




GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
School of Foreign Service
Center for Security Studies



MOLES

DEFECTORS, AND DECEPTIONS:

**James Angleton and His Influence
on US Counterintelligence**

**THURSDAY
29 / MARCH
2012**

A WILSON CENTER AND GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES
JOINT CONFERENCE



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**James Angleton and His Influence
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EDITED BY **BRUCE HOFFMAN** AND **CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN**



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CONTENTS

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	1
PANEL I: Angleton from the Inside	6
Tennent Bagley (CIA, retired)	
Carl Colby (Producer/Director “The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster William Colby”)	
Edward Epstein (author, journalist)	
Ronald Kessler (author, journalist)	
Barry Royden (CIA)	
LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Intelligence and Conspiracy Theory: The Case of James Angleton in Long-Term Perspective	41
Christopher Andrew (University of Cambridge)	
PANEL II: Angleton and His Times	59
Loch Johnson (University of Georgia)	
Oleg Kalugin (CI Centre)	
David Martin (author, journalist)	
PANEL III: The Long View	84
John Prados (National Security Archive)	
David Robarge (Central Intelligence Agency)	
David Wise (author, journalist)	

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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Christian Ostermann (*Woodrow Wilson Center*)

Bruce Hoffman (*Georgetown University*)

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Welcome to the Wilson Center, I am Christian Ostermann. I direct the History and Public Policy Program here at the Center, and it's a great pleasure to welcome all of you to our institution. Many of you are familiar with the Center. The Center is the nation's living memorial to President Woodrow Wilson and tries to provide a nonpartisan forum for dialogue on important public policy issues, including the historical context to these public policy issues that are often overlooked in this town. And so, it is very appropriate that today we are discussing an important and controversial historical figure at this conference "Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and His Influence on U.S. Counterintelligence."

We greatly appreciate the huge response we received for this conference. Bruce Hoffman, my co-host, will talk briefly about the Georgetown partnership here at the Center. The History and Public Policy Program, has for the last twenty-some years run a project, the Cold War International History Project, that many of you are familiar with. It is in many ways the leading international research project on new documentation

on Cold War and recent international history. We collect, translate and publish documents from former Soviet and communist world archives. We now do a lot of work especially in Asian archives and are moving slowly into the Middle East, and have over the years focused every now and then on intelligence issues. We are delighted to be co-hosting this event; I should add that the History and Public Policy Program is one of your Wilson Center hosts. The other co-host is Robert Litwak, Vice President of the Center.

I'm not an expert on Angleton, so I'll keep this short and turn it over to Bruce Hoffman and then the experts that we have brought together here. Let me just say a couple of words of thanks to those who have really made this conference happen. First and foremost, Professor Bruce Hoffman from Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies, who has been really the *spiritus rector* behind this event. I'd like to thank in particular the George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund at Georgetown that really helped to make this conference possible, and we greatly appreciate the cooperation that is part of a longstanding relationship



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between the Center and Georgetown on a number of important public policy issues. I would like to thank all of the speakers that have come from near and far, especially Professor Christopher Andrew—who came from Cambridge and will give the keynote in a short while. Chris, it's great to have you here at the meeting. I'd like to thank my colleagues here at the Center who really have done the bulk of the heavy lifting and organizational work. Tim McDonnell has really been the lead on the organization of this workshop. Also my colleague Allison Lyalikov who's handling some of the technology here, as well as our very talented and dedicated interns, Hannah Monroe-Morse and Amelia Cormier. Also I'd like to thank David Maxwell, the deputy director at the Georgetown Center, and Dmitriy Zakharov for their partnership and collaboration.

I'll be chairing the first panel on "Angleton from the Inside," looking at Angleton through the eyes and testimony of his contemporaries. Then we'll have the keynote later on this morning, and after lunch we'll be looking at Angleton from a broader scholarly viewpoint. With that, thank you all for joining us, and Bruce, you have the floor and thanks again.

BRUCE HOFFMAN:

Thank you, Christian. Let me also thank the Wilson Center for co-hosting and co-sponsoring this event. When I first proposed it to Rob Litwak, who is the vice president of International Security Studies, he responded with alacrity to the idea of having a conference on James Angleton. Equally enthusiastically, Christian, as director of the Cold War History Project,

and Tim McDonnell and their team, provided the absolutely essential support, not least in giving us this splendid venue, which I think makes for exactly the right level of interaction between the speakers and the audience. Let me also thank all the participants and all the speakers who, as Christian said, in the case of Chris Andrew who has come from Cambridge, England, to Loch Johnson who is up from Georgia, Tennent Bagley, who's phoning in from Belgium, and various others who have also come to join us. And thank you to all of you. It shows that our hypothesis that even forty or fifty years after many of the events that will be discussed today, James Angleton and the controversy surrounding his reign as the counterintelligence chief at the CIA still attracts enormous amounts of interest and attention. I would be remiss, also, not to thank the associate director of the Center for Security Studies, my deputy, David Maxwell, for his herculean work, and especially Dmitriy Zakharov, who coordinates our outreach events at the Center, who was really instrumental in making this possible.

Now, many people, not least the speakers, have asked me why a conference on James Angleton, and why now? Essentially it boils down to four people. The previous associate director of the Center—what was then the Center for Peace and Security Studies, it is now called the Center of Security Studies—this was an idea that germinated in the mind of Ellen McHugh, who is now with the Center for a New American Security. One of our distinguished faculty who is a speaker later today, David Robarge, is the CIA's chief historian; and it was a conversation that they had about fourteen or fifteen months ago

Even forty or fifty years after many of the events that will be discussed today, James Angleton and the controversy surrounding his reign as the counterintelligence chief at the CIA still attracts enormous amounts of interest and attention.

that really planted the seed to have a new look in the twenty-first century at Angleton's legacy. The reason they involved me in discussing Angleton, oddly enough, not least because Georgetown's master's program in Security Studies has a very strong intelligence component, was that one of our benefactors and dearest friends, is an individual named Tom Kalaris who very generously has made possible this conference through the fund that he created to honor his father, George T. Kalaris.

George T. Kalaris is really one of those unsung heroes of the Cold War. He is someone that rarely, if ever is recognized—I know Tom often boasts that his father was only mentioned in one book that he knows of—and his father is one of these unsung heroes of the Cold War. A very interesting background, born of Greek immigrant parents in Montana. At age eleven, his mother took him back to Greece. Unfortunately, World War II started shortly afterwards and he remained in Greece throughout the war under false papers, avoiding internment by the Nazis. Subsequently, George Kalaris, in 1952, joined the Central Intelligence Agency, where he spent, not the entirety, but at least two decades of his career in the clandestine services. He served in Greece, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Brazil. During his

time in Laos, he was instrumental in acquiring both a warhead and also the operating manual to a Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air antiaircraft missile.

His involvement in Angleton boils down to the fact that in the early 1970s the then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), William Colby, whose son, Carl Colby, we're very fortunate to have on the panel this morning, brought in George Kalaris and, in essence, instructed him to clean up the mess that, quote unquote, "that Angleton had left behind." So, George T. Kalaris followed James Angleton as the director of counterintelligence. He then went on to head the Soviet/East European Division of the Clandestine Services, and among other things, I believe, dispatched Burton Gerber, one of our other distinguished Georgetown faculty, to Eastern Europe in his service as station chief in a variety of capitals there. George T. Kalaris wound up his career as special assistant to then-DCI Stansfield Turner in 1979, and he retired from the Service in 1980. And it's really in his memory and to honor his father that Tom Kalaris has very generously created the George T. Kalaris Intelligence Studies Fund at Georgetown, which provides stipends for students studying intelligence as one of our core concentrations, provides research funds, and one of its main goals is

to provide forums precisely like this that will not only plumb the depths of Cold War history, but also address contemporary issues.

Last year, exactly at this time, we had an equally impressive conference with the Council on Foreign Relations and the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King's College, London, on intelligence and radicalization in terrorism. So, this is the second of what

we hope will be annual conferences that embody the spirit of George T. Kalaris and honor not just George T. Kalaris, but all those other Cold War heroes who may have gone unrecorded in the history books, but nonetheless played an instrumental role in the Cold War, one should say, and the world we live in today.

Thank you very much. Let me turn it back over to Christian.

PANEL I: ANGLETON FROM THE INSIDE

Christian Ostermann (*Director, HAPP*), Chair

Tennent Bagley (*CIA, retired*)

Carl Colby (*Producer/Director “The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster William Colby”*)

Edward Epstein (*author, journalist*)

Ronald Kessler (*author, journalist*)

Barry Royden (*CIA*)

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

We will get started with our first panel on “Angleton from the Inside.” We have a terrific group of speakers. What I’d like to do is to introduce each of them quickly, and then hopefully, after short presentations, to engage in a discussion with all of you.

Our first speaker will be Tennent Bagley via phone from Belgium. He is a retired CIA counterintelligence officer who served the Agency for over twenty years. During his career, he handled spies and defectors in the Directorate of Operations and rose to the position of chief of Soviet bloc counterintelligence. In 1962, he became the first CIA officer to have contact with Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko. Much of Bagley’s later counterintelligence career related to the Nosenko case, particularly concerning the question of whether or not Nosenko was a KGB plant to protect Soviet assets within the CIA. He is the author of *Spy Wars: Moles,*

Mysteries, and Deadly Games, as well as *KGB*. He is a writer and researcher based in Brussels.

Our next speaker, already mentioned as well, is Carl Colby, award-winning documentary film maker, president of Carl Colby films, and a member of the board of directors of the OSS Society. His production credits include films about Franz Klein, Willem De Kooning, Bob Marley, Frank Garry, George Hurl, and Franco Zeffirelli, an Emmy Award winner, among many others. He recently produced and directed *The Man Nobody Knew: In Search of My Father, CIA Spymaster, William Colby*, a feature length documentary film on his late father, William Colby, the former CIA Director, and the evolution of the CIA from OSS in World War II through today. Carl Colby was born in Washington, D.C., has lived in New York and Los Angeles before returning to Washington in 2003 to make *The Man Nobody Knew*.

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Then we will hear from Edward Epstein, an investigative journalist and author. He has written fourteen books, including a number on topics related to intelligence and counterintelligence. These include *Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth; Cartel; Deception: The Invisible War between the KGB and the CIA; The Assassination Chronicles: Inquest, Counterplot, and Legend; Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer; and Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*. Currently, he is working on a book on the 9/11 Commission. Epstein studied at both Cornell and Harvard, from where he received his Ph.D.

Then we'll have Ronald Kessler, to my immediate left here. He's a best-selling *New York Times* author, nineteen books on the intelligence community. He began his career as a journalist in the early '60s at the *Worcester Telegram* followed by years as an investigative reporter and editorial writer with the Boston Herald. In 1968, he joined *The Wall Street Journal* as a reporter in the New York bureau before becoming an investigative reporter with *The Washington Post* in 1970. Currently, he is the chief Washington correspondent for Newsmax.com and *Newsmax* magazine. He has won seventeen journalism awards, including two George Polk Awards for national reporting and for community service. He's also won the Robert Novak Journalist of the Year Award, the American Political Science Association's Public Affairs Reporting Award, the Associated Press Sevellon Brown Memorial Award and the *Washingtonian* magazine's Washingtonian of the Year Award.

Finally, Barry Royden has worked for the CIA for over four decades in various capacities, last serving as associate deputy director of operations for counterintelligence.

Formerly, he served three years at the U.S. Air Force, taught as a CIA officer in residence at the Joint Military Intelligence College, and contributed to various articles for the *L.A. Times* and CBS News. He wrote an extensive article for *Studies in Intelligence* entitled, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," which was later made available to the public. Currently, he teaches counterintelligence at a directorate of operations training facility.

With that, I'd like to turn it over to our guest over the phone, Tennent Bagley. Mr. Bagley, you have the floor.

TENNENT BAGLEY:

I would first like to express my admiration for the Wilson and Georgetown Centers for sponsoring this discussion. They know the subject has been tackled before, I think especially with a working group on intelligence reform back in 1994 that assembled the memories and insights of veterans like William Hood, James Noland and Sam Halpern. I also think of the valiant research efforts by Agency historian David Robarge. By raising the subject again today, our sponsors are reminding everyone that the historical truth still eludes us. It's still far too early to close the book and draw any long-term conclusions. From my experiences since the Cold War in dealing in dealing with people from the East, former enemies, the matters of moles and deceptions in the Cold War are still blanketed under layers of secrecy, both East and West. And so, as the memories fade out with the passing years, the danger grows that the story as it stands today, flawed and incomplete, might come to be accepted as serious history. The Georgetown and Wilson Centers, as part of their admirable efforts to get the history of the Cold War

right, are holding a door open that might have quietly swung shut. I salute them for it. But until we learn much more about that world of moles and deceptions in the Cold War, we'll have to recognize that any truly fair assessment of Jim Angleton's work in it will have to wait; that whatever we conclude today can only be tentative. But, perhaps we can advance the study a bit.

I saw Jim Angleton from a rather special viewpoint, both close and detached at the same time. Close because there were many years we exchanged our thoughts about moles and defectors, and deceptions, and because we were friends and remained so until his death. But detached, too, because he and I worked in separate parts of the Clandestine Services, I in proactive operations against the Soviet bloc, he in his CI staff capacity, a more defensive position. I never owed him subservience or approval. And, in fact, we had some hefty disagreements.

Why should we today, trying to get history right, still care about Jim Angleton? It's not just because he shaped and dominated American counterintelligence for much of the Cold War. No, I think the historian's interest lies in the fact that, having been so long in that central position, Angleton became a symbol, practically the personification of American counterintelligence. As a result, criticism of him as a professional had a wide fallout. To the degree that his critics have distorted his image, they've distorted our view of the counterintelligence operations of his time.

Take that word "paranoid," for example. You're all familiar with it. His critics have pinned it to Angleton's name so tightly that we're reminded of way back when Southerners used to think "damn Yankee" was one

word. If we view Angleton as a paranoid, it follows that, consciously or not, we tend to see the Soviet bloc deceptions and penetrations he fought as mere phantasms of a deranged imagination. His critics, to discredit views that contradicted theirs, have intentionally built up that image, that image of strangeness. Their intent shines in the way they exaggerate aspects of his personal appearance, his dress, and manner—things that did, in fact, distinguish him from his colleagues. They describe a tall figure of ghost-like thinness behind owl-like glasses wearing a dark hat and dressed in dark clothing, working strange hours in a darkened room, and of twisting lures for fish. With the evident intent to mock, they refer to him with a middle name that neither he nor anyone close to him ever used, personally or professionally. Those of us who know Jim were always aware that anyone referring to him as "James Jesus Angleton" either didn't know him, or had an agenda.

They succeeded in creating an image of a strange figure—even demented, as one recent historian got it—obsessed by the idea that there must be KGB moles inside the CIA, simply because the KGB was busily trying to put them there, or because there were KGB moles in the British and French intelligence services, or because some mad defector named [Anatoly] Golitsyn told him so, and who then launched crazed hunts to find these imaginary moles, burning innocent careers at the stake.

Now, I'd like to stress that this fictional image of him, and it is fictional, has done more damage to American counterintelligence than ever did any failures or missteps of the real James Angleton in the real world. He surely had his shortcomings as I was well-placed to observe, and which I'll come back to,

Matters of moles and deceptions in the Cold War are still blanketed under layers of secrecy, both East and West.

but to the extent that his influence on our counterintelligence may have been negative, the blame lies elsewhere. It lies in that fictional image. It's there that you'll find most, if not all, of the Angletonian excesses that are today blamed for the decline of CIA intelligence—counterintelligence after his time. That decline, which I suppose means counterintelligence became less active and less effective, has been reported by authoritative studies and is admitted even by Angleton's fiercest critics, but they say it's because CIA counterintelligence practitioners were bending over backwards not to repeat his excesses.

But look at those excesses. Look at the ones that have been named, and you'll quickly see that they're part of the fictional image that the critics themselves have created. There are things that Angleton not only didn't do to excess, but that he didn't do at all. The ones I've heard about most often first or second hand from Angleton's detractors inside the Agency are these. The first is that he regarded and treated all the Agency's secret Soviet sources as being under KGB control, which he most certainly did not, although some, in fact, were. That, because of such unfounded suspicions, he paralyzed CIA's intelligence gathering operations against the Soviet bloc. Now, that's pure invention. There never was any paralysis whatsoever,

as I know firsthand. Another is that his paranoid suspicions caused CIA to reject, even turn back, would-be defectors and volunteers from the Soviet bloc. In fact, none were rejected in his time, and the only case of a supposed turn-back that Angleton's critics have named, a man called [Yuri N.] Loginov, has been badly misreported. Also, that Angleton stashed away and ignored promising counterintelligence leads. These accusations not only lacked foundation, but actually involve sheer invention. It's also said that he had a student-to-teacher relationship with Kim Philby, which he never did, and that he gave away the store to Philby, which he did not. Also, that he got his ideas of KGB penetrations from the defector, Golitsyn, also labeled paranoid, which he did not. And other excesses, which Angleton wasn't even in a position to commit.

While we can't deal with all the cases and aspects of Angleton's time, I would like to say a few words about his so-called mole hunts. Calling investigations "mole hunts" invites ridicule of an indispensable part of counterintelligence work. This ridicule seems to have caused within the CIA an aversion to examining one's suspicions for fear of being accused of paranoia. Suspicion, itself, came to be sneered at as "sick-think." This is said to have turned people off counterintelligence as a job choice and created a general feeling that counterintelligence work was not much needed until that shocking wakeup call in the mid-1980s when the Soviets arrested all CIA's sources inside the Soviet intelligence services.

In the real world, Angleton's work was never based on theory—paranoid or otherwise. Each of the investigations that his CI staff undertook in conjunction

with the CIA's Office of Security, when it involved staff personnel, was pursuing a specific lead or indication. Whether valid or not was to be determined. But that was their job, and not to do it would have been shameful and dangerous negligence.

Were the particular mole hunts of his time really justified? None of us here today can answer that question. We don't know what led to them, except for a few, like the KGB defector Golitsyn's knowledge of a certain KGB spy, codename Sasha, whose name began with K, and even those few have been reported wrongly or incompletely. We don't know either what those investigations did or did not turn up. It is all very well to say that the CIA later decided that the careers of three of the suspects had been unfairly hampered, and that the CIA didn't even recompense them for it, but we don't know what caused them to be investigated in the first place.

Portraying Angleton as a paranoid delivers loud-and-clear an underlying message that any more rational person, you know, someone clear-minded like you and me, would naturally see that there never were any moles to be found, nor any of those wicked KGB deceptions that he imagined. But, as I know, as we all should know by now, paranoia or no paranoia, there *were* moles inside CIA in Angleton's time. It has emerged since the Cold War that there were at least two, not counting Karl Koecher, whose betrayal began only as Angleton was departing and who wasn't a staffer anyway. Also, circumstantial evidence points to two more still not identified. By the way, one of those KGB spies inside CIA had the KGB codename *Dobble*, sounding like "double." He will be exposed in

a book that will be coming out in the next few weeks, watch for it. That book is based on formerly secret documents, among them, the KGB's report to its Czech subsidiary telling what a good job *Dobble* had done. That means during the time reported in the book he exposed twelve people who had been secretly helping the CIA, some of whom were shot.

All of this teaches us to be wary of that word "paranoia." That's a pathology not always easy to diagnose, even by specialists. In counterintelligence circles, it's all too often just a label to discredit people who see things differently. If we're to get at the truth about Jim Angleton and his time, we'll have to identify some interim stage between wide-eyed acceptance at one extreme and paranoia at the other. May I propose one? Skepticism. It would more accurately describe Angleton, and it might even be a desirable quality for a practitioner of counterespionage. But if we're looking for ways that Angleton may have had a negative effect on American counterintelligence, we can probably find some.

For one thing, many found it difficult to follow his dense, brilliant descriptions of the counterintelligence picture. For example, how KGB active measures and moles were combining to subvert and manipulate Western policy. It was certainly to the detriment of American counterintelligence that two of those who weren't able to follow were successive CIA Directors, James Schlesinger and William Colby, as both admitted publicly, neither of whom felt much sympathy for counterintelligence practices in the first place. Colby replaced Angleton and his lieutenants with people who, as they themselves have also said publicly, came

in determined to shake CIA out of what they regarded as a dark era paralyzed by sick-think. They evidently shifted the emphasis away from skepticism to give the benefit of the doubt to sources and situations. The harm done by this approach became clear in cases such as the CIA's sources in Cuba, all of whom were subsequently learned to have been under Cuban control.

Sometimes, Angleton tended to portray KGB operations in such sweeping dramatic terms, that some thought he was exaggerating, or even imagining. For example, the defector Golitsyn first reported that in 1959 the KGB decided to increase their very real active measures: political subversion, deception, black propaganda, dirty tricks—and to coordinate them on a worldwide scale for closer support to Soviet foreign policy. The way Angleton described this development allowed some to scoff at it as Angleton's mad vision of a monster plot. To the extent that this ridicule discredited the information itself, American counterintelligence suffered a diminished understanding of how its adversary was really working.

No doubt, Angleton too sometimes went wrong when theorizing about Soviet policies. Whatever his doubts about the full reality of the Sino-Soviet split, they had no influence on American policy and need not concern us here—except to the degree that they discredited his more accurate positions on Soviet intelligence activity.

Those of us who dealt with him sometimes felt that Angleton was applying the principle of “need to know” with excessive zeal, pulling too much under himself and making it more difficult for some of us to do our own jobs. In other words, this central and dominating

figure of the American counterintelligence world was, like all of us, imperfect. However, his long experience, his contribution to American counterintelligence practices and procedures, his extraordinary knowledge and insight, his deep love of his country, his charismatic personality and his warm concern for his friends all earned him high respect from those who worked closely with him, including myself, and for most of those who supervised his work. In the real world Angleton worked in, Soviet intelligence was trying everywhere, every day to penetrate and deceive the United States government. They gave Angleton plenty of reasons to be skeptical. Inside various Washington agencies during the war and immediately afterward, as we all know now all too well, the Soviets had literally scores of secret sources. Angleton fought against such penetration as well as anyone could with the facilities and sources available to him. And history suggests that he did a better job than those who succeeded him.

Thank you very much for listening.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you very much. We will turn to Carl Colby.

CARL COLBY:

Thank you. Thank you very much for inviting me to this occasion. I'm not an expert on Angleton. I am the son of William Colby, one of the sons, and a filmmaker. Some of you may have seen the film I made, *The Man Nobody Knew*. I have great respect for my fellow panelist. I, unlike Mr. Bagley, only worked at the CIA for a couple of summers moving the mail cart around. So, I don't have any special access or secrets

to divulge. There are a number of people on this panel whom I highly respect: Christopher Andrew, of course, David Wise, who I interviewed for the film, David Robarge, very thoughtful and very incisive thinker, John Prados, who was extremely helpful to me in the making of the film; and Oleg Kalugin, who is in the film and is a wonderful person and offers terrific insights from the other side.

I would like to talk a little bit about Angleton in the terms of a comparative biography. I'm not an expert on Angleton, but I know a thing or two about my father. To start the story, if you wouldn't mind a little levity, there used to be a bar on M Street called Charing Cross, and in the '70s I would go in there once in a while after work or after school. One time I went up to the bar and there was an attractive looking, lean, sort-of tall girl. I started talking to her, chatting her up and slowly but surely we both sort of realized that we knew who each other was. It was one of Angleton's daughters. And I'll never forget how I thought, "Does she know—did she know about me ten minutes ago, or is it just now, when I discovered who she was?" It was very much in her character. Of course, I never saw her again—that wouldn't have been an approved relationship in the family.

To indulge in this comparative biography, I really think that in some ways, not to be too stark, but my father and James Angleton were really polar opposites who were probably most closely linked in the 1950s when they both served in Italy and had relationships with various political operatives in Italy. Of course, they were both OSS, but they were very different OSS. Angleton, in my mind, was the scholar, an intellectual

and a great appreciator of poetry and fine literature. The intricacies, the complexities I could see in him probably pouring through Milton, or Gerard Manley Hopkins, or certainly T.S. Eliot. We are familiar with that. My father was not that scholar. He was a full scholarship at Princeton, very bright, but in his OSS application, or in his form, I saw, not long ago, under "motivation" was written "wants action."

Here is the contrast. One is a rich, well-born, his father ran National Cash Register Company, and I believe—Angleton. And my father's father was an army officer and not too successful. As a matter of fact he had gotten involved in a sort of messy situation down in Fort Benning when there was an incident in which a white officer and his wife or girlfriend was walking along a planked area, sort of a sidewalk, and an African-American soldier was walking the other way, and he ordered the African-American off the planked sidewalk so he could pass. He ended up killing him, and then he was acquitted. This white officer was acquitted of this. My grandfather wrote an article for *The Nation* magazine about this outrage, because he was the press officer at Fort Benning. Well, that didn't help his career. My father was a Catholic army brat, and as opposed to Angleton, who I could imagine listening to Brahms or Schubert, my father's music was the *1812 Overture* and liked reciting what happened at the *Charge of the Light Brigade*. And as I said in my film, you know, the six hundred rush into this valley, and I used to say, "It is like a suicide mission." And he would say, "Yeah, but the glory of it all." It's a very different mindset. Angleton, of course, is quoted as saying, being—really, living in a "wilderness of mirrors."

Whereas my father's favorite expression was, "March towards the sound of the guns." Get into the action. If there's a battle going on, go to it.

So this is a very different mindset. And regardless of the title of my film, *The Man Nobody Knew*, I did know a thing or two about my father, because he taught me to observe, to see things. I would actually remember as a boy, we'd be in Saigon and he would say, "What do you see across the street?" And I'd say, "Well, just pedicabs and [a] bicycle shop." And he goes, "Look a little closer." And I would see perhaps somebody standing there waiting for something, and then someone else nervously sort of darting in and out a building. And I would say, "Well, I do see something. And why is that man doing this?" He'd say, "Uh huh, hmm, you're beginning to see." It's as if he was very—he taught me to observe the movement of the spirits in a person, and that's a quote from John Langan, who in my film, also, in a sense, obliquely refers to my father as very similar to a Jesuit who listens, who does not impose his view upon the world, but listens to others and tries to create solutions out of what they're doing. So, you could obviously see that in my father's activity towards—in CIA, with, let's say, the Pacification Program and obviously the Phoenix Program, whereas Angleton is not in the field, he's not taking fire. My father would go to fire bases and send the helicopter back to Saigon, and he would spend the night without a guard. And from twelve midnight to four a.m. he would take the perimeter watch, armed. And then there would be letters he would write to me. A few paragraphs on Georgetown and "how's it going with your studies?" and then, well, "incoming fire, I'll have to write a little bit later." So it

always colored me that this man was elevated eventually to be director of the CIA, but he had seen action, and he had to deal with people here, and especially in this town, like Cheney, Rumsfeld, Kissinger, and others who never made it to a fire base. And I feel that that has colored my opinion of him. At the same time, I think there's a tragic element to that, which I'll get to.

I think the common theme I can pull from this is the theme of betrayal. Both Angleton and my father were ultimately betrayed. I think Angleton actually earlier on. I think his relationship with Kim Philby colored his professional life, led him to be more suspicious, skeptical, wary—I won't say paranoid, but when you have a close relationship with someone like Philby, and you see him, in a sense, off the record and come back to CIA headquarters and do not debrief with your secretary that two-hour lunch you had with Philby, you just sort of wander back into your office and ruminate. And this was a massive deception. I would think if any of you would have, let's say, in your closest business relationship someone who ultimately deceives you like that, or a special relationship with the British—I think this colored him terribly. My father didn't suffer any sort of betrayal at that point, but he certainly, I feel, suffered a betrayal later, in 1975-76, when the White House would not support his testimony, his going to Congress, and offered him a poisonous choice: either lie to the Congress and basically disobey the law, or go your own way, interpret the law as you see it, obey the Constitution, and you'll be hung out to dry.

For example, in the summer of '74, I remember arguing with my father about Nixon. I said he's a liar, he's a criminal, he should be impeached. And he said,



CARL COLBY

“Don’t talk that way about your President.” It wasn’t that he was loyal to Nixon personally. He needed a clear line of authority. He needed a true, authentic chain of command. And so, is this the man who I should respect and I should obey? And I think this is what led him, if you were to examine what happened in ‘75, ‘76—he really reverted back to being that twenty-nine-year-old lawyer from Columbia Law School, with the Law Review and Democratic Party activist, labor lawyer, and sided with the Constitution, or, at least, what he thought was the Constitution.

I have heard that when my father went out to Vietnam in ‘70—sorry, 1968, to run the CORDS Pacification Program—later, also, Phoenix being an element of that—Angleton apparently wanted to set up a counterintelligence operation in the U.S. embassy, because he felt that the Americans and the South Vietnamese were being penetrated by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, and that there were leaks and there were, perhaps, people obviously passing information. My father was very much against this, because he, frankly, didn’t want—well, he didn’t want Angleton in his rice bowl. You know, he didn’t want him out sort of running the show and determining who he should trust and who he shouldn’t trust. And so this counterintelligence operation never really flowered in Saigon, but—so this is really a turf battle between Angleton and my father, which my father won. But it’s very interesting, I really find that my father was the counterinsurgent, sort of Jedburgh all of his life, very much colored by his experiences in Norway and France. Whereas Angleton was really the consummate cold warrior, didn’t engage in the micro—a very

different perception of the CIA than, perhaps, what exists today. Obviously, the CIA is involved in covert action and counterintelligence, et cetera, but the extent to which the Agency was involved in counterinsurgency in the late—in the mid ‘60s and later ‘60s and now is quite striking. I mean, a war in Laos, all of what is going on in Vietnam, all really entrusted to several people like Bob Myers, my father, a few others who are in their mid-40s, and hundreds of millions of dollars are being spent in this direction. It’s quite breathtaking, really, to think that there was such an ascendant CIA, and such an expansive CIA, and the covert action—it was beyond covert action. It was secret wars, extensive secret wars.

I think to get an insight into Angleton and also my father, you might also look at what was the state of the world in ‘74, ‘75, when my father finally let go, in a sense, or fired Angleton—and then he later would be fired himself, a year or so later. Maybe Angleton had legitimate reasons for alarm. Saigon was falling, and so was Cambodia and Laos. There were thirty thousand Cuban troops in Angola. Latin and South America and the Caribbean were rapidly being radicalized. The Russians were on the ascendency around the world. And obviously, the Europeans hated us. They vilified us. We were Phoenix. We were Vietnam. We were imperialists. And frankly, that taint, that stain has never really been rubbed out. I feel the Europeans still feel that way. I’ll never forget, I was in Milan in the late ‘70s. I remember I was talking to some young woman about North Korea, and she said, “North Korea is an ideal state.” She was telling me how fantastic North Korea was—everyone’s unified and they’re all working

to a common purpose, it's like our great communist movements here in Italy. I think, "What the hell are you talking about?" But, this was really a given among liberal circles and radical circles in Europe, and frankly, most everybody was at least a socialist then. I mean very few people you would meet were conservative in Europe in the late '70s.

I think my father was an eternal optimist. He was the OSS paratrooper, the NORSO Jedburgh. He didn't even experience what General Jack Singlaub experienced. When Singlaub, who, as you know, is a pretty hard charger, parachuted into France, he quickly found himself in a real problem. He had the Free French demanding the materiel and the weaponry be given to them—and the monies. But here the Communist French were battling for that same materiel. So you had to make a decision. Here's this young Californian, hot-rodding kind of Jedburgh, the ultimate operator, and he is having to decide, and then suddenly an element of a panzer division is coming up the road. And he had to take charge, he's only twenty-three years old, and tells them to stop. Let's get together and fight the Germans together. But my father never really had that experience. He had what he felt was protecting oppressed people, like in Norway, who ninety-nine percent of the people, obviously, hated the Germans, so it was quite simple. And I think that colored him from then on.

Also, just on a lighter note, Angleton and Colby, our families did not socialize. It was really a completely different crowd. As some of you might know, Angleton was very friendly with Mary Truitt, Cord Meyer, Carlton Swift, the Potters. This was sort of an

Ivy League crowd—my father was Ivy League, he went to Princeton, but he wasn't in the Ivy club. It was a very different world, and it still remains that way, even though I knew the Truitt girls very well. They would look at me with suspicion. Oh, that's the Colby boy, as if he's dangerous, and certainly the father's dangerous, because he's taking action. My father's crowd was everyone from the Greek mafia of George Kalaris, who was an extraordinarily bright and tough-minded character. The conversations around the dinner table would be really illuminating. These were people who had, really, no illusions about the world—perhaps Kalaris, because he'd actually seen it himself as a boy in Greece. My father's crowd was Lou Conein, Singlaub, Douglas Bazata, basically his Jedburgh group.

So what are the legacies? Angleton felt that there was a mole at the CIA, and perhaps there was, and eventually there was revealed to be one. In my father's opinion, Angleton had frozen out our ability to really conduct counterintelligence in the '70s. He was so worried about looking for the mole, that nothing got done. My father actually told me at one point, when I said, "Oh, I see Angleton's been fired." He said, "We're frozen solid. We have done no operations of any merit. Everyone's under suspicion." And then, as many of you know, many people were fired. Many veteran officers—fired. They were under suspicion, out, out the door. I think they both saw, though, a very dark, cruel, disorderly, and harsh world, but Angleton really sealed the door shut. To save the Agency and to save us, he sealed the door shut.

My father was the opposite—he would open it up. His tragedy, frankly, like Bob Myers and Tom McCoy

once told me, both at the same time, simultaneously, when I asked them about, “What’s the key to my father?” They said, “The tragedy is that he believed.” He believed in the cause. He believed he could turn people. He would rather it be messy in here, but he’ll get you. He’ll turn you. He’ll work on you, just like he did with the VC, turning them around in the PRUs and getting them to fight for the South Vietnamese in the Phoenix Program—a very cold, calculating, but a very optimistic and perhaps naïve view of the world, but it worked. That program worked, like it or not.

If you said, “Where are we now?” My father would say the glass is half full. He would say CIA is in its ascendancy. It’s completely legitimate. Look at who’s the head of it now: Petraeus. And look at the crowd who’s in power now—veteran counterinsurgents, in a sense: General McMaster, Admiral McRaven, General John Allen, a protégé of my father’s, Eric Olson, Mattis, all cut from the Colby cloth. I’m not trying to exaggerate, but what war are they fighting: William Westmoreland’s war or Abrams’s war? You tell me. He probably wouldn’t have gone into Iraq or Afghanistan with a heavy fist, but he certainly would have gone into Afghanistan.

In the end what would Angleton have seen? I think he would see enemies everywhere, and perhaps he’s right. He would look a lot more askance at China. He would see a resurgent Russia. He’d be very worried, as I think we should, perhaps, be worried about China. What are their intentions? Are they penetrating our software designs, et cetera? Most likely.

And, as a final little note—it’s kind of a sour thing to do, but I just can’t help it. Who are my father’s descendants, his progeny? Who are we? Who are we

Colbys? Well, there’s an international banker, there’s an attorney at the Department of Justice who does investigations down the street, there’s me, there’s my son, a U.S. Marine Officer, there’s an analyst who works on nuclear disarmament, and there’s an educational consultant. And Angleton’s daughters? They’re both Sikhs living the high life in a temple complex in Santa Fe.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. Thank you very much for this personal and comparative perspective. We now turn to Edward Epstein.

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

Thank you very much for having me. I think it’s astounding that there is a conference on Jim Angleton, who retired—or was forced to retire—in 1975, and I think it’s a very important event. I knew Angleton soon after he left the CIA. I had eighty meetings with him over a span of ten years, met him everywhere from the Army-Navy Club here in Washington to New York City to his home in Tucson to orchid houses in Maryland. Our discussions—I can’t calculate how many hours they ran—were about a single problem, and that’s the problem I want to discuss: the vulnerability of intelligence. That was a concept that shaped many of my own ideas. I wrote three books largely based on Angleton. One was called *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*, which concerned the Nosenko case, which Tennent Bagley can tell us more about, as he knows more about it than anyone in the world. I wrote a book called *Deception*, where the quote on this brochure, “the state of the mind and the

mind of the state,” comes from. And the last book I wrote just last year, called *Angleton: Was He Right?* And that book is available still on Amazon.

Now, when I say, “was Angleton right?” the question I should get back is, “right about what?” And, I mean, he was not right about everything, or even most things, but one thing he was right about was the vulnerability of intelligence. He has been proven right by two cases; both of which everyone in this room knows, the Hanssen case in the FBI and the Ames case in the CIA. His idea, and we have to get the whole concept here, was that an intelligence service, not just the CIA or the FBI, but the KGB or MI5 or MI6—any intelligence service, was vulnerable to being manipulated if two circumstances were achieved.

One circumstance was, of course, that someone had to plant an agent in their midst to provide feedback, a mole—the term actually comes from le Carré, I think. The feedback, the plant, the mole, the double agent has to be in the position where he can feed back information so that when they provide disinformation—and it’s very easy to provide disinformation. It can be a diplomat talking to another diplomat at a party. It could be in the newspapers. It can be through almost any intelligence channel. It could be speaking over a telephone—they didn’t have cell phones in those days—a telephone that one knows is compromised. Okay, it’s easy to spread disinformation and coordinate it. Everyone knows how to do it. The Russians have known how to do it since the Tsarist days, and the British and the Americans, Germans, that’s not a problem. The question is that after a while, very intelligent people in the other intelligent service begin

to become skeptical. They find the information can’t be true, so they doubt the whole—the source, and it fails. Angleton’s point was, if you had feedback, if you had someone in the evaluation of that intelligence who could say, “They don’t believe element A of the story,” then the disinformation program could change element A to conform and dovetail to what was doubted. And in that way, when people saw their doubts one by one taken away, they tended to believe the entire theory. This was—Angleton called this a “deception loop.” You have someone saying something false—by the way, it might not be false, it might just be misleading. It simply could be a series of accurate statements which leads one to the wrong conclusion. And someone else saying they don’t believe this part of it, and then that statement is constantly changed.

Now, one thing—the inspector general of the CIA did an analysis of eight disinformation [sources]—well, there were eight Russian sources that were providing us with information in the 1980s and early 1990s. And the CIA had found out by this time that all of these people were under the control of the KGB. And by the way, if you want to read about this, you could read Tim Weiner’s *Legacy of Ashes*, he quotes the inspector general’s report quite thoroughly. So they found out that there was disinformation. Okay, so what? It was also being passed up to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Advisor in these blue-bound volumes that were for their eyes only. Okay, that happens. But here was the amazing thing: when the CIA discovered that the sources they were relying on for this information and mixing it in with the rest of the information—when

they found out that they were probably or certainly under KGB control, they did not stop this information. They continued it, not because they are treacherous people or they're idiots—neither of that is true. It's because in any bureaucracy you're very concerned about destroying your own reputation and destroying something that you spent years and years building. And this is a form of institutional arrogance and this really is the third element of the intellectual framework that Angleton was so concerned with. In a sense, Bagley, as you heard from his talk, he also is concerned with this. And this is that an institution becomes so committed to what it's doing, that it doesn't listen, it holds in suspension a cognitive dissonance, if you like. But it holds in suspension any ideas that go against what it wants to believe.

Now, why I think Angleton was right, and again, not about China, not about Vietnam, not about covert actions—I'm talking about only one thing, and that is this concept of intelligence. Because in any intelligence service—and, by the way, the same would be true of a newspaper, which in a sense is an intelligence service, it gathers information and it wants to believe its sources. I want to believe my sources when I write a story. You don't want to doubt, especially if a source becomes a source over time. So there's a natural propensity to believe your sources. Angleton's point is someone could take advantage of this in the intelligence world, let's say it was the KGB in the days of the Cold War or the FSB in today's time. In terms of journalism, it might be the public relations of Karl Rove or a Doug Schoen or a very clever public relations person who knows how to take advantage of sources.

But in any case, sources do get or can be compromised, and when they're compromised it is very difficult for an institution to reject everything that its stories have been built on. And there really isn't too much difference if you think of this blue-bound briefing for the President, it's like a newspaper but it has an audience of two or three people as opposed to an audience of millions of people.

I think this is very important—let me go for a moment to Angleton's career, because it was a little different than it's been stated in the media. He began as a liaison with the allied intelligence services—this is MI6, the French, the Israelis, the BND in Germany—very powerful job in the CIA, because these services were performing lots of intelligence and, you know, we're talking about the late '40s and early '50s, and that is how he met and dealt with Kim Philby. I think he had met Kim Philby before, but Philby was the British liaison and he [Angleton] was the American liaison. So, having lunch with him was his job. And I think Carl is right. I think it did influence him when he realized how dangerous a long-term intelligence operation could be—the Philby operation. He then went to Allen Dulles, then the Director, and said, “We need a separate counterintelligence staff, because the geographic divisions”—the Latin American division, the Soviet Bloc division, whatever it was called—“these divisions, they can't see that their own sources are compromised. So the Director needs a staff.” Originally it started with twenty or thirty people and it grew to three or four hundred people by the end, which was 1974.

The main job of Angleton and his staff was giving the bona fides to a source. The divisions would

recruit a source, whether it was in Europe or Vietnam, wherever, they would do whatever, they would use their own methods, polygraph or whatever, but then Angleton's staff would look at it in the larger picture and say, "We will not give this person bona fides." If they didn't, it meant the information that came from him was labeled: "from a source whose bona fides have not yet been established," which, of course, would lead some people, including Colby, to believe that their intelligence is being paralyzed, because, with this label, they weren't able to count on the people, as Carl well described it, that they believed in.

So, there was great friction and animosity by the time that he was forced out in 1974, 1975. I think that Bagley is correct that the mythology that has grown since has been largely fed by people who have an agenda, and that agenda was converting the CIA. The CIA was always two organizations in one. One was covert action. This is what Colby was involved in. They fought, they were in action, they had guns, they parachuted in, they set off bombs, they financed liberation groups, they did *coup d'états*. The other group was basically doing human intelligence, I mean, we didn't get satellite intelligence, we had electronic intelligence, and Angleton was in this second group. A huge battle in the CIA over which group should be the CIA. And the covert action people, I think, have won. I think the CIA, now, is flying drones and it is dropping bombs from them. So I think the CIA has changed, but I think the loss is a very serious loss because we need to know the mind not only of our enemy but of our own. We have to know where we are being manipulated and we are vulnerable. And as much as people now can ridicule Angleton—not necessarily

on the basis of any truths, but opinion—the disservice is that we no longer think—we think of ourselves as invulnerable, and when one thinks of themselves as invulnerable, at that—

RONALD KESSLER:

I can assure you, the FBI and the CIA today consider James Angleton to be a menace, someone who actually never caught a spy, who really was a nut case, paranoid, constantly weaving conspiracy theories, and, ultimately, paralyzing intelligence gathering against the Soviet bloc when intelligence was most needed.

I'll give you just a quick personal anecdote, which tells you a lot, I think. I interviewed Angleton at his northern Virginia home in April 1987, a month before he died. And I had just spent 5 days in Prague with my wife, Pam, interviewing Karl Koecher, who was mentioned earlier by Pete Bagley, as the mole who really was there—it wasn't an imaginary mole. But during Angleton's tenure he operated, he was a high-level intelligence officer, Czech intelligence, but reporting directly to the KGB—compromised Adolf Tolkachev, one of the top assets that the CI had at the time. His intelligence was so important that his reports were circulated to U.S. presidents. When Tolkachev was arrested by the KGB, he said, "I'll give you a confession, but could you give me my Montblanc pen at my apartment?" They did, and the CI had concealed a cyanide pill in there. He took the pill and died. So he committed suicide. He was, therefore, one of the most important assets that the CI has had.

So, here was a real mole, and you would think that anybody in this business would be a little interested in

finding out what he had said during five days of interviews in Prague. And, by the way, one of Koecher's methods of collecting intelligence was going to sex orgies with his gorgeous wife Hana, where other CI people and White House people and Pentagon people also went, and, of course, they were implicitly compromised by going to these orgies, and, therefore, would give information to Koecher, as well. And, by the way, I brought my wife, Pam, along for the interviews to make sure I didn't go to any orgies. But Angleton was not interested whatsoever. Here was the mole he was looking for, did not want to hear about it, did not ask any questions about it, just showed me his orchids, and puffed a lot of cigarette smoke. He was a chain smoker of Virginia Slims, he was a very heavy drinker, and that was the end of it. The real spy catcher, who really has caught spies, is John L. Martin. He was chief of the Justice Department espionage section for almost twenty-five years, and during that time he prosecuted seventy-six spies, including John Walker, including Larry Wu-tai Chin, Aldrich Ames from the CIA, other CIA people such as Barnett, and of those only one acquittal resulted. He did that with hard evidence, not a lot of conspiracy theories and conjecture and talk about, "well, we don't know everything" and therefore, you know, "we may not ever know the answer." By the way, we do know the answer in many respects now, because of course now we have KGB defectors such as Oleg Kalugin and Victor Cherkashin, who wrote a book and described how foolish Angleton was to have paralyzed CI operations against the KGB. And Martin did this without any cases being overturned on appeal, without ever being accused of any unethical conduct, and he describes Angleton as a nutcase.

In my books, I've quoted John Martin. Recently, he gave me an additional tidbit which was that he had an encounter with Angleton. Angleton was interested in the case of Christopher Boyce and Daulton Lee, who were two young men, twenty-three years old, who gave highly classified information from TRW to the Soviets in Mexico City and were prosecuted by Martin. And their whole thing was drugs—they wanted to buy drugs, and this was a way to get money to buy drugs. Well, John Martin told me that Angleton came over to his office at the Justice Department and wanted to see the public transcripts of the trial of these two individuals because, Angleton said, he was quite certain that if he read these transcripts—public transcripts—he would find evidence that these two individuals actually were controlled by a mastermind in the KGB. So just think about that. Here's the head of the Justice Department espionage being visited by Angleton, saying that he thinks that these public transcripts are going to demonstrate that these two individuals were controlled by the KGB. How foolish can that be? How incredibly foolish.

So, in my books, I quote a number of the most distinguished CI people who went up against the Soviet threat, such as Richard Stolz, William Donnelly, Rolfe Kingsley, as saying that Angleton was a menace, that they were simply prevented from developing assets in the Soviet Union because of Angleton, because of his theories, because everybody was afraid of making a misstep that Angleton would pounce upon, and therefore, ultimately, Angleton was extremely dangerous to our efforts to uncover what the Soviets were up to.

In his book, Bob Gates described talking to James Schlesinger, the former DCI, and his assistant, Sam

Hoskinson. And Schlesinger told him that when Schlesinger came in, he wanted to know what Angleton was up to, so he sent Hoskinson in to find out. He saw Angleton in his office. The blinds were closed. Everything was dark, and Angleton was waving these conspiracy theories, and, ultimately, when Hoskinson expressed some skepticism, Angleton said that Schlesinger was a mole, he was KGB. And Hoskinson said, “Well, I’m going to have to tell Schlesinger that you said that.” And Angleton said, “Well, then you’re one of them.” This is how incredible it was that we had this man for twenty years as chief of counterintelligence, never caught a spy, paralyzing operations. When I reconsidered the idea for this conference, I realized that my initial reaction was wrong, that it really was a very important conference, because it is important that history not be revisited, that we do examine his legacy, his approach, that we listen to his side, to the defenders, to the revisionists, to hear what they have to say so that this will never happen again. Because it is so easy to have this paranoid, so-called counterintelligence mentality, which is what Angleton would refer to, which, as John Martin has said, is just amateur hour—that you need to investigate anything, whether you’re a journalist or a homicide detective or a spy catcher, with objectivity, and all the same standards apply. You have to look at facts, you have to look at evidence, and proceed from there. Ultimately, as we know, Colby fired Angleton. It took a lot of guts to do that. He was one of the heroes. And I want to just close with a quote from John Martin in a *Newsmax* story that I just wrote about this whole issue, and he said, “Those who think that Angleton’s paranoid mentality, intimidating tactics, and dishonest

charges against innocent CI officers were admirable risk a return to the disastrous days when the FBI and the CIA trampled on Americans’ rights and overlooked real spies. The revisionists dangerously invite history to be repeated.” Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. Our final speaker on this panel is Mr. Barry Royden. You have the floor.

BARRY ROYDEN:

Thank you very much. First, when I was originally introduced, there was one line saying that I spent forty years in CIA, which I did, and I’ve been working on contract for the last ten years. So, I’ve got really fifty years of experience in CIA. There was also a reference to some of my academic or literary achievements, since this is academia, one of which said that I had published articles in the *Los Angeles Times*. Actually, that’s not true. I was interviewed and misquoted once—in the *Los Angeles Times*. I’ll read my remarks, because I want to get them straight, and I’m happy to take questions in the end.

As chance would have it, I recently had the opportunity to review a series of internal CIA studies written shortly after Angleton’s retirement from CIA in 1974. These studies were written by senior CIA Officers who had either served in the counterintelligence staff with Angleton, or who had worked in what was then the Soviet/Eastern European Division of CIA. The authors comprehensively reviewed what Angleton and KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn had referred to as the “monster plot,” the thesis that the KGB was successfully

Angleton became a symbol, practically the personification of American counterintelligence.

running a highly-compartmented, strategic deception operation against the West, enabled by high-level penetrations of Western intelligence. The authors of these studies termed this the “monster plot,” and concluded that there was no evidence to support this thesis. They judged that, as a result of the personnel and operational decisions made based on Angleton’s belief in the master plot, numerous CIA officers unfairly had their careers ruined because they had been falsely accused of being KGB agents. In addition, CIA’s Soviet operational program had been critically damaged by the mistaken accusations that several important Soviet defectors and volunteers were under KGB control.

How did this happen? There’s no question but that Angleton was an experienced and talented counterintelligence officer. What, then, had led him to embrace the master plot thesis? I would cite three major factors, things that I’ve talked to Burton Gerber, who has many years in CIA and Soviet operations, about and I think he and I agree very much on this. First, Angleton’s exposure to the British Double Cross program in World War II, in which the British, enabled by having broken the German enigma code machine, were able to identify Germany’s agents in Great Britain and then double them back against Germany—very successful, using

them to feed disinformation to German intelligence. Angleton cited this history numerous times as proving that massive strategic deception operations were viable. Second was Angleton’s knowledge of the Soviet Trust operation, in which the KGB predecessor organization, the Cheka, secretly took control of the major monarchist opposition group shortly after the October 1917 revolution. And, after luring into the movement most anti-Bolshevik elements, both inside and outside of the Soviet Union, as well as garnering support from Western intelligence—Western European intelligence services, decapitated the organization. Angleton often cited the Trust operation as an example of the Soviets’ ability to carry out strategic deception. Finally, Angleton’s experience with Kim Philby, which has been already discussed. Angleton worked closely with Philby from 1949 to 1951, when Philby was the Washington representative of the British SIS. And he shared many of CIA’s Soviet secrets with him. Philby, who later rose to the senior SIS officer working against the Soviets, was of course eventually unmasked as a longtime KGB agent, which I believe must have had a devastating impact on Angleton. He would have concluded that if the KGB could penetrate a highly capable and established Western intelligence service, such as the British SIS, they certainly would be able to penetrate the fledgling CIA. And, of course, Angleton was well aware that OSS had been penetrated by the Soviets during World War II.

The precipitating factor which launched the master plot thesis was the defection of KGB officer Anatoliy Golitsyn in December 1961. It was Golitsyn, who, after a period of time in the U.S., first described this

purported KGB strategic deception operation, which he claimed was enabled by high-level KGB penetrations of CIA. It should be noted, however, that in the first six months or so after his defection, Golitsyn identified only one alleged penetration of CIA. The famous Sasha lead, which ultimately led to the identification of a CIA contract officer in Berlin, named Igor Orlov, as a KGB agent. It was only months later, after Angleton allowed Golitsyn to review the personnel files of a number of CIA Soviet experts, that Golitsyn claimed that there were as many as six KGB penetrations in CIA's Soviet/Eastern European Division. Tragically, whereas Golitsyn's information on the Sasha case was based on his exposure to the case while a KGB officer, all the other purported CIA moles that he identified were based on his analysis of KGB *modus operandi*. The Sasha lead was the only Golitsyn lead that proved out. All the others were investigated by the FBI and they were ultimately cleared of suspicion. The flaws in Golitsyn's postulations are obvious in hindsight. He asserted for years that the Sino-Soviet split was part of this KGB strategic deception, long after it was evident that the two countries saw each other as major rivals. Angleton and Golitsyn also held that the Soviet frictions with Eastern European allies, such as Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania, were largely KGB deceptions. He and Angleton insisted that Soviet defectors, such as Yuri Nosenko, and major CIA Soviet agents—and I should say CIA and British agents—such as Oleg Penkovsky, were, in fact, KGB double agents. All of the evidence that we have obtained over the fifty succeeding years strongly indicates the opposite: that Nosenko and

Penkovsky and multiple other Soviet defectors and agents depicted by Angleton and Golitsyn as KGB provocations were, in fact, legitimate volunteers.

I would particularly stress a major flaw in Golitsyn's reasoning. He concluded that Nosenko was a KGB provocation when Nosenko reported that he had no knowledge of the major KGB strategic deception operation that Golitsyn had described. Yet, logically, a mid-level KGB second chief directorate officer, like Nosenko, would almost certainly not have been read into such a program had it existed. Further, when subsequent KGB volunteers and defectors also denied knowledge of such a program and reported that Nosenko was a legitimate defector, this was cited by Golitsyn as proof that they were also KGB provocations. Yet these officers arguably would not have been witting of this highly-compartmented operation either.

A more recent example of Golitsyn's fantasies I found in an article that he wrote about the abortive KGB coup in Moscow in August 1991. He was quoted as saying, "According to my assessment, the Soviet coup and its failure constituted a grandiose display of deception, a provocation." Golitsyn and Angleton never stopped believing that almost everything that happened in the Soviet Union was stage-managed by the KGB to deceive the West. Some will point out, and have pointed out today, that CIA and FBI have indeed been penetrated at high levels by the Russians through such traitors as Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen as support for Angleton's position. My answer to that is yes, Angleton was completely correct to conclude that the KGB would occasionally have success in penetrating U.S. intelligence, but his and Golitsyn's theories of

KGB omniscience were sorely misplaced and caused great damage to U.S. intelligence operations.

A final comment: no, Golitsyn was not a KGB deception agent sent to mislead CIA. He was, instead, a genuine volunteer who presented grandiose theories of KGB omniscience in order to secure special treatment as CIA's most important defector. And no, Angleton was not a KGB mole. He had merely become victim to having been too-long buried in the wilderness of mirrors that is counterintelligence. While it is important to have working-level officers with years of experience working in counterintelligence who can connect the counterintelligence dots, it is also important to ensure that senior counterintelligence officers are rotated regularly so that a healthy balance in operational judgment is maintained.

For further evidence to support this last point, I refer you to the book *The Philby Files* by Genrikh Borovik. Borovik, who was given access to the KGB file on Philby in 1988, relates that, in 1943, KGB CI expert Elena Modrzhinskaya—excuse me for my bad Russian—became convinced that Kim Philby was a double agent who was, in fact, working for the British against the KGB. Her assessment was accepted by the KGB, leading them to inform their London residency that Philby and the other four members of the Cambridge Five were, in fact, all under direction of British intelligence. Borovik described Modrzhinskaya as the Russian version of James Angleton, whose paranoid suspicions about KGB penetration nearly destroyed the CIA.

I would just like to add a couple comments about some things that were said earlier. The ID inspection that was done in the wake of the Ames case indeed

concluded that the Soviets—the KGB had used Ames' knowledge, the reporting that we had certain Soviet agents, to undertake a campaign of massive strategic deception against CIA and U.S. government. That's an absolutely unproven charge that most professionals in the Agency absolutely do not believe. Yes, these agents were compromised and they were wrapped up, and certainly there were occasionally small pieces of disinformation that were fed to us, but the sort of massive strategic misleading of policymakers through these agents is just an unproven statement, and not true.

Karl Koecher was described by Mr. Kessler as a high-level Czech intelligence officer. He was not a high-level Czech intelligence officer. He was an agent. He was recruited by the Czechs before he—

RONALD KESSLER:

No, I said he was a high-level translator.

BARRY ROYDEN:

Okay, well we don't—

RONALD KESSLER:

He was not a—

BARRY ROYDEN:

You didn't say translator actually, and we don't have high-level translators and low-level translators. We just have translators.

RONALD KESSLER:

He was high enough to compromise Tolkachev, one of the top—

BARRY ROYDEN:

Actually, he didn't compromise Tolkachev, he compromised another agent named Ogorodnik. But he did do damage, there's no doubt about that. He was a serious threat. And, as far as I know, there were no CIA officers who attended the wife swap parties that Koecher and his lovely wife Hana did indeed stage. And, finally, I would just say about John Martin, for whom I have the highest respect, that he has caught a lot of spies. He has actually not *caught* spies. He has *prosecuted* spies based on intelligence and information provided by CIA and FBI, [based on] which then he was able to build—or we were able to build cases that allowed him to prosecute spies. Thank you very much.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you.

I'd like to give the panelists a quick chance to respond if there are any particular points, and then I'd like to invite your comments and questions in just a moment. Mr. Bagley, would you like to comment on any of the presentations?

TENNENT BAGLEY:

Well, of course. It would take me quite a while to address all the different points.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

No, just a couple. The most important ones.

TENNENT BAGLEY:

It would probably take us until late in the evening, so if you have any specific questions on my reactions,

I believe that what we're talking about is what people think—what people have said and what people think. What I'm more interested in now—and I think it would help the historical process ahead for the purposes of this conference—I think we ought to look at what we now know about these things, because to quote what people said back twenty or thirty years ago doesn't take us very far forward. In fact, there is much more known, at least, I picked up more, from the East about these cases. There's no reason to assume, for example, that because most KGB people, most CI people thought that Nosenko was genuine, it does not mean that he was genuine.

I've had the amazing experience recently, relatively recently, of talking to a KGB General who was personally invited to help run the Nosenko case for the KGB. He was invited by the man who was in charge of it, who was General Oleg Gribanov, and who informed me, also, the name of Nosenko's KGB case officer. But these are things which I think are contributions to history, and I think would be more important than to rehash the accusations of the past about—and, indeed, by the way, I have no problem that Angleton did exaggerate and misspeak from time to time, but, again, that's a piece of history. It's not a contribution to our knowledge of what really was the situation of the moles, defectors, and deceptions—our subject today.

BARRY ROYDEN:

In response, to Mr. Bagley's saying that he's had contacts in the East with former KGB officers who have told him that, in fact, Nosenko was run by them; I would hope that you would all have healthy

skepticism for former KGB officers telling the truth to Tennent Bagley, who of course has always been a supporter of the Angleton thesis. I have not found that former KGB officers sitting in Moscow have been good sources of honesty about their operations against the U.S.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Any other reactions from the panelists on the presentations? Mr. Epstein?

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

I would just like to say that Angleton was not a spy catcher. Catching spies was the Office of Security and the FBI, which has the legal mandate. The CIA cannot arrest a spy in the CIA in America. So Angleton was basically someone who handled from the counterintelligence staff, he was able to put doubts on any source. He had a liaison, Sam Papich with the FBI, but he was not a spy catcher, so you can't say how many spies he caught or did not catch. And I agree with you about Martin, that prosecution depends on the FBI and the CIA.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Okay, Mr. Colby, do you have any reactions?

CARL COLBY:

No.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Okay.

RONALD KESSLER:

I just stand corrected on Tolkachev, he was not the individual who was compromised by Karl Koecher. But, you know, someone can be compromised by a secretary, by anybody who has access to classified information. Karl Koecher was given some of the most sensitive material in the CIA to translate and was a mole while Angleton was, supposedly, catching spies. That is what counterintelligence people do—although, the actual arrests and prosecution is up to others, and “spy catcher” applied to John Martin is a loose term. He actually did direct FBI investigations as well as part of his prosecutorial duties, so the idea is that in the real world, you have to go with real facts, with real evidence, and John Martin's record of prosecuting seventy-six spies, only one acquittal, knowing more about this business than almost anybody, just tells you a lot. And his reaction to Angleton, and his opinion of Angleton, is, therefore, I think, of note.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. We will go to comments and questions by the audience now.

THORN SMITH:

My name is Thorn Smith. I'm an attorney and I'm a fraud investigator, property, casualty, industry, so I see some analogies. Mr. Epstein, my question is for more information on when you discussed Mr. Angleton's concept of “deception loop.” You mentioned it was composed of three factors: one being institutional arrogance and I didn't catch the other two.

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

In a disinformation program, people have to feed the disinformation, whether it's strategic or tactical. The third and most important is a feedback element, which we'll call a mole, that's placed in a position to say where that information goes—is believed or not believed. Those are the three elements.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you.

STEVE WINTER:

Steve Winter, local researcher. Since we seem to be talking about Angleton as an individual case here—but I can think of, for example, in the German case, Reinhard Gehlen, who had absolutely incredible accusations, after the war, about penetration of Hitler's closest circle, particularly Martin Bormann, or I can talk about Markus Wolf and so forth and so on—and, also, the idea of globally-coordinated deception programs hardly seems to be an unusual concept. I think everybody's aware of this, in terms of, at least, considering that possibility, as something that's taking place.

So, is really Angleton's viewpoint so unusual, when you consider similar people highly placed in counterintelligence?

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

No, you're right, it wasn't unique, it wasn't unique in the CIA during the Cold War. Eventually, the CIA got replaced. As Ron Kessler says, that now no one in the FBI or the CIA that he spoke to believes this. Attitudes change, but certainly, after World War II, it was a common as-

sumption that there were deception programs, CIA ran deception programs, so he wasn't unique, he is simply a way of focusing on the issues of counterintelligence.

RONALD KESSLER:

I'd like to add one more point about the orgies, [laughter] it's certainly true that no CI officers were arrested as a result of providing information to Koecher because they went to orgies. But, I did interview one former CI officer who did admit to me—not on the record, of course—that he did go to the orgies, and he was in the directorate of operations, so—

BARRY ROYDEN:

So there. [laughter]

RONALD KESSLER:

—that is the story on orgies.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Alright. Any other reactions to the questions on uniqueness—

BARRY ROYDEN:

On strategic deception, it's greatly overblown. In other words, yes, there have been some tremendously damaging penetrations in all intelligence services. And then, theoretically, one—another service who's running that penetration could mount deception operations. But, periodically, they will mount a very focused disinformation operation to try to achieve a certain goal, such as when the Russians had Ames in place, they mounted a couple of KGB—a couple of disinformation operations

to try to convince us that our cases had been lost for reasons other than a penetration of CIA.

But the idea of massive strategic deception, that you can mislead governments through these well-placed agents—it just is not realistic. There are too many other sources of information out there that all countries have access to, that they are going to be fooled by one or two well-placed agents who can then help another intelligence service mislead a government with strategic deception.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you, any other questions? Yes, all the way in the back.

JIM BURR:

My name is Jim Burr and I'm a freelance journalist here in town. One of my very best friends just came out with a book—it's on Kindle, it's called *Black Man in the CIA*, and he really credits Colby with being a tremendous supporter of opening the operations divisions up to black people. And Lou—I've known Lou since '75 when he got back from the Philippines, and he's a delightful person and very, very dear friend. And I interviewed him for an entire year on tape, and that's kind of how he used to write the book, but the CIA threw him a curveball when he gave it to the CIA, so it took almost ten more years to get that book written.

ROBERT HATHAWAY:

Thanks, Christian. Bob Hathaway here at the Center. I spent a few years on the History Staff of the CIA in

the mid-1980s and had the distinct privilege of interviewing Jim Angleton several times in his northern Virginia home.

My question is addressed, first of all, I think, to Mr. Bagley, but I welcome others as well. It has been briefly alluded here today that the finger of suspicion ultimately pointed toward Jim Angleton. To the best of my knowledge no one else—no one has ever made a very compelling case to substantiate those suspicions, but I would encourage any of those who have knowledge about this to share a little bit about what they know with us of this greatest paradox.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. Mr. Bagley, would you like to respond to that?

TENNENT BAGLEY:

I am terribly sorry but it wasn't clear, and I couldn't hear it.

ROBERT HATHAWAY:

I can just repeat it in one sentence: the suspicions that Angleton was himself a mole.

TENNENT BAGLEY:

[laughs] Well, I am sorry, I can't take that seriously, and I don't think anybody in the—any of us today would take that seriously.

RONALD KESSLER:

Even I don't. [laughter]

CARL COLBY:

I see that John McLaughlin is in the audience, and with his long history at the Agency, could you offer a thought on Angleton and your sense of his legacy?

JOHN McLAUGHLIN:

I didn't know Angleton, I was a very junior officer at the—in fact, I came into the Agency about a year after he left. And so, I only know him by reputation. And I would—based on my experience at the CIA—associate myself very much with Barry Royden's remarks, which I know to have been very carefully considered, and Barry is really quite an expert on all of this. I do think that the issue of strategic deception is exaggerated, as Barry suggested, but it is still possible to have one or two particularly influential reports influence decisions rather broadly, and we've seen this in recent years. So, I don't rule out the possibility that a foreign intelligence service can develop sources and—I guess what I'm saying is we do have to be ever-vigilant at the possibility of double agents influencing us. Though, I agree with Barry, not on the massive level that many people often suggest, certainly not in the information age.

The other thing I would say is that there is a tendency, I think mistakenly, to think of counterintelligence—I don't quite know to how to relate this to the Angleton legacy—as a separate discipline, that somehow you put in an organizational context or in a box, and then, as in those days, ask those people to validate your sources. My experience tells me that the right way to think about counterintelligence—and, by the way, I have someone sitting on my left who's done a book on this with Burton Gerber—is that it has to infuse

every officer's thinking all the time, just short of paranoia. In other words, it isn't the only thing you want everyone to think about, but you don't want to put it in an organizational box that then lets everyone else assume, "I don't have to worry about it, they will." So, in our training these days, I think we are trying to make counterintelligence just a part of the mental toolkit of every officer. And I don't know whether Barry would agree that's the right way, but that's how I think about it, anyway. That's about all. I can't claim to really know a lot about Angleton personally.

BARRY ROYDEN:

We do say that every operations officer is a counterintelligence officer, John's absolutely right. It should be part of the discipline that every operational officer brings to his operations. Nonetheless, sometimes, we also need that skeptical, wary hand of an outside counterintelligence element to keep us honest. And sometimes we don't do the counterintelligence piece, as case officers, as well as we should. It's certainly something we're supposed to do, it shouldn't completely be imposed from outside.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Alright, any other questions? I'd like to in particular invite those of you, since this panel is about contemporary perspectives or perspectives from the inside, anybody with a personal experience to share.

JOHN PETTY:

John Petty, I'm just a student of intelligence, not a fan of Angleton, but almost a fan of Angleton would

probably be good. The question is—Mr. Royden brought up that the counterintelligence officer kind of rotates, that you're looking for always new, fresh eyes, I guess, and after—from my studies of Angleton—after Angleton left, the counterintelligence community itself went through a transition where they didn't want someone to kind of stay in one particular area for very long, especially counterintelligence. And my question would be, how do you get someone to be a subject matter expert in a particular—dealing with counterintelligence—on a particular enemy, so to speak, or an adversary if you're constantly rotating them out? And then you said, just a few minutes ago that we're all counterintelligence officers—or you said your officers were, but we're not doing a very good job, so, kind of playing off what you just said, and then the rest of the panel—

BARRY ROYDEN:

For any operations officer, part of his job is to work against other hostile intelligence services, so that you don't have to be in counterintelligence to be attempting to recruit penetrations of the KGB, then the KGB, now the SVR, and other important intelligence services. Penetrating hostile intelligence services is part of every operations officer's job, so they have that expertise, you just have a different angle to take if you're sitting in counterintelligence and your job is to look at every case more critically—that's your job, is to be critical and to do the devil's advocacy, and to do the red team critique, and look for things, weaknesses that could suggest the case might be bad. But it's not so different that you don't understand the business when

you're not directly in counterintelligence, because all of us are doing basically that job, whether we're in counterintelligence specifically or an operations officer.

RONALD KESSLER:

I would like to add that what I call “amateurish approach” is not just confined to Angleton and people in CIA—also we've seen that in the FBI. In my latest book, *The Secrets of the FBI*, I revealed for the first time how the FBI actually did get on to Robert Hanssen, the FBI agent who was probably the most damaging spy in U.S. history, and, as most of you know, before arresting him, the FBI thought that Brian Kelley, a CIA officer, was the individual they were looking for and I—for this book, I interviewed Mike Rochford, who was in charge of that investigation, for the first time he described what really happened, and he admitted that he was wrong, that the way they got on to Brian Kelley is that they made a list of people whom they thought had information to the classified material that had been compromised, and Brian Kelley showed up and most of the material had to do with the CIA, so they just sort of assumed the person must be in the CIA. And guess what? Robert Hanssen also had access to this material—he was in the FBI but he was not on their list. So that's not—what do you call that? Stupidity? Amateurish? You don't have to be some kind of a counterintelligence genius to recognize that this is just wrong.

And not only that, but Brian Kelley passed an FBI polygraph exam. And again, Mike Rochford admits that he disregarded that and came up with some rationale, in fact, thinking that, “Oh, this must be a really, really

good spy because he was able to pass the polygraph test.” Well, ultimately, Mike Rochford ironically was also the guy who finally got on to Hanssen. He pitched a current SVR officer, spent a week going to dinner and lunch with him, drinking with him. Finally the FBI paid seven million dollars, total package, to this individual to give up Robert Hanssen—stupidity and [an] amateurish approach is not just confined to the CIA.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

I’d like to refocus the conversation on Angleton since we get to some of the longer-term, broader views in the later panels.

BURTON GERBER:

I’m Burton Gerber. I was a junior and middle, kind of—middle-grade officer during a lot of the time that Jim Angleton was there. So this is a comment, but also, Pete, to invite you, if you’d care to comment on what I will comment on.

One point, please, to consider is that the effect of Angleton on operations—and what some people have called the “paralysis”—was pretty much restricted to operations against the Soviet target and not against the East European target. And I was fortunate enough in that time of trouble—and that’s what we called it—to be working Eastern European targets. And there was no serious question of the validity of those out of the CI staff or even out of our division Pete—at one time in that story, was a deputy chief of the division. I’m not sure why the infection did not spread to Eastern Europe, but it didn’t. And so, our operations were considered valid, they produced some fantastic

intelligence. But I believe that it is true that there was paralysis in Soviet operations because any operation that began which then had any reference to the question of the “master plot”—and that was the term used by the people espousing it—or any reference to Nosenko—if a person didn’t pass that test, then he was considered probable part of the master plot of the provocation. So it was very difficult to move positively on Soviet operations in that time. So much of what we achieved at that time was Eastern European and I just wonder if Pete would like to comment on that.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

The question is about the effect of Angleton on operations limited, as Mr. Gerber just said, to Soviet targets, not Eastern European targets. Would you agree with that?

TENNANT BAGLEY:

It’s a difficult question. I am not sure. I’d have to think about individual operations and I don’t know which ones Burton is talking about.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Any specifics?

[laughter]

BURTON GERBER:

Ten years of Eastern European operations. I’m talking, Pete, about ten years of Eastern European operations and I’m not aware of any time when there was serious question about those operations from the—

TENNANT BAGLEY:

Well, yes, I quite agree with you, Burt. I don't believe—I don't remember any questions being raised about those operations.

CHARLES BATTAGLIA:

Charlie Battaglia. I was up at the Agency when George Kalaris shifted over to the work of the DCI. And we talked about Angleton here. And George says when he went down, the thing he found most alarming was the disorganization of the files down at the—down in the CI staff there and how they could come to any conclusion of that. And the impact that had and—to the image of—of Angleton, of dealing with innuendo. And one thing that was most disturbing to George was the so-called story that went around that if Angleton didn't get his way dealing within the Agency, that he would go outside and work it through the backdoor. And I cite specifically the case where he went to Paris and met with Alexandre de Marenches, head of the SDECE, to tell him not to deal with the chief of station in Paris because he was a Soviet mole. And I think that story probably had a lot to do with Director Colby relieving Angleton. I then shifted to the Senate intelligence committee, where we spent a lot of time looking at counterintelligence. We did believe that, following the departure of Angleton, that counterintelligence didn't seem to be as effective up there at the Agency. And one particular case we could cite, of course, was Aldrich Ames. At the time, Ames wrote a letter from jail to the Chairman of the intelligence committee to say that he in fact had more things to say about the CIA and that he had not revealed to any of the investigation

and wanted to tell it only to the Chairman of the intelligence committee. Well, I told the chairman then, who was then Arlen Specter, that it would be crazy for him to go up to the jail and do it—that I will go up. I went up to the prison in Pennsylvania and I came to Angleton after going through a series of locks to get to his location, and he told me that what he wanted to tell the Chairman was that he thought the Agency was in disarray and here's how he would reorganize the organization. [laughter]

Well, I was flabbergasted. I said, "Tell me again why you passed this information on to the Soviets?" And he gave the same old story: "I was sleepwalking." I said, "What does that really mean, sleepwalking?" And he just went into a diatribe here that made no sense at all. At that point, I ended the conversation and departed here and went back to the Chairman and said, "Mr. Chairman, I saved you a couple of hours of work."

[laughter]

BARRY ROYDEN:

What you described did happen, that he went to Paris and said, "Dave Murphy is a KGB agent," and David Murphy—who had previously been in charge of Soviet operations and later was chief of station, Paris, and this came from Golitsyn. And apparently there was some speculation later that Golitsyn accused Murphy of being a spy because Murphy wouldn't allow Golitsyn access to any of his files, while Angleton had allowed Golitsyn access to files that Angleton controlled.

A comment about Aldrich Ames and the fact that CIA was penetrated—is that a failure of counter-

intelligence? It is really not humanly possible to prevent a given individual from taking into his mind and decide to sell secrets for money. That is not a failure of counterintelligence. It's going to happen. It can't be prevented. Good counterintelligence means running good operations and weeding out agents who aren't being truthful. And it means penetrating the services like the KGB because the way you find out about their spies in your service is through penetrations.

RONALD KESSLER:

Of course, in the case of Ames, he was a total drunk. People would not deal with him. He would literally fall off chairs drinking, so it would not have required any great counterintelligence genius to figure out that this guy should have been fired way, way back.

BARRY ROYDEN:

And I would say to that, that A: there were many people with drinking problems back in the day, and none of them—or most of them—weren't spies. Yes, Aldrich Ames should have been dealt with as a personnel issue. He had a drinking problem, which was not addressed properly. But again that would not necessarily translate in any way, shape, or form as to say he's a spy. We have a lot of people with drinking problems who aren't spies.

MERLE PRIBBENOW:

Yes, my name is Merle Pribbenow, I'm retired CIA. I wanted to ask a question, since we have proponents of both the Colby and the Angleton side here, about how serious was Angleton about his suspicions of Colby that were surfaced—that he certainly pro-

mulgated after he retired in, for instance, the book *The Spike* in which he provided the information to Arnaud De Borchgrave which put the Colby character into that book. So, can anybody there address how serious Angleton was with regards to his suspicions of Colby?

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

The question is how serious was Angleton about his suspicions about Colby. Mr. Bagley would you like to comment on that?

TENNENT BAGLEY:

Yes, I never heard him say anything of the sort. I never had the slightest idea that he had such ideas about Bill Colby. And knowing that, despite all that's been said today, Jim Angleton had an enormous well of common sense. He would not have believed for a moment that Bill Colby was someone else's agent.

RONALD KESSLER:

But he did believe that Schlesinger was an agent, so, according to—

TENNENT BAGLEY:

Nobody believed that, I'm sorry, I heard that—I did catch that, and if he said it, I was never aware of it, and I certainly was never aware of it at the time I knew Jim.

RONALD KESSLER:

This was in a book written by Bob Gates.

TENNENT BAGLEY:

I remain skeptical, I don't believe that Jim might have said it, but I don't believe he meant it seriously.

TENNENT BAGLEY:

That's simply my own personal reaction, that's all.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Great. Thank you. Mr. Epstein?

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

Well, I don't think that Angleton ever suspected Schlesinger. In fact, he convinced Schlesinger when he went into his office to see him that this idea of a deception was possible. On the question of Colby, it wasn't Angleton, it was—I don't know, it was his chief of operations, Scotty Miler, who, in analyzing some reports from Vietnam, asked why Colby had not [filed a report after]—he had met with a known Russian agent, which is, by the way, his job. I mean that was his job to meet—that's what CIA people do, is they meet with diplomats on the other side. Nothing wrong with that. But he hadn't filed a report, which is sort of a piece of bureaucracy, which is used to check that when a CIA officer under diplomatic cover meets a Russian officer under diplomatic cover, there's a report. And they couldn't find a report. I don't think anyone ever took that that seriously, but, I mean, it was told to me by Scotty Miler.

CARL COLBY:

Yeah, I've heard that. That's kind of a—the usual canard. It certainly wasn't comparable to—to Angleton

dining, you know, having lunches—two-and-a-half-hour lunches with Philby repeatedly and never coming back and debriefing. It just—it seems odd and I would say I'd like to hear what Mr. Royden says because—

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

Philby was a liaison with Angleton. You didn't have to file a report.

BARRY ROYDEN:

No, quite the opposite.

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

He wasn't an enemy agent.

CARL COLBY:

That's ridiculous.

BARRY ROYDEN:

No, quite the contrary. You should come back and file some sort of a memo for the record on your conversations with a liaison.

MERLE PRIBBENOW:

I would like to make a point because I actually presented a paper that dealt with this particular case down at Texas Tech University a few years ago. The individual in question was not a Russian diplomat or anything. He was a French doctor who was under investigation as a GRU agent.

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

That's right. I had it wrong, you're correct.

MERLE PRIBBENOW:

In which case, Colby, at that time working for the Phoenix Program, would not have had access to that very sensitive information that this guy was GRU. Therefore, there would have been no requirement for him to file a report, which is the reason I'm asking the question about why there was such great suspicion. Someone provided that information, about Angleton's suspicions of Colby; it's been in several of the books and, again, the initial one was the Arnaud De Borchgrave novel, which featured very prominently a Colby character who was secretly working for the KGB.

RONALD KESSLER:

Well, obviously, Angleton suspected almost everyone except for Philby. [laughter] Philby later said that—and these, by the way, are very hard drinking lunches that Angleton and Philby would have had—Philby later said that he did learn valuable intelligence from Angleton. He was not specific—you know, there was no indication that there was a specific compromise, but you can imagine what it would mean for someone from the other side to spend all this time drinking with Angleton. He had to pick up something as a result.

JOHN PRADOS:

John Prados. I actually have some information on this same subject. The French doctor was sort of like a then-year version of Doctors without Borders. Used to go to Saigon, like, six months of the year. When Colby was station chief, they met at the *Cirque Sportif*, and they became friendly. The families became friendly, as I understand. The doctor was never known

Angleton tended to portray KGB operations in such sweeping dramatic terms, that some thought he was exaggerating, or even imagining.

to be a Soviet source. He was recruited, apparently, by GRU much later and he was discovered by French security. And it was at that point that Scotty Miler might have had a question about whether Colby had filed reports as required with Soviet contacts. But what is puzzling about this whole situation—I mean Colby, as I understand it, sat for interviews with CIA counterintelligence on the fact that he had not filed these reports. Anyway, what is puzzling about the episode is the degree of the investigation based on the very thin circumstance that the doctor in Saigon in 1960-61 was already a French agent, which was never established by anyone.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you for that comment and that additional information.

DAVID ROBARGE:

I'm David Robarge, the Chief Historian of the CIA. One subject that hasn't come up at all this morning yet is Angleton's control of the Israeli account as a counterintelligence asset. This was obviously an administrative anomaly at the Agency, but from Angleton's

standpoint it was crucial for information about Soviet actions and counterintelligence leads. I'd be interested in comments from the panel about that aspect of Angleton's importance.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you.

RONALD KESSLER:

That was very important. Angleton was able, because of that, to obtain a speech that Khrushchev gave, which was very critical. I forgot what—I think it had to do with China. What was it?

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

The secret speech.

RONALD KESSLER:

The secret speech. The Israelis had obtained this, and, because of Angleton's liaison with the Israelis, he was able to provide that. And, as far as I know, that's the only useful thing that he ever did for the CIA. [laughter]

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Mr. Bagley? Anything on the Israeli account? Are you still with us? Mr. Bagley?

TENNENT BAGLEY:

Oh, I'm sorry, I had no direct connection with that and anything I would say would be second-hand or third-hand, and I'm sorry, I simply don't know this about Jim Angleton.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you.

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

Again, Jim was the liaison with all the intelligence services before he became the chief of counterintelligence staff. Israel was one of them. At the Mossad, he had a very close relation with a Teddy Kollek, who then became the mayor of Jerusalem. And when he gave up his liaison position, they didn't know quite what to do with the—who they assigned the Israeli liaison to. It should have been assigned to the Middle East Division but they felt that the—Israelis felt that the Middle East Division had a large share of Arabists in it, so Angleton retained it.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you, anybody else like could comment on this? Okay. Any other questions?

CLAY FARRINGTON:

My name's Clay Farrington, a graduate student at George Mason in history. And this has to do directly with Nosenko—this may be a little bit down in the weeds, but I'll go ahead and ask. From what I understand, and from Pete Bagley's book, Yuri Nosenko left behind two daughters, possibly a wife or an ex-wife in the Soviet Union. Now, over time, has anyone looked into how his family—the family that, from what I understand, he was never reunited with, if he was really telling the truth and really did have a family in the Soviet Union—was that family treated more or less the same as other defectors who came over at around the same

time? And if that's been looked into, is this indicative of whether or not he was, you know, the real thing? I know former DCI Colby cleared him by letter in 1978, but, you know, needless to say, the questions persist.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

The question about the Nosenko family. Mr. Bagley would you like to—

TENNENT BAGLEY:

Yes, yes, I would say that anything that was done, any connections or any—I mean any checks on the family of Nosenko in the Soviet Union was done after my time. And we had no means for doing it while I was still there. And I never heard, and no one ever told me, about any results that might have come from that. In other words, how his family was treated, whether the family was as he described it, or basically any checks on that are unknown to me.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. Mr. Kessler?

RONALD KESSLER:

As I mentioned, we've had dozens of KGB defectors. People who actually were making the decisions, who would have been involved in the question of Nosenko's bona fides, and all of them have said that Nosenko was genuine. Golitsyn made up stories to enhance his own importance. And one more abuse that Angleton presided over is that he ordered the imprisonment of Nosenko. Today—and, you know, people are going to shake their heads and say—

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

That isn't true Ron. He didn't order it.

RONALD KESSLER:

Well, let me just—I looked into it and I think I've quoted on the record individuals who were in charge at the time—

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

Bagley was set off—

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

I'll give you a chance to respond.

RONALD KESSLER:

Well, there were other people who were in charge of being handlers for Nosenko, for example, and they said that Angleton did order that. But beyond that, you know, today, whoever ordered the imprisonment of a defector would be sent to jail and there'd be million dollar settlements. But this is something that happened under Angleton's watch and it was another outrageous abuse.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Dr. Epstein?

EDWARD EPSTEIN:

Well, it was Dave Murphy and Pete Bagley at the Soviet Bloc Division that actually ordered him to be incarcerated. He was here on a—he had come through immigration on a CIA bill, or something, which allowed this—but maybe they should—maybe it would

be illegal today. Angleton actually was not—it was not his style and he was not in favor of—

[break in Audio]

BARRY ROYDEN:

—or disadvantaged. If he had left a relative behind who was serving in the KGB, he'd probably be fired from the KGB, but I don't know and I don't know if Burton knows about whether the family was treated any differently than anyone else.

CARL COLBY:

I have a question. I have a question for the other panelist, John Prados. Could you shed some light on Angleton's relationship to the Gladio, or was there a

relationship to the Gladio group in Italy in the late '40s and the '48 election?

JOHN PRADOS:

[inaudible]

CARL COLBY:

You're not.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Any other questions? Well, then, I'd like to adjourn this session but not without thanking the speakers for a terrific spectrum of views on Angleton. I think we're off to a good start. We'll take just a five-minute break and then we'll reassemble here for the keynote by Professor Andrew. Thank you so much.

LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

Intelligence and Conspiracy Theory: The Case of James Angleton in Long-Term Perspective

Christopher Andrew (*University of Cambridge*)

11:30 A.M. – 1:00 P.M.

BRUCE HOFFMAN:

Christopher Andrew is professor of modern and contemporary history and also chairman of the history faculty. I think it's very safe to say that Chris has been a mentor and an inspiration to literally generations of students, scholars, and practitioners spanning academe, the policy, and the intelligence worlds as well. Chris didn't invent the study of the history of intelligence. I think it was his own supervisor and mentor, Harry Hinsley, who arguably did, but I don't think there's anyone who has done more to advance the study of the history of intelligence than Chris has. Certainly at home, my bookshelves are literally bowing under the weight of—we talked about monster plots earlier—monster tomes that Chris has written. *On Her Majesty's Service* was the first history of MI5, published over of a quarter of a century ago. *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*; *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*; *For the President's Eyes Only*

about the CIA and American intelligence; and his latest book, *Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* are only some of Chris's scholarly contributions to the field. But I think the mark of a true scholar and a great historian is not only the books that he has written, but also the students that he has supervised and taught and the scholars that he has mentored and inspired. And here really, in this respect, Chris has no equal. His contributions to the study of intelligence are legion. I think what's often unfortunately less well known is that his contributions to the study of terrorism are equally profound. For all these things we're profoundly in his debt, not least for his having agreed to provide the keynote speech here today. Chris, thank you very much.

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW:

Thank you very much, Bruce and Christian, not mainly for inviting me over, but for having the imagination

to put this day together. This is a wonderful day—it's a unique day, and my qualifications for speaking are not nearly as good as some of those this morning.

Unlike some of those who spoke this morning, I never met James Angleton. But I did have one memorable phone conversation with him during a visit to Washington just over thirty years ago. I was presenting a BBC documentary and wanted to broadcast an interview with him. Well, nobody had ever broadcast an interview with him, but I didn't see why I shouldn't be the first. It didn't work. I wasn't making much progress, so I put the BBC producer on the phone—who happened to have first class honors, *summa cum laude* in English Literature from Oxford University. The producer didn't get anywhere either, but he found himself being questioned by Angleton about twentieth-century English poetry for over half an hour. "My God," the producer said to me afterward, "that was a better viva than I ever had at Oxford."

For quarter of a century, as was made clear earlier this morning, Angleton had an even more extraordinary personal engagement with British intelligence than English poetry. Uniquely, it had never happened to anybody in world history before. That's a large claim, but I don't think I have any difficulty justifying it. That engagement began when Angleton was posted in the beginning of 1944 to X-2 (OSS counter-intelligence) in London, at the heart of an unprecedentedly close British-American intelligence alliance. At the age of only 26, though a foreign citizen, Angleton was indoctrinated into two of the biggest secrets in British history: Ultra, the high-grade intelligence derived from breaking enemy cyphers, and the Double

Cross System, the most successful deception in the history of warfare. Ultra was so highly classified that this twenty-six-year-old was indoctrinated into something which was known to only six of Churchill's ministers. And Double Cross was so highly classified that even Churchill had not been told about it until 1943 for fear that he might interfere, which he almost certainly would have done. So, one's only got to imagine that in a first intelligence posting abroad.

Angleton, whatever went wrong and whatever went right later on, was plainly a highly intelligent intelligence officer. So it certainly occurred to him that something was happening to him that had never happened before in the history of the world. X-2 privately expressed amazement at its access to Ultra and Double Cross:

For even an ally to be admitted to the innermost arcana, of perhaps the world's most experienced and efficient and therefore most carefully safeguarded security systems, was beyond precedent or expectation. Yet the British did it. The implications of this fact are staggering.

Years later, Angleton discovered that the British secrets were not quite as successfully safeguarded as he'd supposed.

Among the young high-fliers in British intelligence who he got to know in London in 1944, his closest friend became Kim Philby, the most successful penetration agent in Soviet history. While, as we mentioned this morning, Philby is as high as head of station in Washington from 1949 to 1951, he and the unsuspecting Angleton spoke on the phone most days



**PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER ANDREW
DELIVERING THE KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

and had long alcoholic lunches at least once a week. Angleton and Philby probably had the strongest liver in the history of world intelligence, unless anybody can think of any other name.

Philby's deception of both the British and the U.S. intelligence communities is still publically celebrated by today's SVR. I don't feel too sorry for them, but they've not had a good few years. And the idea that they should be attempting to counter the Anna Chapman and the other ghost stories by going back to Philby just suggests that they're not doing all that well, but how would I know? To mark the ninetieth anniversary in December 2010 of the founding of the Cheka's foreign intelligence department in 1920, of which the SVR still sees itself as the successor, the current head of the SVR, Mikhail Fradkov, unveiled on television a new memorial to Philby in the presence of Philby's widow, Rufina, at SVR headquarters. And there are more celebrations this year to mark the centenary of Philby's birth.

I have tried to inject a mildly subversive note into the celebrations by giving an interview on Russian television, revealing that Philby's passion for deception eventually extended to the KGB, as well as SIS and the CIA. He mainly deceived our side, but he was quite keen on deceiving the other side, as well. And that, of course, is not mentioned in the SVR, which is probably why the official Russian TV channel has pulled its program on Philby. The one that you can see in English has not.

Of the surprisingly large amount of material on Philby from former KGB files exfiltrated to the West since the end of the Soviet Union, one of the most remarkable is the recording of the only speech he ever

gave at KGB—a recording now safely lodged in Keith Melton's intelligence archive in Florida, where I've just spent two fascinating days. It has, by the way, a box of Angleton memorabilia dating from the last months of his life, which I shall come to in a moment.

In this speech from 1977, the main advice Philby gave the KGB was—and he keeps emphasizing it: “Insist that your foreign agents, even if they're caught red-handed, must never, never confess anything.” And, of course, what Philby attempted to conceal from his audience, was that, before his defection from Beirut to Moscow in January 1963, he had done just that. He hadn't confessed everything, but he had confessed a remarkable amount. When his friend and former SIS colleague, Nicholas Elliott, was sent to Beirut to offer him immunity from prosecution in return for a confession, Philby admitted spying for the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1946, but said that he then broke off contact with Soviet intelligence, except for sending a warning to his friend, who actually wasn't his friend, Donald Maclean, in 1951. Elliott recorded the key part of Philby's partial confession; I'm pretty sure Philby knows it's being done. If, as seems quite possible, Philby did briefly consider the offer of immunity, he changes his mind a few years later and, as everybody in this room knows, flees to Russia aboard a Soviet freighter.

The shock to Angleton and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community caused by Philby's defection in January 1963 was even worse than I think any American author, possibly out of respect for British feelings, has mentioned. It was exacerbated by the barely believable incompetence of the British response.

After Philby's incomplete confession, the heads of SIS and MI6, Sir Dick White and Sir Roger Hollis, were quick to assure J. Edgar Hoover that they were entirely confident that Philby had told the truth. Well, why Philby would tell the truth I can't imagine. Anyway, this is what they said to J. Edgar Hoover, quote:

"It accords with all the available evidence in our possession, and we have no evidence pointing to a continuation of his activities on behalf of Russian intelligence after 1946. If this is so, it follows that damage to United States interest will have been confined to the period of the Second World War."

A week later, White and Hollis had to confess they were wrong, thus undermining the credibility of *everything* else they had to say on Soviet penetration of Britain.

Though much, of varying reliability, has been written about Philby's career as a Soviet agent, the extent and the variety of his extraordinary talent for deception is only gradually becoming clear. For all his personal charm—and uncharming deceivers do not do nearly as well as charming deceivers—there was also an increasing strain of brutality. One of the things that most surprised me, looking at relevant files in MI5 archives, was the evidence from the psychiatrist of Philby's emotionally fragile second wife, Aileen, by whom he had five children. The psychiatrist told MI5 that he [Philby] had "done his best to make her commit suicide," and he probably did shorten her life. There are the intercepted telephone calls of Philby, who was be-

ing monitored at that point, and what they show is that side of Philby's character which he always sought to keep concealed. He had a brutal streak which is beyond that of any other SIS officer whose career I know. Angleton must have spent months, perhaps years, going over in his mind the many possible occasions when Philby might have deceived him.

Philby's defection didn't, however, affect Angleton's close relations with SIS and MI5. So, just time for one example of how extraordinary that relationship was, which I found in MI5 files as its official historian. The place is London; it's early in the morning of March 14, 1966. Angleton and Anatoly Golitsyn, of whom we've already heard a good deal, and who I shall mention later, have just arrived without warning in London probably on the overnight flight from Washington. Angleton rings his friend, Maurice Oldfield, recently SIS representative in Washington and later, of course, 'C' chief of SIS. Angleton tells Oldfield they're in London for only twenty-four hours and the visit is so secret the CIA London station must not know they are there.

Angleton then asks for an urgent meeting with the Chief of SIS, Sir Dick White—the only Chief of SIS to be formerly Director General of MI5—and also a meeting with the Director General of MI5, Sir Martin Furnival Jones, and some of their senior officers. And what is striking is that White and Jones immediately clear their diaries, immediately cancel all their other appointments, and this is at nine o'clock in the morning. And so far as the Director General of MI5 is concerned, that includes cancelling an appointment with the permanent undersecretary at the home office who was, in fact, his boss. When the meeting

begins, they agree to Angleton's proposals, which, they understand, have the support of the DCI, to set up a new and highly secret transatlantic intelligence forum, later known as CAZAB, to consider evidence of Soviet penetration and disinformation. But they distance themselves from Angleton's and Golitsyn's conspiracy theories—the latest of which was that the Sino-Soviet split, mentioned this morning, instead of revealing a major conflict between the world's two communist paths, was an elaborate exercise in disinformation to deceive the West. According to an MI5 account of the meeting, “The DG, head of MI5, and C, head of SIS, indicated very tactfully that while they accepted the facts of penetration and disinformation, they did not consider that it was therefore necessary to subscribe to the Sino-Soviet deception theory.” Furnival Jones and his head of counterespionage, A.M. Macdonald, agreed afterwards that, “the whole performance was somewhat extraordinary, but then Jim and Anatoliy are quite extraordinary chaps.”

Now, just a comment on this morning: though I may not have understood everything correctly, it was sort of said, “Jim Angleton actually believed that the Sino-Soviet split was a deception, but he was otherwise entirely sane.” Well, that cannot be the case. If one of our students or colleagues comes up to us and says, “Oh, by the way, the world is flat,” you stop believing the other things they say, because by the time you believe anything as preposterous as that, you know that however intelligent the individual—and there's no question as to how intelligent Angleton was—however worthwhile he is as a friend, he's lost his judgment. So, any attempt to suggest that Angleton had the judg-

ment required even of a junior intelligence officer by the time he fell from this particular conspiracy theory is a proposition that, if anybody in this room believes it, I hope they will put a reasoned argument for it. And I don't speak from any position of personal hostility.

Well, Anatoliy and Jim were extraordinary people, so MI5 and SIS thought, and so they were. But blaming Golitsyn and Angleton for the damaging conspiracy theories of the 1960s is a bit like blaming Gavrilo Princip for the First World War. Though the Sarajevo assassination began the countdown to 1914, there were far deeper underlying causes, and those causes have been exhaustively researched. By contrast, research on the underlying causes, half a century later, of belief in a huge KGB conspiracy—and the word “monster plot” is perfectly justified—to deceive the West and of the broader problems posed by conspiracy theorists to the operations of the CIA is still at an early stage.

So, let me now turn to the underlying causes. The most basic problem was that, as Sherman Kent, the founding father of U.S. intelligence analysis—somebody as bright as Angleton, but who kept his judgment—observed in 1955, intelligence was still an immature discipline, the profession with the least understanding of all professions of its own past experience, and the only profession which lacked a serious literature:

From my point of view, this is a matter of greatest importance (the lack of a literature). As long as the discipline lacks a literature, its methods, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine and even its fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity.

Practicing economists and politicians amongst others are rightly critical of the remoteness of some academic research from the real world in which they operate. But economics without economic theory and economic history, politics without political history and political science, would be what Kent forecast intelligence would remain without an intelligence literature—immature disciplines. But those people who went at the world of intelligence in the 1950s did not know, and could not have known, the peacetime record of intelligence. Of course, they knew something of what had happened in the Second World War. So, if politics and economics amongst other professions had been in the same position, they would have been as intelligence was, and, as Sherman Kent quite rightly said, an immature discipline. So the literature available on peacetime intelligence on both sides of the Atlantic—when Golitsyn and Angleton began to hatch their conspiracy theories—would not have been adequate for an intelligence 101 course in any American or any non-American university. Despite some pioneering independent research by Henry Howe Ransom and David Wise on this side of the Atlantic, a majority of the early histories of the CIA published in Europe were either sponsored or written by Service A, the disinformation department of the KGB's First Chief Foreign Directorate—a conclusion reached by the CIA at the time, and confirmed by recent detailed current research in Britain.

Golitsyn's defection to the United States coincided with the publication in Britain of an imaginatively hostile biography of Allen Dulles, secretly written by Service A of the KGB, but published under the name

of the left-wing labor MP, Bob Edwards. What CIA didn't know at the time, but Oleg Gordievsky and as MI5 investigation later revealed was that Edwards was a long-serving KGB agent who was awarded the Soviet Order of the People's Friendship for his services. The decoration was brought to Brussels by his case officer so that he could enjoy looking at it, but it was then taken back to Moscow for safe keeping. Golitsyn had no intelligence which pointed to Edwards or, as far as I am aware, to the rest of Service A operations, to discredit the CIA by fabricating its own past record. As in this instance, conspiracy theories are sometimes so absorbed by their own grand, nonexistent conspiracy theories that they miss smaller, authentic conspiracies.

At the time when Golitsyn and Angleton are elaborating their conspiracy theories of a gigantic KGB deception—"monster plot," as I've said, seems to be perfectly fair—there were even fewer reliable publications on the KGB than on the CIA. There was not, to my knowledge, a single outline of the KGB worth that name. Even within the U.S. and UK intelligence communities, I'm not aware and certainly have not found in MI5 archives anything that yet rivaled the first reliable history of the Cheka, published twenty years later by a former British intelligence officer, George Leggett. When British and American intelligence set out to interpret the evidence of Soviet penetration and deception in the 1960s, they were hampered by an inadequate grasp of its long-term context.

Now, the case that was mentioned this morning is the case that I will concentrate on now. The classic example of that inadequate grasp was Operation TRUST, based, as was mentioned this morning, on

a fictitious OGPU controlled monarchist underground, which in the mid-1920s deceived the British and other Western intelligence services and lured the so-called SIS master spy, Sidney Reilly, to capture and execution in Moscow. Forty years later, the example of the TRUST was used by conspiracy theorists to show the ability of the KGB to mount a huge deception involving bogus KGB agents to deceive Western intelligence. In reality, it did nothing of the kind and I don't believe that any student writing about the TRUST, at Georgetown for example, amongst other universities, would claim as much nowadays. The CIA General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, to whom I talked, later recalled: "Jim's staff...would go over and over old cases like the TRUST and the *Rote Kapelle*. They spent weeks and months on it, and Angleton actively encouraged this work."

When I had the opportunity a quarter of a century ago to discuss the TRUST Operation with a key member of Angleton's staff, a decent man who I shall not name, it seemed to me that they'd got it wrong because their understanding of the history of Soviet intelligence was, to use a polite word, primitive. An accurate history of TRUST would have shown, in my view, that Cold War comparisons were inevitably going to be misleading. Though TRUST was, at the time, a well-run operation, circumstances in the 1920s were extraordinarily different, and Western intelligence enormously weaker than during the Cold War. In 1923, SIS had only fifteen officers at its London headquarters and thirty-three stations (most consisting of one man and a secretary) thinly spread around the world. MI5's officer numbers declined during the

1920s to a low point of only thirteen (not counting secretarial support). At the height of the TRUST deception, the combined officer staff of both MI5 and SIS thus fell well short of three figures at a time when the OGPU's total staff was already well into six figures.

There were also one and a half million disoriented Russian émigrés wandering through Europe at this time. I mean, even I, who am no good at operational matters, could have found some people to pretend to be monarchists. Let's not forget about the so-called British master spy, Sidney Riley. And actually, only yesterday, thanks to Keith Melton, I found some new material on Angleton's views about Sidney Reilly, which I will come to. Sidney Reilly, to put it kindly, was well past his "use by" date, and had become an intelligence maverick. His SIS file, recently quoted for the first time in the official history of the first forty years of SIS, noted euphemistically, "We do not altogether know what to make of him," which is what British bureaucrats say when they think somebody is bonkers. SIS kept in touch with Reilly only in order to try and be in touch with what the poor devil was up to. From the moment the TRUST Operation began, SIS policy was, "to give Riley no more information than is absolutely necessary." According to one of his secretaries, Eleanor Toye, "Reilly used to suffer from severe mental crises amounting to delusion. Once he thought he was Jesus Christ." Well, again, my own view is that by the time people start thinking they're Jesus Christ, they should not be used for intelligence operations.

In part, at least, the monster KGB conspiracy theories of the 1960s were thus fueled by historical ignorance. I don't want to go in to this too much, but, you

know, I'm a historian, therefore I have to make a living by persuading non-historians that history matters. Wouldn't it have been nice in 2008 if those bankers who started reading books with exciting titles like *The Great Crash* had actually read them before 2008? So, I believe that the great intellectual failure of this generation, and the only way I can get through to those of my friends who are social scientists, is to invent an acronym. Social scientists won't listen to you unless you invent an acronym. So here's my acronym: HASDD, historical attention span deficit disorder.

The chief MI5 conspiracy theorist, Peter Wright, claimed that the TRUST deception had fundamentally changed British policy to the Soviet Union in the 1920s. As a result of this deception, he claimed, the British government had cancelled plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union: "The TRUST persuaded the British not to attack the Soviet government because it would be done by internal forces," in other words, by an uprising organized by the nonexistent monarchist underground. Now, had Wright published that ludicrously inaccurate version of events, it would, of course, have been ridiculed by every existing historian of British-Soviet relations who was still taking their medication.

Wright's fellow conspiracy theorists must have assumed, however, this extraordinary claim about the ability of the TRUST to change British government policy as well as to deceive British intelligence derived from top secret files to which he had access. Though there's no documentary proof known to me, Angleton was probably one of those who made that assumption. The future Director General of MI5, Stella Rimmington, claimed that Wright and

Angleton, "fueled each other's paranoia." Now, I absolutely accept what was said this morning, that this is not a medically correct use of the term. But the fact is that we do sometimes use medical analogies. The behavior pattern was one that incited, however medically inappropriate, the use of the word "paranoia."

For the rest of his life, Angleton continued to speculate at intervals about the role of Sidney Reilly. Probably one of the last books which he read before his death in 1987 was a book on Reilly by Robin Bruce Lockhart, son of the far more famous Sir Robin Bruce Lockhart—a contemporary of Reilly's, but you all know that story—that argued Reilly's supposed execution never was; it was simply an OGPU deception and that Reilly became the mastermind behind the recruitment of the Cambridge Five. Angleton's copy of the book is one of a number of fascinating items from the last months of Angleton's life in the Keith Melton collection. I deliberately came to Washington via Miami so I could have a look at Keith's collection, which is simply the most extraordinary private intelligence archive in the world, and one without which it would be difficult to imagine the CIA exhibit or the Spy Museum would have been able to put together such interesting exhibits.

So, one of the things that Keith has had for some time which we began to look at yesterday was simply extraordinary. It's a box full of things which were around Angleton at the moment when he went into hospital for the last time. It's got a collection of his favorite lures that he'd made, nothing surprising about that. It's got a tape recorder with one of those little cassettes that were used in business. And this had not

been played since 1987. You can't imagine the sheer thrill of putting batteries in the machine for the first time and listening to the middle of an interview that Angleton was listening to. It was in Russian, so somebody must have been translating for him, probably Golitsyn. Then there were a series of slides with one of his big, electrically powered magnifying glasses. These consist of diplomatic passports for the Soviet bloc. So, all these thoughts are running through his mind in ways that nobody will ever be able to reconstruct in the last months of his life. The only book in this collection of the last Angleton things is this extraordinary and also preposterous latest conspiracy theory about Sidney Reilly.

As well as relying on historical myth, the monster plot conspiracy theories, which emerge in the early 1960s, also make assumptions about a truly astonishing level of operational efficiency by the KGB during the early Cold War. That is quite impossible to square with what we now know about its actual performance, which was far inferior to the Oleg Kalugin era, and which was unreasonable to assume even at the time. The myths that circulated, and still circulate, about Kim Philby's career as a Soviet agent provide a classic example of these false assumptions.

Philby's recruiter in 1934, and his first case officer, Dr. Arnold Deutsch, had unequaled academic credentials in the history of Soviet intelligence; I've seen his transcript. He went from admission as a first-year undergraduate at Vienna University, to Ph.D. with distinction in five years. Beat that! I think it's illegal in any American university to do that. So, he's undoubtedly one of the most talented in the history of Soviet

intelligence, and the chief collaborator of the leading sexologist of the time, Wilhelm Reich. Look inside the works of Wilhelm Reich in the earlier 1930s and what it says is publisher's name is given as "Munster-Verlag, [Dr. Arnold Deutsch]." I doubt that the SVR and Washington are up to that nowadays.

Another of Philby's early officers, Theodore Maly, was also an inspirational figure. But it never occurred, at the time, to either British or U.S. intelligence—who foolishly believed that Soviet intelligence was twenty or perhaps twenty-five foot tall—that much of what Philby achieved thereafter was despite, not because of, the way he was run by the KGB and its predecessors. The purge of a majority of Russian intelligence officers during the Terror meant that by 1939 there was only one officer left at the London residency, who had to ask Moscow for basic information about Philby, admitting that, "He is known to us only in the most general terms." The Center, however, had grown so suspicious of Philby that it issued instructions in February 1940 for all contact with him to be terminated. Philby's subsequent career as a Soviet agent was due only to his persistence in trying to renew contact with Soviet intelligence, which had lost interest in him.

He finally succeeds when he gains entry to SIS late in 1940. Though Philby quickly becomes one of Moscow's most productive agents, it is not long before suspicions of him revive. As was briefly mentioned this morning, for almost two years in the middle of the Second World War, the Center amazingly believed that Philby and most, if not all, of the Cambridge Five, were an elaborate anti-Soviet deception operation run by British intelligence. SVR admits the mistake, but

someone has to take the blame and, quite typically, one of the few female analysts, poor Elena Modrzhinskaya, fits the bill. However one of the things they've not admitted, but the Mitrokhin Archive has evidence of, is that after it was concluded that the best spies they'd ever had were actually working for the British and not for them, Moscow sent a special, eight-man surveillance team to the London residency, which is ordered to trail Philby and the rest of the Cambridge Five in the hope of discovering their contacts with their non-existent British controllers.

Well, British and U.S. intelligence had some low moments in the Second World War, but probably not one so low as that. Though most, but not all, senior KGB officers in the early Cold War accepted that Philby was genuine, the Center's handling of him when he was head of the SIS station here in Washington, from 1949 to 1951, may be politely described as woeful. That is the very minimum I will accept, but I will be happy to accept more acerbic assessments. The chaotic state of the Washington residency—and remember, this is twenty years before Oleg Kalugin—led to the recall of two successive residents in 1948, 1949, and Philby refused to have any contact with any Soviet intelligence officer operating out of a legal residency. Over most of his first year in Washington, Philby's sole contact with the Center was his friend, Guy Burgess, who was still in London—inconvenient.

In the summer of 1950, Burgess was posted to the Washington embassy, lodged with Philby, and henceforth acted as courier to a Soviet illegal stationed in New York, codenamed HARRY, who had been made Philby's case officer. But just when Philby needed

KGB assistance most, after the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951, HARRY, who was spending far too much time as a musicologist at NYU with a ballerina, lets him down, and fails to deliver a message and \$2,000 from the Center. HARRY is sacked after an inquiry finds him guilty of, "lack of discipline," and, "violation of the Center's orders." Nine-thousand dollars of Center funds—a lot of money in those days—allocated to Harry's illegal residency, were also discovered to be missing.

The conspiracy theorists who believed in a gigantic KGB deception in the early 1960s, involving, for the first time, a string of bogus defectors, which the KGB never had at any point in its history, assumed an extraordinary level of operational efficiency, which, as the Philby and other cases show, the KGB at the time simply did not possess. Though the gross errors in the handling of Philby only came to light much later, there was no shortage at the time of other KGB operational errors which were known to both London and Washington—and actually also known to Golitsyn.

Bungled KGB attempts to assassinate Soviet dissidents abroad in the 1950s and the early 1960s provide embarrassing public evidence of the KGB's operational limitations. Three professional KGB assassins, Nikolai Khokhlov, Wolfgang Wildprett (a German), and Bohdan Stashynsky, actually gave detailed, public testimony, including memoirs, in the case of Khokhlov, about their assignments. Following Khokhlov's revelations, the KGB made a bungled attempt to assassinate him, as well. Golitsyn defected, it's worth remembering, only a few months after Stashynsky in 1961, and he reported that at least

When somebody as bright, as distinguished, and so capable of friendship as Jim Angleton makes these sort of appalling errors that he does, then we are faced with one of the greatest personal tragedies in the modern history of U.S., and for that matter UK, intelligence.

seventeen KGB officers had been sacked or demoted as a result of Stashynsky's defection. Golitsyn never seemed to grasp the contradiction between the bungling he reported in the Stashynsky and other cases, and his claim that the KGB was the most sophisticated and efficient intelligence agency in world history, and therefore able to execute flawlessly such huge deceptions as the nonexistent, bogus Sino-Soviet rift.

It's deeply ironic that at the very time when Golitsyn was beginning to spread conspiracy theories of Soviet intelligence operations in the early 1960s, the KGB and GRU view of the United States was itself distorted by conspiracy theories. Well, just two examples from the Soviet archives that are in print and, to the best of my knowledge, whose authenticity is not challenged. On the twenty-ninth of June, 1960, Aleksandr Shelepin, the KGB Chairman, personally delivered to Khrushchev a horrifyingly alarmist assessment of American policy, which concludes, "In the CIA it is known that the leadership of the Pentagon is convinced of the need to initiate war with the Soviet Union as soon as possible." Khrushchev took the warning so seriously that, less than a fortnight later, he issued a public warning to the Pentagon, "not to forget that, as shown in our latest tests, we have rockets,

which can land in a preset square target thirteen-thousand kilometers away." Nonsense of course, but he probably believed it.

In March 1962, the GRU claimed that the United States had actually taken the decision to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union in September 1961, but had been deterred at the last moment by Soviet nuclear tests, which indicated the Soviet Union had a greater second strike capability than the Pentagon had previously supposed. It is so deeply ironic that monster conspiracy theories were being produced by a Soviet defector at the same time they're being produced by the KGB and GRU leadership within the Soviet Union.

A recurrent theme in Soviet intelligence analysis, of which Western analysts were inadequately aware, was a paranoid tendency when it felt threatened by the West. The KGB repeatedly did that when it felt threatened by the West. So far as I'm aware, it didn't occur to either British or U.S. intelligence analysts during the early 1960s that Khrushchev was being warned by the KGB and GRU of non-existent plans by the United States for a nuclear first strike. Nor did Western analysts discover, twenty years later, that Soviet intelligence was also warning of the danger of the U.S. first strike during operation RYAN, during Reagan's first term, until

Oleg Gordievsky gave SIS some of the RYAN directives, which he and I have since published.

Had British and U.S. intelligence analysts been aware of the paranoid tendencies in Soviet intelligence assessments in the early 1960s, they would have been able to interpret Golitsyn's monster deception theory correctly as one indication of the recurrent flaws in Soviet intelligence analysis, rather than giving a serious insight into KGB operations.

Thanks largely to Oleg Penkovsky, U.S. and UK intelligence about the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis was considerably better than KGB political intelligence about the United States. At the height of the crisis, Aleksandr Sakharovsky, head of KGB foreign intelligence, wrote dismissively on several cables from the Washington resident, Alexander Feklisov, "This report does not contain any secret information." By contrast, every one of the intelligence reports on the Cuban Missile Crisis supplied to EXCOMM carried the code word, IRONBARK, meaning they used materials supplied by Penkovsky.

Angleton initially emphasized the importance and the authenticity of Penkovsky's intelligence, urging that President Kennedy be directly informed. While Penkovsky was alive and sending intelligence, Angleton never changed that view. But for Golitsyn's theory of a huge Soviet deception to be true, Penkovsky, the best peacetime agent in the history of the United States, had to be a fraud, despite the immense amount of work devoted to checking his amazingly varied intelligence by both CIA and SIS, which found no evidence of fraud. Joe Bulik—National Security Archive, thank you for making that available—who had served in Moscow

and was on one of the joint CIA-SIS team who debriefed Penkovsky in London, later recalled that at his last meeting with Angleton, "he told me that every case I ever worked on over the seven years in the Soviet Union was controlled by the KGB. This shocked me, to the point that I couldn't open my mouth; I didn't say a word; I just walked out." Now, however clever, however decent an individual Jim Angleton was, by the time that you've convinced yourself that Penkovsky is a fraud, about the same time you believe the Sino-Soviet rift doesn't exist, you have ceased to have the minimal qualities which are required to be a productive intelligence officer. I think it's as simple as that.

The allegedly bogus defectors, of course, also included Yuri Nosenko, with whom I did have the privilege of spending a day. It was tragically ironic that while attempts were being made within the CIA to persuade Nosenko—at probably the lowest point in the mid-Cold War for the CIA—to admit that he was a fraud, the KGB is simultaneously putting him near the top of a list of "particularly dangerous traitors who should be assassinated."

The rest of my talk would take about thirty-five hours to complete, so, you will be relieved to know, I'm going to stop at this point. In the end, I think the judgment on Jim Angleton is that he's an extraordinary tragedy. When an idiot makes mistakes, particularly when an unpleasant idiot makes mistakes—well that's the sort of thing that unpleasant idiots do, isn't it? But when somebody as bright, as distinguished, and so capable of friendship as Jim Angleton makes these sort of appalling errors that he does, then we are faced with one of the greatest personal tragedies in

the modern history of U.S., and for that matter UK, intelligence. Thank you.

BRUCE HOFFMAN:

Thank you very much, Chris. We have about a quarter of an hour, at least, for questions. Could I ask you to keep your questions brief so we can accommodate more people? Please also identify yourself—first name and surname, and also any institutional affiliation. Mark Salinski.

MARK SALINSKI:

Thank you, Mark Salinski from the Army. Professor, you mentioned medical terminology. As I understand it, a psychopath is somebody that doesn't have a conscience and is completely narcissistic. Would you feel comfortable referring to Philby as a psychopath?

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW:

No, and I never use that word. We are stuck with the fact that non-medical terminology is inadequate to describe some of the things human beings do. To describe him as paranoid is plainly medically incorrect. Why is it medically incorrect? Because the true paranoid becomes dysfunctional, but I think that since our vocabulary is inadequate, it is reasonable to describe people who behave with extreme suspiciousness and who lose any sense of proportion when analyzing the probability of conspiracies as showing paranoid tendencies. If anybody can suggest a more appropriate use of the English language, I would be happy to plagiarize.

BARRY ROYDEN:

Chris, he was saying psychopathic personality on the part of Philby, that was the question.

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW:

I'm confident that I didn't use the phrase 'psychopathic.' Philby had an extraordinary personality change over twenty or thirty years, and for very obvious reason. Doing bad things and having good people killed, even for the best intentions, actually changes your personality—and ought to change your personality. It's a punishment for doing bad things. We've got a pretty good idea of what Philby's personality was like when he became a Soviet agent in 1934 because his first, brilliant case officer, Dr. Arnold Deutsch, was a psychologist and wrote reports on Philby. And there's not the slightest doubt about his ideological commitment. He also suggested that Philby was repressed by his father, who was truly a controlling father, and that this may have had something to do with his speech impediment. But, of course, from an operational point of view, a speech impediment is absolutely wonderful. From the moment that you talk to somebody and you use a speech impediment, you become unthreatening; you're not a controlling individual. So here is one of the British traitors' most controlling personalities—as he subsequently becomes—with extraordinary personal charm and a speech impediment. What happens afterwards? Well, you've only got to look in his memoirs.

This modest individual becomes extraordinarily pleased with himself. The first fabrication in *My Silent War*, his memoirs, is actually in the introduction, when he says, "I have been a Soviet intelligence officer

for thirty years.” Well, he never was a Soviet intelligence officer, and when he died he was ‘Agent Tom.’ Brits have been many things, but they have never been Soviet intelligence officers; they have just been agents. But the status was really important to him. He was not prepared to be a foot soldier. If you look at what he says about the betrayal of Ukrainian freedom fighters, he describes how he passed the coordinates—which he claims to have gotten from the CIA—he makes a kind of joke of it. He says, “Of course, I don’t know exactly what happened to them when they landed, but I’ve got a pretty good idea.” Well, making jokes about people who are tortured and then killed is in very bad taste. Anybody who makes jokes like that does not have the kind of personality with whom we would wish our sons and daughters to enter into any kind of relationship.

STEVE WINTER:

Steve Winter, local researcher. I don’t know enough about the specific cases here to address them, but a lot of people at the time, back in the ‘50s, and you still hear it today, say, “Oh, there was so much paranoia about communist infiltration of the government, the loss of China, this that, this that,” and, basically, that’s become part of the liberal viewpoint for decades since. But then, when the Venona transcripts were finally released, at least from a conservative side, a lot of people said, “Well look, here we have hundreds of names, there *was* this infiltration,” and so on. How do you address a case like that, where what was considered paranoia forty years ago is not considered paranoid today, on the basis of NSA transcripts released?

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW:

What actually happened was an extraordinary Soviet penetration, and it had nothing to do with Angleton’s and Golitsyn’s views. If you ask a Brit what they feel about Kim Philby, they’ll tell you, but you can’t tell their political persuasion from their answer. I always felt in the 1980s and early 1990s, that from the moment I knew what an American thought about the Rosenbergs, or Alger Hiss, I knew the way they voted. In other words, the whole thing became ludicrously and unnecessarily politicized. All that was at stake was the interpretation of historical evidence. Why did this happen? Well, one of the reasons is the result of the best agent influence the KGB never had—Joseph McCarthy. A generation of Americans felt bound to choose between two propositions. One, there was a huge Soviet intelligence offensive against the United States. Or two, that Joseph McCarthy was a drunken, self-serving swine. What they failed to see is that both propositions were absolutely correct. Dr. Haynes is here, and it seems to me that the title of one of his recent books, *In Denial*, puts it very well. Those of you who’ve been around British country houses, which I guess about ninety percent, know that around the walls you’re going to see people who were executed—sometimes drawn and quartered before they were executed—and, you know, those country houses that don’t have a traitor on the walls sort of somehow feel a bit inferior to the others. Treason and treachery is part of the British way of life. But the United States had a president who couldn’t tell a lie, even about a cherry tree, and has really not been able to come to terms with the fact that your production of traitors is just as

good as ours. I like to view the politicization of all this as overly serious historical scholarship.

THORNE SMITH:

Professor Andrew, I'm Thorne Smith, a columnist and attorney, [in] Richmond, Virginia. My question: have you been able to determine in your historical research what the opinion and assessment of CIA Director Allen Dulles, and those CIA Directors who followed him, [was] of Jim Angleton's monster plot and perception in judgment?

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW:

There's just not time to go through all the DCIs, so I'll stick with the only one you named, Allen Dulles. The Brits were actually very fond of Allen Dulles, and Allen Dulles got on pretty well with the Brits. The problem until 1951—and both the Brits and the Americans were probably wrong about this—was that the Brits were raring to go in Iran; they wanted to get Mossadegh out. The problem was that Truman was never going to agree to this. So the joy when Eisenhower took over was absolutely unconfined. And of course, by this time, Churchill was peacetime Prime Minister once again. Well, Kermit Roosevelt gave an account that, even though it can't be fully corroborated, I think expressed the joint thinking of British intelligence chiefs with Allen Dulles at that particular time. Churchill had just had a heart attack, but heart attacks and things like that didn't stop Churchill—it would never appear in the papers. So Kermit Roosevelt described how he went into Number Ten: Churchill was propped up with a lot of

pillows on the bed, which was, after all, from where he ran most of the war. People don't realize that a third of Churchill's leadership during the Second World War was done from bed—the highest proportion, it seems to me, in the leadership of any war in world history, but, once again, I'm perfectly happy to accept an alternative nomination. So, Kermit Roosevelt told the story of how he led this combined operation to get the Shah back and Mossadegh out while in his pajamas, and Churchill said to him, "Young man, had I been but a few years younger, I would have liked nothing else but to take part under your leadership in this great adventure."

Well, I think that's it. It's at the beginning of the 1950s, before covert action began to go wrong. It was a great adventure and it killed a lot fewer people than war. So, the British mindset at the beginning of the Eisenhower era was, I think, astonishingly similar to the American mindset. And then, of course, both Britain and the United States lose their minds. Britain over Suez—the point where you really need your friends is when you're doing something spectacularly stupid and, you know, I think the qualifier "spectacularly," there's not anybody in this room that's likely to suggest that's inappropriate when applied to the level of stupidity employed by the British with the French and the Israelis in 1956. And thank goodness the Americans were able to ease us out. But we don't have nearly as much leverage on the United States as you have on us, which is why we are not able to save you from your Suez, which was the Bay of Pigs.

DAVID AARON:

David Aaron, Rand Corporation. I want to ask a question about Angleton and Israel. During the Church Committee time, there was a presumption or at least a conclusion—never printed, I don't think—that Angleton was instrumental in transferring fissionable material from the United States to Israel for its nuclear weapons. I have a two-part question: A, have you run across any further commentary on that? And B, why was it that Angleton was given the Israel account, unlike any other country that we were targeting?

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW:

Well, the answer to the first question is that I would be absolutely astonished if it were true. I am from time to time astonished [to discover] the things I didn't think were true are, in fact, true, but I would be towards the top end of astonishment if there was any truth in that. As to why he was given the Israeli account, he was the ideal liaison officer. He got on better with the Brits

than probably any liaison officer ever, and there'd been quite a number. He also managed to get the Israeli account at a fairly early stage. Plainly, this is a personal appointment. I hope to be corrected by David Robarge and others if I've got it wrong, but there's not a meeting of senior management that says, "Now, let's see how we need to structure the relationship with Israel. Well, we'll set up this committee and then another committee and several more committees." No, what they actually do is say, "Yeah, Jim's the person, so let's hand it over to him." Those blessed days when you could do things without going into bureaucratic overkill. I would like to think that one of the advantages of being as secretive as British intelligence is we only have a tiny fraction of the number of committees that encumber the performance of U.S. intelligence, but there we are.

BRUCE HOFFMAN:

Let me thank you, Chris. It would be hard to imagine a more incisive or lively luncheon keynote address. And once again, our debt to you grows exponentially.

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LOCH JOHNSON

LOCH JOHNSON

PANEL II: ANGLETON AND HIS TIMES

Loch Johnson (*University of Georgia*)

Oleg Kalugin (*CI Centre*)

David Martin (*Author, Journalist*)

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Welcome back, what a terrific keynote we all were treated to. Thanks again, Chris. And now I have the pleasure of chairing the second panel on “Angleton and His Times,” with Loch Johnson, Oleg Kalugin, and David Martin. Randall Woods from the University of Arkansas unfortunately cannot be with us this afternoon. We have a little bit more time for the presentations and for the discussion. Let me introduce the speakers briefly and turn it over to them.

Loch Johnson is Regents Professor at the School of Public International Affairs at the University of Georgia. From 1975 to 1976, he served as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and was Staff Director of House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. In 2005, he was invited to Yale University as a visiting scholar. During his time at the University of Georgia, he won the Owens Award, its highest honor for research, as well as the Josiah Meigs Prize, which is the University’s highest teaching honor. He has authored a number of books, including *The Handbook of*

Intelligence Studies; *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*; *The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America’s Search for Security after the Cold War*; and *National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies*. He’s also the editor of the well-known journal, *Intelligence and National Security*. It’s a great pleasure to have you with us and to give you the floor.

LOCH JOHNSON:

Thank you, Christian, very much. Let me add my compliments to the organizers. This is such a wonderful event to have a conference on Angleton. I never thought I would see one. But it really has been fun and so well organized, so thank you. When you follow Chris Andrew, you can’t help but feel a little bit like the Bulgarian tumbling act that followed the Beatles on the Ed Sullivan Show. I intend to focus my remarks on my relationship with Jim Angleton from 1975 to 1976, the years I served as an assistant to Senator Frank Church as he led an inquiry into allegations of illegal CIA domestic spying.

The setting in Washington at the time included a resurgent Congress, which had resolved to halt the erosion of its powers at the hands of the imperial presidency. In the lead up to the spy scandal, congressional oversight of America's intelligence agencies was minimal. Allen Dulles once told a journalist that the only person he would tell about America's intelligence operations was the President—if he asked. The Congress was certainly not in his equation. Even when a later DCI, Jim Schlesinger, went up to the Hill quite conscientiously and attempted to inform overseers about CI operations, a senior senator, John Stennis of Mississippi, said to him, “No, no, my boy, don't tell me. I don't want to know.” After Watergate and Vietnam, however, lawmakers took steps toward restoring the reputation of Congress as a co-equal branch of government. In the middle of this institutional uprising came the stunning charges of CIA spying at home.

The Chief Counsel of the Church Committee asked me to examine the CIA's approach to counterintelligence and to prepare a hearing in which Angleton would be the star witness. In preparation for this daunting assignment, the lamb sets out to interrogate the lion. I did all the research I could on the mysterious head of the CI staff, a unit which Bill Colby once referred to as the most secret of all Agency crannies. I soon had the impression that if ever there were a renaissance man, Angleton would fit the bill. On a darker side, though, I also learned that he had been deeply involved in the Huston Plan and the illegal mail opening operations.

Angleton and I met downtown at the Army-Navy Club, a favorite haunt of his at the time, starting in July

of 1975, for the first of many extended interviews. After we ordered lunch, I halfway expected him to pull out of his vest pocket a packet of tarot cards. But, instead, he began the conversation by informing me about the central mission of counterintelligence, which was, he said, “To construct a wilderness of mirrors in which the opponent would be confused and forever lost”—exactly what he thought the Soviets were achieving against the West. Angleton's responses to my question lacked all semblance of linear narrative. I have an appreciation for Colby's verdict in his memoir that the CI chief's explanations were, “impossible to follow.” Or, as Mark Twain might have put it, “Listening to Angleton for a half hour could make one dizzy. Listening to him for a full hour can make one drunk.”

Following each lunch, we shifted from the dining room to the library of the Army-Navy club. There Angleton smoked Merit cigarettes and continued his tutorial while, with his permission, I wrote down virtually every word he said during these sessions. Here are some of the things he said: “Frank Church has never understood counterintelligence. His innocence about the world exceeds that of an unborn child. Doesn't he realize the Soviets seek to destroy American intelligence? What will it take to wake him up? Church's objective is transparent: to fashion a statutory straightjacket for the Agency.” Then, at great length, Angleton began to unfold his counterintelligence theories. He said, for example, “Each day the KGB tries to infiltrate the Western intelligence services, and they have had great success. And what has been at the center of the Kremlin's strategy against the West? Deception operations designed to destabilize and weaken members of NATO.”

After one of our lunches and another lengthy treatise on counterintelligence, he slouched back into his chair in the library and stared at me in silence for a full minute. Then he said, “How many senior officials at the CIA are part of the Soviets’ efforts.” I stared back at him for a while. He stood up abruptly, put on his black trench coat, black scarf, and black Homburg—Angleton was gothic before gothic—and marched out of the room. A couple weeks prior to the Church Committee’s public hearing with Angleton, my assignment was to question him under oath for the record. After more than two hours, I wound down the session with a final query. I said, “Was the CIA bound by all of the government’s overt orders, or might the Agency be given a separate and contrary set of covert directives?” I expected him to say something to the effect that this sometimes happens, although only with the clear approval of the White House and intelligence managers. Instead, as he was putting his papers together, he replied, and I’m quoting, “It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government.”

Years later, when Yale historian Robin Winks looked back at this episode, he suggested that Angleton was saying that there might well be overt orders from the government which would be countermanded by covert ones. This was my interpretation at the time, as well. However, much to Angleton’s anguish, that would not be the interpretation of a few senators when our hearings were held.

The curtain rose on the CIA counterintelligence hearings on the morning of September 24, 1975. Angleton—and we’ve all seen the photograph—

looked dazed and acutely uncomfortable in front of all the bright lights and television cameras. Frank Church gavelled the meeting to order and began a cross-examination on the subject of illegal CIA mail opening. One of the Chairman’s conclusions when he reminded Angleton that President Nixon had thought he had closed down the mail opening program, only to find out, all of this much later, that it had continued on—Church concluded, “the Commander in Chief is not the Commander in Chief at all. He is just a problem. You do not want to inform him in the first place, because he might say no. That is the truth of it. And when he did say no you disregarded it and *then* you call him the Commander in Chief.” Angleton attempted a rebuttal, and I’m quoting him: “From the counterintelligence point of view, we believe that it was extremely important to know everything possible regarding possible contacts of American citizens with Communist countries.”

At the Army-Navy Club, a few days before, he had said to me that the CIA had opened the mail of only a fraction of letter writers in the United States: some 215,000 instances, which, he had quickly added, represented 0.001 percent of the American population. And he went on to say, “This included people who were involved in criminal fraternization with the enemy.”

But in the public hearing, he lamented that the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union was insufficiently appreciated. He shot back at Church: “When I look at the map today and the weakness of power of this country, that is what shocks me.” Another member of the committee, Robert Morgan of North Carolina, turned that argument on its head

by noting that what shocked him was the violation of individual rights represented by the mail opening program. Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota further observed that the Huston Plan revealed, and I'm quoting, "An enormous, unrestricted paranoid fear about the American people." Angleton's retort: "it was not, in my view, paranoia."

Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania zeroed in on my final question to Angleton in the pre-hearing staff deposition. At this point, the former CI chief went into full retreat. Angleton said, "it should not have been said...I would say I had been rather imprudent in making those remarks...I withdraw that statement." That was the extent of his defense, and it came across as unsatisfactory and even lame.

Angleton was a remarkable individual in many ways. And during his tenure as head of the CI staff, no Soviet mole had penetrated the CIA. Yet, here he was, an object of ridicule in a nationally televised hearing. It was well-deserved, too, his critics would no doubt reply, pointing to his many counterintelligence excesses that had led to tragic outcomes for individuals improperly accused of disloyalty. These mistakes and the mail opening program obviously warranted sharp criticism. Yet, lost in this critique against him were the many good things Angleton had done to emphasize counterintelligence. Lost, too, is the importance to U.S. intelligence of his contacts throughout Europe and in Israel. And, sometimes, his relations with the FBI were quite effective at the liaison level, even though Hoover and Helms may not have been speaking to one another. Lost, too, was his warm personality, his great personal charm, and his impressive erudition.

A few days before the hearing, Angleton had complained to me, "The country is going to hell. There is no interest in national security these days, and your committee"—as if it were my committee—"is a manifestation of this." I could remember all of the hours I had spent with him and with Tom Charles Huston and Richard Helms and a number of other people. These were not evil men by any stretch of the imagination. But they did have a more pronounced fear of "the enemy" than most people. For Huston, the enemy was the scraggly-dressed anti-war protestors. For Angleton, it was the KGB as a zero-sum adversary around the world. During the Cold War, this idea of "the enemy," the sinister force, was used to deny freedom in the United States. It was not the first time we had heard such arguments, nor would it be the last.

A few weeks after his ordeal on Capitol Hill, Angleton berated the Church Committee publicly for being "a type of McCarthyite hearing in which the denigration of the intelligence community was its goal." I presumed that that would be the end of our little chats down at the Army-Navy Club. But, to my surprise, a couple of weeks later, he telephoned me and invited me back. I guess he figured at least if he couldn't strangle Church, maybe he could strangle me. After lunch, Angleton compared the Church Committee investigation to the pillaging of intelligence services in countries that had been overrun and occupied by a foreign power, and I'm quoting him, "only *we* have been occupied by Congress with our files rifled, our officials humiliated, and our agents exposed." When the Committee published its final report in May of 1976, Angleton responded with a formal written critique. He deplored "the now shaky



OLEG KALUGIN



and harassed CIA and the straightjacket Senator Church and the Committee's staff have brazenly tailored for it," unquote. Although he conceded that the intelligence agencies "did engage in some illegal and ill-advised operations," he went on to underscore that "these were by no means altogether reprehensible when weighed in light of the national security considerations prevailing at the time." A month later, he told a newspaper reporter that the damage wrought by the Church Committee was "very far-reaching," and that Senator Church had been "dishonest and demagogic."

Early in the investigation, Frank Church had said on a Sunday talk show that "the CIA had been behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage." But in this interview, Angleton said, "History will show Church was the rogue elephant."

I soon moved to Georgia and never saw Jim Angleton again, although he'd telephone me periodically over the next several years, usually to fulminate about the state of security in America. One afternoon in 1987, he called me with a longer than usual diatribe against Frank Church, who had died three years before of pancreatic cancer. He rambled on for a half hour then suddenly ended the conversation with the remark, "It ain't over till the fat lady sings." That wasn't exactly what I was expecting from this erudite scholar, but that's what he said. I suppose what he meant with his uncharacteristically trite phrase was that, eventually, the merits of his struggle against Soviet intelligence operations would be acknowledged. A few weeks later, on May 12, Jim Angleton died of lung cancer. He was buried in Morris Hill Cemetery in Boise, Idaho, just a little ways away from Senator Frank Church. Thank you.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you very much, Professor Johnson, and now we turn to Oleg Kalugin. Mr. Kalugin is a retired KGB major general. He attended Leningrad State University and was recruited by the KGB for foreign intelligence work, serving in the First Chief Directorate. Undercover as a journalist, he attended Columbia University as a Fulbright Scholar in 1958 and then worked as a Radio Moscow correspondent at the United Nations in New York, conducting espionage and influence operations. From 1965 to 1970, he served as deputy resident and acting chief of the residency at the Soviet embassy in Washington.

Kalugin, the youngest general in the history of the KGB, served as the head of worldwide foreign counterintelligence. He retired in 1990 and became a public critic of the communist system and the KGB. That year, he ran successfully for the parliament of the USSR and from that post continued his attacks on the KGB's abuses. In 1995, he accepted a teaching position at Catholic University of America and currently resides here in the Washington area. It's a great pleasure to welcome him to our conference. Oleg, you have the floor.

OLEG KALUGIN:

Thank you for the introduction. I'm really thrilled to attend this conference and talk about the old days. Indeed, it doesn't happen very often. But let me tell you why Angleton's sort of personality fascinated me. I was just a counterpart on the opposite side. He ran foreign counterintelligence; so did I. Before I was transferred to the domestic service, and to my native city [of] St. Petersburg, I was fully in charge of foreign operations

across the world from Australia to Argentina and, of course, the United States was at that time enemy number one. No more. That's target number one these days.

So, the experience as a foreign counterintelligence chief really taught me so many things. Let me tell you, I was a totally ideologically motivated young man. When I joined the KGB, Joseph Stalin was still alive and I was inspired by his greatness. My father had worked briefly in the KGB as a security guard for local party leadership. When he learned about my desire to become a KGB officer, he told me, "Don't join that organization, it's dirty work." I said, "Come on, you have been working for them for decades." "Yeah, that's why I tell you it's dirty work." Well, kids will seldom listen to their parents' advice.

I joined the KGB and indeed spent six years studying all sorts of languages: English, German, Arabic, everything related to the Western world and the Arab, Muslim world. When I graduated, I came to Columbia University School of Journalism and I was featured in *The New York Times* and in the news because I was the first Soviet ever elected to the Student Council of Columbia University. That made headlines at the time. I spent up here, in the United States, ten productive years recruiting and running a number of sources with access to classified information. Finally, the time came in 1970, after New York and Washington, when I was summoned back to Moscow and became deputy and, just a few months later, chief of foreign counterintelligence. It was similar work to that of James Angleton.

Like James Angleton, I supervised some seven hundred officers and technical personnel, the total number of my organization. And we had more than five

hundred foreign sources. Two-thirds of them were members of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and police organizations from Australia to the United States, you name it.

My encounter with the subsequent leadership in the Soviet intelligence was perhaps one of the reasons why I agreed to participate in this program. The man who reminded me so much of Angleton was Vladimir Kryuchkov, the chief of Russian intelligence, a party hack who spent some time with Yuri Andropov, the future Chairman of the KGB, in Hungary. Andropov invited Kryuchkov to Moscow and, within months, simply appointed him chief of intelligence. He knew nothing about intelligence at all, but does it matter? In some countries it does not—in Russia, for instance. And he would try to introduce his own style of running the show. And he bumped into some professionals, like myself, who would raise doubts about his decisions. That irritated him, obviously, and at some point he came to the conclusion that my disobedience was perhaps motivated not so much by my personality, but by some ugly forces from way behind when I went to Columbia University. Another officer who went to Columbia was my friend Alexander Yakovlev. He would later become a Politburo member and a senior official in the Soviet system. That's when a great idea of conspiracy dawned on Kryuchkov: these two guys, Yakovlev and myself, were recruited by the CIA in 1959, and from that moment on they would move up and up, grab power, and install a pro-American system.

That was, in essence, Kryuchkov's philosophy after he had convinced himself of this conspiracy. Andropov was reluctant, but before I left for St. Petersburg, my

native city, Andropov told me, “Don’t worry, it will take just a year or two, I pledge you will be back.” But other guys believed that I was indeed an American spy. I was in St. Petersburg for seven years, instead of a year and a half. Andropov by that time passed away, so Kryuchkov ran the show. And I took note that I’m followed, that I’m bugged. I lived in a luxury apartment, and I would see the guys from the surveillance standing at the corner in the morning. If I would cross the bridge over the Neva River, I would see some guys following me—after all, I had some experience with the FBI and other organizations. One time I stopped, turned around, and said, “What are you doing, why are you following me?” They said, “Now, come on, we have orders, you understand.” I said, “Oh, alright, okay.”

Perhaps there was also an attempt to link me to the United States in one way or another. I met a young lady, she worked for the KGB. She would bring me some papers to sign, and I thought she was very pretty. At some point, she said, “Listen, why don’t we meet outside the office?” I was married, but my wife was in Moscow at the time, so I thought there was nothing wrong. So we did meet, and then she said, “Oh, by the way, I’m just about to have a new job at Pan American Airlines. Would you be interested in a connection with Pan American Airlines?” I said, “Through you? I will hug you, I will kiss you, but what do you mean?” “Well, maybe you’d be interested in Pan American in some different way?” I said, “Well, not really. Not at this time.” They were trying to push me into some sort of trap.

And then, in 1959, I recruited my first source, an American of Russian background. He worked for

Thiokol Chemical Corporation, which manufactured and researched a solid fuel for missiles. When I met him, he was practically a volunteer. I made a few moves, just friendly stuff. And next time, he brought all the papers and samples of solid fuel and asked, “Will I work for you?” I scratched my head and said, “Alright, I’ll check with my bosses.” But the bosses said, “He is an American plant.” But other guys in Moscow said later, “It’s unlikely that the Americans would share with us that kind of stuff.” That was very sensitive material during the space race. Well, he became one of my first sources, and he was very good operationally. But he was a leftist, a peacenik of sorts, and the FBI or the police in New York got interested in him. Afraid that he might be investigated as a source for Soviet intelligence, he fled to Europe using Air France—which did not have to report its passenger list to the local US authorities at the time—to Paris and came to the Russian embassy. He identified himself, was flown to Moscow, given a great welcome, a great job, and started a new life in Russia. His wife—a Chinese Ph.D. in history, born in China, the daughter of the Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences—joined him in Moscow. Everything was good, all settled, and I’m traveling again.

But this is when Kryuchkov took over, and his idea was, “Ah, this is all a trick, this guy from the United States with the solid fuel. That is probably a fake.” So they started investigating him, just to prove that he was an American spy. It was obsession, just like James Angleton obsessed. Well, they found no proof, but they still put him in jail for violation of currency regulations. At that time, changing dollars for rubles was a

crime of sorts. So they put him in jail, and I was summoned by Andropov, KGB Chairman, and he said, “Listen, you know this guy, why don’t you meet him in jail and just tell him, let him admit that he was in fact an American spy.” All these money violations were a pretext, you understand. Can you imagine, twenty years later, I meet this man in a cell, solitary confinement, and he comes in, and I’m saying, “Oh, hello my friend!” I embrace, hug him, and say, “Listen, you must tell the truth. You cheated us all. You were FBI, you planted false information.” When he heard that—I will never forget this—he yelled at me, “You are idiots, KGB and all! I hate you all, I’d better kill myself!” And then he broke down, and I hugged him, embraced him, went to Andropov, and said, “No, this man is innocent.” And that’s when Andropov said, “Well, you better learn something about Russian life.”

That’s how I went to Leningrad, and that’s where I had all this surveillance and all this stuff trying to prove that I was an agent of a foreign power. As you know, that whole story failed, but Kryuchkov never gave up. As you know, when the Soviet system was on the eve of collapse under mounting pressures of public opinion, Kryuchkov tried to stage a coup against the Gorbachev’s power. Of course, Yeltsin at that time emerged as a serious political figure, and Kryuchkov failed because—with the exception of a dozen or so top Russian military party leaders—no one followed him. The coup was a total failure because he overestimated the clout, influence, and power of the KGB. The Soviet system was getting to its final exit, and this is where Kryuchkov miscalculated and got in jail. In fact, after spending two years in jail, he finally wrote

Distrustful mentalities eroded intelligence and could really have led the world to the brink of danger.

a letter from jail begging pardon and saying that was the greatest stupidity. He was eventually pardoned and died in peace in Moscow several years later. These comparisons are important because, unfortunately, in the history of all nations, we bump into people who may be viewed as mad, crazy individuals.

I will just give my own thoughts about the current story of President Assad in Syria today. From times immemorial, at least from my old days when I studied Arabic, the Syrian regime was a friend of Soviet intelligence. It’s no wonder Russia’s so adamant to not let the regime fall down. They tried everything. They got the United Nations involved in Libya, in Egypt, and there things fell apart; a different regime came to power. But not in Syria. For the Russians, Syria is one of the final pieces of something pro-Soviet—where they feel, at least, secure—because the Russians are so insecure today after the collapse of the USSR. With all these Baltic States, Ukraine, Asia becoming independent, it’s Russia proper which is now in trouble. Don’t forget, in Russia we have thousands and thousands of Muslims. The war with the Chechens has been going on for quite some time. We also have the Balkars. And, perhaps more important, we have the Tatars inside Russia living only a few hundred miles east of Moscow in Republic of Tatarstan. We do

not know if they really accept the faith of their ancestors. Russia may simply disintegrate.

This is something which you have to understand, and to understand why today Mr. Putin, my former subordinate, by the way, is so nervous about all these crowds of people shouting, all these demonstrations and public protests. Russia is on the move, that's very important to understand. And the younger generation of Russians, those who do not want to emigrate, don't want to look for jobs somewhere in Australia or in the United States—which, by the way, is now tough on allowing Russians due to new immigration laws. But the younger generation has also been losing interest, and it's very important to keep them inside the country because the future of the country, essentially, lies with them, not with some mad men or jerks like Kryuchkov. I do not mean to talk about James Angleton in the same way. But, in both cases, their distrustful mentalities eroded intelligence and could really have led the world to the brink of danger.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you so much, Oleg. We now have the great privilege of having one of this country's leading national security journalists with us rounding out this panel. David Martin is the CBS News national security correspondent, having covered the Pentagon and the State Department since 1993. During that time, he has reported on virtually every major defense, intelligence, and international affairs story for CBS Evening News, as well as for other broadcasts, including "60 Minutes" and "48 Hours." During the invasion of Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, his in-depth

knowledge of how the State Department, the intelligence community, and the military operate, both on the battlefield and Washington, positioned him as the "big picture" reporter for CBS News. Utilizing his own sources and reports from CBS News correspondents in the region, around the world, as well as in Washington, he explained and assessed the military strategies and operations for viewers. He has received several Emmy Awards for his work as well as the Alfred duPont-Columbia University Award. In 2004, he also received the Joan Barone Award for excellence in Washington-based national affairs and public policy reporting. He's the author of *Wilderness of Mirrors*, an account of the secret wars between the CIA and the KGB, and *Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism*. It's a great pleasure to have you with us. You have the floor.

DAVID MARTIN:

Thank you. As a reporter for the AP, I covered that hearing that Loch was describing, and afterwards I asked Angleton, "Why were you so spaced out?" And he said he had overmedicated that morning. I think he was afraid of having to go to the bathroom and not being able to excuse himself, and so he took something to handle that, and it discombobulated him.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Another inside scoop from David Martin, everyone.

DAVID MARTIN:

I first heard the name "James Angleton" on the night of December 21, 1974. I was working the night desk for

the AP, a job which entailed getting the first editions of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* and chasing any stories that were in there that the AP didn't have. And the edition for December 22 was the one in which Seymour Hersh published his exposé of domestic spying by the CIA, and that was where I saw Angleton's name for the first time. I was sure he would have an unlisted number, but there he was in the phonebook on North 33rd Street in Arlington. I can't remember if it was myself or someone else who made the first call, but I do know that I spent more than an hour talking to him that night. I didn't get anything out of him about domestic spying, but that was the first of many phone calls and subsequent visits to his home, and yes, lunches at the Army-Navy Club. Angleton turned out to be my ticket to the big time, or at least my ticket off the night desk at AP.

Following leads he gave me, I started breaking stories for the AP that got me assigned full-time to covering all the subsequent investigations launched as a result of that first *New York Times* story. That would include, of course, the Church Committee—and just for the record, Loch Johnson was a lousy source.

Like everyone else, I was mesmerized by Angleton. My father had been an analyst for the Agency, but this was my first exposure to the dark side, and Angleton exceeded all my fantasies of a burnt-out spook. He smoked and drank too much; he seemed to speak with a perpetual slur. He had these two hobbies of fly fishing and orchid growing, which just seemed like perfect metaphors for the spy business. And he always intimated that he, and only he, knew the real story behind whatever topic was under discussion, and he sure as hell wasn't going to share it with me. And just because some of the things he

did tell me—like the Sino-Soviet split being a hoax—didn't make sense, that only meant that my mind just couldn't cut it in the world of counterintelligence.

At first, I couldn't figure out why he was devoting so much time to me, a lowly wire service reporter. Eventually it dawned on me that since he was now unemployed, having been fired by Bill Colby, he was spending his time running me and about a dozen other reporters as unwitting agents of his influence. By the time it occurred to me that he just might be using me, I had already parlayed my relationship with him into a contract to write a book about another of the CIA's great cold warriors, a man named Bill Harvey, whose name I first heard from Angleton. So I was, you might say, a monster created by Angleton—which, of course, is more than a little ironic, given how the book turned out. I can remember very clearly going to the home of a man named George Kisevalter, who is perhaps the CIA's most famous case officer, and Kisevalter too was a burnt-out case. He was drinking vodka tonic at 11:00 in the morning. Unprompted, he lit into Angleton as a man who had no qualms about ruining the careers of loyal CIA officers on the flimsiest of evidence that they might be a Soviet mole. I tried to track down some of Angleton's victims, but at that point I didn't have any luck. But then I came across a man named Clare Edward Petty, a longtime CIA officer who was retired and living in Annapolis.

And just a brief aside about Ed. He died last year, and I learned from reading his obituary that, as a young soldier in World War II, he had gone ashore at Normandy. The last time I talked to him was several years ago, and he was weeping because his grandson, an army officer,

had been killed in Iraq. And both he and his grandson are now buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Ed was not a burn-out case. He loved his wife, he went sailing on the Chesapeake Bay, and he had no detectable grudges. The only addiction I could spot was needlepoint, which is, of course, another perfect metaphor for that line of work. And it was Ed who led me into the wilderness of mirrors. Ed had served as a member of Angleton's counterintelligence staff, and during his last years at the Agency took a crack at finding the mole. And for those of you who don't know how this story ends, Ed eventually concluded that Angleton himself was the mole, and that he had initiated the great mole hunt as a means of sabotaging operations against the Soviet Union, at the same time casting suspicion on everybody but himself. So imagine being a thirty-something reporter and suddenly being handed the story which out-le Carréd le Carré. I thought I had found the key to the last twenty years of history. Ed had an encyclopedic recall. He would make notes of the subjects he wanted to cover in each of our meetings, and then he would just methodically go through them, and we would break after three hours, and I would come back again on another day. He guided me through the wilderness, giving me chapter and verse on spy case after spy case. And it was actually better than having access to the files, because every time I got lost, he could simply stop, slow down, and bring me up to speed again.

For whatever reason, he confided in me as no source ever has before or since. He even told me about the breaking of the KGB code, which, at the time, was one of the most closely held intelligence operations ever.

He even told me the code name, Venona, which is, of course, well-known to intelligence buffs, but at that time had never seen the light of day. It was from Ed I first learned that the Venona decrypts had led the FBI to all the big spy catches of the '50s. This was breathtaking stuff for someone of my generation. I came of age during the Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers, and Watergate, and I just assumed the government was lying about everything—of course they framed Rosenberg, and of course they framed Hiss. But here comes Ed Petty, turning that all on its head, and then topping it off by telling me Angleton was the mole.

I'm not going to try to recapitulate Ed's case against Angleton, except to say that it turned Angleton's doublethink into triplethink. I can remember the moment when I finally started to get my dim mind around what he was trying to tell me, and it was literally one of those, "Wait a minute, are you saying what I think you're saying?" And he was. But one thing I could get my mind around was that if I wrote a book saying that James Angleton was a mole, he might sue me, which would prove ruinously expensive, and the only way I could defend myself would be to give up Ed Petty, and I couldn't do that. But I could write a book about the great mole hunt, and report that at the end of it all, Ed Petty had come up with his case against Angleton. You didn't have to believe that Angleton was the mole to believe that his hunt for the mole had been more damaging than any real mole could have been. In other words, the emperor of counterintelligence had no clothes. I wrote that more than thirty years ago. In the intervening years, we've had real moles discovered in both the CIA and the FBI. None of them go back

far enough to have been the ones that Angleton was looking for. And the damage they did was measured in operations blown and lives lost. Angleton's damage was not measured in lives lost, but in careers ruined and operations stymied. The officers who fell under suspicion had been screwed, but they were still alive. Yuri Nosenko had been screwed—1,277 days in solitary confinement while the Agency sweated him. But screwed isn't dead, so Angleton was not as damaging as any mole could have been. But he did, with his suspicions, tie the CIA in knots for a full decade.

What drove Angleton? The pop psychology answer is that, having been duped by his good friend Kim Philby, he was prepared to believe that anyone, no matter how charming and upstanding, could be a mole. Philby defected to the Soviet Union in 1963. 1963, of course, corresponds to the timeframe when Anatoliy Golitsyn was telling Angleton there's a mole in here somewhere. It's probably too simplistic to say that Angleton was just trying to make up for Philby or that he was simply paranoid, although either or both of those may be true. There certainly were grounds for paranoia; the Venona transcripts revealed that the Soviets had penetrated every American institution worth penetrating in the '30s and '40s. But I would argue that the spy game had fundamentally changed since then. The Venona code break brought KGB operations in the United States to a screeching halt. Every agent who was mentioned in those cables, either by real name or cryptonym, was either arrested or had to be considered blown. So the KGB had to start all over again, from scratch, only by this time, the Soviet Union had been revealed for the brutal police state it was. So the KGB no longer had the

ideological pull that brought in so many recruits back in the day. But lord knows, they were still trying to recruit spies, and if ideology didn't work, then maybe money and blackmail would.

So, was Angleton the mole? Well, now that he can no longer sue me, I'm free to say what I think, and I think we should forget the mole business. At various times, other CIA officers were brought in to examine Petty's case against Angleton, and none of them bought it. In the end, I think we should just think of it as a delicious piece of irony, of seeing Angleton hoisted by his own petard of doublethink. I thought at the time that Angleton was drawn to doublethink by the sheer intellectual attraction—the desire to be able to play the game on one more level than anybody else. But I think the fundamental problem was much more prosaic. Angleton had been allowed to remain chief of counterintelligence for way too long. He had become like J. Edgar Hoover, a power unto himself who no one dared challenge because of fear for what he might have on them. I'm a fine person to be saying that Angleton stayed too long—I've been covering the Pentagon for CBS for nearly thirty years. I'm begging you, don't tell anybody at CBS I said that.

After Angleton left the Agency, a long-time CIA officer named Cleve Cram was brought in to write a history of Angleton's twenty-year tenure as chief of counterintelligence. Cleve was working on that study at the same time I was working on my book, and although he encouraged me and seemed to agree with me about Angleton, he never told me much about his own work. It remains classified, and I only know the title of one of the chapters: "What Angleton Thought." Wouldn't I

like to read that chapter! Although, it'd probably make my head explode. Maybe someday the CIA's historical office will declassify it as it has done with the Venona cables. In an essay he wrote for the CIA's in-house publication *Studies in Intelligence*, Cleve included a footnote in which he said he had interviewed Angleton in connection with his own review of Angleton's work, but ended the interviews when it became apparent Angleton's judgment and veracity could no longer be trusted. A man whose judgment and veracity cannot be trusted is not a man you want running a major division of the CIA. Angleton had leads galore, thanks to Golitsyn, but he had no real evidence. Yet, his theories of penetration and disinformation were allowed to dominate the CIA for a full decade. At the very least, Angleton needed some adult supervision. And that would have been provided by the directors of the CIA, and in particular, Richard Helms, who was DCI from '66 to '73, and before that, Director of Operations—years when the mole hunt was in full pry and operations against the Soviet Union were stymied. Obviously, a CIA Director doesn't have time to hunt for moles. He has to trust someone else to do it, and Helms trusted Angleton, which meant he pretty much just let him have his way. At some point, it's a Director's responsibility to look at the costs and benefits, and Helms just never got around to that until way too late in the game.

What was Angleton's legacy? I think it's unfair to practice retroactive morality on James Angleton. He served at a time when almost everyone believed that the U.S. and Soviet Union were involved in a life and death struggle. Between the time Golitsyn defected

in 1961 and Nosenko defected in 1964, there was a little thing called the Cuban Missile Crisis, not to mention the assassination of a President by a man who had lived in the Soviet Union. That's the context you have to judge Angleton in. But that doesn't change the fact that he was wrong. He was wrong about the Sino-Soviet split, he was wrong to trust Golitsyn, he was wrong about Nosenko's *bona fides*. I know there are people today who still believe Angleton was right, and I'm sure they have information to bolster their case. But it's going on fifty years, and the weight of history says Angleton was wrong. I doubt there's ever going to be another Angleton, which is probably good news for intelligence services, bad news for reporters who cover them. Even if someone with his unique personality were to come along again, he could not amass that kind of secret power. He would run afoul of congressional oversight, or he would just be rotated out of his job as chief of counterintelligence. As I said in the book, Angleton was a singleton.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you very much. Alright, we have an hour, forty five minutes or so for Q&A. Who's first? Over here. Please, again, wait for the microphone. State your name and affiliation, if you like.

MARK STOUT:

Mark Stout from the International Spy Museum. My question's for David Martin. If I heard you correctly, and maybe I was reading too much into it, you said back when you'd been talking with Petty and you were writing your book, you didn't want to write in your

book that Angleton was a mole because you didn't want to lose a lawsuit. Should I read into that, that you actually seriously entertained the idea, at the time, that he really was, that perhaps you believed it? And if so, for those of us for whom the whole proposition sounds so crazy, can you just put me inside your mindset a little bit at that time?

DAVID MARTIN:

When I said I thought I had the key to the last twenty years of history, I thought that because, "Aha, Angleton was the mole, that explains everything." By then I was working at *Newsweek*, and we were going to publish this in *Newsweek*. But first we had to find out what became of Petty's report. Our bureau chief at the time, a guy named Mel Elfin, had a friendship or relationship with Richard Helms, who was then retired from having been ambassador to Iran and had an office downtown. I briefed Mel on the case, so Mel went over for one of his regularly scheduled little séances with Richard Helms and coldcocked him with this accusation. And Richard Helms wasn't Director of CIA for nothing. He had his feet up on the table—this is as Mel described it to me—just having a lazy afternoon. Mel hit him with the question, and Helms said, "I gotta take a leak."

He went out and obviously collected himself, then came back in and said there was nothing to it. Once you start looking at somebody, you always find funny stuff, and we never thought there was much to it.

Well, I wanted to try somebody else, and I don't know if this person's still alive, so I'm not going to mention his name. I flew across the country to talk to this

guy on a pretext. I walked into his office at a major corporation and coldcocked him. He started to kick me out of his office, and I said, "I came all the way out here." And he said, "That's your tough luck, buddy." But then he reconsidered, and he gave me a more considered explanation, which is that Bill Colby just didn't buy it. It was Angleton squared. It was everything he didn't like about Angleton, and so Petty's report went nowhere.

I since have found out that they brought in a guy named Richard Crutchfield, a longtime close associate of Helms, to look at the case. Then Cleve Cram wrote the CIA history on Angleton. I was deliberately neutral about it in the book for legal purposes, but over time, and particularly over this span of time, with all the people that we now can talk to from the other side, I've just dropped it as a thesis at all.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. Over here?

KAREN DAWISHA:

Karen Dawisha, the Wilson Center. I have a question for Oleg Kalugin—and I appreciate, Christian, you bringing in someone who looks at these things from the other side.

Oleg, since you brought up Kryuchkov and Putin, I wonder if I could ask about a detail that came up in Masha Gessen's new book. She writes about Yuri Drozdov, who was Major General in 1990, head of the illegals, and had been an illegal in Germany involved in the Rudolf Abel and Gary Powers spy exchange. He was also the head of the team that took out Amin in Afghanistan. Gessen alleges that Drozdov went to Berlin and met Putin in 1990 and, perhaps, that Putin

had some connection with the '91 coup. There is also a set of documents belonging to Maria Salye that was released just two days after her death in St. Petersburg. In one of the documents, there's an order, signed by Putin and approved by Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, giving the authority for a company called Kontinent to import meat into St. Petersburg paid for by the Russian government. That meat was then held in Moscow and was to be released after the August coup so that there would be food on the shelves. Did you have information about this? Is this true? Was the American side following this at all? It's very, very late to have this kind of information come up. I'm just wondering what kind of view you have about it.

OLEG KALUGIN:

Mr. Putin actually retired from the KGB in 1989 when he came back from Dresden. It was a highly unsuccessful career, so he landed in the municipal council of St. Petersburg where his former teacher, Professor Sobchak picked him up. Actually, Sobchak, who I knew pretty well, asked me if I could name someone from the local KGB office who he could rely on, just to have a link between him and the KGB. And I said, "No, I don't know anyone reliable." Well, he found Putin, who used to be his own student, and he made him an assistant on municipal affairs related to international trade. At that time, Russia was in a very bad shape in terms of food supplies. Putin, through Russian oil and some rare metals, managed to organize a deal with Finland to have food come to Russia in exchange for Russian natural resources. That made St. Petersburg a fairly well-off city, unlike people in Moscow, who were still hungry. Yeltsin

himself said, "What's going on? Why are they doing better in St. Petersburg than in Moscow?" He was told that there was a very enterprising guy who organized all that, so he said, "Let him come to Moscow and help us." So Putin arrived to Moscow as deputy chief of Borodin. Borodin was the chief of the Kremlin business administration. Putin became a deputy in charge of Russian property abroad, and that was the beginning of his career in Moscow.

But what actually happened was this: Yeltsin's son-in-law, Yumashev, was in trouble with finance deals and was facing charges from the prosecutor's office. Yeltsin wanted to stop it, but that was a new time for Russia and the prosecutor would not listen to him. Yeltsin could not remove the Prosecutor General, since that was the function of the Duma. Yeltsin was so frustrated. But at some point he talked to Putin, asking him whether they could do anything about the prosecutor. Putin said, "No problem." So the Prosecutor General was invited to a KGB-rented apartment in Moscow with two young ladies. When he entered the apartment, they were confronted with these materials. That's when Yeltsin said, "Putin, he is a great guy. He knows how to handle things."

It's true; it's all recorded. It's not my imagination. And that's how he would become Prime Minister.

Something else that many people do not know, but again is on public record, is that three months before Yeltsin passed away, he was interviewed by the Russian media. He was asked the question: "Mr. President, as you look back at your career, what major errors in judgment do you think you made?" And he said, "Oh, I had so many." "Well, could you name a couple?" And



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he said, “Okay. Number one, the war in Chechnya. Number two, the choice of my successor.” Period.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Alright, this is taking us quite, quite far away from Angleton. My hope is that some of the next questions will go back to the subject of the conference. Mr. Gerber?

BURTON GERBER:

Thank you, Burton Gerber. This is a question for you, Oleg. Can you tell us, from your knowledge from inside the KGB, what was the true status of Nosenko as a defector, or not? And what do you think when Pete Bagley tells us this morning that he has information which seems to support that whole concept of Nosenko as a plant?

OLEG KALUGIN:

In the old Soviet days, any defection by a sailor from a trawler or a stewardess from an airline was a scandal. It could not be tolerated. For Russian propaganda and the Russian mindset at that time, that was just unacceptable. So, to think that a KGB officer with knowledge of sensitive information would defect to the West was most outrageous. If I am correct, he was also the son of the minister of the shipbuilding industry. Never in my life do I remember a scandal of this dimension inside the KGB. In fact, though I did not know him personally, I was among those who were recalled from the United States because they said that he knew too much, that he would finger me and others, so I better get out. And I did get out, although I would later come back anyway under diplomatic cover.

But in the new post-Soviet regime, they can resort to exactly what Angleton was suspected of. They would use polonium, they would use guns, they would shoot Politkovskaya, they would poison Litvinenko, and they would do many other things. And by the way, in one of the books published in the United States by former FBI agent Eringer, he talks to one of the top officials in the former Soviet KGB in Moscow. They’re talking about all sorts of things, including some assassinations, and the author of the book asks that former Soviet senior official, “Well, how come some guys like Kalugin are still alive and kicking?” And the response was, “Had he lived in Europe, he would have been dead a long time ago. But in the United States, we never killed anyone.” And that’s true. There was not one single individual, Soviet or Russian, murdered by the Soviet secret police either in the old days or the current days.

MALE SPEAKER:

Krivitsky?

OLEG KALUGIN:

Walter Krivitsky? No, he was not killed. He defected. No, he was not killed. I know that.

MALE SPEAKER:

[Inaudible]

OLEG KALUGIN:

He was in a state of despair and he committed suicide. No one pushed him, as some claim. [He shot himself in the head.]

JOEL MCCLEAREY:

Joel McClearey, a rank amateur in a sea of experts. If we were to try to come to a consensus on what we've heard today, would it be alright for us to entertain this proposition that there was a period where Angleton, given what Mr. Andrew said, was actually very, very good, and very, very productive for the country, and *then* he became the burned-out case? And is that a general assumption that everybody holds here? Or is there even dissent on whether in his earlier time, let's say into the late '50s, he was more a menace than he was effective?

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. Who'd like to take that on?

DAVID MARTIN:

My research began with the defection of Golitsyn in '61. I think Golitsyn was a negative from the moment he came over. Angleton was also a negative. Together, it was a net negative for the United States and the CIA. As for Angleton's effectiveness before '61, I just don't know enough.

LOCH JOHNSON:

I was simply trying to make the point that Angleton, like the rest of us, [was] very complex, and there are many sides to our personalities, and that, in our rush to condemn him, we shouldn't forget about some of the things that he did accomplish. After Angleton left, as much as I liked George Kalaris, who followed him, a terrific guy, I think there was a dispersal of the counterintelligence responsibility, and that hurt counterintelligence at the

CIA and elsewhere. So his emphasis on the importance of counterintelligence was valuable. And I know this is controversial and people might disagree, but I do think that during some rough periods between the CIA and the FBI, Angleton maintained, at a lower level, some pretty good relationships over there that were helpful for the country. But the bottom line is that Chris Andrew is exactly right. When someone believes wholeheartedly in the Sino-Soviet split, you've got to wonder.

ROBERT HATHAWAY:

Thanks, Christian. Bob Hathaway, here at the Center. I briefly alluded this morning to the fact that I wrote classified histories for the CIA for a few years and interviewed Angleton and Helms a number of times. In obtaining the first copy that got to the West of Khrushchev's 1956 speech denouncing Stalin, Angleton was responsible for one of the greatest intelligence coups of the entire 1950s. It was briefly alluded to this morning, but the details weren't exactly right. This was a huge deal at the time, first to the intelligence community and then, as it became publically known, more generally. I think in answer to your question, I'm certainly not qualified to evaluate his performance throughout the 1950s, but, at least in this one instance, he was widely regarded as having done something quite remarkable. I asked him one time point-blank, perhaps two years before his death, "Will you at long last reveal how you happened to get a copy of that speech?" The assumption was he'd gotten it from the Israelis. And he looked at me and said, "No."

Richard Helms said, some years after his retirement, that during his time as DCI, one of the most important

events for him, particularly in his relationship with the White House, was the accurate CIA assurances to Lyndon Johnson that the Six-Day War would be over very quickly and would result in an overwhelming Israeli victory. Johnson was under immense pressure to publically side with the Israelis and to immediately commence an arms lift, and for reasons primarily related to relations with the Soviet Union, he didn't want to go there if he didn't have to—though, of course, he wasn't prepared to see the Israelis lose that war either. He came to rely on the CIA and its assurances that the Israelis were going to win, and they're going to win big-time, and they're going to win quickly. And Helms always said this was a key point in establishing his relationship with this President, and as a consequence of that, Helms was then invited to the White House for lunch every week, and he felt that this was a big deal. There were a number of reasons why the CIA had the good intelligence on what was likely to happen during the Six-Day War. Angleton was one of the sources for Helms's confident assessment to Lyndon Johnson—not the only one, but one of them. And it was my sense that, perhaps at least in part because of this, and what a big deal this was for Richard Helms, afterwards—and this gets back to Nosenko—he was really prepared to give Helms the benefit of the doubt. My sense was that Helms had doubts about Angleton's handling of Nosenko, at least by '67, '68. I think at one point in this time period, he ordered that Nosenko be released, and Angleton simply dragged his feet, as I recall, for several more years before Nosenko was brought back to a more normal existence. For whatever reason—maybe connected to the '67 war—Helms simply never felt able or prepared or

willing to pay whatever the political cost was to lean on Angleton. That gets back to what David Martin said: at a minimum, Angleton needed much more adult supervision than he ever got. At least at one point in the late '60s, Helms simply was not prepared to do this even though, he was being urged by others to do so.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thanks, Bob, that's very helpful. Loch?

LOCH JOHNSON:

I just thought I'd comment very quickly on the speech by Khrushchev in '56, or the "secret speech." Angleton told me during our meetings that he, in fact, had gotten a copy of that speech from Israeli intelligence, and that he'd gotten the idea along with his staff that it should be doctored to make the Stalinist regime look even more heinous than the speech itself did, and then distribute the doctored speech throughout Eastern Europe. He claimed that he did that, but I think a lot of recent, subsequent research indicated that that never was done—that yes, he doctored it inside the CIA, but he was never allowed to distribute it. I don't think that ever happened.

DAVID MARTIN:

Was there independent evidence in the files that Angleton was the guy who got the speech?

BOB HATHAWAY:

Some of the history of Helms as DCI has been declassified. Some of it hasn't. I'm one of two co-authors; I wrote it twenty-five years ago. I don't remember squat anymore.

However, I did go back and read several of the chapters pertaining to Angleton just last night, the declassified portions of it, and I never found any indication as to how Angleton had gotten it, but it was universally believed that he did, that he was responsible—

DAVID MARTIN:

That's it, right? Universally *believed*—

BOB HATHAWAY:

Yes.

DAVID MARTIN:

—but there's no hard copy anyplace saying that he's the guy.

BOB HATHAWAY:

I don't want to say that. I never found any documentary evidence, but I think that clearly was part of the explanation why he was given free reign for so long.

DAVID MARTIN:

I've just always been very suspicious of that story, and he always was so coy about it that it just made me more suspicious.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Alright, the gentleman in the center-back.

STEVE WINTERS:

Steve Winters again. If I go back to that period, the Church Committee and that mentality of oversight, and I hear the comments about how Angleton responded to

the Committee, it's very easy to me to side very strongly with the Committee and sort of dismiss this idea of a rogue element that thinks they can do things in the national interest without observing the legalities. However, that's fine from a nostalgic point of view, but if I look at the last eleven years, we have case after case after case where there's been a tremendous increase of surveillance legislation, both retroactive and otherwise, to create a more secure country. Very much in the spirit of what it appears Angleton was saying in that testimony. So, rather than going back into a nostalgic '70s and condemning Angleton and his attitude, he actually seems to be very much in the mainstream of current thinking over the last decade. So, why do we want to condemn him when his viewpoint is actually the one that's been adopted by the government wholeheartedly in the present?

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Would anyone like to react to that?

LOCH JOHNSON:

Would you mind clarifying that? What are you characterizing as his view?

STEVE WINTERS:

For example, the surveillance of telephone conversations by the major phone companies. It was then retroactively decided that they wouldn't be prosecuted, even though what they did was illegal at the time. That's one specific example of a recent event that relates to the mail opening operation and the mentality that we've got to scrutinize any suspicious Americans. That's the connection I'm trying to make.

LOCH JOHNSON:

If you go into the Madison Wing of the Library of Congress, you'll see etched on the wall a comment from James Madison: "Power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse." And I think that was what we found out during the Church Committee investigation; that even some good people strayed too far and abused their powers. And I think we found, since the Church Committee, that oversight—Senate intelligence oversight committees and other forms of oversight—have helped reduce that abuse of power, but certainly haven't eliminated it. In its use of warrantless wiretaps, I would argue the second Bush administration is a good example of an instance in which we returned to the same kind of horrors that the Church Committee uncovered back in 1975. Jefferson said you have to have constant vigilance if you want democracy, and I think that's what we have to have. We have to make sure the people who have power are constantly watched, or that power will be abused.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. Ross Johnson.

ROSS JOHNSON:

Ross Johnson, Wilson Center. Just two comments. There'd been discussion about the secret speech, and while Angleton may well have provided one copy that he got from the Israelis, the copies came out of Poland, and this was the version for the foreign communists. There were multiple copies floating around through different channels. No doubt it was of merit, but Angleton's copy may not have been the only source for the secret speech.

My other comment concerns the earlier discussion about the broader background of looking at communism that could have brought Angleton to the conclusion that the Sino-Soviet split was all a hoax. I just remind us of the background here, and the common theme of the international communist conspiracy all orchestrated out of Moscow. The closer you go back to 1960, the more voices you would've found wondering, "This can't be for real," the Sino-Soviet dispute. Go back to Don Zagoria's book and his work inside the Agency and the disputes about all that. When you get ten years out, it's kind of absurd to doubt the Sino-Soviet split. But, at the time, the closer you are to the '60s, the realer it seemed.

And it's not the only case. There's an NIE from the early '50s on Yugoslavia, and in there you can find a footnote from at least two of the agencies that the Tito-Stalin dispute isn't for real. So, there is that sort of mindset that over the years affected thinking. And again, by the late '60s, it seems absurd to conclude that the Sino-Soviet dispute is a hoax meant to fool us. But maybe this helps us understand some of the background that could have led Angleton or others to that kind of conclusion.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thanks, Ross, that's very helpful. The gentleman all the way in the back.

BARRY ROYDEN:

I just want to make a comment on Angleton acquiring the secret speech. It may well be that he got it from Mossad, but that shouldn't be portrayed as an

intelligence coup by Angleton. If the Israelis get the secret speech, and they want to get it to the U.S. government because they know it's going to be useful for us and help advance their interests with us, then they're going to give it to whoever their point of contact is, who at that point in time was James Angleton. So, we shouldn't make it out to be an intelligence coup that James Angleton obtained the speech, if indeed he got it from Mossad. Whoever Mossad was talking to, they would have given the speech to. To put it in perspective.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thanks Barry, that's helpful.

CARL COLBY:

Hi, I'm Carl Colby. I have a question for Loch. I'll be a bit of a contrarian, but you seem to imply that the culture now accepts that the Church Committee was all well and good, that it was effective, that it changed the culture of oversight, *et cetera*. But in the last four months, I've traveled the United States showing my film—thousands of people have seen it. I try to be very fair, but I'm struck by how the audiences will leave the section on the Church hearings and the Pike hearings and say that it was like a witch-hunt; that my father was just vilified; that he was just tarred and feathered. I was a bit surprised by that, and I've talked to Fritz Schwarz and other people about this, and I'm going to see him next week, and what's interesting to me is that there's no outrage today many of the covert actions that are being promulgated. This President has got his hands full. He's probably signing more findings than any President and

ordering more covert action than any President since Kennedy. But there's no public outcry. It's quite interesting to me, if you relate it back to the period of the '70s and the divide between my father and Angleton. Has the culture really changed? Will there be accountability? Again, I'm surprised, I tried to be very fair, but when you see Ron Dellums, Otis Pike, and Frank Church just nailing him, and then I listen to tens of thousands of people after the screenings telling me, "My God, how did you survive this?" and, "Why was there this abuse heaped on him?" It's quite interesting culturally, and I want you to address that, because, in the end, we can talk about Angleton and his disconnect when he finally did testify. But where's the outrage now? It doesn't seem to exist at all. I'd like to hear your comments about that.

LOCH JOHNSON:

I think you make some good points Carl, but I would say that your father, the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, and the Rockefeller Commission created a sea change in attitudes about intelligence. I would say it's a difference between black and white, night and day. Before the investigations of 1975, there was virtually no oversight, and I think intelligence was viewed as an exceptional case. It didn't have to be part of the regular American government; it didn't necessarily have to honor the law in all cases. But after the Church Committee investigation and the stance your dad took, people realized that wasn't right; that the intelligence agencies had to be part of the American government just like the Department of Agriculture. And I think one of the best testimonies that I could point to is every single DCI since that time, with the

exception of William Casey, is on record as saying that oversight is a really good thing; that it helps share our responsibilities; that it gives us insights to what the American people view as the bounds of tolerability. But I am worried that some attitudes around the country don't fully understand that. Although, I spend a lot of time traveling around the country talking to student audiences, too, and most of them get it. They get the Madisonian principle that secret agencies, just like the rest of the government, need to be supervised, and I think that's gratifying.

I've just finished a study on covert action, particularly with an emphasis on the CIA, and we are now in a period of time when covert action has become the tail that wags the dog. We have more covert actions underway today—including some very lethal ones with the use of CIA drones—than we've ever had before. I used to think that the golden age of covert action, particularly paramilitary operations, was during the Reagan years. After all, we did have a lot of them then, and that would be the second highest peak. The third highest peak would be during the Korean War. Then during the Vietnam period, too, we had a lot of covert actions in support of our troops in Vietnam—that would be the fourth highest peak. But we are now in the highest peak, when it comes to covert action, and, at the same time, I don't think enough lawmakers on the Senate Intelligence Committee are taking their responsibility seriously. There was a strong desire to be good overseers in the aftermath of the Church Committee investigations, and then that fell off. And then we had the Iran-Contra scandal, which led to a reinvigoration of interest in oversight, but then it dropped off. So it's

kind of cyclical, and, unfortunately, I think we're in a down cycle right now.

DAVID MARTIN:

I think the point you make goes to what I was saying about how it's unfair to judge Angleton on the basis of retroactive morality. Today's covert actions, particularly the lethal ones, become known almost in real-time; you're learning about them in the context in which they were conducted. All these things that happened in the '60s did not come to light until the '70s, and you learn about them in a totally different, post-Vietnam context. If you had taken a vote in 1960 on how many Americans thought we should assassinate Castro, I think you would have gotten an overwhelming majority in the affirmative. But by the time you get to 1974, that question would seem heinous.

MIKE WEBBER:

Thanks. My name is Mike Webber, and I'm a master's student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington. My question concerns ideas and values about counterintelligence. I haven't seen it myself, but I understand that Israel has a statue for James Angleton, and they really revered and respected him. I don't know of any other country that's done something similar to that, especially in the CI sphere. So my question is, because of how James Angleton learned about counterintelligence overseas during World War II, were his ideas and values and methods about counterintelligence just not at par with what Americans expected when he was head of CI in the United States afterwards? Or was it because,

although the Israelis and the Brits have similar views to the United States, they do have slightly different approaches to counterintelligence and are sometimes willing to fudge civil rights a little bit more than Americans would like to think? I'm just curious to your thoughts about that.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Who'd like to address that?

LOCH JOHNSON:

Well, I would point out that Angleton learned the counterintelligence trade at the knees of the Brits, the Italians, and some Jewish leaders in the West who were helping to fight the Nazis. I think that when he got involved in counterintelligence at the CIA, he brought

a lot of great methodology that he had learned from these real pros who had been doing it a lot longer than the United States had ever been doing it. But then, I think he got caught up in Cold War rhetoric. I'm told that if you're a homicide officer in a police department looking at homicides every day, every week, then pretty soon it does something to your mind. When you're in counterintelligence for so long, I think it begins to warp your mind, as well. So, I think he got the CIA probably off to a good start in basic counterintelligence methodology, but then he began to stray.

CHRISTIAN OSTERMANN:

Thank you. I'd like to call this session to a close, but let me thank our three terrific speakers, Loch Johnson, Oleg Kalugin, and David Martin.

PANEL III: THE LONG VIEW

John Prados (*National Security Archive*)

David Robarge (*Central Intelligence Agency*)

David Wise (*author, journalist*)

3:30 P.M. – 5:30 P.M.

DAVID MAXWELL:

Welcome to our last and final session. I'm Dave Maxwell. I'm the Associate Director for the Center of Security Studies at Georgetown. Welcome back. I think we probably should have renamed this last one something other than "the long view." It's been a long day.

But a long, great day, and I think during this last panel, we'll be able to, perhaps, tie some things together from many of the great remarks and differing viewpoints we've heard all day. So we've got three great speakers here with the long view, and we will get some great remarks from all of them and some more great questions from all of you.

First, we're going to start with John Prados, who directs the National Security Archive's Iraq Documentation Project, as well as its Vietnam Project. He's a Senior Research Fellow on national security affairs and, of course, has authored numerous books that I'm sure most of you are familiar with, but most recently *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War*.

JOHN PRADOS:

Forthcoming is the book on World War II in the South Pacific.

DAVE MAXWELL:

—that's right, and *Safe for Democracy: the Secret Wars of the CIA*—certainly relevant; *William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spy Master*; and *Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War*; and, of course, his books *Unwinnable*, *Keeper of the Keys*—on the National Security Council—and *Combined Fleet Decoded* on intelligence in the Pacific in World War II, were each nominated for the Pulitzer Prize.

His work centers on subjects including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Vietnam War, and analysis of international relations, plus diplomatic and military history more generally, and he holds a doctorate of international relations from Columbia. With that, John, the floor is yours.



JOHN PRADOS

JOHN PRADOS:

Thank you very much. I appreciate that very much. We've been here a long time, so let me change the venue a little bit. Let's move the conversation up the street a few blocks, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, just to set the stage. In the office that's an oval.

The date is January 3, 1975. The time, late afternoon—almost like this, even later, 5:30 p.m. Sitting around are President Gerald Ford, the Director of the CIA, William E. Colby, the Deputy National Security Advisor at the time, Brent Scowcroft, and the two men who would become the White House point people on the whole question of the Church and Pike investigations in the “year of intelligence” in 1975. Those were the White House lawyers, John Marsh and Philip Buchen.

The conversation revolves around Colby briefing the President on the revelations that have appeared in *The New York Times*, about which he had sent President Ford a report a few days before. And, to the point made earlier that none of this affected anything outside the CIA, what we're talking about is a conversation with the President of the United States. As Mr. Colby winds through his report and he deals with various things about CIA surveillance and operations against Americans, he says, “There's another skeleton, Mr. President. A defector we suspected of being a double agent, we kept confined for three years,” a direct reference to Yuri Nosenko.

Mr. Ford was not ignorant of this. In fact, he came right back to Colby and asked him about James Angleton. Colby responded, “Angleton is an unusual type and totally dedicated to his mission. He is very

intense.” So, right off the bat, Angleton's name, his personality even, to some degree, are outside the walls of Langley and inside those of the Oval Office.

This conversation really revolved around Yuri Nosenko, and you've heard that name a lot today—although, I'm a little bit surprised, because for all the experts in here, we've been talking so much about Angleton and Nosenko without actually getting to the specifics of that situation. So, before I proceed, let me run through that really quickly. Nosenko was parlayed into the United States on a waiver of immigration in 1964. Actually, the first conversation Richard Helms had about the Nosenko affair was while meeting with Justice Department lawyers about whether that waiver would be accepted.

Under the 1949 CIA Act, the Agency has the authority to waive one hundred individuals into the United States each year without passing immigration for its purposes in handling defectors. That was how Nosenko entered the country. The counterintelligence staff was an advisory position to the Soviet Bloc Division in the handling of the defector, so the references made to David Murphy this morning were entirely correct. It was Murphy and Bagley, his deputy, who handled Nosenko, and Angleton was in an advisory/supervisory position. According to the records, Helms moved in 1964 for the Nosenko affair to be taken off the books and completed, and that was not possible. Angleton came in at that point, appealing to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence that they needed more time to complete the investigation, and Helms backed off. Helms tried again about eighteen months later and again backed off.

In 1967, the treatment of Nosenko had become such an internal football in the CIA that his custody was handed over from the Soviet Division to the Office of Security, and he became the consignee of Bruce Solie. Solie led the investigation for the Office of Security, which produced a report that decided that Nosenko was a bona fide defector. And that question of bona fides is at the heart of this dispute.

In 1975, a few months after Ford's conversation I described a moment ago, there was a commission headed by the Vice President of the United States, Nelson R. Rockefeller. The Rockefeller Commission was the first of these investigations in 1975, and among the people who testified before the Rockefeller Commission was James Angleton. Vice President Rockefeller asked James Angleton to submit a report to Rockefeller's Commission, which the Vice President forwarded to President Ford with a note saying, "We were so impressed with the things that James Angleton told us, that I asked him to assemble this special report on United States counterintelligence, to which you would be remiss if you did not pay great attention to."

In this report, James Angleton speaks in his own words in an extended fashion for the first time. In this report Angleton treats Yuri Nosenko and the Nosenko affair as if it was completely controversial. In other words, nothing is settled about Nosenko's bona fides, everything is up in the air, and the disputes about it are a product of the differences among U.S. government agencies. The question of Nosenko's bona fides was such a thorny matter. In that investigation I mentioned, which was carried out by the Office of Security from 1967 to 1968, it wrote a report that was sent

to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor. Taylor wrote a memorandum drawing conclusions based on the recommendations of that investigation on October 4, 1968. In his memorandum Taylor wrote, "I conclude that Nosenko should be accepted as a bona fide defector."

Meanwhile, the Office of Security, the CIA unit responsible for this last piece of investigation, was obliged in the spring of 1973 to contribute to the report that became so notorious as the CIA "Family Jewels." In its contribution to the CIA "Family Jewels," the Office of Security wrote about the Nosenko affair and incarceration, and its conclusion was: "It soon became apparent that Nosenko was bona fide, and that he was moved to more comfortable surroundings." And their ultimate conclusion, "He has proven to be the most valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had."

Having said that, there's a certain level at which this can be seen as a back alley knife fight. On the one hand, the Soviet Bloc Division wants this and it's in cahoots with the counterintelligence staff. On the other hand, the counterintelligence staff has long been leery of the Office of Security, these gumshoes that just run around sticking their feet in their mouth. So, this element is at play in everything happening here. It's much too easy to get totally immersed in all of that, so I'm going to move on from Nosenko.

I'm going to talk about other things that James Angleton says; let's start with his attack on Bill Colby. In this paper he writes for Nelson Rockefeller, which goes to Gerald Ford, he attacks Colby on numerous occasions—tells Mr. Rockefeller that, "Action"—he means on counterintelligence—"is imperative today because the

current leadership is almost totally uninformed and inexperienced in the specialty of counterintelligence.” Elsewhere in this paper, he writes, “Oh, my, Mr. Colby has only had the CI staff in his office with him four or five hours,” and in another place, “Since he became director of operations”—which is now a period of about two years—“Colby only once asked to be briefed by the CI staff, and that only for two hours.” He’s got no interest in this. In fact, in another place he says, “Oh, when Colby headed the Far East Division he never did anything with counterintelligence and that’s documented in an Inspector General report,” etc.

Of course, all of this skips over the issue of the counterintelligence staff’s investigation of William Colby, referred to earlier today. Why James Angleton should have been expecting any different treatment from William Colby, when Colby acceded to the exalted position of Director of Central Intelligence is a question worth asking. Alternatively, you can also ask, “why, if Angleton had done all these things, was it not perfectly logical to suppose that Colby was clipping the wings of the counterintelligence staff?”

That gets me to the issue of empire-building. There’s a whole other level here of what’s going on at the Agency with the counterintelligence staff throughout this period. Angleton, in this paper, argues that ever since there was a CIA, it has subordinated positive collection to counterintelligence; until there was a “CI” staff, previous to 1953 there had only been a group called “Staff C,” counterintelligence was nowhere at all. He observes in the report that one of the first things the counterintelligence staff did when it was created was carry out an Agency-wide survey of

counterintelligence assets and operations and activities. They discovered that counterintelligence officers tended to have low rank (an average grade of GS-9), they had little experience (five years or less on average), and only one in four had advanced or even basic training in counterintelligence operations. They were inexperienced and were unprepared for the mission. Angleton used that to argue for a new emphasis on counterintelligence within the United States intelligence community.

This is June of 1975, mind you, after all these controversies, like the Nosenko affair, after everything we’ve been talking about all day. He argues in the report, “It is our view that the operations directorate ought to devote no less than ten percent of its manpower to counterintelligence.” He continues by arguing that this beefed-up counterintelligence capability should, essentially, be its own corps within the CIA. It should have its own reporting channels for CI officers assigned to embassies, and that those officers would transit in and out of headquarters and field assignments throughout their careers, so they would have a career track, and when they served overseas they would be only “nominally” under the charge of CIA station chiefs. In other words, after all this controversy, James Angleton, in June of 1975, was making a bid for a much expanded United States counterintelligence capability.

That’s interesting because, of course, the counterintelligence staff at the CIA had already been in all these places for a very long time. Under Angleton’s leadership, the counterintelligence staff expanded by a thousand percent since its creation. Had the United States had, in 1975, a counterintelligence staff of the

size that Angleton was talking about, ten percent of the DDO, that unit would have rivaled the size of the CIA Saigon station at the height of the Vietnam War. It would have been that big.

The problems Angleton mentioned: low status and lack of specialized training, still existed in 1975, twenty years after Angleton left the CI staff and his friend, Richard Helms, had been in charge of the Agency for almost ten years. So, any problem that Angleton could not solve within that space of time, working closely with Helms, and as the acknowledged superior of the whole counterintelligence department, wasn't going to improve that much. If there was a problem with counterintelligence activity in the United States, it was that the activity had gone too far, as illustrated by the Nosenko affair, CIA mail opening and communications monitoring, and so forth.

The problem was also bigger than James Angleton, and that should be acknowledged. It wasn't until the middle 1990s with the creation of the National Counterintelligence Center—and there was a National Executive for Counterintelligence and a National Counterintelligence Policy Board, all formed in the middle 1990s—the United States began to approach a unified effort on counterintelligence, and, mind you, that effort was spurred by the cases of Aldrich Ames and some of the other CIA mole cases—Barnett, for example.

Now, I cannot let this go by without citing what our friend Mr. Angleton has to say in this conversation with the Vice President of the United States about the monster plot. “We believe it to be most misleading for one to assume that estimates derived from technical

collection justify the negotiation of finite disarmament and other treaties with the Soviet bloc.”

In other words, counterintelligence expert Angleton is arguing that there should be no arms control or disarmament agreements with the Russians because we cannot monitor them by national technical means and we can only trust what we know from spies. But of course, what we've been talking about all day is that James Angleton didn't permit any defectors into the United States to give us good information. He actually has an answer for that. He says, “A more accurate picture could be obtained if the intelligence community were less concerned with public or overt data regarding Soviet intentions, such as the reporting of ambassadors and other representatives, and, instead, give full faith and credit to secret information from bona fide sources who are, or were, within the Soviet bloc system and whose warnings regarding this information have been universally ignored.”

In other words, Angleton is saying in June 1975 that Anatoliy Golitsyn and everything he said should be credited over spy satellites, ambassadorial and State Department reporting, everything we get from the Soviet press, and all of our other intelligence sources, and if we do not believe in that source, we should not make arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. That was Angleton on the monster plot.

We have already discussed the mole hunt and the cases that revolved around it, so I'm not going to give my little rap on that. But let me say, before I pass this, that if you look at the period from 1960 to 1975, when this mole hunt was in full motion, and threatened the careers of dozens of CIA officers—including, by the way,

that of Tennent Bagley, who was on Skype this morning telling us that Nosenko was the bad guy, that there were no significant Soviet sources developed by the CIA. In the single decade between 1975 and 1985, the CIA developed enough new sources that Aldrich Ames could betray half a dozen major agents, and Ed Howard could betray Adolf Tolkacher. So, at least ten major Soviet spies developed in a decade against zero during the Angleton reign. This leads me to my bottom line assessment, of course, which has to be that the evaluation of James Angleton's role over the long-haul is more negative than positive. To go beyond his report, our purpose today has been to assess his role in the Cold War. As a piece of Cold War history, the efforts of the counterintelligence staff that impinged on Americans by monitoring mail and communications helped to create a lasting political impact because they soured Americans' views on the creditability and trust in their government. U.S. security services shares some of the blame here, too. Angleton's formal counterintelligence role also contributed to the paralysis of CIA espionage efforts against the Soviet Union, the poisoned atmosphere inside the Agency, and the attacks on CIA officers themselves. So, my assessment is negative. Thank you very much.

DAVID MAXWELL:

Thank you, John. Next we are going to hear from David Robarge, who is the chief historian at the Central Intelligence Agency. He must have all the secrets and all the answers.

DAVID ROBARGE:

It will be a short presentation.

DAVID MAXWELL:

He joined the Agency in 1989, and served at the Counterterrorism Center and as a Middle East analyst at the Director of Intelligence. In 1996, he joined the Agency's history staff, rising to the rank of chief historian in 2005. Prior to joining the Agency, he taught at Columbia University and worked for the Gannett Center for Media Studies. He is the author of numerous publications, including *A Chief Justice's Progress: John Marshall from Revolutionary Virginia to the Supreme Court*, *Archangel: CIA's Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft*, and a classified biography of John McCone, the sixth director of the CIA—unfortunately we won't hear about that today. He has also published several articles in the official CIA publications, including *Studies in Intelligence*, *Intelligence in National Security*, and *Journal of Intelligence History*. He has taught classes on U.S. history of U.S. intelligence at George Mason University, and as an adjunct at Georgetown University. He holds a Ph.D. in American history from Columbia University.

DAVID ROBARGE:

Thank you, David. Good afternoon. I'm going to take a slightly different approach to Angleton than previous presenters because I'm a biographer by background. And, though John is quoting from Angleton directly, we haven't really heard much about Angleton himself. We've had a variety of perspectives from different optics, if you will: we've had professional colleagues, we've had journalists, we've had the Soviet view, the British view, the FBI view, various angles to Angleton, but I'd like to suggest that he's such a complicated individual

that, like a multifaceted diamond, it all depends on your perspective. A very good quote comes to mind from Robin Winks, who's written one of the best books about Angleton, or, at least, a chapter on Angleton in his book *Cloak and Gown*. He says, "One could ask a hundred people about Angleton and receive a hundred slightly shaded different replies that range from utter denunciation to unadulterated hero worship." I guess that sums up today's conference to a certain extent.

That the positions could occupy these extremes spoke of the significance and the ambiguity of the role he had played. Now, I think it's important to get out of the weeds of various cases, which is sort of the love and the folly of the counterintelligence professional, and approach Angleton as a historical figure, trying to figure out what influenced him, why he thought the way he did, why he acted the way he did, what influences he had, and then make some long-term judgments about his net effect on counterintelligence, both at the time he served and, I think very importantly, afterwards. So that's kind of the summation of my remarks here.

Angleton was exceptionally clever at fashioning a mystique around counterintelligence. It became one of the sources of his bureaucratic power, the "I know something you don't know" approach. And this became a very powerful tool for him because it protected him from recrimination, as information about controversial activities simply wasn't widely known. He had buy-in from two directors who served for fifteen of the twenty years that he was on, running the counterintelligence staff—I'm referring to Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, who thought, pretty much, the same way about the importance of counterintelligence in

intelligence activities. To understand how a twenty-six-year-old intelligence officer in World War II, working in X-2, became one of the preeminent figures in American intelligence history, probably as widely known as some of our more famous DCIs, we ought to study the man himself for a little while. That's the approach I'm going to take—as a biographer.

Now, the problem with the literature on Angleton is that it's exceptionally partisan. Within a growing length of literature, only a handful of items stand out for even approaching objectivity. I'm not going to get into historiography here, but it's a short list of very good books and a long list of ones that peddle mythology and misimpression and recycle old grudges in a very partisan fashion. It is also one of the ironies about Angleton that you can't confine him to non-fiction. He is such a big important player in intelligence that you have to talk about him in fiction, as well. He's been a major character in a number of novels, a handful of movies, either as a character in the flesh like in *The Company* or as a pseudo officer, like Matt Damon in *The Good Shepherd*. And the problem with intelligence history, in general, is the fiction crowds out the fact, and the myth drives impressions of it. That's why we want to dispense with some of these things still regrettably trafficked in some of the popular discourse. We've heard a number of these already, today.

Internal documentation clearly shows the very large Soviet Bloc Division was alive and kicking throughout this period, though there were warnings indicated that its level of activity was sliding, that there was a sense of suspicion within the organization, there's no doubt about that. But the idea that he was receiving every

Angleton was exceptionally clever
at fashioning a mystique around
counterintelligence.

operational cable from the field so he could throw them in the burn bag if he didn't like the source, or that he went around with this weird bevy of nicknames, like "Mother" and the "Grey Ghost" and the "Kingfisher" and the "Black Knight"—have you worked in an organization where you sit down with a friend over the table and say, "Hey, I have a meeting with the Black Knight, or the Kingfisher this morning?" This is hall talk, and a lot of it, I think, is mythology that's been peddled after the fact by people with a variety of perspectives and grudges on Angleton. Studying him as a purely biographical character, the reality is far more interesting, and some of these characteristics have been highlighted in today's remarks.

Yes, all those quirky things about him, the odd clothing, the strange work hours and the weird office he worked in, the briefing that he gave new hires, are all part of this cultivated mystique of counterintelligence at which Angleton was so adept. To be sure, he was secretive and suspicious, occasionally lapsing over into excessive, anti-communist to a fault at times, as we've seen, and very much pro-Israel. This became an important aspect of his internal power—the control over that Israeli account we've heard about. I think one nice, very-quick test is to look someone in the eye and,

without even asking them what they really think about James Angleton, have them say his name. If they say his middle name, your antenna should go up, because Angleton never used it, nobody around him ever used it. About the only people who do routinely are critics with a little bit of strange emphasis on the middle name, like Lee *Harvey* Oswald, James *Jesus* Angleton. He never wrote it on any document. A graphologist would have a field day with his crabbed little handwriting down at the bottom of a piece of paper. But, it's just "James Angleton."

I was very pleased last night after cruising through the Wikipedia article that somebody finally got around to cleaning it up, because for years and years the Wikipedia article started out by saying that his code-name at the CIA was "KU Mother." Totally ludicrous. Yes, they at least got the diagraph right—KU used to be the diagraph for CIA back in previous decades—but to say his code name was Mother and this has become his nickname or something—that article was full of tripe. But thanks, if that anonymous person is in the audience today, for finally putting what I think is a fairly straightforward article up. I'm not allowed to play in that world, given where I work, so I can't take the credit for that.

It's really important to understand that Angleton was, throughout his career, a through-and-through counterintelligence officer. Now, this is unusual at the Agency. You may get involved in the espionage side, but frequently you move around from job to job, even region to region. You're constantly re-accustomed to new perspectives, new ways of looking at things. You may even move off and serve in another directorate or,

if woe unto you, you move up to the seventh floor and get into a staff position, then you really get a different perspective on the world at CIA. But Angleton, from the very time he set foot in the intelligence world, until he was kicked out at the end of '74, was a counterintelligence officer. It was bred in him right from the start, and, as we'll see, in a very peculiar situation, one that I use to sort of try to acclimate our younger officers to here. It's the OSS formative experience. And this is why I think it's important to understand Angleton through a biographical lens.

Imagine if you were twenty-six years old on September 11, 2001, and because of your patriotic passion and your outrage about the attack on the U.S., you sign up for CIA. And your first job is to go to work in the Counterterrorism Center in a special access project. Maybe one-tenth of the people in this room are cleared to work in that world, and you are only twenty-six years old, but you are committed to going after bin Laden, protecting America from another attack. You do this for a number of years, and the outcome is a happy one, and you move on, but your gears have been aligned in a certain fashion because of that environment in CTC and the special access program. Well, go back to the Angleton experience here in World War II. He is serving in X-2, which is the only component of OSS that is cleared to receive raw Ultra traffic, because the British insisted on that as a precondition for sharing that information with us. They wanted, in effect, a service within a service. Needless to say, it had a culture of super secrecy, hyper-security: it had its own reporting channel, it could vet agents in the field that OSS was running without explanation, it could say yea or nay.

You can see how all of this moves over into Angleton's methodology when he sets up the CI staff in 1954. And, as already mentioned by Chris, as a twenty-six/twenty-seven year old, he's sitting in on the planning process of the Double Cross and Fortitude Operations, the big double agent operation and the deception operations.

I've already mentioned the importance of the patronage. These two individuals, Dulles and Helms, thought that CI was as important to the Agency's welfare as FI, foreign intelligence collection and covert action. You couldn't run the latter two without the first as the essential leg of the three-legged stool, so they protected him. There was a previous question today, "What was the relationship between Dulles and Angleton?" Very close. Angleton used to drive Dulles home in the evening. They would frequently have informal chats. It was a very tight relationship. Angleton's relationship with Helms was similar, but personally a little more distant. Helms was not a personality like Dulles but nonetheless...

[Break in Audio]

...hostile service. And the Soviets, who didn't care about any of those values, were quick to take advantage of our willingness to let down our guard. And we can think in the same way, that this may be hurting us in the current operational environment.

I've already indicated the second point, CI is the foundation for good FI and CA, and if you look at our very sorry record with penetrations, blown operations, and compromised assets in the late '40s and early '50s, you can see this is something that Angleton saw

in practice during its earliest years. And very important as a bureaucratic method, counterintelligence, to be effective, has to be centralized and made a senior staff function. It cannot be parceled out to the operating divisions, because there's a built-in conflict of interest. If you are a foreign intelligence collector in the field, you are, in effect, paid by the report. The more agents, the more intel you bring in, the better case officer you are. Well, you're not going to be super suspicious, then, about your sources. You may be a little laxer when it comes to CI vetting. Angleton simply didn't trust the operating divisions to run CI. He said you had to take it out of their hands, put it in the staff seventh floor position, reporting directly to the Director. *Voila*, in 1954, you have the creation of the counterintelligence staff.

"Wilderness of mirrors" is the catchphrase, the signature phrase Angleton borrowed from his favorite poet, T.S. Eliot. And the way he phrased it very much sums up this image that he has of the world of deception and duplicity and distrust: the real is unreal, the fantastical is reality. This becomes the metaphorical world into which he moves.

Now, I'd like to suggest that Angleton's experiences are the source for his basic model. We were talking earlier, especially in Chris's discussion, about strategic deception, and Jay Epstein talked about it as well—I'd like to put it here in a kind of a scheme so it's a little more transparent to you—and this is how it all works. You have the KGB—and this is one of Angleton's faults, he did not look at other services like the GRU, or any other foreign services to speak of. He was very KGB-focused, bad on him. But, anyway, they would use this mechanism of deception by sending out

bogus sources, double agents, false defectors, danglers (people who were sent out to be recruited), and they would be laden with disinformation. Now, because the Western services at this time, in the late '40s and early '50s, are so desperate for information from behind the Iron Curtain, they take anybody who shows up at the embassy door, or who leaves a note on a windshield, or something like that.

We have to know what the Soviet threat is because we have no good sources on the inside, we have no SIGINT, they shut off their intel-comms in '48 after a disclosure by a penetration agent—what goes around comes around. And so, we are desperate. We'll take anything we can get. The feedback mechanism inside that fine-tunes the message is the penetration, as mentioned already by Jay. You have to have somebody inside to let you know the service is buying all this bogus information so you can tailor the message if you need to make it a little more believable. And on and on it goes in a never-ending loop. This is the model.

At this point you might suggest we're starting to lapse into the paranoid fantasy world, but what I want to suggest to you is Angleton's real-life experiences as a young, starting out intelligence officer really shaped his perspective on the world. David Martin made an excellent point in the previous presentation about retrospective morality, and we've heard a couple of the comments here about needing to understand the historical context in which this all occurred. Well, let's look at it. Here you have what Angleton was seeing as a twenty-six/twenty-seven-year-old intelligence officer, an exact duplicate of the strategic deception cycle that he fancied the Soviets were using. I won't say "fancy" is

quite the right word, because there was evidence that they were and could do it.

But consider the success of British Intelligence at doubling German agents sent to the U.K. during World War II, then using these agents to send back disinformation to the *Wehrmacht*. This is what he lived through as a young officer. He has to think, “That’s us doing it. Can they do it to us? They sure can. Twice.” Knowing what Angleton knew at the time—and Chris makes the appropriate caveat here: if only he knew better, he wouldn’t have been quite so caught up in these deceptions. But, you want to keep in mind that we’re dealing with the knowledge base he had at this point. The trust, and then something not mentioned so far today, the WiN operation—that’s the Polish acronym for Freedom and Independence Party—cooked up by the Russians and the Poles in the late ‘40s and early ‘50s to run essentially the same kind of deception operation. We’re not talking about just an agent sent out to trick us on a particular report. This is a large-scale operation that cost the West and the U.S., in the case of WiN, dearly.

Now, for propaganda reasons, the Soviets decided to blow it open in ‘52 and it became a serious embarrassment for us, created a backlash against CIA’s counterintelligence incompetence, and led, in an almost cause and effect relationship, to the creation of the CI staff in 1954. There really is a direct connection between the WiN operation and the CI staff in ‘54. But along the way, Angleton is not only carrying knowledge with him, he’s learning more. He knows how the Soviets ran an extensive spy network in Germany, the *Rote Kapelle*, and that Soviet double agents—he doesn’t know quite

yet about Philby until ‘51—are blowing many of the early CIA operations.

Also not mentioned previously today, Angleton was one of the first CIA people to be read into the Venona secret in 1952. Previously that had been kept within the FBI and the Army and then its SIGINT successors. Angleton is indoctrinated into it in ‘52. Imagine the eye-opening experience of finding out there were hundreds of Soviet operatives throughout the U.S. government during World War II. The OSS, the War Production Board, the War Department, the State Department, the White House, you name it, it was penetrated by the Soviets, and then the betrayal with Philby, as we know.

We have here not only evidence that the Soviets can run a deception operation, but the fact that they have spies all over the place circa 1950 to ‘55. Golitsyn suggests that the Soviet counterintelligence attack has shifted focus from defense to offense, from regime protection to subversion of the West. And this becomes, right around a very key point in his life, a definitive bit of information that shapes his interpretations of what the Soviets are doing all of this for. And then you have, between the period 1959 to 1963, the worst, bleakest period in U.S. counterintelligence history up until the Year of the Spy in the mid-1980s. Notice what you see here: you have key American sources in Soviet services arrested, compromised, executed, and you have clear indication of Soviet penetration of the British and German services. Imagine finding out Heinze Felfe, the James Angleton of the West German service, is a Soviet Agent, among others.

It is during this time, in the depths of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Angleton is, as you could

politely say, starting to lose his sense of proportion. Somebody asked earlier, “What can we say about Angleton? Is there a good phase and a bad phase?” Yes, I would contend that his twenty-year career on CI staff really divides into two periods. There’s the ‘50s and then there’s the ‘60s and beyond. And it’s right at this time, when the evidence is mounting that the West is under serious intelligence attack and you have all that history behind you to show what the Soviets have been capable of, the gears start to grind a little bit in Angleton’s head. And a lot of that is the result of being fed information, some initially valuable but later duplicitous, by Golitsyn. We’ll meet him in a second. But we want to take Angleton’s perspective here, in the early 1960s, at face value. We want to look at the history and say, “What else can we conclude?” Everybody else has been penetrated, we’ve lost some of our own agents, I’ve been tricked. We don’t know anything else about what’s going on because we have no SIGINT, no good sources. You almost have to say you err on the side of security, presume penetration, and then try to prove that it hasn’t happened, or find the cause of the penetration. That’s the ultimatum that Angleton is facing at this stage.

This is fueled, ultimately, by Golitsyn because he has no hard and fast evidence. There are just these suspicions and the historical track record. The relationship between Angleton and Golitsyn definitely becomes dysfunctional after a few years, to the point you don’t really know who’s running whom. Golitsyn was a very clever defector, and a very difficult person to deal with. He had great aspirations for becoming a *de facto* leader of the counterintelligence counterattack against

the Soviet Union. He never got any Agency buy-in for that, though he asked for a good deal of money to set up his own little operation. And it’s around 1963 and ‘64, when Angleton takes the case over from the Soviet Division, which had had its fill of Golitsyn, that this relationship becomes decidedly dysfunctional. And the things we hear about Golitsyn reading raw files about agent operations, reading personnel files, saying, “You know, I could find that mole if you just gave me a few more clues, how about some more documents?” It is during this period that this activity occurs, and it’s not very good counterintelligence practice, to be sure.

The Nosenko case is, as John mentions, very important in understanding the dynamic here. The mistreatment of Nosenko becomes the incubus that hangs over the Agency in subsequent years. Some of it has been mischaracterized in literature, and I’ve heard Nosenko himself tell different stories about his treatment at different times. He’s now deceased, but he used to come to the Agency periodically and talk, and he would remember it differently every time. He would say, “They did this to me,” and then the next time, “Well, they didn’t do that, but they did this.” “They gave me drugs.” “No, they didn’t give me drugs but they gave me intrusive medical exams.” And on and on it went. And though I believe some of these things might have happened—not the drugs, we have documentation proving that never happened. But there was a fishiness to the whole Nosenko situation. As Helms has said, when Nosenko states three months after the JFK assassination, the KGB had nothing to do with it, when there were grounds to think they might have (Oswald had defected for four years), and the KGB was not

DAVID ROBARGE



interested in him at all, even though he was at a radar facility with U-2 flights, doesn't sound right.

Nosenko did embellish, he did misstate, he was a typical defector. The problem is—as one of our former senior analysts has said—with the Nosenko case comes with the presumption of guilt. Instead of looking at it as an objective case, is he or isn't he, it was a biased investigation the whole time. One of the problems I have with the Solie reinvestigation is that, by the time it occurred in 1968, Nosenko knew exactly what he should say. And, though I think it's probably correct that Nosenko was bona fide, I'm not at all surprised that the Solie investigation reached that conclusion. It wasn't whether he was bona fide, it was that they could not prove he was not bona fide. It's like triple negative Scotch verdict. If you read the report, that's actually the language you get. But he sprung from stir, put on contract with the CIA as a counterintelligence instructor, and he spent a number of years on our payroll teaching us how to run counterintelligence operations. It's a bizarre irony in a bizarre situation.

The mole hunt is the episode that overrides the rest of Angleton's legacy. I'd like to explain it in detail because, though some of you may know this, it didn't come out in any of the discussion. The point of the mole hunt was to find an individual, or individuals, whom Golitsyn said had penetrated the Agency. Now, one of the contributions of Pete Bagley's new book, *Spy Wars*, is that he's suggesting there are other moles who had nothing to do with any of Golitsyn's information, that they had been previously planted inside CIA. But I'm not going to get into that. I'm looking here at Golitsyn's mole because it had the most influence on Angleton.

A profile: what type of people did we want to hire into the Agency or recruit as assets in the late '40s and early '50s? Lots of people with names like "Kowalsky." We wanted Eastern Europeans and Russians because they knew the region, they had the contacts, they had the ground truth, and they could be the best assets and intelligence officers. Running CI investigations is very complicated and involves a lot of walking back through cases, looking for people who knew somebody who knew somebody who knew somebody, and that's why it just becomes a massive spider web and why so many individuals wound up being implicated during the mole hunt. It's practically built into the methodology that you're going to throw out a dragnet, then try to figure out which people are really the primary suspects. Eventually it's narrowed down to a group, depending on who you listen to, twelve, fourteen, sixteen, I'll split the difference here. And yes, careers are damaged. It happens any time there's a counterintelligence or security investigation. You are pulled offline, taken away from sensitive information, you are not dispatched to a new location, you are kept in-house and watched.

Careers suffered; there's no doubt about that. Three of the victims of the mole hunt were later compensated in a piece of legislation that David Wise was the first to identify in his very good book *Molehunt*, the "Mole Relief Act," as it came to be called. Yes, there was a mole, Igor Orlov, as [was] indicated earlier. Problem was, he didn't work at the Agency anymore. He had been fired, supposedly for incompetence, because, funny, all the cases he worked on just didn't work out. They all got compromised. Well, we thought it

was because he was a bad case officer. Actually, he was blowing them. But he's off the books. By now we're well into the 1960s, and Angleton simply couldn't accept Orlov was the only mole; there had to be somebody more senior, more serious, way up at the top. So the mole hunt continues.

In the late '60s, there is a reorganization of the Soviet Bloc Division, leadership change, a new perspective, and the Soviet bloc gets reinvigorated as a result. The idea, as I mentioned earlier, that you had hundreds of case officers sitting around headquarters, sipping coffee and working on crossword puzzles instead of recruiting Soviet assets simply isn't the case. That so-called "paralysis" happened for a far shorter period of time. Remember, the mole hunt doesn't start until '61, '62, and it really doesn't get going until '64, when you have the so-called COINTELPRO operation with the FBI. They back out of it fairly quickly because they don't buy Golitsyn, partly because of conflicts about interpretations with Nosenko, but that's kind of too much "wilderness of mirrors" stuff.

So, from '64 to '70, roughly, is the heyday of the mole hunt, but it's beginning to peter out even before 1970. You have the reorganization of Soviet Bloc Division, and that's when, as I've seen from internal documentation, the level of activity really starts to go back up. So we're not talking about years and years of paralysis, as best I know. There was some blowback in foreign countries as the suspicions of penetration go outside the United States—we don't have time to go into these right now in the presentation. If you want to discuss them later we can. But the basic point here is that Golitsyn was right, but the wrong people got

nailed initially. Eventually, for various reasons, the real culprits were found, and, by the way, they happened to fit the suspicions that Golitsyn had advanced.

Now, here's an important point in the Angleton biography: the total loss of patronage at the top. Helms out, Schlesinger in. We've heard the somewhat ambiguous relationship Angleton had with Schlesinger. Colby comes in, and here the longstanding antagonism really reaches its peak. Colby decides to cut back on Angleton's empire and limit his activities because of the disclosures of the domestic intelligence operations—the mail opening operation, with which Angleton was heavily involved and the domestic spying operation, with which he was not heavily involved, the mail opening operation, and the domestic spying operation, with which he was not heavily involved, but got blamed for, largely because of the Seymour Hersh exposé in December 1974. This story about MH/Chaos has recently been discussed in a book by an Agency officer who worked on the operation, and it's called *MH/Chaos* by Frank Rafalko. I'd encourage you to read it because I think it really sets the record straight about the very serious distortions of fact that are in this article. And he picks apart the headline and the major assertions quite well. That said, there was a large intelligence gathering operation run by NSA and FBI; the Agency wound up doing some operations overseas, its principal focus. It did some domestic activities for the purpose of establishing bona fides for assets overseas. Okay, maybe they shouldn't have done that. It probably was a charter violation. But this is the scandal that brought the house down on Angleton, and he's

basically kicked out the day after that article appears.

Now, let's make an assessment before we move on to my final points about Angleton's legacy. I think, as has been indicated earlier by a few of our presenters today, there are a lot of good things that Angleton had done, and the FBI relationship is a very important one. At the time when J. Edgar Hoover never met a Director of CIA he didn't like, [sic] and the feeling was mutual, I can assure you, it was essential to have good working relations one or two levels down, and I credit Sam Papich at FBI for a lot of this. He and Angleton were able to work out some very good collaboration here. And we can see a number of the other accomplishments for Angleton. So I would suggest we keep in mind that it's very much a bifurcated career: good decade, bad decade. There is very much a pro and con aspect to his career. The con side, I would suggest, as most of our presenters here have done, is the preponderant one. And I've written about this in open-source material: major problems with Angleton's perception of counterintelligence, excessive focus on KGB while other services are doing us serious damage—all of our Cuban agents are doubles, all but one of our East German agents were doubles from the start, and that good one was quickly turned. Other countries are hurting us very badly.

And here's another important point: we've been talking the entire day about only one aspect of counterintelligence, which is spy hunting. Well, this is a defensive enterprise. This ties you up. What you want to do in counterintelligence is attack the same way you perceive you're being attacked. And our counterintelligence staff is not doing this under Angleton. He was

so caught up in defensive counterintelligence that we are not doing to them what we think they are doing to us—sending out double agents, turning their people, penetrating their services. That simply isn't happening and doesn't really start to happen much until the—depending on who you talk to back at my place—early to mid-1980s. Occasional little things, but a concerted effort is years in the making. Obviously he overvalued certain sources, particularly Golitsyn.

And as a manager, he was a mess. Somebody mentioned earlier that the CI staff was very badly run and it was very disorganized. I guess it was David Martin. Well, this is true. Angleton was an isolated manager. He was not a walk-around manager by any stretch. And he became so insular and security-conscious within his own staff that it became dysfunctional. There were some people who worked on the CI staff for several years who never even saw him. He didn't have regular staff meetings, he was always out running his own freelance shows, vest pocket operations. We haven't talked at all about Jay Lovestone and the Jim Cannon operation, about which next to nothing exists documentarily because it was destroyed in the clean-up after '75. These are things in the Angleton portfolio that demonstrate the breadth of his activity, the autonomy he was granted by the leadership, but also the way he created a service within a service, very much on the X-2 model. And that system became dysfunctional.

Now, my final point is Americans always tend to overreact to crises. We did it after 9/11, we did it in the '50s; we love to throw that pendulum all the way on the other side of the swing and then dodge it when it comes back. This is what I think happened to counterintelligence

after Angleton. Our own Inspector General, in an IG report, cited earlier today, referred to a major impediment in the Ames investigation as, “an ‘Angleton syndrome’ that is enfeebling counterintelligence at CIA.”

Well, this Angleton syndrome set in almost immediately after he was dismissed. An all-new staff comes in, there are going to be rotationals—you don’t want CI professionals. Very quickly, CI becomes degraded as a discipline, and the best and brightest don’t wind up working on the CI staff. It’s a place for problem people, for putting people out to pasture, for people you don’t know what to do with. It’s not the place for the fast risers. It is true we shifted tack and we’re running more aggressive CE operations, but at the same time—and veterans who were around during that period of time have indicated this is true—a laxity in security set in. You didn’t want to go there anymore, you didn’t work as hard, and consequently more and more problems arise over the years with Agency officers turning coat, with problems developing in overseas operations. It’s a bad decade for counterintelligence.

I’ll jump ahead on this and move to the Year of the Spy. Congress got on our case very heavily—along with some other agencies, as well, this isn’t CIA specific. But both the House and the Senate oversight committees come up with very damning language about the state of counterintelligence in the mid to late 1980s. And they say something really needs to change. And the story here is even worse. We know about twelve to sixteen foreign agents uncovered, Americans working for hostile services. Actually, there were forty; only twelve were uncovered at this time. There are two dozen more we didn’t know about. If only we had known, they

would have blown the intelligence community sky-high. But eventually they turn up. And I’m talking about serious ones—we have Hanssen, we have Ames, we have Montes, the list goes on and on and on. It’s a very serious time for American counterintelligence.

Now, how do we try to rectify the situation? We create, at CIA, a very interesting organization. Now think, you’ve had ten years of decentralization of counterintelligence and then, because of the Year of the Spy, great minds get together and say, “You know what we need to do? We need to create a separate counterintelligence entity inside CIA that centralizes analysis and operations, staffed by CI professionals, and put on the seventh floor reporting to the Director.” *Déjà vu?* And a few years later, you have a senior FBI officer put there, running the counter-espionage, the spy-hunting component.

Now, what are our examples that we’re still trying to get it right? The Ames investigation—I’m not going to go into that in any great detail. We know it was a botch. There was no interagency collaboration, there was infighting, there was a fecklessness inside the CIA, a total lack of engagement until fairly far into it. The Nicholson case after Ames, however, is a good news story, but also a bad news story. Harold Nicholson, the highest ranking CIA officer ever convicted of espionage—he was a GS-15, the equivalent of a bird officer in the military services—looks back on the way the Ames case was handled and says, “You know, I can get away with it.” It’s astounding to think, after the Ames exposures, that Nicholson starts spying because he realizes that our CI investigatory capabilities are so mucked up that he, the smart guy, will get away with it. Thankfully, it didn’t work out because of financial

disclosures, polygraphs, things like that, put in place after Ames. So he's wrapped up very quickly; it was good collaboration. But then we have the dreadful Hanssen case, which is the FBI looking in the Angleton mirror and refusing to accept the obvious—that it's probably one of us. And we know about the tragedy of the false accusations against Brian Kelley.

Now, where do we seem to be going in a positive sense? There are some things I can't talk about here that are obviously collaborative and good information sharing, but one that I can talk about is the joint counterterrorism task force set up after 9/11. And those of you who are intelligence professionals and are knowledgeable about our business know that counterterrorism and counterintelligence have an awful lot of overlap. There are methodologies, techniques, ideas that are very much complementary. A terrorist group runs itself like an intel service, in effect, so CI methodology can be applied to CT. So, we're doing that in that realm and I think, in a general sense, the trend is up. But there are important critics out there, like Michelle Van Cleave and others, who are still making very pointed complaints about the state of counterintelligence.

My basic point, to sum up, is we're still trying to get it right. We haven't grappled yet with the real legacy of James Angleton. We're still going from one end to the other, or we're avoiding certain things because they're like a tar baby or something. But we need to have an honest appraisal of Angleton's accomplishments and failures for us to be able to move smartly ahead into a very challenging counterintelligence and counterterrorism environment. Thank you.

DAVID MAXWELL:

Thank you, David. And now to our last speaker, David Wise. He has been described as America's premier writer on espionage by *The Washington Post* Book World. He has commented on intelligence issues for CNN for six years and has appeared on nearly every major television network. He joined *The New York Herald Tribune* in 1951 and served as the newspaper's White House correspondent during the Kennedy administration and as chief of the Washington bureau. He was a fellow at the Wilson Center in 1971, lectured in political science at the University of California at Santa Barbara, and in 1969, he received the Page One Award of the Newspaper Guild of New York for best magazine writing. In 1974, he received the George Polk Memorial Award for *The Politics of Lying*. He is a prolific writer on intelligence and national security issues and is the author of numerous books, including *Tiger Trap: America's Secret Spy War With China*; *Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America*; *Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the CIA*; *Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for \$4.6 Million*; *The American Police State: The Government Against the People*; *Invisible Government*; and *The Espionage Establishment*. Our final speaker, David, the floor is yours.

DAVID WISE:

Thank you, David. Yes, I was at the Wilson Center forty-two years ago, which makes me 110, I guess.

But I remember it. And I will be brief because the day is long and I'm the last speaker, and I was told very

strictly speakers only had fifteen minutes, which, of course, no one else has paid any attention to.

But I will pay attention to it, partly because I really only have four points about James Angleton, so that's going to make it brief. But before I get into the four points, I thought some of you might be interested to know how I got into the Angleton mole hunt business and wrote my book, *Molehunt*, which was referred to very kindly by Chris Andrew earlier.

I was having lunch with an old friend who was a part of the Directorate of Operations, now called the Clandestine Service. And he said to me, "You know, David, we had some crazy times in the Agency." I said, "Oh, yes?" He said, "We actually had an officer fired because his name began with the letter K." And when I heard that, I said, "That's going to be my next book."

I said, "Well, who was that?" We fenced around a little and he said, "Well, the man's name was Peter Karlow." And I had to find Peter Karlow. I found out that he had an office at one time on K Street but he had now moved to California. I was able to make contact with Peter Karlow, and I said, "Look, I'm really interested in what happened to you." He had written part of the history of the OSS. He had been the equivalent of Q in the OSS—the gadget man, as in the James Bond movies. And he said, "Well, I'm coming in for an OSS function and, you know, let's get together." And I said, "Fine, let's have lunch." So we had lunch, and I can remember it very well. We were sitting outside at a very nice restaurant. It was a spring day. The trees were green, like they're turning now. And he said to me, "Well, I will cooperate with you, providing that what happened," he

said, "providing you write about the others." I said, "Others? There were others?"

He said, "Yes, indeed." He said there were dozens of people whose careers were damaged by James Angleton. And so, that became the focus of my book not so much on Angleton, but on his victims, or on the careers that were damaged or destroyed by James Angleton. There was Peter Karlow, of course, then there was Dick Kovich, who'd handled a woman that Angleton had mistakenly said was a mole in Norway, and she wasn't. And then there was Paul Garbler. Well, I'll come back to why Paul Garbler.

Angleton's mole hunt, I am told, paralyzed the CIA's Soviet Division for a period of time and brought many of its operations to a halt. Now, my friend David Robarge says there were operations alive and kicking during that period. But I can point out, you can be paralyzed and still be alive and maybe kicking a little bit. So, I think it is fair to say that the operations against the Soviets were definitely curtailed during that period. And there's no question that the mole hunt destroyed or damaged the careers of dozens of loyal CIA officers. And the proof of this is that Congress found it necessary to pass not one, but two "Mole Relief Acts." And, as David points out, that's how they were informally known within the CIA. And the first one, passed in 1981, was to compensate Dick Kovich and Paul Garbler.

So, who was Paul Garbler? Now, this was a problem for me. This all started at lunch with the letter "K," but Paul Garbler didn't have the right last name. So, I found him and he was willing to talk to me; I don't know why people talk to me, but a lot of them do.

He was living out in Tucson. So, I went out there and he invited me into his home. We were sitting in his library, and there were a lot of books, a wall full of books, and I said, "Well, tell me about, you know, your career." And he told me about the career and how he'd started out in Berlin as a case officer. He said, "I recruited a real colorful character there." And he said, "He actually, autographed a book for me when I left Berlin." I said, "Oh, I'd like to see that." So, he reaches up to the top shelf—he's a pretty tall man—and he pulls down this book, and I open it up and it's inscribed, "To Paul from Franz Koischwitz."

Now I've got my letter "K." It was like a light bulb going off. And it became clear to me, as my research continued, that Angleton and his people, the mole hunters, felt that it wasn't that Garbler had recruited Koischwitz. It was the other way around. In the strange, upside-down world of counterintelligence, they assumed that it was Koischwitz, who had the letter "K," who recruited Paul Garbler. By the way, Koischwitz was also known as Alex Kopatzky, and when he came to the United States, he was given the name Igor Orlov. I think his wife, whom I know, still runs a successful picture gallery in Alexandria. But in any event, Kopatzky, as it turned out, or Franz Koischwitz, as the inscription said, *was* working for the KGB. We now know that. But the mole Angleton found was not in the CIA. He was an agent; he was not a staff officer of the CIA. So, after that and all of the destruction of all these careers, they found one recruited agent. And, as far as I know, that was it, at that time.

Well, Garbler's situation is worth mentioning in a little bit of detail. After Berlin and Franz Koischwitz,

Garbler became the first station chief in Moscow. The first station chief. And there, he was responsible for the Penkovsky case, he was involved in the famous Cherepanov papers, which had suddenly shown up on the doorstep of the American embassy. And I guess the diplomats were of the persuasion, going back to the '20s, that gentlemen don't read other people's mail. So, they said, "We've got to return these papers to the Russians, this could be a provocation." Paul had the wit to at least photograph all the papers before they were returned to the Russians. But the Angleton people felt that Cherepanov, who provided these papers, was a phony, and was a sent agent, and so on.

But Paul finally comes back to the United States, and they call him into his superior's office. And they said, "Well, Paul, we have good news for you. Your next assignment is Trinidad." Well, here is this man who had been the first station chief in Moscow and knows all about operations with the Russians, against the Russians, and suddenly he is being sent to Trinidad. He said, "What? I can't believe this." And they said, "Well, you know, Dick Helms thinks it's very important to take a look at the Caribbean." So, I said to Paul, "Well, really it wasn't too bad. You could go down there and get a nice suntan and drink a lot of rum," and so on. But that wasn't what he wanted. So, he was one of the two eventually compensated under the first Mole Relief Act.

The case of Peter Karlow is even more interesting, because Peter fought for twenty-six years to clear his name after he was fired by the CIA. He had a nice career in the private industry with Monsanto, as I recall. But still, he had been fired as a suspected Soviet spy and he wanted to clear his name. And so, Peter eventually saw

Bill Casey at an OSS gathering, and he said, “You know what’s happened to me and it isn’t right.” And Casey was the one, to his credit, who said, “Well, we’ve got to rectify this.” And so, the second Mole Relief Act was passed. Peter Karlow got \$500,000. Well, it’s not \$500 million like the current lottery, but that was probably the biggest amount given to any suspected mole. And it’s a lot of money, and government agencies don’t hand out half a million dollars just for nothing. So, he had suffered and so had Paul Garbler and Dick Kovich.

But as I did my research, I discovered there were quite a few other people. They weren’t fired like Peter Karlow, but they were shunted aside and put in strange jobs that were make-work jobs. In the book, I interviewed many of them and have the pictures of some of them; it was not a good situation. I think, David, you said the real culprits were caught, but I guess my main point is I only know of one real culprit, Kopatzky, who, as you pointed out, was not a staff officer.

So, we’re taking the long view here. I think the answer is, although his job was to suspect everyone, and I suppose if you’re in counterintelligence, that’s your job, and he *did* suspect everyone, but on balance, what Angleton did was destructive to the people, to the lives, and to the operations of that Agency. It was, as my friend said at the lunch that began all this for me, it was a crazy time and a bad time in the Agency.

I’ll mention a couple other things beyond my four points, but I’m not going to go very long. A couple of people have mentioned the mail opening operation. There were twenty-eight million pieces of mail provided to the counterintelligence agents working under Angleton. Now, most of the operation was centered

in the two airports in New York, but they were also opening mail, part of the time, in San Francisco, New Orleans, and Honolulu. Twenty-eight million pieces of mail were given to them to screen and they open 215,000 pieces of mail, even though it is clear under the Fourth Amendment that you cannot open first-class mail without a warrant and they had none. How did they do it? Just like your Aunt Matilda, they had steam kettles. And they would steam the letters, and then open them with a little stick that would go under the flap. And then it would come up easily. And they’d read the letter, photograph it, whatever they did, and then put the letter back, reseal it, and send it on its way.

That was a totally illegal operation, and in the Church Committee report there is a reference to a memorandum written by, I believe, Angleton’s top deputy. They don’t give the name, so I won’t speculate about who it is, but this memorandum is proof that they realized what they were doing was unconstitutional and illegal. The memorandum said, “It’s very important,” and I must emphasize in this memo he wrote, “That all the intelligence agencies must deny that we opened any mail,” that this project was going on. And he said, since really nobody knows about it, it should be, “relatively easy to hush up,” unquote. Well, that was true for a long time, at least until the Senate investigators got into it and Loch Johnson and company were able to do that.

That was an example of where counterintelligence crossed the line of legality. But again, as Angleton said, and Loch quoted him, “If I said that we don’t have to obey the laws like other agencies, then that

was imprudent of me.” He didn’t take it back, he just said it was “imprudent.”

I’ll tell you another little story, a personal story of one of the people I interviewed for my research, named Ray Rocca. He was one of Angleton’s deputies and he lived out in northern Virginia where I always get lost, because all these fellows live out in northern Virginia. Ray was so Angletonian that his hobby was raising orchids, just like Angleton. And so, we were talking and he was a helpful, nice guy; a lot of these people are nice guys. Then he says, “Tell me about your background.” So, I told him that I’d been a newspaper man, I’d written some books, and then somehow we got on the subject of the Russians, and I said, “You know, I was over in Moscow.” And I was telling him something and he said, “When were you in Moscow?”

Well, I said, “I was there in 1983 and 1985.” Well, he whips out a pad and he starts writing it down. And I’m thinking, “Oh, they’re starting a file on me.”

I thought, well, that gives me some good insight into the counterintelligence mind.

I guess I would just leave you with the thought that, on balance, since we’re taking the long view here, Angleton, who I agree was probably a bright guy, although maybe not as bright as he thought he was, he probably did more harm than good. Which is not to say we don’t need counterintelligence. Of course we do. And we need intelligent counterintelligence. But we don’t need the Angleton era. Thank you.

DAVID MAXWELL:

Okay, well thank you very much, David, and for all three speakers. We’ve got time now for questions. We’ll

have the first one here, if you could wait for the microphone. Come on down this way.

UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE:

Mr. Wise, talking about the line of illegality, my first bar was the Illinois bar, and in Illinois, they have what they call a “Dead Man’s Statute,” where if you’re a plaintiff and you’re suing the estate of a dead man, you’re not allowed to testify about a conversation you had with that man who is now deceased. That’s kind of peculiar to Illinois. I’ve loved this conference, but it does trigger in me some sense of unfairness that Jim Angleton isn’t here to testify. So, my question to you, Mr. David Robarge: if Jim Angleton had presided this entire conference and had heard these comments, what would have been his testimony today?

DAVID ROBARGE:

Alright, that’s a real biographer’s challenge. Of course, he would be more inclined to agree with people like Pete Bagley and Ed Epstein. One of Angleton’s efforts, after his forced retirement, was to, as I think has been indicated already, engage in a quiet, influence operation in which Epstein became—wittingly or not I don’t know, a part of by, trying to give the Angleton view of the world, and explain, in a non-confrontational manner, how he saw the world and how he went about his business.

Jim was not, as best I can tell, willing to entertain a lot of dissonant views. There was a regrettable uniformity of attitude on the counterintelligence staff. It would have been a more vibrant and more productive element, I think, had there been sort of a devil’s

advocate, perhaps even one built in, like Mossad has. In that sense, he was too inclined to go with an increasingly ideological and skewed view of things, particularly in the 1960s. I think he would reject some of the rash charges that we've heard. There's been a little bit of invective thrown around today that I think is a little over the top. He was not that kind of person, personally. He was very close to a small circle of friends. He was very considerate. He took interest in peoples' lives and families. He was a compassionate person in many ways, which strikes us as exceptionally odd when we consider the ruthlessness and bloodlessness of the counterintelligence profession, which adds, I think, to the fascination and the appeal of the man, to have that kind of bifurcated personality, in a sense, the way he had the bifurcated career.

I think he would probably say that the long-term legacy is one that we are still trying to learn. It's one thing to have a reaction to operational failures, but it has to be moderated and tempered. And the sorts of overreactions that he saw occurring in the mid-1970s at the Church Committee hearings, for example, are to him somewhat indicative of one of the flaws of American democracy that our enemies will exploit. And, as I mentioned in my earlier remarks, those flaws in our system, in our political culture, in our psyche, are ones that adversaries in the world continue to try to exploit, albeit not quite in the same fashion. I think he would say that if something comes out of a conference like this, a heightened awareness of the need for some kind of built-in skepticism and a sense that we need to protect ourselves from an external threat, would be a net benefit, and

he would live with the slings and arrows that have been chucked at him today.

JOHN PETTY:

John Petty. We talked about the mail openings, or the panels did, throughout the whole day, and how illegal they were, but where did it start? The FBI and CIA wouldn't do anything without direction, to a certain extent, I'm sure, but who started it, and how did it progress through the years to the Church Committees and such?

JOHN PRADOS:

I'll take that. The mail openings actually started in 1952. It was an experimental program. It was, in fact, totally aimed at Soviet penetrations of the United States. And it reached, as David noted, twenty-eight million letters. That's an average of seven-thousand Americans' letters every day, over a period of decades, until it stopped in the middle 1970s. That's the level of this thing.

It began as an effort to discover accommodation addresses. Imagine you want to communicate with your spy, but you don't want to do it at any place where that communication can be discovered or found, so you find an innocent place that you send your communication to, and then that person can pick it up without a challenge. It's the same idea as a dead drop, except in this case it involves a letter of communication. In any case, there was a single meeting between high levels of the CIA, in this case Richard Helms, along with, I believe, Dulles and the Postmaster General. And Helms' name is on the only record that exists of this meeting.

This record turns out to be the only time the Central Intelligence Agency ever discussed this operation with the Post Office Department. The Central Intelligence Agency was aware, in 1952, the mail opening operation was not legal. The Post Office Department reserved judgment on the whole process. The CIA never went back to find out the conclusion because they didn't want to know if there was a negative result from a Post Office Department consideration.

Instead, they continued the operation. After an initial experimental period under the Soviet Division, it was taken over by Angleton's CI staff. And Angleton's CI staff carried out this operation for the entire period of time. Six Postmaster Generals of the United States were not informed of this operation carried out by the CIA. On two occasions, the Inspector General of the CIA investigated the mail opening program and decided that it was contributing nothing to United States intelligence and should therefore be terminated. The Director of Central Intelligence never took a step to terminate the program. And, in the late 1950s going into the 1960s, the aim of the program switched from going against potential Soviet agents to going against American dissidents, including the Civil Rights Movement, black nationalist movements, and the American anti-war movement.

Repeated efforts to close down the operation, which eventually split between Angleton's staff and the CIA Office of Security because it was intensive on manpower and Angleton did not want to waste personnel slots on this program, so he got the Office of Security to provide the manpower to carry it out. The Nixon administration, which wanted to cut back

CIA because President Nixon didn't like the Agency, kept ordering it to shave its budgets. The Office of Security came out three times to eliminate this program in order to save the personnel slots for things that it wanted to keep on its agenda. And each time, Mr. Angleton went to the Director and appealed to keep the program open and Mr. Helms agreed. The first time around, Karamessines, Deputy Director of Operations, also agreed. The second time, he went with the Security staff to knock it out, but Helms overruled them.

Two things are significant here. One, it's not just that Mr. Angleton had a certain idea of something. His single-minded pursuit of that against every obstacle contributed to the seriousness of the situation. Second, the degree to which Mr. Helms's fingerprints are on this because of his own repeated decisions to keep the program running, despite its cost to the Agency, and also in spite of the fact that the Agency was aware of the illegality of the program moving right along. So, Mr. Helms was willing to proceed with a program that was universally perceived as illegal.

DAVID WISE:

Just to add one note here, you were quite right in saying that is wasn't just aimed at gathering Russian intelligence. They were interested in Civil Rights and blacks and other dissidents during that period. But that wasn't random, these people were targeted. They must have had a list.

JOHN PRADOS:

They did have a list.

DAVID WISE:

These people were targeted. I would add, it's sort of amusing that I'd mentioned the kettles. At some point, someone said of Angleton's job, "This is not the way a high-tech agency should be operating." And so, someone ordered a big steam oven to open the letters. Well, the oven was sent over to Idlewild, now Kennedy Airport, I believe, and they discovered that the oven didn't work. So, they went back to the steam kettles.

DAVID MAXWELL:

David, do you have anything to add?

DAVID ROBARGE:

Yeah, a couple of points to add, the mail opening program, obviously one of the most controversial activities the Agency ever engaged in, is a clear indication of our ignorance of the Soviet target and our willingness to do practically anything to find out about, at this time, a very, very dangerous enemy. They have the H-bomb, for example, by the time HTLINGUAL is started.

What were we looking for? Yes, accommodation addresses, but all sorts of things. And keep in mind, too, we're not just talking about intercepting Americans' mail. We're talking about intercepting *any* mail going between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and in some cases, for shorter periods of time, the U.S. and Cuba. That's why there was an operation in New Orleans, and U.S. and communist China, and why there was an operation subsidiary in San Francisco. What were we looking for? We were looking for clues to operational trade-craft, accommodation addresses, secret writing, use of microdots. We were looking for techniques of

Soviet mail censorship, so when we sent letters into hostile territory, we could see whether they had been opened or not, tampered with in some fashion. We're looking for suspects; we're looking for contacts. The standard technique with the program was to do a mail cover in which the outside of the envelope, if it was deemed suspicious, was logged. The recipient and the sender were put down in a log, and that became, later, the fodder for watch lists. If, later on, some of those people were clearly identified as suspects, then the material might be opened.

It did expand during the MH/CHAOS period to include domestic targets, as well, largely because of their potential foreign connections. That was, after all, the whole point of MH/CHAOS, to determine whether there was a foreign hand behind the anti-war movement, the black radical movement, various other kinds of left-wing movements of the day. None of that was ever proven. Two Presidents insisted the Agency do it. We want to keep in mind that these are presidentially-mandated projects. MH/CHAOS—HTLINGUAL we cooked up on our own, in cahoots with the Post Office. An interesting coda to the project one of the Postmasters' General at the end of the program was that a former Agency officer refused to continue with it. And he caused the operation's closing.

JOHN PRADOS:

William J. Cotter.

DAVID ROBARGE:

Yeah, right.

JOHN PRADOS:

He was not a Postmaster General, he was the Chief Postal Inspector.

DAVID ROBARGE:

Right, excuse me. He refused to go along with it, and so it closed down. The program was brought to the attention of DCI Schlesinger during the so-called “Family Jewels” collection. These were his efforts, after he heard about the Plumbers operation, to find out what else the Agency had done that was potentially illegal or a charter violation. So, he puts out a broadcast to the Agency workforce saying, “Tell me about anything we’ve ever done that we shouldn’t have,” which was why a fairly large stack of paper accumulated, the 693-page, so-called “Family Jewels” report. It’s all been declassified, at least the content of it. There are some things that were hacked out in the redaction process. There are still some sensitive foreign equities in there. But for the most part, the worst dirty laundry has been exposed, and one of those was the mail opening operation. It was terminated at that point under Colby.

JOHN PRADOS:

I need to add couple of things to what David just said. Number one, that it wasn’t a case of taking covers and deciding later whether the mail was worth investigating. In fact, it was a question of taking mail out of the mail flow and returning it to the mail flow within twenty-four hours or less, because otherwise the absence of the first class mail would be notable. Therefore, the decision to open the mail and record

contents was a decision that was being made in real-time on a constant basis. Thus the need for the watch list. Anyone who was on the watch list had their mail opened and recorded simultaneously.

Number two, on the MH/CHAOS operation, there never was a presidential order to create an MH/CHAOS operation. That was a *supposition* that Director Helms took with him out of the Oval Office. He went back to Langley and directed the counterintelligence staff to organize this operation because he knew the President was interested in this material about the anti-war movement, not because the President had ordered him to do so.

DAVID MAXWELL:

Okay, next question.

RICHARD WILLING:

Richard Willing, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA. Could I ask the panel how James Angleton would do in the counterintelligence environment of today? Would his mindset and skillset conjure with a world of multiple natural targets as opposed to one super heavy-weight? And how would he fare against an asymmetric enemy like Islamic jihadism, or would he?

DAVID ROBARGE:

I think he would be an awkward fit, because I don’t think he would have, especially in the latter years, the mental agility to deal with the variety of targets that we’re confronting today. When you think about the varied issues we’re dealing with, various hard target countries, North Korea, Iran, when we’re dealing with

We need to have an honest appraisal of Angleton's accomplishments and failures for us to be able to move smartly ahead into a very challenging counterintelligence and counterterrorism environment.

multifarious terror organizations, I'm not sure that, later on anyway, the intellectual discernment that's necessary to figure out the proper response to those threats was necessarily in Angleton's psyche at that point. He might have been able to handle it earlier on, but I question whether, certainly after the early 1960s period, he would have been capable of it.

DAVID WISE:

Well, I don't know. I think he would have liked the Patriot Act. He would have liked people having the books they take out of libraries scrutinized. I see certain parallels there. And I think he would have been happy with Guantanamo and maybe the secret prisons and enhanced interrogation and all the rest of it.

He was a Yale man, I think he had mental agility. I went to Columbia like General Kalugin here, but I still think a Yale man could have been happy with some of what's going on now.

DAVID ROBARGE:

Well, David, I kind of question that, because the techniques that were used against Nosenko, for example, are definitely bad CI methodology. That's not the way you uncover a source, by putting them in stir

and occasionally hostilely interrogating them, but for the most part leaving them well enough alone. If you look at the interrogation records of the Nosenko case, they are kind of interesting. It was really a psychological gambit that the Agency was running against him. The hostile interrogations were not only very few in number, but actually pretty short in duration. Now, I wouldn't want to have to sit through them for *any* duration, but we're not talking about what has been indicated during the so-called "Global War on Terror," certain things that were done to individuals in our black sites or anything like that.

Mostly, Nosenko was just left to brood about his eternal fate with the hopes that he would crack through loneliness and lack of attention and such, with occasional visitations by physicians to make sure he was okay, things like that. I think the fact that Angleton did not order the incarceration, not that he could have anyway, he had no such authority is a clear indication that it wouldn't have been the right technique from his standpoint. If anything, he probably would have wanted to let Nosenko go and see where he landed, who he talked to, lead him along, maybe try to double him back again.

JOHN PRADOS:

I've got to say, the paradigm of the War on Terror is there's a certain corpuscular structure. The kind of thing that Angleton loved: to solve the intellectual puzzle, to get into the little details, to use the mass of data to get at the enemy. I think he would have enjoyed the War on Terror. I have to agree with David Wise.

DAVID MAXWELL:

Okay. Sir?

DAN MULVENNA:

Thank you. Dan Mulvenna, the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We worked fairly closely with Mr. Angleton and his CI staff in the Kazakh channel, and I saw in David's slides—excellent presentation, by the way—a comment about the penetration in Canada and the wrong man situation. Now, if you read the literature, in particular one British author, you would read that Jim Angleton controlled and focused our operation on the head of our Russian Desk operations, my boss, as being a Soviet mole. And I would like to make a little more nuanced comment on that.

First of all, we're quite capable of screwing up our own investigations without a lot of help from you guys.

Second, Jim was, of course, intensely interested—as were our other allied services in five and six and the Australians and New Zealanders—in the result of our two-year investigation, which was a mirror image of the Brian Kelley case. I would recommend to any future CE specialists, particularly in CIA, if they go on another mole hunt, go into your records and dig up

our old brief on that case and read it before you go on the next mole hunt.

In any event, although he was intensely interested in it, and although he provided assistance to us of a technical nature when we needed it, Jim Angleton did not drive us to do the investigation. We came up with the idea that this officer was potentially a legitimate candidate all on our own.

Point two: ironically, perhaps the person most convinced that Jim Bennett, the head of the Russian Desk in our service, was a mole, and who did his own independent, deep analysis and investigation was Clare Petty. On every occasion we visited the CIA headquarters, he would get hold of us and whisper in our ears and talk to us and run up the quarter, keep talking to us as we were leaving the building, telling us we needed to really get that mole. He also wrote a 200-plus page thesis that Angleton was a mole, and, by the way, he also identified—and I won't mention their names—two other individuals in the CI staff and wrote papers on them saying they were moles, as well.

So the paranoia, if that was the word you were using, or the paranoid tendencies, weren't totally confined to Mr. Angleton.

BILL WISE:

Thank you. Bill Wise from Johns Hopkins, SAIS. I wonder if the panelists would comment the legacy of Angleton's special relationship with the Israelis, I will not say "in light of current circumstances," but I assume that you might take us there.

JOHN PRADOS:

I'd like to say something about the general question of liaison. Angleton built another little aspect of his empire around the whole idea of liaison. In that 1975 paper he wrote that I was quoting to you earlier, one of his sections argues that liaison with foreign services has got to be primarily, if not exclusively, a counterintelligence role because foreign countries maintain counterintelligence apparatuses, but many don't have intelligence services. So, he was building very strongly on the Israeli account when he did that, as well as his work on the Italian account.

But if you looked at what Angleton actually did: the Bennett case is one example, and he went to England to sell the monster plot, leading to the Fluency Committee. In Norway, he went over there and fingered Ingmar Lyborg.

DAVID WISE:

Lygren.

JOHN PRADOS:

Yes, Lygren, that's right. So, there were good sides and bad sides to some of the liaison relationships. Now, CIA liaison has expanded and increased over the years, and now is at a very high level because of the situations the United States is in today. I wonder if this early sort of freezing of the method into this particular channel has had a positive impact on what intelligence services have been able to accomplish.

DAVID MAXWELL:

Okay, and next question. If there aren't any more, then we will make this one the last one, so make it good.

CLIFF FARRINGTON:

Cliff Farrington again, graduate student at George Mason University. Two questions for Dr. Robarge. First is, if I hear you correctly, it sounds as though the information you've looked at, Yuri Nosenko was a genuine bona fide defector, but as you said, he had some recovered memory problems later on as his value as a defector started to wane, I suppose. And my second question: we talked about the Global War on Terror, but, we haven't really touched that much on the counterintelligence problem with China. David Wise came out with a book, I believe, just last year on the incredible amount of resources that China is putting into us right now. Even at the height of the Cold War, I don't think the Soviet Union and the U.S. were as intertwined as China and America are today. During the duration of the Cold War, we had Soviet citizens going to our universities, but they were more a novelty than anything else. Today, Chinese students keep a lot of universities *going*. So, in light of this, what is our counterintelligence landscape today? Who do we need? If Angleton wasn't the right man for his time, who's the right person to fill the shoes of a counterintelligence leader today? Thanks.

DAVID ROBARGE:

The first question? Both?

CLIFF FARRINGTON:

It had to do with whether I understood the Nosenko case correctly—

DAVID ROBARGE:

Right.

CLIFF FARRINGTON:

—that really, in the final analysis, he was a genuine defector. But it seems like there are so many inconsistencies in the things that he told. And I remember, I did hear that for the CI Center he stated clearly he was given drugs, and you told us very clearly that, from your research, this did not happen. So, there're a lot of credibility issues with Yuri Nosenko, but I was just wondering, was he the real thing? Did he just simply have some issues with the truth?

DAVID ROBARGE:

Yeah, he was given drugs, if you call cold medicine a drug, that's documented. I believe he was, despite the muddiness of the case, a genuine defector, and I think the best evidence comes from the Mitrokhin archive when he's put on a hit list. Of course, as Oleg was careful to note, they don't kill people inside the U.S. They were targeted when they were going to the Olympics in Canada later in the decade. That would have been considered an ideal venue for offing them.

Part of the Nosenko case—and this could lead us into a weird world, but a lot of the Nosenko case is tied up in iterative bona fides of other sources. In other words, if one of your sources says Nosenko is bona fide, you believe it because you believe the first source is bona fide.

The best example of this is the precious FBI source Fedora, true name Kulak, who worked at the UN in New York. This was J. Edgar Hoover's pet source inside the UN. He was unimpeachable, and when he backstopped Nosenko's story, that meant that if you disagreed about Nosenko, then you were disagreeing about Fedora, and that just couldn't be. This is one

of the reasons the FBI pulled out of the mole hunt quickly, because Fedora was contradicting Golitsyn, and that was a touchstone for J. Edgar Hoover just as Golitsyn was a touchstone for Angleton.

Now, what if you find out some years later that the Bureau has decided that Fedora is a plant and they are on record with that? About a decade later, after all of this hubbub, they conclude that Fedora has been a plant the whole time. Well, what does that say, then, about Nosenko? Was that all part of a job? And it just goes on from there, it's like throwing a stone in a pond, the ripple effect just touches on many, many other cases. So, it becomes all the more challenging to discern the truth because nobody here has had access to the actual case files, with perhaps the exception of Barry and myself. But even then, we're dealing more often than not with people's interpretations of those case files.

So, when you go through, for example, Bob Hathaway's section in his Helms study about Angleton and the problem of penetrations and defections, if I'm correct, the sources were not redacted out of the declassified version, so you can see references to various reports: the Fieldhouse report, the Cram study, *et cetera, et cetera*.

These are the source materials that people are relying upon to make judgments and evaluations ten and twenty years after the fact. They're not going back and looking at the original files, some of which are very hard to find, some of which may not exist anymore, we don't know. But that's how you have to deal with the reality. And I'm sorry to say that in the public realm, that's the kind of record that is going to be the last thing pried out of CIA, sensitive counterintelligence

files. You will never get that kind of stuff. It's operationally exempt, and we just wouldn't entertain the idea of even doing it as a public goodwill gesture, if you will, if we're capable of such things.

That's why I say, and you can see some extrapolations from these comments in my *Studies in Intelligence* article, we're never going to really get to the truth about Angleton, even in a good forum like this, because people are working off second and third-hand information. They're working off repetitive reminiscences from people who heard somebody else talk about Angleton. We're dealing with a lot of recycled and parboiled knowledge, so to speak, without really getting at the hardcore truth, which lays in the Agency archives. And we may just have to toss Angleton up as a kind of enigma, a person we may not ever be able to understand, which is probably the exact way he would like it.

JOHN PRADOS:

So, my Agency colleague may be more constrained to speak about this than I am, but I think if you look at the situation today, with respect to counterintelligence and what kind of a counterintelligence master, if you like, would be right, you need to break down the problem analytically. And analytically, the problem is one, the organizations that the nation is up against are of a different sort than the Soviet Union, or even the People's Republic of China. They tend to be small, cellular-based, with very constrained communications.

Two, despite their generalized weakness and "smallness," if that's an attribute, they have still been able to play United States organs. The fire-based Chapman

thing, the assassination of the former Afghan president, several other incidences where people pretending to participate in negotiations have gotten away with embezzling money out of the authorities show that the counterintelligence effort really is highly needed, but the reach isn't there. We can't steam open the letters of the communicating terrorists because they avoid using the telephone; they're using personal messengers and oral communications, I assume, and limiting their communications to the smallest amount. So, on the other hand, you also don't want to have a counterintelligence chief who goes overboard on interrogations and captures with the idea that somehow that would reveal the messages that are circulating back and forth among these small cells.

So, this is really a difficult problem. I should add another factor, too, which is our own methods and techniques. Our own methods and techniques have become highly mechanical and technological, so we are focusing our collection on a particular range of product. A social scientist, that's what you need. Somebody who is not going to be overly committed to the technology, somebody who hopefully might avoid the paranoid track, if you want to call it that, and someone who has the sophistication to look at a play, and read into it. How's that?

DAVID MAXWELL:

Okay, with that I think we are going to close and adjourn to the reception. But before we close, let me just take a minute to, I think speaking for everybody, thank all the great speakers that we've had. And I think this has truly been an honor to gain insights

and hear remarks beyond what has been published, and to hear these great speakers throughout the day, talk on this very complex subject that I think continues to deserve study.

So I'd like to thank all the speakers, and I'd like to thank Christian Ostermann and Bruce Hoffman for their collaboration and vision, David Robarge for putting this together, and all the staff here at the Woodrow Wilson Center for making this hap-

pen, and for all of our participants who came with thoughtful questions. And I *know* everybody got as much out of this as could possibly be given. And hopefully there's a twenty-six-year-old graduate student out there at Georgetown, a scholar here at Woodrow Wilson or at George Mason, who will be that CI officer or chief in the future who will deal with these complex problems in the world we live in today. So, thank you very much.