COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

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SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY

BOHR, THE BOMB, AND SOVIET ATOMIC ESPIONAGE: *Ex-KGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov sparked a controversy when he alleged in his memoirs that Nobel-winning physicist Niels Bohr passed atomic secrets to Moscow. Now the original 1945 KGB report on the espionage approach to Bohr, sent by secret police chief Lavrenti Beria to Joseph Stalin, has surfaced. What does it say, and what does it mean? See pages 50-59.*

SOURCES FOR *STALIN AND THE BOMB*

by David Holloway

For historians of the Cold War, the Soviet nuclear weapons program is a topic of obvious importance. The nuclear arms race was a central element in the Cold War, and much of the historiography of American Cold War policy has focused on nuclear weapons—on the decisions to build them, and on their role in foreign policy and military strategy. But American policy is only one part of the history of the Cold War. Comparable studies of Soviet nuclear policy are needed for a full understanding of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition, which dominated world politics for more than 40 years. This note reviews briefly some of the main sources I used for my *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

An extensive literature on Soviet nuclear policy was published in the West during the Cold War. This dealt primarily with two topics: the structure and development of Soviet nuclear forces, and Soviet thinking about nuclear war and the role of nuclear weapons in war. Some of these works retain considerable value, but the range of issues they could examine was necessarily limited.[1] They were based primarily on data published by the U.S. government about Soviet nuclear weapons systems and on the statements of Soviet leaders about nuclear weapons, as well as on Soviet publications about foreign policy and military strategy, operational art, and tactics. It was not possible to analyze Soviet policy in terms of the interplay of individuals, institutions, and circumstances. The way in which we understood Soviet nuclear policy was therefore very different from the way in which we could think about Ameri-

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Soviet Cold War Military Strategy: Using Declassified History

by William Burr

"The history of the Soviet strategic program is at the same time a history of U.S. perceptions."[1] So wrote a team of historians and political scientists in a once highly classified Pentagon history of the Cold War strategic arms race. The authors were describing an important problem: so long as primary sources were unavailable, academic and government analysts interested in explaining Soviet military policy had to resort to "inferences drawn by long chains of logic" to interpret the scattered data available to

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INSIDE:

Nuclear Weapons after Stalin's Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age

by Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok

By the time Stalin died, on 5 March 1953, the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power whose army was preparing to receive, in several months, its first atomic weapons.[1] The task set by Stalin, to liquidate the U.S. atomic monopoly and to develop the Soviets' own nuclear arsenal, was "overfulfilled" on 12 August 1953, when the USSR successfully tested the world's first transportable hydrogen bomb. The work on this bomb had been in progress since 1948, and Stalin failed by only five months to live to see his triumph.[2]

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STALIN AND THE BOMB

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can or British policy, for example. Two books, by Arnold Kramish and George Modelski, were published in 1959 setting out what was known about the Soviet atomic project, and about the people and institutions involved.[2] These books provided useful information on the early stages of Soviet nuclear research, but were inevitably thin on nuclear weapons development.

The gap between what we knew about U.S. and British policy on the one hand, and Soviet policy on the other, widened in the 1960s and 1970s as more works on Western policy—including detailed official histories of the British and American projects—were published on the basis of archival research.[3] No parallel publications appeared in the Soviet Union; the most informative Soviet work of this period was Igor Golovin's biography of Igor Kurchatov, who was scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project from its inception in 1943 to his death in 1960.[4] Golovin, who was Kurchatov's deputy in the 1950s, based his book on interviews with people who had worked with Kurchatov and known him well (the opening pages of the book, for example, were written by Kurchatov's brother-in-law, Kirill Sinel'nikov). His book is far more informative than other Soviet publications of the period, but it does not compare with the work of Richard Hewlett and Margaret Gowing and their colleagues. Some useful works on nuclear science and the atomic industry appeared in the Soviet Union at about the same time.[5] In 1976, Herbert York's classic *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* was published, throwing important light on Soviet thermonuclear weapons development.[6] Apart from the books by Kramish, Modelski, and York, two papers I wrote on early Soviet nuclear history during a year's fellowship in the International Security Studies Program of the Wilson Center in 1978-79 were, as far as I know, the only studies to appear in English on that history.[7]

Since 1980, and especially in the last four or five years, a great deal of new material has become available on the history of the Soviet project. New books have been published in Russia and the West; the Soviet and Russian press has carried many articles by, and interviews with, participants in the project; some key documents have been published; and some relevant archives—though not yet the most important ones—have become accessible to researchers.[8] There is as yet no comprehensive history of the Soviet project in Russian; recent work has been devoted to clarifying particular aspects of Soviet nuclear history. Nevertheless, this has now become a fruitful area for research, and significant studies may be expected in the coming years.

What sources are now available for the study of Soviet nuclear history? The answer depends on what aspect one wants to study. In my book I examine three main issues: the development of Soviet nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; the relationship between scientists and the political leadership; and the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet foreign and military policies. These issues are often treated separately in studies of Western policies, but I chose to weave them together for two reasons, one practical and one substantive. The practical reason is that sources for the Soviet project are still, in spite of greater openness, very much more fragmentary than those for the American or British projects. I hoped that viewing the project from different angles would make up for some of the deficiencies in the sources. The substantive reason is that, as I hope the

Cold War Soviet Science: Manuscripts and Oral Histories

by Ronald Doel and Caroline Moseley

The end of the Cold War has stimulated new interest in the history of science in the Soviet Union. While several Western historians have produced important studies of various aspects of Soviet science, until recently such works relied largely on published Soviet information; and while Soviet scholars had greater access to archival materials, political pressures kept analyses of twentieth-century Soviet science limited to internal technical developments. Since the advent of *glasnost* in the late 1980s, however, contacts between Western and Eastern scientists and historians has increased dramatically, and scholars have begun the important task of evaluating Soviet-era and East European science within social, intellectual, and political contexts. This process has been aided by two developments. Archivists in the United States and the former Soviet republics have begun collaborating to assess archival sources for the physical and biological sciences in the former Soviet Union; and greater freedom of travel and speech has enabled historians to conduct an unprecedented number of oral history interviews with leading scientists and their families in the former Soviet republics.

For more than two decades, the Center for History of Physics of the American Institute of Physics (AIP), now located in College Park, Maryland, has sponsored oral history interviews with scientists in most branches of the physical sciences, including physics, astrophysics, and geophysics; these interviews are housed within its Niels Bohr Library. Its staff has also gathered information on the papers of scientists and scientific institutions throughout the world. In addition, the AIP houses several small collections of manuscript and printed materials on the history of Soviet science. These sources are described in greater detail below.

I. Archival Sources. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Center for History of Physics has employed some highly qualified researchers, including the Russian historian Alexei Kozhevnikov, to assess archival holdings for scientists and scientific institutions throughout the former Soviet Union and East European nations. Information about known archival collections is found in a database operated by the Center, the International Catalog of Sources for the History of Physics and Allied Sciences (ICOS). Currently the ICOS database contains records of 45 collections which have been preserved in 10 different repositories in the former Soviet Union. One of these repositories, the Archives of the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is a particularly rich source of physics-related collections. Its holdings include the papers of Evgenij Gross, Abram Ioffe, Wladimir Kistiakowsky, Yuri Krutkov, and others.

II. Oral History Sources. For several decades, the Center for History of Physics has sponsored oral history interviews with physicists, astrophysicists, meteorologists, geophysicists, and members of related disciplines. Over 600 interviews are available at the Center; transcripts are available for many

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book shows, the issues are interrelated.

The quality of the sources on different aspects of Soviet nuclear history varies greatly. There is no good technical or administrative history of the Soviet project. (Indeed it is only recently that a technical history of the wartime work at Los Alamos has been published.[9]) Some specialized technical accounts—of the first experimental reactor,[10] of work on the first atomic bomb,[11] and of the first plutonium production reactor[12]—have been or are about to be published. But a detailed technical history cannot be written on the basis of existing material. The outlines of the technical history have to be pieced together from a variety of incomplete sources, and the same is true of the administrative history of the project.[13] Andrei Sakharov's memoirs, for example, have to be used, along with the memoirs of people who worked with him, to sketch out the history of Soviet thermonuclear weapons development.[14]

The richest group of sources is the material on the scientists who took part in the project. There is a three-volume set of Kurchatov's collected works, which includes some memoranda he wrote for the government during and after World War II.[15] There are two collections of memoirs about him; some of these are not very interesting, but others are highly informative about aspects of the project.[16] There is an excellent study of Kurchatov and his research before he was appointed scientific director of the project.[17] Many of the memoirs portray Kurchatov as a hero, but there is enough material to make possible a more nuanced picture of the man.

A great deal has been written about the Leningrad school of physics from which Kurchatov and other key figures in the nuclear project came: Abram Ioffe, the founder of this school;[18] N.N. Semenov, who created the Institute of Chemical Physics from which the first members of the weapons group were drawn;[19] Iu. B. Khariton, who headed the work on weapons design and development from 1943 on;[20] Ia. B. Zel'dovich, who headed the theoretical work on weapons design;[21] I.K. Kikoin, who was responsible for the gaseous diffusion method of isotope separation;[22] L.A. Artsimovich, who took charge of electromagnetic isotope separation;[23] G.N. Flerov, who discovered spontaneous fission;[24] and A.P. Aleksandrov, who occupied several important positions in the project.[25]

Similar materials are available for other scientists in the project. Vladimir Vernadskii, a mineralogist with broad scientific interests, was a key figure in the early history of the project, and his papers, especially his correspondence and diaries, constitute a crucial source for its pre-Hiroshima phase.[26] Several of Vernadskii's students and colleagues played important roles in the project, among them Vitalii Khlopin, who headed research on the separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium, and Dmitrii Shcherbakov, who took part in the development of uranium mining. The materials on these men also throw important light on the project.[27]

In the development of the atomic bomb Kurchatov relied heavily on physicists he had worked with in Leningrad. In 1948, however, he brought Moscow physicists, among them Igor Tamm and Andrei Sakharov, into the project to work on thermonuclear weapons. Sakharov's memoirs are an important source for this history, and so too are the memoirs of those who worked with him.[28] Gennady Gorelik (formerly with Institute of the History of Science and Technology, now with the Dibner Institute at MIT) has been interviewing those who worked with Sakharov, and his book on Sakharov promises to be a major contribu-

Moscow's Biggest Bomb:
The 50-Megaton Test of October 1961

by Viktor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov

On 30 October 1961, Soviet Minister of Medium Machine Building Efim Slavsky and Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Moskalenko sent a telegram to the Kremlin:

> To: N.S. Khrushchev, The Kremlin, Moscow: The test at Novaya Zemlya was a success. The security of the test personnel and of nearby inhabitants has been assured. Those participating in the tests have fulfilled the task of our Motherland. We are returning for the Congress.[1]

In Moscow, the 22nd Congress of the CPSU had already been in session for two weeks. It began its work in the newly-built Kremlin Palace of Congresses, which had just opened its doors for the first time. On October 30, the Congress delegates unanimously reached the sensational decision that "Maintaining the sarcophagus with J.V. Stalin's coffin is no longer desirable."[2] On the same day, Slavsky and Moskalenko reported on the test of a Soviet thermonuclear bomb of unprecedented power.

That morning, at 11:32 AM (Moscow time), there was a 50-megaton (MT) explosion over Novaya Zemlya island in northern Russia above the Arctic Circle at an altitude of 4,000 meters. The atmospheric disturbance generated by the explosion orbited the earth three times. The flash of light was so bright that it was visible at a distance of 1,000 kilometers, despite cloudy skies. A gigantic, swirling mushroom cloud rose as high as 64 kilometers.

The bomb exploded after having fallen slowly from a height of 10,500 meters, suspended by a large parachute. By that time the crew of the TU-95 "Bear" bomber, commanded by Major Andrei Durnovtsev, were already in the safe zone some 45 km from the target. The commander was returning to earth as a lieutenant colonel and Hero of the Soviet Union.

Efim Slavsky and Kirill Moskalenko, as deputies to the Congress, had arrived by plane on the day of the test to observe the explosion. They were aboard an Il-14 "crate" at a distance of several hundred kilometers from ground zero, when a fantastic scene appeared before them; one participant in the test saw a bright flash through dark goggles and felt the effects of a thermal pulse even at a distance of 270 km. In districts hundreds of kilometers from ground zero, wooden houses were destroyed, and stone ones lost their roofs, windows and doors; and radio communications were interrupted for almost one hour. At the time of the blast, the bomb's designers and test supervisors, headed by Major General Nikolai Pavlov, the Chairman of the State Commission, were at the airfield near Olenya station on the Kola Peninsula. For 40 minutes they had no firm information on the test, or the fate of the bomber and the Tu-16 "Badger" airborne laboratory accompanying it. Only when radio contact with Novaya Zemlya was reestablished were they able to request information on the altitude of the cloud. It was clear

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tion to Soviet nuclear history.[29]

Other important memoirs include those by V.A. Tsukerman and his wife Z.M. Azarkh, which deal with life and work at Arzamas-16, the Soviet equivalent of Los Alamos;[30] M.G. Pervukhin's account of the origins of the wartime project;[31] those of N.A. Dollezhal', chief designer of the first plutonium production reactors;[32] and of E.P. Slavskii, one of the early managers, and later Minister of Medium Machinebuilding.[33]

Most of these sources are subject to the usual defects of memoirs: inaccuracies and vagueness as to dates, selective recall, and inflation of the memoirist's role. They are, in addition, subject to the special problems of Soviet sources. The first of these is censorship and self-censorship. Beria is not mentioned once, for example, in the important volume of memoirs on Kurchatov published in 1988, even though Beria was in overall charge of the nuclear project and his relationship with Kurchatov is central to understanding how the project was run.

The second problem is that the Soviet project was highly compartmentalized, so that very few people had a comprehensive view of what was going on; this is one reason why the writings of Iulii Khariton, who headed weapons design and development at Arzamas-16 from 1946 to 1992, are so important. This compartmentalization has shaped how participants in the project have written about it. Golovin's biography of Kurchatov, for example, makes much of Kurchatov's scientific intuition. The recent publication of some of Kurchatov's reports on the intelligence he received about the Manhattan Project makes it clear that his intuition about what should be done was based on a detailed knowledge of what the Americans were doing.

The scientists' memoirs are nevertheless a crucial source for the history of the project. They convey something of the moral and political atmosphere in which the scientists and engineers worked; they reveal a good deal about relations between participants in the project; and they also illuminate some of the scientific and technical issues involved. They can be checked against one another, and sometimes checked against contemporary documents. This is especially so for the period up to 1941, when a good deal was published in scientific and popular science journals; but it is true to some extent for the later period as well. Apart from Vernadskii's papers, the letters of Peter Kapitsa are perhaps the most important contemporary source. Although he was directly involved in the project only for some months at the end of 1945, Kapitsa's letters are critical for viewing the Russian physics community, the politics of science, and the early post-Hiroshima decisions.[34]

An interesting angle on the Soviet project is provided by the German scientists who took part in it. Several of these wrote memoirs, of which the most interesting is by Nikolaus Riehl;[35] others who wrote memoirs are Max Steenbeck, Heinz Barwich, and Manfred Von Ardenne.[36] When German scientists left the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s, some came to the West and were debriefed by U.S. intelligence. Some of those debriefings have been declassified and offer interesting insights about aspects of the Soviet project.[37] Andreas Heinemann-Grüder has interviewed some of the German scientists who worked on the project and incorporated those interviews into his research.[38] Norman Naimark's forthcoming book on the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany will also add fresh evidence on the use made by the Soviet Union of German science and technology, and especially on the Soviet uranium mines in East Germany.[39]

Some memoirs contain documents from private archives—reports, minutes of meetings, and letters—but only now are relevant official archives beginning to open up. Some archives have become accessible to researchers; others have released individual documents or sets of documents. The relevant Russian archives that are open to researchers, at least in part, are the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry; the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary History Documents, and the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (both of which contain records of the CPSU Central Committee); and the State Archive of the Russian Federation. Since nuclear weapons policy was highly centralized under Stalin, the most important collections of documents are not open to researchers, even though selected documents from these collections have been made public or given to individual scholars. I obtained some documents from private and official archives in this way, through the good offices of Russian colleagues.

The most important single group of documents to have been declassified deals with atomic espionage. The KGB made a set of about 300 pages of documents available to the Institute for the History of Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Institute prepared most of these documents for publication in its journal *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* (Questions on the History of Science and Technology), 1992, no. 3, pp. 107-34, but the issue was withdrawn from publication in the fall of 1992 at the insistence of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power, on the grounds that information in two of the documents might contravene the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[40] (One of these documents was a report, based on information from Klaus Fuchs, providing a detailed description of the design of the plutonium bomb tested at Alamogordo on 16 July 1945; Kurchatov and Khariton took this report as the basis for the design of the first Soviet bomb.) Although the issue was withdrawn from circulation, copies did become available to researchers, and some of the documents have been published in an appendix to Pavel Sudoplatov's memoirs.[41] These documents, especially the memoranda by Kurchatov commenting on the value of the intelligence, make it possible to chart the progress of the Soviet project during the war, and to see how information from Britain and the United States influenced the direction of Soviet work.

Several KGB officials who were involved in one way or another in atomic intelligence have written articles or memoirs, or given interviews to the press. Among these are A.S. Feklisov, who was Klaus Fuchs's control officer in Britain after World War II; A.A. Iatskov, who was involved in atomic espionage in New York during the war; and Pavel Sudoplatov, who headed a special "Department S" which collated intelligence information in 1945-46.[42]

Like all sources, these have to be assessed with care.[43] This is especially true of Sudoplatov's book. Some of the claims made by Sudoplatov—especially that physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr knowingly passed secret atomic information to the Soviet Union—are dubious, and have been subjected to serious criticism.[44] Other aspects of his account—for example, about the status of the atomic project during the war—are quite misleading.[45] The reliability of Sudoplatov's memoirs is, moreover, further

STALIN'S SECRET ORDER: BUILD THE BOMB "ON A RUSSIAN SCALE"

Ed. note: Stalin and the Soviet political leadership required some convincing, both from events and from Soviet scientists, before throwing their full weight behind an atomic weapons program. This evolution is illustrated by two previously secret Russian archival documents which have recently become available, and which are excerpted below. The first document is a 29 September 1944 letter from physicist Igor V. Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet nuclear project, to secret police chief Lavrenti Beria, whom Stalin had given principal responsibility for the atomic effort. Prodded by his own scientists and by intelligence reports of the secret Anglo-American atomic enterprise, Stalin had initiated a small-scale Soviet nuclear weapons program in late 1942-early 1943. But the level of support political leaders had given the project failed to satisfy Kurchatov, who pleaded with Beria for additional backing:

In our letters to you, Comrade M.G. Pervukhin [Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and a key atomic administrator] and I reported on the status of work on the uranium problem and of the colossal development of this work abroad. ... around this issue there has been created abroad a concentration of scientific and engineering-technical power on a scale never been seen in the history of world science, and which has already achieved the most priceless results.

In our country, despite major improvement in work on uranium in 1943-44, the situation remains completely unsatisfactory....

Though I know that you are extremely busy, in view of the historic meaning of the uranium problem I all the same decided to disturb You and to ask You to order an effort which would correspond to the potential and significance of our Great State in world culture.

[From I.N. Golovin, "Kurchatov - uchenyi, gosudarstvennyi deiatel', chelovek" ["Kurchatov—Scholar, Government official, Man"], in *Materialy iubeleinoi sessii uchenogo soveta tsentra 12 ianvaria 1993 g.* [Materials of the Jubilee Session of the Academic Council of the Center, 12 January 1993] (Moscow: Russian Scientific Center "Kurchatov Institute," 1993), pp. 24-25]

The success of the Manhattan Project, so dramatically demonstrated at Hiroshima in August 1945, compelled Stalin to reorganize, accelerate, and expand the USSR's atomic effort. But some difficulties persisted, including complaints by some scientists, most prominently the renowned physicist Pyotr Kapitsa, that the political leaders overseeing the project—especially secret police chief Lavrenti Beria—did not properly understand either the science or the scientists involved. The second document reproduced here shows that by late January 1946, Stalin was ready to move even more decisively to boost the secret atomic effort, and to satisfy the scientists' wants and needs. Printed below are excerpts from Kurchatov's handwritten notes from a conversation with Stalin, accompanied by Beria and Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov, at the Kremlin on the evening of 25 January 1946. The notes, in Kurchatov's archives, were published recently in an article by the physicist Yuri N. Smirnov, a veteran and historian of the Soviet nuclear weapons program. The timing of the conversation is particularly important in a Cold War context, for only a month earlier the Kremlin had agreed to the request of U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, during a conference of Soviet, British, and American foreign ministers in Moscow, to create a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission with the goal of establishing international control over all atomic energy and weapons. The document suggests that Stalin, like many U.S. leaders, had little faith in the negotiations, which in fact quickly stalemated and ended in failure later that year as both Washington and Moscow continued to work on nuclear weapons programs under national control. (The USSR exploded its first atomic bomb in August 1949, breaking the four-year American monopoly.)

January 25, 1946

The conversation continued for approximately one hour, from 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening. Comrade Stalin, Comrade Molotov, and Comrade Beria attended.

Basic impressions of the conversation. The great love of Comrade Stalin for Russia and for V.I. Lenin, about whom he spoke in terms of his great hope for the development of science in our country. [...]

Viewing the future development of the work Comrade Stalin said that it is not worth spending time and effort on small-scale work, rather, it is necessary to conduct the work broadly, on a Russian scale, and that in this regard the broadest, utmost assistance will be provided.

Comrade Stalin said that it is not necessary to seek out the cheapest paths, ... that it is not necessary to carry out the work quickly and in vulgar fundamental forms.

Regarding the scholars, Comrade Stalin was preoccupied by thoughts of how to, as if, make it easier, help them in their material-living situation. And in prizes for great deeds, for example, on the solution to our problem. He said that our scholars are very modest, and they never notice that they live badly—that is bad in itself, and he said that although our state also had suffered much, we can always make it possible for several thousand persons to live well, and several thousand people better than very well, with their own dachas, so that they can relax, and with their own cars.

In work, Comrade Stalin said, it is necessary to move decisively, with the investment of a decisive quantity of resources, but in the basic directions.

It is also necessary to use Germany to the utmost; there, there are people, and equipment, and experience, and factories. Comrade Stalin asked about the work of German scholars and the benefits which they brought to us.

[. . .]

A question was asked about [physicists A.F.] Ioffe, [A.I.] Alikhanov, [P.L.] Kapitsa, and [S.I.] Vavilov, and the utility of Kapitsa's work.

Misgivings were expressed regarding who they work for and what their activity is directed toward—for the benefit of the Motherland or not.

It was suggested that measures which would be necessary in order to speed up work, everything that is necessary, should be written down. What other scholars would it make sense to bring into the effort?

[. . .]

[From Personal notes of I.V. Kurchatov, Archive of the Russian Scientific Center "Kurchatov Institute," Fond 2, Opis 1/c, Document 16/4, printed in Yuri Smirnov, "Stalin and the Atomic Bomb," *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekniki* [Questions on the History of Science and Technology] 2 (1994), pp. 125-130.]

clouded by the impossibility of distinguishing Sudoplatov's recollections from what has been added by his co-authors.

The controversy about Sudoplatov's book has produced one benefit: the release of the memorandum (prepared by Sudoplatov) from Beria to Stalin about the visit of the Soviet physicist Iakov Terletskii to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in November 1945 (see the translation on pages 50-51, 57-59). It is good to have this memorandum published, but the way in which it has become public illustrates some of the problems that researchers face in working on the history of the Soviet nuclear program. It can be quite misleading to have individual documents plucked out of the archives, without a sense for the context in which they were filed. In this case we are fortunate that Terletskii left a detailed account of his visit to Bohr, and that Aage Bohr, Niels Bohr's son, who was present at the meetings between Bohr and Terletskii, is alive and able to give his account of what transpired.[46] Even so, Beria's memorandum needs careful interpretation. Some of Bohr's answers to Terletskii's questions are garbled, which makes one wonder how the memorandum was put together.[47] In question 10, for example, Bohr refers to a half-life of 7,000 years, which is close to the half-life of plutonium-240 from all processes, not for spontaneous fission (which is what he was asked about). Answer 22 does not seem to make much sense, as several physicists, including Aage Bohr, himself a Nobel Laureate, have pointed out. Finally, conclusions should not be drawn from the document without comparing it with the Smyth Report, the official account of the Manhattan Project which had been published by the U.S. government in August 1945.[48] It is clear that Bohr, in his answers to Terletskii, did not go beyond what had already been revealed by the Smyth Report.

Russian historians of science are now working intensively on the history of the Soviet nuclear project. They have already written a great deal about the history of Soviet physics, and about the communities from which the leading figures in the nuclear project came. Since the late 1980s they have turned their attention increasingly to the social and political context of Soviet science, and more recently have begun to investigate the history of the Soviet nuclear project, conducting serious interviews with participants in the project and seeking to speed up the declassification of documents. The quality of this work is high. The journal *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* is the main vehicle for the new studies of Soviet nuclear history; the work of Viktor Frenkel' and Gennady Gorelik has already been noted; and mention should also be made of the work of Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok.

The sources on the project itself, and on the relationships between scientists, managers, and political leaders, are far from satisfactory, but they are better and more numerous than Soviet sources on the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet foreign and military policy. Here the situation for the historian is different; while very little had been published before the breakup of the Soviet Union on the nuclear project itself, there was already a significant literature on Soviet foreign policy in the Cold War. This literature, based almost exclusively on Western archives, as well as on published Soviet sources, left many questions unresolved, however, and historians hoped—and continue to hope—that the opening of Russian archives would transform the situation.

Chernobyl: The Forbidden Truth

Declassified CPSU CC Politburo protocols, working group materials, and other formerly secret Soviet documents concerning the April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant are included in Alla A. Yorishinskaya's *Chernobyl: The Forbidden Truth*. The University of Nebraska Press plans to bring out an English-language edition of the book, originally published in Moscow as *Chernobyl: Top Secret* ("Drugie Berega," 1992), in late 1995. Contact:University of Nebraska Press, 312 N. 14th St., Lincoln, NE 68588-0484; tel. 1-800-755-1105.

The opening of the archives has helped, but declassification is moving slowly. Foreign policy-making under Stalin was highly centralized—especially in relation to nuclear weapons—and the relevant archives (in particular the Presidential Archive) have not yet been opened to foreign researchers. Nevertheless, those archives which have become accessible have yielded interesting materials, and important documents have been released (albeit fitfully) from the Presidential Archive. Thus we have better sources now for the study of such nuclear-related issues as the Soviet entry into the war with Japan and the Soviet role in the Korean War.[49] There are still huge gaps, however. Nothing has yet become available, for example, to clarify the nuclear aspect of the Berlin blockade crisis of 1948-49.

Memoirs are less helpful on foreign policy than on science. Gromyko's memoirs are disappointing and must be treated with caution.[50] N.V. Novikov's memoirs are much more useful, especially on the immediate postwar period.[51] The Molotov interviews are interesting, especially for conveying a sense of the mentality of the Stalinist leadership; and on some specific issues, like the date on which Kurchatov was shown intelligence information, Molotov's memory is sound.[52] The memoirs of Ivan Kovalev, Stalin's emissary to Mao Zedong, contain interesting material not only on Sino-Soviet relations but also on the role of nuclear weapons in Stalin's foreign policy.[53] Chinese sources have become very important for the study of Stalin's foreign policy, especially for Soviet policy in the Korean War, and Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai have made good use of these sources in their study of the war's origins.[54]

After Stalin's death in March 1953, and especially after Beria's arrest a few months later, decision-making on nuclear weapons was decentralized. Stalin and Beria had held nuclear weapons decisions very closely, and had allowed very little discussion of nuclear weapons issues in the press or even in the government or the military. In 1954, however, the Soviet press began to carry articles about nuclear weapons and their effect on war and foreign policy.[55] The CPSU Politburo (or Presidium as it was then called) now became involved in the discussion of nuclear weapons issues, and so too did the Central Committee. The July 1953 Central Committee Plenum also touched on the management of the nuclear project. The meeting was convened to condemn Beria, but his direction of the nuclear project did not receive serious criticism. He was charged, however, with having authorized the August 1953 hydrogen-bomb test without the approval of Georgii Malenkov, the premier. The implication of this criticism is that Beria was treating the nuclear weapons complex as his own personal fiefdom.[56]

Unfortunately, not all the stenographic reports of Central Committee plenary sessions have been made available. I did not have access, for example, to the full report of the January 1955 CPSU CC Plenum, at which Georgii Malenkov was condemned for his remark that global nuclear war could lead to

the end of civilization; I had to rely on secondary sources that quoted excerpts from the speeches. Nevertheless the greater openness of the immediate post-Stalin years is very clearly reflected in the archives. It is the last four years of Stalin's life that remain the most opaque and difficult period of Soviet foreign policy.

The same pattern holds for the study of military policy. New materials are now available on the development of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and also on the impact of nuclear weapons on post-Stalin military thought.[57] But the great military buildup of 1949-53 has not yet been illuminated either by archival materials or by studies by Russian military historians. This period requires new sources and research.

For the first time, researchers on these topics in recent years have been able to interview senior Soviet participants in the relevant events. Clearly, interviews are a notoriously difficult source, because people's memories are so often unreliable. Yet I found them enormously helpful—more so, in fact, than is evident from the notes in the book, because people I talked to helped me to evaluate what I had read, pointed me to new materials and questions, and gave me documents. Still, it was not always possible to cross-check what I was told with documentary sources, so I had to be careful in the use I made of interviews. I should note also that cooperation with Russian colleagues working in the same area was extremely helpful: they shared materials, ideas, and advice very generously.

In spite of the difficulties, Soviet nuclear history has now become an exciting area for research. It is intrinsically interesting because the issues it raises are of great importance, and because the people involved were remarkable. It is important for the history of the Cold War, and for the way in which we think about the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations.

A couple of years before completing my book I asked myself whether I should wait until new material appeared before finishing. I decided not to do so, mainly because I thought I had a more or less clear picture of what I wanted to say, and also because I thought a general map of the terrain might be useful to others working in this area. The history of the Soviet nuclear program is not likely to be exhausted by one account, any more than one book provides everything one needs to know about U.S. nuclear history. Nevertheless, I was pleasantly surprised by the evidence that has become available about the development of the weapons themselves, about the community of scientists who built the weapons, about the role of espionage, about the management of the project, and about the effect of the bomb on the military and foreign policies of Stalin and the post-Stalin leaders. The story is an important one, not merely for understanding the arms race and the Cold War, but also for understanding Soviet society and the survival in that society of the traditions of the Russian intelligentsia, personified by such men as Vladimir Vernadskii, Peter Kapitsa, and Andrei Sakharov.

1. Among the most valuable are Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (London: Atlantic Books, 1958); Herbert Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1959); Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). Data on Soviet nuclear weapons and the Soviet nuclear complex have been put out by the Natural Resources Defense Council. See, in particular, Thomas B. Cochran et al., *Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. IV* (New York: Ballinger, 1989); and Thomas B. Cochran and Robert Standish Norris, *Russian/Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production*, NWD 93-1 (New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, 8 September 1993).

2. Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); George Modelski, *Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc* (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 1959).

3. Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, Jr., *The New World: A History of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1, 1939-1946*, and Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield: A History of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 2, 1947-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). These two volumes were originally published in 1962 and 1969 by Pennsylvania State University Press. Margaret Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing (assisted by Lorna Arnold), *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol. 1: Policy Making, Vol. 2: Policy Execution* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

4. I.N. Golovin, *I.V. Kurchatov* (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1967). Two subsequent editions were published, with additional material. The third edition appeared in 1973. English translations were also published.

5. For example, *Sovetskaia atomnaia nauka i tekhnika* [*Soviet atomic science and technology*] (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1967); V.V. Igonin, *Atom v SSSR* [*Atom in USSR*] (Saratov: izd. Saratovskogo universiteta, 1975).

6. Herbert York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976).

7. "Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb, 1939-45," Washington DC: Wilson Center, International Security Studies Program, Working Paper No. 9, 1979 (and also in *Social Studies of Science* 11 (May 1981), 159-97); "Soviet Thermonuclear Development," *International Security 4* (Winter 1979/80), 192-7.

8. Relevant books published in the West include Steven J. Zaloga, *Target: America* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992); and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, *Die Sowjetische Atombombe* (Berlin: Berghof Stiftung für Konfliktforschung, 1990).

9. Lillian Hoddeson et al., *Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

10. I.F. Zhezherun, *Stroitel'stvo i pusk pervogo v Sovetskom Soiuze atomnogo reaktora* [*The construction and inauguration of the first atomic reactor in the Soviet Union*] (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1978). A declassified report from 1947 on this reactor is in volume 3 of Kurchatov's selected works.

11. In a forthcoming book by V.I. Zhuchikhin.

12. A.K. Kruglov, "Pervyi promyshlennyi urangrafitovyi reaktor A dlia narabotki plutoniia," part of a series of articles on the history of atomic science and industry in *Biulleten' Tstentra obshchestvennoi informatsii po atomnoi energii* [*The Bulletin of the Center for public information on atomic energy*] 8 (1993).

13. Institute newspapers (for example, *Kurchatovets*, the newspaper of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow) and local newspapers (like the Arzamas-16 *Gorodskoi Kur'ier*) carry interesting historical information that is often not available elsewhere.

14. Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990); V.I. Ritus, "Esli ne ia, to kto?" ["If not I, then who?"] *Priroda* [*Nature*] 8 (1990); Iu.A. Romanov, "Otets sovetskoi vodorodnoi bomby" ["Father of the hydrogen bomb"], *Priroda* 8 (1990).

15. I.V. Kurchatov, *Izbrannye trudy* [*Selected Works*] three volumes, ed. by A.P. Aleksandrov (Moscow: Nauka, 1983).

16. *Vospominaniia ob akademike I.V. Kurchatove* [*Reminiscinces of the Academician I.V. Kurchatov*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1983); *Vospominaniia ob Igore Vasil'eviche Kurchatove* [*Reminiscinces of Igor Vasil'evich Kurachatov*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1988).

17. A.P. Grinberg and V.Ia. Frenkel', *Igor' Vasil'evich Kurchatov v Fiziko-tekhnicheskom Institute* [*Igor Vasil'evich Kurachtov in the Institute of Physics and Technology*] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984).

18. On Ioffe's school see Paul Josephson, *Physics and Politics in Revolutionary Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); M.S. Sominskii, *Abram Fedorovich Ioffe* (Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1964); and many publications by the Russian historian of science, Viktor Frenkel', for example two very interesting articles on his father, the theoretical physicist Iakov Frenkel', who worked at Ioffe's institute: V.Ia. Frenkel', "Zhar pod peplom," *Zvezda* 9 and 10 (1991).

19. N.N. Semenov, *Nauka i Obshchestvo* [*Science and Society*], 2nd ed. (Moscow: Nauka, 1981); *Vospominaniia ob akademike Nikolae Nikolaeviche Semenove* [*Reminiscinces of academic Nikolai Nikolaevich Semenov*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1993).

20. Iu. B. Khariton, *Voprosy sovremennoi eksperimental'noi i teoreticheskoi fiziki* [*Questions of modern experimental and theoretical physics*] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984); Iu.B. Khariton and Iu.N. Smirnov, "O nekotorykh mifakh i legendakh vokroug sovetskikh atomnogo i vodorodnogo proektov" ["On certain myths and legends surrounding Soviet atomic and hydrogen projects"], in *Materialy iubileoinoi sessii uchenogo soveta tsentra 12 ianvaria 1993g.* [Materials of the anniversary session of the Soviet science center, 12 January 1993] (Moscow: Rossiiskii nauchnyi tsentr

Kurchatovskii institut, 1993). (Most of this was published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1993, under the title "The Khariton Version.") Iu. Khariton, "Iadernoe oruzhie SSSR: prishlo iz Amerkiki ili sozdano samostoiatel'no?" ["Nuclear weapons of the USSR: did they come from America or were they created independently?"], *Izvestiia*, 8 December 1992.

21. Ia.B. Zel'dovich, *Izbrannye trudy* [*Selected Works*], 2 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1984, 1985). A volume of memoirs about Zel'dovich was published under the title *Znakomyi neznakomyi Zel'dovich* [*The Known and unknown Zeldovich*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1994).

22. *Vospominaniia ob akademike Isaake Konstantinoviche Kikoine* [*Reminiscinces of academic Isaac Konstantinovivh Kikoin*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1991).

23. *Vospominaniia ob akademike L.A. Artsimoviche* [*Reminiscences of the academic L.A. Artsimovich*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1981).

24. G.N. Flerov, "Vsemu my mozhem pouchit'sia u Kurchatova" ["We can learn everything from Kurchatov"], in A.P. Aleksandrov, ed., *Vospominaniia ob Igore Vasil'eviche Kurchatove* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988). Flerov talked to many people about his role in the initiation of the Soviet project, and his account of his letter to Stalin in the spring of 1942 has been widely reported in the popular Soviet literature. The most reliable of these popular accounts are two books by Sergei Snegov: *Tvortsy* [*Creators*] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1979); and *Prometei raskovannyi* [*Prometheus unbound*] (Moscow: Detskaia literatura, 1980), which are based on extensive interviews with project participants. The books were recommended to me by Flerov, as well as by others in the Soviet project. They are now curiosities rather than useful sources, in view of the material that subsequently became available.

25. A.P. Aleskandrov, "Gody s Kurchatovym," *Nauka i zhizn'* [*Science and life*] 2 (1983).

26. Vernadskii's statements on atomic energy are scattered throughout his writings. For early thoughts on the significance of atomic energy see V.I. Vernadskii, *Ocherki i rechi* [*Essays and speeches*] (Petrograd: Nauchnoe khimikotekhnicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1922). A wartime memorandum is published in *Priroda* 4 (1975). The most important sources are Vernadskii's diaries and correspondence in the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences; some relevant correspondence can be found in the Vernadsky Collection in the Russian Archives, Butler Library, Columbia University. See I.I. Mochalov, *Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982); Kendall E. Bailes, *Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions: V.I. Vernadsky and his Scientific School, 1863-1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

27. *Akademik V.G. Khlopin: Ocherki, vospominaniia sovremennikov* [*Academician V.G. Khlopin: Essays, memoirs of contemporaries*] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1987); F.I. Vol'fson, N.S. Zontov, G.R. Shushaniia, *Dmitrii Ivanovich Shcherbakov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987).

28. A valuable collection, for example, is P.N. Lebedev Physics Institute, *Andrei Sakharov: Facets of a Life* (Gif-sur-Yvette: Editions Frontières, 1991). The English translation is very poor, but the volume is not yet available in Russian. [Ed. note: A Sakharov archive, containing materials smuggled out of the Soviet Union during his dissident years, has been established at Brandeis University.]

29. Among relevant articles that he has already published are: "Fizika universitetskaia i akademicheskaia" ["Physics in the university and the academy"], *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* [*Questions in the history of science and technology*] 2 (1991), and "S chego'nachinalos' sovetskaia vodorodnaia bomba" ["What started the Soviet hydrogen bomb"], *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* 1 (1993).

30. V.A. Tsukerman and Z.M. Azarkh, "Liudi i vzryvy" ["People and explosions"], *Zvezda* [*Star*] 9-11 (1990). These memoirs were published before Arzamas-16 could be mentioned by name.

31. M.G. Pervukhin, "U istokov uranovoi epopei" ["The origins of the uranium epic"], *Tekhnika-molodezhi* [*Technology of Youth*] 6, 7 (1975); "Pervye gody atomnogo proekta" ["The first years of the atomic project"], *Khimiia i zhizn'* [*Chemistry and life*] 5 (1985).

32. N.A. Dollezhal', *U istokov rukotvornogo mira* [*The origins of the hand-made world*] (Moscow: Znanie, 1989).

33. E.P. Slavskii, "Kogda strana stoiala na plechakh iadernykh titanov" ["When the country was standing on the shoulders of nuclear titans"], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* 9 (1993), 13-24.

34. P.L. Kapitsa, *Pis'ma o nauke* [*Letters on science*] (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989); see also J.W. Boag, P.E. Rubinin, and D. Shoenberg, eds., *Kapitza in Cambridge and Moscow* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1990). In December 1945 Kapitsa sent Molotov the outline of an article on atomic energy that he wanted to publish. For this see P.L. Kapitsa, "Pis'mo Molotovu" ["Letter to Molotov"], *Vestnik Ministerstva Innostrannykh Del SSSR* [*Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs*] 10 (1990).

35. Nikolaus Riehl, *10 Jahre im goldenen Käfig: Erlebnisse beim Aufbau der Sowjetishchen Uran-Industrie* [*10 Years in the Golden Cage: Adventures in the Construction of the Soviet Uranium Industry*] (Stuttgart: Riederer, 1988).

36. Max Steenbeck, *Impulse und Wirkungen* [*Impulses and Influences*] (Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1977); Heinz Barwich, *Das Rote Atom* [*The Red Atom*] (Munich and Berne: Scherz Verlag, 1967); Manfred Von Ardenne, *Ein glückliches Leben für Technik und Forschung* [*The Happy Life for Technology and Research*], 4th ed. (Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1976).

37. CIA, *The Problem of Uranium Isotope Separation by Means of Ultracentrifuge in the USSR*, Report No. DB-0-3, 633, 414, 4 October 1957.

38. Heinemann-Grüder, *Die Sowjetische Atombombe.*

39. Norman Naimark, *The Soviet Occupation of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, planned publication date: 1995).

40. On this episode see my letter to the editor in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 50:1 (Jan./Feb. 1994), 62-63. [Ed. note: Holloway wrote in response to an article describing the incident (Sergei Leskov, "Dividing the Glory of the Fathers," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49:4 (May 1993), 37-39) which implied that Khariton might have opposed publication of the issue containing the espionage documents in order to minimize public appreciation of the intelligence agencies' contribution to the Soviet atomic effort as opposed to that of Soviet atomic scientists. Holloway wrote:

> Because I was involved in this incident, I would like to comment.
>
> The documents throw a good deal of light on Soviet atomic espionage during World War II and on the KGB's contribution to the Soviet atomic project. They include, for example, detailed assessments by Igor Kurchatov, scientific director of the Soviet project, of the value of the material obtained by the intelligence service.
>
> The documents were referred to, and cited in, the Soviet—and then Russian—press in 1991 and 1992. In 1992, Anatoli Iatskov, a former KGB agent who had been involved in atomic espionage, gave photocopies to the Institute of the History of Science and Technology with the understanding that the documents would be published in the institute's journal.
>
> The journal's plan was drawn to the attention of Yuli Khariton by Yuri Smirnov in September 1992. Khariton asked the Ministry of Atomic Power to stop publication of two of the documents, on the grounds that their contents would contravene the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
>
> When the Russian government sought to ban publication, the editor of the journal in which the documents were to appear asked my opinion, since I had already seen galleys of the proposed publication. I consulted some U.S. colleagues who are knowledgeable about proliferation issues. They told me that publication of two of the 14 documents might well contravene Article I of the NPT. Article I states that nuclear weapons parties to the treaty (and that now includes Russia) "undertake ... not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons." That was the response I sent to the editor of the journal.
>
> In his article, Leskov dismisses this issue, saying that "even Edward Teller and Andrei Sakharov would not have been able to build a bomb" with the information that was to be revealed. But the issue is more complex and more serious than that. The criterion for declassification of nuclear-weapon-related information is not whether it would enable someone to build a bomb—the issue is whether the information could be *helpful* to someone who wanted to build a bomb.
>
> Most of the technical information contained in the documents is already in the public domain, but some details of the bomb design are not. This information would not by itself enable someone to build a bomb—they would need the right materials, after all. But it might help someone who wished to build one. The information was certainly useful to the Soviet Union, and it provided the basis for the design of the first Soviet atomic bomb.
>
> According to Leskov, copies of the journal were sent to subscribers in St. Petersburg before the government ban went into effect. No doubt the public dissemination of this information will not lead to immediate proliferation; but it would have been better, I think, if it had not been published. This may be a very cautious position to take, but the issue should not be dismissed lightly. Moreover, it is not surprising that the Russian government took action, given Western concern that the breakup of the Soviet Union would lead to the dispersion of information, specialists, and technology that would contribute to proliferation.
>
> After dismissing the issue of proliferation, Leskov implies that Khariton tried to prevent the documents' publication because it would be a blow to his reputation. (Khariton was chief designer and scientific director of the nuclear weapons laboratory at Arzamas-16 from 1946 to 1992.) This, I think, is unjust. Khariton had already acknowledged that the first Soviet atomic bomb was a copy of the first U.S. plutonium bomb (in an interview with me in July 1992, for example). I do

not believe that he tried to stop publication for personal reasons.

No one objected to the publication of the 12 non-design documents, which by themselves make it clear that Soviet scientists obtained extensive information from espionage. Unfortunately, by the time the ban on publication was issued, it was too late for the journal to remove the two design-rich documents in question. Through no fault of its own, the journal was put in an extremely awkward position.

Students of Soviet history hope that all the documents will appear before long, perhaps with excisions in the two documents on bomb design. What is needed is a procedure for declassifying historically important documents, even if they contain sensitive information—by removing the sensitive portions before publication. The Ministry of Atomic Power should institute a procedure of this kind. The KGB had reviewed these documents, but apparently only to insure that they would not reveal information about intelligence sources or methods, not to check the sensitivity of the weapon information they contained.

Mike Moore, editor of the *Bulletin*, wrote in his May [1993] "Editor's Note" that "those who live longest write history." In a certain sense this is true. It is only because he survived the end of the Cold War that Khariton has been able to write about the Soviet nuclear weapons program. His account is invaluable because he was one of the key people in the program from the very beginning. He has not used his recollections to aggrandize himself or to exaggerate the role that he played in nuclear weapon development. This increases the value of his testimony; and it is made more valuable by the fact that the history of the Soviet nuclear project is encrusted with legend and myth. Moore is incorrect if he means that Khariton has tried to shut out other accounts of the Soviet project.]

41. Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatolii Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness — A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), app. 2, pp. 436-67.

42. A.S. Feklisov, "Podvig Klausa Fuksa" ["The feat of Klaus Fuchs"], *Voenno-istircheskii zhurnal* [*Military-historical journal*] 12 (1990), and 1 (1991); A.A. Iatskov, "Atom i razvedka" ["The atom and reconnaissance"], *Voprosy istorii estestvozananiia i tekhniki* 3 (1992); Sudoplatov et al., *Special Tasks.*

43. There has been, for some years, a running battle between the KGB and the physics community about the Soviet atomic project. Some former KGB officials have claimed that Soviet physicists made no contribution to the development of the atomic or hydrogen bombs, and that everything was done on the basis of intelligence material. The physicists have acknowledged the important role of intelligence in Soviet atomic bomb development, but have argued that the intelligence could have been checked and used only by competent physicists, and have asserted, moreover, that intelligence did not help in the development of Soviet thermonuclear weapons.

44. See the review by Thomas Powers in *The New York Review of Books* 41:11 (9 June 1994), 10-17; and my review in *Science* 264 (27 May 1994), 1346-47.

45. Sudoplatov gives an exaggerated view of the size and scope of the project during the war.

46. Ia.P.Terletskii, "Operatsiia 'Dopros Nil'sa Bora" ["Operation 'Interrogation of Niels Bohr'"], in *Voprosy istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki* 2 (1994); Press Statement by Aage Bohr, 27 April 1994.

47. [Ed. note: In an interview for a documentary ("The Red Bomb") broadcast on the Discovery Channel in September 1994, Terletsky recalled that he did not take notes during his meetings with Bohr, which may explain errors appearing in a memorandum composed subsequently.]

48. Henry deWolf Smyth, *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb Under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945*, available in a 1989 reprint edition published by Stanford University Press.

49. "Za Kulisami tikhookeanskoi bitvy (iaponosovetskie kontakty v 1945 g.)" ["Behind the scenes of the Pacific battle (Japanese-Soviet contacts in 1945)"], *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (15 October 1990); Boris N. Slavinsky, "The Soviet Occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Plans for the Capture of Northern Hokkaido," *Japan Forum*, April 1993; Kathryn Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War," Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18; and Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-58.

50. A.A. Gromyko, *Pamiatnoe* [Memories], 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990).

51. N.V. Novikov, *Vospominaniia diplomata: zapiski 1938-1947* [*Reminiscinces of a diplomat: diaries 1938-1947*] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989).

52. *Sto sorok besed s Molotvym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva* [*One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov: from the notebook of F. Chuyev*] (Moscow: Terra, 1991). An English-language edition was published by Ivan R. Dee (Chicago) in 1993.

53. As yet unpublished.

54. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Chen Jian provides a useful survey of Chinese sources in *The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War* (Washington D.C.: Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1, 1992).

55. *Voennaia Mysl'* [*Military Thought*] ran a series of articles on the tactical use of nuclear weapons.

56. "Delo Beriia" ["The problem of Beria"], *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, 1, 2 (1991).

57. See, e.g., A.Iu. Ishlinskii, ed., *Akademik S.P. Korolev: uchenyi, inzhener, chelovek* [*Academician S.P. Korolev: scientist, engineer, man*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1986); M.V. Kel'dysh, *Izbrannye trudy: Raketnaia tekhnika i kosmonavtika* [*Selected Works: Rocket technology and cosmonautics*] (Moscow: Nauka, 1988); and B.P. Ivanov, "Atomnyi vzryv u poselka Totskoe" ["Atomic explosion in Totsky Settlement"], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* 12 (1991).

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them.[2] And to a great extent, that data, whether leaked/declassified or not, had been filtered through the U.S. intelligence system. Under those circumstances, interpretive efforts were always constrained; the relative opacity of Soviet defense policymaking made it difficult to ascertain, much less evaluate, the relevant "facts." This made it easy for analysts to fall back on Cold War ideology and habits such as "mirror imaging," which could easily lead to misunderstanding. Thus, educated guesswork and perceptions alone, severed from the deeper understanding that primary sources can provide, shaped the American public's understanding of Soviet military decision-making, policies, and programs for the entire Cold War period.

Even with the end of the Cold War and new evidence from Russian archives, historians and political scientists must still rely on perceptions. Despite the significant openings in the files of the Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the culture of secrecy continues to limit access to Soviet-era military records. Although retired military officers are willing to share their recollections of key events, lack of access to Russian military archives means that a crucial portion of Cold War territory cannot be explored systematically.[3] Thus, historians cannot investigate the way that the Soviet military leadership saw the world at the end of World War II, much less during crisis and non-crisis periods of the Cold War.[4] Moreover, given the important role that the military had in the state apparatus, lack of access adds to the difficulty of understanding Soviet national security decision-making during the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, and the years in between and since.

If Soviet military records on nuclear weapons issues ever become available they will undoubtedly greatly enhance our ability to address broad areas of Moscow's Cold War strategies and policies. In the meantime, researchers will benefit from the guidance provided and questions raised in a declassified history prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense in the late 1970s. As a result of a request made in 1974 by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, an interdisciplinary team comprising historian Ernest May of Harvard

University, political scientist John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution, and the late RAND Corporation analyst Thomas W. Wolfe set to work on a history of the Cold War arms race. They completed the *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972* in 1980. Their five-year study produced an immense report; including tables, endnotes, and bibliographies, it runs over a thousand typescript pages.

Although prepared under official auspices, this was not "official history" in the conventional sense. Schlesinger requested a "thorough, objective, critical, and analytical history of the arms race," particularly during the formative postwar years. It is evident that the authors were not constrained to follow a "Pentagon line" and were free to draw their own conclusions, some of which strayed quite far from received wisdom about the dynamic forces shaping the arms race. Nevertheless, the authors wanted their efforts to be policy relevant; they hoped to clarify thinking in the "defense community" and to "improve ... capacity for shaping U.S. programs and policies." To that extent, this study can be seen as part of the documentary record of the Cold War, shedding light on the murky relationship between the universities, think-tanks, and the executive branch, particularly the role of intellectuals in interpreting and influencing national policy.

The study itself is an invaluable guide to the U.S. documentary record, aided by the fact that May, Steinbruner, and Wolfe (hereafter MSW) enjoyed the cooperation of other military organizations—including the Institute for Defense Analyses, RAND, the uniformed services, and the DOD Historical Office—which prepared huge chronologies, studies, and official and oral histories for use as research material.[5] All of the scholars involved in the enterprise had varying degrees of access to a wide variety of classified material held at Presidential Libraries, the State Department, Department of Energy, Pentagon, and CIA. Some of this material, especially "Restricted Data" on nuclear weapons and derived from intelligence sources, apparently remains sensitive to this day. These problems made the Pentagon exceedingly reluctant to review the arms competition history for declassification. Thus, not surprisingly, but unfortunately, while most of the report has been declassified, important material on Soviet and American policy remains excised.[6]

In spite of the redactions, the general line of argument remains relatively transparent. But rather than summarizing or assessing the study as a whole, this article discusses some of the questions raised in the chapters on Soviet-era defense planning and decision-making, strategic nuclear policy, and force deployments, particularly during the 1940s and 50s. The lack of primary sources on the Soviet side forced the authors to rely on "speculation and inference" using data from a variety of secondary sources and highly classified intelligence reports. Nevertheless, MSW produced some rich and provocative material on the range of motives that may have informed Stalin's postwar military policy, the 1949-52 military buildup, Khrushchev's strategic priorities, the Berlin/Cuban crises, and the mid-1960s ICBM buildup, among other issues. These analyses merit careful pondering by historians and political scientists alike.

The authors believe that Stalin expected an "antagonistic" relationship with Washington, yet also suggest that his postwar military decisions provided "little provocation" for a "stepped up competition in armaments." Thus, taking into account postwar demobilization, Soviet forces were large enough to maintain domestic security, stabilize the East European sphere of influence, and possibly to support West European Communists. Anticipating more recent historiographic trends, they see Stalin as "extremely cautious," but possibly mindful that if revolutionary scenarios materialized in Western Europe, military strength could deter counter-revolutionary intervention. Consistent with the idea of a cautious Stalin, MSW offer another explanation as well: that force levels "mirrored some of Stalin's domestic concerns," especially the possibility of instability brought on by reintroducing prewar levels of "discipline." Alternatively, Stalin may have believed that his practice of assuring relatively equal funding for each of the services would provide capabilities for foreseeable military requirements while ensuring that the leaders of any one of them did not become too powerful.[7]

The possibility that Stalin operated on non-rational grounds, like a "Nero or a Caligula," is suggested in a perfunctory way.[8] But the weight of the analysis on postwar developments assumes a pattern of political rationality however it may have expressed itself in particular decisions. This is certainly true of the discussion of the 1949-1952 buildup. For MSW, there are several issues for which there is insufficient data. One is the dimensions of the buildup itself; U.S. intelligence agencies may still not know the size of ground forces expansion during this period. Another problem is motive, the degree to which the buildup was "planned long in advance or ... reflected a Soviet reaction to threatening gestures and language from the West."[9] The possibility that the buildup had something to do with the Korean War is considered, but MSW place greater emphasis on treating it as "primarily a response to fears aroused by Yugoslavia's defection and the concurrent buildup" of U.S. and NATO forces.[10] Indeed, citing Soviet public reaction to Truman's January 1949 budget message, it is suggested that subsequent defense budget growth was "possibly the first instance of action-reaction in the Soviet-U.S. military competition."[11]

The authors carefully avoid concluding that USSR or U.S. strategic forces "developed ... only in reaction to each other." But they suggest that the influence of Western decisions was more than casual.[12] For example, MSW find that Soviet decisions on ground force levels were reactive, following trends in the West. Thus, when in 1952-3 it became evident that NATO could not meet its ground force targets, the Soviets began to cut forces. Moreover, the authors believe that the heavy increase in U.S. spending on nuclear weapons and delivery systems during the Korean War era had a decided impact on Soviet military organization and deployments. PVO Strany, the organization in charge of air defenses, became an independent entity and secured resources that it used to encircle Moscow with SA-1 surface-to-air missiles—reportedly costing over a billion dollars—designed to destroy bomber aircraft.[13]

The extent to which the U.S. nuclear buildup of the early 1950s contributed to intensified Soviet programs in that area is less certain. MSW believe Stalin responded to it with "sangfroid" because he was satisfied that relatively small nuclear forces were enough to deter attack and also constrain the influence of industrial managers. They also believe that heavy investments in nuclear reactors implied that Stalin's priority was not so much producing deliverable weapons but developing the technological basis for

producing a modern and powerful arsenal. This, they suggest, may have dovetailed with Stalin's conviction that nuclear weapons were relevant to supporting Soviet foreign policy rather than for actual military use. That emphasis was also consistent with Soviet military doctrine prior to the mid-1950s, which either ignored or downplayed the role of nuclear weapons and emphasized instead "permanently operating factors" such as national morale and cohesion.[14]

Central to MSW's study is their discussion of the mid-to-late 1950s, which they see as a formative period for Soviet strategic doctrine and weapons systems. At that time the political and military leadership revised official doctrine about nuclear war; rather than minimizing the problem of a preemptive nuclear attack, they began to treat it as the preeminent danger and emphasized the importance of ready forces and preparation as well as arms control. More or less concurrently, the Soviets began to scale down their long-range bomber program and redirect resources toward ICBM and IRBM development. They did not, however, accelerate the latter; worried abut the costs of military competition, they decided to make large investments slowly.[15]

MSW's interpretation of these developments, which fed into U.S. decisions to hasten ICBM and SLBM programs, raises important questions that deserve further exploration when Russian Defense Ministry archives become available. The authors contend that during the mid-'50s Soviet leaders concluded that bombers were useful for deterring an attack but not for "damage limitation," i. e., for the "defensive purpose of minimizing the harm an enemy nation could do." Believing that Washington was far ahead of them in ability to launch a crippling strategic attack, and perhaps overestimating U.S. air defense capacities, the Soviets reasoned that missiles, not bombers, could help them solve their problems, MSW suggest. Missiles, unlike bomber aircraft, were more or less unstoppable and could reach their targets quickly. While acknowledging the importance of various organizational and technological considerations, along with the persuasive abilities of rocket designer Sergei P. Korolev, MSW argue that a preoccupation with the "strategic defensive" was fundamental to explaining the shift in resources from bombers to missiles.[16]

The authors present a stimulating interpretation of Nikita Khrushchev's unsuccessful "missile diplomacy" of the late 1950s and early '60s, an issue that has been of great interest to scholars.[17] For MSW, Khrushchev's missile rattling needs to be understood in terms of military pressure on him to reverse his policy of restraint on military spending. Noting that the bulk of Soviet effort lay in MRBMs and not ICBMs (such as the SS-7 and SS-8), they suggest that Khrushchev was content to pursue a "second best strategic posture" that could meet potential threats on the Eurasian periphery, in particular West Germany and China. At the same time, restraint on ICBM development might have been a way to encourage Washington to disengage from Western Europe. Alternatively, the Soviets may also have had a problem in meeting their ICBM production goals. In this context, perhaps Khrushchev and the Soviet military found a "strategic bluff" as useful and necessary for meeting political goals as well as for concealing the weakness in their strategic posture.[18]

Without access to Soviet military and Presidential archives, MSW's hypotheses cannot be adequately tested; this problem is no less true for their reading of the early 1960s U.S.-Soviet crises—especially the Cuban Missile Crisis—and their impact on Soviet ICBM deployments in the following years. Like many analysts, the authors see the Soviet decision to deploy the MRBMs as motivated in part to defend Cuba and in part to offset U.S. strategic superiority, which had put Soviet nuclear forces in a situation that was "little short of desperate."[19] But they are puzzled by the military logic, noting that the small force of missiles would have "been inadequate to destroy enough of the American strategic strike capability to preclude severe retaliatory damage" to the Soviet Union. MSW provide two possible answers to this problem. One possibility is that the Soviets believed that their deployment was adequate to deter Washington in a crisis: the U.S. would avoid a confrontation rather than risking a few cities. The other, admittedly speculative, is that prospective targets were U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) command and control facilities that could not be reached from Soviet territory. With their MRBMs in Cuba, and in keeping with the Soviet's strategic defensive orientation, they could hinder a "fully coordinated" U.S. first strike.[20]

MSW relate Khrushchev's decisions on Cuba to a struggle with his Presidium colleagues over strategic force levels. Losing political clout after the U-2 affair and the retreat from the Berlin ultimatum (to sign a peace treaty with East Germany that would isolate West Berlin) in October 1961, Khrushchev was under greater pressure to allocate more resources to ICBMs. In this context, he may have seen the Cuban deployment as a way to contain military spending while giving the military more coverage of critical targets in the United States. Thus, "targeting the SAC command structure would help explain why the Soviets would undertake the very risky Cuban venture."[21]

Whatever the purposes of the deployment may have been, MSW argue that the Missile Crisis' outcome, with Moscow forced to back down and withdraw the missiles, acted as a "catalyst" by bringing to the surface latent dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's "second best" approach if not his concern with Germany and China. Thus, U.S. "strategic pressure" touched off a two-year-long debate involving a major decision for significant deployments of third generation ICBM systems: the SS-7 and SS-8 were abandoned and more resources poured into the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs. Moreover, the Soviets decided to develop the "Yankee class" submarine missile system. By 1965, MSW propose, the Soviets had completed basic decisions on force levels which remained relatively stable in the following years. And they further suggest that the intention behind these decisions was not strategic dominance or even serious "counterforce" capabilities, as the CIA's "Team B" maintained in the mid-70s'. Rather, a basic purpose may have been parity with the United States. Indeed, if its priority was MRBM deployments on their territorial periphery, the Kremlin may well have seen parity as sufficient to support their political interests in a future crisis.[22]

Besides their overall assessment of the mid-1960s decisions, MSW raise specific questions about the characteristics of the missile deployments. For example, they are uncertain whether the Soviets developed the relatively inexpensive SS-11 ICBM in a "crash program" after the Cuban Missile Crisis or in 1961, becoming important later. In addition, solid information is not available on what the missile designers and the military had in mind when they developed

and deployed the heavy SS-9 ICBM. Returning to their earlier line of argument about command-and-control targeting, MSW use circumstantial evidence to conjecture that the SS-9's mission may have been to disable the command-and-control system of the U.S. Minuteman missile complex. Perhaps that is why the Pentagon found the SS-9s worrisome; thus, one purpose of Johnson and Nixon-era SALT strategy was to "seek to dissuade the Soviet Union from further large-scale deployments."[23]

MSW raise a host of other interesting questions about Soviet decision-making in such areas as arms control, anti-ballistic missile systems, missile accuracy, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and fourth generation ICBM deployments of the early 1970s. Like the earlier material, the analysis is stimulating and deserves careful study. For example, the authors link the mid-'60s ICBM buildup to the SALT process by suggesting that in the process of deciding force levels each side developed an interest in arms control. They argue that conditions for SALT existed by 1965, when both sides had made basic decisions about ABM systems and the Soviets had decided to match U.S. ICBM deployments and MIRV technology. Thus, SALT was a "matter of ratifying decisions on the size and basic technical competition which each side reached unilaterally."[24]

Declassification of some of the material once closely held by intelligence community—some of which may not even have been available to MSW—may shed light on some of MSW's interpretations. For example, the CIA has begun to release its National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet strategic forces, including NIEs that were produced during the "missile gap" debate of the late 1950s.[25] Perhaps even more important, beginning in 1992 the CIA began to declassify documents on one of the most famous and most successful Cold War espionage cases, the defection-in-place of Soviet GRU (military intelligence) Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Penkovsky provided CIA with a treasure trove of classified material, some of which is now available in translated form. A highlight is the top secret edition "Special Collection" of the journal *Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought)* provided to the Agency in 1961-62 by Penkovsky. More in the nature of "think pieces," contributions to debates, etc., rather than policy and planning documents, the articles in the "Special Collection" clearly indicate important trends of thought in the Khrushchev-era high command. For example, the material documents the sometimes bitter controversy within the Soviet military over the extent to which strategy should depend on nuclear weapons and whether there remained a role for general purpose forces.[26] In addition, some of the articles show that a number of articulate generals believed that it was essential to have an array of ICBMs at their disposal if they were to "fight against means of nuclear attack" with any degree of success. Such statements, which can be interpreted as pressure to raise the ICBM budget, make MSW's line of argument about the strategically defensive character of Soviet planning all the more plausible.[27]

In addition to the top secret articles from *Voyennaya Mysl*, the CIA has also declassified most of Penkovsky's debriefings to CIA and SIS officials during visits to England and France during 1961 and 1962.[28] Besides a remarkable statement on Soviet ICBM force deficiencies ("we don't have a damn thing"), the transcripts contain a wide range of detail on nuclear weapons-related issues, including command and control, missile and weapons tests, anti-ballistic missile and air defense programs, tactical weapons, rocket types and missile technology, weapons dispersal, nuclear facilities and key military figures in the nuclear area.[29] (An amusing revelation is the previously obscure "vodka crisis" of 1961; to ensure the availability of alcohol for missile fuel, the military crimped supplies for civilian use, thus creating a vodka shortage.) As with oral history, Penkovsky's statements require corroboration and cross-checking to screen out inaccuracies and politically-driven interpretations.[30] Nevertheless, the transcripts provide striking detail about personalities and issues during one of the Cold War's tensest passages.

The Penkovsky material, much of which the CIA has yet to release, sheds some light on the Khrushchev era, but more than that will be needed to permit even a preliminary resolution of the interpretive problems that MSW broach. A program of oral history interviews with retired Soviet general officers and weapons designers could be particularly valuable for clarifying developments during the Khrushchev era and after. Oral histories may be essential when written records on some events no longer exist, but they are only a stopgap. It may well be that the eventual transfer of records from the Russian Presidential Archives to the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (the archival repository for post-1952 CC CPSU records) will enable researchers to test the various hypotheses developed by MSW. Nevertheless, a full picture of Soviet military policy during the Cold War will require the Russian Defense Ministry to develop programs for regularizing access to the archival collections under its control. If and when such material becomes available, the history of Soviet strategic program will only incidentally be a history of U.S. perceptions.

1. Ernest May, John Steinbruner, and Thomas Wolfe, *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972*, ed. Alfred Goldberg, (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, March 1981, declassified with deletions, December 1990), 634. Hereafter cited as *History*.
2. *History*, 634.
3. Since this essay was written, several important studies have become available that show how much can be accomplished without extensive access to Russian military archives; see, e.g., Thomas B. Cochran and Robert Standish Norris, *Russian/Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production*, National Resource Defense Council Working Paper NWD93-1, 8 September 1993; and David Holloway's magisterial *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
4. [Ed. note: In what may be a hopeful portent, since this article was written the Russian military has declassified a limited amount of records pertaining to specific Cold War events, such as the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis (1961), and the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, it is too soon to tell whether these limited steps, taken in conjunction with particular political events or academic projects, will lead to more systematic declassification or even to easier and equitable scholarly access to those materials that *are* declassified.]
5. Some of the supporting studies have been declassified, e.g., IDA Study S-467, *The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945-1972* by L. Wainstein et al. (June 1975). Others are under declassification review, including the chronology used to prepare the study, as well as an IDA history of Soviet strategic command, control and warning.
6. Pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request by the National Security Archive, the Defense Department, CIA, and other agencies are now reviewing the excised portions for possible declassification.
7. *History*, 96-103. For Stalin's cautiousness, see also Raymond L. Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), 15-18.
8. *History*, 103. For a still useful assessment of the Stalin literature, see Ronald Grigor Suny, "Second-guessing Stalin: International Communism and the Origins of the Cold War," *Radical History Review* 37 (1987), 101-115.
9. Ibid., 82. For intelligence estimates on Soviet

ground force levels during the 1940s-'50s, see, e.g., Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security* 7:1 (Winter 1982/83), 110-138; and John Duffield, "The Soviet Military Threat to Western Europe: US Estimates in the 1950s and 1960s," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15 (June 1992), 208-27. During 1993 and 1994, knowledge of National Intelligence Estimates of the USSR greatly increased when the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence turned over copies of many Soviet-related NIEs to the National Archives and published two useful compendia in its "CIA Cold War Record Series": Scott A. Koch, ed., *Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959* (Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), and Michael Warner, ed., *The CIA Under Harry Truman* (Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994). These collections were released in conjunction with CIA-sponsored academic conferences on "Teaching Intelligence" (October 1993) and the Truman era (March 1994). Strategic forces estimates from the years of the "missile gap" controversy and later periods are scheduled to be the subject of additional declassification releases and another conference, to be held at Harvard University in December 1994.

10. Ibid., 257. Kathryn Weathersby of Florida State University is now preparing a major study of the role of the Korean question in Soviet policy during 1949 and 1950.

11. Ibid., 250. Others may argue that the first example was the Soviet atomic bomb program.

12. Ibid., 810-11.

13. Ibid., 257, 277-78. For background on Soviet antimissile programs during the 1950s and 60s, see Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BDM Program," in Ashton B. Carter and David Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), esp. 182-201.

14. Ibid., 280-83, 299, 302. For Stalin and nuclear weapons, see Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*.

15. Ibid., 315-33. See also Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine*, 34-35, 42, which emphasizes ideas about deterrence in the new military thinking.

16. *History*, 331-33. Information provided to the CIA by GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky supports the strategically defensive character of Soviet policy: according to the CIA officials who reviewed the Penkovsky "take," it reaffirmed that the "prime Soviet intelligence objective is to furnish early warning of foreign attack." See Jerrold Schecter and Peter S. Deribian, *The Spy Who Saved the World* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 195.

17. See, e.g., David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 84-86.

18. *History*, 334-92. For Penkovsky's explanation of Khrushchev's boasting, see Schecter and Deribian, *The Spy Who Saved the World*, 273-74.

19. See, e.g., Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, rev. ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989), 20-21. For "desperate," see *History*, 475.

20. Ibid., 474-86, 664-65. The first interpretation is consistent with Garthoff's reading (*Reflections*, 20-21). A second interpretation assumes that Soviet nuclear tests in 1961 may have alerted Moscow to the possibility that Electromagnet Pulse (EMP) effects could be used to cripple command and control machinery.

21. *History*, 684-86.

22. Ibid., 491-503, 643-45, 687-90, 704-708. See also Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, 43-44. MSW note that the number of Soviet ICBMs deployed in the 1960s was "not wildly out of line with what Soviet planners might have projected as a matching response" to American programs as of 1963-1965. *History*, 707. For their critique of "counterforce" interpretations, see ibid., 660-63. The 1976 CIA "Team B" report has been declassified and is available at the Modern Military Branch, National Archives.

23. *History*, 500-501, 663-65. Unfortunately, the Defense Department has excised significant parts of discussion of the SS-9. However, the Defense Intelligence Agency made important data available when it recently declassified a supporting study for MSW; see U.S. Air Force, *History of Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972*, Vol. 3, *A Handbook of Selected Soviet Weapon and Space Systems*, June 1976. The most detailed publicly available source on the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union is Thomas B. Cochran et al., *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. IV, Soviet Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989). For the accuracy of the SS-9, among other ex-Soviet ICBMs, see Donald Mackenzie's extraordinary and challenging *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).

24. *History*, 737-38.

25. One example can be found at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library: NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," 1 December 1960. See also the forthcoming collection of NIEs which the CIA hopes to publish in late 1994.

26. Compare "The Nature of Modern Armed Combat and the Role and Place in It of the Various Branches of the Armed Forces" by General of the Army P. Kurochkin, 19 September 1961, with "Military Thought: Theory of Military Art Needs Review" by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, 18 December 1961. The CIA codenamed IRONBARK these and other secret and top-secret documents, and included some in its collection, *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (Washington, D.C.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, October 1992).

27. See, e.g., "Military Thought: 'The Initial Period of a Future War and the Special Features of the Conduct of Military Operations During This Period,' by Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy," 10 January 1962, and "Military Thought: 'Some Conclusions on NATO Armed Forces Exercise SIDE STEP,' by Colonel-General S. Ivanov," 22 January 1962.

28. The CIA and DIA have yet to declassify the studies of the "Ironbark" and "Chickadee" material prepared by intelligence analysts at the time as well as the translations of many of the documents that Penkovsky provided. Some declassification review of some of this material may be underway.

29. For "we don't have a damn thing," which was a quotation of a statement by Gen. Sergei S. Varentsov, see "Meeting No. 4 at Leeds, England, 23 April 1961." Initially dubious about the value of Penkovsky's information—he was a "subsource about whom they knew nothing"—U.S. intelligence refused to include it in NIE 11-8-61 on Soviet strategic forces. See "Conversations with Messrs. Ed Proctor and Jack Smith Re Use of CHICKADEE Material in NIE 11-8-61," 7 June 1961.

30. For example, his description of the "first" Soviet atomic test confuses an air-drop of an atomic weapon with the actual first test, in 1949, of a device on a tower. Compare "Meeting #12, London, England, 1 May 1961" with Cochran and Norris, *Russian/Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production*, 15-16. In addition, new work on Khrushchev and the Berlin crisis does not support Penkovsky's reading of Khrushchev as an "atomic Hitler" who might make a "tremendous attack" on the West. See Vladislav Zubok, "Khrushchev's Motives and Soviet Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962," paper presented for University of Essen-CWIHP Conference on "Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from Eastern Archives," Essen, Germany, 28-30 June 1994.

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COLD WAR SOVIET SCIENCE

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of them. Although Center-financed interviews have largely focused on Western science, a fraction of these interviews discuss Soviet research, some extensively. Of particular interest are in-depth interviews with Viktor Ambartsumian, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Fok, Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa, Alla Genrikova Massevich, and Mitrofan Stepanovich Zverev.

III. Biographical and Institutional Information. The Center for History of Physics also maintains files for individual biographical data and institutional histories. While the bulk of these materials concern Western and particularly U.S. scientists, a number of files contain information on prominent Soviet and East European scientists and scientific institutions. Researchers should phone prior to planned visits to ascertain whether material on particular individuals or institutions is available. Examples of information recently received by the Center include a manuscript by Vitaly A. Bronshten on the influence of V.T. Ter-Oganezov on the development of Soviet astronomy; copies of records relating to the Kharkov Physical Institute between 1926 and 1945; and photocopies of interrogation transcripts of two scientists (Lev Shubnikov and Vadim Gorsky) accused of espionage during the 1930s Stalinist purges.

For further information, contact the Niels Bohr Library, Center for History of Physics, American Institute of Physics, One Physics Ellipse, College Park, MD 20740, tel. 301-209-3175; fax 301-209-0882; e-mail nbl@aip.org.

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AFTER STALIN

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Addressing the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Plenary Meeting on 3 July 1953, Avraami Zavenyagin, deputy head of the recently-created Ministry of Medium Machine Building, spoke proudly: "The Americans [after the first Soviet atomic test in 1949] saw that their advantages had gone, and at Truman's order began the work on the hydrogen bomb. Our people and our country are no slouches. We took it up as well and, as far as we can judge, we believe we do not lag behind the Americans. The hydrogen bomb is tens of times more powerful than a plain atomic bomb and its explosion will mean the liquidation of the second monopoly of the Americans, now under preparation, which would be an event of ultimate importance in world politics."[3]

The country's new leaders, Georgii Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev, having quickly solved "the Beria problem" inherited from Stalin, still faced another dangerous legacy—the confrontation with the United States. Stalin left to his successors his orthodox vision of international affairs, based on Leninist theory, the most staunch supporter and advocate of which in the Soviet leadership was Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov. Even as late as the June 1957 CC CPSU Plenum, Molotov still toed the orthodox line while giving lip service to the new currents in foreign policy: "We all understand and consider it to be necessary to conduct, promote and stimulate such measures which are conducive to the reduction of international tension. This is the foundation of our work on the strengthening of peace, on the *postponement* [emphasis added] and prevention of a new war."[4] To Molotov, in other words, the world conflagration was just a matter of time and determining the proper moment for the inevitable "final victory" over "the aggressive forces of imperialism." The phrase "prevention of a new war," in Molotov's mouth, was a token bow to new fashion.

But nuclear, especially thermonuclear, weaponry very quickly began to dictate new priorities to the Soviet leaders, inasmuch as they came to comprehend its power and danger. Of particular importance in this regard was a classified report prepared in March 1954 by four senior physicists from among the elite of the secret Soviet atomic project—Igor Vasil'evich Kurchatov, scientific director of the nuclear effort since 1943; Abram Isaakovich Alikhanov, who had directed the creation of the first Soviet heavy-water nuclear reactor; Isaak Konstantinovich Kikoin, director of the gaseous diffusion and centrifuge uranium isotope separation projects; and A.P. Vinogradov, scientific director at the plant at Cheliabinsk-40 which purified and converted plutonium into metal for weapons. The four scientists presented their report in the form of a draft article. A copy of this paper, now available in the archives of the former CPSU Central Committee, was sent on 1 April 1954 by Minister of Medium Machine Building V.A. Malyshev to CC CPSU First Secretary Khrushchev with the suggestion to publish the text not over the names of its authors, all key participants in the atomic project, but above the signatures of other authoritative Soviet scientists who were "well known abroad and not related to our field."[5] In his cover memorandum to Khrushchev, Malyshev, a Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers who had headed the tank industry during the war, stated that he, too, had helped author the draft article and had also sent copies to Khrushchev's two leading colleagues, "Comrades Malenkov and Molotov."[6]

The content of the document is of exceptional significance, as is the reaction to it by the ruling Soviet "troika."

In the draft article, Kurchatov and his co-authors vividly and powerfully argued that the advent of fusion weapons meant that the nuclear arms race had reached a new, vastly more dangerous stage:

> The modern atomic practice, based on the utilization of thermonuclear reaction, allows us to increase, practically to an unlimited extent, the explosive energy contained in a bomb....Defense against such weapons is practically impossible [so] it is clear that the use of atomic weapons on a mass scale will lead to devastation of the warring countries....Aside from the destructive impact of atomic and hydrogen bombs, there is another threat for mankind involved in atomic war—poisoning the atmosphere and the surface of the globe with radioactive substances, originating from nuclear explosions...the wind spreads them all over the Earth's atmosphere. Later these radioactive substances fall onto the surface of the Earth with rain, snow and dust, thus poisoning it....Calculations show that if, in case of war, currently existing stocks of atomic weapons are used, dosages of radioactive emissions and concentrations of radioactive substances which are biologically harmful for human life and vegetation will be created on a significant part of the Earth's surface....The tempo of growth of atomic explosives is such that in just a few years the stockpiles of atomic explosives will be sufficient to create conditions under which the existence of life over the whole globe will be impossible. The explosion of around one hundred hydrogen bombs would lead to the same effect....So, we cannot but admit that mankind faces an enormous threat of the termination of all life on Earth.[7]

The timing and context of the Soviet physicists' initiative should be noted. As its title suggested—"The Danger of Atomic War and President Eisenhower's Proposal"—the draft article sent by Malyshev to Khrushchev was, on its surface, intended to rebut the "Atoms for Peace" proposal advanced by Eisenhower to the United Nations almost four months earlier, on 8 December 1953; in his speech, the U.S. president had warned of the grave threat nuclear weapons posed to humanity, and proposed that the nuclear superpowers (the USA, USSR, and Britain) share their stocks of fissionable material to create an international pool for peaceful worldwide atomic energy development. However, while applauding Eisenhower's conciliatory rhetoric, Moscow responded tepidly to the "Atoms for Peace" scheme, as did the Soviet physicists who authored the draft article. The spread and development of "peaceful" atomic energy technology, they noted sharply, leads "not to a reduction in, but to a proliferation of atomic weapons supplies." Expertise in operating nuclear power plants "can also serve as a means for the further perfection of methods for the production of atomic energy for military purposes," they pointed out, and atomic electric power stations "'for peaceful purposes' may at the same time be an industrial and sufficiently cheap way to produce large amounts of explosive substances for atomic and hydrogen bombs"—giving the example of an atomic energy plant with a 10,000-kilowatt

capacity, which would annually generate, besides the electric power, about 130-200 kilograms of plutonium a year, an amount sufficient to produce "dozens" of atomic bombs. "Moreover, the production of atomic bombs from these materials is a process which can be accomplished within a very short period of time."

"In this light," they concluded, Eisenhower's proposals "do not at all diminish the danger of atomic war" and, rather, were "directed at the disorientation of world public opinion."[8]

More immediately, however, the Soviet physicists' impassioned statement came against a backdrop of heightened international awareness of the perils of the hydrogen bomb. On 1 March 1954, in the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean, the United States had detonated what was then the largest explosion ever created by human beings, a blast with the explosive power of 15 million tons (megatons) of TNT, three times the yield scientists had predicted. This first test of a deliverable U.S. hydrogen bomb, codenamed Bravo, had produced a pall of radioactive fallout that descended over 7,000 square miles of the Pacific, forced the unexpected evacuation of hundreds of U.S. service personnel participating in the test and residents of nearby atolls, and irradiated a Japanese fishing trawler, the *Lucky Dragon*, killing one crewman and setting off a panic among Japanese who feared that their tuna supply had been contaminated. As Washington moved forward with the Operation Castle series of thermonuclear test explosions in the Pacific, exploding a second, 11-megaton device (code-named "Romeo") on March 27 (and a total of six explosions between March 1 and May 14), protests rose around the world calling for a ban on further such experiments. Amid the uproar, press conferences in late March by President Eisenhower and the chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis L. Strauss, conveyed to the general public what many scientists already understood: that an H-bomb could destroy an entire metropolitan area, and that radioactive fallout from a thermonuclear war could endanger the survival of civilization.[9]

In their draft article, the senior Soviet nuclear physicists specifically alluded to these events, citing the case of the *Lucky Dragon* and the fact that the United States had "already twice informed the world about the explosion of hydrogen bombs"—indicating that their draft was not completed until the very end of March. "The world community is concerned," the state scientists told their political leaders. "Such concern is entirely understandable." As in the West, atomic scientists were also trying to educate their publics to this new magnitude of nuclear danger. Echoing the explanations given by Eisenhower and Strauss to an incredulous and fearful world, the physicists stated in their draft article that thermonuclear weapon yields had "already reached many millions of tons [of TNT] and one such bomb can destroy all residential buildings and structures within a radius of 10-15 kilometers, i.e., to eliminate all above-ground constructions in a city with a population of many millions....The power of one or two modern hydrogen bombs...is comparable to the total quantity of all explosive material used by both fighting sides in the last war."[10]

Kurchatov and his colleagues, having strongly put before the Soviet leadership the problem of nuclear peril, stressed the need for a "complete ban on the military utilization of atomic energy." This viewpoint obviously contradicted the "historic optimism" of Soviet ideology about the ultimate, inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism. It was, in essence, a pacifist position.

A warning of such seriousness could not go unnoticed by the Soviet leaders. But, it might be the case that by the time of the public speeches of the electoral campaign for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the first half of March 1954, this document or its essence had become known only to Malenkov. (Although Malyshev addressed a draft of the article to Khrushchev on 1 April, it is probable that earlier he, or Kurchatov himself, had informed Malenkov, at that time the number one figure in the leadership, of its contents.) In any case, in his electoral address on 12 March 1954—one day after the news broke that the Bravo H-bomb test had forced unanticipated evacuations—Malenkov, the head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, said that war between the USSR and the United States, "considering the modern means of warfare, would mean the end of world civilization."[11]

This public declaration from the mouth of Stalin's successor was something completely extraordinary with respect to the problem of war and peace, particularly since an electoral speech by Anastas Mykoyan made the same day restated the familiar thesis that "atomic and hydrogen weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union are a means for deterring aggressors and for waging peace," well within the traditional party framework and official propaganda of that time.[12]

Taken together, Malenkov's public pronouncement and the physicists' secretly submitted (for later publication) counsel constituted a clear challenge to orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology, which "scientifically" ordained socialism's triumph in any future conflict, as well as to those who adhered to such an outdated concept. And with the post-Stalin succession struggle at full tilt, Malenkov's rivals in the ruling troika moved quickly to block the profound policy shift which he and the physicists believed was required by the advent of thermonuclear weapons. Publication of the proposed article signed by Kurchatov and his colleagues was vetoed, presumably by Khrushchev, Molotov, or both. And after the next CC CPSU Plenum in April, at which he received sharp criticism from Khrushchev and Molotov, Malenkov was forced publicly to repudiate his heresy by issuing the confident (if hollow) assertion that any atomic aggression by the West would be "crushed by the same weapons" and lead to the "collapse of the capitalist social system."[13]

Unfortunately, the protocols of the April 1954 Plenum still have not been made accessible to scholars, thus precluding a more precise analysis of the internal reaction to Malenkov's speech. But excerpts have emerged from the 31 January 1955 CC CPSU Plenary Meeting at which Khrushchev and Molotov denounced Malenkov shortly before he was officially demoted.[14] Khrushchev called his allusion to the possible thermonuclear destruction of world civilization "theoretically mistaken and politically harmful."[15] He complained further that the statement encouraged "feelings of hopelessness about the efforts of the peoples to frustrate the plans of the aggressors," and confused comrades who had presumed it reflected the CC's official line.[16]

As David Holloway notes in his recent account, Molotov took an even harsher stand. "A communist should not speak about the 'destruction of world civilization' or about the 'destruction of the human race,' but about the need to prepare and mobilize all forces for the destruction of the bourgoisie," he was quoted as saying.[17]

> How can it be asserted [Molotov added] that civilization could perish in an atomic war?...Can we make the peoples believe that in the event of war all must perish? Then why should we build socialism, why worry about tomorrow? It would be better to supply everyone with coffins now...You see to what absurdities, to what harmful things, mistakes on political issues can lead.[18]

It remains unclear, at least so far as Khrushchev was concerned, whether this criticism was merely a means to discredit Malenkov as a leader or was instead a manifestation of genuine loyalty to dogmatic tenets. It is known, however, that Khrushchev, who ousted Malenkov in February 1955 from the post of head of state, and then pushed Molotov aside from the helm of foreign policy, soon revealed that he shared the same estimate of the danger of thermonuclear war he had recently condemned. The East-West summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955, where Khrushchev already acted as the real leader of the Soviet delegation, demonstrated this as well.

During the summit, a memorable one-on-one conversation took place, with only Soviet interpreter Oleg Troyanovsky present, between Eisenhower and Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Georgi Zhukov—two famous military leaders of the Second World War. Each had a clear understanding of the power of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was first to show how much the growth of nuclear armaments worried him, stressing that "now, with the appearance of atomic and hydrogen weapons, many notions that were correct in the past have changed. War in modern conditions with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapon became even more senseless than ever before." Zhukov agreed and noted that "he personally saw how lethal this weapon is." (Zhukov, in September 1954, had supervised a military exercise in the southern Urals at Totskoye, during which a 20-kiloton atomic bomb was dropped from a plane and 44,000 soldiers immediately thereafter staged a mock battle at the test site to simulate nuclear war under "realistic" conditions.[19])

Eisenhower continued: "Even scientists do not know what would happen if, say, in the course of one month 200 hydrogen bombs would explode and if the conditions would favor the spread of atomic dust." In his answer Zhukov stressed that he "personally favors the liquidation of atomic and hydrogen weapons" and noted that "if in the first days of war the United States would drop 300-400 bombs on the USSR," and the Soviet Union retaliated in kind, "then one can imagine what would happen to the atmosphere.[20]

One is struck by the realism and responsibility of two professional military men who had become prominent statesmen. Still, Zhukov had undoubtedly spoken with Khrushchev's advice and consent.

Therefore, one may infer that the physicists' warnings had reached their target. The Geneva Summit, Khrushchev recalled many years later, "convinced us once again, that there was no pre-war situation in existence at that time, and our enemies were afraid of us in the same way as we were of them."[21]

No wonder that, already, in the documents adopted by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the thesis of the inevitability of a new world war resulting from the aggressive encroachments of imperialism and new "warmongers" was replaced with the thesis of durable "peaceful coexistence between different social systems."

In subsequent years, profoundly concerned about the threat of thermonuclear war, Kurchatov did not cease his efforts to enlighten the country's leadership about nuclear danger. "Early in 1957," Andrei Sakharov recalled, "Kurchatov suggested... that I write something about the effects of radiation from the so-called clean bomb."[22]

Sakharov's investigation enhanced understanding of the extreme danger of atmospheric nuclear tests not only to present, but to future generations. He estimated that the overall number of possible victims from the radiation impact of each megaton of nuclear explosion might approach 10,000 in the course of several thousand years following the test. His article ended with a seminal recommendation: "Halting the tests will directly save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and it also promises even greater indirect benefits, reducing international tensions and the risk of nuclear war, the fundamental danger of our times."[23]

Even before this article's publication in a scientific journal in July 1958, Sakharov, again at Kurchatov's suggestion, wrote another article on the dangers of atmospheric testing for a wide audience. It was translated into major languages and published, with the aim of reaching foreign readers, by many Soviet journals distributed abroad. In this campaign one again senses Kurchatov's purposeful activity, but, what is especially significant, even Khrushchev's personal involvement. As Sakharov recalled: "Khrushchev himself authorized the publication of my articles. Kurchatov discussed the matter twice with him and then referred some minor suggested editorial changes to me....Khrushchev approved the revised versions at the end of June and they were sent off immediately to the editors."[24]

On 31 March 1958, Khrushchev announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing—a move that may well have been influenced not only by the immediate political calculus, but also by the considerations of Soviet atomic physicists. In this context the words that Kurchatov spoke at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January 1960, three weeks before his sudden death—when he professed his "deep faith and firm knowledge that the Soviet people, and government would channel to the benefit of mankind"[25] the achievements of atomic science—should be understood as an urgent plea to his country's leaders.

But, as the Soviet missile and nuclear arsenal continued to grow and develop, it began to figure increasingly prominently, and menacingly, as an element of Soviet power diplomacy. This happened, for instance, at the climax of the Suez crisis in November 1956, when Moscow reminded British and French leaders of their nations' vulnerability to Soviet rockets if they did not withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. Khrushchev and his supporters spoke later with pride about the good results allegedly produced by this flexing of nuclear muscles. Speaking on 24 June 1957 at a CC CPSU Plenum, Mikoyan (at Khrushchev's prompting) recalled: "We were strong enough to keep troops in Hungary and to warn the imperialists that, if they would not stop the war in Egypt, it might come to the use of missile armaments from our side. All acknowledge that with this we decided the fate of Egypt."[26]

Khrushchev's realization that the USSR had become a mighty nuclear power tempted the Soviet leader not only to play a sometimes tough game, but even to launch dangerous, reckless adventures, most egre-

giously with regard to the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, which brought the world to the edge of the thermonuclear precipice.

By then, Khrushchev had already learned that the atomic bomb could also be a potent force in internal, domestic struggles. Beria's arrest on 26 June 1953, and the special CC CPSU Plenum dedicated to the "Beria affair" a week later, demonstrated that the Soviet nuclear capability had acquired unexpected weight in the eyes of the leadership of the country as a new, additional lever in political skirmishes and the struggle for power.

In the course of "unmasking" Beria at the July 1953 Plenum, the leadership troika of Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Molotov arranged that among the accusers would be the administrators of the Soviet atomic project, Beria's recent subordinates: the Minister of Medium Machine Building Malyshev and his deputy Zavenyagin. Taking his political cue from the troika, Malyshev, in his speech at the Plenum, pointed to the following sins of Beria: "he put his signature on a whole number of important decisions without informing the CC and the government, for instance, on the working plan of 1953 for a very important research and development bureau working on the design of atomic bombs....He hid them from the government, signed them single-handedly, taking advantage of his position of the chairman of the Special committee."[27]

Zavenyagin seconded his chief, adding that "the decision to test the hydrogen bomb had not been reported to the government, had not been reported to the Central Committee, and was taken by Beria single-handedly." Zavenyagin even took a slap at his former boss's role in the atomic project: "Beria had a reputation of organizer, but in reality he was a die-hard bureaucrat.... Decision-taking dragged on for weeks and months."[28] Malenkov set the tone and summarized the accusations in a crisp formula of political verdict. In his words, Beria had "positioned himself apart and began to act, ignoring the CC and the government in the crucial issues of the competence of the CC. For instance, without informing the CC and the government, he took a decision to organize the explosion of the hydrogen bomb."[29]

The proposition that Beria "positioned himself above the party" and was ready to crush it—aside from other purported "treasonous schemes" attributed to him (including the renunciation of "socialism" in the GDR, and a secret rapprochement with Tito's Yugoslavia)—became the basis for his indictment and execution in December 1953. The recriminations against Beria as a chief of the atomic project were as bizarre as they were effective in the power struggle. In reality, Beria, being the high commissioner of the Soviet atomic project, was also the First Deputy of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a member of the Presidium (Politburo) of the CC CPSU, and, after Stalin's death, one of the ruling troika. This provided him with more than sufficient authority in the framework of the atomic project. Moreover, according to many Soviet atomic veterans, the "die-hard bureaucrat" Beria had quickly given an appropriate impetus and scope to all works on the project, and if, instead, Molotov had remained in charge, the chances for rapid accomplishment of the project's monumental tasks would have been slim.[30] Finally, Malenkov and Zavenyagin's accusation about the decision to test is simply absurd, for a month and a half still had to pass after Beria's arrest until the explosion of the first Soviet hydrogen device. Not to Beria but to his accusers fell the decision to issue the actual authorization for the testing.

After Beria's arrest, the atomic complex became a darling of "the party and the government" (as an official formula put it), guarded and controlled by the Defense Department of the CC CPSU, as well as by the military-industrial commission of the USSR Council of Ministers. But this did not stop Gorbachev in the days of Chernobyl, 30 years after the Beria accusations, from performing a traditional party somersault and making strange accusations at a Politburo session: "All is kept secret from the CC. Its officials could not dare to put their nose into this field. Even the questions of location of [nuclear power plants] were not decided by the government."[31]

New priorities, dictated by nuclear weapons, also played an exceptional role in Khrushchev's ascendancy and his struggle against the Old Guard. The March 1954 episode has already been mentioned, when Khrushchev subjected Malenkov, the head of the state, to sharp criticism for his thesis about "the end of civilization" in the event of thermonuclear war. By taking Molotov's side in this debate, Khrushchev was able later, with his support, to remove Malenkov from the sphere of foreign and defense policies, claiming that he was "a bad communist" who "lacks toughness and falls under alien influence."[32]

After taking Malenkov down a notch, Khrushchev undermined Molotov. He continued to use the nuclear "topic" to accuse his rival, this time for conservatism and dogmatic "deviation." The final clash between Khrushchev and Molotov took place at the June 1957 CC CPSU Plenum. As a target for his attack, Molotov chose a phrase Khrushchev spoke to *The New York Times* a month earlier: "Speaking in more definite terms about international tension, the crux of it, in the final analysis, is in the relations between the two countries—the Soviet Union and the United States of America." Molotov, admitting that the USSR had become a great nuclear power, drew from it a conclusion that fit the party orthodoxy but was quite opposite to what Khrushchev meant—that while relying on this power, Molotov insisted that Moscow "must take special care to broaden every fissure, every dissent and contradiction in the imperialist camp, to weaken international positions of the United States of America—the strongest among imperialist powers."[33]

In a rejoinder, Khrushchev's ally Anastas Mikoyan called Molotov "a dyed-in-the wool conservative" and stressed that Khrushchev's declaration "is correct in essence and corresponds to the accepted decision of the CC," since it meant that "the question—to be or not to be for a war—in the present times depends on the biggest powers of the two camps, possessing the hydrogen bomb." Continuing his allegation that the anti-Khrushchev ("anti-party") group repudiates this crucial fact, Mikoyan said: "This is being done in order to subsequently...turn around our foreign policy, [which is] aimed at the relaxation of international tension."[34]

Khrushchev outwitted his competitors. Unlike Malenkov, whose estimate of nuclear danger sounded as a lonely shot in the dark, Khrushchev skillfully and repeatedly exploited the Soviet atomic project's achievements and the nuclear issue in general in his tactical moves during the power struggle. Moreover, he advanced the new strategic concept of "peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and socialist systems" and guaranteed its approval by the CPSU 20th Party Congress. Thereafter, Khrushchev's bold declaration about the two nuclear powers could be defended as a new party line. Al-

though this declaration implied accepting Malenkov's thesis, Khrushchev enjoyed a political net gain, since he emphasized not so much the threat of thermonuclear war as the equal responsibility of the USSR and United States for the fate of the world.

The first 10-15 years of the nuclear era wrought fundamental change in the positions of the Soviet leadership on the issue of war and peace. The atomic bomb's appearance led Stalin immediately to comprehend that it was a fact of supreme importance for the world and forced him, in a country devastated by the Second World War, to mobilize all available resources to create an atomic bomb of his own. Soon after Stalin's death—and practically at the same moment as the American leadership—Soviet statesmen realized that the utilization of nuclear weapons threatened mankind with total annihilation.

However, the understanding of the dangers facing humanity in the nuclear epoch did not lessen but rather exacerbated the confrontation between the two leading powers. The race for nuclear-missile power and fear of lagging behind the competitor outweighed common sense. Only the ultimate showdown on the brink during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 led to the sobering of both sides.

It was in the 1950s and early 1960s that the global view of war and peace held by statesmen in the two countries irrevocably changed. On the Soviet side the policy reorientation shifted away from the preparations for an inevitable new world war towards the construction of enduring peaceful relations with the United States and its allies. The new sources suggest that a critical role in the enlightenment of the Soviet leaders during that crucial period belonged to the designers of nuclear weapons themselves, primarily to Igor Kurchatov.

The subsequent two decades of the nuclear arms race, Soviet-American arms control negotiations, and, ultimately, "new thinking," added relatively little to what had been understood in principle by the politicians of the 1950s. Despite the huge expenditures on new weapons systems, the endless speculations and maneuverings of political alliances, and major geopolitical changes, the basic priorities which had been dictated to mankind by the advent of the nuclear era remained the same—and they will remain a guideline into our future.

1. Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Jeffrey J. Sands, *Soviet Nuclear Weapons, 1989* (Russian edition) (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1992), 8.
2. Stalin's role in launching the Soviet nuclear program is well described and amply documented in David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). The deliverability of the thermonuclear weapon tested in August 1953 is noted in Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 307. The United States first tested the thermonuclear concepts employed in its hydrogen bombs by detonating a non-deliverable device on the island of Eniwetok in the South Pacific on 1 November 1952; and first tested a deliverable hydrogen bomb in March 1954.
3. See transcript of the 3 July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum in *Izvestia TsK KPSS* [News of the CC CPSU] 2 (1991), 166-170; for an English translation of the July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum transcripts, see D.M. Stickle, ed., Jean Farrow, trans., *The Beria Affair* (Commack, NY: Nova Sciences Publishers, Inc., 1993), quotation on p. 130.
4. "The last 'anti-party' group. A stenographic report of the June 1957 Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* [Historical Archive] 4 (1993), 4.
5. Malyshev specifically suggested that the article could be signed by Academicians A.N. Nesmeianov, A.F. Ioffe, D.V. Skobel'tsin, and A.I. Oparin.
6. Memorandum of V. Malyshev to N. Khrushchev, 1 April 1954, enclosing Kurchatov, et al., n.d. but apparently late March 1954, "The Danger of Atomic War and President Eisenhower's Proposal" ["Opasnosti atomnoi voiny i predlozhenie prezidenta Eizenkhauera"], Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), fond 5, opis 30, delo 126, listy [pp.] 38ff.
7. Ibid., pp. 39, 40, 41.
8. Ibid., pp. 42-44. The physicists' arguments against the "Atoms for Peace" plan were incorporated into the formal Soviet rejection of the proposal conveyed by Foreign Minister Molotov to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later that spring. See Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, chap. 16.
9. [Ed. note: This account of the 1954 tests draws on Jonathan M. Weisgall, O*peration Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 302-307; Herbert F. York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 85-86; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 168-82, and Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, Vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 1985), 168-73.]
10. Kurchatov et al., "The Danger of Atomic War...," p. 39.
11. Speech of Comrade G.M. Malenkov, *Pravda*, 13 March 1954.
12. Speech of Comrade A.I. Mikoyan, *Kommunist* (Yerevan), 12 March 1954.
13. *Izvestia*, 27 April 1954.
14. See Andrei Malenkov, *O moiem otse Georgii Malenkov* [About my father, Georgi Malenkov] (Moscow: NTS Teknoekos, 1992), 115-17; Iu. V. Aksiutin and O.V. Volobuev, *XX s''ezd KPSS: novatsii i dogmy* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), 60-61; L.A. Openkin, "Na istoricheskom pereput'e," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* 1 (1990), 116; and Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 338-39.
15. Aksiutin and Volobuev, *XX s''ezd KPSS*, 60.
16. Malenkov, *O moiem otse Georgii Malenkov*, 115.
17. Openkin, "Na istoricheskom pereput'e," 116.
18. Aksiutin and Volobuev, *XX s''ezd KPSS*, 61.
19. [Ed. note: Footage of this test, once highly-classified, has appeared in several documentaries in recent years, most recently "The Red Bomb," broadcast on the Discovery Channel in Sept. 1994. For memories of the 1954 test, including Zhukov's attendance, see Fred Hiatt, "Survivors Tell of '54 Soviet A-Blast," *Washington Post*, 15 September 1994, A30. See also Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 325-28.]
20. Zapis besedy (Memorandum), meeting between G.K. Zhukov and President D. Eisenhower, 20 July 1955, TsKhSD, fond 5, opis 30, delo 116, ll. 122-23; for the U.S. record of this conversation, see *FRUS, 1955-1957*, V (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 408-418. The latter source quotes Zhukov as saying he was "unqualifiedly for total abolition of weapons of this character," apparently referring to hydrogen bombs.
21. "Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Kruscheva" [Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev], *Voprosi istorii* 8-9 (1992), 76.
22. Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs* (New York: Knopf, 1990), 200.
23. Ibid., 202-203.
24. Ibid., 204.
25. I.N. Golovin, *Kurchatov* (Moscow: Atomizdat, 1967), 21.
26. *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 4 (1993), 36.
27. Transcript of 3 July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum, in *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 1 (1992), 204-206; also *The Beria Affair*, 84.
28. Transcript of 3 July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum, *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 2 (1991), 166-170; also *The Beria Affair*, 130-33.
29. Transcript of 2 July 1953 CC CPSU Plenum, *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 1 (1991) 144; also *The Beria Affair*, 7-8.
30. Yuli Khariton and Yuri Smirnov, "The Khariton version," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49:5 (May 1993), 26-27.
31. A.S. Cherniaev, *Shest let s Gorbachevim* [Six Years with Gorbachev] (Moscow: Progress-Kultura, 1993), 87.
32. "Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Khruscheva," *Voprosi istorii* 8-9 (1992), 70.
33. *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 4 (1993), 5.
34. *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 4 (1993), 36, 37.

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CORRECTIONS

The *Bulletin* regrets that several printing errors slipped into Mark Kramer's article, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," in the Fall 1993 *Bulletin*.. On p. 22, col. 1, l. 20, the words "represent" and "showing" were omitted from: "For the most part these documents, especially those in Fond No. 5, represent key 'inputs' into the decision-making process, rather than showing how decisions were actually made at the top levels." On p. 23, col. 2, lines 5-7 from bottom should have read, "...figure out how to expedite and pay for the physical transfer...." P. 25, col. 1, l. 31 should have read, "...accused Pikhoia of having betrayed the national heritage." On p. 31, col. 2, l. 9 from bottom should have read "to investigate the matter further...." In addition, Mark Kramer's article, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis" (p. 43, col. 1, l. 7-8), incorrectly gave the date of a Soviet General Staff document as June rather than September 1962.

50-MEGATON BLAST

continued from page 3

that the bomb design had worked.

Meanwhile, both aircraft and documentary crews observing the test were subjected to a most graphic experience. As one cameraman recalled: "The clouds beneath the aircraft and in the distance were lit up by the powerful flash. The sea of light spread under the hatch and even clouds began to glow and became transparent. At that moment, our aircraft emerged from between two cloud layers and down below in the gap a huge bright orange ball was emerging. The ball was powerful and arrogant like Jupiter. Slowly and silently it crept upwards.... Having broken through the thick layer of clouds it kept growing. It seemed to suck the whole earth into it. The spectacle was fantastic, unreal, supernatural."[3] Another cameraman saw "a powerful white flash over the horizon and after a long period of time he heard a remote, indistinct and heavy blow, as if the earth has been killed!"[4]

Some time after the explosion, photographs were taken of ground zero. "The ground surface of the island has been *levelled*, swept and licked so that it looks like a skating rink," a witness reported. "The same goes for rocks. The snow has melted and their sides and edges are shiny. There is not a trace of unevenness in the ground.... Everything in this area has been swept clean, scoured, melted and blown away."[5]

A twenty-minute film about the development and test of the 50-MT bomb was later shown to the Soviet leadership. The film concluded with the following remark: "Based on preliminary data alone, it is evident that the explosion has set a record in terms of power." In fact, its power was 10 times the total power of all explosives used during World War II, including the atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities by the United States. It's hard to believe that a more powerful explosion will ever take place.

The test stunned the world community, and became the subject of numerous discussions, legends, and myths which continue to this day. The Russian newspaper *Izvestia* reported in 1990, for example, that this super-powerful hydrogen bomb represented "a qualitative leap which wiped out the American advantage in total number of tests," and that Khrushchev agreed to sign the Moscow Limited Test Ban Treaty two years later "with a 60 megatonner in the arsenal."[6] The 1992 television documentary, "The Story of an Invisible Town," also promoted the incorrect theory that "only after this explosion did the parties make concessions and sign the treaty."

As a result of excessive secrecy and limited access to information, even some of the directors of the test formed incorrect impressions. For example, the director of the test site on Novaya Zemlya, Gavriil Kudryavtsev, mentioned that in our country "60-megaton and even 100-megaton (fortunately never tested) superbombs have appeared." His explanation of their "appearance" is bizarre: "I think that the 'secret' is rather simple. In those days, the strike accuracy of our missiles was insufficient. The only way to compensate for this was to increase the power of the warhead."[7]

A completely fantastic idea about the 50-MT bomb appeared in 1992 in *Pravda:* "[this bomb] represents the yesterday of atomic weaponry. Even more powerful warheads have been developed by now."[8]

In fact, the 50-MT bomb tested on 30 October 1961 was never a weapon. This was a one-of-a-kind device, whose design allowed it to achieve a yield of up to 100 megatons when fully loaded with nuclear fuel. Thus, the test of the 50-MT bomb was in effect the test of the design for a 100-MT weapon. If a blast of such horrific magnitude had been conducted, it would have generated a gigantic, fiery tornado, engulfing an area larger than Vladimirskaya Oblast in Russia or the state of Maryland in the USA.

The explosion of the 50-MT bomb did not lead, as some suppose, to the immediate conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Negotiations to conclude the treaty continued for another two years. However, one may speculate that the explosion indirectly contributed to the talks' success.

The 50-MT bomb never had any military significance. It was a one-time demonstration of force, part of the superpower game of mutual intimidation. This was the main goal of the unprecedented test. Superweapons are rejected by contemporary military doctrine, and the proposition that "now we have even more powerful warheads" is simply ridiculous.

What was the political situation? The relations between Moscow and Washington at the time of Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 had been ameliorating, but the following May the espionage flight of Frances Gary Powers over the Soviet Union aggravated them seriously. The U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by Soviet anti-aircraft batteries near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960. In the aftermath, the summit conference of Soviet, U.S., British, and French state leaders in Paris was aborted, and the return visit to the USSR of U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower was cancelled. Cuba, where Castro came to power, became the object of passions, and the failure of the U.S.-sponsored invasion by anti-Castro Cuban emigres at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 was a great shock for the Kennedy Administration.

But the main arena of opposition between the USA and Soviet Union was Europe. The serious, seemingly insoluble question of a peaceful German settlement once again rose to the fore, with the status of West Berlin the focus of attention. The exhausting talks on arms reduction, accompanied by strict demands from the Western Powers to inspect the territories of participating parties, were unsuccessful. The Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban looked more and more gloomy although the nuclear powers (except France) were adhering to a voluntary test moratorium in the context of those talks. Meanwhile, hostile propaganda and recriminations between the USSR and the USA became the norm. Finally, the main event of that period which aroused a storm of protests in the West was the erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.

In the meantime the Soviet Union sought self-reliance. It was the first to test an intercontinental ballistic missile and launch satellites into orbit, and the first to send a man into outer space. Having acquired immense prestige, among the Third World countries in particular, the USSR did not yield to the Western pressure and started active operations on its own.

Therefore, when by the end of the summer of 1961 international tensions grew unusually high, the course of events took on the peculiar logic of superpower politics. For a month and a half prior to the announcement by the Soviet government, we, the developers of nuclear weapons, began preparing to test new prototypes. We knew that the culmination of the series of tests planned in the USSR would be the explosion of the 50-MT device, which was designed to produce explosions of up to 100 megatons. In

the middle of July 1961, we began the development of this device. Some time thereafter, its actual construction and assembly began. Andrei Sakharov called the planned test "the crux of the program."

The Soviet government made no secret of the planned superblast. On the contrary, it gave the world ample warning about the upcoming event and, in an unprecedented step, made public the power of the bomb under development. This leak corresponded to the goals of the political power game.

By October 24, the final report, including the proposed design of the bomb and the theoretical and design calculations, was complete. The specifications in the report were sent to design engineers and bomb assemblers. The report was co-authored by Andrei Sakharov, Victor Adamsky, Yuri Babaev, Yuri Smirnov, and Yuri Trutnev. While the contents of the report are not publicly available, I can say that the report's conclusion contained the following statement: "A successful result from the test of this device opens the possibility of creating a device of practically unlimited power."

At the same time, a bomber was prepared for the test, and a special parachute system for the bomb developed. The parachute system to permit the slow descent of the bomb, which weighed more than 20 tons, was unique. However, even if this parachute system had failed during the test, the bomber's crew would not have been endangered, as the bomb contained a special mechanism which triggered its detonation only after the plane had reached a safe distance.

The Tu-95 strategic bomber which was to carry the bomb to its target underwent unusual modification. The bomb, around eight meters long and two meters wide, was too large to fit in the plane's bomb bay; therefore, a non-essential part of the fuselage was cut away, and a special lifting mechanism attached, as was a device for fastening the bomb. The bomb was so huge that over half of it protruded from the plane during the flight. The plane's whole fuselage, and even its propeller blades, were covered with special white paint for protection from the explosion's intense flash. A separate airborne laboratory plane was also covered with the same paint.

In Arzamas-16, the secret nuclear weapons laboratory in the Urals, the bomb was assembled in a factory-shop on a special railroad flatcar, which after completion was camouflaged as a regular freight-train car. It was necessary to build a railroad line right into the assembly-shop.

From time to time, we would naturally have doubts: would the device deceive us, would it fail at the moment of testing? Alluding to this, Sakharov said: "If we don't make *this thing*, we'll be sent to railroad construction." At another moment, in the last phase of the job, when foreign protests erupted over Khrushchev's announcement of the forthcoming superpowerful blast, Sakharov calmly observed that while the explosion might lead to the smashing of some windows in our embassies in two or three Western countries, nothing more would come of it.

Khrushchev defined his position in this way:

> I want to say that our tests of new nuclear weapons are also coming along very well. We shall shortly complete these tests—presumably at the end of October. We shall probably wind them up by detonating a hydrogen bomb with a yield of 50,000,000 tons of TNT. We have said that we have a 100-megaton bomb. This is true. But we are not going to explode it, because even if we did so at the most remote site, we might knock out all our windows. We are therefore going to hold off for the time being and not set the bomb off. However, in exploding the 50-megaton bomb we are testing the device for triggering a 100-megaton bomb. But may God grant, as they used to say, that we are never called upon to explode these bombs over anybody's territory. This is the greatest wish of our lives![9]
>
> . . .
>
> In strengthening the defense of the Soviet Union we are acting not only in our own interests but in the interests of all peaceloving peoples, of all mankind. When the enemies of peace threaten us with force they must be and will be countered with force, and more impressive force, too. Anyone who is still unable to understand this today will certainly understand it tomorrow.[10]

Once, during a discussion with Sakharov, a pointed question was heard: "Why do we need to make 'cannibalistic' weapons like this?!" Sakharov smiled and said: "Nikita Khrushchev said: 'Let this device hang over the heads of the capitalists, like a sword of Damocles.'"[11]

The test of the 50-MT bomb was a watershed in the development of nuclear weapons. This test demonstrated the global nature of the effects of a powerful nuclear explosion on the Earth's atmosphere. The test of the bomb's design confirmed the possibility of making a device of any power, however large.

For Sakharov, his involvement in the development of the 1961 superbomb marked a turning point in his years of work in thermonuclear weapons. This was the last device on which he worked intensely, seriously, and without hesitation.[12] He accepted the proposal to make and test this awesomely powerful bomb, motivated by a desire to demonstrate the absolute destructiveness and inhumanity of this weapon of mass annihilation, to impress on mankind and politicians the fact that, in the event of a tragic showdown, there would be no winners. No matter how sophisticated an opponent, the other side would find a simple, but crippling, response.

The device at the same time demonstrated the technological potentials available to humanity. Not without reason did Sakharov search for a worthy application for it. He suggested using superpowerful explosions to prevent catastrophic earthquakes and to create particle accelerators of unprecedented energy to probe the secrets of matter. He also advanced a plan to use similar explosions to deflect the course of heavenly bodies near earth, such as comets or asteroids, in the interests of mankind. But also, at that time, he was still preoccupied with the search for possible military applications of nuclear energy.

Ninety-seven percent of the power of the 50-MT bomb derived from thermonuclear fusion; that is to say, the bomb was remarkably "clean" and released a minimum of fission by-products which would elevate background radiation in the atmosphere. Thanks to this, our U.S. colleagues understood[13] that our scientists also desired to reduce to a minimum the radioactive aftereffects of nuclear testing, as well as to lessen the effect of radiation on present and future generations.

The fact that the 30 October 1961 explosion and its expected yield were announced in advance by political leaders

placed a special burden on the bomb's designers, for a failure or serious shortfall in yield would have undermined the authority of our researchers. The enormous yield of the test (the most powerful of all tests conducted either by us or the USA) should have provoked and in fact did provoke fear throughout the world, in the sense that nuclear weapons were seen to threaten humanity's future. It also led to the realization that such weapons should be placed under international control, the framework for which has yet to be found but must be sought out and implemented. A series of agreements limiting the testing and spread of nuclear weapons was gradually concluded. The world community and the superpowers' governments came to see the necessity for such agreements as a result of evaluating the results of many nuclear tests, among them the test of 30 October 1961.

1. *Trud*, 23 May 1991.
2. *XXII siezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenographicheskii otchet* [22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], *tom* [Vol.] 3 (Moscow: Gospolitizat, 1962), 122.
3. V.A. Suvorov, *Strana limoniia* [*Land of Lemons*] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1989), 117-27.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. *Izvestiya*, 13 October 1990.
7. *Trud*, 23 May 1991.
8. *Pravda*, 20 October 1992.
9. *XXII seized Kommunisticheskoi..., tom. 1* (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1992), 55.
10. *XXII seized Kommunisticheskoi..., tom. 2* (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1992), 571-73.
11. Quoted in P.N. Lebedev Institute, *Andrei Sakharov: Facets of a Life* (Gif-Sur-Yvette: Editions Frontieres, 1991), 603.
12. [Ed. note: But also see the account given by Sakharov in his memoirs, in which the scientist stated that he sent a note to Khrushchev on 10 July 1961 opposing his decision to resume nuclear tests, suggesting that they would "seriously jeopardize the test ban negotiations, the cause of disarmament, and world peace," and that he worked on the test of the "Big Bomb" only after Khrushchev firmly rejected his appeal and chided him for meddling in politics and "poking his nose where it doesn't belong." Once the decision was made, however, Sakharov also says he was "going all out" to achieve the maximum from the fall 1961 test series. See Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 215-25.]
13. Ralph Lapp, *Kill and Overkill* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), 36-37.

Physicist Viktor Adamsky worked on the Soviet nuclear weapons program in Sakharov's group at Arzamas-16, the long-secret nuclear laboratory. Physicist Yuri Smirnov is a Leading Researcher at the Russian Scientific Center "Kurchatov Institute" in Moscow. Both worked on the 50-megaton test.

Letters: Stalin, Kim, and Korean War Origins

10 December 1993

To the Editor:

Ms. Kathryn Weathersby's otherwise informative article in your Fall 1993 issue ("New Findings on the Korean War," CWIHP *Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18) shows how the study of hitherto secret Soviet archives can lead to erroneous conclusions if unaccompanied by an understanding of the general context of Communist policies in the given case. She argues that the initiative for the invasion of South Korea in 1950 came from the North Korean regime, rather than from Stalin, her "proof" that Kim Il Sung had on many occasions begged Stalin to be allowed to "reunite" the peninsula, before actually being allowed to try to do so. But what does that prove? Using analogous reasoning, one could argue that it was South Korea that initiated the war because Syngman Rhee had begged Washington to help it to do the same thing vis-a-vis the North.

The document—an internal Soviet memorandum—proves the opposite of Ms. Weathersby's thesis. It states, "Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve, noting that 'such a large affair in relation to South Korea needs much preparation,' *but did not object in principle*...At Stalin's order, all requests of North Korea for delivery of arms and equipment for the additional units of the KPA were quickly met... But the end of May, 1950, the General Staff of the KPA, *together with Soviet military advisers*, announced the readiness of the Korean army to begin concentration at the 38th parallel."* The idea to invade was clearly Stalin's but, reasonably enough, he waited to permit and help in the venture only at what he thought was the right moment. The notion that in 1950 Kim, or any other Communist leader, was in a position to pressure—compel or shame—the Soviets into doing something they had not planned in the first place, or that the North Koreans could have invaded without Soviet permission/command, cannot be seriously entertained.

The date of the document being 1966—the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute—makes rather debatable its assertion that Kim also obtained Mao's agreement for the invasion. Even in an internal Soviet document there would have been a strong inclination to dilute Soviet responsibility for the invasion.

In an athletic event, a race is not is not initiated by the runners crouching down. The race is initiated by the starter shouting "go." That is what Stalin did.

Yours sincerely,

Adam B. Ulam

* My italics.

Adam Ulam is professor emeritus and former director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, and the author of numerous books on Soviet foreign policy.

K. Weathersby responds (4 November 1994):

Since the publication of the Fall 1993 *Bulletin*, additional documents have been released that further clarify the question of Stalin's role in the outbreak of the Korean War. I have presented translations and analyses of these documents in *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*. To summarize them briefly, they reveal that in January 1950 Kim Il Sung once more appealed to Stalin to grant him permission to launch a military campaing to reunify the Korean peninsula by force of arms. On 30 January 1950, Stalin indicated that he was "ready to approve" Kim's request, and in the following months provided the necessary arms and expertise. The Soviet role was therefore essential, but it was as facilitator rather than initiator. This distinction does not negate Soviet responsibility for the bloodshed that followed, but it is critical for understanding the origins of the Korean War.

In May 1950 Stalin informed Mao Zedong that "owing to the changed international situation, the [the Soviets] agree with the Koreans' proposal to proceed toward reunification." However, he added, "the question must be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of a disagreement by the Chinese comrades, the resolution of the question must be put off until there is a new discussion." Unfortunately, the Soviet documents released thus far do not clarify what Stalin meant by "changed international situation." This is the key question, since we must understand *why* he approved military action in Korea before we can understand the larger picture of Stalin's approach to the Cold War. I hope to describe in future issues of the *Bulletin* additional Soviet documents that have recently become available, including records on the Korean War that President Yeltsin has presented to the government of South Korea.

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SPY vs. SPY: THE KGB VS. THE CIA, 1960-1962

by Vladislav M. Zubok

"The crisis years" of 1960-1962 are remembered as a peak of the Cold War, an apogee of the bipolar confrontation. Many consider them even more dangerous than the Korean War, when the military forces of West and East clashed and almost slipped into a global conflict. The early 1960s were all the more frightening since the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were engaged in a fierce nuclear arms race, and two more states, Great Britain and France, had developed small nuclear arsenals of their own. By the end of the period the edge in this race clearly belonged to the United States such that, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington had at least nine times as many deliverable nuclear warheads as Moscow.[1] After the summer of 1961 the Kennedy administration was perfectly aware of that fact, but, nevertheless, sweeping Soviet progress in ICBMs soon eliminated the impregnability of "fortress America" forever.

The loss of strategic invulnerability weighed as heavily on the American psyche as had the loss of the atomic monopoly (and China) in 1949. And, as before, this agitated state of mind offered fertile ground for spy-hysteria. This time, however, it did not reach the proportions of McCarthyism, but remained localized in government offices where cold warriors, especially true believers among them, began to talk again about a "master plan" of the Kremlin and the KGB to delude and disrupt the Western alliance in preparation for a decisive showdown between the two Cold War blocs. Some of them, most prominently James J. Angleton, head of the CIA's counterintelligence department, tenaciously denied the reality of the Sino-Soviet split as a "hoax" designed to lull the West into complacency. Angleton, along with a Soviet defector, KGB major Anatoly Golitsyn, also believed that there was a KGB mole inside the CIA's Soviet Division, and that Soviet intelligence was assiduously planting its illegals and agents, primarily displaced persons from Eastern Europe and Russia, in various high-placed positions in the West. They even claimed that former British Labour party leader Hugh Gaitskell had probably been murdered by the KGB, that his successor, Harold Wilson, was probably a KGB asset, and that the famous double agent Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) colonel, was also a Soviet plant.[2]

The seemingly wild surmises of an American counterintelligence officer become more understandable as we learn more about the strange "behind the mirror" world of spying, double-agents, and deliberate disinformation in which huge and well-funded rival intelligence services clashed with no holds barred. Intelligence at any time is a necessary and valuable instrument of a state's foreign policy. But in the years of Cold War tension the intelligence services were more than just "eyes," they were powerful weapons in propaganda warfare between the ideological blocs. Furthermore, in a situation of mutual fear produced by the nuclear deadlock, when mammoth armies confronted each other in Europe and around the world, intelligence networks were the only mobile force in action, the "light infantry" of the Cold War: conducting reconnaissance, but also trying to influence the situation in the enemy's rear by means sometimes just short of military ones.

The plans and instructions related to operational work and intelligence sources, in particular involving planting agents abroad and using double-agents, justifiably belong to the most zealously guarded secrets of intelligence bureaucracies. But recently, thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians have acquired a rare chance to peek into the mysteries of one of the two intelligence giants of the Cold War—documents of the Committee on State Security (KGB). These are not papers of the First Main Directorate (PGU), which was responsible for foreign intelligence and which continues under the new regime in Russia and, of course, preserves its secrecy (although some of its former officers, Oleg Kalugin, Leonid Shebarshin, and Vadim Kirpichenko among them, have recently written memoirs[3]). The documents in question were sent by the KGB to the Secretariat and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Com-

munist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), whose archives, unlike those of the KGB, have in part at least become accessible to scholars and the public.[4]

For all their fascination, the internal KGB documents cited in this article should also be treated with a good deal of caution. They contain references to events, plans, individuals, and explicit or implicit relationships that are uncorroborated and should be carefully investigated and cross-checked with other evidence before their accuracy and significance can be confidently gauged. Many of the assertions contained in the documents will require, in particular, collation with relevant materials in the archives of other governments and intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, and analysis by specialists in the history of intelligence. Many names in the documents are transliterated from the Russian after being transliterated from other languages, and the spelling may not be accurate. Moreover, in assessing reports by KGB leaders to Khrushchev, readers should recall the tendency of bureaucrats in any government to exaggerate capabilities or accomplishments to a superior, a provoclivity that may be accentuated when, as in this period, there is intense pressure to produce results. Finally, in addition to remembering the lack of systematic access to KGB and CIA archives, those who evaluate the documents that *do* become available must keep in mind that evidence on crucial matters may have been deliberately destroyed, distorted, fabricated, or simply never committed to paper. All of these caveats should simply serve as reminders that however revealing these materials are, much additional research will be needed before a balanced and informed evaluation of the role of intelligence agencies and activities in the Cold War, on all sides, can be attained.

The KGB reports to Khrushchev

On 14 February 1961, Nikita S. Khrushchev received an annual report of the KGB marked "Top Secret—Highly Sensitive."[5] Only Khrushchev could decide who among the top Soviet leadership might see the report, in which the Collegium of the KGB informed him as the First Secretary of the CC CPSU and as a Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR about the achievements of Soviet foreign intelligence during 1960.

In this period, Khrushchev was told, 375 foreign agents were recruited, and 32 officers of the State Security were transferred abroad and legalized. The stations abroad obtained, among others, position and background papers prepared by Western governments for the summit conference in Paris in May 1960, including materials on the German and Berlin questions, disarmament, and other issues. They also provided the Soviet leadership with "documentary evidence about military-political planning of some Western powers and the NATO alliance as whole; [...] on the plan of deployment of armed forces of these countries through 1960-63; evidence on preparation by the USA of an economic blockade of and military intervention against Cuba"—the last a possible allusion to preparations for the forthcoming April 1961 CIA-supported invasion by anti-Castro Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs.[6]

The sheer numbers conveyed the vast extent of information with which the KGB flooded the tiny group of Soviet leaders. During one year alone it prepared and presented 4,144 reports and 68 weekly and monthly informational bulletins to the Party's Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers; 4,370 documentary materials were sent to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko; 3,470 materials to Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and the Head of the General Staff Alexander Vassilevsky; and 790 materials to other ministries and agencies.[7]

Soviet foreign intelligence appeared to have been particularly successful in "sigint" (signals intelligence) operations. The sprawling Service of Radio Interception and Code-Breaking of Diplomatic and Agent-Operational Communications of the Capitalist Countries, the innermost part of the KGB empire (analogous to the U.S. National Security Agency), managed to break many diplomatic and intelligence codes. During 1960 it reported deciphering 209,000 diplomatic cables sent by representatives of 51 states, and the most important among them—133,200—were reported to the CPSU Central Committee. The Kremlin therefore apparently eavesdropped on some of the West's most classified communications.

True, there were clouds on the horizon. The enemy became increasingly sophisticated and difficult to penetrate. The Directorate of Counterintelligence confronted, according to the annual report, "serious difficulties" in 1960. "The adversary goes to great lengths," the KGB complained. "For instance, the Committee noticed cases when the enemy's intelligence officers met their agents on a beach and secretly exchanged materials while swimming. If it happens on a beach, they would lie close by, pretend they do not know each other and dig their materials in the sand, and then cautiously extract them." There were more serious challenges than the "beach" method. U.S. intelligence, the KGB found, began to use a new type of heavily-protected codes. They wrote on a very thin (papirosse-type) paper prepared specifically for this purpose. Also a special plane was constructed in the USA to bring illegal agents to the USSR. "Since this plane is made of rubber-layered tissue," the report said, "and can conduct flights at low altitudes, it has practically no chance, according to our experts, of being located by existing radar stations."[8]

With the life of KGB officers and agents in the United States becoming increasingly rough due to the effectiveness of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI and harsh restrictions on travel for Soviet journalists and diplomats, the Committee tried to exploit the increasing trickle of Soviet visitors to the United States to include its operatives and agents. Another channel was sending younger KGB officers, Oleg Kalugin among them, as graduate and post-graduate students to Columbia, Harvard, and other American universities.

Yet nobody could replace illegals. The KGB in 1960 began to move its "sleepers" in other countries to the United States "with the aim of planting them in a job in American intelligence or intelligence schools." One priority was "to insert KGB agents as professors of Russian, Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian languages in the language school of USA military intelligence in Monterey," California.[9]

The report distinguished between old and new priorities of Soviet foreign intelligence. An old one was to ferret out, in competition with the GRU *(Glavrazvedupr)* or military intelligence, Western plans for rearmament and NATO's level of combat readiness. New efforts were targeted, first, at scientific-technical espionage and, second, at elaborate propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The former had proved to be a stupendous success in the

1940s, when the Soviets obtained detailed information on the wartime Anglo-American atomic bomb project, and it continued to be important as Cold War sanctions and barriers cut the Soviets off from Western technologies and industrial machinery.

During 1960, the KGB's scientific-technical intelligence service reported that it stole, bought, and smuggled from the West 8,029 classified technologies, blueprints, and schemas, as well as 1,311 different samples of equipment.[10] A special target in this regard was, of course, the United States. On 7 April 1960, the Central Committee had directed the KGB to prepare a "prospective working plan of the intelligence service of the Committee of State Security at the Council of Ministers against the United States of America."[11] The plan, presented on 10 March 1961, postulated a wide array of measures.[12] Among them were efforts to insinuate agents into U.S. scientific-technical centers, universities, industrial corporations, and other institutions specializing in missile building, electronics, aircraft, and special chemistry. The KGB planned to use "third countries" as a springboard for this penetration campaign. Its agents in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan were to worm their way into scientific, industrial, and military research and consulting institutions of these countries with access to American know-how or subcontracting to U.S. military agencies. Agents residing in England, Austria, Belgium, West Germany, and Israel were instructed to move to the United States with the goal of finding jobs in the military-industrial sector.

It also planned to organize "on the basis of a well-screened network of agents" several brokerage firms in order to obtain classified scientific-technical information and "to create conditions in a number of countries for buying samples of state-of-the-art American equipment." One such firm was to be opened in the United States, one in England, and two in France. The KGB also prepared to open in a European country a copying center that would specialize copying blueprints and technical documentation in the fields of radioelectronics, chemistry, and robotics.[13]

Some orthodox anti-communists in the CIA, known as the fundamentalists, were tipped off by the Soviet defector Golitsyn about an alleged KGB "monster plot" to create a strategic web of deception. According to Golitsyn, the KGB's new chairman, Alexander Shelepin, the energetic and imaginative former leader of Young Communist League, revealed this plot in May of 1959 to the KGB establishment. Golitsyn even maintained, contrary to all evidence and logic, that the political and military split between China and the USSR after 1959 was a fake, just a facet of Shelepin's diabolical master plan.[14]

There was no such "master plan" in the KGB. But under Shelepin the Committee indeed hatched several schemes of strategic and tactical deception: to conceal Soviet intentions and weak spots from the West, as well as to disrupt consensus in Western societies and alliances on policies, means, and goals for waging the Cold War. In the plan presented to the Central Committee on 10 March 1961, mentioned above, for example, the KGB proposed "to carry out disinformation measures on the information that American intelligence obtains about the Soviet Union; to pass along the channels of American intelligence disinformation on economic, defense, and scientific-technical issues; to disinform the USA intelligence regarding real intentions of Soviet intelligence services, achieving thereby the dispersion of forces and means of the enemy's intelligence services."[15] The deception went side by side with blunt slander campaigns and forgery. In its 1960 report, the KGB took pride in operations carried out to compromise "groupings and individuals from the imperialist camps most hostile towards the USSR." The Committee publicized in the West 10 documentary pieces of disinformation, prepared in the name of state institutions and government figures of capitalist countries, and 193 other disinformation materials. The KGB took credit for staging a number of rallies, marches, and pickets in the United States, Japan, England, and other countries. It claimed to be instrumental in engineering 86 inquiries of governments and presentations in parliaments and 105 interviews of leading figures in these countries. In addition it asserted that it had helped organize 442 mass petitions to governments, distributed 3.221 million copies of various leaflets, and published abroad 126 books and brochures "unmasking aggressive policies of the USA" and its allies, as well as 3,097 articles and pieces in the media. The Committee reported that it had instigated all this through 15 newspapers and magazines on the KGB payroll.[16]

During the early Cold War and later, both U.S. and Soviet intelligence services used penetration, deception, and propaganda to groom potential allies and neutralize enemies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Each had a record of successes and failures during the 1950s. The KGB successfully played on French suspicions of West German militarism to frustrate ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC), the Western plan to create a "European army." The CIA had its own triumph in Iran by overthrowing Prime Minister Mossadeq and opening the way for conversion of that country into a mainstay of Western defense structures in the Middle East for a generation.

But U.S. intelligence failed during the 1950s to establish a network of influence in Eastern Europe, not to mention the Soviet Union itself. The KGB even in 1960 acted under the impression that it could do better in the United States, using the growing fatigue with the Dulles-Eisenhower hard line and growing public support for U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. The Committee pledged, in accord with its April 1960 instruction, to establish closer contacts with liberal Democrats in the U.S. Congress and to encourage them "to step up their pressure for improvement of relations between the USA and the Soviet Union and for settlement of international problems through negotiations." The KGB concentrated its propaganda efforts, it reported, on "left-wing trade unions, Quakers, pacifist, youth and other social organizations," and was even ready "to provide those organizations and some trusted individuals with the needed financial assistance in a clandestine way."[17]

According to the plan, the KGB proposed to subsidize the "American progressive publishing house 'Liberty Book Club' in order to publish and disseminate in the USA and other capitalist countries books prepared at our request."[18] The experiment seemed to promise further successes, since the KGB intended to internationalize it by opening club affiliates in England, Italy, and Japan. In a spirit of innovation, demonstrated in those years, the Committee also "studied the possibility of using a major American public relations agency for the distribution in the USA of truthful information about the Soviet Union."[19] These and similar undertakings required a lot of money, and some KGB operatives like Konon

Molody (Gordon Arnold Lonsdale) were encouraged to engage in lucrative businesses in the West and then funnel the profits into KGB foreign accounts.[20]

A special division of the KGB was busy fabricating disinformation on the production in the United States of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the development of new means of mass destruction. Faked documents, innuendo, and gossip were used to undercut U.S. positions and influence among delegations of Afro-Asian and Latin American countries in the United Nations and "to promote disorganization of the American voting machine in the structures of the UN." There were even attempts to sidetrack tariff talks among Western countries and "to use financial difficulties of the United States for strengthening of mistrust in the dollar."

On the KGB's list of targets in the propaganda warfare campaign were all the predictable suspects: U.S.-led regional alliances (NATO, SEATO, and CENTO) and U.S. military bases abroad, all denounced as tools for American meddling into the internal affairs of host countries. The Committee also contemplated a terrorist strike at Radio Liberty and the Soviet Studies Institute in Munich "to put out of order their equipment and to destroy their card indexes." Inside the United States this warfare was to be spearheaded against the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), a counterpart of the KGB psychological warfare division, and "the reactionary militarist group in U.S. ruling circles - [Nelson] ROCKEFELLER, [Lauris] NORSTAD, A. DULLES, E. [J. Edgar] HOOVER, as well as their allies in pushing an aggressive course in other countries."[21]

One name on the hit list was that of Allen W. Dulles, experienced in the espionage trade since the late 1930s and since 1953 presiding over the Central Intelligence Agency.[22] In 1960-1961, Dulles became the chief target of the KGB's vendetta.

The Hunt for Allen Dulles

The Dulles brothers had long inspired complex feelings inside the Soviet leadership. Time and again Vyacheslav Molotov and then Nikita Khrushchev betrayed an apprehension of them bordering on respectful awe. Khrushchev, in his typical manner, even engaged personally in a semi-public feud with Allen Dulles boasting that he read his briefing papers prepared for President Eisenhower and found them "boring." The Soviet leaders had some reasons to believe that their sources of "humint"—"human intelligence" garnered from agents and illegals—were many times greater than those of their American adversary. After a flurry of defectors following Stalin's death, the political and military intelligence apparatus had been reorganized, and its discipline and morale seemed to be restored. But the lull proved short-lived. From the mid-fifties onward Khrushchev's policies of reducing the KGB empire and curbing its operatives' privileges produced a new spate of treason. The response was ruthless: a new head of the First Main Directorate (PGU), Alexander Sakharovsky, reportedly took draconian measures to root out a plague of "defecting"; he personally pushed for operations designed to eliminate post-Stalin "traitors" Aleksandr Orlov, Vladimir Petrov, and Piotr Deriabin who had fled to the West and cooperated with Western counterintelligence.[23] (Evidently all three operations failed or were abandoned, since none of the three defectors was assassinated.)

Until the spring of 1960, Soviet foreign intelligence had reasons to believe it had a sound edge over its American counterpart. During 1960, Soviet operatives, together with "friends" from East European security forces, reportedly penetrated Western embassies in Eastern Europe on 52 occasions. They succeeded in illegally smuggling to the USSR five U.S. intelligence officers. They had a high-placed mole in the British counterintelligence MI5—George Blake—another one in NATO headquarters in Brussels, and many lesser ones.

But Allen Dulles had struck back with a new technological breakthrough: U-2 planes and then reconnaissance satellites to overfly and photograph the USSR. Shelepin sounded the alarm and in September 1959, during Khrushchev's visit to the United States, he sent a memo to the Department of Defense Industry of the Central Committee proposing a program to monitor the U.S. satellite "Discoverer." He proposed to obtain "directly and by agents" the data on frequency ranges used by transmitters on these satellites. Ivan Serbin, head of the Department, agreed that the issue was grave enough and sent Shelepin's memo for consideration to the Commission on military-industrial issues at the Council of Ministers.[24]

In fact, the U.S. space reconnaissance program produced a minor panic among Soviet academics who consulted for the KGB. Two of them, Academician L.I. Sedov and doctor of physics and mathematics G.S. Narimanov, warned in September 1959 that the "Discoverer" satellites could be successfully used by the Americans for military and intelligence purposes, "to put out of work our defense installations with electronic equipment over a large territory." With the help of satellite equipment, Shelepin reported, from a height of 200-300 km it would be possible efficiently to photograph stretches of the Earth of 50-90 km in width and 150,000 km in length.[25]

In other words, the KGB alerted the Soviet leaders in a timely fashion to the coming intelligence revolution. Khrushchev's reaction to the downing of an American U-2 seven months later, in May 1960, was, therefore, anything but surprise. The political slight, and even humiliation, that Khrushchev saw in this affair to himself and his country provoked his furious response. He disrupted the summit in Paris and irreparably ruined his relations with Eisenhower.[26] But in his opinion the U.S. president, though he accepted responsibility for the intelligence flights, merely shielded the real culprit: Allen Dulles. So Khrushchev, his considerable venom concentrated on the debonair socialite spymaster, evidently asked Shelepin to prepare a plan to discredit the CIA chief. Three weeks after Khrushchev's return from Paris, Shelepin's plan was formally approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

The document,[27] printed below, offers an extraordinary window into the state of mind and the methods of Soviet intelligence at the height of the Cold War confrontation with the United States:

[Handwritten note across top: "To the Secretariat [for signatures] (round the clock[28] among the secretaries) [—] M. Suslov, N. Mukhitdinov, O. Kuusinen"[29]]

USSR — Top Secret
Committee of State Security
Council of Ministers of the USSR
7 June 1960

CC CPSU[30]

The failure of the intelligence action prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

with the plane "Lockheed U-2" caused an aggravation of existing tensions between the CIA and other USA intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and also provoked protests by the American public and certain members of the Congress, who are demanding investigation of the CIA activities.

The Committee of state security considers it advisable to make use of this newly complex situation and to carry out the following measures targeted at further discrediting CIA activity and compromising its leader Allen DULLES:

1. In order to activate a campaign by DULLES' political and personal opponents:

a) to mail to them anonymous letters using the names of CIA officials criticizing its activity and the authoritarian leadership of DULLES;

b) to prepare a dossier which will contain publications from the foreign press and declarations of officials who criticized the CIA and DULLES personally, and to send it, using the name of one of members of the Democratic Party, to the Fulbright Committee [the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations] which is conducting an investigation into CIA activities in relation to the failure of the summit;

c) to send to some members of Congress, to the Fulbright Committee, and to the FBI specially prepared memos from two or three officials of the State Department with attached private letters, received (allegedly) from now deceased American diplomats, which would demonstrate CIA involvement in domestic decision-making, the persecution of foreign diplomats who took an objective stand, and which also would point out that, for narrow bureaucratic purposes, the CIA puts deliberately false data into information for the State Department;

d) to study the possibility and, if the opportunity presents itself, to prepare and disseminate through appropriate channels a document by former USA Secretary of State F. DULLES, which would make it clear that he exploited the resources of A. DULLES as leader of the CIA to fabricate compromising materials on his private and political adversaries;

e) to prepare, publish and disseminate abroad a satirical pamphlet on A. DULLES, using the American writer Albert KAHN who currently stays in Moscow to write the pamphlet.[31]

2. With the aim of further exposing the activities of American intelligence in the eyes of the public and to create preconditions with which the FBI and other USA intelligence services could substantiate their opinion about the CIA's inability to conduct effective intelligence:

a) to fabricate the failure of an American agent "Fyodorov," dropped in the Soviet Union by plane in 1952 and used by organs of the KGB in an operational game with the adversary.

To publish in the Soviet press an announcement about the arrest of "Fyodorov" as an American agent and, if necessary, to arrange a press-conference about this affair;

b) to agree with Polish friends about the exposure of the operational game led by the organs of the KGB along with the MSS PPR [Ministry of State Security of the Polish People's Republic] with a "conduit" on the payroll of American intelligence of the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN)- "Melnikovists." To this end to bring back to Poland the Polish MSS agent "Boleslav," planted in the course of this game on the OUN "conduit," and to arrange for him to speak to the press and radio about subversive activity by American intelligence against the USSR and PPR. To arrange, in addition, for public appearances by six American intelligence agents dropped on USSR and PPR territory as couriers of the "conduit" in the course of the game;

c) to suggest to the security bodies of the GDR that they arrange public trials for the recently arrested agents of American intelligence RAUE, KOLZENBURG, GLAND, USCHINGER and others.

To arrange for wide coverage of the trials' materials in the media of the GDR and abroad;

d) to disclose the operational game "Link" that the KGB conducts with the adversary and to organize public statements in the media aimed at foreign audiences by the agent "Maisky," a former commander of the "security service" of the Foreign *[Zakordonnikh chastei]* OUN (ZCh OUN), who had been transferred to Ukrainian territory in 1951 and used by us for this game.

Along with revelations about the anti-people activity of the ZCh OUN, "Maisky" will reveal American and British intelligence's use of the anti-Soviet organizations of Ukrainian emigration in subversive work in the Soviet Union;

e) Since about ten agents of the MSS of the GDR who "defected-in-place" to American intelligence have accomplished their missions and currently there is no prospect of their being further utilized, it should be suggested to our German friends to stage their return on the basis of disagreement with USA aggressive policies. In particular, this measure should be carried out with the participation of our friends' agent "Edelhardt" who had been assigned by an affiliate of American intelligence in West Berlin to gather spy information during his tourist trip around the USSR. To organize one or two press-conferences on these affairs with a demonstration of the spy equipment he received from American intelligence;

f) to discuss with our Polish and Albanian friends the advisability of bringing to the attention of governmental circles and of the public of the United States the fact that the security agencies of Poland and Albania for a number of years had been deluding American intelligence in the operational games "Win" and "John" and had obtained millions of dollars, weapons, equipment, etc. from it.

3. To utilize, provided our Hungarian friends agree, the American intelligence documents they obtained in the U.S. mission in Budapest [the underlined words were inserted by hand—ed.] to compromise the CIA and to aggravate the differences between the CIA and other intelligence services by publicizing some of the documents or by sending them to the FBI.

If necessary, the necessary documents should be forged using the existing samples.

4. In order to create mistrust in the USA government toward the CIA and to produce an atmosphere of mutual suspicion within the CIA staff, to work out and implement an operation creating the impression of the presence in the CIA system of KGB agents recruited from among rank-and-file American intelligence officers, who, following their recruitment, admit their guilt, allegedly on the order of Soviet intelligence. To stage for this purpose a relevant conversation within range of a [CIA] listening device, as well as the loss of an address book by a Soviet intelligence officer with the telephone number of a CIA official; to convey specially prepared materials to the adversary's attention through channels exposed to him, etc.

5. To work out and implement measures on blowing the cover of several scientific, commercial and other institutions, used by the CIA for its spy activities. In particular, to carry out such measures with regard to the "National Aeronautics and Space Administration" [NASA] and the "Informational Agency" of the USA [U.S. Information Agency (USIA)].

6. In order to disclose the subversive activities of the CIA against some governments, political parties and public figures in capitalist countries, and to foment mistrust toward Americans in the government circles of these countries, to carry out the following:

a) to stage in Indonesia the loss by American intelligence officer PALMER, who is personally acquainted with President SUKARNO and exerts a negative influence on him, a briefcase containing documents jointly prepared by the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR which apparently belong to the CIA station in Jakarta and which provide evidence of USA plans to utilize American agents and rebel forces to overthrow the government of SUKARNO;[32]

b) to carry out measures, with regard to the arrest in February of this year in the UAR [United Arab Republic] of a group of Israeli intelligence agents, to persuade the public in the UAR and Arab countries that American intelligence is linked to the activities of those agents and coordinates its work in the Arab East with Israeli intelligence.

To compromise, to this end, American intelligence officers KEMP and CONNOLLY who work under cover of the UN commission observing the armistice in Palestine;

c) to prepare and implement measures to make public the fact that American intelligence

made use of the Iranian newspapers "Fahrman" and "Etelliat," specifically mentioning the names of their agents (Abbas SHAHENDEH, Jalal NEMATOLLAKHI);

d) to publish articles in the foreign press showing the interference of American intelligence in the domestic affairs of other states, using as an example the illegal American police organization in Italy, found and liquidated at the end of 1959, that "worked on" Italian political parties under the direction of one of the diplomats at the American embassy;

e) to prepare and publicize a document by an American intelligence officer in Japan Robert EMMENSE in the form of a report to the USA ambassador [to Japan Douglas] MACARTHUR [II] into which information will be inserted about a decision allegedly taken by American intelligence to relocate "Lockheed U-2" planes temporarily to Japan, and then, in secrecy from the Japanese government, to return them to their old bases.

7. To work out measures which, upon implementation, would demonstrate the failure of the CIA efforts to actively on a concrete factual basis use various émigré centers for subversive work against countries in the socialist camp.

In particular, using the example of the anti-Soviet organization "The Union of the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" (SBONR), to discredit in the eyes of American taxpayers the activities of American intelligence in funding émigré organizations. To bring to light, along with other measures, real or forged American intelligence documents on its finances and guidance of subversive activities of the SBONR.

8. With the means available of the KGB to promote inquiries in the parliaments of England, France and other countries of their governments about their attitude to the hostile actions of USA intelligence intended to aggravate international tension.

9. To arrange public appearances by distinguished public and political figures of the East and West with appropriate declarations denouncing the aggressive activity of American intelligence.

10. To prepare and publish in the bourgeois press, through available means, a number of articles on the activities of the CIA and its leaders on the following questions:

a) about how A. DULLES used his position to promote his own enrichment. In particular, to demonstrate that DULLES gets big bribes from the "Lockheed" corporation for allocating contracts to produce reconnaissance planes. To indicate that the source of this information is the wife of a vice-president of "Lockheed" corporation and well-known American pilot Jacqueline COCHRAN, who allegedly leaked it in France on her way to the USSR in 1959;

b) about the CIA's violation of traditional principles of non-partisanship on the part of the USA intelligence service. To demonstrate that in reality the CIA is the tool of reactionary circles in the Republican Party, that it ignores the Senate, the Congress and public opinion in the country;

c) about the unjustifiably large expenditures of the CIA on its staff and its multitudinous agents and about the failure of its efforts to obtain information on the military-economic potential and scientific-technical achievements of the Soviet Union;

d) about the unprecedented fact that the American embassy in Budapest is hosting Cardinal MINDSZENTY, furnishing evidence that the Americans are flouting the sovereign rights of the Hungarian People's Republic and demonstrating the sloppy work of American intelligence that damages American prestige in the eyes of world public opinion;[33]

e) about the CIA's flawed methods of preparing spy cadres in the [training] schools at Fort Jersey (South Carolina) and in Monterey (California). To draw special attention to futility of efforts by the CIA and by DULLES personally to build a reliable intelligence [network] with emigrants from the USSR and the countries of people's democracies. To present a list of names of American intelligence officers and agents who have refused to work for DULLES on political, moral and other grounds;

f) about utilization by the CIA leadership of senior officials from the State Department, including ambassadors, for subversive and intelligence operations that cause great harm to USA prestige. In particular, to cite the example of DULLES' use of American ambassador [to South Korea Walter P.] MCCONAUGHY in subversive plans in Cambodia and then in South Korea;

g) about the activities of American intelligence in West Berlin in covering officers of West German intelligence services with documents of American citizens.

11. To approach the state security leadership in countries of people's democracy requesting that they use available means to discredit the CIA and to compromise A. DULLES.

Asking for your agreement to aforementioned measures,

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE

[signature] (A. Shelepin)

The signatures of Mikhail Suslov, Nikolai Mukhitdinov, and Otto Kuusinen showed that the responsible members of the Secretariat had approved the document—a process that could not have taken place without Khrushchev's assent as well. On 3 November 1960, Shelepin reported to the Central Committee on the KGB's progress in carrying out the plan.[34] On 25 February 1961, after the Kennedy Administration came to power in Washington, the KGB again returned to the operation against Dulles, an Eisenhower holdover who for the time being remained in his post. The KGB suggested measures "to foment mistrust towards the leadership of American intelligence on the part of the Kennedy administration and the intelligence services of the allies." Among other things, the KGB intended "to create among Americans an opinion that documentary information leaks directly from the staff of the CIA." It also plotted "to arrange through a 'double' channel, known to the adversary, a transmittal from Washington of a real classified instruction signed by DULLES and obtained by the KGB." Also proposed were measures "aimed at discrediting the activities of American intelligence directed at the removal from the political arena of politicians and governments, in particular in India and Turkey, who are not welcomed by the USA."[35]

It would be tempting to try to track down all the "incidents" produced by this elaborate planning. It is obvious, however, that the Kennedy administration was looking for a pretext to replace the old cold warrior atop the CIA, and one presented itself after the April 1961 failure of the CIA-trained expedition against the Castro regime at the Bay of Pigs. Soviet intelligence had known about the preparation and evidently Castro's border troops were all in readiness, tipped off by Moscow (and *The New York Times*, for that matter) and ready to teach Americans a bloody lesson. Broadly speaking, the KGB in this case won a considerable victory over its overseas enemy. In late September 1961 Dulles announced his retirement, which went into effect two months later.

But the battle between the two intelligence giants continued, and between April 1961 and October 1962 Soviet intelligence suffered terrible blows from internal treason: senior GRU officer Oleg Penkovsky served a precious 18 months as a source for the Western intelligence community. In May 1961, KGB officer Yuri Loginov became an agent for U.S. intelligence. In December 1961, Anatoly Golitsyn defected from Helsinki. In June 1962, Yuri Nosenko, deputy head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, internal security and counterintelligence, began passing classified Soviet docu-

ments to the CIA (and in February 1964 he, too, would defect). The scale tilted abruptly in the CIA's favor.

The Crisis in Berlin...and in the KGB

The disastrous wave of betrayal and defections in the KGB occurred at a moment of maximum international tension between the Moscow and the West, marked by the Berlin and the Cuban crises. This was not simply a coincidence. In the cases of some double-agents and defectors, among them Penkovsky and Nosenko, psychological and ideological, not material motives, prevailed. As Khrushchev raised the ante, bluffing against Washington, some informed members of the Soviet post-Stalin elites felt acutely uncomfortable. Khrushchev seemed unpredictable, mercurial, reckless, and just plain dangerous—not only to the West but to those Soviets growing accustomed to peaceful coexistence and the relative luxuries it allowed for the chosen members of the *nomenklatura*. The seemingly permanent state of nerve-wracking crisis, coinciding with a drastic expansion of cultural and human contacts across the Iron Curtain and the weakening of Stalinist fundamentalism in the East, strained loyalty to and belief in the regime and system, and in some cases pushed individuals to switch sides.

The KGB's foreign intelligence and other divisions were heavily involved in various ways in the Berlin Crisis. They tested the temperature of U.S. and NATO reactions to Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate treaty with the German Democratic Republic which would give the GDR control over Western access routes to West Berlin. One scoop came when Khrushchev decided to let the East German communists close the sectorial border between the East and West Berlin, a decision resulting in the infamous Wall. On 4-7 August 1961, the foreign ministers of four Western countries (the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany) held secret consultations in Paris. The only question on the agenda was: how to react to the Soviet provocations in Berlin? In the course of these meetings Western representatives expressed an understanding of the defensive nature of Soviet campaign in Germany, and unwillingness to risk a war.[36] In less than three weeks the KGB laid on Khrushchev's desk quite accurate descriptions of the Paris talks, well ahead of its rival, the GRU. The intelligence materials correctly noted that, in contrast to the West Germans, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk supported talks with the Soviet Union aimed at preservation of the *status quo ante*. However, the KGB and GRU warned that pressure in the alliance was forcing the Americans to consider economic sanctions against the GDR and other socialist countries, as well as to accelerate plans for conventional and nuclear armament of their West European allies, including the West German Bundeswehr.[37]

Another line of KGB involvement in the crisis concerned strategic deception. On 29 July 1961, KGB chief Shelepin sent a memorandum to Khrushchev containing a mind-boggling array of proposals to create "a situation in various areas of the world which would favor dispersion of attention and forces by the USA and their satellites, and would tie them down during the settlement of the question of a German peace treaty and West Berlin." The multifaceted deception campaign, Shelepin claimed, would "show to the ruling circles of Western powers that unleashing a military conflict

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over West Berlin can lead to the loss of their position not only in Europe, but also in a number of countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa."[38] Khrushchev sent the memo with his approval to his deputy Frol Kozlov[39] and on August 1 it was, with minor revisions, passed as a Central Committee directive. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense were instructed to work out more "specific measures and present them for consideration by the CC CPSU."[40]

The first part of the deception plan must have pleased Khrushchev, who in January 1961 had pledged, before the communists of the whole world, to assist "movements of national liberation." Shelepin advocated measures "to activate by the means available to the KGB armed uprisings against pro-Western reactionary governments." The destabilizing activities started in Nicaragua where the KGB plotted an armed mutiny through an "Internal revolutionary front of resistance" in coordination with Castro's Cubans and with the "Revolutionary Front Sandino." Shelepin proposed to "make appropriations from KGB funds in addition to the previous assistance 10,000 American dollars for purchase of arms." Shelepin planned also the instigation of an "armed uprising" in El Salvador, and a rebellion in Guatemala, where guerrilla forces would be given $15,000 to buy weapons.

The campaign extended to Africa, to the colonial and semi-colonial possessions of the British and the Portuguese. The KGB promised to help organize anti-colonial mass uprisings of the African population in British Kenya and Rhodesia and Portuguese Guinea, by arming rebels and training military cadres.

Nor did Shelepin forget the Far East. An ardent supporter of Sino-Soviet reconciliation, he played this "Chinese card" once again. He suggested "to bring to attention of the USA through KGB information channels information about existing agreement among the USSR, the PRC [People's Republic of China], the KPDR [Korean People's Democratic Republic; North Korea] and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam; North Vietnam] about joint military actions to liberate South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan in case of the eruption of armed conflict in Germany." The Soviet General Staff, proposed Shelepin, together with the KGB, "should work out the relevant disinformation materials" and reach agreement "with Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese friends about demonstration of military preparations in those areas."

Next came the bubbling cauldron of the Middle East. Shelepin planned "to cause uncertainty in government circles of the USA, England, Turkey, and Iran about the stability of their positions in the Middle and Near East." He offered to use old KGB connections with the chairman of Democratic party of Kurdistan, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, "to activate the movement of the Kurdish population of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey for creation of an independent Kurdistan that would include the provinces of aforementioned countries." Barzani was to be provided with necessary aid in arms and money.[41] "Given propitious developments," noted Shelepin with foresight, "it would become advisable to express the solidarity of Soviet people with this movement of the Kurds."

"The movement for the creation of Kurdistan," he predicted, "will evoke serious concern among Western powers and first of all in England regarding [their access to] oil in Iraq and Iran, and in the United States regarding its military bases in Turkey. All that will create also difficulties for [Iraqi Prime Minister Gen. Abdul Karim] KASSIM who has begun to conduct a pro-Western policy, especially in recent time."[42]

The second component of the Shelepin grand plan was directed against NATO installations in Western Europe and aimed "to create doubts in the ruling circles of Western powers regarding the effectiveness of military bases located on the territory of the FRG and other NATO countries, as well as in the reliability of their personnel." To provoke the local population against foreign bases, Shelepin contemplated working with the GDR and Czechoslovakia secret services to carry out "active measures...to demoralize" military servicemen in the FRG (by agents, leaflets, and brochures), and even terrorist attacks on depot and logistics stations in West Germany and France.[43]

One of the more imaginative strands in the web of Soviet strategic deception concerned the number and even existence of new types of arms and missiles. Along with the General Staff, the KGB long practiced a dubious combination of super-secrecy and bluffing, thereby producing a series of panicky assessments in the West about a "bomber gap" and then a "missile gap." This time Shelepin asked Khrushchev to assign to his organization and the military the task of making the West believe that the Soviets were absolutely prepared to launch an attack in retaliation for Western armed provocations over West Berlin. The disinformation package included the following tasks:

> — to convince the West that Soviet land forces were now armed with new types of tanks "equipped with tactical nuclear weapons";
> — to create a conviction among the enemy "about a considerable increase of readiness of Rocket Forces and of the increased number of launching pads—produced by the supply of solid liquid ballistic missiles of medium range and by the transfer from stationary positions to mobile launching positions on highways and railroads which secure high maneuverability and survivability";
> — to spread a false story about the considerable increase in the number of nuclear submarines with solid-fuel "Polaris" missiles;
> — to bring to Western attention "information about the strengthening of anti-aircraft defense";
> — to disorient the enemy regarding the availability in the Soviet Air Forces of "new types of combat-tactical aircraft with 'air-to-air' and 'air-to-ground' missiles with a large operational range."[44]

It is not clear when Shelepin learned about Khrushchev's decision to close the sectoral border between East and West Berlin, but the Wall went up just two weeks after his letter. It seems that the Wall took some heat off the problem. But in October-November 1961, the KGB and the military leadership evidently still believed that the signing of a separate peace treaty with the GDR was possible and designed its "distraction" measures anticipating that this treaty would be a source of serious tension with the West. Indeed, sharp tension did arise in late October when U.S. tanks confronted two Soviet tank platoons in Berlin near Checkpoint Charlie.

On November 10, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and KGB Deputy Chief Peter Ivashutin asked the Central Committee Secretariat to approve, in addition to the crisis contingency planning by the military forces, deceptive steps "directed at producing in the adversary's mind a profound

conviction that the Soviet Union firmly intends to use force in response to military provocations of Western powers and has at its disposal all necessary combat means." The KGB took upon itself the task "to inform Western intelligence through unofficial channels that the Soviet Union has taken necessary measures to strengthen its troops in the GDR and to arm them with more modern tactical missiles, newer tanks, and other armaments sufficient for the delivery of a quick and crushing response strike on the adversary."

Through the same channels KGB intended "to increase the adversary's belief in the high maneuverability and mobility of Soviet armed forces and their readiness, in case the West unleashes an armed conflict in Germany, to move within a minimal time up to the battle lines of the European theater. To convey as a proof thereof that this summer, during the exercises in the Near-Carpathian and other military districts, some divisions demonstrated an average speed of advancement of about 110-130 km per day."

Along the lines of Shelepin's proposal, the KGB's military-industrial consultants suggested other disinformation steps. Perhaps echoing Khrushchev's boast that his missiles could "hit a fly in the sky," the Committee proposed to convey to U.S. intelligence the information that during its recent series of atomic tests—in Sept.-Oct. 1961—the Soviet Union successfully "tested a superpowerful thermonuclear warhead, along with a system of detecting and eliminating the adversary's missiles in the air."

The KGB laboratories fabricated "evidence" for U.S. intelligence about "the solution in the Soviet Union of the problem of constructing simple but powerful and user-convenient atomic engines for submarines which allow in the short run increasing considerably the number of atomic submarines up to fifteen." (The ever-vigilant Shelepin deleted the number from the text—the super-secretive Soviets excised numbers even in disinformation!)

Finally, the KGB received instructions "to promote a legend about the invention in the Soviet Union of an aircraft with a close-circuited nuclear engine and its successful flight tests which demonstrated the engine's high technical capacities and its safety in exploitation." "On the basis of the M-50 'Myasischev' aircraft, with consideration of the results of those flight tests," according to this disinformation, "a strategic bomber with nuclear engines and unlimited range has been designed."[45]

Even now, reading those documents gives one chills down the spine. Determined to deal with their opponent from a position of strength, and possessing the intoxicating capacity to hide or invent information, to deceive and to bluff, Kremlin leaders went too far, to the very brink where the fine line between deterring an attack and preparing for one blurred altogether. To make matters worse, Khrushchev often held his cards so close to his chest that even his closest subordinates could not guess his true intentions. Inside the KGB there were many levels of knowledge, to be sure, but it seems, for instance, that the famous "Bolshakov channel" and the sensitive information that passed along it to the Kennedy administration during the Berlin crisis were sometimes not reported even to the KGB's highest hierarchy, only to the CPSU General Secretary.[46]

No wonder that a great number of junior and senior officials in the Soviet military and intelligence elites were scared to death. Some of them were convinced that Khrushchev was crazy and had become a victim of his own "hare-brained schemes." This scare still waits to be described by a creative quill. But one of its most tangible traces was a stream of well-positioned defectors.

In his June 1960 plan to discredit Allen Dulles and the CIA, quoted earlier, Shelepin had envisioned fostering "an atmosphere of mutual suspicion within the CIA staff" by fostering fears of KGB penetration within the agency. In fact, as Shelepin hoped, a paranoid "mole-hunt" in the Western intelligence community did occur, but apparently as a by-product of authentic defections from Soviet intelligence rather than because of Shelepin's deliberate deception campaign. Major Anatoliy Golitsyn became a pivotal figure in this regard. He was the least informed of the new crop of KGB defectors, but the echoes of Shelepin's grandiose plans reached his ear. It has been argued, with some justification, that the harm that this stocky Ukrainian defector caused to careers and environment in the CIA could have been done only by a Soviet double-agent. The alliance between Golitsyn and CIA counter-intelligence chief James Angleton was indeed more ruinous for American operatives who fell under suspicion in the frantic "mole-hunt" than for real KGB agents.[47]

It is ironic that KGB leadership had no premonition about this at all. There is, indeed, newly available evidence about how painful Golitsyn's defection was to the KGB. On 28 July 1962, a new KGB chief, Vladimir Semichastny, wrote to Shelepin, now promoted to the Party Secretariat:

> According to reliable evidence American intelligence is preparing a broad campaign of provocation against the Soviet Union that will involve a traitor of Motherland GOLITSYN and other traitors, along with double-agents and provocateurs.

"The Americans count on this provocation," continued Semichastny while ignoring the irony of his words, "to dispel to some extent the impression among the public that the USA is an organizer of world espionage, and to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is conducting active intelligence work in all countries."

The Committee proposed "measures to discredit GOLITSYN" in the eyes of his CIA debriefers by implicating him in a felony. According to the plan, the newspaper *Soviet Russia* was to publish an article about a trial that allegedly had been held in Leningrad on a case of hard currency smuggling. The KGB would "let Americans know, without mentioning GOLITSYN's name, that this article has something to so with him." In case Golitsyn came up "with slanderous declarations," the KGB planned to arrange more publications about his invented criminal background and to demand, after that, from the U.S. government through official channels the "extradition of GOLITSYN as a criminal."

As a last resort, Semichastny asked for Party sanction "to carry out an operation on his [GOLITSYN'S] removal."[48]

Scorpions in a bottle

Glasnost on Soviet intelligence activities has yet to reach the level achieved by the American side during the congressional hearings of the Church and Pike committees in the mid-1970s. But the documents found recently in the CC CPSU archives do shed considerable light on KGB operations and indicate, without mincing words, how ambitious, various and extensive were KGB ac-

tivities, especially against the "number one enemy," the United States. There is little doubt that almost any document on the Soviet side has its U.S. counterpart in Langley still hidden from public view.[49] The process of mutual emulation started after the defection of Soviet cypher clerk Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa, Canada, in the summer of 1945. Ever since then the American intelligence agencies and the FBI, seconded by Soviet defectors, argued that they needed more discretionary resources and rights to match a well-prepared and ruthless enemy.

The KGB documents prove that the enemy was, indeed, ingenious, resourceful, and prepared to go very far. The emphasis on disinformation and on the use of various groups and movements in the "third world" had, of course, been a direct continuation of the OGPU-NKVD tradition in the 1920s-1940s.[50] Back then, the Soviet intelligence leaned extensively on the networks of the Comintern and other individuals sympathetic to the Soviet "experiment." This network suffered from blows and defections as a result of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and its spectacular unveiling at the February 1956 CPSU Twentieth Party Congress. But the collapse of colonial empires and the surge of radicalism and nationalism in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East was a bonanza for Soviet intelligence, bent on expanding their contacts in those parts of the world.

The KGB, no doubt, fulfilled orders from the top. Khrushchev's support of "wars of national liberation" was a big step toward the globalization of Soviet foreign policy, and therefore of the Cold War. It is clear from the KGB documents, however, that even at that time of escalating covert superpower rivalry in the Third World, the Kremlin leadership retained clear *Realpolitik* priorities: with the exception of those posted in Cuba, Soviet intelligence agents in Third World countries were used by the Soviet leadership and its external arm, the KGB's First Directorate, as pawns in a geostrategic game centered firmly on Berlin.

Yet, the KGB had its own distinctive impact on the Cold War. The documents presented in this article challenge the myth that KGB officials (and some American counterparts as well) like to promulgate: that the intelligence services of both sides, by increasing "transparency" about the adversary's intentions and capabilities, thereby contributed to stability and predictability in a dangerously polarized world. Some intelligence efforts that were genuinely devoted to reconnaissance, and reduced fears of a surprise attack, may well have done so.

But the games of deception, disinformation, and distraction designed by the KGB masterminds had a deleterious effect on global stability. They certainly contributed to the perception in Washington of expansive Soviet ambitions. In some cases they even exacerbated the danger of armed conflict. And the elaborate plots to sow the seeds of mistrust between the U.S. leadership and intelligence agencies was dictated by anything but a clear comprehension of how dangerous this kind of conspiracy had become in the nuclear age.

The legacy of the covert activities undertaken by the KGB and CIA at this key juncture of the Cold War was ambiguous: besides the function of obtaining and relaying objective information to their respective leaderships, the two rival intelligence organizations behaved, to borrow Oppenheimer's classic description of the nuclear predicament, like two scorpions in a bottle, prepared to sting each other until death.

The fact that the Cold War in the 1970s and the late 1980s looked more like a "long peace" appeared to have limited impact on the mentality of intelligence officials in Washington and Moscow.[51] By then, the KGB's First Directorate concentrated even more on technical-scientific espionage, which reflected, on the one hand, a long-standing symbiosis between the Soviet intelligence services and the military-industrial nexus, and, on the other, a distancing from "cloak and dagger" covert activities. Vladimir Kryuchkov, later a KGB chief and conspirator in the August 1991 hardline coup attempt, was to a large extent a product of this specialization in scientific-technical espionage.

The paranoia of Kryuchkov, who to this day believes that the West was nurturing a "fifth column" to demoralize and subvert Soviet society, as well as that of his CIA counterpart Angleton, was underpinned and "substantiated" by the shady games and counter-games in which the two intelligence services had engaged all during the Cold War. The alleged existence of American "agents of influence" inside Soviet society and even government—a key tenet of Kryuchkov's homilies for vigilance—had been, indeed, a matter of pride for the CIA since the 1970s and can now, to a very limited extent, even be documented from U.S. government sources.[52]

But the paranoia, even when it fed on realities, remained for the most part a self-deception. The KGB's methods and proclivity for Jesuitical twists of imagination distorted the minds of Kryuchkov and many others. While the whole atmosphere of the Cold War existed, this mind-frame was contagious and spread like cancer.

There was always a sound and pragmatic side to intelligence: the collection and analysis of information. There were failures and errors in this work, but, in general, the record shows considerable accuracy and consistent objectivity, at least as far as the specific actions and motives were concerned. But the darker side of intelligence activity, linked to the Cold War mentality and actions, always co-existed with the former, sometimes casting a long shadow. The resources spent on intelligence operations related to psychological warfare and deception had a dynamic of diminishing returns: the disruption caused by them in the enemy's camp rarely justified the money and efforts spent on them.

1. [Ed. note: It is clear that the United States enjoyed massive numerical superiority in strategic nuclear weapons over the USSR at the time of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but the precise ratio of deliverable nuclear weapons has not been definitely ascertained. Several accounts have used a ratio of 17-1, e.g., Robert S. McNamara, *Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 44-45. A recent accounting of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals during the Cold War, based in part on statistics recently declassified by the U.S. Department of Energy, implied a ratio of closer to nine-to-one at the time. It showed that in 1962 the United States had a total stockpile of 27,100 warheads, including 3,451 mounted on strategic delivery vehicles, and the USSR possessed a total stockpile of 3,100 warheads, including 481 strategic weapons. (Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "Nuclear Notebook: Estimated U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-94," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 50:6 (Nov-Dec. 1994), 58-59.) However, the table did not reflect disparities in strategic delivery vehicles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which overwhelmingly favored the United States.]

2. See Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), and David Wise, *Molehunt: How the Search for a Phantom Traitor Shattered the CIA* (New York: Random House, 1992; Avon, 1994).

3. See Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espio-*

nage Against the West (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Leonid Shebarshin, *Ruka Moskvy* [*Arm of Moscow*] (Moscow: Center-100, 1992), and *Iz Zhizni Nachalnika Razvedki* [*From the Life of the Head of Intelligence*] (Moscow: International Relations, 1994); and Vadim Kirpichenko, *Iz arkhiva razvedchika* [*From the Archive of an intelligence officer*] (Moscow: International Relations, 1993).

4. The author encountered the KGB documents used in this article while conducting research in Moscow in late 1992, for a book on Soviet leaders and the Cold War, in the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (known by its Russian acronym, TsKhSD, for *Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii*), located at Il'inka 12 in Staraya Ploschad' (Old Square). This is the archive containing the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee. The author was also, at the time, researching the 1960-62 period for his paper on U.S.-Soviet crises for the Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History organized by the Cold War International History Project and held in Moscow in January 1993 in cooperation with TsKhSD and the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Universal History. At that conference, some of the KGB documents cited in this article were described in a paper ("The Mentality of Soviet Society and the Cold War") by Russian historian Vitaly S. Lelchuk (Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences), sparking a general discussion of the intelligence service's role in the Kremlin's handling of the U-2 affair.

Although the KGB archives for this period remain closed to scholars, with the limited exception of an arrangement with Crown Publishers to publish a series of books on selected topics, scholars have been able to conduct research on an increasingly regular basis in the archives of the CPSU CC (TsKhSD and the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Recent Documents (RTsKhIDNI)), the Russian Foreign Ministry (MID) archives, and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Moreover, the promulgation of several Russian laws and regulations mandating a 30-year-rule for most archival files, including Politburo records, inspires hope that a more thorough analysis of Khrushchev's foreign and intelligence policies is becoming possible. For details on the Russian archival scene, see Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 18-39. For more on the KGB archives, see the report by Arseny Roginski and Nikita Okhotin, circulated in 1992 and slated for publication as a CWIHP Working Paper; Amy Knight, "The Fate of the KGB Archives," *Slavic Review* 52:3 (Fall 1993), 582-6; and Yevgenia Albats, *The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present and Future* (New York: Farrar, Straus Giroux, 1994).

5. KGB to Nikita Khrushchev, "Report for 1960," 14 February 1961, in CC CPSU Secretariat's "special dossier" [*osobaya papka*], hereafter abbreviated as "St.", protocol no. 179/42c, 21 March 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 74, ll. [pages] 144-58.

6. Ibid., 1.147.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., l. 154.

9. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 133-142, esp. 141-142.

10. KGB to Khrushchev, "Report for 1960," 14 February 1961, cited above.

11. The 7 April 1960 directive was cited in KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, Fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, l. 133. The original directive was not located.

12. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, cited above.

13. Ibid., ll. 136-137.

14. Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, 107 ff.

15. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, cited above, 1. 140.

16. KGB to Khrushchev, "Report for 1960," 14 February 1961, St. 179/42c, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 74, 1.149.

17. KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, 1.137.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 440.

21. The above two paragraphs are based on KGB to CC CPSU, 10 March 1961, in St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961-TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 138-139. [Ed. note: Nelson Rockefeller, a member of the country's wealthiest families, Governor of New York State, and briefly a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1960, had been a Special Assistant to Eisenhower on Cold War psychological warfare strategy; Gen. Lauris Norstad was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR); A. Dulles headed the CIA and J. Edgar Hoover was FBI director.]

22. [Ed. note: On the career of Allen W. Dulles, see the profile in H.W. Brands, *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 48-68; the new biography by Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994) and a forthcoming biography by James L. Srodes; and a five-volume internal CIA history of his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence: Wayne G. Jackson, *Allen Welsh Dulles As Director of Central Intelligence, 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961*, declassified with deletions in 1994, copy available from the CIA History Office and on file at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.]

23. Oleg Kalugin, "Vozhdi Razvedki" ["Chiefs of Intelligence"], *Moscow News* 2 (10 January 1993), 9; see also Kalugin, *The First Directorate*, 93-98. [Ed. note: Orlov defected from the NKVD in 1938 and in 1954 published an exposé that undoubtedly infuriated Moscow: *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (London: Jarrolds, 1954). Petrov and Deriabin both defected in 1954. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story*, 164, 427, 675 n. 9.]

24. Shelepin (KGB) to CC CPSU, 26 September 1959, and Serbin to Commission on Military-industrial issues, 6 October 1959, both in St. 122/7, 14 October 1959, fond 4, opis 13, delo 57, ll. 56-62.

25. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 26 September 1959, in ibid., ll. 60-61.

26. See Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair* (New York: Harper, 1986).

27. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 7 June 1960, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 65, ll. 12-37 in Special Dossier of the Secretariat of the Central Committee 153/30c from 14.VI.60 (14 June 1960). The 7 June 1960 KGB document's existence first became public knowledge in January 1993 when it was described by Russian historian Vitaly S. Lelchuk to the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History; the document was also referred to in Vitaly S. Lelchuk and Yefim I. Pivovar, "Mentalitet Sovietskogo Obshchestva i Kholodnaya Voina" ["The Mentality of Soviet Society and the Cold War"], *Otechestvennaya Istoria* [*Fatherland History*] 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1993), 70-71.

28. That formula meant that the decision was already taken at the top and an agreement of the rest of the Central Committee Secretaries was just a mere formality. In other cases, when no clear consensus existed or a leader was not sure himself, he put it to a vote of the Politburo or the Secretariat.

29. Mikhail Suslov, Nikolai Mukhitdinov, and Otto Kuusinen were three full members (Secretaries) of the CC CPSU Secretariat.

30. This document was sent by the KGB to the Secretariat, the technical body of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which usually dealt with more routine issues than the Politburo.

31. [Ed. note: This evidently refers to the American writer Albert E. Kahn (1912-1979), a journalist and author sympathetic to socialism who had been blacklisted during the McCarthy era and who (after recovering his passport, which the government had taken from him for several years) spent the first half of 1960 in Moscow working on a book on the Bolshoi ballerina Galina Ulanova (subsequently published as *Days With Ulanova* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962). Contacted by CWIHP in Helena, Montana, where he is the state director of the Montana Nature Conservancy, Kahn's son Brian Kahn stated that to his knowledge his father was never approached to write a publication ridiculing Allen W. Dulles and never did so; and that, while sympathetic to socialism and the USSR, he would not have written anything at the direction of Soviet intelligence. "[My father] would write a pamphlet on a political issue that he believed in; but he wouldn't do it at the request of anybody," said Brian Kahn. "He would never do it if he were aware that he was being manipulated; that he would offend his sense of integrity as a writer." Brian Kahn said his father once met in the Kremlin with Nikita Khrushchev and proposed collaborating with him on an autobiography, but that the Soviet leader did not pursue the idea, which Kahn later implemented with Pablo Casals (*Joys and Sorrows* (Simon & Schuster, 1970)). Albert Kahn also authored, among other books, *Sabotage! The Secret War Against America* (Little, Brown, 1942), an expose of pro-fascist activities in the United States; *The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against the Soviet Union* (Little, Brown, 1946), an account of Western actions against the USSR highly sympathetic to Moscow; *High Treason* (Lear, 1950); *Smetana and the Beetles* (Random House, 1967), a satirical pamphlet about Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva; and *The Matusow Affair* (Moyer Bell Ltd., 1987), a posthumously-published account of a McCarthy-era case.]

32. The KGB in this case wanted to kill two birds with one stone. Fears that Americans could influence a "third world" communist leader were pervasive and not without foundation. In 1979 similar fears about Hafizullah Amin, leader of the Afghan "revolution," probably helped convince Politburo member Yuri Andropov, former KGB chief, of the necessity of Soviet military intervention to "save" this country.

33. Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Roman Catholic Primate, was arrested by the Hungarian communist regime in 1948 and sentenced to life imprisonment on treason and currency charges in 1949 (reduced to house arrest in 1955). During the Hungarian October revolution of 1956 he was freed, but, after the Soviet intervention, the U.S. embassy in Budapest gave him political asylum until his death in 1971.

34. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 3 November 1960, in St.-

199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 23-27.

35. Shelepin to CC CPSU, 25 February 1961, in ibid., ll.28-29.

36. See memorandum of conversation, "Tripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany" (D. Rusk, Lord Home, M. Couve de Murville), 5 August 1961, Berlin Crisis collection, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

37. Lt.-Gen. A. Rogov to Marshal Malinovsky, 24 August 1961, TsKhSD, fond 5, opis 30, delo 365, ll. 142-153. The texts of preceding reports of the KGB with parallel intelligence were not available in the archives.

38. Shelepin to Khrushchev, 29 July 1961, in St. - 191/75gc 1 August 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 81, ll. 130-134, quoted passages on l. 130.

39. Handwritten notation on cover letter from Shelepin to Khrushchev, 29 July 1961.

40. CC CPSU directive, St.-191/75gc, 1 August 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 81, ll. 128-129.

41. [Ed. note: U.S. officials had noted with concern the possibility that Barzani might be useful to Moscow. In an October 1958 cable to the State Department three months after a military coup brought Kassim to power, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar J. Gallman, stated that "Communists also have potential for attack [on Iraqi Prime Minister Kassim-ed.] on another point through returned Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani. He spent last eleven years in exile in Soviet Union. His appeal to majority of Iraqi Kurds is strong and his ability [to] disrupt stability almost endless. Thus we believe that today greatest potential threat to stability and even existence of Qassim's [Kassim's] regime lies in hands of Communists." See Gallman to Department of State, 14 October 1958, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, Vol. XII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 344-46. Barzani's alleged ties to the KGB are discussed in Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatolii Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1994), 259-64.]

42. Shelepin also proposed an initiative to entice Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, a Third World leader avidly courted by both East and West, into throwing his support behind the Kurds. Shelepin suggested informing Nasser "through unofficial channels" that, in the event of a Kurdish victory, Moscow "might take a benign look at the integration of the non-Kurdish part of Iraqi territory with the UAR"—the United Arab Republic, a short-lived union of Egypt and Syria reflecting Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism—"on the condition of NASSER's support for the creation of an independent Kurdistan." Shelepin to Khrushchev, 29 July 1961, in St.-191/75gc, 1 August 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 81, ll. 131-32. When a Kurdish rebellion indeed broke out in northern Iraq in September 1961, the KGB quickly responded with additional proposals to exploit the situation. KGB Deputy Chairman Peter Ivashutin proposed—"In accord with the decision of the CC CPSU...of 1 August 1961 on the implementation of measures favoring the distraction of the attention and forces of the USA and her allies from West Berlin, and in view of the armed uprisings of the Kurdish tribes that have begun in the North of Iraq"—to: 1) use the KGB to organize pro-Kurdish and anti-Kassim protests in India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Guinea, and other countries; 2) have the KGB meet with Barzani to urge him to "seize the leadership of the Kurdish movements in his hands and to lead it along the democratic road," and to advise him to "keep a low profile in the course of this activity so that the West did not have a pretext to blame the USSR in meddling into the internal affairs of Iraq"; and 3) assign the KGB to recruit and train a "special armed detachment (500-700 men)" drawn from Kurds living in the USSR in the event that Moscow might need to send Barzani "various military experts (Artillerymen, radio operators, demolition squads, etc.)" to support the Kurdish uprising. P. Ivashutin to CC CPSU, 27 September 1961, St.-199/10c, 3 October 1961, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 13, delo 85, ll. 1-4. The uprising continued until a group of Ba'athist military officers overthrew Kassim in spring 1963, and of course the Kurdish problem remains unresolved more than three decades later. For an overview of Kremlin policy on the Kurdish issue, written before the opening of Soviet archives, see Oles M. Smolandsky with Bettie M. Smolandsky, *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), 63-98.

43. In particular, Shelepin envisioned operations to set ablaze a British Air Force fuel depot near Arzberg in West Germany, and to stage an explosion at a U.S. military-logistics base in Chinon, France. Ibid., 1.133.

44. Ibid., ll. 133-134.

45. The above five paragraphs are based on Ivashutin and Malinovsky to CC CPSU, 10 November 1961, in St. 2/35c, 14 November 1961, TsKhSD, fond 14, opis 14, delo 1, ll. 10-14.

46. Georgi Bolshakov was a GRU officer who acted under the cover of a press secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1961-62. He often met with Robert Kennedy, the President's brother, delivering Khrushchev's personal messages, mostly orally. See Michael Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

47. See Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, and Wise, *Mole-Hunt*, passim.

48. Semichastny to Shelepin, 28 July 1962, in St. 33/26c, 31 August 1962, TsKhSD, fond 4, opis 14, delo 13, ll. 1-6.

49. [Ed. note: Since 1991, CIA directors in the Bush and Clinton administrations have promised to declassify records pertaining to covert operations during the early Cold War, including those relating to the Italian elections (1948), coups in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), the Bay of Pigs (1961), and others. To date, only one recent large-scale declassification of a U.S. covert operation has become known: the release of documents regarding operations in Indonesia against the Sukarno government, included in the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* volume for Indonesia, 1958-1960, published by the Department of State in 1994. (See Jim Mann, "CIA's Covert Indonesian Operation in the 1950s Acknowledged by U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 October 1994, 5.) Press reports indicate that government officials have blocked the declassification (For publication in *FRUS*) of documents disclosing two other CIA covert operations from this period, one to finance pro-American Japanese politicians and the other, during the Kennedy administration, to overthrow a leftist government in British Guyana. See Tim Weiner, "C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's," *New York Times*, 9 October 1994; Tim Weiner, "A Kennedy-C.I.A. Plot Returns to Haunt Clinton," *New York Times*, 30 October 1994; and Tim Weiner, "Keeping the Secrets That Everyone Knows," *New York Times* (Week-in-Review section), 30 October 1994.]

50. The OGPU (*Obyeddinenoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie*, for Unified State Political Directorate), successor to the short-lived GPU, lasted from 1923 to 1934, when it was converted into the GUGB (Main Administration of State Security) and integrated into the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). The NVKD in 1946 became the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

51. On the mentality of Soviet leaders in the Cold War, see Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine V. Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming in 1995). For the "long peace" thesis, including the argument that intelligence activities contributed to stability during the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 215-45.

52. In a December 1976 briefing, CIA representatives informed the incoming Carter Administration National Security Council staff officials Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron of "current Soviet agents and the nature of the materials they provide us with. Brzezinski and Aaron seemed quite impressed, though Brzezinski wondered whether such agents could not be used to pull off a rather massive disinformation operation against the U.S. [Bill] Wells [from the CIA] explained why this is not likely."

Brzezinski, soon to become Carter's national security advisor, "said he would like to be briefed in detail on 'agents of influence' that belong to us abroad." He explained that "he did not want to be surprised in meeting with or dealing with foreign VIPs, if in fact those VIPs were our agents of influence." CIA, Memorandum for the Record on a meeting with [prospective] National Security Adviser Brzezinski, 30 December 1976. The document was declassified by the CIA in January 1994 and is available on file at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

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POLISH MILITARY DOCUMENTS

The Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) in Warsaw intends to publish during the first half of 1995 a collection of ten key documents, originally classified Top Secret, on Polish-Soviet military cooperation during the years 1950-1957.

The first document (an agreement of 29 June 1950) provides for a credit to Poland to purchase Soviet arms and military equipment during the years 1951-1957. The last document (an agreement of 6 April 1957) regards special military-technical supplies to be furnished by the Soviet Union to the Polish armed forces and defense industry during the years 1957-1960.

Only the main bodies of the texts, not their lengthy, detailed appendices, are being published.

New Research on the GDR

by Christian F. Ostermann

The Germans, as the British historian Mary Fulbrook recently pointed out, have "peculiarly vitriolic and problematic ways of 'reckoning with the past.'"[1] A case in point is the way in which Germans have confronted the archival remnants of the German Democratic Republic. The first four years after the collapse of the GDR witnessed everything from the destruction and confiscation of historical records, including police raids on and calls for the complete closing of the East German communist party (SED) archives, to parliamentary investigating committees, to the establishment of new research institutions, and—more recently—to the opening of almost all records of the former GDR.[2] The following essay covers some of the more recent developments of interest to Cold War historians.[3]

The Ministry of State Security Records

Politically, the most controversial legacy of the SED regime was the records of the former Ministry for State Security (MfS/Stasi), many of them saved by citizens' groups from being destroyed by Stasi employees in the GDR's last days. Extremely sensitive for privacy and security reasons, the MfS records were entrusted by the German Unification Treaty of 1990 to the *Sonderbeauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Unterlagen des ehemaligen Staatssicherheitsdienstes* (Special Commissioner of the Federal Government for the Files of the former State Security Service, usually referred to as the "Gauck Agency" after its director, Joachim Gauck).[4]

In December 1991, access to the records was granted on the basis of the "Stasi Records Law" (StUG). The Stasi files are located in the central archives of the former MfS in Berlin and in various regional (district) archives. According to the StUG, the Stasi records, encompassing more than 500,000 feet of documents, are open to all interested researchers. Exemptions exist, however, for documents of supranational organizations and foreign countries and files relating to intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence,

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The Soviet Occupation: Moscow's Man in (East) Berlin

by Norman M. Naimark

The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG in Russian, SMAD in German) ruled the eastern zone of the defeated and occupied country from June 1945 until the creation of the German Democratic Republic in the fall of 1949. Given SVAG's importance to modern German and Soviet history, it is surprising that there have been so few scholarly studies of its policies, organization, and actions. Yet when one recalls both that Soviet and GDR historiography refused to recognize that Soviet activities in Germany were determined by an occupation regime and that West German historiography, especially between the late 1960s and 1989, was often unwilling to ask hard questions about the origins and legitimacy of the East German state, the lack of attention to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany is easier to understand. Particularly in the West, the reticence of historians was also reinforced by the paucity of primary sources on SVAG's activities. With Soviet and GDR archives closed to researchers from both the West and East, there was little hope for a breakthrough in the historiography of the Soviet presence in Germany.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, historians have begun to come to terms with Moscow's role in the development of East German communism and the creation of the GDR. But despite the availability of important new sources in the archives ofthe former East German communist party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and access to individuals who took part in the building of the East German state, very little progress has been made in advancing our understanding of the ways in which the Soviet military government worked. Who determined Soviet policies in the eastern zone of Germany? How were decisions reached? Who was responsible for implementing policies in Germany itself? What did Soviet occupation officers think they were doing in Germany? We have known generally what happened in the So-

continued on page 45

Germany an
New Evidence fro

by Jim

For much of the post-World War II era, from Berlin Wall, a divided Germany loomed as the Cold and most likely flashpoint for World War III. But fading memory, historians are relishing the chance (and those of its former ally, the former Soviet Uni Cold War events and issues that centered on Germ

This past summer, the Cold War Internationa conference on the "The Soviet Union, Germany, a Eastern Archives," to give U.S., German, Russian Soviet and GDR files a forum to debate the significa sources. The conference's first three days, on 28-3 in northwestern Germany, supported by the Kultur Germany's role in such international events as the proposing German reunification, the 1953 East G Participants then traveled by train to Potsdam for tw Germany (both during the 1945-49 Soviet occupat GDR archives; these meetings were hosted by the (Center for Contemporary Studies, or FSP), an instit history. The holding of the conference was also faci Program (NHP) and the Volkswagen Stiftung.

Throughout the sessions, and as has frequently in the former communist bloc, ostensibly "historica the enduring interest in and controversy over the co legacy for the post-Cold War era. In Essen, th

continued o

STALIN AND THE SED L
"YOU MUST ORGANIZE

Ed. note: One of the most intense controversies "Stalin Note" of 10 March 1952 in which the Sovi resolving the division of Germany. In essence, Stal of foreign armies on the condition that the countr Stalin's proposals were seriously advanced in an att or whether they were simply part of a Kremlin prop integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into its

Western governments, including the United Sta the night of 7 April 1952, after his proposal had been delegation of East German communist leaders (Will to reassess strategy. Two versions of that conversat German archives. They show that Stalin, angry at communists to "organize your own state" on the "da Since the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had and-a-half years earlier, it is unclear whether this i existing state of affairs, or whether it signified th Germany on Moscow's terms, seriously intended

The excerpt from the Soviet minutes of the conv of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Narinsky, Deputy Director, Institute of Universal

continued o

d the Cold War:
m East-bloc Archives

Hershberg

the Potsdam Conference to the crumbling of the
War's symbol, greatest prize, covert battleground,
t now, with the "German Democratic Republic" a
e to explore East Germany's once-secret archives
on) and thus better understand some of the crucial
nany.
al History Project (CWIHP) held an international
nd the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from
n, and other scholars working in newly-available
nce of the new evidence that is emerging from these
0 June 1994, took place at the University of Essen
wissenschaftliches Institut, and featured papers on
e 1948-49 Berlin Blockade, the 1952 Stalin Notes
German uprising, and the 1958-62 Berlin Crisis.
o days of discussions on the internal history of East
tion and the GDR period) and on the status of the
e Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien
ute created after 1989 to foster scholarship on GDR
litated by generous grants from the Nuclear History

y been the case in CWIHP-sponsored conferences
al" topics generated lively exchanges that reflected
onsequences of communist rule in Germany and its
here was particularly vigorous debate about the
on page 49

EADERSHIP, 7 APRIL 1952:
E YOUR OWN STATE"

s in Cold War historiography concerns the famous
iet leader gave the Western Powers his terms for
in offered German unification and the withdrawal
y remain neutral. Debate continues on whether
tempt to reach a general settlement with the West,
paganda campaign to hamper the West's efforts to
military alliance.
ates, immediately adopted the latter view. And on
rebuffed, Stalin met in the Kremlin with a visiting
helm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, and Otto Grotewohl)
tion have now emerged from the Russian and East
the West, now firmly instructed the East German
angerous" frontier dividing Germany and Europe.
already been formally established more than two-
nstruction simply reaffirmed an already obvious
at only now did Stalin understand that unifying
or not, was a non-negotiable proposition.
versation printed below was located in the Archive
, and translated into English, by Prof. Mikhail M.
History, Russian Academy of Sciences:
n page 48

The GDR Oral History Project

by A. James McAdams

In November 1994, the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University opens a major new archive, a collection of over 80 oral histories of leading politicians and policymakers from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).[1] The collection has been compiled by the GDR Oral History Project, whose aim was to record on tape some of the still vivid memories of the former leaders of East Germany, so that in 50 or 100 years (the amount of time Socialist Unity Party [SED] general secretary Erich Honecker predicted the Berlin Wall would last) future students of German history would have a unique source for assessing the driving motivations of the individuals who once made up the country's dominant political culture. Of course, no series of interviews alone can realistically relate the entire history of a state. Nevertheless, the researchers felt they could preserve for posterity a segment of that experience by interviewing a select group of individuals who could reasonably be characterized as the East German political elite.

In particular, the Oral History Project chose to interview four types of politically significant individuals. The first group included well-known SED representatives, such as former members of the ruling politburo and central committee, like Kurt Hager, Karl Schirdewan, Günther Kleiber, Herbert Häber, Werner Eberlein, Egon Krenz, and Gerhard Schürer. The second, broader group consisted largely of members of the party and state apparatus representing a sample of policy implementors from diplomats to department heads from key departments of the SED central committee (such as Agitation and Propaganda and International Affairs) and sections of state ministries (such as the foreign ministry department charged with East German-Soviet relations). Our third group of interviewees comprised so-called policymaking intellectuals. This disparate group, with representatives ranging from economist Jürgen Kuczynski to socialist theoretician Otto Reinhold, primarily included individuals who had some tangential

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New Evidence on Khrushchev's 1958 Berlin Ultimatum

Translation and Commentary by Hope M. Harrison

The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961 has long been seen as "Khrushchev's crisis," but at last there is some documentation indicating that at least the initiation of the crisis really was the Soviet leader's personal handiwork. Remaining in Berlin after the Cold War International History Project's conference on the "Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from Eastern Archives" in Essen and Potsdam, Germany on 28 June-2 July 1994, I was fortunate enough[1] to be one of the first scholars to gain access to the freshly-opened archives of the former East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[2] While working in this archive, I found in the files of State Secretary Otto Winzer a document, translated below, written by the East German ambassador to Moscow, Johannes König, and dated 4 December 1958. In the document, König summarized information he gleaned from various Soviet Foreign Ministry officials about the process leading up to Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's speech of 10 November 1958 and notes of 27 November 1958, which launched the Berlin Crisis.

In Khrushchev's November 10 speech, at a Soviet-Polish friendship meeting in the Sports Palace in Moscow, he asserted that the Western powers were using West Berlin as an outpost from which to launch aggressive maneuvers against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other countries of the socialist camp, including Poland. The impending atomic armament of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), he declared, threatened to further exacerbate this situation. Khrushchev stated that the Western powers had broken all quadripartite agreements concerning Germany, particularly the agreement for the demilitarization of Germany, and that the only part of the Potsdam Agreement the West continued to honor was the part stipulating the four-power occupation of Berlin. This situation, in which the West used West Berlin for aggressive pur-

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KHRUSHCHEV'S ULTIMATUM

continued from page 35

poses against the East, could not go on any longer, he declared, and the situation in Berlin, "the capital of the GDR," must be normalized.[3]

In lengthy notes to the Western powers on November 27, Khrushchev elaborated on what he had in mind to "normalize" the situation in Berlin. Khrushchev's proposals were seen as an ultimatum in the West, especially because they set a six-month deadline for negotiations. Khrushchev reiterated in stronger and more detailed language what he had said on November 10 and then declared that he viewed the former agreements on Berlin as null and void. He insisted that a peace treaty be signed with Germany and that West Berlin be made into a "free" and demilitarized city. If sufficient progress on these issues had not been achieved among the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France within six months, Moscow would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and transfer to it control over the access routes between West Berlin (which was located 110 miles inside East German territory) and West Germany. Khrushchev stressed that East Germany was a sovereign country which deserved to control its own territory. Preliminary talks had already been held with the East Germans on this issue, and as soon as the free-city of West Berlin was created, the East Germans would be ready to sign an agreement guaranteeing free access into and out of West Berlin, so long as there was no hostile activity emanating from West Berlin eastwards.[4]

The Berlin Crisis, initiated by Khrushchev's ultimatum, continued through the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and perhaps even through the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Khrushchev's motivations for starting the Berlin Crisis undoubtedly included the stabilization and strengthening of the GDR, a slowing or stopping of the process of the nuclearization of the West German Bundeswehr, and a recognition by the Western powers of the Soviet Union as an equal and of the Soviet gains in Eastern Europe during and after World War II as legitimate.[5] Khrushchev's aggressive tactics probably stemmed from a desire to avoid being outnumbered as the one socialist power in four-power negotiations over the Germany and Berlin questions. As he wrote to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer during the crisis, four-power talks on German reunification would "leave this question to be decided by a group of states where capitalist states have three voices, and the socialists have only one. But what would you say if it was proposed to submit the question of German reunification for decision by a group of states of a different composition, for example, composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia, China, and the Soviet Union. You, of course, would not be enthralled with this proposal, since you would know for sure that these states would support the socialist development of all of Germany."[6] Khrushchev must have hoped that opening a diplomatic offensive against the West would give him added leverage in four-power policies on Germany.

The following document discloses that Khrushchev dictated several pages of guidelines for officials in the Third European Department (responsible for Germany) of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to follow in formulating the November 27 ultimatum. He also met with several of these officials on November 19 to discuss his ideas in detail. It seems that one of these ideas of Khrushchev's was that of creating a "free-city" in West Berlin. (The record of his 1 December 1958 eight-hour conversation with visiting Sen. Hubert Humphrey also notes that Khrushchev "said he had given many months of thought to [the] Berlin situation and had finally come up with his proposal of a so-called free city."[7]) The document authored by König is the only one I have seen from an archive in Moscow or Berlin which points to the direct involvement in formulating a specific policy by a specific leader. Unfortunately, I did not find accompanying documents in the archives containing the actual dictated notes Khrushchev gave to the Foreign Ministry officials or records from the November 19 meeting he had with these officials. Clearly, it would be particularly revealing to have these documents.

The document below not only confirms Khrushchev's central role in formulating the ultimatum, but also the role of the Foreign Ministry's Third European Department since at least 6 November 1958. Several times, König notes that officials of the Third European Department were apprised of and deeply involved in the preparations. If officials in the Third European Department had advance knowledge of critical parts of Khrushchev's November 10 speech, the information given to Raymond Garthoff by Sergo Mikoian (son of then-Presidium member Anastas Mikoian) that "the speech had not been discussed and cleared with the other Soviet leaders" is probably erroneous.[8]

The document also illuminates the bureaucratic workings of the East German side. While the East German leaders had been discussing ideas about a "special note" to the Western powers since September,[9] the East German leaders in Berlin told their Foreign Ministry officials, especially officials at the embassy in Moscow, very little, if anything, about this or much else, it seems. This obviously hampered the work of Foreign Ministry officials.[10]

Finally, the document indicates several times that the Soviets were careful to proceed gradually and cautiously in implementing the threats contained in the ultimatum so as to gauge the Western reaction. This is typical of Khrushchev. His diplomacy of 1958-1962 showed that he liked to push the West "to the brink," but that just before the brink, he would wait to see what the West would do and would generally adjust his policies accordingly. The Soviet emphasis seen in this document on acting gradually and continually monitoring the West's reaction would be repeated in the plans for building the Berlin Wall in 1961.[11]

* * * * *

Secret

Comments on the Preparation of the Steps of the Soviet Government Concerning a Change in the Status of West Berlin

On the preparation of these actions (the composition of Comrade Khrushchev's speech of 10 November and the notes of the Soviet government to the governments of the three Western powers, the GDR and the Bonn government), in which the [Soviet] MID [Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and especially its Third European Department played a critical part. Already several days before Comrade Khrushchev's appearance on 10 November 1958 on the occasion of the Soviet-Polish friendship meeting, comrades from the MID let it drop on 6 November that Comrade Khrushchev's speech of 10 November would bring "something new" with regard to the German question. The Soviet comrades would not, however, hint a word about the substance of the "news."

On 10 November, a few hours before Comrade Khrushchev's appearance, I was still in the

[Soviet] Foreign Ministry and had a conversation with Comrade [Ivan I.] Il'ichev, the head of the Third European Department. He also commented, when I turned the conversation to the insufficient coverage of the GDR election campaign [for the 16 November 1958 Volkskammer (parliament) and local government elections] by the Soviet press, that Comrade Khrushchev's speech would contain important statements with regard to the German question. He told me nothing about what it would deal with. It was, however, obvious that the comrades of the Third European Department were informed excellently about the contents of Comrade Khrushchev's speech.

After the speech was held and had called forth the well-known echo in Bonn and the capitals of the three Western powers,[12] the entire Third European Department of the MID was occupied exclusively with preparing the next steps. I think that I am not mistaken in the assumption that ideas about concrete steps developed gradually at first and perhaps were subject to certain changes.

We know from information from comrades of the Third European Department that the entire Department was occupied for days with studying all agreements, arrangements, protocols, etc., which were concluded or made between the occupying powers with regard to West Berlin since 1945 so as to prepare arguments for shattering assertions made by Bonn and the governments of the Western powers and so as to make from these [i.e., old agreements, etc.—H.H.] concrete proposals for the next steps for carrying out the measures announced in Comrade Khrushchev's speech.

The MID was essentially finished with this work on 19 November 1958.[13] According to information from Soviet comrades, the work on the comprehensive document was finished on this day and the document was submitted to the Council of Ministers for ratification. On this occasion, we learned that this document was supposed to comprise about 20 pages and was supposed to be presented to the three Western Powers, the GDR and West Germany soon. Thus, at this time we did not yet learn that there were 3 different documents.[14]

The Soviet comrades who gave us this news for "personal information" emphasized that they probably would not be telling us anything new, since "Berlin is informed and surely the same practice must exist with us as on the Soviet side, namely that the ambassador concerned absolutely must be informed about such issues regularly."

This comment: "You have of course already been informed by Berlin" was made to me a few other times so as to make clear that we should not expect official information on the part of the local [i.e, Moscow] MID.

In the conversation we conducted with the relevant Soviet comrades, it was said that a comprehensive argumentation was provided in the planned document for establishing the repeal of the agreements concerning Berlin (of September 1944, May 1945, and the Bolz-Zorin[15] exchange of letters [of September 1955]) and that these functions would be transferred to the competence of the GDR. With this it was already mentioned that it is planned to hold official negotiations with the GDR on this. At the same time a hint was made that the Soviet Union would probably not be averse if it should prove to be expedient and necessary also to speak with the Western powers about this issue.

In the negotiations with the GDR, the issue of the transfer or the taking over of the relevant functions will be discussed. The key question in this is when, i.e., at which point in time and how the whole thing should be carried out. Our leading comrades, with whom consultations have taken place, also expressed the view that in this one must not place too much haste on the day, but must go forward gradually, step by step.[16]

In this conversation the Soviet comrade in question thought [very realistically, as it turned out—H.H.] that the Berlin issue would remain at the center of attention for at least one year if not even longer. On this issue hard conflicts with the Western powers will arise.[17]

To my comment: "The Western powers will not want to conduct a war for the sake of Berlin" followed the answer: "Our Presidium proceeds from the same assumption." My comment that ultimately the issue would come to a crisis for the West as a prestige issue and that therefore in my opinion everything must be done so as to facilitate retreat for the Western powers on this issue was acknowledged as correct.

In this connection it was noted by the Soviet comrade that the issue of great significance is what should happen with West Berlin after an eventual withdrawal of the Western troops. This issue plays a large role in the considerations of the Soviet comrades.

Thus, in this conversation, the issue of the transformation of West Berlin into a free city was not yet dealt with.

It was emphasized that in this connection public opinion is also of great significance. One cannot resolve this issue if one has not prepared the basis for this within the population. A correct argumentation vis-à-vis the population so as to win them over for the planned steps is thus of great importance.

In this connection, it was also mentioned that Comrade Khrushchev personally gave extraordinarily great attention to the preparation of the new steps regarding the Berlin question. He personally participated in the preparation of the documents. He submitted to the comrades of the Third European Department his thoughts on the entire problem on several type-written pages which he had personally dictated and asked the comrades to observe this point of view in the composition of the documents and the determination of particular measures.

Comrade Khrushchev personally received on 19 November for a discussion several responsible officials of the Third European Department of the MID who were occupied with the Berlin issue and spoke with them in great detail about the entire problem.

The first mention that the Soviet proposals would include the demilitarization and neutralization of West Berlin was made to me by Comrade Il'ichev on 22 November when I sought him out on another matter. He again emphasized that he wanted to give me "exclusively for my personal information" several hints about the contents of the planned documents. In this connection he mentioned that it was planned to propose giving West Berlin the status of a free city.

Comrade Il'ichev emphasized on this occasion that the Soviet side was ready to negotiate with the three Western powers on the Berlin question, but only on the basis of the enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement in West Germany, [including] for example, demilitarization, denazification, decartellization, repeal of the prohibition of the KPD [Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands], etc.

Concerning further actions regarding Berlin, Comrade Il'ichev also emphasized that these would proceed step by step.

To my question as to whether the planned documents would be given to all nations which took place in the war against Germany, Comrade Il'ichev answered that they would be given only to the three Western powers as well as to Berlin and Bonn. To my question as to whether the delivery would occur in Moscow or Berlin and Bonn, Comrade Il'ichev answered, "probably in Berlin."

After the delivery of the documents, they will wait 2-3 weeks so as to digest the reaction of the other side and then take a new step.[18]

Regarding the negotiations with the GDR or the transfer to the GDR of the functions which are still being exercised by the Soviet side, this will also probably proceed gradually.

I asked Comrade Il'ichev again about the contents of the talks between [Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Andrei] Smirnov and [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer. Comrade Il'ichev confirmed that Smirnov had sought this talk. He once again merely explained the point of view which was expressed in Comrade Khrushchev's speech of 10 November 1958. Regarding this, Adenauer responded that he could not understand Soviet foreign policy. Precisely now when the first signs of a détente were noticeable at the Geneva negotiations,[19] the Soviet government would create new tension with its statement concerning Berlin.

An explanation of why Smirnov conducted this conversation at all in view of the fact that the Soviet government stands by the point of view

that Berlin is a matter which does not concern West Germany but is a matter of the GDR was not given to me by Comrade Il'ichev.[20]

Since the publication of the document to the GDR, the 3 Western powers, and West Germany on 27 November 1958, we have not had another opportunity to speak with Soviet comrades about these questions.

From the above remarks, in my view one can without doubt draw the conclusion that the Soviet comrades already have firm views about the execution of the measures proposed in the documents mentioned.[21] This applies especially in regard to the concrete steps concerning the transfer of the functions still exercised by the Soviet side in Berlin and on the transit routes between West Germany and Berlin.

The concrete steps and forms for the execution of the other measures in regard to West Berlin [presumably meaning the free-city proposal—H.H.] will probably not remain uninfluenced by the statements and responses by the Western powers and by developments within West Berlin itself.

As far as the entire problem is concerned, immediately after Comrade Khrushchev's speech of 10 November 1958 I remembered the conversation which took place at the end of 1957 in Berlin on the occasion of the negotiations for the settlement of issues which were still open [in Soviet-East German relations—H.H.] and in which Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin and then-Ambassador Pushkin from the Soviet side and Deputy Ministers Comrade Winzer and Comrade Schwab as well as Ambassador König took part.[22] As is known, Ambassador Pushkin already expressed the view then in the course of this free and open discussion that it is not impossible to resolve the Berlin question already before the resolution of the German question.[23]

Moscow, 4 December 1958

König

* * * * * *

(Source: Political Archive of the Foreign Ministry. Files of: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic. Files of: the State Secretary. A17723)

1. Due to a tip from Doug Selvage, a Ph.D. student in history at Yale University, who is conducting extensive research in Polish and German archives for his dissertation on Polish-German relations, 1956-70.

2. For access to these archives, interested scholars must receive permission from the German Foreign Ministry: Dr. Hans Jochen Pretsch, Auswärtiges Amt, Referat 117, Adenauerallee 99-103, 53113 Bonn, BRD; tel.: 011-49-228-17-21 61; fax: 011-49-228-17-34 02. A letter of introduction sent to the German Foreign Ministry by the U.S. Embassy in Bonn may also be necessary. Once the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn grants permission, the contact information for the MfAA archives in Berlin is: Archiv der Dienststelle Berlin des Auswärtigen Amts, Postfach 61 01 87, 10922 Berlin, BRD; tel.: 011-49-3020186-229; fax: 011-49-30-20186-169. The person I dealt with there is Herr Gaier. When going in person to the reading room of the MfAA archives, the address is Hinter dem Giesshaus 1-2, 10177 Berlin. The reading room is open Monday-Friday, 8:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m. and sits six scholars at a time. There is a lot of demand now to use the archive, so scholars must reserve space far in advance. There are no finding aids; scholars must rely on archivists to locate relevant documents.

3. For a translation of most of Khrushchev's speech, see George D. Embree, ed., *The Soviet Union and the German Question, September 1958-June 1961* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 14-20.

4. For the English text of the Soviet note to the United States, see Embree, ed., *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, 23-40.

5. For more on Khrushchev's motivations in starting the crisis, see Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961," Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), 8-18; and Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)," Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993).

6. Khrushchev's note to Adenauer on 18 August 1959, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Russkoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation], Referentura po FRG (file group on the FRG), Opis (list) 4, Portfel' (portfolio) 9, Papka (file) 22.

7. "Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State," Moscow, 3 December 1958, 2:00 p.m., from Ambassador [Llewellyn] Thompson, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, vol. VIII, *Berlin Crisis 1958-1959* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 149. Valentin Falin, then at the Department of Information of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has also stated that the free-city idea was Khrushchev's. Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993), 225, 336, cited in Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev's Motives and Soviet Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962," paper prepared for conference, "Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from Eastern Archives," Essen, Germany 28-30 June 1994, pp. 11,13.

8. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary. Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities," Brookings Occasional Paper (Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C., 1991), n.98.

9. On high-level Soviet-East German talks leading up to the ultimatum, see Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose,'" 18-20.

10. On this lack of communication and the resulting frustration of East German Foreign Ministry officials, see the letter from König to Winzer on 5 December 1958, MfAA, Staatssekretär, A17723; and "Stenografische Niederschrift der Botschafterkonferenz im Grossen Sitzungssaal des 'Hauses der Einheit' am 1./2. Febuar 1956" ("Stenographic Protocol of the Ambassadors' Conference in the Large Meeting Hall of the 'House of Unity" on 1-2 February 1956"), Stiftung Archive der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv [of the SED] (SAPMO-BArch, ZPA) [Foundation of the Archives of the Parties and Mass Organizations in the Federal Archive, Central Party Archive], J IV 2/201-429.

11. Commenting on the process of building the wall in a letter to Ulbricht on 30 October 1961, Khrushchev praised the decision of the 3-5 August 1961 Warsaw Pact meeting "to carry out the various measures gradually" so as "not to come to serious complications." SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NL 182/1206.

12. [Generally the Western powers declared that the Soviets did not have the right to change the situation in Berlin unilaterally and asserted that the Soviets were obliged to safeguard the communications routes between West Berlin and West Germany for the Western powers. At a news conference on 26 November 1958, however, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perhaps opened a window for Soviet strategy by adding that the United States might be prepared to treat East German border officials as agents of the Soviet Union, although not as representatives of a sovereign state of East Germany. "News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Dulles Reasserting the 'Explicit Obligation' of the Soviet Union to Assure 'Normal Access to and Egress From Berlin,' November 26, 1958," U.S. State Department, ed., *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 9446), 546-52.—H.H.]

13. [According to another document I have seen, two days prior to this date, on November 17, Pervukhin "informed [Ulbricht] about the proposed measures of the Soviet government regarding the four-power status of Berlin." "Zapis' besedy s tovarishchem V. Ul'brikhtom 17.11.58g" ("Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade W. Ulbricht 17.11.58"), from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 24 November 1958, Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) [the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation—the post-1952 Central Committee Archives], Rolik (microfilm reel) 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo (file) 77. Thus, either one of these dates is wrong, or Pervukhin was extremely confident that the "proposed measures" would be ratified by the Council of Ministers.—H.H.]

14. [It is not entirely clear what the three different documents were. This may refer to the somewhat different notes sent to the United States, Great Britain, and France, but there were also notes sent to both German governments, making five different documents.—H.H.]

15. [East German Foreign Minister Lothar Bolz and Soviet Foreign Minister V.A. Zorin appended to the "Treaty on Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" of 20 September 1955 an exchange of letters detailing rights of control over inter-German and inter-Berlin borders and the communications routes between Berlin and West Germany. See Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR und Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR, ed., *Beziehungen DDR-UdSSR*, Vol. 2 (Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1975), 996-8.—H.H.]

16. [See "Zapis' besedy s tovarishchem V. Ul'brikhtom 17.11.58g" ("Record of Meeting with Comrade W. Ulbricht on 17 November 1958"), from the diary of M.G. Pervukhin on 24 November 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 77, in which Ulbricht told Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Pervukhin: "Regarding concrete steps towards implementing the Soviet government's proposals for transferring to GDR organs the control functions which have been carried out by Soviet organs in Berlin, . . . perhaps we should not hurry with this, since this would give us the opportunity to

keep the adversary under pressure for a certain period of time." Ulbricht's justification for going slowly aside, this is a rare instance in which the East German leader was not pushing the Soviets to move faster on giving up their control functions in Berlin to the GDR.—H.H.]

17. [It may be that the Soviet official in question here had some reason to believe that Khrushchev's declared intention of transferring Soviet control functions in Berlin to the GDR was more of a threat to get the Western powers to the bargaining table than a serious intention. While it proved very useful as a threat, Khrushchev knew that carrying it out in practice would mean relinquishing some Soviet control over the situation in Berlin to the GDR. As the crisis progressed, Khrushchev came to the conclusion, no doubt based in large part on Ulbricht's obvious attempts to wrest control from him and further exacerbate the situation in Berlin, that he did not want to do this. See the argument made in Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose'," and idem., "The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961," paper presented to the 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 28 March-1 April 1994.—H.H.]

18. [The next step was taken on 10 January 1959, when the Soviets submitted a draft German peace treaty accompanied by a note to the three Western powers and sent copies of these to all of the countries that had fought against Germany in World War II, as well as to both German states. For the text of the note to the United States and the draft treaty, see *Documents on Germany*, 585-607.—H.H.]

19. [The reference is to the disarmament negotiations which began in Geneva on 31 October 1958 between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The negotiations ultimately resulted in a treaty on the partial banning of nuclear testing which was signed by the three powers in Moscow on 5 August 1963. On these negotiations, see Christer Jönsson, *Soviet Bargaining Behavior. The Nuclear Test Ban Case* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).—H.H.]

20. [The East Germans were often frustrated at Soviet attempts to maintain or improve relations with the West Germans. The Soviets were always walking a fine diplomatic line of trying to maintain good relations with each part of Germany while not overly alienating the other part in the process. While Khrushchev's prime concern was the support, protection, and strengthening of the GDR, he also had economic, military, and political reasons for maintaining good relations with the FRG.—H.H.]

21. [Presumably, this refers to the Soviet intention to move forward slowly and cautiously with the transfer of some Soviet responsibilities in Berlin to the GDR.—H.H.]

22. [It is possible that König is actually referring to a meeting that took place on 12 December 1956 (as opposed to 1957) in which several remaining "open issues" in Soviet-East German relations were discussed. See König's account of the meeting, "Bericht über eine Unterredung mit stellvertr. Aussenminister, Gen. Sorin" ("Report on a Conversation with Deputy Foreign Ministry Comrade Zorin"), 14 December 1956, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, NL 90/472.—H.H.]

23. [Pushkin was not the only leading Soviet or East German official who believed that the Berlin issue could (and perhaps should) be resolved before the resolution of the entire German question. The next Soviet Ambassador to East Germany after Pushkin, Mikhail Pervukhin, also believed this, as did Soviet counselor Oleg Selianinov and Peter Florin, the head of the International Department of the SED Central Committee. See "O polozhenii v Zapadnom Berline" ("On the Situation in West Berlin), 24 February 1958, report written by two diplomats at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, O. Selianinov, counselor, and A. Kazennov, second secretary, TsKhSD, Rolik 8875, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 82; and "Zapis' besedy s zav. mezhdunarodnym otdelom TsK SEPG P. Florinom" ("Record of Conversation with the Head of the International Department of the SED CC P. Florin), 12 May 1958, from Selianinov's diary, 16 May 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik 8873, Fond 5, Opis 49, Delo 76. Both are cited in Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose,'" 5-6. Considering how this document concludes, it is ironic that as the crisis actually progressed, it was the East German leadership far more than the Soviet leadership that wanted to resolve the Berlin question separately from and before a general German settlement.—H.H.]

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CWIHP Fellowships

The Cold War International History Project offers a limited number of fellowships to junior scholars from the former Communist bloc to conduct from three months to one year of archival research in the United States on topics related to the history of the Cold War. Recipients are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Applicants should submit a CV, a statement of proposed research, a letter of nomination, and three letters of recommendation; writing samples (particularly in English) are welcomed, though not required. Applicants should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States.

For the 1994-95 academic year, CWIHP awarded fellowships to **Milada Polisenska**, Institute of International Studies, Prague (four months); **Victor Gobarev**, Institute of Military History, Moscow (four months); and **Sergei Kudryashov**, History Editor of "Rodina" and "Istochnik", Moscow (four months).

Send applications to: Jim Hershberg, Director, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20560, fax (202) 357-4439.

GDR RESEARCH

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terrorism, and secret West German records. All administrative, policy, and personal records are available in principle, some however only in a sanitized form (e.g., name deletions under the privacy exemption).

Due to the files' sensitivity and time-consuming preparatory screening efforts involved, as well as the massive demand—1.8 million private research applications registered as of mid-1993—research at the Gauck Agency requires researchers to plan well ahead (currently the waiting time is one year). Applications for scholarly research will only be accepted if they deal broadly with MfS history. More than 1,200 academic and 1,500 media research applications have been received so far.

The agency's "Education and Research Department," established in 1993 with a staff of 83 and charged with facilitating research, is also engaged in research projects of its own, covering subjects central to MfS history such as "The MfS and the SED," "The Anatomy of the MfS" (eventually to be published as an MfS "handbook"), "The Sociology and Psychology of the 'Informal Informants,'" and "The Potential and Structure of Opposition in the GDR." Several useful reference and historical works have been published, such as "Measure 'Donau' and Operation 'Recovery': The Crushing of the Prague Spring 1968/69 as Reflected in the Stasi Records" (Series B, No. 1/94). The Gauck Agency held a conference on "The MfS Records and Contemporary History," in March 1994, and plans a symposium on "The MfS and the Churches" for early 1995.[5]

Coming to Terms with the History and Legacy of the SED-Dictatorship

In an effort to expand beyond the narrow public focus on the Stasi records, the German Parliament (Bundestag) decided to create a parliamentary committee for research on the history of the SED dictatorship (*Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland,"* [Study Commission "Coming to Terms with the History and Legacy of the SED-Dictatorship in Germany"]). Following a parliamentary initiative of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in February 1992,[6] the Bundestag established the *Enquete Kommission* in its 82nd session on 12 March

1992.[7] The committee, headed by Rainer Eppelmann of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (CDU), consisted of parliament members and historians (among them Bernd Faulenbach, Alexander Fischer, Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Hermann Weber, and Manfred Wilke). According to a motion passed by the Bundestag on 20 May 1992, the committee was to "make contributions to the political-historical analysis and political-moral evaluation" of the SED-dictatorship.[8]

This was to include, in particular: (1) the structures, strategies, and instruments of the SED-dictatorship (e.g., the relationship of SED and state, the structure of the state security organs, the role of the "bourgeois bloc parties," and the militarization of East German society); (2) the significance of ideology and integrating factors such as Marxism-Leninism and anti-fascism (as well as the role of education, literature, and the arts); (3) human rights violations, acts and mechanisms of repression, and the possibility for further restitution of victims; (4) the variety and potential of resistance and opposition movements; (5) the role of the churches; (6) the impact of the international system and in particular of Soviet policy in Germany; (7) the impact of the FRG-GDR relationship (e.g. *Deutschlandpolitik*, inner-German relations, influence of West German media on the GDR, and activities of the GDR in West Germany); and (8) the significance of historical continuity in German political culture in the twentieth century.[9]

In over 27 months, the committee organized 44 public hearings with more than 327 historians and eyewitnesses and contracted 148 expert studies, producing a massive collection altogether of over 15,000 pages of material on the SED-dictatorship.[10] On 17 June 1994, the committee presented a final report of over 300 pages which sums up some of the findings, reflecting politically controversial issues through "minority votes."[11] While the committee's main focus, as reflected in the report, was the SED apparatus, the Ministry for State Security, and political persecution and repression, much of the committee's work became heavily politicized, as the ensuing parliamentary debate over the validity and success of the various brands of "Deutschlandpolitik" (Konrad Adenauer's "policy of strength" vs. Willy Brandt's "policy of small steps") demonstrated.[12] Similarly, the role of the former "bourgeois" political parties in the GDR, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), proved to be highly controversial. The report contains excellent sections on the East German resistance movement, the MfS, and the early history of the GDR. In its final section, the report gives a brief survey of the Germany-related holdings of various Russian archives as well as criteria for the use of the SED and MfS records.

Of the 148 expert studies to be published along with the hearings in 1995, the most interesting for Cold War historians include the following (only short title given): War Damages and Reparations (L. Baar/W. Matschke); Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/FDP Coalition 1969-1982 (W. Bleek); State and Party Rule in the GDR (G. Brunner); War Damage and Reparations (Ch. Buchheim); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (G. Dalos); On the Use of the MfS Records (R. Engelmann); "Special Camps" of the Soviet Occupation Power, 1945-1950 (G. Finn); The Wall Syndrome—Impact of the Wall on the GDR Population (H.-J. Fischbeck); Germany as an Object of Allied Policy, 1941-1949 (A. Fischer/M. Rissmann); Reports of the Soviet High Commission in Germany 1953/1954: Documents from the Archives for Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (J. Foitzik); German Question and the Germans: Attitudes Among East German Youth (P. Förster); International Framework of Deutschlandpolitik, 1949-1955 (H. Graml); Deutschlandpolitik of the SPD/FDP Coalition, 1969-1982 (J. Hacker); Case Study: 9 November 1989 (H.-H. Hertle); The Self-Representation of the GDR in International Human Rights Organizations (K. Ipsen); Deutschlandpolitik of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (W. Jäger); Deutschlandpolitik of the Adenauer Governments (C. Kleßmann); Opposition in the GDR, From the Honecker Era to the Polish Revolution 1980/81 (C. Kleßmann); West German Political Parties and the GDR Opposition (W. Knabe); Patriotism and National Identity among East Germans (A. Köhler); NVA [the East German New People's Army], 1956-1990 (P.J. Lapp); Deutschland-politik of the Erhard Government and the Great Coalition (W. Link); International Conditions of Deutschland-politik, 1961-1989 (W. Loth); The Berlin Problem—the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961/62 (D. Mahncke); Cooperation between MfS and KGB (B. Marquardt); Political Upheaval in Eastern Europe and Its Significance for the Opposition Movement in the GDR (L. Mehlhorn); Alternative Culture and State Security, 1976-1989 (K. Michael); Deutschlandpolitik of the Adenauer Governments (R. Morsey); Western Policy of the SED (H.-P. Müller); The Role of the Bloc Parties (Ch. Nehrig); Opposition Within the SED (W. Otto); Establishment of the GDR as a "Core Area of Germany" and the All-German Claims of KPD and SED (M. Overesch); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (G. Papcke); the "National" Policy of the KPD/SED (W. Pfeiler); Deutschlandpolitik of the CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1982-1989 (H. Potthoff); Transformation of the Party System 1945-1950 (M. Richter); Role and Significance of the Bloc Parties (M. Richter); Deutschlandpolitik of the SED (K.H. Schmidt); The Integration of the GDR into COMECON (A. Schüler); Influence of the SED on West German Political Parties (J. Staadt); Opposition within the LDPD (S. Suckut); Operation "Recovery": The Crushing of the Prague Spring as Reflected in the MfS Records (M. Tantscher); The Round Table and the Deposing of the SED: Impediments on the Way to Free Elections (U. Thaysen); On the Function of Marxism-Leninism (H. Weber/L. Lange); The German Question: Continuity and Changes in West German Public Opinion, 1945/49-1990 (W. Weidenfeld). While the expert studies are officially not yet available, transcripts of the hearings can be obtained from the Bundestag.[13]

Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv

Next to the Stasi files, the records of the *Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED), comprising over 26,000 ft. of documents, as well as the records of former Communist front organizations such as the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Democratic Women's League (DFB), the Cultural League, the National Democratic Party (NDPD), the Foundation for Soviet-German Friendship, and the Free German Union Federation (FDGB), constitute the most important sources for the history of the GDR.

These records are now in the custody of an independent foundation within the Federal Archives system, the *Stiftung* "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen [SAPMO] der DDR im Bundesarchiv," created in April 1992 and fully established in January 1993 according to an amendment to the Federal Archives Law.[14]

Thus, in contrast, to the 1991-1992 period—when the SED records were by and large still in the hands of the successor organization to the SED empire, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), and located in the Central Party Archives in the former "Institute for Marxism-Leninism" (IML)—full access to the SED papers has now been assured with the establishment of the foundation and its integration into the Federal Archives. Even the internal archive of the SED politburo is now accessible to researchers. There are few restrictions on the use of the records, primarily those pertaining to privacy exemptions. The Stiftung also houses the huge holdings of the former IML library with its massive collection on international and German communism, international and German workers' movements, and GDR history.[15] The records of the former "bourgeois" political parties in the GDR, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), were taken over by the FDP-sponsored Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus in Gummersbach and the Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (affiliated with the CDU) in St. Augustin, respectively. Unclear as of now is the fate of the files of the West German Communist Party (KPD), currently in the custody of the party leadership and not accessible for research.[16]

Bundesarchiv, Abt. Potsdam

Consistent with its traditional task as custodian of all central/federal German government records, the Bundesarchiv was entrusted with records of the former GDR government. Since access to government records, according to the German Archival Law, is granted on the basis of the 30-years rule, GDR government records are available for the 1949-1963 period at the Bundesarchiv's Potsdam branch, the former Central German Archives of the Deutsches Reich.[17] Since the corresponding SED records (technically considered private rather than state) are open through 1989-90, East German records differ considerably in their degree of accessibility.

Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten

The disparity in the treatment of records according to whether they are officially categorized as state or private crucially affected the fate of the records of the former East German foreign ministry (MfAA). In contrast to the "open door" policy which governed most SED records, the FRG Foreign Ministry, traditionally conservative in declassifying records, until recently refused to allow access to the MfAA files which it had seized upon unification. Political sensitivity on the part of the FDP-dominated foreign ministry, rather than the need for meticulous review and organization as the foreign ministry claimed, explained the steadfast refusal of the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) to release the MfAA records, many scholars believe. However, due to parliamentary and public pressure, the AA has now opened its archives to researchers. As of August 1994, MfAA records for the period up to 1963 (30-years rule) are accessible,[18] although prior application for research is required.[19]

The New Institutional Landscape

One of the new institutional experiments on the German research scene is the "**Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien**" (FSP)—Center for Contemporary Studies—of the **Förderungsgesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben**, an affiliate organization of the Max Planck Foundation.[20] Funded by the Federal Government for a transitional period (until 1995), at least initially, the institute, under the directorship of Jürgen Kocka and Christoph Klessmann, has evolved into one of the leading centers for GDR history. Research at the FSP focuses on the history of the GDR "in a broad context and in comparative perspective," emphasizing an understanding of East German history as "part of long-term historical processes" and thus reaching back to the late 19th and early 20th century. Rooted in the peculiar German tradition of independent research institutes, the institute's unique character derives from the fact that its fellows, for the most part East Germans, come from different political backgrounds, thus including ex-SED members as well as dissidents. The institute stresses an interdisciplinary approach to GDR history and therefore is comprised not only of historians but economists, political scientists, and cultural analysts as well as Germanists. With a growing number of Western Germans, the institute is a rare experiment in bridging the East-West gap and expediting the professional rehabilitation of scholars from the ex-GDR. Interestingly, the scientific discourse at the FSP has usually not split along the East-West faultline. Criticism of the institute's personnel policy—and especially the inclusion of politically-compromised members of the former East German academic elite—has been voiced by Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle of the Independent Historians League and is partly responsible for the founding of the Potsdam Office of the Munich-based Institute for Contemporary History.[21] Current FSP research projects include industrial problems in the GDR (J. Roesler, B. Ciesla); the legacy of Nazism and the tradition of resistance in East and West Germany (J. Danyel, O. Groehler); SED Deutschlandpolitik (M. Lemke); the SED's concept of a "Socialist nation GDR" (J. Reuter); reparations and Soviet policy towards Germany (J. Laufer); SED history (M. Kaiser); socialization and youth under the SED dictatorship (L. Ansorg, S. Häder, J. Petzold); agrarian reform and collectivization in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1945-1960 (A. Bauernkämper); the SED's policy towards Jews (M. Keßler); the social history of the People's Police (T. Lindenberger); bureaucracy and parties in the GDR (M. Kaiser, F. Dietze); and dissident traditions in the GDR and Poland (H. Fehr). In June 1993, the FSP made its debut with a symposium on "The GDR as History," followed in October 1993 by a conference on "The Divided Past: The Post-War Treatment of National Socialism and Resistance in the Two German States." Along with Essen University, the FSP co-hosted the June 28-July 2 conference on "New Evidence from the Eastern Archives. The Soviet Union, Germany and the Cold War, 1945-1962," sponsored by the Cold War International History Project. The FSP's fellowship program is open to foreign researchers.[22]

The **Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung** (Mannheim Center for European Social Research), Section "GDR" (Director: Hermann Weber), the leading research institution for the his-

tory of the GDR in Western Germany, organized an international symposium in February 1992 on "White Spots in the History of the World Communism: Stalinist Purges and Terror in the European Communist Parties since the 1930s."[23] In 1993, the Mannheim Center edited a systematic listing of current research projects pertaining to GDR history. Published by the Deutscher Bundestag as "Forschungsprojekte zur DDR-Geschichte" in 1994, it lists 759 such projects, 51 of which fall into the categories "The German Question," GDR foreign relations, and GDR military history.[24] Researchers interested in registering their project should contact the Mannheim Center. The Center's main current project is a six-volume history of the GDR, 1945-1990, based on the new sources. In 1993, the institute started publishing "Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismus-forschung" [Yearbook for Historical Research on Communism] and is continuing a document collection on "Opposition and Resistance in the GDR." Other projects include a history of the FDJ, 1945-1965 (U. Maehlert); a history of the Deutschlandpolitik of the bloc parties; and a study of the role of anti-fascism in the early years of the GDR.[25]

Another organization on the GDR research scene is the **Forschungsverbund SED-Staat**[26] at the Free University of Berlin, a research association established in 1992 under the energetic guidance of Manfred Wilke and Klaus Schroeder. The Forschungsverbund was a deliberate effort to break with the prevailing tradition of Western research on the GDR, a tradition which had come to de-emphasize the fundamental difference in political values in favor of a reductionist understanding of the East-West German rivalry as the competition of two models of modern industrial society both determined by technological processes. In contrast, the Forschungsverbund concentrates its research on the SED's totalitarian rule. Current projects deal with the establishment of the SED (M. Wilke); the relationship of the SED and MfS (M. Görtemaker); the central SED apparatus and the establishment and stabilization of the GDR dictatorship (K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); the SED's realtionship with the churches (M. Wilke); Communist science policy in Berlin after 1945 (B. Rabehl, J. Staadt); the SED and August 21, 1968 (M. Wilke); the Deutschlandpolitik of the SED (K. Schroeder, M. Wilke); opposition within the GDR since the 1980s (K. Schroeder); and a number of aspects of GDR industrial development. Most recently, the Forschungsverbund published a documentary collection on the plans of the Moscow-based KPD leadership[27] and a collection of essays on "The History and Transformation of the SED State."[28] The association is preparing major editions of the SED's role in the 1968 Czech Crisis as well as in 1980-81 Polish Crisis and on the "crisis summits" of the Warsaw Pact. At the **Federal Institute for Russian, East European and International Studies** (BIOst) in Cologne, a federally-funded research institute, F. Oldenburg is engaged in a larger study on Soviet-GDR relations in the 1980s, and G. Wettig is researching Soviet policy in Germany in the late 1940s and early 1950s as well as the Soviet role during the collapse of the GDR.[29] The **Archiv des deutschen Liberalismus** of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Gummersbach has completed a research project on the history of the LDPD 1945-1952, and in December 1993 hosted a colloquium on "Bourgeois Parties in the GDR, 1945-1953." Apart from the records of the (West) German Free Democratic Party (FDP), the archives now houses the records of the former LDPD, accessible for the years 1945-1990. The institute grants dissertation fellowships.[30]

1. Mary Fulbrook, "New *Historikerstreit*, Missed Opportunity or New Beginning," *German History* 12:2 (1994), 203.
2. Hope M. Harrison, "Inside the SED Archives: A Researcher's Diary," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 20-21, 28-32.
3. For the development prior to 1993 see Axel Frohn, "Archives in the New German Länder," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 20-21, 25-27, and Notes by Stephen Connors, ibid., 27.
4. Klaus-Dietmar Henke, "Zur Nutzung und Auswertung der Stasi-Akten," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 41:4 (1993), 575-87.
5. For the MfS archives, contact Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Projektgruppe Wissenschaft und Medien, Postfach 218, 10106 Berlin, FRG, tel.: 30-2313-7895; fax: 30-23137800; for publications and conferences, contact Abteilung Bildung und Forschung, tel.: 30-2313-7801, fax: 30-2313-7800.
6. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2152.
7. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2230.
8. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2597.
9. Ibid.
10. A list of the minutes of the hearings (Protokolle) can be obtained from Deutscher Bundestag, Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland, Sekretariat, Peter-Hensen-Str. 1-3, 53175 Bonn.
11. The report can be obtained by writing to Deutscher Bundestag, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Bundeshaus, 53113 Bonn, FRG; tel.: 228-165287/88; fax: 228-167506.
12. For the final debate on the committee report, see Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 234th Session, 17 June 1994.
13. For publication information contact the Deutscher Bundestag, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit.
14. Hermann Weber, "Die aktuelle Situation in den Archiven für die Erforschung der DDR-Geschichte," *Deutschland Archiv* 7 (1994), 690-93.
15. SAPMO, Wilhelm-Pieck-Str. 1, 10119 Berlin, FRG, tel.: 30-4426837.
16. Weber, "Die aktuelle Situation," 692.
17. Bundesarchiv, Abt. Potsdam, Tizianstr. 13, 14467 Potsdam, FRG, tel.: 331-314331.
18. Author's correspondence with the Auswärtiges Amt, 3 August 1994 and 15 August 1994.
19. The archives are open Mondays through Fridays 8:30 am to 12.30 pm. To apply for permission to use the MfAA files and for information on the further procedure contact Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Postfach 1148, 53001 Bonn, FRG; tel.: 228-172161; Fax: 228-173402.
20. The following based on Förderungsgeesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben, ed., *Tätigkeitsbericht 1993 der geisteswissenschaftlichen Forschungsschwerpunkte* (Munich: FGWN, 1994), and Fulbrook, "New Historikerstreit," 203-207.
21. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Außenstelle Potsdam, Baracke, c/o Bundesarchiv, Abt. Potsdam, Tizianstr. 13, 14467 Potsdam, FRG, tel.: 331-314331.
22. Further information on the institute can be obtained from Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien, Förderungsgesellschaft wissenschaftliche Neuvorhaben mbH, Am Kanal 4/4a, 14467 Potsdam, FRG, tel.: 331-2800512; fax: 331-2800516.
23. The proceedings were published in 1993: Herrmann Weber and Dietrich Staritz, eds., *Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten* [Communists Persecute Communists] (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993).
24. The booklet can be obtained at no charge from the Enquete-Kommission (for address see above).
25. For information contact Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Universität Mannheim, Arbeitsbereich IV: DDR-Geschichte, Postfach, 68131 Mannheim, FRG, tel.: 621-2928592; fax: 621-2928435; e-mail: direkt@mzes.sowi.uni-mannheim.de.
26. Freie Universität Berlin, Forschungsverbund SED-Staat, Ihnestr. 53, 14195 Berlin, FRG, tel.: 30-8382091; fax: 30-8385141.
27. Peter Erler, Horst Laude, Manfred Wilke, eds., "Nach Hitler kommen wir," *Dokumente zur Programmatik der Moskauer KPD-Führung 1944/45 für Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994).
28. Edited by Klaus Schroeder (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994).
29. BIOst, Lindenbornstr 22, 50823 Köln, FRG, tel.: 221 5747129; fax: 221 5747 110.
30. Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus, Theodor-Heuss-Str. 25, 51645 Gummersbach, FRG, tel.: 2261-3002 170, fax: 2261-3002 21.

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GDR ORAL HISTORY

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relationship to policymaking; we particularly emphasized former members of SED policy institutes, such as the Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of Politics and Economics. Finally, as the Oral History Project grew, we decided to develop a fourth group of interviewees in order to cast light upon the transition from the GDR to unified Germany. This category was drawn from former dissidents who became politicians, including such wide-ranging personalities as Markus Meckel, Lothar de Maiziere, Jens Reich, and Wolfgang Ullmann.

From the outset, the project's organizers were confronted with a question that all oral historians face: how to find an appropriate balance between the competing norms of "richness" and "rigor." Rigor involves the kind of rigidly-structured interviews that lend themselves to social scientific generalization and even quantification; richness, in contrast, favors the unique political and personal story of each individual to be interviewed. On the side of rigor, we provided all of our interviewers with a concrete set of core questions to guarantee that the interviews would not be entirely random. Nearly all those interviewed were asked previously formulated questions about their family background and social class, particular path to political engagement, views on the German national question, perceptions of the outside world, and personal experience with policymaking in the GDR.

Yet, if we leaned in any particular direction in developing the project, it was in favor of richness. Clearly, we did not have the resources to interview the number of representatives of the GDR elite that would have been required for quantitative social-science analysis. We also found that it was best to tailor many of our questions to the individuals' own experiences, since we were dealing with very different sorts of people, with diverse backgrounds and perspectives. Some, for example, had worked closely with major figures like Walter Ulbricht; others had been uniquely positioned to understand major events, such as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. We did not want any of these memories, however idiosyncratic, to be lost to future historians. Finally, we believed that after the formal questions were posed, it was crucial to let our discussion partners speak for themselves about what mattered most in their lives. Sometimes they took the interviews in directions that we could not have anticipated.

Not surprisingly, we initially approached our interviews with certain guiding preconceptions about how our discussions might progress and what we might discover. As the Oral History Project developed, some of these assumptions were borne out; but provocatively, others were not. In every case, however, our successes and failures turned out to be enormously revealing about the nature of the project itself and about East German history.

Our first preconception was that we might have a hard time getting some of the most senior SED officials to talk openly about their past. This concern turned out to be unfounded; in the majority of cases, they seemed to speak freely about their experiences, particularly when we assured them that we were not interested in "sensationalist journalism." With only a few exceptions—primarily, those facing criminal prosecution—it was quite easy to gain access to these former leaders, even to individuals who had granted no other interviews to westerners. We had an unexpected advantage: for the most part, we were Americans, indeed Americans from the well-known Hoover Institution. In the perception of many of our interviewees, we were worthy victors. Many were actually thrilled to welcome representatives of the "class enemy" into their living rooms, provided that we would not turn over their interviews to one of the "boulevard newspapers," like the *Bildzeitung*. Three eastern German social scientists also conducted interviews for us. They had the advantage of knowing how to speak the "language" of their former leaders. On balance, our main advantage seemed to be that no members of the Oral History Project came from former West Germany, which was still regarded by our interviewees with suspicion.

In retrospect, the readiness of these individuals to speak with us should probably not have been so surprising. After all, by depositing their thoughts in a major archive, we were assuring them that we were taking their experiences seriously, preserving their views for posterity, and perhaps even helping them to believe that their lives had not been lived in vain. This is no minor consideration in view of what happened to the GDR. Naturally, future scholars must reach their own conclusions about the honesty and sincerity of each interview. Occasionally, we detected moments of outright dishonesty. Sometimes our interviewees simply refused to talk about embarrassing moments in their lives (e.g., association with the Stasi). There was also a recurring tendency for younger individuals, or those lowest on the old hierarchy, to portray themselves as something they were not before 1989—such as closet reformists or enthusiastic Gorbachev supporters. There were also frequent lapses of memory; some older interviewees remembered the "anti-fascist struggles" of the late 1920s with absolute clarity, but could not recall the 1950s at all.

These sorts of problems afflict all oral histories. Yet, there were many moments when we could not help but be struck by the candor of our interviewees. Many showed a surprising readiness to talk about issues that we expected to be embarrassing to them. The best example of this was the Berlin Wall, which they nearly always defended in animated terms. From the first days of the interview project, there was also a telling recognition among the leading representatives of the SED elite that they had lost the battle with the West and that they were beginning to accept this reality. Thus, there was none of the crazed rambling and denial that one found in previously published interviews with Erich Honecker. Among several interviewees, there was even a notable respect for their former opponents, such as the East German dissident Bärbel Bohley, and the late West German Green Petra Kelly. Undoubtedly, there were many points where one wanted more self-criticism from our discussion partners. Yet, some of our interviewers wondered whether this same quality would have been available from comparable politicians in the West. As one eastern German interviewer reflected: "Any political elite has to confront issues involving moral integrity in the daily course of its activities, and each individual must make his peace with truth as he can."

Our second preconception was that we could use such interviews to uncover new facts about the GDR. No doubt, anyone listening to the hundreds of hours of tapes in this collection will encounter a number of interesting facts about distinct events in the East German past (for example, about the mysterious death of planning minister Erich Apel in 1965, about the lack of East German

involvement in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and about the banning of the Soviet publication *Sputnik* in 1988). Moreover, the interviews also serve to undermine many of the stereotypes that scholars have cultivated about some of East Germany's best-known politicians; sometimes the "good guys" turn out to be not so good in the recollections of their former associates, and the "bad guys" not nearly so bad.

Yet, one of our most interesting findings is how little most policymakers, including many members of the SED elite, actually knew about some of the most important events and controversies of the East German past. We feel that this says a lot about the nature of politics in the GDR. This really was a system which kept all politically significant facts restricted to very few people. We discovered that even at politburo meetings, leaders discussed very little of substance. The most important decisions were frequently made by two or three individuals walking in the woods on a weekend. In these instances, expertise rarely played a major role.

Even if we did not acquire the full stories about some of the events in the GDR past that interested us most, the opportunity to discuss such issues as the construction of the Berlin Wall or the SED's opposition to Gorbachev was unique. Indeed, future scholars may find that these interviews provide a natural complement to the mountains of written documents that have recently become available to us in such collections as the SED Central Party Archives in Berlin. For in the latter case, we have huge new reservoirs of historical facts, but frequently lack the personal perspectives necessary to interpret them.

A third preconception was that we would learn much more about policymaking processes in the GDR. This turned out to be true, although not for the reasons we envisioned. Initially, we thought that by interviewing individuals at different levels of the SED's decision-making apparatus, we would be able to construct a rough flow chart of authority, showing how decisions moved upward, downward, or outward in a complex hierarchy. Not only did we never encounter such structures, but we received constant affirmation that, by the 1980s, no well-established hierarchies existed at all. As we have already suggested, absolute power was concentrated in very few hands, and all other expressions of political activity took place on a highly informal and personalized basis. Even the SED politburo had the character of a rubber stamp; to the extent that there were differences among its members—and these did exist on some questions—they were only expressed on a private basis over the lunch table at the ruling body's Tuesday meetings. It is striking that even those who might have been considered personal cronies of SED General Secretary Erich Honecker did not feel that they controlled very much. They, too, felt like cogs in the socialist wheel.

In contrast to this image of a faceless, even amorphous policymaking culture, there was also provocative agreement in many of the interviews that politics in the GDR had not always been so uniform and that it had changed over time, particularly since the 1950s. Those individuals who were politically active in East Germany's first decade were practically unanimous in conveying an image of policymaking during that period that is conspicuously more collegial than anything later experienced in the GDR. Among them, there was a consensus that East Germany's first leader, Walter Ulbricht, was only a *primus inter pares* in the early 1950s, and that those around him could and did oppose his views on a regular basis. These findings seem to concur with the written records in the SED archives.

Finally, we came closest to meeting our fourth preconception: that we could record our interviewees' views on the great issues and great debates of the GDR past. In this case, we were listening to people's memories of their perceptions, regardless of how well they knew the details of an issue. They could say what was important to them, and what was not. Many spoke passionately about matters that had once been life or death questions for their country. This was, above all, true of the long-disputed German national question. In contrast to some Western scholarship which has held the GDR's national policy to be little more than a tactical diversion, all of the interviews conveyed a strong sense that, at least until the early 1960s, if not later, the SED leadership genuinely believed that it was offering a valid German path to socialism. Ulbricht emerges as practically obsessed with the issue, and much of his downfall in 1970-1971 can be explained in terms of this obsession.

Similarly, the Oral History Project offers a very nuanced perspective of the complex relations that existed between the GDR and its superpower ally, the USSR. It will not surprise anyone to hear that some differences existed between East Berlin and Moscow. But future scholars may be impressed by the extent of these differences, as recorded in the interviews, and by how far back they reach in East German history (e.g., in Ulbricht's efforts to push through the economic reforms of the New Economic System in the 1960s, despite manifest Soviet opposition). Additionally, the Oral History Project affords a unique perspective on the East German-Soviet conflict that emerged in the 1980s with the rise of Gorbachev's reformist leadership. Standard Kremlinological approaches to the study of communist leadership might lead one to expect the GDR politburo to have been divided into factions of "Gorbachev opponents" and "Gorbachev supporters," with comparable divisions existing within the Soviet leadership over policy to the GDR. But aside from a few slight exceptions, we were surprised to find almost no evidence of factional divisions over the GDR's relationship with Moscow.

Of all of the great issues of the East German past, the interviews offer perhaps the clearest picture of the evolution of East Berlin's relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. They depict an exceptionally close relationship between the two German states, in fact, one which defies all assertions that the essence of West German policy was to hold the German question open for some future resolution. With German reunification now an accepted fact, future scholars may be intrigued to hear, from the eastern German perspective, how seriously Bonn took the GDR's leaders and how much of West German policy was predicated upon the assumption that the Berlin Wall would remain in place for "50 or even 100 years."

In sum, while the GDR Oral History Project does not presume to offer a complete or unbiased perspective on East Germany's history, we believe it is a valuable source of information and interpretations for future scholars to use as they seek to make sense of the GDR's past. We are not aware of any comparable, publicly accessible projects on the GDR's history, particularly in Germany itself, although much smaller interview collections on the history of inter-German relations in the 1960s and the roots of the East German revolution of 1989 are being as-

sembled. Nor do we know of any similar efforts to capture the memories of comparable political elites in other East European states, although the Hoover Institution is now beginning a similar interview project on the old Soviet elite. Therefore, we hope that the Oral History Project will inspire researchers seeking to lay the foundations for future scholarship on countries as diverse as Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia.

Once the GDR Oral History Project is formally opened in November 1994, all interviews in the collection will be equally accessible to interested scholars, provided that interviewees have not previously requested copyright restrictions on the use of the material. For further information on the collection, contact:

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1. The GDR Oral History Project was initiated in 1990 by Professor A. James McAdams of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. It was made possible largely through the financial assistance of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Other supporters included the Center for German Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the John Foster Dulles Program in Leadership Studies at Princeton University. The Hoover Institution is currently supporting the transcription of all of the interviews in the collection. The GDR Oral History Project would not have been possible without the generous assistance of a number of experts on the history of the GDR. Aside from A. James McAdams, interviewers for the project included Thomas Banchoff, Heinrich Bortfeldt, Catherine Epstein, Dan Hamilton, Gerd Kaiser, Jeffrey Kopstein, Olga Sandler, Matthew Siena, John Torpey, and Klaus Zechmeister. Elena Danielson of the Hoover Archives played a central role in the project, cataloguing all of the interviews and arranging for their transcription.

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SOVIET OCCUPATION

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viet zone, but have been unable to document how and why these events occurred.

The career of Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) S. I. Tiul'panov is central to any analysis of Soviet decisionmaking in the eastern zone. Tiul'panov was in charge of the Propaganda (later Information) Administration of SVAG, and he dominated the political life of the Soviet zone as no other Russian (or for that matter East German) figure. One can argue about the extent of his power and the reasons why he was able to exert so much influence on the course of events. But there can be little question that his machinations can be detected behind virtually every major political development in the zone. A clear understanding of Tiul'panov's responsibilities and activities would go a long way towards elucidating the dynamics of Soviet influence in Germany in the early postwar years.

The partial opening of the Russian archives over the past three years has made possible a much more reliable rendition of Tiul'panov's work in the eastern zone. In particular, the former Central Party archives in Moscow, now called the Russian Storage Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents (RTsKhIDNI), which contain the records of the CPSU Central Committee through 1952, contain important communications between Tiul'panov and his Central Committee bosses. We learn from these communications that Tiul'panov was under constant investigation by his superiors in Moscow and that his goals and methods of work were repeatedly questioned by party officials. His reports and those of his superiors make it possible to tear down the monolithic facade presented to the outside world (and to the Germans) by Soviet Military Headquarters in Karlshorst. Historians have known that Tiul'panov fell into disfavor in the late summer of 1949 and that he was removed from his position shortly before the creation of the GDR in October. But they have been able only to speculate about the reasons why this happened. With the opening of the Central Committee archives and the willingness of the Tiul'panov family to turn over documents related to S. I. Tiul'panov's career to Russian historians, the puzzle associated with Tiul'panov's removal can also be solved.

The following excerpts have been translated from a recent collection of documents on Tiul'panov and SVAG, published in Moscow and edited by Bernd Bonwetsch, Gennadii Bordiugov and Norman Naimark: *SVAG: Upravlenie propagandy (informatsii) i S. I. Tiul'panov 1945-1949: Sbornik dokumentov* [SVAG: The Propaganda (Information) Administration and S. I. Tiul'panov 1945-1949: A Document Collection] (Moscow: "Rossiia Molodaia," 1994), 255 pp. The collection comprises primarily materials from RTsKhIDNI, *fond* 17, *opis'* 128, but also contains several documents from other *opisy* and from the Tiul'panov family archive. The translated excerpts from the first document printed below provide a glimpse into Tiul'panov's understanding of his political tasks in the fall of 1946. Here, Tiul'panov provides a frank assessment of the parties and personalities important to furthering the Soviet cause in Germany. The second document is a translation of the 17 September 1949 report recommending his removal and detailing the trumped-up charges against him. As best we know, Tiul'panov was recalled from Berlin to Moscow at the end of September, shortly before the GDR's official creation.

I would like to thank Andrei Ustinov for his help with the translation from the Russian. As a rambling stenographic report, the translation of the first document required considerable editing.

Document I: From S. Tiul'panov's Report at the Meeting of the Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to Evaluate the Activities of the Propaganda Administration of SVAG — Stenographic Report, September 16, 1946

. . . What is the situation in the party itself today?

— I believe that in no way should even the SED's victory in the district elections be overestimated. There are a number of obvious major shortcomings that threaten the worker, Marxist, and pro-Soviet nature of the SED, which it strived to attain at the outset and remain important in its work [today].

Most importantly, since the unification [of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the SED in April 1946] there has been a noticeable decline in party work within the SED itself. There is a marked political passivity among the former members of the SPD, which will long be felt among members of the SED. The Social Democrats still feel frustrated by the attitudes of our apparat; the commandants have treated them

with cautious distance; and they felt that they were not trusted completely and that they were treated inequitably. We have gotten past this by now to a certain extent, but not completely.

Secondly, even the most farsighted Communists feel the need to discuss every issue with the Social Democrats in order not to offend them, [and this] has led to a lessening of flexibility within the party. We sensed this especially during the elections and referendum. One can also feel this in the Central Committee of the party.

Full attention has been given to the technical questions of the organization, but not to its political character. Organizational questions of the party were considered, while issues having to do with the apparat and with the masses, especially in Berlin, were obviously neglected. This was demonstrated by the fact that there were no [SED] leaders at the biggest enterprises. The Social Democrats took advantage of this [fact] and strengthened their position in Berlin precisely in the large enterprises and among the basic [workers'] organizations.

Despite the merger of the parties, there is still a sense that two distinct groups exist. The results of the elections, which were discussed in the Saxon party organization, offer [only] the most recent example. The results of these elections prompted extremely heated debates.* First of all, they [the Saxon party members] were disconcerted by the results because they had counted on a much higher percentage of the vote, reflecting the extent to which they overestimated their influence among the masses. They were overly complacent because they could count on our administrative support. They were reassured by the fact that they had more paper, posters and other resources, and, if necessary, there was always the possibility to put some pressure [on the population]. This led in Saxony to a major overestimation of their influence on the masses. It was immediately obvious at the Saxon party meeting... that there was a group of Social Democrats talking on the one hand and a group of earlier Communists on the other. One still notices this everywhere....

Organizationally the party is also still not fully formed, which can be seen in the fact that even the exchange of party membership cards has not yet been implemented, or, if it has been implemented it has been done in such a way that the individual's files are processed but they keep their old membership cards. Both Social Democrats and Communists keep their cards. And when you talk to them, they pull out their old membership cards and say: "I am a former Communist and member of the SED." This shows that the party is not fully accepted as a real Marxist party....

We have another dangerous problem here. —And I don't even know whether it is the more dangerous... and that is the presence of sectarianism among some former Communists. This sectarianism is expressed in conversations, which are held in private apartments and sometimes during the course of [party] meetings. [They say] that we [Communists] have forfeited our revolutionary positions, that we alone would have succeeded much better had there been no SED, and that the Social Democrats are not to be trusted. Here is an example for you: once one of my instructors came and said: "I am a Communist, so it's not even worth talking to him [a Social Democrat], you can tell him by sight." These are the words of the Secretary of the most powerful organization [in Berlin] and this kind of attitude is cultivated by [Hermann] Matern. This is not to mention [Waldemar] Schmidt, who has gone so far as to invent the existence of a spy apparatus among Communists [allegedly] to inform on Social Democrats [in the SED]. This is over now, but serious problems remain.

At the moment, it is hard to evaluate the strength of sectarianism among the [former] Communists, but one could estimate that in the Berlin organization approximately 10 percent [of the members] are so discontented that they are ready to join another group in order to break off with the SED. The problem is less serious in other regions. From the point of view of the Communists [in the SED] the party is considered to be more solid [than among former Social Democrats]. But there is the danger that these Social Democrats hold key positions, and their group has much more power. It is impossible to evaluate the phenomenon of sectarianism in a simple manner, because, at the same time, the right wing [the Social Democrats] dreams of the day when it will be able to drop out of the SED. [They] have established contacts with the Zehlendorf [SPD] organization (we even have names) and with the [Western] Allies.

Nothing is simple. The same [Otto] Buchwitz, who completely supported the unification, supervised the process in Saxony, and had served time in [Nazi] prisons, when he comes here [to Berlin] he stays with those Social Democrats who are members of the Zehlendorf organization. When he was confronted with this fact, he responded: "But he is my old friend, and our political differences are not relevant." Therefore, contacts between the Berlin Social Democrats [in the SED] and this group [the Zehlendorf, anti-SED Social Democrats] sometimes have the character of a party faction, and sometimes simply of Social Democrats getting together.... We should very cautious with them.

Therefore, there are two wings [in the party.] There is another major shortcoming of the Central Committee of the SED and its district committees. They do not seek out and develop new cadres who can work consistently with the party aktiv.

In addition, the party is just beginning the theoretical elucidation of all of our earlier disagreements [with the Social Democrats]. The journal, "Einheit," which has [Otto] Grotewohl among its authors, as well as others, is still rarely read by the regular members of the party, and moreover, it is seldom read by [SED] functionaries.

There still remains in the party a whole list of major [unanswered] questions. The time has come to ask these questions clearly. Otherwise the party may become dominated by opportunistic and conciliatory members. Deviations from Marxist positions pose a substantial danger for the party. There is a significant percentage of petit-bourgeois members [in the SED]; 40 percent to 51 percent workers. Still, neither the Communists nor the Social Democrats understand the new forms shaping the struggle for power, the movement towards socialism. They do not understand that the SED is not a tactical maneuver, but the situation by which they can achieve [....] that which was accomplished in our country by different means. They do not speak about the dictatorship of the proletariat, but about democracy. [Still], they have no understanding of the nature of the struggle after World War II.

Then there is another issue; the party can very easily retreat into nationalist positions. My comrades and I observed this even at the large meetings. When Grotewohl spoke in Halle about social questions and equality between men and women, he was greeted very quietly. But as soon as he touched upon the national question, all 440 thousand [sic] applauded.

Recently this issue was raised at the large party meeting in Chemnitz. They argued that they did not have to orient themselves either on the Soviet Union or on Great Britain. They should be oriented on Germany. That said that Russian workers live badly and that they, the Germans, should think only about the German working class.

And now I would say the following. I am not sure that for all that the party proclaims on its banners, [whether] they have managed to distinguish between the correct national viewpoint on this question and the nationalistic and chauvinistic [one]. In all the major addresses and reports in the preelection period, in the speeches addressed to wider audiences, the contents diverged from our censored versions. As a way of demonstrating confidence in themselves, they carried this to extremes. This was the case, when, at Poland's border, Pieck stated that soon the other half [Polish-occupied Germany] would be theirs. After Molotov's speech, they [the SED party leaders] were given permission to state that as a German party they welcomed any revision of the borders which would improve the situation of Germany....

They are allowed to make this statement, but we run the danger of allowing the party to revert to extreme nationalism. Despite this, the SED's propaganda was unable to convince the popula-

tion that the party is a real German party, and not simply the agents of the occupation authorities. There are still countless such shortcomings and failures of [the SED's] propaganda....

Here is the principal question — how should the party develop? Those whom the Old Social Democrats call functionaries, understand their connection with the party in this struggle, and we firmly count on them. They are the basic party unit; they are those we call the party aktiv. All the rest at best carry their membership cards and pay their party dues, but do not view the party's decisions as binding. An example of this is Leipzig. Neither the provincial leadership [of the Saxon SED] nor Berlin understand the conditions in Leipzig. Twice they met and twice they rejected the positions of the Central Committee and the [provincial] committee. This is [not serious] under the conditions here, but in a different situation, such as during the Reichstag elections, these questions will require great attention.[...]

As for the situation in the [SED] Central Committee itself. Grotewohl is the central figure after Pieck in the Central Committee; and he enjoys authority among and the respect of not only Social Democrats but also Communists. (I am still working especially closely with him. I visit him at his home. He has not visited me yet, but I would like to invite him to mine.) All of his behavior demonstrates that he sides with Marxist positions quickly and firmly, and for him there is no problem of speaking up at any meeting, and of speaking up very strongly and saying: if we look at the struggle in our social life, then we will crush our enemies by force of arms. However, at the beginning [of the occupation] he would have never used this expression, but he [now] sees and feels that these things are acceptable. Nevertheless, he has a very well-known past as a Social Democrat. I remember how he hesitated before he came to [his present stance]. I remember his [hesitation] during his last discussion with the Marshal [Zhukov, in February 1946], when there was only he [Grotewohl] and no one else, and the Marshal tackled the question of the political situation — whether or not he [Grotewohl] wanted or did not want [to join with the Communists], this was the political choice. [Zhukov] pointed out the differences between us and the [Western] Allies. Nevertheless, [said Zhukov,] I am used to fighting for the interests of the working class, and we, if necessary, will crush all [opponents]. Grotewohl demanded permission to travel to another zone. He went, reviewed [the situation], and said, I will go along with you [the Soviets].

In conjunction with a new [wave of] dismantling and with the fact that difficulties [in the economy] will not diminish but may even get more serious, the danger exists that if we leave here that we will leave behind only one such figure [as Grotewohl], that even in the Central Committee we don't have prominent figures who would be able to lead the masses during the transition.

Fechner—the second Social Democrat, who wavers a great deal, a powerful parliamentary agitator, activist, a member of the Reichstag.... He appears to be a rather amorphous figure, not much of a battler, though he has produced a number of fine documents, denouncing [Kurt] Schumacher [of the SPD West].

Of the other Social Democrats who are there—Lehmann, Gniffke: one can rely on them with considerably less certainty. In the provinces we have only one such figure — Buchwitz, on whom one can rely, but he is the age of Pieck....

As for the Communists, Pieck is undoubtedly the most acceptable figure for all party members. Pieck is the all-around favorite, but often he says things that he should not; he too easily accepts compromising alliances and sometimes states even more than the situation permits.

I do not see any sectarianism on Ulbricht's part. Ulbricht understands organizational work, and he can secretly forge any political alliance and keep it secret. But Ulbricht is not trusted as a person. He speaks with greater precision and he understands [the political situation] better than anyone else. But they [members of the SED] don't like Ulbricht; they do not like him for his harshness. Moreover, relations between Grotewohl and Ulbricht are not satisfactory. Recently Grotewohl said [to Ulbricht]: you know, Pieck is the leader of the party, not you. However, at big meetings, Ulbricht always commands a great deal of respect, and even more for his efficiency at the meetings of the Central Committee, of the district committees, of functionaries, and others....

Now I will move to the characterization of the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party]. The LDP was regarded by all of us as a counterweight to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union], which during the last year, from the beginning of the liberation though all of 1945 until the beginning of 1946, constituted the major party (within the framework of democratic organizations), to which were attracted reactionaries [and] anti-Soviet elements who were looking for outlets to express their discontent.

I will begin with the CDU. We understand perfectly well that it is impossible to change the position of the hostile classes and that it is impossible to make this party pro-Soviet. But we can accomplish the goal of depriving [the CDU] of the possibility of making anti-Soviet and ambiguous statements; [we] can strengthen the scattered democratic elements in this party. Therefore, when this party turned out to be an obvious threat and synonymous with everything reactionary, we undertook to arrange the replacement of [Andreas] Hermes with [Jakob] Kaiser [in December 1945].... Currently, this party has a very diverse composition, comprised of the following elements: first of all, there is a significant group of workers and Catholic peasants, but mainly [the CDU includes] those who belonged [before the war] to the Center Party. Approximately 15 to 20 percent of the party is comprised of office workers and bureaucrats....

For a long time, we thought of the LDP as a counterpoint to the CDU. I would even say that we promoted [the LDP] artificially. In October and November of last year, we used [the LDP] every time we had to put pressure on the CDU. In other words, we suckled a snake at our own breast. And in fact, before these elections this party never enjoyed any credit [among the population] or any authority....

[Now I will speak about] the leadership of the Kulturbund.** We have come to the firm conviction that it is now time to replace [Johannes R.] Becher. It is impossible to tolerate him any more. I spoke against [his removal] for a long time, and we had many reservations. But now, especially in connection with [the process of the] definition of classes and the intensification of the political struggle, we must prevent the Kulturbund from becoming a gang of all the members of the intelligentsia. We need it to become the cultural agency of the democratic renewal of Germany, as well as a society for [promoting] cultural relations with the Soviet Union. The Kulturbund ... has to be changed and has to have its own leading aktiv. Without them, it [the Kulturbund] can only be of harm and not of use, and Becher cannot and does not want to change it.

In his intellectual aspirations, Becher is not only not a Marxist, but he is directly tied to Western European democratic [thinking], if not to England and America. He is ashamed to say that he is a member of the Central Committee of the SED. He hides this in every way. He even never allows us to call him Comrade, and always Herr Becher. [He] avoids any sharp political speeches in the Kulturbund. Becher is well known enough; in the current situation he represents the progressive intelligentsia. He would not, and did not want to, let [Erich] Weinert into the Kulturbund. He did not want to let [Friedrich] Wolf take part in it, and he despises all party work [....]

Source: RTsKhIDNI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 149; SVAG Sbornik, *pp. 155-176.)*

* [Local (*Gemeinde*) elections were held in the Soviet zone on 1-15 September 1946; State Assembly (*Landtag*) and Regional Assembly (*Kreistag*) elections in the Soviet zone, as well as voting for the Berlin city government, were conducted on 20 October 1946.— N.M.]

** [Kulturbund refers to the Kulturbund fuer demokratische Erneuverung—the Cultural Association for Democratic Renewal. See David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 80-88. — N.M.]

Document II: Report of the Deputy Chief of the GPU (Main Political Administration) of the Armed Forces of the USSR, S. Shatilov, to Politburo member G. Malenkov on the Dismissal of Tiul'panov

September 17, 1949
Central Committee of the CPSU (b), Comrade Malenkov G.M.

I request permission to relieve Major General TIUL'PANOV Sergei Ivanovich of his post as Chief of the Information Administration of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, placing him under the command of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces.

It has been established that the parents of Major General TIUL'PANOV were convicted of espionage: the father in 1938, the mother in 1940. The wife of TIUL'PANOV's brother was in contact with the Secretary of one of the embassies in Moscow—an agent of English intelligence; her father was sentenced to be shot as a member of the right-wing Trotskyist organization. TIUL'PANOV's brother and his brother's wife are closely connected with the family of Major General TIUL'PANOV S.I.

At the end of 1948, organs of the MGB [Ministry for State Security] in Germany arrested LUKIN — TIUL'PANOV's driver — for traitorous intentions and for anti-Soviet agitation. LUKIN's father betrayed his Motherland in 1928 and fled to Iran.

Major General TIUL'PANOV concealed the facts of the arrests and convictions of his father, mother, and relatives from the party, and he did not indicate these in his biographical information.

A number of employees of the Information Administration departments have been arrested lately on suspicion of espionage, and several were recalled to the Soviet Union from Germany for the reason of political unreliability. Major General TIUL'PANOV took no initiative in instituting these measures against the politically compromised persons. He did not approve of these measures, although he expressed no open opposition to them.

The arrested LUKIN, TIUL'PANOV's driver, testified that TIUL'PANOV revealed his negative attitudes in the driver's presence. Fel'dman, the former employee of the Information Administration who is now under arrest, testified that TIUL'PANOV made criminal bargains with his subordinates, engaged in extortion, and received illegal funds. There were 35 books of a fascist nature seized from TIUL'PANOV's apartment.

By his nature TIUL'PANOV is secretive and not sincere. Over the last year he has behaved especially nervously, taking different measures to find out about the attitude of the leading organs in Moscow towards him.

I regard it as undesirable to keep Major General TIUL'PANOV in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. I consider it necessary for the sake of the mission to relieve him of his post and not to let him reenter Germany. The Main Political Administration contemplates using TIUL'PANOV to work within our country.

Comrades Vasilevskii and Chuikov support the proposal to relieve Major General TIUL'PANOV of his duties in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany.

17 September 1949

SHATILOV

(Source: RTsKhIDNI, fond 17, opis' 118, delo 567; SVAG Sbornik, *pp. 233-234.)*

Norman M. Naimark is Professor of History at Stanford University; his The Soviet Occupation of Germany, *will be published by Harvard University Press in 1995.*

STALIN AND THE SED

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Minutes of conversation with com[rade]. Stalin of leaders of SED W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, and O. Grotewohl

Present: Comr[ade]s. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Semyonov (ACC [Allied Control Commission])

7 April 1952

Com[rade]. Stalin said that the last time W. Pieck raised the question about the prospects for the development of Germany in connection with the Soviet proposals on a peace treaty and the policy of the Americans and British in Germany. Comrade Stalin considers that irrespective of any proposals that we can make on the German question the Western powers will not agree with them and will not withdraw from Germany in any case. It would be a mistake to think that a compromise might emerge or that the Americans will agree with the draft of the peace treaty. The Americans need their army in West Germany to hold Western Europe in their hands. They say that they have there their army [to defend] against us. But the real goal of this army is to control Europe. The Americans will draw West Germany into the Atlantic Pact. They will create West German troops. Adenauer is in the pocket of the Americans. All ex-fascists and generals also are there. In reality there is an independent state being formed in West Germany. And you must organize your own state. The line of demarcation between East and West Germany must be seen as a frontier and not as a simple border but a dangerous one. One must strengthen the protection of this frontier.

(Source: APRF, Fond 45, opis 1, delo 303, list 179.)

Following are notes of the same meeting taken by Pieck, discovered in the SED archives in Berlin, in Rolf Badstubner and Wilfried Loth, eds., *Wilhelm Pieck—Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1953* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 396-97 (translation by Stephen Connors):

Final Discussion on 7 April 1952—11:20 p.m. in Moscow

St[alin]: up to now all Proposals rejected
Situation:
no Compromises
Creation of a European-Army—not against the SU [Soviet Union] but rather about Power in Europe

Atlantic Treaty—independent State in the West
Demarcation line dangerous Borders
1st Line Germans (Stasi), behind [it] Soviet soldiers
We must consider terrorist Acts.

Defense:
Reinstate the liquidated Soviet garrisons
3000
Armaments must be furnished,
immediately russian Arms with Rounds [of ammunition]
Military Training for Inf[antry], Marine, Aviation, Submarines
Tanks—Artillery will be supplied
also [a] Rifle division
Hoffmann—24 Units—5800
Not Militia, but rather [a] well-trained Army.
Everything without Clamour, but constant.

Village:
Also Establishment of Productive-Associations in Villages,
in order to isolate Large-scale farmers.
Clever to start in the Autumn.
create Examples—Concessions
Seed-corn, Machines.
Instructors at their Disposal.
force No one
[Do] not scream Kolchosen [Soviet collective Farm]—Socialism.
create Facts. In the Beginning the Action.
—way to Socialism—state Prod[uction] is socialistic

Better Pay of the Engineers
1 : 1,7
2-3 x more than workers
Apartment
11-12000 Rbl [Rubles] to Academics
pay qualified workers better than unqualified

Propositions not dealt with
Party not dealt with Party conference
KPD [Communist Party of Germany]
Economic conference
Unity, Peace treaty—agitate further

CWIHP CONFERENCE

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significance of Soviet overtures toward the West to resolve the German Question both before and after Stalin's death in 1953. Some scholars (such as Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth of Essen University) contended that new evidence from the GDR archives, such as the notes of SED leader Wilhelm Pieck, suggest that Moscow's proposals constituted a serious opportunity to unify Germany on acceptable terms—and, by implication, to end the division of Europe and the Cold War itself—but others argued that recent disclosures from Soviet archives confirmed the opposite, that they were advanced as a propaganda tactic to undermine the Western Alliance's plans to arm West Germany.

At Potsdam, U.S. and German scholars addressed topics that were virtually taboo during the GDR era, such as the regime's attitudes toward Jews and the legacies of the Nazi era, and the misdeeds of Soviet occupying forces, including widespread instances of rape. In addition, representatives of various German archives containing GDR materials discussed the status of their holdings. The conference program follows:

"The Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945-1962: New Evidence from Eastern Archives," 28-30 June 1994, Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut, Essen University

Panel 1: Foundations of Postwar Soviet Policy on Germany. Chair: Alexander Chubarian (Inst. of Universal History, Moscow); Papers: Wilfried Loth (Essen U.), "Stalin's Plans for Postwar Germany"; Jochen Laufer (FSP), "The Soviet Union and the Division of Germany into Zones"; Jan Foitzik (Mannheim U.), "Polish and Czech Interest in the German Question, 1943-1949"; Comment: R.C. Raack (Calif. St. U.)

Panel 2: Soviet Policy and the Division of Germany.

Session One: The Occupation, 1945-1948. Chair: Klaus Schwabe (Technische U., Aachen); Papers: Gerhard Wettig (BIOst, Cologne), "All-German Unity and East German Separation in Soviet Policy, 1947-1949"; Stefan Creuzberger (Bonn U.), "Opportunism or Tactics? Ernst Lemmer, the Soviet Occupying Power, and the Handling of New 'Key Documents'"; Gennadii Bordiugov (Moscow State U.), "The Riddle of Colonel Tjulpanov"; Comment: Norman Naimark (Stanford U.)

Session Two: The First Berlin Crisis, 1948-1949. Chair: Robert S. Litwak (Wilson Ctr.); Papers: Victor Gobarev (Inst. of Military History, Moscow), "Soviet Military Plans and Activities during the Berlin Crisis, 1948-1949"; Mikhail Narinsky (Inst. for Universal History, Moscow), "Soviet Policy and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949"; Chuck Pennachio (U. of Colorado), "Origins of the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift Crisis: New Evidence from East German Communist Party Archives"; Comment: Melvyn P. Leffler (U. of Virginia)

Panel 3: The Early Years of the GDR. Chair: Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Wilson Ctr.); Papers: Alexei Filitov (Inst. for General History, Moscow), "Soviet Policy and the Early Years of Two German States, 1949-1961"; Michael Lemke (FSP), "A German Chance? The Inner-German Discussion Regarding the Grotewohl Letter of November 1950"; Comment: Rolf Badstubner

Panel 4: Roundtable on the Stalin Notes. Chair: Rolf Steininger (Inst. for Contemporary Hist., Innsbruck); Papers: W. Loth (Essen U.); A. Chubarian (Inst. of Universal History, Moscow); Vojtech Mastny (SAIS Bologna Ctr.); G. Wettig (BIOst); Ruud van Dijk (Contemporary Hist. Inst., Ohio U./Athens)

Panel 5: Stalin's Successors and the German Question. Chair: Bernd Bonwetsch (Ruhr-Univ. Bochum); Papers: Mark Kramer (Harvard, Brown U.), "Soviet Policy, the June 1953 GDR Uprising, and the Post-Stalin Succession Struggle"; Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive (NSA)), "Soviet Foreign Policy in Germany and Austria and the Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, 1953-1955"; Christian Ostermann (Hamburg U.), "The United States, East Germany, and the Limits of Roll-back in Germany, 1953"; Commentators: William Taubman (Amherst Coll.) and Jim Hershberg (CWIHP)

Panel 6: Soviet Policy Toward Germany 1955-58. Chair: Otmar Haberl (Essen U.); Karl-Heinz Schlarp (Hamburg U.): "Adenauer's Trip to Moscow and the Establishment of Soviet-West German Relations, 1955"; Eduard Gloeckner, "Khrushchev, Ulbricht, and Schirdewan: The Story of an Abortive Reform Option in the GDR, 1956-1958"; Beate Ihme-Truchel (Free U., Berlin), "The Soviet Union and the Politics of the Rapacki Plan"; Commentator: Ron Pruessen (U. of Toronto)

Panel 7: The Berlin Crisis, 1958-62: Views from Moscow and East Berlin. Chair: W. Taubman (Amherst); Papers: Hope Harrison (Harvard [now Brandeis] U.), "New Evidence on Soviet-GDR Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961"; V. Zubok (NSA), "Khrushchev's Motives and Soviet Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962"; James Richter (Bates Coll.), "Khrushchev, Domestic Politics and the Origins of the Berlin Crisis, 1958"; Bruce Menning (US Army Command & General Staff Coll.), "The Berlin Crisis 1961 from the Perspective of the Soviet General Staff"; Commentators: W. Burr (NSA/NHP); Wolfgang Krieger (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/NHP); and David Alan Rosenberg (Temple U./NHP)

Closing Remarks: Charles Maier (Ctr. for European Studies, Harvard U.)

"Archival and Recent Research on the Early History of the Soviet Occupied Zone and the German Democratic Republic," 1-2 July 1994, Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien (FSP), Potsdam

Panel 1: Details of the Internal Development of the Soviet Occupied Zone in East Germany.(Chair: Jurgen Kocka, Director, FSP); Papers: David Pike (U. of North Carolina/Chapel Hill), "The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied and Early East Germany, 1945-1954"; N. Naimark (Stanford U.), "'About the Russians and about Us': Russian-German relations in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949" ; Ian Lipinsky (Bonn U.), "Soviet Special Camps in Germany, 1945-49: a Model for Allied Internment Practice or for the Soviet Gulag System?"; Jurgen Danyel (FSP), "The Soviet Occupied Zone's Connection with the Nazi Past—Decreed anti-Fascism as the Basis of Legitimacy for the German Democratic Republic's Founding Generation"; Peter Walther (FSP), "The German Academy of Sciences in Berlin as the Collective Scholarly Society and National Research Organization of the Soviet Occupied Zone in the German Democratic Republic, 1946-1955"

Panel 2: "The Archives and Research on the History of the Soviet Occupied Zone and the Early German Democratic Republic. Chair: Prof. Kahlenberg, President of the Bundesarchivs, Koblenz; Papers: Hermann Schreyer, Bundesarchiv, Abtig. Potsdam: Zentrale Uberlieferungen der staatlichen Ebene; Hans-Joachim Schreckenbach, Potsdam: Staatliche Uberlieferungen der Lander unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des Landes Brandenburg; Renate Schwarzel, Berlin: Uberlieferungen der Betriebsarchive (angefragt); Sigrun Muhl-Benninghaus, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin: Zentrale Uberlieferungen der Parteien und Massenorganisationen; Hartmund Sander, Evangelische Zentralarchiv, Berlin: Kirchliche Quellenuberlieferungen am Beispiel der Evangelischen Kirche; Jochen Hecht (Referatsleiter AR 1, Abt. Archivbestande beim Bundesbeauftragten fur die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR): "Die archivalische Hinterlassenschaft des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, Sicherung, Erschliessung, Nutzbarmachung"

Panel 3: The Cold War and the Development of the Early GDR. Chair: J. Hershberg (CWIHP); Papers: Jeffrey Herf (Seminar fur wissenschaftliche Politik, Freiburg U., and Inst. for Advanced Study, Princeton), "East German Communists and the Jewish Question: The Case of Paul Merker"; Mario Kessler (FSP), "Responsiblity for Guilt and Restitution. The SED Policy and the Jews in the Soviet Occupation Zone, 1945-1949"; Catherine Epstein (Ctr. for European Studies, Harvard U.), "'Esteemed

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