

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.005, Urgent**

<b>Date:</b> 6 January 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, 1st Division, MFA, Folder no. 1496, Regarding the Internal Situation in the DPRK (Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Matters. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghie</i>
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For Comrade Nicolae Ecobescu, Deputy Foreign Minister  
For Comrade Nicolae M. Nicolae, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Trade

Following the instructions we have received through telegram no.09/0447175, dated December 5, 1972, we are sending you the monthly report regarding the state of the economy and of foreign trade in the DPRK.

### 1. Economic development

The economic potential is being materialized through the annual and long-term plans conceived by the 7th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party.

Currently the 6-year plan for 1971-1976 is being implemented, and from the information we gathered, it seems that this plan underwent modifications at the end of 1971 and last year, especially after the North-South Joint Declaration of July 4, further modifications were necessary with respect to the directions, priorities and the rhythm of certain economic sectors. In this respect, all production sectors had to fulfill their quotas planned for 1973 by the end of 1972, which was impossible except for some large industrial machinery-building factories and for some chemical plants. Some of these fulfilled the quotas planned for 1975.

In the first two years of the six-year plan, the production quotas were not met, and there is a significant lag between various economic sectors. This leads to stagnation in terms of the quantity and quality of goods set aside for exports. These phenomena are largely caused by the significant amounts of money spent on consolidating national defense, which leads to scarce work-force.

### 2. The evolution of foreign trade

According to the directions set at the 5th KWP Congress 'foreign trade will grow continuously on the basis of the development of our national economy through our own means.' In this respect, at the end of the 6-year plan, the volume of foreign trade is supposed to treble.

Priority is given to trade relations with socialist countries but relations with other countries are concomitantly being developed. From the unofficial information we managed to gather, the following modifications to the structure of foreign trade, compared to that from 1970, appear (in percentages):

Total volume	1970	1971	1972	1975-1976
Trade with:	100	100	100	100
Socialist countries	82	84	55	55
Capitalist and developing countries	18	16	45	45

These structural modifications acquire a special meaning given the long-term agreement signed with Japan at the beginning of 1972, amounting to approximately \$2 billion. Given that the DPRK does not release official data concerning foreign trade or any other economic sectors, our estimates are based on the information gathered from the economic sections of socialist countries, present in Pyongyang and on foreign publications.

Given these circumstances, it appears that the DPRK's foreign trade volume in 1972, according to the commercial protocols and contracts signed with its partners to the 'West,' amounted to 1 billion rubles, out of which 600 million with socialist countries, and approximately 450 million rubles with capitalist and developing countries. We cannot make any statements with respect to the fulfillment of the plan but it is clear that North Korean export quotas to

socialist countries, which according to the commercial agreements signed amounts to 330 million rubles, were only 70-72 percent fulfilled.

Given our observations from last year, we can draw certain conclusions about these phenomena, which carry on from year to year:

- The availability of competitive export goods is inferior to the responsibilities assumed every year through commercial protocols;
- The quality of goods and packaging has not improved;
- Prices are extremely inflated compared to similar goods (which are produced with better technical means);
- Quality benchmarks and delivery timetables specified in commercial contracts are not fully respected;
- Penalties and complaints are not taken into account;
- By the end of each year, goods which are not delivered on time are usually overlooked.

3. Trends in DPRK's foreign trade which may be relevant for our exports:

There are two broad categories of goods the North Koreans are interested in: goods produced by the machinery-building industry and chemical goods.

The main problem is the fact that the DPRK is facing serious problems in terms of its export capabilities, due to the diversification of its exchanges with other states, especially with Western countries: Japan, France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom etc. The array of high quality Korean goods has shrunk considerably. At the same time, the North Koreans are trying to improve their export capabilities, increasing the share of machinery and equipment to the detriment of raw materials.

Because the Heavy Machinery Industry Ministry and the Light Equipment Construction Industry Ministry are not interested in purchasing the quantities specified in the commercial protocol, the leadership of the DPRK Foreign Trade Ministry stopped signing contracts with us on the following categories of goods we export: heavy trucks, diesel and electrical locomotives, etc. etc.

4. DPRK supplies of raw materials and other goods:

- Most goods the DPRK produces have been included in our 1971-1975 trade protocol. Other important goods like cadmium, brass, iron-manganese, copper ore and concentrate, zinc, wolfram, etc. etc., are not available for export to Eastern countries (socialist). Some laminates containing copper, zinc, and lead, even when they are available, they are exaggeratedly highly priced for socialist countries.

Given the raw materials existing in North Korea, we believe it useful to send a delegation of specialists from the Heavy Machinery Production Ministry to explore these resources.

5. The prospects of North Korean economy and foreign trade

For 1973, the DPRK will undertake efforts to develop key branches of the economy, prioritizing on certain objectives of higher importance, such as:

- a. Vehicle and machinery-building: new types of tractors, extractive industry equipment, automated tools, trucks, with a view to reaching the following figures in 1-2 years: 30,000 tractors; 15,000-30,000 trucks and vans. Moreover, special attention will be given to the electronics industry and to the automation of modes of production.
- b. Metallurgy: developing the production of various types of steel and laminates, non-ferrous metals, etc. The following steel mills will start producing: Kim Chaek (current capabilities will be expanded by 1,000,000 tons per year with the help of Japanese and Soviet technology); Songrim (with a capacity of 850,000 tons per year, producing tin, construction steel and large frames. The metallurgical plants in Hwanghae and Kangseon will be expanded, where recently discovered iron ore in the Anju-area will be exploited (approximately 10 billion tons).
- c. Chemistry. Two refineries will be built over the course of this year: at Unggi (with a capacity of 1.5 million tons per year, to be built by the Soviet Union) and Namheung (to be built by the People's Republic of China). Crude oil is imported from the USSR, and PRC respectively. Two other refineries are under construction, and they will process crude extracted in the DPRK. Estimates point out that in 5-6 years the DPRK will no longer have to import petroleum products.

6. Electricity: the network of hydro- and, especially, thermal plants will be expanded by putting online the thermal plant in Bukchang (with a capacity of 800 MW) and the hydroelectric plant at Seodusu (produced with Austrian and West German technology). Two other thermal plants are under construction at Namheung and Hamheung.

With respect to foreign trade, it is to be expected that the DPRK will diversify its trade with capitalist and developed countries, especially with Japan, France and Federal Republic of Germany.

We would like to draw your attention to the fact that the DPRK has demanded massive amounts of equipment and technology for industrial plants from many countries, so as to modernize and rapidly provide certain important economic sectors with high tech production means. We are aware of 35 such demands made to socialist countries, but especially to capitalist countries, which would cover the majority of sectors lagging behind.

Acquiring these means of production would obviously entail extraordinary financial efforts over the short-term.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

C. Prepelita

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.061.009**

<b>Date:</b> 13 January 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter: 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK's relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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02/0422/16.01.1973

To Department II Relations

We would like to draw your attention to several aspects which have occurred over the past 10 days in inter-Korean relations, which result in an aggravation of the relatively calm atmosphere created at the end of 1972.

The political stabilization process experienced by South Korea, generated by the success of certain actions following the state of emergency, instituted in December 1972, continued to consolidate itself.

The last international contacts of South Korean authorities (the dialogue of Kim Jongpil with Nixon and Tanaka) created a sense of security for the regime in Seoul.

On the backdrop on this situation, the South Korean authorities have proceeded towards consolidating their defense system, towards completing large-scale military operations, exercise of local defense, while taking up again the old style of labeling and disseminating 'danger' from the Northern side.

During his first press conference this year, held on January 12, President Park Chung Hee, using rough language towards the DPRK, pointed out towards the fact that distrust towards the North is still prevalent and therefore, military forces need to be consolidated. At the same time, he underlines the reduced efficiency of intra-Korean relations.

In reply, the DPRK reopened the campaign of criticism against the South, in particular condemning military actions and U.S. engagement in modernizing the South Korean army.

Old affirmations about 'the incessant strengthening of fascist policies in the country and of warmongering policies carried by South Korean authorities' re-emerged in the discourse held by Deputy Prime Minister Pak Seongcheol at a public meeting (10.01 current year)

DPRK is visibly irritated by the personality cult created in South Korea and abroad around Park Chung Hee, as well as by the fact that the latter is speaking for 50 million Koreans, that is to say, that the South Korean president is claiming all initiative in contact with the North.

In analyzing the causes for this impasse in the dialogue between the two parts of Korea, we believe they lie in the outlook on the purpose, stages and rhythm of North-South contacts.

While the South is supporting a gradual approach to present problems, starting from the simple towards the more complex ones, the North is pushing for direct and expedient solutions to fundamental issues, which in their turn would lead to the solving of minor issues.

Secondly, cooperation actions envisioned by the DPRK for the near future are not going to be accepted by the South since they are tailored on the political-economic superiority of the North and hold true to the politically revolutionary purposes of the South Korean population.

Keeping in mind the present situation, and most of all the high-level official declarations of the two sides, we expect that no efficient steps will be made towards putting in practice the understandings and accords made in theory by the act of setting up the South-North Coordination Committee (SNCC).

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 16, 1973

Henry:

Much to our amazement, Habib has drafted a proposed policy paper which, among other things, proposes that we be planning a reduction of U.S. forces in FY 1974 and an internal study looking to their total withdrawal in the FY 75-76 period (Tab B). He also wants to consider seriously phasing out all grant assistance in the FY 76-77 period.

We think this should be turned off firmly now before it leaks out (which it most certainly will -- given the wishful thinking on the part of some elements in State). Otherwise, we are headed for a disaster in our relations with the ROK at this critical juncture. We will be handling this firmly in the bureaucracy but believe that the attached backchannel to Habib (Tab A) can put things in focus and get him personally lined up.

Recommend you approve the attached message.

Approve HR

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*[Signature]*  
R. T. Kennedy

*[Handwritten signature]*

Attachments

*John Holdridge concurs*

*See Backchannel  
file for  
outgoing  
message.*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 061.041**

<b>Date:</b> 7 February 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1973. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 07.02.1973/-08:00

No.: 061.041

To: the Second Direction – Relations

On February 6th, in a conversation with A. Lazăr, Iordan Dinici, first secretary in the Yugoslavian Embassy said that he possessed information according to which secret talks are taking place between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America and that the venue for these talks is Paris.

The Yugoslav interlocutor mentioned that Kim Yeongju member of the Political Committee, secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, North Korean co-president of the North-South Coordination Committee (and brother of comrade Kim Il Sung) has been in Paris for many months now, where he repeatedly met Henry Kissinger and other American officials and various South Korean officials, like Lee Hurak, the director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

Based on what we could notice, Kim Yeongju has been missing from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since September 1972, and his absence is justified by invoking medical treatment abroad.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Beijing to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 059.139**

<b>Date:</b> 13 February 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1973. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM  
Sender: Beijing  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET  
Urgent  
Date: 13.02.1973/08:07  
No.: 059.139  
To: Comrade Ad Interim Director Lucian Petrescu,

With respect to the visit made by Heo Dam, North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the People's Republic of China, we would like to inform you about the following matters:

In diplomatic circles, the visit is seen as an expression of the good relations existing between China and Korea.

The fact that the visit was made shortly after that of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji Pengfei, to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is interpreted in diplomatic and journalistic circles as being tightly connected to the evolution of the situation in Southeast Asia.

If the fact that Heo Dam chose his visit to China to be the first in his subsequent tour, which takes him to Pakistan and Algeria, is seen as normal, the choice of timing is seen as closely connected with the Sino-American talks, brought about by the forthcoming visit of [National Security] Advisor Kissinger to Beijing.

Consequently, it is not to be ruled out that Heo Dam meets Kissinger. This belief is based on the things mentioned in the speech given by Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei at the February 9th reception, namely that:

- No solution was found to the Korean problem, although 28 years have passed since the end of the Second World War;
- The division of the country is one of the main factors generating tensions in Asia;
- It is presently very urgently needed to guarantee favorable conditions for the peaceful unification of Korea, without any interference from the outside into internal affairs, which is why it is being requested to withdraw American troops from South Korea, as well as to cease the activity of the so-called UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

The fact that the Chinese government is linking the relaxation of tensions in Asia, a premise of the Sino-American rapprochement, clearly mentioned in the February 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, and the withdrawal of American troops in South Korea, is given a special meaning.

Therefore, it is expected that during Kissinger's talks in Beijing, in case a Kissinger-Heo Dam meeting is impossible, on top of discussing issues related to Indochina, to the Paris conference on Vietnam, as well as to Sino-American relations, the Korean problem will be given a prominent spot, in the sense that [the Chinese will try to] persuade the Americans to accept direct tripartite negotiations so that the process of détente between the two Koreas, and in the Far East in general, is consolidated.

The Chilean ambassador stressed on one of the significant details of the conversation between Kim Il Sung and Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda Medina, namely on the firm decision of the North Korean government to consolidate the process of the large diplomatic opening it started in 1972 through the consistent advancement of a more flexible foreign policy both in its rapports with South Korea as well as towards Japan and the United States. As an immediate premise for the development of détente from Southeast Asia to the entire Far East, Kim Il Sung expressed his desire to abolish the presence of American troops in South Korea, the peaceful unification of the country being conceived as a long-term step-by-step process, without any interference from the outside.

Signed: N. Gavrilescu

**Telegram from Istanbul to Bucharest, No. 037032**

<b>Date:</b> 15 February 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter: 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK's relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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02/01162/19.02.1973

To Comrade VASILE GLIGA, Secretary to the Minister

Recently we had a talk with Kim Chansuk, Deputy Director General of the Pyongyang Industrial bank, the leader of the DPRK delegation that is participating in an international reunion taking place in Istanbul. Throughout the discussion the issue of Korean reunification was tackled, in the light of the joint declaration of the North and South on July 1972, as well as of the agreement to establish the SNCC [South-North Coordinating Committee] since the autumn of last year.

I am taking note of the following facts conveyed by our interlocutor:

Despite the SNCC having decided upon a series of specific measures in the framework of North-South collaboration in the economic, political, cultural and defense fields, meant to bring about unification, the authorities in Seoul have made declarations against any type of collaboration, going as far as affirming that the issue of reunification should be brought up again 10 years from now.

A series of specific facts prove that the South Korean authorities do not wish to take serious measures towards reunification. Recently, the DPRK has suggested a delivery of raw materials to certain factories in the South in order to prevent expensive imports from India. Though the offer was extremely favorable for the South, it was rejected.

According to the opinion of the DPRK, the independent and peaceful reunification of the country will not be possible until U.S. troops leave the South—a fact which would create the necessary conditions for organizing free elections on democratic foundations. In the course of the legitimate struggle of the Korean people for reunification, particular significance has the revolutionary strengthening of the North.

As far as the U.N. is concerned, it could have a significant contribution if it decides on withdrawing the so-called 'U.N. forces,' which have been occupying the South for more than 20 years, as well as on dissolving the SNCC.

Kim Chansuk described the position of Turkey as hostile, though Turkish diplomats have noted that the aggression in 1950 was decided upon by [Prime Minister Adnan] Menderes without parliamentary approval.

Kim Chansuk showed significant interest for the political situation in Turkey and showed interest for both official and informal contacts with representatives of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as with those of other ministries.

At their request of assisting them with this issue, we replied we have no possibility since the central administration is found in Ankara.

Also, we have been asked to distribute PR materials for the DPRK. We expressed our regret in not being able to, due to a Turkish law which forbids the dissemination of such materials, unless they describe our own country.

Signed: Ilie Tudor.

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061072**

<b>Date:</b> 1 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter: 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK's relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Direction II Relations  
02/01476/3.III

Concerning the intra-Korean relations in the context of changes and contacts in the area, we inform:

Recently we are noticing from both sides the more precise formulation of views on the timing, the shape and purpose of mutual relations.

Via significant political comments recently published in the press, the DPRK has resumed the idea of political cooperation with the South, of economic collaboration, of establishing the Korean Confederation.

These proposals point to complex forms of collaboration, with political effects, as opposed to the limited South Korean view.

We consider that the renewal of these theses is the answer to the declarations of the South Korean Foreign Minister, who noted that, according to South Korea, relations have to start with addressing humanitarian aspects (making the object actually of contacts between Red Cross organizations) and follow into commercial exchange, and culminate at an advanced stage with free reciprocal visits as well as other forms of cooperation, including political ones.

Judging from the affirmations of certain functionaries in the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, soon the phase of stagnation in North-South dialogue (December-February, when both parts were focusing on consolidating internal organizational and juridical measures, as well on mutual observation) shall be overcome.

The 27 February Parliamentary elections in South Korea—the last stage of internal political stabilization—faces DPRK with one dialogue partner, namely Park Chung Hee, this is a significantly more difficult moment by comparison with 1972, when the political dispersal and disorganization in the South made it easier for the DPRK to apply its own unification view.

At the same time, diplomats from both parts have become more active in securing international support for their own position in the peninsula.

From the many actions launched abroad by the DPRK and South Korea in mid-February, we view as particularly significant the beginning of the Sino-American dialogue concerning U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea.

We consider that the main objective of the visit to Peking of the Minister for Foreign Affairs Heo Dam was supporting the Chinese initiative in conversations with H. Kissinger for withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. The presence in Washington of South Korean Minister of Foreign Relations, Kim Yongsik aimed at obtaining guarantees that the gradual withdrawal of American troops will happen only if the U. S. modernizes the South Korean army, according to the five-year-plan of economic and military assistance.

At the same time, visits of the DPRK's party, government and parliamentary delegations are taking place in over 30 countries around the world. They have a mandate to express opinions concerning the reunification, to obtain support for it and to push for the isolation of South Korea to such an extent that 'the latter will have to accept the proposals and line imposed by the North.'

The DPRK is facing difficulties in this activity: simultaneous measures from Seoul. The visit of Kim Yongsik to Japan, to the Federal Republic of Germany, to the UK, to the U.N., as well as other international contacts, including socialist countries.

Following the analysis of power balance in the peninsula and in order to maintain dialogue and ensure progress, we recommend a gradual approach to all issues, starting from common points of view which would allow for tackling more complex fields, including the political one.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.074, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 5 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the Second Direction – Relations

After a several months pause in incidents between the two Koreas, a pause probably caused by the cessation of reciprocal infiltrations of hostile elements in the two Koreas, during the night of March 4th – 5th, a group of three North Koreans penetrated the border into South Korea. A South Korean border guard got shot, and weapons of Soviet origins were found on the premises of the incident.

This incident was brought to the attention of Lee Hurak, the South Korean co-president of the Inter-Korean coordination committee.

This incident worsens the state of inter-Korean relations, even more as in the following days a new meeting of the Inter-Korean coordination committee is expected.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

**Minutes of Conversation Taken on the Occasion of the Audience Granted by Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu to the Delegation of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea**

<b>Date:</b> 8 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>National Historical and Central Archives, Bucharest, Collection: Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee, Foreign Relations Department, Folder 23/1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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The following comrades took part in the discussions:

- On the Romanian side: Gheorghe Pana, member of the Executive Committee, member of the Permanent Presidium, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC RCP), Aurel Duca, deputy member of the Executive Committee of CC RCP, Stefan Andrei, Secretary of CC RCP, Dumitru Turcus, deputy head of department within the CC RCP, Dumitru Popa, Romania's ambassador to Pyongyang;
- On the Korean side: comrade Gim Donggyu, member of the Political Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, head of the Korean delegation, Gim Guktae, member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Department Head within the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Gim Gilhyeon, deputy head of Department within the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, and Yi Minsu, DPRK Ambassador to Bucharest.

The discussion started at 12:30 and ended at 16:00.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

How are you feeling in Romania?

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, we are extremely glad that you invited us to visit your country. From the very beginning, I would like to warmly thank you, the party and state leadership, the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party for the warm welcome and the treatment you gave us, and for the fact that we carried out our activity in extremely good conditions.

I was mandated by comrade Kim Il Sung, the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to convey his most sincere regards to you comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Also, on behalf of comrade Gim Seongae, I would like to convey to comrade Elena Ceaușescu the kindest regards.

We were so kindly treated in Romania that I find it hard to express this in a few words. We are deeply moved by the welcome you offered us as well as by the way we were treated here. We think that this is thanks to you, honorable comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, the eminent leader of the Romanian Communist Party.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

I would like to salute the delegation of the Workers' Party of Korea, on my behalf and on the behalf of my comrades, and I wish you feel as comfortable as possible in Romania. I would also like to express my satisfaction with this visit. We very much appreciate these contacts between our parties. I would like to thank you for the greetings you passed on from comrade Kim Il Sung, and I would like to ask you to pass on to him a cordial salute and best wishes from me, and to all the comrades in the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea [best wishes] from all the comrades in the leadership of our party.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I assure you I will pass on [your greetings].

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

I would also like to ask you to transmit comrade Gim Seongae, on behalf of my comrade, a warm greeting, together with the warmest thanks for the message she sent [to comrade Elena Ceaușescu].

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I would like to thank you very much for your extremely friendly words, for the extremely warm greetings, and I assure you I will pass on your regards as soon as I get back home.

We know you were on a trip to Czechoslovakia, we know you came back yesterday; we also know you are very busy, and for this reason we would like to thank you for finding the time to receive us, for which I would like to warmly thank you on behalf of our delegation. We are extremely satisfied with this visit, especially since we feel at home in Romania; we are staying in a very nice villa. We know that all these are the result of your thoughtfulness and attention.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

I wanted to have this meeting, to listen to some of your problems and concerns, to those of comrade Kim Il Sung, of your party, and of course, to inform you about some of our concerns. If you have nothing against it, I would like to listen to you first.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Hereon I would like to pass on comrade Kim Il Sung's exact words. With respect to the internal situation in our country, I would like to inform you about the concerns regarding the internal situation in our country, about the activity of our party regarding the unification of the country; our latest actions, and at the same time, I would like to listen to your precious suggestions concerning the things I will tell you.

Firstly, I would like to talk about some problems regarding the current state of the construction of socialism in our country. Presently, we are carrying out the tasks of the third 6-year plan put forward at the 5<sup>th</sup> Party Congress. The primary tasks we have assigned to ourselves during this 6-year plan include the further consolidation of the technical-material foundation of socialism and the liberation of workers from their chores by consolidating and further developing our achievements through the industrialization of the country and the rigorous promotion of the three tasks of the technical revolution. By undertaking great efforts in the area of equipment production, which is the main pillar for the achievement of the three tasks of the technical revolution, last year we increased the capacity of equipment factories from 5,000 to 30,000 units per year. We achieved to a great extent the complex mechanization in the field of extraction [of raw materials], and we are concentrating our efforts to modernize the metallurgical industry. We scored important successes in the field of chemical industry. Subsequently, we are producing 70-80 tons of vinalon, and presently we are struggling to increase production in vinalon factories up to 50,000 tons per year. We are making huge efforts to increase the production of tractors and trucks in order to mechanize [our] agriculture, a field in which things are going well. Only the tractor factory in Kiag (Is this correct??) produces 1000 tractors per month. We intend to get to 30.000 tractors per year. Despite the unfavorable climate from last year, we obtained good results in agriculture, as well. This year, on top of successfully fulfilling the three tasks of the technical revolution, we are continuously struggling to strengthen the technical-material basis of socialism even more, to lift to a higher level the standard of living of the population.

Moreover, we are actively promoting the ideological and cultural revolution in our country. Currently, our party is paying a lot of attention to the intensification of educational work in the spirit of Juche ideology, as well as to the intensification of educational work in the spirit of the classes. We are carrying out this struggle even more energetically because of the conditions in which we live. As you know, we are eyeball-to-eyeball with the enemies, and therefore we must carry out a peaceful battle against them.

With respect to the cultural revolution, we are continuously working to spread the system of mandatory general schooling until the 10<sup>th</sup> grade [to the entire country]. If we were to add the mandatory pre-school year to these 10 years of education, that means we have an 11-year mandatory general education system. This is no easy task; there are many schools to be built, and we must train many teachers. We intend to spread this schooling system by 20% [of the territory] per year, so that during this 6-year plan, we finish with the spreading of the 10-year mandatory schooling system.

Currently, the situation in our country is, generally speaking, alright. All party members and the entire population are closely united around the Central Committee of the Party. The political and ideological unity of the entire society is now stronger than ever.

At the end of last year, in an atmosphere full of enthusiasm we successfully organized the elections for representatives in the Supreme People's Assembly and in the people's assemblies from the provinces, and we adopted a new Constitution at the first meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly, which enshrines the achievements and the experience acquired by our people in its efforts to accomplish the revolution and to carry out the construction of socialism, the increased consolidation of the socialist order, of workers and peasants.

Subsequently, I would like to stop to go over the situation in South Korea, as well as over some other problems for which we would like to receive the support of your party and government.

The Korean problem is indeed not only a crucial problem of the Korean people, but a vital problem, of extraordinary importance, for peace in Asia and in the world. Over the past years, socialist countries had to focus their attention on the war in Vietnam. Currently however, we believe that since the war in Vietnam is over, our brothers and friends can pay more attention to the problem of Korea's unification.

As you know, comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, in 1971 we launched a peaceful offensive for the reunification of the country. After the beginning of negotiations between the Red Cross delegations from the North and the South in 1971 and [the beginning of] high-level negotiations, the North-South joint declaration was issued, whose central point is about the independent and peaceful unification, as well as about the achievement of the great national unity, based on the principles we formulated. Subsequently, the North-South Coordination Committee was formed, which until now, convened three times. We informed you about these at the time. We scored great victories during this year when we continued our peaceful offensive. The important successes in this campaign were made known accordingly to the South Korean people and to the peoples of the world. It was noticed that the tense situation in South Korea was the result of the South Korean puppet clique, which is precluding the unification of the country. Now, everybody can clearly understand who wants and who is preventing the unification of the country, who wants peace and who is interested in carrying out a warmongering policy. Public opinion circles in the world, including in Japan, are on our side and are supporting us. In other words, little by little, we managed to abolish the warmongers label they used to throw on us unjustifiably. This victory is one of the greatest successes we managed to score in our peaceful offensive.

Moreover, throughout our dialogue with the South we exerted a revolutionary influence on the population in South Korea, we revealed the true state of affairs, and we further intensified the inclination for peaceful unification in South Korea. At the same time, we managed to isolate the puppet clique in South Korea even more, not only internally but also internationally, and we put it in a state of panic and turmoil. After coming to the North, South Korean leaders realized that the entire population is tightly united around the party, and that the enthusiasm and political consciousness of our people are very high. The puppet clique is in a state of turmoil, it is planning how to impose its domination so as to be able to keep up in a confrontation with us. To this end, they declared martial law, they dissolved the Parliament, they closed down schools and they modified the constitution. In this crazy game for prestige, the puppet clique used the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to show that what they do counts as 'freedom and democracy.' Such deceitful fascist activities will only provoke a greater indignation and protests from the South Korean population and the world public opinion.

Another great success we achieved in our peaceful offensive campaign was that we managed to demonstrate that there is absolutely no pretext for American troops to be stationed in South Korea. Until now, American imperialists were carrying out a propaganda [campaign] to maintain their troops stationed in South Korea to prevent a war and to defend this country [South Korea]. But since we declared we do not intend to invade South Korea, and through the

Joint Declaration we took upon ourselves the responsibility not to fight one against the others, American troops can no longer stay there under the cover of UN troops.

To sum up, throughout the entire dialogue with the South, we scored important victories. Honestly speaking, the situation is currently much more favorable than beforehand, when South Korean revolutionaries carried out their activity in the underground/in illegality.

The South Korean puppets, realizing they can't win anything from the North-South dialogue, are now, on the one hand, supporting the slogan of 'peaceful unification' but, on the other hand, they are undertaking actions which are stalling the process of unification. In the Joint Declaration, they agreed to the peaceful and independent unification of the country, without any interference from the outside, but now they maintain that American troops and UN troops are not foreign forces, and therefore, they must be kept in South Korea, and that in order to assure their own [South Korean] superiority in the balance of power, in the eventuality of a confrontation, they argue it is necessary to reinforce their military power. The so-called Prime Minister of South Korea, in a recent trip to the United States, said it would be impossible to achieve the unification of the homeland before 1980, when they will assure their superiority in the balance of power with the North. Last year, while inspecting military units on the battlefield, Park Chung Hee said that the dialogue between the South and the North was a confrontation with communists, who had a different manner of acting; therefore, [the South Koreans] had to build up their forces and must not hasten the dialogue and the exchange of views with the North.

As you were informed, during the second meeting of the co-presidents of the Coordination Committee, we put forward a cooperation plan between the North and the South, as a solution to put into practice the three principles for the unification of the homeland. Not only did they reject this plan, but they are also now talking of a confrontation. In the current circumstances of the North-South dialogue, they are introducing American weapons into South Korea, they are spending huge amounts of money on weapons, and they are holding military maneuvers. Also they allow foreign capital to enter South Korea, including American and Japanese capital. Only last year, the South Korean puppets introduced foreign capital worth \$946 million, out of which \$740 million were introduced in the first six months after the release of the Joint Declaration. Ultimately, this means that they oppose the unification of the homeland and they want to preserve the dismantlement of the country, to completely concede the economy to foreign monopolies and lastly, to sell the economy to American and Japanese imperialists.

The South Korean puppet clique is intensifying even more the repression against the South Korean people, who aspire to democracy and the unification of the homeland. Last year, the South Korean puppet clique, by forging a so-called state institution – the National Assembly – planned with the help of this institution the election of Park Chung Hee as president. Subsequently, it held a mock trial for opposition leaders, on the occasion of the formally organized electoral campaign. By doing so, they try to stop the development of opposition forces and to strengthen their fascist domination system.

Through their two-faced approach, the puppet clique is planning to conserve the dismantlement of the country for ever, instead of taking actions to unify it. Park Chung Hee intends to maintain his grip on power for an unlimited time, he maintains the division of the country, he is accumulating political, economic and military forces which would allow him to confront us and to win time by continuing the North-South dialogue.

For this reason, this is a tough struggle, which requires a lot of patience, obstinacy, it is a fiery class struggle and ultimately it is a political confrontation. It is an even tougher struggle if we consider that American imperialists and Japanese militarists are involved in it. Currently, the American imperialists are trying to form two Koreas, by rendering the division of the country permanent. The Japanese militarists are on the same page [with the Americans].

One of their schemes is to make both the North and the South members of the United Nations. We have studied the problem of the accession of both North and South Korea to the United Nations for a long time. Ultimately, we reached the conclusion that if we become members of the United Nations while the country is still divided, this will harm the unification of the country. In the current circumstances, if the North and the South become members of the United Nations, this will do no good to the cause of the unification of the country; on the contrary it will give a legal pretext to those who are trying to render the division of the country permanent. If we do so, our country will remain divided for an undetermined period of time. For this reason, our position is to join the United Nations after unification or,

presently, with only one Korea, meaning a confederation comprising North Korea and the South. Throughout our dialogue with the South Koreans we openly said it can't be that a divided Korea joins the United Nations.

The troops of the aggressors, the American imperialists continue to be stationed in South Korea and to stall the unification of the country, and the puppet clique continues to act for the division of our country. All these represent the main obstacle to which prevents the peaceful unification of the homeland.

This is the situation that was recently created in our country.

In these conditions, with the political, economic, and military consolidation of our country, our party intends to continue the peaceful offensive according to the plan we previously adopted, to act so as to expose our enemies, putting them in an increasingly tougher spot. Therefore, at the beginning of next month, we want to summon a meeting of the Coordination Committee, and at the same time, to hold talks between the representatives of [the two] Red Cross delegations. By these means, we want to exert pressure on the South Korean authorities so that they open even bigger gates [for us]. The more wide open these gates are, the more favorable the situation will be for us. Currently, students and intellectuals in South Korea are supporting us; not to mention peasants and workers. In case multilateral contacts and exchanges will not be possible, we will try to conquer the large majority of the population in South Korea, we will attract it on the path of socialism, of course, leaving out a small pocket of land-owners, mercantile capitalists, and reactionary bureaucrats. The most important problem today is how to open the gates even wider, how to contact the large masses of people in South Korea.

By exerting a revolutionary influence on the population in South Korea and by attracting an increasingly greater number of democratic people on our side, we want to develop even more the revolutionary movement in South Korea, to upgrade it to a superior stage. In this respect, we want to raise the level of the consciousness of the masses, to develop and strengthen the democratic forces in South Korea, to generate a situation in which, eventually, a democratic person rises to power in South Korea. If such a person assumes power, then we will be able to achieve unification peacefully. We can say that there are some real possibilities in this respect. Although this is an internal, secret affair, we can tell you we have democratic forces in South Korea, but we are acting with caution so that these forces do not get oppressed. We are acting with great caution so that these forces are not liquidated. We are paying a lot of attention to these forces and that is why we want to prevent Park Chung Hee from taking repressive measures against progressive forces.

If socialist countries undertake sustained efforts on the international stage, they will prevent the South Korean puppet clique from suppressing the democratic forces in South Korea, and at the same time, these forces will be able to develop and strengthen faster. If democratic forces strengthen, we will be able to achieve the peaceful unification of the country more easily. In these circumstances, Park Chung Hee, under internal and external pressures, will be forced to accept the creation of a confederation, to renounce the stooge role it plays for American imperialists and for Japanese militarists, to acknowledge the crimes it committed and to allow progressive forces to take part in this confederation.

We are for the creation of a confederation which will eventually lead to the development and strengthening of democratic forces in South Korea. We think Park Chung Hee will accept to live with us in a confederation only when he stops trusting the American imperialists and the Japanese militarists. At the same time, we must expose with all our strength the puppet clique. We must exert powerful pressures on it, both from the inside and from the outside.

As I previously pointed out, this is a very fiery class struggle. In other words, we can say that this is part of the grand struggle between socialism and capitalism, between democracy and fascism, between revolution and counter-revolution, between international proletarian revolutionary forces and the bourgeois. Therefore, throughout this struggle, we pay a lot of attention to the strengthening of our own revolutionary forces and, at the same time, to the strengthening of [our] solidarity with global revolutionary forces. The more we reinforce our solidarity with global revolutionary forces, the more support we will receive from them for the cause of our revolution; the more we isolate American imperialism and their stooges, the more we create a favorable situation for our revolution.

Strengthening solidarity with international revolutionary forces represents one of the main factors for the acceleration of the independent and peaceful unification of the homeland. Therefore, our party wishes to achieve the unification of

the homeland as soon as possible, counting on the internal class struggle; at the same time, it needs the active support of socialist countries and of the working class in the entire world.

Currently, the American imperialists are in a great impasse internally and internationally. They can no longer invoke any pretext for keeping their forces in South Korea, and the South Korean puppets are completely disoriented. If [our] friends isolate the South Korean puppets even more and actively support our struggle that will represent a great help for the cause of the unification of the homeland.

The main obstacle in the way to unification of our homeland is the fact that the puppet clique and the United States use the United Nations Organization to achieve the measures they undertake to render the division of Korea permanent. We are certain that the parties and governments of brotherly countries see the Korean matter as a matter of their own, [we are certain] that they will manage to forestall the reactionary efforts taken on the international stage, and will support the just cause of our people.

In the past, the Romanian Communist Party, with you at the helm, the Romanian government and people actively supported with all their means the struggle of our people and our party for the unification of the homeland. Above all, comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, you really did a lot for the cause of our people, for the cause of the unification of our homeland. I would like to thank you once again for the kind message you sent us on the occasion of the release of the North-South Joint Declaration, for your solidarity and your support for our struggle that you showed at the National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party in July 1972. You, comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, undertook great efforts during your visits to various African countries from last year, as well as during your recent visit to Asia and on other occasions, presenting the situation in our country and the position of our party regarding the unification of the homeland to the heads of those states with whom you met, which contributed to the increase in number of those who support us. These things left a very powerful impression on us.

Our brotherly comrades from the Socialist Republic of Romania are making active efforts not only internally but also internationally, at the United Nations and other international bodies, to expose the betraying actions of the South Korean puppet clique, to actively support our struggle. On the occasion of the 27<sup>th</sup> session of the United Nations, our Romanian comrades undertook intense efforts to support our position.

We are very grateful for the warm comradely feelings that the Romanian Communist Party, the Romanian government and the Romanian people and especially you, have for our party and our people, and we are grateful for the effort and activity that you are undertaking to support our cause.

To take advantage of this occasion, I would like to bring to your attention some problems with which we would like to obtain the support of the Romanian comrades.

1. We would like to ask the Romanian Communist Party, [and] the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania to undertake another effort this year to put the Korean matter on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, so that this organization discusses and adopts just measures on the Korean matter.

The American imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique have already taken action not to have the Korean matter on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Japanese militarists are doing the same thing. The situation, nonetheless, is developing to their detriment.

We believe that if our friends in brotherly socialist countries, countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, undertake efforts to support us, then we will create a situation favorable to us.

We believe that it is good, at least for the beginning, to have the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea dismantled, and to remove the United Nations pretense from American troops which presently occupy South Korea. It would be extremely useful for us if our delegate could make it to the United Nations and give a speech, of course, after the Korean matter makes it onto the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly session. To this end, we have lately sent many delegations not only to socialist countries but to other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Given that the Romanian Communist Party and the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania had relations with many countries in the world and it is undertaking an intense activity internationally, we would like to ask you to influence these countries to create a favorable situation to the discussion of the Korean matter at the United Nations.

2. We would also like to ask the Romanian comrades to continue to actively support us so as to exert international pressure on the South Korean puppets, to compel them to put into practice those things that we agreed upon in the North-South Joint Declaration. In order to avoid being isolated internationally, the South Korean puppets are carrying out a libelous propaganda campaign, they present themselves as if they are the ones who want the unification of the country, and at the same time, they do their very best establish relations with neutral countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Simultaneously, they do their best to break through even in socialist countries. Seeing that socialist countries refuse to have contact with them, they try to enter these countries through third-party trade relations or by sending delegations to international sports competitions. This way they ultimately plan to establish relations with these countries, even political relations. If socialist countries and an increasing number of countries in the world refuse these contacts and expose them, then the puppet clique will be isolated and in the end it will be cast aside or it will have to kneel down before us. Therefore, we would like to ask you, again, to influence other countries to do so, offering us active and comradely support.
3. We would like to ask the Romanian Communist Party and the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania to support us with forestalling the reactionary maneuvers of the American and Japanese imperialists to create two Korean states. If Korea is divided into two, then the South will actually become not only a colony of the Japanese and American imperialists, but will be used as a military base for aggression against socialist countries. If this happens, then severe danger to peace in Korea and in the entire world will arise. We therefore ask you to influence the American imperialists and the Japanese militarists so that they do not prevent the peaceful and independent unification of the homeland and so that they actively support our active struggle against the creation of two Korean states.
4. Just like before, we would like to ask the Romanian Communist Party and the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania to influence certain countries which do not seem to understand correctly the realities of our country and our just approach towards the unification of the homeland, so that they get to a good understanding of our situation and they support our struggle and our just position.  
Also, we would like to ask you that at the same time with the active support given to the position of our party on the unification of the homeland, the Romanian party and government expose on various occasions and at different international gatherings the maneuvers of the American imperialists and of the South Korean puppet clique targeted against the unification of Korea. Honestly speaking, the American imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique are trying to transform the Korean peninsula into a capitalist area, while we try to transform it into a socialist area.  
We are certain that, in the future, the Romanian Communist Party and the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the entire Romanian people will offer us their support and the necessary help to achieve our cause.

As for the relations between our two parties, countries and peoples, we can say they are at an all-time peak. Our party, government and people highly appreciate the friendship and cohesion with the Romanian party, government and people and we noticed with great satisfaction that these relations are growing increasingly stronger. As far as we are concerned, we will do our best to strengthen and upgrade to higher level these comradely and brotherly relations that currently exist amongst us.

At the same time, we would like to assure you that we will support your struggle with all the means available to us. We would like to offer you, comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, our most heartfelt wishes for your health and grander successes in your work.

In conclusion, I would like to tell you that all the things mentioned above represent the message of the Secretary General of the Central Committee of our party, comrade Kim Il Sung.

In addition, I would like to tell you that comrade Kim Il Sung regrets not being able to fulfill the promise he made to comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu to visit Romania, for a variety of reasons regarding the internal situation. Because of the internal situation, he could not travel abroad last year. At the same time, comrade Kim Il Sung asked me to tell you that he would do his very best to respond to your invitation to visit Romania. We repeatedly discussed this problem in our Political Committee. To my mind, I can tell you that I believe comrade Kim Il Sung's visit will not happen any time later than this year. As you know, the situation in Korea is very complicated and before going abroad, we must measure and weigh all the aspects involved.

I would like to thank you very much for the attention with which you followed the message sent by comrade Kim Il Sung. It was a long one, and I am afraid that it occasionally bored you. At the same time, in case you have certain observations, proposals or ideas regarding the things I mentioned, I would listen to them with the utmost satisfaction. I would respect them and pass them on to our leadership.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

I would like to thank you for passing on this message from President Kim Il Sung with respect to the current problems of the DPRK.

We are happy for the achievements that our brothers, the Korean people, are experiencing under the leadership of the party, headed by comrade Kim Il Sung, in the field of the construction of socialism.

I also saluted the initiative to peacefully unite the North with the South and the activity subsequently undertaken in this direction. We understand that the achievement of this extraordinarily important goal for the Korean people implies a prolonged activity and an intense political and diplomatic activity. Of course, we understand your desire that unification is achieved as soon as possible, but from what I understood from your very message, you also believe that this will mean a prolonged struggle and a prolonged political and diplomatic activity. Of course, in the end, it will be of foremost importance to have workers and the population in the South to take action with the goal of peaceful [re]unification in mind. If democratic forces, the population in the South, will decisively manifest this preoccupation, then there is no doubt that decisive results will be achieved in this respect and in a shorter timeframe.

I must tell you that we especially appreciate the way in which these problems are dealt with in the message [you passed on from comrade Kim Il Sung], meaning the prospect and the possibility of a [regime] change in the South, first and foremost, the rise to the helm of power in the South of a president with democratic inclinations. Undoubtedly, this would expedite the whole process of unification. But I believe that the possibility that unification be achieved with the current leadership is completely just.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I never said that this possibility does not exist, even in the current circumstances.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

All capabilities must be used to achieve this goal.

We salute this manner of approaching these issues, and I would like to tell comrade Kim Il Sung that we will support with all our strength this activity towards the peaceful unification of the [Korean] homeland.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I assure you I will pass your words on to him.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

We will task our ministry of foreign affairs and other comrades who deal with international problems to give their support [to your cause] and to take all [necessary] measures to register the Korean matter on the agenda of the United Nations. Undoubtedly, we will militate in the same direction in our relations with other states.

However, if I understood correctly, our [North] Korean comrades do not wish to take part in any activity organized by the United Nations Organization until the unification [of the homeland].

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I would like to underline here that we wish to take it from the bottom to the top, starting with solving certain smaller problems: [we want] American troops to leave from there, the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of

Korea to be dismantled, and ultimately, we will solve these big problems. If you have certain opinions about the things I said earlier, I am happy to listen to you.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

Of course, this is something that you will have the last word on, but in the spirit of our friendly relations, we will give you our opinion.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I was mandated to come here and listen to your opinions, which we respect, and which we will apply if they suit us.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

In the spirit of our friendly relations, I must say that, to my mind, maybe it would be better to think and reflect a bit more on this issue. In what way? Firstly, with respect to [your] participation in the United Nations Organization, which means becoming a member of international organizations, and before becoming a member of the United Nations, [you] could adopt the status of observer, which means being present at the UN. This would be hugely important. You will not automatically get the representation status as a UN member, but you could undertake a vast activity with other states, with agencies within this organization, in the direction that interests you.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

We pay a great deal of attention to the possibility of one of our delegates going to the UN and giving a speech. I am very much aware of what you are saying with respect to sending an observer. We will think about this issue. I will report your opinion to comrade Kim Il Sung. Indeed, sending an observer has nothing to do with our country becoming or not becoming a member of the United Nations.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

The second problem. I agree that vast efforts must be undertaken on the international stage to compel the South Korean authorities to accept your proposal for peaceful unification.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

This is exactly what we are asking for.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

And we will achieve this, but in this respect too I have certain opinions, more specifically with respect to relations with socialist countries and with respect to other countries' relations with South Korea. I want you to understand that this is not about economic problems. We have economic relations with 115 countries, therefore for us it is not a matter of economic problems, but from our experience to date, including with the Federal Republic of Germany, and even with the United States of America and with other states, we noticed that direct contacts and discussions with the representatives of these states were better when we had direct unmediated contacts. I, to be honest, believe that it would be to the advantage of peaceful unification if socialist and other friendly countries, and here I am referring to independent countries in Africa and even Latin America, which would support this effort for the peaceful unification of the country, would have a direct connection with the South. Anyway, Americans, Japanese and other states are present in the South, and they, of course, act in the known direction. The presence of other forces there, acting precisely in the direction of peaceful unification, would exert an even greater pressure on Park Chung Hee and on other forces in the South Korean administration. Of course, we will proceed as you think is best, but because we have such things in mind, we would like to share them with you so that you can reflect on them.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Can I please tell you something in this respect?

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

Please go ahead.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Of course, it is very normal that in your activity on the international stage, in [your] relations with the Americans, the Japanese, with the [West] Germans, you undertake to support the unification of our country. But, in relations with South Korea, problems are a bit different. Our plan for the time being is to further isolate Park Chung Hee. As you know, there is a little thaw in the direction of unification. We are thinking to isolate the current South Korean leader, so that we can establish relations with him. Afterwards, it would be good that other countries, including socialist countries, contact him so as to compel him even more to follow the path of peaceful unification.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

Of course, we understand all these concerns. I do not want to further discuss this problem anymore, but I would like you to pass on our thoughts to comrade Kim Il Sung.

I understand the problem of diplomatic relations too. It may work to try [establishing] relations with a sort of economic and consular group, which does not mean granting diplomatic recognition and to be honest I think this would be in your favor, in favor of the peaceful unification [of the homeland]. Of course, we will do as you decide. We will not do anything without agreeing with you on that matter first.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Of course.

Needless to say, we will take into account and study your suggestion as well. Now, we believe that tactically and strategically, our last channel of communication is to get in touch with him ourselves. Of course, there will come a time when we will ask you to take different actions. But, at this point in time, doing so would come to the rescue of Park Chung Hee. In order to get out of the state of isolation in which he found himself, he is trying to establish economic relations with socialist countries, to deceive the large popular masses in South Korea.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

There is another dimension to these things. Today, he is dependent on the Americans, Japanese and other imperialist, reactionary forces. Isolation may further push him to look for support from these forces. Establishing relations with other countries as well, including with socialist countries, may help him free himself up from the tight grip of the Americans and the Japanese. Therefore, this aspect must be considered as well. And this will have a positive influence on the popular masses in South Korea. Therefore, these are the assumptions from which we start when we came up with our strategy.

As for the state of international affairs, I believe it is now that conditions are ripe to help this struggle. The fact that there are forces, even in this [South Korean] administration, who want to establish relations with socialist countries and with other states as well, should be encouraged and not forestalled, because this will weaken the position of the United States and of the Japanese and of other forces in there. But, of course, you have more information and you will make up your mind on your own. I only expressed certain thoughts we had [on this].

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I will immediately report to comrade Kim Il Sung your precious suggestions.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

Once again, I would like to openly say, on behalf of our party and state leadership, that we will grant our full support, as much as we can, to your efforts to achieve the peaceful unification of the country, in our relations with other countries, including in our relations with the United States and with Japan.

I would like to mention myself the good collaborative relations between our countries and our parties. After my [last] visit to your country, after the discussions I had with comrade Kim Il Sung, we achieved great successes in this respect. We are also determined to do everything possible for these relations to continuously develop, and we believe there are good conditions for this.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Thank you.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

As for comrade Kim Il Sung's visit to Romania, of course, I understand his preoccupations regarding the problems stemming from the efforts to peacefully unify the country.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

We are very happy that you understand this situation, but we believe there will be a time when [comrade Kim Il Sung] will be able to respond to your invitation.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

But please remind comrade Kim Il Sung that we would be glad if he could take his trip to Romania this year. Over the past two years, many things have change in international politics, and we have a lot to talk about. Of course, we will take comrade Kim Il Sung's availability into account when deciding on the period when he comes to Romania. Anyhow, you can rest assured that he is awaited with a lot of pleasure and love and that he will be well received in Romania.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I will pass this message on to him right away. I assure you we will send him the invitation to visit Romania.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

Now I would like to tell you about a few of the problems that concern us. But let's go eat and we'll talk there.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

That is alright.

Please excuse me for keeping you for so long.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:**

We will continue our discussions at the dinner table.

Subsequently Ceaușescu discusses Romania's internal achievements (in agriculture, industry and production) and foreign policy.

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061077**

<b>Date:</b> 9 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter: 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK's relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Direction II Relations  
02/01650/13.III

Today there was a simultaneous communiqué in Pyongyang and Seoul that between 14 – 16 March, the 3rd meeting of the SNCC will take place, preceded on 10 March by a meeting of the common secretariat in Panmunjeom.

We are mentioning that this is the first official meeting of the two sides during the last three months after the reunion in Seoul of the SNCC, when the representative of North Korean co-president, Deputy Prime Minister Pak Seongcheol, carried discussions with South Korean President Park Chung Hee.

We note that the third meeting of the SNCC is taking place in a climate of tension in North-South relations, which is unprecedented since the adoption of the Joint Declaration in June 1972.

Additional to the points of tension mentioned above, there is also the incident on March 7, in the demilitarized area, where casualties were registered on the Southern side, the first such incident since the declaration was signed.

This conflict was preceded as we previously informed, by an unsuccessful attempt at landing a group of North Koreans in the South, a moment which accelerated Seoul's decision to accept a new meeting with Pyongyang.

The meeting on March 14 is preceded these days in Pyongyang by a sustained propaganda campaign against the South, campaign which, by size and means of expression, reminds of the tense relations between the two sides prior to 1972.

We mention that the South Korean propaganda means accessible to the embassy, are not engaged in such a campaign or aimed at antagonizing the North.

Publicity from the side of the DPRK regarding certain political theses underlying the meaning and direction of North-South dialogue, has intensified. Among these we mention the firm rejection of ideas such as 'confrontation' or 'economic competition,' supported by the South, together with the insistent mention of dialogue and multilateral cooperation.

Given the difficult conditions in which the planned session will be taking place, we expect it will ultimately amount to a re-affirmation of principles found in the Joint Declaration, the toning down of the tense atmosphere, the renewal of bilateral agreements concerning mutual reparations, and expressing points of view about the final purpose and stages of the dialogue between north and south.

Contacts at the level of coordination committee will create the environment for reopening discussions between Red Cross Committees, expected for March 21 in Pyongyang.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

**Telegram from Bucharest to Peking, Ulaanbaatar, New Delhi, Islamabad, Djakarta, Tokyo, No. 02/01476**

**Date:**

9 March  
1973

**Source:**

*Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter: 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK's relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe*

To: Direction II Relations  
Comrade Chief of Mission,

The Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang informs you of the following concerning North-South relations:

Over the last period of time, a more specific formulation of policies concerning each other is visible on both sides.

After a long period of time, the DPRK has resumed the idea of political cooperation with the South, of economic collaboration, of establishing the Korean confederation.

This idea pushes the boundaries of the South Korean vision which has at its basis the solving of humanitarian issues, commercial exchange, mutual visits as well as other forms of cooperation as a matter of perspective.

North Korean officials consider that soon the phase of stagnation in North-South dialogue will be overcome.

In the meantime, at the suggestion of North Korea, the Chinese-U.S. dialogue has begun in view of the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea as well as the request of South Korea for U.S. guarantees that the withdrawal of troops be realized only with the condition of modernizing the South Korean army.

Conversely, both sides have engaged in a diplomatic and political offensive in order to obtain international support for their own plan to isolate the other side.

Signed: L. Petrescu.

Written : R. Budura

Typed: R. Păun/3 ex.

## Meeting Minutes between Director Kim and Counselor Pierce

<b>Date:</b> 9 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.</i>
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### Meeting Minutes between Americas Division Director Kim - Counselor Pierce

Date: March 9th, 1973 10:30-11:45  
Location: Office of Director for Americas Division  
Participants: Director of North America Division 2

**Director Kim:** Director Kim explained the background of our contact with leaders in the [United States] Senate as well as key politicians, including Senator Fulbright, Vice President Agnew and Secretary of the State Rogers. On behalf of the Minister, Director Kim expressed gratitude for the cooperation [of the U.S.].

**Director Kim:** At a meeting with [Richard L.] Sneider, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, I heard that Deputy Assistant Secretary Sneider, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs [Thomas R.] Pickering, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs [Dennis J.] Doolin will visit Korea in April to discuss security affairs. Have you heard about anything on this matter? I was told that the above-mentioned officials will tour Japan, Korea and Taiwan to discuss security affairs.

**Counselor Pierce:** We are not aware of this visit. However, if the officials do visit Korea, then it will be a busy month because Department of State inspectors are also scheduled to visit Korea during April.

**Director Kim:** Regarding the clash along the demilitarized zone, the North is spreading false propaganda which suggests that we attacked them first, with the support of aircraft. Do you have any information on this matter?

**Counselor Pierce:** We do not believe it was a planned provocation. As far as I am aware, it was the first accident since an American soldier was shot while repairing the hedgehog along the demilitarized zone on January 13th, 1969. (The repair work was announced in advance. Due to a mechanical malfunction of the helicopter used for the rescue, the helicopter crashed and the injured soldier and rescuers died.) We have routinely notified the North about our operations as well as the events which were to occur on February 27. We believe that the accident happened because the North Korean commander did not know the schedule. We know that fifty-five armed soldiers were involved in the operation. The U.S. will present this clash in the demilitarized zone to the Military Armistice Commission (the U.S. suggested the event be held on March 3 but the North Koreans revised the date and suggested that it be held on March 12). Nonetheless, we expect the North Korean response to remain unchanged. Therefore, if the [South] Koreans seek to argue strongly against the North, it has to be done through the North-South Coordinating Committee. While we have notified the Central Information Agency of this approach, the agency seemed to be reluctant to spread this matter further and has strictly censored news of it.

**Director Kim:** It is a big problem that North Korea is insulting the South through media and that the North continues to do battle [with the South] through, for example, the infiltration of armed agents to Jeju Island. This issue must be responded to strongly.

**Counselor Pierce:** I agree with you and we must clearly find out the details about this case.

**Counselor Pierce:** We are obtaining the text of the North's press announcement. We will deliver the text to you.

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061084**

<b>Date:</b> 17 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter: 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK's relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Direction II Relations  
02/01810/19.III

Concerning the second meeting of the SNCC taking place in Pyongyang throughout two sessions between March 14-16, we inform you:

Taking place on the background of strong tensions generated by two military incidents resulting in deaths, this meeting ended without clear results in any of the addressed issues, due to fundamental differences between the two sides' positions.

During the press conference held in Panmunjeom before entering the DPRK area, South Korean co-president Lee Hurak said he is taking to Pyongyang a message of goodwill from President Park Chung Hee together with a positive answer to some of the previous proposals from the North.

During discussions (delayed by one day at the request of the North, the representatives of Pyongyang, abandoning the questions still open since the past session, have proposed new ideas which surprised the South Korean delegation and which, due to their complexity, could not be translated into practical measures at this particular moment in time, nor were they retained by the South in view of a future study.

Thus, the North, underlining the need for eliminating military confrontation between the two sides, presented a 5-point-plan consisting of: mutual disarmament, reducing troops to 100,000 people or less together with limiting arming, stopping the introduction of foreign weapons, withdrawal of foreign troops from the peninsula, including U.S. ones, banning of weapon usage and the closing of a peace agreement between the two sides.

The North Korean co-president proposed that the 5 members of each side of the SNCC be doubled with the chiefs of staff from both armies, or that a subcommittee made up of representatives for chiefs of staff be charged with putting into practice the program's five points.

Pointing that this new position goes beyond its mandate and its realization is unfeasible for the moment, the South Korean delegation suggested (starting with the present session) the creation of two subcommittees: economic and social-cultural. Representatives of Pyongyang refused to take in consideration the creation of only two subcommittees, insisting on the simultaneous creation of all five (political, military, diplomatic, economic and cultural) planned in the second session of co-presidents in November 1972. This proposal was not accepted by Lee Hurak.

Thus, due to the cautious attitude of the South and the 'all or nothing' strategy of the north, the session ended without any notable success.

At the press conference held on March 16 by Pyongyang-assigned co-president (to which press attaches of diplomatic missions were present),

Deputy Prime Minister Pak Seongcheol criticized South Korean authorities for fragmenting the issue of reunification in 'simple' and 'complex' issues, as well as for introducing 'priorities' and 'procedural sequences'. Pak Seongcheol underlined that the 'sincere wish towards reunification is sufficient for solving all problems, be they simple or complex, without any pre-established order and without preconceived procedures'.

After analyzing the proceedings of the recent session, the rigid position of the DPRK who rejected Southern proposals (which, though did not exhaust all available possibilities, offered nevertheless the framework for economic, cultural, sports, etc. types of exchanges and contacts), we consider that the visible change of stance from the past of the DPRK has a lot to do with the country's first victories resulting from synchronizing the intra-Korean dialogue with international developments (the opening of Sino-American dialogue regarding withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea).

It is obvious that the DPRK is attempting, with the help of P.R. China or by itself, to gain the time necessary for obtaining the disengagement of the U.S. from the peninsula, which in turn would ensure a position of superiority for Pyongyang in intra-Korean negotiations.

At the same time, the DPRK is expecting practical results from the comprehensive international campaign to make contacts (visits to approximately 45 different countries) aimed also at undermining South Korea externally.

Encouraging existing trends of opinion at international level concerning withdrawal of foreign troops from other territories, as well as increased demands of U.S. political personalities for withdrawal from South Korea and cessation of military help for Seoul, are of great interest to the DPRK.

We therefore consider that the new DPRK tactics aims at achieving immediate objectives of unification without South Korea, even against it.

The continuation of intra-Korean dialogue will therefore retain a formal character, depending mostly on indirect actions and various contingencies.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

**Telegram from Bucharest to Pyongyang, SECRET, No. 02/01810**

<b>Date:</b> 21 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter: 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1513, Vol. I, Concerning 1) External politics; 2) DPRK's relations with other states, Period: 04.01 – 14.08.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Date: 21.03.1973  
Sender: Direction II Relations  
To: Pyongyang  
02/01810

Comrade Chief of Mission,

We are hereby presenting a synthesis of the opinions formulated by the bureau in Pyongyang concerning the 2nd session of the SNCC, which took place in Pyongyang between March 14-16, 1973:

The session took place on the background of pronounced antagonisms between the two sides and concluded without clear solutions to issues discussed, due to fundamental differences of opinions.

Throughout discussions Northern representatives, abandoning the issues opened towards consideration during the last session, proposed new ideas which surprised the Southern delegation and were not retained by the latter for further reflection.

The Northern co-president launched thereupon the idea of matching the number of 5 SNCC members from each side with the chiefs of staff from both militaries, or of creating a subcommittee made up of representatives of the two armies.

Showing that this new proposal goes beyond its mandate and putting it into practice is premature given the existing conditions, the Southern side suggested the creation during the present session of two subcommittees—economic and social-cultural.

Northern representatives refused to take in consideration the creation of only two committees, insisting on the simultaneous creation of all 5 committees planned during the co-presidents' meeting in November 1972 (political, military, diplomatic, economic and cultural).

Due to the cautious attitude of the South and the 'all or nothing' strategy of the north, the session ended without any notable success.

Visible change in the position of the DPRK (the rejection of Southern proposals which, though did not exhaust all available possibilities, offered nevertheless the framework for economic, cultural, sports, etc. types of exchanges and contacts) has a lot to do with the country's first victories resulting from synchronizing the intra-Korean dialogue with international developments (the opening of Sino-American dialogue regarding withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea).

It is obvious that the DPRK is attempting, with the help of the People's Republic of China or by itself, to gain the time necessary for obtaining the disengagement of the U.S. from the peninsula, which in turn would ensure a position of superiority for Pyongyang in intra-Korean negotiations. Conversely, the DPRK is expecting practical results from its comprehensive international campaign of building contacts.

The new DPRK tactics aims at achieving immediate objectives of unification without South Korea, or even against it.

The continuation of intra-Korean dialogue will therefore retain a formal character, depending mostly on indirect actions and various contingencies.

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.087, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 23 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Comrade Vasile Gliga  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

On March 22nd I was received by Kim Yoonseong, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party. Kim Yoonseong expressed the satisfaction and gratitude of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, [and] of Comrade Kim Il Sung, for the warmth and hospitality with which the delegation of the Korean Workers' Party, led by Kim Donggyu, was received, for the special attention which this delegation enjoyed from the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party, [and] from Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu.

Afterwards, the Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party handed me a brief on the second session of the North-South coordination committee, which took place recently in Pyongyang.

Besides the main topics approached at this session, which we pointed out in our telegram no. 61084, Kim Yoonseong also informed us [about the following matters]:

In the four-month interval between the first and second session of the North-South coordination committee, there were contacts between North and South, but these contacts did not help diffuse the state of confrontation [between the two parties] and to ease the tension which has been accumulating.

In these circumstances, the party leadership, comrade Kim Il Sung, after analyzing the situation, decided to steer the dialogue with the South towards practical measures, meant to eliminate the military confrontation between the two sides which is the primary condition for creating a climate of tension. [This decision] took shape in the well-known 5-point proposal, which was put forward by the North-Korean co-president of the committee (see our telegram no. 61084).

It was highlighted that this line is not only the most righteous and rational [approach] to [engage] in a dialogue with South Korea, but also 'a test for the loyalty of the South Korean puppets toward the cause of unification.'

Kim Yoonseong showed that the negative reaction of the South [Korean] delegation toward the proposals of the North is circumscribed within the policy of the South Korean puppets to perpetuate the military confrontation and to achieve the unification of the country by means of 'defeating communism,' [and] to participate to the dialogue strictly formally.

He offered an overview of the situation in South Korea, referring to the intensification of war preparations and the psychosis against the DPRK, and he also underlined that this would trigger corresponding countermeasures from the North.

The Deputy Head of the International Section said that the South [Korean] delegation would have blamed the North for inciting the 'Revolutionary Party for Reunification' in South Korea to violent revolution. He did not mention a thing, however, about the incident which occurred in a conversation between the two co-presidents [of the Committee] when in response to Lee Hurak's assertion that the North started the war in June 1950, Pak Seongcheol only said 'what happened is in the past,' a statement recorded on tape and repeatedly played on South Korean radio.

According to the brief [I received], the participants to the session discussed some technical problems, regarding the improvement of the permanent liaison apparatus in the Coordination Committee, as well as regarding the publicity made about this session, but due to the obtuse attitude of the South Korean representatives, no further steps were made.

Kim Yoonseong stressed that although no progress was made with respect to a drawing closer of the two sides' points of view, the North scored a victory by having the following conclusions confirmed: the righteousness of [their] position to eliminate the state of military confrontation, the North's dynamic and active affirmation in its interaction with the South at the international level, the exposure of the South [Korean] puppets' policies, which under the guise of dialogue, are promoting confrontation and preparing for a new war, the reconfirmation of the idea that the North-South dialogue is a 'fierce class struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, between patriotism and betrayal, between socialism and capitalism, a tough and complex struggle whose issues cannot be solved just through a few sessions, who is compelling [us] to strike the enemy whenever it is necessary.'

Kim Yoonseong remarked that in the future, the [North] Korean party and government would militate for the promotion of dialogue, exposing the duplicitous tactics of the South. In conclusion, he expressed his hope that the Romanian Communist Party and the Romanian government would continue to grant the DPRK their support to the cause of the unification of Korea, exposing and isolating the South Korean puppet clique.

The whole brief was formulated using very harsh words with respect to the Seoul authorities.

With respect to our analysis of the significance and underpinnings of the new line promoted by the North in its confrontation with the South, we maintain the position we outlined in telegram no. 61.084.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.087, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 31 March 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Comrade Vasile Gliga  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

During a formal visit I paid to Pak Seongcheol, member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council, he offered an overview of the main current aspects of inter-Korean relations and the future orientation of the Korean Workers' Party in this respect.

After insistently stressing on the unity of the Korean state and nation, Pak Seongcheol said that 'the Korean Workers' Party will not allow for the perpetual dismantlement of the country, [which is] divided not through the will of the Korean people but due to external forces, [due to] American imperialists.' He said that the Korean Workers' Party is promoting the peaceful reunification of the country, but 'the DPRK will not remain inactive if the masses in the South will rise up and ask for help from the North.'

In its dialogue with the South, the DPRK is currently undertaking a firm line, dealing with basic principles of inter-Korean relations: eliminating the state of military confrontation, scaling down the arms race, pulling out foreign armed forces, signing a peace treaty, [all of which] go against the position of the South Koreans to solve the problem gradually and partially.

The refusal of the Seoul authorities to get involved in concrete and substantial matters regarding the rapprochement between North and South, evidence the duplicitous tactics of the South Koreans, [which involves] a continuation of dialogue, on the one hand, and preparation for war, on the other hand.

At its turn, the DPRK feels compelled to do the same thing, taking all preparatory measures to retaliate accordingly to any provocation.

In the current circumstances, when the DPRK is ranked number 1 in the world in terms of armed forces per capita and when it is being discussed to modernize them, it is necessary to sustain some important material efforts.

At the same time, the intensification of the North-South dialogue and the inclusion of an increasing number of people in this process call for measures to improve the standard of living, so that the superiority of the socialist order can be proven through facts.

This task compelled the DPRK to ask for help from abroad. In this respect, the Romanian party and state leadership allotted, with the help of former Vice-Premier Jang Juntaek, a significant [portion] of aid, for which the Korean Workers' Party is deeply grateful.

With respect to bilateral relations, Pak Seongcheol offered a very positive appraisal on their evolution in the interval following the visit to the DPRK of comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu and he underlined that comrade Kim Il Sung repeatedly assigned to the Korean party and state cadres, the task to militate incessantly for the consolidation and development of the collaboration with Romania.

Talking about the recent visit to Romania of the delegation led by Kim Donggyu, the Vice-Premier said that 'comrade Kim Il Sung was very happy with the honest, [and friendly] atmosphere in which the discussion with comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu.' He said that the head of the Korean delegation presented a report before the Political Committee on matters related to his trip in Europe and that the results of his visit to Romania enjoyed the high appreciation of the party leadership.

A summary of the main comments made at various levels of the North Korean party and government with respect to the party leadership's visit to Romania and especially with respect to the meeting between comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu and Kim Donggyumakes us think that comrade Kim Il Sung understood the meaning of the

message sent by the Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, taking note of the value of the ideas and suggested on this occasion.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Beirut, No.015.088, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 2 April 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the International Section of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party

To the 5th Direction, Relations

On Monday, April 2nd, I received the DPRK representative to Beirut, comrade Kim Dongcheol, who informed me about the unfolding of negotiations for the unification of Korea.

He told me that the negotiations were sabotaged by the South Korean regime, which in fact is preparing a land and sea military offensive against the DPRK, with the support of the United States, which is providing it with massive amounts of modern weapons.

When asked why it is accepting and continuing the dialogue with the South, the DPRK representative told me that personally, he believed the puppet regime in the South was compelled to accept a dialogue with the North because:

- a. It feared that after the Sino-American rapprochement and the Soviet-American détente, it would share the fate of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who was then abandoned by the Americans;
- b. In the abovementioned conditions the second reason for accepting this dialogue is 'the inferiority of the South compared to the North in all possible respects' and therefore the fear of the South Korean regime of political turbulences in case it had rejected the North Korean opening.
- c. Finally, at its turn, the United States and Japan exerted a certain pressure on the South Korean regime to accept the proposals of the DPRK to negotiate the unification of the country.

At my second question regarding 'the prospects of North-South relations,' the DPRK diplomat answered that 'the South is weak and unable to conquer the North; it wants to gain time by continuing a sterile dialogue; it wants to totally annihilate the adherence of progressive forces to the North's proposals; it wants to consolidate its internal position and then negotiate with the North from a position of strength. The North Korean communists are nonetheless convinced that the political situation in the South will evolve in favor of unification, and that the plan of the South Korean puppets will fail.

Finally, he added that he was mandated by his government to inform me of the matters mentioned above because 'the South Korean representative to Beirut launched a campaign to visit socialist embassies in Beirut, to spread disinformation' and that he was asking me 'not to listen to their calumnies.'

I assured him that our party and our government had been, was and would be supporting in the future the righteous positions of the DPRK.

Signed: M. Levente

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.113, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 4 April 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the 2nd Direction, Relations

On April 3rd, on the occasion of a meeting with Kim Yeongnam, the head of the International Section of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, he discussed some of the reasons for which, at the latest meeting of the Coordination Committee, the DPRK had insisted on the measures meant to bring about a relaxation of military tensions and a transformation of the Korean armistice into a peace treaty.

Therefore, he mentioned that since the Vietnam War had ended and since there was a real opportunity to find a political solution to the Korean matter, certain dissensions sprung up within the top echelons of power in Seoul, especially in military circles. Park Chung Hee, Lee Hurak, the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and several other reactionary elements, with the support of the USA and Japan, were increasingly moving towards the right and in order to maintain their current positions, they were breaking up the process of unification into time sequences. This group is supported by South Korean generals, recently returned from Vietnam, and who are instigating against North Korea 'to unite the country by defeating communism', etc. These dissensions amongst military cadres grew also as a consequence of the prospects of a reduction in military aid from the United States, which may impact on the material situation and morale of the South Korean army, which would create great uncertainty for career officers in the South Korean military. As a result of this upheaval amongst militaries, Park Chung Hee was recently compelled to remove from office one of his closest friends, i.e. the head of the Seoul garrison, and several other generals, justifying his decision by stating that they did not present enough trustworthiness.

On the other hand, a certain deviation towards the left is growing increasingly prominent, as displayed by a large number of intellectuals and a great share of militaries, motivated primarily by patriotic feelings, and who are more realistic about the possibilities to overcome clashes and differences that have piled on through the years, as a result of the different political systems in the two parts of Korea.

I managed to gather from Kim Yeongnam's remarks that the recent proposals of the DPRK were meant to stimulate the leftist trends in South Korea, the aggravation of the internal contradictions which exist in the Seoul administration and military circles and only lastly [they aimed at] adopting some practical measures to achieve a relaxation of military tensions.

My interlocutor mentioned that the DPRK would not be able to get along with Park Chung Hee because of his total submission to American and Japanese interests. Kim Yeongnam hinted at the fact that the DPRK, by launching its well-known proposals, including the proposal referring to signing a peace treaty, wishes to put the South Korean authorities in a delicate position, one in which they cannot accept any of those proposals but at the same time in which they cannot interrupt the dialogue. Although unable to obtain any concrete successes through cooperation, the North Koreans are winning many followers amongst the opponents of Park Chung Hee, who will help the North Koreans topple the current regime in Seoul.

Getting involved in economic, cultural-social exchanges with the South Koreans would only have created more problems and politically it would have been more efficient for the South, which would have used this [opportunity] as a foundation for its separatist tendencies, arguing that the North Koreans recognize South Korea as an economic and commercial partner.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 11 April 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Direction, Relations

After a conversation Aurelian Lazăr had with the Soviet counselor I. Fadeev, we noted the following matters:

1. Soviet diplomats in Pyongyang concluded that certain shifts had occurred with respect to Korea's unification in the position of the DPRK, which was slowly renouncing the path of ample and direct contacts with Seoul, maintaining only a form of dialogue that did not have any practical results, between the North-South Coordination Committee and the Red Cross delegations. I. Fadeev said that the DPRK was counting on an increase in external support for its position, which it increasingly received lately; on the increasingly pronounced isolation of South Korea and on the aggravation of internal contradiction in Seoul. He said that in the given circumstances, the South Korean authorities would take countermeasures meant to grant them support from the outside and to avoid the aggravation of internal difficulties.
2. As for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, I. Fadeev said that this was a long-term process, and that the DPRK, while initially very optimistic with respect to the support the People's Republic of China had promised it, now started manifesting certain fears and suspicions towards the honesty with which Beijing acted to determine the Americans to pull out of South Korea and to renounce using the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea. He backed up his position by pointing out that Heo Dam, the DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his recent conversations with A. Gromyko at the end of March, had hinted at a statement [Chinese] Premier Zhou Enlai made in front of some Japanese parliamentarians, according to which the People's Republic of China was not yet interested in the withdrawal of American troops from Asia.

From all the matters mentioned above, we gathered that the Soviet diplomats in Pyongyang take note and amplify all the aspects which reveal the suspicion or the lack of trust of the DPRK towards the sincerity and the good intentions of the People's Republic of China.

3. With respect to the University Olympics to be held in Moscow in August [1973] the DPRK representatives asked the Soviets not to allow the South Korean team to take part in the games. Given that the University Olympics are organized by an international forum, with the USSR being just the host of these games, the Soviets foresee certain obstacles in precluding the South Koreans from participating. However, the Soviets will do their best not to allow the South Koreans to enter the USSR. For the time being, the Soviets asked the DPRK to consider the possibility of forming a joint team made up of North and South Koreans with a view to taking part in the games. As I. Fadeev put it, although the Soviets received no answer to their proposal, it seems that the DPRK does not like it.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061.121, Urgent**

<b>Date:</b> 12 April 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1495, 1) The April 1973 Session of the Supreme People's Assembly; 2) The Adoption of a Letter Addressed to All Legislatures and Governments; 3) The Response of the Romanian Government and the Support it Gave the DPRK; 4) The Support Romania Granted the DPRK with Relaying a Message towards the USA (April 9th – June 28th 1973). Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Directorate – Relations

With respect to the second session of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly which took place between April 5 -10, we would like to inform you about the following matters:

At the session, in addition to matters related to the unification of the country, which were comprised in a letter addressed to all legislatures and governments in the world, including the Congress of the United States (the aforementioned letter was sent to the MFA HQ), several other issues related to the economic and social development of the country were on the agenda. Therefore, the recent session of the Supreme People's Assembly passed a law regarding the extension of the mandatory 10-year educational system which includes one year in preschool to the national level; this law will be enforced starting with the 1972-1973 academic year. Preschool education will be enforced at the national level until the beginning of the 1976-1977 academic year.

With respect to the state budget for 1973, estimated at 8.543.510.000 won, this figure shows an increase by 16.9 percent compared to last year's budget (which was 7.4 billion won, approximately \$3.3 billion). For the year 1973, a crucial year for the accomplishment of the entire 6-year plan of the DPRK, it is planned to allocate increased shares of the budget for heavy industry, machine building industry, extraction industry and energy industry. Additional investments will be made in the chemical industry, light industry and consumer goods industry, with the specific purpose of raising the standard of living of the population.

If military expenses amounted to 17 percent of the 1972 budget, for 1973, the military budget will be 15 percent of the total (1.282.000.000 won, the equivalent of \$577 million).

While taking part in the Supreme People's Assembly session, we gathered that because of the open nature of this session, the event had a praising purpose, less critical of the existing shortcomings, displaying a weak disposition towards making criticisms and a self-criticisms [for current problems]. Only after the repeated interventions of comrade Kim Il Sung did they manage to overcome this situation, stimulating criticism and self-criticism, [summoning] the courage to tackle deficiencies and to find solutions to remedy or overcome hardships.

Throughout the discussions we noticed the existence of certain deficiencies in the planning system, a weak activity of the economic and financial control bodies, etc., which, as comrade Kim Il Sung mentioned in his short speech ending the session, lead to a certain state of stagnation, weak rhythm and poor correlation of economic sectors, which in turn, had negative repercussions on the entire national economy.

During the session various shy references were made to the persistence of routine, fear to innovate—all of which are generated by the deficient technical and scientific training [of the workers].

We also noticed that in budget report and throughout the discussions on it no mention had been made regarding the issue of collaborating or cooperating on economic and technological-scientific matters with outside [partners].

Signed:

Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.150, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 23 April 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Direction, Relations

With respect to inter-Korean relations, we would like to draw your attention to the fact that when important events, reunions, or contacts take place, provocations and sometimes serious incidents resulting in casualties spring up systematically in the demilitarized zone. By infringing on the commitments mutually agreed upon through the Joint Declaration of July 1972, the situation is growing tense and the smooth development of the inter-Korean dialogue is hindered.

Therefore, on April 23rd, at the request of the Americans in the Armistice commission a session took place at Panmunjeom, where the DPRK was charged with sending a group of spies in South Korea on the night of April 17th (3 people, 2 of whom were shot in the Southern part of the demilitarized zone) and was accused of not accepting to investigate this case jointly.

Although the North Koreans publicly denounced this setting-up, the arguments they invoked were not convincing and categorical enough, which provided the authorities in Seoul and the Americans with plenty of ammunition to condemn the DPRK for 'its duplicitous policies, aiming at winning the support of public opinion by charging the South and the Americans [for various things], while in reality being the one committing the provocations and perpetuating a state of tension on the Korean Peninsula.'

In these circumstances, we believe that the second meeting of the North-South Coordination Committee Secretariat, planned for April 24th in Panmunjeom, will unfold in a tense atmosphere.

Irrespective of its authors, the aforementioned incident, as all the others from previous months, provide supportive arguments for the continued stationing of US troops in South Korea, and reasons for easily combating against the letters adopted at the recent session of the Supreme People's Assembly addressed to the US Senate and House of Representatives.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from the First Directorate to Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, Berlin, Tirana, Belgrade, Sofia, Beijing, Ulan Bator, Hanoi, Pyongyang, Havana, Analysis Division, No.01/04595**

<b>Date:</b> 4 May 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1495, 1) The April 1973 Session of the Supreme People's Assembly; 2) The Adoption of a Letter Addressed to All Legislatures and Governments; 3) The Response of the Romanian Government and the Support it Gave the DPRK; 4) The Support Romania Granted the DPRK with Relaying a Message towards the USA (April 9th – June 28th 1973). Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Comrade Chief of Mission,

On the attitude of socialist countries regarding the April 6th, 1973 letter sent by the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly to all legislatures and executives in the world, we would like to inform you about the following matters:

1. All socialist countries published various materials to support the measures taken by the DPRK to ensure the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, the demise of the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea and the ceasing of all foreign interventions in the internal affairs of Korea.

European socialist countries display some reserves toward North Korea's assertions on the possibility for the peaceful reunification of the country, given that there are two conflicting socio-economic orders. These reserves stem from the GDR position, the East Germans being worried about a potential resurgence of national unity sentiments in Germany.

2. By the end of April, only the PRC, USSR and Romania replied to the letter of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly.

With the exception of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Cuba, all other socialist countries stated, directly or indirectly, that they are about to send their written responses to the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly. We picked up hints that European socialist countries, with the exception of Albania, coordinated their position toward the North Korean letter.

Signed:

Gh. Diaconescu

**Telegram from the First Directorate to Washington, DC, No.01/04493, Urgent**

<b>Date:</b> 5 May 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Comrade Ambassador,

We would like to inform you that the DPRK government officially requested that an authorized Romanian representative relay to the President of the US Senate, Spiro T. Agnew, and separately, the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, of the letter adopted by the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly on April 6, 1973, which deals with the issue of ceasing foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea.

The DPRK government mentioned that if the letter could not be sent to the aforementioned officials, it must not be sent to any other people without the prior consent of the North Koreans.

On the basis of the approval granted by the party leadership, we informed the DPRK government of our agreement to take the actions [indicated by the DPRK] and it was established that the letter be sent by you.

Consequently, we would like to ask you to take any measures you deem appropriate to send the letter to the abovementioned officials, in the right circumstances.

Please inform us as soon as possible about the measures you took and about the potential commentaries and reactions of the two American interlocutors.

You will receive the two letters through the courier who will leave Bucharest on May 9th.

We would like to inform you that the abovementioned letter was published in the North Korean press on April 7th 1973, and encompasses the following ideas:

- The beginning in 1971 of the North-South dialogue; the release of the Joint Declaration on July 4, 1972; the high-level meetings and the establishment of the North-South Coordination Committee;
- The stalemate of the North-South dialogue caused by the unwillingness of the South to accept the DPRK proposals, the obstacles created by the United States, the maintenance of American troops in South Korea, the modernization of the South Korean armed forces, the military maneuvers and the war provocations carried out by Americans in Korea.
- It is requested that: the US withdraw its troops from South Korea; the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea be dismantled; military aid for South Korea be terminated; military maneuvers, provocations and war preparations in Korea be stopped.

Signed:

Nicolae Ghenea

**Telegram from Beijing, No.059.484, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 14 May 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Direction, Relations

We would like to inform you about some discussions we had with a [North] Korean diplomat in Beijing on the current state of the inter-Korean dialogue:

As it has been the case until now, the DPRK takes the initiative in [starting] the talks.

The attitude of the [South Korean] counter-part is characterized by duplicity and inconsistency in supporting a certain point of view. Therefore, the North Korean diplomat said, the South Koreans at the negotiations table adopt a position which encourages the exchange of views, while they take hostile actions behind the scenes.

According to the administration in Seoul, the Americans stationed in South Korea are not an occupying force, and therefore, it is out of the question that they leave.

The North Koreans are aware of the difficulties involved in negotiating [with the South Koreans], but they still believe that it is possible to cooperate with the South in certain areas, especially on economic issues, to the mutual advantage of both parties.

To achieve this goal, the North Korean diplomat added, the DPRK government already put forward concrete proposals, such as:

1. Taking care of the excess work force in South Korea and helping [the South Koreans] cope with the emigration [of the unemployed] abroad, by hiring the available workers in industrial complexes in the North, where laborers are badly needed.
2. Jointly creating an irrigation system by employing the equipment and richer expertise accumulated by the North in this field.
3. Instituting a unitary system for fishing methods and the ensuing processing industry (granting fishermen from both sides to fish in the fishing areas around the entire peninsula, without restrictions).
4. Opening the gates at the 38th parallel to create the opportunity for the free circulation of the population.
5. Jointly creating a linguistic unification plan. Currently, the North Korean diplomat added, the South is under American and Japanese influences.

The reaction of the [South Korean] counterparts continues to be equivocal and it is basically going against the idea of adopting concrete measures for the relaxation of tensions. The desire of the DPRK to remove existing barriers is interpreted as an attempt to infiltrate the South and to undermine the government in Seoul, by triggering a civil war.

Lastly, the North Korean diplomat said that the DPRK government perseveres in its constructive position, being truthfully motivated by its faith in the possibility of uniting the country peacefully, without interference from the outside.

Signed: N. Gavrilescu

**Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.504, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 7 June 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1495, 1) The April 1973 Session of the Supreme People's Assembly; 2) The Adoption of a Letter Addressed to All Legislatures and Governments; 3) The Response of the Romanian Government and the Support it Gave the DPRK; 4) The Support Romania Granted the DPRK with Relaying a Message towards the USA (April 9th – June 28th 1973). Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Comrade Nicolae Ghenea,  
Deputy Foreign Minister

With respect to your telegram no. 01/04493, dated June 3rd 1973 concerning the relaying of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly letter to the Congress of the United States, [I would like to inform you about the following matters]:

1. The declaration was not only published in newspapers but, at the time, also sent by letter to [various] members of the US Congress.

This course of action was publicly attacked in Congress, on the grounds that it is an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the US, to circumvent habitual communications channels between states and between parliaments.

2. Aware of these reactions and keen to avoid such harmful reactions, which obstruct the purpose for which this declaration was sent, I held confidential and personal consultations with W[illiam] Hyland, one of [Henry] Kissinger's advisors on relations with socialist countries as well as with John Armitage, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, so as to create the appropriate circumstances for relaying the message [from the DPRK].
3. Hyland said that the Department of State would respond to the [North Korean] letter.

On June 6th, 1973, on a personal note, Armitage told me that if the message were relayed to the Department of State, then they would be automatically sent to the President of the Senate (the US Vice-President) and to the Speaker of the House. Directly relaying the message to the two officials would be an abnormal procedure, especially given the record of the North Koreans in such matters.

Doing so may damage the favorable atmosphere dominating the US Congress with respect to Romania, exactly when maintaining such an atmosphere is more important than ever.

The US understands that it is in Romania's interest to help the DPRK and therefore, as the representative of the Department of State, J. Armitage said he was ready to receive the aforementioned documents and to send them to the officials mentioned above.

Of course, he could not guarantee that Congress would give a positive answer or whether there would be an answer at all.

4. Given the matters mentioned above, I judge it is better to accept the procedure suggested by Armitage and to obtain the agreement of the North Koreans on doing so.

My impression is that the very acceptance of the message and its relaying by the Department of State to the speaker of the Senate and of the House marks a significant progress compared to the initial American reaction regarding the release of the message in the written press.

Please send me your orders.

Signed: Corneliu Bogdan

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.224**

<b>Date:</b> 7 June 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1973. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM  
Sender: Pyongyang  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET  
Regular  
Date: 07.06.1973/08:00  
No.: 061.224  
To: Comrade Deputy Minister Nicolae Ghenea

We would like to inform you on the main aspects of inter-Korean relations.

North-South relations on the Korean Peninsula, as known to the wider public, are going through a process of increasing tension.

The propaganda apparatus in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea resumed the labeling of South Korea, showing some restraint, as it should have according to the commitments it assumed through the July 4th Joint Declaration, only towards the South Korean president.

Although there was no consensus on the basic positions of the two parties with respect to unification from the very beginning of the dialogue, currently there is a noticeable drifting apart between the point of view of the North and that of the South on crucial matters to the Korean nation.

Although rational in themselves, the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward within the Coordination Committee as well as in the meetings of the Red Cross delegations, they are, because of their radical character, unacceptable to the authorities in Seoul, especially given that they were put forward in a block, without giving the possibility to negotiate on them.

At their turn, the South Korean authorities, mended after the difficulties they underwent in the international arena and after the measures they adopted in the fall of last year [1972] and aware of the political implications of the North's proposals, are manifesting reduced receptivity towards the path imposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Our attention was grabbed by the fact that lately, the South Korean mass media are carrying out an intense publicity campaign around some alleged cases of infiltrations in the South of Northern agents and around the mass condemnation of those who participated in a spy network working for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The North Korean press systematically refutes, sometimes insufficiently persuasively, these reports.

Externally, there is a sustained concern from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to establish diplomatic relations and to join organizations where South Korea is already present.

To our mind, this approach is not meant to draw the two countries closer, but on the contrary, it is supposed to undermine and gradually weaken the positions of the authorities in Seoul.

Starting from this rationale, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is currently carefully studying the attitude it shall take towards the forthcoming session of the United Nations, especially since, recently, Seoul decided to register this matter on the agenda, going against its old position in favor of postponing a discussion of the Korean matter. Depending on the position it will take, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will or will not use the right it has owing to its membership in the World Health Organization to appoint an observer to the UN.

Against this background, there will be another reunion of co-presidents of the North-South Cooperation Committee on June 9th.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

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Authority E.O. 12958  
By JA NARA Date 11/15/04

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SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING

June 15, 1973

Time and Place: 3:03 p.m. - 3:45 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: U. S. Policy Toward Korea (NSSM 154) and the Korean Force Modernization Program

Participants:

Chairman	Henry Kissinger	CIA	William Colby Theodore Shockley
State	William Porter Richard Sneider Donald Ranard Martin Herz	OMB	Dolf Bridgewater
Defense	William Clements Robert Hill Dennis Doolin R/Adm. Charles Tesh	NSC	B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft Richard Kennedy John Froebe Richard Solomon Philip Odeen James Hackett
JCS	Adm. Thomas Moorer V/Adm. John Weinel		

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

--The State Department will hold its draft cable to Embassy Seoul giving the U. S. view of the proposed South Korean foreign policy initiatives until it has been carefully reviewed by the members of the SRG. The Department may inform Embassy Seoul that instructions will be provided by June 19 for Ambassador Habib to follow in his discussions with the South Koreans on their proposed initiatives. Another SRG meeting will be held on June 18 to determine the nature of the instructions.

--CIA will prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on where the proposed policy changes are likely to lead, for consideration at the June 18 meeting.

~~SECRET~~ XGDS 3 BYAUTH Mr. Kissinger

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--Defense will prepare a paper for the June 18 meeting which will consider the ramifications of a possible termination of the United Nations Command in Korea, including the effects this would have on the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement for U.S. bases in Japan, the US/ROK force relationship in Korea and the Korean Force Modernization Program.

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Mr. Kissinger: We've got two problems here, the evolution of our political relations with Korea and the question of the Korean force structure. We also have to consider how we should respond to (Ambassador) Habib's request for guidance in his discussions with the ROKs on their proposed foreign policy initiatives, and what we should do about UNCURK this year.

Mr. Porter: Habib is under pressure to talk with the Koreans tomorrow and we want to get a cable out to him tonight.

Mr. Kissinger: I can't believe that our relations with **the South Koreans** depend on Habib talking with them tomorrow. Why does he have to talk with them tomorrow?

Mr. Porter: They think every day counts. They are afraid the North Koreans may do something that will steal the initiative from them. They have developed a new policy and they want to complete consultations on it and announce it. We have put <sup>the</sup> issues into this telegram and we'd like the group to look at it and discuss it point by point.

Mr. Kissinger: I hate to think that our relations with Korea are such that Habib's conversation can't be put off for a few days. We just received the cable.

Mr. Porter: The Koreans are insisting that we get started with them. They are pressing for our advice.

Mr. Kissinger: One of the concerns I have about this is that we have complicated discussions with the Chinese and we make points with them when we tell them about something we plan to do anyway. Do we have to cover all of these issues with the Koreans right at the beginning?

Mr. Porter: No, this is just the beginning of a dialogue. We are just responding to their request for comments on their proposed initiatives. We will be fleshing all this out later.

Mr. Kissinger: You have the abolition of the U.N. Command in here!

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Mr. Porter: But we would get something for it. We would get guarantees from the North Koreans. It's all explained in the cable.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand very well what you are saying; I would just like to prepare a more measured response. I understand what Habib wants. He doesn't want any recognition of North Korea unless the PRC and USSR are prepared to recognize South Korea. Before getting into the details of the cable, I would like to discuss where we are going and what we are trying to accomplish. Then we can discuss the cable.

Mr. Porter: We'll do it any way you like, but if we don't get the cable out soon we may not be able to reach you again for awhile.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to see where all of this leaves us with the Soviets and the PRC. That's very important. We'll be seeing the Soviet leadership next week. I don't care about North Korea.

Mr. Porter: (President) Park wants to make his policy statement June 23. He's afraid it will be pre-empted by the North. We can consult with the USSR and PRC concerning any adjustment we may want to agree to in the U. N. in return for adequate guarantees.

Mr. Kissinger: Such as?

Mr. Porter: North Korean recognition of the DMZ and armistice line and a guarantee to honor them.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm more interested in the views of the PRC and the Soviets than those of Pyongyang. The idea is that the U. S. would approach the PRC and the Soviets and ask them to endorse the guarantees?

Mr. Porter: Yes, on matters concerning the security of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Kissinger: When would we make these arrangements on the security of Korea?

Mr. Porter: During the debate in the U. N. this fall. We see the possibility of stating our willingness to support a change in the U. N. Command providing they are prepared to accept an agreement guaranteeing the security of the peninsula. We want to establish the principle first and fill in the details later.

Mr. Kissinger: What's the principle?

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Mr. Porter: Just that. They agree to accept and preserve the armistice line and DMZ.

Mr. Kissinger: And what do we accept, a statement by North Korea?

Mr. Porter: Essentially that.

Mr. Kissinger: We would say that we are prepared to disband the U. N. Command in return for a verbal statement by North Korea?

Mr. Porter: We are not being that specific. We are just giving an indication that we may be prepared to do so. We want to be prepared for the U. N. resolution on Korea.

Mr. Kissinger: What U. N. resolution?

Mr. Porter: There's one every year.

Mr. Kissinger: There wasn't one last year because we stopped it.

Mr. Porter: We can't stop it this year.

Mr. Kissinger: We can't or we don't want to?

Mr. Porter: The South Koreans don't want to.

Mr. Kissinger: For their own policy reasons they may not want to, but what about our policy reasons?

Mr. Herz: The situation has changed substantially since last year. North Korea has just been admitted to the World Health Organization by a large margin and it looks as though we would be severely beaten on UNCURK if it came to a vote. The South Koreans appreciate that and want to modify their policy accordingly.

Mr. Kissinger: Do the South Koreans want merely to suspend UNCURK?

Mr. Porter: No, they're prepared to dissolve it.

Mr. Ranard: The ROKs know they can't keep UNCURK. The question of whether it is dissolved, suspended, terminated or whatever is just a matter of terminology.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you think, Bill (Colby)?

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Mr. Colby: I think we're giving away a lot for a mere declaration by the North Koreans.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Clements) What do you think?

Mr. Clements: Frankly, I'm taken by surprise by this cable. Do I understand correctly that the ROKs want us to support their new moves?

Mr. Porter: They want to take a number of initiatives, but before they do they want to consult with a number of governments, including the U. S.

Mr. Sneider: They have already consulted with the British and French.

Mr. Clements: I'm surprised that President Park would put us in this situation, with such a short fuse.

Mr. Porter: The U. N. problem always looms large for the Koreans at this time of the year. Park has decided to take these steps and wants to move ahead with them before the North Koreans pre-empt the initiative.

Mr. Kissinger: He wants suggestions from us?

Mr. Porter: Not especially from us, he is discussing his proposals with various countries.

Mr. Kissinger: We don't have to give a blanket endorsement to all of these proposals. We have interests that are more important to us than what Habib says to the South Koreans tomorrow.

Mr. Porter: We wish to make clear that any changes in the status of the United Nations Command would have no effect on the maintenance of U. S. troops in Korea under our mutual security arrangement. We also have special arrangements for bases in Japan as a result of the U. N. Command structure in Korea. If we can get the guarantees we want from the Soviets and the PRC concerning the stabilization of the Korean peninsula, we will then want to consider revisions in the U. N. Command, but not anything that will affect the status of U. S. troops. We want to be sure that is completely clear.

Adm. Moorer: What about our bases in Japan?

Mr. Porter: We understand the Japanese will be sympathetic to changes that will permit us to keep the bases.

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Adm. Moorer: That means we will have to renegotiate our treaty with the Japanese.

Mr. Sneider: No, we won't. There are two separate agreements with the Japanese. Regardless of what happens to the U. N. Command, any resumption of hostilities in Korea would be a violation of the U. N. Charter. We have an agreement with the Japanese aside from the U. N. Command, which was confirmed just recently in the Nixon/Sato communique. There is a general statement by the Japanese on the public record that they will support us in any hostilities that may break out in Korea.

Mr. Kissinger: How much can you rely on that?

Mr. Clements: The Japanese are vitally affected by this proposed change of policy by the ROKs, and so are the PRC and the Soviets. They all have to be consulted.

Mr. Kissinger: When you consult the Japanese it's the same as putting it in the newspapers.

Mr. Sneider: That's not true. We consulted them on the Korean North-South talks and there were no leaks at all.

Mr. Porter: If you want to consider the issues addressed in the cable at greater length, we can give some interim guidance to Habib.

Adm. Moorer: The instructions to the Ambassador should not conflict with what we intend to do this fall in the U. N.

Mr. Porter: That's understood.

Adm. Moorer: We at Defense would like to look at this message for a few hours before commenting on it.

Mr. Porter: We're not trying to present you with a fait accompli.

Mr. Kissinger: But you've managed to do so anyway. Park is not going to announce the new policy before June 23rd in any case, so we do have some time to consider the ramifications of these steps.

Mr. Herz: The South Koreans have to consult with the members of UNCURK. It's essential for them to do so. We should get our comments to them in time for them to be able to do that before the announcement.

Mr. Ranard: They've asked our views on these various things they plan to propose. We should respond to them.

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Mr. Kissinger: Has CIA made an assessment of this?

Mr. Colby: We prepared a National Intelligence Estimate a few weeks ago, but not on these specific proposals.

Mr. Kissinger: Can you get us an assessment quickly?

Mr. Colby: I can have you one by Monday (June 18).

Mr. Kissinger: O.K., do that in any case, regardless of what we decide to do about this cable.

Mr. Clements: We (DOD) want to take a look at the cable.

Mr. Kissinger: What I want to know is where is this process leading us. What do we want to encourage Park to do? What process in Korea do we want to encourage? One could argue that to spill our views of the whole package at one time, before other countries have shown their hand, could back us into a position we may not want to be in.

Mr. Sneider: This is not a proposal to abolish the U. N. Command. The ROKs merely want to have discussions about it.

Mr. Kissinger: Has anyone else seen this cable?

Mr. Clements: I'm reading it now.

Mr. Kissinger: That's no way to clear a cable.

Mr. Clements: I know that, but I hadn't seen it before.

Mr. Porter: We can tell Habib that we are not prepared to give him instructions right now, but that we will try to get them to him by June 23rd.

Mr. Kissinger: It's not necessary to do that. You can tell him he will have his guidance on Tuesday (June 19); that will give us the weekend to think about it.

Mr. Porter: That's O.K. with me. I have no aversion to keeping Park waiting a bit. That will meet my requirements.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to get the views of the Joint Chiefs on the bases in Japan. We may also want to say something in the cable about the U. N. Command. I'd like to have another meeting on this subject before we decide on the cable. Monday is bad because of the Brezhnev visit.

Mr. Sneider: What about Sunday?

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Mr. Kissinger: No, I have to be in Key Biscayne. Let's try for 2:30 p.m. on Monday.

Mr. Porter: What would you like to have for that meeting?

Mr. Kissinger: I want the National Intelligence Estimate we discussed. It should address the question of where all this will lead us.

Mr. Porter: What about the U. N. Command?

Mr. Kissinger: I have no strong feelings about retaining the Command. I have thought for some time that the U. N. Command might be dispensable, providing our security agreement is retained.

Mr. Clements: What do you want from Defense?

Mr. Kissinger: I'd like your views on the base problem.

Mr. Clements: Do you want something on military assistance?

Mr. Kissinger: No, we can discuss that in connection with the Force Modernization Program on Monday.

Adm. Moorer: We have a forthcoming meeting with the South Koreans. We should give our people some guidance.

Mr. Kissinger: I don't want our people getting carried away by the enthusiasm of the South Koreans and going off topping their offers by 20%. O.K., we'll meet again on Monday (June 18) at 2:30 p.m.

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~~SECRET~~

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.238, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 16 June 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Direction, Relations

With respect to the proceedings of the Third Session of the North-South Coordination Committee, which met in Seoul, we would like to inform you of the following matters:

Since the Seoul session took place in a state of significant tension between the two sides, it did not mark any sort of progress in Inter-Korean matters.

(In addition to our analysis regarding the North-South relationship, we would like to point out the fact that on the eve of the Seoul session, the DPRK resumed broadcasting radio shows towards the South, using amplifiers installed in the demilitarized zone and infringing the commitments it assumed in the protocol signed on November 4, 1972.)

This time, the positions expressed by the North and the South were essentially different both in content and in the approach adopted by each side. Yet again, the North Koreans put forward:

- 1) The 5-point plan released at the previous meeting;
- 2) The idea of summoning political consultations between parties, civil societies, high-profile personalities in various fields, from both North and South [Korea];
- 3) The idea of creating 5 bilateral cooperation commissions.

Thinking that the core military and political issues can be solved, the South said it was ready to form and launch the economic and socio-cultural cooperation commissions, arguing that they can guarantee the framework for the gradual resolution of fundamental problems, based on the gradual restoration of mutual trust.

On the basis of the same economic and socio-cultural matters, the South put forward the idea of a 'mutual general opening' which, although embraced in principle by the North, bore no fruit because of Pyongyang's insistence that all fields, including political, military, diplomatic issues, be included.

After the press conference of the North Korean co-president of the coordination committee, Vice-Premier Pak Seongcheol, held upon his return from Seoul, it could be gathered that the South criticized the North for enshrining the existence of two 'Koreas,' by seeking membership in international organizations and by establishing diplomatic relations with states with which South Korea already has relations.

Without providing arguments to refute the accusations issued by the South, the Vice-Premier said that if the South Koreans do not wish to transform the country into 'two Koreas' then they should immediately accept the proposal regarding the creation of the diplomatic commission for the coordination of joint actions on the international arena.

After analyzing this new moment in North-South relations, we could confirm the previous conclusion of our office that the resolution of the Korean matter is increasingly heading on a path of direct channels between Seoul and Pyongyang, each camp using collateral solutions and the support given by external factors against the other Korean side.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

**Telegram to Pyongyang from First Directorate, SECRET, No. 01/08463, Flash**

**Date:**

16 June  
1973

**Source:**

*Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Telegrams to Pyongyang, January – December 1973, TOP SECRET, Vol. I. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe*

Comrade Ambassador,

We would like to kindly ask you to request a meeting with the president of the Administrative Committee, Kim Il and inform him of the following issues:

On July 13, 1973 the Romanian representative at the United Nations gave Kurt Waldheim the letters from the DPRK concerning the opening of a permanent observer mission at the UN.

Kurt Waldheim thanked the DPRK government for their kind gesture to officially send him these important documents through us.

After mentioning that he would be happy to offer all his support to the DPRK observers, the Secretary General asked to be informed about their arrival both in New York and in Geneva.

Waldheim also said that the American government reacted extremely promptly to his question regarding the visas that the DPRK observers needed to enter the US. State Secretary W. Rogers, with whom Waldheim discussed this issue, gave him a positive answer the day after. Rogers added that it would not be difficult for the US government to grant visas to the DPRK observers.

Signed: Nicolae Ghenea

**Telegram from Pyongyang , No.061.240, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 19 June 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1495, 1) The April 1973 Session of the Supreme People's Assembly; 2) The Adoption of a Letter Addressed to All Legislatures and Governments; 3) The Response of the Romanian Government and the Support it Gave the DPRK; 4)The Support Romania Granted the DPRK with Relaying a Message towards the USA (April 9th – June 28th 1973). Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Comrade Nicolae Ghenea,  
Deputy Foreign Minister

Regarding your telegram no. 01/06956, I would like to inform you that on June 16th I was received by Kim Jaebong, Deputy Foreign Minister. He asked me to send his most sincere gratitude to the leadership of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for all the efforts undertaken to support the DPRK.

On June 18th I received an answer stating that the DPRK gives its approval that the letter to the US Senate and House of Representatives, adopted after the Supreme People's Assembly session on April 6th, be submitted to the US Department of State, according to the proposals made by the Romanian officials.

Kim Jaebong asked that we inform the North Korean [government] on the date when these documents were sent and on the potential reactions of the American official who would receive them.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

**Telegram from Beijing, No.059.658, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 25 June 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To Comrade Gheorghe Diaconescu

We would like to inform you that the Chinese mass media on June 25th published the following things:

First of all, the statement of Premier Zhou Enlai in support of the new proposals for the unification of Korea made by president Kim Il Sung. The declaration was made by Premier Zhou Enlai at the fare-well reception offered by Mussa Traore, the head of state in Mali, during the evening of June 24th.

The main article in *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily] for June 25th, written on the occasion of 23 years since the war of liberation in Korea, revealed the following important aspects in addition reiterating the support the People's Republic of China is offering to the DPRK:

1. Countless facts show that the peaceful and self-reliant reunification of Korea has already become a powerful historical trend which nobody could stop. There is a conviction that the Korean people are capable of eliminating all obstacles it encounters and, if there is no interference from the outside, they can achieve their national aspiration.
2. Twenty three years ago, American imperialism launched its war of aggression against Korea and later on it occupied Chinese territory, namely the Taiwan province. It is noteworthy that even if the article makes references to 'the aggression of American imperialism in Korea' and the occupation of Taiwan, the liberation of Taiwan as well as the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam are not conditioned by Sino-American relations. As a matter of fact, the article talks about the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea as a request of president Kim Il Sung, while the presence of American troops in Taiwan is overlooked. References to Taiwan are allusive and they are meant to draw the attention of the United States, in an appropriate language, to this major unsolved problem in Sino-American relations.

Signed: Octavian Gavris

**Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.605, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 26 June 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1495, 1) The April 1973 Session of the Supreme People's Assembly; 2) The Adoption of a Letter Addressed to All Legislatures and Governments; 3) The Response of the Romanian Government and the Support it Gave the DPRK; 4) The Support Romania Granted the DPRK with Relaying a Message towards the USA (April 9th – June 28th 1973). Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Comrade Nicolae Ghenea,  
Deputy Foreign Minister

Regarding your telegram no. 01/07237 dated June 21st 1973, [I would like to inform you about the following matters]:

On June 25th I submitted the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly letter addressed to the Speaker of the US Senate and to the Speaker of the US House of Representatives to John Armitage, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Armitage said he would send the documents to their destinations right away.

He added that he learned from various newspapers about the reaction of the South Korean government regarding the joint accession of the two Koreas to the United Nations.

He believes that the attitude of the DPRK is unrealistic. It is impossible to imagine, in the current circumstances, a sole representative of the two Koreas at the United Nations. Armitage, however, agreed that the general evolution of the situation in Korea is a positive one and [he thinks] it is good that dialogue continues between the interested parties.

Signed: Corneliu Bogdan

**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.253, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 29 June 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Direction, Relations

On June 27th An Jang-il, division head within the International Section of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party briefed the Romanian charge d'affaires on the third session of the North-South Coordination Committee, which took place on June 12-14 in Seoul.

After presenting the well-known position of the DPRK, which aims at achieving a relaxation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula through disarmament, reducing military forces, creating the five commissions of the Coordination Committee, covering political, military, economic, diplomatic and socio-cultural matters, An Jang-il stressed on the causes for which the South Koreans are not accepting the proposals of the North. In this respect, he said, at the secret meetings between the two co-presidents, Lee Hurak, the South Korean representative, said that South Korea would have been more receptive to the proposals of the North if the United States and Japan would not have exerted pressure on certain groups, especially on military groups in the South Korean governmental apparatus.

There are several strands of thought developing in governmental circles in Seoul, and here Lee Hurak referred to the military trend as the most powerful one and the most hostile to unification, then to a centrist trend which is leaning towards contacts with the North (limited to economic and socio-cultural matters) and the opposition, comprising progressive and patriotic forces, which are keen on a rapid achievement of unification.

An Jang-il described the situation in South Korea as unstable, which is why Seoul is trying to slow down the process of unification, formulating proposals to revise the agreements reached in July 1972 and the agreements which led to the creation of the North-South coordination committee.

The [North Korean] interlocutor mentioned that the third session in Seoul ended without achieving any concrete results, and that there are new and great difficulties ahead in the field of North-South contacts, that the duration of the process of unification is much longer than initially envisaged.

Furthermore, An Jang-il said that currently South Korea launched an operation meant to enshrine the division of Korea by pushing towards the simultaneous accession of the two Koreas to the United Nations. 'We fear, he said, that this South Korean plan will gain support from Third World countries, from those who do not know or who have a simplistic view of the solution for the Korean problem.'

An Jang-il said that the propaganda agencies in the DPRK would launch an operation to unmask the intentions of the South Koreans and to explain Pyongyang's position in light of comrade Kim Il Sung's statement dated June 23rd.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

## Letter from Kim Il Sung to Enver Hoxha

**Date:**  
7 July 1973

**Source:**  
*AQPPSH, MPP Korese, D 1, V. 1973. Translated for NKIDP by Enkel Daljani*

To the First Secretary of the Albanian Labor Party  
Central Committee  
Comrade Enver Hoxha

Tirana

Dear comrade Enver Hoxha,

Seeing with great delight how the brotherly relations of friendship and cooperation between the parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries are developing well from one day to the next, I send to You, and through You, to the ALP [Party of Labour of Albania], the Government, and the Albanian people our most heartfelt greetings.

I would like to express to You, the CC [Central Committee] of Your party, and the Government your deepest gratitude for the fact that in the international area, including at the UN, Your country is waging an active campaign in support of the great cause of our people for the reunification of our fatherland, and has taken the necessary measures to show its strong solidarity and support for the letter we have sent to the parliaments and governments of all the countries of the world, approved in the second session of the Supreme Peoples' Assembly of the Fifth Legislature of our country.

I take this chance to express my desire to inform You, and through You the CC [Central Committee] of Your party and the Government of Your country, on the situation that has lately been created in our country in relation to the five point program for the peaceful reunification of the country that we recently published.

Over time the division of Korea causes ever more pain and suffering to our people, who during thousands-of-years old history have always lived as a single people, and also creates problem for the issue of the preservation of peace and security in Asia and the world over.

The United States of America has been for 28 years imposing the division of the territory of the country and the breakup of our nation to our people. Now, by using their two-faced tactics they are trying to urge Koreans against Koreans, to consolidate the division of Korea for eternity, and to fabricate two separate Koreas.

Following the letter of these machinations of the USA, the South Korean officials are working hard toward a "confrontation" between the South and the North; they are placing all their forces to the increase of their military capacity, and are continually using scheming to eternalize the division of the country.

Lately, they have gone so far as to make the plan for the creation of the two Koreas their policy and to openly announce a course of division for the country.

Due to all these facts, and despite our continuous attempts for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country, we do not see, at the moment, the necessary progress in talks between the South and the North; the previously miraculous perspectives for the reunification of the Fatherland that were presented to our nation a year ago when the Common Declaration of the North and the South was proclaimed are now becoming darker by the day.

At a time when within and outside the country, one can see the unusual tendency for the eternalizing of the division of the country, based on the sincere aspiration for overcoming the present difficulties and on the desire to accomplish as soon as possible our national aspiration – the peaceful reunification of the Fatherland – on June 23 of this year, we, once again proclaimed our program for the peaceful and independent reunification of the country:

First, we propose to liquidate the situation of military confrontation and elimination of the tensions between the South and the North.

The liquidation of the situation of military confrontation and elimination of the tensions between the South and the North is at the moment the most pressing and key issue to the necessity of the removal of misunderstandings and lack of trust, the deepening of the understanding and trust between the North and the South, the creation of an atmosphere of a great national reunification, the amelioration of the atmosphere between the North and the South, and the achievement of the peaceful reunification of the country.

For as long as the knife remains hidden under the jacket, it will not be possible to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and to successfully solve the problem of cooperation and exchange between the North and the South.

That is why as a first step toward the peaceful reunification of the country, we have approached more than once the authorities of South Korea with proposals for a freeze to the increase of the armed forces and the armament race between us, for the removal of all the foreign troops, the reduction of the armies and the armaments, a stop to the delivery of armaments from abroad, and the conclusion of a peace agreement.

Secondly, we have presented the proposal for the achievement of multileveled cooperation and for trade between the North and the South in the different fields of politics, military arts, diplomacy, economy, and culture.

We think that the initiation of the multileveled cooperation and trade between the South and the North has a great importance for the eventual re-linking of the national relations that have been cut, for the amelioration of the relations between the North and the South, and the creation of the necessary premises for reunification.

We reiterated once more that the South Korean officials should not rely on external forces, but should, instead, accept the development of the economy in the interest of our entire nation through the course of mutual exploitation of the natural resources of the country and the achievement of the national cooperation in all the fields.

Thirdly, we proposed giving to the various layers of the population of the North and the South at large the chance to take part in the patriotic, national process in the name of the reunification of the Fatherland.

We think that as long as the reunification of the Fatherland is a cause that must be exclusively solved on the basis of a common willingness of the entire people of the North and the South Korea, the dialog between the North and the South should not be limited only to the circle of the representatives of the authorities of the South and the North, but must be brought down to the level of the entire nation.

For that reason, we proposed the gathering a great National Assembly comprised of various layers of the population, political parties, and social organizations of the North and the South, the free discussion of the issues, and the solution, through it, of the issue of the reunification of the country according to the will and desires of our people.

Fourthly, we proposed once again the establishment of a confederation of the South and the North under the name of a single state – The Confederative Republic of Goryeo.

The gathering of the great National Assembly and the achievement of the great national consolidation, and the establishment on this basis of a confederative system, all the while keeping for a determined time the two different systems that exist in the North and in the South, is considered by us as the most rational course for the achievement of the reunification of the country.

We have proposed that, should a confederative system comprised of the South and the North be established, this confederative state be called the Confederative Republic of Goryeo, bringing back the name of Goryeo, which is widely known to the world as the only state that has existed in the territory of our nation.

Fifthly, we have presented the proposal that the North and the South operate jointly in their foreign relations with the intention of preempting the consolidation of the division and the eternal separation of our nation into two Koreas.

Our nation, a single nation, which during our thousands of years of history has existed and continues to exist as a single culture and a single language, cannot be left to live separated into two parts.

We think that for the preemption of an eternal division of the country into a northern and a southern part, we must also jointly take steps in the field of the foreign affairs.

In the field of the international relations with other countries, we are also resolutely opposed to every attempt to exploit them for the fabrication of two separate Koreas.

We insist that the South and the North should not become separate members of the UN, and think that if they want to become members of the UN before the achievement of the reunification of the country, we must enter as a single state, with the name of a single state – the Confederative Republic of Goryeo – only after the establishment, at the very least, of a confederative system

But we are also of the opinion that, aside from the issue of the membership to the UN, whenever the issues related to Korea are included in the daily agenda or are discussed at the UN, the representative of the DPR of Korea, as a directly interested party, should be invited to take part.

We also think that all of our proposals are acceptable to all; they are the most rational and the most practical proposals that represent the immediate aspiration of the entire people of Korea, who seek to stop the division of the country, to completely improve their life, to improve the relations between the South and the North, and to achieve as soon as possible the reunification of the country and to further the cause of the day – independence and peace.

Now it has become easily clear who sincerely desires peace and reunification in Korea, and who really desires war and division.

I express my confidence that Your party, government, and people will pay a great deal of attention to the present situation in our country and will take active measures of various forms in support of the new course of the Government of the DPR of Korea for the achievement of the reunification of the country without any interference from abroad, in an independent way, on a democratic basis, and in a peaceful way.

I express my conviction that the close relations of friendship and cooperation that we have established between the parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries, will in the future, as in the past, be strengthened and developed ceaselessly on the basis of the principles of Marxism – Leninism and of proletarian internationalism. I wish You with all my heart good health and new successes in Your work in general.

Friendly greetings,

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of  
The Korean Workers' Party  
Kim Il Sung

Pyongyang, on July 7, 1973

To: Comrade Kim Il Sung  
General Secretary of the Central Committee of  
The Korean Workers' Party

Pyongyang

Honorable comrade Kim Il Sung,

I received with exception pleasure your warm message of July 7, 1973, in which you inform in a friendly way the Albanian Labor Party Central Committee and the Government of the People's Republic of Albania about the events taking place lately in Korea and about the new program you have unveiled for the peaceful reunification of your country.

I take this occasion to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the warm greetings you sent to the Albanian people, their party and government, as well as for the recognition of the support that they give to the just struggle of brotherly Korean people for the achievement of their high national aspirations.

We are happy that the relations of close friendship and cooperation between our two peoples, two parties, and two countries are successfully developing from one day to the next. These relations, which are embodied in the mutual assistance and support that our two peoples have given and continue to give to each other for the consolidation of the victories of socialism in the PR of Albania and the DPR of Korea, are highly valued by us and we are convinced that in the future they will be strengthened even more in the basis of the principles of Marxism – Leninism and of the proletarian internationalism.

The Albanian people and the ALP have deep feelings of love and respect for the brave, hardworking, and peace loving Korean people and are made immeasurably happy by the great victories that they, under the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party, have achieved in all the socialist construction areas of the country and in the unceasing strengthening of the RDP of Korea.

The ALP and the Government of the PR of Albania understand well the legal preoccupation if the Korean Workers' Party and the RDP of Korea about the charged situation created as a result of separation of the country and for the grave suffering that your compatriots are experiencing in South Korea under the double oppression and terror at the hands of the American imperialists and the South Korean authorities. They denounce with fervor the aggressive policies followed against the Korean people by the USA, which, now 20 years after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, continue to keep their occupation troops in South Korea, and have turned it into a colony and base of aggression against the RDP of Korea. The continuation of such a situation is an encroachment onto the sovereign rights if the Korean people, it causes them great suffering and pain, and is a serious threat to peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and the Far East.

The Korean people have an ancient, thousands-of-years history and it comprises one single people. It enjoys the irrefutable right to be once again reunited. Korea has been and it must once again be one, unified whole. The reunification of Korea is for the Korean people, in the South and in the North, a high historic task, which you will undoubtedly accomplish.

The Workers' Party and the Government of the DPR of Korea have justly and continually given an importance of the first rate to the issue of the reunification of the country. They have waged and continue to wage a resolute and principled for the accomplishment of this great task of the entire Korean people. The program of 5 points presented by you on June 23 of this year based on the just objectives and tactics defined by the Korean Workers' Party and the Government of the DPR of Korea for the achievement of the peaceful reunification of the country, is an important political act that contributes to the progress of the struggle of the Korean people for the realization of its sacred aspirations and a heavy blow to the American imperialists and their South Korean tools, which are trying to eternalize the division of Korea.

Your specific and timely proposals for the liquidation of the military confrontation and tension in Korea, for the achievement of an atmosphere of great national unity and of the multileveled cooperation between the South and the North, for the involvement of all the wider masses of the Korean people in the great patriotic work for the reunification of the fatherland, for the creation of a confederation of the two parts of Korea, and for their usage of a single name, the Confederative Republic of Korea, in the field of international relations attest to the goodwill of the DPR of Korea for the just solution of the Korean problem and clearly show who is really interested in the peace and unification of Korea and who is for war and division.

In the name of the Albanian people, the ALP CC, and the Government of the PR of Albania, allow me to express to you, and through you to the CC of the Korean Workers' Party and the Government of the DPR of Korea our support for your program of 5 points, which serves the reunification of the entire Korean people into a single revolutionary front against the imperialism and the administration of Seoul and which opens new possibilities for the independent and peaceful solution of the Korean problem without any interference from outside.

I assure you that the Albanian people will forever stand alongside the brotherly Korean people in their struggle for the construction of socialism, the defense of the DPR of Korea, and the independent reunification of the country. By fulfilling, as always, its internationalist tasks, the PR of Albania will consistently support the just cause of the brotherly Korean people whether in the UN, or in other international forums, and will help at any chance for the fulfilling of its legal requests for the removal of the aggressive troops and the military bases of the Americans from South Korea, for ending once and for all every interference by the UN in the internal matters of the Korean people, and for the dispersal as soon as possible of the illegal Commission of the UN "for the Reunification and Reconstruction of Korea."

Our party and government will forcibly unmask the devilish plan for the "Two Koreas" that seeks the legalization of the colonial domination of South Korea by the USA and the eternalizing of the division of Korea into two states. They will resolutely oppose every attempt to get the plan for the "Two Koreas" accepted by the UN, as well as every other intrigue that the American imperialism, alone or with the help of its collaborators, will weave to the detriment of the Korean people and the DPR of Korea. They will do all that they can to contribute to the strengthening of the international position of the DPR of Korea and its government as the only true representative of the Korean people.

I take this opportunity to deliver to you, and through you to the brotherly Korean people, the Korean Workers' Party, and the Government of the DPR of Korea, the most friendly greetings and wishes for even greater successes in your work to the benefit of the brotherly Korean people and to the triumph of the cause of the revolution and socialism in the entire Korea.

[Signed]  
Enver Hoxha  
First Secretary of the Albanian Labor Party  
Central Committee

Tirana, on August [illegible], 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 18, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

The President has approved the following as interim guidance on our basic policy toward the Korean Peninsula:

-- We shall continue to reassure the ROK of U. S. support for its timely and constructive foreign policy initiative announced in President Park's speech of June 23.

-- The U. S. will make no further adjustments in its present force levels in the ROK except in the context of the overall security situation on the Peninsula. We will consult with the ROK well in advance of any further force reductions.

-- The U. S. will continue military assistance to the ROK, and in particular will complete the Five Year Modernization Plan, although Congressional funding limitations will require that U. S. assistance on this plan be stretched out through FY 1977. We also believe that the emphasis in the plan should be shifted from ground forces to air defense. The other recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee on the plan are presently under consideration; pending decision we should avoid further detailed discussion of U. S. military assistance.

-- We are keenly aware of President Park's desire that we discuss the Korean question with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and can assure the ROK that we have that desire very much in mind. We will do nothing that will harm South Korean vital interests, and will consult with the ROK to the maximum extent possible.

-- We should avoid attempting to force the pace of the South-North talks -- either by suggesting a reduction of our support for the ROK, or by pressing on the ROK a series of initiatives that it might take up with

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
Pyongyang. Beyond lending every encouragement to the ROK to persist in the talks, and assuring the ROK of continued support, U. S. direct intervention with Seoul should be limited to averting any threatened break-down in the talks.

-- We accept the proposition that the termination of UNCURK would be a very useful step in helping avoid a confrontation at next fall's UNGA. Any termination of UNCURK, however, should be without prejudice to its past activities. We should seek to persuade the members of UNCURK to recommend termination in their annual report. A decision on whether to seek a UNGA resolution formally accepting the report, however, will not be made until we have more certain indication of the intentions of the other side.

-- We are reviewing the status of the UNC and will consider the possibility of terminating this body, provided that the related aspects of existing security arrangements can be adjusted in a way that will not diminish the security of the ROK. Since this is a delicate and complex undertaking, we should proceed with caution and are confident that we can defend the UNC against a possible hostile resolution in the next UNGA.

-- As to U. N. membership for the two Koreas, we support the position taken by President Park in his June 23 speech. We will continue to consult closely with the ROK and other friendly nations on the tactics we will adopt on the Korean question in next fall's UNGA.

The President has asked that you use the above interim guidance in your contacts with ROK officials and others, and that you not go beyond this position pending further guidance from him.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

July 27, 1973

National Security Decision Memorandum 227

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Korean Force Modernization Plan

The President has reviewed the Under Secretaries' memorandum on Re-examination of the Korean Force Modernization Plan and has decided:

-- Air defense should be emphasized in modernizing ROK forces in order to assist the ROK in moving toward combat self-sufficiency for defense against the North Korean threat.

-- Modernization of ROK divisions beyond the 16 active and three ready reserve divisions recommended in the military study should receive low priority but the ROK should not be told the U. S. will not support modernization of additional divisions.

-- NSDM 129 continues in effect but no termination date should be established for grant MAP assistance.

-- Planning for grant MAP and requests to Congress should not be precipitously reduced nor should assistance be switched rapidly to FMS (Option Two of the Steering Group's Report is approved).

-- Before high performance aircraft beyond replacement aircraft in the original modernization plan are funded, a complete review of the threat and air defense requirement should be undertaken and recommendations submitted to the President.

~~SECRET~~  
GDS


Classified by Henry A. Kissinger

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Authority EO 12958  
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Subject to the foregoing the recommendations of the Under Secretaries' Committee are approved and the Korean Force Requirements Study should be the general basis for military assistance planning.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~

**Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 091.722, Normal**

**Date:**

31 July  
1973

**Source:**

*Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea – South Korea, The Ministry of External Affairs, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1515, Vol. I, Concerning North-South relations and the position of various states, Period: 16.01 – 30.07.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe*

From a discussion had by one of the members of our mission with a Chinese diplomat, the latter implied that the People's Republic of China does not regard favorably, quite the contrary, is even worried by the possible withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. In this vein, the Chinese diplomat mentioned that 'some Western countries' consider that withdrawal from South Korea would create a 'vacuum,' which, sooner or later, shall be filled by the U.S.S.R. with the approval of the DPRK. The Chinese diplomat expressed his 'puzzlement' regarding the refusal of the DPRK to accept a U.S. military presence in South Korea after the two states had been welcomed into the U.N.

Referring to the possibility of debating 'the Korean issue' at the next U.N. General Assembly meeting, the Chinese diplomat expressed his opinion that the only possible results would be the dissolving of the U.N. commission for Korea and of the U.N. commandment for foreign troops stationed in South Korea. He suggested that the People's Republic of China would not oppose the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea, granted they are based on bilateral agreements.

Signed: Chargé d'affaires Ion Duma

**Note, No. 01/010124/73, Secret, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

<b>Date:</b> August 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, 1st Division, MFA, Folder no. 1496, Regarding the Internal Situation in the DPRK (Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Matters. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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The Issue of the Unification of Korea and the Evolution of the Dialogue between North and South

The Position of the Socialist Republic of Romania

1. The restoration of national unity represents one of the main preoccupations of the party and state leadership of the DPRK. In this respect, over the past 25 years, the DPRK made proposals on more than 130 occasions. Amongst the permanent, constant elements of the DPRK position, the following stand out: unification of the country is a strictly internal problem which should be solved peacefully, by the Koreans themselves, without any interference from outside, through negotiations between the North and the South.

Over the past few years, and especially at the April sessions of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly in 1971 and 1973 numerous proposals for unification have been made, which entail the following:

- Withdrawing all foreign troops from South Korea and dismantling the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
  - Ceasing the arms race between the North and the South and the mutual renouncement to the import of weapons and combat technology;
  - Reducing the armed forces in the North and the South to 100,000 people or even less. In the event of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, the DPRK declared it takes upon itself the obligation to unilaterally reduce the ranks of its armed forces to 200,000 people.
  - Creating a single, central government, following free general elections in the North and the South. In order to organize free elections, it was required to guarantee full freedom and [the freedom of] political activity for all parties and progressive organizations and the release of all political prisoners in South Korea. As a transitory measure to suffice until the complete unification of the country, a proposal to create a Confederation which maintains the current social systems in place was made.
  - Organizing meetings and holding political talks at various levels so as to discuss the unification of the country.
  - Pursuing economic, cultural, technical-scientific exchanges, as well as exchanges of sports teams. On certain occasions, the DPRK offered the ROK material aid at no cost, so that the South can rebuild its economy; the DPRK offered to provide a job for unemployed workers from the South; the DPRK offered the ROK raw materials; the North also offered to build irrigation systems in the South.
  - Signing a peace agreement between the North and the South.
2. Starting on August 6, 1971 the DPRK no longer conditions the unification of the country on the abolishment of the existing treaties between the ROK and the US, and between the ROK and Japan and it no longer requests the removal from power of Park Chung Hee.

Even more, on this occasion, Kim Il Sung said that the DPRK is willing to meet and to hold talks with any representatives and delegates from the ROK, including representatives of the ruling party. Afterwards, various Korean and foreign interlocutors unofficially declared that in the future the possibility of a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee is not to be excluded.

After this change of attitude on August 20, 1971, direct talks between the representatives of the Red Cross from DPRK and those from the ROK began at Panmunjeom. After 51 meetings, on August 11, 1972 it was decided that substantive talks between the delegations of the Red Cross from the DPRK and those from the ROK to begin on August 30, 1972, to take place alternatively in Pyongyang and Seoul and to cover the following issues:

- Identifying the family members and relatives separated between North and South;

- Facilitating visits and correspondence exchanges between separated family members and relatives.
- The reunion of separated family members
- Other humanitarian matters.

Up until now, several meetings and negotiations took place but to no avail.

3. On July 4 1972, after the visit of Lee Hurak, Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency to Pyongyang and following his discussions with president Kim Il Sung, as well as following Pak Seongcheol's visit to Seoul and his subsequent discussions with Park Chung Hee, the North-South Joint Declaration was released in which the two parties agreed to:
  - a) Act with a view to the unification of the country on the basis of the principles of independence and non-interference from outside; as well as through peaceful means and by pursuing national unity above any ideological and social system differences.
  - b) Mutually refrain themselves from denigrating and libeling the other party and take measures to avoid conflicts.
  - c) Promote bilateral exchanges.
  - d) Support negotiations carried out through Red Cross societies.
  - e) Establish telephone lines between Pyongyang and Seoul.
  - f) Create a North-South coordination committee, steered by Kim Yeongju (member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, the brother of comrade Kim Il Sung), the head of the Organizational Section of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and Lee Hurak. Subsequently, such an Executive Committee and a Secretariat of this Committee were formed.

Throughout the 5 sessions of the Coordination Committee that took place until now the following issues were discussed: organizational matters; the manner in which the provisions of the July 4, 1972 Joint Declaration are fulfilled; starting with October 10, 1972 it was decided to stop any radio broadcasting hostile to the other party and to stop the dissemination of leaflets.

At the March 1973 session, in order to bring the confrontation between North and South to an end, the DPRK co-president of the Committee put the following matters on the agenda:

- Ending of the arms race on both sides;
- Reducing the number of armed forces in the North and the South to 100,000;
- Terminating the import of weapons and combat technology;
- Withdrawing foreign troops from South Korea;
- Signing a peace treaty.

In order to turn these proposals into reality, the DPRK suggested to co-opt the chiefs of staff from the North and from the South into the Coordination Committee or to create a military sub-committee. At the same time, the DPRK proposed the creation of other subcommittees, on political, economic, social and cultural matters. Up until now, South Korea agreed to holding talks only on economic and cultural matters.

4. The April 1973 session of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly discussed the matter of 'Ceasing foreign interference into the internal affairs of Korea and accelerating the peaceful and independent unification of the country.' The session adopted a letter addressed to all parliaments and governments as well as a letter addressed to the US House of Representatives and the US Senate in which it is requested to withdraw American troops from South Korea, to dismantle the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea and to cease military aid to South Korea.

On June 23rd 1973, President Kim Il Sung proposed a 5-point unification plan which contains the following provisions: ending the state of tension; starting to collaborate on multiple plans; allowing all layers of society to take part in the unification of the country; creating the Federative Republic Goryeo; the two parts of the country joining the UN as a sole state, under the name of Goryeo.

On the same day, South Korean president Park Chung Hee launched a unification plan which entails the following: mutual non-interference in internal affairs; refraining from the use of force; expanding the dialogue; respecting the responsibilities assumed through the July 1972 Declaration; cooperation at the international level; simultaneously entering various international bodies; both states establishing diplomatic relations with all countries.

Each party deemed the proposals of the other party as unacceptable.

## 5. Conclusions

The dialogue [between North and South] is progressing incredibly slowly because the terms on which the two parties agreed are not respected, each party trying to influence the other so as to gain as many advantages for itself as possible.

The results of the North-South dialogue are taking the following forms:

- Establishing and continuing contacts and negotiations at various levels, with the possibility to launch a meeting at the highest level;
- Establishing telephone lines between Pyongyang and Seoul;
- Ending hostile propaganda towards one another at the same time;
- Reducing the number of incidents at the 38th parallel;
- Forming the economic and cultural cooperation subcommittee;
- The gradual disappearance of the declarations according to which only the North or the South represent Korea and the interests of the Korean people.

With the exception of the UN, the DPRK is not against the simultaneous entry of the two parts of Korea into various international bodies.

## 6. Romania's Position

The Socialist Republic of Romania is constantly and thoroughly supporting the position and the actions of the DPRK to unify the country.

Amongst the recent actions undertaken by Romania to support the position and actions of the DPRK the following are to be mentioned:

- Congratulatory and supportive messages addressed by comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu to comrade Kim Il Sung on the occasion of the release of the July 4th 1972 Joint Declaration and of the June 23rd 1973 5-Point Plan;
- Solidarity and supportive messages and the declaration of the Great National Assembly Foreign Policy Commission, adopted in 1971, 1972, and 1973 to support DPRK's unification proposals;
- Supporting the Korean problem in the working papers and documentation of the National Gathering of the Romanian Communist Party from 1972.
- Including the [Korean] matter in several declarations and communiqués signed on the occasion of high-level visits which took place between 1972 and 1973;
- Supporting the matter of Korea's unification at the UN and various other international organizations;
- Relaying the letter of the Supreme People's Assembly from April 6th 1973 to the presidents of the US Senate and House of Representatives.
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August 1973

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**Note, No. 01/010123/73, Secret, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

<b>Date:</b> August 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, 1st Division, MFA, Folder no. 1496, Regarding the Internal Situation in the DPRK (Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Matters. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Current Internal and External Problems of the DPRK Evidenced in the Decisions of the 5th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party

The documents of the 5th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party mention that the fundamental task of the party and of the Korean people is to continuously consolidate and develop the socialist order and the forthcoming total victory of socialism. To accomplish this task, the following main directives were made:

1. In the economic domain, the main responsibility of the 6-year plan (1971-1976) is to strengthen even more the material and technical basis for socialism, by freeing people of hard labor in all domains of the national economy and by lifting the technical revolution at a superior level of development.

Global industrial production for 1976 is supposed to grow (compared to 1970) by 220 percent, with the production of means of production (sic!) growing by 230 percent and the production of consumer goods growing two-fold. The annual average growth rate for industrial production will be 14 percent.

In certain areas, production levels are supposed to be the following for 1976: electricity 20-30 billion KW/h; coal 50-53 million tons; 3.5-3.8 million tons; steel 3.8-4.0 million tons; laminates 2.8-3.0 million tons; tractors 21,000 units; 27,000 units; chemical fertilizers 7.5-8.0 million tons; textiles 500-600 million meters.

The growth of agricultural production will be achieved through intensive agriculture: increasing the number of agricultural terrain on which two crops a year can be cultivated; the irrigation of another 300,000 hectares; producing 1000kg chemical fertilizers per hectare.

Currently, special attention is given to the realization of the technical revolution, starting from the premise that the main tasks in this respect are: to diminish the differences between hard labor and light labor, to diminish the differences between working in industry and working in agriculture and to free women from the burden of house chores. It is stipulated that the 8-hour work day be gradually introduced in agricultural cooperatives.

2. With respect to the ideological revolution and the revolutionizing of the entire society based on the model of the working class, the 5th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party specified the following responsibilities: the continuous and energetic development of the ideological revolution and its status as the number one priority so as to revolutionize all workers and at the same time to reshape the entire society on the model of the working class. It asserted, at the same time, that only by reshaping all members of society on the model of the working class it will become possible to eliminate all class differences, to achieve a classless society and to ensure the total victory of socialism.

Emphasis is put on the acceleration of educational efforts amongst workers' ranks, in accordance to the thesis which postulates 'to work always and in any circumstances in the interest of society and of the people, of the party and of the revolution, and not in the interest of personal happiness and entertainment' and in accordance to the motto that 'one for all and all for one;' [emphasis is put] on the arming of all workers with the revolutionary ideas of the party, with its political line and with the decision to defend it and firmly apply it into their lives; [emphasis is put] on undertaking an energetic fight to strengthen organizational activity amongst workers' ranks; [emphasis is put] on perfecting the leadership style in all domains of state activity.

3. In the field of socialist cultural development, [the 5th Party Congress] underlined the task of undertaking an unremitting struggle, against the ideological and cultural infiltration of American imperialists, as well as against the tendency to blindly copy old-fashioned and reactionary practices from the past, and to idealize and embellish them, under the pretext of embracing the heritage of national culture.

The number of engineers and technicians will amount to approximately 1 million people in 1976 (compared to the current figure of 600,000).

Starting with 1973 [the DPRK] adopted the technical schooling mandatory until 10th grade.

It is stipulated that all pre-school children are to receive their education in pre-schools and kindergartens, funded by the state.

Until 1976, the television broadcast network will be extended; 90 percent of the country's population will have the possibility to watch televised programs.

4. In the field of military affairs, it is stipulated that the direction previously established by the party will be continued, that is the construction of socialism will be pursued simultaneously with the strengthening of the country's defenses. It is stipulated that the process of strengthening the country's defenses will be pursued in three main directions: the arming of the entire population, transforming the entire country in a fortress and continuing the improvement of the armed forces' readiness while modernizing them.

The national defense doctrine is based on the following main theses:

- Preparing the country and its armed forces with a view to be capable of fighting a war on its own, in case such an event occurs.
- The outcome of this war ought not to be decided by weapons or military technology.

In preparing for the war and modernizing the armed forces, the following matters will be taken into account: the geographical-military characteristics of the DPRK, the level of industrial development in the DPRK, the revolutionary traditions of the North Korean people, its own war-fighting experience, the war-fighting experience of other nations.

After the North and the South started their dialogue, the necessity to strengthen the capacity for national defense is less frequently mentioned in public.

5. Amongst the measures designed to raise to increase the standard of living in the DPRK the following things were specified: the rapid reduction of the differences in the standard of living of workers and that of peasants; the improvement of the activity undertaken to supply the population with foodstuff and consumer goods; the construction of approximately 250,000 homes annually (150,000 of which will be built in the countryside); increasing the wages of workers and civil servants; raising the average wage to 90 won (520 lei); reducing prices of consumer goods by 30-50 percent.

Starting with 1971, the DPRK has registered a tendency for prices of foodstuff and services to rise.

6. In the field of foreign policy, the DPRK makes the following assessments:
  - a. The general trend for the development of the society is favorable to those peoples fighting for peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism.
  - b. Asia became the main battlefield of anti-imperialist revolutionary fights.
  - c. With a view to ending the aggression of American imperialism in Asia, special emphasis is put on strengthening the unity of the people in revolutionary countries in Asia (Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia). Lately, after the peace agreement ending the war in Vietnam, this thesis is no longer brought to the fore.
  - d. The second greatest enemy of the Korean people is Japanese militarism, whose aggressive nature has not changed and will never change. It is stated that 'not seeing the aggressive character of Japanese militarism, not fighting against it, embellishing the political line of the reactionary Japanese government or trying to come closer to it equal an increase in the danger of war in Asia.'

At the same time the DPRK declared that it is ready to establish diplomatic relations with Japan.

- e. The DPRK will establish friendship and cooperation relationships with all states which respect its independence and sovereignty.

Currently, the DPRK has diplomatic and consular relations with 66 countries.

- f. In 1973, the DPRK acceded to the World Health Organization, the first UN agency it is a member of, and it also acceded to the Intern-Parliamentary Union.
- g. On June 23, 1973, President Kim Il Sung declared that the DPRK was ready to form, together with South Korea, a federation called Goryeo, and under this name, have the two Koreas be admitted into the UN as a single state.

South Korea upholds that the two parts of Korea be admitted into the UN separately.

August 1973

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FM SEOUL

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR HABIB SEOUL 818  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE - IMMEDIATE - EYES ONLY DR. KISSINGER  
REF: WH 31940

1. I SPOKE TO PRESIDENT PARK ABOUT PEKING CONTACT WITH NORTH KOREANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL. PRESIDENT PARK AGREES TO THE FIRST MEETING AS YOU PROPOSED. HE ALSO AGREES WITH YOUR BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD NOT ACCEPT A SECOND MEETING UNLESS THE PRC IS PREPARED TO RESPOND TO ROK APPROACHES FOR CONTACT. HE IS HOPEFUL THAT WE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS LATTER REGARD.

2. PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE WISHES TO STRESS THAT THE MEETING WITH THE NORTH KOREANS SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC. HE FEARS THAT NORTH KOREANS MIGHT WISH TO PUBLICIZE SUCH A MEETING IN ORDER TO EMBARASS HIS GOVERNMENT BY MAKING IT APPEAR THAT THE U.S. IS GOING OVER ROKG HEAD TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH NORTH KOREANS. HE APPRECIATED THAT WE COULD NOT GUARANTEE SECRECY ON THE PART OF THE OTHER SIDE BUT WAS HOPEFUL WE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.

3. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION AS TO THE LEVEL AT WHICH HE PREFERENCES WE MAKE THE CONTACT. I GAVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO BUT DID NOT ACTIVELY SOLICIT A RESPONSE FROM HIM SO AS TO LEAVE YOU WITH A FREE HAND. SIMILARLY, HE DID NOT EXPRESS ANY PREFERENCE AS TO THE PLACE AT WHICH CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE. HE DID ASK THAT WE KEEP HIM INFORMED OF THE RESULTS AND I PROMISED TO DO SO.

4. AS TO MY VIEWS WHICH YOU REQUESTED, I FAVOR PROCEEDING AS PROPOSED, BUT WOULD SUGGEST WE MAKE FIRST CONTACT AT LEVEL JUST BELOW USLO CHIEF AND MEET SOMEWHERE OTHER THAN USLO. I AGREE WITH PARK THAT IT WOULD CREATE SOME PROBLEMS FOR HIM IF MEETING IS PUBLICIZED. HOWEVER, WE CAN LIVE WITH PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE IF IT COMES OUT THAT WAY, PARTICULARLY IF MEETING IS AT SECOND LEVEL AND IN INFORMAL SURROUNDINGS.

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\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

KENNEDY, MCFARLANE, SENT SC

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**Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.360, Urgent, SECRET**

<b>Date:</b> 29 August 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1515, First Directorate – Relations, Regarding Relations between North and South Korea and the Position of Various States on this Topic, January 16 – July 30, 1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To: Comrade Nicolae Ghenea,  
Deputy Foreign Minister

On August 28th, on the occasion of an individual audience, Jean Myeongsu, deputy foreign minister, presented the content of a declaration signed by Kim Yeongju, the North Korean co-president of the North-South Coordination Committee, to the Romanian Ambassador, Dumitru Popa. This declaration is due to be released to the press at an unspecified date.

In his declaration, the North Korean co-president vehemently condemns the authorities in Seoul, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency led by Lee Hurak – the South Korean co-president of the North-South Coordination Committee, for the Tokyo kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, the leader of the neo-democratic party in South Korea (the opposition party), and he is denouncing the terrorist-fascist activities of the South Korean government, meant to repress the democratic tendencies within society and [to preclude] the unification of the country.

In his declaration, co-president Kim Yeongju asks that Lee Hurak is removed from the position of co-president, as he proved himself to be unworthy of this forum's mission, which is to militate for the peaceful unification of the country. He asks that Lee Hurak is replaced with somebody of national dignity, determined to dedicate itself to the cause of unification.

The [DPRK] deputy foreign minister expressed his hope that the Romanian government pays attention to the declaration signed by co-president Kim Yeongju and will take supportive measures toward the position expressed in the document.

He mentioned that the DPRK government would be grateful if the Romanian news agencies publish this document and other materials supporting the ideas present in it.

We suggest that after receiving the document from the Korean Central Telegraph Agency, our news agencies publish a summary of the declaration and a commentary on it.

We would like to add that while other chiefs of missions in Pyongyang received this brief collectively, the Soviet, Chinese and Romanian ambassadors were invited separately.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Memorandum, Branch Office of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade in North Korea to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade.**

**Date:**

11 September  
1973

**Source:**

*XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1973, 69. doboz, 81-54, 004396/1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai*

[On September 7,] Comrade [Polish Commercial Counselor J.] Kluczynski informed me about the following issues: [...] The Polish-Korean intergovernmental scientific and technical subcommittee held its 2nd session on August 8-13 in Pyongyang. The protocol of the session was signed on August 13 by Deputy Minister of Scientific and Technical Development and Higher Education M. Kazmierczuk, the Polish chairman of the subcommittee, on the Polish side and Deputy Minister of International Economic Relations Yi Gi-son, the Korean chairman of the subcommittee, on the Korean side. In the protocol they specified the fields of scientific and technical cooperation in 1973-1974. Namely, they scheduled to receive technical experts in the following fields:

The Korean side will receive Polish technical experts in:

Pharmaceutical Industry	1 person	14 days
Optimization of Coal Mining	3 persons	14 days
Machine Building	3 persons	14 days
Metallurgy	3 persons	14 days

The Polish side will receive [North Korean] technical experts in:

Designing and Construction of Harbors	4 persons	1 year
Flax Processing	3 persons	14 days
Production of Electronic Components	[no data]	[no data]
Safety Issues in Mining	6 persons	2 months
Designing and Producing Mining Equipment	10 persons	4 months
Designing and Producing Gas Turbines	5 persons	14 days
Research and Design of Nuclear Reactors	3 persons	4 months

[...]

István Suhajda

Commercial Counselor

**Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061482, Urgent**

<b>Date:</b> 27 October 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 20, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1491, Planning the Work of the Embassy; Annual Report of the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania in Pyongyang for 1973; The Response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Directorate - Relations

To continue our telegram regarding the participation of the DPRK at the dinner we organized to celebrate the 25th anniversary since the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries, we would like to inform you that as far as the main attendant was concerned, the Minister of Economic Relations was replaced by Kim Yeongnam, member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, head of the International Section of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party.

Among the issues discussed at dinner, the following matters caught our attention:

- a. Contrary to the sense of optimism and to the confident atmosphere dominating the high echelons of the DPRK government with respect to the situation in the Middle East, Kim Yeongnam manifested considerable concern about solving this conflict, especially in the circumstances of an increasing interference of the USSR and of the USA [into the conflict]. He said that the fact that the US had alerted its troops in Europe, had prepared them to intervene at any given moment and [the US] had considerably increased the number of warships in the Mediterranean Sea created worldwide worries.
- b. Kim Yeongnam mentioned that the state of tension in the Middle East is rapidly being propagated in South Korea, pointing out that during the preceding week, several US generals and senior military officers were officially and secretly visiting South Korea and were inspecting American military bases. Recently, the US Army Corps commander visited Seoul, arranging with President Park Chung Hee to increase the number of US troops in American bases in South Korea.

In a very near future, it is expected that Henry Kissinger and the US Defense Secretary arrive in Seoul. For the past two days, US troops have been mobilized, which created additional unrest in the DPRK.

- c. The head of the International Section of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party asked about opportunities for the DPRK to draw closer to Turkey and Greece, two countries with which it would like to get in touch with a view to normalizing relations.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

## Memorandum on the Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Todor Zhivkov

### Date:

30 October 1973

Memorandum of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria, and Kim Il Sung, President and Secretary General of the Workers' Party of Korea, 30 October, 1973

### RE: SOME ASPECTS OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

First of all, I would like to point out that during our visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, our delegation was bestowed with extraordinary attention and hospitality. As our Korean comrades pointed out (and our comrades at the Embassy in Pyongyang confirmed later), they had not hosted a similar reception for any other delegation in recent years. From our statement below it will become clear that the great hospitality and attention shown to us was, to a great extent, addressed towards the Soviet Union.

I will cover some aspects of our conversations with comrade Kim Il Sung at the official meeting of the two delegations, and more specifically, of the conversations between the two of us on the train, on our way from Pyongyang to the town of Hamheung and back.

I am relaying these conversations in brief and from memory. The conversations between us were lengthy: the first conversation on the train lasted three hours and the second one about two hours and a half.

I will cover some of the issues that we discussed with comrade Kim Il Sung:

#### **1. On the issue of détente of the international situation, the transition from the stage of "Cold War" towards peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems.**

I spoke about this issue during the official meetings between the two delegations and, later, during my face-to-face talks with comrade Kim Il Sung. The task I had assigned myself was: to explain that the policy of peaceful coexistence, which we, brotherly, socialist countries conduct now, is a class, internationalist policy; a policy that coincides with the key interests and the struggle of the international communist and labor movement, of the workers' class across the world, the national liberation movement, that the policy of détente creates favorable conditions for expanding the global revolutionary process, gives and will continue to give, positive results on all continents on our planet. I pointed out that it was this situation, indeed, that created an opportunity to end the war in Vietnam, the Middle East, etc. I pointed out that the assertion of this policy and its practical results are a major victory for our socialist countries, for the progressive part of mankind, a victory gained in the course of struggles lasting decades. I pointed out the role of the Soviet Union in this regard, the great significance of the Soviet Union's peace program adopted at the XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the personal merit of comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev.

My statement visibly impressed comrade Kim Il Sung. At the end of the official meetings, he stated that they approved of this policy and after our conversation, he had learned certain things and understood them better.

#### **2. On relations with China and China's leadership**

The second issue that we discussed with comrade Kim Il Sung was about the relationship with the People's Republic of China and the Chinese leadership.

At the official meeting between the two delegations, I spoke briefly about the issue of our relations with the Chinese. I only spoke about what their Embassy was doing in Sofia, and pointed out that they were trying to establish pro-Chinese groups in Bulgaria. We provided them with a contingent for these groups from the Secret Service and they were established. But after some time, we told the Chinese that we should no longer play a game of hide and seek, that these were no pro-Chinese groups of any kind, but employees of our Secret Service, and that this game should stop. Now, the Chinese Embassy in Sofia is gathering and exchanging information with the American and other diplomatic missions in Sofia and leading a policy of discrediting Bulgaria before the other diplomatic missions.

In my face-to-face talks with comrade Kim Il Sung, however, I spoke in detail about the Chinese issue, pointing out the following:

- On the neutrality of our Korean comrades in their discord with the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China: I pointed out that by adhering to neutral positions on the Chinese dissent with the communist movement, in principle, this means support of the policy and the dissident activity of the Chinese, practical approval of the anti-Soviet policy conducted by the Chinese leadership. This could push the Chinese towards most dangerous steps with unpredictable outcomes for the smaller countries in Asia. Such a position means departure from the policy of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

- On the Chinese theory of so-called "super states", the division of the world, not into socialist and capitalist states, but rather into big and small states, into white and colored: I pointed out that this theory is anti-Marxist and is taken from the ideological arsenal of imperialism, that the Chinese are using it as a tool in their struggle against the Soviet Union. You cannot put the Soviet Union and the USA on one plate.

- On the Chinese thesis about the socialist imperialism of the Soviet Union, the "threat from the North," and the Chinese provocations along the Soviet-Chinese border: China points out the country of Lenin, the first socialist country in the world, as enemy number one not imperialism..

This was also openly expressed at the 10<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. No "threat from the North" exists. It is a fact that China used weapons against the Soviet Union, that it constantly launches provocations against the Soviet Union. The talks about the "threat from the North" are demagogy. The Chinese need them for internal consumption and to play around with the imperialists. It is difficult to understand why China did not accept even one of the numerous specific proposals made by the Soviet Union for regulating and normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations.

- On the practical alliance of the Chinese with the most reactionary forces in the international arena: In support of this, I pointed out a series of facts: Zhou Enlai's appeal towards the Americans not to withdraw their troops from the Far East; the diplomatic relations between Peking and Franco; the expulsion of Allende's Ambassador from Peking, the practical support of the military junta in Chile, the support that the Chinese render to the reactionary forces in many countries in dealing with the communists, etc.

In conclusion on this matter, I summarized that we were talking not about some Chinese-Russian dispute, but about principle ideological and political disagreements between China's leadership on one side and the socialist community and the international communist movement as a whole on the other; and that the policy of the Chinese leadership was contrary to the collective policy developed by the brotherly parties for unification of the anti-imperialist forces.

Comrade Kim Il Sung responded on the issue about their relationship with China as follows:

We – he said – do not agree with China's policy. It is incomprehensible to us. It is incomprehensible to us why they speak about Soviet socialist imperialism, that there is socialist imperialism in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union there is no socialist imperialism and there is no socialist imperialism at all. We do not share China's idea about the two super states. We do not agree with their theories, which they spread in the past as well, about the blooming of all flowers, the contradictions in socialist society, the peasant communities, the culture revolution, etc.

During the Culture Revolution, the Chinese set up along our border, which is 1,300 km long, loud speakers and they broadcast propaganda against our country day and night. The population along the border could not sleep. My son visited a village along the border at the time. When he came back he said, "Dad, I could not sleep a single night."

When the Chinese launched a military provocation along the Soviet border along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, they launched a military provocation in our country too (he mentioned the name of the river and the village, but I could not remember them). The story that Kim Il Sung told was the following: In this village we had soldiers and armed villagers (along the border our people bear arms), about 50 people; and the Chinese penetrated into our country with 100 armed soldiers and officers. I was out in the country at the time (on Saturdays and Sundays I usually go out in the country and I read,) and they told me about this infiltration by the Chinese soldiers. I gave instructions to our people to let them in and not to shoot at them straight away. But, if they tried to advance further into our territory and carry out actions – our people were to block their way and capture at least five of them alive. The Chinese soldiers, however, penetrated into our territory and after that withdrew, without undertaking any action. There were similar, less significant, incidents in other places along the border, too.

I was in China last year. The reason for my visit was to meet with Sihanouk. The invitation was also from the Chinese. They groomed me at length against the Soviet Union. In the end, I told them that to us, the Soviet Union, the Soviet people are our brothers-in-arms, just as you, Chinese, are our brothers-in-arms. China is a big country and

they believe that they can exist and fight on their own. They do not recognize the international communist movement. We have a saying: "Mountains have high and low peaks, but people are the same." (I don't know if the interpreter interpreted it correctly. He was Korean.)

China's policy in relation to the events in Chile is incomprehensible to us. Now, after the military junta's coup d'état, there are three embassies of socialist countries still remaining: those of China, Rumania, and Albania. I don't know the situation with the Vietnamese Embassy. After the Cuban Embassy, our embassy in Chile was the second one against which the military junta carried out provocations and made the future work of the Embassy impossible. China's establishment of diplomatic relations with Franco's Spain is also incomprehensible to us.

We do not have a neutral policy towards China. But because of our specific situation, we are just keeping our mouths shut. There is a front against us in the South. Opening our mouths would mean opening up a second front. China is all around us. We have a small border with the Soviet Union. In the country, among the party and the people, we do not disseminate their theories and their views. We print out some of their speeches, they print some of ours. But, we do not publish in the press what is contrary to our policy, we delete it.

In the course of our face-to-face conversation, comrade Kim Il Sung pointed out several times: we do not have a neutral policy towards China; we do not intend to maintain such a policy in the future either. We do not disseminate their concepts inside our country. I believe you are right in maintaining an open struggle against the Chinese. But you have to understand us and our situation here, in this region of the world.

I raised the question: How do you, comrade Kim Il Sung see the future? Isn't there a danger for the nationalist, chauvinistic, super-state, and adventurous policy of China's leadership to bring about most unpredictable consequences aimed against the smaller countries and nations in Asia, and sacrifice their interests in favor of the super-state goals of Beijing? Isn't there a danger everything that is most holy to you and to your people to be destroyed and desecrated tomorrow?

To this question, comrade Kim Il Sung answered: Nobody knows what will be tomorrow. That is possible, and we keep track of it. That is why we teach our people against subservience to other countries. In our country, we aim this not against the Soviet Union, but against China. China has influence in our country. Our language has many Chinese words in it.

When we discussed the Chinese issue, comrade Kim Il Sung pointed out: This is my understanding on this issue. This is our policy. And this is not my understanding only. You, comrade Zhivkov, you see the people in our delegation, these are young people. They think the same as well and keep the same in mind in everything they do.

### **3. On collective security in Asia**

I took the initiative on this topic and spoke first, keeping in mind that comrade Kim Il Sung could get carried away and express views that are incorrect. What I said was basically the following:

- What does it mean to talk about collective security in Asia at this stage? At this stage, it is only an idea launched by the Soviet Union. By no means does it mean that this idea is to be achieved tomorrow. This is a task for the future, a task for the time yet to come. To turn it into a material force, the idea for collective security in Asia must become a collective task of the Asian people and it must be outlined in a program.

- The Soviet comrades, too, comrade Brezhnev, and you understand that the situation in Asia is very complicated, it is more complicated than in Europe and the idea for collective security in Asia will not be realized that quickly.

- But we, as Marxists-Leninists, are interested in developing this process, to eliminate the opportunity for generating military conflicts on the largest continent on earth. Moreover, post-World War II, most military conflicts are in Asia and there is a danger for this continent to become a region of sharp and constant tension, serious conflicts, and military clashes.

- Without this process of establishing collective security in Asia, I don't see how it would be possible for North and South Korea to unite.

- This development will change the ratio of forces in favor of the democratic forces, of socialism; it will give an opportunity to the Asian people to rise up in arms for more favorable conditions.

On the issue of collective security in Asia, comrade Kim Il Sung stated that until now they had not spoken out either in support of the idea, or against it. We have not published anything in the press on this issue. First of all, we would like to clarify what our Soviet comrades have in mind and what they propose in relation to this idea initiated by comrade Brezhnev. I spoke with comrade Polyansky on this issue some years ago as well, and with comrade Novikov during the celebration of the 25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But they spoke in general terms, they did not tell me anything specific. That is why we want to clarify these issues before we take a stance. Let the Soviet comrades send us a letter and explain the essence of the idea – along party or government lines – or send us other materials about it.

In relation to this, I told him that because we are in the Balkans, we deal more with Balkan and European problems, but apparently this case is about the following: the realization of this idea and the development of a program for its implementation will include the following key areas:

First, it will guarantee the independence and sovereignty of all countries on the Asian continent – large and small – their independent development, without foreign intervention;

Second, it will further strengthen and develop the progressive and democratic regimes in most Asian countries;

Third, it will bring about the elimination of foreign imperialistic military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops on this continent, and it is well-known that the foreign troops and bases are the American troops and bases;

Fourth, in the future it will open wider opportunities to speed up the revolutionary process on this continent, in all Asian non-socialist countries;

Fifth, it will also create, as I had pointed out previously, more favorable conditions for the unification of North and South Korea. We should not harbor any illusions that the unification of Korea will take place without speeding up the process of Asian security.

I pointed out that the Chinese are against this idea, because, according to them, it was directed against them and was aimed at surrounding them. This, however, is not true, because China, as one of the largest countries in Asia, will have to take part in the system of collective security as well.

In the end, comrade Kim Il Sung stated that, as comrade Zhivkov had pointed out, this was a difficult issue, he agreed with what was said, and concluded that it had to be developed further.

#### **4. On the coordination of our actions in the international arena**

During our conversations with comrade Kim Il Sung we spoke at length about the issue of coordinating our actions in the international arena and in the area of economic cooperation. The key issues that I pointed out in this regard were as follows:

- Korea should not isolate itself from us, from the socialist countries, from the Soviet Union, on key issues; coordinated unified actions in the international arena should be ensured.

- Bilateral cooperation between the countries alone is not enough. It is important, however, to ensure coordination and alignment of our actions and initiatives in the international arena. I pointed out that I understand the situation of Korea right now. But despite this, you should find ways and forms for such coordination. I pointed out that for them, too, coordination was extremely necessary. I pointed out that it was of utmost importance for them to maintain coordination with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, especially between him and comrade Brezhnev. In this regard, establishing constant personal ties and consultations between comrades Brezhnev and Kim Il Sung would play a crucial role in favor of socialism, in favor of our common cause and, in particular, in favor of Korea. In this connection, I spoke in detail about comrade L. I. Brezhnev as a communist, as a leader, and a comrade.

In principle, Kim Il Sung did not object to what I said. However, there were some nuances in the explanation he gave later.

What did he say in essence on this issue? For example, he said the following: We were supposed to meet with comrade Brezhnev last year, but because he was very busy this meeting did not take place. This year I had to go to Moscow to meet with comrade Brezhnev. But, because of the meetings with representatives from the South, and because of the Politburo prohibits me from traveling by plane, I did not meet with comrade Brezhnev (the reason for

this decision of the Politburo of the Korean Workers' Party was the plane crash – as I remember, an IL-18 – in which all passengers died, among them prominent Korean actors). Comrade Kim Il Sung suggested that this meeting with comrade Brezhnev take place somewhere in the middle between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Further, Kim Il Sung explained that he shared my views. But in their conditions they had to take into account many factors. We have to demonstrate independence from the point of view of the South as well. Otherwise, we will give reason to the South Koreans to attack us, to carry out speculative actions against our country.

In the course of my conversations with Kim Il Sung, he made the following statement twice: Please tell comrade Brezhnev that I am not a revisionist; that I have not detached myself from the Soviet Union; that I will never be an opportunist and traitor. Ever since I was 16 years old – now more than 45 years later– I have been in the revolutionary movement. I have about 5 more years of active work left. I will not disgrace myself; I will not discredit my revolutionary activity. He told me about his life and revolutionary activity at length and how he had faced death many times. The Soviet Union has helped us in the past; it is helping us now as well. And I will not become an opportunist, an anti-Soviet and a traitor.

When we left Pyongyang, on our way from the residence to the airport, he asked me once again to convey his personal greetings to comrade Brezhnev and to state, on his behalf, that he was not going along with the Chinese, that he thinks highly of the Soviet Union, and that he will remain loyal to the Soviet Union.

##### **5. On the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the economic cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

After the tour of the country and the visit to several factories and plants, I pointed out the great successes of North Korea. Once again I convinced myself of the great successes achieved by the Korean comrades, of the hard work of the Korean people. I pointed out that we, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, have great respect for Korea, that for us, Korea is a brotherly, socialist country.

I pointed out that we, in Bulgaria, also have achieved success in the development of the economy. However, taking into consideration the times in which we live, the vigorous development of the scientific and technical revolution, and the circumstance, our socialist countries, especially smaller countries like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Bulgaria cannot develop all areas of industry. Even the Soviet Union cannot afford to do this. Under these conditions we need to go resolutely towards economic integration and introduction of state-of-the art technologies in manufacture. Each of our countries need to specialize in areas for which it has the most favorable natural conditions and labor resources. I gave him the example with Bulgaria and Cuba, where with our help and that of the COMECON countries, major metallurgical capacities will be built for the production of nickel of which Cuba has in abundance.

Such economic integration with our countries, and especially with the Soviet Union, would allow Korea to develop its production capacities and become the first, or the second, country (after Japan) in the development of its economy, and the first country in improving the standard of living of its people in Asia. I pointed out that they have a lot of natural resources, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, coal, etc., water encompassing the coast of your peninsula, and so on. Economic integration would also create most favorable conditions, besides ship building, to develop some other areas of machine building as well. That would have great economic significance for the future of Korea.

In relation to that, Kim Il Sung stated that he understood the issue. He spoke several times in detail about what they had built with the help of the Soviet Union and some socialist countries. He said that they did not want to engage with Japan, who reached out to them with proposals all the time for the exploitation of Korea's natural resources.

But he did not give a specific answer to my proposal that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to engage more closely with COMECON. He pointed out that they had an observer at COMECON, and turned to a member of their delegation, an alternate member of the Politburo and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Jo Chae Woo [?], and said that they needed to discuss the issue further for additional steps for joint activities with COMECON. He told me that they were thinking about the issue.

In relation to this, he pointed out that the economic integration, the specialization between the socialist countries gave an opportunity to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in turn, to specialize and cooperate with our socialist countries on a bilateral basis.

When I discussed these issues, I took the opportunity to inform Kim Il Sung about the basic areas of enhancing socialist economic integration and improving the work of COMECON in the light of our last meeting in Crimea.

## **6. On the unification of Korea and the confederation between North and South Korea**

When comrade Kim Il Sung spoke about the unification of Korea, I asked him if he could elaborate more specifically on what a confederation would look like, if it was formed in the near future. Because the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a socialist country, and South Korea, even though it does not have major monopolistic corporations, is a capitalist country. Apparently, the prototype of a unified Korea in the future would not be South Korea, but the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. What would a confederation look like between a capitalist and a socialist country?

In connection with this, Kim Il Sung said the following: The issue is whether the two systems – the socialist and the capitalist system – can exist in one country. There is a contradiction – on the one side we have socialism and on the other – capitalism. The issue is, “what must we do so that South Korea does not become a colony of Japan and a permanent base of American imperialism?” The goal is to pull South Korea away from this danger.

- Our first task is to pull South Korea away from Japan's grasp and eliminate America's military bases along the way towards the creation of a confederation.

- We cannot agree to give up socialism. Along with raising the issue of establishing a confederation, we are consciously changing the name of our constitution. We made it socialist to strengthen the achievements of socialism in our country.

- The confederation, for the creation of which we will insist, will be the retention of both forms – of their independence in domestic policy and joint activity in the area of foreign policy.

- I can point out the following example: the name and the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a socialist country will remain the same; South Korea will also keep its name as the Republic of Korea, and above both governments there will be a joint body which will act on behalf of the confederation only in the area of foreign policy. This, however, will not cover domestic policy – in this regard, both countries will act independently. I think that this is the only right approach.

- If they listen to us and a confederation is established, South Korea will be done with. South Korea will have to reduce its army, we will reduce ours too. But this will bring about the elimination of the reactionary regime in South Korea, because without an army the people, themselves, will rise. That is why, in reality, the South Koreans do not accept our proposals at all.

- The goals of this slogan can be achieved because the patriots of South Korea, the democratic forces there, the people who want this unification, will understand that the traitors are, indeed, the ruling establishment in South Korea, and the patriots are the communists in North Korea.

- I believe we will not fail, we will not lose. Our cooperative farmers will not allow the landowners to come back to power. Many peasants from South Korea, when they see how our cooperative farmers live, will want to establish such cooperative farms there too.

The political goals we are after with the confederation are: not allowing Japanese imperialism in South Korea, elimination of the US military bases in South Korea, and increasing our influence among the people of South Korea. Of course, if we are weak, propagating up such a slogan would be dangerous for us. In reality, the achievement of this political slogan would be a difficult task, because the American enemy is not stupid, the Japanese are not stupid either.

Our idea is a political struggle, aimed at proving to the population of South Korea who is a traitor and who is a patriot.

If a more democratic power is established in South Korea, then we would not bring up the slogan for this confederation. We will simply call it the revolution.

## **7. On the struggle with the faction group in the Korean Workers' Party**

One of the issues that Kim Il Sung spoke about dealt with, as he put it, the struggle against the faction group in their party. This is related to the period after the Patriotic War of the Korean people.

He explained this factionary activity of some party leaders with the fact that they had split over the issue how to use the assistance provided by the socialist countries and mainly by the Soviet Union, amounting to a total of 500 million current rubles – whether to use it for importing commodities for general consumption for the then-starving Korean people, or for creating production capacities. The factionalists were of the opinion to import consumer goods, and Kim Il Sung and the others – to use it for building production capacities, industrial plants. He spoke in detail about the activity of factionalists during that period. He pointed out that after they were expelled from the Central Committee and from the party, they thought that they would defect to South Korea. They took measures to prevent that, but instead they defected to China and are there till this day. This deteriorated their relations with China at the time, and because of it they did not send a delegation to the 8<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

He said that after that, Khrushchev and comrade Brezhnev stated that Kim Il Sung's position for industrialization of the country was correct.

These are the key aspects of our conversations with Kim Il Sung. From the beginning of our face-to-face conversations he informed me that he was talking to me openly, as he had never spoken to with anyone else before.

At his insistence we extended our visit by one day. Apparently, he wanted to have an opportunity to have a lengthy conversation. From the first day until the very end – while we were in the country, in the factories, the young pioneers' palace, and elsewhere – he was with us all the time.

So far as the Bulgarian-Korean relations are concerned, I believe that after our visit, there will be better opportunities to develop these relations further. The Korean Ambassador in Sofia told some comrades that Kim Il Sung had called him before our visit and told him that they needed to develop the economic and other relations with Bulgaria on a wider front.

Kim Il Sung told me that it would be reasonable, after establishing a joint economic committee for cooperation to establish a committee for the exchange of experience, that they would like to study in detail our experience and apply it in Korea.

The public events of our delegation, our meetings with the workers, the visits to the factories, companies, etc., were widely covered in their press and radio broadcasts. My speeches at the mass meetings in Hamheung and Pyongyang, the toasts at both receptions were published in full text with no omissions. The mass meetings in Hamheung and Pyongyang were broadcast on Korean television and radio.

Kim Il Sung made an interesting toast at our reception immediately before we left. He expressed his high appreciation of the visit of our delegation of party and government officials. According to him, the visit of our delegation of party and government officials of the Republic of Bulgaria to Korea was a historic event that opened a new stage in the relations of friendship and cooperation between the parties, governments, and people of both countries, Korea and Bulgaria, based on the principles of Marxist-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

I believe that the visit of our delegation of party and government officials in Korea was a useful one.

30 October 1973  
Ulan Bator

T. Zhivkov

**Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061487, Urgent**

<b>Date:</b> 30 October 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 20, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, MFA, Folder no. 1491, Planning the Work of the Embassy; Annual Report of the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania in Pyongyang for 1973; The Response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Directorate - Relations

Following a discussion between Aurelian Lazăr and I.N. Dudoladov, Soviet first secretary, we noted that the USSR is displeased with the current state of its relations with the DPRK, given that currently Korean-Soviet relations are in a state of stalemate, that exchanges of delegations have been reduced to an all-time low and that the lack of initiative from the North Korean side has been complemented with a passive attitude regarding Soviet initiatives.

I.N. Dudoladov mentioned that his country's relations with the DPRK had passed through such critical moments before, but contrary to past experiences, when Soviet diplomats were worried and alarmed about the respective circumstances, they were adopting a much more indifferent attitude, which, according to the Soviet diplomat, had overarching and rapid effects on the [Korean] hosts.

Dudoladov said that compared to the reserved attitude the DPRK is adopting towards the USSR, the USSR come forward with proposals to support the DPRK on the international arena, taking such actions that the DPRK reconsiders its position towards the USSR on its own.

The Soviet diplomat mentioned that this state of bilateral relations between the USSR and the DPRK would last for at least another year, at which point they will gain the intensity which characterized them in the past years. He added that relations between the DPRK and the PRC follow the same tenuous path [as relations between the DPRK and the USSR] except that good relations between the DPRK and the PRC correspond to cold relations between the DPRK and the USSR, and vice-versa.

I.N. Dudoladov pointed out that although it was less than one week until the anniversary of the USSR October Socialist Revolution, the Koreans have not informed the USSR embassy about the ceremonies meant to celebrate that day in the DPRK, which means that this year's attention to November 7th would be insignificant.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

## Conversation with the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)

**Date:**

31 October 1973

**Source:**

*PoIA, MfAA, G-A 352. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer*

GDR Embassy to the DPRK  
Pyongyang, 31 October 1973

### Note

A Conversation with the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV),  
Comrade Le Dong, on 25 October 1973 (which was held upon his request in the Embassy of the GDR)

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Additional participants in the meeting:

Comrade Ta Kuin, 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary of the DRV Embassy  
Comrade Peter Hoffer, Attaché at the GDR Embassy

Comrade Le Dong informed [us] that his embassy currently analyzes questions of internal DPRK developments, especially compliance with the 6-year-plan, cadre changes at the 7<sup>th</sup> plenum of the KWP Central Committee, the military congress from early October 1973, and the DPRK's positions on the X Party Congress of the CCP.

Referring to the joint communiqué issued by the DRV party and government delegation that recently visited the GDR, and to our deep links of friendship, [Le Dong] requested a frank exchange on issues mentioned.

#### On Personality Cult in the DPRK

He stated pointedly: "If somebody calls himself the greatest, there is something wrong. The personality cult in the DPRK does not only inflict damage on the internal development and reputation of this state, but also on the communist world movement." DPRK intelligence services have a very large network and perform according to the maxim "hearing what people are listening to, and saying what is to be done". Large segments of the population are extremely afraid to enter into a conversation with foreigners. This fact, in addition to the already launched expansion of the personality cult into a family cult, is creating dissatisfaction among people and will deterministically lead to its further increase.

Kim Il Sung's son was appointed a few weeks ago as the Secretary in the Central Committee and Head of the KWP's Division of Propaganda. Kim Il Sung's daughter works as the Secretary in the Youth Association, and the brother of Kim Il Sung's wife is the Deputy of the Administrative Committee for the City of Pyongyang.

#### On Changes of Cadres in the DPRK

Comrade Le Dong asked himself the question. "How many changes have occurred since the V Party Congress in the KWP's structure and the Central Committee and the Political Committee?" No one within the diplomatic corps can answer this question precisely since there is no information issued on personnel changes. One can only infer from meticulous study of the press and the mentioning of functions of respective people. A few weeks ago at the 7<sup>th</sup> Plenum, three members were removed from the Political Committee of the Central Committee, namely Park Song-cheol, Han Ik-su (Head of the Political Main Administration of the Korean People's Army) and Kim Man-kim (Chairman of the Committee for Agriculture). Furthermore, over the last year, major changes in cadres were implemented in the provinces and higher positions in factories and agriculture. The reasons behind all this have to be studied.

#### On Issues of the Peaceful Reunification of the Country

The objective of achieving a rapid and peaceful reunification of the country, which was pursued for the last two years with great effort, remains unfulfilled. According to Comrade Le Dong, the most important reason for this was an insufficient consideration in the DPRK's proposals of the real situation in the ROK. Also, the balance of class forces was not evaluated correctly. Le Dong, himself, considers Kim Il Sung's proposal to establish a "Federal Republic of Koryo" unrealistic.

Some military people have become very nervous. Apparently they prefer, in light of their existing incorrect perception of the enemy, to solve the reunification issue by military means. The recent congress with 22,000 military officers in Pyongyang was convened with the intention to "harness" those military voices, better adapt the course of "rapid peaceful reunification" to the actual situation, and, consequently, follow the goal of achieving reunification without making any concessions on this issue. The problem of "1 against 100" or "1 against 1,000" does not simply involve political and moral components. It also contains a strong military context. [Le Dong] wanted to have noticed how recently many Chinese military delegations visited the DPRK and were hosted with major attention and protocol honors.

It cannot be excluded that the DPRK has entered this decidedly pro-Chinese course due to military considerations, i.e. in order to obtain a safe hinterland or to acquire certain weapons systems from the PRC. Comrade Le Dong voiced his concern

that the PRC will exploit this situation to drive a wedge between the DPRK and the Soviet Union. Earlier, the DPRK criticized the Cultural Revolution in the PRC. Today, the Korean comrades talk about it the same way as the Chinese. He also wonders why the Korean leadership has sent such a "cordial telegram in support" for the political goals of the X CCP Congress to the Chinese party leadership. In his opinion, the entire situation is related to a new and more nuanced DPRK reunification policy.

Concerning the situation in the ROK, Comrade Le Dong emphasized that student demonstrations do not enjoy the essential support of the working class and revolutionary peasants. This speaks to the fact that, in contrast to assertions by leading Korean comrades, a revolutionary situation to remove the existing regime [in Seoul] and to lead to a peaceful reunification of the country is still far from maturity.

#### On the Economic Situation in the DPRK

In economic regards, the DPRK still has to overcome existing disproportions. Le Dong said he wants to talk with about these problems at another time.

He referred to information obtained from a Korean comrade according to which the DPRK owns arable land of about 2 million dschongbo (1 dschongbo equals 0.98 hectare). It is divided up as follows:

- about 700,000 dschongbo for rice cultivation
- about 700,000 dschongbo for corn cultivation
- about 400,000 dschongbo for fruits
- about 200,000 dschongbo for other agricultural products including potatoes.

For 1973, the DPRK estimates a rice and corn harvest of about 500 million tons. This is still insufficient to meet domestic demand. An indication for this is the large imports of grain recently shipped from France and other countries.

Looking at the planning the DPRK has made in individual areas -such as the perfection of agricultural technology (especially tractors), fertilizer production, production of chemicals, oil refining, manufacturing of engineering equipment-you have to note that none of the planning goals were achieved either in terms of deadlines or in the quality of products.

Although the DPRK is developing a remarkable level of trade with Japan, France, Italy, some Scandinavian countries, and the FRG [West Germany], a long-term dependency will persist on the socialist countries for continuous support, especially in the field of technology. Just one year ago, it anticipated fulfilling the Six-Year-Plan in only four years. Today, they just talk about an earlier fulfillment in general. This shows, again, that commitments they made are not being realized. A huge gap exists between scientific planning and the actual potential.

We agreed to continue our conversation in due time.

#### Note:

During the conversation it became evident how the very critical assessment by Comrade Le Dong was partially due to some sort of discontent. Since the [1973] Paris Agreement, the DPRK no longer devotes proper attention to the situation in the DRV and its problems of rapidly dealing with major destructions [from the war in Vietnam] and socialist construction. Frequently, Le Dong compared the large solidarity by the people of the GDR with the attitude of the DPRK leadership.

However, the assessments made by Comrade Le Dong are more or less consistent with our own.

As far as the goal to fulfill the Six-Year-Plan within four years is concerned: In recent weeks informed Korean comrades, again, confirmed to us that this goal remains in place. In this context, I want to refer to the "90 days of Struggle", a movement conducted in the entire country and in all sectors of the economy with great enthusiasm. Its main goal is the very fulfillment of the Six-Year-Plan in four years in the most important economic sectors. Furthermore, it is my opinion that, despite all the critical assessments made, one cannot overlook successes achieved by the DPRK especially last year in both industry and agriculture.

We continue to monitor the overall situation and will apply our observations shortly into a more extensive analysis.

[Signed Everhartz]  
Ambassador

#### CC:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade O. Fischer  
Central Committee, Division IV, Comrade Bruno Mahlow  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Liebermann  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ZID, Comrade Bernatek  
Comrade Everhartz

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.497**

<b>Date:</b> 3 November 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1973. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 03.11.1973/18:00

No.: 061.497

To: Comrade Director Ion Ciubotaru

Following the latest international events and the [evolution of the] situation in South Korea, we noticed that there were new noteworthy elements in the attitude of the DPRK concerning the unification of the country, such as:

Thus we noticed that the frequent references to the 'peaceful and independent unification' started to be replaced, depending on the circumstances, with expressions like 'the independent unification of the country' or purely with 'the unification of the country,' which in the current circumstances, seem to have a totally different connotation.

Also, we noticed that internally, in closed-doors meetings, in political education [classes] etc. ideas used in previous years spring up, such as 'driving the Americans out of the South of the country and achieving the unification [of the homeland],' 'let us achieve the unification during the lifetime of the current generation,' [let's consolidate the defenses of the country at the same pace with the development of the national economy,' etc. These ideas are increasingly used, especially after the recent meeting of the superior party leadership with the military cadres and the political commanders (20,000 people) in the armed forces.

Generally, there is a noticeable state of tension and antagonism. After interrupting the dialogue with the South, both parties, but especially the North, vehemently attacks South Korea, which basically leads to the state of tension preceding the signing of the Joint Declaration from July 4, 1972.

According to press reports and radio broadcasts, party and community organizations, all the cadres in all the units discuss the speech of comrade Kim Il Sung at the rally in Pyongyang organized on the occasion of Todor Zhivkov's visit to the DPRK. These press reports and broadcasts contain strong ideas that peace in the Korean peninsula is endangered, that the peace announced by the American imperialists and the South Korean puppets is nothing else but a façade behind which the enemies of the Korean people are preparing a new war against the North, that peace must be conquered and defended with weapons, etc.

In a recent discussion between the Romanian Ambassador and the Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council, Heo Dam, the latter expressed his skepticism regarding the capability of the United Nations Organization to bring something new [to the table] to solve the Korean problem, showing that history demonstrated that plenty of the resolutions and decisions of this organization were ignored.

Regarding the situation described above, at their turn, the South Korean authorities are manifesting a lot of concern regarding the 'warmongering agitation and the provocations of the North,' regarding the frequent infiltrations in the South of some elements that prepared and supported the recent student movements in Seoul.

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.465, Urgent**

<b>Date:</b> 15 November 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 210, 1973, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Secret, 1st Division, MFA, Folder no. 1496, Regarding the Internal Situation in the DPRK (Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Matters. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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To the First Division, MFA

Between 8 and 13 October, several gatherings organized as military trainings comprising all military corps took place in Pyongyang and reunited all the commanders and political instructors from the Korean Popular Army. At the end, with the participation of comrade Kim Il Sung and other cadres from the high echelons of the DPRK party and state leadership a general gathering took place, with more than 20,000 participants, where O Jinu, the chief of the Army staff presented a report on the state of political and military readiness in the current circumstances, discussing the immediate responsibilities of the Army. The General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party also spoke at this meeting.

The briefs released to the press after the event indicate that the speakers unanimously underlined the necessity to continuously strengthen the political-revolutionary activity, to increase the level of technical and combat preparedness of the army.

Special emphasis was put on the learning of modern combat techniques by the entire army, on 'the transformation of the entire army into an army of military cadres.'

After a prolonged absence, the idea that 'under the leadership of comrade Kim Il Sung, during our lifetime, we must chase away the American imperialists and achieve the reunification of the country' reemerged. The news discussing this gathering underlines that all speakers underscored their indignation that 'the American imperialists and their fascist puppets in South Korea, under the guise of wanting to continue the dialogue, are preparing another war against the North.'

From Aurelian Lazăr's discussions with A. Putinet and I. Taraba, the charges d'affaires ad interim from the USSR and from Hungary, respectively, it could be gathered that this gathering of military cadres was necessary because certain fiery elements within the ranks of the DPRK army appeared, who treated the situation in South Korea and the existing international circumstances superficially, and therefore believed that the current conditions were favorable to forcibly reuniting the country.

Our sources tell us that this issue was the object of ample debates at the recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party in September, where only through the energetic intervention of comrade Kim Il Sung the force of this current of thought could be countered, which made it possible to continue on the same rational line of solving the Korean problem through peaceful political means.

We will follow the events closely and inform you on the commentaries made about this gathering accordingly.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

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By PT NARA Date 4/22/05

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NODIS REVIEW  
Cat. A - Caption removed;  
transferred to O/FADRC  
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC  
with additional access  
controlled by S/S  
Cat. C - Caption and custody  
retained by S/S  
Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly  
Date: 11/9/21 27

DATE: November 16, 1973

PLACE: Blue House, Seoul, Korea

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Discussion with  
President Park

PARTICIPANTS: President Park Chung Hee  
Presidential Secretary General Kim Chong Yom  
Acting Foreign Minister Yun Suk Heun  
Special Assistant to the President for  
Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu Hah  
Interpreter Cho Sang Ho

Secretary Kissinger  
Ambassador Philip Habib  
Acting Assistant Secretary Hummel

The following Korean officials joined  
the discussions during the lunch:  
Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil  
National Assembly Speaker Chung Il Kwon

President Park: You must be very tired from your journey.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I am not tired yet but it will  
probably catch up with me later.

Park: I want to offer to you our wholehearted welcome.  
I know you have had a very busy schedule and we very  
much appreciate your taking the time to visit Korea.

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Secretary: I have always had a very warm feeling for Korea. I visited Korea during the war and I have acquired the highest admiration for the Korean people. It is amazing and admirable what has been accomplished here.

Park: It is 22 years since your last visit?

Secretary: Yes, it has been too long.

Park: I would like to congratulate you on your glorious and successful efforts in bringing peace in the Middle East.

Secretary: The Middle East is still a long way from peace but we have been successful in relieving the immediate tension.

Park: Concerning your recent visit to Peking, I would appreciate your giving me your impressions.

Secretary: First in general--whenever I go to Peking and then visit other countries I find that they expect

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that I will have solved all their problems. I have not talked to you before so I don't know if you have this expectation.

I will make some general comments first and then to the Peking visit. You can count on the fact that we will not make any prior decisions without consulting you. Therefore whenever I go to Peking--and I expect such trips to be frequent--if we have not told you in advance you can count on the fact that Korea will not be an item on the agenda. That was the case this time. On each of my visits the Chinese make their standard speech on Korea but we do not pursue the subject. You know the sort of speech they made yesterday in the UN. On this occasion on my visit to Peking they didn't even make their standard speech. The only context in which Korea came up was in connection with the compromise we are trying to develop in the UN, and it came up because I have the impression that the Chinese are having difficulty in arranging with their co-sponsors the achievement of a compromise. The Soviets may very well be playing a role in these difficulties. So we had to spend time just discussing the technical situation in New York and how to give them more time to consult their co-sponsors. Except for that the issue of Korea never came up.

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I have seen press stories that the withdrawal of US troops from Korea was discussed in Peking, but the fact is that the presence of US troops was not discussed in any form.

Park: On your visit to Peking, I would appreciate your own assessment of Peking's position toward a settlement in Korea. Of course they must give support to North Korea and on the basis of your previous visits and your knowledge of their previous position what assessment can you make of the Chinese attitude toward the Korean question?

Secretary: You know I talked to Chiao Kuan-hua in New York about the fact that we are willing to talk to the North Koreans if the Chinese are prepared to talk to you. They said they could not talk to you in New York because the North Koreans would find out and they also said they could not talk in Washington for other reasons that are not clear to me, but they never absolutely said that the principle was unacceptable. The Chinese position has many elements. On the one hand they must be sure that Pyongyang does not come under the influence of Moscow. On this trip Chou En-lai made

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a special point of this. Peking has the dominant influence in Pyongyang.

Before going further, I assume that this conversation is on a very confidential basis and it will not be spread to other parts of your government. The Chinese are very sensitive. In fact, I am very sensitive.

On the other hand quite candidly--although I can't prove this--the Chinese are not eager to have any powerful unified countries on their borders. So I do not believe that the unification of Korea has the same priority for the Chinese that it has for Pyongyang or for you. I think the Chinese, strangely, do not mind the US presence in Korea, particularly if they think that Japanese influence would rise if ours declined. I think the Chinese would be violently opposed to any military aggression by North Korea at this point, because they would be afraid if we become involved with North Korea it would isolate them from Pyongyang because the Soviet Union would support North Korea. Also if China supported North Korea in a military confrontation, that would drive Japan away from China. If the North Koreans attack and the Japanese supported the South Koreans then the Chinese would become more and more isolated. I personally think that the greater likelihood--in terms of outside support--for an attack by North Korea would come from the Soviets

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rather than from the Chinese, but this could change in five years or so.

Park: That is the prevailing opinion on Korean affairs and on the international and internal situation on the Korean Peninsula. We share the same view, that the overall Korean situation is related to Moscow and Peking. However more recently it seems possible that North Korea may try the same tactics as in the Middle East, influenced by the notion that it can do the same thing on the Korean Peninsula. If they find the opportune moment they may take military action and then they could claim that unification is an established fact. The big powers would come in to stop the fighting, but then the North Koreans would be in a better negotiating position because of their territorial gains. What is your opinion?

Secretary: Although I have been given the Nobel Prize for peace, I assure you our policy is not characterized by an excess of sentimentality. I want to characterize the situation in the Middle East. Mr. President, you should watch our actions and not our statements. What do we expect to happen? After Egypt and Syria made

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their attacks our strategy has been to demonstrate that the side that is supported with Soviet arms could not win. And since it is impossible for Israel with a population of only 3 million to destroy the Arabs who have populations totaling 100 million, it was always necessary for the war to end in a negotiation. So what we wanted was a defeat for the Arabs so severe that they would turn to us, but not so severe as to drive them to the Soviets. And this is exactly what we brought about. In terms of the positions on the map rather than in rhetoric, Syria has been badly hurt and Egypt has had one army trapped and has suffered total defeat. Perfectly frankly--and we need to keep this very secret-- it was on a Friday when I went to Moscow. If a ceasefire resolution had been offered at that time in the Security Council we would have had to accept. There would have been no way of avoiding a ceasefire. My going to Moscow permitted military operations to continue for 48 more hours. By that point both Syria and Egypt had been defeated. We didn't want the war to continue beyond that because the dangers would have been too great. For one thing the more moderate Arab leaders would have been thrown out by extremists. So the lesson of the

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Middle East is not that one can gain territory and get the UN to approve it. The best you can say is that the UN prevented a complete catastrophe. So the lesson of counter attack in such a war is that the international environment might permit you to take Wonsan but not to take Pyongyang. And a second lesson is that if the action goes as it did in Bangladesh the whole matter is finished. The temporary defeat can be handled, but a basic and near-total defeat could be used by North Korea to solidify its gains. Another thing to remember is that we got 22,000 tons of supplies into Israel by air in 48 hours. Here in Korea such supplies would be easier because in Israel we had only one intermediate base we could use, in the Azores.

Park: I consider your remarks are common sense among peace-loving people, but the leaders in Pyongyang are not common-sense people or peace-loving either.

Secretary: I agree you should guard yourself and keep your position strong for a quick counter-attack, and don't panic. As long as this Administration is in office we would give you strong support so as to return to the status quo ante.

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Park: You must have received a report on the North Korean's one and a half hour speech in New York, claiming that the Korean War was instigated by South Korea with U.S. inspiration. Before over 100 members of the UN they made this brazen claim without any sense of guilt. What they are trying to do is re-write history that is known to everybody in the world. They think they can do anything and get away with it. Kim Il Sung is still pretending.

Secretary: I did not say you should not keep yourself alert and cautious. My assessment is that the Chinese will try to prevent a North Korean attack but if it happens ; anyway Kim Il Song would run a very major risk. We strongly believe that in a few years you will be able to defend yourself. The Korean soldiers I have seen so far look very good to me.

Park: During your Peking visit the North Koreans intensified their propaganda offense against the ROK.

Secretary: Possibly  
they don't need much encouragement, and

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probably the Chinese cannot restrain them, at least as far as propaganda is concerned. Also it is possible that the North Koreans are as suspicious of the Chinese as some of our friends are of Washington and therefore they make a big noise so as not to be overlooked.

Park: In reviewing past Korean history the 1950 attack occurred with the support of the Soviets. We believe that Soviet support of the invasion was based on an assessment that the U.S. would not enter in and support us. That was a miscalculation. In fact we must be very cautious and prudent. I am very pleased and am made more confident by hearing your remarks and by your keen interest and detailed knowledge. However we are very close to the problem and we know the history. We are trying to be alert to cope with any changing situation. As I understand your statements, it is that we should take measures to cope with a reckless attack and should stay alert so as to demonstrate strength so that the North Koreans convince themselves that aggression would not be prudent.

Secretary: I agree.

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Park: Mr. Secretary, in meeting with Chou En-lai and talking about our proposal for the admission of two Koreas--we know that they are ostensibly against this but what is their true attitude? Is it possible that under certain conditions the Chinese would not oppose the proposal? I would appreciate your assessment

Secretary: My strong impression is that their attitude on dual admission is significantly affected because of Taiwan. They are genuinely not in favor. You will see in the Peking Communique an interesting evolution in their position on normalization. In the past the Chinese demanded that we break with Taiwan. However, the Communique says only that we must recognize the principle of one China. This might open the possibility of normalization without our breaking with Taiwan. If something is accomplished along these lines, the Chinese could begin to think of a similar thing in the Korean case but I don't think they can consider that now.

Park: However we understand that in the case of dual admission of East and West Germany the Chinese were in favor. Is that true?

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Secretary: Yes, but in that case both Germanys were in agreement. In this case both Koreas do not agree. My experience with the Chinese is that they move very slow and supplely. My impression is they have a mortal fear of making a proposal and being rejected. First they make a general statement and the maybe repeat it if I have not understood them the first time. Then when I do understand, and if I indicate approval, they actually make the proposal. You know the Chinese think they are cleverer than anyone else in the world, and that maybe true. I was once asked by Chou if Americans consider me to be clever. I said I hoped that the Chinese would consider me to be only average clever, for a Chinese, which would be the highest compliment anyone could pay. (laughter)

Park: It has been our constant position that in the present atmosphere unification of Korea is difficult or impossible. So at the present stage there can be no early unification. So our belief is we should put our efforts on a durable peace. First we should bring peace, then unification. Therefore for some time we do not foresee the possibility of reunification. This summer I made a statement <sup>on</sup> unification. Presently

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the North Koreans advocate a peace treaty but they propose that US forces should get out and that we should reduce our military strength to 100,000. In reality they are trying to achieve a goal of weakening our defense capability and neutralizing the US Defense Pact. The North continues to try to make propaganda capital by pushing a peace treaty, and some countries feel that the North is proposing peace and the South is not willing to respond. We have been thinking of this and we have a certain proposal to try to deal with it. Our proposal would first be a matter of careful consultation with the US, but I will now give you the rough idea of it to get your reaction. The essence of our proposition would be to offer a non-aggression pact between North and South to try to make sure there is no aggressive action by either party. We would also jointly assert the validity of the armistice agreement. The other side might demand that the UNC be abolished and we would then reply that the UNC authorities should be handed over to the South Korean Armed Forces. What do you think?

Secretary: First in terms of overall strategy, I was very impressed with your June proposal. I did not

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believe it had the slightest chance of being effective but it put the other side on the defensive. I think, and this is the strategy we used in our Viet-Nam negotiations, we made many proposals some knowing they had no chance of acceptance. We made them so that there was always a US proposal on the table that the North Vietnamese would have to reject, so that the North Vietnamese could not fully develop a propaganda line since we would constantly make proposals that forced them to redevelop their lines. Occasionally we would make proposals in secret and then they could not be sure whether we would make them public. This was a difficult problem for them. I know those negotiations are not exactly parallel to your situation but there are some similarities.

The strategy you proposed is to make a proposal that keeps the initiative in your hands or at a minimum keeps the other side off balance. Such "initiatives" should always be proposals that you could live with. They should be serious, and not just maneuvers, and that of course was the case in your June proposal. My first impression is favorable, in that you could afford to have it accepted.

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We must study together how to dissolve the UNC. This is certainly the initiative they will take next year and we should pre-empt the subject. It would be good if you took the initiative, whether your proposal is best, or some other might be better, with your permission I want to think this over for a couple of weeks and then reply. I have no better idea, now, I just want to think it over. We should think about what counter-proposal they could make, so that we have thought the results through. But your basic approach I like very much.

Park: This is just a thought, and not fully formed, and requires serious study. We know the North would not accept it. As to whom and when it would be presented needs more careful study between us. It would be possible to announce as a South Korean initiative. Another way would be to consult the Soviets, the Chinese and Japanese to see if we could jointly come up with a formula that the North Koreans could be asked to accept, and then our other friends could consider. The way of doing this needs further consideration.

Secretary: My instinct is whatever proposal is agreed,

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it would be better to come from your government. If we discuss it with the Chinese and the Soviets the Soviets have a vested interest in embarrassing the Chinese and they might not agree to it. What might work is that after we have worked out a proposal you let me announce it to the Chinese about two weeks in advance as a message from you and ask their help with the North Koreans. This would be a contact from you to the Chinese. The risk would be slight because they are too afraid of breaking a confidence from me to leak it out.

Park: I certainly appreciate your valuable advice on such proposals and there will be thorough discussions between our Foreign Ministry and Ambassador Habib.

Secretary: I will personally pay close attention to this matter.

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(The meeting then broke up and was resumed again at the lunch table, where the Prime Minister and the Speaker joined the group.)

(There was some discussion of the flight route of the Secretary's aircraft from Peking to Tokyo, in which the PRC insisted that the flight had to go over Shanghai rather than on the direct route over Korea. The Secretary discussed the fact that his former colleagues at Harvard disagree strongly with his policies. President Park mentioned that he had been in China for about five years during the Pacific War.)

Secretary: I think the Chinese do not have a completely closed mind to relations with South Korea. Also I think they are so afraid of the Soviets that they will not challenge the United States during the next few years.

Park: What about the realities of the Sino-Soviet confrontation?

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Secretary: There is very real hostility. In the first place the Chinese do not like the Soviets as people-- but of course the Chinese don't really like anyone. In the second place the Chinese are very worried that the Soviets might attack them. Thirdly, the Soviets are concerned that if the Chinese are this aggressive while still weak, how will they behave when they have a secure nuclear capability?

Park: It seems to me that it would suit the Soviet style to strike when the opponent is weak.

Secretary: I think there is a 50-50 chance that the Soviets may seriously consider an attack before the Chinese are fully nuclear capable.

Park: When I saw President Nixon in 1969 in San Francisco I asked him the same question and got the same 50-50 answer. May I ask whether your estimate is a guess or whether there is evidence.

Secretary: It is now based on some evidence. In 1969 we knew nothing at all about the Chinese.

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(There was some banter about rumors there are many Kissingers flying to many different capitals simultaneously. The Secretary then told the story of the time when Ambassador Habib kicked him out of his office in Saigon when the Secretary, at that time not in government, was visiting Viet-Nam for the first time. There were also ironic complaints by the Secretary that State Department officers refuse to show him interesting telegrams, and have a secret desire to handle everything in the regional bureaus.)

Park: Do you think there will be a North Viet-Nam offensive this dry season?

Secretary: I have the greatest respect for President Thieu. He has done a remarkable job. A North Viet-Nam offensive depends upon being sure of getting the same flow of equipment from the USSR and China. We have the impression it is unlikely the Chinese are maintaining the same flow. There will be attacks in the dry season but the chance is about 55-45 against an all out offensive. We have recently sent a message to the North Vietnamese--this has not been made public--that an offensive would have very serious consequences,

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and we pointed out they have miscalculated us on other occasions. We have recently sent reconnaissance aircraft over North Viet-Nam and recently a carrier has moved into the Tonkin Gulf--this is only for your private information. We take the position that the recent war powers legislation by the U.S. Congress lifts the restrictions on our acts in Indochina so we would have 60 days in which to conduct military operations including mining their harbors again.

Park: How is Mao's health?

Secretary: Of course he is very old, I believe he is 79, and he could die anytime regardless of health factors. When I first saw him two years ago I thought he couldn't last very long. In February 1972 it was hard for him to walk without people holding him. Then in February 1973 he was much better and could walk without help. On this visit he was even better than February 1973, conducting a conversation for nearly three hours, covering every topic in US-China relations and many other subjects, without referring to any notes. In the past this is the sort of conversation that Chou En-lai has undertaken. This time he put on a very

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impressive performance intellectually. Still, he is an old man. Chou En-lai himself is very active at the age of 74.

Park: I saw a picture of your discussions with Chou and it seemed that Chou was taking a very vigorous attitude.

Secretary: Yes, he has made it a point to identify himself with China's policy toward the United States. Of course Mao has also identified himself with it.

Park: Will you go to Norway to receive the Nobel Prize?

Secretary: No I do not plan to go but I will have the American Ambassador there accept it for me. Le Duc Tho refused the prize, possibly because he wants to maintain the freedom to attack South Viet-Nam and also probably because he does not want to associate with me. He did send me a nice letter in connection with the Nobel Prize. You might be interested that once during our negotiations he looked me squarely in the eye and he said, "Let me say frankly, open-heartedly, sincerely and with the

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best intentions, you are a liar." (laughter)

Park: We have some appreciation of the difficulties of negotiations with Communists.

Secretary: I may say that the Israelis are about as tough as the Communists. The Arabs are relatively undisciplined. A problem with the Arabs is that they will proceed from one unjustified assumption to another. They will begin by hoping you have accepted something, and then pretend you have accepted, and then assume that there has been a firm agreement, and will later on claim that you have gone back on some understanding. However, up to now the Arabs have not been as nasty in negotiations as has been my experience with the Communists. For four years I negotiated with Le Duc Tho, without achieving any progress whatsoever.

Ambassador Habib: In your North/South talks you should keep in mind our experience in the Viet-Nam negotiations. The other side will continue over a long period to say "absolutely no". Then suddenly they may change their minds. I advise you to keep on with the discussions, not be discouraged, and wait for a shift in their position.

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Secretary: Every time you make a proposal it will take a few months for them to analyze it.

Park: Despite the fact that we have a common Korean language to use in our negotiations there are very significant differences of meaning that they attach to Korean words. For instance, they insist that the word "freedom" must include their freedom to conduct espionage and subversion in South Korea.

Secretary: We had similar problems of terminology when U.S. Congressmen visited Hanoi. Time after time North Vietnamese officials would use language in talking to the Congressmen that would give them the impression that there had been a major change in Hanoi's positions. Then the Congressmen would talk to our newspapers and the Administration would be accused of failing to respond to the shift.

In 1971 the North Vietnamese made public seven points but proposed nine points to us secretly for negotiation. Every week they publicly demanded an answer to their seven points that they had said privately to us they

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By PT NARA Date 4/22/05

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did not wish to discuss. After two months of this we gave them some secret counter proposals to their secret nine points. Then we published the whole thing and demanded a reply. We never heard from them for seven months after that.

Park: Last year we agreed with the North to stop all slander and abuse between us. The North at first honored this, then they started some slander over their central broadcasting. We taxed them with this and at first they said it was only a certain political party making the broadcast. But later they tried to claim that the broadcast came from a clandestine radio in South Korea. Of course we used direction finding and found out they were lying.

Ambassador Habib: What is the status of your proposal to the North?

Park: There was a Secretaries meeting at 10:00 a.m. today at Panmunjom. We propose that the next Red Cross meeting should be in Seoul. As for the co-ordinating committee, the other side has called it off, refusing

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to deal with certain members of our side. We are contacting them to find out if those talks could be restarted if there are changes of personnel on both sides.

Ambassador Habib: I have not been impressed up to now with North Korean diplomacy. The North Vietnamese are much more skillful.

Park: The North Vietnamese perhaps have adopted some elements of their style from the French. On the other hand the North Koreans are unique, and one could call it a Kim Il Sung style.

Secretary: I want you to know we will be making it increasingly costly for the third world to be freely in opposition to us. In the case of Yugoslavia we have cancelled their Foreign Minister's visit and we have cancelled other visits by Americans to them. We will make sure it is no longer free and easy to oppose the United States. I suppose that the North Koreans are probably the most difficult country in the world now. I expected that there might be a North Korean approach to us in New York but there has not been one. Of course if there is one we will tell you about it before we do anything.

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By PT NARA Date 4/22/05

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Park: Mr. Secretary, you should meet with them to get your own assessment.

Secretary: I meet with them myself?

Park: Well perhaps not necessarily.

Secretary: We will not take the initiative. If they suggest it, we will get your advice. If we were to initiate contact they would think they could deal with us, excluding you. I can assure you there will be no meetings with North Koreans that are kept secret from you.

Park: Newspapers have reported that if the Chinese make contacts with us, the United States similarly will contact North Korea.

Secretary: We thought this was your position. We have no overwhelming desire to contact the North Koreans. For instance, we are in contact with the Soviets and the Chinese for entirely cold-blooded reasons. Thus any contacts we have with the North Koreans that we jointly agree upon would be for equally cold-blooded purposes.

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

EA:AWHummel, Jr./sb 11/17/73

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## Report from the Embassy of Hungary in North Korea on Korean Unification and Sino-Korean Military Cooperation

**Date:**  
22 November 1973

**Source:**  
*XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1973, 69. doboz, 81-20, 00804/7/1973.*  
*Translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai*

### Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 22 November 1973.

Le Dong, the DRV ambassador in Pyongyang, recently had a conversation with the GDR Ambassador in Pyongyang. Considering the importance of the conversation, on November 10, at a joint shooting party, Comrade Everhartz informed [the diplomats of] the “seven” [members of the Soviet bloc] in detail.

[...]

The situation created by [the joint statement made by North and South Korea] last July 4 caused problems in the *Korean People's Army* [emphasis in the original]. Many high-ranking [military] leaders disagreed, and still disagree, with the [policy] line of peaceful unification; they see no way out other than new military action. One year later, these leaders feel that they were proven right when the dialogue [between North and South Korea] reached a crisis. In order to fully enforce the party's policy, immediately after the September plenum, 22,000 officers were called to a military *aktif* [special meeting] that discussed [these issues] for several days. Kim Il Sung's main aim was to underline the correctness of the policy hitherto pursued and to call attention to the changes, i.e., to the fact that the country faced a new situation and was at a crossroads: either it would be unified or there would be two Koreas. Kim Il Sung made a speech at the *aktif* and took a stand in favor of the line of peaceful national unification.

[...]

Although contact was established between North and South, it occurred just when *Sino-Korean military cooperation* [emphasis in the original] intensified. According to information available to the Vietnamese, many secret, high-ranking Chinese military delegations visited the DPRK and made substantial military promises during these discussions. China promised to provide the DPRK with types of military equipment that were hitherto unavailable to it. There was also some discussion that the DPRK might also receive tactical nuclear weapons in the future. The Chinese side had already provided [the DPRK] with the means to establish a defensive missile system.

[...]

János Taraba  
Acting Ambassador

**Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312**

<b>Date:</b> 26 November 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea – other states, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1514, Vol. II, Regarding the Foreign Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards Other States, Period: 06.08 – 24.12.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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01/014867/28.4.1973

Concerning the U.N. debate around the Korean issue:

1. Soviet officials from the U.N. secretariat note that the consensus is the result of an understanding between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, and that it underlines an arrangement which reflects the special attention given by the Chinese government to avoid political confrontation with the U.S.
2. According to the opinion of some U.S. press correspondents accredited at the U.N., Kissinger is said to have insisted in Peking for a compromise solution in the Korean matter. This insistence is said to have had at its root the explicit wish of the U.S. government to avoid, given present circumstances (the Middle East, the energy crisis, Watergate), any action at the U.N. which could affect in any way the position of U.S. troops in South Korea. The spokesperson for the U.S. mission has confirmed at a press meeting that the Korean issue was part of recent Sino-American negotiations.

This is also being confirmed by Kissinger's last moment decision to include South Korea in his tour.

Since the U.S. has found understanding in Peking for the issues of troop leadership and withdrawal, these correspondents consider it possible that the U.S. made concessions with respect to other issues of interest to the P.R. China and DPRK. A possible U.S. commitment to press the South Korean government so that the latter adopts a more flexible position in negotiations with DPRK is being mentioned; the possibility of a compromise arrangement on the issue of Cambodian representation in the U.N., making the object of following debates within the General Assembly, is also possible.

Signed: Ion Datcu

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.530**

<b>Date:</b> 26 November 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea – other states, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1514, Vol. II, Regarding the Foreign Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards Other States, Period: 06.08 – 24.12.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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01/014916/29.4.1973

To Direction I Relations, to Comrade Director Ion Ciubotaru

To Direction II Relations Comrade Director L. Petrescu

1. In a conversation with A. Lazăr concerning recent declarations made at the U.N. by South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yongsik, concerning the intentions of South Korea to intensify efforts towards normalization of relations with the U.S.S.R. and P.R. China, counselor V. Denisov stated that no official relations are foreseeable for the near future between his country and Seoul. He pointed out that the U.S.S.R. representative to the U.N, Dobrynin, had a meeting with the South Korean foreign minister, with the occasion of which he explained that the U.S.S.R. will not meet South Korean wishes, the economic domain included. He noted however that the meeting, regardless of the results, constituted a political contact nevertheless.

2. In support of Kim Yongsik's declaration, radio broadcasts in South Korea report that Henry Kissinger told the Chinese leadership on the occasion of his visit to Beijing that the Seoul authorities would like to establish contacts and normalize relations with the People's Republic of China.

Chinese diplomats in Pyongyang reject the possibility of having Seoul's message relayed to Beijing, but [sic!] they reject all possibilities to establish a Sino-South Korean link, irrespective of its nature.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 IO-14 EB-11

COA-02 DLOS-06 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 L-03

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 INT-08 ACDA-19 OMB-01 DPW-01

SCI-06 DRC-01 /138 W

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1339

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SEOUL 8060

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PGH 6.

JOINT EMBASSY/UNC MESSAGE

1. (S) UNC HAS BEEN REPORTING DEVELOPMENTS ALONG NORTHERN LIMIT LIN (NLL) IN DETAIL AND RECENT JOINT EMBASSY/UNC MESSAGES DESCRIBE NOV 28 EVENTS AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO DEC 1 MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING. WE BELIEVE OUR NOV 28 PROTEST AT PANMUNJOM, FLEET DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER OF UNC NAVAL FORCES, (REPORTED SEPARATELY), AND APPROACH WE TOOK IN MAC MEETING, WILL MEET FOR THE PRESENT THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION CREATED BY NORTH KOREAN APPROACHES WITHINRHAZHZT CONTIGUIOUS TO UNC CONTROLLED ISLANDS. WE ARE ADDRESSING SEPARATELY THE PROBLEM PO ED BS59\$-6'S DEMAND THAT PERMISSION BE OBTAINED FOR ACCESS TO THE FIVE ISLANDS.

2. (S) AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE SEE BASIC AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR USG CAUSED BY NORTH MOVING SOUTH

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 08060 011645Z

OF NLL IN ITS APPARENT ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH CLAIM

TO 12-MILE TERRITORIAL WATERS IN HAEJU AREA, AND W SEE  
NEED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DEFINITION OF OUR ROLE,  
PRINCIPALLY TO ROKG.

3. (S) NON-CLANDESTINE AND REGULAR PATTERN OF NLL  
CROSSINGS IN PAST MONTH AFTER 20 YEARS OF OBSERVING  
THI LINE AS WELL AS THEIR STATEMENTS TO US AT DEC 1 MAC  
MEETING INDICATE THAT NORTH IS MAKING CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO  
ASSERT ITS RIGHT TO IGNORE NLL, AND OPERATE UP TO BUT SO  
FAR NOT BEYOND 12-MILE REACH OF ITS OWN SHORES. TO DATE  
NORTH HAS MADE THESE CROSSINGS USUALLY ON A DEFINITE PATROL  
PATTERN. MOSXXXXNY XZEM MILITARY RESPONSE GUIDED BY UN COMMANDER  
USN NAVAL FORCES, WHO HAS OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF  
ROK NAVY, HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS AND RESTRAINED. WHILE  
CONTINUING REGULAR PARTOL AND SUPPLY RUNS, ROK  
DESTROYERS AND PARTOL CRAFT HAVE FOR MOST PART BEEN  
ORDERED TO OBEY STRICTLY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND  
HAVE NOT INTERFERED WITH NORTHERN CRAFT MOVEMENTS.

5. (S) ROKS HAVE TO DATE AGREED WITH OUR POSITION.  
IN DEC 1 MEETING, DEFENSE MINISTER YU TOLD ACTING  
COM USFK AND UNC NAVAL COMMANDER HE AGREED WITH ALL  
DIRECTIVES ISSUED TO DATE. WHEN UNC REJECTED MND  
YU'S SUGGESTIONS THAT "SHOULDERING TACTICS" AND PATROLS  
CLOSE TO NNL BE TRIED MINISTER YU READILY ACCEPTED  
OUR POSITION THAT THESE WOULD BE PROVOCATIVE ACTS.

6. (S) WHILE WE AND ROKS ARE OFFICIALLY IN STEP,  
SOME OF MORE ACTIVIST ARMY MEMBERS ROK/JCS STAFF AND  
THEIR SUBORDINATES HAVE WE KNOW CALLED FOR  
MORE DIRECT REACTION. IT WAS PARTLY FOR THIS REA ON  
I.E., TO COUNTER MORE STRIDENT VOICES WITHIN ROK  
MILITARY AND TO EMPHASIZE POINT THAT H HAS COMMAND  
OF ROK NAVY, THAT UNC NAVAL COMMAN  
ER I SUEDED DIRECTIVES  
ON MAINTAINING REGULAR ACTIVITY WHILE AVOIDING CONFLICT  
AND IN ONE INSTANCE INTENSIFIED PATROLLING ON SEAWARD  
SIDE IN VICINITY TWO ROK HELD ISLANDS. THROUGH THESE  
MEASURES HE HAS IN FACT MAINTAINED CONTROL OF SITUATION  
BUT PRESSURES FROM SOME ON ROK MILITARY SIDE FOR MORE  
SECRET

SECRET

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ACTIVE REACTION MAY CONTINUE.

7. (S) AS WE SEE IT, TERRITORIAL SEA PROBLEMS RAISED  
BY NLL LINE CROSSINGS AND NORTH KOREAN ATTEMPT TO  
ESTABLISH 12-MILE TERRITORIAL SEAS ARE NOT WITHIN  
PURVIEW OF UNC. UNC ROLE IS PRESERVATION OF PEACE  
IN PENINSULA AND MAINTAINING OF ARMISTICE. IN PRESENT  
SITUATION, WHAT IS HAPPENING INVOLVES A COMPLEX OF

FACTORS INVOLVING LAW OF THE SEA AND INCLUDING SUCH QUESTIONS AS TERRITORIAL WATERS, FISHERIES, (AREA BELOW NLL INCLUDES ROK FISHING GROUNDS), AND POTENTIAL SECURITY QUESTION, FROM ROK POINT OF VIEW, GIVEN PROXIMITY OF INCHON APPROACHES. HOWEVER, AS NOTED ABOVE THESE APPEAR BILATERAL MATTERS BETWEEN ROK AND NORTH, NOT A UNC RESPONSIBILITY. THESE PROBLEMS ARE DISTINCT FROM THOSE RAISED BY TODAY'S NK STATEMENT ON ACCESS TO FIVE UNC-CONTROLLED ISLANDS.

8. (S) IT IS CLEAR THAT ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE NORTH KOREAN INCURSIONS SERIOUSLY AND WISH TO INVOLVE, IN FIRST INSTANCE, THE UNC AND SECONDLY ROK NAVY UNITS UNDER OUR OPERATIONAL CONTROL. WHATEVER WE DO THERE IS ALREADY INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR INCIDENTS IF ONLY BY VIRTUE OF FACT NORTH KOREAN HAVE CHANGED THE GROUND RULES OBTAINING IN THE AREA FOR THE PAST 20 YEARS. HOWEVER, EMBASSY/UNC BELIEVE WE MUST CONTINUE TO RESIST INVOLVING THE COMMAND OR UNITS UNDER ITS CONTROL IN ANYTHING BUT ITS MISSION.

9. (S) SITUATION WE FACE IN SUMMARY IS POSITIVE, CALCULATED THROUGH BY NORTH IN AN AREA OF CONFRONTATION WHERE WE HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ROK FORCES BUT WE MAY NOT BE GUARANTEE CONTINUED CONTROL OVER ACTIONS OF OUR OWN SIDE, LET ALONE ACTIONS BY NORTH. IF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WERE BEST OF FRIENDS AND SHOOTING WERE NOT A DANGER, TWO SIDES WOULD FACE MAJOR NEGOTIATING PROBLEM IN WORKING OUT BOUNDRIES IN NLL AREA.

10. (S) ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY/UNC BELIEVE THAT IN REGARDS  
SECRET

SECRET

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TO PROBLEM OF NLL CROSSING WE SHOULD TAKE FOLLOWING POSITION WITH MOFA AND ROK MILITARY:

A.) THE UNC HAS NEITHER RESPONSIBILITY NOR AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE JURISDICTION OVER TERRITORIAL WATERS AND CANNOT BECOME INVOLVED IN QUESTIONS REGARDING TERRITORIAL WATERS, NOR NLL, WHICH HAS NO LEGAL STANDING, BEYOND TERMS OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. FORCES UNDER UNC OPERATIONAL CONTROL MAY ONLY BE USED WHERE SECURITY ROK CLEARLY INVOLVED.

B.) WE BELIEVE THAT DETERMINATION RESPECTIVE AREAS OF CONTROL IS PRIMARILY SOUTH/NORTH QUESTION THAT ROKS SHOULD PURSUE IN THEIR BILATERAL CONTACT WITH NORTH.

11. (S) ROKS MAY REACT NEGATIVELY TO THIS STATEMENT  
OF OUR POSITION AND MAY THREATEN UNILATERAL ACTION TO  
MAINTAIN NLL AND OTHER BOUNDARY LIMITS. THEY MIGHT  
DECIDE TO ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE 12-MILE LIMIT. WE  
BELIEVE ABOVE APPROACH IS ESSENTIAL. HOWEVER, IF WE  
ARE TO KEEP FROM BECOMING INVOLVED IN COMPLEX DISPUTE  
WHERE ROKS WOULD ATTEMPT TO USE US FOR THEIR AND NOT  
NECESSARILY OUR OWN INTERESTS.  
UNDERHILL

SECRET

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6473-X

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: W. R. SMYER *WRB/JS*

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Proposed WSAG Meeting on Korean Situation

I strongly believe that we need a WSAG no later than tomorrow to decide what position we should take on the North Korean demand that UNC naval and merchant ships obtain prior permission to navigate the waters contiguous to the five UNC-controlled islands off the west coast of Korea (see attached map). North Korea, which made the demand at the MAC meeting December 1, threatened unspecified actions if the UNC did not comply. The UNC representative on the MAC, U. S. Army Major General Greer, rejected the demand.

The urgency of the issue is posed by the fact that the ROK plans to proceed with its regularly scheduled weekly resupply convoy to two of the islands before the end of the week, either Thursday or Friday. (The ROK has about 1,000 forces stationed on two of the islands.) The ROK, in coordination with CINCUNC, who has operational control of all ROK forces in the event of hostilities, intends to reinforce the convoy. In the meantime, it also intends to continue the normal ROK naval patrols in the area, keeping them 10-12 miles from North Korean territory but reinforcing them. Since these questions and possible actions involve a number of agencies and interests, a WSAG offers an essential forum for hearing all views and for getting everybody on the same track.

The immediate U. S. policy issues are:

-- Whether the regular ROK resupply convoy should proceed as planned and, if so, how (including whether we should reinforce the convoy itself or make a reinforcing show of force in the area). To proceed risks a military clash, while postponing it unduly implies UNC-ROK acquiescence in the North Korean demand.



DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12808 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
 By *MM* NARA, Date *2/4/11*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS 5b(2)  
 BY AUTH Sec Kissinger

-- Whether to call for a MAC meeting before December 6 to discuss the North Korean demand, and thus to try to reduce the risk of a military confrontation.

-- Whether and how to approach the PRC and/or the Soviets on this issue.

-- How to relate this problem to the basic issue of the UNC's future status. (A principal North Korean objective in the situation may be to force early U.N. Security Council consideration of the UNC.)

Recommendation:

That a WSAG meeting be scheduled for tomorrow to consider this issue.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: The Korean Situation and the China Element

North Korea's provocative action over the islands, coming as it does within a week of conclusion of General Assembly consideration of the compromise resolution on the Korean issue, has the quality of an effort by Pyongyang to assert its case for further action against the U. N. and U. S. presence in Korea. The compromise GA resolution, worked out at Chinese initiative, was highly favorable to the ROK in that it referred neither to the future of the U. N. Command or to the U. S. troop presence in the ROK. We were totally surprised by Peking's willingness and ability to bring the North along on such a favorable compromise, and Pyongyang may now be attempting to act somewhat independently of Peking in calling attention to the remaining issues where it seeks U. N. and U. S. action, or to force Chinese and Soviet hands in support of their position in the Security Council. (The Soviets at one point late in the GA debate made noises about raising the UNC issue in the Security Council. They were probably miffed at the indications of U. S. - PRC cooperation on the compromise.)

We must assume that the Chinese were able to gain the cooperation of the North Koreans for the GA compromise precisely because they could tell Pyongyang that we had privately indicated a willingness to reconsider the future of the UNC after this session of the GA. The North, not fully trusting Peking, and wanting to keep us off balance in a situation where we clearly have the initiative (only two weeks ago you flew from Peking to Seoul), appears to want to force our hand and impart public momentum to its drive against the UNC and U. S. forces in Korea.

In these circumstances, one of our major objectives should be to keep the Chinese as fully engaged in the evolution of the Korean situation as possible. By all indications Peking has much greater influence in Pyongyang than Moscow. The Chinese undoubtedly see it in their interest to maintain

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

XGDS 5b(3)  
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
 NSC 1, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
 By WA NARA, Date 2/11/11



stability on the Korean Peninsula even as our posture there evolves. We should take advantage of Pyongyang's provocative action regarding the islands to try to invoke Peking's constraint over the North's game-playing. To the degree that Pyongyang feels that the Chinese are able to move us on the UNC issue, they have reason to continue to follow Peking's lead.

I believe that two messages to the Chinese are now in order. The first, which is intended to engage Peking with Pyongyang regarding its provocation, reiterates our intention to reconsider the future of the UNC now that the GA compromise has been concluded, but raises the prospect that such action will be impeded by any incidents which raise tensions on the Peninsula (see Tab 1). This message should be conveyed to the PRCLO as soon as possible.

A second message should be sent to the Chinese just prior to any unusual resupply move that we may make to reassert our right to access to the west coast islands. Its intent would be to inform the PRC of exactly what we were doing, in effect communicating the limits of our action (yet our determination to act) and implicitly inviting their imposition of restraint on Pyongyang. The exact text of such a message would be based on the specifics of our resupply move, and is thus difficult to draft this far in advance of any action.

Recommendation:

That you approve the message to the PRCLO at Tab 1.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
and

That you approve in principle a second message to the PRCLO, to be delivered a few hours before our resupply effort begins, indicating the extent and objective of our resupply effort.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



(Draft message for delivery to the PRC Liaison Office)

The U. S. side wishes to advise the Chinese side of its serious concern about recent provocative actions by North Korean authorities off the west coast of Korea, including unusual naval patrol activity, a heightened state of military alert, and a demand presented on December 1 which would interfere with access to five islands. As a signatory to the Korean Armistice, the Chinese side will understand that this demand is unacceptable, being in contravention of both international agreement and past practice.

These actions are all the more disturbing coming as they do less than two weeks after adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a compromise resolution on Korea abolishing the UNCURK organization. This compromise, which avoided an unnecessary confrontation between the representatives of North and South Korea and their supporters, was worked out in a spirit of accommodation by both sides. This development seemed to establish conditions for further progress in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

The U. S. side has advised the Chinese side on several occasions, most recently during Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking in November, that it would be prepared to reconsider the future of the U. N. Command before the 29th session of the U. N. General Assembly. We must state, however, that provocations by the North Korean authorities which risk military confrontation and heighten tension will seriously complicate



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By MLT NARA, Date 2/1/17

efforts by the U. S. side to consider and put into effect new arrangements affecting the security of the Korean Peninsula.

It is our understanding that normal communication and supply activities will be maintained to the five islands on their usual basis. The U. S. side hopes that no incident will be created which would alter the improved atmosphere which has been created as a result of U. N. General Assembly action on the Korean question.



**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537**

<b>Date:</b> 3 December 1973	<b>Source:</b> <i>Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Matter 220/Year: 1973/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea – other states, CLASSIFICATION: SECRET, Department I Relations, Folder 1514, Vol. II, Regarding the Foreign Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards Other States, Period: 06.08 – 24.12.1973. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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01/0152523/06.12.1973

To Direction I Relations – Comrade Ion Ciubotaru

We further inform you about the various reactions within the DPRK concerning the U.N. consensus over the Korean issue, a topic intensely debated within the diplomatic corps in Pyongyang.

As we formerly pointed out, the consensus of Committee no.1 over the Korean issue, which was received with enthusiasm in Pyongyang, as a great victory, in fact represents a practical compromise solution (as opposed to the unjustified requests during the period of preparations for the General Assembly), which the DPRK is accepting as an alternative to the South Korean project of enrolling two Koreas at the U.N. From the comments of socialist diplomats as well as of other countries, partially confirmed by the insistence with which the Korean press is justifying the position of the DPRK government, it has become apparent that some members of the Korean leadership, militaries most of all, have not fully grasped the concession made in favor of U.S. troops stationing in South Korea, an issue which remained outside the final document adopted on November 21.

On the other hand, the realist spirit in which the U.N. has solved this issue, is ignored in North-South relations. Polemics on various topics is intensifying. On the backdrop of political tensions on both sides, throughout the last days military elements have sprung, motivated by the repeated entry of DPRK ships in the territorial waters of islands recently claimed by the North (next to Haeju port in the Yellow Sea). This course of action, explained by DPRK as a means of exercising legitimate control in these territories, is seen by authorities in Seoul as the most serious incident since the 'Pueblo Case' in 1968 which triggered a state of military alert from the part of South Korea, coupled with the threat that a future similar attempt would result in retaliation.

In case DPRK aimed these actions at supporting student movements in South Korea, the result was the opposite, as the general mobilization of the army is on the verge of resulting in the forceful repression on youth movements.

We note that conversely, the authorities in Seoul used this action to pass through parliament—without objections—of the military budget for 1974.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

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FORM DS 322(OCR)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3; Add Directive 6200-30  
State Dept Guidelines; *State Dept. 12/4/03*

By WJ NARA, Date 2/4/11

EA/K:DLRANARD:LM  
12/4/73 EXT 20780  
EA: RLSNEIDER

DOD/ISA -  
L/EA - EGVERVILLE  
S/S -

JCS-J/5 -  
NSC -

FLASH

SEOUL

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: -GDS  
TAGS: MOPS, PINT, KN, KS

RLS  
DLR *[initials]*

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: KOREAN NORTHWEST COASTAL SITUATION

EGV

REF: A. SEOUL 8106  
B. CINCUNC 021532Z DEC 73

WE ARE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION IN RESPONSE TO POSITION TAKEN BY NORTH KOREA IN DECEMBER 1 MAC MEETING.

A. DIPLOMATIC-POLITICAL MEASURES.

1. YOU ARE TO INFORM ROKG THAT WE AGREE TO CALL MAC MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR REAFFIRMATION OF OUR POSITION AND REJECTION OF NORTH KOREAN CLAIMS CONCERNING ACCESS TO FIVE ISLANDS UNDER UNC CONTROL. ACCORDINGLY, YOU ARE TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO REQUEST THE MEETING IMMEDIATELY. GUIDANCE FOR POSITION WE INTEND TO TAKE NOW BEING DRAFTED AND WILL BE FURNISHED ASAP.

2. SIMULTANEOUSLY, YOU ARE TO URGE THAT THE ROK UTILIZE THE HOT LINE FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES AND, ASSUMING MAC MEETING DOES NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE DECEMBER 5 PRELIMINARY MEETING OF SNCC, YOU ARE TO RECOMMEND THAT

MILITARY ADDRESSEES ATTACHED

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ROK ALSO RAISE SUBJECT IN THAT FORUM. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND NATURE OF ROK OBJECTIONS TO UTILIZING HOT LINE, YOU SHOULD REMIND THEM THAT, CONSISTENT WITH PLEDGES IN JULY 4, 1972 COMMUNIQUE, THIS CHANNEL WAS ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH HOSTILE INCIDENTS AND TO OUR KNOWLEDGE IT HAS BEEN USED FOR RELATED OCCURRENCES SUCH AS DMZ CROSSINGS AS WELL AS FIRINGS. IN HOT LINE DISCUSSION WITH THE NORTH, WE SUGGEST ROKG POINT OUT THEIR INTENTION IS (A) NOT TO DEBATE THE ISSUE WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED IN MAC MEETING, BUT RATHER (B) TO MAKE CLEAR THE ROKG INTENDS NO PROVOCATIVE INITIATIVES AND EXPECTS NORTH TO BE SIMILARLY RESPONSIBLE, AND (C) WILL CONTINUE COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY TO THESE ISLANDS AS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE IN THE PAST. NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE IN HOT LINE CONVERSATION MAY SHED LIGHT ON THEIR MOTIVATIONS AND PROVIDE VALUABLE INFORMATION TO US CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS AND TIMING. INITIATIVES BY SOUTH TO USE THIS CHANNEL MAY ALSO PROVE USEFUL SUBSEQUENTLY IN DEVELOPING THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR ROKG IN HER EFFORTS TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE SITUATION ON PENINSULA.

3. YOU MAY ALSO INFORM PRESIDENT PARK IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT WE INTEND TO APPROACH THE PRC AND SOVIETS, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, TO INFORM THEM WE HAVE NOTED THE INCREASED NORTH KOREAN PATROLS NEAR THESE ISLANDS AND THE UNPRECEDENTED CLAIM MADE AT THE RECENT MAC MEETING. WE CAN NOT ACCEPT THIS NORTH KOREAN INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND INTEND TO PROTECT UNC LONG-STANDING RIGHTS under the agreement to these ISLANDS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE INTEND STRESS COMMON INTEREST IN AVOIDING PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AND POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION. GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS CHANNEL, WE EXPECT ROKG TO HOLD ESPECIALLY CLOSE OUR INTENTIONS TO MAKE THESE APPROACHES.

4. WE INTEND TO BRIEF THE JAPANESE CONCERNING ACTIONS WE PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH EXCEPTION OF APPROACH TO USSR AND PRC AND MAY DO SO SIMILARLY WITH OTHER POWERS WHO HAVE CLOSE INVOLVEMENT WITH KOREAN QUESTION.

B. MILITARY ACTION. WE CONCUR IN BASIC POSTURE AND GENERAL GUIDANCE SET FORTH IN REFTEL B. FOLLOWING IS MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:

1. IT IS OUR GENERAL POSTURE THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WISH TO SEE OR PROVOKE MILITARY INCIDENTS OVER THESE ISSUES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT INTEND TO ACCEPT INTERFERENCE WITH ESTABLISHED RIGHTS under the agreement to THESE ISLANDS.

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1. Organization and Purpose

Mr. Smyser opened the meeting with the explanation that the meeting had been called in order to formulate a consensus on what our policy should be in regard to North Korea's demands. If there was no agreement on what we should do, the issues would be clarified and justified and then forwarded for decision at a higher level. Mr. Smyser expressed the hope that two papers would emerge from the meeting: (1) a memorandum to Secretary Kissinger defining the issues and options; and (2) a cable to Embassy Seoul, giving our views of the situation and what steps ought to be taken. Mr. Smyser also identified five issues to be addressed: (1) how to proceed with the regular supply convoys; (2) how to talk to the North Koreans (through the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) or "hot-line"); (3) how to tell the Soviets and Chinese of our concern; (4) how the situation relates to the UN Command (UNC); and (5) what do we do about the Japanese and the Congress.

2. CIA View of the Current Situation

Mr. Graham gave a brief run-down on the current situation, adding little to what was already known. The ferry that was scheduled to leave for one of the islands today turned back because of bad weather. The North Korean Navy continues to patrol along what is termed the Northern Limit Line. North Korean Army units appear to be on alert, and there is some evidence that reserve forces are also on alert, but this is uncertain. The joint service exercises have not begun. This is only the second time that this has not happened, and there is no clear explanation for this. On the political front, the North Koreans have made no further claims beyond jurisdiction over the islands. The South Koreans still plan to resupply the islands. Their naval units are to escort the supply convoys and have orders to fire only if fired upon. There are no installations on any of the islands, and no US personnel.



It was Mr. Graham's opinion that North Korea's reasons for provoking the issue at this time are basically threefold: (1) a method to get the UNC phased out; (2) to unsettle the ROK; and (3) to weaken South Korea's confidence in the US at the time when the Korean question is about to come up before the United Nations. Mr. Graham explained that this assessment is only conjecture, but that the timing in relation to the UN is just too close to be coincidental.

3. Status of the South Korean Ships

Mr. Froebe reported from a just-concluded telephone conversation with the UN Command that a ferry is scheduled to depart at 0900 (Seoul time) on

December 5. It will not be escorted. Three ROK vessels will be maneuvering off the coast. The ROK Air Force is also on strip alert. The departure of the next re-supply convoy to Paengnyong-do is uncertain; cover plans are now being developed.

4. The Military Situation

Colonel Adams of Defense reported that there is a heavy concentration of North Korean troops near Saigon-ni conducting exercises. Traditionally, these exercises maneuver from the west toward the east. Defense is currently working up the North Korean order of battle in the area, and will have a rundown by the afternoon of 4 December. No US vessels are in the area.

5. The Legal Situation

Mrs. Verville of State reported that it is State's preliminary view that North Korea's claim that the five islands fall within its territorial waters is not/<sup>legally</sup>valid. Under Article 15 of the Armistice Agreement, North Korean jurisdiction over contiguous waters applies only to the mainland--not the islands. State prefers not to get into the argument over territorial waters as this opens a whole Pandora's Box of issues. State will draw up a text to be used as legal justification.

6. Discussion of the Actions to be Taken

A lengthy discussion followed regarding what actions the US might take in response to North Korea's "challenge" and what North Korea and the ROK might do in response to the actions discussed. There was no agreement as to whether North Korea will or will not attempt to seize the ferry boat on the morning of December 5. There are strong arguments that the North Koreans want an incident and thus will try something, and strong arguments that Pyongyang will do nothing. A discussion of whether it would be in our interest to escalate the matter ended with the agreement that it would not be at this time. There was considerable discussion over the advisability of requesting that the ferry postpone its voyage on the 5th of December; it was decided to leave the decision to Secretary Kissinger. It was Ambassador Habib's view that nothing could be done since the ship was due to leave in less than eight hours and the South Koreans probably would not accede to our request, anyway.

On the diplomatic questions, there was a great deal of discussion on whether to inform the Soviet Union and Peking of our concern, whether we should urge the ROK to communicate it's concerns to Pyongyang over

the "hot-line", and whether a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) should be called. It was decided that Moscow and Peking should be informed of our concern, but in a low-key manner. Embassy Seoul would be instructed to urge South Korea to open <sup>the</sup> "hot-line".

7. Informing our Allies and Congress

It was decided that State would inform the Japanese of our concern over the situation and what we are doing to prevent an incident. It was also decided that the leaders of Congress should be told immediately of the gravity of the situation. The method for informing the leaders is to be determined later. Congressional leaders will be informed of our demarches to the Russians and Chinese on an "if asked only" basis.

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 OMB-01 COA-02 CG-00 FMC-04

NOTE-00 INT-08 NSF-04 JUSE-00 /110 W

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1612

JCS IMMEDIATE

INFO CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

CINCUNC IMMEDIATE

CNFK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SEOUL 8450

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR, MARR, KS, KN

SUBJECT: NEXT QUESTION REGARDING NORTHERN LIMIT LINE

JOINT EMBASSY/UNC

SUMMARY: TO DATE PRECAUTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST  
AND RESPONSES DEVISED TO MEET POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS  
TO DISRUPT ROK SUPPORT OF THE FIVE UN CONTROLLED ISLANDS.  
WE ANTICIPATE HOWEVER CONTINUED AND VERY POSSIBLY MORE INTENSE

AND WIDESPREAD NORTH KOREAN NAVAL ACTIVITY IN COASTAL WATERS.  
WE BELIEVE WE MUST DEVELOP FURTHER CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO  
DEAL WITH THE BROAD QUESTION OF HOW WE OPERATE WITHIN NORTH  
KOREAN CLAIMED TERRITORIAL WATERS. END SUMMARY.

1. ORIGINAL EXCURSIONS ACROSS THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE BY  
NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT IN LATE OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER WERE  
BRIEF, SHORT RANGE PROBES WHICH DID NOT PENETRATE THE THREE

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MILE LIMIT OF THE FIVE ISLANDS. IN COURSE OF NOVEMBER,

HOWEVER, A PATTERN OF FREQUENT, DEEPER, AND LONGER LASTING PENETRATIONS BEGAN TO DEVELOP WITH OCCASIONAL PENETRATIONS OF THREE MILE BOUNDARY AROUND ISLANDS. WHILE THEY HAVE NOT PROCEEDED BEYOND THE 12 MILE LIMIT AND RANGE OF THEIR OWN SHORE BATTERIES IN AREA SOUTH OF HAEJU, NORTH KOREANS ALSO HAVE XNGUN SENDING PATROLS OUT PAST 12 MILES IN AREAS NORTH WEST OF THE THREE ISLAND GROUP HEADED BY PAENGYANG DO. THEIR PATROL CRAFT HAVE ALSO IN PAST TWO WEEKS ACTED MORE PROVOCATIVELY IN VICINITY SOUTH KOREAN VESSELS, AND INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN NARROWLY AVOIDED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

2. IT SEEMS APPARENT FROM ANALYSIS OF THEIR OPERATIONS AS WELL AS FROM WHAT THEY SAID AT LAST MAC MEETING THAT NORTH HAS BEEN WAGCNG STEP BY STEP CAMPAIGN TO ESTABLISH RIGHT NOT ONLY TO OPERATE FREELY THEMSELVES BUT TO RESTRICT ROK OPERATIONS WITHIN 12 MILES OF NORTHERN SHORES. THEIR DEEPER MOTIVATIONS ARE LESS CLEAR BUT WE BELIEVE THEY PROBABLY INCLUDE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING: 1) ESTABLISHMENT OF A BASIS FOR A FUTURE CLAIM TO THE UN CONTROLLED ISLANDS:

2) PROVOCATION OF SOUTH KOREAN INITIATED INCIDENT WITHIN NORTH KOREAN CLAIMED WATERS WHEREIN ROKS WOULD BE DISCREDITED;

3) ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUNDS IN ANY EVENTUAL RENEGOTIATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT MORE TO NORTH'S ADVANTAGE : 4) DEVELOPMENT OF ISLANDS AND NEIGHBORING SEAS AS BERLIN TYPE PRESSURE POINT WHERE NORTH COULD ENGENDER DIFFICULTIES FOR ROKG AND POSSIBLY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ROKS AND OURSELVES.

3. EXTRAPOLATING FROM CURRENT PATTERN NK OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE MOTIVES OUTLINED, WE FORESEE CONTINUED AND VERY POSSIBLY MORE WIDESPREAD NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITY IN THE COASTAL WATERS AROUND THE UN CONTROLLED ISLANDS IN THE YELLOW SEA, AND EVEN POSSIBLY IN SOUTH KOREAN EAST COAST WATERS. THEY COULD ALSO EXPAND PATROL ACTIVITY BEYOND 12 MILE LIMIT INTO THE MERCHANT SHIPPING APPROACHES TO INCHON. WHEREAS NORTH HAS SO FAR REFRAINED FROM CLOSE IN HARASRZMENT, SHOOTING, OR BOARDING ATTEMPTS, WE CANNOT RULE OUT SUCH ACTION AT SOME TIME NOT ONLY AGAINST FERRIES, ISLAND SUPPLY BOATS, AND ROKN VESSELS BUT AGAINST FISHING OR

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OTHER COMMERCIAL VESSELS WHICH MIGHT ENTER THEIR CLAIMED WATERS. MUCH LESS LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS A RAID ON UN CONTROLLED ISLANDS DESPITE INSISTENCE OF SOME IN ROKG ON THIS.

4. AS ALREADY REPORTED, WE HAVE TAKEN PRECAUTIONS AND HAVE PLANNED LEVEL OF RESPONSES TO SUPPORT ISLANDS. HOWEVER

GIVEN PROBABILITY OF CONTINUING ANDHVVEN POSSIBLY MORE

WIDESPREAD NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITY, WE MUST CONSIDER OTHER CONTINGENCIES.

5. AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES AWARE PRIOR TO DEVELOPMENT PRESENT NLL SITUATION ROKS OPERATED BOTH MILITARY AND NON MILITARY VESSELS WITH IMPUNITY INSIDE CLAIMED 12 MILE LIMIT AND UP TO NLL. OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT ACCEPT IN ANY FASHION NORTH KOREAN CLAIMS ENCOMPASSING WATER AREAS AROUND UNC ISLANDS. WE MUST MAINTAIN ACCESS AND PATROL ROUTES TO OUR ISLANDS WHATEVER NORTH

KOREANS DEMAND. HOWEVER QUESTION IS TO WHAT EXTENT UNC SHOULD BE INVOLVED INSIDE NORTH KOREAN 12 MILE LIMIT WHEN NOT OPERATING IN DIRE

SUPPORT OF UNC CONTROLLED ISLANDS OR WITHIN OBVIOUS ACCESS ROUTES. WOULD NOTE THAT ROKG WILL PROBABLY REACT NEGATIVELY TO ANY CHANGES IN EXISTING PATTERNS.

6. BEFORE WE CAN REALISTICALLY ADDRESS THESE ONGOING PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH NORTHWEST COUCTAL PROBLEMS, WE NEED WASHINGTON AGENCIES VIEWS ON FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. WHAT SHOULD UNC POLICY BE RE NORTH KOREAN CLAIMED 12 MILE LIMIT IN AREAS WHERE IT DOES NOT RELATE TO ACCESS TO ISLANDS OR CONFLICTING ROK TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIM?

B. WHAT SHALL OUR POLICY BE ON CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF NLL AS PATROL LIMIT LINE WHERE IT OVERLAPS WITH NORTH KOREAN CLAIMED 12 MILE LIMIT, IN AREAS NOT RELATED TO ACCESS TO UNC CONTROLLED ISLANDS, (I.E. AREAS SOUTHWEST OF HAEJU.)

C. WHAT SHOULD OUR POSITION BE WITH REGARD TO TERRITORIAL WATERS

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PAGE 04 SEOUL 08450 151207Z

SURROUNDING 5 UNC CONTROLLED ISLANDS. WE ARE CLAIMING A THREE MILE LIMIT AS CONTIGUOUS WATERS UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

7. REQUEST WASHINGTON GUIDANCE AND WASHINGTON VIEWS ON QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 6 ABOVE. UNDERHILL

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L/EA - MISS VERVILLE:DPW  
12/21/73 EXT. 23039

L/EA - MR. LETTZELL

JCS - COL. ADAMS

S/S -

ROK IMMEDIATE SEUL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3; DoD Directive 5200.31  
State Dept Guidelines; *State Dept. ext 12/4/03*  
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *2/4/11*

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: P80R, MARR, KS, KN  
SUBJ: QUESTIONS REGARDING NORTHERN LIMIT LINE  
REF: {A} SEUL 8450; ~~{B} SEUL 8512~~; {C} SEUL 8574  
{D} SEUL 8575

RLS 7  
EV 20  
DLR 3  
TL 2  
NSC  
RV 2  
REA 2  
S/S

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 6 REFTEL A, AND IN CONNECTION WITH MAC MEETING, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP WELL IN MIND DISTINCTION BETWEEN ISSUES OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS (I.E., QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS AND RELATED LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES) AND QUESTIONS OF RIGHTS UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS SUGGESTED BY EMBASSY, THAT IT IS HIGHLY PREFERABLE TO LIMIT US/UNC POSITIONS TO INTERPRETATIONS AND ~~THE~~ OF AND ASSERTION OF RIGHTS UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND TO AVOID UNNECESSARY AND POSSIBLY PROVOCATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. IN THIS REGARD, CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO AVOID BASING OUR POSITION ON SUPPORT OF ROK CLAIMS TO OR RIGHTS IN "TERRITORIAL SEA" OR "TERRITORIAL WATERS" AROUND ISLANDS WHICH TERMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW CONNOTE SOVEREIGNTY AND RAISE COMPLEX LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES. INSTEAD OUR ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE CAST IN TERMS OF UNC RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 23 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF MILITARY CONTROL OVER ISLANDS AND TO DPRK OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 25 TO RESPECT THE "WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO" THE ISLANDS. LIMIT

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OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" AROUND THE ISLANDS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE LIMIT OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF THE COAST OF THE ROK AND WHERE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF ISLANDS OVERLAPS THOSE OFF THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA, A MEDIAN LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN SINCE THAT IS THE USUAL METHOD OF DELIMITING MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN OPPOSIT OR ADJACENT STATES.

2. THIS APPROACH, WITH BACKGROUND AND MORE DETAIL, GEARED TO ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY DPRK, WOULD BE OUTLINED AS FOLLOWS:

{A} WE REJECT THE DPRK'S ASSERTION THAT PARAGRAPH 13 {B} OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHES PAENGYONG-DO, TRECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO AND U-DO AS WITHIN DPRK COASTAL WATERS. PARAGRAPH 13 {B} DOES NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF "TERRITORIAL WATERS". THE ONLY REFERENCE TO WATERS IN PARAGRAPH 13 {B} IS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES OF BOTH SIDES FROM "THE COASTAL ISLANDS AND WATERS OF KOREA OF THE OTHER SIDE". THERE IS NO ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE SUCH "COASTAL" WATERS OR TO REFER TO THEM FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY LINE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 13 {B} SERVES ONLY AS A CONVENIENT MEANS OF DESCRIBING WHICH ISLANDS ARE UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF WHICH SIDE, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO DIVIDE WATERS. THIS LIMITED PURPOSE OF THE LINE IS MADE CLEAR IN THE TEXT OF MAP 3, VOLUME 2 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, WHICH INDICATES THAT THE SEAWARD EXTENSION OF THE PROVINCIAL LINE DRAWN ON THE MAP IS SOLELY TO INDICATE THE CONTROL OF COASTAL ISLANDS ON THE WEST COAST OF KOREA. THIS LINE HAS NO OTHER SIGNIFICANCE AND NONE SHALL BE ATTACHED THERETO." THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF PARAGRAPH 13 {B} TO THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS, OF COURSE, THE FACT THAT IT SPECIFICALLY PLACE THE ABOVE ISLANDS UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF CINCUNC.

{B} PARAGRAPH 13 {B} WHICH PLACES THE ISLANDS UNDER UNITED STATES NATIONS COMMAND "MILITARY CONTROL" MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH REQUIRES THE NAVAL FORCES OF BOTH SIDES TO "RESPECT THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND TO THE LAND AREA OF KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OTHER SIDE." IT SEEMS CLEAR, CONTRARY TO THE

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ASSERTIONS OF THE KPA, THAT THE TERM "LAND AREA OF KOREA" AS USED IN ARTICLE 15 INCLUDES OFFSHORE ISLANDS AS WELL AS THE MAINLAND. ABSENT SOME SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING TO THE CONTRARY, WHICH THE KPA DOES NOT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE ASSERT, THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE TERM "LAND AREA" WOULD NOT APPEAR MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE TERM "COAST", WHICH FOR PURPOSES OF DEFINING MARITIME JURISDICTION WOULD INCLUDE ISLANDS AS WELL AS MAINLAND TERRITORY. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PERTINENT CONVENTIONS, (1958 CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, 1958 CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF), ISLANDS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING THE BOUNDARY OF A COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE, AS WELL AS THE BOUNDARY OF ITS CONTINENTAL SHELF. ALSO, ISLANDS FAR OFFSHORE HAVE THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE.

(C) THE DPRK IS, THEREFORE, OBLIGATED UNDER PARAGRAPH 15 TO RESPECT THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE ABOVE-NAMED ISLANDS. IF SINCE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY FORMULA FOR RESOLUTION OF THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE OVERLAPPING CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF THE TWO SIDES, SUCH RESOLUTION MUST BE FOUND BY REFERENCE TO GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW USED IN THE DRAWING OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES. SUCH PRINCIPLES DICTATE THE DRAWING OF A MEDIAN LINE EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN THE COAST (INCLUDING NORTH KOREAN ISLANDS) AND THE ISLANDS. THIS PRINCIPLE OF EQUIDISTANCE HAS SERVED AS THE BASIS UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN THE ABOVE-NAMED CONVENTIONS TO DETERMINE VIRTUALLY ALL MARITIME BOUNDARIES SUCH AS THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BETWEEN BOTH OPPOSITE AND ADJACENT STATES.

OF COURSE, NO DEFINITION OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" IS GIVEN IN ARTICLE 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECORDS AND INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US HERE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WE HAVE IN FACT A "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT OF TWELVE MILES OFF THE KOREAN COAST AS CLAIMED BY NORTH KOREA (EXCEPT WHERE ISLANDS OR CONFLICTING ROK TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JSAO JOINT SEA AIR PATROLS, ROK LIKEWISE PATROLS OUT TO AT LEAST TWELVE MILES FROM ITS COAST FOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PURPOSES.

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UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD APPEAR DIFFICULT TO CLAIM OTHER THAN TWELVE MILES "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT FOR ISLANDS UNDER ARTICLE 15. [THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE LIMIT SOLELY FOR PURPOSES OF DEFINITION OF "CONTIGUOUS" IN ARTICLE 15 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND HENCE FOR DEFINITION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTIES UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, AND WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO IMPLICATION IN TERMS OF TERRITORIAL SEA QUESTION OR CLAIMS.] IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION OF REFERENCE IN PARA 6 [C] REF A THAT UNC/ROK HAVE CLAIMED THREE MILE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT FOR ISLANDS.

4. FOLLOWING ABOVE APPROACH AND ARGUMENT, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED PARA 6 REF [A] ARE AS FOLLOWS:

[A] THE U.S. DOES NOT RECOGNIZE TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIMS BEYOND THREE MILES AND PROTESTS SUCH CLAIMS. CONSEQUENTLY WE SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE NORTH KOREAN CLAIMED TWELVE MILE TERRITORIAL SEA LIMIT. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO RESPECT DPRK CLAIMED TWELVE MILE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT IN AREAS WHERE IT DOES NOT RELATE TO ACCESS TO ISLANDS AND WHERE ROK TERRITORIAL WATERS DO NOT OVERLAP IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT RULES AND AUTHORITIES ISSUED TO U.S. FORCES.

[B] AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, NLL IS UNILATERAL LINE AND IS NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZED BY NORTH KOREA AS A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN THE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF THE ISLANDS AND THOSE OF THE NORTH KOREAN COAST FOR PURPOSES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON THIS ASSUMPTION WE BELIEVE PATROL LIMIT LINE SHOULD REFLECT MEDIAN LINE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE RATHER THAN NLL.

[C] THE UNC SHOULD TAKE NO POSITION AS TO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMS OF EITHER NORTH KOREA OR THE ROK. WITH RESPECT TO UNC CLAIMS REGARDING "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" UNDER ARTICLE 15, SEE PARA 3 ABOVE.

5. ABOVE GUIDANCE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREPARED PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF REFS B<sup>AND</sup> C, [AND D.] [WE CONCUR IN ARGUMENTS OUTLINED REF B FOR PRESENTATION BY SENIOR UNC COMMANDER.] OUR COMMENTS ON ROK MEMORANDUM AND NLL FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

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W/ KAK 10a

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

December 22, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT: Korean West Coast Island Situation

At Tabs A and B are draft joint State-Defense cables to Embassy Seoul giving guidance for the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting tentatively scheduled for December 24 and comments on the ROK's proposed memorandum to be circulated to all diplomatic missions in Seoul explaining the South Korean position on the west coast island situation.

at Tab A

-- The proposed guidance for the MAC meeting/-- which will be the first full MAC meeting since that on December 1, in which the North Koreans attempted to restrict access to the UNC-controlled islands on the basis of claimed territorial waters -- would have our UNC representative avoid the conflicting territorial waters claim of the two Koreas. Rather, he would base our rejection of the North Korean demand on our rights of access to the islands as conferred by the Armistice Agreement. He would also not make a legal defense of the Northern Limit Line (see map at Tab C), which the UNC declared unilaterally in the mid-1950s but which North Korean naval patrols began penetrating in late October. Rather, to solve the question of overlap between the "contiguous waters" (the term used in the Agreement) of the islands and those of North Korea we would use a median line, which is the customary solution under international law.

I have no objection to the legal case proposed in the cable, but would propose deleting the second sentence of paragraph 5, and reword the preceding sentence to eliminate reference to reference B. I disagree with the draft cable's assertion that the talking points contained in reference B which were used with the ROKs are appropriate for our UNC representative's use in the MAC meeting.

-- The proposed comments on the ROK memorandum defending its position on the island situation (Tab B) are aimed at bringing the ROK memorandum in line with the legal position proposed in Tab A -- that we not attempt to defend the legality of the Northern Limit Line. We would

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 230006, State Dept, Guidelines, State v. -w 12/11/03

By *JAF* NARA, Date *2/11/11*



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GDS

inform the ROK that we believe that the U. S. and ROK must take consistent positions on the legal aspects of the island issue. I have no objection to this draft cable.

Recommendation:

That you approve the draft State-Defense cables at Tab A (as amended) and Tab B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



