KGB Moscow Center Circulars

Cables Decrypted by the National Security Administration’s Venona Project

Transcribed by Students of the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies

Reissue

From: MOSCOW

To: CANBERRA

No: 233, 232

2 December 1943

[Part I] Circular[a].

Once again we direct your attention to the insufficient secrecy in the work of the leaders and operational workers of the residencies. Some operational workers are being initiated into affairs of the residencies which have no relation to the work which they are carrying out. Of course this is the result of talkativeness and the inevitable responses of brotherly relations which are maintained among our workers. It is necessary to all [6 groups unrecovered] but each individual operational worker should know on the general work of the residency only what is necessary in order to carry out the work on his own assignment. In the premises of the embassy, legation, consulate (in the studies and work rooms of the residents) and in the private apartments, probably fitted with special [1 group unidentified], discussions are being conducted on operational questions. There have even been cases of setting up in the work room a conference of all the workers of the residency for a collective discussion of instructions of the [C% center]. It is categorically forbidden during instruction and generally in discussion, particularly within the premises, to use the real surnames of workers and probationers[STAzhERY], names of cities and countries, officials and other objectives. All this should be encoded.

[Part II][1 group unrecovered] considering the cases cited above it is recommended instead of conversations aloud to exchange notes, which immediately after such a "secret conversation" [1 group unidentified] are destroyed. Our workers must not at work and in private life [4 groups unrecovered] from other [1 group unidentified] apparatus and [1 group unrecovered] that it will inevitably lead to disclosure. [1 group unrecovered] other [1 group unrecovered] discussions in Russian about [5 groups unrecovered].

[5 groups unrecoverable] violation of rules of secrecy we will take strict measures. [1 group unidentified] providing the necessary secrecy in our work to a considerable extent depends upon the leaders of the residencies themselves. The residents should not share with their subordinates communications which they are not supposed to know for the work.

No.677

PETROV[1]

Notes: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to HAVANA, MEXICO CITY, OTTAWA, SAN FRANSISCO and NEW YORK.

Comments:


16 August 1971
MGB AND GRU REPRESENTATIVES TO
COLLABORATE IN RECRUITMENT OF AGENTS (1944)

From: MOSCOW
To: BOGOTA
No.: 79[a] 22 June 1944

In practice [B% in our work] there are cases when we and the military neighbours[i] are working on the preparation of [B% the signing on][KONTRAKTATsIYa] of one and [B% the same] person. In view of this, [and] to avoid misunderstanding, when need arises establish business contact with the chief military neighbour[ii] and reciprocally check with one another on the spot persons of interest to you. The neighbours have given similar instructions in their line.

No. 2673 VIKTOR[iii]

[T.N. and Comments overleaf]
T.N.: [a] This message is known to have been sent also to NEW YORK, MEXICO CITY, SAN FRANCISCO, OTTAWA, and CAIRO.

Comments: [i] The Soviet military intelligence organisation.

[ii] The local GRU resident.

[iii] Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
To all residents [REZIDENTuI]a.

From 1 May[,] instead of the method of setting up the indicator Group [POKAZATEL’NAYA GRUPPA] in effect at the present time, for the determination [or: definition; that is: identification] of the reciphering table [PERESHIROVAL’NAYA TABLITSA]b enter [or: write (down)] in clear [OTKRuITO] at the beginning of the cipher text the first group of the table (the first indicator groupc) with which the leaf of the pod [LIST BLOKNOTA]d on the occasion begins. The recipherment itself begins with the second group of the table. At the end of the cipher text enter, likewise in clear, the group following upon the last used group of the gamma [GAMIA]e (the second indicator group). If the recipherment ends with the last group of a table, enter the first group of the following table.

[38 groups on a depth of 1, 51 groups unmatched]

*Sent to Habana, México, New York, Ottawa, San Francisco (no others found).

a Chiefs of NKGB agent systems abroad.

b Table of additive key [GAMMA], each such table being on one leaf [LIST] of a pod [BLOENOT], whence table [TABLITSA] and leaf [LIST] (often referred to in AFSA as "page", since each leaf is printed on only one side) are up to a certain point interchangeable. (The table is what is written or printed on the leaf.) It is called "reciphering" because it is used in a second encrypting process (the first here being encoding with the code book).

c That is: now this will be the first indicator group.

d That is: the leaf about to be used on the respective occasion (?).

e Additive key.
EMIGRES, CLERGY AND OTHER GROUPS MENTIONED AS MGB "TARGETS" (1945)

From: MOSCOW
To: NEW YORK
No: 217 10 March 45

Circular.[a]

In view of the assignment of work on the old and new Russian and nationalist emigres, the Russian, Armenian and Mohammedan clergy, Trotskyites and Zionists, with regard to these targets[OB "EKTY] we require you in future:

1. To communicate all urgent materials by telegraph.
2. To send by post, with each letter beginning a fresh translate or write a brief review and send us by post only documents of operational interest. By the first post send brief notes on the above targets in your country with specific proposals for dealing with them. Advise by telegraph about persons ear-marked for recruitment, in order to obtain permission. Confirm receipt of this telegram.

No. 1467 VIKTOR[i]
10th March.

T.N.: [a] Also sent to MEXICO CITY, PARIS, and to another station the location of which has not been established.

Comments: [i] Lt.-Gen. P.M. FITIN.
FROM: MOSCOW, M.F.A.

CIRCULAR MESSAGE [a]

To all embassies, consulates-general, consulate agencies of the U.S.S.R., political advisers, People’s Commissariats of Foreign Affairs of Union Republics and diplomatic agencies of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

With offers from the receipt of this [message] [b] diplomatic post and cipher telegrams for the tenth department [c] of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs [C% is to be addressed] to the person in charge of the tenth department, xxKRISTsOV, MIKOLAJ Sergeevich [2 groups unrecovered]. In the xxxxxxxx List of the code write ZhERIETsOV” union group 7846[d].

T.N.[a] Also sent in XXXX and XXXXXX (the latter version is very incompletely read).

[b] Inserted by translator.
[c] The cipher department.
[d] This group previously dxxxxxx the name of ZhERESTsOV’s predecessor.
Moscow [Circular]*
1945
[Separate numeration] (10 April)

Circular to all residents [REZIDÈNTuI]a

Notwithstanding repeated instructions to address in copy to the 8[th] Section [8 OTDÈL] informational material sent by telegraph, many residents continue to violate this arrangement and “to complicate the work of the Center [TSENTR]b all the worse. We categorically demand that one execute this instruction and not force us into endless reminders. With the exclusion of materials of an operative character (questions of recruitments [KONTRAKTÀTSII], individual developments [RAZRABÒTKI], correspondence on organizational questions) and materials on Soviet nationals, all other materials are considered informational, into which category go likewise documentary data, material of a reference character, and materials characterizing the agentural [AGENTùRNoy]d background, structure, methods, and content of the work of foreign intelligence services [RAZVÈDKI].

Upon replying to our inquiries one must likewise give indication concerning the handing on of a copy to the 8[th] Section, if the material bears an informational character. It is forbidden to touch on operative questions in telegrams of an informational character. Cipher clerks are forbidden to embrace in one dispatch [DEPÈSHA] informational and operative telegrams.e

Cipher clerks are under obligation to see to it that there is a notation concerning the copy to the 8[th] Section of informational telegrams, if the resident has forgotten to do so.

2188

Victor [VIKTOR]

7 April

JJH 79-81-JAT-27-29 5 February 1951
*Sent to Bogota (no. 371) Alger (no.42), Canberra (no.68), Habana (no.62), Mexico (no.237), Montevideo (no.114), New York (no.339), Ottawa (no.166), Pretoria (no.39), San Francisco (no.153), and Washington (no.975)

a Heads of NKGB agent systems abroad.
b The branch of the NKGB to which the residents report.
c that is, feeling out potential informers, maneuvering towards their recruitment, and so on.
d Belonging to an AGENTURA or intelligence network.
e A unitary encrypted transmission, giving no external indication that it is not one coherent whole, often turns out to contain several quite separate messages. These latter are, as it here appears, known as telegrams [TELEGRAMMU1], while the larger unit is known as a dispatch [DEPÈSHA]
PRECAUTIONS FOR SAFEGUARDING SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POSTS

From: MOSCOW, M.F.A.

Circular Message[a]

8 - 13 June 1945

To all Soviet ambassadors, Soviet ministers, consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls, and political advisers to Allied Control Commissions[SKK][b][c]

According to information which has reached the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., a foreign intelligence service[INOSTRANNAYA RAZVEDKA][d] has recently begun to show an unusually large amount of interest in Soviet diplomatic post and is setting itself the aim of trying to extract documents from the diplomatic post.

In view of this, diplomatic post is to be classified strictly according to its degree of secrecy and diplomatic couriers are to be given as little classified[SEKRETSNYJ] diplomatic post as possible (on each individual journey) so as not to make it too difficult for them to keep it under observation.

It is categorically forbidden to pack classified diplomatic post in a common bag[VALIZA] together with unclassified[NESEKRETNYJ] diplomatic post, a practice which hitherto has been not uncommon.

Category[LITER][e] “O” packets should be of suitable dimensions for slipping into a side or inside pocket.

Classified and especially important documents not falling within category[KATEGORIYa] “O” should be packed in separate “V” bags and in such a way that they could easily be transferred and, in case of need, destroyed.

A stricter attitude must be observed to the dispatch and packing of diplomatic post traveling as luggage[BAGAZHNYJ], and also unclassified diplomatic post.

Before diplomatic couriers are sent off along their routes they should be given detailed information about, and their attention drawn to, those sections of the route where operations by foreign intelligence services are most likely to be carried out.

It is categorically forbidden to issue anyone with courier’s papers or to dispatch diplomatic post with anyone without having first received the permission of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Your attention is drawn to [the need for][f] seeing that diplomatic couriers are properly met and seen off on arrival and departure, and also to [the need for][f] seeing that diplomatic couriers are provided with escorts (specially detailed colleagues) as far as points where the most difficult and important changes[g] take place and especially when diplomatic couriers have a large amount of diplomatic post with them.

It is forbidden to put diplomatic couriers up at hotels during their stops at embassies, missions and consulates. Special rooms are to be set aside as quarters for diplomatic couriers and are to be given to the diplomatic couriers for the duration of their stops.

DEKANOZOV[i]
Notes: [a] Known to have been sent to ADDIS ABABA, AHWAZ, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO
CHUNGKIN G, DAIREN, HARBIN, KAZVIN, LANCHOW, MANCHOULI, PECHLEVI,
RESHT, RIZAIYEH, TABRIA and TOKYO; to ARDEBIL, BENDER SHAH, CABUL
GORGAN, ISFAHAN, KERMANSHAH, MAKU; to ALGIERS, BRUSSELS, HALIFAX,
HAVANA, ISTANBUL, LOS ANGELES, NEW YORK, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME,
SAN FRANCISCO, STOCKHOLM and WASHINGTON.
[b] SKK = SOYuZNAYa KONTROL’NAYa KOMISSIYa.
[c] Address omitted in some versions.
[d] Or merely "foreign intelligence".
[e] LITER. A category or class designated by a letter of the alphabet.
"O" and "V" here are probably the initial letters of the titles of the two categories.
[f] Inserted by translator.
[g] PERESADKI, i.e. changes of train, or from one form of transport to another.

Comments:
[i] DEKANOZOV, Vladimir Georgievich, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Circular. Communications on émigrés, Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian, and Moslem clergy, Soviet military personnel, non-returners, Trotskyites, Zionists [C% and other] targets of the Security Department [OKhrANNYJ OTDEL] are no longer to be sent to the 8th Department; [this applies to][b] both telegraphic and postal materials on the indicated targets; those sent by post send 2 – 3 copies.

T.N.: [a] Also sent under different numbers to other places.

[b] Supplied by translator.

Comments:

[i] VIKTOR: Lt. Gen. P.M. FITIN.
From: MOSCOW, N.F.A.

CIRCULAR MESSAGE [a] 27-28 July 45

To the person in charge of the OSShO [b].


[1 group unrecovered][f]

T.N. [a] Sent to all holders of this code. A similar message was sent in [Dea]

[b] OSShO. Full expansion not known. SShO stands for ShIFRORGAN – cipher office.

e Inserted by translator.

[d] I.e. groups for "but", "if", "yet", "and", "we", "he", "I" coupled with "not" which could with a one-digit garble become substituted in a message for the preceding groups and so reverse the meaning of a sentence.

[e] Or "telegraph".

[f] This group (7846) from the surname table was used by the heads of the 10th Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Dea]
To the Ambassadors, Ministers and Consuls.

About putting cipher correspondence in order. Recently cipher telegrams are being written in an excessively long form, informational communications are being written in 5-6 pages when they could be stated in a maximum of 2 pages. Questions about the transfer of people, correspondence with relatives, consular correspondence for some reason are being transmitted by cipher and not by diplomatic mail. The regulations on priority marks are also being violated. Telegrams of "VNE OCHEREDI"[a] priority are containing details of various conversations and information of no particular importance which might well be sent by diplomatic mail. In order to eliminate delay in deciphering the most urgent telegrams we are establishing the following system for cipher correspondence:

Telegrama with the mark "VNE OCHEREDI" should contain no more than 2 pages. These should contain communications of the most important and most urgent nature for rapid [2 groups unrecovered] and questions which require decisions which must not be delayed.

"SROChNYE"[b] telegrams should not exceed 3 pages and should contain information of an urgent nature, not requiring a VNEOCHEREDNYJ decision and answer.

In telegrams one should not set forth details of conversations, but essential aspects of questions; details should be described in letters and journals. Political surveys, press reviews, consular, organizational, personnel and economic questions are sent by ordinary diplomatic mail. Fulfillment of these instructions will improve the quality of the information and the work of the cipher clerks, will curtail the telegraphic expenses which must be paid in foreign currencies, and will lead to the timely working up of the cipher telegrams.

Confirm receipt of this telegram.

VYSHINSKIJ

Notes: [a] VNE OCHEREDI: i.e. extraordinary, special, out of order.
[b] SROChNYE: i.e. pressing, urgent.
Item 3.

From: MOSCOW, M.F.A.

CIRCULAR MESSAGE [a]

1 - 2 Aug. 45

To all embassies, legations, consulates, [and] political advisors of Allied Control Commissions [SKK] [b].

We advise for information that a physical culture parade is taking place in MOSCOW on the 12th of August, 1945. In connection with this, all foreigners, except diplomats and diplomatic couriers, are being debarred from entering MOSCOW. Thus, in all cases where you have received, or do in the future receive, permits for visas for foreigners (except diplomats and diplomatic couriers and also special foreign delegations travelling at our invitation) travelling to MOSCOW or in transit through MOSCOW the issue of visas should be calculated to ensure that persons receiving them arrive in MOSCOW after the 12th of August; this restriction does not apply to diplomats and diplomatic couriers and visas should be issued to them without delay.

[Signed] [1 group unrecovered]

T.N. [a] Sent to ADDIS ABABA, ALGIERS, ARDEBIL, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BOGOTA, CAIRO, CANBERRA, CHUNGKING, DAIREN, HAVANA, HALIFAX, HARBIN, KAZVIN, COPENHAGEN, ISTANBUL, LOS ANGELES, MANCHOULI, MESHED, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, NEW YORK, OSLO, OTTAWA, PRAGUE, PRETORIA, RESHT, REYKJAVIK, RIZAIYEH, SAN FRANCISCO, STOCKHOLM, TABRIZ, TOKYO, WASHINGTON.

[b] SKK = SOyuZNAYa KONTROL’NAYa KOMISSIYa.
Item 4.

From: MOSCOW, M.F.A.

CIRCULAR MESSAGE [a]

1 – 4 Aug 45

To all embassies, legations [MISSIYa] and consulates of the U.S.S.R. abroad.

Cases are being observed where consular staff in our establishments abroad are not indicating in visas issued by them to citizens of other countries the official status [SLUZHEBNOE POLOZHEHIE] of the persons to whom the visas are issued. This is leading to misunderstandings as in a number of instances foreign diplomatic agencies [PREDSTAVITEL'/STVO] have represented one or another member of their staffs [RABOTNIK] to us as being in a capacity other than that shown in the application for the visa, or in a capacity other than that in which we consented to accept the foreigner in question. To avoid similar misunderstandings visas issued by you to members of the staffs of foreign diplomatic agencies in the U.S.S.R. must indicate their official status, which should correspond to the status shown in the application for the visa and against which no objections have been raised by us. Diplomatic visas should contain indications such as “attaché, second secretary, of such-and-such an embassy, legation, or the like, in the U.S.S.R.”, and official [SLUZHEBNYJ] visas indications such as “person employed on the staff of [SOTRUDNIK] such-and-such an embassy or legation in the U.S.S.R.”

[Signed] [1 group unrecovered]

WS: XY 13.1

T.N. [a] Sent to ADDIS ABABA, AHWAZ, ALGIERS, ARDEBIL, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BOGOTA, CAIRO, CANBERRA, CHUNGGING, COPENHAGEN, DAIREN, HALIFAX, HARBIN, HAVANA, ISTANBUL, KAZVIN, LANCHOW, LOS ANGELES, MANCHOULI, MESHED, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, NEW YORK, OSLO, OTTAWA, PARIS, PRAGUE, PRETORIA, RESHT, REYKJAVIK, RIZAIYEH, SAN FRANCISCO, STOCKHOLM, TABRIZ, TOKYO and WASHINGTON.
1. The last known message signed VIKTOR is Moscow-Canberra 27 June (26 June) 1946, serial 134 (4246). From the study of isologs it becomes virtually certain that this was a circular. The text as read so far is:

"We advise that the minister -- ABAKUMOV V. S. is assuming the covername "BORISOV". --3F-- covername "BORISOV" to Comrade SHEVELEV is revoked.

"The person designated in place of VIKTOR -- KUBATKIN P. N. is assuming the covername "YEVGENYEVS".

"I wish you a year of successes in the work. Greetings."

4246 VIKTOR
26 June

2. YEVGENYEVS has been turned up as a signature, on 1, 10, and 2x August 1946. As reported before, GENRIH (?), IVANOV (?), and YURYEV come into use on 26 September 1946, 24 October 1946, and 5 September 1947, respectively.

3. Note that Abakumov's appointment to the ministry of state security was not announced until 19 October 1946, but that rumor placed his real appointment not later than the first week in July.

4. The belief that the system is an MGB system may now be regarded as confirmed.
MEMO ROUTING SLIP

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REMARKS

The attached study has been given no distribution outside of AS-90. It is forwarded for such action as is deemed necessary and desirable.

AS 90

Study was given to Col Forney who is taking action on information contained. Wants more whenever possible. HAS

FROM NAME OR TITLE | DATE | ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION | TELEPHONE |
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DA AGO FORM 895 Replaces WD AGO Form 895, 1 Jun 40, 16-48487-2 GPO which may be used.

1 OCT 47
Item 2.

From: MOSCOW, M.F.A.

CIRCULAR MESSAGE [a]

No: 019 22 May 47

To all ambassadors, ministers, consula-general and consuls of the U.S.S.R., and political advisers (BERLIN, VIENNA, TOKYO). [b]

It has been established that a number of persons employed on the staffs [SOTRUDNIKI] of our establishments abroad are employing the services of foreign subjects in gross violation of an instruction of the M.F.A. [MID] [c] prohibiting persons employed in Secret Cypher Departments [SSHO] [d], couriers of the Special Guard [SPETSOKRANA], and all Soviet members of staffs living on the premises [NA TERRITORII] of embassies, legations and consulates from hiring foreign subjects for their personal service; I demand that the instruction in question be carried out precisely. All members of staffs in the above categories who at present have in their personal service foreign subjects (cooks, nursemaids, washerwomen, maids etc.) must discharge them immediately. Indicate receipt of [1 group unrecovered]. Report execution.

Special No. [C% 19] [1 group unrecovered] [b]
[C% Ts] [e]

[Signed] [1 group unrecovered]

WS: XY 13.3

T.N. [a] Sent to ALGIERS, BERNE, BUENOS AIRES, CANBERRA, CARACAS, HAGUE, HAVANA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW YORK (both to Consul and to Soviet Delegate to UNO), OSLO, OTTANA, POZNAN, REYJAVIK, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAN FRANCISCO, SANTIAGO, STOCKHOLM, WASHINGTON. Also sent (with text unrecovered) to ADDIS ABABA, AHWAZ, ARDEBIL, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BRATISLAVA, CAIRO, CAPE TOWN, GENOA, GURGAN, ISFAHAN, ISTANBUL, KERMANSHAH, MESHED, MILAN, NANKING, PAHLEVI, PRETORIA, RESHT, RIZA IYER, SHANGHAI, and TIENSIN.

[b] The address and the unrecovered group following the internal serial number were omitted in some versions of the message.

[c] MID = MINISTERSTVO INOSTRANNYkh DEL.

[d] SShO = SEKRETNO-ShIFROVAL’NYJ OTDEL.

[e] [C% Ts]. If correct, this might be an abbreviation for TsIRKULYaR = Circular.