

The Hungarian "Exception": Lessons in Political Economy

George Kopits

ES Discussion, European Studies Program February 1, 2012

Outline

- Background
- Broad fiscal trends
- Exception 1.0 (in 2001-09)
- Paradigm change?
- Exception 2.0 (since 2010)
- Consequences
- Lessons

Political setting: good news

- Parliamentary democracy since 1990
 - Constitutional reform (1990)
 - 5 full electoral cycles (3 socialist, 2 center-right)
 - Institutional progress, occasional backsliding

Defining events

- Council of Europe, GATT/WTO (early 1990s)
- OECD membership (1996)
- EU membership, Single Market, Schengen (from 2004)

Political setting: bad news

Common denominator

- "Goulash populism"
- Electoral cycle dominates economic performance
- Zero-sum game

Overriding party strategies


- Permanent hold on power, clientelism
- Fiscal sovereignty
- Maximize scope for social entitlements with high taxation or borrowing


Mixed progress during the transition

- Deep reforms in the tradable sector
 - External liberalization (trade and finance)
 - Domestic liberalization (incl. financial system)
 - Privatization (incl. effective bankruptcy procedures)
- Slow reforms in the non-tradable sector
 - Public administration: bloated workforce
 - Social entitlements partially reformed
- Monetary policy: broadly successful (XR peg; IT)
- Fiscal policy: continuous stress, dominant
- EU membership \rightarrow moral hazard

Economic performance

- Foreign direct investment: very strong at outset
- Swings in external performance
- Near crisis in 1995 and 2008 (need for IMF stand-bys)
- Disinflation into single digits, but some persistence
- Marked deceleration in economic growth







Distinguishing characteristics

- deficit bias
- time inconsistency
- pro-cyclicality
- debt sustainability problem
- lack of transparency
- non-cooperative with monetary policy


General Government Balance




Fiscal Stance: Hungary




Fiscal Stance: Euro Area



Public Debt



Public Debt



Eurostat

Exception 1.0 (2001-09)

Center-left government

Expansionary stance during "Great Moderation"

- government wage hikes
- public pension hikes
- VAT rate cuts
- conflicts with central bank
- opaque fiscal and regulatory practices

Exception 1.0 (2001-09)

Center-left government

Contractionary stance during crisis (IMF-EU standby)

- wage and pension freeze
- VAT rate increase
- some streamlining of social entitlements
- rules-based fiscal framework

Paradigm change?

Rules-based fiscal framework (FRL Nov. 2008)

- policy rules: expenditure limit debt limit
- procedural rules: pay-go rule
 MT budgetary planning
- transparency norms
- independent fiscal institution: Fiscal Council
- consistency with EU stability and Growth Pact

Paradigm change?

Expectations about Orban government

- Need to restore policy credibility
- No campaign promises, strong majority
- Good track record of first Orban government
- EU supportive ahead of Hungarian presidency
- Financial markets welcoming

Exception 2.0 (since 2010)

Center-right government

Unorthodox policy measures

- flat tax, without exempt threshold
- temporary taxes on selected activities
- record VAT rate (27%)
- nationalization of private pension funds
- tax exemption of employer-provided health insurance

Exception 2.0 (since 2010)

Center-right government

Demise of checks and balances

- limits on Constitutional Court on fiscal matters
- sharp cut in judges' retirement age
- political appointment as head of State Audit Office
- *de facto* abolition of Fiscal Council
- reduced independence of Central Bank

Consequences


Vulnerability to crises

- Debt sustainability problem
- Spike in risk premium, junk bond status
- Costly interest bill, decline in investment, growth
- Potential loss of access to market financing

Confrontation with EU, IMF

- Indefinite postponement of euro membership
- Possible legal and financial sanctions
- Tough prior conditions for stand-by arrangement

Consequences




Consequences


Comparison with the UK

- Common features
 - fiscal sustainability problem
 - low policy credibility
 - contemporaneous election of center-right governments
- United Kingdom
 - clear medium-term fiscal target
 - front-loaded adjustment program
 - establishment of Office for Budget Responsibility
- Hungary
 - mixed and opaque policy signals
 - adoption of distortionary stop-gap measures
 - abolition of Fiscal Council

Consequences: sovereign risk premium



Consequences: sovereign default risk premium



Negative Lessons

- "Exception" leads to stagnant activity, long-term sustainability problem, and vulnerability to crisis (lacking a natural resource base)
- Fitful discretionary policies and weak institutions
 undermine confidence
- Populist strategy and moral hazard have only shortterm benefits
- Government ignores financial markets at its peril

Positive Lessons

- Fiscal sovereignty can be achieved through a predictable well-designed rules-based policy framework (lacking a natural resource base)
- Policy credibility must be home-grown
- IMF or EU can only provide financial and technical assistance, and guidelines for good practices
- Government must use every opportunity to signal paradigm change, and follow up with action, that leads to virtuous cycle

References

Kopits, G., "Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Central and Eastern Europe" OECD Journal on Budgeting (November 2008)

- Kopits, G., "Monetary and Fiscal Policy from Transition to EU Integration: A Comparative Assessment" in B.Y. Kim and C. H. Lim, eds., *Financial Sector Reform in Transition Economies* (Seoul National University, 2009), pp. 29-61.
- Kopits, G., "Goulash Populism" Wall Street Journal (February 25, 2011)
- Kopits, G., "Hungary's Collision Course with the EU," *Wall Street Journal* (January 12, 2012)
- Kopits, G., "Can Fiscal Sovereignty be Reconciled with Fiscal Discipline? Acta Oeconomica (forthcoming)



Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars