

Central Intelligence Agency  
Directorate of Intelligence  
January 1974

THE WEST COAST KOREAN ISLANDS

1. In recent months North Korea has begun what appears to be a deliberate series of provocations against South Korea in the offshore waters northwest of the port of Inch'on. Since late October 1973, North Korean naval craft have established a patrol pattern that threatens access to five island groups claimed by South Korea and occupied by South Korean civilian and military personnel.\* The provocations have thus far been minor in nature -- high speed approaches by North Korean patrol boats toward South Korean vessels and intrusions within the 3-mile-limit of South Korean islands. Neither side has yet fired on the other.

2. The purpose of these North Korean actions surfaced at the 1 December 1973 meeting of the Military Armistice Commission when North Korea claimed the waters surrounding each of the five island groups -- Paengnyong Do, Taech'ong Do, Soch'ong Do, Yonp'yong Do, and U Do -- as part of its territorial seas (Map 1). P'yongyang demanded that prior permission be obtained for even civilian vessels to transit these waters and land at the islands. Although the United Nations Command (UNC) has not taken a position on the relative merits of the territorial waters claims, it has specifically upheld the right of free access to these islands.

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\* The island groups lie only 2 to 13 miles from the North Korean mainland, and one of the islands is within 1.3 miles of a North Korean island (Map 1). (All distances are stated in nautical miles.) Further information concerning these island groups is contained in the Appendix.

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Comments and questions may be directed to [REDACTED] of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, Code 143, Extension 3057.

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3. When the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, the five island groups were occupied by United Nations forces. Although much closer to North Korean territory than to South Korea, they were specifically retained under UN military control by the provisions of the Armistice. South Korean military forces still are maintained on all island groups and civilians live on four of them;

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The Armistice Agreement also states that forces of both sides are to "respect the waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the other side." Contiguous waters, however, are not defined.

The Northern Limit Line and Hypothetical Maritime Jurisdiction (Map 1)

4. A major complication in the dispute is the Northern Limit Line (NLL), established in a 14 January 1965 order of the Commander Naval Forces, Korea (COMNAVFORKOREA), and drawn between the five island groups and the "hostile waters" considered to be under North Korean control.\* A clear antecedent of this line, although not under the same name, was established in 1961 by the same commander. The sole purpose of the NLL was to avoid incidents by forbidding UNC naval units to sail north of it without special permission; in at least two places, however, it crosses waters presumed to be under uncontested North Korean sovereignty.

5. The South Koreans have regarded the NLL as a seaward extension of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and a *de facto* boundary between South and North Korea. The NLL, however, has no legal basis in international law, nor does it conform along some of its length to even minimal provisions regarding the division of territorial waters. It is binding only on those military forces under the command or operational control of COMNAVFORKOREA.

\* COMNAVFORKOREA, a US Flag Officer, is Navy Component Commander of the UNC and has operational control over the Republic of Korea (ROK) Fleet. Seizures of South Korean fishing vessels off the east coast of Korea in the late 1950's probably prompted the COMNAVFORKOREA to institute the NLL.

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No evidence exists that the North Koreans have ever formally recognized the NLL. South Korea maintains that the North has respected the NLL since the Armistice in 1953, although no documentation can be found to indicate that the NLL was established prior to 1960.

6. The Armistice makes no provision for the delimitation of territorial seas, but Line A-B, drawn in and seaward from the Han Estuary, was used to indicate respective military control of the coastal islands (Map 1). With the exception of the aforementioned five island groups, all islands lying north and west of Line A-B were placed under the "military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers." All islands lying south of this line were retained under the military control of the CINCUNC.

7. Although the NLL and Line A-B have some immediate importance, the major problems are posed by the territorial waters claims of each nation. The situation is complicated by the vagueness of North and South Korean methods of delimiting their respective territorial seas. Map 1 shows North Korea's 12-mile territorial sea based on a straight baseline constructed along the coast and off-lying North Korean-controlled islands. South Korea's 3-mile territorial sea is similarly depicted.\*

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\* All baselines and territorial seas limits shown on the maps are hypothetical. They have been constructed, using accepted techniques of international law, in such a way as to maximize the probable claims of both nations.

Inland waters, landward from the baseline, are those over which a nation exercises the complete sovereignty it exercises over its land territory. Territorial waters or seas -- regardless of whether they are measured 3 miles, 12 miles, or some other distance seaward from a baseline -- form territory over which a nation has exclusive sovereignty conditioned only by innocent passage, the right of foreign vessels -- merchantmen and possibly warships in time of peace -- to pass through a nation's territorial seas. The enjoyment of this right may depend on the observance of special navigation, customs, quarantine, and other regulations promulgated by the coastal nation.

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8. The areas of potentially conflicting claims are obvious latent zones of conflict. All five island groups lie within North Korea's claimed territorial sea. In the absence of any bilateral agreement, legal as well as *de facto* rights of access to the islands remain unsettled. South Korea's assumed 3-mile limit poses somewhat different potentials for overlapping claims. As depicted on the map, it lies within probable North Korean inland waters (where P'yongyang's sovereignty is complete) in two places -- to the northeast of the western island groups and to the north of the eastern island groups. Although the overlap is small northeast of Paenggyong Do, the South Korean position is to enforce its rights up to the 3-mile limit. North of Yonp'yong Do there is a greater overlap. This is a particularly sensitive area because of North Korea's desire for unimpeded access to its expanding port of Haeju.

Hypothetical Median Line (Map 2)

9. A possible method of delimiting disputed Korean west coast territorial seas is the construction of a median line. Map 2 shows a median line based on *de facto* sovereignty and drawn in general conformity with prevailing international law and practice, equidistant between the North Korean coast (including islands) and the island groups under UN military control. The southward extension of this median line into the high seas would normally be used only to allocate areas on the continental shelf for resource exploitation. Solution of the territorial waters dispute by use of a median line would both assure preservation of South Korean access to the five island groups and enhance access from the high seas to the North Korean port of Haeju.

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## APPENDIX

## UN-CONTROLLED WEST COAST ISLANDS

<u>Island Group</u>	<u>Number of Islands and Islets</u>	<u>Civilian Population*</u>	<u>Economic Activities</u>
Paengnyong Do	16	12,000	Agriculture, fishing, and salt extraction
Taech'ong Do	10	2,600	Agriculture and fishing
Soch'ong Do	7	1,000	Agriculture and fishing
Yonp'yong Do	17	2,000	Agriculture and fishing
U Do	3	none	Entirely military

\* Regular military forces are located on all island groups except Taech'ong Do and Soch'ong Do. The Homeland Defense Force, the closest South Korean equivalent to the National Guard, is stationed on all island groups except U Do. About 2,000 military personnel, including Homeland Defense Forces, are stationed on the five island groups.

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## Conversation between Comrade V. V. Samoilov and Comrade Stark

**Date:**

9 January 1974

**Source:**

*PolA, MfAA, C 6854. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer*

GDR Embassy to the DPRK  
- Political Department -  
Pyongyang, 9 January 1974

### Note

about a Conversation between  
Comrade V. V. Samoilov, 2<sup>nd</sup> Secretary of the USSR Embassy, and Comrade Stark on 4 January 1974

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Colleague Uta Robitz participated in this meeting as interpreter.

During the course of the conversation, Comrade Samoilov mentioned discussions in the diplomatic corps that Kim Il Sung is said to have visited the PRC about a month ago. So far those rumors are not yet confirmed.

Furthermore, Comrade Samoilov informed us about the upcoming visit by Comrade Im Jeph-ju, Secretary of the DPRK Central People's Committee, to the USSR. As the Soviet Embassy has only insufficient data about Comrade Im Jeon-ju, he asked for according information from our embassy.

Comrade Samoilov then extensively reported about the development of economic relations between the DPRK and the PR China. He disclosed that those relations continuously expanded in recent years. Trade exchanges have increased significantly. In the DPRK's foreign trade volume the PRC ranks second behind the USSR. China's share of the DPRK's trade volume amounts to 20 percent. In contrast, the Soviet Union's is at 45 percent. For 1973, the DPRK and the PRC have agreed on a plan to exchange goods in the amount of 800 million Swiss francs. He noted how over the last two to three years trade exchanges between DPRK and PRC were continuously increasing, which is mostly due to the stabilization of the domestic situation in China. Goods imported from China are of utmost importance to the DPRK as they contain such important items like oil, aluminum, soy, cotton, and manganese ores. Despite these facts, the DPRK has basically ceased its exports of non-ferrous metals to the PRC since it sells those mainly to Western European capitalist states. Due to such non-deliveries of non-ferrous metals the DPRK has racked up a debt of about 200 million rubles toward China. This tendency of growing debts towards the PRC continues to increase, which is of high political relevance.

Apparently it was agreed, during the recent stay of the Chinese Foreign Minister in the DPRK, that the DPRK would repay those debts at a later stage.

The Comecon states used to have, for a long time, a share of 85 percent in trade with the DPRK. By 1972, however, this share has fallen to 60 percent. Some reasons behind this development are as outlined below.

Trade with Western European countries, Japan, and China is growing. For instance, in 1972 trade between the DPRK and Japan reached a volume of 150 million U.S. Dollars, what is twice the amount of the 1971 volume. In 1972, DPRK exports and imports grew by 13.3 percent.

Trade between PRC and DPRK in Millions of Ruble:

	1971	1972	1973 (plan)
Aggregate trade volume	160	174.8	194
Exports	100	84.6	97
Imports	60	90.2	97

According to the bilateral trade agreement, the following exports were shipped to the DPRK by the PR China in 1973:

Coal	2 million tons
Coke	100,000 tons
Crude Oil	300,000 tons
Oil Products	300,000 tons
Manganese Ores	203,000 tons
Ferro-Manganese Ores	3,000 tons
Tracks	40,000 tons
Soy	100,000 tons
Salt	100,000 tons
Tin	1,000 tons

According to the plan, the following goods were exported by the DPRK to China in 1973:

Metal Cutters	3,000 pieces
Iron Ores	1,150,000 tons
Rice	6,000 tons
Lead	6,000 tons
Magnetite Clinker	100,000 tons
Cement	150,000 tons
Cast Iron	60,000 tons
Special Steels	80,000 tons
Apples	10,000 tons
Ginseng	30 tons
Transformers	80,000 KW/A
Electric Engines	60,000 KW
Various Tools	1,2 Million Ruble

The PRC has aided the DPRK in the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Scandinavian states. Furthermore, the PRC is said to actively support the establishment of economic and political relations between the DPRK and Japan.

In addition, Comrade Samoilov informed us that Soviet comrades have noticed some specialists from West Germany staying in the DPRK to build power plants. Two energy cascades were already started up and the construction of four additional plants is planned. Those electrical power plants are supposedly in Northern DPRK. Comrade Samoilov promised to provide more detailed information on this issue at a later occasion.

[Signed Stark]  
2<sup>nd</sup> Secretary

CC:

1x Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Far East, Section Korea  
1x Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Information  
1x Embassy, Political Division  
1x Embassy, Trade Division

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 OMB-01 AID-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2155

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

CINCPAC

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, KS, KN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ANTICIPATES INCREASE IN NORTH KOREAN  
PROVOCATIONS

1. BLUE HOUSE SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE DISCLOSED GIST OF PRESIDENT PARK'S REMARKS JANUARY 21 AT ANNUAL MEETING OF MILITARY AND SECURITY OFFICIALS AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS. IN APPEALING FOR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY, PRESIDENT REPORTEDLY WARNED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS LIKELY TO INCREASE PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTH IN COMING YEAR TO A LEVEL APPROACHING 1968 PEAK. THAT WAS YEAR OF BLUE HOUSE RAID, PUEBLO INCIDENT, AND COMMANDO LANDING ON EAST COAST. PRESIDENT BASED HIS PREDICTION ON "VARIOUS SIGNS" AND ON TREND OF EVENTS IN NORTH KOREA AND INTERNATIONALLY. HE DREW LESSONS FROM THE PAST THAT LAXNESS COULD LEAD TO DISASTER.

2. ANNUAL MEETING IS DESIGNED TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY. THIS YEAR IT WAS HELD JAN 21, WHICH IS ANNIVERSARY OF BLUE HOUSE RAID.

3. COMMENT: WHILE TALK ABOUT THREAT FROM THE NORTH IS NATURAL FOR SUCH OCCASIONS, PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATE OF  
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SOUTH-NORTH RELATIONS WAS CLEARLY PESSIMISTIC. PESSIMISTIC NOTE

UNDOUBTEDLY IN GOOD PART RELATES TO DOMESTIC CONSIDERATION, BUT  
ALSO PROBABLY REFLECTS CONCERN OVER NORTHWEST ISLAND SITUATION  
AND UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS OF RESUMPTION OF SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE.  
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## Meeting between Minister Hong and the Soviet Ambassador to Rwanda

<b>Date:</b> 30 January 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.</i>
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### Meeting between Minister Hong and the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to Rwanda

- 1. Meeting Date:** January 30, 1974
- 2. Meeting Location:** Residence of the Soviet Ambassador to Rwanda ([Grigory Vasilyevich] Zhilyakov)
- 3. Meeting Background:** Minister Hong visited [the Soviet Ambassador] to bid farewell Hong was leaving his post.

#### 4. Meeting Details

**Soviet:** I am pleased to have had close personal relationship with you. The reason I was unable to make it to your farewell reception hosted by the American Deputy Ambassador was because if I went, North Koreans would crowd the Foreign Affairs Department of the Soviet Union and complain about my attendance.

**KOR:** I appreciate your kindness and I ask for your cooperation in contacting the Soviet ambassadors [illegible] and ministers in Brussels.

**Soviet:** The Soviet government has two basic standpoints. First, [the Soviet Union] does not wish to be engaged in [Korean matters] before any agreement is reached through discussion between the [governments of the] divided country. Secondly, any and all issues must be resolved through peaceful measures. Therefore, establishing a relationship between [South] Korea and the Soviet Union depends on how the conversation between the South and the North progresses.

This standpoint is the same with Soviet Union's standpoint taken towards Germany. We believe that economy and trade should be discussed first in promoting discussions between the South and the North.

**KOR:** [South] Korea suggested a joint-entry to the UN and also a nonaggression treaty. However, North Korea rejects these suggestions. What is your opinion[?]

**Soviet:** In Europe, acknowledging the actual situation [of the region] is facilitating the relationship between East and West Germany; there is no reason why the acknowledgment of the actual situation in Asia shouldn't be applied to the Korean issue. We must seek to solve the Korean issue by recognizing two governments in the Korean Peninsula. How do you view Communist China's influence over North Korea?

**KOR:** This is my personal opinion, but I believe Beijing's influence over North Korea will rise up to ninety-percent if not for Moscow's influence. As you can see in Rwanda, North Korea-Communist China relations are as if they were a son and a father.

**Soviet:** Their relationship is not of a son and a father. It is rather a relationship between a landlord and a peasant. Mao Zedong is not immortal. Therefore, when he is gone, change will come.

**KOR:** Thank you again for your kind hospitality. No one ever knows but we may meet again in Moscow or Seoul.

**Soviet:** We will meet again much earlier in Brussels in July or August. I am aware that we will meet each other in Brussels on my way back to Moscow.

## 5. Reference Notes

A. Minister Hong was invited to and attended a movie event at the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Rwanda (January 3). The U.S. Deputy Ambassador mentioned that he is certain that the Soviet Ambassador issued the invitation upon receiving approval from Moscow.

B. The [Soviet] Ambassador's main interest was to collect information on Communist China. Even after Minister Hong's transfer to Brussels, he intended to maintain contact through the ambassador and the minister. That is, the [Soviet] Ambassador [to Rwanda] had mentioned, the Soviet ambassador to Belgium is a friend of his and that the minister was his student, and he wished to maintain contact between us and the Soviet diplomats.

## Briefing on the Violation of the Territorial Waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by Espionage Vessels of Park Chung Hee's Puppet Clique in South Korea

<b>Date:</b> February 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>National Council for the Study of the Security Services Archives (CNSAS), Bucharest Documentary Fund, 9915/V5 D13134/5, Ministry of the Interior, Juridical Secretariat Direction, Special Problems Section, Folder G7/1973 Regarding Documents, Correspondence and Other Materials Regarding the Liaison between the [Romanian] Ministry of Interior with its Homologue in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 01/01/1973 – 31/12/1973, 186 pages, Volume: II, Filing: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.</i>
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Briefing on the Violation of the Territorial Waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by Espionage Vessels of Park Chung Hee's Puppet Clique in South Korea

Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Socialist Republic of Romania

February 1974

On February 15 [1974], around 10:30, the puppet clique of Park Chung Hee in South Korea carried out an espionage operation, sending espionage vessels in the Western territorial waters of our country.

Our navy vessels which are usually patrolling the area completely muffled the [action] of the enemy taking the appropriate defense measures against the reconnaissance and provocative measures of the enemy espionage vessels, targeted against our country.

The reconnaissance and provocative acts, undertaken by the puppet clique of Park Chung Hee in South Korea represent a violation of our territorial waters as well as a breach of the North-South Joint Declaration, published on July 4th, 1972. The espionage operation undertaken by our enemy, a premeditated operation, planned by Park Chung Hee's puppet clique, was meant to trigger the aggravation of tension and a breach in the [North-South] dialogue.

This scurvy tactic is nothing but an attempt to get out of the complete isolation in which [South Korea] finds itself internally and externally, diverting attention from the [forces] which fight against Park Chung Hee's fascist clique, for the democratization of the [Korean] society.

In spite of these real and obvious facts, Park Chung Hee's puppet clique is undertaking [a campaign] against the Northern part of the Republic, claiming that the vessels caught in the act were not espionage vessels, but so called fishing vessels.

Regarding this operation, the Korean Central Telegraph Agency and the Committee for the Unification of the Country and the Defense of Peace released the following declaration:

The Declaration of the Korean Central Telegraph Agency

On February 15th [1974], Park Chung Hee's puppet clique undertook glaring provocative measures, sending espionage vessels in the territorial waters of our country, off the coast of Jangsan, located at 124 ° 28' East and 38° 14' North.

On the same day, provocative elements in South Korea undertook the so-called civilian operation against communists, mobilizing human forces amounting to a few million people, bringing people from towns in the countryside, plus people from Seoul, and simultaneously sending espionage vessels against us.

This is a premeditated operation directed against the Northern part of the Republic and a serious breach of the North-South Joint Declaration from July 4th 1972, through which the two parties committed themselves to not undertake any military action.

In the name of the entire Korean people, which ardently wants peace and the peaceful unification of the country, the Korean Central Telegraph Agency condemns in indignation, in the name of the entire nation, the provocative and insolent measures of Park Chung Hee's puppet clique against us.

Presently, Park Chung Hee's clique is carrying out a rabid and deceitful propaganda campaign, which, in an attempt to camouflage its provocative and hostile actions, it is claiming to have been an armed attack on our behalf against 'some fishing vessels.'

The puppet clique cannot, however, hide its reconnaissance [operations] and hostile maneuvers, although it is the puppet clique which fixed the 'fishing territorial limits' off shore and which is not prohibiting the free access of South Korean fishermen, and which is sending its espionage vessels deep into our territorial waters under the guise of fishing vessels.

Our navy vessels decisively muffled the hostile actions undertaken by Park Chung Hee's puppet clique.

This is a manifestation of [our] sovereignty for the defense of our territorial waters.

It is not haphazard that Park Chung Hee's puppet clique is ever intensifying its hostile reconnaissance operations against us, because over the past few days it continued to carry out scurvy military provocations in the West Sea.

These operations are meant to forestall the influence which [the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] has amongst the masses in South Korea through the successes we scored in the construction of socialism, as our country develops at a sustained pace, unlike South Korea, whose economy is in ruins.

Through these operations, [the puppet clique] seeks to discredit the successes obtained by the Northern part of the Republic in the eyes of the South Korean population which regards [the Northern] part of the Republic as a lighthouse of hope.

This operation is also a scurvy action undertaken in order to distract the attention [of the South Korean population] from the far-ranging crisis, to forestall the struggle of the various South Korean social classes, a struggle which extends and intensifies with every day, and to enshrine the division of the country by artificially creating two Koreas.

But presently, Park Chung Hee's puppet clique must know that the anticommunist motto it has been using for the past 10 years cannot serve as a universal panacea for all the illnesses of the South Korean population, and the threats it makes with weapons and bayonets cannot stop the people that has risen today for freedom and democracy, for the unification of the homeland.

For [the sake of] Park Chung Hee's clique, it would be better if and he should admit right now that the serious crisis he is undergoing is determined by his policy of betraying and selling the country, by his fascist, terrorist, and anti-popular policy, which is supported by external forces.

We give a serious warning to Park Chung Hee's puppet clique, asking it to immediately stop all military provocations, which are putting undue strain on the North-South dialogue, and which ignore the spirit of the North-South Joint Declaration, through which certain commitments were assumed in front of the whole nation, and by breaching it tension increases.

But if the glaring instigators in South Korea [continue] their brainless military provocations against the Northern side and resort to provocations full of enmity and to reconnaissance and espionage operations, without taking into account what [we are telling] them, they should assume the entire responsibility regarding the consequences deriving from these acts.

#### The Main Ideas of the Testimony of the Espionage Vessel Commander

The commander of the espionage vessel, Pak Jongju, captured on February 15th [1974] in the West Sea, admitted on February 20th [1974] that on February 7th he received orders to conduct espionage [operations] from Lee Jungyang, the head of the Incheon department within the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

Pak Jongju said that Lee Jungyang, the head of the Incheon department within the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, told him that with a view to insuring the total security of the country, the South Korea [authorities] were undertaking a propaganda campaign amongst popular masses in South Korea about the alleged "threat of an

invasion from North Korea against South Korea," but since they are not succeeding, they were trying to provoke an incident by surprise.

Pak Jongju admitted that he received the task to carry out an espionage operation deep into the territorial waters of the Northern side, so as to probe our attitude and our reactions, to take photographs of our ships around Baeknyeongdo Island, to assess their numbers and their military equipment.

He also confessed that he received orders that in case he got 'uncovered,' he must claim that the ship he was in charge of was a fishing vessel; and that in case he got captured, he must pretend to be a fisherman and continue to observe and examine the situation in North Korea.

He admitted that during the afternoon of February 15th he was taking photos and relaying the information to the [Korean Central Intelligence Agency] on the Jangsan Island, which belongs to the Northern side, when the Korean People's Army patrol asked him to leave the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The espionage vessel commander also declared that one of the two espionage vessels sank while trying to escape, after having hit a patrol ship of the Korean People's Army; the other ship's [crew] threw overboard the transmission machine, the reconnaissance equipment, and set the [cipher] codebook and other documents on fire.

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.076**

<b>Date:</b> 21 February 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220/Year 1974/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Telegrams from Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January – December 1974. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 21.02.1974

No.: 060.076

To: First Direction – Relations; Second Direction – Relations

Concerning the effects of the February 15th incident between the two sides of Korea, we would like to inform you about the following issues:

As it is [well-]known, Pyongyang announced that two South Korean vessels were caught in the act of spying on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the territorial waters [of North Korea] and that legitimate defense measures were taken against them, while South Korea claims that the North opened fire on two [South Korean] fishing boats, sailing far in the open sea, sank one of them and captured the other, together with 26 fishermen.

In the time that passed since the incident, countless rallies took place on the entire territory of South Korea, gathering hundreds of thousands of people, culminating with the 1-million people rally in Seoul, where the action of the North was condemned en masse and in the most violent terms; [the participants in these rallies] sent protest notes to the Secretary General of the United Nations, to the International Red Cross.

To our mind, there are few moments in the post-[Korean] War period when the psychosis against the North manifested by South Korean [people] reached such high levels of intensity. After ignoring the echo of the incident in the South for a few days, the propaganda apparatus in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea released the testimony of the captured vessel commander, who, in a unconvincing manner, admits that the two ships were prepared by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and sent in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the premeditated goal to get one of the ships captured by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea defense forces, so as to offer public opinion in South Korea a general shock against the North.

After analyzing the incident through the lens of its destructive implications for the inter-Korean dialogue, for the tension it generated on the [Korean] Peninsula and for the unfavorable international echo around the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we believe the action undertaken by the North was not justified.

The moment of the incident is totally ill-timed for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which needed to consolidate its influence and its power of attraction on the eve of the foreseeable political crisis in Seoul, to consolidate its authority on the international stage, all of these aspects being seriously affected by the February 15th operation.

We believe the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not foresee such a large-scale reaction in South Korea, which goes against the interests [of Pyongyang] towards this part of the country.

It is to be expected that tension deepens, due to the firm request of the South Korean public opinion to immediately release the captured fishermen and vessel.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.079**

<b>Date:</b> 25 February 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220/Year 1974/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Telegrams from Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs , January – December 1974. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 25.02.1974

No.: 060.079

To: First Direction – Relations; Second Direction – Relations

In a discussion with Aurelian Lazar about the February 15th North-South incident, which resulted in the sinking of a South Korean fishing boat and the capture of a second one by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, B.K. Pimenov, Minister-Counselor within the USSR Embassy, pointed out that the Soviet Embassy believed that North Korea committed a serious error by undertaking this action.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea thus offered the authorities in Seoul an important political chapter [content] which the [South Koreans] can use to diminish forthcoming spring student demonstrations and even directing them on an anti-North path.

B.K. Pimenov said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would find it difficult from thereon to re-establish its authority amongst its South Korean sympathizers. In these conditions, not even the forthcoming reunion of the North-South committee, scheduled for February 27th, can contribute to reaching an understanding, [being very likely that] the discussions be transformed into a fiery argument.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127**

<b>Date:</b> 24 March 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1974. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Urgent

Date: 24.03.1974/22:00

No.: 060.127

To: Comrade George Macovescu, Foreign Minister

On Sunday, March 24<sup>th</sup>, Heo Dam, Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited to an audience the Romanian Charge d'Affaires, Aurelian Lazăr, whom the former, on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government, informed of the new measures to be adopted at the third session of the Supreme People's Assembly (which is under way) on matters regarding the independent and peaceful unification of the homeland, with the request to relay the information to the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

After providing an overview of the latest initiatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government regarding the unification of the homeland, unfinished because of the opposition of the South Korean authorities, directly orchestrated by the Chief of Staff of the US armed forces in Seoul, Heo Dam mentioned that, after analyzing the current situation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government reached the conclusion that in the current phase it is necessary to establish direct contacts with the United States of America.

Heo Dam put forward the following ideas to justify this position, which we sum up as follows:

1. In order to expedite the independent and peaceful unification, certain conditions, indispensable to this process, must be created, namely: the cessation of American interference in the internal affairs of South Korea; the withdrawal of US troops and the replacement of the current armistice with a long-lasting peace treaty.
2. The authorities in Seoul are not interested and vehemently opposing such a change.
3. Given that the Americans are controlling the entire situation in South Korea and that they represent the signatory authority of the 1953 armistice on behalf of the UN forces and that they can be counted as a signatory party to a possible peace treaty in Korea, the current session of the Supreme People's Assembly will decide to adopt certain measures regarding the initiation of direct contacts between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

In case the Americans agree, the meetings between North Korea and the United States would take place in Panmunjeom or in a different third country, at a higher level than the heads of the armistice commissions (Major Generals – our note).

With a view to establishing contacts with the United States, the session of the Supreme People's Assembly will adopt on March 25<sup>th</sup> or 26<sup>th</sup> a 'letter to the US Congress' which contains a draft treaty between the two countries, specifying the following matters (which we summarized):

- a. The two parties commit themselves to eliminating those factors which generate tension and armed conflicts, they commit themselves to refrain from using military force and [they commit themselves] not to attack each other.

The United States of America commits itself to refrain from actions meant to support the secessionist actions of the authorities in Seoul, to refrain from supporting the warmongering provocations of South Korea, to refrain from any act which may forestall the process of independent and peaceful unification, according to the three principles of the North-South Joint Declaration from July 4, 1972.

- b. The two parties commit themselves to stop the arms races on Korean territory and to prohibit the insertion of weapons and military equipment from the outside.

c. The UN mandate possessed by foreign troops stationed in South Korea must be abolished and foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea as soon as possible.

d. After the withdrawal of all foreign troops, South Korea must cease to be used as a military base, [and] Korea must not be transformed into a theatre of operations for new military confrontations.

Subsequently, Heo Dam mentioned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sincerely wants to establish direct contacts with the United States of America, and that it plans to keep the initiative in exposing the actions of the South and in the achievement of the unification of the country.

The Vice-Premier showed that in case the United States of America rejects the initiative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, then the North Koreans would expose them in front of the world public opinion as the main factor hostile to the unification of Korea.

Heo Dam underlined that the Korean Workers' Party and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cherish the consistent and sincere support offered by the Romanian party and state leadership to the cause of Korea's unification.

He expressed his conviction that the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, just like in the past, would continue to support the position of the DRPK, including its recent initiatives.

Heo Dam mentioned that the briefing of the Romanians on this matter prior to their actual occurrence is circumscribed in the context of the sincere friendship existing between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Signed: Aurelian Lazăr

(Translation)

Pyongyang, March 25, 1974

I have the honour to send to Your Excellency and, through Your Excellency, to your Senate the "Letter to the Congress of the United States of America" adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Please accept the assurances of my high consideration.



Hwang Jang Yop  
Chairman  
Supreme People's Assembly  
Democratic People's Republic  
of Korea

His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford  
President of the Senate  
United States of America  
Washington

(Translation)

**THE LETTER  
TO  
THE CONGRESS OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**



The Third Session of the Fifth Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, having discussed the question of creating a prerequisite to the removal of tension in Korea and the acceleration of the country's independent and peaceful reunification, sends this letter to both the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America.

All the Korean people and the peace-loving people the world over were greatly stirred up by the bright prospects for the preservation of peace in Korea and the settlement of her reunification problem, when the North-South Joint Statement was made public in July 1972.

But today, after the lapse of almost two years since then, developments in Korea have been quite the opposite to what the people had expected.

Tension seemed to be relaxed temporarily, but it has been aggravated again. Only military confrontation and war danger have daily been increasing, instead of prospects for peaceful reunification.

The prevailing situation naturally causes apprehensions of the people of the world and urgently demands that we adopt proper measures for meeting the situation.

The Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still firmly believes that for the prevention of a war danger and removal of tension in Korea and the promotion of her peaceful reunification, it is necessary, first of all, to eliminate the military confrontation between the north and the south.

In fact, under the condition of huge armed forces standing opposed to each other as it is today, it is impossible to successfully solve any problems, big and small, which are related to the peaceful reunification of Korea.


Ever since the armistice in Korea the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has put forward time and again various reasonable proposals such as proposals for the reduction of armaments and the conclusion of a peace agreement, as a step for converting the armistice into a durable peace.

Even after the start of the dialogue between the north and the south of Korea, we presented the elimination of the north-south military confrontation as a question to be settled before everything else.

If any of our peaceful proposals had been put into practice, a durable peace would have been ensured in Korea and tension as we see today would have not been aggravated again.

The south Korean authorities, however, have not responded to our proposals for the stoppage of arms reinforcement and arms race, the reduction of the armies and armaments, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the conclusion of a peace agreement, but have pushed forward war preparations.

Backed by the United States, the south Korean authorities have only implored the prolonged presence of the U.S. troops



in south Korea and deliberately aggravated the relations between the north and the south, incessantly clamouring about the fictitious "threat of southward aggression" in an attempt to oppose the country's reunification and repress the south Korean people.

With a view to cloaking such acts of theirs, recently the south Korean authorities came out with what they call a "non-aggression pact."

But it is well known to the world that it is not the south Korean authorities but the U.S. Commander who holds the prerogative of supreme command of the army in south Korea today. The south Korean authorities who do not have the prerogative of supreme command of the army propose to conclude a "non-aggression pact" while leaving the U.S. troops to stay on in south Korea. This is an empty talk without any guarantee of peace and accordingly, is not worth discussing at all.

It is none other than the United States that has encouraged the south Korean authorities in all their acts to turn down our independent and peace-loving proposals unconditionally.

Even after the dialogue started between the north and south of Korea, the United States has increased its military aid and armed support to south Korea, saying that the dialogue should be backed up by the armed forces, and has frequently committed provocations against the northern half of the Republic, staged war exercises and perpetrated espionage acts by sending high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance planes and thus has intensified tension ceaselessly.

We, therefore, consider that the responsibility for the failure in Korea's reunification and for the current tension and



danger of war in Korea rests chiefly with the U.S. government authorities.

It is becoming increasingly evident that as long as the U.S. troops remain in south Korea it is impossible to remove tension and consolidate peace in Korea and that the south Korean authorities have no intention and ability whatsoever to solve this problem.

The reality calls for concluding a peace agreement directly with the United States which stations its troops in south Korea and holds the prerogative of supreme command of all the forces, in order to create prerequisites for removing tension in Korea and eliminating the external factors obstructing Korea's independent and peaceful reunification and for enabling the Korean people to solve the reunification problem independently by themselves.

The Chinese People's Volunteers withdrew from Korea long ago, and not the troops of the "U.N. forces" but the U.S. troops remain there. Under this condition, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, the signatories to the Korean Armistice Agreement, are the virtual parties concerned.

At present the Armistice Agreement itself has become already outdated and does not conform to the reality in many respects. To replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement brooks no further delay.

The Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea considers that a peace agreement to be concluded with the United States of America may include the following points:



Firstly, both sides shall pledge to each other not to invade the other side and shall remove all the danger of direct armed conflict.

The United States shall be obliged not to instigate the south Korean authorities to the war provocation manoeuvres and fascist repression of the south Korean people and patronize them, not to obstruct the north and south of Korea in reunifying the country independently and peacefully in accordance with the North-South Joint Statement and not to interfere in any form in the internal affairs of Korea.

Secondly, the two sides shall discontinue arms reinforcement and arms race and stop introducing any weapons, combat equipment and war supplies into Korea.

Thirdly, the berets of the "United Nations forces" shall be taken off the foreign troops stationed in south Korea and they all be withdrawn at the earliest possible date along with all their weapons.

Fourthly, Korea shall not be made a military base or operational base of any foreign country after the withdrawal of all foreign troops from south Korea.

The Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea formally proposes that talks be held for the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, with the above-mentioned points as a premise.

The talks may be held at Panmunjom or in a third country by delegates of a higher level than those to the Military Armistice Commission now functioning-at Panmunjom.

The relations will be improved between the north and



south of Korea and an atmosphere favourable to the independent and peaceful solution of the reunification problem be created, when the question of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement in Korea is settled successfully.

Our new proposal fully accords with the interests of the people of the United States and of world peace as well.

The Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea expresses the expectation that the Congress of the United States of America and the U.S. government authorities will direct serious attention to our new peaceful proposal and make an affirmative response to this.

**The Supreme People's Assembly of  
the Democratic People's Republic of  
Korea**

Pyongyang, March 25, 1974



DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority E.O. 12958  
 By UP NARA Date 11-22-04

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE - XGDS

March 29, 1974

National Security Decision Memorandum 251

TO: The Secretary of Defense  
 The Deputy Secretary of State  
 Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:

1. Negotiating Packages

To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:

- Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North Korean representatives should then become the principal members of the Military Armistice Commission.
- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.
- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of substitute security arrangements.
- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.

2. Negotiating Strategy

A two-track negotiating strategy should be pursued, with the Seoul-Pyongyang track being primary. In the second track, the U.S. should

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 BY UP NARA Date 11-22-04

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
make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:

- Consult with the ROK before making proposals to any of the major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer operational control of ROK forces from CINCUNC, upon its termination, to a new U.S. - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer.
- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling role or direct Soviet involvement.
- After contacts with the PRC, inform other members of the UNC Liaison Group, as well as allies which contributed forces to the UNC.
- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit agreement from the Japanese Government which would extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC.

The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.

3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea

There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrangements following termination of the UNC.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director of Central Intelligence  
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS~~

## Report of Meeting with the Soviet Diplomat (Summary)

<b>Date:</b> 4 April 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.</i>
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### Report of Meeting with the Soviet Diplomat (Summary)

- 1. Contact Person(s):** Third Secretary Kim Yonggyu at the Korean Embassy in Australia  
First Secretary Stepanenko at the Soviet Embassy in Australia
- 2. Contact Date:** April 4th, 1974
- 3. Contact Background:** At the diplomatic corps luncheon, Secretary Kim met with the Soviet diplomat. We exchanged information, including some publications, afterwards. Following these gestures, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy invited Secretary Kim to a luncheon.

#### 4. Meeting Details:

**Secretary Kim:** North Korea is currently taking a pro-Communist China policy. What is your opinion on this?

**Soviet Official:** It is indeed true that North Korea is pro-China.

**Secretary Kim:** Are you aware of the accident in the Yellow Sea where a South Korean fishing boat was bombarded and kidnapped by a North Korean naval vessel a couple months ago?

**Soviet Official:** I am aware of the incident. I am not sure why North Korea undertook such a provocative action.

**Secretary Kim:** Communist China is your enemy and North Korea is taking a pro-China policy line. In terms of restraining Communist China and North Korea, would you not consider improving your relationship with [South] Korea as important? Our country is importing substantial amount of resources from overseas. We could consider importing from your country as well. What do you think about formally discussing trade by inviting our businessmen [to your country]?

**Soviet Official:** I believe it is logical and preferable to promote mutual understanding through trade relationships before we move on to building diplomatic relationship. I believe it is imperative to have trade relations between the two countries. (It should be done). I fully agree with your opinion.

**Soviet Official:** What is your current relationship with Communist China?

**Secretary Kim:** We do not have a relationship yet.

**Soviet Official:** The Americans are strengthening its naval force despite the opposition by adjacent countries in Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. What do you believe are the purposes?

**Secretary Kim:** I believe it is to restrain your naval power. Didn't the Soviet increase its naval power in the Indian Ocean? Do you think the U.S. will stand and watch?

**Soviet Official:** It is true that we have increased our naval power in the Indian Ocean. Since I believe the U.S. has stronger naval power, I do not believe the action was mainly targeted to restrain our navy. I believe it is a measure to secure oil in the Arabian states.

**Secretary Kim:** I would like to know about international sports competitions or international academic seminars planned for this year in your country. If possible, we would like to participate as well.

**Soviet Official:** I will take a look [at the list]. I believe we have exchanged a lot of great ideas. I would like to meet again in the future and exchange ideas.

**Secretary Kim:** I agree. Please send invitation to our ambassador on your national holidays [events].

**Soviet Official:** Very well. Please continue to send us the information.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION*Habib  
Korean 2a*~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER *WR/MS*  
RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RS*

SUBJECT: UNC Termination

We believe that in this instance it would be highly useful to supplement our front channel instruction to Ambassador Habib on the negotiating package for UNC termination (Tab B) with a backchannel. The draft backchannel at Tab A gives Ambassador Habib our thinking behind the negotiating package and strategy. We believe this would be particularly useful in light of continuing differences in approach between ourselves and the bureaucracy, including Embassy Seoul. State, Defense, and Habib all would reduce U. S. involvement in the Korean Peninsula at a considerably faster pace than we believe wise -- and in a manner than would carry an excessive risk of destabilizing the political-security situation. This supplementary guidance to Habib should reduce divergences in implementing the policy on UNC termination outlined in our front channel.

We have, however, suggested that Habib use a front channel to make any comments he may wish to on the general thrust of our backchannel.

Recommendation:

That you approve the backchannel cable to Ambassador Habib at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

GDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/08, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *lh* NARA, Date *12/6/10*



BACKCHANNEL

TO: American Embassy Seoul  
FROM: Brent Scowcroft

(Exclusively EYES ONLY for Ambassador Habib from General Scowcroft)

SUBJECT: UNC Termination

1. In a front channel message from State, you have received the basic instruction for your approach to the ROKG on our negotiating package and strategy for the termination of the UNC. This back-channel is intended to elaborate on the State message by outlining our view regarding the basic negotiating strategy, our immediate objectives, and tactics in these negotiations.

2. Basic Strategy. We believe our fundamental approach in these negotiations should be that, while eliminating the UNC, we should hold the other elements in the security equilibrium constant, until we can be assured that the substitute arrangements are firmly in place.

Thus, we want to keep the US -- and the PRC -- directly involved in the ongoing implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Given the present ineffectiveness of the SNCC and the unlikelihood that the US and PRC could operate in a meaningful manner in that forum, we believe the MAC and our involvement in it must not repeat not be

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines  
By LM NARA, Date 12/6/10



want to begin back-pedaling until we have a clear idea of the other side's position -- if we must back-pedal at all.

4. Negotiating Tactics.

a. For obvious reasons, our front channel indicates that we would approach the PRC and Soviets as equals on this problem. In fact, we intend to work primarily in parallel with the PRC both to backstop and to restrain our respective Korean allies as necessary -- while still aiming to leave the primary negotiating role to the two Koreas. We have complex objectives with the USSR: to keep the Russians generally informed of our new position in hopes of discouraging them from attempting to play a spoiling role; but also to box them out of any direct part in the negotiations.

b. We believe our principle negotiating leverage will lie with two factors: first, our very willingness to go through with the termination of the UNC; and second, the presumed interest on the part of the PRC -- and secondarily



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

the Soviets -- in limiting instability on the Peninsula, along with their probable distrust of North Korea's militant inclinations. We recognize that current PRC internal developments may have reduced Peking's influence with Pyoŋgyang. We have not, however, concluded that any decline in influence has been so great as to vitiate our proposed approach.

5. As the imminent arrival in New York of a high-level PRC delegation to participate in the special UNGA session may afford the Secretary an opportunity to discuss the UNC package with Chinese leaders on a personal basis, we hope you can give us at least a provisional read-out of ROK thinking on the negotiating package by April 9 at the latest.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.180**

<b>Date:</b> 22 April 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1974. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Pyongyang  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET  
Urgent  
Date: 22.04.1974/-08:00  
No.: 060.180  
To: Comrade C. Pacoste

In a conversation with the Romanian Ambassador Dumitru Popa, Vice-Premier Heo Dam, the North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred to the meaning of the recent proposal made by the Supreme People's Assembly regarding the initiation of direct contacts with the United States of America, and the replacement of the current armistice with a peace treaty.

He underlined the idea that the recent move of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, initiated and prepared under the direct command of President Kim Il Sung, aims at the creation of fertile premises for the continuation of the process of unification of the country with the Koreans' own forces.

Hinting at the fact that the new North Korean initiative was interpreted abroad as a diminution of the principle of solving the Korean problem independently, a principle which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea promoted until now, Heo Dam noted that the dialogue with the United States of America did not target the entire problem of the unification of the country, but only the first phase of this process—the withdrawal of American troops from the Peninsula, after which the unification would be achieved by the Koreans themselves.

Heo Dam added that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will continue to promote the North-South dialogue according to the three principles of the July 1972 Joint Declaration.

With respect to the echo of the letter addressed to the US Congress, the North Korean Vice-Premier said that, judging from the declarations of certain American officials, the North Korean move was taken into account and analyzed with care. The US authorities are, however, in a tough spot: accepting the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would affect their relations with Park Chung Hee, and refusing to accept the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would expose them in front of the world public opinion.

Although Heo Dam reassumed the old position that either response from the United States would suit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, his brief revealed this time a keener desire that the United States accepted the initiative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

He expressed his thanks to the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania for the consistent support granted to the solution for the unification of country proposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

MEMORANDUM

1693

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: W. R. SMYSER

SUBJECT: Termination of UN Command in Korea

At Tab A is a draft State cable instruction to Embassy Seoul, responding to the Government of the Republic of Korea's (ROKG) comments (Tab B) on our proposed negotiating package and strategy for the termination of the UN Command (UNC). The ROKG agrees with the basic elements of our proposed negotiating package and strategy, except that they hope that we, rather than they, would carry the main burden of the negotiations.

The draft State cable notes the agreement between ourselves and the ROKG on these basics, and states that we are both therefore in a position to proceed with our approaches to the other side -- but asks Ambassador Habib for his confirmation of this. The draft State cable also notes for Ambassador Habib's information some divergence on the questions of coordinating with Japan and other countries and of the comparative burden that we as opposed to the ROK will carry in negotiations.

I believe that the draft State cable is adequate as far as it goes, and that we do not have to delay our initial approaches to the other side in order to try to compose the differences between ourselves and the ROKG at this point. Nevertheless, I believe it would be useful to convey to Ambassador Habib at this point, for his information, our position on several particular aspects of the negotiation. If Ambassador Habib in his on-going discussions with the ROKG perceives a substantial divergence on any of these points, he can on the basis of this guidance discuss these matters with them.

--We should underscore with the ROKG our belief, as expressed in the original instruction (Tab C), that the Seoul-Pyongyang track will be primary in this negotiation.

--The ROKG has taken the position that all elements of our negotiating package are "inter-related." If necessary, we should make clear that this does not imply that all elements are inseparable. As pointed out

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

GDS<sup>177</sup>

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
 NSC Memo, 3/30/78, State Dept. Guidelines; State review  
 By MM NARA, Date 12/6/10  
 9/17/23

in our basic instruction, the essential element in this package is the continued effective direct U. S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the on-going implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

--The ROKG has expressed the view that it would be "desirable" to obtain the other side's understanding that, once the UNC is terminated, they will not raise at the UN General Assembly the question of the continued presence of the U. S. forces in Korea. If necessary, we should point out to Seoul that while this might be desirable, it is not essential that the other side desist from raising the question. What is essential is that the other side not press seriously for the removal of U. S. forces from Korea.

--As regards the means by which the successor's signatories would formally subscribe to the Armistice Agreement, the ROKG prefers that each side sign the Agreement separately, for immediate tactical reasons which are somewhat obscure. I believe, as we stated in the original instruction to Ambassador Habib, that we should keep this tactical question open until we get a better feel during the course of negotiations for what means will be tactically feasible with as well as adequately binding on the other side.

Paragraph 3 of the draft State cable asking Ambassador Habib to confirm that the ROK is substantially in agreement with our approach is useful -- not so much because we believe there are significant differences in this respect but rather to make sure no approach is made to the PRC before you return.

I have included proposed changes in the draft State cable to reflect the above recommendations.

Messrs. Solomon, Froebe, and myself are proceeding to draft a detailed scenario for an initial approach to the other side and the others concerned. This should be ready for your consideration on your return from your upcoming trip.

Recommendation:

~~That you approve the draft State cable at Tab A as revised.~~

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



ROUTINE SEOUL

[Material in square brackets is my addition to State cable.]

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS ON UN COMMAND

REFERENCE: (A) SEOUL 2457 (L) STATE 70275

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. We have the following comments with respect to ROK memorandum on alternative arrangements to the UNC (ref A).

A. We appear to be in general agreement with the ROKG regarding the package and the scenario to be followed, except mainly as concerns operational control.

B. Agree that problem of operational control is a bilateral issue and will be interested in receiving ROK Study.

C. In the meanwhile, however, we are prepared to initiate discussions with the PRC and USSR along the lines of our package proposal.

2. FYI. Following items are those which appear to be in question or at some variance with our position, but are not substantial enough to delay progress of negotiation.



A. Coordination with Japan and other countries. We agree that such coordination will depend on response of other side, but believe consultation with Japan in particular should be at the earliest practical date. We can determine subsequently how and when to approach allies and who should take the initiative.

B. Parallel discussions with the north. We are in complete agreement with your views as expressed to Kim Dong Jo that we should keep open option of using direct Seoul-Pyongyang channel at any stage. We note ROK willingness to be flexible on this point and hope you will be able to impress on them need to be prepared to move in parallel with U. S.

[We should make clear that, although we recognize the problem they are up against with Pyongyang and because of which we will do our best to backstop them in our own approaches to the PRC and USSR, we cannot assume the main burden of negotiations.

C. Package Approach. We note (para 1, ref A) that ROKG has emphasized the "inter-related" character of the negotiating package. We agree with this as long as "inter-related" is not construed to mean "inseparable." As pointed out in paragraph 2, reference b, the essential element in this package is direct U. S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the on-going implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

D. U.S. Force Presence. The ROKG has expressed the view that it would be "desirable" to obtain the other side's understanding that, once the UNC is terminated, they will not raise at the UN General Assembly the question of the continued presence of the U. S. forces in Korea. If necessary, we should point out to Seoul that while this might be desirable, it is not essential that the other side desist from raising this question in at least a pro forma way. What is essential is that the other side not press seriously for the removal of U. S. forces from Korea.

E. Means By Which Successor's Signatories Subscribe to Armistice Agreement. ROKG has expressed preference (para 4, ref A) that both sides should subscribe to successor Armistice Agreement by signing separately. We understand ROKG concerns, but believe that other factors must also be taken into account -- legal and political insufficiency and political feasibility. We believe, as stated in paragraph 1, reference b, that this question should be left open for present time.] END FYI.

3. Before initiating approaches to PRC/USSR would appreciate confirmation we are in substantial agreement.





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

P 180245Z APR 74  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3374  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ SEOUL 2457

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12 31 AM

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3  
State Dept Guidelines; *stlereview 9/17/03*  
By *ll* NARA, Date *12/16/12*

EO 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS  
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN ON UN COMMAND

REF: A) STATE 070275; B) SEOUL 2246

SUMMARY: ROKG HAS REPLIED TO OUR PROPOSALS ON UN COMMAND BY GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THEM, WHILE EXPLICITLY LEAVING OPEN QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES WHICH THEY RETAIN UNDER REVIEW FOR LATER DISCUSSION. THEY ARE HOPEFUL WE CAN BEGIN EXPLORATION WITH PRC AND USSR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY

1. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG JO APRIL 17 TO RECEIVE ROKG REPLY TO PROPOSALS I HAD SUBMITTED TO HIM REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. HE OPENED DISCUSSION BY REMARKING THAT BEFORE GIVING ME HIS GOVERNMENT'S DETAILED VIEWS HE WISHED TO NOTE TWO THINGS: (A) HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE PROPOSALS AS A QUOTE PACKAGE UNQUOTE IN THE SENSE THAT THEY ARE ALL INTER-RELATED; (B) HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS WERE MULTILATERAL. THE QUESTION OF THE EXERCISE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL WAS A BILATERAL QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND NOT A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE CHINESE, SOVIETS OR NORTH KOREANS.

2. HE THEN HANDED ME A MEMORANDUM THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS (REFERENCES IN TEXT ARE TO TALKING PAPER I HAD GIVEN KIM):

QUOTE

1. THE ROKG HAS STUDIED CAJEFULLY THE U.S. PROPOSED PACKAGE WHICH WE WILL OFFER THE OTHER SIDE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. IT REGARDS THE PACKAGE AS CONFORMING IN GENERAL TO ROK'S POSITION ON THIS MATTER. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS ARE SUGGESTED:

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A. (RE PARA. A) WITH REGARD TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS SUGGESTED IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL, OUR SIDE WILL FORMALLY NOTIFY THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS CASE, THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAKE A FORMAL RESPONSE WITH THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE ARRANGEMENTS.

B. (RE PARA. B) IN ADDITION TO SECURING AN ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS SOLIDLY STABILIZED, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ALSO TO ACQUIRE AN UNDERSTANDING FROM THE OTHER SIDE THAT THE QUESTION REGARDING U.S. FORCES IN KOREA SHALL NOT BE RAISED AT THE UN ONCE THE UNC IS DISSOLVED.

C. (RE PARA. E) IT IS ROKG'S INTENTION TO KEEP THE PRESENT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT INTACT. THEREFORE, THE ROKG DOES NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

2. WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY, THE FOLLOWINGS (SIC) ARE SUGGESTED:

(1) AT THE INITIAL STAGE, THE MAIN CHANNEL OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE BETWEEN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR;

(2) THE PROBLEM OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS MATTER BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG WILL BE CONSIDERED ONLY AFTER SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS MADE IN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR NEGOTIATIONS;

(3) THE TIME OF CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE UNC LIAISON GROUP AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UNC WILL BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROGRESS IN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR NEGOTIATIONS AND IN CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE ROK AND U.S.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO UNDERTAKE CONSULTATION WITH SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND, BOTH THE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN DUE COURSE.

IN UNDERTAKING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, THE ROK WOULD PLAY A PRINCIPAL ROLE WHILE THE U.S. WOULD ASSIST IN THE EFFORT.

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3. WITH REFERENCE TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES FROM CINCUNC TO A U.S.-ROK COMBINED COMMAND, THE ROKG NEEDS MORE TIME TO MAKE FURTHER STUDY OF THE PROBLEM. THE ROKG'S POSITION ON THIS MATTER WILL BE NOTIFIED TO THE U.S. AS SOON AS THE STUDY IS COMPLETED.
4. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE ROK AND U.S. WILL CONSIDER IN DUE COURSE OF TIME VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC MEASURES NEEDED IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC.
5. IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE IMPASSE IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS DUE TO NK'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, APPROPRIATE UN STRATEGIES SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE ROK AND U.S.

ONE POSSIBLE MOVE WOULD BE FOR THE U.S. TO TAKE UP THE QUESTIONS OF THE UNC AND THE ROK'S ADMISSION TO UN MEMBERSHIP (TOGETHER WITH NK IF IT SO WISHES) AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THUS COUNTERING ANTICIPATED NK MOVES AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IT IS REMINDED THAT THE ADOPTION OF ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS PREREQUISITE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC.

6. IT IS ADVISABLE FOR THE ROK AND U.S. TO MAKE A CAREFUL STUDY OF PROBLEMS ENSUING FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE UN SOFA WITH JAPAN AND THE EXPIRATION OF ACHESON-YOSHIDA NOTES OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1951.

UNQUOTE.

3. I SAID I WOULD FORWARD HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS TO WASHINGTON BUT WOULD MAKE A FEW BRIEF COMMENTS AND ASK SOME QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION AT THIS STAGE. FIRST OF ALL I COULD ASSURE HIS IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WE ALSO LOOKED UPON THE PROPOSALS AS A PACKAGE DEAL. SECONDLY, THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL WAS A MATTER FOR BILATERAL DECISION SINCE IT ONLY AFFECTED UNITED STATES AND KOREAN INTERESTS.

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4. WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 1A OF HIS MEMORANDUM I ASKED IF THIS MEANT THE SOUTH DID NOT INTEND TO SIGN A SUCCESSOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT MERELY TO INFORM THE OTHER SIDE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE. HE SAID THE SOUTH WAS WILLING TO SIGN THE SUCCESSOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT DID NOT WISH TO DO SO AT A MEETING WITH THE NORTH. IT PREFERRED MERELY THAT EACH SIDE SEPARATELY SIGN AND ACCEDE TO THE SUCCESSOR AGREEMENT AND THEN FORMALLY NOTIFY THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT ACT. HE SAID THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE SOUTH DID NOT WISH TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PYONGYANG WHICH WOULD ALLOW NORTH KOREA TO RAISE QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF.

5. I ASKED HIM IF HE COULD DEFINE WHAT WAS MEANT BY THE STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 2 (2) WHICH REFERRED TO QUOTE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS UNQUOTE IN U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS BEFORE CONSIDERING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG. HE SAID THEY HAD IN MIND THAT THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST SOME INDICATION THAT OUR PROPOSALS WERE LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BEFORE THEY WOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES DIRECTLY WITH PYONGYANG. I REPLIED THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE TOO RIGID AND THAT WHILE I COULD UNDERSTAND WHY THEY WISH TO HAVE US BEGIN THE PROCESS WITH MAJOR POWERS, WE SHOULD LEAVE OURSELVES THE OPTION OF USING THE DIRECT SEOUL-PYONGYANG CHANNEL AT ANY STAGE. HE SAID THEY WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON THIS POINT.

6. I ASKED HIM WHEN THE ROKG STUDY OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON OPERATIONAL CONTROL, MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF HIS MEMORANDUM, WOULD BE READY. HE SAID THE MATTER WAS CURRENTLY BEING REVIEWED IN HIS GOVERNMENT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SUCH THINGS AS THE NATO ARRANGEMENTS, AND THOSE WHICH EXISTED IN VIET-NAM. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN DETAIL AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT TO ME THAT WITHOUT THE COVER OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IT WAS POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DIFFICULT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT DESIGNATED U.S. COMMAND OF ROK FORCES. THEY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO ACCUSATIONS, BY NORTH KOREA AND OTHERS, THAT THEY DID NOT EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY OR OVER THEIR OWN PEOPLE. THIS COULD BE USED AGAINST THE SOUTH IN MANY WAYS. HE CONSIDERED THE PROBLEM TO BE HIGHLY POLITICAL AND IT WOULD REQUIRE SOME MORE TIME BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE US AN ANSWER. I NOTED THAT WE HAD PROPOSED A COMBINED COMMAND WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THE SAME

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CONNOTATION OF WHICH HE SPOKE. I POINTED OUT THAT MOREOVER THERE WERE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THIS QUESTION WHICH I WAS SURE HE RECOGNIZED. HE REPLIED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM BUT THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THE MATTER IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS. THE QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL POLICY WERE INVOLVED.

7. I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS MEANT IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF HIS MEMORANDUM WHICH SPEAKS OF CONSIDERATION OF DIPLOMATIC MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. HE SAID THIS REFERRED MERELY TO THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WOULD BE DONE AFTER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, I.E., HOW IT WOULD BE HANDLED IN TERMS OF NOTIFICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES.

8. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF HIS MEMORANDUM, I POINTED OUT THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT MEASURES HIS GOVERNMENT WAS PROPOSING, IT MIGHT STILL BE POSSIBLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HIS PROPOSAL IMPLIED THAT BY MOVING IT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WE COULD AVOID DEALING WITH THE RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I WAS NOT SURE THIS WAS POSSIBLE.

9. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 6, I SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE ANY FORMAL ARRANGEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE RIGHTS IN JAPAN WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. HE AGREED AND SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE SOME KIND OF TACIT UNDERSTANDING TO REPLACE THE EXISTING AGREEMENT.

10. IN CLOSING, HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL, SAYING THAT THIS WAS A MATTER TO BE DECIDED BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND WHILE IN ABEYANCE IT NEED NOT HOLD UP OUR GOING AHEAD AND CONSIDERING THE PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS TO BE EXPLORED WITH THE OTHER SIDE. HE WAS HOPEFUL WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT AND MOVE QUICKLY SO AS TO BE PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY.

11. COMMENT: I BELIEVE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE IS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. I RECOMMEND THAT FOR THE PRESENT WE PROCEED TO ADDRESS HIS COMMENTS AND THEN MOVE ALONG LINES GENERALLY AGREED IN APPROACHES TO PRC AND USSR. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE NOT PRESS ROKG ON ISSUE ON OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNTIL WE RECEIVE THE STUDY PROMISED IN THE ROK MEMORANDUM. HABIB

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**Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 78.028**

<b>Date:</b> 8 May 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1974. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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TELEGRAM

Sender: Washington

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Date: 08.05.1974/

No.: 78.028

On May 7th, I gave the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, J. [John A.] Armitage, the messages sent by the Supreme People's Assembly in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the president of the US Senate, Gerald Ford, and, respectively, to the speaker of the House, Carl Albert.

J. Armitage said that he receives these messages while reserving the right to tell us his potential reactions afterwards. He mentioned that in the current circumstances the State Department had great reserves vis-à-vis such a way of communicating between the parliaments of two countries, the United States of America and North Korea, which do not have official state-to-state relations. Moreover, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State underlined, those messages had been sent to the US Congress after being released publicly and after the Americans learned that those messages did not include any concrete proposal.

The Department of State does not want such a way of communicating, in which the Department of State was involved, and which could stir up undesired reactions in Congress, become permanent.

Signed: Corneliu Bogdan

Sent to: Nicolae Ceausescu; Stefan Andrei; First Direction – Relations; Third Direction – Relations

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19

MC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819

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INFO CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/1

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECT GARBLED TEXT THROUGHOUT)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS KS

SUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

REF: A. SEOUL 3053 B. SEOUL 3015

JOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE ROKG IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. IN THIS SITUATION THE ROKG DOES AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUR BEST ADVICE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT WILL ALSO SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. REF A. GIVES THE BACKGROUND ON RECENT ROKG ACTIONS TO BEGIN SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. REF B. REPORTS CURRENT ROKG

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THINKING ON R&D AREA.

2. ROKG MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOT UNEXPECTED AND IS ESSENTIALLY A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THE ROKG CLEARLY HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY LIKELY FUTURE MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE TOO LOW TO MEET ROK DEFENSE NEEDS. AND ROKG VIEWS GRANT ASSISTANCE AS INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATICAL GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. CONSEQUENTLY, UNDER THE PERSONAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PARK, GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR ITS PROCUREMENT NEEDS IN THE MID-70S.

3. THESE ROKG ACTIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT ROKG HAS FORMALLY ABANDONED ITS EXPECTATIONS RE MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES. AND IT HOPES FOR SOME LEVEL OF US GRANT ASSISTANCE IN NEAR TERM. ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS US ON QUESTION OF UNFULFILLED MOD PLAN LEVELS IN HOPE OF EXACTING AS MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, ROKG HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT GRANT ASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND MOD PLAN IN ANY EVENT. FURTHER, MND FULLY AWARE OF, AND HAS ACCEPTED, IMPLICATIONS OF SECDEF CLEMENT'S STATEMENT AT LAST SCM THAT FMS AS WELL AS GRANT ASSISTANCE WILL BE USED IN COMPLETING MOD PLAN. IN THIS SITUATION ROKG APPEARS TO BE MOVING REALISTICALLY AND QUICKLY TO TAKE UP POST-MOD PLAN PROCUREMENT BURDEN AS WELL AS TO MEET WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS OWN HIGH PRIORITY DEFENSE NEEDS WHETHER THEY ARE IN MOD PLAN OR NOT.

4. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT ON USG ALSO TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS FUTURE DIRECTION OF OUR MAP. IN OUR PARA CONTRIBUTION (SEOQNR JEAUENL N COUNTRY TEAM POINTED OUT THAT: ROKG IS INCREASINGLY ABLE TO BEAR COSTS OF ITS OWN DEFENSE; ROKG IS COMPLICITLY AWARE OF DOWNWARD DIRECTION OF US GRANT ASSISTANCE; AND IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL BE ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT FORMER DOMINANT US ROLE IN DETERMINING ROK MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL INEVITABLY CHANGE, AND

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THAT ROKG WILL INCREASINGLY EXPECT TO MAKE ITS OWN FINAL DETERMINATIONS.

5. GIVEN CURRENT ROKG ACTIONS, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN OUR PARA SUBMISSION CONTINUE TO REMAIN A VALID STATEMENT. AS OUTLINED IN THAT PAPER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD:

A. CONTINUE TO MEET OUR MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES BY A COMBINATION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND FMS WITH A TARGET COMPLETION DATE OF FY 77.

B. CONTINUE TO TRANSFER DEFENSE COSTS TO THE ROK BY USING INCREASED FMS CASH AND CREDIT FACILITIES.

C. PROJECT ADEQUATE FMS LEVELS TO MEET MAJOR AGREED ROK PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS.

D. WORK TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK IS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT AND, AS THE ROK MOVES TOWARDS COMMERCIAL CREDIT PROCUREMENT, WORK TO ASSURE THAT US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION.

6. WITHIN THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OUTLINED ABOVE, ESSENTIAL PROBLEM NOW FACING US IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FIELD IS NOT A BOOKKEEPING APPROACH TO MOD PLAN FULFILLMENT. ROKG HAS INTERPRETED OUR PAST COMMENTS RE MOD PLAN STRENGTH-OUT, AND INCREASING USE OF FMS TO MEET MOD PLAN AS SIGNS THAT ORIGINAL MOD PLAN CONCEPT IS IN EFFECT WITHERING AWAY. ROKG WOULD NOT WISH TO PUBLICLY ABANDON MOD PLAN BUT, IT HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT REQUISITE GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE FORTHCOMING. RATHER IT SEES ESSENTIAL PROBLEM AS BEING THE AVAILABILITY OF A HIGH LEVEL OF FMS CREDIT IN THE FY 75-80 PERIOD. FROM ROKG POINT OF VIEW, ITS CONCESSIONAL CREDIT NEEDS ARE BEYOND MOD PLAN LEVELS AND INVOLVE MANY ITEMS NOT IN MOD PLAN.

7. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE MONTHS BEFORE  
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THE NEXT SCM IN SEPT, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MUST SERIOUSLY CONSIDER PRESENTING ROKG WITH REALISTIC PICTURE OF GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUTURE. FURTHER, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FMS CREDIT LEVELS OVER NEXT FEW YEARS TO ALLOW A NEEDED TRANSITION FROM THE LARGE SCALE GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ROK IS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT.

8. THE FMS CREDIT LEVELS WHICH WE WOULD SEE IN THE FY 75-78 PERIOD WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE PRESENT POM LEVELS. IF USG WERE IN A POSITION TO BE FORTHCOMING ON THE FMS CREDIT ISSUE, BELIEVE THAT KOREANS WOULD IMPLICITLY ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH MOD PLAN REQUIREMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BE ABSORBED IN COURSE OF

TIME IN AN EXPANDED FMS CREDIT PROGRAM WE WOULD IN  
EFFECT HAVE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN WHICH GRANT ASSISTANCE  
ELEMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR AND AT SOME POINT IN PROCESS  
WE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO STATE THAT MOD PLAN  
HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED.

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ACTION EA-14

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MC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00

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9. SPECIFICALLY WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING APPROACH  
ON KEY POLICY QUESTIONS:

A. MOD PLAN FUTURE: WITH REGARD TO MOD PLAN  
FUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL REALISTICALLY AND  
HONESTLY WITH ROKG ON PROSPECTS. USG SHOULD USE FORTH-  
COMING SCM TO POINT OUT TO KOREAN SIDE THAT WE WILL  
CONTINUE TO DO BEST WE CAN TO MEET REMAINING MOD PLAN  
OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES,  
WE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT GRANT ASSISTANCE COMPONENT  
AND THEREFORE WE AND ROKG WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIMARY  
EMPHASIS TO FMS CREDIT AND CASH PURCHASES FOR REMAINING  
MOD PLAN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS.

B. O&M QUESTION: WE ARE SCHEDULED TO BE OUT OF  
GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR O&M BY FY 76. IN LIKELY EVENT  
FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW \$112

MILLION, WE MAY WELL ALREADY BE OUT OF O&M BUSINESS IN FY 74. GIVEN ROKG WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONSIDER MAJOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ITEMS OUT OF ITS OWN FUNDS, THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING GRANT O&M. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD TELL ROKG NOW  
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THAT THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT O&M GRANT ASSISTANCE IN FY 75 AND WHATEVER OUR EVENTUAL FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVEL WE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO USE IT FOR PROCUREMENT OF INVESTMENT ITEMS, NOT O&M. THIS WILL ALLOW MND TO REALISTICALLY PLAN ITS FUTURE O&M REQUIREMENTS. (IN VIEW OF LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY ARRANGE AND IMPLEMENT SSA & FMS CASH CASES FOR CRITICAL SUPPORT OF ESSENTIAL HIGH PRIORITY, WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SOME GRANT AID O&M SUPPORT MAY BE REQUIRED).

C. FMS CREDIT LEVELS: USG SHOULD ON PRIORITY BASIS ADDRESS QUESTION OF LIKELY FMS LEVELS AVAILABLE TO ROK IN COMING YEARS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PROVIDE EXPANDED FMS LEVELS NOT ONLY FOR SECURITY REASONS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THAT, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY BEARS ITS OWN DEFENSE COSTS, US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION IN KOREAN PROCUREMENT.

D. ROK THIRD-COUNTRY PROCUREMENT: AT PRESENT ROKG STILL ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TO PROCUREMENT OF US EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. HOWEVER, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY MAKES ITS OWN DECISION IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOP AROUND. THIRD-COUNTRY REPS ARE ALREADY QUIETLY BUT ACTIVELY TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A NEW MARKET. IN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS MAJOR USG CONCESSIONAL MAP PROGRAM HERE, ROKG MUST GIVE US EQUIPMENT HIGHEST PRIORITY. ROKG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS. AT SAME TIME WE DO EXPECT ROKG TO PRESS US FOR UNDERSTANDING AND APPROVAL OF LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY ITEMS WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NEEDS AND WHICH ARE EITHER UNAVAILABLE IN US INVENTORIES OR IN THE ROK VIEW INADEQUATE. WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THESE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS THEY ARISE (E.G. SWISS OERLIKON AA GUNS). HOWEVER, AS STATED ABOVE WE DO NOT BELIEVE USG SHOULD COUNTENANCE MAJOR ROK ARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD-COUNTRIES WHILE WE ARE IN EFFECT STILL UNDERWRITING SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE ROK DEFENSE COSTS.

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10. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA IS ALREADY IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE ROKG IN ITS OWN WAY IS ATTEMPTING TO REACT REALISTICALLY TO WHAT IT SEES AS THE PHASE DOWN OF THE USG'S MASSIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST. THIS REALIZATION HAS NOT LED THE ROKG TO PANIC OR TO UNDUE RECRIMINATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US. IT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH OUR PERFORMANCE IN PAST YEAR ON MANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATTERS AND HAS SAID SO. IN THE SCM WE CAN EXPECT SOME COMMENT ON ON-FULFILLMENT OF OUR PROMISES. AT SAME TIME, ROKG HAS NOT IGNORED THE TRENDS OF EVENTS AND IS NOT TRYING TO TURN CLOCK BACK.

11. FOR OUR PART THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THE ROKG INCREASINGLY WILL TELL US WHAT IT WANTS IN THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT FIELD. THE ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO ASK OUR ADVICE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT IT WILL SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. HOWEVER, THE ROKG IS IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING FROM A PAST DEPENDENT STATUS IN WHICH, IN EFFECT, IT ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATIONS SINCE WE WERE PAYING THE FREIGHT TO A SITUATION IN WHICH IT SEES ITSELF AS BEARING ESSENTIALLY THE MAJOR COSTS OF ITS DEFENSE BY THE MID-70S.

12. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.  
ERICSON

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## Message Text

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ORIGIN IO-14

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TO USMISSION IAEA VIENNA PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: N.A.

TAGS: IAEA

SUBJECT:NORTH KOREAN APPLICATION FOR IAEA MEMBERSHIP

REF: IAEA VIENNA 5072

IN CONNECTION WITH BOARD CONSIDERATION OF NORTH KOREAN APPLICATION, US SHOULD STATE THAT WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE BOARD RECOMMENDATION. ALSO THAT WE SHARE THE HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA THAT NORTH KOREA'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE IAEA WILL CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEFUL AND STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROK AND NORTH KOREA AND THE ADMISSION OF BOTH TO THE UNITED NATIONS. KISSINGER

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**Report by Izidor Urian, “The Foreign Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its Position towards the Main International Matters”**

<b>Date:</b> 18 July 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220/Year 1974/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Folder 1822, Secret, Concerning the Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of Comrade George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Started on: February 2, 1974, Completed on: August 20, 1974, Filing: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
First Direction – Relations  
No. 01/08719  
Secret

The Foreign Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its Position towards the Main International Matters

The main trends in the foreign policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, set at the 5th Party Congress (1970) and at the 1972 Session of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, are:

- a) to develop friendly relations with all countries which manifest a friendly attitude towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, based on the principle of equality and mutual advantage;
- b) to undertake efforts to get to a [higher level] of unity and cohesion of socialist countries and to promote friendly and collaborative relations with socialist countries, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism;
- c) to expand and strengthen even more state-to-state relations with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which are fighting for their freedom and national independence;
- d) to establish and promote friendly relations with as many states as possible in areas like political, economic and cultural relations, based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, [including] with capitalist countries which want to establish relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and which are carrying out a just, unaggressive policy towards the North and the South of the Korean Peninsula.

The struggle against American imperialism and Japanese militarism continues to represent one of the main concerns in the internal and external policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The harsh terms and phrases used at the 5th Party Congress, [such as] : “American imperialism is the most atrocious and cynical aggressor and looter in all modern times, and the number one mutual enemy of all progressive peoples in the world...; Japanese militarism is the sworn enemy of peoples in Asia...” continue to be used at the present moment as well, but to a lower extent, especially in official documents.

The beginning in 1972 of a dialogue with South Korea, the annual visits of certain personalities in the party and state leadership from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to numerous countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, the efforts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to influence as many countries as possible to be able to counter the actions of the South, the creation of friendship associations in all countries where such a thing was possible as well as the more flexible foreign policy promoted in the last 2-3 years resulted in the recognition of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by an increasing number of countries and to its accession to different international organizations. Therefore, only in 1973, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea established diplomatic relations with 12 countries, it joined the World Health Organization and the Interparliamentary Union, it opened a permanent observer office at the United Nations and took part, for the first time, in the workings of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as observer. In 1974, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea established diplomatic relations with Gabon, Costa Rica, Nepal and Guyana, it joined the World Postal Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it took part for the first time in the UN Conference on Maritime Law, in Caracas.

The number of countries with which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea currently has diplomatic and consular relations rises to approximately 70, and the number of countries with which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea currently has economic relations is over 80.

The recent proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (dating back to March 1974) to replace the 1953 armistice with a Korean-American peace treaty, which must comprise the following provisions:

- That the United States commits not to obstruct the peaceful and independent reunification of Korea;
- That both sides end the arms races;
- That foreign troops stationed in South Korea cease to be considered as UN troops and then that these troops are withdrawn;

did not trigger any particular echo not even amongst socialist countries. The American reaction was limited, for the time being, to a statement from the spokesman of the Department of State, which said that "by requesting the negotiation of a peace treaty with the United States of America, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is planning to exclude South Korea from the negotiations, which the United States cannot accept."

#### The Relations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the USSR and with the People's Republic of China

With the emergence and especially with the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet divergences, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sought to promote an independent line and to stay out of public disagreements, without always being able to do so.

Therefore, between 1963 and 1965 Korean-Soviet relations were noticeably tense. The North Korean media published several materials in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea expressed its official discontent towards the manner in which the history of Korea was presented in the Soviet encyclopedia as well as towards the manner in which the 'Economic Seminar' in Pyongyang was presented in the Soviet press.

Between 1966 and 1967, on the one hand, there was a rapprochement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards the Soviet Union, from which North Korea received substantial economic aid, and, on the other hand, relations with the People's Republic of China stalled. The Korean media released certain materials in which it expressed its discontent and disapproval towards the criticism put forward during the Cultural Revolution with respect to the North Korean leadership.

After the visits of Choe Yonggeon in the People's Republic of China (in 1969) and after the visit of Zhou Enlai to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1970), Korean-Chinese relations have experienced a process of continuous improvement. At the same time, there is a simultaneous reserve in the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the USSR.

Officially it is said that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has good relations with both countries.

[...]

July 18, 1974

Written by Izidor Urian

Typed by Sirbu, C.

3 copies

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 04894 290128Z

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5093

INFO USUN 1399

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 4894

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, KS

SUBJECT: KOREA AT THE UN

1. DURING CALL BY WINSTON LORD, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG JO SAID KOREA CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED NATIONS. WHEREAS LAST YEAR ROKG HAD PROPOSED SIMULTANEOUS ENTRY OF SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA, THEY WISHED NOW TO PROPOSE POSSIBILITY OF SECURING SOUTH KOREAN ENTRY AS A SEPARATE ELEMENT NEITHER COMBINED WITH NORTH KOREAN ENTRY NOR OPPOSED TO IT.

2. KIM ASKED IF WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A REASONABLE PROPOSAL DESPITE PROBABILITY OF VETO. WE SUGGESTED THAT QUESTION BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL OTHER CONCURRENT PLANNING FOR KOREAN QUESTION AT THE UN IS FURTHER ALONG. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE MATTER HAD ALREADY COME UP IN DISCUSSION BETWEEN USUN AND ROK OBSERVER DELEGATION. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO THE MOVE BUT IT SHOULD BE CONSISTENT AND PROPERLY TIMED WITH OTHER STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

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## Second Korean Hearing

**Date:**  
30 July 1974

**Source:**  
*South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.*

### MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Number : USW-07421 Date : 301500  
To : Minister Reference (Copy)  
From : Ambassador to the United States of America

Regarding WUS-07280

Today (July, 30th) at 11:30 in the morning, Minister Geun Park had a conversation with Deputy Assistant Secretary Abramowitz who had been inaugurated earlier this morning. The Deputy Assistant Secretary has observed that an immediate and full scale suspension of military provisions for Korea from Congress is unlikely unless there is another civil demonstration and the Korean government takes substantial measures in response. The Deputy Assistant Secretary will testify at the hearing this afternoon and the details of the speech are as follows (미일).<sup>1</sup>

Attached :

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<sup>1</sup> This could be an abbreviation for “미국 일본” (U.S. and Japan) or “미국 일반” (U.S. General Affairs).

## MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Number : WUS-0826 Date : 021630  
To : Ambassador to the United States of America  
From : Minister

Regarding USW-06161 and United States Politics 772-2767

1. Mr. Thomas J. Coolidge, Jr. had sent a message to His Excellency the President last July 22nd regarding the measures to acclimatize American public sentiment and to pursue understanding. In addition, he had arrived in the country the same day to illustrate the development progress and domestic circumstances of Korea to American congressmen and professors, so that the hearing proceeds in a direction that is beneficial to Korea.
2. He is an American entrepreneur, a member of the Harvard Foundation, and also a linera descendent of the 30th president of the United States, Calvin Coolidge. Since 1958, he has lived in Korea for many years. He is known to have performed critical roles behind the scene negotiations in the United States regarding the introduction of foreign capital to Korea.
3. Review and report on the plan to get help from President Coolidge in our activities at U.S. Congress hearings, other activities for engaging Congress, as well as activities in American academia, including Harvard University. (미일).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> This could be an abbreviation for “미국 일본” (U.S. and Japan) or “미국 일반” (U.S. General Affairs).

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1974

**The Afro-Asian Problems Study Group  
of  
The Liberal Democratic Party**

自民党アジア・アフリカ問題研究会

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**Translator's Note:**

The following is a translation of the details of three meetings held between President Kim Il Sung of North Korea and Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya of Japan on August 9 and 10 which were published in three parts in the Mainichi Shimbun on August 21, 22 and 23, 1974.



Details of the Meetings Between President Kim Il Sung  
and Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya

First Meeting: North-South Dialogue

Note: The first meeting took place between 11:30 a.m. and 2 p.m. on August 9 in the main hall of President Kim Il Sung's mountain villa and was also attended by Deputy Premier Park Sung Chul, Chief Secretary Kim Ju Yong and the Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry (name unavailable).

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Chairman Kim: Mr. Utsunomiya, it was 10 years ago that you last visited our country. Since you came such a long way to visit us, I should have met you in Pyongyang. However, if I were to return to Pyongyang, there would be a lot of other work for me to do. On the other hand, if I met you here, I would be able to have ample time and that is why I waited for you here.

Utsunomiya: I am grateful to you for worrying about my visit. Mr. Chairman, you have not changed a bit from 10 years ago. I have become completely gray, but you don't have any white hair. Is it because of "ginseng?"

1



Chairman Kim: No, it's due to a family trait. My 74-year-old uncle has no gray hair. Did we not both pledge to fight for the peace of Asia 10 years ago?

Utsunomiya: It's going to be tough from now on. This is because the finishing touches still have to be made.

Chairman Kim: Thanks. Let's both persevere.

Utsunomiya: This is something that I noticed 10 years ago, but, looking down from the plane on the way from Wonsan to Pyongyang and from Pyongyang to here by helicopter, I was surprised by the superbness of the irrigation works, the afforestation and the homes.

Chairman Kim: Thank you. We have the proverb in Korea, "Ten years and even the mountains and the rivers change," but our country has changed completely. This year we have bumper crops all around. Corn is particularly good. The raising of livestock has developed.

Utsunomiya: I visited Washington in June and scholars and politicians of good sense of both Japan and the United States will hold a conference in Washington to re-examine the Korean policies (of the two countries).



## Beginning of Negotiations

Chairman Kim: I support your efforts. Now, let me first tell you about our negotiations with South Korea. We have made proposals for peaceful unification several tens of times in the past. On August 6, 1971, I said in a speech at a welcome gathering of the citizens of Pyongyang in honor of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, who was visiting our country at that time, "I am prepared to talk at any time to all the political parties of South Korea, including the Democratic Republican Party, to popular groups or to individuals." Sometimes after this, South Korea proposed Red Cross meetings. We accepted this proposal, but all the representatives from South Korea were members of the Central Intelligence Agency.

However, we dispatched people connected with the Red Cross as their counterparts in the discussions. During the process of these discussions, the South side proposed the meetings be held in another country (other than North and South Korea) and proposed Switzerland. I was opposed to going to a foreign country and proposed either Panmunjom, Pyongyang or Seoul. It was first decided to hold the meetings at sea. In the end, it was decided to hold the meeting in Pyongyang and Lee Hu Rak (then Chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) made his appearance. In our meeting with Lee Hu Rak, our side asked: "Are you in favor of peaceful unification?" To this, the reply was, "Yes." We then said, "In bringing about peaceful unification, what do you think of doing it



without the intervention of Japan, the United States or other countries?" By other countries, I meant China and the Soviet Union. To this, the reply was, "We agree." Upon receiving these replies, I said I would be willing to meet Lee Hu Rak personally and I did and made three proposals. I proposed, first, bringing about unification independently; secondly, bringing about unification without the use of force; and, thirdly, bringing about unification through a grand national unity.

Lee Hu Rak insisted: "Since Communism and capitalism are two extremes, that's unreasonable." However, to this, I said: "There's a way of avoiding war. We are of the same race. We will not oppose the capitalists of the South and you will not oppose Communists. Let's retain the two systems. There are Communist parties in the parliaments of France, Italy and Japan. It's said that South Korea is taking the path of capitalism, but you don't have monopolistic capital such as exists in the United States and you don't have great zaibatsu such as Germany has. Even if you do, they're only comprador capitalists, aren't they? Even then, they form no comparison to Japan's monopolistic capital and haven't as yet developed into capitalism. We can handle this problem through greater mutual understanding." In the end, Lee Hu Rak agreed to this "grand national unity" and said, "President Park Chung Hee will likely agree also."



### Three Concrete Proposals

At this, I thought, "If so, there's some prospects." Then, there was an invitation from the other side and I dispatched Deputy Premier Park Sung Cul. I told him: "If Park (President Park Chung Hee) agrees to the three great principles, issue a communique." However, Park did agree to the three principles but opposed the communique. As a result, talks were started again from the middle of April and at the end of June, the South side said: "We are ready to issue a communique." This communique (the North-South Joint Statement) was announced on July 4 (1972) in the names of Lee Hu Rak and Kim Young Joo (Director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the Workers' Party). It was the next day. A lot of news reporters gathered around Lee Hu Rak and asked him questions. One of the questions was: "You say that unification will be carried out without intervention by outside influences and independently. But, what about the United Nations forces?" To this, Lee Hu Rak replied: "The United Nations forces are not an outside influence." The second question was: "Is it not necessary for the South to rescind the National State of Emergency Declaration (December 6, 1971)?" To this, Lee Hu Rak replied: "No, we can't because you can't trust Communists." It's utterly absurd.

Again, when the three men came, Lee Hu Rak, Chang Key Young and Choi Kyu Ha, I personally made three concrete proposals. My first proposal was: "The South doesn't have iron



ore. The North has plenty. We will provide the iron ore and you provide the manpower. We will also provide the facilities." The reply to this proposal was: "We will study it." My second proposal was: "In the South, you are engaged in the Saemaul (New Village) Movement. But, basically, the problem is the livelihood of the farmers. For this, the thing to do is to provide irrigation. We will provide without charge techniques and technicians and plenty of experience." On this, they were silent. Then, I made the third proposal: "The fishermen of the South are suffering because of a lack of fisheries resources. The North has plenty of resources and there is plenty of fish to be caught. We will open up the fishing grounds of the North. How about trying some joint venture in this field." To this, Lee Hu Rak said: "I will report (your proposal) to President Park. Park Chung Hee speaks of "Co-existence with a Dialogue." But, co-existence means recognizing two Koreas. We must strive not for co-existence but for unification. Later Park proposed the joint development of the Kungang Mountains as a tourist area.

Utsunomiya: It's the same with the development of Cheju Island (for tourists).

#### On The United Nations

Chairman Kim: That's just what I wanted to say. We did not reply to this proposal. It was from this time that we began to study their attitude and came to the conclusion



that the prospects were not bright. We proposed the establishment of a subcommittee on military affairs within the North-South Coordinating Committee. It was the spring of 1973.

South Korea says that we will advance south. But, we have repeatedly said we have no intention of advancing south. We made a number of proposals, but none was accepted. Then, on the morning of June 23 last year, President Park proposed the participation of the two Koreas in the United Nations. That afternoon, I said: "This would mean making the division of the two Koreas permanent. We should set up a confederation of the two Koreas and then enter the United Nations."

When we look back at these developments, we can see that the United States wants two Koreas. This is what Japan's reactionaries want too. We have no intention of driving south as far as Pusan. What we're saying is we should maintain the two Koreas for the time being.

We examined the Park Regime itself. Immediately after the start of the North-South Dialogue, the Park Regime undertook its October Revitalization Reforms and decreed martial law. (Note: The October Revitalization Reforms took place when President Park Chung Hee declared nation-wide emergency martial law on October 17, 1972, and, through such emergency measures as partially revising the Korean constitution and dissolving the National Assembly, strengthened his own position). We did not criticize the October Revitalization Reforms because such would constitute internal



interference. This was because the North-South meetings had just begun and there was fear the meetings would break up. We decided to proceed with great patience.

Utsunomiya: There is the opinion among Japanese Korean specialists that the October Revitalization Reforms were carried out in order to cope with the North Korea's revision of its constitution.

Chairman Kim: That's wrong. A constitution that is suited to socialist construction and development is necessary as a socialist constitution. We wrote it two years ago, but we adopted it after the October Revitalization Reforms.

Utsunomiya: When the North-South Joint Statement was announced, Kim Dae Jung submitted a proposal to President Park Chung Hee, saying: "Since a North-South Dialogue was something I had advocated, I would like to cooperate also." However, Park made no reply.

Chairman Kim: Two years have passed since the North-South Joint Statement and we have studied the situation. The Park Regime will not carry out unification. President Park's sole desire is to continue in power. Neither Lee Hu Rak or Kim Jong Pil have any intention of bringing about unification. Further, the United States says the reason why it is stationing



troops in South Korea is to defend it against the southward advance of North Korea. However, we have said many times we will not advance south. Since the United States won't trust our words, we're proposing the conclusion of a peace treaty. (Note: On March 25, 1974, North Korea proposed to the United States peace negotiations covering four items --- including the conclusion of a non-aggression pact through direct negotiations between the two countries, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and a ban on the export of arms by the United States to Korea.) But, the United States won't do it. What we are saying is: Let's achieve unification through talks. Let's hold a pan-Korean peoples congress and let's talk together, with all factions, all political parties and with Kim Dae Jung attending.

Utsunomiya: In the United States, there is increasing criticism of Park Chung Hee these last two three months. This is the case in Japan also.

#### Why the Dialogue is Continued

Chairman Kim: By way of conclusion, we believe we can't reach a conclusion even if we hold talks with Park Chung Hee. Then, why do we continue the talks? It's because we believe there is the possibility that the representatives of the peoples of the South will eventually



join these talks. That's why we keep the doors open. It's not that we are afraid of international public opinion. The interests of the Korean race demand this. At the present time, talks are being held between the deputy chairmen of the North-South Coordinating Committee. The representative from the other side is Chang Key Young. We say: "Stop your suppression." To this, they say: "That's domestic interference."

Utsunomiya: It's good to keep the doors open, in order to show to the world the earnest desire for unification and the peaceful posture of the (Democratic Peoples') Republic.

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Details of the Meetings between President Kim Il Sung  
and Representative Tokuma Utsunomiya

Second Meeting: North Korea and the United States

Note: The second meeting took place between 5:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on August 9. President Kim Il Sung visited the place where Mr. Utsunomiya was staying (Guest House) across the valley from President Kim's mountain villa. Deputy Premier Park Sun Chul sat in on the meeting.

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Utsunomiya: I would like to present to you this book (Tenkan Suru Bei Ajiya Seisaku to Nippon, "The United States' Changing Asian Policy and Japan", May, 1972, Misaki Shobo), which I wrote prior to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to China.

Chairman Kim: Thank you. I recently sent a letter to the United States. (Note: On March 25, Vice-Premier and concurrently Foreign Minister Ho Dam proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States. The same day, the Supreme Peoples Council adopted a "Letter to the U.S. Congress," On receipt of this letter all that the United States did, according to reports, was to notify the Government of the Republic of Korea to the effect: "Unless the Republic of Korea is a participant in the peace agreement, the United States cannot



enter into any negotiations with North Korea.) The Park Regime then proposed a non-aggression treaty (on January 18, 1974). I think a non-aggression treaty is not a bad idea. However, it is not realistic, because, at the present time, the United States has forces stationed in South Korea and has the right to take over command of (all forces). Under such conditions, it would not be realistic to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the Park Regime. There would be no meaning to a non-aggression pact unless it is predicted on the eventual withdrawal of the U.S. forces (in Korea) or on the eventual conclusion of a peace treaty. The problem of a non-aggression treaty is whether it is based on the premise of unification. If unification is not made a premise, (the division of) the two Koreas would become permanent. Further, unless we agree to reduce armaments, our people would be placed in a difficult position. Frankly speaking, the continuation of the present situation places a heavy burden upon us. When it comes to spending even one sen, we study the expenditure carefully. After all, we have to buy our weapons from foreign countries.

Utunomiya: I can understand the hardships of a country that is trying to make it on its own. In contrast, Japan and the United States are providing aid to the Republic of Korea.

Chairman Kim: What we spend is quite considerable. We are only trying to keep pace with South Korea, but, they



(the South Koreans) keep saying: "The North will advance south. The North is powerful. Therefore, give us aid." However, from the point of view of numbers and from the size of their airforce, they are superior to us. What we excel in is the moral aspect. A small country is being exposed to the threat of a great power. I have instructed the persons concerned not to engage in provocative actions. In the past, we have made mistakes in certain incidents. However, I have had the persons who made these mistakes punished. Such (provocations) do not add up as plus factors on the side of peaceful unification. Especially after the North-South Joint Statement (July 4, 1974), we have not engaged in any provocative actions.

Certain segments of the American people believe we will advance south. We sent a letter to the United States saying, "Let's hold talks." However, we received no reply. There was not even an expression of opposition to such talks. This (attitude on the part of the United States) is a big problem as far as the relaxation of tensions is concerned. We have people who are sympathetic to us. They are the leaders of the Third World. There are several tens of them and these leaders are saying on our behalf (to the United States): "Why don't you accept the demand (of North Korea) to hold talks." The United States told a certain leader of the Third World: "We will look for an opportunity and hold secret talks." Or, the United States said (to these leaders): "If the North provides guarantees, we'll hold the talks." However, we don't know what kind of guarantees they're talking about.



We have also not been able to find a way out. It's the same with the United States. There's a proverb: "Unless you look at the skies, you can't see the stars." We want to have relations with the United States, but we just don't have the connections." According to what the people of the Third World say, there are even within the United States different groups of people --- the State Department, the Defense Department and the White House. These groups all have different opinions. We have to settle our problems with people who have authority.

The people of the Third World say: "You should not have made the letter (you sent to the United States) public." Because we proposed making the letter public, these people said, the United States would take our proposal as proof we were trying to drive a wedge between the United States and (President) Park. The United States also says; "South Korea should hold the same sort of talks (as the talks proposed by North Korea) with the Soviet Union and China." But there's no basis for this argument. China does not have any troops in our country. On the other hand, the United States has troops in South Korea and is the country with which we concluded a truce agreement.

Koreans residing in the United States sometimes come to see us. They might be connected with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, but they ask us: "We want to launch a coup d'etat in South Korea. What do you think about



this?" We reply; "We have no connection with what may happen to the regime in South Korea. What we are seeking is peaceful unification." We think we can send (the United States) not an open letter but a secret letter, but we can't send a secret letter when we have no relations (with the United States).

As for the guarantee we will not advance south, we will decide that through direct talks with the United States. If we can get the United States to guarantee the Park Regime will not make war, we will also give guarantees. For this, we would reduce our arms. At the same time, the United States should not provide arms to South Korea.

Utunomiya: What we are worried about is that the Park Government might become reckless while the U.S. still has troops in South Korea and might provoke a war which would drag in the United States.

Chairman Kim: Of course, we can think of the possibility of (President) Park risking an adventure. However, is it possible for Park to do such a thing while the United States still has troops stationed in South Korea, without the United States knowing about it? We would practice self-control. I want you to tell this to the United States. The people of the Socialist countries, the people of the Third World and Koreans residing in the United States say: "Since you



have built up such a fine Socialism, we want you to avoid a war that would destroy it." The United States should make (President) Park practice self-control and the United States should also give expression to its power of self-control.

Utsunomiya: What would be the difference between a peace treaty with the United States and a peace treaty with South Korea?

Chairman Kim: We have proposed to the United States our changing the truce agreement into a peace agreement. Why? Because the country with which we signed the truce agreement is the United States. In this way, if we reduce troops, we can maintain peace and also get closer to unification. Of course, the division of Korea will continue for the time being, but tensions will be relaxed. We also brought up this matter at the North-South Coordinating Committee, but Lee Hu Rak (then Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) said: "I can't persuade the army to agree." This is perhaps because there are many people in the South Korean army who studied in the United States.

Utsunomiya: The United States gives three reasons for maintaining troops in South Korea: (1) because it wants to prevent the North from advancing south; (2) because it wants to prevent the Park Regime from advancing North; and,



(3) because, if the United States leaves South Korea, South Korea will drag in Japan instead.

Chairman Kim: It's quite possible these reasons may be so. Thus, even if the United States does withdraw, it seems it will leave token forces behind. We need to establish direct contact (with the United States) and clarify these points.

We will not advance south. We can guarantee that. We will not send in spies. We can also guarantee this. However, as for a revolution that arises naturally, we can't guarantee it won't take place. This is because, where there is suppression, revolutions arise.

The National Democratic Youth-Student Federation and Bishop (Daniel) Tji --- they are all people we haven't even met. It's the same with Kim Dae Jung. However, their advocacies are right. Their slogans are also good. Honestly speaking, we had placed expectations in these people.

Utsunomiya: President Park says: "If I am replaced, confusion will arise. If so, the North will advance (into South Korea)."

Chairman Kim: According to the hints dropped by the Koreans the United States sent over to see us, the United States, it seems, is worried on this point. We have told these Koreans: "We will not do anything against South Korea."



No matter what may happen, we will not interfere. If the United States chooses progressive people (to lead South Korea), we will welcome them."

We believe a Communist Party will not come to power in South Korea. If progressive people, people who desire peaceful unification or people who advocate reduction of arms come to power, that would be good. If we reduce our military forces, with the forces in the North reduced to 100,000 and the forces in the South also reduced to 100,000, South Korea would be able to maintain a force of this size by itself (without aid from the United States). We would not station troops along the 38th Parallel. We would assign only police forces there. Progressive people would agree to do the same thing in South Korea. There are plenty of progressive people in South Korea. It's these people that should take over power.

Utsunomiya: We also can't stand having South Korea taking aid from us on the grounds it is a bulwark against Communism.

Chairman Kim: International trends will likely isolate the Park Regime. This will be good not only for the Korean people but also for Asia. The National Assembly is now in session in South Korea and it seems the New Democratic Party is putting up a good fight. No matter how much President Park may suppress the people of South Korea, democracy will not be destroyed. Even if the South does not become Communist



or Socialist, we believe we can talk with them if they establish democracy there.

I once said: "When our fatherland is liberated, we will not adopt a Soviet-type Socialism or an American-type Capitalism. We will adopt a Korean-style democracy." As a matter of fact, I opposed comprador capitalists, but I rather protected national capitalists. As a matter of fact, it was the fierce bombing of all our cities by the United States that completely destroyed the small and medium enterprises in our country. We will not oppose the native capitalists of South Korea nor landowners. We must make the interests of our people the starting point. There can be no internationalism where there is no patriotism, and there can be no patriotism without internationalism. The Socialism that we practice is not a frightful Socialism. If Socialism is implemented in a fine manner, we can gain popular support.

Utsunomiya: I understand they are teaching children in South Korea that demons with horns live in the North.

Chairman Kim: There's need for contact between North and South. When Lee Hu Rak came to Pyongyang, he came by helicopter. We told the South our Deputy Premier Park Chung Sul would go to Seoul by helicopter also, but the South refused to permit him to travel by helicopter. They are still afraid and are still trying to hide things. We are neither afraid nor trying to conceal things. There is need for more and more people to establish contact with each other.



DETAILS OF THE MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT KIM IL SUNG  
AND REPRESENTATIVE TOKUMA UTSUNOMIYA

Third Meeting: Japan-North Korea Relations

Note: The third meeting took place from 10 a.m. on until 1 p.m. on August 10, after which the two had lunch together. Representative Utsunomiya left President Kim Il Sung's mountain villa at 2:10 p.m. When the time came for parting, reports say, Premier Kim Il Sung gave every indication he wanted to continue talking.

Chairman Kim: It seems there was no special news this morning (September 10). However, (U.S. President Gerald) Ford had his swearing-in ceremony. We are making no comment. This is because we have no connection (with the United States). In the South, the prosecution demanded 15-year sentences for Bishop (Daniel) Tji and (former President) Yun Po Soon. Absurd the things those people do. How can Bishop Tji be a Communist?

Utsunomiya: The two Japanese students also got 20 years. We say: "That's too severe." To this, they reply: "Unlike your country, we are in a state of war." It's then that the "threat from the North" makes its appearance. They keep talking about "threats" because they want aid. Thus, the (Park) Regime is a difficult Government to talk to.



Chairman Kim: Foreign Minister (Adam) Malik of Indonesia came to see me with a personal letter from (President) Suharto. After (President) Sukarno's death, economic relations (between our two countries) were severed. However, the content of the letter was to the effect: "Let's do things in the same way we used to do in the past." I said: "Whether it be Sukarno or whether it be Suharto, that's your country's problem. I also agree to your proposal." The Foreign Minister was satisfied and I also sent a personal letter (to President Suharto). These people also said; "South Koreans come (to our country) and talk about the threat from the North, but they are not sincere." Foreign Minister Malik also talked to the U.S. and Philippines ambassadors about this and is reported to have said to the South Korean ambassador: "Don't tell me lies."

The Swiss have also come, saying they want to establish diplomatic relations (with us). We intend to establish ties with them. Both Sweden and Switzerland are neutral with regard to the Korean question and they say: "It's South Korea that's raising all this fuss". They also proposed trade with us. We've also established relations with Australia. The South became angry and recalled their ambassador. Australia is a nation that took part in the Korean War. (President) Park did something comparable to dropping a rock he had picked up on his own feet.



Utsunomiya: The establishment of diplomatic relations (between North Korea) and other countries is progressing. I believe Japan will also head in the same direction. Have you exchanged ambassadors with Australia?

Chairman Kim: Australia is to have its ambassador to Peking serve concurrently as ambassador to our country.

Utsunomiya: In the case of countries which took part in the Korean War, do you have some kind of special treaty?

Chairman Kim: No, we don't. We haven't demanded any either. Pakistan was a member of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), but withdrew from the Commission. Chile was the same.

Utsunomiya: In the case Japan moves in the same direction, can Japan establish diplomatic relations side by side with the Japan-(South) Korea Treaty?

Chairman Kim: It's not the restoration of diplomatic relations. In reality it's the establishment of new ties. It seems Japan takes the position that it will recognize North Korea, "if the Soviet Union and China recognize South Korea." It's reported Japan even hinted to China it should recognize South Korea. We don't like this situation. The same thing happened in the case of Switzerland and Australia (with



both countries recognizing both North and South Korea). This sort of thing leads to making the division of Korea permanent. It is also linked to the problem of how to enter the United Nations as one country. We do not lay down any conditions in the case of countries having relations with South Korea. If Japan is to establish diplomatic relations (with North Korea), it must not do it in a way that will make the division of Korea permanent but in such a way that will expedite unification. If Japan insists on China recognizing South Korea as one of the conditions for <sup>the</sup> recognition of North Korea, we will not establish relations with Japan.

Article 3 of the Japan-Republic of Korea treaty is problematical. It says: "The Republic of Korea is the only legitimate government." This is internal interference. Why is it that the South is the only legitimate government? The best way (of establishing relations) is to do so by abrogating the Japan-Republic of Korea treaty. However, Japan can't do so because of loss of face. But if Japan established diplomatic relations with us, Article 3 would naturally lose its efficacy.

What we regard as important is whether Japan has or has not relations with us, whether Japan discriminates or does not discriminate against us. If Japan discriminates against us, it would be better if we did not establish relations with Japan. If we were to establish relations with Japan and were then be discriminated against, we would not be able to bear it.



According to data we have in our hands, when the Tanaka Cabinet was about to be formed, that famous politician (Kakuei Tanaka) said to South Korea: "Japan's relations with North and South Korea during the days of the Sato Cabinet was 10 (for South Korea) to zero (for North Korea). When the Tanaka Cabinet is formed, relations will be nine (for South Korea) to one (for North Korea). It will never be five to ~~one~~<sup>five.</sup>" The Tanaka Cabinet has proved that what Tanaka was saying was true.

Frankly speaking, we will establish diplomatic relations (with Japan), if (1) no conditions are attached, (2) if we are not subjected to discriminatory treatment, and (3) if the division (of Korea) is not made permanent. However, if the Tanaka Cabinet maintains its present stance, we have no interest in establishing diplomatic ties with Japan.

Utsunomiya: What you say is clear and I understand you well. You are saying that Japan's relations (with North and South Korea) must be equal and equi-distant and that economic relations is not a problem of quantity but a problem of the (Japanese) Government's posture (toward North Korea).

Chairman Kim: That's right.

Utsunomiya: Separate from the problem of diplomatic relations, what do you think is necessary between Japan and North Korea?



Chairman Kim: What is necessary is not particularly difficult. Japan must not oppress Koreans residing in Japan. Japan must not discriminate <sup>between</sup> ~~the~~ the Mindan (The Korean Residents Union in Japan), and the Chosoren (The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) and must not oppress these organizations. Japan must step up exchange in various fields (with North Korea). Economically, we do not place great anticipations in Japan. In the economic field also, we are discriminated against in a number of ways. Ten years ago we tried to buy a hydro-electric plant from Japan, but Japan would not sell it to us and we had to buy it from West Germany. Mr. Chuji Kuno Hisano came to visit us. (Note: Kuno is President of the Federation of Japan and North Korean Parliamentarians and Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Liberal Democratic Party, who organized and lead a suprapartisan group of Diet members on a visit to North Korea in January, 1972). However, nothing much has happened since his visit. Mr. Kuno proposed we trade with each other. We said to him: "We don't place much expectations in trade." Mr. Kuno said: "There's a number of things we can trade. We will buy coal and ore from you and will provide you plants." We replied: "Your plants are not necessary to us in our Six Year Plan, but we'll agree for the sake of friendship." Subsequently, we ordered a 2,000 cubic-meter blast furnace from Japan. This was because we have 1,000 cubic-meter furnaces, but we can't make 2,000 cubic-meter furnaces in our country. A group of



Japanese representatives and technicians came to our country and we were ready to sign a contract. However, we were not able to conclude this contract because of pressure from the Japanese Government. I wanted to criticize (the Japanese Government), but I decided for the sake of friendly relations with Japan to desist and wait with great patience.

We have made it a rule to build our basic industries with our own hands. What we need, we buy from the Soviet Union, China, France, Italy, West Europe and Britain. We can buy what we want with the same (British) pounds. Besides, Japan's prices are higher. Japan deliberately quotes high prices so that we cannot make any transactions and then tries to shoulder us with the blame. We have no recourse but to buy from Europe. The prices, however, are cheaper and the quality is good. As far as economics are concerned, the Japanese Government needs to make improvements. The sense of independence of Japan's politicians is weak. It's strange the way Japanese politicians are weak in the face of ~~threats~~ threats from South Korea.

Utsunomiya: There's an adhesion (between Japanese politicians and South Korea). They are also concerned about America's reactions. It's this physical characteristic (of Japanese politicians) that I want to correct.

Chairman Kim: It's true the United States is exerting pressure (on the Japan). Once we bought some equipment

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from Sweden. We bought the equipment on a deferred payment basis. On this occasion also, a Swedish company, which was a joint venture with an American firm, refused to let us pay on a deferred payment basis. At this, other companies who heard of this refusal were very angry, saying: "It's a matter of national prestige" and, in the final analysis, the company decided to fulfill its original promise. Sweden is a small country but it has courage.

Utsunomiya: I understand very well. Basically, it's necessary to change Japan's attitude.

Chairman Kim: What are the possibilities (of doing that)?

Utsunomiya: Frankly speaking, it's difficult unless the United States changes (its attitude). That's why I'm trying to talk with the United States... Incidentally, I feel a personal friendship toward Kim Dae Jung. (Note: The opposition presidential candidate to Park Chung Hee, who was abducted in Tokyo and taken to Seoul). I want somehow or the other to keep him alive and have him leave South Korea. What do you think about this?

Chairman Kim: I think it's a fine thing. We have no connections with Kim Dae Jung, but we've reached the conclusion



his advocacies are correct. If your efforts are successful and he is able to get out of South Korea, I would welcome that.

Chairman Kim: (After asking Utsunomiya's opinions on the stories of the crisis facing the Tanaka Cabinet and Prime Minister Tanaka's theory of remodelling the Japanese archipelago, he asked): Is there any possibility of Japan changing its economic structure as a result of the oil crisis?

Utsunomiya: (Japan's economic structure) should be changed, but the effects (of the oil crisis) haven't made themselves felt to that extent. The inflation has been held down to a certain level and is now in a state of lull. The problem is the future.

Chairman Kim: I want to hear not about the problem of the Third World itself, but about the Japanese Government's reactions to the contentions of the Third World. The world trend is to emphasis independence. This applies not only to the Third World but also to the advanced countries. If the unity of the countries having independence is <sup>strengthened</sup> ~~strengthened~~, the world will change. If the Japanese Government, in this sense, develops its relations with the Third World, not through aggression, but through technical aid, it would be to Japan's benefit also.

Utsunomiya: Japan is basically an Asian country. We



formed the Afro-Asia Study Group for the purpose of strengthening Japan's relations with the countries of Asia and Africa and the Third World. However, we have not as yet been able to exert adequate influence on the Japanese Government. The oil crisis served to turn Japan's attention to the Third World in the Middle East. However, as the proverb says; "Food is no longer hot after it passes through the throat," Japan's interest in the Middle East is again decreasing.

Chairman Kim: When the oil crisis arose, Japan changed its attitude toward Israel. I'd like to hear how Japan's policy changed toward the Third World as a result of this change in Japan's attitude toward Israel.

Utsunomiya: I'm ashamed to say this, but Japan's attitude to the Third World is the same as that toward South Korea. Japan is only concerned with immediate gains and its view is narrow. The way to change Japanese diplomacy basically is to improve Japan's relations with North Korea.

Chairman Kim: You may ask why we are so interested in this problem. The reason is we believe that there is a way that Japan can develop its economy, without walking the path of aggression and by gaining the thanks of the developing countries. I believe Japan can present a new image to the peoples of the world. Is there something behind Japan being tied to the United States?



Utsunomiya: There's really nothing. If Japan were a big country, it would maintain its independence and, at the same time, must throw away its small egoisms. Is this not your "che che" (independence) ideology?

Chairman Kim: That's absolutely so. For Japan to work together with the Third World would also mean the ~~expiation~~ of its sins. If Japan were to provide technical aid to and develop the sciences among a wide range of Afro-Asian countries, would not that be the beginning of a new Japan? A large number of countries are hoping that Japan will be able to do so. China is a great power, but it is turning its eyes toward the Third World. Our country is a small nation and we can't give aid in a material way. China and we will do our best, but if Japan were to join, it would be a big step forward.

Utsunomiya: I'd like to make a final request. I would like to introduce to you those among my friends in Japan and the United States whom I think should be shown your country. Could I look to you for your kind consideration?

Chairman Kim: I would welcome them. If necessary, I will meet them myself.

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## Message Text

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 05345 151225Z

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SY-04 USSS-00 SCCT-02 SSO-00 NSCE-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

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INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SEOUL 5345

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINS, KS

SUBJECT: PARK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

1. A PRESS CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT 6:45 P.M. BY DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTOR HUH HYUNG-KYU AT WHICH HE MADE BRIEF STATEMENT, GIST AS FOLLOWS:

2. AT 10:23 A.M. TODAY AT THE NATIONAL THEATER AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON FIRED A PISTOL AT PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG-HEE. FIRST BULLET HIT PODIUM. SECOND HIT MRS. PARK CHUNG-HEE IN HEAD. THIRD HIT MISS CHANG BONG-HWA, A HIGH SCHOOL GIRL. MISS CHANG WAS PRONOUNCED DEAD ON ARRIVAL AT HOSPITAL. GUNMAN WAS HIT IN THIGH BY BULLET FROM HIS OWN GUN DURING SCUFFLE THAT ENSUED WHEN HE RESISTED ARREST. GUNMAN WAS FOUND TO BE CARRYING A JAPANESE PASSPORT.

2. SPOKESMAN WAS ASKED WHETHER ASSASSIN WAS KOREAN OR JAPANESE AND HE IDENTIFIED HIM AS A KOREAN LIVING IN JAPAN WITHOUT GIVING ANY NAME. NEXT QUESTION ASKED IF ASSASSIN WAS ACTING

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ALONE OR IN CONNECTION WITH CHOSEN SOREN (A COMMUNIST ORIENTED

ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN). QUESTIONER WENT ON TO ASK IF THE ASSASSIN PROVES TO BE CONNECTED WITH CHOSEN SOREN, WOULD ROKG DEMAND THAT JAPAN SEND ACCOMPLICES TO KOREA. PROSECUTOR REPLIED THAT KOREA HAS NO EXTRADITION AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN. HOWEVER, THE INCIDENT IS VERY SERIOUS, AND IF THE INVESTIGATION SHOWS IT TO BE NECESSARY, ROKG WILL ASK FOR JAPANESE COOPERATION.

3. EARLIER IN DAY KOREAN RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PERMITTING JAPANESE NATIONALS AND KOREANS RESIDENT IN JAPAN WHO ARE IN KOREA AT PRESENT TO DEPART FROM KIMPO AIRPORT. AFTERNOON PRESS REPORTED OVER ONE HUNDRED TRAVELERS ALREADY HAD BEEN TURNED BACK BUT THAT JAPANESE DIPLOMATS AND BUSINESSMEN WITH UNQUESTIONABLE CREDENTIALS WERE EXEMPTED FROM CONTROL.

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**FOREIGN MINISTRY COMMENTS ON ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT**

Pyongyang KCNA in English 1650 GMT 19 Aug /4 B

[Text] Pyongyang August 19 (KCNA)--A press conference was held today at the Taedong-Kang Hall in Pyongyang in connection with the "incident of shooting" at traitor Pak Chong-Hui in South Korea. Cha Pyon-ok, vice-director of a department of the Foreign Ministry, spoke at the press conference attended by home and foreign reporters.

He said: Already right after the occurrence of the "incident" the South Korean puppet clique concluded at will that it was an "incident" entirely connected with us and conducted the so-called "investigation" in the direction of fabricating material to "verify" their false assertion.

They published on August 17 what they call "whole aspect of the investigation" into the "incident of shooting at Pak Chong-hui" and went the length of blaming us on an untenable pretext. As clearly pointed out in the statement the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY made public this morning upon authorization, this is a most dastardly farce staged by the South Korean puppet clique in league with the Japanese reactionaries and a most despicable political ruse full of lies and swindles.

It is clear why the South Korean rulers are trying so hard in an absurd way to pass the buck to us, he said, and continued: The South Korean puppet clique and the Japanese militarists, in conspiracy with each other, are blaming the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon) along with us. Their purpose is to invent a pretext to suppress the Chongnyon organization and the just patriotic activities daily intensified among compatriots of broad sections in Japan including those under the influence of the "ROK Residents Association in Japan" ("Mindan").

Therefore, the political ruse of the South Korean reactionaries and the Japanese reactionaries cannot be construed otherwise than a big, deliberate plot against the entire Korean people.

The more frantically the South Korean reactionaries cling to a ridiculous trick against us in collusion and alignment with the Japanese reactionaries employing their habitual method, the more saliently they will reveal their true color as its author and the deeper they will land themselves in a hopeless bog.

The Pak Chong-hui puppet clique had better look straight at the reality, deport themselves with discretion and give up at once their dastardly and shameless plot against us.

The Japanese militarists, too, must know clearly that it is a daydream to get something from the collusion and alignment with the South Korean reactionaries bent on hatching despicable political plots. They must renounce their hostile policy toward our republic and stop foul intrigues to suppress Chongnyon and the 600,000 Korean citizens in Japan.



# Department of State

# TELETYPE

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, *State Review 9/02*  
By KBH, NARA, Date 10/10/02

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, UN, KS, KN  
SUBJECT: FURTHER RESPONSE TO PRC ON UNC PROPOSAL

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR HABIB

1. ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENT AND NSC ANALYSIS OF PRC JULY 31 RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE UNC REAFFIRMS INITIAL INTERPRETATION THAT THE CHINESE ARE INTERESTED IN FURTHER NEGOTIATION ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE THE PRC REPLY REJECTS TWO SECONDARY ELEMENTS OF OUR INITIAL PACKAGE, THE POSITIVE TONE OF THE REPLY AND THE FAILURE TO COMMENT ON CORE ELEMENT OF A FOUR-PARTY ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTINUATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SUGGESTS THE PRC AND NORTH KOREA ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THAT ELEMENT. IN ADDITION, THE EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE UNC QUESTION WILL BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE YEAR FURTHER INDICATES DESIRE FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION.
2. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH A TRUNCATED VERSION OF OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, DROPPING THE IDEA OF A NONAGGRESSION PACT AND PRIVATE PRC/DPRK ACCEPTANCE OF OUR INTERIM TROOP PRESENCE, THUS MAKING THE ESSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON TERMINATING THE UNC THE QUADRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENT FOR MAINTAINING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
3. WE PROPOSE A REPLY TO THE PRC EMBODYING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
  - A. AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET THAT NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES ARE UNWILLING TO ENTER INTO A NONAGGRESSION AGREEMENT WITH THE SOUTH, AS IT IS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF A STEP-BY-STEP BUILDING OF CONFIDENCE AND STABILIZATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA THAT THE U.S. CAN CONSIDER THE ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES.

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Department of State

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FYI: YOU SHOULD ASSURE ROK OFFICIALS THAT THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM KOREA IS NOT LINKED IN ANY WAY TO TERMINATION OF THE UNC. END FYI.

B. WE ARE PREPARED TO HOLD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRC ON FUTURE OF THE UNC BASED ON THE FIRST TWO ELEMENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL OF JUNE 13. THAT IS (1) THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE UNDER AN ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE TWO KOREAN SIDES, THE U.S. AND THE PRC WOULD ACCEPT THE U.S. AND ROK MILITARY COMMANDERS AS "SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND" TO CINCUNC UNDER ARTICLE 11 PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT; AND (2) ENDORSEMENT OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT BY U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE TIME IT IS NOTIFIED OF TERMINATION OF UNC.

4. WE WOULD SAY THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO PRC/NORTH KOREAN SIDE, WE ARE PREPARED TO PRESENT A DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBSTITUTING THE U.S. AND ROK MIL COMMANDERS FOR CINCUNC AS SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND AND AFFIRMING THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. IF AND WHEN AGREEMENT ON SUCH A DOCUMENT IS REACHED, THE MODALITIES FOR INFORMING U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OF TERMINATION OF THE U.N. COMMAND, AND GAINING ITS ENDORSEMENT OF SAME, WOULD BE WORKED OUT BY THE U.S. AND PRC REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK IN CONSULTATION WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE FRIENDS.



5. WE WOULD ALSO INDICATE TO THE PRC OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT INDICATIONS THAT FRIENDS OF NORTH KOREA MAY PRECIPITATE A DEBATE ON THE MATTER OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA IN THE UNGA THIS FALL. WHILE NOTING THAT THIS WILL NOT HELP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE ON KOREAN MATTERS, WE WOULD ASSERT THAT THE U.S., TOGETHER WITH ITS FRIENDS, IS QUITE PREPARED TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS AT THE U.N. TO RESPOND TO THOSE WHO WOULD PRECIPITATE A DEBATE. WE REMAIN WILLING, HOWEVER, TO REFRAIN FROM PRESSING A DEBATE OR RESOLUTION IN THE GA AS LONG AS THIS IS NOT DONE BY ANY OTHER STATE OR GROUP OF STATES. FYI: WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN AN EVEN STRONGER POSITION THIS YEAR THAN LAST TO BUILD A COALITION AGAINST A DEBATE ON KOREA. OUR JUNE 13 PROPOSAL TO THE PRC AND NORTH KOREA CAN BE USED

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NOON 12:00 PM



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TO MARSHALL SUPPORT FOR A FRIENDLY RESOLUTION; AND THE PRC WILL PROBABLY BE INHIBITED FROM ACTIVELY SUPPORTING NORTH KOREA'S FRIENDS IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. GENERAL RELUCTANCE OF OTHER STATES TO TAKE POSITIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUES, WHEN COMBINED WITH FACT UNC IS MOST PROPERLY A QUESTION FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION, GIVE US ADDED CONFIDENCE. THUS, YOU SHOULD REASSURE ROK OFFICIALS THAT WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN A STRONG POSITION TO RESPOND TO ANY GA CHALLENGE THIS FALL, AND SHOULD HOLD BACK ON AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT ACTIONS OF NORTH KOREA'S SUPPORTERS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE QUIET PROPOSAL TO PRC MENTIONED IN THIS PARAGRAPH A CHANCE TO TAKE EFFECT. END FYI.

6. REQUEST YOU SEEK MEETING WITH FONMIN KIM AT EARLY DATE AND SEEK ROK AGREEMENT TO THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN PARAS 3 THROUGH 5 ABOVE. KISSINGER

NSC:RHSOLOMAN/EA:DRANARD/SB

DB/LS/74

S - THE SECRETARY

EA - MR. SNEIDER

IO - MR. BLAKE (DRAFT)

S/S-O:P JOHNSON

L - MR. ALDRICH

S/P - MR. LORD



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**Report by I. Ciubotaru, "The Official Visit Paid by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea"**

<b>Date:</b> 19 August 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220/Year 1974/Country: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Folder 1822, Secret, Concerning the Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of Comrade George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Started on: February 2, 1974, Completed on: August 20, 1974, Filing: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
First Direction – Relations  
No. 01/09962  
Secret  
To: Comrade George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Report

Regarding: the Official Visit Paid by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, George Macovescu, paid an official visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea between July 30th and August 4th, at the invitation of the North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heo Dam.

On August 3rd, the Romanian Foreign Minister was received by Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who organized a lunch [for the Romanian Minister].

During the official talks with the North Korean Foreign Minister, Heo Dam, the two officials discussed the following matters: the development of the friendly relations between Romania and North Korea as well as certain international matters of interest for both parties. The two ministers briefed each other on the main preoccupations of the two countries on matters related to the construction of socialism.

I. Bilateral Relations

Both ministers underlined the exceptional importance of the meetings and talks held in Pyongyang in 1971 between comrades Nicolae Ceausescu and Kim Il Sung, with a view to strengthening and developing the friendly relations and the brotherly collaboration between the two countries.

The two ministers expressed their full satisfaction with the continuously ascending evolution of Romanian-Korean relations and the determination of the two parties to undertake any actions necessary to develop, deepen and diversify these relations in all possible areas. Both parties said that such a development of the cooperation between Romania and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is advantageous to both the Romanian and the Korean peoples, to the unity of socialist countries, and to the cause of peace in the world.

The collaboration between the two ministries of foreign affairs was positively assessed by both parties. The North Korean foreign minister, Heo Dam, repeatedly thanked the Romanian government for the support the latter granted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the international stage. It was decided to intensify contacts and consultations between the two ministries of foreign affairs on all levels. The North Korean side renewed its invitation that Cornel Pacoste, Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, as well as the heads of the First Direction – Relations, the Juridical as well as the International Organizations Directions, visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. With respect to discussing the Korean matter at the United Nations, the Korean side expressed its desire to continue its consultations with the Romanian side in Bucharest, if deemed necessary. Foreign Minister Heo Dam accepted the invitation [launched by Foreign Minister Macovescu] to pay an official friendship visit to our country, leaving the exact date of this visit to be decided later on.

II. The International Situation and Foreign Policy

The Romanian Foreign Minister presented a broad overview of Romania's position on the current situation in international politics, the main international problems, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Middle East, Cyprus, Indochina, the role of the United Nations, and he also discussed our country's relations with various states.

The Korean side said that Romania's interest towards peace and security in Europe is natural. The Korean people is fully supporting Romania's efforts for the establishment of peace and security in Europe, for the triumph, in international life and in relations amongst all states, of the principles of the full equality of rights, respect for national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in the internal affairs and mutual advantage.

"Our views regarding the Middle East, the role of the United Nations, Cyprus and Indochina are identical," said Foreign Minister Heo Dam, adding that "our party is very satisfied with the identity of views between us."

The Korean side paid special attention to the matter of the peaceful and independent unification of the homeland, seen as one of the fundamental tasks of the Korean revolution, the first one being the construction of socialism in the North.

Minister Heo Dam said that because of the maneuvers undertaken by the authorities in Saigon [sic!] great obstacles emerged on the path towards the peaceful and independent unification of the homeland, especially after the South launched the idea of two Koreas. Currently, the state of emergency was declared in the South, with the most basic rights being suppressed, including the right to pronounce the word 'unification.'

This situation made them [the North Koreans] realize that they cannot continue the dialogue for the unification of the homeland with the South Korean authorities. After having analyzed the situation, the following well-known steps were taken:

- The proposal of the Supreme People's Assembly regarding negotiations with the Americans for the replacement of the current armistice with a peace treaty;
- The creation of the following necessary premises for unification: the relaxation of tensions within the country; the withdrawal of US troops; the cessation of US interference and the replacement of the current armistice with a peace treaty. Only after fulfilling these prerequisites can they go on to the peaceful unification of the homeland, without interference from the outside. Only the Americans can be a partner for negotiations, [since] they are the signatories of the armistice and the owners of South Korea.

Romania was asked to send the letter of the Supreme People's Assembly to the United States. The [North] Koreans are sincerely grateful to Romania for its support.

Until now, there were no reactions from the United States. The Koreans would be happy with either a positive or a negative reaction from the US. If the US accepts the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North Koreans are ready for negotiations with the Americans. If the Americans reject the proposal, the US would expose itself even more in front of the public opinion. It would be good, together with the Romanian comrades, to exert pressures that the Americans accept the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's proposal.

Foreign Minister Heo Dam said: "We will continue our dialogue with the South irrespective of how hard it may be; we want [to reach] a détente with the South."

#### With respect to the debate of the Korean matter at the United Nations Organization

After long consultations with countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe, the North Koreans believe that the circumstances are favorable for a discussion of the Korean matter at the United Nations. It was decided that the issue of withdrawing UN troops from South Korea be registered on the agenda of the UN General Assembly session. The Korean Foreign Minister expressed his desire to consult with the Romanian side on the tactics that should be used on the following matters:

- a) Formulating the name of the issue to be registered on the agenda. The North Koreans thought of using the following terminology: "with respect to the withdrawal of UN troops from South Korea" or "with respect to UN troops in South Korea."
- b) Formulating the content of the resolution to be adopted.

The North Koreans are thinking of adopting a part of the preamble from the Resolution adopted in 1973. They are still working on the resolution draft.

- c) Who the author and co-authors of the resolution should be.

It is believed that the author could be Algeria. The wish [of the North Koreans] is to have at least 50 countries from Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America as co-authors.

It is felt necessary to have a majority from the outset.

- d) The participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea representatives at the discussion of the Korean matter at the United Nations.

The 1973 experience shows that the matter of the participation of North Korean representatives should not be submitted to a vote, but it must be asserted by the President of the General Assembly from the very beginning.

- e) The possibility that the Seoul authorities put forward the issue of having the two Koreas accepted to the UN simultaneously.

There are several clues in this respect. Efforts must be undertaken to anticipate the simultaneous accession of the two Koreas to the UN, or individually, of South Korea only. In this respect, there are [various] possibilities. The first option—having both North and South Korea—cannot pass if North Korea opposes it. The accession of the South will be blocked in the Security Council by China and the USSR.

The Romanian Foreign Minister expressed the views and suggestions of the Romanian side in detail so as to guarantee the success of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposal regarding the discussion of the Korean matter at the UN, as well as regarding the best tactics to be used in this respect.

Foreign Minister Heo Dam thanked for the deep analysis offered by the Romanian Minister, he assessed the realization of ideas and suggestions [given by the Romanian side] as crucial for the North Korean side. From what the North Korean Foreign Minister said, the following issues caught our attention:

- He agreed that measures must be undertaken so that the Secretariat of the General Assembly does not kill the attempt to register the Korean matter on the agenda, using as a pretext the fact that the North and the South are involved in negotiations.
- He said he believed that the Korean matter could be discussed both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, on that occasion.
- He agreed that there was a possibility for the Americans to propose the withdrawal of UN troops, even more since US troops, stationed in South Korea according to the Seoul-Washington bilateral treaty, would remain there. The UN does not have any competences in this respect. Passing a resolution on the withdrawal of UN troops would be a resounding political success, simply due to the fact that the unjust nature of the June 25<sup>th</sup>, 1952 Security Council resolution would be indirectly acknowledged. In the following phase, [the North Koreans] will fight for the withdrawal of American troops.
- He agreed that two resolution drafts must be prepared – a minimal draft and a maximal draft, this being a more realistic way of thinking.

Minister Heo Dam asked to maintain close contacts between the two ministries of foreign affairs. The Korean side is ready to send a representative to Bucharest for consultations, after the return of the [North Korean] delegations currently abroad.

The Korean side paid great attention to the visit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Socialist Republic of Romania. In this respect, it is worthy to note the warmth with which president Kim Il Sung received our minister and the long conversation which took place on this occasion. Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Heo Dam was almost always accompanying the Romanian minister. The toasts of the two ministers, said at official occasions, were wholly published in the Korean press, an unusual aspect for visits paid by other ministries of foreign affairs. During the conversations and toasts, the Korean side praised the visit of the Romanian delegation as a new contribution to the development of militant friendship relations between Romania and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

During his stay in Pyongyang, the [Romanian] Minister of Foreign Affairs held a meeting with the staff of the embassy, the economic section and the military attaché to North Korea. During this meeting, the minister offered an overview of the main concerns of our party, about Romania's foreign policy, he gave certain directions regarding the activity of the staff and he answered the questions asked by the participants [in this meeting.] Certain problems were raised, which need to be solved.

[...]

August 19, 1974

Written by I. Ciubotaru

Typed by S. Dinu

2 copies

Copy 1 – sent to Comrade George Macovescu

Copy 2 – send to First Direction – Relations

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 SEOUL 05439 201108Z

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 USSS-00 SY-04 SCCT-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00

NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 L-03 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

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INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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S E C R E T SEOUL 5439

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PINS, KS, KN, JA

SUBJECT: PARK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT: REACTION AND POSSIBLE  
CONSEQUENCES

1. GENERAL REACTION TO ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF  
PRES PARK AND DEATH MRS. PARK HAS BEEN SOMBER AND  
SUBDUED. THERE IS PUBLIC SADNESS AND SHOCK OVER MRS.  
PARK'S DEATH. AS EVIDENCED BY MASSIVE AND BY NO MEANS  
ENTIRELY CONTRIVED TURNOUT FOR HER FUNERAL, SHE WAS  
GRACIOUS AND SYMPATHETIC FIGURE WIDELY RESPECTED EVEN  
BY THOSE WHO OPPOSED HER HUSBAND.

2. THERE IS ALSO SYMPATHY FOR PRES PARK AND HIS FAMILY  
AS WELL AS REALIZATION THAT ABORTIVE ASSASSINATION  
ATTEMPT MIGHT WELL HAVE SUCCEEDED, LEAVING COUNTRY WITHOUT  
ITS PRESENT LEADER. IN VIEW OF THOSE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED  
WITH GOVERNMENT, HIS DEMISE WOULD HAVE PRECIPITATED  
AT LEAST A PERIOD OF DEEP POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY,  
IF NOT AN IMMEDIATE AND DISRUPTIVE INTERNAL  
POWER STRUGGLE. ON OTHER HAND, SYMPATHY OF PARK'S  
OPPONENTS IS TEMPERED AND ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION NOT

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PAGE 02 SEOUL 05439 201108Z

CHANGED THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD PARK AND HIS POLICIES.

3. THERE IS NOW WIDESPREAD SPECULATION AS TO WHAT CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION WILL BE, BOTH IN TERMS OF GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC POLICIES AND WITH REGARD NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN. PRES PARK REMAINS IN STATE OF DEEP GRIEF OVER HIS WIFE'S DEATH, AND WE HAVE GOTTEN CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM BLUE HOUSE AND PRIMIN'S OFFICE THAT PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ABSORBED AND REMOTE IN PAST DAYS. OUR SOURCES STATE PARK HAS NOT GIVEN ANY SIGNAL AS TO WHAT HIS REACTION WILL BE TO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

4. THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT PARK'S WIFE'S DEATH MAY SHOCK HIM INTO ADOPTING MORE MODERATE, CONCILIATORY STANCE, EASING DOMESTIC PRESSURES. OTHER KOREAN OBSERVERS HOWEVER BELIEVE THIS IS WISHFUL THINKING. THEY POINT OUT IT HAS BEEN PARK'S CHARACTER TO REACT STRONGLY, NOT PASSIVELY, TO THREATS OR ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST HIM. SEVERAL CHRISTIAN SOURCES HOLD VIEW THAT PARK WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE HIS REPRESSIVE POLICIES, USING PUBLIC SYMPATHIES OVER LOSS OF HIS WIFE AND ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION TO JUSTIFY HIS ACTIONS. THESE CHRISTIANS BELIEVE THAT PARK MAY SUCCEED IN THIS SINCE THERE IS AMONG GENERAL PUBLIC RENEWED CONVICTION THAT COMMUNIST THREAT CONTINUES. THESE CHRISTIAN LEADERS ALSO FEEL CAUGHT IN DILEMMA SINCE IT INAPPROPRIATE TO MOUNT ANTI-GOVT PROTEST ACTIVITIES IN IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF MRS. PARK'S DEATH. AT SAME TIME, CHRISTIAN LEADERS FEAR THAT IF THEY LAPSE INTO SILENCE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME, MOMENTUM OF THEIR PRESENT OPPOSITION MOVEMENT MAY WELL COLLAPSE.

5. SO FAR WE HAVE NO INDEPENDENT INFORMATION REGARDING ROKG ANNOUNCEMENT THAT MRS. PARK'S KILLER MUN SE KWANG HAS CONFESSED TO BEING UNDER NORTH KOREAN AND/OR CHOSEN SOREN DIRECTION. ROKG WILL, AT THE LEAST, EXPLOIT MUN'S REPORTED CONFESSION BOTH IN DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA, AS JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONALLY AS EVIDENCE OF THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME'S TREACHERY

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PAGE 03 SEOUL 05439 201108Z

VIS-A-VIS THE ROK. ROKG MAY ALSO REFUSE DEAL WITH NORTH KOREANS AT PANMUNJOM FOR PRESENT. (AUG 21 SNCC MEETING HAS BEEN POSTPONED.) WE ARE WATCHING CAREFULLY FOR ANY SIGNS THAT ROKG MIGHT GO FURTHER AND CONSIDER SOME COUNTER-STROKE AGAINST NORTH. SO FAR NEITHER WE NOR UNC HAS RECEIVED ANY INDICATION THAT GOVERNMENT IS THINKING ALONG THAT LINE. WE REMAIN ALERT TO THIS POSSIBILITY.

6. WITH REGARD TO ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS, TANAKA'S GESTURE IN ATTENDING FUNERAL HAS BEEN APPRECIATED. HOWEVER, JAPANESE CONNECTION WITH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT PROVIDES STILL ANOTHER POINT OF STRAIN IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS WILL PARTICULARLY BE TRUE SHOULD ROKG PRESS FOR ACTIONS AGAINST THE YOSHIIS AND CHOSEN SOREN OFFICIAL KIM HO-RYONG ON THE BASIS OF MUN'S CONFESSION.

7. WHILE AS NOTED ABOVE, WE HAVE NO CLEAR SIGNS ON WHAT DIRECTION PRESIDENT PARK WILL TAKE MUCH WILL DEPEND ON HIS STATE OF MIND. DEATH OF HIS WIFE AND RESIGNATION OF PPF COMMANDER PARK CHUNG-KYU HAVE REMOVED FROM SCENE TWO PERSONS ON WHOM HE HAS RELIED HEAVILY FOR PERSONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. WE HAVE NO IDEA HOW THIS WILL AFFECT HIM PSYCHOLOGICALLY OVER THE LONGER TERM, BUT WE BELIEVE PARK'S FIRST REACTION WILL BE TO INTERPRET ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION AS JUSTIFICATION FOR HIS POLICIES AND PROOF OF NECESSITY FOR STRONG CONTROLS. WE DO NOT SEE PARK MOVING TOWARD MODERATION; RATHER, WE EXPECT HIM TO BE MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAT FIRM, FORCEFUL MEASURES ARE NECESSARY FOR THE NATION'S SECURITY AND HIS OWN. WHETHER HE WILL INCREASE REPRESSIVE MEASURES REMAINS TO BE SEEN. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT THAT PRESENT COERCIVE DOMESTIC ATMOSPHERE WILL AT THE MINIMUM CONTINUE.  
ERICSON

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

SUBJECT: President Ford's Meeting with Romanian Presidential Counselor Vasile Pungan

PARTICIPANTS: Vasile Pungan, Counselor to President Ceausescu of Romania  
President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, August 27, 1974  
10:30 a. m.

PLACE: Oval Office - The White House

[The Press was admitted for photographs.]

Pungan: You got the Ceausescu invitation.

President: Yes. I want to visit Romania as soon as our mutual schedules can be worked out.

[The press is ushered out.]

President: I appreciate very much the invitation of President Ceausescu, and I will accept as soon as I can work it out.

Pungan: Perhaps when you come to Europe, you can do it. It is important for us to exchange views and maintain relations.

President: I want you to know Secretary Kissinger has my full confidence. I subscribe completely to President Nixon's foreign policy.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6  
NSC MEMO, 118498, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/9/04  
BY: [signature], NARA, DATE 3/25/04

President: I know you are interested in the Trade Bill and MFN. We are working for a good bill and I think we are close to a good compromise.

Pungan: I think you will succeed by the end of the year.

President: We will be very disappointed if it doesn't happen.

Pungan: Another problem is Cyprus. It is close to us, and prolongation of the conflict increases the danger. At some time, we want to see the right solution--withdrawal of foreign troops, the independence of Cyprus, and both sides to live in peace on the island.

President: We are working to try to be helpful. We want withdrawal, a ceasefire until then, and a stable solution. We have been working with the Greeks, Turks and the Cypriots.

Pungan: I am sure the United States can help find a good solution.

Another problem is Korea. The North Korean leadership wants to have confidential contacts with the United States for discussions. They have suggested Romania. President Ceasescu has offered to help if you want to do it.

President: We are grateful for your offer. Secretary Kissinger and I will discuss it in detail. Certain things must precede such contacts. We don't want to go in without firm understandings. Secretary Kissinger will contact your Ambassador.

Kissinger: We will talk and then relay our ideas through your Ambassador.

Pungan: I will tell the North Koreans and hope you will have a good answer.

The last question is the Middle East. President Ceausescu thinks a delay in further progress is leading to new tensions and the possibility of war. We think the Geneva Conference should start again.

President: We are keeping the process moving. We have been meeting with Arab leaders, and we will meet soon with Saqqaf and Rabin. We agree that more movement is essential, and we are working toward that, but we may differ on whether the best way is Geneva or bilaterally.



Pungan: But it is useful to have talks going on and some sense of progress. We need confidence that the next step will come.

Kissinger: Romania is the only country in Eastern Europe that did not break relations with Israel.


President: We have to keep things moving.

Pungan: You have done so much, but we hope you will do more. Any time there are mutual problems which you think we should discuss, please get in touch and we will cooperate closely for the best solution.

President: You have been extremely helpful. Our relationship with Romania is excellent and we want to make it better. We appreciate your offer on North Korea. We will be back to you.

Kissinger: Counselor Pungan is willing to come here from time to time when something is urgent.

[The meeting then ended.]



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TELEGRAM

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: UNGA, PFOR, KN, KS, CH  
SUBJECT: KOREAN QUESTION IN UNGA

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY Gb, MARA, DATE 4/7/01

REF: A. SEOUL 5483  
B. SEOUL 5522

1. PLEASE CONVEY TO FOREIGN MINISTER KIM OUR VIEWS ON FOLLOWING TWO QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFTELS:

A. NONAGGRESSION PACT

IT WAS OUR INTENTION TO DROP NONAGGRESSION TREATY SOLELY FROM OUR PACKAGE PROPOSAL, LEAVING ROK COMPLETELY FREE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT DESIRED TO CONTINUE PUTTING THIS PROPOSAL FORWARD WITH THE NORTH ON A BILATERAL BASIS. IN FACT, WE THOUGHT THIS MUCH HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO ROK EARLIER BY AMBASSADOR HABIB AND THAT ROK UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION (SEOUL 5093, PARA 4).

B. ROK ADMISSION TO UN

GIVEN NORTH KOREA'S REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED VIEWS ON ADMISSION QUESTION, WE SEE ALMOST NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS EVEN IF WE WERE ABLE TO DEVELOP ALL-OUT CAMPAIGN BY ROK'S FRIENDS TO SUPPORT CONCURRENT ADMISSION OR HER ADMISSION ALONE. MOREOVER, IT APPARENT THAT PRC AND NORTH KOREA ARE REVIEWING OUR UNC PROPOSAL PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF WHETHER IT PERPETUATES DIVISION OF PENINSULA. THAT BEING THE CASE, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT, WHILE OUR PROPOSAL UNDER CONSIDERATION, WE SHOULD DOWNPLAY ANY TALK ABOUT SINGLE OR DUAL ENTRY FOR ONE OR BOTH KOREAS. WE PLAN TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KIM WHEN HE VISITS WASHINGTON. KISSINGER



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, State Review  
By KBH, NARA, Date 10/10/02

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: UNGA, PFOR, KN, KS, CH  
SUBJECT: FURTHER RESPONSE TO PRC ON UNC PROPOSAL  
EYES ONLY CHARGE  
REF: A. STATE 182105  
B. SEOUL 5483  
C. SEOUL 5518

1. YOU SHOULD INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER KIM THAT IN MEETING WITH TSIEN TA-YUNG, PRCLC ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF, AND CHI CHAO CHU, INTERPRETER, ON AUGUST 28, HABIB, HUMMEL AND SOLOMON (NSC) CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OUR TRUNCATED PROPOSAL FOR DISSOLVING UNC, AS SPECIFIED IN REFTEL A (PARAS 3-5). TSIEN ALSO HANDED PAPER SUMMARIZING POINTS INVOLVED.
2. TSIEN SAID HE WOULD REPORT OUR PRESENTATION IMMEDIATELY TO AMBASSADOR HUANG AND TO PEKING. HE THEN VOLUNTEERED A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CHINESE COULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING THAT PERPETUATED THE DIVISION OF KOREA, AS PRC HAD INDICATED IN ITS STATEMENT TO US OF JULY 31. WE REPLIED THAT NOTHING IN THE U.S. PROPOSAL HAD THE EFFECT OF PERPETUATING THE DIVISION, OR WOULD OBSTRUCT THE COURSE OF REUNIFICATION, WHICH WAS A MATTER FOR THE KOREAN PARTIES CONCERNED AS THEY THEMSELVES HAD ANNOUNCED AS THEIR POLICY IN JULY 1972.
3. COMMENT: ON BALANCE WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO READ MUCH INTO TSIEN'S STATEMENT, WHICH MAY SIMPLY HAVE BEEN A DESIRE ON HIS PART TO MAKE SOME KIND OF "PRINCIPLED" RESPONSE OPPOSING A TWO-KOREA POLICY TO SATISFY PYONGYANG, WHICH HE COULD REPORT TO PEKING. HIS REMARKS WERE VERY SIMILAR TO HAN HSUS'S REPOSENSE TO OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION OF JUNE 13, AND HE MAY HAVE SIMPLY BEEN PLAYING HAN'S ROLE INASMUCH AS HE IS ACTING DEPUTY OF PRCLC IN HAN'S ABSENCE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: AWHUMMEL:LM APPROVED BY: EA/K:AWHUMMEL

CLEARANCES: EA/KDLRANARD TO:WBUFFUM S/S:JPMOFFAT NSC:RSOLOMON  
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET

## Information about a Visit by Comrades Gericke and Stritzke to the DPRK

**Date:**

9 September 1974

**Source:**

*PoIA, MfAA, C 6852. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer*

[SED Central Committee]  
Department of International Relations  
Berlin, 9 September 1974

### I n f o r m a t i o n Visit by Comrades Gericke and Stritzke to the DPRK

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During Comrades Gericke and Stritzke's visit to the DPRK a variety of information was received.

1. Information by Comrade Lee Jong-wang [Ri Dzong Wang], Section Chief in the KWP Department of International Relations, about the tasks involved with the construction of socialism in the DPRK.

The Korean Workers Party and the people of the DPRK are currently undertaking strenuous efforts to implement the decisions of the V Party Congress. Major focus is on the completion of the Six-Year-Plan. The main tasks include solidifying industrial successes through the technological revolution and liberating the people from hard manual labor. With the technological, cultural, and ideological revolution, the socialist society will be complete.

#### Technological Revolution:

1. To transform manual labor into more convenient labor;
2. To reduce divergences between industry and agriculture;
3. To liberate women from hard work in the home.

The most important challenges of the technological revolution are represented by machine tool production, mechanical engineering, electronics, and automated industry. Next to industry, major attention is devoted to agriculture. Electrification and melioration were implemented. The number of tractors is growing constantly. In two to three years we will have reached 8 to 9 tractors per 100 hectares. There also is an ever increasing production of trucks for agriculture. Our objective is to industrialize the agricultural sector completely.

#### Cultural Revolution:

The Cultural Revolution is based on the teachings of Marx and Lenin. In 1972, the ten-year secondary school education was introduced. In two years, a mandatory kindergarten year and ten-year secondary school education will be implemented in the entire country. Over the next years more than 1 million educated specialists are anticipated; currently there are about 600,000. We are leading a permanent struggle against capitalist ideology, culture, and art. A socialist national culture is being developed.

#### Ideological Revolution:

The party makes efforts to provide education on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and Juche ideology. Each party member is expected to be a fighter. Important factors are class-based education and education towards socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The entire society has to be educated according to the model of the working class. The party's role increases constantly, and each member must be aware of his task.

Through these three great revolutions the Six-Year-Plan is supposed to be fulfilled in five years. The final deadline to take stock will be 10 October 1975, the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the KWP's founding. An important step along the way was the 8<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the Central Committee. It stipulated that all forces and energy must be mobilized for socialist construction. All taxation was abolished, and at the same time prices for industrial goods were lowered. The current situation is favorable to foment, through intensified socialist construction [in the DPRK], a revolutionary movement in South Korea. Socialist construction is accelerating the reunification of the fatherland. In order to mobilize the party members and the masses, a Red Letter was forwarded to all workers in the context of the 8<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session. It was studied comprehensively and served as a basis for future growth. It also explained the ten great goals of the economic struggle. Creative energy of the workers was awakened, since this is imperative and mandatory in order to solve the great tasks ahead.

Major tasks were defined for five fronts: Construction industry, industrial production, agriculture, transportation, and fishing.

1. Construction industry: The year of 1974 is the year of the construction industry. Numerous industrial projects were declared as priority building projects.
2. Industrial production: Successes must be utilized to move industry up to a higher level (energy, coal, steel, cement, chemical fertilizer). We must reach a higher degree of industrial modernization and efficiency. Many new innovations are in the making (100-ton trucks, 20,000-ton ships). Light industry and local industries are expanded.

3. Agriculture: In the current year, already, we want to reach the target for grain production as outlined in the Six-Year-Plan.
4. Transportation: Railways are getting electrified.
5. Fishing: Targets from the Six-Year-Plan are already fulfilled.

No waste of material and productive resources will, in combination with thriftiness, contribute towards the further strengthening of the industry. Cooperative collaboration between technological and academic cadres and the workers will be developed. All the cadres have to focus on the challenges in a revolutionary spirit. Uniform implementation of the technological, cultural, and ideological revolution will guarantee success.

- Information about measures regarding Korean reunification was provided by Comrade Im Jong-jun [Im Dzong Dzun], Section Chief in the KWP Department of International Relations.

The DPRK is grateful to the GDR because it has constantly supported the DPRK in its struggle for reunification despite the different positions held on the national question. The GDR represents the Western guard post of the socialist community, and the DPRK is the Eastern guard post of the socialist community. Both share a major joint responsibility. The DPRK is supportive of GDR positions towards the FRG and considers it correct from the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist analysis. Different starting positions and developments in Germany and Korea are behind the different perspectives on the national question. Germany was a capitalist industrialized country. Korea was ruled by feudalism, it was a semi-colonial system. The monopolistic capital in the FRG is highly developed and one of the strongest in the world. In South Korea there exists a weak bourgeoisie. There are only medium bourgeoisie and lackeys of foreign monopolies. The living standard in the FRG is high; in South Korea it is low. There are strong forces within South Korea's population that support the KWP policy and strive for reunification, way down into the ranks of the medium bourgeoisie. South Korea is ruled by a small coterie of lackeys of foreigners. The KWP wants to build the foundation for socialism in all of Korea and lead socialism to victory in the entire country. This is why the DPRK made over 130 proposals for reunification. They are based on the three great principles:

1. Without Foreign Interference
2. In a Peaceful Way
3. In Ideological Independence

The South rejects these proposals and prepares for a war. It has incarcerated the people and built a regime of terror. None of the three principles agreed [on July 4, 1972] were followed by them. In essence, the United States is controlling development in South Korea. All attempts to negotiate specific issues were rejected by the South Korean clique. They always argued it would be premature for concrete agreements. South Korea is proposing that both [Korean] states should accede to the United Nations. This raised the question: Divide or reunify? In response, the KWP outlined five steps toward reunification: minimizing tensions; cooperation in all areas; participation of all parties and mass organizations in a National Congress; formation of a cooperative Republic of Goryeo; and joint international presence. This offensive policy increased the isolation of the South Korean clique. The socialist countries and the non-aligned states support the DPRK. As a result, the South proposed a treaty of non-aggression. We had to reject this, since it meant the Americans would stay and two independent states would sign a treaty. The Americans have to be removed from the South, otherwise there will be no reunification. This is why the DPRK approached the United States directly and proposed negotiations. The DPRK did not harbor illusions. The United States was not able to accept this right away. However, if the DPRK sticks to its position it will maintain an advantage. The Americans will have trouble maintaining their position in South Korea.

The DPRK position concerning the issue of the United Nations:

The DPRK holds the position that U.N. forces must be withdrawn from South Korea. Most important of all, the U.N. troops have to withdraw. This means, foremost, that U.S. forces stationed in South Korea under the flag of the U.N. have to leave. Thus, the Korean comrades propose not to separate the issue of the U.N. Command from the troops. Otherwise, there is the chance that the Americans will still stay in Korea after the dissolution of the Command. Continued U.S. force presence would represent interference in Korean internal matters. According to the Armistice Agreement, Article 4, Paragraph 60, there is an obligation to withdraw those forces. In Vietnam, troops withdrew after the end of the war. In Korea, they have already been here for more than 20 years. The Americans have no right to remain in South Korea. It is in violation of the U.N. Charter. A year ago, UNCURK was dissolved. It served as the background for troop deployments. With this background gone, there also is the need to withdraw the [American] forces. If U.N. troops remain in South Korea, the reputation of the U.N. will be smeared. The U.N. has sent American troops to South Korea and it is, therefore, under obligation to also take these forces back. Decisions of the 28<sup>th</sup> Session of the U.N. General Assembly must be implemented. It is in violation of the U.N. Charter to turn South Korea into a colony of the United States. Forces must be withdrawn from South Korea in the interest of world peace. Those are the main lines of argumentation made by the DPRK to the U.N. General Assembly.

The tactics of the enemy consist in either accepting two Koreas in the United Nations, or just South Korea. In this context, the South Korean position has to be unmasked. South Korea is not an independently acting state, and a fascist dictatorship is

underway there (arrest of youth and student functionaries, 1024 arrests during recent weeks according to numbers given by the South Korean government, arrest of the former presidential candidate, slander launched by South Korea against the DPRK in the context of the assassination of the President's wife). Now, the task is to extend influence to other states, to isolate South Korea, and to make the DPRK position prevail in the United Nations.

Thirty four states have supported the DPRK proposal in the United Nations. The DPRK comrades are asking the GDR to support them in this endeavor. They ask us to use our influence with certain states in order to have them join this resolution in the U.N. General Assembly. There are three groups of states they particularly woo for support.

First group (which might be won for the resolution): Uganda, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Argentina, Maldives, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Guyana, Zambia, and Dahomey.

Second group (no contacts yet but maybe to win over as well): Kuwait, Arab Emirates, Liberia, Chad, Peru, Indonesia, Afghanistan, India, Bhutan, Jordan, and Bangladesh.

Third group which ought to be either won over or neutralized: Niger, Gabon, Venezuela, Australia, Portugal, Central African Republic, and Fiji.

#### Position on international organizations:

The DPRK is interested in participating in international organizations, including in special U.N. organizations even though South Korea is a member. South Korea has become a member of many organizations and demonstratively represents all of Korea there. The DPRK wants to unmask these machinations and at the same time utilize experiences from international organizations for its socialist construction. South Korea will not leave those organizations; accordingly the DPRK has to join them. The DPRK is the sole legitimate representative of Korea. South Korea is a puppet of the U.S. not recognized by the DPRK as an independent state. The DPRK will demand that South Korea leave those international organizations.

Today there is an extremely favorable situation for the DPRK. The U.S. can no longer act as independently as they want to. The socialist countries and the developing countries have significantly improved their positions. This offers the opportunity for the DPRK to fight for entrance into special U.N. organizations as well as into other international organizations. This does not apply, however, to the United Nations themselves. The DPRK only wants to accede to the U.N. as the Federal Republic of Goryeo, i.e. as a united Korean state. The decision by the 28<sup>th</sup> U.N. General Assembly was a blow to South Korea. It stressed the need for reunification. This builds a foundation for future efforts. Decisions regarding Korea made by the 3<sup>rd</sup> General Assembly according to which South Korea represents all of Korea, and by the U.N. Security Council where aggressive action against Korea was passed, have to be annulled.

It is important to unmask the puppet regime in international organizations. Currently, South Korea is eager to gain ground in developing countries and also in socialist countries. They attempt to participate and show their presence at events in socialist and developing countries. In international organizations, which held events in capitalist countries where the DPRK could not participate, the socialist countries should also block South Korean participation. In other organizations, they [South Koreans] should be able to participate but not be received by state representatives from socialist countries, i.e. just participate in the conference but be excluded from bilateral events. Therefore no formal relations with the South Korean regime get established. The DPRK is eager to join UNESCO, the IAEA, the World Meteorological Organization, and ILO. It is asking the GDR to support these efforts.

The conversations with the DPRK comrades were held in a friendly and objective atmosphere. At the end of our stay we were received by Comrade Kim Jong-nam [Dzong Nam], Candidate of the Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee and Head of the Department of International Relations. He reiterated his thanks for the good hospitality to the [recent] DPRK delegation to the GDR and expressed his cordial greetings to all known comrades, especially to comrades [Hermann] Axen and [Paul] Markowski. There were no additional issues raised.

We again repeated the invitation for a DPRK study delegation to come to the GDR. This invitation was received with gratitude.

[Signed Gericke]

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONSECRET/SENSITIVE

September 11, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT *shaly*

FROM:

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JK*

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Ambassador Sneider on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider on September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m. As you know, Mr. Sneider is departing shortly to take up his new post in Seoul.

Current Crisis in South Korean - Japanese Relations. The two sides within the past day or so now seem to have broken the Gordian knot. The Japanese have agreed to the basic South Korean demand that Prime Minister Tanaka's letter be carried by a ranking Japanese emissary and that it be addressed to President Park. Final language of the letter is now being worked out as regards the issues of Japanese acknowledgment of responsibility of the assassination attempt against President Park and the killing of Mrs. Park, the Japanese investigation of the assassination plot, and the question of Chosen Soren's (the organization representing North Korea in Japan) involvement.

We have played a key role in the resolution of this crisis -- we have effectively set limits on the lengths to which both parties could go, and we have acted as a traditional Asian go-between in conveying the substantive proposals to each of the parties. (We played a similar role in the resolution of the Kim Dae-jung case earlier this year.) The outcome has thus avoided serious adverse consequences for the South Koreans, the Japanese, and ourselves -- which could have only benefited such as North Korea.

U. S. Continued Strong Support of South Korea. As the State EA Deputy Assistant Secretary concerned with Korea, Dick Sneider has at times in the past year floated the idea of U. S. troop reductions in South Korea and pressed for a reduction of our military assistance to South Korea. Defense has now picked up the cudgel again on this latter issue -- in preparation for the U. S.-ROK annual security consultative meeting later this month, Deputy Secretary Clements has sent Secretary Kissinger a memo proposing an end to U. S. grant MAP to the ROK after FY 76. The memo was

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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 State Dept. Visit 9/02  
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not coordinated with State -- we have asked DOD to do so -- and seemed somehow to have been picked up in its substance in a New York Times piece earlier this week.

Presidential Visit to South Korea. As you know, the President has not yet decided finally whether he will visit South Korea immediately following his visit to Japan in mid-November. Secretary Kissinger believes he should, primarily because of commitments to this effect that he (Secretary Kissinger) and former President Nixon have made to the South Koreans.

I will not plan to sit in on the meeting.



Recommended Talking Points

-- We are relieved that the most recent crisis in South Korean-Japan relations now seems well on the way to solution. We believe State's EA Bureau and our Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo played a highly skillful role in resolving this imbroglio, which could have played into North Korea's hands at a most unpropitious time.

-- We believe that we must maintain strong support for the ROK through the completion of the UNC termination negotiations, until the post-UNC termination arrangements are solidly in place, and until the North Koreans decide to pull back from their military option. In this last regard, we will be particularly interested in the North Korean reaction to Secretary Kissinger's recent proposal to the Romanian intermediary -- that we will consent to direct contacts with the North Koreans as long as they do not attempt to exploit this politically against Seoul and if Moscow and Peking are willing to undertake similar contacts with Seoul.

-- Although the President has not yet made a final decision, he probably will visit Korea immediately after his visit to Japan. This will carry obvious dividends for our relations with South Korea particularly at this juncture, but will inevitably detract to some extent from the President's visit to Japan. What suggestions do you have as to how we might minimize the adverse effect of the Seoul visit after the President's visit to Japan?

-- As regards South Korea's internal political problems, we believe we should carefully stick to the neutral middle ground Ambassador Habib has staked out -- maintaining an equal distance between President Park and

his domestic critics. At the same time, we must when necessary call to the Park Government's attention whatever substantial adverse impact his handling of internal politics may be having on our Congress in so far as this threatens our military assistance and other support for the ROK.



Concurrence:

Mr. Smyser

*WBS | JTK*

Memorandum of Conversation between Qiao Guanhua [Ch'iao Kuan-hua] and Henry A. Kissinger (abridged)

**Date:**  
2 October 1974

**Source:**  
*Gerald R. Ford Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Gregg Brazinsky.*

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION**

**PARTICIPATIONS**

Nations

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC  
Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations  
  
Chi Tsung-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Asian Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)  
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary at the PRC Mission to the U.N. (Notetaker)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
George Bush, Chief-Designate of the United States Liaison Office in Peking  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning, Department of State  
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

**DATE, TIME, AND PLACE:**

October 2, 1974, 8:15 – 11:35 p.m.  
Secretary's Suite, Waldorf Towers, New York City

**SUBJECT:**

Secretary's Dinner for the Vice Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China

[...]

Secretary Kissinger: Let's talk a few minutes about your last point. I want to explore this further. (At this point the serving personnel came in with coffee and liquers.) I'll wait until after they have finished serving.

Are they going to have passionate debates in the General Assembly? On Korea, is it possible that our two Ambassadors can work out something as they did last year? Your Ambassador [Huang Hua] is such a master. The Soviets asked me how it was worked out last year on Korea. They still don't understand how you did it.

I don't think you have given us a reply to our last proposal [on Korea].

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I'll be very frank with you. You wanted us to convey your last proposal to the [North] Koreans. We did this. We didn't received a further response.

Finally this question was put on the U.N. agenda. So now we will have a debate with each side speaking on its separate views.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand. Didn't we have a debate last year? (Huang Hua: In the First Committee.) The question is whether we can have some way of eliminating the United Nations Command without abrogating the Armistice. This is basically what we are after.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Do you have any specific form in your mind?

Ambassador Habib: Our proposal is that the Armistice in its present form be maintained, with South Korea and the U.S....

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, with the People's Republic, which is already a signatory, and North Korea on the other side.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: You understand that we keep on good relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On this issue we have to respect their views. Of course if you have more detailed views, more comprehensive views on this question, we will convey them to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Our problem is that we cannot accept abolition of the United Nations Command if there is no legal basis on both sides for the continuation of the Armistice.

For your information, we have had several approaches from North Korea – from the Romanians, the Egyptians, even David Rockefeller, he is perhaps the largest power involved (laughter) – but we can't respond to their initiatives until the issue of the U.N. Command is resolved. In principle we are not opposed [to having contact with them]. You can convey this to them.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Regarding all these details on the Korean question, we don't feel they are of great significance. As you know from your discussions with Chairman Mao, this is not a major issue if you look at in terms of the overall world situation.

Secretary Kissinger: As I told the Chairman and the Premier, we are not committed to a permanent presence in Korea. This is not a principle of our foreign policy. But we also don't want the speed of our withdrawal to create a vacuum into which some other power might project itself.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: It seems as if Japan does not feel the behavior of [ROK President] Park is satisfactory.

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't pay too much attention to that.

Ambassador Habib: There has been no major change in their relationship.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: True. Japan's policy regarding Korea is formulated according to many considerations.

Secretary Kissinger: But any sudden change in Korea could stimulate Japanese nationalism. You have to watch that former student of mine, Nakasone.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: How is that you have so many bad students?

Secretary Kissinger: Like Ecevit.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: History will lay [responsibility for] all this on your shoulders!  
(Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: Should Scali be in touch with Ambassador Huang Hua? Will there be confrontations?

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There will be confrontations, but it can also be said that there will not be confrontations.

Secretary Kissinger: But we know the vote. We don't care about the speeches. Ambassador Huang can perhaps create diversions.

Ambassador Huang: The differences in this respect are too great. It is beyond my capability [to resolve them].

Secretary Kissinger: Perhaps you can consider this [matter further]. We attach some importance to this question.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I don't think it will bring any complications if the resolution [favorable to North Korea] passes.

Secretary Kissinger: But if it does, it will create complications in Korea, in Japan, or elsewhere.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I met Foreign Minister Kimura [in New York]. We touched on this question, although we didn't go into any details. We'll wait a little while and see how the situation develops.

I want to repeat this – I wasn't using diplomatic language: We keep on good relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is mainly their position. This is not just a matter of just what China wants.

Secretary Kissinger: We have our Korean friends too. But if we have a general understanding then we can influence the situation.

We have reports that you may be interested in contacts with South Korea.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The may not be accurate.

[...]



Department of State  
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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1461Q

DATE: OCT. 4, 1974

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUMJSL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 4765  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8886  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9246  
INFO RUESNG/USLO PEKING PRIORITY 3753  
BT  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, State Review  
By KAT, NARA, Date 10/10/02 #02

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS, KN, US, CH  
SUBJECT: PRC VIEWS ON UNC

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. AS RESULT OF OUR CONVERSATION WITH PRC OCTOBER 2, IT APPEARS THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS PREPARED FOR A CONFRONTATION IN THE UN, AND IS NOT WILLING, AT LEAST AS YET, TO COMPROMISE ON DIFFERING KOREAN RESOLUTIONS AND ALSO DOES NOT YET ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL ON UNC AND ARMISTICE. IT IS POSSIBLE BUT NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT THE PRC IS SOMEWHAT MORE DISPOSED THAN IS NORTH KOREA TO SEEK MIDDLE GROUND, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THERE WILL BE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE DURING PRESENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

2. WE MUST NOW CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS TOWARD SUCCESS FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION IN THE UN. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE MARGIN FOR VICTORY AND WE INTEND TO PROCEED WITH REPRESENTATIONS NECESSARY TO WIDEN FAVORABLE MARGIN TO DEFEAT HOSTILE RESOLUTION. VICTORY FOR OUR POSITION WOULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF UNC ISSUE LATER ON, OR ALTERNATIVELY (ALTHOUGH NOT VERY LIKELY) COULD FORCE OTHER SIDE TO ACCEPT OUR COMPROMISE ON UNC AND ON SAFEGUARDING ARMISTICE BEFORE VOTING TAKES PLACE. WE DO NOT INTEND TO GO PUBLIC WITH RESPECT TO ANY PART OF OUR DISCUSSIONS TO DATE WITH THE PRC, BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO

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NOV 1974



Department of State  
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TELEGRAM

-2- STATE 220134, OCT, 4 '74

NOTE THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR RESOLUTION CLEARLY MEANS WE ARE WILLING TO DISSOLVE UN COMMAND PROVIDED WE CAN MAINTAIN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS GUARANTEE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PENINSULA.

3. FOR SEOUL: KIM DONG JO HAS BEEN INFORMED OF SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE AND PRESUMABLY HAS REPORTED THESE VIEWS TO FONOFF. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ROKG YOU SHOULD REMIND KOREANS THAT THEIR ASSESSMENT AS WELL AS OURS INDICATES WE HAVE COMFORTABLE MARGIN IN FAVOR OF OUR RESOLUTION AND WE INTEND TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN IT. YOU SHOULD DO WHAT APPEARS ADVISABLE TO RESTRAIN KOREANS IF THEY SHOW TENDENCY TO GET PANICKY. WOULD APPRECIATE ROK VIEWS ON TACTICS OF HANDLING UN ITEM.

4. FOR TOKYO: YOU MAY INFORM FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS WITH WHOM YOU HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT ON THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE AND SEEK TO OBTAIN THEIR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH US IN WHATEVER REPRESENTATIONS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE UN.

5. FOR USUN: WE WILL WANT YOUR VIEWS AS TO STEPS WE SHOULD NOW TAKE TO ENSURE SUCCESS AT UN IN NOVEMBER.

6. REQUEST ALL RESPONSES ASAP. ANY STEPS WE DECIDE TO TAKE TO STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION MUST BE TAKEN WELL IN ADVANCE OF DEBATE TO BE CREDIBLE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED: EA/K:DLRANARD

APPROVED: EA:AWHUMMEL

CLEARED: EA:PCHABIB (DRAFT)

S/S:RWOODS

IO:ROBLAKE

~~SECRET~~

## Conversation with Comrade Pimenov, Counselor at USSR Embassy, on 29 October 1974

<b>Date:</b> 4 November 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>PoIA AA, MfAA, C 293/78. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer</i>
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### Note

#### Conversation with Comrade Pimenov, Counselor at USSR Embassy, 29 October 1974

GDR Embassy to DPRK  
Political Department  
Pyongyang, 4 November 1974

Comrade Pimenov informed that the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Gyu-rin, has handed his accreditation letter to Kim Il Sung on 25 October 1974. Following the ceremony where no speeches were held, they had a two-hour conversation which Comrade Pimenov attended. Comrade Gyu-rin handed over a short letter by Comrade Brezhnev to Kim Il Sung. It, again, reconfirmed the invitation to Kim Il Sung to come to the Soviet Union for an official visit.

1. Kim Il Sung gave thanks for the invitation and responded there has been no opportunity this year to follow the invitation. He will make efforts next year. He also wants to meet with Comrade Brezhnev to talk about the development of relations and international problems. There are no special reasons for this visit having not materialized so far. It is just a matter of time. In 1974 he also wants to visit Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The illness of Choe Yonggeon and Kim Il Sung himself have so far prevented this.

At the end of the conversation, Kim Il Sung returned to this issue and referred to the tense situation in Korea as a reason for not being able to follow the invitation.

There are no particular problems in relations with the Soviet Union, and there is also no dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union. He [Kim] did not receive departing Soviet Ambassador Sudarikov for the sole reason that Soviet leaders also did not receive the predecessor of the current Korean Ambassador in Moscow before the former's departure. In diplomacy, you have to act on the basis of reciprocity.

2. Kim Il Sung spoke extensively about the relationship between DPRK and South Korea. Among other things, he said the following:

One cannot say that tensions on the Korean peninsula have decreased.

The DPRK does not want to attack the South; Yet it is not afraid of tensions and the outbreak of a war either. If the South attacks, it will speed up unification. As far as the DPRK is concerned, there will be no war at this time. However, the possibility of war must not be excluded since Park Chung Hee might attempt to look to war as a way out of the critical situation in South Korea.

In its talks with South Korea the DPRK made clear it has no intention to communize the South. Yet it will also not give its socialist achievements. The DPRK proposed a long list of measures towards a transformation from confrontation to peaceful competition, such as:

- Sending unemployed South Koreans to the DPRK and not to West Germany;
- Export of iron ore so that South Korea does not have to import it from Australia;
- Sending irrigation specialists to South Korea to alleviate the situation of the peasants;
- Permission for South Korean fishermen to fish in DPRK territorial waters as elsewhere the Japanese competitors are too strong;
- Financial assistance by the DPRK.

Those proposals were rejected by the South. Dialogue brought about only a few results. Yet it became evident for everybody who is in favor of unification, and who is not.

The DPRK does not believe in negotiations with Park Chung Hee anymore. Like his masters in the U.S., [Park Chung Hee] verbally supports peace but in fact he opposes it. [U.S. President Gerald] Ford also is no supporter of peace and cannot be called progressive.

Now it is about democratization in South Korea. The DPRK only fights against the comprador bourgeoisie and the national traitors. With all others the DPRK is willing to cooperate without asking about the past.

South Korea accuses the DPRK of exporting revolution. Yet neither the DPRK, nor the Soviet Union or China, actually want that. Religious believers and students are not communists! The repression in South Korea generates counter-pressure. South Korea tries to link the assassination attempt against Park to the DPRK. However, the DPRK rejects individual terror.

Origins of developments in South Korea rest with the fascist regime, not in Park Chung Hee as a person.

Mun Segwang, the assassin, probably belongs to the left wing of the pro-South Korean organization of Koreans living in Japan (Mindang) and is a supporter of South Korean opposition leader Kim Daejung who had been kidnapped from Japan.

The majority of the South Korean population and of Koreans living abroad (600,000 in Japan, 140,000 in the United States) is in favor of unification. 80 percents of Koreans living in Japan support the DPRK, and only 15 percent [support] South Korea.

3. During the conversation, Kim Il Sung also remarked that the DPRK defines "external forces" as the United States and Japan but not the socialist countries.

He did not talk about the domestic situation in the DPRK.

Note: Soviet Ambassador [Gyu-rin] informed Comrade [GDR] Ambassador Everhartz during his first visit in similar fashion.

Signed: Steinhofer  
Counselor

CC:  
1 x Central Committee/International Relations  
1 x Foreign Ministry/Far East  
1x Foreign Ministry, Information Center  
1 x Embassy/Political Department

ROK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

November 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID ELLIOTT *D.E.*

SUBJECT: Sale of Canadian Nuclear Reactor to South Korea

(R)

Background

Since the Indian nuclear explosion, (using plutonium produced in an un-safeguarded Canadian supplied reactor), there has been considerable debate in Ottawa concerning the wisdom of freely selling their CANDU reactor abroad. (For one thing, the CANDU is the reactor type most vulnerable to clandestine diversion, although the U.S. is generally satisfied that IAEA safeguards are effective for CANDU.) Compounding this issue, as it relates to South Korea, is Canadian press and public aversion to a reputedly repressive regime. Thus, there is currently some question as to whether Canada will proceed with the sale of reactors to South Korea. On the other hand, reactor sales look like a good money maker and the government may decide that if they don't sell to Korea, other countries will. Tab A .....


The U.S. (Westinghouse) has one reactor under construction in Korea and another one being negotiated. Although not an NPT party, Korea has accepted IAEA safeguards on U.S. supplied nuclear facilities, and has indicated willingness to do the same for the CANDU.

Our agreement with Korea on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy (an agreement which we require as a precondition for nuclear trade) unfortunately has the "PNE loophole" whereby diversion on plutonium is forewarned for nuclear weapons but not specifically for PNE use. While we are considering how to close this loophole in all our agreements, this matter is not a pressing concern vis-a-vis Korea because they have no chemical reprocessing plant for extracting plutonium from spent fuel, and they are very unlikely to have such technology for some time.

Will the Koreans Raise the Question of Nuclear Reactors?

It seems unlikely that the Koreans will broach the reactor subject (1) since Canada has made no final decision and Korea may yet get the CANDU they are

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (4)



SECRET/GDS

NR 94-144, #2 NSC ltr. 7/25/95

By KBH, N268, Date 6/2/95

seeking, and (2) since we are building one reactor and negotiating a second in Korea, there would be no reasons for the Koreans to think it necessary to question in high level discussions the availability of more.

#### How to Respond if They Do Raise Reactor Sales

We may want to use further sales as a lever to close the PNE loophole. Therefore, it would be reasonable to:

- acknowledge the nuclear cooperation that has been carried out between us and recognize that the Koreans have selected a U.S. reactor to help meet their electrical power needs,
- express confidence that future requests for reactors can be worked out, and
- indicate, as we have often said, that the benefits of atomic energy should be available to all who enforce the conditions that preclude proliferation of nuclear explosives.

Denis Clift and Jack Froebe concur.



SECRET/GDS

## Message Text

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13

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEOUL 7722

EO 11652: N/A

TAGS: MARR, MILI, KS, KN

SUBJ: ROK PLAYS UP TUNNEL DISCOVERY

REF SEOUL 7622

1. EXPLORATION OF NORTH KOREAN TUNNEL DISCOVERED IN DMZ (REFTTEL) CONTINUED NOV 17 AND 18. BY EVENING NOV 18 ROK HAD EXPLORED 630 METERS OF TUNNEL BEFORE FINDING SEVERAL STACKS OF DYNAMITE AND TEMPORARILY HALTING EFFORTS. THE TUNNEL RUNS NE-SW WITH THE SOUTHERN END APPROXIMATELY 1400 METERS FROM THE MDL. THE INVESTIGATION INDICATES THAT CONSTRUCTION STILL IN PROGRESS WHEN DISCOVERED.

2. SO FAR EXPLORATION HAS UNCOVERED THREE RAIL TURN TABLES FOR HAND RAIL CARS USED IN TUNNEL, ONE SMALL ROOM OFF TUNNEL, AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF CONSTRUCTION AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.

3. UNC HAS PROPOSED TO HOLD MAC MEETING NOV 19 TO CHARGE NORTH WITH VIOLATION ARMISTICE, BUT KPA/CPV HAS NOT YET RESPONDED.

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4. ROKG HAS USED TUNNEL DISCOVERY TO EMBARK ON MAJOR PROPAGANDA EFFORT AGAINST NORTH. MEDIA HAS GIVEN EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO STATEMENT TO PRESS BY DEFENSE MINISTER SUH THAT PURPOSE OF TUNNEL IS TO MOVE TROOPS FOR SURPRISE ATTACK AND NOT FOR INFILTRATION SMALL NUMBERS ESPIONAGE AGENTS OR GUERRILLAS. SUH LINKED TUNNEL WITH OTHER NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE ROK SUCH AS "CONSPIRACY" NATIONAL FEDERATION DEMOCRATIC YOUTH AND STUDENTS, (NFDYS), AND AUG 15 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON PRESIDENT PARK. SUH SAID THAT ROKG HAS INFORMATION OF OTHER TUNNELS BEING CONSTRUCTED IN DMZ AND WILL TAKE "APPROPRIATE ACTION IN DUE TIME."

5. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN QUOTED BY PRESS AS SAYING THAT PRESIDENT PARK AND KEY CABINET MINISTERS AGREED NOV 17 THAT TUNNEL WOULD ENABLE ENTIRE REGIMENT WITH EQUIPMENT TO SLIP INTO SOUTHERN PORTION DMZ AT ONE TIME.

6. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS ALSO GOTTEN INTO ACT. IT WILL HOLD PLENARY SESSION NOV 19 TO QUESTION GOVT ON TUNNEL AND TO ADOPT RESOLUTION CENSURING NORTH KOREA WHICH WILL BE SENT TO UNGA. NDP IS MEETING EVENING NOV 18 TO DECIDE IF IT WILL PARTICIPATE IN SESSION IN SPITE OF ASSEMBLY BOYCOTT.

7. FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLED IN DIPLOMATIC CORPS NOV 18 FOR BRIEFING ON TUNNEL DISCOVERY BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LHO SIN-YONG. BRIEFING, WHICH UTILIZED CHARTS AND MAPS AS WELL AS SHORT FILM, MADE ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS AS THOSE MADE BY SUH. EMPHASIS WAS ON CONTINUING MILITARY THREAT FROM NORTH AS EVIDENCED BY "PERMANENT FACILITIES" TO BE USED TO LAUNCH "LARGE-SCALE SURPRISE ATTACK AGAINST ROK" AT DECISIVE MOMENT. LHO ESTIMATED THAT TUNNEL COULD HANDLE 5-6,000 SOLDIERS IN ONE HOUR AND SPECULATED THAT WITH 5-7 TUNNELS WHICH MAY EXIST IN DMZ ATTACK BY 30-40,000 TROOPS POSSIBLE.

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8. COMMENT: ROKG IS PREDICTABLEY EXPLOITING TUNNEL DISCOVERY FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT VICE MINISTER LHO'S FIGURES EXAGGERATE THE POTENTIAL THREAT REPRESENTED BY TUNNEL. WE ARE CURRENTLY REVIEWING THIS QUESTION. SNEIDER

Tunnel Is Part of ROK Scheme

Pyongyang KCNA in English 0421 GMT 20 Nov 74 B

[Text] Pyongyang November 20 (KCNA)--The South Korean puppets have invented another fraud called the "tunnel question" in the demilitarized zone in the western sector of the front, over which they are raising an "anti-communist" din slinging mud at us with increasing frenzy. Sharply denouncing this in a commentary November 20, NODONG SINMUN says that this "anti-communist" fraud of the puppets isolated within and without is their death-bed wriggle.

Pointing out that the anti-"communist" din and provocative acts of the puppets are rendering the situation in our country more strained and the prospect of peaceful reunification gloomier, the commentary continues: The so-called "tunnel question" circulated by the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique, an old hand at reversing black and white, is a sheer fabrication which has nothing to do with us and a brazen "anti-communist" swindle.

Lies and fabrication, deception and swindle are the filthy means of prolonging the remaining days employed by the imperialists and their stooges who are floundering in the crisis of destruction, forsaken by the time and people. The Pak Chong-hui clique who find themselves an "international orphan," in the true sense of the word, isolated within and without, are resorting to intrigues and deception more viciously and persistently than any other lackeys of imperialism.

The commentary says: It is self-evident why the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique are speaking ill of us, bringing forward such questions as the "tunnel question" with the approach of the South Korean tour of Ford, the aggressive boss of U.S. imperialism, and the discussion of the Korean question at the United Nations. This is a most base criminal act designed to delude the South Korean people and world public opinion and cadge a few more rifles and dollars from the U.S. imperialist master by screwing up the situation to a high pitch and thus bolster up the military fascist dictatorial "regime" shaking to its very foundation; it is a treacherous move to justify the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops' occupation of South Korea, freeze the national split and intensify the fascist suppression and war preparations.

Internally, the South Korean students and people of various strata are waging a massive struggle against fascism and for democracy in demand of the resignation of the Pak Chong-hui clique and the abolition of the fascist dictatorial system. Externally, the world progressive people are raising high their voices demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops from South Korea and the realisation of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. The South Korean puppets, finding themselves totally isolated under this situation, cooked up the despicable drama, such as the "tunnel question" in an attempt to find a way out of their predicament.

The South Korean puppets' aggravation of the tension in Korea through the "anti-communist" drama is also aimed at giving the pretext of so-called "protection" to the U.S. imperialists who are working hard to keep their occupationist troops in South Korea to seize South Korea indefinitely as their colony and military base.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Park Chung-Hee, President of the  
Republic of Korea (ROK)  
Kim Chong-Pil, ROK Prime Minister  
Kim Dong-Jo, ROK Foreign Minister  
Hahm Pyung-Chun, Korean Ambassador  
to the United States  
Kim Chung-Yom, Chief Presidential  
Secretary

Gerald R. Ford, President of the  
United States of America  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of  
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Richard L. Sneider, United States  
Ambassador to the ROK  
Brent Scowcroft, Lieutenant General,  
USAF, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs

DATE, TIME,  
AND PLACE:

November 22, 1974, 3:00 p. m.  
The Blue House, Seoul, Korea

SUBJECTS:

South Korean Dependence on U. S. Support;  
North Korean Threat; North Korean  
Tunneling Under the DMZ; North-South  
Dialogue; Need to Negotiate from a  
Position of Strength; Japan's Expanding  
Contacts with North Korea; Park Requests  
U. S. Intervention with Moscow and Peking  
on Korean Problem; South Korea's  
Economic Problems; Continuing U. S.  
Support for South Korea; World Economic  
Outlook; U. S. Will Take Korean Question  
Up with PRC and Soviet Leaders

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6

NSC MEMO, 11/24/76, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY John, NARA, DATE 5/16/04

*State's v. cw  
2/10/04*

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



After the opening greeting, President Park began his presentation.

South Korean Dependence on U.S. Support

President Park: I would like to make a few comments. First, on behalf of the government and people of Korea, I extend to you a heartfelt welcome for visiting our country on your first overseas trip since becoming President. The Korean people vividly remember with profound gratitude that American youth came to their aid and shed blood for a common cause. A source of constant assurance to Korea is the stationing of U. S. troops here, who play an important role in defense of Korea.

I also wish to express admiration and respect for the leading world role played by you, President Ford, in easing world tensions, in building a structure of world peace, and in seeking to solve the world-wide economic difficulties. There is no doubt about the enormous difficulties you face today.

North Korean Threat

I would like now to discuss briefly the Korean situation. Since you have been fully briefed, there is no need to go into detail. I would like to point out one fact which concerns us the most. The North Koreans are the most militant, radical Communists of all Communist Party nations in the world. They could easily resort to reckless and adventurous acts, which ordinary people could not predict.

One example of North Korean recklessness occurred only a week ago, when we discovered a tunnel designed to penetrate large forces behind our line for attack and aggression. This tunnel proves that the North Koreans are prepared to resort to reckless, unpredictable acts. I am convening a Military Command Conference to consider the underground approach tunnels. The purpose of these tunnels is not infiltration or small-scale guerrilla attacks. Given their size, the fundamental purpose for building the tunnels -- the number of which we do not know -- is to bring large-scale military forces into our rear areas. We therefore have to reassess our strategy.

In this connection, I recall several articles written last year by American journalists after visiting North Korea. They described North Korea as one huge military camp or garrison state. There are 2,700,000 armed troops in North Korea. The North Koreans are inculcated with the peculiar Communist dogma of Kim Il-Sung. In North Korea there is military rule, military drills for school children beginning in the fifth or sixth grades. We therefore have to be watchful.



North Korea has openly stated that its political objective and basic strategy is to communize the South by force.

In fact, their excessively large military forces overburden the North Korean economy leading to deterioration in their economic situation. There is dissatisfaction and dissension in the North, and Kim Il-Sung is uneasy and uncertain. Feeling time is against him, Kim Il-Sung has often committed reckless acts.

Since North Korea is equipped with excessively large military forces, the ROK must consider the possibility of armed invasion. My assessment is that, without support by Communist China and the Soviet Union, North Korea is not capable of launching a long-term, large-scale, all-out invasion. The possibility of such an invasion is slim if American troops remain here. However, North Korea is able to mount a limited offensive if it is combined with infiltration and serious unrest politically in the South and if government control is weakened. Such a limited offensive could easily escalate into full-scale hostilities, with the tunnels used to penetrate large-scale forces.

#### North Korean Tunneling Under the DMZ

President Ford: General Stillwell showed me diagrams of the tunnel during our trip to Camp Casey. Large-scale troops behind the line does pose an ominous possibility.

At this point, President Park showed President Ford a small-scale model of the tunnel which had been brought into the room. In describing the tunnel, President Park said there was no way to check whether the tunnel goes to the northern boundary of the DMZ, but he thinks so. When completed, the tunnel would be capable of sending one regiment per hour behind the southern boundary of the DMZ, thus penetrating large-scale forces into the rear areas. This would disorganize the front-line troops on the DMZ boundary.

Secretary Kissinger: Would they be capable of bringing heavy equipment with them?

President Park: No. They could bring crew-served weapons. North Koreans have light-armed divisions with light weapons.

President Ford: How far below the surface was the tunnel dug?

President Park: (President Park, misunderstanding the question, replied as follows): From the center line of the DMZ to the south the tunnel runs about 1,200 meters.

Secretary Kissinger: The President was asking about the depth of the tunnel.

President Park: The depth of the tunnel depends on the terrain. In some places it's one to two meters deep. Where it was discovered, it was only one foot deep. One of our patrols saw steam or condensed air coming from the ground and that was how the tunnel was discovered.

Military sources also believe that there are four to five such tunnels elsewhere because sentries have heard knocking sounds underground.

President Ford: Was the tunnel discovery by search or happenstance?

President Park: A patrol saw steam or smoke purely accidentally. They suspected and dug, and found the tunnel. At that point, an enemy sentry fired on the patrol.

We have ordered the latest type of detectors, which are expected next month. We are utilizing all types of sound detectors, including mine detectors, to determine more about the tunnels. Even oil drills are being used to find the tunnels.

Secretary Kissinger: You will probably end up finding oil.

President Park: That would be fortunate. If we find it, we will not have to spend time with the Arabs.

President Ford: This has been interesting and helpful.

President Park: The North Koreans might try a blitzkrieg offensive, taking their cue from the Middle East war. They would try to occupy certain areas and then ask for a ceasefire. This possibility is high.

#### North-South Dialogue

President Park: Last, I would like to speak briefly about keeping the peace consistent with U. S. detente efforts. The North-South dialogue was initiated by us, but the dialogue has been suspended due to the North Koreans' obstructionist tactics. The North Koreans unilaterally notified us that they would not keep the dialogue going at the highest levels. It has been kept going only at a working level. Thus, the North Koreans' ulterior motive in responding to our proposal was not to ease tensions or to establish peace. Rather it was to gain a prompt U. S. withdrawal by using the dialogue for political propaganda purposes.

Even though the North-South dialogue is not working and was suspended last August, we do not intend to let it break down, given world public opinion.

Considering relevant factors in the Korean situation, we recognize that we will not realize our goal of national unification in the foreseeable future. However, we have no choice but to coexist in peace until conditions for unification are right. To establish peace, therefore, is our most desirable interim goal. And we are seeking a peaceful coexistence similar to that which exists now in East-West Germany.

In considering how to act in the interim, I have repeatedly urged North Korea to agree to a nonaggression pact and to entry of both North and South Korea into the United Nations. But North Korea has turned deaf ears. Nevertheless, we will continue our effort to have a dialogue with North Korea and to seek a response to our call.

#### Need to Negotiate from a Position of Strength

I am sure that you, Mr. President, and Secretary Kissinger agree with me that a position of strength is an absolute necessity for negotiations with the Communists. We must build up our national strength and mobilize our total energies to the degree that we can surpass North Korea. When the North Koreans accept the superiority of strength of South Korea, then they will come to the table for negotiations.

The next three or four years will be the most important period for bringing about a shift in the climate. South Korea during this period will become self-reliant so that when North Korea attacks us without help from the Soviet Union or Communist China we will be able to defend ourselves with our own forces. To carry out this task positively, we must maintain political and social stability in the ROK. To attain stability, I believe strong leadership is necessary. Although some of our people complain, we need to develop prosperity and security to deal with the peculiar North Korean type of Communism.

Strong leadership will contribute to peace and stability in Korea, in Northeast Asia and in the world as a whole.

I believe that the Republic of Korea and the United States have a common interest in deterring hostilities and blocking the North Korean scheme to bring Communist rule to the South. My efforts to establish peace are based on close cooperation with the United States. Accordingly, I honestly hope for a continued U. S. military presence, in the interim, at the same level as today. Such a presence will discourage miscalculation, encourage peace in Korea, and maintain the current balance of power as a deterrence.

Of course, we do not expect the U. S. presence to remain indefinitely, given the mounting U. S. public opinion and pressure in Congress. However, Korean self-reliance must be insured before U. S. troop reductions take place. Therefore, I hope for implementation of the Five-Year Modernization Plan with its completion as soon as possible. I also desire help for ROK defense industries, which will build our self-reliance.

#### Japan's Expanding Contacts with North Korea

I would now like to turn briefly to the Japan problem. The general trend in Japan is towards the left. The left-wing press and political circles are pressuring the Japanese Government, and the Japanese Government is making hasty approaches to North Korea. I hope the U. S. will use its influence to discourage these approaches. While maintenance of the military balance in Korea is important, maintenance of the political balance is just as important. Communist China and the Soviet Union are our neighbors. If Japan approaches North Korea, this would break the political balance, since, though we try hard to correct this situation, the Soviet Union and Communist China respond negatively to our approaches. We therefore urge the U. S. to discourage hasty Japanese approaches to the North.

I heard today, for example, that the Japanese Export-Import Bank is planning to loan North Korea a certain amount. This will help North Korean industry. Before, the Japanese Government found it difficult to check private contacts (contracts?) on a cash basis when receiving requests from the North. It said it would stop other official contacts (contracts?), however. But now the Japanese are opening up cooperation funds through Export-Import Bank loans. Apparently the Liberal Democratic Party cannot sustain its policies against the mounting pressures of the Socialist Party.

#### Park Requests U. S. Intervention with Moscow and Peking on Korean Problem

One other problem is how to get North Korea to change its militant policies. We need pressure on North Korea because, if they are left alone, problems will erupt on the Korean Peninsula, given the adventurous attitude of North Korea. We will try to continue our dialogue with the North, but that is not enough. Persuasion needs to be applied to the North, but it would be awkward for the U. S. to do this.

However, the North Koreans could be persuaded through Communist China or the Soviet Union. It would be better to have them do this.

When you, Mr. President, meet with the Russians at Vladivostok and when Secretary Kissinger meets with the Chinese, I hope the sincere efforts of South Korea to establish peace will be brought to the Soviet and Chinese attention and they will be urged to exercise influence over North Korea.

#### South Korea's Economic Problems

Next, I would like to turn to economic problems. Because of the current world economic situation, we have been having difficulties. We depend on others for our primary resources, but increases in prices threaten our international payments position, and it is difficult to expand exports. We are faced with lay-offs in our industries, increasing unemployment, and many other problems. I renew my tribute to your efforts to overcome the worldwide economic problems, since these will contribute to Korea's economy. I particularly appreciate Secretary Kissinger's speech in Chicago, in particular the favorable consideration given to Korea and other developing countries in solving their economic difficulties.

I have taken too much time in talking about our problems. Our people are keenly aware of the need to repay our debts to the United States. The best way is self-reliance through a more vigorous effort so that Korea can live without reliance on the U. S. in the future. But we will remain, as in the past, true allies and trustworthy partners.

#### Continuing U. S. Support for South Korea

President Ford: My purpose in coming to Korea is twofold. First, I wish to establish a personal relationship with the leader of a great country whom I have greatly admired and with the people of this country whom I have respected and admired over the years. My second purpose was to indicate clearly the continuity of U. S. policy in its relationship to Korea, and to indicate to the North Koreans that under no circumstances should they miscalculate and take actions based on the fact that a new administration has taken over in Washington. If the North Koreans will study my record in Congress, they will find that I supported President Truman in his response to North Korean aggression in 1950, and that I supported subsequent administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, that took firm stands on Korea. My record in Congress is one of strength. I supported actions to oppose aggression in Vietnam as I did in Korea.

When I return home, I will report to the American people and Congress that in my opinion it is vitally important for peace and stability throughout the whole world to support Korea and other like-minded nations seeking

to build their countries economically and militarily so that they can become self-sufficient.

I will continue to urge Congress to support allies like South Korea because such actions are constructive in seeking a stable world. Frankly, however, Congress is not as cooperative as I would have hoped. We have some problems convincing Congress that adequate military and economic aid are in the best interests of peace, of our allies, and of the United States. But I will continue my efforts to urge Congress to do so.

The modernization plan will be continued and hopefully speeded up. But, I have problems with Congress. Some members have asked me to speak to you. Their attitude is to seek to give advice to sovereign nations. This attitude does have an adverse effect in trying to convince Congress to provide sufficient funds.

I should like to make several points. We reaffirm the modernization program. Next, we have no intention of withdrawing U.S. personnel from Korea. The joint efforts of the U.S. and Korean military are in the best interests of peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. Further, I urge that the dialogue between the North and South continue, since peaceful coexistence is essential.

Our relations with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China are based on urging restraint in all parts of the world. Therefore, we will continue to urge both to have a continuing influence with their allies in restraining precipitous actions which would destroy regional or world stability.

Your continued strong leadership, Mr. President, is important for the North-South dialogue. It is our intention to have sufficient strength to negotiate from strength, not weakness.

In our discussions with the Japanese, we recommended a cautious, slow, and very deliberate relationship with North Korea. We told them that it would not be helpful to expand Japanese-North Korean relations on a rapid basis since that will destroy the balance necessary for constructive solutions of problems between the North and South. In our discussions over the last several days with Japan, we urged them not to expand relations with the North unless and until the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union establish relations with the Republic of Korea.

The announcement this morning of the Export-Import Bank loan was opposed by the United States Government, since we did not think it in the best interests of the Republic of Korea.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I believe this was not announced as a firm decision, but probably leaked as being under consideration. They did not tell us about it in advance, and I am astonished by the announcement in view of the present political situation in Japan.

President Ford: Let me rephrase my remarks. We have in the past opposed such actions and we will certainly do so in the future.

World Economic Outlook

With respect to the economic situation, we recognize the difficulties faced by the Republic of Korea as a result of the serious increase in oil prices and the unfortunate actions taken by the oil-producing countries. These actions are not in the best interests of a world so interdependent economically. Secretary Kissinger is trying to organize the oil consumers so that we will be better able to negotiate with the oil-producing nations. We have made substantial headway and already taken steps beneficial and helpful to the U. S. and others, like South Korea. We will maximize our efforts. The oil-consuming nations cannot afford the economic impact of the cost of oil. We face inflation and the great world monetary problems. Secretary Kissinger's efforts are designed to develop a strong position vis-a-vis the oil producers and for dealing with the monetary distortions.

At the present time, the United States faces difficult economic problems. The trend in the cost-of-living has been substantial increases, but it is now moderating. In 1974, the increase will be 11 to 12 percent; by the middle of next year, we expect the increase to be down to 6 or 7 percent, which is still too high but substantially improved.

We also face a serious recession or downturn in our economic situation, but this should be reversed by the middle of 1975. The analysis by my economic experts is that a short-term economic downturn will be followed by encouraging increases in growth by late 1975.

The program I have sent to the Congress is aimed at both moderating inflation and also providing remedies for the softening of sales in certain industries and increases in unemployment. It is a fine-honed program to meet inflation and recession. While Congress must make its own judgment, I hope to work out with Congress an agreed plan. Our economic plans also take into consideration the interdependence of the United States with the rest of the world. The difficulties faced are not only American problems but involve our relations with other countries of the world. I think our program will be successful.



U. S. Will Take Korean Question Up with PRC and Soviet Leaders

I would like to make two final points. First, during my visit with General Secretary Brezhnev I will urge him to exercise restraint on North Korea. I will ask Secretary Kissinger to do the same with the Peoples Republic of China. Second, even though we have been approached on contacts or negotiations with North Korea, we will not do so unless or until the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union do the same with the Republic of Korea. There must be a comparable effort by them.

I want to thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity for this frank and broad discussion. It has been very helpful to me, and I hope it has been likewise helpful to you. Finally, I will send you a report, through our Embassy, on my contacts and those of Secretary Kissinger with the Soviet Union and China.

Secretary Kissinger: When the Foreign Minister is in New York, I will ask Assistant Secretary Habib to see him there and fill in any gaps on our conversations with the Russians and the Chinese.

President Park: I reciprocate with my own deep appreciation for your frank and kind remarks, President Ford. They have been of great help to me.

Secretary Kissinger: We should now agree with the President on the joint communique.

President Park: Yes, it is agreeable.

(After a brief exchange, it was agreed that the press briefing would be based upon the joint communique with some elaboration and that we would list the topics discussed and make very general comments. There would be no discussion of the efforts to urge restraint on the Chinese and Russians.)

Secretary Kissinger: We wish to note in our press briefing the warmth and pride in the reception given President Ford, which has cemented solidarity between the American and Korean people.

President Ford: The reception in Korea was the warmest, friendliest and largest I have received.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Park Chung-hee, President of the Republic of Korea  
Ch'oe Kyu-ha, Prime Minister  
President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: November 1974

PLACE: Seoul, Republic of Korea

Park: I hope that American strength will be maintained at current levels for a considerable time into the future. We don't expect American troops to continue into the indefinite future, but Korean troops must be brought up to the latest standards and Korean defense industries must get American help.

Japan is making a hasty approach to North Korea. I hope you will dissuade Japan from such a hasty initiative.

Rising prices have seriously unbalanced our payments, together with the world recession which has closed many of our factories.

President: Mr. President, I had two purposes in coming here. First, I want to establish a personal relationship with you. Second, I want to reaffirm the continuity of American policy.

We reaffirm the modernization program. There is no intention to withdraw American personnel.

The North-South dialogue I hope will continue.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)

278 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, DEC. 31, 2001

REC'D IN HQ, WASHDC, STATE DEPT. ON 11/10/74  
BY 14 . MWA, DATE 5/6/04



I agree that Japan should not expand relations with North Korea on too rapid a basis. Japan's announcement of export-import credits for North Korea has been opposed by us.

I will ask Brezhnev to urge restraint on North Korea and Secretary Kissinger will do the same with China. We will not approach North Korea until the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China do the same for you.

We will send you a report on my trip to Vladivostok and Secretary Kissinger's trip to Peking.

What shall we say to the press?

Prime Minister: Let's just elaborate on the communique.

Kissinger: Yes, but let's both do it the same way. We could list the topics that were discussed and note some general comments about each. We could say the subject of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea was discussed, but not that the President will intervene. He can do that better if the Soviet Union is not put on record.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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*HAR*  
ACTION

3 D  
November 29, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: W. R. Smyser *WRS/jmc*  
SUBJECT: My Meeting with American Missionaries  
in Korea

I met in Seoul on November 23 with the American missionaries opposed to the Park regime, as you instructed.

Attached (at Tab A) is the requested report for the President on the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum for the President (Tab A).

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Meeting of the American Missionaries  
in Korea with a Member of the NSC  
Staff

One of the members of the NSC Staff met with a group of American missionaries in Korea after our departure. He met with them at their request to hear their views opposing the policies of President Park.

The missionaries, who belong to various Christian denominations, made the following principal points:

- The Korean people feel alienated from the Park Government. But they are not against the Government. They just favor things that the Government opposes, like certain democratic liberties.
- The opposition does not want to overthrow the Government but to change its nature. It offers no alternative regime.
- The principal opposition demand is to eliminate the new constitution (which permits Park to rule beyond his original two terms).
- President Park believes that all his opposition is linked to the communists, and he labels it as such. This is not correct.
- The United States shares responsibility for events in Korea because we lost nearly 40,000 men and because we have been there since the armistice in 1953.
- The Korean Government regards your visit and the communique with great satisfaction, but other Koreans are deeply disappointed.
- President Park may become even tougher with the opposition now that he has been bolstered by the visit of the American President. This would be seen by Koreans as a direct insult to the United States, and the United States should speak out.

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The NSC staff member said that he would report the views of the American missionaries, as he had been commissioned to do.



**Minutes of Conversation between comrade Nicolae Ceausescu and the head of the North Korean delegation, Gim Donggyu**

<b>Date:</b> 2 December 1974	<b>Source:</b> <i>National Historical and Central Archives, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Foreign Relations Section, Folder 296/1974. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</i>
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The following officials attended the discussion: Stefan Andrei, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party Secretary and Dumitru Turcus, Deputy Head of Section within the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

Bak Jungguk, the DPRK ambassador to Bucharest also attended.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Are you enjoying yourself in Romania?

**Gim Donggyu:**

Yes, thank you very much. Owing to your care and to that of other comrades in the party and state leadership we are enjoying ourselves very much, We can actually say we're feeling as if we were at home.

Thank you very much for the attention you are paying to our delegation. Thank you for this welcome, especially since you're so busy at the moment.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

I would like to greet your party's delegation once again, above all [to greet] comrade Gim Donggyu. We are happy that such a representative delegation took part in the workings of our Congress. We see it as an expression of the collaborative relations between our parties and our peoples. We see it as an expression of our collaborative relations which have been developing and are ever increasingly developing, between our parties, as we have agreed.

**Gim Donggyu:**

Thank you. I had the opportunity to take part in the workings of your party's Congress, and I had the opportunity to convey to you our warm regards. But in addition, I was assigned by comrade Kim Il Sung to congratulate you right after the party elections, since he thought that the congratulations telegram will not reach you right away. I would like you to think of all these [gestures] as the embodiment of the extraordinary attention that comrade Kim Il Sung is giving you. We believe that your election as secretary general [of the Romanian Communist Party] is a perfectly natural thing. We believe that your election is absolutely normal, especially since you have acquired so much experience in fighting for the interests of the Romanian people, over a period of forty years; you are a figure that did his best to unite the people around the Romanian Communist Party.

Your election is an important factor for the unity of the international communist and workers' movement. We view the Report you presented at the [Romanian Communist Party] Congress as a report which clears up the way ahead for Romania to build the socialist society and thereafter to build the communist society. By taking part in the workings of your Congress we could clearly see the high regard and trust that the party, the Romanian people have for you. Your unanimous election to the fore of the party is an extraordinarily positive thing for the future of the relations amongst our parties as well. Our delegation highly appreciates the fact that you were elected at the peak of the party, and the fact that several comrades to whom we pay special attention and with which we are linked through a deep friendship were also elected to the top echelons of the party.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

I would like to deeply thank you for the greetings and wishes conveyed by comrade Kim Il Sung. Needless to say, I appreciate the fact that such a representative delegation was sent to [our] party's Congress, and I regard the greetings, congratulations and wishes sent by comrade Kim Il Sung as proof of the excellent relations between our parties, between our parties and our countries, Romania and the DPRK.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my satisfaction and that of our party's leadership for the rising development of relations between our parties and peoples in all fields, and I would like to express my conviction that they will continue to develop.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Thank you.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Please tell comrade Kim Il Sung about our desire to increase our cooperation, and even more, tell him about our desire to have him in Romania.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

I assure you I will pass on the invitation and, at the same time, I'd like to tell you that we, including comrade Kim Il Sung, bear in mind at all times the issue of his visit to Romania. Please grant me all your trust on this matter and do not treat my statements as a personal point of view, but as a reflection of our entire leadership, including the opinion of comrade Kim Il Sung.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

As far as Romania is concerned, you attended our Congress, you became aware of the preoccupations we have with respect to internal development, you heard what we said about outcomes, shortages, and you also heard the criticisms brought forward. As for international matters, they were also broadly discussed, I wouldn't want to dwell on them right now. We believe it is necessary to strengthen the unity, collaboration between revolutionary parties, between all anti-imperialist forces, so as to accelerate our struggle against imperialist policies, to guarantee a new type of international politics. In this respect, we believe it is for the better to have as strong a collaboration between our parties and peoples as possible, and we wish to intensify this collaboration. You saw that the big powers strike deals on all problems. In the end they reach an agreement.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

We are aware of the content of the Report you presented at the Congress and we believe that what you said perfectly corresponds to the principles that should form the basis of international relations, principles that should form the basis of relations amongst states and the problem of how to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism according to the state of affairs in each country. As you well know, our country is divided because of our enemies' complot, and the situation is quite tough. With respect to your support that you have given us in the Report from your Congress, it is an extraordinarily important impetus for the struggle of our people, and therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you. We really appreciate the fact that in the Report, you mention that you will support the struggle of our people for the unification of the country in the future as well, and the actions and struggle of other peoples that help us.

We act with a view to peacefully and independently uniting our country, but, as you know, the North-South dialogue has been stalling. We are not guilty in any way for this situation; it's only the fault of the puppets in the South and the American imperialists. However, we deem it necessary, and we will even try to maintain these North-South contacts, to continue to develop a general political action.

As you know, we adopted several approaches to unite the country, including contacting the US Senate, but despite all these, our problems have not been solved. Not long ago, [the South Koreans] have intensified their actions, through which they infringe upon the agreements we reached at our meetings. South Korea is under foreign influence and at the 63<sup>rd</sup> Session of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea we pointed out that in these conditions we can't achieve the unification of the country peacefully as long as Park Chung Hee. For this reason, we asked for the North-South negotiations to continue between social and political organizations and that progressive parties in both Koreas strengthen [their ranks] and convene a Great National Assembly for both Koreas. When we put this forward, we took into account the fact that, in South Korea, there were massive workers and student protests, mass demonstrations, and our proposal is an impetus in the struggle of the masses [against occupiers], [and] on the other hand it is a factor that could lead to the growing isolation of the leadership in South Korea. Park Chung Hee found himself in a tough spot, but it is for this very reason that [U.S. President Gerald] Ford visited [South Korea] and released a very aggressive communiqué to the press. According to this communiqué, the Americans declared that they would not pull out their troops from South Korea and that they would help modernize the South Korean army and that in case of a certain situation occurring, they would intervene. I am telling you, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, all these things because our relations are very good. After his visit to South Korea and after releasing the reactionary

communiqué, Ford went to Vladivostok, where he talked to the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Of course, we do not know what happened there. For the time being we cannot say how Brezhnev talked to Ford and what the former told the latter.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

'Pravda' reports that the Soviets got along [with Ford] even better than with Nixon!

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

The situation in South Korea is pretty severe also because the North-South dialogue is stalling for the time being. We know that just like before, you, comrade Ceausescu and your party will do everything to support our actions to unify the country, and I want to take this opportunity to pass on our thanks to your entire party. Honestly speaking, we have many friends and none of them, with your exception, could commit to sending those letters to the US Congress. Only your party, which is assuming an independent position, [based on] national sovereignty, supported us with this issue.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

We took and will continue to take [all necessary measures] in the spirit of solidarity, to increase the influence of the DPRK, to reach a resolution for this problem, ultimately to unify the country, and we are certain that [all these] will be achieved.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Thank you.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

I agree that the unification of the country will only be achieved through peaceful means, and through the intensification of the people's struggle, both in the South and in the North to draw them closer to one another.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

That is exactly where the problem is: it is progressing very slowly. Our door is wide open.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Of course, it is not easy to carry out a political struggle but, you see, changes sometimes happen very fast. Your efforts to establish contacts will expedite the process of unification. You probably saw that in Portugal these changes occurred all of a sudden and they created the conditions for the demise of colonialism. In Greece, the military dictatorship perished in a few hours. Therefore, the intensification of the political struggle and contacts will expedite this process of strengthening of reactionary [sic] forces in South Korea, and the presence of the United States cannot preclude it, as it managed to do in Greece.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

We fully agree with your overview of the international arena.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Of course, it is necessary to intensify international contacts.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

It is indeed a very important aspect.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Because that will give a powerful boost to the position of the DPRK.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

That is correct.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

And of course, you must not give up developing your contacts with the US, with the US House of Representatives, with political figures in the US.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

We too are doing our best to get in touch with them. It is for this reason that we proposed signing the peace treaty with the United States.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

The situation can be made clear for the US public opinion by inviting some representatives from the US Senate and journalists.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

It is indeed necessary [to do so].

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

And that will fuel a certain position against Ford and his administration.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Without any doubt, the factors you mentioned with respect to the situation in Greece and Portugal are favorable to the struggle we are carrying on as well. However, the situation in South Korea is different from the situation in other countries. There is a reactionary regime in South Korea which is supported internally by foreign forces and therefore it is harder to foresee that there will be a coup.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Even more so, there can be coups overnight.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Compared to other countries, the situation [in South Korea] is complicated because they are dependent on the Americans politically, militarily and economically.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Even more so, it is for this reason that the sentiment against foreign presence must be cultivated.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

[Indeed,] that is why we now mainly stress the democratization of social-political life in South Korea and therefore, we are doing our best to replace Park Chung Hee with a relatively democratic and progressive personality. The problem is that the North is blamed for everything that is going on right now in South Korea, as there are rumors that there are spies from the North, and the South Koreans are therefore carrying out a vicious campaign against communists and [other forces.]

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

The prospects are nonetheless good.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Thank you for your judgment, and you must know that we are optimistic too.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

I am planning a trip to Japan this spring. They are indeed talking about changing Tanaka but irrespective of any changes my visit is set.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

We believe that these visits are good. It is paramount to influence public opinion in Japan.

Thank you very much for receiving me, especially since you are so busy. We could talk for ages, but generally we know the situation of our relations very well.

Once again, I would like to warmly thank you, on behalf of the entire delegation, for receiving us. I would like to wish you good health, a lot of success in your work and to express my firm belief that the tasks you adopted at the recent Party Congress will be carried out successfully. I assure you that upon my return home I will pass on your exact words to our leader, comrade Kim Il Sung.

**Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:**

Once more, I would like to thank comrade Gim Donggyu and the other comrades who took part in the workings of our Congress and I would like to wish you success in your activity and good health.

Please pass on to your party and people our wishes of success in the achievement of the peaceful unification of the country and the construction of socialism and once again, to comrade Kim Il Sung our best wishes for his health and successes in his work.

**Comrade Gim Donggyu:**

Thank you very much.

2 copies

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 269007

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ORIGIN EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 PM-03 NSC-05

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DRAFTED BY EA/K:DAO'DONOHUE:LM

APPROVED BY EA:WHGLEESTEEN,JR.

DOD/OSDISA - T.J.BIGLEY

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INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 269007

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, KS, KN

SUBJECT:NORTH KOREAN TUNNELS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

CINCPAC FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB AND AMBASSADOR

SNEIDER

REF: SEOUL 8113

1. WE UNDERSTAND NEED TO PROCEED WITH EFFORTS TO DETECT ANY FURTHER NORTH KOREAN TUNNELS. AT SAME TIME, BEFORE PROCEEDING WE NEED FURTHER INFORMATION ON DETECTION PROGRAM ENVISAGED REFTEL, WHICH COULD POSE SIGNIFICANT POLICY QUESTIONS.

2. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH GENERAL STILWELL WHO HAS TOLD US HE WILL BE FORWARDING MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES BASED ON HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE

AND IN KOREA AFTER HIS RETURN. KISSINGER

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PAGE 02 STATE 269007



Department of State

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NOD652

TELETYPE

PAGE 01 STATE 271124

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INFO OCT-01 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EA/K:DAVID DONOHUE  
APPROVED BY EA:WHGLESTEEN, JR.  
PM/NPO:EPZIMMER (SUBSTANCE)  
ACDA:EMARTIN (SUBSTANCE)  
CIA: [REDACTED] (SUBSTANCE)  
S/S:REWOODS  
DOC/OIL:RDHADDOX  
INR/REA: JFARRIER (SUBSTANCE)

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.0  
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)

NR 94-146, # 47 Date 3/18/97

By KBH NARA, Date 5/27/97

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: MNUC, KS  
SUBJECT: ROK PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES

NO FOREIGN DISSEM, CONTROLLED DISSEM.  
NO DISSEM ABROAD, THIS INFORMATION NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN  
ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

REF: SEOUL 8023

1. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE EXCELLENT ANALYSIS CONTAINED REFTEL REGARDING ROKG INTENTIONS IN NUCLEAR FIELD.
2. WE HAVE ASKED INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE GROUP PREPARE ESTIMATE CURRENT ROK CAPABILITIES AND FUTURE POTENTIAL. UPON CONCLUSION THAT STUDY, WE WILL THEN ADDRESS SPECIFIC EMBASSY RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED PARA 11 REFTEL. INGERSOLL

~~SECRET~~

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Declassified  
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

### 3333 (XXIX). Question of Korea

*The General Assembly,*

*Desiring* that progress be made towards the attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people,

*Recalling* its satisfaction with the issuance of the joint communiqué at Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 July 1972 and the declared intention of both the South and the North of Korea to continue the dialogue between them,

*Aware,* however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area,

*Recognizing* that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula,

1. *Reaffirms* the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973,<sup>53</sup> and urges both the South and the North of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea;

2. *Expresses the hope* that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the two Korean Governments leading to a lasting peace between them.

*2322nd plenary meeting  
17 December 1974*

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION OES-02

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EA-06 EUR-08 EB-03 INR-05 L-01

SP-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 CIAE-00 PRS-01 IO-03 RSC-01

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7595

INFO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 8516

LIMDIS

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TAGS: EMES PARM MNUC CA KS

SUBJ: SALE OF CANADIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS TO KOREA

1. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR STILES BROUGHT ME ON DECEMBER 23 A COPY OF CANADIAN MINISTER OF ENERGY MACDONALD'S STATEMENT DECEMBER 20 ON NUCLEAR REACTOR SALE POLICY. STATEMENT PROVIDES FOR SALE OF CANADIAN REACTOR TO KOREA WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS.

2. STILES SAID CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOW COMPLETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SALE OF CANADIAN REACTOR TO KOREA. HE BELIEVES SAFEGUARD ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY AGREED TO WILL MEET REQUIREMENTS OF MORE STRINGENT POLICY ANNOUNCED BY MACDONALD, BUT FINAL APPORVAL AWAITS FURTHER REVIEW IN OTTAWA OF THESE SAFEGUARD ARRANGEMENTS.

3. STILES MENTIONED THAT FONMIN KIM DONG-JO, DURING NOVEMBER VISIT TO OTTAWA, ALSO OFFERED TO "TALK TO HIS GOVERNMENT" ABOUT NPT RATIFICATION IF RATIFICATION WOULD FACILITATE SALE OF CANADIAN REACTOR. STILES EXPECTS EARLY INSTRUCTION FROM OTTAWA TO PRESS FOR NPT RATIFICATION WITH ROK MOFA, ALTHOUGH PROBALLY NOT AS

CONFIDENTIAL

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ABSOLUTE CONDITION FOR SALE OF REACTOR.

