

**The Humphrey-Hawkins Budget Debate
and Minorities' Priorities: What Happened?
An Introductory Essay by Don Wolfensberger
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It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. . . . Whilst all authority in [the United States] will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights . . . Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.

–James Madison
The Federalist, No. 51

Introduction

When James Madison wrote about majority and minority factions in 1787, and the danger of the former suppressing the rights of the latter, formal political parties had not yet emerged in the U.S. He may have preferred that they never would, yet he recognized their inevitability given the “zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government. . . [and] an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power.” All these things, wrote Madison in *Federalist* No. 10, have “divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for the common good.” However, by 1800 Madison was deeply involved in the spirit of party, having joined ranks with Jeffersonian Democrats in opposing President John Adams and what they saw as his vexing and oppressive Federalist party.

Even at that early stage of the Republic, the passions of party were sometimes turned against persons due to their national origin or leanings. The fear of invasion during the “quasi-war” with France sparked angry mobs to physically attack pro-French Republicans and editors. Many French residents fled the country in fear for their lives. Congress passed and President Adams signed into law the Alien and Sedition Acts—a frontal assault on civil rights and liberties. One of the Alien Acts, the Naturalization Act, extended the residency requirement for citizenship from five to 14 years. The Act appealed directly to the fear of immigrants, especially the large number from Ireland who tended

to support the Republicans and pro-French ideas and movements. As Federalist House Member Ray Otis of Massachusetts put it, “If some means are not adopted to prevent the indiscriminate admission of wild Irishmen and others to the right of suffrage, there will soon be an end to liberty and property.”¹

The struggle of ethnic, racial, religious, and gender minorities in the U.S. against oppression and for political recognition and rights is a familiar, albeit a long and harrowing, saga. As such groups became more integrated into society and their political clout grew, Congress became more responsive to their needs. The geographic concentration of some racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. eventually led to greater representation by their own members in Congress, though the proportion has lagged far behind their share of the population. In the 107th Congress (2001-2003), for instance, African Americans comprised 12 percent of the population, but just 8.3 percent of the House members; Hispanics made-up 13 percent of the population and just 4.4 percent of the House; and women represented 51 percent of the population but just 13.6 percent of the House, and 13 percent of the Senate.

If one is to look for a microcosm of Madisonian factions in action, one need look no further than the walls of Congress wherein there exists a multitude of what are called, “informal member caucuses.” Over the last three decades, these Congressional Member Organization (CMOs), have proliferated from just three in number in 1968 to 176 today (plus others not formally certified by the House Administration Committee). They are formed by House and Senate members for all manner of national constituency, party, geographic, industry, and personal interest causes.² An alphabetic index of CMOs published by the House Administration Committee runs the gamut from the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs, and the Airport Noise Caucus, through the Wind Hazard Reduction Caucus and the Zero Capital Gains Tax Caucus.³

Scattered among these listings are a number of “national constituency caucuses,” the members of which, political scientist Susan Webb Hammond observes, “are perceived, and perceive themselves, as representing groups nationwide, outside and within their congressional districts or states.” These include the Vietnam Era Veterans in Congress Caucus, the Women’s Issues Caucus (founded in 1977), the Black Caucus (1971), the Hispanic Caucus (1976), and the Asian Pacific American Caucus (1994).

Since caucus members share the characteristics of the groups they represent, says Hammond, the size of their caucuses is self-limiting (though non-Hispanics and non-blacks may become “associate members” of those caucuses, and, since 1981, men have been allowed to join the Women’s Issues Caucus, but not serve on its executive committee).⁴

This essay will focus on just one aspect of the Congressional Black Caucus's activities to show how one minority group caucus in Congress has creatively demonstrated leadership by becoming regularly involved in the annual debates in Congress over budget priorities. This was done in part by using an obscure mechanism of the congressional budget process called the Humphrey-Hawkins debate to highlight the plight of minorities, and in part through the offering of an alternative budget resolution to address those needs.

This two-step, annual exercise provided an opportunity for the Black Caucus to rally and unify its membership around a common purpose, develop and showcase emerging black leaders in Congress, and demonstrate to its national constituents its concerns and efforts on their behalf. While the Black Caucus budgets were predictably defeated by wide margins in the House, their traditional place in congressional budget debates came to be something of an institutional gadfly and social conscience for Congress. Moreover, the annual budget project helped to integrate new and old members alike in a common enterprise of thrashing out strategies, priorities, and programs to address problems confronting African America communities.

The Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act

To understand what the Humphrey-Hawkins budget debates were all about, it is first important to understand their genesis in the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act of 1978. The bill began as a massive federal jobs and economic planning bill introduced in the depths of the mid-1970s' recession by Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) and Representative Augustus Hawkins (D-Calif.). The measure was designed and fueled by a coalition of civil rights and labor groups. Senator Humphrey and Congressman Hawkins were a fitting pair of prime sponsors for the coalition: Humphrey was a longtime champion of organized labor, and Hawkins, who represented South Central Los Angeles, was a longtime civil rights advocate and one of the original 13 cofounders of the Congressional Black Caucus in 1970.

The Humphrey-Hawkins bill as originally introduced called for the Federal government to provide "last resort jobs" if the full employment goal of 4 percent was not reached in five years (by 1983). But that provision was stripped in negotiations with Senate opponents, leaving only the 4 percent unemployment goal and a range of discretionary options for the president to be used in achieving the act's goals. In the process of compromise, the act's goals were expanded to include increased real income, balanced growth, a balanced budget, low inflation productivity growth, and an improved balance of trade.

While Coretta Scott King, one of the leaders of the Full Employment Action Council, conceded that they had not gotten all they wanted, she added that, "those who call it symbolic just

don't understand how important it is." But AFL-CIO lobbyist Ken Young was more restrained in his assessment, saying the act "does represent a small, symbolic step forward, but the Senate weakened it severely."⁵ Some referred to the final compromise as the "Humphrey-Hawkins-Hatch" bill" since it was Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) who led the effort to soften the bill's impact.

The dilution of the bill was made possible in part by an improvement in the employment picture and a worsening of inflation since the measure was originally introduced. Unemployment dropped to 6.1 percent in February 1978, the lowest it had been since October 1974. Minority unemployment was still high, however, dropping to 11.8 percent in February from 12.7 percent the previous month.

As signed into law by President Jimmy Carter in October, 1978 (Public Law 95-523), the "Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978" required the President to include in his annual economic report the numerical goals for the current year and each of the three succeeding years for unemployment, production, real income, productivity and prices, and to set the medium term goals for reducing unemployment at 4 percent for those 16 and over in five years. The Act allowed the President to modify the timetables for achieving the unemployment and inflation goals in his second report and thereafter. It required the President to propose such structural economic policies as he deemed appropriate to achieve the goals, including counter-cyclical employment policies, assistance to economically depressed regions, youth unemployment policies, and efforts to promote a high rate of capital formation. Moreover, the bill permitted the President to create reservoirs of public employment if he found that other policies were failing to achieve the full employment goals.

The Humphrey-Hawkins Act amended the Budget Act to permit up to four hours of separate debate on economic goals and policies during consideration of a budget resolution (in addition to up to 10 hours of debate on the resolution itself).

In addition, Humphrey-Hawkins required Congress to review the goals and policies in the President's economic report. The Joint Economic Committee was to report to the House and Senate budget committees by March 15 on the short-term and medium term goals in the report after holding hearings and receiving reports from other committees. If the President's economic report recommends that the employment goals be met in a year after the five-year deadline, Congress *may* include in its budget resolution the year in which it thinks such goals can be achieved. Moreover, only if Congress includes its economic goals and policies in a budget resolution shall it be in order to offer an amendment to alter those goals in such a way as to be consistent with the aggregate amounts of spending, revenues, surplus or deficit, and debt, contained in the proposed amendment.

The Early Years of the Budget Process

During the early years of the congressional budget process, members of the Black Caucus used the debates to call attention to how their priorities differed from those reflected in the Budget Committee's resolution. In 1976, the second year of the new budget process, for instance, Representative Parren Mitchell (D-Md.), a member of the House Budget Committee, spoke out in committee markup to complain about the congressional “willingness to spend almost without limit on defense, and a lack of willingness to spend” on human resources programs. When the resolution reached the House floor, another Black Caucus Member, Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) urged its defeat on grounds that it committed Congress and the country to five or six years of “a no-growth domestic program and an ever-swelling military budget.” However, neither Mitchell nor Conyers tried to amend the resolution despite a wide-open amendment process.⁶

In the 95th Congress (1977-78), Mitchell was elected chairman of the Black Caucus and retained his seat on the Budget Committee. This time he offered an amendment on the House floor to reduce defense spending by \$1.5 billion--the level originally recommended by the Budget Committee. His amendment was rejected, 88 to 315. The following year, 1978, Mitchell promised in the Budget Committee that he would lead a floor fight to cut defense spending by \$4.8 billion in budget authority and \$2.8 billion in outlays, and reallocate the funds instead to variety of economic stimulus, jobs, and human services programs. His amendment was again overwhelmingly rejected, 98 to 313. But it represented the first formal effort by a Black Caucus member to reorder the priorities in a budget resolution using an amendment with off-setting decreases in defense and increases in domestic spending. Beginning in 1981, when the leadership allowed only substitute budgets to be offered as floor amendments, the Black Caucus as a whole would begin to offer its own budget alternatives.

In 1979, the first calendar year in which the new Humphrey-Hawkins requirements were in effect for budget resolutions, the precedents were set in two regards. First, the Budget Committee did not put its economic assumptions in the budget resolution, and thus they could not be subject to amendment. And second, out of the ten hours of debate on the budget resolution, four hours were set aside for the Humphrey-Hawkins debate on economic goals and policies, divided between the chairman and ranking minority member. Within that time, the precedent was set of yielding such time as they may consume to two members of the black caucus--in this instance, Representatives Gus Hawkins and Parren Mitchell. Black Caucus Chairwoman Cardiss Collins (D-Ill.), was recognized for 5 minutes. Altogether, Black Caucus members used close to an hour of debate time.

Representative Bob Bauman (R-Md.), in a colloquy with Budget Committee Chairman

Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.), questioned why the budget resolution did not contain the economic goals that the Humphrey-Hawkins Act had urged be a part of the budget debate:

I notice that the resolution the gentleman's committee as reported contains none of those goals, and it seems to me that it suggests that either they were too difficult to arrive at or that the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act itself was meaningless, and is not to be considered by the Congress.⁷

Bauman added that President Carter had upheld his end of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act's requirements by including in his annual economic report for 1979 the five-year timetable for achieving certain economic goals, including an unemployment rate that was to decline from 6.2 percent to 4 percent. Giaimo responded that the main thrust of the act was that Congress discuss economic assumptions and implications at the time the budget resolution is debated, and that the report on the budget resolution "contains a great deal in it dealing with the economic outlook and fiscal policy and the projections for the coming years in that regard, all of which is our effort to comply with what the Humphrey-Hawkins type legislation demands that we do." When Bauman complained that "it will be a little bit difficult to understand listening to 4 hours of debate on a matter that is not actually before the House," Giaimo countered that "we have made ample provision here to comply with Humphrey-Hawkins legislation. We are going to have 4 hours of debate right now separately earmarked for Humphrey-Hawkins type discussions."⁸

During his opening remarks in the Humphrey-Hawkins debate, Giaimo conceded that "we have a formidable challenge to achieve the Humphrey-Hawkins Act goals" of 4 percent unemployment and 3 percent inflation by 1983. "The only way we will succeed is through responsible fiscal policies that balance economic goals over time. There is no quick fix to this problem." A fact sheet inserted in the Congressional Record by Giaimo concludes that, "a very optimistic economy must be assumed to reach Humphrey-Hawkins goals by 1983," and, "there are inconsistencies between the unemployment growth and inflation objectives that create severe problems accompanying any effort to reach the Humphrey-Hawkins objectives in 5 years."⁹

The first Democrat Giaimo yielded to during the Humphrey-Hawkins debate was the co-author of the Act, Representative "Gus" Hawkins, who took issue with the directions taken by the budget resolution and its underlying economic assumptions: "The course of action proposed by the budget of slowing down the growth before us today moves in a wonderland of economic unreality and violates in many ways the law we enacted last year by [an] overwhelming vote." Hawkins said the Act had "specifically prohibited the tradeoff" between inflation and full employment because 25 years of empirical observation shows that inflation soared when stagnation and recession came, and

price stability was attained only when there were conditions close to full production and full employment. If the course argued by the Act had been followed, and other strong anti-inflation provisions of the act had been followed, Hawkins argued, “we would be now well on our way toward price stability.”¹⁰

During his 25 minute speech, Hawkins turned many a colorful phrase to make his points about how the goals of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act were being violated: “I recognize that the travesties now under way should be perpetrated in order to balance the budget,” but “the Humphrey-Hawkins Act mandates that the budget be used to support—not defeat—its objectives for full production, full employment, and priority justices, and be balanced when 4 percent unemployment has been reached.” Taking note of a recent amendment to Humphrey-Hawkins to limit federal spending to a specified percentage of GNP, Hawkins pointed out that the Act also provided this not be below a level that is consistent with achieving national needs and priorities, and that it not impede achievement of the unemployment reduction goals of the act. “Insofar as this seems like ordering that the body be mutilated without drawing any blood, it demonstrates the inconsistent nature of what we are now trying to do with this budget resolution. . . . The noble and worthy objective of balancing the budget is reduced to a pretentious sham when we seek to accomplish this by attempting to squeeze the blood of Federal revenues from the turnip of a deliberately stunted economy.”¹¹

Representative Parren Mitchell, the immediate past chairman of the Black Caucus and no longer a member of the Budget Committee, nevertheless played an active role in the 1979 Humphrey-Hawkins debate and subsequent amendment process. Mitchell reiterated what he had said as a member of the Budget Committee, and that was that “in the four years that I served on the committee, though admirable work had been done, we had never really approached the mandate given to the Committee on the Budget—and that was to prioritize, in terms of needs in this Nation.” For that reason, among others, Mitchell said he would again cast his vote against the committee’s budget resolution.

Mitchell said he agreed with Representative Bauman’s criticism that the economic goals and priorities had not been included in the budget resolution. The President was just as guilty as the committee in not spelling out how the country would reach the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment goal, Mitchell said, particularly how to reduce the rate of black unemployment which, since the end of World War II “has always been twice as high, a least twice as high. . . as the rate of white unemployment.” The reason for that, said Mitchell, is that “there is no commitment at any level of the Federal government. . . .to end black unemployment. . . . to even achieve the goals of the Hawkins-Humphrey bill.”¹²

During the consideration of amendments to the budget resolution, Representative Parren Mitchell offered an amendment to increase revenues by \$1 billion in fiscal 1979, and \$4 billion in fiscal 1980 by closing “tax loopholes.” From the additional revenues, \$1.5 billion would be distributed in 1980 among energy conservation, jobs, education and health programs, while another \$2.5 billion would go to reducing the deficit. The amendment was rejected, 130 to 277.

After nine days of consideration, the budget resolution was finally approved by a vote of 220 to 184. “One of the biggest surprises,” according to the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* for 1979, “was the defection of the Congressional Black Caucus.” In previous years its support was deemed necessary for the budget resolution to be adopted. In 1978, black caucus members provided 11 votes for the resolution which only won by four votes. But in 1979 “blacks, disenchanted with the growing fiscal conservatism of the White House and Congress, vowed to oppose the resolution. . . . They stuck to their guns and voted 0 to 13 against adoption (two other voting members of the caucus were not recorded).”¹³

The Black Caucus Budget Alternatives

While the tradition had been set in 1979 of yielding a substantial part of the Humphrey-Hawkins debate time on economic goals and policies to a Black Caucus member, it was not until the 97th Congress (1981-82) that the CBC began formally offering substitute amendments for the congressional budget resolution. District of Columbia Delegate Walter E. Fauntroy (Del.-D.C.) was CBC chairman at the time, and it fell to him to sponsor the Black Caucus budget substitute, though Hawkins was still recognized to manage time half the four hours of debate time on Humphrey-Hawkins (the other half going to the Republicans). The CBC's "Constructive Budget Alternative," as it was called, provided for a balanced budget in fiscal 1982, restored most of the funds for social programs that were cut by the Reagan and Budget Committee budgets, deferred individual tax cuts, closed tax loopholes, and reduced defense spending by \$2 billion. The substitute was defeated, 69 to 356. The following year Delegate Fauntroy and the 18 member Black Caucus fared better with their substitute, though still losing, 86 to 322.

Over the next 20 years (1983-2002), Black Caucus substitutes were offered on the House floor on 13 occasions. On only one occasion, in 1983, was the CBC denied a request by the House Rules Committee to offer a substitute. Appendix A gives a rundown of the CBC budget substitutes-- their sponsor and disposition, by year and Congress.

The interesting question is why, in four of the last five years (1998-2002), did the Black Caucus not offer a substitute-- the year 2000 being the only exception? To answer this question, we went to the debate on the resolution in 1998 to determine whether any Black Caucus members

gave an indication of the reason. Under the terms of the rule, three hours of general debate were allowed, with two hours divided between the chairman and ranking minority member of the Budget Committee, and one hour between the chairman and ranking minority member of the Joint Economic Committee (Reps. Saxton and Stark) to discuss economic goals and policies. It should be noted here that ever since the 1983 full employment goal of Humphrey-Hawkins had expired, management of debate over economic goals and policies shifted from Hawkins (who did not retire from the House until 1990) to the chairman and ranking minority member of the Joint Economic Committee.

The special rule allowed just one substitute to be offered, and that was by the Budget Committee's ranking minority Democrat, Congressman John Spratt (D-SC). During debate on the rule, Ranking Rules Committee Democrat Joe Moakley (MA) indicated that one other substitute had been requested but denied--a Blue Dog Coalition substitute by Representatives David Minge (D-MN) and Charles Stenholm (D-TX). Black Caucus members Barbara Lee (D-CA), Eva Clayton (D-NC), and Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) all spoke against the rule and the Republican budget resolution because it short-changed social needs programs.¹⁴

During debate on the budget resolution itself, the only Black Caucus member to speak was once again Representative Eva Clayton who criticized the social program cuts in the Republican resolution and expressed support for the Democratic alternative. The time allotted for the Humphrey-Hawkins debate was waived, apparently because no one was around to claim the time at 1:25 a.m. June 5 when general debate was wrapping up.

In 1999, a similar scenario unfolded, with three hours of debate time provided, one of which was allocated for a discussion of Humphrey-Hawkins economic goals and policies. This time three substitutes were made in order, a Democratic substitute, a Blue Dog substitute, and a substitute purportedly representing President Clinton's budget. And this time, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Joint Economic Committee (Saxton and Stark) did take their time for the Humphrey-Hawkins debate. No Black Caucus members spoke during this portion. When Representatives Saxton and Stark did not use their full hour, they yielded the balance back to the chairman and ranking minority member of the Budget Committee. Two Black Caucus members did speak at that point, Representative Jackson-Lee on behalf of the Congressional Children's Caucus which she had formed, and its budget priorities as reflected in the Democrats' budget; and Representative Clayton, also in support of the Democratic budget alternative.

The last effort by the Black Caucus to offer its own budget came in the second session of the 106th Congress (2000), and was sponsored by Representative James Clyburn (D-SC), chairman of the Black Caucus, and offered on the House floor by Representative Major Owens (D-NY).

According to the Rules Committee's summary of the Black Caucus substitute, it would use the projected \$1.9 trillion surplus to fund designated priorities, with at least 10 percent devoted to investments in education and other programs, another 10 percent to investments in working class families for safety net programs—all without reducing defense spending or Social Security trust fund monies.

Representative Clyburn inserted in the *Congressional Record* a set of "Principles and Assumptions for the Congressional Black Caucus Maximum Opportunity and Investment Budget FY 2001," devised by the CBC Budget Task Force (see Appendix B). The preamble of the document spelled out the Caucus's motivating principles as follows: "The mission of the Congressional Black Caucus is advocacy for those left out and forgotten: the poor in general and more specifically African Americans and other neglected minorities."¹⁵

As with recent resolutions, debate time was limited to three hours of general debate, one of which was allocated to the Joint Economic Committee for discussion of economic goals and policies. The ranking Democrat on the JEC, Representative Stark, began his remarks by putting the economic situation in the context of the original goals of Humphrey Hawkins:

Many years ago distinguished legislators, Senator Humphrey and Congressman Hawkins, had the Humphrey-Hawkins bill which was to deal with unemployment and the right of all Americans to participate in our economy and the largess that this country has to offer. We have had success. Currently unemployment and inflation are low, and the average wages are rising; productivity is growing, and there is cause to celebrate. These economic gains were due largely to the policies of the last 7 years. But we may have met the numeric targets of Humphrey and Hawkins, but we still have a lot to do to meet the overreaching goals which the Joint Economic Committee is charged with researching and analyzing.¹⁶

Stark proceeded to excoriate Republicans for the way in which their budget increased defense spending and tax breaks for the rich while taking money away from programs for education, children, the poor and the elderly. Stark concluded that, "The Democrats believe in helping all Americans in closing the income gap and educating our children and providing prescription drug benefits and good health care to all Americans. The Republicans would give it to the 2 or 3 percent richest people and the largest campaign contributors only and let the poor people and the innocent children take the hind most."¹⁷

While no Black Caucus members took part in the Humphrey-Hawkins debate, they did play an active role during the 40 minute debate on the CBC substitute (20 minutes of which were allocated to CBC Chairman Clyburn). In addition to Clyburn, 10 other Black Caucus members spoke in support of the CBC substitute. On the final vote, the substitute lost, 70 to 348. Five other

substitutes were considered, three by Democrats and two by Republicans (including the Budget Committee's reported budget).

A Progressive Caucus budget offered by Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR) received even fewer favorable votes, 61 to 351, while a Blue Dog substitute offered by Representative Stenholm did considerably better, 171 to 243. The Democratic alternative did only slightly better than the Blue Dogs' budget, losing on a 184 to 233 vote. A Republican Conservative Action team budget offered by Representative John Sununu (NH) fared about the same as the CBC budget, being turned back on a vote of 78 to 339. The underlying Republican budget, which had been modified in the Rules Committee, was narrowly adopted, 211 to 207.

Conclusions

Without interviewing members or staff of the Black Caucus to get their explanations for why no budget substitutes were offered in four of the last five years, it seems evident from their public remarks and votes that they were relatively satisfied with the Democratic party alternative budgets and did not want to dilute the vote or divide a party already in a weakened minority position. It is likely that the ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee and the party leadership made an extra effort to be inclusive in drafting a substitute budget in order to present a united front on their priorities. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that for the first three of the last five years, a Democratic President, Bill Clinton, was wrapping up his second term, and his budgets were probably more sympathetic to the human resources programs favored by the Black Caucus than had been the case during his deficit-cutting, budget balancing first term.

Another possible factor that cannot be dismissed is the decline of the budget process itself in recent years. Black Caucus criticism of the process in the early years for not producing the kind of debate on national priorities that it was intended to generate is more true today than ever. One indication of that is that debate time on budget resolutions in the House has shrunk from 14 hours to just three hours. But more importantly, budget resolutions are rarely adhered to and thus have become almost meaningless exercises. It is little wonder that members do not want to invest enormous amounts of time on developing alternative budgets that no one pays attention to, let alone votes for. It will take more than a reinvigorated caucus to breathe new life into the budget process.

Another possible explanation is that Black Caucus members may be more diverse in their views and relative power positions than in earlier years as they have become more entrenched in their respective committees and subcommittees, and perhaps more varied in their geographic constituencies and political orientations. "All politics is local," as former Speaker Tip O'Neill still reminds us from his grave, and the first job of a congressman is to get reelected.

The importance of exercising national leadership on behalf of racial or ethnic minorities is not to be diminished, but differences are bound to emerge over how best to do that. The nature of leadership, after all, is not just to be an agent of one's followers by responding to their perceived needs. It sometimes involves inspiring others to think in new ways about the kind of country they want for themselves and their fellow citizens, and motivating them to achieve it. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I have a dream" speech is perhaps the most striking modern example of this kind of leadership. While the U.S. Congress has never been in the forefront of new ways of thinking about a better future, it has always contained a few members who are more visionary than others. And, as history has demonstrated repeatedly, every significant and successful movement or improvement began with a small minority.

**APPENDIX A.
CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS BUDGET SUBSTITUTES**

Congress: Calendar Year	Budget Res. No.	CBC Amendment	Sponsor	Vote
97 th : 1981	H.Con.Res. 115	Yes	Fauntroy (DC)	Def: 69-356
97 th : 1982	H.Con.Res. 345	Yes	Fauntroy (DC)	Def. 86-322
98 th : 1983	H.Con.Res. 91	No	CBC requested; Rules Com- mittee. denied	
98 th : 1984	H.Con.Res. 280	Yes	Dixon (Calif.)	Def. 76-333
99 th : 1985	H.Con.Res. 152	Yes	Leland (Tex.)	Def.: 54-361
99 th : 1986	H.Con.Res. 337	Yes	Leland (Tex)	Def.: 61-359
100 th : 1987	H.Con.Res. 93	Yes	Dymally (Calif)	Def.: 56-362

100 th : 1988	H.Con.Res. 268	No	None requested	
101 st : 1989	H.Con.Res. 106	Yes	Dellums (Calif)	Def: 81-343
101 st : 1990	H.Con.Res. 310	Yes	Dellums (Calif)	Def.: 90-334
102 nd : 1991	H.Con.Res. 121	No	None Requested	
102 nd : 1992	H.Con.Res. 287	Yes	Towns (NY)	Def: 77-342
103 rd : 1993	H. Con. Res. 64	Yes	Mfume (MD)	Def. 87-335
103 rd : 1994	H.Con.Res. 218	Yes	Mfume (Md)	Def.: 81-326
104 th : 1995	H.Con.Res. 67	Yes	Payne (NJ)	Def: 56-367
104 th : 1996	H.Con.Res. 178	Yes	Payne (NJ)	Def: 63-362
105 th : 1997	H.Con.Res. 84	Yes	Waters (Calif)	Def.: 72-358
105 th : 1998	H.Con.Res. 284	No	None requested	
106 th : 1999	H.Con.Res. 68	No	None requested	
106 th : 2000	H.Con.Res. 290	Yes	Clyburn/Owens (NY)	Def.70-348
107 th : 2001	H.Con.Res. 83	No	None requested	
107 th : 2002	H.Con.Res. 353	No. Closed rule	None requested	

APPENDIX B.

CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS

Principles and Assumptions for the Congressional Black Caucus Maximum Opportunity and Investment Budget FY'2001

[Congressman James Clyburn, Chairman; Congressman Bennie Thompson, Chairperson--CBC Budget Task Force; Congressman Major R. Owens, Vice Chairperson, CBC Budget Task Force]

The mission of the Congressional Black Caucus is advocacy for those left out and forgotten: the poor in general and more specifically African Americans and other neglected minorities. To guide the budget preparation process and fully accomplish our mission we shall begin by adopting the following Principles and Assumptions:

1. We accept the general direction of the President's Budget and the House Democratic Caucus. ``Families First'' is a motto we wholeheartedly endorse; however, more resources must be directed toward working families and the unique problems of African American families.
2. We view the projection of a 1.9 trillion surplus over a ten year period as an overriding factor for the basic decisions to be made for the FY'2001 Budget. Common sense dictates that we approach this first year of the decade of budget surpluses with proposals for the most advantageous uses of one-tenth of the projected surplus.

3. Investment in the CBC designated priorities shall be our number one concern. We support a moderate plan to pay the national debt; however, the President's blueprint moves too far and too fast with debt reduction at the expense of investment.
4. The protection of Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare are among the highest priorities of the CBC; however, investments in the education and training of the present and future workforce will provide greater guarantees for the solvency of Social Security and the sound financing of health care than any other policies or actions under consideration.
5. In budgeting for each function, the CBC accepts the principles of a balanced budget, however, increase in CBC priorities must not be inhibited by present budget caps and conventional assumptions. We assume that there is waste in several key areas which may be transferred to enhance better investments for the future. We also assume that there are excessive revenue expenditures to continue corporate welfare which may be eliminated to increase funding for our designated priorities. And finally, we assume that one-tenth of the projected ten year surplus must be factored into the development of this budget for maximum opportunity and investment.
6. The CBC accepts the basic thrust of President Clinton's proposal for the distribution of the surplus; however, the CBC will insist that the emphasis in priorities must be shifted. At least 10 percent of the surplus should be devoted to investments in programs for education and a second 10 percent should be allotted for investments which benefit working families and for safety net programs.
7. Tax cuts, which must be taken from the 80 percent of the surplus which remains, are not a high priority of the CBC; however, since the current political power equation dictates the inevitability of a White House approved tax cut, the CBC must insist that the tax cuts not exceed the percentage of the surplus which is allocated for CBC priorities.
8. Within the priorities earmarked by the President's budget, in each function, the CBC will strive to target some portion of the proposed allocations to the special needs of working families, the poor and the African American Community. New market opportunities and minority contract set-asides must apply across the board--and special units should be funded to implement and facilitate the targeting of CBC designated constituents.
9. Budget allocations for necessary programs that currently do not exist are encouraged. The proponents must also later develop legislation for authorization as part of the process to sell the ideas and convince the President to place the item on his priority list at the time of the end-game negotiations. Proposals for new methods of proposal solicitation, peer review, technical assistance, etc. are also in order.
10. The currently stated CBC FY 2001 Priorities are: Education, Housing, Health, Economic Development and Livable Communities, Foreign Aid, Welfare and Low Income Assistance and Juvenile Justice and Law Enforcement. Some additions or subtractions from these categories are possible; however, they will remain as the basic frame-work for CBC Budget and Appropriations demands for the entire session of the 106th Congress. Members preparing budget functions should also consider promoting tactics and strategies which support the CBC's ongoing advocacy of these dollar allocation positions.

APPENDIX C.
Chairs of the Congressional Black Caucus (1971-2003)

<u>Name</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Congress</u>	<u>Years</u>
Charles C. Diggs	Michigan	92 nd , 1 st	1971
Louis Stokes	Ohio	92 nd , 2d; 93 rd , 1 st	1972-73
Charles B. Rangel	New York	93 rd , 2d; 94 th , 1 st	1974-75
Yvonne Br. Burke	California	94 th , 2d	1976
Parren J. Mitchell	Maryland	95 th	1977-78
Cardiss Collins	Illinois	96 th	1979-80

Walter E. Fauntroy	D.C.	97 th	1981-82
Julian C. Dixon	California	98 th	1983-84
Mickey Leland	Texas	99 th	1985-86
Mervyn M. Dymally	California	100 th	1987-88
Ronald V. Dellums	California	101 st	1989-90
Edolphus Towns	New York	102 nd	1991-92
Kweisi Mfume	Maryland	103 rd	1993-94
Donald M. Payne	New Jersey	104 th	1994-96
Maxine Waters	California	105 th	1997-98
James Clyburn	South Carolina	106 th	1999-2000
Eddie Bernice Jounson	Texas	107 th	2001-2002
Elijah E. Cummings	Maryland	108 th	2003-2004

Notes

1. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Congress of the United States* (New York: The American Heritage Publishing Company, 1975), 115.
2. When LSOs were abolished by House rules in 1995, depriving them of separate offices and budgets, informal member caucuses became known as Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs) which are still permitted to appoint staff using members' official expense allowances, but staff must now be housed in a member's office.
3. A full listing of these caucuses can be obtained on the House Administration Committee's web site under Publications, "107th Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs)," at: <<http://www.house.gov/cha/caucus.htm>>.
4. Susan Webb Hammond, *Congressional Caucuses in National Policy Making* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 3.
5. "Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill," *CQ Almanac*, 1978, 272.

6. *CQ Almanac*, 1976, 679.
7. *Congressional Record*, April 30, 1979, 9031.
8. *Ibid.* As it turned out, only one hour and forty minutes of debate time was consumed for the Humphrey-Hawkins portion of debate. The rest of the four hours was yielded back.
9. *Ibid*, 9035.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid*, 9037.
12. *Ibid*, 9037-38.
13. *CQ Almanac*, 1979, 171-72.
14. *Congressional Record*, June 4, 1996, H 4138-40.
15. *Congressional Record*, March 23, 2000, H 1347.
16. *Congressional Record*, March 23, 2000, H 1323.
17. *Ibid*, 1324.