MEASURING THE HUMAN COST OF WAR: DILEMMAS & CONTROVERSIES

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OBJECTIVES

<u>Part 1:</u>

- Define direct and indirect (or excess) deaths
- Define 3 existing epidemiological models

<u>Part 2:</u>

- Discuss challenges in measuring the human cost of war
- Discuss the dilemmas, controversies, and future expectations in defining the epidemiology of modern day conflict



COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

• Politically motivated disasters with high levels of violence and civilian deaths

• 20th Century: More killed by own country than outside forces

• Outmoded UN Charter that does not adequately address internal conflict and genocide



COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

- Primary emphasis on battle-related deaths... which drives intervention
- As mortality declines so does outside interest & relief aid
- <u>Current assumptions:</u> >Low cost humanitarian aid can reduce these to pre-war levels, or better, within 4-6 months



MEASURING DIRECT & INDIRECT DEATHS

Key Quantitative Indicators

- Land & Look... Walk & Talk... followed by population-based cluster sampling
- Under age 5 mortality rates (U5MR)
- Crude mortality rates
- "Excess mortality"



Figure 1. Relationship Between Under-five Childhood Mortality (per 1000) and Armed Conflict During the 1990s.



Reproduced from Hotez (2001).3

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

- Great majority of losses are "indirect" deaths, or "excess" mortality
- Deaths that would not have occurred without the conflict; due to:
 - breakdown of health & social services
 mass displacement of populations & overcrowded conditions
 impossibility of continuing local livelihoods
- Indirect deaths are a form of collateral damage



INDIRECT DEATHS

- Except for a few countries, the humanitarian community has no idea of worldwide extent of indirect deaths*
- No existing armed conflict datasets measure indirect death toll *
- No one held accountable for war-exacerbated deaths
- <u>Indirect deaths</u> rarely subject of political attention: remain unseen, uncounted, & unnoticed



*Human Security Centre Concept Note: 2006 Ottawa

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Direct Effects

- Injuries/Illness
- Deaths
- Human rights abuses
- International Humanitarian Law abuses
- Psychological stress
- Disabilities

Indirect Effects

- Population displacement
- Disruption of food
- Destroyed health facilities
- Destroyed public health infrastructure
- Destroyed livelihoods



Complex Emergencies: Lethal Mix of...

- Inequalities
- Poverty
- Injustice
- Cultural incompatibilities

- Ignorance
- Racism
- Oppression
- Religious fundamentalism

ALL ADVERSELY INFLUENCE THE PUBLIC HEALTH...

Epidemiological Models of Complex Emergencies

• Developing country model:

E.g. Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Congo

- **Developed country model:** E.g. Former Yugoslavia, Iraq
- Chronic/smoldering country model:

E.g. Haiti, Sudan, Palestine



DEVELOPING COUNTRY MODEL

DEVELOPING COUNTRY MODEL Health Profile:

- Severe malnutrition
- Outbreaks of communicable diseases
- High crude mortality rates (CMR)
- High case fatality rates (CFR)
- No public health infrastructure

*Burkholder & Toole, Lancet '96

DEVELOPING COUNTRY MODEL

Figure 1 Cholera cases in Monrovia, Parts of G.Bassa, Margibi & Bong Counties



Epidemiological weeks

CHOLERA IN LIBERIA: 2003

Figure 1 Cholera cases in Monrovia, Parts of G.Bassa, Margibi & Bong Counties



Epidemiological weeks

MALARIA IN LIBERIA: 2003



Epidemiology: Eastern Congo-February-April 2001*

- Assessment challenges: Few demographics, hostile territory with rapidly moving and easily lost populations
- 2.5 million <u>excess deaths</u> (CI: 2.0-4.0)
 > Only 10% deaths due to war related violence
 > Remainder are preventable: diarrhea, malnutrition, malaria
- 75% of children born during 2001 will die before age 2 years

Roberts L: IRC, NYC

DEVELOPED COUNTRY MODEL

DEVELOPED COUNTRY MODEL

- Occur in relatively healthy populations
- Baseline demographic & disease profiles of Western countries
- Trauma mortality rates > 1.1/10,000/day from war-related advanced weaponry
- Age and gender related mortality increases during times of targeted ethnic cleansing

DEVELOPED COUNTRY MODEL

•Excess mortality from untreated chronic diseases

•High rates of elderly with under nutrition

•Rape, psychological traumatic exposures common

•Very few epidemics

Developed Country Model

War and mortality in Kosovo:*

- Crude mortality rates increased 2.3 times over pre-conflict baseline
- Peaked during times of "ethnic cleansing "
- Males over age 50 were 3 times more likely to die of war-related trauma
- Evidence used in Hague war crimes tribunal

IRAQ PLANNING

- Some critical indicators suffered decline over previous 10 years:
- ✓ Infant mortality rates: 47.1 to 108 (per 1000 live births)
- ✓ Under age five mortality rates: 56 to 131 (per 1000 live births)
- ✓ Acute malnutrition: 3.6% (1991) to 11% (1996) to 4.1 % (2002)
- ✓ Increase in reported cases of : TB, cholera, typhoid fever, amoebic dysentery, giardiasis, leishmaniasis, malaria

Top 10 Causes of OIF Deaths 3/19/2003 - 11/30/2004



Change in the Nature of Conflict: Iraq

- *Major shift from civilians dying from Coalition action to Insurgency action**
- 2003:

coalition-related deaths / non-coalition deaths = $\frac{4}{1}$

• 2006:

coalition-related deaths / non-coalition deaths = $\frac{26}{30}$

*Sapir: The Lancet, 2007

SMOLDERING COUNTRY MODEL

CHRONIC/SMOLDERING COUNTRY MODEL

• Children grow up chronically malnourished

• Children only know a culture of violence

• Little access to healthcare and education

• Struggle to sustain health services

• Only expatriate healthcare

• Reproductive health considered a luxury



SUDAN: ACUTE WAR CONSEQUENCES

- 2 million Internally Displaced Populations -(IDPs)
- Darfur IDPs: > MR = 16-18+ times the baseline (MSF 2004) > Violence: 49% of total mortality (over 3 months)

• Excess mortality: 650,000 (IRC: Jan 2003- April 2004)

CHRONIC/SMOLDERING COUNTRY MODEL

- Initial Gaza-West Bank (1998-2003 studies) all exposed chronic malnutrition & macro-& micro-nutrient deficiencies
- Environmental degradation high
- Haiti's forested areas: 2%...Is this a development or emergency situation?

DILEMMAS, CONTROVERSIES, & FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DATA

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

• Nature (and epidemiology) of armed conflict has changed substantially over past 15 years

• Data suggests we don't fully know the <u>long-term</u> <u>impact</u> of various forms of political violence

• We have glimpses of...but do NOT know the epidemiology of modern day conflicts



STUDIES SUGGEST

- Measures to protect civilians require new protocols and approaches...no longer fit evolving conflicts
- In absence of epidemiology, the consequences of war are left to an inexact process of estimates by political scientists and military analysts*
- Yet, 'countries in crisis' have not changed...and mortality & morbidity continue after the shooting has stopped



*Human Security Centre Concept Note: 2006 Ottawa

International Crisis Group

- Serious Hotspots: 75 (December 2006) Deteriorating: 14 of 75 Improving: 3 of 75
- Hunger climbed 18% 850 M without food for basic health

• Agricultural and public health infrastructure has declined over past 2 decades

SECURITY

• Viet Nam:

- > MILPHAP training program built capability
- > Provincial medical personnel earmarked for assassination
- Sadr: 1/3 of hospitals immediately came under his control: "Control cocial & medical corriges, control the hearts & minds"

"Control social & medical services, control the hearts & minds"

- *Military Security briefs for war not compatible for HA*
- Response: 'Unprepared and at times overwhelmed'*



*Center for Managing Security in Transitional Societies
EXCESS MORTALITY STUDY: IRAQ

- Population-based Cluster Sampling
- Confidence Intervals (CIs) <u>scare & disorient</u> people...but somewhere in between is the <u>valid</u> <u>number</u>
- 'Baghdad Centric' studies when Baghdad is only 1/5th of the population

- Need to translate difficult concepts into "simple speak"
- Indirect deaths from non-violent causes increased from 2005-06: Alarming trend

EXCESS DEATHS STUDIES

- Mortuary counts have role in sentinel surveillance... but NOT National estimates!
- Can't berate the military for not counting bodies... it is not their mandate...
- ...but it should be someone's



*Human Security Centre Concept Note: 2006 Ottawa

What Happens When the Shooting Stops? <u>Worsening</u>:

- <u>Access</u> to healthcare
- <u>Suicide, depression, alcohol & drug rates:</u> Out of work males & IDPs in camps; & Croatia, Afghanistan, Katrina studies
- <u>Increase in Gender Based Violence (GBV):</u> Intimate partner rates as marker of community breakdown & economic/physical insecurity (DRC, Iraq, Katrina)



What Happens When the Shooting Stops?

Worsening:

• <u>Number of girls in school:</u>

Last to go to school especially in insecure environments; or used to help support family; delayed enrollment correlates with high child mortality rates

• <u>Dengue fever marker of urban decay:</u> Governance and economic decline… lack of trash pickup



The Postwar Public Health Effects of Civil Conflict*

<u>Using DALYs lost from various diseases &</u> <u>conditions by age & gender:</u>

- Greatly raise risk of '<u>death and disability'</u> from infectious diseases
- Increase risk through breakdown of norms & social order



*Ghobarah, Huth, Russett

The Postwar Public Health: CHARACTERISTICS*

- Women & children most common longterm victims
- Increases both in country at war...<u>and</u> in contiguous countries
- Increases in casualties far exceed the immediate loses from the civil war



*Ghobarah, Huth, Russett

The Postwar Public Health Effects of Civil Conflict*

- 'Decay' function extends up to 10 years after each civil war
- CE-DAT Mortality Surveys (1999-2005) <u>Indirect deaths</u>:

> Conflict = 71%
> 6 month transition period = 83%
> Drops to 45% in late 20002



*Ghobarah, Huth, Russett

INDIRECT DEATHS: POST-CONFLICT

- What does restored health status really mean?
- Declining mortality <u>or</u> mortality & morbidity?
- Does the measure accurately uncover the <u>functional</u> causes for indirect M & M?
- Is there enough absorbing & buffering capacity to prevent a slippage back?



INDICATORS

- Indicators for <u>outcome</u> (impact) & <u>function</u>
- Outcome indicators are concrete; functional have some abstraction: <u>Ex</u>: Basic food for health (functional) causing death (outcome)
- Functional indicators more important for <u>indirect</u> mortality & morbidity
- Both need to be better defined... with definitions universally accepted



INDICATORS

- Humanitarian Community: Outcome indicators
- Political-military and private sector have steadfastly maintained a non-evidence based approach by using <u>achievement</u> indicators
- Conflict between military definitions (e.g., measures of effectiveness) and those of State Department & USAID



FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DATA

• International NGOs:

> Focus on beneficiaries in certain sectors (e.g., food, water/sanitation, health, shelter)

• Human Rights NGOs:

> Take on a legal issue & interview individuals at length (focus on the trees without judging the forest)

• Academia:

> Prevalence of health issues in a population (in the forest... they estimate the trees)

• *Military/Private Sector:*

> Focus on completion/achievement of a mission (build clinics/MRE delivery) which more often provides form before function

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DATA

- Tension between human rights monitoring & public health monitoring
- Human rights monitoring requires names, dates, and witnesses for confirmation
- Public health approaches require population based truth which almost always involves pledges of confidentiality and lowering the threshold of certainty



*Human Security Centre Concept Note: 2006 Ottawa

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DATA

- Public health estimates of rape based on confidential interviews will always be higher than police reports
- Parties to a conflict (e.g., military PH teams) cannot and should not be doing such work and making pledges of confidentiality which their superiors will at some point betray
- Need for an international monitoring mechanism is critical... as occurs in ICRC and prisons



*Human Security Centre Concept Note: 2006 Ottawa

WHO: HEALTH WORKER CRISIS

- 57 countries facing healthcare worker crisis
- Sub-Saharan Africa: 11% of world's population, 24% of world's burden of disease, 3% of health workers
- <u>Ex:</u> Liberia (2003): 24 "physicians" ... only 10 actually had medical degrees
- Evidence suggests that burden of intentional & unintentional injuries is rising, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa & Middle East



Surgical Burden of Disease

- Surgical burden of disease approaching 50% of overall mortality
- Increasing due to late referral, <u>severe</u> shortage of surgical & anesthetic services
- Increasing use of non-doctors with technical skills, supervised by primary care physician
- Routinely NOT considered part of Public Health model



Surgical Burden of Disease

•Researchers using DALYs see surgical burden of disease as a <u>marker of social inequality &</u> <u>exclusion</u>

• Highest in SE Asia, Western Pacific & Africa

• Obstetrical complications requiring surgery far higher in Africa



GLOBAL DISASTERS*

- Global responses, too often, have been imperfect, ad hoc, and politically motivated
- Public <u>expects</u> equity, transparency and accountability in global health and humanitarian assistance
- 'Expectations' have been driven by universal internet access (e.g., Indian Tsunami and Pakistani Earthquake)



*Burkle: Globalization & Disasters: PH, State Capacity & Political Action J. of International Affairs, 2006

RESPONSE PATTERNS SINCE GLOBALIZATION:

• United Nations and Red Cross Movement led humanitarian missions are now rare

•Indian Ocean Tsunami: US led coalition purposely bypassed UN & Red Cross

• Currently dominated by: US Military-Political command, the World Bank, corporate contractors, and like-minded NGO

•*Military led disaster operations referred to as the <u>"relief</u> <u>and reconstruction complex"</u>*



*Bello: The Rise of the Relief-and-Reconstruction Complex, Journal of International Affairs, 2006

Lessons Learned

- Humanitarian work has become politicized and militarized
- "No one humanitarian voice"...strengthened multilateral core that cuts across emergencies and development in funding & action*
- "Public health must take precedence over politics...nor be driven by political motives"**

*Smillie & Minear: 2003: CRED **Burkle, BMJ, 2000

Lessons Learned

- Public health must be seen as a <u>strategic & security issue</u>... that deserves an <u>international monitoring</u> <u>system</u>
- Urgent need to develop an epidemiology of conflict which can add science to understanding the human cost of modern day war & conflict

FUTURE

Disasters, in the future, may be divided into:

- Disasters occurring in countries economically interdependent with economic powers which will receive robust relief that rapidly recovers the economy
- Disasters in poor countries will depend on fragile UN, UN Agencies, and Red Cross/Red Crescent led response...with limited funding and equipment



In the developing world, rural populations will exceed urban for another 20 years



Source: International Food policy Research Institute, based on United Nations data.

FUTURE

• Redefining "public health"

- Mortality/morbidity dependent on:
 - *> infrastructure*
 - > moral integrity of governments
 - > capacity to provide sustained security

• Not prepared to protect the <u>urban</u> public health infrastructure

PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE



MULTISECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENTS

INFRASTRUCTURE MAY NOT BE WHAT YOU THINK IT IS



What Defines the Conflict Zone & What Does it Look Like?

- Requires Geo-referencing data using GPS
- Requires qualitative & quantitative PH data built in
- Defined by:
 - > population characteristics?
 - > where geographically violence is occurring?
 - > <u>human security indicators</u> (wide range): e.g.:
 - 1. kids not attending school
 - 2. kids not getting food
 - 3. markets not functioning
- Requires fairly accurate population estimates

QUESTIONS?

(A)

BABY ...