Warming Up a Cooling War:
An Introductory Guide on the CIAS and Other
Globally Operating Anti-communist Networks at
the Beginning of the Cold War Decade of Détente

By Torben Gulstorff. February 2015
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Special Working Papers Series

Warming Up a Cooling War:
An Introductory Guide on the CIAS and Other Globally Operating Anti-communist Networks at the Beginning of the Cold War Decade of Détente

Torben Gülstorff

“A brochure ‘Revolution of the 17th of June 1953,’ issued by the Indian committee of the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League (APACL) (Rama Swarup), is sent to you as an attachment. The foreword is signed by Member of Parliament Dahyabhai V. Patel.”

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<tr>
<td>ABN</td>
<td>Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations</td>
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<td>APACL</td>
<td>Asian People’s Anti-Communist League [亞洲人民反共聯盟]</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>American Security Council</td>
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<td>BND</td>
<td>Bundesnachrichtendienst</td>
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<tr>
<td>TsK KPSS</td>
<td>Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Центра́льный комитет Коммунисти́ческой парти́и Сове́тского Сою́за]</td>
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<td>CIADC</td>
<td>Confederación Interamericana de la Defensa del Continente</td>
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<td>CIAS</td>
<td>Comité international d’Information et d’Action Sociale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confédération générale du travail</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CBA</td>
<td>Cruzada Brasileira Anticomunista</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>Democrazia Cristiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>IRD</td>
<td>Information Research Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAS</td>
<td>Institute for American Strategy</td>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td>Chinese Kuomintang [中國國民黨]</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<td>KPÖ</td>
<td>Kommunistische Partei Österreichs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvement Républicain Populaire</td>
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<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Office of Policy Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCB</td>
<td>Operations Coordinating Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ÖJAB</td>
<td>Österreichische Jungarbeiterbewegung</td>
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<tr>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Österreichische Volkspartei</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>Psychological Strategy Board</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Partito Socialista Italiano</td>
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<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français</td>
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<td>PTB</td>
<td>Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Partito Comunista Italiano</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSIUP</td>
<td>Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPÖ</td>
<td>Sozialistische Partei Österreichs</td>
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<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Socialdemokraterne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFF</td>
<td>Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOKS</td>
<td>All-Union Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries [Всесоюзное общество культурных связей с заграницей]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACL</td>
<td>World Anti-Communist League</td>
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In Defiance of the Khrushchev Thaw: A Cool Reception for Khrushchev

In mid-1964, a Soviet delegation, led by the prime minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (TsK KPSS) [Центральный комитет Коммунистической партии Советского Союза], Nikita Khrushchev, paid a visit to the Scandinavian states of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The visit was meant to promote the Soviet campaign for neutrality in the Cold War and Moscow’s foreign policy concept of peaceful coexistence in particular. One year earlier, this policy—together with the American foreign policy concept of containment—had contributed to beginning of a temporary period of détente in Europe.

In the case of Sweden, in 1959 the first attempts for an official Soviet visit had been made and were supported by the Soviet as well as the Swedish government. However, protests among the Swedish public and the Swedish opposition parties foiled this attempted rapprochement. Even three years after the initiation of peaceful coexistence, the USSR was still perceived as aggressive and responsible for most international crises at the time.1 It was only in the wake of détente that Swedish public opinion changed and induced the government in Stockholm to intensify its diplomatic relations with the USSR. In 1963, foreign minister Torsten Nilsson visited Moscow. In the aftermath, diplomatic relations improved significantly, and a Soviet return visit was contemplated. Even a scandal about the discovery of a Soviet spy in the Swedish Foreign Ministry did not strain Soviet-Swedish relations to a great extent. The Soviet state visit to Sweden was already a done deal.

On 22 June, Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation arrived at Stockholm. Official conversations revolved around détente, the German Question, Soviet-Swedish relations, and, finally, the legal case of Raoul Wallenberg. Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat in Hungary who had saved thousands of Jews during the Holocaust, had been imprisoned by the USSR after the Soviet occupation of Budapest in 1945. Since then, several governments in Stockholm had tried

to liberate him, as the case consistently attracted the attention of the Swedish public. In the end, the conversations became a ‘diplomatic success’ for both sides, even though Wallenberg remained missing.\(^2\)

Besides these talks, Khrushchev also visited some sights of the country in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the local population and ensure positive coverage of his trip in the media. Despite his attempts, the Swedish, as well as the foreign press, painted a negative picture. As the popular West German magazine *Der Spiegel* reported:

> Indeed, the Swedish government had invited Khrushchev, but the Swedes behaved, as if they were sorry that he followed this invitation. Admittedly they never provoked him directly, but they let him feel they neither would give him a hug nor would they like to get hugged by him. A strict protocol kept Khrushchev away from a population that already was not interested in watching its mighty neighbor face-to-face.\(^3\)

In contrast to the diplomatic achievements of his visit, Khrushchev had not been able to bond with the Swedish public. Most Swedes, like the Swedish and foreign media, did not show any interest. Others even responded with open hostility to his visit. Several Swedish youths pulled down Soviet flags, which had been placed for Khrushchev along his travel route. Moreover, the Swedish police even expected an attempt on Khrushchev’s life by Baltic or Russian emigrants. This behavior was not unusual during Soviet state visits. In 1960, when Khrushchev visited Austria, public opinion had been against him right from the start of his trip. However, when he began to visit the countryside of the state by bus, the “traveling circus Nikita” was able to win the hearts and minds of the Austrian public, translating the trip into a big success for Soviet PR.\(^4\)

This time, it was only this atmosphere of rejection and hate the media covered. More than a few even focused on anti-Soviet emigrants, combining their reports with parenthesis about Khrushchev’s role during the Stalinist cleansing of Ukraine. The medial point of culmination was reached when the so-called former ‘prime minister’ of Ukraine, Yaroslav Stetsko, and his wife

\(^2\) A. Komarov, ‘Khrushchev and Sweden,’ in H. Carlback et al., eds., *Peaceful coexistence? Soviet Union and Sweden in the Khrushchev era* (Moscow, 2010), pp. 113-123, at pp. 118-120.


provoked with a ceremonial wreath-laying ceremony at the memorial of the Swedish King Karl XII. In the eighteenth century, this king had invaded the Russian Empire. The message behind this gesture was clear. Khrushchev was outraged, a fact media milked with relish.

Interestingly, another fact was left nearly untouched by media: the Stetskos had not acted as simple anti-Soviet emigrants; rather, they had acted as members of the transnational, anti-communist emigrant organization Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). In fact, Yaroslav Stetsko was its president and his organization had been responsible at least for some of the negative media coverage regarding the journey. However, the ABN was just a small cog in a big wheel. Several other anti-communist organizations also had influenced it to an extent that should not be underestimated and doubtlessly can be considered a media campaign.\(^5\)

Preparations for this campaign had begun long beforehand. In March 1964, delegates of the Danish anti-communist organization *Demokratisk Alliance*, the Swedish anti-communist student organization *Inform*, and the West German organization of the international anti-communist network *Comité international d’Information et d’Action Sociale* (CIAS) had met in the Danish capital Copenhagen. On the basis of their decisions and financially sponsored by the CIAS, Inform held an open conference about communism at the university *Lunds universitet* in Sweden two months later.\(^6\) Even though it was arranged for Swedish anti-communists, most of its participants were Ukrainian and Estonian emigrants—members of the ABN, the *Baltiska Kommittén*, and the Estonian exile government. Furthermore, West Germans, members of territorial associations and anti-communist organizations, like the *Vereinigung der Opfer des Stalinismus* and the *Ostpolitischer Studentenbund*, attended the conference as well. Lectures were given, declarations prepared and recited, and decisions about pan-Scandinavian campaigns against Khrushchev’s visit were passed. Although the ‘votes’ had been conducted by members of the conference, the ‘decisions made’ had been formulated by Noemi Eskul-Jensen, a founding member of the Demokratisk Alliance, and “at the instance of” Alfred Gielen, the general delegate of the CIAS.\(^7\) It was a token event with a token ballot and a token result. All the same, at least the latter ‘legitimized’ the planning of further events.

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\(^6\) Cramer – president (CIAS) to department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 16 November 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 147, pp. 293-298.


www.cwihp.org
After the conference, selected delegates of Swedish, ‘token-Swedish,’ and foreign organizations as well as several foreign experts met at a vacation home in a forest near Sösdala, Sweden to vote on ‘the actual’ next steps. Besides Gielen and Eskul-Jensen, the major participants were George Krasnow, a Soviet renegade and lecturer for Russian language at Lunds Universitet, Mr. Mucenieks, a Latvian-Swede and representative of the Russian tradition union La Sentinelle in Brussels, Mr. Dewey, a representative of the British conservative and anti-communist organizations Foreign Affairs Circle and Conservative Monday Club, Jon Skard, a conservative Norwegian journalist and probably a member of the Norwegian CIAS organization Folk og Forsvar, count Armfeld, a former Finnish then American citizen and representative of the World Council of Freedom—a position the CIAS assumed to be a cover for a foreign intelligence service—and Mr. Borin, a former Czech then British citizen, the CIAS considered to ‘have worked’ for an Eastern intelligence service. Once more, exiled Ukrainians and exiled Estonians were considerably involved as well. Concrete anti-communist activities were discussed and plans for a propaganda and PR campaign in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark were agreed upon. Three so-called June committees were established—one in each of the countries—to execute them. The authorities of each country as well as the West German Foreign Office had been informed about all this even before the meeting had taken place.

Besides the conservative Swedish media and the United States Information Agency, these June committees took the lead in a ‘private’ PR campaign against Khrushchev’s visit and his aim to promote neutrality and peaceful coexistence. In the case of Sweden, its June committee rented an office and started distributing booklets, brochures, and flyers. By the end of Khrushchev’s visit, roughly 500,000 of them circulated throughout the country. And the efforts

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8 Ibid., pp. 186-191, at p. 188.
9 Ibid., pp. 186-191, at p. 189.
10 Scholarship usually puts propaganda and PR in contrast to each other, as they reputedly are utilised by different types of protagonists or used for different types of content (M. Kunczik, Public Relations. Konzepte und Theorien (Köln et al., 2010), pp. 34-42.). In contrast, this paper argues that both are utilised by all kinds of protagonists and used for all kinds of content. The difference lies somewhere else—in their practical application. Whereas propaganda uses a rigid, centralised infrastructure—often resulting in a rigid and therefore ineffective spread of information—PR bases on a decentralised, flexible infrastructure—resulting in a flexible and therefore much more effective spread of information.
of the committee were crowned with success. Until 20 July, more than 650 articles of the Swedish and foreign press were influenced.\(^\text{13}\)

This degree of efficiency had been possible due, in no small part, to the support of the committee by a foreign anti-communist power: the CIAS. Not only had it financed several pamphlets of the committee, but also sent two of its experts on anti-communist PR. The task of these two experts was not just to support the work of the committee, but also to ensure its “dealing with the German Question and the situation in the zone [the East German state] through the June committee as well as in the Swedish and foreign press, radio, and television”.\(^\text{14}\) Thus they were even able to “affect the composition of the news report” at the first West German television channel, the \textit{Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland}. The representative of this television channel in Stockholm promised to mention the emigrants’ involvement “just at the edge” and to focus on the negative attitude of the broad Swedish public towards Khrushchev’s visit.\(^\text{15}\) The two experts also achieved the publication of 80 articles about the German Question in the Swedish and foreign press, even though it never had been brought up publicly by Khrushchev or the Swedish government during the visit. The operation was a big success for anti-communist PR in general and the CIAS network in particular, especially as the latter had established its presence in Scandinavia just several years ago.

From its founding in 1956 onwards, the CIAS had established loose contact with several friendly anti-communist organizations: the \textit{Fred og Frihed} in Denmark, the Folk og Forsvar in Norway, and a Swedish organization currently not known by name. It was only after 1961 when, after a proposal by the Dane Eskul-Jensen, the West German Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, perhaps also the CIAS,\(^\text{16}\) began to co-finance her Danish bulletin \textit{Nyt fra Øst}, thereby taking initiative for the first time. One year later, some Danish anti-communists met

\(^{13}\) CIAS to West German Foreign Office and West German Ministry for All-German Affairs, 16 August 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 305-315.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., pp. 305-315, at p. 306 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[...] für die Behandlung der Deutschlandfrage und der Zonenverhältnisse innerhalb des schwedischen Juni-Komitees sowie gegenüber der schwedischen und ausländischen Presse, Rundfunk- und Fernsehvertreter”.

\(^{15}\) Braune (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 28 June 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 316-319, at p. 317 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[...] auf die Gestaltung des Fernsehberichts einzuwirken [...] nur am Rande erwähnen [...]”.

with CIAS general delegate Gielen to discuss the foundation of a Danish branch of CIAS. Even though Gielen refused—the organization seemed too weak and nearly without any influence in the Danish conservative party *Det Konservative Folkeparti* and the Danish social democratic party *Socialdemokraterne* (S)—in December 1962 the anti-communist organization *Aktiv Frihed* was founded. Erhard Jakobsen, a member of parliament for the S, Ole Lippmann, a famous member of the Danish resistance during the German occupation in World War II, and Hans Edvard Teglers, chief editor of the daily newspaper *Dagbladet Information*, formed the presidium. Max Malthar, a Danish journalist, became its executive director. Just one year later, the Aktiv Frihed joined the CIAS network and Eskul-Jensen and Knud Bro, the leader of the conservative Danish youth organization *Konservativ Ungdom*, formed the anti-communist youth organization Demokratisk Alliance. Furthermore, in Norway an anti-communist organization—most likely the *Folk og Forsvar*—became a regular member organization, the Swedish anti-communist organization Baltiska Kommittén a friendly organization.\(^{17}\) By the end of 1964 *Nyt fra Øst* was being circulated throughout all Scandinavian states.\(^{18}\)

In less than five years, the CIAS had become one of the most influential anti-communist networks all around the Baltic Sea. However, this leads to one question: what exactly was the CIAS?

**What Was the CIAS?**

The CIAS was an international, anti-communist network and an integral part of the organized global anti-communist movement after 1945. The global movement was made up of diverse organizations: some weaker ones confined their operations to the fight against communism inside the borders of their respective countries, while stronger ones, like the CIAS, reached further, operating on an international, a continental, and in some cases even on a global level. This paper will primarily address the latter kind. On closer consideration, internationally operating anti-communist organizations and networks all over the ‘free world’ can be divided into three different types.

The first was a ‘national’ type consisting of right wing groups and emigrant

\(^{17}\) CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PAAA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.

\(^{18}\) Cramer – president (CIAS) to department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 16 November 1964, PAAA, AA, B 40, 147, pp. 293-298.
organizations. Whereas the former seem to have operated mostly on a local or national level, loosely connected through conferences like the ones of the Antikommunistische Internationale,\textsuperscript{19} the latter seem to have worked mostly as centralized international organizations, like the ABN\textsuperscript{20} or the Free Pacific Association.\textsuperscript{21} The ideological roots of their anti-communist concepts lay somewhere between simple nationalism and national socialism.

A second type based on religion and spirituality. It also consisted of simple international organizations, like the ‘spiritual movement’ Moral Re-Armament,\textsuperscript{22} and international networks, like the Comité International de Défense de la Civilisation Chrétienne.\textsuperscript{23} Their anti-communism was based not only on the Christian social idea and Christianity but also on faith and religion in general as a concept for future societies.

The third type operated in a way perhaps best described as pragmatic. It consisted of international networks like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, but for the most, of the following three networks: the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League (APACL) [亞洲人民反共聯盟], the Confederación Interamericana de la Defensa del Continente (CIADC), and of course the CIAS. As their anti-communist concepts and activities were often flexible, they were able to work closely with their corresponding states and further investors, thereby strengthening their positions in the global anti-communist movement.

One country, highly involved in the activities of the CIAS, was the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as the West German member organization of the network, the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (VFF), was one of the strongest members of the network. Supported by the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs, the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government and several other ministries and institutions of the FRG, the VFF had a solid financial basis at its disposal. In 1957, its president, Fritz Cramer, and its secretary general, Gielen, even became the president and the general delegate of the international bureau of the

\textsuperscript{19} Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to department II 3, department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 13 May 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 254-261, at p. 254.
\textsuperscript{20} A. Holian, Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany (Ann Arbor, MI, 2011).
\textsuperscript{21} Department L 2 (West German Foreign Office) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 22 January 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 3-10.
\textsuperscript{22} D. Sack, Moral Re-Armament: The Reinventions of an American Religious Movement (Basingstoke, 2009).
CIAS, positions they held for nearly a decade until 1965.

As in many countries, anti-communism had a long tradition in Germany, going back to the 19th century. Initiated by the ‘anti-communalism’ of the liberals during the period of upcoming capitalism, several types of anti-communism took form around 1900, not differentiating between social democracy, socialism, and communism. In bourgeois circles communism was opposed, by the conservatives to protect monarchy, by the liberals to protect private property, and by the Christians to fight secularism and atheism. Anti-communist sentiment was not alien to socialist and communist circles as well, though mostly as a critique on the concept of centralization in communism. However, anti-communism got most of its fierceness and became embedded in society after the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917.

During the following years, four different types of anti-communism formed out of their predecessors. The anti-communism of the social democrats opposed communism in favor of liberal democracy, the one of the liberals also in favor of economic liberalism, and the one of the bourgeois in favor of anti-egalitarianism, anti-atheism, anti-secularism, and western civilization. The fourth type was right-wing, conservative, nationalist anti-Bolshevism. Its advocates used the term ‘Bolshevism,’ instead of ‘communism,’ to admix their anti-communist concept with anti-foreign tendencies. It provided the ideological basis for another form of anti-Bolshevism, which soon would dominate the German anti-communist landscape.

National Socialists formed this advanced concept of anti-Bolshevism. In it, Bolshevism—and therefore anti-Bolshevism—became a matter of race, not of political or social ideas. But not just Bolshevism, Liberalism and free trade also became preferred targets of anti-communism, de facto leading to a racist anti-Slavic and anti-Semitic form of anti-communism. As it was supported by the ruling National Socialist party, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), and the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, it became the major form of anti-communism in the ‘Third Reich’ and the countries it occupied during World War II.

After the lost war, German anti-communism had to reinvent itself. Under observation in the occupied zones of the United States, Great Britain, and France and under pressure in the occupied zone of the USSR, new contents and techniques of anti-communism had to be found to

establish a new financial foundation and reach the German public.

The purpose of this paper is to give a first overview on the CIAS network itself and to present and analyze the involvement of the VFF in its activities between 1957 and 1965. To that end, the short organization history of this paper will compare the CIAS with similar networks—the APACL and the CIADC. Furthermore, the activities of this West German organization will be addressed separately as national activities of the VFF, as international activities of the West German CIAS committee and finally as transnational activities of the international bureau of the CIAS.

As the period investigated reaches from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, this paper will give first insights into projects of anti-communist organizations from the Khrushchev thaw and peaceful coexistence to the early stage of the détente, a phase still mostly obscure in the history of anti-communism. All around the world civil reservations of, aversion to, and denial of anti-communism grew. Progressive and liberal ideas gained influence in societies, hardening the work of anti-communist organizations significantly. Even in conservative postwar Japan, anti-communism became so unpopular in the 1960s that not just progressive and liberal but also conservative and right-wing circles had to argue against it in order to retain their popular support. When the 8th annual APACL conference took place in Tokyo in 1962, it was not publicly announced as such, but as the “8th Congress of the Free Asian League” to avoid a negative repercussion of the public. However, the plan did not work out. The Japanese press got scent of the maneuver and reported on it. In the end, fifty right-wing extremists protested in front of the anti-communist conference until they were conducted away by police.

Literature on the topic of this paper exists but mostly fails to close existing research gaps. Even more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, scholarship on anti-communism still leaves much to be desired, getting to a point where most Cold War dictionaries do not even offer an entry on anti-communism. Exceptions, like the Dictionnaire de la Guerre froide, only prove

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27 T. Parrish, The cold war encyclopedia (New York, NY, 1996); J. Smith and S. Davis, Historical dictionary of the cold war (Lanham, MD et al., 2000); K. Hillstrom, The Cold War (Detroit, MI, 2006); S. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of the Cold War: a political, social, and military history (Santa Barbara, CA et al., 2008); R. van Dijk: Encyclopedia of the Cold War (New York, NY et al., 2008); J. R. Arnold and R. Wiener, eds., Cold War: The essential reference guide (Santa Barbara, CA et al., 2012).
the rule. One reason—perhaps even the reason—for this incapability of scholarship has to be seen in the insufficient consolidation of research results on this topic. Quite often, the differing national origin and language of the research seems responsible for this insufficiency. But as scholarship on international anti-communist organizations and networks deals with an issue of a continental, sometimes even global scope, future studies will have to consider foreign research results to a much greater extent. Otherwise, even studies on the national or local activities of anti-communist organizations will not be able to expand beyond the current state of research on the subject.

Over the last three decades, several studies about the CIAS and some of its member organizations have been published. In those, a special focus was placed on the timeframe between 1950 and 1956. Within this period, the French organization *Paix et Liberté*, the Italian organization *Pace e Libertà*, and the CIAS predecessors, the *Comité Européenne Paix et Liberté* and the *Comité International Paix et Liberté*, have been analyzed in several works. Others, like the West German VFF, the Swiss *Comité Suisse d’Action Civique*, the British

Common Cause,34 and the Norwegian Folk og Forsvar,35 have been examined even beyond this timeframe. Furthermore, secondary literature on anti-communism, national anti-communist organizations, and anti-communist propaganda and PR in several countries, like the FRG,36 France,37 Italy,38 Belgium,39 the Netherlands,40 Greece,41 Turkey,42 Switzerland,43 Great Britain,44 Ireland,45 Sweden,46 Australia,47 Japan,48 South Korea,49 Indonesia,50 and the

35 P. Engstad, Fra kald krig til fredbygging: Med Folk og Forsvar gjennom 50 år (Oslo, 2000).
43 M. Caillat, Histoire(s) de l’anticommunisme en Suisse – Geschichte(n) des Antikommunismus in der Schweiz (Zürich, 2008).
46 W. Schmid, Antikommunism och kommunism under det korta 1900-talet (Lund, 2002).
48 A. Sherif, Japan’s Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law (New York, NY et al., 2009).
Philippines
sometimes—whether wittingly or unwittingly—touches on CIAS organizations as well. However, as most of it focuses on the national level, the international impact of the organizations for the most part remains unknown. An even worse state of research than that on the CIAS—though not because of a lack of consideration of the internationality of the issue—exists in the cases of the APACL, the CIADC, and the later global merger of the networks, the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). In their cases, studies tend to focus to a small extent on the 1950s and to a greater extent on the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, studies on information, cultural, intelligence, and psychological warfare policies in general and on the US ones in particular sometimes touch upon international anti-communist organizations and

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51 D. J. Elwood, The crisis of an idea: some implications for the Philippines of Europe’s anti-communist revolution (Quezon City, 1994).
53 M. N. López Macedonio, ‘Una visita desesperada: La Liga Mundial Anticommunista en México. Notas para reconstruir la historia del movimiento civil anticomunista mexicano,’ Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research 12 (2006), pp. 91-124; M. N. López Macedonio, ‘Historia de una colaboración anticommunista transnacional: Los Tecos de la Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara y el gobierno de Chiang Kai-Shek a principios de los años setenta,’ Historia y problemas del siglo XX 1 (2010), pp. 133-158; Mónica Naymich López Macedonio is currently writing a book about Mexican anti-communists. Even though she seems to focus on the 1970s, it could be useful for scholarship on its early stages, perhaps even the CIADC, as well.
56 J. Fousek, To lead the free world: American nationalism and the cultural roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill et al., 2000); B. Stöver, Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus: Amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg, 1947-1991 (Köl n et al., 2002); F. S. Saunders, Qui mène la danse ?: La CIA et la guerre froide culturelle (Paris, 2003); K. Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s secret propaganda battle at home and abroad (Lawrence, KS, 2006); A. J. Falk, Upstaging the Cold War: American dissent and cultural diplomacy, 1940-1960 (Amherst et al., 2010).

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networks as well. However, they reveal a deplorable lack of interest for existing secondary literature and are thus testament of current research gaps marring the field of Cold-War studies.

This paper tries to fill at least some of these gaps. Accordingly, it will, on the one hand, make use of files of the archive of the West German Foreign Office, the Abteilung Auswärtiges Amt des Politischen Archivs des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA, AA), in Berlin. In doing so, it mainly falls back on reports of the international bureau of the CIAS to the West German Foreign Office, which, as one of its chief financial supporters, was briefed about the national and international activities of the VFF and the CIAS regularly. Therefore, this paper should only be seen a first step in the investigation of the CIAS network and has to confine itself mostly to discussions on the activities of the West German organization. On the other hand, the currently available secondary literature on the national and international anti-communist organizations will play an integral part in this study. Its input, combined with the one of the files, should be sufficient for a first survey on the CIAS and to a certain degree on anti-communist networks in general.

Making Global Anti-Communism in a Nationalized World

Organized anti-communism—similar to organized communism⁵⁷—was a heterogeneous phenomenon. International operating anti-communist organizations and networks differed a lot on an ideological as well as on a practical level. At least once a year, conferences were organized by each of them in the attempt to keep the others in (their respective) line. Depending on the performing organization or network, some of these conferences were more functional, others more representative, like the irregular conference of the APACL in Seoul in 1962, which CIAS general delegate Gielen witnessed and reported about:

The style of the conference was to an almost unjustified degree ‘enormous.’ The participants were accommodated in some of the few best hotels, constantly under supervision by clerks of the CIA ([South Korean] State Security Ministry) and accompanying interpreters (schoolgirls out of the best families of Seoul). The population was ordered to the roadsides several times, 200.000 people participated at a declaration at the stadium. Near the border to North Korea, a heavy infantry attack with live ammunition was presented to the delegates, the visit in Panmunjon

was well prepared by the US-Army; transportation was conducted by helicopter. A parade took place in the military academy, to celebrate the visit. At the receptions—especially the ones at the president’s house—the vanguards of military and civil administration as well as the diplomatic corps were present.  

Conferences of this kind were not unusual—even though they did not reach such a large scale very often. They were not just attended by members of the network or organization which was organizing it, but also by the leaders of foreign networks and international organizations. Among the last often were several powerful US anti-communist organizations, like the All American Conference to Combat Communism, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Red China to the United Nations, and the American Afro-Asian Educational Exchange. But also globally well-connected emigrant organizations, like the ABN, the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, the Byelorussian Liberation Front, the Assembly of Captive European Nations, the National Captive Nations Committee, and the Free Pacific Association, were regular visitors. Furthermore, leaders of national intelligence, military, and police agencies often joined the conferences as well. This composition of delegates often led to disagreement and an unsatisfying outcome of the conferences. The emigrant organizations especially tried to radicalize the conferences, thereby hampering possible agreements more than backing them. Thus, in 1963 CIAS president Cramer reported to the West German Foreign Office about the events on a conference in Mexico-City in 1958 on which a first anti-communist World Congress for 1959 should have been arranged:

During this preliminary conference roughly 20 delegates of the Antibolshevic Bloc of Nations (ABN) appeared and affected the decisions and planning to such an extent, that a performance of the world congress would have resulted in an anti-Russian emigrant congress. As a consequence, many Western participants withdrew from the planning,

Nonetheless, the struggle for a global consolidation continued, and not just the CIAS, the APACL, and the CIADC were involved. Organizations and networks of the three types of anti-communism already discussed staged conferences, thereby trying to influence the development of the global anti-communist movement. However, none of them was ever able to reach the size or the impact of the CIAS, the APACL, or the CIADC—let alone their number of annual conferences.

In the mid-1960s, about 65 national anti-communist organizations had become constant members of one of these three primary networks.\footnote{Cramer – president (CIAS) to department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 16 November 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 147, pp. 293-298.} One of the main goals of each network was to form a strong structure for its international, continental, and global operations. The creation of a global anti-communist network was another of their areas of activity. In 1966, the APACL finally succeeded in it. The WACL was founded. During the following two decades, it would dominate and radicalize the global anti-communist movement.

However, before the similarities and differences of the CIAS, the APACL, and the CIADC can be discussed any further, a better understanding of their origins and the origin of the organized global anti-communism of the post-war era has to be made.

The Formation of Anti-Communist Networks in the ‘Free World’

To probe into these origins, it is necessary to take a closer look on the anti-communist policies of the US government and several conservative parties from all over the world in the post-war era.

Since 1945, communist parties had constantly gained ground in Europe and in Asia. With the support of the USSR and its ‘Red Army,’ communist governments could be installed in several Eastern European states, and communist politicians reached government participation in a number of Western European states. In Asia, communist parties and independence movements...
strengthened as well. These developments, accompanied by aggravations like the civil wars in Greece and China, the Indochina War, and a growing conservative undertone in the US society, led to a political breakthrough of political hardliners in Washington. These so-called ‘hawks’ viewed communist expansion as a direct threat to US security and called for a foreign and domestic policy of strength against the USSR and all forms of communism which they construed as a monolithic bloc under the direct leadership of the TsK KPSS.\

When these ideas became prevalent in the Truman government in 1946, a new radical and confrontational phase in US-Soviet relations began. In March 1947, the Truman Doctrine was announced by President Harry S Truman, followed by the Secretary of State’s introduction of Marshall Plan aid in June and George Kennan’s presentation of the new US foreign policy concept of Containment in July. To the public, this new phase was not explained as the result of a regular conflict between states, but as a “clash” of two “mutually irreconcilable” ideologies. Terms like ‘Cold War’ and ‘Eastern Bloc’ came up, even further increasing the fear of an unpredictable united communist movement under strict Soviet leadership in the Western hemisphere. In context of this new policy, the US foreign intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was founded. Furthermore, the White House’s National Security Council (NSC) was established as a coordinating center for global anti-communist activities of the United States. Covert operations were initialized, including the build-up of ‘stay behind forces’ in Western Europe, support for paramilitary anti-communist groups in Eastern Europe and Asia, and the installment of ‘psychological defense operations’ against the Soviet Union.

This American policy encouraged conservative parties in all Western European countries to revoke their political and governmental arrangements with communism. This was relatively easy in states like Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Austria, Iceland, and Luxembourg where the communist parties only had a weak backing in society, but it was something completely different in France and Italy.

In France, the communist Parti Communiste Français (PCF), the socialist Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), and the conservative Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) had formed a provisional government in 1944. In the general elections for a

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64 T. Weiner, CIA. Die ganze Geschichte (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), p. 56.
constituent assembly in 1945 and 1946, the PCF received 26 percent both times, becoming the strongest and the second strongest party. In the general elections for the national assembly in 1946, the PCF even received 28 percent. It became the strongest party and again formed a coalition government with the SFIO and the MRP which had received 26 percent and 18 percent, the latter providing the prime minister.

In Italy, the communist Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) and the socialist Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (PSIUP)—both accepted the leadership claim of the USSR—together with the conservative Democrazia Cristiana (DC) formed a provisional government in 1945 as well. In the general elections for a constituent assembly in 1946, the PCI and the PSIUP received 19 percent and 21 percent respectively, becoming the third and the second strongest party, and formed a government coalition with the strongest party, the DC, which had received 35 percent.

Nevertheless, in May 1947 the PCF, the PCI, and the PSIUP were excluded from government, even though all three had been significant political factors in their states. In the aftermath of this process, Western European governments quickly established an anti-communist domestic and information policy to weaken the communist parties even further. New anti-communist information institutions were established, and existing ones extended. The Information Research Department (IRD) of the British Foreign Office especially has to be mentioned here, as it was financially well equipped and therefore able to establish not just a national, but also a global infrastructure for its anti-communist campaigns. The communist parties responded to this challenge with campaigns of their own and general strikes by their trade union congresses. In France, the communist dominated trade union congress Confédération générale du travail (CGT) even caused the resignation of the Ramadier government in the end of 1947.

However, now the Truman doctrine was in effect. In 1948, the CIA and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), another US secret service which just had been founded, started their first big psychological operations in Western Europe. In conjunction with conservative local forces, they supported the establishment of a nationwide net of anti-communist organizations in

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Italy. Out of this assistance, the *Comitati Civici* emerged. These organizations operated against the PCI and the newly formed socialist *Partito Socialista Italiano* (PSI) and supported the election campaign of the DC in the Italian general elections of the same year successfully. The DC gained a brilliant election victory against its competitors. In France, the CIA and the OPC supported the establishment of the anti-communist trade union congress *Confédération générale du travail—Force ouvrière* against the CGT, to prevent a repeat of the events of 1947. These anti-communist activities were accompanied by a broadly conceived American anti-communist information policy, distinguishing itself with the effective cooperation of the United States Information Service, the CIA, the OPC, and an enormous number of local anti-communist agents.

However, the USSR had not been asleep in the meantime either. The illegitimate stopping of the Soviet industrial dismantling completion in the American zone by its military governor, General Lucius D. Clay, had provoked the USSR to its first broad anti-American propaganda and PR campaign in 1946. A second global campaign was initiated one year later, when the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed. For its campaigns, the USSR had recourse to several institutions and organizations, like the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, the Committee for State Security, the Main Intelligence Directorate, and the All-Union Association for Cultural Relations with foreign countries (VOKS). The agitation and propaganda departments of the TsK KPSS and the other communist parties and trade unions and the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ parties, which was established in 1947, were involved as well. Furthermore, several clandestine Soviet organizations and Western organizations infiltrated by agents and assets of the USSR, especially those supporting the globally operating peace movement, participated—sometimes wittingly, sometimes unwittingly—in Soviet campaigns.

Initially, the US government responded relatively helplessly to these campaigns. Only in the American zone in Germany did it have the necessary infrastructure and authority at its

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disposal to react. Here, the psychological operation Talkback could be conducted. However, to offer an effective opposition against the Soviet infrastructure, the US government had to amplify its efforts. That is why the Smith-Mundt Act was passed in 1948, leading to an extension of several US information policy institutions. Despite this, as its leading institutions were rigid and an object of several restructurings, it took quite a bit of time until the American psychological warfare became effective on a European or even global level. Not until then it crossed the line of only reacting on Soviet campaigns and took the initiative.

In April 1950, this line was crossed, when President Truman proclaimed the start of the Campaign of Truth. It was a global campaign that not only led to a radicalization of the US information policy, but also to a stronger involvement of foreign private organizations. Thus, organizational and financial assistance for founding private anti-communist organizations by the CIA and various governments, which had already started in 1947, received a considerable boost. Furthermore, to coordinate the US psychological warfare, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was established in 1951. It was the time of the ‘Big Red Scare,’ the time of McCarthyism, a time of radical anti-communism in the US, and it would soon become almost the same in Western Europe.

On 29 August 1950, the private anti-communist organization VFF was founded in the FRG, on 8 September an organization similar to it, the Paix et Liberté, in France. Quite soon, the latter would take the lead in the organized anti-communism of Western Europe.

In 1951, the French organization was able to present its work on several psychological warfare conferences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In succession to this ‘promotion campaign,’ several further private anti-communist organizations emerged in Western Europe, like Pace e Libertà in Italy, Paix et Liberté—België in Belgium, Vrede en Vrijheid in

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73 Friedel 2001, p. 43.
75 Guasconi 1999, p. 137.
76 Verhoeven 2010, p. 212.
the Netherlands, or Common Cause in Great Britain. Peace and Liberty became their prevalent name. Organizations like Common Cause only formed an exception, proving this rule.

These ‘private’ organizations mainly operated on two fields of activity. One of them was anti-communist propaganda and PR in the form of denunciations of potential and actual communists, their sympathizers, and their collaborators. A special focus was placed on the communist party of the country and its related trade unions. Papers, flyers, and posters were published, events organized, radio programs made, and sometimes, like in the case of the French documentary film Crèveceur about French troops in the Korean war, even film productions supported. The French organization even had two weekly radio programs and three newspapers. Between 1950 and 1956, it distributed about 20 million posters and organized about 8,000 events all over France. The second field of activity was the gathering of communist-related information, including not just the monitoring of organizations but also of individuals. Communists as well as their sympathizers and collaborators were monitored systematically. All relevant information was filed in special ‘documentation centers’ and, in the case of need, forwarded towards interested institutions and organizations. The Italian documentation center, for example, contained about 700,000 personal files, but only 300,000 of these belonged to actual communists. The rest contained information on other ‘political suspects.’ For this achievement, each organization had a headquarters, normally situated in the capital of the country, and several regional, local, and sometimes even operational sections and subsections in the hinterland. Their extent ranged from country to country. The West German, French, and Italian organizations seem to have been the largest ones. However, even at this level the organizations differed significantly. While the Italian organization seems to have had about 1,000 members, the West German organization was able to draw on about 20,000 anti-communists for its operations. The funding of the organizations and their activities took place by subsidies of governments, donations of private companies, organizations, donors, and paper subscriptions.

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82 Guasconi 1999, p. 139.
83 Ibid.
84 Ludwig 2003, pp. 33-42, at p. 36.
Furthermore, the CIA and the US domestic intelligence service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), supported these organizations financially as well.\textsuperscript{85}

However, not everybody was satisfied with this development. Institutions of the state often made reservations against these organizations, as they apprehended them as ‘unprofessional’ rivals and distrusted them as recipients of US funds. Even one of the closest allies of US foreign policy, the British Foreign Office, counted the British private organization Common Cause as “an unwelcome American intervention in British internal affairs.”\textsuperscript{86}

Nonetheless, the organizations stabilized and expanded. In the spring of 1951, bilateral cooperation started. During the summer that followed, the French, West German, Italian, Dutch, and Belgian organizations founded the first international anti-communist network of the post-war era: the Comité européen Paix et Liberté. The French capital Paris was chosen as its permanent seat, and the president of the French organization, Jean-Paul David, elected as its leader. Consequently, the French Paix et Liberté gained a dominant position within it. The main aims of the network were to establish a regular information exchange between its member organizations and to create the option of coordinated international operations. In the field, however, the latter seems to have been limited to a few big anti-communist events.\textsuperscript{87} Actual cooperation seems to have been limited, for the most part, to the bilateral level. Nevertheless, in the case of information gathering an intensive information exchange seems to have emerged.

In the following year, David—with the support of the French government\textsuperscript{88}—was able to expand the network. Several institutions of the state, like the British IRD,\textsuperscript{89} and private anti-communist organizations all over Europe were invited to join. In the following, the Greece organization \textit{Eirene kai Eleutheria} [Ειρήνη και την Ελευθερία] and—as it seems—a Turkish state institution for anti-communist information policy\textsuperscript{90} entered the association. In addition, as France was embattled in the Indochina War during that time, a Vietnamese state institution respectively a French colonial institution for Cold War information policy joined the network as well, thereby renaming the network Comité international Paix et Liberté.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{85}Lejeune 2003, p. 206.
\textsuperscript{86}H. Wilford, \textit{The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?} (London and Portland, 2003), p. 68.
\textsuperscript{87}Friedel 2001, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{89}Jenks 2006, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{90}Ludwig 2004.
\textsuperscript{91}Ibid.
1953 brought several changes in the global framework of Cold War. In the US, the Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, and even though he had promoted the rollback strategy of US foreign policy during his election campaign, he distanced himself from this strategy in the following years. Meanwhile in the USSR, the general secretary of the TsK KPSS and chairman of the Council on Ministers, Joseph I. Stalin, had died, leading not just to a power struggle in the Central Committee of the communist party, but also to a new, ‘more moderate’ concept of Soviet foreign policy. At Stalin’s funeral, the new prime minister of the USSR, Georgy M. Malenkov, gave a speech, declaring the possibility of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between the East and the West.92 Meanwhile in Asia, the acts of war between North and South Korea came to a halt as an armistice agreement was signed. A thawing of US-Soviet relations began, relieving the tensions of international diplomacy for the West and the East. But not only the diplomacy of the two super powers underwent a process of moderation, their art of psychological warfare did so as well. Both sides centralized their information infrastructure to make them more manageable and controllable. In the USSR for instance, VOKS was put under direct control of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.93 In the US, the Eisenhower government started an audit of the effectiveness of its Cold War programs.94 Subsequently, the PSB was replaced by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB),95 and US information policy was centralized with the foundation of the United States Information Agency.

These developments put private anti-communist organizations—also the ones of the Comité international Paix et Liberté—in a state of unease. David traveled to Washington, DC most likely to get clarification about further US political and financial support, and it was here he met with CIA Director Allan W. Dulles, Undersecretary of State Walter B. Smith, several employees of the State Department and members of the OCB.96 Talks certainly also involved a project, which David and the French, and Italian governments hoped to accomplish at that time. No later than 1951, the three had started to promote plans for the creation of a NATO department for psychological warfare. They intended a central institution for the coordination of the psychological warfare activities of all NATO member states. David speculated for a strong

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92 Müller 2011, 17.
95 Lehmkuhl 1999, at p. 122.
96 Ludwig 2004.
involvement of the Comité international Paix et Liberté, already keeping in sight further sources of funding. However, sensing its sovereign and dominant position in the ‘Free World’ in danger, the US government successfully pushed for the rejection of the proposal in the NATO council.97

In the following two years, David was unable to gain more regular members. However, until 1955 organizations from Switzerland, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Denmark, Israel, South Korea, and South Africa became ‘friendly organizations.’98 In contrast to the regular ‘member organizations,’ the friendly organizations were admittedly involved in an intense exchange of propaganda and PR material within the Paix et Liberté network, but most likely not in that of personal information of their fellow citizens—at least not to the extent as the member organizations.

In the mid-1950s, the global structure of the participants of Cold War changed again. In the US, the end of Senator McCarthy’s political career helped to reduce the domestic communist ‘witch-hunt’ on a moderate level.99 This change enabled the Eisenhower government to take up a more moderate position in foreign policy as well. In the meantime in the USSR, foreign minister Molotov had once more proclaimed the foreign policy concept of peaceful coexistence, this time at a session of the Supreme Soviet.100 This political climate encouraged a further diplomatic rapprochement. In 1954, the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the US, the USSR, Great Britain, and France, which had been suspended since 1947, was resumed. In 1955, the Geneva Summit took place. Here for the first time since the Yalta Conference and the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the leaders of the US, the USSR, Great Britain, and France came together, to discuss matters of future global security. This international rapprochement had a number of impacts.101 In 1956, the first secretary of the TsK KPSS, Khrushchev, confirmed the new Soviet foreign policy concept of peaceful coexistence on the famous Twentieth Party Congress. In the Socialist State Community, this concept, combined with de-Stalinization, led to the ‘Khrushchev Thaw.’ For the West, it made clear that the USSR would represent a more moderate international position from now on.

In Europe this development led to a consolidation of the status quo. In Asia, where the

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100 Müller 2011, p. 18.
Indochina War ended in 1954, it led to the Asian-African Bandung Conference in 1955, paving the way for a ‘third option’ apart from ‘the West’ or ‘the East.’ The Non-aligned Movement was born and became a foreign political option for several states of the ‘Third World’ that constituted itself at that time. However, once again it was not only international diplomacy, but also the international art of psychological warfare that was affected. As ‘blocs’ decomposed into ‘camps,’ information policy, cultural policy, propaganda, and PR softened and rationalized.

But even though the prospect of an end of radical system contradiction seemed to present itself, the private anti-communist organizations still saw a possibility to continue their activities—by adapting themselves to the ‘new’ Cold War. In 1956, the French, the West German, the Italian, the Belgian, the Dutch, and the Swiss organizations convened and founded a successor for the Comité international Paix et Liberté. The international anti-communist network CIAS was born.103

Initially, this network was led by David, the leader of the French Paix et Liberté. However, in 1957 leadership switched to Maurice Keyaerts, leader of the Belgian organization, and then to Cramer, first chairman of the VFF, in the same year. While its headquarters was moved to Bonn, its legal residence shifted from Paris to Brussels and to Luxembourg in 1960. The network expanded rapidly again. Before 1960, a Portuguese institution joined along with several friendly organizations to become regular members. After 1960, the network was expanded further to Japan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mexico.104 The West German and French organizations remained the most active members. However, as the French organization increasingly lost significant financial support of the French government, the VFF became the dominant power of the CIAS.

In the meantime, private international anti-communist networks had constituted themselves in Asia, Oceania, and Latin America as well. In 1954, on the initiative of the president of Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek, the president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, and the former president of the Philippines, Elpidio R. Quirino along with clandestine support of the CIA,105 the APACL was founded.106 Ideas for such an organization had already come up between

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102 Contino 2004, p. 16.
103 Friedel 2001, p. 78.
104 CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.
106 www.cwihp.org
1949 and 1952 when Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines had contemplated the foundation of a regional Asian military alliance, comparable to the NATO, to be able to defend themselves against the People’s Republic of China and other communist threats. The US had thwarted this approach to keep their dominant position in the region. Instead, the US government installed bilateral defense agreements between the United States and several Asian countries. Additionally, the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty was signed in 1952 and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954, hoping to make any further Asian plans on regional alliances unnecessary. But the US alliance policy was not convincing enough for several Asian governments.

In 1953, President Rhee started a new approach, inviting Asian anti-communists to a first Asian anti-communist conference in South Korea. It was on this conference that the APACL was founded. In its aftermath, the participants formed national anti-communist member organizations in their countries. Branches in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Ryukyu Islands were among its first members. The president and the secretary general of the network changed each year, as these administrative bodies were assigned to the leaders of the organization holding the annual international APACL conference. Between 1954 and 1966 only branches from South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan managed to assume some form of control. However, as most of the participants had been overseas Chinese, the Taiwan organization was able to achieve a nearly dominant position in the network. Its rank was merely challenged by the South Korean organization, which successfully opposed the Taiwanese wish to integrate Japanese anti-communists into the network for several years. Nevertheless, none of the organizations were able to achieve full dominance. In fact, even the influential Taiwanese organization was barely able to obtain the position of the network’s chairman for its leader, Ku Cheng-kang, in 1957. Moreover, the permanent secretariat of APACL was established in Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, and not in the Taiwanese capital Taipei. The power plays resulting thereby between the organizations of Taiwan and South Korea formed one of the major conflicts of interests in the network. Another major conflict was caused by South Korean prejudices against the former imperialist Empire of Japan. All these conflicts weakened the network to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the

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107 Chen 1974.
APACL was able to expand its infrastructure in Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, and Africa during the following years.

In 1954, the third anti-communist network, the CIADC, was founded. Jorge P. Laurens, president of the Mexican anti-communist Frente Popular Anti-Communista de Mexico, was its official initiator. An involvement of the CIA in the founding process is possible, even though it does not appear in the records I went through. Under the code name SUMMIT, the founding congress of the CIADC in Mexico was used by the CIA as a token approval of the Latin American public for a governmental overthrow in Guatemala it had planned. As a matter of fact, the CIA had originally only thought of a hemisphere-wide Committee for the Liberation of Guatemala. But the idea quickly developed an independent existence, and in the end, it was not Guatemalan ‘communist tendencies’ but ‘Soviet expansionism’ that became the issue of the conference and therefore that of the network as well. Among the first members of the CIADC were organizations from Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Peru, Panama, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Former admiral Carlos Penna Botto, president of the Brazilian anti-communist organization Cruzada Brasileira Anticomunista (CBA), became the president of the network and Laurens his general secretary. Like the CIAS and the APACL, the CIADC had to face several problems. The rise of Castroism in Latin America and the ascent of both radical conservatism as well as anti-Americanism in the CIADC led the network into a crisis. A temporary suspension of anti-communist activities in most of its organizations—even in the Mexican and Brazilian ones—was the result and remained in effect until the mid-1960s.

Even though only little evidence exists—not least of all because of the lack of secondary literature on this issue—it seems these two networks, like the CIAS, not only became active in anti-communist propaganda and PR—accompanying anti-communist policies and activities of their governments and the CIA—but also surveyed communists, their collaborators and sympathizers, as well as their organizations.

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108 Rolender (CIA) to Chief of Western Hemisphere Division (CIA), 1 June 1954, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Doc No/ESDN 0000922842.


On the African continent, organized anti-communism started latest and most incoherently. Before decolonization, it was mostly handled by the CIAS organizations of the respective colonial powers. Their influence almost always outlived decolonization. Purely African organizations, like the South African CIAS member *Antikommunistiese Aksiekommissie*, formed an exception. Under these conditions, the building up of an African anti-communist network was impossible. Some years after the start of the decolonization process, the APACL and the CIAS even had to expand their position on the African continent, as the anti-communism of the latter did not even start to grow on a national level.

Interestingly, anti-communism failed to establish an international network in North America in the 1950s and 1960s as well. Even though the Big Red Scare and McCarthyism had animated organized anti-communism in the US to spread—with anti-communist organizations and circles founded in companies, trade unions, churches, and in veteran and patriotic

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111 L. Chen, *From APACL to WACL and WYACL*, *Taiwan today*, 14 April 1974.
112 Rolender (CIA) to Chief of Western Hemisphere Division (CIA), 1 June 1954, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Doc No/ESDN 0000922842.
113 Contino 2004, p. 16.
organizations—the multiplicity of anti-communist organizations was not able to find enough ideological as well as technical common ground to coordinate its practical work. Most of them remained separated, operating on a local or regional, sometimes even national level, perhaps best conceptualized as an anti-communist ‘patchwork rug.’ As it seems, only one anti-communist organization was able to gain greater significance. In 1955, under the temporary name Mid-American Research Library, the right-wing conservative American Security Council (ASC) was founded. Its members and supporters contained former employees of the FBI, as well as members of the conservative organizations America First Committee, American Vigilante Intelligence Federation, and American Coalition of Patriotic Societies. Like the organizations of the anti-communist networks in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, its fields of activity encompassed anti-communist propaganda and PR as well as organization and personal monitoring. Its archive contained more than 2,000,000 files about communists, their sympathizers and collaborators, and people with the ‘wrong’ political attitudes, but mostly about trade unionist and those critical of the ‘concept of free enterprises’. However, in the very same year the ASC was able to found, with support of the CIA-linked Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Aircraft Industries Association, the National Military-Industrial Conference. This annual meeting was visited by several leading members of the Pentagon, the NSC, the CIA, and big American companies, who met to discuss and coordinate further US anti-communist activities in the world. In this way, the ASC became active in foreign policy issues at an early stage as well. In 1959, the conference expanded by forming an Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which two foreigners, the West German Martin Blank, as a ‘deputy of the West German industry,’ and the West German Friedrich August von der Heydte, a military officer of the reserve of the West German army, belonged. By the end of the 1950s, the ASC, the

119 Bellant 1989, p. 34.
120 Ibid., p. 33.
121 Ibid., p. 35.
Institute for American Strategy (IAS)—an institution founded by the ASC in 1958—\textsuperscript{122} the conference and the council started a campaign intended to use the US Army as a promoter for their idea of a radicalization of the Cold War. But the plan leaked and caused a scandal in the US public. It was this organization Eisenhower warned the American people about in his famous TV farewell address of 1961.\textsuperscript{123} However, as in all the other countries, also US institutions of the state apprehended an interference in the anti-communist political course of their country by ‘laymen’ and therefore—as it seems—did not support organized anti-communism inside the US to the same extent that they did outside the US.\textsuperscript{124} First and foremost, Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, never would have tolerated a private rival, like the CIAS, of his agency. It took US anti-communists until 1970, to found the American Council for World Freedom and finally reach the international level which the three networks already had achieved more than a decade ago.\textsuperscript{125}

With that said, there were only two anti-communist networks in the world comparable to the CIAS: the APACL and the CIADC. Therefore, these three shall be the focus of the following two sections of this paper. By comparison, similarities and differences of the three networks will come to light, thus helping to further outline the main contours of the CIAS.

\textbf{Theoretical Reasons for Practical Differences}

The membership in a global organization eases the automatic connection of newer and higher relations for us thanks to the relations of other organizations. Membership in some way obliges other organizations to represent the [West] German arguments and to distribute our material. […] We also commit ourselves to represent the viewpoints of other members to a certain degree. The consequence could be, for example, that the Chinese committee expects us to propagate a preemptive war against Red China.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 36.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} S. Diamond, \textit{Roads to Dominion: Right-wing movements and political power in the United States} (New York, NY, 1995), pp. 50-51.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Stöver 2002, p. 651.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to department II A 3 (West German Foreign Office), 17 October 1966, PA AA, AA, B 40, 109, p. 188 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “Die Mitgliedschaft in einer Weltorganisation erleichtert uns die automatische Anknüpfung neuerer und höherer Beziehungen unter Benutzung der Beziehungen anderer Organisationen. Die Mitgliedschaft anderer Organisationen bewirkt eine gewisse Verpflichtung für diese, die [west-]deutschen Argumente zu vertreten und unser Material zu verbreiten. […] Wir übernehmen selbst ebenfalls die Verpflichtung, Gesichtspunkte anderer Mitglieder bis zu einem gewissen Grade zu vertreten. Wir können dadurch z.B. in die Lage kommen, dass das chinesische Komitee von uns erwartet, dass wir einen Präventivkrieg gegen Rotchina propagieren.”
\end{itemize}
Gielen described these advantages and disadvantages of membership in an anti-communist world organization to the West German Foreign Office. Even though he referred in this quotation only to the field of anti-communist propaganda and PR, his statement shouldn’t be underestimated. His prejudices against foreign anti-communist propaganda and PR are an indicator of the existence of different anti-communist policies and understandings of the term anti-communism. All three networks differed in this respect. The CIAS and the APACL need to be mentioned here especially, as both networks developed a strong sense of intercontinental claim to the conceptual sovereignty on anti-communism.

The CIAS and the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit pursue the purpose of enlightening the population about Leninist Bolshevism, to immune it against its influence and finally to generate mental resistance to defend the possession of freedom.127

The anti-communist policy of the CIAS—as this description of the West German Foreign Office shows—can be characterized as a temperate one in which ‘enlightenment’ should play the leading role. Tendencies of bourgeois, liberal, and social anti-communism were linked with a sometimes more sometimes less objective critique of the applied communism of the USSR and its ‘satellite states’. The typically US topics of ‘freedom’ and the ‘right of nations to self-determination’, the latter mainly pushed by the West German organization, became an integral part of it. This opened the possibility of attaching a ‘positive anti-communism’ that focussed on the advantages and amenities a non-communist life could offer to the regular ‘negative anti-communism,’ which mainly focussed on denouncing and catastrophizing everything related to communism. Politically, it was situated between tempered socialism and conservatism. In this way, members of the main political parties of a country—usually a Christian Democratic and a Social Democratic one—could join and support them. Right-wing policy was denounced, even though many former members of the NSDAP and collaborators of the ‘Third Reich’ occupied leading positions. In fact, the combat against right-wing activism was part of the program of the

127 ten Haaf – department 911 (West German Foreign Office) to buero of the minister, director division 2, department 203, department 204, department 206, department 307, department 702 (West German Foreign Office), 16 April 1959, PA AA, AA, B 24, 265, pp. 301-303ff and pp. 313-329, at p. 302 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “Das CIAS und der Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit verfolgen den Zweck, die Bevölkerung über den leninistischen Bolschewismus aufzuklären, sie gegen seinen Einfluß zu immunisieren und schließlich die geistigen Widerstandskräfte zur Verteidigung des Gutes der Freiheit zu wecken.”
CIAS, as it was said to be “often sponsored by the Communist side.” Other political issues the CIAS pursued were the ‘European integration’—with due regard to the improvement between former enemies, like Germany and the countries it had occupied during World War II—and the ‘Western integration.’ The latter became an especially complex issue as most CIAS organizations showed anti-American tendencies. The president and his general secretary tried their best to reverse this attitude. Finally, the CIAS tried to keep the perceived global emphasis of Cold War on the European continent, even though the actual hot spots of Cold War had already shifted towards Asia.

In comparison to this, the APACL practiced a much more radical anti-communist policy than its league charter proclaimed,

to struggle against Communist imperialism, to checkmate aggressive Communist expansionism and to eradicate it. [...] to promote cooperation between free Asian nations and the rest of the free world, to destroy the Iron Curtain in Asia at an early date and to achieve national unification of the divided countries in Asia so as to restore freedom to the enslaved peoples. [...] to build a new Asia, where freedom, democracy, peace and prosperity will prevail in cooperation with the rest of the free world.129

Despite the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Bamboo Curtain, and the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, many Asian leaders sought refuge in embattled radical anti-communism, as they constantly feared a military communist attack. Their radical anti-communism even included subversive operations to establish an anti-communist “cordon sanitaire” around the communist states in Asia—the People’s Republic of China in particular.130 As the ranks of the APACL were highly interspersed with members of the radical anti-communist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) [中國國民黨] and nationalist overseas Chinese, the APACL anti-communism politically affiliated to them. It showed tendencies of conservative and, as race was still an issue, national socialist anti-communism linked with to a greater or lesser extent objective critique on the People’s Republic of China and its ‘satellites.’ Positive anti-communism was only partially available. Because of the Chinese dominance, the ‘three principles of the people [三民主義],’ a political program by Sun Yat-sen, the former president of the Republic of China and co-founder

of the KMT, played an important role. But as it rested upon Chinese culture, it did not have much to offer for others than Chinese. Asian solidarity at least offered an empty phrase, as the APACL envisioned itself as an alternative to the Non-aligned movement. Politically, it was much closer to the often conservative or even right-wing leading party of the respective countries than the CIAS. These leading parties nearly always had a dominant position in their states, like the conservative Chinese National Party [中国国民党] in Taiwan, the conservative Liberal Party [자유당] in South Korea or the conservative Liberal Democratic Party [自由民主党] in Japan. However, at least the case of the Japan Socialist Party [日本社会党] shows that social democratic parties were accepted. The dominant political issue of the APACL was the ‘Asian integration’ which was contrary to the idea of ‘Western integration.’ As a result, anti-American and anti-European tendencies manifested themselves in APACL branches and at the annual APACL conferences. As it seems, even the chairman of the network just tried to contain, not to terminate these tendencies, to keep the organizations on ‘the Asian line.’ Furthermore, the APACL, like the CIAS, saw the global emphasis of the Cold War on its part of the world. The Chinese Civil War, the Indochina War, the Korean War, and the emerging Vietnam War—not to mention the series of decolonization and civil conflicts in the region—let the APACL anti-communists think of Asia as the preferred global target of communism. Hence, they equipped their anti-Communist policy with a strict “Asia first” strategy.131 In context of this strategy, prejudices against the former European colonial powers and anti-Americanism became even more apparent.

Unlike the APACL and even the CIAS, the CIADC ‘practiced,’ at least on a theoretical level, a much more moderate anti-communism.

Assessment of work by consideration of its economic emancipation and recognition of its social worth and function for the purpose of a fair compensation for all activities. Establishing ethical norms, which allow a fair payment and profit-sharing. Acceptance of systems, which minimize the easement of generalization of property and absolute advancement of productivity. Realization of a social security system to relieve the people and to ensure the protection of the community.132

131 West German Embassy in Manila to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 27 September 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 34, pp. 106-109, at p. 108.
132 Playdon (LINCOLN) to PBSUCCESS (CIA headquarters), 16 June 1954, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Doc No/ESDN 0000923393 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “Valorizacion del trabajo como medio de emancipacion economica y reconocimiento de los valores sociales y funcionales, para los efectos de
Besides its support of the ‘counter revolution’ in Guatemala—these were the topics which the CIADC member organizations agreed upon in one of their first resolutions in 1954 to define their ‘brand’ of anti-communism. The CIADC showed tendencies of bourgeois, liberal, and social democratic anti-communism linked with a critique of the USSR. In the case of single organizations, the appearance of national socialist anti-communism cannot be excluded either. Positive anti-communism, as already mentioned above, seems to have loomed large. However, not just social but also political objectives were declared. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the right of nations to self-determination became two of its main arguments during its founding congress. Politically, the CIADC, like the CIAS, seems to have been situated between conservative and social democratic parties, though with reservations against the latter and a tendency towards right-wing nationalism. Perhaps ‘Latin American integration’ was another of its political issues, further studies may show, but it can be presumed safe to say that anti-(US-)Americanism was one of them. However, not just theoretical, but also practical reasons hindered a consolidation of the anti-communisms of these three networks.

**Practical Reasons for Practical Differences**

On the 10th APACL conference in 1964, the decision had been made that the Asian participants should subsequently start campaigning for the establishment of an anti-communist defensive pact at their governments. In the meantime, negotiations regarding this issue have been conducted between governments. The conference of this year repeated these decisions, whereby it became obvious that the following countries have already agreed to such a pact with the direct aim of an intervention in Vietnam: South Korea—Taiwan—Thailand—the Philippines, and South Vietnam. [...] These five countries intend to send a total of 400,000 men to Vietnam, to support the Vietnamese in their guerrilla warfare. Thereby they hold the belief that the American ‘consultants’ will not be able to secure a victory.133

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As this passage of the West German Foreign Office on the eleventh APACL conference in Manila implies, there was a strong connection—a symbiosis—between some APACL organizations and the governments of their countries.

The reason for the differing grade of radicalism of the networks and for their differing continental and global success did not just lie in their differing ‘theoretical’ approaches, but even more in the differing kinds and extents of ‘alliances’ between the organizations of the respective network and their governments. These alliances, among other factors, led to differing structures of the networks funding, thereby influencing their staff, their infrastructure, their activities, and, in the end, the development of anti-communism in their part of the world.

The funding of the organizations took place by selling their publications and other anti-communist material and the acquisition of donations and subsidies. The last were received from private persons, domestic and foreign organizations, companies, foreign intelligence agencies like the CIA, other foreign state institutions, and, in a large part, from their respective governments. As the scholarship on this subject is only in its infancy, no statement can be made on the exact financial figures—neither in the case of the networks, nor in the case of a single organization, and neither on their annual nor on their monthly accounts. Nevertheless, in comparison, different financial approaches can be recognized between the networks.

The leaders of the APACL branches were truly well connected with politicians and members of the governments of their respective states, which granted many of their organizations a solid financial basis. Ku Cheng-Kang, former general and minister, Member of Parliament, chairman of the National Assembly, and senior leader of the KMT in Taiwan, was joined by Park Chung-hee, president of South Korea from 1961 to 1979, and Choi Doo-sun, prime minister of South Korea from 1963 to 1964, Nguyễn Tiến Hỷ, secretary general of the conservative Vietnamese party Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng, Tsai Chang, external minister on the Ryuku Islands, and Leonel Borralho, a senator in Macao, just to mention some of the organizations leaders. Consequently, governments—especially the ones in Taiwan and South Korea—were important ‘investors’ of the APACL network. Furthermore, the KMT—and
indirectly the CIA as well—had been an important supporter of the network since its beginning. In the mid-1950s, CIA drug trafficking for the KMT in Burma was uncovered by media. The KMT and the CIA had sold drugs to earn money for the funding of the guerrilla war the KMT fought against the People’s Republic of China. In the aftermath of this exposure, the CIA changed the ‘technical implementation’ of the drug trafficking. In 1954, the Taiwanese organization Free China Relief Agency was founded to handle future transports, putting the KMT in charge. The latter made the organization a member of the APACL, based in the same office rooms as the Taiwanese APACL organization, and redirected some of the drug-trafficking profits into the network. This direct linkage of the APACL with the unconventional warfare of the KMT, its high dependence on Taiwan and South Korea—two countries on constant red alert for a communist attack—caused a radicalization of the APACL anti-communism to a level, which was almost incomparable to the ones of the CIAS and the CIADC.

In the case of the latter, a strong connection between the organizations and their respective governments was nearly completely missing. Leaders like Carlos Penna Botto, a former admiral, in Brazil, Jorge P. Laurens, a politician, in Mexico, Jose A. Baquero de la Calle, a diplomat, in Ecuador, Isabel A. Callejo, also a diplomat, in Paraguay, Eduardo A. Figeac, a trade unionist, in El Salvador, Carlos A. Espinosa, another trade unionist, in Nicaragua, Jose C. Salazar, a journalist and writer, in Guatemala, or Federico N. Reyes, also a journalist and writer, in Bolivia visualize the rather ‘civil character’ of the CIADC quite well. Moreover, CIADC president Penna Botto surely was established in conservative and military Brazilian circles—his organization CBA is often labeled as right-wing extremist—but the leading Brazilian party, the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), even though anti-communist, had strong social tendencies. CIADC Secretary General Jorge Prieto Laurens even stood in complete opposition to the socialist Partido Revolucionario Institucional, whose members constituted the Mexican government, and which he accused of being infiltrated by communists in 1954, during the foundation conference of the CIADC. With hardly any strong ties to government, the CIADC might have had only limited financial resources. Even the CIA, which seems to have been involved in the foundation of the network, seems to have passed on this issue, as after the coup in

134 Marshal 1987, p. 33.
135 Rolender (CIA) to Chief of Western Hemisphere Division (CIA), 1 June 1954, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Doc No/ESDN 0000922842.
Guatemala, the focus of the agency switched back on the hot spots of Cold War in Asia and Europe. The distance between policy and government, and especially the lack of adequate funds, made the organizations less active, less aggressive, and surely had a share in the near-collapse of the network in the 1960s.

Contrary to this, the CIAS was far better off. Financial subsidies by governments played an important role in the financing of its organizations, even though they were not as personally interlinked with their governments as the ones of the APACL. A quick glance at the political presidium of the CIAS, occupied by leaders of selected organizations, shows this very clearly. Whether Cramer, full-time anti-communist, in the FRG, Pierre Rostini, publisher, in France, Marcel de Roover, director of the Banque de Bruxelles and president of the Société de Bruxelles pour la finance et l’industrie, in Belgium, Alfred Münst, full-time anti-communist, in Switzerland136 and, until 1959, Edgardo Sogno, a commissioner for building up an Italian semi-governmental paramilitary anti-communist organization, none of them had a high-ranking political or governmental position. Only Jean-Paul David, delegate of the French Parti républicain, radical et radical-socialiste and first president of the CIAS, and Maurice Keyaerts, general of the intelligence agency of the Belgian Army and second president of the CIAS, were the exception. However, their successor Cramer and his general delegate Gielen—though they loosely were connected with the West German intelligence agency Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)137—were already full-time anti-communists. Still, contrary to the CIADC, the staff of the CIAS was strongly linked with governmental institutions, thereby ensuring a continuous, adequate funding. Furthermore, the CIA supported the organizations as well. When the Marshall Plan aid was initiated, the US-government had arranged that recipients had to supply counter-value funds to get their share. The CIA was allowed to take 5 percent of these counter-value funds for its clandestine operations, including its support of organizations like the CIAS.138 Channeled through several private foundations, parts of this money were lead to the network.139 Thereby, the CIAS organizations became at least partly financially and politically dependent, like

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136 Cramer – president (CIAS) to department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 11 June 1965, PAAA, AA, B 40, 33, pp. 95-96.

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those of the APACL, on their governments and, to a certain degree on the CIA. But in contrast to the APACL in the increasingly unsettled Asia, Europe faced peaceful coexistence and since the beginning of the 1960s even a short period of détente. This easing of tension lead to a—compared with the APACL—less radical, more objective, and—compared with the CIADC—more active form of anti-communism.

A Piece of the Global Anti-communist Puzzle: The CIAS

The CIAS was not a recreation, but was built upon the ruins of its predecessor, the Comité international Paix et Liberté. Therefore, it is quite likely that the network maintained its character under David’s and even under Keyaert’s presidencies. The question arises, however, in how far the West German takeover undermined this status quo. At this point, nothing can be said with absolute certainty about possible substantial changes the network underwent, as scholarship on the Comité européenne Paix et Liberté, Comité international Paix et Liberté and the CIAS is still in its inception.

What can be said is that all of these networks participated in anti-communist propaganda and PR, in the gathering of anti-communist information, and in expanding the infrastructure of the network. All interest in the continuities and discontinuities of the direct interventions of the network in the internal affairs of various states unfortunately need to be set aside, as any statement in this direction would be based on mere speculation in the case of the Comité européenne Paix et Liberté and the Comité international Paix et Liberté—even though such interventions are indeed sometimes mentioned in secondary literature.140 In the case of the CIAS, however, they can be empirically proven and will be part of this paper.

Furthermore, it can be said that the West German organization, the VFF, outlived several changes in and after 1956 to adapt the organization to the ‘new’ dynamic of the Cold War. Content and realization of propaganda and PR were rationalized and optimized.141 It is understood that personal and organization monitoring were cut back as West German state institutions or even the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer itself ordered the VFF to...
stop its intelligence work.\textsuperscript{142} In 1955, when the General Treaty took effect and the FRG partly regained its sovereignty, its government had obtained control of the West German domestic intelligence agency, the \textit{Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz}. One year later, the West German communist party \textit{Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands} (KPD) was officially banned and the government formed its own foreign intelligence agency, the BND, out of the ‘semi-private’ intelligence agency \textit{Organisation Gehlen}.\textsuperscript{143} Equipped in that fashion, the government was interested in cutting back the private anti-communist intelligence competition of its agencies which the VFF represented. But as mentioned above, these details are based on mere hearsay. How far the VFF really ceased its monitoring programs cannot be said with certainty at present.

Absolute statements on the issue of changes of the network therefore prove difficult. However, at least a first empirical glimpse on the ‘geographical changes’ of the network, the development of its infrastructure, can be ventured at this point.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p. 70.
Chart 2: The Comité international Paix et Liberté network around 1954:

Member organizations (black): Paix et Liberté (France), Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (FRG), Pace e Libertà (Italy), Paix et Liberté (Belgium), Vrede en Vrijheid (the Netherlands), Eirene kai Eleutheria (Greece), probably an institution of the state (Turkey), probably an institution of the state (Vietnam).

Friendly organizations (gray): Fred og Frihed (Denmark), Folk og Forsvar (Norway), Common Cause (Great Britain), The People's Union—Peace and Freedom (Australia), Antikommunistiesie Aksiekommissie (South Africa), Union Civica International (Mexico), Institut Veritas (Canada), Fédération anticomuniste pour la réunification de la Corée (South Korea), unknown organization (Japan), The Peace and Freedom Association of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Anti-Communist League of Israel (Israel), Nationales Informationszentrum; Comité Suisse d’Action Civique (Switzerland).\(^\text{144}\)

When the Comité européenne Paix et Liberté was founded, it consisted of a French, a West German, an Italian, a Belgian, and a Dutch organization. During the following years, the French presidency was able to expand the network only slightly. Organizations and institutions in Greece, Turkey, and Vietnam became regular members resulting in the networks renaming as Comité international Paix et Liberté. However, no further organizations joined, and it is likely that the Vietnamese organization left when the country became independent. To compensate for this lack of growth, David made contact with several anti-communist organizations and institutions in Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, Switzerland, South Africa, Israel, Mexico, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, which soon received the status of friendly organizations. This status quo did not change until 1956, when the CIAS was founded. This step

\(^{144}\) Ludwig 2004.
led to a wave of accessions by friendly organizations over the following years, but most of them took place after the French and the Belgian presidency. Only the status upgrade of the Swiss organization to that of a member organization can be conceded to have happened during their terms. However, the CIAS also lost some of its member and friendly organizations at this early stage, as the CIADC and the APACL opened the possibility of a global anti-communist interaction.

Chart 3: the CIAS network around 1964:

Member organizations (black): Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (FRG), Comité National d’Information pour la Démocratie Française (France), CIAS-Comité Belge (Belgium), Nationales Informationszentrum; Comité Suisse d’Action Civique (Switzerland), Comitati Civici (Italy), unknown organization (Luxembourg), Union Civica International (Mexico), Antikommunistiese Aksiekommissie (South Africa), L’Institut anti-communiste pour la Liberté au Congo (Congo), probably an institution of the state (Portugal), Common Cause (Great Britain), Aktion junger Österreicher (Austria), Aktiv Frihed (Denmark), Folk og Forsvar (Norway), The People’s Union—Peace and Freedom (Australia), unknown organization (Japan).

Friendly organizations (dark gray): Sociedade de Estudos Interamericanos (Brazil), unknown organization (Argentina), probably an institution of the state (Spain), Baltiska Kommittén (Sweden), unknown organization (Iceland), Vrede en Vrijheid (Netherlands), probably an institution of the state (Greece), unknown organization (Cyprus).

Organizations in progress (light gray): unknown organization (Pakistan), unknown organization (India), unknown organization (Ireland).145

During the West German presidency, the infrastructure of the CIAS suffered several setbacks. In Europe, the influence of the Italian organization was more and more confined to the

industrialized north of the country. The status of the Greek and the Dutch organizations—though the latter had even been one of the founding members of the network—was reduced to that of friendly organizations. In Asia, the Turkish institution was lost to the APACL. The Taiwanese and the South Korean organizations disappeared, just like the connection to the Canadian one on the North American continent. Nevertheless, the time of German presidency was a time of expansion. In Europe, Norwegian and British friendly organizations became regular members. They were joined by newcomers, like the Danish, the Luxembourgian, and the Austrian organizations, and the Portuguese institution as well as new friendly organizations and institutions in Spain, Sweden, and Iceland. Outside of Europe, the Australian and South African organizations became regular members. The CIAS was even capable of compensating for the weak spots of other networks. In the case of the APACL, where South Korea refused to allow a Japanese participation, the CIAS stepped in and installed a member organization in Japan. In the case of the CIADC, which showed signs of decay since the end of the 1950s, the CIAS allowed the accession of a Mexican member organization as well as of friendly organizations in Brazil and Argentina. Furthermore, the hot spots of the early Cold War in Africa, the Congolese Republic and the Republic of Congo during the Congo Crisis, also became the location of a friendly and a member organization. In the mid-1960s, the CIAS had member organizations on all continents and member or friendly organizations respectively institutions throughout Western Europe—with the exception of Ireland. But there, like in the case of Pakistan and India, accession of further organizations was already in progress.

The West German presidency, but also the organizations from which it got its support, will be the central concern of the following five sections. To examine and analyze them effectively, the activities of the West German leadership will be separated into national operations (of the VFF), international ones (of the West German CIAS committee), and transnational ones (of the international bureau of the CIAS). Even though they all depended on the same staff, funds, and infrastructure and shared the same office rooms, their anti-communist activities differed greatly. But first, the structures and networks in which the West German leadership had to operate shall be presented in a short overview.

**Structures and Networks: The Work Environment**

The CIAS consisted of several autonomous anti-communist organizations. Some had the
status of a friendly organization others the rank of a member organization. Whereas the first were, as already mentioned, only ‘loosely’ cooperating with the network, meaning that they exchanged propaganda and PR material on a regular basis but without obligations, the last ‘more or less’ had the obligation to cooperate on all working areas regarding the network.

The member organizations operated on their own national level with their own administration and leadership. This gave the CIAS the character of an international network, not a centralized international organization. To ensure a continuous liaison between the national organizations and the network, each member organization formed a special CIAS committee which operated as an information interface.

There were several institutions which coordinated the cooperation within the network. Besides regular conferences for their directors, a political presidium and a legal committee existed. The political presidium, its members mentioned earlier, met roughly four times a year to discuss the latest communist activities and the general political line of the CIAS. The legal committee consisted of a managing director, the Luxembourgian Lambert-H. Dupong, founder of the law firm Dupong & Metzler, the Luxembourgian Georges Margue, a member of Luxembourgian parliament, and the Belgian banker de Roover.\textsuperscript{146} It looked after the legal issues of the network and held the function of a supervisory board.\textsuperscript{147}

As the official governing body for the daily work of the network, the international bureau was installed. But despite its official character, it mostly operated as a clearing office for the incoming and outgoing information of the network. As it seems, it even got its own documentation center for this purpose—concentrating the information of all national documentation centers of its members—even though the center was not operational before 1964.\textsuperscript{148} The bureau was headed by President Cramer and managed by General Delegate Gielen. Both also were cadres of the West German CIAS committee and the VFF. Officially, the bureau was based in Bonn, from 1960 onwards in Luxembourg. However, it actually remained in Bonn at the Bertha-von-Suttner-Platz 17, in the office rooms of the VFF. Its official Luxembourgian address was only used as a cover up for its financial transactions and national as well as

\textsuperscript{146} Cramer – president (CIAS) to department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 11 May 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 33, pp. 95-96.
\textsuperscript{147} Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 5 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 109-120.
\textsuperscript{148} Cramer – president (CIAS) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 25 February 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 33, pp. 124-145.
international propaganda and PR. As most information passed through this bureau, and it contained the official representatives of the network, it could have had the leading position in the network. But as already mentioned, it was only a clearing office.

Nevertheless, this position combined with the powerful position of the West German CIAS committee in the network and the VFF backing it got the German leadership a nearly dominant position. To support the anti-communist work of the network, this leadership had basically four different types of cooperating partners, of which some were more and some were less compliant.

The first one was constituted by the national CIAS organizations themselves and their friendly organizations. However, even here full cooperation was not assured, as autonomous tendencies had grown since 1956.149 The extent of cooperation of the respective organization depended on its strength and the sovereignty it had with it. Weak organizations were much more willing to exchange information and cooperate than stronger organizations, like the French or the British one. Furthermore, resources as well as information were often held back as soon as national spheres of influence were affected. In that regard, the presence of the network in Africa sets a good example. Files show that the French, British, Portuguese, and Belgian organizations often worked alongside the international bureau of the CIAS, frequently leaving Cramer and Gielen in the dark regarding even their most fundamental work on the African continent. Not just national interests and prejudices—let alone the diverse political as well as intellectual traditions of anti-communism within the network150—complicated the cooperation of the international bureau with the organizations. Anti-Americanism affected the social hierarchy of the network as well. As the international bureau and the West German committee were pro-American, they truly had their hands full just to keep their partners’ criticism within bounds.

The second kind of cooperation partners which the German leadership had recourse to were institutions of the West German state. The Ministry for All-German Affairs, the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Chancellery, and several other institutions that operated in and outside of the FRG frequently supported the international activities of the CIAS. However, among the staff of the institutions competitors also existed, trying to shut their private counterparts down. As the

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150 Ibid.
international bureau and the West German committee were part of an international network, several diplomats of the Foreign Office became their major opponents. The latter considered a private network under West German leadership interfering with the internal matters of foreign states a clear threat to any West German foreign policy. Consequently, their support of the CIAS was granted rather reluctantly. In their reports on the communist danger in various countries they often graded it lower than the intelligence reports of the CIAS. Furthermore, they decried the anti-communist activities of the CIAS and disapproved the expansion of the network in Europe and the rest of the world. Interestingly, only the beginning of détente in Europe brought about a change in the opinions of the Foreign Office on private anti-communism. However, the international bureau and the West German committee had proceeded the expansion of the CIAS anyway. As president Cramer pointed out in 1964:

   Understandably, we simply had to improve our respective relationships. Otherwise we would have abandoned the goal of our association in this part of the world [on the African continent]. On the other hand, we did not organize any activities and therefore abided by the speech regulations we had received [from the West German Foreign Office].

   West German and foreign organizations and companies, as well as institutions of foreign states constituted a third kind of cooperative partner—even though here the links to the network were rather loose. US institutions especially need to be mentioned, if only because the cooperation with the CIA forms a constant in nearly every existing paper on this topic. However, this paper argues that, at present, no statements can be made on the extent of the involvement of the CIA. I only came across one single case in which an US institution directly interfered in the policy of the network. When the international bureau decided to establish an Austrian CIAS organization, it had come to this conclusion on the initiative of the American Thomas S. Hoge. Hoge was the leader of the US Citizen Service group in Vienna. This service ‘looked after’ about

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152 Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 17 February 1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 332.
300,000 Eastern European refugees in Austria.\textsuperscript{154} As individual and organization monitoring was an integral part of the work of CIAS organizations, it is quite likely that Hoge hoped to be relieved of this task by an expansion of the network.

Finally, the international bureau and the West German committee sometimes also cooperated with the other two types of anti-communist organizations—the religious and the radical ones. However, in the mid-1960s private anti-communist organizations turned more and more competitive, as society became more progressive and anti-communist funding by the state a political burden, not every politician was willing to share anymore. Nevertheless, the West German leadership was able to handle the situation and support the anti-communist work of the CIAS at least until 1965.

\textit{At the Front Lines of the ‘Private’ Cold War: The Practical Anti-communist Work}

When I arrived back at my own [hotel] room in the Kempenski [in West Berlin], I found waiting on my bed a large package wrapped in plain brown paper. My name was on it, the name of the hotel and the number of my room, but nothing to identify the sender. Inside, there were half a dozen thick anti-Communist pamphlets, and a handwritten card, without signature, which said, Dear Sir—You ran be raved. Saved, one presumed, from the fates described in the accompanying literature, most of which purported to be the case histories of individuals, primarily Germans, who had gone behind the iron curtain, either voluntarily or as the result of force, and had not been heard from again. It was absorbing, as only case histories can be, and I would have read through the lot uninterrupted if the telephone hadn’t rung.\textsuperscript{155}

The card mentioned in this quotation had been addressed to none other than the famous novelist and journalist Truman Capote. In 1955, he accompanied the opera tour Porgy and Bess into the USSR for the US magazine The New Yorker. The tour was one of the first steps in the Soviet-US cultural exchange program that the ‘new’ phase of the Cold War made possible.\textsuperscript{156} Undermining such rapprochements of ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ was part of the anti-communist operations of the VFF and the CIAS. These can be roughly classified in a handful of different working areas.

\textsuperscript{154} Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 10 January 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 94-96.
\textsuperscript{156} D. Monod, “He is a Cripple an’ Needs my Love’: Porgy and Bess as Cold War Propaganda,’ in G. Scott-Smith, \textit{The cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960}, (London et al., 2003), pp. 300-312.
The national anti-communist organization VFF primarily operated in three such areas. One was anti-communist propaganda and PR. Its propaganda machine consisted of a wide range of printed materials and events. In 1963 alone, four million publications, including periodicals such as *Der aktuelle Osten* and *Asien heute*, were disseminated throughout the FRG. Its PR was well equipped as well. Anti-communist information distributed by anti-communist organizations, their networks, their publications, and their events flooded West German media, science and society. A substantial focus was placed on the bad reputation of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The latter was especially staged as a case of communist misdeeds, as most West Germans empathized with their oppressed relatives in the GDR.

The second working area included personal and organizational monitoring. Not only were potential West German communists, sympathizers, collaborators, and FRG-based organizations of the GDR and the KPD monitored, but members and sympathizers of potential communist organizations like the peace movement and the West German movement against a nuclear armament of the West German army, the *Anti-Atomtod-Bewegung*, were archived and put under pressure. West German right-wingers and their organizations were observed as well. The information gathered was forwarded to other West German anti-communist organizations and institutions of the state.

The third working area was the cooperation with and the further support of West German or in the FRG operating anti-communist organizations and individuals. In some cases these also included foreigners. For example, a community of Greek workers had settled in the city of Hanover and its surroundings during the West German *Wirtschaftswunder* of the 1950s. As leftist tendencies grew among these people, the VFF saw the need to intervene. Initiated and financed by the VFF country section of Lower Saxony in 1963, a private Greek anti-communist organization, not mentioned by name, was founded in Hanover to infiltrate the community and support its preexisting anti-communist forces. However, in the case of the VFF, operations with a foreign focus were the exception.

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158 Friedel 2001, p. 69.
159 Ibid., p. 157.
The VFF’s use of its resources in a fourth working area for political issues has to be the subject of further studies, for instance, siding with certain parties in their political campaigns. We can nevertheless substantiate the claim that the VFF enforced anti-communism during West German parliamentary and employee organizational elections with “extraordinary leaflet campaigns” to “counteract the forced influence of [communist] camouflaged organizations.”\textsuperscript{162}

The West German CIAS committee chiefly operated within these three working areas as well. In the area of propaganda, periodicals like Der aktuelle Osten and Asien heute were also printed in English and French versions and distributed globally. In 1963 alone, about 300,000 items could be distributed in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{163} Furthermore, to reach the large population of foreign workers in the FRG, special ‘foreigner newspapers’, the Italian Informazioni, the Spanish El Informador, the Turkish Anadolu, and the Greek I Elliniki, were printed and distributed in West German companies. In addition, anti-communist events were organized abroad. In the area of PR, West German anti-communist information was transferred to the other CIAS committees, who spread it throughout publications, radio broadcasts, films and other media in their countries to reach their fellow citizens. Catchwords and fragments were passed on to cooperative journalists. Full articles were written by members of the committees and then published under pseudonyms in foreign newspapers, magazines, such as the popular US-American Life magazine,\textsuperscript{164} and in scientific journals. The goal, however, was not simply to influence foreign media. The information used by the foreign press could be depicted as ‘foreign information’ in the propaganda and PR of the VFF and the CIAS, thereby shaping it as ‘regular information’ and having greater impact on its readers.

The focus of the propaganda and PR once more rested on the GDR and the USSR. Unlike the propaganda and PR of the VFF, here the ‘East-West German contradiction’ and the ‘promotion of the West German state itself’ became the main arguments. Thus, anti-communism was able to intertwine with regular West German PR. Its networks could be used for the distribution of regular West German state information and publications. West German state

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{162} Cramer – member (West German CIAS committee) and member of the federal management (VFF) to West German Foreign Office, May 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 31, pp. 145-156, at p. 145 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[...] besondere Flugblattaktionen [...] um der forcierten Einflußnahme der [kommunistischen] Tarnorganisationen auf diese Wahlen entgegenzuwirken”.
\item\textsuperscript{163} Cramer – president (CIAS) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 25 February 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 19-22.
\item\textsuperscript{164} Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 132-167, at p. 141.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
institutions were well aware of the PR potential of the CIAS. Accordingly, they were willing to invest regularly in such an opportunity. However, besides the arguments already mentioned, the CIAS drew on two further points to raise the effectiveness of its PR in foreign countries. On one hand, CIAS paid attention to the popular zeitgeist. Its PR attempted to link Communism to the most pressing concerns of that time, like ‘imperialism,’ ‘colonialism,’ ‘racism,’ and ‘neo-Naziism.’ Meanwhile, anti-communism became associated with ‘revolution,’ as the cover of the ‘Revolution of the 17th of June 1953’ on the Berlin uprising shows. By using this spectrum of actually progressive subjects and catchphrases, the CIAS manipulated the powers of the growing progressive movements for its own purposes. Furthermore, it interwove its propaganda and PR with the respective culture of its target area, especially with its most frequent form of religion. As Cramer mentioned to the West German Foreign Office in 1965:

Some African countries with a Moslem population, especially Somalia, are supplied with records about the current situation of the Mohammedans in the Soviet Union, that are broadcasted e.g. by Radio Djibouti.

The situation of Muslims in the USSR became just as much an issue for the anti-communist work in the Arabian world as that of Buddhism in Asia or Judaism for its PR in the US. Information gathering and transfer was the second working area of the committee. Cramer stated the following on an editor of a Greek student newspaper in the FRG to the Foreign Office:

In case the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution would be able to prove communist activities by the person mentioned, we would take the view that it would be useful to deport the person concerned. The Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government have been informed accordingly.

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The committee observed ‘politically conspicuous’ foreigners, mostly of the radical left.\(^{171}\) Foreign interns, trainees, workers, and students were especially monitored, sometimes even by moles,\(^{172}\) pestered, and had their data gathered and archived. If a communist was uncovered, he or she could face deportation to his or her home country, as this happened to Petros Kounalskis, a member of the Greek communist party Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας in 1963.\(^{173}\) Information gathered, including that of West German communists, pro-communists, sympathizers, and collaborators of the GDR and the KPD, was collected, archived, and provided to domestic and foreign anti-communist organizations and state institutions. Interestingly, it was not uncommon that the “material for gathering” the ‘correct foreign subjects’ was delivered by the embassies and military attachés of the respective foreigners’ home countries.\(^{174}\)

The third working area of the committee was the cooperation with its own organizations and other anti-communist networks and organizations.

After the conference a talk takes place between the general delegate and the doctoral candidate [Alphonse-Marie] Mbwaki, a relative of prime minister Adoula, who—with the help of the Congolese state—is going to record the currently endangered Congolese students in Europe by an anti-communist organization and accordingly asks for German support.\(^{175}\)

Although current documents do not imply that Mbwaki’s request was granted, there existed a “good cooperation” with the “responsible Christian offices” in the FRG regarding the

\(^{171}\) CIAS to West German Foreign Office, 11 May 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 33, pp. 146-151, at p. 147.


issue of recording Africans,\textsuperscript{176} and at least in Belgium and France, such organizations were established with the support of the respective CIAS organizations.\textsuperscript{177} However, support of the West German committee can easily be proven in several other cases of the CIAS, the APACL, and the CIADC organizations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America and will be mentioned in the following two sections.

Measures to influence the policy of foreign states made up the fourth working area. These measures primarily applied to foreign policy. To improve the West German diplomatic relations with respective states and prevent a diplomatic recognition of the GDR, the West German committee could draw upon government contacts of the various CIAS organizations. However, this sometimes also applied to the level of domestic policy, thereby confirming the worst concerns of the Foreign Office—an actual direct intervention into the internal affairs of a foreign state.

If the West can still do something at all, it would have to be r i g h t n o w. Against the concentrated action of the Soviets, the Chinese, and the Egyptians, supported by similar satellite powers, as well as the Ghanaians, and the Guineans, a non-governmental, private counteraction seems necessary. This action would have to be tantamount to that of the enemy. The CIAS could be used for that purpose.\textsuperscript{178}

Proposals such as this, which was made by the West German CIAS committee to the West German Foreign Office during the Congo Crisis in 1961, were made outside as well as inside Europe. For instance, there are files that prove the Austrian CIAS organization *Aktion junger Österreicher* asked for assistance influencing Austrian general elections in 1966. During the presidential elections in 1963, the communist party *Kommunistische Partei Österreichs* (KPÖ) had recommended Adolf Schärf, the candidate for the socialist party *Sozialistische Partei Österreichs* (SPÖ), who was then reelected. Three years later, the KPÖ again made recommendations for the SPÖ, this time in the general elections. In both instances, this support

\textsuperscript{176} Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 132-167, at p. 136 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[...] gute Zusammenarbeit [...] zuständigen christlichen Stellen [...]”.

\textsuperscript{177} Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 5 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 109-120.

\textsuperscript{178} CIAS to West German Foreign Office, 20 January 1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 332 [translated by the author].

was not rejected. The fear of a ‘communist infiltration’ grew in the conservative circles of Austria. It was in this context that Alois Euler, the leader of the Austrian organization and an employee of the federal party administration of the conservative party Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) and the non-profit organization Österreichische Jungarbeiterbewegung (ÖJAB), asked CIAS President Cramer for help “to take action in the way we already discussed”. The West German Foreign Office disapproved of this plan as it did of the others, sometimes more, sometimes less strictly, as this would have created a direct interference in the internal affairs of Austria. In fact, such actions during the Congo Crisis or the Austrian general elections of 1966 cannot be empirically proven by documents at this time. This paper thus cannot validate a direct political intervention of the West German committee in either Europe or Africa. However, it easily can prove this in the case of Latin America to be addressed later. Due to evidence for the Latin American case, this paper will not simply exclude the possibility of other direct interventions.

In contrast to the VFF and the West German CIAS committee, the international bureau of the CIAS had only two primary working areas. The first was that of a clearing office for information. The bureau acted as a central exchange office for the national CIAS organizations. Furthermore, it tried to increase the common core of the propaganda and PR of the network. It counteracted the communist PR, especially that of the USSR, which attempted to drive a wedge between Europe and the US, as well as that of ‘Third World’ countries, which were establishing a new front line against the ‘First’ and the ‘Second World’. The international bureau also attempted to enhance the importance of the German Question in propaganda and PR of the CIAS to that of global relevance, for instance, by establishing a connection between the division of the German nation with those of the Korean, the Chinese, and the Vietnamese nations.

The following decisions were made for the communist festival in Vienna:
   a) the international institution CIAS will be unable to conduct any centralized action due to a lack of resources. b) all national committees try, with the help of other forces in their countries, to achieve whatever

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179 Cramer – president (CIAS) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 20 January 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 33, p. 54.
181 West German Embassy in Vienna to West German Foreign Office, 30 August 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 34, pp. 63-64.
they can: the Swiss committee publishes a positive brochure about Switzerland in several East European languages; West German and Austrian offices will seek an international counter reporting; the French already have wrangled two persons in the French communist delegation etc.. 182

Finally, part of this working area included the coordination of international anti-communist operations against communist events, such as Khrushchev’s visit to Sweden or the one in the quotation of the West German Foreign Office—just above—about the World Festival of Youth and Students in Vienna in 1959. These operations were not limited to influencing the media. Camouflaged moles and troublemakers of several committees, e.g. the French, the British, and the Swiss, were sent to disturb these events. The 7th and 8th World Festival of Youth and Students in Vienna and in Helsinki respectively are examples. 183 Moreover, foreign students and regular visitors in Moscow were undermined. Groups of guest students were trained in anti-communist thinking and sent to the Soviet capital to cause disturbance. 184

The second purpose of the international bureau was to build and retain a common political basis not only between the CIAS organizations, but also between the CIAS and the other anti-communist networks. Anti-Americanism, anti-Europeanism, anti-Judaism respectively anti-Semitism, and reservations against the former European imperialist powers were dismissed as ‘pro-Soviet tendencies’. Simultaneously, Europe was deemed the global anti-communist hot spot with Berlin and the FRG as the “international targets of communism”. 185 Finally, the main West German argument against the pure existence of the GDR—the right of nations to self-determination—was used as the argument for global anti-communism. In this context, Gielen mentioned to the West German Foreign office that during his trip to the annual APACL

182 ten Haaf – department 911 (West German Foreign Office) to buero of the minister, director division 2, department 203, department 204, department 206, department 307, department 702 (West German Foreign Office) from 16 April 1959, PA AA, AA, B 24, 265, pp. 301-303 and pp. 313-329, at p. 314 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “Zum kommunistischen Festival in Wien wurden folgende Beschlüsse gefasst: a) CIAS als internationale Institution kann aus Mangel an Mitteln keine zentrale Aktion durchführen. b) Jedes Nationalkomitee unternimmt mit Hilfe anderer Kräfte seines Landes, was es kann: Das Schweizer Komitee gibt eine positive Broschüre über die Schweiz in mehreren Ostsprachen heraus; deutsche und österreichische Stellen werden sich um eine Gegenberichterstattung im internationalen Maßstab bemühen; die Franzosen haben zwei Personen in die französische kommunistische Delegation eingeschleust u.a..”


184 Wickert – department 702 (West German Foreign Office) to department 992 (West German Foreign Office), 7 January 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 92-93.

185 West German Embassy in Tokyo to West German Foreign Office, 17 October 1962, PA AA, AA, B 40, 24, pp. 93-97, at p. 95 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[...] internationale Angriffspunkte des Kommunismus [...]”.

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conference in 1962:

> It was attempted to a resolution regarding the right of nations to self-determination—according to instructions from Bonn—by means of a member committee of the APACL. As this principle had been declared the basis of the work of the APACL in several resolutions at previous conferences, and was also used at this conference on a daily basis, I encountered no will for a separate resolution.\(^\text{186}\)

In how far these working areas of the West German CIAS committee and the international bureau affected other European and non-European organizations and in how far the international bureau was able to influence the establishment of a global anti-communist organization, will be discussed in the following three sections. The VFF will be left out of further consideration at this point as it primarily operated on a national level.

**Readying Europe: The Continental Work**

Between 1957 and 1965, the West German committee and the international bureau practiced an expansionist network policy across all Western Europe. Upon closer examination, we can see that the West German leadership consequently had to deal with two major issues: the affiliation and conservation of convenient organizations and the exclusion of inconvenient ones.

The Luxembourgian, the Swiss, and the Belgian CIAS organizations, the latter had been renamed *CIAS Comité Belge* in 1958,\(^\text{187}\) did not attract the West German attention to a great extent, most likely because they developed in the way the West Germans had intended them to and the communist threat to their respective countries was rated low. Thus, Cramer told the Foreign Office about a report on communism from a Luxembourgian delegate in 1963:

> RA. Dupong characterizes the communist influence [of the *Kommunistesch Partei Lëtzebuterg*] in Luxembourg as low, but one of the three trade unions, ‘L’amicale des artisans,’ which consists of the established workers and employees in agriculture, is led by communists. It has gained the majority in the council of the workers of a large company by means of manipulation. Leftist tendencies in the

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\(^{187}\) Verhoeyen 2010, 217.
intelligentsia do not have any influence on the government.\(^{188}\)

In Spain, the CIAS was only able to establish friendly relations to state institutions like the Spanish Foreign Ministry\(^ {189}\) and the Ministry of Information and Tourism.\(^ {190}\) Micro states, like Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein, and Vatican City were completely left out of consideration for possible membership.

The actual focus was set on the network’s expansion in other regions. Scandinavia and the insular states of the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean became two of the greater target areas of the CIAS. In the Republic of Ireland, the foundation for an anti-communist organization closely connected to the network was created.\(^ {191}\) On Iceland, an organization became a friendly organization,\(^ {192}\) received material support, and anti-communist technical training for some of its cadres.\(^ {193}\) On Cyprus, the National Youth Council founded an anti-communist organization in 1962,\(^ {194}\) which became a friendly organization one year later.\(^ {195}\) A special focus was placed on Malta. At the beginning of the 1960s, the anti-communist organization *Lega Anti Kommunista* was founded there.\(^ {196}\) The CIAS planned to turn it into a relay station for its PR towards Tunis, Algeria, and other North African states, where anti-communist activities before could not have reached.\(^ {197}\) The accomplishments of this plan do not appear in records. However, differences inside the *Lega Anti Kommunista* seem to have put an early end to this project.

Anti-communist operations in neutral states formed a special case. For unknown reasons, a state like Finland, which nonetheless maintained strong relations with the USSR, was


\(^{189}\) West German Embassy in Madrid to West German Foreign Office, 27 November 1962, PA AA, AA, B 40, 24, p. 309.


\(^{192}\) CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.


\(^{194}\) Ibid.


\(^{196}\) Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 132-167.

\(^{197}\) Dirnecker (West German Foreign Office) to Bachmann (Federal Chancellery), 18 September 1962, PA AA, AA, B 40, 24, pp. 30-32, at p. 32.
completely left out of consideration, whereas the formation of an anti-communist organization in Switzerland seems to have posed no serious problems. With regard to Austria, the experience was somewhere in the middle. As the West German Embassy pointed out to the Foreign Office in 1965:

> The representative of the embassy pointed out that—especially in Austria—the committee would have to operate with caution, as the communist party [the KPÖ] is after all officially approved in Austria. Moreover, everything needed to be avoided, which could be seen as a political manipulation by the Federal Republic [of Germany], because a special sensitivity had become palpable in that respect. Mr Gielen sympathized fully with this remark and emphasized that the connection to the [West German] committee would not get public. Considering these circumstances the embassy did not make any objections against the plans of the committee. 198

Contacts for a friendly Austrian organization were established before 1958, 199 possibly in 1956 when the Italian organization established a temporary operational base in Austria to support the Hungarians, who had risen against their communist government and the Soviet supremacy. 200 However, only in 1963 did the ÖJAB in cooperation with the ÖVP found the anti-communist organization Aktion junger Österreicher, a CIAS member organization 201 “without the foundation of an official CIAS committee”. 202 The West German Foreign Office, as mentioned above, was critical about the project and refused any support but nevertheless was receptive about the financial support given by the West German committee. 203

Major interest was shown in expansion to Great Britain. In the beginning of the 1960s,

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199 Ludwig 2004.


202 Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to department II 3, department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 13 May 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, p. 251 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[..], ohne dass ein offizielles CIAS-Komitee gegründet wird”.

the CIAS was able to integrate the British organization Common Cause, even though it was politically a delicate matter due to Common Cause’s main goal of “directing public attention towards the infiltration of communists in the British Labour movement”. Cramer reported in 1963 to the Foreign Office on a Common Cause delegate’s presentation about communism in Great Britain:

> The Communist Party [of Great Britain] itself is under control and of low importance; but its ideology plays a considerable role among the intelligentsia—especially the teachers. 40 percent of Labour Party parliamentarians usually vote in a fashion that benefits the communists and the Soviet Union respectively!

However, the West German committee disregarded this point as Common Cause was well connected with the IRD. Its membership offered the opportunity to gain access to the British infrastructure for the activities of the CIAS in Africa and Asia. In particular, the West German committee requested permission to use its infrastructure in Hong Kong. After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the British colony had become the Anglo-American “key post” in Asia for gathering information about the Chinese government in Beijing and psychological activities against “Red China.” In the beginning of the 1960s, Cramer and Gielen started talks with British and US anti-communist institutes in Hong Kong, which were probably well connected with the Common Cause and the IRD, in order to intensify cooperation and obtain internal information about the People’s Republic of China on a regular basis.

France and Italy became major targets as well although operations in these two countries served to keep the network together, not to expand it. Here the communist parties were strongest,

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204 CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.


207 Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 5 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 109-120.


and the various political developments weakened CIAS organizations the most, making it necessary for the West German leadership to launch countermeasures. Accordingly, Cramer summarized the report of a French delegate on the state of communism in France for the West German Foreign Office in 1963:

The communist party [PCF] was overaged and appeared reactionary. [...] Consequently, mass demonstrations had become impossible. The foundation of class struggle, the social struggle, practically did not take place any more. [...] The PCF was not isolated any more. [...] Practically, a ‘front commun’ had risen, even though not yet a popular front. [...] [President] De Gaulle’s political conception (‘Europe to the Urals’) and his underestimation of communism and consequently also of anti-communism, as well as his anti-Americanism have led to a situation in which the French CIAS organization had to work almost exclusively with [the financial] resources of the [French] industry.210

Under these circumstances, systematic anti-communist work in France was almost impossible. The French CIAS organization, which changed its name to Comité National d’Information pour la Démocratie Française after 1956, lost a big part of its governmental support to other nationally orientated organizations like the Association d’Études et d’Informations Politiques Internationales. It had to focus its anti-communist operations on French and francophone African trade unions to compensate for its financial losses through the support of the French private economy.211 To find a solution for this political and societal weakness in the anti-communist network of the CIAS, President Cramer traveled to Paris in 1963 for talks with the responsible authorities.212 The French government, however, was not open to any discussion. In the end, Cramer was unable to stop the decay of the French organization. He was also not willing to eject this long-term member of the network despite the fact that the leader of the Association d’Études et d’Informations Politiques Internationales, Georges Albertini, personally asked for closer cooperation. Cramer refused. He justified this decision by pointing out that most of Albertinis

employees had “a certain handicap from the period of the German occupation (collaboration).”\textsuperscript{213} As this circumstance had not influenced his decision regarding Scandinavian organizations, it is much more likely his decision was brought on by the close ties of the organization to the French government. Its integration would have caused a power shift in the network in favor of French interests.

In Italy, the problem of a strong political left was aggravated by domestic fragmentation of anti-communist forces. Cramer reported to the Foreign Office in 1965:

\begin{quote}
We also take the liberty, to advert to the fact that the situation in Italy has become even more threatening since the Church has likewise to some extent joined—according to several reports—in the ‘opening to the left.’ At the moment, the formation of a government—with the inclusion of the [communist] PCI and the left wing of the [conservative Christian democratic party of Italy, the] Democrazia Christiana—was indeed possible.\textsuperscript{214}
\end{quote}

As mentioned, the leaders of the Italian organization had been removed from the board of directors in 1958. The CIAS parted with \textit{Pace e Libertà} as a whole shortly after as the sympathizers of the organization withdrew their support. Meanwhile, the PCI and the PSI became increasingly moderate\textsuperscript{215} and radical anti-communism increasingly unpopular.\textsuperscript{216} During their search for a new Italian member organization, Cramer and Gielen first made contact with the socialist anti-communist organization \textit{Lega della Libertà},\textsuperscript{217} then with the north Italian section of the conservative organization \textit{Comitati Civici}, which maintained close ties to the Catholic Church and the DC. However, the right wing of the DC and the Catholic Church did not accept the offer of cooperation with the CIAS until the PCI was able to raise its share of votes from 22.7 percent to 25.3 percent in the 1963 general elections and until Aldo Moro, a left wing

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{213} Cramer – president (CIAS) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 10 July 1964, PAA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 255-283, at p. 259 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[...] einem gewissen Handicap aus der Zeit der deutschen Besatzung (Kollaboration)”.


\textsuperscript{215} Contino 2004, 17.

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 19.

\textsuperscript{217} Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 28 May 1962, PAA, AA, B 40, 24, pp. 184-198.
\end{footnotes}
advocate of the winning party DC, formed a government with not only the liberal *Partito Repubblicano Italiano*, but also with the socialist PSI.\(^{218}\) The Comitati Civici office for the Lombardy region in Milan, whose general secretary Giulio Barana had loosely cooperated with the CIAS for several years, was allowed to strengthen these ties. As Barana did not believe in the effectiveness of the Comitati Civici, he began planning the *Centro Informazioni Documentazione Attività Sociali*, led by himself, which would assume the Comitati Civici’s anti-communist work.\(^{219}\) The CIAS was asked for financial support. Whether it was granted cannot be concluded from the files at this point. What can be said is that the CIAS sent the request directly to the West German chancellery, and that in 1965, Barana had already received the position of a CIAS representative for northern Italy.\(^{220}\)

The West German leadership, however, did not expand the network at all costs. Organizations operating in an inconvenient way or following an inconvenient policy were excluded. Between 1956 and 1958, a Portuguese institution had become a regular member.\(^{221}\) However, at the beginning of the 1960s, the West German committee tried to end the relationship “to avoid any debate about [the internationally ostracized Portuguese overseas territories in] Africa.”\(^{222}\) It was not until the mid-1960s that the membership was finally discontinued.\(^{223}\) Furthermore, the statuses of the Greek\(^{224}\) and the Dutch\(^{225}\) organizations were demoted to that of a friendly organization, most likely because the CIAS did not endorse their radical anti-communist policies anymore. In 1966, Gielen pointed out to the Foreign Office that the expansion of the network had stopped because many of the organizations had become uncontrollable. Instead, the network started to intensify its cooperation with non-member

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\(^{218}\) Sautter – department I A 3 (West German Foreign Office) to Dg I A, D I (West German Foreign Office), 10 May 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 287-288.

\(^{219}\) Ibid.

\(^{220}\) Cramer – president (CIAS) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 3 June 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 33, p. 170.

\(^{221}\) Ludwig 2004.


\(^{223}\) Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to department II A 3 (West German Foreign Office), 17 October 1966, PA AA, AA, B 40, 109, pp. 186-190.

\(^{224}\) CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.

organizations, which could not influence or make demands of the CIAS.226

Eventually, the West German committee supported the establishment of several new organizations and committees in Western Europe between 1957 and 1965. Those deemed racial or too aggressive in their policies were downgraded. Nevertheless in the nearly ten years of West German leadership, a functioning anti-communist network had been established throughout Western Europe, allowing for the transfer of information from Norway in the North to Italy in the South and from Iceland in the West to Cyprus in the East.

Readying the World: The Transcontinental Work

Outside of Europe the operations of the CIAS mostly consisted of establishing contacts with and infrastructural support of non-European anti-communist organizations, most notably in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. However, in some cases operations reached even further into the internal affairs of a state.

In the Near and the Middle East, the CIAS abstained almost completely. The friendly institutions that had existed in Turkey and Israel when the Comité international Paix et Liberté was in charge had vanished or left the CIAS when the APACL took over. Nevertheless, the CIAS was able to maintain good relations with the Turkish organization. In the years following, the delegates of the Turkish APACL committee became important partners of the CIAS general delegates at annual APACL conferences. Several times they interfered in APACL resolutions to promote CIAS agendas.227

In Africa, the CIAS initially pursued a strategy of building an exterior anti-communist infrastructure. This created recourse for its anti-communist organizations in the European colonial powers of France, Portugal, Belgium, and later on also Great Britain as well as the South African member organization Antikommunistiese Aksiekommissie.228 With the beginning of global decolonization, the CIAS changed its strategy. From then on, it preferred the establishment of national-African anti-communist organizations. To succeed with this strategy,

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228 Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 17 February 1961, PA AA, AA, B 34, 332.

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the CIAS was willing to distance itself from its organizations, like the Portuguese\(^{229}\) and South African\(^{230}\) groups, that would not back this decision. Furthermore, the CIAS approved of expansion of the APACL network on the continent to support the establishment of organized African anti-communism, as it was believed to be less susceptible than the CIAS to ‘anti-imperialist prejudices,’ which were an issue in ‘Third World’ countries at that time. During the years that followed, it became apparent that the APACL was technically as well as financially incapable of accomplishing this task. The CIAS reported to the Foreign Office in 1965:

> The enlightenment of Africa proves much more difficult, not least of all because there does not really exist a bourgeois stratum which could finance a campaign of public enlightenment against the communist activity on this continent.\(^ {231}\)

The international bureau and the national committees of France, Great Britain, Belgium, and the FRG had to step in. To promote the foundation of national organizations, President Cramer paid several visits to the continent while African diplomats in Europe were approached. Special attention was directed towards Somalia, as it was designated by the international bureau to become the anti-communist ‘bridgehead’ of the CIAS in the Islamic Africa.\(^ {232}\) Several Somalian cadres traveled to the FRG to be trained in anti-communist techniques, propaganda, and PR.\(^ {233}\)

In the following years, several national anti-communist organizations would be established in West, North, South, and Central African countries. Although only one became an official member organization, secret support provided by the CIAS was not unusual.\(^ {234}\)

Despite this, the main emphasis of the CIAS mission in Africa between 1960 and 1966 revolved around the Congo Crisis. Mentioned earlier, proposals for direct political intervention in the Republic of Congo (coll. Congo-Léopoldville) had been made by the CIAS no later than 1961. In 1962, the CIAS annexed the sole APACL organization in Africa, the \textit{Association Congo}


\(^{230}\) Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to department II A 3 (West German Foreign Office), 17 October 1966, PA AA, AA, B 40, 109, pp. 186-190.


\(^{232}\) Cramer – president (CIAS) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 25 February 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 33, p. 128.

\(^{233}\) Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 132-167.

\(^{234}\) CIAS to West German Foreign Office, 11 May 1965, PA AA, AA, B 40, 33, pp. 146-151.
Asie Libre in the neighboring Congolese Republic (coll. Congo-Brazzaville), which at that time was ruled by the conservative President Fulbert Youlou and made it a friendly organization. However in 1963, the organization was abandoned, as the government was brought down by a leftist movement. The foreign policy of the Congolese Republic followed the socialist states. In the meantime, the CIAS had already been able to support the foundation of a new anti-communist organization in the Republic of Congo, the L’Institut anti-communiste pour la Liberté au Congo, which shortly afterwards became a regular member organization.

One year later as general elections were about to happen. It was in this context that a special attempt was made by the CIAS to the West German Foreign Office:

Should the [West] German side take action, we could merely help to ensure that money transactions are kept secret. The control of the applications of the funds could be taken over by means of our mediation in the Congo itself—although this is always tricky—with respect to campaign money.

To prevent a victory of the leftist parties, the Belgian CIAS committee and the Congolese conservative party Alliance des Bakongo asked the international bureau and the West German committee for financial support. The CIAS transferred the request to Eugen Gerstenmaier, president of the West German parliament and chairman of the West German association Deutsche Afrikagesellschaft because it was a “party political matter” and the CIAS was not well equipped financially at that time. It is not entirely clear whether Gerstenmaier agreed to this request. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that at this time the West German state was highly involved in anti-communist activities during the Congo Crisis. The Imprimerie Concordia, a Congolese printing office, became a camouflaged outpost of the West German foreign intelligence agency BND, which influenced all Congolese printed material during that time and generated funds for

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237 Ibid., pp. 132-167.
239 Ibid., pp. 16-18, at p. 16 [translated by the author]. Original quotation: “[...] eine parteipolitische Angelegenheit [...]”.

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briberies.\textsuperscript{240} Therefore, even if a direct intervention in the general elections of 1964 cannot be proven, it also cannot be excluded.

As the APACL was able to form a strong network in Asia and Oceania unlike in Africa, the CIAS abstained from larger activities in this part of the world. In 1962, Gielen outlined the current state of the network in Asia to the Foreign Office:

\begin{quote}
The CIAS keeps in touch with the changing international leaderships of the APACL for years, but in direct practical cooperation with the national organizations of the APACL. The anti-European tendencies of the Formosa Chinese had been an occasional obstacle for a closer cooperation with the international APACL network.\textsuperscript{241}
\end{quote}

In the Philippines, in Australia, and in Hong Kong, the CIAS showed almost no activity and in Pakistan, India, and Japan only to a small extent. In Pakistan and India\textsuperscript{242} the CIAS supported the constitution of APACL committees. In the case of India, the CIAS and the the West German Foreign Office were even interested in the constitution of a separate CIAS organization\textsuperscript{243} when they discovered that the East German friendship association \textit{Freundschaftsgesellschaft Indien-DDR} became more and more active in this country. In the eyes of the West German Foreign Office this was a step towards the diplomatic recognition of the GDR by India.\textsuperscript{244} However, only in the case of Japan did such interest become a reality.\textsuperscript{245} As the APACL refused to incorporate a Japanese organization—a Japanese APACL organization was not founded until 1960—the CIAS took the initiative but did not undertake in any bigger activities in either country or in those with greater communist activities like Indonesia or South Vietnam. Some Indonesian guest students in Switzerland received anti-communist training,\textsuperscript{246} but in Indonesia itself no close relationships

\textsuperscript{242} Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 132-167.
\textsuperscript{243} Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 7 September 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 331-332.
\textsuperscript{245} CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.
\textsuperscript{246} Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office) to department 992 (West German Foreign Office), 7 January 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 92-93.
with anti-communist organizations were established. The relationship with the South Vietnamese organization was more involved. During the Vietnam War, the CIAS supported its propaganda and PR in South Vietnam\(^{247}\) as well as in the FRG.\(^{248}\)

The closest cooperation occurred in the South Korean and the Taiwanese organizations. The most significant operation was the support for the establishment of the Freedom Centre, an anti-communist training facility based in South Korea for APACL cadres, which focused on the People’s Republic of China and North Korea.\(^{249}\) In 1962, Gielen explained the positive effects of such an investment to the Foreign Office:

> Depending on our own activities, the nascent international anti-communist training facility in Seoul can be strongly influenced by us; the German Question can become a permanent issue.\(^ {250}\)

Since 1965, the CIAS stationed a West German expert at the academy. He participated in the development of the curricula of the institution,\(^ {251}\) thereby trying to reinforce European over Asian anti-communism.\(^ {252}\)

Besides its contacts to these national organizations, the CIAS was also able to form contacts within the network itself. Gielen attended several of the APACL annual conferences and supported its strengthening and expansion—even on to other continents.\(^ {253}\) Additionally, the CIAS promoted reconciliation between the often quarrelsome Taiwanese and South Korean organizations\(^ {254}\) as well as a depletion of anti-Japanese prejudices.\(^ {255}\) Nevertheless, the main

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255 department L 2 (West German Foreign Office) to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 22 January 1964, PAAAA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 3-10.

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emphasis during inter-network talks lay on another issue: the foundation of a global anti-communist organization.

In Latin America, the CIAS West German leadership primarily focused on Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. As Gielen explained to the Foreign Office in 1963:

> The CIAS currently faces difficulties with South America, as its corresponding transregional organization—because of Castroism—has moved that much towards the right and anti-American waters that a cooperation seems impossible. Therefore, cooperation only will be continued with Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.

Argentina still struggling with the aftermath of Peronism, was extended relations by the CIAS to Alberto Daniel Faleroni, leader of the Argentinian CIADC organization *Frente Revolucionario Argentino Interamericana de Defensa del Continente*, which became a friendly organization in 1963. In Mexico, Cramer and Gielen considered merely keeping up relations with the CIADC was insufficient. Therefore, the anti-communist organization *Unión Cívica Internacional*, which had already been considered a friendly organization for several years, was made a full member in the beginning of the 1960s. In 1962 alone, 80 Mexican unionists, invited by the CIAS, visited the FRG on an anti-communist ‘educational trip’. In 1963, Cramer was able to report to the West German Foreign Office that “regular [anti-communist] trainings” for Mexicans had started. In Brazil, the relations with the CIADC organization were maintained and expanded to three other anti-communist organizations. The *Comité ADC* became a friendly organization before 1958. It was followed by the *Sociedade de Estudos Interamericanos* in Sao Paulo, which

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256 Interestingly, these countries had been a problem area for the American anti-communist PR as well (S. G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: the foreign policy of anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, 1988), pp. 33-34.). It can thus be presumed that the CIAS, as it was not handicapped by Latin American suspicions of imperialist intentions, also focused on these states to deputize for American PR.


259 CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.


261 Ibid., pp. 132-167.


soon was promoted friendly organization as well, before it became incorporated into the Centro de Educação Cívica in São Paulo in 1964. Finally, the conservative anti-communist and anti-government think tank Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais joined the circle of CIAS’ cooperation partners. However, as indicated above, the operations of the CIAS in Brazil were not confined to a simple maintenance of its current relationships. In 1961, João Belchior Marques Goulart, a member of the center-left PTB, had become the president of Brazil. His plan for social and land reform fueled dissatisfaction among conservative circles and led to a military coup in 1964—the Golpe de 64. Putschists had recourse not only with the CIA and the CIADC, but also with the CIAS. Besides material aid, at least one specialist had been sent to Brazil not only to report back to the CIAS and the Foreign Office, but certainly also, as in the case of Khrushchev’s trip to Sweden, to support positive coverage of the events in the Brazilian and international media. Gielen outlined the CIAS support for the coup to the Foreign Office in 1965:

Constant support for the anti-communist organization in São Paulo in context of the regime change in Brasilia; accurate reporting about the situation by the director of this committee to the [West German] Foreign Office.

In the case of Chile, the same reason seems to have caused conservative circles to cooperate with the CIAS two years earlier. In 1962, three Chileans including the chief press officer for the conservative Chilean government of President Jorge A. Rodríguez, a Mr. Cortez-Ponce, visited the FRG for talks with the CIAS. In 1964 when elections did not provide a clear result and a victory of Salvador Allende from the socialist Partido Socialista de Chile seemed possible, a Mr.

264 CIAS to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 121-122.
265 Cramer – president (CIAS) to Wickert – department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 27 February 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, p. 41.
268 J. Marshal et al., The Iran-Contra connection: secret teams and covert operations in the Reagan era (Québec, 1987), p. 65.
269 Cramer – president (CIAS) to department L 2 (West German Foreign Office), 16 November 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 147, pp. 293-298.
Eisenberg-Letelier sought refuge in the FRG and did not leave until Eduardo Frei Montalva from the conservative *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* became president. Throughout his stay, he was personally supported by Gielen. Further involvement in the conservative election campaign, associated with his sojourn, and perhaps supportive of the US-funded ‘scare campaign’ of the conservative party is entirely possible.

In contrast to activities on a national level, the CIAS seems to have been almost entirely inactive on the network level. Only one CIADC conference is mentioned in the files, which the CIAS wanted to attend to continue the international dialogue about the foundation of a global anti-communist network.

In North America, the CIAS showed only slight commitment, at least if we ignore its PR operations. No cooperation seems to have existed between the CIAS and Canadian organizations. In the US, only a few loose relationships with social organizations were established—for instance, the Catholic Central Department in New York and US trade unions. Closer ties were only sought with the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism and the Freedom Academy. Thus, the CIAS explained to the Foreign Office,

> The USA constitute another problem. There are about 200 anti-communist organizations and institutions, which—until now—were nevertheless unable to come to an agreement among themselves. The CIAS keeps in touch primarily with the ‘Freedom Academy,’ lead by Senator [Thomas J.] Dodd.

The idea of such a private US organization had already come up in 1954, when a group of private anti-communists designed the plan to create a private Freedom Commission, which, financed by the US Congress, would run a training facility for anti-communist techniques and a global

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272 Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to Waiblinger (West German Foreign Office), 13 November 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, pp. 326-327.  
274 ten Haaf – department 911 (West German Foreign Office) to buero of the minister, director division 2, department 203, department 204, department 206, department 307, department 702 (West German Foreign Office), 16 April 1959, PA AA, AA, B 24, 265, pp. 301-303 and pp. 313-329.  
information center. However, as American executives feared a civil supremacy in the anti-communism of the country, Congress refused to finance such a project. Democratic Senator Thomas J. Dodd took matters into his own hands. By no later than the beginning of the 1960s, the CIAS cooperated with the academy that operated under Dodd’s leadership. Furthermore, in 1962 Cramer and Gielen became members of the ASC, its National Military-Industrial Conference, its International Advisory Council, and its IAS.

Be that as it may, the CIAS didn’t focus its engagement in the US on the country’s anti-communist organizations but on talks with the State Department and the World Anti-Communist Steering Committee, which coordinated the plans of a global anti-communist organization since 1957. A member of the West German Foreign Office reported on this issue:

The report of the president, Mr. Cramer, on the results of his journey to the United States was at the center. He achieved a principal approval of the state department for the foundation of a world clearing office for anti-communist information and activities, which had been refused heretofore. The approval of the American [Charles Joseph] Kersten, the president of the steering committee, has been obtained. A pro-German general secretary has still to be found.

The involvement of the CIAS in the development of a world clearing office for anti-communist information and activities, which would later come into being as the WACL, will be the issue of the following section.

Realizing a Global Project: The Conception of the WACL

The idea of creating a global anti-communist network emerged as early as the second half of the 1950s with the establishment of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the US foreign and security policy in 1956. The Doctrine declared US willingness to use military force to stop the expansion

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of communism around the world. In 1958, the first preliminary conference addressing this idea took place in Mexico-City organized and financed by the Taiwanese APACL organization and possibly the CIA as well. There, representatives of the APACL, the CIADC, and the CIAS networks, as well as of several anti-communist emigrant organizations and the ASC drafted the first organizational framework. As there were a large number of emigrant organizations, the CIAS along with other networks felt as if radicals had taken their cause hostage and left the conference early. In the end, only the establishment of a steering-committee for the future foundation of a global anti-communist organization could be agreed upon. American Charles Joseph Kersten, a former Member of US Congress for the Republican Party, chairman of the Select Committee of the House Representatives on Communist Aggression, and counselor to the president for psychological warfare, became its president. His fellow countryman Marvin Liebman, a conservative activist, PR and fund raising expert, became its general secretary.

Despite this initial setback, the international bureau of the CIAS went on to promote the initiative. Cramer and Gielen visited several international anti-communist conferences, especially those of the APACL, and kept in touch with Kersten and the US Department of State, to whom they tried to convince of the importance of a pro-German general secretary for a future organization. In 1960, a new attempt was made at the First International Conference on Political Warfare of the Soviets in Paris. Delegates of the CIAS, the APACL, and the CIADC agreed on a protocol for the foundation of a loose global clearing-committee, which, however, the council of the APACL eventually refused to sign. In 1962, the APACL withdrew completely from the proposal. The international bureau of the CIAS, nevertheless, remained with

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284 ten Haaf – department 911 (West German Foreign Office) to buero of the minister, director division 2, department 203, department 204, department 206, department 307, department 702 (West German Foreign Office), 16 April 1959, PAA, AA, B 24, 265, pp. 301-303ff and pp. 313-329.
the project. In 1962, it even submitted a proposal for a global documentation center located in the rooms of the CIAS international office in Bonn.\textsuperscript{286} This occurred in context of the anti-communist activities of the emigrant organization ABN, which had meanwhile started an initiative to create a global anti-communist organization on its own.\textsuperscript{287} Furthermore, the CIAS sent delegates to the Taiwanese APACL organization in 1963 and persuaded APACL leadership to stage a new preliminary conference.\textsuperscript{288} An arrangement was made between the CIAS and APACL delegates about the foundation of an intercontinental coordination center. In this arrangement, the CIAS was not only able to integrate all member organizations into future decision-making processes of the new ‘network,’ but also able to consider the emigrant organizations to an adequate extent. This was arranged against the wishes of the Taiwanese committee, as it looked towards an ‘organization’ with a strongly centralized leadership.

The foundation of the coordination center should have occurred in 1964, but in the end, the Taiwanese committee and the APACL insisted on another solution. They hoped for a tightly centralized organization and therefore started another initiative of their own. By 1963 at the 9\textsuperscript{th} APACL conference in Saigon, they had already started talks about the foundation of a main headquarters.\textsuperscript{289} The international bureau disapproved of this approach, as it feared that a possible shift in attention to Asia would be detrimental to the Europe-centered propaganda and PR of the CIAS. Even the propagandistic exploitation of the CIAS for a preemptive war against the People’s Republic of China seemed possible, though the APACL had already taken the initiative.\textsuperscript{290} In 1966, the 12\textsuperscript{th} APACL conference in South Korea agreed upon the further expansion of the network on all continents and more importantly for preparations for the founding of a global anti-communist network; they had even started planning a West German APACL committee.\textsuperscript{291}

The CIAS had intentionally refrained from sending a West German delegate to the Seoul

\textsuperscript{286} Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 7 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, pp. 132-167.
\textsuperscript{288} Cramer – president (CIAS) to West German Foreign Office, 26 February 1963, PA AA, AA, B 40, 30, p. 184.
\textsuperscript{289} department L 2 (West German Foreign Office) to department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), 22 January 1964, PA AA, AA, B 40, 32, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{290} Gielen – general delegate (CIAS) to department II A 3 (West German Foreign Office), 17 October 1966, PA AA, AA, B 40, 109, pp. 186-190.
\textsuperscript{291} Young Kenn Lee – general secretary (APACL – South Korea) to Gielen – general delegate (CIAS), 19 August 1966, PAA A, AA, B 40, 109, p. 174.
conference to emphasize its disagreement with these developments. Even though Cramer and Gielen had officially resigned in 1965, they still were in charge. Instead, the new president of the network, de Roover, was sent. He had been ‘briefed’ by Cramer and Gielen to communicate the unwillingness of the CIAS to join the APACL. Not only did the West German domestic political development, i.e. the notorious growth of leftist tendencies within the West German society, speak against an accession, but also noted was the fact that European and Asian foreign policies regarding the Socialist States Community had developed in different directions during the last years.\(^{292}\) This briefing became obsolete, however, as preparations for a global anti-communist network became the main emphasis of the conference, which de Roover actively supported. The following year, the CIAS network took part in the official foundation of the WACL in the Taiwanese capital, Taipei\(^{293}\) and, as it seems, joined with all its remaining member organizations.

The aims of this new network included direct “aid of liberation movements”, the development of “political and psychological warfare methods”, and the training of “anti-communist leaders” to “overcome the Communist menace.”\(^{294}\) With these aims, global anti-communism radicalized during the following two decades.\(^{295}\)

**Conclusions**

What final conclusions can be drawn from the activities of the CIAS? During the timeframe examined in this article, between 1957 and 1965, the network and its associated organizations operated in two main areas.

First, the CIAS helped to change the atmosphere after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 so societies would be ready for the anti-communist domestic and foreign policies of their respective governments. It is nearly impossible to assess the impact of its propaganda and PR with any precision. On the one hand, several other anti-communist organizations and institutions existed within the same setting, although very few were financially as well equipped as the CIAS, and less were able to act on a global scale. Furthermore, historical events such as the uprisings in the GDR, Hungary, and Poland, or the 20th Party Congress of the


\(^{293}\) Verhoeven 2010, p. 217.

\(^{294}\) CIAS to West German Foreign Office, date unknown, PA AA, AA, B 40, 147, p. 410.

TsK KPSS, during which the crimes of its former general secretary Stalin were made public, surely had an anti-communist impact of their own.

Second, the CIAS made it possible to establish national personal databases usable by other anti-communist organizations, companies, and institutions, as well as those from other countries, possibly including the CIA or the FBI, which funded or cooperated with them. Since scholarship of anti-communist organizations is only at its infancy, the majority of their activities have not yet been properly researched—much guesswork remains. However, if empirical investigations should reveal a similar extent of personal monitoring in other member organizations, perhaps even a regular systematic information exchange with the CIA or the FBI, these anti-communist networks could be suggested as analogous precursors to the digital Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization and Management—the so called PRISM-program—of today. In this context, it would also be worthwhile to investigate in how far friendly organizations and anti-communist organizations in general participated in personal monitoring.

Since its founding, the infrastructure of the CIAS expanded continually by admitting regular members as well as friendly organizations. It consequently focused on penetrating the European region, stabilizing global anti-communist weak spots, and operating at the global hot spots of the Cold War. In doing so, it followed its predecessors, the Comité européenne Paix et Liberté and the Comité international Paix et Liberté. The CIAS only broke new ground in the technical realization of its aims. Its medial staging of anti-communism was more moderate. Furthermore, it widened targeted groups of people. Along with members of communist parties and persons related to them, progressive social movements and foreigners also became members of the investigated ‘red fifth column’.

The question arises in how far the West German leadership led to the emergence of special German characteristics during this development. Cramer and Gielen were mostly aligned with the mission of their French predecessors, although they may have focused more on PR activities than the French. Only a highlighting of typical West German issues like the German Question and the Berlin Question can be proven. In doing so, it also improved the general perception of West German PR in Europe. In 1964, Cramer could proudly proclaim to the West

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German Foreign Office: “It was proven that the German Question ranked first within the enlightenment activities of all committees.”

The West German leadership became most noticeable in extra-European cooperation. Contrary to France and Britain, the FRG was not recognized as a colonial, or even former colonial, power in the ‘Third World’, even though the propaganda and PR of the GDR and the USSR spent much time to prove the opposite. Establishing CIAS outposts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as appeasing the prejudices of the ‘Third World’ against Europe and European anti-communism was therefore easier to achieve with West German leadership than with any other. The CIAS, the APACL, the CIADC, and the WAACL were able to unite conservatives, who had until then been divided by Imperialism and the two world wars, including those of the FRG, Italy, and France; of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan; or even those of the ‘First’ and the ‘Third World’. The role the CIAS played in this process can be attributed in a large part to its West German leadership.

While this article hopefully managed to deliver on its promise to provide insight into the CIAS network, it certainly also presented a number of pressing research gaps remaining to be explored. To get a full understanding of this network, an investigation of its leadership does not suffice. Future studies will have to focus more on the other national organizations. Only by a comparison of their activities will it be possible to finally comprehend the full scope of the network, the similarities and differences between the organizations, and to make a definite statement about the roles of the CIA, the national governments and the sovereignty of the network. Regarding the APACL and the CIADC, similar approaches are suggested, as the state of research on these is likewise still of a rudimentary nature.

Knowledge of this issue could be of interest even outside of Cold War history. Most of these organizations exist today and promote issues of national defense and security, although some may exist under a new name, such as the VFF, which was renamed Arbeitsgemeinschaft Staat und Gesellschaft in 1970. Most likely, anti-terrorism has become their main focus. Finally, studies on the global war on communism could also deliver an understanding of the historical roots of our contemporary, global ‘war on terror.’
