Pillar IV of ‘Beyond Merida:’

Addressing the Socio-Economic Causes of Drug Related Crime and Violence in Mexico

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Brief Project Description

This Working Paper is the product of a the U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation project coordinated by the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. As part of this project, a number of research papers have been commissioned that provide background on organized crime in Mexico, the United States, and Central America, and the specific challenges these governments confront as they attempt to address the violence and corruption that have resulted. This paper is being released in preliminary form to inform the public about one key element in the strategy to address the underlying factors contributing to the violence and threats from organized. All papers that make up this Security Cooperation series, along with other background information and analysis, can be accessed online at the Mexico Institute web page, Materials can be used for attribution and are copyrighted to the author and the Mexico Institute.

The views of the author do not represent an official position of the Woodrow Wilson Center. For questions related to the project, for media inquiries, or if you would like to contact the author please contact the project coordinator, Eric L. Olson, at 202-691-4336 or via email at eric.olson@wilsoncenter.org.
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The ‘Merida Initiative’ and its successor ‘Beyond Merida’ form an integral part of the Mexican National Crime Strategy that seeks to contain, if not defeat narcotics trafficking, organized crime and the consequential violence. Elaborated in October 2009, both governments announced the second phase in early 2010. Broader than the ‘Merida Initiative,’ ‘Beyond Merida’ proposes four categories, known as ‘Pillars,’ some of which directly involve the U.S. government agencies and others which imply collaboration.

- Pillar I. Disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations.
- Pillar II. Strengthen state institutions, i.e. law enforcement, the judiciary and correctional institutions to reduce public insecurity and provide better serve Mexican citizens.
- Pillar III. Develop a “smart border” with the U.S. so as to facilitate trade and overcome the bottlenecks currently choking the U.S./Mexico border.
- Pillar IV. Address the social and economic factors contributing to the violence and seek to build strong and resilient communities that can withstand the pressures of crime and violence.

This article examines U.S. and Mexican government efforts to develop Pillar IV. It also recognizes programs that Mexico commenced in 2010 to focus seriously on the socio-economic causes of violence in the northern cities, Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey. This article addresses the effectiveness of current bilateral programs and asks what changes might be made to increase the impact in the short and long term.

Broad recognition exists within Mexico that increased violence and criminal behavior has soared since 2003 due to the transshipment and increased consumption of illicit drugs. Patterns of increased criminality are found principally along the northern border with the U.S. and in western states which host the shipping routes and “plazas” between production in the Andes and consumption in North America. Homicide levels have reached nearly 200 per 100,000 in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, but this is not typical of the whole country which national level for homicides close to 20 per 100,000. In addition to unacceptably high levels of homicide along the plazas, extortion and express kidnappings have seeped into municipalities formerly considered secure. The result is a nation hobbled by fear and diminished trust in public institutions. The weakness of democratic institutions, such as law enforcement, the
judiciary and political parties presents the greatest threat to Mexico. The consequences of weakened public institutions indirectly threaten the South West of the United States.

Therefore, in March 2007, at their first summit meeting in Merida, President Felipe Calderon asked President George W. Bush to support Mexican efforts to combat drug related crime. The Merida Initiative emerged from this meeting and the U.S. Congress appropriated $1.4 billion over the next two fiscal years. From an initial heavy focus on equipment transfers, technical assistance, communications capacity and the strengthening of law enforcement, the judiciary and correctional officers, the Merida Initiative has more recently broadened its focus to include the building of resilient communities to withstand the pressure of crime and violence.

Pillar IV addresses the latter through partnerships between the U.S. Department of State and USAID with Mexican federal agencies to provide technical support to plan and implement community development strategies aimed at

- Providing youth with alternatives to criminal activities;
- Catalyzing Mexican efforts to scale up programs that work; and
- Introducing rigorous monitoring and evaluation processes.

These strategies must take into account that Mexico, for centuries, has taken pride in its cultural commitment to help those in need. The challenge now is to build upon this charity so as to empower civil society and build greater civic participation, particularly at the local level. Ideas discussed at the national level need to be shared with those active in chambers of commerce, churches, and community halls at the municipal level. Good ideas developed at the local level must be heard and incorporated into national plans. Pillar IV addresses a fundamental aspect of Mexico’s transition to a fuller and more sustainable democracy, namely giving greater voice to citizens as they confront local challenges to their security and wellbeing. For this reason, Pillar IV should not be relegated to the end of the line with lesser funding. Instead, the U.S. government should be ready to respond in developing a strategy with Mexico to address the underlying causes of contemporary public insecurity.

**Traditional Mexican Social Programs:**

Mexicans have a well developed sense of charitable giving and over centuries have supported identified needy groups through family charitable giving. Donations are often, but not necessarily, linked to the Catholic Church. They support the handicapped, the sick, orphans and the elderly. Some have established schools in poor, urban areas to stimulate education. However, the programs only last as long as the charity continues. There is little concern for sustainability, or client ownership of the program. The challenge is to garner the energies and generosity of charitable giving into a broader plan that addresses fundamental social problems.
The development of that broader plan, or National Crime Strategy requires the input of the Mexican government, private donors and civil society. Foreign aid programs may also contribute, but their role is subordinate to the Mexican government’s leadership in addressing national social problems.

The most prominent of these programs is the *Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF)* with funds from the Federal and State governments to address a broad array of social problems including school feeding, family food baskets, recreational opportunities, income generating projects, care of the elderly and orphans. DIF programs have evolved over time to confront shifting problems. For instance, hunger and malnutrition was a historical problem among Mexico’s indigenous population. In response DIF handed out ‘Family Baskets’ with basic nutritional foods to families below the poverty line. Income generating activities became important in the 1990s with DIF focusing on the training of mothers in artisanship and food preparation so that she might earn money for her family though the sale of her work, often undertaken at home while still caring for children. Immunization has always been an important program, funded by the Ministry of Health, but supported by DIF’s outreach through its municipal offices under the direction of State governors. Today, in the northern Mexican states, DIF focuses on Youth-At-Risk. Professional sociologists and psychiatrists design DIF programs and professional staff executes them.

DIF programs are closely related to the political party in power and are headed by the spouse of the President or state governor. Through its outreach, DIF exercises political influence on communities. It is an instrument of political power that demonstrates the government’s care in exchange for political support. Patronage is exercised effectively through the distribution of social goods and services.

In addressing the underlying causes of the drug related violence, it is therefore necessary to ask whether to expand upon existing DIF programs. Are DIF programs sufficient, or should specialized programs be developed with Secretaria de Desarrollo Social, the Ministries of Health and Education, as well as other Mexican social development agencies to address the need for quality education, extended recreational facilities and the prevention and treatment of addicts among the youth population?

*Todos Somos Juárez, Reconstruyamos la Ciudad*

This was a bold and new idea to ask the citizens of Ciudad Juárez for their analysis of the problems and their suggestions for concrete responses. Members of the business community, civil society, trade unions, youth and interested parents and citizens gathered in early 2010 to discuss 15 themes, among them housing, health, education, culture, sports, security, poverty and employment. From these discussions came firm commitments and the identification of
persons responsible for implementing and supervising the projects. In short, the citizens of Ciudad Juarez played a critical role in the design, implementation and follow up of the plan.\footnote{Estrategia Todos Somos Juárez, Reconstruyamos la Ciudad www.todosmososjuarez.gob.mx}

A key aspect of the strategy was the coordination among the Federal, State and Municipal governments in the implementation of 168 programs. The intent was that effective interaction between officials at the three levels of government would create additional synergies.

A working plan was developed that outlined the commitment, the objectives to be carried out within 100 days and a timeline for completion. The process was structured and funds identified to permit non-governmental-organizations (NGOs) to carry out specific programs.\footnote{USAID played a part in Todos Somos Juarez, holding a daylong conference to discuss human rights, victims’ rights, cohesive and safe communities, security and justice. See www.msimex.com} The concept was excellent and the degree of transparency in determining progress or lack thereof was remarkable. However, something happened. \textit{Todos Somos Juarez} ended its first year of funding on December 31, 2010 and an assessment of the 168 programs was due to be published in mid-February 2011. This never materialized.

One year later, \textit{Todos Somos Juarez} has lost its luster. President Calderon’s office admits disappointments and regrets that only a numerical grading on the number of school opened, roads paved etc... is available. The Mexican government’s intent to hold itself accountable has yet to be realized. Meantime, the failure to complete all projects within the timeframe is explained by the rushed effort to coordinate multiple programs, the overall broad and ambitious nature of the project, the elections and change of government in the course of 2010, as well as the slow disbursement of 600 million Mexican pesos in Federal funds.

This is regrettable, because the underlying purpose was to begin a process of citizen consultation, participation in the choice and implementation of the projects, a participatory budgetary process and most important of all, citizen oversight of the projects. It was the process more than the substance of the programs which was needed to change the attitude of citizens toward their government. Citizen participation in \textit{Todos Somos Juarez} introduced a degree of transparency in the development and oversight of the programs. The intent was to develop incipient trust both in the Federal and local governments. Therefore, as the Federal government grades the relative completion of 115 of its programs, it should not lose that citizen participation in the supervision. No citizen expects perfection in the completion of his or her projects, but persistence is necessary to overcome obstacles, learn from mistakes and continue to work toward the shared goal. I therefore argue that the funeral for \textit{Todos Somos}...
Juárez should not occur and that the comprehensive and integrated approach to building strong and resilient communities should endure.


If a youthful population with minimal educational skills, inadequate employment skills for jobs in the 21st century, dysfunctional families and easy access to illicit drugs and firearms are causes of the current violence, how might the U.S. government respond? Secretary Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. held ‘shared responsibility’ for the drug related violence in Mexico in both her 2009 and 2010 visits to Mexico. How then might the State Department contribute to addressing the causes of that violence?

Pillar IV seeks to develop effective socio-economic programs with leadership from the Mexican government and the support of the U.S. government. To date, the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) is the principal agency that has coordinated the U.S. response to the ‘Merida Initiative’ and ‘Beyond Merida’. As the principal depository of congressionally approved funds, INCLE has addressed the programs under all Pillars, including Pillar IV. To date, the U.S. Congress has not assigned funds to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for Merida’s Pillar IV. Only in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 would USAID receive appropriated funds for Pillar IV projects and those may be subject to the budget cuts presently being negotiated in Congress. Instead, USAID has reassigned funds from its own programs in FY 2008 and FY 2009.

U.S. Budgets for Pillar IV Projects:

- In FY2010, INCLE transferred $5 million to USAID out of its Economic Support Fund (ESF). USAID transferred $3.5 million from previous year’s health programs.
- In FY2011, INCLE has agreed to transfer $14 million to USAID for Pillar IV projects.
- In FY2012, USAID has requested $33 million for Pillar IV. These monies will be ESF which means that they are not earmarked and are subject to other U.S. government priorities.3

Until USAID and the Mexican government announce their coordinated and bilateral strategic plan, we refer to those U.S. programs developed by Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), as well as the program with the Organization of American States (OAS).

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3 Monies will also be transferred to USAID to carry out Pillar II projects for the training of judicial and law enforcement officers in six Mexican states. In the regular appropriation of FY 2010, INCLE will transfer $11.5 million to USAID for this purpose.
INCLE’s participation in Pillar IV: “Creating Resilient Communities and a Culture of Lawfulness.”

INCLE has four major projects: creating communities of law; developing strategic communications; drug demand reductions; and the tip-line project. The total cost is $11.5 million and the funds have been approved by the U.S. Office of Management & Budget in the FY/2010 budget.

1. **Culture of Lawfulness.** Under a grant to the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC)⁴ and Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia (MUCD)⁵ the focus is on instilling “community ethics and values” as well as the rightfulness of not paying bribes to law enforcement and government officials for services. This is directed at a broad array of people from school children to the elderly. This work has been carried out for over ten years under a State Department grant. It will now be extended to police training, mass media and ‘centers of moral authority’ assumed to mean the churches. The effects of these programs are expected to take a generation.

Budget: $2 million per annum to be shared between NSIC and MUCD.

2. **Drug Demand Reduction:** Five programs within this portfolio pre-date Merida and support Mexico’s National Council Against Addiction “CNADIC.”⁶ Many of these programs replicate INCLE projects in other parts of the world.
   i. **Long distance learning** project to increase awareness among rural and local communities. Despite problems in sharing technical specification, agreement was near in mid-March, 2011.

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⁴ Founded in 1962 by Roy Godson, The National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) “Identifies, researches, pilots, and promotes innovative strategies to enhance security and the quality of life in democratic societies. Founded as a nonpartisan, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, NSIC has been at the forefront of education about challenges to democratic institutions for nearly 50 years.” NSIC Goals from its webpage [www.rightweb.irc-online.org](http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org)

⁵ **BASTA, Queremos un México más seguro!** Josefina Ricano and a group of Mexican citizens founded MUCD in November 1997 after the kidnapping and murder of her son Raul. MUCD’s purpose is to raise awareness among citizens and to create an NGO dedicated to sharing information and combating apathy which leaves citizens wondering if they will be the next victim. See [www.mucd.org.mx](http://www.mucd.org.mx)

⁶ The mission of the **Consejo Nacional Contra las Adicciones** (STCONADIC) is to promote and protect the health of Mexicans, by means of a national policy to prepare and develop human capabilities in the research, prevention, and treatment of addictions with the intent to improve the quality of individual, family and social life. See [www.conadic.gob.mx](http://www.conadic.gob.mx)
ii. **Certification of Counselors:** Certification standards meet best international practices. The intent is to improve drug treatment programs in Mexico and assure that best practices are used.

iii. **Creating Drug Free Coalitions:** Focused on the Mexican Border States with the U.S., this program seeks to create greater public awareness through publicity campaigns that advocate “don’t do drugs.” Mexican NGOs together with U.S. consultants implement these programs which seek to emulate the Coalition for a Drug Free America.

iv. **Training Drug Counselors:** Less advanced than the Counselor Certification, this training approaches a lower level of drug counselor with introductory, intermediate and advanced courses. The advanced course remains less rigorous than that offered in the Counselor Certification.

v. **Establishment of Drug Courts:** Begun in 2009, these are currently operating successfully in Nuevo Leon and Chiapas.

Budget: $33 million has been spent on these five programs in FY/2008, ‘09 and ’10.

3. **Tip Line Project:**
   i. The Mexican government is currently replacing the current 066 Emergency line and 089 Tip line with a new number linked to the regional C4 National Centre. U.S. technology is used to erase the identity of the caller and protect the anonymity of victims and witnesses. The Mexican telephone company(s) cooperate in this project because calls go over their (its) lines. In Ciudad Juarez, GPS systems are now installed in all police cars and are linked to the State C4 Center. INCLE seeks to upgrade the C4 Centre in all Mexican states.

   ii. Civil Society should oversee police action in executing follow up. Police response should be reduced from 20 to 4 minutes. Civil Society seeks to restore trust in the tip line concept and law enforcement. A public relations campaign will be launched to inform citizens when the new systems are in place.

   Budget: $5million reprogrammed from FY/2009 funds.

**OAS Support Through its Drug Abuse Control Commission**

Furthermore, close collaboration has existed for several years between the Mexican government and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), an agency within

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7 Regional fusion centers that coordinate crime data at the Federal, state and local level.
the OAS. The purpose is to enhance the human and institutional capacity of the Mexican government in order to reduce the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs. CICAD’s current work concentrates on the development of drug courts and the training of regional judges.

**USAID Programs in 2010**

Using Economic Support Funds within its discretion, USAID has supported notable projects that contributed to Pillar IV, even before that Pillar was announced.

1. Consolidate PanAmerican Health Organization electronic mapping of accidental and intentional homicides in Ciudad Juarez;
2. Strengthen integrated community work through La Federacion Empresariado Chihuahuense (FECHAC);
3. Engage with At-Risk-Youth to provide safe-spaces, after-school programs, and skills training;
4. Provide technical assistance to support urban planning;
5. Strengthen alliance partnerships; and

1. **Pan American Health Organization’s Electronic Mapping**

Electronic mapping enables a municipality to determine where and when crimes occur. This enables law enforcement to focus its capability on high crime areas. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) is currently mapping homicides in Ciudad Juarez from its office in El Paso, Texas. The map originated to determine mortality from traffic accidents. With USAID funding, it subsequently expanded to map homicides, whether intentional or accidental. The significance of this mapping is the recognition that homicides are both a matter of crime and public health. If death from dengue fever is recognized as a public health issue, then death at the hands of drug traffickers, criminals and youth gangs should be likewise recognized as a matter of public health. Mapping not only permits the concentration of law enforcement assets, but allows the monitoring of rising and decreasing death rates. However, it becomes critical to distinguish between intra-family crimes of rage from those caused by traffic accidents and from intentional homicides. Figures from the morgue do not necessarily distinguish between the three. Police figures are a better tool.

PAHOs map of homicides should be continued. It should be possible to create similar maps for Tijuana, Reynosa and Monterrey, cities presently suffering high homicide rates. Depending on cost constraints, the Mexican Federal government may want to identify additional cities for electronic mapping.
The electronic maps also identify the placement of police precincts, health clinics, schools and social service centers. This provides an overview of government presence within a community. Comparing state presence with homicide rates enables the municipal government to know which institutions need strengthening with personnel and equipment.

Budget: $2 million over 2 years

2. **La Federacion Empresariado Chihuahuense (FECHAC)**

FECHAC is an association of business men and women with 29,000 members in the state of Chihuahua that support their respective communities through basic education, preventive health, training and the formation of social capital. Their goal is to develop stronger citizens and communities. Begun in 2005, the association enables citizens to work together with funds provided principally by a 10% tithe from each business. In Ciudad Juarez, FECHAC supports after school programs for students up to 14 years old. The concern is that FECHAC’s support for one school represents a model to replicate, but does not go far enough to addressing the underlying problem. In December 2010, FECHAC has begun to work with the International Youth Foundation to develop “Youth: Work for Mexico.” This project should extend FECHAC’s activities into a comprehensive education and skills training program with job opportunities provided by the members of the business organization.

3. **Engaging Youth-At-Risk, “Youth: Work for Mexico!”**

Under a grant to the International Youth Foundation, and collaborating with FECHAC, USAID has focused on developing after-school and summer programs for Mexican youth aged 9 to 29 years. Safe zones have been identified where youth can meet and play sports. A survey of the skills needed among local business is being carried out to identify which areas of training are most needed. It is anticipated that appropriate skills training given to 500 students each year can help them find work within the Ciudad Juarez business community.

Budget: $3 million grant over 3 years.

4. **Support Urban Planning**

The rapid pace of urbanization due to the migration of people in search of factory jobs has resulted in population growth and density that contribute to increased levels of crime and violence. This is particularly true in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. In the absence of urban planning, design and management, organized criminal groups have taken control and average Mexican citizens are left vulnerable to crime victimization and cartel recruitment. USAID has begun the process of identifying urban planners and social investment advisory in three cities.

Budget: USAID grant of $0.5 million over 2 years.
Using the strategic plans developed by the urban planners, USAID has begun to create a SEED capital fund to quickly start up programs that present targets of opportunities and that focus on sustainability. USAID has engaged the private sector, local chambers of commerce, civil society and the government to several skills, technologies and resources from a range of actors.

5. **Alliance Partnerships.**

Strengthen and promote cooperation among state legislative and executive branch institutions in Mexico and the U.S., with focus on border state legislatures and attorneys general. These relationships have existed for several decades. The additional funds can be used for travel and per diem to permit officials to attend conferences on both sides of the border.

**Budget:** $1 million over 3 years.

6. **Ensuring financial stability**

To ensure the sustainability of Pillar IV projects, USAID has begun to develop state and municipal financing models that have raised $1.5 billion from Mexico’s capital market. Working through a grant to Evensen Dodge International, the program creates new financial instruments through a trust structure for multiple municipalities. Municipal debt is pooled within the framework of the national Mexican debt structure and managed at the federal level. (More language + budget to follow).

These USAID programs represent tried programs that have proven successful elsewhere. They seek to create elements of a strategic and comprehensive effort to strengthen communities. However, only Mexican government leadership and participation in the process can ensure long term success. Therefore, the prolonged effort to reach a bilateral strategy and commitment for Pillar IV is critically important. We recognize that this effort is reached through dialogue and financial commitment at the Federal level. However, success requires that state and local participation is necessary. Therefore, a broad strategy must envisage the active participation and contribution from local communities.

**Going Forward: a draft Mexican and U.S. Strategic Plan for Pillar IV**

Through a partnership with the Mexican federal government, USAID will provide technical support to both plan and implement community development strategies.

**Goal 1:**

- Support federal institutions in developing civic policies and extending best practices across states and municipalities to complement security strategies. In response to the
Mexican government’s request, USAID will provide technical assistance to develop monitoring and evaluation methods. These methods might be applied to the design and replication of civic policies, such as elements of Todos Somos Juarez.

- Work with the Federal government to fine its national crime and violence prevention plan by focusing on longer-term, prevention-oriented outcomes. USAID has gathered significant experience in this area from its work in other parts of the world. The necessary contribution is coordination among institutions of government around crime and violence prevention. Furthermore, a commitment of funds to address crime prevent ion initiatives and youth violence is essential.

- The training program in the ‘national culture of lawfulness’ (known by its Mexican acronym COL) will continue with the Mexican Federal police. It is anticipated that COL will become an integral part of police performance evaluations and promotions. Furthermore, COL programs will be expanded throughout Mexico, working with business and community leaders as well as civil society and media professionals. It is hoped that it will be integrated into the management of both States and Municipalities.

Desired budget: $8 million

**Goal 2:**

USAID offers to support the planning process and provide seed capital, as well as strategies for sustainable financing to translate the multiple and distinct state and private efforts and economic resources into sustainable programs.

- Enable key stake holders, such as elected officials, city council members, city social services, law enforcement, representative of federal institutions and local civil society to work together to develop viable community strategies for (i) public security, (ii) engagement in public expenditures of locally generated resources (iii) oversight of federal transfers for security/prevention-related issues. This was the intent of *Todos Somos Juarez* and its inclusion in the national Strategy Plan indicates that the participatory model should continue.

- USAID will help create a seed capital fund to jump start programs identified by the urban planning activity that present targets of opportunities and which can be sustained. A local entity will manage the fund. The Advisory Board and its membership might include representatives from the private sector, local municipality state government, university, civil society and a faith based group.

- Expand USAID/Mexico’s successful municipal bond capital development program to Ciudad Juarez and other border areas. In the meantime develop medium and long term finance project that will generate sufficient capital to ensure sustainability of programs that address community needs, including citizen security.
• Address the increasing levels of addition among vulnerable populations along the border. Support President Calderon’s ‘tool kit’, a Mexican developed methodology of helping families and interested parties identify addictive behavior and local appropriate treatment resources. Support *Centros de Integracion Juvenil* for young addicts in Ciudad Juarez. Help build linkages at the grass-roots level of secondary responders, such as coaches, clergy and health care providers to combat substance addiction in youth.

Desired budget: $10 million

**Goal 3:**

Provide meaningful economic opportunities and incentives for Mexicans to engage in a culture of lawfulness through building community networks of resources for at-risk-youth and continue after school and summer programs for youth in Ciudad Juarez.

• Create a network of community resources for at-risk youth through sharing information and coordinate the provision of resources. Identify gaps in services for at-risk youth and develop projects based on information gather from public surveys. (These efforts should work with law enforcement efforts and examine the critical risk factors that lead youth into crime and violence.)
• Support, “Youth: Work Mexico” an ongoing initiative that creates safe spaces for disadvantaged youth, strengthens and expands after school and summer programs and prepares Mexican youth for viable futures through self or salaried employment
• Work with CONADIC to prioritize the needs of youth in demand reduction programs. Hold a youth-at-risk conference as part of the U.S. Mexico Binational Demand Reduction Conference.”

**Challenges Ahead**

i. The development of a strategic plan envisages projects that deliver results over the long term. However, citizens in high crime areas refuse to wait. Projects that will see effects in 3 to 6 years are being rejected by the very people in Ciudad Juarez that the plan seeks to involve. Scared citizens want safety now. Currently, their voices are heard louder than those designing socio-economic plans for the long term. As a result, the staff at *Presidencia*, the

ii. Office of the Mexican President is under political pressure to deliver programs that can see results in the short term. Greater attention is given to beefed up law enforcement than social programs.

iii. Apathy is perhaps the greatest obstacle to developing social programs that address the causes of the violence. Mexican citizens retreat into their homes. The wealthy hire
private security and buy bullet proof cars, but the majority of Mexicans shrug their shoulders, cross themselves and continue to ride the bus into work. Addressing that apathy requires leadership and programs that people can see deliver results.

iv. The Colombian wealth tax delivered significant funds to pay for improved law enforcement, protected judges, as well as socio-economic programs. However, so long as government institutions are viewed as corrupt, wealthy citizens reject the concept of a tax. The same occurred for many years in Colombia. Therefore, a two-pronged strategy is needed, whereby institutions are strengthened, corrupt officials are removed and evidence of improved performance can be seen. Then, bold leadership is needed to raise a wealth tax so as to pay for national, not private security, as well as effective socio-economic programs.

Recommendations

A. Improved Communication

Within the development of socio-economic projects under Pillar IV, it is necessary to improve communication between all levels of government, as well as the public about crime. What information needs to be shared with the public to encourage victims to report crime and witnesses to participate in criminal investigations? How might knowledge of criminals promote confidence in government action? The information should be useful, but not alarmist. To avoid public cynicism it should be substantive with appropriate follow-up. Where does knowledge provoke cynicism? The bottom line is that public trust in government is very low. Greater communication might raise that trust so long as it is accompanied by reduced levels of property theft, extortion and homicides.

B. Monitoring and Evaluation

Development of criteria to evaluate success and the benchmarks to monitor progress are essential. USAID could make a valid contribution as a partial outsider to propose an evaluation scheme. The question is who will evaluate progress or retreat? Should it be the government ministries charged with the tasks of implementing crime control, or the Ombudsman for Human Rights, or civil society, academics, or the national press? Should it include foreigners of international repute? I argue that a panel of Mexican evaluators should be created, drawn from government, academia and civil society with the capacity to think strategically and act with integrity. They would meet on a regular basis to apply the criteria and monitor progress. Their report should go to the President. He or she should then report to the Congress or Senate. If the evaluators are respected individuals, their reports should be above political
preferences. The legislature and the public should see this panel as a national institution with the capacity to outlast changing administrations.

C. Public Participation

An essential element of any nation-wide effort to combat crime and drug trafficking is national awareness of citizens’ role in reporting violence and protecting victims. A prominent example of this is Anti-Mafia Movement formed in 1979 to mobilize the Italian nation against the Sicilian mafia and its tentacles into the Christian Democrats and even the Catholic Church. The primary purpose was to awaken consciousness as to the pervasiveness of the mafia network and to galvanize national sentiment to combat the corruption and the trafficking in heroin and other substances. Conferences, dialogue, radio shows, new journals were held to inform Italians and to mobilize support for the rule of law and justice. The anti-mafia movement grew throughout the following two decades. Slowly, corrupt judges were removed from the bench and the politicians who put them there lost elected office. The destruction of a corrupt Sicilian, as well as a national system of government took twenty years to construct and still requires close observation of elected officials and judges.

The lesson for Mexico is that the dialogue among citizens is a necessary part of combating the violence and organized crime. The dismal levels of trust in politicians and public officials trickle through to fellow citizens, unless those same citizens come together to discuss common problems. As Mexico develops its National Crime Strategy, citizens need to be heard. As programs that address delinquency, education, skills training, recreation and health care develop citizens need to participate in their development and funding. The Federal government may provide the seed money for community programs through by establishing Mexican social programs, but it is critical that business and ordinary citizens discover means to participate in the process. Only if the community as a whole is committed to the success of a particular social program will projects become sustainable.

D. Development of trust

The creation of trust in the civilian institutions of local, state and federal government is a necessary ingredient of any effort to combat public insecurity and crime. The formation of that trust requires meeting, dialogue and debate. USAID can play a role in facilitating these meetings through offering to fund the presence of experts from other parts of Latin America and the U.S. USAID should participate in a supporting role and always leave the Mexican public and private sectors to drive the process. However, USAID can contribute in important ways to ensure knowledgeable and experienced speakers attend the meetings. The broad experience that USAID has acquired can act as a catalyst to a national process that Mexicans must want to undertake. Only when Mexicans develop the political will to say “no mas (violencia)” will
society as a whole appreciate that together they can break the cycle of corruption, fueled by drug trafficking and criminal violence.
About the Author

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