African Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations

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The program serves as one of Washington, D.C.’s leading forums for informed debate about the multiple challenges and opportunities that face Africa, and about American interests in—and policy toward—the continent. The program serves as a bridge for academics, diplomatic practitioners, policymakers, and members of the private sector, who share a common interest in developing informed and effective policy decisions on Africa.

With the support of the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Fund, the Africa Program launched a major capacity-building initiative in Burundi, designed to increase the ability of the country’s leadership to advance the post-war transition and economic reconstruction. The strategies and techniques developed in Burundi are now being adapted to conflict and post-conflict situations worldwide. The Africa “Congressional Staff Forum on Africa” series seeks to respond to increased policymaker interest in the African continent. The Africa Program also oversees the Africanist Doctoral Candidate Fellowship Program, supports residential fellows, and works closely with the Center’s other projects and programs on cross-regional issues, such as governance, the development of state capacity, crime and corruption, and pressing health and social problems such as the AIDS pandemic.

**The Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa** was founded in early 2000 to mobilize public and private support in the United States for increased levels of assistance to Africa. The Partnership also seeks to create consensus among Africans and Americans about the steps needed to increase the effectiveness of aid, and bring about real progress in the fight to end hunger in Africa.

In the year 2000, it is estimated that almost 200 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, a third of the total population, go to bed hungry and 31 million African children under the age of five are malnourished. These problems are compounded by poverty and disease epidemics that ravage the continent. Nevertheless, there are strong signs of performance and hope that Africa can meet the challenge of cutting hunger in half by 2015. In order to be successful, committed African leaders, with the assistance of the international community, must reach to the heart of the problem where the greatest need and the greatest opportunities lie — to rural families, farms and firms — and create a sustainable way for Africa to become a more equal and active partner in the global economy and community.

The goal of the Partnership has been to formulate a vision, strategy and action plan for renewed US efforts to help African partners cut hunger significantly. They seek to encourage a “new way of doing development business” in which the U.S. uses its resources to support African-led initiatives focusing on achieving productivity gains in those sectors most likely to reach the very poor and facilitating a successful integration of Africa into the world economy, calling for the “achievement of genuine progress with the poor and the hungry in Africa.”
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I. INTRODUCTION

STEVE MCDONALD, CONSULTING PROGRAM MANAGER

As one examines the Africa of today, its potential and its problems, its progress and its past, there are a number of recent developments that augur well for the future. This evolution gives Africa’s leaders the tools and framework to fashion its way forward and to secure Africa’s rightful role in the global order. The end of the Cold War, the liberation of minority ruled southern Africa, the emergence of the World Trade Organization and the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act, the focus on HIV/AIDS and related public health issues by the international community as well as the growth of civil society and pressures for democratic change throughout the continent, among many other things, all have resulted in an Africa that is markedly changed and full of potential. Now in its third post-colonialism generation, Africa is still beset with conflicts and development challenges, but it also boasts states that have made the transition, some smoothly and some more awkwardly, to democratic governance and have established the sound and diversified economies needed to support and sustain these transitions.

Bright spots are offset by ongoing tragedies like Somalia, Darfur and the Eastern Congo, but the balance is slowing tipping toward peace, progress and stability. Nothing contributes more to this positive trend then the coming of age of the regional structures of Africa, primarily focused on economic integration, export and trade promotion and development. Increasingly, over the last decade, these regional bodies have begun to understand and to take on a prominent role in conflict resolution with their neighbors, both formally and informally. This is evident in the recent peace processes in Burundi, Liberia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and elsewhere.

On April 10, 2008, the Africa Program spotlighted this development in one of its regular public policy forums. Together with the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, the Africa Program hosted a day-long conference discussing the potential role of regional organizations in economic growth and security reform across Africa. The following report details the discussions and conclusions of that day, which featured prominent African leaders from all over the continent, including representatives and leaders of many of the very regional organizations which were the subject of the day. While opinions differed on modalities, there was universal agreement on the
importance of regional structures. Beyond a small number of countries, whose size, population and natural resources give them an independent viability, most of Africa is divided into small geographic entities that cut across ethnicities, natural physical attributes, transportation and communication linkages, and resource sources that make no economic or common sense. They need each other and only through these regional organizations can they hope to reach their full potential.
II. AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

A SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS FROM THE APRIL 10, 2008 SYMPOSIUM ENTITLED, AFRICAN REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Written by Amir Stepak¹

On April 10, 2008, together with the Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, the Africa Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars hosted a day-long conference discussing the potential role of regional organizations in economic growth and security reform across Africa. Over the course of the day, a distinguished panel of experts representing diverse perspectives of several African governments, regional organizations, donor countries, and the private sector shared their thoughts and experiences as they reflected on the history and future of regional cooperation in Africa. Of primary interest were questions regarding the desirable scope of regional integration, the potential contribution of regional economic communities (RECs) to African development and conflict mitigation, and the proper role of the international community in facilitating regional approaches to common challenges.

After introductory remarks by Howard Wolpe and Mimi Nedelcovych the conference commenced with a keynote address by Erastus Mwencha, Secretary-General of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and incoming Deputy Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission. Following his presentation, a morning

¹ This report was written and compiled by Amir Stepak, a graduate student at the George Washington University, currently pursuing his PhD in political science. Stepak completed his Bachelors degree at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and has worked for such organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C.
panel examined the contribution of African regional organizations to conflict management, while an afternoon panel assessed their capacity to promote region-wide economic growth. South Africa’s Minister of Finance, the Honorable Trevor Manuel, delivered the closing keynote address. In addition, participants attended a lunch keynote presentation by Ann Tutwiler, Managing Director of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, who discussed the progress of plans for the development of regional trade corridors in West Africa through the African Development Corridor Partnership.

Despite their multifarious backgrounds and views, the panelists spoke unanimously regarding the critical role regional organizations can play in meeting the formidable economic and security challenges that Africa faces. Opinions diverged, however, on assessments of the present state of regional integration, the optimal order of priorities for regional organizations, and the ways in which the international community could best advance security and economic regionalization in Africa. The discussions also offered a wide array of prescriptions to help regional organizations make a positive and lasting impact on Africa’s future.

**A. INTRODUCTORY KEYNOTE ADDRESS: ERASTUS MWENCHA**

Erastus Mwencha, COMESA’s outgoing Secretary-General, launched the day’s events with a review of the current state of African regional integration. In his presentation, Mwencha weaved together the conference’s two main themes—regional economic cooperation and crisis management—noting their closely intertwined relationship. Despite considerable progress in recent years, he maintained, regional collaboration still lags behind the urgent needs of the continent.

With regard to African economic cooperation, three core objectives of RECs were emphasized: promoting market integration, developing regional infrastructure, and strengthening stability, predictability, and transparency in regional governance.

Mwencha argued that given the arbitrary nature of African state’s boundaries and the relatively small scope of national markets, market integration is instrumental for regional economic growth. It entails removing restrictions on the movement of goods and services across borders, as well as improving labor and capital mobility. While certain regional communities, such as COMESA and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have pro-
gressed in these areas, the necessary levels of integration have yet to be met.

Prevailing attitudes among many African governments which resist increasing their dependence on trade partners—especially in the agricultural sector—are largely responsibly for stymieing progress in this area. Thus neighboring states often specialize in similar crops and are liable to export their produce only once domestic demand has been met. Yet precisely because they share similar crops and climates with their neighbors, fruitful years result in oversupply while undersupply becomes problematic in other years. A central component of efforts to strengthen regional cooperation and economic efficiency therefore, is encouraging African governments to unfetter themselves from traditionally conservative trade policies.

Similarly, Mwencha asserted that efforts to develop regional infrastructure projects, which are especially critical for landlocked states and are often beyond national capacities, have been hampered by investor concerns about the financial viability of regional economic communities. Hence, it becomes essential for RECs to develop transparent and stable regional frameworks in order to attract greater investments. In recent years they have registered some successes in this sphere, particularly in promoting regional energy cooperation. They have also made inroads in the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade.

A second area requiring greater regional cooperation, according to Mwencha, is peace and security. The circumstances in which most African states gained their independence—lacking institutional capacities and sustainable borders, and standing at the crossroads between East and West during the Cold War—have left their mark on the present state of affairs on the continent. Since the 1960s, nearly all African states have experienced intra-state or inter-state conflict. The arbitrary and porous nature of national borders has occasioned the spilling-over of many intra-state rebellions into neighboring states, as has been the case in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa. These unique characteristics make regional approaches particularly suitable for mitigating conflict in Africa.

Since the inception of the African Union in 2002, Africa has witnessed a dramatic reduction in the number of armed conflicts. The AU is now equipped with diplomatic prevention mechanisms, such as the Panel of Wise Men, and standing units that can be deployed quickly in order to terminate ongoing conflicts (the African Standby Force). These have played an important role in Côte d’Ivoire as well as in Sudan.

Still, in many parts of Africa the situation remains grim for a number of reasons. Among others, Mwencha noted the failure to address the root causes of conflicts;
the lack of adequate peace-building mechanisms to monitor and stabilize post-conflict areas; and, finally, the overlap and confusion caused by the multiplicity of regional, continental, and international actors, all vying for a place at the table.

Mwencha proposed that to properly address and mend these problems, the African Union and the RECs should work together with the international community to establish unambiguous response mechanisms and areas of responsibility. African organizations possess the knowledge and human capacity necessary to lead effective response efforts, but they lack certain material and logistical resources that can be provided by international bodies.

Mwencha ended his remarks by reiterating the importance of regional organizations for economic development and conflict prevention, and emphasized the need for convergence among various regional groupings. “This is an area where the international community can play a clear role,” he emphasized, “in the quest for regional integration.”

B. PANEL I: AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Central to the discussions of the morning panel on conflict management in Africa was a dialogue about the appropriate role of regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution and the capacity of the international community to support such regional efforts.

Placing the discussion in perspective, Former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark highlighted Africa’s substantial progress in developing effective regional conflict mitigation mechanisms, which are particularly advanced in comparison to the state of affairs in Latin America and the Pacific Rim. The primary challenge for developing this capacity still further is
Africa’s lack of the material resources necessary to initiate, deploy, and maintain adequate force levels over prolonged periods or in multiple locales.

Clark argued that a regional approach to conflict management is superior to both international involvement and bilateral negotiations. Regional organizations are well positioned to detect early warning signs of a looming conflict. They enjoy greater popular legitimacy in conflict zones than international mediators and peacekeepers, and have the local knowledge needed to carry out nuanced and constructive conflict resolution policies. At the same time, they possess the experience, structure, and balance often lacking in bilateral negotiations.

Yet, in Clark’s view, the principal obstacles facing African regional organizations as they attempt to improve their conflict mitigation capacities stem from the donor community. These shortcomings include: problems with coordination among donors; delays in the realization of donor monetary commitments; well-intentioned but onerous accountability requirements imposed by donors on African organizations; and statutory and bureaucratic constraints on security-related assistance in many western countries. Financial and bureaucratic weaknesses on the part of the donor community can and does impede swift and timely action.

Beyond the need to attend to these specific problems, Clark advocated a broader attitudinal change among western nations, one requiring a deeper commitment to and long-term engagement with Africa. Without such a transformation, he cautioned, African security, as well as economic growth, will be much harder to achieve.

Franklin Moore, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), joined Clark in support of a regional and sub-regional approach to conflict management. He noted that neighboring countries often share similar economic, political, and resource-related concerns and are thus particularly well-positioned to assist in efforts to mollify regional tensions. Moore pointed out that the African Union—in contrast to its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU)—contains in its charter and structure an inherent proclivity toward regional approaches. While the AU creates political space for African states to intervene in the affairs of their peers, it prohibits any one member country from taking such measures unilaterally, thus limiting the utility of bilateral engagements.

Nevertheless, Moore pointed out that most regional organizations in Africa were designed first and foremost as mechanisms to advance economic
growth and development rather than security and peace. Furthermore, they are better equipped to deal with inter-state conflicts than intra-state conflict, though the latter are far more common in Africa. Notwithstanding, in recent years African regional and sub-regional organizations have assumed greater security responsibilities, with some notable successes in Liberia, southern Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Moore emphasized the importance of donor assistance to regional capacity-building efforts in the area of conflict mitigation. Regional organizations must become more efficient and refine their ability to utilize the full range of conflict management tools at their disposal. He maintained that increasing regional capacity would itself play a constructive role in conflict reduction, as the benefits of membership and sense of allegiance would create additional incentives for states to resolve regional conflicts diplomatically, using the pen rather than the sword.

The panel’s third and final speaker, Mahamane Touré, presented the perspective of the West African regional organization, ECOWAS, where he serves as Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security. Established in 1975 and designed primarily to serve economic purposes, ECOWAS officials soon learned how closely intertwined economic growth and security are in Africa. Starting in the late 1980s and particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, member states rapidly began falling pray to civil conflict and humanitarian strife. Beginning with Liberia in 1989, Sierra Leone in 1991, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 this brand of conflict erupted across western Africa.

Unable to attain its economic goals with so many of its members ravaged by war, and with the world’s attention centered on emerging conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans, ECOWAS turned to conflict management out of sheer necessity. Toward this end, ECOWAS members created a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to serve as an intervention and peacekeeping force in West Africa, and in December passed the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. Interventions were carried out in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997, and the hard-learned lessons from these engagements were used to improve ECOMOG’s security-related capacities.

ECOWAS has also taken steps to use regional economic integration as means for conflict mitigation. These include facilitating the free movement of people, goods, and vehicles throughout the region by abolishing visa requirements; supporting infrastructural projects to develop regional roads
and gas pipelines, homogenizing regional economic policy; and establishing a regional investment bank.

Concluding the panel’s discussion, General Lamine Cissé, former UN Special Representative for West Africa, summarized the key points made by the speakers and reiterated the significance of geopolitical conflict over natural resources. Drawing on his own experience as a participant in a 1982 OAU peacekeeping mission to Chad, he recalled how a lack of resources and support from the organization forced the premature termination of their deployment—a problem that recurred only recently with the AU’s mission to Darfur. Cissé remarked on the critical role of donor assistance in future missions.

In response to questions from the audience, the participants elaborated on a number of issues, including the causes of conflict in Africa and the recent introduction of ECOWARN (ECOWAS’s Early Warning and Response Network).

Addressing the creation of ECOWARN, Touré described its evolving mechanisms and purpose. Under the initiative, ECOWAS has designated two points of contact in each member state: one within member governments and the other from the ranks of civil society groups. They are tasked with filling out and submitting daily reports on dozens of security indicators to ECOWAS’s headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. The data is then synthesized with open source information to create a more comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground and allow regional decision-makers to avert rapid deterioration within member states.

Opinions were varied regarding the root causes of most African conflicts. Moore attributed conflict primarily to social identities and regional rivalries, which may transform into violence when environmental pressures and subsequent migrations force hostile neighboring groups into closer contact. The Wilson Center’s Africa Program Director, Howard Wolpe, presented a reverse causal chain, in which the manipulation of identities is merely an instrument in the struggle for resources and power. Similarly, Cissé identified poor governance and the unequal distribution of political and economic benefits as the origins of violence. Still, he cautioned against a uniform approach to conflict resolution and argued in favor of tailoring solutions to particular circumstances. Addressing this point, Wolpe commented on the difficulty of improving governance and dismantling identity-based competition in African societies in cases where the state did not emerge organically and a winner-takes-all, zero-sum mentality has prevailed for many decades.
The inextricable links between security and economic growth were overarching themes in the morning panel’s presentations on conflict mitigation in Africa. The afternoon panel—concentrating on the role of African organizations in promoting economic integration—thus served as a natural extension of the preceding discussion.

In his introduction, Philibert Afrika of the African Development Bank (AfDB), briefly described the evolution of African economic organizations and provided an assessment of their progress thus far. From the very first moments of independence, the imperative need for regional economic integration did not elude African leaders. For this reason, they established the Organization of African Unity as early as 1963 and, shortly thereafter, the African Development Bank to support the work of the nascent UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which was created only a few years earlier. By fostering the formation of regional economic communities, the AfDB and UNECA together have attempted to fuel African growth and development.

A brief retrospective examination reveals, however, that these efforts have fallen short of their proclaimed objectives, particularly when compared to the relative success of the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Afrika enumerated several reasons for this failure. Politically, African leaders have not shown the necessary commitment to regional integration and to the creation of strong, supranational regional organizations. Long periods of politi-
cal instability and endemic intra-state and inter-state violence, reluctance to assist regional infrastructure projects and diversify national economies, corruption, and a lack of transparency and accountability have likewise hamstrung the prospects for region-wide economic resurgence. Structural problems have also hindered growth of sustainable African economic structures. Regional integration has been hampered by inadequate organizational capacity within RECs to support their proclaimed goals, insufficient coordination and communication among RECs. National governments, states’ memberships in multiple regional organizations, and a lack of mechanisms to ensure the equal distribution of organizational benefits have all proven detrimental to the realization of strong RECs. Finally, worsening economic conditions and rising poverty—themselves consequences of some of the aforementioned impediments—have compounded the already imposing task of matching the economic resurgence of the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, in the past decade African leaders have shown renewed interest in and stronger commitment to the cause of regional integration, as evinced by the establishment of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2001. The African Development Bank, according to Afrika, has intensified its efforts to support this encouraging trend. It has done this by providing financial assistance to regional programs and organizational capacity-building efforts, working closely with NEPAD on agricultural, educational, and scientific projects and devising its short- and medium-run plans for regional energy, transportation, and water-related infrastructure; encouraging African countries to lower trade barriers, and aiding post-conflict reconstruction.

Speaking next, Mark Tomlinson of the World Bank reviewed some of the latest economic data emerging from Africa. Despite a strong average growth rate across the continent—estimated at about 5.6 percent for the period between 2003 and 2007—growth has been highly uneven and at any rate is well below the level needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals, which have established target annual growth rates at above 7 percent. Equally worrying is the loss of Africa’s foothold in international trade, particularly in the core economic sectors of agriculture and textiles. Though African manufacturers and farmers remain globally competitive, Tomlinson asserted...
that the lack of investment in infrastructure and cross-border financial integration has added burdensome expenses to original production costs and has caused African products to lag behind their Asian rivals.

Tomlinson maintained that effective African regional economic communities are critical for recapturing Africa’s lost economic competitiveness. The present organizational architecture, however, proves too labyrinthine and inadequately equipped to meet this challenge. Clearer structures of accountability and responsibility must be delineated between regional and sub-regional organizations and between those and state governments; the organizations’ policy planning capacities ought to be strengthened, and regional transportation, energy, water, and health infrastructure need to be developed and integrated into national development plans. According to Tomlinson, African economies will need an annual infrastructural investment of about $20 billion over a two-decade period if they are to regain their footing in world trade.

Toward this end, Tomlinson called on the international donor community and trade partners to provide the support necessary to realize Africa’s immense economic potential. One area of particular importance is the energy sector; Africa possesses enormous hydroelectric resources but nonetheless suffers from endemic and debilitating power shortages. As donor assistance alone is insufficient at present to meet the region’s formidable demands, it is essential to help increase private-sector investment. The World Bank has recently taken steps in this direction, and untangling the complex web of regional and sub-regional structures and trade policies will further assist in rendering Africa more appealing to investors.

Callisto Madavo, former Vice President of the World Bank, provided some concluding reflections. Notwithstanding the vast growth in the number and size of regional organizations, these have not been matched by action on the ground. The main impediment to regional integration in Africa, he argued, is the lack of strong political will in many African states and inadequate public awareness of the importance of regional integration to domestic economic growth.

Madavo pointed to five key economic priorities for Africa in the coming years. The construction of infrastructure projects must be accompanied by regulatory liberalization to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and maximize the benefits of newly-erected roads and railroads. Second, in concor-
dance with Tomlinson’s observation, Africa’s share in world trade must increase. Third, African leaders have to be better informed of long-term national and regional economic needs so that they can better represent the interests of their constituents in international forums and investor negotiations. This would entail improving analytical and policy-planning capacities across the continent and enhancing the role of the African Development Bank in regional economic planning. Fourth, there needs to be a concerted effort on the part of African organizations to confront and dispel donor qualms about financing regional projects. And, finally, while advancement toward economic regionalization has thus far hinged on the initiative of key African leaders, sustainable progress will require a much deeper institutional commitment.

Before turning to the audience for questions, moderator Mima Nedelcovych, Managing Director of the Schaffer Global Group, added his voice to Madavo’s regarding the problem of political will in promoting regional integration in Africa. Presenting the perspective of private sector investors engaging with Africa’s business community, he voiced concern over the failure of some African states to recognize their comparative advantage, opting instead to mimic the production practices of neighboring states in spite of environmental and social incongruities. By developing vibrant regional markets, he maintained, African industries can develop the bulk and production capacity that will enable them to compete more successfully on the global stage.

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During the question session some audience members wondered whether the multiplicity of African regional economic communities could be used as an advantage. The panelists remained skeptical. Afrika emphasized the problem of conflicting obligations resulting from overlapping memberships, which act to deter foreign investors. Tomlinson pointed to time and resources inefficiencies caused by the overlapping organizational structure.

Another question concerned the variation in development stages among REC members and whether these pose an obstacle to successful economic integration. Madavo proposed that this challenge can be mitigated by ensuring that all members—regardless of their economic conditions—have a vested interest in regional success; once this condition is met, he asserted, the economic gaps will be abridged over time. Tomlinson added that, in his capacity as a World Bank regional director, he has witnessed the positive contribution of regional institutions in disseminating successful policies among commu-
nity members, thus improving collective economic conditions.

Asked about the relationship between African RECs and China, Afrika discussed the challenge of instilling responsible borrowing practices among cash-strapped African states, a problem that the African Development Bank has been trying to address. Tomlinson and Madavo spoke of the need for international institutions to engage China directly on this issue and encourage more constructive investment in Africa.

D. CLOSING KEYNOTE ADDRESS: TREVOR MANUEL

Closing a full day of stimulating and engaging discussion, South Africa’s Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, offered a sober assessment of Africa’s current economic state and presented his prescriptions for advancing growth and development throughout the continent. Despite the considerable progress made by African states in the past decade, Manuel observed that much faster growth is essential to catch up with a rapidly developing world, requiring more extensive regional collaboration between African states and accelerated international support.

Manuel began by reviewing key economic indicators, in order to demonstrate the considerable economic improvement Africa has undergone in recent years. Largely due to continent-wide economic reforms, Africa has experienced strong growth rates, declining inflation, increased exports, higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), and an improving balance of payments.

At the same time, Africa suffers from a number of enduring and debilitating vulnerabilities. Many African countries are overly dependent on a limited number of export commodities—nearly half of the continent’s 53 countries rely on a single good for more than 50 percent of their exports—rendering them highly susceptible to exogenous economic shocks and natural disasters. Another complicating factor is Africa’s underdeveloped infrastructure and resultant high transportation costs, which undermine trade competitiveness and cause labor supply shortages. These are aggravated further by the lack of investment and inefficiencies in infrastructure development. Finally, competition for resources, which still bears the marks of colonial extraction policies, continues to fuel many of the ongoing inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the region.

Resolving these impediments, according to Manuel, would require a multifaceted approach centered on strengthening regional cooperation. Existing national borders reflect neither African interests nor present-day economic realities, and so tapping into the relatively underutilized potential for intra-regional trade is of the highest priority. In addition to increasing infrastructural invest-
ments, African states and regional groupings must introduce a clearer structure to regional trade mechanisms. Presently characterized by overlapping state memberships in multiple regional economic communities, and compounded by bilateral trade agreements, the current structure of economic communities is highly confusing and acts as a disincentive for potential international trade partners and investors.

Like his fellow speakers earlier in the day, Manuel spoke of the need to compliment these structural reforms with changes in attitude, and called on African leaders to move beyond short-term myopic considerations in favor of long-term, collective growth. By joining forces in the development of regional infrastructure and increased economic diversification, African states can rise above their individual limitations.

Although the path to greater regional cooperation is not without its challenges—difficult questions of inclusion and exclusion and of scope and extent will have to be addressed. With the help of the international community they can be overcome. In this respect, Manuel urged the international community to demonstrate greater commitment and urgency in providing the aid to match Africa’s own efforts. He also called for a more equal partnership between Africa and foreign donors, one that would enable African states to participate more fully in determining the course of their development.

...more equal partnership between Africa and foreign donors, one that would enable African states to participate more fully in determining the course of their development.

 Refer to “Spaghetti Bowl” Graph on page 34.
My talk today will first describe conflict in Africa and the cost it imposes on the continent’s economies. I will then talk about changing trends as a result of efforts by African leaders and institutions over the last 15 years to proactively address conflict through a wide range of mechanisms and approaches. Democracy and governance efforts on the continent will briefly be discussed and then I will conclude with a few remarks about the future.

Of the 53 Africa Union Countries, 48 have endured post-independence armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been intra-state rather than inter-state and have largely taken the form of rebellions against the central government, including civil wars and insurgencies involving armed factions. Although most of these conflicts have been intra-state, they have often exhibited transnational characteristics, attributable to the porous borders between African states and the existence of cross-border ethnic communities, which are themselves the result of the arbitrary colonial demarcation of boundaries. The transnational character of these conflicts has been manifested by an influx of small arms and light weapons, large refugee outflows, illicit trade in natural resources, and cross border rebel movements, all of which inevitably affect the security situation in neighboring countries. In some instances, rebel groups have fled to neighboring states to launch their insurgencies, such as northern Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels operating from Sudan; rebels from Sierra Leone operating from Liberia; and Rwandan rebels operating from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

CONFLICTS IN THE REGION
These conflicts have no doubt impeded Africa from fulfilling its full economic potential, particularly given the vast natural and human resources otherwise
available throughout the continent. In the Horn of Africa, a 21-year-old conflict between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) of southern Sudan and the Sudanese government festered since the early 1980s with almost two million lives lost. With the exception of a brief period of peace following the 1972 peace accord, Sudan has seen continuous conflict since 1956. No sooner had the conflict been resolved through the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) than another one broke out in the western Darfur region. This conflict has been described as the world’s worst humanitarian disaster and it has also spread into Chad. Neighboring Somalia earned the title of a “collapsed state” following a series of conflicts that has left it without a central government since the early 1990s. This long war, which has also drawn in other countries in the Horn—particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia—has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and resulted in over 800,000 refugees and over one million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Humanitarian agencies claim close to two million people are suffering from food shortages in Somalia today. Despite fifteen peace processes, with the last one establishing a government for Somalia, the conflict continues. The Horn is also the location of one of Africa’s few inter-state conflicts: between Ethiopia and Eritrea over a disputed border. This conflict reached a crisis between 1998 and 2000 with over 70,000 people losing their lives. Although a negotiated settlement was reached in 2000, tensions remain high. This brings out the important observation that signing peace or cessation of hostilities agreements does not necessarily translate to peace. Real peace requires that the structural causes of the conflict be addressed.

In the Great Lakes region, the inter-relationship among the various conflicts enables one to loosely refer to them as a “conflict system” that has largely assumed ethnic dimensions. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which resulted in the killing of close to 800,000 people from one ethnic community, is still very fresh in the minds of many. This genocide became a defining moment for Africa and the world at large, forcing a review of the lack of intervention strategies in internal conflicts. The DRC has been the site of an intermittent civil war since the 1960s that has been raging in full force since 1998 and now appears to have become the epicenter of this conflict system. Over the years, this internal conflict drew in several neighboring countries, including Uganda and Rwanda in support of the rebellion, and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola backing the government; this has led some to label the conflict “Africa’s First World War.” Civil war also broke out in Burundi in the mid-1960s and continued sporadically until 1993, when it intensified into a full-blown armed conflict. Like the other conflicts in the Great Lakes, the civil war in Burundi took on markedly ethnic dimensions. The conflict has since been resolved and the country is now undergoing reconstruction.
The 20-year Angolan civil war was one of Africa’s longest civil wars and was the most significant conflict in southern Africa. The country is now in its fifth year of post-conflict reconstruction. Southern Africa has also seen civil war in the Comoro Islands, which have experienced over twenty coups and attempted coups, as well as a succession crisis.

Conflicts in West Africa have, for the most part, involved various armed groups challenging the central government. Liberia’s civil war started in 1980 after Samuel Doe’s military coup and saw the displacement of over half of the country’s population; meanwhile, in neighboring Sierra Leone conflict erupted in 1991 and lasted for over a decade. Both produced an outflow of refugees into neighboring countries. Finally, fighting in Côte d’Ivoire has turned a once stable and prosperous nation into a tumultuous and divided country.

It is important to note that although most of these conflicts are linked to governance-related issues, they have been exacerbated by other factors, such as the exploitation of natural resources (as illustrated by the conflicts in the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Sudan) and external interference from both neighboring states and other international actors.

THE COST OF THE CONFLICTS

These conflicts have no doubt had a devastating effect on the economic growth of the continent and have severely curtailed the realization of regional objectives, such as sustainable economic development through regional economic and social integration. At the turn of the century, conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa were estimated to reduce Africa’s economic growth by approximately two percent annually. Estimates indicate that Africa has been losing about $15 billion every year due to conflicts.

In 2004, the COMESA Ministers of Foreign Affairs reviewed the conflicts in the region and highlighted the following factors as having a negative impact on the economy of the region:

- Over ten years without central authority and major insecurity in Somalia deprived neighbors such as landlocked Ethiopia of access to ports while denying Somalia of much-needed revenues from the use of its ports;
- The border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea has blocked Ethiopian access to a convenient port, while Eritrea has lost the opportunity to tap into cheaper electrical power from Ethiopia;
- Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has hindered economic development and growth within the country and has denied opportunities for investment and trade with neighboring countries. Instead,
the country has witnessed the illegal exploitation of its vast mineral wealth, which could have been used to advance economic prosperity and poverty alleviation;

• Lack of security in the Great Lakes region has prevented secure access to waterway routes, including Lake Tanganyika and the port of Mbulungu in Zambia, which used to be vital for trade between Burundi, Rwanda, and Zambia. Furthermore, as a result of sanctions imposed on Burundi from 1996 to 1998, in the aftermath of the unconstitutional takeover of the government, trade with countries within the Arusha peace process (most of which are also member states of COMESA) suffered extensively. For instance, Zambia suffered loss of export earnings in sugar and cement exports to Burundi;

• and the devastation of Angola’s Benguela Railway, which provided an alternative and shorter route to seaports for Zambian goods, was costly for Zambia. Now the railway line will necessitate demining and rehabilitation at a very high cost.

COMESA has recently embarked on a research program to assess the actual cost of conflicts in the region in order to help inform post-conflict reconstruction efforts, which sometimes overlook indirect cost factors. Some of the factors to be considered include direct military expenditures, loss of productivity, damage to infrastructure, loss of government revenues, degradation of health and education, and numerous other opportunity costs. There are also human costs, including losses to the economy due to premature death and unexpected medical expenses, reduction in agricultural productivity, which is critical for the agro-based African economies, capital flight, and others.

Mandate and Structure of Conflict Prevention Mechanisms in African Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations

Although I have painted a rather gloomy picture of Africa thus far, I want to note that the continent has changed and it is now witnessing fewer new conflicts. There is thus renewed hope for the continent. Of the 19 major wars in Africa between 1990 and 2001, only four remain, in addition to the more recent conflict in Darfur. This reflects an impressive 79 percent conflict-resolution rate, or nearly double the 40 percent global reduction figure for the same period. It is also noteworthy that among the ongoing conflicts is the LRA insurgency, which is on the brink of resolution.

There are several reasons for the remarkably high success rate of African
conflict resolution since 2001. I certainly believe that African leadership and African institutions need to be given some of the credit, including the African Union and the regional economic communities. It is noteworthy that the post-2001 period, which coincides with the replacement of the former continental body, the Organization of African Unity, with the AU in July 2002, has seen the fastest rate of conflict resolution on record. The major change under the AU has been a renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime that is capable of managing and resolving African conflicts. More specifically, unlike the OAU, the AU laid out provisions for intervention in the internal conflicts of member states, thus overriding the principle of sovereignty and non-interference that guided the OAU and limited its effectiveness.

A key element of the AU’s conflict resolution and prevention architecture is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC is supported by the AU Commission through its chairperson. There are four other pillars that include the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Special Fund. This structure has been strengthened by the peace and security mechanisms of the eight recognized RECs, which form key building blocks of the AU.³ They are designed to meet the specific needs of each region, but all were established because of the recognition that conflict adversely affects the RECs’ primary objective, namely, regional economic integration. The critical link between sustainable development and violent conflict is thus fully recognized by regional African bodies.

**THE ROLE OF THE AU AND THE RECS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

The AU and the RECs have made progress both in peacemaking through mediation and preventive diplomacy and in peacekeeping through military interventions. Other efforts and accomplishments include the creation of early warning systems, support for democratic transitions in member states, and post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance.

³These include the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); the East African Community (ECA); ECOWAS; the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); COMESA; and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Other regional organizations not formally recognized by the AU are the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL); the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); the Mano River Union (MRU); the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA); the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).
**Peacemaking through preventive diplomacy**

As observed earlier, nearly 80 percent of the conflicts in Africa have been resolved since 2001. African mediation, coupled with support from the international community, has been crucial for the resolution of these conflicts. For instance, African mediation, led by Kenya under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. IGAD also tried to mediate the Somali conflict, although the conflict resumed after the 2004 signing of a peace agreement. The Lusaka Accords, which were signed by the DRC and five of its neighbors, were reached due to the persistence of African leaders and considerable support from the South African Development Community (SADC). Burundi’s conflict was resolved through the concerted mediation efforts of two former presidents: the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and, after his death, former South African President Nelson Mandela. Mediation of the ongoing conflict in Northern Uganda, which is in its last throes, has been led by the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and has included the Government of South Sudan.

**Peacekeeping**

With respect to the resolution of conflicts in West Africa, the Economic Community of Western African States sets an excellent example for the continent. ECOWAS interventions have been bold and on several occasions have augmented diplomatic mediation with military intervention by ECOWAS’s military force, ECOMOG. ECOMOG’s interventions began with the Liberian conflict and have proven themselves to be instrumental in providing an environment conducive to negotiations and civilian protection. Similarly, mediation efforts in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau were also supported by ECOMOG.

Such strategies of supporting diplomatic efforts with military force were also employed by the African Union in Burundi and Darfur. In Darfur the current peace process is supplemented by military operations to promote a ceasefire and protect civilians. Until late last year, the African Union mission in Darfur consisted purely of an African force, but faced with severe financial and logistical challenges, the international community moved to reinforce it with UN peacekeepers.

With respect to peacekeeping, it is worth noting that the AU is in the process of establishing an African Standby Force, as one of the four pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The ASF will be made up of five regional brigades and will be coordinated by RECs, except for the Eastern and
Northern Brigades, which will be coordinated by regional mechanisms created specifically for this purpose.

**Peacebuilding: COMESA’s Trading for Peace**

COMESA’s Trading for Peace project provides an example of a direct attempt by a REC to exploit the synergies between economic and conflict dynamics. This project aims to enhance the sustainable and equitable use of natural resources in the Great Lakes region in the interest of regional stability and, ultimately, poverty eradication. The Trading for Peace project is informed by the cyclic relationship between trade, development, and conflict.

COMESA recognizes that effective development work in unstable countries or those just emerging from conflict needs to be done differently from development work in countries that exist in relative peace and stability. As noted earlier, research has shown that countries emerging from conflict have a far greater likelihood of relapsing, particularly if the structural causes of the original conflict are not addressed. It is thus important to employ conflict-sensitive approaches to development. There is a direct link between conflict and poverty. Although conflict may stem from specific concrete grievances, it can be exacerbated by narrow economic interests (war economies) that gain influence over time. These economic interests often become a greater obstacle to peace than the original grievances. Furthermore, development, which is intended to decrease poverty, can help prevent violent conflict, yet at times it can also intensify it.

Trading for Peace seeks to address the economic dynamics that fuel violent conflict, such as inequality and war economies, by identifying approaches that will address some of the conflict-exacerbating impacts of development and trade. This project also intends to take advantage of the emerging peace, security, and stability to encourage trade that can lead to long-term development. This can be achieved by designing and implementing activities through a conflict-sensitive lens. Among its goals, the project aims to improve communication and information-sharing between traders and government officials, since many traders perceive legal trade as unprofitable, due to numerous and high tariffs, and are unaware of COMESA’s simplified trade regime. The creation of informal space for dialogue between countries at local levels is also expected to contribute to stabilization of trade flows across borders.

**Conflict Early Warning**

As noted earlier, one of the four pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture is a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). To support this program, the AU established a CEWS consisting of an observation and
monitoring center and a situation room responsible for data collection and analysis. This is further linked to observation and monitoring units at the regional level. The AU has now developed a set of indicators to track conflicts in Africa. The AU is in the process of putting in place a CEWS Portal, which will link the eight RECs through satellite technology and will provide news briefs and rapid news services. Similarly, the RECs will share early warning information among themselves. Two RECs—IGAS and ECOWAS—already have functioning early warning systems (CEWARN and ECOWARN, respectively) that have been instrumental in providing alerts to forestall conflicts. The other RECs are presently developing their own early warning systems, and COMESA will also monitor conflicts that are rooted or propagated by war economies.

**POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS**

The biggest challenge now facing the African continent is post-conflict reconstruction. Research indicates that protracted conflicts, once resolved, have a 50 percent chance of recurring within five years. Signs of this were seen in Sudan after the South temporarily withdrew from the Government of National Unity only three years and nine months after the signing of the CPA. The dispute is over the administration of the Abyei region between the north and the south. Although clearly addressed in the CPA, disputes over its implementation have resulted in a military build-up by both the Government of Sudan and South Sudan over the past few months. Similarly, although the Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute should have been resolved with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission 2002 ruling, it continues to generate accusations, counter-accusations, and military buildups.

In view of these types of challenges that follow the signing of peace agreements, the African Union developed and adopted a post-conflict reconstruction policy, the first of its kind. Designed to ensure coordinated and collaborative efforts among stakeholders, the policy lays out a framework for post-conflict activities in Africa. It has six constitutive elements: peace and security; political governance and transition; human rights, justice, and reconciliation; humanitarian and emergency relief; reconstruction and socio-development; and gender. The policy is underpinned by several principles, including African leadership, national and local ownership, inclusiveness, cooperation and coherence, and capacity-building for sustainability. Partners and stakeholders planning to engage in post-conflict reconstruction work in Africa should review the policy and use it to guide their efforts.
DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Another challenge to peace and security in Africa has been the institutionalization of democratic governance. This is another area that has recorded remarkable improvements over the last decade. One factor fundamental to democratic governance is the holding of credible democratic elections. Nevertheless, since credible elections do not guarantee democracy and governance, other elements, such as citizen participation, human rights, and the rule of law, must also be supported. Perceptions of elections as lacking credibility and legitimacy can be a source of grievances, tensions, and instability, and can form a hindrance to democracy. They can become a trigger for conflict, as we have seen in Kenya earlier this year and, presently, in Zimbabwe.

Both the AU and the RECs have been actively involved in election observation, including post-conflict Burundi and the DRC. This function has also been carried out by the Pan African Parliament, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the ECOWAS Council of Elders, and by COMESA ambassadors.

In reference to governance, it is important to mention one of the instruments of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, known as the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is a self-monitoring initiative for good governance designed to ensure that policies and practices of participating countries conform to the values, principles, codes, and standards enshrined in the Declaration of Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. It is a voluntary mechanism and twenty-six countries have joined it since 2003. The APRM emphasizes the dissemination of best practices and the mending of underlying deficiencies in governance and socio-economic development processes among African Union members. Since its establishment, the APRM has launched reviews in 13 countries, including fielded country review missions in five countries (Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, and Algeria) and leadership reviews in Ghana, Rwanda, and Kenya. For most of the remaining countries, work on review and country support missions has already started.

Although primarily designed to serve as a self-monitoring mechanism, the peer review aspects of the APRM also help increase leadership accountability and transparency at all levels of government. The mechanism promotes collective and sustainable solutions to common African problems and seeks to spur improvements in a country’s political and economic governance, poverty situation, and trade competitiveness, and to make steps toward the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. The APRM still faces several challenges that will need to be addressed as it continues to take shape, including the lengthy procedures and lack of resources to implement its recommendations.
CONCLUSION

I’d like to end here having described the extent of conflict on the continent and how African leadership and institutions have been successful at reducing it in recent years. But I do not want to paint too rosy a picture. In many cases, although conflict has abated, the root causes still have not been addressed, so it might flare up again. In other cases, the winners who profit from conflict, corruption, and poor governance will not tire easily and will lie in wait for opportunities to destabilize countries and whole regions if they can. A Maasai proverb talks about progress as a zigzagged path which is appropriate in this context. But African institutions—both governmental and non-governmental—are ready to continue tackling these challenges. While they want to lead, they recognize the lack of institutional capacity and welcome the opportunity to partner with outsiders. Recent signs of renewed interest in security issues on the part of the United States, with its creation of AFRICOM, and the European Union, as well as others, suggest that opportunities abound for true progress in enabling the continent to take advantage of the riches with which it has been endowed.
An interesting glimpse into the recent emergence of private-public partnerships for economic growth in Africa was offered in by Ann Tutwiler, Managing Director of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

In her keynote address, Tutwiler described the evolution in the Hewlett Foundation's approach to economic development and poverty reduction in developing countries, and particularly in Africa. From an emphasis on removing trade barriers to developing country goods in the United States and elsewhere, the foundation has shifted growing attention to improving the trade capacity of emerging economies through infrastructural investments, regional integration, and governance reforms.

In Africa, this reformulated strategy has taken shape in four new areas of activity for the Foundation: by providing incentives for African governments and farmers to move beyond subsistence farming toward commercial agricultural capacity; by facilitating farmer access to market information; in the expansion of availability and by reducing the cost of intermediate goods, such as fertilizers; and in working in partnership with African governments as well as other organizations to strengthen both hard and soft economic infrastructure, whether in the form of road and port construction or human capacity development and government practices. Through these activities, according to Tutwiler, the Hewlett Foundation aims to promote programs that are African-led and reflect African priorities rather than foreign perspectives on Africa's needs.

One of the Foundation’s most recent engagements in this area has been with the development of African regional trade corridors. For decades, transportation costs have placed a prohibitive burden on African agricultural markets, rendering commercial agriculture economically unviable. With the recent rise in basic commodity prices, however, African governments and institutions have sought to exploit this opportunity and undertake major investments in regional economic infrastructure, including the proposed trade corridors. From the perspective of poverty reduction, the development of regional corridors in Africa can support not only immediate economic needs, but also a long-term fundamental social and economic transformation, providing local communities with access to stable jobs, education, and healthcare. These corridors can also serve as focal points for international donors and investors, improving public-private coordination and ensuring that funds and efforts complement each other in building African economic strength.

To further this goal, the Hewlett Foundation has launched the African Development Corridor Partnership, a consortium of private and public foun-
dations that establish local presence along economically and politically viable trade corridors and provide grants to local actors engaged in this process. It also aims to reduce information and transaction costs for foreign actors wishing to invest in projects along each corridor. Partnership grants will be geared toward a number of primary needs, such as improving transparency and accountability in local investments; providing training to local government officials and communities so they can engage with potential investors on a more equal footing; and ensuring that trade corridors deliver tangible benefits to local communities and offer business opportunities for local small and medium enterprises.

As African institutions and governments move forward with these plans, the Hewlett Foundation hopes to play a constructive role in fulfilling the economic and social potential of the proposed trade corridors. In her concluding comments, Tutwiler noted that the Foundation is presently engaging with potential participants in the African Development Corridor Partnership, identifying economically viable corridors for Partnership activities, and formulating development priorities along those corridors.
African, with a GDP of just over $2 trillion in 2006, is the poorest region in
the world. This view is quite different from that held of the continent at
the beginning of the 19th century. It was during this time that Africa’s income
amounted to roughly one-third of that of Europe and recorded growth that
was more rapid than in Asia. However, in the last twenty years of the previous
century, GDP per capita on the African continent remained remarkably flat,
while most other emerging regions enjoyed substantial increases in prosperity
and welfare.

I want to give you a mixed message today. A major part of it is one of
hope—looking at the economic data in recent years we can say that Africa is
in the process of catching up to the rest of the world. Another major part of
my message is one of concern—Africa remains vulnerable to economic, po-

citical, and environmental shocks like no other region of the world. And the
final part of my message is one of perspective—that addressing our vulnerabili-
ties means that we must become constructive players in our long-term socio-

economic trajectory.

RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS
Economic growth on the continent has been sustained and is more rapid than
in decades. Since the turn of the century, African growth has averaged 4.8
percent, reaching 5.2 percent in 2007, and it is the only region in the world
expected to grow more rapidly in 2008. Macroeconomic policy reforms and

4Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation. This compared to the
World GDP ($65 trillion), US ($13 trillion), China ($10 trillion) and India ($4 trillion). See International
Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook 2006,” April 2006; available online at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/pdf/weo0406.pdf
outcomes in terms of stability underlie the improving performance. Lower and more stable inflation, manageable debt levels, sound fiscal policies, and improved public financial management provide a firm foundation for this accelerating economic growth.

The average inflation rate for sub-Saharan Africa from 1995 to 2005 was 18 percent. By 2005 it fell to 11 percent and then declined again to 8 percent in 2007. The average budget balance in the region was in surplus in 2006 and accounted for 1.4 percent of GDP in 2007.

Strong commodity prices, in particular oil, have supported growth in recent years. Africa’s exports are expected to reach close to $400 billion this year, with imports at about $290 billion. Looking at China’s role in African trade, we find that trade between the two increased to about $55 billion in 2006 from only about $10 billion in 2000.

Africa’s Foreign Direct Investment rose to $31 billion during 2005, up from $18 billion in 2004 and 2003. South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, the DRC, Algeria, Tunisia, and Chad were the main beneficiaries. Most FDI was in commodity producing sectors, including oil. Thirty-four other African countries received FDI inflows of below $100 million each. Alongside stronger capital inflows, Africa’s overall balance of payments is improving and foreign exchange reserves are rising, contributing to greater macroeconomic stability over time.

While this trend is encouraging, it does not yet provide a sustainable platform for the reduction of poverty and inequality. Africa needs between two and three decades of rapid growth to make a substantial dent in the level of poverty. Over the longer term, economic development will induce a much greater dispersion of investment into commodity and non-commodity producers alike, but to achieve that outcome we need to address the fundamental vulnerabilities of African states, their economies, and communities. Nancy Birdsall reminds us that in East Asia and the Pacific the proportion of the population living on or below $1 per day was 57 percent in 1981, falling to 9 percent by 2004. In Africa, that proportion has remained static—42.4 percent in 1981 and 41 percent in 2004. South Asia fell from 49.6 percent to 31 percent. In 2004, 8.6 percent of the population in Latin America and the Caribbean subsisted on $1 a day. Half of Africa’s population is today regarded as poor, while in regions such as Asia, the number of people living in poverty has been halved in the past three decades.

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5 Ibid; average inflation for the SSA region peaked at 61 percent in 1994
6 David Hale comment on Africa for the 2007 Mining Indaba
If we look at the Millennium Development Goals, we find similarly alarming outcomes. On nearly every measure of human development, the outcomes are unsustainable. Vulnerability breeds conflict and severely handicaps economic growth. Vulnerability means that many African societies will find it nearly impossible to create the economic policies, institutions, and international economic relationships needed to start the cycle of development and escape current conditions.

VULNERABILITIES AND SHOCKS

Africa is also highly vulnerable to economic shocks, be they a sudden drop in the price of an important export commodity, drought, or exchange rate devaluation. The frequency and severity of shocks has been growing. For example, a Commission for Africa background paper pointed out that forty-four African countries have suffered natural disasters in the last ten years. In addition, twenty-eight African countries are judged to be potentially vulnerable to aid shocks, due to their high aid dependency ratios, and twenty-four countries are very vulnerable to export shocks, because they depend on only one product for more than 50 percent of their export revenues. And at least thirteen African countries have suffered foreign private capital crises over the past ten years.

For many African countries, financial pressures limit the range of public services available to help people overcome the costs of supplying their labor to regional labor markets. Transportation costs can be exceedingly high, in part because of underdeveloped private markets and public inefficiency, as well as corruption.

As the Commission for Africa report pointed out, poor infrastructure remains a severe impediment to more rapid growth and poverty reduction:

In some regions of Africa, farmers lose as much as half of what they produce for lack of adequate post-harvest storage. Across the region, women and girls currently walk an average of six kilometers to collect water. The life of those living in urban slums is made still worse by the lack of infrastructure—only 7 percent have access to sewerage services, for example, leading to economic costs in terms of health and lost work hours.

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Some of the handicaps affecting African economies are a legacy of colonialism—railways and roads leading from the interior to the coasts but not between contiguous countries—and poor governance. As the Commission for Africa reported, “Today Africa’s transport costs—local, national, or international—are today around twice as high as those for a typical Asian country. Shipping a car from Japan to Abidjan costs $1,500, whereas moving it from Abidjan to Addis Ababa costs $5,000.”

Part of the vulnerability equation is access to resources and, as all of you know, competition for access alone has been sufficient to generate civil conflict in many regions. Present infrastructure and resource development largely reflect colonial legacies. The lack of investment in infrastructure in the intervening decades may increase the probability of conflict over resources.

Delegates to the AU summit in Accra in 2007 debated how to drive change. Two polar-opposite positions emerged. Some argued for a swifter move to establish some form of a “United States of Africa,” with a constitution, constitutional institutions, and public power to match. The alternative view advocated strengthening Africa’s regional economic communities, as envisaged in the Abuja Declaration. This latter position appears to have garnered greater support from African heads of state. However, what is not in dispute is that the fifty-three countries that define our continent are bound by the agreements struck in Berlin in 1885. These do not provide a sufficient basis for economic development today. Populations and market size are vastly different, as is the role of the sovereign state in the economy. We must, as a matter of exigency, enlarge both the size of the market and its structure. In the short term, at least, we must raise the level of intra-African trade from its abysmally low 10.4 percent. There has to be new investment in infrastructure that will unlock the potential for agriculture and trade across Africa. We must commit to changing the infrastructure design, which was originally designed to transfer primary commodities to Europe rather than fostering regional trade.

**REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ADDRESSING INSTABILITIES**

So it seems that in the medium term, at least, Africa’s vulnerabilities and economic challenges will be addressed through the more decentralized, regional approach. But defining this approach also needs work. Africa’s regional economic communities suffer from overlapping memberships (COMESA, SADC, SACU, etc.) and a multiplicity of regional institutions. Graphically, the picture...
“Spaghetti Bowl” of African Economic Organizations

This chart shows each state’s membership to different regional economic organizations, demonstrating the overlap and redundancy of certain organizations, and the inherent complexity of economic cooperation between different African states.

African Economic Organizations

presented by all of these institutions, is scary. In substance, the complexities increase exponentially when the detail of a myriad of bilateral arrangements with outside agencies and bodies, such as the European Union’s economic partnership agreements (EPAs), are taken into account. Sadly, it appears that too often the question of boundaries and relations are driven by donors rather than the exigencies of Africa’s development. Greater rationality is needed in the structure and relations between these communities. Common tariffs are difficult to apply when countries seek to join overlapping communities with discrete tariff structures.

Discussion of monetary arrangements is weakened by similar discontinuities. In the long-run, common monetary areas make sense, perhaps even going as far as establishing a single currency for Africa; but in the medium-term, there needs to be some sort of shared understanding of the mandates of regional communities that can be applied to all of them. Part of the difficulty is that the leap of faith required to envisage coherent monetary arrangements is too far for the time being, and this tends to undermine the broader logic of economic integration. In short, basic rules for the development of regional communities need to be set out to instill greater confidence and prevent unnecessary competition between communities.

The East Africa region shows us most clearly, perhaps, how weak regional economic relationships undermine political stability. The East African Community (EAC), comprised of Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, is sufficiently integrated for the issue of a common currency to have been raised. A complicating factor is, of course, that Tanzania is a member of SADC and that Kenya and Uganda are members of COMESA. If we assume that those arrangements can be easily overcome, we must then move to a discussion of the arrangements for all of geographic East Africa. How exactly should the countries in the Great Lakes region, especially Rwanda and Burundi, be accommodated? Why are they excluded? How should the issues of economic development and conflict resolution be prioritized? We should also pause to consider the extension of the EAC to the north: what should happen to the IGAD countries in the Horn of Africa? Should we propose extending EAC to include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and even Sudan? Or would such a proposal be considered heresy? I accept that the East African conundrum might be the most difficult of regional proposals, but we must raise it, in order to define and challenge what is possible. Moreover, as Africans we must establish regional boundaries that take into account the interests of both peace and economic development.

Multiple arrangements in Southern Africa are at least as complex. Regionally strong economies need to provide the basis for economic agreements and institutions covering trade, investment, tax treatment, the environment, and public
infrastructure, among others, which facilitate the broadening and deepening of economic activity across borders. Within my own region, South Africa must play the role of economic partner with its neighbors, eschewing short-term protections in favor of long-term growth and job creation. Efforts to deliberately develop Southern Africa as a real common market should be our main regional priority.

Creating platforms for states to jointly invest in modern cross-border public infrastructure, from telecommunications to rail routes and roads, should be a top priority of regional communities. Economic diversification remains critical to long-term economic development and growth.

CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by noting that the work required by African governments and societies, which I sketched out roughly in this talk, is necessary but probably insufficient. The international community—from donors to multilateral institutions and trade representatives of advanced economies—need to reflect more faithfully the commitments made in the Monterrey Consensus only a few years ago. The Consensus focused on the idea of partnership between developing state governments and societies and between advanced and developing countries. It distresses me to say that by far the greatest strides have been made in the developing world. My earlier review of Africa’s macroeconomic performance is just some evidence of the new spirit of accountability and good governance existing in most African countries. I regret that so little has been achieved by our developed partners, whether it is measured by progress in the Doha Round or by development assistance commitments. Greater urgency in the actions of Africa’s partners would help ensure more deliberate measures by Africa’s leaders.
V. GLOSSARY

AfDB – African Development Bank

AFRICOM – U.S. Africa Command

APRM - Africa Peer Review Mechanism

ASF – African Standby Force

AU – African Union

CEWARN – IGAD’s Conflict and Early Warning Response Mechanism

CEWS – Continental Early Warning System

COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

EAC – East African Community

ECOMOG – ECOWAS’s Monitoring Group

ECOWARN – ECOWAS’s Early Warning and Response Network

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development

OAU – Organization of African Unity

PSC – Peace and Security Council

REC – Regional Economic Community

SACU – Southern African Customs Union

SADC – Southern African Development Community

UNECA – United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNOWA – United Nations Office for West Africa
VI. CONFERENCE AGENDA
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
PARTNERSHIP TO CUT HUNGER AND POVERTY IN AFRICA

*Thursday, April 10, 2008, Woodrow Wilson Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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<tr>
<td>9:30 am</td>
<td>REGISTRATION AND COFFEE</td>
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<td>10:00 am</td>
<td>WELCOMING REMARKS</td>
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<td><em>Howard Wolpe,</em> Director, Africa Program, Woodrow Wilson Center</td>
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<td><em>Mima Nedelcovych,</em> Managing Director, Schaffer Global Group</td>
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<td>10:05 am</td>
<td>KEYNOTE ADDRESS</td>
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<td><em>Erastus Mwencha,</em> Secretary-General of COMESA; incoming Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission</td>
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<td>11:05 am</td>
<td>PANEL I: AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT</td>
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<td><em>Lamine Cissé,</em> Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)—moderator</td>
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<td><em>Joe Clark,</em> former Canadian Prime Minister</td>
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<td><em>Franklin Moore,</em> Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID</td>
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<td><em>Mahamane Touré,</em> Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace &amp; Security, ECOWAS</td>
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<td>12:05 pm</td>
<td>LUNCH KEYNOTE</td>
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<td><em>Ann Tutwiler,</em> Managing Director, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation</td>
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<td>2:15 pm</td>
<td>PANEL II: AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION</td>
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<td><em>Mima Nedelcovych,</em> Managing Director, Schaffer Global Group—moderator</td>
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<td><em>Philibert Afrika,</em> Director for Operations Policy, Review, and Compliance, African Development Bank</td>
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<td><em>Callisto Madavo,</em> former Vice-President for Africa, The World Bank</td>
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<td><em>Mark D. Tomlinson,</em> Director, Regional Integration, Africa Region, The World Bank</td>
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<td>4:00 pm</td>
<td>CLOSING KEYNOTE</td>
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<td><em>Trevor Manuel,</em> Minister of Finance, South Africa</td>
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VII. SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

**Philibert Afrika**, Bank Group Director for Operations, Policy and Compliance at the Africa Development Bank, provides guidance and oversight for the preparation of sectoral and operational policies. He also supervises Bank Group activities on development effectiveness and managing for results within the framework of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Previously, Mr. Afrika occupied the position of Bank Group Secretary-General, where he also functions as Secretary to the Board of Executive Directors and the Board of Governors. Among other positions he has held over the past twenty-eight years in the Bank, Mr. Afrika served as Director of Operations for West Africa. Prior to that, he served in various managerial capacities involving project management in the North and East African sub-regions. Mr. Afrika has traveled extensively in Africa and outside it and has represented the Bank at various seminars and conferences concerning development financing. He is a Rwandan national and holds a Masters degree in Economics from the University of Ibadan.

**General Lamine Cissé**, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA), has served as an observer in several peacekeeping operations. He led the international observer delegation to the Islamic Conference in South Philippines (1976–1978). After serving as Director of Public Security at the Ministry of Interior (1987–1991), he was promoted to Brigadier General in 1993 and appointed as Inspector general of the Senegalese Armed Forces. In 1996 he became Chief of Staff and in 1998 was appointed Minister of Interior. In 2000, General Cissé founded the International Observatory for Democracy and Management of Crises and Conflicts, where he serves as Chairman. From July 2001 to 2007, he served as Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Executive Director of the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic.

**Joe Clark**, President of Joe Clark and Associates, an international consulting firm based in Canada, and Chairman of Clark Sustainable Resource Developments Ltd, a Canadian company operating in Ghana, is also Professor of Practice for Private–Public Sector Partnerships in the Centre for Developing-Area Studies at McGill University in Montreal. He was elected eight times to the House of Commons of Canada, and served in Parliament for 25 years, retiring in June 2004. He served as Prime Minister of Canada between 1979 and
1980, Secretary of State for External Affairs (Foreign Minister) (1984-1991), Minister of Constitutional Affairs (1991-1993), and Acting Minister of both National Defense and Justice. He served twice as Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, and as National Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. In government, Mr. Clark chaired the Canadian Cabinet committees on Foreign and Defense Policy, Security and Intelligence, the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, and the constitutional renewal process that led to the Charlottetown Accord. He has led election observation teams in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mr. Clark has also served on the boards of several international NGOs, as well as Canadian and international companies. He has been a visiting scholar at UC-Berkeley and American University, and a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is also the author of the book “Canada: A Nation Too Good to Lose.”

Callisto Madavo, a Visiting Professor of African economic development at Georgetown University, is Chair of the Board of Trustees of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance based in Brighton, and a Trustee of the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) based in Geneva, which works to develop rapid, accurate, and affordable diagnostic tests for poverty related diseases. During his 35-year tenure at the World Bank, Dr. Madavo served as Vice President for the Africa Region, working on economic growth, poverty reduction, and promotion of good governance in forty-seven sub-Saharan African countries. In this capacity, he championed a special initiative on HIV/AIDS. Prior to that, he served as Country Director for East Asia and East Africa. Dr. Madavo received his PhD in economics from the University of Notre Dame.

Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s Minister of Finance, became active in the anti-Apartheid struggle in the late 1970s and served on the executive of the United Democratic Front (UDF), a broad anti-Apartheid coalition. For these activities he was repeatedly detained without trial and placed under house arrest between 1985 and February 1990, spending a total of 35 months in detention. In 1991 Mr. Manuel was elected to the executive of the African National Congress (ANC) and appointed head of the Department of Economic Planning. He was elected Member of Parliament following South Africa’s first democratic elections, and in May 1994 was appointed Minister of Trade and Industry. He has served as Minister of Finance since April 1996, earning him the distinction of being one of the longest serving finance ministers in the world. Mr. Manuel was selected by the World Economic Forum as a “Global Leader for Tomorrow,” appointed to the Advisory Committee of the UN Initiative for Trade Efficiency, and
awarded the Africa Prize by the German Africa Foundation. In 1997 Minister Manuel was named Euromoney’s “African Finance Minister of the Year.” He served two terms as the Chairman of the Development Committee of the World Bank and played an instrumental role as a member of the Commission for Africa in 2005. Mr. Manuel studied Civil and Structural Engineering at the Peninsula Technikon and Executive Management at Stanford / National University of Singapore. He has also received several honorary doctorates.

**Franklin Moore**, a career member of the Senior Executive Service, was appointed as Deputy Assistant Administrator for U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Africa Bureau in January 2008. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Moore served as Director of the Office of Environment and Science Policy within the Agency’s Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT). Additionally, Mr. Moore has served as the Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator and Director for the Agency’s Global Center for the Environment. Before joining USAID in 1998, Mr. Moore held several positions in the areas of agriculture, environment, and national resource management, including International Programs Specialist with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Regional Agricultural Business Specialist for Africare; Associate Country Director for Agriculture in Ghana with the Peace Corps; the Agency’s Agricultural Specialist and then Chief of Operations for Programming and Training; and as Lecturer in the Agricultural Economics Department at Virginia State University and the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana. Mr. Moore has a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Yale University. He received a Master’s in Agricultural Economics, as well as a certificate in African Studies, from the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Mr. Moore studied for a Ph.D. in Development Studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

**Erastus Mwencha** is the Secretary General of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Before joining COMESA, Mr. Mwencha worked for the Kenyan government in various capacities. In 1974, he started out as an economist in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry where he eventually became Head of the Department of Industry and a senior economist. In recognition of his excellent work in the realm of national and regional development, he was awarded the “Moran of the Burning Spear” by the President of the Republic of Kenya. Mr. Mwencha is a renowned regional integrationist with twenty-three years of successful experience in regional and international development. He obtained his undergraduate degree in economics from the University of Nairobi and a postgraduate degree in economics from York University in Toronto.
Mima Nedelcovych, Executive Vice President of Buchanan Renewable Energies and Partner of Schaffer Global Group is a founder and Managing Director of the AfricaGlobal subsidiary of Schaffer Global Group. He is responsible for corporate and county clients and heads all international financing and project development activities for the Group. Prior to joining the Schaffer Group, Dr. Nedelcovych founded DNR International Group, an international trade and investment advisory services firm specializing in emerging African markets. In 1995, he merged DNR with Schaffer & Associates. Dr. Nedelcovych served under President George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1993 as the U.S. Executive Director to the African Development Bank in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. He has worked at the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) as Program Director of Special Projects covering all TDA-eligible countries, and as Special Assistant to USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Africa. Dr. Nedelcovych’s initial service to the United States Government began as Country Director for the Peace Corps in Gabon. He began his career as a professor of economics and political development at Florida State University, Tallahassee & Mohammed V University, Morocco. Dr. Nedelcovych received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Yale University, a Master of Arts in International Relations from George Washington University, and a Ph.D. in Comparative Political and Economic Development from Florida State University.

Mark D. Tomlinson serves as Director of the World Bank’s office for African Regional Integration. He is responsible for the Bank’s growing program of regional assistance to Africa, covering regional infrastructure, economic integration, and regional public goods, including capacity development. Prior to his present appointment, Mr. Tomlinson served four years as the Bank’s Country Director in Nigeria. This is Mr. Tomlinson’s second position at the World Bank, having returned from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 1997 as Sector Manager in charge of the Bank’s energy programs in Africa. At EBRD, Mr. Tomlinson established and led the development banking team on energy, became Country Director for Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia (completing the first project finance operations in these countries by an international bank), and subsequently managed a G-7 program of safety upgrades to Soviet nuclear plants that secured the closure of Chernobyl. In his first appointment at the World Bank, Mr. Tomlinson worked on telecommunications, and was then reassigned to India to work on power sector development. Mr. Tomlinson holds a PhD in Energy Economics.

Mahamane Touré is the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). His previous
positions in Mali include Director of the Cabinet of the Minister for Internal Security (1992), Assistant to the Chief of Staff for the President (1992-1993), Commander of the Special Anti-Fraud Unit (1993-1994), General Director of Customs (1994-1996), and Operations Assistant to the General Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (1997-1998). Colonel Touré has also served as Technical Advisor in charge of reforms for the Ministry of Defense (1998-1999). From 2000 to 2002 he was the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS to Sierra Leone. Prior to his current post, Colonel Touré served as Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans from 2003 to 2005. He holds a Master’s degree in National Security Strategy.

Ann Tutwiler is the Managing Director for Trade and Development, Hewlett Foundation. She served for four years as President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Food & Agriculture Trade Policy Council, an organization that she co-founded in 1987, and which is dedicated to developing and advocating policies that support an efficient and open global food system and sustainable production and distribution of safe, accessible food supplies. She also served as Associate Director of the Council from its inception until 1992. Between 1992 and 2002, she was Director of Government Relations for the North American oilseed crushing and corn refining companies of Eridania Beghin-Say, the French food producer. Previously, Tutwiler served as a Policy Associate with the National Center for Food and Agriculture Policy, where she wrote papers on agricultural trade and the relationship between agricultural development and poverty alleviation, among other issues. She was a Policy Analyst and Presidential Management Intern at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. She is a member of the Advisory Council for the Dean Rusk International Studies Program at Davidson College, and serves on the board of the International Fertilizer Development Center and the Grains and Oilseeds Agricultural Trade Advisory Committee. Ms. Tutwiler received a BA from Davidson College and a Master's in Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She recently received the John W. Kuykendall Alumni Service Award from Davidson College for her work in agricultural trade and development.

Howard Wolpe, a former seven-term member of Congress and former presidential special envoy to Africa’s Great Lakes Region, is currently the director of both the Africa Program and the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A specialist in African politics, Wolpe chaired the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for ten of his fourteen years in Congress. He also
chaired the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee. His other roles in the Congress included the co-chairmanship of the bipartisan Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition and the Congressional Energy and Environmental Study Conference. Prior to entering Congress, Wolpe served in the Michigan House of Representatives and as a member of the Kalamazoo City Commission. Wolpe has taught at the Political Science Department of Western Michigan University and at the University of Michigan’s Institute of Public Policy Studies. He also served as a visiting fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, as a Woodrow Wilson Center public policy scholar, and as a consultant to the World Bank and the U.S. State Department Foreign Service Institute. Wolpe received his BA from Reed College and his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
AMU: Arab Maghreb Union • CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa • CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States • CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries • COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa • EAC: East African Community • ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States • ECAS: Economic Community of Central African States • IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development • IOC: Indian Ocean Commision • MRU: Mano River Union • SACU: Southern African Customs Union • SADC: Southern African Development Community • WAEMU: West Africa Economic and Monetary Union

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