THE POLITICAL ARTICULATION AND AGGREGATION OF PLURAL
INTERESTS IN SELF-MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:
THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

I have devoted five months as a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center to
the preparation of a new book dealing with the problems of articulation and
aggregation of interests in the political system of Yugoslavia in order to
compare it with other political systems, especially with those systems in the
countries of so-called really existing socialism, i.e., the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe.

The point of departure is the assumption that the real nature of any
contemporary political system can be best understood if one looks at the possi­
bilities for expression of interests of different individuals, groups and insti­
tutions and for effective inclusion or exclusion of these interests in the
political decision-making process of one particular system or another.

So conceived, the book will be a direct continuation of my two most recent
works Interests and Political Process (1983), and Debates and Treatises on the
Political System (1986). The first book is an attempt to develop the concept
of interests as a basic tool of political analysis, and to use this tool in
comparative studies of politics in socialist and developing countries. This
has not been done so far on a large scale and in a systematic way.¹

The second book is a result of my direct involvement in discussions,
often involving ideological and political confrontations, during the last few
years concerning the reform of Yugoslavia's political system. Concrete pre­
parations for these reforms are now finally under way.

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In my new book I am trying to present a comprehensive, critical analysis of Yugoslavia's struggle to achieve a peaceful transition from the Stalinist system of party-state "monolitism" to a political system characterized by a new type of pluralism, the so-called "self-management pluralism of interests."

There are several reasons why the very specific Yugoslav experience, both in its positive achievements and failures in building a self-managing economic and political system, may be of broader interest for comparative studies of contemporaneous political systems. One general reason is that the attempt to develop an alternative system to Stalinism has been more than an experiment provoked simply by political accident. What might have looked like a short-lived rebellion caused by misunderstanding and disagreement about minor, specific matters of current policies soon turned out to be a deep cleavage on essential problems of socialism. The result was a continuous process which led to new concepts and new practices not only different from but in many ways directly opposite to Stalinism.

The history of building a system of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia is already thirty-five years old. This history has influenced directly or indirectly developments inside the so-called socialist camp and far beyond its boundaries. In this sense, "Yugoslav heresy" has become the first historical denial of Stalinism, or more precisely, of Stalinist dogma, which has tried, for a long time successfully, to identify socialism with Stalinism.

What makes the Yugoslav experience so interesting, unique, and still relevant for comparative political studies? One answer is that while the Yugoslav experience has been evaluated differently, there are a few facts which are incontrovertible. Yugoslavia has made the first large-scale attempt to transfer self-management from theoretical considerations to daily practice and a way of life for millions of people. This is a unique example up to now of a more or less successful, peaceful transition from the system of party-state monolitism.
into a system based on the recognized pluralism of self-management interests. The process of building self-management systems in Yugoslavia provides one of the most interesting examples of ambitious and far-reaching social and political engineering of our time.

Four postwar Yugoslav constitutions, and especially the last two adopted in 1963 and 1974, are comprehensive blueprints for a completely new socio-economic and political organization of society. Thus, the possibilities, limitations and consequences of larger-scale political engineering may be studied best on the basis of Yugoslavia's experiences. This is also true of the gap between normative and real in political life and the impact which this discrepancy may have on the real developments of different political systems and different countries. In other words, to what extent and for how long do political and economic transformations have the character of a process consciously guided and directed from above—that is from the main center of political decision-making?

All these reasons obviously justify further efforts toward a comprehensive and critical analysis of the "Yugoslav case" in modern political development. To be sure, there are quite a number of good scholarly works on Yugoslavia's economic and political development by both foreign and Yugoslav scholars. But it is obvious, in the "Yugoslav case" also, that modern political science and its oldest approach—comparative study of political systems—are still paying heavy debts to ideological prejudices, compromises and restraints.

On the Yugoslav side these restraints often express themselves as an overestimation of the specific and particular origins and character of Yugoslavia's revolutionary experiences as a new historical breakthrough. Yugoslav development is allegedly not bound by experiences and patterns of bourgeois regimes, past or present, or by what could be learned from the theory and practice of
the countries of state socialism. This official attitude has considerably narrowed the possibilities for the application of knowledge accumulated by comparative political studies and by political science in general. The critical appraisal of different patterns of institutional organization, introduced by different legislation and especially by the Constitutions themselves, has been limited in practice, thus opening the door to so-called "normative voluntarism," and to the penetration of elements of social utopia into the normative structure of the political system as a whole. Discussions about shortcomings and dilemmas in the far-reaching reform of the Yugoslav federation by the 1974 constitution could serve as a very good illustration of these tendencies.

Writings by foreign observers are also very often ideologically bound. A good example is the widespread thesis that new methods of modern political analysis developed in the West, especially the concept of interest groups, interest articulation and aggregations would be appropriate tools of research only in Western-type multi-party democracies but not in other types of political systems, including Yugoslavia. In the last few years this thesis has been criticised and even rejected. This has given a positive impulse to truly comparative studies of different types of contemporary political systems including the political system of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia.

The other one-sided approach to the study of the development and the practical functioning of the Yugoslav political system has been the conviction that in order to avoid ideological traps and biases of any kind, one should go straight to empirical facts, disregarding entirely the ideological context in which the system has developed, including the present role which theory and ideology play in the functioning of the system. This has become more important in view of
growing difficulties and disfunctions which have come to the surface in the past few years. Ideology is an integral part of the political system, of its history and its present day reality. After all, one must bear in mind that the ideological as well as political conflicts with Stalinism were the seed-bed of the new economic and political system of Yugoslavia. Therefore, any attempts to study the Yugoslav political system and political reality from the viewpoint of so-called "end of ideology" would yield no more than an empirical description of some bare facts. This is obviously of little explanatory value and does not satisfy the quest for deeper scientific analysis.

In the book I am writing now, I shall draw heavily on the experiences, observations, and knowledge of facts which I have accumulated as an "insider" in the long process of preparing, writing and amending the last two Yugoslav constitutions. I shall also draw on different documentary materials, memoirs, and books of an historical character that are now available. But I am not going to write another historical description of the past. Of course, the historical description must be included as well, but in a concise form and only in so far as it is necessary for the theoretical rethinking of the past events.

II

The essence and main features of a self-management model of economic and political organization could be best highlighted if the model is contrasted and opposed to Stalinism or, more generally, to the model of party-state monolithism.

Stalinism means, first of all, a suppression and subordination of all autonomous sources and organized forms of interests articulation and aggregation in a given society. In order to achieve an all-embracing and effective totalitarian political control in contemporary society, the mere strengthening and refining
of means and tools of direct coercion are not sufficient any more. What is necessary is the transformation of objectively growing dependence of individuals and groups on socially organized satisfaction of their needs into communal services, health protection, education, professional training, transportation and so on, into direct dependence on the bureaucratic apparatus of the government providing and allocating all these indispensable goods and services.

The essence of this political system and of the concrete mechanism of party-state monolitism found adequate expression in Stalin's own definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As early as 1924, in his well-known work Questions of Leninism, Stalin wrote quite bluntly that the dictatorship of the proletariat consisted of "directions from the party center, plus transmission of these directions by so-called 'transmission belts' of the party (that is soviets, trade unions, youth organization and so on), plus implementation of these directions by the proletariat and working masses in general."

The entire system of free and voluntary forms of articulation and aggregation of interest and of self-motivated collective action (which usually are considered as one of the main achievements and characteristics of modern pluralist democracy) has thus been turned upside down. Instead of being the channel and the instrument of democratic participation and articulate pressure from below in political decision-making, so-called free associations are deprived of their autonomy and are transformed into the main instruments for submission of the total population to the bureaucratic command from above. This transformation has become the most salient feature of any orthodox system of state-party monolitism.3

The degree to which the system of transmission belts has been abandoned in practice is, therefore, one of the most reliable yardsticks of genuine emancipation from the system of party state monolitism.
It is important to note that only four years after the conflict with Stalinism broke into the open, the Communist party of Yugoslavia, at its 6th Congress in 1952, was renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, renouncing in that way, at least formally, its position of the strictly centralized ruling party with the complete monopoly of state power and control. And at the same time Stalinism was accused by Yugoslav ideologists and theoreticians of betraying the very essence of socialism - the economic emancipation of the working class through the abolition of wage-labor relationships. The Marxist concept of the withering away of the state was replaced by Stalin's dogma of the state's ownership monopoly as the lasting and highest form of socialization of the means of production. The state-party machinery was given the position of universal owner of the means of production, of universal employer and universal manager of the economy. Thus, the state's ownership monopoly became the material base and main source of enormous arbitrary power for the bureaucracy. This same system subordinated the working class to a position of powerlessness. That was the essence of the criticism of Stalinism from the viewpoint of self-management. By 1949-1950 the sharp line of division between self-management and Stalinism had been drawn and since then has never been substantially revised or abandoned.

In their resistance to Stalinism and in constructing self-management in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav leadership has never been as pragmatic and non-doctrinal as it has been either praised or blamed for being.

The rejection of Stalinist theory and practice could not be successful without adequate theoretical justification in terms of Marxist theory of socialist revolution. It was a question of survival for Yugoslavia as an independent socialist country. Amazingly quickly, in the early 1950s, the ideological foundations of Yugoslavia's "independent road to socialism" emerged. In 1958
the new program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was adopted - the longest document of this kind in modern political history. The Program contained extensive analysis of the conditions and the prospects of revolutionary social changes in the contemporary world and in Yugoslavia in particular, as well as both a vision and rather detailed projection of the future transformation of Yugoslav society. Unlike any other documents, including the constitutions, this declaration of faith and revolutionary self-confidence remained unchanged during all the turbulent years that followed. It is not possible to understand achievements and failures of leading political forces in Yugoslavia, and even present-day controversies and divisions, if one does not take into account the ideological framework in which these events took place.

The material preconditions for the development of a new type of pluralism in the Yugoslav economic and political system were the social ownership of the means of production as the practical means for abolishing the state's ownership monopoly. Social ownership means that all of the productive resources have the quality of being owned by the whole community. They are neither the property of the state, nor of private individuals, nor of the groups of associated workers who manage them. Workers organized in associated labor units were given the right to use, manage and dispose of resources entrusted to them and dispose of the product of their labor, including the right to appropriate resources for personal income and so-called joint consumption in common with other workers and on the basis of equality. But workers as self-managers, bear the responsibility for the social resources with which they work and are under an obligation to preserve their value and to expand and improve them.

The fundamental criterion for the achievements of workers self-management is the degree to which participation of workers in units of "associated labor"
insures their direct participation on an equal footing in the management both of work and all the other affairs of the community. Workers self-management is therefore not conceived of simply as a series of measures designed to alleviate or partially compensate for the negative effect of the wage labor status of the work force, nor merely as an institution for popular decision-making in the economy or other fields of social life. It is conceived of as a fundamental change in the basic relations of production, which in turn becomes the basis for all the other social rights and freedoms of the workers.

One of the emerging features of the Yugoslav workers self-management system was the linkage of organizations engaged in production with those supplying social and public services. In the early years, workers self-management was limited to the production of goods, but one of the important facets of its subsequent development has been the gradual extension of workers self-management to services such as education, health care, social security, the diffusion of science and culture, and the close integration of the production of goods with these other areas of work.

The provision of these services has ceased to be the domain of state control and budget financing, and has been included within the orbit of workers self-measurement and decisionmaking concerning the disposal of social income. These are supposed to be achieved by the so-called "free exchange of labor" between the providers and the users of the services concerned. The institutional framework in which it is embodied is the self-managing community of interests, managed jointly by the workers in the organization providing the services and those who consume them. Both contribute part of their personal income to its financing.

The establishment of self-management pluralism has been seen as an historically far-reaching extension of real democracy beyond the limits of liberal
political representative systems. According to the theoretical constitutional concept, the starting basis in building the political system of socialist self-management is not the citizen as a voter in general for parliament and other representative bodies, but the worker as self-manager, organized according to his basic interests. These interests are four:

(1) As a worker (producer) in Basic Organization of Associated Labor where he makes decisions for the production and the distribution of income;

(2) As a resident of a defined narrow territory - in the local self-management community.

(3) As a user of services of institutions satisfying his personal and family needs in health, education, culture, social security and so on, in the self-management interest community for the respective region.

(4) As a citizen having larger interests and responsibilities with regard to the control of social business on the macro-social plane - in socio-political organizations like the Socialist Alliances of the Working People of Yugoslavia, Federation of the Trade Unions, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Youth League, the Federation of War Veterans, and various voluntary associations of all kinds.

According to the 1974 constitution, these organized self-management bases form the foundation for the entire pyramid of the global political organization of society. It is done through delegations directly selected in all self-management organizations and communities and through the particular delegates sent by them to the respective councils of the assemblies of social political communities (communes, autonomous provinces, republics and federation). These are the institutionalized channels of permanent bi-directional communication between "self-management bases" and the centers of political decision-making and law enforcement.
Empirical and critical analysis of the results thus far achieved in introducing such a concept of democracy based on self-managing interest pluralism reveals, however, a deep gap between the formal institutional and legal structure of the system, and the realities of daily political and social life. This discrepancy was bound to produce many negative consequences. In recent years the flaws and shortcomings in the functioning of the political system are becoming more and more evident and pressing. The deterioration of the whole economic situation since 1979-80 requires energetic measures of economic policy and their consistent enforcement in practice. But the political system has obviously not been capable of responding to these demands, at least not in time and to the degree necessary. In spite of all uneasiness and ideological resistance within the political leadership, criticism of the whole political system was inevitable. Such sweeping criticism is now the order of the day in Yugoslavia.

III

In order to achieve a deeper understanding of the problems and shortcomings of the Yugoslav political system as they manifest themselves in daily practice, two premises have to be recognized and respected:

(1) Regardless of how specific they may appear to be, problems facing the Yugoslav political system are basically ones which have to be faced in many other political systems as well. They stem from the general conditions characteristic of complex modern industrial or industrializing societies. Problems of so-called "statism", that is, of reshaping the organizational structure and functions of the modern state, for instance, are present in this or that form in all types of contemporary polities.

(2) A concrete approach to the subject and methods of research should not apply a model mechanically or be ideologically bound exclusively. One should
use them, keeping in mind their explanatory value while avoiding their ideologi­
cal or political limits. The general Marxist outlook is not in my experience
incompatible with new concepts and research techniques developed by the modern
political science in the West and especially in the United States: Different
variations of functionalism, of systems-analysis, of elite group approaches, of
new achievements in interest group concepts, in concepts of pluralism and of
"plural societies", studies in the co-associational types of the democracy,
organization theories, and even renewal of corporatist models and practices.
Of course, this is not a plea for eclecticism, but an argument against the
doctrinal exclusiveness and aspirations to self-sufficiency which have been so
harmful to the scientific studies of politics.

In order to answer the basic question, How genuine is the new 'self-
management pluralism of interest,' what are its forms, and what is the relative
importance of each of them, several main lines of research have to be pursued
simultaneously:

(1) How successful and how deep has the transformation of state owner-
ship into social property been, thereby providing the material bases for auto-
nomous activities of self-management enterprises in pursuit of their immediate
and long-term interest as commodity producers for the market? And what effect
has that form of recognized pluralism of interest had on other spheres of
social and political life?

Discussions about the possibilities for combining the market economy and
the social ownership of the means of production have never ceased in Yugoslavia.
Fears and misgivings about the compatibility of a full fledged market economy
and the socialist character of relationships of production are deeply rooted.
Since the first large-scale economic reform in 1965, there has been a strong
school of thought throughout in Yugoslavia defending the view that the greater
the role of the market mechanism, the greater the danger for the restoration of
capitalist relations among publically-owned enterprises. Admittedly, money-
goods relationships and a market are unavoidable at this stage of social develop-
ment for the country. But it is argued that these relations should be gradually
weakened and replaced by direct, consciously built ties connecting economic and
other self-management units. Allegedly this should be achieved by regulating
mutual relationships such as self-management agreements and social compacts.

It seems, however, that the majority of Yugoslav economists, political
scientists and politicians do not accept this concept of "contractual economy." They think that the implementation of these ideas would restore, in disguised
form, the reign of "bureaucratic volunteerism" and that, without an appropriate
role for the market, the genuine autonomy of self-management enterprises could
not be assured. It is important to note that the latter view has been accepted
in some recent political documents including "The Long-term Program of Economic
Stabilization."

How well founded are the warnings about the dangers of the degeneration
of social ownership into group ownership of individual enterprises or their
rigidly institutionalized "basic organizations of associated labor"? Is it
more justifiable to speak about the tacit restoration of state ownership as a
consequence of use and abuse of extensive rights of territorial units of
government to regulate the conditions of production and distribution, i.e. to
regulate the ways and the procedures in which the social ownership of the
means of production have to be used?

In Yugoslav political and sociological theory and in some important poli-
tical documents as well, one can find the contention that the basic contra-
diction underlying the entire process of the self-managed transformation of
economic and political structure is the conflict of interest related to the
crucial questions: which group, which class or social strata is actually in
a position to control the distribution of national income and especially the allocation of "social capital", i.e., allocation of the means for extended reproduction. Does this power belong to the workers in self-managing enterprises or to the professional political ruling strata in different territorial units of state power? There is, in this respect, a great discrepancy between the relationships prescribed by the Constitution and other basic laws (like the Law on associated labor) and actual practice. No serious scholarly analysis of Yugoslav reality could bypass these problems and leave without an answer the questions of the causes and roots of the above mentioned discrepancy and about the possibilities to overcome it.

I believe that this approach is the most fruitful and rewarding. By pursuing this approach more light could be shed on the actual relationships between the working class (ostensibly the ruling class in the economic sense) and the strata of immediate political powerholders. The relationships and conflict of interest in aspirations inside the political ruling strata itself could be better understood and explained if this approach is properly used.5

(2) What is the social nature and the role of the professional political ruling strata in Yugoslavia? It is obvious that this strata in Yugoslavia has had a stronger position and greater prestige and authority than political leaderships in any other East European country. The sources of its legitimation have included a successful national liberation war, socialist revolution, and successful resistance to tremendous economic, political and ideological pressure by a Stalinist-led Communist Bloc which threatened the very existence of the country as an independent state.

The position of the political ruling strata and its internal cohesion have been further strengthened by its firm commitment to self-management ideology and to the reconstruction of the whole social "infra- and super-structure" based
on the new self-management relation of production. The successful mobilization of the working masses for the economic development of the country and its new forms of participatory self-management democracy brought about impressive, easily visible results especially during the first 25 years of self-management. The feeling spread that the country was making very good overall progress, leaving behind in every respect the countries of East European Bloc (countries of so-called "real socialism"), as well as other countries which, at the beginning of the 1950s, were at Yugoslavia's level of economic and cultural development.

All these factors contributed to the relatively high credibility and moral authority of the Yugoslav political leadership and its nucleus - the strata of "old fighters" (wartime political and military leaders). This is why it was possible to make a peaceful transformation from the party organization of an elitist type consisting of about 10,000 devoted professional revolutionaries to a "mass party" comprising more than 2 million party members, preserving at the same time a sufficient degree of ideological unity and internal party discipline.

But the strong position of the professional political ruling strata and its decisive influence on the political decision-making process (which accounts for the relative political stability still prevailing and for the continuity in normative evolution of the self-management systems) has gradually become one of the main obstacles in the way of the consistent implementation of projected democratic changes which could lead to the abolition of any monopoly in interest articulation and to real self-managed pluralism of interests.

Since 1950, developing system of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia has experienced a far-reaching revolution in all spheres of societal organization. This was a genuine revolution, but a revolution which was initiated and
directed from above. And, like all revolutions from above, revolutionary pro-
cesses in Yugoslavia generated serious contradictions concerning, first of all,
the present and future role of the political ruling strata in the system of
recognized and institutionalized pluralism of interests. In spite of its
firm pledge and commitment to the program of socialist self-management, this
strata has unavoidably developed interests of its own, connected with the
preservation of the existing power structure and the maintenance of its privi-
lege ruling position. From the point of view of the particular interests of
the party and state professionals, the ideology of self-management is, by its
consequences, an ideology of self-destruction. To put it quite simply: every
important practical step in the direction of the proclaimed long-term goals of
a fully developed self-management system capable of self-reproduction without
intervention of the State's compulsory political power must also contend with
the position of the party apparatus as long as it remains the most influential
part of the existing power structure. Thus, all radical requests and even
more modest measures in the direction of reducing and finally eliminating
bureaucratic paternalism over self-management relationships and institutions
provoke misgivings and spontaneous as well as conscious resistance inside the
powerful professional ruling strata, including a section of the party leader-
ship as well. Below the surface of formal ideological and political unity
there are often cleavages and conflicts of views and interests inside the
different bodies of state and party leadership that influence the decision-
making process and content of accepted solutions on many concrete issues. 7

It is worth mentioning that regardless of how sensitive they may be, pro-
blems of bureaucratization of the political system and of the revolutionary
party itself, have never been overlooked or ignored in Yugoslav political
theory and even in current political documents. This is certainly a very
important democratic heritage born from the bitter ideological struggle with Stalinism, which remains rejected by Yugoslav's as a total bureaucratic distortion and perversion of socialism both in theory and in practice.

In the almost 30 year old, and never altered or amended 1958 program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the danger of the bureaucratic degeneration of the Communist Party in power was strongly emphasized. This degeneration is, however, inescapable if the party is fulfilling its guiding role in building socialism, clinging primarily to the lever of state power and becoming itself in practice part of the state machinery of command and coercion. According to this program even the guiding role of party in directing the main course of social development is "historically determined" by laws of class struggle and confined to the "transitional period" from capitalism to communism. With the "withering away" of the state, the party, as a separate political organization will "wither away" as well.

But even more important than these general declarations and reconfirmations of theoretical concepts and beliefs, were some fundamental democratic preferences concerning the behavioral and political orientation of the party. Among these preferences, three seem to be most important:

(1) The organization and leadership of the League of Communists and the state machinery should be clearly separated from each other at all levels of political organization, from the top of the bottom. In the words of the program, "the party should exert its indispensable influence and leading political and ideological role less and less from the position of state power and more and more from inside self-management structures and by the democratic participation of party members of policy-making bodies, in workers' councils, assemblies, self-management interest communities and other social-political organization.
(2) The League of Communists does not claim a monopoly in articulating and implementing the genuine interests of the working class and of socialist development in general. Free expression and open struggle of different opinions and the autonomous role of the Socialist Alliance, trade unions, war veterans and youth organization and of other organizations and associations must be not only tolerated but actively supported by the party.

(3) Scientific research and development of both national and social sciences must not be subjected to any kind of outside political control. "Science is its own judge," states the party program.

In no period of its history has the party in power, including the League of Communists, quite lived up to the high democratic demands and standards of its own program. That does not mean, however, that the program of the League and programmatic declarations in the two last constitutions are fictitious with no bearings on social and political reality. Open criticism of bureaucratic distortions contained in these documents and warnings against the bureaucratization of the party itself, have served as a lasting source of critical consciousness inside the League of Communists and in the formation of political public opinion in general.8

During the whole period from 1958 up to now, many concrete measures have been taken in order to breech the existing gap between high goals and the requirements of the party program and the constitution on the one hand, and political reality on the other. The list of such measures is a long one. For the sake of illustration let us mention just a few of them:

(1) the request for the separation of executive functions in the League of Communists and in the government; the rule that the same person should not hold two executive functions at the same time;
(2) the constitutionally fixed separation of functions amongst social-political organizations; special duties and possibilities of the Socialist Alliance and trade unions in elections and in personnel policy in general;

(3) the gradual deprofessionalization of the leadership of the League of Communists and of the other social-political organizations;

(4) the limitations of the possibilities for the reelection for important political and public functions and strictly limited durations of such mandates;

(5) principles and rules of collective leadership (collective decision-making and collective responsibility); the regular rotation of persons in the leading positions (presidents and chairman of all political and governmental bodies);

(6) the political recommendation (but not the rule!) that there should be at least two or more candidates in the election for any office in government or in social-political organizations.

The energy and consistency in implementing all these measures aimed at fighting bureaucratization and insuring and promoting democratic pluralism in the political system have varied considerably from time to time and so have the results and effects achieved in practice. It is certainly of both theoretical interest and of practical relevance to dig deeper into the causes of the partial success in implementing the anti-bureaucratic measures listed above.

In the circumstances of prolonged economic crises and of more pronounced critical mood among party members, and in a large part of the population directly affected by inflation and unemployment, it becomes more difficult to hide or to tolerate obvious bureaucratic distortions in the political system and in the League of Communists itself. The credibility and prestige of
professional politicians was rather high in the past when President Tito was still alive, but it has declined considerably in the last few years.

The most popular political demands in Yugoslavia nowadays are not so much for further institutional changes in the normative structure of the economic and political system, and certainly not for the abandonment of fundamental self-management principles of social organization, but rather for radical changes in the personal composition of the professional political governing strata which has for so long monopolized key political positions in the government and in political life in general. This is exactly the change which is most difficult to achieve.9

The professional political ruling strata which has been in power for more than 40 years now is obviously neither willing nor prepared to give up its present position easily. During this long period the professional political leadership has developed a consciousness of its own interests. The ideological rationalization of these interests is the tendency to identify itself with the values and goals of socialist self-management. It has developed and mastered the technique of self-reproduction based on cooptation rather than on democratic free election in social political organizations and in general electoral processes.

In spite of all genuine democratic changes which have occurred in Yugoslav society during the last few decades, what has remained actually in tact is the monopoly of an "inner political circle" over "cadre policy", that is in recruitment of political personnel and in the distribution of political posts and functions. This monopoly is the main source of arbitrary bureaucratic power in Yugoslavia. Only by taking this into account could one explain why, behind the formal mechanism of self-management institutions and representative bodies relying on the broad net of elected delegations and delegates, an informal
structure of power has emerged which consists of narrow oligarchies or professional political leaders, that is, of individuals who are at the head of social-political organizations and in the main governmental bodies (the assemblies and executive bodies). Before self-managed democracy in Yugoslavia can make further genuine progress, it must include, first of all, a total reform of the electoral system at all levels of political organization.

Complex and extensive regulations and the formal institutionalization of a wide range of social relationships is certainly a common feature of almost all contemporary political systems. In Yugoslavia's case, this feature is especially pronounced and that is why it should be studied on a broad comparative level.

What are the causes and the motives of extensive and (one may say excessive) institutionalization of interest articulation, and what are its effects for the functioning of the political system and for the political influence of different social strata, as well as for the real distribution of political power? In studying Yugoslav political system one must not overlook this crucial question.

In my previous book on interests in politics, I tried to explore, in a more or less systemmatic way, the consequences of these extensive normative (state) regulations of interests and its feedback effect on the social interest structure in general. I intend now to continue this line of research using the results of recent research and theoretical thinking in this field of political science. The tendency to regulate in great detail vast areas of social life and development may have many concurrent causes which are at work simultaneously and therefore any one-sided approach may be misleading. In the Yugoslav case the following few factors seem to be of primary importance:
(1) Building consciously socialist self-management as a comprehensive system of societal organization, in accordance with a preconceived scheme derived from some general principles and theoretical concepts, calls for wide and systematic use of the legislative (normative power) of the state. Extensive use and abuse of this power is responsible for broadening the gap between an imposed normative structure of societal organization and the real relationships which this legal structure was intended to reflect and to shape.

(2) When the remoteness of legislative projections from social reality reaches a certain level, legal norms and regulations tend to lose their initial function. Instead of being instruments for stimulating and supporting social changes in a desired direction, they become obstacles to real change. The normative order is transformed into a more or less complete system of normative myths covering and hiding existing reality and genuine progressive interests of socialist forces. In this way room for more or less spontaneous democratic initiatives and actions might be considerably narrowed and, conversely, the space for bureaucratic ideological manipulation might be broadened.

At the present stage of Yugoslav development, all these problems and dilemmas of excessive normative and formal institutionalization are salient. In such circumstances the role of social sciences and especially of political science, might be of great importance. Empirically based research of the problems mentioned above could help to draw the necessary dividing line between social projects based on the sober assessment of real development possibilities, and unfounded social utopias. In this epoch, when social planning of future development has been indispensable, only objective scientific research can provide the necessary intellectual weapons for fighting successfully against "bureaucratic voluntarism."
(3) The pluralistic nature of the Yugoslav political system is a direct consequence of the self-management transformation which has taken place in the economic as well as in all other fields of the social life of the country. This type of pluralism (self-management pluralism of interest as it is named in Yugoslav theory) has some very specific features but shares at the same time the main characteristics and problems common to all contemporary truly pluralistic political systems.

One such very complex and urgent problem, shared with the other political systems, is so-called problem of "governability".11 This problem has become very prominent and pressing in the last few years when weaknesses and short-comings in the functioning of the political system, especially dealing with economic crises, came to the surface in a very prominent form. By initiating the abolition of the state-ownership monopoly of the means of production, abandonment of central administrative planning, and the dissolution of big trusts and corporations into which publicly-owned enterprises had been integrated in accordance with organization schemes prescribed from above, self-management has set the scene for the genuine revolution in the sphere of interest articulation. These changes, at the macro level of societal organization, have been coupled at the micro level by abolishing the hierarchical structure of authority inside individual economic enterprises, and then also inside all other units of social and political organization, including, to some extent at least, the administrative apparatus of the state authority. In different ways and to different degrees numerous socialist subjects were given, or at least promised, possibilities for free expression and the pursuit of their particular interests. This has injected tremendous new dynamism and mobility into the economic and political life of the country. The liberation of economic and social forces from the rigid administrative constraints of bureaucratic centralism
provides at least part of the explanation for exceptionally dynamic industrial expansion and very high rates of economic growth in the 1950s and beginning of 1960s. But this same process of reconstruction and liberation of the entire structure of interest articulation imposed on the political system, on the "system of authoritative allocation of values", to use the definition of David Easton, enormous pressures of different mutually conflicting social aspirations and demands. Thus, a disproportion was created between now very vocal expectations and demands, on one hand, and of still very limited resources for their satisfaction, on the other hand. This situation threatened to overload the newly introduced democratic system of political decision-making through direct participation and through the channels of delegate assemblies. The system was indeed overloaded far beyond its capacities for effective reconciliation and satisfaction of opposing interests, and was in danger of paralysis and collapse.

To understand the size and complexity of all these problems one must take into account that in spite of strong cohesive factors developed during the national liberation war and the revolution and strengthened by the recognized need to stand together in defense of the common freedom and independence of each of the six Yugoslav nations, Yugoslav society is still, in many respects, heterogenous and interests are divided along many lines. This refers to the inherited striking differences in the level of economic development of different parts of the country, to differences and variations in language and culture, and to religious cleavages which were important in the past and still continue to play an active role in linking different parts of Yugoslavia to different international religious (and political) centers. And last, but certainly not least, the Yugoslav federal community consists of six nations which are in many respects closely interrelated and ethnically and culturally akin to each other,
but which have, at the same time, developed a sense and consciousness of separate national identity.

The importance of the role of the nation building process in the modern history of the Balkan area and the extent to which the national question influenced and determined the course and nature of the Yugoslav socialist revolution should not be underestimated. Unexpectedly important chapters of this history have been written over the 35 years of the self-management system, ones which contradict the widely accepted belief that the "national question" in Yugoslavia had been settled once and for all during the national liberation war and the revolution. This reality has been reflected in far-reaching changes in the organization and actual functioning of the Yugoslav federation and in the respective constitutional changes in 1963, in constitutional amendments in the period 1967 to 1971, and in the new constitution of 1974. In accordance with the recommendations of a special commission whose task it was to examine the practical functioning of the political system, some new changes in the constitution are again on the political agenda.

Judging by all relevant criteria concerning specific features of its heritage, Yugoslavia represents a very complex interest-structure, and should therefore be classified as a "plural society". There is sufficient ground for the conclusion, in other words, that the objective complexity of interest structure and the comparatively low level of economic integration already achieved, combined with far-reaching decentralization entailed in the system of self-management, all push in the direction of more and more extensive and detailed institutionalization and legislative regulation of the economic and political system.

A third factor deserving special attention in studying problems of excessive institutionalization are the changes which a comprehensive system of self-
management provokes inside the political leadership, within its own interest structure, outlooks, and patterns of behavior. Ideological pledges to the long-term interests of the working class and to the general strategy of self-managed transformation in both the economic and political sphere, on one hand, and an immediate self-interest to preserve their own privileged and dominant position, on the other hand, bring about internal differentiation and fractionalization within the political ruling strata. This in turn considerably determines the real content of social change - content quite different from the proclaimed goals of "strengthening the dominant economic and political position of the people in associated labor." (i.e., the workers producing with publicly-owned means of production).

Due to these circumstances, radical changes in the entire structure of the federal state machinery, and especially the strict limitations of its power to play any independent role in the redistribution of national income and allocation of means for new investment, did not mean any direct transfer of this power to self-managed enterprises, but rather the appropriation of these functions by the lower federal units, i.e., the republics and autonomous provinces.15

From the standpoint of the professional political ruling strata an all-embracing system of legislative regulation and formal institutionalization of a wide range of social relationships may be considered and treated as indispensable ruling instruments which serve several purposes:

(1) It makes it possible for actual power-holders to install new normative patterns of social organization, to sustain them, and to keep them formally in operation in spite of adverse external circumstances;

(2) It enables the political ruling strata to extend their direct and indirect control over different fields of social life and activity and, in
that way, to increase the "governability" of the system for their own interests;

(3) It may help to keep in check interest-conflicts within the ruling strata and ensure the necessary balance among opposite factions so that none of them can impose its own domination;

(4) The very operation of the system of rigid and excessive institutionalization of partial interests tends to reproduce and perpetuate the strong and dominating position of the forces and institutions performing intermediary functions in the process of interest articulation and aggregation. The other side of the same coin, however, is the growing dependence of the working masses on legal regulations by which they are "protected" from those who are in the position to prescribe and to implement the "rules of the game."

Regardless of how democratic it may appear, an all-embracing mechanism of interest articulation and satisfaction, prescribed and imposed from above, tends to become a new source of arbitrary (bureaucratic) power and a possible seed-bed for the restoration of some new forms of client-patron relations. In a critical examination of the political system at the present stage of its development, as well as in building a strategy for the future, an awareness of the constant dangers of bureaucratic distortions of self-management concepts and institutions is certainly of great importance.

A careful retrospective look at the history of the self-management system in Yugoslavia will show, beyond any doubt, that some elements of authoritarian corporatism have penetrated the system especially in the more recent stages of its development. In the relevant political discussions and confrontations between views which determined the direction and content of successive reforms of constitutional and of legal systems in general, the interests and aspirations of the political bureaucracy were always present and influential. But they appeared, as a rule, under ideological disguise and even those who
articulated them were often unaware of the broader meanings and consequences. Many measures produced, therefore, in the long run, consequences which were neither expected nor desired. And still some of these consequences have considerable and lasting effects.¹⁶

Whatever may be its specific causes in Yugoslavia's case, the revival of corporatism in different forms and dimensions is obviously a worldwide phenomenon both in theoretical/political thinking and in political practice.¹⁷ This becomes particularly evident if one accepts the broader meaning of corporatism, not as a closed global system of economic and political organization of state and society, but as a complex of different, more or less interconnected attempts and spontaneously born practices of organizing and regulating interest articulation and aggregation with an active regulative role for the state, as a "partner" and/or arbiter. If taken in this latter sense, corporatism (or rather some form of it or some elements of it) could be easily discovered in almost all types of contemporary societies, in developing as well as in developed countries, and in oligarchies as well as in different types of authoritarian regimes. Numerous studies of this problem point out that, apart from the partly dubious origins of corporatist thinking and practices, there are also new ones connected directly with the conditions of life and political needs of contemporary societies.¹⁸

The great complexities of these societies' (class) structures, the new types and new dimensions of pluralism which have emerged, the broadened possibilities and increased demands for political participation by individual citizens and organized interest groups, the pressing problems of "governability" (of efficient government) and the conditions which increase the number of politically independent "plural societies" and new patterns of democratic organization—all require broader use and application of "consensual" or "co-associational" forms of democratic organization. Thus, all these factors may account for the revival
of corporatist concepts and practices and for the different types and different developmental tendencies of corporatism which coexist today.

For a country which faces all the problems of a rigid and very complex system of interest regulations by legislative and political means (and that is the case of Yugoslavia), knowledge accumulated by comparative theoretical studies and empirical research of modern corporatism is certainly relevant and useful. This knowledge helps in avoiding the pitfalls of "creeping authoritarian corporatism", and in waging more successfully unavoidable war against "bureaucratic paternalism",¹⁹ which has already become the main obstacle on the road to genuine democratization of the political system of socialist self-management.²⁰

Some well-known experts in the field of comparative government are inclined to view elements of corporatism in modern political systems as a middle-of-the-road position between the two extremes - between highly centralized authoritarian (or totalitarian) state control of all channels of interest articulation and aggregation, on one hand, and completely free untamed competition and confrontation of interests of a laissez faire type, on the other. Gabriel Almond has put it well:

All differentiated societies and political systems are pluralistic in some measure and form and vary in the extent of integration and decentralization of control. . . . Thus, corporatism is a variety of pluralism - to be distinguished from a more disaggregated competitive variety of pluralism at one extreme to a state-controlled variety at the other.²¹

From the perspective of the countries trying to achieve a transition from the party-state monolithism to the pluralism of interests appropriate to fully developed self-management, the elements of corporatism built in the existing political system should also be considered and treated not as a lasting state of affairs, which is only to be defended and preserved, but as a transitional
one which must be surpassed if socialist self-management is to become a truly democratic global system of societal organization. But one thing is indispensible in order to achieve this goal. That is the fully developed critical consciousness and active critical attitude of the leading political forces in the country toward the existing over-institutionalization and over-regulation of structures of interest articulation and aggregation. I would like to believe that comparative scientific studies of all these problems may make an important positive contribution in this respect.

Only in the last 10-15 years have some serious attempts been made to overcome regionalism and Western-centrism in comparative studies of polities and to apply on a broader scale the modern concepts of political analysis and of interest group theories and research methods first developed in American political science. For a broader insight into these problems and respective discussions and controversies see the article by H.G. Skilling "Interest groups and Communist politics Revisited," in World Politics (October 1983): 1.

As an example of these critiques one could quote an interesting article by E. Gene DeFelice:

"If comparative researchers mistakenly restrict their causal inferences to hypotheses that can be tested only among similar countries, they will have needlessly abandoned hypotheses that can be tested - just as well - by comparing countries that are different. Worse yet, a restriction to similar cases precludes the use of a considerably more powerful explanatory approach, the use of not only the strategy employing similar and dissimilar cases jointly, but also the method of cconcommitent variation, which permits causal inferences to be drawn from quantitatives information." (Comparative Political Studies, volume 19, number 3/October 1986, p. 416).

It is by no means accidental that one of the most serious accusations against the Yugoslav political practices cited in the Stalin/Molotov letter to the Yugoslav Leadership in 1948, was the statement that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been submerged in the Popular Front - the organization without clear class character and that, because of this, the party has lost its leading role.

The most influential Yugoslav theoretician and "the main architect" of the system of socialist self-management, the late Edvard Kardelj, these problems in his well-known book, Contradictions of Social Ownership in Contemporary Socialist Practice, 1976. Although Kardelj considers self-management agreements and social compacts as important tools in building socialist relationships, at the same time he stresses the importance of direct free market exchange as an instrumental factor in defending the autonomy of self-management enterprises against bureaucratic interference. "Direct free market exchange of goods was intended to broaden the dimensions of freedom of the worker and of the working collective in their labor. Because that exchange by itself is one of the yardsticks of productivity of labor, quality of goods, of concertation of production and social needs, of rentability of investment, economy of labor and so on . . . . Abolition of the market cannot be the matter of state inactments. Because of such arbitrary decision objective economic laws express themselves in some other, usually destructive forms, that is in forms which inhibit the development of productive forces." Edvard Kardelj, "Protivurecnosti drustvene svojine u savremenoj Socijalistickoj Praksi" (Beograd, 1976) 2nd Edition, pp. 86-87.
These problems about the role of the market seem to be of crucial importance for all countries where private ownership of the means of production has been eliminated or reduced to marginal size. The lack of competition and of possibilities for expression of plurality of interests in the economic sphere emerges as a main obstacle for liberalization and democratization of relationships in politics and in all other spheres of social life.

Problems of interdependence between economic and political reforms attract more and more attention. An interesting contribution to the understanding of these problems is contained in the essay by Professor Wlodzimierz Brus, "Political Pluralism and Markets in Communist Systems," in Pluralism in the Soviet-Union, ed. Susan Gross Solomon (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 119-29.

According to Professor Brus, "None of the existing communist polities, including Yugoslavia is classified by Lindblom as polyarchic, although the Yugoslav economy (and perhaps Hungary) is counted among the market oriented ones. If we accepted this view, would not our investigation be redundant from the very outset? I think not, because what we are looking for are dynamic tendencies influenced by factors that can be necessary but still insufficient. Differences over time and between individual countries deserve an examination in this context. There has been a significant extension of personal liberties in Yugoslavia parallel to the first steps towards market socialism in the 1950s and some writers claim that such a parallel development continued in the process of marketization of the Yugoslav economy. Hungary does not yet provide adequate evidence for comparisons over time, although it is often said to be relatively more liberal than most of its marketized partners in the Soviet bloc." . . . "the general conclusion therefore must be that the effects of marketization of the economy for the pluralization of the polity are in the last resort determined by the scope and outcome of political struggles."

A small body of literature has emerged from a few East European political scientists who have tried in recent years to deal with problems of the real meaning of public (state) ownership in terms of distribution of power in their respective countries or the countries of "real socialism" in general. Books by Professor Rudolf Bahro, The Alternative, and Dictatorship over Needs, by Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller and Gyorgy Markus deserve special attention. In the latter book the authors treat and explain state ownership as a specific corporative ownership of state/party bureaucracy. One should mention also the joint work by Professors George Conrad and Ivan Szelenyi. These books are inspiring and useful in comparative political studies. Reading them helps, for instance, in grasping, more sharply, the similarities and dissimilarities between political systems of East European countries and that of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia.

These sources of legitimation of the new revolutionary power structure, or rather the claim of the guiding political role and position of the League of Communists (Legitimation based on previous achievements and on the broadly accepted ideology of self management), has played a very important role in recent Yugoslav history. This has become obvious at those times when social and political development reaches a kind of historical crossroad or when a way out of a crisis is sought and far reaching choices have to be made. The slogan that "we have proved in the past to be capable of overcoming even greater difficulties than those we face now" could be very effective, at least for a while, in keeping public morale sufficiently high.

Bogdan Denitch has elaborated on this conflict between the real and the ideal. "However, the institution of self-management in Yugoslavia had as a direct consequence the development of self-management as the unifying social myth of the society analogous to such broad terms in Western politics as "democracy". I stress the analogy because of course in the advanced western polities, although a great emphasis is placed on the ideal of democracy, there is a continual criticism of the gap between the real and the ideal. Similarly, in Yugoslavia much of the criticism of the system is expressed in terms of the norms of the system itself. This is one of the marks of the legitimation of a new norm, for it is evidence that even most of the critics of the system take for granted the value of the norms, that is the rule of the game, and thus concentrate their criticism or what they perceive as the inadequacies of implementation." Bogdan Denitch, The Legitimation of the Revolution: The Yugoslav case (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 192-93.

This may be best observed during the long deliberations inside such bodies as the constitutional commission and its numerous committees and sub-committees, and expert groups which are in charge of preparing blueprints and drafts of intended changes in basic laws and in the constitution itself. At the Federal level such bodies are composed of an equal number of representatives from republics and autonomous provinces who are actually appointed by the respective authorities of these federal units. All main deliberations take place behind closed doors and the results are made public only when a unanimous agreement is formally reached. Therefore, the outcome reflects, by necessity, the real relationship of forces and existing cleavages inside the political leadership, and contains many compromises and inconsistencies which become obvious only when accepted solutions are applied in practice. However, all this is covered by the stubbornly guarded appearance of ideological unity and constant reference to the proclaimed general goals and values of socialist self-government. Therefore, every successive normative change in the economic and political system, regardless of its real content and meaning, is explained and justified as a new step on the same strategic line of self-management's development.
It is good to keep in mind the remark by Professor Robert Dahl about the binding power of ideology in regard to political leaders. "Despite appearances to the contrary, leaders cannot arbitrarily invent and manipulate a reigning ideology, for once a political ideology is widely accepted in a political system, the leaders too become its prisoners, for they run the risk of undermining their own legitimacy if they violate its norms." Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1976, p. 62.

Writing about far reaching democratic reforms in the Yugoslav political system April Carter points out that little has been achieved, however, in adapting the role and organization of the League of Communists to the request of genuine pluralism; "The Yugoslav League did in the 1960's wholly abandon the Stalinist model of 'monolithic unity.' But it did not take more than tentative steps towards real choice in Party elections, and despite formal encouragement for greater participation at all levels, in practice power at both commune and republican levels seems to have been retained by small groups. . . . The decentralization of power in Yugoslavia to both republics and communes does not provide a form of pluralism and creates openings for popular pressure to affect policies. There is a real danger, often illustrated in the past thirty years, of local and republican interests being pressed to the detriment of a broader common good. But given the impossibility of pluralism of parties, and the difficulties of asserting interest group pluralism against the party on the Polish model, acceptance of a regional pluralism may in the long run ensure a degree of genuine democracy and freedom within a stable framework." April Carter, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 245-258.

In his often quoted political essay "The Civil War in France" where he tried to draw conclusions about the future political state organization of a socialist society on the basis of the experience and practices of the short lived Commune of Paris, Karl Marx warned explicitly against the temptation to use just-conquered political power for imposing on the given society a preconceived, ready-made political utopia. The task of historic, revolutionary forces, so he argued, should be to free and put in motion objective tendencies of social change and not to force existing forms of economic and social life into the straight jacket of voluntaristic ideological constructions which would only cripple the real forces and possibilities of revolutionary changes. The history of successful socialist revolutions in this century has testified, however, that none of them have been capable of resisting the temptation to overstretch and abuse the legislative power of the state in order to achieve a shortcut transition to a completely new socialist order of fully developed socialism or communism. Sooner or later each one has tried to wage a most costly and wasteful war against objective laws and the regularities inherent in modern industrial production, such as market exchanges in this or that form and size and importance of money-goods relationships.
It seems that the "problems of governability or ungovernability" have tended to become one of the big topics in recent comparative political studies. There is more and more empirical evidence suggesting that in various concrete forms, these problems have been relevant in all types of contemporary political systems. Three well known authors have studied the case of developed, truly pluralist, western types of democracies. One of the main causes for this "ungovernability" is the "overload" on government because of the democratic "expansion of political participation and involvement" on the one side and the imbalanced expansion of governmental activities on the other side. For more on this see Michel Crozier, The Stalled Society (New York: The Viking Press, 1973) and Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

In considering the "National Question" in the contemporary Yugoslav context, the "historical dimension" is very important. The achievements and the failures of the Yugoslav Communists in "finding solutions" for the national problem could not be adequately assessed if this dimension is not taken properly into account. For an elaboration of this problem see Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

In my book National Question in the Contemporary Epoch (Belgrade, 1973) I have dealt also with the historical dimension of the National question in Yugoslavia. If Western Europe was the cradle of the modern nation state, then the Balkans were part of Europe where the nation building processes were the slowest and most complicated. That is why the national question has played such an important role in all of Yugoslav social and political development.

In an interesting and provocative paper at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (Washington, D. C. Oct. 16, 1982) Professor Fred Warner-Neil contended that Yugoslav political leadership was for a long time reluctant to admit that the "National Question" remains an important problem for Yugoslavia, regardless of the federal formula proclaimed and implied during the national liberation war and in the first Yugoslav postwar constitution (1946). Only under the pressure of actual events have Yugoslav attitudes been changed and hence far-reaching reforms in the structure of Yugoslav federalism introduced, first by constitutional amendments in the period 1967-71, and then by the new constitution of 1974. (See Fred Warner-Neil "Yugoslav approach to the Nationalities Problems: Politics of Circumvention," East European Quarterly, No. 3 (Sept. 1984): 327-334.

It seems that some facts speak in favor of Professor Neil's thesis. In a comparatively short span of time the Yugoslav federation has passed a long way from the very centralized type of federation at the beginning of the self-management era (constitutional law of 1953) to the very decentralized type ordained by the new Constitution of 1974. At the beginning of that evolution, in 1953, Yugoslavia was the only federation in the world which did not have in its federal parliament a separate council representing federal units. (Former Council of Nationalities was incorporated in the Federal Council). Twenty years later, in accordance with the 1974 Constitution Yugoslavia, became the only federation in the world without a separate council proportionally representing citizens (or self-managing workers) at large.
Relying on some earlier works of Stein Rokkan, Hans Daalder, and Robert Dahl, a new concept of "plural societies" has been developed and much used in comparative political systems research. In his recent book Professor Arend Lijphart has made a significant contribution to the elaboration and application of these concepts.

Obviously problems and dilemmas of democracy in contemporary societies could not be studied "in abstracto". In the last half of this century the number of independent states [judging by United Nations membership] has been more than doubled. The great majority of these "new countries" are at a much lower level of internal integration and are much less homogenous than the industrialized Western societies where a classical types of pluralist representative democracies gradually developed. The different types of class structure, the different nature of interest conflicts and cleavages in plural societies where the inherited segmental division is predominant and cross-cutting broader interests could not be expressed directly - all this imposes a search for new forms of democracy better suited to the described social reality of pluralist societies. Starting from these premises, Arend Liejhardt proposes the two basic models of democracy: majoritarian ("Westminster") and consensual. Some characteristics and specific features of consensual or conassociational democracy, especially the mutual veto or "concurrent majority" rule, shared executive power structures, proportionality in civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs and so on, are very prominent in the Yugoslav political system as well. This provides a very good ground for comparison with political systems and practical experiences of a number of developed and developing societies. Such comparisons have not been made yet in a broader and systematic way although they could be, in my opinion, very useful in analyzing and evaluating the Yugoslav model and experiences. See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, and by the same author, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 21 Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

It turned out that one of the most effective ways in which sections of professional ruling strata could retain their decisive influence on the political decision-making process was to appropriate for themselves a monopolistic position in articulating and interpreting separate interests of different national communities, or more concretely, of different units which are at least partly based on national principles. Ideological justification of these aspirations of political leadership of republics and autonomous provinces has been sought in the alleged unity of the working class and national interest. In accordance with Marxian theory, when alienation of the surplus value from the workers is abolised, national and class interests tend to coincide and to become practically identical. It is not by chance that topics about alleged unity of national and class interests have become one of the most discussed subjects not only in political debates but also in the current production in political science, sociology, and history during the last 10 to 15 years. Many books have been written dealing with this subject, and year by year conferences and symposia are organized by scientific associations and universities devoted to this or that aspect of the same problem. Needless to say, interpretations of national interests given by representatives of professional ruling strata bear easily visible imprints of their own interests and aspirations.
15 (continued)

... to strengthen their control over the territory under their jurisdiction. That explains why territorial interests are overemphasized at the expense of functional interests and why instead of free self-management integration, which is a vital interest of the working class, these autarchic tendencies prevail.

16 As a very good example of such a situation one could invoke the case of amendment 15 to 1963 constitution, now almost completely forgotten. In 1967-68 the first 19 amendments were adopted, all of them aiming at far-reaching reconstruction of the federal state machinery in favor of republics and autonomous provinces. The only exception to this was the unfortunate amendment 15. In order to strengthen the autonomy of the self-managed enterprises from the administrative machinery of the state and its numerous regulations and enactments and to enhance generally the position of the enterprises as independent commodity producers for the market, this amendment has given to the collective of employees in each enterprise the right of self-organization. The amendment prescribes only that in each enterprise a workers' council has to be elected by the secret vote of all employees and that the council so elected will be the highest decision-making body. All other questions concerning internal organization of enterprise and further divisions of competencies and responsibilities were left to be settled by internal regulations. As self-managers, workers were in a position to decide for themselves which forms of internal organization would best suit their need for rational and efficient organization of their own work and insure in that way the optimal income for the enterprise and for them personally. But first results of the application of this amendment provoked anxiety and even alarm in some influential political circles. In many cases workers were inclined to accept such forms of organization which gave a free hand to professional management in business policy and daily conduct of the productive process. This was labeled immediately as technocratic usurpation of power at the expense of self-management and even as a "technocratic counter revolution". Spurred by some outstanding political leaders trade unions organized campaigns against these distortions. A couple of years later amendment 15 was abolished and replaced by new provisions in the Constitution and the Law of Associated Labor. Internal organizational structure in the enterprises and in all other self-managed institutions were regulated in every small detail. For every decision, concerning so-called inalienable self-management rights, special decision-making procedures were introduced including the obligatory consensus of all relevant political organizations of associated labor. Special new institutions (social attorneys of self-management and Courts of Associated Labor) were created and given the task to control, supervise and enforce daily applications of all these regulations. Thus, workers, as self-managers, became over-protected and then over-dependent.

17 The literature on general concepts, history and different facets of corporatism has become quite abundant in recent years. For a general outlook, meaning and definition of modern corporatism note contributions by Philippe C. Schmitter (in particular "Still the Century of Corporatism?", Review of Politics (Jan. 1974): 85-131; and Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making, Gerhard Lechnbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., (London, 1982).
For a short but very insightful history of corporatism see also Carl Landover, Corporate State Ideologies (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1983).


Therefore it is not justified to ignore or reject in advance interesting "food for thought" offered by one quickly expanding branch of comparative political studies just because the term itself may recall bad memories of Mussolini's Fascist corporative state, or because we do not want to mix in any way the theory and practice of Socialist self-management with other ideological concepts and schools of thought. In different times and in different historical circumstances, corporatism, generally speaking, meant many different things. It was, to be certain, predominantly "the voice of the past", the voice of nostalgia for the old feudal world collapsing and disappearing in the inevitable historical collision with new capitalist society. Yet criticism of some aspects of the Laissez-Faire economy and of ideological illusions and deceptions of formal representative democracy has preserved its relevance and its vigor and many progressive thinkers of the last century and of our age have borrowed much from this source of intellectual inspiration.