

# THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD 2010-2011

PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY IN BRAZIL,  
COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, MEXICO, AND PERU



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# **The Americas and the World 2010-2011**

Report and results for the biennial survey of public opinion in Brazil, Colombia,  
Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru on foreign policy and international relations  
<http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu>

## **THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD 2010-2011**

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Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru*



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## FOREWORD

**T**he *Americas and the World* is an ongoing research project that aims to study public opinion and political culture in the Americas on key issues in foreign policy and international relations. The project consists of a biennial survey administered in different countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and North America to gather basic information with respect to the opinions, attitudes, beliefs, interests, aspirations, and values of their citizens in a global context. The survey is carried out every two years with representative samples of the national population in various countries throughout the region.

The current report presents the results of the 2010-2011 edition of the survey, updated to include a wider range of countries, events, and issues. This edition is the first to include results from Brazil and Ecuador, where the survey was carried out for the first time, as well as Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, which were featured in the previous edition of the survey. In Brazil and Mexico, a separate survey was applied to a group of leaders in government, politics, business, academia, and the media, as well as leaders of social, civic, and non-profit organizations, the results of which may be consulted in each country's

national report. In upcoming editions of the survey, *The Americas and the World* team hopes to incorporate additional countries and extend the survey's coverage to the entire region.

*The Americas and the World* is a joint effort of a close network of research institutions across the Americas and would not have been possible without the following institutions, which have participated directly in implementing and supervising the survey in Latin America: in Brazil, the Instituto de Relações Internacionais of the Universidade de São Paulo; in Colombia, the Departamento de Ciencias Políticas and Escuela de Gobierno of the Universidad de los Andes; in Ecuador, the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales –FLACSO-Ecuador–; in Mexico, the División de Estudios Internacionales of the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE);<sup>1</sup> in Peru, the Instituto de Opinión Pública and the Escuela de Gobierno y Políticas Públicas of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Each of these research centers, institutes, and academic departments contributed to the methodology, research design, and implementation of the survey, as well as data processing and analysis of survey results.

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<sup>1</sup> The regional coordination of the project is based in Mexico, at the Division of International Studies at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE).





The primary objective of this study is to contribute to filling the void of empirical, rigorous, and objective information in a region where independent, reliable data is scarce and often lacks continuity. For decision-makers in the relatively young democracies of Latin America, understanding how citizens envision their surroundings is indispensable for designing, implementing, and evaluating effective policies oriented towards international action, cooperation, and mutual understanding. Expanding the circle of decision-makers, both public and private, will be essential to forging new paradigms of cooperation and integration that are both politically sustainable and genuinely popular.

*The Americas and the World* is unique in Latin America for its area of study, methodological rigor, and utility for a broad and diverse public. It is the only regional academic survey that specializes in measuring the social conditions that inform attitudes towards international affairs, and offers public access to its data bases, free of charge. *The Americas and the World* is anchored in research, academic, and policy centers known for their academic rigor and internationally recognized research, attesting to the reliability and replicability of survey results, and allowing data to be compared and analyzed alongside that of other studies. This study presents new empirical data on a wide range of global affairs that affect the quality of life of Latin Americans and collects information on general perceptions and attitudes towards foreign policy and the world (rather than a narrow focus on the impact of current events) that constitute the cognitive, affective, and normative lens through which Latin Americans perceive the international environment and evaluate foreign policy. One of the characteristics that distinguishes *The Americas and the World* from other research on public opinion and foreign policy is its comparative focus, permitting simultaneous comparisons and cross tabulations at four distinct levels: *sub-national*, across geographic region; *national*, by economic status and socio-demographic variables; *international*, between the populations of different countries; and *longitudinal*, across survey editions.

The survey comprises 13 subject areas: *Interest, Contact, Knowledge, Identity, Political Culture, Foreign*

*Policy and Government Efficacy, Confidence and Security, International Economy, Migration, Rules of the International Game and International Organizations, Latin America, the United States, and Other Regions and Countries of the World*. National questionnaires also contain individual sections on matters of interest for each country. To analyze and interpret results comprehensively and systematically, the survey design uses a distinct conceptual framework to determine the degree of openness to the world and the structure of social preferences that shape international engagement.

*The Americas and the World* aims to be of use for a wide and diverse audience: decision-makers in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and the rest of Latin America at the public, private, social, and international level, as well as academic institutions, researchers, and students in the social sciences on the American continent and throughout the rest of the world. It is our hope that this project serves as a key instrument in the formulation and exercise of strategic decisions, public policies, and good governance, and contributes to academic research and social communication in a fast moving and globalized world.

As a final note, we do not claim this report to be representative of all Latin American countries. Neither does it include all of the information collected in the five Latin American countries surveyed. Rather, we intend to present and analyze the principal results of the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* with the purpose of comparing, in general terms, the values and political preferences of the Brazilian, Colombian, Ecuadorian, Mexican, and Peruvian populations with respect to the international actions of each country.

The complete information and disaggregated data on the questions included in the surveys for Brazil (54 thematic questions and 21 socio-demographic), Colombia (107 thematic and 21 socio-demographic), Ecuador (122 thematic and 25 socio-demographic), Mexico (103 thematic questions and 26 socio-demographic) and Peru (83 thematic questions and 26 socio-demographic) and the five data bases for these countries, in SPSS format, may be consulted free of charge at <http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu> •



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**T**he principal findings from the second Latin American edition of the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* can be summarized in 10 key trends that highlight the international political culture of the countries surveyed and map out the priorities of and how and where Latin Americans see themselves in relation to the world.

1. ***Latin Americans are proud of their identity, but reluctant to embrace other countries in the region.*** Citizens in the region are proud Latin Americans and view the region with optimism. However, Latin American identity is largely abstract and symbolic, lacking a sense of solidarity or concrete interests. Latin Americans are wary of binding commitments in the region. When it comes to assuming costs that imply greater unity and regional cooperation—particularly those of a material nature—Latin Americans are reluctant to participate. Actions such as investing resources, coordinating responses to defend common interests, or sharing sovereignty with other countries in the region receive little support. Neighboring countries are viewed less positively than other countries, making it difficult for mechanisms of regional integration to foster a sense of regional belonging and identity.

2. ***The countries with the greatest capacity for leadership have a “deficit of attention” and knowledge of international affairs.*** Brazil and Mexico—mid-level powers in the international system—are less knowledgeable and interested in participating in international affairs than countries with less capacity to do so, such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Citizens in Brazil and Mexico have little knowledge of multilateral institutions and international actors, and for distinct reasons, are more focused on internal affairs. Brazil’s lack of interest in international affairs might be explained by the surging national mood of the *o maior país do mundo*, while Mexicans’ disinterest might be related to the country’s crisis of internal security. On the other hand, Colombians stand out as the population with the highest level of interest in international affairs and the most knowledge of multilateral institutions and international actors.

3. ***Latin Americans favor opening their economies to international trade and investment.*** In spite of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, Latin Americans widely support free trade, view foreign investment as advantageous, and consider globalization as more positive than negative.



Considering the wide range of economic policies and strategies for development in the region, there is a broad consensus among Latin Americans of varying socio-economic levels that the benefits of an open economy are far greater than the potential costs, especially in countries with high levels of economic growth such as Peru and Brazil.

4. ***In Latin America, international affairs are perceived through the perspective of distinct local contexts.*** Both international threats and foreign policy priorities are viewed through a local lens, with emphasis on those issues most likely to affect individuals and their communities. This perception of the world is based on a utilitarian and material rationality rather than the normative logic of international solidarity. How citizens view the state of their country influences how citizens view the world and interpret international events: in Brazil this translates into optimism; in Colombia, into openness; in Ecuador, into caution; in Mexico, into pessimism; and in Peru, into opportunity.
5. ***Latin Americans have sent a clear mandate for their foreign ministers to pursue a foreign policy geared toward resolving local problems.*** There is wide agreement among Latin Americans regarding priorities for foreign policy. Latin Americans consider that foreign policy should serve as an instrument to resolve problems of internal security, promote social and economic welfare, fight global warming and boost development and economic growth. In Mexico, foreign policy is seen as a way to promote the nation's prestige and improve its image through the promotion of cultural exchange, while in Ecuador, protecting territorial and maritime boundaries is seen as a primary objective of foreign policy.
6. ***Latin Americans want their countries to participate actively in international affairs using "soft" rather than "hard" power.*** There

is a clear consensus in the countries surveyed to use cultural ties, commerce, and diplomacy, rather than military power, to extend their influence in the world. Latin Americans' rejection of the use of military force does not stem from a poor image of the military; on the contrary, the armed forces are among the most trusted national institutions, leaving behind stigmas from the era of Latin American dictatorships: the army is no longer seen as the enemy of civil society, or to pose a threat by seizing power in the name of "protecting" democracy.

7. ***Latin American countries are divided by two visions of the world: one based in the American Continent, and another defined by more global aspirations.*** While some countries consider that their principal partners and interests are based in the American continent, others look toward alliances and opportunities outside of the region. For Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, visions of the world are limited almost exclusively to the American continent—the focus of their international aspirations and global participation. On the other hand, Brazil and Peru maintain a more global vision of their interests in the world, encompassing other regions and Asia in particular as a new engine of global economic growth. The visions of Brazil and Peru demonstrate a greater capacity for understanding and adapting to the dynamism of the international system than countries whose visions are anchored in the continent.
8. ***Latin Americans recognize Brazil as the undisputed regional leader, while Mexican leadership has faded.*** Brazil enjoys a positive image and is viewed with wide approval by Latin Americans, for whom Brazil's growing international influence and capacity for leadership is undisputed. While a considerable percentage of Brazilians believe that their country should seek to be the region's leader, Mexico is no longer



viewed as a potential leader by the other populations surveyed, nor do Mexicans themselves show interest in acting as a regional leader (a very small number of Latin Americans identify Mexico as a regional leader, while Mexico is less popular among respondents than Brazil). Unlike other countries with intentions of leadership, such as Venezuela (which is viewed less positively by Latin Americans) Mexico is one of the most favorably evaluated Latin American countries. However, due to its close relationship with the United States and preoccupation with internal crises, Mexico is viewed as more distant from the region.

9. ***Latin Americans favor an “American” model of regional integration.*** The actions, scope, and limits of Latin American integration are well defined in the public opinion of the five countries. Free markets and expanded infrastructure are priorities for integration, with the goal of linking countries throughout the region and promoting the free circulation of goods, services, and investment. On the other hand,

Latin Americans reject social and institutional steps toward integration: Latin Americans are opposed to the free movement of persons, the creation of a common currency, and the establishment of supranational institutions, such as a Latin American parliament or regional army.

10. ***On the topic of migration there is a double standard: universal rights for emigrants but limited rights for immigrants.*** In the past few decades, the massive flow of migrants has impacted the region politically, economically, and socially. While in Brazil the impact of emigration and immigration has been less visible, in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, the benefits and potential consequences of emigration have consistently formed part of the public debate. However, while these countries demand equal rights for their emigrants in other countries, many of them are not as receptive toward immigrants in their own countries. There are reservations in all countries towards the integration of immigrants as members of society with full rights, and especially in Ecuador •







## SUMMARY OF 2010-2011 TRENDS AND RESULTS

### *Contact, Knowledge, and Interest in the World*

- **Latin Americans have little direct contact with the world.** Eighty eight percent of Brazilians, 79% of Peruvians, 75% of Mexicans, and 74% of Ecuadorians and Colombians have never travelled outside of their country. The great majority of the population in Mexico (81%), Peru (77%), Ecuador (76%), and Colombia (75%) has no direct contact with foreigners living in their country. Finally, few Latin Americans speak a foreign language: 94% of Brazilians, 93% of Ecuadorians, 90% of Colombians, 88% of Mexicans, and 86% of Peruvians do not speak a foreign language.
- **Latin Americans' principal contact with the world is indirect, through transnational networks of migrants.** With the exception of Brazil, where only 12% report having a relative living outside of the country, around half of the population in Ecuador (58%), Mexico (52%), Peru (49%), and Colombia (45%) have relatives living outside of the country. The flow of remittances is almost non-existent in Brazil (1% report receiving remittances). However, remittances are a regular and important source of family income in the rest of the countries (Ecuador 36%, Colombia 20%, Peru 13%, Mexico 12%).
- **There are large gaps among Latin Americans in access to the Internet.** While the use of the Internet has become an increasingly important tool for interacting with other citizens of the world, there are large gaps in access to the Internet in the region: 44% of Colombians, 39% of Peruvians, 31% of Brazilians, 26% of Mexicans, and 21% of Ecuadorians have access to the Internet. Brazilians' limited Internet use is consistent with their overall isolation.
- **Latin Americans are just as interested in world affairs as they are in events in their own countries, although some publics show a greater level of interest than others.** Latin Americans have a medium level of interest in international affairs: on average, 64.8% of the population in all five countries are interested in international news while a third shows little or no interest. Nevertheless, small countries show a higher level of interest than larger ones: Colombians show the highest level of interest (82%), followed by Ecuadorians (68%), and Peruvians (62%), while Brazilians and Mexicans show less interest (56% in both cases).
- **Latin Americans have a low level of knowledge of other countries, international institutions, and actors.** Although majorities are interested in



following world affairs, knowledge of international affairs is quite low. In these countries, the average level of unfamiliarity with the Organization of American States is 58%, of the Euro, 49%, of FIFA, 48%, and of the UN, 45%. These levels of unfamiliarity rise when Latin Americans are asked to name their foreign minister or government official in charge of international affairs: 86% of the public in the five countries surveyed are unable to state the name of their foreign ministers, and 82% cannot identify the initials of their foreign ministry. The average national unfamiliarity in the five countries is 40% for heads of state, 33% for international organizations, and 20% for other countries in general. Brazil and Peru are the least informed countries, and Colombia, the most.

### ***Nationalism and Identity***

- **Latin Americans have a strong sense of national identity and pride.** Latin Americans identify more strongly with national identities (Mexican, Colombian, etc.) than regional or local identities (such as their community of origin), and large majorities express pride in their nationality. In Ecuador, 82% identify primarily as Ecuadorian, and 97% are proud to be Ecuadorian. In Peru, the level of national identity and pride is, respectively, 74% and 93%; in Colombia, 61% and 94%, and in Mexico, 62% and 94%.
- **After 200 years of independence, Latin Americans show a medium level of satisfaction with the accomplishments of their country.** On average, 61% of Latin Americans surveyed are satisfied with their government's performance in economic policy. However, satisfaction is greater in Colombia (70%) and Peru (62%) than in Ecuador (58%) and Mexico (54%). With respect to independence in international relations, the average level of satisfaction is 57%, with Mexicans the most satisfied (65%) and Ecuadorians the least (52%). Approval of government performance declines notably with respect to matters of social equality (52%), and peace and

internal security: 47% –14 percentage points less compared to economic policy. On average, Colombians are the most satisfied with their nation's progress (58%), followed by Mexicans (55%), Ecuadorians (53%), and Peruvians (52%).

- **Majorities identify as *Latin American*, rather than *North*, *Central*, or *South American*, or *Andean*.** In spite of the intense economic activity and social interaction with the countries that are geographically closest, the publics surveyed identify primarily as *Latin American*: 51% in Mexico, 49% in Colombia, 41% in Ecuador, and 34% in Peru. The percentage of the population that identifies with a given sub-region is much smaller: 3% in Colombia identify as either *Andean* or *Bolivarian*, 2% in Ecuador identify either as *Andean* or *Bolivarian*, while 7% in Mexico identify as *North American*, and 7% *Central American*. The international identity of Peruvians is more fragmented: one third identify as *Latin American*, one fourth as *Andean*, and one of every five as *South American*.

### ***Latin America***

- **Latin Americans view the world situation with pessimism and concern, but see their own region as a strategic priority and an area of opportunity.** While for Mexicans (68%), Ecuadorians (54%), Colombians (51%) and Peruvians (48%) the world situation today is worse compared to the past ten years (only Brazilians view it as better, with 53%), Latin America is viewed with optimism, although to differing degrees. According to the survey, 70% of the population of Brazil, 59% in Peru, 53% in Ecuador, 50% in Colombia, and 40% in Mexico believe that the region has improved compared to the past ten years, and in the same order, 68%, 58%, 47%, 55%, and 46% believe the region will continue to improve in the decade to come.
- **Larger countries are less interested and informed with respect to world affairs, and less willing to participate.** Brazil and Mexico are the least inter-



ested and informed with respect to world affairs (41% and 42%, respectively, have little or no interest in international affairs), and have a poor level of knowledge of international actors and organizations. Eighty-two percent of Brazilians do not know who is Chief of Government in Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, (in Colombia, only 26% of those surveyed are unable to correctly identify Zapatero), while 77% of Mexicans are unable to identify the initials of the OAS (compared to only 37% of Colombians). Brazilians and Mexicans are also less willing to participate in world affairs than citizens in the Andean countries. Seventy-nine percent of Colombians and 76% of Peruvians believe their country should participate actively in world affairs, a difference of 10 and 11 percentage points above Brazil and Mexico, respectively, while 22% of Mexicans and 18% of Brazilians believe their country should stand aside from world affairs.

- **Brazil is the undisputed regional leader.** In spite of its greater isolation and low levels of interest in international affairs, Brazil is perceived as the region's undisputed leader: 49% of Brazilians believe that their country should seek to be the region's leader, compared to lower percentages of Colombians (43%), Peruvians (41%), Mexicans (35%), and Ecuadorians (21%) who believe their country should seek to be the region's leader. Additionally, Brazil's recent economic success seems to have played a part in other countries' positive perceptions of Brazil. Brazil is the highest-evaluated Latin American country, averaging 64 points (on a scale of 0 to 100) in the other four countries, a score that places it within range of developed countries such as the United States, Spain, Canada, and Japan, which are the countries Latin Americans evaluate most highly.
- **Some countries' priorities are anchored in the American continent, while others have more global aspirations.** For Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, the American continent ranks as the

highest strategic priority. Sixty-five percent of Mexicans (36% rate North America and 29% rate Latin America as the most important strategic priority), 63% of Ecuadorians (18% North America and 45% Latin America) and 62% of Colombians (18% North America and 44% Latin America) consider their most important strategic priorities to lie in the Americas. Europe is seen as a priority for only 15% in Colombia, 12% in Mexico, and 10% in Ecuador. On the other hand, the two countries with the most successful economies in the past few years—Brazil and Peru—have a more global vision, in which the importance assigned to the continent is reduced to 36% and 37%, respectively. Europe ranks as a strategic priority for 22% of Peruvians and 11% of Brazilians, while Brazilians assign a similar level of priority to Africa and the Middle East (around 10% for each). Asia, the region that has driven global economic growth in the past few years, is a priority for 10% of Brazilians and 12% of Peruvians, in contrast to the low level of attention of countries anchored in the American continent (between 3% and 4%).

- **Latin Americans support economic integration and infrastructure projects to connect the region, but are opposed to political and social integration.** On average, 84% of Latin Americans in the countries surveyed support the construction of roads, highways, and bridges to connect the region (compared to 12% who are opposed); 78% support the free circulation of investments (with 14% opposed); 75%, the free flow of goods and services within the region (with 15% opposed), and 60%, the creation of a Latin American parliament (with 29% opposed). However, support for regional integration is limited to goods and investment, as 41% reject the creation of a common currency (compared to 50% who are in favor); 51% reject the free flow of persons without border controls (with 43% in favor) and another 51% reject the creation of a Latin American army (with 40% in support).



## *Foreign Policy*

- **How Latin Americans perceive their national situation influences their perception of the world.** Brazilians view both the world and Latin America with optimism: 53% believe the world has improved over the past decade and 70% believe the same with respect to Latin America. Brazilians' optimism contrasts with Mexicans' pessimism. In Mexico, only 20% consider that the world is better off and only 40% believe the same with respect to Latin America. After years of isolation and internal conflict, Colombians view both the region and the world with great optimism and believe that their country's importance on the world stage has grown. While 81% in Colombia, 79% in Brazil, 75% in Peru, and 74% in Ecuador consider that their country has gained importance in the last decade, in Mexico a smaller percentage (64%) share this optimistic outlook with respect to the trajectory of their country.
- **Commitment to multilateralism is inconsistent and selective.** The UN is highly esteemed by Latin Americans, with an average of 54% expressing trust rather than distrust in the UN for the publics surveyed. The UN is also the most favorably evaluated international organism, with an average evaluation of 67 points, and is also the most widely known (only 18% are unable to identify its initials). However, majorities in Mexico (51%), Ecuador (49%), and Peru (43%) are not willing to accept and abide by UN decisions they do not agree with. In Colombia opinion is divided (43% in favor and 42% against), and only in Brazil is a majority (50%) willing to accept UN decisions perceived as unfavorable (compared to 33% of Brazilians who are not). Nevertheless, there are some areas where international cooperation is possible: 63% of Colombians and 56% of Peruvians and Brazilians are willing to recognize the jurisdiction of international courts over nationals accused of committing crimes against humanity. International jurisdiction is rejected in Ecuador

(53%) and Mexico (47% vs. 41% in favor and 8% who responded "it depends"). However, a majority of Latin Americans are willing to contribute troops to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions: 67% in Peru, 59% in Mexico, and 58% in Colombia and Ecuador are in favor of sending troops to participate in UN Peacekeeping Missions.

- **Latin Americans agree on international threats and foreign policy objectives, as well as the instruments favored to achieve them.** Latin Americans perceive threats and define objectives through an individual or local lens. The threats perceived as most immediate are drug trafficking and organized crime (82% on average consider it a grave threat), global warming (81%), global poverty (80%) and the scarcity and price of food (78%). With respect to foreign policy objectives, Latin Americans send a clear mandate to their foreign ministries for a foreign policy based more on utilitarian than normative principles. In descending order, the most important objectives of foreign policy are protecting the environment (75% on average identify it as a very important objective of foreign policy), fighting drug trafficking (72%), protecting the interests of nationals in foreign countries and protecting territorial and maritime borders (both 67%), promoting the sale of national products abroad (66%), and attracting foreign investment (63%). Additionally, Latin Americans prefer the instruments of "soft" power over "hard" power. Using both commercial ties and the promotion of culture to achieve foreign policy objectives garners the support of the highest percentage of Latin Americans (90% on average), followed by diplomacy (82%), and finally, supported by a much lower percentage, military force (47%).

## *Civic Culture and Confidence in Institutions*

- **Support for democracy is steadfast, but participation and respect for the law are low.** Ninety percent of those surveyed in Colombia, 87% in Mexico, 81% in Peru, and 80% in Ecuador believe





that democracy is the best form of government, in spite of its problems. This contrasts with the low levels of participation and respect for the law in these countries: 65% of Colombians, 52% of Mexicans, 51% of Ecuadorians, and 42% of Peruvians consider that citizens have the right to disobey laws perceived as unjust. Additionally, community activism and participation is low: large majorities in Colombia (79%), Mexico (68%), Ecuador (63%), and Peru (60%) have contributed neither time nor money towards the resolution of problems in their community over the last year.

- **The army is viewed with prestige and legitimacy, in contrast to Latin Americans' distrust of politicians and the police.** Wide majorities in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru (60% on average) express greater trust in the army than in any other institution, group, or person. In contrast, police (with an average trust of 35%) and especially politicians (15%) are viewed with distrust. Colombia is the country with the most confidence in its institutions, with an average of 56% of trust, followed by Ecuador (46%), Mexico (43%), and Peru (33%).
- **Countries with popular leaders receive higher marks on public policy.** Majorities in Ecuador (74%), Brazil (71%), Colombia (61%), Mexico (50%), and Peru (49%) have, on balance, a more positive than negative evaluation of the public policies of their governments. Education policy and economic policy (66% for each) are the best evaluated, while foreign policy ranks second (64%).

### *Attitudes toward Globalization*

- **Latin Americans enthusiastically support globalization, free trade, and foreign investment.** Latin Americans believe that in general, globalization is more positive than negative. Brazil (73%) and Peru (63%), the two countries with the highest performing economies in the region in the past few years, evaluate globalization much more positively

than Colombia (45%), Ecuador (45%), and Mexico (43%). Wide majorities believe that foreign investment is positive for their countries (85% in Brazil, 83% in Colombia, 79% in Mexico, 78% in Peru, and 76% in Ecuador). In general, Latin Americans consider that the effects of free trade are more beneficial than detrimental, although the degree of support depends on country and sector. On average, citizens in the five countries consider free trade to be beneficial for the economies of developed nations (74%), their own economy (62%), workers (60%), living standards (58%), national corporations (57%), agriculture and farmers (53%), and the environment (46%).

- **Latin Americans are open to the ideas and customs of other countries.** The majority of Peruvians (57%), Brazilians (55%), Mexicans (50%), Colombians (48%), and Ecuadorians (43%) consider the diffusion of foreign ideas and customs in their countries to be positive. Ecuadorians are the only country less open to foreign customs and ideas: 34% believe that the spread of foreign cultures and ideas is negative, higher than any other country.

### *Attitudes toward Immigration and Preferences of Immigration Policy*

- **Migration has different impacts in distinct Latin American countries.** Emigration has an important economic, political, and social impact in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, but is less visible in Brazil. Around half of the population in Ecuador (58%), Mexico (52%), Peru (49%) and Colombia (45%) has a relative living in another country, while only 12% of Brazilians reported a family member living abroad. Thirty-six percent of the population in Ecuador, 20% in Colombia, 13% in Peru, and 12% in Mexico receive remittances, while few Brazilians report receiving remittances (1%).
- **Destinations for emigration vary in each country.** The concentration of emigrants in receiving countries is different for each Latin American



country. According to the Emigration Diversity Index, which measures the average number of countries that Latin Americans emigrate to, the EDI in Peru is 5.5; in Colombia, 5.1; in Ecuador, 2.7, and in Mexico, 1.1 (with emigration principally concentrated in the United States).

- **Emigration generates more benefits than costs.** Emigration is viewed as more positive than negative by “those who stay”. On average, citizens believe that emigration is beneficial for the families they leave behind (51% versus 33% that consider it detrimental), for the destination country (49% versus 28%), for their country of origin (43% versus 39%), and their communities of origin (42% versus 36%).
- **Opinion towards immigration is ambivalent.** Though the majority of Latin Americans (an average of 77% in the countries surveyed) have no daily contact with foreigners living in their country, opinion of foreigners is positive in Peru (71% positive), Mexico (63%), Colombia (57%), and Ecuador (49%). Nevertheless, Latin Americans are resistant to granting full rights both to nationalized foreigners and immigrants in general. Wide majorities oppose allowing a naturalized foreigner to run for president (82% on average), representative or senator (75%), although they are open to allowing a nationalized foreigner represent the country as a member of the national soccer team (59%). Latin Americans are willing to grant immigrants certain rights, but not in the same proportion as they demand for their own citizens living abroad. On average, 97% believe that their own citizens living in other countries should have access to healthcare, 95%, both the right to attend public schools and seek employment under equal conditions, 93%, to form civic or political associations, 86%, to bring their families with them, and 83%, the right to vote. However, the disposition to grant immigrants the same rights is less: 92% approve of granting immigrants access to healthcare; 90%, the right to attend public schools; 83%, the right

to seek employment under the same conditions as nationals; 78%, the right to form civic or political associations; 80%, the right to family reunification; and 65%, the right to vote.

### *Relations with the United States*

- **Some countries prefer a special bilateral relationship with the United States.** The majority of Colombians (54%), Mexicans (49%), and Ecuadorians (40%) prefer a special relationship with the United States to coordinating with other Latin American countries to defend common interests against the United States. The exception is Peru, where 41% prefer to coordinate interests with other countries in the region over deepening bilateral relations with the United States.
- **Opinion towards the United States is conflicted.** The United States is the most highly evaluated country by Latin Americans, averaging 66 points across the five countries and ranking first, second, or third in the evaluations of individual countries. Colombians, Mexicans, and Ecuadorians seem to favor deepening ties with the United States more than other countries, although opinion over whether the U.S. can be trusted is different in each country. The U.S. is more trusted and admired in Colombia (54% “trust” and 56% “admiration”) and Ecuador (51% and 58%, respectively) than in Mexico, where a plurality (45%) reports *distrust* towards the U.S., although 42% express admiration.
- **Latin Americans favor greater cooperation with the United States, but are opposed to certain conditions of aid.** Majorities in Colombia (74%), Ecuador (72%), Peru (63%), and Mexico (54%) are in favor of receiving financial assistance from the U.S. to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. However, this support falls when aid is conditioned on the United States’ supervision of resources, and especially, sending U.S. agents to operate within national territory. Among respon-



dents who said they favored receiving financial assistance from the U.S., support drops if the U.S. demands to supervise the distribution of resources: 19% in Colombia, 30% in Mexico, 40% in Peru, and 42% in Ecuador would be opposed. Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia are more opposed than Mexico to accepting U.S. agents, with levels of opposition at 49% in Ecuador and Peru, 47% in Colombia, and 26% in Mexico.

### *Opinion toward Other Countries and Regions*

- **Latin Americans have a positive impression of Spain.** With its historic cultural and social ties to Latin America, Spain is highly evaluated by the five countries surveyed (62 points on average). In addition, feelings of trust (60%) and admiration (55%) are higher than those expressed towards the United States. The majority of the population in

Ecuador (62%), Colombia and Peru (61% in each country) and Mexico (52%) consider that relations with Spain have improved over the past decade.

- **Latin Americans view the growing role of China in the world without apprehension.** China is among the most favorably evaluated countries by the populations surveyed (an average of 58 points) and the rise of China as a world power is viewed as one of the least grave threats. In each of the countries surveyed, the rise of China is ranked last out of a list of ten possible threats and only 35%, on average, in the five countries surveyed believes that the emergence of China as a world power is a “grave” threat. China’s economic growth is not cause for concern in any of the countries surveyed, as majorities in Brazil (52%), Peru (49%), Ecuador (45%), Mexico (40%), and Colombia (35%) view China’s economic growth positively •







## INTRODUCTION

In Latin America and the world, the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been marked by strong transformations and profound reflections. Over the biennial period of 2010-2011, Latin America has faced several challenges, from the slow pace of recovery in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 to natural disasters and political changes in some of the countries of the region. These transformations have reshaped a region that no longer sees itself—and that defies definition from the outside—as a single, homogenous entity. Latin America today is more plural and diverse, having emerged from a long period of economic growth and democratic consolidation with various blueprints for development—from Bolivarian Socialism to economic liberalism. However, changes in the region go beyond the scope of domestic politics. In the past two years, Latin America has played a role of increasing importance among the world's emerging economies and societies—each demanding a greater voice in the direction of world affairs.

The five countries included in the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* provide a closer look at the distinct challenges in the region during this crucial period in world history. With the economic crisis and political polarization in the United States, as well as the European Union's financial troubles,

world attention has focused on new political and economic actors, led by China, India, and Brazil. Latin American countries that have pursued closer ties with the dynamic economies of Asia—as in the case of Brazil and Peru—have emerged from the global recession with high rates of economic growth. On the other hand, Latin American economies coupled to the United States—such as Mexico and Colombia—have seen sluggish growth, while facing limited options for the expansion of trade.

The countries of the region have responded to these changing scenarios according to their interests and national contexts. Some have pursued a more assertive diplomacy, exploring new alliances and markets in Latin America and beyond. Others have continued to promote free trade and the free movement of investment across the region, and yet others have pushed for regional integration and economic liberalization within their respective sub-regions. Some have turned towards Asia as a new strategic opportunity; others have opted to strengthen traditional ties to the United States and Europe. Still, other countries, weighed down by internal crises, have maintained the global community at arm's length while focusing on resolving local problems. In a climate of significant changes to the international order, Brazil has increased its international presence



both within Latin America and outside the region, positioning itself as Latin America's link with the BRICS group of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and the principal promoter of South-South cooperation (between the economies of the global south, such as India, Asia, and South Africa) and of South American integration. Other countries with a certain degree of regional weight and international presence, such as Mexico and Venezuela, have followed less consistent strategies that have prevented them from assuming a position of greater leadership within the region.

The five countries where the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* was carried out (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru) allow us to observe the opinions and reactions of citizens to important global and regional transformations, as well as changes in each country. These five countries represent distinct realities of Latin America: they vary in the size of their economies, populations, and in their comparative geostrategic advantages; they present unique cultures and confront distinct social issues; they bear the cultural legacies of Spanish and Portuguese colonization, as well as the experience of two centuries of independence; and they represent a broad range of the political spectrum, from the liberal right to the socialist tide of Bolivarian nationalism and the pragmatic left.

The five countries surveyed represent more than half of the total population of Latin America and almost two thirds of the region's economy, lending significant weight to our results. Of the five countries, Brazil and Mexico stand out as potential leaders of the region, while Ecuador represents an economy of a significantly smaller size, and Colombia and Peru fall into an intermediate range. This group of five countries also allows us to make comparisons across three of the principal sub-regions of Latin America: Mexico in the extreme north; Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in the Andean region; while the Latin American giant of Portuguese ancestry –Brazil– shares borders with three principal regions of Latin America: the Caribbean, the Andean region, and the Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay,

and Chile). The Table of Basic Indicators presented below provides a general map to some of the economic, demographic, and social differences among the five countries surveyed. The accompanying graph displays the socio-demographic composition of the population surveyed in each of the countries.

There are both important similarities and differences between the countries surveyed regarding the political context in which foreign policy is made. In Mexico and Colombia, the political spectrum tilts center-right, with government policy firmly grounded in economic liberalism –in spite of the weakness of the Mexican economy following the economic crisis and the sluggish pace of recovery in the United States. Both Mexico and Colombia have made internal security their top priority, although with differing results. In spite of several consecutive years of economic growth in Peru exceeding 5%, there is a general sense of disillusionment and frustration with the political class, leading to the polarized presidential campaign of 2010 and the election as president of the formerly controversial leftist candidate Ollanta Humala. In recent years, Ecuador has adopted closer ties with the Bolivarian bloc promoted by Venezuela as a response to the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus (Ecuador became a member of ALBA in 2009). However, the crisis in Europe has affected economic growth. In spite of the popularity of Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa, Ecuador has also faced instances of political instability. On the other hand, Brazil's mix of market-friendly policies and emphasis on social programs has entered a new phase with the replacement of its principal architect– former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva –with newly elected president Dilma Rousseff. Under Rousseff, Brazil has maintained its strong commercial links with Asia and the global south, while continuing its forward march as the undisputed economic and political leader of the region.

In spite of their differences, the countries of Latin America face common challenges. The historical weakness of governments throughout the region has produced a common legacy of socio-economic marginalization and corruption when compared wi-



# THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD 2010-2011

| Basic Indicators                                            |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                                                             | Brazil            | Colombia          | Ecuador           | Mexico            | Peru              |
| Population (est.) <sup>a</sup>                              | 195,497,620       | 46,299,052        | 13,773,140        | 110,675,207       | 29,495,252        |
| Territory (Km <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>a</sup>                   | 8,514,880         | 1,141,750         | 256,370           | 1,964,380         | 1,285,220         |
| Annual growth rate <sup>c</sup>                             | 7.5%              | 4.3%              | 3.2%              | 5.5%              | 8.8%              |
| Average growth rate (2001-2010) <sup>b</sup>                | 3.61%             | 4.11%             | 4.63%             | 1.86%             | 5.72%             |
| GDP (thousands USD, current) <sup>b</sup>                   | \$2,087,889,554   | \$288,188,989     | \$58,910,000      | \$1,039,661,516   | \$153,844,937     |
| GDP (thousands USD, PPP) <sup>b</sup>                       | \$2,169,180,489   | \$434,787,542     | \$117,240,544     | \$1,652,167,575   | \$275,354,732     |
| GDP per capita (USD, current) <sup>b</sup>                  | \$10,710          | \$6,224           | \$4,277           | \$9,580           | \$5,216           |
| GDP per capita (USD, PPP) <sup>b</sup>                      | \$11,127          | \$9,391           | \$8,511           | \$15,224          | \$9,335           |
| Share of world Exports <sup>d</sup>                         | 1.22%             | 0.26%             | 0.11%             | 1.83%             | 0.21%             |
| Share of world Imports <sup>d</sup>                         | 1.05%             | 0.26%             | 0.12%             | 1.90%             | 0.17%             |
| Trade as GDP proportion (2007-2009) <sup>d</sup>            | 24.8%             | 34.4%             | 66.5%             | 58.2%             | 49.0%             |
| Trade liberalization (exports/GDP) <sup>d</sup>             | 11%               | 16%               | 37%               | 28%               | 24%               |
| Total Exports<br>(% Manufactures) <sup>d</sup>              | 38.0%             | 27.4%             | 8.5%              | 75.1%             | 12.2%             |
| Total Exports<br>(% Agriculture) <sup>d</sup>               | 37.7%             | 18.2%             | 39.7%             | 6.8%              | 18.1%             |
| Total Exports<br>(% Mining and energetics) <sup>d</sup>     | 21.3%             | 49.6%             | 50.9%             | 15.8%             | 44.1%             |
| Exports to the United States<br>(% of total) <sup>d</sup>   | 10.3%             | 39.9%             | 33.4%             | 80.7%             | 17.2%             |
| Imports from the United States<br>(% of total) <sup>d</sup> | 15.8%             | 28.9%             | 16.5%             | 48.1%             | 19.8%             |
| GINI inequality Index<br>(most recent year) <sup>b</sup>    | 0.54<br>(2009)    | 0.58<br>(2006)    | 0.49<br>(2009)    | 0.52<br>(2008)    | 0.48<br>(2009)    |
| Human Development Index (position) <sup>e</sup>             | 0.699<br>(73/169) | 0.689<br>(79/169) | 0.695<br>(77/169) | 0.750<br>(56/169) | 0.723<br>(63/169) |
| Public expenditure in education<br>(% of GDP) <sup>b</sup>  | 5.08%<br>(2007)   | 4.81%<br>(2009)   | 0.98%<br>(2001)   | 4.81%<br>(2007)   | 2.68%<br>(2008)   |
| Public expenditure in health<br>(% of GDP) <sup>f</sup>     | 4.13%             | 5.40%             | 2.94%             | 3.12%             | 2.71%             |
| Migration rate<br>(per thousand / 2005-2010) <sup>a</sup>   | -0.2              | -0.5              | -5.2              | -3.9              | -4.4              |
| Global Presence Index<br>(position) <sup>g</sup>            | 58.1<br>(25/54)   | 18.8<br>(44/54)   | NA                | 71.5<br>(20/54)   | NA                |
| Failed States Index<br>(position) <sup>h</sup>              | 65.1<br>(123/177) | 87.0<br>(44/177)  | 82.2<br>(62/177)  | 75.1<br>(94/177)  | 73.6<br>(99/177)  |
| Military expenditure (millions USD) <sup>i</sup>            | \$ 25,704         | \$ 8,569          | \$ 1,915          | \$ 4,762          | \$ 1,712          |
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) <sup>i</sup>                | 1.60%             | 3.70%             | 3.40%             | 0.50%             | 1.40%             |

## Sources

- a. CEPAL (data of 2010).
- b. Word Bank (data of 2010).
- c. International Monetary Fund (data of 2010).
- d. World Trade Organization (data of 2009).
- e. UNPD (data of 2010).
- f. World Bank (data of 2009).
- g. Real Instituto Elcano, *Global Presence Index* (Results of 2010).
- h. Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index* (Results of 2011).
- i. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (data of 2009).



### Sociodemographic Profile of Surveyed Population





th more developed countries. The increased pace of production, commercialization, and expansion of the drug trade has had violent repercussions throughout Latin America, from the coca-producing fields in Peru and the narco-guerillas that operate in Colombia to the war on drug trafficking and organized crime that has left thousands dead in Mexico, and back to Brazil, where turf wars among rival drug trafficking organizations fuel further violence in the *favelas*. It would seem that attempts to combat drug trafficking and organized crime have only increased violence, with mass kidnappings of migrants and the targeting of members of the media, police force, and local government. In spite of the global economic downturn, the migration of Latin Americans to other countries has continued to define a region where each year hundreds of thousands of persons leave in search of better opportunities. Finally, the countries of Latin America continue to confront serious problems of poverty, inequality, and insecurity in the job market. Latin America also faces the challenge of improving international competitiveness and achieving sustainable growth on a broader foundation than the region's traditional comparative advantage as a provider of agricultural products and raw materials. The following section will explore in greater detail the global and national events that form the context in which the survey data was collected in the five countries mentioned, between the second semester of 2010 and the first semester of 2011.

### *A Changing World Order*

The biennial period of 2010-2011 has been considered by various analysts as a time of profound global transformation, with both regional challenges and changes in the traditional map of world powers. In January of 2010 Latin America was absorbed by the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti. Reconstruction in that country had hardly begun when a second earthquake hit Chile, arriving as an economic blow to the region but generating goodwill both among Chile's Latin American neighbors and other regions of the world.

The humanitarian role of the United States, combined with the visible change in the tone and emphasis of the foreign policy of the Obama administration—including his attempts to bridge the gap with the Arab world, the withdrawal of combat troops in Iraq, the awarding of the Nobel peace prize to Barack Obama in 2009, and visible progress towards nuclear disarmament with Russia—helped to improve the image of the U.S. in the world significantly. While recovery in the United States was sluggish, the dynamism of emerging markets seemed to lift the world out of the global recession of the previous year. The economic recovery in the United States and Europe suffered severe setbacks over the course of 2010; the disaster of the explosion of the *Deepwater Horizon* oil platform in the Gulf heightened uncertainty in oil markets and stained the image of both British Petroleum (owner of the leaky rig) and the United States. In November of 2010, the web site *Wikileaks* revealed thousands of confidential diplomatic cables, many with embarrassing revelations about the foreign policy, military strategy, and internal functioning of the government of the United States, the effects of which continue to reverberate. At the same time, the midterm elections of 2010 capped a climate of polarization in the United States and marked the reverse of president Obama's political capital with the arrival of a new generation of Republican legislators from the party's most conservative sector.

The economy of Europe was dealt a blow at the beginning of the year when a powerful volcano in Iceland led to closure of airspace across the continent. This same region would confront greater challenges as a result of the debt crisis beginning in the middle of 2010. The financial crisis in Greece forced a rescue of the Eurozone and exacerbated the risk of a new global economic crisis provoked by the collapse of other vulnerable economies, such as Ireland (which would also end up being rescued by the end of the year), Portugal, and Spain, with its large economic presence throughout Latin America. Similar crisis occurred in Asia, with the fall from power of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan—which had led the island nation for more than 50 years—as a conse-





quence of persistent economic problems. Economic discontent led to the rise of new governments in England, Australia, and other countries, generating a global environment of profound and rapid change, forcing the countries of Latin America to respond according to their own preferences, capabilities, and expectations.

### *Diverse National Contexts*

The period of 2010 and 2011 in Brazil was characterized by a substantial increase in the country's importance at the world stage. Brazil's influence over global finance has grown apace, increasing the country's visibility and importance. As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Brazil pursued an international agenda based on cooperation between non-aligned countries, often meeting opposition from the United States and European powers. A prime example was the Brazilian-Turkish initiative to resolve Iran's suspected violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. This initiative was met with opposition by the United States and the European Union, which had advocated a less conciliatory stance toward Iran. This episode allowed Brazil to be seen as an independent actor and to consolidate a position of leadership among emerging countries. On the national stage, the year was dominated by the presidential campaign and the speculation over who would succeed Lula as president. After a contentious election, the public chose Lula's preferred successor, Dilma Rousseff, widely predicted to maintain political and economic continuity with her predecessor, while adopting more moderate positions with respect to foreign policy.

The dominating themes in Colombia over the 2010-2011 period were primarily political, as the country celebrated the Bicentennial of its Independence and prepared for presidential elections. At the beginning of 2010, the country was consumed by an internal debate over a potential third term for president Alvaro Uribe, to whom many had attributed the country's improved security situation. After

a series of scandals engulfing his party in congress and an eventual supreme court decision prohibiting Uribe from seeking a third term, the country's attention turned to the two leading candidates, Antanas Mockus, the popular ex-mayor of Bogotá, and Juan Manuel Santos –backed by Uribe's supporters. The presidential campaign sparked a national conversation over possible changes in the direction and priorities of public policy after years of declining violence, and, in the realm of foreign policy, over tensions with Venezuela and Ecuador. With the election of Santos, Colombia took steps to repair ties with Ecuador and soften tensions with Venezuela, although these measures met stiff opposition from Uribe supporters who had backed Santos. The election of Santos, Uribe's heir apparent, belied changes in Colombia's strategy, which has led to a rethinking of its bilateral relation with the United States and granting the U.S. military access to military bases in Colombian territory. This cooling of ties may be related to frustration generated by delays in the ratification of the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries owing to a resurgence of protectionism in the United States.

Ecuador confronted a particularly tumultuous year in 2010, with political tensions, conflicts within the governing coalition, and sharp reactions to decisions of president Rafael Correa. In August, the government scored a victory over the firm Yasuní-ITT, which would preserve important areas of biodiversity in exchange for contributions from the international community. Ecuador also pursued steps to strengthen ties with the European Union and the United States, with the successful negotiation of a free trade agreement with the European Union and the renovation of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) with the United States. In Ecuador as well, the high price of oil injected growth into the economy, strengthening the public sector and bolstering efforts to diversify trade towards the countries of Asia, with important loans on the part of China and the signing of smaller trade deals. On a regional scale, the ratification of an international treaty between the countries of Mer-



cosur and Venezuela marked Ecuador's increasing efforts to pursue regional integration. Nevertheless, Ecuador was not without periods of difficulty. A strike led by the police force in protest of the elimination of public sector benefits escalated rapidly and led to the declaration of a state of emergency by the government of Correa, which suspected plans for a coup –and even an assassination attempt. At the same time, the government's financial situation was shaken up by conflicts between the government and the banking sector at the end of the year.

In Mexico, 2010 marked the commemoration of the Bicentennial of Independence and the Centennial of the Mexican Revolution. Insistent publicity campaigns gave way to a period of intense critical reflection on the progress accomplished since Independence and the Revolution. The country faced the most violent year since the start of the "War Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime", with more than 30,000 deaths confirmed since the beginning of 2007. During the period in which the survey was administered, this violence took a new turn with the discovery of mass graves of Central American immigrants in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, and an increase in hostilities in the north of the country. This massacre, as well as the urgent demands for immigration reform in the United States on the part of the population of Latino origin and of Latin American citizens, served to increase the attention given to the phenomenon of transmigration. Immigration to Mexico has become an ever more prominent concern, changing the image of Mexico as solely a country of emigration to that of a country of transit for Central Americans as well, encouraging dialogue and discussion with Mexico's Central American neighbors. Efforts for dialogue with the United States were frustrated by internal political divisions in the United States in the context of legislative midterm elections, and the bi-national tension caused by legislative action such as passage of the anti-immigrant law SB

1060 in Arizona. Economically, Mexico benefitted from high world oil prices, which produced a slow recovery after the deep recession of 2009. Finally, Mexico registered some diplomatic importance in this period, becoming the host country for the COP 16 (2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference) and the third Rio summit.

In Peru, the second half of 2010 was characterized by the continuity of its economic policies, leading to a strong recovery and a return to the high growth of the previous decade. Due to strong economic ties with Asia and with the rest of South America, Peru recouped quickly from the global recession of 2009. During this time, the country continued down the path of macroeconomic stability and the policies of liberalization followed by recent administrations, which saw important advances in the country's business infrastructure. With the global financial crisis and subsequent recession, remittances—a fundamental source of income for the less well off—fell dramatically.

Alongside economic issues, politics took center stage as Peruvians held important elections at the legislative, regional, and national levels. The survey was administered during November, 2010, between the October regional and municipal elections and the presidential and legislative elections of April, 2011. The presidential campaign took place in a tense political environment dominated by negative attacks between competing parties, fueling an atmosphere of increased polarization. The electoral process also exposed the decline of confidence in the political class and economic uncertainty after the election of leftist candidate Ollanta Humala as president. Although a former radical, Humala campaigned as a pragmatic leftist more in the mold of former Brazilian president Lula than Venezuela's Hugo Chávez. During the campaign, regional and international issues took center stage, with Brazil and Venezuela becoming points of reference for the highly charged debate over the country's future •





A faint, light blue map of the Americas, showing North and South America, is centered in the background of the page.

# CHAPTER 1

WHO ARE WE? IDENTITY AND CONTACT  
IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD





## WHO ARE WE? IDENTITY AND CONTACT IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

In recent years, and especially in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the idea of two Latin Americas, with two different models of insertion in the international community, has been gaining ground.<sup>1</sup> The Latin America of the North, tightly linked and dependent on the economy of the United States, has been increasingly compared to the Latin America of the South, where countries with more diverse global and economic ties have latched on to Asia as a engine for economic growth, expanding the production and exportation of raw materials. To what extent are these two Latin American realities reflected in the international political culture of the countries of the region? How distinct are citizens' perceptions of their relation to the world in the two Latin Americas? How interested are Latin Americans in what goes on beyond their borders, and how open might they be to the influence of other cultures and countries? How much contact do they have with the outside world, and in what

ways are they connected to foreigners and the global community? Are Latin Americans from the North and South really so different in terms of identity and global connectedness, and if so, in what aspects? The survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* contains a wealth of data that casts light upon how Latin Americans see themselves in relation to the world, allowing for in-depth analysis of these questions in five Latin American countries: three from the Andean region (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) as well as the two largest countries in Latin America (Brazil and Mexico). While it would be difficult to extend our conclusions to all countries in the region, the cases included here vary significantly in terms of geographic location, country size, culture, and insertion into the world economy. At the very least, this diversity permits a first approach to the differences and similarities in the ways in which Latin Americans from the North and South of the region relate to the world and construct their identities.

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<sup>1</sup> This vision is increasingly shared by academics and multilateral organizations in Latin America, in particular regional development organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). For a more detailed analysis of this argument, see Carlos Malamud and Federico Steinberg, "América Latina: perspectivas económicas y políticas para 2011," *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano*, 42, 2011; Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi, *One Region, Two Speeds? Challenges of the New Global Economic Order for Latin America and the Caribbean*, Inter-American Development Bank, March 2011, at <http://www.iadlb.org>.



### *A Region Isolated from the World, and Especially Brazil*

One of the premises of an increasingly globalized world is that geographic distances and territorial divisions are no longer an obstacle for citizens from different countries to interact on a frequent and consistent basis. With citizens increasingly in contact with their counterparts in other countries, we might expect national identity to give way to greater localism, on the one hand, and increasingly supranational, cosmopolitan identities, on the other. However, the fact that technological advances have enabled increased contact with other countries does not necessarily imply that citizens have either the interest or the resources to pursue increased contact with other countries and cultures. Rather, survey results suggest that citizens' level of contact differs considerably by country and socioeconomic group. To gather more accurate and consistent information on Latin Americans' contact with the world, the survey contains a series of questions designed to measure why, how often, and in what ways Latin Americans come into contact with other peoples. The survey includes questions on the number of times respondents have travelled outside of their country, the type and extent of interaction with foreigners, whether respondents have family members or relatives living abroad, receive remittances, have access to the Internet and frequency of use, or speak a foreign language. These questions provide a more accurate assessment of the degree and type of interaction Latin Americans sustain with the outside world.

Survey data reveal that in general, Latin Americans have little contact with citizens of other countries. The contact they do have is overwhelmingly indirect, through family ties to a relative living abroad. As seen in Figure 1.1, a wide majority of Colombians (74%), Ecuadorians (74%), Mexicans (75%), Peruvians (79%), and especially Brazilians (88%) have never travelled outside of their country. Latin Americans' average number of trips abroad is revealing of their generally low level of contact with foreign countries. The citizens of Mexico (average number of trips per person, 1.53), Ecuador (1.24), and Colombia (1.05)

have greater contact with the world than Peruvians (0.79) and Brazilians (0.17). Brazilians' low number of average trips abroad is an important indication of their lower level of contact overall—Brazilians trail the other four Latin American countries in each of the variables of contact measured in the survey.

In general, Latin Americans' contact with foreigners is limited, sporadic, and brief. Majorities of the population in Colombia (75%), Ecuador (76%), Peru (77%), and Mexico (81%), have no daily contact with foreigners, while the proportion of those who do come into contact with foreigners constitutes a minority: 24%, 23%, 22%, and 18%, respectively. Precise information on this question is not available for Brazil, but considering Brazilians' lower level of contact as observed throughout this section, we do not expect that the frequency of encounters with foreigners to be any higher. Among the minority of citizens who do sustain regular contact with foreigners, the type of contact most commonly reported was that of friendship: Colombia (83%), Ecuador (82%), Peru (80%), and Mexico (70%). In contrast, contact with foreigners through work or study, or having a foreigner as a neighbor or relative, is much less common, and in no case is greater than 34% of those who have contact with foreigners.


Although few Latin Americans have travelled outside of their countries or maintain regular and frequent contact with foreigners, the population of Latin Americans living abroad is numerous, with the exception of Brazil. In Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, almost half of the population surveyed (45%, 58%, 52%, and 49%, respectively) report relatives living abroad, while the percentage of Brazilians with a relative living abroad is considerably smaller (12%). When Latin Americans were asked whether a relative living abroad belonged to the same household—that is, whether a relative living abroad was part of the nuclear family (i.e., parents, children, or siblings of the respondent)—only 11% of the population in Brazil responded affirmatively, while between a fourth and a third of those interviewed in Colombia (31%), Ecuador (30%), Mexico (23%), and Peru (38%) report a relative from the same household living abroad.



**Figure 1.1. Contact with the World**


**TRIPS ABROAD**

*Could you tell me how many times you have traveled outside (COUNTRY), approximately 1 or more trips?*  
(%)




**CONTACT WITH FOREIGNERS IN THE COUNTRY\***

*Do you have contact with foreigners living in (COUNTRY)?*  
(%)




**RELATIVES ABROAD**

*Do you have any relatives living outside (COUNTRY)?*  
(%)




**FOREIGN LANGUAGE**

*Do you speak a foreign language?*  
(%)



**INTERNET USE**

*Do you use the Internet?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Was not asked in Brazil.



Remittances are another important source of contact with the world, but their relevance to the populations included in the survey varies. Surprisingly, a greater percentage of Ecuadorians (36%) and Colombians (20%) receive remittances from family members living abroad than in Peru (13%) and Mexico (12%). Remittances are much less important for Brazil, with only 1% of Brazilians reporting that they receive money from relatives living abroad. With contact with the outside world largely limited to family members living abroad, the absence of remittances may explain Brazil's greater isolation: compared to Mexico and the three Andean countries, Brazil is much less affected by the social, economic, and cultural facets of contact generated by migration.

Another potential source of contact with the outside world is through Latin Americans' growing use of the Internet. While access to the Internet is limited—less than half of the population in each country has accessed the Internet in the past year—the Internet represents the fastest growing form of communication and contact with citizens across the globe, even if used for purposes other than following global affairs. However, there are significant gaps in Internet use among the countries surveyed, with Colombia, where 44% of the population has used the Internet over the past year, once again leading the five countries as the country most connected, followed by Peru (39%), Brazil (31%), Mexico (26%), and Ecuador (21%).

Finally, contact with the outside world may be measured by whether Latin Americans speak a foreign language. As the most direct means of communication with another population, knowledge of a foreign language may help us to measure the intensity, regularity, and direction of contact. However, as might be expected from the low level of contact reported in other variables, the percentage of the population that speaks another language is quite small (13% in Peru, 12% in Mexico, 8% in Colombia, 7% in Ecuador, and 6% in Brazil). Latin Americans' low level of contact—as measured by trips abroad, contact with foreigners, remittances, internet use, and knowledge of a foreign language—suggests that citizens' knowledge of the outside world is rarely ba-

sed on direct contact with the exterior or interaction with foreigners.

Despite expanding telecommunications networks, contact with the exterior in each of the five countries remains low. Nevertheless, Brazil's isolation stands out, given the country's size and economic power. Along with low out-migration and remittances, the autarky that tends to characterize large countries with little dependence on other nations, as well as a geopolitical environment that poses no imminent threats might further explain Brazil's isolation. Brazil's self-sufficiency and the lack of immediate threats may also explain Brazilians' lack of interest in and contact with the outside world. Brazil's size itself works against the development of close cross-border ties with its immediate neighbors (with the exception of Argentina). Whether because of the size of Brazil's population and national territory or the lower relative importance of its commercial and financial ties to the international community, survey data point toward a country increasingly disconnected from the region and the world outside.

### *Interested in Global Affairs, but Uniformed*

Given Latin Americans' low level of interaction with and exposure to the international community, we might expect citizens in the five countries surveyed to show little interest in international affairs. However, survey data suggest the opposite: interest in global affairs is just as high as interest in national and local events.

In each of the five countries surveyed, the percentage of the population "very" or "somewhat" interested in world news surpasses 50%, and citizens' interest in international affairs might best be characterized as intermediate. On average, 64.8% of the population in the five countries surveyed is interested in world affairs, while about a third shows little or no interest. Nevertheless, interest in world affairs varies significantly among countries, with the three smaller countries included in the survey showing greater interest than the two largest, despite the latter countries' greater



potential to project influence on the world stage. Of all of the countries surveyed, Colombians are the most interested world affairs (82% are “very” or “somewhat” interested), followed by Ecuadorians (68%), and Peruvians (62%), while Brazilians and Mexicans are the least interested (56% for both). While all three smaller countries show greater interest than Mexico and Brazil, Colombians’ interest is significantly higher than the other two smaller countries. The gap between Colombia and the rest of the countries in the survey is even more noticeable when we compare the percentage of the population that is *not* interested in following world affairs: 18% in Colombia compared to 32% and 34% in Ecuador and Peru, and 44% and 45% in Brazil and Mexico.<sup>2</sup>

As might be expected, certain groups in each country tend to be more interested in world affairs than others. First, those that are concerned with political, social, and economic issues at home, on the one hand, are equally concerned with developments abroad. This finding contradicts popular wisdom that individuals tend to be concerned almost exclusively with national events or local issues that have a direct impact on their daily lives, at the expense of international news. Second, in each country, including Colombia, there is a sizable percentage of the population with little or no interest in world affairs. Which groups then, are those that are the most and least interested in global affairs within each country? In general, citizens interested in their country’s relations with the world are higher earning, college-educated males, while lower-income females with less educational attainment (elementary and in some cases middle school) tend to be less interested.<sup>3</sup>

As mentioned previously, the two largest countries in terms of territory, population, and the size of their economies—and the two countries that have the greatest potential to project influence on the world

stage—are precisely those with the lowest level of interest in world affairs. However, lower levels of interest in Mexico and Brazil have different causes. While in Mexico the lower level of interest may reflect the severity of its internal crises, such as the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as the country’s sluggish economy, Brazilians’ lower level of interest might be better explained by its citizens’ optimism towards the country’s economy and the lack of immediate threats to its national security. Paradoxically, despite its growing international presence, the general climate of euphoria surrounding Brazil’s economy has turned the public’s focus inward, with Brazil continuing its rise as a “sleeping giant” unconcerned (for the moment) with its neighbors and the broader international community.

In general, the countries most interested in international affairs are also those most informed about key elements of the international community, such as international organizations, foreign heads of state, and the name of their foreign minister or secretary of foreign relations, although it is important to acknowledge that there are some international organizations or leaders that are more likely to be known in some regions than others. As shown in Figure 1.3, there are considerable gaps in knowledge between the countries—of up to forty points depending on the subject. Consistent with its citizens’ high level of interest in international affairs, Colombia is the most informed country with respect to key elements of the international order, with 71%, 66%, and 64% of the Colombian population, respectively, correctly identifying the acronyms of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization of American States (OAS). In contrast, recognition of international organizations is notably lower in other countries, and especially in Brazil, where only 46% were able to correctly identify the United Nations


<sup>2</sup> The proportion of those “not interested” is the sum of those who responded “hardly” and “not at all” interested, and “don’t follow the news”.

<sup>3</sup> There is a significant gender gap with men much more concerned with international affairs than women. The gap in interest is particularly wide among those with higher levels of education: the percentage of those who have a university degree or have some level of university studies who are interested in their country’s relations with the world is ten percentage points above the national average in each of the countries surveyed.



**Figure 1.2. Interest in the News**

*When you follow the news, how interested are you in news about (COUNTRY)'s relations with other countries?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't follow the news", "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

and FIFA, and only 24% the Organization of American States. Peru is the second most knowledgeable country in terms of recognition of international organizations, followed by Ecuador and Mexico, and in last place, Brazil. In each country, Latin Americans' recognition of international organizations exceeds recognition of their own foreign ministries and ministers of foreign affairs. A much smaller percentage of the population in each country is able to recognize the initials of their foreign ministry: 37% in Colombia, 28% in Mexico, 18% in Brazil, and only 6%, and 4%, respectively, in Peru and Ecuador. Similarly, the proportion of those able to name their respective countries' foreign minister correctly is even less: Colombia 21%, Ecuador 15%, Peru 14%, and Mexico 6% (the question was not asked in Brazil).

Given Mexicans' and Brazilians' relative disinterest in international affairs, it is not surprising that they are less likely to recognize international organizations' and institutions' acronyms than citizens in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Four out of five citizens in Brazil and Mexico, the two largest countries in Latin America and the two with the greatest capacity to exercise regional leadership, could not correctly identify the Organization of American States, the principal multilateral organization on the continent. In Brazil, the lack of knowledge is even

greater than in Mexico: more than half of Brazilians (54%) were not able to correctly identify the United Nations, while 60% of Mexicans can.

In Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru, an additional question was incorporated into the survey to gauge general knowledge of recent national and international events. Once again, the population of Colombia stands out for its greater level of knowledge of world affairs, although Colombians' knowledge of leaders and institutions within their own country is surprisingly lower than citizens of the other countries surveyed. Seventy-seven percent of Colombians correctly identify Barack Obama as the president of the United States compared to 70% of Mexicans, 63% of Peruvians, and 56% of Ecuadorians. In Colombia, 62% know that the currency of most of the European Union is the Euro, compared to 50% in Peru, 46% in Ecuador, and 45% in Mexico. On the other hand, when asked to identify the name of the head of their local state or province, a higher percentage of citizens in Ecuador (80%), Mexico (77%), and Peru (72%) responded correctly than in Colombia (68%). This suggests that in Colombia, at least, there does not seem to be a correlation between knowledge of international affairs and recognition of local leaders and institutions.

Over the past decade, academic research on public opinion has tried to present a clearer picture of how




**Figure 1.3. Knowledge**

**ACRONYMS**


*Could you tell me what the initials on the following card mean?*  
(%)

■ Incorrect/DK/NA    ■ Correct



**GENERAL KNOWLEDGE \***

*Please, can you tell me the name of...*  
(%)



\* Was not asked in Brazil



individuals form opinions when confronted with little information, or on the other hand, are relatively more informed. Recent research indeed confirms that a citizen's level of information and knowledge has important effects on one's attitudes, values, and opinions. According to one hypothesis, individuals' perceptions of unfamiliar situations or concepts depend, in great measure, on symbolic, cultural, or normative variables such as identity, religious beliefs, or structure of values.<sup>4</sup> Another theory suggests that evaluations of actors, leaders, or public policies that are not well known are generally ambiguous and variable, and therefore less polarized, while opinions of issues or persons that are well known—whether positive or negative—tend to be clear, decisive, and persistent, even when individuals are presented with contrasting data.<sup>5</sup> In this sense, the survey reveals that public opinion in Latin America is not based on solid, consistent knowledge of other countries and their political leaders, even those that are geographically and culturally close.

To compare knowledge of other countries, leaders, and international organizations across the five countries surveyed, we have attempted to measure how uninformed publics in individual countries are on average, by calculating an index of unfamiliarity for each of the countries surveyed. A country's *average national unfamiliarity* (ANU) of international actors and affairs is calculated by summing, across all countries and actors respondents were asked to evaluate, the percentages of respondents who "have not heard of", "do not know", or did not answer a given question. Average national unfamiliarity with 15 countries from around the world (evaluations of which are reported in Chapter 3) is, in descending order, 27% in Peru, 24% in Brazil, 20% in Ecuador, 16% in Mexico, and 10% in Colombia.

In each country, unfamiliarity with heads of state and international political leaders is even higher.

Fifty-four percent of Brazilians, 50% of Peruvians, 40% of Ecuadorians, 39% of Mexicans, and 19% of Colombians did not recognize one or more of the names of the current—or in the case of Brazil, former—presidents of Brazil, Cuba, Spain, Mexico, and Venezuela. There are considerable gaps in awareness across the five countries surveyed. For example, 63% of Mexicans have not heard of or have no opinion of the former president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, while 79% of Brazilians have not heard of or have no opinion of the president of Mexico, Felipe Calderón. Once again, Colombia's population is the most informed, and Brazil's the least. The lack of international awareness is particularly apparent in Brazil, where 41% of those surveyed did not recognize Hugo Chávez, a leader with a considerable level of visibility and influence in regional affairs.

Knowledge of international organizations is not any higher. Taking into account all of the international and multilateral organizations respondents were asked to evaluate, average unfamiliarity is lowest in Colombia (25%) although it is followed, surprisingly, by Brazil (29%). Peru registered the highest level of unfamiliarity, at 42%, while Ecuador and Mexico fall into an intermediate range at 33% and 38%, respectively. There are significant differences in knowledge of international organizations across the five countries surveyed, although there are some areas where they coincide. The United Nations is without a doubt the organization most recognized in the majority of the Latin American publics surveyed: only 18% of Latin Americans could not identify or have no opinion of the UN, ranging from a low of 11% of Colombians to a high of 26% of Peruvians. The international organizations with the highest level of recognition after the UN are multinational corporations, of which only 24% of Latin Americans have no knowledge or opinion, followed by the Organization of American States (OAS), with

<sup>4</sup> Empirical studies on attitudes towards trade liberalization indicate that the individuals' symbolic predispositions, and in particular, national identity, play an outsized role in the formation of opinions toward issues with which they are little familiar. On this respect, see David M. Rankin, "Identities, Interests, and Imports," *Political Behavior*, vol. 23, num. 4, December 2002, pp. 351-376.

<sup>5</sup> For an analysis of the relationship between the average evaluation of heads of state and how well they are known by the populations surveyed, see José Luis Caballero, "Conocerlos es quererlos... ¿o no? Evaluación de jefes de Estado de las Américas y España," *Boletín Analítico Las Américas y el Mundo*, num. 5, November 9, 2010, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, <http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu>.



**Table 1.1. Average National Unfamiliarity (ANU) for Countries**

*(% total of people answering "Never heard of", "Don't Know" and "No Answer")*

|               | <b>Brazil</b> | <b>Colombia</b> | <b>Ecuador</b> | <b>Mexico</b> | <b>Peru</b>  | <b>Average</b> |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|
| Iran          | 30            | 17              | 36             | 25            | 44           | 30.48          |
| El Salvador   | 39            | 16              | 33             | 20            | 44           | 30.47          |
| Guatemala     | 40            | 17              | 34             | 17            | 44           | 30.39          |
| Germany       | 19            | 20              | 24             | 19            | 32           | 22.73          |
| Canada        | 28            | 11              | 26             | 14            | 33           | 22.49          |
| Cuba          | 25            | 9               | 20             | 16            | 29           | 19.88          |
| Japan         | 17            | 13              | 28             | 17            | 24           | 19.78          |
| China         | 18            | 11              | 20             | 14            | 24           | 17.55          |
| Chile         | 22            | 8               | 13             | 18            | 17           | 15.71          |
| Peru          | 28            | 8               | 12             | 21            | 10           | 15.60          |
| Venezuela     | 26            | 3               | 8              | 18            | 23           | 15.55          |
| Mexico        | 25            | 7               | 18             | 2             | 25           | 15.46          |
| Argentina     | 15            | 7               | 14             | 17            | 21           | 14.72          |
| Spain         | 21            | 6               | 7              | 13            | 21           | 13.69          |
| United States | 12            | 4               | 7              | 5             | 17           | 8.72           |
| <b>ANU</b>    | <b>24.27</b>  | <b>10.36</b>    | <b>19.95</b>   | <b>15.89</b>  | <b>27.26</b> | <b>19.55</b>   |

26% average unfamiliarity. However, the profile of the OAS varies in each country: only 12% of Colombians have not heard of or have no opinion of it, while average national unfamiliarity in Brazil is 37%. After the United Nations, multinational corporations, and the Organization of American States, the international organizations that Latin Americans have most knowledge of, in descending order, are NAFTA and the European Union, both with an average national unfamiliarity of 27%, the World Bank (29%), and the International Monetary Fund (31%) and social, civic, and non-profit organizations (31%). This suggests that in general, Latin Americans tend to have greater knowledge of the large multilateral organizations created after the Second World War, as well as the principal engines of globalization (multinational corporations and mechanisms of regional integration such as NAFTA).

On the other hand, Latin Americans are least likely to recognize multilateral organizations created more recently, whether global or regional in scope. The Group of 20 (G-20) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) were unknown to half of those surveyed (52% and 49% average unfamiliarity, respectively). Despite the desire of the countries of ALBA to take an active part in shaping regional affairs and confront U.S. hegemony, this regional organization registers some of the highest levels of unfamiliarity in the region: 36% in Ecuador (itself a member of ALBA), 41% in Colombia, 56% in Peru, and 61% in Mexico. One final point is the high level of mutual unfamiliarity between Mexico and Brazil regarding each country's respective processes of regional integration: 43% of Brazilians have not heard of NAFTA, and 51% of Mexicans have not heard



# THE AMERICAS AND THE WORLD 2010-2011

**Table 1.2. Average National Unfamiliarity (ANU) of Heads of State**

*(% total of people answering "Never heard of", "Don't Know" and "No Answer")*

|                              | Brazil       | Colombia     | Ecuador      | Mexico       | Peru         | Average      |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero | 82           | 26           | 49           | 57           | 62           | 55.00        |
| Felipe Calderón              | 79           | 29           | 58           | 3            | 67           | 47.37        |
| Raúl Castro                  | 66           | 17           | 41           | 44           | 56           | 44.98        |
| Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva  | 1            | 18           | 40           | 63           | 45           | 33.41        |
| Hugo Chávez                  | 41           | 3            | 10           | 29           | 22           | 20.90        |
| <b>ANU</b>                   | <b>53.89</b> | <b>18.55</b> | <b>39.82</b> | <b>39.22</b> | <b>50.19</b> | <b>40.33</b> |

**Table 1.3. Average National Unfamiliarity (ANU) of International Organizations**

*(% total of people answering "Never heard of", "Don't Know" and "No Answer")*

|                 | Brazil       | Colombia     | Ecuador      | Mexico       | Peru         | Average      |
|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| G-20            | NA           | 36           | 56           | 54           | 63           | 52.25        |
| ALBA            | NA           | 41           | 36           | 61           | 56           | 48.54        |
| APEC            | NA           | 45           | 48           | NA           | 46           | 46.26        |
| CACM            | NA           | 42           | NA           | NA           | NA           | 41.73        |
| WTO             | NA           | 30           | 35           | 49           | 45           | 39.70        |
| ACN             | NA           | 38           | 32           | NA           | 44           | 38.33        |
| UNASUR          | NA           | 24           | 30           | NA           | 53           | 35.66        |
| MERCOSUR        | 27           | 19           | NA           | 51           | NA           | 32.20        |
| IMF             | 28           | 22           | 30           | 38           | 38           | 31.25        |
| NGO'S           | 32           | 15           | 34           | 36           | 38           | 30.72        |
| World Bank      | NA           | 19           | 31           | NA           | 37           | 29.04        |
| European Union  | NA           | 16           | 26           | 33           | 35           | 27.30        |
| NAFTA           | 43           | 15           | NA           | 23           | NA           | 26.98        |
| OAS             | 37           | 12           | 22           | 31           | 27           | 25.93        |
| Multinacionales | 19           | 10           | 26           | 30           | 34           | 23.79        |
| UN              | 17           | 11           | 22           | 13           | 26           | 17.53        |
| <b>ANU</b>      | <b>28.91</b> | <b>24.65</b> | <b>32.96</b> | <b>38.00</b> | <b>41.63</b> | <b>33.23</b> |



of, or have no opinion of, Mercosur. As Chapter 3 will discuss in greater depth, survey data indicate a positive relationship between knowledge and evaluation of international organizations.

***Civic Culture: Committed to Democracy, but Confidence and Participation are Low***

For the first time the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* included a series of questions intended to measure civic culture, community activism, and attitudes toward democracy, in addition to general perceptions towards politics, institutions, and international norms and organizations. In Mexico as well as the three Andean countries, citizens evaluate democracy positively, but with important reservations. As seen in Figure 1.4, support for democracy is strongest in Colombia, where 73% of Colombians agree that “democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government”, while a lesser percentage of Mexicans (45%), Peruvians (43%), and Ecuadorians (41%) agree with this assessment.

Despite positive perceptions of democracy, Latin Americans do not always agree that citizens have the obligation to obey the law if they are in disagreement. Asked whether citizens have the right to disobey laws that they judge to be unjust, 65% in Colombia, 52% in Mexico, 51% in Ecuador, and 42% in Peru “very much” or “somewhat” agree. In this respect, there is a generally low level of respect for the law—or, seen in another light, greater distrust in the law and legal institutions—in these four countries, with little variation by age group, level of income, or education.

These four countries are also marked by the absence of a strong civic culture that promotes active involvement in community affairs. The desire to participate actively in the resolution of municipal, community, or neighborhood issues is overwhelmingly low in these four countries, and especially in Colombia. A wide majority of those surveyed in Colombia (79%), Mexico (68%), Ecuador (63%) and Peru (60%) have contributed neither time nor money in the previous 12 months towards the resolution of

an issue affecting their community. Once again, community activism does not vary with socioeconomic level, except for Ecuador, where those with higher incomes are slightly more likely to participate than those of lower income and resources.

With majorities reluctant to participate in community affairs, how confident are Latin Americans in the institutions—national and international—entrusted with the power to make decisions that affect the majority of their citizens? How much do Latin Americans trust their fellow citizens, and what is the degree of social cohesion in each country? In terms of the confidence and legitimacy surrounding distinct institutions and actors, there are important differences among the populations of each country that allow us to distinguish between countries where institutions are highly regarded, such as Colombia, and those in which institutions are viewed with less confidence, such as Ecuador, with the extreme case being Peru. Mexicans’ trust in institutions, on the other hand, falls into an intermediate range. The average level of trust/confidence for each country (that is, the proportion of survey respondents that trust the institutions evaluated “a lot” or “somewhat”) is, in descending order: 56% for Colombia, 46% for Ecuador, 43% for Mexico, and 33% for Peru. Figure 1.5 shows the level of confidence toward seven institutions or actors, five national (fellow citizens, the army, presidents, the police force, and politicians) and two international (The United Nations and government of the United States of America) in the four countries in which this question was asked. As seen in Figure 1.5, there is broad agreement with respect to which institutions are the most well regarded and which are viewed as least legitimate. Without a doubt, the army is one of the most trusted institutions in the eyes of the public, and especially in Colombia and Mexico, where the army is the most trusted out of all the institutions evaluated (71% of Colombians and 67% of Mexicans trust the army “a lot” or “somewhat”), and to a lesser degree, in Ecuador (where the army is the second most trusted institution, by 62% of the population), and Peru (third most trusted, at 41%). There is even greater






**Figure 1.4. Civic Culture**


**SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY \***

*How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government?*  
(%)




**RESPECT FOR THE LAW \***

*How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: People have the right to disobey laws if they find them to be unfair?*  
(%)



**CITIZEN PARTICIPATION \***

*Tell me, in the last 12 months, have you participated with your time or money in solving some problem within your community or neighborhood?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Was not asked in Brazil.


agreement on the two least-trusted institutions—the police force and politicians— although intensity of distrust varies with each country. The proportion of citizens that express trust in the police varies from 47% in Colombia and 40% in Ecuador, to 27%

in Peru and Mexico. Attitudes towards politicians are characterized by general disillusionment in each country, with levels of trust ranging from 13% to 16%. Differences between countries are greater with respect to attitudes towards the president: while



**Figure 1.5. Trust in Institutions and Groups of People \***

*Please tell me, how much trust do you have in each of the following institutions, groups or people?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil.



Colombians and Ecuadorians hold their presidents in high esteem (69% “a lot” or “somewhat” trust in them), Mexicans are more ambivalent (50%) while for Peruvians, trust in the president is low (26%).


It is interesting to note that international actors such as the United Nations and the government of the United States are more trusted than two national institutions—the police and politicians—a surprising fact, considering Latin Americans’ traditional wariness of the United States. Colombians’ level of trust in the U.S. is particularly high (63%), while Colombians are also the population with the highest level of trust in the UN (69%). While Mexicans also trust the UN, their level of trust is lower (52%). Mexicans and Peruvians are also the two populations with the greatest level of distrust towards the United States. Peru and Ecuador are the two countries with the least trust in their own citizens, while Ecuador’s trust in the UN is lower than in Mexico and Peru.

### ***Collective Identities: Nationalists and Latin Americans***

What are the principal roots of identity for Latin Americans? How strong is their sense of national belonging and how strong is their allegiance to broader regional identities? What is their level of national pride, and what are its sources? What points of contact might there be between the distinct sub-regions of Latin America and with the world in general? The portrait of identities and collective ties that characterize a population help us to understand their degree of openness to distinct influences and actors in the international sphere (ideas, values, norms, goods, people, and organizations, among others), as they constitute the lens through which individuals view and interpret global actors and affairs.

To better understand the diverse identities that characterize the populations of Colombia, Ecuador,

**Figure 1.6. National Identity\***  
*What do you most closely identify with?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for “Don’t Know” or “No Answer”.  
\* Not asked in Brazil.



Mexico, and Peru, citizens were asked whether they identify more strongly with their nationality or as members of their local community or (sub-national) region of origin. As Figure 1.6 shows, survey data confirm that in all four countries, national identity is stronger than local identities, principally in Ecuador and Peru. The majority of the populations of Ecuador (82%), Peru (74%), Mexico (62%), and Colombia (61%) identify primarily with their nationality, while those that identify primarily with their region or community are in the minority, although in Colombia and Mexico (37%) this minority is greater than in Ecuador (17%) and Peru (13%).

A clear majority of Latin Americans identify with their nationality over their community or subnational region of origin. What happens, however, when Latin Americans look beyond their country's borders? Do they identify primarily as Latin American, or feel more strongly related to a (sub)region such as South America, the Andean region, or the Caribbean? The regional and international identities of Latin Americans are highly fragmented, and do not necessarily coincide with a country's geographic region or membership in an economic or political bloc. That being said, those identifying as *Latin American* being account for the highest percentage of the population in each of the countries surveyed, with the percentage of the population identifying as *Latin American* being higher in Mexico (51%) and Colombia (49%) than in Ecuador (41%) and Peru (34%).

As shown in Figure 1.7, after the percentage of those that identify as *Latin American*, there are significant differences with respect to the order of importance and level of fragmentation of international identity in each country. In Mexico, the second most common supranational identity is "cosmopolitan", that is, 26% identify primarily as a *citizen of the world*, while *North American* and *Central American* tie for third at 7%. The level of fragmentation in Mexico is relatively lower than in the Andean countries, with

two basic categories of international identity, one historic –*Latin American*– and the other emerging –cosmopolitan. In Colombia, the second supranational identity in order of importance is *South American* (20%) followed by cosmopolitan (16%), *Caribbean* (7%) and finally *Andean* (3%) and *Bolivarian*<sup>6</sup> (3%). In Ecuador the order is slightly different with 28% identifying as a *citizen of the world*, 20% as *South American*, 2% *Andean*, and 2% *Bolivarian*. The breakdown of identities in Peru contrasts sharply with the rest of the countries surveyed, not only because the percentage of the population identifying as *Latin American* is significantly smaller, but also for its diversity and fragmentation: *Andean* identity is second in importance (24%), followed by *South American* (21%) and lastly, cosmopolitan (15%).

In the majority of countries, except for Peru, citizens tend to identify with regions ("*South American*" or "*citizen of the world*") that are more geographically distant rather than with the nations in their immediate neighborhood. The case of Mexico is a prime example. The percentage of Mexicans identifying as *North* or *Central American* is quite small considering the importance of economic, social, and security ties with these two regions, and especially the United States. Similarly, the weakness of *Andean* identity among Colombians and Ecuadorians is testament to the scarce notion in public opinion in these countries of belonging to the Andean sub-region. These trends highlight the difficulties facing any effort to forge a common regional identity: despite government efforts to advance economic integration in the Andean region, going back to the 1970s with the establishment of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN, in Spanish), the survey shows scant presence of a common regional identity. The weakness of *Andean* identity among Colombians and Ecuadorians contrasts with the large percentage of Peruvians who identify as *Andean*. However, in Peru the term *Andean* carries a significant ethnic and subnational


<sup>6</sup> Rather than a region or culture, *Bolivarian* refers to a political and regional alliance, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), whose principal members consist of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba, Nicaragua, along with three nations of the Lesser Antilles: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. (*Translator's Note*)



**Figure 1.7. International Identity\***

*And tell me, which of the following do you most closely identify as?*

(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Not asked in Brazil.



connotation that is not necessarily linked with a geographical region beyond Peru's national borders. The high level of *Andean* identity in Peru may therefore indicative of the strength of local over international identity.

### ***Proud of their Country, but Unsatisfied with its Progress***

Nationalism is a highly complex and nuanced phenomenon. One way of measuring the degree of attachment individuals feel to their country is by asking them how proud they are of their nationality. In the four countries where this question was asked (Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru) survey results suggest that Latin Americans have a strong sense of national pride, especially in Ecuador, which is consistent with its population's firm sense of national over local identity. National pride is strong in each country, with 93% of Ecuadorians, 84% of Colombians, 81% of Mexicans, and 77% of Peruvians "very proud" of their nationality.

What motives might explain Latin Americans' high level of national pride? The 2010-2011 edition of the survey asks subjects to identify their principal motive of national pride. As might be expected, the motives are numerous. The most common responses mention their country's national bounty, their population's culture and values, the connection they feel with the "mother country" due to the simple fact of being born there, as well as their culture and way of life. Surprisingly, the importance of national symbols such as a nation's flag or anthem is almost insignificant, with only 1% of the population in each country naming them as the principal source of national pride. The sources of national pride ranked most important are different in each country, suggesting that the construction of national meaning depends more on the distinct historical contexts of each country rather than abstract symbols. National resources and ties to the land are the most frequently mentioned sources of pride by Colombians and Ecuadorians, while culture is a greater factor in national pride for

Peruvians and Mexicans, ranking as the primary and secondary motives of pride, respectively.

For Colombians, the principal motive of national pride is natural resources (47%), followed by origin (28%), achievements as a nation (14%), culture (7%) and patriotic symbols (1%). In the case of Ecuadorians, origin is first (41%), followed by natural resources (26%), achievements (23%), and culture (5%), with 1% naming patriotic symbols. Mexicans are proud above all of their origin (38%), followed by culture (23%), achievements as a nation (21%), and finally, natural resources (11%) and patriotic symbols (1%). In Peru, culture is the principle motive of national pride (32%), with natural resources as the second (28%), followed by origin (26%), and, to a lesser extent, national achievements (6%) and patriotic symbols (1%).

Although only a small percentage of those surveyed are not proud of their country (7% in Colombia, 2% in Ecuador, and 6% in Mexico and Peru), the reasons for their disaffection are just as numerous. Generally, low national pride is linked to the principal problems facing the country: poverty, inequality, and the lack of security, as well as violence, corruption, unemployment, and frustration with fellow citizens' perceived lack of civility. Although the reasons for disaffection are many, the four countries coincide in identifying the economy and bad governance as sources of discontent. The citizens of Colombia and Mexico identify the same three issues as sources of their discontent, although the order of importance differs: insecurity (Colombia 37%, Mexico 22%), the poor state of the economy (Colombia 29%, Mexico 17%), and bad governance (Colombia 20%, Mexico 40%). On the other hand, for the populations of Ecuador and Peru insecurity is not as strong a motive of discontent as citizens' perceived lack of civility (24% and 7%, respectively), bad governance (22% and 33%, respectively), and the poor state of the economy (15% and 36%, respectively).


Without a doubt, Latin Americans project a strong sense of national identity and national pride. However, how satisfied are they with their country's progress on diverse social, economic, and interna-



**Gráfica 1.8. Satisfaction After 200 Years of Independence \***

*Tell me, how satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the progress (COUNTRY) has made in the past 200 years since its independence in matters of...?*  
(%)

Very unsatisfied    Somewhat unsatisfied    Somewhat satisfied    Very satisfied

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT****INDEPENDENCE BEFORE THE WORLD****SOCIAL EQUALITY****PEACE AND INTERNAL SECURITY**

Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil.

tional issues? How citizens view their country's progress is an equally important aspect of national identity and serves as a measure of how citizens view themselves within the society. To this end, the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* asked citizens how satisfied or unsatisfied they are with what their nation has achieved since independence in four areas: economic development, social equality, peace and internal security, and independence in in-

ternational affairs. In short, Latin Americans' pride in their country and national identity is greater than their perception of what their country has achieved historically.

Colombia is the country with the highest level of satisfaction across the four areas. It is also the only country in which the percentage of those "very" or "somewhat" satisfied with their country's achievements is greater than those that are "somewhat" or "very"




unsatisfied in each of the four areas. Colombians' overall satisfaction is further apparent when we sum the percentages of "very" or "somewhat" satisfied for each of the four areas and compare the average of satisfaction over the four categories for the countries in which the question was asked: 58.3% in Colombia, 55% in Mexico, 52.7% in Ecuador, and 52.1% in Peru.

A closer look at the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in each country shows both points

of convergence and divergence with respect to the level of progress in each category. On the one hand, the populations of Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador are most satisfied with their countries' economic development (70%, 62%, and 58%, respectively), while in Mexico satisfaction with the nation's independence in international affairs (65%) ranked highest. Significant differences emerge when we look at the categories least positively evaluated, although there

**Figure 1.9. Rights of Naturalized Foreigners**

*Do you agree or disagree that a naturalized foreigner may...*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Right to play for the National Football team not asked in Brazil.



are greater points of agreement between Ecuador, Peru, and Mexico with respect to the areas of greatest dissatisfaction than among the three countries of the Andean region. The majority of the population in Mexico (56%), Ecuador and Peru (49% in each case) show some degree of dissatisfaction with their country's progress in peace and internal security, while 56% of Colombians, on the other hand, are "very" or "somewhat" satisfied. Approval of social progress follows a different pattern: Mexicans and Ecuadorians are more satisfied with progress in achieving social equality (57% and 53%, respectively), than Colombians (50%) and Peruvians (47%).

### ***Political Nationalism, Sovereignty, and "Light" Multilateralism***


Survey data suggest that Latin American nationalism in the five countries surveyed plays a greater role in political, social, and cultural relations with the rest of the world than it does in economic relations. In its political

and social dimensions, nationalism is a constant in the five countries surveyed, and is particularly evident in the scarce disposition to grant nationalized foreigners full political rights. As seen in Figure 1.9, wide majorities oppose granting nationalized foreigners, the same rights as native-born citizens, with opposition being greatest in Ecuador: 83% of Ecuadorians, 77% of Colombians, 73% of Brazilians and Mexicans, and 71% of Peruvians reject the possibility of a nationalized foreigner being elected as a congressman or senator. An even greater proportion in each country oppose allowing a nationalized foreigner to run for president: 89% in Ecuador, 86% in Colombia, 81% in Peru, 80% in Mexico, and 76% in Brazil. Opposition to granting nationalized foreigners these rights has broad support in these five countries, regardless of age, income, gender, or level of education.

Latin Americans are much more open to the participation of foreigners in other aspects of society, such as sports, where opposition declines markedly. Similar majorities in Peru (62%), Ecuador (59%), Colombia (58%), and Mexico (55%) approve of

**Figure 1.10. Accepting UN decisions**

*Tell me whether you agree with the following statement or not. When dealing with international problems, (COUNTRY) must accept the decisions of the United Nations, even if it does not agree with them*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Depends", "Don't Know" or "No Answer".



allowing a nationalized foreigner to represent their country as a member of the national soccer team. Nevertheless, between two-fifths and one-third of the population in these countries do not support the possible inclusion of foreigners on nationally representative sports teams.

Given Latin Americans' opposition to allowing nationalized foreigners to hold elected office, how open are Latin Americans to delegating authority and recognizing the jurisdiction of multilateral organizations? How willing are they to abide by multilateral decisions and assume international responsibilities? The survey indicates that multilateralism in Latin America lacks broad-based support, as Latin Americans are reluctant to participate in multilateral organizations if it implies giving away sovereignty, although there are some minor variations between the five publics surveyed.


One indication of Latin Americans' ambivalence toward participating in multilateral organizations is the relatively low disposition to accept decisions of the UN that are viewed as unfavorable. As Figure

1.10 shows, in each of the countries except for Brazil, the percentage of the population unwilling to accept decisions of the UN that they disagree with is greater than those that are willing to accept them. In other words, Latin Americans' willingness to abide by the decisions of multilateral organizations and international rules is conditioned on whether they coincide with the interests and preferences of their countries. This finding is consistent with the weak legal culture that we observe in these countries. If citizens are unwilling to obey laws that they judge as unjust, it should not surprise that they are also unwilling to accept the decisions of multilateral organizations when they are viewed as unfavorable.

Opinion is more divided when it comes to international legal bodies. As seen in Figure 1.11, Latin Americans' views toward the jurisdiction of international courts ranges from Colombians' enthusiastic acceptance to Ecuador's staunch disapproval. While the majority of those surveyed in Colombia (63%), Brazil, and Peru (56% in both), agree that a national accused of committing crimes against humanity,

**Figure 1.11. International Courts**

*Do you agree or disagree that if a (COUNTRY NATIONAL) is accused of a crime against humanity, such as torture, and has not been tried in (COUNTRY), said (COUNTRY NATIONAL) could be judged by an international court?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Depends", "Don't Know" or "No Answer".



such as torture, may be judged by an international court, Mexicans are more divided (41% in favor, 47% against) while Ecuadorians (53%) are opposed. More than any other country surveyed, Colombians openly support international sanctions for violators of human rights and are inclined to accept the jurisdiction of international courts. One possible explanation for Colombians' inclination to send human rights violators to international courts may be that the degree of visibility and concern over the situation of human rights within the country outweighs the potential opposition of nationalists who fear a loss of sovereignty. Colombians' acceptance of international jurisdiction is consistent with the fact that 60% of Colombians would accept outside help by international actors to arrive at a solution to the decades-old armed conflict between the government and guerilla groups.<sup>7</sup>

While divided over the jurisdiction of international courts, a wide majority of Latin Americans agree that criminals residing within their national borders be extradited to the country where they committed the crime, regardless of nationality. Majorities in Ecuador (78%), Peru (71%), Mexico (66%), and to a lesser degree, Brazil (49%) agree that criminals hiding within their national borders be sent to, judged, and sentenced in the country where they committed the crime. The almost unanimous support for extradition may reflect the high level of concern over internal security and criminal violence, and the perception that governments working on their own may not be able to control these problems.

To gain a better understanding of Latin Americans' willingness to take on responsibility on the international stage, respondents were asked whether they approve of their own nationals' participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. Survey results indicate that majorities in the countries where this question was asked (Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru) approve of participating in UN

Peacekeeping Missions, with support highest in Peru (67%), followed by Mexico (59%), and Colombia and Ecuador (58% in both countries). Mexicans' level of support for participation in international peacekeeping and security operations is particularly notable, since government policy has traditionally kept Mexico on the sidelines of international peacekeeping operations.


### *A Region Relatively Open to Other Cultures*

Since culture and national customs constitute one of the most important sources of national pride in Latin America, the question of how open Latin Americans are to the influence of other cultures takes on particular importance. Does pride in one's culture necessarily mean rejecting others? In order to gauge the strength of cultural nationalism, Latin Americans were asked if they consider the diffusion of ideas and customs from other countries to be positive or negative. Figure 1.12 shows that a majority of respondents in each of the countries surveyed agree that the diffusion of other cultures is positive, although there are some differences in their degree of openness. Fifty-seven percent of Peruvians, 55% of Brazilians, 50% of Mexicans, 48% of Colombians, and 43% of Ecuadorians rate as positive the diffusion of foreign ideas and cultures in their countries. Ecuador's lesser degree of openness is consistent with its citizens' more negative perceptions towards foreigners and immigrants, as discussed earlier in the chapter. What other social factors might explain different countries' degree of openness? Age, income, education, and to a lesser extent, gender, are all variables that affect the level of cultural openness of individuals. In general, younger Latin Americans, those with higher incomes and education, and males tend to have perceive the diffusion of other cultures more positively than middle-aged and older adults,

<sup>7</sup> This question was only asked in Colombia. For a more complete analysis of the results of the survey in this country, see: Arlene B. Ticker and Felipe Botero, *Colombia y el Mundo 2010: opinión pública y política internacional*, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Departamento de Ciencia Política-CESO, June 2011.

**Figure 1.12. Foreign Ideas and Customs**

*Do you think that it is good or bad to disseminate the ideas and customs of other countries in (COUNTRY)?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Depends", "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

those with lower incomes and less education, and women.<sup>8</sup>

### ***Greater Support for Economic Globalism***

At two years after the onset of the global financial crisis, Latin Americans continue to favor open economies; they show greater openness in international economic relations than in any other aspect of their international relations. That Latin Americans have continued to support further opening is notable given the rise in nationalist and protectionist sentiment that might have emerged as a result of the economic slowdown and global recession of 2008-2009. On the contrary, survey data show no sign of a resurgence in

protectionism or of renewed support for greater controls over international trade and capital flows – despite the popularity of anti-neoliberal rhetoric among some government and political circles in the region.

Latin Americans' openness to globalization and free trade may be a reflection of the region's economic expansion and stability over the past decade, as well as the relatively short duration of the recession in the Andean region and Brazil. Nevertheless, the crisis revealed both the capacities and limitations of each country's model of growth. According to data from the International Monetary Fund,<sup>9</sup> the crisis struck most severely in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, where GDP shrunk by as much as 6.5% in 2009 – the worst year of the crisis – while leaving

<sup>8</sup> With respect to cultural openness, the gap is greater among age (15 percentage points in Mexico, 14 in Brazil, 12 in Colombia and Ecuador, and 11 in Peru) than gender (9 percentage points in Peru, 8 in Mexico, 6 in Brazil, 4 in Ecuador, and 3 in Colombia). Income is positively associated with degree of openness to other cultures. In Colombia and Mexico, those with greater incomes view the diffusion of other cultures and ideas by 15 percentage points more favorably than those with lower incomes. The gap in openness between those of higher and lower incomes is less pronounced in Ecuador and Peru (11 percentage points) and Brazil (eight percentage points).

<sup>9</sup> Data from the IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, April 2011, at [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org).



the economies of South American countries largely intact. The economic outlook for the region overall improved significantly in 2010, with average growth reaching 5.9%, although varying significantly across countries: Brazil and Peru grew at 8.8% and 7.5%, respectively, followed by Mexico (5.5%), Colombia (4.3%), and finally, Ecuador (3.2%).

Majorities in each of the five countries evaluate globalization positively, although with varying


intensity. As Figure 1.13 demonstrates, the most enthusiastic countries are Brazil and Peru, where 73% and 63% of those surveyed, respectively, consider that the greater contact of their economies with those of other countries is generally positive, while only one in ten disagree. Although globalization is less popular in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, a plurality of those surveyed (45%, 45%, and 43%, respectively), believe that globalization is generally

Figure 1.13. Perceptions of Globalization and Foreign Investment

**GLOBALIZATION**

*Do you think that the increased contact of our economy with others in the world, which is known as globalization, is mostly good or mostly bad for (COUNTRY)?*


(%)



**FOREIGN INVESTMENT**

*To what extent do you think that foreign investment benefits (COUNTRY)?*

(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Depends", "Don't Know" or "No Answer".





positive. However, there are important differences in these three countries between the percentage of the population that has a neutral opinion –those that responded that globalization is neither good nor bad– and those whose opinion is unfavorable. While in Colombia and Ecuador the sector that considers globalization to be neither good nor bad (31% and 22%, respectively), is greater than those that consider it to be negative (9% and 12%, respectively), in Mexico negative opinions (28%) are greater than the percentage of those who are neutral (16%).

Latin Americans evaluate foreign investment even more favorably. As seen in Figure 1.13, wide majorities in each country believe foreign investment to benefit their country “somewhat” or “very much”. Overall, almost four out of every five Latin Americans surveyed believe foreign investment is beneficial. In Brazil, 53% and 32%, respectively, believe foreign investment is “very” or “somewhat” beneficial; followed by Colombia, 46% and 37%; Ecuador, 47% and 29%; Mexico, 45% and 34%; and finally, Peru, 47% and 31%. On the contrary, less than one fifth of those surveyed consider that foreign investment is “somewhat” or “not at all” beneficial.

Free trade enjoys a high level of approval, similar to that of globalization and foreign investment, although citizens in Brazil evaluate free trade more highly. Survey respondents were asked to judge the impact, positive or negative, of free trade on seven distinct areas (the economy of developed countries, the environment, the national economy, citizens’ standard of living, farming, businesses, and workers).<sup>10</sup> Figure 1.14 shows opinions towards free trade in the five countries surveyed. In the majority of countries free trade is viewed quite positively, but with two exceptions: Colombia, where a majority believes that free trade has not helped farmers and agriculture (42%), versus a minority that believes they have benefitted (38%), and Ecuador, where the percentage of the population that believe free trade has benefitted the environment is lower (40%) than

those that consider that it has not (42%). Despite the overall positive perception of free trade, there are some differences between countries: Brazil is the most favorable, and Colombia, the most skeptical. The national average evaluation of free trade, taken as the average of those that responded that free trade is “good” in each of the seven categories measured, is for Brazil, 67%, followed by Peru (61%), Mexico (60%), Ecuador (56%), and finally, Colombia (50%).


In each of the countries surveyed, attitudes towards free trade vary depending on what area or sector is being considered, providing evidence that the average citizen in each of these countries is able to discriminate between the effects of a phenomenon with the degree of complexity of free trade. As might be expected, Latin Americans believe that those who have most benefitted from free trade are developed countries (Brazil and Peru, 76%, Mexico 75%, Colombia 74%, and Ecuador 71%). After developed countries, Latin Americans believe that free trade has been broadly beneficial to national economies, with 61.8% of the five countries surveyed viewing it as beneficial. The percentages viewing free trade as beneficial to national economies in each individual country are: Brazil 69%, Peru 68%, Mexico 63%, Ecuador 58%, and Colombia 51%. Free trade is also believed to benefit standards of living by a significant majority –58.2%– of the five countries surveyed (Brazil 67%, Mexico 59%, Peru 57%, Colombia 55%, and Ecuador 53%). Latin Americans have an equally positive opinion of the impact of free trade on workers (59.5%), and businesses (57.3%), although there are important variations depending on the country. With respect to businesses, Colombians (42%) are less convinced of the benefits of the free flow of goods than Brazilians (66%), Peruvians (63%), and Ecuadorians (58%). Sixty-nine percent of Brazilians and 65% of Peruvians consider that free trade is beneficial for workers, while a lower percentage of Ecuadorians (58%) and Colombians (46%) agree. With respect to the two other sectors included in the survey –the environment

<sup>10</sup> In Mexico two of the seven categories were not included in the national survey; Mexicans were not asked to evaluate free trade’s impact on national corporations or workers.



**Figure 1.14. Free Trade**

*In general, do you think free trade is good or bad for...?*



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Mexico.



and farmers— opinion is more divided. On average, 53.2% of Latin Americans surveyed consider that free trade has benefitted agriculture, with important differences by country: Brazil 65%, Mexico 56%, Peru 55%, Ecuador 52%, and, to a lesser degree, Colombia 38%. Finally, perceptions of free trade's impact on the environment is much less positive, with an average of 45.6% of all Latin Americans considering its impact to be positive, with 57% of Brazilians, 49% of Mexicans, 41% of Colombians and Peruvians, and 40% of Ecuadorians in agreement.

As a final observation, survey results suggest that the two countries with the highest economic performance in the past few years—Brazil and Peru—are more enthusiastic supporters of globalization, foreign investment, and free trade. In contrast, countries with lower rates of economic growth tend to view the opening of their country's economy on slightly less favorable terms. Nevertheless, in spite of these differences, economic nationalism seems to have declined among Latin Americans.

The previous analysis points toward a few general conclusions regarding similarities and differences in Latin Americans' identity and their degree of interaction with and openness to the world. What do these five countries, from distinct sub-regions of Latin America, share in common? In general, the populations of the countries surveyed have little interaction or direct contact with the world, and possess little knowledge of the international community. Nevertheless, they show a significant level

of interest in world events and are open to influences from abroad—especially cultural and economic influences—despite their strong sense of national identity and pride. Citizens in the five countries surveyed tend to identify primarily as Latin Americans more than with of any other region or sub-region of the world. They are little inclined to assume multilateral commitments that imply a loss of sovereignty, and are reluctant to integrate nationalized foreigners into their national political community as citizens with full political rights.

The map of differences is sharply delineated and much more complex. On one hand, the two largest countries in Latin America, with the two largest economies and greatest potential to project political and economic power—Brazil and Mexico—have the least knowledge and interest in international affairs, with Brazil's international isolation being slightly greater than Mexico's. On the other hand, Colombia is the most connected, interested in, and knowledgeable about current international realities, while the two other countries—Ecuador and Peru—fall into an intermediate range of contact, knowledge, and openness. The five countries' contradictions in desires, capabilities, and needs point toward a crisis of regional leadership: in spite of their international visibility, the two largest countries are focused inward, while the smaller countries observe the world intently but lack the capacity and weight to make a significant impact on the regional and international stage •





## CHAPTER 2

WHAT DO LATIN AMERICANS WANT? THREATS, OBJECTIVES,  
AND ASPIRATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY





## WHAT DO LATIN AMERICANS WANT? THREATS, OBJECTIVES, AND ASPIRATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY

What are Latin Americans' greatest concerns and aspirations in their relation with the world? How similar or different is their evaluation of the current global reality and the threats they face? What instruments of foreign policy do they prefer and how do they evaluate their own governments' actions and priorities on the international stage? The results of the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* provide a closer look at how citizens evaluate the threats, aspirations, actions, capabilities, instruments, and effectiveness of foreign policy in each of the five countries surveyed. In general, Latin Americans view the outside world from the perspective of their national and local reality, making an understanding of the region's changing political and economic conditions—and their impact on individuals and communities—especially important. With the exception of Mexico, economic growth in each of the countries surveyed reached historical highs from 2006 to 2010,<sup>1</sup> a period characterized by political stability and democratic consolidation. Mexico, on the other hand, is confronting the most serious crisis of public security in its history, and

was also the hardest hit of the five countries by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. In contrast, by 2010, the other Latin American countries in this survey had already recovered their high rates of annual growth.

For Latin Americans, participating in international affairs is seen as an important way of promoting national development, although in different ways in North and South America. In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, international engagement is seen as an opportunity to promote social and economic development, while in Mexico, international cooperation is seen as a means of resolving internal problems. The different circumstances of the two regions may help to explain their differing concerns and foreign policy objectives and, additionally, the instruments preferred to achieve these objectives. Without a doubt, the international threats and foreign policy objectives that directly impact the development and wellbeing of individuals and communities are those that hold the greatest importance on the international agenda, while the instruments of “soft” power (diplomacy, culture, and commercial

<sup>1</sup> According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the average annual growth rates for the following countries from the period 2006 to 2010 were: Brazil (4.50%), Colombia (4.32%), Ecuador (3.32%), and Peru (7.12%), while Mexico grew at an average rate of 1.64% during the same period. See IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, October 2010.





ties) are preferred over the exercise of “hard” power (military). The following sections will analyze each one of these ideas in greater depth.

### ***Optimism in the International Sphere, Except in Mexico***

How do the citizens surveyed evaluate the current global reality? Is the world better off than in the previous decade? Do Latin Americans believe it will improve in the decade to come? Finally, do expectations for Latin America as a region reflect perceptions of the current global reality? The answers to these questions may help us to understand whether preferences for international engagement are shaped by perceptions of where the world is heading.

Citizens in the five countries surveyed were asked to evaluate the current global reality both retrospectively and prospectively, that is, whether they consider the world to be better or worse off than in the previous decade, and whether they expect it to improve in the decade to come. As seen in Figure 2.1, optimism tends to be greater in the South of Latin America than in the North. With respect to the previous ten years, there is a considerable sense of optimism in Brazil (53% believe that the world today is better off than a decade ago, compared to 34% who believe the state of the world has worsened), while in other countries majorities are pessimistic, although with important differences—moderate in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (where 51%, 54%, and 48%, respectively, believe the global situation has worsened), and elevated in Mexico (68% believe that the world is worse off). With respect to perceptions for the decade to come, Brazilians once again are the most optimistic (53% consider that the world will be better off in the decade to come, compared to 29% who report that the world situation will worsen), while pessimism tends to dominate in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, where 41%, 44%, and 50%, respectively, believe that the world will be worse off. In Peru, the population is divided: 36% believe it will improve, 35% believe it will worsen, and 17%

that it will stay the same (13% responded that they did not know or did not answer).

How do Latin Americans’ perceptions of their own region compare to their evaluations of the world? Latin Americans look toward the region with notable optimism, both retrospectively and prospectively, although once again, with important variations by country. In each of the countries surveyed, majorities report that the region today is better off compared to the previous decade, and that it will continue to improve for the decade to come. Nevertheless, Brazil is considerably more optimistic (70% believe that the region is better off, while 68% believe it will continue to improve), while only 40% and 46% share this assessment in Mexico (see Figure 2.2). The other countries fall into an intermediate range (Colombia, 50% and 55%; Ecuador, 53% and 47%; Peru, 59% and 58%, retrospectively and prospectively, in each case). This suggests that citizens perceive a clear difference between the current global reality and the future of Latin America as a region.

Latin Americans’ optimism towards the region may reflect improvements in key economic and political indicators over the past few years. Despite the global recession of 2008-2009, the region’s economies, with the exception of Mexico, have been able to sustain high levels of growth, while democracy has been strengthened and improvements have been registered in many of the principal social indicators. Social and economic progress in each of these countries may explain why, in spite of an inclination towards pessimism over the state of the world in general—and especially in the case of Mexico—Latin Americans view their own region with considerable optimism. As the following sections explore in greater detail, survey respondents see important opportunities in the region for cooperation and development.


### ***Global Threats, Local Impact***

What international threats do Latin Americans identify as most serious? To what degree are perceptions of threats shared, and in what ways might they differ?




**Figure 2.1. World Situation**

*In general, do you believe that the world is better or worse than 10 years ago?*  
(%)



*And in ten years, do you believe that the world will be better or worse?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Same", "Don't Know" and "No Answer".

As Table 2.1 shows, the 2010-2011 survey included a series of 10 possible international threats that respondents were asked to rate in order of intensity.<sup>2</sup> On average, the populations of Colombia and Ecuador view threats with greater intensity, with 82%, and 74.6% of the population, respectively, viewing

the ten potential threats as "grave" (the category of highest intensity). Brazilians are inclined to perceive potential threats with lower intensity (64.2% responding "grave"), while Mexico and Peru fall into an intermediate range, with 69.3% and 67.1%, on average, viewing threats as "grave", respectively.


<sup>2</sup> The possible responses to potential threats are, in order of descending severity, "grave threat", "important but not grave threat", "threat of little importance", and "not a threat" (spontaneous answer). The following tables only report the percentages responding "grave threat".



**Figure 2.2. Latin America's Situation**


*In general, do you believe that Latin America is better or worse than 10 years ago?*

(%)



*And in general, do you believe that Latin America will be better or worse in 10 years?*

(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Same", "Don't Know" and "No Answer".

In Mexico and the three Andean countries, threats seem to be perceived with greater intensity than in Brazil, although a majority Brazilians still view potential threats as "grave".

In order to better understand the types of international threats, we have divided potential threats

into three broad categories, according to intensity: 1) those that are most important, viewed as "grave" by 75% of the population in each country or higher; 2) intermediate, classified as "grave" by at least two-thirds of the population, and 3) low, rated as "grave" by less than two thirds of the population surveyed.<sup>3</sup> This

<sup>3</sup> The percentage of the population rating threats as "grave" is significantly higher for Colombia and Ecuador in each of the three categories, reflecting the higher perceived intensity of threats in these two countries overall.



division leads us to a second important conclusion: there is a surprising consistency in the international threats perceived as most important, suggesting that despite differing national contexts, Latin Americans share many of the same concerns. The international threats identified as most important are those most likely to have a direct impact on Latin Americans' daily lives, implying that threats are viewed principally from a personal or local perspective. Intermediate-level threats are those related to traditional issues of international security, such as international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, threats viewed with lower intensity are those linked

to national security, specifically border conflicts and the threat posed by guerillas, as well as the emergence of China as a world power.

The populations of the five countries in the 2010-2011 survey coincide in rating the following threats as most important: 1) drug trafficking and organized crime (Colombia 92%, Ecuador 82%, Mexico 82%, Brazil 78%, and Peru 77%); 2) global warming (Colombia 93%, Ecuador 80%, Mexico 80%, Peru 78%, Brazil 74%); 3) global poverty (Colombia 91%, Ecuador 83%, Mexico 76%, Peru 76%, and Brazil 73%), and 4) the scarcity and price of food (Colombia 91%, Mexico 80%, Ecuador 79%, Peru 75%, and Brazil

Table 2.1. International Threats

| Threats                                   | Brazil | Rank | Colombia | Rank | Ecuador | Rank | Mexico | Rank | Peru | Rank | Average |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|------|----------|------|---------|------|--------|------|------|------|---------|
| Drug-trafficking and organized crime      | 78     | 1°   | 92       | 2°   | 82      | 3°   | 82     | 1°   | 77   | 2°   | 82.1    |
| Global warming                            | 74     | 2°   | 93       | 1°   | 80      | 4°   | 80     | 2°   | 78   | 1°   | 80.9    |
| Poverty in the world                      | 73     | 3°   | 91       | 3°   | 83      | 2°   | 76     | 4°   | 76   | 3°   | 80.0    |
| Shortages and high price of food          | 67     | 5°   | 91       | 3°   | 79      | 7°   | 80     | 2°   | 75   | 4°   | 78.4    |
| Nuclear weapons                           | 72     | 4°   | 91       | 3°   | 80      | 4°   | 72     | 5°   | 73   | 5°   | 77.4    |
| Epidemics such as AIDS                    | 66     | 6°   | 87       | 6°   | 85      | 1°   | 72     | 5°   | 73   | 5°   | 76.7    |
| International Terrorism                   | 64     | 7°   | 87       | 6°   | 76      | 8°   | 72     | 5°   | 71   | 7°   | 73.9    |
| Guerrillas                                | 60     | 8°   | 68       | 9°   | 80      | 4°   | 59     | 9°   | 64   | 8°   | 66.2    |
| Border conflicts and territorial disputes | 58     | 9°   | 77       | 8°   | 61      | 9°   | 62     | 8°   | 62   | 9°   | 63.8    |
| The rise of China as a world power        | 30     | 10°  | 44       | 10°  | 40      | 10°  | 40     | 10°  | 23   | 10°  | 35.3    |
| AVERAGE                                   | 64.2   |      | 82.0     |      | 74.6    |      | 69.3   |      | 67.1 |      | 71.5    |

Note: Only show values for those who answered "Grave Threat".



67%). As seen in Table 2.1, each one of these threats is directly related to the security and wellbeing of individuals and their communities.

Populations in each of the five countries also coincide in rating the following international threats as intermediate: 1) the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Colombia 91%, Ecuador 80%, Peru 73%, Mexico 72%, and Brazil 72%); 2) worldwide epidemics such as AIDS (Colombia 87%, Ecuador 85%, Peru 73%, Mexico 72%, and Brazil 66%), although for Ecuadorians global epidemics are the gravest international threat, and 3) international terrorism (Colombia 87%, Ecuador 76%, Mexico 72%, Peru 71%, and Brazil 64%). There is also a remarkable degree of consistency as to the threats rated as least important: 1) guerillas (Ecuador 80%, Colombia 68% Peru 64%, Brazil 60%, and Mexico 59%); 2) border conflicts and territorial disputes (Colombia 77%, Mexico 62%, Peru 62%, Ecuador 61%, and Brazil 58%), and 3) the emergence of China as a global power (Colombia 44%, Ecuador 40%, Mexico 40%, Brazil 30%, and Peru 23%). These threats, with the exception of epidemics, are generally related to international or national security and therefore are perceived as less immediate to individuals' security and wellbeing, except in the case of a regional or international conflict. International threats are thus seen through a local or personal lens, with the threats perceived as most severe tending to have a direct impact upon individuals' daily lives.

### ***Foreign Policy Priorities: Security and Wellbeing at Home, Protecting Nationals Abroad***

To what extent do Latin Americans' priorities and preferred instruments of foreign policy respond to their perception of international threats? Survey results indeed suggest a high level of coherence between the threats perceived as most grave and the

most important foreign policy objectives. However, how important is it to Latin Americans that their countries participate actively on the international stage? Wide majorities in each country want their country to participate actively in international affairs (Colombia 79%, Peru 76%, Brazil 69%, Mexico 68% and Ecuador 67%). Interestingly, Latin Americans' pessimism towards the state of the world doesn't appear to have turned public opinion inward. On the contrary, dissatisfaction with the current global reality seems to have inspired a greater preference for global action. The two countries with the greatest percentage of isolationists—that is, those who would prefer their country to stay out of world affairs—happen to be the two largest, and the two with the greatest potential to wield influence in the region: Mexico and Brazil (22% and 18% prefer their country to “stay out of world affairs”, respectively). One possible reason behind the greater isolation of Brazil may be its relatively low dependence on the exterior, a large internal market, and trade balance—which while positive—measures less than 30% of the country's GDP. Mexico's relative isolation might be explained by the current internal security crisis and the perception that pressing national problems should be dealt with before turning attention to the international community.

With large majorities in each country preferring an active participation in international affairs, what goals and priorities of foreign policy do Latin Americans perceive as most important? For the 2010-2011 survey, individuals in each of the five countries were asked to evaluate 13 objectives of foreign policy according to importance.<sup>4</sup> As Table 2.2 shows, there is a considerable difference among countries in the average importance assigned to each objective. In Colombia, foreign policy goals are viewed with greater importance (for the 13 objectives of foreign policy, the percentage of Colombians responding “very important” is, on average 78.5%), while for Peru and Mexico the 13 foreign policy objectives are

<sup>4</sup> The possible responses rating the importance of foreign policy objectives are, in descending order, “very important”, “somewhat important”, “barely important”, and “not important”. The following tables and analysis only report the percentage of those responding “very important”.



viewed with a medium level of importance (59.9%, and 59.2%, respectively), while for Brazil and Ecuador (47.1% and 46.6%) foreign policy objectives are viewed with lower overall importance. Brazilians' low level of interest, contact, and knowledge of the

world seem to shape their perception of both the severity of international threats and the importance of foreign policy objectives.

As in the case of international threats, we divide the 13 possible objectives of foreign policy into three

Table 2.2. Foreign Policy Objectives

|                                                                    | Brazil      | Lugar | Colombia    | Lugar | Ecuador     | Lugar | Mexico      | Lugar | Peru        | Lugar | Average     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-------------|
| Protecting the environment                                         | 67          | 1°    | 92          | 1°    | 66          | 1°    | 74          | 2°    | 78          | 1°    | 75.3        |
| Fighting drug trafficking and organized crime                      | 66          | 2°    | 90          | 2°    | 57          | 3°    | 75          | 1°    | 72          | 2°    | 71.9        |
| Protecting [COUNTRY NATIONAL] interests in other countries         | 52          | 4°    | 85          | 4°    | 57          | 3°    | 73          | 3°    | 68          | 5°    | 66.9        |
| Protecting our land and sea borders                                | 51          | 5°    | 85          | 4°    | 63          | 2°    | 64          | 6°    | 70          | 3°    | 66.7        |
| Promoting sales of [COUNTRY NATIONAL] products abroad              | 48          | 6°    | 88          | 3°    | 53          | 5°    | 73          | 3°    | 69          | 4°    | 66.0        |
| Attracting foreign investment                                      | 46          | 8°    | 80          | 8°    | 52          | 6°    | 71          | 5°    | 66          | 6°    | 63.0        |
| Combating international terrorism                                  | 48          | 6°    | 81          | 7°    | 50          | 7°    | 62          | 7°    | 66          | 6°    | 61.2        |
| Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons                    | 53          | 3°    | 85          | 4°    | 46          | 8°    | 54          | 9°    | 56          | 9°    | 58.7        |
| Promoting regional integration                                     | 43          | 9°    | 79          | 9°    | 45          | 9°    | 57          | 8°    | 57          | 8°    | 56.1        |
| Helping improve the standard of living in less developed countries | 43          | 9°    | 69          | 10°   | 38          | 10°   | 47          | 10°   | 49          | 10°   | 49.3        |
| Helping to spread democracy to other countries                     | 37          | 11°   | 64          | 11°   | 30          | 11°   | 43          | 11°   | 45          | 11°   | 43.9        |
| Strengthening the United Nations (UN)                              | 34          | 12°   | 63          | 12°   | 27          | 12°   | 43          | 11°   | 43          | 12°   | 42.1        |
| Strengthening the Organization of American States                  | 24          | 13°   | 60          | 13°   | 24          | 13°   | 34          | 13°   | 39          | 13°   | 36.2        |
| <b>AVERAGE</b>                                                     | <b>47.1</b> |       | <b>78.5</b> |       | <b>46.6</b> |       | <b>59.2</b> |       | <b>59.9</b> |       | <b>58.3</b> |

Note: Only shows values for those who answered "Very Important".





categories, according to their perceived relevance: 1) those that are viewed as “very important” by two thirds of the citizens in the countries surveyed; 2) those with a medium level of importance, viewed as “very important” by close to one-half of those surveyed, and 3) those of little importance, viewed as “very important” by less than one-half the publics surveyed.<sup>5</sup> As seen in Table 2.2, there is a considerable degree of consistency between the external threats and the principal foreign policy objectives in the five countries surveyed. In total concordance with international threats, the objectives identified as most important are those directly or indirectly related to issues affecting citizens’ security and wellbeing, while those of medium or lower importance address traditional issues of international security and economic development (terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and regional integration) and strengthening international organizations and values (promoting democracy and cooperation on development). The threats and objectives analyzed here constitute a clear mandate to foreign ministers for a foreign policy that prioritizes social and economic issues over strengthening multilateral organizations. The importance of threats such as global warming, drug trafficking and organized crime, and the scarcity and price of food suggests that the utilitarian rationality of personal wellbeing more aptly describes the needs of Latin Americans than the normative rationality of international solidarity.

In line with perceived threats, the most important foreign policy objectives for Latin Americans are, in decreasing order: 1) protecting the environment (Colombia 92%, Peru 78%, Mexico 74%, Brazil 67%, and Ecuador 66%), which ranks as the most important objective of foreign policy for all of the countries surveyed with the exception of Mexico, for which it is second-most important; 2) fighting drug trafficking and organized crime (Colombia 90%, Mexico 75%, Peru 72%, Brazil 66%, and Ecuador 57%), ranking as most important for Mexico; 3) protecting the

interests of their nationals in other countries (Colombia 85%, Mexico 73%, Peru 68%, Ecuador 57%, and Brazil 52%); 4) protecting land and sea borders (Colombia 85%, Peru 70%, Mexico 64%, Ecuador 63%, and Brazil 51%), whose relevance is greater for Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador (ranking as the second, third, and fourth most important objective of foreign policy, respectively) than for Mexico and Brazil (fifth and sixth most important), most likely due to the prominence of recent border conflicts in the former three countries (Colombia-Venezuela, Colombia-Ecuador, Ecuador-Peru, Peru-Chile); 5) promoting the sale of national products abroad (Colombia 88%, Mexico 73%, Peru 69%, Ecuador 53%, and Brazil 48%); and 6) attracting foreign investment (Colombia 80%, Mexico 71%, Peru 66%, Ecuador 52%, and Brazil 46%). Each of these objectives aims to promote the security and wellbeing of Latin Americans at home as well as abroad, with the only exception being the defense of national borders, more closely related to international security.

The objectives ranked as medium-important are: 1) combatting international terrorism (Colombia 81%, Peru 66%, Mexico 62%, Ecuador 50%, and Brazil 48%); 2) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Colombia 85%, Peru 56%, Mexico 54%, Brazil 53%, and Ecuador 46%), which for Brazil ranks as third-most important, and finally 3) promoting regional integration (Colombia 79%, Mexico 57%, Peru 57%, Ecuador 45%, and Brazil 43%). Once again, there is considerable agreement between the international threats and foreign policy objectives ranked as medium-important, with the exception of nuclear proliferation. As in the case of threats, objectives of medium importance are directly related to traditional issues of international security (terrorism and non-proliferation) and economics (regional integration), themes relatively more distant from the daily lives and wellbeing of Latin Americans.

Finally, the objectives ranked as less important are: 1) helping to improve the living standards of

<sup>5</sup> As in the case of threats, Colombians perceive foreign policy objectives as significantly more important than the publics in the other countries surveyed.





less-developed countries (Colombia 69%, Peru 49%, Mexico 47%, Brazil 43%, and Ecuador 38%); 2) helping to spread democracy to other countries (Colombia 64%, Peru 45%, Mexico 43%, Brazil 37%, and Ecuador 30%); 3) strengthening the United Nations (Colombia 63%, Mexico 43%, Peru 43%, Brazil 34%, and Ecuador 27%), and, ranking last for all countries, 4) strengthening the Organization of American States (Colombia 60%, Peru 39%, Mexico 34%, and Brazil and Ecuador, 24%). Once again, majorities in the five countries coincide in the objectives that are perceived as less important. In comparative terms, the promotion of international values such as democracy and cooperation for development, as well as the strengthening of international organizations, would seem less relevant for a region focused more on its own development than that of other nations.<sup>6</sup> As in the case of threats, foreign policy objectives ranked least important, such as multilateralism and promoting democracy and development abroad, are less relevant to Latin Americans' daily lives, welfare, and security.

In spite of significant differences among the five countries in size and international importance, as well as considerable differences in interest and knowledge (as shown in the first chapter), there is a great deal of consistency and coherence between the perceived threats and principal objectives of foreign policy, where broad majorities want their countries to participate more actively on the international stage to promote security and wellbeing at home. Traditional foreign policy objectives such as international security and the global economy are viewed as having a medium level of importance, while promoting democratic values and strengthening international organizations are rated as less important.

### ***International Prestige and Instruments of Foreign Policy***

Latin Americans in the five countries surveyed want their countries to participate actively in world affairs, and have specific priorities for foreign policy. However, what capabilities do Latin American countries possess for taking action on the international stage? What foreign policy instruments do Latin Americans prefer to achieve their foreign policy objectives? In order to assess each country's capabilities in the international sphere, citizens in the five countries surveyed were asked to evaluate their country's international importance at three points in time: presently, retrospectively, and prospectively.

As seen in Figure 2.3, majorities in each country believe their country to be "very important" on the world stage, although with some variations in intensity (in descending order: Mexico 57%, Ecuador 56%, Colombia 51%, Brazil 49%, and Peru 42%). Mexicans' perception of their country's international relevance in the present is eight percentage points higher than in Brazil, while Ecuadorians' and Colombians' perception of their country's importance is also higher than Brazilians'.


On the other hand, Brazilians are much more likely to believe that their country has gained importance than Mexicans. In order to compare how countries' perceptions of their relevance have changed on a global level, citizens in each country were asked to evaluate their country's importance both retrospectively and prospectively—that is, whether their country has gained or lost importance over the past ten years, and whether it will continue to do so. Majorities in the five countries surveyed believe the importance of their country has increased over the past decade, although

<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that those able to identify the acronyms of international organizations are more likely to view the strengthening of international organizations as important. Those with greater incomes and males (with the exception of Brazil), and for the case of the UN, those who are younger, tend to support the strengthening of these institutions in considerably greater proportions. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a clear relationship between the promotion of democracy or cooperation for development and gender, age, or income.




**Figure 2.3. International Importance**


**CURRENT**



**PAST**



**FUTURE**



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".



with some variation. In descending order, perceptions of increased international importance over the past decade are: Colombia 81%, Brazil 79%, Peru 75%, Ecuador 74%, and Mexico 68%. While Mexicans' perception of their country's importance in the present is higher than that of Brazilians', a higher percentage of Brazilians than Mexicans believe their country has gained in importance over the past decade, with a gap of 11 percentage points. This difference is the same regarding evaluations of future importance: 76% of Colombians, 75% of Brazilians, 71% of Peruvians, 68% of Ecuadorians, and 64% of Mexicans believe their country will grow in importance in the decade to come— a gap of 11 percentage points between Mexicans and Brazilians.

With respect to international importance, two findings stand out. First, Brazilians' relative optimism, and Mexicans' relative pessimism concerning the current global situation seem to influence their perceptions of their countries' importance, both retrospectively as well as prospectively. Second, Colombians' perception of their country's importance, as well as their knowledge and interest in international affairs, is considerably higher than in other countries. Although Colombians assign great importance to their relations with the world, there is also little discrimination between the intensity of threats and the importance of objectives—most threats are “grave”, and no objective is unimportant. It would seem then, that Colombia's ambitions are greater than its potential weight both regionally and throughout the world. Nevertheless, Colombia's growing ambitions and desire to participate actively in international affairs mark a turn in the country's international relations after years of being isolated by internal conflicts. On the other hand, Mexicans' perception of their country's importance and influence is lower than its potential by almost any measure (population, territory, GDP, geographic size, or trade). Despite being overtaken by Brazil as the most important country in Latin America, Mexico continues to rank among the top ten to fifteen powers in the world.

A majority of Latin Americans prefer that their countries take an active part in world affairs, and view their countries as highly relevant on the world stage: majorities in each country believe that their nation has gained in importance over the past ten years and will continue to do so in the decade to come. With large majorities in favor of international engagement, which instruments do Latin Americans prefer to achieve their foreign policy objectives? Do Latin Americans prefer the exercise of “hard” (military) power, “intermediate” (economic and commercial ties) power, or “soft” (diplomacy and culture) power?


Taking into account the five nations' relative capabilities on the international stage—Brazil and Mexico are mid-level powers with significant regional influence in Latin America, while Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are emerging countries whose relevance is greatest in the Andean region—in the past few decades Latin Americans have eschewed the use of hard (military) power in favor of soft power (diplomatic, juridical, and culture). Since the beginning of the 1990s (and for Brazil, beginning in the early 2000s), the five countries have pursued a gradual process of opening their economies to international trade, signing a series of sub-regional trade agreements (NAFTA, Mercosur, and CAN), and have negotiated a wide range of bilateral agreements and preferential accords with countries across the world. In this sense, trade has increasingly served as an instrument of foreign policy. Finally, even giving the asymmetry of power of Mexico and Brazil compared to the areas under their regional influence (Central and South America, respectively), both countries have preferred the exercise of soft and intermediate power in their bilateral and sub-regional relations, and in their relations with Latin America as a whole.

Given the relative capabilities and limitations of Latin American countries, it is not surprising that a majority of Latin Americans in the four countries surveyed (unfortunately, this question was not applied in Brazil) prefer the use of soft and intermediate over military power. As seen in Figure 2.4, wide majorities of Latin



**Figure 2.4. Foreign Policy Instruments \***

*In order to increase (COUNTRY)'s influence in the world, how much do you agree with (COUNTRY) utilizing the following resource...?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "Not Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil.

Americans surveyed are "very much" or "somewhat" in agreement that promoting culture (Colombia 95%, Mexico 91%, Ecuador 87%, and Peru 85%), commercial ties (Colombia 95%, Mexico 90%, Ecuador 89%, and Peru 86%), and diplomacy (Colombia 89%, Ecuador 83%, Mexico 79%, and Peru 75%) be used to increase a country's influence in the world.

Opinion is more divided over the use of military power, although there is some variation across coun-

try (in agreement and disagreement, respectively: Colombia, 42% and 55%, Ecuador 49% and 44%, Mexico 51% and 43%, and Peru, 44% and 46%). In Mexico and Ecuador, support for the use of military force is slightly greater than opposition, while in Colombia opposition is slightly greater, and in Peru the population is divided almost exactly in half. In some countries, the level of rejection of military power may be related to the level of confidence in the military:



high among Mexicans and Ecuadorians, where the use of military power has greater acceptance (67% and 62%, respectively, trust the army “very much” or “somewhat”), and medium in Peru (41% trust). In the case of Colombia, this relationship does not seem to hold true. While the military is the most trusted institution (71%) out of the five national institutions measured in the survey, Colombians firmly reject use of military force abroad. One possible explanation for this seeming contradiction is that Colombians are overwhelmingly opposed to the use of force in general, after decades of internal conflict.

In sum, there is broad agreement among Latin Americans not only with respect to the threats and objectives of foreign policy considered as most important, but also over the importance of their countries on the international stage and desire for active participation in world affairs. Latin Americans also coincide in the instruments they favor in order to achieve foreign policy objectives, with a broad consensus backing the use of “soft” over “hard” power. With the most immediate threats perceived to have a direct impact on Latin Americans’ security and welfare, Latin Americans opt for a foreign policy that produces concrete benefits at home, and maximizes the use of diplomatic, cultural, and commercial ties.

### ***Evaluating Foreign and Domestic Policy in Latin America***

How satisfied are Latin Americans with the public policies put into place by their governments? How do evaluations of foreign policy compare to evaluations of domestic policy? Do citizens coincide in their evaluations of public policies, as they do with respect to the other variables measured in this chapter? The 2010-2011 version of the survey asked citizens in the five countries to evaluate four areas of public policy (foreign policy, economic policy, public security, and education). Unlike evaluations of threats, objectives, and instruments of foreign policy, evaluations of public policies show considerable variation over

the five countries surveyed, both with respect to the level of satisfaction with each policy area, and in the order of policies most highly evaluated.


Two findings stand out with respect to Latin Americans’ evaluations of their governments’ performance. First, there are significant differences in how well public policies are evaluated in each of the five countries surveyed. The average of those who agree “strongly” or “somewhat” with their governments’ performance for the four policy areas – a measure of how favorably citizens view their governments’ performance overall – varies considerably. While Ecuadorians and Brazilians are highly satisfied with their governments’ performance in the four policy areas (73.5%, and 71%, on average, “strongly” or “somewhat” agree), Mexicans and Peruvians are more critical (50% and 49.3% agree), while Colombians fall into an intermediate range, with 61.3% in agreement (see Figure 2.5).

Second, there is a lack of consensus over the order and degree of the policies best evaluated. Citizens in each of the five countries evaluate public policies differently, providing evidence of their ability to discriminate between policies and evaluate each one based on its effectiveness in each country. Brazil is the country with the smallest gap between the most and least favorably evaluated policies: economic policy at the top, with 79% in agreement, and security policy ranked lowest, with 66% in agreement – a gap of thirteen percentage points. Foreign policy (72%) and education (67%) are the second and third ranked policies, respectively, for Brazilians. Citizens in Mexico and Colombia, on the other hand, show a much higher variation in their evaluation of the most and least favored policies (22 and 23 percentage points, respectively). In Colombia, security policy enjoys the highest level of support (70%), followed by foreign policy (64%), economic policy (63%), and education (48%); while in Mexico, education is first (64%), followed by foreign policy (48%), economic policy (47%), and security (41%). The evaluation of public policies in Ecuador is much higher, with its least favorably evaluated policy – security (65%) – evaluated more favorably than the most favorably evaluated policy for Peru – economic policy (56%).



**Figure 2.5. Government Performance**

*Do you agree or disagree with the (COUNTRY NATIONAL) government's performance regarding...?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "Not Answer".

Like Mexicans, Ecuadorians are most satisfied with their government's performance with respect to education (86%), followed by economic policy (73%), foreign policy (70%), and security (65%), while for Peru, economic policy is the most favorably evaluated

(56%), followed by foreign policy (54%), education (49%), and security (38%). With the exception of Ecuador, foreign policy is the second most favorably evaluated policy for all of the countries surveyed.





Finally, Colombians' evaluation of their government's performance suggests an alternative reading of their goals and model for international engagement. First, Colombia is the only country to evaluate government performance in the category of public security positively –70% of the population are “strongly” or “somewhat” in agreement, making public security the best evaluated of the four policies. For the other four countries, public security is among the worst evaluated areas, occupying the fourth or third position (Brazil 66%, Ecuador 65%, Mexico 41%, and Peru 38%, in descending order by agreement). Second, Colombians are the most likely of all the four countries to answer “do not know” in each of the four policy areas surveyed (17% in public security, 22% in economic policy, 23% in foreign policy, and 30% in education), while the percentage of the population responding “do not know” in the other four countries tends not to be greater than 8% in each area, with the exception of foreign policy, the area with the highest percentage responding “do not know” (Brazil 11%, Ecuador 9%, Mexico 12%, and Peru 14%). Nevertheless, even in the case of foreign policy, in no country does the percentage of those who responded that they “do not know” come close to that of Colombians (23%). This second point may be interpreted in different ways: that for Colombians, foreign policy is less visible to the public; that the

level of complexity in foreign policy is greater than that of other policies, and therefore, requires a greater level of information to sustain an informed opinion; that foreign policy is viewed with less interest among the public; or that the mechanisms of social communication of the government are ineffective, among others. Whichever the implication, Colombians' greater ambiguity with respect to government policies opens a window for decision makers in foreign policy to provide greater and clearer information to the public, building consensus for policies that have greater overall support.

The citizens of Latin America, as observed in the five countries included in the 2010-2011 edition of the survey, have sent a clear signal to their foreign ministries: Latin Americans want a more active foreign policy –a policy preference that enjoys wide support among the five countries– making extensive use of the instruments of soft power (culture, diplomacy, and trade) rather than military power, and, that in a direct and accountable manner, promotes the objectives of foreign policy that are most likely to contribute to the population's wellbeing. Putting this agenda into practice would undoubtedly improve citizens' evaluation –already high, except for Ecuador– of foreign policy, and more closely reflect the interests and preferences of their citizens •







## CHAPTER 3

WHAT IS LATIN AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD?  
VISIONS OF COUNTRIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS





## WHAT IS LATIN AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD? VISIONS OF COUNTRIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

**H**ow do Latin Americans see themselves in relation to the world? What opinion do they have of other countries, regions, and international institutions? What are the points of agreement and possible differences among the various Latin American publics in their vision of the world? The four sections of this chapter attempt to answer these questions, exploring Latin Americans' affinities, priorities, and preferences in international relations, as well as the costs that international action may imply. The first section measures Latin Americans' opinions of distinct countries, leaders, and regions across the globe, comparing them with Latin America's strategic priorities. While Latin Americans coincide in the countries they view most favorably, as well as those they hold in less regard, there is less agreement over the regions and priorities viewed as most important. These conflicting priorities result in two distinct global visions: one for countries whose strategic interests are strongly grounded in the American continent (Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico) and another for those with more global aspirations (Brazil and Peru). The second section reviews relations and expectations for action within Latin America. While some countries are more eager than others to assume a role of regional leadership, the five countries coincide in recognizing

Brazil as the undisputed regional leader. Regarding a possible regional conflict, countries disagree over how to respond: some countries are more proactive, preferring to act unilaterally instead of waiting for multilateral organizations to act, while other countries are more reactive, preferring to work through regional or international organizations. On the other hand, Latin Americans overwhelmingly agree on the type and extent of regional integration, prioritizing the free movement of goods and investment while rejecting the free movement of people. The third section is centered on the attitudes, opinions, and expectations of Latin Americans towards other regions of the world, and the United States, Spain, and China in particular. For the 2010-2011 edition of the survey, there are large differences between pro and anti-American populations, each one with a separate calculus of the costs and benefits of relations with the United States. Finally, as many Latin American countries celebrate the bicentennial of their independence from Spain, it is interesting to note that this country is more trusted and admired than the United States. The last section of the chapter describes Latin Americans' evaluations of international actors and organizations, with greater focus on the United Nations and the members of the UN Security Council.




### Who are the Favorites in Latin America?

In order to measure attitudes and preferences towards other countries, survey respondents were asked to evaluate a series of countries on a scale of 0-100, where 0 represents a very unfavorable opinion, 50 is neutral, and 100 represents a very favorable opinion. Results are reported in Figure 3.1 for each of the publics surveyed. Two findings stand out with respect to Latin Americans' evaluation of other countries. First, average evaluations differ significantly in the five countries surveyed. While in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, the average number of points awarded is between 52 and 55 points, Peruvians award an aver-

age of 49 points, while in Brazil, the average number of points awarded is 41 points. In general, Brazilians' evaluations are characterized by a lower number of points for each country, which may be interpreted as an indication of Brazilians' greater isolation (as observed throughout this report).


Second, the order of countries evaluated is distinct in each of the countries surveyed, although Latin Americans generally agree on the highest and lowest ranked countries. The United States is among the most favorably evaluated countries for each of the publics surveyed: it is ranked first in Ecuador (with 69 average points) and Peru (68 average points); second in Brazil (52 points) and Mexico (68 points), and third in Co-

Figure 3.1. Country Thermometer





**Figure 3.1. Country Thermometer**  
*Continuation*



lombia (72 points).<sup>1</sup> Averaging evaluations across the five countries surveyed, the United States receives 66 points, making it the most favorably evaluated country overall. Close behind are Spain (with an average of 62 points across the five countries surveyed), Japan (62 average points), Canada (61 points), Germany (59 points), and China (58 points), although these countries are ranked in a distinct order in each of the publics surveyed. Brazil is the highest ranked Latin American country and is among the most highly rated of all coun-

tries: it is ranked first in Colombia (72 points) while coming in third in Ecuador (62 points). When each public's evaluation of Brazil is averaged, Brazil ranks as the second most favorably evaluated country, after the United States, (64 points), an important showing of regional solidarity, and, as will be discussed in the next section, of Brazil's emergence as the region's new leader. Argentina and Chile are the next most favorably evaluated of the Latin American countries included in the survey, in second and third place, respectively.

<sup>1</sup> Due to rounding, Colombians seem to evaluate the United States with the same number of points as Brazil and Canada, as seen in Figure 3.1. However, average evaluations for the United States are actually a few decimal points lower than these two countries. Similarly, Mexicans seem to evaluate the United States and Canada equally, ranking both first with 68 points. However, Canada is rated more favorably than the United States by 0.6 decimal points, making it the highest evaluated country for Mexicans.



The five populations surveyed also coincide in rating Iran least favorably: Iran ranks last in Brazil and Mexico, and second to last in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Iran is also the country with the lowest number of points when averaged by the five publics surveyed, receiving an average of 37 points. Venezuela is the least favorably evaluated Latin American country when averaged by the five publics surveyed—with 40 average points—and is ranked last in Colombia and Peru. Ecuadorians, on the other hand, rank Colombia last. Among the countries evaluated least favorably are also various countries from Latin America, with El Salvador and Colombia receiving 42 and 43 points, respectively, when averaged by the five publics surveyed, just below Cuba, Ecuador, and Guatemala (each with 44 points on average).

In sum, Latin Americans show considerable agreement over the countries evaluated most and least favorably. On the one hand, Latin Americans rank as most favorable countries those with whom they hold historical ties and close relations (the United States and Spain) as well as countries they perceive as examples of success for their level of development and stability (Germany, Canada, and Japan) or fast pace of economic growth (Brazil and China). On the other hand, countries that in recent years have been at the center of international conflicts (Iran and Israel) and regional confrontations (Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Venezuela), or with lower levels of development and problems of criminal violence (El Salvador and Guatemala) tend to be ranked lowest.

Of the five countries surveyed in the 2010-2011 edition of *The Americas and the World*, Brazil was the highest evaluated by fellow Latin Americans, followed by Mexico, Peru, and, on the lower end of the scale, Colombia and Ecuador. Two important conclusions can be drawn from Latin Americans' evaluations of countries. First, higher opinions of Brazil and Mexico coincide with the status of the two countries as regional leaders, as discussed in the next section. Second, there is notable tension

between the countries of the Andean region, and especially Colombia and Ecuador: Colombians rank Ecuador among the least favorable of the countries in the survey, while Ecuadorians rank Colombia last, just below their other neighbor, Peru.

How do heads of state rank in comparison to the countries they lead? Survey respondents were asked to evaluate a series of heads of state on the same scale applied to countries, with 100 points indicating a highly favorable opinion, 50 points neutral, and 0 highly unfavorable. First, it is important to point out—as noted in the first chapter—that Latin Americans lack basic knowledge of foreign leaders, even those of neighboring countries—with the exception of Colombians, whose knowledge of foreign leaders is much higher overall. On the other hand, Brazilians' knowledge of foreign leaders is even lower than in Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru.


As seen in Figure 3.2, those who do have knowledge of foreign leaders tend to evaluate them similarly, agreeing in most cases over the most and least favorably evaluated. In the majority of countries where the survey was carried out, the leader with the highest evaluation is then-president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (with more than 60 points among each of the publics surveyed, and an average of 70 points in Colombia). The next-highest evaluated head of state is the president of the United States, Barack Obama, also rated with more than 60 points by each public—except for in Ecuador where Obama is ranked higher than Lula, and in Colombia where Obama and Lula share the same position. Colombia and Ecuador also stand out for ranking their own presidents highest. Among those evaluated in the middle of the scale are, in third place, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, head of government of Spain (with a range of 35 points in Brazil to 61 points in Colombia), and in fourth place, Mexican president Felipe Calderón (with a range of 34 points in Brazil to 62 points in Mexico). Peruvians are much more critical of their own leader than other publics surveyed, ranking then-president Alan García second to last, with only 39 points.<sup>2</sup> Latin Americans

<sup>2</sup> Peruvians' low evaluation of their president is consistent with their ranking of the presidency as one of the least trusted institutions. As reported in Chapter 1, only 27% of the population "very much" or "somewhat" trust the president, ranking the presidency second to last of all institutions, just above trust in politicians.





Figure 3.2. Heads of State Thermometer



also coincide in the leaders worst evaluated. The worst evaluated leader is Hugo Chávez, with 31 points on average for the five publics surveyed, followed by Raul Castro, ranked second to last, with 38 average points, with the only exception being Ecuador, where Castro is evaluated worst than Chávez.

Second, there is a similar order to Latin Americans' evaluations of countries and their leaders: the most favorably evaluated countries are also governed by the highest evaluated leaders, and vice versa. On the one hand, Brazil and Brazilian ex-president Lula da Silva are among the highest evaluated by the five publics surveyed, as is the United States and U.S. president Barack Obama. On the other hand, Venezuela and Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez are among the worst evaluated by the five publics surveyed, followed by Cuba and Raúl Castro. What

might explain this coincidence? Does the high evaluations of the U.S. depend on the popularity in the region of U.S. president Barack Obama? Does the recent boom in economic growth in Brazil influence opinions of Brazilian ex-president Lula da Silva? Or does the controversial figure of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez play a part in negative evaluations of Venezuela? These are questions that merit further research.

Finally, how do evaluations of countries and leaders compare with regions viewed as strategic priorities? In order to compare attitudes towards regions, we organized all countries ranked into the following geographical blocs:<sup>3</sup> *North America* (Canada and the United States); *Asia Pacific* (China and Japan); *Central America and the Caribbean* (Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dominican

<sup>3</sup> Instead of grouping countries by continent such as Asia or America, we decided to group countries into continental sub-regions that are relatively more homogenous. Africa was excluded from this analysis, as South Africa was the only African country to be evaluated in the 2010-2011 survey.




Republic); the *Southern Cone* (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay); *Europe* (Germany and Spain); the *Middle East* (Israel and Iran), and the *Andean Region* (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela).<sup>4</sup> The average evaluation for each region consists of the average of the scores of its corresponding countries.

In contrast to evaluations of countries and leaders, the five publics vary considerably in the ranking of regions, shown in Figure 3.3. While for Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Mexicans the highest evaluated re-

gion is North America (72, 64, and 68 average points, respectively), for Brazilians and Peruvians this region is Asia Pacific (50 points and 66 points, respectively). The prominence of Asia Pacific for Brazilians and Peruvians may be due to the strengthening of ties between the two Latin American countries and the countries of this region (among the five countries surveyed, Brazil and Peru have the fastest growing economies, due in no small part to their expanding trade with the countries of Asia).<sup>5</sup> While North America is the second highest evaluated region for

Figure 3.3. Regions Thermometer



<sup>4</sup> Brazil and Mexico were excluded from the regional blocs for two reasons. The first reason is conceptual: for their geographical, cultural, and commercial ties, Brazil and Mexico stand apart from their respective regions (Mexico is geographically part of North America but shares its southern border with the countries of Central America; Brazil shares borders with both countries of the Andean Region and the Southern Cone). The second reason is empirical: after running diverse factorial and correlational analyses, it is clear that neither Brazil nor Mexico fit into the regional groupings described above. These results are available on request.

<sup>5</sup> According to data from the World Trade Organization (WTO), by 2009 China had already become the second and third largest trading partners of Brazil and Peru, respectively. Almost 13.2% of Brazilian exports in this year were destined to China, while Chinese exports accounted for 12.5% of total imports in Brazil. In the case of Peru, exports to China represent 15.3% of Peru's total exports, while Chinese exports account for 14.9% of the Andean country's imports. Commercial relations between the two countries were further deepened with Peru's signing of a free trade agreement with China (in effect since March of 2010), while in Brazil, the United States—until recently Brazil's second largest trading partner—was displaced by China, becoming Brazil's third largest trading partner. Source: [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org).



Brazilians and Peruvians (49 and 63 points, respectively), Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Mexicans rank Europe second (67 points in Colombia, and 64 in Ecuador and Mexico), and Asia Pacific third.<sup>6</sup>

In spite of differences in the order and average number of points assigned to other regions, the five publics coincide in their evaluations of the following two regions. The first is the Middle East: this region is the worst evaluated in each country –from 25 points in Brazil to 49 points in Ecuador. As mentioned previously, in recent years, the countries of this region have been at the center of international conflicts, one of the characteristics shared by lower-evaluated countries. The five publics also coincide in ranking the Southern Cone fourth overall, the highest among the Latin American sub-regions –from 42 points in Brazil to 59 points in Colombia.<sup>7</sup>

There is also an interesting pattern with respect to divergences: the regions evaluated least favorably tend to be those that are geographically closest. While Brazilians and Mexicans rank Central America and the Caribbean last out of the sub-regions in Latin America (33 and 46 points, respectively), Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Peruvians rank the Andean Region last among Latin America sub-regions (45, 50, and 42 points, respectively). As mentioned above, there seems to be a general tendency in the countries belonging to this region to evaluate their neighbors poorly, which may be due to territorial disputes, the ongoing internal conflict in Colombia, ideological differences between governments in the region and the possible costs of regional coordination, despite the existence of a decades-old effort to promote regional integration –the Andean Community of Nations.

Given the differences in regional evaluations, do evaluations of regions correspond to those ranked as strategic priorities? Not entirely. When asked explicitly “What region of the world should your country pay more attention to?” majorities in each country identified Latin America as the highest priority, although in varying intensities. As Figure 3.4 shows, one out of every four citizens in Brazil and Peru consider Latin America to be the most important regional priority, while almost half of Colombians and Ecuadorians rank Latin America as most important. The only exception is Mexico, where 36% of the population identifies North America as the highest priority, which may be explained by the importance of contact and economic ties between Mexico and the region. For Mexicans, Latin America ranks as the second highest priority, identified as such by a slightly higher percentage of the population than in Brazil and Peru. The second-ranked region for Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador is North America, although in percentages considerably smaller than the percentage of Mexicans who rank North America as their first priority. On the other hand, Europe is the second most important regional priority in Peru, favored by 22% of the population (a percentage higher than that of North America).

When it comes to regional priorities, Brazilians and to a lesser extent, Peruvians, have a more global vision than their counterparts in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico: their preferences are less concentrated in the American continent and more open to other regions of the world. Around 35% of those surveyed in Brazil and Peru identify a region of the Americas as a strategic priority, compared to more than 60% of the population in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico.

<sup>6</sup> Alternatively, including Mexico in the region of North America and Brazil in the Southern Cone tends to distort regional evaluations in two ways. First, the relatively high evaluation of North America would be brought down on including Mexico by two to four points, while evaluations of the Southern Cone would rise by two or three points in spite of lower overall evaluations of Latin American countries. This redistribution has an important impact on the rankings of regions: North America would drop one position, ranking just behind Europe in Brazil, fall to second place in Ecuador (where Europe would rank first), and would fall to one position behind Europe in Peru. On the other hand, the Southern Cone would be ranked one position higher in Colombia with the addition of Brazil, in third place above Asia Pacific. These results are available on request.


<sup>7</sup> Comparing these results to the individual evaluations of Brazil and Mexico verifies the difficulty of including these two countries in one of Latin America’s sub-regions. As mentioned in the previous note, the inclusion of Brazil tends to raise evaluations of the Southern Cone (evaluations of Brazil are slightly higher than the Southern Cone) while the average evaluation of Mexico is below that of the Southern Cone, but above all other Latin American regions.



**Figure 3.4. Regional Priorities**

*What region of the world should (COUNTRY) pay more attention to?*  
(%)

■ North America    ■ Latin America    ■ Europe    ■ Asia  
■ Middle East    ■ Africa    ■ Oceania



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

However, in spite of the growing importance of Asia for the economies of Brazil and Peru, this region is defined as a strategic priority by only 10% of Brazilians and 12% of Peruvians, respectively.

Finally, with the exception of Mexico, the regions evaluated most positively do not correspond to those ranked as strategic priorities: North America, Europe, and Asia are the best evaluated regions, but they are not ranked as important priorities. On the contrary,

the regions of Latin America are among the worst evaluated; however, a wide majority of Latin Americans agree that Latin America is the region to which their countries should direct more attention. Only for Mexicans is the best-evaluated region also the top strategic priority: North America. Despite Mexico's supposed "abandonment" of Latin America after the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexicans are divided over whether Mexico is



more North American or Latin American, calling into question expectations that Mexico would become more closely associated with its neighbors to the north—or more broadly, whether regional integration can transform identity, as discussed in Chapter 1.

In general, Latin Americans are more likely to favor countries that are perceived as examples of success for their level of economic development and stability or current pace of economic growth, as well as those with which they maintain close relations due to important historical and commercial ties. On the other hand, countries that have been at the center of recent international conflicts, or those with lower levels of development and problems of criminal violence, are evaluated less favorably. The most favorably evaluated countries are also governed by the most favorably evaluated leaders, making it difficult to distinguish whether evaluations of leaders depend on sentiment towards individual countries, or whether countries are evaluated according to the popularity of their leaders. Additionally, the most favorably evaluated regions are not necessarily those to which Latin Americans believe their country should direct more attention. However, Latin Americans' preferences can be broadly categorized into two types of countries: those whose strategic priorities are anchored in the Americas (Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico) and those with more global aspirations (Brazil and Peru). Nevertheless, considering the five countries surveyed as a whole, a majority of those interviewed rank Latin America as the highest strategic priority. The next sections will examine the visions of Latin Americans with respect to their own region.

### ***Latin America: Looking Inward***

How do Latin Americans perceive the current reality in the region? What are their expectations for their country's role, and which country do they view as most influential? First, as reported in Chapter 2, perceptions of Latin America are for the most part more optimistic than perceptions of the current global reality: wide majorities in the five countries

are optimistic with respect to the current situation in Latin America. Latin Americans also evaluate the region positively in both retrospective and prospective terms. As shown in Figure 2.2, more than 50% of Latin Americans surveyed in all five countries believe that the region today is better off than it was ten years ago, and 50% of Latin Americans believe that the region will continue to improve in the decade to come. Brazilians are particularly optimistic towards the region: almost 70% evaluate the region favorably, both retrospectively as well as prospectively. On the other hand, Mexicans are more pessimistic.

Second, Latin Americans are generally optimistic when it comes to relations with other countries in the region, both retrospectively and with respect to the decade to come. As seen in Figure 3.5, more than 60% of Latin Americans believe that relations with other Latin American countries have improved compared to the last decade and will continue to improve in the decade to come. The exception, once again, is Mexico, where only 49% consider that their country's relations with Latin America have improved compared to the previous decade, and only 55% expect relations to improve in the decade to come. Ecuadorians are slightly less optimistic than citizens in the other countries surveyed with respect to the decade to come: 57% of Ecuadorians expect relations with other countries in Latin America to improve in the next ten years. Once again, Brazilians are the most optimistic: 70% believe that relations with Latin America have improved over the last decade and will continue to improve in the decade to come.


Given the general climate of optimism, what expectations do Latin Americans have for their country's role in the region? Citizens in the five countries were asked whether they want their country to assume a role of leadership in the region, or to work with other Latin American countries on an equal basis without assuming a leadership role. As Figure 3.6 shows, Brazil is the only country that clearly perceives itself as a regional leader—a plurality of Brazilians, 49%, consider that their country should assume a position of leadership in Latin America. On the contrary, a majority of Ecuadorians and Mexicans

**Figure 3.5. Relations with Latin America**


Worse The same Better

**PAST**

*Compared with 10 years ago, do you think that your country's relations with the rest of Latin America are better or worse?*  
(%)

**FUTURE**

*And in 10 years, do you think that your country's relations with the rest of Latin America will be better or worse?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".


prefer their country to work with other countries in the region on an equal basis without pursuing a leadership role. Colombians and Peruvians are more divided, with equal parts either wanting their country to assume a leadership role or preferring that other countries lead. It is important to point out that a small, but nevertheless significant, percentage of Mexicans (13%) would prefer their country to stand apart from regional affairs altogether.

With many countries unwilling to assume a leadership role, is there any country that Latin Americans think could lead? For a majority of Latin Americans, Brazil has been the most influential country in the region in the past ten years. As seen in Figure 3.6, 62% of Brazilians, 40% of Colombians, and 23% of Peruvians consider Brazil to be the most influential country in the past ten years, a higher percentage than any other country, with the exception of Ecua-



**Figure 3.6. Views on Leadership and Cooperation with Latin America**

Which of the following statements is closest to what you think (COUNTRY)'s role in Latin America should be?  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

dor, where 32% believe the most influential country is Venezuela. Brazil is also viewed as the most influential country by Mexicans, although it is important to point out that in each country, and especially in Mexico, a large proportion of individuals either did not respond or responded that they "do not know": 67% in Mexico, and 43% in Peru. Brazil is also viewed as the most influential with respect to the decade to come: 63% of Brazilians, 33% of Colombians, and 21% of Peruvians consider that Brazil will be the most influential country for the decade to come. As in their evaluation of the previous ten years, Ecuadorians believe that the most influential country in the next ten years will be Venezuela (20%). In Mexico, 70% of those surveyed did not respond; among those who did, a plurality named Mexico as most influential, followed closely by Brazil.

In brief, there is a clear consensus that Brazil has been and will continue to be the regional leader, not only by the vote of its own citizens, but also of the other Latin American publics surveyed. Brazil's

greater influence is consistent with the results reported in the last section: Brazil is the most highly evaluated Latin American country and its former president, Lula da Silva, the most highly evaluated leader. The perception of Brazil as a regional leader and as the most influential country is also consistent with Brazilians' elevated optimism toward the region and their relations with other Latin American countries. At the other extreme, Mexicans' pessimism is much lower than their country's potential for regional leadership: Mexicans are not only the most pessimistic toward the region and their relations with other countries in Latin America, but also prefer to step aside from leadership in regional affairs. Of the remaining countries, Peru and Colombia look toward a possible leadership role in the region, although with certain ambivalence, while Ecuadorians are more reserved.

For Latin Americans, what risks and challenges would regional leadership imply? Any potential leader in the region would face two distinct chal-





lenges: on the one hand, dealing with regional conflicts, whether within individual countries or involving several ones, and on the other, the challenge of advancing regional integration. The following paragraphs will report Latin Americans' preferences regarding both of these situations. First, how realistic do Latin Americans believe the possibility of a potential armed conflict in the region might be? On the one hand, for a significant percentage of Ecuadorians and Peruvians (44% and 43%, respectively) there is less probability of regional conflict today than in the previous ten years. On the other hand, for Colombians and Mexicans, the probability of a regional conflict is greater (43% and 42%). Brazilians are divided: 36% consider that the probability of an armed conflict in the region is greater than in the past ten years, while for 38%, the probability of a regional conflict is less likely. These variations may reflect the perceived importance of various security threats in each country. As discussed in Chapter 2, for a majority of Latin Americans (See Table 2.1) the possibility of armed conflicts, territorial disputes, and guerillas are seen as less relevant threats.

In the case of a possible armed conflict, which country do Latin Americans think would be responsible? For the majority of Brazilians and Ecuadorians, Colombia is the country that has generated the most conflict in the past decade. On the other hand, for Mexicans and Peruvians, Venezuela is the country that has generated the most conflict. In the case of Peru, it is important to point out that the next most conflictive country is Chile, which may be explained by historic tensions between the two countries. With respect to the most conflictive country in the decade to come, opinion is similar, although there is a greater percentage of the survey sample in each country that did not respond or does not know (24% in Colombia, 35% in Brazil, close to 40% in Ecuador and Peru, and 64% in Mexico). Of those who did respond, the most conflictive country for the decade to come is Venezuela, with the exception of Ecuador, where the country perceived as most conflictive is Colombia (40%). As might be expected, 23% of Peruvians believe that the country that will generate the most conflicts in the

decade to come is Chile. These results are consistent with the high level of tension observed between countries in the Andean region in the previous section. Countries in the Andean region tend to evaluate their neighbors least positively, and hold a low opinion of the region overall. Unlike Brazil and Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are more likely to rank the protection of borders—both land and sea—among the most important foreign policy objectives.

Although the past few years have seen the consolidation of democracy throughout the region, Latin America has not been entirely without conflict. Recent events such as border tensions in the Andean region and the 2009 coup in Honduras have made possible responses to a regional conflict even more relevant. With this in mind, what action do Latin Americans prefer their country to take in response to a possible conflict in the region? Latin Americans were asked how their country should respond in the hypothetical case in which an army or armed group were to overthrow a democratically elected government in the region. In general, public opinion in Latin America is highly divided. A relative majority of Brazilians (34%), Mexicans (38%), and Peruvians (32%) want their countries to condemn such actions publicly, without breaking diplomatic relations. On the contrary, a plurality of Colombians (38%) and Ecuadorians (36%) prefer that their country wait for the reaction of international organizations and then act. Who do Latin Americans believe should act to resolve possible conflicts? Broad pluralities of Brazilians (44%), Mexicans (58%), and Peruvians (44%), as well as a smaller plurality of Colombians (37%) and Ecuadorians (31%) consider that the United Nations should act to resolve the situation, rather than a regional group of countries. However, it is important to point out that a quarter of Colombians and Ecuadorians believe that a group of countries in the region should act alone to resolve regional conflicts. Only a tiny percentage of those surveyed consider that the OAS or United States should be called upon to resolve conflicts in the region.

While Latin Americans agree on the country with the greatest influence in the region—Brazil—there is a



lack of consensus over the possibility of a conflict in the region and the proper response. Without a doubt, for a majority of the publics interviewed, the country most likely to be responsible for a conflict in the region is Venezuela. This affirmation coincides with the low evaluations of Venezuela and Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez observed in the first section of this chapter. Nevertheless, Colombia is identified as a source of possible conflict among some of the publics interviewed, while both retrospectively and prospectively, Peruvians name Chile, a sign of growing tension between the two countries. With respect to a possible conflict in the region, two points stand out. First, the percentage of each public that favors either of the two extremes: breaking diplomatic relations or doing nothing at all –is very small. Second, there is a difference between countries that are more proactive and favor multilateralism (Brazil, Mexico, and Peru) and countries that are more reactive and favor bilateral responses (Colombia and Ecuador). The former are countries with leadership and/or success in the region, and with the exception of Mexico, are more global in their aspirations; the latter are countries with greater internal problems, with a slower pace of economic growth, and with visions relatively anchored in the continent.

Despite possibilities for conflict, Latin Americans widely favor greater regional cooperation. With this in mind, the 2010-2011 edition of *The Americas and the World* incorporated a series of questions on regional integration. Survey respondents were asked to indicate their support for seven possible steps or policies that would deepen integration in Latin America. As seen in Figure 3.7, there is a clear consensus among Latin Americans over what steps should be taken, even though regional integration ranks in the intermediate range of foreign policy objectives. For citizens in the four countries where the questions were included,<sup>8</sup> the option with the highest level of support is the construction of highways and bridges to connect the region (77% to 87% in agreement), followed by the free circulation of investments (70%

to 87%), and the free flow of goods and services (70% to 85%). Colombians show the highest level of support for these options, while Ecuadorians are less supportive in each case.


The action with the next-highest level of support is the creation of a Latin American parliament or congress with the authority to pass binding legislation (59% to 62% support). With respect to the creation of a common currency, opinion is more divided (48% to 53% support). Finally, the following two options –permitting the free movement of people, without border controls, and the creation of a Latin American army– have much less support. Support for the free movement of individuals averages only 44%, from 51% in Colombia to 30% in Ecuador. The creation of a Latin American army is the option with least support (from 38% to 42%). For these last three options (with the exception of the free movement of individuals) Colombians show the least levels of support, while the free movement of persons is the option least favored by Ecuadorians, behind even the creation of a Latin American army.

Support for regional integration differs according to the level of commitment that different aspects of integration entail. In the first place, the possibility of *material and commercial integration* (infrastructure, investment, goods, and services) obtains the highest level of support in each of the countries surveyed. Secondly, there is far less of a consensus towards *political-institutional integration* (Congress, currency, army): Latin Americans support the creation of a regional parliament, are divided with respect to a common currency, and reject the creation of a regional army (especially Colombia). Finally, *social integration* (the free movement of people) enjoys only minority support, with Ecuadorians most opposed. In conclusion, Latin Americans are most supportive of steps towards integration that would provide clear material and economic benefits, such as regional free trade agreements (including NAFTA). On the other hand, Latin Americans oppose steps toward integration that would imply giving away sovereignty (legislative,

<sup>8</sup> Questions on regional integration were not included in the survey in Brazil.



**Figure 3.7. Possible Actions to Promote Latin American Integration \***  
*How much do you agree or disagree with the following actions being taken in Latin America...?*  
 (%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
 \* Not asked in Brazil.



financial, and military) to a supranational institution, in the style of the European Union. Given the significance of migration for the countries of the region, it is surprising that there is not greater agreement over the process of social integration, a dilemma that will be addressed in the next chapter.

In short, Latin Americans have a shared vision of the challenges facing their region, as well as of opportunities for increased cooperation. First, there is clear recognition of Brazil's leadership role in Latin America, both by its own citizens and by those in the other countries surveyed. Mexico, on the other hand, seems to have ceded its traditional role as regional leader to Brazil: Mexico is not seen by other countries as a regional leader, nor do its citizens want it to be. At the same time, while Latin Americans look toward the region and relations with other Latin American countries with marked optimism, Mexicans are more pessimistic. Second, Latin Americans consider the probability of a conflict in the region to be low, although Venezuela and Colombia are viewed as those most likely to be responsible if a conflict were to arise. Latin Americans are divided in their response to a potential regional conflict: some countries are more proactive, while others are more reactive. Finally, while Latin Americans are divided in their response to a regional conflict, there is broad agreement over the type of regional integration desired and the steps to be taken to achieve it. Nevertheless, not all types of integration are supported with the same enthusiasm. Latin Americans broadly favor material and commercial integration, while supporting institutional and social integration in far lower percentages.

### ***Latin America: Looking Out at the World***

Latin Americans' relations with the world are far from limited to the countries of the region. In recent years, Latin America's relations with the world have moved beyond the two traditional powers in the region—the United States and Spain—to focus increasingly on the rapidly developing economies of Asia. This section attempts to measure the shifting balance of Latin

America's relations with the world by focusing on three countries: the United States, Spain, and China. Although North America is not a priority for the majority of Latin Americans—except in Mexico—North America, and the United States in particular, obtained particularly high evaluations, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. In what might these positive perceptions of the United States consist?

As seen in Figure 3.8, majorities in four out of the five countries surveyed (with Mexico as the exception) reported that “trust” rather than “distrust” best characterizes their feelings toward the United States. The percentage of the population expressing trust is a solid majority in Colombia and Ecuador (more than 50%) and is strong in Brazil and Peru (slightly more than 40%). The only exception is Mexico, where a plurality (45%) “distrusts” rather than “trusts” the United States. Survey respondents were also asked whether “admiration” or “disdain” better describes their feelings towards the United States. In the Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru), more than half of those surveyed reported “admiration”, while among Brazilians and Mexicans the percentage of those reporting “admiration” is smaller (slightly more than 40%). In each country, the percentage of those reporting “indifference” (between 24% and 32%) is higher than those reporting “disdain” (from 6% in Colombia to 22% in Mexico). In general, a majority of Colombians and Ecuadorians, followed by Peruvians, look towards the United States with trust and admiration, while Brazilians and Mexicans are more reserved in their perceptions of the United States.


As seen in Figure 3.9, citizens in the five countries evaluate relations with the United States positively, both retrospectively and prospectively. In four out of the five countries, more than 50% consider that relations today have improved compared to the last ten years. Once again, the exception is Mexico, where only 44% believe relations have improved; at the other extreme is Colombia with 72%. With respect to the decade to come, about half of the population in each of the countries surveyed believes that relations with the United States will continue to improve (from 48% in Ecuador to 66% in Colombia).



**Figure 3.8. Trust and Admiration toward the United States**


**TRUST-DISTRUST**

*Which of the following words best describes your feelings toward the United States?*  
(%)



**ADMIRATION-DISDAIN**

*Which of the following words best describes your feelings toward the United States?*  
(%)




Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".



**Figure 3.9. Relations with the United States \***


**PAST**

*Compared to 10 years ago, do you think your country's relations with the United States are better or worse?*  
(%)



**FUTURE**

*And, in 10 years, do you think your country's relations with the United States will be better or worse?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Not asked in Brazil.


While Latin Americans consider that relations with the United States have improved over the past ten years and will continue to improve in the decade to come, what are their priorities and expectations for relations with the United States? Do countries prefer deepening bilateral ties with the U.S. or coordinating with other Latin American countries to defend common interests? For a majority of Colombians and Mexicans, negotiating bilaterally with the United States would be more beneficial than coordinating with other Latin American countries to defend common interests against the United States. These two

countries' preference for the United States should not come as a surprise, given that they represent the two extremes of sentiment towards this country: Colombians are the most pro-American, while Mexicans are the most anti-American –though it is possible that pro- and anti-American sentiments play a lesser role in the type of relation these countries desire with the United States. Among Ecuadorians opinion is more divided, while Peruvians would prefer to coordinate with other Latin American countries to defend common interests before the United States (this question was not asked in Brazil).




**Figure 3.10. Cooperation with the United States: Financial Aid to Fight Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime \***


**FINANCIAL AID**  
*Are you for or against (COUNTRY) receiving financial aid from the United States to fight drug trafficking and organized crime?*  
 (%)



**RESOURCE SUPERVISION**  
*And if in exchange, the United States asks to supervise those resources? \*\**  
 (%)



**SENDING AGENTS**  
*And if in return the United States asks to send agents to operate inside (COUNTRY)? \*\**  
 (%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil.

\*\* Of those who responded favorably about receiving financial aid.





Despite these differences, more than half of the publics interviewed in the four countries disagree with the statement that to resolve common problems, their country should make joint decisions with the United States, even if this implies commitments they do not agree with. While countries differ over the respective relationship they aspire to with the United States, none of them is willing to make decisions that are not in their own interest, or take on commitments that they disagree with.

In recent years, cooperation with the United States has centered on the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime. For Latin Americans, this is also a priority, although support for U.S. aid falls when it is attached to certain conditions. As seen in Figure 3.10, public opinion strongly favors receiving financial assistance from the United States to combat drug trafficking and organized crime: more than 70% of Colombians and Ecuadorians, more than 60% of Peruvians, and slightly more than 50% of Mexicans favor U.S. aid to fight drug trafficking and criminal organizations.

While Latin Americans are strongly in favor of U.S. aid, what happens when the United States demands to supervise the distribution of resources? A majority of Colombians (67%) and Mexicans (58%) continue to be in favor even if aid is conditioned on U.S. supervision of resources, while in Ecuador and Peru support is lower, and at least 40% of the population is opposed. What happens if aid is conditioned on allowing U.S. agents to operate within national territory? If aid is conditioned on sending U.S. agents, support drops drastically: a relative majority (close to 50%) in each country is opposed. The only exception is Mexico, where 57% of the population is in favor of U.S. aid even if this means allowing U.S. agents to operate within Mexico's national territory. While combatting drug trafficking and organized crime ranks among the most important objectives of foreign policy, not all countries are willing to accept the possible conditions of U.S. aid. It would seem that Mexicans are the only ones willing to pay the potential costs of U.S. financial assistance (supervision of resources and U.S. agents) to fight

drug trafficking and organized crime. Colombians are willing to accept U.S. supervision of resources, but not agents, while for Ecuadorians and Peruvians these costs are greater than the potential benefits of U.S. aid. These differences may be due to the greater visibility of drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Colombia as threats to national security and stability.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Europe, and particularly Spain, receives high evaluations by the five publics surveyed – Spain is the second-highest evaluated country in Ecuador, third-highest in Mexico, and fourth-highest in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. Indeed, high evaluations of Europe could depend in great measure on positive sentiments towards Spain, such as trust and admiration. As seen in Figure 3.11, more than 50% of respondents in the five countries surveyed said that they “trust” Spain. The majority of Latin Americans also report that admiration, rather than disdain best characterizes their feelings toward Spain. Positive sentiment toward Spain is especially high in Ecuador, where almost 70% report trust and admiration toward Spain. Positive sentiment toward Spain is especially relevant considering that in 2009 Ecuador, and in 2010 Mexico and Colombia marked 200 years of independence from Spain (In Peru the Bicentennial of independence from Spain will be officially commemorated in 2021). On the occasion of the Bicentennial of independence in Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, the “mother country” enjoys some of the highest levels of trust and admiration in Latin America, and is seen as an actor with important relevance in the region.

Could the fact that Europe is not among Latin Americans' strategic priorities, in spite of high evaluations of Spain, reflect problems in Spain's relations with Latin America? In short, the answer is no. Figure 3.12 shows different countries' evaluations of relations with Spain, both retrospectively and prospectively. As seen in Figure 3.12, Latin Americans view relations with Spain with great optimism: close to 60% of Latin Americans surveyed consider that relations with Spain have improved over the past




Figure 3.11. Trust and Admiration toward Spain \*

TRUST-DISTRUST

Which of the following words best describes your feelings about Spain?  
(%)


Trust Indifference Distrust



ADMIRATION-DISDAIN

Which of the following words best describes your feelings about Spain?  
(%)

Admiration Indifference Disdain



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Not asked in Brazil.


decade, and will continue to improve in the decade to come. The exception to this pattern is Mexico, where just slightly over half of those interviewed believe that relations with Spain have improved over the

past decade, and will continue to do so in the next. Given the general climate of pessimism in Mexico (observed throughout the report), lower evaluations of relations with Spain may be due more to Mexicans'

**Figure 3.12. Relations with Spain\***


**PAST**

Compared to 10 years ago, do you think your country's relations with Spain are better or worse?  
 (%)



**FUTURE**

And in 10 years, do you think your country's relations with Spain will be better or worse?  
 (%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
 \* Not asked in Brazil.

pessimism in relations with the world than genuinely negative sentiment towards Spain.


Opinion towards Spain is more positive than the United States in each variable measured by the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011*. Compared to the United States, Spain is more trusted and admired by Latin Americans, while bilateral relations with Spain are evaluated more positively in three out of the four countries where the question was asked. In general, Latin Americans consider that relations with Spain have been and will continue to be better than relations with the United States (see Figure 3.9 and

Figure 3.12). The only exception is Colombia, whose population evaluates relations with the United States in the decade to come by a few points higher than with Spain. This may be explained by Colombians' strong sentiments of affinity for the United States, reflected in the high number of points Colombians award to this country (72 average points).

In the first section of the chapter, we noted that Japan and China are among the highest evaluated countries in the survey, and that for Brazilians and Peruvians Asia Pacific is the highest evaluated region. Nevertheless, in spite of its growing importance for

**Figure 3.13. China's Economic Growth**

*If the Chinese economy grows to the point of being as big as the US economy, do you think that this would be positive or negative for the world?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

Latin America, Asia Pacific is not ranked as a strategic priority in any of the countries surveyed. One conceivable explanation could be that many Latin Americans view the rapid economic growth in China with some concern. However, a closer examination of survey data reveals that this is not the case. As seen in Figure 3.13, a majority of Latin Americans view the possibility of China's economy reaching the size of the United States' economy positively, especially Brazilians (52%) and Peruvians (49%), followed closely by Ecuadorians (45%). This result is consistent with the high evaluation of China in Brazil and Peru. On the other hand, Colombians and Mexicans are more divided, as China's economic growth is viewed as positive and negative in almost equal proportions.


The more favorable view of China's economic growth in Brazil and Peru may be due to the fact that both countries have benefitted considerably from China's economic expansion, while for Mexico, and to some extent Colombia, China has emerged as a competitor for the U.S. market.

In sum, Latin Americans lack a common vision in their relations with other regions of the world. Colombians are consistently more pro-American, while Mexicans tend to be the most negative in their opinions toward the United States. Nevertheless, both countries prefer to cultivate a "special relation" with the U.S., rather than coordinate interests with other Latin American countries. Relations with the United States are viewed positively in each of the countries surveyed, and wide majorities are in favor of receiving financial assistance to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. However, only Mexicans and Colombians are willing to accept all of the costs that such aid may imply, compared to Ecuadorians and Peruvians who are not. Ecuadorians have the most positive opinion of Spain, and Mexicans, the least favorable—which is most likely a reflection of Mexicans' overall pessimism towards the world. Finally, the two countries that evaluate Asia Pacific the highest—Brazil and Peru—are the two countries that view China's economic expansion most favorably.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> While in Brazil, China might be seen as a competitor—both have been included in a select group of the most powerful emerging economies (the BRICS)—opinion towards China is actually quite favorable.



Figure 3.14. Organization Thermometer



### Latin America and International Organizations

Latin America's relations with the world are not restricted to the countries of the region nor to those of North America, Europe, or Asia. Rather, Latin American countries work extensively through international organizations, whether global or regional in scope, and participate in various multilateral bodies for development and cooperation. Latin America is not only one of the regions where multilateral organizations first appeared in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but is also one of the areas where multilateral organizations have grown most –both in scope and number– in recent years. To measure Latin Americans' opinion towards international organizations, the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* asked respondents to evaluate distinct multilateral and international organizations on the same scale of 0 to 100 explained above. Figure 3.14 shows evaluations of distinct organizations by country.

Both the ranking and absolute scores of international organizations vary by country. It is important to point out that, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there are significant variations in the percentage of each country's population that is able to identify a given organization. While some organizations are correctly identified by 80% of survey respondents, others are recognized by only half of the population. For Latin Americans, the international organization most recognized is also the best evaluated in each of the countries: the UN. The UN is the most favorably evaluated international organization in each country, from 59 points in Brazil to 75 points in Mexico (with 67 average points overall).

After the UN, international organizations are ranked in a different order in each country, although there are some points of agreement. The OAS is ranked among the most favorably evaluated organizations in almost every country: the OAS is ranked second in Colombia (with 68 average points), and third



in Mexico and Peru (64 and 61 points, respectively). Latin Americans also coincide in ranking the European Union among the organizations most favorably evaluated: the EU is ranked third in Colombia (66 points) and fourth in Mexico and Peru (63 and 60 points). Out of the international financial institutions included in the survey, the most highly evaluated is the World Bank, ranked second out of all organizations in Peru (61 points) and third in Ecuador (60 points). Multinational corporations are also ranked highly in some countries: multinational corporations are ranked second in Brazil and Mexico (52 and 64 points), and fourth in Colombia (65 points).

Latin Americans also coincide in the organizations evaluated least favorably. In particular, ALBA is ranked last in Colombia (46 points), Mexico (52 points), and Peru (46 points), and is one of the lowest ranked in Ecuador (56 points), itself a member of ALBA. The G-20 is also one of the least positively evaluated organizations, ranked third to last in Colombia (51 points), and second to last in Ecuador (53 points), Mexico (54 points), and Peru (53 points). The APEC also obtained low evaluations in countries where it was included in the survey. These organizations are not only the lowest evaluated by Latin Americans, but are also those least known, that is, with the lowest percentage of Latin Americans able to correctly identify them.

For Latin Americans, traditional multilateral organizations—those born at the end of the Second World War—receive the highest evaluations. Latin Americans also evaluate key economic actors in the current international order—such as the World Bank, multinational corporations, and the European Union—quite favorably. On the other hand, organizations formed in the last decade, such as ALBA and the G-20, obtain much lower evaluations. The relation between when organizations were formed,

how well they are known by Latin Americans, and Latin American public opinion is in need of further study, but these relations could bear fruit for policy makers and researchers seeking to understand which international bodies Latin Americans choose to participate in, to what extent, as well as the outcomes they desire.

While more traditional multilateral organizations receive higher support, the UN above all is the organization and multilateral setting that is most important for Latin Americans. As noted in Chapter 1, the UN is also the international institution most trusted by Latin Americans: in Peru, the UN is the most trusted of all institutions, national and international (46% of the population trusts the UN “a lot” or “somewhat”). The UN is the second most trusted institution in Colombia (69%), and Mexico (52%), and third in Ecuador (47%). Additionally, as mentioned in the previous section, the UN is the most trusted to act to resolve a possible armed conflict in the region. The UN is not only the most trusted institution in the case of a regional conflict, it is also much more trusted than the international organization created to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region—the Organization of American States. The level of trust in the UN to resolve conflicts is also much higher than trust in the United States, or in action by a group of countries from or outside of Latin America.

Given that the UN is the most well known, most trusted, and the highest evaluated organization in the countries surveyed, it should not come as a surprise that the UN is the preferred actor to intervene in the case of a possible armed conflict in the region.<sup>10</sup> This goes along with one of the principal objectives of the United Nations: maintaining peace and security across the world. However, while Latin Americans look toward the UN to maintain peace and security in the region, the body tasked with approving UN


<sup>10</sup> While wide majorities prefer the UN to act to resolve a possible armed conflict, majorities in each country—except for Brazil—are not willing to accept and abide by UN decisions that they do not agree with. For their inconsistent level of commitment, Latin American countries might best be described as adherents of *light* multilateralism. On the one hand, a majority of the publics surveyed is in favor of participating in multilateral actions, such as sending troops to participate in UN Peacekeeping Missions. On the other hand, strengthening the UN and OAS are foreign policy objectives of lesser importance for Latin Americans, as mentioned in Chapter 2.





**Figure 3.15. Confidence in Countries to Maintain World Peace \***

*Which of the following countries do you trust most to keep world peace?  
And which of the following countries do you trust least to keep world peace?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Other", "None", "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Net confidence is the amount of confidence subtracted from the amount of distrust.

peacekeeping missions –the Security Council– is dominated by five permanent member countries, each evaluated differently in the five publics surveyed. To this end, Latin Americans were asked which permanent member of the Security Council inspires the most confidence to maintain world peace. With the results of this question, we were able to measure the degree of “net confidence” in each one of the permanent members, that is, the percentage of the population that “trusts” a permanent member of the council to maintain world peace minus the percentage that responded that they “distrust” the same member.

As shown in Figure 3.15, there is wide agreement over the permanent members of the UN Security

Council most and least trusted to keep world peace. In the majority of the publics surveyed, the United States is the country with the highest net confidence to maintain world peace, with confidence being particularly high in Colombia and Ecuador. Confidence in the U.S. is consistent with positive evaluations discussed at the beginning of the chapter: when the five publics’ evaluations of the U.S. are averaged, the U.S. receives the highest number of average points. It also should not come as a surprise that in Mexico the U.S. is not the country with the highest net confidence, given Mexico’s traditional wariness of its neighbor to the north; for Mexicans, France is the most trusted permanent member of the Secu-





rity Council. Great Britain and France are the next two countries that inspire the greatest amount of trust to maintain world peace. The only exception is Brazil, where net confidence in Great Britain is slightly negative.

At the other extreme, China, and especially Russia, are the two countries that are least trusted to maintain world peace in each of the publics surveyed. While China is one of the most favorably evaluated countries in each of the publics surveyed, trust in China to maintain world peace is low. This may be due to the fact that China and Russia are the least democratic and transparent of the permanent members of the Security Council. It would seem that Latin Americans have greater confidence in countries with democratic institutions to work within the UN to maintain world peace—a possible legacy of the Cold War and the former cleavage between the capitalist world and the socialist bloc. The case of China raises questions that may be interesting to address in future research: China's high evaluations may be due in large part to the dynamism of its recent economic expansion, but confidence in maintaining security in the world may depend on the type of regime.

In sum, this chapter takes a closer look at Latin Americans' vision of the world: their opinion and vision of their own countries in the region, on the international stage, and of international organizations. Although these themes and issues will be addressed in greater detail in the report's conclusions, the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* reveals the plurality and diversity of Latin America and its peoples. There are some countries whose vision is centered on the American continent and others with more global aspirations; some countries that are more optimistic and others more pessimistic regarding the region, as well as countries that are more proactive or reactive in the case of a potential regional conflict; and finally there are some countries that are more pro-American and others that are more anti-American. Nevertheless, there is wide agreement over the countries and heads of state most highly evaluated by Latin Americans; over Brazilian leadership in the region; over the type of regional integration desired; over the optimism regarding relations with Spain; and over positive evaluations of the UN and some of the members of the Security Council •



## CHAPTER 4

HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA?  
EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND POLICY





## HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA? EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND POLICY

**T**he current debate over migration has revolved around a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, the growing movement of populations in the world has resulted in migratory flows that are ever larger, with increased social pressures in receiving countries as well as in migrants' countries of origin. On the other hand, the political climate in receiving countries has become increasingly hostile to immigration in the wake of the global financial and economic crises. In the United States, destination for a large number of Latin American emigrants, various states have passed laws that criminalize undocumented immigration as a response to Congress' failed attempts to reform immigration policy on the national level. In Spain (an important destination for many immigrants from South America) and other European countries, public sentiment has also become less friendly to immigration, with various nativist parties gaining votes, and in some cases, participating in governing coalitions. These shifts in public opinion have transformed the political and social landscape in receiving countries, raising new barriers to immigration and resulting in harsher policies towards undocumented immigrants. However, changes in migratory flows are not limited to the United States and Europe. Across Latin America, countries have debated the increasing role of Latin

American countries as destinations for migrants or as countries of transit, as well as the challenges and opportunities these changes present. Given the role of public opinion in determining policies toward migration, the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* significantly expanded its coverage of migration compared with previous editions.

This chapter is divided into four sections in order to better analyze the experiences, effects, attitudes and policies toward the phenomenon of migration in Latin America. The first section seeks to establish the basic profile of emigration in each country, that is, the percentage of family members living in another country, the quantity and importance of remittances, and whether and for what reasons are citizens willing to leave their country of origin. The second section explores attitudes towards emigration and perceptions of its potential benefits, or harm, to the multiple actors involved. The second section will also address the steps that citizens want their governments to take to inform and protect citizens from the risks of migrating to another country. The third section will examine attitudes towards immigrants in Latin American countries and their potential economic, social, and cultural contributions to the societies that receive them. Finally, the fourth section will inquire as to the rights that Latin Americans demand for



their citizens living in other countries, and the rights that they are willing to grant to the immigrants that reside within their own borders.

The phenomenon of migration has grown in importance for the societies of Latin America over the past few decades. Until the recent financial crisis, migratory flows from Latin American countries to the developed world increased significantly each year, along with the importance of remittances to the communities left behind. The impact of emigration is just as high in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru as it is in Mexico, the country of the Americas that is perhaps most often associated with migratory flows. The proportion of citizens with family members living abroad is similar in the four Spanish-speaking countries. However, as a percentage of the population, emigrants and remittances are higher in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru than in Mexico. Survey data confirms that emigration in South American countries, in terms of the countries of destination, is much more diverse than in Mexico. On the other hand, emigration has been far less significant in social, economic, and political terms in Brazil. Compared to the other countries in the survey, fewer Brazilians leave their country and only a tiny proportion receive remittances from abroad.

In general, citizens in each of the countries surveyed view emigration in a positive light and are receptive to foreigners. Majorities in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, with the exception of Ecuador, consider that emigration is more positive than negative for the families of those who leave, their communities and countries of origin, and the countries that receive them.<sup>1</sup> Citizens of the four Spanish-speaking countries also have more positive than negative opinions with respect to the foreigners residing in their countries, and significant majorities are in favor of granting immigrants political and social rights.

While Latin Americans view immigration as positive in general, there are important differences in attitudes towards immigration in each country. Peru,

the country with the largest percentage of families with a member of the same household living abroad; the largest percentage of families receiving remittances; and with the greatest diversity with respect to the countries to which emigrants arrive, is the country most open to immigration. Peruvians have the most favorable opinion of foreigners, viewing them as contributing positively to their country's economy and culture, and are the least demanding with respect to the requirements of potential immigrants. Peru is also the country where emigration is perceived to be most beneficial. On the other hand –and consistent with the analysis of previous chapters– Ecuador is the least welcoming of the four countries with respect to immigration: Ecuadorians have the least favorable opinion of immigrants; they consider in large proportions that there are too many foreigners in the country; view immigration as a threat to the labor market and their nation's culture, and consider that immigration leads to elevated rates of delinquency. Ecuadorians also favor the most strict policies in the face of undocumented immigration, and view emigration the least favorably out of the four countries. Given that Ecuador is not only the country with the greatest percentage of citizens with family members living abroad, but also the country with the highest percentage of families receiving remittances, Ecuadorians' negative perceptions of both emigration and immigration presents an interesting paradox, and possible point of departure for future research. With respect to attitudes towards emigration and immigration, Colombia and Mexico fall into an intermediate range of approval, between Peru and Ecuador.


### ***Not Only Mexico: Emigration as a Region-Wide Phenomenon***

The flow of migrants from Mexico to the United States has traditionally dominated the conversation on migration in Latin America. The large populations of

<sup>1</sup> The version of the survey applied in Brazil did not include a large part of the questions on migration, not allowing comparisons with Brazil in many of the following questions.



**Figure 4.1. Basic Emigration Indicators**



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".  
\* Not asked in Brazil.

the two countries, the extension of their shared border (one of the largest in the world), and the century-old tradition of Mexicans who leave for the "North" combine to make migratory flows from Mexico to

the United States one of the most significant in the world. However, less is known of the importance of migration—both emigration to other continents and immigration—for the countries of South America.



The results of the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* permit a closer look at the phenomenon of migration in the five countries included in the survey. In some aspects, emigration is just as important, if not more, for the countries of South America (with the exception of Brazil) than for Mexico.

In the four Spanish-speaking countries surveyed, the percentage of citizens that report a family member living outside the country—as reported in Chapter 1—fluctuates within a relatively narrow range. As seen in Figure 4.1, slightly more than half of Mexicans (52%) report having a family member living outside the country. The percentage of Peruvians and Colombians that report a family member abroad is similar to that of Mexicans, at 49% and 45%, respectively. This percentage is greater in Ecuador, where almost six out of ten (58%) Ecuadorians report a family member living in another country.

If rates of emigration are indeed similar in the four countries, the percentage of families directly affected by migration is greater in the Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) than in Mexico. When asked whether a family member(s) living abroad *used to live in the same house*, that is, whether a relative living abroad was part of the nuclear family (i.e., parents, children, or siblings of the respondent) a greater percentage of citizens in the Andean countries respond positively than in Mexico. A larger percentage of Peruvians (38%), Colombians (31%), and Ecuadorians (30%) report a family member from same household living in another country, compared to 23% of Mexicans (See Figure 4.1). Although the percentage of families directly affected by migration is greater in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, in Mexico emigration is concentrated in a fewer number of households, possibly as a result of emigration to the United States. In the case of Mexico, the concentration of emigration in a single country—the United States—and among fewer families—may foster a more intimate network of family ties in the communities of those left behind. On the other hand, in the three South American countries, those who are left behind are more likely to be bound by looser ties of family or friendship, possibly as a result of the

greater variety of countries for which emigrants set out, as discussed below.

In two of the three Andean countries (Ecuador and Colombia), the percentage of those receiving remittances is greater than in the third (Peru), while the percentage of the population in Mexico that receives remittances is almost the same as in Peru. Thirty-six percent of Ecuadorians, and 20% of Colombians receive remittances from relatives working in other countries, while this percentage is only 13% in Peru and 12% in Mexico.


In the three South American countries, there is also greater variation in the countries from which remittances are sent. In the case of Mexico, practically all remittances come from the United States (96%). In the countries of South America, however, the distribution of remittances is more varied. While Ecuador depends to a large extent on a single country as a source of remittances, this dependency is significantly lower than in Mexico. In Ecuador, 55% of remittances arrive from Spain, which is the second most important source of remittances for Peru (19% of the total) and Colombia (18%). In Peru and Colombia, the United States is the country from which the greatest percentage of remittances is sent—30% in the case of Colombia and 27% in the case of Peru, while the United States is the second largest source of remittances for Ecuador (20%). For Colombia, 51% of remittances come from other countries, including Venezuela, Canada, and Chile. In Peru as well, 51% of remittances come from a variety of other countries, such as Argentina, Italy, and Chile, among others, while in Ecuador, 24% of remittances come from countries other than the United States and Spain (Italy, Venezuela, and others).

In order to obtain a more precise measure of the range of countries to which Latin Americans migrate to in each of the countries included in *The Americas and the World 2010-2011*, we have calculated an Index of Emigration Diversity. The Emigration Diversity Index allows us to calculate the number of destination countries, on average, for each of the national populations included in the survey. The Emigration Diversity Index sums the number of countries men-





Figure 4.2. Emigration Diversity Index \*



Note: The index for each country is the reciprocal of the sum of the squared percentages of people who receive remittances for each emitting country:  $1 / \sum_i^p (p_i)^2$ , where  $p_i$  is the percentage  $p$  of respondents who receive remittances from country  $i$  and  $P$  is the total number of countries remittances are sent from.

\* Not asked in Brazil.

tioned as a source of remittances (which were taken as an approximation of the countries of destination) proportional to each country's share as a source of remittances.<sup>2</sup> For example, although Mexicans mentioned a dozen countries as sources of remittances, 96% of remittances are sent from the United States. In the case of Mexico, the United States would receive a weight of close to one, while other countries would receive weights slightly larger than zero. The result of this process – an index reading of 1.1 in the case of Mexico – may be interpreted as the “effective number” of destination countries for each public surveyed. As seen in Figure 4.2, the country leading on the Emigration Diversity Index is Peru (5.5), followed by Colombia (5.1), and Ecuador (2.7), with Mexico (1.1) at the bottom of the index.<sup>3</sup>

Although the countries of South America receive remittances from a greater diversity of countries than Mexico, the percentage of the population that depends on remittances as an important source of family income is similar in the four Spanish-speaking countries. In Colombia, 39% of the population reports that remittances received from relatives outside of the country account for half or more of their monthly household income. For 38% of Ecuadorian families, 30% of Mexican homes, and 27% of Peruvian families, remittances provide half or more of monthly household income. On closer analysis, remittances have a slightly greater weight in the monthly income of Ecuadorian families than in the families of other countries. Remittances provide *more than half* of monthly income for 16% of households

<sup>2</sup> To be more exact, the index for each country is the reciprocal of the sum of the squares of the percentages of survey respondents that receive remittances from each country:  $1 / \sum_i^p (p_i)^2$ , where  $p_i$  is the percentage  $p$  of survey respondents that receive remittances from country  $i$  and  $P$  is the total number of countries from which remittances are received.

<sup>3</sup> Brazil was not included in the index, as the low number of those surveyed that responded that they receive remittances (N=22) does not allow for a precise estimate of the percentage of survey respondents that receive remittances from a given country.



in Ecuador, compared with 11% in Peru, and 10% in Colombia and Mexico.

Another indicator of the importance of migration for the Latin American countries surveyed is in the aspirations of many of their citizens to migrate to another country. As seen in Figure 4.1, 47% of Colombians and Peruvians would leave their home if the opportunity existed to do so. The percentage of Mexicans (37%) and Ecuadorians (34%) that would leave their homes for another country is smaller, but still significant. One trend common to all four countries is that the desire to emigrate is significantly higher among the youth.<sup>4</sup> Latin Americans from the four countries differ, however, in the intensity of aspirations to emigrate. The desire of Mexicans to emigrate is so strong that 30% of those surveyed said that they would be willing to emigrate to another country even without a visa or other required documents (a percentage that reaches only 7% to 10% among the Andean countries). In comparative terms, Mexicans are much more willing to assume the potential risks of undocumented emigration than their counterparts in South America.

While a considerable percentage of Latin Americans are willing to move to another country, both the possible destinations as well as the reasons for doing so are different in each country. While 62% of Mexicans willing to live in another country choose the United States as the country they would most like to emigrate to, the U.S. is the most attractive destination for 37% of Ecuadorians, 23% of Peruvians, and 19% of Colombians. In the case of the South American countries, it would seem that linguistic, historical, and cultural ties are a more powerful motive than geographic closeness, as 30% of Ecuadorians, 27% of Peruvians, and 26% of Colombians choose Spain as their primary option for emigration, compared to only 7% of Mexicans. Among other countries that stand out as attractive options are Canada (mentioned by 12% of Mexicans and 11% of Colombians) and France (chosen by 6% of Colombians).

The reasons for emigration are diverse, however, among the most popular, as might be expected, is the opportunity for a better job (the principal motive for 60% of Ecuadorians and Peruvians, 51% of Colombians, and 40% of Mexicans), and economic crises in their country of origin (19% of Mexicans, 13% of Peruvians, 11% of Ecuadorians, and 9% of Colombians). Other motives for migration include the search for better educational opportunities (10% of Colombians, and between 4% and 7% of the population of the rest of the countries), and a desire to experience other cultures (motive of 15% of Colombians, and between 7% and 8% of the population in the rest of the countries). A significant number of Mexicans (21%) named “political” problems (corruption and a lack of security, among others), although this figure reaches only 2% in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. On the other hand, the percentage of Latin Americans mentioning family as a motive—as in the case of family reunification is surprisingly low; in no country did it surpass 6%.

In Brazil, the social, political, and economic aspects of migratory flows have a much smaller impact, making the situation of Brazil necessary to study as a case apart. Compared to the high rates of emigration in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, only 12% of Brazilians report a family member living in another country, and only 11% a family member that used to live in the same home. However, the lower percentage of emigrants in Brazil belies the considerable number of emigrants in absolute terms. Out of a population of almost 194 million, Brazil has around 23 million migrants, a number just shy of one fifth of the total population of Mexico. However, in Brazil remittances are almost entirely absent from the culture of migration—only 1% of those surveyed responded that they receive remittances from a family member living abroad. Spain, the United States, and Portugal are among the countries named as sources of remittances, but the low number of respondents reporting that they receive remittances (N=22) makes it impossible to draw conclusions as

<sup>4</sup> The percentage of those between 18 and 29 years of age willing to emigrate to another country is 62% in Colombia, 61% in Peru, 49% in Mexico, and 47% in Ecuador.



to the relative importance of each country as a source of cash transfers.

### *Those That Leave: Do the Benefits of Emigration Compensate Potential Harm?*

The previous section described the magnitude of Latin American emigration and the importance for families (with the exception of Brazil) of economic resources sent from abroad. However, what are the fe-

elings towards emigration of those who stay? Are the benefits of emigration greater than the possible costs? What type of public policies are favored to address the possible problems caused by emigration?


As seen in Figure 4.3, Peru is the country that perceives emigration most positively. The proportion of Peruvians that consider that emigration is “good” for the families of emigrants is 70% (compared to 13% that consider it to be “bad”),<sup>5</sup> with net sentiment towards emigration positive, at +57%. With respect to the effects of emigration on emigrants’

**Figure 4.3. Evaluation of Emigration \***


*Do you believe that the migration of (COUNTRY NATIONALS) to other countries is good or bad for...?*  
(%)

■ Bad ■ Neither good nor bad ■ Good


#### THEIR FAMILIES




#### THE COUNTRY THEY GO TO



#### THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN



#### THEIR COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN



Note: Does not show values for “Don’t Know” or “No Answer”.  
\* Not asked in Brazil.

<sup>5</sup> The percentages reported here do not sum to 100% due to the number of respondents, sometimes considerable, that answered “neither good nor bad”.



communities of origin, Peruvians' overall opinion is positive: +32% (52% "good" versus 20% "bad"), while net positive sentiment toward the effect of emigration on the country as a whole is +24% (50% "good", 26% "bad"). On the other hand, Ecuador is the country that perceives the effects of emigration as most negative, with net opinion with respect to families at -23% (30% "good", 53% "bad"), with respect to communities of origin -22% (30% "good", 52% "bad"), and -6% with respect to the country as a whole (40% "good", 46% "bad"). Mexico and Colombia fall into an intermediate range (See Figure 4.3) with the following net evaluations of the consequences of emigration by sector: for families, in Colombia, +32% (58% "good", 26% "bad"), and in Mexico +4% (45% "good", 41% "bad"); for communities, in Colombia, +4% (37% versus 33% "bad"), and in Mexico, +9% (47% versus 38%); and for the country as a whole, in Colombia -1% (38% versus 39%), and in Mexico 0% (44% versus 44%).

Although opinion towards the benefits of emigration for each country differs among the four publics (and is sometimes diametrically opposed), each of the populations surveyed agrees that emigration is beneficial for receiving countries (see Figure 4.3). In each case, net evaluations are positive: in Peru, +33% (51% "good" versus 18% "bad"); in Mexico, +28% (57% versus 29%); in Ecuador, +18% (49% versus 31%), and in Colombia +7% (40% versus 33%). As might be expected, Latin Americans consider emigration to benefit receiving countries more than their countries of origin. For this reason it is surprising that Peruvians consider that emigration is as beneficial or more for emigrants' communities of origin (52%) and for their country (50%) – and for families (70%) – than for the countries they arrive to (58%). This paradox also exists in Colombia, although to a lesser extent. Fifty-eight percent of Colombians consider that emigration is "good" for Colombian families (while 37% and 38% consider that emigration is "good" for emigrants' community of origin and the country as a whole, respectively), compared to 40% that believe that emigration is "good" for the countries that receive them.

In spite of the benefits of immigration for receiving countries –improvements in worker productivity, increased consumption and government revenue from taxes, in addition to a lower-cost workforce and help in supporting the "dependence load" of an aging population (especially in Europe)– these countries have put up ever greater obstacles to immigration in the past few years. Opposition to immigration has manifested itself in diverse ways –from greater restrictions on who can enter the country, the passing of anti-immigrant legislation at the national and (especially in the United States) subnational level, and the emergence and electoral success of nativist parties (particularly in Europe). With the emergence of anti-immigrant sentiment and policies, emigrants are forced to assume ever-greater risks to assure that their family members and relatives receive the benefits of emigration.

In light of these dangers, what actions do Latin Americans expect their governments and multilateral organisms to take? Overwhelming majorities in Ecuador and Mexico –the only two countries where this question was asked– demand that their governments inform citizens of the potential risks of undocumented emigration (97% of Ecuadorians and 96% of Mexicans "strongly" or "somewhat" agree). Perhaps more surprising is the fact that these two publics insist that their governments play a more active role to prevent emigrants leaving the country though "unauthorized crossings" (95% of Ecuadorians and 90% of Mexicans "strongly" or "somewhat" agree), while rejecting outright that their government do nothing, a position which only 11% of Ecuadorians and 10% of Mexicans favor.

On the international stage, the possibility that developed countries impose greater restrictions on the entrance of immigrants –although far from the most immediate of the threats reported– is nonetheless ranked as a grave threat by an important percentage of Latin Americans (65% of Colombians, 55% of Ecuadorians, 52% of Mexicans, and 50% of Peruvians). It might seem contradictory, then, (as reported in the previous chapter) that Latin Americans are reluctant to support the "free movement of



persons” in the region. This proposition has majority support only in Colombia (although by a slim margin, with 51% “strongly” or “somewhat” in agreement). On the other hand, only 46% in Peru, 44% in Mexico, and 30% in Ecuador support the free movement of persons, without border controls. Opposition to the free movement of peoples suggests that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Latin Americans support an “American” model of integration that leaves the question of migration aside: investments, goods, and services may circulate freely, but individuals must stay in their country of origin. This model of integration contrasts with the European model, where capital and labor are equally free to circulate according to the needs of the market. Latin Americans’ rejection of the unrestricted movement of persons within the region may be due to the fact that 61% of Colombians and 60% of Ecuadorians (but only 47% of Peruvians and 40% of Mexicans) perceive undocumented immigration as a “grave” threat. Colombian and Ecuadorian opposition to the unrestricted movement of peoples may also be a result of tensions along the borders of these two countries.

### ***Those that Arrive: What Do They Contribute, and What Concerns Might They Cause?***

Each of the countries included in the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* is characterized by a net positive outflow of migrants. However, immigration has also played a large role in the history and traditions of each country, which, while difficult to measure quantitatively, nevertheless forms an important part of each country’s social fabric. What opinion, then, do Latin Americans have of the foreigners that arrive to their countries? How open might they be to ideas and customs of other origins?

Faithful to their fame of hospitality, Latin Americans have a generally favorable opinion of foreigners living in their country. As Figure 4.4 shows, Peruvians view immigrants most positively, with a difference of +64% between those who view immigrants favorably (71% of Peruvians have a “good” or “very good” im-

pression of foreigners) and those who view them unfavorably (7% have a “bad” or “very bad” impression). Mexicans also have a high impression of foreigners, at +51% (63% have a “good” or “very good” impression of foreigners, and 12% a “bad” or “very bad” impression), followed by Colombians, +50% (with 57% “good” or “very good” and 7% “bad” or “very bad”). Ecuador is the country where immigrants are viewed least favorably, although opinion of foreigners is still positive on balance, with positive opinions (49% “good” or “very good”) surpassing negative opinion (20% “bad” or “very bad”) by a margin of +29%.


Nevertheless, when asking about specific groups of foreigners in Mexico and Ecuador—the only countries where opinion towards specific nationalities was measured—opinion is slightly less favorable. As seen in Figure 4.4, citizens from the United States merit a positive balance of +39% for Ecuadorians (55% “good” or “very good” and 16% “bad” or “very bad”), and +33% for Mexicans (56% “good” or “very good” and 23% “bad” or “very bad”). In Ecuador, the positive difference between favorable and unfavorable opinion jumps 10 percentage points (from +29% to +39%) for citizens of the United States compared to attitudes towards foreigners in general. In contrast, in Mexico this difference is reduced by 18 percentage points (from +51% to +33%) when respondents are asked to measure opinion towards citizens of the United States. Regarding foreigners from China, Mexicans’ opinion is 30 percentage points more favorable than unfavorable (51% good, 21% bad), while for Ecuadorians opinion is more favorable than unfavorable by 16 percentage points (44% good, 28% bad). In both countries, the difference between positive and negative opinions of Chinese citizens is narrower than that for foreigners in general, falling 21 points in Mexico (from +51% to +30%) and 13 points in Ecuador (from +29% to +16%). Lastly, citizens of Spain are viewed quite positively in Mexico (55% good, 17% bad, with a difference of +38%), but once again, the difference in positive and negative impressions of Spanish citizens is lower than that of a generic foreigner (+38% versus +51%).





**Figure 4.4. Opinions of Immigrants**

*In general, what is your opinion of foreigners living in (COUNTRY)?*  
(%)



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil.

\*\* Ecuador and Mexico only.

\*\*\* Mexico only.

Another indicator of how open societies are to immigration is their opinion with respect to the number of foreigners living in the country: if the number of foreigners is too many, just right, or in the case of some publics, too few. Consistent with their less positive opinion of foreigners, Ecuadorians are the most reluctant of those surveyed to view the arrival of foreigners positively: 63% of Ecuadorians

consider that there are "too many" foreigners living in the country (compared to 12% responding that the number of foreigners is just enough and 19% who consider that there are too few).<sup>6</sup> The percentage of Mexicans that considers that there are "too many" foreigners in the country is significant, but considerably lower, at 32% (compared to 24% responding that the number of foreigners is just enough and

<sup>6</sup> Responses of "do not know" or did not answer were omitted, a percentage that varies from 6% to 17% in each of the countries surveyed.



29% who consider that there are too few). Peru and Colombia are more open to the presence of foreigners: in Peru, only 21% consider that there are too many foreigners living in the country (compared to 27% responding that there are just enough and 35% too few), while in Colombia, this proportion is only 17% (33% consider that the number of foreigners is adequate and 33% too few).

Although Latin Americans have little daily contact with foreigners, as reported in Chapter 1, what characteristics do Latin Americans believe the “ideal” immigrant should have? In Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, the profile of the “ideal” immigrant is similar—immigrants should have a high level of education and come from a profession that is in high demand. For 91% of Ecuadorians, 86% of Mexicans, and 85% of Peruvians, it is “very” or “somewhat” important that a foreigner “have a trade or profession that the country needs” in order to be allowed to enter. Eighty-eight percent of Ecuadorians, 84% of Peruvians, and 81% of Mexicans also believe that it is “very” or “somewhat” important that potential immigrants have a “high level of education”. Ecuadorians, Mexicans, and Peruvians also consider that it is important that foreigners be able to speak Spanish (87% of Ecuadorians, 86% of Mexicans, and 77% of Peruvians consider that knowing Spanish is “very” or “somewhat” important). The characteristics ranked as less important are still highly valued: that an immigrant comes from a country “with a culture similar to our own” (78% of Ecuadorians, 67% of Mexicans, and 56% of Peruvians view culture as “very” or “somewhat” important), have “close relatives living here” (73% of Ecuadorians, 64% of Mexicans, and 63% of Peruvians), and “have money” (72% of Ecuadorians, 69% of Peruvians, and 65% of Mexicans). In general, Ecuadorians are more strict with respect to the requisites they demand of immigrants, while Peruvians are the least demanding and Mexico falls into an intermediate range.

While some societies are more demanding than others with respect to the requisites potential immigrants would need to meet, how do Latin Americans evaluate the economic, social, and cultural contributions of those who arrive? In what ways do immigrants

contribute to host societies, and in what ways might they provoke concerns? In Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, citizens were asked to evaluate a series of five possible effects of immigration—two positive (that immigrants “contribute to the national economy” and “bring innovative ideas”) and three more negative (that immigrants “take jobs away from nationals”, “compromise security”, and “weaken our traditions and customs”). As Figure 4.5 demonstrates, the citizens of these countries coincide, to a greater or lesser extent, in considering that immigration is beneficial—although, consistent with data presented above, Ecuadorians are less in agreement than the two other countries that immigration brings benefits. Wide majorities of Peruvians (77%), Mexicans (76%), and Ecuadorians (61%) are “very” or “somewhat” in agreement that immigrants represent a net positive contribution to the economy. Eighty-one percent of Peruvians and 77% of Mexicans also consider that foreigners contribute new and innovative ideas to their host countries. The belief that immigrants bring new and innovative ideas is also consistent with Latin Americans’ openness to receive them, as reported in Chapter 1: in the five countries surveyed, a greater proportion of citizens believe that the diffusion of the ideas and customs of other cultures is “good” than “bad”.

Although conscious of the possible prejudices that immigration may stir up, Mexicans and Peruvians widely reject the idea that immigrants harm the countries they arrive to (while Ecuadorians are much more distrustful). Only 38% of Mexicans and 37% of Peruvians agree that immigrants represent a threat to security (compared to 55% of both Mexicans and Peruvians who disagree). In contrast, 74% of Ecuadorians believe that immigration does increase insecurity, leading to elevated rates of crime, for example (while only 25% of Ecuadorians disagree). While Mexicans and Peruvians are divided as to whether immigrants threaten national traditions and culture—47% of Mexicans agree, versus 48% who disagree, while for Peru 42% agree, and 51% disagree—Ecuadorians perceive immigrants as a greater threat: 64% consider that immigrants represent a threat to national traditions and culture (compared





**Figure 4.5. Attitudes towards Immigrants**


*In general, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding foreigners living in (COUNTRY)?*  
(%)

Strongly disagree    Somewhat disagree    Somewhat agree    Strongly agree


**BRING INNOVATIVE IDEAS\***




**CONTRIBUTE TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY\*\***




**TAKE JOBS AWAY FROM (NATIONAL COUNTRY)\*\***



**WEAKEN OUR TRADITIONS\*\***



**COMPROMISE SECURITY\*\***



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador.

\*\* Not asked in Brazil and Colombia.

to 32% who disagree). Finally, a lower percentage of Mexicans (41%) believe that immigrants take jobs away from Mexican citizens, (compared to 54% who disagree), than Ecuadorians (68% agree and 31% disagree) and Peruvians (48% agree and 45% disagree).

In the previous section we reported Latin Americans' expectations with respect to the actions their governments should take to protect their own citizens from the dangers of undocumented emigration. However, what policies do Latin Americans favor

to limit undocumented immigration to their own countries? In Ecuador and Mexico, respondents were asked to evaluate five possible options of immigration policy: "allowing (undocumented) immigrants to enter without obstacles", institute a "temporary workers program", "increase border controls", "deporting (undocumented immigrants) to their country of origin", and "build walls along the border". The preferences of Mexicans and Ecuadorians toward immigration policy are similar, although Ecuadorians, as noted throughout the survey, prefer a slightly



harder line toward undocumented immigrants than Mexicans. In both countries, the policy that enjoys the most support is the increasing of border controls, with the backing of 91% of Ecuadorians (with 8% in disagreement), and 79% of Mexicans (with 20% in disagreement). The policies with the next highest levels of support are deportation (second in Ecuador with 84% in agreement and 13% who disagree; and third in Mexico with 66% in agreement and 30% that disagree), and the establishment of programs for guest workers (third in Ecuador, with 58% in agreement and 39% in disagreement; and second in Mexico, with 71% in agreement and 27% in disagreement). Majorities in the two countries overwhelmingly reject the free entry of undocumented immigrants (17% of support in Ecuador and 34% in Mexico, compared to 82% and 63% in disagreement, respectively), as well as the construction of border walls to keep immigrants out (44% of support in Ecuador and 21% in Mexico, with 53% and 76% in disagreement, respectively).

### ***Between Marginalization and Social Participation: Rights for Emigrants and Immigrants***

The rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States and Europe has brought the debate over immigrants' rights to center stage. Immigrants' access to public institutions such as education, healthcare, and legal protection is conditioned not only on the laws that define policy toward immigrants and their own legal status, but also on public opinion towards migrants and immigration. With policy toward migrants and immigration growing increasingly strict in the United States and Europe, what rights do Latin Americans demand for their own emigrants in other countries? For immigrants living in their own countries, what rights are they willing to grant?

For the first time, the 2010-2011 edition of *The Americas and the World* included a series of questions

on the rights of migrants, both for emigrants from Latin American countries and those who arrive as immigrants. Latin Americans were asked to indicate their level of support for the following six rights—for both their own emigrants living abroad and immigrants who come to live in their own countries. Four of these rights—family reunification, access to healthcare, public education, and the right to seek work under equal conditions as nationals—can be categorized as social rights, while the following two—the right of free association and the right to vote—as political rights. In each case, wide majorities are willing to grant immigrants the same rights they demand for their nationals abroad, but with less intensity: in each case, the proportion of the population supporting a given right for emigrants is slightly greater than the proportion willing to grant it. For social rights, differences between rights for emigrants and immigrants are almost insignificant (with the exception of the right to seek work). Support for political rights, on the other hand, tends to vary considerably.

There is wide agreement among Latin Americans—both in the case of emigrants and immigrants—in support of the right to access health services and public education, as well as the right for emigrants/immigrants to bring their families with them. As Figures 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 demonstrate, wide majorities demand—and are willing to grant—access to healthcare: 98% of Colombians,<sup>7</sup> 98% of Ecuadorians (compared to 91% who would grant this same right to immigrants, a difference of only seven percentage points), 99% of Mexicans (compared to 94% for immigrants, a difference of five points), and 94% of Peruvians (90% for immigrants, a difference of four points). With respect to public education, 97% of Colombians, 96% of Ecuadorians, 96% of Mexicans, and 92% of Peruvians consider that emigrants should have access to public education in their host countries. The percentages willing to grant this same right to immigrants are 91% in Ecuador (a difference of five points), 91% in Mexico (a difference of five

<sup>7</sup> In Colombia, survey respondents were only asked to rate their support for the rights of Colombians living abroad. Survey respondents were not asked to rate their support for rights for immigrants in Colombia.



**Figure 4.6.1. Rights of Citizens Abroad \***


*How much would you agree or disagree with (COUNTRY NATIONALS) who live abroad having the right to...?*  
(%)

Strongly disagree      Somewhat disagree      Somewhat agree      Strongly agree


**PUBLIC HEALTHCARE**




**PUBLIC EDUCATION**



**GET A JOB**




**FORM ORGANIZATIONS**



**TAKE THEIR FAMILY**



**VOTE**



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil.

points) and 88% in Peru (a difference of four points). Support for family reunification is also high –wide majorities support this right for both emigrants and immigrants. Ninety-two percent of Colombians, 81% of Ecuadorians, 83% of Mexicans, and 87% of

Peruvians consider that emigrants should have the right to bring their families to live with them. With respect to immigrants, 75% of Ecuadorians (a difference of six points), 81% of Mexicans (a difference of two points), and 85% of Peruvians (a difference of



**Figure 4.6.2. Rights of Foreigners \***

*How much would you agree or disagree to foreigners who live in (COUNTRY) having the right to...?*  
(%)


Strongly disagree

Somewhat disagree


Somewhat agree

Strongly agree


#### PUBLIC HEALTHCARE




#### PUBLIC EDUCATION




#### GET A JOB




#### TAKE THEIR FAMILY



#### FORM ORGANIZATIONS



#### VOTE



Note: Does not show values for "Don't Know" or "No Answer".

\* Not asked in Brazil and Colombia.

two points), are in favor of allowing immigrants to bring their family to live with them.

Unlike the other social rights examined above, support for the right to seek work under equal conditions as country nationals is more contentious. There

are larger gaps among those demanding the right to work and those willing to grant the same right to immigrants. On the one hand, 97% of Colombians, 95% of Ecuadorians, 97% of Mexicans, and 92% of Peruvians consider that their emigrants should have the right to



work under equal conditions as citizens in their host countries. On the other hand, a lesser majority of Ecuadorians (80%, a difference of 15 points), Mexicans (85%, a difference of 12 points), and Peruvians (83%, a difference of nine points) would allow immigrants to seek work under the same conditions as citizens. While the disposition to grant this right is lower, wide majorities in the four countries would still allow immigrants to seek work under equal conditions. Nevertheless, the gap between the rights demanded for emigrants and the disposition to grant the same rights to immigrants is significantly larger with respect to labor rights than other social rights. The overwhelming majorities that demand the right to work under equal conditions for emigrants is consistent with the primary motive Latin Americans named for emigrating: the opportunity to obtain better jobs. Furthermore, while the majority of citizens in the countries surveyed disagree with the notion that emigrants take jobs away from citizens, significant minorities share this perception. Evidently, a tough labor market in the four Latin American countries, a high turnover rate, and the fear of losing one's job all influence in Latin Americans' less generous stance towards labor rights than towards the other social rights mentioned above.

Latin Americans are much more reluctant to grant political rights to immigrants, such as the right to vote and to form civic organizations, although majorities are still willing to grant immigrants the right to free association, and somewhat more surprisingly, the right to vote. With respect to emigrants living abroad, wide majorities demand the right to free association, that is, the right to "form organizations to protect their rights": 94% of Colombians, 93% of Ecuadorians (compared to 77% who would grant this right to immigrants, a difference of 16 points), 93% of Mexicans (77% for immigrants, a difference of 16 points), and 90% of Peruvians (80% for immigrants, a difference of 10 points). Finally, 86% of Colombians, 86% of Ecuadorians, 80% of Mexicans, and 78% of Peruvians consider that emigrants should have the right to vote in their host countries. In contrast, only 66% of Ecuadorians (a difference of 20 points), 61% of Mexicans (a 19 point difference), and 68% of Peruvians (a difference of 10 points) would

grant immigrants the right to vote in their countries. The greater reluctance to grant political rights is also consistent with Latin Americans' elevated political nationalism as described in Chapter 1: majorities in each country are opposed to a nationalized foreigner being elected as president, senator, or representative. In sum, there is a gap present throughout the survey between the rights demanded for "our own" and the rights granted to "others".

Finally, two more findings stand out with respect to migration, although they will be discussed in greater detail in the conclusions. On the one hand, the results of *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* reveal that the Latin American publics surveyed, and especially those of the Andean countries, share similar patterns of migration. Emigration is equally important in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, with similar proportions of relatives living in other countries, although the percentage of families with a family member from the same household living abroad and where remittances represent a crucial part of family income is greater in the Andean countries than in Mexico. In the same sense, the diversity of the Latin American diaspora is greater in the Andean countries than in Mexico, where emigration is concentrated principally in the United States. On the other hand, survey data reveals that the attitudes and opinions of the Latin American publics surveyed toward the benefits of emigration, immigration, foreigners, rights, and migration policy differ significantly. Although the attitudes of Latin Americans towards these issues are largely favorable, there are important differences in each public. Peruvians are the most optimistic and open with respect to the benefits of emigration and immigration in their country, while Ecuadorians are more pessimistic and view emigration and immigration—as well as foreigners in general—more unfavorably. Ecuadorians' feelings toward foreigners are reflected in the limited range of rights they are willing to grant and their preference for more stringent policies towards immigration. Overall, the perceptions and attitudes of Colombians and Mexicans towards emigration and immigration fall into an intermediate range, between those of Ecuador and Peru •



## CONCLUSIONS

### LATIN AMERICA AT A CROSSROADS: SHARED ASPIRATIONS AND DIVERGING AGENDAS

The results of the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* point toward a series of conclusions that may help us to better understand how Latin Americans observe, perceive, and interact with the world. At the conclusion of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is no longer possible to speak of Latin America as a homogeneous region with a single vision of its role in a globalized world. However, neither is it possible to divide the region into North and South; two separate mental geographies with two distinct international political cultures. While the past decade has seen the emergence of rival political, ideological, and economic blocs, survey results suggest a Latin America whose social contours are more complex, diverse, and heterogeneous, challenging the image of a region divided by clear and exclusive borders.

Two trends are particularly revealing of the multiplicity, fluidity, and diversity of Latin America and Latin Americans. First, independent of their country's size, location, or level of international engagement, the majority of citizens interviewed identify as *Latin American*, rather than *North American*, *South American*, or *Andean*. The small proportion of Colombians and Ecuadorians that identify as *Andean*—and in the case of Mexico the small percentage of Mexicans that identify as *Central*

or *North American*—suggests that Latin American identity is not bound by commercial or social ties, or even geographical proximity. The diverse patterns of regional integration pursued in the North and South of Latin America do not seem to have strengthened sub-regional (*North, South, or Central American, or Andean*) over national identities. What we do see, however, are countries that identify almost exclusively with Latin America as a continent, such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, or, on the other hand, countries whose populations are inclined to view themselves as members of a wider global community, such as Brazil and Peru, where international trade has increased sharply over the past decade. On the other hand, the region's two largest economies—Brazil and Mexico—which are precisely the countries with the greatest potential to project their influence both regionally and globally, do not yet have the social bases necessary to assume the costs and commitments of active and sustained leadership on the global stage. Brazilians' contact with other countries is the lowest of all of the Latin American countries surveyed, while, along with the Mexican public, Brazilians are less informed and interested in international affairs than their counterparts in much smaller countries such as those of the Andean region, and in particular, Colombia.





Second, in spite of the large variety of models and strategies for international engagement, the populations of the Latin American countries included in the survey share certain preferences characteristic of the region as a whole. What are the attributes that characterize the typical Latin American citizen's engagement with the world? In general, the wide majority of Latin Americans surveyed has little contact with citizens of other countries, has travelled outside of their country infrequently if at all, and is vaguely familiar with international affairs. Three out of every four Latin Americans have never travelled outside of their country nor sustain contact with foreigners on a daily basis; at most, two out of five have access to and use the internet; and only one out of ten speaks a foreign language. Latin Americans' interaction with the world tends to be indirect—most often through a wide network of family ties to one member of the family living abroad—except for the case of Brazil, which stands out as the only country isolated from the social and economic impact of Latin American migratory flows.

Latin Americans on average are less informed regarding international affairs and have scarce and little knowledge of other countries and their leaders, including those that of countries that are culturally or geographically close. Latin Americans are even less knowledgeable of international institutions and multilateral organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the United Nations (UN). Although Latin Americans on average are less informed with respect to international institutions and affairs, there is a considerable gap between Colombia, whose citizens are the most informed, and Brazil, whose public is least familiar with international affairs and organizations. There is also an important gap between Latin Americans' pride in their country and faith in public institutions. Latin Americans are proud of their nationality, their nation's natural resources, and cultural traditions, but tend to be dissatisfied with their countries' progress in education policy, security, and economic policy. While Latin Americans agree that democracy is the best form of government, they tend to vote in low

numbers, have a low level of respect for the law and distrust in legal institutions, and have little trust in politics and politicians.

Despite limited contact with the world and scarce knowledge of international affairs, a strong sentiment of national identity and pride, and little trust in politics or institutions, the citizens of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru show a level of interest in the international affairs of their country similar to that of events directly affecting the nation. On average, close to two of every three citizens surveyed describe themselves as interested in international news, while only one third professed little or no interest. These findings call into question the notion that citizens are only interested in events that have a direct effect upon their daily lives, and are inclined to follow only local or national news. While contact with the exterior is sporadic and knowledge of international affairs is scarce, the citizens of Latin American countries are just as concerned with events that occur beyond their borders as those that take place within. On a country level, interest in world events varies significantly, confirming the thesis that citizens of larger countries seem to suffer from a sort of "attention deficit" when it comes to international affairs. Indeed, the citizens of Mexico and Brazil are less focused on international affairs than their counterparts in the three Andean countries, and especially those in Colombia. Nevertheless, the greater disinterest expressed by the citizens of Mexico and Brazil may stem from the two countries' contrasting circumstances. While Mexicans' inward turn may be related to the country's dual economic and security crises, the optimism generated by Brazil's economic bonanza may have produced a "sleeping giant" whose citizens have yet to look toward Brazil's rising potential as a world power.

One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from the survey is that while nationalism in Latin America continues to shape social and political relations, nationalist sentiment is increasingly selective and ambivalent. On the one hand, social and political nationalism, traditionally characteristic of the countries of Latin America, remains strong, with large majorities rejecting the possibility of opening





borders to the free flow of migrants and of granting naturalized foreigners the full range of political rights enjoyed by native-born citizens. The question of sovereignty continues to define Latin Americans' commitment to multilateral organizations, with large majorities opposed to accepting decisions they view as unfavorable or submitting their own citizens to the jurisdiction of international bodies. Latin Americans are also reluctant to favor the creation of a Latin American parliament or the adoption of a common defense policy. Viewed in this way, the persistence of nationalism has been a major obstacle to multilateralism, which has been reduced to rhetoric and token gestures amid fears of a loss of sovereignty. At the same time, Latin Americans are surprisingly open to cultural influences from other countries, and especially, greater integration with the global economy, with high overall support for open economies, free trade, and foreign investment. Latin Americans' openness to new cultural and economic ties is surprising not only for the contrast with their strong defense of sovereignty but also because of certain policies inherent in the opening of cultural and economic barriers that would be expected to increase nationalist sentiment. Although one of the most powerful sources of national pride among Latin American nations is national culture and traditions, majorities in each country consider the diffusion of customs and traditions from foreign cultures to be positive.

The survey also did not find evidence of a resurgent economic nationalism or protectionist attitudes that would favor greater government control of international trade and financial flows despite criticism of neoliberal policies on the part of some political and social actors. Considering the impact of the global recession of 2008-2009 on countries across the world, it is also notable that Latin Americans did not respond to these crises with a rise in protectionist attitudes. Two years after the global financial crisis, Latin Americans in the countries surveyed are more open to economic liberalization than in any other aspect of their country's foreign relations. As might be expected, the two countries with the greatest economic performance in the last

two years, Brazil and Peru, are precisely those that are most enthusiastic with respect to globalization, foreign investment, and free trade. In contrast, the populations of countries with lower rates of economic growth tend to be slightly less in favor of opening their country to the global economy. In spite of these differences, economic nationalism has declined in popularity with each edition of the survey.

It is also important to mention that while Latin American countries share a common series of threats and aspirations, there is a lack of consensus on how to manage global and regional challenges. This discord is due, in part, to the fact that each of the countries surveyed views international engagement through the lens of its respective country or region. In Mexico, international cooperation is seen as a potential source of aid for resolving internal problems, while South Americans envision partnerships with other nations as an opportunity to increase their overall welfare. Rather than a single conceptual framework, each country operates within a distinct national context that determines which opportunities and models of engagement are pursued. In the case of Mexico, the insecurity resulting from the country's crackdown on criminal organizations has played a larger role in shaping the country's immediate engagement with the world, while South Americans look toward the international community with greater confidence, optimism, and opportunity. However, greater optimism—whether over a country's economic future or stability—does not always lead to greater international engagement. In Brazil, euphoria over the nation's economic and political rise has turned the country's focus inward, resulting in a certain indifference and detachment from world events.

Despite a shared sentiment that the world will be "worse off" in the decade to come, wide majorities in each of the five countries surveyed prefer their country to participate actively in international affairs. This call to global action comes not in spite of, but because of perceptions over where the world is heading. Instead of prompting countries to respond passively or turn attention inward, concern over a common set of global threats has encouraged greater



activism and a stronger will to participate in global affairs.

There is a broad consensus among the populations of the five countries surveyed as to the principal international threats facing Latin America. While their impact is felt in different contexts, both national and individual, Latin Americans are worried by the same set of concerns, particularly those that directly affect their standard of living such as drug trafficking and organized crime, the deterioration of the environment, the scarcity and price of food, poverty, and economic crises. Although global in nature, these threats are viewed through an individual or local lens that is focused on the immediate impact on the standard of living of both individuals and their communities.

There is also a considerable degree of consistency between the threats identified as most immediate and the foreign policy priorities identified as most important, both related directly or indirectly to the wellbeing and security of the population. Foreign policy priorities of medium and low importance are those that address traditional themes of international and economic security, take steps to strengthen international organizations, and promote the wellbeing and security of the global community. These priorities suggest a clear mandate for foreign ministers to pursue policies that increase individual and community wellbeing and address threats that have a direct impact on daily life, making the promotion of global institutions and values relatively lower in importance. In sum, the utilitarian rationality of personal wellbeing better describes Latin Americans' aspirations than the normative rationality of international solidarity.

How countries perceive their impact or degree of relevance on the world stage is influenced by their relative optimism or pessimism toward the direction in which the world is heading. Brazilians' optimism on the one hand, and Mexicans' pessimism, on the other, shapes their perception of international relevance: greater in Brazil, lesser in Mexico. Brazilians have a higher impression of their country's importance, both prospectively and retrospectively, in ac-

cordance with their rising power in Latin America. Mexicans, on the other hand, tend to undervalue their importance on the global stage, focusing instead on their declining power in the region. Colombians' perception of the importance and influence of their country, both regional and global, tends to be higher than its actual potential. However, Colombians' enthusiasm is a welcome phenomenon after decades of isolation and internal conflict.

In total accordance with their relative power on the international stage, the countries of Latin America prefer primarily the exercise of soft power (cultural, commercial, and diplomatic), and view the use of hard (military) power as a much less attractive option, with the populations of the countries surveyed divided in their support for military action. From here we can deduce another important mandate for Latin American foreign ministers: Latin Americans demand an active foreign policy that privileges the use of instruments of soft power and promotes actions that have a direct impact on their security and wellbeing.

However, despite sharing the same preference for a non-militarized foreign policy focused on development, wellbeing and security, Latin Americans have very distinct impressions of the performance of their respective governments. There is large variation in the evaluation of public policies, both in level of agreement and order of priority. Ecuadorians and Brazilians tend to evaluate their leaders more positively, while Mexicans and Peruvians are more critical and Colombians fall in an intermediate range. Additionally, there is no broad agreement as to which policies are the best or worst evaluated, proving that Latin American citizens are capable of distinguishing clearly between different policies and evaluating them and the popularity of their leaders accordingly. In general, foreign policy is the second-best evaluated of public policies, except in Ecuador where it occupies the second to last place.

If the threats and international aspirations of Latin Americans do indeed converge on a general level, there is little agreement over the framework for a common agenda for the region. Latin Americans vary not only by the relevance with which they view



their country on the international stage, but also in their perception of regional priorities and actions that are preferred to achieve them. Considering the multiplicity of the visions and preferences of Latin Americans, it is difficult to outline a common agenda with clear priorities for the region. When priorities do align, countries prefer limited cooperation on a case-by-case basis that does not threaten sovereignty and leaves political and social integration aside.

Latin Americans do not share the same priorities with respect to their regional or international relations; in general, they coincide on the countries rated most favorably (those with which they maintain close and friendly relations, or perceive as examples of success for their level of development and stability or pace of economic growth), and those rated least favorably (countries involved in international conflicts or have a high incidence of criminal violence). There are countries whose aspirations seem to be anchored on the American continent (Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico), which place higher value on the various political or cultural sub-regions in the North and South of the western hemisphere than on other regions in the world. On the other hand, countries like Brazil and Peru place greater value on regions outside of the American continent –and specifically with Asia. In these countries, strategic priorities are more evenly distributed across the globe.

With respect to Latin America as a region, we observe significant limitations to countries' abilities to coordinate effective responses to regional crises. Where countries most diverge is in their preferred responses to a possible regional conflict. While some countries are more proactive (Brazil and Mexico), others are more reactive (Colombia and Ecuador). There is also a significant gap between the various publics' optimism towards relations between countries in the region. Although there is a lack of agreement with respect to actions that might be taken in response to a region-wide conflict, Latin Americans coincide on two issues: the regional leadership of Brazil and the integration of regional economies.

First, the country that has risen to become Latin America's leading power, and is widely viewed to

continue as such, is Brazil: majorities in each of the countries surveyed believe that Brazil has been and will continue to be the most influential country in the region. Second, while Latin Americans are reluctant to support regional integration in general, significant majorities support the free flow of investment, goods, and services in the region, supported by an ample network of infrastructure, highways and bridges. These steps toward material and commercial integration contrast with uniform opposition to the free movement of individuals without border controls and much less, the creation of a common Latin American army. On the other hand, there is limited and conflicting support for the creation of a Latin American parliament and common currency. While Brazil's newly recognized regional leadership might have the political sway to advance the region's limited common agenda, its inward focus, along with the disinterest of its citizens in international affairs constitutes an important limitation.

Latin Americans also differ greatly in their perceptions of the United States, making it difficult to develop a common agenda with this country. While some populations tend to be more pro-American, (Ecuador, Peru, and in particular, Colombia), others view the United States less favorably (such as Brazil, and principally Mexico). Nevertheless, these sentiments do not necessarily correspond to the type of relation desired by each country. Despite viewing the United States least favorably, Mexico, along with Colombia, prefer a "special" relation with the U.S. and are willing to pay the costs (U.S. supervision of resources and the sending of U.S. agents) of aid to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. On the other hand, Ecuador and Peru (and to a lesser degree, Brazil), prefer to coordinate actions with the countries of Latin America in order to defend common interests against the United States. While these countries would accept aid to combat drug trafficking, they are not willing to pay the possible costs and the sharing of sovereignty that the acceptance of U.S. aid might imply.

On the other hand, Latin Americans' confidence in Europe makes the adoption of a common agenda with the countries of this region more plausible. In



general, almost all of the individuals surveyed view Spain in a positive light, and expect their relations with this country to improve in the decade to come. In practice, however, the possibility of increased ties with Spain and Europe is less realistic, as neither Spain nor Europe rank as strategic priorities for Latin Americans, except in the cases of Ecuador and Peru, home to a significant population of Spanish nationals. Multilateral organizations present another potential opportunity for advancing a common Latin American agenda in response to global challenges. While multilateralism faces significant barriers within Latin America, Latin Americans tend to view multilateral organizations with prestige. Latin Americans have a very favorable opinion of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations, and coincide in trusting the United States, France, and Great Britain to maintain world peace through joint action on the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Latin Americans have much less trust in China and Russia to keep world peace. Greater trust in the UN, however, does not necessarily translate into a higher level of commitment to multilateral organizations. In addition to Latin Americans' limited knowledge of multilateral organizations, the strengthening of multilateral organizations does not count among Latin Americans' most immediate foreign policy priorities nor is considered to be one of the most effective actions for resolving global crises.

One of the most significant items on Latin Americans' global agenda is international migration. Mass emigration weighs heavily upon the economic and social life of not only Mexico, but –as results from the survey *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* confirm– Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru as well. Significant percentages of citizens in these countries have relatives living abroad, receive remittances, and may as well desire to migrate to other countries. Migration in the Andean countries is distinct from that of Mexico in two aspects. First, there is a greater percentage of families with relatives living abroad, and second, the destinations of migrants are more diverse. Brazil is more isolated from the social, economic, and cultural facets of migration: few citizens

report relatives living abroad, and even fewer receive remittances. Differences in the degree of exposure to migration constitute a limitation to the adoption of a common agenda and the coordination of policies towards both emigrants and immigrants.

Lesser known, but nonetheless vital to the discussion of migration in Latin America, are attitudes toward immigration from other Latin American countries and foreigners in general. With respect to immigration, Colombians, Ecuadorians, Mexicans, and Peruvians are generally open to the presence of foreigners. In addition, survey respondents concur in that immigrants contribute to the nation's economy and culture and are inclined to recognize migrants' social and political rights.

Nevertheless, Latin Americans' openness to the world has certain limitations. While majorities in the countries surveyed are concerned that industrialized countries might close their borders to migrants, Latin Americans are reluctant (except in Colombia) to approve of the free flow of persons, without border restrictions, in Latin America. Despite the suffering of their own emigrants abroad, overwhelming majorities in Ecuador and Mexico support the deportation of undocumented immigrants. In Ecuador, many of those interviewed responded that immigrants increase rates of delinquency, take jobs away from nationals, and weaken cultural traditions.

Finally, the rights demanded for migrants abroad are frequently greater than the disposition to grant them in the four Spanish-speaking countries included in the survey. In all of the countries surveyed, the granting of social rights, including access to health care and education, is widely accepted. However, the gap between social and labor rights, such as the right to seek employment under the same conditions as nationals, is significant in each country. There is a considerable difference in the intensity of Latin Americans' demand for political rights for their compatriots abroad –such as the right to free association and the right to vote– and the willingness to grant them at home, although it is important to clarify that the proportion willing to grant these rights constitutes a solid majority.



The Latin American countries included in the survey, with the exception of Brazil, exhibit patterns of migration that are remarkably similar. Nevertheless, attitudes towards emigration and immigration policy in each country differ considerably. Based on the common experiences of their migrants abroad, we might expect a broader consensus with respect to the defense and protection of emigrants' rights. However, differences in public opinion make it difficult to consider a common agenda with respect to emigration, immigration, and trans-migration in Latin American countries. First, majorities oppose the free movement of people across borders as an element of regional integration, and second, attitudes

towards the actions and rights of immigrants vary considerably. In Peru, attitudes towards immigration are more favorable, in Colombia and Mexico, less so, while Ecuadorians are more opposed. In sum, surveys like *The Americas and the World 2010-2011* allow us to better understand the intricacies of international migration, its patterns, and attitudes towards migrants. As public opinion continues to inform legal and social responses to migration – especially in democratic countries – it is even more important to understand our citizens' perceptions of those that leave for other countries and those that arrive to their own •







## NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

### NOTES ON METHODOLOGY FOR BRAZIL

| Methodological Summary    |                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Target Population         | Brazilians 16 years of age or older, living within the national territory at the time of the survey |
| Sample Size               | 2,000 persons                                                                                       |
| Method of Data Collection | Face-to-face interviews conducted in the respondent's private home                                  |
| Sampling Error            | +/- 2.0% for the entire sample                                                                      |
| Survey Date               | April 20 <sup>th</sup> to May 10 <sup>th</sup> , 2011                                               |

**Population:** A survey administered nationally to a probabilistically representative sample that permits the generation of estimations applicable to the totality of the population of interest, composed of men and women 16 years of age and older, from both rural and urban zones, residing within the national territory at the time of the survey field work.

**Sampling Frame:** The 2000 Census and the National Survey of Brazilian Households (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) were utilized as the reference sample frame. On the base

of these two surveys various socioeconomic variables were established (age, level of schooling and economic situation, all cross tabulated with gender) with the aim of representing the entire Brazilian population.

**Sample Design:** A multistage sampling method was utilized. In each of the stages a randomized selection process was done: selection of municipalities, of sectors to be surveyed, and of households/persons. For questions of practicality, a minimum quota of interviews was established in each sector to be surveyed, a process which has been denominated productivity.





The 2000 interviews were distributed proportionally to three broad strata: rural zones and the interior, state capitals, and greater metropolitan areas. For the interior and metropolitan zones, municipalities with self-representation were separated (municipalities that would usually be sorted through probabilistic procedures of systematic selection) and interviews were administered proportionally among their populations. Municipalities of the interior without self-representation were stratified by the following regions in Brazil: Northeast, North, Center-East, Southeast, and South, with interviews being distributed proportionally to the populations of these five regions. In each region, municipalities were newly stratified according to the population of their states with interviews also being administered proportionally among these populations. Within each state, municipalities were stratified according to their population size (large, medium-large, medium-

small, and small), so that each stratification would consist of the same number of municipalities.

In state capitals, the number of interviews previously calculated was also distributed proportionally by population.

With the goal of controlling the various socio-demographic variables, municipalities were also stratified implicitly according to a key economic variable (level of urbanization) and one social variable (level of literacy).

**Sample Size and Margin of Error:** In accordance with the objectives of this study, the sample size selected was sufficiently large to allow the analysis of results on both national and regional levels. The total number of interviews completed was 2,000, with a level of confidence of 95%, and a margin of error of  $\pm 2.0\%$ . The following table describes the territorial distribution of the sample.

| Territorial Division of the Sample, Brazil |                                                                                              |                    |
|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| <i>Domain</i>                              | <i>State</i>                                                                                 | <i>Sample Size</i> |
| Northeast                                  | Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte and Sergipe | 520                |
| North                                      | Amazonas and Pará                                                                            | 80                 |
| Southeast                                  | Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo                                   | 1020               |
| South                                      | Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa Catarina                                                | 280                |
| Center-East                                | Distrito Federal (Brasília), Goiás, and Mato Grosso do Sul                                   | 100                |
| <i>Total Sample Size</i>                   |                                                                                              | 2,000              |

Note: The survey was not administered in the states of Acre, Amapá, Rondônia, Roraima, and Tocantins.



**Fieldwork and Dates:** The interviews were carried out from April 20<sup>th</sup> to May 10<sup>th</sup>, 2011. Each interview was administered face to face in the private homes selected to only one person residing in each household. A structured questionnaire<sup>1</sup> was used as a data collection tool by professional interviewers qualified in fieldwork.

**Data Processing:** All of the data collected were processed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software.

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<sup>1</sup> With 54 thematic questions and 21 socio-demographic questions.



## NOTES ON METHODOLOGY FOR COLOMBIA

| Methodological Summary         |                                                                                                                        |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Target Population              | Colombians 18 years of age and older, living within any department of the national territory at the time of the survey |
| Sample Size                    | 1,499 persons                                                                                                          |
| Method Mode of Data Collection | Face-to-face interviews conducted in the respondent's private home                                                     |
| Sampling Error                 | +/- 3.0% for the entire sample                                                                                         |
| Survey Date                    | October 1 <sup>st</sup> to October 30 <sup>th</sup> 2010                                                               |

**Population:** A survey applied at the national level to a probabilistically representative sample that permits the generation of estimations applicable to the totality of the population of interest, composed of Colombians of 18 years of age and older, residing within any department of the national territory at the time of the survey fieldwork.

**Sampling Frame:** The cartography of the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas, DANE) was utilized as the reference sample frame for each one of the municipalities selected.

**Sample Design:** A multistage sampling method was utilized. In each of the three stages a randomized selection process was held for each of the sampling

units. The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) composing the first stage of the sample were municipalities selected across the different regions of the country. The Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs) in the second stage were city blocks selected proportional to stratification and rural townships. The Tertiary Sampling Units (TSUs) for the third stage of the sample were households. The selection was random.

**Sample Size and Margin of Error:** The total number of interviews completed was 1,499, with a level of confidence of 95% and a margin of error of +/- 3.0%. This sample size is representative for regions and some departments, but not for municipalities. The following table describes the territorial distribution of the sample.

| Territorial Division of the Sample, Colombia |                                                                          |             |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Domain                                       | Departments                                                              | Sample Size |
| Atlantic                                     | Atlántico, Bolívar, Cesar, Córdoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and Sucre      | 289         |
| Central                                      | Bogotá, Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Huila, Meta, Norte Santander and Santander | 571         |
| Cafetera                                     | Antioquia, Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda, and Tolima                        | 350         |
| Pacific                                      | Cauca, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca                                 | 259         |
| National Territories                         | Casanare and Putumayo                                                    | 30          |
| Total Sample Size                            |                                                                          | 1,499       |

Note: The survey was not administered in the departments of Chocó and Putumayo



**Fieldwork and Dates:** The interviews were carried out from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 30<sup>th</sup> of October, 2010. For the realization of fieldwork, working groups were organized in the cities of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Pasto, from which professional interviewers departed to cover all of the areas in the sample. A structured questionnaire<sup>2</sup> was used as a data collection tool by professional interviewers qualified in fieldwork. Each interview was administered face-to-face in the private homes selected to only one person residing in each household. In almost 20% of the households visited subjects were re-interviewed by fieldwork supervisors by telephone.

**Data Processing:** All of the data collected were processed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software.

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<sup>2</sup> With 107 thematic questions and 25 socio-demographic and cultural questions.



## NOTES ON METHODOLOGY FOR ECUADOR

| Methodological Summary |                                                                                                   |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Target Population      | Ecuadorians of 18 years and older, living within the national territory at the time of the survey |
| Sample Size            | 1,574 persons                                                                                     |
| Method of Data         | Collection Face-to-face interviews conducted in the respondent's private home                     |
| Sampling Error         | +/- 2.5% for the entire sample                                                                    |
| Survey Date            | September 13 <sup>th</sup> to October 19 <sup>th</sup> , 2010                                     |

**Population:** The Ecuadorian population, men and women of 18 years of age and older of high, middle, and low socioeconomic status, from urban and rural regions belonging to the 17 provinces of Ecuador (where 94% of the Ecuadorian population resides, 96.1% urban, and 89.5% rural).

**Sample Design:** The unit used to calculate the sample size is based on housing units registered in the 2001 census of the National Institute of Statistics and the Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INEC), and not by household. This second measure is much less stable than the first, which constitutes physical units.

**Sampling Method:** A multistage sampling method was used. The corresponding phases are described below:

The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) are stratum, which correspond to each of the 17 provinces selected. The selection of sampling units was proportional, according to the population density of each province. The populations of each province were then stratified into urban and rural populations, with the distribution of interviews proportional to the sample for each stratum. Third, in each stratum, zones of the census

were selected with equal probability, owing to the homogeneity of each geographic region, although rural and urban areas differ in size. Nevertheless, each zone of the census is composed of around 10 sectors. Each zone of the census was later sorted by sector, with equal probability (in urban areas each sector has around 150 households, while rural areas have around 120). In the fifth phase, 10 households were selected with equal probability from each sector of the census. Finally, in the last phase, in each household selected one person of 18 years of age or older was selected at random to be interviewed (with the intention of maintaining a 50%-50% gender balance).


**Sample Size and Margin of Error:** In accordance with the objectives of this study, the sample size selected was sufficiently large to allow the analysis of results a national scale. The total number of interviews completed was 1,574, a number calculated with a margin of error of +/- 2.5% and with a level of confidence of 95%. The territorial division was the

The size of the national sample, both urban and rural, for each one of the municipalities, cities, and localities and for each one of the provinces visited is the following:



| Territorial Division of the Sample, Ecuador |                                                                                                       |             |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Domain                                      | Provinces                                                                                             | Sample Size |
| Costa                                       | El Oro, Esmeraldas, Guayas, Los Ríos Manabí and Santa Elena                                           | 837         |
| Sierra                                      | Azuay, Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, Imbabura, Loja, Pichincha, Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas and Tungurahua | 678         |
| Oriente                                     | Morona Santiago, Napo and Sucumbios                                                                   | 59          |
| Total Sample Size                           |                                                                                                       | 1,574       |

Note: The survey was not administered in the provinces of Bolívar, Cañar, Carchi, Galápagos, Orellana, Pastaza y Zamora Chinchipe.



**Fieldwork and Dates:** The interviews were carried out from September 13<sup>th</sup> to October 19<sup>th</sup>, 2010. A previously structured questionnaire<sup>3</sup> was used as a data collection tool by professional interviewers qualified in fieldwork. The survey was administered by 45 interviewers and 12 supervisors. Each interview was administered face-to-face in the private homes selected to only one person residing in each household, trying to maintain a gender balance of 50% to 50%.

**Data Processing:** The processing and preliminary presentation of the data took place from October 1<sup>st</sup> to October 25<sup>th</sup>. All of the data collected were processed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software.

<sup>3</sup> With 122 thematic questions and 25 socio-demographic questions.



## NOTES ON METHODOLOGY FOR MEXICO

| Methodological Summary |                                                                                                    |
|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Target Population      | Mexicans 18 years of age and older, living within the national territory at the time of the survey |
| Sample Size            | 2,400 persons                                                                                      |
| Method of Data         | Collection Face-to-face interviews conducted in the respondent's private home                      |
| Sampling Error         | +/- 2.04% for the entire sample                                                                    |
| Survey Date            | September 27 <sup>th</sup> to October 29 <sup>th</sup> , 2010                                      |

**Population:** A survey applied at the national level to a probabilistically representative sample that permits the generation of estimations applicable to the totality of the population of interest, composed of Mexicans 18 years of age and older, residing within the national territory at the time of the survey fieldwork.

**Sample Design:** The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) electoral sections of the country were utilized as the reference sample frame. This included all of its forms for the entire country. Updated data from the last federal election (2009) were incorporated.

**Sampling Method:** A multistage sampling method was utilized. In each of its three stages a randomized selection process was done for each of the sampling units. The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) composing the first stage of the sample were regions and states corresponding to the electoral sections, which were set in order according to size. The Secondary

Sampling Units (SSUs) that formed the second stage of the sample were blocks within each electoral section. The Tertiary Sampling Units (TSUs) for the third stage of the sample were households. The initial ordering of the elements of the sampling frame guarantees a selection probability proportional to size (PPS), which leads to more representative results. The sample is probabilistic, and thus can be used to make inferences from its results regarding the target population.

**Sample Size and Margin of Error:** In accordance with the objective of the study, the sample size chosen was sufficient to allow analysis of the results on both national and regional levels. As with previous rounds, the survey required samples at both the national and the regional levels, which were stratified by states on the northern border and the South and Southwest of the country. The following table describes the territorial distribution of the sample.

| Territorial Division of the Sample, Mexico |                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| North                                      | Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Sonora                                                                                                                                                                 |
| South and Southeast                        | Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatan                                                                                                                                                      |
| Rest of the Country                        | Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Colima, Mexico DF, Durango, Estado de Mexico, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacan, Morelos, Nayarit, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, Veracruz and Zacatecas |

Note: Due to security issues and for the safety of the fieldwork team, during the 2010 survey fieldwork the state of Tamaulipas was excluded from the sample, and only 11 municipalities were included in the sample in the state of Michoacan.





The size of the national sample as well as that for each region, along with the margin of error for estimations, is the following:

sample from this domain, reaching a total of 480 cases. Finally, of the 1,800 cases of the national sample, 500 cases were subtracted from the states of the North and South and Southeast to form the rest of the country domain at 1,190 cases.

**Fieldwork and Dates:** The interviews were carried out from September 27<sup>th</sup> to October 29<sup>th</sup>, 2010. Each interview was administered face-to-face in the private homes selected to only one person residing in each household. The selection of this person was done in a random manner with a final adjustment of quotas, taking as a parameter the distribution of the population by sex and age resulting from the Second Count of Population and Households from the INEGI in 2005. A previously structured questionnaire<sup>4</sup> was used as a data collection tool by professional inter-

| Domain                   | Sample Size  | Theoretical Margin of Error |
|--------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|
| National                 | 1,800        | +/- 2.36                    |
| North                    | 730          | +/- 3.70                    |
| South and Southeast      | 480          | +/- 4.56                    |
| Rest of the Country      | 1,190        | +/- 2.90                    |
| <i>Total Sample Size</i> | <i>2,400</i> | <i>+/- 2.04</i>             |

The total number of interviews completed was 2,400. The distribution of interviews was 1,800 cases based on the electoral selections of the entire country. An oversample of 400 cases from the electoral sections that make up the North domain was added to the 330 similar cases from the national sample to create a total of 730 cases for this domain. Another oversample of 200 cases from the electoral sections that make up the South and Southeast domain was added to those already included in the national

viewers qualified in fieldwork. Seventy-two data collectors, 10 supervisors, 15 capturers, an analyst and a project director participated in the fieldwork.

**Data Processing:** The processing and preliminary presentation of the data took place from October 25<sup>th</sup> to November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010. All of the data collected were processed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software.

<sup>4</sup> With 103 thematic questions and 26 socio-demographic questions.



## NOTES ON METHODOLOGY FOR PERU

| Methodological Summary    |                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Target Population         | Peruvians 18 years of age and older, living within the national territory at the time of the survey |
| Sample Size               | 1,516 persons                                                                                       |
| Method of Data Collection | Face-to-face interviews conducted in the respondent's private home                                  |
| Sampling Error            | +/- 2.5% for the entire sample                                                                      |
| Survey Date               | November 24 <sup>th</sup> to December 20 <sup>th</sup> , 2010                                       |

**Population:** A survey applied at the national level to a probabilistically representative sample that permits the generation of estimations applicable to the totality of the population of interest, composed of men and women of 18 years of age and older, of all socioeconomic levels residing in urban and rural zones of the country.

**Sampling Frame:** For the Lima metropolitan area and Callao, the selection of households was determined using as a sampling frame the digital cartography of the National Institute of Statistics and Computation 2007 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática, INEI) for the 31 districts of the Lima metropolitan area. The districts that were not included in the sampling frame for Lima are: Chaclacayo, Lurigancho, Cieneguilla, and the resort districts of the North and South of the city.

For the selection of the cities to be included from the provinces, the cartography of the INEI from 2005 was used as a sampling frame, and for the selection of rural areas the cartography of the 2002 INEI was used.

**Sampling Method:** A multistage sampling method was utilized. The sample was stratified by provinces (of the regional capitals and other provinces) and by rural and urban areas. The sample was probabilistic

and by clusters. In urban areas city blocks were selected in the first stage with base in the cartographies mentioned above, in the second stage households were selected using a systematic sample. In rural areas selection was carried out randomly with respect to population centers with 200 households or less, located within a radial distance from major highways not greater than a day of distance (round trip) from principal cities or from the provinces selected. Finally, in each population center households were selected to interview by a random selection process.

Both in rural and urban zones, the selection of interviewees was done according to a system of quotas for gender and age, determined by the demographic distribution of the population.

**Sample Size and Margin of Error:** In accordance with the objective of the study, the sample size chosen was sufficient to allow analysis of the results on both national and regional levels. The total number of interviews completed was 1,516, with a margin of error of +/- 2.5% with a level of heterogeneity of 50-50% and a level of confidence of 95%, according to the probabilistically represented sample. The following table describes the territorial distribution of the sample.



| Territorial Division of the Sample, Peru |                                                                        |                    |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| <i>Domain</i>                            | <i>Department</i>                                                      | <i>Sample Size</i> |
| Lima-Callao                              | Lima Antigüa, Lima Moderna, Lima Norte, Lima Este, Lima Sur and Callao | 531                |
| North                                    | Ancash, Cajamarca, La Libertad, Lambayeque and Piura                   | 410                |
| South                                    | Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cusco, Ica, Puno and Tacna                         | 330                |
| Center                                   | Huancavelica, Huánuco and Junín                                        | 135                |
| East                                     | Loreto, San Martín and Ucayali                                         | 110                |
| <i>Total Sample Size</i>                 |                                                                        | <i>1,516</i>       |

Note: The survey was not administered in the departments of Amazonas, Apurímac, Madre Dios, Moquegua, Pasco, and Tumbes.



**Fieldwork and Dates:** The interviews were carried out from November 24<sup>th</sup> and December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2010. A previously structured questionnaire<sup>5</sup> was used as a data collection tool by professional interviewers qualified in fieldwork. Each interview was administered face-to-face in the private homes selected to only one person residing in each household. Wild code and consistency checks were carried out on 100% of the surveys to assure the correct implementation of the survey and that the questionnaire was filled correctly, along with supervision of fieldwork, which in urban zones required the re-application of specific questions to around 30% of the subjects surveyed, in at least one zone, chosen at random, for each one of the interviewed. In rural zones about 50% of the interviews were supervised by a professional in fieldwork accompanying the primary interviewer under the coordination of the overall fieldwork supervisor.

**Data Processing:** The processing and preliminary presentation of the data began the December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2010. The completed surveys were digitalized using the program CSPro, specifically designed to process survey data, with controls for coding and alert messages in the case of inconsistencies. To assure the

<sup>5</sup> With 83 thematic questions and 26 socio-demographic questions.



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quality of the input of data, each completed survey was entered twice, which permitted the digitalization and control of possible errors. In addition to comparing the double digitalization and the correction

of detected errors, an analysis of the consistency of results was carried out, subject to an additional round of controls. The final database was presented using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) •



## ACRONYMS

| Acronym  | Meaning                                                 |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| ACN      | Andean Community of Nations                             |
| AIDS     | Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome                     |
| ALBA     | Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America      |
| ANU      | Average National Unfamiliarity                          |
| APEC     | Asia-Pacific Economic Community                         |
| BRICS    | Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa          |
| CACM     | Central American Common Market                          |
| CCGA     | Chicago Council on Global Affairs                       |
| CIDE     | Center for the Research and Teaching in Economics       |
| COMEXI   | Mexican Council on Foreign Relations                    |
| DK/NA    | Do not know/Not answer                                  |
| EU       | European Union                                          |
| FIFA     | International Federation of Association Football        |
| FLACSO   | Latin American Social Sciences Institute                |
| G20      | Group of 20                                             |
| IDB      | Inter-American Development Bank                         |
| ICC      | International Criminal Court                            |
| IFE      | Federal Electoral Institute (Mexico)                    |
| IMF      | International Monetary Fund                             |
| INEGI    | National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Mexico) |
| Mercosur | Southern Common Market                                  |
| MRE      | Ministry of Foreign Relations                           |
| NAFTA    | North American Free Trade Agreement                     |
| NGO      | Non-governmental Organization                           |
| OAS      | Organization of American States                         |
| PSU      | Primary Sampling Unit                                   |
| PUCP     | Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú                 |
| SSU      | Secondary Sampling Unit                                 |
| TLCUE    | Free Trade Agreement Mexico-European Union              |
| TSU      | Tertiary Sampling Unit                                  |
| UA       | Universidad de los Andes                                |
| UN       | United Nations Organization                             |
| UNASUR   | Union of South American Nations                         |
| UNSC     | United Nations Security Council                         |
| U.S.A.   | United States of America                                |
| USP      | Universidade de São Paulo                               |
| WTO      | World Trade Organization                                |

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