The nuanced Australian – U.S. defence relationship

Presentation to:
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Asia Program
1st June 2005

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Australia has the unusual distinction of being one of America's most important, yet continuously ignored and underrated, formal ally. When one reads the vast literature on U.S. security relations in "Asia", Australia is fortunate to get the odd (and irregular) passing mention and rarely more than a cursory assessment of its import to U.S. and wider Western security interests in the region. Indeed, it is not an infrequent occurrence that official U.S. government statements on Asia fail even to mention Australia. The current writer has yet to ascertain why there exists this geographic lacuna in the Weltanschauung of U.S. Asian experts and officials, however, what is certain is that this "affliction" is rather widely spread. Of course, the obvious explanation for ignoring Australia in the context of "Asia" is that Anglo-Saxon Australia, simply isn't, well, "Asian". And, after all, how important can a country be that is only 20 million people, geographically "challenged" and possessing a small defense force of only 50,000? However, such myopia is imprudent when one considers the facts.

As a well-known former senior U.S. defense official with wide Asian experience stated in a lecture to the U.S. Army College in the early 1990s, whenever one had to "do" something in Asia (e.g., respond to a crisis), the first thing one did was to start talking to "the Australians". After all, whenever something had to be done, one could always rely upon the Australians to contribute something. In a region where America's Asian allies tend to be limited by their military means, or policies of reticence to contributing to coalitions, ignoring what the Australian Defence Force (ADF) can offer takes on a different meaning.

In consequence, no one should have been surprised when just days following the attacks on the United States the collective defence alliance between the United States and Australia was inexorably altered when Australian Prime Minister John Howard, after

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* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defence, or the U.S. Government. Please note that this paper was written in a private capacity.

consultations with the U.S. government, on 14 September invoked Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty.[1] For the first time since its signing in 1951, the mutual defence provisions of the treaty had been invoked. Since that moment, Australia became a key ally of the United States in the global war against terrorism[2] and was an active participant in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.[3] One could argue that the Bali bombing in October 2002 killing 88 Australian citizens has reinforced the mutual understanding and commitment of both Australia and the United States to combat collectively fundamentalist Islamic-inspired terrorism directed against them. As a result, without question the alliance between these two long-standing allies has undergone a qualitative change due to the altered nature of the common threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism faced by both countries. And, from the practical perspective of alliance management, there is little doubt that the Bush Administration, not one to aver to traditional allies, considers Australia to be a "first tier" global ally.[4] Given that post-war Australian governments have long worked to increase their visibility over decision-making in Washington and gain special access to senior U.S. officials, attaining this status constitutes a significant diplomatic achievement for the Howard government, since many of these arrangements will likely outlast this current conflict.

My presentation will attempt to demonstrate why Australia is one of America's closest and important allies through an examination of its "nuanced" defense relationship with the United States. As a key element of explaining why it is categorized as "nuanced", the presenter will have to describe and analyze "Australian strategic culture" and why it makes understanding fully Australian defense orientation so (bloody) vexatious.

A key ally: who knows more than you think…

What might surprise an American staff officer today in the U.S. bureaucracy dealing with defense issues with Australia, particularly in light of recently co-operation in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), is the fact that the current phase of intimate defense cooperation between the two countries got off to a slow, if not inauspicious, start in the late 1940s. American defense officials at the time were persistently pestered by Australian officials intent upon never again experiencing the failure of national strategy, as befell Australia following the loss of Singapore in February 1942. Great Britain was simply not to be trusted by the then Labor government. Surprisingly, such anti-"Pommie" ("Pom": pejorative for those unfortunate enough to be a British subject) feelings and suspicions were reflected by some in the conservative coalition government that came to office in December 1949, led by Sir Robert Menzies (maddeningly confusing to Americans, head of the "Liberal" Party). Australia demanded a security guarantee, particularly if Canberra were to sign any peace treaty with Japan. Moreover, Australian officials were simply not content with a collective defense treaty (in itself, a bit of reach…); they wanted also peacetime defense cooperation—meaningful defense cooperation with the world's Western superpower, not an anemic Britain.[5] Such cooperation, in Australian minds, should include, inter alia, the exchange of war planning information and close defense liaison in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at hearing such suggestions were exceedingly ill-amused by this proposal. The release of

war plans to a foreign government would not be countenanced by the JCS and most importantly; defense cooperation was to be conducted in Hawaii by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, not in Washington, and without (Heaven forbid!) the permanent exchange of liaison officers. Case closed.[6]

It would be silly to assume that the widely perceived image of Australians being "laid back", sitting around the "barbie", eating ghastly large "prawns" and quaffing back massive quantities of green "tinnies" of ubiquitous V.B. (Victoria Bitters to those uninitiated unfortunates) is correct. A case in point is the success realized by Australian officials in apparently achieving their security objectives vis-à-vis the United States. As the present writer has written rather extensively about this subject in a published monograph,[7] one will limit the discussion to the major manifestations of such cooperation:

Strategic cooperation. Since the mid-1960s, Australia has been a willing participant in supporting the West in the strategic balance. The establishment of a low-frequency naval communications station on the Northwest Cape of Australia, followed by the establishment of two "Joint Facilities" at Alice Springs (SIGINT) and Nurrungar (DSP), gave Australia the necessary gravitas to be considered part of the "first team" as a Blue Force nation in Washington. Perhaps surprisingly, the coalition government of Sir Robert Menzies apparently did not capitalize on this new entrée into the U.S. alliance hierarchy. It was not until these facilities attracted undue public attention (despite their isolation from anything remotely resembling Western civilization) and the advent of the Labor government led by Gough Whitlam in 1973 did the Australian defense bureaucracy find the political support needed to press to Australia's advantage the existence of these bases could be bring to Canberra. An important agreement followed in 1975 that, in short, brought Australia into the realm of internal strategic thinking and discussions in the U.S. Department of Defense. In effect, Australian defense officials gained access both to senior U.S. officials through Head of Australian Defence Staff, Washington, as well as to regular high-level meetings to discuss highly "sensitive information".[8]

Global war plans. One would be injudicious to speculate in an open forum whether Australian defense officials have access to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), let alone to the family of operation plans that are derived from this key document. However, two examples should suffice to establish that Australia has been an active participant in U.S. war plans. First, even prior to the signing of the ANZUS Security Treaty in 1951, the Chiefs of Naval Staff of the navies of Australia and New Zealand and USCINCPAC signed an agreement in Honolulu that effectively divided the Southwest Pacific amongst them for global war purposes (the Radford-Collins agreement). This agreement is apparently still in effect.[9] Second, Australia has been at the forefront of allies supporting the objectives of the GWOT and has participated in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. One of the results of this co-operation has been a re-doubled effort to ascertain impediments to interoperability and improving combined training.[10] As a result of experiences in the GWOT, the Bush administration is in the process of moving away from deliberate war plans to more "adaptive war planning", [11] which may well auger well for future mutual collaboration. In short, the result of such an

initiative should act to concentrate the minds of officials in both countries on the types of forces they collectively need for certain conflict (e.g., anti-terrorism) scenarios. Moreover, depending upon the eventual fidelity of such plans, they could facilitate the integration of ADF's logistic support requirements into the U.S. deliberate planning system's ponderous time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), or whatever might replace it in a new regime of "adaptive war planning".[12]

Operational deployments. Australia has been sending off troops to far away campaigns to the tune of "Waltzing Matilda" even before Federation. The ADF and their US Service counterparts have worked together closely for years to effect interoperability, and failing that, to find solutions to problems that would otherwise inhibit cooperation on the battlefield. The field exercise and command post exercise program of the two countries is extremely robust. Whilst it would be silly to assume that there would not be problems in coalition operations between the two countries (particularly between their armies), problem areas are generally known and "work arounds" are always being proposed, tested and validated; to varying degrees of success.[13]

Nature of the cooperative relationship. In essence, the relationship can best be described as follows:

Decentralized. NATO has elaborate organizational structures, committees, command headquarters, buildings, pipelines, colleges, and even an ASW research center. In the context of US-Australian defense cooperation, there is no single organization that oversees the management so to speak of the entire bilateral relationship. Of course, there are desk officers in the Joint Staff, Pacific Command, Service Staffs, OSD, Department of State, etc., who oversee elements of the relationship. But it is a brave AO who can claim that s/he has a handle on the entire relationship. One can say that this is almost impossible. The reason for this is that since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, cooperation has grown extensively, particularly amongst the Services where even their central staffs do not necessarily have an understanding of the extent of cooperation. This is both a strength, as well as a weakness. As to the former, cooperation tends to be achieved at the lowest possible level, almost without significant restrictions. Importantly, there is an almost complete absence of national positions one sees so frequently raised with such debilitating effect in NATO over even the most mundane issues.[14] The weakness of a decentralized relationship was demonstrated in 1986 when the Administration decided to end defense cooperation with New Zealand over Wellington's refusal to allow potentially nuclear armed (no matter how unlikely) warships into their ports. It took OSD months simply to ascertain where there was cooperation, in order to put a stop to it. (Mind you, this was with a defense force of approximately 12,000—and apparently every cooperative arrangement could not be found!)[15] Moreover, given the disparate size differentiation between Australia and the United States, Australian officials find it easy to "work the system" in Washington, as opposed to if the U.S. were to attempt to do the same in Canberra—where everyone knows each other.

The subtle (but important!) Anglo-Saxon "mafia". It would be a mistake to consider cooperation between Australia and the United States as largely consisting of

bilateral arrangements. Nothing could be further from the case. Since the end of the Second World War, Anglo-American peacetime defense cooperation has grown extensively and now includes participation of Australia, Canada and (believe it or not) New Zealand (still!) This is particularly strong in the standardization arrangements that exist amongst the respective services of the five ("ABCA") countries. "Standardization", in reality, however, is a relative term since "it" is no longer the objective of these arrangements. After a number of glaring failures to achieve standardization of such basic kit, such as tanks, rifles, etc., efforts now stress achieving interoperability and planning to conduct coalition operations.[16]

Of direct relevance to the issue of science and technological cooperation is "The Technical Cooperation Program" (TTCP). One could wager with a high degree of confidence that TTCP is all but unknown within the U.S. Department of Defense R & D community. Yet it is the principal program by which Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand carry out almost their entire defense R & D cooperation with the United States. As established by its Declaration of Common Purpose, TTCP recognizes that no single member has the resources to conduct research in all areas of defense science by itself. The program provides to its members the means of acquainting themselves with the defense science activities of their counterparts. In providing this conduit for diffusing technological innovation, each country is able to plan its activities in cognizance of the efforts of others. Given diminishing defense budgets in Western countries, the ever-growing complexity of defense science and its technological application, the value of TTCP has grown.[17]

TTCP, it should be stressed, is a "program" and is not a corporate body. Therefore, it does not have any resources or projects under its direct sponsorship. Rather, the program is headed by the respective heads of the defense science establishments of the five countries, administered by seconded representatives ("Washington Deputies"), and served by a small secretariat in Washington, DC. TTCP acts to facilitate "the definition and initiation of joint complementary research studies of defense problems of mutual concern". Thus, it acts as a conduit by which military scientific and technological innovation can be known to the other program members. Research studies can, in principle, cover the entire range of military-related R&D topics. As an illustration of the value of TTCP to the Australian defense science community in particular, the Australian government has estimated that without TTCP, its Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) would have to be doubled in size to maintain its current level of scientific support to the Australian Defence Force.[18]

Australia and its flirtations with Asia: Do they really think they are "Asians"?

Australia does not enjoy, historically speaking, a cozy relationship with its Asian/Pacific neighbors. A white British colony (after 1931 a Dominion) with a policy of limiting immigration to "whites"—a policy that was only ended in the early 1970s—left strong feelings of antipathy in the region. Specifically, bilateral ties with Malaysia and Indonesia have been dodgy since both countries gained independence. Post-war Australian threat perceptions (fear of incursions through, or emanating from, the north,

thereby threatening the very vulnerable northern part of the country) were reinforced by Indonesia's policy of Confrontation during the early 1960s vis-à-vis Malaysia. The shedding of Australian blood to protect Malaysia during this conflict and the fall of Indonesian President Sukarno did not result in an amelioration of bilateral ties with these two countries. It is not going too far to argue that Australia's ties to the region did not experience significant improvement until the late 1980s when a foreign affairs white paper was published by the then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Asia was put on the front burner of Australian foreign policy and a concerted effort was made to establish much closer ties in the region.[19] This was supported by Australian diplomatic efforts to emulate in Asia the confidence- and security-building measures regime that was so successful in Europe. Part of this strategy was also manifested in Australian support of the establishment of regional collective security fora.

Importantly, the then Australian Chief of Defense Force, General Peter Gration, quietly led this initiative to improve regional ties through the development of an intensive program of military-to-military contacts, similar to those taking place between the militaries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, one could argue that the success Australia experienced in improved regional bilateral ties was in large part due to the personal and institutional ties that developed between the ADF and its regional counterparts. So intensive were the ADF's programs with these countries that by the late-1990s, one report found that the ADF was getting to the point of being overly-exercised and under-trained, due to the high operational tempo of military-to-military contacts. [20]

This effort to improve relations with the region suffered a severe shock, if not major setback, with the Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999 to end wide-spread violence stemming from the election returns that supported independence from Indonesia.[21] One senior ADF official evinced in a private conversion that the operation was a "tactical" success, whilst constituting a "strategic" failure. By this, the ADF was exceedingly successful in deploying a brigade from Australia to East Timor within 72 hours and leading a multinational force that quickly establishing order in that troubled island. Australia's failure in this endeavor is two fold. First, Canberra's efforts to create multilateral security institutions to handle such regional crises were shown to be a cropper. Second, the very forceful approach Australia took in pressing for a multinational force to intervene to stop the violence has been perceived by many Asians as reinforcing Australia's past image of being a condescending white European nation that was not part of Asia. Prime Minister John Howard's "injudicious" description at the time that Australia was America's regional deputy sheriff did not have, to say the (very) least, the reassuring effect upon region as he had envisaged. Australian success of arms, no matter how effectively and lightly applied, has yet to deliver a regional diplomatic victory.

Strategic culture: We're self-reliant…with a lot of US help.

To understand Australian strategic culture, one only needs to appreciate the concept of "abandonment". The "tyranny of distance" and the geographic isolation of the

country from its inhabitants' cultural homelands have made Australians sensitive (sometimes in extremis) to being abandoned.[22] This certainly happened following the failure of the Singapore strategy (a policy that many Australians seriously doubted as being realistic at the time)[23] and the (far from accurate) perception that Britain "abandoned Australia" during the West New Guinea crisis between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and America did not support Canberra during Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia. In the post-war era Australia, at times reluctantly, supported British Commonwealth defense arrangements for the Middle East and then later Southeast Asia. The latter took on the name of "Forward Defence" (a terribly derided concept amongst the Australian strategic community since the early 1970s). In its more recent definition, "Forward Defence" is used to describe the deployment of ill-equipped forces in early 1942 to assist in the defense of the Netherlands East Indies and which were almost immediate captured and suffered horrific casualties.[24]

Since the 1960s the most traumatizing events to the Australian strategic and defense communities were: 1) Britain's withdrawal of forces from East of Suez (1968), 2) the failure of America's strategy of military intervention in Vietnam (a conflict along which Australia had gone "a waltzing Matilda" with America) and 3) the subsequent announcement by President Nixon of his (infamous!) "Guam Doctrine".[25] It is not uncommon to attend a conference or meeting in Australia today and hear the Guam Doctrine mention as if it were some codicil of the U.S. Constitution. That no one in Washington today can remember who actually said it (the hint that it is sometimes referred to as the "Nixon Doctrine" does not always help either), let alone what it meant at the time, is little import. Australia was abandoned and it will happen again. Period. Exactly how Australia suffered physically from these policy pronouncements and the realignment of U.S. forces in the Pacific has never been fully explained to the present writer.

But, the truism that one doesn't need a discernable threat to feel insecure (witness the size of the U.S. defense budget) clearly holds for Australia. Australia's population is approximately 20 million, whilst it is one of the most highly urbanized societies in the world. The international image of Australians may be one of a beer-swilling drover living in the bush is certainly not support by the facts. The interior and the north of the country in particular are all but uninhibited and lack sufficient, let alone redundant, infrastructure (a quick visit particularly during the "wet" season will explain why this is the case to even the most adventurously minded). Yet the north and interior are rich in minerals and natural resources.[26] A "vulnerable" north, adjoined to a foreign and at times hostile northern neighbor have reinforced an already creepy feeling about 180 million Indonesians being "just right up there" near the "Top End". (That said, one should recall that Darwin did experience 63 air raids during the Second World War).[27] From the perspective of actually needing to defend the country, this view is highly preposterous since the inhospitable north is almost enough alone to bar any but the most committed, or bloody-minded, invader. However, from the important perspective of sovereignty protection, such concerns are very legitimate indeed (It has been estimated that the introduction of anthrax into Australia, would spread like wild-fire and would all but destroy the important grazer industry).

One can discern arguments made by Australian officials shortly after federation to develop the capability to defend itself, vice blindly supporting British imperial efforts and plans.[28] Indeed, one can see instances of where Australian officials have periodically made arguments for adopting "self-reliant" policies. There are a series of "code words" that essentially mean the same thing: "self-reliance", "Defence of Australia", "never again forward defence" and "continental defence" (the latter often also used confusingly as a pejorative to argue against the previous three concepts). Such an ambitious objective first found its way in a public document in the regrettably ignored but important 1972 Defence White Paper.[29] This was reiterated in a louder fashion in the 1976 Defence White Paper.[30] The crescendo of the self-reliance Symphony, Defence of Australia 1987,[31] was preceded by a remarkable overture in the form of the important Dibb Report on Australian Defense Capabilities.[32] A justifiably forgotten Defence of Australia 1994 more or less ends this line of official document that Australia would/could/will develop the capability to defend itself.[33] Mind you, defending a continent with a population of 20 millions souls has been defined in many unusual, if not indeed creative, ways since the 1976 paper. Thus, one cannot be abandoned if one is self-reliance, n'est-ce pas?

The problem with the policy of self-reliance has been that it has almost become a doctrine of faith in the defense liturgy of Australia. As a result, Australian strategic culture, now almost accepts as "a given" that such a policy can be achieved and should not be reviewed for factual accuracy. For to do so is to risk the return of "Forward Defence", which Australia is insufficiently large enough to undertake on its own, and which would run the inevitability risk off failure and (you guessed it!) "abandonment". What is remarkable about the Australian strategic community is the fact that such a vibrant and intellectually solid community has been unwilling to accept that "self-reliance" has many serious weaknesses.[34] Now, to be sure, self-reliance must be measured against the objective to be achieved by government, i.e., defense against "what"? Given that many NATO allies have difficulty convincing their public of the need to allocate scarce resources to the Defence Vote, it hardly seems justified to criticize the Australian defence community for similar failure in this regard. If one looks at the requirement to undertake sovereignty protection tasks, as well as to locate, isolate and repel minor incursions and lodgments (no matter how unlikely this may be), the concept of "self-reliance" is on stronger ground. And indeed, probably the most beneficial implication "self-reliance" has had on Australian security is that it has given the ADF (until recently at least) a disciplined planning system by which its capabilities were ascertained and then acquired. The ADF has also benefited from such top-down planning, as well as developing an enviable capability to conduct joint operations.[35] One would be hard put to find another Blue Force country that can claim similar success.

In reality, however, self-reliance/Defense of Australia and the Australian defense and strategic community's fascination with it has been that it has not really been always closely practiced. For instance, in the early 1990s it was made known that Australia would not develop capabilities that were not directly applicable to the Defence of Australia, nor would Australia participate in forward deployments of forces (read: forward defence). The inconsistency that these statements were obviously decisions for

government to determine, yet uttered by defense officials; almost concurrently whilst the ADF were deployed on exactly these types of missions that they were not structured to undertake, consistently struck this writer as being a bit illogical. In fact, it simply didn't make any sense. As a result, the present writer would argue that whether Australian strategic thinkers would accept it or not, it would appear as though strategic thinking and its application is in a state of profound stasis. Australian civilian defense officials accepted (indeed embraced) Defence of Australia since it has given them power over the orientation and force development priorities of the ADF. And, after all, who, in any country, is going to argue in camera, let alone in public, against a policy that purports to defend the homeland?

Defence of Australia has its intellectual and political roots in the Liberal-National Party (remember: they're the conservatives!) of the early and mid-1970s, yet the concept was seized with alacrity by the Labor government from 1983-1996, particularly by the then Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley (currently the Leader of the Opposition), who commissioned Dibb report and the 1987 white paper. The advent of the coalition government led by John Howard in 1996 has since thrown defense planning, but as yet strategic culture, into a bit of a funk. Upon taking office, the Howard government, besides initiating a far-reaching effort to find efficiencies in defense (Defence Efficiency Review)[36] was exceptionally timid to realign its rhetoric of closer ties with the United States into effective policy (with apologies to Australian Strategic Policy 1997)[37] Indeed, almost as excuse not to engage in such a potentially difficult task, it initiated a highly unusual public discussion period[38] on what Australian wanted out of defence ("…all Australians should have their say on the important defence choices we face"), the results of which were (finally) published in the form of the Defence Review 2000—Our Future Defence Force.[39] This white paper initiated a policy shift away from Defence of Australia; however, there is enough ambiguity in the document not to make this shift final.[40] A subsequent "Defence Update", issued in light of developments in GWOT, added yet another policy statement down-playing the requirements of Defense of Australia in defence planning.[41] Eight years to state in a public document what was advocated in public since being elected office in 1996 speaks volumes to the strength of the opposition resident in the "defense community" to the idea of moving away from the Defence of Australia theology. One cannot but help feel that Australian strategic culture, no matter how new in an historical sense, simply isn't accepting what is perceives as a return to "Forward Defence" and reliance upon "Great Powers and Friends". Indeed, that a very conservative government led by such a stronger supporter of the U.S. alliance, John Howard, can countenance a public defense discussion paper in that describes the U.S. commitment to its allies as "qualified" after Vietnam speaks legions to the strengthen of Australia's strategic culture and its factual misdirection in certain key assumptions.[42]

Conclusion

Whether Asian experts in this country consider Australia to be part of the region or not, or even unimportant to Asian security, the fact is America is important to Australia. As a result, successive Australian governments have endeavored to ensure that

they have extensive knowledge of the U.S. defense community and organization. Perhaps most important is the fact that Australian officials have developed an institutional relationship that enables them to gain access to senior officials and information. With perhaps the exception of the British/"Poms", no other country or defense force has this access, both at the highest, as well as the "action officer" levels of the defense bureaucracy and armed forces, as does Australia. Cui bono? Or better, who profits "more" from this relationship, is difficult to say. What is clear, however, is that both parties do profit from the relationship, albeit perhaps in different ways.

What is maddeningly frustrating is the inherent contradiction in Australian strategic culture. Call it what you prefer: Defence of Australia, Defence self-reliance, Continental Defence, etc., the argument that Australia is capable of defending itself is nonsense and nor is this situation likely to improve. The continued obsession with geography (described by Michael Evans as "geographic determinism") by acolytes of this ideology can only be judged as myopic in light of contemporary threats faced by all Western nations. Moreover, as correctly identified by Evans, history does not provide empirical support for making geography the key determinant in Australia's defense policy priorities. "…in every conflict and crisis since Federation, Australia has always fought not in defence of its geography, but to uphold its liberal democratic values. Nothing that has occurred in recent years suggests that this situation will change in the first quarter of the 21st century."[43]

Australia is one of the few U.S. allies that has embraced the concept of the revolution in military affairs (RMA).[44] The Australian Department of Defence has designated an "Office of the RMA" to lead the effort at ascertaining the potential importance of the RMA for Australia. And, indeed, one finds a very sophisticated understanding of the RMA in Australia and not a little frustration given the country's finite defense budget. Yet, any advantages that arise from the introduction of sophisticated technology only will make, in all likelihood, the ADF yet even more dependent upon overseas suppliers for the technology and follow-on logistic support.

Likewise it is nonsense that Australian governments will not, for whatever political reason, decide to not deploy the ADF to the far ends of the globe to further the nation's interests. That the Department of Defence has done its best not to acquire capabilities for the ADF that are not of direct relevance to the defence of Australia has yet to keep the ADF "home". Despite this perhaps rather sharp criticism of Australian strategic culture, some good has come from it, e.g., improving the ADF's ability to operate independently in the important area of surveillance and sovereignty protection of that enormous continent.

Thus does Australia share with many other countries national myths and contradictions of fundamental aspects of national policy. Perhaps this is why America gets along so nicely with "Oz"…

NOTES

[1] Prime Minister of Australia, Media Release, "Application of the ANZUS Treaty to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 14 September 2001.
[2] The Australian government's response to terrorism is contained in its notion of "Layered Defence" that develops the concept integrating international diplomacy, legislative, financial and boarder controls, intelligence, policing and defence resources to defeat the terrorist threat. See Australia. Department of Defence, Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003, DPS NOV010/02, Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2002, p. 13.
[3] See, The War in Iraq: ADP Operations in the Middle in 2003, Canberra, Department of Defence, 2004. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/lessons.pdf
[4] For example, see "Remarks by Richard L. Armitage", Deputy Secretary of State Asia Society Forum, AustralAsia Centre Sydney, Australia August 13 2003, at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/press/2003_0813_armitage_syd.html
[5] See Thomas B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations, 1788-1977. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1978.
[6] See, "Memorandum on the substance of discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting', Washington, DC, 23 April 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume 12, Part 1, p. 83.
[7] Thomas-Durell Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, 1951-1986, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
[8] Idem, "The Australian-United States Strategic Relationship: Merely an Issue of Suitable Real Estate?," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1989, pp. 125-138. Cf., Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, North Sydney, NSW: Hale and Iremonger, 1980.
[9] Jeffrey Grey, Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1955-1972, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1998.
[10] [10] For example: "Both countries looked forward to an improved capacity to operate together as a consequence of the results of the ongoing Interoperability Review, the agreement on the Joint Strike Fighter, and cooperation on the development of other major capability enhancements. Both countries place a high priority on further improving interoperability between their defence forces. They agreed to strengthen cooperation in strategic planning, capability planning and development of new concepts and technologies. A future review will recommend measures to enhance the ability of the defence forces to work effectively together in combined and coalition operations. This will be addressed at AUSMIN 2003". See "AUSMIN 2002 – Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, Joint Communiqué", 29 October 2002, point 12, http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/press/ pr2002-1030_AUSMIN_jc.html. The present writer had the unique pleasure of participating in this multi-year study project as an adjunct staff consultant for RAND.
[11] "…the Department already is moving from deliberate to adaptive war planning. Some

reforms that accelerate the production of contingency plans have been enacted, but a more fundamental overhaul of the planning system is required. Contingency planning must become more responsive to rapid changes in planning conditions and assumptions by exploiting improving training of planners, automating time-intensive activities, and using collaborative environments for parallel rather than sequential development of component parts of plans". See, Transformation Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C., Department of Defence, April 2003, p. 7.

[12] The experience of the War in Iraq has resulted in recognition of the need to develop more flexible means by which logistics can be planned and changed during a conflict. "Military officials altered U.S. Central Command's troop deployment plan [during the war against Iraq], referred to in military parlance as Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data. [The] TPFDD did not work quickly enough to meet the situation's requirements… As a result, JFCOM is devising tools for combatant commanders to make it easier to change plans as they go and "let logistics planners keep up with operational planners," he said. "It was a conscious decision to do away with TPFDD after it couldn't keep up." See Inside the Pentagon, 25 September 2003.

[13] See Peter Leahy, "ANZUS: A View from the Trenches" Joint Force Quarterly, No. 17, Autumn-Winter 1997-98, pp. 88. This insightful essay is drawn from then Brigadier (now Lieutenant General) Leahy's full statement and answers to questions posed to him in a parliament committee hearing. At present, he is Chief of Army. The full text of his testimony can be found in Australia, Parliament, The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Sub-committee, ANZUS After 45 Years: Seminar Proceedings, 11-12 August 1997, Canberra, House of Representatives, September 1997, pp. 102-109. In a wider, global sense, the nature of the global war against terrorism could well require Western armies to review their current definitions of, and expectations for, interoperability. Specifically, heretofore, the ABCA armies programme has been realistic, in view of past failures, of accepting that the best their efforts could hope to achieve has been to accept the sui generis nature of each of the five armies and simply develop "work-arounds" to identified impediments to interoperability. Given that responses to future threats are likely to necessitate the deployment of ABCA armies units, likely integrated into larger allied formations possibly facing periods of high-intensity operations, then there will be a concomitant requirement for a higher degree of interoperability at a lower tactical level than envisaged in past. In other words, the previous complacency that the ABCA armies have taken to accepting the difficulty of effecting interoperability and accepting the solution of "work arounds" needs to reviewed by all parties. As demonstrated in 1996 during a corps level command post exercise (CPX) CASCADE PEAK 96, some incomprehensible incompatibilities of equipment were revealed: 105mm tank ammunition, JP8/diesel fuel and (for Heaven's sake) even fuel nozzle sizes! (American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies, "ABCA Exercise CASCADE PEAK 96, Post Exercise Report", Washington, DC, ABCA Primary Standardization Office, 20 January 1997, p. 13 "Lessons Learned". N.B.: "I (US) Corps was the lead nation headquarters, with 25 (US) Infantry Division (Light), 3 Brigade / 2 (US) Infantry Division, 1 (CA) Division and 1 (AS) Brigade under command. The principle exercise objective was to evaluate standardization achieved in C3I2, EW and logistics". See p. vii.) That all said, the emerging international strategic environment

could well now preclude the previous "luxury" of particularly ABCA armies maintaining incompatible systems and structures. Therefore, it might be prudent for the ABCA chiefs of armies to press for greater emphasis placed on effecting interoperability amongst themselves. Perhaps a review of the program's basic terms of reference or simply the development and acceptance of "interoperability principles" should be considered as a first step in this direction.

[14] Young, Australian, New Zealand and United States Security Relations, see particularly Chapter 11.

[15] Idem, "ANZUS: Requiescat in pace? Conflict, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1989, pp. 45-58.

[16] Idem, "Cooperative Diffusion through Cultural Similarity: The Post-War Anglo-Saxon Countries' Experience" in Adaptive Enemies, Reluctant Friends: The Impact of Diffusion on Military Practice, edited by Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliasen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

[17] For an informative description of the creation and development of this program see, The Technical Cooperation Program Document, Subcommittee on Non-Atomic Military Research and Development, Policies, Organization and Procedures in Non-Atomic Military Research and Development (POPNAMRAD), Washington, DC: December 1997, pp. 1-2. (The TTCP Homepage also provides a wealth of information on the program and extent of its activities. See, http://www.ttcp.osd.mil/).

[18] Hon Bronwyn Bishop, MP, Minister for Defence Industry, Science and Personnel, "Speech for the 1997 Technical Cooperation Program Awards," Canberra, July 24, 1997.

[19] See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans, QC, December 1989.

[20] For a critical view of how these activities have negatively affected the ADF see, Ball, Desmond and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996.

[21] Cotton, James, ed., East Timor and Australia, Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1999.

[22] For greater attention to this important theme in Australian history see, Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History, Melbourne: Sun Books, 1966.

[23] Ian Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: the Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942 , Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981.

[24] Thompson, Alan, "Australia's Strategic Defence Policy: A drift towards new-Forward Defence", ADSC Working Paper 29, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, November 1994. For a different view regarding the "lessons" of force defence see, Michael Evans, "Developing Australia's Maritime Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942", Study Paper No. 303, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon ACT, July 2000.

[25] See, Robert O'Neill, Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1976, passim; and, Babbage, Ross, Rethinking Australia's Defence. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980.

[26] Ross Babbage, A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s, Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1990.

[27] Lockwood, Douglas, Australia's Pearl Harbor: Darwin 1942, Australian War Classics, Ringwood, VIC: Penguin Books Australia, 1984.
[28] John Mordike, An Army for a Nation: a History of Australian Military Developments, 1880-1914, North Sydney, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with the Directorate of Army Studies, 1992.
[29] Australian Defence Review, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1972.
[30] Australian Defence, November 1976, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976.
[31] The Defence of Australia 1987, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987.
[32] Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Canberra: AGPS, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service March 1986.
[33] Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994.
[34] For one of the very few critiques of Australian strategic culture see, Michael Evans, "Strategic Culture and the Australian Way of Warfare: Past, Present and Future Perspectives", Canberra, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Presentation to King Hall Naval History Conference, 22 July 1999.
[35] See my essays on Australian defence planning and joint doctrine development processes, "Capabilities-Based Defence Planning: The Australian experience," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 349-369; and, "'Top Down' Planning and Joint Doctrine: The Australian experience," Joint Force Quarterly, No. 12, Summer 1996, pp. 61-66.
[36] Report of the Defence Efficiency Review, Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence, Canberra: Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Defence Centre, March 10, 1997.
[37] Australian Strategic Policy, Canberra, Department of Defence, December 1997.
[38]See Australian Perspective on Defence: Report of the Community Consultant Team, Canberra, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000; and, Defence Review 2000-Our Future Defence Force, A Public Discussion Paper, DPS 38459/2000, Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, June 2000.
[39] Defence Review 2000—Our Future Defence Force, DPS OCT010/2000, Canberra: Defence Publishing and Visual Communications, June 2000.
[40] The paper defines the Military Tasks for the ADF which includes the first capability requirement to be "defend Australia". The paper then defines general capability principles to include "Flexible forces, not scenario specific". See Defence Review 2000, pp. 15; 54.
[41] See Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003, DPS NOV010/02, Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2002, p. 23.
[42] See Defence Review 2000, A Public Discussion Paper, pp. 22-23. The Review is critiqued in a special edition of Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 143, July/August 2000.

[43] Michael Evan, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901–2004, Study Paper No. 306, Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre Papers, 2005, p. v.

[44] Idem, "Buck Rogers or Rock Throwers? Technology Diffusion, Military Modernisation and the International Response to the Revolution in Military Affairs", paper presented to the National Security Studies Programme Conference, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 14 October 1999.