What can Mexico learn from other countries' successes in limiting organized crime?

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Italy and US have substantially reduced power of organized crime

- US Mafia now limited to NY metro area
 - Not a major player in drug markets
 - High rate of incarceration of senior figures
 - Occasionally no member will accept promotion
 - Some defendants eligible for public defender
 - NY families: 1200 in mid-1990s vs. 3500 in 1970
- Italian Mafias notably weaker
 - Unable to hold commission meetings
 - Gangs have been restricted to local activities
 - Political ties have been attenuated

The US organized crime problem, ca 1970

- Well established gangs in Northeast, Midwest cities
 - Closely tied to local/state politics
 - Deeply involved in illegal markets
 - Only marginally in drugs
 - Control of some major unions
- Still restricted to Italian-origin males
 - Violence not prominent
 - No attacks on police or the state more generally

Factors weakening Mafia: non-governmental influences

- Decline in flow of young Italian male immigrants
 - 1.5 million 1900–1909
 - 80,000 1960–1969
- Incompetent, aging, leadership
 - No innovation
- Deregulation of trucking
 - Weakened value of Teamsters control

Factors weakening Mafia: Government actions

- Increased power of federal government
 - More bureaucratic decision-making
- Growth of federal law enforcement
 - Entry of FBI into organized crime control
- New legal powers
 - Title III wiretaps
 - RICO
 - Continuing Criminal Enterprise
- New organizational forms
 - Organized crime strike forces

American Mafia by 1995

- Many senior informants
 - John Gotti convicted by evidence from former deputy
 - Omerta doesn't survive 15 year sentences
- Families shut down in many cities
- New ethnic groups lack Mafia's breadth
 - Minimal union control
 - Not connected to local corruption
 - No reputations outside of own community

Italian organized crime problem ca. 1993

- Visible ties to politicians at all levels
 - 7 time PM Andreotti acquitted on technicality
- Rise in internal violence within Mafia
- Small number of attacks on the state:
 - Two judges (Falcone, Borsellino) killed 1992
 - Three terrorist incidents 1993

Mafia Groups Are Organisations (Paoli)

- Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta are two consortia of about 100 mafia groups ('families') each
 - Mafia families are distinct from members' blood families
- Ruling bodies exist
 - within each family and
 - at the interfamily level
 - · Importance of the 'commissions' grossly overestimated
- Locally based
 - Rooted in municipal economic and political structures

Mafia Groups Are Not Bureaucracies (Paoli)

- Mafia families impose a pre-modern, lifelong 'status contract' on their member
 - No well-defined duties and rewards
- Members are required
 - To assume a new identity: the status of 'men of honour'
 - To subordinate all allegiances to mafia membership
- Honour and secrecy (omertà) are key inspiring principles of members' duties

Government response

- New laws/authorities
 - Wiretaps
 - Search powers
 - Offenses
 - Trial procedures
- New programs and agencies
 - DIA formed from three national police forces
 - Witness protection program
- Huge number of informants relocated

Mafia Groups Sharply Hit by Crackdown since 1992 (Paoli)

- All leading Cosa Nostra figures and many 'Ndrangheta bosses were captured
 - Totò Riina in January 2003
 - Bernardo Provenzano in April 2006
- Rank-and-file mafiosi were also decimated
 - Members of Sicilian and Calabrian mafia were target of 1,627 and 2,317 DIA-arrest warrants in 1992-June 2006
 - Over 1,200 fugitives were arrested in 1992–June 2005
- Given previous membership estimates (3,500/5,000), probability of being arrested has become very high

MURDERS AND ORGANISED CRIME-RELATED MURDERS REPORTED IN CALABRIA, SICILY AND CAMPANIA

	Calabria		Sicily		Campania	
	Murders	Org. crime murders	Murders	Org. crime murders	Murders	Org. crime murders
1990	326	141	428	150	_	201
1991	277	165	481	253	378	232
1992	151	46	399	200	290	181
1993	126	43	252	85	197	86
1994	121	42	249	90	165	65
1995	95	24	223	88	228	113
1996	103	30	180	66	204	94
1997	100	32	131	34	185	103
1998	85	28	140	35	199	107
1999	82	26	116	28	151	65
2000	84	34	86	13	163	73
2001	88	28	82	20	127	57
2002	61	17	70	11	109	47
2003	69	26	61	10	125	70

Source: ISTAT, Annuario Statistische Giudiziarie Penali, several years.

DEFECTORS AND WITNESSES UNDER THE SPECIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMME AND NEW ADMISSIONS TO THE PROGRAMMES, 1992–2005

	Defectors under protection	Witnesses under protection	New admissions to the programme
1992	_	_	17
1993	_	-	98
1994	-	-	282
1995	1,052	67	397
1996	1,214	59	338
1997	1,028	56	131
1998	1,041	55	199
1999	1,100	56	151
2000	1,100	61	91
2001	1,104	74	59
2002	1,098	64	84
2003	1,119	65	117
2004	968	71	65
2005 first six months	927	73	36

Source: Ministero dell'Interno, 2005c: 8, 12.

Dynamics of violence

"Especially in the last few years, a number of shoot-outs and murders in central city neighbourhoods in full daylight have raised social and political alarm. Paradoxically, some of these conflicts are unwanted side effects of the law enforcement successes. The weakening of the most powerful criminal clans has left open spaces for a variety of middle-sized and small crime groups that often fight each other for control of the local territory. crime groups that often fight each other for control of the local territory. Several conflicts have also erupted within large criminal groups when lieutenants have challenged the power of the group leaders to gain control of the most profitable activities, often exploiting the leaders' judicial difficulties." (Paoli, 2008; 867)

Deep Crisis, but No Defeat (Paoli)

- Cosa Nostra is marginalised from wholesale drug trafficking
 - 'Ndrangheta does better but has no longer strong North Italian position
- Extortion is main source of revenues for both organisations
 - Local people do not profit from mafia difficulties
- Hopes of recovery are on public contracts
 - But so far no evidence of large-scale mafia infiltration in major infrastructural investments
- Contacts with local politicians, but no influence on national choices
- Mafia's ability to survive should not be underestimated, though
 - Southern Italy's underdevelopment provides breeding ground for crime

How comparable is the Mexican organized crime problem?

- Criminal organizations:
 - More market focused
 - Less stable, durable
 - Much more willing to attack the state
- Violence both more gruesome and with different goals
 - Terrorism
 - Intimidation of media

Can Mexico learn from Italy, US?

- Need for
 - Specific legal tools
 - Institutional reforms
- But lack of credibility of all aspects of criminal justice:
 - Police
 - Prosecutors
 - Judges
 - prisons

Key references

US:

 Reuter, P. (1995) "The Decline of the American Mafia" The Public Interest Number 120, pp. 89– 99.

Italy:

 Paoli, L. Mafia and organised crime in Italy: The unacknowledged successes of law enforcement" West European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4, 854 – 880, September 2007