PREVENTING THE SPILLOVER OF DOMESTIC CRISSES INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: NEW THINKING FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Corneliu Bogdan

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE’S CRISIS

The internationalization of domestic politics has become one of the main features of international life today. Preventing the spillover of domestic crises into the international arena, taking advantage of domestic developments to strengthen international cooperation without undue interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, has become a major concern for statesmen and a topical issue of scholarly inquiry.

Eastern Europe is one of the best cases in point, as it is experiencing some of the fastest social changes in Europe and perhaps anywhere in the world. This state of affairs creates both opportunities and dangers for peace, freedom, and cooperation in Europe and worldwide. On the one hand, there now exists a genuine chance to remove one of the main sources of instability and insecurity in Europe by transforming Eastern Europe from an object of competition between the major powers into an active and valuable actor in European and world politics. On the other hand, it is equally likely that the East European domestic crises will get out of control and spill out into the international arena, with unpredictable consequences.

What can the international community do to avoid or minimize these dangers and to take advantage of these opportunities?

I only have two caveats: First, there is no international substitute for domestic efforts which remain decisive. Second, although the international environment does play an important role, which in certain circumstances may tilt the balance, there exists no fool-proof formula.

What is, now, the international dimension of the East European situation? The conventional wisdom has it that Soviet-East European relations represent the international factor affecting the fate of the nations in the region. This is no doubt true. But we must not forget that there are other increasingly important components of the international dimension of East European issues: (1) The contradictions among the various East European countries, some new, some old, which were
muted during the period of quasi-total Soviet predominance; and
(2) Eastern Europe's relations with the rest of the world and
especially with the United States and Western Europe. These
factors, although they are independent of one another and have
their own dynamics, are never compartmentalized: they interact.
At the same time, we must consider the impact of the past on the
present, the fact that the division of Europe began sixteen
hundred years ago, with the division of the Roman Empire under
Diocletian, and continued with the schism in the Christian
church. The borderline marking those divisions is strikingly
similar, and both of them are close to the line dividing Europe
politically and militarily today.¹

At the same time, during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, Eastern Europe (roughly east of the Elbe) experienced
a decline and found itself in a subordinate economic position
vis-à-vis the West. This status was set and perpetuated in the
seventeenth century. This division continues to have an impact
today: apart from the East-West division of the continent, there
is also a North-South dimension.² Eastern Europe is thus a pawn
in the big powers' struggle for spheres of influence.

The Soviet Factor
Against this background, we can now turn to the Soviet
factor in Eastern Europe. It is generally agreed that the
constraints imposed on Eastern Europe by the competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union and the imposition of a
Soviet sphere of influence in the area lie at the origin of the
present East European crisis and, for that matter, of the Cold
War. Even Soviet scholars are indirectly coming to a similar
conclusion. A paper prepared by the Moscow Institute of
Economics of the World Socialist System for an American-Soviet
conference on "The place and the role of Eastern Europe in the
relaxation of tensions between the USA and the USSR" (Alexandria,
Virginia, July 6-8, 1988) read: "The administrative-state model
of socialism, established in the majority of East European
countries during the 1950's under the influence of the Soviet
Union, has not withstood the test of time, thereby showing its
socio-political and economic inefficiency";³ and, further,
"major deformations of socialism in East European countries,
major mistakes in their internal policies, together with the
hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet leadership of that period,
were among the main reasons for the deep political crises in
Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1956,
1970 and 1980. These crises acquired an international dimension
and seriously tested military and political stability in Europe.
The negative distortions in the domestic policies of the
socialist countries and in the system of relations among them are
being felt even today."⁴

The most troublesome aspect of the Soviet sphere of
influence in Eastern Europe has been its ideological component,
the Soviet Union's presumption that it had the right to intervene, by force if necessary, in a socialist country if it decided unilaterally that socialism was being threatened there (the Brezhnev Doctrine). It follows from this that the first international prerequisite for a constructive resolution of East European crises is the creation of an environment in Europe capable of moderating and eventually eliminating the constraints imposed by the existence of the Soviet sphere of influence and the superpowers' competition in Eastern Europe.

It is fair to say that in the past meaningful movement has been made in this direction. Credit should go first to the nations of Eastern Europe themselves, who obtained significant advances in what Ferenc Feher called "Eastern Europe's long revolution against Yalta." But this refers mostly to domestic developments which are beyond the scope of this study. Returning to the international factors underlying the positive trends emerging in Eastern Europe, one should first acknowledge the improvement in Soviet-American and East-West relations in general. In this context, the two superpowers' positions on Eastern Europe have become, in different degrees, more flexible and more sophisticated.

The key factor which has radically changed the situation in Eastern Europe is the shift which transformed Moscow from the bulwark of conservatism into a center of reform in the socialist world. Gorbachev's regime may be the first Soviet regime, as Richard Ullman put it, "secure enough in its own domestic standing not to feel threatened by questions about the legitimacy of regimes in Eastern Europe." Particularly important are Soviet pronouncements favoring all-human values over class interests, the de-ideologization of international relations, and extensive diversity in the socialist world. In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Gorbachev came very close to denouncing the Brezhnev Doctrine: "Freedom of choice," he said, "is a universal principle to which there should be no exceptions... The increasing varieties of social developments in different countries are becoming an ever more perceptible feature of these processes. This relates to both the capitalist and socialist systems."

Soviet scholars, senior advisors to the Soviet leadership, have gone further. Academician Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Alexandria conference mentioned earlier, said: "Everyone has to follow very strictly the principles of sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect. The Brezhnev Doctrine is completely unacceptable and unthinkable.... We gave too much advice before to our partners, and it was actually very damaging to them. It's time to keep our advice to ourselves. We cannot take responsibilities for all of Stalin's mistakes, [but] we are responsible to change our performance now." Such statements are important and have already had a powerful impact.
in Eastern Europe. It is evident that the East European nations have greater freedom of maneuver now than at any time since World War II, and the East European leaderships are quite often criticized in their own countries for not taking full advantage of the new liberties.

Yet the ambiguities and uncertainties of the Soviet position have not disappeared. The insistence of the Soviet Union on restructuring the economic cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is bound -- if it succeeds--to have positive effects. But it could also indicate Moscow's intention to use its considerable economic leverage in Eastern Europe to maintain and strengthen its influence there. This may create new tensions between the Soviet Union and the other members of the CMEA.

Even more significant is the current Soviet position on the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The treatment of its twentieth anniversary in official Soviet statements and in the media was closer to the old than to the new thinking. It is understandable that the Soviet leaders are very cautious especially in an area as sensitive as Eastern Europe. But, at the same time, if we want to remain realistic we must assume that another reason for Moscow's ambiguity on the Prague Spring stems from its desire to retain the option of a bottom line in the amount of freedom to be allowed in Eastern Europe. No one, probably not even the Soviet leaders (quite possibly they were not able to agree on this matter among themselves), knows when and where to draw this bottom line. I agree with Timothy Garton Ash that at least at this stage of the developments in Eastern Europe "this question can only be answered in practice."9

It can be safely assumed, however, that the Soviets would prefer to put off answering this question indefinitely and that at least the present leadership would be prepared to go very far to put it off. Ken Jowitt has a different interpretation: "support by East European regimes, the dependence of East European regimes and the adoption by East European regimes of Soviet institutional features remains a vital component of the Soviet leadership's conception of itself as a European political and ideological, not simply military and economic force.... The Soviet emphasis on the 'eastern part of Europe' may well intensify in response to a Soviet apprehension that the growth of its international power which began with non-European Outer Mongolia may end with non-European Afghanistan.... This line of reasoning suggests that Gorbachev leadership's commitment to Eastern Europe will be exceptionally strong."10 I also share Ullman's view that "so long as domestic change in Eastern Europe appears peaceful and does not threaten the formal structure of East-West alliance relationships it seems likely that Gorbachev will accept substantial deviations from the Eastern bloc's norms."11
What does the Soviet Union expect from the international community, from the United States in particular, in regard to Eastern Europe? We read in the already quoted paper from the Moscow Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System: "In today's era of growing interdependence, no region, and especially not Eastern Europe, should be the arena of interstate rivalry of the two systems, of the two great powers, the USA and the USSR. After all, in Eastern Europe -- as in all of Europe--their basic interests coincide, regardless of the acuteness of the contradictions existing between them. The confluence of interests derives above all from the need to prevent conflictual processes in international affairs to maintain stability, and to strengthen international security."12

How can Eastern Europe be taken out of the Soviet-American competition? The Soviets answer: by pursuing, regardless of the crisis, the progress of East-West, American-Soviet relations, "in rendering assistance to East European countries that find themselves in difficult straits."13 They mention the "obsolete stereotype of a bipolar evaluation of global politics," and passing references are made to the "all European process." But by and large the paper, one of the few recent elaborate presentations of Soviet viewpoints on Eastern Europe, leans heavily toward the bilateral approach. No more bilateral rivalry in Eastern Europe, but still bilateral, Soviet-American, cooperation to help the East Europeans.

The Western Response

It should be mentioned at the beginning that while for the Soviet Union Eastern Europe has always been a priority, for the United States and the West in general it has remained a secondary issue of importance only during international crises or electoral campaigns. As a rule, it is considered in the context of relations with the Soviet Union, in subordination to these relations, or as a pawn in the American-Soviet competition in Europe and around the world. The obvious exception has been the Federal Republic of Germany, but even it has given priority to its relations with the Soviet Union.

Turning to the substance of Western policies toward Eastern Europe, perhaps the most succinct definition is Lincoln Gordon's. He distinguishes three time frames: long-term aspirations or ultimate objectives, medium-term operational objectives, and short-term specific measures. We are concerned here primarily with the first two. "At the level of long-term aims and aspirations, the policies of all Western countries generally converge upon the objective of lightening the Soviet yoke in Eastern Europe, securing for the peoples more freedoms and better conditions of living. Full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act would make a good beginning. Ultimately but very remotely, movement in that direction would seem to be some kind of
finlandization or austrianization -- in effect a peaceful
detachment of Eastern Europe from Soviet political control."14

Turning to the medium-term operational objectives, there are
significant differences among and within the Western powers.
Gordon analyzes these differences in terms of a spectrum of
approaches "running from accommodation to Soviet control through
transformation of Soviet control to dissolution of Soviet
control." These "are not mutually exclusive policy options, but
points along a spectrum that also permits intermediate
positions."15 His conclusion is that "the consistent main line
of U.S. policy since 1956 has been in the middle of the spectrum,
that is, transformationist. Most of the dissenters in Washington
have leaned toward some aspects of dissolution, so the American
position might be described as transformation-plus. In Western
Europe, however, although prevailing policies have also aimed
broadly at transformations, there is far greater support for
substantial accommodation leading to an overall posture of
transformation-minus."16 These operational objectives presently
guide a more sophisticated US policy of differentiation, which is
based "on the recognition that the countries of Eastern Europe
are different not only from the Soviet Union but also from each
other, and that there are potential differences even where there
are no actual differences on specific aspects of policy. It says
that we will seek to develop better relations with the
individual countries of Eastern Europe, at whatever pace they
set, and that we will be guided in these efforts by one or both
of two criteria: the extent to which they are different -- in the
right direction -- in terms of domestic arrangements and/or in
terms of foreign policy."17

The right direction means, of course, liberalization in
domestic policy and independence from the Soviet Union in
foreign policy. Changes in this direction will be pursued
through the leverage offered by bilateral relations (trade,
cultural-scientific exchanges, political contacts not only with
the "government" but also with "the governed," including those
who oppose their governments, and people-to-people contacts),
propaganda, and some material support for opposition groups
through non-official channels. But it is made clear that no
direct support should be expected for revolt; at times, the
opposition groups are counseled to act in moderation.

Gordon stresses that no change which would threaten the
security of the Soviet Union directly is encouraged. "The West
has no interest in promoting that kind of change and should leave
no doubt on that score."18 Thus, the United States and, by and
large, its allies, in defining strategic goals in Eastern Europe,
have finally settled for a formula advanced more than forty years
ago by Charles Bohlen. Bohlen objected to an idea suggested by
his friend and colleague George Kennan who, like Henry Wallace
and Walter Lippman, was in favor of a more formal agreement with
the Soviet Union on a division of Europe into exclusive spheres of influence. In October 1946, in a memorandum addressed to James Byrnes and Dean Acheson, Bohlen made a distinction between "open" and "closed" spheres of influence and added: "The United States should not and indeed could not assist or even acquiesce in the establishment by the Soviet Union of exclusive spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe by means of complete domination.... On the other hand we should not attempt to deny to the Soviet Union the legitimate prerogatives of a great power in regard to smaller countries resulting from geographic proximity."

Of course, the final goal of the dissolution of the Soviet sphere of influence is by no means forgotten: its achievement is expected, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's words, "through the stealth of history" as a result of the processes under way in Eastern Europe which are helped by the policy of differentiation. This policy could be considered an updated form of Finlandization through bilateral relations without any new formal agreement with the Soviet Union. Ash has offered as an alternative to Finlandization the notion of "ottomanization." He explains that this, "a crude metaphor" meaning "emancipation in decay," explains better the nature, but not the result of this process. The two metaphors are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Finlandization could better describe the international status of a country and the objective of a particular foreign policy.

No doubt the policy of differentiation has brought some results for the West, for Eastern Europe, and for East-West relations. The question now is whether it is the best available policy in the circumstances prevailing now and in the near future in Eastern Europe.

Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger maintains that the present policies amount to waiting passively for the dissolution of "the Soviet empire or its automatic transformation into something for which there is no precedent in 400 years of Russian history," and that "in the absence of a political dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States the two sides are working themselves -- in the name of peace and arms control -- into a classical European crisis of the kind that produced World War I."21

Luminaries of East-West relations, including Richard Nixon, Brzezinski, and others, have expressed similar concerns. Defenders of the administration's policy reply that differentiation offers a comprehensive, flexible, and realistic framework to allow the United States "to deal with change up and down, creatively and in keeping with the national interest."22 The direct and open approach to the Soviet Union is rejected as politically unacceptable because it implies recognition of the Soviet right to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.
From the perspective of an East European, this dispute seems out of focus. The present Western policies toward Eastern Europe are too passive when one takes into account the pace of change in Eastern Europe. But this passivity is not due so much to the absence of a direct dialogue on this issue with the Soviet Union, but to the substance of the policy. And when we look at its substance we cannot detect, at least as far as Eastern Europe is concerned, meaningful differences between the advocates of the present Western (or American) policy and its critics. Both are pursuing the same goal: some sort of Finlandization of Eastern Europe. Both rely almost exclusively on the bipolar system of managing international affairs, which does not require too much elaboration in the case of those who urge immediate direct negotiations and an understanding with the Soviet Union. I can already hear the protests of those who reject the idea of such direct negotiations. And yet opponents of direct contacts with the Soviet Union, who argue that this would represent a formal recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence, have not suggested an alternative for managing relations between states or the contradictions and potential crises in Eastern Europe. Their current emphasis on bilateral relations with each East European nation on its own merits, a welcome development, does stop short, however, of affecting their attachment to the bipolar system of managing international relations as expressed in the present military alliances. And as George Modelski points out, "a world that is marked by unequal power distribution and bipolar concentration tends to produce spheres of influence," whether one likes it or not, whether one recognizes it or not.

The concept and pursuit of the policy of Finlandization is a case in point. The Finlandization of Eastern Europe, in any of its guises, is to be pursued in parallel with the strengthening of the Western alliance. And this is the built-in contradiction that diminishes the capacity of this policy to keep up with the developments in Eastern Europe. It is difficult to weaken your competition's zone of influence while strengthening your own without extracting a reaction in kind. What has happened in Europe has been, in Pierre Hassner's term, "a game of mutual Finlandization" which instead of muting the rivalry between the two major powers and increasing their mutual confidence has had precisely the opposite effect. It is not certain that this game ended with the current phase of detente between the United States and the USSR. Obviously, such a game diminishes the capacity of the international community to act as a moderating force, helping a more or less smooth development of change in Eastern Europe and preventing or reducing the spillover of tumultuous change into the international arena. The interests of avoiding a crisis coming out of Eastern Europe would, however, be better served by changing the game of mutual Finlandization from a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game through a joint effort of all interested nations to dilute the pressure from the two military blocs. But
let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the Finlandization of Eastern Europe is successful or making good progress.

Let us recall now that the Soviet factor is not the only component of the international dimension of East European issues, that there are other components including the contradictions among the East European countries themselves and Eastern Europe's relations with the rest of the world, primarily with Western Europe. Finlandization is largely irrelevant in these matters. One hears concern in Eastern Europe that some of these problems may become more acute with the relaxation of Soviet control in the area.

The complex web of contradictions affecting Eastern Europe and increasingly challenging the ideological and political division of the continent may not necessarily lead to a direct confrontation between the major powers, but it could lead to anarchy: also not a very reassuring prospect. Stanley Hoffmann's assessment that the biggest threat to order in the next decade is likely to be "not the confrontation of the superpowers but chaos"\(^{24}\) fits Eastern Europe.

**A PAN-EUROPEAN APPROACH: BEST HOPE FOR EUROPE**

By what criteria should we judge the international contribution to the resolution of the East European crisis? There are two main criteria: (1) the extent and consistency with which the international environment contributes to the dilution of spheres of influence in Europe; (2) if the first criterion is met, the timing, magnitude (more in terms of quality than quantity), and continuity of the foreign contribution which may make a difference between efficient and inefficient action. By both standards, the US and Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe, with all due credit for their increased flexibility, sophistication, and realism, fall short of what is possible today.

As has already been argued, the present American and Soviet policies aim only at an improvement of the present system of spheres of influence, an improvement which by its very nature remains intact, very fragile, and irrelevant to some current East European problems. At the same time, the present policies rely primarily on bilateralism which is too slow and too dependent on the inconsistencies and vacillations of domestic policies. The temptation will remain great, especially at times of crisis, to return to the more malignant form of spheres of influence to restore order.

The East European situation is one which requires that bilateralism be supplemented by multilateralism, a joint effort of all the participants in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) covering all the fields of international relations. In this respect, let us mention the
project initiated by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy under the leadership of Alan K. Hendrikson entitled "Negotiating World Order." This study focusses on the handling of international problems which, "because of the large number of countries or other parties involved and the high degree of international interdependence and related technical complexity associated with them, seemed to require multilateral diplomatic action. The particular topics chosen for detailed examination were to be those which meet two further criteria: (1) there had to be, in the given field in question, a serious challenge to existing international arrangements, owing either to a changing ideological climate or to shifting economic and political circumstances; and (2) there had to appear to be at least some possibility of establishing, through bilateral and especially multilateral diplomacy, an improved norm-setting and rule-making system, a regime, in the field."25 Eastern Europe, and for that matter Europe as a whole, meets these conditions.

Eastern Europe is primarily a European issue whose resolution can be found only in an all-European context. In other words, a pan-European solution is its best hope for becoming an increasingly constructive actor in world affairs instead of a pawn in power politics and a source of international tensions. This conclusion would not come as a surprise if it were made by an East European. There is a wide consensus on the assessment that the Europeans most interested in the pan-European idea, the main beneficiaries of the CSCE process, the only existing trace of functioning pan-Europeanism, are the East Europeans. But what about those outside Eastern Europe? For the West, in particular for the United States, pan-Europeanism is a good idea, especially for its strong "psychological appeal" in Eastern Europe, and for this reason "should be maintained as a long-term aspiration."26 But the issue is not whether it is a short- or a long-term aspiration. It is certainly a long-term aspiration. The real question is: can and should we do anything about it now? To answer this question we need not resort to abstract speculation. In Europe, we have had experience with pan-Europeanism in the form of the CSCE process. This experience is eloquent.

First, the CSCE process has imposed itself as a pan-European institution, rejecting the bloc-to-bloc bipolar approach to European issues, against the initial opposition of the two superpowers. The battle for it was waged primarily by the small and medium-sized states. Second, this process has continued to grow despite periods of tension. It has helped to ease these tensions by offering a channel of communications at times of crisis. One of the most important additions to the process was the inclusion of security issues, first through the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and then, indirectly, through the already established links between the forthcoming Warsaw Pact-NATO talks
on conventional arms in Europe. Third, although the USA and the USSR naturally exert considerable influence within the CSCE, they do not have full control over its process.

Turning from procedure to substance, the CSCE process has brought a few conceptual clarifications and eliminated certain inconsistencies which had plagued other pan-European schemes and, in all probability, prevented them from taking off. First, the geographic area covered by the pan-European idea: We have seen many formulas in recent years which excluded either the United States or both the United States and the Soviet Union from Europe. Some of them advanced the idea of Central Europe as a neutral zone between East and West and a solution to the division of Europe. These formulas cannot be justified historically or politically as a viable alternative to the present division of Europe and the restoration of European unity. Historically, the concept of European unity emerged after centuries of cooperation and living together, but also after centuries of contradictions, struggles, and divisions along political, ideological, religious, and economic lines. Out of this complex network of cooperation and conflict, unity and division, a set of common cultural and spiritual values has emerged based on the Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian heritage, the contributions of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and the revolutions of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. This European unity is primarily cultural and spiritual, and as such it covers an area from San Francisco to Vladivostok. From a political point of view, it is not realistic today to exclude either the United States or the USSR from a united Europe. The exclusion of one of them would create an imbalance unacceptable not only to that power but to all other states concerned. The exclusion of both would make them "the Garantienächte for a 'European peace order,'" by this they would again take over the classical role that the Anglo Saxons and the Russians played in previous centuries for the maintenance of the European balance of power,"27 as Peter Bender puts it. The same idea transpires from the proposals made at the other end of the political spectrum by Henry Kissinger.28 In fact, it means a return to bipolarity, to the nineteenth century, and not a step forward into the twenty-first century.

The CSCE format remains the only adequate geopolitical framework for the restoration of European unity. A unity, of course, based on common values -- cultural, political, and spiritual -- but, at the same time, one that has always been based on diversity, on the recognition of each nation's identity and personality. This does not and should not preclude any other security arrangements with different geographical configurations by all interested parties which are consistent with the process as a whole. By the same token, the emergence of regional or subregional groupings of European nations (Western Europe, Central Europe, the Balkans, the Northern States, and so on)
based on specific common interests, historical traditions, and common cultural heritage is perfectly legitimate on historical as well as on present economic, cultural, or political grounds. But such associations of nations can fully develop their beneficial potential for themselves and for European unity only in the framework of an all-European process. Some states might join more than one such grouping.

Second, most of the previous schemes to eliminate the division of Europe relied primarily on one issue: military disengagement. Some emphasized economic matters. The linchpin of Klaus Bloemer's suggestion, for example, is a "New Deal--Marshall Plan-type proposal for the Northern industrial world--based on equality and mutual benefit." But some in the West and most of the dissident movement in Eastern Europe have made human rights their top priority.

One of the main achievements of the CSCE has been to recognize human rights as a major component of international peace and security and, as such, a legitimate international concern. At the same time, the Final Act established that genuine and steady progress toward European security, cooperation, and unity can be achieved only by advancing political, security, economic, and human rights in a balanced way on all fronts. Peace and security, individual freedom and national independence, material and cultural scientific progress stand together or fall together.

The CSCE process has become if not an alternative at least an autonomous companion and moderator of the military alliances, of bipolarism, of spheres of influence. It may be faint, but it is real and it is generally accepted as a permanent and important feature of European politics, since all participants derive some benefits from it. The continuity of the process is secure. The CSCE process clearly responds to certain deep-rooted realities and to the needs of the European nations, skeptical attitudes still in circulation notwithstanding.

As far back as 1973, Pierre Hassner gave us what I believe to be one of the most comprehensive and realistic outlines of a pan-European project. He saw it as being achieved in three stages: "In the first stage, the search for common definitions of such notions as cultural cooperation, subversion, and nonintervention should lead to real reciprocity in commercial exchanges and communications, in the understanding of the limits with which they must be hedged for security considerations, and of the guarantees needed to prevent their abuse." In the second stage, pan-European institutions are to be considered such as "a commission on crises and conflicts," "an arms control committee to monitor the introduction of measures designed to limit the freedom of action of the superpowers," and "a political assembly that would be consultative could give each state a
chance to express its views in arenas broader than the framework of their respective alliances, yet narrower than the forum of the United Nations...a European commission for human rights.\textsuperscript{31}

The third stage, to Hassner, is: "the most distant and uncertain and yet probably the key to the other two. All the practical compromises and the temporary recognition of all the unpleasant realities can have real meaning if they are underlain by a real European project. What could this project be? Perhaps the gradual emergence within their respective present alliances and systems of a Western Europe and Eastern Europe whose dialogue would engender a third voice rather than a third force or a third way? Perhaps the combination of preferential ties between these two Europes and their respective superpowers, and between countries having common traditions transcending military and ideological barriers, like the two Germanies or the Balkan countries? Perhaps a dialogue between a European way to liberalism and a European way to communism which might end by defining at last the premises of real democratic socialism? Today one can only speculate."\textsuperscript{32}

That was fifteen years ago. With certain slight amendments, the actual course of events from Hassner's perspective still stands. More than that, there has been progress along the way he suggested. The CSCE process is performing more or less successfully in the first stage and to some extent the second stage of the pan-European design envisaged by Hassner. The conclusion of the Vienna review conference represents a new step in that direction. But, I believe, the process is advancing too slowly and it is still too weak. Its major weakness lies in the fact that it does not focus on the pan-European project as a whole but only on some of its components, and the issue of its institutionalization has never been examined properly. And these weaknesses are not due to any built-in faults of the process itself. The main reason for the slowness of the process is precisely the fact that it works, which stirs up strong opposition among its adversaries or those who have serious reservations about any significant change in the European political status quo and those who prefer the existing division of the continent, however it may be adjusted to the necessities of the present.

"The vested interests in the status quo in East and West remain stronger than the forces making for change," estimated Jonathan Dean over two years ago. He went further: "In the West, these vested interests include the ingrained dependence of the NATO states on the United States for conventions and nuclear protection, less against the possibility of outright Soviet attack than to counterbalance the political weight the Soviet Union draws from its military power. In the East, the vested interest is the realization of Eastern European governments and of the Soviet leadership that these governments cannot survive
unless propped up by Soviet military forces. Even where there is some realization on the part of the NATO and Warsaw Pact governments that the European confrontation is winding down, this would be the last point they would make explicitly to their own publics, for then how could they confidently rely on continuing support for the defense budgets that will still be necessary?" 33

Other observers and scholars mention the "inertia of clinging to old practices from habit reinforced by old fears." 34 All this is true, but the most powerful source of opposition to change is probably the enduring impulse of the powers-that-be to cling to power, be it national or international. The opposition to changes in the European political status quo finds some support in the complacency widespread among the public, which is based on the probably correct assumption that the peak of the military confrontation between the superpowers has passed, as well as on the incorrect conclusion that the international situation will continue to improve automatically. But the picture is beginning to change. Both the dangers of inaction and the opportunities for positive action are becoming more apparent.

The big powers are beginning to understand that the practice of spheres of influence "is losing the very purpose for which the dominant powers erected their spheres of influence in the first place, namely to preserve the status quo and order." 35 The magnitude and pressure of global issues, which require global solutions based on the common efforts of all nations, and the common dangers threatening civilization are imposing even on the powers-that-be the imperative of devising new ways of thinking and acting.

One of the most momentous developments directly affecting the situation in Europe -- and in Eastern Europe in particular-- are the changes currently occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the past, the main argument advanced by those who either opposed or counselled extreme caution in making any significant move toward dismantling the political-military confrontation and toward creating a new Europe based on a consistent pan-European idea was that before any such move could be contemplated, significant political change should take place inside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As one-sided as it was, this argument was valid. But now, domestic changes are taking place and finding expression in foreign policy.

In his address to the United Nations in December 1988, Gorbachev expressed his support for deepening the Helsinki process: "We intend to expand the Soviet Union's participation in the monitoring mechanism on human rights in the United Nations and with the framework of the pan-European process" 36 (emphasis added). Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the General Assembly of the United Nations that "the interrelationship of events in an interdependent world increasingly compels us to
delegate some national prerogatives to an international organization. In fact, this is already happening."

These are significant departures from standard Soviet positions, which could -- if they are put into practice -- have a particular impact on the pan-European process. Of course, no one knows how far and how deep the process of change in the Soviet Union will go. But this is not the main point. Nor is the main point whether the West should help Gorbachev or not. The question that the international community must answer is whether it can take advantage of the new situation to strengthen the structures of peace, cooperation, and freedom in the world, and, in Europe, to move more forcefully toward the dissolution of that continent's division. I think that the answer is yes. The changes in Eastern Europe are real and deep enough to allow us to make significant new moves to advance the pan-European project. And even if the process of change in Eastern Europe stops and if attempts are made to revise it, a complete reversal does not seem possible and, sooner or later, that process will resume with even greater intensity. The progress we make toward the elimination of the division of Europe now will help us to face new adversities and pursue the momentum of the pan-European idea.

Although many public leaders from both parts of Europe and North America are coming closer to this view, their governments are moving slowly or not at all. Governments are like wheelbarrows, former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once observed. They become useful only when they are pushed. Only a powerful grassroots movement uniting all the meaningful political forces of all the nations participating in the process will be able to push the governments into action. A prerequisite for the emergence of such a movement is an improved definition of the conceptual framework and the elaboration of a realistic outline of a program of action capable of uniting all these forces.

A UNIFYING CONCEPT FOR A RECONCILED EUROPE

As far as the conceptual framework for reconciling Europe is concerned, we should begin by clearly defining its purpose. The CSCE process has become a tentative alternative to the spheres of influence, not as a result of a deliberate design or a well thought-out strategy of all the nations involved, but only because it seems appropriate to accept the elimination of the spheres of influence as a final goal of the Helsinki process. This goal should not be difficult to reach, since practically all governments have openly rejected and condemned spheres of influence. But, on the other hand, we also must recognize that the spheres of influence, which are indissolubly linked with the balance of power, represent the main functioning model for the management of international affairs. If this model is to be changed, new institutions must be built and invested with authority. Obviously, this cannot happen overnight, but at the
same time it should not be an excuse for doing nothing.

We must begin a process of building new institutions which will gradually replace those of the spheres of influence. Until these are fully in place, the two systems will have to coexist and cooperate. This process will not represent a new understanding about spheres of influence, a new Yalta, but an open-ended evolution which can adjust to ever-changing circumstances based, to use Stanley Hoffmann's description, not "on permanent alignments but on permanent bargaining between shifting coalitions," which will aim at the continuous diminution and eventual elimination of spheres of influence in Europe. How long this process will be or even whether it will ever end may prove immaterial: its goal should be a political and moral guidepost.

The relationship between the spheres of influence and the newly emerging institutions on the one hand and the process as a whole on the other can very roughly be compared with the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative and judiciary branches in the United States. The process would serve also as an educational process, a confidence-building machinery for all states, primarily the big powers. They will have to gain confidence that they can promote their legitimate interests better by relinquishing some of their power and delegating some of their prerogatives to pan-European institutions. From the point of view of the big powers, the process could be considered the centerpiece of a trade-off: in exchange for some of the privileged positions they abandon (and which are, in any case, too costly to maintain) they will obtain greater stability and predictability in world affairs.

Before we leave the theme of the conceptual framework of the pan-European process, one last aspect requires attention. The popular movements for peace and human rights have been weakened by difficulties in reconciling two main currents of thought: (1) arms control and disarmament are the top priority, and (2) human rights should be the main focus. Recently, a more active dialogue between these two trends has begun to take place, and an outline of a unifying concept is beginning to emerge. Two observations can be made here.

First, the relationship between the arms race and war: it is being said that wars are caused not by the existence of weapons but by political differences. This is only partly true. The arms race acquires a logic of its own, evolves according to its own dynamics, and may escape political control. This possibility becomes a distinct probability with the rapid development of military technology, especially the dramatic reduction of the time between the launching of a weapon and its arrival at its target. It is becoming virtually impossible to correct the inevitable errors in the warning system and to make
political decisions. The dynamics of the arms race can thus lead to an unintended war. This is why the arms race deserves separate attention.

Second, the thesis that the main cause of wars is represented by the expansionist tendencies of the totalitarian regimes, which, again, is only partly true. Of course, totalitarian regimes have a propensity for aggressive policies. As history shows, however, in Jan Triska's words, "democracies have often been belligerent. Classical Athens, republican Rome, revolutionary France, nineteenth century Britain, nineteenth and twentieth century United States and Israel have all been at times aggressive and expansive dominant powers.... Superpowers, like all states whether or not they are democratic, attempt to maximize their power at acceptable cost and risk in the international system.... To increase their power, the superpowers reduce the autonomy of states in adjacent regions. To that end, whether autocracies or democracies they create and maintain conditions consistent with their domination over the region."38

Pope Paul II, in his encyclical on social concerns, wrote: "Each of the two blocs harbors in its own way a tendency towards imperialism, as it is usually called, or towards a form of neo-colonialism: an easy temptation to which they frequently succumb as history, including recent history, teaches."39 Thus, the abuse of power, both domestically and internationally, emerges as the main cause of international conflicts, infringements on the freedoms of nations and individuals, and misuse of scientific and technological achievements, thereby endangering civilization. While there is an obvious link between power and ideology, power has a dynamics of its own which cannot be explained in purely ideological terms.

Social control of power, both national and international, becomes, accordingly, the main prerequisite for the maintenance of peace, freedom, and national independence in the world. It also represents one of the universal human values around which we could create an effective pan-European grassroots movement. Of course, the mere acceptance of this principle does not resolve all problems and differences. There will remain sharp disputes over the application of this principle, especially within each country. But an inter-European debate on this subject could be very useful.

This debate may not yet be the full dialogue imagined by Hassner between East and West which could lead to the definition of the premises of real democratic socialism, nor the third way described by Jolyon Howorth as "aimed at a historic synthesis of socialism and communism on the one hand and freedom and individualism on the other by retaining their virtues and rejecting their flaws."40 But the concept of social control over
power includes generally accepted elements which can serve as a good working basis for a conceptual framework to advance this process.

We cannot conclude this outline of an improved conceptual framework for the pan-European project without mentioning the German question -- of the reunification of Germany -- in the division of Europe, the key to American-Soviet competition. This problem can only be solved through a long process, which is already under way. To raise the German question now means bringing up the most difficult issue of European reconciliation. The widespread opposition both in the West and in the East to the reunification of Germany is one of the sources of the strength of the opposition to the pan-European idea. Some fear that it could lead to the re-emergence of Germany as the major power in Europe. It would therefore be wrong, even fatal, for the pan-European project to decide now what the Germans themselves have not yet decided. On the one hand, most public opinion polls, many scholarly works, and public statements tell us that a majority West Germans are ready either to consider reunification as a priority second only to freedoms for the East Germans or to give up reunification in exchange for a neutral East Germany. On the other hand, West German leaders have raised the issue of reunification publicly.

In these circumstances, it is better to put off discussions, let alone decisions on the German issue and to support Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik within the framework of the pan-European process. This way, while keeping open all the options for the German nation, we will be able to allay the apprehensions stirred up on all sides by the German issue and continue to improve the international conditions of the two German states until such time as the Germans are in a position to make their own decisions and the international community is ready to accept that decision.

The conceptual framework outlined above has as one of its main components the idea of institutionalizing the pan-European process. This institutionalization is central also to the concrete steps needed now to advance this process. Without institutions the process will advance only on paper. When the crunch comes, when a specific issue arises or a crisis breaks out and there is no such institution, we will be forced to turn to the old obsolete or even counterproductive ones. In pursing the idea of institutionalization in international life we should, however, heed Harlan Cleveland's warning that the primary obstacle in its implementation is "the still widespread illusion that the mutation of international institutions must be modeled on the increasing centralization of the modern nation-state." To remove this barrier the institutions envisaged here will have "a wider reach and stronger powers than a U.N. style committee of government. Yet not a world government from which there is no earthly appeal. Most of [them] will not need to be global."
How will such institutions relate to the Final Act of the CSCE, the basic document of the whole process? Are there no proposals implying a renegotiation of the Final Act? The answer is no. The consensus remains the political basis of the CSCE. "Without consensus, there is no community," as Lincoln Bloomfield points out. But after the consensus on principles has been achieved, the community of independent states can and should agree in order "to give political life to the consensus" to encourage the formation of institutions "embodying programs polarized not around abstractions, but around concrete international tasks based on shared interests, whether they be trade, science, space, or the control of armaments." 43

SUGGESTIONS FOR A PROGRAM OF ACTION

Trying to translate these general guidelines into a practical program to deepen and expand the CSCE process, my suggestions cover the three main components of the process: political-military, economic, and humanitarian. In the field of arms control and disarmament, it is reasonable to expect in the next five to ten years a second agreement on confidence-building measures at the Stockholm Conference (CDE) and a first agreement on conventional arms reduction in Europe from the Atlantic to Urals, the Conventional Stability Talks (CST).

Some measures already exist, have been made public, and seem to enjoy wide support: for instance the restricted military corridor. But the prospects are still for slow progress. The causes of this slowness include some of the characteristics of the arms controls talks in general, as analyzed by Jonathan Dean. He wrote two years ago: "There is no integrating concept to hold together the [arms control] activities, no overall Western scheme of arms control negotiation with the East, and no comprehensive coverage in arms control negotiation of all important aspects of the East-West military confrontation." 44 And further: "There does not seem to exist a single encompassing arms control approach to the NATO Pact confrontation that by its intrinsic effectiveness and broad appeal could dismantle the confrontation to a decisive degree.... No government in East and West has thus far permitted arms control to become anything more than an occasionally useful tool for the management of a continuing military confrontation."45 Of course, we understand that this situation is determined primarily by political factors. But as the political situation begins to change, the substance and pace of arms control and disarmament may change too.

Change could be accelerated if the participants at the CDE and CST agreed to establish a European arms control and disarmament committee empowered to monitor the introduction of the measures adopted by the conferences. In the first phase this committee would function only within the CDE, which includes all the states participating in the process and where there are
already measures that need to be implemented. This committee's advisory council would be appointed by governments but have the authority to consult specialists and public leaders representing the widest spectrum of opinion. The first task of the advisory council would be to develop proposals for an integrated concept of the arms reduction talks in Europe aimed at easing and eventually dismantling the military confrontation in Europe. The committee, through its advisory council, would be able to assure two-way communications with the public to enhance mutual confidence and deepen and accelerate the process of arms control and reduction.

In the second major field of intra-European cooperation, economic cooperation, the pan-European process is the least advanced, practically non-existent. Resignation seems to prevail. Economic cooperation, it is said, should remain confined primarily to bilateral exchanges and joint ventures. But this is wrong. The case for multilateralism may be even stronger in the economic field than in other fields, but it is definitely more urgent. A multilateral effort is not only the sum of the efforts of its participants: it has a multiplying effect. There are economic issues in Eastern Europe which require a multilateral approach.

As a rule, when one considers the impact of foreign economic relations of the East European states on their domestic situations one thinks primarily about the extent to which these relations may help to improve their domestic economic situation and prevent social explosions which might spread out into other countries. This, of course, remains a major consideration, and it is here that the sense of urgency is particularly acute. But there are further considerations.

As has already been mentioned, the East-West division of the continent also has a North-South dimension. A united Europe also means the elimination of the developmental gap between Western and Eastern Europe. One of the consequences of West European integration on Eastern Europe may be -- if we are not careful -- that Western Europe, as William Hyland warns us, will turn "increasingly toward its foreign policy and a closed Western Europe...could perpetuate the continent's division."

The East European states may become a zone, as described by Ash "of weak states, national prejudice, inequality, poverty, and schlammassal. It is almost true to talk, in the case of Hungary and Poland, of a double dependency, on the great powers to the West, as well as to the East." Of course, such a development could simply result from domestic failure. But the international environment, especially the evolution of the European Economic Community, will play a significant, perhaps a decisive, role. This is a disturbing perspective not only for the East Europeans.
A few observers of Eastern Europe, West and East, have floated the idea of a Marshall Plan. Budget restraints, past relations with Eastern Europe, the indisputable fact that this region does not have the same crucial importance for the West as did Western Europe for the United States in the aftermath of World War II makes this idea unrealistic. It is not even certain if this would be the best formula from the point of view of the East Europeans. What Eastern Europe needs perhaps more than capital is technology and management expertise to modernize its economies. Multilateral international economic action to restore the continent's unity should take the form of a European Bank for Investment and Development open to all the participants to the process, organized and managed along the lines of the regional banks within the system of the World Bank.

Why do we need a special European bank when there already exists a World Bank with its affiliates? A special European Bank would be useful because it would be able to focus exclusively on European issues, take into account the specificity of the European issues, and attract other nations to cooperate economically with European nations.

The Bank would approve and support:
(a) joint European projects (communications, transportation, protection of the environment, etc.),
(b) national programs to modernize the economy, and
(c) selected major joint ventures or national projects.

The participation of the major powers and the main industrialized nations is, of course, a prerequisite for the success of the Bank but its establishment should not be made dependent on the adhesion of all the participants in the Helsinki process.

To cover the human dimension of intra-European cooperation and to assure, in general, the link between detente from above and detente from below, the establishment of an all-European parliamentary assembly should be considered. It is apparent that at this stage in developments in Eastern Europe the European assembly would have to be composed of members appointed by each national parliament, an equal number of deputies for each. They would, however, include representatives of all the main political parties or organizations represented in their respective parliaments. The deputies would act as individuals and adopt resolutions by a large (two-thirds or three-quarters) majority. The main task of the assembly would be to examine and recommend proposals submitted by various public organizations pertaining to the implementation of the Final Act. A commission of the assembly would examine and recommend to governments for approval a European convention for public control of international and national power. Another commission would focus
on another field in which cooperation between governments and non-governmental, public organizations is crucial: culture and science. Since European unity is primarily a cultural and spiritual phenomenon, the promotion of cultural exchanges is essential to the advancement of the pan-European idea.

Taking into account potential opposition to the idea of a European parliamentary assembly, as a first step annual meetings of the European, United States, and Canadian parliaments within the Interparliamentary Union could be held. Such meetings have taken place before and if they are now to be held regularly annually they could perform at least some of the functions envisaged for the assembly proper.

Finally, it may be opportune to revive the idea of a permanent organ of the CSCE advanced during the first phases of the Helsinki Conference by Romania and other states. This permanent organ could also serve as a commission on crises and conflicts, not only to manage but also to prevent crises. The existence of a permanent organ would allow the convening of preview conferences only every five to seven years.

Some of the above mentioned ideas have already been advanced by public organizations, peace and human-rights movements, and non-official international gatherings. They underlie the generally accepted fact that the grassroots movement for peace and cooperation is ahead of governments as well as scholarly research.

A particularly encouraging sign are the growing contacts between the peace movements from West and East. Successful efforts have been made to develop a common approach to link disarmament and human rights. These developments prompted Jolyon Howorth to conclude that "detente from below is now a booming industry in both parts of Europe, thanks largely to the inadequacies of detente from above." But as far as the pan-European idea is concerned, the various peace or human-rights movements do not yet have either an integrated concept or, as a consequence, a comprehensive and realistic program. They usually ignore economic issues. The strategy of the fourth phase of Eastern Europe's long revolution against Yalta as described in the study by Ferenc Feher is focussed on domestic issues. The foreign dimension of this struggle is reduced to the general objective of how each East European nation will be able to choose its own domestic regime while keeping its security arrangements with and commitments to the Soviet Union. How could this objective be translated into specific international terms? Is it possible to attain it only through domestic efforts and, if not, what could be the international strategy and tactics of the struggle? These questions remain unanswered.

There is indeed a need for a debate on these issues. Such
a debate should be widened to include spokesmen of all the significant political forces in all the states participating in the process, including the peace movements which cooperate with the East European governments as well as independent or opposition groups. This should be possible today, just as it should be possible, despite the sharp differences on domestic matters, to find a common base on which to begin building a better international environment, an environment helpful to everybody and especially helpful in easing the way for a peaceful solution of domestic crises. Of course, this task cannot be accomplished at an official level but must be the responsibility of public organizations and -- in the first place -- of intellectuals and their institutions. The debates which have already begun to take place on a regular basis between American and Soviet scholars of Eastern Europe will serve as a useful model. Why not expand them to cover a wider spectrum of viewpoints?

We must accept the challenge of creating a common European home. After all, whether we like it or not, we already are in a common home. The questions are: Do we like our home? Do we need a new one? If so, what should it look like? It would be useful to hold a permanent non-official informal forum to debate such issues.

Let us also answer a question raised in the first part of this paper: are direct American-Soviet talks on Eastern Europe and on the fate of Europe in general necessary, useful, and appropriate? In the context outlined here, the answer is yes. Such talks within the framework of a pan-European project could not be construed as a recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The exact opposite would be true.

So where is the new thinking? As already stated, many, if not all, the ideas and proposals in this paper are not brand new. What is new here, however, is an attempt to integrate all these ideas and proposals into a more coherent and consistently anti-spheres-of-influence concept and program of action. Perhaps the most important question now is whether governments and nations will pass from rhetoric to deeds, from verbal denunciations of spheres of influence to their gradual dismantling. What I suggest is not a blueprint or a grand design for a brave new world, but rather an outline of an itinerary on a difficult, sometimes even dangerous, road toward a better and safer Europe. It tries to combine vision with pragmatism because vision without a pragmatic approach is sterile, while pragmatism without a vision is blind.

Grand designs and visions are not very popular these days, particularly in this country. But there must be a vision. This vision may look too ambitious but the practical proposals are modest, and although they are part of the same vision they can be
approached separately and the vision tested. Who knows, through this test we may gain more wisdom, confidence, and courage. At any rate, without a vision, as Norman Cousins put it, "we stumble into the future day to day, dependent of our survival more on the hope that our margin for error may not have been completely exhausted than on a working design for a peaceful world."51

I simply suggest that we can do better. And if we can start in Eastern Europe, if only because there is no better alternative, why not? Eastern Europe may become an example to follow, for a change.
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 62.


11. Ullman, p. 36.


13. Ibid., p. 67.


15. Ibid., p. 308.

16. Ibid., p. 301.

17. Thomas W. Simons, Jr., "Strategy and Tactics in U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Eastern Europe," in Creditworthiness and

18. Gordon, p. 327.


27. Peter Bender, Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters (Berlin: Severin und Siedler, 1981), pp. 263-64.


31. Hassner, p. 80.

32. Ibid.


34. Jan Triska, ed., Dominant Powers and Subordinate
35. Ibid.

36. Gorbachev, p. 17.


38. Triska, pp. 444-45.


42. Ibid.


44. Dean, p. 93.

45. Ibid., pp. 220-21.

46. Hyland, p. 31.


48. Howorth, p. 129.


50. Feher, pp. 32-34.