SUMMARY

• In recent times, and since the potential security threat posed by failed states became more apparent, there has been a realization at the highest levels of the U.S. government and most governments around the globe that international development plays a key role in national security strategy. Consequently, the need for a more coherent, holistic, and comprehensive strategy for development and peacebuilding interventions in fragile or failed states has emerged as a prominent theme in recent U.S. and other governments’ policy discussions.

• To ensure the efficacy of a comprehensive strategy, coordination, or at least cooperation and coherence between international agencies involved in countries affected by conflict, has to improve in some way.

• Afghanistan is a fragile state in which, during the last year and a half, various development actors have attempted to create a more comprehensive approach to building relationships between the Afghanistan government and international agencies by linking security and development procedures and programs.

• The centrality of government to the state-building process and subsequent creation of government-led and -endorsed planning mechanisms to facilitate reconstruction and development have transformed the civil-military environment.

• Civil-military relations in Afghanistan are no longer characterized by the debate pertaining to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the wisdom of the military’s involvement in development activities. Instead, the international military presence is strengthening the process of state building by utilizing subnational governance structures to identify Afghanistan’s development needs.

• However, the relationship between international NGOs and military actors remains controversial, even though coordination between the two is a crucial element of the state-building agenda and is a significant determinant of local support for Afghanistan’s overarching political process.

• The challenge for international actors is to move beyond the conceptualization of “civil-military relationships” as merely an operational issue concerning the day-to-day interactions between civilian and military personnel and agencies on the ground level, and begin to incorporate a policy of integration at the country policy and strategic levels.
What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States

About the Series

This occasional paper is the third in a series titled, “What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States.” The series is based on a series of public forums held in 2006 and 2007 under the direction of Ambassador Howard Wolpe, director of the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The series aims to examine key thematic issues that affect conflict transformation in settings of weak and conflict-prone societies. This third occasional paper is based on a public forum that took place on February 27, 2007, at the Wilson Center, titled, “Linking Security and Development in State Building: Recent Lessons From Afghanistan.” Michael Lund, consulting program manager to the Leadership Project and senior specialist for conflict and peacebuilding at Management Systems International Inc. (MSI), moderated the session. The publication was compiled and edited by Haider Mullick, with contributions and oversight by Georgina Petrosky and Sarah Cussen of the Leadership Project.

Linking Security and Development in State Building: Recent Lessons from Afghanistan

About the Contributors

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J. Alexander Thier is senior rule of law advisor at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). From 2003 to 2004, Thier was legal advisor to Afghanistan’s Constitutional and Judicial Reform Commissions in Kabul, where he assisted in the development of a new constitution and judicial system. Additionally, Thier worked as a United Nations (UN) and NGO official in Afghanistan during the civil war, from 1993 to 1996, and was officer-in-charge of the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan in Kabul. Detailed biographical statements are available on page 12.

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INTRODUCTION

Applying a Holistic Approach to Peacebuilding
by Michael Lund

Multifaceted Approaches to Security and Development

Like the previous forums in this series, the following discussion is motivated by an interest in probing into “what really works” in preventing and rebuilding failed or fragile states. Our purpose is to get beyond a commonly heard discourse in which development actors promote one particular program or project in a conflict-affected country, feeling little obligation to present any evidence of actual results. We seek to probe more deeply into what kinds of approaches are effective in the field in improving the lives, both in terms of security and development, of the people in countries that are affected by conflict and/or state breakdown.

The need for a more coherent, holistic, and comprehensive strategy to peacebuilding in fragile or failed states has emerged as a prominent theme in recent policy discussions in the United States and elsewhere. The ubiquitous stove-piped, sector-specific approach to post-conflict peacebuilding—in which programmatic instruments in the peacebuilding toolbox such as rule of law, refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), humanitarian assistance, education, health, democracy building, elections, and security are carried out by a variety of development and other actors with little reference to one another—is no longer believed to suffice. Rather, the aim should be to create multifaceted strategies that identify and address the short and long-term underlying drivers of conflict, or potential conflict, in specific country contexts and are implemented more collaboratively by a number of actors. Recent efforts to encourage a “whole-of-government” approach to peacebuilding, such as the U.S. government’s National Security Strategy 2006, emphasize the three Ds of state building: development, diplomacy, and defense. The establishment of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State is evidence of an increased awareness of the need for wider and more constructive cooperation among aid agencies. To ensure the efficacy of such a comprehensive strategy, coordination, or at least cooperation and coherence between international agencies involved in countries affected by conflict, has to improve in some way. However, such collaboration is extremely difficult to achieve among competing NGOs or public agencies, many of which are chronically starved for funds and have differing mandates. So is this notion simply the latest buzzword being echoed around the halls of our government, in the UN Secretariat, or in the European Commission, with little chance of being carried out?

Collaboration between Governments and International Agencies

Afghanistan is a fitting test case for probing the question of whether effective collaboration is working or even possible. Afghans have witnessed close to three decades of war, and Afghanistan, if not a failed state, is a fragile state in which, during the last year and a half, various development actors have attempted to create a more comprehensive approach to building relationships between the Afghanistan government and international agencies by linking security to development procedures and programs. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), building upon the earlier Bonn Agreement, reflects these efforts, as do the provincial reconstruction teams that attempt to integrate security and development through civilian-military cooperation at the community level.

Most of the time, this topic has been addressed as a matter of “civil-military relationships,” suggesting an operational issue concerning the day-to-day interactions between civilian and military personnel and agencies on the ground level, where inter-organiza-
tional cultural tensions often arise. But this discussion is looking at integration also at the country policy and strategic levels. This discussion addresses the following three critical questions that are relevant to the case of Afghanistan:

• Are holistic approaches in fact being implemented in Afghanistan?
• What are the major challenges in establishing such approaches?
• Have these approaches, to the extent they are carried out, led to more effective achievement of both security and development?

For insights about the experiments in collaborative action between security and development initiatives to date in Afghanistan, we turn to three analyst/practitioners who have considerable recent experience in Afghanistan. Each of our contributors has been involved in initiatives intended to mobilize and engage a variety of actors toward a wider peacebuilding goal, so they are eminently qualified to explore the questions above.
The partnership between the government of Afghanistan and the international community will face several challenges in 2007, not least the insurgency in the south and east of Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan has responded to the insurgency by requesting further donor support to expand the state's security apparatus. In lieu of aid disbursements to cover the long-term recurrent costs associated with increasing police and army recruit numbers, a budgetary balancing act will be required to ensure that increased security expenditures do not result in a parallel decrease in resources for rebuilding and sustaining Afghanistan’s human and physical capital.

Balancing Expectations: Security at the Cost of Development?
Should the government of Afghanistan fail to meet public expectations with regards to service provision, its own legitimacy will be undermined. It is entirely plausible, therefore, that insecurity in the south and east of the country has the potential to destabilize and undermine state-building efforts throughout Afghanistan and reverse the gains made to date, if the newly created infrastructure falls into a state of disrepair as a result of fiscal pressures.

While combating the insurgency, the government of Afghanistan is also fighting a war of perception. Polling data recently gathered by various sources—including the Asia Foundation, the Program on International Policy Attitudes, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies—indicates that while Afghans remain committed to a post-Taliban Afghanistan and prefer the status quo over alternatives such as a return to the Taliban, support for President Hamid Karzai and the executive branch of government is decreasing.

Impatience with the pace of service provision is one reason for wavering support. The failure of ministries to spend development budgets on building Afghanistan’s human and physical capital through service provision is linked to an absence of capacity within line ministries. Corruption and the perception of impunity is another reason for decreased levels of support. There remains no silver bullet for dealing with these challenges, apart from recognizing that the political will of the government must be employed to respond to the expectations of the Afghan public.

For all the challenges currently facing the state-building coalition in Afghanistan, the country has progressed remarkably since 2001. To appreciate this fact, one must remember the destruction Afghanistan faced after Soviet occupation, after its own civil war, and after the rule of the Taliban. Afghanistan is not a typical post-conflict country; in fact, it cannot even be considered post-conflict yet. Nonetheless, service provision has commenced and reconstruction and development in Afghanistan is now being pursued within a government-led framework: the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy
The ANDS sits across three pillars: first, security; second, governance, rule of law, and human rights; and finally, economic and social development. The ANDS is also linked to the Afghanistan Compact, a series of benchmarks representing the state-building partnership between the government of Afghanistan and the international community, agreed upon at the London Conference in 2006. Preparations to complete the ANDS are underway and include sub-national consultations, the creation of comprehensive sector strategies, and the completion of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which will identify policies and programs for broad-based growth and poverty reduction.
Government-led and -endorsed planning mechanisms coordinate and operationalize the ANDS and Afghan Compact by identifying needs, suggesting and endorsing policy prescriptions, and coordinating the development inputs of a diverse array of state-building actors. These planning mechanisms are found centrally, provincially, and locally.

Central mechanisms include the budget and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. The Board provides political and policy support for the Afghan Compact and also deals with coordination, implementation, and financing issues. At the sub-national level of governance, provincial development committees and local shurahs identify and prioritize reconstruction and development requirements. Developing the capacity of both will facilitate decentralization of government functions, which is crucial to ensure that government is responsive to the needs of even the most remotely located Afghan.

Civil-Military Cooperation

The centrality of government to the state-building process, and the subsequent creation of government-led and -endorsed planning mechanisms to facilitate reconstruction and development, have transformed the civil-military environment. Civil-military relations in Afghanistan are no longer characterized by the debate pertaining to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the wisdom of the military’s involvement in development activities. Instead, the international military presence is strengthening the process of state building by utilizing sub-national governance structures to identify Afghanistan’s development needs.

In the absence of comprehensive sector strategies, best practice of military actors undertaking development activities was recently exemplified by the approach of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) regional command, based in Kabul. Operating as part of ISAF IX and X, its political and development officers identified geographical locations and specific locales in which there existed an absence of reconstruction and development with an increased likelihood of instability. ISAF’s first point of contact in this process was the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA was contacted to ascertain whether the provincial development committees had established a list of development priorities. If so, ISAF and UNAMA representatives determined which activities had been completed, started, or postponed. If no such activities were planned or underway, ISAF and UNAMA representatives determined the most suitable development framework for the specific geographic area. The development framework was formulated in partnership with the line ministry representatives, who were contacted early in the process to ensure the sustainability of potential projects and to guarantee an Afghan face to project outcomes. ISAF representatives also sought feedback from local communities and NGOs.

Potential projects for a specific locale were classified into separate categories including those that could be conducted by ISAF and those that required donor assistance. Actual ISAF participation in reconstruction and development activities was often determined by existing ISAF technical capacity, such as the availability of engineers. If donor assistance was required, ISAF representatives submitted project documents to donors. Once a donor expressed interest, ISAF representatives sought out an implementing partner and developed information campaigns which best described the planned project and intended benefits for the project’s recipients. The role of government throughout the process was highlighted to reinforce Afghan ownership.

Development actors within PRTs operated in much the same way. Extending the writ of central government translated into developing the sub-national state-building mechanisms by mentoring Afghans to assume responsibility for reconstruction and development. A local shurah (community group) in eastern Afghanistan may have suggested
the construction of a school, but representatives from USAID, who are located within U.S. PRTs ensured that other elements associated with infrastructure development, such as staffing requirements, were considered. U.S. PRTs are now required to choose projects from provincial development plans, which were created as a result of sub-national consultations.

Security-Development Nexus

As a result of the insurgency, however, civil-military relations have returned to a more traditional division of labor, through which military actors have been compelled to reassume their primary role as security providers. Insecurity has also reinforced the nexus between security and development. In response to the insurgency, the Policy Action Group (PAG) was created in July 2006 as a crisis management body for the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, and Zabol. The action group meets weekly, usually under the chairmanship of the national security advisor, and highlights priority challenges in the areas of reconstruction and development, strategic communication, and intelligence and security operations.

Successes to date have included the successful completion of polio vaccination campaigns that were coordinated between military actors and health service providers to ensure that target areas were free from conflict for the duration of the vaccination campaign. The creation of Afghan Development Zones (ADZ) is another initiative between security and development actors within the PAG structure. ADZs are strategically important geographic areas where improvements in security and governance will enable development actors to operate. Consequently, the PAG is credited with increased coordination and cooperation between the government of Afghanistan and the international community, as well as improved coordination between security and development actors.

NGOs and Military Actors: A Contentious Relationship

The relationship between international NGOs and military actors remains controversial even though the relationship between the two is a crucial element of the state-building agenda and is a significant determinant of local support for Afghanistan's overarching political process. The Afghan population is likely to decide whether state building in Afghanistan is worthy of continued support based on the efficacy of the NGO-military collaboration.

To date, international NGO attitudes towards their military counterparts have fluctuated between a willingness to engage and a refusal to do so. NGO representatives attempting to explain the aversion of NGOs to working with the military cite the twin humanitarian pillars of impartiality and neutrality as key reasons for non-engagement. It can be reasoned, however, that this argument is neutralized when NGOs, in effect, leave their impartiality and neutrality at the door when they embark on a highly politicized development agenda that requires operational coordination and cooperation to maximize available resources.

Joint operations between international NGOs and military actors do not occur at present, but at the very least, joint operations should be considered, if only to acknowledge the similarity of objectives that drive state-building actors and the overarching political agenda that even the most apolitical organization is supporting through its very presence in Afghanistan.

—Candace Karp
Conclusion

When addressing what really works in rebuilding failed states, coordination and cooperation between civilian and military actors is fundamental in the civil-military sphere. Additionally, empowering the government and operating through government structures is logical, as is training to build indigenous capacity. The international community should, after all, aim for its own redundancy. Finally, civilian and military actors, and the governments that dispatch them, must recognize that state building is a generational process.
There has been a realization at the highest levels of the U.S. government and most governments around the globe that development plays a key role in national security. As a result, USAID is increasingly working in conflict-prone countries alongside the U.S. military. USAID, the U.S. Department of State, and the military play important roles in achieving effective defense, diplomacy, and development strategies.

Historical Perspective
To understand how USAID is now working with the U.S. military, ISAF, international donors, and, most importantly, with the Afghan government, it is necessary to analyze Afghanistan’s historical context. Before the U.S. intervention of 2001, Afghanistan had a licit economy of approximately $2.4 billion, no formal banking system, fewer than a million children in school, no access to basic healthcare, and one of the worst maternal and infant mortality rates in the world. Afghanistan was a rural and agricultural society with very few paved roads or other infrastructure, limited electricity provision, widespread illiteracy, and a growing poppy problem.

However, following September 11, 2001, the country became the focal point of the global “war on terror,” and U.S. and coalition forces were mobilized to remove the Taliban and the remaining Al-Qaeda camps. As a result, a nascent democratic government is now in place with a standing army and police force. Due to the will of the Afghan people and the support of the United States and many other donors over the past five years, significant progress indicators have emerged. In fact, the licit economy is now estimated at $8.8 billion dollars and is growing much faster than the illicit economy—the Afghan Central Bank now has 32 branches nationwide. Additionally, more than six million children are now in school, 80 percent of the population has some access to healthcare, more than 4,200 kilometers of roads have been paved or repaired by the United States alone, and hundreds of schools and clinics have been rebuilt or repaired.

Challenges to Development
While significant progress in Afghanistan is evident, several challenges remain. From a security perspective, the most pressing issues include the insurgency that is growing in the south and the southeast, and the poppy problem, which is worse than it has ever been. From a development perspective, less than ten percent of the country has access to electricity, maternal and infant mortality remains high, and literacy, particularly among women in rural areas, is very low. Insecure environments make it difficult to obtain the development information needed to prioritize and implement successful programs.

To address both the security and development needs of the Afghan people, USAID has fostered a close working relationship with the military, the donor community, and the Afghan government. USAID works closely with the U.S. military and NATO to ensure that programs are implemented in conflict-ridden areas and not just directly after the conflict. Additionally, development advisors are situated within each of the NATO regional commands in Logar, Khost, Herat, and Kandahar, as well as within the ISAF headquarters in Kabul and Bagram. Those advisors provide development advice and information to the commanding officers and try to ensure that military-funded reconstruc-
tion projects are developmentally sound and well coordinated with other donors and the central government. Recognizing that there remains room for improvement, it is important to note that there has been significant progress in the past four years.

U.S. Civil-Military Integration

USAID field staff, including field program officers who serve in the PRTs, are the strongest element of USAID’s coordination efforts with the military. With military support, the PRTs provide food, housing, force protection, and other forms of reconstruction assistance to expand the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government. Field program officers in the PRTs monitor the development programs in the provinces and serve as the eyes and ears of USAID staff who have restricted travel opportunities. Additionally, the field program officers coordinate with the military on development issues and advise the military on sustainable reconstruction spending.

The field officers themselves have modest budgets to implement small-scale community development projects in the provinces. While the focus of these projects a couple of years ago was on quick impact projects, mostly concentrated on local infrastructure, the program now advocates strengthening ties between communities—including traditional bodies like shurahs, local government officials, and some of the development councils—in order to encourage more meaningful community participation. However, due to security concerns, even these development efforts have to be overseen by the military.

To facilitate enhanced coordination between security and development efforts, the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance at the State Department and the Office of Military Affairs at USAID have been created to facilitate collaboration between the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense in Washington, DC. USAID advisors are also learning more about civil-military cooperation by working closely with the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

As a result of increased cooperation with the military, USAID priorities have been adapted to focus specifically on roads. In an effort to expand the reach of the U.S. coalition and Afghan military into conflict areas, enable elected local and provincial Afghan leaders to speak with their constituencies, and facilitate economic development in outlying areas, USAID and military priorities focus on expanding paved and permanent roads throughout the country. Such a focus was also necessary to encourage the cessation of poppy production and provide farmers with adequate roads to transport fruits and vegetables to market.

Inter-Donor Coordination

USAID priorities have also been influenced through coordination with other donors. USAID’s close collaboration with the United Kingdom on counter-narcotics, for example, greatly influenced the U.S. decision to ramp up efforts in that area in the last two years. Additionally, USAID coordinates closely with the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) on alternative livelihoods programs in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, where Canadian troops run the PRTs. In the area of justice reform, USAID works closely with Italy to increase the capacity of the Afghan government to arrest and prosecute criminals under the rule of law. Equally, the European Union, Japan, and Saudi Arabia are working closely with USAID to build the ring road around Kabul and several other key provincial roads.
Inter-Governmental Collaboration

Most importantly, however, is USAID’s collaboration with the government of Afghanistan. The key to success is working with the central, provincial, and local governments to ensure that they have the capacity to provide basic rule of law, governance, and social services throughout the country. The Afghan government has committed to building the requisite capacity and political will needed to meet these lofty goals through the Afghan Compact. The United States is working closely with the Afghan government to attain these goals. The presidents of the United States and Afghanistan formed a strategic partnership to formalize an annual review process to monitor progress on specific economic prosperity and governance priorities. The economic prosperity working group was convened in February 2007 to provide an opportunity to candidly discuss the ANDS and to identify priorities, problems, and solutions. Capacity building remains the number one priority necessary to enhance prosperity, increase aid effectiveness, and build better governance particularly at the local level.

Capacity Building as a Critical Element of Success

As a result of the recognized need for increased capacity building, President Bush’s 2007 supplemental request to counter the insurgency in the south and southeast identified three main development priorities. These priorities included roads, electricity, and rural development. Recognizing the strategic security and development utility of paved roads, the government of Afghanistan, the U.S. military, and USAID also agreed that the hearts and minds of Afghans in the south could not be won without bringing electricity to Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Equally, the Afghan government and other donors advocated on behalf of a comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy—that focuses as much on alternative livelihoods as on narcotics eradication and interdiction—as the only recipe for a comprehensive strategy to counter poppy cultivation. Consequently, the United States has decided to focus on rural development and alternative livelihoods as a mechanism of effective capacity building and has come to recognize the importance of integrating capacity building strategies into every element of development and security initiatives.

Five years following the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, USAID is taking the time to invest in dialogue with the U.S. military, international donors, and all levels of the Afghan government to set development and security priorities. The U.S. government is listening to and integrating the thoughts, perspectives, and priorities of those involved, thereby enhancing civil-military integration so that a more prosperous and secure Afghanistan can exist. The lessons learned from Afghanistan will also better prepare the U.S. government for future crises where a whole of government approach is needed.

“...the United States has decided to focus on rural development and alternative livelihoods as a mechanism of effective capacity building and has come to recognize the importance of integrating capacity building strategies into every element of development and security initiatives.”

—Mark Ward
In order to assess the success of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, it is important to address the context in which the intervention took place, the U.S. commitment to the intervention, and the resulting investment strategy.

Historical Context

In the last 30 years, Afghanistan endured five major regime changes, each accompanied by tremendous violence that paralyzed any efforts toward political stability. In the 1970s, Afghanistan was already one of the poorest, least developed countries in the world. It is resource-scarce, poverty-stricken, mountainous, and landlocked by often unfriendly neighbors; all factors that serve as negative indicators of political stability and economic growth. In fact, the 2004 Human Development Report rated Afghanistan the sixth least developed country in the world and the poorest outside sub-Saharan Africa, ranking just above Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso.

Statistics from 2004 indicate that Afghanistan had an under-five infant mortality rate of 25 percent. Furthermore, the maternal mortality rate was recorded at 1.6 percent. When multiplied by the birth rate, that equals approximately seven to eight percent of Afghan women dying in childbirth. Additionally, the average life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44.5 years, the lowest in the world.

Afghanistan underwent a 25-year period of deconstruction prior to 2001 that resulted in the delegitimization of the state and radical decentralization. Politically and economically, the country had broken apart, and all major state systems that facilitated central governance, such as roads, taxes, and justice systems, were destroyed or decentralized to the local level. Consequently, the key elements of state-building in 2001 should have been providing security, rebuilding the legitimacy of the central government, and providing public goods to the people living in the rural areas.

U.S. Commitment to the Intervention in Afghanistan

A key failure of the initial U.S. intervention was the decision not to provide security throughout the country, reinforcing the power of unaccountable local and regional leaders, while only providing public goods to the center. The U.S. commitment to security and nation building in Afghanistan lacked consistency. For example, Governor George W. Bush, quoted in an October 2000 presidential debate, said, “I don't think our troops should be used for what is called ‘nation building.’” However, only 18 months later as president, Bush invoked the Marshall Plan stating, “We will stay until the mission is done. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan develop its own government. We are working in the best traditions of George Marshall.” This dramatic shift in rhetoric was unfortunately not achieved in reality. By February 2003, the BBC World Service reported that “The United States Congress has stepped in to find nearly $300 million in humanitarian and reconstruction funds for Afghanistan after the Bush administration failed to request any money in the latest budget.”

Part of this inconsistency was due to the fact that the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan had conflicting goals and priorities that became evident during the first two years. Following September 11, 2001, the immediate goal was not to rebuild Afghanistan economically, or create a stable democracy, but simply to rapidly dismantle Al-Qaeda. The second goal was to transform Afghanistan into a stable and secure country that would never again be a haven for global terrorist networks. These goals need not have been mutually exclusive; indeed, they should be mutually reinforcing. In attempting to remove Al-Qaeda, how-
ever, the United States made a critical strategic error. The United States embraced warlords such as Rashid Dostum, Ismael Khan, and Gul Agha Shirzai—who the U.S. government, State Department, and UN, among others, had previously condemned for human rights abuses—and made them chief allies in the war on terror. The failure to provide security and expand the ISAF outside Kabul between 2001 and 2003 enabled the warlords to consolidate their military, economic, and political control over their regions. Post-conflict environments are like wet cement; there is an initial window for change, and then in a few years, political and economic forces start to harden. Unfortunately, realizing the policy flaws of the earlier years and simply increasing assistance will not solve the problems. However, this appears to be the investment strategy that has driven the U.S. intervention.

The U.S. Investment Strategy: Security & Aid - Too Little, Too Late?

Graph 1 above, developed by CARE International, compares the aid levels in the first few years in Afghanistan to the aid levels during other major interventions.

A dramatic difference in post-conflict foreign aid is evident between the aid spent on Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003 and the five other cases. It is notable that, of these cases, Afghanistan was seen as a critical national security priority to the U.S. government and international community; however, in comparison, it was dramatically under-resourced. Additionally, during the first two years of the intervention, far fewer peacekeepers were stationed in Afghanistan compared to the other countries as shown in the table below.

In 2003, Afghanistan had 4,800 peacekeepers, which translates into one peacekeeper for every 5,380 Afghans. While the total number of peacekeepers in Afghanistan exceeded those in Rwanda and Croatia, Afghanistan ranked worst when rated by population per peacekeeper. Rwanda had the second lowest number of peacekeepers per population, with one peacekeeper for every 3,350 people. In Kosovo there was one peacekeeper for every 48 people.

Since 2001, the overall cost of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan has largely remained the same at approximately $17 billion a year despite increases in

“A key failing of the initial U.S. intervention was the decision not to provide security throughout the country, reinforcing the power of unaccountable local and regional leaders, while only providing public goods to the center. The U.S. commitment to security and nation building in Afghanistan lacked consistency.... Part of this inconsistency was due to the fact that the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan had conflicting goals and priorities that became evident during the first two years.”
—J. Alexander Thier
troop levels. As of this year, U.S. engagement in Afghanistan has cumulatively cost approximately $110 billion since 2001. The graph above compares the amount of U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan in blue to the total U.S. expenditure on OEF in green.

It is important to note that in the decade from 1990 to 2000, the cumulative U.S. investment in Afghanistan was a mere $350 million—a startling comparison to the $110 billion spent on OEF from 2001 to 2006. However, the cost of OEF, and particularly the increased cost in troop levels over the last couple of years, has primarily been in response to the need to fight resurgence in the insurgency rather than directly provid-

### TABLE 1: Population per Peacekeepers

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Peacekeepers</th>
<th>Sq. kms. per PK</th>
<th>Population per PK</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo (KFOR NATO)</td>
<td>48,159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia (IFOR-NATO)</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia (UNTAES)</td>
<td>2,847</td>
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<td>East Timor (UNTAET)</td>
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<td>Bosnia (UNPROFOR)</td>
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<td>Somalia (UNOSOM II)</td>
<td>28,000</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</td>
<td>17,472</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (ISAF)</td>
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</table>

Source: Care International (2003)

### GRAPH 2: Combined OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) Costs and Aid ($ in Millions)

![Graph showing combined OEF costs and aid from 1990-2006](image-url)
ing security for the majority of Afghans. Interestingly, in the summer of 2003, the Pentagon developed a program for Afghanistan called “accelerating success,” through which it became evident that the U.S. government had recognized that a significant deficiency in funding existed. The red line in Graph 2 indicates the increase in funding levels that began in 2003 and peaked in 2005.

As a result of the rising insurgency and regrouping of the Taliban in the south, total U.S. troop levels began to rise in 2003 and increased dramatically from 2004 to 2006 as evidenced in Graph 3. The graph also indicates a decline in U.S., non-ISAF troops that decreased from 2005 to 2006 as a result of their absorption into the ISAF force in 2006. Consequently, both U.S., non-ISAF and U.S., ISAF forces have been dramatically reconfigured.

**GRAPH 3: Troop levels in Afghanistan**

**GRAPH 4: U.S. Aid to Afghanistan: Security, Counter-Narcotics, Health, and Education**
Since 2003, there has been a dramatic increase in funding for security initiatives focused mainly on rebuilding the army and national police force as indicated in Graph 4 on page 15.

Obviously, the rhetoric that promoted preparing the Afghans to take on their own security was not initially met with the magnitude of funding that could have made it a reality. Unfortunately, while significant progress has been made with the Afghan National Army, the funding started too late. Counter-narcotics funding also increased dramatically after opium production and trafficking grew out of control. In fact, the recent growth of the counter-narcotics budget dwarfs funding for development. According to the available statistics, the development budget directed at the health and education sectors has been declining in recent years. Consequently, U.S. foreign aid is predominantly focused on security and counter-narcotic issues at the expense of support for development projects.

Sectoral Reform
There are several sectors of Afghan society that could benefit from additional development resources. Attention still needs to be focused on delivering a peace dividend that will encourage Afghans to embrace the government. For example, the ring road around Afghanistan needs to be completed and additional infrastructure projects should be identified. Equally, enormous gaps continue to exist in the strategy to develop the justice system. Justice is one of the most important hallmarks of legitimacy for Afghans.

Conclusion
In the years immediately after the fall of the Taliban, U.S. policy in Afghanistan followed a predominantly military strategy to eradicate Al-Qaeda. This approach had the spillover effect of dismantling an oppressive regime only to replace it with a marriage of convenience between the central government and the regional warlords. The weak national government failed to provide security, thereby dampening any long-term sustainable socioeconomic development and political stability. In response, the United States increased security aid at the expense of development aid. More broadly, a key reason for Afghanistan’s slow progress is that political attention and resources were diverted to Iraq. Serious, long-term commitment will be required by Afghanistan and its international partners to set Afghanistan back on the path to stability.
Conclusion

Sustainable development comes from “mainstreaming development” with building state capacity, integrating civil and military operations, and increasing inter-donors collaboration. While short-term marriages of convenience such as the one between the Afghan central government and the warlords are counterproductive to long-term development, strong partnerships between civil society, military, and governmental organizations are essential for peacebuilding. For Afghanistan to truly become a success story, efforts aimed at providing security and implementing development projects must be backed by judicial reform.

CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

Michael Lund, consulting program manager to the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, is senior specialist for conflict and peacebuilding at Management Systems International Inc. (MSI). Author of Preventing Violent Conflicts (1996), Lund has been a leading specialist in the field of intra-state violent conflicts, with a special focus on post-conflict settings and conflict prevention. At the Wilson Center, he designed and helped to direct an inter-disciplinary, inter-agency working group that assessed the impacts of systematic conflict transformation training with key political leaders in six countries, the findings of which will be published as a book in 2008 co-edited with Howard Wolpe. Currently, he is co-editing and writing analytical chapters for a volume of country case studies by the International Peace Academy on the respective roles of security and development programs in achieving sustainable peace. At MSI, and earlier at Creative Associates, he researched the sources of intra-state conflicts and has conducted conflict assessments in several countries, such as Burundi, Georgia, Guatemala, Kosovo, Macedonia, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe, and he has pioneered the formulation of systematic methodologies to evaluate the effectiveness of development and peacebuilding programs in reducing conflict (“peace and conflict impact assessment”). He has applied these methods to a wide range of development policies both at the micro (program) and macro (multi-program) levels. His analyses have been contracted by such diverse organizations as the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, the World Bank, the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the European Commission, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as well as several international NGOs. Lund was the founding director of the Jennings Randolph Fellows Program and is a senior scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and taught at Cornell, U.C.L.A., the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, and the University of Maryland.

Candace Karp is currently the special assistant to the president of Afghanistan’s senior economic advisor. For the past six years, Karp has worked in numerous capacities in Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Afghanistan, focusing on reconstruction and development in state building frameworks, civil-military affairs, and international humanitarian and human rights law. She is the author of Missed Opportunities: US Diplomatic Failures and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1967 (2005), in addition to numerous articles on state building and U.S. strategy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Karp holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Queensland, Australia, an Honors degree in History from the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and a B.A. from the University of Queensland.
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The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is the living, national memorial to President Wilson established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C. It is a nonpartisan institution, supported by public and private funds, engaged in the study of national and world affairs. The Wilson Center establishes and maintains a neutral forum for free, open and informed dialogue. The Center commemorates the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson by providing a link between the world of ideas and the world of policy and fostering research, study, discussion and collaboration among a full spectrum of individuals concerned with policy and scholarship in national and world affairs.

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ABOUT THE LEADERSHIP PROJECT

The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, launched in June 2005, expands upon the work of the former Conflict Prevention Project and responds to the growing demand for leadership training directed at both the prevention of violent conflict and the reconstruction of war-torn societies.

There is an emerging awareness of the importance of leadership training in achieving sustainable peace. On a technical level, the art of building democratic state capacity is well understood. But the harder political task—helping the leaders of warring factions achieve their objectives, to work collaboratively in avoiding war or supporting postwar reconstruction and to build democratically accountable links between the governors and the governed—requires a careful examination of the underappreciated “leadership factor” in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

Under the leadership of former Congressman and Presidential Special Envoy Howard Wolpe, the Leadership Project seeks to promote more sustainable approaches to international conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, first, by conducting in-country training programs designed to strengthen the trust, communication, and negotiation skills among key leaders in countries under stress or emerging from violent conflict; and, second, by stimulating analysis and discussion of ways to achieve more effective and holistic strategies for peacebuilding and strengthening state capacity.
What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States

Linking Security and Development in State Building: Recent Lessons from Afghanistan