

RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

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Introduction.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the post-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years.¹ In contrast, LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one else wanted to deal with.² Neither the Army nor Department of Defense had an adequate plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel,³ and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Post-conflict planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. Also, U.S. Army leaders and planners tend to focus on winning wars and not on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives often can only be accomplished after the fighting has ceased, and it is possible to win a war and lose the peace.

With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks. The interagency planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any possible combat, was an excellent approach. Still, that operation eventually failed because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. Recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated the potential assistance that can be provided by international and non-governmental organizations, though coordination with them can be difficult.

In Iraq it will also be important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously as possible, so interagency planners must be sure that governmental, non-governmental, and international civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks when required. The primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in providing post-conflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation-building. U.S. leaders must accept this mission as an essential part of our national security and better tailor and fund the military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it. This will take considerable manpower and money.

Challenges of a Military Occupation of Iraq.

The military occupation of Iraq will face a number of unique challenges rooted in the special circumstances and political culture of that country. If the war to defeat Saddam Hussein is short with limited civilian casualties, that task will be easier. Nevertheless, the issue of Western domination is of serious concern in the Arab World and a prolonged occupation of Iraq with U.S. forces may lead to especially acute problems with the Iraqi population as well as the wider Arab World. Moreover, the more detailed nuances of Iraqi political, ethnic, and culture activities are not well-understood by even the most informed U.S. scholars, journalists, and officials.

Iraq political institutions have never been well-developed, and Iraq has a strong tradition of instability and violence in resolving political disputes. The instability was brought under control and violence institutionalized only after Saddam Hussein achieved power and established a regime of unprecedented brutality. Pre-Saddam instability may emerge in the aftermath of the dictator's removal. In particular, tensions among Iraqi religious, ethnic, and tribal communities are expected to complicate both the occupation and efforts to build a viable postwar government. Power-sharing among groups is a new and untested concept in Iraq that could well be subverted by elite political instincts to struggle for power before rivals achieve opportunities to consolidate their own gains. Also, while a struggle for power between civilian and military elites is possible and could contribute to Iraqi fragmentation, the U.S. should recognize that the military is a national institution and one of the few forces for unity within the country.

Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship is likely under most circumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless assume that the U.S. intervened for its own purposes and not primarily to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to complete occupation tasks as quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinary Iraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confront increasing Arab nationalist and religious concerns as time passes. The possibility of terrorism being directed against occupation forces probably will increase over time, and even a small number of terrorists can be expected to create serious problems for an occupation force. A popular uprising against U.S. troops is much less likely than a terrorist campaign, but is still possible if the occupation is poorly managed.

Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is consequently just as important as winning the war. Preparing for the postwar occupation of the Iraqi political system will probably be more difficult and complex than planning for combat.

A Mission Matrix for Iraq.

Based on relevant experience and an analysis of the current situation in Iraq, this study proposes a list of essential missions that must be performed to maintain a viable state and change the regime. The way such tasks fit in the overall campaign plan for possible operations in Iraq is illustrated by Figure 1.⁴ They will be performed during a period of "Transition" that must begin while "Decisive Operations" are still ongoing. Transition will take many years, and for purposes of this study has been divided into four distinct phases. The first will encompass those requirements necessary to provide "Security," including separating factions and beginning the repair of vital infrastructure. Functions in this phase

will be almost solely the responsibility of coalition military forces, and it will take a few months to move to the “Stabilize” phase. The timelines on the chart are approximate, and different mission categories are likely to progress at varying rates.




Figure 1.

The next phase for occupying forces will be to Stabilize the country. Security tasks will continue, but services will expand and begin to incorporate civilian agencies. Their involvement should become at least equal to that of coalition military forces once they start to “Build Institutions,” where the basis of the new Iraq will be firmly established. Eventually military forces will “Handover” all duties to Iraqi and international agencies, and the new regime will be ready to resume its proper place in the world community.

In the past, no part of post-conflict operations has been more problematic for American military forces than the handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation of effort and process of shifting responsibilities should proceed as depicted in Figure 2,⁵ but in reality it normally looks more like Figure 3, where the handover is given directly to the local government. To limit the potential for any regional backlash from a perceived prolonged American military occupation, it is essential that civilian and international organizations assume coalition military responsibilities as soon as possible.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

While recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan appear to indicate that civilian agencies are now better prepared to take over transition responsibilities from military forces, this should not be assumed for Iraq. Years of sanctions and neighbors with restrictive border policies have severely reduced the number of non-governmental organizations and international agencies prepared or positioned to enter Iraq. To facilitate participation of such groups and speed the reintegration of Iraq into the international community, sanctions and associated licensing requirements need to be removed as soon as possible, probably at the beginning of “Stabilization.”⁶

Additionally, the haphazard and ad-hoc nature of civil-military organization and planning in Afghanistan has made many NGOs and IOs wary and hesitant to deal with the American military again. Some have been especially critical of what they perceive as the manipulation of humanitarian aid for political advantage, and a blurring of roles between NGOs and military civil affairs or special operations forces. The civilian agencies feel that if they become identified with military agendas their utility will be lessened and their personnel endangered.

Another factor that could further limit any civilian involvement in Iraq is the threat of biological or chemical weapons. No governmental, non-governmental, or international organization is trained or equipped to operate in such an environment, and most will not even go near an area where the use of such weapons is just rumored.

While some UN agencies and aid groups like CARE and the Jordan Red Crescent have begun to anticipate future requirements, little money will be available until a crisis erupts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees received a 25 percent budget cut in 2002, and has had great difficulty getting preliminary support or financial commitments for Iraqi contingencies. Some donors who made pledges to Afghanistan have still not met those obligations, and the costs of reconstruction there were grossly underestimated. So, military planners would be wise not to assume too much support from civilian agencies, especially those outside the U.S. government, for the early phases of Transition.⁷ The United States should work to put together the broadest possible coalition to carry out combat operations, since that group will also inherit the immediate responsibility for Transition.

The Mission Matrix for Iraq (Appendix A) was constructed with these facts in mind.⁸ The 135 essential tasks are grouped into 21 mission categories and arrayed across the four phases of Transition described above. Each column lists those agencies that should be involved in performing that task during a specific phase. The focus is on outside U.S. and international organizations. While Iraqi participation is not specifically stated except in a couple cases of special emphasis, it should be understood that local Iraqis will be involved as much as possible in each activity. That is why quickly establishing an effective personnel vetting process is so important.

It should also be noted that each task will proceed on a different timeline, determined by individual measures of success developed by planners. For instance, reestablishing the legal system in Category 3 might advance quickly into Stabilizing and Building Institutions, while the major security activities in Category 1 lag behind. Achievements might differ between regions, as well. Commanders and governors must be aware of the progress achieved in each task in each part of the country.

While the Mission Matrix appears complicated, the array of activities involved in rejuvenating Iraq and changing its regime will actually be even more complex. And leaders of the occupation must keep in mind the dangers of being too successful in supplying services. The final goal is to create an Iraqi state that can stand on its own, not one dependent on American or international aid.

While all 135 tasks will have to be accomplished to fully reestablish an Iraqi state, they are not all of primary concern for the commander of coalition military forces. Thirty-five are considered “critical.” If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure. The thirty-two “essential” tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission. The remaining sixty-eight “important” tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility of non-military agencies. The rating of these tasks is valid whether there is a civilian or military governor of Iraq. They will have to be accomplished no matter who is in charge. We now summarize each Mission Category in more detail, paying particular attention to military roles. The categories themselves are not prioritized.

Major Security Activities. Most coalition combat forces will be occupied with these tasks for some time, though there will also be plenty to do for specialized units like Military Police. Considering the political aspects of an Iraqi occupation and the size of the forces required, military planners should not assume a major UN peacekeeping role. The U.S.-led coalition might be able to broaden its participation for tasks like training the new Iraqi Army, which eventually must be able to assume these security responsibilities. Part of this training program should include bringing selected Iraqi officers to the United States for special courses on how an army should function in a more democratic state. A long-term solution also requires creating a trustworthy and transparent new Iraqi government that will live up to its international obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction and other issues.

Many long-term cautions should be considered in conducting these major security activities. In separating factions, coalition military forces must avoid the dangers of unplanned and escalating alienation of ethnic and religious groups such as the Israelis experienced during their occupation of Lebanon. That example also illustrates the previously noted problems that will grow if an occupation begins to be perceived as permanent.⁹ Military commanders and forces must be clear from the beginning that they intend to leave as quickly as possible, they must demonstrate progress toward that end, and civilian organizations that accept a handover of responsibilities in turn must be clear that they aim to return control to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible.

Public Administration. First priority in this mission category will be establishing viable local governments, relying as much as possible on existing institutions. Civil affairs units will be needed throughout the country to assist this process. Evaluating the trustworthiness and reliability of indigenous administrators will be important, and the effort should begin now to gather a body of regional experts, Americans and trusted Iraqis, who can make such judgments. National government will be developed in later phases of Transition, and while civil affairs can help with this task, the responsibility primarily will be with other agencies. All troops need to be aware of the importance of preserving public records, and this must be emphasized from the beginning of actual military operations.

Legal. While coalition military forces will pick up missions in this category as security is being established, overall responsibility should be passed fairly quickly to other agencies. However, commanders should be prepared to provide support for war crimes tribunals for a while, and depending on what system is decided upon for prosecution, military personnel might be involved with the actual trials. In regard to quickly reestablishing civilian courts, judges and lawyers from the Arab League might be available, though coordination for such augmentation should begin early.

Public Finance. The coalition military commander must be prepared to take necessary actions to keep the public finance system operating until civilian government agencies can take responsibility. Again, civil affairs units will be instrumental.

Civil Information. Information will be a key tool in gaining and maintaining the support of the Iraqi people. Coalition military forces will have to work promptly while security is being established to restore and maintain mass media to communicate around the nation, and to coordinate messages with whatever transition government exists. The initial priority

for restoring capabilities must be given to government systems with wide range and newspapers with the largest circulation.

Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services. While it would be best to let the Iraqis control access to historic and cultural sites, an occupying power assumes responsibility for security of such places. Particular attention must be paid to religious and historic sites that have great importance; their damage or disruption could fan discontent or inspire violence, not just within Iraq but around the region. At the same time public access must be assured, especially to religious sites. The coalition military commander will have to delicately balance these competing requirements for security and access.

Public Safety. Coalition military forces will have to include a sufficient number of military police to perform law and order tasks until an international or trustworthy indigenous police force can be established in sufficient numbers. This may take some time. For example, it is estimated that training and deploying a new Afghan police force will take at least 3 years.¹⁰ Iraq does not contain the same density of UN and NGO demining elements as Afghanistan did, so coalition forces will also have to be prepared to do more of those missions. Requirements may be reduced if coalition military forces limit their own use of mines and cluster bombs. The latter can be especially problematic. Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 12,000 unexploded bomblets remain on the ground in Afghanistan, and well over 100 civilians have been killed or maimed by them since October 2001.¹¹

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. This is another category that will require regional experts for vetting and evaluation of personnel. A system resembling the *Fragebogen* questionnaires used in postwar Germany might be relevant for this process.¹² First priority for coalition military forces will be disarming groups and securing weapons.

Electoral Process for More Participatory Government. Many proposals are being discussed about the future form of Iraq's government. American-style democracy is probably not the ideal model for a Middle Eastern state, but some system with increased popular participation should be adopted. This will not be a decision for the coalition military commander to make, but he will be involved in supporting elections, as well as the constitutional convention and referendum to shape and legitimize the new government.

Disaster Preparedness and Response. Coalition military forces must be prepared to provide these services until civil capacity can be restored. As with most other categories, the intensity of the conflict preceding Transition will have a great impact on the timeline leading to Handover.

Public Works. Iraq's infrastructure has deteriorated under sanctions, and coalition military engineers will have to begin repairing key facilities early in the Security phase. This will be necessary to facilitate their use by the coalition as well as by the Iraqis. This mission will be much easier if the coalition limits destruction with careful targeting during combat operations.

Public Utilities. Special concerns for this mission category resemble those for the previous one. Restoring public utilities quickly will have a significant impact on public health and sanitation, and help avoid epidemics.

Telecommunications and Public Communications. Restoring communication links will help tie the country together. First priority should be given to broadcasting systems to facilitate nationwide coalition information operations. Computer networks and Internet sites also are included in the telecommunications systems to be restored and maintained.

Education. Though this is primarily a category for civilian agencies, some engineer and civil affairs effort should be dedicated to helping rejuvenate public schools. Iraqi education has seriously deteriorated under sanctions. Students in schools are off the streets and out of trouble. It also will be important to quickly implement job training programs for the many Iraqi unemployed.

Public Health. This is a category where help from international and non-governmental organizations should be forthcoming fairly quickly, though the limitations mentioned earlier about access and WMD might have significant impact. Iraqi medical personnel and facilities should also be available, though sanctions again have had a deleterious effect. Coalition military support will be especially important early in the Transition to provide and distribute health-related supplies. Many non-governmental organizations have already voiced concerns about the potential health and environmental disaster that war could bring to the whole region, and coalition military forces must contribute to preventing such an outcome.¹³

Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief. This will be another mission category of very high international visibility.¹⁴ The coalition military commander and governing authorities will need to work with UN agencies to exploit the resources and 46,000 distribution centers of the Oil for Food Program. Again there should be some responsive IO and NGO support for what could be a massive refugee problem. Caring for and controlling displaced populations will require extensive and well-orchestrated civil-military cooperation that should have already started.

Economics and Commerce. First priority in this category for coalition military forces will be to secure, repair, and maintain oil facilities. If Saddam Hussein burns wells as he did in Kuwait, military forces will have to provide assistance to fire-fighting organizations. Managing oil revenues will be very important in rebuilding Iraq and perhaps funding occupation costs, and coalition military forces will have to coordinate with many agencies on this complicated issue. Iraqi technocrats should also be available for assistance, though some vetting will be necessary to insure their reliability.

Labor. This mission category should not be a concern for the coalition military commander.

Property Control. Though this category is also not directly a coalition military force responsibility, the military will be preserving the public records as mentioned under Public Administration. These will provide important documentation to establish ownership systems.

Food, Agriculture, Fisheries. During the Security phase, coalition military forces will have some responsibility to insure the availability and flow of food and agriculture. To avoid famine the coalition commander must be sensitive to the timing of the initial planting and

harvest, and might have to provide supporting resources to overcome any post-conflict disruption.

Transportation. During the Security phase especially, coalition military forces will have primary responsibility for the operation of Iraqi transportation systems which will be essential for military as well as civilian organizations. These duties will require many specialized units which must be available from the beginning of any hostilities. These systems have deteriorated under sanctions, but the Iraqi technocrats who have maintained them should be available to help operate them.

As is apparent from the matrix and discussion of mission categories, civil affairs, engineer, military police, and transportation units will be in high demand. Some of these specialties have been stretched thin by requirements for the war on terrorism.¹⁵ At the same time a strong combat force will be essential, at least during the Security and Stabilize phases. It would be advisable for military leaders, and especially the Army, to perform a detailed analysis of the force requirements for Title X and other missions in a post-conflict Iraq. The Army Staff could conduct this exercise at the Center for Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Army War College, which has already developed a concept for a wargame that will examine such issues. It will involve all major service components, and possibly joint players, since the impact of requirements for occupying Iraq will have repercussions on force providers around the world.

While this study has focused specifically on Iraq, these insights will apply to any important post-conflict operation. The U.S. Army has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation's major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peace as well.

ENDNOTES

1. For more on Operation ECLIPSE in Germany, see Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. LXV, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 713-739.

2. John J. Yeosock, remarks in "What We Should Have Done Differently," Part II of *In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm*, Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000, p. 25.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 29; Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999.

4. This chart is primarily the product of COL Stephen Kidder of the U.S. Army War College.

5. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

6. These observations and those in the next two paragraphs came from NGO and IO participants at two conferences, a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Project on the Means of Intervention Ground Operations Workshop held at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC, on October 17-18, 2002; and an Institute for National Security Studies/Naval Postgraduate School Workshop on "Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam's Rule," held at National Defense University in Washington, DC, on November 20-21, 2002.

7. Moni Basu, "Aid Groups Get Ready for War," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, December 23, 2002; James Bone, "UN Chief Issues Secret Orders for War in Iraq," *TimesOnline*, December 23, 2002, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-522510,00.html>; Mukesh Kapila and Karin Wermester, "The Afghan Job is Bigger Than Expected," *International Herald Tribune*, January 14, 2003.

8. For the completion of the Mission Matrix, the authors are indebted to the participants in the Post Conflict Military Missions Workshop held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on December 10-11, 2002, and particularly to Professor William Kiehl, of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.

9. For further analysis of the Israeli experience in Lebanon, see W. Andrew Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War," *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 22-35.

10. Chris Kraul, "In Afghanistan, Guns Hold Sway Over Law," *Los Angeles Times*, December 27, 2002, p. 1.

11. Peter Slevin and Vernon Loeb, "Bush Urged to Limit Weapons in Iraq," *Washington Post*, December 27, 2002, p. 12.

12. For more on the use of the *Fragebogen*, see Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975.

13. See, for example June Salvage, *Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq*, London: Medact, 2002. Medact is the United Kingdom affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

14. A number of organizations have already raised red flags about the impact of war in Iraq on the whole region due to refugee flows. See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, "A New Refugee Crisis in Iraq?" *Strategic Comments*, Vol. VIII, No. 8, November 12, 2002.

15. Military police have been in especially high demand. Harry Levins, "New Guard Call-Ups Renew Question of Troop Strength," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, December 21, 2002.

APPENDIX A

MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

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C = Critical Task, E = Essential Task, I = Important Task

Task No. Task	Security Phase	Stabilize Phase	Build Institutions	Handover Phase
Category 1 - Major Security Activities				
1A - C Secure/Destroy WMD	CMF	CMF, DoS, UNMOVIC	DoS, UNMOVIC	Transparent Iraq Govt
1B - C Stop intra- and inter-factional fighting	CMF	CMF	CMF, Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1C - E Train new Iraqi Army	CMF	CMF	CMF (broadened)	US Army
1D - C Round Up Regime	CMF	CMF, CIA, DoJ	CMF, CIA, DoJ	
1E - C Eliminate Pockets of Resistance	CMF	CMF	CMF	
1F - E Process Detainees/POWs	CMF, DoJ	CMF, IATF	CMF, IATF	Iraqi Institutions
1G - C Secure Borders	CMF	CMF	CMF, Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1H - C Seize and Secure Oil Facilities	CMF	CMF	CMF, Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1I - C Plan and Conduct Consequence Management	CMF	CMF	CMF, Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1J - C Plan and Conduct Theater Information Operations	CMF	CMF	CMF, Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1K - C Maintain Freedom of Movement	CMF	CMF	CMF, Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1L - E Regulate Movement	CMF	CMF	CMF, Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
Category 2 - Public Administration				
2A - C Establish and Assist Regional and Local Governments	CMF	CMF, AID, NED, DoS, IO	AID, NED, DoS, UNDP, IO	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2B - I E&A National Legislative System	CMF	AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF	Same as above	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2C - I E&A National Executive Office	CMF, DoS	AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF	Same as above	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2D - I E&A Ministries	CMF, DoS	AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF	Same as above	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2E - E Preserve & Improve Public Records System	CMF, DoJ	CMF, DoJ	Iraqi Institutions	

Category 3 - Legal

3A - E	Operate Criminal Court System	CMF, Iraqi courts	AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi	Previous + DoS/F	AL, Iraqi
3B - E	Operate Civil Court System	CMF, Iraqi courts	AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi	Previous + DoS/F	AL, Iraqi
3C - E	Establish and Operate System to Enact & Publicize Laws	CMF	AID,DoJ,AOUSC,AL	Previous + DoS/F	AL, Iraqi
3D - E	Operate Judicial Administrative System	CMF, Iraqi courts	AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi	Previous + DoS/F	AL, UNDP, ICM, Iraqi
3E - E	Support & Conduct War Crimes Tribunals	CMF	CMF,DoJ,DoS/S/WCI	CMF&ICC or Tribunal	Iraqi Institutions
3F - I	Provide Legal Education		AID,USED,AL,NGO	AID,USED,AL,NGO	AL,Iraqi
3G - I	Protect Human Rights	CMF	DoS,AID,CMF,NGO	DoS,AID,ICM,NGO	ICM,NGO

Category 4 - Public Finance

4A - E	Stabilize Currency	CMF, Trsy	Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4B - I	Maintain & Operate Govt Finance System (Revenues & Distribution)	CMF, Trsy	Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4C - I	Establish Private Financial Institutions		Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4D - I	Conduct Foreign Currency Exchange	Trsy	Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4E - E	Pay Govt Civil & Military Employees	CMF	AID,DoS,CMF	AID,DoS,CMF,WB	WB, Iraqi
4F - I	Collect Customs and Duties	CMF	Trsy,AID,CMF	Trsy,AID,CMF, Iraqi	Iraqi

Category 5 - Civil Information

5A - E	Restore and Maintain Newspapers and Print Media	CMF	AID,DoS/IIP,CMF	AID,DoS/IIP,CMF	Iraqi
5B - C	R&M Government Radio System	CMF	AID,BBG,CMF,DoS,FCC	Same as previous	Iraqi
5C - C	R&M Government Television System	CMF	Same as above	Same as above	Iraqi
5D - I	Establish Private TV System		AID,FCC	AID,FCC	Iraqi
5E - I	Establish Private Radio System		AID,FCC	AID,FCC	Iraqi
5F - I	Develop Censorship and Libel Laws		AID,DoJ,CMF,DoS,AL	AID,DoJ,CMF, DoS, AL	AL,Iraqi
5G - I	Restore & Maintain Cable Systems		AID,CMF,DoS	AID,CMF,DoS	Iraqi

Catetory 5 - Civil Information (continued)

5H - C Coordinate USG-Iraq Govt Info CMF,DoS/R DoS/R,CMF DoS/R

Category 6 - Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services

6A - I Maintain Art & Cultural Institutions Iraqi DoS/ECA,AID,Iraqi Previous +UNESCO UNESCO,Iraqi
 6B - I Protect Historical Artifacts CMF,Iraqi DoS/ECA,DoJ,AID,Iraqi Previous + UNESCO UNESCO,Iraqi
 6C - I Maintain Sports and Recreational Systems Iraqi AID,DoS/ECA,Iraqi Previous + UNESCO UNESCO,Iraqi
 6D - C Protect Religious Sites & Access CMF,Iraqi CMF,Iraqi Iraqi Forces

Category 7 - Public Safety

7A - C Establish & Maintain Police Systems and Operations CMF DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, UNP AP,Iraqi
 7B - I Train Police DoJ,DoS/INL,AP DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, UNP AP,Iraqi
 7C - E Maintain Penal Systems CMF AID,DoJ,CMF,AL AID,DoJ,AL AL,Iraqi
 7D - I Provide & Support Fire Fighting Systems CMF AID,FEMA,CMF AID,FEMA Iraqi
 7E - E Conduct Explosive Ord Disposal & Demining CMF CMF,AID,DoS/PM,NGO AID,DoS/PM, UNMAS,NGO UNMAS,Iraqi,NGO
 7F - I Protect Foreign Residents CMF CMF,DoS CMF,DoS,Iraqi Forces Iraqi

Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

8A - E Demobilize & Reorganize Army/Scty Forces/militias CMF,DoS CMF,DoS CMF,DoS
 8B - I Transfer & Reorient to reintegrate into civil sector AID,CMF AID,CMF
 8C - I Reintegrate Demobilized Persons into Civil Sector AID,DoS AID,DoS

Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (continued)

8D - I	Restructure & Reorganize New Civil Security Forces	CMF	DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP	Same as previous	AP
8E - E	Dismantle Baath Party		NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL, CIA	Same as previous	
8F - C	Disarm and Secure Weapons	CMF	CMF		

Category 9 - Electoral Process for More Participatory Government

9A - I	Plan Local Elections	CMF	NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL	Previous+NGO	NGO
9B - I	Plan National Elections		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9C - I	Prepare Local Elections	CMF	Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9D - I	Prepare National Elections		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9E - I	Assist Conduct of Local Elections	CMF	Same as above+CMF	Previous +NGO	NGO
9F - I	Assist Conduct of Natl Elections		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9G - I	Provide Post Local Election Support		NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL	Previous +NGO	NGO
9H - I	Provide Post Natl Election Support		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9I - I	Plan for Constitutional Convention		Same as above	Previous	
9J - I	Assist Conduct of Const Convention		Same as above +CMF	Previous	
9K - I	Assist Conduct of Constitutional Referendum			Same as above	

Category 10 - Disaster Preparedness and Response

10A - I	Provide Emergency Warning Systems	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi
10B - I	Provide Emergency Evacuation and Treatment	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi
10C - I	Provide Post Disaster Recovery	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi
10D - I	Conduct Pre-Disaster Planning	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi

Category 11 - Public Works

11A - C	Repair Roads and Streets	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
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11B - C	Repair Bridges	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11C - C	Repair Port Facilities	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11D - C	Repair Airports	CMF	AID,FAA,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,IATA, UNDP	IATA,UNDP,Iraq
11E - C	Repair Railroads	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11F - I	Repair Dams	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11G - I	Repair Canal System	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi

Category 12 - Public Utilities

12A - C	Restore & Maintain Power Systems	CMF	AID,DOE	AID,DOE,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
12B - C	Restore & Maintain Water Systems	CMF	AID,HHS	AID,HHS,UNDP, WHO	UNDP,WHO,Iraqi
12C - I	Restore & Maintain Gas Systems	CMF	AID,DOE	AID,DOE,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
12D - C	R&M Sewage Systems	CMF	AID,HHS	AID,HHS,UNDP, WHO	UNDP,WHO,Iraqi
12E - E	R&M Garbage Collection	CMF	AID	AID,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi

Category 13 - Telecommunications and Public Communications

13A - E	Restore & Maintain Telecommunications System	CMF	AID,FCC	AID,FCC,IPU	IPU,Iraqi
13B - C	R&M Broadcasting Systems	CMF	AID,FCC	AID,FCC,IPU	IPU,Iraqi
13C - I	R&M Postal System	CMF	AID,USPS	AID,USPS,IPU	IPU,Iraqi

Category 14 - Education

14A - E	Operate Public School System	CMF	AID,USED	AID,USED,UN,WB	UN,WB,Iraqi
14B - I	Operate Private School System		AID,USED	AID,USED,UN,WB	UN,WB,Iraqi
14C - I	Provide Adult Education Services		AID,USED	AID,USED,UN	UN,Iraqi
14D - I	Provide Job Training Programs	AID	AID,UNDP,NGO	AID,UNDP,NGO	UNDP,NGO
14E - I	Provide University Education		DoS/ECA,USED,AID	Previous+ UNESCO	UNESCO,Iraqi

Category 15 - Public Health

15A - E	Provide Emergency Medical Service	CMF, IT	AID/OFDA, FEMA, IT	Prev. +UN, ICRC, NGO	UN, ICRC, NGO, Iraqi
15B - E	Operate Hospitals	CMF, IT	AID, HHS, WHO, NGO, IT	Same as previous	WHO, NGO, Iraqi
15C - E	Provide Doctors and Health Professionals	CMF, IT	AID, HHS, WHO, NGO, IT	Same as previous	WHO, NGO, Iraqi
15D - E	Provide and Distribute Pharmaceutical Supplies	CMF	AID, HHS, WHO, NGO, CMF	Same as previous	WHO, NGO, Iraqi
15E - E	Provide and Distribute Non-Pharmaceutical Medical Supplies	CMF	Same as above	Same as previous	WHO, NGO, Iraqi
15F - E	Dispose of Medical Waste	CMF	AID, HHS, WHOA	ID, HHS, WHO	WHO, Iraqi
15G - E	Provide Vector Control Systems	CMF	AID, HHS/CDC, WHO	AID, HHS/CDC, WHO	WHO, Iraqi
15H - E	Provide Garbage Disposal System	CMF	AID	AID, UNDP	UNDP, Iraqi
15I - E	Insure Proper Sanitation	CMF	AID, HHS, WHO	AID, HHS, WHO, UNDP	WHO, UNDP, Iraqi
15J - I	Perform Preventive Medicine	CMF	AID, HHS, WHO, NGO	Previous+UNDP	WHO, UNDP, Iraqi
15K - I	Provide Mortuary Services	CMF	AID, HHS	AID, HHS, UNDP	UNDP, Iraqi

Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief

16A - I	Provide Assistance to Poor	CMF	AID, USDA, WFP, NGO	Previous+UNDP	UNDP, WFP, NGO, Iraqi
16B - I	Provide Emergency Relief	CMF	AID/OFDA, DoD	AID/OFDA, DoD, ICRC	ICRC, Iraqi
16C - I	Operate Orphanages	CMF	AID, HHS	Prev. +UNICEF, NGO	UNICEF, NGO, Iraqi
16D - I	Provide Care for Aged	CMF	AID, HHS	AID, HHS, WHO, NGO	WHO, NGO, Iraqi
16E - I	Provide Psychological Assistance	CMF	AID, HHS	AID, HHS, WHO, NGO	WHO, NGO, Iraqi
16F - C	Care for and Relocate Refugees	CMF	DoS/PRM, CMF, AID, UN NGO	Previous, incl. OCHA	OCHA, NGO, Iraqi

Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief (continued)

16G - C	Care for & Relocate Displaced Persons	CMF, DoS/PRM	AID, CMF, DoS/PRM, UN, NGO	Previous, incl. OCHA	OCHA, NGO, Iraqi
16H - C	Administer Oil for Food Program	CMF, UN	UN	UN	
16I - C	Manage & Distribute Relief Supplies	CMF	AID, CMF, UN, NGO	AID, CMF, UN, NGO	UN, NGO, Iraqi

Category 17 - Economics and Commerce

17A - I	Revitalize Commercial Sector		AID, DoC, Trsy, IT	AID, DoC, Trsy, WB, IT	WB, Iraqi
17B - I	Revitalize Industrial Sector		AID, DoC, Trsy, IT	AID, DoC, Trsy, WB, IT	WB, Iraqi
17C - E	Repair & Maintain Oil Facilities	CMF, IT	AID, DoE, IT	AID, UNDP, IT	UNDP, Iraqi
17D - E	Manage Oil Revenues	CMF, UN	AID, DoS, Trsy, DoE, UN	Previous +WB, Iraqi	UN, WB, Iraqi
17E - I	Implement Wage and Price Controls		AID, Trsy	AID, Trsy, WB	WB, Iraqi
17F - I	Maintain Foreign Trade System		AID, DoS, Trsy	Previous+WB, IMF	WB, IMF, Iraqi
17G - I	Set Customs and Duties		DoS, Trsy, DoC	Iraqi	
17H - C	Implement Oil Fire Contingencies	AID, CMF	AID		

Category 18 - Labor

18A - I	Establish and Provide Employment Services & Benefits		AID, DoL	AID, DoL, ILO	ILO, Iraqi
18B - I	Establish and Maintain System to Resolve Managmnt-Labor Disputes		AID, DoL, DoS/DRL	AID, DoL, DoS/DRL, ILO	ILO, Iraqi
18C - I	Establish and Monitor Worker Safety Programs		AID, DoL, OSHA	AID, DoL, OSHA, ILO	ILO, Iraqi

Category 19 - Property Control

19A - I	Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Real Property		AID, DoC, DoJ	AID, DoC, DoJ	Iraqi
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Category 19 - Property Control (continued)

19B - I	Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Personal Property	AID, DoC, DoJ	AID, DoC, DoJ	Iraqi
Category 20 - Food, Agriculture, Fisheries				
20A - I	Maintain Production System	CMF, IT	AID, USDA, IT	UNFAO, Iraqi
20B - I	Maintain Processing System	CMF, IT	AID, USDA, IT	UNFAO, Iraqi
20C - I	Maintain Distribution System	CMF, IT	AID, USDA, IT	UNFAO, Iraqi
20D - I	Maintain Retail Sales System		AID, USDA, DoC	Iraqi
20E - I	Establish and Execute Inspection System	CMF	AID, USDA/APHIS	Iraqi
20F - I	Maintain Irrigation System	CMF, IT	AID, USDA, IT	UNFAO, Iraqi
20G - E	Support Harvest	CMF	AID, CMF, USDA	

Category 21 - Transportation

21A - C	Operate Ports	CMF, IT	AID, CMF, DoT, IT, Dos/F	UNDP, Iraqi
21B - C	Operate Rail System	CMF, IT	AID, CMF, DoT, IT, DoS/F	UNDP, Iraqi
21C - C	Maintain Intercity Road Network	CMF	AID, CMF, DoT, DoS/F	UNDP, Iraqi
21D - E	Maintain Municipal Roads	CMF	AID, CMF	UNDP, Iraqi
21E - C	Operate Air System (incl. Airspace Management)	CMF	AID, FAA, CMF, DoS/F	UNDP, IATA, Iraqi
21F - C	Operate Pipelines	CMF, IT	AID, DoE, IT, DoS/F	UNDP, Iraqi

Task Breakdown:

- 35 Critical Tasks
- 32 Essential Tasks
- 68 Important Tasks

DEFINITION OF TASK CATEGORIES:

Critical – If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure.

Essential – These tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission.

Important – These tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility of non-military agencies.

ABBREVIATIONS

AID –	U.S. Agency for International Development AID/OFDA- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance AID/OTI- Office of Transition Initiatives
AL –	Arab League
AP –	Arab Police Academy
AOUSC –	Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
BBG –	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CIA –	Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. intelligence organizations
CMF –	Coalition Military Forces
DoC –	U.S. Department of Commerce
DoD –	U.S. Department of Defense
DoJ –	U.S. Department of Justice
DoL –	U.S. Department of Labor OSHA - Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Dept. of Labor
DoS –	U.S. Department of State DoS/PRM - Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Affairs DoS/ECA - Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs DoS/IIP - Office of International Information Programs DoS/INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs DoS/DHL - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor DoS/F – Future of Iraq Project DoS/G - Office of the U/S for Global Affairs DoS/R- Office of the U/S for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs DoS/CA- Bureau of Consular Affairs DoS/DRL- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor DoS/PM – Bureau of Political-Military Affairs DoS/S/WCI – Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues
DoE –	U.S. Department of Energy
FEMA –	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HHS –	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services HHS/CDC – Centers for Disease Control

ILO –	International Labor Organization
IATA –	International Air Transport Association
IATF –	Interagency Task Force
IPU –	International Postal Union
ICC –	International Criminal Court
ICM –	United Nations International Civilian Monitors
ICRC –	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF –	International Monetary Fund
IO –	International Organizations
IT –	Iraqi Technocrats (Indigenous and Expatriate)
NED –	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO –	Non-governmental Organizations
OCHA –	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Trsy –	U.S. Department of the Treasury
USDA –	U.S. Department of Agriculture USDA/APHIS – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
UN –	United Nations Organizations
UNDP –	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF –	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNFAO –	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
UNMAS –	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMOVIC –	United Nations Moratorium Verification and Inspection Commission
UNP –	United Nations Police
USED –	U.S. Department of Education
USG –	U.S. Government
UNESCO –	U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
WFP –	World Food Program
WHO –	World Health Organization
WB-	World Bank