapprochement with the Soviets. They maintained contact with the State Department and with the chief Russian delegates to the UN. They published a pamphlet, *The United States and the Soviet Union*, in which the authors were seeking to find the means to achieve a transition from an attitude of suspicion and hatred to one of tolerance and forbearance.

In 1955 the AFSC sent a team to the Soviet Union, to visit for a month. The team met with private individuals and officials, saw a variety of institutions and projects. A pamphlet based on this trip was issued, *Meeting the Russians*, and the team back in the U.S. lectured widely, wrote articles and attempted to interpret a more sympathetic and understanding account of the Russian scene than was usually found in American publications.

Also in 1955 the Conferences for Diplomats program in Europe, part of the AFSC International Division's programs, issued invitations to the Soviet Foreign Ministry to have Soviet diplomats participate, and they began to do so in 1956. These opportunities for confidential dialogue brought the Soviets into an international grouping and also gave them increasing openness to AFSC initiatives.

Further direct exchanges over the last 20 years have included reciprocal seminars for academics, journalists, and social scientists, work-camp/seminars for young people, and a Secondary School Teacher exchange (now seconded to American Field Service). Our long concern and involvement with the Soviet Union has enabled us to continue contact with the many past participants in Moscow and Leningrad, and has given the AFSC an entree for dialogue with leading Soviet experts.

The Disarmament and Conversion Program of the American Friends Service Committee is working to stop the arms race, convert military production and promote nonviolent conflict resolution. The AFSC has a network of 35 offices in the United States and to contact the office closest to you please write to the nearest regional office listed on the back of this pamphlet. Please use the reply form provided here.

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Messages to the British Public

From the Right Hon. William Whitelaw, MP, Home Secretary:

"Most houses in this country offer a reasonable degree of protection against radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions and protection can be substantially improved by a series of quite simple do-it-yourself measures."

(Times, 12 February 1980)

From Mr William Rodgers, MP, Labour parliamentary spokesman for Defence:

"It was the view of the previous Government that theatre nuclear modernisation was essential, and that is our view today."

(Hansard, 24 January 1980)

From Dr Alan Glyn, MP for Windsor and Maidenhead:

"I welcome the decision to instal 40 bases in Britain."

(Hansard, 24 January 1980)

From Mr Stephen Ross, MP for the Isle of Wight, Liberal parliamentary spokesman for Defence:

"I shall mention hovercraft, which are built in the Isle of Wight. We need a large hovercraft capable of quickly conveying tanks on to beaches, particularly in the Middle East. The quickest solution is to buy those for sale from Hoverlloyd, which operates between Ramsgate and the Continent."

(Hansard, 24 January 1980)

From the Right Hon. James Callaghan, MP, Leader of the Opposition:

"We must welcome the intention of President Carter to set up a task force of 100,000 men which could move quickly into position, if only because of the utter dependence of the West on oil."

(Hansard, 28 January 1980)

From Mr Eldon Griffiths, MP for Bury St Edmunds:

"In the event of ... demonstrations by political zealots it is better that British military police rather than Americans should be doing the job of protection."

(Hansard, 24 January 1980)

From Mr James Scott-Hopkins, Euro-MP for Hereford-Worcester:

"Releasing details to the general public of a Home Office pamphlet, Protect and Survive, describing what to do in a nuclear attack would cause unwarranted panic and be an irresponsible action. With the limited amount of spending money available, Britain should place priority on building up its armed forces."

(Worcester Evening News, 19 February 1980)

From Mr W. Blake, in another place:

"Then old Nobodaddy aloft Farted & belch'd and cough'd, And said, 'I love hanging & drawing & quartering Every bit as well as war & slaughtering.'"
Protest and Survive
by E.P. Thompson

The following letter appeared in The Times on January 30, 1980, from an eminent member of Oxford University:

Reviving Civil Defence
From Professor Michael Howard, FBA
Sir,
The decision to provide bases in this country for United States cruise missiles; the future of our own "independent" strategic deterrent; the extent of our provisions for civil defence: all these have surely to be considered together as part of a single defence posture. No evidence emerged in the course of last Thursday's debate (January 24) that this is being done by the present Government.

The presence of cruise missiles on British soil makes it highly possible that this country would be the target for a series of pre-emptive strikes by Soviet missiles. These would not necessarily be on the massive scale foreseen by Lord Noel-Baker in your columns of January 25. It is more likely that the Russians would hold such massive strikes in reserve, to deter us from using our sea-based missiles as a "second strike force" after the first Soviet warheads had hit targets in this country.

This initially limited Soviet strike would have the further objective, beyond eliminating weapons in this country targeted on their own homeland, of creating conditions here of such political turbulence that the use of our own nuclear weapons, followed as this could be by yet heavier attacks upon us, would become quite literally "incredible".

Civil defence on a scale sufficient to give protection to a substantial number of the population in the event of such a "limited" nuclear strike is thus an indispensable element of deterrence. Such measures should not be covert and concealed. On the contrary, they should be given the widest possible publicity; not only so that the people of this country know that they will be afforded the greatest possible degree of protection in the worst eventuality, but so that the credibility of our entire defence posture should not be destroyed through absence of evidence of our capacity to endure the disagreeable consequences likely to flow from it.

In the absence of a serious civil defence policy, the Government's decision to modernise or replace our "independent deterrent" will be no more than an expensive bluff likely to deceive no one beyond these shores, and not very many people within them.

Yours faithfully,
M.E. Howard,
Chichele Professor of the History of War,
All Soul's College, Oxford.

This letter contains a number of very serious assertions and speculations, and I will proceed to examine these. We must first note that the letter is composed of two distinct elements, although these are so interwoven that the inattentive reader might be confused into taking them as a single progressive argument. One element is a speculative scenario as to future events; the other concerns the postures and pretences appropriate in the theatre of nuclear diplomacy. We will attend now to the first.

According to the scenario, the enemy — which enemy is plainly stated to be the Russians for as many years ahead as speculation can go — will make a pre-emptive strike against Britain with nuclear missiles. This is not anticipated to occur before 1982, since the decision that 160 or more United States cruise missiles should be based on British soil was taken by NATO (without consultation with the British parliament) on December 12, 1979, at Brussels; and it will take about three years before their manufacture is complete and they have been transported and sited in this country.

Professor Howard considers that the presence of these missiles on our soil will make it "highly possible" that this country will be the target, not for one, but for a series of pre-emptive strikes, at some time in 1982 or thereafter. So far from "deterring" the Russians, he supposes that the presence of these missiles here will provoke and draw down upon us these strikes. We may agree that his reasoning here is sound.

I am less happy with the next step in his reasoning. He does not suggest that there will be any counter-strikes by British-based missiles against the Russians. On the contrary, he supposes that the Russian strikes, although "limited", would succeed in "eliminating" all of these 160 cruise missiles. And that the Russians will hold more "massive strikes" in reserve to "deter us from using our sea-based missiles" against them. In the absence of adequate measures of civil defence, these first "limited" strikes would create conditions of "political turbulence" in this country, preventing "us" (but I am not now sure who "us" can be, unless the typesetter has inadvertently dropped the capitals into the lower case) from massive nuclear retaliation. If, however, a sufficient proportion of the surviving population were prevented from acts of "political turbulence" by measures of civil defence, then a proper military strategy could be pursued by NATO, and massive second-stage nuclear exchanges could freely commence.

It will be seen that the purpose of civil defence is political and provisional. It is to ensure the necessary degree of stability in that short interval between the first and the second (retaliatory) nuclear strike. Professor Howard does not take his scenario any further. He does not tell us whether the "massive strikes" of the second stage would seal the entrances to the air-raid shelters and block up their airducts.

We may suppose, at least, that these second strikes will be effective in bringing "political turbulence" to a prompt end, and thereby in removing the necessity for further civil defence. At this stage the professor passes over to the consideration of the correct degree of mendacity to be exercised in our current defence "posture", and we will consider that element in his argument later on.
Now, as to the scenario, we will commence by noting that Professor Howard, in a letter to The Times whose intent is to advocate much greater expenditure and publicity on civil defence, does not, in any single clause, indicate any detail of what such defence might consist in, nor how effective it might be. His terms are all general. He wishes there to be "measures", which afford "the greatest possible degree of protection", and "evidence" of "our capacity to endure the disagreeable consequences likely to flow from" our present military and diplomatic strategies. But he does not indicate what measures might be possible, nor does he even explain what could be "disagreeable" about the expected event.

Professor Howard is perhaps himself a little uneasy on this count. For he reassures us that these pre-emptive strikes by Russian missiles "would not necessarily be on the massive scale foreseen by Lord Noel-Baker in your columns of January 25". He wishes us to suppose that this "series of strikes", which "eliminate" the 160 cruise missiles scattered on our soil, are to be, as these things go, a mild and local affair.

I have therefore consulted the letter from Philip Noel-Baker in The Times of January 25. Lord Noel-Baker is the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for his work for international conciliation over very many years. We may take it that he keeps himself well-informed. In his letter he notes that "many voices are being raised in the United States, Britain and elsewhere to argue that nuclear wars could be fought without total disaster; some even suggest that nuclear war could be won". He then goes on to detail the findings of Mr Val Peterson, who was appointed United States Civil Defence Administrator twenty-five years ago, and who organised many exercises, national, regional and local, at the height of a previous Cold War.

Mr Peterson drew the following conclusions from his successive exercises. In 1954 the national exercise was estimated to have had a yield of twenty-two millions of casualties, of whom seven millions would have been dead. In 1956 fifty-six millions, or one-third of the population of the United States, were presumed as casualties. In 1957:

"If the whole 170 million Americans has Air Raid Shelters, at least 50 per cent of them would die in a surprise enemy attack. In the last analysis, there is no such thing as a nation being prepared for a thermonuclear war."

From evidence of this order Lord Noel-Baker concludes:

"Any use of nuclear weapons will escalate into a general war... There is no defence against such weapons; and... nuclear warfare will destroy civilisation, and perhaps exterminate mankind. To hope for salvation from Civil Defence is a dangerous self-deceiving pipe dream."

I do not know whether Professor Howard is a pipe-smoker or not. But he has at least taken care to cover himself against this argument. The series of strikes envisaged in his scenario "would not necessarily be on the massive scale" which Lord Noel-Baker foresees. What he foresees is possible (we should note), and perhaps even probable, but not "necessarily" so. That is a large relief. But, then, on what scale are we to suppose that a more "limited" attack might be? If we are to be futurist authorities on war, or even historians of war, then we should be exact as to weaponry and as to its effects.

There is a good deal of talk around today, from "defence correspondents", military strategists and the like, which leads us to suppose that the military, on both sides of the world, are capable of delivering very small nuclear packs, with the greatest accuracy and with no lethal consequences outside the target area. Professor Howard's scenario is evidently supported by some such assumptions: the Russians are to "eliminate" 160 cruise missiles, but only local damage will be done.

Now there are two points here which require examination. The first concerns the known power and probable effects of these weapons. The second concerns the strategic assumptions of those "experts" who suppose that any nuclear war could be limited in this way. We will now turn to the first.

It will not have passed Professor Howard's notice that there appeared in The Times, nine days before his own letter, a major article ("The Deterrent Illusion", January 21) by Lord Zuckerman. The author was the Government's chief scientific advisor from 1964 to 1971, and, in addition to drawing upon his own extensive experience, he also draws, in this article, upon that of eminent United States scientists and advisors.

Lord Zuckerman's testimony (which should be read in full) is wholly dismissive of the notion of a "limited" nuclear strike, confined to military targets only:

"It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions, of civilians would be killed, whatever the proportion of missile sites, airfields, armament plants, ports, and so on that would be destroyed."

And he explains that strategists, in calculating the estimated effects of missile strikes, employ the acronym CEP (Circular Error Probable) for the radius of a circle within which 50 per cent of strikes would fall.

Thus we have to deal with two factors: the 50 per cent of missiles which fall within the CEP, and the 50 per cent which fall without and which "would not necessarily be distributed according to standard laws of probability". Lord Zuckerman does not tell us the presumed CEP for a "limited" strike aimed at a single missile base, and this is perhaps an official secret. But in the debate that was eventually held in the Commons (Hansard, 24 January) after NATO's decision...
to base cruise missiles here, statements were made which enable an impression to be offered.

I must first explain that the strategy of nuclear warfare has now become a highly specialised field of study, which has developed its own arcane vocabulary, together with a long list of acronyms: CEP, MIRV (multiple independently-targetted reentry vehicle), ICBM (inter-continental ballistic missile), ECCM (electronic counter-counter measures), MEASL (Marconi-Elliott Avionics Systems), and, as the plum of them all, MAD (mutual assured destruction).

In this vocabulary nuclear weapons are sub-divided into several categories: 
- **strategic** — the inter-continental missiles of immense range and inconceivable destructive power, which may be submarine-launched or sited in silos and on tracks behind the Urals or in the Nevada desert: 
  - theatre (long, middle or short-range), which may be bombs or missiles, carried on aircraft or permanently sited, or moved around at sea or on land on mobile launch platforms: and tactical. Sometimes NATO strategists refer to “theatre” weapons as “tactical” ones, and sometimes they are referring to smaller battlefield nuclear (and neutron) devices — land-mines, artillery shells, etc., which could be mixed in with “conventional weapons”.

These several degrees of weaponry form “a chain of deterrence”. Mr Pym, the Defence Secretary, spoke in the House of Commons on January 24 of “an inter-locking system of comprehensive deterrence... a clear chain of terrible risk”, with the pistol and the grenade at one end and the MX missile at the other.

It is generally agreed that “the West” has the advantage in **strategic** weapons, although this fact has been concealed from the Western public in recent months in order to direct attention to long and medium-range **theatre** weapons, where it is said that the Soviet Union has recently attained an advantage by replacing the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the very deadly SS-20, and by introducing the Backfire bomber. It is to meet this “threat” to parity in the middle link of the chain that cruise missiles are to be introduced by NATO all over Western Europe.

On December 3, 1979, Mr David Fairhall, the Guardian’s defence correspondent and a very zealous apologist for NATO, published a map (reproduced on page 7) which illustrates how NATO apologists perceive the European “balance”. It will be seen from this map that the Soviet threat is very serious, since it is marked in heavy dotted lines and thick arrow-heads, whereas NATO’s response is delicately etched. It will also be seen that NATO’s existing, pre-modern weaponry (the Pershing I, the F III and the Vulcan) is pitiful, and will not even be able to destroy Rome or Naples, nor any part of Greece. So that if it were not for the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Polaris and Trident), NATO would be reduced in a nuclear war to stinging itself, like a scorpion, to death.

Either NATO or the map is pretty silly, or both. The point, however, is that present strategic thinking supposes a “limited” nuclear war, with “theatre” weapons. This limited war will be localised to a small area from the Urals to the Western coast of Ireland. In this scenario, “strategic” weapons (ICBMs and the like) will be held back for a “second strike”, so that neither Siberia nor the North American continent will be under any immediate threat. Professor Howard has adopted this scenario, in supposing the Russians will employ their own “theatre” weapons (SS-20 or Backfire bombers) in a pre-emptive strike upon our cruise missile (“theatre”) bases.

Let us now examine this scenario more exactly. Sir Frederic Bennett (Torbay) affirmed in the Commons debate on January 24 that the warheads of these Russian theatre missiles “have at least the destructive capacity of the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima”, although Mr Churchill (Stretford) had different information: “By today’s standards Hiroshima’s bomb was a puny and miserable weapon” and (he said) each SS-20 missile carried a pack equivalent to 100 Hiroshima bombs.

It will be seen that two well-informed Conservative spokesmen differed in their information by a factor of one hundred. This is a trivial disagreement (since both are agreed that these missiles are capable of very great destruction). But it serves to illustrate the fact that, when we come to hard information, the air is very much fouled up today.

The reasons for this are easy to identity, but they illuminate a part of the problem, so we will digress to explain them. First, it is axiomatic that each military bloc has an interest in misleading the other, and this is done both by concealing information and by deliberately spreading disinformation.

In general, each bloc is at pains to deny and conceal its own areas of greatest
military strength, and to advertise a pretense to strength in areas where it is weak. The intelligence agencies which report on each other’s resources are themselves an interest-group, with high ideological motivation, and on occasion they deliberately manufacture alarmist reports.

Lord Zuckerman gives evidence as to the steady flow of “phoney intelligence” and “far-fetched” predictions as to Soviet military power which have influenced United States planning over the past twenty years. There is no reason to suppose that this fouling-up of information takes place only in Western capitals.

The name of the game, on both sides, is mendacity. Indeed, “deterrence” might itself be defined as the biggest and most expensive lie in history; and it was, in effect, defined in this way by our Defence Secretary, Mr. Pym, in the debate on January 24: “Deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what we may think”.

The debate on that day was the first to be held in parliament on the subject of nuclear weapons for fifteen years, and it lasted for about 5½ hours. It was distinguished throughout by the paucity of hard information, although it should be said that Mr. Pym imparted some new information, and more than had come at any time from the previous administration.

Mr. Pym announced the near-completion of the “Chevaline” programme to “modernise” the warhead of our Polaris missiles—a programme costing £1,000 million, which had been carried out in the deepest secrecy, and without the knowledge of the full Cabinet, and in defiance of official Labour policy, on the authority of Mr. Callaghan and two or three of his particular friends.

Thus the House was given this information after the decision had been taken, the money had been spent, and the work had been done. I do not know how £1,000 million was tucked away in a crease in the estimates and hidden from view (just as the many millions expended on internal security services, telephone-tapping, etc., are hidden from view), but it suggests that the level of official mendacity is today very high indeed.

In any case, let us be fair, Mr. Pym did give the House this information, and we may suppose that he did so in order to embarrass Mr. Callaghan, Mr. Fred Mulley, Mr. Healey and Mr. David Owen (the co-partners in this expensive deception), and to reduce them to silence or assent on other matters of nuclear weapon “modernisation” in the ensuing debate.

In this he succeeded very well. (We may suppose that he held other, “second-strike”, secret material back as a further deterrent.) But apart from this malicious little political detonation, the yield of new information in the debate was low. The House was not informed where the cruise missiles are to be sited, nor, most importantly, whether the British Government will have any effective control over their operation and launching. But this is another matter.

The second reason why the air is fouled-up is that the military and security elites in both blocs, and their political servitors, cannot pursue their expensive and dangerous policies without continually terrifying the populations of their own countries with sensational accounts of the war preparations of the other bloc.

To be sure, the plain facts are terrifying enough without any embroidery. But it is necessary to persuade the native populations that the other side is stealing a lead in order to justify even greater preparations and expenditure at home.

This is as necessary in the Soviet Union as it is in the West, despite the absence of any open public debate over there on the issues. For the Soviet military budget is very heavy, and this entails the continual postponement and disappointment of people’s expectations as to improving services and goods. In particular, a quite disproportionate concentration of the nation’s most advanced scientific and technological skills takes place in the military sector—as it does, increasingly, even in this country. The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders.

In the West we have “open debate”, although it is contained by all-party “consensus” and is not permitted to intrude in any sharp way into our major media. I have discussed elsewhere (New Statesman, December 1979) the ways in which this is carefully controlled by the preparation and selective release of “official information”.

An interesting example of this manipulation came out towards the end of the Commons debate. In responding, Mr. Barney Hayhoe, the Under-Secretary for Defence, sought to allay fears expressed by the patriotic Mr. Peter Shore (Labour’s shadow Foreign Secretary) that the NATO programme of missile “modernisation” might not be large enough to keep up with Soviet missile programmes. Mr. Hayhoe replied:

“The United States is planning to introduce cruise missiles, carried on B 52 bombers, for the strategic role. It is planning an armament of 2,000 or 3,000 missiles . . . forming only one part of a huge strategic triad alongside ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and all due to enter service in two or three years’ time.”

This programme is to be in addition to the existing United States “strategic” resources (which are generally agreed to be already in excess of Russia’s, and which have always been so).

Now I am not an expert in these matters, and I do not usually follow the specialist press. But in the past three months, and especially in the weeks preceding the NATO decision of December 12, I followed the general press with care. I have on my desk now a thick file of clippings from the defence correspondents of the more serious daily, weekly and Sunday papers. Yet this is the first mention I have met with of these rather substantial United States plans, which are to be added to NATO’s little provision.

“The Alliance should plan to maintain an adequate conventional defence as long as necessary to negotiate an acceptable peace. If not successful in achieving its aims with conventional forces, NATO will employ nuclear weapons as necessary.”

The entire “debate” in Britain was conducted in the press and television on the basis of letting the people believe that there was a massive build-up of Soviet SS-20s and Backfire bombers, all aimed at “NATO” (but with the United States, the dominant power in NATO, removed from the equation), and that NATO’s programme of nuclear weapon “modernisation” was a tardy and inadequate response to this. Nothing at all was mentioned, in the general press, as to this little addition to the Western sum (“2,000 or 3,000 missiles”) as part of “a huge strategic triad”.

In fact, NATO’s “modernisation” programme, taken together with that of the United States, was one of menace. It was certainly perceived by Soviet leaders as menacing. This perception hardened, on December 12, when NATO endorsed the full programme at Brussels. In response, the hard arguments and the hard men had their way amongst the Soviet leadership, and, two weeks later, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took place. It is a textbook case of the reciprocal logic of the Cold War.

I am not suggesting that Russian missiles are not multiplying, nor that they are not menacing to us. They are both. My point has been to illustrate the logic of “deterrence”; and to emphasise that the whole basis of our information is corrupt, and that every official statement, on both sides, is either an official lie or a statement with direct propagandist intent which conceals as much as it reveals.

As to the actual facts of the “nuclear balance”, objective research by such bodies as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute give rise to conclusions more complex than anything that we have been offered in our press or on our screens. Thus, in one count of strategic weapons, by individual bombers and missiles, the Soviet Union appears to be a little ahead of the United States; whereas by a different count of actual warheads (for the US Poseidon missile carries an average of ten warheads, each capable of being independently targeted) the United States appears as having twice as many weapons (8,870 to 3,810) as Russia. This is, of course, before “modernisation”. The available information has been examined with care by Dan Smith in The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s (Croom Helm, 1980), and his fourth chapter, “Of Numbers and Nukes”, is essential reading. Please get it, and read it.

We are now in a position to conclude this digression, and to return to Lord Zuckerman and to Professor Howard.

Lord Zuckerman has shown that we must take into account two variables when considering the effect of the “series of pre-emptive strikes” which Professor Howard envisages as being drawn upon us by cruise missile bases: the 50 per cent of missiles falling within the CEP, and those falling without.

We have seen that the SS-20 is the “theatre” missile which we must expect to strike Britain, and that the lowest estimate of its destructive capacity is “at least” that of the bomb dropped upon Hiroshima. This bomb (Mr Churchill reminded the House) caused the death of 100,000 persons within hours, and of a further 100,000 who have died subsequently, in the main from radiologically-related diseases.

I do not know the CEP of a missile of this very small yield. I would guess that if it was buffeted about and wobbled a little — and if the aiming and homing devices were a trifle inexact (as Soviet electronic technology is reputed to be) — then it could miss the target by several miles. The meditated strategy of both sides is to send, not one accurate missile at each target, but missiles in clutches of thirty or forty.

These strikes would be made against the major bases from which these missiles are deployed. Currently, Lakenheath and Upper Heyford are being mentioned as these. Upper Heyford is less than fifteen miles as the crow or the SS-20 flies from the centre of Oxford city, and Lakenheath, by crow or cruise, just over twenty miles from Cambridge. It is possible that Cambridge but less probable that Oxford will fall outside the CEP. Within the CEP we must suppose some fifteen or twenty detonations at least on the scale of Hiroshima, without taking into account any possible detonations, release of radio-active materials, etc., if the strike should succeed in finding out the cruise missiles at which it was aimed.

This is to suppose that the Soviet strike is homing onto clearly-defined and immobile targets. Now this matter is unclear, since we have been told a number of contradictory things by defence “experts”, some of which are perhaps disinformation (to set the public mind at rest) but most of which are whistlings in the dark, since United States military personnel will take the decisions in their own good time.

We have been told that they will all be housed at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath, and will be moved out to launching positions in times of emergency, perhaps on mobile transporters carrying four at a time. We have been told that they will be permanently sited, in six, or twelve, or forty different stations. The latest statement to come to hand is from Mr Pym, and was given, not to the House of Commons, but on a BBC TV phone-in programme:

“From the point of view of siting the cruise missiles I don’t think it makes a great deal of difference. It is really a security and defence and strategic consideration, and of course one must take public opinion into account as far as one possibly can.” (Cambridge Evening News, 6 February 1980)

The poor fellow was really saying that he does not know, and he is waiting for an American officer to tell him. He added that:

“From the point of view of siting the cruise missiles I don’t think it makes a great deal of difference. It is really a security and defence and strategic consideration, and of course one must take public opinion into account as far as one possibly can.”

This is a politician’s way of saying that the military will take the decision, and that public opinion will be disregarded. Three weeks before this Mr Pym gave a somewhat more honest reply to questions from the Member for Swindon (Mr David Stoddart) who had discovered that Greenham Common, near Newbury (Berks) and Fairfax (Gloucs.) are being considered by US military as convenient places for little batches of missiles: “I urge the Secretary of State to keep these updated nuclear weapons well away from Swindon”. Mr Pym responded thus:

“The sitting of these weapons in no way affects the vulnerability or otherwise of a particular place. It is a mistake for anyone to think that the sitting of a weapon in a particular
enabling this number to endure the "disagreeable consequences" which would ensue. We are now at last prepared to cast a more realistic eye upon Professor Howard's scale sufficient to give protection to a substantial number of the population", civil defence precautions, create conditions of "political turbulence" which would prevent "us" from using our "second-strike", sea-based nuclear war. But he envisages civil defence measures "on a scale sufficient to give protection to a substantial number of the population", enabling this number to endure the "disagreeable consequences" which would ensure. The object of civil defence, then, is not so much to save lives as to reduce the potential for "political turbulence" of those surviving the first strike, in order to enable "us" to pass over to a second and more fearsome stage of nuclear warfare. It is Professor Howard's merit that he states this sequence honestly, as a realist, and even allows that the consequences will be disagreeable. We are still entitled, however, to enquire more strictly as to what measures would be on a scale sufficient, what proportion of the population might constitute a substantial number, and what may be indicated by the word disagreeable. It is not as if nuclear weapons are a completely unknown quantity, which have only been tested in deserts and on uninhabited islands. They have been tested upon persons also, in 1945, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to some effect. These effects have been studied with care; and the beneficiaries of this sudden donation of advanced technology were so much struck by the disagreeable consequences that they have continued to monitor its effects to the present day. One remarkable consequence of those two detonations is that the survivors in those two cities, and the descendants of the sufferers, were transformed into advocates, not of revenge, but of international understanding and peace. To this day work for peace is regarded as a civic duty, and the mayors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima regard this work as the principal obligation of their office. For example, in 1977 an International Symposium on the Damage and After-Effects of the bombing of these two cities was inaugurated, and a number of reports of this work are now in translation. I have read condensations of these, as well as other materials from Nagasaki. It had been my intention to condense this material still further, and to remind readers of the effects of the first atomic bombings. I have now decided to pass this matter by, for two reasons. The first is that I have found the task beyond my powers as a writer. After reading these materials, whenever I approached my typewriter I was overcome by such a sense of nausea that I was forced to turn to some other task. The second reason is that, at some point very deep in their consciousness, readers already know what the consequences of these weapons are. This knowledge is transmitted to children even in their infancy, so that as they run around with their space-weapons and death-rays they are re-enacting what happened thirty years before they were born. There is, however, one area of convenient forgetfulness in this inherited memory. The moment of nuclear detonation is remembered vaguely, as a sudden instant of light, blast and fire, in which instantly tens of thousands of lives were quenched. It is thought of as a stupendous but instantaneous moment of annihilation, without pain or emotional suffering. But this is not accurate. It is now estimated that 140,000 were killed "directly" by the bomb on Hiroshima, and 70,000 by that on Nagasaki, with an allowance for error of 10,000 either way in each case. But the bombs were dropped on August 6 and 9, and the accounts for immediate casualties were closed on December 31, 1945. This reflects the fact that a very great number of these deaths — especially those from burns and radioactivity — took place slowly, in the days and weeks after the event.
Michiko Ogino, ten years old, was left in charge of his younger sisters when his mother went out to the fields to pick eggplants. The bomb brought the house down on them all, leaving his two-year-old sister with her legs pinned under a crossbeam:

"Mamma was bombed at noon
When getting eggplants in the field,
Short, red and crisp her hair stood,
Tender and red her skin was all over."

So Mrs Ogino, although the clothes were burned from her body and she had received a fatal dose of radiation, could still run back from the fields to succour her children. One after another passing sailors and neighbours heaved at the beam to release the trapped two-year-old, failed, and, bowing with Japanese courtesy, went on their way to help others.

"Mother was looking down at my little sister. Tiny eyes looked up from below. Mother looked around, studying the way the beams were piled up. Then she got into an opening under the beam, and putting her right shoulder under a portion of it, she strained with all her might. We heard a cracking sound and the beams were lifted a little. My little sister's legs were freed.

"Peeled off was the skin over her shoulder;
That once lifted the beam off my sister.
Constant blood was spurting
From the sore flesh appearing..."

Mrs Ogino died that night. Fujio Tsujimoto, who was five years old, was in the playground of Yamaato Primary School, Nagasaki, just before the bomb dropped. Hearing the sound of a plane he grabbed his grandmother's hand and they were the first into the deepest part of the air raid shelter. The entrance to the shelter, as well as the playground, was covered with the dying. "My brother and sisters didn't get to the shelter in time, so they were burnt and crying. Half an hour later, my mother appeared. She was covered with blood. She had been making lunch at home when the bomb was dropped."

"My younger sisters died the next day. My mother -- she also died the next day. And then my older brother died.

"The survivors made a pile of wood on the playground and began to cremate the corpses. My brother was burned. Mother also was burned and quickly turned to white bones which dropped down among the live coals. I cried as I looked on the scene. Grandmother was also watching, praying with a rosary..."

Mrs Ogino's son said, "I am now in the fourth grade at Yamaato Primary School. That playground of terrible memories is now completely cleared and many friends play there happily. I play with my friends there too, but sometimes I suddenly remember that awful day. When I do, I squat down on the spot where we cremated our mother and touch the earth with my fingers."

I will not quote any more of the testimony of the children of Nagasaki (Living Beneath The Atomic Cloud). What it makes clear is that the "instant" of detonation produced effects of the bomb which are still being studied) do not as yet appear to have been as bad as was at first apprehended.

"Radiological conditions may be expected to prevent any organised life-saving operation for days or weeks following an attack. Trained health service staff would be vital to the future and should not be wasted by allowing them to enter areas of high contamination where casualties would, in any case, have small chance of long-term recovery."

Home Office circular on the preparation of health services for nuclear war, ES1/1977.

We may now push this distressing matter back into our subconscious, and reconsider the possible effect of "a series of pre-emptive strikes", with scores of weapons very much more powerful than those bombs, upon this island.

It is true that the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were very little prepared for this advanced technology, and, indeed, in Nagasaki the "All Clear" had sounded shortly before the detonation, so that the populace had trooped out of their conventional shelters and the women were working in the fields and the children playing in the playgrounds when the bomb went off.

Our own authorities might be able to manage the affair better. With greater warning, stronger houses, and with some more effective measures of civil defence, some lives might be saved, and perhaps even "a substantial number". Indeed, two Conservative MPs have calculated that effective measures might reduce deaths in a nuclear war in this country from about thirty-five millions to just twenty millions, and I will allow that fifteen millions in savings is a substantial number indeed.

Nevertheless, two comments must be made on this. The first is that the death or mortal injury of even the small figure of twenty millions might still give rise to the conditions of "turbulence" which Professor Howard is anxious to forestall. The incidence of disaster would not be evenly spread across the country, with hale and hearty survivors in all parts standing ready, with high morale, to endure the hazards of the "second strike".
Air Marshal Sir Leslie Mavor, Principal of the Home Defence College, addressing a civil defence seminar in 1977 said that "the main target areas would be so badly knocked about as to be beyond effective self-help. They would have to be more or less discounted until adjoining areas recovered sufficiently to come to their aid". Those parts of the country "holding no nuclear targets" might come through "more or less undamaged by blast or fire".

"Their difficulties would be caused by fall-out radiation, a large influx of refugees, survival without external supplies of food, energy, raw materials . . ." (The Times, 16 January 1980)

This seems a realistic assessment. There would be some total disaster areas, from the margins of which the wounded and dying would flee as refugees; other intermediate areas would have energy supplies destroyed, all transport dislocated, and persons, food and water contaminated by fall-out; yet others would be relatively immune. But even in these immune areas there would be some persons in a state of hysterical terror, who would be ready (if they knew how) to intervene to prevent the second stage of Professor Howard's scenario.

The second comment is that we do not yet have any realistic notion of what might be a scale sufficient to effect substantial savings, nor what measures might be taken. We may certainly agree with the professor that no such measures are either planned or contemplated. The defence correspondent of The Times, Mr Peter Evans, in an illuminating survey in January, discovered that measures have been taken to ensure the survival of the high personnel of the State. This has long been evident. There will be bunkers deep under the Chiltems for senior politicians, civil servants and military, and deep hidey holes for regional centres of military government. That is very comforting.

The population of this country, however, will not be invited to these bunkers, and it is an Official Secret to say where they are. The population will be issued, some three or four days before the event, with a do-it-yourself booklet (Protect and Survive), and be sent off to wait in their own homes. They will be advised to go down to the ground floor or the cellar, and make a cubby-hole there with old doors and planks, cover it with sandbags, books and heavy furniture, and then creep into these holes with food and water for 14 days, a portable radio, a portable latrine, and, of course, a tin-opener.

I have for long wondered why sociologists and demographers keep writing about "the nuclear family", but now it is all at length set down and explained, and there is even a picture in illustration of the term (see page 17).

Now this might save some lives, but it will also make for an unhappy end to others. For the principal effects of nuclear weapons are very intense heat, blast and radio-active emissions. Within a certain distance of the centre of the detonation all houses, cars, clothes, the hair on dogs, cats and persons, and so on, will spontaneously ignite, while at the same time the blast will bring the houses tumbling down about the cubby-holes. We must envisage many thousands of nuclear families listening to Mr Robin Day's consensual homilies on their portable radios as they are burned, crushed or suffocated to death.

Those outside this radius might be afforded a little temporary protection. But

We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third world compound the political tensions that fuel a demented arms race. In Europe, the main geographical stage for the East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more deadly weapons are appearing.

For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliance have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilised life. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation.

As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent their use by the other side, new more "usable" nuclear weapons are designed and the idea of "limited" nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process can logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller countries to forgo the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that installs them, reinforce the likelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multiplying the risks of nuclear exchanges.

Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and detente between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing proportion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though mutual extermination is already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in both East and West, contributes to growing social and political strain, setting in motion a vicious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vice versa: a deadly dialectic.
We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and of internal security forces are enlarged, limitations are placed upon free exchanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East.

We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.

We must act together. We must act to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two super powers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory. In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of the SS-20 medium range missile and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Western Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT II agreement, as a necessary step towards the renewal of effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.

We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, women’s organisations, trade unions, youth organisations, professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and Pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to “East” or “West”, but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East or West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from confrontation, to enforce detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.

In appealing to fellow Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilisation by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The dangers steadily advance. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome both your help and advice.
I endorse the statement on a European nuclear-free zone, and consent to the publication of my name in this connection.

Signed .................................................................

Name (in block capitals) ...........................................

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When they eventually emerge (after some fourteen days) they will find the food and water contaminated, the roads blocked, the hospitals destroyed, the livestock dead or dying. The vice-chairman of Civil Aid, who is a realist, advises thus: "If you saw a frog running about, you would have to wash it down to get rid of active dust, cook it and eat it”. (The Times, 14 February 1980.) And, according to Professor Howard’s scenario, people will still be living in expectation of “yet heavier attacks”.

The Nuclear Family

If we are to learn from the experience of the people of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, then I think it is, after all, unlikely that many survivors will be devoting their energies to “political turbulence”, since, unless they know the entrances to the governmental deep bunkers, they will have nothing to turbul against. Most will be wandering here and there in a desperate attempt to find lost children, parents, neighbours, friends. A few of the most collected will succour the dying and dig among the ruins for the injured.

The measures outlined in Protect and Survive do not seem to me to be on a scale sufficient to reduce the consequences of a nuclear strike to the compass of a small word like “disagreeable”. It is possible to imagine measures on a greater scale. The evacuation of whole cities, as is planned in the USA and perhaps in the Soviet Union, is inoperable here because this island is too small. But one might imagine the excavation of vast subterranean systems beneath our towns – and perhaps beneath All Soul’s – complete with stored food and water, generating systems, air-purifying systems, etc.

This might save a substantial number of lives, although one is uncertain what it would save them for, since above ground no workplaces, uncontaminated crops or stock would be left. The logic of this development, then, will be to remove these activities underground also, with subterranean cattle-stalls, granaries, bakeries, and munitions works.
It is certainly possible that, if civilisation survives and continues on its present trajectory until the mid-twenty-first century, then the “advanced” societies will have become troglodyte in some such fashion. But it would not be advisable to suppose that our descendants will have then at length have attained to “security”, in the simultaneous realisation of the ultimate in “deterrence” with the ultimate in “defence”. For the military will by then have taken further steps in technology. Neutron weapons and Earth Penetrators already exist, which can drive death underground. All this will be perfected, “modernised”, and refined. There will be immense thermonuclear charges capable of concussing a whole underground city. And, in any case, by the time that humanity becomes troglodyte, it will then have been already defeated. “Civilisation” will then be an archaic term, which children can no longer construe.

We will now turn to the second assumption which underpins Professor Howard’s arguments. This concerns “tactical” or “theatre” nuclear war.

The professor supposes a “theatre” war confined to Europe, which does not escalate to confrontation between the two superpowers. We will not chide him too much on this witless supposition, since it is now commonplace in the strategic thinking of both blocs. Indeed, it is commonplace not only as idea but also as fact, since immense sums are spent on both sides to match each other’s weapons at “tactical” and “theatre” levels.

We have seen that poor Mr. Pym (who is still waiting to be told by an American officer what to do) is quite as simple on this matter as Professor Howard. Both suppose a “chain of deterrence”, according to which war may not only start at any level but it may be confined to that level, since at any point there is a further fearsome threshold of “deterrence” ahead.

This is not the same as the proposal that local or regional wars with nuclear weapons may take place. That is a reasonable proposal. If the proliferation of these weapons continues, it is possible that we will see such wars: as between Israel and Arab states, or South Africa and an alliance of African states. Whether such wars lead on to confrontation between the superpowers will depend, not upon the logic of weaponry, but on further diplomatic and political considerations.

This proposition is different. It is that nuclear war between the two great opposed powers and their allies could be confined to this or that level. This is a silly notion at first sight; and, after tedious and complex arguments have been gone through, it emerges as equally silly at the end. For while it might very well be in the interests of either the USA or the USSR to confine a war to Europe, or to the Persian gulf, and to prevent it from passing into an ultimate confrontation, we are not dealing here with rational behaviour.

Once “theatre” nuclear war commences, immense passions, indeed hysterias, will be aroused. After even the first strikes of such a war, communications and command posts will be so much snarled up that any notion of rational planning will give way to panic. Ideology will at once take over from self-interest. Above all, it will be manifest that the only one of the two great powers likely to come out of the contest as “victor” must be the one which hurl its ballistic weapons first, furthest and fastest — and preferably before the weapons of the other have had time to lift off.

This was the commonsense message which Lord Louis Mountbatten, shortly before he was murdered, conveyed to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at a meeting in Strasbourg. He referred to the introduction of “tactical” or “theatre” weapons:

“The belief was that were hostilities ever to break out in Western Europe, such weapons could be used in field warfare without triggering an all-out nuclear exchange leading to the final holocaust.

“I have never found this idea credible. I have never been able to accept the reasons for the belief that any class of nuclear weapons can be categorised in terms of their tactical or strategic purposes . . .

“In the event of a nuclear war there will be no chances, there will be no survivors — all will be obliterated. I am not asserting this without having deeply thought about the matter. When I was Chief of the British Defence Staff I made my views known . . . I repeat in all sincerity as a military man I can see no use for any nuclear weapons which would not end in escalation, with consequences that no one can conceive.”

The same firm judgement was expressed by Lord Zuckerman in The Times on January 21: “Nor was I ever able to see any military reality in what is now referred to as theatre or tactical warfare”:

“The men in the nuclear laboratories of both sides have succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built. They have become the alchemists of our times, working in secret ways which cannot be divulged, casting spells which embrace us all.”

Professor Howard takes his stand on these irrational foundations, and practices alchemy in his own right. The spells which he casts on the public mind are presented as “civil defence”. He calls for measures (unnamed) which must be “given the widest possible publicity”, in order to ensure “the credibility of our entire defence posture”, a posture which might otherwise be seen to be “no more than an expensive bluff”.

The professor supposes that he is a tough realist, who is drawing conclusions which others, including politicians, are too timorous to draw in public. If we spend thousands of millions of pounds upon nuclear weapons, then we either intend to use them or we do not. If we intend to use them, then we must intend to receive them also.

But, as he knows, there are no practicable civil defence measures which could have more than a marginal effect. He is therefore telling us that “we” must replace one expensive bluff by a bluff even more expensive; or he is telling us that “we” have decided that we are ready to accept the obliteration of the material resources and inheritance of this island, and of some half of its inhabitants, in order to further the strategies of NATO.

These are two distinct propositions, and it is time that they were broken into two parts. For a long time the second proposition has been hidden within the mendacious vocabulary of “deterrence”; and behind these veils of “posture”, “credibility” and “bluff” it has waxed fat and now has come of age.
The first proposition is that nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting such “unacceptable damage” on both parties to an exchange that mutual fear ensures peace. The second is that each party is actually preparing for nuclear war, and is ceaselessly searching for some ultimate weapon or tacticalategic point of advantage which would assure its victory. We have lived uneasily with the first proposition for many years. We are now looking directly into the second proposition’s eyes.

“Deterrence” has plausibility. It has “worked” for thirty years, if not in Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, Africa, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic, Afghanistan, then in the central fracture between the superpowers which runs across Europe. It may have inhibited, in Europe, major “conventional” war. But it has not worked as a stationary state. The weapons for adequate “deterrence” already existed thirty years ago, and, as the Pope reminded us in his New Year’s Message for 1980, only 200 of the 50,000 nuclear weapons now estimated to be in existence would be enough to destroy the world’s major cities. Yet we have moved upwards to 50,000, and each year new sophistications and “modernisations” are introduced.

“... The exercise scenario foresaw and developed a declaratory policy by the Warsaw Pact of no first nuclear use and a related NATO negation of this policy. The Alliance was therefore able to start from the assumption that its strategy of flexibility in response could take nuclear weapons fully into account ... as a means to attempt war termination and restitution of the status quo ...”

“A message sent to an enemy during hostilities with strong ultimate features (demanding an end to hostilities and threatening to use nuclear weapons) should not be sent without a definite use decision by the nuclear power actually having been taken.”

Report of NATO WINTEX 1977 exercise, prepared by the staff committee of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (‘secret’).

The current chatter about “theatre” or “tactical” nuclear war is not a sophisticated variant of the old vocabulary of “deterrence”; it is directly at variance with that vocabulary. For it is founded on the notion that either of the superpowers might engage, to its own advantage, in a “limited” nuclear war which could be kept below the threshold at which retribution would be visited on its own soil.

Thus it is thought by persons in the Pentagon that a “theatre” nuclear war might be confined to Europe, in which, to be sure, America’s NATO allies would be obliterated, but in which immense damage would also be inflicted upon Russia west of the Urals, while the soil of the United States remained immune. (In such a scenario it is even supposed that President Carter and Mr Brezhnev would be on the “hot line” to each other while Europe scorched, threatening ultimate intercontinental ballistic retribution, but at last making “peace”.) This has been seen as the way to a great “victory” for “the West”, and if world-wide nuclear war seems to be ultimately inevitable, then the sooner that can be aborted by having a little “theatre” war the better.

The cruise missiles which are being set up all over Western Europe are weapons designed for exactly such a war, and the nations which harbour them are viewed, in this strategy, as launching platforms which are expendible in the interests of “Western” defence. In a somewhat muddy passage, Mr Pym assured BBC listeners that:

“It is never envisaged that these weapons are in any sense a response to a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union which comes out of the blue. This is a lesser weapon, which would be deployed from these bases in times of tension, not only from the United Kingdom but throughout the other countries in Europe.” (Cambridge Evening News, 6 February 1980)

Mr Pym has also confirmed to the House of Commons (Hansard, 24 January 1980) that the cruise missiles “are to be owned and operated by the United States”.

Their use must be sanctioned by the President of the United States on the request of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, who is always an American general. It was for this reason that Senator Nino Pasti, formerly an Italian member of the NATO Military Committee and Deputy Supreme Commander for NATO Nuclear Affairs, has declared: “I have no doubt that the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe represent the worst danger for the peoples of the continent”:

“In plain words, the tactical nuclear weapon would be employed in the view of NATO to limit the war to Europe. Europe is to be transformed into a ‘nuclear Maginot line’ for the defence of the United States.” (Sanity, July/August 1979)

Meanwhile the United States is urgently seeking for similar platforms in the Middle East for another small “theatre” war which might penetrate deep into the Caucasus. And an even uglier scenario is beginning to show itself in China, where greed for a vast arms market is tempting Western salesmen while United States strategists hope to nudge Russia and China into war with each other—a war which would dispell another Western phobia, the demographic explosion of the East. The idea here is to extract the West, at the last moment, from this war—which the same scenario as that which went disastrously wrong in 1939.

These little “theatre” wars (not one of which would obediently stay put in its “theatre”) are now all on the drawing-boards, and in the Pentagon more than in the Kremlin, for the simple reason that every “theatre” is adjacent to the Soviet Union, and any “tactical” nuclear strike would penetrate deep into Russian territory.

The plans for the European “theatre” war are not only ready— the “modernised” missiles designed for exactly such a war have been ordered, and will be delivered to this island in 1982. And at this moment, Professor Howard makes a corresponding political intervention. Let us see why this is so.

Professor Howard wishes to hurry the British people across a threshold of mental expectation, so that they may be prepared, not for “deterrence”, but for actual nuclear war.
The expectations supporting the theory of deterrence are, in the final analysis, that deterrence will work. Deterrence is effective, because the alternative is not only “unacceptable” or “disagreeable”: it is “unthinkable”.

Deterrence is a posture, but it is the posture of MAD (mutual assured destruction), not of menace. It does not say, “If we go to nuclear war we intend to win”; it says, “Do not go to war, or provoke war, because neither of us can win”. In consequence it does not bother to meddle with anything so futile as “civil defence”. If war commences, everything is already lost.

Those who have supported the policy of deterrence have done so in the confidence that this policy would prevent nuclear war from taking place. They have not contemplated the alternative, and have been able to avoid facing certain questions raised by that alternative. Of these, let us notice three.

First, is nuclear war preferable to being overcome by the enemy? Is the death of fifteen or twenty millions and the utter destruction of the country preferable to an occupation which might offer the possibility, after some years, of resurgence and recuperation?

Second, are we ourselves prepared to endorse the use of such weapons against the innocent, the children and the aged, of an “enemy”?

Third, how does it happen that Britain should find herself committed to policies which endanger the very survival of the nation, as a result of decisions taken by a secret committee of NATO, and then endorsed at Brussels without public discussion or parliamentary sanction, leaving the “owning and operation” of these “theatre” weapons in the hands of the military personnel of a foreign power, a power whose strategists have contingency plans for unleashing these missiles in a “theatre” war which would not extend as far as their own homeland?

The first two questions raise moral issues which it would be improper to introduce into an academic discussion. My own answer to them is “no”. They are, in any case, not new questions. The third question is, in some sense, new, and it is also extraordinary, in the sense that even proposing the question illuminates the degree to which the loss of our national sovereignty has become absolute, and democratic process has been deformed in ways scarcely conceivable twenty years ago.

But Professor Howard’s arguments are designed to hurry us past these questions without noticing them. They are designed to carry us across a threshold from the unthinkable (the theory of deterrence, founded upon the assumption that this must work) to the thinkable (the theory that nuclear war may happen, and may be imminent, and, with cunning tactics and proper preparations, might end in “victory”). More than this, the arguments are of an order which permit the mind to progress without thinking about the arguments, their consequences or probable conclusions, and, indeed, without knowing that any threshold has been crossed.

At each side of this threshold we are offered a policy with an identical label: “deterrence”. And both policies stink with the same mendacious rhetoric – “posture”, “credibility”, “bluff”. But mutual fear and self-interest predominate on one side, and active menace and the ceaseless pursuit of “tactical” or “theatre” advantage predominate on the other. Which other side we have crossed over to, and now daily inhabit.

“Nuclear weapons must be employed . . . to convey a decisive escalation of sufficient shock to convincingly persuade the enemy that he should make the political decision to cease the attack and withdraw. To evidence our solidarity, I am considering use in all regions employing both UK and US weapons using primarily aircraft and land-based missile systems. The initial use would be restricted to GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.”

Telex message from General Alexander Haigh, then Supreme Allied Commander Europe to the NATO Command, during the WINTEX 77 exercises.

Professor Howard himself has certainly thought the problem through. His letter was a direct political intervention. He called on the British authorities to rush us all, unthinkingly, across this thought-gap. His language – his anxiety as to possible “political turbulence”, his advocacy of measures which are not “covert or concealed” – reveals a direct intention to act in political ways upon the mind of the people, in order to enforce a “posture”, not of defence but of menace, and in this it corresponds, on a political level, with the menacing strategic decisions of NATO last December at Brussels.

The high strategists of NATO are busy in the Pentagon and the Hague, and Professor Howard is busy at All Soul’s, but they are both working away at the same problem. One end of the problem was clearly stated, at the height of the old Cold War, by John Foster Dulles:

“In order to make the country bear the burden, we have to create an emotional atmosphere akin to a war-time psychology. We must create the idea of a threat from without.”

But that was when the problem was only in its infancy. For the country – that is, this country – must now not only be made to bear a burden of heavy expense, loss of civil liberties, etc., but also the expectation, as a definite and imminent possibility, of actual nuclear devastation.

Hence it becomes necessary to create not only “the idea of a threat from without” but also of a threat from within: “political turbulence”. And it is necessary to inflame these new expectations by raising voluntary defence corps, auxiliary services, digging even deeper bunkers for the personnel of the State, distributing leaflets, holding lectures in halls and churches, laying down two-weeks supplies of emergency rations, promoting in the private sector the manufacture of Whitelaw Shelters and radiation-proof “Imperm” blinds and potent Anti-Fall-Out pastilles and “Breetheesy” masks, and getting the Women’s Institutes to work out recipes for broiling radio-active frogs. And it is also necessary to supplement all this by beating up an internal civil-war or class-war psychosis, by unmasking traitors, by
threatening journalists under the Official Secrets Acts, by tampering with juries and tapping telephones, and generally by closing up people's minds and mouths.

Now I do not know how far all this will work. There are tactical problems, which those who live outside All Soul's are able to see. Whitehall's reluctance to issue every household with a copy of Protect and Survive is eloquent testimony to this. For there is a minority of the British people who are reluctant to be harried across this threshold. These people have voices, and if they are denied access to the major media, there are still little journals and democratic organisations where they are able to speak. If the mass of the British public were to be suddenly alerted to the situation which they are actually now in — by "alarmist" leaflets and by broadcasts telling them that they have indeed every reason for alarm — then the whole operation might backfire, and give rise to a vast consensus, not for nuclear war, but for peace.

I suspect that, for these reasons, Professor Howard is regarded, by public-relations-conscious persons in the Establishment, as a great patriot of NATO and an admirable fellow, but as an inexperienced politician. The people of this country have been made dull and stupid by a diet of Official Information. But they are not all that stupid, and there is still a risk — a small risk, but not one worth taking — that they might remember who they are, and become "turbulent" before the war even got started.

I suspect that the strategy of high persons in the Cabinet Office, the security services, and the Ministry of Defence, is rather different from that of Professor Howard. There is preliminary work yet to do, in softening up the public mind, in intimidating dissidents, in controlling information more tightly, and in strengthening internal policing and security. Meanwhile planning will go forward, and at the immoral sort of person. I do not suppose myself to be a more moral sort of person. I think it unlikely that he put forward his ghastly scenario with any feelings of eager anticipation.

And, finally, although I am myself by conviction a socialist, I have not been grounding my arguments on premises of that kind. I do not suppose that all blame lies with the ideological malice and predatory drives of the capitalist "West", although some part of it does.

Socialists once supposed, in my youth, that socialist states might commit every kind of blunder, but the notion that they could go to war with each other, for ideological or national ends, was unthinkable. We now know better. States which call themselves "socialist" can go to war with each other, and do. And they can use means and arguments as bad as those of the old imperialist powers.

I have based my arguments on the logic of the Cold War, or of the "deterrent" situation itself. We may favour this or that explanation for the origin of this situation. But once this situation has arisen, there is a common logic at work in both blocs. Military technology and military strategy come to impose their own agenda upon political developments.

This is an inter-operative and reciprocal logic, which threatens all, impartially. If you press me for my own view, then I would hazard that the Russian state is now the most dangerous in relation to its own people and to the people of its client states. The rulers of Russia are police-minded and security-minded people, imprisoned within their own ideology, accustomed to meet argument with repression and tanks. But the basic postures of the Soviet Union seem to me, still, to be those of siege and aggressive defence; and even the brutal and botching intervention in Afghanistan appears to have followed upon sensitivity as to United States and Chinese strategies.

I can think of no instance in modern history where such a breakdown of political communication and such a triumph of unrestrained military suspicions as now marks Soviet-American relations has not led, in the end, to armed conflict.


The United States seems to me to be more dangerous and provocative in its general military and diplomatic strategies, which press around the Soviet Union with menacing bases. It is in Washington, rather than in Moscow, that scenarios are dreamed up for "theatre" wars; and it is in America that the "alchemists" of superkill, the clever technologists of "advantage" and ultimate weapons, press forward "the politics of tomorrow".

But we need not ground our own actions on a "preference" for one of the other blocs. This is unrealistic and could be divisive. What is relevant is the logic of process common to both, reinforcing the ugliest features of each others' societies, and locking both together in each others' nuclear arms in the same degenerative drift.

What I have been contending for, against Professor Howard, is this. First, I have
shown that the premises which underlie his letter are irrational.

Second, I have been concerned throughout with the use of language.

What makes the extinction of civilised life upon this island probable is not a greater propensity for evil than in previous history, but a more formidable destructive technology, a deformed political process (East and West), and also a deformed culture.

The deformation of culture commences within language itself. It makes possible a disjunction between the rationality and moral sensibility of individual men and women and the effective political and military process. A certain kind of "realist" and "technical" vocabulary effects a closure which seals out the imagination, and prevents the reason from following the most manifest sequence of cause and consequence. It habituates the mind to nuclear holocaust by reducing everything to a flat level of normality. By habituating us to certain expectations, it not only encourages resignation — it also becakes on the event.

"Human kind cannot bear very much reality". As much as reality as most of us can bear is what is most proximate to us — our self-interests and our immediate affections. What threatens our interests — what causes us even mental unease — is seen as outside ourselves, as the Other. We can kill thousands because we have first learned to call them "the enemy". Wars commence in our culture first of all, and we kill each other in euphemisms and abstractions long before the first missiles have been launched.

It has never been true that nuclear war is "unthinkable". It has been thought and the thought has been put into effect. This was done in 1945, in the name of allies fighting for the Four Freedoms (although what those Freedoms were I cannot now recall), and it was done upon two populous cities. It was done by professing Christians, when the Western Allies had already defeated the Germans, and when victory against the Japanese was certain, in the longer or shorter run. The longer run would have cost thousands more of Western lives, whereas the short run (the bomb) would cost the lives only of enemy Asians. This was perfectly thinkable. It was thought. And action followed on.

What is "unthinkable" is that nuclear war could happen to us. So long as we can suppose that this war will be inflicted only on them, the thought comes easily. And if we can also suppose that this war will save "our" lives, or serve our self-interest, or even save us (if we live in California) from the tedium of queueing every other day for gasoline, then the act can easily follow on. We think others to death as we define them as the Other: the enemy: Asians: Marxists: non-people. The deformed human mind is the ultimate doomsday weapon — it is out of the human mind that the missiles and the neutron warheads come.

For this reason it is necessary to enter a remonstrance against Professor Howard and those who use his kind of language and adopt his mental postures. He is preparing our minds as launching platforms for exterminating thoughts. The fact that Soviet ideologists are doing much the same (thinking us to death as "imperialists" and "capitalists") is no defence. This is not work proper to scholars.

Academic persons have little influence upon political and military decisions, and less than they suppose. They do, however, operate within our culture, with ideas and language, and, as we have seen, the deformation of culture is the precedent condition for nuclear war.

It is therefore proper to ask such persons to resist the contamination of our culture with those terms which precede the ultimate act. The death of fifteen millions of fellow citizens ought not to be described as "disagreeable consequences".

A war confined to Europe ought not to be given the euphemisms of "limited" or "theatre". The development of more deadly weapons, combined with menacing diplomatic postures and major new political and strategic decisions (the siting of missiles on our own territory under the control of alien personnel) ought not to be concealed within the anodyne technological term of "modernisation". The threat to erase the major cities of Russia and East Europe ought not to trip easily off the tongue as "unacceptable damage".

Professor Howard is entitled to hold his opinions and to make these public. But I must enter a gentle remonstrance to the members of the University of Oxford nonetheless. Does this letter, from the Chichele Professor of the History of War, represent the best thoughts that Oxford can put together at a time when human culture enters a crisis which may be terminal? I have no doubt that members of that University hold different opinions. But where, and how often, in the last few months, have these other voices been heard?

I am thinking, most of all, of that great number of persons who very much dislike what is going on in the actual world, but who dislike the vulgarity of exposing themselves to the business of "politics" even more. They erect both sets of dislikes around their desks or laboratories like a screen, and get on with their work and their careers. I am not asking these, or all of them, to march around the place or to spend hours in weary little meetings. I am asking them to examine the deformities of our culture and then, in public places, to demur.

I am asking them whether Professor Howard's letter truly represents the voice of Oxford? And, if it does not, what measures they have taken to let their dissent be known?

I will recommend some other forms of action, although every person must be governed in this by his or her own conscience and aptitudes. But, first, I should, in fairness to Professor Howard, offer a scenario of my own.

I have come to the view that a general nuclear war is not only possible but probable, and that its probability is increasing. We may indeed be approaching a point of no-return when the existing tendency or disposition towards this outcome becomes irreversible.

I ground this view upon two considerations, which we may define (to borrow the terms of our opponents) as "tactical" and "strategic".

By tactical I mean that the political and military conditions for such war exist now in several parts of the world; the proliferation of nuclear weapons will continue, and will be hastened by the export of nuclear energy technology to new markets; and the rivalry of the superpowers is directly inflaming these conditions.

Such conditions now exist in the Middle East and around the Persian Gulf, will shortly exist in Africa, while in South-East Asia Russia and China have already
engaged in wars by proxy with each other, in Cambodia and Vietnam.

Such wars might stop just short of general nuclear war between the superpowers. And in their aftermath the great powers might be frightened into better behaviour for a few years. But so long as this behaviour rested on nothing more than mutual fear, then military technology would continue to be refined, more hideous weapons would be invented, and the opposing giants would enlarge their control over client states. The strategic pressures towards confrontation will continue to grow.

These strategic considerations are the gravest of the two. They rest upon a historical view of power and of the social process, rather than upon the instant analysis of the commentator on events.

In this view it is a superficial judgement, and a dangerous error, to suppose that deterrence "has worked". Very possibly it may have worked, at this or that moment, in preventing recourse to war. But in its very mode of working, and in its "postures", it has brought on a series of consequences within its host societies.

"Deterrence" is not a stationary state, it is a degenerative state. Deterrence has repressed the export of violence towards the opposing bloc, but in doing so the repressed power of the state has turned back upon its own author. The repressed violence has backed up, and has worked its way back into the economy, the polity, the ideology and the culture of the opposing powers. This is the deep structure of the Cold War.

The logic of this deep structure of mutual fear was clearly identified by William Blake in his "Song of Experience", The Human Abstract:

And mutual fear brings peace;
Till the selfish loves increase.
Then Cruelty knits a snare,
And spreads his baits with care . . .

Soon spreads the dismal shade
Of Mystery over his head;
And the Caterpillar and Fly
Feed on the Mystery.

And it bears the fruit of Deceit,
Ruddy and sweet to eat;
And the Raven his nest has made
In its thickest shade.

In this logic, the peace of "mutual fear" enforces opposing self-interests, affords room for "Cruelty" to work, engenders "Mystery" and its parasites, brings to fruit the "postures" of Deceit, and the death-foreboding Raven hides within the Mystery.

Within the logic of "deterrence", millions are now employed in the armed services, security organs and military economy of the opposing blocs, and corresponding interests exert immense influence within the counsels of the great powers. Mystery envelops the operation of the technological "alchemists". "Deterrence" has become normal, and minds have been habituated to the vocabulary of mutual extermination. And within this normality, hideous cultural abnormalities have been nurtured and are growing to full girth.

The menace of nuclear war reaches far back into the economies of both parties, dictating priorities, and awarding power. Here, in failing economies, will be found the most secure and vigorous sectors, tapping the most advanced technological skills of both opposed societies and diverting these away from peaceful and productive employment or from efforts to close the great gap between the world's north and south. Here also will be found the driving rationale for expansionist programmes in unsafe nuclear energy, programmes which cohabit comfortably with military nuclear technology whereas the urgent research into safe energy supplies from sun, wind or wave are neglected because they have no military pay-off. Here, in this burgeoning sector, will be found the new expansionist drive for "markets" for arms, as "capitalist" and "socialist" powers compete to feed into the Middle East, Africa and Asia more sophisticated means of kill.

"The MX missile will be the most expensive weapon ever produced - some estimates run as high as $100 billion to deploy 200 missiles. Building its 'race track' bases will involve the largest construction project in US history . . . More than 20,000 square miles may be involved for this system . . . in the sparsely inhabited states of Utah and Nevada. Some 10,000 miles of heavy duty roadway will be required, and perhaps 5,000 additional miles of road . . . The MX will thus require the biggest construction project in the nation's history, bigger than the Panama Canal and much bigger than the Alaskan pipeline."


The menace of this stagnant state of violence back up also into the polity of both halves of the world. Permanent threat and periodic crisis press the men of the military-industrial interests, by differing routes in each society, towards the top. Crisis legitimizes the enlargement of the security functions of the state, the intimidation of internal dissent, and the imposition of secrecy and the control of information. As the "natural" lines of social and political development are repressed, and affirmative perspectives are closed, so internal politics collapses into squabbling interest-groups, all of which interests are subordinated to the overarching interests of the state of perpetual threat.

All this may be readily observed. It may be observed even in failing Britain, across whose territory are now scattered the bases, airfields, camps, research stations, submarine depots, communications-interception stations, radar screens, security and intelligence HQ, munitions works - secure and expanding employment in an economic climate of radical insecurity.

What we cannot observe so well - for we ourselves are the object which must be observed - is the manner in which three decades of "deterrence", of mutual fear, mystery, and state-endorsed stagnant hostility, have backed up into our culture and
our ideology. Information has been numbed, language and values have been fouled, by the postures and expectations of the “deterrent” state. But this is matter for a close and scrupulous enquiry.

These, then, are among the strategic considerations which lead me to the view that the probability of great power nuclear warfare is strong and increasing. I do not argue from this local episode or that: what happened yesterday in Afghanistan and what is happening now in Pakistan or North Yemen. I argue from a general and sustained historical process, an accumulative logic, of a kind made familiar to me in the study of history. The episodes lead in this direction or that, but the general logic of process is always towards nuclear war.

The local crises are survived, and it seems as if the decisive moment – either of war or of peace-making and reconciliation – has been postponed and pushed forward into the future. But what has been pushed forward is always worse. Both parties change for the worse. The weapons are more terrible, the means for their delivery more clever. The notion that a war might be fought to “advantage”, that it might be “won”, gains ground. George Bush, the aspirant President of the United States, tries it out in election speeches. There is even a tremor of excitement in our culture as though, subconsciously, human kind has lived with the notion for so long that expectations without actions have become boring. The human mind, even when it resists, assents more easily to its own defeat. All moves on its degenerative course, as if the outcome of civilisation was as determined as the outcome of this sentence: in a full stop.

I am reluctant to accept that this determinism is absolute. But if my arguments are correct, then we cannot put off the matter any longer. We must throw whatever resources still exist in human culture across the path of this degenerative logic. We must protest if we are to survive. Protest is the only realistic form of civil defence.

We must generate an alternative logic, an opposition at every level of society. This opposition must be international and it must win the support of multitudes. It must bring its influence to bear upon the rulers of the world. It must act, in very different conditions, within each national state; and, on occasion, it must directly confront its own national state apparatus.

Recently the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has issued an all-European Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament. The objective of this Appeal will be the establishment of an expanding zone in Europe freed from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, etc. We aim to expel these weapons from the soil and waters of both East and West Europe, and to press the missiles, in the first place, back to the Urals and to the Atlantic ocean.

The tactics of this campaign will be both national and international.

In the international, and especially in the European, context, each national movement will exchange information and delegations, will support and challenge each other. The movement will encourage a European consciousness, in common combat for survival, fostering informal communication at every level, and disregarding national considerations of interest or “security”.

It is evident that this logic will develop unevenly. The national movements will not grow at the same pace, nor be able to express themselves in identical ways. Each success of a unilateral kind – by Holland in refusing NATO cruise missiles or by Romania or Poland in distancing themselves from Soviet strategies – will be met with an outcry that it serves the advantage of one or other bloc.

This outcry must be disregarded. It cannot be expected that initiatives on one side will be met with instant reciprocation from the other. Very certainly, the strategists of both blocs will seek to turn the movement to their own advantage. The logic of peace-making will be as uneven, and as fraught with emergencies and contingencies, as the logic which leads on to war.

In particular, the movement in West and East Europe will find very different expression. In the West we envisage popular movements engaged in a direct contest with the policies of their own national states. At first, Soviet ideologues may look benignly upon this, looking forward to a weakening of NATO preparations which are matched by no actions larger than “peace-loving” rhetoric from the East.

Yet we are confident that our strategy can turn this rhetoric into acts. In Eastern Europe there are profound pressures for peace, for greater democracy and international exchange, and for relief from the heavy burden of siege economies. For a time these pressures may be contained by the repressive measures of national and Soviet security services. Only a few courageous dissidents will, in the first place, be able to take an open part in our common work.

Yet to the degree that the peace movement in the West can be seen to be effective, it will afford support and protection to our allies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It will provide those conditions of relaxation of tension which will weaken the rationale and legitimacy of repressive state measures, and will allow the pressures for democracy and detente to assert themselves in more active and open ways. Moreover, as an intrinsic part of the European campaign, the demand for an opening of the societies of the East to information, free communication and expression, and exchange of delegations to take part in the common work will be pressed on every occasion. And it will not only be “pressed” as rhetoric. We are going to find devices which will symbolise that pressure and dramatise that debate.

Against the strategy which envisages Europe as a “theatre” of “limited” nuclear warfare, we propose to make in Europe a theatre of peace. This will not, even if we succeed, remove the danger of confrontation in non-European theatres. It offers, at the least, a small hope of European survival. It could offer more. For if the logic of nuclear strategy reaches back into the organisation and ideologies of the superpowers themselves, so the logic of peace-making might reach back also, enforcing alternative strategies, alternative ideologies. European nuclear disarmament would favour the conditions for international detente.
As to Britain there is no need to doubt what must be done to protest and survive. We must detach ourselves from the nuclear strategies of NATO and dispense with the expensive and futile imperial toy of an “independent” deterrent (Polaris). We must close down those airfields and bases which already serve aircraft and submarines on nuclear missions. And we must contest every stage of the attempt to import United States cruise missiles onto our soil.

Although we know that 164 cruise missiles are planned to be sited in Britain by 1982, Mr Pym (as we have seen) is still waiting for a United States official to tell him where they will be sited. Official leaks suggest that the major bases for the operation will be at Lakenheath in Suffolk, at Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire, and possibly at Sculthorpe (Norfolk).

Whether they are permanently sited at these spots, or dragged around on mobile platforms in “emergency” to subsidiary bases (as at Fairford or Greenham Common), we can be sure that there will be a permanent infra-structure of buildings and communications devices, wire and forocious guard dogs. It should be easy to find out what is going on. As a matter of course, in a question of national survival, any responsible and patriotic citizen should pass his knowledge of these matters on, whether they call it an “official secret” or not. How can a question which may decide whether one’s children live or not become anyone’s official secret?

There will also be a flurry of preparations, such as road-building and the strengthening of culverts. As Mr Churchill noted in parliament, the transporters for Pershing missiles weigh 80 tons, and are heavy enough to crush 90 per cent of the German road network. All this they will have to attend to, and there will be time not only for us to find it out but also to do our best to bring it to a stop.

The first necessity of Protect and Survive is to contest the importation of these foul and menacing weapons, which are at one and the same time weapons of aggression and invitations for retaliatory attack. In the course of this, there must be great public manifestations and direct contestations — peacefully and responsibly conducted — of several kinds. We must also take pains to discuss the question with the United States personnel manning these bases. We must explain to these that we wish them to go home, but that they are welcome to return to this country, as visitors, in any other role.

As it happens, these major bases are to be placed in proximity to the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and it seems to me that there is useful work to be done from these old bases of European civilisation. There will be work of research, of publication, and also work of conscience, all of which are very suitable for students, members of professions, churches, practitioners of Esperanto or of chess and various other societies.

Upper Heyford is a few miles out of Oxford on the Kidlington road (A43): take the left fork by Weston-on-the-Green, and then turn left again at Stone. The fellows of Cambridge who wish to inspect their friendly neighbourhood base at Lakenheath must drive a little further. One route would be on the A10 through Ely to Littleport, then turn right on the A1101 and wiggle across that flat fenland alongside the Little Ouse. Gum boots should be taken.

Oxford and Cambridge, then, are privileged to initiate this campaign: to plot out the ground: and to recommend which measures may be most effective. But they may be assured that thousands of their neighbours can be brought to take a share in the work. And there are plenty of other places which will need visiting, alongside the general work of education, persuasion and creating a sharp political weather which through which the politicians will have to sail. Our aim must be to ensure that, by 1982, any politician who still has a cruise missile on board will fear to put out to sea at all.

As for the international work, this is in hand, and I hope that before the summer is out we will receive news from — and exchange delegations with — the movement in other nations. The Dutch already have a start on us. They are, in a sense, the founders of this movement. Their torchlight processions were out in force last November, in Amsterdam, Heerlen, Groningen and Utrech; and an alliance of left-wing organisations and of the Dutch Council of Churches proved to be strong enough, in December, to defeat the government and to enforce a postponement of the Dutch decision on cruise missiles. In Belgium also there is a movement, and in West Germany the “green” movement against nuclear power is looking in the same direction. Indeed, a movement is astir already in West Europe, and only Britain, the first home of CND, has been yarning on its way to Armageddon.

A final, and important, consideration is that this European work need not wait upon governments, nor should it all be routed through centralised organisations. What is required, and what is now immediately possible and practicable, is a “lateral” strategy.

Indeed, this strategy, even more than the conventionally political, is the most appropriate for exchanges between Western and Eastern Europe. Any existing organisation, institution, or even individual, can look out for any number of colleges and get on with the work. Universities and colleges — or groups within these — can commence to exchange ideas and visits with colleagues in Warsaw, Kiev or Budapest. Students can travel to Poland or to Prague. Trade unionists, women’s organisations, members of professions, churches, practitioners of Esperanto or of chess and any and every kind of more specialised group can urge, along with their more particular common interests, the general common interest in European Nuclear Disarmament.

Before long, if we get going, we will be crossing frontiers, exchanging theatre and songs, busting open bureaucratic doors, making the telephone-tappers spin in their hideaways as the exchanges jam with official secrets, and breaking up the old stoney Stalinist reflexes of the East by forcing open debate and dialogue, not on their mendacious “peace-loving” agendas but on ours, and yet in ways that cannot possibly be outlawed as agencies of the imperialist West. If we have to do so, then we must be ready to inspect each other’s jails. We must act as if we are, already, citizens of Europe.

It would be nicer to have a quiet life. But they are not going to let us have that. If we wish to survive, we must protest.

The acronym of European Nuclear Disarmament is END. I have explained why I think that the arguments of Professor Howard are hastening us towards a different end. I have outlined the deep structure of deterrence, and diagnosed its outcome as terminal. I can see no way of preventing this outcome but by immediate actions throughout Europe, which generate a counter-logic of nuclear disarmament.

Which end is it to be?

If you wish to help with the British Campaign contact Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 29 Great James Street, London WC1N 3EY. If you can help with the European Campaign, write to Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham NG7 4ET.
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