ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
AND THE MONTENEGRIN QUESTION, 1914-1921

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Montenegro is in the news again. As was the case precisely seventy years ago at the time of the Paris Peace Conference, newspaper headlines and journal articles talk about Serbo-Montenegrin solidarity, political unrest, and civil disobedience in Montenegro, ethnic tension between Serbs (including Montenegrin Serbs) and Albanians, and general Balkan ferment. They are causing diplomats and pundits to ask fundamental questions about the long-term viability of the multi-ethnic Yugoslav state. And just a few weeks ago the mortal remains of Nicholas I, the first—and only—king of Montenegro were returned to his homeland after a period of almost seven decades. The king, who figured prominently in the story before us, saw his kingdom for the last time in the winter of 1915-16. Despite the fact that he was on the winning side in World War I, he lost his throne and after 1918 was not permitted to return to Montenegro in any capacity. He died in exile in 1921.

Of course, until recently most Americans had never heard of Montenegro, or if they had it was because a place called Montenegro was the homeland of Rex Stout's mythical sleuth, Nero Wolfe. Very few Americans have read the works of one of Montenegro's most famous contemporary sons, Milovan Djilas, though the publishing house of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich has bent over backwards to make them available to the general reader. Over the years historians of world affairs, including historians of Balkan affairs, have tended to neglect Montenegro, the Land of the Black Mountain. The same holds true for historians of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference.

In his classic Peacemaking 1919, for example, Harold Nicolson dispenses with Montenegro in four pages. To be sure, those happen to be four important pages, and reference to some of Nicolson's comments will be made later in this paper. Similarly, Arno J. Mayer skips over Montenegro in his monumental, and controversial, book, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking. It is, of course, understandable that Nicolson and Mayer should concentrate more on other issues, such as the handling or mishandling of Germany and Russia at the Paris Peace Conference, than on Montenegro. But even books devoted largely to Balkan affairs (such as Rene Albrecht-Carrie's Italy at the Paris Peace Conference and Ivo Lederer's Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference), books which do touch upon Montenegro because Montenegro was an important issue to both Italy and Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, tend to put it in the "oh-by-the-way" category. This is not to suggest that Montenegro during and after World War I has been slighted altogether by
historians. This certainly is not the case in Yugoslavia. Dragoljub Živojinović, in particular, has written many important studies of Montenegrin history during those critical years. But Western historians who concern themselves with Montenegrin affairs have been few and far between.

This paper is a small part of a more detailed study-in-progress of British and American foreign policy vis-à-vis Montenegro. My inquiry into British and American foreign policy is, in turn, part of a book-length study provisionally entitled "The Strange Death of the Kingdom of Montenegro," which examines the demise of that independent Serb, but not Serbian, kingdom between 1914 and 1924.

BRITAIN AND MONTENEGRO—TO 1918

From the earliest days of World War I, Britain and Montenegro were allies. Montenegro was one of the first countries to declare war on Austria-Hungary because of the Dual Monarchy's attack on Serbia in July 1914. Admittedly, King Nicholas (of the House of Petrović-Njegoš) had personal reservations about going to war in 1914, but he declared war nonetheless, and for over one year Montenegrin troops held the Austrians at bay until the massive Austro-German offensive of 1915-16 led by Field Marshal von Mackensen prevailed. Even after the fall of Montenegro in January 1916 and the simultaneous flight of King Nicholas and his court first to Italy and then finally to France, Britain enthusiastically embraced its small Balkan ally--officially, at least. David Lloyd George, soon to become prime minister, for example, praised the Montenegrin military effort and declared before Parliament that "the interests of Montenegro will not be lost sight of by the Allies in the final [peace] settlement." Almost immediately the British and French governments received King Nicholas and company with open arms and agreed to pay a monthly 400,000 franc subsidy to the Montenegrin government-in-exile.

But official pronouncements do not tell the whole story. Nor do the published documents. Marginal comments and minutes of and about British diplomatic correspondence indicate that even at this early date many in the British Foreign Office were beginning to think of Montenegro as Serbia's ugly stepsister. While Whitehall went to great lengths to accommodate Serbian desiderata, it paid mere lip-service to official Montenegrin needs. Foreign Office minutes containing Lloyd George's aforementioned remarks—minutes initialed by Edward Grey, Arthur Nicolson, and Robert Cecil—read as follows: "Montenegro certainly does not deserve the same promises as have been made to Belgium and Serbia." In part, these distinguished gentlemen were expressing an anti-Montenegrin, or at least an anti-Nicholas (anti-Petrović), animus in the Foreign Office going back many years. In part, they were reflecting the judgment of Count John de Salis, the last British minister to Montenegro, and of other observers concerning Montenegro's questionable defense of Mount Lovćen against Austrian forces in 1915. De Salis called the Montenegrin defense "a farce" and reported a general belief that Nicholas had been negotiating with the Austrians "to save himself and dynasty"—a question that is still the matter of some historiographical debate—in Montenegro and elsewhere. Sometimes it was not so much what was said, but
the way it was said that is indicative of an anti-Montenegrin attitude on the part of certain Foreign Office officials. Upon learning that Mount Lovćen and the village of Njegushi were in Austrian hands, for example, Lancelot Oliphant, who would concern himself with Montenegrin affairs for years to come, wrote in the official minutes: "Montenegro—Finis!" The next day, upon learning that an armistice had been concluded between Montenegro and Austria, Oliphant wrote: "I gather that our military authorities consider Montenegro an entirely negligible factor in the war and do not think it worth while moving a finger to help her." Shortly thereafter, the Foreign Office received a letter from the English traveller and writer Mary Edith Durham, a private citizen who regularly corresponded with Sir Edward Grey, other British diplomats, and scholars interested in Balkan affairs. Moreover, Durham was one of King Nicholas's most caustic critics. The letter was a thorough denunciation of the king and government of Montenegro. Oliphant noted: "It is pleasant to hear from Miss Durham again, though this letter merely restates in a vivid manner what we have heard already—namely that the present Royal Family will never again be allowed to rule in Montenegro." Similar comments and observations, including many gratuitously snide and insulting remarks, were routinely initialed or expanded upon by other members of the Foreign Office, including the secretary of state and the permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. In December 1917 officials wrote that "it hardly seems to matter to H[is]. M[ajesty's]. G[overnment]. whether Montenegro is united to Serbia or not. King Nicholas has not done much to deserve our support."

Now all this is not to suggest that Montenegro, Britain's ally—at least Britain's nominal ally—was totally without British advocates during the war years. One man in particular came forth to take on the Foreign Office, Mary Edith Durham, and anyone else who had anything untoward to say about King Nicholas and the Montenegrin cause. This was Alexander Devine, founder and headmaster of Clayesmore School.

By 1918 Devine was able to write that his "room [at Clayesmore School] devoted to Montenegro [was] a mass of filed letters and correspondence, and [he] never let pass a single chance of defending and championing the cause of the country, or of obtaining friends to her cause, and refuting the attacks of her traducers, in season and out of season, in a hundred differing ways." Of course, the more he did for Montenegro, especially Montenegrins in exile, such as King Nicholas, the greater his reputation and standing with the king and his court. The problem was that while obtaining friends and "refuting the attacks of traducers," to use his phrase, he also made enemies, among them most of the leading figures of the Foreign Office and Britain's scholarly, generally pro-Serbian, community, including R.W. Seton-Watson, founder and editor of the journal The New Europe. At the request of the Foreign Office, Seton-Watson prepared a confidential statement in which he wrote that "Mr Devine is to all intents and purposes the agent of King Nicholas in this country," an appraisal obviously shared by Seton-Watson's friends and readers in the Foreign Office.

In 1917 the Montenegrin government-in-exile approached the British and French governments about the possibility of their accepting accredited Montenegrin ministers.
Hitherto, the British and French governments had representatives accredited to the Montenegrin court, but not the other way around.\textsuperscript{12} The person King Nicholas had in mind as his personal representative to the Court of St. James's was Alex Devine.\textsuperscript{13} The question of British representation was widely discussed throughout the spring and summer of 1917, largely because of Devine's contacts with Ronald McNeill, a sympathetic, although by no means wholly uncritical, member of Parliament. In the inter-office discussion that transpired, Harold Nicolson wrote that "in view of this official application it will perhaps be difficult to refuse, but I submit that we should make it quite clear that we will only receive a representative of Montenegrin nationality. We must exclude Mr. Devine at all costs."\textsuperscript{14} And so he was excluded. By playing a delaying game, the Foreign Office maintained as its sole conduit to King Nicholas, George Grahame, the Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy in Paris, who was already accredited to the king of Montenegro as "Chargé des Affaires." Grahame remained the official British-Montenegrin link throughout the war and the Paris Peace Conference, and, for his part, periodically indulged in "Devinely inspired" rhetoric and argumentation on behalf of King Nicholas and his court. Even so, Devine continued to act "in an unofficial manner as [the] 'friend' [of Montenegro]" in Britain and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{15} Occasionally styled Montenegro's "honorary minister" to the Court of St. James's, he continued to portray himself as Montenegro's de facto representative in the United Kingdom.

THE UNITED STATES AND MONTENEGRO—TO 1918

The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 found the United States pursuing a policy of neutrality while Montenegro committed itself to the Entente powers. At first, US-Montenegrin relations, such as they were, were not affected by the conflict, but in the summer of 1915, ties were damaged when the U.S. Justice Department arrested several Montenegrins, charging them with conspiring to violate American neutrality laws by recruiting Montenegrin immigrants and sending them to fight in their homeland. In fact, King Nicholas had sent agents to enlist several thousand soldiers, chiefly in the western United States.\textsuperscript{16}

Following America's entry into the war in April 1917, however, and especially after the January 1918 proclamation of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points—the eleventh point called for the evacuation and restoration of Montenegro—King Nicholas had every reason to be confident that things were going his way and that when the war came to an end, he would be restored to his throne. Throughout the spring and summer of 1918, Nicholas exchanged a series of warm letters with Wilson. Nicholas was doing his best to win the American president over to his side, and Wilson's short letters seemed to indicate that the king's efforts were paying dividends. In a response to a note from Nicholas on the first anniversary of the American involvement in the war, for example, Wilson wrote: "Your gracious and welcome message comes to us as the voice of a nation in which the people of the United States have always had the liveliest interest and with whose struggles and aspirations they have always felt a very genuine sympathy. We welcome it as the voice of a friend and send to you in return assurances of our sincere friendship."\textsuperscript{17} In response to
Nicholas's Fourth of July message of 1918, Wilson wrote: "I trust that Your Majesty and the noble and heroic people of Montenegro will not be cast down, but will have confidence in the determination of the United States to see that in the final victory that will come, the integrity and rights of Montenegro shall be secured and recognized."18

With his ties to Wilson on seemingly firm footing, the king moved to consolidate his influence in American circles and to assure himself of the president's ear. He asked the American government to accept Doctor (and General) Anto Gvozdenović as his country's first minister plenipotentiary to Washington and William Frederick Dix, the secretary of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, as Montenegro's new consul general in New York. The choice of the latter was a calculated one—by Nicholas and especially Alex Devine. Not only was Dix a prominent insurance agent and a colonel in the New York police reserve; more important, he was a member of the Princeton Class of '89 and a personal friend of Woodrow Wilson's. Devine thought he knew how to pull the heartstrings of the Anglophile American educator-turned-president: the old school tie. In a letter written on New York Life stationery, Dix wrote to the president that "His Majesty, King Nicholas and the Government of Montenegro, I am informed by Alexander Devine, their representative in England, have wished to appoint me their representative in this country, giving me the appointment of Consul General."19 Devine's ploy worked. Immediately upon receipt of Dix's letter, Wilson wrote to Secretary of State Robert M. Lansing, vouching for Dix and asking Lansing to expedite the appointment.20 Lansing accepted Gvozdenović as Montenegrin minister and William Dix as consul general, much to the chagrin of the British Foreign Office.21 Wilson promptly sent Dix a congratulatory letter he had typed himself in which he wrote that "we are particularly glad that you will undertake to represent the interests of the doughty little kingdom in New York."22

The new US-Montenegrin connections (and possibly Devine's machinations) were duly noted in Whitehall with considerable consternation on the part of Nicolson, who wrote in a lengthy memorandum of 2 August 1918 that

I have no particular bias against the Petrovich dynasty as such, but I am personally quite convinced, and I think most people will agree with me, that King Nikita is a reactionary, selfish and disreputable old man; and I cannot feel the Allied loans, to say nothing of private 'Red Cross' subscriptions, should be devoted to whitewashing him and his family.... I submit that we should inform the United States Government exactly what we know and think of King Nikita, and should indicate to them that his representative in the United States is likely to direct his activities to the conduct of dynastic and dangerous propaganda for which purpose he will doubtless expend the subsidies being afforded by the two Allied Government, if not the sums subscribed for the 'Montenegrin Red Cross Fund.'23

Two months later, in October 1918, Devine wrote to Wilson personally, being careful to mention "our friend Wm.F. Dix" in the opening line. After describing himself to the
president as "probably [being] regarded by the King and people of Montenegro as their chief English friend," he offered an "unbiased," and for Devine an unusually balanced, appraisal of the Montenegrin question for Wilson's consideration. But, as we shall see, this was only the beginning of Devine's paper assault on the American president.

THE POSTWAR SITUATION

At the end of the war in 1918, Nicholas found himself on the winning side, but the outcome was not exactly what he had hoped for. Despite previous assurances from Allied quarters, the French government did not permit him to return home right away. Upon the withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian forces from Montenegro in August 1918, French and, more important, Serbian troops filled the political-military vacuum there. President Raymond Poincaré told Nicholas on 24 November 1918 that "it appears preferable that your Majesty should postpone the return to your kingdom until life shall have resumed its habitual course." At the same time, the new government in Belgrade (in Harold Nicolson's words) "summoned a 'National Assembly' at Podgoritza [in Montenegro] and obtained a vote for immediate union with Serbia, and the deposition of King [Nicholas] and the whole Petrovic dynasty." Needless to say, Montenegrin advocates of a Serbo-Montenegrin union considered Serbian troops to be "liberators," while opponents considered them "occupiers." In Djilas's words, Montenegro drifted toward a civil war, which was a squaring of accounts not only between the opponents and the partisans of union, but also between an absolute monarch and leading families who could not accept the position of vassals and parliamentary democrats and capitalists who longed to become vassals. The two opposing parties were given nicknames from the color of the leaflets with which they proclaimed themselves at the elections—the Whites and the Greens, the supporters and the opponents, respectively, of union.

The opponents of union called the elections to the Podgorica assembly a sham. Supporters contended that, however imperfect, the elections nonetheless reflected the will of the majority of the Montenegrin people, who, after all, were ethnic Serbs. What Djilas called a "suppressed civil war" ensued, with both sides committing atrocities. Debates over the "true" nature of the Serbian presence in Montenegro; the "true" nature of the Serbo-Montenegrin political, ethnic or racial, and cultural connection (and the question of Montenegrin self-identity); and the "true" wishes of the Montenegrin people fed the diplomatic fires in 1918 and 1919—as did a related matter touching upon nationalism and terrorism throughout the country: the alleged persecution of the Albanian minority population of Montenegro and adjacent areas by Serbian or Serbo-Montenegrin elements, and, from time to time, the alleged Albanian persecution of ethnic Serbs living in the Montenegrin border areas. Some of these debates are still going on.

Suffice it to say that Alexander Devine and other pro-Nicholas voices denounced the proceedings of the Podgorica assembly and the presence of Serbian troops on Montenegrin
soil. Devine defended the honor of King Nicholas's government-in-exile, which after all was still nominally an allied government, and denounced what he termed Serbian "perfidy" and "barbarism." He called for "justice" and "fair-play" in numerous letters and visits to the Foreign Office in London and the British Peace Delegation in Paris. Similarly, Devine's ally Ronald McNeill repeatedly called for a public accounting of Britain's policies concerning Montenegro.28

Devine made every effort to bend the ear of the Americans in positions of power, in particular President Wilson. The British educator used his hotel room in Paris and the Clayesmore School in Winchester as bases of operation for bombarding not only the British, but also the American and, to a lesser extent, the French delegations with almost equal intensity. It is a measure of his success that amidst the tumult of Paris some of Devine's correspondence actually reached President Wilson's eyes. Not only did the president make marginal notations in his famous Grahame shorthand, but on several occasions he actually went to the trouble of responding to Devine personally, typing out responses on the typewriter he always had at his side. (This was indicative of Woodrow Wilson's good intentions but also of his shortcomings as chief executive. He was reluctant to delegate business and attempted to answer as many letters personally as possible.)

The specifics of Devine's numerous letters differed from day to day, but the themes invariably remained the same: he vigorously defended the cause of King Nicholas and attacked what he routinely referred to as the "military occupation" of Montenegro by Serbian troops. On 13 January, President Wilson personally acknowledged receipt of one of Devine's letters. Less than a week later, Devine "acknowledged the acknowledgement," writing "my dear President, if I felt that you knew, not from some excitable Balkan partisan but from some level-headed Englishman the exact position of matters, I think I should be entirely at rest in my mind and should feel content." Thus, he requested an interview with the president. In a letter of 27 January Devine complained about the British government's two-month delay in granting him an extended visa to go to France, and at the same time attacked the presence in Paris of R.W. Seton-Watson and Wickam Steed, who, he wrote, "are notorious [in this country] as the main supporters of the aggressive aspirations of Serbia." He warned the president that Seton-Watson and Steed were in Paris to "pull strings" and "work out their plans with a distinct political bias," while styling himself as the honest defender of an oppressed nation, a man "unsophisticated enough to take the talk of 'self-determination' and the 'preservation of small nationalities' as a real and sincere thing." He assured the president that "[he sought] no reward, place or power from these poor [Montenegrin] Highland folk," only justice. Once again, he requested an interview with the president.30

In the beginning, Wilson took the time to respond to Devine's letters. But an answer to one of these letters only encouraged more, usually accompanied by various documents and newspaper and journal articles (many penned by Devine himself) designed to give the president "the correct" view of the Montenegrin question.31 Eventually even President Wilson tired of the game, and he never granted Devine the audience he sought. Even so,
the indefatigable Devine continued to pepper Wilson with letters, articles, and books, which in Devine's words, "[set] forth, I hope dispassionately and fairly, the suffering and injustice that [the] unfortunate [Montenegrin] people have had to submit to." And what was true for Wilson, was true for the Department of State. In fact, the department received even more correspondence from Devine than the White House.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF 1919

In the face of a mountain of reports concerning Serbian "excesses" in Montenegro, the Foreign Office began to modify its support for Belgrade's policies and actions. Officials in London and Paris came close to parroting many of Devine's arguments, though most of them would not have given him any credit for their new line of thinking.

Early in 1919, the Foreign Office actually contemplated an Anglo-American or, even better as far as the British were concerned, an American occupation of Montenegro, pending the definitive decision of the Paris Peace Conference. The U.S. government turned down the proposal, and Britain chose not to act alone. (The War Office argued that it could not spare troops in any event.) Subsequently, British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour proposed and the American government agreed to form a joint Anglo-American Commission to investigate conditions in Montenegro firsthand. It was initially understood that the report of this commission should play an important role in the formulation of subsequent British and American policy towards Montenegro. Balfour wanted to know "the real wishes of the Montenegrin people." In particular, he wanted to ascertain whether all reports "as to dissension in Montenegro have been wilfully exaggerated for the purposes of Italian propaganda." (This was the contention of Andrija Radovic, the "leader of the party of complete [Serbo-Montenegrin] fusion in Paris.") As head of the British representation the Foreign Office appointed none other than Count John de Salis, then the British envoy to the Vatican, but formerly His Majesty's minister at Cetinje. President Wilson appointed as his commissioner Lt. Colonel Sherman Miles, who had served initially as a member of Professor Archibald Coolidge's party at the peace conference. At the time Miles was conveniently stationed with American forces along the eastern Adriatic coast. Like Balfour, Secretary of State Lansing also requested clarification as to reports not only of Montenegrin resistance to the Serbian military presence but also of "alleged massacres of Albanians in Montenegro." Quoting British sources, Lansing wired Miles that "Gusinje, Plava, Ipek, Djakova [and other Montenegrin localities] had reportedly been the scenes of terrorism and murder by Serbian troops and Serbian agents whose policy appears to be the extermination of the Albanian inhabitants of the region." The Albanian issue aside, the fate of Montenegro as a separate—or even autonomous—political entity lay in the balance. In an appraisal virtually unthinkable only a few months before, Gerald Wellesley of what had been the overwhelmingly anti-Nicholas Foreign Office commented that "the only hope for Montenegro now lies in [this] Commission." Otherwise, noted Gerald Spicer, "the Montenegrins will...be left to the mercy of the Serbians." The question of "maltreatment of Montenegrins by the Serbians" was a topic of discussion at the meeting of the Council of Four on 17 May. It was agreed to adjourn the discussion pending the receipt of the Anglo-
American Commission’s report.38

As it happened, the two commissioners did not prepare a single, unified report, but instead wrote separate accounts. Miles, who had been directed to present himself in Paris immediately upon concluding his fact-finding journey to Montenegro, was the first to submit his findings in writing. On 19 and 21 May he submitted two lengthy written reports, the first on general political conditions in Montenegro (including questions of Serbian maltreatment of Montenegrins), the second on the question of alleged Serbian massacres of Albanians in Montenegro.39 On 24 May Miles gave an oral summary of his findings to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary of the American Delegation (excluding President Wilson) and, when asked, also gave specific recommendations.40

Some of Miles’s conclusions concerning the political conditions in Montenegro were as follows:

1. “It is very probable that the result of [the elections to the Podgorica assembly of November 1918 were] influenced, as politics have always been in Montenegro, by the military power back of the winning party. In any event, the pro-Serb party won the election, assembled the Government, and imprisoned the leaders of the opposing parties.... About the 20th of April, 1918 [sic] the Serbians executed a quiet coup d’etat, and ejected all the Montenegrin officials. The country is now nominally under a civil "Minister-Delegate" from Belgrade, who happens to have been born a Montenegrin but who was educated and has lived all his life in Serbia.... There is also at Cetinje a Serbian Major-General, who intimated to me that he was...the real Governor of Montenegro."

2. “In the neighborhood of Antivari [Bar] there are small bands of Montenegrin royalists, aided by local Albanians, who are opposing in a feeble manner both the Serbian Government and the Allied troops on the coast." Thus, he affirmed what was generally known—that at least some Albanians were making common cause with Montenegrins against Serbian or Serbo-Montenegrin rule.

3. "It would be absolutely impossible to ascertain the real political wishes of the Montenegrins except under a British or American occupation of the country.... As this would appear to be practically inadmissible, I consider that the best solution of the Montenegrin problem is the recognition by the Great Powers of Montenegro in the Yugo-Slav State, under guarantees from Yugo-Slavia that local autonomy will be granted and maintained in Montenegro. It is practically certain that even under these conditions the Serbians would use means of repression for political control in Montenegro; but, on the other hand, severe measures of repression will never repay the Serbians, because they are dealing with a warlike, mountainous people. I believe that in a comparatively short time the Montenegrins would reach their natural political
level, and that the country as a whole would profit by the protection gained through inclusion in Yugo-Slavia and by direct contact with the higher civilisation of the other Yugo-slav States."

4. "There are two other solutions. One is to abandon Montenegro wholly to Serbian control, which would be a political crime. The other is to reconstitute Montenegro as an independent state. I think this latter solution would be almost as great a mistake as the former, both because the barren mountainous district called Montenegro is geographically unfitted for self-sustained independence, and because there is no possible Government for an independent Montenegro except the dynasty of King Nicholas. It is, of course, impossible, without a plebiscite, to know what the Montenegrin people really think of King Nicholas, but all indications seem to show that he is discredited and despised by a majority of his people...

In his lengthy report of 21 May concerning the question of alleged Serbian atrocities against Albanians living in greater Montenegro, Miles noted the following:

1. Both sides acknowledged that hostilities had in fact taken place between "Serbo-Montenegrin elements" (including Serbian army units) and Albanian civilians, especially around the time of the Podgorica assembly of November 1918. Albanian sources reported massacres in the districts of Podgur, Plava, Gusinje, and Rozaj. According to Miles, "the Albanians state that of the 15 villages in the district of Rugova not a soul is now left. Eight hundred people were massacred there, not counting the men killed while resisting.... At Plava and Gusigne 333 women, children and old men were massacred." For their part, Serbo-Montenegrin officials denied allegations of massacres or acts of terrorism, telling Miles that about 100 people had been killed when Albanians had resisted "properly constituted authorities," casualties about equally divided between Serbo-Montenegrins and the Albanians. "Except for one or two Albanian women accidentally killed during the fighting in the villages," reported Miles, "they deny that any unarmed Albanians suffered."

2. According to Miles, "the details of the affair and even the responsibility for its beginning will probably never be determined impartially.... But it is an incontrovertible fact that there are now between 2000 and 2500 Albanian refugees from Montenegro who are now near Scutari, and undoubtedly many more in the mountains. Americans, British, French and Italians have seen these people come in, and agree that they refugeed out of their country taking with them little more than the clothes in which they stood. It is the grossest nonsense for the Serbo-Montenegrins to say that these Albanians, who had always lived in the [Montenegrin border districts had] abandoned their homes and property and fled in the depth of winter without being forced to do so. Nothing but force, accompanied by terrorism in the form of atrocities could
have produced the results that were produced. Nor is it at all probable that
the Montenegrins, unaided by the Serbians, could have forced the Albanians
out.

3. "The figure given me by the British Mission in Scutari [Albania] of between
18,000 and 25,000 Albanians killed is only an approximation as is the
Albanian estimate of 30,000 killed. But there can be no doubt that many
hundreds, if not thousands of Albanians were killed and that most, if not all
the rest were driven from their homes."

4. Miles suggested that in drawing the frontier between Albania and Montenegro
(or the new Yugoslav state in general) "geographic features will have to be
taken into consideration, but neither side should be favored on the ground of
what they are supposed to have done during the War." In his words, "the
Southern Slav and the Albanian are so essentially different, and even
antagonistic in all characteristics that it is impossible to expect them to live
in peace within the same political frontier for many generations to come."

Typically, perhaps inevitably, when reporting Miles's findings to President Wilson on
30 May, Secretary of State Lansing reduced the colonel's elaborate arguments (only some
of which are described here), to a single sentence:

His [Miles's] conclusions confirm reports from many other sources that the
solution of the Montenegrin question, which would best meet the wishes of
the people concerned, is the incorporation of this country into Yugo-Slavia
under guarantees of autonomy and the protection of local rights.41

This solution was the one the American government decided upon—or, perhaps more
accurately, it is the one which more or less conformed with what in fact transpired.
Guarantees of autonomy and protection of local rights aside, the U.S. government
acquiesced in the incorporation of Montenegro into the new Yugoslav state. Still, the role
of the Miles report in the formulation of American policy is not clear, in part because it is
not clear how seriously President Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, or the other American
deleagues took Colonel Miles's report. At a meeting of the American commissioners
plenipotentiary in Paris on 8 July, for example, little more than one month after Miles's
submission of his two reports and his personal appearance before the American
commissioners, the question of Montenegro, having been previously adjourned pending
President Wilson's receipt of Miles's reports, was taken up again. Curiously (or typically),
the principals did not seem to remember anything about Sherman Miles or his report.
Secretary of State Lansing asked Professor Coolidge: "I don't know who was on that [Anglo-
American] Commission. Do you know about that?" Professor Coolidge, whose staff had
originally included Miles, replied: "I haven't any information about it." Upon being
reminded by a third member of the delegation that Sherman Miles was the American
commissioner who had reported on Montenegro "several months ago," Lansing commented
that "we had better find out what his views are."

In any case, in the wake of the Miles report, Nicholas's star continued to fade. On 20 June 1919 Andrija Radović, a member of the Yugoslav delegation, a former prime minister of Montenegro, but a leader of the Serbo-Montenegrin opposition to Nicholas's continued rule, paid a call on the American delegation in Paris. When King Nicholas applied for an audience of ten or fifteen minutes with President Wilson the very next day, his request was turned down. The Yugoslav government subsequently named Radović a full delegate on 29 October 1919; the United States expressed no opposition or concern.

So much for Miles and his report. What about Count de Salis? After numerous delays and a lengthy stay in Montenegro, de Salis finally transmitted his lengthy report to the Foreign Office at the end of August. His findings and recommendations were essentially in line with Miles's. In the words of C. Howard Smith of the Foreign Office, de Salis, who ordinarily had nothing kind to say about King Nicholas and his government, had made out "a damning case against the Serbs." Oliphant called it a "doubtless fully deserved indictment." Alexander Devine, who had urged the creation of just such an inquiry in the first place, pressed the Foreign Office to make public the report he was convinced "would bear out all that he had said about the conditions in Montenegro." But the Foreign Office refused. Instead, it took the position that "we need [not] take any active part in the controversy from here." Their energies and patience expended, British diplomats chose to recognize, though not officially, what they had for some time considered to be fait accompli. In September Gerald Wellesley, writing to Treasury on behalf of Lord Curzon, matter-of-factly referred to Nicholas as "the ex-King."

De Salis's report was soon seconded by Major Harold W.V. Temperley of the general staff, who prepared a lengthy memorandum for the War and Foreign Offices in October. Temperley had been the first Allied representative to visit Montenegro after the armistice, and at the time the de Salis report was being studied in London, he had returned to northeastern Montenegro for an investigatory trip of his own. His conclusions were essentially the same as de Salis's: as bad as the existing situation was—and he admitted that it was very bad—it was still preferable to the return of King Nicholas. Thus, the best course of action was no course of action. The de Salis and Temperley reports became the basis for subsequent British policy vis-à-vis Montenegro.

AN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN MONTENEGRO

In conjunction with other provisions of the various armistices that ended World War I in October and November 1918, Allied governments discussed the possibility, indeed the necessity, of occupying enemy (and in some cases formally friendly) territory, pending the territorial decisions of the future peace conference. The British, their military lines already stretched to the utmost, suggested on more than one occasion that American forces actually occupy Montenegro, in part to help maintain order in the country, in part to serve as a
buffer between hostile Italian and Serbian military forces, both of which laid claim to much of the same territory along the Adriatic coast of the Balkan Peninsula. Italy claimed much of the Adriatic littoral in accordance with provisions of the Treaty of London of 1915. Rome coveted the Montenegrin coastline for various strategic reasons, including the desirability, from an Italian nationalist viewpoint, of preventing Serbia from acquiring the territory and thereby becoming an even more powerful political and military force—and rival—in the region.

Washington repeatedly declined British offers to have American forces "occupy" Montenegro. On the other hand, between November 1918 and September 1921, American naval and military forces did operate in the Adriatic area and were in fact given responsibility for controlling much of the Adriatic littoral of the Balkan Peninsula, an area stretching from Istria (which explains Colonel Miles's whereabouts at the time of his appointment to the Anglo-American Commission) to (and including) Montenegro. In fact American units did find themselves stationed on Montenegrin territory but were largely restricted to the coastal area, where they rubbed shoulders with Italian forces similarly dispatched. As Dragoljub Živojinović has pointed out, in the course of their stay on the Adriatic [American commanders were] very quickly brought...into open conflict with the Italians, who had preponderant influence in drafting and carrying out the provisions [of the armistice agreements pertaining to the area].... The Italians entrenched themselves [along the Adriatic] and imposed harsh measures against Yugoslav committees and organizations for self-government.  

Thus, American forces did find themselves providing a kind of buffer between Italian and Serbian military units in Montenegro, occasionally exchanging blows (and shots) with both. As mentioned before, the American presence was largely limited to the Montenegrin coastal area (notably Bar and vicinity), though on some occasions American troops did move into the interior of the country. American commanders did their utmost not to become involved in the civil struggle that pitted pro- and anti-Belgrade elements against one another. This did not prevent the two sides from occasionally accusing the American authorities of favoring the other.

In addition to armed forces, other American units—notably the Red Cross—also saw service in Montenegro in the immediate postwar years. Red Cross involvement in Montenegro had actually begun as early as 1915, when an agent of the Sanitary Commission to Serbia, Albania, and Montenegro managed to extend some relief during an outbreak of typhus in the region. Then, in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Montenegro in January 1916, the then Montenegrin consul in the United States, Anto Šeferović, approached the Red Cross about sending supplies to his homeland. Although the society was not in a position to act in Montenegro between 1916 and 1918, it recognized that there would be a great need for assistance when peace was finally achieved—and there was.
Relief units of the American Red Cross began arriving in Montenegro in the winter of 1918-19. Three years of occupation had depleted the country's food and clothing supplies. According to reports submitted to Red Cross headquarters, virtually the entire population was suffering from malnutrition and wearing old clothes or rags. Few doctors were on hand to care for the medical needs of 300,000-400,000 people, and there were no hospitals or drug supplies worthy of mention.

Almost immediately the Red Cross initiated a wide range of relief operations: providing medical and dental services, distributing clothing, maintaining soup kitchens and sewing rooms, teaching nursing, running orphanages, aiding schools, etc. The society promptly set up four hospitals in Montenegro, one each in Podgorica, Cetinje, Nikšić, and Kolašin; in the first nine months of 1919, they treated more than 22,000 cases. Similarly, the Red Cross brought modern dentistry to Montenegro. In the first few months of 1919, the lone dentist, Captain Bruce Wolff—no relation to Nero—extracted over 1,500 teeth.

Between May and October 1919 the Red Cross distributed 6,000 bundled sets of old clothes as well as tens of thousands of unbundled items. Throughout 1919, but especially in the winter and spring months, it maintained food and soup kitchens in Podgorica, Cetinje, Nikšić, and Grahovo, at which 126,000 meals were served between February and April 1919. Food distribution centers were set up elsewhere in the country. In 1919 approximately ten percent of all supplies, clothing, and money earmarked for Red Cross operations in the Balkans was sent to Montenegro. Six of fifty doctors went to Montenegro, as did a disproportionately large percentage of trucks, ambulances, cars, motorcycles, kitchen trailers, and gasoline.

One enthusiastic American Red Cross worker commented that "the salvation of Montenegro, devastated and starving, was accomplished by American-made automobiles, American drivers and American energy." While this self-congratulatory statement is certainly excessive, the governing authorities in Montenegro recognized the American contribution on several occasions. In a letter to Colonel Henry Fairclough, the head of the Red Cross Commission to Montenegro, the Serbian governor-general of Montenegro, W.P. Pavićević, wrote that "very many poor and sick people have escaped, thanks to you, from poverty, sickness and cold." The Montenegrin National Executive Committee likewise expressed its gratitude to the Red Cross "which has greatly facilitated our functions and has saved from misery thousands of our people." In Cetinje an imposing ceremony was held in front of the governor's palace, formerly the Russian legation. Pavićević received Red Cross members with military honors and decorated them in the name of King Peter I Karadjordjević. Three were awarded the Order of the White Eagle, twenty-three the Order of Saint Sava. The American Red Cross remained in Montenegro for the greater part of four years. The last unit was withdrawn early in the summer of 1922.
THE KINGDOM OF MONTENEGRO—INTO THE NIGHT SOFTLY

On 21 January 1921, the U.S. Department of State finally revoked the letters patent of Consul General Dix in New York, who had been Montenegro's only real representative in the United States for some time. In the words of Bainbridge Colby, Wilson's last secretary of state, this action ended "all official relations with the Kingdom of Montenegro." The royal government-in-exile protested vigorously from its new home in Rome and appointed a new representative, Luigi Criscuolo, in Dix's stead—but to no avail.

A State Department letter of December 1920 admitted that it was the department's view that "Montenegro, as a sovereign state, has, in fact, been non-existent" for a long time, but offered no firm reason to explain its failure to recognize formally Montenegro's incorporation into Yugoslavia. Officials speculated that this lack of action "may have been due" to a desire not to give offense to Italy pending the settlement of the Adriatic question as well as a desire to await the decisions of the constituent assembly of Yugoslavia, whose principal task was the definitive organization of the new Yugoslav state. The letter noted that if the United States wished to change its attitude toward Montenegro and Yugoslavia, the actions of the assembly might furnish a convenient occasion for doing so. They did not.

King Nicholas contributed greatly to a final resolution of the Montenegrin question by dying in exile at Cap d'Antibes, France, in May 1921, but all dreams of the restoration of an independent Montenegro did not die with him. As late as 1924, Jovan Plamenac, Nicholas's last foreign minister, tried to sell bonds in the United States on behalf of the "Kingdom of Montenegro." Moreover, members of the "International Committee for the Independence of Montenegro," including Luigi Criscuolo, continued to bombard the new League of Nations, the British Foreign Office, and the American State Department with political tracts for years to come.

For his part Alexander Devine also continued to fight the good fight. Throughout the 1920s he flooded the Foreign Office and Department of State with letters and treatises concerning Montenegro, and in 1920 he helped to organize what was called a "British Relief Mission" to Montenegro, initially under the command of one Colonel Cheke. Fortunately for Whitehall, the mission did not become directly involved in the Montenegrin civil conflict. As late as 1928, seven years after Nicholas's death, Devine was seeking to achieve a measure of justice for certain individual members of the Petrović-Njegoš family. In October 1928, for example, he wrote two letters to his old nemesis, R.W. Seton-Watson, one of the founders of Britain's new Yugo-Slav Society, in which he called upon Seton-Watson and other members of the society to consider the financial plight of King Nicholas's elderly daughter Xenia, who, according to reports, was being forced to sell bamboo furniture from her home on the French Riviera to make ends meet.
CONCLUSION

During the Paris Peace Conference, the British Foreign Office was reluctant to take a stand on Montenegro. Instead it essentially decided to "pass the buck"—to let "Paris" decide. The U.S. government, certainly the Department of State, did precisely the same thing. The problem was that "Paris" never decided. The "Montenegrin question" was widely discussed officially and unofficially at the peace conference, and spokesmen for pro-Serbian (pro-unification) and pro-Nicholas forces were duly heard at various sessions, each side vehemently denouncing the other. Still nothing was decided one way or the other. The British and American governments were content to let "Paris" decide, but "Paris" was content to let matters take their natural course. As a result, Montenegro ceased to exist as an independent state. It merged (or was merged)—willy nilly—with Serbia and the South Slavic components of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to create the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Thus, Montenegrin complaints about mistreatment at the hands of Serbian forces and Albanian allegations about Serbo-Montenegrin (especially Serbian) persecution and atrocities were left to wither away.

In conclusion, I would only note that in his famous book Peacemaking 1919, Harold Nicolson, who while in the Foreign Office held both King Nicholas and Alexander Devine in highest disregard, wrote:

The story of the submergence, or as Lord Cushendun would say, the suppression, of Montenegro, is not a very pleasant story.... I disliked and distrusted King Nikita [Nicholas], yet I felt he was almost in the right. I had a passion for the Yugoslav State, and yet I felt they had behaved very badly.... It was awkward to reflect that the balance of right inclined towards the [Montenegrin] dynasty, and the balance of wrong towards the Serbian liberators. It was in connection with this problem of Montenegro that my early faith in Self-Determination as the remedy for all human ills became clouded with doubts and reservations.72

Thus, writing many years after the fact, Harold Nicolson admitted that despite his "passion for the Yugoslav State," he had felt Nicholas had been "almost in the right."

NOTES


5. See Minutes of Grahame to Foreign Office, 3 October 1917, PRO FO 371/2968 p. 92.


7. Rodd to Foreign Office, 12 January 1916, PRO FO 371/2608/7401. Subsequently, Sir Edward Grey was not inclined to support a loan to Montenegro, writing "I see no reason for supporting [the proposal]. Montenegro never played the game in the war." Grey minute to Foreign Office draft to Treasury, 7 July 1916, PRO FO 371/2611/131668.


9. L.C. Minute, Devine to Balfour, 4 December 1917, PRO FO 371/2968 p. 140.


12. See PRO FO 371/2711.


14. Nicolson minute, 1 October 1917 (Bertie to Foreign Office, 27 September 1917), PRO FO 371/2968 p. 72. In May, Nicolson had written: "Mr. Devine is a most tiresome man." Nicolson minute, 19 May 1917, Devine to Undersecretary of State, 16 May 1917, PRO FO 371/2968 p. 34. In September he had written that "Mr. Devine is a most officious and exasperating person." Nicolson minute, 24 September 1917, Grahame to Foreign Office, 18 September 1917, PRO FO 371/2871 p. 225. A month later he wrote that "Mr. Devine is impossible." Nicolson minute, 27 October 1917, Devine to Balfour, 25 October 1917, PRO FO 371/2968 p. 117.

15. Devine to Balfour, 16 December 1917, PRO FO 371/2968 pp. 154-56.

17. Wilson to Nicholas, 12 April 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, LC, Reel 370, Series 4, Case File 4618.

18. Wilson to Nicholas, 10 July 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, LC, Reel 286, Series 4, Case File 551.

19. Dix to Wilson, 26 June 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reel 370, Series 4, Case File 4618.


21. Lansing to Wilson, 9 July 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reel 370, Series 4, Case File 4618. See also PRO FO 371/3149, esp. Nicolson memorandum, 2 August 1918, p. 9: "I have no particular bias against the Petrovich dynasty as such, but I am personally quite convinced, and I think most people will agree with me, that King Nikita is a reactionary, selfish and disreputable old man; and I cannot feel that Allied loans, to say nothing of private 'Red Cross' subscriptions, should be devoted to whitewashing him and his family... I submit that we should inform the United States Government exactly what we know and think of King Nikita, and should indicate to them that his representative in the United States is likely to direct his activities to the conduct of dynastic and dangerous propaganda for which purpose his will doubtless expend the subsidies being afforded by the two Allied Governments, if not the sums subscribed for the 'Montenegrin Red Cross Fund.'"


24. Devine to Wilson, 11 October 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reel 371, Series 4, Case File 4618. Accompanying Devine's letter to Wilson was a copy of a lengthy letter Devine had posted to King Nicholas the day before. Devine to Nicholas, 10 October 1919.


28. PRO FO 371/3566.

29. Devine to Wilson, 19 January 1919, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reel 427, Series 5D.

30. Devine to Wilson, 27 January 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reel 391, Series 5B.

31. Devine to Wilson, 27 January 1919, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reel 391, Series 5B.


33. See PRO FO 371/3579 and 3580; also Graham to FO, 24 January 1919, PRO FO 371/3565 p. 387.


37. FO Minutes, 19 March 1919, Derby to FO, 18 March 1919, PRO FO 371/3580 p. 165.

38. Excerpt from Council of Four minutes, 17 May 1919, NA, DOS, M 820, R 223, f. 790.


40. Excerpt from Minutes of a Meeting of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary of the American Delegation, 24 May 1919, NA, DOS, M 820, R 223, ff. 803-804.

41. Lansing to Wilson, 30 May 1919, DOS, NA, M 820, R 223, f. 794.

42. Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reel 412, Series 5B.

43. Woodrow Wilson Papers, Reels 412 and 413, Series 5B.


45. FO minutes (6 September 1919) to de Salis report, 22 August 1919, PRO FO 371/3580 pp. 597-98.


47. Ibid.

48. The officials in the Foreign Office had long been reluctant to take a stand, at least officially. Unofficially, they were pro-Serbian, or better pro-Yugoslav federation, almost to a man, though some were gradually discouraged by the means employed by the Serbian government and army to achieve what was generally considered a desirable end. Only George Grahame, the official British representative to the Montenegrin government-in-exile periodically indulged in what could be considered "Devinely inspired" rhetoric and argumentation on behalf of King Nicholas and his court. The minutes tell the story. As early as December 1917, in response to one of Devine's letters, officials wrote that "it hardly seems to matter to H[is]. M[ajesty's]. G[overnment], whether Montenegro is united to Serbia or not. King Nicholas has not done much to deserve our support." L.C. minute, Devine to Balfour, 4 December 1917, PRO FO 371/2968 p. 140. In September 1919, Mr. Gerald Wellesley writing to Treasury on behalf of Lord Curzon matter-of-factly referred to Nicholas as "the ex-King." Wellesley (FO) to Treasury, 5 September 1919, PRO FO 371/3576 p. 519.

49. Wellesley (FO) to Treasury, 5 September 1919, PRO FO 371/3576 p. 519.

50. Military Intelligence to FO (Temperley Report of 22 October 1919), 28 October 1919, PRO FO 421/297.

51. See, inter alia, Albrecht-Carrie.

52. Ibid., p. 2.

53. Strong to Boardman, 2 June 1915, RC Papers, NA, RG 200, Box 70, 962.52; NYT, 7 April 1915, p. 7.

54. O'Connor to Bicknell, 13 May 1916, RC Papers, NA, RG 200, Box 70, 962.5, Yugoslavia, Albania, Serbia & Montenegro, Health Activities.
55. Page to Boardman, 3 April 1916, RC Papers, NA, RG 200, Box 70, 962.08, Yugoslavia, Albania, Serbia & Montenegro, Reports, 1915-6/30/1916.


57. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

58. The initial shipment of fifty bales of second-hand garments was divided into bundles for men, women, and children—a man’s bundle including one complete outer suit, one set of underwear, one shirt, one tie, and one pair of shoes. Ibid., pp. 83-86.


61. Ibid., p. 124.

62. The letter continues: "The Americans came at a time when our country was in a most critical condition and the generous assistance they gave us will always be remembered gratefully by Montenegrins." Ibid., p. 126.

63. Ibid., pp. 124, 128, and 132.

64. Bicknell to Fieser, 19 December 1922, RC Papers, NA, RG 200, Box 823, 900.02, Montenegrin Relief Association; Wadsworth to Mitchell, 9 January 1923; Bicknell to Dinwiddie, 24 January 1923.


68. Criscuolo to Hughes, 23 December 1924, NA, M358-18, fr. 182-3.

69. See PRO FO 371/3682.


71. Foreign Office minutes concerning the possibility of Allied acceptance of elections to the Podgorica assembly and the incorporation of Montenegro into the new South Slav state: "This must be settled in Paris." Minute of 12 January 1919, Rodd to FO, 10 January 1919, PRO FO 371/3565 p. 351; "Let Peace Delegation deal with it." Minute of 22 January 1919, Soc to Grahame, 16 January 1919, PRO FO 371-3565, p. 381; "I think this is clearly a question to be dealt with in Paris." G. Grahame to Curzon, 17 January 1919, PRO FO 371/3565 p. 378.