

## MAO ZEDONG'S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958: CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Translated and Annotated

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**Translators' Note:** On 23 August 1958, Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian area along the People's Republic of China's Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled Jinmen Island. In the following two months, several hundred thousand artillery shells exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around it. At one point, a Chinese Communist invasion of the Nationalist-controlled offshore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In response to the rapidly escalating Communist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the Eisenhower Administration, in accordance with its obligations under the 1954 American-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. naval vessels to help the Nationalists protect Jinmen's supply lines. Even the leaders of the Soviet Union, then Beijing's close ally, feared the possible consequences of Beijing's actions, and sent Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to inquire about China's reasons for shelling Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed on October 6, when Beijing issued a "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it was speculated by many at that time, and later confirmed, that this message was drafted by Mao Zedong). The message called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem, arguing that all Chinese should unite to confront the "American plot" to divide China permanently. From this day on, the Communist forces dramatically relaxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the Taiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war between China and the United States.

In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in Cold War history, it is particularly important to understand Beijing's motives. Why did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the shelling relate to China's overall domestic and international policies? Why did the Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis

as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, scholars have been forced to resort to "educated guesses" to answer these questions.

The materials in the following pages, translated from Chinese, provide new insights for understanding Beijing's handling of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu Lengxi, then the director of the New China News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People's Daily). Wu was personally involved in the decision-making process in Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and attended several Politburo Standing Committee meetings discussing the events. His memoir provides both a chronology and an insider's narrative of how Beijing's leaders, Mao Zedong in particular, handled the crisis. The second part comprises 18 documents, including two internal speeches delivered by Mao explaining the Party's external policies in general and its Taiwan policy in particular. The two parts together provide a foundation to build a scholarly understanding of some of the key calculations underlying the Beijing leadership's management of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly interesting is the revelation that Mao decided to shell Jinmen to distract American attention from, and counter American moves in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his extensive explanation of how China should use a "noose strategy" to fight the "U.S. imperialists." Equally important is his emphasis on the connection between the tense situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass mobilization in China leading to the Great Leap Forward. It should also be noted that despite the aggressive appearance of Beijing's Taiwan policy, Mao paid special attention to avoiding a direct military confrontation with American forces present in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. Although these materials are not directly from Chinese archives, they create a new basis for scholars to deepen their understanding of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: For recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using newly available Chinese sources, see Shu

Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by Thomas Christensen to be published by Princeton University Press.]

Rendering Chinese- or English-language materials into the other language is difficult because the two languages have no common linguistic roots. Thus, the materials provided below are sometimes free rather than literal translations from Chinese to English. Great care has been taken to avoid altering the substantive meaning intended by the author of the documents. Material appearing in the text in brackets has been supplied to clarify meaning or to provide missing words or information not in the original text. Additional problems with individual documents are discussed in the notes. The notes also include explanatory information to place key individual and events in context or to provide further information on the material being discussed.

### **Part I. Memoir, "Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen"**

By **Wu Lengxi**<sup>1</sup>

[Source: *Zhuanji wenxue* (Biographical Literature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]

In August 1958, the members of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Politburo met at Beidaihe<sup>2</sup> for a regular top leaders' working conference. The meeting originally planned to focus on the nation's industrial problems, and later the issue of the people's commune was added to the discussion.

The Politburo convened its summit meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend the meeting several days later. On the 20th,

however, the General Office of the Central Committee called, urging me to go to Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 August on a scheduled flight arranged by the Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed with Hu Qiaomu<sup>3</sup> in a villa in Beidaihe's central district. This seaside resort area was used only for the leading members of the Central Committee during summers. All of the villas in the resort area were built before the liberation<sup>4</sup> for high officials, noble lords, and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman Mao's large, one-story house was newly constructed.

At noon on 23 August, the third day after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People's Liberation Army's artillery forces in Fujian employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding offshore islands occupied by the Nationalist army.

In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I learned the reason [for the bombardment]. In mid-July, American troops invaded Lebanon and British troops invaded Jordan in order to put down the Iraqi people's armed rebellion. Thereafter, the Central Committee decided to conduct certain military operations in the Taiwan Straits to support the Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle as well as to crack down on the Nationalist army's frequent and reckless harassment along the Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announced on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores], Jinmen, and Mazu were all "to be on emergency alert." It showed that Jiang's army was going to make some moves soon. We therefore deployed our air force in Fujian Province at the end of July.<sup>5</sup> Our fighters had been fighting the Nationalist air force and had already taken over control of the air space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, our artillery reinforcement units arrived at the front one after another. And mass rallies and parades were organized all over the country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples and to protest against the American and British imperialists' invasions of the Middle East.

Chairman Mao talked first at the meeting of August 23. He said that the day's bombardment was perfectly scheduled. Three days earlier, the UN General Assem-

bly had passed a resolution requesting American and British troops to withdraw from both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American occupation of Taiwan became even more unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was that American armed forces should withdraw from Taiwan, and Jiang's army should withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bombardment would certainly shock the international community, not only the Americans, but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab world would be delighted, and African and Asian peoples would take our side.

Then Chairman Mao turned to me and said that [the reason for] rushing me to attend the meeting was to let me know about this sudden event. He directed me to instruct the New China News Agency (NCNA) to collect international responses to the bombardment. Important responses should be immediately reported to Beidaihe by telephone. Mao asked me not to publish our own reports and articles on the bombardment at present. We needed to wait and see for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao also asked me to instruct editorial departments of the NCNA, the *People's Daily*, and national radio stations that they must obey these orders and instructions in all their reports. Our military troops must follow the orders, as well as our media and propaganda units, Mao emphasized.

Chairman Mao continued his talk. Several days earlier, at the beginning of the summit meeting, he addressed eight international issues. He had been thinking of these issues for many years. His thinking had gradually formulated some points and opinions, and his mind thereby became clear. Those viewpoints, however, could not be all brought forth without considering time, place, and circumstance in our public propaganda, Mao said to me. We had to use a different tone in our media work. What he used as the first example was that at the meeting a couple days earlier he predicted that world war would not break out. But our military should still be prepared for a total war. And our media should still talk about the danger of world war and call for opposing the imperialists' aggressive and war-provoking policies to maintain world peace. The next example in his explanations was which side feared the other a bit more. Al-

though Mao believed that the imperialists were more afraid of us, he told me that our media and propaganda should state that first we were not afraid of war, and second we opposed war. Another point he made was that international tension had a favorable aspect for the people of the world. Our propaganda, however, should declare that we must prevent the imperialists from making any international tension, and work on relaxing such tension. These were only some examples, he continued. There were so many bad things happening in our world. If we were too distracted with worries by everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse psychologically under pressure. We should learn how to use a dichotomous method to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though international tension was certainly a bad thing, we should see the good side of it. The tension had made many people awaken and decide to fight the imperialists to the end. Employing such an analytical method could help us achieve a liberation in our mind and get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks.

Chairman Mao said that the bombardment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our turn to create international tension for a purpose. We intended to teach the Americans a lesson. America had bullied us for many years, so now that we had a chance, why not give it a hard time? For the present we should first wait and see what international responses, especially American responses, there were to our shelling, and then we could decide on our next move. Americans started a fire in the Middle East, and we started another in the Far East. We would see what they would do with it. In our propaganda, however, we still need to condemn the Americans for causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We did not put them in the wrong. The United States has several thousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plus two air force bases there. Their largest fleet, the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Taiwan Straits. They also have a large naval base in Manila. The chief of staff of the American navy had stated not long ago (around 6 August) that the American armed forces were ready anytime for a landing campaign in the Taiwan Straits just as they did in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof [of America's ambition], Mao said.

Two days later, during the afternoon of 25 August, Chairman Mao held another Politburo Standing Committee meeting in the

lounge hall of the swimming area at Beidaihe's beach. Mao chaired the meeting in his bathrobe right after swimming in the ocean. Among the participants were Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Dehuai.<sup>6</sup> Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, Hu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meeting.<sup>7</sup>

Chairman Mao started the meeting by saying that while we had had a good time at this summer resort, the Americans had extremely hectic and nervous days. According to their responses during the past days, Mao said that Americans were worried not only by our possible landing at Jinmen and Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We did not say if we were or were not going to land. We were acting as circumstances dictated. We had to be doubly cautious, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was not a small matter because it had a bearing on much more important international issues. The problem was not the 95,000 Nationalist troops stationed there—this was easy to handle. The problem was how to assess the attitude of the American government. Washington had signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, however, did not clearly indicate whether the U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen and Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the Americans wanted to carry these two burdens on their backs. The main purpose of our bombardment was not to reconnoiter Jiang's defenses on these islands, but to probe the attitude of the Americans in Washington, testing their determination. The Chinese people had never been afraid of provoking someone far superior in power and strength, and they certainly had the courage to challenge [the Americans] on such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and Mazu, which had always been China's territories.

Mao said that we needed to grasp an opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen was an opportunity we seized when American armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15 July 1958]. Our action therefore not only allowed us to test the Americans, but also to support the Arab people. On the horns of a dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to cope with both the East and the West at the same time. For our propaganda, however, we should not directly connect the bom-

bardment of Jinmen [to the America's landing in Lebanon]. Our major propaganda target was America's aggressions all over the world, condemning its invasion of the Middle East and its occupation of our territory, Taiwan, Mao said. The *People's Daily* could begin our propaganda campaign by criticizing an anti-China memorandum recently published by the U.S. State Department, enumerating the crimes of America's invasion of China in the past and refuting the memorandum's calumny and slander against us. We could also organize articles and commentaries on the resolution passed by the UN General Assembly, requesting American and British troops to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request the withdrawal of American armed forces from their military bases in many countries across the world, including Taiwan. Our media should now conduct an outer-ring propaganda campaign. After we learned the responses and moves of America, of Jiang Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then issue announcements and publish commentaries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. Mao said that at the present our media should build up strength and store up energy—draw the bow but not discharge the arrow.

Peng Dehuai suggested that the media should write some reports and articles about the heroic fighting of our commanders and soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The participants at the meeting agreed that our reporters on the front could prepare articles, and we would decide later when they could publish their reports.

That evening I informed the editors of the *People's Daily* in Beijing, through a secured telephone line, of the Politburo's instructions on how to organize our propaganda campaign. But I did not say anything about the Politburo's decisions, intentions, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, which were a top military secret at that time.

For the next two days, the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe focused its discussions upon how to double steel and iron production and upon issues of establishing the people's commune. Chairman Mao, however, still paid close attention to the responses from all directions to our bombardment of Jinmen, especially to America's response. Mao's secretary called me several times checking on follow-up information after the NCNA's *Cangao ziliao* [Restricted Reference Material]<sup>8</sup> printed

America's responses. During these days, I asked NCNA to report to me every morning by telephone about headline news from foreign news agencies. I reported the important news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou.

The Central Committee's working conference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August. Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 September, one day before the conference, Mao called for another Politburo Standing Committee meeting, which mainly discussed the international situation after the bombardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed the American responses. Both [Dwight] Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles made public speeches. They ordered half of their warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Meanwhile, the American government also suggested resuming Chinese-American ambassadorial talks at Warsaw.<sup>9</sup> Seemingly, the American leaders believed that we were going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to have made up their mind whether or not to defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower and Dulles slurred over this matter without giving a straight answer. The participants at the meeting agreed that the Americans feared a war with us. They might not dare to fight us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accomplished our goal. We made the Americans very nervous and mobilized the people of the world to join our struggle.

At the Politburo's Standing Committee meeting, however, the participants decided that our next plan was not an immediate landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose [around America's neck] tighter and tighter—putting more pressure on America—and then looking for an opportunity to act. All participants agreed with Premier Zhou's suggestion of announcing a twelve-mile zone as our territorial waters so as to prevent America's warships from reaching Jinmen and Mazu.<sup>10</sup> Chairman Mao considered it righteous for us to defend our territory if American ships entered our territorial water. Our batteries, however, might not fire on them immediately. Our troops could send a warning signal first, and then act accordingly.

Chairman Mao also said that we were preparing another approach as well. Through the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, which would be resumed soon in Warsaw,

we would employ diplomatic means to coordinate our fighting on the Fujian front. We now had both an action arena and a talk arena. There was yet another useful means—the propaganda campaign. Then Chairman Mao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and said that at present our media should give wide publicity to a condemnation of America for causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We should request America to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Our propaganda should emphasize that Taiwan and the offshore islands were Chinese territory, that our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu was aimed at punishing Jiang's army and was purely China's internal affair, and that no foreign country would be allowed to interfere with what happened there. Our propaganda organs, the *People's Daily*, NCNA, and radio stations should use a fiery rhetorical tone in their articles and commentaries. Their wording, however, must be measured, and should not go beyond a certain limit, Mao emphasized.

From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Mao chaired the Supreme State Conference. He made two speeches on the 5th and the 8th.<sup>11</sup> Besides domestic issues, his speeches focused on international issues similar to the eight issues which he had explained at the Beidaihe meeting. When Chairman Mao talked about pulling the noose, he said that our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu made the Americans very nervous. Dulles seemingly intended to put his neck into the noose of Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good for us to get the Americans there. Whenever we wanted to kick them, we could do so. Thus we had the initiative, and the Americans did not. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troubles for us mainly through the breach at Fujian. It was indeed troublesome to let Jiang's army occupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could an enemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed? We, however, did not intend to launch an immediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. [Our bombardment] was merely aimed at testing and scaring the Americans, but we would land if circumstances allowed. Why should we not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there came an opportunity? The Americans in fact were afraid of having a war with us at the bottom of their hearts so that Eisenhower never talked publicly about an absolutely "mutual defense" of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americans seemingly intended to shy away [from

Jinmen-Mazu]. Although their policy of escape was acceptable, the Americans also needed to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang's troops from Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americans continued to stay and kept Jiang's troops there, the situation would not be affected as a whole but they would put the noose around their necks.

During Chairman Mao's speech on the 8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxi was attending the meeting. I answered. Chairman Mao told me that his speech needed to be included in that day's news, and asked me to prepare it immediately. I discussed this with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us found it difficult to decide which part of Mao's speech should be published, we agreed eventually to write the part about the noose first. I drafted the news and then let Hu read it. When the conference adjourned, Chairman Mao and other members of the Politburo's Standing Committee gathered in the lobby of Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed over the news draft to Mao for his checking and approval. While talking to the others, he went over the draft and made some changes. Mao told me that only publishing the noose issue was all right. It was not appropriate at that moment to publish all the issues discussed because it was merely an exchange of opinion among the top leaders. Moreover, Mao did not want to relate the noose issue directly to Jinmen-Mazu. This was different from writing articles or editorials for newspapers. In our articles, Mao continued, we should not write about our policy toward Jinmen-Mazu, which was a top military secret. Our writing, however, could clarify our position toward the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks which would resume soon,<sup>12</sup> expressing that whatever the outcome would be, we placed hopes on the talks. We were now shelling on the one hand and talking on the other—military operations combined with diplomatic efforts. Our bombardment was a test. Mao said that we had fired 30,000 shells that day in coordination with the mass rally at Tiananmen Square to make a great show of strength and impetus. Our talks were a test through diplomacy in order to get to the bottom of American reaction. Two approaches were better than a single one. It was necessary to keep the negotiation channel open, Mao emphasized. After checking and polishing my manuscripts, Chairman Mao asked me to instruct NCNA to transmit the news that evening and to publish it in the

*People's Daily* the next day (9 September).

There was another interesting episode. Khrushchev did not have any idea about our intentions in shelling Jinmen. Afraid of being involved in a world war, he sent Gromyko to Beijing to find out our plans on 6 September. During the Supreme State Conference, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou met with Gromyko, informing him of our decisions and explaining that we did not intend to have a major war. In case a major war broke out between China and America, China did not intend to involve the Soviet Union in the war. After receiving our message, Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, asking the American government to be very cautious in the Taiwan Straits and warning that the Soviet Union was ready to assist China anytime if China was invaded.

Right after the Supreme State Conference, Chairman Mao left Beijing on an inspection trip of the southern provinces. From 10 to 28 September, he visited Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shanghai, and other places. On 30 September, one day after Mao returned to Beijing, his secretary called to tell me that Chairman Mao wanted to see me. I immediately went to Fengzeyuan in Zhongnanhai.<sup>13</sup> When I walked into the eastern wing of the Juixiang Study,<sup>14</sup> Chairman Mao was reading a book. He asked me to sit down and said that during his trip he was impressed by the boundless energy of the people across the country, especially in their great efforts to develop a steel and iron industry and to mobilize massive militias. Mao had drafted a news story for NCNA, which was being typed and would be ready soon. Chairman Mao also told me that he particularly invited General Zhang Zhizhong<sup>15</sup> to join in the trip. Besides his interests in a rapid growth of industry and agriculture, Zhang showed special concerns during the trip about the situation in the Taiwan Straits. Zhang did not understand why we took so long to land on Jinmen. His advice was that even though we were unable to liberate Taiwan at that time, we must take over Jinmen and Mazu by all possible means. Zhang suggested not letting slip an opportunity which might never come again.

Chairman Mao told me that in fact we were not unwilling to take over Jinmen and Mazu. Our decision [on the landing], however, not only concerned Jiang Jieshi, but also had to give special consideration to America's position. The Americans feared

a war with us. After we announced a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters, American warships at first refused to accept it. They invaded the boundary line of our territorial waters many times, though they did not sail into the eight-mile territorial waters which they recognized. Later, after our warnings, American ships did not dare to invade our twelve-mile territorial waters. Once some American gunships escorted a Nationalist transportation flotilla shipping munitions and supplies to Jinmen. When this joint flotilla reached Jinmen's harbor, I ordered heavy shelling. As soon as our batteries opened fire, the American ships turned around and quickly escaped. The Nationalist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently, America was a paper tiger.

America, however, was also a real tiger, Mao continued. At present, America concentrated a large force in the Taiwan Straits, including six out of its twelve aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, forty destroyers, and two air force divisions. Its strength was so strong that one could not underestimate it, but must consider it seriously. Thus, our current policy [toward Jinmen] was shelling without landing, and cutting-off without killing (meaning that without a landing, we would continue bombing Jinmen to blockade its communication and transportation and to cut off its rear support and supplies, but not to bottle up the enemy [on the island]).

Chairman Mao also told me that the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks had resumed at Warsaw. After several rounds of talks, we could tell that the Americans were certain about defending Taiwan but not sure about Jinmen. Some indications suggested that the Americans intended to exchange their abstaining from defending Jinmen-Mazu for our recognition of their forcible occupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We needed to work out a policy concerning this situation. It was not adequate for us to accept General Zhang Zhizhong's advice at that point. Mao asked the *People's Daily* and NCNA to suspend the ongoing propaganda campaign and wait for the Central Committee's further decision.

Chairman Mao asked for my comments on his news draft after it was typed out. I noted that the article particularly mentioned at its end that General Zhang had joined Mao's inspection trip. I agreed with Mao's manuscript except the last paragraph about

Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead public thinking about relations with the Nationalists. According to Chairman Mao's instruction, the article was published as the headline news on the front page of the *People's Daily* on that National Day (1 October 1958).

After the National Day, Chairman Mao held continuous meetings of the Politburo's Standing Committee to discuss the situation in the Taiwan Straits. From 3 to 13 October, the committee members met almost every day. The meetings of the 3rd and 4th focused on an analysis of Dulles's speech on 30 September. In his speech, Dulles blatantly proposed a "two Chinas" policy, requesting that the Chinese Communists and the Taiwan government "both should renounce the employment of force" in the straits. Meanwhile, he criticized Taiwan's deployment of large numbers of troops on Jinmen and Mazu as unnecessary, "unwise and not cautious" actions. A reporter asked him if America's Taiwan policy would change if the Chinese Communists made some compromises. Dulles said that "our policy in these respects is flexible. . . . If the situation we have to meet changes, our policies change with it."<sup>16</sup>

Premier Zhou pointed out at the meeting that Dulles's speech indicated America's intention to seize this opportunity to create two Chinas, and Dulles wanted us to commit to a non-military unification of Taiwan. Using this as a condition, America might ask Taiwan to give up its so-called "returning to the mainland" plan and withdraw its troops from Jinmen and Mazu. In one word, Dulles's policy was designed to exchange Jinmen and Mazu for Taiwan and Penghu. This was the same hand of cards we had recently discovered during the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. Zhou emphasized that the American delegates even spoke more undisguisedly at the talks than had been suggested in Dulles's speech.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping believed that both China and America were trying to find out the other's real intention. The two sides did the same thing at both Warsaw and Jinmen. By now both had some ideas about the other's bottom line, they said. Americans knew that we neither intended to liberate Taiwan in the near future nor wanted to have a head-to-head clash with America. Fairly speaking, both sides adopted a similar cautious policy toward their confrontation in the Taiwan

Straits. Our test by artillery fire in August and September was appropriate because the Americans were forced to reconsider what they could do in the area. At the same time, we restricted our shelling to Jiang's ships, not American ships. Our naval and air forces all strictly observed the order not to fire on American ships and airplanes. We acted with caution and exercised proper restraint. Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping also said that we put up quite a pageant in our propaganda campaign to condemn America's occupation of our Taiwan territory and to protest American ships and aircraft invading our territorial waters and air space. Our propaganda had mobilized not only the Chinese masses but also the international community to support the Arab peoples and put very heavy pressure on the American government. They both emphasized that this was the right thing to do.

Chairman Mao said at the meeting that our task of probing [the American response] had been accomplished. The question now was what we were going to do next. He pointed out that regarding Dulles's policy we shared some common viewpoints with Jiang Jieshi—both opposed the two-China policy. Certainly Jiang insisted that he should be the only legal government, and we the bandits. Both, therefore, could not renounce the use of force. Jiang was always preoccupied with recovering the mainland; and we could never agree to abandon Taiwan. The current situation, however, was that we were unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain period; Jiang's "returning to the mainland" also included "a very large measure of illusion" as even Dulles recognized. The remaining question now was how to handle Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang was unwilling to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, and we did not need to land on Jinmen-Mazu. Mao asked us about the proposal of leaving Jinmen and Mazu in the hands of Jiang Jieshi. The advantage of this policy was that we could maintain contact with the Nationalists through this channel since these islands were very close to the mainland. Whenever necessary, we could shell the Nationalists. Whenever we needed tension, we could pull the noose tighter. Whenever we wanted a relaxation, we could give the noose more slack. [The policy of] leaving these islands hanging there neither dead nor alive could be employed as one means to deal with the Americans. Every time we bombed, Jiang

Jieshi would ask for American help; it would make Americans anxious, worrying that Jiang might bring them into trouble. For us, not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little impact on our construction of a socialist country. Jiang's troops on Jinmen-Mazu alone could not cause too much damage. On the contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu, or if we allow the Americans to force Jiang to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would lose a reliable means by which we can deal with the Americans and Jiang.

All the participants at the meeting agreed with Chairman Mao's proposal to allow Jiang's troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu and force the American government to continue with this burden. The latter would be always on tenterhooks since we could kick it from time to time.

Premier Zhou expected the Americans to propose three resolutions during the Chinese-American talks. Their first proposition might ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiang would reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazu and America would announce that Jinmen-Mazu was included in the American-Jiang mutual defense perimeter. The second proposal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiang reduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, while America would declare that their mutual defense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. The last plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang's withdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a commitment by both sides not to use force against each other. All three propositions were unacceptable, Zhou emphasized, because they were essentially aimed at creating two Chinas and legalizing America's forcible occupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, considered it favorable for us to continue the Chinese-American talks, which could occupy the Americans and prevent America and the European countries from bringing the question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN. We also needed to explain clearly the situation to our friends in Asia and Africa so as to give them the truth and prevent [the crisis] from doing us a disservice. All the participants agreed with Premier Zhou's suggestions.

Chairman Mao concluded at the meeting that our decision had been made—continuation of shelling but not landing, blockading without bottling up and allowing Jiang's forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Our shelling would no longer be daily, with no more 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time.

Later on, our shelling could be at some intervals; sometimes heavy shelling, sometimes light; and several hundred shells fired randomly in one day. However, Mao said that we should continue to give wide publicity to our propaganda campaign. We insisted in our propaganda that the question of Taiwan was China's internal affair, that bombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuation of the Chinese civil war, and that no foreign country or international organization should be allowed to interfere in China's affairs. America's stationing of its land and air forces on Taiwan was an invasion of China's territory and sovereignty; concentrating a large number of naval ships in the Taiwan Straits revealed American attempts to cause tensions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawn from that area. We must oppose America's attempts to create two Chinas and to legalize its forcible occupation of Taiwan. We would solve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or even the problem of Taiwan and Penghu, with Jiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chairman Mao emphasized that our media propaganda should explicitly address the above principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw talks should also follow these principles while using some diplomatic rhetoric. All these points would not be publicly propagated until we had issued a formal government statement. At the present, the *People's Daily* could have a "cease-fire" for a couple of days to prepare and replenish munitions. Then, Mao said, ten thousand cannons would boom after our orders.

After the meeting of the 4th, Chairman Mao issued an order to the frontal forces on 5 September to suspend their bombardment for two days. The same day Mao himself drafted the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan," which was published on the 6th in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. The message began with "We are all Chinese. Out of the thirty-six stratagems, the best is making peace." It pointed out that both sides considered Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu as Chinese territories, and all agreed on one China, not two Chinas. The message then suggested that Taiwan leaders should abolish the mutual defense treaty signed with Americans. The Americans would abandon the Taiwanese sooner or later; and one could discern certain clues about this in Dulles's speech of 30 September. After all, the American imperialists were our common enemy. The message

formally suggested that both sides hold negotiations to search for peaceful resolutions to the Chinese civil war which had been fought for the past 30 years. It also announced that our forces on the Fujian front would suspend their shelling for seven days in order to allow the [Nationalist] troops and residents on Jinmen to receive supplies. Our suspension of bombardment, however, would be with the precondition of no American ships providing escort.

This statement drafted by Chairman Mao was a very important turning point in our policy toward Jinmen. That is, our focus shifted from military operations to political (including diplomatic) efforts.

After watching the situation for two days, Chairman Mao called for another Politburo Standing Committee meeting at his quarters in the afternoon of 8 September. All the committee members noticed that the world had made magnificent and strong responses to the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan." Some Western newspapers and magazines even saw the message as a straw in the wind that augured dramatic change in the relations between both Chinese sides and between China and America. Meanwhile, American ships stopped their escorts and no longer invaded our territorial waters around Jinmen. Only Jiang's Defense Department believed the message to be a Chinese Communist "plot."

Chairman Mao then asked me about how the *People's Daily* prepared its editorial. I answered that the paper had already finished one article to attack Americans in particular. Mao told me to work on the Guomindang (GMD) first by writing an article which focused on a dialogue with Jiang Jieshi, while at the same time posing some difficult questions for the Americans. This article should explain that our message was not a crafty plot, but part of our consistent policy toward Taiwan. The message showed our stretching out both our arms once again, Mao said. The article might try to alienate Jiang from America, saying that Taiwan suffered from depending on other people for a living, and that getting a lift on an American ship was unreliable. Then the article could criticize Dulles's so-called cease-fire and ask the Americans to meet five requirements for a cease-fire (stopping naval escorts, stopping the invasion of China's territorial waters and air space, ending military provocation and war threats, ending inter-

vention in China's internal affairs, and withdrawing all American armed forces from Taiwan and Penghu). Chairman Mao asked me to finish my writing that evening. He was going to wait to read and check the article that night. Mao told me that I could leave right now to write the article without waiting for the end of the meeting.

Leaving Zhongnanhai, I rushed back to the *People's Daily's* building. After ordering a dish of fried noodles as my dinner from a restaurant across the street, I began to draft the editorial hurriedly in my office. With Chairman Mao's instruction, my writing was very smooth and fast. A little bit after the midnight, I finished my draft. It was two or three o'clock in the early morning of the 9th when the final proof of the article was sent to Chairman Mao for checking and approval. Mao read the editorial early the same morning and made important changes in its last paragraph. He re-wrote the paragraph as follows: "Seemingly, the problem still needs to have more tests and observations. We are still very far away from the time of solving the problem. After all, the imperialists are the imperialists, and the reactionaries are the reactionaries. Let us wait and see how they will make their moves!" Chairman Mao noted his approval on the final proof: "Not very good, barely publishable." The time written down below his signature was six o'clock of 9 October.

I received my manuscript sent back by Chairman Mao on the morning of 9 October. Meanwhile, I received a telephone call from Mao's secretary, Lin Ke. Lin told me that Chairman Mao wanted to include Dulles's 8 October announcement of American ships stopping their escorts in the editorial. Mao also suggested postponing its publication for one day. After reading Mao's revision and corrections, I felt that the editorial's title was not a very bold headline. So, according to the changes he made in the last paragraph, I changed the title to "Let's See How They Make Their Moves." After the editorial was published on 11 October, it was thought to be Chairman Mao's writing because of its striking title and special style close to that of the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan."

Two days later, the *People's Daily* published another editorial, "Stop Talking about Cease-fire; To Leave Is the Best," on 13 October. This editorial was based upon Premier Zhou's opinion at the Politburo

Standing Committee meeting on 4 October. Zhou gave the editorial his final check and approval. Its main content was our critiques and refusal of an American request for a cease-fire on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The editorial clearly stated that there was no war between China and America, so where did the cease-fire come from? It asked America to withdraw all of its naval and air forces from Taiwan and surrounding areas around the Taiwan Straits. It was a perfect timing for this editorial, corresponding to the "Defense Ministry's Order," which was issued on 13 October and drafted by Chairman Mao. In that order, the Defense Ministry announced a continuation of the suspension of our bombardment for two more weeks. The suspension, however, still contained the precondition that no American ships could be escorts. We would resume shelling immediately if there were any American escort vessels.

Two days later, Eisenhower ordered all the warships from the Sixth Fleet which had been sent as reinforcements to the Pacific to return to the Mediterranean. He also sent Dulles to Taiwan to confer with Jiang Jieshi. The Editorial Department of the *People's Daily*, without really knowing what was going on, wrote an editorial entitled "Having Only Themselves to Blame," saying that Dulles and Jiang played a "two-man show." After the editorial was published on 21 October, Premier Zhou called us during the same morning and gave a pungent criticism that we were neither consistent with the facts nor with the policy made by the Central Committee. When Chairman Mao chaired a Politburo Standing Committee meeting that afternoon, he also criticized our editorial as bookish and naive, reeling and swaggering, which had a one-sided understanding of the Central Committee's policy and gave an inappropriate emphasis to the American-Jiang solidarity. Chairman Mao believed that Dulles's mission to Taiwan was to persuade Jiang Jieshi to withdraw his troops from Jinmen-Mazu in exchange for our commitment not to liberate Taiwan so that America could gain a total control of Taiwan's future. Disagreeing with Dulles, however, Jiang demanded that America commit to a "mutual defense" of Jinmen-Mazu. Jiang and Dulles had a big argument in which nobody gave in to the other. As a result, the meeting ended in discord and was not a "two-men show" of solidarity. After the Politburo meeting, Chairman Mao asked Premier Zhou to talk to me

one more time about this particular matter. Then we wrote another editorial to re-criticize the Dulles-Jiang meeting.

Chairman Mao also said at the Politburo Standing Committee meeting that there were many problems in the relationship between America and Jiang. The Americans wanted to make Jiang's "Republic of China" one of their dependencies or even a mandated territory. But Jiang desperately sought to maintain his semi-independence. Thus came conflicts between Jiang and America. Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Ching-kuo] still had a little bit of anti-American initiative. They would resist America if it drove them too hard. Among such cases in the past were Jiang's condemnation of Hu Shi [Hu Shih]<sup>17</sup> and his dismissal of General Sun Liren<sup>18</sup>—actions taken because Jiang believed that the troublemakers against him were supported by the Americans. Another good example of Jiang's independence was the recent smashing and looting of the American Embassy in Taipei by Taiwanese masses.<sup>19</sup> Jiang permitted American armed forces stationed in Taiwan only at the regimental level, while rejecting larger units at the divisional level which America had planned to send to Taiwan. After our shelling of Jinmen began, Jiang allowed only 3,000 more American marines to reinforce Taiwan and they were stationed in Tainan [a city in southern Taiwan]. As Chairman Mao had pointed out two days earlier, we and Jiang Jieshi had some common points. The conflict at the Dulles-Jiang meeting suggested that we might be able to ally with Jiang to resist America in a certain way. Our policy of not liberating Taiwan in the near future might help Jiang relax and concentrate on his fight against America's control. We neither landed on Jinmen nor agreed with the American proposal for a "cease-fire." This clearly caused problems between Americans and Jiang. In the past months, our policy had been one of shelling without landing and blockading without driving Jiang's troops to the wall. While continuing the same policy, we should from now on implement it more flexibly in favor of supporting Jiang Jieshi to resist America's control.

All the participants at the meeting agreed with Chairman Mao's ideas. Premier Zhou added that "shelling" was coordinated with "blockading." Since we relaxed our "blockading," we might also need to relax our

“shelling.” Mao agreed with him by suggesting that we should announce an odd-numbered-day shelling, with no shelling on even-numbered days. For the odd-numbered-day shelling, our targets might be limited only to the harbors and airport, not the defense works and residential buildings on the island. From now on, our shelling would be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light shelling might not be on a regular basis. Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such policy was unknown in the history of Chinese or world warfare. However, we were engaged in a political battle, which was supposed to be fought this way. Chairman Mao said that we only had “hand grenades” right now, but no atomic bombs. “Hand grenades” could be successful for us to use in beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], but not a good idea to use in fighting against Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, when everybody had nuclear weapons, very likely nobody would use them.

Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meeting whether we should issue a formal statement announcing future shelling on odd days only but not on even days. Chairman Mao believed it necessary. He also required me to understand that the editorial mentioned early in the meeting should not be published until our formal statement was issued.

On 25 October, the “Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” drafted by Chairman Mao was issued in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analysis of Dulles’s speech published by the U.S. State Department on 23 October, the message pointed out that on the one hand Dulles finally saw a “Communist China” and was willing to make contact with it. On the other hand, however, this American bureaucrat still considered the so-called “Republic of China” in Taiwan as a “political unit which was factually existing.” The American plan was first to separate Taiwan from the mainland, and second to mandate Taiwan’s special status. The message read, “China’s affairs must be handled by the Chinese themselves. For any problem unable to be solved at once, we can give it further thought and discuss it later between us. . . . We are not advising you to break up with Americans right now. These sort of ideas are not practical. We simply hope that you should not yield to the pressure from Americans. If you

live under somebody’s thumb and lose your sovereignty, you will eventually have no place to call your home and be thrown out into the sea.” The message announced that we had already ordered PLA batteries on the Fujian front not to fire on the airport, harbors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on even days. On odd days, we might not bomb either, as long as there were no ships or airplanes coming to Jinmen.

The same day the statement was issued, Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying<sup>20</sup> and me for a conversation. Besides asking us to make a survey of the current condition of people’s communes in Henan Province, Mao talked about the bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu. He said that during this event both we and the Americans adopted a brinkmanship policy. America concentrated many warships which invaded our territorial waters and escorted Jiang’s transportation fleets, but never fired on us. We fired 10,000 or 20,000 shells a day, or even more whenever there were American escort ships. Our shells, however, fell only on Jiang’s ships not on American ships. Some shells fell near American ships, which frightened them and caused them to turn around. While confronting each other in the Taiwan Straits, both sides continued talks in Warsaw. Americans were on one side of the brink, and we on the other. Even though both were at the brink of war, no one ever crossed the line. We used our brinkmanship policy to deal with American brinkmanship. Mao continued that there were many stories written in *Liaozhai Zhiyi* (The Chinese Ghost Stories)<sup>21</sup> about people without fear of ghosts. One of the stories was titled “Qing Feng,” which talked about a bohemian scholar named Geng Qubing. One night, Geng was reading late in a remote village house. “A ghost walks into his house with long hair and black face, and stares at the scholar. Laughing, dipping his fingers into the black ink, and painting his face black himself, Geng looked directly at the ghost with keen, sparkling eyes. The ghost felt embarrassed and ran away.” Chairman Mao told us that if we were not afraid of ghosts, ghosts would be unable to do anything to us. He said that our experience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was the case in point.

I can say that what Chairman Mao told us here is his summary of our management of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1958.

## Part II. Documents

### 1. Notation, Mao Zedong on Chen Geng’s Report, 18 December 1957<sup>22</sup>

Source: *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* [A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), 6:373

Return to Comrade Peng Dehuai:

[What has been suggested in the report] is absolutely necessary. You should supervise and push the air force to go all out [to fulfill the task], so that we are sure that the invading enemy will be annihilated. Please consider the question regarding our air force’s moving into Fujian in 1958.

### 2. Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng, 27 July 1958<sup>23</sup>

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Formation of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1992), 7:326

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

[I] could not sleep [last night], but thought about it again. It seems more appropriate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen for several days. While holding our operations, [we will] observe the situational development there. We will not attack whether or not the other side relieves a garrison. Until they launch a provocative attack, [we will] then respond with a counterattack. The solution of the problem in the Middle East takes time. Since we have time, why should we be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack plans now, but one day we will put it into implementation. If the other side invades Zhang[zhou], Shan[tou], Fuzhou, and Hangzhou, a best scenario [for us to take action] would emerge. How do you think about this idea? Could you have a discussion about this with other comrades? It is extremely beneficial [for our decision-making] with politics in command and going through repeated deliberations. To make a plan too quickly usually results in an unthoughtful consideration. I did such things quite often and sometimes had unavoidable miscalculations. What is your opinion? Even if the other side attacks us, [we still] can wait for a couple of days for a clear calculation, and then start our counterattack. Can all of



the above points be accounted as working out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy in battles a thousand miles away, and having some certainty of success that we will be ever-victorious? We must persist in the principle of fighting no battle we are not sure of winning. If you agree [with the above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and ask him to think about it very carefully. Let me know his opinion.

Have a peaceful morning!

Mao Zedong  
10 A.M., 27 July<sup>24</sup>

### 3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.<sup>25</sup>

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:348

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

[We are] preparing to shell Jinmen, dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the Americans indirectly. Therefore, do not conduct military maneuvers in Guangdong and Shengzhen, so that the British would not be scared.

Mao Zedong  
1 A.M., 18 August

P.S.: Please call air force headquarters attention to the possibility that the Taiwan side might counterattack us by dispatching large groups of air force (such as dozens, or even over one hundred, airplanes) to try to take back air control over Jin[men] and Ma[zu]. If this happens, we should prepare to use large groups of air force to defeat them immediately. However, *in chasing them, [our planes] should not cross the space line over Jinmen and Mazu.*<sup>26</sup>

### 4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng, 3 September 1958<sup>27</sup>

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:376

Part I

Comrade [Huang] Kecheng:

Both the instruction and the appendix<sup>28</sup> are well written. Please send them to Comrade Peng Dehuai immediately for his reading. Then, they should be approved by the Central Military Commission's meeting and issued thereafter. Please give a detailed explanation of the reasons [for these docu-

ments] at the Military Commission's meeting.

Part II

Distribute them to the Fujian Military District and all other military districts; the party committees of all provinces, metropolises, and regions; all departments of the Central Military Commission and all special forces headquarters; all members of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lu Dingyi;<sup>29</sup> and Wu Lengxi.

### 5. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 5 September 1958 (Excerpt)

Source: *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1994), 341-348

As far as the international situation is concerned, our view has always been optimistic, which can be summarized as "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind."

At present, America commits itself to an "all-round contract" policy along our coast. It seems to me that the Americans will only feel comfortable if they take complete responsibility for Jinmen and Mazu, or even for such small islands as Dadan, Erdan, and Dongding. America gets into our noose. Thereby, America's neck is hanging in China's iron noose. Although Taiwan is [for the Americans] another noose, it is a bit farther from [the mainland]. America now moves its head closer to us, since it wants to take responsibility for Jinmen and other islands. Someday we will kick America, and it cannot run away, because it is tied up by our noose.

I would like to present some viewpoints, offering some ideas for the participants at this meeting. Do not treat them as a decision, or some kind of law. As law, they might not be changed; as opinions, they are alive and flexible. Let us use these points to review and analyze the current international situation.

The first question is who fears whom a bit more. I believe that the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. So are we. But the question is which side actually fears the other a bit more. This is my point, as well as my observation. I would like to invite everybody here to apply this point to your observa-

tion from now on. You can observe the situation for one, two, three, or four years by using this point. You will eventually find out whether the West fears the East a bit more, or the East fears the West a bit more. According to my opinion, it is Dulles who fears us more. Britain, America, Germany, France, and other western countries fear us a lot more. Why do they have more fears? This is an issue of strength, and an issue of popularity. Public attitude is indeed strength. There are more people on our side, and fewer on their side. Among the three doctrines [in today's world]—communism, nationalism, and imperialism, communism and nationalism are relatively closer. Nationalism dominates a large part of the world, including the three continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even though the ruling groups of some countries in these continents are pro-West, such as those in Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and Iran, among the people in these countries many, probably quite a few, are pro-East. Only the monopoly-capitalists and a few people who have been totally poisoned by the monopoly-capitalists want a war. Except for them, the rest of the people, or the majority of the people (not all of them) do not want a war. In northern European countries, for example, the ruling classes, though belonging to the capitalists, do not want a war. The balance of strength is like this. The truth is in the hands of the majority of the people, not in the hands of Dulles. As a result, while they feel rather diffident, we are solid and dependable inside. We depend on the people, while they support those reactionary rulers. This is what Dulles is doing right now. He specializes in such people as "Generalissimo Jiang," [South Korean leader] Syngman Rhee, and [South Vietnam leader] Ngo Dinh Diem. My viewpoint is that both sides are afraid [of each other], but they fear us a bit more. Thus, it is impossible for a war to break out.

The second question is what is the nature of the international military alliances organized by the Americans and the other imperialists, such as the North Atlantic [Treaty Organization], the Baghdad [Treaty Organization], and the Manila [Treaty Organization].<sup>30</sup> We say that they are of an aggressive nature. It is absolutely true that these military organizations are of an aggressive nature. However, against which side do these organizations direct their spearhead? Are they attacking socialism, or na-

tionalism? It seems to me that they are currently attacking the nationalist countries, such as Egypt, Lebanon, and the other weak countries in the Middle East. But they will attack the socialist countries until, say, when Hungary completely has failed, Poland has collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany have fallen down, and even the Soviet Union and us have encountered troubles. They will attack us when we are shaking and crumbling. Why should they fail to attack you when you are falling down? Stable and strong, we are not falling down now, and they are unable to bite the hard bone. So they turn to those more bitable countries, gnawing at Indonesia, India, Burma, and Ceylon. They have attempted to overthrow [Gamal Abdul] Nasser,<sup>31</sup> undermine Iraq, and subjugate Algeria. By now Latin America has made a significant progress. As [U.S.] vice president, [Richard] Nixon was not welcomed in eight countries, where people spat and stoned him. When the political representative of America was treated with saliva and rocks there, it means contempt for America's "dignity," and an unwillingness to treat it "politely." Because you are our enemy, we therefore treat you with saliva and rocks. Thus, we should not take the three military organizations too seriously. [We] need to analyze them. Even though aggressive, they are not steady.

The third point is about the tension in the international situation. We are calling every day for relaxing international tensions because it will benefit the people of the world. So, can we say that it must be harmful for us whenever there is a tense situation? I do not think it necessarily so. A tense situation is not necessarily harmful for us in every circumstance; it has an advantageous side. Why do I think this way? It is because besides its disadvantageous side, a tense situation can mobilize the population, can particularly mobilize the backward people, can mobilize the people in the middle, and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction. Afraid of fighting a nuclear war? You have to think it over. Look, we have fired a few shells on Jinmen and Mazu, and I did not expect that the entire world would be so deeply shocked, and the smoke and mist is shading the sky. This is because people are afraid of war. They are afraid that the Americans will make trouble everywhere in the world. Except for Syngman Rhee, no second country

supports America among so many countries in the world. Probably the Philippines can be added to the list, but it offers only "conditional support." It is a tense situation, for example, that caused the Iraqi revolution, is it not? The current tense situation is caused by the imperialists themselves, not by us. In the final analysis, however, the tense situation is more harmful for the imperialists. Lenin once introduced this point in his discussions about war. Lenin said that a war could motivate people's spiritual condition, making it tense. Although there is no war right now, a tense situation caused by the current military confrontation can also bring every positive factor into play, while at the same time stimulating groups of backward people to think.

The fourth point is about the issue of withdrawing armed forces from the Middle East. American and British troops of aggression must withdraw. The imperialists now refuse to withdraw and intend to stay there. This is disadvantageous for the people, but it will at the same time educate the people. In order to fight against aggressors, you need to have a target; without a target, it is difficult for you to fight against the aggressors. The imperialists now come up there themselves to become the target, and refuse to leave. This arouses the people of the entire world to fight against the American aggressors. After all, it seems to me that it is not so harmful for the people when the aggressors put off their withdrawal. Thereby the people will yell at the aggressors everyday: why do you not leave [our country]?

The fifth question is whether it is a good thing or bad thing to have [Charles] de Gaulle in power. At present, the French Communist Party and the French people should firmly oppose de Gaulle coming to power, and veto his constitution. Meanwhile, they should also be prepared for the struggle after he takes office in case they cannot stop him. Once in power, de Gaulle will oppress the French Communist Party and the French people. His taking office, however, may also have advantageous effects in both domestic and foreign affairs. Internationally, this person likes to make trouble for Britain and America. He likes to argue. He had some miserable experiences in the past. In his memoirs, de Gaulle blamed Britain and America all the time, but said some nice words about the Soviet Union. It seems to me that he will make trouble

again. It is advantageous when France has trouble with Britain and America. Domestically, he would become a necessary teacher who can educate the French proletarians, just like "Generalissimo Jiang" in China. Without "Generalissimo Jiang," it would not be enough for the Chinese Communist Party's positive education alone to educate [China's] 600 million people. Currently, de Gaulle is still enjoying his reputation. If you defeat him now, people are still missing him as he is still alive. Let him come to power, he will run no more than five, six, seven, eight, or ten years. He will be finished sooner or later. After he is finished, no second de Gaulle will be there and his poison will be completely released. You must allow his poison to be released, just like that we did to our Rightists.<sup>32</sup> You have to let him release the poison. If not, he always has the poison. You can eliminate the poison only after he releases it.

The sixth point is the embargo, that is, no trade with us. Is this advantageous or disadvantageous to us? I believe that the embargo benefits us a lot. We do not feel it [to be] disadvantageous at all. It will have tremendous beneficial impact on our [handling of] clothing, food, housing, and transportation, as well as on our reconstruction (including the production of steel and iron). The embargo forces us to work out all the solutions ourselves. My appreciation goes to He Yingqin<sup>33</sup> all the time. In 1937 when our Red Army was re-organized into the Eighth Route Army under the Nationalist Revolution Army, we received 400,000 *yuan* of *fabi* every month. After we were paid the money, we became dependent on it. In 1940, however, the anti-Communist movement reached its peak, and the payment stopped. No more money was paid [to us]. We had to find out our own means [to support ourselves] from then on. What did we find out? We issued an order that as there was no more *fabi*, each regiment had to find out its own way of self-support. Thereafter, all [of our] base areas launched a production movement. The value yielded from the production reached not 400,000, not 4 million, even not 40 million *yuan*, but about 100 or possibly 200 million *yuan*, if we combined the production of all the base areas together. We have since relied on our own efforts. Who is today's He Yingqin? It is Dulles, a different name. Currently, they are carrying out an embargo. We are going our own way. We have

initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwing away dependence and breaking down blind faith. The result is good.

The seventh is the non-recognition issue. Is [imperialist countries'] recognition [of the PRC] or non-recognition relatively more advantageous to us? Same as on the embargo issue, imperialist countries' non-recognition of us is more advantageous to us than their recognition of us. So far there are about forty some countries which refuse to recognize us. The main reason lies in America. For instance, France intends to recognize China, but it does not dare to do it because of America's opposition. Many other countries in Central and South America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and Canada, dare not to recognize us because of America. There are only nineteen capitalist countries which recognize us now, plus another eleven countries in the socialist camp, plus Yugoslavia, totaling thirty-one countries. It seems to me that we can live with this small number. Non-recognition [of us], in my opinion, is not a bad thing. Rather, it is relatively good. Let us produce more steel. When we can produce 600 or 700 million tons of steel, they will recognize us at last. They may still refuse to recognize us by then, but who cares?

The last issue is about preparations for an anti-aggression war. I said in my first point that as both sides are afraid of war, war should not break out. Everything in the world, however, needs a safety factor. Since there exists a monopoly-capitalist class in the world, I am afraid that it will make trouble recklessly and abruptly. We must therefore be prepared to fight a war. This point needs to be explained clearly to our cadres. First, we do not want a war, and we oppose any war. So does the Soviet Union. If war comes, it will be started by the other side and we will be forced to enter the fighting. Second, however, we do not fear fighting a war. We must fight it if we have to. We have only grenades and potatoes in our hands right now. A war of atomic and hydrogen bombs is of course terrible since many people will die. That is why we oppose a war. Unfortunately, the decision will not be made by us. If the imperialists decide to fight a war, we have to be prepared for everything. We must fight a war if we have to. I am saying that it is not so terrifying even if half of our population perishes. This is certainly talk in extreme terms.

Thinking about the history of the entire universe, I do not see any reason to be pessimistic about the future. I had a debate with Premier [Jawarharlal] Nehru<sup>34</sup> over this issue. He said that [as the result of a nuclear war] no government could remain and everything would be destroyed. Even though someone might want to seek peace, no government would be there. I told him that it would never be like that. If your government would be eliminated by atomic bombs, the people would form another one which could work out a peace. If you fail to think about things in such extreme terms, how can you ever sleep? This is no more than a matter of people being killed, and [what is reflected here] is the fear of fighting a war. But if the imperialists definitely want to fight a war and attack us first, using atomic bombs, it does not matter whether you fear fighting a war or not; in any case they will attack you. If that were the case, what should be our attitude? Is it better to fear or not to fear? It is extremely dangerous [for us] to fear this and fear that every day, which will make our cadres and people feel discouraged. So I believe that [we] should be case-hardened toward fighting a war. We will fight it if we have to. We will rebuild our country after the war. Therefore, we are now mobilizing the militias. All people's communes should organize their militias. Everyone in our country is a soldier. We should arm the people. We can distribute several million guns at the beginning. Later on we will distribute several dozen million guns among the people. All provinces should be able to construct light weapons, including rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, and light mortars. Each people's commune should have a military office to supervise [combat] training. Some of our participants here today are intellectuals. You need to make a call for holding a pen in one hand and gripping a gun in the other. You cannot only have pens in your hands. You should be culturalized as well as militarized.

These eight points are my opinions. I offer them to you for your observation of the international situation.

**6. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 8 September 1958 (Excerpt)**

Source: *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 348-352

I am going to discuss something we have talked about before. About the noose issue we discussed at the last meeting, did we not? Now I want to say that we need to place nooses on Dulles, Eisenhower, and other warmongers. There are many places where the nooses can be used on the Americans. In my opinion, wherever an [American] military base is located, [America] is tied up by a noose. [This happens], for example, in the East, in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan; in the West, in West Germany, France, Italy, and Britain; in the Middle East, in Turkey and Iran; and in Africa, in Morocco and other places. In each of these countries, America has many military bases. For instance, in Turkey there are more than twenty American military bases, and it is said that in Japan there are about 800. In some other countries, although there is no [American] military base, they are occupied by the troops [of the imperialists]. For example, American troops in Lebanon and British troops in Jordan.

Here I am focusing on two of these nooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan. Taiwan is an old noose since America has occupied it for several years. Who ties America there? The People's Republic of China ties it there. 600 million Chinese have a noose in their hands. This is a steel noose and it ties America's neck. Who tied America? The noose was made by America itself and tied by itself, and it throws the other end of the noose to mainland China, letting us grasp it. [America] was tied in Lebanon only recently, but the noose was also made by America itself, tied by itself, and the other end of the noose was thrown into the hands of Arab nations. Not only so, America also throws the [other end of the] noose into the hands of the majority of the people in the world. Everyone condemns America, and no one gives it any sympathy. The noose is held by the people and governments in many countries. In the Middle East, for example, the UN held meetings [on the Lebanon issue], but [America's] main problem is that it has been tied by the Arab people and cannot escape. At present, America is caught in a dilemma—is it better to withdraw earlier or later? If an early withdrawal, why did it come in the first place? If a late withdrawal, [the noose] will be getting tighter and tighter, and will become an encased knot. How can this be handled? Lebanon is different from Taiwan

with which America has signed a treaty. The situation in Lebanon is more flexible as no treaty is involved there. It is said that one issued the invitation, and the other came, and [the noose] is hitched up. As far as Taiwan is concerned, this is an encased knot since a treaty was signed. There is no difference between the Democrats and Republicans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on the treaty and [Harry] Truman sent the Seventh Fleet there. Truman could come and go at will since there was no treaty during his time. Eisenhower signed the treaty. America is tied up [in Taiwan] because of the Guomindang's panic and request, and also because America was willing [to be tied up there].

Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen and Mazu? I think that it has also been tied up at Jinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Did not the Americans say that they had not

made any decision yet, and that they would make the decision in accordance with the situation after the Communists landed there? The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomindang troops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu. America has to pay attention to them as long as these two large garrisons are on the islands. This concerns the interest and feelings of their class. Why do the British and Americans treat the governments in some countries so nicely? They cannot fold their hands and see these governments collapse. Today the Americans and Jiang are having a joint military exercise under the command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] Beakley, commander of the Seventh Fleet. Also is there is [Roland] Smoot,<sup>35</sup> the person who ordered the firing, which made the [U.S.] State Department and Defense Department unhappy. He is there, together with Beakley, to take the command.

To make a long story short, you [Americans] are noosed here. You may be able to get away if you take the initiative to leave slowly and quietly. Is there not a policy for getting away? In my view, you had a policy for getting away from Korea, and now a policy for getting away from Jinmen-Mazu is being shaped. As a matter of fact, those in your group really want to get away, and the public opinion also asks you to do so. To get away is to extricate yourself from the noose. How can this be done? That is, the 110,000 troops should leave. Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs. The dealing between us and you [the Americans] is an international issue. These are two different issues. Although you Americans have been associated with Jiang Jieshi, it is possible to dissolve this chemical combination. This is just like electrolytic aluminum or electro-

### **Khrushchev's Nuclear Promise To Beijing During the 1958 Crisis**

**introduction by Vladislav M. Zubok**

The history of the "second" Taiwan Straits crisis (August-October 1958) has gotten a second wind lately, due to the emergence of new Chinese evidence.<sup>1</sup> While this research has greatly illuminated Chinese decision-making, scholars still have been unable to ascertain precisely what transpired between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships after the outbreak of the crisis. The document printed below, a previously secret 27 September 1958 communication from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CPC), an internally circulated version of which is now declassified and available to researchers at the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, adds one more piece of evidence to this puzzling story.

Two episodes relating to Soviet-Chinese interactions during the 1958 crisis have attracted particular attention: the secret visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Beijing and his talks with Chinese leaders on September 6-7; and the letter of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 warning that an attack on the People's Republic

of China (PRC) would result in Soviet nuclear retaliation. Researchers have assumed for some time that Soviet leaders were unhappy with the new Sino-American confrontation and considered the Chinese brinkmanship as a dangerous development that interfered with Kremlin plans for "detente" with the West. In their memoirs, Khrushchev and, more recently, Gromyko both described how puzzled and alarmed they were by Mao's seemingly reckless attitude toward nuclear war as not only possible, but actually desirable for the communist camp.<sup>2</sup> However, Khrushchev's September 7 public declaration to Eisenhower—stating that "An attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union"<sup>3</sup>—seems to contradict this general thesis.

The secret letter from the CC CPSU to the CC CPC printed below links the two puzzling events noted above, and helps point toward possible answers to the questions they raise. It attests to the fact that, in spite of the genuine tension between the two communist giants, the Khrushchev leadership at that time still was determined to stand with Beijing at a moment of crisis, and took additional steps to prove that it remained loyal to the spirit and letter of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950.

The first article of that treaty, concluded at the end of Mao Zedong's summit meetings in Moscow with Stalin after the estab-

lishment of the PRC the previous fall, stated that, "in the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal."<sup>4</sup> (The United States was not mentioned by name in the text, but the implication was clear enough.)

What emerged from the Gromyko-Chinese talks in early September 1958 and what appeared to have worried the Kremlin leadership was not that the Chinese might provoke a general war with the United States. Rather, as the text of the Soviet letter below implies, it was the general assumption of the Chinese Politburo that if the United States "should start a war against the People's Republic of China" and used tactical nuclear weapons against the PRC (in response to Chinese attacks against the offshore islands or Taiwan), the Soviet Union should remain passively on the sidelines, as a strategic reserve in case the Americans decided to broaden the war by using high-yield (e.g., thermonuclear) weapons. This interpretation of the Soviet commitments diverged significantly from Article I of the Treaty signed in Moscow eight years earlier.

In a forthcoming book, Constantine Pleshakov and I argue that many in the Soviet leadership were unhappy to see the

lytic copper, the combination will be dissolved when it is electrolyzed. Jiang Jieshi is [for us] a domestic issue, and you [Americans] are [for us] a diplomatic issue. [The two] cannot be mixed up.

America now attempts to dominate four out of the five continents, except for Australia. First of all, in North America, this is mainly America's own place, and its armed forces are there. The next is Central and South America where it intends to provide "protection," although it does not have garrisons there. Then, there are Europe, Africa, and Asia, to which [America] has given its main attention, and deployed its main force in Europe and Asia. I do not know how it [America] can fight a war with a few soldiers scattered everywhere. Thus, I believe that it focuses on occupying the intermediate zone. As far as the territories of our [socialist countries] are concerned, I believe that the Americans do not dare to come, unless the socialist camp encounters big trouble and they are convinced that the Soviet Union and China will totally collapse as soon as they come. Except for [the countries belonging to] our camp, America is seeking hegemony everywhere in the world, including Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and, also, Australia. Australia has linked itself with America through a military alliance and follows its orders. Is it better for America to try to control these places by utilizing the banner of "anti-communism" or by fighting a real war against communism? To fight [a real war] against communism means to dispatch its troops to fight us and fight the Soviet Union. I would say that the Americans are not so stupid. They only have a few soldiers to be transferred here and there. After the incident in Lebanon, American troops were transferred there from the Pacific. After they arrived in the Red Sea area, the situation changed unfavorably [in the Pacific], and they turned around quickly and landed at Malaya. They announced that [the troops] were taking a vacation there, and kept quiet for seventeen days. Later, after one of their reporters claimed that [America] was taking charge of the Indian Ocean, everyone in the India Ocean [area] expressed opposition. When we began our artillery bombardment, America came here since there were not enough [of its] troops here. It will probably better serve America's interests if it leaves such places like Taiwan in an earlier time. If

it continues to stay, let it be noosed here. This will not affect the overall situation, and we can continue the Great Leap Forward.

We should strive to produce eleven million tons of steel, doubling last year's output. Next year another twenty million tons, striving to reach thirty million tons. The year after next, another twenty million tons. Is it not fifty million tons by then? Three years of hard efforts, fifty million tons of steel. At that time, we will occupy third place in the world, next only to the Soviet Union and the United States. The [steel] output of the Soviet Union reached fifty million [tons] last year. In three years, they can make it sixty million [tons]. If we make hard efforts in the next three years, it is possible that [our steel output] may surpass fifty million tons. In another two years, by 1962, it is possible [for us to produce] eighty to a hundred million tons [of steel], approaching the level of the United States (because of the impact of economic recessions, America's [steel output] will probably only reach a hundred million tons at that time). [At the end of] the second five-year plan, we will approach or even surpass America. In another two years, in seven years, [we may] produce a hundred fifty million tons of steel, and surpass America to become the number one in the world. It is not good for us to name ourselves as the most superior in the world, but it is not bad to become the number one steel producer. [We should also] make hard efforts in the next three years to [increase] grain production. The output of this year is between three hundred fifty to four hundred million tons. [The output] will double next year, reaching, probably, seven hundred fifty million tons. We should slow down a little bit the year after next, for we have to find outlets for [extra] grain. Food will be grain's main outlet; but we also need to find other outlets in industry. For example, [using grain] to produce ethyl alcohol, and, through ethyl alcohol, to produce rubber, artificial fiber, plastic, and other things.

Let me talk a little bit more about the tense situation. You [Americans] cause the tense situation, and you think it advantageous to you, do you not? You may be wrong. The tense situation can mobilize the people in the world, making everyone blame you Americans. When a tense situation emerges in the Middle East, everyone blames the Americans. When tension comes to Taiwan everyone again blames the Ameri-

cans. Only a few people blame us. The Americans blame us, Jiang Jieshi blames us, and Syngman Rhee blames us. Maybe there are some others [who blame us], but mainly these three. Britain is a vacillating element. While it will not be militarily involved, it is said that it has strong sympathy politically. This is because Britain faces problems in Jordan. How can it handle the situation in Jordan if the Americans withdraw from Lebanon because [the British] failed to show sympathy [to the Americans]? Nehru issued a statement, which basically echoed us, suggesting that Taiwan and other [offshore] islands should be returned to us, but hoping that a peaceful solution can be reached. The countries in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Iraq, warmly welcomed [our artillery bombardment] this time. They praise us every day, saying that we have done the right thing. This is because our [artillery bombardment] here has reduced the pressure the Americans put on them.

I think that we can tell the people of the world publicly that, in comparison, a tense situation is more disadvantageous to the western countries, as well as more disadvantageous to America [than to them]. Why is it advantageous to them [the people of the world]? Does the tense situation in the Middle East do any good for America? Does it do any good for Britain? Or is it more advantageous to the Arab countries and to the peace-loving people in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other continents. To which side is the tense situation in the Taiwan [Straits] more advantageous? Let us take our country as an example. Our country is now experiencing a nationwide mobilization. If during the Middle East crisis about thirty to forty million people participated in the rallies and protest parades, this time [during the Taiwan crisis] we will probably mobilize 300 million people [to participate in rallies and parades], educating them and toughening them. This event will also benefit our unity with all democratic parties<sup>36</sup> in China because all the parties now share a common goal. As a result, those who in the past had knots in their hearts, who were unhappy, and who were criticized will now feel a little bit more comfortable. If we can continue to handle the situation in this way, doing it again and again, we will all belong to the working class one day. Therefore, in my view, the tense situation caused by the imperialists eventually becomes advanta-

geous to hundreds of millions of Chinese people who oppose imperialism, to peace-loving peoples all over the world, and to all social classes, all social ranks, and the governments [in various countries]. They now have to believe that America, always arrogant and aggressive, is no good after all. [The U.S. government] moved six of its thirteen aircraft carriers [to the Taiwan Straits]. Among these carriers, there are some big ones with the size reaching 65,000 tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it forms the strongest fleet in the world. It does not matter if you want to make it even stronger. It does not matter if you want to concentrate all of your four fleets here. I welcome you all. After all, what you have is useless here. Even though you move every ship you have here, you cannot land. Ships have to be in the water, and cannot come to the land. You can do nothing but make some threatening gesture here. The more you play, the more the people in the world will understand how unreasonable you are.

### 7. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh, 10 September 1958

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:413

Comrade President:

Your letter of 8 September<sup>37</sup> has been received. Thank you.

I believe that (1) the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. As far as the current situation is concerned, it is highly unlikely that a big war will break out; and (2) it seems to me that the business in your country should go on as usual.

### 8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and Huang Kecheng, 13 September 1958<sup>38</sup>

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 7:416-417

Part One

Premier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng:

[I] have received [the documents] you sent to me, including two intelligence reports on Jinmen's situation and the order of our military.<sup>39</sup> In addition to carrying out [the operations] in accordance with the lines set up by the order, it is also necessary to fire some scattered shells day and night around the clock, especially at night, shelling especially the area within the three-mile radius of Liaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to

300 shells a day) will make the enemy panic[ky] and restless day and night. It seems to me that [doing this] is a big, or at least moderate, advantage [to us]. What is your opinion about it? On the days of heavy shelling we will not fire scattered shells. On the days of light shelling we will use this method. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowan at night, [we] should accurately calibrate battery emplacements during daytime, which will make the shelling at night more accurate. Please seek opinions from [the people at] the front, to see if this method is workable or not.

As far as the Warsaw talks are concerned, in the next three to four days, or one week, [we] should not lay all of our cards on the table, but should test [the Americans]. It seems that it is unlikely for the other side to lay all of their cards out, and that they will also test us. What is your opinion, Zhou [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Wentian],<sup>40</sup> and Qiao [Guanhua]<sup>41</sup>?

Congratulations for the success from the very start.

### 9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1958

Source: *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 353

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

Your letter dated the night of the 18th has been received. It is indeed very good.<sup>42</sup> [I am] very happy after reading it since [we] have gained the initiative. Please take due actions immediately. Please also pass your letter and my reply here at once to Comrades Wang Bingnan<sup>43</sup> and Ye Fei. Make sure that they understand [the key to] our new policy and new tactics is holding the initiative, keeping the offensive, and remaining reasonable. We must conduct our diplomatic struggle from a far-sighted perspective so that it will develop without any difficulty.

Mao Zedong

4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei

### 10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Conversation with S.F. Antonov<sup>44</sup> on the Taiwan Issue, 5 October 1958 (Excerpt)<sup>45</sup>

Source: *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan*, 262-267

The entire situation has already changed at this point. Dulles's press conference published on 30 September reveals some

changes in America's position. Although Dulles's talks with reporters do not clearly indicate [America's new position], he expressed ambiguously that if China commits to a cease-fire, America can persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from the offshore islands [under his control]. Apparently America intends to carry out basically a policy to help Jiang slip away from Jinmen.

After Dulles made this suggestion, Jiang Jieshi became very upset. Jiang knew the content of Dulles's talks in advance. Thus, he gave a speech on 29 September, and another on 1 October, stating that the Americans had done a disservice to him. Two days later, when he talked to British reporters from *The Times* [of London], Jiang asked Britain to advise America not to be fooled [by the communists]. This is really funny.

Last night the Indian ambassador [to Beijing] hurriedly informed me of V. K. Krishna Menon's plan [at the United Nations].<sup>46</sup> Menon believes that current changes in the situation have already become a tendency. Thus, he is planning to make a general speech at the UN meeting, including a suggestion that Jiang's troops withdraw from the offshore islands and a request to us to stop fighting against Jiang. Britain attempted to mediate this affair in the past, but we refused it. Dag Hammarskjöld<sup>47</sup> of the UN intended to talk to us through Norway, [but] we also turned it down. Even though America was not willing to invite India [to mediate] before, it had no choice but to invite Menon this time. Menon was unwilling to come himself, if America did not send an invitation to him, or if he was unsure about the situation. At the present, since Menon feels certain about the situation because America has asked for his help, he is planning to deliver this proposition. Our assumption is as follows: after Menon makes his proposition, it will be accepted by UN members, and then by most countries in the world. Through this approach, the UN can put pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhile ask us to make compromises. Thereby, America can maneuver between Jiang and us to make a bargain.

We calculate that America has three cards to play:

First, to defend Jin[men]-Ma[zu]. America's proposition on 18 September requested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we rejected it immediately. We have been ever since condemning America's occupation of

Taiwan. America now attempts to expand its occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we must oppose it firmly. America dares not engage in a war merely for the sake of Jinmen, because the American people and its allied countries oppose it. Moreover, if America wants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared to fight against it. In addition, the Soviet Union supports us. After our rejection, America took back its first card, that is, defending Jinmen and Mazu.

Its second card is about "two Chinas." America's proposition on 30 September had a central point of lining up China with the Soviet Union on the one side, and Jiang Jieshi with the United States on the other side. It puts forth a "two Chinas" scheme and pushes us to accept the status quo. We firmly oppose it now, and will continue to oppose it.

The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits. America intends to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from the offshore islands as an exchange to freeze the situation in the Taiwan Straits, requesting our renouncing the use of force on Taiwan, or our accepting America's occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and "two Chinas" as "an existing fact." America may not play its third card at once. As soon as Dulles's meeting with press caused Jiang Jieshi's big complaints, Dulles wrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort. At the same time, Eisenhower informed the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that America could not yield to force. He, however, also said that if Communist China ceased fire, [America] could reconsider [the situation there]. It shows that America is still wavering, though it wants to get away from Jinmen-Mazu.

According to the above calculations, I told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we did not want Menon to deliver his proposition to the UN. We cannot trade a settlement of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition of America's occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and acceptance of the existence of so-called "two Chinas."

Meanwhile, some Asian and African countries are suggesting that the Eight-nation Committee<sup>48</sup> can draft a statement about the Taiwan situation. I also told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we believed that the Asian and African countries could hardly issue such a joint statement since there existed two different positions among them-

selves. I said to him it was better not to have this kind of joint statement. If the statement mentioned a cease-fire, it would benefit America; we had to oppose it. If the statement criticized both America and China, it would be unable to tell right from wrong, we had to disagree as well. A just statement should include the following major points: to recognize firmly that Taiwan is China's territory, and that no foreign countries are allowed to intervene; America should withdraw from the Taiwan Straits; no creation of "two Chinas"; China and America should continue their talks. Obviously, some countries that follow America will not agree to these points. Thus, if the Asian and African countries cannot issue a just statement, it is better for them not to issue any joint statement.

Moreover, this morning Comrade Chen Yi<sup>49</sup> met diplomatic envoys from eight concerned Asian and African countries that have diplomatic relations with China. Regarding these countries' discussion about issuing a joint statement, he clarified the above position of the Chinese government and made further explanations.

I talked to you on 30 September [about our policy toward Taiwan]. Originally, our plan had two steps: the first was to recover the offshore islands; the second to liberate Taiwan. Later, after we began shelling Jinmen, our bombardment played a role to mobilize the people of the world, especially the Chinese people. Thereafter, many countries launched and joined a new anti-American movement on a much larger scale than that after the Lebanon event. The situation already becomes clear. America knows that we do not want to fight a war against it. When it escorted Jiang Jieshi's ships, we did not fire [on them]. We have no intention to liberate Taiwan immediately. We know that America does not want to fight a war against us over Jinmen either. It strictly restrained its air and naval forces from entering our territorial waters between three and twelve miles from our coast. Currently America works on how to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu to prevent its forces from being pinned down in this region.

As I said to you on 30 September, we realized that it was better to keep Jiang Jieshi on Jinmen-Mazu. After the Central Committee's discussions, we still believe that it is the best to keep Jiang Jieshi on Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It

is extremely beneficial [to us] that Jiang stays at Jinmen and Mazu, and America continues to intervene. It will educate the people of the world, especially the Chinese people. We will not let America go, when it wants to get away from Jinmen and Mazu. We demand that America withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan. Under this circumstance, if we need tension, we can shell Jinmen and Mazu; if we want relaxation, we can stop shelling. As Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi said to you, [we can] have small-, or medium-, or large-scale shelling of Jinmen. We can have shelling while negotiating, and we can stop shelling anytime we like. This is advantageous for us. So we are not going to recover these offshore islands in the near future. We will take back them together with the Penghus and Taiwan later.

Thus, we decided to issue a "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the name of our defense minister. [It indicates that] we will suspend our shelling for seven days from 1:00 p.m. on 6 October so as to allow Jiang's troops to transport their logistic supplies easily. Our suspension of bombardment, however, has a precondition that no American ships provide escort. Moreover, [it] suggests a direct negotiation with Jiang Jieshi searching for peaceful solutions to the conflicts between both sides. Since our shelling is actually a punitive operation against Jiang's troops, we can slow it down as long as Jiang is willing to cooperate [with us]. If he is not, we will continue to punish him. Therefore, we will always be in a positive position.

Our purpose in publishing this "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" is to deepen the conflicts between America and Jiang. Jiang's current garrison on Jinmen, about 80,000 men under the command of Chen Cheng,<sup>50</sup> is the main strength of Jiang's forces. Jiang Jieshi wants to defend Jinmen to the last and drag America down to the water. Chen Cheng, however, wants to save these troops. If we bottle up the troops on Jinmen, it is easier for America to encourage Chen to persuade Jiang to withdraw his troops from the offshore islands. If we let these troops stay on Jinmen, Jiang and Chen can use them to drive a hard bargain with America. In our message to the compatriots [in Taiwan], we warn them that America will abandon them sooner or later. There is no need to fight for America's interests between the two Chinese sides. Although

we can possibly fight for thirty more years, it is better [for both sides] to talk for solutions.

To be sure, [on the one hand,] Jiang Jieshi will likely hold a press conference [as soon as we publish our message], accusing us of attempting to cast a bone between him and America, saying that he will never sit down with the Chinese Communists for negotiations, and so forth. In his mind, however, Jiang can figure out himself that there is a lot behind this, and that he can make a further bargain with America. This is his old trick. On the other hand, Americans will also criticize the Chinese Communist attempt to drive a wedge between them and Jiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect in their minds that we suddenly let up pressure on Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death, because there might be a tacit agreement between us and Jiang. The louder Jiang yells, the more suspicious the Americans will become.

Therefore, we cause a new dilemma for America, and it does not know how to cope with it. America is facing a very difficult situation right now. It originally planned to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw [from Jinmen]. If it again suggests withdrawal, Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandons him. If America stops persuading Jiang to withdraw, we will achieve our goal.

**11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958**

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:437

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

Our batteries should not fire a single shell on 6 and 7 October, even if there are American airplanes and ships escorts. If the enemy bombs us, our forces should still not return fire. [We should] cease our activities, lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then, we will know what to do. Although the air force must carry on our defense, the airplanes should not fly off the coast. One more thing: do not issue any public statement during these two days because we need to wait and see clearly how the situation will develop. Please carry out the above order immediately. Or [you can] pass this letter [as an order] to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu.<sup>51</sup>

Mao Zedong

8:00 A.M., 5 October

P.S.: After you have handled this letter, please convey it to the Premier.<sup>52</sup>

**12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958**

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:437

Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng]:

Please pass on to Han [Xianchu] and Ye [Fei]:

Yesterday I said not to issue any public statement, and to wait and see for two days. Later [I] thought about this again, and considered it more appropriate to issue a statement first. This is the reason for [me to write] the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan."<sup>53</sup> This statement is about to be issued, please instruct the Fujian Front radio station to broadcast it repeatedly.

Mao Zedong

2:00 A.M., 6 October

Send this to [Huang] Kecheng for handling immediately.<sup>54</sup>

**13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 11 October 1958**

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:449-450

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

No hurry to reply to the letters from the Soviets.<sup>55</sup> Need to discuss them first.

Cao Juren<sup>56</sup> has arrived. Ignore him for a few days, do not talk to him too soon. [I] will think about whether I need to meet him or not.

Tell [Huang] Kecheng to double-check accurate numbers of how many enemy airplanes we shot down, and how many of our planes were shot down in more than fifty days of air engagements since the Shantou air battle on 19 August. Prepare the statistics for the Soviets' information. They believed the enemy's false information and do not know the true story. [The Soviets] should sell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let us control the employment of them. The Soviets may send a few people to teach us how to use them. I intend to adopt this policy. [We can] discuss and decide whether it is appropriate tonight or tomorrow night.

Mao Zedong

10:00 A.M., 11 October

**14. Notation, Mao Zedong on Zhou Enlai's Report, "On the Shelling of Jinmen," 20 October 1958<sup>57</sup>**

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:466

Part I

The report is approved.

Part II

It is more appropriate to start shelling *one hour after*, or half hour after, the reading [of the order] is finished.<sup>58</sup>

**15. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 31 October 1958**

Source: *Mao Zedong Wengao*, 7:479

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and [Huang] Kecheng:

[We] should extend the areas where no shelling is allowed on even-numbered days. That means shelling will be prohibited on even days on all fronts. Allow Jiang's troops to come outdoors and get some sunshine so that they can continue to stay there. Only fire a few shells on odd days. Instruct the Fujian [front] by internal channels to carry it out. Do not issue public statement at this point. If there is a need later, [we] will consider making an announcement then. Please discuss and decide on this matter.

I am leaving for a southern trip this afternoon.

Mao Zedong

2:00 A.M., 31 October

**16. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 2 November 1958**

Source: *Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:490

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and [Huang] Kecheng:

Suggest having a heavy all day shelling tomorrow (the 3rd, an odd day). Fire at least 10,000 shells and bomb all the military targets [on Jinmen] in order to affect America's election, promoting the Democrats' victory and the Republicans' defeat. Meanwhile, give Jiang's troops an excuse for refusing to withdraw [from Jinmen]. Please consider and decide if this is proper.



Mao Zedong

5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou

## 17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2 November 1958

Part One<sup>59</sup>

Attention, Military and Civilian Compatriots on the Jinmen Islands:

Tomorrow, 3 November, is an odd-numbered day. You must make sure not to come outside. Do be careful!

Part Two

*Deliver to Premier Zhou.*

The Xiamen Front must broadcast [the message] this afternoon (2 November) for three times.

## 18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on "Huan Xiang on the Division within the Western World,"<sup>60</sup> 25 November 1958

Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:581-582

Part I

Huan Xiang's viewpoint is right. The situation in the Western world is indeed disintegrating. Even though currently it is in the middle of a gradual disunification and not yet breaking into pieces, the West is moving toward its inevitable final disintegration. It will probably take a long time, not overnight nor a single day, for this process. The so-called united West is purely empty talk. There may be a kind of unity that Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants [the West] to "unite" under the control of America, and asks all his partners and puppets to get close to America in front of its atomic bombs, paying their tributes and kowtowing and bowing as America's subjects. This is America's so-called unity. The current situation must move toward the so-called unity's opposite—disunity. Comrades, please take a look at today's world and ask which side has the real control.

Mao Zedong

Part II

Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping:

Please print and distribute this report.

Mao Zedong

10:00 A.M., 25 November

1. Wu Lengxi, a member of the CCP Central Committee, served as director of Xinhua (New China) News Agency and editor-in-chief of *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily) in 1958.

2. Beidaihe is a beach area located at the border of Hebei and Liaoning provinces, where Chinese leaders regularly take vacations and hold meetings during summer.

3. Hu Qiaomu, a CCP theorist, was Mao Zedong's political secretary and a member of the CCP Central Committee.

4. This refers to the Communist takeover in China in 1949.

5. In late 1957, the Beijing leadership began to plan to deploy air force units in the Fujian area, so that the Guomindang air force would no longer be able to control the air (for more information on this matter, see document 1). On 18 July 1958, the CCP Central Military Commission held an urgent meeting attended by heads of the PLA's different arms and branches. Peng Dehuai, the defense minister, conveyed to the meeting Mao Zedong's instructions: Under the circumstances that America and Britain continued to dispatch troops to the Middle East, the Guomindang planned a diversion by causing a tense situation in the Taiwan Straits. In order to provide effective support to the anti-imperialist struggle by the people in the Middle East, it was necessary for China to take action. First, air force units should be deployed in Fujian. Second, Jinmen islands should be shelled. The air force units must enter the air bases in Fujian and eastern Guangdong by July 27. The next day, the Air Force Headquarters issued the operation order. After extensive preparations, on July 27, 48 MiG-17 planes finally took position in the two air bases located respectively at Liancheng, Fujian province, and Shantou, Guangdong province. (See Wang Dinglie et al., *Dongdai zhongguo kongjun* [Contemporary Chinese Air Force] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 334-336.)

6. Liu Shaoqi, vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress, was China's second most important leader; Zhou Enlai was vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China's premier; Deng Xiaoping was the CCP's general secretary

7. Wang Shangrong headed the operations department of the PLA General Staff; Ye Fei was political commissar of the Fuzhou Military District.

8. *Cangao ziliao* [Restricted Reference Material], an internal publication circulated among high ranking Chinese Communist officials, published Chinese translations of news reports and commentaries from foreign news agencies, newspapers, and journals in a timely fashion.

9. On 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai stated at the Bandung Conference that China was willing to hold talks with the United States to discuss all questions between the two countries. On 13 July 1955, through Britain, the U.S. government proposed holding bilateral meetings at Geneva, Switzerland. The Chinese-American ambassadorial talks began on 1 August 1955 at Geneva and lasted until December 1957. In September 1958, during the Taiwan crisis, the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks resumed in Warsaw, Poland.

10. On 4 September 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai formally announced a twelve-mile zone off the Chinese coast as China's territorial waters.

11. For the minutes of these two talks, see documents 5 and 6.

12. See note 9.

13. Zhongnanhai is the compound where top Chinese leaders live and work, and Fengzeyuan was Mao Zedong's residence in the 1950s.

14. The Juixiang Study was the location of Mao's office in Zhongnanhai.

15. General Zhang Zhizhong, who had been Jiang Jieshi's subordinate, shifted to the Communist side in 1949 and was then vice chairman of China's national defense commission.

16. For the transcript of Dulles's answers, see *The New York Times*, 1 October 1958, 8.

17. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a prominent Chinese scholar and Chinese ambassador to the United States during the Second World War, had a pro-American reputation. He then served as president of the Central Academy [Academia Sinica] in Taipei.

18. Sun Liren, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, commanded the Taiwan garrison in 1949, when the Guomindang government moved from mainland China to Taiwan. In 1955, Jiang dismissed Sun and placed him under house arrest.

19. This is also known as the "May 24th Incident." On 20 March 1957, an American army sergeant, Robert R. Reynolds, shot a Chinese, Liu Zhiran, in Taipei's American military residence area. On 23 May 1957, an American court-martial found Reynolds not guilty. The next day, a riot involving tens of thousands of protesters erupted in Taipei, with the American Embassy and other American agencies as the target. Guomindang authorities announced martial law in Taipei on the same evening to control the situation.

20. Tian Jiaying (1922-1966) was Mao Zedong's secretary from October 1948 to May 1966, when he committed suicide.

21. This is a collection of bizarre stories by Pu Songling written during Qing times.

22. Mao Zedong wrote his remarks on the 9 December 1957 report of Chen Geng, the PLA's deputy chief of staff, to Peng Dehuai. Chen Geng's report stated: "This year, planes from Taiwan have frequently invaded [the air space] of important coastal cities and the inner land of the mainland, dropping large numbers of reactionary leaflets and 'condolence gifts,' creating a very bad impression on the masses. Because some leading members of our army failed to take anti-aircraft operations seriously and their superiors failed to supervise them closely, [we have been] unable to shoot down any of the invading planes [dispatched by] Jiang [Jieshi]. In order to improve quickly this situation, we have arranged for the air force and all military regions to take every positive and effective step necessary to attack the Jiang planes that are invading the mainland, trying our best to shoot them down." (Source: *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, 6:372.) Chinese air force units finally took position in Fujian on 27 July 1958. See note 5.

23. Mao Zedong composed this letter on the eve of the deadline previously established by the CCP leadership to shell Jinmen. On 15 July 1958, the Eisenhower administration dispatched 5,000 American marines to land in Lebanon. On July 17, the Beijing leadership made the decision to bombard Jinmen, and China's defense minister, Peng Dehuai, conveyed the decision to the General Staff. On the evening of July 18, Mao Zedong spoke at a decision-making meeting attended by vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission and leading officers of the air force and navy, emphasizing that the Arab people's anti-imperialist struggle needed more than moral support and China would take real action. He stated that since Jinmen and Mazu were China's territory and the shelling of Nationalist troops there was China's internal affair, it would be difficult

for the enemy to use this as an excuse [to attack mainland China] while at the same time it would play the role in checking American actions in the Middle East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which scheduled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to "prepare for an operational order at any moment." At this juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter.

24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the bombardment and focus on making further preparations for the shelling.

25. After three weeks of "waiting and seeing," Mao Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This letter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu) to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at that time if the shelling should be followed by landing operations in accordance with the actual situation. On August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particularly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the enemy's headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also made it clear that the initial shelling would last for three days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next action could be taken in accordance with the responses of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al., *Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo* [The Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.)

26. The italics are Mao's.

27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese military planners believed that they had succeeded in cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities repeatedly requested American assistance to support their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to observe the responses of the other side.

28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's "Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan and the Offshore Islands under Jiang's Occupation." The instruction emphasized that "because the struggle against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang's occupation is a complicated international struggle, which has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and propaganda should follow the principles of concentration and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on his own." (Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:376-377)

29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, headed the CCP's Central Propaganda Department.

30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), established in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The United States was related to the organization as an "observer." The Manila Treaty Organization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt's president from 1956 to 1970.

32. The "Rightists" referred to by Mao were intellectuals who had been criticized and purged during the "Anti-Rightist" campaign in 1957.

33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a high ranking Nationalist officer. During China's War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as chief of the general staff and headed the Military-Political Department of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government.

34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India's premier from 1947 to 1964.

35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the Taiwan Defense Command.

36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, eight "democratic parties" existed, all claiming to follow the CCP's leadership.

37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), telegraphed to Mao Zedong: "Considering the tense situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible for a war to break out between China and the United States? (B) What preparations should we make here in Vietnam?" (Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:413-414.)

38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships began escorting Guomindang transport vessels delivering supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This becomes the background of this letter and the CMC's order cited in the next note.

39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission's order, "On the Shelling of Jinmen," issued at 11:15 a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: "(1) If the American ships continue their escort today and anchor three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should shell Jiang's transport ships entering the Liaoluowan harbor to unload and the people working there. The ships not entering the harbor, be they America's or Jiang's, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level needed to sink or to expel Jiang's transport ships, while at the same time damaging the enemy positions on ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and anti-aircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with the air raids by Jiang's planes. The air force and anti-aircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above principles, you may make your own decisions on specific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the situation changes, [you] must report immediately so that [we] can report it to the Central Committee to make new decisions." (Source: *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, 6:380.)

40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo, was China's first vice foreign minister.

41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign minister; he later served as China's foreign minister in the mid-1970s.

42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in this letter, concluding that China had gained the initiative at the meeting.

43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Americans in Warsaw.

44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d'affaires to China.

45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to 3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing, holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however, did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing's leaders told the Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct confrontation between China and the United States, let alone one between the Soviet Union and the United States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis.

46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962.

47. Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplomat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to 1961.

48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group established by Asian and African countries at the UN to draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, and the Philippines.

49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Politburo, was China's vice premier and foreign minister.

50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice president and prime minister in Taiwan.

51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the PLA's Fuzhou Military District.

52. The italics are Mao's.

53. The "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" was broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in all major newspapers in mainland China the same day. The message announced that the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist troops to receive supplies.

54. The italics are Mao's.

55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing's intentions on handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the reliability of Beijing's statistics on the results of air battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide China with ground-to-air missiles.

56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had extensive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him, mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring about Taiwan's "peaceful liberation." After returning to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao mentioned Cao's name on the eve of the second "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan," announcing that the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen for another two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12.

57. At 12:30 p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the following report to Mao Zedong: "The broadcasts to warn America against using its escort vessels in the waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft of the Defense Ministry's order has been completed. It is also enclosed here for your consideration. Please

return it to me right after you have read and approved it. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Huang [Kecheng] for their reading and checking. Everything is ready on the Xiamen front. Our order [for the shelling] has already been issued [to the front] separately by telephone and in writing which was signed by [Huang] Kecheng. The order limits shelling to fortifications, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Jinmen islands. No shelling of civilian villages, garrison camps, and command headquarters is allowed, particularly no shelling of any American ships. Our air and naval forces will make no movement at this time. The Defense Ministry's order will be broadcast at 3:00 [p.m.] in Chinese and foreign languages at the same time. As soon as the reading of the order is finished, [our batteries] will open fire." (Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:466-467.)

58. The italics are Mao's.

59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast.

60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d'affaires in Britain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the Chinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the report "Huang Xiang on the Division within the Western World." The main points of the report were as follows: The two-year long British-French negotiation to establish a free trade zone in Western Europe had recently failed, and a trade war between imperialist countries had started. The British plans to divide West Germany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland, and sabotage the European Common Market had failed. In an economic sense, this was not a big failure for Britain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was the first serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplomacy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced two important choices: it could take retaliatory measures and thus destroy the political and economic cooperations between European countries, or it could return to negotiations, searching for the basis of a temporary compromise. It seemed that only one choice was feasible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort to find ways to compromise with France and Germany, and to seek the support of the United States. This failure on the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain's position as the "second power" in the capitalist world had been weakened further, and that the postwar British hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughly shaken. The balance of power in continental Western Europe now tilted toward France and West Germany, and against Britain. As far as the triangular relations between Britain, France, and Germany were concerned, it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to take advantage of French-West German contradictions in order to divide the two countries, making them check each other. This balance of power policy would certainly last a long time. The balance of power among imperialist countries in West Europe was changing, and the contradictions between the imperialists over West European problems had never been so sharp. (Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 7:582-5823.)

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## KHRUSHCHEV'S NUCLEAR PROMISE

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Chinese leadership developing their own school of brinkmanship that threatened to draw the USSR into a conflict with the United States. Yet, there is no reason to believe that Khrushchev, the real authority behind the Soviet letter, was dismayed by the Chinese position (though he may well have been miffed that Mao failed to tip him off during his summit in Beijing only a few weeks before the PRC opened the crisis by shelling the offshore islands on August 23). Khrushchev, it appears, actually supported nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achieving China's reunification, provided that the policy was fully coordinated with the Kremlin.<sup>5</sup> He therefore took the Chinese position, reported to him in an urgent cable from Gromyko, as an indication that the Chinese leaders had begun to put their national interests above the common interests of the "entire Socialist camp." This effective unilateral Chinese revision of the Treaty signified an implicit challenge to the unity of the communist bloc under Kremlin leadership—and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaders on both political and ideological grounds. Hence the letter decries the peril of disunity in the strongest terms possible: "...a crime before the world working class ... a retreat from the holy of holies of the Communists—from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism."

Khrushchev evidently dictated his letter to Eisenhower immediately after he received the warning from Gromyko. It took him 20 more days to address the Chinese leadership through party channels. It is still unclear what happened inside the Kremlin in the interim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about the same time to respond to the CC CPSU's letter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he thanked him "heartily" for his stand and wrote that the Chinese leadership had been "deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism."<sup>6</sup>

In sum, this episode testifies to the ambiguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese relationship: for the majority of the leadership on both sides, it continued the grim comedy of misunderstandings; only Khrushchev began to suspect what was occurring in faraway Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian internationalism the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening and would erupt in earnest only a

year later, in the autumn of 1959.

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### **From the CC CPSU's letter to the Central Committee of the CPC About the USSR's Readiness to Provide Assistance to the PRC in the Event of an Attack on It From the Side of the USA or Japan, 27 September 1958**

... Comrade Gromyko informed us about his conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking on 7 September. Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the consideration of the situation in the Taiwan region the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proceeded from the fact that should the USA start a war against the People's Republic of China and in this event uses tactical nuclear weapons, then the Soviet Union will make a stern warning to the USA but will not take part in the war. Only in the event that the United States uses large yield nuclear weapons, and in this way risks widening the war, will the Soviet Union make a retaliatory strike with nuclear weapons.

We carefully considered this issue and decided to express to you our opinion... We cannot allow the illusion to be created among our enemies that if an attack will be launched against the PRC by the USA or Japan—and these are the most likely adversaries,—or by any other state, that the Soviet Union will stand on the sidelines as a passive observer.

Should the adversary even presume this, a very dangerous situation would be created. It would be a great calamity for the entire Socialist camp, for the Communist working class movement, if, when atomic bombs have begun to fall on the Chinese People's Republic and China has begun to pay with the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet Union, possessing terrible weapons which could not only stop but could also devastate our common enemy, would allow itself not to come to your assistance. This would be a crime before the world working class, it would be a retreat from the holy of holies of the Communists—from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.

Thank you for your nobility, that you are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the Soviet Union. However, we believe, and are convinced, that you also agree that the main thing now consists of the fact that everyone

has seen—both our friends and, especially, our enemies—that we are firm and united in our understanding of the tasks, which flow from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all brother Communist parties is unshakeable, that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to the aggressor in the event of an attack on any Socialist state. This is necessary so that no hopes will arise in our enemies that they will be able to separate us, so that no cracks will be created which the enemy could be able to use to break the connection between the Socialist countries.

...It is necessary that neither our friends nor our enemies have any doubts that an attack on the Chinese People's Republic is a war with the entire Socialist camp. For ourselves we can say that an attack on China is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also convinced that in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union the Chinese People's Republic would fulfill its brotherly revolutionary duty. If we in this way will build our policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, depending on the unity of our goals, on the might of our states, on our joint efforts, the uniting of which is favored by the geographical disposition of our countries, then this will be an invincible shield against our enemies....

[Source: *Information and Documentation Administration, First Far Eastern Department, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. The letter appears in a formerly classified Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary collection on the history of Sino-Soviet relations, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.; Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]*

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129-142; Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and documents translated, annotated, and introduced by Xiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed in this issue of the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin*.

2. *Khrushchev Remembers*, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 469-470; *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, ed. Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), 147-150; "Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," *Voprosi istorii* [Questions of History] 2 (1993), 90-91; Andrei A. Gromyko, *Memoirs* (New York: Knopf, 1989), 251-252; see also Philip Taubman, "Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used on G.I.'s," *New York Times*, 22 February 1988, 1, 6-7.

3. Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 255; Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle*, 198.

4. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 14 February 1950, reprinted in English translation as an appendix to Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260.

5. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming, March 1996), 226-227.

6. "We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. In the name of all my comrades-members of the Communist Party of China, I express to you my heartfelt gratitude." *Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949-1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33.*

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Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the National Security Archive, contributes frequently to the *Bulletin*. His book, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev*, co-authored with Constantine Pleshakov, will be published in March 1996 by Harvard University Press.

1. See Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972*

**MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES'S  
"PEACEFUL EVOLUTION"  
STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM  
BO YIBO'S MEMOIRS**

**Introduction, translation, and  
annotation by Qiang Zhai**

Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a leading member of the CCP-led resistance force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was elected a member of the CCP Central Committee at the Party's Seventh Congress. During the Chinese Civil War in 1946-1949, he was First Secretary of the CCP North China Bureau and Vice Chairman of the CCP-led North China People's Government. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, he became Finance Minister. As a revolutionary veteran who survived the Cultural Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of the most powerful figures in China today.

Between 1991 and 1993, Bo published two volumes of his memoirs, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [Recollections of Certain Major Decisions and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first volume covers the period 1949-1956 and the second volume 1957-1966. In the preface and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes that in preparing his memoirs he has consulted documents in the CCP Central Archives and received the cooperation of Party history researchers. Bo's reminiscences represent the most important memoirs of a high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966 period.

As a still active senior leader, Bo is not a disinterested writer. His arguments and conclusions are completely in line with the 1981 Resolution on Party History.<sup>1</sup> Memoirs in China usually have a didactic purpose that encourages the creation of edifying stereotypes. Bo's memoirs conform to a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo's memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little description of the character and personalities of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo's volumes follow another memoirs-writing tradition in the PRC, which tends to emphasize the role of groups and societal forces at

the expense of individuals. Despite these drawbacks, Bo's memoirs contain many valuable new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Especially notable are Bo's references to Mao's statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo played a major role in Chinese economic decision-making during the period, his memoirs are especially strong on this topic. He sheds new light on such domestic events as the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposition to Rush Advance, the Great Leap Forward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, economic rectification in 1961-1962, and the Socialist Education Campaign. Although international relations in general does not receive much attention, the volumes do include illuminating chapters on some key foreign policy decisions.<sup>2</sup>

The translation below is taken from Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138-1146). This section is very revealing about Mao's perception of and reaction to John Foster Dulles's policy toward China in 1958-1959. The CCP leader took seriously statements by the U.S. Secretary of State about encouraging a peaceful change of the Communist system. In November 1959, according to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao's secretary, prepared for Mao translations of three speeches by Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful evolution within the Communist world. After reading the documents, Mao commented on them before having them circulated among a small group of Party leaders for discussion. Thus Bo's memoirs not only provide fresh texts of what Mao said, but also an important window into what he read. As a result, the interactive nature of Mao's activities—with his top colleagues and his secretary—is open to examination. A sense of the policy-making process, as well as Mao's opinions, emerges from Bo's memoirs.

The years 1958-1959 were a crucial period in Mao's psychological evolution. He began to show increasing concern with the problem of succession and worried about his impending death. He feared that the political system that he had spent his life creating would betray his beliefs and values and slip out of his control. His apprehension about the future development of China was closely related to his analysis of the degeneration of the Soviet system. Mao believed that Dulles's idea of inducing peaceful evolution within the socialist world was already

taking effect in the Soviet Union, given Khrushchev's fascination with peaceful co-existence with the capitalist West. Mao wanted to prevent that from happening in China. Here lie the roots of China's subsequent exchange of polemics with the Soviet Union and Mao's decision to restructure the Chinese state and society in order to prevent a revisionist "change of color" of China, culminating in the launching of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Mao's frantic response to Dulles's speeches constitutes a clear case of how international events contributed to China's domestic developments. It also demonstrates the effects of Dulles's strategy of driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.

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**To Prevent "Peaceful Evolution" and  
Train Successors to the Revolutionary  
Cause**

**by Bo Yibo**

According to the general law of socialist revolution, only through the leadership of a proletarian political party directed by Marxism, reliance on the working class and other laboring masses, and waging of an armed struggle in this or that form can a revolution obtain state power. International hostile forces to the newly born people's government would always attempt to strangle it in the cradle through armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade. After the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union experienced an armed intervention by fourteen countries. In the wake of World War II, imperialism launched a protracted "Cold War" and economic containment of socialist countries. Immediately after the triumph of the revolution in China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea, blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and implemented an all-out embargo against China. All of this shows that it will take a sharp struggle with external hostile forces through an armed conflict or other forms of contest before a newly born socialist country can consolidate its power.

History suggests that although the armed aggression, intervention, and economic blockade launched by Western imperialists against socialist countries can create enor-

mous problems for socialist countries, they have great difficulty in realizing their goal of overthrowing socialist states. Therefore, imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a “soft” method in addition to employing “hard” policies. In January 1953, U.S. Secretary of States Dulles emphasized the strategy of “peaceful evolution.” He pointed out that “the enslaved people” of socialist countries should be “liberated,” and become “free people,” and that “liberation can be achieved through means other than war,” and “the means ought to be and can be peaceful.” He displayed satisfaction with the “liberalization-demanding forces” which had emerged in some socialist countries and placed his hope on the third and fourth generations within socialist countries, contending that if the leader of a socialist regime “continues wanting to have children and these children will produce their children, then the leader’s offsprings will obtain freedom.” He also claimed that “Chinese communism is in fatal danger,” and “represents a fading phenomena,” and that the obligation of the United States and its allies was “to make every effort to facilitate the disappearance of that phenomena,” and “to bring about freedom in all of China by all peaceful means.”<sup>3</sup>

Chairman Mao paid full attention to these statements by Dulles and watched carefully the changes in strategies and tactics used by imperialists against socialist countries. That was the time when the War to Aid Korea and Resist America had just achieved victory, when the United States was continuing its blockade of the Taiwan Straits and its embargo, and when our domestic situation was stable, “the First Five-Year Plan” was fully under way, economic construction was developing rapidly, and everywhere was the picture of prosperity and vitality. At that moment, Chairman Mao did not immediately bring up the issue of preventing a “peaceful evolution.” The reason for his later raising the question has to do with developments in international and domestic situations.

In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev attacked Stalin, causing an anti-Communist and anti-Socialist wave in the world and triggering incidents in Poland and Hungary. In 1957, a tiny minority of bourgeois Rightists seized the opportunity of Party reform to attack the Party. In 1958, Khrushchev proposed to create a long-wave radio station and

a joint fleet with China in order to control China militarily; he also openly opposed our Party’s “Three Red Flags”<sup>4</sup> and objected to our just action of “shelling Jinmen”<sup>5</sup>. (Chairman Mao once said that whether we bombarded Jinmen or suspended our bombardment, our main purpose was to support the Taiwan people and the Taiwan regime to keep Taiwan [from being] invaded and annexed by foreign countries.—Bo’s note). The above events alerted Chairman Mao.

In the meantime, the United States actively practiced its strategy of promoting a “peaceful evolution” of socialist countries. In 1957, the Eisenhower administration introduced the “strategy of peaceful conquest,” aiming to facilitate “changes inside the Soviet world,” through a “peaceful evolution.” On October 24, 1958, in an interview with a BBC correspondent, Dulles asserted that communism “will gradually give way to a system that pays more attention to the welfare of the state and people,” and that at the moment, “Russian and Chinese Communists are not working for the welfare of their people,” and “this kind of communism will change.”

Considering the situation in both the Soviet Union and at home, Chairman Mao took very seriously Dulles’s remarks. In a speech to the directors of the cooperation regions<sup>6</sup> on November 30, 1958, Chairman Mao noted that Dulles was a man of schemes and that he controlled the helm in the United States. Dulles was very thoughtful. One had to read his speeches word by word with the help of an English dictionary. Dulles was really taking the helm. Provincial Party Committees should assign special cadres to read *Cankao ziliao*.<sup>7</sup> Chairman Mao has always insisted that Party leaders at all levels, especially high-ranking cadres, should closely follow international events and the development of social contradictions on the world scene in order to be well informed and prepared for sudden incidents. It is very necessary for Mao to make that demand. Chairman Mao read *Cankao ziliao* every day. For us leading cadres, we should consider not only the whole picture of domestic politics but also the whole situation of international politics. Thus we can keep clear-headed, deal with any challenges confidently, and “sit tight in the fishing boat despite the rising winds and waves.” This is a very important political lesson and a leadership style.

In 1959, Sino-Soviet relations were even more strained and Sino-Soviet differences even greater. In January, the Soviet Union officially notified China that it would scrap unilaterally the agreement to help China build nuclear industry and produce nuclear bombs. In September when the Sino-Indian Border Incident occurred, the Soviet Union announced neutrality, but in actuality it supported India. It openly criticized China after the incident. At the Soviet-American Camp David Talks during the same month, Khrushchev sought to improve relations with the United States on the one hand and vehemently attacked China’s domestic and foreign policies on the other.<sup>8</sup> All these events convinced Chairman Mao that the Soviet leadership had degenerated and that Khrushchev had betrayed Marxism and the proletarian revolutionary cause and had turned revisionist. At the Lushan Conference held during July–August that year, when Peng Dehuai<sup>9</sup> criticized the “Three Red Flags,” Chairman Mao erroneously believed that this reflected the combined attack on the Party by internal and external enemies. Facing such a complex situation, Chairman Mao felt deeply the danger of a “peaceful evolution.” Accordingly, he unequivocally raised the issue at the end of that year.

In November 1959, Chairman Mao convened a small-scale meeting in Hangzhou attended by Premier Zhou [Enlai], Peng Zhen,<sup>10</sup> Wang Jiaxiang,<sup>11</sup> Hu Qiaomu,<sup>12</sup> among others, to discuss and examine the international situation at the time. Before the opening of the meeting, Chairman Mao asked his secretary, Lin Ke, to find Dulles’s speeches concerning “peaceful evolution” for him to read. Comrade Lin Ke selected three such speeches: Dulles’s address titled “Policy for the Far East” delivered before the California Chamber of Commerce on December 4, 1958, Dulles’s testimony made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28, 1959, and Dulles’s speech titled “The Role of Law in Peace” made before the New York State Bar Association on January 31, 1959. Chairman Mao had read these three speeches before. After re-reading them, he told Comrade Lin Ke of his opinions about them and asked him to write commentaries based on his views and insert them at the beginning of each of Dulles’s statements. After Comrade Lin Ke had completed the commentaries, Mao instructed him to distribute Dulles’s speeches, along

with the commentaries, to the members attending the meeting.

The three speeches by Dulles all contained the theme of promoting a “peaceful evolution” inside socialist countries. The three commentaries based on Chairman Mao’s talks highlighted the key points in Dulles’s remarks and warned of the danger of the American “peaceful evolution” strategy. The first commentary pointed out: “The United States not only has no intention to give up its policy of force, but also wants, as an addition to its policy of force, to pursue a ‘peaceful conquest strategy’ of infiltration and subversion in order to avoid the prospect of its ‘being surrounded.’ The U.S. desires to achieve the ambition of preserving itself (capitalism) and gradually defeating the enemy (socialism).” After noting the main theme of Dulles’s testimony, the second commentary contended: Dulles’s words “demonstrate that U.S. imperialists are attempting to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union by the method of corrupting it so as to realize their aggressive goal, which they have failed to achieve through war.” The third commentary first took note of Dulles’s insistence on “the substitution of justice and law for force” and his contention that the abandonment of force did not mean the “maintenance of the status quo,” but meant a peaceful “change.” Then it went on to argue that “Dulles’s words showed that because of the growing strength of the socialist force throughout the world and because of the increasing isolation and difficulties of the international imperialist force, the United States does not dare to start a world war at the moment. Therefore, the United States has adopted a more deceptive tactic to pursue its aggression and expansion. While advocating peace, the United States is at the same time speeding up the implementation of its plots of infiltration, corruption, and subversion in order to reverse the decline of imperialism and to fulfill its objective of aggression.”

At the meeting on November 12, Chairman Mao further analyzed and elaborated on Dulles’s speeches and the commentaries. He said:

Comrade Lin Ke has prepared for me three documents—three speeches by Dulles during 1958-1959. All three documents have to do with Dulles’s talks about en-

couraging a “peaceful evolution” inside socialist countries. For example, at his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28 Dulles remarked that basically the U.S. hoped to encourage changes within the Soviet world. By the Soviet world, Dulles did not mean just the Soviet Union. He was referring to the whole socialist camp. He was hoping to see changes in our camp so that the Soviet world would no longer be a threat to freedom on the globe and would mind its own business instead of thinking about realizing the goal and ambition of communizing the world....

In commenting on Dulles’s statement of January 31, 1959, Chairman Mao asserted:

Dulles said that justice and law should replace violence and that war should be abandoned, and law and justice should be emphasized. Dulles also argued that the abandonment of force under the circumstances did not mean the “maintenance of the status quo,” but meant a peaceful “change.” (laughter) Change whom peacefully? Dulles wants to change countries like ours. He wants to subvert and change us to follow his ideas.... Therefore, the United States is attempting to carry out its aggression and expansion with a much more deceptive tactic.... In other words, it wants to keep its order and change our system. It wants to corrupt us by a peaceful evolution.

Chairman Mao believed that Khrushchev’s speeches reflected the “peaceful evolution” advocated by Dulles and that our principle should be:

Under the existing complex international conditions, our policy is to resist the pressures head-on—pressures from two directions, Khrushchev and Eisenhower. We will resist for five to ten years. Toward the United States, we should do our best to expose it with facts and we should do so persuasively. We will not criticize Khrushchev, nor will we attack him through im-

plication. We will only expose the American deception and lay bare the nature of the so-called “peace” by the United States.

This is the first time that Chairman Mao clearly raised and insightfully elaborated on the issue of preventing a “peaceful evolution.” From that time on, he would pay more and more attention to the matter. In a series of meetings that followed, he would repeatedly alert the whole party on the issue and gradually unfold the struggle against the so-called revisionism both at home and abroad.

From 1960 forward, differences between the Chinese and Soviet Parties increased. On April 22, an editorial titled “Long Live Leninism” published by the journal *Hongqi*<sup>13</sup> denounced Comrade Tito of Yugoslavia by name and criticized Khrushchev of the Soviet Union without mentioning his name. On internal occasions, we unequivocally pointed out that the Soviet Union had become revisionist and that we should learn the Soviet lesson. We also felt that “revisionists” already existed in China and that Peng Dehuai and some other comrades were examples. We warned against the emergence of revisionism in order to prevent a “peaceful evolution.” In his meeting with Jespersen,<sup>14</sup> Chairman of the Danish Communist Party, on May 28, 1960, Chairman Mao said: “There are also revisionists in our country. Led by Peng Dehuai, a Politburo member, they launched an attack on the Party last summer. We condemned and defeated him. Seven full and alternate members of our Central Committee followed Peng. Including Peng, there are eight revisionists. The total number of full and alternate members in our Central Committee is 192. Eight people are merely a minority.”

At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference”<sup>15</sup> held in January 1962, Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi delivered a “written report” on behalf of the Party Central Committee. He made a special reference to the question of opposing contemporary revisionism. In his remarks concerning the issue of practicing democratic centralism, Chairman Mao stated: “Without a highly developed democracy, there cannot be a high level of centralism. Without a high level of centralism, we cannot establish a socialist economy. What will happen then to our country if we cannot create a socialist economy? China will become a revisionist country, a bourgeois coun-

try in fact. The proletarian dictatorship will become not only a bourgeois dictatorship but also a reactionary and fascist dictatorship. This is an issue that deserves full attention. I hope our comrades will consider it carefully.” (*Selected Readings of Chairman Mao’s Works*, Vol. II, pp. 822-823.) Here Chairman Mao officially sounded an alarm bell for the whole party. In his meeting with Kapo<sup>16</sup> and Balluku<sup>17</sup> of Albania on February 3, 1967, Mao contended: At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” in 1962, “I made a speech. I said that revisionism wanted to overthrow us. If we paid no attention and conducted no struggle, China would become a fascist dictatorship in either a few or a dozen years at the earliest or in several decades at the latest. This address was not published openly. It was circulated internally. We wanted to watch subsequent developments to see whether any words in the speech required revision. But at that time we already detected the problem.”

At the Beidaihe Meeting and the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee during August and September, 1962, Chairman Mao reemphasized class struggle in order to prevent the emergence of revisionism. On August 9, he clearly pointed out the necessity of educating cadres and training them in rotation. Otherwise, he feared that he had devoted his whole life to revolution, only to produce capitalism and revisionism. On September 24, he again urged the party to heighten vigilance to prevent the country from going “the opposite direction.” The communiqué of the Tenth Plenum published on September 27 reiterated the gist of Chairman Mao’s remarks and stressed that “whether at present or in the future, our Party must always heighten its vigilance and correctly carry out the struggle on two fronts: against both revisionism and dogmatism.”

From the end of 1962 to the spring of 1963, our Party published seven articles in succession, condemning such so-called “contemporary revisionists” as Togliatti of Italy,<sup>18</sup> Thorez of France,<sup>19</sup> and the American Communist Party. On June 14, 1963, the CCP Central Committee issued “A Proposal for a General Line of the International Communist Movement.” On July 14, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) published “An Open Letter to Party Units at All Levels and to All Members of the CPSU,” bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to the open. From September

last to July 1964, our Party used the name of the editorial boards of the *Renmin ribao* and *Hongqi* to issue nine articles, refuting the Soviet open letter and condemning “Khrushchev Revisionism” by name. Thus the Sino-Soviet polemics reached a high point. In the meantime, the struggle to oppose “revisionism” and to prevent a “peaceful evolution” was accelerated at home.

1. *The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China* was adopted by the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981. While affirming the historical role of Mao Zedong, the resolution also blames him for the Cultural Revolution. After an analysis of all the crimes and errors in the Cultural Revolution the resolution describes it as, after all, “the error of a proletarian revolutionary.” It concludes that although Mao has made “gross mistakes” during the Cultural Revolution, “if we judge his activities as a whole, his contribution to the Chinese revolution far outweighs his mistakes.” For the text of the resolution, see *Resolution on CPC History (1949-1981)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981).

2. I have previously translated the chapter in the first volume concerning Mao’s decision to make an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1949-1950. It was first published in *Chinese Historians 5* (Spring 1992), 57-62, and later in Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill, eds., *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: Volume II: Since 1914*, 4th ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1995), 332-34.

3. Bo does not mention precisely when and where Dulles made those remarks about Chinese communism. I have not been able to identify Dulles’s speech to which Bo is referring.

4. The “Three Red Flags” refer to the General Line of Socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the People’s Commune.

5. Jinman (Quemoy).

6. These refer to the economic cooperation regions established during the Great Leap Forward. China was divided into seven such regions.

7. *Cankao ziliao* (Reference Material) is an internally circulated reading material, which provided Party leaders with translations and summaries of international news from foreign news agencies and press.

8. According to the U.S records of the Camp David talks, in his discussions with President Eisenhower, Khrushchev actually defended China’s position on Taiwan. See memorandum of conversation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, 26 and 27 September 1959, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. X, Part I: Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 477-482.

9. Peng Dehuai, Defense Minister and a Politburo member.

10. Peng Zhen, Party Secretary of Beijing and a Politburo member.

11. Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP International Liaison Department and a Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat.

12. Hu Qiaomu, Mao’s political secretary and an Alternate Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat.

13. *Hongqi* (Red Flag) is the official journal of the CCP Central Committee.

14. Knud Jespersen, leader of the Danish communist Party.

15. The conference was held between January and February, 1962 to review methods of Party leadership and examine problems caused by the Great Leap Forward.

16. Hysni Kapo, a leader of the Albanian Labor (Communist) Party.

17. Bequir Balluku, Defense Minister and a Politburo member of the Albanian Communist Party.

18. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party.

19. Maurice Thorez, leader of the French Communist Party.

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**THE VIETNAM WAR AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1964-1973: NEW RUSSIAN EVIDENCE**

by Ilya V. Gaiduk

The Vietnam War stands out among Cold War crises for its scale, length, intensity, and global repercussions. The literature on the war and the American role in it encompasses thousands of volumes, from political memoirs to soldiers' eyewitness accounts to historical and journalistic studies, to novels and political science treatises.<sup>1</sup> With the passage of time, ever more documents have been declassified, enabling more thorough and comprehensive analyses. Now that there is substantial access to archives in the former USSR, researchers have at their disposal a whole set of previously unavailable materials which shed new light on unresolved issues as well as on problems which have either escaped the attention of Western scholars or have not yet been analyzed in detail.

One of those problems relates to the Soviet Union's participation in the Vietnam conflict, particularly the nature of Soviet-American relations during the war and Moscow's role as a potential mediator. Although many U.S. researchers have studied these problems and, on the basis of the documents analyzed, drawn certain conclusions, their analyses of the subject were far from exhaustive and quite often insufficiently corroborated by the necessary archival sources.

The present article assesses Soviet policy toward Vietnam and the war's impact on U.S.-Soviet relations from 1964 to the early 1970s on the basis of materials bearing on this subject in the archive of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC)—a repository now known as the Storage Center for Contemporary Documents (SCCD, or TsKhSD, in its Russian acronym)—located in the CC's former headquarters in Staraya Ploschad' (Old Square) in Moscow. This report was originally prepared for presentation at the January 1993 Moscow Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, organized by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) in cooperation with the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and SCCD. Subsequently, the author expanded

his research into a far broader study of Soviet involvement in the Vietnam conflict, utilizing sources in both Russian and American archives (the latter during a CWIHP fellowship for research in the United States); that study, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War*, is scheduled for publication by Ivan R. Dee (Chicago) in Spring 1996.

The SCCD archives contain materials related to a broad range of the former CPSU CC's work, primarily correspondence with a wide range of Soviet organizations and establishments dealing with various socio-economic, domestic, and foreign policy issues. The archive collections (*fondy*) include a considerable number of documents on the subject of the Vietnam War and Soviet-American relations which were sent to the CPSU CC—mostly to the CC International Department and the CC Socialist Countries' Communist and Workers' Parties Department—by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Ministry, and Committee of State Security (KGB). Considerably less frequently encountered, alas, is documentation illuminating recommendations, draft decisions, and top-level decision-making. Thus, the top leadership's decisions and the mechanism of decision-making on this level are only indirectly reflected in the SCCD materials. This unfortunate gap, naturally, creates problems for historians trying to determine how policy was actually made by the top Soviet leadership on important foreign policy questions, and necessitates continued efforts to increase access to materials in Russian archives that remain off-limits, particularly the so-called Kremlin or Presidential Archives, known officially as the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF).

At the same time, the SCCD materials enable historians not only to reconstruct many events related to the Vietnam War during the period in question, and to present matters which were previously interpreted only inferentially, but also to assess the development of U.S.-Soviet relations in close interconnection with the conflict in Southeast Asia. This last factor is of obvious import, for one can hardly study U.S.-Soviet relations during the Vietnam War in isolation from an understanding of relations between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV), between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and between the

DRV and PRC. All those interconnected relations crucially influenced the relevant Soviet policies.

The escalation of the conflict in Vietnam after the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964 and the February 1965 attack by armed units of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV, also known as the NLF) on the base of American military advisers in Pleiku (triggering U.S. aerial bombardment of North Vietnam in retaliation), coincided with a certain cooling in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations. This chill between Moscow and Hanoi, in turn,

*This section of the Bulletin presents new evidence from Russian, Chinese, and Polish sources on one of the Cold War's most costly conflicts: the Vietnam War, which consumed more than 58,000 American lives and, according to recent estimates, more than 3.2 million Vietnamese lives. Presented here are articles by Ilya V. Gaiduk (Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow), who employs documents from the CPSU Central Committee archives to illuminate Soviet policy toward the Vietnam conflict (in a foretaste of his soon-to-be published book on the subject), and by Zhai Qiang (Auburn University at Montgomery), who uses newly released Chinese sources to explore Beijing's handling of the escalation of the war in 1964-65; and a precis of a secretly-prepared memoir by Jerzy Michalowski, a Polish diplomat who was deeply involved in secret mediation efforts between the United States and North Vietnam in the mid-1960s.*

*However, recognizing that the most important "other side" for Americans during the Vietnam War was, of course, the Vietnamese themselves, the Cold War International History Project has launched an*

was partly attributable to the growing differences between the USSR and the PRC, the two chief patrons and supporters of the Vietnamese struggle against the Saigon regime.<sup>2</sup> Besides the impact of the Sino-Soviet split, the tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations during this stretch was also tied to the relatively moderate stand adopted by the then Soviet government, under the leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev prior to his downfall in October 1964. Owing to the

*continued on page 250*

**BEIJING AND THE VIETNAM  
CONFLICT, 1964-1965:  
NEW CHINESE EVIDENCE**

by **Qiang Zhai**

The years 1964-1965 marked a crucial period in the Vietnam War. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and subsequent U.S. escalation of war against North Vietnam represented a major turning point in the American approach to Indochina, as the Johnson Administration shifted its focus from Saigon to Hanoi as the best way to reverse the deterior-

*effort to organize collaborative research with Vietnamese scholars and to collect Vietnamese sources on the international history of the Vietnam and Indochina conflicts. To this end, CWIHP has begun contacts with the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Hanoi on the possibility of organizing an international scholarly conference on the history of U.S.-Vietnam relations since World War II. CWIHP, along with the National Security Archive at George Washington University, is also collecting declassified archival evidence from Vietnamese, American, and other sources in connection with an oral history conference of senior former Vietnamese and American decision-makers (including Kennedy and Johnson Administration Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara), to be organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Foreign Policy at Brown University, and the IIR. (Agreement in principle to hold the conference was reached during discussions in Hanoi in November 1995.)*

*CWIHP also plans to devote a special issue of the Bulletin to new evidence on the war, primarily from Vietnamese sources.*

*--Jim Hershberg, Editor*

rating trend in South Vietnam and to persuade the North Vietnamese leadership to desist from their increasing involvement in the South. How did Beijing react to Washington's escalation of the conflict in Vietnam? How did Mao Zedong perceive U.S. intentions? Was there a "strategic debate" within the Chinese leadership over the American threat and over strategies that China should adopt in dealing with the United States? What was in Mao's mind when he decided to commit China's resources to

Hanoi? How and why did a close relationship between Beijing and Hanoi turn sour during the fight against a common foe? Drawing upon recently available Chinese materials, this paper will address these questions.<sup>1</sup> The first half of the article is primarily narrative, while the second half provides an analysis of the factors that contributed to China's decision to commit itself to Hanoi, placing Chinese actions in their domestic and international context.

**China's Role in Vietnam, 1954-1963**

China played an important role in helping Ho Chi Minh win the Anti-French War and in concluding the Geneva Accords in 1954.<sup>2</sup> In the decade after the Geneva Conference, Beijing continued to exert influence over developments in Vietnam. At the time of the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese Communists asked the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to help them consolidate peace in the North, build the army, conduct land reform, rectify the Party, strengthen diplomatic work, administer cities, and restore the economy.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, Beijing sent Fang Yi to head a team of Chinese economic experts to North Vietnam.<sup>4</sup>

According to the official history of the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG), on 27 June 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap headed a Vietnamese military delegation on a secret visit to Beijing accompanied by Wei Guoqing, head of the CMAG in Vietnam. The Vietnamese visitors held discussions with Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, and General Petroshevskii, a senior Soviet military advisor in China, regarding the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's reconstruction of the army and the war plan for the future. The DRV delegation visited the Chinese North Sea Fleet before returning to Hanoi in mid-July. That fall, on 15 October 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap led another secret military delegation to China, where he talked with Peng Dehuai and Soviet General Gushev again about the DRV's military development and war planning. The Vietnamese inspected Chinese military facilities and academies and watched a Chinese military exercise before traveling back to North Vietnam on December 11.<sup>5</sup>

The official CMAG history states that during both of Giap's journeys to Beijing, he "reached agreement" with the Chinese and the Russians "on principal issues." But it

does not explain why Giap had to make a second visit to China shortly after his first tour and why the Soviet participants at the talks changed. Perhaps disagreement emerged during the discussions of Giap's first trip, leaving some issues unresolved. In fact, according to the study by the researchers at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, the Chinese and the Russians differed over strategies to reunify Vietnam. The Soviet advisors favored peaceful coexistence between North and South Vietnam, urging Hanoi to "reunify the country through peaceful means on the basis of independence and democracy." The Chinese Communists, conversely, contended that because of imperialist sabotage it was impossible to reunify Vietnam through a general election in accordance with the Geneva Accords, and that consequently North Vietnam should prepare for a protracted struggle.<sup>6</sup>

On 24 December 1955, the Chinese government decided to withdraw the CMAG from Vietnam; Peng Dehuai notified Vo Nguyen Giap of this decision. By mid-March 1956, the last members of the CMAG had left the DRV. To replace the formal CMAG, Beijing appointed a smaller team of military experts headed by Wang Yanquan to assist the Vietnamese.<sup>7</sup>

These developments coincided with a major debate within the Vietnamese Communist leadership in 1956 over who should bear responsibility for mistakes committed during a land reform campaign which had been instituted since 1953 in an imitation of the Chinese model. Truong Chinh, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers' Party (VWP), who was in charge of the land reform program, was removed from his position at a Central Committee Plenum held in September. Le Duan, who became General Secretary later in the year, accused Truong Chinh of applying China's land reform experience in Vietnam without considering the Vietnamese reality.<sup>8</sup>

The failure of the land-reform program in the DRV dovetailed with a growing realization that the reunification of the whole of Vietnam, as promised by the Geneva Accords, would not materialize, primarily as a result of U.S. support for the anti-Communist South Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, who refused to hold elections in 1956. As hopes for an early reunification dimmed, the DRV had to face its own economic difficulties. The rice supply became a major

problem as Hanoi, no longer able to count on incorporating the rice-producing South into its economy, was forced to seek alternative food sources for the North and to prepare the groundwork for a self-supporting economy. In this regard, leaders in Hanoi continued to seek Chinese advice despite the memory of the poorly-implemented land-reform program. There are indications that the Chinese themselves had drawn lessons from the debacle of the Vietnamese land reform and had become more sensitive to Vietnamese realities when offering suggestions. In April 1956, Deputy Premier Chen Yun, an economic specialist within the CCP, paid an unpublicized visit to Hanoi. At the request of Ho Chi Minh, Chen proposed the principle of "agriculture preceding industry and light industry ahead of heavy industry" in developing the Vietnamese economy. The Vietnamese leadership adopted Chen's advice.<sup>9</sup> Given the fact that the CCP was putting a high premium on the development of heavy industry at home during its First Five-Year Plan at this time, Chen's emphasis on agriculture and light industry was very unusual, and demonstrated that the Chinese were paying more attention to Vietnamese conditions in their assistance to the DRV. Zhou Enlai echoed Chen's counsel of caution in economic planning during his tour of Hanoi on 18-22 November 1956, when he told Ho Chi Minh to refrain from haste in collectivizing agriculture: "Such changes must come step by step."<sup>10</sup>

Donald S. Zagoria argues in his book *Vietnam Triangle* that between 1957 and 1960, the DRV shifted its loyalties from Beijing to Moscow in order to obtain Soviet assistance for its economic development.<sup>11</sup> In reality, the Hanoi leadership continued to consult the CCP closely on such major issues as economic consolidation in the North and the revolutionary struggle in the South. With the completion of its economic recovery in 1958, the VWP began to pay more attention to strengthening the revolutionary movement in the South. It sought Chinese advice. In the summer of 1958, the VWP presented to the CCP for comment two documents entitled "Our View on the Basic Tasks for Vietnam during the New Stage" and "Certain Opinions Concerning the Unification Line and the Revolutionary Line in the South." After a careful study, the Chinese leadership responded with a written reply, which pointed out that "the most

fundamental, the most crucial, and the most urgent task" for the Vietnamese revolution was to carry out socialist revolution and socialist construction in the North. As to the South, the Chinese reply continued, Hanoi's task should be to promote "a national and democratic revolution." But since it was impossible to realize such a revolution at the moment, the Chinese concluded, the VWP should "conduct a long-term underground work, accumulate strength, establish contact with the masses, and wait for opportunities."<sup>12</sup> Clearly, Beijing did not wish to see the situation in Vietnam escalate into a major confrontation with the United States. Judging by subsequent developments, the VWP did not ignore the Chinese advice, for between 1958 and 1960 Hanoi concentrated on economic construction in the North, implementing the "Three-Year Plan" of a socialist transformation of the economy and society.

The policy of returning to revolutionary war adopted by the VWP Central Committee in May 1959 did not outline any specific strategy to follow. The resolution had merely mentioned that a blend of political and military struggle would be required. During the next two years, debates over strategy and tactics continued within the Hanoi leadership.<sup>13</sup> Ho Chi Minh continued to consult the Chinese. In May 1960, North Vietnamese and Chinese leaders held discussions in both Hanoi and Beijing over strategies to pursue in South Vietnam. Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping argued that in general political struggle should be combined with armed conflict and that since specific conditions varied between the city and the countryside in South Vietnam, a flexible strategy of struggle should be adopted. In the city, the Chinese advised, political struggle would generally be recommended, but to deliver a final blow on the Diem regime, armed force would be necessary. Since there was an extensive mass base in the countryside, military struggle should be conducted there, but military struggle should include political struggle.<sup>14</sup> The Chinese policymakers, preoccupied with recovery from the economic disasters caused by the Great Leap Forward, clearly did not encourage a major commitment of resources from the North in support of a general offensive in the South at this juncture.

In September 1960, the VWP convened its Third National Congress, which made no major recommendations affecting existing

strategy but simply stated that disintegration was replacing stability in the South. To take advantage of this new situation, the Congress urged the party to carry out both political and military struggle in the South and called for an increase of support from the North.<sup>15</sup> This emphasis on a combination of political and military struggle in the South reflected to some degree the Chinese suggestion of caution.

In the spring of 1961, U.S. President John F. Kennedy approved an increase in the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) of 100 advisers and sent to Vietnam 400 Special Forces troops to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency techniques. This escalation of U.S. involvement in Indochina aroused Chinese leaders' concern. During DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to Beijing in June 1961, Mao expressed a general support for the waging of an armed struggle by the South Vietnamese people while Zhou Enlai continued to stress flexibility in tactics and the importance of "blending legal and illegal struggle and combining political and military approaches."<sup>16</sup>

1962 saw a major turning point in both U.S. involvement in Vietnam and in Chinese attitudes toward the conflict. In February, Washington established in Saigon the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to replace the MAAG. The Kennedy Administration coupled this move with a drastic increase in the number of American "advisers" and the amount of military hardware it was sending to the Diem regime, marking a new level of U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

That spring, an important debate broke out within the Chinese leadership over the estimation of a world war, the possibility of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, and the degree of China's support for national liberation movements. On February 27, Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP Foreign Liaison Department, sent a letter to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi (the three PRC officials directly in charge of foreign policy), in which he criticized the tendency to overrate the danger of world war and to underestimate the possibility of peaceful coexistence with imperialism. In terms of support for national liberation movements, Wang emphasized restraint, calling attention to China's own economic problems and limitations in resources. On the issue of

Vietnam, he asked the party to “guard against a Korea-style war created by American imperialists,” and warned of the danger of “Khrushchev and his associates dragging us into the trap of war.” Wang proposed that in order to adjust and restore the economy and win time to tide over difficulties, China should adopt a policy of peace and conciliation in foreign affairs, and that in the area of foreign aid China should not do what it cannot afford.<sup>17</sup> But Mao rejected Wang’s proposal, condemning Wang as promoting a “revisionist” foreign policy of “three appeasements and one reduction” (appeasement of imperialism, revisionism, and international reactionaries, and reduction of assistance to national liberation movements).<sup>18</sup>

The outcome of the debate had major implications for China’s policy toward Vietnam. If Wang’s moderate suggestions had been adopted, it would have meant a limited Chinese role in Indochina. But Mao had switched to a militant line, choosing confrontation with the United States. This turn to the left in foreign policy accorded with Mao’s reemphasis on class struggle and radical politics in Chinese domestic affairs in 1962. It also anticipated an active Chinese role in the unfolding crisis in Vietnam. With the rejection of Wang’s proposal, an opportunity to avert the later Sino-American hostility over Indochina was missed.

In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thanh came to Beijing to discuss with Chinese leaders the serious situation created by the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the possibility of an American attack against North Vietnam. Ho asked the Chinese to provide support for the guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. Beijing satisfied Ho’s demand by agreeing to give the DRV free of charge 90,000 rifles and guns that could equip 230 infantry battalions. These weapons would be used to support guerrilla warfare in the South.<sup>19</sup> In March 1963, Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), visited the DRV and discussed with his hosts how China might support Hanoi if the United States attacked North Vietnam.<sup>20</sup> Two months later, Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the PRC, traveled to Hanoi, where he told Ho Chi Minh: “We are standing by your side, and if war broke out, you can regard China as your rear.”<sup>21</sup> Clearly Beijing was making a major commitment to Hanoi in early 1963. Toward the end of the year, Chinese and

North Vietnamese officials discussed Beijing’s assistance in constructing defense works and naval bases in the northeastern part of the DRV.<sup>22</sup> According to a Chinese source, in 1963 China and the DRV made an agreement under which Beijing would send combat troops into North Vietnam if American soldiers crossed the Seventeenth Parallel to attack the North. The Chinese soldiers would stay and fight in the North to free the North Vietnamese troops to march to the South.<sup>23</sup> But the precise date and details of this agreement remain unclear.

In sum, between 1954 and 1963 China was closely involved in the development of Hanoi’s policy. The CCP urged Ho Chi Minh to concentrate on consolidating the DRV and to combine political and military struggles in the South. Although before 1962 Beijing policy makers were not eager to see a rapid intensification of the revolutionary war in South Vietnam, neither did they discourage their comrades in Hanoi from increasing military operations there. Between 1956 and 1963, China provided the DRV with 270,000 guns, over 10,000 pieces of artillery, nearly 200 million bullets, 2.02 million artillery shells, 15,000 wire transmitters, 5,000 radio transmitters, over 1,000 trucks, 15 aircraft, 28 war ships, and 1.18 million sets of uniforms. The total value of China’s assistance to Hanoi during this period amounted to 320 million yuan.<sup>24</sup> 1962 was a crucial year in the evolution of China’s attitudes toward Vietnam. Abandoning the cautious approach, Mao opted for confrontation with the United States and decided to commit China’s resources to Hanoi. Beijing’s massive supply of weapons to the DRV in 1962 helped Ho Chi Minh to intensify guerrilla warfare in the South, triggering greater U.S. intervention. By the end of 1963, Chinese leaders had become very nervous about American intentions in Vietnam but were ready to provide full support for the DRV in confronting the United States.

### **China’s Reaction to U.S. Escalation**

In the first half of 1964, the attention of U.S. officials was shifting increasingly from South Vietnam toward Hanoi. This trend reflected mounting concern over the infiltration of men and supplies from the North and a growing dissatisfaction with a policy that allowed Hanoi to encourage the insurgency without punishment. In addition to expand-

ing covert operations in North Vietnam, including intelligence overflights, the dropping of propaganda leaflets, and OPLAN 34A commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast, the Johnson Administration also conveyed to Pham Van Dong through a Canadian diplomat on June 17 the message that the United States was ready to exert increasingly heavy military pressure on the DRV to force it to reduce or terminate its encouragement of guerrilla activities in South Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese leader refused to yield to the American pressure, declaring that Hanoi would not stop its support for the struggle of liberation in the South.<sup>25</sup>

Mao watched these developments closely. Anticipating new trouble, the chairman told General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff of the (North) Vietnamese People’s Army, in June: “Our two parties and two countries must cooperate and fight the enemy together. Your business is my business and my business is your business. In other words, our two sides must deal with the enemy together without conditions.”<sup>26</sup> Between July 5 and 8, Zhou Enlai led a CCP delegation to Hanoi, where he discussed with leaders from the DRV and Pathet Lao the situations in South Vietnam and Laos.<sup>27</sup> Although the details of these talks are unknown, clearly the three Communist parties were stepping up their coordination to confront the increasing threat from the United States.

Immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing sent a cable on August 5 to Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung, asking them to “investigate the situation, work out countermeasures, and be prepared to fight.”<sup>28</sup> In the meantime, Beijing instructed the Kunming and Guangzhou Military Regions and the air force and naval units stationed in south and south-west China to assume a state of combat-readiness. Four air divisions and one anti-aircraft division were dispatched into areas adjoining Vietnam and put on a heightened alert status.<sup>29</sup> In August, China also sent approximately 15 MiG-15 and MiG-17 jets to Hanoi, agreed to train North Vietnamese pilots, and started to construct new airfields in areas adjacent to the Vietnamese border which would serve as sanctuary and repair and maintenance facilities for Hanoi’s jet fighters.<sup>30</sup> By moving new air force units to the border area and

building new airfields there, Beijing intended to deter further U.S. expansion of war in South Vietnam and bombardment against the DRV. Between August and September 1964, the PLA also sent an inspection team to the DRV to investigate the situation in case China later needed to dispatch support troops to Vietnam.<sup>31</sup>

The first months of 1965 witnessed a significant escalation of the American war in Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S. aircraft struck North Vietnamese military installations just across the 17th Parallel, ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong attacks on American barracks near Pleiku and in Qui Nhon. On March 1, the Johnson Administration stopped claiming that its air attacks on North Vietnam were reprisals for specific Communist assaults in South Vietnam and began a continuous air bombing campaign against the DRV. On March 8, two battalions of Marines armed with tanks and 8-inch howitzers landed at Danang.<sup>32</sup>

Worried about the increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Zhou Enlai on April 2 asked Pakistani President Ayub Khan to convey to President Johnson a four-point message:

(1) China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States. (2) The Chinese mean what they say. In other words, if any country in Asia, Africa, or elsewhere meets with aggression by the imperialists headed by the United States, the Chinese government and people will definitely give it support and assistance. Should such just action bring on American aggression against China, we will unhesitatingly rise in resistance and fight to the end. (3) China is prepared. Should the United States impose a war on China, it can be said with certainty that, once in China, the United States will not be able to pull out, however many men it may send over and whatever weapons it may use, nuclear weapons included. (4) Once the war breaks out, it will have no boundaries. If the American madmen bombard China without constraints, China will not sit there waiting to die. If they come from the sky, we will fight back on the ground. Bombing

means war. The war can not have boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to finish the war simply by relying on a policy of bombing.<sup>33</sup>

This was the most serious warning issued by the Chinese government to the United States, and given the caution exercised by President Johnson in carrying out the “Rolling Thunder” operations against the DRV, it was one that Washington did not overlook. Clearly, U.S. leaders had drawn a lesson from the Korean War, when the Truman Administration’s failure to heed Beijing warning against crossing the 38th parallel led to a bloody confrontation between the United States and China.

The U.S. escalation in early 1965 made the DRV desperate for help. Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap rushed to Beijing in early April to ask China to increase its aid and send troops to Vietnam. Le Duan told Chinese leaders that Hanoi needed “volunteer pilots, volunteer soldiers as well as other necessary personnel, including road and bridge engineers.” The Vietnamese envoys expected Chinese volunteer pilots to perform four functions: to limit U.S. bombing to the south of the 20th or 19th parallel, to defend Hanoi, to protect several major transportation lines, and to boost morale.<sup>34</sup> On behalf of the Chinese leadership, Liu Shaoqi replied to the Vietnamese visitors on April 8 that “it is the obligation of the Chinese people and party” to support the Vietnamese struggle against the United States. “Our principle is,” Liu continued, “that we will do our best to provide you with whatever you need and whatever we have. If you do not invite us, we will not go to your place. We will send whatever part [of our troops] that you request. You have the complete initiative.”<sup>35</sup>

In April, China signed several agreements with the DRV concerning the dispatch of Chinese support troops to North Vietnam.<sup>36</sup> Between April 21 and 22, Giap discussed with Luo Ruiqing and First Deputy Chief of Staff Yang Chengwu the arrangements for sending Chinese troops.<sup>37</sup> In May, Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Mao in Changsha, the chairman’s home province, where he asked Mao to help the DRV repair and build twelve roads in the area north of Hanoi. The Chinese leader accepted Ho’s request and instructed Zhou Enlai to see to the matter.<sup>38</sup>

In discussions with Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu, Zhou said: “According to Pham Van Dong, U.S. blockade and bombing has reduced supplies to South Vietnam through sea shipment and road transportation. While trying to resume sea transportation, the DRV is also expanding the corridor in Lower Laos and roads in the South. Their troops would go to the South to build roads. Therefore they need our support to construct roads in the North.” Zhou decided that the Chinese military should be responsible for road repair and construction in North Vietnam. Yang suggested that since assistance to the DRV involved many military and government departments, a special leadership group should be created to coordinate the work of various agencies. Approving the proposal, Zhou immediately announced the establishment of the “Central Committee and State Council Aid Vietnam Group” with Yang and Li Tianyou (Deputy Chief of Staff) as Director and Vice Director.<sup>39</sup> This episode demonstrates Zhou’s characteristic effectiveness in organization and efficiency in administration.

In early June, Van Tien Dung held discussions with Luo Ruiqing in Beijing to flesh out the general Chinese plan to assist Vietnam. According to their agreement, if the war remained in the current conditions, the DRV would fight the war by itself and China would provide various kinds of support as the Vietnamese needed. If the United States used its navy and air force to support a South Vietnamese attack on the North, China would also provide naval and air force support to the DRV. If U.S. ground forces were directly used to attack the North, China would use its land forces as strategic reserves for the DRV and conduct military operations whenever necessary. As to the forms of Sino-Vietnamese air force cooperation, Dung and Luo agreed that China could send volunteer pilots to Vietnam to operate Vietnamese aircraft, station both pilots and aircraft in Vietnam airfields, or fly aircraft from bases in China to join combat in Vietnam and only land on Vietnamese bases temporarily for refueling. The third option was known as the “Andong model” (a reference to the pattern of Chinese air force operations during the Korean War). In terms of the methods of employing PRC ground troops, the two military leaders agreed that the Chinese forces would either help to strengthen the defensive position of the DRV

troops to prepare for a North Vietnamese counter offensive or launch an offensive themselves to disrupt the enemy's deployment and win the strategic initiative.<sup>40</sup>

But despite Liu Shaoqi's April promise to Le Duan and Luo Ruiqing's agreement with Van Tien Dung, China in the end failed to provide pilots to Hanoi. According to the Vietnamese "White Paper" of 1979, the Chinese General Staff on 16 July 1965 notified its Vietnamese counterpart that "the time was not appropriate" to send Chinese pilots to Vietnam.<sup>41</sup> The PRC's limited air force capacity may have caused Beijing to have second thoughts, perhaps reinforcing Beijing's desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Whatever the reasons for China's decision, the failure to satisfy Hanoi's demand must have greatly disappointed the Vietnamese since the control of the air was so crucial for the DRV's effort to protect itself from the ferocious U.S. bombing, and undoubtedly contributed to North Vietnam's decision in 1965 to rely more on the Soviet Union for air defense.

Beginning in June 1965, China sent ground-to-air missile, anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and logistical units into North Vietnam to help Hanoi. The total number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam between June 1965 and March 1973 amounted to over 320,000.<sup>42</sup> To facilitate supplies into South Vietnam, China created a secret coastal transportation line to ship goods to several islands off Central Vietnam for transit to the South. A secret harbor on China's Hainan Island was constructed to serve this transportation route. Beijing also operated a costly transportation line through Cambodia to send weapons, munitions, food, and medical supplies into South Vietnam.<sup>43</sup> When the last Chinese troops withdrew from Vietnam in August 1973, 1,100 soldiers had lost their lives and 4,200 had been wounded.<sup>44</sup>

The new materials from China indicate that Beijing provided extensive support (short of volunteer pilots) for Hanoi during the Vietnam War and risked war with the United States in helping the Vietnamese. As Allen S. Whiting has perceptively observed, the deployment of Chinese troops in Vietnam was not carried out under maximum security against detection by Washington. The Chinese troops wore regular uniforms and did not disguise themselves as civilians. The Chinese presence was intentionally commu-

nicated to U.S. intelligence through aerial photography and electronic intercepts. This evidence, along with the large base complex that China built at Yen Bai in northwest Vietnam, provided credible and successful deterrence against an American invasion of North Vietnam.<sup>45</sup>

The specter of a Chinese intervention in a manner similar to the Korean War was a major factor in shaping President Johnson's gradual approach to the Vietnam War. Johnson wanted to forestall Chinese intervention by keeping the level of military actions against North Vietnam controlled, exact, and below the threshold that would provoke direct Chinese entry. This China-induced U.S. strategy of gradual escalation was a great help for Hanoi, for it gave the Vietnamese communists time to adjust to U.S. bombing and to develop strategies to frustrate American moves. As John Garver has aptly put it, "By helping to induce Washington to adopt this particular strategy, Beijing contributed substantially to Hanoi's eventual victory over the United States."<sup>46</sup>

### Explaining PRC Support for the DRV

Mao's decision to aid Hanoi was closely linked to his perception of U.S. threats to China's security, his commitment to national liberation movements, his criticism of Soviet revisionist foreign policy, and his domestic need to transform the Chinese state and society. These four factors were mutually related and reinforcing.

#### Sense of Insecurity:

Between 1964 and 1965, Mao worried about the increasing American involvement in Vietnam and perceived the United States as posing a serious threat to China's security. For him, support for North Vietnam was a way of countering the U.S. strategy of containment of China. The Communist success in South Vietnam would prevent the United States from moving closer to the Chinese southern border.

On several occasions in 1964, Mao talked about U.S. threats to China and the need for China to prepare for war. During a Central Committee conference held between May 15 and June 17, the chairman contended that "so long as imperialism exists, the danger of war is there. We are not the chief of staff for imperialism and have no idea when it will launch a war. It is the conventional weapon, not the atomic bomb,

that will determine the final victory of the war."<sup>47</sup> At first Mao did not expect that the United States would attack North Vietnam directly.<sup>48</sup> The Gulf of Tonkin Incident came as a surprise to him. In the wake of the incident, Mao pointed out on October 22 that China must base its plans on war and make active preparations for an early, large-scale, and nuclear war.<sup>49</sup>

To deal with what he perceived as U.S. military threats, Mao took several domestic measures in 1964, the most important of which was the launching of the massive Third Front project. This program called for heavy investment in the remote provinces of southwestern and western China and envisioned the creation of a huge self-sustaining industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event China became involved in war. The project had a strong military orientation and was directly triggered by the U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam.<sup>50</sup>

On 25 April 1964, the War Department of the PLA General Staff drafted a report for Yang Chengwu on how to prevent an enemy surprise attack on China's economic construction. The report listed four areas vulnerable to such an attack: (1) China's industry was over-concentrated. About 60 percent of the civil machinery industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry, and 52 percent of the national defense industry were concentrated in 14 major cities with over one million people. (2) Too many people lived in cities. According to the 1962 census, in addition to 14 cities of above one million, 20 cities had a population between 500,000 and one million. Most of these cities were located in the coastal areas and very vulnerable to air strikes. No effective mechanisms existed at the moment to organize anti-air works, evacuate urban populations, continue production, and eliminate the damages of an air strike, especially a nuclear strike. (3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and harbors were situated near big and medium-size cities and could easily be destroyed when the enemy attacked the cities. No measures had been taken to protect these transportation points against an enemy attack. In the early stage of war, they could become paralyzed. (4) All of China's reservoirs had a limited capacity to release water in an emergency. Among the country's 232 large reservoirs, 52 were located near major transportation lines and 17 close to important cities. In conclusion, the report made it

clear that “the problems mentioned above are directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war.” It asked the State Council “to organize a special committee to study and adopt, in accordance with the possible conditions of the national economy, practical and effective measures to guard against an enemy surprise attack.”<sup>51</sup>

Yang Chengwu presented the report to Mao, who returned it to Luo Ruiqing and Yang on August 12 with the following comment: “It is an excellent report. It should be carefully studied and gradually implemented.” Mao urged the newly established State Council Special Committee in charge of the Third Front to begin its work immediately.<sup>52</sup> Mao’s approval of the report marked the beginning of the Third Front project to relocate China’s industrial resources to the interior. It is important to note the timing of Mao’s reaction to the report—right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The U.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnam had confirmed Mao’s worst suspicions about American intentions.

Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun became Director, Deputy Prime Minister Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing became Vice Directors of the Special Committee. On August 19, they submitted to Mao a detailed proposal on how to implement the Third Front ideas.<sup>53</sup> In the meantime, the CCP Secretariat met to discuss the issue. Mao made two speeches at the meetings on August 17 and 20. He asserted that China should be on guard against an aggressive war launched by imperialism. At present, factories were concentrated around big cities and coastal regions, a situation deleterious to war preparation. Factories should be broken into two parts. One part should be relocated to interior areas as early as possible. Every province should establish its own strategic rear base. Departments of industry and transportation should move, so should schools, science academies, and Beijing University. The three railroad lines between Chengdu and Kunming, Sichuan and Yunnan, and Yunnan and Guizhou should be completed as quickly as possible. If there were a shortage of rails, the chairman insisted, rails on other lines could be dismantled. To implement Mao’s instructions, the meetings decided to concentrate China’s financial, material, and human resources on the construction of the Third Front.<sup>54</sup>

While emphasizing the “big Third Front” plan on the national level, Mao also ordered provinces to proceed with their “small Third Front” projects. The chairman wanted each province to develop its own light armament industry capable of producing rifles, machine guns, canons, and munitions.<sup>55</sup> The Third Five-Year Plan was revised to meet the strategic contingency of war preparation. In the modified plan, a total of three billion yuan was appropriated for small Third Front projects. This was a substantial figure, but less than 5 percent of the amount set aside for the big Third Front in this period.<sup>56</sup> In sum, the Third Front was a major strategic action designed to provide an alternative industrial base that would enable China to continue production in the event of an attack on its large urban centers.

In addition to his apprehension about a strike on China’s urban and coastal areas, Mao also feared that the enemy might deploy paratroop assault forces deep inside China. In a meeting with He Long, Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu on 28 April 1965, Mao called their attention to such a danger. He ordered them to prepare for the landing of enemy paratroopers in every interior region. The enemy might use paratroops, Mao contended, “to disrupt our rear areas, and to coordinate with a frontal assault. The number of paratroops may not be many. It may involve one or two divisions in each region, or it may involve a smaller unit. In all interior regions, we should build caves in mountains. If no mountain is around, hills should be created to construct defense works. We should be on guard against enemy paratroops deep inside our country and prevent the enemy from marching unstopped into China.”<sup>57</sup>

It appears that Mao’s attitudes toward the United States hardened between January and April 1965. In an interview with Edgar Snow on January 9, Mao had expressed confidence that Washington would not expand the war to North Vietnam because Secretary of State Dean Rusk had said so. He told Snow that there would be no war between China and the United States if Washington did not send troops to attack China.<sup>58</sup> Two days later, the CCP Central Military Commission issued a “Six-Point Directive on the Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in the South China Sea,” in which it instructed the military not to attack American airplanes

that intruded into Chinese airspace in order to avoid a direct military clash with the United States.<sup>59</sup>

In April, however, Mao rescinded the “Six Point Directive.” Between April 8 and 9, U.S. aircraft flew into China’s airspace over Hainan Island. On April 9, Yang Chengwu reported the incidents to Mao, suggesting that the order not to attack invading U.S. airplanes be lifted and that the air force command take control of the naval air units stationed on Hainan Island. Approving both of Yang’s requests, Mao said that China “should resolutely strike American aircraft that overfly Hainan Island.”<sup>60</sup> It is quite possible that the further U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam in the intervening months caused Mao to abandon his earlier restrictions against engaging U.S. aircraft.

It is important to point out that the entire Chinese leadership, not just Mao, took the strategic threat from the United States very seriously during this period. Zhou Enlai told Spiro Koleka, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania, on 9 May 1965 in Beijing that China was mobilizing its population for war. Although it seemed that the United States had not made up its mind to expand the war to China, the Chinese premier continued, war had its own law of development, usually in a way contrary to the wishes of people. Therefore China had to be prepared.<sup>61</sup> Zhou’s remarks indicated that he was familiar with a common pattern in warfare: accidents and miscalculations rather than deliberate planning often lead to war between reluctant opponents.

In an address to a Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965, Liu Shaoqi stated:

If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed.... If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade.... We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and it is easy for us to strike them. We should develop as early as possible new tech-

nology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. The enemy's strength is in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On the other, we should realize that the enemy lacks justification in sending troops.... This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.<sup>62</sup>

Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that "so long as we have made good preparations on every front, the enemy may not dare to come. We must defend our offshore islands. With these islands in our hands, the enemy will find it difficult to land. If the enemy should launch an attack, we will lure them inside China and then wipe them out completely."<sup>63</sup>

Scholars have argued over Beijing's reaction to the threat posed by U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Much of this argument focuses on the hypothesis of a "strategic debate" in 1965 between Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao. Various interpretations of this "debate" exist, but most contend that Luo was more sensitive to American actions in Indochina than either Lin or Mao, and that Luo demanded greater military preparations to deal with the threat, including accepting the Soviet proposal of a "united front."<sup>64</sup>

However, there is nothing in the recently available Chinese materials to confirm the existence of the "strategic debate" in 1965.<sup>65</sup> The often cited evidence to support the hypothesis of a strategic debate is the two articles supposedly written by Luo Ruiqing and Lin Biao on the occasion of the commemoration of V-J day in September 1965.<sup>66</sup> In fact, the same writing group organized by Luo Ruiqing in the General Staff was responsible for the preparation of both articles. The final version of the "People's War" article also incorporated opinions from the writing team led by Kang Sheng. (Operating in the Diaoyutai National Guest House, Kang's team was famous for writing the nine polemics against Soviet

revisionism). Although the article included some of Lin Biao's previous statements, Lin himself was not involved in its writing. When Luo Ruiqing asked Lin for his instructions about the composition of the article, the Defense Minister said nothing. Zhou Enlai and other standing Politburo members read the piece before its publication.<sup>67</sup> The article was approved by the Chinese leadership as a whole and was merely published in Lin Biao's name. Luo Ruiqing was purged in December 1965 primarily because of his dispute with Lin Biao over domestic military organization rather than over foreign policy issues.<sup>68</sup> Luo did not oppose Mao on Vietnam policy. In fact he carried out loyally every Vietnam-related order issued by the chairman. Mao completely dominated the decision making. The origins of the "People's War" article point to the danger of relying on public pronouncements to gauge inner-party calculations and cast doubts on the utility of the faction model in explaining Chinese foreign policy making.<sup>69</sup>

### **Commitment to National Liberation Movements:**

The second factor that shaped Mao's decision to support the DRV was his desire to form a broad international united front against both the United States and the Soviet Union. To Mao, national liberation movements in the Third World were the most important potential allies in the coalition that he wanted to establish. In the early 1960s, the chairman developed the concept of "Two Intermediate Zones." The first zone referred to developed countries, including capitalist states in Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The second zone referred to underdeveloped nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These two zones existed between the two superpowers. Mao believed that countries in these two zones had contradictions with the United States and the Soviet Union and that China should make friends with them to create an international united front against Washington and Moscow.<sup>70</sup>

Mao initially developed the idea of the "intermediate zone" during the early years of the Cold War. In a discussion with Anna Louise Strong in 1946, the CCP leader first broached the idea. He claimed that the United States and the Soviet Union were "separated by a vast zone including many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial coun-

tries in Europe, Asia, and Africa," and that it was difficult for "the U.S. reactionaries to attack the Soviet Union before they could subjugate these countries."<sup>71</sup> In the late 1940s and throughout the greater part of the 1950s, Mao leaned to the side of the Soviet Union to balance against the perceived American threat. But beginning in the late 1950s, with the emergence of Sino-Soviet differences, Mao came to revise his characterization of the international situation. He saw China confronting two opponents: the United States and the Soviet Union. To oppose these two foes and break China's international isolation, Mao proposed the formation of an international united front.

Operating from the principle of making friends with countries in the "Two Intermediate Zones," Mao promoted such anti-American tendencies as French President De Gaulle's break with the United States in the first zone and championed national liberation movements in the second zone. For Mao, the Vietnam conflict constituted a part of a broader movement across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which together represented a challenge to imperialism as a whole. China reached out to anti-colonial guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique, to the "progressive" Sihanouk in Cambodia, to the leftist regime under Sukarno in Indonesia, and to the anti-U.S. Castro in Cuba.<sup>72</sup> Toward the former socialist camp dominated by the Soviet Union, Mao encouraged Albania to persuade other East European countries to separate from Moscow.<sup>73</sup>

During this increasingly radical period of Chinese foreign policy, Mao singled out three anti-imperialist heroes for emulation by Third World liberation movements: Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella, the Algerian nationalist leader. In a speech to a delegation of Chilean journalists on 23 June 1964, Mao remarked: "We oppose war, but we support the anti-imperialist war waged by oppressed peoples. We support the revolutionary war in Cuba and Algeria. We also support the anti-U.S.-imperialist war conducted by the South Vietnamese people."<sup>74</sup> In another address to a group of visitors from Asia, Africa, and Oceania on July 9, Mao again mentioned the names of Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella as models of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.<sup>75</sup>

Envisioning China as a spokesman for the Third World independence cause, Mao believed that the Chinese revolutionary ex-



perience was relevant to the struggle of liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By firmly backing the Vietnamese struggle against the United States, he wanted to demonstrate to Third World countries and movements that China was their true friend. Victory for North Vietnam's war of national unification with China's support would show the political correctness of Mao's more militant strategy for coping with U.S. imperialism and the incorrectness of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence.

A number of Chinese anti-imperialist initiatives, however, ended in a debacle in 1965. First Ben Bella was overthrown in Algeria in June, leading the Afro-Asian movement to lean in a more pro-Soviet direction due to the influence of Nehru in India and Tito in Yugoslavia. The fall of Ben Bella frustrated Mao's bid for leadership in the Third World through the holding of a "second Bandung" conference of Afro-Asian leaders. Then in September, Sukarno was toppled in a right-wing counter-coup, derailing Beijing's plan to promote a militant "united front" between Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The Chinese behavior, nevertheless, did convince leaders in Washington that Beijing was a dangerous gambler in international politics and that American intervention in Vietnam was necessary to undermine a Chinese plot of global subversion by proxy.<sup>76</sup>

### Criticism of Soviet Revisionism:

Mao's firm commitment to North Vietnam also needs to be considered in the context of the unfolding Sino-Soviet split. By 1963, Beijing and Moscow had completely broken apart after three years of increasingly abusive polemics. The conclusion of the Soviet-American partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 was a major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. Thereafter the Beijing leadership publicly denounced any suggestion that China was subject to any degree of Soviet protection and directly criticized Moscow for collaborating with Washington against China. The effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Vietnam soon manifested itself as Beijing and Moscow wooed Hanoi to take sides in their ideological dispute.

After the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, the new leadership in the Kremlin invited the CCP to send a delegation to

the October Revolution celebrations. Beijing dispatched Zhou Enlai and He Long to Moscow for the primary purpose of sounding out Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin on the many issues in dispute: Khrushchev's long-postponed plan to convene an international Communist meeting, support for revolutionary movements, peaceful coexistence with the United States, attitudes toward Tito, and "revisionist" domestic policies within the Soviet Union. The Chinese discovered during their tour on November 5-13 that nothing basic had changed in the Soviet position: the new leaders in Moscow desired an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations on the condition that Beijing stopped its criticisms and limited competition in foreign policy, probably in return for the resumption of Soviet economic aid.<sup>77</sup>

Instead of finding an opportunity to improve mutual understanding, the Chinese visitors found their stay in Moscow unpleasant and the relationship with the Soviet Union even worse. During a Soviet reception, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky suggested to Zhou Enlai and He Long that just like the Russians had ousted Khrushchev, the Chinese should overthrow Mao. The Chinese indignantly rejected this proposal: Zhou even registered a strong protest with the Soviet leadership, calling Malinovsky's remarks "a serious political incident."<sup>78</sup> Zhou Enlai told the Cuban Communist delegation during a breakfast meeting in the Chinese Embassy on November 9 that Malinovsky "insulted Comrade Mao Zedong, the Chinese people, the Chinese party, and myself," and that the current leadership in the Kremlin inherited "Khrushchev's working and thought style."<sup>79</sup>

Before Zhou's journey to Moscow, the Chinese leadership had suggested to the Vietnamese Communists that they also send people to travel with Zhou to Moscow to see whether there were changes in the new Soviet leaders' policy. Zhou told Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan later in Hanoi, on 1 March 1965, that he was "disappointed" with what he had seen in Moscow, and that "the new Soviet leaders are following nothing but Khrushchevism."<sup>80</sup> Clearly Zhou wanted the Hanoi leadership to side with the PRC in the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, and Beijing's extensive aid to the DRV was designed to draw Hanoi to China's orbit.

The collective leadership which succeeded Khrushchev was more forthcoming in support of the DRV. During his visit to

Hanoi on 7-10 February 1965, Kosygin called for a total U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam and promised Soviet material aid for Ho Chi Minh's struggle. The fact that a group of missile experts accompanied Kosygin indicated that the Kremlin was providing support in that crucial area. The two sides concluded formal military and economic agreements on February 10.<sup>81</sup> Clearly the Soviets were competing with the Chinese to win the allegiance of the Vietnamese Communists. Through its new gestures to Hanoi, Moscow wanted to offset Chinese influence and demonstrate its ideological rectitude on issues of national liberation. The new solidarity with Hanoi, however, complicated Soviet relations with the United States, and after 1965, the Soviet Union found itself at loggerheads with Washington. While Moscow gained greater influence in Hanoi because of the North Vietnamese need for Soviet material assistance against U.S. bombing, it at the same time lost flexibility because of the impossibility of retreat from the commitment to a brother Communist state under attack by imperialism.

Before 1964, Hanoi was virtually on China's side in the bifurcated international communist movement. After the fall of Khrushchev and the appearance of a more interventionist position under Kosygin and Brezhnev, however, Hanoi adopted a more balanced stand. Leaders in Beijing were nervous about the increase of Soviet influence in Vietnam. According to a Vietnamese source, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary General of the CCP, paid a secret visit to Hanoi shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in an attempt to wean the Vietnamese away from Moscow with the promise of US\$1 billion aid per year.<sup>82</sup> China's strategy to discredit the Soviet Union was to emphasize the "plot" of Soviet-American collaboration at the expense of Vietnam. During his visit to Beijing on 11 February 1965, Kosygin asked the Chinese to help the United States to "find a way out of Vietnam." Chinese leaders warned the Russians not to use the Vietnam issue to bargain with the Americans.<sup>83</sup> Immediately after his return to Moscow, Kosygin proposed an international conference on Indochina. The Chinese condemned the Soviet move, asserting that the Russians wanted negotiation rather than continued struggle in Vietnam and were conspiring with the Americans to sell out Viet-

nam. But as R.B. Smith has observed, the Chinese “may have oversimplified a Soviet strategy which was... more subtle.... Moscow’s diplomatic initiative of mid-February may in fact have been timed to coincide with—rather than to constrain—the Communist offensive in South Vietnam.”<sup>84</sup> The Chinese criticism of the Soviet peace initiative must have confirmed the American image of China as a warmonger.

The Sino-Soviet rivalry over Vietnam certainly provided leaders in Hanoi an opportunity to obtain maximum support from their two Communist allies, but we should not overstate the case. Sometimes the benefits of the Sino-Soviet split for the DRV could be limited. For example, the Hanoi leadership sought a communist international united front to assist their war effort. They wanted Moscow and Beijing to agree on common support actions, particularly on a single integrated logistical system. They failed to achieve this objective primarily

because of China’s objection.<sup>85</sup>

### **Domestic Need to Transform the Chinese State and Society:**

Beginning in the late 1950s, Mao became increasingly apprehensive about the potential development of the Chinese revolution. He feared that his life work had created a political structure that would eventually betray his principles and values and become as exploitative as the one it had replaced. His worry about the future of China’s development was closely related to his diagnosis of the degeneration of the Soviet political system and to his fear about the effects of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ strategy of “peaceful evolution.”<sup>86</sup> Mao believed that Dulles’ approach to induce a peaceful evolution within the socialist world was taking effect in the Soviet Union, given Khrushchev’s fascination with peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Mao wanted to prevent that from

happening in China.

The problem of succession preoccupied Mao throughout the first half of the 1960s. His acute awareness of impending death contributed to his sense of urgency. The U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam made him all the more eager to put his own house in order. He was afraid that if he did not nip in the bud what he perceived to be revisionist tendencies and if he did not choose a proper successor, after his death China would fall into the hands of Soviet-like revisionists, who would “change the color” of China, abandon support for national liberation struggles, and appease U.S. imperialism. Mao was a man who believed in dialectics. Negative things could be turned into positive matters. The American presence in Indochina was a threat to the Chinese revolution. But on the other hand, Mao found that he could turn the U.S. threat into an advantage, namely, he could use it to intensify domestic anti-imperialist feelings and

### **POLISH SECRET PEACE INITIATIVES IN VIETNAM**

by Jerzy Michalowski

*This summary was prepared by the author’s son, Stefan Michalowski.*

This is the story of peace initiatives undertaken by Polish diplomats during the height of the Vietnam war. It was written by one of the main participants, Jerzy Michalowski, who was, at the time, a senior official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, and a close friend and colleague of Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki. The events took place during the years 1963-1966, when Poland was in a unique position to act as broker between the U.S. and North Vietnam. While formally allied with the latter, and subject to Soviet domination in numerous ways, Poland was able to steer a course of limited independence in its internal and international affairs. Polish diplomats were liked and respected in the West, where they maintained many useful contacts. Jerzy Michalowski, for instance, had been a member of the UN Control and Monitoring Commission that was set up under the 1954 Geneva Accords following the French defeat in Indochina.

In the late 1970s, after a distinguished

career as ambassador to Great Britain, the United Nations and the United States, Michalowski found himself out of favor with the government of Communist Party boss Edward Gierek. Removed from positions of responsibility, he was nonetheless given access to secret Ministry archives, and was able to prepare this 120-page report. Eventually, after being expelled from the Party, he retired from the foreign service. The manuscript was brought to the United States shortly before his death in March of 1993.

*Polish Secret Police Initiatives in Vietnam* is terse, honest, and highly readable. The author describes events that he actually took part in. Whenever possible, he supplies references from the Foreign Ministry archives or from published material. He provides accounts of personal meetings with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Leonid Brezhnev, Ho Chi Minh, Phan Van Dong, Lyndon Johnson, Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk and others. Whenever he feels that the historical record has been distorted, he does not hesitate to put forth his own version. He takes strong issue, for example, with the published memoirs of Henry Cabot Lodge.

Michalowski’s perspective, both as peace-maker and author, is that of a professional diplomat, rather than an official representative of a Soviet Bloc nation. His goal

was simply to end the bloodshed in Indochina by moving the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Poland’s peace proposals did not attempt to specify the terms of any final settlement. The focus was on defining the principles and conditions that would bring the two sides together. In the end, even this limited goal could not be achieved. The author’s analysis of this failure constitutes perhaps the most interesting and instructive part of the narrative. Both sides were committed to the military struggle. The Vietnamese had an almost absolute belief in final victory. They were convinced of the similarity of their situation to the previous conflict with the French, and were willing to absorb even the most horrendous blows that the United States could inflict. Michalowski reserves his most critical comments, however, for the Johnson Administration. America’s “carrot and stick” policy of cautious peace feelers combined with a campaign of savage bombing raids was disastrous, for it served only to strengthen the enemy’s resolve, and deepened suspicions about America’s true motives and intentions. Time and again, during the most critical and sensitive diplomatic maneuvers, the bombing raids turned the diplomats’ carefully crafted arrangements into rubble.

*continued on page 258*

mobilize the population against revisionists. Mao had successfully employed that strategy during the Civil War against Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. Now he could apply it again to prepare the masses for the Great Cultural Revolution that he was going to launch. Accordingly, in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Mao unleashed a massive "Aid Vietnam and Resist America" campaign across China.<sup>87</sup>

### Sino-Vietnamese Discord

In its heyday the Sino-Vietnamese friendship was described as "comrades plus brothers," but shortly after the conclusion of the Vietnam War the two communist states went to war with each other in 1979. How did it happen? In fact signs of differences had already emerged in the early days of China's intervention in the Vietnam conflict. Two major factors complicated Sino-Vietnamese relations. One was the historical pride and cultural sensitivity that the Vietnamese carried with them in dealing with the Chinese. The other was the effect of the Sino-Soviet split.

Throughout their history, the Vietnamese have had a love-hate attitude toward their big northern neighbor. On the one hand, they were eager to borrow advanced institutions and technologies from China; on the other hand, they wanted to preserve their independence and cultural heritage. When they were internally weak and facing external aggression, they sought China's help and intervention. When they were unified and free from foreign threats, they tended to resent China's influence. A pattern seems to characterize Sino-Vietnamese relations: the Vietnamese would downplay their inherent differences with the Chinese when they needed China's assistance to balance against a foreign menace; they would pay more attention to problems in the bilateral relations with China when they were strong and no longer facing an external threat.

This pattern certainly applies to the Sino-Vietnamese relationship during the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The Vietnamese Communists during this period confronted formidable enemies, the French and the Americans, in their quest for national unification. When the Soviet Union was reluctant to help, China was the only source of support that Hanoi could count

upon against the West. Thus Ho Chi Minh avidly sought advice and weapons from China. But sentiments of distrust were never far below the surface. Friction emerged between Chinese military advisers and Vietnamese commanders during the war against the French in the early 1950s.<sup>88</sup> Vietnamese distrust of the Chinese also manifested itself when Chinese support troops entered Vietnam in the mid 1960s.

When Chinese troops went to Vietnam in 1965, they found themselves in an awkward position. On the one hand, the Vietnamese leadership wanted their service in fighting U.S. aircraft and in building and repairing roads, bridges, and rail lines. On the other hand, the Vietnamese authorities tried to minimize their influence by restricting their contact with the local population. When a Chinese medical team offered medical service to save the life of a Vietnamese woman, Vietnamese officials blocked the effort.<sup>89</sup> Informed of incidents like this, Mao urged the Chinese troops in Vietnam to "refrain from being too eager" to help the Vietnamese.<sup>90</sup> While the Chinese soldiers were in Vietnam, the Vietnamese media reminded the public that in the past China had invaded Vietnam: the journal *Historical Studies* published articles in 1965 describing Vietnamese resistance against Chinese imperial dynasties.<sup>91</sup>

The increasing animosity between Beijing and Moscow and their efforts to win Hanoi's allegiance put the Vietnamese in a dilemma. On the one hand, the change of Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam from reluctant to active assistance in late 1964 and early 1965 made the Vietnamese more unwilling to echo China's criticisms of revisionism. On the other hand, they still needed China's assistance and deterrence. Mao's rejection of the Soviet proposal of a "united action" to support Vietnam alienated leaders in Hanoi. During Kosygin's visit to Beijing in February 1965, he proposed to Mao and Zhou that Beijing and Moscow end their mutual criticisms and cooperate on the Vietnam issue. But Mao dismissed Kosygin's suggestion, asserting that China's argument with the Soviet Union would continue for another 9,000 years.<sup>92</sup>

During February and March, 1966, a Japanese Communist Party delegation led by Secretary General Miyamoto Kenji, visited China and the DRV, with the purpose of encouraging "joint action" by China and the

Soviet Union to support Vietnam. Miyamoto first discussed the idea with a CCP delegation led by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen in Beijing. The two sides worked out a communiqué that went part of the way toward the "united action" proposal. But when Miyamoto, accompanied by Deng, came to see Mao in Conghua, Guangdong, the chairman burst into a rage, insisting that the communiqué must stress a united front against both the United States and the Soviet Union. Miyamoto disagreed, so the Beijing communiqué was torn up.<sup>93</sup> Clearly, Mao by this time had connected the criticism of Soviet revisionism with the domestic struggle against top party leaders headed by Liu, Deng, and Peng. It was no wonder that these officials soon became leading targets for attack when the Cultural Revolution swept across China a few months later.

In the meantime the Vietnamese made their different attitude toward Moscow clear by deciding to send a delegation to attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which was to be held between March 29 and April 8 and which the Chinese had already decided to boycott. The Vietnamese were walking a tightrope at this time. On the one hand they relied on the vital support of Soviet weapons; on the other hand, they did not want to damage their ties with China. Thus Le Duan and Nguyen Duy Trinh traveled from Hanoi to Beijing on March 22, on their way to Moscow. Although no sign of differences appeared in public during Duan's talks with Zhou Enlai, China's unhappiness about the Vietnamese participation in the 23rd Congress can be imagined.<sup>94</sup>

In sum, the Beijing-Hanoi relationship included both converging and diverging interests. The two countries shared a common ideological outlook and a common concern over American intervention in Indochina, but leaders in Hanoi wanted to avoid the danger of submitting to a dependent relationship with China. So long as policymakers in Hanoi and Beijing shared the common goal of ending the U.S. presence in the region, such divergent interests could be subordinated to their points of agreement. But the turning point came in 1968, when Sino-Soviet relations took a decisive turn for the worse just as Washington made its first tentative moves toward disengagement from South Vietnam. In the new situation, Beijing's strategic interests began to differ

fundamentally from those of Hanoi. Whereas the Chinese now regarded the United States as a potential counterbalance against the Soviet Union, their Vietnamese comrades continued to see Washington as the most dangerous enemy. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and the unification of the country, Hanoi's bilateral disputes with Beijing over Cambodia, a territorial disagreement in the South China Sea, and the treatment of Chinese nationals in Vietnam came to the fore, culminating in a direct clash in 1979.

### Was China Bluffing During the War?

The fact that Beijing did not openly acknowledge its sizable presence in North Vietnam raised questions about the justification for Washington's restraint in U.S. conduct of war, both at the time and in later years. Harry G. Summers, the most prominent of revisionist critics of President Johnson's Vietnam policy, asserts that the United States drew a wrong lesson from the Korean War: "Instead of seeing that it was possible to fight and win a limited war in Asia regardless of Chinese intervention, we...took counsel of our fears and accepted as an article of faith the proposition that we should never again become involved in a land war in Asia. In so doing we allowed our fears to become a kind of self-imposed deterrent and surrendered the initiative to our enemies." Summers contends that "whether the Soviets or the Chinese ever intended intervention is a matter of conjecture," and that the United States allowed itself "to be bluffed by China throughout most of the war." He cites Mao's rejection of the Soviet 1965 proposal for a joint action to support Vietnam and Mao's suspicions of Moscow's plot to draw China into a war with the United States as evidence for the conclusion that Mao was more fearful of Moscow than Washington and, by implication, he was not serious about China's threats to intervene to help Hanoi.<sup>95</sup>

Was China not serious in its threats to go to war with the United States in Indochina? As the preceding discussion has shown, Beijing perceived substantial security and ideological interests in Vietnam. From the security perspective, Mao and his associates were genuinely concerned about the American threat from Vietnam (although they did not realize that their own actions, such as the

supply of weapons to Hanoi in 1962, had helped precipitate the U.S. escalation of the war) and adopted significant measures at home to prepare for war. China's assistance to the DRV, to use John Garver's words, "was Mao's way of rolling back U.S. containment in Asia."<sup>96</sup> From the viewpoint of ideology, China's support for North Vietnam served Mao's purposes of demonstrating to the Third World that Beijing was a spokesman for national liberation struggles and of competing with Moscow for leadership in the international communist movement.

If the actions recommended by Summers had been taken by Washington in Vietnam, there would have been a real danger of a Sino-American war with dire consequences for the world. In retrospect, it appears that Johnson had drawn the correct lesson from the Korean War and had been prudent in his approach to the Vietnam conflict.

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### NEW CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Translated by  
Qiang Zhai

#### Document 1: Report by the War Department of the General Staff, 25 April 1964.

Deputy Chief of Staff Yang<sup>97</sup>:

According to your instruction, we have made a special investigation on the question of how our country's economic construction should prepare itself for a surprise attack by the enemy. From the several areas that we have looked at, many problems emerge, and some of them are very serious.

(1) The industry is over concentrated. About 60 percent of the civil machinery industry, 50 percent of the chemical industry, and 52 percent of the national defense industry (including 72.7 percent of the aircraft industry, 77.8 percent of the warship industry, 59 percent of the radio industry, and 44 percent of the weapons industry) are concentrated in 14 major cities with over one million population.

(2) Too many people live in cities. According to the census conducted at the end of 1962, 14 cities in the country have a population over one million, and 20 cities a

population between 500,000 and one million. Most of these cities are located in the coastal areas and are very vulnerable to air strikes. No effective mechanisms exist at the moment to organize anti-air works, evacuate urban population, guarantee the continuation of production, and eliminate the damages of an air strike, especially the fallout of a nuclear strike.

(3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and harbors are situated near big and medium-size cities and can easily be destroyed when the enemy attacks cities. No measures have been taken to protect these transportation points against an enemy attack. In the early stage of war, they can become paralyzed.

(4) All reservoirs have a limited capacity to release water in an emergency. Among the country's 232 large reservoirs with a water holding capacity between 100 million and 350 billion cubic meter, 52 are located near major transportation lines and 17 close to important cities. There are also many small and medium-size reservoirs located near important political, economic, and military areas and key transportation lines.

We believe that the problems mentioned above are important ones directly related to the whole armed forces, to the whole people, and to the process of a national defense war. We propose that the State Council organize a special committee to study and adopt, in accordance with the possible conditions of the national economy, practical and feasible measures to guard against an enemy surprise attack.

Please tell us whether our report is appropriate.

The War Department of the General Staff,  
April 25, 1964.

[Source: *Dangde wenxian*<sup>98</sup> (Party Documents) 3 (1995), 34-35.]

#### Document 2: Mao Zedong's Comments on the War Department's April 25 Report, 12 August 1964.

To Comrades Luo Ruiqing<sup>99</sup> and Yang Chengwu:

This report is excellent. We must carefully study and gradually implement it. The State Council has established a special com-

mittee on this question. Has it started its work?

Mao Zedong  
August 12.

[Source: *Ibid.*, 33.]

**Document 3: “Report on How Our Country’s Economic Construction Should Prepare Itself Against an Enemy Surprise Attack” by Li Fuchun<sup>100</sup>, Bo Yibo<sup>101</sup>, and Luo Ruiqing<sup>102</sup>, 19 August 1964.**

Chairman<sup>103</sup> and the Central Committee:

In accordance with Chairman’s comments on the General Staff War Department’s report of how our country’s economic construction should prepare itself for a surprise attack by the enemy, we have gathered comrades with responsibility in these areas for a meeting. All of us agree that Chairman’s comments and the War Department’s report are extremely important. We must pay serious attention to and do our best on such an important issue concerning our country’s strategic defense. The meeting has decided:

(1) To establish a special committee on this case within the State Council. We suggest that the committee consist of thirteen people including Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, Luo Ruiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Zhang Jichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, Gu Mu, Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchun serves as Director, and Bo Yibo and Luo Ruiqing Deputy Directors.

(2) In addition to the four areas mentioned by the War Department, our preparation measures also need to include universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutions, warehouses, government departments and institutions as well as civil shelters in cities and mines. We must follow Chairman’s principle of “careful study and gradual implementation” in conducting our investigation into various areas as early as possible and pay attention to the following issues.

(a) All new construction projects will not be placed in the First Front, especially not in the fifteen big cities with over a

million population.

(b) For those currently on-going construction projects in the First Front and particularly in the fifteen big cities, except those that can be completed and put into effective operation next year or the year after, all the rest must be reduced in size, undergo no expansion, and be concluded as soon as possible.

(c) For existing old enterprises, especially those in cities with high industrial concentration, we must remove them or some of their workshops. Particularly for military and machinery enterprises, we must break them in two parts if possible, and shift one part to the Third and Second Fronts. If we can remove them as a whole, we must do that with careful planning and in steps.

(d) Beginning in next year, no new large and medium-size reservoirs will be built.

(e) For key national universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes in the First Front, if they can be removed, we must relocate them to the Third and Second Fronts with careful planning. If they can not be removed, we must break them into two parts.

(f) From now on, all new projects, in whatever Front they will be located, must comply with the principle of dispersion, closeness to mountains, and concealment. They must not be concentrated in certain cities or areas.

We have divided labor to deal with the above work:

(a) The State Economic Commission and the State Planning Commission will be responsible for the arrangement of the industrial and transportation systems.

(b) The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for preparation measures concerning railroad junctions.

(c) The Office of National Defense Industry will be responsible for the arrangement of national defense industry.

(d) The General Staff will be responsible for the division of the First, Second, and Third Fronts on the national level and for the arrangement of national defense fortifications and war preparation mobilizations.

(e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be responsible for preparation measures concerning reservoirs.

(f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and Han Guang will be responsible for the arrangement of universities and colleges, scientific research and planning institutes.

(g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be responsible for the protection of city buildings and government departments and institutions.

We will spend the months of September and October investigating the various aspects and produce detailed plans that can be implemented gradually. The special committee will synthesize the plans before submitting them to the Central Committee for inclusion in the general plan for the next year and in the Third Five-Year Plan.

(3) We propose to revive the People’s Anti-Air Committee. Premier<sup>104</sup> should still serve as Director and Comrade Xie Fuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade Luo Ruiqing was Secretary General originally). The Ministry of Public Safety will be responsible for the daily work of the committee.

We should restore the Planning Office for the Construction of Underground Railway in Beijing and carry out an active preparation for the building of underground railway in Beijing. In the meantime, we should consider the construction of underground railway in Shanghai and Shenyang. The Ministry of Railway will be responsible for this task.

(4) If the central leadership approves the above suggestions, we propose to distribute our report along with the General Staff War Department report as well as Chairman’s comments as guidelines to all Party Bureaus, to all provincial, municipal, and district Party committees, and to all Party committees within government ministries.

Please inform us whether our report is correct.

Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Luo  
Ruiqing  
August 19, 1964.

[Source: *Ibid.*, 33-34.]

**Document 4: Zhou Enlai’s Conversation with Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 2 April 1965.**

(1) China will not take the initiative to provoke a war (with the United States). (2) China means what it says and will honor the international obligations it has undertaken. (3) China is prepared. China’s policies are

both prudent and prepared.... (4) If the American madmen carry out an extensive bombing, China will not sit still and wait to be killed. If they come from the sky, we will take action on the ground. Bombing means war, and war will have no boundaries. It is impossible for the United States to resolve the issue of war simply by relying on a policy of bombing.

[Source: The Diplomatic History Research Office of the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry, comp., *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975* (Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Major Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975) (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), 445.]

**Document 5: Liu Shaoqi's Speech to the Central Military Commission war planning meeting on 19 May 1965.**

The enemy has many contradictions, weaknesses, and difficulties. Its problems are no less than ours. If our preparations are faster and better, war can be delayed. The enemy will find it difficult to invade. If we make excellent preparations, the enemy may even dare not to invade. If it does not invade, we will not fight out. Such a prospect is not impossible. But we must work hard to achieve this goal. We must build the big Third Front and the small Third Front and do a good job on every front, including the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long-distance missiles. Under such circumstances, even if the United States has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big targets out on the sea and are easy for us to strike. We should develop as early as possible new technology to attack aircraft and warships so that we can knock out one enemy ship with a single missile. Our Red Flag 1 and Red Flag 2<sup>105</sup> can shoot down the enemy's high-altitude airplanes. If we have assurance to shoot down high-altitude airplanes, we can have more assurance to knock down low-altitude ones. The enemy's strength lies in its navy, air force, atomic bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy and air force has its limits. If the enemy sends ground troops to invade China, we are not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we should be prepared for the enemy to come from all directions, including a joint invasion against China by many countries. On

the other hand we should realize that the enemy lacks reasons and justifications in sending troops. If the enemy invades us without our attacking it first, the enemy's morale cannot be high. This will decide the difference between a just and an unjust war.

In addition, there is the issue of increasing the size of troops. In order to build fortifications, we can organize some engineer units. After working for a period and completing fortifications, they can be dismissed. Troops engaged in agricultural production and divisions on semi war alert should also construct fortifications. Production troops are busy with agricultural work, but during slack seasons they should spend most of their time building fortifications. This means that they can work on fortifications for half a year in North China and for four to five months in the Yangtze valley. If war begins and we have to expand troops, we just need a mobilization. This matter will be easy. At the moment, we need to do a good job in organizing militia forces.

What we cannot have time to prepare when war begins includes fortification construction, third fronts, bases as well as communications, a reconnaissance network, and new technology. We must pay attention to these issues. We should start work on the big Third Front, the small Third Front, material storage, state-of-the-art technology, scientific investigation, and research on new weapons. If we delay work on these matters, we will find ourselves unprepared later. To do these things needs time.

As to the issues of the size of troops, the number of military regions, and a unified leadership between the local civilian government and the military, we can have time to deal with them when war begins. Some of the issues will be dealt with only after the enemy has invaded our country. In case that the enemy occupies the Longhai Railroad,<sup>106</sup> or the Yangtze valley, or the Jinghan Railroad<sup>107</sup>, or the Jinpu Railroad<sup>108</sup>, our country will then be divided into sections. If that happens, we have to practice a unified leadership of the party, the government and the army. But this will be decided at that time, not now. With trains and airplanes at its disposal, the enemy will not do things according to our methods. Only when that time comes will our leadership go to mountains. At present, the leadership must live in the city because it will be inconvenient if it does not live in the city. Only when a large

number of enemy troops invades China and cuts us into parts will the leadership go to the mountains. It will not do that when China is not cut into parts. For instance, if the enemy does not occupy cities like Xian and Tongguan, Shaanxi<sup>109</sup> will not create a Shaanan Military region and a Shaanbei military region. The leadership will decide on this matter after the enemy has invaded, and there is time to do that. There is also time to mobilize troops. At present, we can begin the organization of the militia.... (the rest of the speech is about how to organize the militia).

[Source: *Dangde wenxian* 3 (1995), 40.]

**Document 6: Mao's Conversation with the Party and Government Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam<sup>110</sup>, 20 October 1965.**

You are fighting an excellent war. Both the South and the North are fighting well. The people of the whole world, including those who have already awakened and those who have not awakened, are supporting you. The current world is not a peaceful one. It is not you Vietnamese who are invading the United States, neither are the Chinese who are waging an aggressive war against the United States.

Not long ago the Japanese *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* published several reports filed by Japanese correspondents from South Vietnam. U.S. newspapers described these reports as unfair, thus provoking a debate. I am not referring to the Japanese Communist newspaper, *Akahata*. I am talking about Japanese bourgeois newspapers. This shows that the direction of the media is not favorable to the United States. Recently the demonstration by the American people against the American government's Vietnam policy has developed. At the moment it is primarily American intellectuals who are making trouble.

But all this are external conditions. In fact what will solve the problem is the war you are fighting. Of course you can conduct negotiations. In the past you held negotiations in Geneva. But the American did not honor their promise after the negotiations. We have had negotiations with both Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. Rusk said that the United States has had most negotia-

tions with China. But we stick to one point: the United States must withdraw from Taiwan, and after that all other problems can be easily resolved. The United States does not accept this point. China and the United States have been negotiating for ten years and we are still repeating the same old words. We will not give up that point. The United States once wanted to exchange press delegations with us. They argued that when we began with minor issues, we could better settle major problems later. We contended that only by starting from major issues could minor problems be easily resolved.

You withdrew your armed forces from the South in accordance with the Geneva Accords. As a result, the enemy began to kill people in the South, and you revived armed struggle. At first you adopted political struggle as a priority supplemented by armed struggle. We supported you. In the second stage when you were carrying out political and armed struggles simultaneously, we again supported you. In the third stage when you are pursuing armed struggle as a priority supplemented by political struggle, we still support you. In my view, the enemy is gradually escalating the war; so are you. In the next two and three years you may encounter difficulties. But it is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need to take this possibility into consideration. So long as you have made all kinds of preparations, even if the most difficult situation emerges, you will not find it too far from your initial considerations. Isn't this a good argument? Therefore there are two essential points: the first is to strive for the most favorable situation, and the second to prepare for the worst.

The Algerian experience can serve as a reference for you. Possibly in the fourth or fifth year of their war, some Algerian leaders became worried. At that time, their Prime Minister Arbas came to talk with us. They said that Algeria had a very small population of ten million. A million had already died. While the enemy had an army of 800,000, their own regular forces possessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops. To add the guerrillas, their total forces were less than 100,000. I told them at the time that the enemy was bound to defeat and that their population would increase. Later, after negotiations France began to withdraw its troops. Now it has completed the withdrawal, only leaving behind a few small

naval bases. The Algerian revolution is a national democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie. Our two parties are Communist. In terms of mobilizing the masses and carrying out people's war, our two parties are different from Algeria.

I talked about people's war in my article. Some of the statements refer to specific problems of ten to twenty years ago. Now you have encountered some new conditions. Many of your methods are different from our methods in the past. We should have differences. We also learn about war gradually. At the beginning we lost battles. We have not done as smoothly as you have.

I have not noticed what issues you have negotiated with the United States. I only pay attention to how you fight the Americans and how you drive the Americans out. You can have negotiations at certain time[s], but you should not lower your tones. You should raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared that the enemy may deceive you.

We will support you until your final victory. The confidence in victory comes from the fighting you have done and from the struggle you have made. For instance, one experience we have is that the Americans can be fought. We obtained this experience only after fighting the Americans. The Americans can be fought and can be defeated. We should demolish the myth that the Americans cannot be fought and cannot be defeated. Both of our two parties have many experiences. Both of us have fought the Japanese. You have also fought the French. At the moment you are fighting the Americans.

The Americans have trained and educated the Vietnamese people. They have educated us and the people of the whole world. In my opinion it is not good without the Americans. Such an educator is indispensable. In order to defeat the Americans, we must learn from the Americans. Marx's works do not teach us how to fight the Americans. Nor do Lenin's books write about how to fight the Americans. We primarily learn from the Americans.

The Chinese people and the people of the whole world support you. The more friends you have, the better you are.

[Source: The People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong Waijiao wenxuan*

(Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Central Documentary Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 570-573.]

#### **Document 7: Mao's Conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968.**

Because there has been no battle to fight recently, you want to negotiate with the United States. It is all right to negotiate, but it is difficult to get the United States to withdraw through negotiations. The United States also wants to negotiate with you because it is in a dilemma. It has to deal with problems of three regions: the first is the Americas—the United States, the second is Europe, and the third is Asia. In the last few years the United States has stationed its major forces in Asia and has created an imbalance. In this regard American capitalists who have investments in Europe are dissatisfied. Also throughout its history the United States has always let other countries fight first before it jumps in at halfway. It is only after World War Two that the United States has begun to take the lead in fighting, first in the Korean War and then in the Vietnam War. In Vietnam the United States is taking the lead, but it is followed by only a small number of other countries. Whether the war is a special war or a limited war, the United States is totally devoted to it. Now it cannot afford to pay attention to other countries. Its troops in Europe, for example, are complaining, saying that there is a shortage of manpower and that experienced soldiers and commanders have been removed and better equipment has been relocated. The United States has also redeployed its troops from Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia. Did not the United States claim that it has a population of two hundred million? But it cannot endure the war. It has dispatched only several hundred thousand troops. There is a limit to its troops.

After fighting for over a dozen years you should not think about only your own difficulties. You should look at the enemy's difficulties. It has been twenty-three years since Japan's surrender in 1945, but your country still exists. Three imperialist countries have committed aggression against you: Japan, France, and the United States. But your country has not only survived but also developed.

Of course imperialism wants to fight.

One purpose for its war is to put out fire. A fire has started in your country, and imperialism wants to put out that fire. The second purpose is to make money through producing munitions. To put out fire they must produce fire-extinguishing machines, which will bring about profits. Every year the United States spends over 30 billion dollars in your country.

It has been an American custom not to fight a long war. The wars they have fought average about four to five years. The fire in your country cannot be put out. On the contrary, it has spread. Capitalists in the United States are divided into factions. When this faction makes more profit and that faction make less profit, an imbalance in booty-sharing will occur and trouble will begin domestically. These contradictions should be exploited. Those monopolized capitalists who have made less money are unwilling to continue the war. This contradiction can be detected in election speeches made by the two factions. Especially the American journalist Walter Lippmann has published an article recently, warning not to fall into another trap. He says that the United States has already fallen into a trap in Vietnam and that the current problem is how to find ways to climb out of that trap. He is afraid that the United States may fall into other traps. Therefore your cause is promising.

In 1966, I had a conversation with Chairman Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou. At that time, the United States had already resumed attack on North Vietnam, but had not renewed bombing. I said that the United States might end the war that year because it was an American election year. No matter which president came to power, he would encounter the problem of whether the United States should continue the war or withdraw now. I believed that the difficulties that the United States faced would increase if it continued the war. Countries in all of Europe did not participate in the war. This situation was different from that of the Korean War. Japan probably would not enter the war. It might lend some help economically because it could make money by producing ammunition. I think the Americans overestimated their strength in the past. Now the United States is repeating its past practice by overstretching its forces. It is not just us who make this argument. Nixon has also said so. The United States has stretched its forces not only in the Americas and Europe but also in

Asia. At first I did not believe that the United States would attack North Vietnam. Later the United States bombed North Vietnam, proving my words wrong. Now the United States has stopped bombing. My words are correct again. Maybe the United States will resume bombing, proving my words wrong a second time. But eventually my words will prove correct: the United States has to stop bombing. Therefore I believe that it is all right for you to make several contingency plans.

In sum, in the past years the American army has not invaded North Vietnam. The United States has neither blockaded Haiphong nor bombed the Hanoi city itself. The United States has reserved a method. At one point it claimed that it would practice a "hot pursuit." But when your aircraft flew over our country, the United States did not carry out a "hot pursuit." Therefore, the United States has bluffed. It has never mentioned the fact that your aircraft have used our airfields. Take another example, China had so many people working in your country. The United States knew that, but had never mentioned it, as if such a thing did not exist. As to the remaining people sent by China to your country who are no longer needed, we can withdraw them. Have you discussed this issue? If the United States comes again, we will send people to you as well. Please discuss this issue to see which Chinese units you want to keep and which units you do not want to keep. Keep the units that are useful to you. We will withdraw the units that are of no use to you. We will send them to you if they are needed in the future. This is like the way your airplanes have used Chinese airfields: use them if you need and not use them if you do not need. This is the way to do things.

I am in favor of your policy of fighting while negotiating. We have some comrades who are afraid that you may be taken in by the Americans. I think you will not. Isn't this negotiation the same as fighting? We can learn experience and know patterns through fighting. Sometimes one cannot avoid being taken in. Just as you have said, the Americans do not keep their words. Johnson once said publicly that even agreements sometimes could not be honored. But things must have their laws. Take your negotiations as an example, are you going to negotiate for a hundred years? Our Premier has said that if Nixon continues the negotia-

tions for another two years and fails to solve the problem, he will have difficulties in winning another term of presidency.

One more point. It is the puppet regime in South Vietnam who is afraid of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Some people in the United States have pointed out that the really effective government popular among the South Vietnamese people is not the Saigon government but the Liberation Front. This is not a statement attributed to someone in the U.S. Congress. It is reported by journalists, but the name of the speaker was not identified. The statement was attributed to a so-called U.S. government individual. The statement raises a question: Who represents the government with real prestige in South Vietnam? Nguyen Van Thieu or Nguyen Huu Tho? Therefore although the United States publicly praises Nguyen Van Thieu, saying that he will not go to Paris to attend the negotiations, it in fact realizes that problems can not be solved if the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam does not participate in the negotiations.

[Source: *Ibid.*, 580-583.]

1. Using recent Chinese sources, Chen Jian's "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," *The China Quarterly* 142 (June 1995), 357-387, provides an informative and insightful analysis of China's decision to assist Hanoi during the Vietnam War, but he does not address the historiographical controversy of whether there was a "strategic debate" in Beijing in 1965. Fresh materials released in China in 1994 and 1995 shed new light on this issue.
2. See Qiang Zhai, "Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950-1954," *The Journal of Military History* 57 (October 1993), 698-715; *idem.*, "China and the Geneva Conference of 1954," *The China Quarterly* 129 (March 1992), 103-122; Chen Jian, "China and the First Indochina War, 1950-1954," *The China Quarterly* 133 (March 1993), 85-110.
3. Guo Ming, ed., *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian* [The Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations over the Last Forty Years] (Nanning: Guangxi People's Press, 1991), 65. The contributors in this volume are from the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, a major research center on Sino-Vietnamese relations in China.
4. Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949-1956* [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1956] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 94; Hoang Van Hoan, *Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geming huiyilu* [A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's Revolutionary Reminiscences] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1987), 267.
5. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed. *Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi* [Historical Facts about the Role of the Chinese Military Advi-



- sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and Resist France] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1990), 126-127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selected Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and Wei Guoqing as members of the Chinese delegation for the forthcoming discussions during Giap's second visit. See Mao to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16 October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419. Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had served as China's chief military advisor to the Vietminh in 1950, was not mentioned during Giap's first visit; evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chinese team to talk with Giap during his second trip.
6. Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 65.
  7. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed. *Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi*, 142-143.
  8. During the Vietnamese land reform, an excessive persecution of so-called landlords and rich peasants occurred, creating serious resentments among the peasant population against the party. Hoang, *Canghai yisu*, 279-285. Truong Chinh was often regarded by Western observers as a member of the "pro-Chinese" wing of the VWP.
  9. Pei, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wajiaoshi, 1949-1956*, 94.
  10. For Zhou's visit to Hanoi, see the PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai wajiaohuodong dashiji, 1949-1975* [A Chronology of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, 1949-1975] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), 169-170; Huang Zheng, *Hu Zhiming he Zhongguo* [Ho Chi Minh and China] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1987), 182-183. Zhou's quote is taken from Han Suyin, *Elders Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898-1976* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 260.
  11. Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 102-104.
  12. Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 65. According to a recent study by William J. Duiker, Le Duan as General Secretary was "a powerful advocate of an aggressive strategy to achieve national reunification with the South." At the Fifteenth Plenum of the VWP held at the end of 1958, the Central Committee adopted a new policy which advocated a return to revolutionary war to unify the South. But the new line also included the ambivalence that had shaped attitudes in Hanoi from the time of the Geneva Conference. Though urging a return to revolutionary war, the Central Committee report, which was not issued until May 1959, asserted that the "political strength of the masses" would remain the principal form of struggle, although it would now be supplemented by low-level military operations conducted by local guerrilla forces and village self-defense units of the type that had been employed during the August 1945 Revolution. William J. Duiker, *U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 235. It is possible that China's advice for caution in waging revolutionary struggle in the South contributed to the ambivalence in Hanoi's policy.
  13. Duiker, *U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina*, 265.
  14. Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 67.
  15. Duiker, *U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina*, 266.
  16. For Pham Van Dong's visit to China, see the PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai wajiaohuodong dashiji, 1949-1975*, 313-314. Remarks by Mao and Zhou are taken from Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 67.
  17. Cong Jin, *Quzhe fazhan de suiye* [Years of Twisting Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1989), 500-502. The author is a party history researcher at the Chinese National Defense University. See also Zhu Zhongli, *Liming yu wanxia: Wang Jiexiang wenxue zhuanji* [Dawn and Dusk: A Literary Biography of Wang Jiexiang] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986), 394-396. The author is the wife of Wang Jiexiang.
  18. Ma Qibin, Chen Wenbin, et al. *Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian, 1949-1989* [The Forty Years of the Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1989] (Beijing: CCP Party History Material Press, 1989), 213; Cong, *Quzhe fazhan de suiye*, 502; Zhu, *Liming yu wanxia*, 396-399.
  19. Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., *Dangdai Zhongguo wajiaohuodong* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1990), 159; Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 69; Wang Xianguan, *Yuanyue kangmei shilu* [A Factual Record of Assistance to Vietnam against the United States] (Beijing: International Culture Press, 1990), 25. Wang Xianguan was a secretary at the headquarters of the PLA Engineering Corps in the late 1970s and is currently working with the PLA General Staff. His book contains much useful data on the role of Chinese army engineer troops in Vietnam.
  20. Xue and Pei, *Dangdai Zhongguo wajiaohuodong*, 159.
  21. Ibid.
  22. Li Ke, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," *Junshi lishi* [Military History] 4 (1989), 30. This bi-monthly journal is published by the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Museum in Beijing.
  23. Interview with a Chinese military history researcher, Beijing, 13 July 1995.
  24. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun* [The People's Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: CCP Historical Materials Press, 1989), 409.
  25. George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (New York: 2nd ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 117-119.
  26. Xue and Pei, *Dangdai Zhongguo wajiaohuodong*, 159.
  27. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng of the CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; Hoang Van Hoan, and Phoumi Vongvichit of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. The PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai wajiaohuodong dashiji, 1949-1975*, 413.
  28. Li and Hao, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun*, 408.
  29. Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 364.
  30. Allen S. Whiting, "How We Almost Went to War with China," *Look*, 29 April 1969, p. 76; Melvin Gurtov and Hwang Byong-moo, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 160-161.
  31. Li, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 30.
  32. Gurtov and Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, 162; Herring, *America's Longest War*, 128-131.
  33. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai wajiaohuodong dashiji, 1949-1975*, 445; Xue and Pei, *Dangdai Zhongguo wajiaohuodong*, 160-161.
  34. Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingjiao, chief comp., *Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo* [The Military Work of the Contemporary Chinese Armed Forces] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 1:539-40; Li and Hao, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun*, 415; Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 69-70; Li, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 31.
  35. Han and Tan, *Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo*, 539-540; Wang, *Yuanyue kangmei shilu*, 44; Li, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 31.
  36. Xue and Pei, *Dangdai Zhongguo wajiaohuodong*, 161.
  37. Wang, *Yuanyue kangmei shilu*, 45.
  38. Ibid. 35, 44; Li and Hao, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun*, 422. R. B. Smith also mentions Ho's meeting with Mao in Changsha. He dates the meeting at May 16-17. His source is the diary of Ho's personal secretary. See R. B. Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 139.
  39. Wang, *Yuanyue kangmei shilu*, 46-48. According to Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, to facilitate the transportation of materials to Vietnam, Beijing in 1965 also established a special leadership group in charge of transportation to Vietnam. Luo Ruiqing was director. Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Yang Chengwu, Li Tianyou, Fang Yi, Li Qiang, and Liu Xiao were vice-directors. Li and Hao, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun*, 413.
  40. Li and Hao, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun*, 417.
  41. Quoted in Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66*, 171. According to Luu Doan Huynh, from the International Relations Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Beijing informed Hanoi in June 1965 that it would not be able to defend North Vietnam from U.S. air attacks. Quoted in Allen Whiting, "China's Role in the Vietnam War," in Jayne Werner and David Hunt, eds., *The American War in Vietnam* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1993), 71-76.
  42. Xue and Pei, *Dangdai Zhongguo wajiaohuodong*, 161; Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 70.
  43. Li, "The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assistance to Vietnam against the United States," 31; Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 69. For a description of the Chinese use of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville to send military supplies to the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam between 1966-1967, see Kang Daisha, "My Days in Cambodia," in Cheng Xiangjun, ed., *Nu wajiaogaowan* [Women Diplomats] (Beijing: People's Sports Press, 1995), 482-483. Kang Daisha is the wife of Chen Shuliang, who was the Chinese ambassador to Cambodia between 1962-1967. For a detailed treatment of Chinese aid to the DRV between 1965-1969, see Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 371-380.
  44. Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 71.
  45. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 186; idem., "Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford:

- Clarendon Press, 1994), 506-523.
46. John W. Garver, "The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War," *Parameters* 22 (Spring 1992), 73-85, quotation on 75.
47. Sun Dongsheng, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," *Dangde wenxian* [Party Documents] 3 (1995), 42-48. Sun's indirect quotation of Mao's remarks is on p. 44. *Dangde wenxian* is a bi-monthly journal published by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and the Central Archives. It often contains important party documents. Sun Dongsheng is a researcher at the Central Documentary Research Office.
48. Mao's conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 582.
49. Yuan Dejin, "The Evolution of Mao Zedong's Theory of War and Peace since the Founding of New China," *Junshi lishi* [Military History] 4 (1994), 36.
50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, development and consequences of the Third Front, see Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," *The China Quarterly* 115 (September 1988), 351-386.
51. For the complete text of the report, see *Dangde wenxian* 3 (1995), 34-35.
52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in *ibid.*, 33.
53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19 August 1964, see *ibid.*, 33-34.
54. Mao's remarks are quoted in Sun, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," 45.
55. Sun, "The Great Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our Country's Economic Construction," 44.
56. Naughton, "The Third Front," 368.
57. Mao's conversation with He Long, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu, 28 April 1965, in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* [Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Writings] 6 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press and Central Document Press, 1993), 6:404.
58. For Snow's version of his conversation with Mao, see Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1971), 215-216. For the Chinese version, see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 544-562.
59. Li and Hao, *Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun*, 341.
60. *Ibid.*, 341-342; *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, 6:403.
61. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975*, 455.
62. Liu Shaoqi's speech at the war planning meeting of the Central Military Commission, 19 May 1965, in *Dangde wenxian* 3 (1995), 40.
63. The CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Zhu De nianpu* [Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing: People's Press, 1986), 537-538.
64. Harry Harding, "The Making of Chinese Military Power," in William Whitson, ed., *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 361-385; Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate', 1965-1966," in Tang Tsou, ed., *China in Crisis*, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 23-71; Donald Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," in *ibid.*, 237-268; Michael Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66," *The China Quarterly* 49 (January-March 1972), 32-75.
65. Barry Naughton has made a similar criticism. Naughton, "The Third Front," 370-371.
66. Luo Ruiqing, "The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism Too," *Peking Review*, 3 September 1965, 31-39; Lin Biao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," *ibid.*, 9-30.
67. Xu Yan, *Junshijia Mao Zedong* [Military Strategist Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1995), 149; Huang Yao, *Sanci danan busi de Luo Ruiqing Dajiang* [Senior General Luo Ruiqing who Survived Three Deaths] (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 1994), 263, 265, 270-271. This book is based on sources from the Central Archives, the PLA General Staff Archives, and the Ministry of Public Security Archives.
- It is possible that the two articles published in Luo and Lin's names were written in response to Soviet arguments on war and peace. On 30 January 1965, Mao asked Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, Deputy Director of the Combat Department of the General Staff, to find a person well versed in political and military issues to prepare a commentary on the book *Military Strategy* edited by Soviet Chief of Staff V. D. Sokolovsky and published by the Soviet Defense Ministry's Military Press in 1962. See Mao to Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, 30 January 1965, in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, 6:402.
68. For a detailed discussion of the Luo-Lin dispute, see Huang, *Sanci danan busi de Luo Ruiqing Dajiang*, chapters 24-34. Allen Whiting attempts to establish a causal relationship between Luo's purge and China's foreign policy change in mid-1965. Citing the Vietnamese claim that China decided in June 1965 to provide no air cover for North Vietnam, Whiting argues that this timing dovetails with a major personnel change in the Chinese leadership: "At some point between May and September Luo Ruiqing fell from office, after which Lin Biao published a major treatise on guerrilla war implicitly rejecting Luo's forward strategy and with it any advanced air combat. Chinese ground support apparently came as a substitute form of help for Hanoi." Whiting, "Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy," 516. In fact, Luo did not fall from office until December 1965.
69. Michael H. Hunt has also criticized the emphasis on factions to account for Chinese foreign policy formation. He poses the question sharply: "Does the factional model transpose on China the competitive ethos of American politics and underestimate the restraining authoritarian and hierarchical qualities of China's political culture?" See Michael H. Hunt, "CCP Foreign Policy: 'Normalizing the Field,'" in Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds., *Toward a History of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program, 1995), 163-191. The quotation is on p. 170.
70. For Mao's statements on the "Two Intermediate Zones," see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 506-509. See also Chi Aiping, "The Evolution of Mao Zedong's International Strategic Thought," in *Dangde wenxian* 3 (1994), 46-52; Li Jie, "Study of Mao Zedong's International Strategic Thought," in the International Strategic Studies Foundation, ed., *Huanqiu tongci liangre* [All Is the Same in the World] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1993), 1-16.
71. Mao Zedong, "Talks with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 4:99.
72. For a recent study of China's policy toward Angola and Mozambique, see Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93," *The China Quarterly* 143 (June 1995), 387-422.
73. On Beijing's attempt to divide the Soviet-led bloc, see the putative memoirs of Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China*, 2 vols., (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1979). For an overview of Chinese-Albanian relations, see Fan Chengzuo, "The 'Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter' in Chinese-Albanian Relations," *Waijiao xueyuan xuebao* [Journal of Foreign Affairs College] 3 (1993), 50-52.
74. Mao's conversation with the Chilean Journalist Delegation, 23 June 1964, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan*, 529-533.
75. Mao's talk with delegates from Asia, Africa, and Oceania on 9 July 1964, in *ibid.*, 534-539. These delegates came to China after participating in Pyongyang in the Second Asian Economic Forum.
76. For a good discussion of anti-imperialism in Chinese foreign policy, see Edward Friedman, "Anti-Imperialism in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post Cold War Era*, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 60-74.
77. Gurtov and Hwang, *China under Threat*, 161.
78. For a detailed, first-hand account of Zhou Enlai's visit to Moscow, see Yu Zhan, "An Unusual Visit: Remembering Zhou Enlai's Last Visit to the Soviet Union," *Dangde wenxian* [Party Documents] 2 (1992), 85-91. It is also included in the Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *XinZhongguo waijiao fengyun* [Episodes of New China's Diplomacy] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 3:14-30. Yu Zhan was Director of the Department of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 1964 and accompanied Zhou to Moscow.
79. The PRC Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975*, 428.
80. Zhou's conversation with Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan, 1 March 1965, in *ibid.*, 438.
81. Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66*, 54.
82. The Vietnamese claim is quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Secrets of Former Friends," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (15 June 1979), 38-39. I have not seen any Chinese material that confirms the Vietnamese claim.
83. Xie Yixian, ed., *Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979* [A Diplomatic History of China: The Period of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1988), 344.
84. Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66*, 55.
85. Douglas Pike describes Hanoi's strategy to put the Sino-Soviet dispute to its own use in service of its war as "the alternating tilt gambit." See Douglas Pike, *Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 54-55.
86. For Mao's reaction to Dulles' policy, see Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huiyu* [Recollection

- tions of Certain Important Decisions and Events], vol. 2 (Beijing: CCP Party School Press, 1993), 1137-1157.
87. For more discussions of Mao's attempt to use the escalation of the Indochina conflict to radicalize China's political and social life, see Chen, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 361-365.
88. For a description of this problem, see Zhai, "Transplanting the Chinese Model," 712-713.
89. Wang, *Yuanyue kangmei shilu*, 60-68.
90. *Ibid.*, 74-75.
91. Guo, *Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian*, 102.
92. Cong, *Quzhe fazhan de sui yue*, 607.
93. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung," *The China Quarterly* 35 (July-September 1968), 58-77; Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66*, 285-304.
94. Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965-66*, 298-299. For Zhou's reception of the Vietnamese delegation led by Le Duan, see The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., *Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975*, 491.
95. Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 93-94, 96.
96. Garver, "The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War," 75.
97. Yang Chengwu.
98. *Dangde wenxian* is a bi-monthly journal published by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and the Central Archives. It often contains important party documents
99. Chief of Staff.
100. Deputy Prime Minister, Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation.
101. Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation.
102. Luo was also named Deputy Director of the State Council Special Committee on war preparation.
103. Mao Zedong.
104. Zhou Enlai.
105. These are the names of Chinese missiles.
106. A major railway trunk running east and west between Lianyungang and Lanzhou.
107. A major railway trunk running north and south between Beijing and Wuhan.
108. A major railway trunk running north and south between Tianjin and Nanjing.
109. A province in North China.
110. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Pham Van Dong.

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palpable improvement in Soviet-American relations following the shared fright of the 1962 Caribbean (Cuban missile) crisis, the Kremlin sought to minimize Soviet involvement in the Vietnam conflict, which was not only problematic from the viewpoint of possible foreign-policy advantages but was also fraught with possible new clashes between the USSR and the USA. Moreover, the Soviet leaders were apprehensive of radical views held by North Vietnam's leaders, who had a clearly pro-Chinese orientation.

The extent of the difference in the positions held by the two countries became clear after a visit to Moscow in Jan.-Feb. 1964 by a delegation of the Workers Party of Vietnam (WPV), led by Le Duan, the party's First Secretary. The DRV Communists came out in support of their Chinese colleagues with such zeal and expressed such radical ideas about the role of the national liberation movement in Third World countries that their Moscow interlocutors were obliged to switch from "the patient explanation of the CPSU stand and the general line of the world communist movement" to direct warnings about the possible consequences such views could have for "the Vietnamese friends'" relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

Further evidence that the two sides were slowly but surely drifting apart surfaced during a July 1964 visit to Moscow by an NLF delegation at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The representatives of the patriotic forces of South Vietnam presented to the Soviet leaders a number of requests and proposals, including requests for increased supplies of arms and ammunition. They also expressed a desire that a permanent mission of the NFLSV be opened in the USSR. The CPSU CC viewed skeptically all those requests. In his report to the CC about that delegation's visit, D. Shevlyagin, deputy head of the CC International Department, advised that no definite answer about the opening of such a mission be given and that all talks be held exclusively via the North Vietnamese state agencies. In view of this, it was decided not to receive the delegation at the CPSU CC, for that would have raised the awkward necessity for the Kremlin leaders to state in clear terms their stand on the above-mentioned issues. CC Secretary Boris Ponomarev, who was the

curator of relations between the CPSU and other parties, accepted that advice.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, faced with the Soviet leadership's unwillingness to plunge into the Southeast Asian conflict, Hanoi redoubled its efforts to improve relations with China. According to the information of the Soviet Defense Ministry, PRC and DRV officials opened talks in 1964 on a bilateral treaty of military cooperation. North Vietnam hosted a delegation of PRC military leaders, led by the Defense Minister, and in December 1964 a bilateral treaty was signed which provided for the introduction of PRC troops to the DRV.<sup>5</sup> Prior to that, the DRV General Staff had informed the Soviet military attaché in Hanoi that there was no longer any need for Soviet military experts to stay in the country and they should leave the DRV without replacement by other Soviet advisors as soon as they completed their current business.<sup>6</sup> The rapprochement between Hanoi and Beijing was facilitated by common views on the need to fight against "U.S. imperialism." Although the North Vietnamese leaders never fully trusted China (as later conflicts demonstrated), coolness in relations with the Soviet Union predetermined their official position.<sup>7</sup>

Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 marked a turning point in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations.<sup>8</sup> For reasons that remain unclear, the Soviet Union made an about-face and again oriented itself toward closer cooperation with North Vietnam. Probably Leonid I. Brezhnev and his entourage feared a loss of Soviet influence in the region, particularly in the context of the mounting differences between Beijing and Moscow which threatened to develop into an open conflict. In that context, the consolidation of China's position in Southeast Asia at the USSR's expense posed a potential threat to the Soviet authority in the world communist movement.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in November 1963 and advent to power of Lyndon B. Johnson (whose election as president in 1964 was regarded in the USSR as an indicator of greater right-wing influence in American politics) dimmed the hopes of improvement in Soviet-American relations that had arisen in the last year of Kennedy's life. This development offered a certain freedom of action to Moscow's new leadership, which had reverted to the policy of confrontation—a policy which was, in turn,

facilitated by Johnson's escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

From late 1964 on, Soviet policy with respect to Vietnam pursued several goals. First and foremost, the USSR emphasized moral and political support to what it described as the Vietnamese people's war against American aggression. The Soviet mass media now promptly and frequently carried official statements by Soviet leaders denouncing U.S. aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, no longer delaying as it had with TASS's statement on the Tonkin Gulf incident. Steps were taken to expand contacts both with Hanoi and representatives of the South Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, accordingly, the CPSU CC now approved the opening in Moscow (at the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee), on 24 December 1964, of a permanent mission of the NFLSV.

Second, Soviet material assistance (economic and, primarily, military) to the DRV and NLF expanded. Soviet military supplies in the period from 1963 to 1967 (particularly after 1965) exceeded one billion rubles, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi.<sup>10</sup> Prior to 1965, German models of arms were sent to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union, but from then on the Kremlin provided only Soviet-made arms to the "Vietnamese friends," including the latest designs of surface-to-air missiles, jet planes, rockets, and field artillery, as well as a large array of especially sophisticated arms and combat hardware for the DRV air defense system.<sup>11</sup> And Soviet economic and military assistance to Vietnam kept on increasing. According to estimates of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, by 1968 Soviet material assistance accounted for 50 percent of all aid to the DRV, and as of 1 January 1968 the total value of Soviet assistance over that period was in excess of 1.8 billion rubles, with military supplies accounting for 60 percent.<sup>12</sup>

Such a turnabout in Soviet policy with respect to cooperation with Vietnam was received with satisfaction by the Hanoi leaders, who increasingly stressed the importance of Soviet moral, political, and material assistance in their conversations with the officials of the Soviet Embassy and those of other socialist countries. However, the North Vietnamese leaders' appreciation for this largesse by no means signified that they would now take the USSR's side in the Sino-

Soviet dispute, or otherwise rely exclusively on only one communist patron. Rather, after Moscow changed its attitude to the DRV, Hanoi took steps to secure maximum profit by exploiting its friendship with *both* of its mighty allies—the PRC and the USSR—as they competed for influence in Southeast Asia. Precisely this policy was pursued by the WPV Central Committee grouping which was formed in late 1964–early 1965 and included Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap.<sup>13</sup> This group sought to rid North Vietnam of China's excessive wardship, on the one hand, and, on the other, to avoid any kind of dependence on the Soviet Union. As a result, in that period reports by Soviet representatives in Vietnam, the USSR Defense Ministry, and the KGB regarding reduced Chinese influence in the DRV were accompanied by complaints of insincerity, egoism and unmanageability on the part of "the Vietnamese friends."

For instance, back in 1966, in his analysis of the prospects of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Ilya Shcherbakov pointed out: "Just as before, the Embassy believes that the process of promotion of our relations with the WPV and the DRV will hardly be steady or rapid in view of the policy pursued by the Vietnamese comrades. This was, regrettably, confirmed in the past few years. Even the manifestation of a more serious discord between the WPV and the Communist Party of China will not probably mean automatic or proportionate Soviet-Vietnamese rapprochement. The year 1966 showed once more that we are obliged constantly to display initiative and unilaterally, as it were, drag the Vietnamese comrades to greater friendship and independence." The ambassador then stressed the "general positive nature" of the WPV's tendency for independence but pointed to its negative aspects, primarily to indications that the Vietnamese conducted its foreign policy, including its relations with Moscow, from a narrow, nationalistic viewpoint. Soviet aid was regarded by Hanoi exclusively from the standpoint of their benefit to Vietnam, rather than for the good of the international socialist cause.<sup>14</sup>

This undercurrent of tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations, produced by what Moscow viewed as Hanoi's parochial perspective, cropped up repeatedly. In 1966, for example, the North Vietnamese expressed indignation at the partial reduction of Soviet

and U.S. military contingents in Germany. Why? Because, they explained, the Soviet troops had allegedly been transferred to the Soviet-Chinese border, which provoked tensions there and diverted Beijing from North Vietnamese military requirements, and the U.S. troops were immediately transferred to South Vietnam.<sup>15</sup>

The Vietnamese side's egoism and its desire (in the words of a Soviet Embassy political letter) "to have a monopoly on the correct assessment and methods of solution to the Vietnam conflict," often verged on cynicism. Indicative in this respect was a complaint by the Soviet Ministry of Commercial Shipping, dated 18 July 1966, sent to the CPSU CC, in connection with the actions by the Vietnamese in Haiphong, the DRV's chief port. The port authorities, the ministry complained, had artificially delayed the unloading of Soviet vessels, evidently believing that the longer they held the large-tonnage vessels flying the Soviet flag in the port and its vicinity, the less risk of damage they would run of U.S. bombing raids. Moreover, they usually placed those Soviet vessels in close proximity to the most dangerous areas (e.g., near anti-aircraft guns), in hopes of ensuring their safety during air raids. Moreover, during air raids Vietnamese military boats lurking behind Soviet vessels fired at the enemy, thus making the Soviet "shields" the targets of U.S. bombers (and those vessels contained loads of cargoes meant as assistance to "the embattled Vietnamese people"). The clearly outraged ministry officials demanded that Soviet commercial vessels be kept out of danger while discharging their noble mission.<sup>16</sup>

No less complicated was the situation concerning Soviet-North Vietnamese military cooperation. The USSR Defense Ministry and embassy in Hanoi repeatedly informed Moscow about "the Vietnamese friends' insincere attitude" toward the Soviet Union, the Soviet people, and the Soviet Defense Ministry. They pointed out that they received slanted reports from the People's Army of (North) Vietnam regarding the situation in South Vietnam, belittling the role and importance of Soviet military assistance to the DRV and discrediting the performance of Soviet arms and military hardware. They also reported that the North Vietnamese had raised obstacles in the way of Soviet military experts who wished to inspect U.S. military hardware, and displayed

other signs of distrust and suspiciousness toward Soviet Defense Ministry representatives. The Soviet leadership was informed about violations of storage rules for Soviet military hardware, wasteful use of missiles and ammunition, and neglect of Soviet experts' advice on the rules of exploitation of military hardware, which led to its spoilage. All this coincided with Hanoi's requests for more assistance, but the DRV leaders evidently saw no contradiction in this: It was pointed out in the 1970 political report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi that, while "attaching great importance to the Soviet military assistance, the command of the People's Army of Vietnam at the same time regarded it exclusively as the obligatory discharge of its internationalist duty by the Soviet Union."<sup>17</sup>

All the above-mentioned facts suggest how complicated and contradictory Soviet-Vietnamese relations were, and demonstrate the great discrepancy between the scale of Soviet assistance to Vietnam and the degree of Soviet influence on Hanoi's policy. As a Vietnamese journalist in his conversation with M. Ilyinsky, an *Izvestia* correspondent, put it: "Do you know," the Vietnamese journalist asked, "what is the Soviet Union's share in total assistance, received by Vietnam, and what is the share of Soviet political influence there (if the latter can be measured in percent)? The respective figures are: 75-80 percent and 4-8 percent." The Soviet journalist noted: "If the Vietnamese journalist has exaggerated the former figures (by 15-20 percent), the share of Soviet influence is probably correct."<sup>18</sup>

Sino-Vietnamese relations were no less complicated and contradictory. That Moscow monitored their development closely is testified to by the vast number of reports in the CPSU CC archives on this subject, sent by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, the KGB, and the Military Intelligence Agency (GRU) of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. An early sign of the incipient discord between the two countries seems to have appeared in a still-classified 21 February 1966 KGB report to the CPSU CC stating that Chinese leaders were concerned about the WPV's increasingly independent foreign policy, especially in relations with the PRC and the conduct of the war.<sup>19</sup> And the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi pointed out in its 1966 report that, although the WPV tendency to settle the Vietnam issue inde-

pendently from China was not yet pronounced, the DRV's trust in Beijing had already been undermined. However, the report admitted that one could hardly hope for the WPV leadership to display initiative to opt for one patron over the other, for "the comrades probably have not yet risen to the level of clear-cut choice." In view of this, the Soviet Embassy set itself the task "to render all-round assistance to the Vietnam leadership in its adoption of an independent stand on the issues of home and foreign policy." That "independent" policy naturally was meant to be independent from China, for the report then underlined the need "to react more firmly to any action by Vietnamese comrades which may be directly or indirectly damaging to Soviet-Vietnamese friendship."<sup>20</sup>

Sino-Vietnamese contradictions tended to sharpen as the DRV leadership came to realize the need for a diplomatic settlement with the USA. The DRV's consent to hold talks with Washington in 1968 profoundly irritated Beijing, which was dead-set against any compromise settlement leading to a cessation of hostilities. To advance its more militant policy, the Chinese leaders began to expand separate contacts (bypassing Hanoi) with the NLF, urging it to carry on protracted warfare. Moreover, the PRC started to obstruct carriages of Soviet arms and ammunition delivered by rail through Chinese territory, with the express aim of undermining Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Although the PRC leadership's approach to the talks issue later softened, Sino-Vietnamese relations remained strained.

Although discord between the Beijing and Hanoi leaderships affected Sino-Vietnamese relations, no major conflict between the two countries threatened a complete rupture during the course of the war. Vietnam still needed Chinese assistance and support, so it took steps to reduce or contain the level of tensions. The DRV's party and government leaders, as before, regularly visited Beijing to discuss with "the Chinese friends" important foreign policy issues. No matter how riled, Hanoi carefully avoided giving categorical assessments of Chinese policy—either regarding the world communist movement or Soviet-Chinese relations. "The WPV leaders realize full well," the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi explained to Moscow, "that China is situated quite close to Vietnam, whereas the Soviet Union is far away. Viet-

nam would be hard put to do without Chinese assistance in its struggle and in future peaceful construction. So it would be premature to ask the Vietnamese now to state their clear-cut position with respect to the USSR and China."<sup>21</sup> And the following fact is quite indicative: Hanoi named Xuan Thuy, well-known for his pro-Chinese views and a past president of the Vietnamese-Chinese Friendship Association, as the head of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks.

The details of relations among the USSR, DRV, and PRC also throw light on the Soviet Union's relations with the USA. Soviet leaders could hardly react indifferently or simplistically to the Vietnam conflict and the dramatic escalation of American military activity in Southeast Asia. From a purely propaganda viewpoint, the conflict played into Soviet hands. While U.S. support for an unpopular neo-colonial regime in Saigon offered a ripe target for condemnation and undermined Washington's international stature, the USSR could simultaneously pose as a consistent fighter for the triumph of a just cause, acting in the spirit of proletarian internationalism—as evidenced by its moral-political, economic, and military assistance to North Vietnam—and also as a potential mediator in the forging of a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, the likely protracted nature of the conflict promised to sap the strength of the Soviet Union's principal rivals, distracting the United States and China and thereby enhancing Soviet security interests in other regions (especially Europe and the Soviet Far East).

Yet the Vietnam War also presented long-term difficulties and dangers for Moscow, especially to the extent that there was a real threat of its escalating from a local into a world war, if (as was sometimes speculated) the USA were driven to desperation and resorted to the use of nuclear weapons. In that case, the USSR could hardly have kept neutral—and yet retaliating against the United States might have led to disastrous consequences. All the same, even if no nuclear conflict broke out, the risk of a direct clash between the two superpowers arising from the Southeast Asian crisis was too great and this was precisely what the Soviet leadership wished to avoid at all costs. Plus, to the extent Kremlin leaders genuinely desired an improvement in relations with Washington, the war would inevitably serve as a distraction and potential sticking point.

There were naturally other “pros” and “cons” which Moscow must have taken into account in determining its policy toward the struggle: Military factors constituted one major positive incentive favoring a more active Soviet involvement, according to archival documents. There were two principal, interconnected perceived opportunities: Vietnam offered a live battlefield testing ground for Soviet military hardware, including the latest models, and also a chance to obtain a windfall of hard information about up-to-date U.S. weaponry, by inspecting the war booty captured or obtained by the DRV forces. The North Vietnamese air defense was fully equipped with modern Soviet hardware, whose effectiveness was shown by the fact that even the Vietnamese personnel managed to operate it successfully, despite a frequent lack of training or competence. Those systems were being constantly improved, taking into account the capabilities of U.S. warplanes.<sup>22</sup> Apart from the anti-aircraft defense system, the archival documents note, the North Vietnamese used the Soviet-made Grad artillery shelling systems, which were highly effective in attacks on U.S. bases, airfields, ammunition depots, etc.,<sup>23</sup> as well as MiG-21 jets.

The Soviet military also relished the opportunity to pore over the latest U.S. military hardware. In accordance with a Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement signed in the spring of 1965, the Vietnamese undertook to transfer to the USSR models of captured U.S. military hardware for inspection. All difficulties notwithstanding, according to the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, a total of 700 models were delivered to the USSR between May 1965 and January 1967. The embassy pointed out that the work done was very valuable: the CPSU CC adopted a decision to apply in Soviet industry of a number of selected and studied models.<sup>24</sup>

However, apart from obvious assets the USSR gained in the course of the Vietnam War, its expenditures were likewise enormous, primarily in the sphere of ever-increasing material assistance to Vietnam. (See the figures cited above.) In 1966-1968 the Soviet Union undertook to render to the DRV economic assistance to the tune of 121.6 million rubles, but in fact the assistance was far greater in view of Hanoi's incessant requests for additional supplies. In 1968 Soviet assistance to the DRV totaled 524 million rubles, with 361 million rubles

transferred as a gift. Soviet assistance in 1969 was planned to remain on the same level (525 million rubles), but with the opening of peace talks and reduction of the scale of hostilities in Vietnam, part of the funds originally assigned for military deliveries was reallocated for other purposes, so Soviet assistance to Vietnam in 1969 totaled 370 million rubles and in 1970, 316 million rubles.<sup>25</sup>

One negative factor, from the Soviet leaders' viewpoint, in decision-making on aid to the DRV was what they saw as the Vietnamese allies' unmanageability and unpredictability. Hanoi's independent course in relations with the USSR hardly inspired Moscow to greater enthusiasm in its support for the war, and as time went on, those Vietnamese properties might have led to undesirable consequences—perhaps an open break. So from that standpoint, at least, Moscow had every reason to favor an early cease-fire and political solution.

In fact, the hope for a peaceful settlement was shared by both Soviet and American leaders, and their tactics on this issue, paradoxically enough, were surprisingly similar. However, the Soviet government backed a settlement on Hanoi's terms, whereas the U.S. sought to ensure the maximum consideration of the Saigon government's interests. Moreover, of course, as a direct participant in the conflict, the United States could not possibly play the part of an arbiter, which remained a privilege of the Soviet Union. For this reason, with U.S. armed forces directly involved in hostilities, the Johnson Administration was obliged to rely on intermediaries in its attempts to convince Hanoi to sit down at the negotiating table rather than pursue a purely military outcome. And in this respect Washington pinned much of its hopes on the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup>

U.S. leaders had every reason for such hopes, for they believed that since the USSR rendered massive and ever-growing military and economic assistance to Vietnam (of which Washington was well aware),<sup>27</sup> so the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the DRV leadership. Both Johnson and, after January 1969, his successor Richard M. Nixon were convinced that Moscow would press Hanoi to agree to open negotiations, once Washington: 1) demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the Vietnam War was hardly in its interests; 2) seduced it by the

promise of cooperation with the United States; or, better still, 3) warned it that if Soviet cooperation were not forthcoming the United States might resort to rapprochement with China—or some optimal combination of all those approaches. When in retirement, Johnson disclosed his calculations as president in a conversation at his Texas ranch with Soviet citizens that was reported to the Kremlin leadership by the KGB in December 1969. The USSR could be instrumental in helping the United States to bring the Vietnam War to a conclusion, Johnson argued, for “if we take Soviet strategic, not tactical, interests, the end of the Vietnam War fully accords with the Soviet Union's interests,” considering that, “after all, it is the United States, not Vietnam, which is the main partner of the USSR.” And Johnson rejected the argument that the Soviet Union was not in a position to exert pressure on the DRV as groundless from the viewpoint of realpolitik. “It's highly doubtful for a country supplying Vietnam with 75 percent of [its] arms not to have real levers of influence on it,” the ex-president was quoted as saying.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, the problem, from the U.S. perspective, consisted only in discovering how best to approach Moscow. The United States might have acted through official channels, since although Soviet-American relations were rather cool at that time, they were maintained. And the United States certainly probed what could be done in that direction. For instance, at an August 1966 meeting between Colonel C.C. Fitzgerald, a military attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, with officers of the Department of External Relations of the Soviet Defense Ministry, the American stressed the important role the USSR could play in the settlement of the Vietnam conflict as the initiator of and active mediator in peace negotiations. Col. Fitzgerald drew the attention of his interlocutors to the Johnson Administration's constant efforts to open talks, stating that the visit to Moscow of Senator Mike Mansfield and Averell Harriman's appointment as a special presidential advisor aimed at precisely this purpose.<sup>29</sup> However, worried that a formal, top-level overture to Moscow might result in a rebuff or even denunciation by the Kremlin leaders, the White House opted not to run the risk, but to first sound out Soviet officials in order to ascertain their attitudes and try to reach agreement unoffi-

cially.

Regrettably, we do not yet have access to all the documents, including the still-classified “special dossiers” (*osobaya papki*) at SCCD, as well as KGB, Foreign and Defense Ministry, and Presidential Archive materials, that are necessary to reconstruct fully from Soviet sources all of the many conversations and probes connected to various diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the Vietnam conflict in 1965-67, including, perhaps most importantly, the so-called MARI-GOLD and SUNFLOWER initiatives (to use the secret U.S. government code names), in both of which the Soviet Union played an important role.<sup>30</sup> An initial survey of the SCCD archives disclosed only cryptic traces of Soviet contacts with potential intermediaries. For instance, documents failed to clarify what was discussed in conversations with L. Mulkern (vice-president for international relations of the Bank of America), who asked for assistance in establishing unofficial contacts between U.S. President Johnson and the Soviet government, or with Marshall D. Shulman (then an associate of Harvard University’s Russian Research Center), both of which were recorded by the KGB (the latter with the recommendation that Shulman be advised that his information had to be confirmed by the U.S. President). While the documents encountered during this early stage of research left these and many other questions unresolved, they certainly pointed at the high intensity of unofficial Soviet-U.S. contacts apparently related to the war (either directly or through mediators, as, for instance, through the services of Austrian Ambassador in the USSR Vodak) in the summer-autumn of 1965.<sup>31</sup>

Moscow’s seeming reluctance to meet Washington half-way in its diplomatic efforts was probably at least partly attributable to the fact that the Kremlin was acutely aware of its limited ability to exert influence on Hanoi’s policy—an awareness due in large measure to the complete and objective information sent to Moscow by the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, led by Ambassador Shcherbakov. Perusing the great number of minutes of conversations between Soviet Embassy officials and Vietnamese leaders, WPV members, and Vietnamese citizens, as well as informational letters and reports sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the CPSU CC, one gets the impression that decision-making on the Vietnamese issue

was largely produced in accordance with recommendations and draft decisions sent by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi—not by the Politburo, the CC Secretariat, nor the Foreign Ministry—and only later were those recommendations and draft decisions rubber-stamped by the top Soviet leaders. This conclusion, albeit preliminary, is based on ample documentary evidence, when, for instance, the Soviet Ambassador sets out a number of ideas in his political letter to Moscow about what should be done, and later the same considerations were put forward as the official views of the CPSU and Soviet government in conversations with Pham Van Dong or Nguyen Duy Trinh.<sup>32</sup> So Moscow obviously deemed it advisable to consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi before adopting decisions.

Take the following two examples. The political letter<sup>33</sup> of the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, entitled “Soviet-Vietnamese Relations After the Talks Held in April 1968,” prepared for Moscow Center on 1 September 1968, assessed the results and significance of the opening of the Paris peace talks. Regarding the situation as favorable for achieving a settlement in the best interests of the Vietnamese people, the Ambassador, who signed the letter, believed that the prime task at the moment was “to help the Vietnamese comrades to put an end to the hostilities this year and switch over to a political settlement of the Vietnamese issue.” With this aim in view, Shcherbakov believed, it would be advisable to invite a higher-level DRV government delegation to Moscow in October and “try once more to analyze jointly the situation and convince the DRV government to express its opinion on the whole package of the Vietnamese settlement.”

Soon afterward, V. Chivilev, the Soviet charge d’affaires in the DRV, presented Pham Van Dong with a letter of invitation from Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin for a DRV party and government delegation to visit the Soviet Union. The date of the visit was later settled and a decision was adopted on a visit to the USSR by a Vietnamese government delegation led by Le Duan in November 1968. Though the materials on the visit remain inaccessible, it seems highly likely that Soviet leaders followed the recommendations of their man in Hanoi.<sup>34</sup>

Another example of the importance of the Soviet ambassador’s advice in decision-making dates to early 1974. CC Secretary

Boris Ponomarev, who was in charge of the Party’s international relations, submitted to the CPSU CC Secretariat a memorandum, entitled “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends,” in which he raised the issue of establishing and promoting relations between the CPSU and the communist parties of several Southeast Asian countries by making use of the authority wielded by the WPV in the communist movement in the region. In other words, he suggested possible Soviet penetration of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. After inconclusive discussion of the proposal, Ponomarev, along with CC secretaries Suslov, Kirilenko, Demichev, Katushev, and Rakhmanin, decided to consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi on the matter.<sup>35</sup>

The new importance attached to the role of ambassadors and embassies in the process of decision-making on foreign-policy issues reflected a general trend, typical of the Brezhnev era: the growing influence of the bureaucratic apparatus, especially medium-level officials, on policy-making. Since top Soviet leaders had little idea of the reality in Vietnam, they willingly entrusted decision-making in the sphere of current policy to experts, signing ready-made decisions or intervening only in extraordinary situations.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, indirect evidence suggests that in defining its stand on the Vietnam War, Moscow largely drew on the opinion of its diplomatic representatives in the DRV. And in 1965-1966 the Soviet Embassy was far from optimistic about the prospects for a peaceful settlement. Meetings and conversations between the Soviet Embassy officials and members of the diplomatic corps and journalists accredited in Hanoi revealed that North Vietnam’s leaders were fully committed to continuing the hostilities against the USA. Indicative in this respect was a conversation at the WPV CC on 23 August 1966 between Soviet charge d’affaires P. Privalov and Nguyen Van Vinh, Chairman of the Committee for the Unification of the Country. Gen. Vinh firmly believed that the situation was hardly favorable for opening North Vietnamese-U.S. talks. “Had we been defeated by the Americans,” Vinh said, “we would have had no other choice than to agree to hold talks, but we are confidently dealing blows at the enemy and winning decisive victories. What would it mean for us to hold talks now? That would mean losing every-

thing...."<sup>37</sup> This viewpoint was shared by the entire WPV top leadership.

That is why the Soviet Embassy's report for 1966 included very cautious forecasts about possible changes in the DRV stand. The embassy, in the belief that it was necessary to "exert and broaden, with the support of all peace-loving forces and the socialist countries, strong political and diplomatic efforts in order to bring the matter to the settlement of the conflict in the current year," suggested that the USSR might eventually have to elaborate and present its own peace plan to the Vietnamese comrades. That supposition was made on the basis of what the embassy viewed as a certain coincidence of the CPSU and WPV "assessment of the situation and active promotion of politico-diplomatic struggle for Vietnam."<sup>38</sup>

In that contest, the USSR sought to evade the issue of acting as a formal mediator at the U.S.-DRV talks (which was what the USA sought). The only role the Soviet Union was then prepared to play was that of a "postman," who would carry both sides' messages, and that of "a night watchman" by offering an opportunity for unofficial meetings between U.S. and North Vietnamese embassy officials in Moscow.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, Moscow spared no effort to convince its "Vietnamese friends" of the need to switch from military to political-diplomatic methods to attain a settlement.

The USSR undertook the mission of "a postman" and "a night watchman" very reluctantly, probably for fear of being turned into an official mediator. At least it did not wish to perform those functions on a permanent basis. So the United States had to use the services of other countries, in particular, Poland, Canada, India, etc. However, early in 1967 a new flurry of activity was observed in Moscow. In Jan.-Feb., DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh received Shcherbakov and familiarized him with the gist of President Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh, handed over at a regular meeting in Moscow of representatives of the DRV and the US embassies. And Ho Chi Minh's reply, according to Trinh, was to be sent along the same channels.<sup>40</sup> Those facts make it possible for us to suppose that by 1967, meetings of diplomats of the two warring parties were held in Moscow on a regular basis.

As to its function of "a postman," in 1967 Moscow regularly supplied Hanoi with

information regarding the requests and offers of U.S. representatives, conveyed during meetings with Soviet diplomats, and delivered messages between the two sides. For instance, on 24 April 1967, "Vietnamese comrades" were informed about a request of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet government take the necessary steps for the DRV government to give access to representatives of the international commission of the Red Cross to American POWs then held in North Vietnam. And on April 28, the DRV leaders learned that Johnson envoy Averell Harriman had handed over a U.S. statement on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the demilitarized zone to the Soviet charge d'affaires in the United States.<sup>41</sup> There is no doubt that Hanoi also received exhaustive information about the June 1967 Glassboro summit between Kosygin and Johnson.

In 1967, too, the Soviet Union failed to convince the Vietnamese leaders to hold talks with the USA on a peaceful settlement. The Soviet Embassy in Hanoi believed that the DRV leadership would accept the idea of such a settlements only under the following conditions: a worsening of the military situation; U.S. acceptance of North Vietnam's main demands; a change in China's attitude to the Vietnam War; and finally, the socialist countries' clear declaration to the North Vietnamese that they could not afford to bear the ever growing burden of that war for reasons of an international nature or for fear of its protracted nature. So in assessing the results of the Soviet-Vietnamese talks in April 1967 and the subsequent DRV policy, the Soviet Embassy drew the conclusion that at that juncture, "not a single [one] of the above-mentioned situations makes the Vietnamese comrades take the road of active searching for ways to a peaceful settlement."<sup>42</sup>

Nevertheless, summing up the results of 1967, Soviet diplomats in Hanoi reached the optimistic conclusion that the year 1968 would be the most favorable for starting the process of settlement. They strongly denounced Hanoi's rejection of Johnson's San Antonio formula—so-named after a speech in the Texas city on 29 September 1967 in which LBJ declared that Washington would stop bombing North Vietnam when assured that this would "lead promptly to productive discussions"—pointing out that that formula could not be regarded as "insurmountable"

and advising that the DRV leadership take steps to snatch the diplomatic initiative. In order to convince Hanoi to change its intractable stand on talks with Washington, the Soviet Embassy advised Moscow to inform the North Vietnamese at their next summit with Soviet leaders that the USSR could not afford to pursue a policy of brinkmanship with respect to the United States by getting more deeply involved in the Vietnam conflict, and that therefore the best plan for both the Soviet Union and Vietnam would be if the hostilities drew to a close in 1968.<sup>43</sup>

The fact that talks on the settlement of the Vietnam issue in fact finally started in 1968 may be regarded as a matter of pure coincidence. At the same time, the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi was farsighted in its assessments—what mattered was not that its forecasts had proved correct but rather the factors on which those forecasts were based. And in this respect, the Soviet Embassy had every reason to hope that the pressure exerted by Moscow on the Vietnamese leaders to accept a political rather than military solution, would finally bear fruit.

Preliminary U.S.-North Vietnamese talks opened on 13 May 1968, followed on 18 January 1969 by the official quadripartite (U.S.-South Vietnam-North Vietnam-NLF) Paris negotiations. Soviet diplomats justifiably regarded the event as their own success, at least in part. "Without acting as an official mediator," the Soviet Embassy in the DRV pointed out, "the Soviet Union rendered an important service for the two sides to sit down at the negotiating table and open official talks. The USSR spared no effort to convince world opinion and national governments to support an end to bombing raids on the DRV, and exerted pressure on the USA. At the same time it emphasized to the Vietnamese comrades that the year 1968 was most favorable for a number of reasons for launching the process of the political settlement of the Vietnam issue."<sup>44</sup>

The USSR did much to organize the Paris meeting, including influencing the choice of venue. The record of a conversation between V. Chivilev, Soviet acting charge d'affaires, and Le Duan, First Secretary of the WPV CC, held on 2 May 1968, suggests that on the eve of the opening of U.S.-DRV peace talks, the Vietnamese side offered Paris as the venue with due regard for the Soviet opinion. By that time Soviet diplomacy had already performed "a certain



amount of work with the French.” The main factor behind Hanoi’s choice of the French capital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “the opportunity to maintain contacts with Moscow from it.”<sup>45</sup>

The same factor was taken into account by Moscow, which faced the task of keeping the sides at the negotiating table. With this aim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constant pressure on North Vietnam not to disrupt the process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CC and Soviet government sent a letter to the WPV CC and DRV government stressing that the Paris talks were vitally important for achieving a settlement of the Vietnam issue. The Soviet leaders also emphasized that they were living through an important period from the viewpoint of opportunities for diplomatic struggle, offering to put the entire weight of Soviet authority in the world in order to triumph in the political and diplomatic contest.<sup>46</sup> In an effort to influence the North Vietnamese side and as a hedge against the DRV’s sometimes unpredictable behavior, the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi offered to send experts on Vietnamese affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Paris.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, Moscow reached an agreement with the DRV leadership for the Vietnamese regularly to inform Moscow on the situation at the talks and their future strategy, tactics, and plans. In turn, the USSR gave the Vietnamese exhaustive information about U.S. intentions.

Nevertheless, despite its promises, Hanoi on several occasions confronted Moscow with a *fait accompli*. Yet, having “forgotten” to inform its ally about a planned action, the Vietnamese leadership nevertheless insisted on Moscow’s immediate support. This happened, for instance, when the NLF published its program of ten points and established the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (RSV PRG). Although Le Duc Tho met with Kosygin on the eve of the program’s publication (during a stopover in Moscow on his way to Paris), the leading DRV negotiator never mentioned the planned steps.<sup>48</sup>

However, in attempting to convince Soviet leaders to exert greater pressure on Vietnam to achieve progress in the talks, U.S. officials often forced an open door. Assessing the steps taken by Moscow for the settlement of the Vietnam conflict alongside the difficulties it encountered in dealing with Hanoi’s foreign policy, one may

reasonably conclude that the USSR did its utmost to ensure a favorable outcome of the talks, naturally with due account of its own interests.

Moscow continued to play an important role at the Paris talks after Nixon came to power in 1969. The Soviet leaders kept abreast of the latest developments and did their best to influence the Vietnamese position through the services of the USSR embassies in Hanoi and Paris. At his regular meetings with the leaders of the DRV and NLF delegations, the Soviet Ambassador in France, V. Zorin, asked the Vietnamese what questions they considered it necessary for him to raise in his conversations with the U.S. delegation. At the same time, Zorin expressed his “desire” for the Vietnamese side to put forward some specific proposals on military issues and for the NLF to elaborate a specific diplomatic program. Simultaneously, the Soviet ambassador in the DRV, Shcherbakov, warned “the Vietnamese friends” against following an extremist path, such as the temptation to pursue a purely propagandist policy or to resort exclusively to military methods in relations with the USA.<sup>49</sup>

Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 elections marked a turning point in U.S. policy toward the USSR, as the incoming administration made every effort to obtain greater Soviet involvement and cooperation in the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The newly elected U.S. president and his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, decided that all problems in Soviet-American relations were linked to the Soviet stand on the Vietnam issue. And if efforts in Moscow did not quickly or sufficiently pay dividends, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared not to miss an opportunity to play “the Chinese card” to make the Soviet leaders more tractable.

Like his predecessors, Nixon was convinced that the USSR had unlimited control over Hanoi’s policy and that as soon as it issued the appropriate orders, the Vietnamese leaders would be ready, willing, and obliged to conclude the talks. As a result, each time the Paris talks reached a blind alley, the White House turned to Moscow to help find an acceptable escape route. After a meeting with Kissinger on 12 June 1969, when the American openly asked the USSR for assistance to overcome the latest crisis in the talks, Soviet Ambassador in the United

States Anatoly F. Dobrynin reported to Moscow: “All indications are that his [Nixon’s] attempts to convince the USSR to help the USA in the settlement of the [Vietnam] conflict, will be repeated in the future, and this will probably be felt in the course of our talks with this administration on other international issues, if not directly, then at least in the form of procrastination in the course of such talks or in decision-making on other issues.”<sup>50</sup>

In this respect, however, former CIA chief William Colby was probably right when he wrote in his memoirs about his deep skepticism with respect to the Soviet Union’s ability to exert pressure on its friends, who were “stubborn and full of determination.”<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of its limited opportunities, the USSR managed to make a considerable contribution to the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. So the signing of the bilateral agreement by the DRV and USA, on 27 January 1973, on the end of hostilities and restoration of peace in Vietnam, irrespective of all its weak points, was an important result of the efforts of Soviet diplomacy as well.

In conclusion, in assessing Soviet policy toward the Vietnam War in the 1964–1973 period, including in the sphere of Soviet-American ties, it may be asserted that in spite of all the difficulties, complications, and human costs associated with the conflict in Southeast Asia, the superpowers avoided grave crises, upheavals, or direct confrontations in their bilateral relations—thus preserving a degree of general international stability and paving the way toward the U.S.-Soviet détente of the early-mid-1970s.

1. Space precludes a full listing of relevant titles here: for detailed references see Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, forthcoming [1996]).

2. According to data of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the period from 1961 to 1966 the Soviet Union supplied the NLF via the DRV as disinterested assistance 130 recoilless weapons and mortars, 1400 machine guns, and 54,500 fire-arms with ammunition. Prior to 1965 the USSR supplied to North Vietnam German models of arms. (Top Secret Memorandum of the Southeast Asia Department, USSR Foreign Ministry, “Soviet Moral and Political Support of and Material Aid to the South Vietnam Patriots,” 24 March 1966, SCCD, fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 50, delo (d.) 777, listy (ll.) 58–59.) This aid supplemented the economic assistance Moscow rendered to the DRV. China, in turn, in the period from 1955 to 1965, supplied the DRV with economic assistance to the total value of 511.8 million rubles, including 302.5 million rubles as gift. (Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, “CPR’s

- [Chinese People's Republic's] Economic Assistance to the Socialist Countries," 30 March 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 254, l. 172.)
3. Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to France, SCCD, f. 4, op. 18, d. 582, St.-95/462 g., 14 February 1964.
4. International Department of the CPSU CC to the CC, 25 July 1964, SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 163-164.
5. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Defense to the CPSU CC, 14 July 1967, SCCD, f. 4, op. 59, d. 416, l. 119-120.
6. Top Secret Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, "On the Political Situation in South Vietnam and the Position of the DRV," 19 November 1964, SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 253.
7. See, e.g., Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 157.
8. For further analysis of the impact of Khrushchev's overthrow on Soviet policy toward Vietnam, see the paper presented by Ilya V. Gaiduk to the conference on the Vietnam War held in October 1993 at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
9. A memo, sent to the CPSU CC by I. Shchedrov, a *Pravda* correspondent in Southeast Asia, may serve as an indirect basis for such suppositions. In it Shchedrov analyzes the situation in the region in the first half of the 1960s from the viewpoint of Soviet and Chinese influence on the events in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. He not only criticizes the Soviet Union's restraint, shown before the end of 1964, and expresses concern in view of stepped-up activities by the PRC in those countries, but also offers a series of measures to improve the situation. In their time the top CPSU leadership familiarized themselves with that memo, and the following note by Boris Ponomarev testifies to this: "Please read this memo and submit proposals and measures on issues which call for them." (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264.)
10. Political Report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 148.
11. Memorandum, "Soviet Moral and Political Support," SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 773, l. 59; Soviet Embassy in Hanoi Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 148.
12. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 331, l. 26.
13. Shchedrov Memorandum, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264, l. 96.
14. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 130.
15. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Embassy in Hanoi interpreter M. Isaev and Ho Hai Thuy, 25 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 261, l. 167.
16. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Commercial Shipping for the CPSU CC, 18 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 38-41. The report by the Ministry of Commercial Shipping was a source of concern by the Soviet leadership. It was decided to make use of the information contained in it, in the course of talks with the DRV party and government delegation to be held in Moscow (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 43).
17. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 109.
18. Memorandum from *Izvestia* correspondent M. Ilyinskii for CPSU CC, 29 January 1968, SCCD, f. 5., op. 60, d. 368, l. 19.
19. Memorandum from Committee of State Security (KGB), 21 February 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 511. Regrettably, this document is kept in a "special dossier," so we have had no opportunity as yet to study it.
20. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 141, 259.
21. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104.
22. A memo by Defense Minister Grechko to Brezhnev serves as testimony to this fact. Grechko wrote that on 30 March 1968 a U.S. F-111A plane was brought down by an anti-aircraft Dvina complex in the area of Hanoi. He also mentioned measures, adopted by Soviet experts to improve the anti-aircraft complexes after they had obtained information about the use of high-speed aircraft (up to 3700 km per hour) by the US air forces (SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 232, ll. 9-10).
23. Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Southeast Asia Department S. Nemchina and Head of the NFLSV Permanent Mission in Moscow Dang Cuong Minh, 2 September 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 416, l. 139.
24. Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, 14 March 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 329, l. 43.
25. Memorandum from the State Committee on the Economic Relations (GKES), "On the Economic and Technical Assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," 29 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, ll. 54-55; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 48; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459, l. 123; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104.
26. Washington's first attempts to reach agreement with the DRV leaders were made back in 1962, under President Kennedy's administration, so we can only suppose what could be the results of those contacts, had President Kennedy been alive. A. Goodman, for instance, believes that as a result of President Kennedy's assassination, the USA lost an opportunity to reach agreement with Hanoi. (A.E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), 14.)
27. To this testifies the KGB information of President Johnson's talks with Italian Foreign Minister A. Fanfani (SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 690, l. 93).
28. KGB Memorandum, 11 December 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 558, l. 178-179.
29. Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), USSR Ministry of Defense, to CPSU CC, 23 August 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 262, ll. 237-238. (For an English translation of this document, see CWIHP *Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993) 61-62.)
30. The most complete records of these and other secret Vietnam peace efforts during the period 1964-68, based on classified U.S. government records, can be found in George C. Herring, ed., *The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983). MARIGOLD and SUNFLOWER are covered in greater detail, using additional Soviet and U.S. sources, in Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (forthcoming).
31. KGB Memoranda, 5 and 21 July 1965 and 7 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 379, 389, 533.
32. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
33. Political letters from Soviet embassies were in fact detailed reports of the situation in the respective countries, their domestic and foreign policy, and usually written in connection with particular events.
34. Political Letter, "Soviet-North Vietnamese Relations after the April 1968 Talks," 1 September 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 114; see also SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, ll. 129, 131-132, 133.
35. Memorandum from B. Ponomarev for the CPSU CC, "On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends," attached to resolution of the CPSU CC Secretariat, SCCD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 1240, Art. No. 113/10, 12 February 1974.
36. Sometimes the situation looked simply ridiculous. Mentioned in the list of materials, included in "special dossiers," is the draft decision on the reply to Le Duan's personal message to Brezhnev, presented by the CC Department and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 24 December 1974. There is the following note on the card of that document, written by Brezhnev's aide, Alexandrov: "to C-de K.U. Chernenko. Leonid Ilyich asked to hold a vote on this proposal (he has not read the text)." It turns out that top Soviet leaders signed documents either having learned the gist of the document at best, or having read only its title.
37. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Hanoi P. Privalov and Chairman of the Lao Dong Party's Committee on the Unification of the Country Nguyen Van Minh, 23 August 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264, ll. 173-174.
38. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 259.
39. For details, see Herring, ed., *The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War*, and Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (forthcoming).
40. KGB Memorandum, 28 January 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 680; Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador Shcherbakov and DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 15 February 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 145.
41. USSR Foreign Ministry, list of questions on which the Vietnamese comrades were informed, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 15.
42. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, "Soviet-North Vietnamese Talks of April 1967 and the Policy of the PTV [Workers' Party of Vietnam] on the Settlement of the Vietnamese Problem," August 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 263.
43. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 332, l. 133-138.
44. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 30-31.
45. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Charge d'Affaires in the DRV V. Chivilev and Le Duan, 2 May 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 376, l. 47.
46. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, "Soviet-North Vietnamese Relations After the April 1968 Talks," SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 109.
47. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 31.
48. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459, l. 117.
49. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador V. Zorin and Xuan Thuy and Tranh Byu Khiem, 21 February 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 460, ll. 56-60, 131-134. (For an English translation, see CWIHP *Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 62-63.
50. Memorandum of Conversation between A. Dobrynin and H. Kissinger, 12 June 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 558, l. 103. (For an English translation of this document, see CWIHP *Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 63-67.) The contents of this conversation, as the note on the document testifies, were reported to Brezhnev, so the top Soviet leadership had been informed about Washington's intentions.
51. William Colby and James McCargar, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam* (Chicago, N.Y., 1989), 335.

Ilya V. Gaiduk, a research scholar at the Institute of Universal History (IUH), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, is the author of *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, forthcoming). A recipient of fellowships from CWIHP and the Norwegian Nobel Institute, he originally presented the findings in this article to the January 1993 Conference on New Soviet Evidence on Cold War History in Moscow, organized by CWIHP and IUH. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Oganecz V. Marinin, then a staff archivist at SCCD (now at the State Archive of the Russian Federation [GARF]), in locating archival documents for this article.

### RESEARCH IN MOSCOW

Scholars needing research performed in the Russian archives may contract with scholars at the Russian Center "Archival Conversation at the Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow. For further information please direct inquiries to:

Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov  
Historical Archives Institute (HAI)  
Russian State University for the Humanities  
Moscow, Russian Federation  
Fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964-3534  
Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or  
(7-095) 925-5019

Scholars may also address inquiries regarding possible collaboration for research in Russian archives to:

Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian  
Director  
Institute of Universal History  
Leninsky prospekt 32a  
117334 Moscow, Russian Federation  
Fax: (7-095) 938-2288  
Telephone: (7-095) 938-1009

### MICHALOWSKI

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#### Operation Lumbago

In the early morning of 29 December 1965, Jerzy Michalowski was awakened by Polish military authorities, who informed him that U.S. Air Force One, with ambassador Averell Harriman on board, was requesting permission to land in Warsaw. Harriman's peace mission was part of a broad diplomatic offensive that coincided with the Christmas bombing halt of 1965. A 14-point peace plan, including immediate face-to-face negotiations, was presented to the Poles, with the request that it be passed on to the North Vietnamese government. A meeting with Communist Party Secretary Wladislaw Gomulka followed (Michalowski was not present, but he could hear Gomulka haranguing Harriman through a thick oak door). The next day, Michalowski departed for Hanoi, with intermediate stops in Moscow and Beijing. Friends and co-workers were told that his absence was due to a severe bout of lumbago.

In Moscow, Michalowski met with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who expressed support for the mission, but predicted (correctly) that Chinese leaders would try to sabotage it in any way they could. In Beijing, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Bingnan angrily denounced any offers of peace and condemned Poland's participation in the American scheme. Michalowski decided to terminate the meeting when Wang became abusive. This stormy session was followed by a lavish banquet, with many cordial toasts and remarks. Arriving in Hanoi on January 4, Michalowski was met by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, whose initial response to the American offers was unenthusiastic. The Vietnamese, he claimed, were doing well on the battlefield, and the time had not yet come to exploit these successes at the negotiating table. The same sentiments were echoed during the next two days by Prime Minister Phan Van Dong (less emphatically) and Party Secretary Ho Chi Minh (in much stronger terms). Michalowski's account of these discussions makes clear that the Poles were acting as strong advocates of the peace process, presenting the American plan in as favorable a light as possible. As he left Hanoi,

Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnamese would eventually express a willingness to negotiate.

After returning to Warsaw, Michalowski joined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts to persuade the Vietnamese that a positive signal of some kind was in their best interests. Working through U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski, they made it clear that a resumption of bombing raids in the North would eliminate any chance for peace. Norman Cousins, a personal friend of Lyndon Johnson, tried to play the role of intermediary in this process, but to no avail. To the dismay of the Polish diplomats, the United States resumed bombing raids on January 31, and Operation *Lumbago* came to an unsuccessful end.

#### Operation Marigold<sup>1</sup>

This was another attempt to bring the United States and North Vietnam together in secrecy and with a minimum of preconditions. This time, Polish diplomats worked closely with their colleagues from Italy. Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end of the operation. Poland's representative to the International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski, Italy's ambassador to South Vietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the main protagonists in Saigon.

Phase I of *Marigold* developed from a discussion between Lewandowski and Premier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 in Hanoi. Lewandowski learned that the North Vietnamese would be willing to begin peace negotiations, provided the U.S. suspended the bombing campaign. He relayed this information to Orlandi who, in turn, notified U.S. ambassador Lodge. The American side was anxious to know whether Hanoi would make any overt sign of accommodation (such as refraining from offensive military operations in the South, or reducing traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bombing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polish diplomats could obtain no assurances from Hanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries.

Phase II was a lengthier and more complex operation that began when ambassador Lodge requested that Lewandowski present a 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnamese. This time, an unconditional bombing halt would precede the substantive negotiations. Rapacki and Michalowski under-

stood the importance of this new development, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid Brezhnev, who encouraged them to proceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went to Beijing at about the same time, where he received contradictory advice from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

Phan Van Dong's reply to Lewandowski generated considerable excitement since it contained a request to arrange an unprecedented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw, between the Americans and the North Vietnamese. Rapacki and Michalowski began a series of consultations with John Gronouski, to set the stage for these critical talks. From the beginning, however, difficulties emerged. First, the American side began to express doubts about certain unspecified details of the 10-point plan as it had been recorded by Lewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese government, opposed to any talks, increased its pressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all, the tempo and brutality of American bombing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up. On December 13 and 14, the center of the city was hit for the first time. Stunned by these attacks, the North Vietnamese withdrew their offer to meet. In a dramatic confrontation on December 19, when Gronouski accused the Poles of acting in bad faith, Rapacki's frustration overflowed: he smashed his glasses down on the table, and they flew into the American ambassador's face. Operation *Marigold* appeared to be dead.

The Poles continued to hope that a basis for face-to-face talks still existed, however. They briefed UN General Secretary U Thant, who promised to do whatever he could. They also contacted Pope Paul VI (using Italian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary). The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and to Washington, begging both sides to save the peace process. Gronouski left Warsaw to consult with President Johnson, while Rapacki drafted an urgent appeal from members of the Polish Politburo to their counterparts in Hanoi, calling for a reconsideration of the American proposals. As snowstorms closed down airports all over Europe, Gronouski returned to Warsaw unexpectedly, and requested a meeting with Rapacki on Christmas Eve. He announced that all bombing within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended, and that he was ready to meet with a Vietnamese representative in Warsaw. This message was promptly

conveyed to Phan Van Dong by Poland's ambassador Siedlecki. The Vietnamese, still smarting from the bombing raids of early December, and under intense pressure from China, refused to discuss the matter any further. Operation *Marigold* had failed.

The great hopes that were raised by *Marigold*, and its dramatic collapse, gave rise to many commentaries, explanations, and to some finger-pointing. In his report, Jerzy Michalowski provides a detailed rebuttal of certain claims made by Henry Cabot Lodge in his memoirs. Michalowski had the opportunity to discuss *Marigold* with President Johnson in September of 1967. LBJ did not accept Michalowski's interpretation of the events, nor would he acknowledge the continuing determination of the North Vietnamese to keep fighting. In time, he would change his views.

After personally witnessing some of the unsuccessful attempts to end America's entanglement in Vietnam, after discussing the events with many of the participants, and after studying many of the relevant documents, Michalowski closes his report with a strong indictment of U.S. policy. He is convinced that Lyndon Johnson and his circle of hawkish advisors never understood how diplomatic efforts could lead to the resolution of what they saw as an essentially military crisis. Thus, the President's half-hearted attempts to seek non-military solutions (such as *Marigold*) were doomed, mocking the hard work and good will of dozens of committed professional diplomats all around the world.

Here is what Michalowski writes on the last page of his report:

Based on newly-revealed documents and memoirs, we now know that Secretary of State Dean Rusk was one of the chief "hawks" in the ornithological roster of President Johnson's advisors. Thus, the surprising nature of the event that I now relate in closing this account of Polish peace initiatives in Vietnam.

January 19, 1969 was the eve of the inauguration of President Richard Nixon. The departing Secretary of State met with the Washington diplomatic corps in a sad, but formal, ceremony on the seventh floor of the State Department

building. Following the toasts and sentimental speeches I was preparing to leave, when Dean Rusk's secretary informed me that he would like to have a few words with me in private.

Rusk was subdued as he spoke at length about his upcoming academic work, and his retirement plans. Then he said: "During my long tenure as Secretary of State, I'm sure I made many erroneous judgments and bad decisions. But my intentions were always pure, and I acted according to the dictates of my conscience. Thus, I have no regrets. Except for one thing—that in 1966 we did not take advantage of the opportunities and your role as go-between. We should have begun a negotiating process that, with your help, could have ended a conflict that has cost us so much blood and treasure, and that now has cost us the election. I wanted to say this to you today, to thank you for your efforts, and to ask that you convey my words to Minister Rapacki."

1. [Ed. note: For the declassified U.S. account of Operation *Marigold*, see George C. Herring, ed., *The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), 209-370.]

# CAMBODIA AND THE COLD WAR

## THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES

by **Kenton J. Clymer**

On a graceful boulevard radiating out from Wat Phnom in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly renovated National Library of Cambodia. Built by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24 December 1924), the library also housed the country's archives. A separate archives building, located directly behind the National Library (and thus not visible from the street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library, it still awaits renovation. Designed with high ceilings, large windows, and electric ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated the best available technology for preserving books and manuscripts in tropical climates.

During the French colonial period and after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in 1975, the library and archives were administered jointly. In 1986, however, following the Vietnamese model, they were separated. The library is controlled by the Ministry of Information and Culture, while the archives reports to the Council of Ministries.<sup>1</sup>

During the terrible period of the Khmer Rouge (1975-78), the library and archives were home to pig keepers, who served the Chinese advisers living in the hotel next door. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gardens. All of the staff from the library and archives, about forty people, fled. Only a handful survived the Khmer Rouge regime, and only two or three returned to work in the library once the Khmer Rouge were driven out in 1979.

The library's holdings today are only a fraction of what they were in 1975. But contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge may not have systematically destroyed books and documents.<sup>2</sup> To be sure many books were ruined, some simply pushed off the shelves to make room for cooking pots, others used for cooking fires or for cigarette papers.<sup>3</sup> Subsequent neglect and mismanagement made matters worse, arguably much worse. Many books that did survive the Khmer Rouge years were improperly stored and soon succumbed to insects and the elements. Two Australians archivists, Helen

## SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS: THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROGRAM

[Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the Cambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale University.]

### Executive Summary

The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement "the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979." [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit:

#### 1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress

Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime's crimes. The Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference, chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in Cambodia. Cambodia's two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others, including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers.

#### 2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide

Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot's 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages on the Pol Pot regime. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking.

#### 3. Recreating Lost Histories

Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge

regime had been contemplated. The Cambodian Genocide Program has nine new histories already underway, comprising detailed and original research on the fates of various regions and population groups into which Pol Pot's regime divided Cambodia. In the process, Cambodian scholars are being trained in both social science methods and computer documentation. In addition to these nine separate studies in preparation, others are in the planning stage. The first volume of these studies is to be published in 1997.

#### 4. Training Cambodian Lawyers

Until now, the legal expertise did not exist in Cambodia to support a trial of Khmer Rouge leaders utilizing due process guarantees and unimpeachable evidentiary standards. The Cambodian Genocide Program has just graduated the first class of seventeen Cambodian legal professionals, government officials, and human rights workers from CGP's nine-week intensive summer school on international criminal law and international human rights law. The school was held in Phnom Penh from June to August 1995, with the participation of the Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights at the Yale Law School. A second summer school will be held in Cambodia in mid-1996. The individuals trained in the CGP program will be able to staff a domestic or international tribunal.

#### 5. Creating a Permanent Cambodian Documentation Center

Until now, no "center of gravity" existed in Cambodia to provide a spark for the serious study of what happened to Cambodian society during the Khmer Rouge regime. The Cambodian Genocide Program has established an international non-governmental organization in Phnom Penh, known as the Documentation Center of Cambodia. The Documentation Center is facilitating the field operations of the CGP, training Cambodians in research and investigative techniques, and will enable an indigenous organization to continue the work of the program after the conclusion of the CGP mandate in January 1997.

#### Introduction

In Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the world witnessed one of the worst cases of

genocide and crimes against humanity ever perpetrated. While those responsible for the Nazi Holocaust in the first half of the 20th century were punished, there has been little effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice for the atrocities they committed. In 1994, the U.S. Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. A team of world-class Cambodia scholars based at Yale was chosen to receive funding from the U.S. Department of State, and subsequently, by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. That team has now, in three quarters of a year, made tremendous progress in remedying this omission of justice and accountability. Four major problems face any effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice:

- 1) a paucity of specific documentary evidence linking high-level policymakers and military personnel to acts of genocide and crimes against humanity;
- 2) insufficient training of Cambodian officials and lawyers with the political will and legal skills to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice;
- 3) insufficient awareness among Cambodian policymakers of the options available for legal redress of genocide and crimes against humanity; and
- 4) the lack of a permanent, indigenous Cambodian NGO tasked to carry out independent research and documentation on the Cambodian genocide.

Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program is making excellent progress toward solution of these four problems. That progress is described in this First Interim Progress Report of the Cambodian Genocide Program.

*Identifying Legal Options for Redress.* Until now, no conference of Cambodian and international observers has examined specific legal options for redress of Cambodia's genocide. On 21 and 22 August 1995, the Cambodian Genocide Program hosted an international conference under the banner, "Striving for Justice: International Criminal Law in the Cambodian Context." The Striving for Justice Conference brought together a wide range of interested observers and decisionmakers for discussions with two international criminal law experts. Under a

contract with the U.S. Department of State, Mr. Jason Abrams of the Open Society Institute and Professor Steven Ratner of the University of Texas are now completing a study of options for legal redress of criminal human rights violations during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979. When it is completed, the study will offer an analysis of the most probable cases of violations of criminal human rights laws under the DK regime, and the most likely avenues for redress. Abrams and Ratner have tentatively concluded that the Khmer Rouge are culpable on several counts of violating international criminal laws concerning genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They further have concluded that there are several possible avenues for legal redress of these criminal violations, including an ad hoc international tribunal, a domestic Cambodian tribunal, and/or some form of an international commission of inquiry.

At the Striving for Justice Conference, Abrams and Ratner presented their draft conclusions to an invitation-only audience of nearly 100 distinguished guests. The audience consisted of representatives from the Offices of the Co-Prime Ministers, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, several key ministries including Interior and Justice, numerous Cambodian and international human rights organizations, members of the Cambodian National Assembly, a representative of the United Nations Secretary General, a member of the U.S. Congress, and others. The conference was also addressed by the First Prime Minister, His Royal Highness Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh, and the Second Prime Minister, His Excellency Samdech Hun Sen. The conference offered extensive opportunities for discussion and exchange of ideas among the participants. Conference participants reached a clear consensus on the need for accountability, and outlined important specific next steps to be taken to bring the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice.

*Documentation Databases.* The Cambodian Genocide Program is assembling an elaborate family of databases collectively known as the Cambodian Genocide Data Base (CGDB). Using the Computerized Documentation System (CDS/ISIS) designed by UNESCO and modified to suit CGP's particular needs by our programmers, CGP is making rapid progress in the

compilation of all known primary and secondary material relating to the Khmer Rouge regime. The Program has already obtained access to several little-known caches of documents, including a DK Foreign Ministry archive, archives of the DK Trade Ministry, the only known surviving archive from a DK regional prison, original maps of Khmer Rouge killing fields, and several collections of rare photographs taken by the DK regime itself. Another collection made available to the CGP includes a set of internal minutes of key meetings of the DK "Party Center" held in 1975 and 1976. CGP currently has two missions at work in Vietnam, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, searching for relevant documentation in state and private archives.

These databases will bridge a huge gap in the case against the Khmer Rouge. Because these databases did not previously exist, policymakers could not precisely identify victims and perpetrators, nor could they establish empirical links between the two on a national scale. Yale's CGDB resolves this problem. When the databases are complete, an investigator using them could, for example, identify individual victims and perpetrators of a particular atrocity, perhaps with photographs and biographies of the individuals in question. Yale's CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of Yale's singular combination of Cambodia area and archival studies, genocide research, legal resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute this complex research undertaking.

*The Bibliographic Databases.* The bibliographic database will contain records on this new material and on all other known primary and secondary sources of information pertaining to the Khmer Rouge regime, including books, articles, monographs, documents, reports, interviews, tapes, films and videos, transcripts, and so forth. As noted, CGP research efforts have already led to a dramatic increase in existing documentary evidence through discovery of previously unknown archival sources. Rapid progress has been made with the design and establishment of this database. The initial program timelines projected the creation of some three hundred records in a bibliographic database by the end of December 1995. That milestone was achieved in February 1995. As of August 1995, approxi-

mately 1000 records representing some 50,000 pages of documentation had been entered into the bibliographical database.

*The Victim Database.* The Cambodian Genocide Program has made arrangements to obtain and make electronically accessible to an international audience Dr. Justin Corfield's biographical database containing more than 40,000 entries on the Cambodian elite. We express our thanks to Dr. Corfield. We have plans to expand this database with additional information obtained as a result of our original research. Given the patterns of violence in Democratic Kampuchea, it is likely that a large number of the individuals listed in this database became victims of the Khmer Rouge. Thus this database may become useful for identifying and cross-referencing victims of genocide and crimes against humanity.

*The Photographic Database.* The Cambodian Genocide Program is preparing to scan several large collections of photographs into the CGDB. These collections contain a significant number of items which are likely to have a high degree of evidentiary value for the prosecution. Examples include a large number of photos of DK leaders, of forced labor brigades, and the entire collection of prisoner photographs from the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum. Most of the 4,000 prisoner mugshots are currently not accompanied by any identification of the prisoners. By making these photographs available on the internet, and adding to the database a special field for readers to key in suggested names for each photograph, we hope to obtain identities for many of the victims of the Khmer Rouge. The names could be used to prosecute perpetrators on charges of killing specific persons.

*The Khmer Rouge Biographical Database.* The Cambodian Genocide Program is assembling a second biographical database containing data on members of the Khmer Rouge organization between 1975 and 1979. This database will include both political and military leadership, down to the *srok* (district) level. Thus this database will be useful for identifying the chain of command in various regions at various times, and in establishing command responsibility for particular atrocities.

*The Imaging Database.* The Cambodian Genocide Program is in the process of scanning images of original DK documents into the database. We have already accom-

plished the scanning of several hundred relevant documents, including a near-complete set of the records in Khmer from the 1979 in absentia genocide tribunal of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Using custom software already designed specifically for CGP, CGDB users will be able to browse through the bibliographic database and, upon finding a record of particular interest, "jump" to a full digital image of that specific document with the "click" of a mouse. This capability can considerably expedite the search for incriminating evidence of genocidal intent.

*The Geographic Database.* The Cambodian Genocide Program is also in the process of constructing an elaborate computer-based map showing the physical locations of facilities of the Khmer Rouge "internal security" apparatus, including prison and "killing field" sites. The Cambodian Mine Action Center established by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia has designed standardized software for mapping work in Cambodia, and CGP has obtained access to this system for our purposes. Utilizing the Global Positioning System to pinpoint the precise coordinates of locations identified by our researchers, CGP will accurately map the Khmer Rouge terror system and the resting places of its victims. The resulting display is likely to constitute an incriminating indictment of the scope of Khmer Rouge terror, providing strong evidence of widespread crimes against humanity.

*Disseminating the Databases.* In addition to publishing analytical indexes of the databases, user access to the computer databases themselves will be enabled in several ways. First, physical copies of the database will be deposited at several locations in the United States and Cambodia. Second, we hope to make the entire database available on CD-ROM. Finally, through the Internet, the database will be made accessible to all interested parties worldwide. The projected implementation date for the online genocide database is early 1997.

Collecting and compiling data on Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge will be one of the most significant contributions of the CGP, for both historical and legal reasons. Organizing this mass of new information into a structured whole will enable citizens to fully comprehend the nightmare of what happened in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. It will allow historians to compile a

more compelling and accurate picture of the past. It will allow policymakers to fashion a case for the necessity of accountability for the Cambodian genocide. And it will provide prosecutors with critical information on crimes committed by specific individuals.

*Research.* Cambodian Genocide Program Director Ben Kiernan's new book, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979*, will soon be available from Yale University Press. A comprehensive survey of the Cambodian genocide, it provides a baseline of existing information from which more specific research can be initiated. The CGP has already begun implementing a wide range of new social science research on the Cambodian genocide.

For instance, six professional Cambodian researchers and an American have been at work for several months on new histories of the seven geographic zones and regions of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime: the Southwest Zone, the Western Zone, the Northwest Zone, the Siemreap-Oddar Meanchey Region, the Northern Zone, the Northeast Zone (including Kratie) and the Eastern Zone. One of these 70-page monographs is already well on the way to completion, and the others are expected to be completed in 1996, for publication in 1997.

The Cambodian Genocide Program has also commissioned several additional studies, including one of the DK "Party Center" (whose members included Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Thirith, Yun Yat, Mok, Ke Pauk and Vorn Vet). This monograph will examine the Khmer Rouge chain of command and the degree of central authority over events in the zones and regions. This study will commence in September 1995, and is expected to be completed in 1996. The CGP has commissioned a further study of the genocide against the Cham Muslim minority under the Pol Pot regime, and work on this monograph will also commence in September 1995. In addition, the CGP plans new monographs on the Buddhist monkhood, on women, and on the Vietnamese, Chinese and tribal minorities, focussing on the fate of these population cohorts under the Pol Pot regime. We expect at least one and possibly two collected volumes of these monographs to be published in 1997 and 1998.

These studies will be of crucial impor-

tance in synthesizing the general and the particular in Cambodia's genocide. Few detailed studies exist of particular regions under the Khmer Rouge, and so up to now it has been impossible to assemble a complete picture of what happened on a national scale. By breaking down the research task into particular regions, and simultaneously selecting several integrating themes such as the Party Center, Cham Muslims, Buddhists and women, the CGP studies will reconstruct the nexus between the local situation and national policy. This will provide crucial analytical evidence of the extent of national control by the Khmer Rouge, and the impact of this control on all the people of Cambodia.

*Legal Training Project.* On 18 August 1995, the Cambodian Genocide Program produced its first graduates in international criminal law and international human rights law. Seventeen Cambodian legal professionals successfully completed the nine-week training program, including officials from the Ministries of Justice and Interior, the Council of Ministers, and three Cambodian non-governmental human rights organizations. The training covered principles of international criminal law pertaining to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; the structure of national and international legal enforcement mechanisms, including national courts, ad hoc international tribunals, the International Court of Justice, and truth commissions; and the requirements of due process and evidentiary standards.

The Cambodian Genocide Program will build on this foundation next year to further enhance the capacity of the Cambodian legal system to cope with the anticipated political decision to move forward with legal redress for crimes committed during the Pol Pot regime. After consulting with the Royal Cambodian Government and other interested observers as to the preferred fora for seeking redress, the CGP will fashion a second training project designed to inculcate the skills necessary to implement those means of redress selected by the appropriate political authorities.

Several additional varieties of training under CGP auspices are in progress. Training of Khmer researchers in Cambodia on social science methods, historiography and database management has been proceeding since June 1995 on a weekly basis. Two Cambodian scholars are currently enrolled

for MA's at Yale, in History and International Relations. Training of Khmer staff and researchers in Cambodia on all aspects of operating the Documentation Center of Cambodia is also occurring on a weekly basis.

Until now, no one in Cambodia had the range of legal skills required to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice in fair and procedurally sound trials. The CGP's training programs have directly addressed this shortcoming. This is consistent with the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, which states that it is "the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979." [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.]

*The Documentation Center of Cambodia.* The Documentation Center of Cambodia ("DC-Cam") is a non-profit international non-governmental organization (NGO) established in January 1995 by the CGP to facilitate training and field research in Cambodia related to the CGP's mission. With offices in Phnom Penh, the DC-Cam serves as a base of operations for the documentation, research and training activities carried out under the auspices of the CGP. The staff of DC-Cam is entirely Cambodian in composition, and weekly staff development training is already in progress to prepare indigenous personnel to assume full responsibility for all aspects of operations in 1997.

In January 1997, at the conclusion of the CGP's mandate, DC-Cam will be transformed into a Cambodian NGO to serve as a permanent institute for the study of topics related to the Khmer Rouge regime, and as a resource for Cambodians and others who may wish to pursue legal redress for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated under that regime. The documentation and research products of the CGP will be deposited with the Documentation Center of Cambodia for access by the Cambodian people.

[For those who have access to the internet, DC-Cam has a World Wide Web Home Page containing more information about that organization, located at <http://www.pactok.net.au>. The Documentation Center e-mail address is [dccam@pactok.peg.apc.org](mailto:dccam@pactok.peg.apc.org).]

*Research Collaboration.* The Cambodian Genocide Program has won strong sup-



port from the worldwide Cambodia studies community (see "Scholars Speak out on Cambodia Holocaust," letter to the *Wall Street Journal*, signed by 29 Cambodia scholars and specialists, 13 July 1995). These scholars represent virtually the entire field of Cambodian studies. Leading Cambodian scholars David P. Chandler, Milton E. Osborne, and Michael Vickery have already provided help in various ways. Others who have responded positively to requests for information on their personal archival holdings include Justin Corfield, Mark Dodd, Stephen Heder, Henri Locard, and Judy Ledgerwood. Additional Cambodia scholars like David Ashley and Jason Roberts have generously offered to work with the CGP on a volunteer basis.

An Australian professional working with the CGP has also initiated a project to begin the computer mapping of Khmer Rouge prison and mass grave sites. This project has now been funded by the Australian government at the level of A\$24,300. Additional funding is being sought. This is the first time anyone has attempted to construct a comprehensive inventory of the terror apparatus used by the Khmer Rouge regime to murder up to two million people.

In June, July, and August 1995, CGP Director Ben Kiernan presented the Program's work-in-progress at the U.S. Forum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (in New York), at Monash University and the University of New South Wales (in Australia), and at the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Phnom Penh. These occasions all produced new collaboration from foreign scholars and specialists, ranging from an offer of a large biographic database to a promise of rare photographs of the Pol Pot leadership. The ability of the CGP to attract the cooperation of Cambodia scholars, along with legal and technical experts worldwide, is a key factor in explaining the success of the Program to date.

*Cambodian Reception of the CGP.* Cambodian leaders have complained for years that the outside world had not recognized the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and the tragedy of the Cambodian people. The initiation of the Cambodian Genocide Program helped answer this complaint on an international scale. This measure of recognition sparked a new willingness among the Cambodian political elite to squarely face the darkest chapter of Cambodian history.

Cambodians have become full partners in the CGP's work. His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk wrote to CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson on 21 July 1995, "I infinitely thank the distinguished promoters of this research program, especially Dr. Ben Kiernan and yourself, for the care that you have manifested, thanks to the 'Cambodian Genocide Program,' in nourishing truth and promoting and assuring respect for human rights in my country."

Since the earliest days of the CGP in January 1995, the Royal Cambodian Government has been unreservedly supportive of the mandate given to Yale University by the U.S. government. The Co-Prime Ministers, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Co-Ministers of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Co-Ministers of Defense, and the President of the National Assembly have all pledged their personal and institutional cooperation with the CGP. Enthusiasm about the goals of the program transcends political affiliation, with support coming from the leadership of all three parties represented in the government. But the cooperation of the Royal Government has gone far beyond pledges. The Royal Government is providing the CGP with a wide range of resources to facilitate our work in Cambodia and in the region at large.

At the Striving for Justice Conference in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995, First Prime Minister Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen publicly committed the Royal Cambodian Government to bring the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice for their crimes against humanity. In his opening address to the conference, the First Prime Minister complimented the CGP, saying, "On behalf of the Royal Government, on behalf of Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister, and on my own behalf, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and warmest congratulations to the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigation and Yale University for embarking on the two years programme of documentation, research and training on the Cambodian genocide. I would also like to express my sincere thanks equally to the United States to create the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act and its appointment of Yale University to carry out the two year programme."

Substantively, the First Prime Minister argued, "The international crimes of the

Khmer Rouge violated the most central norms of international law and this clearly affected the interests of all states in general and Cambodia in particular." His Royal Highness the First Prime Minister added, "The Royal Government is determined to bring those responsible for the perpetration of these heinous crimes against the Cambodian people to face justice." In his closing address to the conference, His Excellency Samdech Hun Sen summed up the view of many participants by saying of the conference, "This is not about politics, it is about justice. If we do not bring the Khmer Rouge to justice for killing millions of people, then there is no point in speaking about human rights in Cambodia."

Large numbers of ordinary Cambodian citizens seem to concur with the Co-Prime Ministers. Many Cambodians in Cambodia, the U.S., and other countries have volunteered their assistance. Since June 1995, a team of Cambodian volunteers in New Haven, CT, has been preparing a biographical index of Khmer Rouge political leaders and military commanders. As of September 1995, Cambodian-American citizens' groups in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, California, and Texas have offered to compile witness testimony on behalf of the CGP. The thirst for justice is powerful among the survivors of Pol Pot's genocide.

Consistent with these feelings of ordinary Cambodians and the policy of the government, the CGP has received from the Royal Cambodian Government significant assistance to our research program. One of the most useful forms of this aid is the unprecedented assistance from the Royal Government in retrieving documentation from Vietnam unavailable to researchers up until now. In combination with previously unexamined archives from the Cambodian People's Party, Royal Government ministries, and private archives now being opened to the CGP in Cambodia, a wealth of new data pertaining to criminal culpability during the Khmer Rouge regime seems destined to come to light. It is the expressed policy of the Royal Government to assist the CGP in uncovering such important information.

*Evaluation.* To ensure objectivity and quality control, the CGP has instituted a rigorous two-tier system of program evaluation. In the first tier, the Steering Group of the Department of State's Office of Cambo-

dian Genocide Investigations conducts periodic external reviews of CGP operations. As a basis for these evaluations, in May 1995 CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson produced a 209-page Implementation Plan outlining the Program's strategy for achieving its objectives. The first external evaluation, held in June 1995, termed the progress of CGP operations "excellent" (*Time Magazine*, 26 June 1995).

CGP also carries out an internal review process, staffed by distinguished experts in international law and genocide investigation, such as Professor Cherif Bassiouni, former Chair of the United Nations Commission of Experts for the inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia (predecessor to the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal). The first round of internal evaluation of CGP operations began in June 1995. This evaluation has already produced numerous useful ideas for improving various aspects of our operations, and yielded an overall positive appraisal of CGP progress. According to one evaluator, "Your thoughtful and methodical explanations for the preparation of such a project should serve as a model for the documentation and analysis of crimes against humanity in other countries.... The training program designed to support the project is outstanding."

**Summary.** In 1994 the prospect of a trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders seemed remote. Now, through the work of the Cambodian Genocide Program, it has become a strong probability. In 1994, the information resources and legal evidence necessary for a judicial accounting of the genocide had yet to be identified or assembled, and the required legal skills did not yet exist. These prerequisites are now well on the way toward fulfillment. By the end of 1996, when the CGP's mandate will expire, an international Cambodian genocide tribunal may have already commenced functioning. By then, the CGP will certainly have provided the scholarly and legal resources for Cambodians to pursue their own justice for the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. In short, the Cambodian Genocide Program has taken major steps to fulfill its own three-part mandate: to expose and document the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and to hold the perpetrators accountable.

## CAMBODIAN ARCHIVES

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Jarvis and Peter Arfanis, who visited the archives at the end of 1992 were "dismayed at what we saw. . . . Valuable records from the French colonial days are on the floors and shelves rotting away. About 50% of the records—and there are about 2000 linear metres of records all up—are either wrapped in brown paper or still in their original boxes. The boxes have been constructed from acidic pasteboard, starch-filled cloth, and protein adhesive which has promoted insect infiltration, mainly termites and beetle larvae. Other records are sitting unwrapped gathering dust, mould and also being attacked by insects."<sup>4</sup>

By the end of 1994, conditions were still far from good. During my two visits to the archives that year, stacks of books, most beyond repair, still stood on the floor of the library's storage areas and in the archives. Wrapped and unwrapped documents remained on dusty shelves in the archives, and insect damage was evident everywhere. Nevertheless, thanks to the dedication of some Cambodians and some foreign (mainly Australian) assistance, there have been improvements, and the archives can in any event be used. There are now typescript guides to some of the more important documentary collections, and proper archival storage boxes, a gift from Australia, are increasingly being used.

The archives contain numerous, if eclectic, works including official journals, the United States Civil Code, Russian encyclopedias, and works from the French period. More significant are the collections of published and unpublished documents that have survived. The bulk of the collection consists of those colonial records which the French did not take with them when they left, particularly records of the *Résidence Supérieure du Cambodge*. Some of the manuscripts date to the late nineteenth century and concern a wide range of mostly domestic matters. These, along with some printed Foreign Affairs records from the 1950s and 1960s, were the documents most useful to me. However, other records concern the Buddhist Institute, Norodom Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge period.<sup>5</sup>

Permission is required to use the archives, and prospective researchers need to apply at the Council of Ministers. There is no fee. Writing ahead might be useful (it is

very unlikely that a reply will be sent even if the letter is received), but I was able to obtain permission in Phnom Penh without great difficulty. It may, however, take a few days. (The first time I applied on the Friday before a holiday week. Nevertheless, permission to use the archives was received the Monday following the holidays.)

The archives is open only about four or five hours per day. Many documents remain wrapped in paper. The documents themselves are often in very fragile condition, and insects sometimes scurry out from among the pages. There is no working electricity in the building, and plumbing is rudimentary. Miss Kim Ly, the archivist, is helpful, as are other members of the staff. Kim Ly understands French and some English.

In May 1994, there were few researchers (often I was alone in the building), and the rainy season added to a sense of gloom and foreboding resulting from reports of rebel Khmer Rouge gains in the countryside. But by December the Khmer Rouge threat seemed to have receded. Now government officials and private citizens did come by to consult the archive's records. School children also visited. The library was heavily used, especially in December when there was a very well attended celebration of the library's seventieth anniversary. Perhaps this is a hopeful sign of Cambodia's returning health.

1. Peter Arfanis and Helen Jarvis, "Archives in Cambodia: Neglected Institutions," *Archives and Manuscripts* [Australia] 21:2 (1993), 252-62.
2. *Ibid.*, 255. George Smith, a librarian employed by the state of Alaska, made the same point in a paper delivered at the "Seminar on the Khmer Culture's Revival," Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 21 December 1994.
3. Helen Jarvis, "The National Library of Cambodia: Surviving Seventy Years of Drastic Socio-Economic Impact," Paper delivered at CONSAL9, the Ninth Congress of Southeast Asian Librarians, Bangkok, Thailand, 2-6 May 1993.
4. Arfanis and Jarvis, "Archives in Cambodia," 256-57.
5. For a more complete description of the archive's holdings, see Arfanis and Jarvis, "Archives in Cambodia."

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