U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region
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A Conference Report

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It is time to rethink America’s strategic vision for Asia. The next decade will bring far-reaching challenges for U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war against terrorism have underlined that reality. But the need for serious reconsideration of America’s posture in Asia predates 9/11.

On May 5, 2003, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and The Sorrento Group hosted a daylong conference to promote thinking about U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region over the next eight to ten years. Attended by senior U.S. military officers, former policy makers and government officials, and leading academic experts, this program was part of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, organized by the U.S. Army to stimulate more systematic consideration of future national security problems.

In a wide-ranging discussion, conference attendees looked more closely at the nature of American interests in the Asia-Pacific region, likely threats to those interests, and the best ways to counter or at least mitigate those threats. Some of the nation’s most eminent strategists, scholars and diplomats pursued broad strategic questions, such as:

- How are fundamental American interests in the Asia-Pacific region likely to change during the coming decade?
- How and to what extent will new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction modify traditional American security concerns?
- Is deterrence increasingly irrelevant in a world where so-called “rogue states” and non-state actors pose substantial threats to the American homeland?
- Does the doctrine of pre-emption set forth in the September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy provide an appropriate and effective foundation for dealing with threats to U.S. security in Asia?
- What should be the role of alliances in America’s Asia strategy?
- How can U.S. strategy accommodate China’s growing power in a manner that adequately safeguards American interests?
What changes should the United States consider in the deployment of military forces in the region, including overall troop levels and types of forces, command arrangements, and number and locations of permanent military installations?

While definitive answers to these questions were neither reached nor sought, participants agreed on the necessity of more precise analysis and discussion in security policy discourse. In addition, a few broad concepts surfaced periodically throughout the day and suggested possible starting points for addressing the question of U.S. strategy in the region in the years ahead. One recurring theme revolved around the unprecedented degree to which American power today overshadows that of any potential rival or coalition of rivals. Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, whose long Asian experience included assignments as U.S. ambassador in China, Indonesia and Singapore, observed that both American political and constitutional theory and a close reading of history warn that unchecked power of this magnitude is in continual danger of being abused. Other participants, however, emphasized the opportunities afforded by this unparalleled power, and argued that American might gives the United States the capability to play the role of benign cop on the beat, keeping law and order in Asia.

Consideration of the potential uses of American power led to a broader discussion of whether the United States is a status quo power or an ideologically driven crusading nation. In an analysis offered during the discussion, former National Security Council official Kenneth Lieberthal described the United States as a revisionist, even “revolutionary” actor in the international arena. The other major countries of East Asia, Lieberthal claimed, are all status quo powers, so many of them view Washington with apprehension. This led to a discussion of the need for American leaders to articulate U.S. policy and intentions more clearly, and to take care lest Washington’s actions, inadvertent as well as deliberate, encourage Asians to fashion a strategy to counter America’s dominance of the region.

Most conference participants felt that America’s fundamental interests in Asia are unlikely to change dramatically over the next decade. From this point, however, consensus evaporated, as the conferees disagreed on whether those interests could best be safeguarded by maintenance of traditional alliances, by shifting “coalitions of the willing,” by a balance of power with the United States in the role of balancer, by an old-fashioned concert of power, by multilateral institutions of either a global or regional character, or by benign neglect. How to reconcile the short-term horizon
dictated by the American political calendar with a need for a long-term vision of U.S. interests in Asia proved equally difficult to specify.

Inevitably, considerations of American interests and strategy in Asia are colored by uncertainty surrounding Chinese intentions and ambitions. Many conference participants endorsed the view of Princeton’s Aaron Friedberg that future events in East Asia will be shaped by long-term competition between the United States and China. This competition, conference attendees agreed, need not result in full-blown Sino-American rivalry, let alone in armed conflict. Indeed, several China specialists asserted that the top priority for Chinese leaders will remain domestic and that Beijing will have an active interest in avoiding external crises, most especially with the world’s sole superpower. Friedberg and others rightly noted, however, that it would be far easier to avoid such rivalry if the domestic regimes of the two countries were more similar – i.e., if China were something other than an authoritarian one-party state. Still, as Ambassador Thomas Pickering pointed out, Beijing’s desire to host a spectacularly successful Summer Olympics in 2008 will probably moderate Chinese actions over the next few years.

Keeping the U.S. relationship with China on the right path, Ambassador Roy noted, is “a necessary but not sufficient factor for strategic success” in the Asia-Pacific region. By almost any calculation, Japan will also remain an important component in American strategy for the region. There was general agreement that the Bush administration deserves credit for erasing the perception of “Japan passing” prevalent during the Clinton years. The improved tone in bilateral Japanese-American ties may smooth the way for frank talk from Washington on the necessity for serious economic reform in Japan – which several participants deemed essential if Japan is to play a regional security role commensurate with its wealth. There was less agreement, however, on the future of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Clearly, Japan is less patient today with its “abnormal” status arising from defeat in a war now two generations removed from today’s young Japanese. The question, of course, is how the United States might support Japan’s desire to become a more normal nation while forestalling the emergence of a Sino-Japanese rivalry or reawakening old fears of an aggressive, expansionist Japan. Nor will Tokyo wish to find itself asked to choose between Washington and Beijing.

The Korean peninsula is likely to see some of the earliest manifestations of the new strategic thinking taking hold in Washington. U.S. force posture is changing, with a pullback from forward positions along the Demilitarized Zone and consolidation south of Seoul and, quite probably,
some reductions in overall troop levels. This new posture reflects a judgment that a massive, 1950-style invasion across the DMZ is increasingly unlikely, rendering obsolete the “tripwire” role formerly played by U.S. forces. Still undetermined, however, is how this appraisal might be influenced by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and international efforts to rein in the North’s nuclear ambitions. Nor is it clear that the administration’s new emphasis on pre-emption provides much guidance for dealing with Pyongyang’s threat to become a declared nuclear weapons state. And just how central to U.S. interests is a non-nuclear North Korea?

Conferees also recognized a new and potent security threat in the region: terrorism organized and executed by Islamic extremists in Southeast Asia. Rear Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt put the matter succinctly: “Southeast Asia is more important to the United States today than it was two years ago.” This will be true into the foreseeable future. The increased importance of Southeast Asia involves more than just a shift in geographic focus. As Marvin Ott of the National War College pointed out, any serious consideration of U.S. strategy for the region must now take into account a host of factors—anemic economic performance, governmental weakness, the sense of victimization felt by many Southeast Asians—heretofore thought only peripheral to American strategic concerns. Enhanced intelligence-sharing among the states of the region, stepped up cooperation in the areas of law enforcement and the regulation of financial flows, and more targeted economic assistance will occupy a more prominent place in American strategy. Increased military assistance will have a role here as well, but as Ambassador Pickering urged, should be regarded as merely one component of a far broader strategy.

Are America’s Asian alliances still useful in the unipolar world of the 21st century? In a world where terrorism has replaced international communism as the primary threat to American interests, must an alliance be predicated on a common enemy in order to succeed? Do American alliances in Asia serve important purposes beyond shielding friends from external threats? And what of American bases in the region? Do the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the war in Iraq suggest the United States needs fewer troops in East Asia and the Pacific than seemed desirable as recently as two years ago? Several conference participants noted that America’s ability to project power over long distances, coupled with a new priority on light, mobile forces, is likely to reduce the importance of fixed bases on foreign soil. Hence, the changes in the deployment of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula already announced are likely harbingers for more sweeping moves still to come.
Nonetheless, as one participant noted, a continued American military presence can promote other U.S. strategic objectives, such as fostering democratic change, by eliminating the pretense of external aggression that is sometimes used to justify military rule. Another attendee wondered why development and poverty had not figured more prominently in the day’s discussion. Not all analysts will welcome this expansion of traditional military responsibilities, especially if decision makers fail to provide additional resources commensurate with the added responsibilities. Clearly, further discussion is needed on how—or even whether—the promotion of political pluralism, democratic institutions, human rights, economic development, and the rule of law relates to U.S. strategy.

Consideration of strategy inevitably leads to questions of leadership style. Is diplomacy undervalued as we discuss military strategy and national security? Thomas Pickering cautioned that we need to avoid displaying “a tin ear” and not undercut our diplomatic and strategic advantages while transforming our military doctrine for the region. Asians look to the United States for leadership—but they expect consultation, recognition of their status, respect for their sovereignty, and sensitivity to their specific circumstances. In the absence of full and frank consultation, Jonathan Pollack warned, uncertainty about American intentions could trigger suspicions that could unravel alliance bonds that have long ensured American regional security interests. Seen in this light, strategy absent skillful leadership is meaningless.

As many of the contributions to this report note, defense planning detached from larger political, economic and strategic considerations cannot provide lasting security solutions in East Asia and the Pacific. The Wilson Center conference sought to stimulate formulation of an overarching conceptual framework to guide future U.S. policy toward the region. Nothing would more greatly please the conference organizers or the individual authors whose ideas are presented in this report than for others to build on the suggestions presented here. Our goal, consonant with the broad purposes of the Eisenhower Series, is to spark serious inquiry into the purposes and instruments of American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region in the demanding years ahead.

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I congratulate the organizers of this conference for providing this opportunity to take an in-depth look at the question of what strategy the United States should be following in the Asia Pacific region. The timing could not be better. Twelve years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have gained enough experience in the post Cold War world to do the serious thinking about the global situation that should have occurred a decade ago. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the unexpected speed with which the Soviet threat diminished created euphoria that obscured the nature of the new world that was emerging.

Recent events have sobered us. Every government in the world is in the process of assessing the implications for them of the speed with which U.S. military power ousted the Saddam regime in Iraq. In the absence of any challenger, the United States is in the position to use its military power virtually anywhere in the world to achieve its objectives. We are only dimly aware of the potential costs of wielding such unchecked power. Nothing in our history has prepared us for this moment. Conspicuously absent is any far-ranging domestic debate over the likelihood of abuse of such global hegemony.

History would suggest that a more sober look is warranted. Empires have risen and fallen before, whether because of imperial overstretch, the development or proliferation of new technologies, or the formation of opposing coalitions capable of constraining the dominant power. The kernels of all three challenges are visible today. No one is sure how the costs of the war in Iraq will affect our domestic economic performance, whether for better or worse. Some unfriendly regimes seem to have concluded that only through the acquisition of nuclear weapons can they deter the threat of U.S. interventions. Should we fail in our efforts to curb such proliferating tendencies, we will face a more dangerous world. And the unprecedented split in the Atlantic Alliance, with France, Germany, and Russia lining up to oppose our intervention in Iraq, has demonstrated the countervailing forces that can be generated by perceptions of American unilateralism. As a minimum, these factors demonstrate that the assumption of a
common threat that has been the underpinning of our alliance structures since World War II may need to be reevaluated.

The concern about terrorism that has dominated our thinking since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 could quite possibly not be a central factor in our national security strategy over the next decade. Much will depend on the impact of the war in Iraq. There is already evidence that the most dangerous terrorist networks have suffered devastating blows from the firm actions the United States has taken since September 11th. This could cause the threat to recede, although it will never vanish. On the other hand, if setbacks in Iraq were to fuel a backlash of radical Islamic anti-Americanism, the threat could worsen. We need to remain open-minded on such matters.

The moment is ripe, therefore, for serious strategic thinking about our position in Asia. With China rising rapidly, Japan stagnant, and the remaining two divided states left over from World War II in the region, it should be self-evident that we need a strategic perspective as the backdrop for our policies in East Asia. If we allow our policies and relationships in East Asia to drift, the region is heading for trouble.

Even a cursory glance at the region will show three sets of challenges:

- In Northeast Asia, the questions are: whether a wealthier and militarily more powerful China can coexist successfully with Japan and the United States; and how to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula and open up prospects for constructive change in North Korea.
- In the East China Sea, the question is whether the Taiwan issue can be stabilized, in a manner satisfactory to all parties, so that Taiwan does not generate periodic crises in U.S.-China relations; does not have to squander resources in a spiraling arms race; and can continue to benefit from the mainland’s expanding economy.
- In Southeast Asia the issues are whether ASEAN cohesion will be sufficient to help balance China’s growing power; whether China’s economic growth will be at the expense of Southeast Asia or contribute to prosperity there; and whether China and the countries of Southeast Asia can manage their conflicting claims in the South China Sea in a mutually accommodating way.

The United States is relevant to all of these issues. Our national interests will only be enhanced if they are managed successfully. A central tenet in our strategy, therefore, should be to free ourselves from ideological blind-
ers and to seek to manage our relationships in the region so as to maximize prospects for favorable outcomes and to minimize the inevitability of pessimistic results. Keeping our relationship with China on the right path is a necessary but not sufficient factor for strategic success in the region. The question is how to proceed.

**STARTING POINT**

President Eisenhower is often quoted as saying: “In planning for battle, plans are useless but planning is essential.” This quote occurs in so many different variations that one suspects it lacks a textual basis. Nevertheless, it makes an important point: no one can accurately foresee the future, but the process of thinking about future contingencies can result in far better responses to emergencies when they occur. This applies equally to diplomacy as to battle.

It is also true, of course, that to have a meaningful strategy, you need to know what your goals are. Seneca is quoted as saying several thousand years ago that, “If a man knows not to which port he steers, no wind is fair.” Applied to foreign policy, this could be rephrased as meaning that if you lack a strategy, no policy is wise.

So our starting point should be to think about the sort of Asia that we would like to see emerge five to ten years from now. To accomplish this, we need to look beyond current problems. This immediately confronts us with the dilemma posed by the U.S. political calendar, which is broken into four-year segments, periods of time far too short to lend themselves to strategic thinking or implementation. Many observers have noted this problem without offering a solution. I can do no better, and can only bemoan the fact that foreign policy advisors to presidential candidates also seem incapable of learning from history. As a result, transitions repeat the same errors over and over again, while Washington veterans while away the time estimating how long it will take for sound policies to emerge from the ashes of campaign rhetoric. This disjointed process every few years tends to frustrate coherent strategy. We can and should do better.

Aside from these structural problems, humility is in order. If we look at the world since 1945, we find that the situations at the end of each ten year period differed radically from the expectations ten years earlier. Sometimes the outcomes were worse than anticipated. More often, perhaps, they were better. For example, who in 1990 would have anticipated that Japan was entering a prolonged period of substandard economic performance while China’s economy was on the verge of a breathtaking take-
off. A sensible strategy, then, should allow for outcomes both better and worse than our current expectations.

**ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES**

Let’s begin by taking a look at some of the alternative outcomes that could result either because of or despite our policies. We can begin by dismissing what I would call the straight-line conventional outcome. Here we would suppose that the situation ten years from now will be roughly comparable to current circumstances. The United States would still have a substantial number of troops stationed in Japan and Korea. Korean unification would still be a distant dream because of North Korean intransigence and resistance to reform. Taiwan-mainland relations would still be marked by the struggle between common interests and incompatible objectives, with no more stable resolution in sight. ASEAN would still be playing a significant regional role but without regaining the cohesion and élan that marked the pre-1997 financial crisis period. Such a straight-line outcome would suggest a prolonged period of drift, both in the region and in U.S. policy.

To focus our minds, let’s consider instead a more dire scenario. This would see a situation emerging ten years down the road marked by serious strains in U.S.-PRC relations. Growing U.S. skepticism of China is leading toward an increasingly polarized situation in Asia with some Asian countries looking to the PRC for regional leadership while others are seeking closer alignment with the United States. The Taiwan issue has reemerged as an issue blocking effective U.S.-PRC cooperation, and the PRC is adopting a more threatening posture towards Taiwan. North Korea is a declared nuclear state. Only token U.S. forces remain in South Korea, which has chosen to align itself with China in pursuit of its unification goal. Severe U.S. economic difficulties have enabled European trade and investments in the region to overtake those of the United States. Japan, while retaining U.S. bases, has declared they cannot be used for contingencies involving China. Indonesia, under a strongly Islamic government, has aligned itself with China and is increasingly hostile to the United States. Irreconcilable divisions have emerged in ASEAN, which is unable to assert its traditional influence. Such a scenario, however unlikely, highlights the potential consequences of a failed U.S. strategy in the region.

Lest we become too gloomy, let’s consider a more optimistic outlook. In this scenario, U.S. relations with China are stable and constructive. The PRC is beginning to implement political reforms while sustaining economic growth at a reduced rate. Japan is regaining vitality. The U.S. pres-
ence is welcomed throughout the region. Taiwan’s economic links to the mainland are stronger, and a modus vivendi has been reached based on not challenging the one China concept. ASEAN is cohesive. Indonesia is stable and democratic. U.S. relations with the region are mutually beneficial.

While these scenarios are artificial constructs, they illustrate, perhaps too graphically, the potential consequences of U.S. policies that gain support throughout the region, as opposed to policies that increasingly isolate us from the region. This can be helpful in focusing our strategic thinking.

BUILDING BLOCKS OF A SENSIBLE ASIAN STRATEGY

What are the aspects of the new Asia we would like to see emerge? A full listing would be endless, but surely most of us would include features such as peace and prosperity, full U.S. engagement, reduced security threats, acceptance of U.S. leadership and forward presence, open economies and political systems, and legitimate and representative governments.

Our goals, of course, also need to be related to our interests. In the broadest sense, U.S. diplomacy for over 200 years has sought to promote security, trade and access, and friendly and cooperative governments. These fundamental interests are not likely to change. Note that I did not say democratic governments. This is not accidental and leads to my next point.

INTERESTS, VALUES, AND NATIONAL MYTHS

For us, as for many countries, interests (such as trade and national security) and values (such as promoting democracy and human rights) are both important. Conceptual problems arise, however, when we fail to appreciate the distinction between interests and values or treat them rhetorically as being on the same level and as occupying an equal place in our priorities.

If we review our own history, several things become evident. Our policies are most reliable and consistent when our interests and values are congruent, such as when we fight to defend ourselves or a democratic ally. When our interests and values are not in harmony, our behavior (as opposed to our rhetoric) is driven by our interests. We tolerated slavery, knowing it was wrong, in the interests of national unity. We interred Japanese-American citizens because of our fears of Japanese sabotage. We supported anti-communist dictatorial regimes because of the perceived threat of communist expansion.
Such accommodations, of course, are inherently in contradiction with our principles, and our open society is not blind to such contradictions. As a result, they are inherently unstable and normally cannot outlast the circumstances that gave rise to them. Accordingly, there is a constant thrust in our national policies to resolve contradictions between our interests and values by bringing them into congruence with each other. This is healthy. It also illustrates that strategies should seek congruence between interests and values, although tactics, which are the normal drivers of our foreign policy, must often be responsive to shorter-term interests that may involve conflicts with our fundamental values.

What conclusions can we draw from this? If we are aware of these contradictory tendencies in our behavior, we can seek to manage the contradictions more effectively and at less cost to our values. If we are blind to the contradictions, or deny their existence, as too often is the case, we appear in our behavior and rhetoric as arrogant and hypocritical. Such perceptions weaken our diplomacy and make it more difficult to achieve our goals.

What are examples of such contradictions? One is provided by the pattern of weak governments that normally result from the downfall of authoritarian regimes. Such governments exercise less effective domestic control and are often staffed by inexperienced officials ill-prepared for the responsibilities of governance. Moreover, in such transitions the security organs that previously enforced domestic order are often discredited and unable to function effectively. The consequence can be instability and fertile opportunities for terrorists to operate. Democratic governments also have to be more responsive to public opinion than authoritarian regimes and can thus pose challenges for our diplomacy, as in the case of Indonesia and Turkey. In the short term, then, transitions to democratic regimes may weaken support for our policies. In the long term, of course, we stand to benefit if stable democracies emerge. A well-conceived strategy must allow for such contradictions and seek to ensure that tactical compromises do not pose insurmountable obstacles to strategic goals.

**KEY VARIABLES**

Now, let me focus on some of the key variables in the region that will impact on our policy. First and foremost are U.S.–China relations. There is virtually no issue in the region that will not be easier to achieve if we are able to work cooperatively with China. Conversely, growing hostility between the United States and China, unless this is clearly the result of
threatening Chinese actions and policies which are seen as such by China’s regional neighbors, would tend to repolarize the region. At the moment, there is not a single country in East Asia that would see their interests served by such a development. Moreover, this would undermine the favorable synergies that emerged in the late 1970s when both China and Vietnam were drawn into engagement with the region. Clearly, then, successful management of U.S.–China relations should be an important component of a coherent U.S. strategy in the region.

Our most important ally in the region is likely to remain Japan. No one can tell for sure how Japan will develop over the next ten years. By the end of the decade, however, the majority of leaders in Japan will come from the post–World War II generation that is impatient with the constraints imposed on the country as a result of its defeat and want Japan to have the status of a normal major power, neither threatening to its neighbors nor threatened by them. Japanese are sensitive to their disparities with their giant neighbor, with China holding a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and having nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles in its arsenal. Japan’s ability to maintain balance in its relations with Russia and China is also constrained by its unresolved territorial dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories and, to a lesser degree, by its dispute with China over the Senkakus, or Diaoyutai islands. The United States needs to display awareness of these considerations and use its influence, where possible, to forestall the reemergence of destructive rivalry between China and Japan. At the same time, we need to remain conscious of the degree to which Japan has benefited from its close ties to China in trade and investment, ties that make Japan reluctant to be used or taken for granted in U.S. sparring with China.

Obviously, a major focus for U.S. policy, both in the short and longer term, should be to lessen the possibility for disruptive crises in Korea and across the Taiwan Strait. Here our goals should be clear. In both cases continuation of the status quo is less desirable than approaches which seek to defuse their crisis potential.

In the case of North Korea, we are confronted with an unpalatable choice between regime collapse and regime replacement, both of which would be dangerous and fraught with unpredictable consequences. A far better approach, and one more compatible with both the policies and interests of our South Korean ally, would be a process of gradual reform and openness in the North on a pattern already demonstrated by China and Vietnam. Accomplishing this will be far from easy, but since it would suit the interests of all the interested parties, including the North Koreans
themselves, it should not be dismissed as impossible. As a minimum, we should avoid an uncoordinated confrontational approach to North Korea that separates us from South Korea and fuels sentiment in the South, already significant, that partnership with China is more beneficial to Korea’s unification goal than continued alliance with the United States.

At the moment, U.S. policies toward North Korea are seen by a significant number of South Koreans as incompatible with the reunification aspirations of Koreans. This has helped fuel the anti-Americanism there that has moved beyond the traditional student and intellectual hotbeds of anti-U.S. sentiments and permeated other sectors of society. A survey in South Korea at the end of 2000 found that in looking ten years ahead, a majority of South Koreans saw links with China assuming greater importance than links with the United States.

Aside from these considerations, the current imbroglio with North Korea has highlighted the potential consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the East Asian region. Japan is already within range of North Korean missiles and is alarmed about the implications for Japanese security if North Korea were to acquire nuclear warheads that could be mounted on them. The administration is also quite properly alarmed about the possibility that North Korea would disseminate nuclear weapons technology to other countries. It is widely assumed that were North Korea to become a declared nuclear weapons state, the pressures on other countries to follow suit would rise significantly. Such a trend would severely worsen the security outlook for the region since it is all too easy to understand the disturbing implications of an East Asia in which North Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia all have nuclear weapons. In the past, the United States has been reluctant to embrace a nuclear weapons free zone for Northeast Asia. Any sensible U.S. strategy for the region should look at the full range of measures that could be used to strengthen inhibitions on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Our approach to the Taiwan issue also needs to be carefully calibrated. It is unlikely that conditions for peaceful unification will emerge over the next decade, but China considers it a vital interest to block independence for Taiwan and to keep the possibility of eventual unification open. This clashes of course with the aspirations of some political elements on Taiwan who are pressing for an international status for the island comparable to that of an independent country. In a circumstance where Taiwan is already in full control of its own affairs and enjoys substantial and growing trade and investment interests with the mainland, it is hardly in the U.S. interest
for our relationship with Taiwan to be a periodic destabilizing factor in U.S.-China relations.

Given the growing ties between Taiwan and the mainland, as long as Beijing has confidence that the United States is not quietly promoting a status for Taiwan incompatible with the one China framework of U.S. policy, it should be possible to return to a situation where Beijing no longer resorts to threats to use force against Taiwan and reduces military deployments opposite the island. The United States in turn should display restraint on arms sales while ensuring that Taiwan has sufficient self-defense capabilities to resist military coercion by the mainland. It would also be desirable to foster an environment conducive to a resumption of a political dialogue across the strait.

At the moment, China’s territorial disputes with various Southeast Asian countries over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands are relatively quiescent. From the U.S. standpoint the problem is how to position itself with respect to these disputes since they involve two countries, the Philippines and Japan, that have security treaties with the United States. Both are seeking to draw the United States into support for their claims. The United States needs a firm and consistent position on such conflicting claims, and should resist involvement in the absence of a clear basis in international law for doing so.

Other variables that would have a significant impact on the achievement of U.S. strategic goals in the region include the degree of cohesion within ASEAN, the extent and causes of anti-Americanism, and the degree to which radical Islam has taken hold in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and southern Thailand.

Our strategy also needs to be alert to factors that could incrementally alter the balance of interests in the region. This would include a decrease in the relative importance of the U.S. market to Asian economies. For example, last year, for the first time, Taiwan’s exports to the mainland exceeded those to the United States. South Korea also now exports nearly as much to China (19%) as to the United States (21%). The U.S. economy is so huge, of course, that export-oriented economies in the region are likely to remain keenly interested in preserving and enhancing their access to U.S. consumers. But relative slippage in our position could play into the hands of countries interested in reducing the U.S. role regional institutions or excluding us altogether under the rubric of “Asia for the Asians.”

There are other players in the region as well. The Europeans are aggressively competing for market share, and in markets such as China they often have more to offer in terms of trade-supporting aid than we can bring to
the table. Both the Europeans and the Russians provide alternative sources of military equipment and are formidable technological competitors in areas such as telecommunications. European influence in the region could be enhanced if there is movement away from the dollar toward the Euro as the global trading currency.

**U.S. FORWARD BASES**

What sort of assumptions should we make about U.S. bases in the region ten years from now? The answer, of course, is that this will depend on the state of U.S. relations with key countries, and the degree to which the U.S. forward presence is seen by regional countries as contributing to their own security. After the passage of a decade, we undoubtedly should assume that the historic rationale for keeping a major troop presence in Japan and Korea—i.e., to defend them against the danger of communist aggression—will no longer be valid. If so, we will either have to come up with a new credible rationale, in consultation with the host governments, or we can anticipate that efforts to retain the bases will entail significantly higher costs and/or will undermine our relations with the host countries. Any updated rationale for the bases will have to be compatible with the foreign policy and national security interests of Japan and Korea.

If we assume that it will be desirable to maintain some forward-positioned forces in the circumstances we are likely to face a decade hence, we must assess the purpose for the bases not simply from the standpoint of the purposes for which we might wish to use them, but also from the perspective of the host country. For example, is it reasonable to expect that we would be able to retain our Korean bases for regional contingencies unrelated to direct threats to Korea itself? The answer is clearly no, unless there were to be a substantial shift in current Korean attitudes. Under present circumstances, it is doubtful that any South Korean government, regardless of the party in power, would be prepared to have U.S. bases in Korea used against China or in ways viewed by Beijing as threatening.

It is possible, of course, that both Japan and South Korea will wish to have the United States retain a forward base presence as a stabilizing factor in the region. Then the issue would become whether such bases were cost-effective for this purpose, and whether U.S. foreign policies will remain sufficiently congruent with the interests of Japan and Korea to make this a viable expectation.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would stress that there is nothing inevitable about the nature of the relationship that the United States will have with the East Asian region ten years from now. The United States cannot presume to control the course of events, but we have enormous capacity to have a significant impact on how developments unfold. Adopting a strategic perspective that improves our ability to relate our current actions to our longer term goals can help us to avoid the law of unintended consequences, which often controls the fate of short-sighted policies.

However, even the wisest policies can go awry if they are not implemented properly. Finding the right style of leadership for the world conditions we are likely to face over the next decade may be the most fundamental challenge we face. Three years ago, an Asia Foundation Task Force report on Asian views of the American Role in Asia was replete with references to a flawed U.S. style of leadership, which was characterized by Asians as heavy-handed, lacking consistency and sensitivity, and prone to unilateralism. Most countries in East Asia still want and expect the United States to provide leadership. But there is strong evidence that they want more consultation and sensitivity. Over a decade into the post Cold War era, the United States has not yet brought its leadership style into harmony with the different threat perceptions we now face. Having the right strategy and the right style of leadership will maximize our ability to achieve our goals.
In Northeast Asia, American strategists face the necessity of playing two very different games simultaneously. On the one hand, in this region, and more broadly across all of East Asia, the United States is engaged in a long-term competition with China. This is a rivalry that could well continue for several decades, with the two Pacific powers circling around each other, cooperating in some areas and on some issues, while simultaneously maneuvering to accumulate incremental positional advantages. The defining characteristics of this game are subtlety, indirectness, extended time horizons and at least the possibility of mixed results. While they are by no means inevitable, it is certainly possible to imagine stable outcomes that would be acceptable to both parties and which would leave neither one in a position of clear-cut preponderance over the other.

At the same time, and especially since the fall of 2002, the United States has been drawn into an increasingly direct, and potentially deadly, confrontation with North Korea. This contest has been going on for some time, of course, but in recent months the pace and the stakes have both advanced dramatically. If the first competition is rather like the stately Asian game of go, this one more closely resembles the pumped-up speed chess popular in American parks (and prisons). Here players must make their moves quickly, and often without adequate time to consider the possibilities for traps and errors. Mistakes are common, draws rare, and games often end with overturned boards and ugly brawls.

In the months ahead American policy makers will have to find a way to play out this dangerous contest with North Korea while at the same time keeping an eye on the longer term competition in which they are still engaged with China. The best possible outcome would be for the United States to find a winning solution to the first game that simultaneously improved its chances in the second. At the other extreme, and to be avoided at all costs, would be a situation in which the U.S. pursued a strategy that led to a loss (or perhaps a pyrrhic victory) against North Korea and to a weakening of its long-term position in East Asia.
LONG-TERM COMPETITION

As it has done since the early years of the twentieth century, the United States today aims to prevent the emergence in East Asia of a power or a coalition of powers that would be hostile to its interests. This longstanding American policy has always had a strong element of geopolitical calculation. A hostile hegemon (or coalition) would be threatening because it might be able to aggregate resources and develop capabilities with which it could strike at America’s Pacific possessions or its home territory. Since the early part of the nineteenth century, U.S. policy makers have also been intent on gaining and maintaining access to Asian markets and commercial opportunities. Finally, for much of the past century (and especially in the past sixty years), American policy has also had a strong ideological coloration; the United States has been concerned, not only with markets and the balance of power, but also with the promulgation of democracy. This mix of geopolitical, commercial and ideological considerations led the U.S. into competition and eventual conflict with Japan, and then into a protracted Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union (which was seen, at least until the late 1960s, as being in league with China).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States has moved into the early stages of what could turn out to be another extended rivalry, this one with the People’s Republic of China. Like those that preceded it, this nascent competition is fueled by a blend of power politics and ideology. Because the United States is now the preponderant power in Asia (and, indeed, the world) while China is, for the moment at least, a fast-growing regional power, a certain measure of mutual mistrust and wariness is probably inevitable. If the domestic regimes of the two nations were more similar than different these suspicions might be easier to overcome. The fact that the United States is a liberal democracy while China is still an authoritarian one-party state will make it much harder for them to reach a lasting, mutually acceptable accommodation.

A full-blown Sino-American rivalry is not, of course, inevitable. The two countries have strong, shared interests in continuing economic cooperation and in avoiding war.
power politics is a matter of speculation and debate. It seems likely, however, that Americans would feel less threatened by a powerful, democratic China than they would by one that was powerful but still authoritarian.)

Reflecting the underlying realities and uncertainties of the situation, the United States has, over the course of the past ten or fifteen years, developed a mixed strategy for dealing with China. Successive American administrations have remained committed to some variant of engagement; trading and talking with China in the hopes that this will lead to a deepening of mutual interest and understanding and, ultimately, to the peaceful evolution of the PRC’s domestic political system. Because it is unclear at this point whether such an approach will work, the United States has also pursued aspects of what might be called, for lack of a better word, a strategy of containment. While seeking to avoid an overtly hostile or confrontational stance, the U.S. has nevertheless taken steps that are largely, though not exclusively, aimed at countering China’s growing power and hedging against the possibility that it might some day be used against American interests. Towards this end, the United States has sought since the mid-1990s, to strengthen its traditional alliance relationships in Asia and to develop new quasi-alliance ties to others in the region. It has also maintained significant forward based forces in East Asia and has taken steps to increase its ability to project power, and to defend its allies and assets, all along the East Asian littoral. The ultimate aim of American global strategy is, in the words of the recent National Security Strategy document, to “promote a balance of power favorable to freedom.” In Asia this means deterring and counterbalancing China, even as its power grows, while at the same time engaging and working to change it.

For its part, China too appears to be pursuing a “two-handed” strategy. The main thrust of Chinese strategy at this point is to create international conditions conducive to sustained economic growth and the continued accumulation of “comprehensive national power.” This means cultivating good relations with trading partners and potential investors and, above all, staying on good terms with the United States. At the same time, the PRC has been engaged in a serious and sustained effort to improve its military capabilities and, in particular, its ability to blunt or counter American power projection and to project its own power into the air, sea and space beyond its immediate frontiers. Diplomatically China seeks to use its increasing wealth and power to expand its influence throughout Asia, cultivating good relations with its neighbors and working, albeit subtly and gradually, to weaken America’s alliances and to erode the foundations for its continuing presence and influence in Asia. The ultimate goals of Chinese policy are unclear, but
it seems likely that they include fending off American efforts to undermine the current regime via “peaceful evolution” while working to displace the United States as the preponderant regional power.

As regards Northeast Asia, the key issue in any long-term competition between the U.S. and China will be the disposition of Japan. Despite its recent difficulties, that country remains the region’s wealthiest, strongest, and best-positioned democratic power and its active cooperation remains essential to the success of American strategy. Much of what the United States has done in Northeast Asia in the last few years, and much of what it is likely to continue to do in the years ahead, can best be understood as part of an effort to bolster Japan and to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Thus the United States has worked to improve mechanisms for bilateral consultation and cooperation, it has taken steps to reduce frictions over economic and basing issues, and it has encouraged Japan to participate in joint development of key military systems (including missile defenses), and to reduce its inhibitions against, and improve its capabilities for, projecting military power. Albeit cautiously, the United States has also sought to promote multilateral communication and cooperation on strategic issues among all of its major regional democratic allies, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

American policy towards other issues in Northeast Asia is at least in part derivative of its concerns over Japan. The U.S. relationship with South Korea, and the future of the Korean peninsula, are clearly important in their own right for both ideological and power political reasons. But what happens in Korea is important also because of its impact on Japan. A unified, democratic Korea that maintains strong strategic links to the United States and develops closer, warmer ties to Japan would clearly contribute greatly to “a balance of power that favors freedom” in Asia. On the other hand, a reunited but increasingly neutral (or pro-Chinese) Korea would leave Japan isolated and vulnerable, with uncertain implications for the future of its relationship with the United States.

American attitudes toward the Taiwan issue will also be shaped in part by its possible impact on Japan. An American failure to prevent the forcible (or clearly coerced) absorption of Taiwan by the PRC would certainly raise profound doubts about the utility of U.S. regional security guarantees. But even peaceful reunification could stir deep anxieties in Tokyo, both because of what such an outcome would appear to suggest about the future trajectory of Chinese (and American) power and because of the possible implications for the security of Japan’s sea lines of communication. Here again, the impact on the future of relations between the United

U.S. STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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States and Japan are difficult to predict. Heightened feelings of vulnera-
ility might cause Japan to cleave even more closely to the United States, but
they could also move it to embark on a very different course, whether tak-
ing dramatic steps to provide for its own defense or, alternatively, seeking
to reach some kind of independent accommodation with China.

In an inversion of the American approach, in recent years Chinese strat-
egy in Northeast Asia has seemed to focus more on Japan’s flanks than on
Japan itself. In its bilateral relations with Japan, China has continued to
seek closer economic relations and it has welcomed signs of increased
Japanese dependence on Chinese markets and Chinese labor. Meanwhile,
Beijing has maintained diplomatic pressure and occasional public criticism
that seem aimed at discouraging Japan from going too far in deepening its
security ties with the United States or, even more worrisome, enhancing
its capacities for independent strategic action. To the south, the PRC has
focused intently on developing military capabilities designed to deter any
move towards Taiwanese independence, while at the same time encourag-
ing greater economic integration between Taiwan and the mainland. In
the last few years China’s diplomatic stance towards Taipei has also shifted
markedly from threats and intimidation to a far softer, less menacing and
more welcoming approach. There are signs that Beijing believes it stands a
growing chance of gaining its objective of unification through this mix of
means, and perhaps sooner rather than later.

On the Korean peninsula, the PRC has sought to prop up its tradition-
al ally and client, while at the same time encouraging it to adopt Chinese-
style economic reforms. Perhaps even more important for the achievement
of its long-term objectives, since the end of the Cold War Beijing has cul-
tivated deepening economic and diplomatic ties with South Korea. At least
until the onset of the current crisis, China’s strategy seemed to consist of
the following elements: stabilize the North; promote a gradual (decades-
long?) process of reconciliation and reunification between North and
South in which China itself would play an increasingly central role; culti-
vate ties with Seoul, and move towards an outcome that would leave a uni-
fied Korea leaning heavily toward China and increasingly independent of
the United States. With the Taiwan and Korean issues settled, Japan would
stand alone, and the justification for its continuing alliance with the
United States (except as an open counterweight to Chinese power) would
be open to question. If, in the meantime, the Japanese economy had con-
tinued to grow sluggishly, if at all, and if its population had begun to
shrink, perhaps the time would be right for a readjustment in relations
between Japan and the PRC.
To sum up: in Northeast Asia the United States is engaged in a long-term struggle for position and preponderance with China. By maintaining a strong military presence in the region, bolstering its ties to democratic allies and working to promote cooperation among them the U.S. hopes to be able to counterbalance the PRC’s rising power while it waits for engagement to promote the liberalization of China’s domestic regime. For their part, China’s present rulers appear to hope that engagement will help their country to grow wealthier and stronger without unleashing uncontrollable pressures for political reform. As China’s military might, economic weight, and diplomatic clout grow it will seek to constrict America’s presence and influence throughout the region and perhaps eventually to eliminate them altogether.

NEAR-TERM CONFRONTATION

The events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath have not, to date, produced a fundamental change in the underlying ideological and geopolitical factors impelling a rivalry between the United States and the PRC. These events have, however, provided the occasion for a marked warming in the tone of Sino-American relations and for at least the initial steps towards more concrete cooperation on certain issues, including countering terrorism and slowing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the past year, the two powers have also been at pains to soften the edge of their differences over Taiwan. Whether these shifts will develop into something larger and more significant remains to be seen.

Since September 11 American policy makers have been focused intensely on dealing with the overlapping global threats of terrorism and proliferation. The war on Islamist terror groups with “global reach” has had a more direct and obvious impact on American policy in Central, South, and Southeast Asia than it has in Northeast Asia. In that sub-region, however, heightened U.S. concerns about proliferation have helped to set in motion a chain of events that could have profound and far-reaching effects.

This sequence of developments is well-known and need only be briefly summarized here. Even before the attacks on New York and Washington, the Bush administration was inclined to step up pressure on North Korea in hopes of encouraging it to curtail its ongoing WMD and ballistic missile programs. That inclination grew markedly stronger after September 11. In January 2002 the President identified Kim Jong-il’s regime as one member of the “Axis of Evil,” in June he indicated that, under some circum-
stances, the United States might launch preemptive attacks on those developing weapons of mass destruction, and in October the United States confronted North Korea with evidence of its secret uranium enrichment program. Whether because they believed that the United States was too preoccupied with Iraq to take action against them, or because they feared that they might be the next U.S. target after Iraq, or perhaps out of some combination of opportunism and fear, the North Koreans have now taken a number of major steps that have brought them from being the suspected owners of one or two nuclear weapons to the brink of becoming the proud, public possessors of a large and growing nuclear arsenal.

If the DPRK clearly crosses the nuclear finish line by testing a device, or if it begins the open reprocessing of plutonium into weapons grade material and accelerates its uranium enrichment program in some visible way, the implications will be far-reaching. A heavily nuclear-armed North would be harder to coerce, far more costly to defeat, and better equipped to make extortionate threats and demands against its neighbors. By openly going nuclear Kim Jong-il could succeed in buying himself another 20 or 30 years in power. An American failure to prevent the North from acquiring nuclear weapons could also place grave strains on key U.S. alliances. If South Korea or Japan (or both) respond by trying to appease the North, sharp differences with the United States are likely to ensue. On the other hand, concern over North Korean threats and over the future viability of U.S. security guarantees could induce the South Koreans or the Japanese (or both) to launch their own nuclear weapons programs. Unless the U.S. abandons its long-standing opposition to such activities, the result could be the end of existing alliance relationships. Different responses on the part of Japan and South Korea could also destroy any hope of building trilateral security cooperation. For example, a muted South Korean reaction might convince the Japanese that they were the intended targets of a Korean bomb and that their long-term security therefore required an independent nuclear deterrent. An especially tough Japanese response, on the other hand, could alienate Seoul and push it toward China, and perhaps toward seeking some kind of accommodation with the North.

Whatever the effects on the immediate neighborhood, if North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without suffering severe consequences, and if its leverage on its bigger, stronger opponents is seen to have grown as a result, the probability that others will try to follow suit seems likely to increase. By facing down the United States, the DPRK could erase some of the reputation for resolve that the Bush administration has banked as a result of its confrontation with Iraq. Especially on the heels
of Iraq’s failure to deter American action, a successful North Korean breakout would confirm the wisdom of the Indian general who remarked in the early 1990s that the lesson of the first Gulf War was that a country that wished to confront the United States needed first to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran is the country that is presently closest to being able to act on this bit of strategic wisdom. Nor is the U.S. the only large state that might find its advantages in conventional capabilities offset by a smaller, nuclear-armed opponent. Taiwan too might conclude that the only way to counter Chinese power in the long run is by following North Korea’s lead. Given that Beijing has indicated that it would regard Taiwanese nuclear weapons as a *casus belli*, the risks are grave that such a move could cause the mainland to implement its own policy of preemption.

Beyond merely serving as an inspiration to others, an active, unchecked North Korean nuclear program could become a source of valuable knowledge, critical materials, and perhaps even fully assembled weapons for others further down the nuclear food-chain. Given the North’s demonstrated willingness to, in the words of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, “sell anything to anybody” the likelihood that it would attempt such transactions appears disturbingly high. Even more troubling than the prospect of sales to states is, of course, the danger of transfers to non-state actors, including the Islamic terrorist organizations against which the United States has struck repeated, damaging, but not yet fatal, blows since September 11.

In sum, North Korea’s recent actions pose a grave and immediate challenge to America’s reputation for resolve and to its interests and alliances in Northeast Asia, they threaten to encourage and enable a further wave of nuclear proliferation, and could greatly increase the dangers of a direct and devastating attack on the United States itself.

**U.S. AND CHINESE PREFERENCES AND STRATEGIES**

Aside from North Korea itself, the key players in the present crisis are the United States and the PRC. Chinese strategists will certainly approach the question of how best to deal with Pyongyang with one eye fixed firmly on the future and on the possibility of a more open Sino–American competition. Despite the urgent necessity of disarming the DPRK, Washington too will be well-advised to attend to the long term.

In keeping with their reading of the present world situation and their assessment of the requirements for continued rapid economic growth, China’s leaders will go to considerable lengths to avoid antagonizing the
United States and to convince Washington of their benign intentions. Whatever else it does, Beijing will be eager to avoid any suggestion that it is trying to thwart the U.S. or is indifferent to its concerns. Nor is this merely a matter of appearances. American and Chinese preferences regarding the North Korean nuclear issue probably do converge, at least to some degree. Both sides are obviously eager to avoid war although, given its proximity and its worries about the implications for its own domestic stability, China is probably somewhat more worried about this prospect than the U.S. Other things equal, China would also almost certainly prefer that Kim Jong-il not openly acquire nuclear weapons, in large part because of its fears about the possible U.S. response. Given its regional commitments and global concerns, Washington is probably more worried about this scenario than Beijing. To the extent that the Chinese become convinced that North Korea’s actions will lead to further proliferation in Northeast Asia, however, their anxieties will grow. (While the PRC’s preferences may be changing, in light of its own history as an early nuclear “rogue” state, its past assistance to Pakistan, and what could be construed as a record of relative passivity in the face of North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, there are reasons to think that Chinese observers do not regard the prospect of further proliferation with quite the same visceral dread as their American counterparts.)

In addition to their obvious worries about war and nuclear weapons, Chinese strategists will approach the Korean issue with strong defensive concerns and, perhaps, with some offensive ambitions as well. From Beijing’s perspective the present crisis is premature; it comes at a moment when the DPRK is weak and unreformed and when China itself is still in the relatively early stages of building its comprehensive national power and expanding its regional influence. If a sequence of events is set in motion that leads quickly to the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime, Beijing must fear that North Korea will end up simply being absorbed by the South. This could leave China with a unified neighbor, under the control of a democratic government that will most likely still be allied to the United States. Some observers have suggested that Beijing would be willing to tolerate such an outcome if U.S. forces remained south of the 38th parallel instead of coming all the way to China’s border. But it is difficult to believe, in an age of rapid mobility, that the precise location of American bases would make a huge difference. What matters is Beijing’s expectations about the eventual strategic disposition of a reunified Korea and, at this point, there seems more reason to expect that it would remain linked to the United States than that it would suddenly become neutral, still less lean
toward the PRC. Given another 10 or 20 years of economic interdependence, diplomatic suasion and military confidence building the outcome might be different. If the 50 year Korean civil war is resolved tomorrow the results could well be a substantial, and perhaps irrevocable strategic setback for China.

Depending on how it plays out, the current crisis also presents the PRC with some opportunities to strengthen its long-term posture in Northeast Asia while weakening the position of the United States. Differences between Washington and Seoul over how to deal with the North have already produced serious strains in the U.S.-ROK alliance and these could conceivably grow more severe in the months ahead. A shrewd Chinese strategist would look for ways to encourage these differences without appearing to do so, perhaps simply by following the lead of the South Korean government, adopting positions that mirrored its concerns and seeking to make the U.S. appear obdurate and extreme by comparison. Beijing may also see opportunities to promote mistrust between Seoul and Tokyo, perhaps encouraging South Korean suspicions that Japan cares only about its own safety and is willing to take actions that risk a massive and unnecessary war on the Korean peninsula. Finally, China might look for divisions between the U.S. and Japan that it could exploit for its own purposes. If Tokyo’s rising anxieties bring it more closely into alignment with Washington this will be difficult. But if the Americans can be maneuvered into a situation in which they appear unduly aggressive and even reckless there may still be chances for weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Overall, China would probably prefer to see a resolution of the present crisis that leaves an independent North Korean political entity intact, albeit without an active nuclear weapons program or an openly declared nuclear arsenal. It would be best if such an outcome could be attained in a way that seemed to boost Sino-American relations, and improved Beijing’s ties to South Korea, while at the same time not strengthening, and perhaps subtly weakening, links between Washington and Seoul, Seoul and Tokyo, and possibly between Washington and Tokyo.

Assuming that this assessment of Chinese perceptions and preferences is basically correct, what are the implications for American strategy? The stated objective of the United States in the present crisis is to achieve the total, verifiable elimination of all North Korean nuclear weapons programs. This is consistent with China’s stated goal of achieving a “nuclear weapons free” Korean peninsula as well as with the declared preferences of South Korea, Japan and Russia. The best hope of achieving such an outcome would seem to lie in all of the outside parties adopting a common
stance and delivering a unified message to the North that if it does not agree to disarm it will face immediate and total economic and diplomatic isolation. Whether or not Pyongyang would agree, even in the face of such pressure, and, if it did, whether it would adhere to its commitments, are difficult questions to answer. (There must also be some doubt as to whether the other parties would follow through on their threats if the North failed to comply. China, in particular, might fear that isolating North Korea would cause its regime to collapse, with the harmful strategic consequences spelled out above.) Nevertheless, if it were successful, this course of action could resolve the immediate crisis without harming U.S. alliances or worsening relations with the PRC.

From an American perspective, the only outcome that might be preferable to negotiated, verifiable North Korean nuclear disarmament would be a collapse of the Kim Jong-il government. Given the current regime’s track record there are strong reasons to doubt that it would ever agree to such a satisfactory negotiated settlement or that, if it did, it would hold to its agreements. (The regime’s history of brutality towards its own people also means that there are strong moral grounds for wishing to see it gone.) Depending on the manner of Kim Jong-il’s departure from power, and the nature of the arrangements put in place after he was gone, regime change could conceivably be acceptable to China. If it could be installed without chaos, a kinder, gentler one-party authoritarian government might be tolerable to Beijing and perhaps, if it abandoned its nuclear ambitions, to Washington as well. Collapse and reunification under South Korean (and American) auspices, meanwhile, could advance the goal of building a “balance of power favorable to freedom” as well as solving the nuclear problem, but, precisely for this reason, it would most likely lead to heightened Sino-American tensions. There is a chance that unification would be followed eventually by a loosening of U.S.-Korean ties and this might offset Chinese concerns, at least to some degree. Even if there were a possibility of long-term gains, however, the unpredictable consequences of a regime collapse scenario would probably make it very unappealing to Beijing.

Suppose that the United States launched a preemptive attack on North Korea’s nuclear facilities without initiating any further actions aimed at toppling the current regime. Assume for a moment that such an attack could be carried out with high confidence of success and with reasonable assurance that it would not lead to large-scale radioactive fallout, or massive North Korean retaliation with conventional and unconventional weapons against the South. If the U.S. could gain the acquiescence of
Seoul and Tokyo, such a move could solve the immediate problem (at least for the time being) without necessarily damaging the larger American position in Northeast Asia. The implications for relations with China would depend on whether Beijing could be convinced that such a course of action was preferable to the alternatives of either allowing the North’s nuclear programs to proceed or taking steps intended to induce regime change in Pyongyang.

In light of its immediate concerns and longer-term objectives, China will probably prefer to see the United States negotiate an agreement with North Korea that would resemble in most respects the 1994 Agreed Framework. Such an outcome could be construed as satisfying the PRC’s demand for a nuclear weapons free Korean peninsula. Depending on how determined the North is to proceed toward open nuclear weapon status, it is also conceivable that Pyongyang might be willing to agree to freeze and promise to dismantle its programs without Beijing having to apply undue pressure, thereby risking regime collapse. The economic and diplomatic inducements that the United States and its allies would presumably have to offer to ensure such an agreement could help to keep the North afloat and might even be useful in inducing it to take steps toward Chinese-style reforms. Best of all, if China could put itself in the position of having brokered such an agreement it would enhance its stature as a peacemaker and a regional power.

The Bush administration has already indicated that merely freezing or partially dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs is unacceptable for a variety of reasons, not least that it would leave Pyongyang with unspecified quantities of weapons grade material and with the infrastructure needed to replay the present drama at some point in the future. Beijing may hope to persuade Washington that, whatever its shortcomings, a return to the Agreed Framework would be preferable to the likely alternative outcomes. The fact that both Japan and South Korea may share this view makes such a position even more attractive. But China may also hope to draw the United States into a situation in which it will be isolated and alienated from its allies and in which it will have to bear the responsibility for whatever comes next if negotiations fail. If the DPRK goes openly nuclear and the United States does not respond, Washington can be blamed for provoking the North with its talk of preemption and axes of evil and then failing to find an effective solution to the problem it helped to create. If the United States attacks, on the other hand, it could do grievous damage to its alliance with South Korea, and perhaps Japan as well. (There are enormous dangers here for China, of course. Unchecked
North Korean proliferation could trigger nuclear weapons programs across Northeast Asia, with damaging implications for China’s long-term position and successful American preemption could lead to a collapse of the North Korean regime.

If the United States cannot achieve a negotiated dismantlement of the North’s nuclear programs or engineer the replacement or collapse of the Pyongyang regime, if it is unwilling to accept a return to the Agreed Framework or to run the risks involved in a preemptive attack, it will have to find ways of managing the consequences of an openly nuclear DPRK. Fear of the North’s newfound capabilities could provide the basis for enhanced strategic cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea, including the possibility of a naval blockade and embargo and accelerated development of ballistic missile defenses. Preventing the export of nuclear weapons or materials by land or air would also require the assistance of China and Russia. For this reason too the United States needs to calibrate its actions in the current crisis with an eye toward what may lie ahead.
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eluctably but unmistakably, American security strategy in Northeast Asia is in the gestational stages of major shifts in policy, deployment, and purpose, whose long-term consequences are as yet only dimly discernible. In preliminary agreements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) announced during the spring and summer of 2003, the Bush administration revealed its determination and intention to redefine U.S. military strategy and operational policies on the peninsula.

Over the coming half-decade, and quite possibly sooner, the United States will initiate redeployment of major combat units that have been forward deployed near the 38th Parallel since the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953. These changes constitute the harbinger of larger, long-term shifts that could ultimately recalibrate the security dynamics of Northeast Asia as a whole. However, the strategic logic of these redeployments, which U.S. officials are advocating despite growing tensions generated by North Korea’s renewed nuclear weapons activities, has yet to be fully articulated. As a consequence, the assumptions animating these shifts have not been fully presented or scrutinized.

In this paper, I will characterize and briefly describe some of these assumptions, discuss how they seem likely to affect U.S. strategy and policy in Northeast Asia, and speculate on the consequences that could flow from them.

During the Cold War and for some years thereafter, U.S. security planners conceptualized Northeast Asia in terms of American policies toward six principal actors: the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia; China; Taiwan; North Korea; South Korea; and Japan. There was also a continuing concern with how U.S. forces in the region responded to military contingencies in more distant theaters, in particular the Persian Gulf. With the end of Cold War and the vast erosion of Russian military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, contingency planning focused on Russia (with the exception of nuclear contingency planning) dropped off the radar screen.
During the remainder of the 1990s, the principal U.S. security concerns focused on alliance enhancement with Korea and Japan (including basing and logistics arrangements for deployments beyond Northeast Asia); maintaining deterrence and defense on the Korean peninsula; and diminishing any potential Chinese or Taiwanese misperceptions of U.S. responses to events in the Taiwan Strait, whether initiated by Beijing or Taipei. Though all three issues remain relevant today, U.S. planners are clearly intent on a major overhaul of American defense planning in Northeast Asia.

DEFINING A NEW STRATEGY

Very early in its tenure in office, the Bush administration conveyed that it did not attach equivalent value to upholding the regional status quo or to ensuring undiminished U.S. military “in theater” deployments. Initial evidence of the administration’s intention to revisit American defense strategy was signaled by the September 2001 publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), with especially prominent implications for U.S. strategy in East Asia. According to the report, American military power required a comprehensive set of changes focused on the anticipated character of warfare in the 21st century. New approaches would emphasize lethality, precision, stealth, information, and long range strike capabilities, thereby maximizing America’s technological advantage while seeking to reduce the potential vulnerabilities of U.S. forces to ballistic missile, cruise missile, or terrorist attack. None of these future needs was explicitly linked to the U.S. presence, and some of them argued for far less presence. DOD further posited future threats to the U.S. homeland entailing the potential use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons; growing vulnerabilities of the United States to cyber attack and information network disruption; and the prospect of military operations in space that could disable U.S. intelligence and communication assets. Although the report emphasized an enduring commitment to the security of regional allies, there was an undoubted rebalancing of American defense priorities under way, with a relative decline in attention to the hardy perennials of regional defense planning.

Prior to September 11, these postulated threats were expected to emanate principally from nation states, not non-state actors. Even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the assumption of a future nation state threat in Asia remained evident in the QDR, with unambiguous reference to China. The document warned about the prospect of “an [Asian] military competitor with a formidable resource base” intent on denying U.S. forces access in the East Asian littoral, from Southeast Asia to the Sea of...
Japan. DOD asserted that it had decided to shift from “threat based planning” characteristic of the Cold War to “capability based planning,” but China’s identity was not even thinly disguised. This theme has persisted in subsequent DOD planning documents, but the focus on nation state threats (except for those states purportedly tied to terrorist groups or to potential U.S. adversaries) is now a subordinate issue in post-9/11 U.S. defense strategy. Though the prospect of a future Sino-American strategic competition has received continued emphasis, its centrality in U.S. planning has diminished or at least been deferred, enabling attention to more pressing and immediate threats to U.S. national security interests, especially those associated with the war on terrorism. But DOD has not wavered in its judgments about the capabilities it believes are required for the new century; it is the identity of the threats and the relevant scenarios that have shifted. In this emerging strategic construct, the United States must simultaneously diminish the potential vulnerabilities to American military forces; retain a clear margin of superiority against any presumptive competitor; and ensure the capability for decisive, unfettered intervention wherever and whenever it might be judged necessary.

What do such changes imply for U.S. regional defense strategy in Northeast Asia? Though less remarked upon in the immediate aftermath of the report’s release, the QDR also redefined the geographic distinctions in U.S. regional defense planning, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Four “critical areas” were identified in U.S. defense planning: Europe; Northeast Asia; the East Asian littoral (i.e., a predominantly maritime environment “stretching from south of Japan through Australia into the Bay of Bengal”); and the Middle East and Southwest Asia. (It seems reasonable to assume that Central Asia is now incorporated in the last of these critical areas.) The prospective contingency between China and Taiwan was no longer deemed part of defense planning for Northeast Asia. Not unreasonably, this shift presumed that the potential threat posed by China was maritime rather than continental. A military conflict on the Korean peninsula was therefore treated apart from any presumptive Chinese challenge to U.S. forward deployed air and naval power in the Pacific. But increased U.S. reliance on longer range military assets did not address how, where, or even whether the United States saw the need for regional bases and access in a Taiwan contingency.

Although senior U.S. officials emphasize that any changes in U.S. regional deployments are intended to enhance deterrence, many within the region express ample skepticism about these claims. Part of this skepticism is rooted in decades of relative stasis in U.S. regional security policy. American
officials have long tied the credibility of U.S. security commitments to the forward presence of substantial American forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the early 1990s, American officials have deemed 100,000 U.S. forces forward deployed in the West Pacific (with nearly 80 per cent of these forces based in Korea and Japan) as the most tangible embodiment of the U.S. regional security commitment. Given the symbolism, longevity, and seeming permanence of these deployments (albeit at numbers well below those of the Cold War), regional states had become inured to such force levels and to the U.S. security commitments they were presumed to uphold.

Senior Bush administration officials believe that inertia cannot substitute for strategy in the post-9/11 security environment. In a controversial late May 2003 interview with the *Los Angeles Times*, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith came close to asserting that nearly all U.S. forces deployed in East Asia could be reassigned to new locations, for operations very different than their traditional missions, and with no explicit commitment to employ these forces in the locales where they were based. Although these remarks were quickly disavowed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (then on a visit to Singapore), the change in tone and argument was unmistakable. In essence, American military forces in East Asia would no longer be treated as fixed assets that would be configured exclusively for their historic functions. The impending changes in Korea thus constitute an early indicator of a larger strategic realignment in the region, whose full contours and implications have yet to be spelled out.

**THE KOREAN REDEPLOYMENTS**

The impending changes on the Korean peninsula presuppose a pullback of U.S. forces from their forward deployment near the 38th Parallel, with American forces consolidated in locations south of the Han River, with the forward positions to be assumed by ROK forces. Most observers posit that reductions in U.S. military personnel deployed on the peninsula will follow at a subsequent point. Such changes may not be imminent, but they appear inevitable. U.S. officials hope to see significant results achieved sooner rather than later. Despite the keenly expressed South Korean desire for increased autonomy in the U.S.-ROK alliance, defense planners in Seoul want to prolong this process into the latter years of this decade, or even longer. Should the North and South reach a more lasting accommodation or if unification were to transpire, the pace of these redeployments would undoubtedly accelerate. But American defense planners appear intent on pushing the pace of these realignments largely independent of
the status of political-military relations on the Korean peninsula, even including the possibility that North Korea might officially declare that it is a nuclear weapons state.

The impending changes in American defense planning on the peninsula reflect a range of interrelated policy judgments. First, senior U.S. defense officials believe that long standing American strategy in Korea no longer addresses the potential threats in Northeast Asia or the optimal means to defeat such threats. These officials contend that U.S. strategy has been premised for far too long on the expectation of massive North Korean troop movements across the 38th Parallel at the outset of the war—essence, a reprise of the 1950 conflict. DOD asserts that the “tripwire” concept for U.S. forces on the peninsula is antiquated and increasingly irrelevant. In the administration’s view, the severe degrading of North Korean conventional capabilities occasioned by the North’s precipitous economic decline heightens the North’s reliance on its capacity to inflict major damage on South Korea and on Japan at longer range. In this view, North Korea will employ missiles and long-range artillery to directly target major cities and military facilities in the ROK and Japan. In addition, senior officials believe that they can reduce the presumed vulnerabilities of U.S. forces by exploiting new technologies and operational concepts, and by turning over more responsibilities to its ROK allies, whose firepower will be significantly enhanced in future years. Such judgments, however, do not address the implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea, and how such capabilities might reconfigure U.S. strategic planning on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole.

Second, U.S. planners argue that their regional military deployments and war preparations must increasingly focus on Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, not conventional conflict in Northeast Asia. Despite the singularity of America’s global reach and capabilities, the United States does not believe it has forces to spare in the post-9/11 environment, even less to keep them deployed on an open ended basis for a military contingency on the peninsula that it judges increasingly remote. Thus, the Bush administration asserts that American forces (especially ground forces) can no longer remain a static strategic asset: they must be able to deploy on short notice to locations (including to highly remote areas) where military operations are deemed far more likely. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s declared preference for consolidating U.S. forces on the peninsula into an air hub and sea hub underscores his belief that U.S. forces must increasingly prove “dual capable” in future years, with capabilities relevant to conflicts well beyond the peninsula.
Third, the United States believes that local sensitivities and nationalistic sentiments necessitate reductions in the visibility and “footprint” of American forces, especially in major urban settings. There are also growing differences in threat perception between the United States and its long-term ally. The Bush administration sees the impending redeployments as an incentive (i.e., to not have its forces and strategies held hostage to the vagaries of Korean public opinion) and an opportunity (i.e., the ability to free up U.S. resources for power projection elsewhere by insisting that regional allies assume increased responsibility for their own security). In future years, U.S. planners seem increasingly likely to treat the Korean peninsula as one potential military conflict among a range of competing security priorities, not necessarily one entailing significant in-country deployments of American military personnel, unless U.S. forces were configured for military contingencies beyond the peninsula.

Though the changes U.S. regional defense policies are nominally based on the White House national security strategy document of September 2002, they do not correspond with Korean or Japanese characterizations of the emergent threats and opportunities in Northeast Asia. Both countries have clear incentives to retain close defense ties with the United States, but both also see the need to ensure their own security interests, at a time when the regional security framework seems increasingly unsettled. Senior U.S. officials emphasize that deterrence is a far less credible concept in the emergent security environment, since terrorist groups and the states purportedly supporting them are judged wholly opportunistic in their goals and actions. This assumption explains the emphasis on prevention and pre-emption in the White House national security strategy document. American planners also believe that the U.S. and its regional allies must prepare for interdiction operations designed to prevent any exports of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials or associated delivery systems intended for U.S. adversaries, with North Korea as the preeminent concern. In essence, American planning is not prepared to assume a rational calibration of ends and means by desperate adversaries, nor is it prepared to simply await future dangers. But the security perceptions of major U.S. allies may be far from fully congruent with American assessments.

At the same time, does the United States genuinely believe that the threats in East Asia have changed profoundly and irrevocably? Deterrence of armed conflict on the Korean peninsula remains uppermost in U.S. regional strategic calculations, but the presumed requirements of deterrence are now viewed very differently. There is also growing U.S. attention to potential terrorist threats in the Asia-Pacific region, but these concerns...
focus disproportionately on Southeast, South, and Central Asia, not on Northeast Asia. The prospect of an operational nuclear weapons capability in North Korea; the growth of North Korean missile forces able to reach targets throughout the ROK and Japan; and continued increases in Chinese short range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan (the latter now deemed part of the East Asian littoral), suggest that deterrence and defense (including missile defense), not preemption of unconventional or terrorist threats, will remain uppermost in U.S. regional defense needs in East Asia.

U.S. assessments of the risks and consequences of a future conflict on the Korean peninsula also reflect the singularly unappealing options confronted by the United States in the face of Pyongyang’s renewed nuclear defiance. Despite U.S. insistence that it is prepared to initiate preemptive military actions against perceived imminent dangers to the United States or its regional allies, any attack on North Korean nuclear facilities would almost certainly trigger retaliation by the North against the ROK and potentially against Japan, thereby involving two of the world’s major industrial economies in an armed conflict for the first time since World War II. The implications of major warfare on the peninsula for future U.S. relations with China and with Russia in Asia (but especially with China) are also of pivotal importance. For this worst of cases, no strategic solution seems in sight, underscoring the fervent desire among all the states of Northeast Asia for a negotiated solution to the Korean nuclear crisis. Despite the evident determination of American planners to redefine their future regional defense plans and policies, the very indeterminacy of current circumstances underscores the risks and unknowns that now loom in Korea and Northeast Asia as a whole.

FUTURE PROSPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES

The shifts in U.S. security policies in Northeast Asia reflect the imperatives imposed by new threats (most far removed the region); the presumed technological advantage that attaches to current and future American defense capabilities; the increasing maturation of the defense capabilities of America’s regional allies; and the competing demands on U.S. military resources. So construed, there is much that seems commendable and long overdue in redefining the role of the U.S. forces within the region. But the redirection of U.S. regional defense policies has not been accompanied by a straightforward statement that presents the ultimate purposes of such change. These impending changes have also been unveiled in preemptory fashion, without full consultation with America’s principal security part-
ners, while also triggering suspicions on the part of other regional actors that an undisclosed strategic design underlies American actions.

To some extent, this lack of full disclosure represents an artifact of the defense planning process, which is often much clearer about the “how” of defense planning than the “why.” This liability has been reinforced by the administration’s insistence that it is engaged in capability based planning, as distinct from threat based planning. Although the latter label remains relevant in some circumstances (most notably, contingency planning related to North Korea), the administration’s approach is more akin to “possibility based planning.” In possibility based planning, the circumstances that could necessitate the application of military force are imaginable, even without persuasive evidence that an adversary is intent upon or capable of a hypothesized course of action. However, without the United States specifying much more clearly the precise contingencies against which it plans, how would Japan or another regional ally grasp the strategy to which they would be linked? This major shortcoming underscores important unfinished business in U.S. national security strategy, as well as some unwelcome consequences for U.S. strategic interests should regional states (including major U.S. allies) be left in the dark about future U.S. strategic intentions in Northeast Asia.

Some of the potential longer term concerns are most keenly felt in Japan, arguably America’s pivotal regional partner. Officials in Tokyo view U.S. redeployment plans in Korea as potentially presaging comparable steps in Japan, including reductions in the U.S. Marine presence on Okinawa, which has long focused on contingencies in Korea. Some observers in Tokyo argue that reductions in Okinawa might ultimately trigger changes in the deployment of the 7th Fleet in Japan. In the absence of full and frank consultation, such suspicions can ultimately assume a life of their own, leading regional allies to conceive of their future security needs in ways that could diminish the alliance bonds that have long ensured American regional security interests. Given Japan’s growing willingness since September 11 to undertake increased international responsibilities well beyond its commitment to the defense of Japan, any erosion of alliance ties could prove highly damaging.

This view holds with at least equal weight in the ROK, where South Korean officials find themselves uncomfortably balancing the dangers posed by their neighbor in the North, the pressures induced by shifts in domestic opinion, the opportunities posed by ever closer ties to China, and the expectations from Washington that Seoul concur with the Bush administration’s keen desire for major changes in U.S.-ROK defense
responsibilities. Quite apart from the specifics associated with the timing and terms of force redeployments, these policy developments raise profound questions about the purposes and durability of America’s security alliances, and what security order the United States envisions to supplant existing arrangements. Such concerns would be appropriate even in the absence of the latent dangers of a major crisis on the Korean peninsula, but they are far more essential in view of the looming nuclear crisis.

Viewed on a broader regional canvass, there are major uncertainties and unknowns in East Asia’s longer term strategic configuration, in particular the prospects for a durable, reasonably amicable political-military relationship between the United States and China. American defense planners may find increased utility in subdividing East Asia into separable “critical areas,” but such policy distinctions are largely lost on states focused on inescapable geographic realities. From an American planning perspective, the China-Taiwan standoff may be better addressed as a potential threat along the East Asian littoral, but this hardly negates China’s strategic centrality across all of Asia’s subregions. Notwithstanding the increased congruence of U.S. and Chinese interests following September 11, regional actors necessarily view their long-term relations with China from a different perspective from that of the United States. Uncertainties about future ties with China do not necessarily predict to an antagonistic future in East Asia. Indeed, virtually all regional actors perceive the need for a more durable, future oriented strategic architecture to which China is closely linked as participant and stakeholder.

Such considerations do not readily mesh with the exigencies of American regional defense strategy in the post-9/11 world. However, they underscore that defense planning detached from larger political, economic, and strategic considerations cannot provide lasting security solutions in Northeast Asia. If alliances are to remain credible pillars of U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia and if collaborative U.S.-China relations are to endure over the longer term, a fuller strategy will be required. This strategy must define a larger concept of the regional security order, not a constricted vision of America’s defense requirements, whether in Northeast Asia or beyond. For such needs, American policy makers have much work yet to undertake.
The organizers of the conference asked that each paper address six specific questions associated with the near-term future, in this case, of U.S. interests and strategy associated with Southeast Asia. Each of the questions posed has been addressed through this paper, but when thinking about U.S. strategy and Southeast Asia it is useful to start with historic perspective.

U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1800-1975

The United States and its armed forces have been involved in Southeast Asia for over 200 years. As early as 1800 the U.S. frigate Essex was escorting merchant shipping through the East Indies—protecting them from French privateers during the Quasi-War with France. Early in the life of the United States, Washington considered trade with the East Indies very important, and in 1835 the United States established a permanent military presence in the region when several warships were deployed to establish the East India Squadron. This took place a decade before the U.S. had a “West Coast” and involved assignment of forces half of the way around the world from their home station. They have been there ever since, except during part of World War II.

U.S. strategic interests in Southeast Asia became dramatically more important after the annexation of the Philippines in 1898. In addition, to having to fight a very difficult 3-year insurgency campaign to secure the archipelago, the U.S. now had a vital interest in Southeast Asia—sovereign U.S. territory—it was obliged to defend. This requirement created a strategic dilemma that the United States was not, in the end, able to successfully resolve. Trying to determine how best to defend the Philippines, without a massive investment in money and forces, in the face of growing Japanese ability to project power in East Asia became a preoccupation—unsuccesfully realized—of Army and Navy strategic planners for almost 40 years.

Southeast Asia became a major factor in the total estrangement of the United States and Japan that led inexorably to World War II in the Pacific.
It was Japan’s move into French-Indo China in 1940 that triggered U.S. oil embargo, that in turn, resulted in Japan starting down the planning process that culminated in Pearl Harbor. Once war broke out, among the earliest and least successful campaigns of the War in the Pacific—trying to hold the Philippines and Dutch East Indies—were fought in Southeast Asia. Three years later, the U.S. Army fought a difficult campaign to liberate the Philippines.

With Philippine Independence in 1946, the nature of U.S. interests changed once again. While, it no longer had to defend U.S. sovereign territory, in the 1950’s the U.S. assumed defense responsibilities for the Philippines and later other SEATO allies. In the two decades following World War II the region underwent decolonization with all the countries of Southeast Asia, save Thailand that never was a colony, becoming newly independent states. Virtually all these states, along with Thailand, had to deal with Communist insurgencies. It was the problem of decolonization and communism that precipitated the last substantial commitment of U.S. military power in Southeast Asia—the Vietnam War.

**STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1975-2000**

During that long war one of the issues that was endlessly debated was whether the U.S. had “vital” interests in the region. Was the region itself strategically important to America, or was it the fight against communist expansion that was the issue, and Southeast Asia just happened to be the locale for this struggle? In other words, the region itself was not intrinsically a “vital” U.S. strategic interest.

Examining U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia since the end of the Vietnam War through the turn of the 21st century would suggest that U.S. strategists tended to toward the latter judgement. Southeast Asia was a region that was important, but not vitally so. Following the Vietnam War, U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia shrunk back to the minimal levels of the 1950’s. The only real combat capability permanently in Southeast Asia was the Air Force wing at Clark in the Philippines. Permanent U.S. Navy, Army and Marine Corps combat presence was clustered in Northeast Asia spread between Japan and Korea. Of course, the Navy and Marine Corps forces stationed in Japan routinely operated in Southeast Asia.

Once the Cold War was winding down, and Soviet Naval presence in Cam Rahn Bay was no longer a problem, bases in the Philippine assumed less strategic importance for American policy makers. During the 1990-91 the negotiation to renew access for Philippine bases the U.S. demonstrated
it was willing to walk away from the bases rather than pay what the
Government of the Philippines demanded. Admiral Hardisty, then
USCINCPAC, set the stage by testifying that U.S. Bases in the Philippines
were important, but that the U.S. did have alternatives if the government
of the Philippines and the U.S. could not reach agreement on continued
access to the bases.²

This opinion, shared by the Defense Department, effectively set an
upper limit on how much the U.S. was willing to pay to maintain
Philippine bases. A “take it or leave it” approach was successful, especially
after Mt. Pinatubo erupted and covered Clark AFB with volcanic ash. But
the agreed level of financial “support” was so low that it was politically easy
for the Philippine Senate to eventually reject the agreement.

Permanent military presence and the attendant training, logistics and
maintenance facilities in Southeast Asia were no longer available. The U.S.
determined that a concept of gaining access for transiting or rotational (the
modest USAF fighter aircraft detachments that rotate through Singapore)
forces would suffice. Known as “places not bases” this concept made a
virtue of necessity, and thanks to Singapore’s willingness to play a leading
role, did permit a very modest U.S. presence permanently in Southeast
Asia proper to convey the impression of U.S. commitment.

But, save for Singapore and Thailand, the U.S. never did achieve access
to important facilities for training or the bed down of substantial numbers
of tactical aircraft. Some progress toward access with Malaysia and Suharto’s
Indonesia (largely for maintenance of USN ships and repair of USAF C-
130’s) was also made. But, in truth the concept was almost a return to the
concept of 150 years before when a token U.S. presence, available to show
the flag and respond to challenges to the safe passage of commercial ship-
ning, was deemed adequate to sustain U.S. strategic interests.

In its modern manifestation, “places not bases” was tailor made to
rationalize “engagement” activities. But the vision of access to facilities
similar to the model of facilities in Saudi Arabia was never realized. The
Thais turned down requests to station Army afloat propositioned material
(they have continued to provide air and naval access in “emergencies”),
Singapore was too small to entertain a large U.S. footprint, and until very
recently the government of the Philippines was unwilling to grant access
to the former Clark Air Force base or Cubi Point Naval Air Station.

Despite periodic U.S. “enthusiasms” for gaining access to former U.S.
facilities in Vietnam, especially in the wake of the Clinton visit in 1999,
Vietnam was not willing to entertain access understandings because of the
residual antipathy from the Vietnam War and concerns about an adverse
Chinese reaction. Cambodia was too unsettled and Burma politically off limits. The U.S. was only able to get very limited access to Indonesian instrumented air training facilities at Siabu on Sumatra, despite years of trying. Malaysia has, in general, been quietly helpful, permitting small-scale jungle training and port visits, again more in keeping with what could be considered “engagement,” or as it is now known “security cooperation.”

So while “places not bases” helped justify engagement activities, it did not result in the sort of access understandings that would permit a predictable basis for the deployment of a substantial U.S. combat force into the region should the need arise, as well as a more robust regional training and support infrastructure. One reason that this was so was because there was no obvious threat that would make a more substantial presence politically desirable for the countries in the region.

It was, and remains, difficult to hypothesize compelling enough scenarios that would require the introduction of a large U.S. force presence. Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia in September 1989 seems to have marked the end of worries about one neighbor invading the other. The success of ASEAN in mitigating regional disputes has been a major regional success story.

In fact, demonstrating continuing U.S. interest in the region through a combination of a token presence in Singapore, and periodic “engagement” activities has been perfectly agreeable to the countries in the region. A minimal U.S. presence served their interests perfectly. It was tangible evidence that the U.S. was still “interested and engaged” in Southeast Asia, and was therefore available as a counterweight to growing Chinese power without presenting such a large footprint that it created domestic political difficulties, or caused an adverse reaction from Beijing. Singapore was the greatest beneficiary. By hosting small numbers of U.S. forces it gained a de facto security commitment.

Looking back over the past two hundred years suggests when U.S. interests were deemed vital—protecting sovereign U.S. territory or fighting communist expansion—the U.S. generally failed despite a substantial commitment of military power. On the other hand, when Southeast Asia was deemed important, but not vital, a more modest U.S. presence was adequate to the task of defending our interests while contributing to the stability of the region by remaining engaged with Southeast Asia.

Whether this model will be sustainable into the immediate future is an issue. The character of the major security issues faced within the region—terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy—suggests that it will. These sorts of threats are best addressed by intelligence cooperation, law enforcement...
cooperation, coast guard operations and small combat unit, i.e., special forces, than by a large scale combat force presence.

**U.S. INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA CIRCA 2000**

Probably the best statement of U.S. interests in the region before the Bush administration assumed office and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed our national strategic paradigm are found in the early 2001 Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Southeast Asia report. It held that Southeast Asia remains “important” to the United States, and that the United States has an interest in making sure that the region was not dominated by any one hegemonic power.

According to the Council task Force America’s primary strategic interests have been consistent over the years and remain unchanged:

- Free and open access to the sea-lanes that pass through the Indonesian archipelago and connect the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea.
- Regional stability
- Expanding free trade
- Democratization
- The security of allies and key friends—Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia

On the issue of U.S. presence in the region the Council task force found no fault with the minimalist “places not bases “ approach of the previous 10 years. But it did opine that, “... routine U.S. presence did not adequately signal the degree of interest and importance the [U.S.] should attach to the area.” The Council Task Force believed that additional access arrangements to facilitate training and support should be pursued.

**EAST ASIAN LITTORAL—A CRITICAL AREA.**

Whether or not the Council report influenced the Bush administration, the administration certainly has signaled that Southeast Asia is an area of vital importance to the United States. With the publication of the Bush administration’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in September 2001, Southeast Asia found itself keeping company with other traditional “vital” areas such as Northeast Asia, Europe or the Middle East. The QDR unveiled a novel geostrategic region known as the “East Asian littoral”
which was defined as the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal.  

It was accurately described as an area that was challenging for operations because of the vast differences and because the “density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other critical areas.” (It turns out there may not be other good alternatives to Philippine bases after all.)

Electing to define a new geostrategic region called littoral Asia—as opposed to calling it Southeast Asia, or Indochina, or nothing at all—suggests a carefully chosen formulation that is at pains to include Taiwan while avoiding an impression that U.S. critical interests in the region include continental Asia. It was also a useful way to include Australia as part of an Asian regional concept as opposed to characterizing it as a sort of an afterthought, i.e., a Southern anchor.

Importantly, DOD’s judgement about the significance of littoral Asia was reached even before the commencement of the war on terrorism; a war which involves Southeast Asia as one of its principle theaters of operation. Interestingly, before the war on terrorism one could have argued that it was only because the geostrategic characterization included Taiwan that the region shared pride of place with Europe and Northeast Asia. But, because of the war on terrorism and the prospect that Islamic extremists could find a haven in the region, the “Southeast Asian piece” of littoral Asia, has assumed a much greater strategic importance. This is somewhat analogous to the reason that the region was deemed so important during the era of communist insurgencies. It is a locale that harbors enemies.

**WILL THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OUR POLICY CHANGE OVER THE NEXT 5-10 YEARS?**

It is important first, to quickly establish as a baseline the fact that the Bush administration’s Asia policy is grounded in a number of enduring fundamentals of U.S East Asian security policy.

The first and perhaps most enduring fundamental is the United States does not intend to be excluded from Asia. The United States considers access to Asia a vital interest because of a combination of economic, security and societal reasons. Looking to the future it is difficult to imagine a future in which the U.S. would revise this judgement and either turn its back on Asia, or in security terms allow itself to be denied access to the region. For well over a century, the U.S. has proclaimed that it is a Pacific power—a Pacific power that did not stop midway across that great ocean but a power that had interests in Asia.
The second fundamental is America’s enduring commitment to Asian security and stability. Even though we are not in Asia in a geographic sense, our commitment, as Colin Powell said in June of 2002, is an enduring one for both Asia’s sake and our own. This is a particularly salient point in view of the reported concern that some Asians have expressed after learning of discussions surrounding the realignment of U.S. presence in Asia. Again, quoting Colin Powell, “the U.S. is a Pacific Power and we will not yield our strategic position in Asia.”

The third fundamental is the rock-solid belief that forward deployed forces contribute to stability. The syllogism that best captures why the U.S. remains committed to presence in East Asia is that a capable military presence creates stability; stability, in turn, is the *sine qua non* for economic development, and economic development creates prosperity. Bush defense strategy is based on the notion of forces already in the theater being able to “deter forward, without massive reinforcement from the United States,” which equates to presence in the region.

The final fundamental is the reality that the bedrock of our strategic position in Asia is our alliance structure in Asia, especially with Japan and Korea. Access to bases and facilities in those countries allows the United States to execute a regional stabilizing military mission. One reason for this is that the alliances are bilateral in nature, not multi-lateral, and have not historically been a hindrance to the pursuit of U.S interests in East Asia. The alliances facilitate, not impede, U.S. objectives.

While these fundamentals, along with other traditional U.S. interests—spread of democracy, freedom of the seas—remain as a constant, security policy has evolved, necessarily in the wake of 9/11.

**INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER 9/11**

U.S. interests in Southeast Asia listed in the Council Report remain valid, but are now incomplete. The 9/11 attacks brought home to officials that there are stateless terrorist groups who are willing to use any means possible, including the most powerful weapons available, in order to inflict mass destruction on the U.S. and its allies. This means traditional concepts of deterrence, based on massive retaliation, have little meaning if the enemy is stateless, has infiltrated into the fabric of politically weak or fragile (but not hostile) nations, and is willing to commit suicide to achieve its goals. For Southeast Asia, this has required the U.S. to either rethink previous policies or place greater emphasis on policy concepts that had previously received episodic or scant attention.
First, the worry that, with its 206,000,000 Muslims (95% of whom are in Indonesia and Malaysia), Southeast Asia could succeed Afghanistan as a home for Al Qaeda and its network of allied organizations. Indonesia has always been important for the United States but the fate of the secular government in Indonesia is even more critical now.

To be successful in the war on terrorism, it is important that secular Islamic states become the model for Islamic culture. Should secular Malaysia or Indonesia collapse (today not considered likely by experts), it would be a blow to secularism throughout the Islamic world. It would also lead to fundamentally different considerations regarding unimpeded access to the vital straits that pass through the Indonesian archipelago.

The United States has increased direct assistance to Indonesia for political reform and stabilization, more effective police and intelligence programs, and to strengthen moderate, mainstream Islamic organizations that are appalled at global terrorism. There is greater realization in Washington as well that continued ostracism of Indonesia’s armed forces, despite their dismal record of human rights abuses, is not the best way to bring about change in the Indonesian military. Education programs for the TNI in counter-terrorist related fields has been funded this year, the first military education program since 1991.

Second, our willingness to assist the Philippines in its drawn out struggles with Islamic militants and terrorists reflects a change in attitude of many within the Administration about the importance of being willing to patiently endure frequently unpredictable and mercurial relations with Manila in order to stamp out terrorists in Southeast Asia. Recall, many of today’s principals were involved in government during the 1988–92 period when our relations with the Philippines went downhill.

President Gloria Arroyo gave unreserved support to the United States after 9/11, even offering use of the former bases if necessary in counter-terrorist operations. It was immediately apparent that parts of the southern Philippines that were virtually under the control of a criminal/Islamic gang, the Abu Sayyaf group—which had already had contacts with Al Qaeda operatives—represented a major threat. U.S. military assistance to the Philippines over the past year to help combat Islamic terrorism in the South, and improve the AFP’s ability to reestablish security and government control, has been welcomed.

Our closer relationship with Manila also reflects the geostrategic reality that access to Philippines facilities is much more important than most judged 12 years ago, because of contemporary worries about defense of Taiwan and access to training facilities for U.S forces stationed in Japan. As
MacArthur learned to his dismay in 1941, Luzon is within easy flying distance to Taiwan (then Formosa). When compared to the 600 or so miles from Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa, gaining temporary access to airfields on Luzon seems to be a recognized priority.

Third, our security relationship with Singapore continues to evolve. The access Singapore provides for supporting our forward presence is important, particularly at Singapore’s new naval base at Changi. Implicit in U.S. arrangements with Singapore over the past decade has been an understanding on both sides that Singapore could rely on the United States in the event of a serious threat to its security. Post 9/11, this understanding has deepened, and Singapore has become a key ally and confidant in the shared contest against Islamic terrorism.

Both Singapore and Philippines provide useful locales to conduct both sustained and announced campaigns against terrorists as well as useful staging areas for preemptive moves against terrorism throughout Southeast Asia.

Certainly, increased interest in Guam, while not in Southeast Asia per se, as an additional base for U.S. forces reflects a perception that Guam provides a locale, almost equidistant from Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, for U.S. forces. Guam can act a hub so long range air and naval forces can respond throughout all of East Asia.

REGIONAL STABILITY, THE RISE OF CHINA AND U.S. OPTIONS

Any discussion about long-term stability in East Asia must start with China. The discussion starts with China because of its geographic centrality, its physical size, and the size of its population, its systemic and relentless military modernization, its economic development and its historic position as the Middle Kingdom.

Clearly, China need not fear an invasion from any of her continental neighbors, whereas those neighbors, with the exception of India are vulnerable to an overland Chinese invasion. China’s continental dominance is a fact of life today; and an accepted feature of the East Asian strategic landscape that is not considered destabilizing.

This suggests that U.S. presence in East Asia whose mission is to sustain stability need not have a capability to preserve stability on the Asian mainland. First, it is not militarily feasible; and second, the existing Chinese dominance, which is likely to persist, has not proven to be inherently destabilizing. DOD seems to implicitly recognize this reality when it elect-
ed to describe the areas of Asia of importance to the United States as Northeast Asia, where our military footprint in region is substantial and allies are beyond the grasp of the PLA, and littoral Asia, which includes a number of significant states that are totally, or very nearly, surrounded by water. This formulation is implicit recognition of the de facto division of Asia into two “military spheres of influence.” China is the dominant military power on the mainland of Asia, while the U.S. and its littoral allies hold sway in what might be termed maritime Asia.

The Bush administration is clearly concerned about the rise of China. While they do not name China by name, Defense Department reports hold that Asia is “...gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition.” The according to DOD maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task, and, clearly implying China, holds that a “military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge.” No other East Asian country but China fits this profile.

China’s growing influence in Burma and Cambodia concerns Southeast Asians, as does China’s coyness over serious resolution of the claims issues in the South China Sea. Although, Beijing’s agreement to a 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea has eased ASEAN anxieties on this score. Over the longer term, Southeast Asians worry about China’s ability to project power in a meaningful way into their back yard. From the point of view of most Southeast Asian states, the ability of the U.S. to act as counterweight to China’s continued economic, and concomitant military, growth is more important than ever.

To address this issue and to preclude China, or anyone else for that matter, from dominating Northeast Asia or the East Asian littoral, declaratory U.S defense strategy will focus on promoting security cooperation with friends and allies in order to create a “favorable balance of military power” to improve deterrence and prevent aggression and coercion. In fact, a principle objective for “security cooperation” will be to ensure access, interoperability with allies and friends, and intelligence cooperation. As a result, as the Quadrennial Defense Review indicates, the United States will place a premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements in the region.

At this time only the Philippines and Thailand appear as practical options for the U.S. to secure additional access and infrastructure agreements within Southeast Asia. Geostrategically, the Philippines and Thailand are ideally located. But reaching any new or expanded access agreements with these two allies is problematic. There are well known “nationalistic” problems associated with the Philippine option.
Perhaps, Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea and the overlapping Chinese and Philippine claims in the Spratly’s could provide a basis for translating Philippine anxiety regarding China into long term access arrangements that allow the U.S. to have periodic access to the former Clark Air Base and the former Cubi Point NAS for both training and contingency.

Certainly, ongoing cooperation between Washington and Manila in fighting terrorists provides a way to gradually allay Filipino fears that the U.S. is trying to turn the clock back in terms of bases. In any case, I suspect the U.S. will have to reimburse the government of the Philippines handsomely—either on a pay as you go basis, or in trade for U.S. funded equipping of the Philippine armed forces—for any long term access arrangements. Agreements could also entail U.S. pledges of support in case of confrontation over revival claims in the South China Sea—something the U.S. has assiduously avoided becoming embroiled in over the years.

Thai sensitivity to Chinese attitudes is well known, but Burma’s ongoing military modernization with Chinese equipment and advice when compounded with the negative impact Burmese originated diseases and drug trafficking across the Thai-Burma border could make Bangkok more amenable to improved access and infrastructure agreements. As always with Thailand any agreements would have to be very discrete.

**U.S. PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA—STABILITY AS A MISSION**

The previous sections address specific U.S. objectives and options regarding U.S. interests and objectives in Southeast Asia. It is worth stepping back for a moment and briefly considering how to convert the notion of political military stability into a well-defined military mission so that U.S. forces assigned to the mission are the proper mix and size.

Care must be used to not define the mission of stability too broadly. It would be foolish to argue that the U.S. military presence could be the panacea for every form of misfortune that might befall the countries of Southeast Asia. Clearly, the U.S. military presence had little effect one way or another in arresting or preventing the economic instability of the late 1990’s. On the other hand, U.S. forces have contributed to the long peace that permitted the economies to flourish in the first place.

Furthermore, when we think about internal political instability in East Asia, historically the U.S. military presence is not a major preventative fac-
tor. One need only consider the changes in Indonesia, or the coups or putsches in Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia that have taken place despite the U.S. presence in the region.

But the opposite side of the same coin is also true: by contributing to overall stability, U.S. presence has helped contribute to the process of democratic change by eliminating the pretense of defending against external aggression as a justification for military rule.

What forward presence does accomplish is reassure friends and allies that the U.S. does have an interest in a peaceful future for the region. It also prevents militarily induced instability, more commonly called aggression. Military presence plays a significant role in East Asia by dampening the military dimension of historic animosities and rivalries. It inhibits the use of military power to change boundaries or resolve territorial disputes. And, now in the aftermath of September 11th, it provides credible capability and assistance in the struggle against regional terrorist groups.

Clearly, unlike the current situation in Korea where U.S. forces are effectively held hostage to the single mission of deterring a North Korea attack, forces that are assigned the mission of stability must be mobile. They must also have flexibility in political arrangements with the host country as well as in administrative and support arrangements. Minimum criteria might include:

- Not being tethered to specific crisis scenarios so forces can quickly respond throughout East Asia, or globally if necessary
- The forces must have the political or policy freedom from the host country that permits them to use bases as operating hubs for contingencies not directly associated with the defense of the host country.
- The forces must be agile enough to be able to carry out a wide range of tasks anywhere in the region or in some cases beyond the region. In current usage they should be expeditionary. This agility is a combination of characteristics of the force themselves as well as their training and command arrangements.
- Were China, or any other country for that matter, make a choice to become serious about developing a region-wide projection capability the key to preserving stability would be the ability of the U.S. and our allies to keep ahead or at least keep pace with projection capability and therefore be able to “trump” regional projection attempts. In other words, to sustain stability in the future, U.S. force structure would have as its primary, but not only, combat focus defeating power-projection beyond the continent of Asia.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Southeast Asia is more important to the United States today than it was two years ago. It is always been important because of economic interests and the key straits between the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean area. But since the beginning of the war on terrorism, the combination of its large Islamic population, the political weakness of Indonesia and the military weakness of the Philippines have raised concerns that the region could become a haven for organized terrorist groups.

With this as a given, translating the conceptual framework for the mission of stability into future U.S. force structure as it applies to Southeast Asia must start with two realities: the nature of the security problem in Southeast Asia; and, how limited the opportunities are for additional access in the region.

Deterring or defending against aggression is today not a central security concern for “traditional” Southeast Asia. The causes of instability are terrorism, criminal activity, secessionist movements, and potentially, the Islamization of politics in Indonesia and Malaysia. Worries about trouble in the South China Sea have abated over the past three years—and the U.S. has effectively opted out of this dispute so long as it doesn’t impact on the sea-lanes through the South China Sea. In any event, none of these issues, even the South China Sea, can be made less worrisome by a dramatic increase in U.S. military presence in the region, even if there were facilities that could accommodate a rapid build-up. The one exception to this judgement would be an attack on Taiwan by China. In this case access to airfields in Luzon so large numbers of land-based airpower could surge into the region would be very important. But Taiwan is a special security case, one that is not central to what has been traditionally viewed as Southeast Asia.

In all the other cases, modest improvement in access for presence and training while sustaining the relatively modest U.S. presence in the region makes the most sense for the region. Increasing intelligence cooperation and other forms of cooperative law enforcement would be the best way to deal with the threats the region faces. In addition, because Special Operations forces are optimally suited for dealing with many of the extant threats, relocating the Special Forces detachments currently in Okinawa to Southeast Asia, perhaps Singapore, makes very good sense.

Keeping the more substantial elements of U.S. military presence on the periphery of Southeast Asia by utilizing extant facilities in Guam and Northeast Asia, and potentially in North Australia effectively surround the region. So long as these forces are “expeditionary” in nature and are not
inhibited from acting by host nation restrictions they are available to surge or routinely deploy from these peripheral hubs into the region.

This is why the eventual transformation of the 2nd infantry Division in Korea into an expeditionary Army force in East Asia is so desirable. Without Korea it is difficult to imagine where a sizable Army footprint in East Asia could be maintained, and it is important that an Army presence in the region be sustained, if for no other reason than the dominant service in all Asian militaries (except Japan) is the Army. Following the dramatic success the U.S. Army in Iraq, army to army contact will be a high priority for East Asia militaries.

It may also be desirable to create a permanent Joint Task Force for Southeast Asia so there is a headquarters that becomes knowledgeable and specialized in the particular problems of this region. Such a headquarters would also be able to facilitate security cooperation throughout Southeast Asia.

On balance, today’s strategic approach to Southeast Asia, with its focus on terrorism and other transnational threats, that do not require a large conventional force footprint actually in Southeast Asia on a more or less permanent basis, makes sense. It is suited to the nature of the threat today, and reflects a certain historic continuity with periods of the past when our strategy reflected a correct balance between strategic ends, ways and means. Not only is it well tailored to contemporary threats but it also reflects a serious U.S. commitment to the long-term stability of the region. This reassures our allies and provides a hedge against any malignant Chinese intentions toward the region. Developing additional access agreements throughout the region to facilitate the introduction of substantial numbers of land-based aircraft is also a prudent hedge.

NOTES

1. The United States and the Republic of the Philippines signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951. In 1954 the U.S., the Philippines and Thailand signed the Manila Pact Creating SEATO.


Any attempt to predict the future security environment in Southeast Asia must begin with an understanding of the past. An observer of Southeast Asia over the last three or four decades has to be struck by the sheer dynamism—the pace of change and transformation—that has characterized the region. Much of that dynamism has been economic. From roughly the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s the core countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia) were, along with South Korea and Taiwan, the fastest growing economies in the world. These were the Asian tigers—less developed countries that had become “newly industrialized countries.” They were the subjects of a major World Bank study in 1993 entitled *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*. The macroeconomic statistics were reflected in facts on the ground. Per capita incomes quadrupled and quintupled during this period. Urban centers like Kuala Lumpur were transformed from sleepy tropical backwaters into cosmopolitan cities, with all the accompanying benefits and drawbacks. Lives were transformed utterly. The sons and daughters of rural rice farmers found their way to MIT and into the high-rise glass towers of the capital.

This economic transformation was bracketed in geographic and temporal terms by developments in Japan and China. Japan, of course, set the template for Asian modernization by making the transition in the early 20th century. And the spectacular Japanese postwar economic recovery set the standard for Asia’s tigers. China, slower off the mark, had begun to evidence the dramatic effects of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms by the early 1980s. By the late 1990s, China on a huge scale was the fastest growing single economy in the world. Today, by direct GDP comparisons, China is the second largest economy in the world. In short, Southeast Asia’s economic dynamism has to be seen in association with powerful trends in Japan and China.

The word dynamism implies movement both up and down and in 1997-1998 the Asian Financial Crisis rolled across much of the region inflicting difficulties on Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam; severe pain on Thailand, Malaysia (and South Korea); and devastation on Indonesia. Meanwhile, the Japanese economy had ceased to grow with the
collapse of the “bubble” in 1991–2 and has remained in a condition of sta-
sis to the present moment. The picture in China is quite different with
solid and often spectacular growth maintained right through the 1990s to
the present. For Southeast Asia, the geo-economic balance of influence
has begun to shift from Japan to China.

A second manifestation of dynamism has been the development of
regional institutions and consciousness. In the 1950s and 1960s, the term
“Southeast Asia” had only geographic or cartographic meaning. It simply
denoted a place on the map between India and China. The inhabitants of
that space identified themselves in cultural, ethnic, or national terms, but
not as “Southeast Asian.” That is no longer the case; “Southeast Asia” is a
real place with a coherent identity and some claim on the loyalties of peo-
ple who live there. This remarkable development is in part the byproduct
of economic modernization and with it growing intra-regional contact. It
is also the product of regional institutions, most notably the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established in 1967 and subsequently
expanded to include all ten Southeast Asian states. Founded when com-
munist movements were active throughout the region, ASEAN has broad-
ly succeeded in its principal goals of: (1) strengthening the region’s resis-
tance to external manipulation and subversion and (2) creating a security
community in which intra-regional disputes are settled by nonmilitary
means. It has also presented a broadly united diplomatic front to the rest of
the world on several key issues. Integral to these achievements, the gov-
ernments of Southeast Asia have developed dense webs of interaction with
each other—particularly among the original five members: Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Here again, dynamism can have its downside. The expansion of
ASEAN in 1996–7 to include Cambodia, Laos and Burma added three
new members very different from the founders—less developed, less com-
mitted to free markets, less acculturated into the “ASEAN Way” and not
even nominally democratic. The new entrants would have been hard to
digest under the best of circumstances, but their accession coincided with
the regional economic downturn. Not surprisingly, ASEAN’s traditional
search for consensus has proven very difficult and its future viability has
been seriously questioned. Since ASEAN’s expansion the region has faced
a succession of challenges including massive forest fires in Indonesia, civil
war in East Timor, the financial crisis, human rights abuses in Burma, and
a quasi-coup in Cambodia without an effective ASEAN response. The
most recent challenge comes in the form of militant Islamic terrorism and
the SARS epidemic—with ASEAN’s response still a work in progress.
From a strategic perspective the sudden adverse shift in the region’s economic climate, the declining fortunes of ASEAN, plus the severe political and economic difficulties in Indonesia, raise the specter of a power vacuum. The Southeast Asia of the early 1990s was vibrant, self-confident, and cohesive and was beginning to invest significant resources into modernized, professional militaries. Perhaps most important, the region’s leader and cornerstone—a successful and modernizing Indonesia—was clear to all. At that time it was not too fanciful to imagine that East Asia was evolving toward a natural organic balance of power with China, Japan, Southeast Asia, a resurgent Korea, and eventually India all counterbalancing one another and providing an overall stability. The East Asia of 2003 looks decidedly different.

Southeast Asia’s difficulties must be seen in the context of a broader dynamic environment. First, an increasingly globalized economy has created both opportunities and serious risks for the region. This is most evident in the volatile flows of foreign investment that are the lifeblood of much of the region’s economic development. But when sentiment turns negative they can be withdrawn suddenly with catastrophic effects as occurred in 1997-1998. Second, China’s rapid economic growth has been accompanied by even steeper acceleration in military spending—all harnessed to an ambitious geopolitical agenda regarding Southeast Asia. Over the last decade China’s rise has coincided with Japan’s relative decline. Third, to the surprise of foreign observers and regional officials alike, Southeast Asia has proven vulnerable to the appeal of militant politicized Islam to the point the region has become host to violent organizations and networks—some of them tied to international terrorism.

The security issues that currently face the region then are clear—even if the means or strategies for dealing with them are not.

**ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE**

Five years after the financial crisis, the economies of Southeast Asia are generally growing, but not at pre-crisis rates. Even among the more successful, including Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, consumer and business confidence is shaky. In Indonesia conditions remain grim, although confidence, paradoxically, is on the rise. The widespread sense of malaise derives from multiple sources including an uncompleted menu of needed reforms, especially government regulation of the financial sector. It is not at all clear that today the region is really less vulnerable to volatile international financial flows than it was five years ago. Another pervasive concern...
is continued soft demand for exports to the all-important American market. Hopes that exports to Japan would provide an engine for regional recovery have largely vanished. The one major bright spot is the continuing growth of the huge Chinese economy and the expanding trade and investment opportunities that result. But this is a two-edged sword because China’s growth is based on becoming the world center of low cost manufacturing. From Southeast Asia’s perspective, China is becoming a formidable economic competitor as its exports compete with (and often displace) those from Southeast Asia and as foreign investment that once went to Southeast Asia now goes to China.

The sudden and unexpected advent of SARS adds a pronounced element of uncertainty to the economic picture. In this case China has not escaped; it is ground zero for an epidemic that has already taken off a point from most GDP projections for the region and could soon take off much more.

TERRORISM

It has long been an article of faith that Islam in Southeast Asia has a moderate, tolerant, live-and-let-live, quality that distinguishes it from more doctrinaire varieties prevalent in the Middle East. In the immediate wake of 9/11 most experts answered “no” to the question whether international terrorist organizations would find favorable conditions for organizing in Southeast Asia. But the discovery of Al Qaeda affiliated networks in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia with advanced planning for a series of massive bombings in Singapore proved that assessment inaccurate. It soon became clear that the region was vulnerable to penetration by violent Muslim militants for a variety of reasons beyond simply the presence of over 200 million Muslims. First, the geography of the Muslim areas with sprawling archipelagos and unpolicable borders created a certain irreducible exposure. Second, the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia also weakened police, military and intelligence agencies—the first line of defense against terrorist penetration. Third, devout Muslims, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, felt they had been marginalized by secular (Indonesia) or Christian (Philippines) governments. This produced a sense of victimization that meshed with the message from Osama bin Laden and others. Fourth, money from the Persian Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia) has flowed into Southeast Asia propagating a strict, doctrinaire version of Islam through schools and mosques. Finally, the mujahaddin war against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan had a galvaniz-
ing effect. No one knows how many young Muslim men left Southeast Asia to join the mujahaddin – it may have been a few thousand or only a few hundred. But those that went received training in weapons and explosives. They were indoctrinated into a militant jihadist worldview and became part of an international clandestine network of alumni from that victorious struggle. With the war over, many returned to Southeast Asia ripe for recruitment into local terrorist organizations dedicated to the destruction of non-Muslim communities, Western influence, and secular governments.

In the period since 9/11, efforts by law enforcement and intelligence organizations have revealed much that was previously unknown about these organizations. They fall into three types: (1) international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) whose agenda includes attacks on U.S. interests and the establishment of a pan-Islamic “caliphate;” (2) social extremists like Laskar Jihad in Indonesia that accept the existing national state but attack non-Muslim elements within it; (3) Traditional Muslim separatists such as the MILF in the southern Philippines that seek a separate Muslim state. The picture is greatly complicated by linkages between groups including JI and Al Qaeda, between Abu Sayyaf and Al Qaeda, and between JI and the MILF. Further complications arise from links between elements of the Indonesian military and JI and another similar group, The Islamic Defenders Front. In short, the wiring diagram for terrorism in Southeast Asia would depict interactive networks with multiple agendas.

The most important single enabling factor in the growth of these networks is governmental weakness in Indonesia. The 32-year rule of Suharto precluded development of a new generation of political leadership and deeply corrupted the instruments of state security—police, intelligence and military. As a consequence it has proven very difficult to establish an effective government and security apparatus in post-Suharto Indonesia. The Megawati administration initially reacted to 9/11 and the arrests in Singapore by denying the presence of similar Al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Indonesia. The October 2002 bombings in Bali forced Jakarta to acknowledge the reality and at least temporarily silenced overt supporters of the most militant groups. The subsequent police investigation (importantly aided by Australian experts) surprised many by producing a quick string of arrests.

Other governments reacted to 9/11 very differently. President Arroyo, backed by a strong majority of public opinion in the Philippines, invited U.S. forces to assist (training, intelligence and civil affairs) the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in its operations against Abu Sayyaf. Prime Minister Mahathir in Malaysia seized the opportunity to rebuild tattered relations with the U.S. culminating in a cordial visit to the White House. Both Singapore and Malaysia cooperated closely through police, intelligence and customs in counter-terrorism with U.S. counterparts. Thailand, in contrast, has tried to distance itself from the whole subject despite clear evidence of some Al Qaeda activity in the southern majority-Malay provinces.

CHINA

China’s interest in Southeast Asia is deep and long. For millennia the Middle Kingdom dealt with the rulers of the region through the tribute system, which served to validate the superiority and centrality of Chinese civilization. This relationship suffered a two-century interregnum with the coming of European colonial powers to Asia. China itself was reduced to semi-colonial status first by Europe and more devastatingly by Japan. But now the geopolitical wheel has turned. China’s historic sources of security concern, Central Asia/Russia and Japan, are not a credible threat today. But China’s strength, economically and militarily, has grown dramatically. For the first time since the height of the Ming Dynasty, China is in a position to assert its interests beyond its borders. The natural focus of this revived strategic ambition (besides Taiwan) is Southeast Asia.

In Northeast Asia, China’s strategy will by essentially defensive, designed to prevent adverse developments. But to the south lies opportunity. The short-term objective is to build and strengthen close relations with the Southeast Asian governments while attracting investment from the wealthy Chinese minorities in the region. The longer-term goal is to establish a classic sphere of influence—a security monopoly not unlike that maintained by the U.S. in Latin America. An integral part of that objective is to eventually establish sovereign territorial control over the South China Sea. Both objectives require the eventual expulsion of U.S. military power from Southeast Asia, the South China Sea and the sea-lanes that transit them.

In pursuit of these objective Beijing can take some satisfaction in its success to date. The picture includes strong and growing influence in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos; an expanding physical presence in the South China Sea; and a recently signed free trade agreement with ASEAN designed to bind the Southeast Asian economies ever more closely to China.
THE FUTURE

Against this backdrop we can posit a future security scenario for the region and identify those factors most likely to perturb that scenario.

The core factor shaping Southeast Asia’s prospects will be economics. The most likely trend for the next five years is a continued uneven recovery from the late 1990s crisis with growth in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam averaging about 4 to 5 percent per annum. A return to the spectacular growth trajectory of the 1980s is unlikely due to competition from China (and increasingly India); continued weakness in government regulatory institutions; and the absence of a first-rate educational system outside Singapore. Growing intra-regional trade and investment will be a positive factor. Southeast Asia will remain an economically two-tier region with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand at the high end and Laos, Cambodia, and Burma at the low. Vietnam could move toward the top tier if it finally decides to alter the authoritarian character of the regime in favor of open markets and at least some political participation. SARS will likely prove to be a temporary economic problem as medical science develops effective countermeasures. In short, the economic transformation of Southeast Asia is real and will continue apace. The region already constitutes one of America’s largest trading and investment partners and that relationship will grow—and with it U.S. strategic interest in the economic health of the region. The sea-lanes through Southeast Asia are the world’s busiest and will maintain and strengthen that status.

Politically, over the next 5 to 10 years, single party dominance can be expected to continue in largely the present form in Singapore and Malaysia and democratic institutions will become more solidly rooted in Thailand and the Philippines. The greatest potential for major political change exists in Vietnam and Burma. Both have economically dysfunctional authoritarian governments dedicated to regime survival and state security. There is a high likelihood that the Vietnamese regime will have evolved toward a fully free market economy under a government in which communist party rule has either been sharply attenuated or the party itself has evolved into something on the Singapore model. Burma is likely to go through a more wrenching transition with military finally relinquishing the political heights to an elected civilian government while reserving the (perhaps unstated) right to intervene politically if state security or institutional military interests require. The model here would be something like Thailand in the 1970s and 1980s.

The great wildcard in the deck, both economically and politically, is Indonesia. And Indonesia’s economic prospects are closely tied to what...
happens politically. The most likely scenario will see President Megawati reelected in 2004 despite some growth in Islamist political strength. This will mean continued governance by a low-energy, marginally competent, but politically moderate administration. The real question is whether presidential elections in 2009 will provide a transition to a more purposeful government under a new generation of leaders. At this point the odds look 50/50. Partly as a consequence the Indonesian economy will probably exhibit only sluggish growth in the 3 to 4 percent range. That could change for the better if the current process of devolution of political power produces a burst of initiative at the provincial level and outside Java.

The other key variable is foreign investment—whether investors will detect a point where they feel confident Indonesia is politically stabilized and the security situation is under reasonable control. That in turn will focus attention on the Indonesian military (TNI). The TNI emerged from the Suharto period as a wounded institution— politicized and personalized under Suharto and discredited in the eyes of the public by pervasive corruption and human rights abuses. A stable secure Indonesia requires a reformed more professional TNI. But that objective will remain elusive so long as the military continues to have to raise most of its budget itself “on the economy” through methods that range from commercial business to outright extortion.

In all likelihood China will enjoy continued growth in influence in Southeast Asia during the next 5-10 years. This will reflect China’s rising economic and military capability reinforced and exploited by very skilled diplomacy. Laos and Cambodia will be particularly responsive to Chinese influence with Thailand not far behind. The Burmese situation is more brittle. The current regime is more closely aligned with, and dependent upon, China than any other Southeast Asian government. But the potential for an anti-Chinese nationalist backlash is also real—and Beijing knows it. The best guess is that Chinese influence in Burma will be constrained, but still substantial, over the next 5 to 10 years. If communist party and ideology influence diminishes in Vietnam, the void will be filled by nationalism. This will mean a reassertion of Vietnam’s traditional resistance to Chinese dominance. Archipelagic Southeast Asia, more geographically distant from China, will feel growing Chinese influence but will retain a capacity for independent policies toward China.

The X factor in China’s relationship with Southeast Asia is the South China Sea. In recent years China has soft-pedaled and to some extent obfuscated its position. However, there is little doubt that at this point China is determined when its capabilities allow, to assert full sovereign
control over the Sea. For the next 5 to 10 years the issue will not inhibit the growth of Chinese influence assuming Beijing continues to adopt a low posture and avoid provocative initiatives that might alarm regional governments. One serious incident such as a naval clash could alter this picture significantly.

UNITED STATES

The U.S. will be called upon to play three security roles regarding Southeast Asia over the next 5 to 10 years. Each of them is complex and will require a nuanced blending of deterrence, diplomacy and selective development assistance—all backed by a robust war-fighting capability.

The first role is the primary one played by U.S. forces over the last several decades. As the strongest military power in the region, but one with no territorial designs, U.S. forces have served to buttress regional stability—the necessary precondition for economic growth. American forward deployed forces have been the proverbial gendarmes keeping the peace by assuring that neighborhood disputes do not flare out of control and larger neighbors are not tempted to impose their interests. In the process they have assured that the sea-lanes through the region remain open to commercial traffic without danger of interdiction. This broad role will remain vital as the region navigates a period of economic and political uncertainty and adjusts to growing Chinese power. Since the loss of access to air and naval bases in the Philippines, the U.S. military has relied upon negotiated access to facilities in a number of Southeast Asian countries—most notably Singapore where an aircraft carrier pier to accommodate the U.S. navy has been constructed. These access arrangements will remain important in the period under consideration.

In the wake of 9/11 U.S. forces have returned to the Philippines to exercise, train and assist. Although a restoration of a large base presence is highly unlikely, there is some prospect that patient U.S. diplomacy might restore the single most prized asset the U.S. military once had in Southeast Asia—the air-to-ground gunnery range at Crow Valley of particular value to carrier-based pilots.

The second U.S. security role will concern counter-terrorism and will take a variety of forms including close liaison with intelligence and police counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. There is every reason to expect that these relationships will become more robust over the next few years—as long as terrorism remains a first order threat. The most dramatic consequence of the sudden focus on terrorism has
been the return of U.S. troops to the Philippines. President Arroyo has made it clear that she wants the U.S. presence to be sustained indefinitely. Looking to the future, however, two questions arise. Arroyo has already announced she will not run for reelection. It remains to be seen whether her successor will have the same view. Also these deployments are not without strategic risk to the United States. Specifically, U.S. Special Forces in the southern Philippines could well be drawn into the escalating clashes between the Philippine army and the MILF. Unlike Abu Sayyaf, MILF is a mainline Muslim organization with a considerable popular following. The obvious danger is that the U.S. may find itself involved in the decades-old quasi-civil war between Catholic and Muslim Filipinos.

In Indonesia, the counter-terrorism mission is largely one of building the capacity of Indonesian state institutions. Indonesian nationalism and Islamic identification absolutely preclude any introduction of U.S. forces to the archipelago. The key task will be assisting the Indonesian police while reestablishing military-to-military relations with the TNI. The latter will require lowering congressionally mandated barriers while avoiding any collaboration with discredited elements in the TNI.

Terrorism is likely to be a strategic concern of limited duration—perhaps less than a decade. The enduring challenge to Southeast Asian security and to U.S. strategy will come from China. Growing Chinese power and influence cannot be prevented; it is a fundamental historic development and in that sense, entirely legitimate. In the next 5 to 10 years China’s status as Asia’s preeminent great power is likely to become increasingly clear. That does not mean, however, that Southeast Asia fated to be subordinated—a latter-day collection of Chinese satellites. The U.S. will continue to maintain its economic, political, and military presence. American naval and air forces will continue to be the most powerful single military capability in the region. In the most fundamental terms the task facing U.S. strategy is to work with the Southeast Asian states to create conditions that will persuade China that it can settle for a Southeast Asia open to both Chinese and American influence and where the states of the region continue to retain all the prerogatives of sovereignty and where international sea-lanes remain unchallenged.
I am delighted to be with you and to be asked to address a formidably challenging and difficult topic—U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. In looking at the question, I am struck immediately by elements of continuity and change.

In a number of ways the region looks similar to the way it did when I left the State Department in December 2000. This includes the continuing rapid development of China, the dangers posed by the traditional flashpoints from Korea to Kashmir, and the relative weakness of the nascent regional institutions like APEC and ARF.

In other ways, it is a very different region. September 11, the Bali bombing, SARS, Afghanistan, and the influence of the Iraq conflict are all significant. Also, some of the traditional problems like the Korean nuclear situation and the Taiwan Straits have taken on some different twists.

To manage all of this, I want to take a look at the region as a whole, rather than the individual countries. I want to do so from three vantage points—security, economic and diplomacy. Let me try to identify what has changed or is likely to change over the next five to ten years. Let me also draw some implications for American strategy.

I recognize I am venturing into hot water in the sense that I won’t discuss every country in the region individually, including some very good friends of this country. But I hope in the question and answer period that we can touch on issues and countries not covered in my presentation.

SECURITY

Let me begin, as always, with security—a key factor for all states in the region.

We can start by identifying four sets of such issues, that are not necessarily threats, but things that will occupy our time and attention. There are the traditional flashpoints, including Korea, China-Taiwan, and Kashmir. There are the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea. There are the transnational threats, including terrorism, narcotics trafficking, piracy, HIV-AIDS and so on. And then finally the impli-
cations of the U.S. defense policy transformation regarding forward deployment and the future of U.S. forces in the region.

Let me turn first to the flashpoints. Generalization is tough. They are all in different stages. Korea is most acute. Kashmir is warm and perhaps heating. China-Taiwan is cool and growing colder but always dangerous and ready to pop out of the box. Given the new developments in Korea and the overall importance of this crisis, I want to devote some time to it at the end of my remarks.

Let me now jump in with a few brief observations on the other two situations. Kashmir remains dangerous. It doesn’t get consistent U.S. policy attention. Continued infiltration tries Indian patience. Iraq is an enormous invitation to New Delhi to think that the problem might be solved by armed invasion, which even could lead to regime change. Kashmir separatists, according to the CIA, continue to be supported by Pakistan. The real problem is the potential for conflict, which can—I say “can” and not “must”—lead to a powder train leading to a nuclear powder keg.

In India recently, I found great skepticism that the U.S. could or wanted to change Pakistani views; the U.S. was increasingly dependent upon Pakistan for access to and support in Afghanistan and that was that. But today there is somewhat better news. Indian saber-rattling has been replaced, first by a statement by prime minister Vajpayee, that he would talk with Pakistan, a break in Indian policy. This was followed by a phone call from Pakistan’s prime minister to the Indian prime minister to talk about talks. This has been followed by an Indian announcement to reestablish airline and diplomatic relations with Pakistan, broken off in the aftermath of the Kargil crisis and the failure of the talks in Agra.

The implications for us are simple and we seem to have grasped them. Deputy Secretary of State Rich Armitage is on his way out this week. There is a consistent need for high-level attention to bring the parties to the realization that the issues must be addressed. Rich’s trip is important because the last time he went out, he secured a commitment from the Pakistani prime minister to cease infiltration. The commitment hasn’t been kept, but may be renewable.

What the region needs is quiet diplomacy by the U.S. with each of the parties. India will reject the notion of international mediation or an international effort to organize a solution. India seems willing to accept consultation and cooperation with its newfound friends in America, which could lead to a helpful outcome.

What else we need is not only momentary attention in times of crisis, but sustained and continued attention that can lead back to progress.
Kashmir is not easy, like the Middle East has not been easy. But it doesn’t mean that there are no solutions. It does mean that the solutions are tougher to achieve and will require more sustained involvement.

Now let me move on to China-Taiwan. We are talking about it at a comparatively good moment. Beijing seems relatively relaxed, possibly because it believes time is on its side right now and the process of economic integration is working. There are also some important incentives for further Chinese moderation at the present time. China wants to finish economic modernization, which would inevitably be disrupted by a military confrontation over Taiwan. With an equally strong desire to pull off a truly spectacularly successful Olympic games in 2008, battling over the Taiwan Straits would cast an early dark cloud over that prospect.

So barring, as always, unexpected developments from the Taiwan side such as a declaration of independence, the situation seems likely to stay more manageable for the foreseeable future.

The implications for us are clear. Don’t rock or upset the boat by taking steps that might be seen to be encouraging pro-independence moves for Taiwan, and certainly do not deviate from our long-standing and bilaterally approved and supported one-China policy.

Continuing with security, let me look at the myriad maritime territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea. Again, there’s good news—they’ve been quiet lately. There seems to be a conscious decision in Beijing to downplay its claims right now, but not to renounce them, and to focus on other issues. China seems to be bent on trying to implement a de facto good neighbor policy through such steps as the proposed ASEAN-China FTA. It also includes robust high-level diplomacy including head of state participation in the annual 10+3 talks. The implications here for American policy are also clear. We need to be aware and wary that the current lull could end at any time. It only takes another Mischief reef-type incident to make that happen. Since any incident could result in the use of force with the potential to escalate, we now need to take advantage of the current happier atmosphere to get the claimants to strengthen their recent declaratory statements that they won’t use force to resolve the disputes. We should move on from there as well to get them to consider confidence-building measures.

What about the new threats to the region, principally beginning with radical Islam?

Up until now we always believed Islam as practiced in Southeast Asia was moderate and somewhat immune from radicalism imported from the Middle East or elsewhere. But less tolerant forms of Islamic observance
appear to be making inroads now in Indonesia and Malaysia. Some of these unfortunately appear to have ties with terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.

One of the worst circumstances might be the emergence of an Iran-like fundamentalist state in Southeast Asia. Could that come to pass? Probably not highly likely, but nevertheless not totally impossible.

What are the implications for us right now? We can’t keep Southeast Asia permanently on a back burner. Terrorism is a threat, but not the only one to our interests in the region. We should continue to encourage governments to provide better services to their people. Malaysia, of course, has recently moved to help itself by deciding to stop funding some religious schools. But also the U.S. can help. While religious schools of an Islamic and more fundamentalist character have replaced public schools in parts of Malaysia and Indonesia, we need to think about how we can help promote an open, more focused and more effective educational system. Pakistan is a perfect example of what we want to try to avoid. Resources to deal with these problems in a number of these countries, in particular, in Indonesia and the Philippines, would be a worthwhile investment by the United States.

Terrorism, linked in many minds with Islamic fundamentalism, and with the Bali bombing graphically demonstrating an ability to strike in Southeast Asia, is a worrying and potentially very dangerous issue for us in the states of the region.

While the terrorists don’t seem strong enough to overthrow any of the regimes and are unlikely to become so anytime soon, they have a huge disruptive ability in regard to many of the economies. Look at the impact of Bali on tourism. Just imagine the impact of further Bali’s on critical issues like FDI.

What are the implications for our strategy here? Keep building greater cooperation in intelligence-sharing between the U.S. and the regional countries and among themselves. This is also true with efforts to counter radical Islam. We also need to provide greater resources to assist countries, as mentioned earlier, in providing basic services. There may be a need as well for continued and increased military assistance in a few places like the Philippines. That should not be thought of as more than a palliative; total solutions require greater and more far-reaching efforts.

Now let me wind up this section by looking at the transformation of our own defense policy. This may be in effect the greatest change having an impact in the region over the past two years. We used to think that the greatest threat to forward deployment of our forces was from opposition groups in the regions themselves. This is best epitomized by the ubiquitous
“Yankee go home” phrase. That still exists, of course, as we’ve seen in Korea recently. The tragic military accident which killed two young girls there is also the kind of event having a tactical and even strategic impact.

But the bigger source of changes is revolving military doctrine. Our ability to project power over long distances is diminishing the importance of foreign bases. The new priority for light mobile forces diminishes the need for bases for heavy armored and mechanized infantry divisions. While Iraq and the role of the Abrams tank may mitigate this approach, it nevertheless is still one of the central thrusts of transformation.

Right now the Pentagon is working hard on Korean redeployment and possible downsizing. This will have potential impact as well in our military presence in Japan. The State Department is working at updating our current military alliances in the region. They assigned one of our best senior diplomats to the task full time.

What will this mean for U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific? The timing here is critical. So far, it seems like we have a tin ear about getting it right. Military and budget imperatives ought to be considered in the geo-political context. At a time of high tension in the Korean peninsula, it makes no sense to play around with our posture to undermine deterrence. On the other hand, a big in-town presence in Seoul, continued military accidents involving Koreans, and a freeze on cold war deployments in command structures will become less and less viable. A plan is needed to synchronize and interweave the steps that have to be taken in a way that transforms our military while maintaining our diplomatic and strategic edge in the region.

**ECONOMICS**

The Asia-Pacific has been as much buffeted by economic problems since 1997 as anywhere else. September 11, the Bali bombing, lower growth rates, especially in the U.S. and Japan, SARS, and the uncertainties of the Iraq war have all done their bit. If lower oil prices return—and there is reason for real hope in that regard—that may turn this into a net plus.

I think that the U.S. strategy can no longer be based on the success of the aging tigers. In this regard, the Chinese dragon is probably the only real tiger. So far, some countries continue to turn an impressive growth in the region, including Vietnam, Australia and India.

As opposed to a decade ago, we can no longer either be afraid of Japanese economic hegemonism or, even more realistically, assume a robust Japan that will serve as the second locomotive for regional growth. China is moving increasingly into this role.
Political instability in Korea will have its own impact in reducing growth rates in the short term. And longer term prospects will be determined very much by how the unfinished nuclear question plays out.

In Southeast Asia, we will continue to see an economy under siege. Such factors as SARS, terrorism, diversion of FDI to China and away from the region, and governance problems at the national level in Indonesia and the Philippines will continue to assure that uncertainty impacts the area.

Again, what does all this mean for our own policy?

One clear answer is that one size doesn’t fit all in economic policy terms for this complex and complicated region.

In China, we should continue our strategy of avoiding disruptive trade wars of the kind that used to bedevil U.S.-Japanese relations. We need to be alert that with the apparent growing imbalance in trade flows, there will be a real possibility of a protectionist backlash. One key area with China will be WTO implementation. The response so far there is, “so far, so good.” This could result in the creation of a more level and certain playing field.

Another key question is to ensure that Asia that doesn’t split off into a separate trading block under Chinese dominance that discriminates against American products. Close coordination with Japan and Korea on this issue will be very significant. This is particularly true because, unlike the U.S., they belong to such Asia-only institutions as the 10+ 3 grouping—the 10 ASEAN states plus China, Japan and Korea. This is rising in prominence and their influence there can be helpful and positive.

For Japan, the strategy should be a more proactive U.S. effort to help Japan move down the now seemingly impossible track of real economic reform. In Japan, there is an increasing willingness to admit that economic reform hasn’t materialized in any significant fashion. A stagnation is apparent, evident and undeniable. The huge debt overhang poses not just a risk to Japan, but to the entire international financial system.

With gridlock in the political system, some cojones are called for. This could even be welcomed coming from the Bush administration, which has worked hard and successfully to restore luster to U.S.-Japan security relations after the problems of the Clinton years. They have succeeded in making Japan feel like, work like and operate like a valued ally. As a result, sincere and frank economic advice, even if necessarily tough, may be more palatable.

In Southeast Asia, the strategy should be premised on enhanced resources to help governments battle the twin threats of terror and Islamic fundamentalism. Technical assistance, technology transfer and trade and export credits may also help them attract back FDI now flowing to China. Keeping U.S. markets open will be critical also.
In South Asia, increased trade, investment and access will pay dividends, particularly in India. Gradually, India is shedding some of its malign, unpredictable and difficult controls over foreign investment. The IT industry as developed in India has literally escaped from and continues to run ahead of the efforts of government bureaucrats to control it. It’s a perfect pattern of success for the future. India could well duplicate it in engineering, R&D and other areas, given its tremendous advantages in education. The other parts of the region will be dependent upon continued assistance programs. Pakistan will need to continue to struggle hard to get its economic house in order, despite the fact that it has first-class economic leadership in some of the key ministries.

DIPLOMACY

Here there are two points of interest at the present time, one general and one country-specific.

First, we must understand that despite the high priority which Asia enjoys in any objective assessment of our national interest, it has not yet received the level of attention or resources that such priorities require. A successful Asian strategy is not available to us, on the cheap, or with part-time, sporadic or uncertain attention.

Secondly, our diplomacy in the region will continue to be challenged and tested by the expected continuation of rapid growth in China. This will result inevitably in a concomitant rise in Chinese power and influence in the region and beyond.

By saying this, I’m the last person in the world to suggest that the U.S. and China are inevitably enemies, competitors or adversaries. On the contrary, we have a number of true, shared interests. This is a concept which happily the Bush administration has come to share post 9/11.

China’s help at the time of heightened tension on the Korean peninsula in organizing talks in Beijing a week ago is clearly obvious. But there are other common interests which we share, including everything from world peace and security and stability, through cooperation in fighting terrorism, fundamentalism, crime, and narcotics trafficking, to further cooperation at the United Nations, particularly in the runout of efforts to help Iraq recover and the Middle Eastern region to take advantage of the new situation created by military victory in Iraq.

But we need to realize that while we work with China on a range of issues, we are also competing with China on another series of issues. China is assuming a higher security, economic and diplomatic profile in the region. The Beijing proposal for an ASEAN-China FTA and the strong
support for a 10+3 meeting as an Asians-only event are significant. We should anticipate further such initiatives for the future.

We should particularly look at the economic area. As China increasingly develops its manufacturing prowess and power, we will see it as a competitor, even in high-tech sectors. This is already taking place in the area of computers and cell phones.

We should not shrink from this competition or be afraid of it. We must of course be prepared to compete, and we must be prepared as well to cooperate and develop the advantages of partnership in that regard. We need to put the resources into this effort.

THE NORTH KOREAN CHALLENGE

Now let me turn to a conclusion based around an issue we’ve all followed closely over the last weeks.

North Korea and the nuclear problem remain front and center for us as a critical issue. One could at least postulate three options with respect to an outcome. One of these would be the use of force, the second a de facto U.S. acceptance of the North Korean nuclear capability, and third, a negotiated solution.

Let me just say a few words about each.

On the use of force, happily both North Korea and the U.S. have significant disincentives to move in that direction. Any Northern attack on the South would only lead to the kind of full-scale conflict that would result in the defeat of the North and regime change. However, the North’s ability through artillery and rocket attack to devastate the densely populated region between the DMZ and Seoul should ensure that this administration always takes this capability into account in considering any type of attack against the nuclear facilities in the North.

In light of these considerations, the danger of a conflict comes rather from accident or miscalculation and not a deliberate decision to use force.

The de facto acceptance of the North Korean nuclear capability by the U.S. is very difficult to envisage. But it’s not hard to imagine that we could get into a scenario where the U.S. would in the end choose not to do much about the development of such capability. Today’s press might foreshadow some of this with its focus on DPRK sales of sensitive material.

If military action to take out such a capability becomes too problematic, that would push further toward ignoring it.

It also doesn’t also seem likely that key players would support us in the UN Security Council to introduce sanctions at this time.
The U.S. might be left with an ineffectual response of continuing its current sanctions and perhaps persuading a small number of countries such as the UK, Australia and perhaps even Japan to support a policy of isolation.

For some, this might be the most likely outcome of the current crisis. Not having good options on the military side and not wanting to reward bad North Korean behavior by initiating direct negotiations to buy out the North’s program with some combination of incentives might well put us in such a place where we would have no place else to go.

The danger here is less that the North would risk its own destruction by using its nuclear weapons against the neighborhood or the U.S., but rather the North would exploit its possession once again to go, as it has so many times in the past, into the market. Sales to rogue regimes, terrorist groups or others would not only be possible, but perhaps even likely.

There is also the not inconsiderable risk that such a program in the DPRK would trigger a destabilizing nuclear arms race in the neighborhood, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. These are serious and sensitive consequences that can’t be ignored.

Finally, there is a question of a negotiated solution. While the recent talks contained their own usual combination of good news and bad news, I am not discouraged. The reports tended to substantiate what we have been led to believe has been the conclusion of our CIA for some time. The negotiating behavior is shrill, confrontational, harsh and brutal, but in keeping with the traditional DPRK approach, which seems to be more interested in calling for attention to itself than working out an answer.

On the side of the North, nuclear weapons don’t solve its fundamental problem—the collapse of the economy. Only an end to its isolation, coupled with reform and aid, can solve its huge economic problems. Nuclear weapons will only increase its isolation.

The North has a built-in incentive to find a way out of the current crisis, provided the revival of the economy is an imperative for its leadership. Then it will have to choose between nuclear weapons and economic success.

On our side, the benefit of a negotiated solution is obvious: to eliminate multiple risks of war, of the proliferating sale of fissile material to terrorists in third countries, and of the initiation of a regional nuclear arms race.

What a negotiated solution would look like is probably somewhat beyond the scope of what I can talk about today. The bad news seems to be that the North is proposing elements that are a non-starter from the western point of view. The good news however is that they have put forward a proposal and started the process that could lead to bargaining.
What is clear is that any likely solution would have to fall into the category of a grand bargain.

North Korea would have to re-freeze its plutonium-based program and dismantle its uranium-based program with all of the verification and intrusive onsite inspection necessary to ensure that there would be no danger of future violations of any follow-on agreement.

On its side, the North clearly wishes to receive a written non-aggression commitment from the United States, a repeal of U.S. sanctions against it (which North Korea, in a highly unrealistic way, seems to believe is solely responsible for its economic collapse), and a serious and large provision of economic assistance, with Japan and the Republic of South Korea helping us to provide the bulk of that aid. Diplomatic relations and their establishment would not be beyond the bounds of such a grand bargain.

Getting going on this remains one of the principal difficulties. The recent three-way talks in Beijing were a necessary step for creating the right mechanism. There were not yet, as I understand it, negotiations. They could have, and probably have had the effect of opening a still somewhat rocky, cluttered and obstacle-strewn path that could initiate a process. More talks should follow.

Diplomacy is most successful when, faced with bad options, it chooses the one that provides the longest term chance for success. President Kennedy saw this clearly in the Cuban missile crisis. In another case where nuclear weapons haunt the scene, President Bush has an equally challenging opportunity.
## Conference Agenda

### U.S. STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

* A U.S. Army Eisenhower National Security Series Event

May 5, 2003
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC

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Paper #1: Michael McDevitt

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1545 – 1600  BREAK

1600 – 1700  PUTTING IT TOGETHER: A U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Discussion Leader: Ralph A. Cossa

Chair: William M. Wise
Participant Biographies

**KURT CAMPBELL** is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He also holds the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security at CSIS. Previously, he served in several capacities in the U.S. government, including deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific, director on the National Security Council staff, and deputy special counselor to the President for NAFTA, and taught at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Dr. Campbell holds a doctorate in international relations from Oxford University.

**RALPH A. COSSA** is president of Pacific Forum/CSIS in Hawaii. He is a retired USAF colonel and is active in the field of Asian security studies, serving on the steering committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, as executive director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP, and as a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Mr. Cossa is also a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. He received an MBA from Pepperdine University and an MS from the Defense Intelligence College.

**AARON L. FRIEDBERG** was professor of politics and international affairs and director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University at the time of this conference. He has since then joined the staff of Vice President Richard Cheney. He has also served as a consultant to the National Security Council, the Office of Net Assessment in the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the George C. Marshall Center, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is the co-editor (with Richard Ellings) of Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose and Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian Aftershocks (both published by NBR Research). Dr. Friedberg received his Ph.D. from Harvard University.

**LEE H. HAMILTON** is president and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Prior to assuming his current position, he served for 34 years as a United States congressman from Indiana. During his tenure, he served as chairman and ranking member of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs and chaired the subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East from the early 1970s until 1993. He also served as chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. He is currently a member of the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council and vice-chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. He is a graduate of DePauw University and Indiana University Law School.

ROBERT M. HATHAWAY is director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Prior to assuming his current position, he served for twelve years on the professional staff of the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, where he specialized in American foreign policy toward Asia. Dr. Hathaway has authored three books and numerous articles on U.S. foreign policy since 1933.

DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR. is Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army. His military career spans over 32 years. During this period, MG Huntoon has commanded at every level from company to brigade and served as Executive officer to the Army Chief of Staff and Assistant Division Commander. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a Masters in International Relations from Georgetown University.

KARL D. JACKSON is the C.V. Starr Distinguished Professor and director of Southeast Asian Studies at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. His government service includes positions as Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (1991-1992), senior director for Asia, National Security Council (1989-1991), and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific (1986-1989). He has published on Islamic extremism in Indonesia, the Indonesian domestic political system, the Khmer Rouge, Thai political and economic affairs, and the Asian financial crisis. Currently he is writing a comparative study of civil society and democratic political behavior in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea. He received his doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

MICHAEL McDEVITT is the director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the CNA Corporation. A rear admiral (ret.) in the U.S. Navy, he was formerly director of Strategy, Policy and Plans for the Commander-in-Chief,
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