DILEMMAS OF DIVERSITY AFTER THE COLD WAR: Analyses of “Cultural Difference” by U.S. and Russia-Based Scholars

Edited by Michele Rivkin-Fish and Elena Trubina
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Cover Photograph: A detail of the fountain, The Friendship of the Peoples, which was installed on the grounds of the Exhibition of National Economic Achievements (VDNH, originally The All-Union Agricultural Exhibition) in August 1954 (architects K. Topuridze and G. Konstantinovskiy). The composition consists of a gigantic sheave surrounded by 16 female figures symbolizing the 16 republics of the Soviet Union (including Karelo-Finnish, which eventually became the Karelian autonomous republic). (Courtesy of Elena Trubina)

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Introduction: Conceptualizing “Cultural Diversity” after the Cold War

ELENA TRUBINA AND MICHELE RIVKIN-FISH

When the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 presented a momentary sense of euphoria to societies around the globe, a fundamental question about the nature of future societal development arose: Would the realignment of geopolitical power, together with the emergence of market economics and democratic politics, result in a global convergence of social life and a “flattening” of difference?

The rapid and tumultuous changes that occurred in Russia during the 1990s and 2000s quickly revealed the shortsightedness of this question, as those years bore witness to sweeping sociocultural change and upheavals, stemming from processes such as widespread migration, the rise of nationalist and separatist movements, ethnic violence and war, and contestations over universalizing discourses of human rights. The importance of scholarship on “diversity” in this context and beyond cannot be underestimated; the dire need for increased understanding of legitimate and effective strategies for peacemaking, tolerance building, and the creation of a multicultural society becomes inescapable as numerous high-profile tragedies repeatedly call our attention to the violence and conflict being endured. These include the 2004 Beslan tragedy, in which Chechen separatists took more than 1,200 men, women, and children hostage in a school in the southern Russian province of Ossetia, an event that ended with an estimated 330 people, including more than 188 children, dead; the October 2006 murder of the journalist Anna Politkovskaya, a major critic of human rights abuses committed in Chechnya by the Vladimir Putin administration; and also outbursts of hostilities, street fighting, and murders based on ethnic animosity that have become all too common in Russian towns and cities.

Less visible in the daily headlines, but still significant in their cumulative impact on society, are the myriad interactions in which perceived social differences become the object of discrimination, symbolic violence,
and struggle among groups whose members increasingly see each other as “enemy.” Such mundane events include the routine police procedures of stopping people with dark complexions and forcing them to show their documentation on the streets of Russian cities; struggles between students and administrators in the sociology department of a top Russian university in 2007 over allegations that the latter promote anti-Semitic and nationalist ideology; and processes of deepening socioeconomic stratification—dividing society into the many who suffer abject poverty; the few, outrageously wealthy elite; and a small, struggling middle class for whom the ability to consume high-status products is becoming increasingly indispensable as a marker of true professionalism if not human dignity itself.

In social science and humanities scholarship on Russia since the 1990s, issues related to the broad rubric of cultural identities and diversity have been central. Among cultural anthropologists based in Western settings, a range of theoretical concerns have emerged, including the use of racialized imagery in vernacular and intellectual discourses on difference; the importance of social memory among ethnic and geographical minorities; and the shifts engendered by the breakdown of the Soviet system in the already varied symbolic landscape of religion, spirituality, and spiritual healing. Of particular importance, a focus on conflict and contestation among minority groups, such as Jews and various Islamic groups, has added nuanced analysis of the diversity within diversity and provides crucial evidence against the essentialist characterizations of ethnic groups. Virtually all ethnographic work seeks to parse the multiple effects of the Soviet and Russian state on subjectivity, whether ethnic, “racial,” religious, gender-based, and so on. Many of these theoretical concerns are developed in a growing body of work examining indigenous communities in Siberia. Scholars have analyzed these communities’ struggles to negotiate post–Soviet change in terms of changing modes of subsistence and ways of life, shifting relationships with the state, and the rise of indigenous political movements.

Another ethnographic location for questions of the construction and reconstruction of identity among indigenous peoples has been the Russian Far East, where scholars have examined the impact of Soviet nationality policies, state power, and local agency. And as Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer reminds us, Western anthropological agendas must not be mistaken for the only set of debates on cultural diversity and social change. It is crucial to
acknowledge the vast oeuvre of Russian ethnography and its intellectual debates in key fields of ethnohistory, political anthropology, and symbolic anthropology—much of it undertaken by indigenous anthropologists in Russia, whose voices add distinctly important understandings.

Historians and political scientists have also addressed questions of “diversity” in Russia, from the empire through the present, focusing largely on nationalism, indigenous peoples, interethnic relations, and violence. Discussions abound on the role of ethnicity, religion, and perceived cultural differences before and during the creation of the Soviet Union, on the politics of minorities and repression during Stalinism, and on the evolution of nationality policy and the role of national minorities in the USSR’s collapse. Through its focus on the multifaceted system of Soviet ethnofederalism and its postcommunist legacies, this body of work reanimates debates concerning state attempts to manage cultural diversity; it also raises key questions about the complex interplay of economic and political change, on the one hand, and social identity, on the other, as it examines the evolution of ethnic and religious identities in the era of marketization and globalization. While recognizing the primacy that the Chechen conflict merits due to its appalling human cost in all its guises—battlefield deaths, civilian casualties, victims of terrorist acts, and atrocities committed by both sides—these scholars rightfully remind us that diversity issues in Russia range far beyond this central concern and provide much comparative material for social scientists and historians concerned with cultural pluralism in other venues.

The present volume, an interdisciplinary collection of essays by scholars of “cultural diversity” from the Russian Federation and the United States, both builds on and stands somewhat to the side of the scholarship mentioned above. The book is the product of an experimental process of dialogue and debate, in which a group unified only by a broadly defined topical framework came together to actively seek out possible grounds for a shared framework of analysis, while striving to understand systemically—epistemologically, historically, economically—the sources of difference among us. The chapters originated as presentations in a series of workshops sponsored by the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in the summer of 2005 and winter of 2006.

The participants in these workshops could take little for granted about their colleagues; we shared neither common disciplinary norms nor a common social background. As a result, questions of intellectual “diversity”
among scholars became as important a subject of analysis as was empirical “diversity” in our respective societies. Without an a priori assumption regarding what counts as “cultural diversity,” we were forced to articulate it, explain it, and in some cases, translate its relevance across history and cultural context. Having been inspired by these conversations, this introductory chapter aims to highlight and account for social difference within the field of “diversity” studies itself. As we will see, the chapters that make up this book provide striking examples of the various kinds of cultural “diversity” currently acknowledged as salient in the United States and Russia, and it examines how these forms of difference are made meaningful by social policies, scholars, educators and ordinary citizens.

A comparative perspective on diversity scholarship in the United States and Russia is valuable for several reasons. Primarily, the tenor of dialogues and debates at the workshops on which this book is based revealed that in some cases, distinct assumptions and orientations shape the concerns of scholars from the two countries. This book, therefore, brings into relief the striking impact that historical and social experience has on the kinds of knowledge produced about “diversity.” At the same time, there were numerous lines of intellectual connection in the theoretical approaches we brought to our work. This conceptual convergence between Russian and American scholarship in the social sciences and humanities is in and of itself an interesting phenomenon—partly an organic outcome of global cultural and political changes since the end of the Cold War, and partly the product of deliberate institutional efforts by entities like the Kennan Institute to create an international community of scholars across the former Iron Curtain. Thus, the common language and visions we found through our dialogues invite reflection on the ways shared scholarly paradigms are emerging, despite the different historical, cultural, and institutional settings in which we live and work.

This volume makes three main contributions to scholarship on “diversity.” First, we demonstrate that “diversity” is a socially embedded concept, whose analysis reflects specific histories as well as the political contexts in which social and academic debates develop. Second, we detail the emergence of multiple varieties of liberalism and nationalism (often in combination with each other) as touchstones in current debates over “diversity,” even as elements of Soviet-era discourses continue to exert an impact. Third, we explore the ways that social constructivism has come to serve
as an important tool for scholars in former Soviet contexts who aim to critique primordialist understandings of ethnicity, including those that inform nationalist approaches to civic and political life. In a societal context where essentialist understandings predominate and are often celebrated as expressing the basic elements of one’s patriotic loyalty, the use of social constructivism for analyzing cultural diversity entails a politically radical, even subversive stance. The stakes are far more than academic.

AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF “DIVERSITY”

Contradictions and paradoxes abound in the conceptual creation of “diversity” in U.S. society, where extensive rhetoric and discursive production sit side by side with unacknowledged silences and even taboos on what can be stated. At one level, discourses celebrating “multiculturalism” and “diversity” fill the public sphere in the United States. Cities around the country regularly hold “cultural diversity” festivals at which the cultural identities, food, dance, and community building among minorities and immigrant groups are publicly celebrated. Entire industries have emerged that are devoted to ensuring the successful management of cultural diversity. Some of these are specific to particular service spheres, such as the “cultural competence” standards required of health care providers; others are more general modes of increasing people’s awareness and acceptance of diverse ways of life. Characteristic of the latter are the thousands of “diversity training” consultants who established themselves as experts in the 1980s and 1990s, and who sell their models of interpersonal behavior to businesses across the economic spectrum for lucrative profits. Yet given the persistent, even worsening levels of racial and economic inequality in the United States, and the ambivalence if not hostility among American legislators, courts, and many ordinary citizens to support affirmative action programs to reverse such patterns, most scholars consider the political significance of mainstream, public displays celebrating “diversity” to be rather limited. Diversity training has been critiqued for erasing the structural dimensions of inequality and reducing the complex insights of a radical civil rights movement into a popular psychology exercise that sees the solutions to injustice in individual attitude adjustments and therapeutic feel-good processes.13

In the post–civil rights, post–affirmative action, and Barack Obama eras, a major task for American scholars and activists has been to refute claims
that racial discrimination is a mere anomaly at present, by documenting
the ongoing, institutionalized patterns of racism that structure society.
Other tasks have been to expose discrimination against other marginal-
ized groups, such as gays and lesbians, and to devise innovative solutions
to these systemic problems. Such agendas involve increasing minorities’
 inclusion in the public sphere, ensuring inclusion and belonging through
“cultural citizenship” as well as political citizenship, and raising awareness
of the ways the ideology of “color-blindness”—purported to be a mode
of treating everyone equally—actually reproduces racism by denying the
continuing legacies of inequality and discrimination that minorities face.
The latter goal requires persuading Americans that equality of opportunity
is an illusion when drastic disparities in wealth and social resources create
an unequal playing field; even more challenging is to find practical, cul-
turally legitimate ways to undo these systemic inequities. In the legislative
arena, struggles are under way by the gay and lesbian rights movement to
attain equal protection under the law, including rights to marry and adopt
children. The disability rights movement attained visibility with the pas-
sage of the Americans with Disability Act in the 1990s that mandated such
material changes as requiring public buildings to provide physical accom-
modations for people in wheelchairs. And still, there are forms of differ-
ence that remain hidden, and often naturalized, such as class. Americans’
common sense notion that practically everyone is a member of the “middle
class” has left the society without a legitimate language for discussing class-
based inequality as injustice, despite the fact that income differentials and
stratified opportunities and risks have steadily and persistently increased
over the last decades.

Arriving with this intellectual and experiential “baggage,” the American
scholars participating in our workshops shared a set of assumptions that cul-
tural differences are personal and that collective identities are actively con-
structed through public assertions and performative acts for recognition.
In other words, an important moment in which cultural diversity becomes
meaningful occurs when groups articulate and mobilize their identities for
broader social purposes. Two key aspects of American history are especially
salient in shaping these assumptions: first, America’s character as a country
of immigrants, in which the main criterion for belonging became adher-
ence to normative liberal values, rather than a claim to shared “blood”
or “genes”; and second, the twentieth-century civil rights movement, in
which the value of equal rights for all became the object of active mobilization within the framework of democratic civic action. Although primordial or essentialist understandings of identity have found fertile ground at some times and places in the United States (most notably with regard to inaccurate, biologically based notions of race), the constructivist understanding of ethnicity and identity is no longer considered controversial in the social sciences and humanities. And still, translating this understanding for a popular audience remains a challenge.

In our workshops, U.S. participants shared the view that preventing the use of cultural belonging to stir up ethnic hatreds, conflict, and violence was among the most urgent tasks for scholarship and social movements alike. In chapter 4, Stuart Kaufman details the central role that symbols and myths about ethnic others play in mobilizing ethnic hostilities; his argument highlights the urgent need to challenge such myths in conflict resolution work, which has tended to address opponents’ rational interests alone. In chapter 7, Rachel Belin presents the first-person account of a high school teacher who has implemented the Holocaust education curriculum titled Facing History and Ourselves. This curriculum aims to explain the Holocaust through an analysis of the moral implications of group identity and boundary construction; it challenges students to recognize the responsibilities they have in opposing cultural intolerance, ethnic discrimination, and racism. In chapter 1, Omer Bartov examines how the process of constructing a sense of collective belonging linked with a particular physical space so often involves erasing the historical presence and suffering of groups considered “outside” the community. He examines two distinct cases of this: contemporary erasures of both historical Jewish communities and their annihilation in Western Ukraine, and erasures of Arab Palestinian culture and life in modern Israel. He urges us to recognize that tolerance, human rights, and peaceful forms of globalization cannot be built until states, organizations, and local communities produce honest accounts of historical events and social relationships, including acknowledging the wrongs committed against those deemed “other.” For all these authors, the recognition that cultural identities are by definition socially constructed and instrumentalized for political agendas leads to a shared conclusion: A key goal of scholarship on diversity involves intervening in the production of knowledge, through formal or informal education against racism, ethnic hatred, cultural intolerance, and historical erasure.
Yet in the course of our workshop discussions, several Russian participants characterized their American colleagues’ approaches to dealing with social problems as romanticized, posing ideal principles for social life (tolerance, diversity, equal rights) that could not possibly be realized; they felt the American scholars to be imbued with an unquestioned confidence that solutions can indeed be found for achieving these ideals, and proposed programs or tasks to fulfill them. The multiple obstacles that could readily thwart such programs at every step of the way went unmentioned. This discussion brought into relief an important realization: that underlying what we may call the normative position—which includes the embrace of diversity and equal rights, on the one hand, and the active engagement by citizens to create social change, on the other—sit the fundamental premises of liberal political theory regarding individual rights, democratic citizenship, and engagement. Liberalism emerged in all United States–based participants’ essays, which in turn share the agendas of scholarly trends in social science and historical research over the last ten years, including analyses of how specific public policies, cultural myths, and educational programs do or do not promote the values of tolerance and equality (i.e., Bartov, Belin, Katherine Graney in chapter 3, and Kaufman); the search for new educational and practical mechanisms to compensate for historical inequalities and promote the successful integration of ethnic, racial, and religious groups (Belin, Kaufman); and scholarship on the contradictions between, on the one hand, the values of tolerance, diversity, and multiculturalism, and the actual policies and institutional practices that contemporary societies implement, on the other (Bartov, Kaufman).

Interestingly, our Russia-based participants also found themselves referring to liberal ideals in their chapters. Thus in chapter 6, Oksana Karpenko, by analyzing discourses about ethnic and cultural difference in Russian social studies textbooks, links these texts’ primordialist vision of humanity as divided into culturally homogenous groups associated with physical territories, on the one hand, with Soviet and post-Soviet authoritarian political power, on the other. She exposes the ways these constructions can easily lead to the justification of both Russian nationalism and hostility to persons identified as ethnic “others,” while thwarting the kinds of critical thinking central to democracy. In chapter 2, Tatiana Skrynnikova and Darima Amogolonova undertake a similar critique of nationalist mythmaking in the Siberian region of Buryatia; though not asserting this directly in their
chapter, Amogolonova elsewhere equates their use of social constructivism with the expression of political support for a civic state and society (see the introductory comments to their chapter.) In chapter 5, Tatiana Venediktova criticizes the latent nationalism that underlies many Russian literature experts’ hostility to diverse forms of texts and nontraditional modes of interpretation. Recasting pluralism as a source of intellectual and cultural richness that would enhance rather than threaten Russian society, she advocates reorienting the teaching of literature and appraisal of texts to allow readers’ own thought processes and individual perspectives to flourish. Liberal ideals and democratic values emerged as reference points for these authors’ critiques, despite their skepticism (in our live discussions) about the possibility that such models had any promise of being realized.

The America-based scholars at our workshops were acutely aware of the deliberate misuse of liberal values for political expediency. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which shifted the parameters of what became possible to do in the United States to manage certain kinds of “diversity,” the instrumentalist dimensions of diversity for the U.S. government became quite evident. The government’s increasing suspicion and surveillance of people deemed “different” or “foreign,” suppression of civil rights and human rights, and use of torture all became justified in the name of “security.” Though Muslims were a particularly notable object of problematic difference in this context, it is also important to note that migrant workers and illegal immigrants have also been the target of scorn and political backlash by conservative groups bent on “protecting American interests.” The hypocrisy many scholars noted in George W. Bush administration’s policies in the years following the 2001 attacks raised significant questions for some about whether liberal statements about human rights and democracy could be articulated in good faith with reference to the United States.

At still another level, starker differences emerged between United States–based and Russian-based scholars in our discussions over the pragmatic dimensions of ethnic identity and diversity politics. On the one hand, United States–based scholarship on ethnic diversity in Russia and the former Soviet Union has found that the state has continually played a key role in constructing the available identity categories for residents and migrants, from the earliest years of the construction of the Soviet Union as an “empire of nations” to the politics of the census in the post-Soviet context;
pragmatic approaches to pluralism play a key role in cities such as Kyiv that are confronting large influxes of migrants. Yet in our workshop discussions, United States–based and Russian-based scholars reacted differently to the framing of collective identities as pragmatic, interest-based strategies. While Russian-based participants frequently proposed such arguments and portrayed them as the insights of “realist” thinking, United States–based participants were more reluctant to ascribe instrumentalist intentions to those who would claim ethnic feelings and identities, and they sought to retain a scholarly commitment to studying “authentic” expressions of minority subjectivity. We see these different perspectives as reflections of the larger historical experiences and social dynamics of our two societies, and as an example of our contrasting involvements in liberal notions of the subject. The mixture of embrace and ambivalence toward liberal ideals and assumptions in our approaches to diversity thus became a theme through which the similarities and differences between us became expressed.

Finally, in reflecting on the use of liberal theory as a touchstone for both American and Russian scholars, we have come to recognize the need to view current research on diversity as a social and political artifact. In the sections below and in our introductory commentaries to each chapter, we highlight how the very concepts of “cultural difference” and/or “diversity” as a conceptual field became produced by the contributors to this volume, and we discuss the political implications of their particular formations of knowledge. In these sections as well as the afterword, we home in on two key questions: How have the specific institutional and political contexts of academic work in Russia shaped the contributors’ approaches to analyzing “diversity”? And what structures in academia and society shape and constrain the diversity of our research, and what can be gained by making them visible?

SOVIET AND CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN CONFIGURATIONS OF “DIVERSITY”

The Russian scholars in our workshops confronted the study of “cultural diversity” not only with a set of historical baggage that was distinct from that brought by their American colleagues but also from within a political landscape that is far more complex and fraught—there is less agreement in Russian academia on the nature of the issues at stake, and greater chances in Russian society that pervasive hostilities will deteriorate into physical
violence. The widespread acceptance of primordialist notions of ethnicity not only in Russian society and politics but also in academia meant that our participants represented a minority, maverick group of scholars struggling to introduce and develop social constructivist analyses. In this way, their scholarship contributes to an agenda that opposes xenophobia and nationalism in Russian society. At the same time, it is valuable to examine how the broader context of Soviet history and nationalities policies, and the economic and cultural experiences of life amid post-Soviet transitions, shape their work, including the kinds of questions and concerns they bring to the table, their relationships to activism and politics, and the ways they configure their constructivist analyses.

Most notably, in contrast to activists for disadvantaged groups in the United States, the Russian participants highlighted the fact that in the post-Soviet context, there is little expectation that acquiring recognition as a minority group will lead to entitlements, privileges, or state protection. Debates currently under way in the United States and Great Britain over who constitutes a true “minority” and which forms of disadvantage represent legitimate criteria for compensation or assistance, would be unthinkable in the Russian context—where it is the very definition of Russianness and the boundaries of inclusion into this majority identity that have occupied public debate. Both Russian politicians and intellectuals consider Russian identity to be under siege. Indeed, with the introduction of market reforms having been widely experienced as punitive and humiliating, Vladimir Putin has encouraged Russians to perceive themselves as a highly threatened nation, vulnerable in demographic, political-economic, and cultural terms. Both nationalist activists and the mainstream press portray foreign influences as obstacles to the revival of the Russian nation.

Several contributors to this volume detail aspects of this struggle to shore up Russianness and defend against things perceived “foreign.” In chapter 6, Karpenko’s study of Russian social studies textbooks, we see educators’ efforts to promote patriotic allegiance to one’s “own” people [narod], which is conceptualized as absolutely distinct physically and culturally from other “peoples.” In chapter 5, Venediktova’s exploration of reading as a social process calls attention to the dilemmas of Russian literature teachers who confront approaches to textual interpretation that differ dramatically from those felt as natural and “Russian.” In each case, we see how encounters
with “diversity” are shaped by broader experiences of the anxieties and losses associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, in Russia’s urgent struggle to reassert itself as a great power, to offer a source of pride for its citizens, it is consumed with the problem of establishing clear definitions and boundaries for the question “Who are we?” The most legitimate models of government, nation, and personhood for this task are those that can be persuasively characterized as authentically Russian; models from abroad—and America in particular—are readily discredited. Similarly, diversity—whether represented by migrants, religious pluralism, political sovereignty for ethnic minorities, or even new modes of interpreting fiction—is easily portrayed as a threat. And though the market is successful at promoting certain kinds of “diversity” by packaging and commodifying them as “exotica,” this does not necessarily translate into a greater openness to differences in worldview and religious practice. As the sociologist Boris Dubin has noted, whereas postcolonial and multicultural literatures are widely read in what might be called “developed civic nations,” indicating societal recognition of the value of minority perspectives, in Russia there is no public discussion or market for literature by Tatars, Ukrainians, Buryats, or Gagauz. Indeed, countering the market for foreign and exotic goods are well-organized nationalists, conservative politicians, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which campaign against what they see as an onslaught of foreigners and foreign ideas to their “fatherland” by advocating for legislation, social policy, and grassroots efforts to defend “their” culture, territory, and families.

To be sure, the roots of current understandings of cultural identity and diversity stem from the Soviet Union’s unique approach to institutionalizing ethnic identity, no less than from the political-economic and cultural changes wrought in that empire’s demise. The Soviet Union dealt with ethnic diversity in a manner unique among modern states: Although Soviet identity was established as an umbrella form of citizenship, nationality [natsional’nost’]—the Soviet term for ethnicity—became a central unit of identity at the substate level. The Soviet state comprised political-administrative territories ostensibly dedicated to the members of the particular national groups of the region or republic. There were also personal and communal dimensions of nationality. Nationality was a legal category that defined an individual’s status. Yet as Rogers Brubaker has shown, territorial and political identity (institutionalized in national republics) was separ-
rate from and often incompatible with personal and ethnocultural identity, because many people in the country did not live in their nationally designated place of residence (or did not have one). Consequently, the Soviet system involved a complex and contradictory system of knowledge and power that at once gave national identity immense importance as a social category, separated it from statehood and citizenship, and controlled the forms of expression it could legitimately take.

The system not only distributed the privileges and limited the opportunities citizens had as members of nationalities but also subjected a whole range of ethnic groups to violent persecution. The seeds of animosity were sown as early as the 1920s, when state attempts to “affirmatively” institutionalize non-Russians generated first Russians’ widespread resentment and then interethnic violence. In the 1930s, the authorities’ increased security concerns led to the forced relocation of “diaspora nationalities” (Poles, Finns, Germans, Estonians, Latvians, Koreans, Belarusians, and Ukrainians). If these nationalities were repressed because their geographical location raised suspicions of them as a potential “fifth column” aiming to secede from the Soviet Union, the ethnic groups that were persecuted during and after World War II (Balkars, Carachaevtsy, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushs, and Crimea Tatars) were considered potentially “anti-Soviet” on the basis of numerous cases of collaboration with the occupiers. Thus the Soviet state both created and squashed spheres of influence for nationalities.

Russians were indisputably the dominant nationality in the Soviet Union, for they controlled the political apparatus and ensured that the Russian language remained the lingua franca for the entire country. At the same time, the privileges accorded to the dominant nationality were not often visible to Russian people themselves. One important reason for this stemmed from the images of parity and advantage that emerged historically from the territorial and political forms of institutionalized nationality. From the early years of the Soviet Union, the “cultural technologies of rule”—the map, census, and museum—helped Soviet officials, ethnographers, demographers, and regional and local elites to organize the Soviet Union’s myriad, diverse peoples into a new and unprecedented group identity—a Soviet one. Not only cultural and territorial differences but also drastic economic ones divided the citizens of the new country. For this reason, the Soviet ideologists promoted, first, the notion of “double assimilation,” whereby citizens were simultaneously assimilated into nations
and into the Soviet Union; and second, the Soviet territory was divided into fifty-three units, including fifteen Soviet socialist republics, twenty autonomous republics, eight autonomous provinces, and ten autonomous regions—and it is these boundaries that continue to be a source of tensions in the post-Soviet era.29

The Soviet Union’s fifteen republics consisted of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and fourteen republics of “titular” nationalities. This appeared to offer nonethnic Russians a clear advantage, because Russians were not designated the titular nationality in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic. Yet Russians held clear control over political processes in the country as a whole; and during the Stalin era, numerous minority groups were subject to severe discriminatory practices, including political repression, coercive deportation, the forced abandonment of traditional subsistence methods, and genocide.30 The benefits derived from having Russian nationality are indirectly manifest in the far more frequent tendency of non-Russians than Russians to switch nationality for personal benefit during the Soviet era. One of these “tactical” responses to the authorities' cynical management of ethnicities is documented in an article with the ironic subtitle “The Transnational”:

His mother was Chuvash, and his father was Tatar. When the time came to apply for a passport, one song was often broadcast on the radio: “In the Armenian language I am called Vano, and in Russian I am Vanya.” In those times, many people were embarrassed to have non-Russian names and nationalities. So he managed to have the Russian nationality listed in his passport and he usually introduced himself as Misha. When he enrolled in a higher education institution in Kazan, he changed his nationality to Tatar and again became Muhamet, as he was called by his parents. When he got a job in Bashkoria, he converted to Bashkir and took the prophet’s name—Muhammad (having a Bashkir name in Bashkoria usually helped one’s career more quickly). He recently escaped the tax police by moving to Tuva and, apparently, obtained yet another nationality.31

This is obviously an extreme case, but one of the contributors to this volume can remember numerous occasions when, for example, a person
who introduced himself as Nikolai Alekseevitch (Russian) turned out to be Nagazhbai Amangalievich (Kazakh). The deliberate Russification of one’s name (so that it would be easier for people to pronounce it) or “signing up” (zapisatsia) as Russian in one’s passport were popular ways of conducting context-contingent and pragmatic changes in self-identification. From the Soviet era through the present, an instrumental dimension has been important for minority identity. The main difference between Soviet and post-Soviet ethnicity-related pragmatism is that previously, the predominant strategy was that of individuals inventively building their relationship with the paternalistic state, whereas today it is the ethnic community that has become one’s asset. The flows of migration bring more and more people from the former Soviet republics and from the “far abroad” to Russia. To cope with ethnic profiling, exploitation, and a “second-rate” status, one must rely on one’s ethnic community, especially on those members who immigrated earlier and gained the necessary social capital. Membership in one’s ethnic group thus becomes the predominant mechanism of successful survival in the receiving society. The new immigrants oscillate between adaptation and segregation as two main ways of obtaining the assistance of ethnic networks, communities, and “diasporas.”

One of the most problematic aspects of these tendencies is the appearance of “ethnic entrepreneurs,” that is, the members of minority communities who are involved in wholesale trade and run small and medium-sized businesses. In opposition to popular stereotypes that some ethnic groups are predisposed to work as farmers and in industry, while others are traders “by birth,” a number of recent studies convincingly show that many immigrants have, in fact, been pushed into the ethnic economy (including the shadow and criminal one) by both the weak legislative base (which makes obtaining Russian citizenship one’s lifelong objective) and increased competition in the labor market. This situation suits the state. Working with primordialist understandings of ethnicity, the authorities prefer to handle “ethnic problems” by dealing with national groups and their representatives; this in turn stimulates the emergence of ethnic activists, who tend to engage with the authorities on behalf of groups, often entering political institutions and capitalizing on ethnicity. In the process, these high-profile ethnic activists gain the power to define—and monopolize—the supposed interests of their groups. The appearance of clans and clienteles tightly related to corrupt local authorities is a common outcome. Despite
these problems, the high intragroup solidarity and social capital of migrant groups enable them more effectively to overcome the lack of pro-entrepreneur institutional arrangements in Russia. In this sense, calls by Russian nationalists and conservatives for policymakers to establish economic measures that favor Russians and put an end to “the migrant dominance in trade” miss the mark because it makes much more sense to promote cooperation among isolated Russian traders.  

In addition to the institutionalized organization of nationalities, Soviet discourse on the “friendship of the peoples” provided the accepted ideological attitude for relationships between ethnically diverse groups or nationalities. The notion of diverse nationalities united under the banner of Soviet identity served to legitimize the narrow forms through which minority groups could express their cultural aspirations, historical memory, and experiences of being “different”; the accepted genre was that of folklore—quaint, politically neutralized expressions, denuded of any nationalist political aspirations. This ideological imperative denied the histories of mass repression, forced resettlement, and even genocide that many Soviet “nationalities” endured during the Stalinist era, and that were not officially recognized as criminal acts until the very last years of the Soviet era. The violence and denials of violence that characterized Soviet and post-Soviet policies—for example, from “friendship of the peoples” discourses to the Chechen wars—has left searing imprints on contemporary diversity politics in the country. Balzer and Vinokurova’s metaphoric description is apt: “The Soviet version of melting pot ideology scalded its cooks and in many areas did not even achieve for its people its fall-back recipe of an ethnic salad, a ‘vinaigrette’ of mixed ethnic groups keeping their discrete identities and cultural flavors but tossed compatibly together.”  

Experiencing these hypocrisies has led many groups to seize onto nationalist (romantic) narratives while remaining suspicious that pragmatic interests must ultimately be at play in universalizing (romantic) discourses on diversity. Several chapters in this volume examine the continuing impact of this Soviet approach to nationality, both in the struggles of present-day minorities working to re-create their identities and communities, and in the various movements of Russian nationalists to redefine their state. In chapter 3, Graney’s study of museums in the Russian Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan finds echoes of the Soviet “friendship of the peoples” paradigm in recent representations that Tatar elites have created of their republic’s
diverse population. In chapter 6, Karpenko finds that the “friendship of the peoples” model of understanding ethnic relations, with its overt hierarchy of Russia as the superior “nation” and other “nationalities” as subordinate, continues to resonate among Russian authors of social studies textbooks. In chapter 2, Skrynnikova and Amogolonova demonstrate how the strong desire in Buryatia to reverse aspects of Soviet nationality policy shapes current efforts to revive national feelings and commitments. Thus, Buryat leaders are preoccupied with reclaiming their community’s Mongolian heritage and establishing themselves as the descendents of Chinggis Khan—symbolic associations explicitly banned under the Soviet era.

THE URGENT SEARCH FOR RUSSIA’S IDENTITY: DEFINING—AND DELIMITING—THE POSSIBILITIES OF BELONGING

In the 1990s, the loss of the Soviet Union as a symbolic expression of Russian geopolitical supremacy, combined with newly expressed resentments by national groups that had formerly been part of the USSR, generated a new context for negotiating ethnic identity and interethnic relationships. Diversity within the Russian Federation itself became an object of attention and debate: With its eighty-five federal political-administrative units that include autonomous regions, republics, and also the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg (which have the status of regions themselves), the Russian Federation is a society composed of a multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups. And the very definition of what this Russian society is—how belonging is defined and delimited—became the subject of intense debate. The historian Vera Tolz identified five ways in which the Russian nation was defined in public discourses during the late 1990s: (1) “Union” identity (Russians as an imperial people, based on their mission to create a supranational state); (2) Russians as a nation of all eastern Slavs (including Belarusians and Ukrainians); (3) Russians as a community of Russian speakers, regardless of their ethnic origin; (4) Russians defined racially; and finally, (5) a civic Russian (rossiiskaia) nation, whose members are all citizens of the Russian Federation, regardless of their ethnic and cultural background, united by loyalty to the state and its constitution.

None of these types is predominant, and each is contested by particular groups. For example, the idea of a civic Russian (Rossiiskaia) nation is not accepted universally, because for many Russians the question of citizen-
ship does not seem significant; yet of course it does matter (1) for ethnic Russians who have returned to Russia from former Soviet republics and (2) for nonethnic Russians who would like to live in Russia. For many, Russian identity is linguistic and cultural; according to opinion polls, more than 80 percent of respondents thought that to be a Russian meant to be versed in Russian culture and know Russian traditions and customs. In other words, the majority of Russians define the Russian nation as a community of Russian speakers. Yet the Russian Federation is viewed by many Russians not as a multiethnic state where all ethnic groups should have equal rights but primarily as a state of Russians—presumably in a biogenetic sense.42

Several processes have made the question of social and ethnic diversity—the problem of who can belong to the Russian people, nation, federation—an especially sensitive component of public debate: Russia’s shrinking population (caused by the combination of low fertility among ethnic Russians and high male mortality) is widely portrayed as the tragic “dying out of the Russian nation”; here what is seen as threatened is not only Russian culture, traditions, and language but also the Russian “gene pool.”43 It is important to emphasize that this defensive, inward turn has been buttressed by experiences of perestroika and post-Soviet transition. The severe economic hardships wrought by “shock therapy” and market reforms in general have resulted in the widespread delegitimization of liberal democracy as a foreign ideology alien and harmful to Russia. The resulting backlash against Western paths of reform and “the West” has, more generally, encouraged nationalist movements and provided their visions of national revival with increased legitimacy. For example, conservatives opposed to liberalism have successfully portrayed the NGO as an entity that “imposes” “Western” values on Russians. Instead of liberal reforms of social politics, the paternalism of a strong state has returned to the fore, with projects that suit nationalist interests, such as programs devoted to increasing the birthrate.

The strain of neoliberal economics, manifest in both material impoverishment and a sociopolitical sense of humiliation, figures centrally in the ways Russia is approaching issues of diversity. These experiences feed into public anxieties over nonethnic Russian immigrants, shaping both official public policies about migrants and unofficial, street-level interactions. Putin and other politicians assert the need to combat illegal immigration
and to protect Russian interests from an onslaught of ethnic outsiders. In January 2000, Putin signed the Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation, which claimed that “uncontrolled migration fosters nationalism, political and religious extremism, and ethno-separatism, and provides conditions for the emergence of conflicts.” In this document, immigration, along with “the economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion of neighboring states into Russian territory,” is pictured as a “threat” to be “neutralized.” In April 2007, a national law went into effect prohibiting non-Russian citizens from working in markets, an economic niche that had previously been dominated by workers from Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Tadjikistan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Belarus, and by Russian Koreans.

In general, immigration is presented as a “problem” for Russia; the most prominent solutions proposed to what is widely seen as a regrettable economic necessity, are formulated in the language of prohibitions, limitations, and regulations, such as “put a stop to illegal immigration” and “increase the severity of penalties against those who organize illegal immigration.” The integration of migrants is rarely considered in political decisions. A significant number of people, especially low-skilled and unskilled labor, are thus left without official recognition. Debates central to the English-speaking world over the creative development of a multicultural society are nonexistent; while politicians and think tanks are focused on the interests of the state, society is either indifferent or hostile toward newcomers. State leaders attempt to “manage” migration by changing quotas on the foreign labor force—the capital and neighboring regions that are particularly attractive to migrants have established the lowest quotas in the country, legal regulations related to getting work permits and/or legal status are contradictory, and politicians’ concerns to stem unemployment due to the global economic crisis in 2009 led them to again decrease quotas with the putative goal of increasing local workers’ probability of finding jobs.

The bleak perspective for public policies addressing the ethical dimensions of cultural diversity and matters of equality in Russia stems in part from the lack of societal institutions and organizations devoted to these issues. Putin’s widespread success at building what he terms “vertical power” has taken place at the expense of the independence of local authorities and leaders, nongovernmental organizations, social institutions, and initiatives—creating a state-sponsored image of the country as comprised of a vast, undifferentiated population with its charismatic leader. The growing
centralization of political rule weakens the existing bonds among various groups in society and poses substantial obstacles to the emergence of institutional formations that might represent the country’s diverse cultural experiences and interests. Political activity, as a consequence, is increasingly reduced to the public demonstration of one’s loyalty to the country. New economic realities—whether the growth of the gross national product due to oil revenues, the mid-2000s’ growing satisfaction with the standard of living, or the global economic crisis that began in late 2008—coexist with growing expressions of overt Russian nationalism, while there is only minimal social debate to question the legitimacy of such discourses. Jingoism is increasingly common in public discourse, as talk of Russia’s “toughness” and “superiority in the world” gets combined with statements about Russia’s uniqueness, exceptional “destiny,” and special “path.” Because it is Russia’s difference from all other countries and people that gets emphasized, there is little room for differences within Russia to be appreciated and supported. Migrants from Ukraine and Belarus, not to mention those from the Caucasian republics, are not considered to be part of “us.”

The provocative mix of imperial pomp and nationalist sentiments, together with the Russian government’s hostility toward nearly everything that is non-Russian, have led to a number of ethnic conflicts and riots. In September 2006, in the northwestern town of Kondopoga, and in June 2007, in Moscow and Russia’s southern city of Stavropol, anti-Caucasian riots and mass clashes between Slavs and Caucasians broke out. Online discussions, television talk shows, and sociological polls about the attacks against ethnic Chechens and other ethnic minorities show the growing influence of nationalist discourses in inscribing the boundaries of who belongs to and who is excluded from the Russian nation. Many people are willing to tolerate those coming from the Caucasus only if they assimilate: “The citizens of Kondopoga differentiate between local ethnic minorities not only according to their nationality but on the basis of whether they have successfully adopted the local way of life and assimilated.” To give another example: In an episode of the popular liberal talk show Vremena that was devoted to the ethnic conflicts on Manezhnaia Ploshad in Moscow, many participants insisted on the need for Caucasians to “obey our rules.” They further explained the reasons for Russian xenophobia against Caucasians as based not only on their “problematic” behavior but also on their successful and more rapid adaptation to market conditions in comparison with
Russians. Finally, participants mentioned state corruption and the lack of an effective national policy as the main reasons for deteriorations in inter-ethnic relationships.50

Understanding these conflicts and hostilities requires a nuanced analysis of the context in which the inhabitants of many depressed Russian towns encounter “cultural difference.” Unfortunately, reports of ethnic hostility in Russia usually fail to address such details, implicitly leading readers to assume that Russians are somehow naturally beset by a pathological level of low tolerance for people from diverse backgrounds. In contrast to expressing any “natural” or ancient ethnic hatreds, recent tensions are the product of state economic policies that directly and indirectly create conditions of disempowerment, frustration, and inequality. Over the last two decades, provincial Russia has become more and more marked by economic decline, physical decay, and a sense of doom. Many towns and former industrial cities suffer from a severe lack of investment, while manufacturing employment is rapidly diminishing, and services (which could help to relieve the burden of unemployment) are basically absent. This combination of unemployment, crumbling apartment buildings, and a rather depressing general environment of conservatism and repression has created conditions in which ordinary people are deeply marginalized from the public sphere and turn inward; their very existence becomes highly “privatized” because economic exclusion means the loss of recognition in the public sphere.

Sociological surveys register this widespread sense of alienation from political influence. One survey conducted in February 2006 asked respondents how they explained the fact that “Russian citizens, as a rule, don’t control the actions of the authorities and don’t have a significant influence on them.” The very wording of this question suggests the pervasive sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis policymakers and officials; and yet the answers seem to indicate a lack of systematic analysis, let alone consensus, as to why this is so—48 percent answered that officials only take into account the opinions of their bosses, ignoring the opinions of citizens; 29 percent said that the authorities do not really inform citizens about their actions; 27 percent said that elections, referendums, and discussions have less and less impact on the life of society; 18 percent said that people do not care about the authorities’ actions; and 17 percent said that citizens merely look to the authorities to take care of them.51
Missing from these survey responses are salient issues such as cynical politicking, profitable alliances between various groups of politicians and businesspeople, and endless bureaucratic “cadres” who tirelessly convert their administrative resources into profits, along with the very minimal organization of active protest from citizens’ groups. In these circumstances, the domestic media might seem a potentially unifying force. Although the Internet remains largely unavailable in many places, television is everywhere. But the features of the Western mass media—increasingly dissociated from its potential role of encouraging critical thinking and more oriented toward a consumer/aesthetic function—exert an additional numbing affect on Russian social life.

The neoliberal bent of the Russian government’s policy has resulted in the decentralization of economic responsibilities to regions; however, many municipal governments are unable to pay out wages and benefits. This situation contributes significantly to rapidly growing social polarization, for local inhabitants’ perceptions of newcomers are marked by their own poverty and humiliation. At the same time that local authorities appear indifferent to the painful consequences of economic restructuring on the lives of thousands of people, these same authorities enter into alliances with various social organizations—including organized crime groups. Thus, while local workers are left with little leverage for demanding better working conditions, newcomers (mostly non-Russian traders) often receive favorable treatment from local authorities by virtue of bribing them. The self-confidence and economic self-sufficiency that such newcomers display contrast strongly with the persistent material constraints and inertia characteristic of many Russians. Locals’ anxiety regarding newcomers is often bound up with the loss of dignity endured through these broader economic and social processes. Russians experience themselves as the victims of pervasive, systemic injustice, whereas newcomers to their town seem unfairly advantaged and empowered. This politically structured set of emotions, catalyzed by highly biased news and media, produces locals’ enmity toward ethnic minorities. Their defensiveness and anxiety expressed itself clearly in the slogans of those participating in the riot in Stavropol, whose angry taunts included “Hail Russia!” “Russia, Go, Go!” “Suitcase, Railway Station, Chechnya!” and “Our Own Mob Law!”
INTELLECTUAL DEBATES ON THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP, NATION, AND BELONGING

Thus, it is political and social circumstances of interethnic hostility, economic vulnerability, and growing nationalism that form the background of current Russian discussions of cultural diversity. One line of debate about diversity in Russia concerns efforts to understand what differentiates contemporary Russian/Rossiiskaia culture, including various ways to conceptualize the notion of diversity. According to many observers, the most important dimensions of present-day Russian/Rossiiskaia culture are individualist and consumerist ones. On the basis of a comparative study of the values pursued by citizens of various European countries, the sociologists Vladimir Magun and Maxim Rudnev claim that the citizens of the Russian Federation are less inclined toward the social good and solidarity and more oriented toward personal success, authority, and wealth. A consequence of this is widespread indifference toward the well-being, equality, and tolerant treatment of others. This explains why societal attention remains focused not on diversity among living human beings but on “diversity” in terms of material objects, so to speak. The most important expression of diversity today is “variety”—that is, the very broad choice of goods, opportunities, and modes of personal communication that have become available in the information economy characteristic of a “free” society. The consumption of goods, both purchased and dreamed of, enables people not only to identify with the most popular strata, “those who have money,” but also to enact the ongoing narratives of their lives by imagining acts of purchase and the subsequent combination of things.

Although scholars working in this vein seek tendencies that highlight Russia’s similarities with other industrial nations, another approach can be found among sociologists and cultural studies scholars who explore Russia’s cultural specificities (understood not in the sense of continuous primordial traditions but as a particular set of predispositions that characterize the population of the country). Boris Dubin metaphorically claims that what currently emerges at the fore is people’s downward adaptation to living on the ruins of a big societal structure, and their ambivalent attempts to cope with the ruptures and holes in the social fabric. He believes that, as a result, a peculiar type of subject emerges, one who simultaneously counts on the government and is totally mistrustful of it, is suspicious of oth-
ers and yet lacks individual responsibility, and hopes that he himself will always “manage” to get out of trouble. Everything that exceeds the limits of the field of his or her habitual life and mental habits is deemed unnecessary, harmful, and alien. It is no coincidence that comedy shows depicting “the stranger” (a Westerner, and increasingly often an American, as in Mikhail Zadornov’s sketches) as a complete idiot who does not understand “normal things” soar in popularity. Dubin points out that politicians’ attempts to foster national coherence through the widespread popularization of Orthodox Christianity have not only dramatically increased the number of people who count themselves as believers (up to 70 percent of the population) but also contributed to the growth of xenophobia and conservatism. Dubin concludes that it remains unclear how to analyze this complicated configuration of traits and circumstances that characterize the “Rossiiski” subject and the “Rossiiskoie society” using the traditional instruments of the humanities and social sciences.

The next line of debate addresses the views held by ordinary people toward those considered “other.” Some scholars have highlighted the serious problems faced by migrants, who are not treated as equal citizens. They are seen either as prey to be used to resolve labor deficits in a country with a bustling economy but a graying population or as those who come to “our country” to seize the limited economic resources (jobs, business opportunities, etc.) that do exist. According to the political scientist and journalist Denis Dragunski, “in Moscow, the names of some ethnic groups have come to signify a cheap, docile work force deprived of virtually all rights; the names of other groups are synonymous with unjust wealth; and the names of still others are associated with threats to the life and property of the locals, all of which not only fails to promote the development of a civic nation but further catalyzes the ethnicization of political life and the dehumanization of all social relations.” Dragunski goes on to suggest that only genuine political change will address this problem, whereas rhetoric—from both liberal and nationalist corners—is doing little to successfully manage migration. The only guarantee of migrants’ loyalty to their new home and their prospective integration into the new society is their legal security.

The economist and public activist Alexander Auzan points out, however, that legal security is not enough; ordinary people’s opinions about others are based on their vague ideas about who they themselves are, that is, that difficulties with national identity that Russia faces have direct rel-
An A ly se of Cultural Difference by U.S. and Russia-Based Scholars

Evance to the problem of migrants’ integration. He finds Ernest Renan’s definition of “nation” particularly useful—that the concept of a nation presupposes a set of values that would be common for its members—and he argues that Russia is not a nation, understood in this sense, because it has as yet no common values. To deal with the legacy of the Russian and Soviet empires is to integrate migrants by not only making them obey the law and learn Russian but by socializing them, that is, introducing them to the values most people in this country share: “At the moment there are no values that one could follow to demonstrate his or her successful integration.”

The sociologist Lev Gudkov also locates the problem of the “other” within the broader context of contemporary Russia, with its extremely low level of trust and prevalence of negative and suspicious feelings toward other people. He explains the social dynamics behind the growing xenophobia by locating them in the mass use of psychological defense mechanisms amid a weakened social order and general insecurity. He is reluctant to interpret people’s feelings of mistrust or indifference toward newcomers as an expression of reprehensible political views, but he warns that mass interethnic hostility can be “retranslated into the Nazi or racist populism of political parties and authorities.”

As in society at large, for Russian academics, too, the question of who and what constitutes the Russian nation is among the most central issues. As experts struggle over the intellectual and political problem of how to define Russianness, how to apply social constructivist approaches, and for what purpose, charges abound about instrumentalizing cultural identity and refusing to engage in socially useful work that promotes greater acceptance and tolerance of diversity. Confronting the question of how citizenship should be defined in a multiethnic country, some Russian intellectuals insist on promoting the double identity of Russians: as having both a civic (Rossiskaia) and an ethnic (Russian) identity. The Russian anthropologist Valery Tishkov, a key participant in this debate, claims, “These two forms of community do not exclude each other, and... to use the notion ‘Rossiiski people,’ does not mean to deny the existence of Russian, Tatar, Ossetin, Yakut, and other people of our country.” Yet in everyday use, there is a lot of confusion about the ways “Rossiiski” is employed, and many people lack a sense of unified nationhood, of what it means to be “Russian” (Rossiiskii) as opposed to “Soviet” or “Rossiiski.” Because all successor states are still “states in the making,” Russia is also searching for a
national self-definition, one that broadens the grounds of civic solidarity among its citizens. According to the demographer Sergei Gradirovski, this means “broadening the very understanding of what it means to be Russian, and in particular, to be Russian in Russia. One must fight against narrowing this notion to a mythic phenotypic image (a particular color of skin, a conventional sounding last name, in short, to the notorious purity of blood). One must actively defy stereotypes connected with people possessing a Caucasian appearance, or who have a Jewish mother, or an Armenian last name. In this sense, ‘Russian’ should be elevated to the national level, and its ties to ethnicity should be broken.” What we believe is obvious in this line of reasoning is the attempt to use “Russian” or “Rossiiski” as a designator of the nation of its multiethnic citizens, as in the expression, “Asian American.”

The historian Alexei Miller argues that in the Russian case, it is the particularly weak civic component of the nation that makes its cultural component especially important. However, there is no societal consensus regarding the notion “Rossiiskaia nation.” Too often, the word “Rossiiski” fails to work as a unifying term and, when used in official discourse, becomes a marker of the non-Russian origin of a person in question. Looking for reasons for the negative attitudes Russians have toward the word “Rossiiski,” he suggests that “Rossiiski” has come to substitute for the term “Soviet,” evoking associations with both the suppression of Russianness (for the Russians) and forced Russification (for non-Russians). Conversely, “Russian” also fails to work as a unifying term because there are millions of people in the country who are reluctant to use this term for themselves. Apart from the inertia of habitual word use, there are historical processes that make it as difficult for people to imagine “Rossiiskost’” (a civic component of the nation) without “Russkost’” (its cultural component), as it is to imagine “Britishness” without “Englishness” or the Republican component of “Frenchness” without its cultural dimension. In the Russian case, he contends, it is the particularly weak civic component of the nation that makes its cultural component especially important.

Miller’s points raise doubts about Valery Tishkov’s argument that the “genuine unity of the people of Russia amidst continuing ethnocultural diversity” has been achieved. Tishkov and other scholars believe that excessive attention to ethnicities on the part of both scholars and ideologists of nationalism prevents the popularization of a notion of a united Russian
people ("Rossiiski narod-natsiia) and the development of "Rossiiskost’" (Russianness) as a predominant identity category.67

Cultural differences are often constructed and declared either for political goals, or for academic ambitions—discovering and researching a cultural stratum, a clan structure, or a new ethnicity. For some scholars this is more significant than pointing out that among Russians [Rossianami]—Armenians, Jews, Tatars, Russians, Ukrainians, Chechens, et al., there are more similarities than differences. My personal conversations and observations... have shown that, from clothing to daily life ways to the style of conversation and behavior at the table, true ethnic differences between Tatars and Russians do not exist. Differences were noticeable between age groups, between representatives of academic and bureaucratic-managerial groups, between the nonbelieving majority and the few who observed Islamic traditions.68

Thus, Tishkov portrays attention to the cultural specificity of Russian communities as unjustifiable social constructions that impede acceptance of Russia as a “civic nation.” He calls on intellectuals to explain to people that "Rossiiskost’," as an identity and a people-nation, is the result of “the natural overlapping of broader historical-cultural and sociopolitical identities on top of numerous internal ethnocultural differences that exist among the population of the country.”69 Yet his hope to promote a civic conception of Russia leads him into a quandary: He takes superficial appearances of sameness (e.g., table manners) between Russians and Tatars at an international conference he attended as evidence that a shared civic Russianness is the most important cultural identity for these groups. He does not question the possibility that factors less visible than external behaviors, such as historical memory, may give rise to differences in Russian and Tatar perspectives; nor does he acknowledge the role of education and/or class in shaping the similarities he did observe among his academic colleagues. It remains unclear from his texts whether the cultural differences ethnographers “find” are actually their own social constructions or, as he asserts in the above quotation, that historical-cultural differences “exist” and have come together to form civic Russianness.
The reviewers of Tishkov’s latest book, *Requiem for Ethnos*, reject his calls to move beyond the concept of ethnicity (ethnos). The archaeologist Tatiana Alekseeva went so far as to suggest that contemporary political reality is forcing scholars such as Tishkov to reject the importance of terms such as “ethnicity” and “race” as a way of avoiding the sociopolitical problems associated with them. On a different occasion, the political anthropologist Emil Pain has conceded that, although essentialist and primordialist approaches prevail in the Russian humanities, and far too many people are busy describing, with a touch of mysticism, the predetermined cultural traits of nations and civilizations, it is also important to critically examine the extremities of social constructivism evident in Tishkov’s reasoning. He further charges Tishkov with a tendency to overestimate the ability of the mass media to reshape public consciousness, which, Pain believes, results in rather simplified ideas about nation building.

At stake in this debate are distinct evaluations of the state of the Russian nation. Though Tishkov believes that a civic nation has already been formed and the task is to teach people to strip the words “nation” and “national” from ethnicity-related understandings that the Soviet policy “glued” onto them, Pain argues that this estimation constitutes wishful thinking about what is in reality a neo-imperial project. Russianness, meanwhile, remains inseparable from imperialism; the story of Russia that is often told envisions the Russian Empire as having brought a system of law and order to religiously and tribally diverse people (also see chapter 6 for one version of this narrative). Symptomatic of a neo-imperial process, Pain argues, is the popularity of the idea that the Russian majority is entitled to a specific status and set of privileges ensuring state protections on the basis of its origin.

The field of debate is thus highly fragmented and contentious. Efforts by scholars such as Tishkov to oppose primordialist and nationalist conceptualizations of ethnicity by emphasizing historical convergences, diffusion, and the existence of a broad, civic form of Russianness face criticism by other liberals for failing to acknowledge cultural specificity and diversity—and they face charges by nationalists that supporting migration and a pluralist society constitutes nothing less than the betrayal of the Russian nation. The production of endless narratives of Russian suffering and calls for resistance to the “enemies within” (meaning non-Russians)—even in the framework of seemingly academic discourses—exemplifies the “herme-
neutics of suspicion,” in which heterogeneity is viewed as a threat to society’s solidarity rather than as a sign of its vitality.73

Understanding this broader context of Russian scholarly debate helps make sense of the chapters contributed to this volume by the Russian-based participants in our workshops. The social constructivism they employ as an analytic strategy simultaneously serves as a political intervention in the production of knowledge about Russian society and the significance of its “diversity.” With its cognitive distance toward dominant logics, social constructivism enables these authors to challenge the increasingly popular organic metaphors deployed to reinforce the emotional links between individuals/groups and the nation (Karpenko, Skrynnikova, and Amogolonova); to expose the emergence of racist discourses, in academic or scientific texts no less than in popular writing (Karpenko); and to open up alternative conceptual possibilities for imagining social organization, cultural relationships, and values such as openness, tolerance, and visions of community based on pluralism and dialogue (Venediktova). In this context, the constructivist approach to identity—both Russian identity (Karpenko, Venediktova) and non-Russian identity (Skrynnikova and Amogolonova) represents a radical intervention in the acerbic public debate and diversity politics of the Russian Federation.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS BOOK

This book is divided into two parts. Part I, “Constructing the Nation in the Shadows of Difference,” includes chapters 1 through 4, which apply social constructivist analyses to explain the ways identities are being formed and mobilized for national revival in the aftermath of the Soviet Union. Several of the chapter authors highlight how campaigns for national revival entail the selective and politically instrumentalist use of collective memory to establish a sense of belonging, cohesion, and continuity among otherwise diverse groups and histories. Another theme is the continuing salience of Soviet-era discourses and narrative models (e.g., discourses on “friendship of the peoples”), even as the Soviet past is explicitly rejected and nationalist forms of expression increasingly predominate. An important theme spanning all four chapters is the central importance of expert knowledge as a tool in the construction of national identity and its boundaries. It is society’s leaders—historians, political leaders, museum curators, and others
carrying the authoritative mantle of cultural elite—who create the powerful myths of difference that enact exclusions. Part II, “Contesting Diversity in the Field of Education,” confirms this finding in chapters 5 though 7, which examine struggles over cultural difference within school curricula and among experts connected with teaching.

In chapter 1, Omer Bartov focuses on the dynamics of interethnic relations, highlighting the layers of memory and forgetting that are intertwined with the replacement and removal of one ethic group by another. Hence this innovative chapter broadens the volume’s terrain of diversity studies by examining both the history and the memory of erasure, both physical and mental, and the inevitable return of the past as long as it is not confronted and worked out. Two case studies of memory and forgetting are juxtaposed in the chapter: the history of Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian communities and their relationships; and Israeli and Palestinian history. The decision to focus on these cases stems partly from the author’s own biography; the town in Eastern Europe that he writes about is where his family came from; the neighborhood in Tel Aviv he writes about is where he grew up. Thus, the chapter presents a daring comparison in that it juxtaposes the case of Eastern Europe with that of Israel/Palestine, not just as comparison but also as linked historically. Bartov strives carefully to elucidate similarities and differences in the Eastern European and Israeli-Palestinian cases, not least because so many false and facile comparisons have been made between the two cases by nonacademic commentators driven by political agendas. Indeed, most contemporary work on interethnic relations has focused on only one of the groups in a conflict, and has been written from its unique, and therefore also one-sided perspective. Bartov examines events from the perspectives of all those involved. His goal is neither to reconcile these narratives nor to argue that one is right and another is false, but to examine the conversation between them, their mutual influences on each other, and how they can lead to violence and erasure, or to reconciliation and understanding, at least in retrospect.

In chapter 2, Tatiana Skrynnikova and Darima Amogolonova seek to oppose the highly politicized and ideological character of mainstream social science on ethnicity/nationalism. Describing the vast majority of humanities research on ethnopolitics in the Russian Federation as interwoven with ethnic patriotism, they view their use of social constructivism as more than a research methodology: it is a direct engagement in “real” politics.
Given the tense social climate in Russia, social constructivism is a mode for opposing assumptions based on primordialist understandings of ethnic and national groups, and thereby for supporting civic values in Russian society. In this sense their chapter, as all of their research, seeks to oppose the highly politicized and ideological character of mainstream Russian social science on ethnicity/nationalism.

At the same time, they also strive to intervene in contemporary approaches that apply social constructivism among Russian-based scholars. They are critical of the tendency to focus the analysis of “ethnic revival” on the narrow sphere of political mobilization and anti-national (anti-all-Russian) identity, and thus their work highlights the importance of culture, “tradition,” and symbolic dynamics in nationalist political revivals. They detail the symbolic resources and narrative frames that the members of the local cultural elite in Buryatia mobilize as they strive to create a post-Soviet Buryat ethnic political revival. These nationalists—primarily historians, archaeologists, and other academics—focus on historically remote cultural events, symbolically powerful images and the physical landscape to establish persuasive arguments about the “authentic” historical roots and sacred space of the Buryat people. They also emphasize the cultural and ethnic unity of the Buryat and Mongol people, and they celebrate Chinggis Khan as a Buryat—associations that were prohibited under the Soviet era. Underlying these mythologized discussions of nationhood and belonging is the idea of a singular, unchanging Buryat-Mongol ethnicity that, the authors believe, fails to take into account the complicated history of the Buryats’ relationships with Russians both before and during the Soviet era.

In chapter 3, Katherine Graney focuses on the question of how state power is used to favor certain interpretations of national identity and national community over others. By examining the cultural representations of nationhood that the Tatarstan Republic promotes through its museums, she touches on key themes of this volume, including the politicization of “culture” and the creation of politics through symbols of nationhood. To some extent, her approach reflects her disciplinary background, in the sense that she examines the nation-state, and particularly the often poor fit between states and nations; at the same time, her approach differs from much political science in that her methods are qualitative and interpretive. Hearkening back to the traditions of political anthropology and cultural
analysis, she works in the vein of scholars such as Mark Beissinger who look at how states use discourses of nationality to legitimate their attempts at state building. Her scholarly goals include advocating the need for political scientists to take “cultural politics” seriously.

In chapter 4, Stuart Kaufman links symbolic politics theory to the conflict resolution practice of many nongovernmental organizations. He positions himself against the dominant view in political science and economics, which assumes that people's behavior is exclusively based on the rational pursuit of material self-interest. His research demonstrates the ways that violent ethnic conflict is driven by the emotional pursuit of intangible or symbolic group benefits, often with no material benefits to the individual. Though much on-the-ground conflict resolution practice is compatible with symbolic politics theory, diplomats tend to conceptualize conflict through rational choice paradigms, and therefore pursue superficial policies that fail to address the real forces that drive conflict. The chapter aims to use symbolic politics theory to explain how nongovernmental organizations' peace-building practices can be used to improve the effectiveness of traditional conflict resolution efforts.

Kaufman, echoing the focus of many chapters in addressing the ways ethnic identities get built through processes of social and cultural construction, specifically examines the symbolic struggles at stake in ethnic wars. Focusing on the conflicts in the South Caucasus in the early 1990s and in 2008, he demonstrates that ethnic war results when myths justifying ethnic hostility and fears of group extinction lead to chauvinist ethnic mobilization and perceived threats to group security. Solving ethnic conflicts, therefore, requires making changes in all these social processes. True conflict resolution requires that hostile attitudes be changed to more moderate ones, ethnic fears be assuaged, and the intragroup symbolic politics of ethnic chauvinism be replaced with a politics that rewards moderation. He endorses peace-building efforts by nongovernmental organizations, such as problem-solving workshops, as the only policy tools for promoting such attitudinal and social changes. Expanding peace-building programs that address the symbolic politics of ethnic relationships is therefore a necessity.

In chapter 5, Tatiana Venediktova draws on insights from reception aesthetics, the theory and history of reading, and cultural studies to examine the ways Russian literature teachers react to their society’s burgeoning diversity in reading materials and modes of interpretation. Reading occupied
a top rung in the conventional Soviet hierarchy of cultural practices; it was central to Soviet discourses on “cultured” consumption and a major element in the Soviet idea of a “cultured person.” More recently, however, the market has multiplied the kinds of reading materials available and made alternative modes of reading more prominent and self-assertive as never before. Reading has become significantly less linked to one’s status, less canon-oriented, freer from ideological instructions, and more deeply embedded in processes of individual consumption and self-identification. Most Russian experts in reading—teachers of literature and literary theorists—experience these changes as highly threatening. Their trusted, canonical works are being displaced by seductive, low brow texts, and the reverential attitude toward “the author” they authoritatively prescribe has also been challenged.

In analyzing this sphere of cultural pluralism and expert encounters with diversity, Venediktova contributes to the volume’s themes in at least three ways. First, by identifying an unexpected arena where encounters with difference become problematic for local actors, she challenges our assumptions that issues surrounding “cultural diversity” are limited to ethnic groups or nationalist movements. Second, in exploring reading experts’ defensiveness toward the new reading pluralism, she demonstrates how Russians’ struggles to preserve the national idea extend to the most quotidian, seemingly “nonpolitical” dimensions of everyday life, in encountering and evaluating the significance of texts. Third, she posits an alternative approach to the mode of reading promoted in Soviet and Russian schools, which has focused on the transmission of collective values while deemphasizing readers’ reflexivity and self-consciousness. Her embrace of pluralism recognizes that the ability to enter unfamiliar (fictional) worlds also enriches one’s broader abilities to engage with difference. The chapter reflects her professional goal of shifting the debates in literary studies, to transform the teaching of reading and interpretation in Russia into a process for developing individual reflexivity and agency, and a welcoming approach to “cultural diversity.”

It is worth highlighting one particularly provocative juxtaposition between two of the chapters in this section, inasmuch as the empirical differences they reveal raise key questions for scholars and activists concerned with promoting tolerance and multiculturalism in the former Soviet world. In chapter 6, sociologist Oksana Karpenko investigates the notions of cul-
ture, ethnicity, and nation as presented in Russian social studies textbooks for high school students. She describes her research as distinct from mainstream Russian sociology, for it centers on the critical analysis of discourse, a multidisciplinary approach investigating the (re)production of power relations in discourses. She is particularly interested in the question of what kinds of discursive practices and resources make it possible for Soviet modes of conceptualizing social reality to maintain salience, and how these contribute to the recent authoritarian shift in Russia. Simultaneously, she analyzes why alternative forms of political thought (liberal thinking in particular) and academic approaches based in constructivism so often lose the game.

Viewing state educational programs as a key site for the production of citizenship and national identity, Karpenko finds that the concept of narod (people, ethnic group) is a central building block of essentialist discourses that posit fixed boundaries between types of people. Narod is flexible enough to denote a range of meanings, from “race” to “nation” to “citizenship,” and the lack of distinction between these usages conveys the understanding that no matter how one conceptualizes social groups, they are inevitably distinct from one another in biological and cultural terms. Narod is also often used in conjunction with organic metaphors, which further create images of human groups as “naturally” differentiated. Notably, a form of “cultural relativism” informs this framework; as the textbooks strive to instill in students a patriotic duty to protect the Russian narod, the essentialist character of this thinking is naturalized, for the authors assert that every cultural group wants to preserve its own way of life against the encroachment of others. Drawing on the theorist Etienne Balibar and others, Karpenko demonstrates how these discourses exemplify “modern racism,” a paradigm in which “difference is conceptualized through models of a hierarchy of “cultures” with stable boundaries between them.” She further suggests that the racism in social studies textbooks reflects a much broader logic prevalent in contemporary Russia, saturating political discourse in general and dominating the increasingly frequent discussions of “interethnic hostilities” such as the September 2006 riots and murders in Kondopoga.

Striking contrasts emerge between Karpenko’s chapter and chapter 7, by Rachel Belin, an American social studies teacher and educational consultant who, as mentioned above, presents a first-person account of her work on citizenship education with American high school students—specifically,
the Holocaust education curriculum titled Facing History and Ourselves. She explains in detail how this program begins with the explicit assumption that a democratic society requires widespread tolerance for cultural diversity and that it aims to cultivate such tolerance by providing citizenship education that charges students with acquiring a sense of moral responsibility for combating discrimination, racism, and intolerance in their daily lives. Inspiring students to acknowledge that they are agents of history through the choices they make about how to live their everyday lives, the class examines people and groups who have opposed genocide, from the era of the Holocaust to the 1960s American civil rights movement and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Yet the facts of these events are only the starting point of this curriculum—they are presented as tragic outcomes that compel us to learn about the social conditions and processes that enable—or prevent—genocides. By exploring the moral choices of people who become bystanders, resisters, and rescuers in the face of discrimination and violence, Facing History and Ourselves aims to demonstrate that individual actions—as well as the failure to act—are decisive historical actions. Belin has taught this curriculum in Florida and Kentucky classrooms and continues to promote it vigorously as a volunteer. She was initially drawn to the program by her exposure to it in a public high school in Marblehead, Massachusetts. She credits Facing History as a major force in propelling her civic engagement well into adulthood.

The divergent messages about cultural difference and identity in these examples of Russian and American citizenship education highlight the key questions this volume raises: How are conversations about “culture” and the promotion of tolerance shaped by particular historical, social, and political contexts? What are the implications of such diverse approaches to “diversity”? Though the authors’ own framings suggest one comparative angle—Karpenko labels Russian textbooks as “racist,” whereas Belin lauds the Facing History curriculum as “innovative,” “creative,” and “radical”—as editors, we strive to push the inquiry into more challenging grounds, as the Russian context certainly demands. If Facing History begins with the unquestioned assumption that democracy is a “good” and “multiculturalism” a norm (with Nazi Germany and the Jim Crow American South as prototypical, indisputable cases of immorality), what would this curriculum do in a context where such assumptions are not widely held? What social and political-economic conditions are presumed in Facing History's
efforts to create a liberal subject poised to become a politically engaged citizen? What kinds of adaptations might need to be made to undertake this course in a context saturated with perceptions of individual and collective vulnerability? How can a sense of moral responsibility to stand up against wrongs be cultivated under social circumstances where people face pervasive fear and a sense that their government does not protect them—where there is a societal consensus that citizens have no real influence on their leaders? In raising these admittedly difficult questions, we take into account the necessity of adapting liberalism’s universal framework to the specifics of local communities and concerns, lest they be rejected as meaningless or even hypocritical.

This book thus aims to contribute to our understanding of “diversity” in general, and in the former Soviet world in particular. Our most immediate finding is that discussions of “culture” and the promotion of tolerance, in both U.S. and Russian societies, as well as among both the American and Russian authors of the chapters that follow, are complex, multilayered, historically embedded processes—and thus the units of analysis to which these concepts refer are not readily evident, though translation is rarely straightforward. The former Soviet context is rife with campaigns to (re)define the nation and place boundaries on belonging; social exclusion, hostility, and violence are not infrequent consequences. In addition to generating active animosity against those perceived as “other,” individuals’ widespread experience of being politically impotent and alienated from state power is linked to two additional kinds of responses: a growing indifference toward historical questions of their society’s guilt toward “other” nationalities; and profound misgivings about defending liberal ideas, given the likelihood that “upsetting” the political authorities could further endanger an already-vulnerable existence.

We have suggested that the histories of “diversity” in each country, and the broader political and institutional contexts in which Russian and American academics work, have shaped the case studies in this volume. As the Russian public has endured the severe strains wrought by market reforms, those who support openness, democratic ideals, and pluralism have found themselves on the defensive; the abstract ideal of “democracy” has become widely connected with a breakdown of social order and morality, and cannot be legitimately invoked in public discourse as a positive ideal. These social experiences became refracted in our workshop discussions, as
the Russia-based participants articulated far greater skepticism about embracing “democracy” as a viable and achievable normative end goal of “diversity” scholarship and politics than did the America-based participants.

At the same time, however, it is interesting to note the kinds of issues that emerge even when the concept of “democracy” gets decentered. Particular aspects of liberal pluralism remain salient in Russian public debates; as Graney argues in chapter 3, rhetorics of tolerance, respect, human rights, and multiculturalism carry symbolic authority as representative language of the modern nation-state, and therefore post-Soviet leaders—and perhaps also academics—deploy these terms with some frequency. The textbook authors that Karpenko analyzes in chapter 6 explicitly reject “racism” as a social evil, even as their discourses formulate essential “cultural differences” between homogenous, territorially based groups and endorse the “natural” tendency of these groups to be patriotic and ethnocentric. The courageous efforts of Russia-based scholars to promote critical analyses of nationalism and primordialism, marginal though they may be, push local communities to consider issues and values that even their political leaders acknowledge have significance at a global level. Karpenko’s chapter, and the volume as a whole, argue for the need to historicize, contextualize, and laud their struggles, to recognize the diverse circumstances that shape “diversity” scholarship.

NOTES


2. On social memory among the Roma, see Lemon, Between Two Fires; on social memory among rural Russians, see Margaret Paxson, Solovyovo: The Story of Memory in a Russian Village (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).


An Analysis of Cultural Difference by U.S. and Russia-Based Scholars


14. A key debate among American scholars of diversity concerns the problem of how to relate to liberalism’s ideological primacy of individual rights and autonomy. On the one hand, these principles aim to ensure the freedom to choose one’s way of life and be protected from state coercion or group pressure to follow any single religion or worldview. On the other hand, the inability of liberalism to effectively address the rights of cultural groups and other collectivities in which the individual is not the main unit of autonomy underscores the highly limited acceptability of liberalism as a paradigm for ‘freedom’ globally. Though liberalism takes many forms, its limitations as an overarching ideological orientation become visible in critiques by those advocating for a more radical “diversity politics.” These critics reject liberalism’s insistence on individual rights as the core ethical foundation of public policies, and they particularly oppose the notion that “illiberal” communities should be reeducated or legally forced to adopt liberal ways of life. Diversity politics advocates instead strive to promote the acceptance of culturally diverse expressions and life ways as valuable for their own sake—e.g., Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Yet rather than any simple rejection of liberalism, diversity politics can be seen as taking its core values—equality, acceptance, freedom—to their logical conclusions. The debate has led both liberals and their critics to actively develop and even extend the boundaries of their conceptual paradigms. Liberal theorists, for example, have begun to offer new ways of conceptualizing freedom and group rights, as well as “culture.” Some argue that liberalism needs to be adapted to acknowledge the centrality of group identity in people’s lives—e.g., Jeff Spinner, *The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)—while others caution that any conception of ‘culture’ as a coherent entity with shared interests is an illusion—e.g., Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). Critics of liberalism strive to clarify types of oppression, such as those that involve injustices of distribution and/or injustices of recognition, and to promote public policies that address sources of disempowerment—e.g., Davina Cooper, *Challenging Diversity: Rethinking Equality and the Value of Difference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 43; and Nancy N. Fraser, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

16. In different ways, this approach is evident in United States–based scholarship on questions of diversity in Russia by authors, e.g., Katherine Graney, Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, Alaina Lemon, and Sascha Goluboff.


24. Ibid., 57.


29. The popular Marxist–Leninist belief that social and cultural processes could be accelerated has found its expression in what Francine Hirsch calls “state-sponsored evolutionism,” a doctrine according to which nation formation and national consciousness was a necessary phase on the way toward socialism for the people of Central Asia, the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. The belief that everybody, even a member of the most backward community, could “evolve” into a higher being by embracing the Soviet ideology comprised the core of the twofold Soviet cultural policy that involved the invention of ethnic cultures (including the creation of the alphabet in some cases), and the establishment of a Soviet culture. Soviet authorities built the supranational centralized state on the idea of class unity and a number of amenities that promoted modernized Soviet culture, such as clubs, libraries, schools, and museums. Notably, this approach differentiated Soviet cultural policy from classic colonial ones, which were based on the conservation of cultural
backwardness among colonized people.


46. Mikhail Malykhin, “Gastarbaitery poyekhali,” *Vedomosti*, February 11, 2009,
Dilemmas of Diversity After the Cold War


50. Ibid.


54. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Russian top-quality publications have moved from being oriented toward “New Russians” to “Global Russians.” This is how Vladimir Yakovlev, an editor of a new magazine titled The Snob, has put it: “Global Russians is the group that is in search of self-identification and is in the process of development and, most importantly, in the process of the development of new system of values.” Gleb Morev, “‘Snob’ eto ne schlyagernaya journalistika, Interv’u s Vladimirom Yakovlevym,” http://www.openspace.ru/media/paper/details/3763/. It seems unlikely that downshifting and frugality will be at the top of this prospective hierarchy, even in times of financial austerity since the cost of a single issue is about $20.


56. Ibid.


58. Ibid.


69. Tishkov, “Rossiiskaia natsiia i ee kritiki,” 585.
70. Tatiana Alekseeva’s remarks are quoted by Obsuzhdenie Knigi V. A. Tishkova, “Rekviem Po Etnosu,” in *Materialy Metodologicheskogo Seminara Instituta Etnologii i Antropologii RAN, Etnograficheskoe obozrenie*, no. 3 (Moscow: Institute of Ethnology and Russian Academy of Sciences, 2005), 110.
Chapter 1: From Buchach to Sheikh Muwannis: Building the Future and Erasing the Past

OMER BARTOV

We live in a world that proclaims the end of nationalism, the decline and disappearance of the nation-state, the emergence of multicultural societies, the merits of diversity, and the upward trajectory of globalization. But we also inhabit an age of growing violence fed by hateful popular, ideological and theological sentiments, cultural phobias, policies of foreign aggression, and domestic social neglect, restrictive immigration, tightening definitions of identity, and racial discrimination. In other words, the increasing mobilization of animosity toward cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and difference seems to be pulling us progressively away from the fine visions of a globalized shared humanity.¹

This is one of the major paradoxes of the second half of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first centuries, which leaves us dangling over the vast gap between the high hopes of postnationalism and postcommunism, and the stark facts of xenophobia, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Though the former cannot be reduced to mere rhetoric, and the latter is hardly ubiquitous, the growing tension between promise and reality should be at the heart of any endeavor to secure humanity’s political, economic, and cultural future. This central paradox of our time is often interpreted in two contradictory ways. For some, the rapid globalization we have experienced in the last few decades has produced an understandable, if lamentable, resistance to the drastic changes it brings in its wake. Just as the Industrial Revolution had its Luddites, this response is merely a natural but futile urge to hold on to the old for fear of the new. Such opposition has no chance of success and must simply be taken in stride as we gear ourselves up for the Brave New World that humanity inevitably faces.

For others, the growing resistance to globalization indicates that many of the plans and predictions of the recent past were wrong or misleading. It is argued that the designers of this scheme for humanity neglected to take into account the popular sentiments, tastes, prejudices, and cultural and religious affiliations of the multitudes subjected to this process.
Moreover, such critics point out that the projected economic and political consequences of globalization were false or at least overly optimistic. Hence the negative responses to globalization in wide sectors of the world—from France to Pakistan, Russia to Argentina, Egypt to Canada—may indicate an objective fault with the entire concept, not least because of the imbalance between the multiplicity of its victims and the narrow spectrum of its beneficiaries.²

Breaking these realities down into more concrete issues, one can point out, for instance, that whereas the decline of the nation-state may have diminished strident nationalism, it has also led to the reemergence of local and regional identities, memories, and allegiances, with all the frictions and conflicts they may entail. Similarly, the rise of multiculturalism not only enhances tolerance of difference but also unleashes a growing anxiety among dominant cultures about losing their cultural and political hegemony. At the same time, globalization may in fact be creating a greater homogenization of cultures and cultural-political dominance by the economically more powerful, rather than facilitating greater knowledge of and sympathy for difference and diversity. Indeed, we may say that the gulf between the optimism of progress and the despair of those denied it, between the prophets of the future and the protectors of the past, and between promoters of economic logic and defenders of religious faith is a main source of contemporary violence. Meanwhile, the unchecked flow of military technology provides the radical opponents of modernity with unprecedented destructive power against its disseminators, an ability to annihilate others totally disproportionate to the extremists’ political and ideological reach, even within their own communities.³

The violence triggered by the gap between promise and reality can be traced to three main causes. First, the exploitation, corruption, political repression, and environmental degradation that has accompanied globalization—often triggered or supported by its promoters—has made it appear to those newly subjected to it as nothing but a euphemism for a new kind of Western imperialism. Second, those advocating increasingly popular anti-Western and antimodern ideologies and theologies—mostly Islamist extremists often linked with anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments—have revised, streamlined, and adapted worldviews legitimized by ancient texts and traditional beliefs and remolded themselves as the defenders of their communities against Western moral corruption and material deple-
tion. Third, in response to a perceived threat by non-Western immigrants and cultures, the West has seen the intensified mobilization of cultural phobias as expressed in discriminatory social policies, immigration barriers, and defensive redefinitions of national identity. Such policies and the popular sentiments they reflect starkly contradict the rhetoric of globalization and diversity on which the West has increasingly relied as the alleged core of its cultural and political identity and its universal mission, even as it has concluded that globalization constitutes an irrefutable economic necessity for its continued hegemony.

THE CONTEXT

In the present context, here I concentrate on one aspect of this paradox: the attempt to build a new world without uncovering the crimes and misdemeanors of the past—indeed, the drafting of a future-oriented agenda geared as much to erasing the past as to constructing the future. Such repressed pasts, as we know, rarely go away; eventually they tend to resurface in an altered form but with no less ferocity. This is why workable futures must be anchored in their past rather than detach themselves from it, however difficult the confrontation with the events leading to the present may be. Suffice it to recall the complex and often tragic history of Eastern Europe and Russia, in order to recognize the price that was paid by building the world of tomorrow—now so hopelessly lodged in the past—on the ruins of yesterday—now the focus of so much often-misdirected nostalgia. There were those who believed that by entirely eradicating the past they would be able to look forward without ever looking back. This may be another way of saying that history is always written by the victors. But this aphorism is not always true; nor does it tell us much about the nature of victory. For we can also say that the road to Hades is paved with forgetting, and that civilizations become sterile not because they glance back at their path out of hell but because they do not.

Since the turn of the previous century, the vast swath of territory stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans has been the site of an extraordinary exercise in destruction and reconstruction. Within the context of such “population policies,” entire peoples have been murdered, deported, ethnically cleansed, and resettled. The borders of nations have been made and remade; cultures have vanished, languages have disappeared; and identity has been defined and redefined.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the toppling of communism in Eastern Europe, both the new and the old nations of the region have been engaged in creating a new future, distinct from the socialist future they have left behind. As they strive to join the European Union—whose very identity is based on a renunciation of its constituent members’ nationalist legacies—they are also in the process of recovering their own national roots, long suppressed by communism. As they join the information technology revolution and propel themselves into a digital age of limitless stored memories, they are also preoccupied with assigning the revolutionary rhetoric of the past to the dustbin of history and with erasing recollections of recent affiliations and complicity.

But at the same time, these new/old nations must do what all nations have done: define their national identity and anchor it in history, the midwife of modern nationalism. This must hold true to varying degrees in the cases of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, Poland and Belarus, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, and Moldova, and the newly independent or semi-independent states of the former Yugoslavia, as well as Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, and, of course, Russia. Apart from Russia, however (and at this point also such states as Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine), the entry of the newly independent Eastern European states into the new European Union of states that have overtly given up many attributes of their national identity paradoxically entails first asserting their identity and only then agreeing to subject it to the larger category of a united Europe.6

This is a difficult exercise, complicated by the fact that it is largely based on an invented past, from which much of the complexity—some would say also the richness, but in any case, the diversity—has been expunged. It is erased in word and representation and rewritten history and new rhetoric, but it was also first obliterated physically by means of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and deportation. Thus the entry into a supposed multicultural and diverse European community is dependent—or made dependent—upon a massive forgetting of one’s own past diversity and multiculturalism, or at least the multiethnicity and multiplicity of cultures and traditions.7

To some extent, it can be argued that this is a necessary process on the way to normalizing one’s relationship with the past, with one’s neighbors, and with a projected or recreated future. But the question is to what extent can populations be reeducated into tolerance, acceptance of other cultures,
traditions, religions, faiths, or even physical appearance and manners of
dress, speech, and conduct, if they begin by a highly impoverished and
distorted view of their own past, that is, if they do not confront both their
own history of diversity and their complicity in its eradication. Let us re-
member, for instance, that only 65 percent of interwar Poland’s population
were ethnic Poles, and 10 percent were Jews; that most towns in present-
day Western Ukraine and Belarus were inhabited primarily by Jews and
Poles; that Vilnius was a city in which Polish and Yiddish were spoken and
Lithuanian hardly known; and that much of the intelligentsia of Prague
and Chernivtsi (Czernowitz) spoke German and were either Jewish or eth-
nic German.8

So the question is, Will globalization be built on erasing differences,
expunging memories, and creating a future where everyone will be similar
(because they will have forgotten or cleaned up their pasts) in taste and cul-
tural references, a world planned by bureaucrats in Brussels, Washington,
or Geneva, rationalized by economists and streamlined by technicians? Or
is globalization about bringing together diverse peoples and pasts on the
basis of the realization that the multiplicity of the human experience is
precisely what makes it rich and creative, and that any attempt to unify or
simplify it will only lead to its impoverishment and stagnation?

I have now spent a fair amount of time traveling in the former Eastern
Galicia—now part of Western Ukraine—and have been struck by the ex-
tent to which the new Ukrainian nationalism in this region is basing itself
on the erasure of its own multicultural or multiethnic past, thereby creat-
ing a culturally impoverished and historically distorted society right amid
the ruins of what had existed there before. And I know some of the conse-
quences of such an undertaking from my own native land, Israel. My ma-
ternal family came from Eastern Galicia, where only a few scattered traces
and hardly any memory of their Jewish civilization have remained. As a
result, I grew up in Israel, where the remnants of a former Arab Palestinian
culture and life had been thoroughly erased. On the basis of my own ex-
perience and observations, I do not believe in turning back the clock. I do
not think that I should go back to live in my ancestral home in the town
of Buchach (formerly Buczacz). Indeed, I do not even live in Israel any
more, and my younger children’s mother is a native of Hong Kong. In this
sense, one could say that my own life exemplifies globalization. Similarly,
I do not believe that the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and their numerous
descendants could or should return to their nonexistent villages in Israel, opening nonexistent doors with the rusty keys they have now kept for three generations.

But I do believe that one cannot build a healthy culture and society on the basis of unacknowledged erasure. Just as Russia, Poland, and Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the states of the former Yugoslavia must come to terms with the richness of a past that was purged and destroyed, so too Israel will never become a normal society without acknowledging the wrongs it perpetrated on the Palestinians. Societies that erase the past do not neglect history; on the contrary, they are obsessed with it. But they tend to be obsessed with a history of conflict, bloodshed, and subjugation, where they are the victims—and heroes—and the others are the perpetrators and villains. It is a history that justifies erasure rather than fills in the gaps. States can reach political compromises, sign treaties, and even provide restitution. But without incorporating into their own culture and identity their whole, full, rich past, replete with catastrophe and mayhem just as much as with creativity and diversity, any exercise in globalization will turn into a sterile bureaucratic blueprint that is bound to be ultimately rejected.

BUCHACH

Let us then set out on a brief journey to a site and a past whose preservation—as memory rather than concrete reality—could provide greater depth and meaning to the new emerging culture, and whose repression empties not just the past but also the present. What follows are some scenes from the town of Buchach, 2003–7, and of its past.

Buchach, whose recorded history dates back to the fourteenth century, is situated on the River Stryapa, a tributary of the Dnister, some 45 miles southwest of Ternopil’ (formerly Tarnopol) and 84 miles southeast of L’viv (formerly Lvów, Lvov, or Lemberg). The town was part of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1772, when it came under Austrian Hapsburg rule within the newly named province of Galicia until 1918. In the interwar period, Buchach was under Polish rule, and following the outbreak of World War II, it was occupied by the Soviets in the period 1939–41 and by the Germans in 1941–44. It became part of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine in the wake of the war, and since 1991 has been in the western territories of independent Ukraine.
We come to Buchach by way of the smaller neighboring town of Zolotyi Potik (formerly Potok Złoty). Both towns, like many others in the region, had been the private property of the noble Polish Potocki family for centuries. During the German occupation, the town’s Jewish inhabitants, numbering just under 1,000 and constituting about a third of its total population, were mostly deported to Buchach and shared the fate of that town’s Jews. In June 2004, when I visited the Jewish cemetery of Zolotyi Potik, it was serving, as it has for many decades, as a meadow for the local goats. Some of its extraordinary tombstones were still standing, decorated with intricate carvings and dating back several centuries. Others were piled up and ready to be carted off. In the past, such tombstones had been used to repair the staircase leading into the only standing part of the once-grand and now-ruined Potocki Palace, as well as for the steps and banister of a dilapidated prewar villa now serving as the “Municipal Veterinary Clinic.” In the grove by the clinic lies a displaced tombstone, carved with the words “The important virgin, Miss Leah, daughter of Israel, may her soul be gathered into the bundle of life.”

Because my mother, who was born in 1924, had lived in Zolotyi Potik as a small child, I asked an old woman at the cemetery whether she remembered a family called Szimer, my mother’s maiden name. Her smile revealed a single gold tooth; she nodded vigorously. But because she had nothing to add to that initial affirmation, this was probably more a gesture of goodwill to a visiting foreigner. The yard of the simple farmhouse across from the romantically derelict palace was another site of vicarious memories. Eight decades earlier, my great-grandfather had been an estate manager for Graf (Count) Potocki, and for all I knew it was precisely in that courtyard where my mother had spent the first years of her life, before her parents moved to Buchach. Had it not been for the upheavals that followed, I too might have called this patch of dirt my homeland.

From Zolotyi Potik, we drive along the Strypa Valley on a winding dirt road to Buchach. This, my Ukrainian assistant says, must be the same path that my great-grandfather traveled by wagon when he went to the larger town’s market to buy or sell goods. It is a very quiet and peaceful afternoon. Only the sound of the car’s wheels rolling on the gravel disturbs the silence. The Strypa keeps flowing slowly to the Dnister, just as it did all those decades ago.

Buchach is known to have had a Jewish population since 1500. The city was heavily damaged in the Cossack and Turkish wars of the seven-
teenth century but subsequently recovered. It was known for its impressive synagogue (completed in 1728) and its elegant town hall (ratusz in Polish or ratusha in Ukrainian, completed in 1751), as well as for its churches, a Basilian monastery, the remnants of its Renaissance fortress, and its remarkable location perched on hills rising above a great loop of the Strypa River. On the eve of World War I, the town numbered more than 14,000 inhabitants, more than half of whom were Jews, the rest being either Poles or Ukrainians. The town was very heavily damaged in the war, and its population was halved, but it gradually recovered in the interwar period. It is estimated that there were some 8,000 Jews in the town on the eve of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.

The Germans occupied Buchach in early July 1941, and a few weeks later they murdered several hundred “intellectuals” on the nearby Fedir (in Polish, Fedor) Hill. The first massive Aktion (a German term connoting a roundup and mass murder) took place in October 1942. Some 1,600 Jews were transported to the Bełżec extermination camp, and another 200 were shot on the spot by the Germans and their Ukrainian collaborators. In November, another 2,500 Jews were taken to Bełżec, and about 250 were hunted down and shot with the collaboration of some of the local population. A ghetto was established in late 1942, in which Jews from nearby towns were also concentrated. In February 1942, an estimated 2,000 Jews were shot and buried in mass graves on the Fedir Hill. The killings continued throughout the spring, costing the lives of another 3,000 people.

In June 1943, the last remnants of the community were shot at the Jewish cemetery, along with those who worked in the town’s labor camp. Remarkably, when the city was seized by the Red Army in March 1944, some 800 Jews came out of hiding, an indication that despite local collaboration, many Poles and Ukrainians also assisted the Jews. However, the Germans counterattacked and reoccupied the town shortly thereafter, with the result that most of the original survivors were murdered. By the time the Soviets finally drove the Germans out in July, only about a hundred Jews were still alive in the area. During the last months of the war, the substantial Polish population of the entire region was also subjected to a massive campaign of violence and ethnic cleansing, which ultimately terminated the presence of Polish life and culture in Galicia along with the extermination of the Jews.
Present-day Buchach, like all other towns in this region of Western Ukraine, is ethnically almost completely homogeneous. Its memory of the past parallels its national and religious identity. Though a few older inhabitants still remember the events of the war and can even recall some individual victims of the genocide, there is no collective memory of either the presence or the elimination of non-Ukrainians. Visitors to Buchach will find no official indication of this city’s rich Jewish past. (The Polish past is treated more respectfully; the town’s Roman Catholic church has been beautifully restored, and the Catholic priest, Father Ludwik Rutyna, who was born in Buchach in 1917 and fled from it in 1939, has been living next to it since he returned in 1995). The Great Synagogue, or Groyse Shul, which can still be seen standing in a German aerial photograph taken in April 1944, is no more. There is no indication in the town as to where it once stood, but its location can be established from documents, recollections, old photographs, and maps. The site now serves as an open market.

Until recently, it was unclear what had become of the remnants of the Great Synagogue’s massive structure, which was built in the local tradition of fortress synagogues and whose walls are said to have been about five yards thick at the base. Some people in town report that its stones were used to build the ungainly Soviet Kinoteatr (cinema) that still stands nearby. But in March 2006, Oresta Synen’ka, a local resident of Buchach, whose family moved to the town in 1945, related in an interview that her father had been employed there as the foreman of a construction brigade until 1950. According to Synen’ka, the synagogue was adjacent to an entire block of houses that had been heavily damaged—apparently in the last bout of fighting over the town in the late spring and summer of 1944—and the workers had to decide which houses to repair and which to demolish. “There was no sense in repairing the synagogue,” she said, “so they demolished it. The work was done by 1950.”

The Study House (Beit Hamidrash) adjacent to the Great Synagogue remained standing very close to the main city square and marketplace (rynek in Polish or rynok in Ukrainian) as late as 2001. It was then torn down to make room for a shopping center, despite the protests of some Israeli tourists who happened to have been there at the time and took photographs of the bulldozer demolishing the structure. The Study House is mentioned in many of the stories and novels written by the town’s most illustrious son, the Nobel laureate in literature Shmuel Yosef Agnon (1888–1970). The Jewish
cemetery, on Bashty Hill overlooking the town, still contains many tombstones, including that of Agnon’s father, Shalom Mordechai Chachkes. The more recent tombstones were cleaned up and photographed by Thomas Weiss of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and his sons, who trace some of their roots to Buchach. Another, largely overgrown part of the cemetery, located on the slope leading down to the town, contains stones dating back to 1587.14

Because the town municipality has put up no signs indicating the location of the cemetery, visitors must come with prior knowledge of its whereabouts and history. As a few old photographs illustrate and survivors’ testimonies record, a memorial was put up there immediately after the town’s liberation, but it has long vanished, to no one knows where. In 2006, a small memorial was finally installed in an isolated spot over the mass grave behind the cemetery. Again, no sign leads to this shabbily constructed and only slightly raised slab of stone, which was already showing signs of dilapidation when I saw it the spring of 2007 and, by the time I visited the town again in October 2008, was also being used as a public toilet by some residents. Similarly, no sign has been put up in the large empty field next to the cemetery, which the Jews called “Chazerplatz” because it used to be an open market for selling swine. It was here that the Germans assembled the Jews, who were then led either to execution at the cemetery or to the train station for transportation to Belżec.

Conversely, the handsome gymnasium building, built in the late nineteenth century in the Hapsburg style, does carry a commemorative plaque. But this plaque is dedicated to the Ukrainian students arrested by the Soviet authorities there, making no mention of the numerous Jewish and Polish students deported or murdered during the Nazi occupation.15 (Thanks to discriminatory admission policies by the Polish government during the interwar period, the number of Jewish students in the gymnasium declined and that of Poles increased. Under Soviet rule in 1939–41, admission became easier for Jews, Polish teachers were removed, and preference was shown to Ukrainian students and language, as well as to Russian language and history). As another plaque installed by the school gate indicates, the gymnasium is now named after Volodymyr Hnatiuk, an important figure in the revival of Ukrainian culture, who was born in Buchach County in 1871 and worked closely with the poet Ivan Franko. Hnatiuk eventually became general secretary of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv and
served as an active member of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) Society, also in L’viv. Although the recently deceased Simon Wiesenthal, later internationally known as the “Nazi hunter,” was born in Buchach and attended the gymnasium in the 1920s, no mention is made of him there.

The Fedir Hill, where several unmarked mass graves contain the bodies of thousands of the town’s former Jewish residents, is within easy walking distance of the main square. But without a local guide, it would be extremely difficult to locate the site of the graves, even if visitors had any prior knowledge of these events. There is no indication in Buchach of what transpired on the hill, and no signposts leading one to the lone memorial at the site, a simple tombstone-sized edifice erected to commemorate the victims of the “registration Aktion.” In this early mass execution, most of the town’s Jewish professionals ostensibly assembled in order to be registered by the German occupation authorities were murdered. The inscription, written in imperfect Ukrainian, reads simply: “Here rest 450 people slain by the German executioners on August 27, 1941.” The Star of David on the stone indicates the identity of these otherwise-unnamed victims. This stone, which was put up shortly after the liberation, lay broken into two parts on the forest floor for most of the Communist period. It was put up again in the 1990s thanks to Roman Antoshkiv, who was serving then in the town municipality and found the broken memorial, and the Jewish (but not Buchach native) principal of the agricultural school on the Fedir Hill, who provided cement and a tractor for this purpose.

There is one impressive memorial on the Fedir Hill—a large cross planted on a round mound of earth that can be seen from afar—but it is dedicated to the Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya (UPA, Ukrainian Insurgent Army) freedom fighters who had first helped the Germans murder the Jews and then resisted the reoccupation of the region by the Red Army. At the bottom of the cross is a plaque with this rhymed phrase: “Glorious heroes who have fallen [in the struggle] for freedom; holy knights, hear this in your graves: We swear here, by your grave, to preserve the freedom of Ukraine.” This post-independence memorial stands in competition to an older monument, erected during the Soviet regime, which is located elsewhere on the same hill. Featuring an oversized Red Army soldier, the older monument is simply inscribed with the words “Eternal Memory to the Fallen Heroes,” and the dates “1941–45,” clearly indicating that it is about the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany.
and bears no link to—indeed, refutes the legitimacy of—the Ukrainian struggle against the Soviets. One assumes that the cross attached to the side of the monument was added only after 1991.

Buchach also now contains a museum for the UPA, situated in the former offices of the NKVD (the Soviet Secret Police) and established in the early 1990s by the same Oresta Synen’ka quoted above, who works there voluntarily as part of her self-appointed task of preserving the memory of Ukraine’s local freedom fighters and victims of the NKVD, one of whom was her husband, Ivan Synen’kyi. Finally, another monument has been erected in the yard of the Saint Nicolas Greek Catholic Church, situated on a hill overlooking the town center. It is a simple wooden cross commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Ukrainian famine of 1933. When I visited the site in March 2003, there was a bouquet of fresh flowers at the foot of the cross.

The only site in town where a former Jewish presence is publicly acknowledged is the humble museum in the main square. Here several glass cases containing books by Agnon, mostly donated by visiting Israeli tourists in 2001, make a somewhat ghostly appearance, in that no context is provided for the presence of this yarmulke-wearing, Hebrew-language author in what is otherwise an almost purely Ukrainian town. Nevertheless, the belated revelation of this former resident’s celebrity stimulated the municipality to rename the street on which he lived at the beginning of the twentieth century. Also, in 2003 an elaborate marble plaque was put up at 5, Vulitsa Agnota to commemorate the author’s residence—in what is now a rather derelict tenement—but it was stolen soon thereafter. It was replaced by simpler, wood-frame sign, which reads: “In this house lived in 1888–1907 the writer, Nobel Prize laureate (1966) Shmuel Yosef Agnon (Chachkes), July 17, 1888—February 17, 1970.” Written only in Ukrainian, the plaque makes no mention of the author’s Jewish identity or the language in which he wrote. As I noted, this modest commemorative effort did not prevent the demolition of the Study House that features so prominently in Agnon’s voluminous writings on his hometown.

Every other opportunity to commemorate Jewish life and death in Buchach has been missed. No plaque has been attached to the local police station and jail, though parts of it have been renovated, to indicate that it served to hold many of those who were subsequently led up the path to be shot on the Fedir Hill, or were transported to the larger Gestapo
prison in Chortkiv (formerly Czortków). No plaque has been put up at the Christian cemetery to commemorate the heroism of the undertaker Manko Szwierszczak, who hid four Jews for almost two years in the cemetery. The train station, from which some 5,000 Jews were sent to Belżec, carries no sign indicating this event. The railroad tunnel, which was blown up by the retreating Soviets in 1941, rebuilt by Jewish slave labor under the Nazis, and is still used by freight trains to this day, bears no indication identifying these workers, most of whom eventually perished. The site of the Jewish hospital, the most modern in the region before World War II, is now an empty lot without any mark of its past glory or the ghastly manner in which its Jewish patients were murdered by the Germans.

Recently, however, Buchach too has been undergoing a memory renaissance. In 2008 the town completed the construction of a monument for the leader of the OUN-B (the more radical faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and the UPA, Stepan Bandera, on a hill overlooking Buchach. The “Banderivtsys” (Banderowcy in Polish), bands of Ukrainian fighters associated with the UPA and named after their leader Bandera, actively participated in the murder of innumerable Jews in Eastern Galicia. The funds for this edifice were collected by public subscription among the citizens of the town, despite its depressed economy. This is part of a larger nationalist undertaking in Buchach, which is currently catching up with other towns in the region that have already constructed many nationalist monuments and museums. In January 2006, the town celebrated the ninety-seventh anniversary of Bandera’s birth with solemn patriotic speeches and a performance by the women’s choir. The event took place at a building that had previously served Sokół (Falcon), the Polish gymnastics and cultural association, but that before the war had also been made available to Jewish and Ukrainian groups. However, the plaque on this fanciful structure, built in 1905, as well as the city’s Internet announcement of the event, blandly describes the building as the “District Culture House,” making no reference to its past role in bringing together the different groups that had once inhabited the city.

Conversely, even the construction in May 2005 of the concrete base for what later became the modest monument over the mass grave at the Jewish cemetery caused some local consternation. It seems that any such attempt to commemorate the fate of the Jews in Buchach creates discomfort. One local resident complained that the foreign Jews who asked Mayor
Overko to build the base never paid him. They also offered to pay for a fence around the mass graves on the Fedir Hill, but this informant claimed that the money was insufficient and that in any case people would steal the fence for the metal. And though the monument has now been completed, tombstones are still being carted away to serve other, more immediate needs, and hens roam the area, picking the garbage that people dump on the unfenced grounds of the cemetery. Some, more future-oriented, work is being carried out in Buchach. But although the prewar hotel of the Jewish Anderman family has finally been renovated, it now serves as a bank. Another recently opened hotel is not recommended to foreigners. Thus, just as contemporary Buchach has fewer facilities to accommodate tourists than it did seventy years ago, so, too, its citizens are still reluctant to reveal the secrets of its past to the few visitors who pass through.

My maternal grandfather received a certificate of immigration to Palestine on March 12, 1935. My mother, her two brothers, and their parents landed at the port of Haifa in December of that year. From a comfortable bourgeois existence they were reduced to the status of blue-collar workers. My grandmother, who had been educated at a gymnasium in Prague when the family fled the Russians in World War I, and spoke fluent German as well as Yiddish, Hebrew, Polish, and Ukrainian, worked for years packing oranges an hour’s walk away from their home in Petah Tikva. Unbeknownst to my orthodox grandfather, who would spend the Sabbath at the synagogue, she would use his absence to clean house for the richer neighbors, refugees from Nazi Germany. My grandfather worked as a laborer until he was felled by a heart attack. My mother was the first in her family to receive a college degree. But the rest of the extended family (with the exception of one uncle, who left in 1935 to South America) disappeared without a trace. No one knows precisely how they were murdered or where their bodies lie. I am the only member of my family to have ever returned to Buchach. By then my mother had passed away. I am glad that we never accomplished our plan to go there together. She had fond memories of her childhood there and took them to her grave without seeing the merciless erasure of the postwar years.

As I was leaving Buchach in June 2004, the sky cleared and the sun lit the main square, with its still-handsome, though dilapidated, town hall, with a soft afternoon glow. The massive stone statue of Ukraine’s national poet, Taras Shevchenko, looked out toward the bridge over the Stryapa, the
Basilian Monastery, and the Fedir Hill in the distance. This was the path the town’s Jews had followed on their way to execution in public view of all the other residents. I was standing more or less where the synagogue had once stood, as a funeral procession wound its way down from the monastery to the marketplace. A coffin was being carried on the back of a truck. In front of the procession marched two men holding flags: the blue-and-yellow national flag of Ukraine, and the black-and-red flag of the UPA. Ukrainian Buchach had come into its own.

**SHEIKH MUWANNIS**

On June 10, 1954, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion addressed a crowd of 8,000 Israelis at a stadium in the Sheikh Muwannis section of northern Tel Aviv, urging them to commit themselves to a pioneering style of life. This was less than two months after I was born in Kibbutz Ein Hakoresh, a socialist commune, or kibbutz, near the northern Israeli town of Hedera. As a baby, I resided in the “children’s home” and was expected to address my parents by name; the nuclear family was supposed to be replaced by a community of equals, whose members would work as hard as they could and receive as much as they needed. The most famous member of our kibbutz was Abba Kovner, who on December 31, 1941, had called upon the Jewish youth of Vilna (Wilno, Vilnius) to resist the German occupiers rather than “be led like sheep to the slaughter.” Kovner became even better known to the Israeli public thanks to his testimony at the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961. Already, as children, we knew that we would never be sheep.

My mother did not want her children to call her by name. By the early 1960s, we were living in Ramat Aviv, a new neighborhood north of Tel Aviv. Soon the place filled up with Jews expelled from Poland following the anti-Semitic campaign of Władysław Gomułka’s regime. Just east of our neighborhood was the hill that had once been the site of the Arab Palestinian village of Sheikh Muwannis. By then, however, it was populated by Jews from North Africa, who had been ejected from their homes by regimes hostile to the establishment of what they called the “Zionist entity.” We, the “Polacks,” had our share of fights with the “Moroccans” on the hill, who lived in dilapidated stone houses that did not resemble the cheap 1950s and 1960s housing of the new neighborhood. One ruin
especially stood out—the Sheikh’s House, as we called it—a large, impressive structure even in its state of progressive decay. Occasionally, we would make our way to what was left of the tall cactus fences that had once surrounded the village, snapping the juicy fruit from the thorny bushes with empty food cans tied to long sticks. The vague notion that this had once been the home of Palestinian Arabs never made the slightest impression on us, nor was it discussed either at home or in school. That past was definitely in the past, and we had enough difficulties making sure that we had a future.32

Years later, I attended the University of Tel Aviv as an undergraduate student, and after completing my DPhil in Britain returned for a few years to teach there. By then the university, which was born two years after me, had spread from its original site and stretched over much of what had been Sheikh Muwannis, whose poor postindependence Jewish residents had meanwhile been mostly relocated. Tel Aviv University was considered to be a stronghold of the political left; students and faculty lamented the right-wing Menahem Begin’s election as prime minister in 1977, objected to the Lebanon War of 1982, and protested the Israeli Army’s actions against Palestinians in the Intifada, which broke out for the first time in 1987. But everyone also did their duty as conscripts and reserve soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In 1991, two years after I left for the United States, the old Sheikh’s House was transformed into a prestigious restaurant and event center frequented by many of the university’s employees. The history of the new/old Green House, which has since officially become the faculty club, is outlined as follows in its recently redesigned and strictly Hebrew-language Web site:

The University Club... is located in the “Green House,” which is within the bounds of Tel Aviv University. The house is a unique architectural asset left over from the village of Sheikh Muwannis....

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the village grew and expanded, and along its simple stone houses, large mansions built of chiseled stones were erected.

Toward the end of World War I, British forces arrived at the edge of the village, which was under Turkish control. The village fell into British hands in a surprise night attack on December 2, 1917.

The transition to Mandatory rule brought progress to the
entire region of Tel Aviv, Jaffa, and also to the village of Sheikh Muwannis. The green house stood out from the distance thanks to its color and the magnificent arcade that decorated its front. At this point, the two top floors served as living quarters and the first floor served for commerce and workshops.

As of 1924, conditions in the village changed, some of its lands were sold, and negotiations began to buy more lands. In March 1948, an encampment for [the underground Jewish organization] Lehi was situated in the village…. At this spot, all of Lehi’s fighters were assembled to hear the order of the day announcing their entry into the ranks of the IDF.

Following the establishment of the State (June 1948), Sheikh Muwannis housed members of the Air Force and Mahal [foreign volunteers]. As of 1949, the village accommodated immigrants,… war refugees,… [and] soldiers who returned from fighting… and lacked housing. . . .

With the development of the university, the Green House came to accommodate the faculty club. . . .

The planners of the house strove to preserve the characteristic architectural elements, combined with contemporary design. The house stands out on the campus thanks to its beauty and uniqueness.33

So what happened to the village of Sheikh Muwannis? The Green House’s Web site neglects the most salient and disturbing aspects of the story as it celebrates the reconstruction without dwelling for a moment on the original destruction and displacement of the population. But other sources provide the information that was unavailable to me when I was growing up in the shadow of the village and that has been obfuscated by the rhetoric on “characteristic architectural elements” and “contemporary design.” Not many of those who gather for delectable meals or festive events at the Green House wish to know the history of the village that once stood on a hill overlooking the Mediterranean to the west and facing the mountains of Judea and Samaria to the east.

The Green House is said to have first been documented by an Australian painter during the British military campaign against the Ottoman forces in Sheikh Muwannis in 1917. During the British mandate of the interwar
years, the village saw a great deal of development, including land registration, house and road construction, and irrigation. The Green House was also enlarged. This process was linked to the massive increase in the Jewish population of the area in response to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and favorable British regulations regarding Jewish immigration until the Arab Revolt of 1936–39. In the years 1931–45, the population of Sheikh Muwannis almost doubled, from 1,154 to 1,930. An elementary school for boys was established in the village in 1932, with an enrollment of 232 in 1945. An elementary school for girls was established in 1943, achieving an enrollment of 34 by 1945.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a partition of Mandate Palestine into a Jewish State and a Palestinian State (33 in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions). The Jewish leadership accepted the partition; but the leadership of the Arabs in Palestine rejected it and unleashed a series of hostile actions against the Jews. Because the British could no longer control the growing civil war, they announced their departure from the country by May 15, 1948. Much of the Jewish and Arab population was geographically mixed, a condition that intensified the brutality of the conflict. Between December 1947 and January 1948, the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish population of Palestine) was largely on the defensive; in February and March, the Jewish population, which numbered only 650,000, came under heavy pressure due to the Arab blockade of the roads. But in April and May, the Haganah (the main underground military organization of the Yishuv) went on the offensive; the paramilitary Palestinian forces were routed, and thousands of Palestinian civilians fled from their towns and villages. On May 14, 1948, the Jewish leadership proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel, and the following day, as the British officially left, the new state was attacked by Arab armies from Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The bitter and costly fighting continued until January 1949 and ended with the victory of the newly established IDF.

In 1949, the Palestinian population totaled 1,380,000, of whom 730,000 were refugees. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, second and third generations had been added to the original refugees. Palestinians have one of the fastest natural population growth rates in the world. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), in 2001 their number stood at 3.7 million, although it is generally believed
that the figures quoted by the UNRWA are somewhat exaggerated, not least because anyone registered as a refugee is entitled to financial support from the UNRWA.\textsuperscript{37}

The most authoritative study on the Palestinian refugees, by the Israeli historian Benny Morris, has concluded that though there was never any overtly official policy by David Ben-Gurion and the leadership of the Yishuv and the new state to expel the Palestinian population, in practice this became the policy in most, although not all, cases. The consensus of the Jewish political and military leadership, as well as the Jewish population more generally, was that the fewer Arabs left within the borders of the young and fragile Jewish state, the easier it would be to consolidate and secure it. And as the Arabs became increasingly reluctant to leave of their own free will, the measures of expulsion by Israeli commanders grew progressively harsher. Once the war ended, Israeli disinclination to consider any return of refugees, and the decision of the surrounding Arab states to make the refugees into a powerful political and propagandistic weapon against Israel, determined that this problem would remain one of the main and most intractable issues on the political agenda of the world until this very day.\textsuperscript{38}

The case of Sheikh Muwannis needs to be seen within this context. The Israeli historian Haim Fireberg, quoted in an article by the journalists Uriya Shavit and Jalal Bana, has claimed that the inhabitants of the village were neither expelled by force nor left of their own free will. Sheikh Muwannis overlooked the main airport of the state in the making, Sdeh Dov, and the Reading power plant; it was also suspected of harboring armed residents who posed a potential threat to the surrounding Jewish communities. At the beginning of March 1948, the Haganah General Staff received reports that Arab volunteers with large quantities of arms had entered Sheikh Muwannis, though other sources contradicted this information. Indeed, subsequent events demonstrated that there probably were no armed men in any number in the village at the time. On March 7, the Haganah’s Alexandroni Brigade blocked all access roads to the village. On March 12, five village elders were kidnapped, apparently by members of the dissident Etzel (IZL, or National Military Organization, known also as the Irgun) or of the more radical underground group Lehi (LHI, or Israel Freedom Fighters, known also as the Stern Gang). Meanwhile, local Arab residents complained about looting, random shootings, and acts of humiliation and intimidation by Jewish forces in and around the village.
According to Fireberg, written testimonies indicate that the Haganah did not intend to expel the residents of Sheikh Muwannis but merely to isolate the village and prevent its residents from linking up with other Arab forces. Indeed, a senior officer in the Kiryati Brigade is quoted in the formation’s operations log on March 17, 1948, as expressing the hope that it would be possible to ensure calm in the region by means of cooperation between the “moderate” circles in Sheikh Muwannis and “Jews who are well-acquainted with the village and its residents.” But on March 20, 1948, soldiers of the Alexandroni Brigade encircled Sheikh Muwannis and seized houses on the outskirts of the village. Within twenty-four hours, the more than 3,000 inhabitants of the village fled their homes, leaving much of their property behind. The Green House, which belonged to the village chief (mukhtar), Ibrahim Abu Kahil, was still filled with packed boxes and other items waiting to be packed, when soldiers of the Kiryati Brigade set up their headquarters there.

The Haganah troops, together with officials from the municipality of Tel Aviv, then registered the Palestinian property. Shavit and Bana argue that “the chief of the General Security Service, Zvi Averbuch, was concerned that the village would become the object of looting by Jewish forces,” and he therefore “recommended the ‘speedy entry of [Jewish] refugees’ from the outlying areas of Tel Aviv into Sheikh Munis [the common Israeli spelling of the village’s name]. The village became the home of destitute Jewish refugees, who clung to the land and the homes they received. Within a year, some 3,000 Jews were settled in 200 of the village’s abandoned homes.”39

This is a somewhat gentler version of events than the one presented by many Palestinians. Shavit and Bana conclude that “the direct cause of the flight from Sheikh Munis is not entirely clear,” and they speculate that “the residents were fearful of the Haganah’s ‘true’ intentions,” or that “Jewish ‘friends’ intimated to them that it would be best for them if they left,” or that “leaders of the Arab forces in Jaffa called on them to leave the village, based on the mistaken assumption that this would induce the British to intervene in the area of north Tel Aviv.”40 A Palestinian web site notes that “either in December 1947 or January 1948 the leaders of al-Shaykh [another possible transliteration of the Arabic] Muwannis” and other Arab villages in the vicinity “met with Haganah representative in the house of Avraham Schapira in Petah Tikva and expressed desire for peace. Despite
the commitment of these villages not to harbor any Arab Liberation Armies or local Arab Militia, they were all completely ethnically cleansed. In late March, al-Shaykh Muwannis inhabitants were intimidate[d] into fleeing after the kidnapping of village leaders."

This is, in fact, also the version of events offered by Morris. Thus, he writes that the Arabs in the central sector of the country refused to launch attacks on the Jews, despite appeals from the commanders of the paramilitary Arab forces. Indeed, he cites the leaders of Sheikh Muwannis and other nearby villages as declaring to Schapira in late 1947 or early 1948 that “if they could not keep out the irregulars unaided, they would call on the Haganah.” These initiatives by local Arab leaders were reciprocated by Jewish officials who visited their villages and asked them to accept the protection of Jewish forces and to remain in their homes. Nevertheless, as the hostilities intensified, mutual suspicions and lack of trust also grew. What seems to have been the main cause for the tragedy of Sheikh Muwannis was the kidnapping by Lehi of five elders from the village in late March. Morris quotes an intelligence source of the IDF reporting less than three months later that this kidnapping brought about the exodus of the population, because the inhabitants had “learned that it was not sufficient to reach an agreement with the Haganah and that there were ‘other Jews’ [i.e., dissidents] whom one should fear perhaps more than the Haganah, which had no control over them.”

Morris rejects the thesis that was popular in Israel for many decades, one that I was taught in school and that much of my generation had internalized as a rationalization for an event that neither we nor our teachers were willing to concede. Though we were told that the Palestinians left because they had been encouraged to do so by their own leadership, expecting to return soon thereafter behind the victorious Arab armies, in fact the local Arab leadership was strongly opposed to the exodus. On March 30, 1948, the Jaffa newspaper *Al Sarikh* wrote:

The inhabitants of the large village of Sheikh Muwannis and of several other Arab villages in the neighbourhood of Tel Aviv have brought a terrible disgrace upon us all by quitting their villages bag and baggage. We cannot help comparing this disgraceful exodus with the firm stand of the Haganah in all localities in Arab territory…. Everyone knows that the Haganah gladly enters the battle while we always flee from it.
The Jewish leadership was also well aware of what was happening, and while its ambivalence about expelling Arabs remained, apart from a few exceptions it had no intention of halting the fleeing Palestinians or, even less so, of allowing them to return. Golda Myerson (Meir), at the time director of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, reported on May 6, 1948, on her visit to Arab Haifa a few days after it was conquered:

It is a dreadful thing to see the dead city. Next to the port I found children, women, the old, waiting for a way to leave. I entered the houses, there were houses where the coffee and pita bread were left on the table, and I could not avoid [thinking] that this, indeed, had been the picture in many Jewish towns [i.e., in Europe during World War II or previous pogroms].

Myerson, who was born in Kyiv in 1898, wrote in her autobiography that one of her earliest memories was of her father boarding up the front door in response to rumors of an imminent pogrom. Clearly, this issue was on her mind when, a few days later, she told the (Labor) Mapai Party Central Committee that the Jews could not treat villagers who had fled because they did not want to fight the Yishuv, “such as [those of] Sheikh Muwannis,” in the same manner as hostile villagers. Then she added:

What do we do with the villages… abandoned by friends? Are we prepared to preserve these villages in order that their inhabitants might return, or do we want to wipe out every trace that there had been a village on the site?

Myerson obviously had compunctions. But even in the same speech, she made room for what would eventually become the policy of erasure:

I am not among those extremists—and there are such, and I applaud them, who want to do everything that can be done in order to bring back the Arabs. I say I am not willing to make extraordinary arrangements to bring back Arabs.

She then went on to say that the question remained of how the Yishuv should behave toward those who had stayed behind. Ill treatment might
both prompt those who were still there to leave and discourage those who had left from returning—“and we would [then] be rid of the lot of them.” She then called for a comprehensive discussion of the “Arab Question” in the Central Committee. But no such discussion ever took place.49

By June 16, the position of the Israeli government had hardened. On that day, Ben-Gurion told the Cabinet that he opposed allowing the Arabs to return to Jaffa or to any other site. The views expressed in this forceful speech, as Morris puts it, “were to serve as the basis of the consensus that emerged” in the Israeli leadership:

I believe we should prevent their return.... We must settle Jaffa, Jaffa will become a Jewish city.... To allow the return of the Arabs to Jaffa would be... foolish. [If the Arabs are allowed to return] and the war is renewed, our chances of ending the war as we wish to end it will be reduced.... Meanwhile, we must prevent at all costs their return.... I will be for them not returning also after the war.50

In 1948–49, about 400 Arab villages and towns were depopulated, and soon thereafter they were fully or partially destroyed and made uninhabitable. Most of the destruction was not due to fighting but part of an intentional policy of plunder and erasure.51 Sheikh Muwannis, next to which I spent much of my own childhood in the 1960s, was one of those villages. The fate of the refugees of these towns and villages will not be resolved by returning them to sites that no longer exist. What was done cannot be undone. But their fate remains at the core of the conflict, and without recognizing, acknowledging, and taking responsibility for the past, the only future that awaits the coming generations of Palestinians and Israelis is one of continuing conflict, bloodshed, distortion of the past, and lack of any prospects for reconciliation and peace.

CONCLUSION

A close examination of such cases as Buchach and Sheikh Muwannis illustrates that the erasure of past diversity will always block rather than facilitate modernization and progress. Such erasure inhibits a meaningful and constructive globalization, making it appear as a faceless, threatening, and
annihilatory process, which has in turn become the root cause of so much violence and instability in our world.

I have no wish to make analogies between the cases of Buchach and Sheikh Muwannis. In the former, the Jews were murdered by the Germans and their local collaborators, even if some were saved by their Polish and Ukrainian neighbors. In the latter, the Arabs were intimidated into fleeing from their homes and became refugees, a status that remains the fate of those who have survived from the original population and of many of their numerous offspring. The first case is genocide; the second is ethnic cleansing in time of war, a war in which the Arab leadership in fact hoped to eradicate the small Jewish population in Palestine at the time. But the erasure of memory and its few remaining physical traces, the rewriting of history, and the goal of building a prosperous and hopeful future on the basis of a distorted past—of constructing new buildings on the half-buried corpses of forgotten victims and on the redesigned relics of abandoned and requisitioned property—is a perilous undertaking. This is not because history can be reversed and its victims can be appropriately compensated, which is impossible and not even desirable. But it is because building the future on an erased past ensures that the memories will never be buried, the bones will keep resurfacing, and the animosity, fear, and prejudice that fueled the destruction in the first place will keep simmering, awaiting new opportunities to burst forth and wreak the revenge of the forgotten.

NOTES


8. Joanna Beata Michlic, Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 (New Haven,
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11. The account on Zolotyi Potik is based mainly on Danuta Dąbrowska et al., eds., *Pinkas Hakehillot: Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities: Poland*, vol. II: Eastern Galicia (in
Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), 415–16. For a more detailed account of the present condition and history of this and many other towns in Western Ukraine, as well as for more extensive references, see Omer Bartov, Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).

12. Apart from references in n. 10, above, see also Dąbrowska et al., Pinkas Hakehillot, 83–89.

13. Interview of Oresta Synen’ka and her husband Ivan Synen’kyi conducted by Sofia Grachova and Andryi Pavlyshuk on March 2, 2006, in Buchach.


15. See also interview of Petro Pasichnyk (born in 1923) conducted by Sofia Grachova and Andryi Pavlyshuk on March 3, 2006, in Buchach.


17. Pick, Simon Wiesenthal, 42–43.

18. Interview conducted by the author with Roman Antoshkiv in Buchach on June 21, 2004. Antoshkiv was born and raised in the 1930s in a nearby village. He related that his mother worked for the Jews and, as he put it, thanks to that experience she could distinguish between the good ones the bad ones. He recalled the day on which the Jews of the village were assembled by the Germans and led away, presumably to Buchach. Antoshkiv was mentioned in the local press around the time of the interview as one of the citizens who donated money for the construction of the Bandera monument (see more below).

20. See n. 13 above. I am thankful to Sofia Grachova for photographing the memorials and the museum, translating the texts, and conducting the interviews. It is unlikely that those interviewed would have expressed themselves in the same manner had I been present; indeed, they would have most probably refused to be interviewed in the first place. Oresta Synen’ka noted in her interview that “a few Poles came back” to Buchach. Commenting on the then eighty-nine-year-old Roman Catholic Father Ludwik, she said: “They have an old priest. But we keep them in their place.” She also mentioned that on the Fedir Hill the bones of the murdered Jews could still be seen, presumably because of the shallow graves. She commented: “I asked the mayor, as well as the principal of the college [apparently the agricultural school situated on the hill] many times: Take a few fellows from the college and make them scatter some earth over the grave. There are people lying about there, never mind who they were.” Ivan Synen’kyi was born in Buchach in 1925 and served as a member of the UPA during the war. He was arrested on May 14, 1946, and spent ten years in Soviet camps. See also “The Testimony of Ivan Iosypovych Synen’kyi,” recorded for the Poshuk Archive, October 29, 2004.

21. Apart from Agnon’s above-cited novel, A Guest for the Night, which contains retrospectively tragic sections in which the author looks out to the Fedir Hill, where the community would be murdered ten years later, from the windows of the study house during his visit there in the early 1930s, his posthumously published book, The Whole City (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1973), is a vast collection of tales, legends, and historical accounts about Jewish life in Buchach, much of it centered on its many synagogues, rabbis and cantors.


24. See more in Bartov, Erased.

25. See http://buchachnews.iatp.org.ua/foto/displayimage.php?album=2&pos=46; and http://buchach.com.ua/?mhnnews_id=206&mhnnews_newsid=7310&mhnnews_page=1 (this site no longer contains the information cited below). Among the speakers was also the director of the Bandera Memorial (Society) Oresta Synen’ka, mentioned above. The speeches are said to been “beautiful and sincere,… full of heartfelt feelings, reflections on the figure of Stepan Bandera in the history of our Fatherland and the region, and his enormous role in the formation of Ukrainian self-consciousness, national spirit, and the striving for freedom and liberty.”

26. Interview with Mykola Kozak conducted by Sofia Grachova on March 2, 2006, in Buchach.

27. For photographs of the tombstones by Thomas Weiss and his sons, see http://www.


32. See the instructive discussion in Amnon Raz-Krakotskin, “Historical Consciousness and Historical Responsibility,” in From Vision to Revision: A Hundred Years of Historiography of Zionism (in Hebrew), ed. Yechiam Weitz (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1997), 97–133.

33. See http://www.tau.ac.il/university-club/description.html. The previous site, http://www.gv.co.il/index.htm, no longer operates. That site had an even briefer historical survey that did not include any information on the purchase of lands from the village (obviously by Zionist agencies) starting in the 1920s, nor about situating a base for the radical terrorist group Lehi in the village in 1948. This information has been added a few years ago, possibly in response to attempts by activists among students and other left-wing and Palestinian groups to have the university acknowledge in a more public fashion the fact that the faculty club is built over so-called abandoned property. See, e.g., Ester Sandberg, “The History of the Green House” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, November 16, 2003, http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=361120&contrassID=2&subContrassID=3&shSubContrassID=0; and the petition by the organization Zochrot: “Tel Aviv University Is Asked to Acknowledge Its Past and to Commemorate the Palestinian Village on Which the University Was Built,” http://www.zochrot.org/index.php?id=143.


39. Shavit and Bana, “Everything You Wanted to Know.”

40. Ibid.

41. “Al-Shaykh Muwannis.” Avraham Schapira (or Shapira, 1870–1965) was a legendary figure of the early Aliyah (Jewish immigration) to Palestine/Eretz Israel. He was head of the Shomrim, the early defense organization of the Jewish settlers, and was later active in the Haganah. He formed close ties of mutual respect with the local Palestinian and Bedouin population in the area. See more at the Hebrew-language sites: http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki and http://muni.tik-tak.co.il/web/project/project.asp?id=12660&Modul=40.


43. Ibid., 127–28.

44. Ibid., 138.

45. Ibid., 310.


48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.


Siberia is the largest historically defined region of Russia and enjoys an array of natural riches of global importance. Yet the question of who owns the land has become a political problem, and the physical territory is currently being treated as symbolic capital in struggles marked as “ethnic.” Discourses of ethnicity have become the central vehicle with which local groups assert historical and cultural rights to the land, ethnic space, and statehood. Paradoxically, though ethnic elites of the former Soviet Union have been consistently critical of Soviet power, they nonetheless appeal to the ethnonational state that the Soviet regime constructed and strive to prove that this entity has long cultural and historical roots. The Buryats—the most numerous community of indigenous Siberians—have been engaged in such territorial and political discourses alongside other ethnic minorities since the end of the Soviet period.¹

The “search for a national idea” has preoccupied ethnic Russians no less than ethnic minorities in the post-Soviet era. To assert their “inherent” rights in a multinational society, Russian nationalist activists have invoked religious identity as a symbolic marker. Not surprisingly, therefore, discourses of Orthodox revival in Buryatia reflect the same incantations found throughout Russia, which often involve statements such as “The Russian people are the founders and transmitters of an inherently unique, high spirituality. It has its own historical destiny and features of cultural development that are closely connected to Orthodoxy.”² The revival of Russian Orthodoxy, ostensibly aimed at providing a unifying national idea, also serves as a vehicle for challenging ethnic non-Russians’ claims to political sovereignty.³

In Buryatia, Russians’ religiosity differs from that of the Buryats. Though the Buryats understand themselves as Buddhists and Shamanists simultaneously, and perceive no contradiction between these creeds, the Russians are divided into those adhering to Orthodoxy and Old Believers (staroobriadytsy, bespopovtsy, and semeiskie). The medieval split of the Russian
The deeper we comprehend our heritage, the better we understand that our history and culture are both penetrated by Orthodoxy. The Orthodox understanding of the world and of human beings in it, the place which the native land and its authority occupy in the world, have always been our national ideology.... Having united the tribes into a nation, Orthodoxy inspired it with patriotism, lifted above the sinful land, and pointed out the great purpose to everyone. Hence, the outlook of the nation must again become consistently Orthodox in order for Russians to overcome [contemporary trials] and not lose their essence.

Competing religious expressions of ethnic rights and claims to the land have been used to mark the physical landscape throughout Buryatia. Buryat activists have established *datsans* and *stupas*, while Russians leaders have erected churches and crosses. A big wooden cross erected on the steep bank of the Uda River in the center of the city’s historical district serves such political and cultural interests. On their own, such expressions do not cause conflicts, inasmuch as Buryats and Russians have maintained cultural interactions since the seventeenth century and intolerance and enmity between them have not been as virulent as between Russians and ethnic

Orthodox Church has not yet been overcome; nevertheless, whether a person is a member of the Orthodox Church or not (or is or is not a believer), for most people (Russians and Buryats), Russia and the Russians are indissolubly connected to Christianity. This idea has been successfully inculcated into public consciousness since perestroika so that, at least formally, Russia is considered a Christian country. The campaign to assert this Christian national idea has been even more actively pursued in the ethno-political regions of Russia than in the regions with more ethnically homogeneous Russian populations. The Orthodox clergy in Buryatia regard the Russian Orthodox Church as the only resource for the revival of Russian culture and self-consciousness. The priest of Sviato-Odigitriaia Cathedral, which is the main Orthodox church in Buryatia’s capital, Ulan-Ude, has emphasized the political and integrating function of the religion in this context of rapid social transformation: “The Russian people, who are now coming back to the sources, will find forces for revival only in the Orthodox belief of the pious ancestors.” He explains:

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minorities in other parts of the country. Fears arise when religious and other cultural symbols become ideological weapons in claims for superiority. Thus, throughout the 1990s, a group of Russians in Buryatia reclaimed the collective name “Zabaikalia Kazaks,” donned military uniforms, sabers, and tsarist awards that they had inherited from the ancestors, and marched down the city streets of Ulan-Ude proclaiming slogans that demanded a return to the city’s historical Russian name of “Verkhneudinsk.” Buryats reacted to these events very painfully; though there were no violent conflicts, the slogans were understood as chauvinist and racist. Such nationalist logic allows Buryat activists to assert that Russians and Evenks, who are to some extent recognized as natives, have no right to be considered indigenous populations of the Republic of Buryatia, arguing that “the Russians possess the whole Russia” and “Evenks have the Evenk national district.” This primordialist understanding of group rights to land and statehood has made offensive exclamations like “clear off to your Russia!” a norm of interethnic encounters.

As sociopolitical changes in Russia within the last two decades have given rise to a wide array of new social practices and political opportunities, Buryat intellectuals have begun mobilizing efforts to revive and reconstruct Buryat identity. This chapter explores these processes, focusing on Buryat intellectuals’ use of the concept of “traditional culture” and particular narratives of Buryat history to construct Buryat identity and imbue it with cultural legitimacy. We draw on Eric Hobsbawm’s classic concept of the “invention of tradition” to highlight how claims to cultural and historical authenticity are strategically deployed for the political purpose of national revival. The discussion here focuses on two central features of elite discourses: the emphasis placed on cultural aspects related to Buddhism and shamanism, and the concept of the Buryat-Mongols as a single ethnic community. We examine the remythicization process currently under way as elites assert a shared history and culture between Buryats and Mongols, and sacralize their perceived ethnic unity as connected to and emerging from the physical landscape. Within these themes, we examine the particular issues of shamanism, the epic story Geser, and Chinggis Khan as sites where “traditional culture” is actively constructed as a religious and historical source for the Buryat ethnonationalist revival.

As a case study of the ways “diversity” is currently being managed contemporary Russia, the Siberian context of Buryatia reveals the continuing
impact of Soviet nationality policies on present-day efforts to reconstitute ethnic communities. As Buryat nationalist activists strive to compensate for the Soviet politicization of ethnic expression and its repression of locally valued practices, relationships, and notions of identity, they paradoxically rely on the Soviet model of ethnic difference, reviving Buryat-Mongol identity by making space “ethnic” and based on exclusive understandings of “nationality.”

**THE REJECTION OF SOVIET POLICIES**

Contemporary Buryat leaders consider overcoming the negative consequences of the Soviet era to be among their most important tasks. The Communist Party’s strong objections to any claims to national specificity on the part of non-Russians emerged frequently in discourses on the ideology of the “friendship of the peoples.” As Brezhnev stated in 1973, “Attempts to create a certain exclusive position for representatives of one’s ‘own’ nation are resolutely condemned. Also, the task of rapprochement of nations… cannot be served by the fetishization of outdated customs and traditions, and the exaggerated role of a falsely conceived national specificity that threatens the development of common Soviet norms and principles of life.” In concert with this position, the Soviet party elite excluded historical, cultural, and religious practices from the permissible forms of expression granted nationalities; for example, the performance of religious rituals by unregistered lamas and shamans, especially public rituals that could be controlled by the authorities, were the object of surveillance and often targeted for prosecution.

This aspect of Soviet nationality policy justified the repression of Buryat cultural expression. The Buryat epic poem Geser, for example, became the object of political manipulation in Communist Party academic discussions of 1948–49, when it was derisively labeled a “feudal Chinggis Khan piece,” and scholars studying it were subjected to reprisals. Many local authorities were complicit with this official Soviet position. For example, in February 1949, the chairman of the Board of the Republic’s Union of Writers, Ts. G. Galsanov, buttressed official ideology when he stated: “The Epic Geser was never an original Buryat-Mongol epic. It originated from the Tibetan-Mongol version and some later sections that were first dictated by lamas and then shamans, in all cases by the kulak-noyon nobility, in order to please
Soviet officials treated statements about genetic kinship between Buryats and Mongols—even implicit ones read into positive comments about by Buryats—as a sign of pan-Mongolism, a rival allegiance based on ethnic or national identity that threatened Soviet socialist loyalties. Such statements were consequently grounds for prosecution.

Buryat attitudes toward Chinggis Khan were also regulated in the post-Stalin period. For example, the 1962 celebration of the eight-hundredth anniversary of Chinggis Khan’s birthday in the Mongolian People’s Republic, initially planned as a grand event, was significantly scaled back following the academician I. M. Mayski’s pronouncements of Chinggis Khan’s actual significance from a Marxist-Leninist perspective:

Chinggis Khan, undoubtedly, was a central military and state worker of his epoch…. In the first era, ending in 1206, Chinggis Khan made a certain contribution to the cause of Mongolian consolidation, creating the first Mongol state of the early feudal type. In the second era, beginning in 1206 and developing an especially aggressive character after 1211, Chinggis Khan played a negative role…. The military successes of Chinggis Khan (and his successors) are to be explained not so much by his personal qualities, as by weaknesses and divisions in the environment in which the nascent Mongol state was emerging. Having met no serious resistance, the ruling class of this state—noyons—in insatiable pursuit for booty, pastures, and riches went further and further, ruthlessly building on their own superiority. However, they did not (and could not) manage to create a strong empire and establish their domination of Asia and Europe for a long time. Observing Chinggis Khan’s activities in totality, we can conclude that in general they brought immense harm to the cause of human progress. This is the final conclusion emerging from an evaluation of Chinggis Khan from a Marxist-Leninist position.10

This statement was echoed by further criticisms of Chinggis Khan in scientific conferences, with the result that the date of his birth did not become an official festival of the Mongol state. But at the regional level, glorifying celebrations still took place, expressing deep respect to the leader revered as the founder of the Mongol ulus (state).
The declaration of the free development of peoples of the USSR and the étatization of ethnicity—the creation of ethnoterritorial formations ranging from Union republics to autonomous districts—was the other component of Soviet nationality policy. The Soviet state promoted the conscious construction of cultures on the basis that they would be “socialist in content and national in form.” As a result, explains Andrei Sinyavski, “under the words ‘national form’ a rather limited number of ethnographic details are permitted,… [such as] national costumes and musical and dance performances” and national specificity “is reduced to scenery and to the opportunity to say the same socialist slogans in any language.”

Except for those spheres of cultural activity that were authorized and doled out by the authorities (most commonly, national theatres and ensembles, literature and art), elements of Buryat culture were kept in latent form in the domestic practices of everyday life (clothes, food, dwellings—most of all in villages), and in rituals (rites of transition and calendar rituals). With the coming of the era known as the Thaw following Stalin’s death, former symbols of the Buryat symbolic world were again emphasized—the mountains, the yurta (a traditional Buryat dwelling), the dark blue dome of the sky, the space of the steppe filled with blossoming fragrant grasses and grazing herds and flocks. These traditional Buryat metaphors became symbols of hearth and home. The walls of the yurta became one’s “own” sanctuary from the external world, and the yurta became a model of the microcosm “steppe—sky.”

When the Soviet Union collapsed, many people began questioning existing social practices, while exploring new forms of expressing identities. The vision of personal and collective identity based on ethnicity became one of the most important of these needs. Recent sociological studies aiming to measure ethnic identity in Buryatia demonstrate how elites are producing and mobilizing ethnicity for the purposes of national-cultural revival. One sociologist, comparing studies she conducted in the Ust’-Orda Buryat Autonomous District in 1990 and 1997, noted that in the first round of the survey, none of the respondents specified an ethnic form of belonging in response to the question “Who am I?” while in 1997 the category “Buryat” appeared in the responses to a quarter of those questioned.

We contend that the increasing importance of ethnicity as a mode of identity is a result of intentional efforts by intellectual elites to mobilize ethnicity. The Buryat national movement actively formulates common
interests and constructs boundaries of ethnicity, by which we mean ethnic indicators used as symbols of group identity:

_In the beginning of the 1990s, the All-Buryat Congress established the preconditions for ethnic consolidation under the new circumstances._ The following tasks were put forward as significant for ethnic revival: strengthening the sovereignty of the Republic, strengthening the sense of shared history and connection with the Mongol world, bringing to light and reviving the riches of the national culture, art, language, and national consciousness…. In the search for a national idea, attempts were undertaken to create new theories on a religious basis, such, for example, as “tengrianstvo” [a neologism that refers back to the collected name of supreme deities (sing. Tengri, pl. Tengriyi) of the western Buryat shamanic pantheon]. Modified ideas of “pan-Mongolism” were revived as a foundation for political tasks. However, _leaders of the Buryat revival mainly focused on ideas about the past. Reflecting upon the future is an unusual occurrence._ (italics added)

Buryat intellectuals are actively involved in developing a way of supporting and preserving Buryat ethnic identity, creating an image of the ethnic group, forming ethnic stereotypes, and identifying attitudes toward certain phenomena as markers of ethnicity. The reference to “traditional culture” has become especially important in establishing symbolic distinctions from the socialist past. Traditional culture and the ethnic paradigm of the Buryat-Mongols serve as the most important resources of ethnic symbolism for constructing the discourse of national-cultural revival.

_“CULTURE” IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY_

The important role of elite intellectuals in mobilizing the revival of Buryat identity is visible in the frequent use of sociological surveys on the idea of ethnic identity presented to the population. These surveys raise the topic, give it importance, and provide respondents with possible answers regarding the meaning and importance of the Buryat identity. The responses highlight the ways ideas of Buryat revival are focused on a combination of valuing “traditional culture,” claims of national sovereignty, and a vision of ethnic identity based on common origins with the Mongols. In reply
to the question “What conditions are now most necessary for the revival of your people?” slightly more than half of all those questioned chose the answer the “revival and development of national culture,” and more than 48 percent chose the “development of a market economy, broad economic independence.” Yet a significant number of respondents (44 percent) chose “strengthening independence, the sovereignty of the republic, and control over the use of natural resources,” and about 34 percent chose “support for the language.”

Despite some statistical differences caused by distinctions in how the questionnaires were formulated, these surveys allow us to see the identity paradigms through which the Buryats construct their ethnicity and the issues to which they attribute value. According to A. V. Bil’trikova, the question “What are your principal associations with the idea of our Buryat people?” yielded this distribution of responses: (1) “the place where I was born,” 66 percent; (2) “our land, territory,” 63.2 percent, (3) “the language of our people,” 60.4 percent; (4) “our past, our history,” 55.2 percent; (5) “our religion,” 44.4 percent; (6) “sincere qualities of our people,” 42.5 percent; and (7) “the state in which I live,” 22.2 percent.

In I. Yelayeva’s research, which included the paradigm of ethnic identity as “culture, customs, and ceremonies,” about 60 percent chose this response to the question “What makes you related to people of your nationality?” This was followed closely by the response “native land, nature,” while 53 percent respondents chose language (although among urban residents the response “appearance” was in third place with 44 percent, followed by “language,” chosen by 42 percent of respondents. Among rural residents, by contrast, “language” as a component of ethnic identity was specified by 53 percent, and “appearance” by 25 percent; (5) “Buddhism,” 35 percent; (6) “common values, outlooks on life, attitude,” about 30 percent; (7) “historical destinies, the past,” 22 percent; (8) “character traits, psychology,” 20 percent; (9) “common statehood,” 14 percent; and (10) “shamanism,” about 10 percent.

It is notable that the basic concepts deployed to promote national revival by intellectual elites, such as traditional culture, national culture, and ethnic culture, are not precisely defined, and used interchangeably as synonyms. A vivid example of this can be found in a program speech of the former chairman of the Congress of the Buryat People, E. M. Yegorov (in this and subsequent quotations, the italics are the authors’):
The basic goals of the Congress include the restoration of the ethnocultural foundation of the Buryat people as inhabitants of that vital environment which daily feeds us. But the Congress does not call on Buryats to return back to the world of the yurta. It calls for an approach to a new understanding of the “culture of the yurta” with its universal values in a new millennium. I think that the intellectual center of the Congress should consolidate the values of our people’s traditional culture, revive its symbols, achievements of science, philosophy, ethics, ethnopedagogy—everything that comprises the gene pool of the nation. [Whatever]… stimulates the national spirit, serves the cause of the survival of the people and is of interest for all mankind…. The fourth direction… includes activities related to spiritual revival…. Due to historical circumstances, the loss of belief became one more source of the disintegration of our people, and recent conflicts among Buryat lamas do not at all promote the cause of spiritual revival and consolidation of the Buryats. In this generally uneasy situation the Congress, retaining a position of non-interference in the internal affairs of clergy, considers it to be not only possible but also necessary to lift the spiritual problems and needs of the people to a new level and to do the utmost to ensure that our spiritual traditions, knowledge, and philosophy revive and develop, so that they serve to… promote unification and mutual understanding among Buryats as well as all people. The revival of boo-murgel, promoted by shamans, is not only their cause; and the revival of Buddhism is not the cause of lamas alone. This is the cause of the people itself. Therefore, the Congress should more thoroughly and regularly approach the organization of research, publishing, educational programs in the field of spiritual traditions of the Buryats in cooperation not only with supervising religious bodies but also with the bodies of government. In fact, the spiritual traditions of the Buryats are not just religious beliefs and customs; they are components of traditional culture and education. This includes traditional ethics, psychology, the whole system of traditional knowledge such as Mongol-Tibetan medicine, traditional calendars, etc.19 The education system and department of culture in the republic and in other Buryat regions, with the assistance of experts from the Congress, should reconstruct their standards and
ideas about cultural education. Education and culture should have spiritual aspects…. The main priority here should be the strategy of ethnic survival and development of the Buryat ethnos within the commonwealth of ethnic groups of the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite the fact that contemporary Buryat life is secular in many respects, the leaders of the national revival often emphasize the religious dimensions of “traditional culture.” Thus, Buddhism and shamanism (as a system of religious beliefs) are frequently central to the discourse of national cultural revival, as one typical text conveys: “The morality of the people, their centuries-old traditional culture, is reviving. The Buddhist religious-philosophical system, with its emphasis on humanism, pacifism and compassion, is part of this culture. The truth now being written is that the history of our people is tightly connected to faith, and that faith, in its turn, brought us all our culture: our language, our literacy, our architecture, our art.”\textsuperscript{21} Such discourses define the content and significance of Buryat religion, and elites consequently use them to produce the concept of traditional (national, ethnic) culture.

SHAMANISM

A highly contested issue among Buryat elites is the role and significance of shamanism as a marker of ethnic identity and a mechanism promoting national revival. Although shamanism is portrayed as a central element of “traditional” culture, the discourses surrounding this practice reveal that its meanings are subject to extensive contestation, and there is not even agreement as to what constitutes shamanic practice. Among proponents, for example, we see representations of shamanism as a worldview both connected with Buddhism under the common designation “religion” and also, independently, as a positive phenomenon in its own right: “Shamanism is the outlook initially inherent in a given ethnic group which helps it live and survive in extreme conditions, providing an opportunity to communicate with descendants. We can say that shamanism, to a certain degree, is an original form of life-support for the people…. And some shamans think that shamanism can become the national religion of the Buryats, a major factor of their consolidation, for it is a fundamental principle of all religions, including Buddhism.”\textsuperscript{22} This contrasts with a view of shamanism as its own religion: “For many Buryats, including nonbelievers, shamanism is associated with
the whole national culture.… Attempts are under way to declare shamanism to be the national religion of all Buryats.”

Finally, some advocates emphasize shamanism’s far-reaching impact on all aspects of culture: “Nature itself ‘gave birth’ to a shamanic worldview and culture: certain styles in art (sculpture, ornaments, and music), a rich mythology and the greatest of ethnic traditions. All of this compromises the heritage of the ethnic group, and is a source for the cultural creativity of new generations.”

Advocates of shamanism, however, are outnumbered by Buryat intellectuals who reject the notion that shamanism can serve as an integrative mechanism promoting Buryat ethnic revival and progress. First, they highlight its function as a clan-based religion: “Having no precise organizational structure, shamanistic revival occurs spontaneously and un-systematically within the framework of ulus-clan and zemliacheski [friendly societies of persons coming from one locality] and communities. Only infrequently does it display an ethnic-based or all-Buryat character.… Organizational measures are necessary to ensure the unification and training of shamanic clergy to preserve the ethnic life of the people, and its physical and spiritual health.”

Other critics disparage the intellectual level of shamans: “Certainly it is difficult to consider the great majority of shamans to be educated, cultural people—intellectuals.” Still others worry that shamanism has the potential to weaken the position of Buddhism: “A ‘shamanic Renaissance’ conflicts with the interests and norms of other faiths.”

THE ORIGIN STORY GESER

One of the most important cultural symbols of Buryat national identity is the epic myth Geser. “Repressed in 1949 after being labeled a “feudal Chinggis Khan” product, it was rehabilitated in 1951, and its significance as part of the cultural heritage of the Buryat people was recognized.” The active study of this epic soon followed; more than ten versions were written down, and over ten texts with translation and commentaries were published. This activity further catalyzed the use of the epic by national elites as a symbol of ethnic mobilization. The five-year-long celebration of the thousandth anniversary (sic) of the epic Geser, from 1990 to 1995, became a moment of deep symbolic meaning. The Geseriad was understood, in the words of one leader, as “an expression of ethno-cultural consciousness.…
The Geseriad became a symbol of the growth of national consciousness, familiarization with Buryat spiritual roots and sources, and a revival of ancient customs and traditions seen to have lasting universal value. The Geseriad is a latent reaction to the bitter fruits of historical unconsciousness and national nihilism that began to take root during the former totalitarian era. This movement celebrating the symbol of Geser, a cultural hero of public renown, has, to a certain degree, filled the spiritual and ideological vacuum formed in Buryat society in the post-perestroika period.”

Several events surrounding the Geseriad became symbolically meaningful. The raising and consecration of Geser’s Banner (an invention of “tradition,” which was not noted by ethnographers among the Buryats before), became a symbol of all-Buryat unity. The banner was raised on August 17 and 18, 1991, in the village of Hadahan of the Nukut area of the Ust’-Orda Buryat Autonomous District, on the native land of the storyteller Peokhon Petrov (1866–1943) and it was carried, for five years, over all areas where Buryats reside. Wooden posts to hold the Geser Banner (Geserei Serge) were established “along the whole route of procession, symbolically marking the territory as owned by the indivisible Buryat people; and a Geser temple was constructed in the Oka area of Buryatia. The goal of these activities, on the one hand, was to fix the shared territorial-clan identity of the Buryats ritually. On the other hand, the Geseriad was a symbolic expression of another unity: that of the Buryat-Mongol and Central-Asian peoples. The epic myth Geser was named a treasure of the peoples of Central Asia, and the memorial “Geser’s Halting Place” (Geserei Buusa) was created on the mountain pass of Daraashyn Dabaan, on the shores of Lake Gusinoye, on a highway that connects Buryatia to Central Asia through Mongolia. Certainly, the importance given to the epic by B. S. Dugarov—the organizer and the ideologist of the celebration, including the determination of the date—oversteps the bounds of mere cultural phenomenon. In a process exemplifying the “invention of tradition,” the Geseriad was made into a core symbol of the Buryat-Mongol people, providing them with their own historical narrative.

THE HISTORY AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BURYAT ETHNICITY

In constructing a modern political ideology, Buryat intellectual elites pay appreciable attention to such concepts as national consciousness, nation-
al uniqueness (which implies a connection with culture), and the unity of the Buryat people embodied in the ethnic name “Buryat.” A wider common Mongolian unity finds its expression in the paradigm “Buryat-Mongolia” or “Buryat-Mongols,” which links Buryatia to a larger sense of Central Asian civilization, of which the Baikal area is recognized to be an integral part, and is based on notions of common origin (“consanguinity”) and common territory (“native ground”), in a recognizable Blut und Boden theme.  

Debates exist among Buryat scholars over the historical development of Buryat culture, with the ideological dividing line between those who emphasize the historical contingency and social constructions at work in the development of Buryat ethnicity, and those who posit the existence of a primordial Buryat nation. In our opinion, the professional academic point of view on this phenomenon was set forward by T. M. Mikhailov, who argues:

The ethnic and geopolitical understanding of the terms Buryat and Buryatia arose in the modern and contemporary periods. During the Mongolian period of our history (from the 12th to the first half of the 17th century), Zabaikal and Prebaikal were a part of the Mongolian state, and during the time of the Khan and his descendants they became core components of the Empire. As a result of the formation of the Mongolian nationality (a supra-ethnic group) between the 12th and 14th centuries, the Mongol-speaking tribes of the Baikal region—Bagruts, Oirats, Bayauts, Khoriri-tumats, and others—came under its influence and were barely visible as separate ethnic groups. There was no such thing as Buryat nationhood. With the arrival of the Russians into Eastern Siberia, Zabaikal, and Prebaikal became the border of Northern Mongolia, known as Ara Mongol. The Mongol-speaking tribes assimilated into the Russian state did not profess allegiance to Buryat nationality: there was not even a concept of general Buryat self-consciousness (in the sense of “we are Buryats”). The basic forms of self-consciousness were tribal and territorial: expressed as, “we are Bulagats,” “we are Darkhats,” “we are Tunkintses.” Even in the 17th century the Khorints did not call themselves Buryats and the Selengink-Dzhidinsk group referred to themselves as “Russian Mungals.” The sense that “we
are Buryats” did not arise all at once. However, over the course of 150–200 years, as a result of the formation of a completely new culture and social psychology,... the ethnic label “Buryat,” with the active cooperation of the Russian state, became a symbol of the coming together of an entity, and a political slogan. And there followed the “Buryatisation” of all tribal and territorial groups, along with the assimilation of their languages, way of life, consciousness, etc. In other words, what was created was a completely new ethnosocial entity: the Buryat people, differentiated from the Mongols.... Although various tribes retained their traditions, a consciousness of the unity of the people ("we are Buryats") became an actual fact in the second half of the 19th century.34

Although Mikhailov acknowledges the social and political factors at work in the construction of a Buryat identity, many other contemporary Buryat intellectuals strive to establish the most historically remote ethnongenesis possible, driven by an ethnic ideology that symbolically links authenticity with “roots” and “ancientness.” For this reason, Mongolian history is preferable to Buryat history proper. The powerful importance of time for ethnic ideology means, first of all, constructing a “great history,” because as P. Chatterjee said, “a nation, or so nationalists believe, must have a past.”35 In this context, the revitalization of the name Buryat-Mongols attains an important, instrumental meaning. This major symbol of identity was repeatedly used in political practice during the twentieth century. Having been formulated and endowed with meaning by intellectual elites during the national movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, in 1923 it became a symbolic component of the name of the republic—the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1958, however, Soviet officials renamed the republic, citing the official reason that “preserving the complex double name—Buryat-Mongols—causes much misunderstanding and idle talk. Poorly informed people think that this is connected with two peoples living in the territory of the Republic, that is, Buryats and Mongols. Such erroneous assumptions not only bring confusion but also to a certain extent restrains the national pride of the Buryats.”36

In this process, historians became involved in establishing a new political identity. For example, P. T. Khaptayev wrote that “the native population of our Republic consists of the Buryats, who have lived in
Pribaikalye since ancient times…. The majority of Soviet scholars believe that the Buryat nationality was formed in the pre-Russian epoch, and the name ‘Buryats’ was already in use nationwide by then.”37 In the central section of the document renaming the republic, the official explanation states: “The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is a new confirmation of the national statehood of the Buryats, a recognition of the strengthening and blossoming of the Buryat socialist nation,… a deep respect for the national interests of the native population of the Republic.”38

With the beginning of perestroika, the paradigm Buryat-Mongols/Buryat-Mongolia was reintroduced, marking a new stage of identity construction. This paradigm aimed at national consolidation and the revival of the Buryat people’s “spiritual culture.” The information statement, “About the Name the Buryat-Mongol Republic,” submitted in 1991 by the Scientific Council of the Buryat Institute of Social Studies to the leaders of the republic, asserts:

International Mongolian studies normally divides the Mongolian world into large regions: Khalkha-Mongolia, Buryat-Mongolia, etc., based on the following: all Mongolian peoples have a common ancient culture, rooted in the Central-Asian civilization, and had a common writing system—the classical, so-called old-Mongolian vertical script. Mongolian scholars have always stated that Buryat-Mongolian culture and the Buryat-Mongolian language should develop based on a traditional, common Mongolian foundation, for they will lose their prospect for development if separated from it…. We think that in everyday use, in press and literature, the ethnic labels Buryat and Buryat-Mongols can be used similarly, however our Republic should carry the traditional name Buryat-Mongolian. It is necessary to return the name aimak [the Mongolian term for a basic administrative territorial unit]39 to rural Buryat areas of the Republic and to reflect this in the new Constitution of the Republic…. This is a request that the Supreme Soviets of the [Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic] and the USSR restore the traditional name of the Republic and henceforth to name it the Buryat-Mongolian Socialist (Sovereign) Republic.40
A wider appeal to tradition was offered by a philology professor, L. Shagdarov: “The name Buryat-Mongolia (Buryat-Mongols) reflected the common ethnohistorical, linguistic, and cultural background of Mongolian peoples, their common historical destiny. They had the same nomadic way of life, the same methods of raising livestock, the same dwellings, basic foods, clothes, customs and rituals, religion and so on. Shared ethnic features determined a common culture.”

At present, the name Buryat-Mongols carries particular symbolic weight as a signifier of national revival. The vision of unification that this concept mobilizes stems from the postrevolutionary period, when an ethnoterritorial unit of Buryat-Mongolia including Pribaikalye and Transbaikalia was established in 1924. Restoring this original name of the republic is a key goal of nationalist revivalists, including the Buryat Institute of Social Studies: “We consider that the reintroduction of the traditional name, the eternal name of ‘Buryat-Mongolia,’ would enable the following positive tendencies, which we have noticed in the freeing-up of traditions and the culture of our ancestors, not only in our Republic but in other autonomous areas: playing an important role in the spiritual rebirth and consolidation of our people, in the future journey of the Mongol peoples on the paths of democracy, and in the social progress and harmony of civilization.”

The emphasis placed on the eternal character of the name, which only became a historical fact in 1923, reveals the sacramentalizing character of this name. This term has the magical ability to organize the country, locating the republic within concentrically larger entities emanating from the center to the periphery: from our republic—the autonomous okrug—to our people—the Mongol people—to human civilization.

As we can see, the paradigm Buryat-Mongolia, as one level of ethnic loyalty, has found its place among a number of national/ethnic loyalties in modern Buryat political discourses. With the revitalization of Blut und Boden ideas connecting Buryats and Mongols, discussions of national “belonging” have been given a prominent place in newspaper publications and articles over the last two decades. One primordialist writer, S. Sh. Chagdurov, a doctor of sciences in philology, applied anthropomorphic imagery to Buryatia and Mongolia, as he lamented that current regimes continue to limit the national revival: “The paradox... is that within the power structures of Buryatia and Russia, a primordial ethnic group
(Mongols by blood) has not been allowed to be named legally by the names of mother and father simultaneously—as Buryat-Mongol, as it had been before July 7, 1958, even though it would be more ethical for those who hold power in the Republic of Buryatia, including those who represent the interests of the majority of its population, to dare to return to the native ethnicity its mother name.⁴⁵

Notably, leaders of the modern national-cultural revival do not try to revive pan-Mongolism as a political project, a source of major anxiety for Soviet and now Russian leaders.⁴⁶ The key question for Buryat leaders concerns emphasizing shared national-cultural features. As the author Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev stated: “We think that restoring the primordial name (Buryat-Mongolia) will open up opportunities for reviving and deepening the national basis of our language and culture as a whole…. Having restored the name Buryat-Mongol, we will recognize that the Buryats had an ancient culture that was created together with other Mongolian peoples. This act will promote wider contacts between them, and will strengthen their friendship and cooperation, first of all in the field of culture and language.”⁴⁷

Legitimating the primordial rights of Buryat ethnicity is first and foremost based on ideas of “ancient” and “privatized” history. Interestingly, the ancient emergence of the Buryats became an axiom of political discourse in the Soviet period. Indeed, the regime portrayed the Buryats as having evolved through all the stages of national development, as outlined by Soviet paradigms of ethnic emergence: from a tribe to a nationality (as a part of the Mongolian feudal state) to a nation (a socialist one, of course). The supposed eternal presence in the territory served as one of the key arguments in favor of setting up a national Buryat state in the twentieth century.

The restoration of the joined Buryat-Mongol name is closely connected with demands for recognizing the Buryats as a repressed people. If the central authorities agreed to return the former name, they would also implicitly, at least, acknowledge that the partition of the republic in 1937 (when it was divided into the republic proper and two autonomous districts in the Irkutsk and Chita regions) was illegal; this in turn could bring about the further escalation of nationalist agitation. The possibility of establishing such a precedent is considered dangerous, because irredentist feelings were rather strong among many (if not all) ethnic minorities in Russia. The
need for a common language and writing system among the Buryat and Mongols is also emphasized:

Communication between Mongolian-speaking peoples by means of one easily understandable language or one of their dialects is a highly important cause, even a historical necessity. Why? As we develop further, we should not differ more and more from one another, but on the contrary, we should approach and at last become one people with a single language, for language, as is widely known, is the most characteristic attribute of a people…. It is necessary to create a literary language that will be shared by all Mongols with a uniform grammar… in order to create a common literary language it is necessary to invite the participation of all scholars from Inner Mongolia, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Kalmykia, and Buryatia—not only philologists, but all who are eloquent, articulate people…. Then we can become one people with one language. The dialects will not lead to anywhere, but they will feed the basic literary language. And certainly we should write in the Old-Mongolian script, as this language was passed down as though from the sky and was chosen by the great Chinggis Khan.48

CHINGGIS KHAN

As the above quotation reveals, Chinggis Khan’s image in historical and cultural discourses speaks to the perceived urgency of reconstructing Buryat collective identity; at stake is the immediate Buryat ethnic identity, as well as the assertion of a more expanded identity, the Buryat-Mongols, which are often used as synonyms. In both cases, one symbol of identity—Chinggis Khan—is used, and it is transformed as necessary when used in other identity practices. Intellectuals are engaged in an active search to prove that Chinggis Khan belonged to the Buryat land and Buryat “blood” as a means of establishing a foundation for unity between the Buryats and the Mongols, based on common origins (“consanguinity”) and a common territory (“the native land”), Blut und Boden.

Chinggis Khan occupies a particularly prominent place in the discourse on national-cultural revival, linking together the great state of the past
with a cultural hero for Buryat ethnic ideology. For the historical and national consciousness of the Buryats as well as for the Mongols, the image of Chinggis Khan is one of the major “national” images. Therefore, we will discuss in more detail how this image is used to construct a modern national identity.

In historical and cultural discourses on Buryat historical identity, the image of Chinggis Khan is described in rich, if diverse, ways: Some discourses highlight his heroism as a warrior and military leader. Others depict him as the embodiment of statehood and an ideal sovereign—a leader and strategist. These discourses also draw on Chinggis Khan to envision a sacred ruler capable of cosmologizing space. Certainly, he is represented as a quintessential cultural hero: from demiurge—the creator of the new (fair) world and humankind—to the creator of writing, as mentioned above. His birth is connected with sky signs and symbols of the Mongol Empire that occupied a significant part of Eurasia. As one article noted:

Flags and arms to a certain extent reflect the condition of the society and state, and, if we were to dig deeper, the phase of ethnogenesis or the degree of ethnic pressure. If we take the era of Chinggis Khan, when a 400,000-person state and army conquered millions of people, or 80 percent of the population and territory of Eurasia. The leader of the Mongols was preoccupied by the idea of establishing a single kingdom where law and justice, freedom of worship, and tolerance would triumph. Probably, therefore, the color of his banner was white, synthetically including all the colors of the rainbow. On a deep, subconscious level, this correlates with the enormous ethnic variety of the empire created by the Mongols.49

In these historical and cultural discourses, increasing importance is given to the correlation of Buryat history with the history of the Mongolian Empire.

The name of Yalbak Khalbai’s book, Chinggis Khan—the Genius, is also symbolic. One of the main features of the historical and cultural discourse on national revival is that it emphasizes that Chinggis Khan belongs to the whole Mongolian world. It emphasizes his merit in uniting the Mongolian tribes, which became the core of the Mongol Empire. “Today the overwhelming majority of researchers are inclined to see Chinggis Khan’s merits in uniting isolated Mongolian clans and tribes into a single whole, a
single state (Ikh Mongol Uls), in putting an end to conflicts between clans and tribes, and in developing Mongolian economy and culture. They also recognize Chinggis Khan as an outstanding statesman and brilliant military leader.”

The globalizing character of Chinggis Khan’s activity is marked in a considerable number of publications that emphasize the great military leader’s conscious steps to transform the world. A professor of philosophy, I. S. Urbanayeva, emphasizes Chinggis Khan’s purposefulness and full realization of his goal: “The great steppe reformer consciously cultivated the Central Asian tradition that he reflected... to provide unity to his world and to introduce order in it, corresponding to the concept of Man and human self-respect.” Urbanaieva further characterizes the Yasa, or collected laws, rules, and words of wisdom, as the mechanism through which Chinggis Khan tried “to return the lost order, to restore the Great Truth... to put people on the right road.”

Referring to the work of Erenzhen Khara-Davan, one of the ideologists of pan-Mongolian cultural revival, S. S. Chagdurov, writes that Chinggis Khan began to think of conquering the world in order “to establish for all Mankind an era of ideal universal order and prosperity when mutual wars will be stopped and conditions for peace and prosperity will be created in the field of spiritual as well as material culture.”

The moral character of Chinggis Khan is emphasized also by the lama M. R. Choibonov:

Chinggis Khan won not for the sake of enjoyment but for the sake of knowledge about people, secrets of the Universe, everyday life, customs, the foundations of different peoples, nations and creations... Chinggis Khan’s Mongols destroyed isolation, the stagnancy of consciousness, religious intolerance, and ethnocentric thinking, and created a new, open Eurasian space and global worldview [planetarnoe mirovozzrenie]... Chinggis Khan is a spiritual teacher, encouraging belief and hope in firmness of the spirit, the clearing of human souls... He is, first of all, a spiritual teacher who taught morality and called on everyone to be fair, spiritually strong, and courageous. The firmness of spirit of the Great Mongol is recognized today as “the Person of the millennium”; his purposefulness, belief in tomorrow, belief in uniting many peoples into
a single whole, in the possibility of their joint residence in different territories from the eastern boundaries of Asia through the center of Europe.\textsuperscript{54}

The globalizing importance of Chinggis Khan is emphasized by the archaeologist and historian B. B. Dashibalov, whose words echo the quotation above, in places verbatim. In our view, such repetition serves the purpose of creating a sense of reality, much as an incantation: “But Chinggis Khan belongs to the whole world. He cannot be only Chinese, Mongolian, Kazakh or Buryat; he was outside of ethnic frameworks. Mongols of the 13th century were carriers of the idea of Eurasianism, they destroyed isolation, stagnation of consciousness, religious intolerance and created open Eurasian space and a planetary worldview. The enormous state of Chinggis Khan existed for more than 200 years because its inhabitants found validity, law and order.”\textsuperscript{55}

The destruction that inevitably results from aggressive wars is interpreted as preparation for the transition to a new stage: “During these intrusions they—the ancestors of our native peoples of the republic [Buryat-Mongols, Khamnigans, Soyots]—not only destroyed countries higher than their own [more civilized settled lands], the centers of civilizations of Iran, China and other Christian, Islamic and Buddhist countries, but also restored everything, erecting on the ruins of what had been destroyed a more effective state and political system, a steadier economy, a more capacious culture.\textsuperscript{56} This allows the author to name the Mongolian Empire the “Golden Age” of the history of humankind. A common topic of such claims is the civilizing function of Chinggis Khan, who is said to have ordered the space of Eurasia: “In conquering peoples, he, first and foremost introduced into the conquered territories order and justice, and forbid robbery of the enemy, under penalty of death.”\textsuperscript{57} Such discourses, we argue, exemplify the mythicization of history—an ideological use of Chinggis Khan aimed at constructing a new cosmos of ethnic space.

Key to the above statements are several basic ideas. The first is the creation of a vast united space, endowed with Eurasian (i.e., global) qualities, under the aegis of an outstanding ruler, that is, the creation of a new world. The boundaries of the core group participating in the creation of this new world are broadly drawn: as \textit{ethnic}—that is, the Mongolian peoples (the Buryats, Mongols, Kalmyks); as \textit{territorial}—that is, peoples occupying
Pribaikalye (Buryat-Mongols, Khamnigans, Soyots); and as *civilizational*—that is, nomadic tribes. This world is characterized with an orderliness (a cosmology) that defines its civilizing function.

As scholars of myth and the invention of tradition have shown, the cosmologization of space begins with its sacralization, that is, the establishment of the sacred center. As scholars of myth and the invention of tradition have shown, the cosmologization of space begins with its sacralization, that is, the establishment of the sacred center. This topic is also widely presented in the historical and cultural discourse of national revival at the end of the twentieth century. First of all, as has been argued above, the center is located in Chinggis Khan himself as “a sacred ancestor.” Khalbayev (Yalbai Khalbai, an active participant of the Buryat revival), argues that a cosmologizing function is also exercised by the name of the shared entity headed by Chinggis Khan—the Mongols—and proves this by his own translation of this ethnic name: “And in translation from Buryat ‘minii gol’ meant ‘my basis or support.’” Certainly, this interpretation is symbolically expressive. Without commenting on its scientific validity, we would like to emphasize the highly semiotic status of the suggested translation—“my basis or support” for the Mongolian word *gol* (i.e., axis mundi) is an explicit expression of the generating center—the hub of the universe from which blessing stems.

Discourses of national-cultural revival also define other markers of the center, the most important of which are territories possessing sacred qualities, such as his birthplace, throne/altar, and burial place. The localization of Chinggis Khan’s birthplace or those of his ancestors in the territory of Buryatia preoccupies many intellectuals. Dashibalov states that “the foremother of Genghisids Alan-Goa was born on the Khori-Tumat land Bargudzhin-Tokum spreading around Baikal.” Representatives of the creative elite outside academia, who are often unsatisfied with scholarly work on this theme, are also active in constructing the Mongolian Empire as their “own” space by placing it in the modern territories inhabited by the Buryats. A member of the Union of Writers of Russia, A. Gatapov, places the birthplace of Alan-Goa (whose youngest son, Bodonchar, was Chinggis Khan’s ancestor), not on the whole territory around Lake Baikal, but in a valley of the Barguzin River—a site with a highly evocative symbolic value, for it is considered the location of origin of the Buryat civilization in ancient times, from where the genetic kinship with the Mongols, and especially with the Golden Clan of Chinggis Khan, stemmed.

Folkloric narratives of Chinggis Khan’s military campaigns and his occupation of the territories of modern Buryats also have a sacralizing effect:
“The folklore in Zakamna reflects in detail Chinggis Khan’s campaigns; the names of the sites Sagaan Morin and Ulekchin are directly connected with Chinggis Khan’s horse and a dog he met on the way.” No one challenges the location of the place where Chinggis Khan was elevated to khan. However, because the throne of Chinggis Khan has special value for the location and preservation of the sacred center of a shared Mongol identity, the legends attributing the throne to natural objects in the territory of Buryatia gain preeminence. The sacred character of the space of the throne is also amplified by its location—at the bottom of the Sayan Mountains, which in themselves were sacred to the Buryats. A specific feature of the “invented ancientness” in these narratives is the absence of a precise boundary between scientific interpretations of the past (undertaken through archival analysis) and modern discourses on it, which are shaped by the ideologically driven political discourses of national-cultural revival.

There are numerous examples of what Hobsbawm titled the “invention of tradition” with respect to the putative ancient connections between Chinggis Khan and the Buryat lands. Much of this occurs as historians, archeologists, anthropologists, and other experts focus extensively on the origin of the Mongols—the territory from which they came, their genetic and cultural roots, the boundaries of their nomadic dispersion and settlement, and the like. What is known is that they first appeared in the territory of present-day Mongolia not earlier (or later) than the ninth and tenth centuries. Specialists in Mongolian history are very careful in all writing about these issues, especially in their use of terminology, because the term Mongol most likely did not exist at that time.

However, for the discourse of ethnopolitical revival, scientific assumptions and discussions are easily swept aside; defenders of the nation find it much more productive to present suppositions as facts. A notable issue is how the contemporary division of the Buryats into geographically distinct regions plays into narratives regarding the origin of the Mongols. The Buryats are divided into Western (Predbaikalskiye) and Eastern (Transbaikalian) communities, and the “Western” version of Mongolian ethnogenesis has become very important in both pan-Mongolian and internal Buryat contexts. Thus, nationalist activists claim that it was the territory of ethnic Buryatia where the legendary land of ancestors of all the Mongols—known as Ergune-Kun—was situated. For example, A. L. Angarkhayev priva-
tizes Chinggis Khan by connecting him with the Buryat lands, arguing that Ergune-Kun is the Irkut River (a main tributary of the Angara, a single river that flows from Lake Baikal). This connection between an ancient name and the familiar river on Buryat lands that enables him to establish the shared quality of Buryat/Mongol “blood and soil.” In contrast, I. S. Urbanayeva connects this historical locality with the valley of the Selenga River, the biggest river in the Republic of Buryatia and the principal source of water flowing into Lake Baikal. It begins in Mongolia and in the poetic vision represents a connection between territories and cultures. For both activist-writers, the landscape is a symbolic canvas for establishing the ancientness of Buryats and their primordial kinship to Mongols—even as their imagined geographies differ.

The journalist C. D. Gomboin continues the process of constructing Buryats’ “own” space through Chinggis Khan’s image. In his narratives, present-day sacred sites are endowed with additional effervescence through imagined historical links with Chinggis Khan’s activities. In the following passage, Gomboin refers to an obo (literally, a hip of stones), which is a sacred place in which believers, Shamanists, Buddhists, and others, perform rituals of worship to the spirits—masters of the locality. An obo can be on the hill, in the valley, in the steppe, in the forest, on the river bank, and so on. It will be clearly visible from some distance. For example, one or more trees on the obo are decorated with many-colored ribbons; all around there are coins, sweets, cigarettes. Having originated in the archaic Pagan (shamanic) cults, the obo has been incorporated into Buddhist practices. According to local traditions, when passing by the obo, one must make a short stop and express his respect to the master of locality. Barisa or Barisan is a synonym of obo. This is a place of worshipping and a kind of sacrifice when people are pouring milk, tea with milk, or alcohol, throw money (banknotes or coins) to the local deity spirit. Gomboin asserts:

At the top of Khamar-Daban there is a well-known place called Chinggis Khan’s obo There is a version that this Obo was constructed under the orders of the Great Emperor in honor of his ancestors Burdun Shino. The recorded legends serve as proof of the validity of the way in which the modeling of space is carried out through traditional markers of the center—obo, serge, and barisan: “From conversations with local residents it was possible
to find out that since olden times, the place has been esteemed as Serge Obo, and the tether is esteemed by Mongol-speaking peoples as a symbol of the family hearth, a native, and ever more broadly—as a clan-based nomadic camp. It is possible to assume that Serge Obo or Chinggis Khan’s Obo was esteemed and is still esteemed as a symbol of clan territories of the Great Khan’s ancestors. Prayers here were led by especially devoted shamans only, and only leaders could be present. In our opinion, these prayers were in observance of the precepts that, according to Chinggis Khan’s will, had to be observed by all Mongolian tribes in Ikh-khörig. I shall add that Chinggis Khan’s Obo itself is located at the top of Khamar-Daban near the mountain Barisan. The name Barisan also specifies the sanctity of these places.”

This text explicitly presents the process of constructing sociocultural space; having begun by ascertaining the existence of the obo as an object created by Chinggis Khan, the author refers to the legend which marks this territory as a symbol of the family hearth. The prevalence of the image of the tether as a symbol of the axis mundi—the center of the world, and the definition of the given territory as a clan-based nomadic camp, allows us to assume that the author in this case locates Chinggis Khan and his ancestors’ native land on Khamar-Daban.

Gomboin has been the most consistent spokesperson for the idea that Chinggis Khan belonged to the ethnic Buryats. Referring to the statement of his grandfather, he insists that Chinggis Khan was both born and buried “on the river Onon near the mountain Delyun-Boldok, in the Yikhe-Aral locality,” situated in the territory of the Aga Buryat Autonomous District (Chita Region). As authoritative evidence of his view, he cites legends that still exist in the Aga Buryat Autonomous District. “From Esukei,... in 1160 on the bank of Onon, a little bit higher than the village Chindat (Shindan), at the bottom of Delyun-Boldok Mountain that is three versts from the Kuchuyev sentry, the great Temuchin, subsequently known under the name Chinggis Khan, was born. According to the legend, Transbaikalia is the native land of Chinggis Khan.”

A remarkable example of the romanticization of Chinggis Khan’s image is the expressive legend about his burial place:
And in 1965 near Delyun-Boldok,… I had a meeting with an easy touch of mysticism. Never before nor afterwards would I meet my interlocutor again, but his story certainly affected my further searches…. I told of my dream to find his [Chinggis Khan’s] burial place, since I surmised that it might be found nearby, on the Onon. At these words, the eyes of the old man sparkled, and with great conviction, he said that I was right in my assumptions. Directly on the sand he outlined something like a map and told me that the commanders brought the Great Khan’s body to Onon and, having constructed a temporary dam, removed the channel of the river. On the naked stone bottom they lowered Chinggis Khan’s body in a sarcophagus made of rock crystal and then again started up the waters of the Onon on the old channel…. We, present-day Buryat-Mongols, are the descendants of Burte-Chino and Goa-maral and we are related to Chinggis Khan no less than other Mongolian-speaking peoples, if not more. I assert that it is exactly here, in ethnic Buryatia, where Yikh-khorig is situated—the Great reserved zone of Mongols of the 13th to 15th centuries.72

Localizing Yikh-khorig in the territory of Buryatia is an important step in the development of the idea of shared “blood and soil.” The burial places of outstanding ancestors (forefathers) are of great importance in the sacralization of space. Ancestors connect all parts of the cosmos in space and time from their position at the center of the cosmological model of the world.

As a result of such spatial constructions, the sacred center of the Mongolian Empire is connected with the territory of Buryatia. Dashibalov, citing for added authority the respected archaeologist Kiselyov, provides an illustrative example of this:

Can we can say that Chinggis Khan was a Buryat? It is necessary to note at once that the Buryat people in today’s form did not exist at that time. There were tribes of Khor-Mongols, Bulagachins (Bulagats), and Keremuchins (Ekherits), which became part of the Buryat ethnicity. These facts permit us to answer the question under discussion affirmatively. Yes, he was a Buryat! “The Secret History of Mongols” begins with listing of ancestors. The foremother of Genghisids Alan-Goa was born on the Khor-Tumat
land Bargudzhin-Tokum that stretched around Baikal. Chinggis Khan’s matrilineal ancestor was Khorilartai-Mergen—*the Khorii Buryat*. Hence, Chinggis Khan was born among Khorii Mongols who had been wandering on the banks of the river Onon since ancient times. The archaeologist and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences S. V. Kiselyov specified the natural border of Deljun-Boldok in Aga as the place of his birth. A similar natural border is also located on the other side of the border in Mongolia, where the Buryats of Khorii origin also reside. These two places are located near each other and the border that divides them didn’t exist before. *Therefore Chinggis Khan can rightfully be named a Buryat.*

Interestingly, as noted above, in the same article Chinggis Khan was described as “outside of ethnic frameworks.”

At one level, elite reflections on the problems of national revival are marked by the absence of concrete programs and policies, and they can be said to suffer from the more general, post-Soviet crisis in the humanities, in which scholars confront the simultaneous strains of economic collapse and the urgent contest to establish appropriate analytic frameworks and theories. Despite these challenges, scholars’ efforts to construct a mythic-symbolic system focused on the past (and specifically, the connection of generations) that promotes ethnic integration are notable. They are undertaking the creation of an *intertexual* cultural meaning system, where continuity is traced over space and time—from the nomadic civilizations of Central Asia to the Mongolian Empire and Chinggis Khan, through the spread of Buddhism, the national movement of the early twentieth century, and the formation of Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic—and all are portrayed as moments of the manifestation of a unitary ethnic identity. Examined from this perspective, we view the production of both scientific and popular materials, including the publications of books and manuals on the Buryat language, literature, history, and culture, as textual symbols reflecting how intellectual elites understand and participate in the formation of an ethnic-based consciousness.

Efforts to establish the historical and cultural unity of the Buryat-Mongols are part of the larger project by Buryat intellectuals to recreate Buryat “traditional culture” and link this primordial entity to the territory
as ethnic and sacred space. This chapter has demonstrated the multiple arenas in which the invention of “traditional culture” serves as a key instrument for Buryat intellectual nationalists’ agendas of political revival. The sacralization of space and symbols of unity at the levels of blood, earth, and spirituality serve to create boundaries of the ethnic community and tie it to the physical landscape. In revitalizing and celebrating the cultural sources repressed by Soviet policies, from the epic Geser to Buddhism and shamanism, to the image of Chinggis Khan, Buryat intellectuals have resituated these images as sites of authenticity within histories that they consider to be mythic. The Soviet past lurks in the background of the Buryat nationalist revival, at once the target of this movement’s efforts and a silent authority offering a blueprint for nationalist reconstruction.

NOTES

1. The Buryats represent a small ethnic group who live in the Buryat Republic and neighboring regions. When we began writing this text, there were three Buryat ethno-political subjects of Russia. But in 2007 and 2008 the Ust’-Orda and Aga Buryat Autonomous Districts were merged with the Irkutsk and Chita regions respectively (the latter became the Zabaikalski Krai) and they lost their autonomous status. At present the Republic of Buryatia is the only Buryat ethno-political region in Russia. The migration of populations throughout the Soviet Union during the twentieth century led to a decrease in the concentration of Buryats in the Republic; in 1923, when the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was founded, Buryats made up 55 percent of the population; by 1989 the figure was only 25 percent. Social structures also changed: a population of city-dwelling Buryats, nonexistent before the 1917 Revolution, had come into being. A large number of factors led to the weakening of social ties and to a broad-based alienation which the economic situation of postperestroika Russia only strengthened. Among these were migration to the cities by more than two-fifths of the Buryats in the Buryat Republic, the creation of a large Buryat diaspora, increasing scientific and technical literacy, exposure to the dehumanizing effects of certain aspects of modern civilization, and accommodation to a multiethnic environment, all of which hastened the transformation of cultural practices.


3. Ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics experienced low-status and faced discrimination as other ethnic groups aimed to push them out of the new ethno-national states. This dangerous tendency was characteristic of Russia throughout the 1990s, though its severity differed in different times and places.


6. Actually, the epic Geser, part of the heritage of the peoples of Central and East Asia, is widely distributed in Tibet, Mongolia, and Buryatia.

8. In contemporary scholarly usage, the accepted spelling is “Chinggis Khan.” See, e.g., David Sneath, ed., Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).


12. As the Buryat poet Chimitov wrote, “In the steppe sea where the grassy wave rustles, / In the steppe sea where boundlessness, rest and deficiency, / White yurta as an island in the sea stands— / The crossroad of external worlds, grassy roads… / It seems to exhale light… / To an island in the steppe sea as if boats, flocks will moor.” G. Chimitov, Slovo o zemle buriatskoi: Stikhi (Ulan-Ude, 1973), 5–6.


14. The term tengrianstvo was proposed by I. S. Urbanayeva in her research works on Buryat shamanism; see I. S. Urbanayeva, Chełovek u Baikala i mir Tsentral’noi Azii (Ulan-Ude, 1995). As currently accepted in ethnological studies, western Buryats belong to the western, or more precisely Indo-Iranian, cultural tradition in combination with Turkic cultural influence; see Skrynnikova T. The historical Roots of two Traditions in the Culture of Mongolian-speaking Peoples. In: Nomads and Use of Pasture today. International Symposium. Ulaanbator, 2000, 111-116. It is for this reason that the common term shamanism does not reflect the entirety of the traditional Buryat religious outlook, which entailed a polytheistic belief with an inner structure and hierarchy. Together with a well-developed hierofania, or manifestations of the sacred in the profane world, in Buryat shamanism one can see the expressed features of the pantheon that was a reflection of the syncretic character of the traditional religious consciousness. As Urbanayeva argues, in the process of Buryat revival, tengrianstvo is to occupy a central position as the national religion, which itself manifests the national spirit and is sufficiently powerful to integrate the nation. Later, when Urbanayeva ceased being a shamanist and entirely devoted herself to Buddhism, she became a protagonist of the idea that Buryats have an inborn Buddhist identity.

15. A. A. Yelayev, Buriatskii narod: stanovlenie, razvitie, samoopredelenie (Moscow, 2000), 308.


17. A. V. Bil’trikova, “Nacional’naya intelligentsiya v processah konsolidacii buryatskogo naroda” (National intelligentsia in processes of consolidation of the Buryat people), in Sovremennoe polozhienie buryatskogo naroda i perspektivy ego razvitiya (Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferenci) (The modern condition of the Buryat People and views on their development (conference papers), ed. Yu. Randalov et al. (Ulan-Ude, 1996), 72–76; the quotations here are on 75.

18. Yelayeva, “Etnichnost’ buriat v postsovetskii period,” 62. These statistics are direct citations from Yelayeva’s paper, and not all exact figures were provided.
19. There are two traditional calendar systems, known in Mongolian as “Lite” and “Zurkhai.” Lite is a Mongolian word for the traditional solar-lunar calendar, which is based on a twelve-year animal circle. Since approximately the thirteenth century, Lite has been officially recognized among most Mongolian-speaking peoples. Transmitted to the Mongols from China via Buddhism, Lite simultaneously marks years with a definite animal (Dog, Pig, Tiger, etc.) and days. The day is divided into 12 double hours, each named in the same way (the hour of the Mouse is from 0 to 2 o’clock; the hour of Bull from 2 to 4 o’clock, etc.) Portraits of this calendar drawn on wood created picturesque forms of artwork.

The second traditional calendar, Zurkhai, is different. Some specialists think that this calendar is an original Mongolian invention. It corresponds more to mathematics and astrology based on astronomy. Special people in the khan’s milieu (zurkhaihid) were responsible for counting time by continuously observing the sky and stars. The calendars they constructed were used to regulate all social and individual practices, enabled one to predict the abilities, character, health, and fate of every person in accordance with the exact time of his or her birth. Zurkhai was also widely used for determining the proper time for weddings, travel, etc. Of course, Buddhist monks (lamas) were and still are great experts in Zurkhai astrology and can give every person a detailed plan of his or her behavior in order to avoid the adverse influence of the stars.


23. Yelayev, Buriatskii narod, 296.

24. T. M. Mikhailov, “Buriatskoe vozrozhdenie i ‘rossiianizatsiya,’” in Problemy istorii i kul’turno-natsional’nogo stroitel’stva v respublike Buriatiya, ed. B. V. Bazarov et al. (Ulan-Ude, 1998), 112–18; the quotation here is on 114.


27. Yelayev, Buriatskii narod, 296.


30. Serge (Сэргэ) (literally: tether) is a post usually 1.7–1.9 meters in height, decorated at the top with a curved ornament. The serge was an object of worship and symbolized well-being and social status of a Buryat and his family. Establishing a serge fixed a man’s rights to a territory; the wooden posts symbolized that this land has an owner. A serge was established only twice in the course of one’s life: on the day of his wedding, and on the day of his death. In the past, a serge stood by every yurt, because “when a serge is standing,
the family is alive.” It was strictly prohibited to destroy a *serge* until it became worthless itself. The use of this tether, with its power to mark ownership of a territory for a family, thus had profound symbolic meaning when used with the banner of the national epic poem of *Geser*: erecting *serges* on the entire territory consecrated it as the land of ancestors and implied the integration of all Buryats. This is notable because the heroic epic *Geser* was only common among western (Predbaikalian) Buryats. Yet the banner of *Geser*, having been carried all over ethnic Buryatia, was made to testify for the one and indivisible Buryat culture. The political context of the festival was also rather transparent; though Buryats reside in three territories of the Russian Federation, the message was that they are still a united nation. “The Procession of the Geser’s Banner throughout the region that had been the territory of the Buryat-Mongol republic from 1923 to 1937, implicitly conveyed the elites’ irredentist expectations. The route where the tethers were placed included these stops: Ust’-Orda, Khor, Yeravna, Kizhinga, the Chita region, Aga, Mukhorshibir, Kiathta area, Gusinoosiorsk, Orongoi, Priibaiakalye, Tunka, Oka.” Ibid., 101.

32. Ibid.
33. *Blut und Bloden*, or “blood and soil,” is a central mythic component through which national identity for an essentialized group of people is built.
37. Ibid., 20–21.
38. Ibid., 4.
39. Until the 1960s, the districts in Buryatia were called *aimaks*. Since then, instead of *aimak*, the Russian word *raion* has been used, although without changes to the administrative structure or boundaries. This is another example of how the pathos of ethnic ideology is aimed at the Mongolization of human-geographical space.
41. All researchers agree that the Buryats shared three linguistic groups of the Altaic family of languages (the Mongol, Turkic and Tungus groups), with the Mongol groups taking the lead. The problem of the appearance of the Buryats on the historical scene is less unanimously agreed upon, and researchers suggest different possibilities. The reasons for this disagreement are to be found, in our opinion, in the fact that certain of the researchers consider the ethnos as a single aboriginal unit, and do not consider the dynamics of the process of ethnic formation. The ethnic name plays an important role in proving the antiquity of the Buryat people, although it may also contain important facts which are not available to contemporary researchers. This is especially true of the ethnic name Buryat (Burut), which is as widely distributed in Mongol-speaking as Turkic-speaking areas.
43. Ibid., 13.
44. Ibid.
45. S. Sh. Chagdurov, ““Zolotoi vek’ v istorii chelovechestva” (“The Golden Age” in the history of mankind), in *Genghiskhan i sud’by narodov Evrazii: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi
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Chagdurov believes that the names of the country and of the people can be male and female. He explains that if there are hard consonants (like b or r) in the name, then a country and nation are male. And if the consonants are soft (m or l), then a nation or country is female. Following this logic, Buryatia is male, the father, and Mongolia is female, the mother. Moreover, Mongolia is the mother because the Buryats originated (were born) from the Mongolian commonness.

At the end of the nineteenth, beginning of the twentieth centuries, the first Buryat national revival emerged based on the idea of pan-Mongolianism and called to restore the political statehood of all Mongols, including Buryats. This movement was a response to the challenge of modernization. A propos, it was supported by the Japanese, who saw in this idea an opportunity to weaken the Manchurians. Among those who saw modernization as posing a serious danger to Buryat traditional mode of life were prominent intellectuals like Ts. Zhamtsarano and E. Rinchino. They scrupulously studied the situation and came to the conclusion that preserving the people required resisting Russification in various spheres. They made up a theoretical basis for pan-Mongolian identity and elaborated something like a program of revival. Among other goals, there were proposals for political and cultural unification with Mongols as the only possible means of preserving their culture. When Soviet power in Buryatia was established, pan-Mongolism was deeply condemned by Lenin as a bourgeois-nationalist movement alongside with pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, etc. Accusations of Pan-Mongolism provided a juridical basis for repressions against Buryat communists in the 1930s, though this movement never took on a political character against the Buryat Bolsheviks. During the later Soviet period, the topic of pan-Mongolism was nearly officially prohibited—even in scientific publications concerning the first third of the twentieth century, there was no mention of pan-Mongolism even in criticism. In the absence of any rational information, the topic was mystified and mythologized. Cultural identity—the principal idea of Buryat revival during post-Soviet period—was taken by ignorant representatives of the mass-media as pan-Mongolism. The sensationalism that they perceived in nationalist discourse led them to revitalize an obsolete label. In our view, the dreams of Buryat leaders of pan-Mongolian unity are no more then just ideological moves. Yet, having been victims of Soviet cliché and influenced by the mass media, even people in power can see challenges in claims to strengthening ties with Mongolia. After all, pan-Mongolism must first of all have sympathy on the side of Mongols. Although in Mongolia at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, one could sometimes could hear discussion about a pan-Mongolian world, this issue completely disappeared in Halkh-Mongolian centrism. Moreover, in the sphere of international affairs, the Mongolian state wants to develop relations with the Russian state, not with Buryatia.


I. S. Urbanayeva, Chelovek u Baikala i mir Tsentral’noi Azii (Ulan-Ude, 1995), 214.
52. Ibid., 206.
53. S. Sh. Chagdurov, “‘Zolotoi vek’ v istorii chelovechestva,” in Genghiskhan i sud’by narodov Evrazii, ed. Kalmykov et al., 48–56; the quotation here is on 50.
54. M. R. Choibonov, “Genghiskhan: Dukhovnyi nastavnik gritadushikh pokolenii,” in Genghiskhan i sud’by narodov Evrazii, ed. Kalmykov et al., 240–46; the quotation here is on 244–45.
59. “A. Makhachkeiev.”
60. Ibid.
62. A. L. Angarkhayev, “‘Prestol Chingishana’ (k voprosu o prarodine mongolov),” in Genghiskhan i sud’by narodov Evrazii, ed. Kalmykov et al., 62–71; the quotation here is on 62.
63. Ibid., 62–63.
64. In the scientific community, the accepted point of view is that the site of Ergune-Kun is hilly terrain in the area of the River Argun.
65. Angarkhayev, “‘Prestol Chingishana,’” 69.
67. Ch. D. Gomboin, “‘Ikh khorig’ zapovednaia zona predkov: Postanovka problemy,” in Genghiskhan i sud’by narodov Evrazii, ed. Kalmykov et al., 545–51; the quotation here is on 548.
68. Ibid., quoting G. Lenkhoboyev.
70. One versta equals to 10,668 kilometers, or 3,500 feet.
72. Ibid., 50.
73. A corresponding member (chlen-korrespondent) is the second-highest rank in the Russian Academy of Sciences.
74. “A. Makhachkeiev.”
Chapter 3: Multiple Museums, Multiple Nations: The Politics of Communal Representation in Post-Soviet Tatarstan

KATHERINE GRANEY

The contributors to this volume have set for themselves a high goal—not only to analyze with some precision the historical and contemporary dynamics of cultural diversity in two vastly different contexts, namely, the former Soviet Union and the United States, but also through this analysis to comment on the likely trajectory of these dynamics, and in the best case even offer some guidance about how to help that trajectory tend less toward violence and domination and more toward increased tolerance and respect among different ethnic groups. Regarding the former Soviet Union, the enormous political and economic transformations of the last twenty years have made these tasks at once both easier and more difficult than they might be for those studying other cases. They are easier, in the sense that since the collapse of communism there has been a virtual explosion of raw data to work with as the various ethnic groups that populate post-Soviet spaces attempt to determine the existence and authenticity of various “nations” within and to assert hegemonic ownership over the new states in which they find themselves located. But they are more difficult, in that the political, economic, and cultural landscape of postcommunism imbues these conflicts over cultural diversity (carried out chiefly in the idiom of nationality and statehood) with a sense of opportunity, threat, and urgency that makes the most-desired outcomes of compromise and mutual tolerance potentially more difficult to achieve.

Nowhere are both the prospects and perils inherent in the process of recalibrating the institutionalized relations of cultural pluralism in the former Soviet Union more visible than in the Republic of Tatarstan, an autonomous area in the Russian Federation whose eponymous Muslim, Turkic-speaking, Tatar ethnic group constitutes a bare 54 percent majority. Since declaring itself to be a “sovereign” republic in August 1990 (with Boris Yeltsin’s blessing), Tatarstan has been engaged in a skillful and
willfully ambiguous campaign to fulfill its declared sovereign status with as many of the political, economic, and symbolic trappings of statehood as it can muster without provoking the type of devastating military response from the Russian center that has resulted in the ongoing tragedy in Chechnya. Though Tatarstan’s largely successful efforts during the Yeltsin era to transform Russian federalism by wresting more political and economic authority from Moscow have received the bulk of attention from scholars in the past, and were recently the most central target of Vladimir Putin’s recentralization campaign, the republic has also engaged in an expansive and sustained cultural and symbolic campaign aimed at fundamentally (and permanently) recasting the terms of the multicultural bargain according to which both Tatarstan itself and the Russian Federation as a whole are governed.

Tatarstan’s endeavor to reshape the landscape of cultural pluralism in post-Soviet Russia, which includes initiatives in the realm of language policy, education policy, religious policy, and textbook and other publishing ventures (especially in the realm of historical scholarship), is an effort to right (and rewrite) what Tatar cultural and political elites see as not just decades but indeed centuries of discriminatory and oppressive “diversity” policies emanating from the Russian center in Moscow. In the Tatar view, cultural pluralism in Russia historically has been conducted in bad faith; has been based on biased, inaccurate, and defamatory interpretations of Tatar (and all other non-Russian) culture and history; and as such has amounted over the years to little else than a catalogue of various pro-Russian and indeed Russifying actions. Whether these aims were quite open and visible, as during the Tsarist era, when the Russian state tended to view its non-Russian populations (particularly the Muslim ones) with the same “civilizing mission” that other Western states applied to their overseas colonies, or whether they were somewhat obfuscated by their subjugation to the Marxist idioms of the Soviet era (when the goal of “civilizing” was replaced with the “historic inevitability” of “modernization” of non-Russians at the hands of the “Great Elder Brother Russian nation”), in the view of Tatar political and cultural elites the cumulative effect of these policies was, by the late 1980s, to have brought the Tatar nation (and other non-Russian ethnicities in Russia) to the brink of cultural collapse and potential extinction. Thus since the declaration of sovereignty in 1990, major policy priorities for Tatar political and cultural elites in the republic have
been remaking the institutions of cultural diversity in Tatarstan in ways that *correct* historical misrepresentations of Tatar history and cultural; *revaluing* previously undervalued aspects of Tatar history and culture; and *claiming* new positions of prominence, authority, and ownership for the ethnic Tatar nation both in Tatarstan itself and in Russia as a whole.

The aims, methods, and consequences of this attempt to reengineer institutions of cultural diversity in postcommunist Tatarstan are uniquely visible in one particular realm: museum policy. As “repositories of knowledge, value and taste that educate, refine or produce” social communities, it is no surprise that museums have become a central focus of state policies regarding cultural diversity in contemporary Tatarstan. This chapter examines the considerable extent to which the government of Tatarstan has inserted itself into the politics of museums in the post-Soviet period, concentrating on three institutions: the Museum of National Culture (MNC), the National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan (NMRT), and the museum complex known officially (if awkwardly) as the State Museum-Preserve “Kazan’ Kremlin” (KK).

Examining the different roles that each of these institutions plays in transforming the landscape of ethnic diversity in post-Soviet Tatarstan reveals that through its patronage of various types of museums, all of which carry some form of “national” designation, the government of Tatarstan is simultaneously promoting two different, and apparently somewhat contradictory, understandings of who the national community is in Tatarstan and thus to whom ownership of the state properly belongs in the republic. One prominent vein of state-sponsored museum activity takes a specifically ethnic view of the national community and thus of Tatarstan’s national museums, arguing that these institutions should be aimed at asserting and displaying the high cultural credentials of the entire ethnic Tatar nation, including that part of it that lives outside the boundaries of Tatarstan (some 3.5 million Tatars live in diaspora in Russia and the former Soviet Union). In these ethnically defined national museums, which include most prominently the MNC, special emphasis is placed on the antiquity and indigenousness of ethnic Tatar civilization; the advanced levels of industry, literacy, and moral development of the Tatar nation; and the uniqueness and sophistication of Tatar decorative, folk, and fine art culture. The goals for the MNC model of an ethnically defined national museum are both to rescue Tatar national culture from centuries of denigration at the hand of
Russian-dominated museums and to assert that the Republic of Tatarstan is the proper political authority to govern this revival for the entire Tatar nation. In this sense, then, the government of Tatarstan is promoting itself openly as the spiritual and cultural, indeed national, homeland first and foremost of all members of the ethnic Tatar nation, whether they live in the republic or in diaspora.

Simultaneously, however, the government also has consciously promoted a much more civic and multiculturalist understanding of who the nation is in Tatarstan, one explicitly identified with the territory of Tatarstan and all the peoples who live in it. These more civic and multiculturalist national museums, which include the NMRT, and to a more significant extent the museums of the KK, offer a highly visible attempt to use museums to assert and display the “fitness” of the political entity known as Tatarstan for modern statehood. For this second type of national museum, the emphasis above all else is on displaying the historic and contemporary “state-forming” capacity of the “multiethnic people” of Tatarstan, who include Russians, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurts, and others along with the eponymous Tatars. However, embedded firmly within this civic multiculturalist national discourse is a discernable echo of the ethnically identified national idea. That is, even in civic, multiculturalist national museums, the ethnic Tatar people do play a “first among equals” role in the story, which is an interesting inversion of the role Russians played during the Soviet-era “friendship of peoples.” Yet overall, in the civic multiculturalist national museums, the aim seems to be less glorifying the ethnic Tatar nation than asserting and helping to secure the right of the Republic of Tatarstan to enjoy an enhanced form of statehood in a renewed system of Russian federalism (a right that Yeltsin bestowed in the 1990s and that the Putin and then Medvedev administrations have sought to revoke).

These seemingly contradictory understandings of the nation being represented in museums in Tatarstan reflect the doubly precarious position of the republic in the post-Soviet era. On the one hand, through its patronage of ethnically defined national museums, the government of Tatarstan hopes not only to rectify past Russian slights and misrepresentations of Tatar history and culture but also to protect the Tatar ethnic nation both from being swallowed up in the newly proximate ocean of global consumer culture and from being subjected again to, if history is any guide, what are sure to be assimilationist and decidedly unmulticulturalist policies on
the part of whatever government should evolve in the post-Soviet Russian Federation. On the other hand, the promotion of civic multiculturalist national museums reflects the almost palpable fear among Tatarstani elites that the gains in political and economic autonomy they have won in the 1990s will be short-lived unless they can convince domestic, Russian, and international audiences that they are “fit” for modern statehood and thus deserve sympathy in their fight against the antifederalist, recentralization campaign Russian federal officials in Moscow have been engaged in since 2000. Thus the assertive museum policy of the Tatarstani government is both an attempt to use the forces of globalization to its advantage by thrusting itself onto the world stage as a player rather than a pawn (by creating “world-class” national museums of both types and making sure international audiences know about these institutions) and to anticipate and defend itself prophylactically against what it (rightly, it turns out) perceives to be the inevitable attempt to reassert ethnic Russian cultural dominance over the entirety of the Russian Federation.

Tatarstan’s actions raise a number of important questions regarding the present and future state of cultural diversity in Tatarstan and the Russian Federation as a whole. The first set of questions concern internal ethnic relations in the republic itself. In its simultaneous promotion of both ethnic and civic understandings of the national community in Tatarstan, has the government found, as it claims, a satisfactory, indeed “model” balance between competing claims that can be useful for other diverse societies to emulate? Are, in fact, roughly equal material and symbolic resources given to both the ethnic and civic multiculturalist types of national museums in Tatarstan? Do the understandings of the nation presented in the two types of museums balance and enhance one another in some way, as is hoped? Or, as detractors claim, are non-Tatars in the republic alienated by the presence of purely ethnic Tatar national museums there? Ultimately, we must ask, do these new museums appear to be increasing civic harmony or exacerbating ethnic tensions in the republic?

The second set of questions concerns cultural diversity in Russia as a whole. Is it true, as Tatarstan asserts, that without its patronage of purely ethnically defined Tatar national museums, there would be virtually no institutionalized or officially supported forms of cultural diversity in the postcommunist Russian Federation, where fully 20 percent of the population is not ethnically Russian? Are Tatarstan’s ethnically defined national
museums, then, the last hope for the “cultural survival” of the ethnic Tatar nation and the first step toward a truly multicultural and diverse Russian Federation, as the republic’s leaders claim? Or, as critics assert, are the eth- nically Tatar national museums in the republic dangerous examples of the “virus of separatism” that threatens to tear the Russian Federation apart?

By means of pursuing preliminary answers to the above, before turn- ing to an examination of museums and museum policy in contemporary Tatarstan, I begin with a brief discussion of why museums are a uniquely attractive and important site for the contestation of ethnic and national identities, both in general and in the post-Soviet world in particular.

MUSEUMS, NATIONS, AND STATES

In his recent review of contemporary museological studies, Randolph Starn asserts that “the newer studies constantly remind us that museums are not neutral. While they collect and conserve, classify and display, research and educate, they also deliver messages and make arguments.” Indeed, far from merely “providing the pleasant refuge from ordinary life” that they were once purported to do, today theorists tend to see museums as “apparatuses of power” where a process of “push and pull” over the representation of “historical, political, and moral relationships” is constantly under way. In the museums in their midst, particularly those that carry a “national” or some other official state designation, communities both “strive for consensus regarding” and “struggle against the imposition of” various definitions of group and community identity. Indeed, the very acts of collection, interpretation, and display in which museums engage are “bound up with assertions about what is central or peripheral, valued or useless, known or to be discovered, essential to identity, or marginal,” in a given community. Therefore museums, which “solidify culture and endow it with a tangibility in a way that few other things do,” are one of the most primary cultural sites where “a society can define itself and present itself publicly.” Influencing museum exhibitions is thus a political consideration of rank importance, as such power means “precisely to control the representation of a community and its highest values and truths,” and moreover, to acquire the ability to “define the relative standing of individuals within that community.”

This process of communal self-definition that takes place in part through museums is in the modern age of course chiefly one of national self-defini-
tion. As theorists such as Benedict Anderson, Carol Duncan, and Martin Prosler have noted, beginning with the “republicanization” of the Louvre after the French Revolution, museums, and in particular so-called national museums and galleries, became the premier spaces where the first modern nation-states could present themselves as “imagined communities,” constructing and presenting their particular nation’s history and culture in a way that clearly “expressed the difference between this one nation and all others.”

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, national museums and galleries such as the Louvre were conceived as virtually sacred spaces, sites where newly created citizens encountered most clearly the virtues of the equally newly formed republican and democratic states that claimed to have authority over them, and where the state, “acting on behalf of the public, [stood] revealed as the keeper of the nation’s spiritual life and the guardian of the most evolved and civilized culture of which the human spirit is capable.”

In addition to establishing the political virtue of the first modern nation-states, patronage of national museums and galleries also helped the state acquire the power to “classify and define” the different groups of peoples making up their national publics. Those groups that found their cultures and histories represented in national museums obviously had their identity as citizens and valued members of the national body politic of the new states “more fully confirmed” than did those who did not find their stories represented there. It is precisely the role of museums in acting as arbiters of “national” prestige, legitimacy, belonging, and ownership though their “collecting, exhibiting, and managing” of cultural diversity in pluralistic societies that makes them such important objects of competition and conflict for ethnic groups in these societies.

Messages about “the nation” that are produced and displayed in museums are not only for domestic consumption, however. In addition to securing legitimacy with their internal subjects, museums can also help states secure their reputations and positions on the international stage. With national museums having been established as de rigueur by France, Britain, and other European nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Europe’s former colonial possessions finally gained statehood in the 1950s and 1960s, they saw state-sponsored museums as ways “both to reinforce and confirm a sense of national identity and to give status within the world community,” things these new states desperately wanted and
needed. Indeed, the norm of the national museum, with its seemingly “transcendental ability to embody the given order of things and firmly embed the nation in it,” has become so entrenched and influential that, as a UNESCO study noted in 1985, “To have no [national] museum in today’s circumstances is to admit that one is below the minimum level of civilization required of a modern state.”

Significantly, Tatarstan’s intense interest in museum policy in the post-Soviet period shows evidence of having been influenced by both these sets of concerns—internally redefining the nation in Tatarstan and using museums to display the Republic of Tatarstan’s fitness as a modern state to the international community. Before embarking on this discussion, however, a brief examination of the state of Tatarstan’s museums during the Soviet era, itself a time of intense cultural engineering, is in order to help gain a fuller appreciation of the transformative nature of the Tatarstani government’s actions since then.

**MUSEUMS IN TATARSTAN DURING THE SOVIET PERIOD**

Upon taking power in 1917, the Bolshevik agenda was “nothing less than that of creating a new society based on a new ideology and its corollaries—new values, rituals, beliefs, social structures, and cultural practices.” Despite the early and short-lived desire of utopian, futurist-inspired activists like Vladimir Mayakovski that the “museum junk” of the Tsarist era be destroyed in order to make way for this new society (“its time for the bullets to pepper museums” went his 1918 poem “It’s Too Early to Rejoice”), more moderate voices seeking to preserve the “glories of the past” in Russia and place them in the service of the new Soviet state and its people ultimately won out. As such, public museums, both those that the Bolsheviks themselves opened (including a network of Lenin memorial museums that numbered at least fifteen scattered across the USSR at one point), and those that were appropriated from the old regime and turned for the first time into “people’s museums,” such as the Hermitage, became key resources in the effort to use cultural institutions to “inspire the Soviet people with optimism, energy, and the conviction of superiority of Soviet culture and Soviet socialism.” As such, museums, like other cultural arts, were well supported by the Soviet government, even in the lean years of the Civil War and World War II.
The more exact aims of the Soviet government’s “political museumizing” varied over its seventy-year existence. In the early years of the Soviet Union, Bolshevik leaders were eager to use museums to display evidence of “progress” brought by the Revolution, particularly among the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Thus in the 1920s, for exhibits at Leningrad’s Ethnographic Museum (which served as the model for exhibits in provincial capital cities like Kazan’ in Tatarstan), the standard “exoticizing” and cultural evolutionist paradigm that graded ethnic groups according to their levels of political, cultural, and economic “civilization” that Russian museums had followed during the Tsarist era (like their European and American counterparts) was replaced by a Marxist-inspired developmentalist paradigm that showed non-Russian peoples such as the Tatars moving, with the help of the Revolution, from the tedium of feudalism, through the even more exploitative “colonial capitalist” era, to the glorious, technology-enhanced Soviet present and radiant Communist future.

With the advent of the Stalinist era, however, messages about the benefits of Soviet-borne modernity and progress for all the peoples of the USSR were replaced by what David Brandenberger calls “national Bolshevism.” This was a form of “Russocentric étatism” aimed at strengthening a sense of Soviet civic identity and patriotism that had three elements: the use of events and personages from Russia’s Tsarist past as mobilizational tools; the creation of a model of Soviet multiculturalism based on the twin ideas of a “Friendship of Peoples” among all the nationalities of the USSR and the understanding that the Russian people was the “elder brother” or “first among equals” in this friendship; and a type of what Brandenberger calls “Stalinist orientalism,” according to which only the Russian people were allowed to “possess a political history of a famous state-building people,” while non-Russians were portrayed in patronizing ways that emphasized their traditionalism, inferiority, and lack of dynamism. The Russocentric aspects of this discourse became even more prominent during World War II, when museums across Russia were directed to stir patriotic fervor and raise morale by staging exhibits centered on great military moments and military leaders from Russia’s past.

Intriguingly, Brandenberger notes that during the dire years of World War II, non-Russians were given a limited freedom to stage museum exhibits and publish works that dealt with “inspiring martial moments” from their own pasts—in the case of the Tatars, this meant celebrations of the
warrior spirit of the Mongol Hordes and the publication of the Mongol warrior epic *Edegei.* However, once victory over the Germans had been secured, this freedom was harshly revoked, and non-Russian historiography and museology were again strictly subordinated to the “central Russocentric narrative” of national Bolshevism. According to Brandenberger, the basic formula Joseph Stalin had devised, which gave ethnic Russians a privileged place within the multiethnic pantheon of peoples that supported Soviet power and who together had secured the great victory of 1941–45, remained largely in place and overwhelmingly dictated cultural trends until the end of the Soviet Union.

Interviews I conducted with museum professionals in Tatarstan in the summer of 2005 indicate that Brandenberger’s conclusions are correct. These former Soviet cultural cadres describe how both art and “cultural-historical” museums in the then–Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were well supported financially (as late as 1988, when the Soviet economy was largely crippled, a huge new Lenin Memorial Museum with an exhibition space of more than 3,000 square meters was built in Kazan’), but were also subject to strict ideological control from party elites in both Moscow and Kazan’. They also recall with visible frustration being allowed only to stage “exhibits by order” (*po zakazy*) of the political elites, and the “stupidity” (*glupost*) of having to mount seemingly endless “anniversary” exhibits celebrating the October Revolution, Lenin’s death, the 1945 victory, the founding of the Tatar Autonomous Socialist Republic, and other important Soviet milestones. As is evidenced by the direction museum policy took after the fall of the USSR, both museum professionals and political elites in Tatarstan were also frustrated and angered by the discursive privileging of ethnic Russians over non-Russian groups in museums and other forms of cultural production during the Soviet era.

**REVIVING THE ETHNIC NATION: THE CREATION OF THE MUSEUM OF NATIONAL CULTURE**

From the moment that the Republic of Tatarstan was born in “sovereign” form on August 30, 1990, ethnic Tatar intellectuals viewed the revival of ethnic Tatar culture and history as a main priority of the new state. In late 1990, a group of ethnic Tatar cultural workers sent the Tatarstani government an appeal in which they called on the state to show its support for
the revival of ethnic Tatar culture through an act that would have both symbolic and material impact—converting the recently completed Lenin Memorial Museum in Kazan’ into a “National Cultural Center” for the republic.31 The Cabinet of Ministers of Tatarstan complied with this request, creating the National Cultural Center “Kazan’” on January 6, 1991. Though quickly “nationalizing” the former Lenin Museum did certainly give the impression of a convincing break with the Communist past, the goals and aims of the new center remained obscure until the following year, when on September 16, 1992, another Tatarstani ministerial decree announced the creation of a “Museum of National Culture” as the centerpiece of the “Kazan’” complex.32

The MNC was the brainchild of those same Tatar intellectuals who had sent the original appeal to the government of Tatarstan about its cultural obligations to the ethnic Tatar nation, and who made more clear just what they felt those obligations were in the “Concept of the Development of Tatar Culture” that was published in a moderate nationalist newspaper in the republic in June 1992.33 According to this influential document, one of the lynchpins of the revival of Tatar culture was the creation of what it called a “national museum,” defined as a museum of a “new type” that would be organized on an ethnic Tatar, not a territorial Tatarstani basis.34 The intellectuals argued that without such a museum to showcase the “highest forms of spiritual and artistic culture of the Tatar people,” Tatars “can’t be considered a civilized nation.” As such, they called on the government to create a “national fund” for the acquisition of the best of Tatar art and artifacts from private and museum collections across the former Soviet Union and the world to form the basis of the new Museum of National Culture.

In the years following the decree creating the MNC, as unease about separatism and non-Russian ethnic nationalism in Russia grew, theorizing about what role this new type of ethnically identified national museum should play in Tatarstan continued. In an interview in October 1993, Tatarstan’s then–minister of culture, Marsel Taishev, tried to calm fears about the ethnic revival in Tatarstan, arguing that this was a “natural process of a people returning to the culture, a process that was not allowed to function normally during the totalitarian period.” He added that opening “new type” museums such as the MNC was a “priority” of the government in aiding this process of revival.35 Later that year, one of the most prominent
ethnic Tatar art historians in Tatarstan, Guzel Suleymanova-Valeeva, further elaborated the conceptual framework underpinning the MNC, arguing that it “must be distinct from all other museums in Tatarstan, such as the State United Museum [later to be renamed the National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan], which remain organized on the principles of Russian imperialism.” Instead, the MNC, under the direct patronage of the government of Tatarstan, must serve to “unify the Tatar nation in all countries” and act as the “cultural center and basis for cultural revival” of the entire Tatar nation, wherever it be located.36

The ethnic aspirations of the MNC have only intensified in the years since its founding. Its assistant director proudly told this author that the MNC has the distinction of being “the first ethnic museum in the whole world,” distinguished from other museums in that it is not the “product of colonial plunder nor the desire for exotica” but rather has been inspired by the lofty goal of “transmitting the contents of the Tatar national soul” to the world.37 She added that the MNC’s great achievement is that it has “attempted to present all components that make up the Tatar people’s culture,” including ethnography, history, decorative arts, linguistics, and “mentality.” It is also unique in that it has “begun to reimagine Tatar history outside the categories the Soviets had used.”38 By the early 2000s, the MNC had refined its organizing principles down to three: accurately presenting the history and culture of the entire Tatar people, including the Siberian, Mishar, and other subethnoses; accurately presenting the ethnocultural history of the Tatar people within its proper place in Turkic, Muslim, and world civilizations; and presenting the best of Tatar fine arts, especially contemporary Tatar art.39

If the conceptual apparatus behind Tatarstan’s MNC has evolved in sophistication and sharpness since 1990, actually realizing this vision of an exclusively ethnically defined national museum in the republic vision has been more of a challenge for its staff. Having to start virtually “from scratch” during the extremely lean first postcommunist years, the MNC staff struggled to mount its first temporary exhibits in 1993, managing to open studies of the prominent nineteenth-century author Gayaz Ishaki and a show of rare Tatar genealogical scrolls from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.40 Plans for the MNC’s permanent installations have been hampered by the difficulty of acquiring artifacts from private collections and other museums, forcing the MNC to rely on reproductions, such as
that of the famous “Kazanskaya Shapka” (a sixteenth-century bejeweled Mongol Khan crown that sits in the Kremlin Armory in Moscow) and on other creative means, such as the set of clay busts of the nineteen Tatar khans who ruled the Kazan’ Khanate in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that the museum commissioned in the mid-1990s. Despite the challenges, by 2004 the MNC’s collection fund had grown from zero to almost 30,000 exemplars, and the museum was gearing up at last to unveil its permanent installations, including a “Hall of Tatar Khans” with a reproduction of a sixteenth-century Mongol-style throne (the MNC administration has also tried supplement its state revenues with such entrepreneurial, but also ethnically inspired, events as holding Tatar pop music disco nights, sponsoring more traditional Tatar song festivals, and renting out the center for conferences).

The government of Tatarstan has continued its initial patronage of the MNC, including most prominently the funding in 1996 of a nearly 200-foot-tall statue on its premises by Moscow-born Tatar sculptor Kamil Zamitov. The statue, called Khurriyat, which means “freedom” in the Tatar language (and which replaced a huge bust of Lenin), is intended to symbolize the rebirth of the Tatar people. More recently, Tatarstani president Mintimer Shaimiyev, who is described by MNC staff as being a frequent visitor and great patron of the MNC, chose the museum to be the site of the prestigious “History of Kazan’” exhibit, which is being mounted in accordance with the 1,000th anniversary of the city in August 2005. “He chose us because we know that Tatars founded Kazan’ and that we’ll present the real history of Kazan’,” an MNC staff member told me in June 2005, two months before the exhibit was to open. The MNC also figures prominently in the international relations of the republic. When Tatarstan hosted the second and third world congresses of Tatars in Kazan’ in 1997 and 2003, the MNC hosted many of the events, and the government makes sure that a visit to the MNC is on the agenda of all foreign delegations (most recently, in the summer of 2005, the MNC hosted part of the European Union–sponsored Days of European Heritage in Kazan’, the logic of which makes one’s head spin).

The decision to invest significant amounts of political and economic capital in what is openly celebrated as the “world’s first ethnic museum” during the uncertain first postcommunist years in Tatarstan, and then to proudly call that museum the “Museum of National Culture” sends a fairly
strong and unambiguous message about which ethnic group makes up “the nation” in Tatarstan, and about whose culture really matters in terms of national prominence and prestige in the republic. Though ethnic Tatar intellectuals and cultural elites, and ethnic Tatars both in Tatarstan and in diaspora, can be pleased with the achievements gained by the MNC over the past fifteen years, one could imagine that the attitudes of non-Tatars in the republic toward the MNC’s ethnic interpretation of the nation might be somewhat more ambivalent. Perhaps in part to preempt these feelings of alienation among non-Tatars, the state has also patronized museums with a more civic multiculturalist understanding of the Tatarstani nations, as is explored in the next section.


Having continuously operated under various names since it first opened in 1895 as the “Kazan’ Municipal Scientific-Industrial Museum,” located in a beautiful nineteenth-century building near the Kazan’ Kremlin, and enjoying a collection of more than 750,000 exemplars, the former State United Museum of Tatarstan was renamed the National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan by the government in 2001, in honor of its “service in the preservation and promotion of the historical legacy of the peoples of the republic.” The NMRT is organized according to the “traditional philosophy of a historical-cultural museum,” and it strives to “reflect the history, culture, traditions and ways of life of all the peoples living the Republic of Tatarstan.” This civic, multicultural, territorial-based understanding of the museum’s mission—which derives directly from its nineteenth-century roots as a strictly municipal, that is, specifically not a national museum—is directly in opposition to and to some extent in competition with the expressly ethnic and national understanding of the MNC’s mission, a point on which the staff members of both institutions agree.

After suffering a devastating fire at the end of the Soviet era in 1987, the then so-named Central Museum of the Tatar Autonomous Socialist Republic underwent a long restoration process, which stalled in the mid-1990s amid the economic and political turmoil of the Yeltsin years. During these years, the cadres of the museum, which from 1991 to 2002 was called
the State United Museum of Tatarstan, felt that their institution was being neglected by the government, and they complained bitterly about this in a letter to the president in July 1996. In response to the letter, which had insinuated that the republican government was “embarrassing” itself by allowing this august institution to languish half-refurbished, starting in the late 1990s the Tatarstani government increased the State United Museum’s funding significantly, and it did so again, by a factor of more than five or six, when the institution finally received its current designation as the National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan in 2001. According to one NMRT staff member, it was the decision to give the museum “national” designation that triggered in the government an attendant desire to see “more professional, modern, European-style” exhibits in the museum, along with the realization that this would not happen without increased funds. According to this source, Tatarstan’s leaders understood, that the specific value of the NMRT for the republic was the very “multinational” nature of its collection, that it “has an incredibly rich collection from all the people’s of the Republic of Tatarstan,” and as such, a renewed and improved NMRT “provided a real opportunity to find a balance here in our exhibits, neither Tatar nationalism or Russian chauvinism.”

The timing of the decision to upgrade the State United Museum to the “national” museum of the Republic of Tatarstan, as opposed to that of the ethnic Tatar nation, suggests that the government was at least in part responding to the unease ethnic Russians in Tatarstan felt about the establishment of the Tatar-oriented MNC some ten years earlier. The upgraded designation and increased funding of the NMRT was, then, a way for Tatarstan to “walk the walk” of cultural diversity that it had pledged to do when it declared sovereignty in the name of “the entire multiethnic people of Tatarstan” in 1990. Because of its earlier relations with the all–Soviet Union set of central museums in the USSR, the NMRT also remained Tatarstan’s closest link with Russia’s federal cultural apparatus. The decision to upgrade the NMRT in 2001 thus also indicates a renewed appreciation for the importance of these ties, and an understanding that the fate of the NMRT also reflected in a real way “on the state of the state” in Tatarstan. Being able to show a modern, professional, multicultural “national” museum fit for a “real” state to the rest of the Russian Federation would be powerful evidence of how successful Tatarstan’s controversial push for sovereignty had in fact been during the 1990s. To a large extent,
the NMRT has come to serve this role as a state symbol—it has become a prominent leader among regional museums in Russia, sponsoring annual conferences on technological and informational innovations for museums, and helping to organize several international exhibits, including “Amazons of the Avant-Garde,” which appeared at the Guggenheim Museums in New York, Berlin, and Bilbao in 1999 and 2000.  

If the government of Tatarstan sees utility in framing the NMRT as a “national” museum fit for a modern, civic, multicultural state (the only kind Russian and international audiences would ever accept Tatarstan as being), the ethnic Tatar intelligentsia loyal to the MNC believe that the NMRT and its director remain firmly rooted in a “Russian imperial mindset” and that the NMRT is unable to see Tatar culture as anything but a “minority culture.” As such, those associated with the ethnic MNC resent the increase of funds given to the NMRT for the promotion of what they see as “Russocentrism.”  

To what extent do these charges ring true? An analysis of the first of the refurbished permanent exhibits of the NMRT, which opened in August 2005 and is devoted to the eighteenth century “on the territory of Tatarstan,” provides some insight. To be sure, the new eighteenth-century exhibit, which is of very high quality and features some new technological innovations, such as interactive maps and computerized informational kiosks, does follow the traditional Russian focus on the tsars and Imperial dealings as the center of history, featuring most prominently relics associated with the visits of both Peter and Catherine to the territory of Tatarstan, including Peter’s saber and official seal and Catherine’s personal china and one of her most fabulous fairytale coaches. 

However, the exhibit also is sensitive to the presence of the territory’s indigenous inhabitants during the eighteenth century, featuring not only examples of Tatar clothing but also special presentations showcasing the high levels of literary, cultural, and religious development among Tatars, with examples of beautiful Islamic calligraphy, other Tatar written documents representing both imperial and domestic correspondence, and fine Tatar jewelry from the period. In this sense, though the primary story is that of how the territory of Tatarstan interacted with the Tsarist government in the eighteenth century (including the stiff resistance to that government put up by Yemelyan Pugachev and his multiethnic followers), the cultural and historical development of the Tatars is certainly a promi-
nent and noticeable thread of that story (e.g., there is no equal display of ethnic Russian or other non-Tatar clothing or religious literature of the period in the display). To this author, at least, the NMRT’s professed effort to achieve “balance” in the presentation of the multiethnic history of Tatarstan is visible in this exhibit.

THE STATE MUSEUM-PRESERVE KAZAN’ KREMLIN

Of all the “national” museum ventures supported by the state of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet period, the State Museum-Preserve of the Kazan’ Kremlin is the most ambitious and most complex. It is the site of the Presidential Palace and presidential administrative offices, of numerous historically significant ruins (some dating back to the fifteenth century), and of several religious buildings, including both the Blagoveschenskii Cathedral, which was built on the ruins of the Kul Sharif mosque after the taking of Kazan’ by Ivan IV in 1552, and the rebuilt Kul Sharif Mosque, which was finished and dedicated in June 2005. In 1994, the entire territory of the Kazan’ Kremlin and all its contents were “museumified” by a series of presidential and ministerial decrees that created the State Museum Preserve of the Kazan’ Kremlin. The stated goals of this new museum complex were to “first, preserve and develop the historical-cultural legacy of the peoples of Tatarstan contained within the Kazan’ Kremlin; second, to restore the Kazan’ Kremlin to a state fit for the historical, cultural, and political-administrative center of the Republic of Tatarstan; and finally, to restore the Kazan’ Kremlin to a state fitting its significance of an object of historical-cultural importance, for the republic, the Russian Federation, and the international community.”

Thus, like the NMRT, but on an even grander scale, the restored Kazan’ Kremlin museum complex is meant to demonstrate to multiple audiences just how well Tatarstan historically has, and currently does, play the role of modern, democratic, multiethnic nation-state. The fact that from 1994 to 1998 the republic worked tirelessly to get the Kazan’ Kremlin listed on UNESCO’s list of World Cultural Heritage Sites, an honor it now relentlessly publicizes both on the Kremlin walls and in all official publications about Kazan’ and the Kremlin, demonstrates clearly how the administration sees the Kazan’ Kremlin museum complex—as the calling card of the modern, cultured, and, indeed, civilized state of Tatarstan.
But what is the nature of this calling card? What stories are told in the new “museumified” Kazan’ Kremlin? Does it, as it claims to, represent the “complicated historical and cultural heritage of all the peoples of Tatarstan” and reflect its history as a product of “the interaction of three great civilizations—Tatar, Russian, and European”? To a significant degree, the answer is yes. The museums and historical buildings that have been restored and newly opened in the KK do reflect this professed creed of civic multiculturalism, though there is a pronounced current of ethnic Tatar pride running through many of the complex’s offerings as well. For example, the Museum of Islamic Culture of the Volga Region that is part of the new Kul Sharif Mosque in the KK is paralleled by a planned Museum of Culture of the Slavic Peoples of the Volga, which is to be opened under the auspices of the Blagoveschenskii Cathedral elsewhere on the territory of the complex. The planned Museum of Silver-Working and Silver Art, devoted to the works of the Kazan’ Tatars of the Kazan’ Khanate period (fifteenth to sixteenth centuries), will be counterbalanced by the planned “Weapons Hall of the Kazan’ Armory” and “Museum of the Garrison of the Kazan’ Kremlin,” whose exhibitions will be devoted to the history of the Russian Imperial Army and its foundry works in the Kremlin during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Accompanying the attempt to present an ethnically balanced and multicultural view of Tatarstan’s cultural history through the museums of the KK is the creation of a prestigious “national gallery” for the Republic of Tatarstan along the lines of the National Portrait Gallery in Washington or the National Gallery in London. According to the conceptual plan for the new National Gallery of the Republic of Tatarstan, the intention is to establish a “unique and unrepeatable” institution, one that will “bear the national character of Tatarstan, distinguishing itself from all the other art museums in Russia.” However, being located in the Kazan’ Kremlin, the “national” character reflected in this gallery is specifically based on a territorial understanding of the national community, and as such, will “reflect the unity of artistic process that have taken place in Tatarstan,” featuring “the best Russian artists who in some way are connected with Kazan’ or Tatarstan,” along with “the history of the development of Tatar decorative arts in Tatarstan.” The main exhibition gallery, on the third floor of the museum space, reflects this civic nationalism, devoting two rooms to Russian artists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, two rooms to
Tatar artists of the Kazan’ Art School, one room to “Tatar people’s decorative arts,” and the rest of the rooms to “the art of Tatarstan during the twentieth century.”

Significantly, some elements of the KK complex also reflect the government’s desire to incorporate residual elements of Soviet patriotism into this new “Tatarstani” civic multicultural nationalism. For example, the second floor of the new National Gallery is devoted to one Tatar artist, Kh. Yakupov, whose works are solidly in the socialist realist vein and do not portray any ethnonationalist elements. Relatedly, one of the most prominent of the new museums on the territory of the KK is the Museum of the Great Fatherland War (World War II), which opened for the sixtieth anniversary of V-E Day in May 2005.

However, within the civic and multicultural fabric of the KK museum complex is woven a prominent thread of ethnic Tatar pride, much akin to the Russocentrism that marked the ostensible “Friendship of Peoples” of the Soviet era. For if the KK represents the historical-cultural legacy of all the peoples of Tatarstan, there is little doubt that the greater part of that legacy is most closely identified with the ethnic Tatar people. This subtle, but clearly discernible, ethnically Tatar bias is present both in the official self-descriptions of the KK museum complex, whose uniqueness is based first on it being “the only intact fortress of the Kazan’ Tatars,” second on it being “the only operational center of Tatar state power in the world,” and only third on it being “the product of cooperation and interaction of many different cultures.” Thus it is perhaps not surprising that in the KK’s planned “Museum of Statehood of the Tatars and Tatarstan,” the entire first floor will be devoted to the history of the Kazan’ Khanate (the last independent Tatar state formation before the coming of the Russians in 1552), whereas the entire second floor will be an exhibit titled “1,000 years of Tatar Statehood.” This museum then seems pointedly to not include any reference to the Russian imperial or Russian Soviet influence on the seemingly purely Tatar-identified state-building history of the republic.

**CONCLUSIONS**

What are we to make of the varied and complex stories of nationality and statehood told by the various “national” museums of the Republic of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet period? According to its (mostly ethnic Tatar)
leaders, Tatarstan has made a unique, and uniquely successful, good-faith effort to fulfill the ethnic Tatar people’s internationally recognized right to cultural self-determination while also providing for equal or at least sufficient symbolic space for Russians and others as members of the national community in the republic (a solution that liberal democratic theorists such as Will Kymlicka and James Tully also propose for multiethnic Canada).

To any who would look at the ethnically based MNC and the Tatarcentric plan for the “Museum of Statehood of Tatars and Tatarstan” in the Kazan’ Kremlin complex and charge the government with fomenting ethnonationalist “Tatarization,” Tatarstan’s leaders would point to the mosque and cathedral standing side by side in the Kazan’ Kremlin, to the twin Muslim and Slavic cultural museums of that complex, to the dazzling Russian imperial relics proudly displayed in the NMRT, and to the works of Russian masters hanging in the National Gallery of the KK. Furthermore, they would ask critics to examine recent political and cultural developments in the Russian Federation itself, such as the decision by the Duma to deny non-Russian republics the right to use a non-Cyrillic alphabet for their native languages (Tatarstan passed a law in 1996 introducing Latin script for the Tatar language in the republic), the attempt by the Duma to introduce an obligatory “Principles of Orthodoxy” class into the Russian federal middle-school curriculum, and the popularity of the film “Russian Ark,” with its openly nostalgic pining for the days of the Tsarist Empire. In light of such attitudes, Tatarstan argues, it simply must play the role of protector of minority cultures such as that of the Tatars, for Moscow certainly will not do so. Thus, they ask, where is the harm if Kazan’ does not openly discriminate against ethnic Russians, does not misrepresent ethnic Russian culture or history, and offers at least some symbolic space for Russians and other non-Tatars to also participate and be recognized as citizens of the national community (or at least one of the national communities) in the Republic of Tatarstan?

And in fact, there has been no real outcry against Tatarstan’s museum policy from Russians or other non-Tatars in the republic. Instead, it seems that post-Soviet citizens in Tatarstan do seem to be able to accept, as the republic’s leaders want them to, that people can and should juggle multiple understandings of “nationhood” and “nationality,” some ethnic and some civic. Rather than asking their citizens to make a stark choice between being members of an ethnic Tatar nation or a civic Tatarstan...
nation, Kazan’s cultural and political elites seem to want to inculcate a more “both/and” understanding of Tatarstan’s national community, one that honors the unique history of the ethnic Tatars (a history that cannot, will not, and perhaps should not be honored adequately by the Russian Federal government), while also recognizing, at least to some degree, the role of Russians and the Russian state in that history. Particularly when it is remembered that ethnic Russians living the republic are by no means prevented from participating in those much more numerous, powerful, and prevalent Russocentric cultural institutions supported by the Russian Federation, the worth of the evolving multicultural regime of Tatarstan’s museums is brought into even greater relief. At a time when cultural institutions across the postcommunist world are suffering from state neglect and public apathy, Tatarstan’s controversial but creative attempt to complicate understandings of the nation through its ambitious museum projects adds a richness to the landscape that can only be applauded.

NOTES

1. According to the October 2002 Census of the Russian Federation, as listed on the Republic of Tatarstan’s official Web site (www.tatar.ru), Tatars constituted 51.3 percent of the population of Tatarstan, and ethnic Russians constituted 41 percent.


12. Duncan, Civilizing Rituals, 26. Duncan notes that by 1825, almost every Western capital had a “national gallery.”
13. Ibid., 21.
19. Ibid., 77–78.
21. Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 78.
25. Ibid., 686, 696, 707.
27. Ibid., 152–53.
28. Ibid., 185–89.
29. Ibid., 185.
30. Ibid., 243–44.
31. The Lenin Memorial Museum—a huge space, with a concert hall / auditorium and exhibition spaces—was completed in 1988.
33. Izvestiya TOTi, no. 8a, June 16–21, 1992. This special issue consists entirely of the “Concept of the Development of Tatar Culture.”
34. Ibid., 4.
42. Vsy Ye Murei Kazani, 2004, 10. The material on entrepreneurial activities is drawn from the author’s interview in Kazan’, October 1996,
43. Author’s interview in Kazan’, June 2005.
44. Author’s interviews in Kazan’, October 1996 and June 2005.
47. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
54. From the multimedia DVD Kazanskii Kreml’ (Kazan’ Kremlin) (Kazan’: ZAO Insait Media, 2005).
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Author’s interview in Kazan’, 2005.
Chapter 4: Peace Building after Violent Conflict in the Caucasus and Beyond: Managing the Symbolic Politics of Ethnic Diversity

STUART J. KAUFMAN

Eastern Europe and the Caucasus became well known internationally for ethnic civil wars in Bosnia, Mountainous Karabagh, and elsewhere in the 1990s, but these regions are not uniquely prone to such conflicts. Indeed, according to one count, there were twenty-five ongoing “armed conflicts for self-determination” in the world in 2004, including the fighting in Chechnya.1 Not included in this total were conflicts such as those in Karabagh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, which were “contained” or frozen but not settled.

Unfortunately, existing alternatives for conflict resolution in disputes like these have a dismal track record, both in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.2 After a decade and a half, for example, the Minsk Group negotiating process established to resolve the Karabagh conflict had still achieved little. Though some studies profess optimism about resolving civil wars in general, there is no existing approach for resolving ethnic civil wars that is both reliably effective and morally acceptable. On the one hand, the military victory of one side can reliably end ethnic wars, but such victories are too often followed by genocide or politicide or, as in Abkhazia, Karabagh, and South Ossetia, the expulsion of the population on the losing side. Compromise settlements, in contrast, remain difficult to achieve, difficult to implement, and usually break down into renewed fighting. The interposition of peacekeeping troops can prevent such renewed fighting but may not lead to resolution of the conflict. In the former Soviet space, where peacekeeping troops are often drawn from parties to the conflict, the peacekeepers themselves are prone to be drawn into fighting, as in South Ossetia in 2008. International security policy is therefore at an impasse: It is essential to find a way to resolve ethnic civil wars like those in the Caucasus, not merely freeze them; but no acceptable means of doing so has been found.
Part of the reason for the failure of conflict resolution efforts lies in the self-interest of the governments involved; Russia, the United States, and other states pursue their own interests, not only the interest of peace, in their mediation and peacemaking efforts. Another part of the problem, however, is that diplomats base their efforts on an inadequate understanding of the driving forces in these conflicts. In political science and economics, as well as in international organizations such as the World Bank and most governments, the dominant understanding of ethnic violence starts from the assumption that human behavior is driven by the rational pursuit of individual self-interest. This approach attributes violent conflict to competition over tangible interests in the context of a lack of mutual trust and a breakdown of institutional order, a combination that generates insecurity. Ethnic identity is considered irrelevant to such dynamics. This logic assumes that both sides in a conflict want peace and are in principle willing to offer compromises to achieve it, if only these problems of mutual trust and institutional order can be overcome. Based implicitly on this logic, official mediators focus on providing ideas and processes; they work to promote communication, organize negotiations, suggest ideas for conflict resolution formulas and the stages of their implementation, and so on. They may also offer carrots and wield sticks to try to make a potential deal more beneficial to both parties, and offer help in building new institutions to overcome disorder.  

In some cases, to overcome the parties’ difficulty in credibly committing to implement the agreement, third parties also commit to guarantee the safety of the parties in civil war for a transitional period while the institutions are being built.  

This mainstream view is attacked by critics on both sides. Hawkish critics from the “realist” tradition of international relations theory point out that the assumption of moderation is frequently misplaced; parties to conflict may well want peace only on their own terms, which often include domination over the rival group. Thus, all too often, the conflicting parties seem unwilling to compromise no matter how creative the mediators may be. These critics, however, have no better answer. Often relying implicitly on the discredited “ancient hatreds” understanding of ethnic conflict, they have little to offer beyond the despairing suggestion to “give war a chance,” wait for a “hurting stalemate,” or accept ethnic cleansing as irreversible and simply to partition the disputed territory. On the other side, conflict resolution practitioners in the academy and in nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) point out that aggressive goals are not immutable. They therefore move forward, creating problem-solving workshops and other interactions between individuals on both sides, finding that well-designed programs can help shift attitudes toward a willingness to compromise. Such initiatives tend to be small scale, however, with little lasting effect. Even the proudest achievement of this approach, the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo agreement, followed hopeful progress with catastrophic failure.

I argue in this chapter that a different way of thinking about ethnic conflict offers a way to build on the strengths of all three approaches, to integrate them into a new paradigm not only for explaining violent ethnic conflicts but also for managing and resolving them. This new approach, symbolic politics theory, is based on the “social-psychological paradigm” of conflict analysis and conflict resolution theory. It recognizes the material conflicts and desire for peace assumed by the rationalist school, but also the hostile attitudes identified by realist critics as well as the genuine progress toward moderating those attitudes that the conflict resolution school can generate. The symbolic politics approach also adds an additional element that the other schools overlook: a way to understand, and to change, the toxic politics within conflicting groups that generates support for hard-line leaders and prevents moderate ones from striking and implementing peace deals. The key to conflict resolution, in this understanding, is to stabilize mass and elite preferences on both sides around attitudes amenable to compromise, and to mobilize a political coalition in favor of it.

Symbolic politics theory starts from the assumption that popular opinion is driven largely by emotion, and emotions about ethnic relations are framed by ethnic myths that can promote hostility toward particular out-groups. In cases of ethnic war, political leaders use emotionally laden symbols to play on such hostile myths and on group fears to arouse popular emotions in support of extremist policies. Those emotionally founded extremist policies, typically aimed at group domination, create a security dilemma relative to other groups—each group defines its security as requiring the other’s insecurity. When this happens, the result is a “symbolic politics trap”: Once a leader has aroused chauvinist emotions to gain or keep power, he and his successors may be unable to calm those emotions later, even if they wish to reverse course and moderate their policies. Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian, for example, faced just this dilemma when pursuing his 1998 peace initiative, and he was ousted from power as a result.
The way to address these problems is with a set of policies collectively known as peace building, which work to address the emotional foundations of hostile political attitudes, and their symbolic expression, to help promote reconciliation. Existing peace-building techniques can be effective at changing the hostile, emotional attitudes of the individuals exposed to them, but they are rarely tried on a large enough scale to replace the symbolic politics supporting war with a new symbolic politics promoting peace. For example, there have been a number of public and private peace-building initiatives involving participants from the parties in conflict in Karabagh, Abkhazia, and elsewhere, but they occur on a very small scale and have little impact on the overall conflicts. In only a few cases around the world have peace-building techniques been attempted on a large scale; in northern Ghana in the early 1990s, for example, a broad-scale application of peace-building techniques apparently succeeded in resolving an ethnic war that involved hundreds of thousands of people and may have killed as many as ten thousand. The argument of this chapter is that effective conflict resolution in cases of large ethnic wars, including Eurasian conflicts such as Karabagh and Abkhazia, would require something never before attempted on such a scale: a comprehensive strategy integrating the logic and practice of peace building with the traditional tools of international mediation and conflict resolution. Unless conflict resolution efforts address the emotional and symbolic roots of ethnic violence as well as the tangible interests at stake, they will continue to be ineffective.

In the rest of this chapter, I explain why I believe this understanding to be accurate. I begin with a discussion of the roots and nature of ethnic identity, a key issue in the debate over ethnic conflict resolution, because assumptions about the nature of ethnicity drive one’s understanding of how ethnic conflict works. Building on social-psychological insights on the role of emotions in driving ethnic war and in making conflict resolution work, I argue that the emotionally based preferences of the parties are the key barrier to reaching compromise settlements of ethnic wars, and one of the key barriers to implementing them. Because sufficiently hostile attitudes destroy institutions for regulating conflict, institutions can only be sustained if preferences allow. I then present evidence that peace-building programs are capable of changing attitudes and preferences, and have played an important role in resolving some civil wars. I conclude by suggesting that a strategy integrating a comprehensive program of peace
building into existing conflict resolution policies is the best way of improving on the abysmal performance of past efforts, in the conflicts in the Caucasus and elsewhere.

UNDERSTANDINGS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

Current conflict resolution practice is inadequate in large part because it applies the tools for the resolution of international conflict to the quite different problem of internal ethnic conflict. The trouble is that nonstate ethnic groups are not the same sort of entity as are states, and they behave differently. Ethnic groups act as collections of politically mobilized individuals; states, in contrast, are collections of institutions usually able to control the political mobilization of their populations. Interstate peace agreements can be meaningful because their negotiators typically have the institutional machinery to implement them. Warring ethnic groups—especially rebel ones—often lack those institutions. Thus assuming that warring ethnic groups can be treated like warring states assumes away two of the key problems of ethnic conflict resolution: mobilizing group members for peace instead of war; and building institutions that can stabilize the new, peaceful relationship. In the case of frozen conflicts like Karabagh and Abkhazia, the key actors all have de facto governments (some internationally recognized; others not), but the separatist regimes are premised on their demands for independence, so they represent the institutionalization of mobilization for conflict, not peace.

Understanding how to mobilize ethnic groups for peace instead of confrontation requires first understanding the nature of ethnic identity, and how this identity contributes to political mobilization. These issues are highly contested in the political science literature on ethnic conflict. A few works, such as the journalist Robert Kaplan’s influential Balkan Ghosts, largely accept the “primordialist” claims of parties to ethnic conflict that the groups are age-old “primordial” communities bound together by blood ties and locked in enduring violent conflict characterized by ancient hatreds. Works like Kaplan’s can themselves therefore be labeled “primordialist.”

Confusingly, however, political scientists often apply the label “primordialist” (or sometimes “essentialist”) to any work that emphasizes the practical importance of primordialist actors’ claims—even if the scholar
emphasizes that these claims are inaccurate. For example, scholars in the social-psychological school who emphasize the psychological power of ethnic attachments, the in-group/out-group psychology that drives ethnic communities apart, or the emotions that can be stirred by appeals to alleged primordial blood ties, are themselves branded “primordialists” or “essentialists.” Likewise, Clifford Geertz is frequently quoted as having written about “primordial attachments” based on the “‘givens’ of social existence,” and is therefore also labeled a “primordialist.” In fact, Geertz makes clear that “as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, [a primordial attachment is based on] the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence” (italics added). Anthropologists thus rightly see Geertz as a founder of the approach of symbolic anthropology, emphasizing the importance of symbols, meanings, and interpretations in defining group identity. But to political scientists, he is a founder of the “primordialist” school.

What these so-called primordialist understandings primarily have in common is that they take seriously the importance of the ethnic bond as something beyond a common material interest. The competing view in contemporary political science—the “instrumentalist” view—is that ethnic identity does not have much independent significance outside its instrumental use by political entrepreneurs trying to mobilize supporters in pursuit of purely tangible goods such as economic benefits or political power. Ethnicity itself, in this account, is little more than individuals’ choice of a preferred language, which is made on purely instrumental grounds. Violent ethnic conflicts, it is asserted, do not really exist; they are actually conflicts over wealth or power—like Africa’s conflicts over “blood diamonds”—to which ethnic motivations are falsely asserted by propagandists or erroneously inferred by outsiders. The causes of all civil wars in this view are the same—weak states confronted not by public grievances but by private greed—and ethnicity is irrelevant. 

Ironically, both these understandings of ethnic identity are easily synthesized into a third approach, labeled “constructivism.” Combining the three is very useful: if the puzzle of ethnicity is why it is so powerful and so widespread a political force, the best explanation is that all three schools of thought about it are correct in identifying powerful forces that drive it. The contribution of the “primordial” (i.e., social-psychological and symbolic anthropological) approach is to note the emotional power of ethnic attachment, which comes from the appeal of ethnicity to a kinlike
relationship that forms a group whose status is important for individuals’ honor or self-esteem. The instrumentalist account adds two other insights. First, material interests such as land and economic goods, and language rights actually are also often at stake in ethnic conflicts. Second, ethnic identity is a useful tool for elites to use for mobilizing people in pursuit of their own personal interests. Constructivists, finally, point out that the meaning of an ethnic identity—who is included in the group, what its values are, and so on—is a set of ideas, stories, and historical interpretations developed by intellectuals, who therefore “construct” ethnic identity.

This constructivist point is actually conceded by both “primordialists” and instrumentalists, forming the basis of the constructivist-led synthesis. As noted above, Geertz emphasizes that ethnic identity is the result of cultural interpretations that change over time, a point also conceded by the social-psychological school. Similarly, the leading instrumentalists James Fearon and David Laitin agree that instrumentalists’ theories “are all constructivist in the sense that they posit the content and boundaries of ethnic groups as produced and reproduced by specific social processes. This understanding defines a useful middle ground on the question of how malleable ethnic identity is: Though intellectuals can creatively reinterpret history and culture to “construct” ethnic identity, or to use it instrumentally, they cannot stray too far from existing beliefs, real group needs, and the influence of relevant social structures or they will fail. National identities with weak cultural roots do not survive, even if, as in the case of the Yugoslav and Soviet national identities, they are promoted by powerful state apparatuses.

The social-psychological and symbolist approaches would include in this synthesis the insight that any specific ethnic identity is the result of a particular kind of social construction—one that symbolically equates ethnic identity with the family, hence the “motherland” and “fatherland” symbols commonly used by nationalists. This “kinship to kinship” gives ethnicity its “primordial” emotional charge. Relatedly, Anthony Smith argues that the core of an ethnic identity is a “myth-symbol complex,” a combination of myths, memories, values, and symbols that define not only who is a member of the group but also what it means to be a member. Thus ethnic symbolism is at the heart of this conception; the existence, status, and security of the group depends on the status of group symbols, which is why people are willing to fight and die for them—and why they are will-
ing to follow leaders who manipulate those symbols for selfish goals. At the same time, for the symbols to be effective, they usually must also refer to tangible interests (defined in ethnic terms), which is the key instrumentalist insight.

**THE EMOTIONAL AND SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF ETHNIC WAR**

In the international relations literature, the most prominent argument about how ethnic war occurs is the instrumentalist-rationalist argument focusing on the roles of ethnic fears and of the security dilemma. This account argues that ethnic wars are the result of state breakdown. According to Barry Posen’s influential view:

> In areas such as the former... Yugoslavia, “sovereigns” have disappeared. They leave in their wake a host of groups... [that] must pay attention to... the problem of security.... [Thus], there will be competition for the key to security—power. The... competing entities... begin to threaten others. Those threatened will respond in turn.... This is the security dilemma: What one does to enhance one’s own security causes reaction that, in the end, can make one less secure.²³

A wide array of instrumentalist and rationalist arguments add nuance and detail to this argument. Some focus on the pivotal role of ethnic elites in mobilizing their groups for violence.²⁴ Others note the role and importance of information failures and commitment problems in making ethnic accommodation difficult to achieve.²⁵

There are several problems with this argument, however. First, near anarchy in ethnically diverse states is common, while ethnic wars are rare.²⁶ Second, a number of studies convincingly show that in many cases, factors such as “predatory elites,” “mass hostility,” and “status concerns,” not just security concerns, were crucial in causing the outbreak of ethnic wars in cases ranging from Karabagh and Abkhazia to Rwanda and Sri Lanka.²⁷ Indeed, in some cases there was no evidence of emerging anarchy before the outbreak of ethnic violence. Pure security dilemmas, therefore, do not by themselves cause ethnic wars. Furthermore, the assumption that the key cause of ethnic war is the security dilemma is precisely the logic...
scholars use to conclude that commitment problems are “the critical barrier to conflict resolution,” and that the answer is third-party enforcement— even though such enforcement very rarely works. The conclusion is inescapable that an effective conflict resolution approach must be based on a broader understanding of the causes of ethnic war, including the sources and possible alteration of “mass hostility,” “status concerns,” and “predatory elites.”

A growing body of work on the emotional and symbolic sources of ethnic violence provides a compelling and useful way of understanding these problems. In an impressive application of psychological theory, Roger Petersen shows that a number of distinct emotional mechanisms contribute to ethnic violence. The most important of these, he finds, is status resentment: Groups sometimes resort to violence to reduce the status of groups seen as higher in social status, but undeservedly so. Such violence sometimes takes place in the absence or near absence of any sort of leadership or elite mobilization. The key role of emotions, Petersen argues, is to change preferences and priorities away from tangible interests like economic prosperity and toward satisfaction of emotional resentments. Though institutional breakdown is critical in providing the opportunity for ethnic violence, he finds, the motivation and target are determined by emotions, most often resentment.

Symbolic politics theory explores the sources of these emotions and how they can be used politically. Hostile emotions such as hatred and resentment tend to have roots in preexisting ethnic myths justifying hostility against the ethnic out-group—that is, in the very “myth-symbol complex” that defines an ethnic group’s identity. These myths often involve what Vamik Volkan calls “chosen traumas,… the collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors,” defining the group as a victim which must seek security or revenge. They also generate emotionally laden symbols (e.g., flags and historical heroes and events) that politicians can manipulate to evoke certain emotions—loyalty to the in-group, or hostility and fear toward the out-group. In cases of ethnic war, these hostile myths are reinforced by fears (often exaggerated) of group extinction on at least one side in the conflict.

In this account, when political opportunity arises, leaders or would-be leaders can use group symbols to evoke hostile feelings and exacerbate fear. They use the hostility and fear, in turn, to justify extremist or predatory
policies; and they justify their own quest for power in terms of their “defense” of their people’s status and security. For example, Armenian nationalist mythology generalizes the experience of the 1915 genocide to suggest that all Turks, including Azerbaijani Turks, are potentially genocidal. In the late 1980s, nationalist leaders drew on the symbolism of the 1915 genocide to refer to Azerbaijani discrimination against Armenians in Karabagh as “white genocide” or “cultural genocide,” defining concrete issues of education, jobs, and cultural monuments in terms of an implied existential threat. It is the interaction of these hostile myths and symbols with existential fear, stirred by symbol-manipulating elites, that escalates mass hostility, driving ethnic mobilization and creating ethnic security dilemmas that lead to war. This symbolic politics process also contributed to Georgians’ conflicts with their Abkhaz and South Ossetian minorities, and also to the conflicts in Chechnya and Transnistria. Similar arguments are made by Francis Deng for the conflict in Sudan, Gerard Prunier for Rwanda, Bruce Kapferer for Sri Lanka, and Peter Gowing for the Moro conflict in the Philippines. Mythically based symbolic politics is a typical, not exceptional, driver of ethnic warfare.

Herbert Kelman explains the psychology of ethnic or nationalist symbolism as follows:

The display of national symbols evokes a strong emotional reaction,… which often translates into automatic endorsement of the policies and actions the leadership defines as necessary. When leaders invoke national security and national survival as the issues at stake in the conflict, people are often prepared to make enormous sacrifices that cannot be entirely understood in terms of rational calculations of costs and benefits. The nation generates such powerful identifications and loyalties because it brings together two central psychological dispositions: the needs for self-protection and self-transcendence.

Stated somewhat differently, symbols are so potent because they have both cognitive effects—they frame an issue—and emotional effects. Ethnicity is a rich resource for politicians engaged in symbolic politics because it is so emotionally laden. Ethnic groups by definition have a shared history—and therefore historical heroes—that can be evoked, and a belief
in shared descent that allows claims of kinship; most have flags or other graphic symbols, and so on. Furthermore, the threatened ethnic symbol—for example, the appeal to “defend the flag”—can be used to tap a number of values and emotions simultaneously: to evoke fellow-feeling among those in the in-group, shared feelings of superiority over the out-group and of threat from it, a desire to contribute to something greater than oneself (“self-transcendence”), and a perception of interests at stake. According to Murray Edelman’s classic *Politics as Symbolic Action*, the basic function of any political symbol is to create around conflicts of interest a myth of struggle against “hostile, alien, or subhuman forces” as a way to mobilize support.36

Again, the conflict over Mountainous Karabagh illustrates how the symbolic politics process works to produce ethnic war. If Armenian nationalist mythology identifies the Armenians as a martyr nation repeatedly victimized by Turks, Azerbaijani myths identify Armenians as perennial troublemakers, and Azerbaijani territorial integrity as essential to national survival. The struggle over the territory of Mountainous Karabagh was thus quickly defined on both sides in absolute terms, in which the status and security of each group was defined as requiring the subordination of the other, with national destruction at stake in case of defeat. Rabblerousers on both sides played on symbols such as the fear of “genocide” to arouse hostile emotions, sparking massive violence and widespread ethnic cleansing even before they came to power, and before there was any other evidence of incipient anarchy in the region, or in the Soviet Union generally. Thus in this case, mythically based fears and hostility caused a security dilemma, which in turn created anarchy: the simple structural pattern of anarchy causing insecurity was reversed.37

The fighting in South Ossetia in 1991 followed a similar pattern. According to Georgian nationalist mythology, the very name “South Ossetia” is illegitimate; the Ossetians are, rather, newcomers to a region that should be called “Inner Kartli,” a part of the ethnic Georgian heartland. On the basis of this hostile nationalist mythology, Georgian nationalist leaders between 1989 and 1991 imposed a language law that discriminated against speakers of Ossetian, organized violent protests in South Ossetia advocating the expulsion of Ossetians, barred regionally based parties from participating in Georgian parliamentary elections, and then legally abolished South Ossetian autonomy. Faced with this array of threats, the South Ossetians responded with a bid to secede from Georgia; the Georgians answered with
an attempt to suppress South Ossetia by force. Soviet troops, later labeled Russian “peacekeepers,” blocked that effort, confirming in Georgian eyes the image of Russia as an enemy bent on the domination of Georgia.\(^{38}\)

Kelman, in a series of works outlining the social–psychological basis of ethnic violence, offers a similar theoretical account.\(^{39}\) He argues that international and interethnic conflict are driven by collective needs, such as the needs for security, identity, and recognition, and by existential fears. The fears generate escalatory norms and hostile group images that create an intersocietal process of conflict escalation, and the mobilization of group loyalties in defense of the group identity. The key point he makes is about conflict as an intersocietal process; to him and like-minded theorists, conflicts are hostile relationships between whole groups or societies, not just leaders or armies. Thus the social–psychological and symbolist arguments are mutually reinforcing: the psychological power of ethnic myths comes from the hostile images they justify, and ethnic symbols are what politicians use to harness hostile norms. Both understandings also emphasize the importance of existential fears.

**HOSTILE ATTITUDES AS A BARRIER TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

On the basis of this understanding of the nature of ethnic conflict, Herbert Kelman argues, it follows that hostile norms and images—or, in my terms, attitudes—among ethnic groups are a key barrier to the resolution of ethnic war. Furthermore, as Chaim Kaufmann argues, the conduct of ethnic war hardens these attitudes.\(^{40}\) Massacres suffered and battles fought—whether won or lost—provide new myths and symbols to be used in furthering the demonization of the enemy that justifies the continuation of fighting. Those experiences can so change public opinion that the idea of a compromise peace loses credibility, and those who propose it are widely denounced as cowards or traitors. For these reasons, Kelman characterizes these conflicts as having an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic.

Given that escalatory dynamic, elites who exploit nationalist symbols to gain or keep power and to justify extremist policies often have trouble later if they want to reverse those policies. This is the symbolic politics trap. Its operation is illustrated by the fate of the Karabagh peace process in the late 1990s. In 1998, Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian, the nationalist
hero who had led his country to independence a few years before, endorsed an international proposal for a compromise settlement of the Karabakh conflict. His nationalist credentials availed him nothing; the agreement was attacked as a betrayal, and Ter-Petrosian was quickly ousted and replaced by Robert Kocharian, the hard-line former leader of Mountainous Karabakh.\textsuperscript{41} Ironically, Kocharian also quickly recognized Armenia’s desperate need for a resolution of the conflict, so in 1999 he began a series of one-to-one meetings with the Azerbaijani leader Heidar Aliyev in an attempt to find a resolution. However, because Kocharian’s political base was in Mountainous Karabakh rather than Armenia proper, he had to rely for political cover on the support of his premier, the war hero and former defense minister Vazgen Sarkisian. When Sarkisian was assassinated in October 1999 by a group of political extremists protesting corruption in Armenia, Kocharian found himself too weak politically to pursue the opportunity, and no agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{42}

The collapse of the Khasavyurt peace agreement for Chechnya in the late 1990s illustrates how, in the context of the symbolic politics trap, supporters of violence can easily win out over advocates of reconciliation. Chechen hostility to Russians was already deeply embedded in the national psyche, associated especially with the mythology surrounding Imam Shamil, the leader of the mid–nineteenth-century Chechen resistance to Russia.\textsuperscript{43} This hostility was of course reinforced by the first round of Russian-Chechen warfare in 1994–96, and indeed the moderate Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya in 1997 as one of the victorious heroes of that war. Thus, though the extremist Shamil Basayev was initially reviled by ordinary Chechens for provoking the Russians in 1999, he gained legitimacy as a leader of the resistance—sidelining the moderate Maskhadov and his peace policy—once the Russians counterattacked.\textsuperscript{44} On the Russian side, similarly, “racial hatred of the ‘Chechen bandits’ does appear to have played its part in the Russian decision to intervene” in the mid-1990s,\textsuperscript{45} and this attitude was only strengthened by a desire for revenge after the 1996 defeat. In this context, then–Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin reaped great popularity by blaming Chechnya for several terrorist bombings in Moscow in 1999 (which were apparently carried out by other groups), and then relaunching the war in Chechnya in retaliation.\textsuperscript{46}

The renewal of fighting in South Ossetia in August 2008 also illustrates the symbolic politics trap. Georgia lacks the capability to reassert
control over either South Ossetia or Abkhazia, due mostly to Russian support for those separatist regions. After the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by most of the West, it should have been clear that both South Ossetia and Abkhazia would ultimately achieve independence as well. And given the fierce hostility to Georgian rule in both regions—and these regions’ preference for Russian protection—it had long since stopped being in Georgia’s interest to try to reassert its control by force. Georgia would by then have done better to establish new international borders along lines it could control, ideally exchanging de jure recognition of the regions’ independence for control over portions of the disputed territories, such as Abkhazia’s Gali District, that were formerly inhabited overwhelmingly by ethnic Georgians. Indeed, once it had internationally recognized borders, Georgia would even be eligible to improve its security against Russia by joining NATO.

Such a course is, however, politically and psychologically impossible for Georgian politicians. Georgian myths about South Ossetia’s status as part of the Georgian heartland and about the “migrant” status of ethnic Ossetians deny any sort of legitimacy to the South Ossetian cause. Abkhazia, similarly, is considered inalienable Georgian territory, whereas Russia is traditionally viewed as an unalterably hostile aggressor, to which no concessions can be offered. President Mikheil Saakashvili, furthermore, initially came to power on a platform of reunifying Georgian territory. Therefore, it was unthinkable to Saakashvili to consider acquiescing to the loss of any of the separatist territory; defiance of the Russian bear, no matter how hopeless and costly, was his only politically viable option, so he initiated the fighting with a wholly inadequate army, even though it might well have resulted in Russia’s occupation of Tbilisi itself. Georgia has lost the reality of sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it would rather fight than concede the symbolism of it.

The psychological dynamics that create the symbolic politics trap are aptly explained by Kelman:

In principle, group loyalties should be just as available to mobilize support for policies that entail risks for the sake of peace as for aggressive policies that entail risks of war. In practice, however, the dynamics of intense conflict generally favor efforts to mobilize support for intransient, hostile actions. An appeal to defend
the nation against an imminent attack is more compelling than an appeal to seize a promising opportunity. This phenomenon represents a special case of the central observation of prospect theory:.... People tend to be risk-acceptant to avoid losses and risk-averse to achieve gains.... Proposals for conciliatory actions, even if they are in one’s own interest, may [also] offend nationalist thinking simply because they are seen as extending some benefits to the enemy.48

To be sure, this hard-line public opinion in all three conflicts mentioned above is also sustained in large part by organizations, from the Yerkrapah union of Armenian veterans—the late Premier Sarkisian’s old power base—to Georgian refugee groups and Chechen criminal and terrorist organizations. This social and organizational component of the problem does not, however, mean that the attitudinal dimension is unimportant; it just means that attitudes are harder to change because of the social context.

THE LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY OF PREFERENCE CHANGE

The symbolist argument identifies myths justifying hostility, fears of group extinction, and a resulting symbolic politics mobilizing people for conflict as the key driving forces of ethnic war. Conflict resolution therefore requires changing those factors. Herbert Kelman notes that what underlies fear of extinction is often conflicting groups’ refusal to acknowledge any legitimacy in their opponent’s claims. For example, Azerbaijani claims that Armenians are newcomers to a historically Azerbaijani Mountainous Karabagh, and countervailing Armenian claims that Karabagh is traditionally Armenian land that was illegitimately attached to Azerbaijan, are perceived—rightly—as a refusal by each side to grant legitimacy to the other’s claims. Knowledge of the other side’s rejectionism leads each side to fear that the other aims ultimately at their annihilation.

The rejectionism, furthermore, is not merely tactical or aggressive; it is also part of each side’s identity, as defined by their ethnic or nationalist mythology. Ethnic fears are thus caused directly by ethnic myths. Armenians, again, frame their national history around the 1915 genocide, projecting that real event back in time to conjure a myth of repeated efforts by Turks to exterminate Armenians. Any undesirable Azerbaijani policy or relative gain can therefore be framed the same way: The removal of Armenian
historical sites in Karabagh was called “cultural genocide,” and the demographic decline of Armenians there was “white genocide.” Adopting this psycho-logic in the group mythology justifies hostility against the out-group: Because “their” attitude is irremediably hostile, “they” can be written off as mere mindless aggressors—and any compromise takes on the odium of appeasement that is at best groundless and at worst cowardly.

Quoting John Burton, however, Kelman points to a source of hope: The psychological needs driving identity conflicts—especially the needs for identity, security, and recognition—are not zero-sum, and can be improved through efforts at reassurance. For example, if insecurity in the Armenian-Azerbijani conflict is exacerbated by each side’s refusal to recognize the other’s concerns, simple verbal acknowledgments of those concerns can make an enormous difference in reassuring the other at no tangible cost; an exchange of such acknowledgments would therefore be low-risk and positive-sum in nature. Similarly, symbolic gestures implying recognition or acknowledgment—Kelman cites the example of Sadat simply shaking hands with Israeli interlocutors—or confidence-building measures that are responsive to the other’s concerns, can also be important in reassuring the other side at relatively low cost. Such actions can also create a symbolic idiom that can be reused to reassure the adversary of one’s benign intentions, while also demonstrating to one’s own constituents the humanity of the adversary and the possibility of coexistence. When U.S.-Soviet summits became routine and boring to the public, for example, their very banality demonstrated that the tensions in the relationship were manageable. Their recurrence also undermined the myths justifying mutual hostility, showing each side that the other was not unconditionally hostile.

In a recent study, William Long and Peter Brecke go beyond the call for reassurance to offer a social-psychologically based “forgiveness model.” The model includes four key elements. First, in agreement with Kelman, they argue for the necessity of acknowledgment or “truth-telling” to make reconciliation possible; each side must acknowledge the harm it did to the other. Second, the sides must forgive—that is, each side must change its understanding of its own identity and that of its adversary, so that it sees itself not as a victim (and the adversary as the victimizer) but in terms of more positive identities. Forgiveness thus includes the element of rethinking the ethnic myths on which group identity is based. Third, the sides must give up on the hope of retribution or complete justice and settle for
“partial justice,” especially with regard to punishment of criminals and victimizers—in short, they must accept a compromise. Finally, the parties must agree to build a new, more positive relationship. Though the points are slightly recast, the logic is closely similar to Kelman’s.

Further, Long and Brecke’s evidence shows that reconciliation along these lines is effective in promoting successful civil war resolution. They study ten cases of civil war settlements—three failures and seven successes. In all seven of the successful cases, the four desiderata of forgiveness were present: public truth telling (i.e., acknowledgment), partial justice, redefinition of social identities, and a call for a new relationship. In all three of the unsuccessful cases, in contrast, the first three of these desiderata were absent or partially absent. Thus every settlement in which the parties worked at reconciliation succeeded, while every settlement that did not aim at reconciliation failed. To be sure, most of the successful cases in the Long and Brecke study involve settlements of South American civil wars that were not ethnic conflicts, but they also include the South African (racial conflict) case and the case of Mozambique (which included ethnic elements). This is not proof of success in ethnic war, but it is suggestive.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR ETHNIC WAR: USUAL AND UNUSUAL TOOLS

The argument so far has made two points: reconciliation, including changes in myths and attitudes, is necessary; and it is possible. The necessary next step is to explain how it can be done.

Some parts of the puzzle are already well understood. In Michael Lund’s comprehensive listing of conflict resolution and peace-building tools, many are widely accepted and widely employed. Four of his broad categories of interventions are “official diplomacy” (primarily different forms of mediation), “military measures,” “economic and social measures,” and “political development and governance measures.” All these are compatible with the logic outlined above. Precisely because of the attitudinal barrier that diplomats often underrate, mediators are often indispensable, as a channel of communications, a source of advice, or provider of reconstruction aid to make peace more attractive. Third parties can act as peacekeepers or observers to help maintain cease-fires and verify the implementation of any agreement, ameliorating commitment problems. They can provide eco-
nomic aid as “sweeteners” to make a settlement more attractive, and they can help build institutions to stabilize peace.

These standard tools, however, though important, are not sufficient. None of them acts directly to alter the political processes inside each group that justify its insistence on extremist goals—the prejudices, the flag-waving extremist leaders, violent propaganda, and so on. These are the rocks on which diplomatic efforts so often founder, and diplomacy cannot remove or avoid them. Leaders who take steps toward compromise are charged by opponents with selling out, while the public is reminded of the other side’s atrocities and perfidies (real or alleged), and the media resonate to the emotional charges. Among the many reasons why ethnic wars are more often settled by military victory than by negotiations, this problem is one of the chief ones. It also helps explain why negotiated settlements that are reached so often collapse into renewed fighting.²⁵⁴

Getting the parties to ethnic wars to agree to a settlement, and getting that settlement to stick, therefore require changes in the attitudes and political processes that make war seem preferable to peace—efforts collectively referred to as “peace building.” Defined more precisely, “peace building” refers to any activity aimed at encouraging nonhostile attitudes and building cooperative relationships across communal lines.²⁵⁵ The policy tools for pursuing these goals are well understood in the community of NGOs concerned with conflict resolution, and in the social-psychological literature on conflict resolution. They are not, however, well respected in the security literature or highly prized by diplomats, because both groups tilt toward a realist understanding of the problem that makes the psychological approach seem both unnecessary and ineffective. In fact, it is neither; it is merely underapplied.

The paradigmatic policy tool in the peace-building toolbox is the problem-solving workshop pioneered by psychologists such as Kelman.²⁵⁶ The general idea of such workshops is to bring together people from opposing sides of conflict so they can replace their mythical beliefs about the other side with better information, and replace their hostility and fear with enough understanding to make a compromise peace look attractive and attainable. At the same time, these experiences start to change intergroup relations by building at least cordial if not friendly relations across group lines, replacing purely hostile ones. These two changes, if extended, can then work to change the public mood and political dynamics within groups.
so that leaders will be rewarded for moderate rather than hostile policies toward the rival group.

Peace-building initiatives can be pursued at three different levels: among grassroots leaders and activists, among middle-level officials, and at the elite level. They all have the same goals: to reduce existential fears, undermine hostile myths, change hostile attitudes, and build cooperative relationships across group boundaries so that peace agreements can be reached, ratified, and implemented. The precise tools used are various; they include elite-level peace building, middle-range peace building, grassroots peace building, and the symbolic politics of peace building.

**Elite-Level Peace Building**

In spite of the wide range of tools available to formal mediators, it sometimes turns out that initial stages of prenegotiation and negotiation are better pursued by unofficial groups. “Track II diplomacy” of this sort, typically carried out by elites who have access to top leaders but are not part of the official leadership, and usually mediated by NGOs, allows for an informal and often more creative exploration of options than formal leaders are willing to risk. They also provide an opportunity for elites to begin building trust across the communal divide. One of the proudest successes of Track II diplomacy is the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo accords (despite those accords’ unhappy fate). The process that led to that agreement began as an informal series of discussions between two Israeli academics and some members of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s leadership. The participants worked together intensively in meetings facilitated by Norwegian intermediaries, getting to know each other personally and learning enough about the concerns of the other side that they overcame their suspicions and developed mutually acceptable compromise formulas. When official Israeli representatives were added, these discussions evolved into the formal negotiations that yielded the Oslo accord, the foundation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the 1990s. In part because of the (unfortunately temporary) success of those efforts, Track II diplomacy is the one type of nongovernmental peace-building effort to have become accepted as a normal part of modern diplomacy.

Such techniques have been tried on a small scale in the conflicts in the Caucasus. For example, a January 1997 workshop hosted by George Mason...
University in Virginia brought together parliamentarians from Georgia and Abkhazia in a meeting that many participants found useful for making connections. A similar initiative brought together Georgian and South Ossetian negotiators in a series of encounters in the mid-1990s that participants from both sides reported to be useful in building trust and generating ideas for conflict resolution. Such meetings are rarely followed up in any systematic way in these cases, however, so their impact has been small.

Another sort of elite-level peace-building measure, one best carried out by incumbent leaders themselves, is acknowledgment of their own side’s past transgressions. Postwar German acknowledgment and repudiation of the Holocaust and of Hitler’s aggression, for example—especially Willy Brandt’s emotional visit to Auschwitz—played an important role in enabling German reconciliation not only with Israel but also with its European neighbors. Similarly, as noted above, Sadat’s acknowledgment of Jews’ past suffering played a key role in building the Israeli-Egyptian trust that made possible the 1978 Camp David accords. A refusal to acknowledge past atrocities, conversely, can be highly damaging; the Turkish government’s refusal to accept that its Ottoman predecessor was responsible for genocide in 1915, for example, is a key obstacle to Armenia’s reconciliation not only with Turkey but also, almost certainly, with Azerbaijan. The denial is taken as a sign that such horrors could be repeated.

**Middle-Range Peace Building**

Middle-range peace-building efforts come in several types, which have in common the aim of influencing larger portions of the society, but through opinion leaders or regional elites rather than through the governmental structure. One relatively well-accepted approach is the problem-solving workshops mentioned above. The way they work is to gather “opinion leaders” in “informal, week-long meetings of the representatives of parties in protracted... conflicts in an informal, often academic setting that permits the reanalysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the generation of some alternative courses of action to continued coercion, together with new options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution.”

The first step is to moderate participants’ typically hostile mutual attitudes. Joseph Montville has found that if such meetings begin with the participants’ sharing of their personal experiences of conflict, it helps humanize
each side for the other by attaching a human face to the previously anonymous—and easy to ignore—suffering of the adversary. This is necessary because psychologists have found that emotionally based attitudes are hard to change except through emotional appeals. So to the extent that ethnic hostility is emotionally based, founded in the powerful emotions caused when people become victims of violence, only emotional appeals that allow reinterpretation of those experiences are likely to result in changes in the hostile attitudes. Only affective appeals change affect.

Such transformations are routine in well-designed peace-building programs. It is easy, for example, for Abkhazians to argue that Georgian refugees from Abkhazia are “not really refugees” but rather people who “returned to their homeland”; it is much harder to maintain that denial when face to face with individuals from the other group who passionately insist that Abkhazia is their home. Similarly, it is easy in the abstract for any conflict participant to argue that “my side suffered more”; but when face to face with someone from the other side saying, “my cousin was killed” or “my sister was raped,” it is much harder to avoid acknowledging that the other side also suffered. Such acknowledgment is often the first step toward reconceptualizing a conflict as a shared problem demanding a shared solution—that is, toward recognizing a superordinate goal. These examples of dialogue are hypothetical, but in fact there have been a number of midlevel workshops involving Georgian and Abkhazian participants—and, in some cases, Ossetians, Armenians, and Georgians as well. Participants seem to find these contacts useful, though again they have been rare, so their cumulative impact has been small.

Religiously based organizations sometimes play a key role in such peace-building efforts—appropriately, because questions of transgression and forgiveness are core religious concerns. For example, a program in Mozambique sponsored by the Christian Council of Mozambique and titled “Preparing People for Peace,” involved an integrated set of middle-range and grassroots efforts. It began in 1991 with a five-week seminar for church representatives, focused on Bible-based conflict resolution techniques. This phase was a “train the trainers” initiative, as the participants then fanned out into the countryside, back to their own home provinces, for two-week conflict resolution training seminars throughout the country. Overall, some seven hundred people participated in this program, which seems to have contributed to the relatively happy results of Mozambique’s
early-1990s peace initiative. And though the conflict in Mozambique was not primarily ethnic, it did have important ethnic elements: the Renamo rebels had their strongest bases of support in a few ethnically defined areas, and their leadership was overwhelmingly from the N’dau group; while the governing party, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, drew its support primarily from the Gaza-Nguni, who provided its leadership. Peace building in Mozambique did, therefore, calm ethnic as well as political-ideological hostility. This is a form of peace building that has been little tried in the Caucasus, even in cases (e.g., Georgia–South Ossetia) in which the parties to the conflict have similar religious beliefs.

Another sort of midrange initiative involves educational reform. Durably replacing myths justifying hostility requires promoting the writing and teaching of fair-minded history instead of the ethnocentric and scapegoating kind. If, instead, children are taught in school that their group’s demands are unquestionably justified, and that opposing claims are threatening and unjustified, any compromise settlement will be unstable—too easy to attack as a betrayal. International efforts in this direction have been done in numerous cases; the peace builder Joseph Montville, for example, has helped organize national processes for writing a common, nondiscriminatory history in both Bosnia and Burundi, to replace the biased curricula that had previously promoted chauvinist attitudes. In the 1950s, a similar Franco-German initiative contributed to the revision of history teaching in those two countries, playing a significant role in removing references in history textbooks to the idea that each country was the “hereditary enemy” of the other. Some joint academic exercises have been attempted involving scholars from the Caucasus, but these have, by comparison, been rather marginal affairs with little impact.

The problem-solving workshop is the most immediately powerful of these tools because it can, in some cases, actually lead directly to the resolution of a conflict. Former U.S. assistant secretary of state Harold Saunders developed his model of “A Public Peace Process”—essentially a sort of extended problem-solving workshop reconvened repeatedly with the same participants—in the context of carrying out such a program in Tajikistan. The program played a critical role in working out the eventual resolution of that conflict.

One success of middle-range peace building in settling an ethnic war comes from the case of Northern Ghana. In 1994, a conflict between tribal
and acephalous peoples in Northern Ghana erupted, killing as many as 10,000 people and displacing more than 100,000 in a year-long series of fights. The conflict pitted a set of tribally organized, mostly Muslim groups, especially the Nanumbas, Dagombas, and Gonjas, against migratory, mostly Christian groups without chiefly organization, particularly Konkombas, Nawuri, and Nchumuru. An official Permanent Peace Negotiating Team was quickly established, and almost as quickly sidelined after the cease-fire it negotiated collapsed.

The NGO Nairobi Peace Initiative then stepped in, organizing a series of problem-solving workshops involving elders, chiefs, local administrators, and youth organization activists. Participants in the first workshop reportedly headed off a threatened renewal of Konkomba-Dagomba violence, and after the second meeting, they began offering testimonies, such as “in these meetings, many of us saw our mistakes”; and “there were people from all ethnic groups who were hard-liners when they first arrived. They now seem to feel and think differently.” Participants fanned out to engage in grassroots peace building, organizing “peace awareness meetings” in multiple towns, and working together on tasks such as returning stolen cattle and tractors. Later rounds of the workshop also involved delegates to the official Permanent Peace Negotiating Team talks in addition to other representatives, specifically including hard-liners. It was in these NGO-sponsored talks that a peace accord was negotiated; formal signature came in March 1996. At least in one telling of the story, the peace-building approach had succeeded where official talks had not.69

**Grassroots Peace Building**

Grassroots peace building also comes in many forms, starting with such obvious initiatives as public relations and public education efforts. One example comes from Burundi, where peace-building NGOs created radio Jambo, staffed by Hutus and Tutsis, to “highlight issues of importance to Burundians interested in peace,” and to quash rumors that might spark violence.70 Another public-relations-type effort comes from Mozambique, where a UNICEF-funded “Circus of Peace” toured the country, using drama and arts to explore the challenges of war, conflict, and reconciliation, serving as a way for the public to grieve over
the country’s war losses, to position it to implement the peace that followed. Similar sorts of arts-based programs, including cultural fairs and dramatic presentations designed to foster reconciliation, have also been employed, to some effect, in Northern Ireland. The limits of small-scale efforts like these must be emphasized, however: Radio Jambo did not manage to prevent horrific violence from occurring in Burundi; and even favorable testimonials about the Northern Irish efforts emphasize more the limits to their effectiveness.

In situations in which the perpetrators of crimes or atrocities cannot always be punished, victims still feel a need at least for the truth about their suffering to be acknowledged. Truth commissions can serve this function for the grassroots, discovering and publishing the truth about such events so the psychological wounds can begin to heal. Such commissions have been widely used, most prominently in South Africa, but also in Nicaragua and in other African conflicts. Though the precise form and scope of each of these commissions remain controversial, what is clear is the positive effects on those who testified. One member of the South African commission, for example, noted that some mothers of victims who came, “bowed down by... grief,” to testify, “went home singing and smiling,” saying ‘Now everybody knows... that my son was not a criminal.’ Other accounts also report that testifying produced a catharsis for witnesses, though one cautions that this was “the beginning of a healing process rather than the end.”

Another type of grassroots peace-building initiative is represented by the “Seeds of Peace” program. This program brings together Israeli and Arab teenagers (including, in the past, stone-throwing participants of the Palestinian Intifada of the early 1990s), for a three-week summer camp program in Maine. Exposed for the first time to the humanity of the “enemy,” participants share their tragic experiences and argue about their beliefs, but they also learn to cooperate, often in such simple ways as playing together on ethnically mixed soccer teams. What the organizers find is that time and again, after heated arguments and initial resistance, most participants come to an increased mutual understanding, with many keeping in touch after they return home, to try to promote efforts for peace. Grassroots peace-building efforts such as these are rare in the conflict areas in the Caucasus.
The Symbolic Politics of Peace Building

Most of the peace-building tools discussed above are aimed at intercommunal peace building—rebuilding relationships across ethnic lines into relationships of cooperation rather than enmity. These initiatives have two positive effects: transforming individual attitudes, and rebuilding intercommunal relations. Missing, however, are tools for addressing an equally tough challenge: the intracommunal task of building a political coalition for peace and reconciliation. Though problem-solving workshops or media efforts can begin changing attitudes in some sectors of society, many other sectors will retain the hostile myths and existential fears that make extremist symbolic politics work. Even if attitudes begin to change, therefore, societies can remain in the symbolic politics trap unless political leaders mobilize doves and moderates into an active pro-peace coalition that provides an alternative symbolism of peace and reconciliation and a political base supporting tough compromises. This is a critical step in the peace-building process that has received scant attention in the literature; whereas realists and rationalists tend to assume ethnic groups are unitary rational actors, advocates of the social-psychological paradigm tend to focus on individual and small group psychology, overlooking how attitudes are translated into support for political action.

One device for promoting the building of pro-peace coalitions, most prominently used in the Northern Ireland conflict, is to organize a referendum on a peace agreement or a peace process. This forces political leaders to articulate their reasons for supporting a compromise peace, and therefore provides the occasion for them to create and deepen a mainstream discourse that makes peace seem sensible and acceptable. It provides an opportunity for pro-peace forces to coalesce and cooperate around a clear common goal, and it provides the voters with the opportunity to commit themselves to reconciliation through a vote specifically on that issue—which is valuable because the psychology of commitment then works to motivate them to continue to support it. Finally, if the measure is approved, the referendum can be used to legitimize any later agreements or measures to implement them as carrying out the explicit will of the people; charges of betrayal then cannot as easily stick.

Governing political parties also need to develop and implement more general campaigns of pro-peace public relations and mobilization. This is
exceptionally difficult to do. One study finds, for example, that most of the Israeli peace lobby *demobilized* after the start of the Oslo process, even during the time when Benjamin Netanyahu’s government was effectively stalling it. Even Labor Party governments, however, distrusted groups such as Peace Now and failed to coordinate with them, while the activists restrained themselves in an effort to avoid undermining the official peace process. Also counterintuitively, trying to institutionalize these groups by providing them with permanent paid staff contributed to this demobilization, as unpaid activists’ efforts at community-based peace building were sidelined.76 The result was to leave the field more open to opponents of the peace process, enabling them to undermine it. (The much weaker Palestinian peace movement had even less success in preventing Palestinian actions that undermined the process.)

Although solving this problem requires a complete strategy, one idea for a symbolic approach is to tap the healing effects of ritual. Lisa Schirch notes, for example, that a problem-solving workshop for Greek and Turkish Cypriots benefited from evenings spent in the social ritual of dining and dancing together, because they shared the same musical tradition.77 The “Seeds of Peace” program noted the same effect from the social ritual of playing soccer on mixed teams including Israeli and Arab teens; participants found for the first time the opportunity to root for members of the other community.78 Schirch goes on to note that more explicitly political activities can also take on the role of ritual: civil rights marches, in the United States, for example, took on that character.79 Peace rallies, with their emotional rhetoric and evocative music, can serve the same function.

**OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE PEACE BUILDING**

In the Caucasus, efforts to initiate a symbolic politics of peace are largely absent. Mass rallies are more likely to favor hard-line policies than policies of peaceful conflict resolution. Indeed, the most important obstacle to effective peace building in the region (as in many conflicts in other regions) is the entrenched nature of the attitudes it is meant to combat. In Azerbaijan, for example, belief in the need to recover control of Mountainous Karabagh is axiomatic for the whole political class, with opposition leaders typically taking an even harder-line position than the government.
The central pillar of Azerbaijani identity is territorial, focusing on the historical existence of various political units on the territory that now makes up Azerbaijan, especially ancient Albania and medieval Shirvan. Thus the meaning of the official Azerbaijani identity is attachment to territory, including Mountainous Karabagh. Therefore, in his 1993 inaugural address, Azerbaijani president Heidar Aliev mentioned “territorial integrity” six times. Azerbaijani opposition leaders typically take a harder line: Former President Abulfaz Elchibei, for example, said in 2000: “Karabakh has never been an Armenian territory. Armenians came and settled in Karabakh from another place…. No part of that territory can be given to anybody without the permission of Azerbaijani people. If there won’t be peace in the future, we will bring Azerbaijani Turks altogether and take back these territories by fighting.”

The difficulty of changing such attitudes should not be underestimated. Conversely, it should also not be overestimated: President Ilham Aliev has publicly stated a willingness to offer almost total de facto autonomy to the Armenians of Karabagh in exchange for recognition of de jure Azerbaijani sovereignty. The official Azerbaijani position has, therefore, slowly moved toward compromise.

Another obstacle to peace building is the reluctance of third-party governments to promote it. The reason for this reluctance is that reconciliation issues are primarily internal issues for the societies in conflict—the psychological and political dynamics that keep ethnic conflicts going. Should mediators try to change these dynamics directly, their attempts would be rejected by the parties as unwelcome interference in their internal affairs. Also, the mediators themselves tend not to believe in the need for such efforts. Thus, though mediators do occasionally sponsor Track II initiatives, they do so only reluctantly, with no enthusiasm and little follow-through. Furthermore, mediators focused on the here and now of delicate negotiations are reluctant to endanger their relations with the parties by protesting outbursts of violent rhetoric, or by getting tangled in disputes about hard-line dominance of regional media. Instead, mediators are typically assured by the parties that the hard-line rhetoric is intended for domestic consumption only, to protect the leaders’ right flanks; and the mediators, mollified, go on with their work.

The trouble is that ignoring such expressions of the conflict is shortsighted at best, leaving the problem unchallenged just to keep stalled talks under way. As long as leaders find it necessary to stay in power through
appeals to chauvinist public opinion, they will be unable to persuade their constituents to transcend chauvinist thinking and accept a compromise—they will still be stuck in the symbolic politics trap. The solution to this dilemma is for governments to support the efforts of international governmental organizations or NGOs to address these issues, while the mediating governments focus on keeping the parties accountable for their own rhetoric. Though this is now being done to some extent, governments do not make it a priority, and they fail to integrate it into their overall mediation strategies.

Furthermore, though it is clear that peace-building programs can change attitudes, there is much that is not yet known about the effectiveness of peace-building efforts, and much that is known about their real and potential limits. One important constraint is the need for a deep understanding of the relevant cultures, and in particular of regional norms of conflict management. John Paul Lederach, a highly experienced leader of conflict resolution training programs, tells a story of one training exercise in Guatemala, a role-playing exercise in which Lederach took an example of an actual family conflict from the region and had participants act out a suggested way of managing and resolving the dispute. The first reaction from the audience was a man who stood up and said to the role players, “You two looked like gringos!” Lederach realized that the conflict resolution model he had been teaching was simply not compatible with Guatemalan cultural norms. Thus, one of the most difficult tricks for peace builders is to work with regional actors to develop peace-building programs in which the parties learn to improve their own conflict management skills, rather than being taught inapplicable methods that just happen to be familiar to the peace-building staff.

Another problem stems directly from the nature of the organizations carrying out peace-building efforts, mostly NGOs. Because NGOs are numerous and typically small, frequently many NGOs are operating simultaneously in a single conflict area; but because they are often highly jealous of their autonomy, they tend to resist efforts to make them coordinate their efforts. The result is often wasteful duplication; one study found, for example, that the large number of peace-building efforts aimed at promoting reconciliation between Georgians and Abkhazians in the late 1990s were almost all focused at the middle-range level, mostly involving the same cast of characters from local (especially Abkhazian) NGOs who attended one
workshop after another. Few efforts were made to extend the benefits of these efforts to the grassroots level or to the elite Track II level. In some cases, efforts end up undercutting each other, to the point that “it tends to take as much energy to manage the coordination (trying to make peace among the peacemakers) as to do the work for which the collaboration is needed.”

A third limitation is the so-called reentry problem: when participants in peace-building workshops return to their polarized societies, they often find few people receptive to hearing their new insights. Emotionally driven changes of heart are difficult to pass along. As a result, participants in such events often face strong social pressure to renounce their new views. Some participants even do so preemptively, announcing after their return that they had participated in a meeting with the other side merely to defend their group’s point of view. Others, familiar with the workshop mentality but disagreeing with it, merely pretend to moderate their views during the workshop and comfortably revert to their old views after it. All these difficulties have been reported in the aftermath of workshops involving participants from the Caucasus.

The reentry problem can be seen, in part, as indicating that peace-building workshops typically occur on too small a scale. When done on a larger scale, they create networks that amplify their message of peace, so participants are better situated to challenge hostile views rather than abandoning their moderate ones—at least those who are sincerely moderate. Two examples of this occurring, in Ghana and Mozambique, are described above. More typically, however, peace-building or problem-solving workshops are one-time events involving only a dozen participants, so participants return to social isolation. Others may repeat the experience for the same participants but fail to expand beyond a small cast of characters. Expanding these efforts, however, may be hard because the NGOs carrying them out may lack the capacity. And expanding the NGOs can commercialize them, diluting the factor that gives them their effectiveness—the personal dedication of the people who work for them.

Another problem of peace building is that it is difficult to carry out peace-building projects while fighting is under way, and even more difficult for the projects to have much positive effect under those circumstances. Psychological analyses of conflict resolution agree with Chaim Kaufmann that violence is a key cause of hostile attitudes, and indeed one formula-
tion has it that establishing safety, and a sense of safety, is the first necessary step toward reconciliation. In short, the violence must stop before peace building is likely to be effective.

A final obstacle to any conflict resolution policy is the "spoiler problem," in which certain subgroups oppose compromise and violently obstruct peaceful conflict resolution. In one prominent analysis, Stephen John Stedman identifies three common strategies for handling spoilers: the threat of withdrawal, inducements, and the "departing train" strategy. All three, unfortunately, have major drawbacks: the withdrawal of peacekeepers and mediators may clear the way for further predation by the strong; inducements may encourage spoilers to increase their demands; and spoilers can sometimes not only get on the "departing train" of a peace agreement, but also hijack it later. Sometimes force is the only alternative for handling spoilers; the Bosnian Serbs, for example, never stopped being spoilers, but as they became weaker, they lost the power to block a settlement—though they did continue to block implementation of some of its provisions. In the Caucasus, however, the main outside force is Russia, which has increasingly supported the Georgian separatists’ maximal claims instead of pushing them to compromise; Karabagh has the additional support of hardline diaspora groups. This combination of local spoilers and international support has been at the heart of the deadlock in peace processes in the Caucasus for two decades.

The role that peace-building efforts can play is to undermine spoilers’ power after a cease-fire or a settlement is reached. By changing the attitudes of ordinary people to favor peace over violence, peace builders can erode the support base on which spoiler groups depend. Furthermore, peace builders can sometimes change the attitudes of the spoilers themselves. In the Northern Ghanaian case, some participants in problem-solving workshops were activists in the youth organizations that were responsible for most of the violence. These people played a key role in “bringing on board” their groups, shifting these youth groups from spoilers to partners in peace building. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, ex-paramilitary fighters played a key role in peace-building efforts and in negotiations, while cross-community communications efforts—often led by women—are often important in quashing rumors that spoilers might exploit to justify violence. Peace-building efforts are not a silver bullet, but they often help; even killers not infrequently change their views. Considered as a whole, peace
building represents a potentially effective set of tools that can be added to the toolbox for handling spoiler problems.

**A COMPREHENSIVE PEACEMAKING STRATEGY**

A wide range of policy tools is available for promoting the resolution of ethnic civil wars, but due to lack of vision among all concerned, they are rarely employed all together in a single, coordinated strategy. Diplomats focus on negotiations, and they are reluctant to consider the interactions of their efforts with others’. Peacekeeping commanders often stick to narrow mandates that prevent the use of their muscle to keep peace processes on track. Peace builders focused on “structural” issues such as economic justice or human rights are often at odds with peace builders focused on psychosocial issues such as hostility and fear, and neither group is inclined to coordinate with diplomats, military officials, or even rival peace-building groups. Obviously, however, these efforts would be more effective if they were coordinated to reinforce each other in a single, comprehensive strategy. In a few cases, such as Northern Ireland and Ghana, something like this sort of strategy has been fairly successfully implemented.

It has not been attempted, however, for any of the violent conflicts in the Caucasus. For example, the Minsk Group negotiators for the Karabagh conflict and the Friends of the Secretary-General group mediating the Abkhazia conflict—both led by diplomats from great powers, including Russia and the United States—have not made peace-building techniques an integral part of their strategy; instead, they have marginalized and denigrated such efforts. What is needed is a large-scale initiative that would, for example, involve a large swath of Armenian and Azerbaijani officialdom in a series of peace-building workshops over the course of years. This approach would ameliorate the reentry problem by creating an environment in which inclusion in such workshops is a mark of international status: “Everybody who is anybody” should be included, and they should be ejected if they disrupt the proceedings. Holding such workshops in pleasant international resorts would be a further incentive for officials to participate—and begin the slow process of moderating their views toward the other side.
CONCLUSION

Despite its therapeutic bent, the social-psychological understanding of ethnic violence is not necessarily more optimistic about conflict resolution than is the more common rationalist understanding. It is less optimistic than liberal approaches that simplistically suggest institution building as a silver bullet for conflict resolution. At the same time, it offers more hope than realist-rationalist arguments that a partition resulting in reduced but not ended conflict is the best that can be achieved. And that is the case for adopting it in cases such as Abkhazia or Karabagh: It promises to fill in the lacuna left by liberal theory, while avoiding realist despair.

Ethnic civil wars are indeed fought over tangible stakes such as land, economic benefits, political power, and security. But such issues allow for compromise, and therefore are not a fundamental barrier to conflict resolution. Selfish interests of outside parties to the conflict—in the South Caucasus, this means primarily Russia—create another set of obstacles to conflict resolution. Even these, however, can be accommodated in a peace process involving multiple mediators. What makes ethnic wars intractable are the intangibles—myths and fears that lead the parties to demand political dominance, superior status, and a security position unacceptably threatening to their rivals. These factors lead to security dilemmas between groups, and to chauvinistic symbolic politics within groups that makes compromise seem like betrayal. Together, the chauvinistic internal politics and the security dilemma create the symbolic politics trap, which can destroy leaders who try to escape it and achieve peace.

Given this context, pursuing negotiations to settle an ethnic war in the absence of a strategy for societal peace building means trying to construct peace in the shiftingest of sands. Collapse is the likely result, as has repeatedly happened in conflict resolution and mediation efforts in the Caucasus region. Constructing a solid foundation for peace requires that negotiators, including mediators, be much more demanding of their interlocutors with regard to the intangibles of ethnic symbolism and group emotions. Both sides should expect not merely the abandonment of provocative rhetoric by their opposite numbers but also explicit mutual acknowledgment of each side’s own responsibility, and of the other side’s wounds.

To make this work in the peace processes for Abkhazia, Karabagh, and South Ossetia, mediators should fund and coordinate diverse NGO-led
programs of mutually reinforcing peace-building initiatives on a wider scale than currently exists. These would probably include problem-solving workshops at a variety of levels; cultural fairs, dramatic presentations, and other participatory events; commissions for reconciling competing histories; journalistic training programs; the production of pro-peace documentaries, films, television shows, books, and studies; and a number of other initiatives. Religious groups also need to be brought on board. Ultimately, leaders on both sides need to construct new nationalist discourses that justify peace and reconciliation, to sideline if not replace the hostile discourses that lead back into the symbolic politics trap. At the same time, the societies themselves must rebuild their relationship into one cooperative enough to allow the solution of mutual problems, and one compatible with positive images and attitudes toward the other group. In the absence of such major transformations, peace agreements usually collapse.

Many of these tasks are, to be sure, long-term ones that take decades fully to bear fruit. That is as it must be. Conflict resolution is not only about reaching agreements but also about implementing settlements that endure. The job of peace building is to create an atmosphere in which a settlement can be reached, and be stable when implemented. In ethnic conflicts, characterized as they are by deep fear, hatred, and resentment, the job realistically takes decades to be completed. Though its effectiveness is not yet fully known, peace building is the only approach that can even be used to undertake this job.

NOTES


5. Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July–August


10. Making a similar argument from a different starting point is Ross, *Management of Conflict*.


32. Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (New York: Farrar,
An Analyses of Cultural Difference by U.S. and Russia-Based Scholars (Straus & Giroux, 1996), 48.

33. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds.


37. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, chap. 3.

38. Ibid., chap. 4.


40. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions”; Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails.”


42. The author was a U.S. government official during the 1999 negotiations; the summary here represents the perception of U.S. officials at the time.

43. On Chechen national mythology and history, see Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).


45. Ibid., 336.


47. Ibid.


49. Ibid., 198.


51. Ibid., chap. 2.


54. Licklider, “Consequences of Negotiated Settlements.”

55. These definitions are adapted from the discussion in Lederach, Building Peace. Roland Paris identifies peace building with efforts to promote economic and political liberalization. Because he argues, and I agree, that such efforts are not necessarily effective as peace-building measures, I see no need for further discussion of them here. Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International Security 22, no. 2

57. The first three levels are outlined by Lederach, *Building Peace*, 38–43.


60. Christopher Mitchell, quoted by Nan, “Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts,” 46–47.


75. This problem is highlighted by Saunders, “Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation.” Saunders’s suggestion for addressing this problem, a variant of the problem-solving workshop approach, is detailed by Saunders, *Public Peace Process*.

An Analysis of Cultural Difference by U.S. and Russia-Based Scholars


78. Wallach, Enemy Has a Face.

79. Schirch, “Ritual Reconciliation.”

80. This is as quoted by Cameron S. Brown, “Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their Neighbor’s Too: Azerbaijani Attitudes towards Karabakh and Iranian Azerbaijan,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 576–96; the quotation here is on p. 582.


83. Nan, “Complementarity and Coordination of Conflict Resolution Efforts.”


86. I am indebted to Jim Richter for pointing out this obstacle.


89. On Ghana, see Assefa, “Coexistence and Reconciliation”; and on Northern Ireland, see Fitzduff, “Challenge to History.”


91. The details regarding a possible strategy are given by Kaufman, “Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap.”

92. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions”; Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails.”
Chapter 5: Reading Differently as a Cultural Challenge in Russia: On Literature, National Unity, and the Promises of Pluralism

TATIANA VENEDIKTOVA

For the past two centuries, Russia has been and even now largely remains a literature-centered culture. Reading has been commonly recognized and respected as one of the central modes of enculturation. When mass illiteracy was finally “liquidated” in the first half of the twentieth century, the proud self-image of Russians as “the most reading nation in the world” emerged—where “reading” meant, and still means for many, the reading of literature. Lately, however, this image has grown dim, leading many who invest in this national self-image to undertake anxious soul-searching: Are we still that most-reading nation? If not, are we facing a situation of the sheer loss of a shared identity and source of dignity? Or is this change inevitable, perhaps even necessary? If so, what is the nature and direction of such change? These questions, posed with urgency and a sense of crisis, reflect the broader distress many Russians have experienced with their society’s rapid cultural change—the disorienting, threatening experience of encountering “diverse” modes of thinking, embodied here in both textual forms and modes of engagement with literature.

Reading has grown newly problematic in Russia today. The diversity of reading matter and of modes of engaging a text (in print, visual, electronic, and hybrid forms) is spectacularly on the rise, yet the flattening effect of “massification” seems even more apparent. As a professor in the School of Philology of Moscow State University (traditionally, the source of the future elite corps of teachers in language and literature), I witness this paradoxical process as if from a besieged citadel. The sense of cultural mission, traditionally high in the teaching profession, has been eroded by a combination of disorientation and defensiveness. Teachers of literature like to see themselves as guardians of the cultural heritage, protecting it from the alien forces of dispersal and perceived cheapening that they see raging outside in the mass market. Students share in this flattering self-image, but they are increasingly
apprehensive about their impending venture into the “real world,” where their high-status academic competencies may be not needed.

In this chapter, I explore the landscape of debates and the confused, mostly defensive emotional reactions that emerge as literary experts encounter the new cultural situation and vernacular modes of reading to which it gives rise. I begin with an overview of the historical development of the Russian reading myth and then survey the dramatic social changes that have occurred in the availability of reading materials since the end of censorship. This background sets the scene for an explanation of the profound defensiveness that experts in reading have felt upon confronting the fragmentation of reading modes and the advent of a pluralistic market of reading materials. This differentiation of reading, supported by new technologies and consumer energies of the new market, is developing mostly on the margins of the recognized realm of “culture.” It generates little sympathy on the part of the teaching community—and even less in the way of practical reactions. Contrary to my colleagues’ disquiet, I present key insights from reader response theory to establish an alternative approach to understanding reading. I argue that the underappreciated expressions of cultural agency and cultural diversity reflected in the multiplication of reading material and modes of interpretation ought to be given due attention—through critical reflection, social discussion, and educational practice. They represent a significant move away from the dominant Soviet model of engaging with both texts and authorities, and they simultaneously challenge the nationalist conceit inherent in that hierarchical model of individual passivity.

**READING FOR ENLIGHTENMENT: THE GOOD OLD (FAILED?) CAUSE**

Because they are intimately connected with the production and social fixation of knowledge, reading and writing have always existed in the shadow of power practices—reading, compared with writing, even more deeply in the shadows. An author is assumed to be reality’s “first reader” and thus, traditionally, is endowed with more privilege than the “proper reader.” Confronting a clean sheet of paper, the writer seems to enjoy more freedom and have more responsibility than those who follow the lines traced by someone else. The hierarchy of those who write and those who read seems “natural,” as do most ideological products. Historically, this hierarchy was
watched over by the Orthodox Church, and over the past two centuries—by both the nation-state and the public education system. Other cultural factors, such as the Romantic sensibility, enhanced the author-centered Enlightenment ideology by bringing forth the ideal of the “original productive genius” as the sole source and generator of textual meanings that readers would reverently “uncover” and “restore.” In post-Romantic times, including our own, the capacity for personalized, creative authorial initiative has continually served as a foil to readers’ (presumably) passive, collective, anonymous state.

In nineteenth-century Russia, due to a number of circumstances (the low level of literacy, the lack of a middle class, the underdevelopment of the market to nourish and support the differentiation impulse in society), the nation’s major effort at “learning to read” developed in the highly paternalistic context of joint church-state domination. Reading was seen, rather uniformly, as an instrument of enlightenment, “administered” by the educated elite to the mass of the population. Cultural hierarchy and capital, backed (as a rule) by social hierarchy and wealth, were respected even by those who opposed and rejected the latter two.

Literary riches were seen as compensating for the poverty of public political life, and belief in literature’s importance as a national treasure, the semi-sacred repository of values, dominated the climate all through the nineteenth century (extending, in terms of cultural clichés, from the “Golden Age” of Pushkin and Gogol to the “Silver Age” of Bely and Blok). The high cult of “khudozhestvennaya literatura” was coupled with suspicion of both the market and the literary tastes of the common folk (which were to be raised and improved through education, but not indulged!). Reading was at the core of the project that gave an identity and mission to the Russian intelligentsia, whether conservative or reform minded. Social forces as various as revolutionary radicals and state bureaucrats, patriotic populists and Westernized liberals, showed unanimity in opposing the “sellout”—that is, the commercialization of literature—and after 1917, this opposition only grew. As huge, largely peasant masses were shaken out of the rut of rural traditionalism and propelled into a “new life,” the promotion of reading was adopted as one of the central concerns of the Soviet state—a powerful means of mobilization and change, ensuring large-scale ideological consensus and social manageability. The formative and informative impulses were assumed to run, “naturally,” from the cul-
tural top to the broad bottom, defining the entire society’s communication system. Enthusiasm for books was supported by both their availability and absence—that is, the wide, state-sponsored circulation of Russian, Soviet, and world classics and the shortage of “other” books, “unrecommended” but sought by intellectuals.

The 1960s and 1970s saw multiplying signs of a growing contradiction between the prescribed, politically correct reading diet and the pressure for more appealing and varied popular forms. Immediately preceding the collapse of the Soviet system, glasnost was a moment when reading and literature were taken up as a common cause with renewed fervor and no word “from above.” All types of audiences, elite and popular, were catching up on what has been previously suppressed, whether of avant-garde, classical, or market variety, taking in a fresh breath of freedom through reading. This moment was short-lived, however. The social drive toward the market and the rapid ascendance of visual and electronic media began to dominate the scene in the 1990s, which meant, clearly, the beginning of a major change.

In an attempt to interpret these transformations as they were occurring, the sociologists of reading Boris Dubin and Stephen Lovell were unanimous in describing them as a “Revolution of Differentiation.” For both, this promise was associated with the move from a state-managed monopoly to a growing—market-driven—diversity of available reading matter. For both, it signaled Russia’s return, or attempt to return, to the fold of “normality,” epitomized (in Lovell’s explicit argument) by the Western European experience that exhibits “uninhibited freedom of the print market and unfailing expansion and diversification of the culturally active middle class.” This could not but result (as it seemed then) in the demise of the “Russian reading myth”—the “profoundly abnormal” (according to Lovell) yet widely shared idea of literary reading as a cult, unifying the nation and ensuring the Russian people’s uniform and exceptional spiritual profundity (dukhovnost’).

Sociological surveys conducted ten to fifteen years later show that the change was, indeed, revolutionary; reading matter has grown spectacularly diverse, and it is now provided overwhelmingly by nonstate, commercial publishers—including two-thirds of new titles, or more than 90 percent of circulation. The reading myth, however, continues to hold extensive social appeal among the public at large. This same public appears less interested
in reading than ever before but also more content with reading than ever; almost three-fourths of the respondents claim to be satisfied with what is available to read. Yet the underside of this newly achieved complacency is a lack of interest in the new and growing defensiveness toward the “other.” The conclusion of Boris Dubin and Natalia Zorkaya, based on the results of their 2008 study, is dispiriting:

In the last ten to fifteen years, a predominant proportion of the population of Russia (no less than two-thirds of the adult population, according to our expert estimate based on many years’ monitoring, systematic and representative surveys conducted by Levada Centre), have become used to either doing totally without printed matter, having switched to long hours of TV viewing, or else opted exclusively for popular genres: detective stories, romances, sensational prose. Most often, people have neither borrowed a book from the library nor bought one from a bookstore, but rather borrowed from friends or acquaintances. In other words, in this country there has emerged a totally different society compared to the late Soviet era, perestroika years or during the 1990s efforts at systematic social transformation. This society is different in the structure of communication, in its intensity (or rather the opposite—its lack of intensity) as well as in its content.

As a result of these changes, Dubin and Zorkaya argue that “Russia today has come to resemble an island, continuously split into still smaller islands, regions, etc.” The reading public is splintered into smaller and smaller audiences, each centered on its own set of publications, with no channels or motivations for communication, “with no books circulating among them, without any kind of influence upon one another.” The landslide of mass popularization and the fragmentation of reading cultures seem to have occurred in parallel, and as a result, the market-bred variety of reading has failed to translate into “wholesome” diversity of culture for which these critics had hoped. Ironically, their dreams were based on an idealized image of reading in the West: “Book, print and literary culture has developed historically in Europe and in America as a means of communication among various groups in the open, dynamic societies.” At the same time, how-
ever, that same Western idyll is also frequently demonized for serving as a negative model.

The sense of discouragement and dissatisfaction is shared by many observers of the Russian scene, however variously they interpret the “reform process”; jeremiads lamenting the issue of social disunity, de-moralization, and degradation of culture have become an extremely popular genre. Not infrequently, that people read less figures as a major sign of disease, and that people should read more is publicly advertised as a possible cure. This logic is hardly new; it has been well rehearsed in the past—because a good book is certain to teach you common good, bringing more books to the people and more people to the books may qualify as an anticrisis measure. The National Program for the Support and Development of Reading was started in 2003, characteristically, with this statement: “Russia has come to the critical threshold in its neglect of reading, and at the present time we can speak of the beginning of the process of the irreversible destruction of the nucleus of national culture.” The campaign for reading literature is currently led by the state and seconded by major libraries, foundations, educational establishments, and the media. There is certainly no lack of publicity—one can see invocations to read books at bus stops (at least, in Moscow); and in the Metro trains; while going up or down public escalators, one will hear recitations of lyric poetry through the din of advertising. At least two major national conferences devoted to reading took place over the past five years, and two nationwide sociological surveys were carried out in 2005 and 2008. Findings from the latter, however, raise doubts about the effectiveness of these campaigns: “More than three-fourths of our respondents have ‘heard nothing’ about the state Program for the Support and Development of Reading, 14 percent (20 percent among the highly educated and 24 percent among citizens of Moscow) ‘have heard something, but have little idea of what it is.’ In sum, 90 percent of the adult population of Russia knew virtually nothing of the program.”

It would be sad indeed if the whole well-intended social effort to promote reading were to prove ineffective. My argument in this chapter is that to find a solution, we first need to adequately formulate the problem—that is, in our case, to realize that “reading” is not an old answer to a new social question but part of that new question itself.
New interest in reading studies emerged in the West in the 1960s and early 1970s, stemming from German reception aesthetics and American reader response theory. The cultural crisis that gave rise to both was not unlike the one that Russia is currently plowing through: “The cultural heritage no longer served as an unquestioned means of promoting what used to be called Bildung; it became a problem because there were no longer uniform guidelines for such education, as had been the case in the past.” Literature, in particular, could no longer function as secular religion, nor would a work of literature be seen, in the Hegelian fashion, as “the vessel for the appearance of truth.” In the context of structuralist and poststructuralist thought, reading was rediscovered as a complex enterprise associated with the interpretation of signs, the processing of meanings, and the recodification of norms (their dislocation, necessarily, from traditional bases, problematization, and reassessment).

Even though squeezed onto the black-and-white regularity of a printed page, disciplined by long years of schooling and tamed by the daily routine of information processing, reading presents itself as a potentially variable and unpredictable experience, only partly conscious of itself, fraught with individual improvisation and risk. The new interest in the reader as actor and agent stems from the broader concern with human subjectivity “as the selecting and motivating agency”—and, more generally, from the impulse toward individualization, recognized as central in cultural, social, and economic life. The “turn to the reader” has become a widely shared trend in the humanities as reader response literary studies have created alliances with psychology, history, sociology, ethnology, and anthropology. As a result, there is currently an impressive body of research in reading as an activity informed by “the human desire for self-extension,” self-reflection, and self-(re)fashioning—processes that define the modern individual and the social structures that he or she sustains and is sustained by.

The social and material circumstances of reading have been and continue to be explored in their enormous diversity—by age, nation, and social strata—approached through typologies or case studies. An even greater challenge, however, are the immaterial, “virtual” components of reading—the ways individual readers variously engage, stage, and experiment with behavioral codes, social and cultural presuppositions, habits of the mind,
and “grooves” of the imagination. This activity is difficult to gain access to and even more difficult to formalize, yet it is highly intriguing; it is this that gives reading both reproductive and creative dimensions and that accounts, ultimately, for its cultural centrality.

An act of reading (when we deal with a literary text) inaugurates a world that is both imagined and real—that a reader takes as his or her own, though it also belongs to the other. As I read, I come out of the fortress of myself into another’s territory, a space that is alien yet becomes familiar through my participation. I become inhabited by the words and the consciousness of another person, thinking thoughts that are my own but not quite, or thinking another’s thoughts that also become my own. A word uttered by a character in a novel must be complexly contextualized (being addressed to another character, it is also addressed to the reader, and has thus at least two meanings/functions); the narrator’s and the author’s intentions/positions need also be figured out as part of the “reading game.”

This work, sustained by pleasurable interest, we undertake while remaining largely unaware of it. It takes reader-response theory to essentially remind us that even a fairly simple text presents a reader with a “field of action,” where “everything counts and something is always happening” (Stanley Fish). To the degree that these happenings are noticed and reflected upon, reading begins to be appreciated as an adventure in which a participant feels constrained and enabled at every step, controlled yet challenged to exercise his or her freedom, where values are formed and reformed, rather than taken in as givens—where a reading subject’s identity is maintained through active choice rather than as some essence or substance.

Reception-oriented research brings into focus the definition of literature as a “performative use of words.” Or rather, it is a double performance, because an author’s performative speech act would invoke, necessarily, a reader’s implied speech act to meet it. Some critics (like J. H. Miller) would insist that the performance is triple, because a reader’s response may indirectly translate into social action; hence the larger definition of literature as “a use of words that makes things happen by way of its reader.”

Sophisticated analyses of the reading process (of the kind offered by R. Barthes, W. Iser, S. Fish, or J. H. Miller) may look to some like a linguistic exercise in Chinese. In fact, these analyses prove uniquely usable in relation to mass cultural phenomena that are increasingly textualized and aestheti-
although “literature” as an academic field is dwindling, as a communication medium it is thriving, and branching out into hybrid forms (video, audio, electronic, etc.), which are all increasingly marketable. “Media-ization” changes the balance of power in the relationship between producers of (and experts on) literature, on one hand, and its consumers, actual “users,” on the other. In turn, this provides for the new validation of reading modes that until recently would have been dismissed as “naive,” irregular, extravagant, or worthless. What most of these modes have in common is their increased freedom in dealing with convention and their failure to observe the proper, normalized (meaning controlled through education and shared convention) distance between the reading subject and the text.

Should these modes continue to be censured and disregarded, or can they be learned from? It may be fitting in this context to remember Walter Benjamin’s intuition in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” that the distracted, relaxed, unschooled modes of perceiving art characteristic of mass audiences may be a medium where new models of apperception are tried out and cultivated: “The ability to master certain problems in a state of distraction proves that their solution has become a matter of habit.” In our time of revolutionary shifts in human sensibility, looking more closely at the “undisciplined” practices of consuming literature, rather than ignoring or disparaging them, is a way to honor the continuing importance of literature as a medium—that is, as an extension of the human imagination.

Casting a retrospective look on the fortunes of reader-response theory in the West, we see clearly that focusing on the act of reading has invited further theoretical attention to the reader’s agency in building up literary meanings, and the reader’s agency, in turn, has been taken up as a model of cultural agency. In the increasingly textualized world we now live in, I view this approach to the reader as highly relevant.

THE RUSSIAN LANDSCAPE: NOSTALGIA FOR THE ONE TRUE READER? PROSPECTS FOR THE SIMPLE SEPARATE READER?

Differences are felt most keenly through contrast. I distinctly remember coming to America as an exchange student at the end of the 1970s, and heading for my first seminar in literature with anxiety, unsure if my Russian schooling had supplied me with enough erudition. The culture
shock, however, came from elsewhere and was provoked (as culture shocks are) by minuscule details—such as the strange (to me) little phrase the professor kept repeating while discussing a text: “How does it work?” or the comments that students often made, by starting with “I feel. . . .” In both cases, the wording struck me as irrelevant and out of place, almost absurdly inappropriate. As I later came to understand, these approaches were incompatible with the culture of reading that I had been reared in—those attitudes to literary texts that I had been socialized to adopt as a matter of course. The first phrase felt wrong because it seemed to imply a “technical” approach—treating a work of art distantly, almost as a mechanical toy that one is free to take apart and reassemble. The second rang to me (and proved sometimes to be) too direct and crude an emotional reaction. Neither attitude, I thought to myself, had anything to do with genuine, legitimate literary reading—which was more akin to reverent contemplation, aspiring to the sacred, even if secular realm of culture. For me this shock was the first challenge enabling me to appreciate that most valuable gift of cross-cultural education—in becoming perplexed by the locals’ “provincialism,” a traveler may sooner or later become aware of her own.

In the 1990s, under social circumstances that seemed drastically changed, I had the interesting opportunity to cast a critical look at my younger self and also to witness the strength and continuing appeal of the reading ideology that many of my colleagues unconsciously share. In the spring of 1994, I planned a course on contemporary literary theory with an American colleague who had received a Fulbright fellowship to teach in my department at Moscow State University. This was an interesting period in post-Soviet Russia’s reacquaintance with contemporary Western thought—the first surge of passionate curiosity had ended, and many Russians were now looking at the West with closer scrutiny and more systematic study. We organized the course by applying a series of critical approaches to a single text. We agreed that the text should be *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*. As a classic of children’s literature, this novel would be familiar to students but still suitably fresh ground for experimentation because it was generally not included on high school or university reading lists.

Indeed, the course turned out to be an experiment in cross-cultural (mis)communication—as the teacher’s and students’ expectations, presuppositions, and reading strategies proved subtly but significantly at odds. One of my own biggest surprises was that the “perspectival” mode of getting
at a text—so well tried, so obvious, and routine in an American academic context, aroused not only a sense of strangeness but also skepticism and resistance in the Russian students. The most articulate among them tried to make their case as best they could. In their eyes, the “multiperspectivist” approach seemed to be not a means of “honoring” a text but rather the opposite: It signaled a lack of due respect and subordination, suggesting a hands-on experience of something too precious to even be touched.

One of the discussions that ensued was later published in the university bulletin, so I can quote a remark by one of the students whose position was particularly outspoken and, characteristically, contained a judgment on what she took to be “American ways” (an assessment based on little direct knowledge). This is the statement in translation:

So far as I can imagine, an ideal American university is peculiar in that it is in need of an ideal student—unencumbered, preferably, by earlier reading (whether classical or other). Therefore—naturally—he would first be taught to read (by the book Contemporary Literary Theory and Criticism), and then he may read whatever he likes—Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man or Emily Dickinson’s poems, a newspaper or a street ad. He has learned how to question the given hierarchy of values or how to deconstruct; he is wonderfully free of cultural blinders. A Russian university, however (even now), presupposes a student has read certain authors before matriculating. Then, of course, they’d try reeducate her, but it may be already too late; a student may have already acquired a passion for reading as well as a particular preference for a given author over and above the “literary process.”

This statement reflects the Russian “reading myth” closely—making critics’ pronouncements of that myth’s demise rather premature. Reading is described as a skill almost acquired “from the native air”—in one’s home, as a family inheritance, rather than in a classroom or other official formal context. At times, it can lead to expressions of haughty irony in relation to academic authorities, foreign or local, who meddle with what is assumed to be an organic art. Efforts to interpret texts through a set of techniques or theoretical frames (presumably, the “ideal American” way that the writer tries to caricature), or even the late-Soviet approach to interpretation,
summarized through its clichés about the need for analyzing the “literary process,” both fall short for proponents of the Russian reading myth as a national idea. Reading as enlightened author worship figures here as central to Russian cultural identity and is openly used to define “us” against “them” (often, American cultural aliens).

In the ensuing years, the student completed graduate school, wrote a brilliant dissertation in comparative literature, and is now my colleague in the same department (reflecting the typical career path in Russian academia, in which respected scholars are invited to “stay” in their home institutions). When I asked her recently whether she remembered that encounter long ago during her sophomore year, and whether she had since revised her position, I received an emphatic “yes” to my first question and almost as emphatic a “no” to the second. Her stance, as well as her attendant feelings, remained essentially unchanged. The practice of bringing a fictional text under scrutiny through a series of instrumental perspectives remained doubtful, in her view, on both aesthetic and moral grounds. Thus, for instance, Wallace Stevens’ poem “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” diverts attention away from the object/blackbird to the modes of vision, thus replacing the uniqueness of the author’s Truth with mere opinions of readers (parading though they may be in theoretical “armor”):

In the course of our studies, it became obvious that we needed no Uncle Tom’s Cabin as an experimental ground, for theory was considered self-sufficient and in a way self-serving. Currently, this would not surprise me, but at the time I was shocked—I saw in this fact (and still see) some incredibly excessive pretense on the part of the reader. This is because, in my understanding, once you believe in some critical theory, you should be ready to stake your own person on it, and should view everything from within that perspective (at least this should have been true for those who bring the theory forward and those who adhere to it).

Theory, in this description, functions more like a creed—not what one chooses but what one is chosen by and belongs to. Ideally,

any critical theory should remain subordinate to literature—sometimes (not so rarely) to a single book. One theory would be created
for the sake of Rabelais, another for *The Divine Comedy*; one scholar would be a student [*stavlennik*] of Khlebnikov, another of Holderlin. This hierarchy should be respected, and the necessary submission to it maintained, if one wants to remain honest.... From this point of view, there would forever be an abyss between, for example, the ‘modest’ Beecher Stow and any theoretician, however celebrated—because some would necessarily reign while others bow and adapt to the royal personalities (and if one annuls this hierarchy, the breath would go out of literary art.)

Though produced in the context of informal exchange, such pronouncements are typical of most publications emanating from authoritative quarters and sources. For instance, the philosopher Ivan Ilyin, recently rediscovered as one of the pillars of Russian twentieth-century thought, has written:

A true reader would give a book all his attention, all the capacity of his soul, and all his ability to call forth the true spiritual attitude necessary for understanding *this* particular book. True reading... necessitates concentrated attention and determination to truly hear the author’s voice. Reason or empty imagination alone is not enough for reading. You have to feel in your heart and contemplate from within the heart.... This means that the reader’s calling is to truly reenact within himself the soulful and spiritual act of the writer, giving himself over to it trustingly. Only in these conditions will the desired meeting between the two occur.21

Here, too, the “true” reader is made to look like an inspired devotee. Reading is described as akin to worship, as a dedicated but unselfconscious—indeed, almost self-unconscious!—effort to be rewarded by superior insight into authorial individuality. “Arrival” at the truth is all-important, while the individual journey—hardly at all.

Transposed to a less philosophical, more practical plane, this logic and rhetoric continually resurface in discussions of literary reading. Teaching literature is commonly seen as a practice for instilling the social creed of patriotism, love of Russian culture, and respect for tradition. Ye. Tselikova’s article “Reading as a Patriotic Cause,” published in the journal for high
school literature teachers, offers a typical example. Lamenting that contemporary Russian “students go out into life armed with nothing but a manual of the English language” (i.e., practical, instrumental skills but not guiding values), she emphasizes the importance of Russian literature as a symbolic, nation-consolidating resource. To conclude her argument, she cites a lengthy quotation from a battle scene in Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* to demonstrate the power of the word “our” [nashi]. Charged with emotion but empty of concrete reference, this word serves as a marker for the bliss of supportive togetherness as well as a vehicle for conveying national values. Being “in truth” and being in close alliance are almost synonymous here, an equation that may signal an unflagging utopian drive but also must be recognized as a persistent social problem. This perspective values “correctness” over individual “difference,” and it readily identifies the latter with extravagance, presumption, or ineptitude. Subjectivity [subiektivnost’] may be recognized, excused, and respected in great, “world-historic” individuals, while in a “single, simple person” it is more likely to be assessed as a sign of poor “breeding” or a lack of proper knowledge. As a result, the average student/reader is unlikely to grow aware of himself or herself as an active medium for gaining insight (whether in the form of knowledge or understanding). A passive consumerist stance is “naturally” adopted, which has, no doubt, its social comforts but also serves as a social trap. Assumptions that reading literature is a normalizing cultural practice, and that culture itself (read: high culture) is a universally uplifting resource, come dramatically into conflict with the actual cultural situation of Russian society.

Given the fact that over the past two decades, major works in Western literary and cultural theory have been translated into Russian, the relatively low interest in reader-response theory is almost striking. As of this writing (2009), not a single book or collection of articles on reader-response theory has been published in Russian. There are a couple of short pieces by Wolfgang Iser, one by H.- R. Jauss, one J. H. Miller, and none by Stanley Fish. In comparison with the numerous volumes representing the thought of Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Genette, Eco, Ricoeur, and other luminaries, this looks meager, and one can only wonder about the reasons. Is it because the abundance of “indigenous” knowledge on the subject of reading leads to the assumption that imports from the West are superfluous?

Studies of reading in Russia (as our experts never fail to remind us), have a venerable tradition. They began earlier than in the West, in the
mid-nineteenth century. Investigations of what the people read and “what
the people should read” (the title of Kh. Alchevskaya’s three-volume bibli-
ography published in 1888–1906) continued on an even larger scale in later
years. The focus on social groups rather than on individuals has remained
intact. As experts on reading themselves admit, the “distinctive character-
istic” of research in this field is its highly normative model, which is aimed
at achieving the ideologically defined goal of shaping a proper, shared pub-
lic consciousness.24

A number of Russian literary critics and outstanding theoreticians have
emphasized and explored the nature of reading as an individual creative
effort, rather than as pious repetition. In the 1920s, these included B.
Eikhenbaum, A. Beletski, and M. Bakhtin; and in the 1960s, the theme
was further developed by V. Asmus and M. Mamardashvili. This line of
thinking, however, failed to be taken up more widely. Indeed, even to
these relatively few scholars who were developing it, the priority of autho-
rial production over readers’ consumption seemed axiomatic; it was pos-
sible to discuss creativity only in the context of a strictly normalized dis-


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Thus, paradoxically, with no lack of scholarly lit-

erature on reading and readers, the process of reading remains untheorized
and continues to be discussed in terms of quantities and numbers, or else in
terms of “common sense,” that is, the habitual mythology.

One rare article, published in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, sums up the situation
well:

Reading (in fact, any cognitive activity) has been transformed into
the curious enterprise of bringing together a literary text with its
uniquely correct interpretation. Generally speaking, this procedure
is the opposite of what reading means, when understood beyond
the confines of totalitarian culture, namely—the process of elabo-
rating one’s particular relation to what is read and correlating this
mode of understanding with a variety of others.26

This passage, which was coauthored by scholars who are, perhaps not
coincidentally, situated at some remove from the revered philological cen-
ters, reads to me like an apt diagnosis, unique in emphasizing the kind of attention that reading needs to become: “The Practice of Free Citizens.”

**SOMETHING IS HAPPENING...**

Michel de Certeau’s famous comparison of readers to poachers (migrants? tinkers? wanderers?), traveling through estates settled by authors and guarded by scholars (philologists), allows us to think of the relationship between these groups as a complex set of “political” arrangements and interactions, curiously parallel to contemporary global and national realities. Do “poachers” deserve attention? If so, of what particular kind? Measures taken to subdue, police, or “contain” this unruly crowd need to be taken, but many of these tactics prove ineffective in the long run. Indeed, rather than to police their actions, it would be more productive to explore and engage the social potential poachers present. But to achieve this task, a totally different ideology and set of approaches are needed.

A visual illustration of this dilemma may be found in an advertisement for MTS (a mobile telephone system) recently shown on Russian television. So far as there is a story, it is of two friends, one of whom is taking an exam in literature while the other helps him out at a distance, with some ingenuity. The situation is framed by two disciplinary contexts: stately volumes of collected works sit on the shelf, on one end; and the formality of a university exam is depicted on the other end. In between the two “enclosures,” all is movement and metamorphosis. Four lines from a poem by Alexander Blok (“Noch’. Ulitsa. Fonar’. Apteka . . .”) have risen off the book’s page by a human voice; get recoded into an electronic signal; travel (visualized symbolically as a running line) through the busy, bustling city environment; then again become a voice in the receiver’s ear; and, finally, run from under his ballpoint pen as graphic signs. The MTS system here acts as a nontraditional muse as well as a “magic helper.”

Following this ad’s appearance, there were some halfhearted protests from literary academics who thought that the use of classical literature for commercial purposes was outrageous. And ultimately, the ad was removed from the screen, because rectors of several leading universities complained that it was offering directions for cheating at an exam. I would suggest, however, that the ad enabled many people to remember—or even hear for the first time—Blok’s poem, and they have certainly remembered it since.
The advertising medium here may have acted as a powerful host, giving poetry new mobility in cultural space—a “new life” that, however risky and full of dangers, is nonetheless preferable (I would insist) to mere storage as a museum piece. I doubt that, if given the choice between his word being safely dead or unsafely, uncontrollably alive, the poet himself would choose the former. This situation reminds us of the need to explore what people in Russia today variously “do” with literature. Its meaning and value should not necessarily be diminished or compromised through these unauthorized “doings”; indeed, they may be even enhanced. Of greater importance, however, is enhancing readers’ insights into the complexities, challenges, and opportunities involved in the participation in the larger “text” of society and culture.

Reading may be many things to many people, and to tease its differences out into public discussion seems crucially important. Conceptualized as a reflexive practice, and thoroughly reflected upon as such, reading provides a “single, simple person” not only with spiritual guidance but also with a means of self-criticism and personal empowerment. In the mode I am suggesting, reading offers an object lesson in embracing, and exploring, diversity.

NOTES

1. According to two recent nationwide sociological studies of reading conducted in Russia in 2005 and 2008, the proportion of respondents who reported that they “never read fiction” decreased from 20 percent in 2005 to 8 percent in 2008, while the proportion of those who claimed that they “read nothing but fiction” remained stable and at a considerably higher level—22 percent in 2005 and 23 percent in 2008. This brings researchers to the conclusion that for Russians, even today, “to read” means, essentially, “to read fiction.” Dubin B.V., Zorkaya N.A. Chtenie v Rossii-2008. Tendentsii i problemy. M. 2008, p.24, 28. Khudozhestvennaia literatura (coined from the French belles lettres), to which both interviewers and respondents referred, can be translated into English as “fiction” or as “literature” but is not exactly equivalent to either of those (see note 2).

2. Unlike the English “fiction,” the Russian phrase carries a distinct evaluative overtone, referring to “artful,” “artistic”—i.e., aesthetic value and quality of writing, rather than to its invented—“made-up,” imaginative nature. Very much like the English “literature,” khudozhestvennaia literatura embraces prose, verse and drama, stressing the excellence of form and expression as well as the seriousness, depth and universal appeal of the ideas expressed.


19. Ibid., 7.
20. Ibid., 37.
21. Ibid., 69.
22. Ibid., 70.
23. Ibid., 71.
24. Ibid., 74.
27. Ibid., 62.
30. A nice illustration of this struck my eye on a wonderfully warm and sunny January day in 2006, after the Kennan workshop session, as I walked into a Barnes & Noble bookstore on the corner of E and 12th streets, N.W., in Washington—intending to cast a quick look at the “Literary Theory” section. It was not abundant, to say the least, but the share of books dealing with reading was impressive—with titles like How to Read a Book Like a Professor (with a sample of professorial reading—Harold Bloom’s Genius—standing by), Reading Diary (another professor’s), Book Lust and More Book Lust, The New Lifetime Reading Plan, Bound to Please, and others. Many contained recommendations to an enlightened consumer of literature about how best to enjoy books he or she might yet not have read. The genre of writing would sometimes be self-defined as “good talk” or “cocktail party”—enabling one to express and convey “the excitement of reading,” the rich experience of traveling through a fictional text, enjoyable in a variety of ways and from many perspectives. The borderline between academic and popular, professional and amateurish seemed to blur, as patrons of literature, forsaking esoteric language, tried to place themselves in the role of marketers (natural enough, in a climate where culture and economy, famously, undergo “implosion.”) The fact that these books qualified as “literary theory” may have been the mistake of a store employee, or perhaps it was not. We may be dealing with one of the dimensions or consequences of the “turn to the reader,” itself indicative of broader processes in contemporary culture. Contemporary marketing would view a commodity as a reflection of consumer demand, and consumption as a complex process of symbolic interaction and individual self-identification. Somewhat similarly, from the point of view of reader-response critics, a literary work finds its meaning in the reading process, that is changeable, multifaceted and cannot be identified exclusively with the interpretation of the author’s intent.
33. I quote from an email, with the author’s consent.
36. A friend remembered using the phrase “As Belinski rightly stated” in her high school composition essay. Instead of being commended as she expected, she received a furious reaction from the literature teacher: “How dare you evaluate Belinski!?!?”

27. Marc Ratz is professor of minerology who has also written on books and book collecting (Kniga v systeme obschennii. Spb.: Retro, 2005). Julia Griaznova holds a degree in philosophy.

28. “Far from being writers—founders of their own place, heirs of the peasants of earlier ages now working on the soil of language, diggers of wells and builders of houses—readers are travellers; they move across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across fields they did not write, despoiling the wealth of Egypt to enjoy it themselves.” Michel de Certeau, “Reading as Poaching,” in The Practice of Everyday Life, by Michel de Certeau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 165–76; the quotation here is on p. 165.
Chapter 6: Teaching “Ethnic” and “National” Differences: The Concept of “Narod” in Russian School Textbooks

OKSANA KARPENKO

The events at the Tchaika were the last drop. The main reason was that right in front of us several representatives of another narod demonstrated insolent and provocative behavior, while ignoring the mentality of our narod. It takes a long time to enrage the northern people. On the whole, I can relate to the feelings of those who took to the streets. But anyway, we shall do our best to punish those who initiated the violence and to see that the rights of Russian citizens, not excluding the natives of the Caucasus [urozhency Kavkaza], are respected. Our goal is to kick out the insolent youngsters who do not respect us... We do not have anything against inhabitants of the Caucasus [zhiteli Kavkaza]; on the contrary, we always keep the door open for honest, hard-working people, but we shall not allow anyone to disrespect our laws. (italics added)

This was the message that the governor of the Russian Republic of Karelia, Sergei Katanandov, delivered to the citizens of Kondopoga in the summer of 2006, after the upheaval in that town, dubbed an “interethnic conflict.” These events, as covered by the various mass media, involved this scenario: On the night of August 29, there was a fight “between locals [mestnye zhiteli] and natives of the Northern Caucasus [vykhodtsy c Kavkaza]” near the Tchaika restaurant. The fight, in which, “according to official sources,” twenty to twenty-five people were involved, resulted in the death of two “locals.” The policemen who were near the crime scene took no action. “The locals” considered the police’s lack of desire (or ability) to provide a timely and appropriate response to the incident as a sign of their aiding “the natives of the Caucasus.” The town became the scene of “anti-Caucasian demonstrations that turned into a
mass riot.” On September 2, “the locals” held a spontaneous demonstration and demanded that the town government “investigate all natives of the Caucasus and Asia who reside in the town for ties with the criminal world, and whether they reside in the town legally; also, demands were made to “punish the corrupt officials who sell the town to strangers [chuzhaki].” In addition, “the locals” “wanted the town government to deny natives of the Caucasus access to store rentals and to close down the entertainment places belonging to them.”

Here, I do not present or comment on everything conveyed about the incident by the mass media. Rather, I focus on the above quotation, which typified representations of both this particular event and “interethnic conflicts” in Russia in general. What emerges in this quotation is a vision of the participants in the conflict as members of a single, homogeneous political community (Russian citizens) and at the same time as representatives of hierarchically organized groups—“us” (“our narod,” “northern people”) and “them” (“others,” “another narod,” “those who’ve come from the Caucasus,” “strangers,” etc.). The hierarchical power relations between “us” and “them” are normalized and legitimized. Usage of the word kavkaztsy (Caucasians) or its variations—urozhentsy Kavkaza (the natives of the Caucasus) and zhiteli Kavkaza (inhabitants of the Caucasus)—presupposes an established constellation of particular stereotypes involving physical features (“black”), cultural features (masculine, defiant, traditional, etc.), and political status (“migrants,” who are actually “inhabitants of the Caucasus,” despite having lived in another region of Russia for a decade).

The head of the republic speaks on behalf of “the Northern people,” acknowledges their privileged status in the region, and reiterates the demand that immigrants from the Caucasus (“the inhabitants of the Caucasus,” “natives of the Caucasus”) should conform to the requirements of “the Northern people.” The boundary between “us” and “them” is understood through the metaphor of “a house,” where the doors must be open only to a certain type of “guest,” that is, “honest, hard-working people.” “We” and “they” have our very own lands (“homes”), where “we” are “hosts” and “they” are “guests.” The distinction between “our” people and “another narod” is based on the idea that behavioral characteristics correlate in an essential way with a specific geographical area (“our narod lives in the Northern valleys,” “the other narod came down from the Caucasian mountains”). “We” (“our narod”—“masters of the house”) are willing to
let outsiders in only if they alter their practices and identities to conform
to the presumably fixed, immutable identities and “mentality” of the local
community and also “make themselves useful.”

Furthermore, the mere fact that someone originates in the “Southern,”
“mountain area” is considered sufficient cause for anticipating that he has
ties with the criminal world and will present problems to the local commu-
nity. These discourses view the source of such problems as stemming from
“cultural differences” between the “locals” and “natives of the Caucasus.”
It is “they” (Caucasians) who supposedly challenge stability and order, and
involve officials and police in corruption. “The locals,” it is said, are merely
exercising self-defense, for they are forced to meet the challenge “in a sym-
metrical fashion.”¹⁰ Such discourses do not question the legitimacy of the
existing power structure and its rules, but direct all criticism to the cat-
egory of people who supposedly destroy “our laws.” As a consequence of
this logic, any potential struggle against corruption among state officials
and the police is replaced with the struggle against “newcomers,” who (re)
produce models of behavior that are “alien to us.”

The term “law” in the above quotation (“we shall not allow anyone
to disrespect our laws”) may be misleading. I argue that it serves as a
rhetorical device, deployed to justify illegal violence against a particular
category of Russian citizens. A “law” that divides people into distinct
“narods” loses its function as a universal regulator of relationships be-
tween citizens, and serves instead to legitimize discriminatory actions
against “newcomers.” The head of the republic proclaims that he will
“kick out insolent youngsters” while respecting “the rights of Russian
citizens, not excluding the natives of the Caucasus.” The obvious con-
tradiction between “kick[ing] out” a Russian citizen from the territory
of the Russian Federation by “respecting his/her rights” remains com-
pletely unaddressed. The distinction between “our own narod” and an-
other “narod” serves to justify illegal violence against particular catego-
ries of Russian citizens.

This rhetoric demonstrates Katanandov’s approach to the construction
of “ethnic” problems in general and problems with “Caucasians” in par-
ticular. The problem is defined and resolved as a problem of objectively
existing “bad” groups: (1) “the insolent [Caucasian] youngsters who do not
respect us” and (2) “extremist locals” who strive, with good intentions, to
correct such people but use the wrong methods (massacres, pogroms) to do
so. The basic assumption underlying this construction of the problem stems from the Soviet conception of ethnicity as naturalized and territorialized (known as the theory of ethnos). It leads to the conclusion that the best solution to “ethnic” problems would be the struggle against “bad” groups and the ethnocultural education of locals.

Here, I argue that the Soviet theory of ethnicity informing Katanandov’s interpretation of social relations and the conflicts in Kondopoga can be conceptualized as modern racism. Recent debates on racism in Western academic discourse have offered a productive distinction between traditional forms of racism, based on notions of biological difference, and newer forms of racism, in which difference is conceptualized through models of a hierarchy of “cultures” with stable boundaries between them. The latter logic is described as “modern racism” or the “racism of differentiation,” a mode of managing social differences grounded in the assumption that there are objective and essential barriers between separate “cultures.” Thus, the French thinker Pierre-Andre Taguieff has argued that

racist thinking is built on the premise of the fixedness of the “essence” or “nature” that every human being possesses because of his “birth,” or because he belongs to an origin asserted as a primary or determining origin. The unity of humanity has broken down and fragmented into “essential categories.”... Racism works as a method of separation. It separates and differentiates before classifying into a hierarchical order. It thus creates people who can be “integrated” and others who cannot be “integrated.”

The key point is that modern racist discourse has replaced biological models of difference with cultural ones—racism is inserted into various modes of “recognition,” including those that appear to be based on “cultural relativism.” Cultural essentialist positions on gender, race, or other group characteristics consider these to be fixed traits, without allowing for variations among individuals or over time. In this vein, current Russian debates on “Caucasians” are explicitly framed around the assumption that there are totally different “cultures” (“Caucasian” vs. “Russian”). As a metaphor of difference, “culture” here serves the same purpose as “blood,” for it is being naturalized and essentialized. As Stuart Hall argues, essentialist forms of political and cultural discourse naturalize and dehistoricize
difference, and therefore mistake what is historical and cultural for what is natural and biological.\textsuperscript{12}

This chapter argues that modern racism is an ideology and practice that is widely legitimized and normalized in Russia. It is remarkably integrated into the logic and rhetoric of Vladimir Putin’s “sovereign democracy,”\textsuperscript{13} as well as in Russian discourses of “multiculturalism” and “patriotic education.” As I demonstrate in the pages that follow, this normalization is the product of essentialist modes of understanding “ethnic and national differences”\textsuperscript{14} and authoritarian modes of thinking and teaching in general\textsuperscript{15} that are (re)produced routinely. To explore these processes, the chapter focuses on the category of “narod” as it is used in contemporary social science textbooks for Russian high schools (eighth to eleventh grades).\textsuperscript{16} These books are intended for students between the ages of fourteen and seventeen, and they function within the curriculum of what in Russia is called obschestvovedenie, or social science. Education is a critical domain for understanding the production of national identity, for schools are the key institutional location where the state disseminates ideas about legitimate membership in the nation.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, Russian state educational standards stipulate that social science education is an arena for realizing the goal of “establishing the values of a civil and democratic society and a law-based state.”\textsuperscript{18} Here, I focus on the social science series edited by Leonid N. Bogolyubov and Anna Yu. Lazebnikova, which is among the most commonly used (reprinted three times since 2004, it is published with large print runs) and has remained on the recommended textbook list since the establishment of the Federal Expert Council in 2001.\textsuperscript{19} In addition to analyzing the texts from this series,\textsuperscript{20} I also examine a few other relevant educational materials.\textsuperscript{21} My focus aims to clarify the conceptual framework through which these textbooks present notions of ethnicity and society as well as social differences. Given that the Federal Expert Council of the Russian Ministry of Education has officially authorized and endorsed these textbooks for schools, they offer valuable insights into state-supported models of identity.

\textbf{“NAROD” BETWEEN “RACE,” “ETHNIC GROUP,” AND THE “STATE”}

The concept of “narod” warrants close scrutiny because it is so widely used in the construction of identity. The desire “to preserve one’s narod”
pervades official rhetoric on building “a sovereign democracy.” It is used by the state to explain the demands of various political groups associated with “extremism” (in particular, ultranationalist organizations, e.g., the “Movement Against Illegal Migration” and “Russian National Unity”). The privileged status of the concept of “narod” is also explicitly created by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, whose preamble contains the formula: “We, the multinational narod of the Russian Federation, proceeding from the conventional principles of equality and self-determination of narods, adopt the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” Here we face one of the problems with the concept: “narod” is used to signify both the political community (“the Russian narod”), and parts of this unity (“narods of Russia”). From another perspective, “narod” exists at the intersection of racial, ethnic, and civil categories.

School textbooks use “narod” as a universal concept appropriate not only for the discussion of political, ethnic, and cultural differences but also for that of racial differences. “Narod” appears so flexible that it can bring together different categorization systems. A sixth-grade introductory geography textbook published in 2006, for example, provides this explanation in the chapter titled “Races and Narods of the Earth”:

Ethnographers distinguish between three of the largest human races on Earth: Europeoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. Essential features of races are rather stable and are evident in the physiognomy of narods. The largest narods of the world are the Chinese, the Hindus, the USA Americans, the Brazilians, the Russians, the Japanese. Russians belong to the Europeoid race and have all of its characteristic features. The Chinese are the largest narod in the world; it is part of the Mongoloid race. This narod has a centuries-old history, culture, and traditions. In the USA Americans formed a nation only at the end of the 18th century on the basis of three races and three cultures: European, American Indian, and African.

The author of this quotation offers both the old fashioned “three-race” typology and an original typology of “numerous narod(s).” One is ascribed to racial and cultural homogeneity; the “Chinese” (as well as the “Russians”
and “Japanese”) are examples of a narod that belongs to a particular “race” and has (its own, centuries-old, original) “history, culture, and traditions.” In this case, “narod” functions as a sort of link between “race” and “culture.” Other narod(s), formed at a junction of “races and cultures,” such as the “Americans of the USA” (the “Brazilians” are mentioned in this context as well), are defined as “people that inhabit a state” (either the United States or Brazil). That is, “narod” may imply a political community that is heterogeneous in both a cultural and racial sense.

This quotation captures all the problems that I aim to highlight in this chapter: (1) “narods” belong to “races” (and are divided into “pure” and “mixed” forms as far as race is concerned); (2) “narod” and “nation” are used as synonyms; (3) “narods” are used to describe communities that have a monogeneous or heterogeneous culture; (4) the author does not question whether she can rightfully mingle so many diverse meanings in one concept or what the social consequences of this mingling may be.

In the sections that follow, I examine the consequences of such overlapping, mixed meanings. I contend that this overlapping not only disorients the audience (ensuring a space for all kinds of manipulation) but also thwarts the possibility of critical reflection on the power relations and regulatory norms that constitute the social relations internal to communities (of which “narod” is just one name) and between them. I demonstrate that the (re)production of modern racism as a dominant perspective in Russia can be traced to this combination of meanings.

**THE PHYSICAL APPEARANCE [FIZICHESKII OBLIK] OF A NAROD**

A “racial” typology for understanding humankind is explained to schoolchildren in detail when they are eleven or twelve years old (sixth grade). In all subsequent texts, this typology is applied without any sign of contestation in descriptions of the “biological” differences between “the Earth’s humans.” This sixth-grade geography textbook states:

Ethnographers distinguish between three of the largest human races on Earth: Europeoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid.... Europeoids tend to have wavy or straight and soft hair, light or olive-colored skin, a narrow nose and lips of average thickness. Negroids tend to have curly hair, dark brown skin, a wide nose and thick lips. Human
races have been constantly mixing…. Some of the examples of mixed races are the mestizos and mulattos of America.  

A social science textbook for tenth and eleventh graders states: “All of the Earth’s humans belong to the same biological species, but to different races (in addition to the three main racial groups, there are a number of transition groups).”

Here we see the typology of different human races (the old “three-race” model), based on a biological conception of race. The boundary of “race” is represented as *natural*, given, and unproblematic. An individual can be classified as a member of “their race” automatically through recognizing their particular combination of physical features (skin color, eye shape, hair color and texture, shape of the nose, and thickness of the lips). The division of people into phenotypically different communities is (re)produced as being simple and neutral, and generated by the necessity to register “natural” differences between them. Racial boundaries are offered as an “objective” fact proven by “ethnographers.”

Such a list of “races” is highly misleading with regard to the way racial categories function in various societal contexts and also in scientific conventions. In international scholarship, it is now widely accepted that “race” is socially constructed, and blackness and whiteness are not categories of essence but are defined through historical and political struggles over their meaning.

In turn, categorizations of human beings involve the use of certain power relations. Modern discussion of “races” cannot ignore the fact that racial categories served the agendas of colonialism, racial segregation, apartheid, and so on. Efforts to divide human beings into groups on the basis of alleged genetic or phenotypical differences have proved to be spurious and misleading, and in some cases politically disastrous. As noted above, the usage of the word *kavkaztsy* (Caucasians) in mainstream Russian discourse reconfirms the stereotyped vision of a physically discrete (“black”) group of person(s) as well as the misleading interpretation of such phenotypical features as a marker of their belonging to a specific “ethnic” culture and particular territory. This naturalization of “racial” categories and lack of critical reflection thus provides a conceptual framework for making sense of various social situations and conflicts. As we see in the Kondopoga case, as soon as agents involved in the conflict look phenotypically different (“Caucasians” vs. “Slavs”), these assumptions can readily be mobilized to interpret the conflict as “ethnic.”
No chapter in the textbooks is specifically devoted to “racism.” In history textbooks, racism is only mentioned in the context of “Nazism” and “the colonial expansion of Western countries in the second half of the 19th century.” In history and social studies textbooks, racial discrimination is usually identified with a group or country that is distant from “us,” and also morally and intellectually inadequate. The concept of “racism” is defined as the “establishment of the superiority of the white race” and inferiority and “lack of civilization” of certain narods over which whites declare supremacy.”

The discursive emphasis these texts place on “the traditional ethnic diversity of the Russian state” and the “peaceful nature of the Russian colonization process” makes it impossible to use the category of “racism” to describe Russian reality. One major move in the dominant Russian strategy of denying racism is to focus on discrimination and racism in other countries—for example, in Germany (where texts discuss discrimination against “migrants from Turkey”) or in the United States (where the problem is defined as “black/white racism”). Criticism of traditional (biological) racism is limited to the rejection of the idea of a natural superiority of “the white race,” identification of cultural heterogeneity of “the races,” and the normalization of “racial mixing.”

Here, I demonstrate that essentialist understandings of “races” and “narody” form a special genre of a seemingly antiracist critique that nonetheless fits the definition of modern racism. Explicit critiques of extreme forms of ethnonationalism and racism mask the silence toward more respectable forms of “inclusionary” racism, which are based on the idea of “national cultures” as “historically formed on a certain territory,” internally homogeneous, and stable. Existing rules for talking about ethnocultural differences legitimize the racism of differentiation, which is embodied in state programs of ethnocultural education.

THE CULTURAL APPEARANCE [KUL’TURNYI OBLIK] OF A NAROD

An analysis of the concept of narod as presented in social science textbooks for eighth to eleventh graders reveals that a whole set of concepts—“narod,” “narodnost’” (peoplehood), “tribe,” and “nation”—are used to describe various states of an “ethnic group” or, in Russian terminology, an “ethnos”:

In history lessons, we have discussed such historically emergent
forms of communities \([istoricheski slozhivshiesia formy obshchnosti liudei]\) as clan, tribe, narodnost', and nation that appeared over the course of history.... The concept of “ethnos” has become widely used in scholarly literature alongside the concepts of “tribe,” “narodnost’, “nation.” This Greek word means “narod” and does not have an unambiguous description.... An ethnos is a community of people that emerged in a certain area in the course of history—people with a common culture, language, an awareness of their union.... A nation formed during a long period of history as a result of coming together, and the “mixing,” “melting” of the representatives of various (related and not) tribes and narodnosty.... we shall use the word “nation” in its ethnocultural meaning, i.e., to denote the highest form of an ethnic community.\(^35\)

This definition is not very different from those given in the 1970s by Yulian Bromlei and is primarily based on the assumption that ethnoses are the oldest, holistic entities that make their own journey through history.\(^36\) Bromlei and his colleagues treated etnos as a “definite category of objective reality,”\(^37\) and as the object of their studies. In this case, ethnicity (although, notably, this term was actually never used until the late 1980s in Russian academic language), is natural, innate, and inescapable. “Ethnos,” an “ethnosocial organism—ESO,” is a basic category, and its highest manifestation is the nation. According to the dominant Soviet conceptualization, “ethnos” is a pregiven category in the historical development of human society; ethnicity emerges from an ongoing relationship between a social community and a particular geographic environment, and the resulting ethnos naturally develops from the tribal level to that of a nationality (ethnic group) and ultimately to that of a nation-state. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a centrally directed union of such states, with each state conceived as a national entity, to be developed according to Stalin’s principle of “national in form, socialist in content.” Ethnicity, in this picture, was inherently territorial, and ethnoses were seen to have “homelands,” in which they are “hosts” while other, nontitular ethnic or national groups are “guests.” For decades, such a naturalized and territorialized conception of ethnicity was institutionalized in state practices, including passport registration and census procedures, and in nationality policies associated with the Soviet model of ethnoterritorial federalism (see the introduction to this volume).
The strongly primordialist position on ethnicity represented in these textbooks has been widely accepted. Alternative (critical, reflective, constructivist) approaches to the understanding of ethnic boundaries are not treated seriously (if even mentioned in passing). The reproduction of Soviet modes of thinking about (ethnic) differences in current Russian society renders events such as that which occurred in Kondopoga as “interethnic” conflicts, an interpretation that leads to at least three troubling effects: It reconfirms assumptions that social collectivities based on ethnic categories are culturally homogenous groups; it naturalizes the notion that members of one group have loyalty to their own, and interests that oppose those of other groups, so that hostility between groups is inevitable; and it systematically erases other factors, from institutional corruption to discrimination to individual behavior, that may contribute to a given situation or conflict.

**Characteristics of “Narod(s)”/“Ethnoses”**

Despite recognizing the fact that “modern scientific theories do not give a clear answer as to the characteristics of this [ethnos] community,” and despite the authors’ own inability to determine the definitive number of “ethnoses,” they do not doubt the value of using the category of narod as a tool to describe existing social differences. The authors repeatedly assert that “a narod is a subject of the process of history,” one of the “subjects of politics,” and so on.

“Narod” and “ethnos” are used as synonyms. The division into “narod(s)/ethnoses,” just as the division into “races,” is described as something natural. The internal homogeneity and external differences between “narods” are described as ahistorical, “objective facts” to be recognized. The Teacher’s Manual for the eleventh-grade textbook instructs educators: “In the introduction, when you are setting the tone of the lesson, you should point out the objective fact that during all of its known history, humanity consisted of various narody, or scientifically speaking, ethnoses.” However, unlike the boundaries of “races” conceptualized as “biological subspecies” of humans, ethnic boundaries are those of “cultures.” Various sources list the following characteristics of “ethnoses”: common land, language, culture (“lifestyle, beliefs, and traditions”), “psychological type” (“national character”), “awareness of their community,” and so on. The authors presuppose that the borders of the area where “a narod”
was “historically [re]formed” may be clearly defined and “objectively” described. The metaphor of an organism allows the perception to be sustained that a “narod” is an entity with a degree of integrity (occupying a specific place in space, and having its own “way of life,” “fate,” “interests,” and “will”): “Narods appear, flourish, disappear. Every narod has its own way, its own fate”;43 “the basis for the development of any viable organism (including a community of people) lies in the diversity of forms and types”;44 and so on.

The metaphor of an “organism” (a narod is “born,” “lives,” and “dies,”) and of a “flower” (a narod “appears,” “blooms,” and “disappears,”) are instruments for reifying a community, turning it into a collective subject capable of “entering into (‘interethnic’) relationships” with other, supposedly similar collective subjects. The coexistence of such single and homogeneous communities (“cultures”) with definite, fixed (“historically formed”) boundaries leads to images of a mosaic. “Cultural diversity” is limited to the diversity of separate “original narods/cultures”: “Humanity is a vivid, multicolored world of narods.”45 “Narod” and “culture” are used as synonyms: “narods strive to preserve their original culture, protect it from… the influence of other cultures.”46 “Historically formed” cultural barriers that divide narods are represented as natural and essential, as “the basis of a successful future of humanity.” The “narod” is ascribed an interest in (re)producing its boundaries (“narods strive to preserve their original culture, protect it from… the influence of other cultures.”47 The loss of a narod’s “original culture” means not only the loss of the “tangible products of a narod’s historical trajectory” (the end of a narod’s history, the disappearance of the narod) but also the death of “humanity.”48

The development of a narod as an organism is supposed to follow its own internal logic and be determined by “objective” characteristics of the environment. The stable cultural differences supposedly existing between narody is explained by “different natural and climatic conditions where different narody lived,”49 and “the different paths of historical development of particular countries, their contacts with other narody, i.e., their historical environment.”50 According to this logic, the reified narod, and not an organization of activists or politicians, is interested in the segregation of different narods and the preservation of the particularity and uniquenss of the “national culture.” Essentialist forms of political and cultural discourse naturalize and dehistoricize difference, and therefore mistake what is his-
torical and cultural for what is natural, biological. The ideological work of reification and homogenization undertaken to create an image of narod as something objective, beloved, and in need of the community’s protection, is obscured.

As we see from the above quotation, the textbook presents a whole set of concepts (“narod,” “narodnost’,” “tribe,” and “nation”) to describe “ethnos”/“narod” as the “historically emergent forms of communities of people” that exist at different “stages of development.” In this way, these textbooks faithfully (re)produce central premises of Soviet anthropology. They depict social phenomena as containing elements of the past and presages of the future. The typology of “historically emergent forms of communities of people” leads to two narratives of “narod”: diachronic and synchronic.

These two narratives become useful for constructing a certain vision of the Russian narod. Diachronically, the division into “tribes, narodnosti, and nations” enables experts to discuss both history in general and the history of Russia in particular. World history becomes conceptualized as the histories of particular “narod(s).” “The history of the Fatherland” is presented as the history of the “Russian narod” (the most tolerant and active subject of historical processes) that built a “multiethnic state.” Such a typology (in the context of the federal educational standards) serves to confirm the hegemonic status of the “Russian narod” and makes it possible to describe the position of other “narody of Russia” as less important and subordinated to the most important one. Moreover, such a typology enables authors to outline the history of a contemporary “narod” “from the depth of centuries.” At different stages in its historical development, a narod can be seen “in the form of a tribe, narodnost’, or nation.” Having established “a community” “over the course of centuries,” changes only occur in the evolution from the simplest structure of a “tribe” to the “highest” form of a “nation.” The transition from a narod to “the highest form of community” is understood as a natural process of “melting” the differences characteristic of “the lower” “forms” (“tribes and narody”). While assuming different “shapes,” the stuff that constitutes this “community”—“an original national culture”—grows, but it still remains the same in its fundamental elements: “One of the most tangible results of the historical process is a national culture.” In this context, the concept of “national culture” presupposes a special essence (a kind of “genetic code”). Changes that occur
over historical time are viewed through a social evolutionary model, in which the group advances from tribe to nation, maintaining its authenticity by retaining the stability of this essence. There is no conceptualization of historical change as enmeshed in political and cultural struggles, with outcomes that are unpredictable, contested, and result in continual fragmentations and reconstructions of social groupings.

From a synchronic perspective, the typology of “historic communities of people” (“ethnoses” or “narody”) establishes a hierarchy of nations within the entirety of “modern human society”:

Modern human society is comprised of all the diverse types of communities. There are clans and tribes, narodnosti and nations. This is due to the diversity of natural, climatic, economic, social and cultural conditions in which people live.55

The place of narody in the hierarchy of “types of communities,” and therefore the different “levels” of their social and economic development, is explained by supposedly “objective” conditions. Narody are rated according to their status as a “nation”: the oldest “English nation” “that formed in the 16th century,” “the Russian nation that formed in the 17th and 18th centuries, the German in the 19th century.”56 The text further states that “dozens of nations have formed and are being formed in the 20th century.”57 Notably, the question of whether “the Armenians” and “the Georgians”—who are listed as “examples” of “modern narody that appeared in ancient times”—are nations, is left unresolved.58

“National Self-Awareness” and Criticism of “Extreme Nationalism”

The authors of these textbooks ascribe to each person the need for a “national or ethnic identity.”59 The inability to define one’s ethnic/national identity may be seen as living a “life between cultures,” a state that is seen as potentially causing individuals psychological difficulties. The individual cannot be viewed outside of his or her belonging to a certain narod: “The fate of an individual person cannot be separated from the fate of his/her narod,”60 “knowing that one is a part of a specific narod helps a person find psychological safety and stability.”61 The authors describe the desire
to maintain the autonomy of one’s “national” lifestyle and value system as being *natural* to people, inasmuch as they are aiming to preserve an *objectively* significant community. Russian textbook discussions of the concepts of ethnos and culture unequivocally convey the message that you have only “your own culture” (represented in ethnic terms) and cannot escape or shift it without problems.

Moreover, the logic of Russian social science textbooks represents the “historically formed” cultural barriers dividing *narods* as natural and essential, even going so far as presenting them as “the basis of humanity’s successful future.” Attempts to remove these distinctions, in turn, are depicted as generating defensive (“protective”) reactions, “interethnic conflicts,” and the “overall growth of aggression.”

It is widely acknowledged that every ethnos is characterized by ethnocentrism. One’s own *narod* has the central and highest position, while other ethnic groups are seen as different and alien. Thus, the behavior, views, and customs of a different ethnic community are evaluated through one’s own culture. Ethnocentrism has a number of positive consequences. It serves as the basis for patriotism and national dignity. However, ethnocentrism may become the cause of national prejudice and extreme nationalism (e.g., ideas of national uniqueness, supremacy, mistrust, enmity, and ethnic conflicts), discrimination against ethnic minorities, and racism.62

On the one hand, the author retains essentialized perspectives on the concept of “*narod*,” which supposes the positive evaluation of “patriotism” (the normalization of the practice of placing one’s own *narod* in the highest position in the “hierarchy of *narods*”). A person is “naturally” ascribed to his or her “own culture” and necessarily looks at the world (and at his or her interlocutor) through the prism of this culture. The rejection of a preference for “one’s own *narod*,” a lack of “national dignity,” and the “loss of national roots” are viewed as the acceptance of a forced, “alien” view of the world, which in turn is considered destructive for one’s personal identity, *narod*, and humanity as a whole. On the other hand, the author takes an “antiracist” position; on the basis of her experience, she asserts that the majority of racist (“nationalistic”) crimes are committed under the slogans of “love for one’s own people/nation,” and its protection from
an “alien’s” invasion. As a result, the author argues, we face a “dilemma of ethnocentrism” (or “dilemma of national pride” in another version), for which essentialist discourse has no solution. If the dilemma is a reflection of the “objective” nature of social relations, the goal to eliminate the cause of “extreme nationalism” cannot be achieved without damage to one’s “national dignity.”

If “national dignity” is seen as an inalienable characteristic of a correctly shaped identity, the struggle against “racism” is formulated as the goal to increase the “positive” and reduce (ideally, to eliminate) the “negative” potential of “ethnocentrism.” While suggesting that ideas typical of traditional racism should be eliminated—in particular, the idea of protecting “racial boundaries” as a necessary condition for the survival of the human species—the author promotes the theory of “ethnic relations,” in which any interaction between people may be seen as (intra- or) “international” (it is not persons, but narods, that live next to each other, get married, etc.). Such an ethnic model of social relations forces a view of “the other” as a member of either one’s “own” or “another” narod. The requirement to protect and strengthen the “historically formed” boundaries between narods means that acknowledging “multinationalism” (equality and diversity) as “an objective and typical characteristic and living condition for people” is a problem. To struggle against “extreme nationalism,” it becomes necessary to establish clear-cut boundaries separating “one’s own narod” from “another.”

The (modern) racist discourse pervasive in Russia claims to uphold cultural relativism and antiracism while actually reiterating strict distinctions between various ethnic groups and legitimizing their segregation. Migrants from other regions or countries—speaking a different language, looking different, and observing different customs from the majority population—thus easily become the target of such racism. Discursively, the mainstream Russian press portrays migrants’ integration problems not in terms of biological inferiority but as based in their “cultural incompatibility” with “the locals.” With the acknowledgment of cultural diversity as a normative requirement of liberal democracies, modern racism divides humans into separate and exclusive cultural entities, and it then proceeds to naturalize the boundaries and hierarchies between them.
"NAROD" IN THE CONTEXT OF "CITIZENSHIP"

As noted above, one of the important features of the concept “narod” is that it can be used to signify both the political community (“the Russian narod”) and parts of this unity (“narods of Russia”). The definition of “ethnos” discussed above reveals that the authors do not draw essential differences between the first and the second meanings. The choice of this or that word for naming the community does not conform to any strict logic. “Ethnos,” “nation,” and “narod” turn out to be interchangeable, and any differences between an “ethnic” and “superethnic” (political) “organism” are erased. In this context, it is interesting to understand how political unity and a sense of citizenship get constructed.

In the textbooks under consideration, citizenship is divided into two conceptions: first, citizenship as a status (in the “legal sense” of “citizen”); and second, citizenship as an activity (in the “moral sense” of “citizen”):

A citizen is (1) in legal terms—a person with the right of citizenship. In other words, it is a person’s belonging to a state. Citizenship creates a stable, legal link between a person and the state, demonstrated in their rights and responsibilities to each other.... (2) Since ancient times, the concept of “citizen” has carried an especially moral meaning. To be a citizen means to hold a certain moral position associated with the sense of duty and responsibility toward one’s Motherland, narod, national values, sacraments, culture. The feelings of citizenship are manifest in sincere concern for the fate of one’s Motherland, a strong desire to see one’s land free and flourishing, an eagerness to work for the sake of one’s country, the ability to control one’s selfishness, and to help those in need. At the same time, citizenship is always associated with a critical attitude toward social injustice. And of course a citizen must always be ready to show personal courage and to rise up in defense of their country against any intrusion.63 (italics added by OK)

The neutral representation of the “legal sense” of “citizen” does not presume to denote the national community to be regulated by certain legal norms. In this context, neither “narod” nor any of its synonyms qualified to represent the collective identity appear. This can be explained by the proposed concept of “law,” which refers to a set of legal norms that address
vertical relations, that is, between a citizen and the state, rather than horizontal ones, between citizens themselves. A person’s responsibility to uphold legal norms is described as a patriotic duty but not as the (re)production of rules necessary and common within the community. The subordinate position of a citizen to the state may not be questioned. It has been rhetorically fixed and normalized: “Citizenship means a person’s belonging to a certain state.” The back side of such a concept of “law” is its requirement for a strong (authoritarian) state, which is supposedly able to control every detail of public (and private) life of (groups of) population. An implication of this assumption is that if the state is not perceived by people as strong enough (e.g., because of corruption) to cope practically with actual social problems (criminality, poverty, etc.), then some groups of population may impose order in their “home” with illegal methods. The coercive, illegal actions of “locals” in the Kondopoga case, for example, which included demands for the illegal punishment of “uninvited guests” and pogroms, and the confusion of local and federal authorities in the face of mass illegal actions (bashing, etc.), are the result of this uncritical, taken-for-granted acceptance of this understanding of “law.”

The “moral sense” of “citizenship” implies subordinate (duty-based) relations between a “citizen” and his or her “Fatherland/Motherland” and “narod” (constituted by a complex of supposedly homogenous “values, culture,” etc., equally valued by all members of the narod). A person finds himself or herself naturally included as part of “his/her own narod,” and therefore has “obligations” to it. The relations between a person and his or her “Fatherland” and “narod” are represented as essential: “The destiny of a particular person cannot be separated from the destiny of his narod.” The feeling of love for one’s Motherland is essential and organic. It is often connected with the special features of the landscape and natural conditions, i.e., it is ‘primeval’ to a certain extent. The “moral sense” of “citizenship” coincides with a person’s “patriotic duties.” With the reproduction of this concept in official textbooks, the possibility for readers to construct and develop a more democratic model of citizen identity (which would presuppose at least some critical reflection on existing power relations) is diverted.

“The sense of duty and responsibility towards one’s own Motherland, one’s own narod” is represented as essential; it is formed naturally (under the influence of “natural” conditions) and does not require any rational un-
derstanding ("love" is contrasted with rationality and reflexivity). "Love" supposedly makes such a hierarchy between the person and the community desirable and natural. Those social differences, contradictions, and inequalities that exist in the community termed “our own narod” are absent from this discourse, while the differences between “our” and “other narod(s)” are emphasized.

Metaphors of “kinship” used by the authors of textbooks for identification of “Motherland” with the near and dear are actually a call to refuse reflecting on the (social) nature of this “sacred” (irrational) feeling. Transferring the content of “love” to “patriotism” and “citizenship” makes it possible to assign patriotic practices (including discourse) a constant (absolute) humanitarian value, and gives them the status of “goodness.”

The concept of citizenship in Russian school textbooks stresses the importance of conformity with current rules and the traditional national value systems, thereby legitimizing the existing power structures. It is distinct from the modern concept of an “active, democratic citizenship” that promotes an open, critical discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of political and economic structures as well as societal rules and values currently prevailing in one’s country. The construction of the contemporary Russian state, with its roots in the Soviet past, is occurring through the institutionalization of entitlements, rights, and privileges for the “narod,” creating a differentiated and unequal approach to citizenship. This is a tendency to deindividualize citizenship and make it more of a group phenomenon. Rather than the state providing a common bond for people through the tie of citizenship—with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, both in precepts and practice—people’s loyalties are bifurcated. The result is frequent tension and contradictions in the public sphere as claims of exclusion and domination among individuals and groups proliferate.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that modern racism, an ideology and practice underlying the Soviet model of multiculturalism, is still widely legitimized and normalized in Russia. This normalization is the product of essentialist modes of understanding ethnic and national differences and authoritarian modes of thinking and teaching in general that are (re)produced routinely. It is remarkably integrated into the logic and rheto-
ric of dominant Russian discourses of multiculturalism and school-based social studies education.

Contemporary discussions of ethnic differences in school textbooks (discourses that typify the dominant discourse in society) are highly problematic. The discussion of the “national” that pervades textbooks makes use of the concept of “a community historically emergent in a certain area,” which serves to materialize the symbolic boundaries of the nation and to objectify its supposedly singular “culture.” This discourse links “national cultures” to geographical “areas,” assigns each person to “his or her national/ethnic culture,” and also consequently to a certain “area.” The language of “ethnos” is ambiguous, redundant, and hierarchical. It transforms appeals for “tolerance toward others” into abstract, moralistic, and unpersuasive statements. The requirement “to love one’s narod” may be interpreted as the requirement to love the exclusive local community, seen as culturally homogeneous.

These textbooks socialize students to accept the same basic assumptions we have seen reflected in the comments of the governor of the Russian Republic of Karelia, Sergei Katanandov, cited at the beginning of this chapter: that the community of citizens is divided into distinct “narods”; that a central element in the structure of a narod is common origin, culture, and area (“native land”); that a narod in the area of “another narod” must follow the requirements of the “natives” (“masters of the land”); and that every person is naturally part of one narod (or has “mixed” origins) and, as a representative of this narod, may be required to follow norms of subordination to this narod. These assumptions reproduce Soviet practices of conceptualizing and coping with social (and ethnic/national in particular) differences, enabling them to be applied for making sense of the complexities of contemporary Russian society. Because such assumptions define the framework of identity in Russia, they prevent the emergence of an understanding of “the Russian nation” as a political community of citizens who are equal in their rights and opportunities throughout the country.

As I have argued, current “ethnic conflicts” are a result of the (re)production of the naturalized and territorialized conception of ethnicity (ethnos theory) that is created and supported by the Soviet state. It bears highlighting that the Soviet ethnos theory was inextricably related to the ideology and practices of the “friendship of the nations,” a rhetoric that obscured its close relationship with the authoritarian political system, its rigid regula-
tion of migration and control over public expressions of individual and collective identities, and so on. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the democratization of life in Russia (including changes in the migration regime, freedom of speech, etc.) opened up the borders of cultural difference conceptually and materially, leading to strong contestation and, in some cases, armed conflict. Yet the rhetoric of “friendship,” far from being abandoned, is heard with increasing frequency in efforts to promote “ethnocultural competence” and “the improvement of interethnic relations.” This rhetoric, which is based in the essentialized understandings of groups described in this chapter, obscures its own investment in (ethno)cultural segregation and subordination, and the authoritarian control over the meanings of cultural diversity. I would argue that attempts to cope with current “interethnic” conflicts by promoting such rhetoric and practices is equivalent to fighting fire with gasoline, and using the guise of promoting tolerance and patriotism to justify authoritarian modes of state administration.

NOTES

1. Because of the many possibilities of translation, ranging from “people” to “nation,” none accurately reflects the rather diverse meaning of the Russian word narod, which functions like a linguistic idiom. Because no translation can capture the connotations and the agglomeration of cultural meanings behind this word, I retain the Russian term narod in the text and try to elucidate its significance in the course of the chapter. To define a plural number of narod, I use “narod(s)” or the Russian narody.

2. “Veli sebia derzko, ignoriruia mentalitet nashego naroda” (Demonstrated insolent behavior, while ignoring the mentality of our narod), Kommersant, September 5, 2006.

3. Kondopoga is a town with a population of 30,000 in the Republic of Karelia in northwestern Russia.


5. What is meant here are Russian citizens who have moved to Kondopoga from Chechnya. Moreover, it is necessary to point out that the categories of “immigrants from the Caucasus” (“Caucasian,” “natives of Caucasus,” “inhabitants of Caucasus,” etc.) in political discourse and the media, as well as in everyday conversation, denote a racialized group of people with a specific “Southern” appearance, culture and mentality. “Caucasian” in the Russian context denotes “black” people with a background associated with the Caucasian mountains.


7. Ibid.


10. This response is supported not only by local officials but also by a great number of scholars. Thus, the director-general of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, Valery Fyodorov, believes that the cause of “ethnic conflicts” like that in Kondopoga is “the economic expansion of, first and foremost, natives of the Caucasus, together with a disrespectful attitude some of them show towards the customs, mores and culture of the local population…. Thus, the key to peace and cooperation is held by the leaders of the ethnic communities themselves. They need to provide for moderation and tolerance in their communities”; Valery Fyodorov, “Svoi sredi chuzhikh” (Our people among strangers), Itogi, October 13, 2006.


14. As Hall argues, essentialist forms of political and cultural discourse naturalize and dehistoricize difference, and therefore mistake what is historical and cultural for what is natural, biological. Hall, “Old and New Identities.”


16. The materials to some extent presented in the article were gathered during my work on the project “Racism in Russian School Textbooks: Critical Analysis of the Contemporary Educational Discourse”, supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. As part of my research, I analyzed high school textbooks on “the history of the Fatherland” (Istoria otechestva) and “social science” (Obchestvoznanie) (eighth to eleventh grades) recommended by the Federal Expert Council to be used in schools in the academic year 2004–5.


20. “Introduction to Social Studies” [Vvedenie v obshhestvoznanie], for eighth and ninth
grades, and “Human and Society: Social Studies” [Chelovek i obschestvo: Obshchestvoznanie], for tenth and eleventh grades, from the set of materials edited by Leonid N. Bogoliubov and Anna Yu. Lazebnikova, as cited in full in the notes that follow.

21. I use the sixth-grade geography textbook to clarify the meaning of “race” not given in the books for higher grades.

22. Karpenko, “‘Suverenaia demokratia’ dlia vnutraennego.”

23. Russian scholars have examined the problems of analyzing the concept of narod that arise from its ambiguous usage. In his study of the use of this term in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitutions of the Subjects of the Federation, Sergey Sokolovsky concludes that “it is used for two different concepts and two different, if not contradictory, concepts: narod 1, ‘co-citizenship,’ and narod 2, ‘ethnic community;’ and it is not always clear which concept is being used in a given context.” Sergey Sokolovsky, “Kunteptualizatsiia ethniceskogo v rossiiskom konstitutsionnom prave,” (Conceptualization of ethnic [issues] in Russian Constitutional law) in Rasizm v iazyke sotsial’nykh nauk, ed. Viktor Voronokov, Oksana Karpenko, and Aleksandr Osipov (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiya, 2002), 102.

24. In English, this is usually referred to as “Caucasian,” but I prefer the transliteration of the Russian word “Europeoid.”


27. Ibid., 177–78.


31. Leonid N. Bogoliubov and Anna Yu. Lazebnikova, eds., Chelovek i obschestvo: Obshchestvoznanie—Chast’ 1, Uchebnik dlia uchashikhsia 10 klassa obshcheобразователь’nykh uchrezhdenii (Moscow: Prosveshenie, 2004), 228.


33. Ibid.

34. In the sixth-grade textbook, “the mixture of races” is described as a process that has always existed, “is continuous and becoming faster.” Petrova, Geografiia, 178.


36. The concept of ethnos, which had already emerged by the 1920s—see S. M. Shirokogorov, Etnos: Isledovanie osnovnykh printsipov izmeneniia etnicheskikh i etnograficheskikh iavlenii (Shanghai, 1923)—attained its central importance in the 1970s and 1980s under the patronage of Yulian Bromlei, director of the Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow. For Bromlei, “an ethnos is a historically stable entity of people developed on a certain territory that possesses common, relatively stable features.
of culture (including language) and psyche as well as a consciousness of their unity and of their difference from other similar entities (with self-consciousness), that is embedded in a collective name (ethnonym)”; Yu. V. Bromlei, ed., “Sovremennye problemy etnografii” (The term ethnos and its definition), in Ocherki teorii i istorii (Soviet ethnology and anthropology today) (Moscow, 1981). 27.


38. Bogoliubov and Lazebnikova, Chelovek i obshhestvo: Oshhestvoznaniie—Chast’ 2, 222.

39. “At present, there are more than 1,000 ethnoses on Earth”; Labeznikova, Oshhestvoznaniie: Uchebnik dlia 10–11 klassa obsheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii, 119. “There are over 6 billion people living on Earth; they form 3,000–4,000 narods”; Petrova, Geografia, 178. The same authors give different number of “ethnoses (nations, narodnosti, tribes)” in books for different grades—2,000 in one source, Leonid N. Bogoliubov, Vvedenie v oshhestvoznaniie: Uchebnik dlia 8–9 klassov obsheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii (Moscow: Prosveshenie, 2004), 129); and “about three thousand” in another, Bogoliubov and Lazebnikova, Chelovek i obshhestvo: Oshhestvoznaniie—Chast’ 2, 221.

40. Bogoliubov and Lazebnikova, Chelovek i obshhestvo: Oshhestvoznaniie—Chast’ 1, 226.

41. Ibid., 238.

42. Leonid N. Bogoliubov, ed., Metodicheskie rekomendatsii po kursu “Chelovek i obshhestvo,” Chast’ 2, 11 klass (Moscow: Prosveshenie, 2003), 120.

43. Ibid.

44. Bogoliubov and Lazebnikova, Chelovek i obshhestvo: Oshhestvoznaniie—Chast’ 2, 23.

45. Ibid., 223.

46. Labeznikova, Oshhestvoznaniie: Uchebnik dlia 10–11 klassa obsheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii, 120.

47. Ibid., 120.

48. “It is the preservation of cultural and historical diversity that many scholars view as the basis of a successful future of humanity. Supporters of this view emphasize the unquestionable idea that the basis for the development of any viable organism (including a community of people) lies in the diversity of its forms and types. The emergence of a single cultural tradition and lifestyle shared by all civilizations would mean the end of the development of human society.” Bogoliubov and Lazebnikova, Chelovek i obshhestvo: Oshhestvoznaniie—Chast’ 2, 23.

49. Labeznikova, Oshhestvoznaniie: Uchebnik dlia 10–11 klassa obsheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii, 120.

50. Ibid.

51. Hall, “Old and New Identities.”

52. One typical example of how Russia is conceptualized as a “multiethnic state” can be seen in the introduction to the textbook on the history of Russia for 10th graders, written under the editorship of A. N. Sakharov, director of the Institute of Russian History in the Russian Academy of Sciences: “The multinational structure of its population became a historical particularity of Russia. It was not all at once that our country developed as a big, multinational state, and neither was it all at once that all of the narod(s) who lived in Russia became part of the Russian [rossiiskii] narod…. Over time the various narod(s) entered into cooperation with eastern Slavs (later Russian [russkie])…. who became the most powerful and economically advanced narod among the rest of the population and emerged as the ethnic leader of Eastern Europe…. In the course of time many nationalities [narodnosti]
became fully legitimate inhabitants of Russia, as Russians were. Others competed, and sometimes took up arms against the aspirations of Slavs (later Russians [ruskie]) to include them in the structure of their own [svogo] state. Only later, as a result of the impact of common… interests and sometimes under the influence of force by local leaders… did they become integrated into the flow of all-Russian [obsherossiiskoi] history.” Andrej N. Sakharov, Viktor I. Buganov, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XVII veika: uchebnoe posobie dlia 10 klassa obshcheobrazovatel’nykh uchrezhdenii (Moskva: Prosveschenie, 2004), 11.

53. Different “types of communities” correspond to particular “stages of development”: “tribes or clans are characteristic of a primitive society. A narodnost’ is formed as classes and states emerge. Capitalism makes economic and cultural ties active, creates a national market… brings different narodnosti together [as in a medieval state]. A nation appears.” Bogoliubov, Vvedenie v obshestvoznanie, 400.

54. “One of the most tangible results of historic development is a national culture: folktales, legends, historical narratives, songs, dances, music, specific art seen in temples, icons, household artifacts. It is the folk epos;… it is the works of writers, artists, composers, including contemporary ones, where the national specificity and national legends are reflected. It is through culture that a person is linked to his/her nation.” Bogoliubov and Lazebnikova, Chelovek i obshestvo: Obshestvoznanie—Chast’ 2, 223.

55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. If there is no principal distinction between “ethnic group” and “nation,” it is not surprising that phrases such as “ethnic” and “national identity” or “ethnic” and “national consciousness” are used as synonyms.
60. Bogoliubov, Vvedenie v obshestvoznanie, 129.
62. Ibid., 176.
64. Bogoliubov, Vvedenie v obshestvoznanie, 152.
65. Ibid., 129.
67. Dietmar Kahnsitz links authoritative discourse with the promotion of biased, uncritical attitudes and the passive acceptance of current social institutions. It aims to stabilize the contemporary order and its power relations. Kahnsitz, “Oekonomische und politische Bildung sowie die Frage ihrer Integration aus der Perspektive einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Allgemeinbildungstheorie,” 131.
Chapter 7: Facing History and Ourselves: An Approach to Teaching Tolerance through Understanding the Holocaust

RACHEL BURG BELIN

For thirty years, Facing History and Ourselves, an international nonprofit organization headquartered in Brookline, Massachusetts, has engaged teachers and students of diverse backgrounds in an examination of racism, prejudice, and anti-Semitism in order to promote the development of a more humane and informed citizenry. By prompting students to scrutinize the historical development of the Holocaust and other examples of collective violence, Facing History teachers support them in making the essential connection between history and the moral choices they confront in their own lives.

As one among many practitioners of the Facing History curriculum, my passion for it derives from a somewhat atypical experience: At the age of fourteen years—in 1984—in a Massachusetts public high school, I landed in a Facing History social studies classroom. This early exposure to a class that taught me to think of myself as a critical consumer of history itself was transforming; it directly inspired me to obtain initial training and ongoing organizational support as a Facing History teacher in a Florida social studies classroom and to my current role living in Central Kentucky and facilitating local Facing History professional development for other educators.

The questions Facing History raised in my own ninth-grade social studies class still resonate: How is identity created? Why do we seek to be part of groups? What are the implications of seeing “us” as individuals and “them” as a monolithic mass? Do individuals have the power to shape history? Can we actively choose the roles we play in it? By asking questions that respect the social consciousness and intelligence of teenagers and the teachers who work with them, Facing History never ceases to be relevant.

In this chapter, I explore the innovative pedagogy that seeks to engage students and educators in examining history through an understanding of human behavior as it relates to tolerance and diversity. First, I explore
some of the challenges teachers in general face when attempting to teach the Holocaust in American high schools. Then I look specifically at my own experience teaching Facing History. In this context, I detail the concrete ways I used Facing History material to facilitate an understanding among adolescents about history and their critical role in it. Finally, I reflect on some of Facing History’s uses and limitations for teaching about the Holocaust as it pertains to understanding and appreciating difference.

THE TEACHING OF THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOLS

In America’s secondary school classrooms, there has been no shortage of attempts to raise awareness about the history and legacy of the Holocaust. The systematic persecution and annihilation of European Jewry by Nazi Germany more than sixty years ago has been the subject of ample curriculum materials in American middle and high schools. A recent survey sent to a nationally representative random sample of teachers stratified by state revealed by Belin nearly three-quarters of all responding secondary school educators reporting that they had taught the Holocaust in the most recent school year.¹

Like most subjects taught in American schools, the Holocaust as a curriculum can look vastly different from classroom to classroom. The background of the educators, their motives, their course requirements, and their resources are just a few of the elements that may dictate how the Holocaust is presented to students. Though a majority of American educators teach the Holocaust emphasizing a human rights perspective (88 percent), a significant number place it in the context of American history (56 percent), politics (54 percent), literature (40 percent), and religion (35 percent), among others. Furthermore, though 31 percent of the respondents indicated that they used history textbooks to teach about the Holocaust, the majority cited firsthand accounts of the Holocaust (69 percent), films (69 percent), photographs (57 percent), documentaries (36 percent), and museums (19 percent) as other resources they personally used to teach the subject. The depth and breadth of available resources in American schools is not meant to suggest that teachers do not struggle with the content of their materials and context in which they teach them. Issues of teaching too much about the Holocaust (“Holocaust fatigue”), desensitizing young people to genocidal violence with overexposure, seeming to appear pro-Zionist or
overuniversalizing the importance of a unique event, are just a few of the challenges documented by experienced American Holocaust educators.\textsuperscript{2}

**ENTER FACING HISTORY**

One innovative approach to teaching about the Holocaust in the secondary school classroom is the Facing History and Ourselves program, based in Brookline, Massachusetts. Since the program’s founding in 1976, more than 23,000 educators around the world have participated in its workshops and week-long seminars. As a program reaching an estimated 1.6 million students each year and with regional offices in Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Los Angeles, Memphis, New York, and San Francisco, Facing History stands apart as especially influential in American secondary school classrooms.

Facing History aspires to do far more than teach about the historical facts of the Holocaust. The program’s stated mission is to engage students of diverse backgrounds in citizenship education, by which it means “encouraging the skills, promoting the values, and fostering the ideals needed to sustain a democratic society.”\textsuperscript{3} Its classroom pedagogy hinges on the assumption that there is a vital link between democracy and tolerance of diversity—that without a humane acceptance of a wide variety of individual and group differences among citizens, we cannot have an authentic and effective democratic government.

By studying the historical development and the legacies of the Holocaust and other instances of collective violence, Facing History explicitly aims to help students, in its own words, to “learn to combat prejudice with compassion, indifference with ethical participation, myth and misinformation with knowledge”\textsuperscript{4}. Among many creative approaches to teaching about the past in the American secondary classroom, this program is radical in that it does not shy away from the historical complexities that are often represented in the baser actions of individuals and groups. Rather, it views the study of history as a decidedly moral venture.

**SCOPE AND SEQUENCE**

At the heart of the Facing History pedagogy is a circular scope and sequence of material that begins and ends with each student’s reflecting on
his or her own life experiences and responsibilities. The name “Facing History and Ourselves” derives from the concept that in order to understand historical developments, we must first understand human behavior at the micro level. That is to say, we must begin the exploration with an examination of ourselves.

TheFacing History journey is replete with essential personal questions stemming from a larger topic with which every student must grapple. What follows is the anatomy of this journey, as described by Facing History in its self-published sourcebook, *Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior*, and in its online campus. Both the book and the Web site provide ample readings, resources, lessons, and teaching strategies for Facing History classroom teachers. Here, I supplement Facing History’s course chronology with a detailed sample of activities I used to help my own students better understand each stopping point on the journey (see figure 7.1).

**INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY**

Who am I? How do I see myself? How do others see me? What are the factors that influence how I think and behave?

Every Facing History journey begins with questions of identity. Students are guided to explore the perceptions, values, and interests that make up their own unique identity and those of their peers. This process challenges the assumptions and stereotypes they use to make daily choices. And their
reflections almost always lead to an examination of the consequences of human choices in their own lives and in history.

To prompt a deeper understanding of how history is created and influenced by notions of identity in my own Facing History high school classrooms, I begin with the Personal Timeline Activity. I first ask each student to list and reflect upon five events in their lives that they believe most define who they are today. They do this in the personal journals I require them to keep throughout the six-week course. (It is important to note here that while I teach the course as a standalone six-week unit, the program is highly flexible. Other Facing History teachers may teach it more fully integrated with a history, literature, or psychology class. Some even teach the curriculum as a semester-long elective, among other approaches.) Next, I have the students use a large sheet of paper to draw a timeline that illustrates their history to the larger class. The creative catch: The students do not have to use a horizontal line to illustrate their personal histories; instead, they may draw any metaphorical design that most captures what they hope to convey.

This activity invariably produces stimulating artwork and rich discussion when the students are asked to share their timelines with the larger class. The conventional, horizontal lines of historical timetables are commonly replaced by such visuals as butterflies, ladders, and roller coasters, suggesting that despite having endured so many previous lessons in more traditional history classes, the students are intuitively capable of grasping the concept that history does not have to be seen as progressing in a linear fashion.

After asking the students to explain their pictures, I pose pointed questions:

What did you leave off of your timeline and why? Do you think your best friend would have drawn a similar timeline for you? What about your mother? Your father? Your history teacher? What does this activity suggest about the way history is created? What does this activity suggest about the way history is remembered?

If I have been successful in my Personal Timeline Activity, the students will begin to see that what they study in high school is constructed through a subjective process having much to do with identity and how we choose to define ourselves. But in case they need more convincing, we then examine
some excerpted readings from Michael Lowen’s *Lies My Teacher Told Me*, a content analysis of American history textbooks used in high schools.\(^6\)

Lowen’s premise is that American history is sanitized in the classroom. He makes the case that most American high school textbooks are biased toward the heroic side of American leaders and that they ignore history’s many complexities. His compelling argument that the way in which American history is taught in public schools mirrors the propaganda used in Nazi Germany often goes a long way in piquing my students’ attention. The text generally serves to prime the students to think critically about my subsequent presentations of historical information—including my own role in creating it for their consumption.

**NATIONAL IDENTITY**

Where do I belong? For whom am I responsible? Why are some people included and others excluded? How can I belong to a group and still be true to myself?

At this point, the students are guided to move from an understanding of their individual identity to issues of group and national identity. They learn that the way a nation chooses to see itself has a direct impact on how it acts toward those who do not fit into its self-concept. Thus, they are led to see the power and peril of group membership as it relates to one’s sense of identity.

For most of the adolescents whom I have taught the Facing History curriculum, making the connection between individual and group identity is not difficult. American high schools are notorious for the creation of social groups with distinct labels. And to delve into the relationship of individuals to groups, I stimulate discussion with the High School Clique Analysis. In this exercise, I ask the students to don a sociologist’s cap and create a list of all the different groups they see daily roaming the high school hallways. Typically, within minutes, the chalkboard is covered with scores of labels such as “Jocks,” “Punks,” “Brains,” “Goths,” “DeadHeads,” and so on. I pepper the students with prompts:

Which group or groups are the best and worst to be a part of?
What happens if you are a member of those groups? Why do people
create so many groups? What purpose does it serve? Does power play a role in creating such groups?

This introductory activity primes the students for a subsequent, more sober look at the implications of the human tendency to identify with groups.

We begin with a reading of Kurt Vonnegut’s “Harrison Bergeron,” a futuristic fable about a society that handicaps people who excel in any way and about individuals who try to oppose it to their detriment. We use the story to talk further about the rules in society—who creates them and who follows them. We ask ourselves why people in the story and in our own society are so willing to conform to a perceived norm. And we examine what it takes for an individual to stand up to a society that conflicts with his or her values.

We next watch the 1968 documentary *Eye of the Storm*, the chronicle of Jane Elliot, a third-grade teacher in a rural Iowa school. In front of a rolling news camera, Elliot arbitrarily divides her students into artificially defined inferior and superior groups to teach them about their susceptibility to prejudice and to show them how stereotypes shape their views of themselves and others. The students are usually amazed to observe that within a single week, children who were previously well behaved and loving toward one another become mean and intolerant to those they are told are not like themselves. The film shows the human tendency to “scapegoat” or conveniently blame innocents for one’s problems. It also suggests how easily a perceived authority figure—even a teacher—can define group norms.

Finally, we read Frank Tashlin’s *The Bear That Wasn’t*, an illustrated satire about a bear who stumbles into a factory and who, despite his insistence to the contrary, cannot convince the bureaucrats that he does not belong there. The absurdity of letting others define us becomes more clear as the humans with authority tell the bear that he must be a human (albeit one who needs a shave) because he is standing in a factory.

During this literary and audiovisual odyssey, I ask the students to reflect in their journals on some essential questions:

How is the “norm” created? What roles do perceived authority figures have in contributing to identity? How does the quest for identity marginalize others? And why does it often seem so difficult for a person to oppose a group?
It is only after completing these classroom activities, and supporting my students in coming to understand how the identity of individuals and groups are created and related, that I feel they have the underpinnings and the primitive vocabulary to begin to understand the history of the Holocaust.

THE RISE OF THE NAZIS

How does prejudice become law? Why did this happen in Germany? Why didn’t people stop it?

At this juncture, we begin to explore the complex events that led to the rise of the Nazis in Germany. The emphasis here is on the themes of identity, belonging, and membership, and relating them to larger historical forces.

The students are now ready to study in-depth a vivid historical example of how individual choices about inclusion and exclusion can have dramatic implications. Through the focus on Germany, the students specifically look at how, in the context of the early twentieth century, an understanding of race became the framework within which individuals, groups, and nations viewed their world and how a deeply embedded anti-Semitism manifested itself. More specifically, they look at how, in the context of the early twentieth century, an understanding of race became the framework within which individuals, groups, and nations viewed their world and how a deeply embedded anti-Semitism manifested itself. In this way, the students start to grasp how a democracy can become totalitarian as a direct result of the seemingly inconsequential choices of ordinary citizens. They also see how a population that has been primed by such beliefs can more easily come under the influence of a charismatic leader and powerful propaganda.

To give the students a sense of the incremental rise of the Nazis, I hand each one a card with a dated event and ask them to get into chronological order by forming a Human Timeline. Then, one by one, they are asked to read their card aloud and to consider, after each card is read, whether and how something could have been done at that point to prevent the genocide that was the Holocaust.

This activity lends itself to the Frog-in-Boiling-Water Analogy. I explain the classic science experiment about frogs who will jump out of boiling water on a hot stove but who will also burn to death if the heat is turned up...
slowly. The students start to make the connection between the frogs and the people who watched as neighbor turned against neighbor slowly, over time, until it was too late to either reverse or escape an unbearable situation.

Other activities reinforce the concept that historical tragedies often arise on the heels of a series of choices with consequences that, left unchecked by an engaged citizenry, grow dire over time. We read Maurice Ogden’s *The Hangman*, a poetic parable about a bystander who allows his fellow citizens to be hanged one by one by a stranger in the town square until there is no one left to save him. From the reading, the students grasp how choosing to take no action is in fact a critical action in itself. And hence, they also come to see that citizens’ active participation in protecting tolerance and respect for diversity is a necessary precondition for democracy to be realized and sustained.

**THE HOLOCAUST**

What is the Holocaust? What does resistance mean in a world of diminished choices? What factors contributed to the choices the perpetrators made?

In this part of the course, the students now focus on the Holocaust itself—a time when the Nazis murdered millions of men, women, and children, solely because of their perceived ancestry. Drawing on a variety of historical sources and the ideas raised in previous classes, the students confront the question “How could the Holocaust have possibly happened in the heart of civilized Europe?”

As part of our quest for the answer, I first try to gauge what my students already know about the time period. Typically, the students cite popular movies such as Steven Spielberg’s *Schindler’s List* or books such as *The Diary of Anne Frank*. They recall scenes of graphic horror and raise poignant questions about whether something like the Holocaust could ever happen again. This is the point at which I usually feel compelled to detail why, out of so many important events in world history and American history, I choose to focus so much of our time on the Holocaust.

I explain that the Holocaust—though a unique event—also offers stark, universal lessons about the way history unfolds. Among other things, the Holocaust is a case study of the moral consequences of pushing human
beings outside the universe of obligation; it allows us to see how we create “the other,” why we often cede responsibility when in the context of groups, and what compels us to act on our conscience. To bolster the argument, I ask my students to consider these four points:

1. The Holocaust began in a highly industrialized democracy, expedited by the most advanced science and technology then known to humankind.
2. The murder of 6 million Jews could not have happened on such a scale without the participation of masses of ordinary citizens.
3. Killing Jews had no major political or economic justification; it was an end in itself.
4. Eyewitness accounts from perpetrators, victims, bystanders, rescuers, and resisters paint a picture of human behavior in all of its complexity.

Though we spend just one session on the Holocaust survivors’ testimonies, the idea is not to downplay the experience of the victims. On the contrary, having survivors come into the classroom to speak or, when that is not possible, watching Steven Spielberg’s documentary Survivors of the Shoah, has such a profound effect that students require only the smallest exposure to begin to imagine the larger horrors.

After hearing from the survivors, I ask the students to write their responses in complete silence on a giant “graffiti board” I have taped to the wall. This silent exercise is designed to allow the students to process the experience on their own terms—without first consulting their peers. Yet in every class in which I have tried this, most students express similar sentiments—that they are overwhelmed or humbled by the magnitude of what their fellow human beings have suffered at the hands of other people.

To be sure, the roles of the victimizers and victims during the Holocaust are critical to understanding how historical events played out, but they are not the only ones. Like other trained Facing History teachers, I aim to convey that during the Holocaust, individual choices contributed to more nuanced roles. Ordinary citizens—who on some level chose to be bystanders, resisters, and rescuers—were also essential creators of the history that unfolded.

To illustrate, I assign readings of numerous first-person accounts of German youth documented in the resource book given to all teachers.
trained by the Facing History organization. In readings excerpted by *Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior*, students are often startled to discover that while some teenagers readily joined the Hitler Youth and thrilled to the feeling of being part of a larger historical force, others struggled mightily with turning on their Jewish friends and their inner conscience, or going against the wishes of their teachers and other authority figures in the larger society. I ask the class to consider what choices German youth had before and during the Holocaust and, more specifically, what determined the choices they actually made.

Our readings of testimonies by adult bystanders, resisters, and rescuers serve to further enrich the discussion. In an account titled “Mauthausen,” we read a description of how a home for developmentally disabled children near Vienna was taken over by the Nazis as a center for mass murder with questions—but little protest—by neighboring residents.11 “The Protest at Rosenstrasse 2–4” depicts the activation of another group of bystanders—a group of intermarried Aryan women—loudly protesting the roundup of their Jewish husbands and children and succeeding in securing their release.12 And in “The Courage of Le Chambon,” we read about an entire community that turned their town into a hiding place for Jews from across Europe.13 These profound accounts underscore critical subtleties in individual decisions to shape history. In reflecting upon them, the students are able to see how a single person can consciously or unconsciously choose to play different roles on the bystander, resister, or rescuer spectrum. And it must be said here that we also look at the complexities embedded in “choice-less choices,” or situations so dire that all choices seem tragic.

Establishing the role of choice in human behavior and understanding how these choices add up to a larger history are essential for better grasping the next step in the Facing History scope and sequence—one having to do with historical accountability.

**RESPONSIBILITY, MEMORY, AND RECONCILIATION**

Who is to blame? Are some people more to blame than others? How do we judge and/or punish those who participated? Is forgiveness, or even reconciliation, possible? How do we remember—so that we will never forget?
In this part of the Facing History course, the students consider the human atrocities of the Holocaust and conceptualize the meaning of guilt, responsibility, and judgment. They examine the Nuremberg Trials, at which many high-ranking Nazi officials were tried for war crimes, and they learn how the standards established in those trials have set the stage for how other nations deal with war crimes. The students also look at the different ways people take responsibility for the past, including preserving its memory through communal gestures such as monuments and memorials.

We launch our study by looking at a series of slides of Holocaust memorials from around the world, arranged by Facing History librarians and embodied in the online module “Memory, History, Memorials.” By comparing monuments and memorials devoted to the same subject matter but produced by various artists on various sites in various nations, the students glimpse how much context can influence historical preservation. And after viewing Maya Lin: A Strong Clear Vision, a documentary about the young Chinese American architect who endured a political firestorm after designing the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, the students are primed to engage in the hands-on activity of designing their own monuments.

Our Monument and Memorial Art Project begins with the students asking themselves, “What one idea in this Facing History course do I think is most essential to be preserved? What critical concept is most in danger of being overlooked or forgotten?”

The students are then prompted to think as a real sculptor might: “Where should my monument be ideally located?” “What should be my monument’s ideal scale?” “Who should be targeted to view my monument?” And “What materials should be used to construct my monument?” The students’ level of understanding is evidenced in their production of a Memorial Art Gallery. They are allotted two class periods to work with self-hardening clay to make their monument a small-scale reality and present it to the entire school, accompanied by a placard with text that details their work.

And though the project feels climactic, the discussion about memorializing history hardly ends with it. I guide my students to consider other ways that history is remembered—ways that transcend a physical rendering. And this is where we examine the recent work of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Led by the African National Congress in the wake of the dismantling of apartheid in the early 1990s, the commission
was designed to confront past evils in a manner that would allow the country to forge a future with all its citizens. The commission testimony we watch, excerpted from *Facing the Truth with Bill Moyers*, illustrates the beginning of what for some South Africans is a healing process but for others is a source of further torment. I show excerpts from the film in the hope that the students will come away with a glimmer of understanding of—and a great respect for—how challenging it can be for a society to come together after massive injustice.

**CHOOSING TO PARTICIPATE**

Does one individual matter? How can I make a difference? Where do I begin?

The conclusion of the course revolves around reflecting on the role individuals have in shaping history. In the best case, the students can now see that the choices they make every day—in thought and in action—can have an effect on history. If my greatest hopes as a teacher have been realized, Facing History leaves the students asking questions about what it means to be a citizen in a democracy and how to exercise their rights and responsibilities to create a more compassionate world.

For this concluding session, we look at carefully selected excerpts of *Eyes on the Prize*, the acclaimed documentary of the 1960s American civil rights movement. The segments that I show center on the various roles played by adolescents in the social and legislative gains made by African Americans during this time period.

The students hear the story of the Little Rock Nine, the group of high school students who confronted a torrent of hostility as they successfully integrated the Arkansas schools. And we watch the Birmingham children, who led nonviolent protests in the streets and willingly went to jail in place of their African American parents, who could not afford to miss a single day of paid work. Both serve as stark examples of how small groups of marginalized American youth could play a part in shaping history writ large. In their journals and class discussions, the students often articulate that the idea that people like themselves who are too young to vote could exercise such a powerful voice in democratic life is an especially compelling one.

This sentiment naturally leads into our concluding discussions about
the students’ present—today’s history. The *Reebok Human Rights Awards* is a streaming video documentary that profiles young people recognized by the global athletic shoe company for making exponential differences in the world. Upon screening some clips of the film in class, I ask my students to share with me thoughts about their own roles in choosing to prevent injustice and make a positive difference for other human beings.

The ensuing discussion brings the Facing History course full circle. If I have been successful in reaching them in the way I have intended, my students understand fully—and can fully express—that they can be not only historians but also makers of history.

**PEDAGOGICAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM TEACHING THE FACING HISTORY CURRICULUM**

Just as Facing History is intended to help teachers introduce students to the moral gray zones of history, so it is that the curriculum does the same for educators. With the help of an online campus, a multimedia lending library, and continued seminar training, Facing History teachers are openly challenged to confront profound questions about how and why we teach history in the first place. The most effective Facing History facilitators encourage teachers to see their profession as an ongoing exploration without necessarily postulating any absolute answers. For me, these questions include:

- How do I teach history through introspection and a lens of human behavior without violating students’ personal lives?
- How do I reconcile teaching history with my personal motive of inculcating civic virtues?
- How do I teach different perspectives without conveying a sense of moral relativism?
- How do I convey the unique qualities of a historic event while drawing universal lessons? As a Jewish teacher—and as an American teacher—how do I fairly present and justify the emphasis on “my” history?
- How do I make the distinction between holding individuals accountable for great atrocities without losing compassion for them and the situation of “choice-less choices”?
- How do I measure the progress of Facing History students?
Facing History never claims to have all the solutions; but its success lies in its ability to raise virtually all the right questions. In so doing, it engages both teacher and student in applying knowledge beyond the classroom walls and can instill a lifelong sensitivity to social inequalities and the skills and passion to make a profound difference in the way current—and future—history unfolds.

NOTES

5. The Facing History online campus, available to teachers trained by Facing History associates, is at http://www.facinghistorycampus.org.
12. Ibid., 376.
13. Ibid., 385.
Afterword

MICHELE RIVKIN-FISH AND ELENA TRUBINA

In early 2001, the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, in cooperation with their Russian partners, the Russian Ministry of Higher Education and the Moscow Public Science Foundation, established three Centers for Advanced Study and Education (CASEs), based at Ural State University, Tomsk State University, and Voronezh State University. Recognizing the pivotal role of higher education in a society undergoing massive political-economic and social change, the foundations described the goals of establishing and supporting the CASEs as aiming “to strengthen universities, restore academic communities, foster a new generation of social scientists and integrate scholars from the region into the West.” This book is a product of the CASE endeavor. Its topic—the challenges of understanding cultural diversity and promoting tolerance in complex societies—was the core topic of the faculty at Ural State University in Yekaterinburg, a CASE represented by the volume’s coeditor, Elena Trubina. Our two workshops, and the ongoing communication that took place between the Ural CASE participants and scholars at higher educational institutions in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Ulan-Ude, and the United States as we developed this volume, reflect the very kinds of intellectual exchanges, debates, and development that the CASEs were designed to facilitate.

As is discussed in the introduction to this volume, the international character of our group raised productive questions regarding how distinct social contexts shape the scholarly analysis of “diversity” and “tolerance.” We became aware of this issue during our first workshop in 2005, and were reminded of it repeatedly in the course of our collaborative work, as we undertook the process of editing the chapters and continuing our conversations (via the Internet) with the contributors to this volume. Thus, as we began to analyze and summarize the various ways the scholars in our collective approached their analyses of diversity, we found ourselves compelled again and again to ask how particular epistemological differences may have been rooted in the condi-
tions of academic production: how had contributors’ own life experiences, both as members of a particular society and as professionals in particular institutional locations, shaped their analytical frameworks, their methods, their writing styles, and even partially their conclusions? Darima Amogolonova, responding to an inquiry on chapter 2 by coeditor Michele Rivkin-Fish, offered some insights into these issues when she described the broader crisis situation in which Russian humanities scholars have worked and struggled:

We have to take into consideration the fact that scientific research in this country during the Soviet period had only one financing source—the state, both in the Academy of Sciences and in the universities. Those responsible for research simultaneously had to be responsible for the ideological—i.e., Marxist—purity of scientific production. And almost at once the situation changed completely! [...] A political battle began between the old Marxist guard and newer thinkers. For the former, it was vitally urgent to retain the old methodology; for the latter, to gain inclusion in international scientific trends and modern modes of thought. The struggle sometimes led to the complete denial of the previously accumulated scientific heritage. This especially concerned the social sciences, which suffered most of all. In addition, poor financial support from the state led many young people to leave scientific institutes and change professions. [...] I won’t say that the crisis has now been overcome, but at present at least the institutes have opportunities and scholars have the possibility to work. What is most valuable, scholars of different methodological approaches can now express their views openly in scientific discussions.  

Having been established in the context of this kind of crisis, the CASEs represent a much-welcomed intervention that has greatly contributed to invigorating Russian scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. Yet questions remain as to how the experiences to which Amogolonova refers—from the political battles over ideology and analytical models, to the reorganization of academic institutions, to the emergence of pluralism in scholarly debates—shape current scholarship, and what kind of impact they have on the development of diversity within the Russian academy.
This volume has suggested that the broader context of social and academic life has an impact on scholarly production in both the United States and Russia, and that the analysis of “diversity” is a prime arena for examining how this occurs. We found it intriguing that during our in-person discussions, all the American contributors to this volume eagerly applied an explicitly normative, democratic framework to their analysis, whereas most of the Russian contributors deployed a social constructivist approach against primordialist and essentialist discourses alone, and expressed skepticism toward the Americans’ willingness to entertain the possibility of actually realizing the “good society.” Unfortunately, assessing the representativeness of this trend beyond our small sample of scholars is beyond the scope of this brief afterword. Though certain American observers of Russia might see in this trend a confirmation of American critiques that Russian academics are too compliant and exhibit a low level of political activity in the face of growing authoritarianism, we reject such an analysis, asking why such a critique is not similarly directed at American academics—for even those who embrace a normative stance in writing are rarely also mobilizing collective action for social change.

Our point here is different. We have argued that social context matters greatly in the kinds of arguments academics develop; American society urges and endorses problem-solving modes of thinking, and the American contributors to this volume also confront their topics with the tacit awareness that a substantial degree of political activity exists both in and outside academe, and, perhaps more important, with a sense that it is reasonable to expect that undertaking collective political activity may lead to the realization of significant change for the better. The Russian contributors, conversely, write from the position of people living in the state with minimal political life and an impoverished social fabric. Tolerance for diversity as a normative ideal concerns very few in contemporary Russia; ubiquitous pressures to make money overshadow concerns for justice and mutual respect, or lead these concerns to become instrumentalized.

In raising these insights, we draw on a recent pragmatic turn in social theory that posits the need to view social practices—and here we include modes of scholarly analysis—not from an abstract normative standpoint but from the perspectives of the participants, which are always shaped by the broader social context. Thus, the American contributors to this volume are not simply more oriented toward normative criteria—they are
also encouraged to have this standpoint by virtue of living in a society that
endorses and supports this perspective.

Also, in parallel fashion, the pressures and tensions facing the Russian
social sciences and humanities have a direct impact on the daily experi-
ences of scholars who research and write about “diversity”—even those
in the relatively privileged settings of the CASEs. At the outset of the es-
establishment of the CASEs, when the Carnegie Foundation invested $2.4
million, hopes were expressed that eventually the Russian government and
Russia-based donors would continue the financing of scholarly activities in
the social sciences and humanities. Fortunately, the disciplines represented
in the CASEs—geography and history, social theory and philosophy, and
international relations and cultural studies—now receive at least moderate
support of the Russian governmental funding bodies. At the same time,
neoliberal reforms in higher education aim to reduce the state’s obligations
to provide social welfare, while increasing the management of economic,
social, and ideological relations. As a result, many universities simulta-
neously face budget cuts and increases in bureaucratic regulations, while
higher education reforms aim to produce a dozen “world level” federal
universities by merging existing ones. This leads to an increased depen-
dence on state funding and management of selected universities (including
Ural State) and a significant reduction in the number of those schools that
receive stable and substantial state funding. All those who fail to get into
the circle of so-called federal universities will have to subsist on very mod-
est state funding, raise funds themselves, and find themselves in serious
competition with private institutions for prospective students. There are
fewer and fewer students because the generation that was born in the early
1990s, during years in which Russia suffered its lowest birth rates ever, is
now entering universities.

The Russian participants in our project brought this social and institu-
tional experience—and their awareness that international collaborations to
promote the diversity of intellectual work are in jeopardy—with them to
our workshops. On the one hand, the global aspirations of the education
reformers from the Russian government produce an instrumentalized social
climate in which scholars experience themselves as constantly being prompt-
ed to become more “efficient” in terms of the number of lectures they give
abroad or articles they publish in international journals, so that university
administrators have achievements to boast about in their reports.³
On the other hand, they came with the knowledge that it is highly unlikely that as historians, literary theorists, and sociologists, they will be able to attract extensive local funding for their kind of research. Indeed, they are often accused by their university administrations of producing words, texts, and theories that are divorced from societal goals. Moreover, many came burdened with the broader perception that Russian society views poorly remunerated, socially oriented professions (whether social work, teaching, or others) as lacking prestige in these neoliberal times. These scholars thus experienced the growing conformism and fragmentation of political interests in Russia on the personal level.

One important outcome of this is that the Russian participants in our project saw the persistent efforts by Western donors to support their work as having vital importance, even if they did not always agree with all the terms of the collaboration. Some found that the American participants’ focus on classic liberalism seemed to erase the fact that it is the ideology of neoliberalism that increasingly structures politics and everyday life. This contradiction—or perhaps connection—raises a key question: To what extent does diversity rhetoric, framed in normative pretensions, take into consideration the fact that neoliberalism normatively constructs and interpellates individuals as entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life? Here we do not mean the simple extension of market values into the political sphere but the essentially normative character of neoliberalism as a cultural logic, which readily makes the state the main mechanism for promoting economic rationality and prescribing to subjects how to behave as rational agents and consumers. Given that the transition period in Russia simultaneously brought liberalism and neoliberalism, and arguably institutionalized the latter far more thoroughly than the former, the Russian scholars’ reluctance to expect profound social change as a result of liberal democratic discourses is understandable.

The analysis of diversity and difference requires a multiplicity of models and frameworks, along with opportunities for debates about them—and this is perhaps the most normative statement that we as editors are willing to support.

NOTES

2. This is from an email message from Darima Amogolonova to Michele Rivkin-Fish, June 14, 2007.

3. It is important to point out the essential role that competence in the English language plays in structuring the opportunities Russian scholars have to engage in international projects. Though Russian universities benefit from the symbolic capital of having their faculty involved in international endeavors, they have done very little to enable their faculty to develop fluency in English. Nor has the inequality between those Russian academics who have had opportunities to improve their English and those who have not been addressed by the foundations based in the United States that have promoted the democratization of higher education in Russia.


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The CASE Program

The Kennan Institute, in partnership with the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, initiated the Centers for Advanced Study and Education (CASE) program with a needs assessment conducted in 1998 and 1999. The CASE program established nine thematic research centers at regional Russian universities in order to foster scholarship in the social sciences and humanities. It sought to integrate Russian scholars into the international academic community through a system of individual research fellowships, library and publications support, and professional community-building efforts. The Centers were established in partnership with the Carnegie Corporation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Russian Ministry of Education, and the Moscow Public Science Foundation in 2000 and were administered jointly with the ISE Center (Information. Scholarship. Education.) since 2002. The program ended in 2010.
Darima Amogolonova is a senior researcher in the Department of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Religions in the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist, and Tibetan Studies, of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. She is also an Associate Professor in World History, Department of History, Buryat State University. Her principle publication is *Sovremennaya buryatskaya etnosfera: diskursy, paradigm, sociokul’turnye praktiki* [Modern Buryat Ethnosphere: Discourses, Paradigms, Sociocultural Practices], Ulan-Ude: BGU, 2008. She has recently published an article in English entitled “Religious Revival in Modern Buryatia” in *Asiatische Studien Études Asiatisques*, Vol.63, No. 2 (2009).

Omer Bartov is the John P. Birkelund Distinguished Professor of European History at Brown University. He was born and raised in Israel and received his B.A. degree from Tel Aviv University. He was awarded his D.Phil. from Oxford University in 1983, and taught at Tel Aviv University until 1989. Bartov is the recipient of fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Academy in Berlin, the Radcliffe Institute at Harvard, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Davis Center at Princeton, and others. He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His books include *The Eastern Front, 1941-45* (1985), *Hitler’s Army* (1991), *Murder in Our Midst* (1996), *Mirrors of Destruction* (2000), *Germany’s War and the Holocaust* (2003), *The “Jew” in Cinema* (2005), and *Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine* (2007). His books have been translated into many languages. Bartov has also written for such magazines as *The New Republic, The Nation, The Times Literary Supplement, The New York Times Book Review, The Washington Post*, and other European and Israeli journals. He is currently writing a history of the town of Buczacz in Eastern Galicia.

Rachel Burg Belin is the Director of Development for the Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence, a statewide citizen’s advocacy organization that promotes high-quality public schools in Kentucky. A certified high school social studies teacher, she has taught the Facing History and Ourselves curriculum to students in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida and in Lexington, Kentucky. She has also spent over two decades working with young people outside the classroom to use the media to amplify their voices in public life through media-literacy initiatives such as the Youth
Voice Collaborative, the Peabody-Award-Winning radio program, Kid Company, and the Youth News Team in Lexington. She received a B.A. from Harvard College and an M.A.T. from the University of Rochester.

**Katherine Graney** is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Government at Skidmore College in Saratoga Springs, New York. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her major publications include *Of Khans and Kremlins: Tatarstan and the Future of Ethno-Federalism in Russia* (Lexington Books: Lanham, MD, 2009). Her articles about Tatarstan have also appeared in journals such as *Europe-Asia Studies* and *Problems of Post-Communism*. She is currently at work on a book-length manuscript about the “Europe question” and legacies of Orientalism in the former Soviet Union. Her research interests include multiculturalism and federalism in Russia, gender in the former Soviet Union, and relations between Russia and the European Union.

**Oksana Karpenko** was trained in sociology and is currently the Associate Director of the Center for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg (www.cisr.ru). Together with her colleagues at the Center for Independent Social Research, she has edited two volumes on the role of the academic community in opposing the spread of racist ideas and discriminatory practices in Russia, including *Racism in the Language of Social Sciences* (coedited with Viktor Voronkov and Alexander Osipov; Aletheia, 2002) and *Racism in the Language of Education* (coedited with Viktor Voronkov and Alexander Osipov; Aletheia, 2008).

**Stuart J. Kaufman** is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. He specializes in ethnic conflict, international security affairs and international relations theory. Trained in political science, he aims to broaden that discipline by drawing on insights from political psychology to develop a theory of symbolic politics. He is the author of *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Cornell University Press, 2001), and co-editor of *The Balance of Power in World History* (Houndmills, England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). He served as Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs on the U.S. National Security Council staff in 1999. His current research focuses on nationalist
movements that have worked to avoid ethnic violence, such as those led by Mohandas Gandhi and Nelson Mandela.

**Michele Rivkin-Fish** is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Her research focuses on reproductive and demographic politics and their relationship to broader social transformations in Russia. Her book, *Women’s Health in Post-Soviet Russia: The Politics of Intervention* (Indiana University Press, 2005), was awarded the 2006 Basker Prize for Outstanding Work on Gender and Health, by the Society for Medical Anthropology, and the 2006 Heldt Prize for Best Book in Women’s Studies by the Association of Women in Slavic Studies of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. She is currently working on a study of pronatalist politics in Russia. A key theme in her work involves the challenges that Western feminist theory confronts in making sense of Soviet and post-Soviet societies.

**Tatiana Skrynnikova** is Head Researcher, Professor, and Ph.D. in History at the Culture and Art Studies Sector, Institute of Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Science in Ulan-Ude, Republic of Buryatia, Russia. In addition to numerous articles, she is the author or co-author of six Russian-language monographs on ethnic Buryats, including *Charisma and Authority in the Epoch of Chinggis-khan* (1997); and most recently, a two volume series on *Buryat Ethnicity in the Context of Socio-Cultural Modernization*, one covering the Soviet period, (co-authored with P.K. Varnavskyi and S.D. Batomunkuev) in 2004, and one on the post-Soviet period, co-authored with Darima Amogolonova and I.E. Yelaeva, in 2005.

**Elena Trubina** is Professor of Philosophy at Ural State University in Ekaterinburg, Russia. Her research addresses a broad set of issues in social theory, including the intersections of philosophy and qualitative studies, and the interactions between urban space and subjectivities. Her publications include four books in Russian, articles published in American Studies International and Stadtbaeuwt, and book chapters in edited collections, including *Negotiating Urban Conflicts* (transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2006) and *Transit Spaces* (jovis Verlag, Berlin, 2006). She has been a visiting scholar at Bauhaus-Dessau, The International Center of Research on Culture (IFK),
Vienna, and Harvard University. Trubina co-edited “Trauma: punkty” (Moscow, 2009) and Russian Mass Media and Changing Values (Routledge, 2010). She is currently the co-organizer of the interdisciplinary Russian-Finnish project on the coverage of ideas of the good life and post-Soviet subjectivities by the Russian media, as well as co-organizer of the CASE network project “The Russian Cities: The Strategies of the Authorities and Citizens’ Recourses.”

Tatiana Venediktova is Professor and Head of the Department of Discourse and Communication Studies, and Professor, Department of Comparative Literature in the School of Philology, at Moscow State University. Her research examines the history of literature, intercultural communication, and American and comparative literature and culture. Trained in literary history, she later became interested in discourse and cultural studies, and in the broader uses of literary theory applied to/in cultural research. Her publications include: Poetry of Walt Whitman (1982); 20th Century Poetry in America: Discovering Modernity (1989); The Self Made Man as Image and Profile: The Experience in American Culture (1993); Finding the Voice. Poetic Tradition in America (1994); and Conversation in American: Discourse of Bargaining in the American Literary Tradition (2003).