The National Conversation--9/11: The Next Ten Years

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>> Good afternoon and welcome to The Wilson Center, the Chairman of the Wilson Center Joe Gildenhorn is here and many of the Wilson Council members are behind him and we have a overflow attendance this afternoon, some are in another room. For those that can hear me in that other room please know that your questions also will be conveyed to our moderator, Daivd Ignatius, and he will try to ask as many questions from the audience as possible. I am Jane Harman, director, president, and CEO of our nation's living memorial to our 28th and first internationalist President. Yesterday no one missed it, we marked a terrible and sad anniversary for the United States and the world. There are only a handful of dates each century that need no explanation, and that define an era. 9/11 is one such date. • As the towers were falling and the Pentagon fire was burning, I was walking toward the US Capitol I was then a member of Congress, a senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee and my destination was the Intelligence Committee rooms in the Capital Dome, the place most believe was the intended target of the fourth plane which, as we know, thanks to the heroism of its passengers went down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. My staff called to alert me that the Capital had just been closed as were the house office buildings. So I, and most of Congress, probably including Mike Rogers, milled around on the lawn in front of the Capital. No evacuation plan. And as I frantically tried to reach my youngest daughter who was then a D.C. high school student and my older kids who were living in New York City, there was no cell coverage either. We have surely come a long way in the 10 years since. I'm proud of my own role in co-authoring the 2004 Intelligence Reform Law I think which is a centerpiece of our intelligence capability that is now far more robust, insisting that the Bush administration abandon efforts to work outside the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act pressing for more privacy and civil liberties oversight and urging that the full intelligence committees in Congress be briefed about our CT activities. I'm also in awe, and I think all of you are too, of those in government as well as first responders and average citizens whose vigilance has forded many attempts since 9/11 to harm us, only some of which can even now be revealed to the public. We all know the list of things left undone like making fully functional the President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Board and creating a national interoperable emergency communications network which, shockingly, still does not exist. But today's panel will employ a broader lens, a prospective look at threats and strategies to combat them. Despite the solid track record in preventing attacks since 9/11, everyone should understand that there is no such thing as a hundred percent security. To improve the odds we must remain vigilant and let me suggest two areas that need a lot of work, other than the ones I've mentioned countering the narrative of extremism and building citizen resiliency. Al-Qaeda and other groups will hear about this I'm sure, use a narrative a compelling story line to convince susceptible individuals that violent extremism is the only way to achieve their goals. Inspire Magazine, a Yemeni produced regular electronic communication is written in colloquial English with step-by-step instructions for assembling bombs and deploying weapons. And inspirational sermons by the American Yemeni and terrorist mentor Anwar Al-Awlaki are included in thousands of videos, on You Tube and other websites. How do we convince the next 19-year-old not to attack innocent civilians? No doubt that will be addressed here today too. This panel is the third in the Wilson Center's New Signature National Conversation Series. We will release shortly a schedule of future conversations, but mark your calendars for November 1 when Henry Kissinger, joined by a panel of experts, will lead a discussion on a regional solution for Afghanistan. Our moderator, to my left, and our panel, all good friends, are superbly qualified to address the subject of today, the next 10 years. The timing of this panel is not an accident. This is the first day of
the next 10 years. Please welcome associated editor and columnist and noted author of several books.

Five?

>> Eight.

>> Eight, how could I have done that to him? Eight, is the ninth one in progress?

>> I just decided to stop work on it.

>> Today?

>> No.

>> In order to work on the panel? And my valued friend, David Ignatius who will introduce our panel. Let me commend David’s piece in the Washington Post yesterday which talked about President Obama’s agenda on this subject and noted that a very good job was done of alerting the public to a credible vehicle bomb threat in New York or Washington around this past weekend. Law enforcement and the public responded magnificently. I was in both cities this weekend. But vigilance must continue. So a civil, nonpartisan and substantive discussion of how to think about and shape our roles in the next decade starts right now.

[ Applause ]

>> David Ignatius: Thank you, Jane. I should say in starting that Jane Harman was one of my heroes when she was a member of Congress because she tried consistently to make bipartisanship work in national security policy and in particular in intelligence policy. She now has what, with all due respects to my fellow panelists, I have to say is the best job in Washington, running the Woodrow Wilson Center succeeding Lee Hamilton, a worthy successor to a great director. As Jane says, this is the day after 10 years after and so we’re going to look forward after so many moving deeply somber recollections over the last few days of the past. We’re going to look forward and talk about what’s ahead over the next 10 years. And I want to start by asking -- I’ll introduce the panel and then I’ll ask my first question. Immediately to my left is Congressman Mike Rogers, he’s a Congressman from Michigan. He is now the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and is working for the same kind of bipartisanship that Jane struggled for. Next to him is retired General Stanley McChrystal who was the COM ISAF, Commander of NATO Forces in Afghanistan, before that was the head of the Joint Special Operations Command, is now teaching at Yale and writing a book. Next to him is Mike Leiter, who for many years was head of the National Counter-terrorism Center, has just retired from that position and is in the happy position of getting to think
a little bit about what he wants to do next. Next to him is Jim Zogby who is the founder and head today of the Arab-American Institute and who is well-known as a pollster at home and internationally with Zogby Research Center. And finally Bruce Hoffman who is a professor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, for many years was at the RAND Corporation and is widely regarded as one of the country's most experienced and wisest terrorism analysts. And I'm going to ask Bruce if he would start us off. As you look towards the next 10 years, describe for all of us how you would characterize the threat that the United States is likely to face.

>> Bruce Hoffman: Well, interestingly, I think the threat has evolved largely because of our successes. Certainly the attrition of Al-Qaeda core, the weakening of really a central apparatus in Pakistan has clearly reduced the threat. But I think with that reduction comes new challenges. The movement is likely to fragment, and as a fragment it will probably spread to different countries and locations. It will be a large or a collective group of terrorists in any one place necessarily that we can easily site with predator drones with other weapons. But I think what concerns me the most in this fragmentation is that groups that we haven't even heard of now will in a very short period of time become threatening in one sense or another. And the reason I say that, Al-Qaeda was founded in 1988, and it was really 10 years, a decade before it mounted its first major international terrorist operation which was the bombings of our embassies in East Africa in 1988. Take a group like Al-Qaeda in Arabian peninsula, it basically amalgamated or came together in January, 2009. By the end of the year it had attempted to assassinate the Saudi official responsible for counter-terrorism and of course presented one of the most serious threats to the United States since 9/11/2001 which was the December, 2009 airline plot. And this we see is a pattern. Terrorist groups seem to be becoming more threatening, with a greater rapidity than ever in the past.

>> David Ignatius: Let me turn to Mike Leiter for another sort of baseline comment about the threat. Mike, you just left a position where you were charged at looking at all source intelligence and trying to make sense of what the threat was, how it was evolving, how to cope with it. Look out, if you would, today and then as far out as you'd like to give us your sense, in particular if there're points where you would disagree with Bruce's framing of this we'd be interested.

>> Mike Leiter: I would largely agree with Bruce. I think I'd add a couple of things. First of all, domestically I think looking out over the next 10 years, while I think it's unlikely that we see a significant increase in the threat of radicalization and mobilization here within the United States, vividly an ongoing threat. It's not going away. I would guess we'll probably remain at 2009, 2010 levels for the foreseeable future. And I think some of the fracturing that Bruce identified overseas and the emergence of various [inaudible] in different parts of the world runs the risk of at least maintaining again the trajectory that we've seen over the past two to three years here in the United States. The other piece that I would add is with the increase proliferation at technology. I think we will unfortunately in the next 10 years run an increasing risk of more technologically advanced weapons being used against us. Most fearful of course biological weapons, I think less likely some sort of improvised nuclear device, and I think even though these organizations are likely to be less organized than Al-Qaeda core has been over the past 10 years, the ability to gain access to these weapons and the technologies used to produce them will increase so that even less sophisticated organizations will have them within their reach potentially in the next 10 years.
>> David Ignatius: Mike Rogers, that's a specially chilling scenario and let me turn to you in your capacity as Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee charged with oversight of our intelligence agencies. Tell us how well you think they're prepared to cope with the kinds of threats that Bruce and Mike have described and what, if anything, you would see as urgent areas for improvement, again, in your role as a key person in oversight.

>> Mike Rogers: Well, there's several things happening. When you have the fragile states like Egypt where they're going through transition, or you have Libya that's going through transition, one of the concerns is when you looked at where they fell on intelligence priority lists in years past may not have listened to the top of our resources, our interest, our personnel, and clearly that has changed and changed quickly and we think that's going to happen more often than not in the near term. You're going to have other states that are changing and other states that are going to have fragile governments that are in some areas not quite governable before they finally get their feet on the ground. Those resources and deployed resources are a huge challenge for all of our intelligence services given the threats that they're facing everywhere else in the world. So as we move forward we all know that they can't sustain the kind of revenue increases that they had in the last decade, almost tripling the budget, that's unsustainable. So how do we keep the spending in check and then apply those resources to what I think is a growing and more diverse problem set is a real challenge for the Intelligence Committee.

>> David Ignatius: Let me turn to Jim Zogby and to one of the items that was on Bruce Hoffman's initial threat assessment and that was home-grown, what we call home-grown terrorism, referring to the Muslim-American, Arab-American community. Jim, you're part of that community but you've studied it extensively and I think we'd all be fascinated to know how you assess this issue, this problem going forward, the extent to which you think it is a problem.

>> Jim Zogby: I don't think it's the problem we've made it out to be in the sense that we've -- I made this point after the Christmas Day attempted bombing at -- it was a failure of intelligence to connect the dots, we knew that. But what we were doing at the time was putting up a board of America with little dots all over it of attempted terrorist acts and we were trying to force connect those dots, and as bad as it is to not connect, it's even more dangerous to force connect because you end up with a picture that's not real. Too many of the events that have occurred have been unconnected and have been as varied as Columbine, Virginia Tech and Tucson. We have to look at it as it is, not as we sort of fashion it to be. At the same time though what worries me most as I look forward is partly that, but it's also the general sort of attitude toward Islam and Muslims that is so pervasive right now in our political discourse. What's been great about America is our ability to absorb and our ability to transform new communities into America. The extent to which we don't do that, to the extent to which we alienate people, new immigrants coming in, we run the risk of actually making them ripe for the exploitation. Look, Anwar Al-Awlaki can sit in a cave in Yemen and try to lure alienated young people, but the bad behavior of political people here can alienate them making them an audience for him, and so that's the bigger threat. And if you saw the way the Park51 Debate exploded and in some ways it's still playing out and this nonsense to date over Sharia that is taking place in our presidential politics but also in 24 states legislation to ban it doesn't exist at all. It's sending a message to new Muslim immigrants, you're not part of us, you don't belong in our world. And there is a danger there, and that is that we send a message to young Muslim kids that -- we were talking about the narrative, we've got the narrative, it's called America. To the extent to which we deny that
narrative to a new group of immigrants coming in, we make them, I think, a threat that they don't have to be.

>> David Ignatius: Jim, just to follow up because you know the numbers. As you look at polling, do you find evidence that Muslims in America feel increasingly isolated, increasingly that they're facing hostility from the rest of the population?

>> Jim Zogby: When we ask a forward-looking question, the answer is yes. When we ask a current question, no. It's sort of like it's the, you know, what we used to call in polling the Reagan questions, are you better off than you were and are you going to be better off in the next four? Are you better off today? They feel great, they do feel good, they're worried about it, but when you say how concerned are you about the future, enormous concern and that is, I think, the problem. We talk about the Arab polling later but I think that you asked about here, and here is a real problem, I think.

>> David Ignatius: General McChrystal, let me turn to you to close out this first round of baseline questions. You as much as any person in our country helped shape our military response to terrorist threats around the world in this first decade. I'd ask you, based on that unique experience to look ahead and talk about what you think the military is going to need to do that's different, that augments capabilities that we have, to focus just a little bit more, I'd be especially curious whether you think that CT operations of the sort that JSOC has been associated with, the raid on Bin Laden's compound the perfect example. Could it be possible and effective without the broader counter-insurgency footprint to back them up which obviously if you look at the numbers is going to decrease?

>> General McChrystal: Yeah, thanks, Dave. I think that if you try to look ahead and you think of Christmas morning and your kid gets some toy that's got a million pieces and the first thing you do is you look at the pieces and you're a pretty small person, you start putting that thing together, and then about halfway through when it looks a little strange you pull out the instructions, I think that's going to be our requirement for the future. I don't think that we are going to be able to pull out tools that exist or that seem easy to use and start using them and then try to figure out what the problem is. I think that particularly to your question, particular focused efforts using a single tool like a JSOC element is only going to be appropriate if it's used in a wider effort, not just counter-insurgency but also our relations in the region. You can never solve the entire problem with a single tool, and I think that what we have got to do is understand that, I think, parts of the world are accepting of a certain national right to defend yourself. But I think they're only accepting if our wider policy makes sense to them. If it looks like our wider policy is simply to strike and it's not to engage and explain and to help them develop internally, then I think the logic is stretched and it's more difficult. I think that's what we're going to have to project as we go forward. I think we're going to have to be very thoughtful about measure twice, cut once.

>> David Ignatius: Let me ask each of you to respond quickly to what I would describe as the paradox of this new period in the Arab world but increasingly the Muslim world, and that is that this wave of citizen protest that has the chance of creating more democratic societies, we don't know yet, has also had the
effect of weakening what the intelligence community would call our liaison partners. To an extraordinary extent the United States depended during these last 10 years on the intelligence services of friendly Arab and Muslim countries, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, you all know the list far better than any of us. We're in a new world now where liaison is trickier, and I'd be interested in starting with Mike. What do we do about that, does that mean the United States has to think about doing more unilateral collection depending less on others? What's your thought?

>> Mike Leiter: Well, it's always in the United States' interest to have a unilateral collection capability that is at least on par with a liaison relationship. But liaison relationships have been a huge part of our success and they are incredibly important as we go forward in the next 10 years. But we've always had strained relationships with our liaison partners. The Pakistani relationship has been good and bad all in the same day. And when you look at other Middle Eastern countries, we had developed, over time, even countries that you might think have high degree of friction with the United States, we still have good partnerships on the counter-terrorism front because those are threats to those countries as well. And that will still filter out. Has it interrupted the flow of cooperation in some places, Egypt and others? Yes, clearly. Yemen is a great example. There's lots of turmoil in Yemen, the role is -- we're still trying to put back together the pieces of that relationship as we move forward. Al-Qaeda actually holds ground in the southern parts of Yemen which is a new problem for us. But those relationships are going to have those bits and starts. It's something they work on everyday. And sometimes those relationships go beyond the political fray that happens above them. So you can have that political turmoil and still have a good relationship with those liaison partners and that's where the agency is focusing its time and energy and I think rightly so.

>> David Ignatius: Based on what you see in overseeing the CIA and other intelligence agencies, are you concerned that the flow of information from other friendly services is diminishing, well, useful information in this new period?

>> Mike Leiter: Every case is different and I think every period is different. We have seen in some periods of time information just being shut down completely. Most of that has been brought back on line. Again for -- our interests that are mutually beneficial for both countries invoke intelligent services and whatever government happens next. And so those relationships are easy, I think, to turn back on, easier, not easy but easier to turn back on. And the agency and other intelligence services spend a lot of time trying to repair those relationships where you have that interruption. I will say that even given the turmoil, again, sometimes it would seem counter-intuitive but because of that political uncertainty and that sometimes the government's weakness those intelligence services play a pretty important role in keeping security and stability and so there is that ongoing relationship and there is still an ongoing flow of information. But you can always get to a point where an intelligence service because of politics or some other rationale just shuts off. I mean, clearly, we even have good relationships with our Russian intelligent services. Doesn't mean that they aren't trying to do bad things when it comes to intelligence, but it does mean we can find areas of cooperation. So you're going to see that kind of a relationship in places that have difficult political governance problems going forward.
David Ignatius: Stan, what about the military side of this liaison puzzle? I know that one thing that JSOC and Special Operations Forces have done is to work with other countries, Special Operations Forces, train them, get to know them. How well has that worked over the next 10 years, how important is that going to be?

General McChrystal: I think it has worked well but never perfectly. It's always problematic. I think one of the things we have to do is not be wedded to the status quo. We've got to understand that the world's going to change, governments will change, there will be some national boundaries that will change in the next 10 years. And rather than being very comfortable and being worried about losing what we have, I think we've got to understand, we're not going to be able to stop or control many of those changes. I think what we have to do is be adaptive to deal with them. And just as Chairman Rogers said, when there is a change, there are strong reasons for the new regime to want to have good relations and good connections, military intelligence. And I think what we've got to do is very maturely, you know, long live the king. You know, when the new regime comes in and deal with it.

David Ignatius: Mike, at the National Counter-Terrorism Center, one thing that you worked hard on, I know, is the question of messaging. How what the United States says as a government, how what our leaders say ends up impacting people in these countries where terrorist groups are potentially strong. Talk about messaging going forward. Big change for the Obama administration was to kind of tone down the war on terror, rather use different phrases. What about going forward, what are phrases that you think are going to work and what are ones that are going to get us in trouble?

Mike Leiter: Well, first, I've to give credit where credit is due and a lot of credit is to Stan McChrystal because I think JSOC earlier than almost any other element in U.S. government understood the importance of messaging and how actions influence what you're trying to say and trying to influence populations, and part of what we did at NCTC was try to adopt those lessons and obviously in different contexts either internationally in diplomacy or domestically, think about some of those lessons that Stan taught us all so well. I think going forward, first of all, the Arab Awakening is just such an opportunity. And that goes in part to the intelligence liaison relationships which are so important. But we have to, I think, be very careful and I think we've been good about this so far, we have to be careful not to strive to maintain a good tactical position and poison ourselves strategically by attaching ourselves to kind of that tactical partner that we need right now because with the Arab Awakening, there's a huge strategic awakening there's a huge strategic opportunity for the United States to associate ourselves, I think, with forces that have clearly undermined the al-Qaeda message and the ways in which they've overthrown or reformed their nations. And, again, if we associate ourselves with kind of the strong-arm tactics, because we have tactical imparities right now, that will pose real risks for us into the future. I think more broadly al-Qaeda has done a fabulous job over the last 10 years poisoning its own message. But we, I think, as the United States have to do, and Jim knows this far better than I do, we have to make sure we help accelerate that and, again, we don't do anything to undermine their own undermining. Al-Qaeda bombing a wedding party in Amman, Jordan, turn the people of Jordan against al-Qaeda's message so much better than anything our ambassador could have said in Amman or what the director of NCTC could have said. We have to continue through this period of the Arab Awakening, show that al-Qaeda's ideology of violence really doesn't produce any positive effects for the Muslim world. And I think as a U.S. government we then have to have -- make sure our actions are aligned with that message. And, again, that goes to some of
our political response in the period of the Arab Awakening. So we are not hypocritical saying empowerment of the people, change can occur through nonviolent means and that our diplomacy, our aid, our intelligence work is aligned with those messages which are clearly appealing as illustrated by the Arab Awakening.

>> David Ignatius: I can't resist asking you whether you think in this delicate process you're describing of standing back so that these larger forces can operate and perhaps giving up some tactical advantage. What you think the right stance of the United States is towards Syria. You're out of government now so I'm hoping it's a fair question. You know, that's an enormously consequential country. It's in a period of potentially violent transition, what's your thought?

>> Mike Leiter: Well, there are always incredible competing interests here. There are tactical interests that I don't want to completely dismiss. Some more actions in Yemen are critical to protecting the American people today. And you can't just play the long game, you have to take bad guys off the battlefield. Second, you don't want to say too much and promise too much if you can't actually influence the game. Because that just makes you look like a paper tiger. So I think our options with Syria early on were not wonderful, and I think the gradually escalating statements of U.S. condemnation combined with international condemnation, accepting that we are only going to do so much to change it ourselves, I think is probably hitting the right place. I think I would, like Steve Hadley has said I think pretty eloquently, being a little bit more vocal about how atrociously bad the Assad regime has been and I think ultimately that will carry the day and we have to be quite clear, so we are not hypocritical, where the United States stands, and that is supporting the people against an incredibly oppressive dictator who has only brought ruin to his country.

>> David Ignatius: Jim Zogby, I thought I saw you nodding your head as Mike Leiter was saying that we have our Syria policy about right. Is that -- would you agree with that and more broadly your polling frankly scares the heck out of me.

>> Jim Zogby: Good.

>> David Ignatius: And I would ...

>> Jim Zogby: I have a book too.

>> David Ignatius: ... like you to scare the heck out of our audience, you know, just to throw out one thing that I just noticed in a poll you did several weeks ago. If I'm not mistaken favorability ratings for the United States in key Arab countries are now lower than they were at the end of the Bush presidency. So maybe
you could talk about those results, but also just talk what are people feeling in Syria and Egypt and Libya about the United States as you measure it as a pollster.

>> Jim Zogby: We don't poll in Syria. We haven't polled in Syria, it's too difficult. But I would agree with Mike that I think presented with limited option we did about as good as we could do to handle it. I mean, this is a game that ultimately will be shaped by, and we hope in a constructive way by Turkey, by Saudi Arabia, by some neighbors in an effort to kind of find a regional stabilizing solution. I mean, Iran and Iraq are not being helpful right now but -- and Lebanon is on the brink. It is -- it is vulnerable to what happens in Syria. But in any case, the polling, you're right, it scared the heck out of me too. The fact is is that numbers were very low. The victory of Barak Obama spiked them way up, doubled, tripled in some countries [inaudible]. And those expectations have been dashed. And so in a sense when you say, you know, what should we be doing, remember, the last lunch I had with Karen Hughes when she was leaving her job and she had just done a piece that day in the Post it appeared, and the paper saying we're winning because al-Qaeda's favorable rating in Turkey was down to 9%. But ours was too, it was 9% in Turkey and so they may not be winning, but we're not winning either. And the point is is that it goes back to the very earliest polling we did in the Middle East. They like us, they like our values, they like our products, they like everything about us. They hate our policy, they're convinced we don't like them. I got called by a reporter during the time of the Mubarak turmoil and she said to me, if we dumped him now would our favorability rating go up? And I said you got the question backwards. We're not in trouble in Egypt because we supported Mubarak. He's in trouble in Egypt because he supported us. He supported us with the Iraq war. He supported us with Gaza and keeping his population quiet over things Israel was doing. He became a way-station on the road to rendition. These were things his people knew about and did not like. While the unpopular policies delegitimized leaders in the region, we were able to work with them because they frankly didn't give a damn what their people thought as they protected the interests of their regime. Now Arab opinions will matter after the Arab Spring. I mean, that's the one thing that has changed. Governments may not change but whatever governments are there are going to be more responsive to their own people and if not they will face a very uncertain future. And I look forward to, I think, a very uncertain decade. I don't think we know how this comes out whether good or bad and we may get some surprises yet in some countries that turn out better than we expect. But some will turn out maybe a little worse. But one thing will be sure, the policies of these governments will be more responsive to their people because they're now more afraid of what happens at home. I mean, even look at the Gulf Cooperation Council and the way they operated in Yemen and the way they've operated in the Horaine [assumed spelling] and the way they're operating vis-a-vis Iran and Syria. They're making their own way. We've lost the ability to lead in that region in part because our ratings are so low. Just one quick story. I remember in 2005 we had American rating, America's favorable rating of 5% in Jordan. That was when one of our officials went to Jordan to preview the speech that Condoleezza Rice was going to give in Cairo a couple months later. She started before this massive audience at the Dead Sea in Jordan, our policies have been wrong for the last X-number of years, people started counting back 60 years to see what, you know, what was going, oh, Arab-Israeli conflict. And she said we've supported kings and dictators against the people. People were aghast in the audience. It's like you're in Jordan, we've got a king, he's probably your last friend in the region. What are you doing? Well, the speech went on and it was over and a couple months later the President needed to meet with al-Malaki, we were having a problem with him. Yes, we've had problems with him even then. And Bush went over to meet with him -- where does he go to meet with him, Amman, Jordan. And I thought congressman, you know, if a president has a favorable rating of 40% or lower and comes to your district, you've got a bingo game to go to that night, or your grandmother is sick or something, you know. Our favorable rating was 5%. Bush comes and King Abdullah is greeting him at the airport and, you know, they have been friends through
thick and thin. And so it is a -- it's a problem, sure. Do we abuse our friends and throw them away? I think not. But at the same time we have to recognize that we've contributed to delegitimizing them at home. And now we've got to recast our whole policy to balance our interests and the interests of our friends and maybe do a little bit of soul-searching about how we handle, for example, a U.N. vote coming up in a couple of weeks, or how we handle some of the things that have become inflammatory in that region and maybe not deliver anymore self-inflicted wounds to ourselves as we're now facing an informed Arab opinion that is saying we now matter.

>> David Ignatius: You make a powerful point about Arab opinion mattering in a new way. Bruce, maybe you could finish this second round of questions by talking about how you see al-Qaeda's diminished leadership playing its hand now. I'm sure you study each [inaudible] missive, each little trace of intelligence that allows us to get some sense of how they see all this. I think we'd all be very curious for your reading.

>> Bruce Hoffman: Well, I think ironically, despite everything that we've just discussed, they see tremendous opportunities because terrorism, of course, thrives in instability and an uncertainty and that's what my four distinguished panelists have all described, an enormously dynamic situation. Whether they can take advantage of it is another matter. But I think sometimes we lose sight of what a terrorist organization is which is first and foremost a spoiler. They're out to tear things down, not to build things, and in that sense they're going to sense any opportunity or any vulnerability in the region to destroy things that we might favor, that certainly might hasten the progress towards democracy and they view times being on their side. Whatever good is coming out of the Arab Spring and the Arab Revolution now, it's still going to be years, perhaps even a decade or more before it actually solidifies or crystallizes. And during that amount of time I think they're going to be any number of disenfranchised, disenfranchised, disillusioned individuals that al-Qaeda will precisely see -- well, al-Qaeda that's associated movements will precisely see as a reservoir that they can draw from and that's in particular what worries me is the impatience that will happen and the instability will create new opportunities for al-Qaeda. Now, it's our job and certainly General McChrystal and [inaudible], you know, get effective pairing back al-Qaeda's ability to take advantage of those opportunities. But don't forget, this isn't September 12th, 2001 when we didn't have quite the grievous budget deficit we have today, when we didn't suffer under the travails of an ailing economy. We're looking to our military and to our intelligence community in the future to do more with fewer resources. And as I said at the beginning, if we're facing an enemy that also is fragmenting and where we'll both have to bolster our relationships with liaison organizations because of this fragmentation into smaller movements that are less difficult to track, more difficult to anticipate. Also our own intelligence community is going to have to be better, it's scanning the horizon and presenting the emergence, let's say, of an al-Qaeda and Arabian peninsula in a very constrained period of time such as we've seen.

>> David Ignatius: Let me ask a specific question. I've heard intelligence analysts say words to the effect, if the United States could have chosen the person from among the top Al-Qaeda leaderships to succeed Osama bin Laden in terms of the person who'd be most useful for our interests, we would have chosen Zawahiri, not a strong leader, kind of isolated in the Egyptian wing of al-Qaeda. A lot of people other than if some other people who would have been scarier. Do you share that view, and what kind of grade would you give -- Bruce Riedel gave a first hundred days report card. How would you grade Zawahiri's performance based on what we've seen?
>> Bruce Hoffman: Well, I think that a lot of the assumptions about Zawahiri were more wishful thinking than empirical analysis. There was some debate whether he would succeed Bin Laden. It was a no-brainer. In 2001 he merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with al-Qaeda. They were colinears. We may have liked to have styled him as the number two, or as the deputy but, in fact, they operated in tandem. So I think it was a given he would succeed. Often I think people rise to the occasion of leadership. I hope -- I'm hoping that he won't, but someone like Zawahiri wouldn't have been able to have prosecuted but not for him is a decades long struggle. He's -- I'm looking at this like when he was age 15 he formed his first subversive group in Egypt. I mean, he's been one way or another at least if not a terrorist someone leaning forward into the world of terrorism now for most of his life, and I think he succeeded in that. I mean, you're right, he's not the most telogenic personality. He's not the most loquacious personality. At least I think for many of their followers he doesn't have the warm fuzzy feeling that Bin Laden, you know, paradoxical as it sounds, but Bin Laden was someone that was a good leader in that he took an interest in his subordinates, knew the names of their families, this kind of thing. Zawahiri isn't that, I mean, he's a very cut and dried business man. But I think two things. One, he will take advantage of this opportunity because he doesn't want to see what he and Bin Laden created fall apart because of some missteps or because of some arrogance on his part. Secondly, I suspect over time he's like -- if he is going to prove his medal as an effective leader, he'll choose a number two or deputy that compliments him that doesn't completely reflect him and perhaps makes up for some of his relative shortcomings. But I think from his point of view you don't get to survive in this business for as long as he has unless he hasn't had this very polished and well-honed set of skills that I'd imagine as Bruce Reidel suggested will put him in good stead at least in the near future. I think the main thing is though it's going to be up to him to put al-Qaeda back in the ball game. It really is now a put up or, you know, put up or shut up moment. That they have to do something dramatic to catapult them back into a limelight. Now if we can prevent him from doing so then I'll be content to say in the future he will fade away, but I think it's too premature. [Inaudible].

>> David Ignatius: Jim, and then I want to turn to Mike and ask him some ...

>> Jim Zogby: Just quickly I wanted to say that the man was unique and I think very special in that regard. And it was the persona that whether it's real or not, the one he created, it fits into a Semitic tradition of the kind of the hanife [assumed spelling] or the John the Baptist, the esthetic who goes into the desert and is purified and has this personality that transcends the mundane. Zawahiri doesn't have that. Frankly no one in the movement has that and so we are good to be rid of him and there really is, in that sense, no mythic character who replaces him. I think ...

>> Mike Rogers: Mike, before you even get to that, I'll just say in 10 years when we do the 20 years later, I think Zawahiri's going to be nothing but the minorest of footnotes. I don't actually even think that the core of al-Qaeda may be the center of the discussion. I think it's much more likely, again, as Bruce said at the beginning, the groups that we don't know about yet or the current franchises grow and prosper. I don't think Zawahiri will influence that movement at all that significantly. I think even the Arab Awakening has made things more local and less centralized and in that sense, I think it will be a huge challenge for him to play a prominent role and I don't think it will be remotely like the [inaudible] it's been over the past 10 years.
David Ignatius: Mike, within the limits of what you can say in a public on-the-record session like this, as you reviewed the cache, the enormous cache of materials taken from Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad. What's the thing that we most need to know that you discovered looking at those materials?

Mike Rogers: I think I would offer two points. One, the incredible focus and commitment that Bin Laden had to perpetrating a catastrophic attack against the United States. As focused as guys like Stan were and his troops were, and as focused as my troops were, al-Qaeda is just as focused. And they didn't lose that over 10 years at all. He still believed he was in a righteous struggle and they were going to do everything they could to attack us and I think even using unconventional weapons, had they had the opportunity. So I think that is point one. Point two is the organization again of core al-Qaeda was less able to absorb their leader's strategic vision than I think we probably thought. They're still there, they're still dangerous, but he had a grand vision for the organization and it was a little bit like an admiral without any ships, or at least no battleships and a few PT boats. They could go off and do little things and he as a leader increasingly didn't understand that. And also, as Jim said, was really struggling with what they should do about the Arab Awakening. Not quite sure how to play into that. Which I think again goes to the importance of the United States making sure that we don't give them an opportunity that they might not otherwise have.

David Ignatius: Let me turn to a question that is at the center of my uncertainties about the Arab Spring, I wanted to start calling it the Arab Transition, because I really don't know what it's in transition to. But my question is, what is the role and potential danger both of the Muslim Brotherhood and of Salafis groups which had been disorganized in places like Egypt but are becoming more so. And Mike, let me start with you. There was a kind of an easy in the days of the Tahrir Square revolt of easy analysis that said, gee, the Muslim brothers are less threatening than we might have thought. Do you share that? What's your assessment as you look at the information coming to you about what the Muslim Brotherhood leadership across the Arab world wants to do?

Mike Leiter: Well, it's interesting, al-Zawahiri actually came from the Muslin brotherhood before he separated to take a more violent track and merge with al-Qaeda which is -- which is interesting. And I have a just -- let me back up, just a little bit of a difference of opinion with Mr. Zogby in the sense that to lay at the feet of America all of the small incidents, and they're not small in the sense of the politics, but they're small in the sense of what was the plight of the Egyptian people under a dictator. I mean, corruption was rampant, and the economy was falling apart and there was no future and no hope laid out at the feet of the United States. I just -- I don't buy it for a minute. The Arab determination that you see now is about freedom, and I -- you know, we've always said and I passionately believe that I would always take liberty and freedom over a dictator at any day. And, yes, we've got a very difficult period moving forward in the next months. Really weeks, months, years as we get through this period. But that's where the United States can nurture what we know works. And that is self-governance and self-representation. Is it hard, absolutely. It's hard in our own government. Democracy is hard. It's the hardest form of government we have. And that's why we're finding friends in Egypt that we might not normally have been able to identify with because at the end of the day, it wasn't about the United States, it wasn't about the rendition highway which sounds great, it was about the fact that they were completely
oppressed from freedom to do anything. To have to go down and have a speech in the square about how they were feeling against their government. And so I think what Condoleezza Rice was trying to accomplish, and I'm not saying it was exactly perfect, was to say, listen, we understand that the Arab population's not happy with the United States because we have been supporting people who have oppressed you and oppressed your future. And we are more inclined to believe in liberty and freedom moving forward. So I thought it was -- I just disagreed and as good as you are, sir, I just had to have a moment of disagreement on where we are.

>> Jim Zogby: And I disagree back.

>> Mike Leiter: I appreciate it. But you do polling pretty well and I'll give you that one. So as we move forward it gives us an opportunity. The Muslim Brotherhood is concerning because it is the single largest group that has the organization and the resources to initially hit the ground running. So it gave the secular groups, and by the way, it was led by secular groups. It puts them at a disadvantage politically and so there's -- we have spent a lot of time, energy and effort trying to understand who is the Muslim Brotherhood that is in Egypt. And by the way, they're all a little bit different. I will tell you that their public sentiment and their public statements in the past are concerning. We have seen some rays of hope in the Muslim Brotherhood. We have also seen some things that concern us greatly. And so I argued that as our opportunity to try to engage with the other secular elements of Egypt, let them understand how you run a political campaign and get your feet on the ground and participate in your government, as well as how we challenge the Muslim Brotherhood meets the elements that we're concerned about to play a less prominent role in their future. And again, we do see lots of activity from the Muslim Brotherhood in places like Egypt, and Yemen and other places where they want to see some change and I would -- I've seen it all. I have a hard time coming to the conclusion that we know exactly what the Muslim Brotherhood is engaging in in Egypt and we see it a little different in other places as well. It is concerning, but at the same time there might be some opportunity.

>> David Ignatius: Let me just go down the row and ask each of you for a very brief assessment of this, of what dangers you see from the Muslim Brotherhood. Just I think I'll put a more general phrase from political Islam in these countries as they become more democratic, more open. Stan?

>> General McChrystal: I think the jury's out, of course, but something like the Muslim Brotherhood which represents that move into politics I think has to have a reason to exist and part of that was, of course, the autocratic leadership that they were resisting against. It will be very interesting when they are in the different role how they evolve. And I think the jury's absolutely out.

>> David Ignatius: Mike, what do you think?

>> Mike Rogers: I think the Chairman captured it quite well and I think the most important thing the Chairman did was show a subtlety of thought and analysis on what the Muslim Brotherhood is in Egypt
and what it is elsewhere. And we have to maintain that same subtlety of analysis in our politics and our policies and not simply say ooh, the Muslim Brotherhood sounds scary, we have to fight all incarnations. The subtlety again identifying the differences, seeing where we can work with them, making sure that they are not pursuing violent means. That's the sort of subtlety we have to have towards all parties, secular or otherwise in all of these nations.

>> David Ignatius: Jim, let me put the question to you, but with this particular focus. One thing that troubles me is somebody who travels a lot in the Middle East and has for many years is I don't see as much sign of tolerance in these countries as I'd like to see and as you could argue as is necessary for democracy to work, and that's, you know, quite of minorities in the Arab world, of Christians, of Drews [assumed spelling], of Shions [assumed spelling] in some countries. Is that -- what is your sense of the dangers of that? What Islamic majorities will end up huge in the ...

>> Jim Zogby: The dangers are great, and the dangers are a function of a whole history and a sociology that we're not going to get into right now. But let me just respond quickly to the issue of -- and just a personal take on the issue of Islamic religion. I worry across the Middle East about religion and politics period. The politicization of religion and the sacralizing of politics are huge dangers. We're seeing them play out in our own country. The difference between politics which allows you to engage in debate and the sacralizing of politics in which there is no debate because it's God's word, is dangerous. And it is something that traditional societies have difficulty moving beyond. We saw it in New York as we evolved, as the European continent evolved. We're seeing it in the Middle East, we're seeing it elsewhere, seeing it in India, seeing it in many parts of the world. It's worrisome and I think it's something we have to deal with.

>> What's the chance that, as an Egyptian said to me yesterday, the era of secular government which ended up getting associated with dictatorial autocratic government, that era's over. No, it's not over and we will see -- we'll see a continuing process of transformation in Egypt. This game isn't over and the first election's not the most important one after the revolution, it's the second, third and forth in [inaudible] we get there or when we get there. I mean, there's a process of transformation and I think that we have to be attentive to that, but also know that there are limits to America's role right now. I mean, parties, new parties emerging in Egypt and Tunisia don't want our help because, you know, we've -- in the past we've embraced people to death, not helped them. The history in the Middle East is scattered with folks who lost elections because we hugged them a little too tight.

>> David Ignatius: I think if Hosni Mubarack could rise from that hospital bed he might agree with you.

>> Mike Leiter: Let me just say that I think that we're -- in Syria right now which is something we started talking about, the folks who were demonstrating have lost their fear. But the folks who aren't demonstrating are the ones who are still afraid, and they are Christians. And they are the urban middle-class in the business communities, and they are the folks who say, we don't want our help because, you know, we've -- in the past we've embraced people to death, not helped them. The history in the Middle East is scattered with folks who lost elections because we hugged them a little too tight.
Syria or else you will lose them now and you will lose these groups in the future as Iraq lost them. I mean the middle classes and the elite professionals and the Christians left Iraq, and they're not going back.

David Ignatius: Bruce Hoffman, I'd be interested in your final thoughts summing up about political Islam and I want to read a very good comment from the overflow room. "Religious fundamentalism of any form, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, et cetera is inherently incompatible with democracy. It's as if you know the world God, why would you allow the excretion of any other opinions. And democracy developed and thrived without dealing with thus issue." And that's a very good comment, you can't see the person who made it. But, Bruce, what do you think?

Bruce Hoffman: Well, I think, my concern is as much of Muslim Brotherhood because I don't think al-Qaeda has ever attempted to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood. My concern is al-Qaeda attempting to siphon off the discontents and the malcontents from the Muslim Brotherhood. And I think the Middle East right now, we can put the best face on that we want and be either prudently pessimistic or cautiously optimistic, but the point is, there's tremendous upheaval and tremendous uncertainty. And everything we've heard now at least from Jim is that there's also tremendous polarization. Polarization against forms of government in the region itself, polarization against the United States in the West polarization against Israel. We have Hezbollah ruling in Lebanon, uncertainty in Syria. I mean, all of these things are almost the kind of devils or witches brew that terrorists can exploit and I think will exploit and take advantage of. So I don't want to be pessimistic and say that the region once again is going to ascend into some, you know, massive campaigns of terrorism as we've seen in the past, but unfortunately historically all the ingredients are there.

David Ignatius: I want to turn to the audience for questions, but I want to ask one last question. I'm going to ask for quick responses from anybody who wants to speak to this. When you celebrate a 10 year anniversary it's an opportunity to say, okay, we're not going to do this anymore, or we're going to be careful about doing that. And in that context, I want to ask you about the problem for our country of creating new enemies as we fight existing enemies. And I want to ask you specifically, and I know this is a difficult question for people to respond to about the use of drone attacks against our adversaries. This is a tool that's been very powerful over the tribal areas of Pakistan where there are few other tools, but it's being used increasingly. Now by the Washington Post count it's been used in seven countries. The demand from other countries to use drones to fight their wars is growing. I would just ask anybody who wants to speak to this whether they see -- whether it's desirable over this next 10 years to reduce the use of these weapons if at all possible. Don't all speak at once.

Jim Zogby: I would say, not as a military person, because I can't speak to that, I am horrified offended by the use of drones and the extensive use of drones. It's not lessen, it's eliminate. There is no difference between this and outright assassination and outright acts that are extra judicial and cause, I think, yes, they've been effective in some instances, they've taken collateral damage which means innocent people die in many instances, but it's the law of the jungle, and it's not who we are. It's not the way we want the world to operate and we open the door for others to operate in that way as well, and I find it offensive.
>> Well, that will get me to talk.

>> Jim Zogby: Okay.

>> I agree with absolutely nothing that Jim just said. I think even the phrase drones is almost pejorative. It's an air strike. Air strikes have been the single most effective tool at protecting the American people from core al-Qaeda and other organizations. We have taken people off the battlefield that the host nation, the Pakistanis could not take off the battlefield, who were plotting to attack and kill Americans like on September 11th. We have saved lives because we have employed these tactics. Are there negative repercussions from doing so and have we alienated some and pushed some towards the ideology of al-Qaeda? Absolutely. But there's a short game and there's a long game in counter-terrorism. The short game is killing the guys before they kill you. The long game is the ideological fight. The two are intention, but in my view not perfectly inconsistent with one another. And last but not least, no greater conservative flame-thrower who does not respect civil liberties [inaudible] I think has eloquently defended the legality under international and domestic law and traditional principles of warfare, and I believe Harold and others who have analyzed this closely are exactly right.

>> David Ignatius: Stan, my question, you thought as deeply as anybody I know about the problem of this -- the fight against terrorism of getting the population on your side and fighting an adversary that is imbedded within that population. And maybe in whatever way you choose, you could respond to this broad question of how we keep from making enemies as we kill enemies.

>> General McChrystal: But my silence was deafening. The way you operate does matter and how people perceive you. I do think that we are going to have to use a whole range of capabilities and it's -- I don't take any off the table. I do think, however, that every time we take an action, it has a physical effect, but it has a much greater information effect, and if the people who see or are aware of that action respond negatively, that's got to be part of your calculus. One of the things which we came to understand in Afghanistan, it's a warrior culture and if you go to a village in an armored vehicle, and you get out wearing body armor and you wear a helmet and you've got safety glass that they can't see through, on the one hand you're a very intimidating person or thing, but they are warriors and they're not wearing any of that. And they wonder why you've got to hide behind that and why you just don't stand man-to-man and deal with them directly. And so there's a cultural aspect, and I'm not saying you never wear body armor, I'm saying you gotta understand how it's perceived. I go back to every time we take a strike, we need to understand the affect of the people. In 1998 when we took the retaliatory strikes into the Sudan and to Afghanistan, I think most Americans, if you'd asked them the day after, was America at war, the answer would be no. We took appropriate response to something. If you were at the receiving end of a cruise missile your perception might be different. It doesn't mean the strike's not right, it means that we've got to calculate what's the affect on the people and others who are not right there but who see that, and we've got to calculate it. So I think as we use every tool at our disposal and, again, I think they're going to be appropriate, we've got really understand the cultural aspects and perception of those.
>> David Ignatius: Mike Rogers, do you want to speak to this or do you want to leave it be?

>> Mike Rogers: Well, I can't talk about the joint programs, I can tell you this that, you know, the military has air strike capability and this notion of collateral damage is something that is reviewed and reviewed and reviewed and it is wildly exaggerated and it's exaggerated in the press, it's exaggerated in rhetoric and I think it's a horrible disservice to the impact, and I think Mr. Leiter said it perfectly, it has had a tremendous impact on changing the enemies ability to plan, to finance, to train and to engage in terrorist activity. I can't find anything other than this particular air strike capability that's allowed the United States to do that and if I -- if people knew the painstakingly way that -- I'm speaking from a Title 10 perspective here, the painstaking way that these are reviewed for engagement on an air strike, I think they would be absolutely proud of the men and women who wrestle over this and sweat over it and sometimes they decide not to do it because of collateral damage risking American lives when they do it. And it happens everyday and it is a long process and it is well-viewed and reviewed and well -- the oversight of this program is intense. And so, I'm going to plug again, Title 10, for the record.

>> David Ignatius: Title 10 for anybody who's not well-versed in the U.S. Code means military operations as opposed to CIA operations.

>> Mike Rogers: So I can -- I rest assure at night that this is a program that is a tool, and I think Stan McChrystal said it best, you shouldn't take any tool off the table. I hope 10 years from now we're not engaged in any of this, that we keep talk -- we had the theoretical talk about how we engage the enemy, that would be fantastic. The problem is that's not the reality which we find ourself in today. So you have a multi-level engagement not just in the tribal areas of Pakistan or Afghanistan or an [inaudible] or someplace in Africa, fill in the blank, where you have an engagement that may look completely different with the same angle as to try to disrupt a terrorist operation and cell. And every one of those is going to be different and what I found in this town in the last 10 years, [inaudible] my time and I know Jane and I have had this conversation, it's the, you know, the shiny new toy technique, right. This particular toy was really cool and we just got it out of the box, so let's play with this one a lot. And that's a dangerous place to be here and in the future. We have made huge improvement on our ability to perform air strikes and disrupt the enemy from planning and plotting and carrying out attacks not only on the homeland but on our soldiers overseas. Great. It doesn't mean that is the only way forward as we move forward, and it doesn't mean you can plop that up and set it down someplace else and it's going to work exactly the same, it won't work that way. And so, again, I think there's been a lot of focus on it and I'll tell you one of the reasons why is that when we travel overseas and what the bad guys in the, you know, the folks who are committed to this al-Qaeda and other elements, other terrorist groups are terrified of this. They're absolutely terrified of it. And we know they've made entreaties to try to get people to stop doing it. They also have psychological warfare practices that actively engage in saying every time something like this happens, there are huge civilian casualties. Remember, it was a big wedding, it was -- all of that was proven not to be true. They understand how effective it is, we should understand how effective it is and then keep working all the other levels all at the same time so hopefully one day we're not participating in any of them.
>> Dave Ignatius: I do want to turn the audience -- Bruce, I'm going to ask you if you have thoughts about this to fold them into a response to our audience. Yes, sir. Will you please identify yourself and keep the question brief and be specific, if you can as to who you want to answer it.

>> Benjamin Toole: Thank you very much, I'm Benjamin Toole [assumed spelling] a retired U.S. diplomat. The panel is in broad agreement that the past 10 years have shown a substantial technical and physical success in our fight against what we might call terrorism and the al-Qaeda threat. But while the intelligence has been used well and in improved ways and key people have been eliminated, networks disrupted, these things can grow back and my question is, how much confidence do the members of the panel have that in the coming decade the U.S. will make the policy changes to drain the swamp to make sure that there are many fewer people who will be inspired to try to hurt us.

>> David Ignatius: Bruce -- Bruce Hoffman, maybe you could take a crack at it if you have thoughts about the last thing we were discussing, fold them in.

>> Bruce Hoffman: That would have, in essence, be my response to the question of the use of drones. I don't think that there's any doubt that the drones have been enormously effective and [inaudible] weakening our enemy which was absolutely what we have to do. I think about -- a concern is that that in essence addresses only the supply side. It eliminates the existing terrorists, as it were, the existing terrorist leaders. We have to be better and I don't think we have been as good at this over the past decade at staunching the supply or the flow of recruits into these terrorist organizations. Because after all, our enemies make no secret of it that what they're trying to do is not defeat us on the battlefield, but to [inaudible] us, to weaken us, to undermine our economy, to undermine our morale. They see the cracks in our economic strength as, from their point of view, doesn't mean that it's true, but propaganda doesn't have to be true it just has to be believed. But they see that as proof positive that those -- that they're achieving those cracks and if they can widen them. So therefore, I think just as the gentleman asking the question said, we have to be much better and we've discussed some of this with -- our messaging. I'm not sure that it's necessarily policy changes as much as getting better at the non-kinetic aspect of countering terrorism. It becomes good in the non-kinetic as we have been in the kinetic realm.

>> David Ignatius: Let me turn first to Joe Doldenhorn [assumed spelling] in the first row and then to Trudy.

>> Joe Doldenhorn: In one hour of very informative conversation the country of Iran has not been mentioned. I think that I'd like to hear -- well, you can pick, David, who you want a comment from, what our strategies should be going forward.

>> David Ignatius: Let me ask Mike Leiter to start that off because he spent a lot of time thinking about Iran in his previous job as head of the NCTC and then anybody else who has thoughts on that can jump in.
Mike Leiter: We face, on the terrorism front we face some real challenges, more broadly on Iran we face some really fundamental challenges, national security challenges in my view. The terrorism front, they remain the single largest state sponsor of terror in the world. They continue to support Hezbollah. Hezbollah continues tactic, they continue to support some organizations in Gaza. Iran is sponsoring terrorism in a way that sometimes makes you wonder if they notice 9/11 at all. They've really continued on their way. I think more broadly the challenge you have is how you balance that with the other incredible national security challenges Iran poses. Its growing influence in the Gulf region, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and I think Iran, no matter what happens in the Arab Awakening, will remain a core challenge for the U.S. for the next 10 years.

David: Jim.

Jim Zogby: The most interesting thing our polling has found, I think, over the last decade has been, and I actually would show you the graph. Iran's numbers have gone this way. Our numbers aren't very good, we've pretty much stayed here, we went out for a period and came down, but there's been a steady alienation of Arabs from Iran and from everything that Iran represents in the region. I think that that's important to note. To some degree, the war in Iraq and other policies pursued in the first half of the last decade caused Iran's numbers to go very high, about 2004, 2005 they were very high, especially when you had, you know, the situation in Iraq, yes, and Abu Ghraib, yes, and almost everything we did ended up not only emboldening them, but we empowered them. Number one, we eliminated one of their big enemies and they became a real threat across the Gulf region and I think people felt it. But alienated Arab masses began to feel that Iran was the defender of what was right and just and when you had 2006 and the war in Lebanon, again a poll we did in Saudi Arabia 2006, we asked what leader, not from your own country is the one you most respect? The number one was [inaudible] and number two was [inaudible]. I mean, two Shiite leaders in the home of the Wohabies [assumed spelling] and yet here's what we get right now. Numbers went from 80 something favorable to Iran -- for Iran and Saudi Arabia down to like five or 6%. And in other countries in the region that we polled regularly the numbers had dropped precipitously down in the 20%, 15% range. What happened? Number one, we lowered our rhetoric level. We may not have engaged as some had hoped or thought that President Obama would in a very effective or in a very sustained way, but we've lowered the rhetoric. We don't give speeches about them in a way that sort of bolster their image in the region. Number two, because the Arab world in the U.S. are distracted by Arab Spring, people have had a chance to actually look at Iran in its own right and not see us as -- not see them as the opposite of us, and their behavior in [inaudible] or in Lebanon, what they've done in Iraq in particular, and the threat they pose in the region has become manifest and publics in the region are now alienated. It used to be that just Arab governments were opposed to Iran, now Arab publics are opposed to Iran. We're doing another poll right now on how the region is perceiving Iran's roll in Syria and we'll see how that plays out. But I think that it's interesting, you know, our assumption has always been partly with the Iranian narrative, and that is that they speak for masses. Apparently they're not anymore and I think that there's a good thing there. When you put Iran up against the United States, or up against Israel it's a losing equation. When you put it in its own right and see its own behavior, people are turned off by it, and I think that that's the kind of interesting thing here.
David Ignatius: Data point, The White House takes this poll-finding that Jim just cited extremely seriously regards the declining support for Iran among Arabs as polled by Jim as a really important point.

Jim Zogby: Worst thing to do ...

David Ignatius: [Inaudible].

Jim Zogby: ... would be to reengage in attacking Iran now that the numbers are low. That would only give them, it's like the Farrakhan factor. You know, the more you attack him the more popular he becomes. I mean, in other words, they're doing badly, leave them alone, they're going badly on their own. Thank you.

David Ignatius: Trudy Rubin.

Trudy Rubin: The other situation that hasn't been mentioned is Israel/Palestine, and I'd like to ask if the peace process ends or if it has already ended and doesn't restore it, what impact do you think that will have on terrorism in the region both in terms of inside the Palestinian territories themselves whether you might see a linkage, the beginning of a linkage of Palestinian renewal of terrorism linked to international terrorism which there hasn't been before. And also how you think that would affect the region, whether you think it would increase terrorism beyond the kind of thing that Bruce suggested discontent with the inability of the revolutions to move fast enough.

David Ignatius: Trudy, do you want to direct that to a particular panelist?

Trudy Rubin: Well, Bruce has obviously been thinking about that, I'd like to ask Jim and, you know, anyone else that wants to jump in because it's coming right up the pipe, end of peace process.

David Ignatius: Bruce, why don't you start off and then others who have quick thoughts.

Bruce Hoffman: Well, I think interestingly in the past few months Hamas has still been active in firing missiles and certainly been threatening to Israel. I think what's worse and as I described earlier the fragmentation of al-Qaeda we also see something in the fragmentation of the Palestinian resistance movement and it would style itself with new and different groups emerging to similarly challenge Israel as well. And I would say in response to your question, that's a process or a trajectory that I would imagine would increase. In terms of international terrorist attacks, you know, it was really the hard core FATA and
some of the rejectionist groups like [inaudible] organization of the PFLP that had that capability 30 or 40 years ago. I don't want to say it doesn't exist any longer, but I would be surprised to see it reconstituted in the same manner. I don't think Hamas has that capability for example. Hezbollah, we're talking about Iran and Iranian sponsor group, Hezbollah certainly has it. But I think the biggest problem is that in an already unstable and uncertain environment the lack of progress and the lack of resolution in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict means that it's very easy to use that as a rallying prize. A means to divert attention from internal problems as is historically being the case. And it does remain an enormously volatile and very emotional issue for people that I think is constantly on the verge of being the igniter.

>> David Ignatius: Other thoughts.

>> Jim Zogby: Our polling shows that, Trudy. It remains in spite wishful thinking here and people wanting to create an Arab narrative when there already is an Arab narrative, Palestine's at the center of it. It's the wound that never healed, it's the Wounded Knee of the Arab story. Wounded Knee in the sense of the Bury My Heart ad, not ailment. It is -- and the degree to which it remains a wound that festers and the degree to which folks end up on the wrong side of it and aren't sensitive to it. We're going to continue to see it used and in some cases abused, but in many instances it's there and it's something that strikes the heart of Arab sensitivity. It's a voice we need to hear.

>> David Ignatius: The gentleman in the second row and then I want to go back a little further. You, sir, after that.

>> Gerald Post: Gerald Post, George Washington University. Bruce, you've spoken about fragmentation several times in your responses. You spoke about not now but the future response, Mr. Zogby, too of alienation within the American/Muslim community. In your introductory comments, Jane Harman, you spoke about the need to counter the extremists, the Islamic ideology. My concern with fragmentation is the ultimate fragmentation to the unit of one. And something I haven't heard mentioned is the concern with lone wolves, individuals and it isn't just an accident, al-Awlaki, the Bin Laden of the internet is targeting lonely isolated Muslim men and women and hoping to recruit them to become a member of the virtual community of hatred. I wonder if you could address the future prospects for increase in lone wolves and how it seems to me a daunting counter-terrorism challenge to counter this without violating civil liberties.

>> David Ignatius: Mike Leiter, who's just been spending years worrying about this.

>> Mike Leiter: First of all, the good news is we've encountered fewer lone wolves and more lone slightly vicious dogs or puppies. Lone wolves gives them kind of a level of threat that I think in most cases they haven't deserved, and that's a very important piece to remember. Secondly, fragmentation is not all bad because if you can have fragmentation of the movement and localize the interests, you can actually make the United States more secure because these fragmented organizations may choose to target frankly
their home government and not the U.S. Embassy or the United States. So fragmentation has negative repercussions, but it can also be positive. Now specifically to the lone offender. It is by far the hardest challenge we face. That's the bad news. I have said before, if you go and find a police officer and you say where are all the banks in your patrol area, he'll be able to tell you. And each one of those banks has an alarm system. And many of those banks have an armed guards. And the FBI investigates bank robberies all the time. And guess what still happens in this country? We have banks getting robbed. Now let's analogize that to terrorism. You don't know what the target's going to be, you can use pretty much any instrument as one of death, either buying a gun or using hydrogen peroxide to make an explosive or just driving your car through a pedestrian area. And there are huge challenges to identifying people before they actually start taking those concrete steps. Just identifying peoples' ideology is notoriously hard. That's why finding a lone offender is so difficult. The community is doing a good job of that. I think people today fundamentally exaggerate how much the federal government and state and local governments are doing intrusive of their civil liberties in the first instance. We don't have the people to be nearly as interested as people think we are. So I think we actually have to be very blunt about the fact that we can't cover everything, that there will be attacks, that the perceived infringement of civil liberties I think is actually much greater than the actual infringement which still poses real problems in terms of ideology and alienation. I'm not dismissing it, but I think we have to be realistic about it. And last but not least, and I say this all the time, we have to be a resilient, political and public culture after the fact. In the same way that we experience tragedies in the workplace shootings and school shootings, some of those shootings in the future will probably include someone who identifies with al-Qaeda. We can't have a spasm, a political spasm. And over the coming 10 years, the farther we get from 9/11 in many ways, the more likely we are to react spasmodically to that. And that will help the terrorists and it will chase people who are doing the work of counter-terrorism out in droves if that's the standard to which we hope.

>> David Ignatius: We have time for one more question. The gentleman here in the third row and then I'll ask each of you since Jane Harman tells me that we have only four minutes to make a concluding comment either in answer to this question or others that we've had. Go ahead.

>> Al Beagle: My name is Al Beagle, I'm a lecturer on Iran and I'd like to thank the panel for their very lucid description. I'd like to turn that same focus of the panel to the role of Turkey now and some of the rhetoric that is now coming out, is that going to be translated in the future to action and what can the United Stats and its allies do about tempering that rhetoric between Turkey and Israel at the present time? Thank you.

>> David Ignatius: Tough question, good question. Mike, why don't you start us off? > Mike Rogers: You know, Turkey has -- they get about a million Iranian visitors a year by visa, and so they've got a unique relationship with Iran, and their feeling that they can be a broker in that particular equation and also on the Israel question, they believe now that they are in a position to take advantage of the turmoil in the region to increase their influence within the region. And that -- that's a double-edged sword for us from both ways. And it is very, very concerning, of course with the expulsion of the Diplomatic Corps there, the Israeli Diplomatic Corps creates a problem that we're not sure how we're going to be able to wind that. And we've, you know, Erdogan has changed quite a bit since, you know, signing to leadership in Turkey. He was very, very pro-U.S., very open. He had his leanings toward his more conservative expression of faith in Islam. And there's slowly, we think through advisors and other things, crept in to his government.
And, you know, in his mind the Arab street, and we've -- I've met with him on a couple of occasion, is an important part of every equation he makes. And when the street is reacting the way they were to the incident where the blockade with the ship that was bordered on the blockade and it never seemed to heal, I think rather than saying this is a problem we have to fix, they're saying this is a problem we can take advantage of. And that's what's so concerning about where Erdogan's calculation is today on their relationship with Israel. And I doubt that anyone could tell you today exactly how we unwind it. It is something that we have to do, we're going to have to have a surge of diplomacy in Turkey, that's been a place that we haven't invested a lot of time and effort in the past. They were a reliable ally and somebody we kind of counted on. I think that can still be the case and should be the case, but we're going to have to spend a lot of time and effort trying to repair some of those problems and keep Turkey as an important ally to the United States. I don't think they want to lose it yet, that's very clear to me and that's the best leverage we have when we move forward on this relationship.

>> David Ignatius: Stan, concluding thought?

>> General McChrystal: Well, just on the role of the Turks in Afghanistan was very helpful. But their view of their position in the region in the world is very different. We're probably about 10 or 20 years behind where they view their place in the world. And so as they reach out and they take a new role, I think we need to keep reexamining that because it's going to take greater effort on our part to understand and show them the kind of engagement I think's going to be required.

>> David Ignatius: Mike?

>> Mike Leiter: Can I leave Turkey?

>> David Ignatius: You can comment on anything you want to say.

>> Mike Leiter: I think 10 years later great times turn the page not times close the book. Terrorism domestically overseas remains a significant challenge and one that can cause huge disruptions not just in terms of the loss of life, but real political instability in critical parts of the world whether or not it's Pakistan and India or East Africa. And I think the one thing we have to guard against in the coming 10 years with clearly declining budgets along a number of fronts is not significantly dropping our level of engagement, not in the intelligence world, not in the military world, not in the diplomatic world, and not domestically on the programs we try to reduce the amount of alienation that we could experience with [inaudible].

>> David Ignatius: Jim, Turkey?
Jim Zogby: It was interesting when we came out with our last poll and retrospectively looked at the 10 years that had preceded. We were focused on the fact that the U.S. numbers had gone up and dropped precipitously and that the Iranian numbers had been continued in a slump. There's only the economists that noted the Turkey numbers, that Turkey's numbers have continued to rise over the last decade in the Arab world. And it is a factor of great importance right now in the region. And only part of it has to do with what began in Davos and continued on with the blockade. A lot of it has to do with the fact that Turkey's exercising leadership and playing an independent role and is a democracy and is presenting itself as a model. And I think that that makes sense to some people. Interesting though, in some of the questions when we ask people options about who -- if not this, who, who should lead? Egypt comes out as the winner, not Turkey. And that is that there is an Arab character to this. Turkey is right now in a surrogate role for Egypt. Egypt's in a little chaos but when Egypt comes back it has the natural leadership role in the Arab world. And just a final word on some of these things that I worry -- I worry about Islamic phobia. I worry -- I thought it was the gay marriage issue in the last election. We'd have it one election and it'd be over. It seems it's going to stay with us. I think we need adult supervision on this one and we have to deal with it. Because what's at stake is the very fabric of who we are as a country. And I think that partisanship plays into it because it's become a wedge issue. We really must pay attention. People abroad are listening to our internal debate and we're not looking awful pretty. And we've got to pay attention to that. It's not the nut job in Florida burning the Koran. It's politicians going around the country talking about Islam, talking about oil deals, talking about building mosques, talking about Sharia, and sending a message that is not who we are and it's hurting us.

David Ignatius: Bruce Hoffman.

Bruce Hoffman: Well, I'll leverage off of Jim's file points. Sometimes we forget that it's in the parents of some of the people who've gone off to join these groups that have alerted the authorities that they've left. So sometimes the problem is very different than we imagined it to be and the reality. I'll end by going back to my old friend Jerry Post's point and I think he underscores what and how challenging it will be to counter-terrorism in the next decade because we in essence, we have to cover the waterfront. We face a threat from the remnant of al-Qaeda, from its affiliates and associates potentially from new terrorist groups that we haven't seen appear yet, and also from lone individuals. And we're going to have to do all that in the face of 30% -- potentially 30% defense and intelligence budgetary cutbacks, and I think now is the time that we have to start thinking of how to do more with less and how to similarly develop a very dynamic and innovative response and approach to countering terrorism that keeps pace with what we've seen as the dynamic phenomena that it is.

David Ignatius: So that brings us to an end. I'll say under Lee Hamilton and now under Jane Harman, this is a place where people get together to try to solve problems and not shout at each other and I thought that was particularly true today. So thank you all the panel.