Proceedings of the Conference

The U.S. Role in the World: Enhancing the Capacity to Respond to Complex Contingency Operations

Washington, DC, September 19, 2001
Conflict Prevention Project
Recent cycles of violence in the Middle East, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, Central Africa, Kosovo, Chechnya, East Timor and the chronic instability that continues to plague much of the world, have forced the international community to reconsider its attitudes toward and role in preventing violent conflict. Established through a grant by the Carnegie Corporation of New York in February 2001, the Conflict Prevention Project aims to broaden the understanding of how hard-edged policy analysis of conflict prevention may be infused into decision-making and planning at the highest levels of this government and others. Building on the work begun by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Conflict Prevention Project will emphasize prevention as policy by sponsoring a distinguished speaker series to emphasize the high-level political attention necessary to shift governments’ impulse from reaction to prevention; a series of ‘issue forums’ to refine our understanding of the opportunities for effective preventive action leavened with the reality of a conflict’s regional contexts; and a conference series with a specific focus on preventive assistance—the long-term strategies that help not only make struggling countries better off, but that also help undermine the tendency for societies in transition to succumb to violence.

Jane Holl Lute is the Consulting Director, Anita Sharma serves as the Deputy Director and Jennifer Klein is the Project Assistant.

Africa Project
The Africa Project was launched in 1999 with generous support from the Ford Foundation.

Under consulting director Gilbert Khadiagala, the project capitalizes on the Center’s location in Washington, D.C., where the federal government is centered and such major financial institutions as the World Bank are headquartered, to promote dialogue among policymakers and academic specialists on both African issues and U.S. policy toward Africa.

Since its inception, the Africa Project has served as a forum for informed debate about both the multiple challenges and opportunities that face Africa. The Center has provided a place where diverse viewpoints can be expressed on issues such as the civil wars in the Sudan and Sierra Leone, the democratization process in Nigeria, economic transformations in South Africa, and the role of women in resolving African conflicts.

The Africa Project will focus, over the next two years, on the implications of globalization for Africa, U.S trade relations with Africa, resources conflict in the Nile basin, the economic sources of civil wars, and the impact of HIV/AIDS on the continent.

The project has also launched an innovative program, the Young Africanist Fellowship that will bring three advanced doctoral students to the Center during the summer. Through the fellowship, the Project seeks to identify young scholars who will play a significant role in making future policies toward Africa.

Gilbert Khadiagala serves as the Consulting Director of the project and Jennifer Klein is the Project Assistant.

East European Studies
East European Studies (EES), a non-partisan program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is devoted exclusively to the advancement of a thorough and sophisticated understanding of the states of Central and Eastern Europe. In its effort to bridge the gap between the academic and policy community, EES serves as Washington’s primary meeting ground between national and international academic experts on the region, policymakers, journalists, professionals from the private sectors and the general public. In perpetuation of the Wilsonian commitment to a deeper understanding of issues crucial to global peace and stability and in an effort to facilitate informed policy decisions, EES contributes to the expansion of in-depth regional understanding and knowledge—taking into account all aspects of the region’s historical, political, economic, sociological and cultural traditions—through its four primary missions:

■ training new generations of experts in the field;
■ fostering the research work of established scholars;
■ hosting an array of roundtables, conference forums, seminars and noon discussions; and
■ disseminating relevant policy information, in state-of-the-art format, to a wide range of audiences.

Martin L. Sletzinger serves as the Director, Sabina A.-M. Crisen as Program Associate & Editor and Meredith L. Knepp as Program Assistant.

Asia Program
The Asia Program provides a forum for bringing historical depth and contemporary understanding of Asia to the nation’s capital. It seeks to furnish an intellectual link between the world of learning and the world of public affairs, specifically on issues relating to Asia. The Program organizes seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences featuring prominent Asia scholars and policymakers with hands-on experience in shaping Asia policy.

The Program’s activities focus on five geographical areas, China, Japan, Korea, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. In addition, the program arranges events that address cross-regional and global comparative topics.

Robert M. Hathaway is the Director, Gang Lin and Amy McCreedy are Program Associates, and Wilson Lee and Tim Hilderbrandt are Program Assistants.
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The U.S. Role in the World: Enhancing the Capacity to Respond to Complex Contingency Operations

Washington, DC, September 19, 2001

Conference Report Draft by
Karen Hirschfeld

Written with
Anita Sharma

Photographs by
David Hawxhurst
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Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Wilson Center Board and Wilson Center Council inside back cover
About the Wilson Center inside back cover
The rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars posing threats to regional and international peace are often accompanied by natural or manmade disasters resulting in widespread human suffering. Called complex contingency operations, the United States has responded to an increasing number since the end of the Cold War.

On September 19, 2001, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars gathered a spectrum of experts—including personnel from the military to civilian agencies of the United States Government, to the United Nations, to think tanks and research institutions to non-governmental organizations—for a symposium entitled, “The U.S. Role In The World: Enhancing The Capacity To Respond To Complex Contingency Operations.” Co-sponsored by the Wilson Center’s Conflict Prevention and Africa Projects in the Division of International Studies and the East European Studies, and Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center, the conference was partially funded through federal conference funds and the Ford Foundation as a component of the Wilson Center’s U.S. Role in World series.

The conference examined the demand for humanitarian, political, and military assistance to respond to complex contingency operations and U.S. capacity to manage and coordinate bilateral and multilateral responses. In the past ten years, U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief has grown rapidly. The Presidential Decision Directive 56 of 1997 defines “complex contingency operations” as peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995–present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991).

After action reports on complex contingency operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, have highlighted the need for better coordination. But harmonization among the numerous federal agencies, the U.S. military, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, is an arduous and consuming endeavor. Many of those organizations are already working in the field long before the official arrival of the military and will stay to assist in post-conflict reconstruction long after they are gone. Often the aims of the operation are at odds with one another. For instance, humanitarian concerns are often secondary to military objectives of restoring peace and order. But they cannot happen in a linear fashion. In Bosnia, the United States learned that you couldn’t set an unrealistic timetable or work independently. The original plan to send troops for just one year resulted in the restoration of peace and order, but the underlying causes of violence demanded a much greater time commitment.

The meeting also explored the challenges of civil-military coordination during the operation and transition phases; enhancing the capacities of others to respond to complex contingency operations; and prospects for future operations.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 led many participants to reflect on the definition of U.S. national security. Several participants suggested that we expand the definition of contingency operations, while others noted that the United States must remain engaged and combat terrorism on many fronts, not just militarily. Still, acknowledgments of the tragedy, then only a few days old, echoed throughout the conference, but did not overshadow the stated purpose of the sessions.
Several participants noted that previous attempts to formulate and implement interagency coordination and policy, such as Presidential Decision Directives 25 and 56, and Executive Committees (EXCOMMs) of the National Security Council, have met with varying degrees of success. They said it was too early to evaluate further attempts to refine interagency planning such as the Bush Administration’s first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) and formation of the Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations Policy Coordination Committee. Others said that the United States should also learn to work better with international organizations and foreign governments, including enhancing United Nations capacity to respond and sharing information and resources with others. The regional case studies suggested that actors are often at odds with one another. Speakers urged that any response effort aimed at stopping the downward spiral of violence, restoring stability, and promoting recovery requires meeting not only military demands, but political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic, social and security, as well.

Restoring Order in Complex Contingency Operations

Ruth Wedgwood, professor of International Law at Yale and Johns Hopkins Universities, summarized what she viewed as the chief weaknesses in U.S. capacity to restore order in a humanitarian emergency. These included inefficient infrastructure to reach remote areas, lack of a refugee strategy, inability to restore minimal security or deliver basic services, unwillingness to confront corruption, and the inability to keep investment in the troubled areas. Wedgwood also criticized the general outlook on relief operations, saying that we view them strictly as short-term, humanitarian crises as opposed to opportunities to build long-term security and self-sufficiency.

Trends in Humanitarian Response

Ellen Laipson, Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), summarized a NIC report entitled “Global Trends 2015,”1 which examined how the international system may be changing strategically over the next 10-15 years. This report outlined trends in the main drivers that shape international politics including demography, natural resources, science and technology, economics, governance, and cooperation and conflict.

Enid Schoettle, Special Assistant to the Chair, National Intelligence Council (NIC), outlined another pertinent NIC study, “Global Humanitarian Emergencies: Trends and Projections 2001-2002,”2 which examined several trends in emerging humanitarian disasters. This study assessed the global demand for money, food, and military support in response to humanitarian emergencies. According to the study, the primary cause of humanitarian disasters during the 90s was internal conflict. A troubling statistic from the study showed that while the number of humanitarian emergencies between April 1998 and August 2001 has stabilized to 20, the number of people in need has increased by about six million. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the increase from approximately 36 million in 1998 to some 42 million in December 2000 is attributed mainly to the increasingly violent and long lasting internal conflicts in countries such as Angola, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. In terms of response, there continues to be a willingness from outside states to help as well as a local

2 http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/global_humanitarian_pub.htm
ability and desirability to help. Lastly, the demand for humanitarian assistance is likely to increase over the next 18 months.

U.S. Engagement in Complex Contingency Operations: Understanding the Tasks and Finding the Gaps and Seams

Eric Schwartz, Former Special Assistant to the President and Former Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), confirmed one of the trends reported by Schoettle—there is a large reservoir of support to overseas emergencies within the U.S. government. But, he stressed that we can only provide effective and efficient leadership if we are also prepared to address the political and security issues that are so often the proximate causes of humanitarian suffering.

According to Schwartz and a message that would be repeated throughout the conference, effective response to emergencies requires coordinated action on political-military, peacekeeping, civilian administration, and humanitarian assistance planning. In response to this perceived need, the Clinton administration instituted Presidential Decision Directive 56. When multiple agencies of the U.S. government respond to a complex emergency or to anticipate a potential crisis, the government requires an integrated plan as well as a disciplined process to ensure effective and coherent implementation. The Bush administration appears to be continuing this focus and work, he noted.

Integrating the Actors

Matthew McLean, Director for Planning and Contingency Operations at National Security Council, talked about the next steps involved in interagency planning and coordination. He described the four components of contingency planning that are carried out by Policy Coordination Committees: 1. Warn. McLean looks to the intelligence agencies for their ability in painting scenarios. 2. Plan. The emphasis here is on strategic planning, not on operational planning. Concept papers help in the process. 3. Prevent. Now that we know the possible problems, how to prevent them? According to McLean, the United States should do more of this type planning with our regional counterparts. 4. Respond. Hopefully we have done some pre-thinking so we have some guidance. Pre-thinking and planning should eliminate the hand wringing stage.

Improving Civil-Military Coordination

Speaking from the military viewpoint, Matthew Vaccaro, Director for Peacekeeping at the Department of Defense, said leadership is the most necessary, yet most difficult ingredient for achieving interagency planning. Leadership, required to prioritize advance thinking and planning, is a tremendous challenge, given that current operations always feel most urgent. Also, on the tangible, practical side, Vaccaro pointed out the need for an “interagency virtual place for political-military planning.” Such technological innovation would enhance interagency cooperation, enabling collaboration across agency and across borders.

As the Director of the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping at the State Department, Dennis Skocz focused on the political in political-military (pol-mil) planning. He contrasted straight military planning with pol-mil planning, pointing out that military planning was at an operational level with heavy
emphasis on logistics and command control, while pol-mil planning suggests a coordinated multi-agency effort on a strategic level where decisions are negotiated.

Julia Taft, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, at the U.S. Department of State, presented the NGO point of view of complex contingency operations. She described NGOs as “those on the ground, the first responders to any given situation,” and therefore imbued with a unique perspective. The first responders to humanitarian disasters (health care professionals, disaster specialists) are trained for rapid response. They are neutral and impartial. But according to Taft, this neutral environment might become threatened when the military arrive—often, a clash of cultures occurs. A successful intervention should be designed to harmonize these various roles. For example, she suggested that the military provide perimeter security, and allow relief workers access to do their job.

Engaging with the UN to Respond to Potential Conflicts

“The United Nations is trying to foster a culture of prevention,” said Tapio Kanninen, Chief of the Policy Planning Unit in the UN's Department of Political Affairs. Although the Security Council is almost exclusively crisis and emergency driven, since the mid-1980s the Council has made efforts to raise conflict prevention higher on the agenda. A new phase was reached when the Council asked the Secretary General to prepare a comprehensive report on the prevention of conflict, and approved a subsequent resolution in August 2001—the first of its kind. Some key ideas proposed in the report include periodic regional reporting on situations threatening international peace and security; establishing an informal working group on prevention; and creating a system wide and consistent funding approach geared toward prevention.

Enhancing the Capacity of Others: Strengthening Regional Responses

Experts on regional crises in Latin America, Africa, East Timor, and Bosnia and Kosovo discussed recent success and failures of response. According to Len Hawley, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Former Director of Multilateral Affairs, National Security Council, a lead nation is the key to a successful multinational complex contingency operation. Aside from the U.S., there are just 12 nations that possess the attributes to lead, a potential problem as we look to future operations, he said.

Responding to Complex Contingency Operations: Future Prospects

The final session looked at post-conflict reconstruction and the prospects for future operations. According to Robert Orr, Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, post-conflict reconstruction must be viewed as a long-term process and therefore should be attempted in stages. Second, the bulk of the burden of post-conflict reconstruction should be kept where it belongs with the local population. Third, a broad range of international actors, each with their own comparative advantage in certain skill areas should be engaged.

Donald Daniel, Special Advisor to the Chair, National Intelligence Council, was tasked with writing an estimate on the future of peace operations. This report, based on a meeting of representatives from G-77 countries, distilled a number of positive and negative factors for the
future of peace operations (see appendix for full report). Among the positive factors were the willingness on the part of the international community to support peace operations; improvement in military capabilities in peacekeeping; and a greater number and better quality of peacekeeping training programs. Among the negative factors was the necessity of looking at peacekeeping holistically, involving also peace building and civilian administration. According to Daniel, “If you are in for a dime, you are in for a dollar and if that is the case, some people don’t want to be in for the dime.”

Stove piped into Cold War structures, interagency coordination has been fraught with difficulties, including problems with information sharing, turf wars, competing agendas, and limited funding. A growing recognition that the U.S. must reorganize and adapt to the new security environment was further underscored by the tragedy of September 11. Out of the meeting arose some provocative suggestions for follow-on meetings: including one examining international cooperation and coordination; and another focusing on U.S. funding for contingency operations.

A Special Note of Thanks from Anita Sharma, Deputy Director, Conflict Prevention Project

While the conceptual organization and logistical arrangements for the September 19 conference had been organized months in advance, the horrific terrorist attacks on September 11 obliterated all previous plans. It seemed inappropriate to ask people to think about anything but the immeasurable loss of life, the immense sorrow and potential responses to the attacks. In addition, the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, which houses the Wilson Center, tightened security and made entry into the Center an arduous process. Postponing the conference seemed the appropriate decision. However, conversations with participants and cosponsors suggested that most were eager to meet in a public forum, discuss what had transpired and somehow, return to business as usual. Thus, we decided to continue as scheduled.

The conference was made possible only through the dedicated work and energy of a several Wilson Center staff members. In particular, I would like to signal out the tireless commitment of Jennifer Klein, Project Assistant for the Africa and Conflict Prevention Projects. Janine Rowe, Sabina Crisen, Anita Wright, Jennifer Kaczor, Meredith Knepp, and Amy McCreedy provided helpful logistical assistance in organizing the event. Project Directors, Bob Hathaway of the Asia Program, Martin Sletzinger of East European Studies, and Gilbert Khadiagala of the Africa Project, dedicated their valuable time to serve as panel moderators. Special thanks is due to the conference speakers, all of whom offered insightful suggestions on how to best structure the meeting and helped to bring the “right people” to the room. Finally, the encouragement and support given by Jane Holl Lute, Consulting Director of the Conflict Prevention Project and Robert Litwak, Director of the International Studies Program of the Wilson Center, was equaled only by the enthusiasm and interest of the nearly 80 participants. It was largely due to the generous spirit of teamwork and dedication that this conference proceeded smoothly and was a success.
The morning session of the conference, entitled “Setting the Stage,” allowed the panelists an opportunity to identify the major problems encountered in American involvement in humanitarian emergencies ranging from Bosnia and Kosovo to Rwanda, East Timor and Somalia. Lee Hamilton, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, welcomed the audience and speakers to the conference and set out the task at hand for the speakers. “The U.S. is often the 9-1-1 for the entire world, called upon to respond to crises around the world. This responsibility requires coordinating the military, non-governmental organizations and international organizations, and we can only achieve stability and security by addressing political, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian needs in addition to military goals.”

The panel’s moderator, Jane Holl Lute, opened her remarks with a mention of the tragic events of September 11. That morning she recounted that her daughter remarked, “Mom, you’re in conflict prevention. I thought that you were supposed to keep things like this from happening.” Indeed, the importance of prevention cannot be overstated, she noted. As we examine the factors surrounding the execution of the terrorist attacks, we must remember that swathes of the world’s population remain isolated politically and economically, and those with murderous aims have exploited their misery. Ms. Holl Lute described the 1990s as an “instructive decade,” which demonstrated the shortcomings of the international community’s response to humanitarian emergencies and civil conflicts. In her
opinion, it is time for the legitimate leaders of
the world to reclaim the globalization agenda and
address issues of deprivation and discrimination.
Creating an environment of security, well-being
and justice, and preventing the recent violence
and destruction from reoccurring is an impera-
tive we can no longer ignore. If we do, it will be
at our own peril, Lute said.

Discussing difficulties encountered when
attempting to intervene in a civil conflict to
restore order and rebuild societies wracked by
conflict, Ruth Wedgwood noted the U.S. track
record during the past decade, gives us “great
modesty.” She highlighted a range of problems in
dealing with complex emergencies, from the lack
of adequate conflict prevention, differing opin-
ions among agencies regarding the required
response, lack of coordination during complex
humanitarian emergencies, and the inadequacy
of services in the post-conflict phase of an opera-
tion. In her opinion, the lack of physical infra-
structure in the conflict areas, makes it difficult
for the U.S. military to act, because “the military
was built to respond to the challenges of the
Cold War, not to engage in remote crises.” How-
ever, she conceded it is unlikely that the basic
structure of the military will change in the near
future. Another problem is a dearth of critical
thinking about problems that exacerbate conflict.
For example, Ms. Sadako Ogata, the outgoing
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, was con-
cerned primarily with feeding and sheltering
refugees and was decidedly ambivalent about the
security dilemma caused by massive refugee
flows, Wedgwood said. In her opinion, the new
High Commissioner must consider the security
issues posed by displacement and mass move-
ments of people within countries and across bor-
ders if there is to be a serious effort to mitigate
conflict and move beyond the immediate crisis.

Restoring legal mechanisms has been a
particularly vexing problem. Often there is a
revolving door of justice. Those arrested are often
released within 72 hours, as there are no courts,
lawyers or even laws, she said. In Bosnia, it was
difficult to create an inter-ethnic police force
after many in the police force had been implicat-
ed in ethnic cleansing; whereas in East Timor,
civilian police officers who didn’t speak the local
language and didn’t have adequate transportation,
felt impotent to enforce the peace. The transition
from peace enforcement to
economic recovery is often
problematic, Wedgwood
explained. “We have created
a biosphere bubble of false
development—pizza parlors,
taxi cabs and motel rentals—
none of which is sustainable.”
As such, it is difficult to con-
vince industry to invest in
volatile, risky areas. Furthermore, civil conflict is
often exacerbated by inadequate service delivery;
in particular, she noted that the UN is not well
suited to provide basic services, such as building
schools and roads and encouraging sustainable
agriculture. In order to prevent new crises and
respond to ones in progress, she argued that the
international community needs to recruit a
“whole new type of civil service, a Marshall Plan
of people” who can meet the needs of develop-
ing societies.

The National Intelligence Council’s report:
“Global Trends 2015,” a strategic analysis of
trends in the international system in the next
10–15 years, suggests there are eight main drivers
shaping international politics and explains how
the trends in each of these areas might affect
global security in the next 14 years. In her discus-
sion, Ellen Laipson pointed out that the report
was published in December 2000, and she cau-
tioned that some of the broad conclusions of the
study might need to be re-examined in light of
September 11.
1. **Demography**: There will be an additional 1.2 billion people on earth by the year 2015; 95% of population growth will happen in the developing world and in cities. At the same time, industrialized countries are “aging,” resulting in an increase of older people unable to work and dependent heavily on government services for their survival. These factors will encourage a growing reliance on migration; both spontaneous and managed movements of populations between countries with excess supply of labor and those countries requiring workers. While this migration story can be a net positive, it also presents a host of problems for the agencies dealing with poor, hungry and sick refugees, she said.

2. **Natural Resources** (*food, water, energy*): There will be ample energy and food in the next 14 years (although unevenly distributed), but 60% of the world’s population will be living in ‘water-stressed’ areas by the year 2015. While tensions over water rights historically have been resolved peacefully, “Global Trends 2015” anticipates an increase in violent conflict over water access.

3. **Science and Technology**: The arrival of technology, both modern and more traditional forms, in underdeveloped countries can have an enormous impact as a positive force, in the case of immunization technologies, or a negative one, as in the proliferation of nuclear technologies in Iraq and North Korea.

4. **Economics**: As globalization continues certain countries may be adversely affected; however, the trend looks overwhelmingly positive. Given the shock to the U.S. and global economies by the events of September 11, this prediction, too, should be reexamined.

5. **Governance**: The predictions that globalization and the rise of powerful transnational organizations would lead to a contraction of the role of the nation state has not materialized as illustrated by the struggles of the past decade and the continued importance of the nation-state and the powerful influence of nationalism.

6. **Cooperation versus Conflict**: Currently, two-dozen small, mostly internal conflicts brew throughout the world. The study suggests that the size of conflicts may increase; for example, the smaller conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda may be replaced by conflict in larger countries such as India, Pakistan and Cote d’Ivoire. While the possibility of a large-scale conflict between conventional states is unlikely, if it were to occur, it would most likely be in South or East Asia.

7. **International Cooperation**: The need for international cooperation is expected to rise but this need will only be fulfilled when there is a demand in the state and private sector interests, and NGO consensus for support of the action. On the same token, international organizations may be willing to reform to enable a more comprehensive response to complex emergencies but their authority may be constrained by a state’s reluctance to give additional powers to these organizations.

8. **The Role of the United States**: The economy, intellectual ideas, policies and culture of the United States have a tremendous impact on the rest of the world. Laipson noted that the study’s authors decided that the anti-globalization movement of fractured coalitions of countries and groups was unlikely to coalesce, due mainly to the diffuse interests of the actors. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, Ms. Laipson suggested the United States examine the violent reaction to American values and global outlook.

Ms. Laipson’s colleague, Enid Schoettle, overviewed the National Intelligence Council report “Global Humanitarian Emergencies:
Trends and Projections, 2001-2002.” The report detailed the current humanitarian emergencies and projected the global need for humanitarian assistance through the year 2002, and the capacity of the international community to cope with these emergencies. Schoettle first defined humanitarian emergencies as “a situation in which at least 300,000 civilians require international aid to avoid serious malnutrition or death, and/or protection in order to gain access to humanitarian aid.” Such emergencies may be caused by internal conflict, severe government repression, sudden economic emergencies, major technological disasters and sudden or persistent natural disasters. In the 1990s, internal conflict was the primary cause of 22 of the 25 humanitarian emergencies, including many long-lasting wars in Angola, Sri Lanka and Sudan. Since 1994, the number of current, on-going emergencies has ranged from 22-25, peaking in 1993 and again in 1999. Over time, the number of refugees has leveled off, whereas the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) is rising quickly. Because IDPs are the most difficult group of people to assist during conflicts, due to international law, sovereignty issues, and an unclear UN mandate, this statistic is particularly important to humanitarian and relief workers, Schoettle said. Crises in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq and North Korea are considered of greatest concern to the U.S. government either because they relate directly to U.S. strategic interests, or the scale and impact of the humanitarian situations and the impacts on their respective regions, make them too important to ignore.

Six countries: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yugoslavia (Kosovo and Serbia) are transitioning out of humanitarian emergencies, while the list of countries that might dissolve into civil conflict includes Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, India/Pakistan (Kashmir), Kenya, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

With the overall demand for humanitarian assistance likely to increase over the next 18 months, conditions of several on-going emergencies, in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, North Korea, Sudan and Tajikistan are likely to worsen, while the humanitarian situation is expected to improve in a handful of places in Bosnia, North Iraq, and for the Albanian population in Kosovo. However conditions throughout these countries will deteriorate further if the global economy continues to stagnate.

The international community’s response depends on several factors: the political will to act, the ability to respond within the country (including local infrastructure, NGO presence, local governance structure), the military capability, the financing of humanitarian assistance and the support for international humanitarian agencies through intergovernmental institutions. While international donor assistance continues to decline, priorities are reassigned so that major donor countries are apt to respond quickly to major natural disasters (such as Hurricane Mitch) and to fund responses to new complex emergencies rather than continuing assistance to long-standing conflicts, she said. Donor fatigue and mixed successes have decreased interest and funding for operations in places such as Angola, Sri Lanka and Sudan. “On the supply side, the picture is not promising, and could be bleak,” Schoettle stressed.

As the final presenter on the panel, Eric Schwartz acknowledged the dire predictions of
the NIC’s report, and discussed the strong desire within both the U.S. Government and the American public to respond generously to those in need. However, in his opinion, “The ‘uneasy feeling’ about U.S. responses to complex humanitarian crises reflects the reality that we can only provide effective humanitarian leadership if we are also prepared to address the political and security issues that are often the proximate causes of human suffering.”

Evidence of weaknesses in the U.S. capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies abound over the past eight years, due in part to the disinclination of the U.S. to be involved in more than marginal ways in operations that do not directly affect our national security interests. This narrow view has limited the U.S.’s capacity for influence and for enhancement of UN operations at the very time that others—from the Australians to the Europeans—have demonstrated a willingness to bear burdens, provided that the United States is engaged. According to Schwartz, “Even before the terrible events of September 11, the new Administration was voicing a strong desire to scale back from our already-limited commitments… However, a greater willingness to engage and exercise leadership could send a message of support for multilateralism at a time when we are actively seeking the support and involvement of the international community.”

The operational challenge of engagement involves developing effective tools in the areas of warning, management and communication, noted Schwartz. “From Haiti to the Balkans, we have learned that effective policy responses to complex crises require coordinated action in a wide variety of distinct yet inter-related arenas: political-military planning, peacekeeping, civil-military relations, civilian administration, humanitarian assistance and human rights. But, such coordination is often the exception rather than the rule.”

Responding to complex contingency operations must involve the whole spectrum of conflict, from early warning, to response, to post-conflict reconstruction. While organizational improvements have allowed for greater cooperation, huge planning challenges remain. Schwartz suggested that those executing plans should consider them enablers, not constraints. In addition, institutions should be transformed in order to develop a culture of interagency cooperation; and key questions of resource availability need to be addressed. This last challenge “bedeviled the Clinton Administration in Africa,” he said, “where requirements for operations in Sierra Leone, Congo-Kinshasa and Burundi arguably outstripped the willingness of the international community to provide adequate resources.”

Beyond peacekeeping improvements, which are crucial to security and stability, post-conflict situations also require the effective transitional administration, and political and economic development that will ultimately permit the departure of peacekeepers. Since 1993, the Office of Transition Initiatives at USAID has aided in the rehabilitation of war torn societies. OTI has played a key role in providing relief to development assistance in the context of post-crisis transitions, from Haiti and the Balkans to East Timor and Sierra Leone. PDD 71, issued in February 2000, added to transitional efforts by giving the State Department the lead in organizing and overseeing U.S. participation in field operations involving criminal justice issues; developing technical assistance programs for foreign police forces and in coordinating U.S. activities relating to criminal justice systems. According to Schwartz, this direc-
tive recognized a supporting role for outside military forces in ensuring basic public safety until newly established indigenous forces can effectively oversee that function.

As echoed by many conference participants, Schwartz stressed that governments, international organizations, private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) need to understand better the political and security implications of humanitarian assistance delivery. One critical step in enhancing relations between the humanitarian actors in the U.S. government and those concerned with the political and security dimensions of conflict would be for the humanitarian offices within the U.S. government to establish a more coherent organizational structure, he suggested. In addition, accounting for grave abuses of human rights as illustrated by tribunals in Cambodia, Rwanda, the Balkans and through the creation of the International Criminal Court, remains a crucial, yet controversial, issue. By providing justice to victims and marginalizing extremist elements, these mechanisms can facilitate political transitions and deter some of those who might commit abuses, noted Schwartz. However, potential legal ramifications such as provisions in the International Criminal Court might affect the willingness of the international community to respond to complex contingency operations. In Sierra Leone, for example, where a continual supply of peacekeeping troops will be critical to averting a resurgence of mass abuses, potential peacekeepers have more than a passing interest in knowing whether or not they could be brought before an international court.

Responding to a question from the floor regarding the U.S.’s ability to combat terrorism and shut down “breeding grounds for supporters of Osama Bin Laden,” Enid Schoettle commented that countries harboring terrorists cover a broad spectrum, ranging from countries with humanitarian emergencies, poor but stable countries, and to wealthy countries. Still she pointed to the bleak situation in Afghanistan, where more than 500 million people are in need of assistance and a three-year drought has left one third of the population completely dependent upon food aid. Ellen Laipson added to those remarks, commenting that strategies to defeat terrorism must address the poor countries used as breeding grounds for terrorist cells, but also in wealthier countries, whether they support terrorist groups directly or indirectly. Regarding a question from the floor on U.S. support to the Brahimi Report3, Eric Schwartz replied that although both the U.S. government and the P5 (the 5 permanent members of the Security Council) support most of the report’s recommendations, it is questionable how much effort the U.S. government will put towards facilitating these reforms, and how the UN will manage the funding implications. Jane Holl Lute responded that, while the U.S. government supports Brahimi’s recommendations, the developing world views them as a thinly veiled attempt to allow intrusiveness and interference into their domestic affairs. Ruth Wedgwood agreed with her, saying that the G-77 didn’t take the Brahimi recommendations seriously; considering it as “nothing more than a cat’s paw for Western imperialism.”

3 The Brahimi Report was the outcome of a high-level Panel charged with thoroughly reviewing the United Nations peace and security activities, and presenting a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.
Matthew McLean began the morning’s second session, a discussion of the actors involved in complex humanitarian emergencies, by noting that “PDD 56 is a good document, a necessary mechanism for interagency cooperation,” and suggested “the new Administration should continue examining our ability to respond to a complex emergency.” The Bush Administration’s recently published National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD), and the subsequent formation of the Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations Policy Coordination Committee, are further attempts to refine interagency planning. This PCC is chaired by Elliot Abrams, Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations at the NSC, and because it is at the assistant secretary level, key issues and decisions reach quickly the deputies and principals, he said.

McLean discussed four components of contingency planning for complex emergencies: warning, planning, preventing and responding. The purview of the intelligence community, early warning scenarios must anticipate potential crises six to nine months in the future. The planning stage is strategically, not operationally, focused, and it is the planners’ responsibility to produce concept papers and guidance documents to familiarize the actors with the situation, and to suggest contingencies and potential scenarios. Once scenarios and potential responses have been assembled, planners must anticipate potential problems and pitfalls and identify ways to prevent...
them. “Prevention, though not a regular component of the contingency planning process, is especially important,” McLean said. As the United States engages in more and more contingency operations, it gets smarter, and this learning will enable the planners to develop better prevention strategies and avoid pitfalls and “worse case” situations. While prevention is typically seen as the realm of diplomats in the State Department, it could also take a military or economic shape, McLean said.

Response options need to be more detailed and broad, McLean said. With its focus on pol-mil planning, PDD-56 was a hammer and nail approach. Future directives must include prevention plans, interagency responses to a military plan, a peace implementation plan, peacekeeping or intervention, or other innovative responses. The most important aspect in any response is coordination and clear guidance, he added.

Acknowledging that room for improvement exists; Matthew Vaccaro began his remarks by highlighting accomplishments over the last decade. The continued evolution of coordinating effective U.S. interventions in complex humanitarian emergencies will require further organizational changes and a commitment to long-term thinking, he suggested. Leadership is the most crucial ingredient for building interagency cooperation, because agencies, when left to their own devices, often respond based on self-interests and territoriality. In order to foster leadership and coordination, deputies need to be more involved in advanced thinking and planning, while functional assistant secretaries should be empowered so that they can delve into problems in countries “owned by” regional assistant secretaries, he suggested.

There is need for an interagency “virtual space,” a classified network connecting the various agencies and allowing members of different agencies to access and collaborate on pol-mil planning papers, Vaccaro said. “It is only in the last year that we have achieved connectivity between the State Department and the Pentagon!” Within the Pentagon there is reluctance to plan for response if the Department of Defense is not in charge, Vaccaro admitted. “Because of our strategic planning ability, there’s a tendency to think that we’ll get stuck filling in for others, regardless of the intention,” he said. To remedy such disinclination to engage, Vaccaro suggested the military improve coordination in future crises through increased communication, planning and information sharing. Military participation, whether it is dominant presence or limited involvement such as intelligence, communications, and force projection, must be coordinated not only within the U.S. government, but internationally as well, he added. In addition, the military should try to improve long-term planning and coordination by engaging relief agencies and bringing them into the planning process. As noted later by Julia Taft, developing better links to NGOs would increase efficiency and effectiveness during all phases of a humanitarian crisis—from early warning to post-conflict reconstruction.

Dennis Skocz contrasted military planning with political-military (pol-mil) planning. At the most basic level, military planning is done within a single agency, whereas pol-mil planning requires the participation of multiple agencies. In his opinion, military planning is done at a precise operational level, while pol-mil planning must be done at a strategic level (i.e. considering refugees a
potentially destabilizing political problem). Whereas strictly military operations are command and control driven, pol-mil planning is focused on ‘coordinating’ the different agencies, and defining tasks and objectives for each agency. Another difference is that, while military planning is done according to doctrine, pol-mil planning is constantly evolving. “There’s no textbook for this—we have to make it up as we go along. We have to adapt to this and make decisions in this spirit.” Finally, pol-mil planning also must take into account the perspectives of the Security Council, the G-8 and other allies. According to Skocz, the success of the Kosovo operation was due in part to the response created in consultation with our allies. “It didn’t have that look of being made in the U.S.A.,” he said.

Julia Taft quipped, “D.C. is 50 square miles surrounded on all sides by reality. Today, I want to talk about that reality. The non-governmental agencies (NGOs) are a part of that reality. NGOs are the frontline actors. Once there is a crisis anywhere in the world, they respond, offering food, shelter, medical services and relief to the affected populations.”

Taft’s experience spans the gamut of humanitarian assistance positions, offering her a unique perspective. She worked within the U.S. Government, most recently at Assistant Secretary For Population, Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. Department of State, with the NGO community as President and Chief Executive Officer of InterAction, (the American Council for Voluntary International Action), a coalition of over 150 U.S.-based NGO’s working on international relief and development, and has joined the United Nations as the Director of the United Nations Development Program’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. During this conference, her remarks focused on lessons learned from those positions, but addressed in particular the role of the NGO community during complex contingency operations.

Complex humanitarian emergencies require closer coordination and better communication among different parts of the government—an ongoing bureaucratic challenge, perhaps, but also one that can make the response to crises more comprehensive and effective, she said. The coordination of resources is key to maximize response and minimize duplication or unnecessary expenditures. NGOs, because of their critical and long-term engagement with the local population, are often excellent sources of human intelligence. Despite recent efforts to harmonize NGO involvement in the planning process, there are, at best, only fragile communication networks between NGOs and policy makers. In addition she added that protocols for information sharing must be established so that NGOs have access to information once their input has been classified.

While NGOs are indeed excellent sources of information there is an inherent tension between their ability to convey this knowledge to capitals and militaries and their perceived responsibility to be impartial and neutral. Many NGOs are committed to providing assistance on the basis of need without regard to politics. Taft suggested that the military, other agencies within the U.S. government, and NGOs develop a mutually agreed response strategy. Relations have improved markedly over the past decade, military personnel have become familiar with the work of NGOs, in particular those in command’s area of
responsibility, and maintain regular contact with them. Conversely, NGOs have come to view the military less adversely and fostering more productive relations should continue, Taft said.

Responding to a question about including NGOs in contingency planning, Matthew Vaccaro explained that NGOs have a very different perspective, coming directly from the field, than people in D.C., at the UN and in European capitals. “We don’t want to put NGOs in a difficult spot, where they might be accused of [wrongdoings] down the road, but it is clear that they have a valuable perspective and should be listened to.” Dennis Skocz agreed, adding that NGO participation was sought in the Foreign Disaster Response Plan, an effort begun at the end of the former Administration. He also encouraged pol-mil discussion within the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE, ECOWAS and other regional initiatives. “It shouldn’t be viewed as competition, but as facilitating debate and gathering consensus,” he suggested.

A comment from the floor about the necessity of more flexible funding drew strong agreement from the panelists, as illustrated by Julia Taft’s anecdote of the case in Sierra Leone. In 1994, the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs tried desperately to raise money for a peacekeeping force, but were only able to gather $3 of the necessary $17 million. Rather than put funds into early crisis management, the international community then ended up spending $70 million on relief programs. Flexible funding to deal with situations as they arise is necessary, agreed Matt McLean, however, he noted, “Congress has a contingency pot of money to dip into, but they are not comfortable giving out blank checks.” Matt Vaccaro advocated a new appropriations environment, whereby funds could move more easily between departments. “If that happened, we might be more interested in coming up with integrated solutions. We might become more team-oriented.” Responding to a comment about the need for structural change in the U.S. government in order to enable it to respond more effectively to humanitarian emergencies, Matt Vaccaro advocated bold thinking. “There are aggressive ideas out there with merit, such as grouping together Customs, the Coast Guard and INS to make it easier for the Pentagon to coordinate.” In addition, he repeated his earlier call for leadership to rise above bureaucratic self-interest.
First of all, I would like to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center for its remarkable work on conflict prevention and resolution and on its initiative in organizing this conference. I am honored to have been invited to give my thoughts to this session on how the UN responds or should respond to potential conflicts or other complex emergencies and how it could cooperate with Member States, including the United States, more effectively than it has done in the past.

The subject of this conference is a very important and timely one. More effective prevention and management of humanitarian catastrophes is today in the minds of us all. I am going to talk especially about the Secretary-General’s recent Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, which was issued on 7 June 2001, and gives us a framework to act on many complex root causes of violence and conflicts in a more systematic fashion, in a world which is becoming more inter-dependent day by day. I am going to approach this topic from four different angles: The role of the Security Council and the whole UN system in enhancing prospects for prevention; working with other actors in prevention; improving the capacity of Member States in conflict prevention; and how the United States and the UN could jointly contribute towards greater commitment, better coordination and delivery, and greater political will and ambition in the area of the prevention of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.
The Role of the Security Council

As the UN organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council has a key role to play in the prevention of armed conflict. Similarly, as a permanent member of the Security Council with a veto power, the United States has a major role in moving the Council toward a new mode of conflict prevention. The Council, in its daily activities, is almost exclusively crisis and emergency driven. It has tended to become involved only when violence has already occurred on a large scale. Since the mid-80s, the Security Council has made periodic efforts to raise conflict prevention higher on its agenda. The Council held informal consultations on the matter in the early 80s, but it still took almost another 20 years for the first open debates to take place on prevention.

A new phase was reached when the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report on the prevention of armed conflict. The report was issued in early June of this year, after which the Security Council held an open debate on its content two weeks later. A substantive resolution on the report (S/RES/1366 (2001)), the first of its kind on the subject, was adopted on 30 August, after 15 intensive working-level sessions of the Council. Some key ideas proposed in the Secretary-General’s report regarding the Security Council’s role in prevention is as follows:

**Periodic regional reporting:**

The Secretary-General proposed in the report to present periodic regional reports to the Council on disputes threatening international peace and security. Although the situation in each country and region of the world is unique, recent developments have highlighted the rationale to review regional inter-linkages and root causes of conflict from a broader perspective with a focus on cross-border issues that potentially constitute threats to international peace and security, for example, arms flows, natural resources, refugees, mercenaries, and potential security implications of their interaction, to name but a few.

The first periodic reporting to the Security Council has already taken place concerning West Africa. The Security Council welcomed this initiative and Resolution 1366 gives the Secretary-General a mandate to move forward with periodic and sub-regional reports to the Council in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter. In this context, the Council also supported the active development of regional prevention strategies by the Secretary-General.

**Informal Working Group on Prevention:**

In his prevention report, the Secretary-General also proposed that the Security Council could consider establishing an ad hoc informal working group, other subsidiary organ, or other informal technical arrangement, to discuss prevention cases on a more permanent basis. If established, early warning cases could be regularly referred to this Group before any discussions in informal consultations or public meetings of the Council. However, the Council did not respond to this recommendation in its resolution, reflecting considerable ambivalence by a number of Council members towards this proposal.

**Discussion of prevention outside the Council meeting room:**

In developing the previous proposal, the Secretary-General also suggested that the Security Council could consider the use of the “Arria Formula” or other similar informal discussions.

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4 The Arria Formula is an informal arrangement that allows the Security Council greater flexibility to be briefed about international peace and security issues. It has been used frequently and assumed growing importance since it was first implemented in 1993. It is named for Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, who designed the concept.
outside the Council chambers for exchanging views on prevention. This kind of informal meeting could also address more thematic issues, including such matters as the question of terrorism. It could, in addition, be used as an opportunity to hear civil society representatives or other experts on conflict prevention. Again, the Security Council made no response to this proposal in its resolution.

Apart from the two proposals just mentioned, which the Council did not address, the resolution endorsed all other recommendations in the report pertaining to the peace and security field. Resolution 1366 explicitly gives the Secretary-General a mandate to move forward with regard to the following points:

- The development of a system-wide approach to conflict prevention involving all parts of the UN systems, including the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as NGOs, civil society and the private sector;
- Strengthening of the capacity and resource base of the UN system for conflict prevention, particularly through “adequate, predictable and properly targeted resources for conflict prevention and consistent funding for long-term prevention activities;
- Increased use of UN interdisciplinary fact-finding and confidence-building missions, as well as similar missions by the Security Council itself;
- Information and analyses from within the UN system to the Security Council on cases by serious violations of international law and on potential conflict situations arising from ethnic, religious and territorial disputes, poverty and lack of development. This includes information that may be provided by the General Assembly or ECOSOC;
- Support for national and regional capacity building in conflict prevention, and greater use of regional prevention mechanisms and the development of further interaction with regional organizations in this field, particularly in Africa.

After the passing of this resolution, there exists much potential in the future for the Secretary-General and the Security Council to develop a much more active cooperation in the prevention of conflicts than previously. But this requires the UN system to strengthen its role in providing information and analysis to back up the Article 99 role of the Secretary-General in this field, an issue I will now address.

The Role of the UN System

Over the past few years, a number of initiatives have been launched to foster a culture of conflict prevention in the day-to-day work of the Secretariat, as well as the wider UN system. Every part of the UN system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, has shown an active interest in prevention and peace-building activities within the framework of their own respective mandates.

Since 1998, the UN has taken steps to push prevention higher up on the agendas of both the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN system as a whole. The DPA Prevention Team was established in 1998 with representatives from the Department’s regional divisions participating in monthly meetings to identify potential conflict areas. An Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination, which also meets monthly, has become the pivotal mechanism for early formulation of preventive strategies within the whole UN system. The UN has also set up a major training effort on Early Warning and Prevention Capacity under the auspices of the UN Staff College in Turin for UN staff from all departments and agencies.

Looking at the UN system as a whole, the potential capability for preventive action is exten-
sive. There remains, however, a clear need for introducing a more systematic conflict prevention perspective into the multi-faceted programs and activities of the UN system so that they can contribute to the prevention of conflict by design and not by default. This, in turn, requires greater coherence and coordination in the UN system, with a specific focus on conflict prevention.

Cooperation with Member States, including the United States, would also be beneficial and proper cooperation in the preventive stage might well lead to a stronger cooperation in the operational phase if, after all, prevention efforts are not totally successful. Cooperation between Member States and the UN in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and humanitarian emergency operations is already a long-established practice, although our cooperation and coordination could always be improved upon, as has already been discussed in this Conference.

However, specific cooperation between the UN and Member States in early warning and prevention of conflicts and complex emergencies is a rather new territory. The General Assembly, in its Resolution 52/12B of 19 December 1997, invited Member States to improve the supply of information to the Secretary-General, which assists the Organization in preventing conflict and maintaining international peace and security in full accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. And indeed, some Member States do give us such information. But naturally, the UN cannot share this information with other Member States without the permission of the original provider of the information, and this fact alone might affect our capacity for full sharing of information, joint planning and execution in the area of prevention.

However, despite this, I see a lot of promise for cooperation with the United States and other Member States in the areas of joint training for preventive action, as well as organizing joint seminars and workshops to improve our analytical skills and early warning techniques. The lessons learned capacity for prevention is an entirely new territory. This would be another area in which our cooperation is needed.

**Working with Other Actors**

The recent debates of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the Secretary-General’s prevention report may encourage Member States to move forward with the proposed prevention agenda. But they are not the only constituency involved. The Security Council resolution recognizes also the role of other relevant organs, international and regional organizations, NGOs, civil society actors and the private sector in the prevention of armed conflict.

Regional organizations, for example, can contribute to conflict prevention in a number of specific ways. Such organizations build trust among States through the frequency of interaction, and have a greater grasp of the historical background of a conflict. Since 1994, the UN and regional organizations have instituted a practice of holding biennial meetings to promote cooperation within this framework. Two successful examples are the Third and Fourth High-level UN/Regional Organizations meetings, held in 1998 and recently in February 2001, which focused on cooperation in conflict prevention and peace-building. These meetings made meaningful progress with regard to coordination and consultation, joint training of staff and joint assessment missions to the field, better flows of information, establishing peace-building units, developing repertoires of best practices and lessons learned, and the joint holding of pledging conferences. Another working-level meeting between the UN and Regional Organizations in the area of prevention and peace-building is
expected to take place in December 2001; regional seminars will be organized thereafter.

In his report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the Secretary-General also urges NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to organize an international conference of local, national and international NGOs on their role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the UN in this field. The UN Charter recognizes the contributions that NGOs can provide to the goals of the UN in the maintenance of peace and security by offering non-violent avenues for addressing the root causes of conflict at an early stage. International NGOs can also provide studies of early warning and response opportunities, and can act as advocates in raising the international consciousness of particular situations and in helping to shape public opinion and summoning political will.

In recent years, a number of UN bodies and academic and research institutions around the world have begun to develop programs of collaboration with NGOs in the field of peace and security, and the Secretary-General has encouraged them to continue their endeavors and to bring their research results to the attention of UN practitioners and the political community. In this regard, UN field presences and field agencies in particular need to be more aware of the strengths and limitations of civil society actors in the area of conflict prevention and resolution.

**Improving Capacity of Member States**

As part of our ongoing overall conflict prevention program, the UN has also started to experiment with providing direct assistance to Member States that have requested it, to develop national and local strategies for conflict prevention and by offering tools and techniques specifically designed to meet the needs of these Member States. The primary aim of this conflict prevention initiative is to build institutional capacity to accomplish the Secretary-General’s stated aim of making the 21st Century increasingly the century of prevention, internationally, regionally, nationally and locally. This effort will focus on developing country-specific workshops in conflict prevention for the benefit of Member States, by developing national strategies and offering tools and techniques specifically designed to meet their needs.

One example of this creation of national tailor-made conflict prevention strategies is the workshop which took place in Niger from 23—27 July, after our first experiment in Nepal in February 2001. There were 64 participants present, almost all Niger nationals from the national government, civil society, NGOs, the media and the armed forces. The discussions held during this workshop and its follow up actions will enable the Government of Niger and its partners to enhance the country’s capacities for peace and purposefully integrate a conflict prevention dimension in ongoing good governance and development programs. During the briefing of Niger’s external partners about the conclusions and recommendations of the workshop, it was pointed out that Niger could not develop a national conflict prevention strategy in isolation of its neighboring countries which confront similar internal and trans-national threats to peace and security. Therefore, in time, a sub-regional approach needs to be envisaged.

**Concluding Comments**

Today, the UN is simultaneously dealing with 4 different types of conflict: inter-state conflicts; intra-state conflicts; regional conflicts; and transnational conflicts involving non-state actors, including the all too timely issue of terrorism.
The UN Charter has equipped the UN to deal primarily with the first of these conflicts, the inter-state conflicts. But since the end of the Cold War, the UN has been forced to radically improvise and adapt to the second type of conflict that has emerged—the intra-state conflicts. More recently, it has even had to govern certain war-torn territories like Kosovo and East Timor as the most prominent examples of this new threshold. Post-conflict peace-building is a new activity for the UN, one in which we have not had much experience. Over time, the UN has also recognized that intra-state conflicts can easily escalate to a regional conflict if left unattended, a conflict type that has broadened our framework of analysis and action.

The UN and its main organs in peace and security are even more ill-equipped and inexperienced to deal with the fourth type of conflict, transnational conflicts involving non-state actors. However, long-term structural prevention strategies that address the root causes of conflicts in the Third World, such as poverty, acute under-development, discrimination or marginalization of groups of the population, failure of governance and gross human rights violations, can help states confront non-state actors and transnational violence. The UN supports and strengthens state structures in this effort to prevent conflict and violence but it needs the help of Member States, including the United States.

In the Prevention Report, the Secretary-General states that the primary focus of preventive action should be in addressing the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional, political and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of conflicts. In other words, the emphasis lies on the need to develop effective long-term structural prevention policies that address the root causes of conflicts.

The UN is the only universal forum for addressing the global dimensions of development, social ills and injustice. Within this multilateral framework, and on a long-term basis, the United States and the UN need to work together as partners to prevent violence, conflict and humanitarian emergencies. The recent tragedies at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania underline the inter-dependence of the modern world, and emphasize the urgency and the importance of States and international organizations, fully acknowledging our strengths and weaknesses to work together for a better and safer world, in a much more complex global environment than previously realized.

In response to a question from the floor regarding the reaction in the UN to the announcement by the United States to ‘target and replace governments that support terrorism,’ Mr. Kanninen replied that the many capitals hope that President Bush will show restraint in his response and that he will not take any actions taken that will polarize the world. He also noted that Members hope that the U.S. is thinking beyond the immediate crisis to the longer-term issues on how to build international defenses against terrorism.

Responding to a question about the UN’s record on dealing with terrorism, Mr. Kanninen replied that the United Nation’s history of dealing with terrorism dates back to the terrorism declaration of the1970s. In addition, he noted, there is an ad hoc working group on terrorism, and the UN intends to arrange a Convention on Terrorism. The Security Council’s resolution 1368 following the hijackings of September 11, 2001, “Expressed its readiness to respond to acts of terror of 11th September, 2001 and to combat all forms of terrorism.”

5 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973
The afternoon’s panelists were charged with discussing various regional peacekeeping operations. Johanna Mendelson Forman discussed lessons learned in recent contingency operations in Latin America. In her opinion, U.S. responses to complex contingencies in this hemisphere are still dominated by national interests in the region, but Haiti gave the region a first understanding of the complexities of post-Cold War complex contingency operations. After 23,000 troops landed in Haiti, the “intervasion” set the standard for creating coalitions for emergency operations. Suggesting that the U.S. ground mission in Haiti in 1994 was a rare example of “interagency cooperation at its best; the exception rather than the rule,” the mission, the first operationalization of Presidential Decision Directive 56, had clear goals; restoring democracy in Haiti, strengthening legal institutions and jump starting the economy. The mission’s objective was facilitated by a clear exit strategy and good coordination among all of the governmental, nongovernmental and multilateral institutions involved. Once the U.S. and its allies defused tensions on the island, they were able to demobilize the military and create a civilian police force. In addition, the development community was well-coordinated, able to quickly channel money into Haiti for immediate needs, while the multilateral agencies supported medium-term development and strengthened the judiciary system. While post conflict reconstruction efforts have not fared well, initially it was a successful mission. Indeed, because Haiti was an
example of an “almost perfect complex contingency,” the international community was “mis-led,” in that it expected future operations to go as smoothly, Forman added.

Latin America’s capacity to respond to emergencies was strengthened by the 1991 adoption of the Santiago Resolution, which created a community of democracies that agreed to collectively defend countries where the democratic process had been interrupted by coups, or other illegal means. It also signaled a greater role for the Organization of American States as a real player in regional politics. Unfortunately, Haiti was the first test of the Santiago Resolution, and it soon became obvious that little political will existed to actually use the tools of the charter, including sanctions and isolation, to return a democratically controlled president to office. In the end, the mission was ceded to the United States.

As Latin American militaries continue to professionalize, they are increasingly preoccupied with peacekeeping. Armies that once fought internal enemies were now gearing up to participate in peace operations around the world and recent humanitarian crises in El Salvador, and Venezuela demonstrated a broader hemispheric interest in supporting this type of role for the armed forces. Yet resource constraints and the lack of a united vision of regional peacekeeping might impede the region’s capacity to respond to contingency operations. Forman briefly outlined the current crisis in Columbia, calling it one of the most challenging complex contingencies. Efforts to coordinate responses through Plan Colombia raise the difficult question of how to deal with the neighboring countries in this case, the Andean countries of Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia affected by a complex emergency. As countries grapple with their own difficulties; a resurgence of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, precarious leadership in Venezuela and a challenge to democracy in Bolivia, unilateral approaches prove unable to respond to these challenges.

“While Africa is at the bottom of America’s security priorities,” Nancy Walker said, “Africa does matter.” We conduct $22 billion in trade with Africa annually, and the continent represents an ‘untapped market’ of 800 million consumers. Finally, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria represent true complex emergencies in the African context, as well as transnational threats. A generation of AIDS orphans could represent a future generation of terrorists. “We need to look at Africa as a place where we have interests, not obligations.”

Nancy Walker said the Bush Administration is considering a more strategic approach to Africa through focusing on preventing HIV/AIDS, promoting stability and trade and investment and encouraging regional engagement. Walker stressed that it is in the long-term interest of the United States to help develop Africa’s capacity to deal with its own crises, and therefore instead of dictating responses, the U.S. should assume a partnership role with regional organizations such as ECOWAS. In addition, capacity enhancement should occur at the civilian level and in the legal context, because while the military has an important role, the input of civilian leadership, regional organizations, and international actors, is also integral. Programs at the strategic level, bringing together civil and military leadership, educating officers, and training diplomats, soldiers and emergency workers, would further serve to enhance the capacity of African nations to prepare for and respond to manmade and natural disasters, she said.

Created by the Clinton Administration in response to instability in Burundi in 1997, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) enhances the capacity of Africans to respond to...
humanitarian crises and peacekeeping missions in their regions. ACRI also coordinates its activities closely with the humanitarian programs of France, Belgium and the United Kingdom and has provided training and non-lethal equipment to nearly 6,000 peacekeepers from six African militaries. ACRI trained soldiers from Mali and Ghana deployed to Sierra Leone as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force; Benin sent a contingent to Guinea-Bissau; and Senegalese peacekeepers were engaged under the UN mission in the Central African Republic.

Walker directs the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, founded by the Department of Defense and soon to be housed at the National Defense University. According to Walker, The Africa Center supports democratic governance in Africa by providing academic and practical programs in civil-military relations, national security strategy, and defense economics to senior African civilian and military leaders. Regional engagement by the United States through programs such as ACRI and ACSS are vital, and should be based on mutual interest instead of pure donor assistance, she said. In addition, in order to be successful capacity enhancement must not overlook the importance of civilian roles, she said, noting that military training is just one facet of response.

Ms. Walker concluded with a quote from a speech that President John F. Kennedy delivered to the UN in 1962: “Peace does not lie in the covenants and charters alone, but in the hearts and minds of all people. And if it is cast out there, then no act, no pact, no treaty, no organization can hope to preserve it without the support and wholehearted commitment of all people. So, let us not rest our hopes on parchments and on paper, let us strive to build peace, a desire for peace and a willingness to work for peace in the hearts and minds of all of our people.”

Len Hawley addressed lessons learned in East Timor and the challenges of coalition leadership. “The driving lesson from East Timor is that, under Chapter VII conditions, a competent lead nation is the key to a successful multinational complex contingency operation,” he asserted. According to Hawley, the problem is that aside from the United States, only 12 nations have the ability to lead such an operation. Insights gleaned from Australia’s successful leadership of International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) in East Timor might serve to clarify what should be done in the future, he suggested.

Military interventions through coalitions, while preferred by most nations because of the legitimacy they impart, have serious limitations. Their necessary makeup of numerous players, both multinational and multilateral, often results in competing agendas. In addition each participant is under at least two sets of command instructions—those given by the mission commander, and those given by the authorities at home. Because mandates might conflict, they have limited capacity to respond to very complex missions. Finally, coalitions are short-lived—they are created in response to a conflict and are disbanded when the mission has run its course.

Answering his own question why a lead nation is so important to a coalition’s success, Hawley suggested that diplomatically, a lead nation secures concrete commitments to address the international community’s political consensus for common action. Operationally, the lead nation skillfully integrates the coalition’s many participants—both multinational and multilateral—to create unity of effort among the various players under a common political-military strategy. Structurally, the lead nation establishes effective mechanisms for coalition management: political oversight, chain of command, military organization, civilian integration, logistical arrangements.
and financial management. Politically, the lead nation nurtures cohesion among the coalition partners as they pursue the mission, withstands the efforts of the adversary and sustains the shock of combat. Pragmatically, the lead nation does much of the dirty work. It often takes on the heavy responsibilities of combat operations and risks the majority of the casualties.

Leading up to the intervention, in the first free elections in East Timor, 78.5% of the population voted for independence, creating a powerful international consensus for East Timor’s peaceful separation from Indonesia. Then, in the days following the vote, the Indonesian militia ravaged the country, with unknown numbers of East Timorese civilians murdered, homes burned, and the country razed. Well over 100,000 East Timorese fled to West Timor and thousands were displaced within East Timor. UN staff and foreign journalists were driven out of East Timor by the violence, resulting in little news reaching the international community.

In early September, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie accepted international peacekeeping troops, and the Security Council responded by authorizing the deployment of a peace enforcement force, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Led by Australia, INTERFET was authorized on September 15th and, by early October, had some 5,000 troops operating in East Timor from 22 countries. This eventually grew to 8,000 troops. INTERFET also facilitated the relief activities of at least 65 international organizations in East Timor of which 23 were UN organizations. In the end, INTERFET encountered minimal resistance and the coalition did not sustain heavy combat. Finally, after successfully completing its mission INTERFET handed over its responsibilities to a UN peacekeeping mission on February 23, 2000, and continues today as United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET).

At the change of command, Kofi Annan said that INTERFET served as a model for future humanitarian interventions.

Hawley explained that Australia was successful lead nation because it possessed ten key attributes, nine of which are beyond robust military forces:

1. Australia’s long-standing disposition for non-interference and non-intervention within the region allowed its leadership in East Timor to be viewed as an exception to its normal policy.
2. Strong domestic public support gave the Australia government the energy and stamina to make long-standing commitments to recruit important coalition partners.
3. Personal political and military diplomacy early on mobilized the rapid support of Australia’s leadership by the Security Council and mustered key troop contributions from nations in the region.
4. Effective, long-standing relationships with major key powers enabled Australia to fill rapidly critical gaps for military and financial capabilities to support the formation of the coalition.
5. Previous arrangements for defense cooperation opened doors for military cooperation in the region to conduct this operation.
6. The professional competence of the Australian Defense Forces conducted joint operations with ease—Australia had a high capacity to gather intelligence, both political and military, and leverage information-gathering activities.
7. Strong financial management capacity and sufficient resources offset financially strapped countries and enabled them to contribute forces to the mission.
8. A responsive information management capacity addressed day-to-day media issues as well as countered efforts of the adversary to undermine the coalition’s cohesion.
9. Australia had a well-founded international reputation as a middle-range power for peaceful leadership and cooperation in the region.

If these are the major attributes of the lead nation, what are the implications for the United States as we look ahead to the future, he asked. As there are only 12 nations today with the capacity to lead a coalition, the United States should simultaneously preserve the capacities of these 12 and expand the number to potential leaders in the future, he suggested. In developing lead nation capacity, U.S. government agencies should undertake the following agenda:

The NSC staff should develop an inter-agency strategy for long-term preservation and development of lead nation capacity. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) should identify minimum attributes for coalition leadership and clarify the strengths and limitations of the several nations that could serve as coalition leaders. The NIC should also examine intelligence-sharing practices to strengthen relationships with potential lead nations. The State Department should develop regional political strategies that build lead nation capacity, guide diplomatic priorities, and serve as a basis for regional cooperation to deal with the complex emergencies under a UN mandate. OSD should work with potential lead nations to encourage them to develop constructive defense cooperation and arrangements within the region. Such arrangements would help address many of the cultural and interoperability issues associated with coalition management. OSD should also work with potential lead nations on the financial management aspects of coalition leadership. The Joint Staff should develop a doctrine for smaller nations to lead multinational coalitions and work with the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) that shape Theater Engagement Plans to build military command and control capacity and civilian agency collaboration in complex contingency operations.

C. Michael Hurley discussed the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia that compelled the U.S. to act, albeit late. While the suffering, the misery and the waves of refugees flooding Europe and the horrors of ethnic cleansing prompted NATO to respond, the decision to intervene must also be viewed in the context of the Cold War, he suggested. In 1990, the disintegration of Communist ideology and the breakup of the country were compounded by increasing competition for economic resources. As Croatia and Slovenia attempted to protect their wealth, Serbia sought to gain control of the resources. Rampant nationalism, campaigns of violence, forced expulsion and ethnic cleansing took place over the next five years. The Serbo-Croatian War of 1991 gave way to ferocious fighting in Bosnia, when in 1992 Bosnian Serbs led an assault on Sarajevo and other areas in reaction to Bosnia’s claim for independence. The insertion of the United Nations Protections Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 did little to ameliorate the humanitarian, security or diplomatic crisis. It was only when the United States backed diplomatic bark with bite, deploying a combat-ready NATO force in December 1995, that a cease-fire, brokered in Dayton, Ohio, was accepted. What does it take to bring peace to a region in today’s world? When armies have shredded each other for years and paramilitary commandos have committed unspeakable atrocities, peace does not break out spontaneously,” Hurley said.
national community $54 billion between 1992 and 1998 and left more than 100,000 dead.  

The violence in Kosovo, which began in 1997, threatened to further destabilize Serbia and Albania, inflame nationalism among the Albanian minority in Macedonia, and undermine the fragile progress of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. In response, the United States pursued a three-part strategy aimed at resolving the crisis and protecting regional stability: 1. Work with the UN and NGOs to relieve the humanitarian suffering, 2. Pursue a negotiated track toward an interim political settlement giving Kosovo self-government, and 3. Partner with NATO to build a credible threat of military force. When that threat proved no deterrent to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and he began a mass program of forced expulsion of the Albanian majority of Kosovo, NATO was forced to react.

NATO’s basic objectives in Kosovo were to halt the humanitarian catastrophe, preserve stability and maintain the credibility of the security coalition as guarantor of the peace and stability in Europe. The organizational, logistical and resource requirements to rebuild even a small province such as Kosovo are ‘mind boggling,’ Hurley said. With an estimated 11,000 killed and over 1.5 million Kosovar Albanian displaced—roughly 90 percent of the estimated Kosovar-Albanian population in Kosovo—the current tasks facing the civilian administrators are endless: setting up justice systems, training police, holding elections, rebuilding transportation systems, and supplying energy and power, sanitation, hygiene, and public health services. “We have made progress in Bosnia and Kosovo, which has only been sustained by constant diplomatic and economic engagement. What we have is the absence of war. But, the absence of war is not the presence of peace. War is destructive, and recovering from it is hard work that takes years,” he said. “However, if we had failed to act in Kosovo, we would have faced history’s judgment that the most powerful alliance in the world was unwilling to act when confronted with crimes against humanity on its doorstep.”

In response to a comment from the floor about the capacity of Africans to lead peacekeeping missions, Nancy Walker responded that a new cadre of African leaders are willing to “step up to the plate” and take responsibility for regional issues in Africa. She also said that the United States should develop a “side nation capacity,” whereby the United States or Britain acts as the nominal ‘leader’ of the operation, while a G-77 nation takes the military and operational lead.

One participant queried Michael Hurley about the West’s prompt and resolute action in Kosovo while it turned a blind eye to the genocide in Rwanda. Hurley responded that the proximity and accessibility of the Balkans made intervention easier than in more remote conflict areas. However he conceded the questioner’s point that intervention is based largely on perceived interests: Kosovo represented a more compelling case and was of strategic importance to the West.

“We have made progress in Bosnia and Kosovo, which has only been sustained by constant diplomatic and economic engagement. What we have is the absence of war. But, the absence of war is not the presence of peace. War is destructive, and recovering from it is hard work that takes years,” Hurley said.

Robert Orr discussed the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ project on “Post Conflict Reconstruction,” which focuses on producing operational recommendations to improve post-conflict reconstruction capacities. The Post Conflict Reconstruction Project seeks to identify tasks and prioritize the broad aid, development, political and military efforts once the violence ends. “Rebuilding a country is a long-term process that engages a broad range of international actors,” Orr said. “However, the real burden of rebuilding should be placed on the locals. They are the creators of their destiny—we are only enablers.” That said, the U.S. support, and in some cases, leadership, is crucial to the success of post-conflict reconstruction.

The project suggests that the United States should increase its capacity to respond in four crucial areas: security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic well-being; and government participation, and in four functional areas: planning; coordination; training; and funding. In the area of security, key gaps include the inadequate integration of military and police elements, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of warring parties. In addition, the U.S. and others have begun to address the uneven quality of troop and police contributions by the international community. Operation Focus Relief, the U.S. European Command contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, is a good example of the United States “starting to get it right,” and the United States should continue to expand its capacity to
train and equip other countries (in this case up to seven battalions from West African countries) to conduct peace enforcement operations.

A key gap in justice and reconciliation is the inability to set up comprehensive justice systems resulting in expensive, yet ineffective, propositions. Instead of piecemeal projects, the United States has been experiencing with the development of rapidly deployable “justice DART teams,” to simultaneously set up the varied components of a judicial system, he explained. Whereas the U.S. government pays very little attention paid to reconciliation mechanisms, such methods (such as truth commissions) are quite effective and much cheaper than judicial mechanisms, Orr added.

In addition, two offices at the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Office of Transition Initiatives and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, are extremely effective for the short-term targeted post conflict reconstruction efforts. Yet, OTI and OFDA have limited resources—with a budget of only $40 million—OTI is limited in the scope, and thus effectiveness of mission.

Private sector investment is absolutely crucial in these fragile economies, yet companies would rather wait for a few years until investing is more secure. Orr suggested that the United States create temporary capacity for countries emerging from conflict to promote trade opportunities. Governance and participation further illustrates gaps in service. Corruption runs rampant and aid disbursement mechanisms often tear local governments apart instead of helping unify them. Third, while attention to civil society is not sexy, nothing could be more important than hiring and training district administrators, mayors, etc. in a post-conflict situation and allowing local government to begin to function.

In the functional areas; the absence of integrated planning mechanisms ensures that ad hoc efforts continually “reinvent the wheel,” Orr suggested. A Federal response plan for post-conflict reconstruction and better coordination of the U.S. government with international partners, within the government with its interagency partners, and at the operational level (in the field) is crucial. In countries where the actors come together, the operations are successful, he noted. For example, in Guatemala, United States and international agencies on the ground overcame the existing divides in world capitols, and the peace process was successful. Orr noted that the concept of “training” was a recurring theme in the day’s discussion. To better the training process he suggested participants understand the purpose of the training. Not only should countries agree on their mission, they also need to address joint civilian-military training prior to a post-conflict situation.

Funding is the most crucial issue though most problematic to reconcile, Orr said. At the international level, the funding mechanisms for donor conferences are “messy,” and follow-through is often weak. Timing and sequencing of funding are also crucial; however, at the U.S. level, fragmented funding streams further complicate matters. Flexibility and speed are also crucial. “OTI and OFDA work because they are fast and flexible,” he said. We need to look at these authorities and try to emulate these characteristics. This doesn’t mean re-writing the foreign assistance act, but it does mean reconciling some of these overlapping authorities and allowing for transfer funds between accounts with certain checks and balances,” he urged.

Don Daniel summarized a NIC estimate on the future of peace operations gleaned from a
conference on peacekeeping and peace enforcement attended by representatives of the G-77 countries, UN officials, officials of the U.S. government and other knowledgeable participants. (See appendix for the referenced workshop paper.)

Trends indicate that future peacekeeping operations will be more efficient and effective as militaries improve their capabilities and apply lessons learned from peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. While some states, such as New Zealand, are reducing their militaries, they are restructuring their residual resources for rapid and flexible responses, sometimes specifically for peace operations, Daniel noted. Many national militaries are training and deploying together, and some are forming combined force peacekeeping units. Increasingly, there is international collaboration, with more experienced militaries providing training, equipment and other support to less experienced militaries. Peacekeeping training is now becoming more standardized; currently there are 27 peacekeeping training centers around the world, he noted. The UN has standardized requirements, training and curricula for peacekeeping forces, requiring that all forces that present for an operation will have a minimum baseline of training and capabilities.

His paper further suggested that in terms of regional capabilities, the EU is the most highly developed, with significant reserve forces and a civilian police force. Other regions, including SADC and ECOWAS in Africa, continue to require forces outside an organizational capability.

There are positive stimuli which cause nations to respond to humanitarian disasters: the desire to alleviate suffering, the issue of activism by influential and/or neighboring states with special interests (the lead nation concept), a determination of a coalition of states to turn over an operation to an international organization once order has been restored, and the combined effect of precedence and conscience. There are also negative factors influencing states’ capacity and willingness to respond in complex emergencies. For example, an increase in the capability will not translate necessarily to broadening the scope of operations or mandate. For instance, the EU is developing better capabilities, but their new forces will remain in Europe to deal with the threats closer to home. There are also negative stimuli against deploying peacekeeping operations. The call for a peacekeeping mission will not be heeded if there is a feeling that it is too big or unwieldy an operation. Also, a mission will not occur if there is strong opposition from a global or regional power. “There is certainly not going to be a UN peacekeeping mission in Tibet.”

Nations have increased conditions on their willingness to participate in operations. Some states will stay out of high-risk operations. Some will oppose operations that violate a state’s sovereignty and some will deploy to consensual operations only if the P-5 participants as well, or if it is a UN-mandated missions. Some will participate only if consulted beforehand on the formulation of policies governing the mission. Some will deploy only if they receive outside assistance and support. States are markedly less willing to undertake complex or risky operations that do not engage their interests directly.

In response to a question regarding the need to differentiate between methods of reconciliation and justice, Bob Orr responded that justice systems and reconciliation were different methods of reaching similar ends. Justice addresses war crimes and truth commissions deal with longstanding tensions, he said. The predilection for the more costly, longer-term solution of courts and judicial systems often contrasts with the immediate results sought by the locals.

In response to a question regarding the current limitations of DARTs, Daniel suggested
oft-mentioned ideas of interagency, multi-disciplinary DARTS, including Congressional member or staffers. These DARTs would be dispatched to conflict zones as soon as problems occurred. However, such entities have yet to be created because Congress worries that they might lose control over these DARTs and is reluctant to provide the necessary flexible funding.

Responding to a comment regarding the need to deepen democratic processes in post-conflict situations, Orr said that he was pleased that the OAU had followed the lead of the OAS, which passed a set of democracy standards in 1991. The OAS has generally been good at putting diplomatic muscle behind these standards, Orr said. Orr agreed with a comment about the need to look at a country’s past and the root causes of the conflict in order to determine the priorities for reconstruction. “It is important to identify the most important elements and priorities on a case-by-case basis. The same things that worked in El Salvador and Cambodia are not the same things that will work in East Timor or Sierra Leone.”

In sum, the conference reiterated the notion that the United States will increasingly be called upon to respond to complex contingency operations. As suggested by the reports by the National Intelligence Council and illustrated by a Congressional Budget Office report, the pace of U.S. military deployments has increased sixteenfold since the end of the Cold War. Between 1960 and 1991, the Army conducted 10 operations outside of normal training and alliance commitments; between 1992 and 1998, it conducted 26 such operations. Similarly, the Marine Corps conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 1989, and has conducted 62 since 1989.7

However participants agreed that the any U.S. response operation requires broad effort and planning from a multitude of expertise and organizations. Furthermore, complex contingency operations demand a comprehensive response extending well beyond initial humanitarian aid or first military response. The longer the duration of the required response, the greater the need for effective coordination to ensure that sufficient resources are committed throughout the life cycle of the operation. As noted in an earlier report by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “The policy implication is that coordination must be sustained over the entire life cycle of the response, and it must be structured from the outset to achieve an enduring effect even as responsibility passes from external actors to local authorities.”8

At the conclusion of the meeting, participants noted that a potential paradigm shift is emerging in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11. Along with supporting immediate retaliatory measures such as the military campaign, arresting suspected terrorists, and freezing monetary assets linked to terrorist groups, it is increasingly understood that punitive methods are insufficient to combat this deadly threat. As the United States revises its national security structure to incorporate the Office of Homeland Defense and begins to encourage the required interagency cooperation, it also has the opportunity to devise strategies that not only promote growth and prosperity, and protect against dangers, but also attempt to strengthen others to act constructively on their own behalf and cooperatively in collective efforts.

The Future of Peace Operations—
Findings from a Workshop

Remarks by:

Don Daniel
Special Advisor to the Chair,
National Intelligence Council

Key Points:

States will be more selective than in the 1990s about undertaking peace operations. They probably will meet demand for simple missions, but unless their interests are directly engaged, they will be especially wary about committing to complex or risky endeavors.

- For both political and practical reasons many states are adding conditions on their willingness to commit troops or becoming more insistent that prior conditions be met.
- Frustration with the leadership of the Security Council is seriously undermining the willingness of such important troop contributors as Egypt, India, and Jordan to participate in future UN operations.
- High-risk missions usually will occur only when a powerful state persuades an international organization to take on the task or assembles its own coalition of willing partners.
- The Africans seem the group most willing to undertake hazardous missions. They expect such missions to be the norm for their continent and believe they can handle them if others provide equipment, lift, and training.

The UN Secretariat will remain the world’s most adept organization for peacekeeping but not for peace enforcement. Only the Europeans will possess comprehensive regional capabilities.

- Though slow in coming, the European Union’s initiatives to create military and civilian police forces are particularly promising.
- African organizations will remain hard pressed to provide much beyond political blessing for missions.
- No other regional organizations will have operational capabilities worthy of note.
Introduction

On 9–10 July 2001 the National Intelligence Council, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the United Nations Association of the USA hosted a workshop on “The Future of International Peace Operations” in the next five years. The meeting sought to draw out practitioner and expert opinions on:

- Expected demand for peace operations conducted by military forces.
- The politics of peace operations at the United Nations.
- National willingness to engage in operations.
- National, commercial, and international capabilities to do so.

Thirty-five principals and 25 observers attended. They included UN Permanent Representatives and other diplomats based in New York and Washington, civilian and military heads of peace operations, officials from the UN Secretariat, and specialists from think tanks and universities in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. Also present were current and former US Government officials.

The Future Demand for Peace Operations

The overall incidence of conflicts, especially internal wars, probably will remain steady or worsen. This is because the underlying causal trends—such as the availability of weapons, poor governance, autonomy movements, disagreements over the control of valuable resources, ethnic differences, and the spillover of existing wars—continue unabated. The Balkans, Burma, Nepal, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Central and West Africa, Indonesia, Colombia and possibly the southern Philippines will be particularly susceptible to major strife. Thus, the international community should have ample opportunities to launch peace operations to help quell disturbances, but how often it will do so is difficult to predict. Few experts, for example, forecasted the surge in large UN missions in the first half of the 1990s (when the number of peacekeepers jumped nearly six fold to 76,500 before falling sharply) and the lesser but more surprising resurgence at turn of the century (when numbers almost tripled to 38,500).

Whether a conflict generates widespread demand for a peace operation will depend on a mix of factors that will differ for each case. Positive stimuli will include:

- A desire to alleviate a humanitarian disaster (though even this dire prospect will be insufficient by itself).
- Activism by influential or neighboring states with such special interests as limiting the spread of instability.
- Media coverage.
- The determination of an international coalition of states to turn over an operation it began to an international organization (such as NATO did with the UN after it forced the Serbian army out of Kosovo).
- The lobbying efforts of diasporas or others with an affinity to the victims of disaster.
- The combined effect of precedents and conscience. Other factors will mute or suppress demand; the most prominent of these are:
  - Strong opposition from a global or regional power to particular operations.
  - The perception that a conflict is not “ripe” for international action because the contending parties are determined to continue the struggle.
  - The belief that a contemplated operation will be too risky or simply too challenging—especially if reminiscent of “never again” past operational disasters.

States will avoid missions they judge highly challenging, not only because they fear their troops will suffer casualties but also because the supply of effective peacekeepers is tight and probably will likely expand only slowly. In short, states will neither generate nor tolerate demand that they conclude cannot be met.

While peace operations almost always occur in the aftermath of conflict, they also can help prevent its onset. Such prevention was the intent of the United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) mission that deployed to Macedonia from early 1995 through early 1999. It signaled an international determination not to allow developments in Yugoslavia or Albania to spill over into Macedonia. While many now believe that UNPREDEP’s withdrawal was a mistake in light of recent developments, preventive deployments will remain rare because of limited numbers of peacekeepers and the difficulty of predicting which potential conflict is suitable to this type of activity.
The Politics of Peace Operations at the United Nations

A central feature of the politics of UN peace operations will be worsening tension between the Five Permanent (“P5”) Members of the Security Council (with the U.S. viewed as the first among equals) and the newly industrialized and developing “Southern” states. Dominating the Council, the Permanent Five determine which operations take place and how they are conducted. Most of the Southern nations resent how the Permanent Five exercise authority and criticize them for inflating or suppressing demand for operations based on their individual national interests. They readily accept that countries act to their own benefit, but they see the Permanent Five as having special responsibilities commensurate with their dominant role. They want the Council restructured and its processes made more accountable and transparent.

Particularly unhappy are Southern troop contributors. Since the early 1990s the Council has mandated large, hazardous, and complex missions and heavily relied on them to provide ground personnel. These contributors feel taken for granted and are highly vexed that the USA and its P5 counterparts generally do not deploy their own soldiers to hazardous UN missions outside of Europe. They want the Council to mandate a challenging mission only after the Permanent Five pledge that some of their own soldiers will participate. They also want the Council to consult with them earlier—when a mandate is being crafted—and to give their views more weight throughout the mission.

The Permanent Five argue that their need to decide expeditiously and reach consensus among themselves limits the time available for broad consultation. They also note that their troops deploy to hazardous peace operations that are not under direct UN control. Such rejoinders are unconvincing to important contributors such as Egypt, India, and Jordan. Their growing frustration will undermine the ability of the UN to obtain the soldiers needed for large, complex, and potentially dangerous operations.

National Willingness to Engage in Peace Operations

A significant number of states will strive to have troops available for peace operations. These will include regular troop contributors—from the Nordic states, South Asia, Western and Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab bloc, Canada, and Argentina—as well as others with little peace operations experience such as China, Japan, and South Korea.

Several overlapping factors will encourage nations to contribute:

- A specific interest in the effects of a conflict or in the peace mission to end it.
- A sense of responsibility to bring about peace and well-being even in distant places.
- Burnishing the state’s reputation.
- The state’s image as a global or regional player.
- The training, equipment, and operational benefits that would accrue to the state’s military, and
- A reliance on reimbursements from the UN or others for the use of the state’s military.

The above factors will make their influence felt, however, within the context of an increasingly significant trend: states are becoming warier about committing to missions. They are placing more conditions on their willingness to participate or becoming more insistent that prior conditions be met. Some will now:

- Stay out of high-risk operations altogether.
- Remain on the sidelines until assured that a mission is free of problems that led to past disasters.
- Oppose operations perceived as violating a state’s sovereignty.
- Deploy to non-consensual operations only if P5 and developed states deploy to them as well.
- Participate only in UN-mandated operations.
- Participate in such operations only if properly consulted beforehand in the formulation of the policies governing the mission.
- Hold back unless they can be assured of timely reimbursement for the use of their soldiers and equipment.

In short, states have always assessed the benefits versus the costs of committing to an operation, but particularly where their direct interests are low, they will give greater weight to costs than they did in the 1990s. Although it should remain relatively simple to
assemble the resources for observer and interpositional missions that occur with the full consent of the conflicting parties, high-risk operations now will generally occur only when a powerful state assembles a coalition of willing partners or persuades an international organization to take on the task. That state will probably also have to provide those in the operation with a guarantee of help should their soldiers come in extremis.

A corollary to the obvious point that national interests are key is that countries are likely to focus their efforts more within their region than without. Europeans that regularly deployed troops outside the continent now confront continuing problems in the Balkans to which they will give priority as they seek to limit spillover and refugee flows. Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa will remain so troublesome—so prone to spreading instability—as to keep most of its indigenous and meager capabilities for peace operations well tied up on the continent. In addition, because most African operations are likely to necessitate risky enforcement, outsider participation probably will be limited, but that need not be a problem since there will also remain “low-tech.” Thus, Africans should be able to handle peace operations on the continent if provided with relatively modest outside aid, equipment, and training. They seem willing to do so and believe that they know how to operate within Africa far better than outsiders.

The African situation illustrates a point that applies as well to the old “reliables” such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Nordics: states that stay out of an operation may not necessarily do so because they will lack political will. Some, such as the Africans, will lack proper resources, and others, such as the traditional contributors, may simply be “maxed out” by their commitments to existing operations. In other words, some willing states may be unable to contribute to large missions even in the face of great perceived need.

National and Commercial Capabilities

National military forces will remain overstretched because of decreasing defense budgets and a resurgence of large operations, some not directed by the UN. National forces also are being earmarked to more than one international organization, leading to “double and triple counting.” A unit pledged to the UN’s Standby Arrangement System might simultaneously be pledged to NATO and/or to the European Rapid Reaction Force. To avoid problems, deployments will have to overlap by having, for example, the UN endorse a NATO or EU operation.

Some positive trends will alleviate overstretch:

- Some militaries are applying learned lessons from peace operations of the 1990s to improve their capabilities.
- Some that are cutting back are restructuring their residual resources for rapid and flexible response appropriate for peace operations.
- Many national militaries are training and deploying together, and some are forming combined peacekeeping units. In some instances, newcomers to peace operations have fielded small units as part of larger formations of more experienced countries.
- Peacekeeping training and exercising are becoming more institutionalized around the globe, and the number of national and multinational peacekeeping training centers (about 20 or so today) is increasing.
- Programs in which advanced states provide not only training but also equipment and other support to the less advanced also are increasing. The recipients welcome the help, though some Africans complain that the US, British, and French programs too often play favorites.
- The UN has upgraded its own program to standardize requirements for peacekeeping forces and associated curricula and training.

Reliance on civilians to carry out policing and other duties will increase, and this trend will alleviate the pressure for national troop contributions. The EU will assemble a pool of several thousand civilian police volunteers, and the UN plans to upgrade its civilian police administrative office. Commercial entities will play a larger role in ground logistic support, training, information-gathering, and administration, but there will be considerable hesitation about turning to soldiers-for-hire because of their profit motive, lack of accountability, and record on human rights.

Organizational Capabilities

The Secretary-General commissioned in 2000 a comprehensive review of UN Secretariat procedures and organization for planning and directing peace operations. The resulting Brahimi Report sets the agenda for reform, but not all UN member states agree with the
The efforts of states, international organizations, and commercial suppliers probably will lead to modest increases in the availability of personnel and equipment appropriate to missions.

■ There probably will always be enough motivated nations to meet the need for simple observer and interpositional missions.

**On the other hand:**

Increases in the availability of appropriate personnel and equipment will not broaden significantly the scope of what nations will be able to do. National military resources available for peace operations will remain overstretched.

■ For political and practical reasons—not the least of which is a desire to avoid a repeat of past operational disasters—states are adding conditions on their willingness to participate or becoming more insistent that prior conditions be met.

■ Heightened concern about local regional instabilities will hold most states back from deploying troops to distant missions, and heightened frustration with the Security Council’s leadership will undermine the continued cooperation of important contributors such as Egypt, India, and Jordan.

■ High-risk missions will occur, but the powerful states that call for them will almost surely have to exert more effort than they did in the 1990s to sign up participants. The latter probably will require assurances of help to meet any threats their forces might confront.

■ Of all groups, the Africans seem the most willing to contemplate hazardous missions. They sense that most operations on their continent will necessitate enforcement, but their own meager capabilities will not markedly improve without outside help.

In sum, simple missions will readily take place, but states are now markedly less apt to undertake complex or risky operations that do not engage their interests directly.

**Conclusion**

The net effect of contrasting trends will make states warier about committing to peace operations. On the one hand:

■ The expected incidence of conflict will provide them ample opportunities to demand and engage in operations.
Agenda for September 19, 2001 Conference

Cosponsored by the Conflict Prevention and Africa Projects, East European Studies, and Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center

Wednesday, September 19, 2001, 5th Floor Conference Room

8:30 – 8:45am
Continental Breakfast

8:45 – 9:00am
“Welcome”
Lee Hamilton
Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

9:00 – 10:30am
Session One: “Setting the Stage”

Moderator:
Jane Holl Lute, Consulting Director, Conflict Prevention Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Executive Vice President, United Nations Foundation

Presenters:
“The Challenges: Restoring Order in Complex Contingency Operations”
Ruth Wedgwood, Professor of International Law, Yale Law School;
Edward B. Burling, Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Ellen Laipson, Vice Chair, National Intelligence Council
Enid Schoettle, Special Advisor to the Chair, National Intelligence Council

“A Brief Overview of U.S. Engagement in Complex Contingency Operations: Understanding the Tasks and Finding the Gaps and Seams”
Eric Schwartz, former Special Assistant to the President and Former Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs, National Security Council; Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace

10:30 – 10:45am
Coffee Break

10:45 – 1:00pm
Session Two: “Integrating the Actors”

Moderator:
Gilbert Khadiagala, Consulting Director, Africa Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Presenters:

“Improving Civil-Military Coordination”
A Military View:
Matthew Vaccaro, Director for Peacekeeping, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, Department of Defense
A Political View:
Dennis Skocz, Director, Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Department of State
A Civilian View:
Julia Taft, Former Assistant Secretary of State, Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau, Department of State

1:00 – 2:00pm 
Lunch

Session Three: “Engaging with the UN to Respond to Potential Conflicts or other Complex Contingency Operations”

Moderator:
Bob Hathaway, Director, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Presenter:
Tapio Kanninen, Chief, Policy Planning Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

2:00 – 3:30pm 
Session Four: “Enhancing the Capacities of Others: Strengthening Regional Responses”

Moderator:
Martin Sletzinger, Director, East European Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Presenters:
Latin America: Johanna Mendelson Forman, Senior Advisor, Role of American Military Power, Association of the U.S. Army
Africa: Nancy Walker, Director, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
East Timor: Leonard Hawley, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and former Director of Multilateral Affairs, National Security Council
Bosnia and Kosovo: C. Michael Hurley, former Director for Southeastern Europe, National Security Council

3:30 – 3:45pm 
Coffee Break
Session Five: “Responding to Complex Contingency Operations: the Way Forward”

Moderator:
Anita Sharma, Deputy Director, Conflict Prevention Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Presenters:
“The Prospects for Peace Operations”
Donald Daniel, Special Advisor to the Chair, National Intelligence Council

“U.S. Engagement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction”
Robert Orr, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

“Strengthening the Tools of Engagement”
Andrew Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development
Donald Daniel
Donald C.F. Daniel serves as Special Advisor to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in Washington, DC. Prior to assuming that position in January 2001, he held the Milton E. Miles Chair of International Relations at the Naval War College, Newport, RI. He has also been a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, a Visiting Scholar at the Brookings Institution of Washington, and a Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. His latest book, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of Crises (co-authored with B.C. Hayes and C. de Jonge Oudraat), was a finalist for the 2000 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order.

Johanna Mendelson Forman
Johanna Mendelson Forman is a senior fellow at the Association of the United States Army's project on the Role of American Military Power in the 21st Century (RAMP). Before that time she served as a Senior Policy Advisor for the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, where she managed the Agency's policy on post-conflict reconstruction, security and governance. She was the Agency's technical specialist on issues of demobilization and reintegration of armed forces in developing countries. From 1998-1999 she served as Senior Social Scientist and Attorney at the World Bank's newly created Post Conflict Unit, on assignment from the United States Agency for International Development. Since 1994 she served as a Senior Advisor to the Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, an office she helped co-found to respond to complex emergencies and transition needs in the post-cold war world. She also holds a faculty appointment at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies. For the last ten years she has directed a program to improve civil-military relations in Latin America, a groundbreaking effort to create a core of civilian leaders knowledgeable about military issues. Dr. Mendelson is a regular lecturer at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the National Defense University and the Inter-American Defense College. Mendelson, who has been with USAID since 1992 and with The American University since 1986, previously has held positions at the Department of Justice, National Public Radio and the American Association of University Women, where she served as director of public policy.

Her extensive publications on civil-military relations, security sector reform and democracy in Latin America include Political Parties and Democracy in Central America, with Louis W. Goodman and William Leogrande, editors, (Westview Press, Boulder Co. 1992), Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience, with Louis W. Goodman, Moises Naim, Joseph Tulchin and Gary Bland, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) and The Military and Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, with Louis W. Goodman and Juan Rial, (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA. 1989). Her recent research on security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction has also included many articles and a monograph on human security, poverty reduction and sustainable development, published by the World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit, and essays about the conflict in Colombia, also published by the World Bank. She is an accomplished public speaker who has lectured on a...
wide range of issues including post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarianism and public policy. Dr. Mendelson appears regularly on the Spanish network, UNIVISION, Worldnet and the CNN Spanish Service.

Dr. Mendelson holds a J.D. from Washington College of Law at The American University, a Ph.D. in Latin American history from Washington University, St. Louis, and a Masters of International Affairs, with a Certificate of Latin America Studies from Columbia University in New York. She is fluent in Spanish and Portuguese. She is a member of the Advisory Board of Women in International Security and also serves on the board of the Institute for World Affairs. She is married to Dr. David Forman, a scientist and patent attorney. They have a son, Gideon Louis.

Leonard R. Hawley

As a recent Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Leonard R. Hawley directed State Department foreign policy engagement and political-military preparations for multilateral responses to regional crises that called for a Multinational Force or UN peacekeeping to help move nations and regions from military confrontation to political stability. He was also responsible for State Department oversight of UN reform initiatives such as the recent Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping as well as other UN management and budgeting issues, in consultation with Congress.

Prior to coming to the State Department in May 1999, Mr. Hawley served on the National Security Council staff where he coordinated U.S. political-military planning activities regarding multilateral complex contingencies. He also advised the National Security Advisor to the President on policy options and diplomatic strategies regarding multilateral crisis response for use in Principals and Deputies Committee meetings. He enhanced Washington interagency capabilities to manage these complex contingencies successfully.

Mr. Hawley also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he developed and implemented Department of Defense policies regarding multilateral peace operations and U.S. military operations in support of humanitarian relief activities.

Mr. Hawley has worked on staff in both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. In the Senate, Mr. Hawley was a legislative fellow for defense and foreign policy matters. In the House of Representatives, he was a professional staff member on the Committee on Armed Services with special responsibility for force planning in the post-Cold War era, emerging Defense program requirements, and Goldwater-Nichols implementation. He also worked as speechwriter for Congressman Ike Skelton of the U.S. House of Representatives, who is now the Ranking Member on the House Committee on National Security.

He is a former research fellow at both the Naval War College and the National Defense University. In addition, as Professor of Strategic Decision-making at the National Defense University Mr. Hawley taught courses in national security strategy and crisis decision-making. Prior to this assignment, he served on the Joint Staff as Chief of the Strategic Plans and Program Priorities Division.

Mr. Hawley has several years of operational military experience in U.S. Army armor and infantry ground combat units stationed in the United States, Vietnam, and Germany. He also served in the Office of the Chief of Staff Army with responsibility for the Army’s heavy and light force modernization programs.

An experienced contributor to U.S. political-military policy development and implementation, Mr. Hawley has written on a number of diverse topics to include professional ethics, the effectiveness of complex contingency operations, Defense reorganization and reform, leader development, and strategic team decision-making within the interagency.

C. Michael Hurley

Former National Security Council Director for Southeast European Affairs, Michael Hurley received his law degree from the University of Minnesota Law School and is a member of the Minnesota Bar. He practiced law for three years, specializing in litigation. In 1983 he began his career at the CIA and has served more than 12 years on assignment overseas. As a senior U.S. Government official he has served in U.S.-led peace interventions in Port-au-Prince Haiti (1994–95), Sarajevo, Bosnia (1995–96), and Pristina, Kosovo (1999–2000). He has served twice at the National Security Council, from 1998–99 as Director for Dayton Implementation and in 2000 as Director for Southeast European Affairs.
Tapio Kanninen

Tapio Kanninen, a native of Finland, received his Master’s degree in Economics from the University of Helsinki and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Graduate School of the City University of New York. In the 1970s, he worked in the Finnish Government and in the Academy of Science, Finland. He joined the United Nations in 1979 and served in the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA) and the Department of Administration and Management (DAM). Early in 1986, he joined the Office of the Secretary-General to deal with the financial crisis and reorganization of the United Nations. Between 1987-1991, he was a member of the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI), established to assist the Secretary-General in his various political functions, notably in the field of early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation and good offices. Since 1992, he has been with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

In February 1992, Mr. Kanninen was asked to act as the Secretary of a high-level Secretariat task force which the Secretary-General had established to assist him in drafting “An Agenda for Peace”, his blueprint on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building, as requested by the Security Council at its historic summit meeting on 31 January 1992. Subsequently, he served as Secretary of the Special Working Groups established by the Security Council and the General Assembly to deal with the recommendations contained in that document and as the convenor of the interdepartmental working group on the implementation of those recommendations.

In the Fall of 1995, Mr. Kanninen was appointed the first Secretary of the High-Level Working Group for the Strengthening of the United Nations System. Between 1994 and 1998, he acted as Secretary of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, under the chairmanship of the President of the General Assembly. In March 1998, Sir Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, established a Policy Planning Unit to assist DPA in fulfilling its mandate in the areas of early warning, prevention, peacemaking and peace-building.

Mr. Kanninen was made head of this Unit. The priorities of the Policy Planning Unit have focused on strengthening the functions of the Department and the United Nations in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, for which the Secretary-General has designated DPA to be the focal point in the UN system.

Publications include: Leadership and Reform: The Secretary-General and the UN Financial Crisis of the Late 1980s. (Kluwer International Law, the Hague, September 1995).

Ellen B. Laipson

Vice Chairman National Intelligence Council Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

Ellen Laipson became Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in September 1997.

Previously she served as a Special Assistant to the US Permanent Representative, Ambassador Albright, at the US Mission to the United Nations. Prior to her assignment to New York, she served as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council staff from September 1993 to September 1995. From 1990 to 1993, she was the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia.

From 1979-1990 Ms. Laipson worked at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, where she was a Specialist in Middle East and North African Affairs and held several management positions in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

In 1986-87, she served on the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, with responsibilities for Middle Eastern and African Affairs. She also worked at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 1980, as an analyst on Greek and Turkish issues. From 1977-1979 she was on the staff of Senator Joseph Biden.

Ms. Laipson holds a BA degree from Cornell University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. She speaks and reads French, Arabic, and Hebrew.

In addition to numerous CRS studies, Ms. Laipson has been a contributing author to books on the Middle East, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean, and she has had articles and book reviews published in several journals.

Ms. Laipson is a native of Worcester, Massachusetts. She is married to Henri Barkey and they reside in Bethesda, Maryland. They have one child, Maya.
Matthew McLean
Matthew McLean is currently serving as the director for Planning and International Operations at the National Security Council, where he has served since July 1999. From 1996–1999, he served as an intelligence analyst covering global humanitarian and refugee issues. He previously served as an analyst assessing advanced foreign technologies.

Mr. McLean holds a degree in mechanical engineering from Brigham Young University and a Masters in International Affairs from George Washington University.

He is married with four children.

Andrew Natsios
Andrew S. Natsios was sworn in on May 1, 2001, as administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is the government agency that administers economic and humanitarian assistance worldwide.

Natsios has served previously at USAID, first as director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance from 1989 to 1991 and then as assistant administrator for the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance (now the Bureau for Humanitarian Response) from 1991 to January 1993.

Before assuming his new position, Natsios was chairman and chief executive officer of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority from April 2000 to March 2001. Before that, he was secretary for administration and finance for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from March 1999 to April 2000. From 1993 to 1998, Natsios was vice president of World Vision U.S. From 1987 to 1989, he was executive director of the Northeast Public Power Association in Milford, Massachusetts.

Natsios served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1975 to 1987 and was named legislator of the year by the Massachusetts Municipal Association (1978), the Massachusetts Association of School Committees (1986), and Citizens for Limited Taxation (1986). He also was chairman of the Massachusetts Republican State Committee for seven years.

Natsios is a graduate of Georgetown University and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government where he received a master’s degree in public administration. He has taught graduate and undergraduate courses at Boston College, the University of Massachusetts and Northeastern University.

Natsios is the author of numerous articles on foreign policy and humanitarian emergencies, as well as the author of two books: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), and The Great North Korean Famine (U.S. Institute of Peace, forthcoming).

After serving 22 years in the U.S. Army Reserves, Natsios retired in 1995 with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is a veteran of the Gulf War.

A native of Holliston, Massachusetts, Natsios and his wife, Elizabeth, have three children, Emily, Alexander and Philip.

Robert C. Orr
Robert Orr currently serves as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he co-directs a major project on Post-conflict Reconstruction. Previously he served as Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, and Director of his Washington office. In this role he served on the National Security Council-chaired Deputies Committee.

Prior to this, Dr. Orr has served as Senior Advisor and Executive Office Director at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York, and as a Director in the Office of Global and Multilateral Affairs of the National Security Council where he was responsible for peacekeeping, humanitarian emergencies, and multilateral negotiations. He has also worked for the International Peace Academy in New York, the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C., USAID in Nairobi, Kenya, and CBS News in Beijing, China.

Dr. Orr received his Ph.D. and M.P.A. in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his Bachelor’s degree from the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). He speaks Spanish and Mandarin Chinese.

Dr. Orr is co-author of Keeping the Peace: Lessons from Multidimensional Peace Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge University Press, 1997), as well as author of various articles on U.S. foreign policy, democracy promotion, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Enid C.B. Schoettle
She currently serves as Special Advisor, National Intelligence Council. From 1996–1997 she was Chief of the Advocacy and External Relations Unit of the
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. From 1993-1996 she served on the National Intelligence Council as the National Intelligence Officer for Global and Multilateral Issues. From 1991-1993 she was Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations for international organizations and law. From 1976-1991 she was on the staff of the Ford Foundation, serving as Director of Ford’s International Affairs Program from 1981-1991. Prior to that, she was on the faculties of political science at the University of Minnesota and Swarthmore College.

She has a B.A. from Radcliffe College, and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Ms. Schoettle’s expertise includes humanitarian affairs; the United Nations; peacekeeping; arms control; multilateral organizations and diplomacy.

Eric Paul Schwartz

Eric Schwartz will assume a senior fellowship with the United States Institute of Peace in October 2001. Most recently he was a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Mr. Schwartz served at the National Security Council at the White House between 1993 and 2001. From June 1998 until January 2001, Mr. Schwartz was Special Assistant to the President (and NSC Senior Director) for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs. Between January 1993 and June 1998, Mr. Schwartz held a range of related positions at the NSC.

Mr. Schwartz also served at the NSC in the early part of the Administration of George W. Bush, assisting the new National Security Advisor in the context of the Presidential transition.

During his tenure at the White House, Mr. Schwartz was responsible for development and implementation of policies relating to human rights and the rule of law; the United Nations, peacekeeping, and U.S. responses to humanitarian crises; as well as refugee affairs and international migration. He chaired Administration working groups on Human Rights Treaty Implementation, Peacekeeping, and Contingency Planning, each of which was established pursuant to Presidential directives. He played major roles in the Administration’s responses to a wide range of peacekeeping and humanitarian contingencies, including those relating to East Timor, Kosovo, Central Africa, Haiti, Northern Iraq, Indochina, Central America, Mozambique and India.

From 1989 to 1993, before joining the NSC staff, Mr. Schwartz served as Staff Consultant to the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Prior to that, he served as Washington Director of the human rights organization Asia Watch, now Human Rights Watch-Asia.

Eric Schwartz holds a law degree from New York University School of Law; a Master of Public Affairs degree (with a specialization in International Relations) from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University; and a Bachelor of Arts degree, with honors, in Political Science from the State University of New York at Binghamton.

He is married to Catherine M. Graham of New South Wales, Australia, and has two daughters, Sarah, age 7, and Anna, age 5. He and his family live in Silver Spring, Maryland.

Julia Vadala Taft

From November 1997 until January 2001 Julia Vadala Taft served as Assistant Secretary of State for Population Refugees and Migration. In this capacity she was responsible for overseeing United States Government policies regarding population, refugee and international migration issues and managed $700 million in annual allocations for refugee protection and humanitarian assistance programs. In January 1999, Mrs. Taft was also appointed to serve as Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. In this role her main objectives were to promote a substantive dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government and to help preserve the unique linguistic, religious and cultural heritage of the Tibetan people.

For the four years preceding her confrontation as Assistant Secretary of State, Mrs. Taft was the President and Chief Executive Officer of InterAction (the American Council for Voluntary International Action, a coalition of over 150 U.S. –based NGO’s working on international relief and development). Mrs. Taft has served as the Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance with USAID, the Director of Refugee Programs and Acting US Refugee Coordinator at the Department of State, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

In 1975, she was selected by President Ford to direct the Indochinese refugee reception and resettlement program in the United States. In addition she has been a consultant on refugee immigration affairs and humanitarian aid to the Ford Foundation, the World Bank, and various U.S. government agencies.
Her awards include the World Hunger Award, the AID Distinguished Service Award, One of the Top Ten Men and Women in Federal Service, the USSR Supreme Soviet Award for Personal Courage in Annenia, and a White House Fellowship. She is married to William Taft IV and has three children.

Matthew Vaccaro
Matthew Vaccaro serves as Director of the Office of Peacekeeping in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The office is responsible for all aspects of peace operations and conflict management activities around the world. Previously he served on the staff of the National Security Council and as an Army officer. Mr. Vaccaro has published numerous articles and book chapters on international security issues.

Nancy J. Walker
Dr. Nancy J. Walker is the Director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). With more than ten years of government experience, Dr. Walker has spent over half in leadership positions in the area of U.S. policy in Africa. Throughout her career, Nancy Walker has been involved in international programs in both Europe and Africa.

Prior to assuming her responsibilities at the Africa Center, Dr. Walker served as the Director of the Office of African Affairs, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She designed and managed policy and programs in sub-Saharan Africa. She oversaw the development of the Department of Defense strategy for engagement in sub-Saharan Africa, working closely with the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, the Department of State, and the National Security Council. Since 1996, Dr. Walker led the effort to establish the Africa Center, consulting extensively with African and European partners. She assumed the duties of ACSS Interim Director in May 1999. Dr. Walker came to the Office of African Affairs as Deputy Director in 1995.

Dr. Walker joined the Pentagon’s newly established Office of Peacekeeping in 1993. As Chief of its UN Headquarters Division, she developed and managed initiatives on enhancing U.S. and UN peace operations capabilities, becoming known as an expert on UN reform. With the U.S. Information Agency’s Office of Research from 1989 to 1993, Dr. Walker designed studies and reported on German and European public opinion on U.S. foreign and security policy issues. Prior to USIA, Dr. Walker worked as a politics producer for German television, as a policy consultant to the International Institute for Women’s Political Leadership, as an editor and researcher, and as a defense analyst for an investment bank.

Nancy Walker holds a bachelor’s degree from Harvard and Radcliffe Colleges. She earned her doctorate from Oxford University (Nuffield College), serving as a Rotary Foundation Fellow during that time. After her studies, she spent a year in Germany as a Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow. During her tenure in the Office of African Affairs, she completed the MIT Seminar XXI program in national security decision making. Dr. Walker is a member of the Women’s Foreign Policy Group, Women in International Security, the American Council on Germany, the American Political Science Association, and the World Affairs Council. She speaks both French and German.

A sought after public speaker, Dr. Walker has lectured widely on U.S. policy in Africa, national security decision making, civil-military relations, United Nations reform, peacekeeping policy, and European public opinion. Dr. Walker was recently decorated with the “Order of the Lion”, the Republic of Senegal’s highest award, in recognition for her dedication toward the founding and establishment of the ACSS. A native of Los Angeles, Nancy Walker is married and has two children.

Ruth Wedgwood
Ruth Wedgwood has been Professor of International Law at Yale Law School since 1986, and writes on the use of force, peacekeeping, international tribunals, Security Council politics, international crimes, and American foreign affairs power.

Ms. Wedgwood is also Senior Fellow for International Organizations and Law at the Council on Foreign Relations, and the incoming Director of Studies at the Hague Academy for International Law in the Netherlands. Paul Wolfowitz invited her shortly before his appointment as Deputy Secretary of Defense, to serve as the Edward B. Burling Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., on her sabbatical in 2001–2002. She will also be a guest scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Since 1994, she has convened the United Nations Roundtable at the Council on Foreign Relations, for ongoing discussions among senior members.
of the U.N. Secretariat, the U.N. diplomatic community (including members of the Security Council), nongovernmental organizations, and the business and academic communities on foreign policy and legal issues arising from crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Iraq, and control of chemical and biological weapons and nuclear proliferation, as well as the reform of the operations of the United Nations.

She has visited and conducted research on the international law and policy problems arising in U.N. and regional peacekeeping operations and civil reconstruction efforts in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Haiti, East Timor, and Georgia. She recently guest-edited a symposium on Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the January 2001 issue of the American Journal of International Law, and has just returned from conducting a training session under the aegis of the Swedish government for Serbian judges, prosecutors and defense counsel interested in national war crimes trials. She is a member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on International Law, and was appointed by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the National Security Study Group of the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security in the 21st Century.

In 1998-1999, she served as the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. She is on the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International Law, and serves as chairman of Research and Studies for the American Society of International Law. She is also a member of the policy advisory group of the United Nations Association (USA), a former board member of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and was recently appointed to the board of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS). She is a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the World Policy Journal of the New School University.

Professor Wedgwood is a graduate of Harvard University (magna cum laude) and Yale Law School. She served as the executive editor of the Yale Law Journal and was awarded the Peres Prize for the finest writing in the journal. She also studied economics at the London School of Economics as a Harvard prize fellow.

Professor Wedgwood is the editor of After Dayton: Lessons of the Bosnian Peace Process and was study director of the CFR task force report on American National Interest and the United Nations, which has been widely distributed in the American foreign policy community. She co-directed a United Nations symposium for the Council on issues arising under the law of the sea, entitled Security Flashpoints: Oil, Islands, Sea Access, and Military Confrontation.

She is a former law clerk to Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the United States Supreme Court and Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. She is also Vice-President of the International Law Association, American Branch.

From 1980-1986, she was Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York, where she was chief counsel in the espionage prosecution of a Bulgarian trade attaché, leading to negotiations for the release of Andrei Sakharov and Natan Sharansky. She also headed investigations of the transshipment of war materiel to North Korea, the Soviet Union, Iran and Iraq, as well as domestic terrorism involving the planned bombings of federal facilities, public corruption in the federal WIC food program and the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, and landlord arson that destroyed low-income housing in New York City. From 1978-80, she served as chief of staff for the head of the criminal division in the U.S. Department of Justice and as head of the Attorney General-FBI joint working group to frame guidelines for the investigative use of informants and undercover operations. She also devised trial procedures to permit espionage prosecutions without prejudice to national security information, later incorporated in the classified information procedures act.

She was also a summer associate of the law firm of Covington and Burling, and has consulted with Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett, as well as other firms.

Professor Wedgwood has been involved in the attempt to negotiate a compromise to protect U.S. interests under the Rome treaty for an International Criminal Court and the Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. She has served as amicus curiae for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague. Her scholarly essays have appeared in the Yale Law Journal, the American Journal of International Law, the Leiden Journal of International Law, the European Journal of International Law, the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, and the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, among others. Her popular essays have appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, Financial Times, and Christian Science Monitor. She comments occasionally on CNN and National Public Radio.
Appendix D

Attendees

Sheppie Abromowitz  
 International Rescue Committee

Pauline Baker  
 Fund for Peace

Tyler Beardsley  
 Applied Data Systems, Inc.

Esther Brimmer  
 United States Department of State

Dallas Brown  
 National Security Council

Holly Burkhalter  
 Physicians for Human Rights

Letitia Butler  
 United States Agency for International Development

Lisa Campeau  
 World Bank

Leigh Caraher  
 National Defense University

Lawrence Chalmer  
 National Defense University

Antonia Handler Chayes  
 Conflict Management Group, Harvard University

Elizabeth Spiro Clark  
 Georgetown University

Christine Coleiro  
 George Mason University

James Colgary  
 United States Navy

Gilbert Collins  
 United States Agency for International Development

Paul Crespo  
 Strategic Options Group

Lauren Crowley  
 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Michael Demirjian  
 Joint Staff, UN and Multilateral Affairs

Michael Dooley  
 United States Army Peacekeeping Institute

William Dunch  
 The Henry L. Stimson Center

Caroline Earle  
 The Henry L. Stimson Center

Andrew Erdmann  
 United States Department of State

Scott Feil  
 Association of the U.S. Army

Scott Fisher  
 United States Department of State

Ron Fisher  
 American University

David Fuhr  
 Center for Strategic and International Studies

Peter Gantz  
 The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping

Michael Glennon  
 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

James Haas  
 National Defense University

John Hegelerson  
 National Intelligence Council

Allen Holmes  
 Georgetown University

Fred Hudson  
 United States Army

Julie Hughes  
 Better World Campaign

Heather Hullburt  
 International Crisis Group

Jay Huston  
 Joint Staff, UN and Multilateral Affairs

Mirna Kalic  
 International Crisis Group

Lorelei Kelly  
 House of Representatives, Special Projects
John Tunheim  
United States District Judge

John Tsagronis  
National Security Research, Inc.

Alan Van Egmond  
Balkans Task Force

Mark Walkup  
United States Department of State

George Ward  
United States Institute of Peace

Nancy Ward  
United Nations Foundation

Lynne Weil  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Ross Wherry  
United States Agency for International Development

Nicole Widdersheim  
International Rescue Committee, Government Relations

Joseph Wilson, IV  
JC Wilson International Venture Corp.

Don Wolfensberger  
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Howard Wolpe  
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Vicent C.H. Yao  
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Lee H. Hamilton, Director

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