The Arab Spring, or Arab Awakening as some prefer to call it, shattered the Middle East status quo a little over a year ago. Since then, a cascade of uprisings has brought down three Arab leaders, threatened several others, and ushered in a potentially historic era of change.

These events highlighted one of the defining features of contemporary Arab societies: their large and expanding youth populations. Researchers and demographers have long underscored how these cohorts of young people will present new challenges—political, social, and economic—to Arab governments.

But it took the past year’s dramatic developments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Morocco, and even Oman to showcase the growing role of young people in shaping the future of this region. Clearly, the Arab Awakening is shifting the region’s political center of gravity from an older to a younger generation. And all of a sudden, the youth of the Arab world are front and center in everyone’s consciousness.

There is one major Arab country, however, where young people have not challenged their rulers. Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer, the spiritual homeland of Sunni Islam, and a heavyweight in regional diplomacy and trade. It is, therefore, crucial to foresee as much as possible the kingdom’s likely future path, which is why it is wise to study its youth. What do they want? Where are they headed? How different are they from their peers elsewhere in the region? Are they being affected by the Arab Awakening?

Saudi youth, who represent the future of this strategic country, are the largest-ever generation in the kingdom, with an even larger generation coming up behind
The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of increased U.S. engagement in the region and the profound changes sweeping across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day issues, the Program concentrates on long-term economic, social, and political developments, as well as relations with the United States.

The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional experts for its meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences and meetings assess the policy implications of all aspects of developments within the region and individual states; the Middle East’s role in the international arena; American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; arms proliferation; and strategic threats to and from the regional states.

The Program pays special attention to the role of women, youth, civil society institutions, Islam, and democratic and autocratic tendencies. In addition, the Middle East Program hosts meetings on cultural issues, including contemporary art and literature in the region.

- **Current Affairs:** The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of current issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region, including: the events surrounding the uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East and its effect on economic, political and social life in countries in the region, the increased use of social media, the role of youth, Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy, Iran’s political and nuclear ambitions, the drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and their effect on the region, human rights violations, globalization, economic and political partnerships, and U.S. foreign policy in the region.

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- **Islam, Democracy and Civil Society:** The Middle East Program monitors the growing demand of people in the region for the transition to democratization, political participation, accountable government, the rule of law, and adherence by their governments to international conventions, human rights, and women’s rights. It continues to examine the role of Islamic movements and the role of Islamic parties in shaping political and social developments and the variety of factors that favor or obstruct the expansion of civil society.

The following paper is part of a Middle East Program Occasional Paper Series featuring the work of our scholars and fellows. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Woodrow Wilson Center.
them. As a result, Saudi Arabia is passing through a unique demographic period. And it was evident during my recently completed three-year tour there as an independent journalist that the kingdom is a very young country. Go no further than one of Riyadh’s many shopping malls. Everywhere one turns there are infants in arms, toddlers in shopping carts, and gaggles of teen-age boys horsing around, desperately trying to get the attention of more sedate female shoppers.

Approximately 37 percent of the Saudi population is below the age of 14. Those under age 25 account for around 51 percent of the population, and when those under 29 are included, young people amount to two-thirds of the kingdom’s population. (In the United States, those 14 years and younger are 20 percent of the population; those 29 and below make up 41 percent.)

The country’s unprecedented “youth bulge” has not yet crested, which means increasing numbers of job-seekers in coming years. This demographic profile is typical of the Gulf region where around 60 percent of the people are under the age of 30, making it one of the most youthful regions in the world.

Saudi youth are also more diversified and complex than earlier generations were at their age, which is to be expected in a country where the native population is now 20 million. One challenge in studying youth in a place like the kingdom is not to overlook that diversity. The very visible presence of Saudis who are progressive and pro-change on Twitter, YouTube, and in the blogosphere might lead one to conclude that all young Saudi people think that way. But that is not so. Many are socially conservative and very traditional in their views, which they also voice in cyberspace.

Notably, in one survey of 200 Saudis aged 18-24 in 2011, 69 percent said “traditional values mean a lot to me and ought to be preserved.” In another poll, substantial minorities (33 percent of females and 44 percent of males) agreed with the statement: “the culture of my country should always stay the way it is right now.”

THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION

Young Saudis are relatively better off than their peers in many other Arab states. But they also face enormous challenges, some of which were unknown to their parents. Education is one of them.

Many are openly frustrated that their education does not adequately prepare them for the workplace. One survey of Gulf residents between the ages of 15 and 24, including Saudis, found that only 19 percent believed that their education is preparing them to find a job “to a large extent.”

The government has begun reforming its education system and currently is allocating more than one quarter of its annual budget for education and training. But turning around what has been one of the worst education systems in the Middle East is a gargantuan task, and progress is slow. Curricula continue to be heavily weighted towards religion, though science, math, and other practical subjects are being given more time and prestige in the classroom. Meanwhile, the long-dominant teaching method of rote learning is only now beginning to be replaced by new pedagogical techniques that encourage the traits needed for today’s globalized workers: critical thinking, teamwork, and problem solving. With the government’s declared intention of moving toward a more diversified, knowledge-based economy, education reform is a priority.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Above all, Saudis are worried about their job prospects. In the past, the government could more or less absorb most university graduates into the public sector. But nowadays, that sector, particularly the education system, is so bloated that it can no longer take in large numbers. There is a different problem in the private sector: 90 percent of the jobs there are filled by foreign workers.

According to official statistics, last reported in 2009, the unemployment rate for Saudis aged 15 to 24 was 30 percent. Many young people believe it is much higher and assert that 40 percent of their peers do not have work.

Greater numbers of youths are seeking entry into the national workforce each year. In a 2010 speech, Saudi Aramco CEO Khalid A. Al Falih said, “Saudi Arabia will need to create nearly 4 million jobs over the next 10 years. The Kingdom’s economy historically has grown between 3-5%, while to generate the number of well-paying jobs required for our youth, the economy needs to grow in excess of 8%.” He added, “This is a tall order.”

In 2011, the government launched a new push to promote “Saudization,” or the hiring of Saudis to replace expatriate workers. The so-called Nitaqat program set quotas for Saudi
employees at various companies and threatened to impose penalties on delinquent companies, such as not having access to government services and licenses or not being able to renew visas for existing foreign staff. It was the most serious official effort so far to force the business community from its dependence on cheap foreign labor. But enforcement will be key, and it is too soon to know yet how strict that will be.

Related to unemployment are young people’s concerns about their financial insecurity. Despite the country’s immense privately-held wealth and the government’s generous social welfare spending, young people are deeply worried about their financial future, according to polls. In one survey of Gulf youths aged 15-24, including Saudis, the “high cost of living” emerged as the number one concern followed by “unemployment.” Many young people postpone getting married because of costs, and, once married, they face the problem of finding affordable housing.

Omar Abdelaziz, 23, works as a cashier in a supermarket chain in Riyadh. He takes home $540 a month, lives with his family, and has little hope of ever accumulating the $40,000 that he says is the cost of a wedding nowadays. “Some Saudis take out bank loans, some get help from family but I can’t, my family is not rich,” he told me. He also complained that his free government education did not prepare him for a career, saying, “It had nothing to do with a future job.”

BOREDOM

If you linger around the giant sliding glass doors at the entrances to any large shopping mall, it will not be long before you see young, jeans-wearing men arguing with security guards. Following orders, the guards are refusing to let the men enter as a way to enforce the kingdom’s rigid policy of gender segregation in public places. Men accompanied by wives, sisters, or daughters have no problem going into malls, but unaccompanied single males are presumed to be on a mission to meet young girls, not to go shopping.

The scene underscores the lack of recreational and leisure opportunities for Saudi youth, especially males. There are no cinemas, a paucity of athletic fields and courts, and virtually no student-led campus life with activities such as clubs, sports, or newspapers.

Much of young people’s spare time is spent at home with relatives and friends. This family-centered leisure represents a great strength of Saudi society, which is its strong family bond. But a lack of extracurricular activities that engage young people inhibits the creation of strong community spirit.

When alone, the preferred pastimes of youths are mostly sedentary, such as Internet surfing and watching TV. As for sports and exercise, one survey of Gulf youths found that only 14 percent of respondents said they exercised more than five times in a typical week. Thirty percent said they exercised once a week or less. And 19 percent, or almost a fifth of respondents, reported that they did no exercise at all.

Clearly, boredom is a huge problem. And when coupled with the sexual frustration arising from strict gender segregation (in schools, universities, gyms, restaurants, libraries, mosques, and even in some homes), what you get is a youth population susceptible to depression, delinquent behavior, illicit drug use, and dangerous activities such as “drifting,” a form of extreme drag racing. Obesity, too, has become another major problem among young Saudis. And almost 85 percent of Saudi youths in one poll agreed with the statement that “there is a great need for psychological counseling among people my age.”

Even the government is alarmed by some consequences of widespread boredom and inactivity. In a January 24, 2011 statement, Prince Nawaf bin Faisal bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, President of the General Presidency of Youth Welfare, said the “menace of narcotics is a national responsibility that should be shouldered by society,” adding that there was a “dire need” for narcotics prevention.

Volunteerism is still in its infancy in Saudi society, and it is often young people who are taking initiatives to boost it. This was especially evident after the devastating 2009 floods in Jeddah that left more than 120 people dead and wiped out hundreds of homes in low-income neighborhoods. The slow government response kick-started a spontaneous movement among young Saudis to help rescue stranded people and assist those left homeless. Maha Taher, 26, was one of those who rushed to help out. Since then, she has continued her engagement as an anti-poverty activist. She and her husband regularly ferry boxes of canned tuna, pasta, rice, and blankets to Hai Al Jama’a, one of Jeddah’s poorest neighborhoods, where they distribute the goods to its residents. Taher is a co-founder of Young Initiative Group (YIG), whose projects assist low-income families. “Don’t procrastinate on doing
good, and Allah will facilitate the process for you,” Taher said in a 2010 interview.  

**POLITICS**

Like most Saudis, young people express genuine respect and love for King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz because he is widely seen as pious, kindly, and someone who has the best interests of Saudis at heart. Many of his subjects also admire his reformist stance in such areas as education and women’s rights. While those warm feelings do not extend to everyone in the ruling royal family, the Saudi political structure enjoys widespread legitimacy among Saudis, including young people.

In March 2011, there was a call on Facebook for a Saudi “Day of Rage.” This was just weeks after Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had been ousted and tensions in the region were running high. But on the day of supposed rage, journalists in Riyadh managed to find only one protester in the city of five million.

There are several reasons for this apparent apathy. First, there was a huge police presence, including helicopters, in Riyadh’s streets that day. Second, the government deals harshly with those who defy its writ or criticize its policies, subjecting them to arbitrary arrest and long-term detention. For example, the “Day of Rage’s” sole protester, 40-year-old teacher Khalid Al Johani, was detained shortly after his public declaration to journalists that Saudi Arabia is a “police state.” He was still jailed without charges four months later.

And a group of about a dozen reform-minded activists in Jeddah who were discussing forming a political party, which is banned in the kingdom, were recently given long prison terms of up to 30 years after a secret trial on charges, including terrorist financing, that many Saudis found dubious.

Apart from fear, there are other reasons why young Saudis do not turn out in the streets in protest. One is money. The government is rich, and it is using its financial resources to blunt hardships faced by youths. The $130 billion financial packages announced earlier this year included funds for unemployment compensation and the construction of thousands of new homes. In addition, many young Saudis are now studying abroad on government scholarships or hoping to do so in the future. If they became open dissidents, access to this generous benefit would be lost.

Noteworthy, too, is the fact that the dominant Wahhabi religious doctrine promoted by the state teaches that open opposition to government, especially street protests, is religiously forbidden. Criticism of authorities should be made in private, behind closed doors, the doctrine states. State-employed clerics have repeatedly reminded Saudis of this ever since Arab Awakening protests began. Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz Aal Al-Sheikh, the kingdom’s most senior religious official, warned that the protests were being fomented by outsiders to “tear apart our Muslim nations.”

When protests erupted in Tunisia and Egypt, the kingdom’s Twitterverse radiated support and admiration. Many youths, glued to their television sets, were transfixed by the events. But overwhelmingly, Saudi youth do not want to see similar protests in the kingdom because they prize the orderliness of daily life, even if that demands a high degree of social conformity. Also, having witnessed chaos and bloodshed in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, Saudi youth are wary of anything that could jeopardize the day-to-day security they enjoy at home.

The upshot of these realities is that many, if not most, Saudi youth are apolitical, content to let the government rule as it wishes as long as it continues to dispense generous financial benefits to its subjects. In one 2011 survey of Saudis aged 18-24, only 51 percent said living in a democratic country was the most important issue for them.

But Saudi Arabia is a complex place and there is another reality, too: a small, but growing, slice of Saudi youth would like to have a say in how they are governed. In one recent survey of Gulf youth, including Saudis, 63 percent of those questioned said the government should “give young people increased access to [the] decision-making process and policy implementation at [the] local level.” More than half (58 percent) also would like to see the government create “local youth councils for effective participation in society.”

Another window on the awakening political consciousness among young people can be found on YouTube, where they are using satire, humor, and investigative reporting to poke fun at and deride Saudi society and officials—both political and religious.

Malik Nejer, a 20-something cartoonist, gets rave reviews from his peers for his willingness to tackle sensitive subjects, including corruption, in his animated videos posted on YouTube. Also popular is La Ykthar (“Don’t Spread it
Around”), a comedy channel founded by Saudi stand-up comic Fahad Al Butairi, 26, that now has 15,000 subscribers.

Filmmaker Bader Al Homoud also used humor to decry the lack of affordable housing when he posted his film “Monopoly” about a young Saudi who lives in his car. The film had subtle digs at corruption by members of the royal family, as did “We Are Being Deceived,” another short film posted to YouTube highlighting poverty in the kingdom.

The government is definitely noticing the criticism; it arrested Feras Bugnah and two other young Saudis who helped him film “We Are Being Deceived,” only releasing them after several weeks.

Young people also were among the hundreds of signers of several petitions demanding political reform that were sent to King Abdullah when he returned home in February 2011 from three months of medical treatment abroad. The recurring theme of these petitions was a demand for a constitutional monarchy. One petition also asked for a new cabinet in which the average age of ministers would be 40 years old, about 25 years younger than the current cabinet.

The petitions reflected a general sentiment, including among youth, that the ruling House of Saud is a unifying force and that seeking to bring it down threatens national unity. Rather, young Saudis are hoping that the royal family will take the initiative on its own to begin a process of sharing power with its subjects. For now, that hope is stronger than the conviction that power-sharing will only come because of pressure and political action from ordinary Saudis.

**RELIGION**

The Saudi ruling family’s legitimacy is based on its role as an upholder of Islamic values and its alliance with an ultraconservative religious establishment. So where does Saudi youth stand religiously? What portion of them is still susceptible to extremist thinking such as that espoused by Al Qaeda? How many subscribe to King Abdullah’s call for tolerance and interfaith dialogue? Who are their most influential sheikhs?

By all accounts, the level of sympathy for Al Qaeda and its ideology has dropped off considerably over the past ten years. Whatever support remains is deeply clandestine. This change is largely due to the government’s aggressive counter-terrorism offensive, which has included a high-profile public campaign against what it calls “deviant” understandings of Islam, such as Al Qaeda’s, and promotion of “moderate” Islam.

Unlike previous generations, young Saudis today know much more about how other Muslims live because they were raised with satellite television and the Internet. As a result, they are increasingly forming their own ideas about what is religiously allowed rather than blindly following government-employed clerics. The authority of the religious establishment has eroded in recent years, and younger Saudis do not defer to the clerics’ pronouncements to the same extent as their older siblings and parents.

This does not mean that youth are abandoning religion—not at all. Even those most Westernized in their lifestyles are deeply religious and observant, widely naming the Prophet Muhammed as a role model. A young Saudi may work for an international advertising agency but have the *athan*, or call to prayer, as his iPhone’s ringtone.

Essentially, young Saudis are coming up with their own version of Islam. This was evident in an interview I had with a 23-year-old woman who calls herself “a human rights activist.” She had an education heavily loaded toward religion, but instead of focusing on outward displays of piety, she lobbies on Facebook for Saudis who are detained without trial.

She does this, she said, because she believes that her faith calls her to work for those unjustly treated. “Our religion teaches us justice...if you see any guy with an unfair situation, you have to stand with him—that’s our religion,” she said.

Asking that her name not be used because she feared retaliation from Saudi security, the woman said, “our government uses religion sometimes to make their position strong and make the people here not to speak about them.”

She added, “a lot of young people...don’t communicate with [the state-employed clergy] and we don’t believe them. We don’t take our rules or fatwas from them because now we are thinking, now we have the internet, we know the world, we know what’s happening....Young people here have changed. A lot of them became liberal because they say...they give you religion like drugs, to shut your mouth and to be not like a person...They don’t want you to think, they don’t want you to invent.”

When I asked about her favorite religious leader, she named Salman Al Audah, who is arguably the most popular Islamic scholar in the kingdom. Significantly, he does not work for the government and was jailed for five years in the 1990s because of his outspoken criticism of the government
and of the U.S. military presence in the kingdom. Earlier this year, Al Audah’s television program was canceled by the government after he spoke favorably about the youth uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia.

“He’s the good sheikh, he speaks about the good religion,” said the young woman. “He’s not a liar. He doesn’t make a fatwa because the king wants [it]. The other sheikhs, because the government pays them, they give them the fatwa.”

**YOUNG WOMEN**

If there is one segment of Saudi society pushing aggressively for reforms, it is young women. Their demands for greater personal freedoms and more say in Saudi public life will be the biggest driver of social and economic change in the next few years. This is because the restrictions under which Saudi women live, which collectively come under the rubric of the “guardianship” system, are increasingly running into two obstacles.

One obstacle is resistance from young, educated women who are aware that Muslim women in other countries have more personal freedoms than Saudi females, who are not even allowed to drive.

In addition, the guardianship system, as well as society’s strict gender segregation, will be difficult to maintain given the government’s often-stated intentions to bring women into the workforce and to create a more diversified, knowledge-based economy less dependent on oil. It is very difficult to have a creative, dynamic, and productive economic system if half the population is segregated and treated like children.

One survey of young Saudi women found “88% of female students see a successful career as part of their life plan”—a finding the authors called “a small revolution.” (Many young women nowadays demand that their marriage contract include clauses guaranteeing their husband’s consent for them to finish their education and work outside the home.)

And yet, in 2008, Saudi Arabia had the Gulf region’s highest female youth unemployment rate – 45.8 percent. Among women with Bachelor’s degrees, the unemployment rate skyrocketed to 78 percent.

There are many signs of restlessness among Saudi women, particularly young ones. For one, there was the 2011 campaign against the ban on female drivers, which was made possible by the social media tools Facebook and Twitter. Another female-led campaign demanding the right to vote unexpectedly got royal endorsement when King Abdullah announced in September 2011 that he had decided to allow women to run as candidates and vote in the next round of elections for municipal councils in 2015. He also announced that he intended to name an unspecified number of women as full members of the appointed Majlis Al Shura, the kingdom’s top advisory body.

Women also are lobbying for changes in the divorce laws that strongly favor men and for tougher government action against domestic abuse. Two other trends that indicate growing assertiveness by women include a reported rise in young women running away from home, often to escape abuse, and a rocketing divorce rate among young couples.

All these trends will only increase as the kingdom’s female population becomes increasingly educated. Already, more than half of the country’s university students are female. And in the spring of 2011, the world’s largest all-female university, Princess Noura bint Abdulrahman University, opened its doors. When fully up to speed, it will have an enrollment of some 40,000 Saudi women.

The coming decade in Saudi Arabia will be marked by clashes of gender expectations in both society at large and in individual families as young women demanding greater freedom and opportunities come up against still-dominant patriarchal attitudes. Although young Saudi males have become more open to the idea of their female peers getting advanced degrees, working, and driving, they still do not support women’s liberation to the same extent that women do, according to surveys and numerous conversations with Saudi men. When asked by one pollster if there would be “substantial changes within the next five years” on women’s rights, 75 percent of the women surveyed said there would be, but only 49 percent of males agreed.

**A WILD CARD**

Hoping to train a cadre of well-qualified Saudis in a range of professions, as well as expose them to ideas and cultures that expand their intellectual horizons, the government vastly expanded its scholarship program for Saudis to study abroad. By the end of 2011, there were around 150,000 Saudis in many different countries studying for Bachelors’ and more advanced degrees. At last count, about a third—47,000—were in the United States, far exceeding the previous academic
peak year of 1980-81 when 10,440 Saudis were attending U.S. educational institutions.

This is an unprecedented experiment for the kingdom and it has a potential downside: will there be jobs for these students as they begin to return home? The government already is concerned about this, which is one reason they launched the new push for Saudization in early 2011.

Officials have other concerns: what new political and social attitudes and aspirations will the students returning from abroad bring with them? How will they affect the future course of their country in these areas? Will they just fold back into their conformist, conservative society as their predecessors did? Or will they sow the seeds of economic, social, and political change?

SHIITE YOUTH

Another potential wild card in the kingdom’s future is the angry youth of Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minority, which is believed to be around 10 percent of the population. Heavily concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province, Shiites complain of discrimination in government jobs, including the military, and of intolerant, anti-Shiite declarations of many Saudi clerics, including some employed by the government. In addition, the government limits the number of Shiite mosques and religious study houses built in Shiite communities.

An added irritant to the Shiites was Saudi Arabia’s March 2011 military intervention in neighboring Bahrain to support its Sunni royal family in quelling pro-democracy protests by its predominantly Shiite population.

Increasingly, Shiite community leaders in Saudi Arabia are unable to control the frustration and anger of their youths who staged a series of demonstrations in 2011 that culminated in clashes with police and the deaths of four Shiites, including one woman.

LOOKING AHEAD

By their sheer numbers, Saudi young people will dramatically alter the kingdom over the next decade. They will be decisive in how much the kingdom is able to transform itself into a competitive, globally-integrated economy, as well as a dynamic, creative society that can successfully make its way in a turbulent, complex 21st century.

Understanding their ambitions, challenges, and worldviews will help U.S. policy-makers more confidently gauge where the kingdom is headed and assist them in navigating the uncertain period ahead in U.S.-Saudi relations.

The Saudi ruling class is a gerontocracy that has shown no inclination to significantly alter the political structure in which the royal family offers little accountability and transparency while enjoying excessive privileges and riches. It is difficult to see how this situation can endure through another generation, particularly with such large numbers of youths making their way into adulthood.

Although a large segment of these youth are apolitical, they are increasingly being shaped by forces beyond the government’s control, such as globalization and the information revolution. A critical mass of Saudi youth wanting a greater say in their country’s political life is likely to eventually emerge, presenting the aging Saudi leadership with a major test to its governing ideology, power, and privileges.

If past history is a guide, the ruling family will pragmatically and slowly adapt to the demands of young people, but also will try to co-opt many of them in order to preserve its ultimate authority.

But spurred by economic difficulties and the potential of successful political reform elsewhere in the region, young Saudis are likely to resist being co-opted to the same extent their parents were, leaving the royal family with distasteful options: further suppressing dissent or giving up some of its prerogatives.

More pressing than political issues, however, is the need to respond to the demand for jobs from the army of young workers marching on the national workplace. If their employment aspirations are unmet, or if the economic situation deteriorates dramatically and drastically, Saudi youth are likely to become a more volatile and discontented segment of the population, and some may again take refuge in extremist versions of Islam.

There are likely to be more protests and demonstrations in future years related to employment issues. Also, the kingdom may see rising anti-foreigner sentiment among youths because so many private sector jobs are held by expatriates, including Indians, Bangladeshis, Filipinos, and Pakistanis. This is why the Saudization program is so crucial.
As today’s young people mature, there is also a danger that the population will become more polarized. Already there are, in the words of Saudi television executive Jamal Khashoggi, “two Saudi Arabias.” One is progressive, out-going, at ease with global interactions. The other is inward-looking, still extremely religiously-oriented, and very conservative. This polarization may harden into political attitudes and stances as today’s young people become adults.

The bottom line is that young Saudis are being shaped by political and economic forces never before experienced in a massive way in Saudi Arabia. As a result, change is coming to the kingdom.

Notes

1 Figures are mostly from CIA World Factbook. See also “Youth in GCC Countries, Meeting the Challenge,” Booz & Company Inc, 2011, p. 4


3 Booz, p. 16


5 Booz, p. 7

6 Booz, p. 53

7 “Bridging the Gap,” p. 11


9 3rd Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey 2010,” Dubai, UAE, p. 13

10 Booz, p. 8

11 Interview with author in Riyadh, June 2011

12 “Bridging the Gap,” p. 12

13 Booz, p. 40 & p. 74 note 17

14 “Bridging the Gap,” p. 10; Booz, p. 40
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