China’s “Credibility Gap”: Public Opinion and Instability in China

ABSTRACT: This Special Report examines public opinion and instability in China. Martin King Whyte of Harvard University presents his findings from a survey conducted in Beijing on popular views about inequality. According to him, most respondents thought that current income gaps in China were too large, but believed that they have opportunity to move upward. Jie Chen of Old Dominion University argues that the Chinese regime still enjoys a moderately high level of public support among urban Chinese. However, the overall level of support appears to be declining in the long run, due to Beijing’s inability to combat rampant corruption and minimize the income gap. Edward Friedman of the University of Wisconsin at Madison maintains that the findings of urban surveys can be misleading because of the tendency of respondents to give the “correct” answer following the official story. Given social polarization and regional disparity, Chinese society is less stable than some surveys suggest. Yongming Zhou of the University of Wisconsin at Madison points out that Chinese nationalism in the 1990s is less emotionally charged or ideologically biased than that in the 1960s, but more rationally driven by national interests. Thus, Beijing is less likely to manipulate or control nationalism. This Special Report concludes that China’s stability hinges on how the government embraces public opinion and addresses popular concerns.

Introduction

China’s reform and openness, while keeping the country’s engine of economic growth running, have created a series of social problems, including widespread corruption, regional disparity and social protests. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promises to deliver wealth to all people, the increasing gap between rich and poor has shattered the credibility of the Party among the general public. The growing numbers of unemployed workers and underemployed farmers have provided new sources for social instability. The Party’s recent initiative in redefining itself as a vanguard team not just for the working class, but also for all the Chinese people, reflects Beijing’s efforts to expand its base of support. However, it may also promote new political tension between social elites and desperate laborers in the coming years.

Is China fragmenting? Has the government lost the support of the populace? Is the gap between public opinion and government policies growing? What does the public in China think about domestic and foreign issues, such as the pace of economic and political reform, official corruption, public security, social equality, urban unemployment, rural disorder, economic globalization, and U.S.-China relations? Is public opinion supportive of the Chinese government in general? How has growing nationalism among the public created new pressures on Beijing? What are the main channels in China for the expression of public opinion?

This Special Report is a follow-up to a March 6 seminar on Public Opinion and Instability in China, hosted by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. The four essays

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collected here explore the above-mentioned questions from different perspectives, employing both quantitative and qualitative approaches. While all the essayists observe an increasing gap between the government’s position and public opinion in China, they differ as to whether such a gap has resulted in social instability in China.

The first essay, by Martin King Whyte of Harvard University, reviews two different arguments—the “stability” scenario and the “chaos” scenario—that have been advanced in regard to future social tensions and political stability in China. As Whyte notes, most versions of the “stability” scenario emphasize the extraordinary improvements in the lives of the Chinese citizens since China’s reform, while those who espouse various versions of the “chaos” scenario stress the wrenching and destabilizing consequences of the shift from centrally planned socialism to a market society. Whyte presents his preliminary findings from a survey project conducted in Beijing on Chinese popular views about inequality. According to him, most Beijing residents interviewed thought that current income gaps in China were too large, and that “system failure” was somewhat responsible for the poverty of many families. However, most respondents agreed that their lives were improving and there was still the opportunity for upward mobility under the current regime.

Whyte admits that his discussion of Chinese public opinion on inequality may be questioned because public opinion in Beijing is not necessarily representative of other parts of China. Until a larger survey study in widely contrasting locales in China is conducted, however, the Beijing survey data provides more support for the stability than for the chaos scenario, Whyte maintains.

The second essay, by Woodrow Wilson Center/George Washington University Asian Policy Studies fellow Jie Chen from Old Dominion University, discusses the results of three public surveys he conducted in Beijing over the past several years. Chen argues that the current Chinese regime still enjoys a moderately high level of public support among urban Chinese, but the overall level of support appears to be declining in the long run. According to Chen, people who highly evaluate the government’s policy performance, have strong nationalist sentiment, or prefer stability tend to be more supportive of the current regime, while those who believe in democratic values and support political reform tend to be less supportive of the regime.

Like Whyte, Chen admits that the Beijing surveys used in his analysis are not necessarily representative of all China, but he believes his findings are heuristic for understanding the legitimacy of the Chinese regime. The success of the regime comes from the government’s relentless propaganda to portray itself as the only guarantor for sociopolitical stability and the defender of national interests. But the failure of the regime is its alienation from those who believe in democracy and support political reform, and its inability to combat rampant corruption and minimize the gap between rich and poor. Chen believes that the incoming post-Jiang leadership will inherit both success and failure of its predecessor in strengthening regime legitimacy, which hinges on whether the new leadership can take more substantive measures to push political reform and address serious social issues.

In the third essay, Edward Friedman of the University of Wisconsin at Madison provides an analytic reinterpretation of public opinion in China, in contrast to the urban surveys conducted by Whyte and Chen. According to Friedman, people surveyed in China tend to live on official and unofficial levels. Should a question touch on politically sensitive issues, the respondent’s tendency is to give the “correct” answer, following the official story. At the unofficial level, people express a less censored view of the world, revealing other political worldviews than those scripted in the official discourse.
The results of public opinion surveys in China, therefore, can be misleading.

Studies of public opinion in China should first ask how different groups comprehend China’s policy possibilities in different ways. Friedman lists China’s four different regions—a patriotic region centering on Beijing, a south and east coastal region, a central region, and a vast west region—with great disparity in terms of public opinion. In particular, he points out that Beijing residents are far more likely to consider the official story as their genuine opinion. Observing how social polarization is vividly captured in popular doggerel verse, Friedman concludes that Chinese society is less stable than some of the public opinion surveys suggest.

The fourth essay by Woodrow Wilson Center fellow Yongming Zhou from the University of Wisconsin at Madison explores an emerging paradigm of Chinese nationalist discourse based on a trinity of concepts: comprehensive national power, national interest, and the “rules of the game.” The concept of comprehensive national power provides Chinese with a much-sought boost to express their pride in China. The concept of national interest legitimizes the new paradigm by giving it the basis of rational thinking. The concept of the rules of the game aims at promoting Chinese interests by joining international “games” (such as the WTO) and modifying the existing rules to China’s advantage. According to Zhou, a general weakness of recent discussion of Chinese nationalism is that too much attention has been given to the nationalism per se, thus missing the broader picture. The fundamental difference between Chinese nationalists of the 1960s and those of the 1990s, as Zhou argues, is that the latter are well informed, and thus less receptive to official manipulation. It is therefore not the lack of access to, but rather the interpretation of the available information that is crucial. Compared with previous paradigms—social Darwinism and proletarian internationalism—employed by Chinese nationalists, this interest-driven-game-playing paradigm is less emotionally charged, less ideologically biased, and more rationally driven, Zhou concludes.

These four essays focus on economic inequality, regional disparity, rampant corruption and rising nationalism as engines of growing discontent within the Chinese populace. While the four essayists vary as to the degree of social instability in China, they agree that the future survival of the current authoritarian regime is contingent upon how the government embraces public opinion and undertakes the necessary reforms to address the people’s concerns. Thus, public opinion, as well as Beijing’s response to it, can serve as a gauge of political stability in China, a country amid unprecedented leadership transition and social transformation.
Speculating about future social tensions and political stability in China has become a cottage industry of late, particularly in Washington, D.C. When you look at the products of this industry, the first thing that strikes you is how wildly diverse are the predictions that are made. On the one hand you have a number of analyses that stress the sources of stability and support for the status quo, on the other hand you have a variety of accounts suggesting that China is a “social volcano” that could explode any minute. Given this lack of consensus, one is naturally reminded of the fable of the blind men groping at various extremities of an elephant. Is there any way that we can go beyond wildly varying speculations in order to reach more informed estimates of China’s potential for stability versus chaos?

In this essay I want to do several things. First, I will briefly review some of the arguments that have been advanced in favor of either the “stability” or the “chaos” scenario in these debates. In doing so I will particularly focus on inequality trends and their implications for popular feelings about social justice or injustice, since inequality issues are at the heart of most discussions of social tensions in China today. Then I will present some preliminary and intriguing survey results from a research project that I have launched with both U.S. and Chinese collaborators. Our project is designed to shed more light on how ordinary Chinese view the changes in the structure of rewards and opportunities within which they operate. Perhaps the evidence we are seeking can help make analyses of China’s future less speculative.

**Stability?**

Most versions of the “stability” scenario emphasize the extraordinary improvements that have occurred in the lives of Chinese citizens since China’s reforms were launched in 1978. While recognizing that the pace of such improvements was more rapid in the 1980s than recently, the continuing ability of China’s leaders to keep the engine of economic growth going is seen as creating a powerful source for social stability. In essence this analysis contends that Deng Xiaoping’s original calculation in rejecting Mao’s version of spartan socialism and replacing it with the competitive and acquisitive ethos of market capitalism was correct and continues to pay off today. The “carrot” of potential economic gains and new opportunities, when combined with the “stick” of state coercion against any who threaten social stability, produce an inclination for most Chinese to work hard and keep their nose to the grindstone. Consequently, most take little interest in politics and try to stay out of trouble. The predominant feelings are some combination of gratitude, acceptance, and apathy, rather than discontent and outrage.

Awareness of rampant corruption and the role of connections in becoming rich do generate popular anger. However, the continued generation of new opportunities for economic gain by ordinary people, the acquisition of new consumer goods, and improving lifestyles convince many Chinese that the
benefits of China’s evolving reforms are not being monopolized by the powerful and wealthy. Rather, much of China’s new prosperity is seen as “trickling down” to the common people, who can take advantage and prosper despite the existence of bureaucratic corruption and the unfair advantages of the well-connected. Many of those whose lives have improved in recent years feel that China today is a more equitable society than in the Mao era, despite prevalent corruption and injustice. Individuals and families can try to improve their lot through their own efforts, rather than being locked into the bureaucratic dependency of the Mao era. Those who work harder or contribute more are likely to be rewarded, rather than receiving just the same as their more slothful neighbors and colleagues.

Even those groups that have been “losers” in the reform game have their potential for anger and protest blunted by a number of features of the current scene. For example, laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have clear reasons to feel that they are being treated shabbily after years or even decades of loyal service. However, to date the problems of SOE workers have been manifested in many local and mostly brief protests, but no serious challenge to state authority. The reasons that the millions of unemployed and laid-off workers have not produced more turbulence can be debated. Among the factors at work, in addition to the threat of state coercion, may be some combination of new employment possibilities; fear of losing retained livelihood supplement, housing, and other benefits; the government’s concessions and at least partial payments in response to some protests; and perhaps even some grudging acceptance of the claim that many SOEs are overstaffed and inefficient. Workers may blame their firm’s managers for their poor fate, rather than themselves or bad luck. But they do not seem all that likely to blame the system or its top leadership.

Seen in these terms, Deng Xiaoping’s dramatic alteration of the social contract between the state and its citizens may contribute to political stability by defusing an important but often overlooked vulnerability of centrally-planned socialist societies. State socialism is so structured that the Party elite monopolizes all power and decision-making. By so doing they are able to claim credit for any improvements that occur in the lives of citizens, thus poten-

tially reinforcing Party prestige and legitimacy. However, by that same token when people’s lives take a turn for the worse, there is a natural tendency to hold the system and the Party elite ultimately responsible. In a well-developed market society, in contrast, the connection between individual economic fates and decisions at the top of society is considerably more indirect and obscure. People who are not doing as well as they think they should be may blame themselves, bad luck, or perhaps individual employers or local officials. However, they are less likely than in a centrally planned economy to blame the system as a whole. China is still engaged in the transition to a market society, but the situation regarding disgruntled groups such as laid-off state workers might suggest that some of this tendency that markets diffuse and thus defuse blame may already be at work.

Another way to frame the “stability” scenario is to say that after an interlude of experience in the very peculiar social order that Mao Zedong presided over, China has once again become a “normal” if contentious society. Normal means not only a society more similar to market societies around the world, but more like China itself in the decades prior to 1949. It is a society with very substantial inequalities of power, wealth, and other resources, and in all such societies, individuals and groups do not have equal opportunities to get ahead. However, the stability scenario stresses that it is also a fairly open and dynamically growing society in which there are lots of opportunities for ordinary individuals to succeed and enrich themselves and their families, despite the unevenness of the “playing field.” These opportunities and the optimism they create can help to make the status quo acceptable to many Chinese.

**Chaos?**

Those who espouse various versions of the “chaos” scenario, on the other hand, stress the wrenching and destabilizing consequences of the shift from centrally planned socialism to a market society. The “rules of the game” by which Chinese citizens planned their lives for so many years have been undermined, producing an altered set of winners and losers. Many of the social evils that socialism was designed to eliminate—foreign ownership, land-
lordism, unemployment, criminal syndicates, prostitution, and so forth—are abundantly in evidence once again. Inequalities in income and wealth are seen as growing rapidly, and as not justified by national needs or meritocratic efficiency. Many of the benefits of the reforms are seen as monopolized by the rich and powerful, whose gains are due to corruption and connections, rather than to entrepreneurship, hard work, or contributions to social welfare. Gratitude for past improvements in general living standards has faded as the struggle to meet family needs has become more difficult and unpredictable. The specter of loss of employment, health insurance coverage, and other basics of life that has resulted from the state-led assault on the “iron rice bowl” security of the socialist era fosters nostalgia for the days when Mao Zedong was in charge of the nation’s fate.

In this context many Chinese feel that their leaders and the Party have turned away from their traditional worker and peasant allies and are mostly concerned these days with the needs and concerns of entrepreneurs, foreign businessmen, and other groups that already enjoy advantages. The emphasis on economic growth when combined with market-oriented decentralization has placed heightened power and autonomy in the hands of local elites and gatekeepers—local officials, managers, and entrepreneurs. These key actors are not only given free rein, but are also strongly pressured, to adopt whatever measures they deem necessary to squeeze more profits out of their economic undertakings. The result is that the needs and past contributions of ordinary employees are increasingly ignored, while the potential for local elites to abuse their power and enrich themselves has increased immeasurably.

The collapse of the socialist project and of faith in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, in the context of market competition and the emergence of capitalist or quasi-capitalist institutions, is seen as producing an amoral, man-eat-man struggle in which leaders at all levels are increasingly venal and self-serving. The rules of the game in China’s increasingly marketized society are stacked in favor of the powerful and wealthy, while ordinary people have few resources with which to challenge or change the situation. Official coercion is the main force supporting the status quo, since it remains difficult for any discontented voices to be heard, and particularly to find organizational form. The apparent stability and disinterest in politics stressed in the stability scenario are seen as illusory by the rival, chaos camp. Anger and alienation from the system and its leaders are seen as increasingly widespread, but hidden beneath the surface maintained by official coercion. If the coercive diligence of the state should be weakened, as happened in 1989, then China may be headed for a social explosion and a very uncertain political future.

It is obvious that these competing scenarios see the contrast between the Mao and the present eras in quite different terms. In the stability scenario, Maoist socialism was the “bad old days,” and whatever the defects of the distributional system today, China at least is a better society offering much more rewards and opportunities to most of its citizens. In the chaos scenario, in contrast, the Mao era, whatever its defects, offered considerable security and predictability, with an accepted ideology that made it seem fair to most—enough so to qualify as the “good old days.” The current scene, in contrast, is seen as much more insecure and unjust, with the nation and its fate increasingly at the mercy of the rich and powerful.

Put in these terms, it is clear that the tradeoffs involved are ones debated for decades if not centuries, and in many places besides China. Which is a more just society—one that locks its citizens into secure niches determined by a purportedly benevolent state, or one that allows citizens to compete with one another for a variety of rewards and opportunities not under direct state control, but also allows them to fail and fall into destitution? In this context we can raise a number of concrete questions about the current views and preferences of ordinary people in China. What sort of society do they think is most desirable and fair, and how much do they think that China at present departs from those preferences and standards? Do they think that China has too much inequality these days, or that such inequality is necessary for China’s development? To what extent are they nostalgic for the security of the Mao era, or do they prefer the competitive but insecure environment they face today? To what degree do Chinese citizens feel that the benefits of the reforms have been monopolized by the rich and powerful, or do they feel that they are being widely shared? Do they think the government should be
doing more to limit inequalities and redistribute from the rich to the poor, or that those who have prospered deserve their advantages? If we can answer questions such as these we may be able to make our analyses of China’s social tensions less speculative.

The Chinese Perceptions of Inequality

In the remainder of this brief essay I want to present some preliminary results of a survey project in China that I have been directing for the last three years. Working with a number of colleagues both in the United States and in China, we hope to carry out surveys of representative samples of urban residents, urban migrants from rural areas, and peasants in eight locations in different regions of China. Our planned surveys will focus on the kinds of issues about popular perceptions of inequality and social justice values that I have been discussing. In order to test the waters and see if this kind of survey work is feasible in China currently, my colleagues and I carried out a pilot survey in Beijing at the end of 2000 which contained a module of questions focusing on these issues. We successfully completed interviews with a probability sample of 757 registered residents of Beijing.

We are still in the early stages of analyzing data from the Beijing survey. Here I will present a small sampling of some of our results from this survey and then try to draw some possible implications for considering whether China will continue to experience rough stability or may be headed for chaos. Our Beijing questionnaire contained questions designed to tap a variety of sentiments, including perceptions of the current system of rewards and distribution in China, level of optimism regarding personal chances to get ahead, and views about what system of distribution is most fair.

To start this discussion I want to draw attention to patterns of responses in our Beijing survey that might be interpreted as lending support to the chaos scenario. For example, 95% of Beijing residents interviewed thought that current income gaps in China were too large, and the same percentage agreed with statements that it was the responsibility of the government to provide jobs to everyone wanting to work and that the government should guarantee a minimum standard of living for everyone. On related themes, 85% of Beijing residents felt that “system failure” was at least somewhat responsible for families living in poverty, while 91% said that having connections had at least some influence on determining who became rich. About two thirds of our Beijing sample disagreed with a statement that it was fair for people with power to enjoy special treatment and privileges, while 60% disagreed with a statement that it was fair to lay off large numbers of workers in order to reform state enterprises. More respondents agreed than disagreed with two other statements: that “in the current situation it is hard to know what is just or unjust anymore”(44% versus 38%) and that “officials do not care what ordinary people like me think”(45% versus 34%).

There were responses to other questions we asked that seem to fit the same pattern, suggesting a perception that the current system of distribution in China is too unequal and unfair, and that the pattern of winners and losers is unjust rather than equitable. However, there were responses to other questions in the Beijing survey that yielded a quite different picture. About 69% of Beijing respondents said that their families were doing better economically than they were five years earlier; almost the same proportion (68%) expected to be doing better economically five years after our survey; and only a minority of respondents (24%) took exception to a statement that in China as a whole, ordinary people have a good chance to improve their standards of living. In response to questions about the background factors that are important for career success, education and hard work were ranked as significantly more important than having connections to high officials or personal guanxi networks. In questions related to support for market distribution, 64% of Beijing respondents agreed with a statement that the free market is vital to China’s economic development; 58% agreed with a statement that society as a whole benefits if each individual pursues his own immediate interests; and 74% agreed that mental labor is more valuable than manual labor. In a similar vein, only 17% of our respondents thought that the fairest system of distribution would be to give everyone an equal share; 68% agreed that it was fair to allow everyone to keep what they had earned even if this fostered inequality; and by large margins they agreed that it was fair for rich people to obtain better education for their children (82%) and obtain better
housing than ordinary people (74%). It is also worth noting that while the great majority of respondents said that the income gaps in China were too large, by a small margin more thought that the income gaps in their own work unit were about right or too small (51%) than thought they were too large (49%). Responses to these and other questions we asked do not seem to indicate much overall condemnation of the current distributive system. Rather, they lend support instead to the stability scenario, with substantial acceptance and optimism despite the evident lack of equal opportunity.

How can we reconcile these apparently contradictory findings? Our questions were based substantially, although not entirely, on surveys dealing with inequality and social justice issues that had been carried out in other countries during the preceding decade. Many of our specific questions were replications of questions employed in the International Social Justice Project or in surveys of the International Social Survey Program, which surveyed countries in Eastern and Western Europe, the United States, Japan, and a number of other countries. For some enlightenment about how to interpret our Beijing survey results, we can turn to the findings of this broader literature.4

The findings of this general “social justice” literature are complex, with substantial variation across countries and some changes over time. However, in most of the other countries surveyed, the majority of respondents support neither a pure market nor a radical egalitarian system of distribution. Instead there tends to be most support for a sort of welfare market society, in which the government acts to provide certain basic guarantees of jobs and livelihoods and to promote equality of opportunity, but which allows individual and family competition, with the winners entitled to enjoy and pass on their rewards. In other words, Beijing residents are not unusual in voicing support for a combination of redistributive/egalitarian and market/meritocratic principles of distribution.

Saying that our Beijing results are in the same general ballpark as those from many other countries is not very satisfying, however, in terms of our effort to judge the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the current set of disparities and opportunities. Let me conclude by presenting a few results based upon a more precise comparison—of our Beijing results with those obtained from a probability sample survey conducted in 2001 in Warsaw, Poland.5

The Warsaw survey incorporated many of the same questions that we had asked in Beijing, and we are just beginning to compare the results. Both are capital cities of societies that have embarked on the transition away from centrally planned socialism. However, it is obvious that the two societies and their capitals differ in many important ways. For example, Poland has made a political transition to democracy while China has not; China has generally been more successful in sustaining high economic growth (although Poland has recovered much better from the shock of transition than most other East European states), and inequalities have widened more in China than in Poland. Putting such differences aside for the moment, what can we learn about the pattern of attitudes toward inequality issues in Warsaw and Beijing?

I will try to give some sense of the pattern of responses in these two capital cities by analyzing responses to a few of the questions asked in both places. When asked how they would judge the income differences in their societies, large majorities of both Warsaw and Beijing residents judged the differences were too large, with this sentiment stronger among those in the Chinese capital (94% versus 87%). On the other hand, substantial majorities in both cities said that the free market was vital to their society’s development, with stronger support for this statement in Warsaw than in Beijing (75% versus 64%). Poles seemed in general more pessimistic about their country’s economic prospects. For example, many more Warsaw than Beijing residents (78% versus 38%) expected the proportion of poor people in the country to increase over the next five years. Poles and Chinese surveyed had similar views on the great importance of factors such as ability, effort, and education in avoiding poverty. For example, about half of the respondents in both cities thought that lack of effort was a great or very great influence on whether an individual was poor or not. However, many more Poles than Chinese blamed the system itself for the plight of the poor. For example, 74% of Warsaw residents saw system failure as a very great or great influence on whether people were in poverty, whereas that was the case for only 34% of the Beijing residents. Similarly, Warsaw residents saw personal connections and contacts with
the powerful as even more important than did Beijing residents in explaining why some people became rich, and they were also much more likely to stress dishonesty as the explanation for current wealth.6

Beijing residents were more optimistic than their Warsaw counterparts not only about the prospects for the country, but also about their own prospects, while also being somewhat more approving of allowing “winners” to enjoy their gains. Specifically, Beijing residents were somewhat more in favor than their Warsaw counterparts of allowing the wealthy to enjoy and pass on their advantages in realms such as schooling for their children, medical care, and housing.7 Many fewer Warsaw than Beijing residents expected to be doing better in five years than they were at that time (28% versus 68%), and many more Beijingers than Warsaw residents agreed with the statement that in the current situation people like the respondent had good chances to improve their standard of living (45% versus 14%). Finally, many more Warsaw than Beijing residents agreed with the statement that public officials did not care what people like the respondent thought (78% versus 45%).

Although these are only a few of the comparisons possible, in general they suggest a pattern. While Beijing residents have critical views about many aspects of the current structure of inequality, in general they seem markedly less critical, and more optimistic, than their counterparts in Warsaw. If anything they have more faith than Warsaw residents that education and hard work will be rewarded, and they are somewhat less likely to see the deck as stacked in favor of the rich and powerful. In other words, once we put the Beijing data in a comparative framework, it is not clear that they display unusually high levels of dissatisfaction with the status quo. To the extent that they can do this they hope they can avoid serious challenges to their continued rule. If the Beijing data are at all relevant to the situation in the rest of the country, they suggest that this strategy is still providing dividends by reinforcing the status quo.

**Endnotes**

1. In a recent publication I summarized some of the issues raised in these debates. See my chapter “Chinese Social Trends: Stability or Chaos?” in David Shambaugh, ed., *Is China Unstable?* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

2. My primary U.S. collaborators are Wang Feng (University of California at Irvine), Jieming Chen (Texas A&M University at Kingsville), and Albert Park (University of Michigan), with assistance and support from David Featherman, the director of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. We are working particularly with Shen Mingming, professor of political science and director of the Research Center on Contemporary China at Beijing University. Since 1995 Professor Shen has been carrying out an annual Beijing Area Study, and our module of inequality questions was included in the 2000 version of that survey enterprise.

3. We also conducted a “pilot within a pilot” by interviewing 128 rural migrants who resided in five
of the fifty neighborhoods included in the 2000 Beijing survey. However, migrant responses to our questions will not be discussed here.


5. The Warsaw study was a survey of 1003 representative adult residents of that city conducted by Bogdan Cichomski and other scholars at the Institute for Social Studies at Warsaw University.

6. Specifically, 61% of Warsaw residents said that connections had a “very great” influence on who became rich, while 44% said that dishonesty had a very great influence. The comparable figures for Beijing residents were only 21% and 5%.

7. For example, 82% of Beijing residents said it was fair for those who could afford it to obtain better education for their children, while only 55% of Warsaw residents voiced this view.
Popular Support for the Political Regime in China: Intensity and Sources

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Popular support for a political regime, especially support from sizable segments of a society, is critical for the functioning and maintenance of any form of government. In democratic systems, it is quite obvious that the level of popular support significantly influences both the functioning and the stability of governments (especially in crises), since democratic governments can exist and operate only with the consent of the people. In non-democratic systems, such as China and the former Soviet Union, while order is usually maintained by coercion and/or monolithic ideologies, prolonged absence of political support may also eventually bring about political instabilities and even “revolutionary alteration of the political and social system.” Such political instabilities and revolutions, for example, had been already witnessed in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In general, therefore, “societies with legitimate authority systems (i.e., ones enjoying popular support) are more likely to survive than those without.”

Thus, I assume that whether or not the current Chinese authoritarian government can maintain sociopolitical stability depends, in large part, upon the level of popular support for the political regime, especially after the original official ideology—Maoism—was much shattered in the reform era. How much support does the current Chinese political regime enjoy from Chinese citizens? And why do or do not Chinese citizens support the political regime? In this analysis, I attempt to answer these two fundamental questions, based on data collected from three longitudinal surveys conducted in Beijing from 1995 to 1999.

How Much Support Does the Current Regime Enjoy?

A. Measurement of popular support for the political regime

Popular support for a political regime, or “regime legitimacy,” is defined as the “diffuse or generalized attachments” members of a polity have for the government and political system in general. Unlike the public’s evaluation of specific government policies, which is formed in a relatively short period of time and is subject to spontaneous responses to specific policies, support for a political regime represents an entrenched emotional attachment, taking years to form. Once shaped, such a generalized emotional attachment establishes a firm foundation for the stability and viability of a given political regime.

Drawing upon theoretical arguments and empirical findings from previous studies, I measured popular support for the political regime in China within our respondents by asking them to assess six statements, as follows:

1. I am proud to live under the current (socialist) political system;
2. I have an obligation to support the current political system;
3. I respect political institutions in China today;
4. I believe that current political system is a good thing;
5. I am willing to sacrifice some personal interests for the current political system;
6. I believe that current political system is the best choice under current circumstances.

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4. I feel that the basic rights of citizens are protected;
5. I believe that the courts in China guarantee fair trials;
6. I feel that my personal values are the same as those advocated by the government.

Specifically, items 1 and 6 were designed to detect the popular affection for the values/norms of the regime. Items 2 and 3 were intended to tap into affection derived from a respondent’s generalized feeling about political institutions and the current political system as a whole. Items 4 and 5 related to a person’s evaluations of political authorities in terms of whether the authorities had functioned and wielded their power in accordance with that person’s sense of fairness and basic interests. These items were all pre-tested for their validity in Beijing before the first actual survey. In each survey, respondents were asked to rate each of the six items on a 4-point scale where “1” indicates respondents’ strong disagreement with a statement, and “4” indicates their strong agreement with the statement. These six items were then combined to form an additive index to capture a collective profile of a respondent’s evaluation of regime legitimacy. This index was used in the multivariate analysis that follows.

B. The intensity of popular support for the political regime

Before 1989 most Western China observers were quite optimistic about the prospects of the post-Mao reform and popular political support in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After the Tiananmen crackdown, however, most China scholars believed that the Chinese political regime led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had ever since lost its popular support and legitimacy, and hence had become nonviable. One China scholar has summarized such a predominant, pessimistic mood among most China scholars about the prospects of the Chinese political regime, as follows:

Prior to the late 1980s, scholars documented trends and changes, but did not question the continued existence of the communist regime. The events of 1989 in China and elsewhere shattered this assumption and analysts embraced the task of diagnosing the condition of what most came to view as moribund system. This sea change raised questions about the fate of the country’s communist political elite and institutions . . . Although scholars continue to disagree about the probable life-span of the current regime, the disagreement now is usually about when, not whether, fundamental political change will occur and what it will look like.  

Along this line of thinking, some China scholars have also identified at least two major areas in which the regime has lost its support from the population. First, and foremost, some of them point out that the regime has lost its ideological appeals to the population, especially the intellectuals and the younger generation. For example, these analysts often cite the so-called “crisis of faith” as evidence to illustrate how much moral support the regime has lost. Secondly, some China analysts argue that the regime has lost its moral appeals to the population. Due to rampant official corruption and misconduct in the post-Mao era, they argue, ordinary people in China have become more and more skeptical of basic moral standards and motivations of the Party and government leaders, and hence doubtful about their rights to lead.

But our findings from the three surveys conducted in Beijing between 1995 and 1999 by and large contradict those predominant views mentioned above. Specifically, two important findings emerge from these surveys. The first important finding was that a clear majority of our respondents apparently supported the current political regime. Most respondents in all three surveys either agreed or strongly agreed with each of the six statements listed above, which were designed to collectively measure support for the political regime. Most respondents in all three surveys either agreed or strongly agreed with each of the six statements listed above, which were designed to collectively measure support for the political regime. This finding seems to be consistent with the findings from other two empirical studies of Chinese public opinion: one was based on a nation-wide survey conducted in 1994, and the other was based on a six-city survey carried out in 1999. Similar to ours, those two studies also found that a majority of the Chinese citizens were still supportive of the current political regime. The second important finding from our three surveys was that, although a majority of our respondents still remained supportive of the political regime from 1995 to 1999, the level of their support had gradually declined during that time period.
In short, the two findings described above indicate that the absolute level of regime legitimacy among the respondents remained moderately high; but such support gradually declined during the second half of the 1990s. I suspect that this downward trend has continued since 1999 when our last survey was conducted.

**Why Do or Do Not Chinese Citizens Support the Political Regime?**

Now let me turn to the second question raised in the beginning of this essay: “Why do or do not Chinese citizens support the current political regime?” To answer this question, in this analysis I focus on five attitudinal orientations of our respondents, which I believe, among other factors, are very important subjective sources for regime legitimacy in contemporary China. These attitudinal orientations include respondents’ (A) evaluation of the government’s policy performance, (B) nationalist sentiment, (C) preference for stability, (D) democratic values, and (E) belief in the need for reform of the current political system. I will first explain the hypothesized relationship between each of the attitudinal orientations and regime legitimacy, and then test each relationship against the data from the three Beijing surveys.

**A. Evaluation of the government’s policy performance**

Many China scholars have linked the government’s policy performance with the level of regime legitimacy. They argue that in addition to the government-promoted ideology, public assessment of government policies in such areas as socioeconomic equality, job security, and basic economic conditions has played an important role in strengthening or eroding the communist regime’s legitimacy. As one prominent China scholar has argued, popular perception of the negative socioeconomic consequences of government policies was significantly “eroding the legitimacy of the regime.”6 Therefore, I hypothesize that those who give the government’s policy performance low evaluations are more likely to register low levels of support for the political regime.

To measure our respondents’ evaluations of the government’s policy performance, we asked our respondents to assess government policies in dealing with nine major socioeconomic issues: inflation, job security, official corruption, the gap between the rich and the poor, housing, order in society, medical care, welfare to the needy, and environmental pollution. It is worth noting that, of these nine issues, our respondents gave the lowest scores for government policies in dealing with official corruption and the gap between the rich and the poor. These results are consistent with some observations at the macro level that the Chinese people have constantly complained about inequality since the onset of the post-Mao reform, as “income distribution has undergone a qualititative transformation from being one of the most equal among the developing Asian countries to being one of more unequal;”7and that people have been very much dissatisfied with the incumbent leadership, as official corruption has just become more and more rampant during the reform era.

**B. Nationalist sentiment**

Beliefs in and expectations of a greater role China should play in regional and world affairs are “part of a generic Chinese nationalism rooted in a sense of Chinese national identity that developed historically over a very long period, and that acquired its current characteristics in the course of the past century and a half.”8 In today’s China, this kind of nationalist sentiment has been growing within the population. Such a strong sentiment was evident in our Beijing surveys: over 80% of the respondents believed that China should play a more important role in Asia and the world, and should be a stronger world power in the next century.

More importantly, nationalism in today’s China not only explicitly stresses loyalty and obligation to the national government, but accords with the values and norms promoted by the government. Since the early 1990s, the national government has made more efforts in its education campaign to promote what some China scholars call the “state-led” nationalism. In this kind of campaign, the government not only equates the “nation” (guo) to “state” (zhengfu), but emphasizes the government-defined “Chinese characteristics” that encompass such core norms of the regime as the imperativeness of the one-party rule, the absolute priority of stability/order over individual freedom, and the necessity of “gradual” (if any at all) democratization.
in China. As a result, many Chinese, including intellectuals and college students, have “accepted the themes of the patriotic education campaign.” One evidence of the acceptance of such government norms, at least among intellectuals, is the emergence or revival of conservative schools of thought such as “neo-authoritarianism” (xin quanwei zhuyi) and “neo-conservatism,” which advocate principles very similar to those by the government, such as a strong, centralized state and political stability (instead of democratization) as prerequisites for a stronger China. Therefore, I expect that, in the three Beijing surveys, those who have strong nationalist sentiment tend to be more supportive of the current political regime.

C. Preference for stability

In today’s China, most people have strong preference for sociopolitical stability. For instance, in our three samples, over 80% of the respondents preferred a stable and orderly society to a freer society that could be prone to social disruption. Even more important, the government propaganda and the traditional culture also make people believe that only a strong, centralized authority can provide needed sociopolitical tranquility. This connection between a strong authority and stability has been manifested best in a popular political thought in China, “neo-authoritarianism,” which revived and gained currency in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. This school of thought bluntly advocates that only a centralized state led by a strong leadership can fit Chinese society, maintain political stability, and promote economic development. The strong “authority” is, by default, the current CCP regime. In short, as a China scholar has argued, the current regime may acquire the so-called “Hobbesian” legitimacy within the population “for delivering civil peace and civil order.” Thus, I expect that those who strongly prefer stability should be more supportive of the current authoritarian regime.

D. Democratic values

In this analysis, I focus on three specific democratic beliefs that I believe are, among others, critical to a potential democratization of the political system in China. These three beliefs are: (1) competitive elections of government officials with multiple candidates, (2) equal protection and rights for all, regardless of political views, and (3) an independent media with freedom to expose and criticize the government’s wrongdoings.

Based on field observations and extant studies of contemporary Chinese politics, one can easily see that the current Chinese regime’s norms and practices have thus far worked against all these three democratic beliefs. While some democratic terms, such as “equal protection,” “freedom of speech” and “freedom of association” appear in the PRC’s constitution, these terms do not mean what they are supposed to mean in a democratic society. Even though government control over citizens’ private lives has been drastically reduced since the onset of the post-Mao reform, the current regime has by no means given up one-party rule and has never ceased its harsh oppression against political dissidents, whether they be individuals or organizations. Therefore, in this study I expect that those who strongly believe in democratic values tend to be less supportive of the current authoritarian regime.

E. Belief in the need for reform of the current political system

It is erroneous to say that China has never engaged in any kind of political reform during the post-Mao era. Rather, limited political reform in China, with its ebbs and flows, has lasted for more than two decades since the 1970s. Yet, this limited reform has thus far aimed at the improvement of administrative efficiency rather than at the establishment of a true democratic system. Therefore, any deepening of such limited reform will naturally require changes in the current regime’s ideological norms and fundamental structures (e.g., the one-party rule). Consequently, I expect that people who perceive the need for further political reform should be more likely to challenge the current political regime for its norms and structures.

To test these hypothesized relationships between the five attitudinal orientations and support for the political regime, I have conducted a multiple regression analysis. In order to assess whether these attitudinal orientations independently affect regime legitimacy, I include in this analysis such key demographic attributes as age, sex, education and income as control variables. Overall, the results of this analysis confirm the earlier-expected effects of the five attitudinal orientations on the level of regime legiti-
macy. That is, those who have high evaluations of the incumbent policy performance, who strongly prefer stability, and who have strong nationalist sentiment tend to support the current regime; but those who strongly believe in democratic values and the need for a further political reform are more likely to challenge the current authoritarian regime. More important, the results from all three surveys have also indicated that, among all these five orientations, nationalist sentiment and preference for stability are the most powerful factors to influence the level of regime legitimacy.

**Implications and Conclusion**

While the three Beijing samples used in this analysis are not necessarily representative of all China, I do believe that the above-mentioned findings are heuristic for our understanding of the legitimacy of the current authoritarian regime in that country. These findings are especially relevant to our study of mass political support in the urban areas. Thus, I would like to conclude my analysis here with two important political implications from the findings presented above.

First, the findings about the intensity of popular support for the current political regime bring China’s incumbent leadership both good and bad news for its effort to maintain sociopolitical stability. The good news from these findings is that the leadership can still keep the stability at least in the short run (say, within 8-10 years), since the current level of regime legitimacy is moderately high. But the bad news for the ruling elite is that social stability may not be maintained in the long run, because the regime legitimacy has gradually yet steadily declined. Unless the incumbent leadership takes extraordinary measures to deal with some serious concerns within the population, such a downward trend of regime legitimacy is very likely to continue.

Second, the findings presented above have also indicated both success and failure of the incumbent leadership in strengthening regime legitimacy. The success seems to come from the government’s relentless propaganda to portray the current political regime as the only guarantor for sociopolitical stability and defender of national interests. This kind of propaganda has apparently convinced those who had strong patriotic or nationalist feelings and a strong preference for stability to support the current regime. (Please note: about 80% of our respondents had such feelings and a preference!) But the failure of the incumbent leadership is its almost complete alienation from those who believe in democracy and support for political reform. These people have never been convinced that the current regime is consistent with what they strongly believe in. Failure to boost regime legitimacy also comes from the government’s inability to combat rampant corruption and to minimize the gap between rich and poor.

Finally, I believe that the incoming post-Jiang Zemin leadership will face the same downward trend of regime legitimacy. And this new leadership will inherit both success and failure of its predecessor in strengthening regime legitimacy. However, whether regime legitimacy can be strengthened in the long run depends largely on whether the new leadership can take more substantive and decisive measures to push political reform and to address such serious and touchy issues as official corruption and social inequality.

**Endnotes**


How to Understand Public Opinion in China

BEHIND PUBLIC OPINION

Survey is a social scientific approach to understand public opinion. But people surveyed in politicized authoritarian societies tend to live on at least two levels, the official level and the unofficial level, as James C. Scott has detailed.1

At the official level, or the public transcript level, people surveyed have imbibed an official story. Should a question touch on politically sensitive issues, the respondent’s tendency is to give the “correct” answer. In a Leninist system where the state still controls not only much of the economy but also access to a great deal of housing, jobs, passports, education and administrative service, people are structurally compelled to collaborate with the regime in order to protect themselves as well as their family members. Therefore, it is not obvious what it means when surveys find Chinese supportive of the regime and conclude that China is stable.2

At the unofficial level, people bound by ties of trust and local notions of justice express (in graffiti, jokes, popular songs, gossip, and critical rhymes) a less censored view of the world, one that reveals other political potentials than scripted in the official discourse. Analysts of political culture, hoping to capture an alternative meaning of public opinion, must decipher and decode what is encrypted in both the official and unofficial discourse. Surveys of Chinese public opinion, therefore, require a great deal of interpretation to understand the forces that inform public opinion, assuming one can capture the unofficial story.

American observers often conclude that the large number of collective protests in China since the 1990s is a proof of a rise in “rights consciousness” in that country. What I find when asking protesters if they are acting because of a belief in human rights, however, is an emphatic rejection of that explanation. I am told that the human rights issue is an American plot to weaken and conquer China, and that Chinese are warm and caring people whose proper behavior is shaped by traditional social relations and not by some abstract, individualistic, and amoral calculus that could bring anarchy to China.

That is, Chinese people respond to foreigners in terms of an official story that frames public discourse. They then go on to justify their collective protest because some particular officials are treating them unreasonably. Explaining purported opinion in China is not an easy matter. It is not obvious that what interviewees say is what they really think.

In nations with ruling Leninist political parties, opinion moves and divides. It lacks grounding and has no staying power. This is largely due to the problems of cautionary complicity and the framing power of the official story. Consider the Ukraine. A year before the Soviet Union imploded, an anonymous survey of the Ukraine found that 80% of the respondents affirmed that, if given a free choice, they would choose to stay in the Soviet Union.
Soviet Union imploded, when the people of the Ukraine could actually freely opt for independence, 90% voted to leave the Russian empire.

In general, studies in Russia show that the discursive post-Leninist discourses are so different from those of the Leninist era that opinion shifts rapidly and by huge amounts. This finding should be applied to comprehending publicly expressed attitudes in China. People’s opinion on the Cultural Revolution changed in an instant from regarding it as a way of saving China to describing it as a national catastrophe; Lin Biao was transformed from hero to villain in a flash.

Given the obvious volatility of attitudes in nations with ruling Leninist political parties, it might be useful to think of people’s political inclination, no matter how firmly expressed, more as sentiment than as opinion. If foreign policy could be debated, some could ask if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was on the side of international criminals in backing Milosovic in Serbia, or for that matter, what does it signify that Beijing propped up the most repressive regimes in Asia, those of Kim Il Song, Pol Pot and the Burmese military tyrants? My hunch is that the Chinese government is far superior to that of the former Soviet Union in making its narrative persuasive. Hence, the results of public opinion survey in China could be more misleading because they tend to be more changeable than that in the former Soviet Union.

**Public Opinion and Regional Disparity**

Studies of public opinion in China should first ask how different groups comprehend China’s policy possibilities in different ways. Chinese are not all alike. For myself, I often feel there are no Chinese at all in China. What I see when I visit China are young and old, men and women, officials and non-officials, educated and non-educated, migrants and residents, military and non-military, richer and poorer, coastal and hinterland, retired and working and so on *ad infinitum*. When people in the United States ask me what I think of Chinese, I respond, “which one?” I know very different Chinese—some of them are prejudiced and conservative, and others are tolerant and liberal.

Popular Chinese doggerel verse (*shunkouliu*) can be of help in capturing regional diversity in China. Consider a verse from the late 1980s, which declared, “Beijing is full of patriots, while Shanghai people are trying to go abroad, and Cantonese are traitors.” Interestingly, such a characterization of China’s diverse people had changed by the end of the 1990s. Beijing people’s patriotism no longer seemed unambiguously wonderful. Shanghai people had risen as an ideal model. Also, with the government declaring that incorporating Taiwan into the PRC was a life-or-death matter (as eastern Poland or the Ukraine once was to Russian patriots in the Soviet Union) Xiamen, a port city across from Taiwan, richly benefiting form large Taiwanese investment, replaced Canton in the rhyme. The verse claimed this time, “Beijing is the source of war; Shanghai is the source of peace; and Xiamen is the source of surrender.” The rhyme finds that time was on China’s side in dealing with Taiwan and that the war threats emanating from Beijing were counterproductive, whereas Shanghai’s policy of serving as a home to hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese businesspeople was a better choice for maintaining peace with prosperity, and thereby benefiting the nation. Understanding opinion requires getting regional divisions correct.

In fact, any understanding of politics requires attention to regional diversity. Just look at a presidential electoral map of the United States. It will show the Democrats in 2000 winning the two coasts and the belt of industrial states across the north-center of the nation, a division almost indistinguishable from a century before. There are numerous scientific approaches to Chinese regionalism. My observation on the contestation of political opinion in China finds four regions with great disparity:

- a super patriotic north around the capital city region, committed to reform through more centralization;
- a south and east coastal region more open to globalization and decentralization;
- a center region, running from the rust belt in the northeast down through the long-marginalized southwest, whose people, suspicious of the reform project, see themselves as not benefiting from reform and tend to be super-centralizers;
- a vast west region running from north to south, a home to ethnic minorities who are imagined by self-styled Han Chinese in all other regions as a
problem, a potential source of division and weakness, and a region whose voice is not legitimate in the patriotic debate over China’s destiny.

The two verses quoted above on Beijing, Shanghai and Canton (or Xiamen) allow no voice for the center or the west. It is the center region that is most understudied. Studies of collective protest in contemporary China find that the provinces that experienced the most turmoil were mostly interior provinces in central China, including Sichuan, Hunan, Shaanxi and Henan. These provinces have a high concentration of strategic and heavy industries. Religious sectarianism, a standard indicator of social discontent, concentrates in this region. The demonstrations of late July 1999 by the Falun Gong in response to a crackdown on Li Hongzhi’s group, which began in his hometown of Changchun in the northeast, were strongest in central China, including Hubei, Anhui, Hunan and Guizhou. Also, according to Chinese Public Security reports, reactionary religious sects figured “most prominently in the provinces of Henan, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan.”

When I look at public opinion polls that try to characterize Chinese opinion, they tend to ignore this regional diversity, and privilege Beijing but omit its recent immigrants. This misconstrues the diversity of attitudes in China. Obviously Beijing is not China. Indeed, it is quite distinct from much of the rest of China. Studies on the Soviet Union tend to show that Moscow, the capital, absorbed far more of the national propaganda story, the public transcript, than did other sites. This is only natural since Leninist command economy distribution is prejudiced on behalf of the political center and discriminates against the periphery, with Pyongyang being the extreme within the Leninist world in such skewing. While the center is also the home of more liberal and cosmopolitan attitudes, the attitudes in peripheries—as in the Ukraine—tend to be far more volatile, shallow and conflicted. Beijing residents, excluding the huge number of recent and temporary migrants, are far more likely to treat the official story as their genuine opinion.

The dominant tendency in the north in Beijing is to imagine a happy swing in opinion from the 1980s when people romanticized the West to the 1990s when Chinese lost their illusions about the West and became realistic. Liberal Zhu Xueqin and neo-conservative Xiao Gongqin in Shanghai in the coastal south, on the other hand, warn that the present conjuncture of forces in China has facilitated the rise of a potentially anti-reform and destabilizing radicalism that combines nationalist, super-conservative and new left tendencies. This ideological debate is reflective of regional disparity in China.

People do not, in the northern or southern narrative, imagine villagers as proving—in making the administrative and electoral reform of village self-governance work—that China’s better off urbanites could benefit from democratization. Nor do they imagine hard-working but low paid rural migrants as the builders of the urban modern infrastructure and the providers of higher quality food now affordable for urban-dwellers. The center is imagined as without virtues while the center imagines itself as the heartland of Chinese culture. A goal for comparative politics is to comprehend diversity of opinion as related to divisions within political culture. This requires sensitive interpretation of regional divisions. One should be wary of claims made about the opinions of “the Chinese.”

**Political Instability and Social Polarization**

Chinese society is less stable than some of the public opinion surveys suggest. According to Dali Yang, most people and rulers in China agree that the Party’s position actually is precarious. There is “trepidation about the ability of the CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) to maintain national integrity.” Both rulers and the ruled share a sense of insecurity. A consequent obsession with control and order produces a powerful Hobbesian legitimacy in which no one wants to do or say anything that would destabilize the country. The out-of-control forces unleashed by China’s incomplete effort to reform its way out of Leninist trammels leave behind much explosive social dynamite and “fertile soil for widespread social unrest that could threaten the stability of the communist regime.” This is vividly captured in doggerel verse that rural analyst Cao Jinqing found in central China on the people’s relationship to the Communist Party:

During the revolution, it was fish and water.
When reform began, it was oil and water.
Now it’s fire and water.
[Next it will be fire and oil.]
That is, a big conflagration may happen sooner or later. Such unofficial opinion is at odds with the public transcript (as a team of opinion surveyors in Beijing led by Martin Whyte has found) that people accept the official story that the regime guarantees stability.

Other doggerel verse, despite the recognition of the Hobbesian legitimacy, captures likewise the chasm between rulers and the ruled which leaves the ruled feeling exploited and impoverished even as China's general national product (GNP) soars.

Furloughed women don't cry.  
Into the barrooms they fly.  
Drinking, singing, shaking their asses,  
Screwing for free the top four classes.  
Screwing for free all the top men,  
Women's wages soar by a factor of ten.  
Paying their share of the state tax bill,  
Who says women are lacking in skill?

Another rhyme captures the fraud of limiting local tax rip-offs by distributing cards to people with the maximum amount of tax specified, since officials actually are believed to grab, in the unofficial story, whatever they want in order to enjoy a corrupt good life.

First you're given a card.  
Still your money is taken anyway.  
Everything's said to be O.K.  
It's what's meant by karaoke.

How then does one interpret the result of the above-mentioned Beijing survey that ordinary people believe that the rich get ahead by hard work and skill, in light of the widespread unofficial opinion about the rich gaining their wealth by connections and corruption? The point is that for Beijing residents the impoverished people are suffering difficulties because of laziness and backwardness. Beijing people in the north imagine themselves as the top quality people in China. For the post-modern knowledge economy, it is talent that matters. If others score higher on the national college entrance exam than Beijingers, they are dismissed as just nerds. Consequently, the poor in Beijing or elsewhere, including villagers, rural migrants and those thrown out of work, seem to have only themselves to blame for their plight. People doing well tell each other exemplary stories of how the lazy do not know how to turn free rickshaws into good cash but college students do.

This hard-heartedness reflects the dog-eat-dog cynicism of post-socialism, which assumes that all have learned what it takes to climb the greasy pole such that, should you fall, you have but yourself to blame. To me, the attitude is similar to American whites in the U.S. south ignoring the deep structure of racism so that they could believe that African-Americans had only themselves to blame for their problems. Those who were ahead had earned their good fortune. There was no common bond between groups in the polarizing society to impel the better-off to empathize with, learn from or aid those abandoned and injured by the system. It is a public opinion reflective of a political culture not actually committed to equality no matter what is found by the survey results that capture only the public transcript.10

Already in the 1980s Chinese intellectuals began to discredit the egalitarian project. They, like post-Leninist reformers in Europe, found wisdom in neo-liberal attacks on the wasteful socialist state that had long mired the Chinese people in stagnant misery. In both Europe and China, reformers accepted the neo-liberal view that the quest for equality actually undermined economic efficiency. Growth therefore became the master legitimator of economic policy. In the east and central European democracies, however, the neo-liberals could be voted out of power in the next round of elections and replaced by the former Communists, now Socialists, who promised to stop layoffs and restore the social safety net. Chinese inequality intensified because China lacked the accountability institutionalized in democracy.

In addition, elitism seemed in China to be reason incarnate. What were the alternatives? Ignorant masses would ruin things, or old-line Stalinists would keep running things into the ground. Embracing economist Joseph Schumpeter's thesis of the creative destruction of entrepreneurship and economist Milton Friedman's criticism of the counterproductive program of social welfare, reform economists in China did not merely de-emphasize delivering social equity, they felt disdain for the egalitarian project.
That is, contrary to the claim reflected in the public transcript that the Marxist heritage makes Chinese egalitarians, many people in powerful and rising urban centers actually are part of a political culture that does not at all privilege social equality. This has great significance for China’s future. The social Darwin style elitism of north and south contrasts to a commitment to charitableness and shared sacrifice spreading in central China and legitimated by a revived Confucianism’s notion that it is moral behavior “to suffer before the whole world does and to enjoy life the last of all people.”

CONCLUSION

It is misleading to analyze public opinion in a unidimensional and single directional way, ignoring thereby social polarization, regional disparity, and the volatility in public opinion. The major thrust of this essay is that the monism of the public transcript, no matter how momentarily monolithic, misleads by obscuring the alternatives. These are manifest in the non-official story. Whether there is grounded public opinion in China or not, it is important to understand the force of public sentiment, the power of the unofficial discourse, and the alternative futures pregnant within the Chinese body politic.

ENDNOTES


10. Zhang Yimou’s movie Not One Less uses Aesopian techniques to expose rural-urban polarization as a result of government policy combined with urban selfishness and hypocrisy. See Zhang Xiaoling, “A Film Director’s Criticism of Reform China,” China Information, No. 2, 2001, 131-139.
On January 18, 2002, two China-related articles called readers’ attention to two major western media outlets. One was a commentary by Nicholas Kristof in the *New York Times*, discussing how Chinese internet chat participants reacted unsympathetically toward the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City, and attributing the rise of Chinese nationalism to the “result in particular of ‘patriotic’ campaigns planned by President Jiang since 1990 as a way of knitting together the country, of providing a new ‘glue’ to replace the discredited ideology of communism.” Later the same day, the online version of the *Financial Times* reported that “more than 20 bugging devices have been discovered by Chinese intelligence officers in a Boeing 767 delivered from the U.S. and due to serve as the official aircraft of Jiang Zemin, China’s president, according to Chinese officials.”

While following the story through the Western media, I simultaneously logged on the Qiangguo Forum (Strengthening China Forum) of the People’s Daily Online to see the Chinese responses. I found there was little being said about the bugged plane. This was not because the members of the forum had not heard about the incident and did not want to talk about it, but because they were forbidden from doing so. To the dismay of Chinese authorities, however, Chinese web surfers have many places to get news from the outside world. Many individually run websites discussed the issue openly. The initial response was disbelief and shock; as one chatter commented, “who could have done such a stupid thing?” After the authenticity of the news was confirmed, online messages became more emotionally charged against the United States.

The above description of the Chinese response to the plane bugging incident shows a complex picture of online politics in China that contradicts several sweeping claims we often hear these days. First, the blocking of Western media websites by the Chinese authorities has not been able to prevent Chinese citizens from getting news from outside, thanks largely to the rapid development of the Internet which the government has helped to promote. Second, the Chinese government has not always been an unambiguous promoter of Chinese nationalism. In fact, it sometimes is more eager to put a brake on nationalism, because the latter is a double-edged sword and could be used against the government. Third, while many commentators assume that the free flow of information will have positive influences on Chinese minds and enhance China’s quest for democracy, they have been disappointed by the fact that Chinese cyberspace has become a place to vent the strongest nationalistic sentiment against the West. The rise of Chinese nationalism thus does not have much to do with the lack of exposure to Western values or with the manipulation by the hidden hands of Communists, but rather with the way in which the Chinese interpret the information and look at the outside world.

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A general weakness of recent discussion of Chinese nationalism is that too much attention has been given to the nationalism per se, thus missing a broader picture. This essay tries to tackle the issue of contemporary Chinese nationalism from a different perspective by addressing the formation of a new paradigm by which the Chinese have come to perceive their position in the world since the late 1980s. The new paradigm has not appeared overnight, nor is it the product of a single sponsor. Rather, it has evolved from a long process of thinking and rethinking on the part of Chinese, with additional conceptual input from the West. The convergence of intellectuals and the state on the issue of nationalism is based on this shared new paradigm, which is interpreted by the state, intellectuals and the general public with different emphases. Thus the so-called Chinese nationalism is in fact an “over-interpretation” of the paradigm. Even though nationalistic thinking is an integrated part of this paradigm, compared to the previous conceptual frameworks that harbored waves of Chinese nationalism, this new paradigm is more elastic, rational, engaging and has the possibility of being directed to achieve goals that are beneficial to China and the world.

**THE KEY CONCEPTS OF A NEW PARADIGM**

It is worth emphasizing from the start that because of the fluidity and complexity of the new paradigm, it is a virtually impossible task to present a complete picture. What this article intends to do is to examine several key concepts which comprise this paradigm, trying to reveal how these widely accepted concepts have given relatively coherent analytical tools to the Chinese people. Among numerous concepts the Chinese often use, comprehensive national strength, national interests, and the rules of the game are the three phrases that we often encounter in Chinese mass media, intellectual writings, and messages in Internet chat rooms. These are the three key concepts that are the backbone of the new paradigm that Chinese use to perceive their position in the current world. Understanding these key concepts will help us make sense of seemingly often-contradictory positions and discourse of Chinese nationalists.

Before exploring details of these three key concepts, a brief account of previous paradigms employed by Chinese nationalists is necessary. At least two paradigms exerted widespread influences prior to the 1980s. One was social Darwinism, which appeared at the turn of the twentieth century and emphasized the imminent danger of the demise of the Chinese nation. Both the Nationalists and Communists were propelled by this “salvation” urgency in their revolutionary mobilizations.

Another was proletarian internationalism. The Chinese Communists followed an ambivalent policy in relation to nationalism. While they were nationalists in essence, the Communists avoided using the concept because nationalism was in conflict with Marxist internationalism. Thus, after 1949, even though the Chinese leadership never formally endorsed nationalism, policies were pursued under a framework of anti-imperialism and proletarian internationalism. After its split with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, China faced virtual isolation from the rest of the world. Keeping self-reliant became the main means of warding off foreign pressure at that time, while a large amount of foreign aid was provided to the third world countries in the name of internationalism, an action that triggered the endless contemporary discussion of how “irrational” China’s foreign policy was in the 1960s and 1970s.

**Comprehensive National Power**

The concept of comprehensive national power (CNP) was introduced into Chinese academic and discourse in the mid-1980s. Hang Shoufeng, a strategic studies scholar for the Chinese military, was probably the first one to use this concept. He was inspired by strategic studies by Western political scientists, such as Ray Cline and Joseph Nye, in which the phrase “national power” was a well established concept. Huang coined the term “comprehensive national power” in 1984, most likely under the influence of system theory, which was a hot topic throughout Chinese academia at that time. In a very short period, this concept became widely accepted and used, not only by academia and mass media, but also by the Chinese leadership.

Why was this concept taken up so quickly in Chinese thinking? The concept of CNP satisfied, to a certain degree, the Chinese dream of seeking national wealth and power, a “big country com-
plex.” No matter how CNP is defined, it generally takes into account, to China’s advantage, a country’s population, territory, and natural resources. In other words, China may still lag behind the West in many areas, but it is catching up and, by the standard of CNP, everybody should pay due respect to the country.

The concept of CNP therefore was widely used in the 1990s, and more serious studies were conducted. The collapse of the Soviet Union further prompted the Chinese to realize that the essential competition among nations was not limited to distinct areas such as the military, economy and polity, but was based on the CNP of each country. Correspondingly, a broadened concept of national security emerged, which emphasized the protection of multiple aspects of national security, including political, economic, military, environmental, and financial safety.

NATIONAL INTEREST

Even though national interest is a key concept in modern geopolitical theories and nationalist arguments, its use has been short in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), starting from the early 1980s. Its pervasive use today has made Li Shenzhi, a famous Chinese liberal, feel uneasy. Because of the Marxist doctrine of proletarian internationalism that denies nationalism and sees the interest of international revolution as ultimate, the phrase “national interest” was discarded as a bourgeois concept in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s political discourse for a long period. It was not until 1985, however, that through subtle and sometimes undercover efforts, Li and his colleagues reintroduced the concept of national interest back into Chinese academic and media circles. Thus, to the surprise of today’s nationalists, it was in fact Chinese liberals who played an instrumental role in reviving this key concept.

As it had done with the concept of CNP, the CCP leadership, while continuing to hold nationalism to be undesirable, quickly adopted national interest as a valid concept, as did Chinese intellectuals. Strategy and Management, a journal that focuses on strategic studies of contemporary China issues and which is widely read by the intelligentsia, has published numerous articles employing this concept since its inception in 1993. The journal’s third issue of 2001 included a translation of an article by Condoleezza Rice, national security advisor to the U.S. president, carrying the title “Promoting U.S. National Interests.” Not surprisingly, the concept of national interest has been picked up by the nationalists and has become one of the most frequently used concepts in their arguments. The idea of national interest has thus become deeply rooted in Chinese thinking in just a decade.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

Compared to the concepts of CNP and national interest, the concept of the “rules of the game” is relatively new. The concept gained popularity during China’s long negotiating process to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), which sets rules governing international trade. Gaining WTO membership requires China to conduct international trade according to these rules, while simultaneously benefiting from the rights to which it is entitled. As its economy became increasingly connected to the world, joining the WTO was a key goal of the Chinese government, the challenging question being under what conditions China should join.

By conceiving political, economic, and strategic interactions among different world players as game playing, the concept of the “rules of the game” has symbolized the total de-ideologization by the Chinese in their perception of world affairs. While Westerners have emphasized “rules” in dealing with Chinese, Chinese have focused on the aspect of “game playing,” with the prize of national interest as the ultimate goal. The concept’s rapid gain in popularity, both in elite and mass discourse, also reflects a shifting perception of the Chinese people of their position in the world and, correspondently, how to act within it. If “opening-up” reflected the urgency of redressing Mao’s isolationism, the increasing use of the “rules of the game” has reflected a more confident China that is not satisfied with opening its door to the rest of the world, but is also eager to be an active player in world affairs.

More importantly, Chinese use of the “rules of the game” does not imply that they will obey the extant rules; rather they are aware of the prejudice and unfairness the extant rules pose to latecomers in the world political and economic system. China has
found itself in the pitiful position of applying for admission to the game, rather than in the position of referee and rule setter. The wide acceptance of this concept reflects the mainstream opinion emerging in recent years that China has no other choice but to accept the existing world system, although China may increase its status through CNP and become a “rule-setter” over time (thereby helping to revise the current inequities).

**Different Interpreters of the New Paradigm**

CNP provides both an emotional boost and a quantitative criterion to the Chinese to re-assess their world position, and has been accepted by all groups. The concept of national interest has been subject to more contested interpretations. To the Chinese state, China’s internal stability has been presented as one of the most important areas of national interest. While it is not difficult to note that the state’s main purpose has been to hold a monopoly on power after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has provided a convenient and convincing example for the Chinese state to make its case. The subsequent economic crises Russia endured have severely dampened the belief that liberal political change would bring about economic and social progress, as often argued by Chinese intellectuals in the pre-Tiananmen era. The appeal of political reforms has thus been severely muted by the government’s appeal for stability on the one hand and its delivery of high-speed economic development on the other. Thus stability and development have become the two pillars of official national policies and the legitimization of these policies is often done in the name of national interests.

However, for Chinese in general, and for nationalists in particular, the focus point has been Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland, which is perceived as the most crucial area of national interest. Frustrated by the growing pro-independence trend in Taiwan’s internal politics, and angered by the United States’ real or perceived hostility toward China, the Chinese have become more receptive to the nationalist interpretation of the U.S. threat to China. In addition, based on their understanding of a broadened concept of national security, Chinese nationalists call for vigilance against a Western conspiracy of economic and financial warfare against China, often using the examples of the East Asian and Russian financial crises to support their argument.

Since the United States is perceived to be a real obstacle to China’s reunification and a threat to China’s ascension as a major power, the ideologies it represents and promotes, such as democracy and human rights, have lost a great deal of appeal to many Chinese nationalists, at least at face value. Though democracy remains an ultimate goal to many Chinese, concern for immediate national interests such as Taiwan outweighs everything else. Given the dominance of a de-ideologized discourse of national interests, democracy advocates seem to have attracted few new followers, especially among young Chinese.

How to play the rules of the game has divided the Chinese state and intellectuals. On the issue of the WTO, there were furious disputes among state bureaucrats on China’s entry conditions and timing. Intellectuals, while using the concept of the rules of the game, held more theoretically sophisticated discussions on the issue of globalization. To the liberals such as Li Shenzhi, globalization represents the trend of “mainstream civilization in the world” and is an inevitable historical process in which China, willingly or not, has to participate. Thus the best way to serve China’s national interest is by immersing China into a Western-dominated political and economic system. Conservatives instead focus on how iniquitous and self-serving the current system is, thus seeking alternative ways of globalization. Of the conservatives, the so-called New Leftists have criticized capitalism and globalization mainly from the perspective of contemporary Western critical theories and neo-Marxism, while others who emphasize the protection of national interests and the breaking down of international inequity are often labeled as nationalists.

**Conclusion**

In summary, there are three key concepts in a new Chinese paradigm of the world. The concept of CNP provides Chinese with a much-sought emotional boost and a quantitative criterion to express their pride in China as a rising country in the world.
The concept of national interest has been emphasized as the ultimate goal of all national undertakings, and it legitimizes the new paradigm by giving it the basis of “rational thinking.” The third concept, the rules of the game, is a practical strategy, aiming to promote Chinese interests by joining “international games” and further modifying the existing rules to China’s advantage. The formation of this paradigm is the result of convergence of reflections of old paradigms and observations of current international situations by different sections of Chinese society, with conceptual input from the West. Compared to old paradigms, this interest-driven-game-playing paradigm is less emotionally charged, less ideologically biased, and more rationally driven. Because of these characteristics, it has become rooted in everyday Chinese thinking and has gained a lasting and encompassing power in forming a Chinese cognitive framework of the world.

Though nationalism is rising in China, the so-called nationalists are a fluid and constantly changing group. Since the new paradigm is open to broad interpretation, nationalism occupies only the extreme end of the spectrum, and high-running emotion is often a reaction to external stimulation as in the events of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the spy plan collision incident in April 2001. Such emotion can come and go at a fast pace. Constrained by both the liberals and the state, nationalists in China do not occupy the political or intellectual mainstream. There is thus no need to exaggerate nationalism’s pervasiveness in China.

The fundamental difference between Chinese nationalists in the 1960s and those in the 1990s is that the latter are well informed. An informed public is less receptive to manipulation. The success of the state-led patriotism campaign should not be over-estimated, especially in the post–Cultural Revolution context where the effectiveness of such political campaigns has been severely weakened. The seeming convergence of nationalist thinking among different sectors within Chinese society is more due to the interpretive power provided by this new paradigm than to deliberate political manipulation by the government. As long as highly charged emotion is constantly attached to interpretation, it may prove to be the case that accessibility to Western media, satellite TV and the Internet may even further enhance the anti-foreign sentiment in China. It is thus not the lack of access to, but rather the interpretation of the available information that is crucial. In the foreseeable future, Chinese nationalism will continue to be driven by this interest-driven-game-playing paradigm.
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