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C. Warren Goldring Annual Lecture

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“Navigating the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 World”

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

I. Introduction

I am honored and flattered to be giving this year’s Goldring Lecture and to be following in the footsteps of the two previous Goldring lecturers, Leon Panetta and Lee Hamilton, both dedicated public servants and wise men. I would like to thank the Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Canada Institute on North American Issues for hosting me.

I would also like to thank Gerry McCaughey for his kind introduction, and C. Warren Goldring for his support of this event.

It is also a treat to share the stage with Allan Gotlieb, a distinguished former Canadian Ambassador to the United States whom I was fortunate to work with in Washington some two-and-a-half decades ago.

II. A picture of today’s world

I would like to begin by outlining what I see as the principal features of today’s post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, as well as its principal challenges.

One important feature is clearly positive. The chance of war between great powers is slimmer than it has been for several centuries. This is a fundamental departure in international relations; it constitutes nothing less than a respite from history.

The second feature reflects U.S. power. Certainly the United States enjoys a position of tremendous strength: militarily, economically, politically, diplomatically, and

culturally. But power is not the same as influence, and no single source of power can order today's global system.

Third, we are in an age of globalization. At its core, globalization is the increasing volume, speed, and importance of flows within and across borders of people, ideas, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, dollars, euros, television and radio signals, drugs, germs, e-mails, weapons, and a good deal else. Many of the most important forces in the world are now beyond the control and, in some cases, even the knowledge of governments.

Indeed, whereas great power competition was the signature challenge of the last era, the Cold War, today's signature challenge is a series of threats stemming from globalization. Though the United States, Canada, and our allies no longer face an existential danger in the Soviet Union, we do face an array of dangers that respect no borders. That they are diffuse does not make them benign. Terrorism is certainly a major threat, as are climate change, pandemic disease, and the proliferation of nuclear and other such materials.

This picture demonstrates that today's world contains forces of order and disorder. This is nothing new; indeed, history can be understood as the balance or struggle between such forces. But nearly 20 years after the Cold War ended, these forces are still coexisting without the era's character having emerged.

In this situation, no invisible hand exists to guide events in the most benevolent or efficient way. Opportunity represents possibility, not inevitability. Finding our way in this still-undefined era will require U.S. leadership in tackling a wide range of challenges. The United States cannot isolate itself from the world. Neglect would be malign. But nor can the United States succeed alone. Leadership is the opposite of unilateralism. Leaders require partners.

III. Middle East

In this era, the United States faces three major challenges.

The first, and largely negative, challenge is the greater Middle East. A region of disproportionate importance borne of oil, the Middle East poses the biggest threats to the United States, and to many others around the world, in part because of terrorism and proliferation, in part because of ongoing conflicts.

In Iraq, the most salient issue for my country, the current policy debate pits the surge against a rapid, calendar-based withdrawal of U.S. forces. Each has drawbacks. The surge depends on the existence of an Iraqi government willing and able to take advantage of the opportunity it is designed to provide, that is, willing and able to act with national, not sectarian, interests at heart. Alas, I see few signs this is the case or will be anytime soon.

On the other hand, a rapid disengagement would likely intensify the civil conflict, cause a humanitarian disaster, give terrorists free reign, draw Iraq's neighbors further into the fighting, and raise questions throughout the region and beyond about U.S. reliability and staying power.

I favor a gradual reduction of U.S. force levels with less participation in Iraq's civil conflict and an increased emphasis on tasks that could improve the outcome. These include training and advising of Iraqi military and police units, efforts to help local political leaders forge compromises, a residual military capacity to attack terrorists and back up government forces, and diplomacy to influence the behavior of Iraq's neighbors, notably Iran and Syria.

One thing is clear: we cannot "remove" the Iraq problem. Terms like "success," "solution," and "democracy" are no longer appropriate, if indeed they ever were.

In Iran, we face a nation fueled by buoyant energy prices that acts like an imperial power, challenging the United States and others through its nuclear program and its support for terrorism and militias.

Diplomacy is the best available course with Iran. First, we might strike a deal. Second, only by making a good-faith negotiating effort can the United States gain later support for a more confrontational tack.

Regime change is not an available option. There is no way to guarantee it would occur soon enough to make a difference. It is more wish than strategy.

At the same time, living with an Iran that possesses nuclear weapons or could build them in short order is not acceptable. Iran's support for terrorism and its radical statements and at times actions cast doubt over the adequacy of deterrence. It is unlikely military force could solve this problem; you cannot destroy what you cannot target. Capabilities can be reconstructed in more secure locations. And attacking Iran would lead to a number of retaliatory actions that would further undermine regional order and unsettle the global economy.

There are four essential points to make about negotiations with Iran, and in general:

Diplomacy is a policy tool, not a favor to the other side. We must get past the view that negotiations constitute a reward to the Iranians.

There should be less emphasis on preconditions. What matters is not where you start a negotiation but where you end.

The focus should be on changing the Iranian regime's policy, not the Iranian regime. We cannot succeed in negotiations with unrealistic goals.

And even where negotiations do not succeed they tend to clarify the situation and the necessity of considering alternatives.

With Iran, the United States should pursue bilateral talks that address the points of contention, using a sliding scale with increasing benefits offered by the United States and our allies in exchange for increasing cooperation by Iran. Offers should include a reduction of current sanctions, security guarantees, political incentives, and a deal to provide Iran access to but not control of the nuclear fuel it says it needs for power generation.

Benefits would accrue to Iran as it took several steps. These include opening its nuclear program to intrusive inspections to prove that it is not developing weapons or the

fissile material they require; stopping its support of Hezbollah and Hamas, which interfere with prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace; and stopping its support of militias that are involved in attacks against Iraqis and U.S. forces in Iraq.

Sanctions and other penalties must also be part of diplomacy. Iran's people and leaders must understand the price they will pay if the Iranian government continues to defy the call of the international community to renounce a nuclear option.

On the Israeli-Palestinian issue, I have called for President Bush to announce a detailed vision of a peace agreement. With leaders in Israel and the Palestinian territories beset by difficulties, now is not the moment for negotiation. But it is the moment for pre-negotiation. The United States should outline its views on such questions as territorial issues (including compensation to Palestinians for deviations from the 1967 borders), the settlement of Palestinian refugees in the new Palestinian state, financial assistance to that state, and the final status of Jerusalem.

Stating U.S. ideas on these points would encourage the emergence of conditions conducive to pursuing diplomacy and making peace, with either new leaders or existing leaders adopting new positions. It would stimulate a debate in Israel, one that would likely demonstrate that a majority of Israelis supported such an approach. On the Palestinian side, the goal should be to challenge Hamas and show the Palestinian people how they would benefit from peace. Hamas would be left to explain why it refused to adopt the positions – renouncing terrorism, honoring past Palestinian commitments, and acknowledging Israel's right to exist – that would open the door to negotiations with Israel and increased assistance from the United States and Europe.

This is one example of a step that would help curb extremism in the Middle East. More broadly, we should seek to promote modernization and reform across the region. Engineering societies is probably the single hardest foreign policy task. But the United States and Canada should encourage open markets and the rule of law, and find ways to support liberal, tolerant voices. In order to avoid a clash between civilizations, we must recognize the clash within a civilization.

Strengthening the rule of law, building robust civil societies, modernizing educational systems, promoting open markets, and giving women a chance to participate in all areas of Middle Eastern life would respond to both our humanitarian concern for the people of the region and the need to diminish the appeal of radicalism. This is not primarily a military effort; diplomatic and political resources will be in higher demand than military ones. And reform does not equate with elections. Elections should come relatively late in a reform process; too early and they risk putting in power parties with non-democratic, violent agendas, as we have seen in Iraq and the Palestinian Territories.

Finally, even though they are not strictly part of the greater Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan deserve a mention given the important role of Canadian and U.S. forces. That part of the world – from the streets of Pakistani cities through the tribal border regions and into the fields of Afghanistan – is a perfect example of the intersection of the local and the global. Local situations, mainly related to terrorism and drugs, have become massive global concerns.

Today, with the Taliban ousted, we are engaged in the slow process of nation building in Afghanistan. We see the high costs that Canadians are paying there today. These efforts require patience in building up Afghan capacities to provide security, institute sound governance, reduce poppy production, and drive economic development. But Afghan problems cannot be solved solely inside Afghanistan. Pakistan has a great influence over Afghanistan's fate for many reasons – not least the presence of Taliban and al-Qaeda militants in Pakistan's tribal regions. Building a solid and secure Afghanistan will require greater cooperation from Pakistan, and years of U.S., Canadian, and European political, economic, and military involvement.

IV. Asia

In Asia we also face enormous challenges, but here the challenges are largely positive. Asia is the most dynamic region of the world, and the question is how to harness this dynamism for peace and increased prosperity.

Asia's tremendous economic and technological progress has come largely without the kinds of institutions that have solidified peace, for example, in Europe. Europe has strong regional institutions but often lacks dynamism; in Asia it is the other way around.

Integrating China more fully into such arrangements is a top priority. The Japan-China relationship should come to resemble the Franco-German one: so close that war between formerly bitter enemies becomes unthinkable, while simultaneously providing the foundation for regional cooperation.

Japan has begun to raise its profile in the world. It has supported operations in Afghanistan and even sent forces to Iraq. Growing Japanese assertiveness comes as Japan faces several potential challenges, including North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, territorial disputes with Russia, and an increasingly powerful China. Given that the prospect of renewed Japanese militarism is marginal, we should welcome a Japan ready to assume a regional and international role commensurate with its resources and abilities.

India must also be further integrated into the regional and global system. This requires treating India as a major power and accepting its status as a nuclear-armed state. On the latter point, we should include India in arrangements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials. Helping India realize its potential and play a strong positive role also requires working for the gradual normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.

Overall, we should work on creating regional architecture that can continue channeling Asia's dynamism into increased prosperity and sound relations, instead of an arms race, renewed great power rivalry, or outright conflict.

A good model would be the OSCE or Helsinki process, which brought together countries that had been suspicious of, and sometimes hostile to, each other. This process allowed states on both sides of the Cold War divide to build common understandings and institutions to promote political and military security, as well as human rights and economic prosperity. The OSCE began as a conference and took on the character of a standing institution. Asia could benefit from something similar.

V. Global Challenges

The third major challenge in today's world is an array of global issues that cause problems and present opportunities across borders. The biggest such issues today are climate change, terrorism, proliferation, pandemic disease, and trade.

By definition such global matters require a collective response.

We need to put in place new rules and norms based on goals that are broadly acceptable to most countries. Norms are needed in such areas as:

sovereignty, to make clear that sovereignty is not absolute but contractual, and that rulers forfeit its rights and protections if they violate accepted rules (by committing or abetting genocide, for example);

non-proliferation, to frustrate the spread of nuclear material and technology and make countries understand the price they will pay for using nuclear weapons or passing them to third parties; and

terrorism, to build unanimous opposition to the intentional killing of innocent men, women, and children for political purposes.

In addition, we should support new and reinvigorated trade negotiations.

Economic relations are the best way to integrate developed countries into a system whose stability they have a stake in maintaining. Opening markets is also the best way to help developing countries develop and, over time, become more open politically as well.

And on the environment, we need to think about a post-Kyoto framework, probably including a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system to limit emissions that cause climate change. Any system should include positive credits for forested areas that absorb carbon dioxide. Developing countries need to be a central (although not necessarily equal) participant in a post-Kyoto framework.

The need to think about climate change is so great because it is a matter of national and international security. Countries are unlikely to go to war over emissions levels, but they may well go to war over emissions' effects, such as water shortages and large-scale human migration. Eventually, climate change's effects will contribute to state failure, which in turn provides opportunities for activities such as terrorism, illegal drugs, and slavery that exploit "sovereignty deficits."

Energy security, closely related to climate change, is also a national security matter. Canada is the largest supplier of oil to the United States, but many other countries also earn significant income from oil and other fossil fuels. The flow of resources to Canada does not concern me. The windfall in such countries as Iran and Venezuela does.

Finally, on disease, we need to put in place requirements so that outbreaks in one country become known elsewhere, in order that necessary precautions and reactions can be taken.

VI. Conclusion

It is difficult to get a handle on the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world that I have described. Our continued use of the word "post" reflects our difficulty in assigning it a defining characteristic.

This world calls for rules and international arrangements that can meet the challenges it poses and make the most of the opportunities it presents. It requires bringing countries together to pursue a number of goals, ranging from frustrating would-be terrorists to lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty through trade, investment, and the provision of aid linked to economic and political reforms.

In the current era, the signature challenge is the array of forces loosed by globalization. What happens elsewhere will not stay there. The remote chance of conflict between great powers creates an opportunity for a collective response. Again, though, opportunity is not the same as inevitability.

We have not done enough in the nearly two decades since the Cold War ended. But it is not too late; the opportunity remains to be seized. The United States needs partners – and Canada is a natural one – to devise the rules and institutions to order this era. We also need partners to enforce rules against states who violate them.

The end of World War II marked a similar passage from one era to another. Just as after the Cold War, the United States emerged from World War II as the most powerful country in the world. But it still needed partners to meet the new challenges it faced. The United States responded at that time in an extraordinary way. It is for good reason that Dean Acheson, secretary of state during the Truman years, titled his memoirs *Present at the Creation*. The title evokes a time when new structures and arrangements were created to deal with the changing international system. Today, the same level of creativity is called for. Let's commit ourselves to being present at this era's creation.

Thank you.