Local Natural Resource Regimes in Conflict Contexts: Towards

Multi-Scale Governance

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Varied "Sites" of Conflict and Violence around Natural Resource Management

- Forests
- Wildlife
- Protected Areas
- Agriculture
- Marine Resources
- Minerals
- Fossil Fuels





Violence and Deforestation or

 Forest violence and the defence of local communities can be associated with deforestation, as in conflicts in Brazil



Chico Mendes 1944-1988



Sister Dorothy Stang 1931-2005

Violence and forest conservation, as in Colombia

Could peace be worse than war for Colombia's forests?



Maria Alvarez. 2001. <u>The Environmentalist</u> PublisherSpringer NetherlandsISSN0251-1088 (Print) 1573-2991 (Online)

Other sources of natural resource conflicts

guerrilla wars

- drug cultivation
- flows of refugees
- insecure property rights
- Imposition of public protected areas over pre-existing customary rights

The Most Intractable Sources of Natural Resource Violence: Armed Conflicts and Corruption

Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts:

- Natural resources once a means of funding and waging armed conflict; but now armed conflict "increasingly becoming the means to individual commercial ends: gaining access to natural resources"
- Natural resources can increase the vulnerability of countries to armed conflict by diminishing capacity of governance institutions to peacefully resolve conflicts, the "resource curse"

Phillipe Le Billon. Political Geography. (20) 2001.

Scarce Resource Wars or Abundant Resource Wars ?

 Research suggests that low levels of violence (25-1,000 battle related deaths per year) have positive relationship with environmental degradation but not low levels of endowment.



 "while abundant renewable resource in otherwise poor countries and non-renewable resources in all countries increases the likelihood of armed conflict"



A Typology of State and Substate Natural Resource Conflicts-Communities Normally Powerless Victims

See Deal and

	Point	Diffuse
Proximate	State control/coup d' etat Algeria (gas) Angola (oil) Chad (oil) Congo-Brazzaville (oil) Iraq-Iran (oil) Iraq-Kuwait (oil) Liberia (iron ore, rubber) Nicaragua (coffee) Rwanda (coffee) Sierra Leone (rutile)	Rebellion/rioting El Salvador (coffee) Guatemala (cropland) Israel–Palestine (freshwater) Mexico (cropland) Senegal–Mauritania (cropland)
Distant	Secession Angola/Cabinda (oil) Caucasus (oil) D.R. Congo (copper, cobalt, gold) Indonesia (oil, copper, gold) Maroco/Western Sahara (phosphate) Nigeria/Biafra (oil) Papua New Guinea/Bougainville (copper) Senegal/Casamance (marijuana) Sudan (oil)	Warlordism Afghanistan (opium) Angola (diamonds) Burma (opium, timber) Caucasus (drugs) Cambodia (gems, timber) Colombia (cocaine) D.R. Congo (diamonds, gold) Kurdistan (heroin) Lebanon (hash) Liberia (timber, diamonds, drugs) Peru (cocaine) Philippines (marijuana, timber) Sierra Leone (diamonds) Somalia (bananas, camels) Tadjikistan (drugs) Former Yugoslavia (marijuana, timber)

Corruption and Natural Resource Mangement

- "corruption in natural resource management is defined as the use or overuse of community (state, village, city, etc) natural resources with the consent of a state agent by those not legally entitled' (Robbins, 2000)
- Corruption as "covert privatization"
- "corruption is quite often the predominant organized system governing the use of nature" (Robbins, 2000).
- Corruption can come from outside the community, where they are victimized by powerful outside forces
- Or it can come from inside the community, where local elites appropriate resources that may in principle belong to the entire community

- Corruption is the flip side of concerns for "good governance"
- Robbins critiques the "corruption as the weak state" school of thought
- Corruption is not the absence of state institutions, but the presence of differing institutions, which vie for legitimacy and trust amongs diverse players within both the state and civil society.

Thus, while we frequently speak of institutions and social capital as positive things, both are present in "corrupt" practices.

"Corruption is the bending of explicitly equitable state institutions around structures of regional and local social capital to create unequal distributive outcomes" Robbins, 2000

• Fig. 1. Natural resource corruption as a function of social institutions and normative power.



Conflicts over Protected Areas

 Parks in Congo Basin-estimates that they have displaced and impoverished 120-150,000 people. (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006)

 On-going low level conflicts over resource use in protected areas by neighboring communities ("soft eviction" from traditional resource use) Can Local Governance or "Community-Based Conservation" mitigate natural resource conflicts?

No

 Not if community-based conservation means working only at the level of the community, which was the assumption of early concepts of CBC

 Communities are too small, too powerless, too poor, normally with deficiencies in human, social and financial capital to be able to relate equally with other actors in society.

Local Governance as multi-scale governance

Both community-based conservation and government top-down conservation are "panaceas" (a universal remedy). Neither one alone is sufficient. (Ostrom, Berkes)

 CBC as shorthand for multi-scale governance, by government at all levels and civil society at all levels, focused on supporting and empowering local institutional mechanisms for natural resource management (Berkes)



Fig. 1. Key institutional linkages facilitating the activities of the Arapaima conservation project, Guyana



Civil Society Advocacy Campaigns

Ethical and Green **Business Advocacy** Campaigns are **Community-Oriented Conservation and Conflict Reduction** Tiffany & Co announced a policy of "zero tolerance" for diamonds from conflict zones (brand value estimated at 77% of capitalization)



IAMOND

Nothing Says 'I Love You' Like a Superficial and Overvalued Rock Clawed From the Guts of the Earth by African Slave Labour.

REALDIAMONDFACTS.ORG

300,000 CARATS OF DIAMONDS ANNUALLY ARE MINED WITH SLAVE LABOR IN THE REBEL-HELD REGIONS IN IVORY COAST AND SOLD TO FUND VIOLENT CONFLICTS.

DIAMOND FACTS

Intercana Unantour Paces of the role diamods play is bringing taggety and despair to boomings pace we work where diamods are sourced. Knowhere is the more evident han a Mirca. It is also in Africa that this same resource continues to be used to fund olvi wars, non-governmental organizations and the diamode industry established the Kimbelley Process Carrification System, a UN-bacted process that thes to address the narrow definition of confrict diamonds. The Kimbelley Process has glaring problems and does not address monotant turnar rights abuses. In cited as anciticad violatione, environmental monotant turnar rights abuses in cited as ancitored violatione, environmental monotant turnar rights abuses in cited as ancitored violatione, environmental monotant turnar pitts abuses in cited and the amonotant of the source of violatione. SPREAD THE WORD

Make the choice to purchase socially responsible diamonds, and encourage others to do the same. Be a part of the solution, not the problem.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Glimmer of Hope for Multi-Scale Governance?



- Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN) with Flora and Fauna International (FFI)
- Developing first national-level community conservation strategy
- New protected areas legislation under development that recognizes rights of local communities, compensation for costs of conservation, etc



Liokatis, 2008, Oryx 42(1):13-18

- Mechanisms for engaging local communities in park management and reducing conflict in and around parks
- Bottom-up approach used where local communities living in vicinity of eight protected areas were consulted and requested to identify issues they felt needed to be addressed.
- ICCN pledged to increase percentage of revenue sharing benefitting local communities from 3 to 40%



Lessons from the Mexican Experience

 Agrarian Reform Process and forest programs throughout 20th century devolved forest ownership to local communities.

- Based on secure access, emergence beginning in 1970s of "community forest enterprises"
- Still problems of corruption and violence in many communities, but hundreds are operating well.

 Study of two neighborning watersheds in Guerrero, one with forest-related violence (18 deaths) one peaceful (0 deaths) showed that investments in organizing forest communities resulted in increased benefits, reduced deforestaton, and much less violence



Thanks for your Attention!

