Peace Agreement Suggested by North Korea

Date: 1975
Source: South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.

Peace Agreement Suggested by North Korea
1. Overview
   a. The Beginning of Peace Agreement Suggestions

   At the Geneva Conference in June, 1954, North Korea first suggested that we turn from armistice status to peace-treaty status and reduce the size of both sides’ armed forces (100 thousand each). Since then to suggest a Nonaggression Peace Agreement Treaty, which takes the withdrawal of the American Army as a precondition, at the joint meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium, Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland Central Committee, and Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, North Korea has argued for a peace agreement between South and North Korea (withdrawal of the American Army, reduction of 100 thousand armed forces each by the South and the North) as a part of ensuring peaceful reunification.

   b. Interruption in Suggesting Peace Agreement

   Between 1964 to the end of 1969, North Korea did not mention a peace agreement or peaceful reunification officially. We observe that North Korea has prepared for a war during this period.

   c. Re-discussion of Peace Agreement

   In a memorandum submitted to the United Nations in October 1969, North Korea argued for a peace agreement between North and South Korea. North Korea again brought up the issues of the withdrawal of the U.S. Army and mutual reduction of armed forces through Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heo Dam’s suggestion (8 Points) in March 1971. Furthermore, the country has argued for a peace agreement between the South and North (ceasing the competition in military spending, withdrawal of foreign military, mutual reduction of 100 thousand armed forces, discontinuing the induction of weapons) at the second meeting of the fifth Supreme People’s Assembly in April 1973.

   d. Change in the Counterparty to Conclude the Peace Treaty with (Peace Agreement with the U.S.)

   Heo Dam’s Report at the Fifth Supreme People’s Assembly, third meeting, on March 25th, 1974, suggested achieving a peace treaty with the United States directly. Since then, the peace treaty to be directly concluded with the United States is mentioned as a “peace agreement” between the so-called “real parties” at the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 and 1975 as well as at non-alliance meetings at each level after 1976.
January 9, 1975

National Security Decision Memorandum 282

TO: The Secretary of Defense
    The Deputy Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Korean Force Modernization Plan

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 211, together with
the departmental and agency views thereon, and has decided the
following:

-- The United States will complete its obligation to the Republic of
Korea Force Modernization Plan at an early date, in order to
demonstrate the United States commitment to the security of the
Republic of Korea.

-- The shift from grant military assistance to FMS credits should be
accelerated to the rate defined in Option 2 in the NSSM response.

-- No termination date should be set for grant military assistance
to the Republic of Korea. The downward trend in grant military
assistance defined in Option 2 should be continued beyond FY 77,
but should look toward the maintenance of a modest investment
and training program with an annual ceiling of $10 million.

-- The F-4D squadron now on bailment to the Republic of Korea
should be transferred to the Republic of Korea by sale. The
Republic of Korea should be asked to pay the $3.3 million cost
for rehabilitating the two F-5A squadrons being returned to
South Korea under the Enhance Plus Agreement, but this should
not be a condition for the sale of the F-4D squadron if the Republic
of Korea raises serious and persistent objections.

-- The review of the North Korean threat and the Republic of Korea
air defense requirement contemplated by NSDM 227 should be
forwarded with recommendations to the President no later than March 3, 1975.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
    Director, Office of Management and Budget
    The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)(3) ACTION
January 29, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: W. R. SMYSER, W. R. SMYSER
CLINTON E. GRANGER
SUBJECT: Wrong Signals to Pyongyang

We have learned only this week of two changes which Defense is planning and executing in U.S. force structure and organization in South Korea, and of an initiative which State is undertaking to expand contacts with North Korea. Collectively, these actions could easily be interpreted by Pyongyang as unilateral U.S. steps to reduce support for South Korea.

Equally importantly, State and Defense are not relating these steps to a coherent conceptual approach to American policy toward the ROK and developments on the Korean Peninsula for either the near or long term. As regards the near-term, State has been slow to develop another approach (which might include renewed discussions with the PRC) on the question of how to terminate the U.N. Command. We believe we should try to take advantage of the U.N. General Assembly's favorable action on the Korean question to try to get underway a serious discussion of this question and to avoid another confrontation at next fall's UNGA. We plan to forward to you in the near future recommendations on a new approach. We strongly believe, however, that the military and political moves which Defense and State contemplate are unwise in the absence of a more comprehensive strategy for Korea.

Specifically, these actions consist of:

-- A Defense plan to phase U.S. officers out of the strategic joint I Corps (ROK-U.S.) Group, which exercises operational control over the western half of the DMZ. DOD rationalizes this as part of its global effort to reduce headquarters contingents. On DOD's instructions,
General Stilwell, U.S. Commander in Korea, has already approached the ROK and gained its acquiescence in this move. General Stilwell himself (Tab B) has serious political reservations about this move.

-- Defense is contemplating the removal of the only U.S. rifle company manning a sector in the southern half of the DMZ. The contingent is important not for its size -- it is only three dismounted Platoons of a mechanized infantry company -- but for the position it occupies -- the sector astride the road south from Panmunjom to the southern boundary of the DMZ -- and its value as the most forward deployed part of our trip-wire forces in South Korea.

-- State, for its part, has decided to give visas to North Koreans who apply for any of four major international non-governmental conferences to be held in the U.S. in the near future. (Visas will also be given to delegates from North Vietnam and Cuba.) State is also favorably disposed toward visas for North Koreans who in the future might want to attend any other major international non-governmental conference held in the U.S. We raised some questions with Habib on this; he said it would not be seen as contrary to our efforts to keep a diplomatic balance between North and South Korea, since South Koreans can attend international conferences in Russia and Eastern Europe, which is very rarely true.

The actions contemplated by Defense would send the wrong message to South Korea -- particularly in light of the President's assurances of support during his recent visit there -- as well as to North Korea. The Defense actions would also follow on our recent decision to withdraw our Nike-Hercules battalion from South Korea. They seem to be part of a DOD tactic to pull out the props -- one by one -- from the U.S. force presence in South Korea, perhaps because the President has said that there are to be "no significant changes in the level or missions of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea during the period of transition to new security arrangements following the termination of the United Nations Command." Defense's basic objective seems to be the same as in 1949, when we were contemplating the withdrawal of our remaining 7,000 forces in South Korea: that it is more important to reduce the risk of U.S. involvement in any renewed hostilities in Korea than to reduce the risk of renewed hostilities there. As you may know, Defense is also undertaking a major in-house review of U.S. strategy and force deployments in Asia, a study which so far seems to boil down to a new rationale for withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea as a means of coping with our problems with the Congress.
At Tab A is a draft memorandum from you to Secretary Schlesinger directing, in the President's name, that any changes in the disposition or organization of U.S. units in South Korea be cleared with the President.

The State action is less bothersome, but it is a departure from our basic policy of not expanding our contacts with North Korea until the PRC and the Soviet Union have expanded theirs with South Korea and it is not well timed. We do not believe that we should try to turn the clock back on what State has already decided in this respect, but that we should put a clamp on invitations to North Koreans to attend any other such conferences in the U.S., at least until we have seen the North Korean reaction to our willingness to attend the four conferences already decided on.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the draft memorandum to Secretary Schlesinger at Tab A.

That you authorize us to inform State that we should withhold visas from North Koreans for any additional major international conferences to be held in the U.S. until we have assessed North Korea's reaction to the visas we are now willing to issue.

APPROVE H DISAPPROVE _____

Concurrence:

Mr. Solomon

Concurrence:
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Sale of Rocket Propulsion Technology to South Korea

The Department of State has received a copy of Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements' memorandum of January 23, addressed to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, recommending that the contracts signed in December 1974 between the Lockheed Propulsion Company and the Republic of Korea for advanced missile technology be approved.

After reviewing the arguments in Mr. Clements' memorandum, the Department of State reaffirms its position that the Lockheed contracts should not be approved. Rationale for this decision is set forth in the attached paper.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concurs with the State Department position on these contracts.

Attachments:

Sale of U.S. Rocket Technology to South Korea

The Lockheed Propulsion Company has requested approval of two contracts signed in December with the Republic of Korea Agency for Defense Development (ADD), which would give South Korea a solid rocket propellant production capacity and would train South Korean personnel in rocket motor design. The Department of State has considered this matter from all angles, and concludes that approval should not be granted.

On January 23 Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements addressed a memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs urging that the contracts be approved.

Background/Analysis

Following Park's instructions the ADD approached the McDonnell-Douglas Company with a request for improving the Nike-Hercules SAM system in a surface-to-surface mode and extending its range. McDonnell-Douglas agreed that ROK plans looked feasible, and is currently putting the finishing touches on the design phase of a project to meet ROK requirements. The company expects to submit a formal request for Department of State (Munitions Control) approval in one or two months.

McDonnell-Douglas representatives said in late 1974 that the ADD had indicated McDonnell-Douglas should not plan on producing the improved propulsion system to boost the Nike-Hercules range the required distance. The Koreans, however, were at the same time negotiating with Lockheed
for establishment of a solid rocket motor production facility in Korea, which could be used among other purposes to upgrade the Nike-Hercules propulsion system. It is this proposal which is now before us for decision. The conjunction of ROK approaches to Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas appears more than coincidental. The basic technology is unclassified and is available from other countries -- notably France, which is reportedly attempting to sell similar facilities in competition with Lockheed. However, sale of the surplus Lockheed plant and related technical assistance would considerably reduce the time and cost required for the ROK to establish operational production facilities.

Mr. Clements' memorandum of January 23 contends that the Lockheed plant would enable the ROK to achieve substantial savings in reloading motors for the US-made rockets it now possesses. The memorandum further states that it is desirable for the ADD to undertake research and test programs for anti-tank and other rocket ordnance. (The ROK is purchasing more than 1,000 TOW missiles under the Foreign Military Sales program. We do not see the justification for such research, and it has not previously been raised).

The Department of State believes that President Park, through the ADD, is embarked upon an ambitious program to develop advanced weapons systems which will be "strategic" in the context of the Korean Peninsula. In addition to advanced missiles the ADD has been directed to supervise production of a prototype nuclear weapon. We believe that SSM's, even without nuclear warheads, could be destabilizing in the hands of the present ROK leadership, and would risk serious and rapid escalation arising from the low level naval and other incidents which are chronic between North and South Korea. Linkage of nuclear weapons development to an advanced missile capability would have the most serious strategic implications given the ROK's geographic location. The evidence, to us, suggests strongly that the ADD has selected the Nike-Hercules system, as modified, as an interim SSM, in response to Park's insistence that rocket development receive the highest priority.

The Issues

In these circumstances, much more is at stake in the Lockheed contracts than the reloading of Hawk missiles, R&D in anti-tank ordnance, or competition with the French.
Given the evidence that the ROKG is determined to create an advanced weapons capability within the next ten years, we would be contributing significantly to ROK capability in this area. President Park would regard our approval of the Lockheed projects as a major step in securing U.S. technological support for his ambitious plans for the ADD. The Defense position that we should approve the Lockheed case and then stand firm in refusing to provide further "significant" technology is not consistent. Provision of the Lockheed plant and related technology would be regarded by the Koreans as only the initial phase, and we would find ourselves under continuing pressure to provide further industrial support and additional advanced technology to the ADD on an incremental basis.

There is also the problem of perception by the ROK's neighbors, including Japan. Whatever the protestations by the Koreans and ourselves, sale of a propellant plant and related technology to the ROK's major defense research and development entity would be interpreted in the worst possible light. Given growing knowledge of ROK intentions in the nuclear field (which Defense does not dispute), we would be hard put to explain our actions to others.

The argument that we would gain leverage or a better opportunity to monitor ROK rocket development by approving the project appears to us specious. Park clearly views the ADD as a fundamentally Korean-only enterprise, for special weapons projects that we will not provide or are likely to oppose. In the ADD, South Korea will have an unconstrained facility which it can use for its own purposes without reference to our wishes or agreed requirements for Korean security.

It is not certain whether the Koreans will in fact proceed with the purchase of propellant equipment from the French. However, U. S. unwillingness to cooperate with the ROK in this program is an essential signal conveying to the Koreans that we will not under any guise assist them in developing an independent missile capability. Further, our refusal of this sale will put us in a stronger position in any future efforts to secure agreement with the Canadians, French and others on a common approach to ROK nuclear related requests.

Another, less central, consideration is U. S. labor union opposition to the sale on grounds of export of jobs as well as advanced technology. Union spokesmen have gained some Congressional interest in their case. Negative feelings on the Hill about the Park government
would complicate any effort we might make with Congress to defend the sale.

Mr. Clements has suggested that we use the opportunity provided by the Lockheed sale to give the ROKG our position on ROK missile development. The Department of State believes that, in view of the ROK's lack of candor with us in this area, our message is best conveyed by actions rather than words, i.e., denying the Koreans the technology rather than lecturing them about its use.

A direct question to the ROK leadership about long-range missile plans would be likely to elicit a pious denial.

An interagency message on the broad question of ROK nuclear weapons and potential delivery systems is being cleared, and will provide the basis for a more comprehensive approach on the whole question than could be made now.

For the above reasons, the Department of State plans to notify the Lockheed Propulsion Company it does not approve the December contracts.
SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 01089 210253Z

61
ACTION OES-04

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 ACDA-05 CIAE-00

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 FEA-01 SS-15 EB-07 XMB-02

AID-05 TRSE-00 OMB-01 COME-00 /083 W
---------------------     121711
P R 200848Z FEB 75 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8451
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TORONTO
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
AEC GERMANTOWN

SECRET SEOUL 1089

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ETRD ENGR PARM NUC TECH KS
SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR PROGRAM

1. DURING PAST WEEK EMBASSY WAS VISITED BY MEMBERS OF
GENERAL ELECTRIC (GE) NUCLEAR SURVEY TEAM VISITING KOREA
TO ASSESS ROK NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND POSSIBILITY OF GE SELLING
GE BWRS FOR KOREAN NUCLEAR PLANTS 5 AND 6. GE TEAM WORKED
CLOSELY WITH EMBASSY AND WERE DEBRIEFED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

2. GE PLANS FOR SALE OF 600 MEGAWATT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
TO ROK ARE BASED ON SIMILAR OFFER RECENTLY MADE TO EGYPT.
PLANT WOULD BE TURNKEY OPERATION WITH TOTAL COST OF DOLS
SIX TO SEVEN HUNDRED MILLION WITH FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS OF
DOLS THREE TO FOUR HUNDRED MILLION. GE EMPHASIZED THAT
THEY EXPECT COMPETITION FROM FRENCH, WHO GE SAYS HAVE BEEN
"VERY ACTIVE" IN NUCLEAR SALES AND HAVE MOUNTED "MASSIVE"
PROGRAM ORIENTED TOWARDS DISPLACING US AND WEST GERMANY
IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

3. GE TEAM WAS AWARE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR SALES ACTIVITY IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 01089 210253Z

ROK INCLUDING POTENTIAL SALE OF 100-METRIC TON A YEAR NUCLEAR
REPROCESSING FACILITY. IN TALKS WITH HE TEAM, ROKG OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR MATTERS EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN CONCEPT OF KOREA AS REGIONAL REPROCESSING CENTER, SELLING REPROCESSED NUCLEAR MATERIAL FIRST TO JAPAN AND TAIWAN AND EVENTUALLY TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (KAERI) HAS DONE A STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIONAL NUCLEAR REPROCESSING FACILITY AND GE TEAM EMPHASIZED THEIR IMPRESSION THAT REPROCESSING WAS OUT OF IDEA STAGE AND NOW A DEFINITE PLAN. GE TEAM INDICATED THAT, ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS, IDEA OF A REGIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITY IN KOREA WAS SOUND AND COST OF PLANT LARGE ENOUGH TO BE COMMERCIALLY SUCCESSFUL MIGHT BE ABOUT DOLS 250 TO 300 MILLION. ROKG OFFICIALS RAISED IDEA OF COMBINING JAPANESE CAPITAL AND US TECHNOLOGY FOR SUCH A PLANT.

4. ROKG OFFICIALS RAISED POSSIBILITY THAT, DUE TO POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS STILL INVOLVED IN CANADIAN SALE OF CANDU UNIT FOR ROK NUCLEAR PLANT 3, GE UNITS FOR ROK NUCLEAR 5 AND 6 COULD BE BUILT FIRST. IN RESPONSE TO ABOVE POSSIBILITY GE TEAM RAISED WITH EMBASSY POSSIBILITY OF US FORESTALLING ENTIRE CANDU PROGRAM THROUGH GE OFFER OF "STONG" PACKAGE PROGRAM FOR FOUR NUCLEAR PLANTS, THE FIRST OF WHICH COULD COME ON LINE IN LATE 1980. GE TEAM EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WOULD MAKE SUCH AN OFFER IF GE HAD USG SUPPORT, TO INCLUDE SOME EXIMBANK FINANCING.

5. GE TEAM WAS IMPRESSED WITH KNOWLEDGE OF NUCLEAR MATTERS DISPLAYED BY ROKG OFFICIALS WITH WHO THEY MET. ROKG OFFICIALS WERE DESCRIBED AS BEING IN "DECISION FRAME OF MIND." ROKG APPROACH TO NUCLEAR MATTERS CONTAINED REAL "SENSE OF URGENCY" AND GE WAS TOLD DECISION OF NUCLEAR 5 AND 6 WOULD BE MADE THIS YEAR.

SNEIDER

SECRET

NNN
TO SECRETARY WASHDC 8549

CONFIDENTIAL 1239

FRO M AMBASSAD OR SEOUL

SUBJECT: NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ACTING FM MIN NO (1.HO) SIN-YONG FEBRUARY 26 TO URGE EARLY ROK RATIFICATION OF NPT. AMBASSADOR SAID HE COULD ASSURE THE AMBASSADOR "THAT THE ROK WAS MOVING QUICKLY IN THAT DIRECTION". AMBASSADOR SAID THAT US INFORMATION WAS HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE UNTIL DECISION HAS BEEN FINALIZED APPROVED BY CAFJ OF THE VP. AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT US REMARKS AND SAID THAT ROK ADHERENCE TO NPT WAS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT FROM STANDPOINT OF PROLIFERATION PROBLEM, BUT WOULD ALSO SERVE TO HELP ROK IN THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF MOFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS NOTED THAT ROK WAS DISCUSSING ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD AGREEMENTS WITH IAEA AS WELL AS WITH CANADA AND FRANCE.

IN RELATED DEVELOPMENT, CANADIAN FM TELLED 26 FEBRUARY 26, THAT ROK PRESIDENT PARK HAD MADE DECISION TO RATIFY NPT. FM TELLED 26 FEBRUARY 26, THAT ROK PRESIDENT PARK HAD MADE DECISION TO RATIFY NPT.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE OR SEUL 2139 267825Z

DECISION TO US AND UK IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS, REQUIRED
CABINET APPROVAL WOULD TAKE PLACE AT CABINET
MEETING IN APRIL. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, DESIGNED TO
OBTAIN MAXIMUM FAVORABLE IMPACT IN TERMS ROK
INTERNATIONAL POSITION VIS-A-VIS NORTH KOREA, KOREA,
WOULD FOLLOW. ROKG NOT YET CERTAIN AS TO EXACT TIMING,
BUT ACCORDING TO HAN ROKG APPARENTLY NOW FEELS THAT
ANNOUNCEMENT AT FORTHCOMING NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
WOULD APPEAR MOST PROPIETOUS OPPORTUNITY. ROKG WOULD
SUBSEQUENTLY PROCEED AT LEISURELY PACE WITH RATIFICATION
PROCEED TO AVOID IMPRESSION THAT IT ACTING UNDER ANY
PRESSURE. THIS PRESUMABLY WOULD MEAN PASSAGE OF
RATIFICATION BILL AT NEXT REGULAR SESSION BY NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY THIS FALL IN ACTUALITY.

SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 01 SEUL 01275 271040Z

ACTION EA-10
INFO OCT-81 ISO-00 PM-03 INR-07 SS-15 SSO-00 INRE-00 IO-10
COA-01 L-02 EB-07 DLOS-03 A 059 W

Q 270947Z FEB 75
FM AMBASSADORE SEUL
T1 SECSTATE WASHDC NIAC IMMEDIATE 8572
S... C R E T SEUL 1275
S;
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, KS
SUBJECT: YELLOW SEA INCIDENT BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH,
FEBRUARY 26-27

REF: CINCUNC 270350 FEB 75
1. WE HAVE JUST REVIEWED REPORT BY CINCUNC TO JCS (REFTEL). REPORT COVERS BASIC FACTS BUT THERE ARE NUMBER OF DETAILS STILL TO BE FILLED IN BY CINCUNC
2. FROM EMBASSY VIEWPOINT, WE HAVE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY COMMENTS OF OUR OWN:
A. YELLOW SEA INCIDENT WAS FIRST IN OUR RECOLLECTION TO TAKE PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AS CLEARLY ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES. IN PAST INCIDENTS, THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A CLAIM BY EITHER SIDE THAT INCIDENT ORIGINATED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.
B. WHILE THIS IS FIRST INCIDENT INVOLVING NORTH KOREAN FISHING VESSELS SOUTH OF NLL TO OUR RECOLLECTION, THERE CAN BE A NUMBER OF EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS. ONE POSSIBILITY IS THAT SMALLER NORTH KOREAN FISHING VESSELS STRAYED SOUTH AND TWO LARGER ARMED NORTH KOREAN VESSELS WERE SENT SOUTH TO DIRECT THEM BACK NORTH.

SECRET
PAGE 02 SEUL 01275 271040Z

C. AT NO POINT IN OUR RECORDS OF INCIDENT DID LARGER ARMED VESSELS HEAD TOWARD SOUTH KOREAN TERRITORY, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE MOVING SOUTHWARD WHEN SPOTTED AND CONTINUED TO DO SO, RAMMING INCIDENT TOOK PLACE AFTER NORTH KOREANS TURNED WESTWARD FROM SOUTH KOREAN TERRITORY TO MOVE OUT OF AREA WHICH CINCUNC DEFINES ROUGHLY AS ADIZ.
D. OUR INITIAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREAN REACTION LEADS US TO TENTATIVE CONCLUSION THAT NORTH KOREANS WERE REACTING TO WHAT THEY CONSIDERED TO BE UNIQUE ACTION OF ENGAGING THEIR VESSELS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THEIR REACTION WAS IN TURN UNIQUE AND UNCHARACTERISTIC, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO USE OF AIRCRAFT SOUTH OF NLL AND OVER UNC CONTROLLED NORTHWEST ISLANDS. NEVERTHLESS, AS REFTEL POINTS OUT, NORTH KOREAN AIRCRAFT ACTIONS WERE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE.
E. WE ALSO ARE CONCERNED THAT NORTH KOREANS MAY BE
SECRET

REACTING TO LOSS OF TWO VESSELS IN PREVIOUS MONTHS AND THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT THEY MAY WISH TO "EVEN THE SCORE."

F. AT PRESENT TIME OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS CONTINUATION OF TENSE ATMOSPHERE WHICH COULD LEAD TO FURTHER INCIDENTS INITIATED BY THE NORTH OR AS RESULT SOUTH KOREAN REACTION TO NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS. I HAVE SPOKEN WITH GENERAL STILWELL AND HE ASSURES ME THAT VERY TIGHT CONTROL IS BEING MAINTAINED OVER ROK FORCES.

G. FINALLY I RECOMMEND URGENT REVIEW OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AS THEY AFFECT ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. AS WE UNDERSTAND CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AS EXPLAINED TO US BY CINCUNC, OUR SHIPS HAVE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE AND BOARD SHIPS THAT REFUSE TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WHERE THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF HOSTILE INTENT.

Sneider
SECRET

NNN
Less than two weeks [since the last incident], a second serious incident took place in the South Korean territorial waters, which resulted in the sinking of another North Korean vessel. Pyongyang says it was a fishing vessel while Seoul claims it was an armed vessel, which, together with a group of military vessels went into the South Korean territorial waters.

Navy and Air Force units from both sides were deployed during this incident. In order to expedite the succession of events, an American Phantom Fighter jets escadrille intervened. Each side blamed the other for the occurrence of this incident, accusing each other of being the instigators. News agencies in both the North and the South published statements. Both sides asked for the urgent summoning of the Panmunjeom Armistice Supervisory Commission. After this incident, which began on February 26th in the afternoon, a state of tension, almost incandescent, emerged: decision-makers in South Korea ordered the general mobilization [of the armed forces] and they are keeping air, navy and army units in the impact areas with North Korea in a state of alert.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is using this incident to intensify its campaign against the Seoul authorities and the US presence in South Korea, to intensify the disorder which dominates Seoul and within the South Korean military leadership.

We will inform you separately on the official position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Signed: Dumitru Popa
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: W. R. SMYSER DAVID D. ELLIOTT
SUBJECT: Development of U. S. Policy Toward South Korean Development of Nuclear Weapons

February 28, 1975

At Tab A is a draft State cable to Embassy Seoul informing the Embassy of the approach we are using to formulate a policy toward South Korea's development of the nuclear capability. The cable also responds to Ambassador Sneider's recommendations on this question (Tab B); we are in essential agreement with Sneider.

Specifically, the draft State cable:

-- Agrees that the ROK has entered the initial stage of nuclear weapons development.

-- Affirms that ROK continuation on this course would have a decidedly stabilizing effect in Northeast Asia.

-- Defines our basic objective as (1) to discourage and (2) to inhibit the ROK effort to develop a nuclear explosive capability or delivery system.

-- Stresses the need to develop our policy toward Korea on this issue within the multilateral framework which we are using for global policy on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

-- States that, in consonance with this multilateral approach, we are at present considering the following courses toward the ROK:

  • Inhibit ROK access to sensitive technology and equipment both through unilateral U. S. action and through the development of common supplier nation policies.

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
E.O. 12654 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 10-017, #24

By del NARA Date 01/23/10
• Press the ROK to ratify the NPT. (The ROK has told us recently that it intends to proceed to ratify the NPT in the near future.)

• Increase our information on the current state of ROK technical development in this area.

We have no objection to the draft State cable.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the draft State cable to Embassy Seoul at Tab A.

APPROVE ________  DISAPPROVE ________
SUMMARY: While it has been recognized for some time that Korea wished to keep its nuclear options open, evidence accumulated in recent months justifies strong presumption that the Korean Govt has decided to proceed with the initial phases of a nuclear weapons development program. At the present time, evidence is still not conclusive and the Program, as regards both nuclear device and delivery system, is still in its very initial developmental phase; however, evidence is sufficient to merit careful study.

END SUMMARY.

Korean Government Intentions: While the Korean Government continues to delay any steps toward ratification of the NPT, beginning this summer...
C. Minister remarked that decisions concerning the nuclear program taken as far back as 1969 had all been consistent with Korea's developing a nuclear weapons capability by the late 1970s using reprocessed wastes from the first power generating reactor and succeeding units.

2. Acquisition of weapons-grade material: After concentrating on U.S. research and enriched uranium power reactors for some years, ROKG has begun to diversify its reactor sources. Its main thrust has been attempt to acquire both CANDU heavy water power reactors and a research reactor from Canada. While there are other valid reasons for acquiring the CANDU reactor, including favorable credit terms, the Canadian reactors, particularly research reactor, could provide an easier means for evading safeguard controls and acquiring plutonium.

3. Additionally, we have reports that ROKG is seeking to acquire a nuclear fuel repro-

SECRET
Cessing plant which would separate plutonium from reactor wastes.

We understand, has contracted with ROC to make a feasibility study. Moreover, Economic Planning (EPU) has identified a projected French source public loan for a nuclear fuel re-processing and disposal plant.

4. Finally, the Korean govt has announced that it will develop domestic uranium deposits to fuel the Canadian reactors even though EPU-financed studies have demonstrated that these resources are limited in size and commercially unexploitable in foreseeable future.

5. Technical skills acquisition: Both Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KARI) have been recruiting Korean scientists working in U.S. by offering very favorable salary and other inducements. Requirement for scientists is fully legitimate in terms of developing Korean economy and also providing sufficient talent for its nuclear power reactor and research programs. But, nuclear scientific skills can be utilized for weapons development.

Secret
SECRET

6. WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT: THE ROK FORCES TODAY ARE EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY, SUCH AS F-4 AIRCRAFT AND NIKE HERCULES; NORTH KOREAN WEAPONS SYSTEMS HAVE SAME CAPABILITY, BUT NEITHER FORCSE HAS ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. THE ROKS ARE ALSO ENGAGED IN THE FIRST STAGES OF MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WHICH IS LARGELY EXPERIMENTAL AND ELEMENTARY AND IS MAINLY GEARED TO IMPROVED OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF MISSILE SYSTEMS NOW IN THEIR INVENTORY, THERE IS LEGITIMATE ROK CONCERN THAT, AS THESE MISSILE SYSTEMS GO OUT OF U.S. INVENTORY, THERE WILL BE PROBLEMS IN MAINTENANCE AND ACQUISITION OF SPARE PARTS. ADDITIONALLY, KOREANS ARE INTERESTED IN THE LOCKHEED PROPELLANT PLANT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AND FURTHER DEVELOP PROPELLANT COMPONENTS OF THEIR ROCKETS AND MISSILES. ADD RESEARCH PROGRAM SO FAR HAS PRODUCED ONLY A 10-FOOT SOUNDING ROCKET WHICH HAS STILL TO BE FLIGHT-TESTED.

8. THERE HAVE BEEN, HOWEVER, INDICATIONS OF KOREAN GOVT INTEREST IN UPGRADING ITS MISSILE CAPABILITIES, AND HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO DEVELOP A 200-MILE PLUS SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO HIT AIRFIELDS AND OTHER STRATEGIC TARGETS. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT INFORMED BY MND THAT IT DOES NOT INTEND TO FOLLOW THOUGH WITH MCDONNELL DOUGLAS.
PROJECTED CONTRACT, FOLLOWING INKLINGS OF U.S. CONCERN, MND VICE MINISTER CHOI KWANG SOO ALSO RECENTLY TOLD EMBASSY THAT MND HAS NOT YET DECIDED UPON ITS MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH GIVING ADD GO-AHEAD UN PROPELLER PLANT.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: EMBASSY LACKS SUFFICIENT EXPERTISE TO PROVIDE CLEARLY DEFINITE JUDGMENT REGARDING ROK NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, BUT, FROM EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US, WE CONCLUDE THAT DECISION HAS PROBABLY BEEN MADE TO LAUNCH INITIAL STAGES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HOWEVER, IT IS STILL IN AURIDINARY STAGE AND LACKING A NUMBER OF CRITICAL ITEMS SUCH AS FUEL RE-PROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM. MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IS EVEN LESS ADVANCED AND AT PRESENT TIME APPEARS TO BE GEARED VERY LARGELY TO SUPPORT OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS ALREADY AVAILABLE IN ROK INVENTORY.

10. WE EMPHASIZE, THESE ARE PRELIMINARY JUDGEMENTS AND WE BELIEVE THAT AS FIRST STEP WE NEED ASSESSMENT OF ANY ROK PROGRAM BY QUALIFIED TECHNICAL EXPERTS.

11. FURTHER IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION:

A. SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS AT ALL FACILITIES AS PROVIDED FOR IN EXISTING AGREEMENTS BE UNDERTAKEN IN EXTREMELY THOROUGH MANNER.
B. FORMAL APPROACH TO ROK ON NPT RATIFICATION.
12. NET PRODUCT OF THESE EFFORTS SHOULD BE WELL-DEFINED AND
TECHNICALLY REGIMED POLICY ON ONE HAND WHICH PRESERVES
MILITARY BALANCE ON KOREAN PENINSULA BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH
KOREA.

SNEIDER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
To continue our telegram no. 059.057, we would like to inform you that after four days since the Yellow Sea incident between South Korean and Democratic People's Republic of Korea vessels, a fiery debate on this topic continues, in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is seeking to involve the support of those countries with which it has friendly relations; in this respect, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is releasing numerous official documents to the press and it is summoning the diplomatic corps at various levels.

At a meeting with the heads of diplomatic missions to Pyongyang, Li Jongmok the North Korean deputy foreign minister, asked on behalf of his government that the governments of all states represented in Pyongyang to support the measures undertaken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on matters related to this conflict.

At the reunion of all ambassadors with Li Jongmok, our attention was caught by the fact that the insufficient preparation of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be able to completely and accurately inform the heads of diplomatic missions about the February 26th incident.

When asked to elaborate on whether the US air forces, involved in the incident, opened fire on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea vessels, the Deputy Foreign Minister said that because of the darkness in which the incident occurred, it is impossible to accurately know what happened, although the briefing contained formulations with clear accusations in this respect.

After omitting to inform that the North Korean fishing ships were themselves protected by military vessels and aircraft which took part in the conflict, a fact which is absent from public documents, Li Jongmok admitted to this fact only after being repeatedly and directly asked about it by the diplomats present at the meeting.

The opinion of our mission is that the February 26th incident eloquently reflects the high level of tension between the North and the South, tension which often turns into military conflict.

By insisting on not avoiding such situations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea tries to demonstrate the righteousness of its statements regarding the aggressive nature of the current South Korean administration, [which enjoys the] support of the United States, regarding the irreconcilable character of North-South relations, and consequently, regarding the need to "prepare for war," an idea put forward in recent [official] documents.

The increased frequency of armed clashes, the last one being of noteworthy seriousness, and the aggravation of inter-Korean disagreements give birth to the danger of sparking new conflicts of this sort.

Signed: General Dumitru Popa
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT:  
ROK Weapons Plans

The attached telegram to Embassy Seoul has been cleared by General Scowcroft.

Jeanne V. Davis  
Staff Secretary

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8  
by KBK, NARA, Dec. 5/16/97

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) (3)

DISPATCHED 3/03 (bmt)
ACTION: SEOUL

INFO: OTTAWA, PARIS, TOKYO, IAEA VIENNA

SUBJECT: ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

REF: (a) SEOUL 8023; (b) STATE 271124;
(c) SEOUL 1239

1. Washington agencies concur fully in Embassy assessment that ROKG is proceeding with initial phases of a nuclear weapons development program. Subsequent intelligence reporting on this has added further confirmation to Embassy's excellent summary of evidence contained in ref tel. Interagency study on South Korean nuclear capability has been finished and indicates that ROKG could develop limited nuclear weapons and missile capability within ten year time frame. (Copy of study pouch to Embassy.)

2. In the case of Korea our general concerns are intensified by its strategic location and by the impact which any Korean effort to establish nuclear capability would have on its neighbors, particularly North Korea and Japan. ROK possession of nuclear weapons would have major destabilizing effect in an area in which not only Japan but USSR, PRC, and ourselves are directly involved. It could lead to Soviet or Chinese assurances of nuclear weapons support to North Korea in the event of conflict. Further, ROK efforts to secure a nuclear weapon capability will inevitably impact on our
bilateral security relationship. This impact will be complicated by fact that ROK nuclear weapon effort has been in part reflection of lessened ROKG confidence in U.S. security commitment, and consequent desire on Park's part to reduce his military dependence on U.S.

3. We recognize that there are significant difficulties and a long timeframe before ROKG would be able actually to produce nuclear weapons. Ten year estimate would seem a realistic one. However, the fact that ROKG is now attempting to establish nuclear capability will inevitably become more widely known well before explosive device or weapons actually come into being and would have significant political impact in itself on the ROK's neighbors.

4. It remains USG policy to oppose the further spread of nuclear explosives and, while continuing to provide power reactors and fuel under IAEA safeguards for necessary energy projects, to control the spread of sensitive technology and equipment which would enhance the nuclear weapons capability of other countries. We are endeavoring to implement this policy not only bilaterally in our dealings with non-nuclear weapon states such as the ROK, but also in a multilateral framework which will control the worldwide availability of nuclear materials. Strictly FYI: We have proposed a confidential conference among the most important suppliers of nuclear materials (U.S., U.K., Canada, France, FRG, Japan, and USSR) to develop common export policies which would seek to develop
guidelines for restraint on sensitive items and remove the problem of safeguards from the commercial bargaining process. All except France have agreed with U.S. to begin such a conference and we are awaiting a reply from France. In recent U.S.-French contacts, the question of French willingness to supply a re-processing plant or technology (to extract plutonium from spent fuel) to the ROK was raised. The French indicated that they had not yet signed a proposed agreement for a small pilot reprocessing plant and were seeking to have IAEA safeguards provided if the deal does go forward to completion. END FYI.

5. Therefore, our basic objective is to discourage ROK effort in this area and to inhibit to the fullest possible extent any ROK development of a nuclear explosive capability or delivery system. We are considering several complementary policy courses to give effect to this objective. These policies will be evolved inside of, or in consonance with, the multilateral framework just described. Using this approach, we hope in the near future to formulate a clear policy on this question toward the ROK.

6. The following are the policy courses we are now actively considering:

   a. Inhibit ROK access to sensitive technology and equipment, both through unilateral U.S. action and through the development of common supplier nation policies. As regards unilateral U.S. actions, we would, in addition to applying full IAEA safeguards
to the sale of power reactors and fuel, also seek to withhold from the ROK, or to provide only under appropriate safeguards, any technology or equipment which we would judge to be sensitive in terms of contributing to the acquisition of self-contained nuclear weapons capability. This would be done in a manner consistent with the criteria in 10 CFR 110 (which include the application of safeguards), with the significance of the proposed activity, and with availability from other sources. We are also looking at existing agreements to see if there is room for tightening constraints to inhibit diversion of weapons-useable material. As regards common supplier nation policies, we are particularly concerned with enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and with any ROK acquisition of Candu reactors, which present fewer obstacles for clandestine diversion of plutonium bearing fuel rods than do the more common light water reactors.

We realize that in some cases ROKG might well have plausible rationale other than nuclear weapons development for procuring certain elements of such technology or equipment. Nonetheless, we would not intend to provide technology and/or equipment which we would feel might be harmful to our own interests and the stability of the area. Such an approach would also provide an indirect signal that we are aware of ROK intentions, and would not support them under any guise. Restriction of such technology and equipment would also slow the pace of ROK efforts in nuclear area and increase costs significantly while not harming legitimate power needs.
which could be met through reactors fueled by enriched uranium imported from abroad. Even in those instances where ROKG might be able to go to other suppliers, this would cost more both in economic and political terms. And any significant ROKG efforts to procure sensitive nuclear related equipment or technology would over longer run be visible and heighten sensitivities of other possible suppliers, including the French. Finally, recognizing relationship between independent nuclear explosive capability and delivery systems, we are examining ways in which account can be taken of latter in our general non-proliferation strategy.

b. Press the ROK to ratify the NPT. The Canadians are already pressing the ROK to do so. The ROK seems to have been responsive to our own initial approach, but we will want to follow up on this, preferably in cooperation with the Canadians. We would also intend to support the Canadian intention to defer their final decision on the sale of research reactors.

c. Improve our surveillance of ROK nuclear facilities, and increase our information on the current state of ROK technical development in this area. We would intend to undertake a study of appropriate ways to move forward on this policy course. Tentatively, we are considering a program for more regular visits to ROK nuclear energy installations and inspections by technically trained personnel.
7. Request Embassy Seoul's comments on the approach outlined above.
PORTION(S) THAT REMAIN CLASSIFIED AFTER
ISCAP DECISION ARE BRACKETED IN RED

Department of State

PAGE 01 STATE 048673

CONTROL: 859Q
Reed: Mar 4, 1973
11:30 PM

SUBJECT: FOR PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES

REF: (A) SEOUL 8023; (B) STATE 271124; (C) SEOUL 1239

1. WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONCUR FULLY IN EMBASSY ASSESSMENT

PORTION(S) THAT REMAIN CLASSIFIED AFTER
ISCAP DECISION ARE BRACKETED IN RED
 THAT ROKG IS PROCEEDING WITH INITIAL PHASES OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. SUBSEQUENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON THIS HAS ADDED FURTHER CONFIRMATION TO EMBASSY'S EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN REF A. INTERAGENCY STUDY ON SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY HAS BEEN FINISHED AND INDICATES THAT ROKG COULD DEVELOP LIMITED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILE CAPABILITY WITHIN TEN YEAR TIME FRAME. (COPY OF STUDY POUCHED TO EMBASSY.)  

2. IN THE CASE OF KOREA OUR GENERAL CONCERNS ARE INTENSIFIED BY ITS STRATEGIC LOCATION AND BY THE IMPACT WHICH ANY KOREAN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WOULD HAVE ON ITS NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY NORTH KOREA AND JAPAN. ROK POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD HAVE MAJOR DESTABILIZING EFFECT IN AN AREA IN WHICH NOT ONLY JAPAN BUT USSR, PRC, AND OURSELVES ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED. IT COULD LEAD TO SOVIET OR CHINESE ASSURANCES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT TO NORTH KOREA IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT. FURTHER ROK EFFORTS TO SECURE A NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY WILL INEVITABLY IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. THIS IMPACT WILL BE COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT ROK NUCLEAR WEAPON EFFORT HAS BEEN IN PART REFLECTION OF LESSened ROK CONFIDENCE IN U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT, AND CONSEQUENT DESIRE ON PARK'S PART TO REDUCE HIS MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON U.S.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES AND A LONG TIMEFRAME BEFORE ROKG WOULD BE ABLE ACTUALLY TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. TEN YEAR ESTIMATE WOULD SEEM A REALISTIC ONE. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT ROKG IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WILL INEVITABLY BECOME MORE WIDELY KNOWN WELL BEFORE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR WEAPONS ACTUALLY COME INTO BEING AND WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL IMPACT ITSELF ON THE ROK'S NEIGHBORS.

4. IT REMAINS USG POLICY TO OPPOSE THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND, WHILE CONTINUING TO PROVIDE POWER-reactORS AND FUEL UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS FOR NECESSARY ENERGY PROJECTS, TO CONTROL THE SPREAD OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES. WE ARE ENDANGERING TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY NOT ONLY BILATERALLY IN OUR DEALINGS WITH NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES SUCH AS THE ROK, BUT ALSO IN A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL CONTROL THE WORLDWIDE AVAILABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. STRICTLY FYI: WE HAVE PROPOSED A CONFIDENTIAL CONFERENCE AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT SUPPLIERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (U.S., U.K., CANADA, FRANCE, F.R.G., JAPAN, AND USSR) TO DEVELOP COMMON EXPORT POLICIES WHICH WOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP GWIDE-LINES FOR RESTRAINT ON SENSITIVE ITEMS AND REMOVE THE PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS FROM THE COMMERCIAL BARGAINING PROCESS. ALL EXCEPT FRANCE HAVE AGREED WITH U.S. TO BEGIN SUCH A CONFERENCE AND WE ARE AWAITING A REPLY FROM FRANCE. IN RECENT U.S.-FRENCH CONTACTS, THE QUESTION OF FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY A REPROCESSING PLANT OR TECHNOLOGY (TO EXTRACT PLUTONIUM FROM SPENT FUEL) TO THE ROK WAS RAISED. THE FRENCH INDICATED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET SIGNED A PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR A SMALL PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT AND WERE SEEKING TO HAVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS PROVIDED IF THE DEAL DUES GO FORWARD TO COMPLETION. END FYI.

5. THEREFORE, OUR BASIC OBJECTIVE IS TO DISCOURAGE ROK EFFORT IN THIS AREA AND TO HINIBIT TO THE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXTENT ANY ROK DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY OR DELIVERY SYSTEM. WE ARE CONSIDERING SEVERAL COMPLEMENTARY POLICY COURSES TO GIVE EFFECT TO THIS OBJECTIVE. THESE POLICIES WILL BE EVOLVED THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK JUST DESCRIBED. USING THIS APPROACH, WE HOPE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO FORMULATE A CLEAR POLICY ON THIS QUESTION TOWARD THE ROK.

6. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE POLICY COURSES WE ARE NOW ACTIVELY CONSIDERING:

A. INHIBIT ROK ACCESS TO SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT, BOTH THROUGH UNILATERAL U.S. ACTION AND THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON SUPPLIER NATION POLICIES, AS
REGARDS UNILATERAL U.S. ACTIONS, WE WOULD, IN ADDITION TO APPLYING FULL IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO THE GALLEY OF POWER REACTORS AND FUEL, ALSO SEEK TO WITHHOLD FROM THE ROK, OR TO PROVIDE ONLY UNDER APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS, ANY TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT WHICH WE WOULD JUDGE TO BE SENSITIVE IN TERMS OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACQUISITION OF SELF-CONTAINED NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. THIS WOULD BE DONE IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE CRITERIA IN 12 CFR 110 (WHICH INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS), WITH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY, AND WITH AVAILABILITY FROM OTHER SOURCES. WE ARE ALSO LOOKING AT EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO SEE IF THERE IS ROOM FOR TIGHTENING CONSTRAINTS TO INHIBIT DIVERSION OF WEAPONS USEABLE MATERIAL. AS REGARDS COMMON SUPPLIER NATION POLICIES, WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES, AND WITH ANY ROK ACQUISITION OF CANDU REACTORS, WHICH PRESENT FEWER OBSTACLES FOR CLANDESTINE DIVERSION OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING FUEL RODS THAN THE MORE COMMON LIGHT WATER REACTORS.

WE REALIZE THAT IN SOME CASES ROKG MIGHT WELL HAVE PLEASABLE RATIONALE OTHER THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT FOR PROCURING CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT, NONETHELESS, WE WOULD NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE TECHNOLOGY AND/OR EQUIPMENT WHICH WE WOULD FEEL MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO OUR OWN INTERESTS AND THE STABILITY OF THE AREA. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD ALSO PROVIDE AN INDIRECT SIGNAL THAT WE ARE AWARE OF ROK INTENTIONS, AND WOULD NOT SUPPORT THEM UNDER ANY GUARD. RESTRICTION OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT WOULD ALSO SLOW THE PACE OF ROK EFFORTS IN NUCLEAR AREA AND INCREASE COSTS SIGNIFICANTLY WHILE NOT HARMING LEGITIMATE POWER NEEDS, WHICH COULD BE MET THROUGH REACTORS FUELED BY ENRICHED URANIUM IMPORTED FROM AURAXD. EVEN IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE ROKG MIGHT BE ABLE TO GO TO OTHER SUPPLIERS, THIS WOULD COST MORE BOTH IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TERMS. IN ANY SIGNIFICANT ROKG EFFORTS TO PROCURE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR RELATED EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY WOULD OVERLAP CONSIDERABLY BE VISIBLE AND HeightEN THE SENSITIVITIES OF OTHER POSSIBLE SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING THE FRENCH. FINALLY,
RECOGNIZING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, WE ARE EXAMINING WAYS IN WHICH ACCOUNT CAN BE TAKEN OF LATTER
IN OUR GENERAL NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY.

B. PRESS THE ROK TO RATIFY THE NPT. THE CANADIANS ARE
ALREADY PRESSING THE ROK TO DO SO. THE ROK SEEMS TO
HAVE BEEN RESPONSIVE TO OUR OWN INITIAL APPROACH, BUT
WE WILL WANT TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS, PREFERABLY IN CO-
OPERATION WITH THE CANADIANS. WE WOULD ALSO INTEND TO
SUPPORT THE CANADIAN INTENTION TO DEFER THEIR FINAL
DECISION ON THE SALE OF RESEARCH REACTORS.

C. IMPROVE OUR SURVEILLANCE OF ROK NUCLEAR FACILITIES,
AND INCREASE OUR INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT STATE OF ROK
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THIS AREA. WE WOULD INTEND TO
UNDERTAKE A STUDY OF APPROPRIATE WAYS TO MOVE FOR-
WARD ON THIS COURSE. TENTATIVELY, WE ARE CONSIDERING
A PROGRAM FOR MORE REGULAR VISITS TO ROK NUCLEAR ENERGY
INSTALLATIONS AND INSPECTIONS BY TECHNICALLY TRAINED
PERSONNEL.

7. REQUEST EMBASSY SEOUL’S COMMENTS ON THE APPROACH
OUTLINED ABOVE.

KISSINGER
Regarding unilateral U.S. actions, we would, in addition to applying full IAEA safeguards to the gall of power reactors and fuel, also seek to withhold from the ROK, or to provide only under appropriate safeguards, any technology or equipment which we would judge to be sensitive in terms of contributing to the acquisition of self-contained nuclear weapons capability. This would be done in a manner consistent with the criteria in 1C CFR 110 (which include the application of safeguards), with the significance of the proposed activity, and with availability from other sources. We are also looking at existing agreements to see if there is room for tightening constraints to inhibit diversion of weapons-useable material. As regards common supplier nation policies, we are particularly concerned with enrichment and reprocessing technologies, and with any ROK acquisition of Candu reactors, which present fewer obstacles for clandestine diversion of Plutonium bearing fuel rods than do the more common light water reactors.

We realize that in some cases ROK might well have plausible rationale other than nuclear weapons development for procuring certain elements of such technology or equipment. Nonetheless, we would not intend to provide technology and/or equipment which we would feel might be harmful to our own interests and the stability of the area. Such an approach would also provide an indirect signal that we are aware of ROK intentions, and would not support them under any guise. Restriction of such technology and equipment would also slow the pace of ROK efforts in nuclear area and increase costs significantly while not harming legitimate power needs, which could be met through reactors fueled by enriched uranium imported from abroad. Even in those instances

where ROK might be able to go to other suppliers, this would cost more both in economic and political terms. Any significant ROKG efforts to procure sensitive nuclear related equipment or technology would over longer run be visible and heighten sensitivities of other possible suppliers, including the French. Finally,
RECOGNIZING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, WE ARE EXAMINING WAYS IN WHICH ACCOUNT CAN BE TAKEN OF LATTER IN OUR GENERAL NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY.

B. PRESS THE ROK TO RATIFY THE NPT. THE CANADIANS ARE ALREADY PESSING THE ROK TO DO SO. THE ROK SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RESPONSIVE TO OUR OWN INITIAL APPROACH, BUT WE WILL WANT TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS, PREFERABLY IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE CANADIANS. WE WOULD ALSO INTEND TO SUPPORT THE CANADIAN INTENTION TO DEFER THEIR FINAL DECISION ON THE SALE OF RESEARCH REACTORS.

C. IMPROVE OUR SURVEILLANCE OF ROK NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AND INCREASE OUR INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT STATE OF ROK TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THIS AREA. WE WOULD INTEND TO UNDERTAKE A STUDY OF APPROPRIATE WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS COURSE. TENTATIVELY, WE ARE CONSIDERING A PROGRAM FOR MORE REGULAR VISITS TO ROK NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTALLATIONS AND INSPECTIONS BY TECHNICALLY TRAINED PERSONNEL.

7. REQUEST EMBASSY SEOUL'S COMMENTS ON THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE.

KISSINGER
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD SMYSER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Lockheed Sale to South Korea

I have gone over the State Department paper of February 4, entitled "Sale of Rocket Propulsion Technology to South Korea." I would like to make some general comments as well as deal with a few details of that memorandum.

Despite the implications of the State paper there is no disagreement between State and Defense regarding the basic issue of discouraging the ROK from acquiring an effective and independent medium range surface-to-surface guided missile capability. The major disagreement resolves around whether the Lockheed plant makes a substantial contribution to ROK capabilities in this area and where we should draw the line with the ROK.

On the first issue the State paper says: "Given the evidence that the ROK is determined to create an advanced weapons capability within the next ten years, we would be contributing significantly to ROK capability in this area." I was not aware until reading this memorandum that State had the technical capabilities to make this judgment. Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), on the other hand, has broad familiarity with military R&D programs and has responsibility for administering the $10 billion R&D program of the Defense Department. I asked DDR&E again to reassess their original analysis. They categorically assure me that their analysis remains unchanged; that whatever ROK plans may be for the attainment of a medium range surface-to-surface guided missile capability, the acquisition of the Lockheed plant will not significantly contribute to them. A propulsion manufacturing capability is a necessary but non-critical component compared to the sophisticated warhead and guidance technology which would have to be developed by the ROK to make an effective missile of the kind visualized by State.

The next question becomes, At what point do we say no to the ROK? Defense asserts that the point should not be drawn at the sale of ground facilities which will do little to move the ROK into an independent guided missile capability but which do make it possible for the Koreans to meet a legitimate and established military requirement at a reduced cost -- a requirement which our Army in the relatively near future will be unable to meet.
It should be noted that the ROK presently has a 25 gallon solid propellant mixer, cast, cure, and test facility and with this equipment could design and build rocket motors with increased range and thrust. Insofar as we can determine, however, they lack the capability to design and produce an improved missile control and guidance system and warhead. These are the critical and important elements. It is for this reason, which State Department ignores in its memorandum, that we urge the line be drawn at the McDonnell Douglas proposal. State contends that turning down the Lockheed sale is "an essential signal" to the ROK regarding our future intentions. It seems to me that turning down the McDonnell Douglas proposal would serve that purpose equally well.

Let me deal with a few specific points. DOD has not ignored the considerable body of intelligence regarding ROK intentions. But we are not mesmerized by these reports and do not propose acting like Chicken Little. There is no question that Park wants to reduce his dependence on the US and acquire an offensive surface-to-surface capability. However, despite all the rhetoric, the questions to be answered are as I have stated above.

It ought to be clear that the ROK already has a potential surface-to-surface missile capability in the NIKE system. They have four batteries and we are going to give them six batteries more if they wish. NIKE is not an effective medium range surface-to-surface weapon because the guidance and warhead were not developed for that kind of use.

State implies that there may be an adverse Government of Japan reaction to the sale. The GOJ has had adverse reactions about many things which have not proved insurmountable. I would suggest one way to proceed would be to tell the GOJ the truth -- that the sale meets legitimate military requirements, that we are going to turn down the McDonnell Douglas proposal, and we do not intend to support ROK acquisition of advanced missile technology.

Since 1967, the Government of Japan has been actively engaged in the manufacture of basic Hawk and NIKE Hercules missiles under license agreements with McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, and several other US contractors. Japan is also deeply involved in a space satellite program and, in recent years, has acquired considerable missile/space technology. Therefore, Japan is sufficiently sophisticated to recognize the limitations of the NIKE missile in a surface-to-surface role and will not be unduly impressed with a ROK-Lockheed contract. Here again, State appears to be planting fears and ignoring facts.

I note in a recent CIA assessment of the ROK's nuclear programs the following statement:

South Korea would have no difficulty in securing a propellant production facility and the technology for its operation from some foreign country. The ROK is already actively discussing with a US company the purchase of a double based propellant production facility. Possible sources for a facility to produce the more effective composite propellant include US, Japan, France, West Germany, UK, Italy and Israel.
I do not see much virtue of encouraging a third country sale of readily available technology and running the risk of giving the French particularly a foot in the door in this sensitive area.

The labor argument strikes me a very insignificant. Labor's concern for jobs at this time is understandable. Lockheed is closing the plant involved in the proposed sale, however, and does not plan to reopen it, whether or not the equipment is sold to Korea. I suggest this argument be omitted from this controversy as de minimus.

Finally, I do not understand the unwillingness of the State Department to begin to talk candidly to the Koreans on this matter. The absence of candor on the Koreans part should not be matched by a similar absence on our part.

Morton I. Abramowitz
Deputy Assistant Secretary

cc: Mr. Habib
    Mr. Vest
Following the transfer of new US military units from Southeast Asia to South Korea and the introduction of significant quantities of nuclear arms, the spokesperson of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Foreign Ministry has issued a statement on March 10th warning about the danger of an armed conflict in the Korean Peninsula and deems the US as responsible for the serious results of this situation. The comments of the diplomatic community in Pyongyang concerning this situation often indicate that the US, while losing ground in Southeast Asia, do not wish to worsen their position in the Korean Peninsula; that the intensification of US activities in South Korea is due to the increased confrontations between the USSR and the People’s Republic China, on the one hand, and Japan and the US on the other; that the increase of US troops in Seoul is made at the request of South Korean authorities and of their complete lack of resistance. There is also mention that these developments are due to preparations for war of the North Korean side, to declarations of Pyongyang officials to the effect that the next war or South Korean revolution must be used towards reunification.

The continued tension of internal situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the declarations of most authorized Korean personalities concerning “the approach of the great revolutionary event,” are strong pretexts for South Korea and its allies to balance the ability for confrontation.

Signed: Dumitru Popa
Following the intensification of the revolutionary struggle in Indochina, together with the attitude lacking in firmness on the part of the US and unwillingness to intervene for maintaining the present authorities in Phnom Penh and Saigon, as well as for renewed talks for withdrawing the last aviation units from Thailand, South Korea is showing signs of increased concern.

Authorities in Seoul consider the US position passive and damaging for the political atmosphere in South Korea. There is an increase in the number of declarations pointing that a future dismantling of the U.N. troops’ headquarters in South Korea will not influence the presence of US troops in the Korean Peninsula.

In various ways, guarantees are being required from the Americans that “in the present situation a withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea is not in question and impossible”.

South Koreans are intensely “assisting” South Vietnamese refugees, by providing them with food, medicine and transportation means for their evacuation from dangerous areas. At the same time, with the intensification of anti-communist propaganda and the increase to a maximum of the “Northern danger,” measures are being taken in South Korea for preventing any type of disorder. Thus, new restrictions, backed by last year’s decrees for exceptional situations, have been again set in place over the last days. An increase in the number of arrests, together with an intensified censorship of the opposition’s political activity is being registered.

We note an increased activity of the union of progressive forces under the leadership of neo-democratic and unity parties, a coalition that we deem capable of successfully conducting activities against the current President Park Chung Hee.

Nevertheless we note that presently in South Korea not even the opposition fosters anti-American feelings, which helps the authorities in Seoul and the US, which until now does not allow for the possibility to renounce the positions they occupied in the country.

Signed: Dumitru Popa
Meeting Minutes between Lee Sang-ok and Paul Cleveland

Date: 12 March 1975  
Source: South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.

Meeting Minutes

Date: 1975 March 12 (Wednesday) 11:00 ~ 11:25  
Location: Office of Director for Americas Division  
Participant: Lee Sang-ok, Director for Americas Division  
First Secretary Paul Cleveland  

Details:

First Secretary Cleveland: [I] came to the meeting on behalf of Counselor Horowitz as he is visiting the U.S. temporarily. I am aware that there were discussions between [you and] Counselor Horowitz but I would like to mention again regarding the incident in the West Sea last February 26th because I have received order from the Department of State. The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN issued press releases twice on February 28 and March 4. Regarding this matter [:]

- First, it is desired that Korea “plays down in public relations” regarding the announcement of this incident.
- Second, the press release included a phrase stating the above-mentioned water as “operational waters.” The U.S. believes that such “claim” is complicated. Since the matter involves conflict with international law, if the U.S. is officially asked questions on this matter, we have no other choice but “to disassociate ourselves.”
- Third, media reports based on the press release related to the United Nations Command announcement on March 4 present an impression that it is a press release by the United Nations Command.

The Department of the State would like [me] to convey our interests in the above-mentioned three issues.

Director for Americas Division: First, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN had provided a press release on the incident in the West Sea not because we wanted to actively publicize this. It was because we wanted to stand against the North Korean puppets promoting propaganda surrounding this incident. Li Yungyeom, the second in command of the Mission of North Korea to the UN has even insulted [South] Korea through hosting a press conference.

Second, in addressing the operational waters issue, we have delivered your inquiry and the interest of your embassy to the Ministry of Defense. Our Navy is under the directive of United Nations Command. Regarding this issue, shouldn’t we consider that there has been a preliminary negotiation or cooperation between the UN Command and our Navy?

Third, the press release on March 4 was a reprint of the excerpt related to the West Sea incident from KPS News Service which we send out to the public information officials overseas. KPS is a summary of English newspaper articles in Korea. Therefore, there should be no concern for the press release to be misunderstood as an announcement by the UN Command.

The End.
SECRET NOD983

PAGE 01 SEOUL 01637 121700Z

ACTION NOD5-00

INFD OCT-81 0001 W

1. P 120913Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE VIA MCI PRIORITY 8808
INFD AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
S E C R E T SEOUL 1637

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XD55-3
TAGS: MNUC KS
SUBJECT: ROK PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES

REF: STATE 048673

1. WHILE EMBASSY IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH DEPARTMENT'S
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF ROK PLANS TO DEVELOP
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES AND WITH THE PROPOSALS
OUTLINED IN REFTEL, WE BELIEVE A MORE EXPLICIT COURSE
VIS-A-VIS ROKS WILL EVENTUALLY BE CALLED FOR.

2. TIME ROKS WILL REQUIRE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON
COULD BE WELL LESS THAN TEN YEARS IN OUR JUDGMENT AND
IN ANY EVENT WE WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ACT ON THIS BASIS
EVEN IF TEN YEAR PROJECTION IS CLOSER TO MARK. ROK
LEADERSHIP ACCORDING TO BEST EVIDENCE WE HAVE HAS
PLACED HIGH PRIORITY ON WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND IS LOOKING
FOR RESULTS BY EARLY EIGHTIES. THIS IS FEASIBLE WE THINK
GIVEN ROK'S NOTABLY HARD DRIVING NATURE, HIGH LEVEL OF
TECHNICAL SKILLS THEY ALREADY HAVE AND MAY BE ABLE TO
RECRUIT AMONG EXPATRIATE KOREANS OVERSEAS, AND STRONG IMPETUS FROM THE TOP.

TAGS (NUC KS): ROK PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES

REF: STATE 048673

1. WHILE EMBASSY IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH DEPARTMENT'S
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF ROK PLANS TO DEVELOP
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES AND WITH THE PROPOSALS
OUTLINED IN REFTEL, WE BELIEVE A MORE EXPLICIT COURSE
VIS-A-VIS ROKS WILL EVENTUALLY BE CALLED FOR.

2. TIME ROKS WILL REQUIRE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON
COULD BE WELL LESS THAN TEN YEARS IN OUR JUDGMENT AND
IN ANY EVENT WE WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ACT ON THIS BASIS
EVEN IF TEN YEAR PROJECTION IS CLOSER TO MARK. ROK
LEADERSHIP ACCORDING TO BEST EVIDENCE WE HAVE HAS
PLACED HIGH PRIORITY ON WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND IS LOOKING
FOR RESULTS BY EARLY EIGHTIES. THIS IS FEASIBLE WE THINK
GIVEN ROK'S NOTABLY HARD DRIVING NATURE, HIGH LEVEL OF
TECHNICAL SKILLS THEY ALREADY HAVE AND MAY BE ABLE TO
RECRUIT AMONG EXPATRIATE KOREANS OVERSEAS, AND STRONG IMPETUS FROM THE TOP.

TAGS (NUC KS): ROK PLANS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES

REF: STATE 048673
3. WE ALSO BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE ROIK
ABILITY TO OBTAIN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS
FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT FROM THIRD COUNTRIES, IN EVENT
WE TURN THEM DOWN, WE DOUBT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
COSTS INVOLVED WILL DETER ROIK VERY MUCH, WHILE ROUK
PURCHASES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES COULD LESSEN OUR
ABILITY TO CONTROL ROUKS. THIS SIMPLY BEHOOVES US ALL THE
MORE TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARD REQUIREMENTS
IMPOSED BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND USING JUDICIOUS TRANSFER OF
US TECHNOLOGY AS WEDGE TOP CONTROL ROUK EFFORTS.

4. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT IN WORKING OUT DETAILS OF
OUR APPROACH TO ROUKs THERE IS NO NEED TO PUSSY-FOOT. ROUKS
ARE SERIOUS, TOUGH CUSTOMERS BENT ON THIS CASE ON A
POtENTIALILY HARMFUL CAUSE. FACT THEY HAVE MOVED AS
QUICKLY AS THEY HAVE RECENTLY TOWARD RATIFICATION OF
NPT AND TO ACCOMMODATING CANADIANS AND FRENCH RE
SAFEGUARDS IS VERY PROBABLY BECAUSE THEY ALREADY HAVE
WORD WE ARE ON TO THEM, BUT IT IS NO INDICATION THEY
ARE GIVING UP, TO THE CONTRARY IT APPEARS TO INDICATE
THEY WILL BE AS HYPOCRITICAL AS NECESSARY, GIVEN
IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR PLANS, THEIR TOUGH MENTALITY,
PLUS DEPTH OUR CONCERN ON THIS ISSUE, WE BELIEVE THAT
DIRECT, EARLY, AND FIRM APPROACH WILL BE MOST APPROPRIATE
AND WILL HAVE BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS.

5. IF AND WHEN A MORE EXPLICIT APPROACH APPEARS
NECESSARY, A SCENARIO CAN BE CONSTRUCTED
GIVING BACKGROUND FOR EMBASSY DE-MARCHE

SNEIDER

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 01637 1217WZ

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD SMYSER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: 26-27 February Yellow Sea Incident (U)

Attached, as you requested, are a chronology of events associated with the subject incident, a copy of the JCS cable transmitting the Rules of Engagement to CINCPAC, the UNC's Rules of Engagement, and a joint State/Defense cable dispatched after the incident.

Attachments

Morton I. Abramowitz
Deputy Assistant Secretary
26-27 February Yellow Sea Incident - Republic of Korea (ROK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME (EDT)</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>260205</td>
<td>South Korean radar station made first radar contact with unidentified North Korean boats south of Py-do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260430</td>
<td>ROKN Escort Transport (ADP-82) challenged NK armed patrol boats at 37-39N/124-15E. The NK boats ignored the challenge, and the subsequent ROK warning shots, and proceeded south at 15K. ADP-82 pursued and was joined by ROKN destroyer DD-92. The two NK boats merged with an estimated eight NK fishing boats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260508</td>
<td>Two ROKAF F-5s scrambled from Suwon against track of unidentified vessels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260633</td>
<td>COMROKFLT ordered ROKN ships to capture the two original NK boats, using minimum force and without main battery gunfire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260710</td>
<td>First NK aircraft penetrated Northern Limit Line (NLL) - i.e. extension of the Military Demarcation line into international waters - 10 NM southeast of Py-do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260720</td>
<td>314th Air Division Commander, to support the ROKs, ordered an air defense scramble. Two USAF F-4E aircraft from Osan AB assumed CAP at a position 70 NM west of Osan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260726</td>
<td>DD-92 collided accidentally with a small NK fishing boat at 37-36N/124-00E. The vessel was sunk, and no survivors were found. The other NK boats then proceeded north at 5 knots, shadowed by APD-82 and DD-92.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260813</td>
<td>USAF F-4E's were directed to return to base; landed 0835.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261055</td>
<td>Second scramble of two USAF F-4E aircraft from Osan AB. Flew CAP at position 30 NM west of base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261116</td>
<td>South Korean radar station reported two high speed surface contacts (in excess of 30 knots), presumed to be North Korean patrol boats, south of NLL, proceeding on apparent course to intercept ROKN units. NK boats came to within 7 NM of ROKN vessels, then turned back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME (EDT)</td>
<td>EVENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261230</td>
<td>Second flight of F-4E aircraft returned to Osan AB. No further activity by US aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Feb</td>
<td>Throughout the day, radar trackings indicated 68 NKAF aircraft in defensive fighter patrol in the area around UN-controlled islands south of the NLL. The maximum number detected at one time was seven, with the deepest penetration about 40 NM southwest of Py-do. Some NK aircraft flew over UN-controlled islands. Air Forces Korea responded throughout the incident with 77 sorties (4 USAF F-4E's and 73 ROKAF: 71 F-4D's and F-5's, 1 AT-33, and 1 C-46 flare ship). The actions of all aircraft on both sides was defensive. The opposing aircraft maintained a minimum 40 NM separation. Except for the ROKN warning shots mentioned above, no rounds were fired by either side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262145</td>
<td>All NK aircraft had returned to base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262235</td>
<td>All ROKAF aircraft had returned to base.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. WE APPRECIATE CONSIDERATIONS CITED REFTEL. WE FURTHER
RECOGNIZE THAT NO BOARDING OR SEIZURE DID IN FACT TAKE
PLACE AND THAT SINKING OF NORTH KOREAN SHIP WAS THROUGH
INADVERTENT COLLISION.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR BOARDING OR SEIZURE OF VESSELS ON
HIGH SEAS EXCEPT IN THE MOST NARROWLY DEFINED INSTANCES
AS SPECIFIED BY CONVENTION OR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES.

3. THE CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS, CONCLUDED UNDER U.N.
AUSPICES, IS PRIMARY CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THIS AREA US IS A PARTY TO THE CONVENTION AND ALTHOUGH NEITHER ROK NOR NK IS A PARTY, WE CONSIDER THEM BOUND BY PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED THEREIN.

4. IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS INTERNATIONAL LAW RIGHT OF QUOTE APPROACH AND IDENTIFICATION UNQUOTE A WARSHIP MAY APPROACH AND CHALLENGE (CHALLENGE IN THIS SENSE IS LIMITED TO RIGHT TO REQUEST ID BY TRANSMITTING AA FROM INTERNATIONAL CODE OF SIGNALS OR BY OTHER APPROPRIATE MEANS) WITH RESPECT TO AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL ON THE HIGH SEAS. (OBVIOUSLY A VESSEL CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE AS A WARSHIP OF A FOREIGN STATE IS NOT AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL.) THERE IS, MOREOVER, NO CORRELATIVE DUTY UPON THE CHALLENGED VESSEL TO RESPOND IN ANY PRESCRIBED MANNER, OR INDEED TO RESPOND AT ALL. AS YOU KNOW, US SHIPS ROUTINELY IGNORE CHALLENGES FROM PRC SHORE INSTALLATIONS WHILE ENTERING HONG KONG. THIS RIGHT OF APPROACH AND CHALLENGE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO HAZARD THE VESSEL OR DIRECT ITS COURSE.

5. IF THE VESSEL IS A WARSHIP, SUCH VESSEL IS, UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION, COMPLETELY IMMUNE FROM THE JURISDICTION OF ANY STATE OTHER THAN ITS FLAG STATE. IN PARTICULAR THERE IS NO RIGHT OF VISIT AND SEARCH OF A FOREIGN WARSHIP. IN THIS CONNECTION, A WARSHIP IS DEFINED BY ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION AS QUOTE A SHIP BELONGING TO THE NAVAL FORCES OF A STATE AND BEARING THE EXTERNAL MARKS DISTINGUISHING WARSHIPS OF ITS NATIONALITY, UNDER COMMAND OF AN OFFICER DUTY COMMISSIONED BY THE GOVERNMENT, WHOSE NAME APPEARS IN THE NAVY LIST, AND MANNED BY A CREW WHO ARE UNDER REGULAR NAVAL DISCIPLINE -- UNQUOTE. DETERMINATION WHETHER APPROACHED VESSEL IS A WARSHIP MAY ON OCCASION BE DIFFICULT FOR THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDER, SINCE SOME ELEMENTS OF ARTICLE 8 DEFINITION ARE NOT VERIFIABLE BY OBSERVATION IN ANY EVENT. UNDER CONDITIONS OF RESTRICTED VISIBILITY, AND DEALING WITH SMALL PATROL-TYPE CRAFT, JUDGMENT IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND IS RECOGNIZED AS SUCH. NEVERTHELESS, EXERCISE OR ATTEMPTED EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN WARSHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS IS A SERIOUS BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM. ACCORDINGLY, A HIGH DEGREE OF CIRCUMSPECTION IS REQUIRED IN MAKING THIS DETERMINATION.
THE VESSEL'S GENERAL CONFIGURATION AND APPEARANCE, THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNAL ARMAMENT OR DISTINGUISHING MARKINGS, ENSIGN DISPLAYED, AND RESPONSE, IF ANY, TO CHALLENGE ARE ALL RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

6. EVEN IF UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL IS DETERMINED NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE A WARSHIP, NO AUTOMATIC RIGHT OF VISIT AND SEARCH ARISES, EVEN IF VESSEL IGNORES CHALLENGE. UNDER ARTICLE 22 OF THE CONVENTION, SUCH RIGHT ARISES ONLY IF THERE ARE REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR SUSPECTING PIRACY, SLAVE TRADE, THAT THE VESSEL IS REALLY OF THE SAME FLAG AS WARSHIP CHALLENGING IT, OR IF FLAG STATE OF CHALLENGED VESSEL HAS BY TREATY CONFERRED SPECIAL POWERS ON CHALLENGED VESSEL. REFUSAL TO DISPLAY ANY NATIONAL ENSIGN IN RESPONSE TO A CHALLENGE IS ONLY ONE CIRCUMSTANCE TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER VESSEL FALLS INTO ONE OF ABOVE CATEGORIES.

7. ARTICLE 23 OF CONVENTION AUTHORIZES HOT PURSUIT OF FOREIGN VESSELS ON HIGH SEAS ONLY WHERE PURSUING STATE HAS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE ITS LAWS AND REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED AND IF PURSUIT IS COMMENCED WHEN FOREIGN SHIP WAS WITHIN ITS INTERNAL WATERS, TERRITORIAL SEA OR CONTIGUOUS ZONE (LIMITED TO 12 NAUTICAL MILES). SINCE HOT PURSUIT CONTEMPLATES ULTIMATE ARREST OF FOREIGN VESSEL, AND SINCE WARSHIPS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO ARREST, HOT PURSUIT DOES NOT APPLY TO WARSHIPS.

8. FOREGOING, OF COURSE, DOES NOT AFFECT RIGHT OF A VESSEL OR AIRCRAFT TO DEFEND ITSELF WHEN VESSEL, AIRCRAFT, OR COASTAL STATE IS UNDER ATTACK.

9. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDER THAT ARMISTICE CREATES EXCEPTIONS TO CONVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO BOARDING OR BRINGING IN FOREIGN VESSELS ON HIGH SEAS, NOR ARE WE AWARE OF ANY CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE WHICH WOULD PERMIT, DESPITE CONVENTION, SUCH ACTIONS. WE ARE WELL AWARE THAT HOSTILE ACTS BETWEEN TWO SIDES CONTINUE DESPITE ARMISTICE, ARMISTICE NEVER-THELESS REMAINS IN FORCE, AND IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO ALLEG EPARTIAL BELLIGERENCY RIGHTS SUCH AS VISIT AND SEARCH UNDER OR OUTSIDE ARMISTICE IN LIGHT OF OUR
PAST PUBLIC POSITION IN CASES SUCH AS PUEBLO AND FEBRUARY 15, 1974 INCIDENT.

10. ASIDE FROM LEGAL CONSIDERATION INVOLVED, SEIZURE OR SUCCESSFUL BOARDING WOULD HAVE CREATED SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS. SEIZURE WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED APPARENT PARALLEL TO NK ACTIONS IN CASE OF PUEBLO AND ROK FISHING BOATS ATTACKED FEBRUARY 15, 1974. IN BOTH INSTANCES WE RAISED STRONG PROTEST OVER SEIZURE ON HIGH SEAS IN CASES WHERE VESSELS WERE OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS, BUT MUCH CLOSER TO NK MAINLAND. OTHERS WOULD BE QUICK TO CITE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY. GLOBAL MOBILITY OF US NAVAL AND MERCHANT FLEET DEPENDS IN LARGE MEASURE ON STRICT OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW EVEN WHEN SUSPICIOUS OF A VESSEL'S INTENT.

11. MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGES RELATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS COMMAND ROLE AND AUTHORITY. LEGITIMACY OF PRESENT UNC RELATIONSHIP CAME UNDER STRONG ATTACK IN UNGA LAST YEAR AND WE CAN EXPECT SIMILAR MOVE THIS YEAR. PLAUSIBLE CHARGES THAT US WAS EXCEEDING ITS ROLE AS UNC IN SUPPORT OF ROK FISHING OR QUOTE OPERATIONAL WATERS UNQUOTE CLAIMS WOULD BE HIGHLY DAMAGING TO US/ROK POLITICAL INTERESTS IN UNGA AND DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO COUNTER.

12. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ALL CONCERNED AVOID US INVOLVEMENT IN FUTURE ACTIONS WHICH APPEAR TO VIOLATE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSURE THAT ROK FORCES DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN SIMILAR ACTIONS WHILE UNDER UNC CONTROL. YOU SHOULD EXERT APPROPRIATE INFLUENCE TO DISCOURAGE ROK FROM UNILATERALLY PARTICIPATING IN SUCH ACTIONS AS WELL.

INGERSOLL
BT
#1354
ANNOTES
MDC 332
## Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 059.101

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>25 March 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220/Year 1975/Country: South Korea, Folder 1632, Secret, Concerning the Sessions of the North-South Coordination Committee. Problems Discussed by the Co-Presidents of the Committee. Assessments regarding the Prospects for Korea’s Unification. Some Incidents Occurring between the Two Koreas, etc., Filing: Permanent. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TELEGRAM**

Sender: Pyongyang  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET  
Date: 25.03.1975  
No.: 059.101

The recent 10th meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the North-South Coordination Committee, on which the head of the Liaison Division in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs individually informed the Romanian Ambassador and other heads of diplomatic missions, confirms our conclusion that the inter-Korean dialogue continues to stall, being practically limited to an organized exchange of accusations and labels.

In spite of the seemingly new proposals made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the 10th meeting of the North-South Coordination Committee, these are premeditatedly inoperable, tacking fundamental claims which could be solved only if the two parties gradually drew closer to one another and reached an understanding (regarding the cessation of the hostile South Korean campaign against the North, the cancellation of anti-communist measures in South Korea, etc).

The recent discovery of another two tunnels connecting the North with the South, for which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is blamed but which North Korea refuses to admit to, dug at great depth under the DMZ and allowing for the instantaneous launch of important [armed] forces [into South Korea], aggravated the crisis in inter-Korean relations even more, which was the main topic tackled by the Vice-President from South Korea at the most recent meeting.

In the current circumstances, it is impossible to mitigate the tensions on the Peninsula, as long as the two sides are drifting away from the political path of achieving the unification [of the country], and as long as the primordial role of the entire Korean nation in fulfilling this desideratum is ignored.

Signed: Dumitru Popa
Sneider: The President's trip to Korea was very useful. The crucial question in Korea is our credibility, and that trip did much to boost it.

Things are going well in Korea. The country is becoming a middle size power, though we do not realize it. It is too large an economy to be a client state. In ten years it will be a significant military power. It will also have a per capita income of $2,000 or more. It has energy, intelligence and leadership.

Right now Korea is in a real box of rising oil prices and declining export markets.

President Park has been developing his second option, the "what if" option. He says it in terms of a 2 to 3 year period. He wants to accelerate independence. He knows we do not like it, so he does it in a clandestine way.

Park knows that the Administration wants to keep a U.S. presence in Korea but he does not know if we can deliver the goods. Vietnam made it worse. We can no longer tell him what to do.

Scowcroft: Will he go in this direction no matter what we do?
Sneider: We have to go to Park with an honest package that will tell him how we will help him and what we do not want him to do -- such as move toward nuclear weapons. Once it gets out that South Korea is developing nuclear weapons, I do not know what the Russians or the Chinese or the North Korean reaction would be.

I do not just want to go in and beat him over the head. I want to give him a package, perhaps a broad energy agreement with ERDA. We are making a lot of ad hoc decisions but none are coordinated.

Scowcroft: That makes good sense. Maybe the debacle in Southeast Asia will help us with other aid bills in time.

Sneider: It may go the other way.

Scowcroft: We fight a constant eroding action from DOD. Schlesinger wants to pull out.

Sneider: I have him interested. He may come out to Korea.

Scowcroft: In response to Congressional pressures, he wants to pull out from other places than Korea as well.

What do you think about I Corps?

Sneider: I think we should hold off until the end of the year and then do it as part of the UNC rearrangement.

I am concerned about coordination. I did not learn of the Yellow Sea incident until several hours after the event.

Scowcroft: We were worried about the scramble.

Sneider: We should have put aircraft over our assets, but not to deter the North Koreans.

On Lockheed, I do not want the French to get this contract. We should draw a line on where we will not give them stuff. We should be in bed with them so as to have access. We should talk to Park about this in the next six months or so.
I have the Department looking at the thing and I have talked to Schlesinger. I have asked for a science attaché. But I do not want to talk to Park without the President's or the Secretary's instructions.

Park knows that we are holding back. We have to talk to him promptly. Every time he is worried, he tends to be erratic and he plays silly games.

The President's visit was a boost to Park. He now wants to come here. I don't know what a good time is.

Scowcroft: Not now. It may change after Southeast Asian events.

What about the UNC?

Sneider: We have talked to the Koreans on the basis of Kissinger's decision. We will go to the Security Council and then to the General Assembly. The Non-Aligned Bloc has decided to make North Korea a full member. That means a few more votes for them.

I have told the Koreans they have to fight their own battles with the Non-Aligned. I have told Park to visit some of those countries that will show the initiative and they will take him seriously. All this UNC stuff will force us to sort out Opcon. I think we should keep this. We can exercise caution in a situation. Our commanders have to be able to say "no" to Park. On the air side, we have good control. I also think that, with 40,000 men, Congress won't be comfortable unless we cannot be dragged into things. If we do not have Opcon, we may need to reduce.

Smyser: Habib says we do not really have Opcon.

Sneider: In the Yellow Sea incident, we gave the orders.

Scowcroft: It turned out okay. We were lucky.

Sneider: They will get a lick in somewhere. They have lost three ships.

Scowcroft: I think it is better not to clobber them in international water. That was our concern.

Sneider: Would we be prepared to do anything with the Chinese and the Russians on Korea? We cannot wait for ever. We can live with the present situation, but it is not a good one. I think North Korea will need more Russian economic aid.
Scowcroft: The Sino-Soviet split is a factor.

Sneider: Maybe there would be a payoff for Moscow or Peking. Can you think about it?

In Korea, we should prove that we have a negotiating process. I hope that Schlesinger comes for this security consultants meeting in August.

It was good to see you.

**Scowcroft:** It was good to see you. Please stop by any time.
The PRC appears to be preparing an unusually large welcome for Kim II-Sung when he comes on a state visit in the next few days. People's Daily April 16 announces the visit with a set-off headline clearly aimed to give it unusual prominence. In the afternoon thousands of brightly dressed Peking school children were gathered in Tien An Men Square to rehearse for Kim's arrival. Preparations suggest a massive reception on a scale which the Chinese have not accorded to a visiting head of state in many years. Resident journalists have been told that Kim and his entourage will arrive Friday at 4:00 PM Peking time and a welcome banquet will be held that night.

2. Comment: Visit by Kim II-Sung comes as a surprise and raises a number of questions. Both Mao and Chou will almost certainly have to appear for a leader of this stature, and a major Tien An Men review should have the chairman on the podium, something which is most unlikely. Coming at a time when the situation in Indochina is...
Evolving more rapidly than anyone expected, there is a possibility that both sides felt it necessary for consultations at the highest levels. Some of the missions having relations with North Korea are attempting to see the ambassador here regarding the visit and we will be checking with them on anything they pick up.

Bush

Limited official use

NNN
Kim Il-song Banquet Speech

Peking NUNA in English 2119 GMT 18 Apr 75 OW

[Text of speech by Kim Il-song, general secretary of the KWP Central Committee and president of the DPRK, at 18 April Peking banquet given by the CCP-Central Committee and PRC State Council]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Vice-Chairman Wang Hsing-min,
Esteemed Comrade Vice-Chairman Ye Chien-yung,
Esteemed Comrade Vice-Chairman Deng Hsiao-ping,
Esteemed leading comrades of the Chinese party and government,
Esteemed Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, and princess,
Esteemed Prince Penn Mon, prime minister of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, and maiden,

Dear comrades and friends,

It gives us great pleasure today to revisit the People's Republic of China, our fraternal country, after a long time and sit together with you, our close comrades-in-arms, here in an amicable atmosphere.

Allow me, first of all, to express my deep thanks to Comrade Mao Tsetung, the great leader of the Chinese people and intimate friend of the Korean people, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China, for having kindly invited our delegation to visit China and for showing us this boundless hospitality now.

At the same time I would like to convey the warm militant greetings from the entire Korean people to the fraternal Chinese people.

I am also hugely delighted to meet here head of state of Cambodia Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, our close comrades-in-arms, Prince Penn Mon and other Cambodian friends, and I express my profound thanks to you for your warm welcome.

We have been warmly welcomed by the Chinese people everywhere we went through—from the very first moment of our entry into Tiantung yesterday from our country until our arrival at Peking.

The tumultuous welcome overflowing with revolutionary enthusiasm accorded us today by the citizens of Peking vividly showed the beautiful picture of great friendship between Korea and China and demonstrated the invincibility of this friendship to the whole world.

As soon as we arrived at Peking than we went straight to have a significant meeting with Comrade Mao Tsetung and exchanged a friendly talk with him in an amicable atmosphere. This is an expression of particular attention to our delegation, for which I feel very glad.

Korea-China friendship is a militant friendship between class brothers based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism; it is a noble friendship sealed in blood through the common struggle against imperialism and an immortal friendship that will endure any ordeal and will flower forever.

We are convinced that our visit to China will contribute greatly to developing the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between our two parties, two countries and two peoples onto a higher plane in conformity with the trend of the development of the present era, and to accelerating the revolutionary movements in Asia and the rest of the world.

Our present era is characterized by the ceaseless struggle between the old forces and the new-emerging forces, as a new historic era in which the general crisis of imperialism is being aggravated and the peoples of the socialist countries and the Third World have appeared on the international arena as its masters.
The new-emerging forces, as a new historic era in which the general crisis of imperialism is being aggravated and the peoples of the socialist countries and the Third World have appeared on the international arena as its masters.

As the economic crisis is worsening and the political crisis and social contradictions are growing acute in the capitalist world, the imperialists are more stubbornly persisting in the policy of war, threat and blackmail in an attempt to find a way out. On the other hand, the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of the socialist countries and the Third World and the international working class is surging high on a worldwide scale.

At the present stage in which the struggle between the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary forces is becoming increasingly fierce on the international scene, it is of very great importance to intensify the anti-imperialist common struggle of our two peoples.

We shall take this opportunity to have an ample exchange of views with Chinese comrades on problems of the development of the present international relations and take effective measures for our two peoples' future common struggle to cope with the fast-changing situation.

Joining hands closely from long ago, the Korean and Chinese peoples have been having out the road to national liberation and class emancipation, to socialist revolution and construction; and through their own experience they have realized that their destinies are inseparably related to each other as teeth to lips.

In the past our two peoples fought in firm unity, and defeated Japanese imperialism and also repulsed the U.S. imperialist aggressors.

In the future, too, the two peoples will fight and win as comrades-in-arms and as brothers.

The present situation in our two countries is excellent and their might is increasing as never before.

Under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tsetung and the Communist Party of China headed by him the fraternal Chinese people have achieved great successes in the socialist revolution and construction with the revolutionary spirit of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance and converted a backward old China into a socialist new China in a short span of time.

The imperialists' policy of blockading and isolating China has been bankrupted shamefully, and the People's Republic of China has grown in strength as a powerful anti-imperialist revolutionary force in Asia and its international prestige is rising as never before.

In recent years in China the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucianus has consolidated the Proletarian dictatorship, strengthened the unity of the entire people, built up the nation's economic might and defence capabilities and further renewed the people's mental and moral qualities.

Indeed, the Chinese people are now entering an era of national prosperity China has never known in its history of thousands of years.
China was historically plagued by poverty and hunger and is inhabited by a huge population. But it has successfully solved the problems of food, clothing and housing for its people, reaping a bumper harvest every year when the world is swept by food crisis, though once far removed from modern technological civilization, it has rapidly developed its economy, culture, science and technology to such a level as to launch artificial earth satellites. All this was possible only in the present era led by the Communist Party of China.

All the epochal changes brought about in China today are the brilliant fruits borne of the long, indomitable revolutionary activities and wise leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung who founded the Communist Party of China and has invariably led it along road to victory and who has dedicated his all to the freedom and happiness of the Chinese people, and borne of his revolutionary line which has creatively applied the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution.

The Korean people warmly congratulate the fraternal Chinese people on their successes achieved in the revolution and construction, regarding them as a common victory for the world's revolutionary peoples.

The Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China and the first session of the 4th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China showed that the unity of the party, the SAE [as received], the people and the army in China has reached new heights and been further consolidated under the banner of proletarian dictatorship.

We sincerely wish the fraternal Chinese people ever greater victories in their future struggle to build China into a mighty modern socialist state and in their cause of liberating Taiwan and reunifying all China.

Since national liberation the Korean people have implemented the revolutionary line of independence, self-reliance and self-defense in the northern half of the republic under our party's leadership, and thereby turned, in a short span of time, their once backward country into a strong socialist sovereign and independent state which never vacillates in whatever storm and stress.

At present our people are further speeding up the Chollima march in order to fulfill ahead of schedule the 6-year plan set forth by the fifth party congress this year which will mark the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea.

As the socialist construction has entered a higher stage and the revolutionizing and working-classization of the whole society is accelerated through the intensified ideological revolution in our country, the socialist economic construction goes on more successfully and there is a fresh upswing throughout all its spheres.

The successful building of socialism in Korea and China and the militant unity of the two peoples are precisely a powerful factor that will strengthen the world's socialist forces and the anti-imperialist national liberation forces and hasten the destruction of the imperialist forces of aggression in Asia.

Dear comrades and friends.
A great revolutionary transformation has taken place in the East and the look of Asia has radically changed since the Second World War.

The colonial Asia, the underdeveloped East of yesterday has disappeared once and for all and new Asia has been born that advances towards independence, progress and prosperity.

The U.S. imperialists started going downhill after their ignominious military defeat in the Korean war and have sustained repeated setbacks in their aggressive wars to Indochina, and their hostile policy towards China has gone bankrupt. All this proves that no desperate manoeuvring on the part of the imperialists can block the liberation struggle of the peoples and stop the victorious advance of socialism.

Nowadays the U.S. imperialists are again being dealt fatal blows and are sliding into an inextricable quagmire of ruin in Indochina.

Yesterday the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces defeated the traitorous Lon Nol clique, the stooges of U.S. imperialism, and finally liberated Hoan Kiem.

This is a great victory won by the patriotic Cambodian people in their 5-year-long heroic struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, and it is another shameful defeat sustained by the U.S. imperialists in Asia.

This glorious victory of the Cambodian people over U.S. imperialism and its stooges is an important contribution to the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle of the oppressed nations and a historic event exerting a great influence upon the development of the situation of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Availing ourselves of this opportunity, I warmly congratulate the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces on their shining victories in the operation to liberate Hoan Kiem and in the cause of liberating the whole country under the leadership of the National United Front of Cambodia with Head of State of Cambodia Sihanouk as its chairman and the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia.

Now in South Vietnam, too, the Saigon puppet clique is being dealt strong punitive attacks by the South Vietnamese people and the people's liberation armed forces and it is on the verge of collapse.

In Asia the imperialists have resorted to various methods and tricks one after the other such as direct armed intervention, neo-colonialist rule through their puppets and the "new Asian policy" to make Asians fight among themselves; however, they have been unable to save themselves from doom and reached such a dead end that they can no longer hold out in Asia.

We actively support the struggle of the Indochinese peoples against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys and the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle of all the Asian peoples.

We strongly support the Arab peoples in their struggle to regain the occupied Arab territories and restore the national rights of the Palestinian people and manifest firm solidarity with the African and Latin American people in their anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist struggle.
Africa which was called Dark Continent yesterday is turning into a new continent over which the light of complete liberation is dawning; in Latin America, too, the colonial system of imperialism is being shaken to its very foundation.

At present the struggle of the Third World peoples is developing in depth, into a collective, joint struggle to achieve complete economic emancipation, while consolidating their political independence already achieved, to destroy the old international economic order set up by the imperialists and establish a new international order.

Because of the community of their past situations and the identity of their present struggles the Korean people are standing firm by the Third World peoples on the same front and fighting in close coordination with them.

Indeed, the world has never undergone such a rapid change in such depth and width as today.

The Third World which emerged out of struggle is a mighty anti-imperialist revolutionary force of our times; it is a great motive power that advances the history of mankind.

The common struggle waged by the Third World, which is inhabited by the overwhelming majority of the world's population and has a vast territory and inexhaustible natural resources, is a great struggle that will cut off the lifeline of world imperialism.

Once old and new colonialism is wiped out of Asia, Africa and Latin America, neither imperialist Western Europe nor imperialist North America will be able to exist.

However this does not mean that imperialism will recede from its position of its own accord.

The further the imperialists are driven into a predicament, the more they resort to double-faced tactics, holding an olive branch in one hand and wielding a bayonet in the other, and the more viciously they manoeuvre for aggression and war under the signboard of "peace." This is a rule.

How the imperialists are openly working to find a way out of their deepening economic crisis in a new adventurous war of aggression.

However, war will never bring them any way out.

As historical facts show, in former days aggressive wars ended in the defeat of imperialists. Now if they provoke war again, it will accelerate the final ruin of imperialism.

We shall always keep a sharp vigilance against the imperialist threat of war and get ourselves firmly prepared to meet the forthcoming great revolutionary event victoriously, whether there will be war or revolution.
We consider that in order to defeat imperialism, maintain and consolidate peace and hasten our revolutionary victory, we must thoroughly frustrate the counterrevolutionary double-faced tactics of the imperialists by countering the enemy's spear with our spear and meeting his deceptive "peace" tactics with revolutionary principle.

The world's anti-imperialist revolutionary forces will definitively defeat imperialism and win final revolutionary victory, if they are strongly united, and administer successive blows at imperialism and bring pressure to bear upon it everywhere.

Our people's present struggle to reunify their divided country is a major link in the whole chain of the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle which is being carried out on a worldwide scale.

Now that the colonial system of imperialism is in the process of total disintegration, the colonial rule of U.S. imperialism in South Korea will never remain intact, either.

Encouraged by the successful socialist construction in the northern half of the republic, the people of all streets in South Korea are waging an increasingly dynamic struggle against fascism and for democracy, and the colonial military fascist rule of U.S. imperialism and its stooges in sinking into a serious crisis.

In an endeavour to save themselves from crisis, U.S. imperialism and South Korea's ruling clique are intensifying their fascist repression of the South Korean people and further stepping up their preparations of war against the northern half of the republic.

However, history is not moving as the imperialists and their lackeys expect but advancing steadily as the people, makers of history, wish and act.

If the South Korean rulers continue to suppress at the point of the bayonet the people's discontent and wrath that is underlying South Korean society, it will result in a greater revolutionary explosion.

If revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people.

If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors.

In this war we will only lose the military demarcation line and will gain the country's reunification.

The problem of whether there be peace or war in Korea now depends, in the last analysis, on the attitude of the United States which actually holds all powers in South Korea and lords it over there.

If the United States really desires peace in Korea and does not want to obstruct the peaceful reunification of Korea, it should stop instigating the traitorous forces rejected by the people in South Korea and it should not interfere in what the people are doing so that they may realize the democraticisation of society and establish a democratic regime as they demand.
U.S. imperialism must desist from its aggressive ambition to rig up "two Koreas" and take hold of South Korea as its permanent colony and military base, and must get out of South Korea.

If U.S. troops pull out of South Korea and a democratic figure with national conscience comes into power in South Korea as its people demand, we will firmly guarantee a durable peace in Korea and successfully solve the question of Korea's reunification among us Koreans themselves by peaceful means.

The Communist Party of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people always give firm support and encouragement to our people in the just struggle for the country's independent and peaceful reunification.

I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to the Communist Party of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people for having sent their volunteers to help our people with blood during the Korean war, for having given us a lot of aid in our postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction and in our work of socialist construction and for carrying on positive activities in support of our people's struggle for national reunification on the international arena.

Dear comrades and friends,

The future of the world belongs to the peoples who advance, holding aloft the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary banner of anti-imperialist struggle.

In order to promote the common cause of anti-imperialism and achieve the final triumph of the cause of socialism, the Korean people will march forward forever shoulder to shoulder with the fraternal Chinese people and will firmly fight on hand in hand with the peoples of the socialist countries, the Third World peoples and all the progressive people of the world.

Now, at this place overflowing with fraternal friendship, may I propose a toast:

To the everlasting militant friendship and unity between the Korean people and the Chinese people,
To the prosperity and progress of the People's Republic of China,
To the solidarity of the peoples of socialist countries, the Third World peoples and the progressive people the world over,
To the good health and long life of comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people and close friend of the Korean people,
To the health of Comrade Chairman Chu Te,
To the health of Comrade Premier Chou En-lai,
To the health of vice-chairmen Wang Hung-wen, Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Hsiao-ping,
To the health of leading comrades of the Chinese party and government,
To the good health and long life of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, and princess,
To the health of Prince Pamnouth, prime minister of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, and madam,
To the health of diplomatic envoys from different countries and madams, and to the health of all comrades and friends present here.
Tong Banquet Speech

Tong Banquet Speech

[Text of speech by Tong Hae-sung, vice chairman of the CPP Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council, at 18 April Peking banquet honoring DPRK President Kim Il-song]

[Text] Respected Comrade President Kim Il-song, respected comrades on the Korean party and government delegation,

comrades and friends,

The Korean people's great leader, President Kim Il-song has come to our country at the head of the Korean party and government delegation on an official friendship visit. This is a major event of historic significance in the relations between the Chinese and Korean parties and our two countries. The people of our country are much rejoiced and inspired by this event. Just now the Chinese people's great leader, Chairman Mao Zedong met the Korean people's great leader President Kim Il-song, and they had a very cordial and friendly conversation. On behalf of the Chinese people's great leader, Chairman Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government and people, I here extend our warmest welcome and highest salute to President Kim Il-song, the Chinese people's close comrade-in-arms and the Korean party and government delegation led by him.

President Kim Il-song is the founder of the great Korean Workers Party and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the long-tested, respected and beloved leader of the Korean people. For decades, President Kim Il-song has integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Korean revolution, adhered to the Marxist-Leninist line and led the Korean people in winning one great victory after another.

Under the leadership of the Korean Workers Party led by Comrade Kim Il-song, the Korean people fought bravely and were the first to defeat U.S. imperialist armed aggression since the conclusion of the Second World War. They thus safeguarded the hard-won victory of the people's revolution and set a brilliant example for the revolutionary people of the world in the anti-imperialist cause.

Following President Kim Il-song's revolutionary line, the heroic Korean people have persisted in the dictatorship of the proletariat, adhered to the socialist road and, through self-reliance and hard work, achieved splendid successes in socialist construction at galloping speed. At present, in an enthusiastic response to the militant call of the tenth plenary session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, they are vigorously carrying forward the three great revolutionary movements--ideological, technical and cultural, bringing about a new upsurge in socialist construction with high political zeal and boundless revolutionary drive and striving to attain ahead of schedule the magnificent goals set in the 6-year national economic plan.

The Korean Workers Party and the Korean Government and people have adhered to proletarian internationalism, resolutely opposed imperialism and modern revisionism and actively supported the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and oppressed peoples, thus making an important contribution to the revolutionary cause of the people of the world.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 02764 211108Z

15

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 ACDA-05 SAM-01 OMB-01 AID-05 SAJ-01 /090 W

---------------------     102882

PR 210958Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9593
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONGEN HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
USUNMISSION NEW YORK 1534
CINCPAC

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 2764

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH KN KS
SUBJECT: KIM IL-SUNG VISIT TO PEKING

REF: A PEKING 743, B HONG KONG 4424, C SEOUL 2689

1. DURING PEKING VISIT KIM IL-SUNG HAS TAKEN HARSH
AND UNCOMPROMISING LINE ON NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND
KOREAN UNIFICATION PROBLEM. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO
SPECULATE ON PURPOSE AND OUTCOME OF VISIT, IT SEEMS CLEAR
THAT KIM ENDEAVORING TO CONVINCE HIS HOSTS OF NEED TO
SUPPORT HIM IN WHAT IS BASICALLY POLICY OF CONTINUED
ANTAGONISM RATHER THAN DETENTE ON KOREAN PENINSULA.

2. EMBASSY HAS REPORTED IN DEPTH THE ROK CONCERN
WITH IMPACT OF INDOCHINA ON KOREA. KIM'S APRIL 18
BANQUET SPEECH IN PEKING AND HIS CAREFUL ATTENTION
TO SIHANOUK BEAR OUT THIS CONCERN, ILLUSTRATING KIM'S
CONTENTION THAT KOREAN SITUATION IS LINKED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 02764 211108Z

REVOLUTIONARY EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS, OF WHICH CAMBODIA
IS LATEST SUCCESSFUL CASE. HOWEVER, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER KIM IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH STRENGTHENING HIS CREDENTIALS AS CHAMPION OF THIRD WORLD, FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL OPENING STAGE BY NORTH KOREAN DRIVE TO JOIN NONALIGNED NATIONS CONFERENCE, OR WITH SEEKING TO REPEAT INDOCHINA SUCCESSES IN KOREA. ON LATTER POSSIBILITY, MOFA NOTES THAT KIM IN 1966 HAD SUGGESTED UNITED ACTION IN INDOCHINA BY FORMING MILITARY GROUP OF SUPPORTERS OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND THAT HE HAD SAID AT THAT TIME THAT GROUP COULD BE PATTERN FOR ACTION IN KOREA, BUT THAT PRC HAD OBJECTED TO IDEA.

3. IT IS OF COURSE WITH POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA THAT ROKG IS CONCERNED, AND WE FIND KIM'S SPEECH NOTABLY HARD-LINE WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS HERE. APPEARING IN HIS REMARKS TO IGNORE BOTH THE ROKG AND THE UN AS RELEVANT TO THE KOREAN QUESTION, KIM STATED THAT "THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THERE BE PEACE OR WAR IN KOREA NOW DEPENDS . . . ON THE UNITED STATES." HE CALLED FOR THE REMOVAL OF US TROOPS AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING GOVERNMENT IN ROK, IN RETURN FOR WHICH NORTH KOREA WOULD OFFER UNILATERAL GUARANTEE OF PEACE. ALTHOUGH HE GAVE NO TIME LIMIT IN INSISTING ON US WITHDRAWAL, KIM CLEARLY INDICATED THAT HIS SCENARIO FOR SOLVING KOREAN QUESTION INVOLVES A REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH LEADING TO UNIFICATION OF THE PENINSULA, IF THE US DOES NOT INTERFERE "IN WHAT THE PEOPLE ARE DOING."

4. MOFA FINDS THE KIM SPEECH THREATENING, HARSHER IN TONE AND CLEARER IN MEANING THAN PREVIOUS NORTH KOREAN PRONOUNCEMENTS. WHILE MAINTAINING LINE THAT US IS KEY TO SETTLEMENT OF KOREAN PROBLEM, KIM WENT FURTHER THAN BEFORE IN STATING HIS MILITANT INTENTIONS, ACCORDING TO MOFA, WITH HIS DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION AND HIS STATEMENT THAT "IN THIS WAR WE WILL ONLY LOSE THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND WILL GAIN THE COUNTRYS REUNIFICATION". ON THE OTHER HAND, TENG SPEECH IN MOFA'S VIEW DID NOT BREAK NEW GROUND, AS CHINESE APPARENTLY REFRAINED FROM DIRECT SUPPORT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SEOUL 02764 211108Z

FOR KOREAN REVOLUTION.

5. MOFA ALSO SEES VISIT IN CONTEXT OF INDOCHINA AND SINO-SOVET RIVALRY ALTHOUGH IS UNSURE OF WHETHER IT WAS INITIATED BY CHINESE OR NORTH KOREANS. A SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO MOSCOW BY KIM IS SEEN AS A POSSIBILITY BY ROKG, SINCE IN 1961, ON HIS LAST TRIP TO THE TWO CAPITALS, KIM VISITED MOSCOW FIRST
AND THEN PEKING A WEEK LATER. MOFA BELIEVES THAT KIM WOULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO CHINA AT THIS TIME AND DOUBTS A RECENT PRESS STORY THAT USSR HAS ASKED NORTH KOREA TO PAY ITS KOEAN WAR DEBTS. EMBASSY NOTES THAT RECENT PYONGYANG RADIO REPORTS OF RETURNING DPRK DELEGATIONS HAVE EMPHASIZED PRESENCE AT AIRPORT OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS, AS IN CASE OF IPU DELEGATION RETURNING FROM COLOMBO VIA PEKING. WHEN SOVIET GREETER WAS ONLY DIPLOMAT IDENTIFIED BY COUNTRY.

6. ROK PRESS CONTINUES TO EXPRESS VIEW THAT KIM'S VISIT IS DESIGNED TO GAIN PRC SUPPORT FOR MILITARY MOVE AGAINST ROK. HIS BANQUET REMARKS WERE CRITICIZED BY MOST PAPERS AS PROVOCATIVE, WITH TONGA ILBO CALLING HIS SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION IN SOUTH AN OPEN VIOLATION OF THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUE. TONGA LAMENTED FACT THAT KIM INTENDS USING ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN ROK FOR HIS COMMUNIST POLITICAL PURPOSES. GOING ONE PREDICTABLE STEP FURTHER, SEMI-OFFICIAL KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN SAID "IT IS NOT THE TRIGGER-HAPPY NATURE OF KIM IL-SUNG BUT THE INTERNAL DISUNITY IN OUR SOCIETY THAT WE HAVE TO TRULY DREAD IN FACE OF THIS EXTERNAL THREAT".

7. PRESS APRIL 21 REPORTED REMARKS BY UNIFICATION MINISTER SIN TO-SONG, REPORTEDLY GIVING CONCLUSIONS OF APRIL 18 MEETING OF ROK NORTH KOREAN EXPERTS ANALYZING RECENT MOVES BY PYONGYANG. SIN TOLD PRESS THAT VISIT BY KIM TO PEKING AGAINST BACKGROUND OF INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS WAS INDICATION THAT NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGY AGAINST SOUTH "HAS NOW BEEN SETTLED AS A POLICY OF UNIFICATION BY MILITARY FORCE." SIN SAID THAT THE EXPERTS CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL.

HAD CONCLUDED THAT NORTH KOREA HAD FAILED IN ITS SIX YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN, FORCING IT TO ADOPT AGGRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE ROK. DECIDING AGAINST ALTERNATIVE OF OPENING ITS SYSTEM TO THE WORLD, SIN SAID, NORTH IS OPTING FOR MILITARY CONFRONTATION AGAINST SOUTH ON ONE HAND AND PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY ON THE OTHER, WITH THE LATTER COURSE AIMED AT ISOLATING SEOUL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND CREATING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION FAVORING THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM KOREA. SNEIDER

CONFIDENTIAL.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  PEKING 00762  220828Z

20
ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 OMB-01 SAM-01 8070 W
---------------------     115913
P R 220800Z APR 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3618
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CONFIDENTIAL PEKING 0762

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR KN CH

SUBJECT: KIM IL SUNG VISIT TO PRC

REF: A. PEKING 743; B. HONG KONG 4424

1. SOUNDING AMONG PEKING DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY REFLECT CONSIDERABLE UNAMITY THAT KIM'S VISIT TO PEKING WAS A) AT PYONGYANG'S INITIATIVE; B) ON SHORT NOTICE; AND C) SEEN BY NORTH KOREA AS A MEANS OF EXPLORING WAYS TO CAPITALIZE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA TO STEP UP PRESSURE ON THE ROK. (REF A). SEVERAL DIPLOMATS HAVE COMMENTED ON THE FACT THAT THE ONLY NORTH KOREAN OTHER THAN KIM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SMALL PRIVATE MEETING WITH MAO FOLLOWING THE PICTURE TAKING SESSION WAS DPRK CHIEF OF STAFF O CHIN YU, WHO IS NOT THE SECOND RANKING MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION. NO ONE IN THE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET ANY HARD INFORMATION ON SUBJECTS DISCUSSED, BUT THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT MILITARY MATTERS CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  PEKING 00762  220828Z

FIGURED PROMINENTLY.
2. Protocol has informed several Western diplomats that the return banquet for Kim Il Sung will take place Friday evening, April 25. We assume, therefore, that Kim will depart for Pyongyang on Saturday, and we can probably expect a joint communique following his departure. No one has been able to pin the Koreans down on whether Kim plans any further travels, but the Soviets here are pushing the idea that he may return to Pyongyang and then journey to Moscow.

3. Ten Hsiao-P'ing has continued his leading role as Kim’s principal interlocuter. Although as reported ref A, the printed text of Teng’s welcoming address distributed at the banquet omitted any reference to his speaking on behalf of Chairman Mao or Chou En-Lai, the NCNA English version which came out after the banquet corrected this oversight and has Teng welcoming Kim on behalf of Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Government and People. Incidentally, Chinese included dog meat in Great Hall banquet menu, pleasing the North Koreans but offending the Arabs and all dog lovers present. One ambassador described the banquet as the grimmest he had ever attended. Bush

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN
Department of State  
SECRET  
NO. 836  

PAGE 01  
STATE 069905  
COPY 1  OF 15 COPIES  

O
ORIGIN NODO-02  

INFO OCT-01 1001 R  

DRAFTED BY IO/UNPICKSCHALLER  
APPROVED BY IO/AMBASSADOR BUFFUM  
EASKI/DAVID DONOHUE  
S/SHR, MOFFAT  

R 2722562Z MAR 75 ZFFG  
FM SEESTATE WASHDC  
TO AMBASSADORE SEOUL  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  

E E E E T STATE 069905  

NODIS  

E Q 116321-005  

TAGS: PFO, UN, KB, KN  

SUBJECT: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA  

1. ROK FONMIN KIM DONG-JO MET MARCH 26 WITH IO ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY BUFFUM TO DISCUSS KOREAN ISSUE AT 30TH GA. ALSO  
PRESENT WERE ROK AMB. HAMM, ROK UN PERMREP PARK, AND AMB.  
SCHNEIDER.  

2. MINISTER KIM SAID RECENT ROK SOUNDINGS IN 64 COUNTRIES  
SHOW US/ROK MUST ACT PROMPTLY TO PREPARE STRONGEST POSSIBLE  
POSITION ON KOREA FOR NEXT GA. HE EXPECTS NORTH KOREANS  
TO REQUEST GA ITEM AND SUBMIT THEIR DRAFT RES OF LAST  
YEAR BEFORE SEEKING MEMBERSHIP IN NFORMED MOVEMENT (NAL)  
AND NAL RES ENDORSING NK POSITION AT AUGUST NAL CONFERENCE  
AT LIMA. KIM SAID THE NAL PREPARATORY MEETING IN HAVANA  
HAS ENDORSED NK MEMBERSHIP AND ESSENTIALS OF PRO-NK GA  
RES. HE FEARS THE LIMA CONFERENCE WILL APPROVE BOTH  
MEMBERSHIP AND DRAFT RES.
3. Amb Buffum said USG hard at work on issue. We believe fresh approach needed if NK draft res again to be defeated. We are considering lowering UN profile, possibly reducing UN command functions to only those connected directly with preserving armistice agreement, and then advising either UN SG or President of security council by letter of our intended actions and willingness to terminate UN completely once other side affirms armistice will remain in force.

4. Responding to question from Hahn, Amb Buffum said we had carefully studied idea of requesting formal security council meeting but see difficulties. Given adamant PRC opposition to idea and current unfavorable council composition where Korean issue concerned, we do not expect not appear to have votes to inscribe subject let alone to adopt a res or force veto of it. Highlighting this situation in council would impact unfavorably on GA atmosphere. However, we could demonstrate our intent to give effect to last year's GA res by stating in letter to UN SG or council President our willingness to meet with council members at any time to discuss situation.

5. Fonmin Kim expressed general agreement with above approach, but voiced pessimism that NK draft res can again be defeated under any circumstances. Kim in personal vein also threw out possibility of unilateral UNC termination. He pointed out our concern at dangers of such a course. Amb Buffum concurred that our approach described in para 3 above would likely produce only marginal improvement in our position and that we would again have to make all-out diplomatic effort to prevail at 30th GA. Important in this respect is need to demonstrate what we are going to make progress on UNC and to make clear that our sole concern is for preservation of armistice to which UNC is still the vital link.

SECRET
6. FONMIN KIM STRESSED NEED FOR EARLY LETTER TO SG OR COUNCIL PRESIDENT AND FOR OBTAINING VOTING PRIORITY IN GA BY TIMELY REQUEST FOR INSCRIPTION AND TABLING A DRAFT RES. AMB BUFFUM SAID TIMETABLE ENVISAGED SENDING LETTER IN JUNE AND REQUESTING INSCRIPTION OF GA ITEM IN JUNE OR JULY. WE HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO DRAFT GA RES. VERY PRELIMINARILY WE WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO MAKE OPERATIVE PARA 2 OF LAST YEAR'S GA RES MORE DIRECT IN ITS REFERENCE TO UNC TERMINATION PROVIDED ARMISTICE MAINTAINED. AMB BUFFUM GAVE FONMIN SEVERAL SUGGESTED DRAFT APPROACHES TO OPERATIVE PARA 2, AGAIN STRESSING PRELIMINARY NATURE OF LANGUAGE.

7. AMB. MAHM WONDERED WHETHER HE MIGHT BE EVEN MORE SPECIFIC IN THIS RESPECT, SUCH AS ADDING LANGUAGE HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT UNC BE REPLACED BY US/HOK AS SIGNATORIES, SUCCESSOR TO UNC SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT OF OTHER SIDE. AMB. BUFFUM REPLIED THAT THIS IDEA MERITED SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, BUT IT WOULD LIKELY BE PREFERABLE AS A Fallback POSITION.

8. AMBASSADOR MAHM WONDERED WHETHER OUR DRAFT GA RES SHOULD REFER TO CONCURRENT UN MEMBERSHIP FOR BOTH KOREAS. AMB. BUFFUM SAID IT IS PREFERABLE FROM A UN TACTICAL VIEWPOINT TO KEEP THIS TOPIC SEPARATE FROM THE UNC SO AS TO MAXIMIZE GA SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION ON LATTER ISSUE. AMB. SNEIDER AGREED AND SUGGESTED THAT ROK LET ASEAN COUNTRIES, WITH WHICH IT HAS DISCUSSED THIS MATTER, PURSUE IT. JOINING UN MEMBERSHIP TO UNC ISSUE MIGHT DILUTE NONALIGNED SUPPORT FOR US/HOK ON THE UNC. KIM APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION.

9. KIM ASKED WHETHER WE PLAN FURTHER CONTACTS WITH PRC. AMB. BUFFUM SAID WE DOUBT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE AT PRESENT, SINCE PRC LIKELY TO CONCLUDE WE ARE DEALING FROM WEAKNESS. KIM WONDERED IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PUBLICIZE PAST CONTACTS WITH CHINESE. AMB. BUFFUM SAID THIS MIGHT WELL FORECLOSE LONGER-RANGE CONTACTS WITH PRC ON KOREAN AND OTHER ISSUES.

10. KIM AGAIN URGED EARLY PLANNING ON STEPS TO LOWER
UNC PROFILE, HE POINTED OUT THAT THESE REQUIRE CAREFUL US/ROK CONSULTATIONS WHICH WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT LETTER TO SYG OR PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL ON STEPS TAKEN OR PLANNED ON UNC MUST PRECEDE TABLING OF DRAFT GA RESOLUTION.

11. COMMENTS: KIM APPEARED APPRECIATIVE OF OUR READINESS TO DISCUSS UN SITUATION CONCRETELY WITH HIM. HE COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD CONSIDERATIONS MITIGATING AGAINST FORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION AND HAD APPARENTLY COME TO SAME CONCLUSION HIMSELF. HE ALSO RAISED NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO IDEA OF SEPARATING UN MEMBERSHIP QUESTION FROM UNC ISSUE. AT SAME TIME KIM CLEARLY COMPLETELY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT UNGA PROSPECTS (I.E., DEFEAT OF OTHER SIDE'S DRAFT RESOLUTION) IN VIEW OF NORTH KOREAN SUCCESSES WITH NONALIGNED COUNTRIES. KISSINGER
Message Text

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01  HONG K 04590  290143Z

64
ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSA-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 AID-05 SAJ-01 SAM-01 ACDA-05 IO-10 EB-07

OMB-01 TRSE-00 /097 W
---------------------     085526
R 280909Z APR 75 ZDK
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4727
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
P
KNQPG/USLO PEKING 4019
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HONG KONG 4590

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR KN KS
SUBJ: DPRK-PRC COMMUNIQUE

REF: HONG KONG 4224

SUMMARY: THE DPRK-PRC JOINT COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS NO DEPARTURE FROM KNOWN OR PRESUME DPRC STANDS OR POSITIONS, BUT DOES SEEM TO REFLECT SOME MODIFICATION OF KIM'S MORE MILITANT PRONOUNCEMENTS ON KOREAN REUNIFICATION. THE COMMUNIQUE'S REFERENCES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SUGGEST THAT KIM MAY HAVE SOUGHT AND RECEIVED SOME PRC ASSISTANCE ALONG THESE LINES. END SUMMARY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02  HONG K 04590  290143Z

1. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE SUDDEN AND HIGH-LEVEL
NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY DELEGATION LED BY KIM IL-SUNG (AND THE KIM-MAO MEETING) IN THE WAKE OF RECENT COMMUNIST VICTORIES IN INDOCHINA SERVED TO DEMONSTRATE AND UBERSCORE THE CLOSE TIES AND BONDS BETWEEN PEKING AND PYONGYANG. IN THE APRIL 26 JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF KYGS 9 DAY VISIT, BUT CHINA AND NORTH KOREA ACCLAIMED THE "HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE" OF THE MEETINGS, THE TWO SIDES HAVING "COMPLETE IDENTITY" OF VIEWS ON "ALL QUESTIONS DISCUSSED", AND FEELINGS OF COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH THE RESULTS OF THEIR BILATERAL TALKS. HOWEVER, THIS RECENT EXERCISE IN SUMMITRY SEEMS MORE AN EXERCISE IN STYLE WITH LESS THAN FULL AGREEMENT ON KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE MERELY RESTATES POSITIONS AND THEMES SET FORTH IN THE EARLIER BANQUET SPEECHES OF TENG AND KIM. THE PRC STATED SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL KOREAN REUNIFICATION, EXPLICITLY REITERATING CHINA'S SUPPORT FOR KIM'S "THREE PRINCIPLES AND 'FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION' AS BEING THE "CORRECT WAY" IN WHICH THIS GOAL "SHOULD BE REALIZED". THE CHINESESIDE REFERRED TO THE PROTRACTED NATURE OF THIS STRUGGLE AND PAID TRIBUTE TO THE NORTH'S EFFORTS TO FULFILL ITS "MAGNIFICENT" ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TARGETS.

2. ON OTHER CRITICAL ISSUES OF THE UN COMMAND AND US FORCES IN KOREA, CHINA MERELY REPEATED CALLS FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE "SO-CALLED UN COMMAND" AND WITHDRAWAL OF US ARMED FORCES, WITHOUT ANY HINT OF A SPECIFIC TIME FRAME. THERE IS ALSO NO MENTION OF JAPAN OR OF US FORCES THERE.

4. PYONGYANG MAY HAVE BEEN MOVED CLOSER TO ACCEPTANCE OF A MORE MODERATE AND PRAGMATIC PRC-TYPE STRATEGY IN ACCOMPLISHING ITS GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN RETURN FOR OBTAINING AND END TO PEKING'S TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARDS SEOUL. THE COMMUNIQUE NOTES THE VIEW THAT THE DPRK IS THE "SOLE LEGAL SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE KOREAN NATION."

4. WHILE THE DPRK SEEMS TO ALIGN CLOSER WITH THE PRC WORLD VIEW, THERE IS A CONSPICUOUS ABSENCE OF CRITICAL REMARKS OR REFERENCES TO MOSCOW OR MODERN REVISIONISM, INDICATING THAT THE NORTH KOREANS ARE NOT READY TO COMPLETELY RULE OUT THEIR SOVIET OPTION. THERE IS EXPRESSION OF MUTUAL SUPPORT FOR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 HONG K 04590 290143Z


5. THERE IS NO HINT OF NEW BILATERAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS,
ALTHOUGH ECONOMIC MATTERS WERE UNDOUBTEDLY A PRIORITY TOPIC
AND THE TWO DPRK ECONOMIC MINISTERS STAYED ON IN PEKING WHILE
THE REST OF THE DELEGATION VISIT NANKING. THUS, NORTH
KOREA’S PROFESSIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH THE VISIT MAY STEM
FROM POSSIBLE PRC AGREEMENT TO ASSIST PYONGYANG IN RESOLVING
ITS CURRENT CROP OF DPRK ECONOMIC WOES.

CROSS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PEKING 00802 290017Z

72
ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 /077 W
--------------------- 084367
R 280909Z APR 75
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3649
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USMISSION USUN
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CONFIDENTIAL PEKING 802

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT TO THE PRC

SUMMARY: THE CHINESE-NORTH KOREAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE SIGNED DURING KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT SUGGESTS THAT THE NORTH KOREANS MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING CHINESE ACQUIESCENCE TO A HARDER LINE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE CHINESE, FOR THEIR PART, APPEAR TO HAVE DAMPENED ANY THOUGHTS KIM MIGHT HAVE HAD OF ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT U.S. DIFFICULTIES IN INDOCHINA BY STEPPING UP MILITARY PRESSURES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. PREDICTABLY, KIM CONTINUED TO HOLD OPEN THE SOVIET OPTION BY AVOIDING ANY ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC.

END SUMMARY.

1. THE PRC-NORTH KOREAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF APRIL 26 (RELEASED APRIL 28) APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THE CHINESE AGREED TO TAKE A HARDER LINE ON NEGOTIATIONS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THE TWO SIDES MAKE THE STANDARD DEMAND THAT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PEKING 00802 290017Z

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND BE DISSOLVED AND THAT U.S. FORCES
BE WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH KOREA. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE GO FURTHER THAN USUAL BY SUPPORTING THE DPRK AS THE "SOLE LEGAL SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE KOREAN NATION" AND CONDEMNING THE UNITED STATES FOR PURSUING A "TWO KOREAS" POLICY. THESE STATEMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE CHINESE HAVE AGREED NOT TO NEGOTIATE COMPROMISES WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE KOREAN QUESTION EITHER AT THE UNITED NATIONS OR ELSEWHERE AND TO BACK OFF FROM THEIR PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENTS.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CHINESE MAY HAVE MANAGED TO COOL SOME OF KIM'S RhetORIC ON THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. NONE OF KIM'S TOUGH STATEMENTS IN HIS OPENING BANQUET SPEECH ON THE POSSIBILITY A NEW WAR -- E.G. ACCUSATIONS THAT THE SOUTH WAS STEPPING UP WAR PREPARATIONS OR THAT THE NORTH HAD NOTHING TO LOSE IN A WAR BUT THE DEMARCATION LINE--SURVIVED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE. AND AN UNUSUAL STATEMENT THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAD "TRUST IN" KIM IL SUNG MAY HAVE BEEN A VEILED REFERENCE TO A PROMISE BY THE NORTH KOREAN LEADER THAT HE WOULD NOT STEP UP MILITARY PROVOCATIONS TO A LEVEL WHICH WOULD RISK WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

3. THE WORDING OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE KOREAN "COMPLETE AGREEMENT" WITH THE CHINESE DID NOT EXTEND TO THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PREDICTABLY, KIM CAREFULLY RETAINED HIS OPTIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BY AVOIDING ANY REFERENCE TO "MODERN REVISIONISM" OR OTHER IMPLIED CRITICISMS OF THE SOVIET UNION DURING HIS PEKING VISIT. THE NEAREST HE CAME TO CRITICIZING SOVIET POLICY IN THE COMMUNIQUE WAS AN AMBIGUOUSLY WORDED CRITICISM OF "IMPERIALISM" USE OF THE "SIGNBOARD OF PEACE" AS A TRICK, WHICH COULD BE SEEN AS AIMED AGAINST DETENTE IN A CHINESE INTERPRETATION AND AGAINST COMPROMISE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN THE KOREAN INTERPRETATION.

4. COMMENT: WHILE THE EVIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC RECORD REMAINS SKETCHY, WE SUSTECT THE CHINESE AND NORTH KOREANS ACCOMPLISHED THEIR BASIC GOAL DURING KIM'S VISIT OF COORDINATING THEIR APPROACHES TO KOREAN QUESTIONS. WE SUSTECT THE CHINESE MADE CLEAR TO KIM THAT SHARPLY INCREASED TENSION OR ACTUAL CONFLICT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PRC FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS, BUT CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PEKING 00802 290017Z

IN EXCHANGE WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT A TOUGHER PEKING STANCE ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO KOREA. BUSH

CONFIDENTIAL
On the Visit of a DPRK Party and Government Delegation Headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China from 18 to 26 April 1975

A party and government delegation headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party and President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Il Sung, visited the PR [People’s Republic] China from 18 to 26 April, 1975. The delegation consisted of high-ranking officials from the army and others concerned with foreign affairs and foreign trade.

The actual date of the visit was apparently decided on short notice based on the context of current developments in Cambodia and South Vietnam, although such a visit had certainly been in the making for a long time. This was Kim Il Sung’s first official visit [abroad] since he had visited the USSR and China in 1961 and Indonesia in 1965.

Kim Il Sung was received upon his arrival by the Deputy Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and Deputy Prime Minister, Deng Xiaoping, and by other members of the PRC party and state leadership. Shortly after his arrival Kim had a meeting with Mao Zedong and later met with Zhou Enlai at a hospital.

Intensive negotiations were conducted between the DPRK delegation and the PRC delegation headed by Deng Xiaoping. According to the Communiqué, “issues of further strengthening and expanding the fighting alliance and revolutionary unity between the two parties and states, as well as questions of the current international situation and problems of joint interest to both sides” were discussed in “a cordial atmosphere of revolutionary friendship.” A “complete agreement of positions” was reached on “all issues discussed,” which left “both sides completely satisfied.”

The main concern of the Korean side during this visit was to apparently coordinate its future policy towards South Korea with the PRC. Various indicators point to the direction that based on developments in Indochina, the DPRK leadership apparently made an assessment of how pressure placed on the United States might force them to give up their positions in South Korea. During his first public appearance in Beijing, Kim Il Sung accordingly made extremely aggressive statements on the liberation of South Korea. First he listed the well-known demands for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea: the ending of all American interference [in Korean affairs]; and for the overthrow of the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea as preconditions for peaceful reunification without external force. Then he stated, among other things, that the DPRK will rush to offer assistance in the case of a “revolution” in South Korea. The Korean people “have only to lose a demarcation line but reunification to gain.” It is up the United States themselves “whether there will be a war in Korea or not.”

From the beginning, the Chinese side stated its support for the DPRK’s policy of peaceful reunification without foreign interference. The Chinese side demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces and condemned the terror of the Park Chung-hee regime. It also declared that reunification must be achieved on the basis of the three principles outlined in 1972 by Kim Il Sung himself (peaceful, without foreign interference, establish national unity irrespectively of different ideologies and social systems) and the DPRK’s Five-Point-Proposal of 1973 (détente, disarmament, rejection of the two-Korea policy, confederation etc.). The Chinese side expressed its preference for the continuation of dialogue between North and South Korea that began in 1972 but had been stagnant since mid-1973. This shows that the Chinese are presently not interested in the DPRK’s policy of confrontation with the United States and South Korea, which, due to the unstable situation in Korea, could easily lead to hard-to-calculate risks for the PR China and jeopardize the PRC’s rapprochement with the U.S. and Japan.

In fact, the Communiqué unilaterally represents the position of the PR China. The three principles mentioned above and the Five-Point-Proposal are defined as “the correct path towards the solution of the question of Korea’s reunification.” Still, Kim Il Sung’s posturing during the end of the visit was much more moderate than at its beginning. However, it cannot be excluded that, during negotiations, joint foreign policy measures and steps were discussed in order to increase pressure on the United States.

The Chinese side intended for this visit to commit the DPRK and Kim Il Sung, based on their similar ideological and political outlines, as far as possible to anti-Soviet positions, to tie the DPRK even closer to China, and to steer it away from the community of socialist states. In particular, it might have done so because Kim Il Sung, according to yet unconfirmed information, is planning to accept the invitation from the USSR—pending for many years already—for a visit during the
current year.

At the welcoming banquet Deng Xiaoping talked about “modern revisionism,” the “struggle of the superpowers for world hegemony,” and so on. Apparently due to Korean requests, the Chinese side did not undertake any direct name-calling attacks against the Soviet Union. Yet both sides strongly emphasized the “unbreakable friendship and closeness, sealed with blood, initiated by Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung themselves”. The Communiqué states that this matches with the “basic interests of the Chinese and Korean people.” After praising the successes of the DPRK and its policy—whereby those aspects of DPRK policy of interest to the PR China are highlighted—the Korean side offers an extraordinarily enthusiastic praise of the PRC and Mao Zedong.

The Chinese side made massive attempts to influence the DPRK against the policies of détente as they are pursued by the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community. During the first day of the visit, Deng Xiaoping accused the “superpowers” of warmongering and declared that, “not the so-called irreversible process of détente, but the growing danger of a new global war is the predominant trend of our times.” Though the Communiqué defines the international situation in a favorable light for the revolutionary peoples and unfavorably for imperialism, the conclusion drawn from the crisis of imperialism is said to be the danger of a new global war.

While at the beginning of his visit Kim Il Sung still referred to a close connection between the struggle of the socialist states and the “third world” against imperialism, the Communiqué exclusively recognizes the “third world” as a power force in the global revolutionary process.

Materials published do not support the conclusion that there was complete agreement on all issues, despite that it was explicitly emphasized this way. To the contrary, both sides seem to have stuck to their positions. Aside from the South Korea issue, this also seems to apply to issues not mentioned in the Communiqué at all; for instance, the policy towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, but also policies towards U.S. imperialism and Japan.

Despite lengthy negotiations, the Communiqué does not contain any concrete results for bilateral relations (there also is no return invitation mentioned). However, one cannot exclude Chinese promises for further aid. This might in particular apply to arms and equipment, but also to economic aid given the precarious foreign trade situation of the DPRK (high obligations of debt towards both socialist and capitalist states).

Although Kim Il Sung was apparently unable to move the PRC towards a full and unconditional support for the DPRK’s South Korea policy and more long-term differences in opinion remain, it is to be expected that this visit will further develop the already close party and state relations between the DPRK and the PR China.
Visit to China by North Korean Leader Kim Il Sung

Date: April/May 1975
Source: South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. Translated for NKIDP by Jihei Song.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Classification : __________

Received Telegram

Number : GEW -04106    Date : 222200

To : Minister
From : Ambassador to Germany [? Illegible]

Reference (Copy) : Chief of KCIA

Regarding: WGE – 0455

1. An official from our ministry visited the Head of East Asian Affairs of the resident country on the 22nd and exchanged opinions regarding Kim Il Sung’s visit to Communist China.

2. According to the person in charge at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kim’s visit to Communist China occurred as a result of an unexpected request. China was rather perplexed because his visit coincided with Belgium Prime Minister Tinderman’s visit to Communist China.

3. In his speech, Kim mentioned that North Korea will crush any attempt by the South to attack North Korea. He also stated, when a revolution occurs in the South, [the North] will provide support at an adequate point of time, thus, suggesting a possible war. On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping made a speech mentioning that Communist China will support peaceful and independent unification of the Koreas. Therefore, the official mentioned, both sides are exposing differences in their opinions.

4. Predicting the possibility of Kim’s visit to the Soviet Union, the official mentioned, Kim’s visit to China and the Soviet Union reminded him of Kim’s visit to the countries immediately before June 25th, 1950. He expressed concerns that, first, whether we will recognize Kim’s [illegible] as an initiative of revolution in the South, and second, if [(object unsure)] will willingly accept Kim’s defeat when Kim provokes a war, arguing Communist China has not approved of the war.

5. During the discussion, the official mentioned Portugal as an example. Understanding it is a supposition, we inquired if the West bloc will intervene if Portugal is communized, the official negated the possibility to intervene. (북이, 정일, 구일)

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Control No. 75 – 201

Confidential 381
I have exchanged XX opinions with Assistant Secretary of State Habib on Kim Il Sung’s recent visit to Beijing. Assistant Secretary Habib believes that the recent joint statement used the standard language of the Communists and, from the Communist Chinese perspective, it does not seem that China has encouraged North Korean provocations. In this recent visit, Communist China treated Kim Il Sung with lavish treatment. Kim has stated that he will not remain as a mere spectator when there is a revolution in the South. However, if we limit our focus to the joint statement only, he has expressed his support for the peaceful unification of Korea. Also, while he did argue for the withdrawal of the U.S. Army, the lack of a definite deadline clearly requires attention. The joint statement itself seems to be focused on diplomacy and as a response to the U.N. [Assembly] taking place this year, it is to improve North Korea’s image outward and we observe that it is likely to initiate a diplomatic offensive. Working level officials at the Department of State are currently analyzing [the circumstances] by accumulating the joint statement and other speeches as well as exchange of opinions of relevant organization. The outcome is likely to be released by the beginning of next week and I will report the outcome as soon as we obtain it.

2. Making the use of this opportunity, I have inquired about Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union. Assistant Secretary Habib has referenced to the person in charge at the Soviet Foreign Affairs, Asia Desk, who is likely to have sufficient information to answer the inquiry. He has confirmed that there is no such plan at the moment.
Regarding: Continuation of JAW – 04778 (Part 2)

Such superiority and unity is completely aligned with fundamental interests of both the Chinese and North Korean people. Both parties should form solid unity in the course of struggles against Imperialism and operations for socialist revolution and establishment. Both parties should fight against as one and contribute to the world people’s revolution.

3. Communist China recognized Korean unification as an event that should be realized on the basic principles and measures as provided by Prime Minister Kim Il Sung. Communist China condemned Park Chung Hee’s group for firmly pressing (Kataku Nani) to divide Koreans under the support and silence by American Imperialists, violating the South-North Joint Statement, oppressing fascism on the people of the South and the North, and aggravating the tension on the Korean peninsula.

Communist China firmly supports social democratization for each level of the people in the South as well as the struggle for justice to realize autonomous and peaceful unification of our fatherland. Communist China criticized American Imperialists promoting the “Two Koreas” policy, solidifying the division of Chosun [Korea], and scheming to promote permanency of the division. Communist China firmly argued that the issues of Chosun should be settled by the people of Chosun, without any external disruption. So-called “Combined Armed Forces Command” must be dismissed. The U.S. Army must withdraw from South Korea (Chosun) completely.


It also praised highly of Chinese Communist party’s victory in its long-sustained struggle by instructing the Chinese people and fighting against its domestic and international opponents.

5. The Chinese public follow the basic line of the Party’s total Socialist historical process which is set by their great leader Mao Zedong, continue revolution under the proletariat dictatorship, lead the proletariat Grand Revolution into victory by defeating two anti-revolution bourgeois level headquarters, led by Liu Shaoqi Lin Bao, and continue Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius movement widely and in-depth.

Public movement to study the theories of Proletariat dictatorship is being expanded widely in the nation. The Chinese public shall promote the revolution spirit of independency, autonomy and self-regeneration under the leadership by the Chinese Communist Party, always fight against boldly, build more Socialism, quickly and without wasting. While accomplishing valuable results, the
Chinese public are striving to establish Communist China as a strong modernize Socialist nation within this century. The people of [North] Korea consider this achievement of our Chinese brothers, achieved under the leadership of Prime Minister Mao Zedong, consider it as achievement of our own, fervently congratulate it, and whole heartedly wish even greater achievement in the future.

(Schedule – North 1, North 2, Political 2)

75. 4. 28, 15:53
Purpose of and Outlook for Kim Il Sung’s Visit to Soviet Union

1. Kim Il Sung’s Visit to Soviet Union:
The possibility of Kim Il Sung visiting the Soviet Union is presently rising. If this is realized, his visit will be the eighth trip to the Soviet Union since March 1949 when he visited to discuss “June 25th Provocation [the Korean War]” with the Soviet leadership group. In terms of the timing, this plan requires attention [from us] as it is likely to take place immediately after his visit to Communist China and the collapse of Vietnam and the Khmer.

2. Purpose of Visit:
There are several theories regarding the purpose of Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union. In summary, these theories are largely categorized as the following.

A. To request support for North Korea’s revolution in the South
On the outside, Kim Il Sung is likely to argue to the Soviet leadership that there is potential for revolution in the South and if [the North] supports the revolution in the South, the situation will explode and will result in the liberation of the people and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula (in order to conceal the North’s potential plan to the Soviet leadership for its all-out-war against the South). Kim is likely to request support from the Soviet Union [in this endeavor].

B. To request diplomatic support in reunification by communizing the South
[Kim] is likely to request diplomatic support from the Soviets to remove major barriers to the peoples’ liberation movement, that is, the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from the South and also the dissolution of the UN Armed Forces. At the same time, Kim will want to obtain assurance from the Soviets that North Korea is the only legitimate government in the Korean Peninsula and to request that Soviet Union avoid contact with the South in the future, in order to isolate the South.

C. To request support in military and economy
He [Kim] is likely to request military support and argue that new arms are needed and are an important element to the peoples’ liberation movement. Also, in order to tackle economic and financial difficulty due to the North’s focus on the peoples’ liberation movement, he is likely to request economic and financial support from the Soviet Union,

D. To explain Kim Il Sung’s visit to Communist China
The visit is to resolve the Soviet leadership’s doubts about North Korea due to Kim Il Sung’s visit to Communist China. In order to maintain a more powerful “equal distance” diplomacy with China and Soviet Union, Kim is likely to make excuses to the Soviet Union and state his visit to Communist China was merely for the “solidarity among international Communist Parties,” coming from the international Socialists principle,

E. To extend mutual assistance treaty on alliance and cooperation between Soviet Union and North Korea
It is mentioned that Kim will argue for the strengthening of mutual alliance and friendship, signifying the extension of the treaty on military alliance between Soviet Union and North Korea, which was signed on July 1961.

3. Outlooks

A. Soviet Union’s basic attitude towards the Korean Peninsula
If the Soviet Union actively supports North Korea’s forceful reunification by communizing the South, it will result in a worsened U.S.-Soviet relationship and fundamentally threaten the Soviets current East-West rapprochement policy. In terms of national welfare, [it is not beneficial because] it will result in Japan’s rearmament and a strengthened alliance between the U.S. and Japan. Also, the Asian empires are likely to oppose to Soviet expansionism and promote pro-U.S. or pro-Sino policy and realizing Asian security as the Soviet plans is going to become more difficult. Therefore, the Soviet Union has no other choice than to maintain current status in the Korean Peninsula. However, it is dominantly argued among experts, including Donald S. Zagoria of Hunter College, that the Soviet is unable to officially promote such policy because it must avoid upsetting North Korea and prevent the North from leaning towards Communist China.

B. Communist China strengthening its support on North Korea and Soviet Union’s response
Recently, the joint communique following Kim Il Sung’s visit to Communist China, Communist China designated North Korea as the “only legitimate country in Korea.” They also criticized our “Statement of June 23rd” and signaled their policy to change the status quo of the Korean Peninsula. To summarize, they actively supported the North’s so-called people’s liberation movement in the South. In current visit to Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung is expected to make same request to the Soviet leadership. We believe the following as possible responses from Soviet Union.

When North Korea obtains assurance from the Soviet Union that it is the “only legitimate government” on the Korean Peninsula and requests the Soviet Union to “avoid contact with the South,” the Soviet Union might accept the request in order to restrain North Korea from leaning towards Communist China, mistakenly believing the peoples’ liberation movement argued by the North is feasible and at the same time considering Communist China already agreeing to the North’s request. On the other hand, if the Soviet leadership recognizes the so-called peoples’ liberation movement cannot be realized, and if they are convinced that the North will definitely attempt forceful reunification by communizing the South, we cannot rule out the possibility for the Soviet leadership to clarify their basic standpoint (status quo on the Korean Peninsula is ultimately the best measure for peaceful reunification) and reject North Korea’s requests.

C. Support North Korea’s revolution in the South
While supporting North Korea’s effort in the liberation of the people, the Soviet Union is [illegible] in terms of supporting North Korea’s forceful revolution in the South. Considering the Soviets basic standpoint for the Korean Peninsula, we observe that the North will attempt to persuade and induce the Soviet to their benefit.

D. Support [the North] in dissolving the UN Military Command and withdrawing the U.S. Army in the South
The Soviet Union does not welcome the dissolution of the UN Military force and the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from the South in order to prevent North Korea’s provocation in the South. However, they will support the North as in the past (Soviet Union has supported North Korea at the UN [assembly]), to prevent North Korea’s opposition and their leaning toward Communist China and hoping for the people’s liberation movement in the South to mature.

E. Military assistance to North Korea
We observe that Soviet military assistance to North Korea will be influenced by the Soviet leadership’s decision on the feasibility of the North’s forceful reunification by communizing the South. We project, there can be some military assistance intended for defense which includes conventional weapons and military supplies, in order to prevent North Korea’s inclination to Communist China and to attract them to Soviet Union. However, we believe, nuclear weapons and other massive scale military support intended for offense is unlikely.

F. Economic and financial assistance to North Korea
We observe that Soviet economic and financial assistance to North Korea will depend on the Soviet leadership’s decision on North Korea’s adherence to Communist China, observed in Kim Il Sung’s current visit to Soviet Union and North Korea’s pro-Soviet attitude in Sino - Soviet conflict. Unless North Korea abandons its Sino-Soviet equal distance policy, unprecedented, large scale assistance from the Soviet is hard to expect. (report from the U.S. Ambassador to Soviet Union)

4. Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet and the impact on our country :

A. When the Soviet leadership restrains North Korea from leaning towards Communist China and attempts to attract North Korea, and accepts North Korea’s argument (that potential for people’s revolution in the South is accumulated and thus, communist revolution is currently possible) :
We observe that the Soviet Union will observe the conflicts in the Korean Peninsula as domestic issue in Korea, and to support North Korea’s so-called peoples’ liberation movement, the Soviet might adopt policy that abandons the status quo in the Korean Peninsula as Communist China did. Therefore, as outlined above (refer to Outlooks), the Soviet will provide substantial diplomatic, military, economic and financial assistance to North Korea. The Soviet Union is also likely to avoid “contact” with our country and this will largely impact our policy to improve relationship with communist countries.

B. When the Soviet attempts to prevent North Korea from leaning toward Communist China and to attract the North to the Soviet while not viewing the South has accumulated potential for communist revolution :
We observe that the Soviet policy towards Korea will stay in a range where it will not upset North Korea. The Soviet is likely to continue its unclear status quo policy on the Korean Peninsula, depending on the circumstances in the Korean Peninsula and its relationship with the U.S. and Japan. At the same time, the Soviets assistance to North Korea will not radically change, compared to its previous assistance.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 03091 010900Z

20

ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 INR-05 PM-03 DODE-00 PRS-01

CIAE-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 L-02 /037 W

---------------------     119855

P 010808Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9822

CONFIDENTIAL SEOUL 3091

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652; GDS
TAGS: PFOR, KN, KS
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK: KIM IL-SUNG VISIT TO PEKING

1. DURING APRIL 30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK I REVIEWED INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REGARDING KIM IL-SUNG'S VISIT TO PEKING. I POINTED OUT COMMUNIQUE APPEARED RELATIVELY MODERATE IN TONE WITH ROUTINE TREATMENT OF "PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION" AND AVOIDANCE OF ANY DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS AND KOREA. I SAID THAT WE WERE STILL ANALYZING RESULTS OF VISIT AND IT WAS PROBABLY TOO EARLY TO REACH ANY FINAL CONCLUSIONS.

2. PARK AGREED WITH THESE CONCLUSIONS BUT SPECULATED THAT KIM IL-SUNG IN FACT MAY NOT HAVE SOUGHT DIRECT CHINESE SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ADVENTURES SINCE THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR PEKING TO PROVIDE. INSTEAD KIM IL-SUNG MIGHT HAVE ASKED FOR CHINESE AGREEMENT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN ROK AND TO SUPPORT NORTH KOREA POLITICALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY ONCE SURPRISE ATTACK ACCOMPLISHED INITIAL CONTROL OF SEOUL AND NORTHERN PART OF ROK. CHINESE WOULD BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT CEASEFIRE CALL AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN TO PROVIDE ARMS AND GROUND TROOPS. PARK THOUGHT THAT PRC WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SAY NO TO SUCH A REQUEST.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT WE DOUBTED THAT PEKING DESIRES ANY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 03091 010900Z

TYPE OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT WITH US AT THIS TIME, SINCE
NORTH KOREAN ATTACK WOULD INVOLVE US FORCES, AND THAT PEKING
COMMUNIQUE EMPHASIS SEEMED TO BE PLACED UPON FIRST SECURING
US WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA. PARK AGREED AND STATED THAT
PERHAPS KIM IL-SUNG MIGHT NOT ATTACK RIGHT AWAY AND WOULD
WAIT FOR US WITHDRAWAL, BUT THEN HE WOULD TRY TO SOW
CONFUSION IN THE REAR AREA BEFORE LAUNCHING HIS ATTACK. IN
ANY EVENT, HE CONCLUDED THAT EXTREME VIGILANCE IS NECESSARY
SINCE COMMUNISTS' PLANS DIFFICULT TO DISCERN.

SNEIDER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN
Report from the GDR Embassy in the PRC, “Summarized Evaluation of Kim Il Sung’s Visit to the PR China (18 to 26 April 1975).”

**Date:**
6 May 1975

**Source:**
PolA, MfAA, C 6857. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer.

---

GDR Embassy to the PR China
Beijing, 6 May 1975

**Summarized Evaluation of Kim Il Sung’s Visit to the PR China (18 to 26 April 1975)**

1. The General Secretary of the KWP Central Committee and President of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Il Sung, stayed for an official state visit in the PR China as head of a DPRK party and government delegation between 18 and 26 April 1975. During their stay the Korean delegation visited Beijing and Nanjing. They visited factories, people's communes and topographical and historic attractions. There are no reports about visits of army units.

   On 19, 20, 21, and 25 April, negotiations were held in Beijing between the party and government delegations of the DPRK and PRC. Delegations were chaired by Deng Xiaoping and Kim Il Sung respectively (see delegation list in appendix 2 [not included in this translation]). On 26 April 1975, a “Joint Communiqué” was agreed upon and then published on 28 April.

   The Communiqué and speeches from both sides praised in identical language Kim Il Sung's China visit as “a great event of historical importance” in the history of relations between the parties, states, and peoples of China and Korea. According to the Communiqué, political negotiations were held in “a cordial atmosphere of revolutionary friendship.” On all issues discussed a “complete congruence of opinions was achieved.”

   There was no return invitation issued for a visit by a Chinese party and government delegation to the DPRK.

2. The Chinese hosts made extraordinarily large efforts to stage the Kim Il Sung visit. This was demonstrated primarily by the extraordinarily high attention to protocol for Kim Il Sung and the Korean guests, the pompous reception at the Beijing train station, the colorful line up of Chinese people (for the first time in many years), the organized welcomes at every location where the delegation traveled, and finally by the meetings with the PR China's top leadership.

   Everything was clearly staged for a targeted appreciation of Kim Il Sung the person. Among other things, he was called "a time-tested great leader of the Korean people" who applies the "general truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete reality of the Korean revolution." He was called a "wise leader" with "glorious merits for the cause of revolution" and a "true friend and closest comrade in arms of the Chinese people."

   During his visit to China, Kim Il Sung met almost the entire active top Chinese leadership. In particular, the meetings with Mao Zedong and Zhu De on 19 April and with Zhou Enlai on 20 April reveal the importance attributed to Kim Il Sung's visit for China's foreign and domestic policy by the Chinese leadership. Kim Il Sung was the highest ranking guest from a socialist country since the visit by Comrade Ceausescu in June 1971.

   Apparently the meetings by the Chinese top leadership with the DPRK delegation did not fail in their explicit intention to appreciate Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung felt very honored. For instance, he commented on his upcoming meeting with Mao right after his arrival in Beijing that he was “delighted about this special treatment.”

   The Kim Il Sung visit was featured in the Chinese press with extensive and prominent coverage. This demonstrated in particular the great importance of this event in terms of domestic policy. On the other hand, the Chinese press featured very few aspects about the Kim Il Sung visit from the DPRK press (excerpts from editorials in “Nodong Sinmun” and two other newspapers, see also appendix 3 [not included in this translation]).

   The Cambodian leadership residing in Beijing was present for all of the official events. Members of the DPRK delegation headed by Kim Il Sung met twice with Prince [Norodom] Sihanouk and Penn Nouth for talks. Judging by the visible joint appearances from both sides their relations can be considered as good.

3. Speeches and the Joint Communiqué focused very strongly on bilateral issues. The intense and high praise for the “correctness” of both sides’ policies,” always focused on the personalities of Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung, is especially significant.

   It was repeatedly asserted that the CCP and KWP are “fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties,” the PRC and DPRK are “closest socialist neighboring countries,” and the people of China and Korea are “comrades in arms and members of
one family." Friendship, as established by Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung, is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and is unbreakable. Kim Il Sung talked on 19 April about a "fighting alliance between class brothers."

Moreover, the Chinese side portrayed the DPRK as the first country to have defeated the armed aggression of U.S. imperialism following World War II and thus gave a shining example for the anti-imperialist struggle. At the same time, the great domestic policy successes of the DPRK were praised, especially the Chollima movement and the so-called three great revolutions achieved by the DPRK's own force and its own defense.

The DPRK side fully has recognized and broadly appreciated Chinese domestic policies in recent years. Special emphasis was given to: great success in socialist revolution and socialist construction; a "revolutionary spirit of independence, sovereignty, and self-confidence"; the "Cultural Revolution" and the "Campaign against Confucius and Lin Biao" had "consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat in China"; the "strength of the economy and the country's defense" has increased; the "intellectual and moral potential of the people" was renewed; wish for even more successes "in creating a powerful socialist state"; support for the policy to liberate Taiwan.

4. It is all but apparent that this visit by the DPRK party and government delegation to the PR China was arranged on very short notice (supported by e.g. the rather uncommon fact here in Beijing that two high ranking foreign delegations are visiting the PRC at the same time, Kim Il Sung and the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans). The background for Kim Il Sung’s visit in China is in all likelihood the new situation in Asia created by the great victories of the peoples of Indochina during recent weeks. The DPRK leadership was confronted by the question how to proceed with its policy towards South Korea.

Thus the Korea question was probably one of the most important issues in talks between the Chinese leadership and in political negotiations between both delegations. This is reflected in speeches and the Communiqué in different ways (see appendix 1, chapter 3).

The remarks of the Chinese side were consistent from the beginning and there was a firm official convention of speech in place. China especially emphasized that Kim Il Sung "has defined the correct policy for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea" and the DPRK government "repeatedly made correct and reasonable proposals for the peaceful reunification of the fatherland." It was always referred to the three principles [of the 4 July 1972 declaration] and the [1973 DPRK] Five-Point-Proposal. In addition, the Chinese side supported the DPRK demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and condemned the Park [Chung-hee] clique’s policy and its attempt to create "two Koreas".

The DPRK referred extensively to the issue of Korean unification only in Kim Il Sung's speech of 19 April. In the speech, Korean reunification was called "an important link in the chain of the global anti-imperialist liberation struggle." Kim Il Sung struck an extremely militant tone. His remarks culminated in the statement that in "a war (if started by the enemies, added by this author’s evaluation) we only lose the line of demarcation but will gain the reunification of the fatherland".

The Communiqué of 26 April only contains the extensive Chinese positions on Korean reunification. The DPRK position is not represented there. Also the DPRK did not repeat its own proposals and it also did not express thanks to the Chinese side for its support of proposals and policy of the DPRK (as Kim Il Sung had done in its speech on 19 April).

We think that this analysis demonstrates that there apparently was no "complete congruence of positions" on this issue. It can be assumed the Chinese leaders were not prepared, given their foreign and domestic policy interests and intentions, to let themselves dragged into an unwelcome military confrontation in Korea – and thus used to extened their influence to moderate Kim Il Sung.

5. During Kim Il Sung’s visit to the PR China, statements were also made on some important international issues. The Chinese side (see Deng Xiaoping's speech on 19 April) forcefully outlined some foundations of its current foreign policy: the "superpower" thesis with its clear line of attack against the USSR, the role of the "Third World", the thesis about the growing danger of a new world war.

Apparently, the results of talks on foreign policy issues differ to certain extent. There were probably similar positions on the role of the "Third World." However, the Korean side did not adopt the Chinese phrase that the "Third World is the main force in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism."

On the other hand, the Chinese side did not accept Kim II Sung's words from his 19 April speech according to which "in our epoch … the peoples of the socialist countries and the Third World act as the masters in the international arena." The Joint Communiqué talks about the "Third World" as a "great force to drive the history of humankind toward progress."
Both sides did not state, as the Chinese leaders had done many times before, that China or the DPRK belong to the “Third World.”

Concerning the danger of a new global war, both sides seem to agree on their positions regarding an actual aggravation of international contradictions. However, it looks like there are far-reaching differences with regard to their causes: The Chinese side views the “struggle of the superpowers”, i.e. the Soviet Union, as the reason behind these developments. The DPRK primarily refers to contradictions within imperialism, as well as between imperialism on one hand and the socialist states and the “Third World” on the other (though this is camouflaged by the definition of our times as the epoch of “permanent struggle between the old forces and the newly emerging forces”).

Of special relevance is the fact that Kim Il Sung did not accept the massive anti-Sovietism (without explicit mentioning) contained in Deng Xiaoping’s speech on 19 April, and that he requested to refrain from such in the context of his visit to China. In subsequent Chinese speeches as well as in the welcoming editorials, there is only a line that the DPRK is leading a decisive struggle “against imperialism and modern revisionism.” We think it represents compromise language when the Communiqué states “contradictions within imperialism are on the rise.” The Chinese side interprets this line as “contradictions between imperialisms,” i.e. “between imperialism and social-imperialism” (refer to the Communiqué’s English translation which says “between imperialisms”).

In the speeches as well as in the Joint Communiqué there are references to the struggle of different peoples and respective support is declared: Cambodia, South Vietnam, Middle East, South of Africa, Latin America.

It looks like that the phrasing of those passages was comparatively easy due to the well-known positions held by both sides. Yet here as well the Chinese had to refrain from anti-Soviet remarks.

No references were made in the Communiqué to a number of important geopolitical issues. This applies, among other things, to the decisive role of the socialist states for the history of the current world, the relations among the socialist states, the role of the Italian Communist Party and relations between communist and workers parties, the developments in Europe, the Chinese-American relations, the positions on Japan and India.

Apparently both sides were not interested in stating their positions on some of these issues. On other questions the actual policy on both sides precluded a public statement (e.g. relations with the socialist states, relations with the United States and Japan).

6. Though the bilateral relationship was drummed up by both sides, neither in the speeches nor in the Communiqué substantial statements were made about actual party relations and concrete bilateral relations. The Communiqué states only very generally how the visit was “a great success” and made “an important contribution to the further strengthening of the comrade-in-arms friendship and the great unity between both parties, both states, and the peoples.”

There are no hints whatsoever regarding concrete agreements reached during Kim Il Sung’s visit to the PR China about the further development of relations. The comparatively long period of negotiations (the delegations met altogether four times), and the fact that the Ministers for Foreign Trade and for Foreign Economic Relations stayed behind in Beijing while the DPRK delegation traveled to Nanjing, might invite the conclusion that issues of bilateral, in particular economic relations, played no subordinate role during negotiations.

For instance, according to rumors, the DPRK asked for Chinese support in planning and construction. So far we and other fraternal socialist embassies were unable to receive further information from the DPRK Embassy.

7. Concluding Remarks

- The visit by the high-ranking DPRK party and government delegation headed by Kim Il Sung to the PR China evidently holds important relevance for future relations between both parties and states. In particular the extraordinary praise for Kim Il Sung personally is supposed to bear favorable results for Chinese-Korean relations. It also is noteworthy here that Kim Il Sung visited the PR China before the other visits planned for the current year.

- At the time, the visit showed that different positions and unresolved problems continue to exist on matters of importance between the leaderships of PRC and DPRK. This might offer good points of contact for a targeted policy by the socialist community of states towards the DPRK.

[Signature]
Wittik
Ambassador
Appendix 1

Statements on various issues during the Kim Il Sung visit to the PR China

1. **Statements by the Chinese side, respectively from the communiqué, on the international situation and policy:**

   - Welcome editorial in “Renmin Ribao”:
     
     “True to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the Korean Workers Party, the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the Korean people fight decisively against imperialism and the modern revisionism. They support with determination the just struggle of the peoples from all countries, especially the struggle by the peoples of the countries in the Third World to gain national liberation, respectively national independence and state sovereignty.”

   - Speech by Deng Xiaoping on 19 April, 1975, during the banquet:
     
     “The current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven. All the basic contradictions in the world are growing. Factors leading towards revolution as well as to war are on the rise. The struggle of the superpowers for world domination becomes fiercer than ever. The fight is not just over continents but also over oceans. The further they stretch out their hands, and the more territories fall under their hegemony, the heavier their burden and the greater resistance they encounter by the peoples of all countries […]. Lenin is teaching us: ‘World domination’ is the content of imperialist policy, and its sequel is the imperialist war.’ As long as imperialism does exist in the world, its social system will generate war. This is independent from the will of the people. What we are seeing right now is by no means a so-called irreversible process of detente but the increasing danger of a new world war. The superpowers are talking about ‘detente’ and ‘peace’, but in reality they prepare for a war with all they have. We must not relax in our vigilance. Neither a nuclear war nor a conventional war can save imperialism and hegemonism from its demise. Instead they will create a new upsurge of revolutionary struggles by the peoples of the world”.

   - Speech by Peng Chong (Chair of the Party Committee of Jiangsu Province) on 22 April:
     
     “Comrade Peng Chong praised the heroic Korean people. Under the wise leadership of President Kim Il Sung and the KWP, it consequently preserves the course of Marxism-Leninism, holds high the three great banners (ideology, technology, culture), achieves great successes in the revolution and socialist construction. It makes a great contribution towards the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism, as well as to the just struggles of the peoples.”

   - Speech by Deng Xiaoping at the concluding banquet:
     
     … no direct references …

   - Xinhua News Agency Correspondence in “Renmin Ribao” on 27 April on the Visit of Kim Il Sung:
     
     “The KWP, the government of the DPRK, and the Korean people led by President Kim Il Sung have steadfastly stood with proletarian internationalism. They have fought against imperialism and modern revisionism and made a great contribution to the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed peoples all over the world.”

   - The “Joint Communiqué” of 28 April states:
     
     “Both sides agree in their opinion that the current international situation is developing even further towards the advantage of the world’s revolutionary peoples and to the disadvantage of imperialism and the old and new colonialism. The old economic order built in colonialist and imperialist foundations is currently confronted with heavy
destruction and blows on a daily basis. World capitalism is sliding towards an economic crisis which aggravates daily. Contradictions within imperialism escalate ever further [GDR Embassy insert: "English translation: between imperialisms"]. Wherever in the world imperialism does exist, the social order serves as fertile ground for war. Currently imperialism uses the cover of "peace" to move on with aggression and bellicose actions. The danger of a new world war is increasing. Peoples of all countries must raise their vigilance and make preparations accordingly. If imperialism will dare to launch a new war, the demise of imperialism will inevitably accelerate and bring about new victories for the world revolution. Both sides express their conviction that perspectives for the world are bright and clear, no matter whether a war creates the revolution or the revolution stems the war."

2. **On the Role of the “Third World”**:  
   – Speech by Deng Xiaoping on 19 April:  
     “The revolutionary struggles by the peoples of all countries move ahead victoriously in the midst of all upheaval. Now everybody can see that the international situation has massively changed in favor of the peoples of all countries. The Third World, the main force in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism is rising.”
   
   – Speech by Kim Il Sung on 19 April:  
     “Our epoch is characterized by a permanent struggle between the old forces and the newly emerging forces. It is a new historical era where the general crises of imperialism aggravate and the peoples of the socialist countries and the Third World appear in the international arena as the masters.  
Since the economic crises in the capitalist world worsen, and the political crises and social contradictions there escalate, the imperialists look for a way out and seek refuge in a policy of war, threats, and blackmail. However, on the other side the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples from the socialist countries and the Third World and the international working class become ever more powerful on a global level. […]  
Due to the joint experiences in situations past and the identity of their current struggle, the Korean people stand firmly on the side of the peoples from the Third World at the same front. It fights with them in close coordination. […]  
The Third World, created through struggle, is a powerful anti-imperialist revolutionary force of our time. It is a great force that presses ahead the history of humankind. […]  

   – “Joint Communiqué”:  
     “Both sides forcefully state: The awareness and strength of a great number of states from the Third World is an outstanding characteristic of the current excellent international situation. For a long time, the countries of the Third World were subject to colonialist and imperialist repression and exploitation. They more than ever increase their solidarity in the struggle for the gain and preservation of national independence, for the defense of state sovereignty, and for the development of their national economy and the protection of national resources. They constitute a strong and vital fighting force and play an ever growing role in international affairs. Peoples of the vast mass of Third World countries have already become a mighty force for the progress of mankind's history and a powerful anti-imperialist revolutionary force.”

3. **On Korean Reunification**  
   – Speech by Deng Xiaoping on 19 April:  
     “Under the leadership of the Korean Workers Party the Korean people conduct an indefatigable struggle to turn into reality their noble strive towards reunification of the fatherland. The government of the DPRK repeatedly made correct and reasonable proposals for the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. In particular the three principles for the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland and the Five-Point-Proposal for the prevention of national division and the reunification of the fatherland, both of them proposed by President Kim Il Sung, fully represent Korea's national interests. They were met with the determined backing by the entire Korean people and great international support.”
   
   – Speech Kim Il Sung's on 19 April:  
     “The current struggle of our people for the reunification of their divided fatherland is an important link in the chain of the global anti-imperialist national liberation struggle. […]"
If revolution breaks out in South Korea we, being members of the same nation, will not stand by idle keeping our arms folded, but we will energetically support the South Korean population.

If the enemy recklessly launches a war, we will decisively respond with war and destroy the aggressors completely. In this struggle we will only lose the military demarcation line but gain the reunification of the fatherland. Peace or war in today’s Korea ultimately depends on the position of the United States. It is them who hold the power in South Korea in their hands and view themselves as the masters of the country. […]

If the U.S. forces withdraw from South Korea and a democratic individual with national conscience comes to power – as the South Korean population so desires –, we will have a firm guarantee for a permanent peace in Korea and can successfully resolve the question of Korean reunification in a peaceful manner and among us Koreans. […]

– Speeches at the concluding banquet on 25 April:

   Only brief general statements

– “Joint Communiqué”

   The Chinese side unilaterally states its positions in similar fashion as done in Deng Xiaoping’s speech of 19 April.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Chung II-Kwon, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea
Hahm Pyong-choon, ROK Ambassador to U.S.
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:
Thursday - May 8, 1975
10:45 a.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

The President: I understand you have been meeting with a number of Congressmen on the Hill.

Chung: Six.

Hahm: You had four Prime Ministers here yesterday.

President: Three yesterday and one today.

Chung: I met with President Park before my departure. He asked me to convey his special wishes to you.

The President: Please give him my best. I appreciated his welcome and that of the Korean people when I visited last November. I appreciated it and the opportunity to discuss with him privately about our special relationship.
Chung: We appreciate your reaffirmation of the ties with Korea.

The President: I wanted it said publicly as well as privately. We intend to maintain close ties and live up to our obligations. We have no intention of changing our commitment to your strength and I hope we can proceed as soon as possible in helping your modernization. Congress isn't always cooperative, but we will do our best within those restraints.

Chung: It raises the morale of the Korean people, as did your visit. I will transfer your message to President Park and the Korean people.

President: I hope President Park is well.

Chung: He is. Frankly, we hope you stay as President forever.

The President: That is not quite possible. But my Administration feels strongly about maintaining a strong presence in Asia, and a vital part of that is our association with Korea.

Hahn: Even the opposition leaders are giving the message that we don't want the American troops withdrawn.

The President: We have a problem with Congress. I hope you have been able to convey a unified message.

Hahn: We have unity on the security issue. They said to leave the domestic issues to us. That is our problem.

Chung: Please convey my regards to Mrs. Ford.

[The conversation ended.]
Memorandum of Conversation, Huang Zhen [Huang Chen] and Henry A. Kissinger (abridged)

Date: 9 May 1975
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Gregg Brazinsky.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPATIONS
Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Yang Yu-yung, Notetaker

Secretary Kissinger: [...] With respect to Korea, I want to make clear that under no circumstances will we tolerate a military attack on Korea, and a military attack on Korea will involve the certainty of American involvement. We will support peaceful evolution on the Korean Peninsula. We are prepared to discuss measures which would bring about the dissolution of the United Nations Command. And we will work to create conditions for coexistence on the Peninsula. But we are not prepared to accept another attack on the American presence.

[...]

Ambassador Huang: [...] As for the Korean question, our consistent position all along we have consistently and resolutely supported the Korean people in their struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of their country, for termination of the United Nations Command, and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not asking you to change that position, but military action on the Peninsula would have grave consequences.

Ambassador Huang: And our position is consistent. As far as we know, the South Korean side, the Pak Chung-hee clique, has made provocations against the North, made attacks against
them. And Chairman Kim Il-song has repeatedly stated his intention to carry on the struggle for
the independent and peaceful unification of Korea.

Secretary Kissinger: Just so he doesn’t define ‘peaceful’ too generously. We will not permit
South Korean attacks against the North.

Ambassador Huang: And Chairman Kim Il-song has repeatedly stated his position on the
independent and peaceful reunification of his country. We wouldn’t necessarily accept your
definition of peace. Kim Il-song’s proposals were warmly received by all the people in Korea,
and the Pak Chung-hee clique has disrupted them. The fact that the South Korean side has
repeatedly made provocations and attacks is inseparable from their consideration that they have
the support of the U.S. side.

Secretary Kissinger: We will do our utmost to prevent that [any actions by the South against the
North]; but when war starts on the Korean Peninsula, it will be clear which side of the line the
troops are, and when that is known, we will take action accordingly.

But we will take seriously what you have said.

Ambassador Huang [somewhat agitatedly]: I did not intend to come over here to have a
conversation on Korea, but as you raised it, I intended to clarify our position.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand. We should understand your position. We are not objecting to
your government’s position in general; we are not asking you to change it.

Miss. Shen: Ambassador Huang just said to me that we are not in a position to discuss these
questions on behalf of the Koreans.

[... ]
As it is known, in the resolution adopted last year concerning the Korean matter, at the initiative of Western countries, the General Assembly expressed the hope that the Security Council, in consultation with directly concerned parties, will formulate those aspects related to its mandate, the dissolution of the UN headquarters [in Korea] included, all within the framework of adequate arrangements meant to preserve the armistice in Korea.

From an occasional conversation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ambassador to the UN, transpires that he had contacts with the American side, with the purpose of turning the above recommendation into reality.

From those mentioned by the Korean ambassador, we conclude that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is considering the possibility of reaching an understanding with the US concerning the dismantling of UN headquarters in Korea, and in so doing, of by-passing a discussion in the UN Security Council. It is possible that the US, as a result of an implied understanding, will take measures towards de facto dissolving the UN headquarters.

In such circumstances, the General Assembly or the Security Council shall solely take note of the UN headquarters [in Korea] dismantling, similar to 1973, when the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was dissolved.

Signed: Ion Datcu
**Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 059.156**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Source:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1975</td>
<td>Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Matter 220 - Relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1975. Obtained by Izador Urian and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TELEGRAM**

Sender: Pyongyang  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET  
Date: 10.05.1975/04:00  
No.: 059.156  
To: Comrade Constantin Oancea

Deputy Foreign Minister, Jeon Myeongsu individually briefed the Romanian Ambassador and the other heads of diplomatic missions from socialist countries regarding the results of the visit made by the North Korean delegation led by President Kim Il Sung to the People’s Republic of China.

Focused mainly on the elements mentioned in the joint communiqué published after the visit, the briefing revealed the following ideas which were more noteworthy:

- The North Korean delegation was received with unusual grandeur and cordiality, exceeding the customs of Chinese protocol.

- The two parties hold identical positions on the achievement of the peaceful and independent unification of Korea, based on the three principles of the July 1972 declaration.

- The two parties agreed that the evolution of the situation in Indochina positively affects the prospects of the Korean [matter] and of unification.

- The two parties decided to perfect their economic cooperation and trade, to increase the volume of exchanged, which are required given the extraordinary tasks involved in fulfilling [the quotas] for the 6-year plan ahead of the deadline and in fulfilling the objectives of the future plan.

- The assurance granted by the Chinese that the People’s Republic of China would continue to undertake efforts for the international isolation of the regime in Seoul, rejecting all the attempts of the latter to establish contacts.

Our attention was caught by the idea that the identity of perspectives held by the two sides on fundamental issues for the region will have a strong impact on the prospects of the situation on the Korean peninsula, a fact which, when corroborated with other hints, reveals that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China decided to adopt a firm, yet peaceful line, on the Korean matter, until they manage to compel the United States to completely withdraw their troops from South Korea and to remove Park Chung Hee from power.

Signed: Dumitru Popa
Note concerning a conversation between
Ambassador Comrade Everhartz with the Head of Department II in the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Comrade Choe Sang-muk, on 7 May, 1975, about the Visit by Comrade Kim Il Sung to the PR China

The meeting was arranged upon the initiative of the DPRK Foreign Ministry.

Comrade Choe Sang-muk explained that the visit took place between 18 and 26 April in the PR China. The last visit by Comrade Kim Il Sung to the PRC was said to have taken place more than 10 years ago.

The DPRK mostly attributed a protocol character to the visit, while its great importance lies in demonstrating, in certain situations, to the capitalist world how relations between DPRK and PRC are moving along well. Since the newspapers have reported extensively about Comrade Kim Il Sung's journey and its results, he [Choe] just wanted to provide additional information on some issues which go somewhat beyond the general public coverage.

At both meetings with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, an exchange of opinions was held about current political problems. The center of the talks was on the situation in Asia, in particular the newly emerging situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam and its impact on developments in South Korea. With other officials from the PRC, the same issues were discussed, in addition to the development of socialist construction in the respective countries as well as issues of Korean unification and Taiwan's alignment with China.

With regard to the situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam, there was mutual agreement to continue the assistance to those peoples.

Comrade Choe Sang-muk stated that Comrade Kim Il Sung alerted the Chinese side to attempts by the U.S. imperialists to continue their occupation of South Korea and to cement the existence of two Koreas in collaboration with Park Chung-hee. The Chinese side commented that it continues to recognize as correct the three principles for the reunification of the country from 1972, as well as the Five-Point-Proposal of Comrade Kim Il Sung. The Chinese stated those should serve as the basis for the unification of the country. The Chinese side condemned the attempts by U.S. imperialism to fabricate two Koreas as well as Park Chung-hee's terror against the South Korean population. The PRC is convinced that such a policy will suffer defeat.

The Chinese side wants to launch further efforts and initiatives to remove the U.N. mandate from the U.S. forces and achieve their withdrawal from South Korea. China will continue to fully support the DPRK's peace offensive for the unification of the country.

In the context of Park Chung-hee's attempts to establish contacts with socialist countries, the Chinese side stated it will not establish relations with this regime and is going to continue to fight for the isolation of the Park Chung-hee clique.

When analyzing the situation of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Kim Il Sung emphasized the need for increased cooperation with the states of the "Third World" in order to achieve larger support for the DPRK on issues concerning reunification of the country. The Chinese side stated its willingness to collaborate with the DPRK on this matter in the context of the "Third World".

Both sides conducted negotiations about the expansion of economic relations. It was agreed to realize the mutual exchange of products for 1975 in full and in compliance with trade agreements signed.

Given the fact that the DPRK's Six-Year-Plan will be fulfilled one year earlier than scheduled, there was an agreement to have negotiations on short notice about future cooperation in the context of scientific-technological collaboration and trade. There is the intention to extend economic relations in a systematic manner.

Following up on this information I asked the following questions:
Were issues discussed concerning unity of the communist world movement? If so, which point of view was taken by the Chinese side?

**Answer:**
As the visit was conducted by a DPRK party and government delegation respective positions were discussed on this issue as well. The KWP has come up with its own position on the unity of the communist world movement and in particular regarding the socialist states. The leading comrades of the SED and the GDR government are aware of this position, which has not changed.

Comrade Kim Il Sung reiterated this position also in his first speech. A joint communiqué cannot reflect everything that had been said. Yet the DPRK position on this issue is not identical with the Chinese position. He asked for my understanding not to elaborate further on these questions.

How does the Chinese side explain its growing relations with the most reactionary representatives of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany, aka West Germany] monopolistic capitalists, and the shift of PRC policy towards positions directed against the GDR and other fraternal countries?

**Answer:**
There was no discussion about problems of Europe and the FRG. In its negotiations the DPRK side was mostly guided by commonalities. Questions where differences of opinions exist were deliberately not placed in the center of talks. Consequently, discussions focused mainly on the situation in Indochina and on problems of the "Third World".

Comrade Kim Il Sung mentioned that in case of a war the DPRK would have only lose a line of demarcation but would gain instead an united Korea. How did the Chinese side comment on that?

**Answer:**
Comrade Kim Il Sung mostly talked about the situation in the country. He analyzed and explained how the Korean revolution is part of the world revolution. The most important question for the DPRK is the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. The DPRK is mainly concerned about international solidarity to strengthen its political course.

The Chinese side supported the three principles and the Five-Point-Proposal of Comrade Kim Il Sung, which simultaneously serves as the DPRK peace program for the solution of the Korea question.

In speeches and documents both sides talked about the "Third World," but what is the Chinese position on the First and Second World in comparison to the DPRK position?

**Answer:**
The DPRK holds the opinion that the peace offensive also simultaneously means class struggle. If Park Chung-hee will launch a war, the Korean comrades expect respective support from their class brothers. The latter are primarily defined as the socialist countries and the progressive people of the world.

Most important here are facts such as that the DPRK has a military assistance treaty with both the Soviet Union and the PR China. The DPRK is convinced that in case of war China will assist the DPRK the same way it did during the Patriotic Liberation War between 1950 and 1953.

In his speech Deng Xiaoping stated the PR China will fight shoulder to shoulder with the DPRK for the reunification of the country.

What is the status of economic relations between DPRK and PR China? What volume is expected for those relations in upcoming future periods?

**Answer:**
Regarding economic relations it was reiterated that the trade agreements for 1975 will be mutually fulfilled. This way the [DPRK foreign ministry] conversation partner admitted there had been problems in this regard in the past. He claimed to be unable to provide exact figures about trade volumes of the current year and future plans.

Does information exist about travel intentions of Comrade Kim Il Sung for this year?

**Answer:**
It was confirmed that another journey is planned for this year. However, he does not know exactly which countries will be included and when the visits are going to take place.

The meeting was open and friendly.

It was evident that the partner was under instructions not to provide more detailed information.
[Signed]
Everhartz
Ambassador

CC:
Comrade Mahlow – Central Committee/ Department IV
Comrade Moldt – Foreign Ministry
Comrade Liebermann – Foreign Ministry, Far East Department
Foreign Ministry/ Central Information
Embassy
With respect to the prospects for the reunification of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ambassador, Gwon Higyeong underlined in a conversation on May 19 [1975] the obstacles generated by the presence of American troops in South Korea, by the commitments made by the United States towards Park Chung Hee's clique. In these conditions, our interlocutor said, during 1975, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would focus its efforts and would carry out an active fight at the United Nations and in other international organizations, as well as in its bilateral relations strategy, to compel the United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea.

Ambassador Gwon Higyeong said that in order to promote and achieve the reunification of the homeland, the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea envisages three options:

a. The peaceful path. This approach has been constantly promoted, starting from the well-known proposals of the North Korean government. But as long as Park Chung Hee, the adversary of reunification, remains at the helm of power in South Korea, the will of the people will not be fulfilled. The peaceful path can succeed only if a democratic government assumes power in Seoul.

b. The military path. Taking into account the frequent clashes between the armed forces of South Korea, supported by the United States, and the armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, together with the fact that the two sides signed only an armistice, it may be at any given moment that an armed conflict breaks out, which would then be blamed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The [North Korean] ambassador pointed out that there are huge concentrations of troops and weapons on both sides of the DMZ. Fire exchanges often take place between the two parties. When fired upon with automatic weapons, North Korean militaries fire back with automatic weapons. The same applies to other types of weapons. On the contrary, the South Korean side replies to fire from the North as follows: with automatic weapons to machine guns; with mine launchers to machine guns; with artillery to mine launchers.

In case war breaks out between the two sides, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is ready to achieve the unification of the homeland with these [military] means too, but it will not be the one to start the war. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea believes the US do not want a war either, after the 'experience' they gained in Vietnam.

c. The revolutionary path. As revolutionary spirit intensifies in South Korea, that could lead to sparking a revolt or to the organization of large-scale revolutionary activities, which would culminate with a democratic government assuming power. Such a democratic government could ask for help from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reunite the North with the South. In such a scenario, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would react positively. In such a scenario, according to Ambassador Gwon Higyeong the liberation process and then the reunification of the country would happen much faster than in Vietnam.

The North Korean Ambassador said that the leadership of his country assigned three tasks, closely related to these three options:

a. The forceful and rapid development of the construction of socialism in the Northern part of Korea.

b. The support and promotion of the revolutionary and democratic movement in South Korea.
c. The reinforcement of militant solidarity with all revolutionary forces in the world, with all democratic, friendly countries, so that in any of the three scenarios outlined above, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea enjoys their support for the reunification of the country.

Signed: Gheorghe Badrus
Minutes of Conversation between Nicoale Ceauşescu and Kim Il Sung

Date: 23 May 1975


Minutes of Conversation taken on the occasion of the Romanian – Korean discussions from May 23, 1975.

Participants:
- Representing Romania: Comrades Nicoale Ceauşescu, Manea Mănescu, Emil Bobu, Ștefan Voitec, Ion Pățan, Ștefan Andrei, George Macovescu, Ion Coman, Dumitru Popa.

Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu:

At the beginning of our discussions, I would like to offer once again a warm welcome to Comrade Kim Il Sung and to our other Korean guests. We are glad you were able to make this visit, which will doubtless mark an important moment in the relations between our countries’ respective parties.

Kim Il Sung:

Thank you. In my turn, I would like to sincerely thank you, Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu, as well as the Central Committee, [and] the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, for the kind invitation to visit your country.

As you yourself Comrade Ceauşescu underlined, the visit to your country marks a new opportunity to strengthen the relationship between the parties, governments and people of our countries.

I would like to express, yet again, my thorough satisfaction with the warm welcome we received yesterday. As I have previously underlined, this welcome testifies to the special friendship that the Romanian people have with our people, and I would like to stress that we are extremely touched by this [gesture].

Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu:

As far as our discussions go, I believe we should agree to discuss any issue we consider necessary and we should start with bilateral relations and then international issues. And, keeping in mind that you are guests – as a sign of respect towards our guests, we always give them the word first.

Kim Il Sung:

Thank you. I will start.

To my knowledge, relations between our parties, between our states are developing normally and well.

I would like to present you with my sincere gratitude and, at the same time, express our satisfaction for the multifaceted and total support, which, you, Comrade Ceauşescu are granting in support of our cause.

Nothing in particular is stalling in our relations, I believe. The friendship, solidarity and unity between us is developing normally and, above all, we have the duty to make greater efforts to allow it to further develop. Just as we do now, in the future we shall need your support in accomplishing our most pressing issues.

In particular after your visit, Comrade Ceauşescu, changes of policy and of our party position took place in our country. We continue developing the socialist edifice in the Northern part of our country – in the DPRK. Our first task is to consolidate our socialist order and to strengthen our revolutionary, economic and military basis. This is our number one priority.

Secondly, we are making efforts to actively support the democratization of South Korea, to strengthen the new establishment and eliminating the old, Fascist establishment in this region, to further new progressive forces with the purpose of bringing to fruition our wish – the unification of the homeland. This has been our party stance in the past, has been repeated during plenums and during all our party meetings, and
this shall be also in the future the course of development of our activities, as we consider it to be the most rational.

As far as the first point is concerned, developing the socialist edifice, there were no particular developments in our country since your last visit, Comrade Ceaușescu. What is new is the progress which has accumulated over the past 30 years since liberation.

What I can underline as new, is a cadres policy stance, more particularly this is about the party cadres in the government, from the administrative sector, generally cadres with a long history of communist service. These are cadres who took part in the liberation, in the first democratic reforms such as the agrarian one, but who could not keep up with the daring development and the rhythm required. For this purpose we have established the activity of the Three Revolutions Movement, to assist the cadres in the new [sic., sentence ends here; we can safely assume the meaning is 'the new effort/rhythm']. The cadres do not have great experience, but are devoted to the party. From a practical point of view, they were left a little behind. For this reason, we were not able to continue with our development, with the technical-scientific revolution. To assist them, we are concurrently developing an intensive activity of education and support. However, the drawback is that these cadres are of an old age and, with all efforts to support them, the results do not always meet our expectations.

As far as the Three Revolutions Movement is concerned, it is made up of very well-prepared party cadres from the administrative sector, teachers, technicians, and students in their last year or graduates, who are divided into brigades which act along the lines of the three revolutions: the ideological, the technical-scientific and the cultural ones, throughout factories – all factories, throughout institutes and agricultural and production cooperatives. This activity has been taking place over the last approximately three years and the results have not been slow to appear. This is the fight with the older remains of the cadres, the fight to eliminate older, retrograde, conservative ideas, and against routine, against practicality [sic].

New initiatives, new movements began as a result of the activities conducted by these groups. This occurred especially in the mining industry and in agriculture. The results obtained in the mining industry are particularly notable since these sectors needed increased support as the work is very difficult. The progress made by those who worked was visible. The Three Revolutions Brigades supported innovation in these sectors. They managed to eliminate the bureaucratic activity which party committees were performing in the factories. The Three Revolutions Brigades have two characteristics and manners of work. First of all, there is mutual help between them and the party committees but also with the Central Committee whose indications they transmit further down the rank. We have acted in this manner in agriculture for about four years. Since 1973 we have noticed good results, which means that the work has been positive. Since the members of the brigades are majorly young intellectuals, with work abilities, they can contribute to the improvement of the activity. Positive results were obtained in the area of industry. Besides our own inventions and innovations, we have managed to import necessary products from other countries. I can fairly say that in general the socialist edifice is developing well. This is, in short, what I can tell you about our socialist edifice.

Concerning the unification of our country, I will not insist on it at the moment, as we will have a separate opportunity for that. A year after your visit to our country, in 1972, a common declaration of the Northern and Southern parts was made public. This however seems to have been made only with the approval of the Americans. The South cannot act without their approval. We talked to them. When these delegations were at the negotiations, I met with them. I proposed three principles:

- Reunification on based independence, without foreign involvement.
- Accomplishing the reunification peacefully, without altercation.
- Accomplishing the principle of national unity independently of the social order in each respective part, whether it be communist or capitalist, before we accomplish national unity.

It was then that they agreed and our delegations went to Seoul. Our delegates also met Park Chung Hee. They agreed to our proposals, that is to say to those of Kim Il Sung’s, entirely. They agreed to the principles and we subsequently proposed the declaration projects, but we were unable to discuss and work on the declaration project. A month later, on July 7, they came up with the idea of adopting a common declaration as a response to the many questions asked by opposition parties, by the progressive parties [which] began claiming that the U.N. army is not a foreign army. All emphasis was on the fact that the U.N. army was not a foreign army. Secondly, the issue of peaceful unification by reducing armed forces was raised - we therefore wanted to unify peacefully but they disagreed.

Was not the liquidation of anti-Communist laws necessary for bringing the populations of the North and South together? This however was not possible because Park Chung Hee declared that the number one objective of the Southern side was the anti-Communist fight. All the representatives of progressive forces asked for ending this state of affairs. He said this cannot be done, with the exception of some modifications. It remained therefore an empty paper.

Further on, after approximately a month, we met again a few times and insisted to have an explanation with them. They underlined a wish to continue the discussions, but on separate basis – on that of competition and on that of coexistence. Therefore, they came with new proposals based on the principle of competition between
the two sides, and that of coexistence. This entire policy is aimed at establishing two Koreas, therefore they don't have unification in mind. We have proposed competition and coexistence, we do not know though – perhaps it would be better to collaborate, to unify. We told them we could collaborate. We told them they need raw materials as they have very few, while we have plenty. We proposed to give them the necessary technology, if they could provide the people so that we can work together. Therefore, a collaboration; and within this collaboration we would only have gotten closer.

We also proposed to set up irrigation systems for them, as in South Korea, the smallest of rains results in floods, and when it does not rain, there is drought. We proposed to give them specialists and technology for free, but they asked 2 billion dollars from Japan, who did not give it to them. We also considered how they could pay this money. We, being part of the same nation, proposed to give it to them for free. We have pumping units, and we have good experience in irrigations in the North. We considered it was our national duty to help the peasants in the South live and work well.

There are many fishermen in South Korea. Because of great pollution in the South, there is not too much fish left there and the production has declined. In the Northern part of the country we have a few very good fish reservoirs. From the Northern part comes a cold water current, while from the Southern part comes a warm water current which meet on our side where one can still fish very well. We suggested their fishermen should come to our side to fish. Of course, they do not fish on industrial level, therefore they cannot make any damage.

The representatives of Park Chung Hee, the personal counselors of [Jang Jee Rang and Lee Hu Rak] came over, and during discussions they regarded our proposals as being very good, and they did not involve disputes, but rather rapprochement. We proposed to reduce the armed forces as the costs involved are very high. We told them that even if they get free assistance from the American side, it is still difficult. The proposals for reducing armed forces were accepted. They said that their life depends on not reducing the military forces. We explained that whether their life depends on it or not is to be decided by their own people. We told them they do not need to support a 700,000 people army for oppressing the population in the South, and for this purpose we have proposed to make reductions, but they disagreed.

We proposed to begin to cooperate. We said that for greater things we have to begin from a rational collaboration: you will not criticize communism and we will not criticize you. In this manner we can achieve rapprochement. They received the proposal and showed interest, but without results. They agreed with one proposal: to use the Diamond Mountain – the Southern and Northern parts – for developing a common tourism base.

This is the way in which discussions took place. What Park Chung Hee is really after, and this is something the Americans are also after: Park Chung Hee, just as the Americans, is making a few calculations: in South Korea there exists a democratic, progressive side; there is then the North; and there is the rightist movement led by Park Chung Hee. Within a unified government, he thinks that he will lose by a 2-to-1 margin because the democratic and progressive side will take the part of the North and he will be left with the minority. This is why he has begun a brutal campaign of interrupting the dialogue with the North, by adopting a variety of measures. It is well-known that the representative of the New Democratic Party has fled to Japan as a result of Park Chung Hee's adoption of measures against progressive forces. Last year, he was abducted and brought to Seoul, and now he is under house arrest. This is the element which could have constituted that plus of 2-to-1 in the alliance with the North by realizing a government for peaceful unification.

In South Korea, academic and education activities are interrupted and are in a state of complete vacation. As a result of the new repressive measures against the masses and the democratic movements, not only were 200 important and progressive leaders apprehended, but also thousands of students and young people. Amongst them there were mostly intellectuals, writers and journalists.

This is the stage at which we are with this problem. As a result of our visit to the People's Republic of China, they were terribly scared that we may start a war. They say the same things will happen as in Cambodia and South Vietnam. At the moment they are alert and mobilized. They don't know what to believe – could it be that the Americans have given them any indications? There are multiple versions indicating that as a result of their failure in Cambodia, the Americans will not give up Korea since it is a place of great strategic importance for them. We are, however, working as we have always worked: we are generally mobilized, but for replanting rice. Park Chung Hee has only that kind of ideas.

I would like to dwell in a few words on the third point of our discussion, that of the collaboration with the outside world. I will not focus on the relations we have with the other communist countries, as you, Comrade Ceauşescu, know very well just how good these relations are and you are in a good position to assess our standing.

Our basic idea is unique: that of strengthening and consolidating the relations with socialist countries, the same way we did in the past. This line was and will remain in our focus.

We give a lot of attention to the rapprochement and consolidation of relations with Third World countries. We receive efficient support from Comrade Tito and Boumediene as well as from other chiefs of state in this respect. This activity has as particular aim, besides the unity with the fore-mentioned peoples, to obtain support for our cause of unifying the country based on the three principles we have initiated, as well as on the five points that guide our policy. We are tirelessly working towards participating next year in the meeting of the non-aligned countries. We were recently accepted as part of the group at the meeting that took place in Cuba. We feared that
India, Indonesia, and Malaysia would raise objections but, due to insistent activity, we have obtained also the promise of these countries. There is the possibility that even in Latin America there will be some against us, but we believe that the great majority will be in our favor. We have the main advantage that we have normalized relations with a number of countries with which we did not have diplomatic relations.

In what the socialist countries are concerned, we have not encountered objections regarding our participation at the conference next year. The Soviets have expressed – not within the central Committee – at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs some opinions, but officially they did not object to our actions. There is no other purpose to our accession to the Third World but that of strengthening the unity and friendly relations with that group of countries, and of obtaining allies for our policy of peaceful unification of the homeland, of chasing the Americans away from South Korea and of eliminating Park Chung Hee.

Another important activity that we are focusing on is that of unmasking the Americans acting under U.N. helmets. Whether they leave South Korea or not, that is another problem, but they should not be there under the U.N. helmet. Under this guise, the Americans can also bring Japanese troops - it is very easy to bring them to South Korea in the name of the U.N. army. This will not be difficult due to the fact that the Americans are in South Korea as a result of bilateral agreements, of mutual understandings between the two sides. The important thing is that they are not stationed there under the U.N. helmet. There are also a lot of South Koreans – some understand, some do not, what it means to take the American troops from under the U.N. helmet.[sic.]

This is the context of our international activity.

As far as the activity, contracts, and our opinions on the discussions with the Americans for resolving our problem are concerned, I would like to speak privately with Comrade Ceauşescu.

In general and brief terms, this would be the situation and activity we are engaging in at the moment. I will of course insist on some issues during our separate discussions.

As far as our bilateral, and most importantly, our economic relations, I have nothing more to emphasize except my wish that we will accomplish what we set out to do initially. I would like to ask you that in the future you receive more of our specialists to learn from you. I do realize there are difficulties, but I would ask you to accept more trainees.

I also had the pleasure to remind you of the special efforts you have made, Comrade Ceauşescu, together with the medical group, to save a man who seemed almost lost – I am speaking of Prime Minister Kim Il. We are profoundly impressed with and happy about his recovery. Our entire people as well as all party members shall never forget the assistance you gave him. Comrade Kim Il repeatedly says, jokingly, that had it not been for the Romanian comrades, he would since long ago been an angel and risen to the heavens. For this reason, I insist that our specialists should come here and improve their medical, technical-scientific and other levels at which they have yet to learn.

As far as relations along party lines are concerned, there is nothing in particular that I wish to address. I consider these relations to be as profound and rational as possible.

With your permission, I will conclude my address here.

If Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu or others wish to ask questions concerning one issue or another, I am at your disposal for answering.

Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu:

I would like to thank Comrade Kim Il Sung for the exposé he gave us. I believe there are no questions for now. We will surely have time to discuss other problems.

Kim Il Sung:

Very well.

Comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu:

I would also like to make reference to some problems regarding the situation in Romania.

In fact, almost a five-year plan elapsed since our last meeting. We were, then, in the first year of the cycle and now we are in our last. I have to say that this particular cycle is going according to plan. We foresee that we will complete it a few months in advance, while in some counties, the capital included, we will complete it in four years and a half.

In the meantime, at the end of last year, we held the 9th Congress, which elaborated the Party's Program as well as the Economic and Social Development Directives until 1980, and, in perspective, those until 1990. We actually plan to get closer to the developed countries in the next 10 to 15 years. This involves achieving a rather serious growth in industrial and agricultural volume, and based on these, reaching a national income of about $2,500 per capita. At the end of the current five-year cycle, by 1975, we will probably have a national income of
about $2,000 per capita. We are taking into account the continuous development of the industry and, in general, of the entire economy at a fast pace. During this cycle, the average industrial growth rate is of about 14% per year; during the next cycle we will reach a growth rate of about 10%. We are allocating about 33% of the national income (in the last years as much as 34%) added, towards development. It is one of the highest growth rates internationally. It is precisely on this basis that we hope to accomplish the projected development.

We put stronger emphasis on developing the most modern branches of industry – technology and most especially equipment, electronics, complex machineries – which would cover not only national demand, but be also suitable for export.

In order to reach these objectives, we stepped up scientific research as well as the education system, including the training of highly qualified personnel. About 100,000 people are working in research. As far as higher education is concerned, we are, in effect, preparing all the people we need, and we are admitting 5,000 additional foreign students.

I can, therefore, say that as far as the industry in concerned – certainly, with some shortcomings and difficulties we are currently addressing – things are generally going well.

As far as agriculture is concerned, though we registered an increase in production at an average level of 5% per year, we are not entirely satisfied with the results during this last five-year cycle. We have yet to create the practical conditions for ensuring a good crop regardless of weather conditions. We have launched an irrigation program and several land exploitation improvements. By the end of this year we will have irrigated approximately 1.8 million-2 million hectares. We want to reach 3 million hectares by 1980 and 5-6 million by 1990, which represents practically the entire surface that can be irrigated. This requires great efforts, but we are determined to do this to ensure a radical solution for the state of our agriculture. At the same time, we will solve the issues of complete mechanization in all sectors during the current cycle until 1980, and will reach the quota of over 250 kg active fertilizer substance per hectare. This will be the basis of sustainable crops. Generally, we can ensure our own internal consumption and we even export some products, but we wish for agriculture to contribute more to the general development of our society.

Concerning the increase in living standards, during this cycle we planned an increase by 20% and will reach approximately 25%, a larger increase, therefore, than what we originally planned.

Concerning international economic relations, almost 50% of our economic exchanges are with socialist countries, the rest with developing countries and with developed capitalist countries.

Concerning socialist countries, exchanges with them are based on an annually adjusted balance of trade. In 1974, however, we reached almost a $200 million positive balance of trade for Romania.

Regarding loans, we have no debts besides those of about $200 million made with the People’s Republic of China in 1969, during the draught. We did have some debts with the Soviet Union for the SovRom enterprises and for armament, which we were due by 1980 but which we paid in full by 1974. We do, however, have taken some credit in capitalist countries, but we have also granted credit in value of several hundred million dollars to developing countries. In the future, we wish to pay in full the credits made in capitalist countries and create an external activity fund so that we will never have to get credits in the future. This is, therefore, the present economic situation of Romania.

As far as the party is concerned, we held the Congress; we have 2.5 million party members. Generally, the political atmosphere in the country is good.

Concerning the international issues, major changes have taken place in the world since the meeting in 1971. We believe, however, that all these changes are to the benefit of anti-imperialist, socialist and progressive forces.

In the meantime, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has just begun. We are now close to its conclusion. The important fact is that the workings of the Conference, which lasted for almost three years, were based on consensus, which ensured unquestionable equality among all participants, regardless of size and social system. It was certainly not easy, as some socialist states such as the Soviet Union, as well as some capitalist states such as the United States, disagreed, but eventually they had to accept this principle as the premise of the conference. We believe there are real possibilities that the Conference will conclude this year with generally positive results. We know the Conference has been criticized by certain countries, including the Chinese comrades. We believe, however, that the Conference will end with good results and will represent an important step in the direction of real collaboration – at least in Europe. We certainly do not have any illusions that this Conference will solve the complex European problems, but it will open up ways for a more genuine dialogue towards finding solutions. Certainly, we still have in Europe the two main military organizations – NATO and the Warsaw Pact; there are still foreign troops on other countries’ territories – the American troops in Europe, the military bases and nuclear equipment brought to Europe. This is why, at the Congress, we concluded that the greatest danger for a new conflict is the high concentration of armed forces in Europe. Starting from this conclusion, we believe great efforts have to be made to diminish this danger and, subsequently, to eliminate it altogether; to dismantle the military blocks and bases, and to reduce the number of national troops and of arms in general. There are actual problems in Europe according to our judgment.

We also grant special attention to the situation in the Balkans. In the meantime, things have become more complicated due to the events in Cyprus and the straining of relations between Greece and Turkey. Our
focus in this situation is towards finding solutions for the Cypriot problem through peaceful and political means; towards maintaining the Cypriot independence, as well as towards solving the issues between Greece and Turkey.

Concerning the events on other continents, according to our appreciation, great changes have taken place in this direction. I would first of all refer to Africa, where the elimination of colonial domination registered great successes and where neo-colonial relations are changing, national independence is being affirmed, and the progressive development of most African states is underway.

Great changes also took place in Latin America. In fact, all states on this continent view their relationship with the US from a different angle, including the activity reform of the Organization of American States.

As you know, great changes occurred in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. During my recent visit to the Philippines, I have taken note of their eagerness to revise their treaties with the United States and to adopt a more independent position internationally. This tendency is visible in other Asian countries, such as Thailand; that is to say, among those most devoted allies of the US 2-3 years ago.

All of this testifies to the great changes that occurred over the past years in the peoples’ way of thinking and to their wish of carrying a defense policy for their national independence and ending foreign dependence and domination. Based on these facts, we can say the current center of anti-imperialist struggle is found particularly in these areas: Africa, Latin America, and Asia. From this point of view, Europe is far behind. It is a paradox, but Europe not only lacks an increased struggle against imperialist countries and for withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories, but also supports the stationing of foreign troops and military basis on its territory. The issue of dismantling NATO is no longer even part of the agenda amongst European communist parties. Certainly, this is a complex situation that would take a lot of time to explain, but among the explanations is the fear some communist parties have of what could happen in Europe after the departure of foreign troops, especially the American ones.

This situation is, of course, encouraged by the US and the USSR. These developments are complex and changes will unfold over years to come.

As you know, the Sino-American or the Soviet-American contacts did not being until 1971. During the following years, Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China took place, and as a result the establishment of US-PRC contacts, which we considered as positive; an intensification of contacts and the visit of Nixon to the USSR and well as of Brezhnev to the United States took place; a series of agreements were reached – some known, others less so. We considered the improvement of relations between the USSR and the United States as positive. We have of course expressed our concern and told both the Soviet and the American sides that these agreements should not be made behind closed doors, to the disadvantage of other countries, and should not lead to the division of the world according to spheres of influence. The events and the change in the balance of forces at the international level make impossible such a style of solving problems behind the backs of other states and shall not be accepted by anyone. It is, however, not a secret that the US and the USSR believe that solving problems between the two of them is equivalent to solving problems at an international level. Reality has demonstrated that such logic is wrong and that their agreements are not sufficient for solving complex international issues – this is actually the main result of changes in the balance of power at an international level. This is why we are for an active participation of all peoples in solving complex international issues, as well as for a more active role of the U.N., which offers the appropriate backdrop for active participation of all states in the international arena.

The situation in the Middle East continues to be tense and real and permanent danger for new conflict is there. We have discussed extensively with all concerned Arab states, including with the Palestine Liberation Organization. We also consulted Israel and we remain convinced that a military solution is not an option in the Middle East. This is, in fact, the conclusion of the Arab states and Israel, as well. A military solution is not an option because this would entail the presence in the Middle East of other states. This is why a political solution is the only way to peace. In order for this to happen, it is certainly necessary that Israeli troops withdraw from territories occupied after the war in 1967, and the Palestinian issue be solved [by] the creation of an independent Palestinian state. This should be the way to secure peace and, consequently, guarantee the integrity of all states. All Arab states agree with this in general, including the Palestinians.

As far as Romania’s foreign relations are concerned, we definitely have good relations with all socialist states and in order to reach optimal collaboration we act in a spirit well-known to you. There are a series of differences of opinion – both within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as well as within the Warsaw Pact – but we are discussing them and we are acting in order to solve them while guaranteeing the independence and the right of each party and people to solve their own issues.

As you know, there is a lot of talk about socialist integration into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as some see in it a model of integration through supra-national organizations, through a single instrument of planning, and starting from here there appears also the need for ideological integration and territorial integration. There are also wishes for military integration. All of this stir discussion. There are a few meetings to which we are not participating because we disagree with the proposed directions.

Kim Il Sung:

Are there many who accept them?

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu:
There are many who accept with the thought that in the end nothing will come of it, but unfortunately they do not have a firm position needed to create a truly new type of relations in the Marxist-Leninist spirit.

In order to understand how this happens I shall give you an example from the military. Within the Warsaw Treaty there are war provisions regarding the common actions and decisions which need to be taken to allow for the passage of troops on the territory of different states – hypothetically. To this end, we have suggested the sealing of government agreements among states. Until now – this happened a few years ago – the Soviets and the others are refusing to seal such agreements. This is why Romania has not accepted, yet, and still does not accept, any military presence on its territory. For both maneuvers and transit, state agreements are necessary.

Therefore, a series of issues which are being discussed and will continue to be discussed as long as this mentality we disagree with continues to exist. We are, however, developing relations and will continue to do so.

We have good relations with Yugoslavia; we have good state relations with Albania; the relations with the People’s Republic of China are also good. Certainly, we disagree on some issues with the Chinese comrades, especially, as I showed before, on the issue of European security. We agreed that our different ways of judging things should not affect our collaboration. They agreed on this point – that they live further away and have a different view on things. We also have good relations with Mongolia. The same goes for Vietnam and Cuba. Therefore, even with all punctual disagreements, we have managed to develop these past years a satisfactory collaboration with practically all socialist countries. Clearly, without all the disagreements, the collaboration would work much better.

I will speak now about the relations between Romania and Korea, but I consider them to be very good.

We also pay special attention to the relations with developing countries. We collaborate well with most countries in Africa. With Guinea-Bissau we even signed a treaty. We have good relations with almost all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia. They took a decision not to accept representatives of socialist countries on their territory, but we, nevertheless, managed to develop some economic relations through the mediation of certain Arab countries, and we will see whether nationalization is possible. It seems that the new king is favorable to that.

We, also, have good relations with countries in Latin America, especially with two – Argentina and Costa Rica – we have closed treaties. We visited seven countries in the Latin America and, soon, I will visit Brazil and Mexico.

We have working relations with all Asian states, except South Korea. We cleared the situation with South Vietnam. With Thailand we initiated diplomatic relations half a year ago. With some of these countries there are even very good economic collaboration prospective. The same goes for India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. We have very good economic and political relations with Iran. Also we have good relations with Iraq.

In total, we have good relations with 125 states. We, therefore, give a lot of attention to developing countries. We actually have several thousand specialists working in these states, especially in Africa.

Additionally, we are planning to attend the Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement as observers. We have received promises from a large number of states that we will be supported in this attempt. Perhaps Romanian and Korean representatives can meet there.

We have good relations with all developed capitalist states in Europe. There are of course problems related to the Common Market, for example at the beginning of this year they decided they will adopt a joint approach to deal with some issues, which requires new strategies from our part. We have established some direct contacts with the Common Market. A year ago, we have become the subject of preferential border provisions, but we have to keep pushing. We shall see how we can address these issues as members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. An agreement was reached to initiate ties between the Council and the Common Market. Contacts have begun. We believe, however, only general issues are to be solved at the level of the Council and the Common Market, while every separate country is to solve its particular issue directly, without the Council’s mediation. Discussions are ongoing within the Council but I believe we will go in that direction. In any case, we wish to solve some issues and begin a direct dialogue with the Common Market, in order to solve some of Romania’s issues. Certainly, we hold on to the opinion that the Common Market represents a monopoly, but it is not the only one in the world. We have to solve our problems starting from these premises. This is why we have also decided to negotiate directly with the Common Market.

As far as our relations with the United States go, these are generally good. We don’t have direct problems that could affect our relations. Economic exchanges have intensified. Recently, we signed a trade agreement, which will soon be approved by the US Congress. If this agreement goes through, we shall also obtain the Most Favored Nation clause and will, therefore, be able to engage in trade under better conditions. It greatly interests us to develop relations with the US, especially for developing technologies and for importing raw materials. About 50% of our raw materials already come from the US – coke, cotton, leather and others – under relatively favorable conditions.

These are in general Romania’s relations with different groups of states around the world. We are determined to act according to the same principles in the future.
Among the international problems that concern us most, I could mention that of disarmament. The main issue aside, we also have to consider the fore-mentioned situation in Europe. Disarmament is an important issue for us if we are to secure the country’s development. The continual accumulation of new armament, the production of nuclear weapons will undoubtedly lead to additional states getting in their possession. For this reason and in order to contain this phenomenon, nuclear proliferation has to stop.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is currently underway, and Romania together with other states, has specifically expressed this point of view together with a long list of proposals regarding the proliferation prevention. We read an informative note today from Geneva which indicates that even Senator Kennedy expressed a similar opinion. Clearly, Romania’s position has again failed to be to the liking of Soviet comrades, but we have openly said we don’t believe there is any other way besides the one mentioned above. It is not admissible to force a state to buy its nuclear weapons [from somewhere else] while others [are allowed] to produce them [themselves].

Other issues that seriously concern us – and that actually concern all states - are those related to the economic crisis, energy, raw materials and economic underdevelopment. Clearly, these are very complex issues, but without clear regulations from all states, aimed at discouraging underdevelopment, there will be no solution for the economic crisis and for all the existing problems. There is a lot of discussion nowadays about the new international economic order, which would bring about an end to inequality and unfair domination and would replace these with equity and international collaboration. We support an active approach to finding a solution for these problems, while the Soviet comrades are still reserved. Clearly, they are in a different position: they have raw materials and a large territory; but generally we consider that socialist countries should be much more active than they are in finding a solution to these complex economic issues. Starting from this premise, we have joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – international organizations that play a rather important role in global economics – and we believe that we need to continue our presence and activity within these bodies.

This is the way we understand to act internationally.

As far as the relations between Romania and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are concerned, I believe they are developing with positive results and there are no obstacles to extending collaboration between our parties and states. In the last years, economic exchanges have doubled. Too my mind, however, they are still underdeveloped and we should set as [our] aim at least the threshold of 100 million rubles. Both Romania and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are developing at a fast pace and I believe we can develop a good collaboration on many issues, and on a longer term basis. Perhaps it would be better to consider a longer-term understanding, at least over the duration of a five-year cycle. We have such understandings with almost all branches of agriculture, especially in the production of rice, cotton and others. We also have experience in agriculture, which could be interesting to you and could result in a positive collaboration. The same goes in the field of scientific research, of technology, including in the area of professional training. We hope that the good relations between our parties and peoples find expression in an ample economic collaboration that could lead to the development of both countries and further the socialist and communist edifice in our respective countries. With this opportunity, we would like to reach a few agreements at least in principle, which would be finalized in the same spirit, during the next months.

This is the direction in which we want to extend the collaboration between our parties and peoples.

I thank you.

Kim Il Sung:

I sincerely thank you for this comprehensive presentation. In our next discussions, I will address some international issues.

Regarding the development of bilateral relations, especially economic ones, we have nothing against a long-term agreement. We have abilities and resources in the field of colored metals, coal, and limestone. We also have a development plan for extractive industry. I say this especially to underline some prospects for the development of these sectors, as well as for the expansion of our industry. We have also discussed and identified some issues regarding extraction. We have iron deposits with a high percentage purity, which we export to the People’s Republic of China in return for coke. With our consistent resources, we, therefore, have possibilities to develop the metal industry to the level of 10-12 million tons of iron, but this is not yet done as the deposits are not close to the earth’s surface. We will be able to reach them after the introduction of the appropriate technology and machines. Some of these latter ones come from imports, others we produce ourselves. We ask from China as much coke as we need – they are close and the transportation is cheap. Our iron is also well renowned. Though we have many exploitable resources, we have difficulties because of water infiltrations.
As far as electricity is concerned, we need it for the chemical industry and for the production of fertilizers. We have the ability to develop the energy industry up to 50 billion kilowatts, which would ensure new capabilities for the industry.

We are renowned for our colored metals industry. We can produce up to 1 million tons of such metals – lead, zinc, copper. We have closed a series of agreements with other countries in this area.

Concerning oil, we have secured part of it from the People’s Republic of China, part from the Soviet Union.

We have no major complaints about development prospects in our country.

Concerning cereals, we have to ensure 500 kilograms per capita, with a small arable surface. We have approximately 2 million hectares, 200 thousands of which are reserved for orchards and other uses. We are aiming for intensive cultivation. We have reached a high level of rice cultivation. While Japan holds the first place worldwide for rice cultivation with 4.8 tons per hectare, we have surpassed the level of 5 tons. We went as high as 5.9 tons of rice per hectare. As a result, we have not felt the recent world food crisis.

We have a few strategies in the area of fishing, where we have to secure the necessary number of ships. There are some difficulties here, as our most intense relations in the field have been with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. There are some limitations because these countries cannot secure everything we want. For this reason, we wish to develop economic relations with the other socialist countries, with developing countries and with the developed capitalist countries. To this end, we need transportation ships. This year we will build 8-10 such ships, with a capacity of 10 thousand tones. If we reach the number of 100 such ships, we will have the necessary transportation means. The distance between us is too long via railway. Often times, we can use the Soviet Union’s railways, but even they are unable to help us in all circumstances. We can only access the world by waterway from our location. We believe that in 2-3 years we will solve this problem as well. Even if we wanted to buy ships from somewhere, it is still difficult to obtain the needed amount.

Regarding our long term agreement, I consider it feasible even with the volume you suggest. The difficulty resides with what I mentioned before: the distance. This year, we are experimentally building a few large ships. We will produce them and provide them with imported engines – we realized this is something we can do. I therefore agree with this long-term agreement – we have a strong economic basis for this as well as the necessary resources.

From our side, the agreement shall be signed by the Minister for Foreign Economic Affairs.

We are interested by the technical-scientific collaboration. In our turn, we will share everything without any trace of secretiveness.

Clearly, we can also collaborate in the military field. We have no secrets here either, and until now we have had good relations in this area. We can therefore develop a good collaboration in this field as well.

We can achieve much more in terms of rapprochement by comparison with the present level of collaboration. If we only focus on buying from somewhere else, we will have many difficulties; resources are expensive and we will not obtain everything we need.

As far as our documents are concerned, we will sign a Friendship and Collaboration Treaty as well as a Common Communiqué. We shall start from the already existing relations. I believe there is no problem with those. We also got along with our Chinese comrades during our visit. You have certainly seen the Communiqué we drafted with them. All was made in the spirit of mutual understanding. We were open; we provided information for each other and made this exchange in order to understand better what and how we think. We only had admiration for their positions, and they for ours. I believe we share the same principles and in the future we shall be guided by the same actions.

Let’s now pass the responsibility to those who have to carry the discussions.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:

Yes, we have here all the comrades who can take care of the external, economic and military areas.

I believe that with this we can close the discussions.

Kim Il Sung:

Certainly.
Esteemed comrade Kim Il Sung,

Esteemed comrade Kim Song Ae,

Dear comrades and friends,

I take immense pleasure in offering you, comrade Kim Il Sung and comrade Kim Song Ae and all other Korean delegates, the most cordial greeting on behalf of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, the State Council, the government and the entire Romanian people, and to welcome you to Romania, who receives you with its warmest feelings of friendship. (lively applause)

The visit that you are paying our country these days – just like the visit I paid your beautiful homeland in the summer of 1971, marks a very important contribution to the development of the friendship, solidarity and cooperation ties between our peoples, parties and respective countries.

The Romanian people watch with profound sympathy the disciplined work which the diligent Korean people undertake, under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea, at whose helm is its eminent leader Kim Il Sung, to build the edifice of socialism, to insure progress and the flourishing of his country. (Applause) Dear friends, we salute with sincere joy the remarkable successes you are achieving in the development of the economy, science, education and culture, in the rise of the people’s standard of living, in the strengthening of the defense capacity of your country – and we would like to wish you more accomplishments in your grandiose path! (Applause)

The Romanian people, who constantly and firmly manifested their internationalist solidarity with the righteous cause of the Korean people, is offering their full support for the constructive policy promoted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, by you, comrade Kim Il Sung, for the peaceful reunification of the country - the precious ideal of the entire Korean nation. (Applause)

Your visit to Romania is taking place in a period when our entire peoples are intensely working to fulfill the decisions of the 11th Congress of our party, which adopted the Program for the creation of a multilaterally developed society and advancement of our country towards communism. Throughout your visit, you will have the opportunity to get to know directly the enthusiastic work that the Romanian peoples, tightly united around the party, are undertaking to fulfill, ahead of time, the requirements of the current five-year plan. We believe that by ensuring the success of the building of the socialist society edifice in Romania, we are not only fulfilling our supreme responsibility towards our people, but also the grand internationalist duty towards the socialist cause, the strengthening of revolutionary anti-imperialist forces across the globe. (Applause)

Esteemed comrade Kim Il Sung, in the four years that have passed since our last meeting, profound revolutionary, national and social transformations and deep transfigurations in the global balance of forces have occurred in the world. The anti-imperialist struggle of peoples against domination and oppression has intensified; the will of nations to assume control over their national wealth and resources and over their destinies is becoming increasingly assertive. Consequently, certain steps towards détente and the relaxation of tensions have been undertaken. This course is, however, only starting; reactionary forces capable of imperiling international peace and security still exist. We, therefore, believe it is the supreme duty of all peoples, of all progressive forces everywhere to unite their efforts and take firm action to abolish the old policies of inequality and oppression, to promote new democratic relations throughout the world, to renounce the use of force and use of threats when solving international issues.

While fighting for peace and international cooperation, Romania is developing its friendships, alliances and cooperation with all socialist countries, acting consistently to strengthen their unity and their cohesion, according to Marxist-Leninist and internationalist socialist principles. (Applause)

At the same time, we are expanding our cooperation with developing countries, with states that are fighting for their own economic and social emancipation; we are actively supporting national liberation movements, [and] the fight of all peoples against foreign domination, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, for freedom and independence. In the spirit of peaceful coexistence, Romania is promoting relations with all countries of the world, irrespective of their social order, starting from the belief that, in our times, the active participation in the international division of responsibilities represents an objective requirement for progress and an important factor of détente and peace. We constantly base our international relations on the principles of equality of rights, respect for independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage. We believe that the firm respect for these principles, for the right of every nation to take its own
decisions on the path to social and political development, represents the crucial condition for instituting normal rapports in international politics. We are happy to say that the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are taking firm action and are productively cooperating to implement these principles in international politics. (Applause)

Romania saluted with great satisfaction the illustrious victories of the Vietnamese and Khmer peoples in their struggle against internal reactionary forces and foreign intervention, to liberate the entire territory of their homelands. These victories are of tremendous international importance and demonstrate, yet again, that when nations are determined to defend their independence and sovereignty, no force in the world can prevent them from achieving their aspirations!

In its foreign policy, Romania is paying a lot of attention to the achievement of security and cooperation in Europe, which would allow each nation to focus its energy on its own economic and social development, shielded from any aggression or interference from the outside.

As for the Middle East, we believe we should intensify our efforts to find a political solution to the conflict, beginning with the requirement that Israel withdraw its troops from the territories it occupied during the 1967 war, that the Palestinian problem be resolved according to its legitimate interests as a nation, including through the creation of an independent Palestinian state, as well as through guaranteeing the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security of all states in the region.

We believe that a fundamental task of our times is to liquidate underdevelopment, the great gaps existing between the various levels of development between countries resulting from the practices of imperialism and colonialism. This means that a new economic and international political order must be instituted, that fair relations must be spread across the globe, to exclude all forms of inequality and to facilitate the rapid progress of all countries, especially the backward ones.

Romania is firmly in favor of general disarmament and especially nuclear disarmament, of the eradication of military bases on foreign territory, of the dismantlement of military blocs and of undertaking concrete measures to insure peace and international cooperation.

It is imperative we intensify efforts for the democratization of international relations, for the participation of all states – irrespective of their social order or size – in the resolution of all [international] problems so as to advance the freedom and independence of all nations in the world. (applause)

Starting from the lessons we learned during the Second World War, Romania is in favor of strengthening the United Nations Organization, [and] all other international bodies that can ensure the resolution of complex problems through the participation of all states and peoples in the world.

Acting on the principles of the internationalist traditions of the revolutionary workers’ movement in Romania, the party and the government of our country is developing far-reaching relations of cooperation and solidarity with all communist and workers’ parties, with other political bodies of the working class, with national liberation movements, with revolutionary, anti-imperialist, progressive and democratic forces worldwide, actively fighting for the perpetual strengthening of their unity and collaboration, towards the aim of the anti-imperialist struggle, social progress, for freedom and peace in the world. (Applause)

Esteemed comrade Kim Il Sung,

I would like to express our wish to perpetually develop the cooperation between our parties and our peoples. (Applause) Even if your visit is rather short, I wish your stay be most pleasant, and if possible, I wish you feel as comfortable as you feel at home. (Applause)

I would like to express my confidence that your visit, [and] the talks we will have will mark an important moment in the development of the multilateral cooperation of our parties and our peoples. (Applause)

At the same time, I believe that the multilateral cooperation between our parties and our peoples fully corresponds to the interests of our two countries, as well as to the cause of socialism, cooperation and international peace. (Applause)

I would like to ask you, dear comrades and friends, to raise your glass and toast to the health of our comrade and dear friend Kim Il Sung and of comrade Kim Song Ae. To the health of all the members of the party and governmental delegation from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea! (Applause)

To the friendship and solidarity that exist between our parties, countries and peoples!

To the happiness and wellness of the Korean people!

To the triumph of the socialist cause, democracy, and world peace! (Applause)
Dear Comrade Kim Il Sung

Dear Comrades and friends,

Today, we have the pleasure of welcoming from the bottom of our hearts, at this demonstration of the Korean-Romanian friendship, the party and government delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, headed by Comrade Kim Il Sung.

For us it is a great satisfaction to evoke our close relations of friendship, collaboration and solidarity which has been established between our parties, peoples and countries, linked as we are by the same form of social organization, by the same supreme goals of building the socialist and communist society. At the basis of the Romanian-Korean collaboration (which is developing well at many levels: economic, political, technical-scientific, cultural, including at that of experience exchange with the purpose of building a new social order) stand the Marxist-Leninist principles of rights equality, respect for national independence, mutual benefit and comradeship. The friendship, collaboration, and Romanian-Korean solidarity has deep roots in the very historical development of our peoples, who experienced during their history: foreign domination and exploitation, carried heroic battles for their national independence and social freedom, for earning the right to be masters of their own destiny, in their own country.

The Romanian people have consistently manifested their admiration and support for the heroic fight of the Korean people in the liberation of their homeland. With the occasion of the visit we made four years ago we noticed the brilliant successes of the working people of the DPRK in their efforts of recovery and independent development of the country, in ensuring economic, scientific and cultural progress, in improve the quality of life, both material and spiritual. We sincerely rejoice the remarkable economic realizations that the Korean people constantly achieve while putting in practice the decisions of the Fifth Congress, in view of building a new society under the leadership of the Party, headed by the great son of the Korean people, eminent leader of the Party and the State, comrade Kim Il Sung.

Dear guests, as sincere and close friends, we wish you from the bottom of our hearts new and significant success in the multilateral flourishing and development of the homeland, in building the socialist and communist order on Korean territory.

The Romanian Communist Party, our state and people, appreciate and actively support the constructive initiatives and fair policy that the DPRK consistently promotes, under the leadership of its President, comrade Kim Il Sung, towards achieving the vital and legitimate aspirations of and independent and peaceful unification of the Korean nation.

We are entirely convinced that the visit you are now completing in the Socialist Republic of Romania – as well as the visit which we made in 1971 in your beautiful country – the conversations we are carrying and the documents that will be signed, shall open ever wider horizons of our multilateral collaboration and militant solidarity between our countries and parties. This is entirely consistent with the interests of both our peoples, as well as to the general cause of socialism, progress and peace around the world.

Dear comrades,

You are visiting our country in a period when the Romanian people finds themselves strongly committed, with all their forces, to putting into practice the historical decisions of the 11th Congress, which adopted the Program of the Romanian Communist Party, aimed at building a socialist multilateral developed society and at furthering Romania towards communism. Our entire peoples are working assiduously towards reaching, before the deadline, the targets established by the new five-year plan for the period of 1976-1980. An increasing number of enterprise collectives are reporting early final results for the tasks they had to finish during the current five-year plan.
The accomplishments of the working men during this period testify to the realism of our plans of economic and social development, to the creative ability of the Romanian people who follow uncompromisingly the communist path, and to their decision to ensure the successful completion of the great plan of multilateral development of the socialist Romanian society, adopted by the 11th Congress. The advances of our country on the way of economic and social progress, of building a new social order, testify to the flawlessness of the Marxist-Leninist policy promoted by the Romanian Communist Party, which creatively applies the general principles of socialism to the conditions in our country, while firmly guiding the Romanian people on the path of prosperity, happiness and national independence.

Beginning with the close organic and dialectic interdependency of national and international tasks, the Romanian Communist Party will do everything in its power to bring about the victory of socialism and communism on Romanian territory, aware as it is that this action represents a contribution to the general cause of strengthening the forces of socialism, progress and peace around the world.

Your visit to Romania, comrade Kim Il Sung, is taking place during a period when the international arena is marked by events that open ever wider perspectives for the peoples’ fight for freedom, independence and social progress. It can be said that we stand at the beginning of a new phase in the crisis of capitalism, which encompasses all the spheres of social life and which hastens the revolutionary process of change in the balance of power internationally, in favor of forces which act for a better and fairer world. On all continents, unprecedentedly wide and strong social forces are raising against imperialist domination and dictatorial regimes, with the purpose of replacing it with a new, democratic and fair type of relationship in the international life.

As a result of the peoples’ fight, of the enlightened social forces, certain steps towards détente and collaboration were made in the international arena. Reactionary forces and circles interested in maintaining the old policy continue to exist in the world, perpetuating conflict and tensions, military clashes and putting in danger the peace and security of peoples. This renders ever more necessary a colluding of the efforts of socialist countries, of all peoples and of enlightened, democratic and progressive forces everywhere, to consolidate and continue in the direction of détente, in order to forever remove from the international arena inequitable and oppressive imperialist politics, with the purpose of replacing it with a new policy, based on perfect equality and respect for the sovereignty of all the world’s peoples.

A vivid illustration of the determination and agility with which peoples are fighting for the right to free development, is represented by the developments in Indochina. The victories obtained by the Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples, illustrate the truth once more: when the peoples are determined to defend their independence, their right to determine their own destinies, nothing and no one can stand in their way! The Romanian people, who have constantly supported from a material, political and diplomatic point of view the fair fight of peoples in Indochina, salutes with satisfaction these historic victories and wishes them ever new successes on the way to building a free, independent, and prosperous life.

More than ever, life demonstrates that during our lifetime no problem can be solved with the use of weapons, through military intervention; force can only aggravate existing problems, increase international tension and endanger the security and peace of humankind.

As a European country, Romania gives special attention to achieving security on our continent, where both world wars began, and where presently the most significant armed forces are concentrated together with the largest arsenal of destruction weapons, including nuclear. We consider that in this situation, by reaching security we mean that each and every European nation must focus its resources in the area of economic and social development according to their will, under the conditions of complete and real protection from any aggression or external involvement. We support the idea that the high level phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe must elaborate clear documents, with explicit provisions and firm commitments from the part of all states, for the creation of a climate of friendship and collaboration on our continent. We are convinced that European security corresponds not only to European interest, but must also be accomplished in the interest of peace and security for all humanity.

An important demand is that of extinguishing all hotbeds of tension and conflict still existing in the world today, and ensuring political and peaceful resolution to controversial issues. As far as the situation in the Middle East is concerned, we consider that the essential issue at hand is that of acting energetically, on various fronts, towards the fast adoption of a political solution to the conflict and establishing a lasting and equitable peace in the region. For solving the conflict in the Middle East, it is necessary that Israel withdraws from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the war in June 1967, that the problem of the Palestinian people is solved by including the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and that the right to independent economic and social development of all states in the region is observed.

A major goal of progress in today’s world is the elimination of underdevelopment. The enduring and deepening economic gaps between states, resulting from imperialist, colonial and neo-colonial policies, constitute a serious source of inequality on the international scene, of tension and conflict, of continual increase of economic
and political instability. To end underdevelopment, conditions must first be created for all developing countries to use all their material and human resources in order to accelerate their economic and social progress. We consider that advanced states have the duty to contribute to programs for accelerating the multilateral economic and social progress in developing countries, in parallel with the efforts towards industrialization and resource exploitation made by those peoples themselves.

In this spirit, we must abolish the old norms and principles that have governed the past relationships between states, and that led to a partition of the world between the oppressed and oppressors, between poor and rich. A new international economic and political order, as well as new equitable inter-state relations, is necessary for solving the complex problems in the present economic life, worldwide: the crisis situations, the scarcity of raw materials, the energy crisis, and world economic instability.

Without doubt, there are in the world today numerous problems that await their solution. As long as the arms race continues around the world, one cannot speak of true, effective security of the peoples. For this reason, we believe it is absolutely necessary that peoples act firmly towards concrete disarmament measures, especially nuclear disarmament.

The complexity of present international life demands that all countries, regardless of their size or social system, must participate actively, equitably, in finding solutions to the problems humanity is facing, all in the interest of every nation, towards durable peace on all continents. An increasingly important role in this respect is played by small and middle-sized states, the developing countries, the non-aligned countries - those most interested in the democratization of international relations. In this respect, it is necessary to act with determination for affirming around the world the equality of rights, the respect for independence and national sovereignty, of non-interference in internal affairs, for renouncing force and threats with force in international relations. Let us do everything in our power so that the peoples can decide their lives themselves, according to their own wishes, without external intervention!

The United Nations Organization and other international bodies must have a more important role in solving complex matters in contemporary international relations; beginning with the realities of today's world, the transformations that have occurred in the global balance of power, these [international] organizations must ensure the inclusive participation of all peoples in finding a solution for international issues, in fighting for security and peace, for the respect of international law principles in inter-state relations.

The Romanian Communist Party gives top priority to the development of solidarity relations with all communist and workers' parties, which play a significant role in the political and social evolution of today's world, in the progressive transformation of society, in the global fight for peace and security. We are actively militating for the strengthening of communist and workers' movement unity, which represents the basis for the development of solidarity of all democratic, anti-imperialistic forces. We base our relations with other parties on full respect for the principles of equality, independence of all parties, their right to design their own political lines, revolutionary strategy and tactics, creatively applying the dialectical and historical Marxism to those concrete conditions in which they are operating. We believe that, given today's international situation, communist parties must put in a lot of effort to strengthen the unity of all anti-imperialist and democratic forces at the national level – this represents the key to success for the fight supporting social progress, peace and cooperation.

As an active division of the global anti-imperialist front, our party and government is building cooperative relations with all political organizations of the working class, all socialist and social-democratic parties, national liberation movements, ruling parties in newly independent states, and with progressive, democratic social forces, in its fight for progress and world peace.

More than ever before, it is now necessary to do everything we can to overcome the old way of doing things, and to strengthen the unity of the working class, of cooperation between communists and socialists; this is the essential condition for progress and peace in the world!

Our party firmly believes in the dialectical materialist principles about the decisive role of peoples in creating history, about the necessity to unite and increasingly mobilize the masses, [and] peoples everywhere to deal away with the old policy of oppression and inequality, for a new policy of cooperation, peace which would insure full independence, and independent development for all countries.

Dear Comrade Kim Il Sung,

Esteemed comrades,

Throughout our talks over the past few days we reached the joint conclusion to develop the multilateral cooperative relations between our parties and our peoples. Evidence of our common wish to do so is the decision to sign a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the DPRK.
Undoubtedly, this treaty will provide a durable foundation for the relations, which at this point have been very good, between our parties and countries, and it will exert a positive influence on future Romanian-Korean cooperation, on the development of cooperation and peace in the world.

This is why we are certain that relations between the Romanian Communist Party and the Workers’ Party of Korea will strongly develop in the future as well, so as to continuously strengthen Romanian-Korean friendship, cooperation, and solidarity, the cause of socialism, peace and international security. Esteemed Comrade Kim Il Sung your visit to Romania will undoubtedly mark a historic moment in the ascendant evolution of the brotherly relations between our parties, countries and peoples.

To conclude, on behalf of the Central Committee of our party, of the State Council, our government, our entire people, I would like to offer you the warmest welcome to all workers of the DPRK, to the entire Korean people, wishing them ever greater successes in their efforts to build the edifice of socialism, to fulfill its ideals and aspirations for national unity, progress and prosperity, socialism and peace.

Long live the Romanian-Korean friendship and brotherly cooperation!

Long live the unity of socialist countries, communist and workers’ parties, all progressive, democratic, anti-imperialist forces!

May the peace and cooperation among all world’s nations triumph!
GDR Embassy to the People’s Republic of Bulgaria
Sofia, 18 June 1975

To:
Member of Politburo and
Secretary of SED Central Committee
Comrade Hermann Axen
Berlin

Dear Comrade Axen!

Enclosed I forward the original and two copies of a translation of “Information for the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party about the Talks between Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung during the Visit of the DPRK Party and Government Delegation to Bulgaria from 2 to 5 June 1975”.

This material was handed over by Comrade Tellalov to the ambassadors of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and to me on 17 June to forward to our party leaderships and governments. It is also still supposed to be shared with the Mongolian and Cuban comrades.

[…]

With socialist greetings
Wenning
[GDR Ambassador]

Enclosure

CC:
1x Central Committee, Department IV, Comrade Markowski
1x Foreign Ministry, Comrade Minister Fischer
1x Foreign Ministry, Comrade State Secretary Dr. Krolikowski

Working Translation

For Personal Information only, highly confidential!

About the Talks between Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung during the Visit of the DPRK Party and Government Delegation to Bulgaria (2 to 5 June 1975)

During the official talks between the party and government delegations of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and the DPRK, and in private talks between Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung, a wide range of questions were discussed and positions of both countries outlined.

1. Questions discussed during official meetings of both delegations

[…]  

2. [Kim Il Sung:] For Korean Unification

The second issue we are working on is strengthening the revolutionary movement in South Korea, the struggle for the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, and the creation of conditions for peaceful unification of the country.

   a) The movement for democratization of the society and the unification of the fatherland is growing in South Korea and very active. A deficit is the lacking active participation of workers and peasants in
this movement. The intelligentsia are unable to deeply penetrate the village and the working class and exert respective influence. This is a result of the heavy repression in South Korea. The struggle for democratization of South Korean society is still highly active. In the past, as well as in the current year, the students were uprising for mass struggle. Educational institutions were closed down, a major part of students were drafted into the army, and another part ended up in prisons. That is the situation in South Korea.

b) We were forced to freeze peaceful dialogue with South Korea since they insist on creating two Koreas. This means in fact the eternal division of Korea. Such happened on instructions from the U.S. and Japan. By demanding the creation of two Koreas they aimed at shutting down the talks. We think we cannot achieve any results by talking to them. Moreover: What benefit would we have from talking to the dictator [Park Chung Hee] in a situation where the South Korean people are actively against him?

c) We are against creating two Koreas. The United States is attempting to turn South Korea into an American base. That is why they insist on petrifying the division. Japan has identical goals. The Japanese strive at maintaining the South Korean territory as a market for their goods and define the DMZ at the 38th parallel for the fight against communism. They claim, in light of the changed situation in Indochina, we will attack the South as well. In this context they make noise and continue to agitate against us. As a result, compared to previous years, the tension has increased. In South Korea they have begun an anti-communist campaign with new forms and frequently talk about a war with the DPRK.

d) Kissinger and the U.S. Defense Secretary repeat over and again that they will not tolerate in South Korea what happened in Indochina and will continue their commitments. There are additional troop deployments in South Korea. Obviously, the Americans cannot achieve anything anymore. Their forces are spread out over many countries. This leads to the assumption that they cannot fight successfully any longer. Yet they are still imperialists.

e) We have to increase our vigilance and combat readiness. If they attack us, we are ready to fight them. However, we will never attack first. We even intend to have talks about a peaceful unification of the country in case there will be a democratic change in [South Korean] leadership. We have not refrained from using the slogan of the peaceful unification of the fatherland. We continue to insist on the three principles to achieve unification, namely autonomously, without foreign interference, in peaceful ways, and independently from ideological differences.

f) In the context of increasing the fight of the Korean people for unification, we deem it necessary that ever more peoples from different countries in the world will raise their voice for the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea.

[...]

II. Issues discussed in private talks between Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung

Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung talked to each other in Varna for about three hours. They also talked while traveling there [from Sofia]. The following topics were discussed in these talks:

[...]

6. On Korean unification

Comrade Kim Il Sung stated, after the U.S. defeat in Indochina, attention of the world is now focusing on the Korean question. Western news agencies would relentlessly report the DPRK will attack South Korea-- inspired by the Vietnamese victory. This is directed by the Americans and the South Korean puppets to increase repression against patriotic and democratic forces that fight for the democratization of society [in South Korea] and the unification of the fatherland.

The South Korean army (760,000 men) is stronger than the DPRK forces (500,000). The number of American forces was increased by 4,000, and now amounts to 42,000 troops. With only 16 million people and a shortage of workers in the DPRK, it will be very difficult to recruit and mobilize even more young people for the army. Also, the U.S. forces have equipment superior to North Korea’s army.
Talking in more detail about the situation in South Korea, Kim stated the DPRK maintains relations with the New Democratic Party. It forms together with the Party of Democratic Unification and the Social-democratic Party the People's Front for the Unification of Korea. Religious leaders are also members of the People's Front, advocating democratization of society and Korean unification. Yet, mostly representatives of the middle class are part of the People's Front. Their relation with workers and peasants, as well as their influence among them, is still weak.

The Marxist party in South Korea, the Revolutionary Unification Party, is weak in numbers. It has about 3,000 members. They have centralized leadership and centralized leadership structures in the provinces. They have representatives in several factories but they are illegal and their activities are much impaired. Making active efforts among workers and peasants, and fighting openly against Park Chung Hee, would result in the liquidation of its leaders. Therefore, we have instructed the members of the Revolutionary Party to join the ranks of the legal opposition parties and increase their influence from there under the workers and peasants.

An important force in the struggle of the South Korean people for the democratization of society and Korean unification are the students that organize mass demonstrations against Park Chung Hee. All these forces are fighting an active struggle. Kim underlined that the de facto score between the forces fighting for Korean unification and those advocating the eternal division of the country and the creation of two Koreas is 2:1 in favor of the former when including the DPRK into the count.

Comrade Kim Il Sung explained that there are low-level contacts between DPRK and U.S. representatives in Panmunjom. The Americans declared that U.S. forces will leave South Korean territory if the DPRK makes an official statement not to invade South Korea. The DPRK has frequently made such declarations, yet there are still American forces in South Korea.

There are two options to achieve the unification of Korea: either peacefully with diplomacy or by military means. Kim stated the DPRK continues to be committed to the first option and has not given up the slogan of the country’s peaceful unification. Yet, its success requires American withdrawal, Park Chung Hee’s international isolation, and the outbreak of an uprising in South Korea.

There is always a possibility for a revolt while U.S. forces are still present. Yet, the DPRK recommended some advice to the democratic forces in South Korea for their actions. Obviously, Kim said, there is always the option they do not listen to us and rise up.

Geographical and natural conditions in South Korea are very different from Vietnam’s. South Korea has no neighboring territories like Vietnam has in Laos and Cambodia, and it is surrounded by sea on three sides. In the case of a move by the Korean army into the South, Northern forces would be in great danger of entrapment and encirclement. Also, there is no fertile ground for a sustainable guerrilla war. The forces of the adversary are strong and small unit fighting cannot be successful. For all these reasons, the DPRK does not favor a military method to solve the unification problem.

Kim Il Sung concluded that this does not mean the DPRK will be unable to defend its achievements if attacked. To the contrary, it increases its vigilance. The DPRK is ready to fight if attacked. Kim emphasized that its mountain ranges and submerged rice paddies are natural obstacles for any enemy to move forward rapidly in case of an aggression. The enemy could only resort to air power, but countermeasures are already in place – underground bunkers, factories, power plants and so on. Then Kim stressed that there is the huge supportive hinterland of the allies Soviet Union and China. In essence, Kim stated that the KWP and DPRK’s positions are aiming at solving the question of Korean unification peacefully. However, it will take a lot of time.
SECRET

SUBJECT: LOWERING UNC PROFILE AND KOREAN QUESTION AT UN

1. APPRECIATE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED REFTELS.

2. OUR BASIC PURPOSE AT UPCOMING UNGA IS TO AVOID A DEFEAT ON QUESTION OF UNC AND US FORCE PRESENCE. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, ROKG VIEWS THIS OBJECTIVE OF SUCH CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE IT WILLING TO CONSIDER AS FINAL OPTION UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF UNC.

3. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT WE WILL HAVE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TIME IN NEW YORK ON THE KOREAN QUESTION. EVEN WITH OUR CURRENT STRATEGY. AS A CONSEQUENCE, BASED ON CURRENT ESTIMATE UNGA VOTING SITUATION, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DEMONSTRATE SINCERITY OF OUR PROPOSAL ON CONDITIONAL JANUARY 1 UNC TERMINATION BY COUPLING IT WITH SOME CLEAR GESTURE IN REDUCING THE UNC PROFILE.

4. MEASURES OUTLINED IN REF B APPEAR MINIMUM WHICH WE COULD CONSIDER TO MEET OUR NEEDS IN NEW YORK. IT MAY WELL BE THAT WE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER FURTHER

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, MARR

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

EXDIS

EA/K: EKELLY: CHG
6/20/75, EXT 22332
EA - MR HABIB

IO: - AMB BLAKE
DOD/ISA: MR ABRAMOWITZ

NSC

JCS: ADM TRAIN

S/S

ROUTINE

SEOUL

ROUTINE

USUN NEW YORK

426
REDUCTIONS IN UNC PROFILE TO INCLUDE LIMITING OF FLAG SOLELY TO THE UNC HEADQUARTERS AND PANMUNJOM OPERATION AS WELL AS REVIEW NEED FOR HONOR GUARD CONTINGENT. AS FIRST STEP WE CONTEMPLATE THAT FLAG WOULD NOT BE USED BY US UNITS WHICH ARE NOT UNDER UN COMMAND. OUR USE OF FLAG IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IS SIMPLY NOT EXPLICABLE IN PRESENT UNGA CONTEXT. WE WOULD ALSO ENVISAGE EMPHASIZING THAT OUR TROOP PRESENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR BILATERAL MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, AS MEANS TO HIGHLIGHT THAT US FORCE PRESENCE IS NOT CONNECTED WITH UNC. THIS IS DESIRABLE EMPHASIS FOR IMMEDIATE TACTICAL REASONS IN EVENT WE LOSE IN NEW YORK, BUT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO CREATE BEST CONTEXT FOR ANY POSSIBLE EVENTUAL TRANSFORMATION OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

5. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE PUBLICITY ATTENDENT TO PROFILE LOWERING, OUR INTENT WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN WELL PUBLICIZED THROUGH UNSC LETTER AND WE WOULD EXPLAIN IT IN THAT CONTEXT.

6. CONSEQUENTLY, WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH LETTER TO UNSC AS ALREADY AGREED TO BY ROKG, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO REDUCING MANIFESTATION OF UN COMMAND, INCLUDING USE OF THE FLAG.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET (GDS) ACTION
June 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: W. R. SMYSER
SUBJECT: Lowering UNC Profile in Korea

In addressing the Korean issue in the UNGA this year the US and the ROK have agreed on the strategy that we will reiterate our readiness to terminate the UNC if provisions of the armistice agreement are maintained.

Two new tactics this year are:

-- a specific date for termination (January 1, 1976) provided the conditions are agreed to, and:

-- moves prior to the debate to lower the UNC profile in Korea. The latter tactic involves removal of UNC flags from some non-armistice associated units.

State and DOD have agreed on a joint message (Tab A) reaffirming the decision in regard to the UNC flags. USUN believes that it is essential to couple our proposal on a conditional January 1 UNC termination with some current gesture of this sort reducing the UNC profile.

Ambassador Sneider has agreed with this tactic and has suggested limited sites where the UN flag could be removed (Tab B). General Stilwell, however, has come in with a strong message protesting that the move will create serious psychological and morale problems (Tab C). Stilwell invoked the name of the NSC Staff asserting that he had been informed that the Staff had reached "a consensus that hauling down the flag as a sop to a few third countries was not consistent with the dignity of a great nation." It is uncertain where Stilwell got this impression. Dick Solomon, who saw Stilwell in Korea earlier this month, believes the proposal is a marginal one but is prepared to support it on the basis of the UN vote assessment.

SECRET (GDS)

A R L 5/24/01

428
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET GDS ACTION

June 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W. R. SMYSER

SUBJECT: Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled Islands in Korea

Heightened concern about North Korea's intentions in the wake of the Indochina collapse has underscored the vulnerability of the five islands off the northwest coast of Korea. President Park, in a letter of May 12 to ROK Defense Minister Suh, instructed the Minister to work out jointly with General Stilwell a coordinated plan for the defense of the islands in case of large-scale surprise attack by the enemy. Minister Suh, in a subsequent letter to General Stilwell of May 13 requested that a clear-cut policy on the defense of the islands be established as soon as possible. Minister Suh specifically requested that the plans provide for the contingency employment of U.S. air and naval forces in the defense of the islands (see Tab B).

The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the ROK unilaterally reinforced the island garrison

If we assume that joint planning is now appropriate and necessary,

Ambassador Sneider and General Stilwell have both recommended that we engage in joint planning regarding the islands.
State/Defense Position

A joint State/Defense message attached at Tab A reaffirms that the islands fit the definition of territory under ROK administrative control and therefore come under the MDT. The message authorizes CINCUNC to discuss planning for the defense of the islands with a view toward reaching understanding that (a) the ROK will not act precipitously and unilaterally and CINCUNC will exercise opcon of ROK forces; and (b) in the event of an attack on the islands, CINCUNC will immediately commit ROK forces but these commitments must not jeopardize the capability to defend the ROK as a whole.

Our View
Except for this addition, we recommend approval of the joint State/Defense message. Joint planning will remove the element of ambiguity regarding our commitment, will reassure the ROK, and once Pyongyang hears of it may constrain DPRK adventures. By asserting CINCUNC opcon, we will also be better able to control ROK response and to head off any precipitous ROK effort.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the joint Defense/State cable at Tab A with our recommended addition.

APPROVE ___________ DISAPPROVE ___________

Approve without our addition ___________
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: EFIN, ETRD, MNUC, TECH, PARM, KS, JA, TH, CH

SUBJECT: ROK NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PLANS

REFS: {A} LONDON 9224; {B} LONDON 9295; {C} STATE 148895; {D} 135500; {E} STATE 133128 [F] SEOUL 5462

1. AS REPORTED IN REFS A AND B, BILATERAL TALKS WERE HELD AT LONDON SUPPLIERS' MEETING WITH FRENCH AND CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES. ATTITUDES OF BOTH COUNTRIES WERE AS FORTHCOMING AS WE HAD THOUGHT POSSIBLE. FRENCH INDICATED CANADIANS INDICATED

2. SITUATION IN CONGRESS, AS REPORTED IN REF C, IS THAT RELEVANT COMMITTEES HAVE AGREED TO POSTPONE HEARINGS ON EXIM BANK LOAN REQUEST FOR KORI II REACTOR ON CONDITION THAT EXIM PRESIDENT CASEY WILL NOTIFY THEM TWENTY-FIVE DAYS PRIOR TO SIGNING AGREEMENT WITH THE ROK THAT EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS SATISFIED WITH NON-PROLIFERATION ARRANGEMENTS

DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12333, Sec. 3.4
WITH TOMBSTONE EXEMPTED
E.O. 12333, Sec. 1.3 (a) (3.15)

By KAL, NARA, Date 9/16/74
RELATING TO THE REACTOR AND TO THE USE OF SPENT FUEL, IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT PROSPECTS FOR APPROVAL OF THE LOAN WILL BE SMALL UNLESS ROK HAS AGREED NOT TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL REPROCESSING CAPABILITY. WITH SUCH AN ACTION WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE LOAN COULD BE APPROVED.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD NOW BE TIMELY TO EXECUTE SECOND PHASE OF APPROACH WITH KOREANS ON REPROCESSING OUTLINED IN REFS D AND E. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN PREPARED ON ASSUMPTION THAT ROK WILL HAVE ALREADY ACCEPTED OUR INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION. SINCE REF F INDICATES ROKG CONFIRMATION OF US INTERPRETATION, EMBASSY SHOULD EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR ROKG AIDE-MEMOIRE BEFORE USING TALKING POINTS IN PARA. 4 AND SPECIFICALLY REQUESTING THE ROKG NOT TO PROCEED WITH ITS PLANNED REPROCESSING PLANT.

4. ACCORDINGLY YOU SHOULD APPROACH ROKG WITH THE FOLLOWING POINTS, SLIGHTLY REVISED FROM THE OUTLINE IN REF D:

A. THE US HAS BEEN GIVING SERIOUS ATTENTION TO KOREA'S ASPIRATION TO ACQUIRE ITS OWN REPROCESSING CAPABILITY, STARTING WITH A PILOT FACILITY THAT MIGHT EVOLVE INTO A LARGER-SCALE REGIONAL CAPABILITY. ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZING THAT AT SOME FUTURE TIME THE NATIONS IN THE AREA MIGHT HAVE A COMMERCIAL NEED FOR REPROCESSING, WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT KOREA'S MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION ON ITS OWN.

B. IN PARTICULAR, ALTHOUGH KOREA HAS RATIFIED THE NPT, STEPS TOWARD EVEN A PILOT REPROCESSING FACILITY IN KOREA COULD BE DESTABILIZING AND COULD RAISE SERIOUS APPREHENSIONS WHICH COULD IMPAIR US-KOREAN NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIPS.

C. THERE ARE WIDESPREAD CONCERNS WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AS WELL AS IN THE CONGRESS ON THE SUBJECT OF REPROCESSING AND STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM FROM SPENT FUEL, THAT ARE VERY LIKELY TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO MOVE PROMPTLY ON KOREA'S NUCLEAR REQUESTS SHOULD KOREA CONTINUE IN ITS DESIRE TO ACQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL REPROCESSING CAPABILITY, STARTING WITH A PILOT FACILITY.

D. IT IS TO BE NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT THE ISSUE OF AN EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOAN FOR THE ROK IS BEFORE CONGRESS. THIS LOAN MAY WELL BE DISAPPROVED UNLESS THESE CONCERNS REGARDING REPROCESSING AND STORAGE OF FISSILE
MATERIALS FROM SPENT FUELS ARE SATISFIED. WE FRANKLY ANTICIPATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES UNLESS WE CAN ASSURE CONGRESS THAT THE ROK HAS TERMINATED ITS PLANS TO ACQUIRE A PILOT REPROCESSING PLANT.

E. ALSO, WE BELIEVE IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF A REPROCESSING PLANT IS AN EXPENSIVE, RISKY AND COMPLICATED VENTURE. THERE HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL LARGE-SCALE VENTURES BY VERY COMPETENT INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS GENERAL ELECTRIC. FEW COUNTRIES HAVE ENGAGED IN LARGE-SCALE REPROCESSING IN THE PAST, AND THOSE FEW HAVE ALL EXPERIENCED CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY.

F. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE NATIONS OF EAST ASIA, INCLUDING THE ROK, MAY IN TIME HAVE COMMERCIAL REASONS FOR WISHING TO DEVELOP A REGIONAL REPROCESSING CAPABILITY. THE USG IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE NATIONS OF THE REGION IN EXAMINING THIS POSSIBILITY. WE BELIEVE IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE RECENTLY RECOGNIZED THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF ESTABLISHING FUTURE REPROCESSING FACILITIES ON A MULTINATIONAL REGIONAL BASIS TO EASE PROLIFERATION CONCERNS.

G. WHILE THERE COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL PLACE FOR ROK PARTICIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL REGIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITY FOR ASIA, WE QUESTION THE WISDOM OF THE ROK PROCEEDING WITH ITS PROPOSED PILOT PLANT OR CONDUCTING DETAILED PLANNING FOR LARGER PLANTS IN THE ABSENCE OF CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE US AND OTHER CONCERNED COUNTRIES -- ESPECIALLY JAPAN -- ON QUESTIONS OF DEMAND, TIMING, TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES, ECONOMICS AND, PARTICULARLY, POTENTIAL LOCATION. WE WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH THE ROK AND ALSO THE JAPANESE, AS SUGGESTED BY THE ROK {REF B}. HOWEVER, SUCH DISCUSSIONS WILL HAVE TO BE FREE TO CONSIDER A NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVE SITES AS WELL AS DIFFERENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION.

5. FYI.
Telegram from New York to Bucharest, No. 052648

Date: 1 July 1975


Ministry of Foreign Affairs
TELEGRAM
Sender: New York
No.: 052648
Date: 01.07.1975

North Korean diplomats at the UN consider the letter addressed on June 27 to the President of the Security Council concerning the dismantling of the UN headquarters in South Korea, a “tactical maneuver to create confusion at this year’s session of the General Assembly.”

Ambassador Li Yungyeom pointed out that the US is taking a step back from their traditional approach to the Korean issue, when agreeing to dismantle the UN headquarters only if the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic China accept in exchange that American and South Korean troops will take over the responsibilities of the headquarters, as well as by keeping in place the conditions of the Armistice.

Through the above-mentioned conditions, the US is actually seeking to force North Korea into accepting the presence of American troops in South Korea and accept the latter as a state.

According to the North Korean diplomat, such an approach represents an obvious interference in the internal affairs of his country as well as in the Korean efforts at reunification. The North Korean Ambassador has received instructions from home concerning his future actions at the UN. I however believe they will act towards rejecting and revealing US maneuvers.

The only means of settling the dispute is via bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the US on the one hand, as well as between North and South Korea, on the other, in view of signing the peace treaty.

Such a solution would allow North Korea to decide the deadline of US withdrawal from the Korean territory, in order to make way for a real territorial reunification.

The North Korean diplomat appeared dissatisfied by the passive attitude of the Soviet diplomats displayed in talks he had with them about the US letter. They avoided formulating their own opinions on the new US position in the Korean context.

Signed: Ion Datcu
MEMORANDUM TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Subject: Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing

July 2, 1975

I am forwarding for NSC clearance and your consideration the attached action memorandum (Tab 1), which reflects views received from the interested agencies and has my concurrence. It requests approval to transmit an instruction cable (Tab 2) to Embassy Seoul on ROK reprocessing plans, which State, ACDA, Defense, ERDA and CIA have cleared through the Non-Proliferation Backstopping Committee.

The memorandum responds to Mr. Lodal's request of June 30 for a paper considering various approaches to the ROK on this problem. Since the proposed approach to the ROKG is highly time-sensitive for both diplomatic and Congressional reasons, we believe that both the memorandum and the instruction cable should be considered at the earliest possible time.

Robert S. Ingersoll
Acting Secretary
ACTION MEMORANDUM

Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing

Background

The South Korean Government has been negotiating to purchase a small pilot scale reprocessing plant from France which would give them direct access to plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons.

Perhaps more than any other likely near-term case of potential proliferation, South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons would be extremely dangerous and directly damaging to important U.S. interests. As recognized in the Korean nuclear policy cable approved at the White House in March (Tab 2), these effects would be felt even if Korea were merely to hover at the nuclear threshold, a prospect which has become more tangible as a result of President Park's recent press statement that Korea would exercise its nuclear option if the U.S. removed its nuclear umbrella.

If Korea has direct access to separated plutonium, it will eventually be widely assumed that she either has nuclear weapons or could acquire them in a short interval. No special safeguards short of a complete prohibition on reprocessing and storage of plutonium in South Korea are likely to provide adequate protection against the most troublesome contingency in which South Korea abrogates some or all of her safeguard agreements, including those inherent in the NPT which she ratified in May.

Reprocessing will not be necessary for the South Korean nuclear fuel economy for the foreseeable future. If at some time it should become necessary it could be provided more safely and economically through regional plants or supplier services. Of much greater economic importance are the power reactors for which the South
Korean Government is currently negotiating with the United States and Canada. A request for an Export-Import Bank loan of $132 million and an additional $117 million of credits guarantees, to finance South Korea's purchase of a second U.S. reactor, KORI II, is now before Congress. We believe this loan and the sale of the U.S. reactor would be beneficial to South Korea's economy and could also be arranged in a way so as to be helpful to our non-proliferation objectives. Exim Bank President Casey has obtained Congressional agreement to postpone hearings on the loan request pending notification by the Executive Branch that we are satisfied with the non-proliferation arrangements relating to the recycling and use of spent fuel in South Korea. Present indications are that we will be unable to make the loan unless we can give the Congress some assurance that South Korea has cancelled its plans for a national reprocessing plant.

Attitudes of Canada and France

Pursuant to the March policy guidance we have spoken to the Canadians, in the context of general nuclear export policy discussions, who have indicated that the ROK would need to receive Canadian consent before reprocessing of spent fuel from reactors sold by Canada. The Canadians indicated serious reservations about any in-country reprocessing and undertook to coordinate future Korean nuclear assistance policy with us.

We have also spoken to the French prior to the recent suppliers' meeting in London, and explained that we were considering an approach to the ROKG to discourage its acquisition of a reprocessing plant from France.
Approach to Korea

In the context of ongoing consultations with ROKG atomic energy officials, we have recently reminded them of the provision in our Agreement for Cooperation which we understand gives us a veto over reprocessing of spent fuel from U.S. reactors supplied to South Korea. We have requested their confirmation of this understanding and, in response to their expression of interest, have told them that we would also like to hold further discussions with them on the broader question of reprocessing in general. After receiving confirmation of our interpretation of the Agreement, we would propose to recommend that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issue the necessary export license for the fuel already contracted (and due to be delivered in August) for the KORI I nuclear power reactor.

Thus far, the Koreans have indicated significant flexibility in their response to Canadian concerns on non-proliferation and to our preliminary approaches on the reprocessing question. We believe that there is a good possibility that the ROK can be influenced to abandon its present plans for a national reprocessing capability. The ROK might participate in a regional facility, as described in our earlier message to Ambassador Sneider (Tab 3). Such a plant, which would be preferably located outside Korea, could meet their future reprocessing needs both safely and economically.

Proposed Course of Action

On the basis of this apparent Korean receptivity and the willingness of the other nuclear suppliers (Canada and France) to coordinate their actions with us, our consensus is that the best approach at this stage is a relatively limited one, roughly along the lines proposed in our earlier message (Tab 3). We would (1) state our concern about Korean national reprocessing plans and point out that such a development could jeopardize U.S. nuclear assistance,
particularly the pending Exim loan for the KORI II reactor; (2) ask the ROKG not to proceed with its planned pilot reprocessing plant; but (3) offer support for the idea of ROK participation in a multinational regional reprocessing plant for East Asia. At this stage, the approach would not need to be more specific about what leverage we would be prepared to exercise, or about our expectation that we would be satisfied with a multinational plant only if located outside of Korea.

We have considered both weaker and stronger alternatives to the recommended approach. The weaker alternative would be to make no further approach to the ROKG, but rely on our rights to veto the reprocessing of spent fuel from U.S. reactors only. However, this would not stop the construction of the French reprocessing plant and preclude the ROK from eventually finding another source of spent fuel. Making no further approach would thus leave our proliferation concerns open. It would also jeopardize the Exim loan and with it the Westinghouse sale, given Congressional reactions, and it would not meet Canadian, French, or, for that matter, Korean expectations.

We have therefore incorporated our preferred course of action in a proposed instruction cable (Tab 1), which draws upon the earlier message to Ambassador Sneider and has been re-cleared by State,
ACDA, Defense, ERDA, CIA and the NSC staff. In order for this relatively limited approach to have the maximum positive effect on Korea, the other suppliers and Congress, we believe it should be made as soon as possible. After observing its results, we will be in a better position to consider future courses of action. If our expectations for this approach are borne out, we will have significantly complicated Korean acquisition of a nuclear capability. At the same time, we expect President Park to continue with this program, probably on a more covert and delayed basis. Based on the results of the present preliminary dialogue on reprocessing, an interagency paper on the shape and direction of our overall non-proliferation strategy............. the interagency review of our policy in Korea, we will later want to recommend for your consideration alternative ways of addressing these underlying problems.

Recommendation:

That you approve the approach outlined above, and incorporated in the instruction cable to Ambassador Sneider at Tab 1.

Approve _________  Disapprove _________

Attachments:

- Instruction Cable to Embassy Seoul
- Policy Cable (State 48673)
- Earlier Message (State 135500)

Drafted: ACDA: PWolowitz: S/P: JKalicki
6/30/75: ext. 27771

Concurrences:

ACDA - Dr. Ikle
C - Mr. Dobbins
EA - Mr. Zurhellen
S/P - Mr. Bartholomew
PM - Mr. Vest
OES - Mr. Bengelsdorf