Managing Fishing Capacity: Silver Bullets or A Delicate Balancing Act??

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Overview

Overcapacity: Causes & Effects

Case Studies:

Managing Fishing Capacity in Australia's Northern Prawn Fishery

The Madagascan Shrimp Fishery - Implementing Individual Transferable Fishing Rights in a Developing Country Fishery

Conclusions from Case Studies

Tools to Address / Avoid Overcapacity

Finding the Balance

Causes & Effects

- Weak Institutional Arrangements
- Lack of Fishing Rights/ Race to Fish
- Market Impacts where rights exist (fishing costs, exchange rates; increased aquaculture production; price fluctuations)
- Declining Fish StocksPoverty

- Loss of economic rent
- Overfishing/ overfished fisheries
- Depletion of major food sources in developing countries
- Threats to marine ecosystems
- Loss of fisher &/ or investor confidence
- Market failure

Adjusting Fishing Capacity in Australia's Northern Prawn Fishery



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• Primary Management Tool - individual transferable effort units (gear units)

- Biological, economic & ecological objectives enshrined in formal Management Plan
- Clearly defined Fishery target (MEY) and limit reference (MSY) points, and decision rules
- Long term fishery catch/ effort & economic data sets

•Stock assessment models (including bio-economic model) for key target species; fishery independent surveys; a 'risk assessment' approach to other species, including bycatch species

• Eco-system based management approach comprising Bycatch management (Bycatch Action Plan, Compulsory TEDs/ BRDs; US Accreditation); implementation of MPA's

• Strong co-management system in place (govt, industry, science, NGOs, other stakeholders)

Historical Snapshot

- Commercial fishery commenced in late 1960's / early 1970's key target species: tiger, banana, endeavour and king prawns
- Open access fishery until limited entry introduced in 1977
- Appeared to have strong institutional arrangements (managed by govt, scientific research support)
- Liberal 'limited entry' criteria results in indiscriminate issue of licenses (302) by Govt in early 80's results in significant overcapacity
- First individual transferable fishing rights (boat units) allocated in 1985
- Adjustment to target overcapacity/ improve fishery profitability first recommended by Economists in 1986 - rejected by industry!

NPF Cont...

- Overcapacity, combined with effort creep, leads to significant overfishing of tiger prawn stocks from mid to late 1980's and late 1990's
- Fishery very susceptible to external factors eg fluctuations in fishing costs/ market prices, exchange rates, aquaculture production
- Significant and on-going adjustment required to rebuild stocks and improve fishery profitability
- Adjustment programs (buy backs, compulsory acquisition of fishing rights) reduce fishery capacity from 302 licenses (1985) to 52 licenses (2007) but pace of adjustment impeded by industry disunity/ political intervention
- ITFRs provided effective mechanisms for adjustment, but not sole solution to addressing/ avoiding overcapacity problems

The Madagascan Shrimp Fishery –Implementing Individual Transferable Fishing Rights in a Developing World Fishery



Industrial/ Artisanal Sector:

Major export sector for Madagascar, yielding 10,000 tons per year and providing \$75 million USD in foreign earnings; major employment source; major food source; 75 industrial/ 36 artisanal vessels restricted to four specific fishing zones

Traditional sector:

Important food source yielding 1000 tonnes per year, 8000 traditional pirogues; not currently integrated into formal management arrangements

Fishery Overview

- Established in late 1960's
- 1960's to 1990's discretionary (irregular) licensing policy; lack of transparency in license allocation
- Lack of license security discretionary annual renewal
- Uncontrolled fishing capacity & effort / Unstable / economically unsuccessful fishery
- Lack of industry representative body/ serious conflict between operators
- 'Open Access' until limited entry introduced in 1998
- Traditional sector not managed, increasing fishing effort/capacity negatively impacting on catches in industrial/artisanal fisheries

MSF Cont....

- **GAPCM** established as industry representative body in 1996
- Decree 2000-415 (2000) limits entry to 75 industrial trawlers, 36 artisanal trawlers; provides 20 year license; imposes compulsory VMS, provision of catch/effort and economic data, horsepower restrictions
- GAPCM initiates increased seasonal closure to protect juvenile stocks, improve shrimp size/value; reductions in mesh size; reductions in headrope restrictions for industrial vessels
- Fishery very susceptible to external factors eg increased fishing costs; gas oil prices; market fluctuations, exchange rates, aquaculture production
- GAPCM initiates external, independent review of fishery in response to declining shrimp production/ declining economic returns

MENTOR COMMITTEE REVIEW

(Goodlad, J; Jarrett, A; Wilson J) - January 2003

MC concluded fishery reasonably managed but that there was a clear need to:

- better balance effort and sustainability in the MSF
- improve economic returns to fishers & the Nation
- implement a flexible, responsive management mechanism to facilitate adjustment/ restructuring and improve future biological and economic sustainability of shrimp resources
- formally adopt the precautionary approach to managing the MSF

Scoping Paper on potential management options provided to GAPCM - September 2003

Options Paper provided to GAPCM - April 2004

Workshop on Transferable Fishing Rights Options - July 2005







Management Options Review Process

- INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE FISHING RIGHTS Types, The Needs & the Benefits
- AGREEMENT ON BASIC ASSUMPTIONS & CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE VARIOUS OPTIONS

• **OPTIONS CONSIDERED:**

- Boat Days/Time Units
- Effort Units (acombination of boat days, horsepower & hull size
- Gear units (based on headrope/footrope length)
- ITQs

ASSUMPTIONS

Under All Options:

- INDIVIDUAL FISHING RIGHTS MUST BE FULLY TRADABLE
- RETENTION OF LIMITED ENTRY
- RETENTION OF CURRENT FISHING 'ZONES' SYSTEM
- CLOSURES FOR BIOLOGICAL/ ECOLOGICAL PURPOSES
- CONTINUED USE OF TED/BRDS; BYCATCH PROGRAMS
- NEED FOR ONGOING RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION & COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS MAY VARY WITH EACH SYSTEM
- NEED TO ADDRESS COMPLEXITIES OF INDUSTRIAL, ARTISANAL & TRADITIONAL SECTORS IN ALLOCATION

CRITERIA

- Equitable: need to identify existing shares & determine translation formula; the 'share' of rights held under one system must not be diminished in moving to a new system
- Flexible & Adjustable: operators need flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances & to maximise returns; fishery needs to be adjusted to respond to biological or economic changes
- Responsive: capable of adjusting the fishery on either biological or economic grounds in a timely manner
- Transferable: allows operators maximum flexibility to trade up or down to suit their own operational/market demands
- Economically efficient: retaining as few inputs as possible to maximise opportunity for economically efficient exploitation
- Simple & Cost Effective to manage: easily understood by industry; simple administration & enforcement; legally defensible
- Should be applicable to both industrial & artesanal sectors to allow trading between sectors; adjustment to both sectors

GAPCM Considerations – ITQs/ Boat Days/ Effort Units

- ITQS PROVIDE MORE ECONOMIC BENEFITS THAN INPUT CONTROL SYSTEMS/ FLEXIBILITY TO MAXIMISE CATCH FOR LEAST COST; ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY; FACILITATE TRADE BETWEEN SECTORS; PROVIDES LIMITS ON CATCH; PROVIDE GUARANTEED RESULTS AS ADJUSTMENTS ARE MADE TO TACS (& INDIVIDUAL QUOTA HOLDINGS) – NOT EFFORT LEVELS
- NOT POSSIBLE TO SET MEANINGFUL TAC'S IN MSF DUE TO HIGH VARIABILITY IN RECRUITMENT; MULTI-SPECIES NATURE OF FISHERY NOT SUITED TO QUOTA MANAGEMENT; HIGH GRADING/DISCARDING LIKEY TO RESULT IN LOSS OF REVENUE TO THE NATION; COST OF POLICING AND ADMINISTERING ITQS IN MADAGSCAR WOULD MAKE SYSTEM UNPROFITABLE FOR BOTH OPERATORS AND THE NATION
- CONCLUSION: ITQS ARE NOT AN APPROPRIATE SYSTEM FOR THE MSF

GAPCM Conclusions Cont....

- BOAT DAY AND EFFORT UNITS SYSTEMS PROVIDE FLEXIBLE RESPONSIVE MANAGEMENT TOOLS - A NUMBER OF BENEFITS OVER THE LICENSE-ONLY SYSTEM; EFFORT UNITS NOT AS FLEXIBLE AS THE BOAT DAY SYSTEM; BOTH SYSTEMS ALLOW OPERATORS TO MAXIMISE THEIR FISHING OPERATIONS; FACILITATES TRADE BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIAL & ARTESANAL SECTORS; FLEXIBLE ADJUSTMENT TOOLS
- EFFORT UNITS SYSTEM WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE SCIENTIFIC STUDIES TO DETERMINE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VESSEL SIZE + FISHING POWER IN MADAGASCAR – EXPENSIVE AND TIME CONSUMING; EFFORT UNITS MORE COMPLEX TO ADMINISTER THAN BOAT DAYS – REQUIRES BOTH EFFORT UNITS & BOAT DAY REGISTERS
- VMS NOT CAPABLE OF TRACKING DAYS FISHED BY ALL VESSELS REQUIRED UNDER THESE SYSTEMS – SYSTEMS CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY POLICED
- CONCLUSION: THESE SYSTEMS ARE TOO COMPLICATED FOR MADAGASCAR

GAPCM CONCLUSIONS – Gear Units

- Headrope (controlling swept area) good measure of fishing effort better than boat size or horsepower; headrope easily measured & enforced - particularly compared to hp; need for some at sea checks to ensure compliance with gear unit allocation
- Gear Units provide for technical innovation; no need for hp restrictions/vessel constraints as effort controlled by gear
- Operators can trade gear units to suit own operational/market demands
- Gear units system facilitates trading between industrial & artesanal sectors as headrope has the same fishing effort in both sectors
- Flexible tool for adjustment gives operators option of buying, selling, leasing gear units, amalgamating licenses, or fishing with smaller gear
- Appropriate management tool for MSF

Review Outcomes - 2006

- Agreement by GAPCM & Administration to adopt gear unit system for both industrial & artisanal sectors
- Total headrope (total number of gear units) allocated to industrial/ artisanalsectors; individual gear unit allocations based on combination of fixed allocation component and catch history
- Future reductions in fishing effort/ capacity to be implemented through gear units
- Recognition of need to implement management controls on traditional (small scale) fishery; rights based (individual/ community) systems to be considered for SSF in future
- Amendments to Decree to implement new management approaches agreed upon – in process of implementation

MSF Current Perspective

(Industrial/ Artisanal Sectors)

- Secure Fishing Rights: Limited entry/ 20 year fishing rights; individual transferable rights (gear units) system being implemented in 2008 to provide mechanism for future fleet reductions/ improved biological & economic sustainability
- Effort/ Environmental Controls: Restricted fishing zones; horse power limitations currently in place; headrope restrictions; spatial, temporal and night closures; TEDs/ BRDs; pursuing MSC certification
- Data Collection: Well-established economic and scientific data collection, and surveillance & enforcement programs in place- will need to improve under new system
- Co- Management: Excellent example of a pro-active industry association (GAPCM) working with Govt to achieve management outcomes under generally weak Institutional arrangements





Comparing Approaches: NPF/ MSF

Differences:

Developed versus developing world context (affluence versus poverty); institutional arrangements; resource sharing requirements; social/ economic drivers - eg employment, food source/ economic return to Nation; limits on/ use of bycatch resources

Commonalities:

- Management based on secure fishing access rights, autonomous adjustment mechanisms to address overcapacity
- Shared vision for wealth generation and biological sustainability as primary fishery targets
- Significant investment by industry and others in co-management approaches
- Considerable potential for increased stock size; improvements in fishery profitability if appropriate management approaches are in place

Conclusions

Effective management of developing country fisheries is possible DESPITE generally weak (or even absent) fisheries data/information; lack of policies, laws, institutions, transparency, public involvement AND....

Approaches used in industrialised fisheries can be adapted to the developing world BUT

 One size doesn't fit all - Institutional/ management arrangements MUST be appropriate to individual circumstances/ fisheries AND
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Conclusions cont...

•There are no 'Silver Bullets' for addressing overcapacity

•Balancing between fishery objectives is a given

•Fishing Rights in isolation are not a solution - a range of tools is required

•Conventional approaches (including establishment of fishing rights) could/ should be adapted for small scale fisheries to avoid further stock depletion, increased poverty, and loss of economic rent in developing world countries

Tools for Addressing/ Avoiding Overcapacity

- Government funded adjustment (short term)
- Secure Fishing Rights (ITQ's; ITE's; Community-based rights)
- Institutional/ Management Arrangements Appropriate to Individual Fisheries/ Circumstances
- Well-Defined & Well-Balanced Fishery Objectives biological, economic, social, ecological)
- Clearly Defined Harvest Strategies including reference points <u>AND</u> decision rules
- Co-Management approaches involving key stakeholders; effective engagement with stakeholders; buy-on by stakeholders
- Shared Vision, Respect, Cooperation

"THE SECRET OF LIFE IS BALANCE, THE ABSENCE OF BALANCE IS LIFE'S DESTRUCTION"

The Challenge: Finding the balance between conventional fisheries management approaches and the needs of small scale, developing-country fisheries