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**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The NAFTA at Ten Conference was organized and directed by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kent Hughes in close collaboration with David Biette and Andrew Selee. Hughes, Biette, and Selee also collaborated in organizing and editing the NAFTA at Ten Conference report. At the Wilson Center, Hughes directs the Program on Science, Technology, America and the Global Economy (STAGE), Biette the Canada Institute, and Selee the Mexico Institute. The primary author of the main text of the report was Hady Amr of the Amr Group. Lynn Sha, Audrey Yao, and Stefanie Bowles reviewed the entire manuscript and made significant editorial contributions.

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On December 9, 2002, President George H.W. Bush, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and President Carlos Salinas de Gortari came together in Washington, D.C. to mark the tenth anniversary of the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA.¹

Formal presentations by the three former leaders opened a two-day conference held in the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. More than 800 people gathered to hear their formal remarks, which looked back at the considerations that led them to create NAFTA but also looked forward with their personal assessment of future trade ties. Their formal remarks were followed by a day and a half of panel discussions. Specific panels assessed the agreement itself and its impact on Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Other panels considered deepening ties in North America, an upcoming period of intense trade negotiations, and the ongoing process of global economic integration.

By the time President Bush, Prime Minister Mulroney, and President Salinas initiated the negotiations to create a North American partnership, Canada and the United States had already taken a step toward closer trade ties, first with the Auto Pact of 1965 and then with the Free Trade Agreement of 1989. Mexico and the United States were also developing a closer economic relationship, driven by rising Mexican exports and growing cross-border investment by U.S. companies.

Ties among the three North American partners have grown rapidly during the first decade of this historic trade agreement. By 2001, North American trade reached $1.7 billion a day. Investment and other commercial decisions have become increasingly North American in character. The 1990s saw rapid growth in all three NAFTA countries; those years also saw a peso crisis and persistent poverty in Mexico, sharp depreciation of the Canadian dollar, and growing skepticism about free trade in the
Nafta at 10: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Introduction

The tenth anniversary of NAFTA came in the midst of the most wide-ranging set of trade negotiations the world has ever experienced. In addition to the multilateral Doha Development Agenda launched in 2001, a number of regional and bilateral negotiations were also underway. In particular, Canada, Mexico, and the United States were deeply involved in the effort to forge a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas by 2005. This ambitious trade agenda is taking place in the context of a widespread debate over the benefits and costs of globalization. On the morning of the second day of the conference, separate panels looked at NAFTA as a laboratory for future trade agreements as well as the effort to “get globalization right,” that is, to make sure that globalization is working for everyone.

The very forces that led Canada, the United States, and Mexico to seek closer trade relations with each other have also led to deeper economic, social, and cultural ties. To many observers, North America is developing a common labor market and interdependent financial links. Cooperation among the governments of the three countries goes far beyond the economic arena, and multiple private actors are engaged in countless cross-border relations.

In an era when globalization is often referred to as Americanization, it is all too easy to ignore the impact of Canada and Mexico on the United States. Canadian scholars, artists, and scientists have long made a mark on American culture and learning. Mexican music, art, and cuisine have become as American as the proverbial apple pie. Mexico and Canada are more important in each other’s economic, foreign policy, and cultural agendas than ever before. On the afternoon of December 10th, to conclude the conference, three separate panels explored the degree to which greater cooperation and integration is taking place in North America, and whether this has implications for the sovereignty and identity of the three individual NAFTA countries.

The NAFTA at Ten Conference examined the experience of the first decade of NAFTA to look ahead to the still unfolding development of a North American community both challenged and strengthened by growing economic and social integration. The lessons of NAFTA are integral to the understanding of trade relations and development in the rest of the Americas, the current international trade agenda, and the ongoing process of globalization.

Notes

1. The North American Free Trade Agreement was initialed on October 7, 1992 in San Antonio, Texas. The Agreement was subsequently ratified in the United States, Canada, and Mexico and came into force on January 1, 1994.
NAFTA at Ten: Progress, Potential, and Precedents

Ten years ago, U.S. President George Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since the signing of NAFTA, trade and investment among the three North American nations has grown by more than 100 percent, with $1.7 billion in trilateral trade each day.

Marking the 10th anniversary of this historic agreement, the Wilson Center convened a two-day conference to assess the impact of NAFTA, the lessons the agreement may hold for deepening North American ties and future trade agreements, and the international effort to “get globalization right.”

The 10th anniversary of NAFTA comes in the midst of the most wide-ranging set of trade negotiations the world has ever seen. In addition to the Doha Development Agenda launched in 2001, a number of regional and bilateral negotiations are underway. In particular, Canada, Mexico, and the United States are engaged in the effort to forge a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. This ambitious trade agenda is taking place in the context of a widespread debate over the benefits and costs of globalization, particularly the effects of trade on poverty, inequality, labor rights, and the environment.

During the conference, panelists examined the experiences of the past decade to look ahead to the still unfolding development of a North American community both challenged and strengthened by growing economic and social integration. As Wilson Center President and Director Lee H. Hamilton said in his introductory remarks, “Woodrow Wilson himself might have seen [NAFTA and this conference] as steps toward his own vision of an international community.”
Another challenge will be to ensure that certain regions, particularly the southern sections of Mexico, are not left behind.

**Linking North America**

While the “big idea” behind the European Community was the prevention of another European war, many found it difficult to see the “big idea” behind NAFTA, beyond the obvious strengthening of trade relations. NAFTA institutions do exist, and the three states do submit to them, but these institutions are neither democratic nor transparent. The question was raised as to whether the concept of continental security could be the new idea around which NAFTA could move forward, especially if the tradeoffs between continental democracy and sovereignty are addressed in the process.

Numerous speakers throughout the conference noted that, in practice, NAFTA represents two separate bilateral agreements (between the United States and Mexico, and the United States and Canada), more so than one trilateral agreement as was intended. For example, there is little military collaboration between the United States and Mexico compared with the stronger military cooperation between the United States and Canada. Panelists discussed the call for a reduction in the perceived unilateralism of the United States regarding border issues with Canada and particularly Mexico. Some also suggested that potential benefits would result from stronger convergence on many elements of tax policy.

**Getting Globalization Right**

A panel on globalization highlighted the growing income inequality, both within and between Mexico and the United States. Income disparities in Mexico are among the highest in the world with many elements and geographic regions failing to participate in the market economy, a situation which, in turn, drives migrants to the United States in search of jobs.

Panelists also said that income inequalities have been a major source of Mexican migration. For example, the rural population comprises one fifth of Mexico’s total population, yet it contributed only about one twentieth of GDP. Meanwhile, U.S. job creation of 1.2 million jobs per year exceeded growth in the U.S. labor force—a gap that Mexicans living in the United States helped fill. Six million of the Mexicans in the United States send about $9 billion to Mexico each year.
In particular, speakers pushed for the building of stronger institutions in NAFTA to address governance problems and corporate disputes. Panelists observed that, regardless of whether the NAFTA countries develop a common currency, interest rates and monetary policy in Mexico, the United States, and Canada are beginning to converge.

**INTO THE FUTURE**
While NAFTA addresses business relations, some of the related and more difficult issues have yet to be tackled, such as migration, labor, security, transportation, and monetary policy. Regarding NAFTA as a model for future agreements, speakers emphasized that negotiators should take a long-term approach to the agreement, seek to avoid special status treatment for politically powerful industries, and focus on building better institutions for the resolution of disputes. Speakers also stressed the importance of involving civil society, NGOs, and businesses, big and small, to build a more powerful constituency for a better agreement. Panelists suggested that NAFTA be seen as a model, along with the creation of the European Community, for the creation of substantial regional free trade agreements in other parts of the world.

**NOTES**
1. Recent estimates indicate that there are over nine million people born in Mexico who live in the United States and that they send more than $14.5 billion per year to Mexico. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000; and Receptores de Remesas en México, Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, Bendixen and Associates, and the Pew Hispanic Center, 2003.
Conference Agenda
Nafta at 10: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
Albert Fishlow, Columbia University, United States
Alan Alexandroff, University of Toronto, Canada

12:30–2:00
Luncheon in the Wilson Center Dining Room
Keynote Speaker: James Derham, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Mexico, Canada, and Economic Affairs
Comments by: Bertin Côté, Canadian Embassy, and Mario Chacón, Mexican Embassy

2:00–3:00
NAFTA and a North American Labor Market: Migration, Wages, and Labor Rights
Chair: Maria Echaveste, Nueva Vista/United Farm Workers, United States
Frank Bean, University of California, Irvine, United States
Phillip Martin, University of California, Davis, United States
Commentator: Sidney Weintraub, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States

3:00–4:00
NAFTA: Trade, Economic Integration, and Security
Chair: George Haynal, Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Canada
Lorraine Eden, Texas A&M University, United States
Guadalupe González, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico
Thomas Courchene, Institute for Research on Public Policy and Queen’s University, Canada

Day Two
The Woodrow Wilson Center Joseph H. and Claire Flom Auditorium

9:00–10:30
NAFTA as a Laboratory for Future Trade Agreements
Chair: David Edgell, University of Missouri—Kansas City; MMG Worldwide, United States
Kishore S. Gawande, Texas A&M University, United States
Antonio Ortiz Mena, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico
Daniel Schwanen, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Canada
Commentator: Stephen Farrar, Guardian Glass, United States

10:45–12:15
NAFTA and Getting Globalization Right: Poverty, Inequality, and Trade
Chair: Joseph Tulchin, Woodrow Wilson Center, United States
Carlos Heredia, Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, Mexico

11:00–12:15
Luncheon in the Wilson Center Dining Room
Keynote Speaker: James Derham, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Mexico, Canada, and Economic Affairs
Comments by: Bertin Côté, Canadian Embassy, and Mario Chacón, Mexican Embassy

2:00–3:00
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Guadalupe González, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico
Thomas Courchene, Institute for Research on Public Policy and Queen’s University, Canada
The panel addressed the lessons of and the challenges to NAFTA. The overall sense of the panel was that NAFTA has been a success in generating unprecedented levels of trade to a degree that even its creators had not foreseen. However, the framework still has much room for improvement and continues to be met with some skepticism in all three countries. Several panelists recommended that NAFTA be institutionally developed to ensure that the agreement is enforced and effective.

**Stephen Randall**

Stephen Randall, dean of social sciences at the University of Calgary, noted that the creation of NAFTA, like the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, was surrounded by political controversy during its creation with a wide spectrum of opponents. NAFTA was also the product of the strong bilateral relationships between the United States and each of the countries on its borders. He stated that the formal trilateral relationship among Canada, Mexico, and the United States remains young and even “fragile.”

Randall, revisiting the morning’s speeches by the three former heads of government, touched on some of the remaining challenges, which include Mexican rural poverty, the plight of Mexican migrant workers in the United States, and disagreement on environmental policy. Furthermore, the full geographical scope of NAFTA has yet to be settled,
Gustavo Vega Canovas largely agreed with the assessments by the three former heads of government that described NAFTA as “revolutionary” and as a “turning point in Mexican history.” He noted that throughout much of the historical relationship between Mexico and the United States, the two nations largely avoided formal, written agreements due in part to a sense of mutual distrust. He asserted that as late as 1989, President Salinas doubted the wisdom of entering into a trade agreement with the United States. NAFTA marked a complete departure in Mexican trade policy.

Vega noted that the lesson from NAFTA was a dismissal of the previous belief that developing nations were not ready to enter into free trade agreements with developed countries. NAFTA demonstrated that it is possible for a developing nation to enter into a major trade agreement and improve its economic health. Mexico’s new economic competitiveness, due in large part to NAFTA, even helped the country recover from the economic crises of the mid-1990s and maintain economic stability despite the recession of the U.S. economy to which it is closely tied.

Vega listed several unmet challenges for NAFTA. Foremost is NAFTA’s uneven impact within Mexico, due largely to the country’s lack of effective infrastructure. He specifically pointed to the Mexican financial sector, which has not fully recovered from the country’s last major economic crisis. This lack of competitive financing explains the reaction of the Mexican agricultural producers who are increasing their political pressure to protect the sector or receive financial support from the government at the same levels as their U.S. and Canadian counterparts. These producers contend that they cannot compete with American or Canadian agricultural producers that benefit from government subsidies. Finally, even Mexico’s “new” democratic government has not been able to address some of the most pressing structural problems remaining in Mexico. All of this has created an atmosphere in which many Mexicans, including political parties, cast blame on NAFTA for various problems.

Vega recommended that NAFTA be institutionally strengthened. The leaders of Mexico, Canada, and the United States also must develop a new vision of their shared borders that satisfies America’s need for security and Mexico’s need for an increased flow of resources and the free movement of people across the borders. Vega suggested that the three countries should be prepared to deepen NAFTA and strengthen its institutions.
Michael Hart

Michael Hart called the creation of NAFTA and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement a “dividing point in the history of trade policy.” Prior to the negotiations that led to these two agreements, he contended, political leaders left the issue of trade to processes that combined high complexity with very little publicity, thus largely free from public scrutiny. However, starting with these efforts, visionary political leaders worked with “policy entrepreneurs” and moved the issue of trade into the public forum.

Hart stated that this transformation was matched by a change in the prevailing attitudes on trade from one that favored “incremental multilateralism” to one that favored open markets. This change also redefined the traditional sources of support and opposition to trade, creating an alignment where both import- and export-based industries are united in support of free trade. He described the new opposition as a disparate coalition of those worried about their own economic security and those who are worried about the social and economic consequences of globalization.

The unforeseen scope of NAFTA’s success has created even more social and economic linkages and dependencies between the treaty’s partner countries. The large remaining challenge is to establish a system of governing these closely linked economies, whose integration is driven by everyday consumption. To do so, the countries’ political leaders must recognize the impact of borders and eliminate useless obstacles to travel and transit, specifically customs. Hart said that another obstacle is the “bureaucratic rent-seeking” that is a product of marginal and counter-productive regulatory differences. Finally, he recommended the establishment of an institutional framework to maintain and advance NAFTA, which could initially begin with bilateral dialogues and later extend to all.

Gary Hufbauer

Gary Hufbauer stated that the creation of NAFTA left many citizens of all three countries expecting more than was achieved because of the combination of unrealistic expectations and undelivered promises. The treaty, he said, is about increasing the flow of products and investment among the countries—it is not about any changes in immigration, economic stability, or social issues that increased trade may bring. Furthermore, negotiators’ tendencies to strike agreements on the promise of future actions only postponed inevitable hard decisions, as witnessed by the current tensions in the trucking and agricultural sectors.

Hufbauer repeated Hart’s observation that trade issues have achieved a new prominence in the public dialogue. He also noted that NAFTA lends itself well to study, analysis, and debate.

Hufbauer went on to call for new big ideas in several areas. First of all, there needs to be free trade in agriculture. In migration, specifically between Mexico and the United States, he suggested that the United States find the balance between legalizing new and current immigrants in exchange for effective Mexican control of their own border. He suggested revisiting the treaty’s energy supply provisions, designed to take effect during an energy crisis. Hufbauer also stated that the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security must work closely with the consequences and conditions of NAFTA to ensure that it will be effective. Finally, he recommended deepening NAFTA’s institutional development, including the creation of a secretariat and the regional integration of existing institutions. For instance, he suggested that the Federal Reserve Board invite non-voting members from Canada and Mexico to attend its meetings.

Peter H. Smith

Peter H. Smith, serving as discussant, concluded the panel by referring some of the presenters’ questions and observations to the findings of his new book. Smith agreed that the treaty does not require renegotiation but asserted that it is in need of substantial reform, which will occur only as a result of political will. Smith pointed out that certain aspects of the current treaty, specifically labor and environmental provisions, are not being adequately enforced.

Smith sought to emphasize NAFTA’s political dimensions. If the treaty were solely about trade and market forces, its design and ratification would not have required such political boldness and entrepreneurship from the three heads of government. As NAFTA continues into the future, leaders of the three nations need to decide what geostrategic results they want to see from this agreement in the medium-term. He noted that public opinion research shows that attitudes towards NAFTA and free trade are mixed, with overwhelming support for free trade in principle, but less favorable opinions of the treaty itself. Smith encouraged political leaders to take public opinion seriously.
Despite the favorable statistics showing the increase in North American trade, Smith suggested that Americans should be cautious about giving all the credit to NAFTA. Canadians give much credit to the bilateral Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement; Mexicans see their progress starting from trade liberalization discussions and its accession to GATT during the 1980s.

Smith remarked on the recurring theme of disparity in the effects of free trade. He noted that local policy and implementation has a significant impact on such matters. Limitations in the North American transportation infrastructure also inhibit free trade. In addition, he mentioned the problem of immigration, for which NAFTA was (rightly or wrongly) presented as a solution; nonetheless, he insisted, something here needs to be done.

Looking forward, Smith observed that there are two possible strategic approaches to NAFTA’s future. The first, he said, would be to acknowledge its strengths and leave it as is. The second alternative would be to deepen the accord—through supplementary agreements on agriculture, creation of a social fund, migration reform, and perhaps, common external tariffs or even dollarization. He noted that NAFTA could not really be “broadened” to include more countries in the hemisphere, arguing that the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) will be a separate and distinct form of regional economic integration. However, caution is needed given the political and economic instability in much of Central and South America and the special status afforded Mexico under NAFTA that would be diminished under the FTAA.
Wendy Dobson began her presentation by noting several major economic changes during the past fifteen years. She pointed out that NAFTA was mostly about facilitating the movement of goods; on the other hand, trade is now composed of knowledge-based services and driven by firms participating in global supply chains and industrial clusters that are increasingly tightly connected across borders.

Dobson warned that many Canadians feel that NAFTA “has outlived its usefulness.” At a minimum, NAFTA needs to be deepened to remove the obstacles to people, investment, technology, and knowledge that matter in the “knowledge economy” and for the interconnectedness of cross-border value chains.

Steps toward deepening will be shaped by three factors. One is “asymmetric interdependence.” While American trade remains less dependent on its neighbors than the converse, U.S. actions that damage its neighbors increasingly affect itself. A second factor is political sensitivities in all three partners. Each country is interested in deepening NAFTA in ways that preserve and enhance political independence and distinctive national institutions. A third factor is political realities that constrain what is possible. For example, Canadian worries about economic security since September 11 are only likely to be addressed if they are linked to the U.S. domestic priority of homeland security.

Dobson suggested a “Big Idea,” a strategic framework with a common purpose to secure the North American economic space that links security and defense with economic goals. She suggested four pillars, using as a platform the unprecedented level of cooperation within and across governments that underpins the Smart Border Plan introduced in December 2001:

- A security initiative that would focus on creating an efficient **seamless** border for low risk cargo, NAFTA travelers, and NAFTA visas for retirees; agreement on common procedures and shared intelligence to handle third country migrants and inspect third country cargo;
- A Canadian defense initiative whereby Canada would contribute a world class capability to North American defense;
- A secure natural resources area. In the event of uncertainty or conflict in the Middle East, the U.S. focus will shift to North American energy security. If the U.S. focus were to shift, Canada would have to ramp up production under NAFTA provisions. This is not easily done without a federal-provincial framework, since the provinces own the resources, and a ten-year development program would be required. In exchange, Canada should seek more secure market access for other natural resources such as forest products through, for example, mutual recognition of each other’s regulatory regimes.
- A North American economic efficiency initiative that achieves three things at a minimum: (1) facilitation of the movement of people by broadening the TN visa to technical personnel; (2) harmonization where it makes sense to adopt a single North American standard, such as in competition policy (a NAFTA commitment that has not yet been implemented), and in such areas as drugs approval; and (3) negotiation of a simple customs union that eliminates the bilateral tariff and the adoption of a common tariff for the rest of the world, preferably by choosing the lowest tariff rate among the partners.

Dobson noted that the four-pillar approach avoids the undesired characteristics of the European approach, namely political integration. In North America, the goal is a common economic space in which political autonomy is preserved. Dobson concluded by noting that, while the advantage of a Big Idea is its potential profile in the U.S. political system, achieving this requires political champions willing to think and bargain strategically. A framework agreement between the U.S. president and the Canadian prime minister would be a good first step, but is unlikely in current circumstances. She noted that champions will have to be found among private sector stakeholders such as industries with extensive cross-
Rafael Fernández de Castro

After recognizing Sidney Weintraub for his efforts in the creation of NAFTA, Rafael Fernández praised the NAFTA agreement as the only truly important historical agreement signed by Mexico and the United States since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848). NAFTA represented a change in Mexican attitudes that abandoned overly strict notions of self-determination to recognize the potential of working with its northern neighbor, the world’s most economically powerful country.

He noted, however, that Mexicans are now becoming increasingly disappointed at the continued income disparity within Mexico and the lack of a migration accord between Mexico and the United States.

The success of advancing NAFTA also depends on Mexico addressing its internal economic problems as it did under President Salinas in 1989. Specifically, Fernández recommended that Mexico undertake reform in the fiscal, electricity, and labor sectors.

Mexico could work harder to institutionalize its relationship with the United States. Most importantly, the two countries should work to achieve a migration accord that includes a regularization of those undocumented immigrants already in the United States as well as a guest worker program. Current migration conditions, where citizens from Mexico are dying every day in attempts to cross the U.S. border, are unacceptable, particularly in light of Mexico’s status as a major trade partner. The United States should recognize the value of Mexican workers since the American labor market will suffer from the retirement of the Baby Boomer generation. Fernández noted that although there are currently about one million entrants into the Mexican labor market each year, this flow would be reduced by about one third in the coming fifteen years as the result of a declining birth rate. He said that Mexico should also resolve its own migration problems, focusing on the southern border that is more dangerous for Central Americans than its northern border is for Mexicans.

Fernández also recommended that the two countries increase the number of Mexican students in U.S. schools, noting that, according to his estimates, only 10,000 Mexicans study in the United States, compared to about 30,000 Canadians. He noted that if the numbers of Mexican students in the United States were up to the Canadian proportions, there would be about 100,000 Mexican students in the United States, ten times the current figure.

Given the interdependence of all three economies, Fernández remarked that Canada should recognize the value in joining Mexico’s efforts to satisfy the U.S. need for secure borders in the development of a security perimeter around North America. Fernández also recommended that Mexico increase its trade with Europe to complement its trade with the United States. Mexico should also develop its border regulation infrastructure and position itself in regional trade discussions, recognizing the inevitability of the FTAA or other liberalized trade agreements.

Jeff Faux

Jeff Faux acknowledged that his perspective was not consistent with the conference’s other panelists. He suggested that many North Americans feel that NAFTA had fallen far short of delivering the promises of its creators, pointing to continued trade deficits, illegal migration to the United States, lack of rapid income growth, rural dislocation in Mexico, and employment stagnation in Canada. Faux cited public opinion research showing that while the majority of people want close economic relationships among the three nations, many are not happy with the current form of those relations.

Faux said that continued economic integration is leading to a common market, but that NAFTA was an inadequate structure for governance due to its lack of democratic representation, absence of transparent institutions, and limited capacity for a North American “social contract.” He argued that private corporations have juridical standing in NAFTA, and therefore can pursue their interests on a continental basis, but that individual citizens do not. He said that the agreement was sold in all three countries without full disclosure.

Faux maintained that the single market is transforming many economic policy issues that once were “domestic” to each country into questions that must now be resolved on a continental basis, where sovereignty must be shared. Preserving democracy now requires the development of cross-border politics in which trinational constituencies—other than corporate investors—can join politically to support common interests.
Faux proposed a “grand bargain” in which the United States and Canada commit to a sustained program of economic development aid—primarily in education, health, and public sector administration—in return for enforceable labor rights and environmental protections throughout North America.

Faux reminded the audience that Mexican farmers are demanding that NAFTA be revised. Others throughout the continent would also like to see the agreement changed. He called for a continental discussion on the future of our evolving North American society.

CHARLES F. DORAN
Charles Doran concluded the panel with closing thoughts on the previous presentations. He agreed with Dobson’s call for a “Big Idea” to merit political attention, but he stated that the conditions surrounding a greater NAFTA debate may be more complicated, especially if there is uncertainty about whether to proceed with bilateral or multilateral relationships. Doran agreed with the importance of resolving domestic considerations, such as infrastructure and energy, before advancing discussions for multilateral agreements. He emphasized that Canada and Mexico, who had started the discussions on free trade that led to NAFTA, should take Faux’s presentation as evidence of both a hearty U.S. debate on the issue and that free trade is not an American effort to dominate the other countries. He ended his comments by stressing that NAFTA does increase trade, investment, jobs, and tax revenue, which is why positive recommendations to strengthen NAFTA need to be made and enacted.

NOTES
1. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on February 2, 1848 at the conclusion of the war between the United States and Mexico. It established the Texas border at the Rio Grande and allowed the United States to annex the territory that is present-day Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas, and parts of Colorado, Nevada, and Utah.
hypothetical free trade agreement between China and India. Although the two still have a Cold-War style relationship and there are significant internal political pressures working against integration, he looked at the motivations for entering into such an agreement, arguing that any compact must address large common issues as well as national interests.

Gawande said that a Chinese-Indian free trade agreement (FTA) would be based on the same common interest as in Europe—security. He even saw security as the main reason behind U.S. engagement in free trade with Mexico. However, the European model involved countries with largely equal markets and production capacity. This would not apply to a China-India FTA given the enormous advantage China has in both market size and production. Gawande concluded that the overriding mutual interest of security was a strong enough reason for China to enter into a conditional free trade agreement with India, from which the two countries could work to deepen it, or expand it to other countries in the region.

Gawande drew a parallel between the Chinese-Indian disparity and that of Mexico and the United States. NAFTA demonstrated that economically unequal countries could successfully enter into a free trade agreement. The key to NAFTA’s ability to develop a similar scope of beneficiaries between the United States and Mexico was the use of exclusions. NAFTA excluded sectors from liberalization to give the United States enough incentive to enter and maintain the agreement. Similarly, Gawande saw the use of key exclusions as a prerequisite to China’s involvement in any type of free trade agreement. Establishing some sort of institutionalized framework for cooperation, even with exclusions, would be highly beneficial. Speculating on the long term, Gawande sees a China-India agreement as a prerequisite for greater rapprochement between the two potentially volatile nuclear powers of India and Pakistan.

ANTONIO ORTIZ MENA
Antonio Ortiz Mena explained the dynamics and procedure of the successful negotiation process that created NAFTA in three phases. In the prenegotiation phase, Ortiz Mena stated that the respective democratic structures of the countries affected their room to negotiate. Ortiz Mena asked why the United States was the only country that could turn to what he called the “monster” of Congress lurking behind the negotiators, which gave the U.S. delegation great leverage but less scope for compromise. The Mexican negotiation team, on the other hand, had less leverage due to its relatively weak legislature.

The NAFTA negotiations demonstrated the importance of a policymaking framework that featured effective coordination within and among the executive branch, the legislature, and civil society. He cautioned political leaders to find a balance between promoting the agreement to win political support and raising expectations to an unreasonable level. Finally, for this phase, he recommended an open and informed debate, led by academics.

During the negotiations phase, Ortiz Mena stated the importance of establishing areas that were clearly acceptable or unacceptable for inclusion in the agreement. For example, Mexico was very clear in what NAFTA would and would not include. NAFTA, for instance, explicitly excludes oil. Negotiation teams should make certain that provisions are both technically and politically feasible, and they should not demand special treatment. All sides should not only distinguish between permanent and temporary provisions such as NAFTA’s tariff phase-out periods, but they should also devote greater attention to those that are permanent. He emphasized the importance of domestic and international consulting and lobbying during the negotiation period. Ortiz Mena stressed that a strategy needed to be developed for dealing with civil society, perhaps by using new technologies for consultation and exchange.

During the implementation stage, the parties need to realize that the agreement is not only the result of the process but also a framework for trade. Political leaders, said Ortiz Mena, need to create policies or an infrastructure that supports the agreement to ensure its maximum benefit. The parties to the negotiation must recognize and accommodate the costs of the agreement as well.

Ortiz Mena argued that the post-negotiation phase must not be taken for granted because trade agreements are being continuously implemented and interpreted. He used the impending phaseout of Mexican agricultural subsidies as an example, stating that the Mexican government had known for ten years that this phase out was coming and yet did nothing about it. He emphasized that the political costs must be addressed in the post-negotiation phase or else the agreement will become a “lightning rod” for every problem, citing what he saw as the unrelated relationship between the Chapter 11 investor state rulings and environmental protection.
Daniel Schwanen examined NAFTA as a model of free trade agreements and its application as a model elsewhere. The goal of regional agreements, said Schwanen, is to create more trade, rather than just divert it from existing relationships. The NAFTA model contradicts traditional trade models that suggest trading partners will specialize in those industries where they have competitive advantages. On the contrary, NAFTA’s results include inter-firm specialization within industries, in which parts are made in all three countries for different stages of production.

Nevertheless, Schwanen did not suggest that the NAFTA experiment could be tried elsewhere. He cited unique conditions of the agreement’s creation, including the federal structure of all three partner nations which makes it difficult to apply the same process and structure in another set of circumstances. Furthermore, Schwanen questioned whether anyone would want to replicate NAFTA, pointing to the lack of strong institutions within the agreement, its inability to avoid protectionism, and the exclusion of significant sectors as major weaknesses. NAFTA, he said, failed to accurately predict the “interface” between trade agreements and other issue areas, including social programs and the environment. In Canada there is a need to address the false perception that if you allow a small amount of commodification in a given sector, such as health care or water exports, it will then have to be opened up completely. Schwanen recommended that future trade agreements take better account of how the movement of people can generate economic growth, without neglecting related security considerations.

Stephen Farrar concluded that NAFTA is a good example for future trade agreements because of its scope. Farrar agreed with Gawande that potential trade partners must share a common initial vision of their intentions. However, he differed from Gawande in asserting the difficulty of expanding narrow trade agreements and in recommending agreements based on broad vision with limited initial implementation.

Farrar shared Ortiz Mena’s regret on the miscommunication of perceived promises during NAFTA’s creation. There was an unfair expectation that the agreement would create a substantial number of new jobs. Commenting on Schwanen’s concern that free trade agreements are not meant to divert trade, Farrar said that trade diversion may indeed be beneficial in encouraging other nations to join.

Q&A Session
Jeff Faux, a participant on the previous day’s program, asked Ortiz Mena about the “room next door” used by the Mexican delegation during negotiations. Ortiz Mena responded that the “room next door” was a group of industry representatives with whom the Mexican negotiating team consulted. He added that while it served to help the Mexican negotiators coordinate with civil society during the process, the industrial representatives came primarily from a limited number of large corporations that could afford the expense, leaving out the interests of small- and medium-sized businesses.
Panelists addressed growing income inequality both within and between Mexico and the United States. Income disparities in Mexico are among the highest in the world. Many geographic regions of Mexico have not gained from trade, a situation which drives migrants to the United States in search of jobs. In particular, speakers called for a focus on building significantly stronger institutions within NAFTA to address governance problems and corporate disputes, arguing that strengthened economic integration requires strengthened integration of governance.

**Carlos Heredia**

Carlos Heredia began his presentation with an anecdote from the time of NAFTA’s creation. It illustrated the extent to which the Mexican government failed to realize the implications of NAFTA beyond strictly trade relations. Heredia explained that a coalition of civil society representatives from academics to labor leaders was advocating the inclusion of measures that addressed poverty and democracy in the trade negotiations. Despite the agreement’s potential effect on the lives of all Mexicans, he said, the coalition was excluded from the decision-making process.

Since NAFTA was created, Heredia asserted, the gaps between the Mexican and American economies have grown, with per capita GDP in Mexico falling from 32 percent of U.S. per capita GDP in 1980 to 25 percent in 2000. He noted that the Mexican economy has become tied to the U.S. business cycle since Mexico is the United States’ second largest trading partner, with Mexican exports to the United States roughly doubling...
in the past seven years. The larger proportion of this growth has been in northern Mexico while southern Mexico continues to stagnate, contributing significantly to northward migration. He stated that Mexico “lost a generation of its entrepreneurial class” due to the huge sell-off of Mexican companies to multinational corporations after NAFTA. Heredia conceded that trade between Mexico and the United States has increased, but he contended that perhaps two-thirds of exports from Mexico to the United States were actually intrafirm trade of U.S. companies that had set up branches in Mexico.

In Heredia’s recommendations for the future of NAFTA, he borrowed lessons from European economic integration, proposing investment in people, infrastructure, regional development, and transportation networks to ensure that promised economic benefits will actually reach the majority of citizens. He encouraged a “broader vision” of NAFTA, which would develop a governance system and strengthen existing institutions. Heredia warned that integration without convergence would lead to increased social stratification in Mexico, where millions of people are excluded from the new economy. Heredia used a revealing anecdote from Brazil to illustrate the conditions in Mexico: “The Brazilian economy is fine. It’s only 98 percent of the people that are suffering.” He also argued that the existing “narrow vision” of NAFTA will have serious security implications for the United States due to sharp increases in the numbers of jobless migrants.

Heredia argued that the NAFTA countries should pursue a strategy of convergence and called for steps to be taken with vision and leadership in the direction of a North American parliament and the development of institutions that will strengthen democracy. He also proposed developing sectoral and geographic linkages. He noted President Fox’s initiative to prioritize the domestic market and support small- and medium-sized business. He concluded by stating that market integration must include the entire population to an extent that they can actually see benefits, not just be told they will “trickle down.” Otherwise, Heredia argued, integration will not be able to generate the social legitimacy and the political support it needs to survive.

**ALBERT FISHLow**

Albert Fishlow described NAFTA as a success despite its design. As Fishlow recounted, NAFTA was sold to political leaders and voters as an agreement that would increase trade among partner nations and, in the case of the United States, reduce the flow of illegal immigration. However, the migration problem still exists, and Fishlow contended that the realized increase in trade was due in part to external factors, such as the U.S. economic boom and simultaneous Mexican economic crisis. He asserted that persistent levels of inequality in both the United States and Mexico demonstrate that NAFTA has not reduced inequality. Fishlow added that trade does not affect inequality. He argued that trade only marginally affects service-based industries, which are the main employer of low-income workers.

However, Fishlow credited NAFTA with causing macroeconomic convergence not in terms of per capita income, but in terms of policy. This phenomenon, he argued, is NAFTA’s real, if unanticipated, success. This convergence is manifested in movements toward a common inflation rate, interest rates, and restricted monetary policies in the three countries.

Fishlow made the case that all of the surprising successes that worked for NAFTA would not work well for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The FTAA would not enjoy the benefits of two large shared borders, substantial migration, or the expansion of agriculture. He characterized NAFTA as a somewhat cohesive bloc with levels of interaction and joint cooperation that would probably not occur in the FTAA.

**ALAN S. ALEXANDROFF**

Alan S. Alexandroff analyzed several aspects of the NAFTA debate based on empirical research. His starting point was Wendy Dobson’s analysis, which showed that many Canadian experts and politicians had begun to question NAFTA’s capacity to handle economic integration before the increased complications of the United States’ global war on terrorism. He drew attention to one sophisticated empirical analysis by Daniel Trefler of the University of Toronto, who concluded that liberalized trade in the form of tariff cuts under NAFTA and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement ended up initially reducing employment and manufacturing output. However, Trefler’s empirical analysis subsequently demonstrated a rebound in these indices and a rise in productivity.

Alexandroff then evaluated “Feasible Globalizations” by Dani Rodrik of Harvard University. Rodrik argued that global markets are unsustainable without global governance, and that if there is to be no governance, there
is a need to reduce and slow ambitions for worldwide economic integration. However, Alexandroff suggested that the North American relationship differed from the current global governance and regional models, and the European Union (EU) in particular. NAFTA is built on the “rule of law” and has no significant institutional development.

Alexandroff asserted that the key to advancing further market integration is addressing economic interests and the domestic political issues that they provoke. Canada and the United States need to concentrate on the special interests that now block resolution of a number of significant trade issues. Tackling trade irritants begins at home, and both countries need to address the contentious trade irritants surrounding the Canadian Wheat Board, softwood lumber, and standards testing and certification by emphasizing liberalization, not preference. If Canada and the United States can refocus on liberalization, then it would be possible to address important trade issues such as the elimination of trade remedy initiatives, which in turn would reduce the power of special interests to create new cross border disputes. In eliminating antidumping and countervailing duty actions, Canada and the United States still would retain safeguard provisions that enable domestic sectoral adjustments and do not rely on “unfair” trading standards. In addition the two countries could rely on “competition law” (antitrust regulation).

Finally, Alexandroff recommended that at least for the foreseeable future, leaders recognize NAFTA as a set of two bilateral agreements rather than a single trilateral structure. Given the widely varying concerns of Canada and Mexico on issues such as defense and immigration, attempts to hold conditions on security or immigration in both relationships to the same standard will lead to inaction.

JOSPEH S. TULCHIN

Joseph S. Tulchin concluded the panel with reflections on the presentations. He related Alexandroff’s discussion of Canadian sovereignty concerns to those experienced by Americans when faced with the prospect of ceding autonomy to any supranational institution. He then responded to Heredia’s comments on subnational economic disparities by stating that national governments must accept more responsibility for their internal problems and develop their own institutions to address them. Tulchin also cautioned against looking to the EU as a model because of the amount of time it took them to get to where they are. Tulchin ultimately credited NAFTA for serving as an “enabling agreement” that has advanced necessary discussions on a variety of issues among Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

Q&A

Heredia responded to Tulchin’s comment that Mexico should take responsibility for its own poverty by stating that Mexico was not engaged in a process of blaming Americans, but rather in a process of recognizing ineffective and unjust policies. Another conference attendee contended that NAFTA runs the risk of missing out on potential benefits by ignoring the European model, and should not be deterred by the fifty years it took to develop the EU. Fishlow responded to a question on the efficiency of NAFTA’s management by emphasizing the importance of education and opportunity in a growing market. The last comment was made by Tom Courchene of Queen’s University who asserted that Canada only wants access to the U.S. market, not its institutions or policies.

NOTES

1. Heredia distinguished between “integration” and “convergence.” He sees the consequences of market integration (e.g., increasing gap between rich and poor, lowered labor standards, increased migration) as problems that require institutional convergence. This would include some sort of democratic parliament, investments in infrastructure, wealth redistribution systems, and guarantees of higher standards, among other measures.
During the luncheon on the second day, representatives of the three governments of the NAFTA countries shared their views on the treaty and the future of North American integration. Excerpts from their remarks follow.

Bertin Côté
Mario Chacón
James Derham

...Let me just share with you two or three brief points... We know that NAFTA has been a great success and let me tell you why it was successful. We strengthened the rules on governing trade and investment between our three countries on this continent... NAFTA has made us, North America, one of the most competitive, prosperous, and economically integrated regions in the world. NAFTA's record is clear in that respect. By lowering trade barriers, the agreement has expanded trade in North America... This has led to increased employment, more choices for consumers at competitive prices, and altogether rising prosperity.

But NAFTA has been more than a scorecard for trade. It has fundamentally changed the North American economic space. It has enabled individuals to make decisions in their own best economic interest, thus accelerating the pace of economic integration. The new opportunities and competitive pressures created by NAFTA have contributed significantly to reorienting Canada's industrial structure. The same is true in the United States and in Mexico. All of those who have been closely associated with NAFTA over the past ten years have lived through those times. There is one question that we all have in mind: Where do we go from here? I have heard some people who say that maybe we should look across the Atlantic, who suggest that maybe this continent should emulate the European Union. While the success of the European Union in creating a single market offers inspiration—and the success there is undeniable—the circumstances on each continent are very different. We have a different story, culture, political system, and geography that should lead us to plot our own course, drawing on the experience of other regions but grounded in the realities in which we live every day among our people.
In terms of the future, I would recommend to you that you look again at the text of the preamble of NAFTA...where we have set out certain resolutions that at the time we determined would guide our work. In reading the preamble, what strikes me is that at the time we had a vision not so much about what governments would do, but what a continental economic space would enable our citizens to achieve. Thus we resolved to create an expanded and secure market:

• to reduce distortions to trade;
• to ensure a predictable commercial framework;
• to enhance the competitiveness of our firms in global markets;
• to foster creativity and innovation.

We knew that entrepreneurs, consumers, investors, and workers—and communities—would do the rest once our three governments removed the obstacles. In looking ahead we should ask ourselves how governments can better enable our citizens to build on what they have achieved over the past ten years and what we can do to empower inventors, investors, entrepreneurs, and workers, and what we can do that will create a more secure environment for them to make decisions in their—and in our—best economic interests.

Our governments are making progress on many fronts to meet the challenges to our individual and collective security caused by terrorism...However, ultimately our physical security and our economic future rest on the shoulders of our citizens. And it is there at the individual level that NAFTA has made the greatest difference. And this is where it will continue to make a difference in the future.

**Mario Chacón**

...I think that NAFTA still has potential. We have not taken advantage of all its possibilities. Our bilateral agendas are richer than what we can call our trilateral agenda. We have yet to build the infrastructure needed by the growing trade between our three nations. There are roads, bridges, trade corridors, and border crossings to be constructed. There are almost no NAFTA programs in our universities. We need to teach the new generation to think about the possibilities that NAFTA offers them. We believe that a group of wise men from Canada, the USA, and Mexico could help us identify the specific ways and issues in which our trilateral cooperation can effectively enhance our partnership and further advance our common values and objectives. While the first impact of the cowardly attacks on the innocent victims on September 11, 2001 was to focus our attention on the immediate need to keep our borders safe, a more enduring effect has been to acknowledge that we as a region face common challenges.

We have to learn from adversity and strengthen our ties to act and react as a region that in many ways functions as a unit. Integration is a fact of life, whether it is in a geographic area, as in northern Mexico and the southern United States, or a sector, as in the auto plants in our three countries. NAFTA, in the eyes of many companies that benefit from producing and selling in it, is already an integrated market. We are increasingly important to each other. The exponential growth of trade—and production—sharing arrangements in the last few years creates new realities that must be taken into account in any serious decision-making process.

We have been through a decade of confidence building, and in very delicate areas, like the fight against organized crime, we have proven to be successful. There are many issues of common concern that require our united efforts. I have already mentioned security, but I could add the environment, sustainable development, energy, natural resource utilization, conservation, and a standards organization, just to name a few.

Developing a trilateral NAFTA perspective on issues such as these makes sense. I am convinced that our three countries could gain by expanding the scale of our association. Politics is of course the art of the possible. And we will always have to deal with the unavoidable tension that exists between that which we aim for and that which may be achievable at a given moment.

A clear and shared vision of a more secure and prosperous North America will provide the necessary guide as we venture into new territories. I am convinced that this event will make an important contribution to this goal.

**James Derham**

...Since April [2002], if you asked me what subject or what issue I have spent more time on than any other, I suspect that none of you would come close. The answer is water. The problem with water is that there is not enough from Mexico for South Texas, and North Dakota has so much [that] they want to give some of it to our Canadian friends. So, the point is that the NAFTA relationship is a very complex one by its nature, by its shared borders, [and] by the mix of the domestic and international issues that we deal with. And in certain ways, it is also unpredictable. I suspect that the three of us [Bertin Côté and Mario Chacón] could sit down and talk about water and get nowhere at all at solving my two problems. So, every issue does not lend itself to the NAFTA approach. But I think that some do, so I want to mention a couple...

...You have all heard over the last couple of days about how successful NAFTA is. I can give all the numbers: the employment growth, the export...
growth, the investment growth, and the increase in the economic integration between our three countries.

But there is another dimension of NAFTA that I do want to highlight because it also says a little about how we can build on NAFTA or what the value of NAFTA is in the future. Think particularly of the impact of NAFTA on Mexico, the whole range of provisions on things like dispute settlement, enforcement of contracts, investment rules, respect for property rights. I think that when we were designing NAFTA in the United States, a very important element of that whole process was to support and reinforce the kind of economic modernization that Carlos Salinas, Miguel de la Madrid, and Ernesto Zedillo were undertaking in Mexico. I think that when we ask what was the biggest success of NAFTA, I think it was that reinforcement, that assistance to that policy orientation. The proof of that is that … the election of Vicente Fox and the opening of the Mexican political system in the second half of the 1990s, culminating in the election of 2000, would not have been possible without NAFTA. I think that the importance of NAFTA is something we need to be very aware of.

Where do we go now? How do we build on NAFTA? This week we hope to conclude a bilateral agreement with Chile. And next month we are going to start negotiations with Central America… All of this feeds into this whole program for the Free Trade Area of the Americas. And if we go through with this process, there are going to be all sorts of trade disputes and [disputes about] access for agricultural products which are very important. They have employment effects, have investment effects on the economy. But I really think that one of the main reasons that this whole project is important for us is… to get the hemisphere on a policy orientation, economic liberalization, support for political opening and for democratization. Sometimes when we just look at the narrow trade benefits, I think we lose sight of other broader benefits of the entire process.

So the question is how do we build on NAFTA? We are building on NAFTA with the Chileans and the other sub-regional groups and finally with the whole hemisphere. Within NAFTA itself—and here I am speaking more personally than for the administration—I think there are probably things we can think about. There are, unlike water, some subjects that might lend themselves to a trilateral approach. One is border security. Governor Ridge has been working with his counterparts Minister Creel and Minister Manley on border security, focusing on the northern and southern border. But there are other things that the three countries could sit down and talk about. This concept of a North American perimeter is one of the things that the three of us could sit down and exchange some ideas on.

Another would be improvements on NAFTA. There are certain, almost technical provisions on things like rules of origin, on convergence of regulatory frameworks, on a whole series of trade matters relating to NAFTA, that were not completed during the negotiations. Another area might be transportation, some sort of open skies arrangement for passengers or cargo…

Fourth, and somewhat more sensitive and complicated is the area of energy. We have established a North American working group on energy, and we have made some statistical exchanges. Energy is a very important and obviously a very sensitive subject politically in Mexico. In Canada it is sensitive and the whole governmental structure is very different [than] the one we have in the United States, so there are going to be some limitations on how much we can do in that area.

The final point that I would like to make is that, as I have mentioned in the case of water, not all issues lend themselves to trilateral approaches. In addition to water, the one I would think about would be migration, which I would suspect is something that we would deal with in conjunction with Mexico and will remain essentially a bilateral matter.
NAFTA and a North American Labor Market: Migration, Wages, and Labor Rights

Maria Echaveste
Philip Martin
Frank D. Bean
Sidney Weintraub

The panel noted income inequalities as the source of Mexican migration to the United States. The panel further highlighted that the U.S. labor force growth was not able to keep up with the rapid job creation rate in the United States of 1.2 million jobs per year in the late 1990s. Mexican workers entered the United States and filled some of these jobs. Panelists differed on possible solutions for regularizing migration flows.

MARIA ECHAVESTE

Maria Echaveste began the discussion by relaying comments she received concerning the lack of representation of organized labor at this conference. She remembered that each of the three former leaders who had spoken in the opening session of the conference pointed out the difficult political battles they had faced when trying to pass NAFTA, due in part to the opposition of labor groups.

Echaveste answered a question on the role of immigrants in creating jobs by virtue of their economic participation in their communities. She cited a study by Northeastern University attributing a significant part of the U.S. economic growth in the 1990s to the economic activities of immigrants. Echaveste also called for the development of standard labor rights as part of NAFTA’s long-term development.

PHILIP MARTIN

Philip Martin stated that demographic trends had indicated that the 1990s were going to be a period of high immigration from Mexico to the United...
Nafta at 10: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Frank D. Bean described several structural imbalances that make it difficult to assess NAFTA’s impact on migration. Like Martin, he referred to the incomplete demographic transition in Mexico that saw its population grow dramatically and then enter a period of slower growth. Second, he asserted that many countries around the world have overcapacity in the manufacturing sector. Finally, he noted that Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. businesses have been constantly and successfully striving to improve productivity thus employing fewer resources.

Bean summarized U.S. efforts to control migration, including the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and NAFTA. However, economic conditions in the 1990s greatly encouraged Mexican immigrants. During that time, the United States was generating about 1.2 million more jobs a year than its domestic population growth was able to fill through new entrants into the labor market. Fearing a labor shortage, U.S. manufacturers and others applied political pressure for the government to create guest worker programs.

Bean concluded that the underlying problems of migration are more the product of demographic and economic circumstances than of NAFTA itself. However, he noted that the timing of the events makes it easy to blame NAFTA. He encouraged the development of policies that would deal with the structural imbalances he identified and better address the true causes of migration.

Sidney Weintraub concluded the panel with further elaboration of the panelists’ arguments. Weintraub pointed to the rural poor in Mexico, who constitute a quarter of the population but contribute only five percent of GDP. Under those conditions, he said, they must leave their homes to find economic opportunity. In defense of NAFTA, Weintraub asserted that no institution would have been able to handle adequately the effects of the 1995 Mexican economic crisis, in which one million jobs were lost. Weintraub predicted that this problem will continue until Mexico has greater income and can create jobs at home, which could only come from increased growth.

Weintraub disputed an earlier argument by Albert Fishlow stating that NAFTA’s supporters sold the agreement to the U.S. Congress with the promise that it would control migration. On the contrary, he pointed to an article he published at the time predicting a short-term increase in migration.

Weintraub highlighted the challenge of choosing a migration policy that would satisfy the demand for low-wage workers without rewarding and encouraging illegal immigration.

States, regardless of the existence of NAFTA. Mexico had experienced a dramatic population spike in the 1970s, adding pressure to an already limited Mexican job market. He asserted that the Mexican population almost doubled from 1970 to 2000, from about 50 million to about 100 million people, while the number of Mexican-born persons in the United States increased tenfold. Martin also attributed high migration levels to the combination of a U.S. job creation boom and a Mexican economic crisis that had been unforeseeable during the creation of NAFTA. Mexico still has trouble generating formal sector jobs. Demand for low-wage labor in the United States, he said, had moved from its concentration in the southwestern states to spread across the country.

Martin commended Mexico’s recognition of the valuable economic resource it has in the community of Mexican workers in the United States. He noted that Mexico has a labor force of about 40 million while the United States has a labor force of about 140 million. Problems such as continued skepticism about investing in Mexico still hinder the development of small businesses there. Only 15 million workers of the Mexican labor force were covered by social security and health care. A significant number of the six million or so Mexicans who work in the United States send back about $9 billion per year to Mexico.1 The Mexican government has made efforts to facilitate the remittance of their wages back to their families in Mexico.

If the United States is to be effective in reducing the flow of illegal immigrants, the American government needs to address the nationwide demand for low-wage jobs. An industry of “risk absorbers” has arisen who assemble crews of undocumented immigrants to perform construction and janitorial services, which in turn enables businesses previously unwilling to accept the risk of employing undocumented immigrants to do so and save on their wage bill. Furthermore, Martin said, the United States must realize the consequences of its policies on migration and commit to working with the Mexican government on this issue.

Sidney Weintraub

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Weintraub highlighted the challenge of choosing a migration policy that would satisfy the demand for low-wage workers without rewarding and encouraging illegal immigration.
Panelists had divergent approaches to the concept of security and addressed the topic from various perspectives, ranging from military security to economic security. The panel noted the weak military collaboration between the United States and Mexico as compared to the stronger military cooperation between the United States and Canada. The panel also stressed the need to reduce the perceived unilateralism of the United States vis-à-vis border issues with Canada—and particularly Mexico. While the panel commented on the beginning of convergence in areas of tax policy, it also noted the deeper benefits to even stronger convergence. Panelists also pointed out the particular challenge NAFTA will face in harmonizing fair tax, tariff, and subsidy policies in relation to agriculture in the years ahead.

**GEORGE HAYNAL**

George Haynal opened the panel by observing the vitality of the current Canadian discourse on North America, which had intensified since the tragedy of the September 2001 attacks on the United States. He remarked that the apparent consensus among conference participants was that North American integration was irreversible, that the instruments for managing it had lagged behind, and noted the paradox created by NAFTA. The agreement has fostered North American relationships that were rich, complex, and made the three NAFTA countries deeply interdependent. Haynal highlighted the need for more advanced...
mechanisms to manage the proliferation of linkages among us, as well as the shared need for security against global threats. A new framework is necessary, he said, to enable the three countries to share responsibility in both linkages and security areas. He added that such a framework would be challenging to construct given the differences in capacity and commitment to shared approaches. Haynal concluded by recognizing that there is no choice but to proceed, as a matter of urgency, to build the framework.

**Lorraine Eden**

Lorraine Eden posited that NAFTA integration in trade and investment should be accompanied by deeper integration in tax policy.

Differences in tax policies distort investment decisions, reduce efficiency and growth, encourage price manipulation, and facilitate tax evasion. The benefits of deeper integration in tax policy, she argued, include reducing incentives for income shifting, limiting tax havens for drug cartels and terrorist groups, encouraging voluntary compliance, and providing Canada and Mexico with more protection against the ill effects of U.S. tax policy.

Eden argued that steps should be taken to reduce or eliminate border taxes. She conceded, however, that such a deeper integration process could be perceived as a surrender of national sovereignty, negatively affect public services, and stymie innovation from competition. She recommended that the integration be done by trilateralizing tax policy in NAFTA by establishing a formal tax policy working group at the ministerial level, replacing bilateral tax agreements with a trilateral tax treaty, and establishing an arbitration system for cross-border tax disputes.

**Guadalupe González**

Guadalupe González presented a Mexican perspective on how trade integration affects security considerations. Security in a globalized context includes a broad category of threats, including drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and terrorism. A predominant concern is the relatively new emergence of transnational threats posed by non-state actors. González stated that this combination of a broad definition of security and elusive threats makes international coordination of security policies difficult. A further problem, she said, is the degree to which various security concerns affect each nation differently.

González remarked that the North American integration model has particular security characteristics, with unique and very deep international security doctrines in all three countries as well as a lack of a shared vision of transnational security and security institutions. She noted that the issue of security was largely ignored during NAFTA’s creation and that the convergence of security policies has been slow and sporadic. She discussed contrasting views of how free trade may have either increased or decreased illegal activities and threats to security in the NAFTA area. She also said that the concern of controlling transborder movement has led to high-pressure situations in border areas.

González listed a series of outstanding challenges to NAFTA’s security integration. Canada and Mexico must determine how to deal with or limit increasing U.S. militarization and protection of its borders. The partner countries also need to immediately remove growing restrictions on the border areas. The strong military cooperation between the United States and Canada does not have a parallel in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. There is a need to reduce unilateralism by the United States on security and border issues related to Mexico; the “Smart Border Strategy” is an imperfect move in the right direction. She urged a tougher approach towards those who make a business of smuggling people across the border, along with further measures to prevent the loss of life of undocumented migrants.

**Thomas Courchene**

Thomas Courchene acknowledged some disconnect between the panel topic and his presentation on a Canadian perspective on the transformation of the North American economic space which addressed trade flows among states and provinces, exchange rates, current account surpluses, north-south integration, and the rise of state governments. Courchene analyzed the aggregate international and interprovincial flows of trade and confirmed that Canadian trade with the United States has increased. Thirty-eight U.S. states now have Canada as their largest trading partner, while trade among the Canadian provinces themselves had fallen. He stated that all Canadian provinces but one now trade more with the United States than with other Canadian provinces. Courchene called these new provincial trading units “region states.” The rise of the “region states” has caused further asymmetry and decentralization in Canada’s political economy.
Courchene remarked that cities need to be brought more fully into bodies of intergovernmental relations, noting that while the U.S. federal government can give federal aid directly to cities—and not just to states—the Canadian government could not constitutionally give aid directly to Canadian cities. This could in turn lead to relatively weak infrastructure in Canadian cities, making them less competitive in terms of attracting business.

Furthermore, Courchene noted that the dramatic weakening of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dollar since 1975 contributed to the impetus for many Canadians to seek jobs in the United States where wages were higher.

Courchene stated that pressures for deepening NAFTA include the explosion of trade under NAFTA and increasing U.S. interests in Canada. National systems of infrastructure need to be transformed into one system. He recommended that NAFTA be strengthened to include more government levels and provide a space for subregional integration. Courchene concluded with a recommendation that Canada pursue its own interests by utilizing fixed exchange rates and building a North American monetary union.

**Irwin Altschuler**

Irwin Altschuler concluded the panel by recalling how political considerations kept NAFTA from eliminating all trade barriers. He predicted that imbalances put NAFTA countries on a collision course with one another, citing the brewing controversies over the agricultural sector and security. In particular, he noted that U.S. subsidies to farmers would continue to cause grave problems for the Mexican agricultural sector. He also pondered how implementation of bioterrorism legislation would affect the import of food products from NAFTA members.

**Panel 7**

**NAFTA: Democracy, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of a North American Community**

*Peter Hakim*
*James Robinson*
*Anthony DePalma*
*Gordon Giffin*

Panelists noted that while the “big idea” behind the European Community was the prevention of another European war, it was difficult to see the “big idea” behind NAFTA beyond the obvious strengthening of trade relations. While NAFTA institutions do exist and the three states do submit themselves to them, the institutions themselves are not democratic and do not conform to the norms of transparency. The question was raised as to whether the concept for continental homeland security could be a new idea around which NAFTA could move forward, especially if the trade-offs between continental democracy and sovereignty were addressed in the process. Finally, the panelists felt that NAFTA should be seen as a small but historic step forward in the history of the North American continent and not considered the light at the end of the tunnel.

**Peter Hakim**

Peter Hakim began the panel presentations by framing the discussion around the question of North American community. Specifically, he asked, does the North American community truly behave as a community—with a genuine sharing of values, purposes, and a North American identity—or is it simply a collection of three nations? Hakim asked the panel and the audience to reflect on the question of the winners and losers of a conflict between a single North American identity versus separate national identities. Further, he asked those concerned with the matter to reflect on what governments should do to promote this North American identity.
JAMES ROBINSON

Robinson argued that economic liberalization does not equal democratization because true democracy requires strong institutions. The European Union recognizes this and as such includes in its charter a clause encouraging democracy, as well as investment in a strong infrastructure. It is interesting, he noted, that the United States and NAFTA do not embrace this latter view. Robinson suggested that this may be related to President Salinas’ attempt to preserve political stability while engaging in large-scale reforms of the nation’s political economy. Partially borrowing the model of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Salinas “worked for perestroika without glasnost” (e.g., economic reforms without political reforms).

Robinson argued that Mexico’s increase in democracy and transparency occurred not because of NAFTA but in spite of it. Robinson argued that the anti-institution forces of free trade were countered not by national or continental standards but by international standards of democracy and legitimacy such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Also, by 1995, support for NAFTA had declined to about 20 percent in Mexico. He argued that it was these international pressures, in conjunction with public dissatisfaction from below, that forced Mexico to engage in political reform.

Economic integration means that states share governance with complex public and private institutions at various levels, resulting in more transparent government actions. In addition, Robinson said that Mexico and Canada are now able to impose legal limits on the behavior of the United States, while forcing its actions to become more transparent and accountable.

ANTHONY DEPALMA

DePalma argued that NAFTA was a historic milestone. However, while the big idea behind the European Community was clear—the prevention of another European war—he wondered aloud about the binding common interest behind NAFTA. He suggested that there was no similar master plan in the case of NAFTA. Rather, the three NAFTA partners were stumbling forward in the direction of community and towards the idea of the interrelationship between international and domestic policies. DePalma posed the question of the trade-off between sovereignty and “continental democracy.” For example, while all three states submitted themselves to tribunals to resolve trade disputes, the tribunals themselves are not democratic in that they do not conform to norms of transparency.

He posed the question of whether continental homeland security could be a new organizing idea around which NAFTA moves forward. Today [Dec. 2002], with a seat on the United Nations Security Council, Mexico is trying to negotiate between its ideals of non-intervention and submitting to U.S. interests on Iraq policy. The Canada-U.S. military planning group is trying to finalize an agreement that would allow military troops in the other country should the need arise in response to a terrorist attack. As a final note, DePalma concluded that the three nations should build on the mutual confidence fostered by NAFTA to draft continental agreements on common defense and security.

GORDON GIFFIN

In closing comments, Gordon Giffin suggested that the celebration of the ten-year-old NAFTA agreement was, in a sense, the easy part of strengthening relations among the three nations. In the continental community, the United States is oblivious and Canada and Mexico are paranoid. He stated that the three partner countries still have a lot of political work to do to deepen this relationship, work that will inevitably entail large-scale debate. He asserted that harmonization of standards should not be seen as the Americanization of standards and that there is a space for Canadian and Mexican leadership in the formulation of policies. Finally, he felt that NAFTA should be considered but a small step in North American history and not the light at the end of the tunnel.

DISCUSSION

Sidney Weintraub remarked that the Center for Strategic and International Studies had created a war game related to smallpox contamination across North America, leading to the conclusion that borders are largely irrelevant. He also questioned why Canadians in particular focused on the U.S.-Canadian bilateral relationship while Mexicans and Americans focused more on the trilateral relationship. Rafael Fernández responded that perhaps Mexico should focus on the U.S.-Mexican relationship, which in turn might spark interest from Canada. John Noble, a former Canadian diplomat, noted that there are some
uniquely U.S.-Canadian issues and U.S.-Mexican issues. DePalma closed by saying that closer Canada-Mexico-U.S. relations would not reduce separate identities but might indeed enhance them. He used the example of France and Germany in the 1930s, two countries that no one imagined would ever cooperate.

**APPENDIX 1**

**Full text of speeches**

*Susan Sylvester*

*Joseph Giddenhorn*

*Lee Hamilton*

*Michael Wilson*

*Prime Minister Brian Mulroney*

*James Jones*

*President Carlos Salinas*

*Richard Chilcoat*

*President George Bush*

**Susan Sylvester**

Good morning.

My name is Susan Sylvester and I am general manager of the International Trade Center for the U.S. General Services Administration, the owner of the building.

I would like to welcome you to the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center to join in this special recognition of the ten-year anniversary of NAFTA.

The International Trade Center was established to create and enhance opportunities for American trade and commerce with other nations. And NAFTA certainly plays a pivotal role in the activities and services that take place at the International Trade Center.

For example, in January 2003 we will host a three-day conference for leaders of the 60 World Trade Centers in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. That conference will help small companies throughout the NAFTA countries develop new tools and networks to increase their international business and trade.

One of the key organizations located at the International Trade Center, and a co-sponsor of today’s program, is the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and we are very glad to cosponsor this event and welcome the distinguished visitors.
At this time, I would like to introduce Ambassador Joseph Gildenhorn, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

JOSEPH GILDENHORN
Good morning. As Chairman of the Board of Trustees for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, I am pleased to welcome all of you to this major conference marking the tenth anniversary of the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The Wilson Center commemorates the ideals and concerns of President Woodrow Wilson by bridging the world of ideas and the world of policy. Scholars and policymakers are provided with an environment where they can pursue research and a constructive dialogue concerning the most important issues in public and international affairs. In North America, I can think of few issues that merit our attention more than the unprecedented cooperation between Canada, the United States, and Mexico that began with the signing of NAFTA.

In this spirit, the Wilson Center has worked to turn the idea of this conference into two days of formal presentations, panel discussions, and an informed dialogue. None of this would have been possible without the thoughts, insights, and support of our many cosponsors.

The Wilson Center is pleased to act as host of the conference. Today’s event is cosponsored by the Wilson Center, the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, the Power Corporation, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, CN, North America’s Railroad, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Canadian Embassy, and the Canadian American Business Council. It is true that many hands make light work, and we hope that together we have established what will be a path-breaking and inspired conference.

It is an honor to welcome former President Bush, former Prime Minister Mulroney, and former President Salinas. It is rare to be in the company of just one leader who has changed the world, let alone three. It is a particular pleasure to be on the stage with my old boss, President Bush. I had the great privilege of serving the president and through him the American people as his ambassador to Switzerland. It gave me a first-hand opportunity to see this incredibly skillful president in his role as America’s master diplomat.
Michael Wilson
I am honored to introduce the Right Honorable Brian Mulroney, prime minister of Canada at the time of both the NAFTA and FTA trade agreements.

Mr. Mulroney will present to us a broad perspective of these trade initiatives together with his view of future trade directions.

I thought that it might be helpful to provide some of the context within which this earlier negotiation occurred.

Trade relations with the United States are always controversial within Canada, dating from the 1911 election when the Liberal government of the day ran on the issue of U.S. free trade and was defeated by the Conservatives. Since that time, the issue has always been a tender one, something which successive governments treated with great care.

That feeling certainly prevailed in the 1980s.

Prime Minister Mulroney approached it with realism, vision, and wisdom.

Realism, because he knew it would be very controversial and likely divide the country.

Vision, because he understood the importance of the economic relationship with the United States and had the good judgment to visualize the very positive impact of greater access to the large U.S. market.

And wisdom, to manage the issue with a delicate balance of raw energy, political judgment, and historical perspective.

He was correct on all three.

Free trade became the defining political issue of the day. It was controversial, highly emotional, and generated hard positions on both sides. Free trade was the issue in the 1988 election, almost to the total exclusion of anything else. The country was absorbed by it; little else mattered.

Two weeks before the election we were in third place facing almost certain defeat and a consequent loss of the Free Trade Agreement. With a heroic effort, the Mulroney government was returned, and with a substantial majority.

I can truly say to you without the commitment, understanding, vision, and political leadership of Brian Mulroney, the election would have been exciting work that is being done at the new George Bush School at Texas A&M. Dean Chilcoat…
lost, the Free Trade Agreement would have died, and NAFTA would never have been an option for Canada.

Ladies and gentlemen it gives me great pleasure to present to you the Right Honorable Brian Mulroney, 23rd prime minister of Canada.

**Prime Minister Brian Mulroney**

Exactly one month after my birth, Winston Churchill described the Canadian-American relationship in memorable terms: “That long frontier from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, guarded only by neighborly respect and honorable obligations, is an example to every country and a pattern for the future of the world.”

In the 63 years since Churchill spoke, neither of our countries has done anything to diminish the expectations of excellence and cooperation he forecast.

For Canada and the United States, the post-cold war world offers unique opportunities and daunting challenges. We begin from a common heritage of democratic traditions and a defense of liberty. There are reminders of that from the trenches of one war to the beaches of the next, places inscribed in the history of valor, where Canadians and Americans have fought together, where Canadians and Americans have died together, in the defense of freedom.

It was on the basis of these shared values and common achievements that, as a new prime minister in 1985, I signalled to President Reagan that Canada was interested in negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States of America.

I was aware that similar attempts by Canadian prime ministers had founded painfully over the previous 100 years, in large measure because of a reality described by Prime Minister and Nobel Laureate Lester B. Pearson: “The picture of weak and timid Canadian negotiators being pushed around and browbeaten by American representatives into settlements that were ‘sellouts’ is a false and distorted one. It is often painted, however, by Canadians who think that a sure way to get applause and support at home is to exploit our anxieties and exaggerate our suspicions over U.S. power and policies.”

I knew we would have to confront a powerful American administration at the bargaining table and an influential clutch of naysayers at home. The fact that the U.S. population base and economic power was roughly 10 times ours did nothing to soften my critics’ charges that, if successful, this would make Canada the 51st state.

At that time, access to our most important market was being threatened. A severe wave of protectionism swept through Congress like a bitter November wind, and about 40 percent of our exports to the United States were subject to quotas, “voluntary” restraints, and other restrictions. As I indicated to the House of Commons, by way of illustration of the mood and atmosphere that existed in the United States, the Ottinger Bill, passed three successive years by the House of Representatives, sought to destroy the Auto Pact, the heart of Ontario’s economic power in Canada. The Americans also demanded punitive action against Canadian lumber, steel, uranium, cement, subway cars, fish, in fact, virtually all of our exports. There was a crisis a month for one Canadian exporter after another, as new trade barriers were erected against Canadian products and new legal interpretations were advanced to inhibit Canadian access to the U.S. market. That is the challenge we faced at that time and I believed the negotiation of a bold new trade agreement offered the most realistic solution on behalf of the people of Canada.

In 1987, following more than two years of difficult negotiations, we reached agreement. President Reagan and I subsequently signed the massive and quite radical agreement, which came into effect on January 1, 1989.

In Canada, we had to endure a vicious three-year onslaught and unprecedented vitriolic personal attack—and I had to call and win a brutal general election campaign—before we could enact the agreement into law. According to our opponents it was going to be an unrelieved disaster and Canada was going to lose its shirt. So what happened?

Well, last year, two-way trade in goods and services between our countries exploded to $700 billion. It is now $2 billion a day, more than $1.3 million per minute, every day of the year, the largest amount of commerce between any two nations in world history.

Canada is the number one export market for 37 of the American states, and Canada buys more goods from the United States than the 15 countries of the EU combined. America now exports three times as much to Canada as to China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan combined.

The value of goods crossing the Windsor-Detroit border point alone is greater than total U.S. trade with Japan.
Based on the Canada-U.S. experience, NAFTA has opened up the Mexican market of 100 million people, creating the largest, richest, single market in the world—400 million people accounting for one-third of the world's output, approximately $11 trillion per year.

This constituted the second act in the trilogy.

Mexico's exports have increased by more than 220 percent between 1993 and 2001 and Mexico's average annual capital inflow has reached almost $12 billion, three times the annual amount in the seven years prior to NAFTA. As a result, since NAFTA, Mexico has now surpassed Japan as America's number two trading partner even though its economy is one-twelfth the size of Japan's.

The rise of trade between Mexico and Canada, countries with modest economic links prior to NAFTA, was dramatic, and is now worth more than $10 billion a year, our sixth largest trade partner.

The fear mongering of those who predicted massive losses of jobs, the curtailing of sovereignty, a race to the bottom in environmental and social policy has proved hollow.

Our countries are stronger, our economies more robust, our peoples more prosperous, our social structures more resilient, our capital markets more stable, our roles in the world more vigorous as a result of NAFTA.

We have, in short, accomplished much. There are however new challenges that face us and opportunities open to us as we try to manage an intensifying economic relationship and cope with increasing threats to our shared values and security.

These issues are inseparable. North America is more than a free trade area. It is a community of values motivated by a deep belief in democracy, economic opportunity, tolerance, and the rule of law. It is three countries sharing a critical infrastructure of pipelines, telecommunication networks, rail, and power lines. It is three closely integrated economies whose prosperity depends on free flows of people and goods between them.

It is, in short, an area whose social, economic, and national security is indivisible. Our economic security relies on seamless borders within North America. Our security against global terrorism and criminality can only be ensured by acting together to protect our external borders before threats can reach any of our territories. Our values are only safe if we insist on practicing them and make them a compelling example to the world. It is essential therefore that we dedicate ourselves to protecting our
shared continent together and to work together in the world, acting in defense of our beliefs.

Let me list some of the tasks I see lying ahead for us in North America.

First and foremost, the NAFTA partners must dedicate themselves as a matter of the greatest urgency to building an area of security in North America, one that denies terrorism a foothold on our continent and ensures uninterrupted legitimate flows among us. Such common action is also essential to allow us to protect the great north-south flows of goods, people, and technology that underpins our shared prosperity. Our internal borders will only be smart if our external perimeter is secure. We may well need new political institutions (ministerial councils) to heighten vigilance and direct concrete action which gives all of North America more certainty against the unprecedented threat of terrorism. We must make our internal borders work in our shared interest rather than succumbing to the false temptation of sealing them off against each other to protect security. Doing so would be a victory for terrorists.

We must also protect our shared economic security against political expediency. An economic relationship that is so close and so strongly based in mutual reliance should not be subject to the misuse of draconian trade instruments. The sometimes arbitrary application of trade remedies in North America can have the most hurtful consequences on communities and on whole regions in our countries. They serve no one but special interests and hurt consumers. Though the application of such measures has fallen significantly since the conclusion of NAFTA, each instance is like a violent lurch in a stable relationship, a rude assault on the fundamental goals of a grand continental partnership. In my view, we should press for a common standard of trade remedy embracing the rule of law rather than the rule of power. There are other more effective means to resolve our trade disputes, such as appeals under what are highly compatible national competition laws. We should, in any event, rely on and reinforce our shared mechanisms to resolve disputes. These have worked well; made more permanent and properly resourced, they could perform even better.

Also important to our shared welfare in North America is the flow of services, technology, and knowledge. These are conveyed by people. Assuring their movement across our borders should be the focus of renewed attention as we put in place the new structures we need to protect our security.

Our economies are now closely connected and interdependent, a reality that needs to be better reflected in the way our governments manage our national affairs and in the way they regulate economic activity.

They should work together to ensure that while our national systems of regulation serve to protect our citizens—and are fully respectful of our different constitutions—they are also as compatible as possible in order to increase the efficiency of our economies and enhance our global competitiveness.

The future is also full of possibility for achieving a closer sense of community among our three countries—through education, culture, shared infrastructure, and the collaboration between local communities. Our governments should also engage more vigorously in the effort to define a vision that will benefit all our peoples, a vision of a vibrant harmonious continent.

It is therefore vital that the third act in the trilogy now be completed. After a decade of tremendous progress towards democracy throughout Latin America, uncertainty and unpredictability are now creeping into fragile democratic institutions from Venezuela to Brazil to Argentina. They must now be drawn together into greater prosperity and deeper democracy by a powerful act of political leadership. If this occurs, one day, NAFTA’s successor—the Free Trade Area of the Americas—shall include 34 countries and 800 million people with an annual GDP of $12.5 trillion and the United States, Canada, and Mexico will have defined a powerful role for themselves at the very heart of a new free trade zone, stretching from Montreal to Monterrey, Point Barrow to Patagonia, Hawaii to Honduras, Easter Island to Nunavut. The geopolitical and international security implications of this new grouping will be profoundly beneficial for us all.

NAFTA is about more than North America. We are countries of the Americas. I say this proudly as the leader of the government which made Canada a member of the Organization of American States in 1990.

Canada’s decision to join the OAS was a historic one, reversing long standing Canadian policy and based in our confidence that we were at home in the region, that democracy and respect for human rights was embedded in the hemisphere, that the countries of the Americas were committed to the rule of law and open economies. The decision was a prelude to Canada’s finally assuming a leadership role in its own hemisphere.
Led by wealthy and powerful G-7 nations—the United States and Canada—societies that understand free trade agreements must initially allow poorer economies to prosper quickly—the democracies of the hemisphere are now committed to social equity, freer markets, less state intervention, and a firmer rule of law.

They want to reap the advantages that these offer their societies, but all agree that free trade, particularly access to the great markets of NAFTA and Brazil, will be essential if they are to be able to do so. That is why the countries of the hemisphere, inspired by the vision first articulated by President Reagan, agreed to a Free Trade Area of the Americas.

President Bush carried forward that vision in his powerful Enterprise for the Americas initiative in 1990 and the leaders of the hemisphere launched the FTAA negotiations four years later.

Our governments have agreed to conclude the FTAA by 2005, a little over two years from now. Much hard negotiation lies ahead. Some countries of the Americas have made confident strides towards open economies, but a number have stumbled and others face difficult political and social choices. The prospect of a successful FTAA agreement is the strongest support for their efforts that we could give them. It has the capacity to change their lives in dramatic fashion and forever.

It is our privilege, in North America, to have made a success of free trade. It is now our responsibility to share that success.

The Americas are our neighborhood. Our security depends on our neighbors’ capacity to provide stability under the effective rule of law. Our prosperity will be enhanced as theirs is assumed.

The FTAA negotiations are at a critical stage. We have the opportunity, as the United States and Brazil assume chairmanship of the process, to make them a historic success.

We must not underestimate the complexity of the task, particularly given that the global negotiations on new WTO rules are also under way.

Nor should we forget that the countries of the Americas are pursuing two linked goals: democracy and economic growth.

The leaders of the Americas agreed at the Quebec City summit last year on the bond between the freedom to trade and the freedom to enjoy democratic institutions.

It is important, in my view, that the FTAA re-assert that freedom—economic and political—is indivisible. The agreement should provide that the benefits of free trade are open only to democracies living under the rule of law and with respect for human rights.

What then are some of the key issues to resolve if the FTAA is to become reality?

One is the need to guarantee access to our markets for the exports that matter most for our partners, particularly the export of agricultural commodities. This ought to be the first step on “the ladder of economic prosperity” that poor countries desperately seek to take. But the rich countries pay out more than $300 billion a year in farm subsidies, thereby enabling farmers in some industrialized countries to sell overseas at 20 percent below the actual cost of production, and consequently killing off any hope for developing countries to compete effectively. Just to be sure, in the United States there are further tariff barriers that make it doubly tough for many third world farmers to sell any of their produce here at all.

We will, in turn, need to be assured that their markets are open to us, particularly to the provision of services by North American suppliers, whose participation will bring innovation and efficiency in their wake.

The agreement should provide rules that protect the rights of foreign investors against arbitrary and discriminatory action.

The agreement should establish effective mechanisms to resolve disputes among us. The NAFTA and the WTO provide rich experience on which to draw to make such a system both responsive and authoritative.

The agreement should provide for the movement of people, allowing professionals much greater freedom to provide services across the region, students to benefit from a wider range of learning opportunities, and our citizens to share in the great cultural gifts of our hemisphere.

The freedom of movement across our borders, both of goods and people, is elemental to the notion of free trade. In the world of the twenty-first century, however, such a freedom must not be left open to abuse. It must be accompanied by agreements to eliminate threats to our security, whether from global criminality or its Siamese twin—global terrorism. The commitment to fight the illegal traffic in people, drugs, and capital must be intensified as part of our efforts to build a community based on free trade in the hemisphere.

Lastly, countries of the FTAA should establish fora where environmental and labor issues can be studied and reviewed among our govern-
ments, where best practices can be shared and where those who do not honor their own laws respecting these matters can be held to account by their peers.

The agenda I have sketched here is ambitious. Some will say it is unattainable. But the remarkable thing about the FTA and NAFTA is that success emerged despite heavy obstacles and fierce opposition. The leadership and perseverance that forged those agreements are paying dividends today for all three partners. The power of a good idea should never be underestimated. It could happen again. It should happen again.

We who have benefited so dramatically from a decade of free trade in North America have a special role to play. We are able to offer our success as an example of what is possible.

Access to our markets will be critical to assuring stability and growth in our sister democracies now passing through a period of uncertainty, sometimes of stagnation and turmoil.

NAFTA’s place will evolve, depending on the outcome of these trade negotiations. It will continue to be a critical bond among the countries of North America; its importance in the hemisphere as an example is unquestioned; its role as a magnet will be compelling.

Ten years on, there is much to celebrate in what we North Americans have accomplished.

Ten years from today however we must gather again to celebrate the great achievement of a new generation of political leaders: the binding together of all peoples and countries of the western hemisphere who believe in freedom and practice democracy in a vast free trade zone, greater than the world has ever before seen, which will ensure growing prosperity and durable social justice for many, long deprived of both. And in the process, we will contribute to the political stability and peaceful progress for all peoples, becoming as Churchill predicted, a model for all mankind.

JAMES JONES
It’s a great pleasure to see many former colleagues from the government—Senator Moynihan, Secretary Mosbacher, Mac McLarty, and others. I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center for hosting this perspective on what is about to be the tenth year of NAFTA in existence. For those of us who played a small role in trying to convince our U.S. Congress to pass and implement NAFTA, what we promised has been far exceeded by what has been delivered. But yet the potential benefits, both economic and otherwise, have barely been accomplished.

I was honored to participate in the responsibilities of helping to implement NAFTA in Mexico. When you look at it, however, you have to recognize that without these three giant leaders, it probably would never have happened. It was their vision, their political courage, and their tenacity to both imagine and to negotiate this agreement which has fundamentally altered the relationships of the three North American countries. In the course of any nation’s history, there are just a handful of events that are true turning points. One of those events, at least insofar as Mexico’s history is concerned, was the passage and the implementation of NAFTA.

And looking back at those years, it is my belief that there was no one better equipped to move this turning point in history in Mexico than former President Carlos Salinas. He had the combination of a very impressive understanding of economics with a practical knowledge of politics, and that combination enabled him to convince what was then a rather cosy, very powerful, and closed business leadership in Mexico, and to persuade the political establishment that opening Mexico was a good thing to do.

So beginning in 1988 when President Salinas was elected, Mexico was truly one of the most closed economies in the world. Today it is one of the most open. Although a democracy, it was perceived as a closed political system. The opening of Mexico to free market economics clearly resulted in today it being one of the most competitive political democracies in the world. And while the successors of each of these gentlemen have added to the richness of NAFTA, it was they who started it all, and without Carlos Salinas de Gortari, I believe it would not have started at that time in the history of Mexico.

I am pleased to present former President Carlos Salinas.

PRESIDENT CARLOS SALINAS
I want to express my appreciation to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for the invitation to participate in this conference on NAFTA’s ten years, and in particular my recognition to its director, Lee H. Hamilton, for his initiative to make this conference happen.
Yesterday: The Beginning

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was born on November 22, 1988. Despite the anticipation, it was stillborn.

On that date, I met with the president of the United States, George Bush, in Houston, Texas. We were both presidents-elect. In a few days, we would each begin our respective mandates. This simultaneous commencement of administrations in Mexico and the United States occurs only once every 12 years. It was to be a promising meeting.

I found the future U.S. president to be a respectful man, someone who understood the sensibilities of our country, someone with a clear plan for the relationship. I also had mine. On the issue of trade, President-elect Bush went right to the point: he proposed the establishment of a free-trade zone between Mexico and the United States. Canada and the United States had just negotiated an agreement for free trade. This proposition came like a thunderclap. We had not anticipated it because our attention was riveted on the unbearable weight of our foreign debt and its service: Mexico’s primary and fundamental task was to resolve that excessive weight. My plan was to reduce our external debt, not renegotiate its payment. The priorities of the presidents-elect did not match.

So I said no to NAFTA, and George Bush accepted our proposal that Mexico begin debt negotiations. That process took up all of 1989. In the end, we achieved the first reduction of a huge foreign debt in Latin America, an outcome never before attained. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady and Secretary of Hacienda Pedro Aspe played innovative roles.

Thus, NAFTA disappeared at the moment of its birth during that meeting in Houston. But President Bush had had the vision to suggest it as a priority. It was not the first time: ten years earlier, President Ronald Reagan had proposed to another Mexican president that they negotiate a free trade agreement. The response of the Mexican leader was forceful: “Our children and our grandchildren,” he vowed, “will never see the day that we sign a free trade agreement.” It did not prove an accurate prediction because NAFTA became reality—not after two generations, but after a mere two administrations.

During these ten years—14 if we count from the first proposal—NAFTA, as it matured, has had some “near-death” experiences, dictated by circumstances and actors, sometimes south of this border, sometimes here. To illustrate these cycles, suffice it to say that NAFTA was proposed in November 1988, it was signed in November 1992, and both Congresses approved it in November 1993 [Ed. note: refer to p. 67 for exact dates]. The process took five years. The negotiation and the signing of the treaty took place under the worst of conditions within the United States—in the midst of the Gulf War, an economic recession, and a presidential campaign. During such complex times, President Bush never indicated he might postpone it, and he always firmly favored its completion, even at the most difficult moments. In that extremely adverse context, we forged the first trade agreement between the industrialized North and the developing South.

During that intense negotiation, a change took place in both the way Mexico and the United States did politics with each other and in the fundamentals of foreign relations. During those years, Mexico twice allied itself with the U.S. government: first in the struggle to achieve fast track authority, and later, to win U.S. congressional approval for the agreement. Twice we were adversaries: during the NAFTA negotiations and later during discussions on the side agreements on environment and labor.

In this context of ally-adversary, the Mexican government, for the first time in history, had to assume the challenge of playing politics in the United States and play them according to its rules of the game. Throughout the process, we knew that within the Mexican government, interests were not monolithic nor, we learned, were they in the United States.

From the beginning of my talks with President Bush, we agreed that we would deliberately demarcate the bilateral agenda, so that no part of it—not any actor or unforeseen circumstance—would be able to define the overall relationship. In practical terms, this meant that differences over specific issues must not contaminate the bilateral relationship, much less divert its general direction. This clarity was especially propitious given the tensions that we would experience during the NAFTA negotiations.

In this singular process, we, the Mexicans, entered the labyrinths of U.S. political and economic power. We had to learn—and learn quickly—to play politics with them without creating precedents that might be used against us or argued as a pretext for the Americans to interfere in Mexico’s domestic matters. On U.S. soil, we had to address multiple fronts: direct dialogue with the White House and the federal government, as well as with members of Congress and their aides, to say nothing of the political
parties, the press, the business community, labor unions, nongovernmental organizations, Latinos, governors, local legislators, academics, and intellectuals, and—within each of those groups—their various factions. It was necessary to make alliances, neutralize adversaries, and take care during the process not to win Pyrrhic victories that might cost us the opportunity that opened on the horizon for Mexico. In particular, when you negotiate, you win and lose, so you must avoid the paralyzing fear of accepting your adversary’s reasoning. We had to “keep our eyes on the prize,” and above all, not lose sight of our guiding principles. It was a process of unprecedented intensity.

We achieved the reduction of the debt in 1989. Thanks to that, the foreign debt dropped during my administration from 44 percent of GDP to 16 percent, which eliminated its excessive burden on Mexico’s growth. At that time, we believed that this single action would enable us to get back on the road to economic recovery. In a short time, the international political and economic reality showed us that we were wrong.

At the end of 1989, the world reality changed drastically. We found ourselves facing a major global transformation, and with it, a new political scenario for Mexico. In the world arena, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the meeting between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta confirmed the end of the Cold War. Shortly after, the so-called “Second World” would collapse (that is, the disappearance of almost the entire Socialist bloc). Most nations joined the market economy. The notable exceptions of China, Vietnam, and Cuba, with their major importance, confirmed that globalization was spreading throughout the world. The general trend toward market integration had been gestating for more than a century, and it was a definitive sign of the capitalist system. Globalization became an inevitable force.

Since the end of the Second World War, free trade had not enjoyed such wide acceptance. Just before the fall of the Wall, at the start of the Uruguay Round of GATT, that organization had 92 member countries; in a short time, another 64 countries would join or request admission, including China and Russia. In that context, 1990 marked the year that the European Union formed, with 12 countries participating. That integration scheme comprised 345 million people in a unified market with a value of US$6 trillion. We had to confront this new political and economic reality.

It was a change of hegemonies, in which Eastern Europe became a magnet for investment and development flows. The reduction of our debt—a notable and innovate achievement—would be insufficient for growth. We had to face globalization from an economically integrated region. Thus, the moment the negotiations to reduce the foreign debt concluded, we, the Mexicans, proposed to return to the original plan that President Bush had put forward in Houston. We let it be known: We want trade, not aid. So, during a visit that I made to the World Economic Forum in Davos in February 1990, I instructed the minister of commerce, Jaime Serra, to meet there with Carla Hills, the U.S. official responsible for trade negotiations. He proposed that we begin negotiations. What was the response of Carla? “Our priority is the Uruguay Round,” she affirmed. Serra was disappointed. “Don’t worry, Jaime,” I told him. “Carla has already started negotiating.”

It was impossible to ignore that the day-to-day relationship between the two nations during the final decade of the twentieth century went well beyond the commercial dimension: almost 20 million U.S. citizens were of Mexican origin. The Mexican-American community had its historical, linguistic, and genealogical roots in Mexico. At the same time, Mexico was home to the largest community of U.S. citizens residing outside the borders of the United States. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1990s, there were five million Mexicans working temporarily in the United States.

NAFTA signified a new type of bilateral relationship between neighbors that history had kept distant. It also guaranteed that Mexican products would gain access to the world’s largest market. For the first time, labor and environmental issues—the latter an issue on which Canada taught us much—had a place in a trade agreement. In short, NAFTA represented the possibility of institutionalizing cooperation and establishing a new type of relationship with the United States.

My predecessor, President Miguel de la Madrid, had taken a bold and basic step when he requested and gained Mexico’s admittance into GATT in 1986. With that action, Mexico made progress in the attempt to leave behind its closed economy with its strategy of import substitution.

Transforming the relationship with the United States was one of my goals. I wanted to emphasize the similarities while respecting the differences. During my administration, we were even able to agree to disagree.
Consciously taking the initiative to negotiate the terms to regulate the tight-knit economic relationship with our powerful neighbor to the north was a step that represented a major risk—one that ran counter to the traditional Mexican position of resistance and withdrawal when faced with proposals from the United States.

In Mexico, we had to build a consensus in favor of the negotiations. Indeed, a consensus existed, but it was in opposition. If the decision whether to negotiate the free trade agreement were to have been made by a poll, at that point, the answer would have been negative because most of the population was unsympathetic to a more intense rapprochement with the United States. Through persuasion, dialogue, and intense give and take, we managed to create a space for the discussion of the free trade agreement among the political actors and in public opinion.

Within Mexico, the promotion of the free trade agreement required the defeat of those who were entrenched against change. Corporations and the protectionist political and economic sectors, allied with the most backward enclaves of academic, partisan, and media leftists opposed the negotiation. Of course, we were accused of selling out our country, when in reality, everything indicated that we were able to reinforce its viability. However, without forgetting the lessons of history, we undeniably overcame prejudices and complexes and opened a new path in the relationship between Mexico and the United States, between the North and the South. We also counted on important allies: the modernizing currents within the PRI, the PAN, and other political and social organizations.

In the PAN, a division of opinion about the free trade agreement existed. One of its most renowned and combative members, Diego Fernández de Cevallos, gave his support from the start, as did Carlos Castillo Peraza and Gabriel Jiménez Remus, but others were categorically opposed.

In the PRD, opposition was unqualified. In New York in February 1991, the leader of that party indicated that the agreement would exacerbate Mexico’s economic condition. He stated that the free trade agreement was a tool “to close the door to democratization in the country.”

In civil society, some intellectuals opposed NAFTA, but others expressed their support, arguing for the agreement’s significance and the need for its timely negotiation. Groups of environmentalists, among them the so-called Group of 100, fought tenaciously to have environmental protection included in the agreement.

A variety of voices opposing the agreement managed to achieve an acceleration of the rhythm of our domestic reforms and a broadening of the negotiating points on the table, particularly those relating to the environment. This pressure was undoubtedly favorable. They deserve credit for their contributions.

We carried out intense efforts in Mexico to explain and persuade. Above all, I took active steps to form a solid negotiating team. The first such step was with the government itself: it was necessary to create unity within the government apparatus so that the bureaucracy would understand and support the project. If we failed to do this, it could weaken our position vis-à-vis the United States. The second step was to establish a negotiating team that, although it lacked experience with a project of this size, brought together people of talent and conviction. In the Ministry of Commerce, Jaime Serra headed an excellent team, which Herminio Blanco coordinated. Pedro Aspe gave his immediate support, and in light of his excellent experience as a negotiator, the financial sector unre- servedly joined the project.

It was essential to rally civil society. Thus, as a third step, we formed an advisory council composed of representatives from social groups. And as an additional step, we encouraged the organized participation of the business community in the so-called “room next door,” so that they could be part of the negotiations. In recognition that “the devil is in the details,” “for the first time in the history of the country, the various members that make up private enterprise had the opportunity and the need to meet in working groups to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each one of Mexico’s productive sectors, and to design, together with the government, a negotiating strategy.”

It was also necessary to have the public involved. We decided to air a weekly radio program and broadcast special programs on television to inform the Mexican people. We were determined to pay particular attention to the universities and the centers of higher education in order to elevate the quality of the discussion, and we entered into direct dialogue with social and business organizations, in particular, those representing small and mid-sized businesses.

On April 16, 1990, the Mexican Senate summoned the general public, political parties, private associations, and the representatives of the social sector to participate in the Forum for National Consultation on Mexico’s
Trade Relations with the World. Two days later, the consultation had begun. In sessions held in Mexico City, Puebla, Mérida, Mazatlán, Monterrey, and Guadalajara, lawmakers from all the political parties, in particular the PRI and the two most important opposition parties, the PAN and the PRD, debated the issue. Also participating were businesspeople, workers, campesino leaders, academics, members of a variety of social and political forces, state governors, federal and local public servants, as well as some members of the foreign service.

During both the broadcasting of our activities as well as the work that we did to achieve the free trade agreement, we avoided presenting ourselves as petitioners, victims, or dependents. Through Mexican promotional campaigns in the United States, we highlighted the advances in our development strategy: democratization, protection for human rights, elimination of the fiscal deficit, easing of inflation, privatization by public auction, increased social spending, unilateral liberalization of trade, environmental protection, and support for grassroots organizing through the Solidarity program. We emphasized the enormous depth of our culture. We promoted Mexico's image through exhibits, such as “Mexico, Splendor of 30 Centuries,” at the Metropolitan Museum of Art—until recently the exhibition with the highest attendance record—as well as through conferences featuring intellectuals and in tourist publicity campaigns.

In May 1990 after a broad national consultation, the Mexican Senate expressed its opinion in an official resolution: “The Senate of the Republic, in virtue of Mexico’s geographic location, its history of trade relations, of the complementarity and potential of its economy with respect to the United States of America, recommends negotiating a free trade agreement with that country. This agreement, in contrast to a common market, will preserve the political and economic sovereignty of the country.” The Senate also proposed broadening relations with Canada. The support for the negotiation of the free trade agreement was not unanimous but a majority was in favor.

Meanwhile, how did we approach Canada, the other great nation of North America? In the middle of 1990, I welcomed the prime minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney, to Mexico. During our private conversation at Los Pinos, the official residence, he told me about his experiences as the architect of the agreement between Canada and the United States, which had been finalized only a few months earlier. His comments were invaluable. He urged me to establish clearly from the very beginning what would not be negotiated in the agreement. “Fix those points clearly,” he told me, “and no one will be caught unaware during the negotiation.” I enthusiastically accepted that suggestion and followed it with conviction. At the end of his visit, Mulroney declared publicly that it was Mexico’s “sovereign and free” decision to join the North American market.

In September 1990, Canada decided to formalize its plan to join fully in the treaty negotiations. Prime Minister Mulroney sent me a letter in which he expressed his interest in participating in the search for a trilateral trade agreement. It was a difficult and courageous decision for him, since the trade agreement with the United States was unpopular with Canadians: most, without justification, blamed the agreement for Canada’s economic recession.

The teams formed. Opposite us was the United States with its formidable team. Participating intensely in it were, among others, Secretary of State James Baker and his counselor, Robert Zoellick; Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher; as well as Carla Hills and President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft. Initially, John Crosbie, as Minister of International Trade, represented Canada, and, later, the talented Michael Wilson followed him. Julius Katz in the U.S. team and John Weeks in the Canadian team faced Herminio Blanco.

The first obstacle appeared when the U.S. government requested fast track authorization from the U.S. Congress. The government confronted an unexpected opposition when a coalition of anti-NAFTA opponents formed. It was a formidable group since it included companies that were losing market share, workers who feared being displaced, agricultural producers, and also environmental and human rights organizations, among others. Everyone found in the process an opportunity to promote their agendas or defend their convictions. The formation of this opposition led to an unexpected development. The free trade agreement became a political issue of the greatest importance within the United States.

In January 1991 in Washington, D.C., we opened an office to support Herminio Blanco’s team, which would establish contacts with U.S. congressional representatives. During the fast track process, the members of this office met with U.S. representatives on more than 320 occasions.

We succeeded in getting the American business community to take vigorous action through the Business Round Table, the U.S. Chamber of
senting the proposal as a package, we attained clarity of ideas, firmness of action, and an exact course for pursuing our plan.

On August 12, 1992, after exhausting and intense sessions, we concluded the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. It had required more than 200 ministerial-level meetings and more than 2,000 meetings of specialized working groups. In the end, they agreed to open the economies in four stages, the last one providing protection for agricultural products up to 15 years, and the asymmetry in our economies was acknowledged. At 12:30 p.m. that day, Jaime Serra of Mexico, Carla Hills of the United States, and Michael Wilson of Canada shook hands on the completion of the treaty. In a press conference later that same day, Serra presented the Mexican people with a full account of the details of the agreement’s contents.

In October 1992, the three heads of state met in San Antonio, Texas, to witness the lead negotiators from the three nations initial the agreement.

On December 17, 1992, we signed the North American Free Trade Agreement. President Bush signed it at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., while Prime Minister Mulroney did so in Ottawa. Simultaneously, I signed it during a ceremony in the Adolfo López Mateos Room in Los Pinos.

During 1993, we negotiated the side agreements on environment and labor, and at the end of that year, following an intense yet delicate effort, the administration of President Bill Clinton won ratification of NAFTA in the U.S. Congress. The Mexican Senate approved it on November 22, 1993, and a short time later, on December 20, we published the full text in the Diario Oficial de la Federación.

A national-level poll in Mexico elicited encouraging results: 70 percent of those interviewed favored NAFTA, and only eight percent opposed it. We had forged a national consensus in support of our new relationship with our important North American neighbors, the United States and Canada.

**TODAY: INITIAL RESULTS**

When we signed the treaty, it was agreed that NAFTA would take effect on January 1, 1994. At that moment, the world’s largest free trade region with almost 400 million inhabitants and goods and services worth US$8
trillion was born. NAFTA became a model for other agreements Mexico has signed with other nations, all of which have been rules-based and have contained a clearly defined dispute settlement mechanism, as does NAFTA.

Among NAFTA’s results, we can list the following:

In terms of trade alone, the data are spectacular. The level of trade and the type of products that cross the borders silenced even the most ardent critics and surprised the firmest of believers. Aspe, one of the strongest sponsors of the agreement, did a study in 1993 to estimate NAFTA’s impact on trade: reality shows he considerably underestimated the agreement’s results. In August 1999, during the Latin American meeting of the Econometric Society, held in Cancún, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker asked Jaime Serra if the negotiating team had foreseen a trade increase of such magnitude. Serra responded with a resounding “no.”

In 1993, the last year before NAFTA took effect, Mexico’s foreign trade (exports plus imports) exceeded US$88 billion. For 2002, that figure will be almost US$350 billion. In 1993, foreign trade represented 22 percent of Mexico’s GDP; today, that figure has risen to 53 percent. The explanation for this notable increase lies in Mexico’s having tripled its trade with the United States and doubled its trade with Canada since the advent of NAFTA. Two years after the agreement took effect, Mexico doubled its exports to Brazil. A little later, Mexico surpassed Japan as the second largest exporter of goods to the United States. Today, Mexico accounts for 11.5 percent of all U.S. imports. There is also an important change within the structure of Mexican exports. Petroleum has lost its dominance in Mexico’s foreign trade. Before NAFTA, petroleum accounted for a quarter of Mexico’s exports. Today, this energy resource represents less than one percent of total exports because we now export high-tech equipment and mass consumer goods. These include exports of, among other items, 25 million color television sets and one million automobiles, making Mexico the world’s sixth largest producer of automobiles.

It is true that today a little over 80 percent of Mexico’s trade occurs with the United States, but that is not an effect only of NAFTA. Throughout the past one hundred years, our exports have been concentrated on our neighbor to the North. Over the entire twentieth century, Mexico sent between 60 percent and 90 percent of all its exports to the United States. Today, NAFTA is helping Mexico diversify, with goods exported not only to the United States and Canada but also to Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Furthermore, the country’s overall trade has increased. In other words, unlike other trade zones, such as MERCOSUR, trade within the North American free-trade zone did not grow at the expense of trade with other regions. It was trade-creating and not trade-diverting. Thus, Mexico’s presence in other markets has increased.

Experts have confirmed that “since 1993, Mexico has been exporting more not only to the United States but to nearly every major region in the world.” For example, before NAFTA, Mexican exports to Latin America represented one-tenth of all exports to the region. Today, Mexican exports account for more than 25 percent of all exports to Latin America.

NAFTA strengthened the previous economic reforms and together increased the competitiveness of Mexican industry. One must recall that before entering GATT and the free trade negotiations, excessive protectionism in the Mexican economy obliged domestic businesses to buy most of their inputs within the country. Although seemingly a sound decision—since it would ostensibly stimulate domestic industry—this requirement translated into an obligation to acquire only what the domestic market produced, without considering quality or price. This policy hurt the consumers and reduced our competitiveness abroad. NAFTA eliminated this policy, and the increased efficiency made it possible for Mexico to increase its overall trade with other world regions. It is widely recognized that “Mexican industry has demonstrated significant improvements in labor productivity, product quality, and competitiveness. Vehicle quality is reportedly on par with vehicles built in the United States and Canada, and some industry observers report that despite extensive reliance on manual labor, many Mexican plants have better labor productivity than comparable U.S. and Canadian plants.”

NAFTA became a powerful stimulus for investing in Mexico. After the agreement took effect, the annual flow of international investment to our country tripled, from an average of US$4 billion in 1993 to almost US$11 billion annually, following the implementation of NAFTA. This adds up to US$72 billion during the first seven years of the agreement. That period saw the creation of 2.7 million jobs, more than half of which were related to exports. Facing these growing flows of foreign capital into Mexico as a result of the agreement, we chose to be prudent. Thus, NAFTA’s “national security clause” recognizes that the Mexican
government would be able to limit any investment that would threaten its security, without the affected party having recourse to the dispute resolution mechanism.

NAFTA strengthened unionization. The export manufacturing industry registered the highest levels of unionization in the country (90 percent of its workers are unionized). Unionization has been a fundamental means for protecting labor rights and improving wages. On average, jobs in export industries pay wages that are 40 percent higher than wages in non-export businesses. The agreement also opened the way for a new kind of industrial policy. Indeed, the transition periods made it possible to detect which industries would prosper and which would not. Moreover, the rules of origin have required the acquisition of a large proportion of inputs from within the free trade region. These rules represent a form of industrial policy without the inefficiencies of protectionism.

NAFTA became a tool for improving Mexico’s regional development. Before taking effect, Mexican workers migrated to our northern border region in search of jobs. NAFTA has made it more profitable for companies to move to interior regions of the country. With the economic opening, the borders—particularly the so-called free zones—and Mexico City ceased being the most attractive places in which to locate. Of the 2,500 maquiladora firms that began operating in Mexico between 1994 and 1999, more than half located outside our northern border region, choosing instead the interior of Mexico.

NAFTA strongly stimulated the creation of small and mid-sized companies. In the first six years of the agreement, the number of businesses of this type in the export sector grew more than 75 percent. To this, one must add the productive linkages that the major export companies generate for small and mid-sized firms.

NAFTA reinforced the institutional mechanisms for Mexico-U.S. relations. This was a basic change in how the two countries conducted political dialogue. The institutions that NAFTA created—such as the dispute-settlement committee, the tripartite commissions on labor and the environment, and border agencies, among others—contribute to ensuring that inter-governmental disputes will not be settled by means of arbitrary or unilateral decisions.

NAFTA was a determining factor in guaranteeing permanence for the reforms achieved during my administration. Before the agreement, in the foreign arena, uncertainty existed about the benefits of trade agreements. With NAFTA, our exporters acquired the confidence and certainty that they would have access to the U.S. and Canadian markets. Thanks to the agreement, not only did the North American market open up, but now administrative or unilateral decisions cannot close it. Within Mexico, NAFTA prevented the possibility that political circumstances or moments of crisis might reverse the modernizing reforms. This was dramatically confirmed at the beginning of 1995, when the new administration tried to introduce exchange controls and increase tariffs in response to the economic crisis: responsible officials reminded the new administration that adoption of such decisions would violate the treaty. That neutralized the misguided attempt. Nor was it possible to reverse the reform making the Central Bank independent, nor the one that gave land titles to the Mexican campesinos.

THE LOST OPPORTUNITY, AND MEXICAN RECOVERY THANKS TO NAFTA

In evaluating these early results, in the case of Mexico, one must remember that NAFTA has unfolded in the framework of the 1995 economic crisis. The fact that the launch of the treaty coincided with the crisis has generated criticisms and complaints, which attribute to NAFTA problems that did not arise from its application and which it has, indeed, helped to resolve.

My administration concluded on November 30, 1994. In the end, there were assets and liabilities. Problems existed that I have certainly recognized, as is indicated in my book, Mexico: The Policy and Politics of Modernization. But there was no crisis. As that book documents, a problem turned into a crisis at the beginning of the new administration, between December 19 and 21, 1994. During those few hours, Mexico lost more than half its international reserves. After that massive capital flight came the terrible devaluation. Did foreign speculative capital deplete the reserves? In an official document, the IMF has recognized, “The available data show that the pressure on Mexico’s foreign exchange reserves during 1994, and in particular just prior to the devaluation, came not from the flight of foreign investors or from speculative position-taking by these investors, but from Mexican residents…” Why did Mexican capital leave prior to the devaluation? Paul Krugman wrote, “It soon became clear that some Mexican businessmen had been consulted about
the devaluation in advance, giving them inside information... Massive capital flight was now inevitable, and the Mexican government soon had to abandon fixing the exchange rate at all.” This inside information made worse what Joseph Stiglitz has noted, “As perceptions that a devaluation is imminent grow, the chance to make money becomes irresistible.” Jeffrey Sachs and a group of specialists concluded, “The final step on the rundown of reserves was a speculative attack induced in large part by the government itself... The key difference in the Mexican case is that the devaluation was taken after reserves had been depleted...” This was accompanied by the dismantlement of the financial team and the inexplicable delay in introducing an economic program. In Mexico, this is now known as the “December mistake.”

To cope with the problem that it had created by leaking information about the imminent devaluation to a small group of businessmen, the new administration embraced neoliberalism and adopted a devastating contractionary policy: by March 1995, the exchange rate had devalued by almost 120 percent and the interest rates rose from 15 percent to almost 110 percent. Public expenditures collapsed 14 percent in real terms in the first half of the year. Consequently, the Mexican economy faced its worst recession in half a century: that year, the GDP fell almost seven percent and more than a million jobs were lost. The U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA) and the World Bank have calculated that during 1995 and 1996, between 8 and 12 million Mexicans entered the ranks of the poor, joining millions of others who already lived in poverty. The World Bank has pointed to “the devastating social effect of the 1994-95 crisis—which, in a few months, fully undid the ten percentage point reduction in poverty levels painstakingly achieved over the preceding decade.” Such was the economic and social cataclysm that the “December mistake” provoked.

In Mexico in 1995, another economic policy could have been adopted to overcome the crisis and thus avoid the extremely adverse affects on the country. Above all, it is unacceptable that inside information was provided to a select few, so that they could empty Mexico’s international reserves. If this mistake had been acknowledged, it might have been understood that an economic contraction was unnecessary since Mexican public finances were not in fiscal deficit. Any competent economist was able to see that the debtor was not the government but companies and families. Another major error was to allow, or even encourage, the skyrocketing hikes in interest rates because this destroyed Mexican companies and left Mexican families in poverty.

Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-winner in economics, has maintained that such a policy was simply wrong. “With high levels of indebtedness,” stated Stiglitz, “imposing high interest rates, even for short periods of time, is like signing a death warrant for many of the firms, and for the economy.” As a result, Mexico began 1995 with the majority of its families insolvent, its companies exercising a debt-payment moratorium, and the banking system broke.

A cover-up was preferred, and it severely harmed the country and the confidence people were gaining in it as well. At that moment, there should have been an open and broad debate on public policy, which would have prevented the adoption of the neoliberal model. An open debate and a competent economic team might have made it possible to develop alternative, effective plans. Instead, the decision was made to protect the bureaucracy that committed the December mistake instead of protecting the well-being of families and companies and the nation’s higher good.

Injury was added to insult. Mexico lost the sole opportunity—which NAFTA had created for it—to benefit from the largest U.S. economic expansion in history. If the December mistake had not been committed, between 1995 and 2000, Mexico might have grown at annual rates above five percent. Per capita GDP in Mexico in 2000 should have been 50 percent higher than what it was. If we apply the ECLA methodology to estimate the impact of economic growth on poverty reduction, during those six years, the number of those living in poverty could have declined from 45 percent of the total population to around 20 percent. It might have been possible not only to avoid having eight million Mexicans swell the ranks of the poor but also to lift approximately 20 million of our compatriots out of poverty. Instead, according to ECLA data, the number of Mexicans living in poverty in 2000 was greater than in 1994. Therefore, clearly, we have not recovered, since to recover is not to return to where we were in 1994 but to attain the level where we should have been had we not suffered the December mistake.

In that context, given the mistakes made, NAFTA’s most spectacular result is that it saved Mexico from the 1995 crisis. Despite its severity, this
The populist past, but in a globalization that regulates market excesses and strengthens organized civil society.

Some of the criticisms against NAFTA were mentioned above, principally, those relating to the concentration of exports to the United States, the lack of an industrial policy, the supposed haste in the negotiations, and the failure to recognize the asymmetry between the three countries. Without a doubt, the treaty had costs for many Mexican workers and businesses. Americans and Canadians also paid a price.

However, it seems to me that the above-mentioned results confirm that the costs have been more than offset. This does not mean that there are no problems to address or demands to resolve.

As former heads of state, our interest is no longer in the next election but in the next generation. Let us talk, then, with a view toward the coming ten years. The agenda for the future must address the complaints and also open the way for new initiatives that are essential for strengthening the reforms that NAFTA had as its goal.

In the case of Mexico, the agenda has a specific profile as well as aspects that go straight to the international debate on globalization. This agenda must be placed within the new world reality as defined by the tragedies and reprehensible events of September 11, 2001. The following may be some of the relevant themes for Mexico:

1. **The Migration Treaty.** This subject is as inevitable as it is essential. We must recall that during the NAFTA negotiations, a decisive moment occurred in November 1990 in Monterrey, Mexico. On that occasion, I met with President Bush, and during a frank discussion, I proposed that NAFTA include not only goods and services but also the free movement of people between our two nations. The proposition was to expand access to the U.S. labor market for Mexican workers and to strengthen protections for their rights. The intent was not to create an escape valve for the failure to generate sufficient jobs in Mexico: NAFTA itself would increase job availability in our country. In reality, a U.S. labor market for Mexican workers already existed, but we needed to regularize it to protect workers’ rights.

   We sought only legal and temporary migration, since Mexico’s migrant workers are courageous and thrifty men and women who are precisely the kind of people we wanted to keep in Mexico. President Bush countered by proposing a liberalization of the oil industry. He went on to emphasize that crisis resolved itself with a rapidity that astonished the world. The official propaganda attributed the recuperation to the financial bailout, and so the government awarded its highest medal of honor to the director of the IMF. However, once the propaganda died down, objective appraisals appeared. Stiglitz was conclusive: “Mexico hadn’t recovered because the IMF forced it to strengthen its weak financial system, which remained weak years after the crisis… Mexico recovered because of a surge of exports to the United States, which took off thanks to the U.S. economic boom, and because of NAFTA…”

   The OECD confirmed this, recognizing that recovery was based on exports and that the growth in investments was related to foreign trade. Of all the economic growth achieved by Mexico during the last part of the 1990s, it is now known that half resulted from the dynamism of exports and the other half from investment stimulated by export activity. Thus, almost all jobs created in Mexico between 1995 and 2000 came from activities linked to exports and the associated investment.

   In addition to saving Mexico from the crisis, NAFTA is responsible for results that will give the country viability in the medium term. In a recent visit to our country, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, declared that NAFTA, as an element central to that country’s economic viability, sets Mexico apart.

**TOMORROW: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE**

If NAFTA and market opening show encouraging results, why do they generate such criticism and complaints, concerns and resentment?

On the topic of market liberalization, the critics are correct in demanding a better distribution of its benefits and a positive and consistent attitude from industrialized countries. The new WTO Doha Round to revise excessive protectionism (which still exists in various developed countries and regions on products that are very sensitive for developing countries) reveals part of the problem—and also its solution.

It is correct to criticize globalization as it is advanced by market fundamentalists: its excesses hide privileges for the few. Globalization is inevitable, since it forms part of the capitalist system. Moreover, parts of it are essential (such as market opening or the availability of financial resources). However, the excesses, deviations, and corruption of market fundamentalists must be stopped. The solution is not in a return to the
if the migration issue were part of NAFTA, it would be impossible to get the U.S. Congress to ratify the agreement. I refused to open the oil industry to foreign ownership and exploitation, and I knew that this negative response would not further our discussions on the subject of migration. Today, conditions have changed. With NAFTA now operating, petroleum is no longer a negotiating point. In the new context, President Fox has taken the correct position by insisting on a migration treaty. It is important to remember that these workers want to migrate only on a temporary basis. The fundamental point is that the movement of Mexican workers responds to a demand from the U.S. economy. Based on data from the 2000 U.S. Census, research has found that “the U.S. economy would have stumbled in the past decade without the new arrivals, and most immigrants contribute more in taxes than they use in services.” Moreover, the Social Security Administration owes them payments. We need to establish an agreement to avoid the abuses to which Mexican migrants are subjected. A proposed migration agreement should not be one that guarantees a workforce of Mexicans to meet temporary labor shortfalls in the United States. Rather than creating a bilateral commission to regulate migratory flows at the governmental level, labor unions must take charge of doing so to ensure that these workers will not erode wages and to better protect their rights. Similarly, such an agreement will have to clarify the amount and fate of Social Security contributions deducted from Mexican workers’ paychecks. Only thus will it be possible to determine the amount of their Social Security savings and to define the benefits to which Mexican workers are entitled. Unlike the Bracero Program, which operated in Mexico and the United States from 1942 to 1964, under a new treaty, a worker would not have to commit him or herself to a specific employer. The Bracero Program led to severe problems and growing abuse, as well as corruption on the part of the authorities who controlled who would get U.S. work visas. Because of the labor abuses and terrible working conditions, for most braceros, the costs of the program greatly exceeded the benefits. Today, the issue of payments owed to braceros for payroll deductions (made supposedly on their behalf into savings accounts) remains open. That problem and its solution must serve as a precedent in any new migration accord.

2. Additional Structural Changes. Beyond North America, it is essential to recognize the spirit of NAFTA, which, through its accession clause, welcomes the addition of other nations in the hemisphere. It is important to support President George W. Bush’s initiative to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas. It would be worthwhile to include the Caribbean region. It would also be good to recognize that the trade embargo on Cuba is an anachronism in this era of globalization and new geopolitical realities. To lift the embargo would be the best way for the generous American people and the respected and sovereign Cuban people to open the way for justice. Within Mexico, the most urgent structural changes include improving the quality of education; stimulating greater regional development with the opportunities that NAFTA offers; and strengthening the participation of civil society in NAFTA’s implementation, particularly in regard to the environmental and labor commissions, as well as through the creation of an ombudsman for migratory workers. Improvement in the efficacy of the special program for the U.S.-Mexico border region is also needed. Additionally, we must avoid taking inadvisable steps. Take the case of those who propose a North American monetary union. They are, in reality, recommending that the central banks of Mexico and Canada disappear, along with the Mexican peso and the Canadian dollar, and that these be replaced with the U.S. dollar and the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank. That would not be union, it would be submission. Mexico should not renounce its monetary sovereignty or the autonomy of its central bank. NAFTA created institutions for the three countries (such as the trade, labor, and environmental commissions), but it did so without encouraging hegemonic positions. That spirit, which should be maintained in any new initiative, has nothing to do with the notion of a monetary union.

3. Rural Support. Today in Mexico, agricultural liberalization is the NAFTA issue that generates the most criticism and complaints. The Mexican countryside is clearly in grave difficulty. The poverty in which most campesinos live is unacceptable, and concern about the effects of the liberalization is valid. However, one should remember that the NAFTA talks negotiated a longer period of protection for agricultural products: fifteen years. Protection on corn, beans, and milk imports extends until 2008, so those products have yet to be liberalized. Thus, NAFTA did not mean immediate agricultural liberalization nor did the agreement cause the agricultural trade deficit. That deficit was incubating...
before the signing of NAFTA, and tariff reduction did not exacerbate it. For example, in 1993, agricultural imports from the United States were US$4.1 billion, and Mexico exported US$3.2 billion in return. Thus, the deficit existed before the implementation of the agreement. Last year, under NAFTA, Mexico exported almost US$6 billion in agricultural products and it imported less than US$7 billion. This exchange is almost at equilibrium because, since NAFTA went into effect, the annual trade deficit has been below US$1 billion. According to ECLA data, during the first six years of NAFTA, Mexican agricultural exports grew on average 12 percent annually, but imports only grew by three percent annually. Beginning in 1995, the previous administration allowed non-tariff food imports above NAFTA quota limits. The motive for that decision should be investigated. A document from the Cámara de Diputados (Mexico’s lower house) noted that these imports violated NAFTA rules and the exception was granted “at the discretion of the authorities and with an absence of transparency.”

People have also claimed that support for agriculture is lacking. That is true, but my government put in place a program of support for rural Mexico that was greater than one percent of GDP, the same proportion as U.S. agricultural subsidies. Through the PROCAMPO program, we introduced the first direct cash support for campesinos. Additionally, we made a commitment to maintain that level throughout the agrarian transition to allow for capitalization of rural areas. Almost 3.5 million Mexican campesinos received this support in 1994, the first year that NAFTA operated. However, between 1995 and 2000, the rural support program collapsed: the PROCAMPO budget dropped from US$2 billion in 1994 to less than US$500 million in 2000. Likewise, 600,000 campesinos lost their access to the subsidies; the land area supported was reduced by more than 100,000 hectares; and the support that a farmer received per hectare declined until, finally, it was barely half the amount granted in 1994. During these years, the government truly abandoned its responsibilities to the campesino. To meet the commitment it had accepted at the start of the presidential term, the previous administration would have had to grant direct support to campesinos at an annual level of approximately US$8 billion. Instead, it allocated, on average, US$500 million per year. The accumulated difference over that sexenio (presidential term) exceeds US$8 billion. The debt for the undelivered value of PROCAMPO obligations must be paid to Mexico’s campesinos. The previous government bequeathed this debt. If that administration had delivered this support—as it promised to do—the campesinos would have had capital to fund their agricultural operations. If, today, the commitment were met and this debt were paid, it would significantly reduce the magnitude of the problem in the Mexican countryside. Some propose to renegotiate NAFTA in order to remove the obligation to liberalize agriculture in the tenth year. However, in the past the government protected the rural sector for many decades, yet its condition only worsened. Renegotiate only to delay finding a solution for rural Mexico? If we renegotiate NAFTA, what will our partners demand? In reality, justice demands fulfillment of the commitment to pay the US$8 billion in accumulated PROCAMPO debt. That would strike at the root cause of the prostration of the Mexican countryside. Failure to meet that obligation would wipe out one of the basic solutions to the rural problem. Moreover, all responses to the challenge of the countryside must be linked closely to environmental and water use issues, both rural and urban.

4. Financial Reform. NAFTA will bring future economic growth, thanks to the exports and also investments that the agreement engenders. However, because the Mexican economy lacks bank financing, that growth will not be enough. Lending from commercial banks to the non-financial private sector collapsed from ten percent of GDP in 1994 to 0.3 percent in 2000, even though the banks were sold to foreign interests, supposedly to resolve their low capitalization problem. The agricultural sector, small and mid-sized businesses, the educational system, and consumers, all urgently need loans. The 1995 crisis left Mexican banks insolvent. To save them, the previous administration introduced a banking bailout program called FOBAPROA (and now called IPAB). The government gave the banks non-tradeable ten-year bonds at an attractive interest rate in exchange for their non-performing loans. The terms of each bond and the assumption of the portfolios were negotiated in a discretionary and selective way, without consulting the Mexican Congress. The program was not a one-time event but continued for several years, so that the unrecoverable loans grew over time despite the economy’s rapid recovery. Related lending grew as it became apparent that the rescue was an open-ended bailout mechanism. The moral hazard induced by this process was tremendous. Bad loans con-
5. Judicial Reform. Enforcement of the rule of law continues being a persistent demand of the Mexican people. The rule of law is essential for daily social coexistence and also for economic development. The climate of insecurity that Mexico is experiencing will not be resolved through harsher punishments but by attacking the causes of that insecurity. Without the rule of law, future sustained growth is impossible.

6. The China Challenge. Mexico’s greatest rival for investments and markets is China. In 2001, Mexico was the second largest exporter to the United States, with export sales surpassing US$131 billion. China was in fourth place, exporting US$102 billion. Plants have not moved from Mexico to China, and with the exception of the textile and apparel sectors and telephones, the United States has not replaced Mexican imports with goods from that Asian nation. Mexico has the advantage over China in the exportation of vehicles, automobile parts, and television sets. China is gaining ground in products that require sewing (apparel, shoes, luggage, and toys) and also in computer and telephone equipment and household appliances. Mexico has the advantage of proximity to the United States and tariff-free access that it gained with NAFTA, particularly with regard to rules of origin. However, China exports seven times the amount that Mexico exports to the European Union and 72 times the amount to Japan. China, moreover, has shown that it can perform favorably even in adverse circumstances: during 2001, in the midst of the American recession, while U.S. imports of Mexican machinery and textiles fell by more than US$1.3 billion, U.S. imports of Chinese products in these categories grew by the same amount. Surveys of foreign investors and Mexican exporters have pinpointed three factors that affect Mexico’s competitiveness in regard to China: (a) overvaluation of the peso (which, at the end of 2000, was already 21 percent higher than in 1994) and the high cost of some inputs; (b) the banking sector’s lack of interest in lending; and (c) insecurity, particularly in Mexico City. Trade competition between China and Mexico to export to the United States does not have to occur in a scenario of confrontation. Mexican and Chinese producers could make a strategic alliance—for example, by using Mexican inputs (which may be cheaper, even after transportation costs) and processing them in Chinese plants.
THE COMING CELEBRATIONS
NAFTA has contributed greatly to the well-being of our three nations. Much more must be done so that it will fully bear its fruit. Given the new geopolitical realities and international economics under which we lived after the end of the Cold War, the Mexicans negotiated NAFTA in order to have an instrument that would give that nation markets for its products and a stronger flow of investment resources. This was vital for recovering economic growth. Under globalization, NAFTA has met these expectations by allowing us to overcome the crisis and promote growth.

This is essential since the economic growth that market liberalization has encouraged can be one of the most important means for reducing the unacceptable levels of poverty that Mexico suffers. Poverty reduction also requires specific programs. There are two types: individualized grants or organized participation. Here one must choose. Neoliberalism pretends to reduce poverty while it destroys the organized participation of civil society. The alternative is social liberalism, which proposes the empowerment of organized people, since that translates into new social capital. This is the truly effective and just method for reducing poverty. There can be no sovereignty in the midst of destitution. Moreover, one must not forget that, in essence, sovereignty has to do with state legitimacy, which is rooted in the support and backing that the people give the state. Thus, a globalization that does not reduce poverty threatens sovereignty and must be rejected.

The issues of sovereignty and globalization must be faced squarely. The risk for sovereignty is not in the liberalization of trade but in lacerating poverty. We must move from inevitable globalization to necessary and unavoidable solidarity since most Mexicans want Mexico to remain a sovereign nation.

Ten years have passed since we signed this innovative agreement. With the internationalist spirit that led us to negotiate it, we now must take the next steps. In that endeavor, during the next ten years, we propose to promote ideals and act in a way that will support the sovereignty of the Mexican people. Thus, in the next ten years, we must prepare for other events that the Mexican people shall celebrate.

In 2006, we will commemorate the bicentennial of the birth of Don Benito Juárez, a model Mexican who reaffirmed the sovereignty of Mexico under a republican regime.

We will celebrate the 150th anniversary of our liberal constitution and the 90th anniversary of our social constitution in 2007.

We will be preparing to celebrate, in 2010, the bicentennial of our independence and the 100th anniversary of Mexico’s social revolution.

Amidst new threats to the removal of obstacles to free trade, along with difficult steps toward modernization, new doors will open. I am certain of it. It is a certainty as long as the world continues to have men of vision, such as George Bush and Brian Mulroney, who are ready to launch great initiatives, like the one we accomplished ten years ago, with the vigor of adversaries in the negotiating arena, and the spirit of responsible leaders in the world of cooperation.

NOTES
14. ERI, S.C. Consultores en Economía Regional e Internacional, “Producción y comercio agropecuarios de México en el marco del Tratado de Libre Comercio de
América del Norte y su impacto en el desarrollo rural.” Comisión de Agricultura y Ganadería de la Cámara de Diputados, October 1, 2001, p. 7.
16. Ibid.

**Richard Chilcoat**

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Dick Chilcoat. I’m the dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, located at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. We’re proud to be part of the George Bush Presidential Library Center and part of Texas A&M, now the 4th largest university in the United States, with over 45,000 students in residence.

We’re delighted to be one of the cosponsors of this important conference that examines the progress, potential, and precedents of NAFTA all at the tender age of 10 years.

Before I assume the privilege and honor of introducing our next very distinguished speaker, I’d like to say a quick word about the Bush School. We are a young school, a graduate school, a professional school. Our mission is to educate principled leaders in public service and administration and in international affairs. We just celebrated our first five years of history.

We’ve graduated four great classes of 20 students each, and I’m proud to say that our graduates are well placed: they serve at all levels...from local to national levels...in small towns and state government in Texas...to nonprofits, federal departments and agencies, and even the White House, in our nation’s capital.

We get great students from around the country (next year we’ll have over 100 graduate students in residence and 100 certificate students in residence, plus many more at a distance); our faculty is a preeminent group of scholars who teach, research, and serve (Drs. Lorraine Eden and Kishore Gawande are participants in this conference); our master’s degree programs in public service and administration and in international affairs are innovative and highly regarded; we have great facilities; we have high-profile conferencing and speakers programs; we use educational technology to leverage our programs; we’re building a national and international reputation; and, in a phrase, we believe we are “a new school, for a new era”...preparing the public servants of the future for the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

When you walk in the front entrance of our school, you will see a marble bust of our namesake, former president George Bush. Underneath, carved in stone, are his words that serve both as our touchstone and as a challenge: “Public service is a noble calling, and we need men and women (who are leaders) of character who believe that they can make a difference in their community, in their state, and in their nation.” We at the Bush School—students, faculty, and staff—aim to be a great school and fulfill that compelling challenge.

The president not only gives us inspiration, he gives us his personal support and commitment for which we are deeply grateful. He is a most distinguished leader, statesman, and public servant. Need I say, he is a great role model for our students and a most distinguished member of our faculty. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in a warm welcome for the 41st president of the United States, the honorable George Bush.

**President George Bush**

Let me just start by saying it is an honor to be introduced by a public servant of Lee Hamilton’s caliber, who represented his district, his state, and his political party with integrity—particularly as chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. We didn’t always agree on policy, but Lee Hamilton always placed principles above partisanship and worked comfortably with those on both sides of the aisle—and just as important, he has proven that it is indeed possible to have a wonderful and productive private life after public service in his leadership capacity here at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

The Center does outstanding work in promoting the discussion of crucial policy issues, and is a place where scholars and policy makers can engage in fruitful discourse—and so I want to thank Lee and his very able staff for hosting the “NAFTA at Ten” Conference.

On a somewhat parochial note, I also take some pride that the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M is one of the cosponsors for this event.

Last month, in fact, the Bush School celebrated its fifth anniversary—and I can hardly believe it. We have some of the best and brightest young men and women in the country enrolled there—and I can only hope we are
symbolically important because, among other things, we wanted to use economic reform as a vehicle for peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Central America. Just as important, we wanted to achieve progress on Latin American development issues while solidifying closer ties with our trusted Canadian and Mexican neighbors.

When I came into office in 1989 after eight years at Ronald Reagan's side, I was already a firm believer that trade and investment were the only way to improve the collective economic prospects of the hemisphere. In short, it was the better road—the proven road—to the future we all wanted to see realized. And to this end, to fully engage our Central and South American neighbors on a broad range of issues from debt relief to trade and investment accords, our team launched the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative in 1990.

When it later came to negotiating NAFTA, of course, we—Brian, Carlos, and I—knew it wouldn't be easy. On several occasions, Brian has referred to the fact that at certain points his political support was down to members of his immediate family, and I know how he feels.

But we stayed the course, because in the end we believed that economic reform would contribute to increased political stability and democracy in the Western Hemisphere. We believed that not only would trade benefit our neighbors, it would open new markets—new opportunities—for tens of millions of businesses and investors.

Perhaps that is why signing the NAFTA agreement was one of my proudest moments as president of the United States. I viewed the agreement as a palpable step forward to greater prosperity and stability across the region.

And here I want to acknowledge the exceptional efforts of U.S. negotiators Carla Hills and Jules Katz, as well as their outstanding counterparts Jaime Serra and Michael Wilson and their respective colleagues. They and their superb teams did a marvelous job in concluding these complicated talks in a little over one year.

I want to stress that many individuals beyond these top negotiators worked diligently for the success of NAFTA. In the United States, many in both parties labored on behalf of NAFTA. I am grateful for their hard work.

I also want to salute former President Bill Clinton for fighting for NAFTA after I left the White House. I appreciate what he and his administration did in getting the accord through Congress with the help
of a lot of congressional Republicans. They lobbied tirelessly on behalf of the agreement because it was right for our country—and right for our hemisphere.

Of course, as we have heard, achieving NAFTA was not easy. There were opponents across the political spectrum in each of our three nations.

In particular, I remember reference being made to a “sucking sound” of American jobs going out of the country; but, again, we stayed the course, because we knew that in the end more trade would yield results—including, for the record, millions of new, higher paying jobs. True, I read a report that, in 1997, the United States lost some 385,000 manufacturing jobs; but at the same time, we added more than three million jobs in advanced sectors such as computer programming and management consulting.

So there is a trade-off in some ways—a painful trade-off for many, but one I believe we simply must endure if we want America to compete for and win new business in this increasingly interconnected and competitive global economy.

Now, am I happy that 385,000 Americans lost manufacturing jobs in 1997? No, not for a second. Many of them had families to feed, but the argument is that adding millions of better paying jobs to the rolls benefits us all in the long run. And the two million NAFTA-related jobs that have been created in the United States since 1993 pay between 13 and 18 percent more than the average national wage.

And as we have already heard Brian and Carlos describe in detail, NAFTA isn’t just a two-way street, it’s a three-way street. The foreign direct investment inflows into the NAFTA countries between 1994 and 2000 reached $1.3 trillion—or about 28 percent of the world total. Of this, a Dow Jones report out just last week noted that 70 percent of the FDI into Mexico has come from the United States. (Maybe some of you saw this, but the Bancomex director put out a release last Wednesday citing the 13,715 Mexican companies that have received American investment since NAFTA was signed.)

Now, I know you are in for two intensive days of examining this Agreement and the laborious details that go along with it—and so, in a kinder and gentler way, I do not want to bludgeon anyone to death with statistics.

But I know part of the agenda for this conference is to examine the prospects of the Doha Development Round, and several panels will look at what it takes to “get globalization right.” So let me just broaden the perspective here for a moment.

If you look around the world, freer trade has clearly delivered benefits to developing countries as well. For example, as a recent IMF paper points out, in trade, opening East Asian countries—the so-called “New Globalizers”—the number of people in absolute poverty declined by over 120 million between 1993 and 1998.

Moreover, since the Seattle WTO meeting, governments comprising about a quarter of the world’s total population—some 1.5 billion people—have joined the WTO. And another two dozen or so countries are currently negotiating their terms of membership, perhaps most significantly Russia. The WTO’s multilateral trading system is now nearly universal, covering more than 97 percent of total global trade.

This is a positive development in my view. Some experts predict that, by 2015, reshaping the world’s trading system and reducing barriers to trade in goods could reduce the number of poor people in developing countries by 300 million—and boost global income by as much as $2.8 trillion over the next decade.

Of course, in many political corners, including here in the United States, trade will continue to stir up parochial passions. The process of advancing the trade agenda often involves several steps forward, as we witnessed ten years ago, followed by occasional steps backwards—as we saw in Seattle in 1999, where a lawless mob of anarchists showed the world their true, extreme colors.

(But do the best you could say for those rioters was they had the good taste to ransack a Starbucks and get some decent coffee before getting on with their day.)

Extremists like that either don’t “get” the benefits of freer and fairer trade, or are simply content to ignore the facts. One problem, as WTO Director Mike Moore has noted, is that the “anti-globalization (movement) is confused with anti-Americanism. Little credit is given to the fact that U.S. companies account for around one-fifth of total world imports, and almost one quarter of total exports.”

But we are also aware that 96 percent of the world’s consumers live outside the United States, and that the more prosperous they become, the better it is for U.S. businesses.

Now, is the current system perfect? Far from it. No country adheres to
totally free trade. Every country finds that it has to compromise from time to time. Sometimes it is agriculture; sometimes it is textiles; sometimes it’s steel imports.

Those of us who support more trade must acknowledge that managing trade relations is ongoing work, and FTA and NAFTA were just a starting point in an ever evolving process of balancing competing objectives between the increasing numbers of nations who seek genuine, sustainable progress for their peoples.

I believe that, given time, the administration, the Congress, the WTO, and the other participants responsible for designing and managing the system of global trade will iron out differences that emerge and identify certain fundamental principles that govern the way we trade products. For example, we must be sure to avoid having regional trading pacts turn inward, and evolve into protectionist “blocks.” In my view, agreements like NAFTA and Mercosur should be but steps to knocking down more barriers and joining more nations and regions together.

And I am hearkened that, in the United States, the Congress passed Trade Promotion Authority legislation empowering the president to strike more trade deals with our hemispheric partners vis-à-vis the FTAA. With some 22 million jobs in the United States depending on trade, now is not the time to rest on our laurels. This hemispheric FTAA agreement uniting the Americas in free trade would link 34 countries with 800 million people producing roughly $13 trillion in goods and services.

Indeed, the benefits of free trade would seem clear; and yet, some remain oblivious to the magic and resilience of opening more markets. At precisely the moment history beckons us to take wing—and realize the promise of a New World Order in which ideas and commerce are more freely exchanged throughout the global village—some seem intent on sticking their collective heads in the sand.

Speaking for my own country, we simply cannot retreat from the world; we cannot withdraw into a “Fortress America”; we cannot give in to the selfish voices of isolation and the timid voices of protectionism.

Having said that, I feel obliged to warn you that, at this stage of my life, I don’t normally “do” issues. But this NAFTA issue is near and dear to my heart—enough for me to come to Washington, where I do not often visit. That surprises some people, I guess, but it’s true.
Ipsos-Reid poll results

ON THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF NAFTA...

- More Americans (48%) believe they are NAFTA winners, compared to Canadians (38%) and Mexicans (30%)
- However, Canadians (44%) are most likely to want closer trade and economic ties with NAFTA partners, while Americans (39%) are most likely to want the status quo...
- And Mexicans (33%) are less likely to want more trade and stronger economic ties

Washington, D.C.—A new Ipsos-Reid poll conducted on behalf of the Washington, D.C.-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for the “NAFTA at 10: Progress, Potential, and Precedents” conference, released today, shows that at the 10th anniversary of the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, half (48%) of Americans say that their country has been a winner as a result of the agreement. This compares to the views of Canadians (38%) and Mexicans (30%) on how their own country has fared in regards to NAFTA.

Mexicans (52%) are the most likely to indicate that their country is a loser in NAFTA, while 47% of Canadians also hold this view regarding Canada’s role in NAFTA. In comparison, only 37% of Americans believe this to be the case for the United States. In general, younger people in Canada (44%) and the United States (64%) are more likely than their middle aged (Canada 36%; United States 41%) or older (Canada 34%; United States 39%) counterparts to believe their country has been a winner in NAFTA.

IN OTHER FINDINGS...

Canadians appear to be the most polarized as to the effects of NAFTA on their country.

More Canadians (38%) believe that NAFTA has hurt Canada, com-
Nafta at 10: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Appendix 2

pared to one-third (34%) who say that the agreement has benefited Canada, while 17% believe that it hasn’t had any impact one way or the other on the country. In comparison, one-third (34%) of Americans believe the agreement has benefited the United States, while 23% say that it has hurt their country. One-third (32%) say that it hasn’t had any impact on the United States. Mexicans are the most evenly split on the effects of NAFTA on their country, with 29% who say that the agreement has ben-

efited Mexico, 33% who say it has hurt the country, and an equal number (33%) who say it has not had any impact on Mexico.

• Younger Americans (43%) are more likely to say that NAFTA has ben-

efited their country, while middle aged (37%) and older (36%) Americans are more likely to say that the agreement has hurt the United States.

• Meanwhile, middle aged (33%) and younger (28%) Mexicans are more likely to say that the agreement has benefited Mexico, while older (39%) Mexican are more likely to say that NAFTA has hurt Mexico.

• In Canada, middle aged (46%) Canadians are more likely than either older (37%) or younger (37%) Canadians to say that NAFTA has hurt Canada, while there is no statistical difference between age groups as to the view that NAFTA has benefited Canada.

• For comparison, when this question was previously asked of Canadians in October 1999 and December 1997, four in ten (1999: 41%; 1997: 40%) believed that Canada benefited from NAFTA, while three in ten (1999: 30%; 1997: 27%) said that NAFTA had hurt Canada.

However, Canadians (44%) are the most likely to say that we should make trade even closer between these countries and integrate the three economies further (United States 34%; Mexico 33%). Meanwhile, Americans (39%) are the most likely to say that we should keep trade between these countries and their economies the way they are today for the foreseeable future (Canada 31%; Mexico 25%). Mexicans (33%) are the most likely to say we should reduce trade and integration of the economies of these three countries (Canada 19%; United States 19%).

• Younger (44%) Americans are more likely than older (36%) Americans to say things should remain the way things are for the foreseeable future, while middle aged (23%) Americans are more likely than their younger (14%) counterparts to indicate that trade and integration of the economies of the three NAFTA countries should be reduced. This is also the view of Americans in middle (24%) and upper (21%) income households compared to the views of those in lower income households (13%).

In Canada, younger (38%) Canadians, more than older (29%) or middle aged (28%) Canadians, say that trade and economic integration should remain the way it is for the foreseeable future.

These are the findings of Ipsos-Reid polls conducted in Canada, the United States, and Mexico during November 2002. The polls are based on a randomly selected sample of 1,007 adult Canadians, 1,000 adult Americans, and 503 adult Mexicans. With samples of this size, the Canadian and American results are considered accurate to within ± 3.1 percentage points, 19 times out of 20, of what they would have been had the entire adult populations of Canada and the United States been polled. The Mexican results are considered accurate to within ±4.5 percentage points, 19 times out of 20, of what they would have been had the entire adult pop-

ulations of Mexico been polled. The margin of error will be larger within regions and for other sub-groupings of the survey population.

Location: United States
© Ipsos-Reid
December 8, 2002
Appendix 3

Trade agreements between Canada, Mexico, and the United States

1854  Canada-United States Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Agreement

1866  United States terminates Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Agreement

1911  United States passes another reciprocity agreement, only to have it defeated in Canadian Parliament following a Liberal election loss

1930  Smoot Hawley Tariff Act—United States raises tariffs on dutiable goods to 60 percent

1934  United States Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act—establishes the authority of the president to negotiate the reduction of tariffs

1935  First official Canada and United States Trade Agreement enters into force under the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934

1944  The Bretton Woods Agreement

1947  Canada-Mexico Trade Agreement enters into force (largely superceded by NAFTA)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in Geneva. This year also marks the beginnings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the
1960–62 Dillon Round of GATT (Geneva, Switzerland); preceded by the Annecy Round (1949); the Torquay Round (1950–51); and the Geneva Round (1955–56)

1962–67 Kennedy Round of GATT (Geneva, Switzerland)

1965 United States–Canada Auto Pact and defense sharing agreements give Canadian branch plants of some multinationals special status in U.S. markets

1968 Formation of Canada–Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC)

1971 President Nixon closes the gold window, ending the period of fixed exchange rates established by the Bretton Woods Agreement

1973 Smithsonian Agreement amends IMF article to reflect new era of floating exchange rates

1974 U.S. Trade Act introduced “fast track” congressional procedures for accelerated consideration of trade agreements (fast track is now also referred to as TPA or Trade Promotion Authority)

1980 Canada–Mexico Agreement on Industrial and Energy Cooperation; Canada–Mexico Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Agricultural Cooperation

1981 Canada–Mexico Economic Cooperation Agreement

1985 Mexico and United States sign an agreement governing subsidies and countervailing duties

1986 Mexico joins the GATT

1986–93 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations

1987 Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) negotiated

1988 United States and Mexico sign “Framework of Principles and Procedures” to settle trade disputes

1988 U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act provides the authority for the president to enter into bi/multilateral trade agreements; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) approved under this act

1990 Canada–Mexico Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

1991 Canada–Mexico Double Taxation Agreement

1992 Initialing of NAFTA (ratified in 1993)

1994 NAFTA comes into force, establishing the NAFTA Secretariat, consisting of:

- the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation and its secretariat in Montreal

1980–84 World Bank (established by the Bretton Woods Agreement).
• the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and its secretariat in Washington, D.C.

• the North American Development Bank with its secretariat in San Antonio

Thirty-four heads of state and government meeting at the Summit of the Americas launch negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas

1995 World Trade Organization (WTO), established in the Uruguay Round, enters into force

1999 WTO Ministerial—Seattle; first highly publicized large-scale demonstrations protesting trade and globalization

2001 WTO Ministerial; 142 members agree to new global trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar

2005 Deadline for completing global trade negotiations, Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and the final phasing out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement

APPENDIX 4

Statistics on trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United States

U.S. Trade Balance with Canada and Mexico, 1992-2001*

*Balance of goods, services, and income (BEA, September 2002)
Two-thirds of all NAFTA trade is transported by trucks, with goods valued at US$429 billion in 2000. Detroit/Windsor and Laredo/Nuevo Laredo saw the highest volume of trade on each border.

Canada is the United States’ primary oil and energy supplier.

The United States is Canada’s leading agricultural market, importing almost a third of Canada’s food exports.

250,000 People entering the United States from Canada daily

800,000 People entering the United States from Mexico daily

Canadian Investment in Mexico, 1994-2001

- US$743 million
  Ketchup and mustard sold in the United States

- US$827 million
  Mexican sauces sold in the United States
ALAN ALEXANDROFF

Alan Alexandroff received his Ph.D. in government from Cornell University in 1979 and his LL.B. from McGill Law School in 1984. He has taught political economy and international relations at Queen’s University, McGill University, and the University of California, Los Angeles.

After leaving full-time law practice in 1992, he established a number of programs at the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. Currently Alexandroff is the research director of the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation (PCMN) at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. He has taught courses dealing with the following subjects: alternate dispute resolution, strategic negotiation, cross-cultural negotiation, international relations, and the management of public disputes and conflict.

As research director, Alexandroff has focused a great deal of attention on the accession of China to the World Trade Organization. As a result of the China/WTO accession project, chaired by Sylvia Ostry, a book entitled “China and Long March to Global Trade: The Accession of China to the World Trade Organization” is being readied that includes some of the research from this project. He has published a number of other articles on China accession as well as on the WTO.

In private practice, Alexandroff is a director of Mediated Solutions Incorporated (MSI), a full-service dispute resolution consultancy for private and public organizations. In addition he is the office director in Toronto for LECG LLC, an economic and finance consulting firm. There he specializes on trade and public policy matters.

In 2000, Alexandroff was appointed fellow-in-residence in international policy at the C.D. Howe Institute, where he is primarily responsible for international trade studies at the Institute.

IRWIN ALTSCHULER

Irwin Altschuler is a partner of Greenberg, Traurig LLP. He was previously a partner with Manatt Jones Global Strategies. Altschuler has pro-
President Bush put together an unprecedented coalition of 32 nations to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein’s brutal aggression.

President Bush also signed into law, among other things, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Clean Air Act—landmark civil rights and environmental legislation. He also successfully fought for and negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was later signed into law.

He was elected in 1966 to the U.S. House of Representatives from Texas’ 7th District and served two terms. Bush has held a number of senior level appointments: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (1971); chairman of the Republican National Committee (1973); chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China (1974); and Director of Central Intelligence (1976).

In 1980, Bush lost his first bid for the Republican presidential nomination to Ronald Reagan, but he later accepted a spot on the national ticket and served as vice president from 1981 to 1989.

Born on June 12, 1924, in Milton, Massachusetts, George Bush became a decorated naval pilot who flew torpedo bombers during World War II. He then graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Yale University in 1948 with a degree in economics.

**Frank Bean**

Frank Bean is professor of sociology at the University of California, Irvine, and visiting scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation. He is former director of the Center for U.S./Mexico Border and Migration Research at the University of Texas, Austin. Bean’s current research examines four areas: the intersection of race/ethnicity in the United States, immigration and U.S. welfare patterns, migration within and from Mexico, and the effects of immigration on labor markets.


**George Bush**

George Bush was elected president of the United States on November 8, 1988, sworn in on January 20, 1989, and served until January 20, 1993. During his term in office, the Cold War ended; the Soviet Union ceased to exist; Germany was reunified; and Eastern Europe became free.

He holds two master’s degrees in economics and in food science, both from the University of California, Davis. He has published numerous journal articles and book chapters and lectures frequently at universities.

**RICHARD A. CHILCOAT**

On September 1, 2000, Dick Chilcoat retired from the United States Army after 42 years of active military service. On July 1, 2001, Chilcoat was named dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

During his military service, Chilcoat served in a variety of leadership positions. These positions included chief of staff, 3rd Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army; executive assistant to General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and deputy director, strategy, plans and policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army. In 1994, General Chilcoat became 43rd commandant of the United States Army War College. In 1997, he was appointed ninth president of the National Defense University by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and served until July 7, 2000.

Among Chilcoat’s service awards were the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, and the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters. He was a senior army aviator, ranger, parachutist, and combat infantryman.

Chilcoat received his M.B.A. from Harvard Business School and a B.S. from the United States Military Academy; during his cadet career he was first captain and brigade commander of the Corps of Cadets, president of the Class of 1964, and captain of the varsity basketball team. He is an honorary graduate of the U.S. Army War College. Currently, he serves as a member of the board of advisors, Naval Postgraduate School, a class trustee of the Association of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy, and a member of the board of directors, National Defense University Foundation.

**BERTIN CÔTÉ**

Prior to his appointment as minister (economic) and deputy head of mission in Washington, Bertin Côté was assistant deputy minister (Europe, Middle East, and North Africa) in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa.

During an earlier assignment in Ottawa, Côté was director of Canada-United States trade relations (1991-1994). He was closely associated with the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and with the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement, serving as NAFTA lead negotiator for standards-related measures. Côté also served as deputy director of trade policy and GATT affairs at department headquarters, leading Canadian delegations to the GATT negotiations on aircraft agreement and government procurement.

Côté also served abroad at the Canadian Embassy in Paris as minister-counsellor (economic/commercial), the Canadian Embassy in Rome as counsellor (economic/commercial), and at the Canadian Mission to the European Union in Brussels.

**THOMAS J. COURCHENE**

Thomas Courchene’s distinguished writing career, comprising some 300 articles and books, has been one long love affair with Canada, its policies, and institutions. Two of his recent books, *Social Canada in the Millennium* and *From Heartland to North American Region State: The Social, Fiscal and Federal Evolution of Ontario*, received the Douglas Purvis Prize and the inaugural Donner Prize, respectively.

Born in Wakaw, Saskatchewan, and educated at the universities of Saskatchewan, Princeton, and Chicago, Courchene currently holds the Jarislowsky-Deutsch Chair in economic and financial policy at Queen’s University and is a senior scholar at the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) in Montreal. Courchene is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, an officer in the Order of Canada, holds honorary degrees from the universities of Western Ontario and Saskatchewan, and in February 2000 was awarded the prestigious Canada Council Molson Prize for lifetime achievement in the social sciences. His latest book is *A State of Minds: Toward a Human Capital Future for Canadians.*
JAMES DERHAM
James Derham is Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Previously he served as deputy chief of mission of the U.S. Embassy in Brazil, and its chargé d’affaires.

Prior to this assignment, he was U.S. consul general in Rio de Janeiro. Mr. Derham’s other overseas assignments in the Foreign Service have been to Argentina, Brazil (two previous tours—Rio de Janeiro and Salvador), and Italy.

In Washington, D.C., he has worked in the Department of State in the economic bureau and in the office of Japan. Derham also spent a year on Capitol Hill as a legislative fellow in the office of Senator Frank H. Murkowski (R-Alaska).

Derham is a graduate of Fordham University in New York. He has a master’s degrees in economics from the George Washington University and in public administration from Harvard University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1970–1972. His languages are Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian.

ANTHONY DEPALMA
Anthony DePalma was the first New York Times correspondent to serve as bureau chief in both Mexico and Canada. Starting in 1993, he wrote on some of the most tumultuous events in modern Mexican history, including the Zapatista uprising, the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential candidate, and the peso crisis that threatened to spread economic chaos to markets all over the world. In 1996 he was transferred to the other end of North America. In Canada he reported from all ten provinces and three territories, covering natural disasters like the Quebec ice storm and the Red River flood—both once in a century occurrences, the 1997 federal elections that showed the deep regional divisions in Canada, and the historic Indian treaties in British Columbia. In addition, he wrote extensively about the creation of the territory of Nunavut, in which Inuit people formed their own government.

Besides North America, DePalma has reported from several other countries, including Cuba, Suriname, Guyana, and, during the Kosovo crisis, Montenegro and Albania. He was nominated by the Times for a Pulitzer Prize in 1996, and recently published Here: A Biography of the New American Continent (Public Affairs, 2001). In addition to his foreign reporting, DePalma has held positions in the metro, national, and business sections of the Times. From 2000 to 2002, he was an international business correspondent covering North and South America. Most recently, he has been writing about New York City.

WENDY DOBSON
Wendy Dobson is professor and director of the Institute for International Business at the University of Toronto. She received her Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University in 1979. Between 1981 and 1987 she was president of the C.D. Howe Institute, Canada’s leading independent economic policy research institution. From 1987 to 1989, she served as associate deputy minister of finance in the Canadian government with responsibility for international monetary affairs.

Dobson is non-executive director of a number of public companies in financial services, advanced manufacturing, and transportation. She is a member of several international networks including the Trilateral Commission and the Pacific Trade and Development Network (PAF-TAD), and serves as an advisor to governments and international organizations on international trade and finance issues.

Her most recent publications include World Capital Markets: Challenge to the G-10 (2001), co-authored with Gary Clyde Hufbauer; Financial Services Liberalization in the WTO (1998), co-authored with Pierre Jacquet; Fiscal Frameworks and Financial Systems in East Asia: How Much Do They Matter? (University of Toronto Press, 1998); and Multinationals and East Asian Integration (1997), edited with Chia Siow Yue, which won the 1998 Ohira Prize. In 1991, the IIE published her study, Economic Policy Coordination: Requiem or Prologue?

CHARLES F. DORAN
The Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations, Charles Doran is also director of the Center of Canadian Studies and director of international relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. He is the author of more than 75 refereed articles and eight books, including Myth, Oil and Politics (Free Press, 1977), Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century’s End
MARIA ECHAVESTE

Maria Echaveste is an attorney and director of the Nueva Vista Group. She was previously assistant to the president and deputy chief of staff for President Clinton, a position she held from May 1998 through January 2001.

As deputy chief of staff, she managed policy initiatives and developed legislative and communications strategies for the White House regarding various policy issues including immigration, education, civil rights, bankruptcy, trade, Plan Colombia, Latin America, AIDS and Africa, New Markets, and many other issues.

Upon leaving government service in January 2001, she formed her own consulting firm, Nueva Vista Group, focused on public policy, strategy, and advocacy. Echaveste’s firm provides strategic and policy advice to a number of clients including Time Warner, The Limited, AFSCME, the United Farm Workers, and the Rockefeller Foundation. She is a member of the executive committee of the Democratic National Committee and is also a member of the board of directors of People for the American Way and of the National Immigration Forum. She is a frequent commentator on television.

Prior to serving as deputy chief of staff, Echaveste held the post of assistant to the president and director of public liaison from February 1997 to May 1998. Before then, she served as administrator of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division from June 1993 to early 1997. Echaveste also directed the Department of Labor’s anti-sweatshop effort, which received a 1996 Innovations in Government award.

LORRAINE EDEN

Born in St. Stephen, New Brunswick, Canada, Lorraine Eden received her Ph.D. with distinction in economics from Dalhousie University in 1976. Before joining Texas A&M’s Management Department in 1995, she was professor of international affairs at Carleton University, where she continues to hold an appointment as adjunct research professor. She has also held full-time appointments in economics at Mount St. Vincent and Brock universities, and a visiting appointment at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

Lorraine Eden’s more than 85 publications include six scholarly books and more than 30 journal articles. Her core research area is the political economy of multinational enterprises, specializing in transfer pricing (the pricing of products traded within MNEs) where she is recognized as a world authority. Her most significant publication is Taxing Multinationals (University of Toronto Press, 1998) Her other scholarly books are Multinationals in North America (1994), Multinationals in the Global Political Economy (1993), Retrospectives on Public Finance (1991), and Multinationals and Transfer Pricing (1985). Her current research projects focus on transfer pricing, tax havens, and corruption.

Lorraine Eden has received several major research awards including a Canada-U.S. Fulbright Research Fellowship at Harvard University (1992-93), a Pew Faculty Fellowship in Case Teaching in International Affairs (1991-92), and a Carleton University Faculty Research Achievement Award (1994-95). In February 2002, she became the first recipient of the university-wide Texas A&M Bush International Research Award for faculty excellence in international research. Most recently, she was promoted to professor of management, and named as a Texas A&M University Faculty Fellow for 2002-2007. Eden also has more than ten years of consulting experience, working with the Canadian and U.S. governments on transfer pricing and international taxation matters.

Within Texas A&M, Eden has played a leadership role in the Center for International Business Studies, including co-authoring a successful
Jeff Faux

Jeff Faux and several prominent economists founded the Economic Policy Institute in 1986. Faux has researched, written, and published studies on a wide variety of subjects, from the global economy to neighborhood community development, from monetary policy to political strategy. He has been a consultant to governments at all levels, business, labor unions, and community and citizen organizations. He sits on the boards of directors of several national organizations and two national magazines, and received a presidential appointment to the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity.

Faux has worked as an economist with the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity and the U.S. Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor. He has management experience in the finance industry. He has been a small-businessman, a blueberry farmer, and a member of a municipal planning board in the State of Maine.

Stephen P. Farrar

Stephen P. Farrar serves as director of international business for Guardian Industries Corporation, a leading worldwide manufacturer and fabricator of flat glass products used in automotive and construction industries. The company also manufactures a broad line of automotive trim products, fiberglass insulation, and molded plastic products.

In his position as director of international business, Farrar is responsible for the company’s global business development efforts. In recent years, Guardian has become one of the largest global glass producers, operating facilities in North and South America, Western and Central Europe, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. Farrar also serves as chairman of the Trade Advisory Committee on Building Products and Other Materials, advising the Commerce Department and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

During the first Bush administration, Farrar served as special assistant to the president for policy development and as chief of staff to U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills. During the Reagan administration, Farrar served on the White House National Security Council staff as special assistant to the president for international economic affairs. Earlier in his career, Farrar was with the Office of Management and Budget and the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Farrar earned a Master of Science in Foreign Service degree from Georgetown University in 1967 and a Bachelor of Arts degree in government from Bowdoin College in 1965. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the advisory council of the George Bush Presidential Library.

Farrar is married and resides in Clarkston, Michigan. He has two adult children.
**Rafael Fernández de Castro**
Rafael Fernández de Castro is the founder and chair of the Department of International Studies at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). He received his B.A. in political science at ITAM, a master’s in public policy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of the University of Texas at Austin, and a Ph.D. in political science from Georgetown University.

Fernández de Castro is an expert on the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States, as well as in Mexican foreign policy. On these issues and many more, he has published numerous articles and several books such as *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict* with Jorge Domínguez, *The U.S. Congress: The Controversial Pivot of North America* with Robert Pastor, and *México en el Mundo: Los desafíos para México en 2001*. Furthermore, he has taken part in important efforts such as the Binational Panel on Migration, which published the *U.S.-Mexico Binational Study on Migration*.

Fernández de Castro is active in the printed media. He is the editor of *Foreign Affairs en Español*, the sister magazine of *Foreign Affairs*, and he has a column in *Reforma* and another one in the weekly magazine *Proceso*, two leading print media in Mexico.

**Albert Fishlow**
Albert Fishlow is professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University, director of the Center for Brazilian Studies and director of the Institute for Latin American Studies at Columbia. He was Paul A. Volcker Senior Fellow for International Economics at the Council of Foreign Relations until June 30, 1999. Previously Fishlow had been professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley and dean of international and area studies. He has also been visiting professor at the Yale School of Management, and professor of economics and director of the Center for International and Area Studies at Yale University. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs from 1975 to 1976, and has been a member of a number of public groups relating to Latin America. In 1999, he was awarded the National Order of the Southern Cross by the government of Brazil.


**Kishore S. Gawande**
Kishore S. Gawande is associate professor in the George Bush School of Government and Public Service and holds the Helen and Roy Ryu Chair in International Affairs. He earned his Ph.D. in economics at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Gawande’s areas of specialty are empirical political economy and trade policy in which he has published extensively. His articles have appeared in economics, political science, and management journals such as *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *International Organization*, and *Management Science*. He is the recipient of two NSF grants for policy-related empirical research on issues concerning governmental performance and the political economy of trade policy.

His current research interests include papers on empirical testing of models of the political economy of free trade areas and customs unions using data from Mercosur; empirical testing of models of lobbying and trade policy using panel data from the United States; theoretical modeling of principal-agent models of public organizations and their empirical testing using the example of the United States Coast Guard; extensions of Grossman-Helpman models of political economy and their testing. His research interests also include energy policy in which he is developing empirical methods that make valuation of energy contracts more transparent, making it easier for auditing firms to assess energy firms’ valuations of trading contracts.

Gawande’s teaching interests include graduate and undergraduate teaching on globalization, international trade policy, international finance, emerging economies, and applied econometrics. He has taught at the University of New Mexico, and held visiting positions at the Stigler...
Gildenhorn is a widely respected diplomat and businessman. In 1989, he was appointed by former president George Bush to serve as the United States ambassador to Switzerland, where he served until 1993.

He currently is a director and founding partner of The JBG Companies in Washington, D.C. Gildenhorn serves on numerous civic and public policy-oriented boards, including the University of Maryland College Park Foundation, the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, the Council of American Ambassadors, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In 2000, Gildenhorn was honored with the Woodrow Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship and served as a member of the Wilson Council until his appointment as board chairman. He is married to Alma Gildenhorn, who also serves as a member of the Wilson Council.

Guadalupe González

Guadalupe González is professor of international studies at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City. Previously she was an associate researcher at the Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies at the University of California, San Diego, a visiting researcher at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, and academic director of the North American Studies Program of the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies.


Peter Hakim
Peter Hakim is president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a leading U.S. center for policy analysis and exchange on Western Hemisphere affairs.

Hakim writes and speaks widely on hemispheric issues, is regularly interviewed on radio and television, and has testified more than a dozen times before Congress. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Washington Post, Financial Times, and Christian Science Monitor. He was a vice president of the Inter-American Foundation and worked for the Ford Foundation in both New York and Latin America. He has taught at MIT and Columbia. He currently serves on boards and advisory committees for the Foundation of the Americas, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Foreign Affairs en Español, Intellibridge Corporation, and Human Rights Watch. He is a member of the Council of Foreign Relations.

Hakim earned a B.A. at Cornell University, an M.S. in physics at the University of Pennsylvania, and a master of public and international affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School.

Lee H. Hamilton
Lee Hamilton is president and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Center on Congress at Indiana University. Prior to becoming director of the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1999, Hamilton served for 34 years in Congress representing Indiana’s Ninth District. During his tenure, he served as chairman and ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations), chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East from the early 1970s until 1993, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.

Hamilton also served as chair of the Joint Economic Committee, working to promote long-term economic growth and development. As chairman of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress and a member of the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee, he was a primary draftsman of several House ethics reforms.

Since leaving the House, Hamilton has served as a commissioner on the influential United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission), and was co-chair with former Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-Hamilton Commission to Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos. He is currently a member of the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, and served as vice-chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission).

Hamilton is a graduate of DePauw University and Indiana University School of Law, as well as the recipient of numerous honorary degrees and national awards for public service. Before his election to Congress, he practiced law in Chicago and Columbus, Indiana.

Michael Hart
Michael Hart is Simon Reisman professor of trade policy in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University where he teaches courses on the laws and institutions of international trade as well as advanced seminars on emerging trade issues, comparative trade policy, and the historical development of Canadian trade policy.

As a distinguished fellow of the Center for Trade Policy and Law at Carleton University, Hart provides strategic analysis and advice to governments, international organizations, and businesses on emerging trade policy issues and leads training missions to enhance the skill levels of officials in developing and transitional economies. He has led missions and provided advice to governments in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.

Over the summer months, Hart acts as one of the two co-directors of the Center’s Certificate Program, a program designed to upgrade the skills and knowledge of trade officials from developing countries and transitional economies.

Hart is a former official in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where he specialized in trade policy and trade negotiations. He was involved in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade negotiations, the North American Free Trade negotiations and various GATT, textile, and commodity negotiations. He was founding director of the Center for Trade Policy and Law and stepped down in September 1996 after a second term as director.

Hart holds an M.A. from the University of Toronto and is the author, editor, or co-editor of more than a dozen books and numerous articles...
and chapters in books on international trade issues, including: *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (UBC Press).

**GEORGE HAYNAL**

George Haynal serves as vice president of public policy at Bombardier. He was previously senior vice president for policy of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Canada’s leading business association.

In the academic year 2001-2002, prior to retiring from the Canadian Foreign Service, which he joined in 1969, he was at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, working on North American issues and international relations management.

In the period 1998-2001, he was assistant deputy minister for the Americas in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with responsibility for the coordination of relations with the United States, the Caribbean, and Latin America.

His most recent foreign assignment was as consul general in New York and commissioner to Bermuda. He had earlier been deputy permanent representative to the OECD in Paris, as well as first secretary (political) in London.

He had also served as head of the DFAIT policy staff, leading the foreign policy review that produced “Canada in the World,” the government’s foreign policy statement in 1995. He had earlier been director general of economic policy.


He is a fellow of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, senior fellow of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, and an associate member and past president of the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers.

**CARLOS A. HEREDIA**

An economist with a long experience in foreign affairs, Heredia did his undergraduate work at ITAM in Mexico City and his Master’s at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He currently works for the Governor of Michoacán and previously worked for the governor of Mexico City. He served as a Member of Congress (PRD) in the 57th Legislature, 1997-2000, and was the international affairs spokesperson for the Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas presidential campaign in 2000.

Heredia has worked with Mexican development NGOs for more than twenty years. With Equipo PUEBLO, he studied the economics of free trade and the impact of the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank. In 1993-1994 he was a guest researcher with The Development GAP in Washington, D.C., where he testified before several committees of the U.S. Congress on various topics related to Mexico. Heredia worked at the Mexican Treasury (1982 to 1988) on issues such as the foreign debt and development financing.

He has been a commentator on Mexican issues for U.S. media, including *Nightline*, the *MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour*, and CNN. He writes a weekly column for *El Diario de Tampico* and has a weekly commentary for Televisa. Heredia is the vice president of the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. He also serves on the executive council of the Mexican Center of the University of Texas and is a board member of The Development Group for Alternative Policies (DGAP) of Washington, D.C.

**GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER**

Gary Clyde Hufbauer is Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics. He was formerly the Marcus Wallenberg Professor of International Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown University (1985–92); deputy director of the International Law Institute at Georgetown University (1979–81); deputy assistant secretary for international trade and investment policy of the U.S. Treasury (1977–79); and director of the international tax staff at the Treasury (1974–76). He has written extensively on international trade, investment, and tax issues. He is co-author of *The Benefits of Price Convergence* (2002) and *World Capital Markets* (2001), and co-editor of *The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century* (2001), *Unfinished Business: Telecommunications after the Uruguay Round* (1997), and *Flying High: Liberalizing Civil Aviation in the Asia Pacific* (1996).


Thomas F. “Mack” McLarty III

Thomas F. “Mack” McLarty III has a distinguished record of business leadership and public service, including various roles advising three presidents: Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Jimmy Carter. McLarty worked with President Carter as a member of the Democratic National Committee, was appointed to two commissions by President Bush, and served President Clinton in several key positions: chief of staff, counselor to the president, and special envoy for the Americas, with more than five years of service in the president’s cabinet and on the National Economic Council. Upon leaving the White House in July 1998, McLarty returned to the McLarty Companies as its chairman and continues in that role while also serving as president of Kissinger McLarty Associates, which provides strategic advisory services to U.S. and multinational businesses, and vice chairman of Asbury Automotive Group, one of the largest automobile retailers in the United States.

As White House chief of staff, McLarty helped enact the historic 1993 deficit reduction package, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Family and Medical Leave law. In 1994 McLarty organized the successful Summit of the Americas in Miami, and he played a critical role in structuring the 1995 Mexican peso stabilization program. The president recognized McLarty’s work by appointing him special envoy for the Americas in 1997.

Born in Hope, Arkansas, in 1946, McLarty graduated summa cum laude from the University of Arkansas in 1969 and returned to Hope,
where he helped build the business his grandfather founded into one of the nation’s largest transportation companies. He was elected to the state legislature at the age of 23 and served as chairman of the state Democratic party from 1974-1976. McLarty was finance chair for David Pryor’s gubernatorial campaign, and he later served Bill Clinton in the same capacity.

McLarty is a frequent public speaker, and he has published numerous articles on U.S. trade and foreign policy. He has served on the boards of many corporate and non-profit institutions. McLarty is the recipient of the Secretary of State’s Distinguished Service Medal; the highest civilian honors of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela; the Olympic Shield Award; and the Center for the Study of the Presidency Distinguished Service Award.

ROBERT MOSBACHER
Robert Mosbacher, Sr., chairman of Mosbacher Energy Company and Mosbacher Power Group, served as Secretary of Commerce in the 1989-92 Bush administration, for which he was confirmed 100-0 by the Senate. He has been an oil industry leader, serving as chairman of the National Petroleum Council, chairman of the U.S. Oil and Gas Association, and numerous other energy organizations.

Secretary Mosbacher was inducted into the Texas Business Hall of Fame in 1987 and the Houston Hall of Fame in 1999. He received the Aztec Eagle Award presented in 2000 by President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico. He has served as a director of Texas Commerce/Chase Bank, Enron Corporation, and New York Life Insurance Company, recently completed his three-year term as chairman of the Americas Society and Council of the Americas, and is on the Naval Academy Endowment Trust Board and the Board of Trustees of the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation.

Among Secretary Mosbacher’s past civic contributions, he was twice chairman of the Board of Visitors of M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, and is currently a member. He was a co-founder of the Model School Program, vice-chairman of the Texas Heart Institute, is on the Advisory Board of the Baker Institute at Rice University, and is Trustee Emeritus of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. He is co-founder and president of the board of Odyssey Academy, a charter school in Galveston.

From 1981 to 1987, he served as vice chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson Center.

Secretary Mosbacher is an avid sailor, having won two Olympic-class world championships as well as numerous other sailing awards. Mosbacher resides in Houston with his wife and stepson.

BRIAN MULRONEY
Having served as prime minister of Canada for almost nine years, in 1993 the Right Honorable Brian Mulroney returned to the law firm of Ogilvy Renault as senior partner.

Mulroney led his party to the largest parliamentary victory in Canadian history, and was sworn in as Canada’s 18th prime minister on September 17, 1984. His government was re-elected with a majority for a second mandate on November 21, 1988.

The major achievements of his government include the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, the Canada-U.S. Acid Rain Treaty, tax reform, deregulation, privatization, and reduction in government spending.

On June 11, 1983, Mulroney was elected leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. He subsequently won election to the House of Commons on August 29, 1983, representing the riding of Central Nova, Nova Scotia. He entered the House of Commons as leader of the opposition on September 12, 1983. Mulroney was re-elected to the House of Commons on September 17, 1984 and again on November 21, 1988.

Mulroney holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honors) degree in political science from St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, and a Bachelor of Laws from l’Université Laval, Quebec City. Doctorates of Law Honoris Causa have been conferred upon him by leading universities around the world.

Mulroney was born in Baie-Comeau, Quebec, on March 20, 1939, is married to Mila, and is father to four children: Caroline, Benedict, Mark, and Nicolas.

ANTONIO ORTIZ MENA
Antonio Ortiz Mena is professor of international political economy at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City and chair of the Department of International Relations. His areas of
Speaker Biographies

James F. Robinson

James F. Robinson has been a professor at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City since 1996. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. and another Ph.D. in history from McGill University in Montreal.

Robinson has recently completed a book manuscript on changing notions of sovereignty in North America, State Sovereignty and International Relations, and has numerous other publications including “Globalization and Sovereignty: Reconciling Standards of Legitimacy in Environment, Human Rights, and Democracy” (in Rafael Fernández de Castro, ed., México en el Mundo, ITAM, 2001); and “Structural Realism” (with Athanasios Hristoulas, in Hristoulas, ed., International Relations Theories, forthcoming).

Carlos Salinas de Gortari

Born on April 3, 1948 in Mexico City, Carlos Salinas de Gortari was president of Mexico from 1988 to 1994.

As president he introduced several reforms, including the regularization of rural property, the reestablishment of relationships with the Vatican, and the creation of a national human rights ombudsman.

President Salinas also took steps to open the protected Mexican economy to both foreign investment and foreign competition. In 1992 he signed the North American Free Trade Agreement with President George Bush of the United States and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada. The treaty came into force in January 1994 after being approved by the national legislatures of the three countries.

In addition, President Salinas introduced a program of economic retrenchment and privatization. He sold off several of state-owned corporations to private investors and invested the obtained resources in infrastructure and social services, mainly through the Solidaridad program.

Stephen Randall

Stephen J. Randall, FRSC, is dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, and professor of history, University of Calgary, Canada. He is president of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (Calgary branch), and was a founding member of the Canadian Council for the Americas (Alberta branch) as well as the Western Canada office of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas. He is an elected member of the Royal Society of Canada. A specialist in U.S. foreign policy and Latin American international relations and politics, he holds the Grand Cross, Order of Merit from the government of Colombia.

Randall has served with the United Nations in international election supervision (Nicaragua, 1990; Cambodia, 1993); with the Organization of American States (El Salvador, 1991; Venezuela, 1993); with the Carter Presidential Center (Jamaica, 1997). He is the author or editor of a number of books, including: The Diplomacy of Modernization: The United States and Colombia, 1920-1940 (1977); United States Foreign Oil Policy (1984); Hegemony and Interdependence: Colombia and the United States (1992); Ambivalent Allies: Canada and the United States (1994, 1996, 2002); Canada and Latin America (1992); Federalism and the New World Order (1994); An International History of the Caribbean Basin (1998); North America Without Borders (1992); NAFTA in Transition (1995).


Ortiz Mena worked in the NAFTA negotiations office of the Mexican Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development (SECOFI) from 1991 to 1993 and in the Mexican Ministries of Budget and Programming (1987-88) and Fisheries (1989-91).

Ortiz Mena holds a Ph.D. in political economy from the University of California, San Diego, and master’s degree in economics from the London School of Economics.

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President Salinas joined the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) at age 18. From 1971 on he held successively more important economic-affairs posts in the government. In 1982, Salinas was appointed minister of planning and the budget, a post that he held until the PRI named him its presidential candidate for the 1988 elections.

In 2000 President Salinas published *Mexico: The Policy and Politics of Modernization* (Random House, 2001) about his administration. He has also published several books and texts on civil society, economic liberalization, and the formation of social capital.

President Salinas holds a B.A. from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (1971) and an M.P.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in political economy and government from Harvard University.

**Daniel Schwanen**

Daniel Schwanen holds degrees in economics from the University of Montreal and Queen’s University. Prior to joining the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), Schwanen was senior policy analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto. He has also been an international economist at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, where he covered G-7 economic developments and the European Community single market process, and has worked as an economist for investment dealer Wood Gundy Inc.

Schwanen specializes in trade and economic growth issues, and is the author of a number of articles and commentaries on Canada’s external trade policy, the impact of free trade agreements, interprovincial economic issues, and global warming policy.

**Peter H. Smith**

Peter H. Smith is professor of political science and Simón Bolívar Professor of Latin American Studies at the University of California, San Diego. He is a specialist on comparative politics, Latin American politics, and U.S.-Latin American relations.

A magna cum laude graduate of Harvard College, Smith received the Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1966. He has served in faculty positions at Dartmouth College (1966-68), the University of Wisconsin-Madison (1968-80), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1980-87). Smith’s intellectual interests have focused on long-term patterns of political change. His publications include more than a dozen books and about seventy book chapters or journal articles including *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (1979); *Modern Latin America* (co-author with Thomas Skidmore, 1984), now in its fifth edition (2001); *Drug Policy in the Americas* (editor, 1992); *Cooperation or Rivalry? Regional Integration in the Americas and the Pacific Rim* (co-editor, 1996); *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (1996, second edition, 2000). His most recent publication is *NAFTA in the New Millennium* (edited with Edward J. Chambers, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 2002). He is also working on a book about democracy in Latin America.

In 1981 Smith was president of the Latin American Studies Association. He has been a consultant to the Ford Foundation (1984-89, 1991) and other institutions. He has also served as co-director of the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations and of the Inter-American Commission on Drug Policy.

**Susan P. Sylvester**

Susan P. Sylvester is the U.S. General Services Administration’s general manager of the International Trade Center at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center (RRB/ITC). The building is not only the government’s second largest office building (after the Pentagon), but one of the nation’s largest and most attractive mixed-use facilities. It conveys the United States’ recognition of the importance of trade in linking countries and communities. Additionally, the RRB/ITC serves as the headquarters for the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, as well as key components of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Commerce.

The ITC has become Washington’s premier conference center hosting a wide variety of corporate, social, and government events. Sylvester has worked on this challenging project for nearly ten years from design, construction, programming, and now operations. She is also project director of the major redevelopment plan of the Woodrow Wilson Plaza and Daniel P. Moynihan Place, known as Culture and Commerce Bridging the Federal Triangle.
Before joining the GSA, Sylvester worked in the private sector as a commercial real estate broker for Insignia/ESG (formerly Barnes, Morris & Pardoe, Inc.) specializing in investment sales. She graduated from the University of Maryland and has completed numerous graduate and professional development programs. She is currently participating in the GSA’s Advanced Leadership Development program for their senior managers.

**JOSEPH S. TULCHIN**

As the director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., Joseph S. Tulchin coordinates research and public discussion of issues of concern to Latin America.

Prior to becoming the director of the Latin American Program, Tulchin was professor of history and director of international programs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill where he taught for twenty years, after having taught at Yale University for seven years. His areas of expertise include U.S. foreign policy, inter-American relations, contemporary Latin America, urban problems, and strategic planning.

Tulchin holds a B.A. degree, magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, from Amherst College and a Ph.D. in history from Harvard University. Recognized as an outstanding teacher while at Yale, he was the recipient of the Conference on Latin American History Award of the American Historical Association. In addition, he has taught or lectured throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in Europe, Japan, and Russia.

Tulchin was associate editor and then editor of the *Latin American Research Review*. He has published seventy-five scholarly articles—in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and German—and has published more than thirty books on inter-American relations, Latin American affairs, Spanish foreign policy, and international relations. Among his publications are *Latin American Nations in World Politics* (edited with Heraldo Muñoz, Westview Press, 1996); *Latin America in the New World System* (edited with Ralph Espach, Lynne Rienner, 2000); and *Mexico’s Politics and Society in Transition* (edited with Andrew Selee, Lynne Rienner, 2003).

**GUSTAVO VEGA CANOVAS**

Recently a visiting public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Gustavo Vega holds the rank of professor at the Center for International Studies (CIS) of El Colegio de México in Mexico City where he teaches courses on international trade regulation and in international political economy. His publications include *The Politics of Free Trade in North America* and numerous book chapters and articles on NAFTA including “Disciplining Anti-Dumping in North America: Is NAFTA Chapter Nineteen Serving Its Purpose?” and “NAFTA and the EU: Towards Convergence?”

Vega holds a law degree from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University. He was the director of the program for North American Studies at CIS of El Colegio de México from 1990 to 1997. Among other professional activities, Vega has served in five NAFTA dispute resolution panels and acted as chair in four of them.

**SIDNEY WEINTRAUB**

Sidney Weintraub is director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the senior scholar specializing in Western Hemisphere issues. In addition, he holds the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center. He is also professor emeritus at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs of the University of Texas at Austin, where he taught before joining CSIS.

A member of the U.S. Foreign Service from 1949 to 1975, Weintraub held the post of deputy assistant secretary of state for international finance and development from 1969 to 1974 and assistant administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development in 1975. He has also been a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. His most recent books are *Financial Decision-Making in Mexico: To Bet a Nation* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000) and *Development and Democracy in the Southern Cone: Imperatives for U.S. Policy in South America* (CSIS, 2000). He is co-author of *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Lynne Rienner, 1994) and author of *NAFTA at Three: A Progress Report* (CSIS, 1997), *A Marriage of Convenience: Relations between Mexico and the United States* (Oxford, 1990), and *Free Trade between Mexico and the U.S.?* (Brookings, 1984). He has also published numerous articles in newspapers and journals. Weintraub received his Ph.D. in economics from The American University.
Michael Wilson is president and chief executive officer of UBS Global Asset Management in Canada. He was formerly president and chief executive officer of Brinson Canada Co. (formerly RT Capital Management Inc.).

Prior to July 2000, Wilson was vice-chairman and director of RBC Dominion Securities Inc. He has held senior federal cabinet posts with the government of Canada in Finance, Industry, Science and Technology, and International Trade. Wilson is director of a number of companies, including BP p.l.c. and Manulife Financial Corporation.

Wilson has been active in a number of community organizations in Canada and the United States including the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health and the Canadian Neuroscience Partnership. He is also senior chairman of the Business and Economic Roundtable on Mental Health and in that capacity has spoken frequently about mental illness in the workplace.

Among other accomplishments, Wilson was responsible for the NAFTA negotiations. In January 1994, he formed Michael Wilson International to provide advice and assistance to companies seeking to expand their international business activities through projects, joint ventures, and major procurement orders.