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**THE THIRD YUGOSLAVIA, 1992 - 2001**

**Sabrina P. Ramet**

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**East European Studies**  
The Woodrow Wilson Center  
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza  
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20004-3027

(tel) 202-691-4000; (fax) 202-691-4001  
kneppm@wwic.si.edu

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## THE THIRD YUGOSLAVIA, 1992 - 2001\*

**SABRINA P. RAMET** is a Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, Norway and a former Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow.

The Milosevic regime was a classic example of what has been called a “democradura,” i.e., a system which combined some of the mechanisms of democracy (with the result that Milosevic’s Socialists were, at one point, forced to enter into a coalition with Seselj’s Radicals, in order to form a government) with many overtly authoritarian features (among which one might mention the constriction of press freedom, the use of the police against the political opposition, and systematic violations of human rights). It was also a regime which drew its energy from the manipulation of Serbian nationalism, even if, as has been argued, Milosevic himself was not an ideological nationalist.<sup>1</sup> To the extent that xenophobia lay at the heart of Serbian nationalism, the regime found itself relying on an ideology which consisted of an explicit repudiation of such values as tolerance, equality of peoples, respect for the harm principle,<sup>2</sup> and individual rights.

The record of Serbian opposition to Milosevic is striking both for its tenacity and, until 2000, for its ineffectiveness. One need but remember the anti-Milosevic protests of March 9, 1991, the anti-regime procession led by the Serbian Orthodox patriarch on June 14, 1992, the anti-regime demonstrations led by Vuk and Danica Draskovic in early June 1993, the protests by Women in Black and other Serbian pacifist groups during the war years, the 78-day protests in several cities in the winter of 1996/97, the wildfire of anti-Milosevic rallies in a number of Serbian cities in June - August 1999 (where demands were raised for Milosevic’s resignation), the energetic anti-regime activities by the student resistance group “Otpor” during 2000, and the repeated efforts by courageous journalists to revive independent media throughout the years of Milosevic’s rule to see the point. There *was* public willingness to resist the Milosevic regime. The difficulty

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\* This piece is adapted from a chapter in the author’s forthcoming book, *The Three Yugoslavias: The Dual Challenge of State-Building and Legitimation among the Yugoslavs, 1918-2001* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, forthcoming). Copyright © 2001 by Sabrina P. Ramet. All rights reserved.

was that, among Serbs, such opposition to Milosevic was largely concentrated in the larger cities, especially Belgrade, Nis, and Kragujevac. On the other hand, Milosevic had his base of support in Serbia's small towns and villages. Indeed, Milosevic's rule opened a chasm between city and countryside, and deepened the mutual distrust between them. For many rural supporters of Milosevic, "Belgrade is Tito's whore. It sees itself as Yugoslav, cosmopolitan, democratic. The only thing it doesn't want to be is what it is: Serbian."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, as Eric Gordy notes, Milosevic's support was strongest among persons over 45 years of age, especially those with less education. At the same time, between 300,000 and 600,000 young university graduates emigrated during the Milosevic years, confirming the alienation of the educated classes from the regime.<sup>4</sup>

If, as I have argued elsewhere,<sup>5</sup> political legitimacy hinges on the observance of routinized, legal, and accepted procedures for political succession, then much depends on the origins of the given regime. Accordingly, to understand the nature of the Milosevic regime and the roots of its crisis, one must return to its origins in 1987.

Slobodan Milosevic did not come to power through either popular election or normal party procedures: he seized power through an internal party coup, embracing as the core of his ideology the waxing anti-Albanian and anti-Muslim phobias which were then spreading particularly among rural Serbs. The Milosevic regime built its ideological foundations on hatred, rapidly expanding that hatred to include also Croats, Hungarians (in the Vojvodina), Germans, Austrians, the Vatican, and, of course, the US – and expanded its power through a series of unconstitutional and illegal measures. These included the mobilization of protesters to destabilize and topple the elected governments in Novi Sad, Titograd (Podgorica), and Pristina, the arrest of Kosovar Albanians who had signed a petition supporting the 1974 SFRY constitution, the installation by Belgrade of Momir Bulatovic and Rahman Morina (in 1989) as the party chiefs in Montenegro and Kosovo respectively, the amendments to the Serbian constitution adopted in 1989 (which by-passed the federal constitution), the suppression of the provincial autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina in March 1989, the subsequent suppression of the provincial assembly in Kosovo, the use of official channels to declare a boycott of Slovenian goods (in December 1989), the Serbian bank swindle of December 1990, the conduct of local Serbian referenda in Croatia in summer 1990 without the approval of Croatian authorities, the unilateral establishment of Serb autonomous regions in Croatia and Bosnia between August 1990 and April 1991, and the establishment and arming of Serb militias in Croatia, beginning in summer 1990. This is only a partial list of unconstitutional and illegal measures taken by Serb authorities between 1988 and 1991.<sup>6</sup> That said, it is clear that the Milosevic regime was illegitimate both objectively (in terms of its political system, economic system, and general disregard for human rights) and contextually (in terms of its failure to comply with the laws of the land). It is no coincidence that among his few close allies, Milosevic could count Iraq's Saddam Hussein, who (in early 2000) promised to send troops to Serbia to shore up Milosevic's regime in the event of any future conflict with NATO.<sup>7</sup>

The third Yugoslavia was born on April 27, 1992 when Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). From the

beginning, it was a curious construction: Serbia and Montenegro were nominally equal, but in fact Serbia clearly dominated the union; the FRY President appeared to be the superior of the Serbian President, but Serbian President Milosevic was clearly in charge and even (illegally) arranged for the removal of FRY President Dobrica Cosic in June 1993; and, though its officials constantly reiterated that the country was “at peace,” Yugoslav Army troops and war material were simply transferred outright to Bosnian Serb command in 1992, crucial supplies were diverted to Bosnian Serb forces, and the economy itself was put on war footing (partly, though not exclusively, under the duress of UN economic sanctions). Then there was the spectacle of Serbian parliamentary deputy Milan Paroski proposing, in May 1992, that the newly established FRY seek affiliation with the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States.<sup>8</sup> It was no wonder, then, that Serbs’ strategies of coping with conditions of Milosevic’s despotic rule have been compared with strategies adopted by patients in mental asylums.<sup>9</sup>

### **Milosevic’s Strategy of Control**

Milosevic built his power through the control of three key institutions: financial institutions and large industrial complexes (controlled directly or by his trusted cronies), the secret police and regular police, and the media.<sup>10</sup> Of the three, it was the media which proved the hardest to keep under control, in spite of the clear priority Milosevic assigned to its control.

The combination of the war and the sanctions created conditions which facilitated the subversion of the economy. Already on July 9, 1992, barely three months after the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian Assembly adopted legislation which granted Milosevic emergency powers over every facet of the economy. Some 15,000 students marched through the streets of Belgrade in protest as the Assembly considered the measure – but to no avail. Milan Paroski, president of the opposition Serbian People’s Party and a presidential candidate in the December 1992 elections, summed up his despair, declaring, “Lenin-style war communism has been introduced without a single, positive governmental measure to safeguard production.”<sup>11</sup> Milosevic’s brand of “war communism” meant that ordinary citizens became steadily poorer and poorer, until 60 percent of Serbs lived below the poverty line, while Milosevic and his wife, as well as the members of their inner circle, became egregiously wealthy, spiriting funds clandestinely into bank accounts in Russia, China, Cyprus, and elsewhere.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, organized crime spread throughout Serbian society, some of it benefiting from regime protection; among its operations were smuggling of fuel, arms smuggling, and drug smuggling.<sup>13</sup>

The economy shrank by 6.6 percent in 1990, by another 8.2 percent in 1991, by a further 26.2 percent in 1992, and by a catastrophic 30.3 percent relative to the previous year in 1993.<sup>14</sup> Skyrocketing inflation wiped out ordinary citizens’ savings overnight,<sup>15</sup> annihilated pensions, and accelerated the widening gap between Serbia’s new kleptocrats and the growing mass of impoverished Serbs. During these same years, industrial production also plummeted: by 12.9 percent in 1990, by 15.9 percent in 1991, by 21.4

percent in 1992, and by 37.3 percent in 1993. The modest reversal of these trends in 1994-95, when economic growth was recorded at 6.5 percent for 1994 and 6.0 percent for 1995 (with industrial growth rates of 1.3 percent and 3.8 percent respectively), could scarcely begin to compensate for the dramatic contraction of the preceding four years;<sup>16</sup> during the winter of 1994-95, there were shortages of electric energy, with intervals with no electricity lasting up to six hours at a stretch.

Where the police are concerned, by 1993, the regular police had been built up to an 80,000-strong, heavily-militarized force, most of them recruited from among the Serbian populations of Croatia and Bosnia, or from rural parts of Serbia itself. As Robert Thomas notes, these recruits had little sympathy for urban intellectuals in Belgrade.<sup>17</sup> Some 25,000 police were stationed in Belgrade alone. But, as important as their loyalty was, Milosevic ultimately depended much more on the security police, the so-called “secret police,” who could carry out “dirty jobs” such as the murder, in March 1999, of independent journalist Slavko Curuvija.<sup>18</sup>

The third foundation of Milosevic’s power was his control of the media. In the war years, Milosevic’s strategy was to control Radio-Television Serbia and the newspapers *Politika* and *Politika ekspres*, while circumscribing the influence of other media outlets. Among leading newsmagazines, *Duga* was under clear regime influence too, while *NIN*, the prestigious Belgrade weekly, espoused a clear Serb nationalist line. *Borba* [Struggle], an independent Belgrade newspaper dating back to the Partisan war, which was critical of Milosevic’s rule, experienced difficulties in obtaining newsprint, and in December 1993, missed an issue because of newsprint supply problems, according to the Associated Press.<sup>19</sup> Later, on December 23, 1994, the regime seized control of the wayward newspaper, installing Yugoslav Information Minister Dragutin Brcin as its new director and chief editor. All but 15 of *Borba*’s 120 journalists refused to go along with the new management and launched a rival newspaper, *Nasa borba* [Our Struggle], which maintained its integrity and continued to publish until October 15, 1998, when it too was finally brought down by the regime.<sup>20</sup> Independent-minded journalists purged from Tanjug, the state news agency, adopted a similar approach, establishing the independent Beta news agency, which has maintained high professional standards to this day.<sup>21</sup> The independent media struggled to maintain balance in their reportage of the war. But in the regime-controlled media, which, in addition to RTV Belgrade, Radio NTV-Studio B (after its takeover), the newspapers *Politika*, *Politika ekspres*, and after Christmas 1994, *Borba* as well as some provincial newspapers, the Serbs were always and everywhere innocent victims, while Croats and Muslims were the aggressors. Mark Thompson comments:

At the beginning [of the war in Bosnia], Serb forces were often ‘unarmed defenders of centuries-old hearths’: this was shortened to ‘defenders’ and, often simultaneously, ‘liberators’ of towns and territory. Sarajevo was a site of conflict, but the daily bombardment of the city by Serb forces was not mentioned for two months. The fact of a siege was not denied, it was turned inside out: ‘The Muslim authorities are holding Sarajevo under siege from within,’ said reporter Rada Djokic, adding, ‘The Serbs continue to defend their centuries-old hills



around Sarajevo.’<sup>22</sup>

And if the siege of Sarajevo could be turned upside down, then, it followed for *Politika* that the bread-line massacre in Sarajevo on May 27, 1992 could “only” be the work of the Muslims themselves, in an effort to make the Serbs look bad! Not surprisingly, opinion polls found Serbs to be often quite ignorant concerning the most basic facts about the war in Bosnia.<sup>23</sup>

Yet the media proved adept at shaping most Serbs’ views of the world and, with the media constantly harping on the alleged hostility of Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Hungarians, the U.S., Germany, Austria, Italy, the Vatican, and perhaps other states and groups as well, it is not surprising that xenophobia and nationalist chauvinism among Serbs grew steadily in these years (though they had been present at lower levels before Milosevic’s rise of power, of course).<sup>24</sup> The media were also able to change Serbs’ views rather rapidly, at least on occasion. Thus, in March 1993, for instance, Belgrade’s main evening news program was severely critical of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which, it said, would lead to the “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Serbs and thus be tantamount to “national suicide”.<sup>25</sup> An opinion poll conducted on April 9, 1993 found that 70 percent of Serbs were opposed to the Vance-Owen plan. Milosevic however, became convinced that a Serbian rejection of the plan might lead to Western military intervention against the Bosnian Serb forces, and the regime-controlled media switched tracks and began to endorse the plan as a reasonable compromise. After this reversal, a second opinion poll, taken on April 27, found that only 20 percent of Serbs were still opposed to the plan, while 39 percent declared themselves in favor.<sup>26</sup>

When Serbian journalists stepped out of line, they ran the risk of being harassed or beaten by police, as happened to three journalists who covered the June 1, 1993 anti-regime demonstrations in Belgrade.

## **Serbia At War**

On March 9, 1992, on the first anniversary of the 1991 demonstrations, 50,000 anti-Milosevic protesters attended a rally held outside St. Sava’s Cathedral. Patriarch Pavle, defying the authorities, spoke to the protesters, advising them that Milosevic’s government had failed to acknowledge “...the truth that out of such evil no good can come.”<sup>27</sup> As the war spread to Bosnia, a groundswell of anti-war feeling rocked Belgrade, where, on June 4, university students initiated anti-government demonstrations running for 40 days. It was in the course of these demonstrations that, on June 14, Patriarch Pavle led a procession of several thousand people through Belgrade’s streets to demand that Milosevic resign.<sup>28</sup> Subsequently, on June 28, 1992, the opposition coalition DEPOS began a series of anti-regime demonstrations running through July 5.

Seeking to enlist useful allies, Milosevic saw to it that novelist Dobrica Cosic, author of *A Time of Death*, was elected the first FRY President by the federal Skupstina (on June 15, 1992) and recruited Milan Panic, a Serbian-American pharmaceuticals

entrepreneur, to serve as Prime Minister. Cosic's nationalist credentials were expected to appeal to the nationalist right, while Panic, he hoped, would be useful in relations with the US and Europe. But Panic and Cosic were against the war, and wanted to seek a negotiated settlement. During October 1992, Milan Panic met several times with Zivota Panic, Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army. With presidential elections scheduled for December, Panic decided to challenge Milosevic for the office and brought Cosic on board as a political ally. Milosevic's supporters countered by calling for a vote of no-confidence in Prime Minister Panic on November 4, but the Montenegrin deputies rallied to Panic's defense and the prime minister survived the vote.

Meanwhile, bureaucratic obstacles were created to obstruct Panic's candidacy for the Serbian presidency. Until his candidacy had been approved, he could not campaign, and his candidacy was, in fact, held up on a technicality. On December 9, 1992, however, the constitutional court ruled that the electoral commission's refusal to accept Panic's candidacy was illegal and ordered the commission to register Panic as a candidate. On the following day, Vuk Draskovic withdrew from the race in order to encourage the opposition to unite behind Panic. Milosevic employed a number of questionable devices, including arranging for university registration to be held the same day as the elections, in order to assure his election,<sup>29</sup> and when the elections were held on December 20, irregularities were reported at 86 polling stations. The final results gave Milosevic 56.32 percent of the vote, against 34.02 percent for Milan Panic, and 3.31 percent for Milan Paroski, with the remaining votes divided among four other candidates.<sup>30</sup> In the parliamentary race, Milosevic's Socialist Party and Seselj's Radical Party were the big winners, garnering 101 seats and 73 seats respectively.<sup>31</sup> The postscript came on December 29, 1992, when Panic's Montenegrin allies abandoned him and the Prime Minister lost a no-confidence vote 95 to two with 12 abstentions.<sup>32</sup>

FRY President Cosic continued to hope for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. On May 27, 1993, Cosic held a meeting with Chief-of-Staff Zivota Panic and other high-ranking officers. News of the meeting spread quickly; it was rumored that Cosic wanted to enlist the army's help to remove Milosevic from power. Four days later, Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party introduced a no-confidence motion against Cosic in the federal Skupstina, *alleging* that he had been conspiring to organize a military coup against Serbian President Milosevic. The Socialist Party backed the motion, with Socialist MP Nedeljko Sipovac accusing Cosic of having "contested the current constitution and expressing doubts about the ability of federal Yugoslavia to function" in the course of his meeting with General Panic.<sup>33</sup> The bicameral legislature thereupon voted on June 1 (by 22 to 10 with four blank votes in the Chamber of Republics and by 75 to 34 in the Chamber of Citizens) to remove Cosic from the presidency. The next day, some 1,500 persons, led by Vuk Draskovic and his wife Danica, staged a protest rally in downtown Belgrade, alleging that Cosic's removal from office was unconstitutional. Riot police flooded into the city center, fired tear gas at the protesters, and beat them with batons. One policeman was killed, dozens of persons were injured, and 121 were arrested. Vuk Draskovic, addressing reporters in an *ad hoc* news conference in front of the federal Skupstina, announced that the opposition was now in "a state of war" with the regime. That same night, police visited SPO headquarters, where they arrested the

Draskovices, beating them severely. The Draskovices were detained in prison and charged, under article 114 of the constitution, with having carried out “a criminal attack against the constitutional order” (maximum penalty, 10 years in prison) and, under article 24 of the law on public order, with “preventing officials from carrying out security duties and maintaining law and order.” They were finally released from prison, with charges dropped, only after appeals from the governments of France, Greece, and Russia.<sup>34</sup> At the height of the crisis, as Milosevic considered the possibility of banning the SPO, the leadership of the opposition coalition DEPOS issued a statement (published by the still-independent *Borba*) warning that such a move “not only would be illegal but would lead to the introduction of dictatorship and the outbreak of civil war” in Serbia.<sup>35</sup>

In the meantime, the war had its reverberations within the FRY – in Vojvodina, in the Sandzak, and in Kosovo. In Vojvodina, purges were carried out during 1992 in the police, customs service, and, reportedly, the judiciary as well. By December 1992, there were almost no Croats or Hungarians still working in the police force or customs service of Vojvodina, and not a single judge in Subotica of Croatian nationality.<sup>36</sup> Altogether, in the years 1991-99, between 50,000 and 100,000 Hungarians were driven from their homes in Vojvodina, together with some 45,000 Croats.<sup>37</sup>

In the Sandzak, more than 100,000 Muslims were driven from their homes in the years 1991-2000.<sup>38</sup> This was to a considerable extent the work of Serbian paramilitary formations which were active in the Sandzak in the years 1992-94, and which played a dominant role in creating an atmosphere of terror in the region.<sup>39</sup> In addition, during the first half of the 1990s, numerous physicians, educators, army officers, and police officers of Bosniak-Muslim ethnicity were dismissed from their positions in the public sector of the Sandzak.<sup>40</sup>

In Kosovo, conditions were, by some measures, even worse. The situation in Kosovo in the Milosevic era will be discussed later in this chapter.

If the stoking of nationalism by the Serbian (and later also by the Croatian) media helped to prepare the people for war, the war, in turn, fed the flames of ravenous nationalism and fantasies of a Great Serbian state to be built on the corpses of non-Serbs. In July 1991, Mihailj Kertes, who had helped to organize some of the famous “meetings for truth” in 1988-89, promised that Serbs would soon see “a great Serbian state [stretching] from Montenegro to the left bank of the Neretva River with Dubrovnik as the capital city.”<sup>41</sup> Kertes even promised that Dubrovnik would be renamed Niksic-on-Sea. Then there was the figure of Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, whose poetry was largely unnoticed until his forces began killing non-Serbs, but who was now decorated with Russian and Montenegrin prizes for poetry. But probably no one could exceed Ratko Mladic for sheer hubris. Described by Tim Judah as clinically paranoid<sup>42</sup> and by Richard Holbrooke as a “charismatic murderer,”<sup>43</sup> Mladic boasted in 1993, “Through the war I have broken away from Communism and Yugoslavia and have become the greatest Serb. Sooner or later I will liberate the Serbian city of Zadar...Trieste is an old Serbian city, too, and will be ours in the end. The Serbian army will finish this war, just like the previous two, on the Trieste-Vienna line.”<sup>44</sup> It was

symptomatic of the psychological state of Serbian society that, in those years, Mladic was the single most popular Serb among Serbs.

The nationalist sicknesses penetrated even into the Church, whose clergy, however, were divided about the war. Metropolitan Amfilohije embraced the “Serbian cause” fully and spoke of his hope that all lands inhabited by Serbs would be integrated into what he called “the United States of Serbia,”<sup>45</sup> though he surely realized that in some of the areas inhabited by Serbs, Serbs were, in fact, in the minority. Patriarch Pavle, on the other hand, was unambiguously opposed to the prosecution of the war, and told his flock, in his Christmas message of January 7, 1993,

“We are filled with shame, brothers and sisters, because we are less ready than ever in our history to welcome the holy visitor. Our region is poisoned with gunpowder, the smell of blood, and the cries of undiscovered and unburied bones on the battlefield. There is not enough of the black cloth needed for mourning.”<sup>46</sup>

Milovan Djilas, the aging *enfant terrible* who had earned a reputation as the conscience of the nation, spoke out against Serbian nationalism and the war in Bosnia. In recompense, he was demonized as anti-Serb. Yet Djilas had understood these processes for a long time. Political thieves, he had warned in *The New Class* in 1957, “...elevate the pygmies and destroy the great, especially the great of their own time.”<sup>47</sup>

### **Pseudo-Heroic Escapism and the Wages of War**

The war years also saw the rising popularity of so-called “turbo-folk,” which blended synthesized pop music with traditional Serbian folk conventions. Among its divas were Svetlana (Ceca) Velickovic, who toured the Croatian front attired in combat fatigues, and Simonida Stankovic, whose stage wardrobe included mock-peasant garb, the habit of an Orthodox nun, and tight black leather pants,<sup>48</sup> and who likened the Serbs to “modern Mohicans defending their land.”<sup>49</sup> Sponsored by the regime, “turbo-folk” purveyed a strong nationalist message while serving up images of a glamorous life – a blend one might call “pseudo-heroic escapism.” The recurrent theme in turbo lyrics was that Serbs were strong and would defeat their enemies.

The lyrics from a 1993 song by Baja “Mali Knindza” (little Ninja from Knin) will illustrate the point:

They can hate us  
or not love us  
but nobody  
can do anything to a Serb.  
This nation will live  
even after the ustase  
because God and the Serbs  
[are on the same side:]

the heavens are ours.  
They can hate us,  
all our series of enemies,  
but Serbs are the strongest:  
my grandfather told me.<sup>50</sup>

Or again, there was another song broadcast by Radio Belgrade about the same time, which boasted, “We are Serbian supermen / We fight against the world.”<sup>51</sup> Turbo culture apotheosized provincialism and turned hatred into a virtue.

Turbo fans frequented clubs such as Belgrade’s ‘Zombi’, where they could dance through the night until 9 a.m. For men, required attire included gold Orthodox crosses, Nike Air Max shoes, and guns (to be checked at the entrance); for women, voluminous wigs, mega-makeup, and black corsets or spandex were *de rigueur*. The pit bull won overnight popularity as a kind of ‘mascot’ of the turbo wave. Not everyone was won over to the fad, however. In January 1995, a local comedy show did a sketch parodying turbo; in a featured song, a hooded singer, decked out in gold chain, sang, “I am walking with my pit-bull dog. We have the same view of the world.”<sup>52</sup>

But in August 1994, even as Milosevic embraced the “Contact Group” peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a reversal of his previous position, Nada Popovic-Perisic, Belgrade’s Minister of Culture, declared the inception of “a war on all forms of ‘cultural kitsch’.”<sup>53</sup> State patronage of turbo now largely vanished, as television commercials and posters declared that 1995 would be “the Year of Culture,” and urged the public to visit museums and galleries and attend classical symphonic concerts.<sup>54</sup> State television also changed its fare, giving more airtime to symphonic concerts and even to documentaries about Yugoslav rock groups of the 1980s. Turbo fans could nonetheless celebrate one last time in February 1995, when 42-year-old paramilitary leader Zeljko ‘Arkan’ Raznatovic married 21-year-old ‘Ceca’ Velickovic, the buxom queen of turbo. For many Serbs, it seemed a marriage ordained by destiny.

In spite of the efforts made on behalf of the ‘Serbian cause,’ whether on the battlefield or via turbo, Serbia did not expand by even one square kilometer. Meanwhile, the combination of war, sanctions, and the greed of Belgrade’s kleptocrats bled Serbia dry. Economic sanctions were first imposed on Serbia on May 30, 1992; these sanctions were extended on April 26, 1993. As state coffers (though not the bank accounts of Milosevic and his cronies) emptied, the Milosevic regime simply printed the money it needed, thereby fueling horrific rates of inflation, possibly without precedent. Realizing that the Serbian economy was strained to the breaking point, Vuk Draskovic, who had earlier sponsored a Serbian paramilitary unit in Croatia,<sup>55</sup> and who had indulged in his own folk-romantic fantasies about the ‘rebirth’ of a Greater Serbian state (and hence the name of his political party), now threw his support behind the notion of an internationally brokered peace.

By July 1993, inflation was roaring at a monthly rate of 500 percent, with the black market offering an exchange of 7 million dinars to the dollar (as compared with

300 dinars to the dollar a year earlier). A 5-million dinar note was in circulation. But the government did nothing to slow the inflation, printing up 6.9 trillion dinars in unbacked currency, to purchase wheat from private farmers.<sup>56</sup> In December 1993, in an effort to head off complete economic disaster, Milosevic appointed respected economist Dragoslav Avramovic to put together an economic reform package. Avramovic launched a “new” dinar on January 1, 1994, pegging it to the German mark, and reduced inflation to minus 0.6 percent.<sup>57</sup> But these measures did not hold, and by October 1994, the dinar was sliding against the mark and inflation was returning in force. Later, after the Dayton Peace Accords, the FRY would make ends meet by shipping arms clandestinely to Libya;<sup>58</sup> demobilized Serb soldiers and paramilitaries would sell their services as mercenaries to President Mobutu of Zaire.<sup>59</sup>

As the economy continued its downward hurtle, Mirjana Markovic, Milosevic’s neo-Marxist wife, took the initiative in establishing a new political party, the Yugoslav United Left (JUL). The new party held its first congress on March 24-25, 1995, at Belgrade’s plush Sava Center, where JUL leaders declared their unanimous rejection of nationalism. A few months later, Markovic explained that JUL was “opposed to the terrible, primitive, Cetnik nationalism at work in Bosnia and personified by Radovan Karadzic.”<sup>60</sup> In spite of this ostensibly principled declaration, JUL had not been created for the purpose of promoting legitimate politics and economics. On the contrary, JUL’s leaders, including Markovic, believed that the sun had set on parliamentary democracy and that the future lay with one-party systems such as communist China.

Mirjana Markovic was unmistakably an ideologue. But Milosevic, as many observers have noted, not only was not an ideologue, but, in fact, had no programmatic vision to offer. His supposed championing of the Serbian Nation was a stratagem, not the expression of a deeply held conviction. Indeed, this became patently clear to Serbs when he made no response to the Croatian Army’s reconquest of western Slavonia in May 1995 and when, as the Croatian Army moved into the Krajina on August 4, he reportedly ordered the Krajina Serbs to withdraw from the Krajina rather than fight.<sup>61</sup> About 20,000 persons demonstrated in Belgrade on August 10, 1995, to protest Milosevic’s failure to come to the defense of the Krajina Serbs, accusing him of “betrayal” and “complicity.”<sup>62</sup> Vojislav Seselj also spoke out against Milosevic’s policies in Croatia and Bosnia, and, after a scuffle with police on June 3, 1995 in Gnjilane, Kosovo, was sentenced to 30 days in jail.<sup>63</sup> The final straw, for Serb nationalists, was Milosevic’s signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, which effectively jettisoned the project to establish a Greater Serbia.

## **A Victory for the Opposition**

At the end of 1995, after more than four years of war, per capita income in the FRY was less than \$1,500 per year, or less than half of what it had been in 1991. The standard of living was officially reported to be 25 percent lower in December 1995 than it had been a year earlier. Inflation, though modest by comparison with the rates of 1993, was still strong at 119 percent.<sup>64</sup> The formal economy lay in ruins, and economic life had been effectively criminalized.

It was in this context that, in January 1996, the SPO (Draskovic's party), the DS (Djindjic's party), and the DSS (Kostunica's party) formed an alliance on the local level in Kragujevac. Two months later, the three parties collaborated in staging a rally on the fifth anniversary of the March 9, 1991 demonstrations, which Milosevic had suppressed. The rally was attended by about 30,000 opposition supporters. Draskovic and Djindjic temporarily mended fences and, although spurned by DSS President Vojislav Kostunica, who now complained that Draskovic and Djindjic were turning their backs on Serbs living outside Serbia, built bridges with Vesna Pesic's Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS). That same month, the SPO, DS, and GSS staged a rally under the banner 'Zajedno' (Together). But it was not until September 2, 1996 that the Zajedno coalition was formally established, with an agreement on the allocation of such seats as they might win in the local elections scheduled for November 1996. In the meantime, Kostunica blasted Draskovic, asking rhetorically,

"Where is the integrity in a man who is the author of flattering statements about Josip Broz and Slobodan Milosevic, and shameful essays about Draza Mihailovic, a man who when he felt it to be necessary collaborated with the Socialists and...only wanted to be in power?"<sup>65</sup>

Federal elections were scheduled for November 3, 1996, with the second round scheduled for November 17. International observers were on hand for the November 3 federal elections, but left immediately after they were finished, much to the disgust of the Serbian opposition parties. Already in the first round, Zajedno candidates took the lead in 14 of Serbia's largest towns, including Belgrade, Nis, Kragujevac, Novi Sad, Cacak, Kraljevo, Pirot, and Uzice. After the votes had been counted on November 17, Zajedno's victories in these towns were confirmed; in the assembly of the city of Belgrade, Zajedno won a particularly resounding victory, capturing 70 of its 110 seats (with Milosevic's Socialists winning 23 seats there and Seselj's Radicals taking 15). On November 18, the Zajedno coalition held a victory celebration on Belgrade's Square of the Republic.<sup>66</sup> Then, however, the electoral commission refused to confirm the results, citing "irregularities." Authorities subsequently annulled the opposition victories in Nis, Jagodina, and Kraljevo. This sparked protests in the cities affected. Further annulments were announced soon thereafter.

On November 24, authorities announced the annulment of the victories of 33 Zajedno candidates for offices in and around Belgrade, and declared that a third round of elections would be held on November 27. Meanwhile, the mass protests which had begun the evening of November 19 spread, drawing tens of thousands, in some cases as many as 100,000-200,000, participants.<sup>67</sup> Then, on November 26, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Serbia confirmed the cancellation of several election results, while 30,000 persons (among them, 15,000 students) protested. On the following day, the third round of voting was held, but boycotted by the opposition. The official results now gave the ruling Socialist Party a resounding victory, though the opposition still won in seven cities, in spite of the announced boycott.<sup>68</sup>

Milosevic counted on four things: first, that the opposition would simply get tired of the protests and give up; second, that the combination of Belgrade's icy winter and constant police harassment would prove too much for the protesters; third, that he could establish and maintain control of information, so that most Serbs would remain unaware of the demonstrations, or of their true character; and fourth, that he could rely on the army as his *ultima ratio*. Milosevic proved to be mistaken in all four calculations. First, the protesters showed a resilience which the Serbian strongman had not anticipated. In fact, as days wore into weeks, Belgrade's daily protests (involving 150,000-200,000 persons on November 30, more than 150,000 persons on December 4, 100,000 persons on December 6, and 100,000 persons on December 15<sup>69</sup>) increasingly took on a festive character, with protesters marching on one day with their pets (some grinning protesters carrying their fish tanks through town), or, on another day, holding their noses for the camera, to signal their belief that Radio-Television Belgrade's news broadcasts (in which the strictly nonviolent protests were being characterized as aggressive and violent) stank. A huge effigy of Milosevic dressed in striped convict garb was carried aloft as the opposition demanded that Milosevic resign. To emphasize their commitment to nonviolence, the opposition protesters threw eggs at government buildings, while shouting, "Slobo is Saddam!"<sup>70</sup>

Since the protesters were neither tiring nor finding the winter too cold to continue, Milosevic tried threats and force. On December 2, the regime banned all public meetings in Belgrade and brought several hundred specially trained riot police to the city center. While the police applied force, protesters shouted back Milosevic's famous pledge of 1987: "No one will ever beat you again!"<sup>71</sup> Djindjic stated the opposition's strategy boldly:

"Milosevic has only two options left. He can admit defeat and honor the election results or he can arrest all of us. Either option is good for us. If he arrests us, it will hasten his demise, leaving him isolated domestically and internationally. Such a move would also split the police and military. If he recognizes the election results, we can build a political base to topple him in the presidential elections next year."<sup>72</sup>

Milosevic however, was not yet ready to give up, and as December drew to a close, riot police cordoned off Belgrade's streets and beat protesters with their batons, killing one man, a Predrag Starcevic, thereby giving the Zajedno opposition its first martyr.<sup>73</sup>

Milosevic also had counted on being able to control the information system, and when, on December 1, Serbian Assembly Speaker Dragan Tomic accused the opposition of "deliberately provoking unrest with destructive, violent, and pro-fascist demonstrations" and of resorting "to certain undemocratic moves,"<sup>74</sup> this was supposed to be the view which Serbs would adopt. But an opinion poll taken in early December showed that Milosevic's popularity rating had dropped to a slender 16.5 percent, while Djindjic's had risen from a nearly nullibicitous two per cent to 10 percent.<sup>75</sup> Then, on December 2, five Serbian Supreme Court justices issued an open letter to the government, declaring their opposition to "the changing of election results."<sup>76</sup> The



following day, the authorities shut down Radio B-92, began jamming the broadcasts of a small student radio station operating in Belgrade, arrested 32 student activists, and blocked busloads of would-be protesters from reaching Belgrade's main bus station.<sup>77</sup> But B-92 was not to be silenced. First, Voice of America agreed to carry its transmissions. Then, before the week was out, Radio B-92 began digital broadcasts in Serbo-Croatian and English over audio Internet links.<sup>78</sup>

Finally, Milosevic had hoped that the loyalty of the army and in particular of the respected 63<sup>rd</sup> Parachute Brigade, highly regarded for its high standards of recruitment and training, could, if necessary, be used as had been done on March 9, 1991. But on December 29, opposition leaders read to crowds of supporters a letter described as representing the views of the commanding officers and their troops of several military units including the 63<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, which declared that the army would not allow its weapons to be used against the people of Serbia.<sup>79</sup> Milosevic had struck out.

As the protests continued, the state-run Theater T prepared to stage an adaptation of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. In what Chris Hedges of *The New York Times* called a "vast perversion of the play," Prince Fortinbras was dressed as Bosnia's High Representative Carl Bildt and walked onstage to the sound of a Nazi marching song. Horatio (an intellectual), usually a positive character, was recast as the villain of the piece. As for Hamlet himself, he was painted as gripped by "the steely drive to seize power."<sup>80</sup> "Here is a Hamlet for our time," director Dejan Krstovic explained. "Because of Hamlet, the bodies pile up on the altar of authority and the system collapses. Because of Hamlet, the foreign prince, Fortinbras, who for us represents the new world order, comes in from the outside and seizes control, as has happened to the Serbs throughout their history."<sup>81</sup>

Milosevic now resorted to a risky gambit: he invited the OSCE to send a team to Belgrade to study the facts and make recommendations. Perhaps he hoped that he could pull the wool over the eyes of the OSCE mediators. Or perhaps he believed that, knowing that OSCE representatives were now involved, the demonstrators would go home. Whatever Milosevic's calculations, when the OSCE mission, led by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, finished its research, it submitted a report urging Belgrade to accept opposition victories in all 14 disputed towns, including Belgrade, where opposition victories in nine districts had been overturned.<sup>82</sup> By this point, Zajedno had been endorsed by former FRY President Dobrica Cosic, 30 members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, the Serbian Association of Writers, the pretender to the Serbian throne Crown Prince Aleksandar, the Montenegrin opposition coalition, and even Adem Demaqi, the Albanian human rights activist in Kosovo.<sup>83</sup>

On January 2, 1997, the Serbian Orthodox Synod held an emergency session to discuss the crisis produced by Milosevic's effort to deny the opposition its electoral successes. Characterizing the regime as "Communist, godless, and satanic," the assembly condemned the "falsification of the people's votes, the elimination of political and religious freedom, and particularly the beating and killing of people on the streets of Belgrade...[Milosevic] has already set us against the whole world and now he wants to pit us against each other and trigger bloodshed in order to preserve his power."<sup>84</sup> On

December 7, 1996, when approached by a delegation from Belgrade's protesting students who were seeking his blessing, Patriarch Pavle had declined to give it, averring that it would not be proper for the Church to take sides in the dispute. But on January 27, 1997, Patriarch Pavle led a huge procession through town in honor of St. Sava's day and, addressing the more than 100,000 persons who had joined in the procession, offered implicit support to the opposition. By that point, moreover, Milosevic's Minister of Information, as well as the Socialist mayors of Belgrade and Nis, had resigned, in what could not be interpreted but as tacit votes of no-confidence in Milosevic's handling of the situation. Finally, on February 4, noting that "great damage" had been done to Serbia's reputation, both domestically and internationally, Milosevic ordered the reinstatement of the opposition victories in all 14 local elections.<sup>85</sup> It had taken 78 days of protests and demonstrations to persuade Milosevic to respect the law.<sup>86</sup>

### **The Unravelling, March 1997 - May 1998**

Among those who gained political office as a result of the November 1996 elections were Zoran Djindjic, who became Mayor of Belgrade, and Vojislav Seselj, who was elected Mayor of Zemun. Seselj predictably waded into controversy, targeting local Croats for harassment but also creating anxiety for the 170 Jews inhabiting Zemun, as well as for all those who cherish historical and cultural treasures. Specifically, the summer following his election, Seselj confiscated the Jewish community's 147-year-old synagogue, which had been designated a state-protected historical monument, and had it converted into a nightclub.<sup>87</sup>

In the meantime, Milosevic regained his balance and pushed through a new law on the media in mid-March 1997, which imposed new restrictions on privately owned newspapers and set down an "anti-monopoly" clause which stipulated that no privately owned radio or television station would henceforth be permitted to broadcast to more than 25 percent of the country's population.<sup>88</sup> Subsequently, in July 1997, Serbian authorities shut down 55 small radio and television stations. That same month, Milosevic, whose five-year term as President of Serbia was about to end, engineered his election, by the Skupstina, as President of the FRY. Zoran Lilic, the erstwhile FRY President (since the ouster of Cosic), was now nominated by the Socialist Party to run as its candidate for the office of President of Serbia.

The combined presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for September 21. The Socialists calculated, correctly, that the principal challenge to Lilic would come not from the SPO's Vuk Draskovic but from the neo-fascist Vojislav Seselj,<sup>89</sup> and, accordingly, granted candidate Draskovic a generous amount of time on state television.<sup>90</sup> Although the Socialists felt confident that Draskovic had no prospects of winning the presidency, Draskovic himself believed that he could emerge as the electoral victor. Hence, when Djindjic joined Vesna Pesic and Vojislav Kostunica in calling for a boycott of the elections, Draskovic's resentment of Djindjic, inflamed by differences over strategy after the winter 1997 victory as well as by differences of temperament, only deepened. The growing animosity between the two men was given

aggressive expression in mid-August when a group of SPO members barged into a 3,000-strong anti-election rally in Kraljevo being held by the Democratic Party and pelted Djindjic with eggs.<sup>91</sup> Curiously, when most of the rest of the opposition understood the problem in Serbia in terms of a lack of democracy, for Draskovic, the problem was the abolition of the monarchy in 1945 – an abolition which he wanted to repeal.

“We have a monarchical tradition,” he explained in an interview in *Duga* (16-29 August 1997), “except for [the] five-century long Turkish rule and [the] 50-year long Communist dictatorship....What I would do, and I will do, is to propose to the Parliament to repeal [the] monstrous edict under which Josip Broz Tito, a Croat, in 1945, stripped [the] Karadjordjevic dynasty of their property [and] citizenship, and banned their return to their Serbian homeland.”<sup>92</sup>

In a transparent reference to Crown Prince Aleksandar, who had repeatedly cited the Spanish example, Draskovic offered that “Serbia needs a Serbian Juan Carlos.”<sup>93</sup>

The elections were scheduled to be held on September 21, and in the parliamentary returns, gave 110 seats to Milosevic’s Socialists, JUL, and the satellite Nova Demokratija, 82 seats to the Serbian Radical Party, 45 seats to Draskovic’s Serbian Renewal Movement, and the remaining 13 seats to five smaller parties, representing ethnic Hungarians, Sandzak Muslims, and Serbian oppositionists from Vojvodina.<sup>94</sup> In the presidential race, the Socialist candidate Lilic obtained 35.9 percent of the vote, with Seselj securing 28.6 percent, and Draskovic finishing third, with 22 percent of the vote.<sup>95</sup> Convinced that the boycott had cost him the presidency, Draskovic had his deputies in the Belgrade City Assembly join the Socialist and Radical deputies in ousting Djindjic from his post as mayor of Belgrade on September 30.<sup>96</sup> Draskovic and Djindjic had fallen out soon after their victory in January, but after this ouster, reconciliation between the two men became, in practice, impossible. Although Draskovic urged his supporters to abstain from voting in the second round (on October 5), most of those who had voted for Draskovic in round one gave their support to Seselj in round two. The result was that Seselj finished slightly ahead of Lilic, collecting 49.9 percent of the vote, according to the official results, against 46.9 percent for the Socialist contender.<sup>97</sup> But according to official rules, this result was inconclusive, because voter turnout did not reach the 50 percent threshold required for a presidential contest. (Officials said that the turnout was 49 percent.)

A third round was now scheduled for December 7. Since this was, in theory, a replay of the “run-off,” one would normally have expected to see Lilic once more facing Seselj in an electoral duel. But in the topsy-turvy world of Serbian politics, anything was possible. Accordingly, Lilic pulled out of the race, and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, regarded as the quintessential “yes man” for Milosevic, took his place as the Socialist contender. And Draskovic was allowed to reenter the race, rendering it less a run-off than a completely fresh election. In another curiosity, a 90-minute televised debate, broadcast on November 29, included only Draskovic and Seselj, while Milutinovic, who would ultimately win the election, did not take part; in this debate, Draskovic and Seselj accused each other of being Croats, Draskovic accused Seselj of

having friends such as Russian ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and French ultranationalist Jean-Marie Le Pen, Seselj accused Draskovic of having no friends at all, and neither of them discussed any real issues.<sup>98</sup> Although Milutinovic surged ahead in this third round, picking up 43.7 percent, he did not break the 50-percent barrier, thanks to Draskovic's reentry into the "run-off." Seselj finished second with 32.2 percent, while Draskovic attracted only about 17 percent of the vote. The remaining 7 percent of the ballots were, presumably, invalid.<sup>99</sup>

Accordingly, a fourth round of voting was held on December 21, in which, amid "widespread evidence of election fraud,"<sup>100</sup> Milan Milutinovic, a protégé of Milosevic, was declared the winner. According to the official results, Milutinovic won 2,185,218 votes (59.68 percent), against Seselj's 1,363,577 (37.24 percent).<sup>101</sup> SRS deputy Dragan Todorovic brought diagrams to the Skupstina, in an effort to demonstrate that, given the Albanians' well-established practice of boycotting all elections, it was impossible for Milutinovic to have collected as many votes as he was said to have garnered in Kosovo. These protests were waved aside, on the grounds that the electoral commission had already certified the result.<sup>102</sup> Besides, staging yet another round of voting would have risked turning Serbia into an international laughing stock.

As 1998 opened, the Socialists found themselves, for the first time, faced with the necessity of forming a coalition government. They approached Draskovic who, to the horror of many in the opposition, proved all too willing to be bought. After weeks of negotiations, Draskovic agreed on February 17 to enter the government; he was now named Deputy Prime Minister (one of five), and let it slip that he hoped to see the double-headed eagle (a symbol used by several European states, including Albania) reinstated as the national symbol.<sup>103</sup> Mirko Marjanovic, Prime Minister since 1994, was chosen for another four-year term. The SPO, which had demanded 10 cabinet ministries as well as the prime ministership, was advised that it would have to be content with eight cabinet ministries (though not the most important ones) and a deputy prime ministership. The SPO's demand for the post of director of *Politika* was also rebuffed.<sup>104</sup>

By this point, tensions in Kosovo were escalating rapidly and Milosevic had decided to hit the Albanians hard. Draskovic was not prepared to support a hard-line in Kosovo and "...told Milutinovic that the Kosovo Albanians should be urgently offered agreement on a democratic solution to the Kosovo problem and that, if they fail to accept it, they will be held responsible."<sup>105</sup>

As late as March 23, 1998, Milutinovic said that he was still trying to come to an agreement with the SPO and ruled out the possibility of a "red-brown" coalition, which would bring Seselj's Radicals into the government. The same day, however, discussions between the Socialists and the Radicals were begun in earnest. On the following day, it was announced that the left-wing parties (the Socialists, JUL, and New Democracy) would form a coalition government with the Radicals, with Marjanovic staying on as prime minister. The Socialists retained 15 ministerial posts, JUL was awarded five, and the Radicals were given 15.<sup>106</sup> Nicknamed "the Titanic" and "honored" by the issuance of a rock album (by Rambo Amadeus) bearing that title, the new government quickly

passed a new university law (on May 26), resulting in the purge of certain academics unfriendly toward the regime. On September 30, the government suspended ten professors from the Faculty of Law, under the provisions of the same law which, *inter alia*, required professors to swear their loyalty to the regime and to submit their research plans for approval by state-appointed functionaries.<sup>107</sup>

It was with this “red-brown” coalition in the government that Milosevic would take up the challenges being presented in Kosovo.

### **Tensions in Kosovo, 1991 - 1999**

As of 1991, there were some 1.6 million Albanians in Kosovo, according to official statistics, or 2 million, according to Albanian estimates; Albanians constituted about 90 percent of the population of the province.<sup>108</sup> Yet, in August 1990, the Serbian parliament had introduced a new uniform school curriculum for the republic, under which the teaching of Albanian language, history, literature, songs, and even dances was severely curtailed, while instruction in Serbian language, history, culture, songs, and dances was beefed up.<sup>109</sup> Albanian teachers and students refused to accept the new curriculum and withdrew from the school system, setting up a parallel education system operating out of ordinary citizens’ homes. The following year, all Albanian students were expelled from the University of Pristina, and registration was restricted to non-Albanians, which, in practice, meant mainly Serbs together with a few Greeks. And, in spite of their strong demographic presence, Kosovo’s Albanians became the target of discrimination in other spheres as well.

After the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989, five policy spheres – police, economic planning, justice, territorial defense, and international relations – had been placed under Belgrade’s direct administration.<sup>110</sup> Milosevic now began a multi-pronged campaign designed, in the short run, to reduce the Albanians to second class citizens and, in the long run, to drive them from the province. Albanians were fired from their jobs only because they were Albanians, and then expelled from their state-owned apartments because the apartments were linked with the jobs they had now lost. Throughout the years 1990-95, about 130,000 Albanians were dismissed from their posts; among them were judges, university rectors, factory directors, physicians, and police officers. Their jobs were taken by Serbs who, in many cases, were brought to Kosovo from outside the province.<sup>111</sup> In spring 1991, there were reports that the Yugoslav National Army had been distributing firearms among Serb and Montenegrin civilians in Kosovo; meanwhile, authorities were confiscating arms from local Albanians, even where they were able to produce valid licenses. After the war broke out in Croatia, many young Albanian men were drafted into the army and sent off to fight Croats. Thousands of Albanian men went into hiding or fled abroad, rather than be drafted to do service for Greater Serbia.<sup>112</sup>

In frustration, deputies of the suppressed provincial parliament approved a resolution on September 22, 1991 to put the option of independence before the public, via a clandestine referendum to be conducted September 26-30. According to Albanian

opposition sources, some 87 percent of eligible voters in Kosovo took part in the referendum (which is to say, essentially all the Albanians), with 99.87 percent declaring themselves in favor of independence. Only 164 votes were recorded against independence, with 933 invalid ballots.<sup>113</sup> The suppressed parliament thereupon declared the independence of Kosovo on October 19, 1991, naming Dr. Bujar Bukoshi as Prime Minister. Subsequently, on May 24, 1992, the Kosovar Albanians staged clandestine presidential elections, electing Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the local writers association and president of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), as president of the Republic of Kosovo.

From the 1970s until the late 1980s, as Predrag Tasic has noted, separatism had been a minority view among the Albanians of Kosovo; it was Milosevic's repressive policies, his complete disregard of rule of law, his embrace of naked intolerance, and his scorn for the harm principle, which made separatism mainstream among the province's Albanians.<sup>114</sup>

In the latter half of 1992, Serbian authorities renamed the streets and squares of Pristina, removing references to Albanian heroes and cultural figures, and emblazoning signs with the names of Serbian heroes and cultural figures instead.<sup>115</sup> The Serbian authorities also engaged, in the years after 1990, in frequent harassment and beatings of local Albanians, in the ejection of Albanian civilians from their homes, in the plundering of Albanian-run businesses, and in raids of Albanian homes on the pretext of searching for weapons.<sup>116</sup> On January 13, 1995, Belgrade issued a decree offering free land to Serbs who would settle in Kosovo, promising them 40-year loans so that they could build new houses on the properties they would receive. The land was to be obtained through forcible confiscations from Albanian land-owners.<sup>117</sup>

In the meantime, the Kosovo problem was already being quietly "internationalized." In October 1992, Kosovar Prime Minister Bukoshi came to Washington D.C. and, in a news briefing at the National Press Club, alerted those present to what he called "an alarming and very dangerous situation in Kosova," noting that "...life in Kosova is unbearable, the repression is increasing every day."<sup>118</sup> He added, probably more presciently than he realized, that, unless some effective prophylactic measures were taken, in time "...there would be a massacre of [the] Albanian population in Kosova. And also almost one million refugees would seek shelter in the neighboring countries."<sup>119</sup> Six and a half years later, Bukoshi's forebodings would be borne out, when 855,000 Albanians would flee the province to escape ravaging Serb forces, taking refuge primarily in neighboring Albania and Macedonia.<sup>120</sup>

1993 saw the issuance of what came to be known as "the Minnesota Plan." Drafted by the Organization of Independent Attorneys for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, based in Minnesota, the plan called for the restoration of Kosovo's autonomy by June of that year or, failing that, for the UN Security Council to establish a protectorate in the province, under Articles 75-91 of the UN Charter.<sup>121</sup>

In March 1994, as the West considered lifting some of the economic sanctions imposed on Serbia, President Sali Berisha of Albania called on Western states to hold off on such a move and to make any lifting of sanctions contingent upon a settlement in Kosovo. Berisha also requested that UN monitors be dispatched to Kosovo, so that there would be at least a symbolic international presence in the province.<sup>122</sup> Berisha's advice was ignored and the sanctions were eased. Later that year, Bukoshi submitted testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He took the opportunity to scold the US and the West for undue equanimity about Milosevic's politics in Bosnia and for having ignored developments in Kosovo:

The recent Security Council action to lift certain restrictions imposed on Serbia is at best a travesty, considering [the] evidence provided by U.S. officials that Serbia has not closed its border with Bosnia. Belgrade is not fully enforcing its embargo against [the] Bosnian Serbs, and therefore it is a serious mistake to ease economic sanctions. The effect of recognizing Serbia in this way is to grant a legitimacy to Milosevic that is hardly deserved. It gives him increased external and internal credibility, while he tightens the juggernaut on innocent civilians in Kosova. Internationalization of the Kosova crisis is absolutely essential, as part of a global solution to the grave crisis that has swept Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, threatening stability in the entire region. President Rugova has called for an international protectorate of some sort to guard against [the] total annihilation of Albanians in Kosova.<sup>123</sup>

This, and similar pleading from Rugova himself as the Dayton peace talks were being organized, were ignored. Kosovo was "peaceful," Western "realists" calculated: so why get involved? For all that, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the European Union did call on Belgrade, on October 30, 1995, to restore wide-ranging autonomy to Kosovo; but the suggestion was not backed up with either "carrots" or "sticks."

Subsequently, on January 24, 1996, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1077, noting,

1. The Assembly is seriously concerned by persistent reports from many reliable sources of continuing systematic human rights violations against the Albanian population in Kosovo, including torture, police brutality, violent house searches, arbitrary arrests, political trials, and irregularities in legal proceedings.
2. The Assembly deplores the ethnic persecution and discrimination which appear to be directed mainly at those Kosovo Albanians engaged in passive resistance to the Serb authorities, which suppressed Kosovo's autonomous status within the former Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia in 1989, and at those active in the 'parallel' Kosovo Albanian Assembly, Government, education, health and welfare systems. Such discrimination has also resulted in the dismissal of over hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians from their jobs

and the ejection of hundreds from their houses.<sup>124</sup>

Belgrade, however, did not even blink. Indeed, in the mid-1990s, thousands of Albanian-language books were confiscated from the National and University Library of Kosovo and pulped.<sup>125</sup> Yugoslav army and police were reportedly harassing Albanians “frequently” and some Albanian civilians were fatally shot.<sup>126</sup> In February 1996 alone, the Pristina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms recorded 580 cases of human rights abuses in Kosovo, noting that women and children had not been exempted from the systematic abuse.<sup>127</sup> Serbian police demolished Albanian-owned shops,<sup>128</sup> raided Albanian homes,<sup>129</sup> and raided video-cassette shops across the province, confiscating copies of the film, *Nje Pallto per Babain tim ne Burg* (“A Coat for My Convicted Father”). Directed by Adem Mikullovc and edited by Ekrem Dobercani and Ergyn Dobercani, the film was said to portray “the life of children in Kosova under Serbian occupation and the Serbian police practices against the Albanian children.”<sup>130</sup>

In the meantime, radical militant groups had begun organizing themselves among Kosovar Albanians in spring 1993, purchasing weapons in Albania or on the international arms black market. When the Albanians saw themselves once more sidelined and ignored at Dayton, their patience snapped.<sup>131</sup> Albanians knew instinctively that the time for armed struggle had arrived.

Then, in April 1996, a Serb shot a young Albanian in Pristina, because he thought that the Albanian was stealing his car. Some 10,000 people turned out for the young Albanian’s funeral. In the following days, five Serbs were shot in different towns across Kosovo, and a policeman was wounded. Another Serbian policeman lost his life in a shooting attack in June, when three police were wounded.<sup>132</sup> Before the end of 1996, rumors began to circulate that an armed resistance group calling itself the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) had been formed, and some actions were already being attributed to this body. But many observers remained uncertain, at the time, as to whether the KLA<sup>133</sup> was more than a phantasm of Albanian wishful thinking. These doubts were laid to rest in mid-January 1997, when the KLA carried out a bombing attack on the rector of the University of Pristina, Radivoje Popovic, leaving him wounded.<sup>134</sup> In the meantime, the KLA was building up a small arsenal rather quickly, thanks to an uprising in southern Albania during December 1996 - March 1997 over failed pyramid schemes, in which arms depots throughout Albania were looted, with the booty often being put up for sale at bargain prices.<sup>135</sup>

Meanwhile, Albanians failed to make any headway in obtaining their reintegration into the educational system. Although they had set up an underground educational system, embracing all levels from elementary to university education, and could count about two-thirds of Kosovo’s 450,000 school-age Albanian youngsters as enrolled in the underground system as of 1994,<sup>136</sup> the Albanian side wanted to see an opening of the state schools to Albanian pupils and students and the restoration of Albanian-language instruction. In September 1996, Rugova and Milosevic had signed an agreement to such an effect, but the agreement was stillborn. On October 1, 1997, there were demonstrations by Albanian students in Pristina and several other cities in Kosovo.



The students demanded implementation of the 1996 agreement between Milosevic and Rugova on the reopening of schools to Albanians and the resumption of Albanian-language instruction. Serbian police suppressed the demonstrations with force, arresting dozens, and putting them on trial on charges of membership in the KLA.<sup>137</sup> On December 30, there were renewed protests by Albanian students, who demanded unconditional access to university facilities. Once again, the police forced them to disburse. After this second incident, however, Patriarch Pavle wrote a conciliatory letter to the leadership of the Albanian Students' Union, criticizing the use of violence by the police and noting that both Serbian students (in winter 1996/97) and Albanian students had been subjected to police violence under the Milosevic regime.<sup>138</sup>

About this time (specifically, on November 20, 1997), the UN General Assembly passed a resolution which was critical of Belgrade for human rights violations in Kosovo, including the closure of Albanian schools there and the use of force by Serbian police against the peaceful Albanian student protests on October 1. But the Serbian police was less sympathetic to the Albanians. Poisoned by ten years of chauvinistic propaganda, 41.8 percent of Serbs surveyed told pollsters in November 1997 that the solution to the problems in Kosovo lay in the expulsion, whether peacefully or by force, of the Albanian population of the province. Only 27.2 percent felt that a policy combining tolerance and cultural autonomy would be the best approach.<sup>139</sup>

In spite of some misunderstanding in Western capitals concerning the depth and seriousness of the crisis in Kosovo,<sup>140</sup> NATO ambassadors meeting in Brussels on January 7, 1998 expressed "great concern" about developments in Kosovo. Subsequently, after the repression of Albanians in the Drenica region and in Pristina in the period February 28 – March 2, EU External Relations Commissioner Van den Broek called on Milosevic on March 3 to press the FRY President to enter into dialogue in good faith with Kosovo's Albanians and to restore their autonomy. Two days later, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement about Kosovo in which it condemned "...unreservedly the violent repression of [the] non-violent expression of political views."<sup>141</sup>

By this point, however, the KLA had declared an insurrection, and by late July 1998, it controlled about 40 percent of the countryside, including some important towns.<sup>142</sup> Serbia fought back with tanks, helicopter gunships, and a strategy of terror. The Albanian resistance was quickly put on the defensive and sent reeling, and by mid-September, there were more than 700 dead on the Albanian side and more than 265,000 Albanians were homeless, many of them camping in the woods.<sup>143</sup> In the course of this counteroffensive, Serbian forces were said to have carried out massacres in Likoshan, Qirez, Prekaz, Lybeniq, Poklek, Rahovec, Goluboc, Galica, and Abria.<sup>144</sup> When some brave Serbian broadcasters for private radio and television stations dared to raise their voices in criticism of Milosevic's policies, they found themselves taken off the air; some 20 independent radio stations and ten independent television stations were shut down by Belgrade in May 1998 alone.<sup>145</sup>

NATO councils issued a series of threats and “last warnings.” The more NATO ministers threatened, the more they seemed to confirm Stefan Troebst’s suspicion, voiced about this time, that “swift and robust Western intervention is unlikely.”<sup>146</sup> Even after an eleventh-hour agreement between Milosevic and US special envoy Richard Holbrooke on October 13, 1998, in which the Serbian leader promised to cease military operations in the province, to grant Kosovo autonomy of some sort, to reduce his military presence in the province, and to allow some 2,000 international “compliance verifiers” freedom of movement in Kosovo, Milosevic did not deviate from his dangerous course. In fact, Yugoslav troop strength was actually reinforced after this agreement with Holbrooke, rising from 18,000 at the time of the agreement to 23,500 as of December 23, and to 29,000 on the eve of the initiation of NATO aerial strikes on March 24, 1999.<sup>147</sup> The build-up was part of a Serbian plan known as ‘Operation Horseshoe,’ which was designed to drive the Albanians out of Kosovo. General Momcilo Perisic, Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army, considered Milosevic’s plans to be complete folly and told him so. Perisic went further and, addressing a group of political leaders in Gornji Milanovac in October 1998, warned them that Milosevic’s plans for Kosovo would take the country to war with NATO.<sup>148</sup> Perisic was thereupon fired from his post and Operation Horseshoe was set in motion on December 24, 1998.<sup>149</sup> In addition to regular troops, authorities also enlisted Serbian paramilitaries recruited from within Serbia proper and reportedly recruited an unknown number of thugs from Serbian jails, offering these criminal elements amnesty, high incentive pay, the chance to engage in wanton violence without accountability, and the “right” to keep whatever they plundered from Kosovo’s Albanians.<sup>150</sup>

Although the Albanians who had been camping in the woods as of July - September 1998, for fear of Serb reprisals, had been encouraged to return to their, in many-cases, damaged houses after the October 1998 agreement and although some, in fact, did return, the renewed military campaign launched on December 24 drove some 20,000 Albanians from their homes during January 1999. Combined with those who had remained homeless since the previous year, the total number of displaced persons was estimated at about 200,000 as of the end of January 1999.<sup>151</sup> Then, after the massacre of 45 Albanian civilians – including young children – in the town of Racak on January 15, the international community once more roused itself and summoned Serbs and Albanians to a peace conference at Rambouillet, France, on February 6. The Albanians sent a high-level delegation and came to Rambouillet with the earnest desire to find a solution. By contrast, as Tim Judah has pointed out, the FRY sent a low-ranking delegation whose members kept “...much of the rest of the chateau awake by late-night carousing and the singing of Serbian songs, which induced the [other] negotiators to complain.”<sup>152</sup> In fact, the Yugoslav delegation showed no interest in negotiating and ultimately rejected the compromise offered by Western mediators, even though the draft endeavored to find a middle ground between the Serbian and Albanian positions. Even while the conference at Rambouillet continued its deliberations, Serbian tanks and artillery continued to pound Albanian villages, and the Yugoslav Army even reinforced its strength in the province. The death toll for the period March 1998 through mid-March 1999 stood at more than 2,000, while the number of Albanians driven from their homes by Serbian forces by the eve of the NATO attack (i.e., by the week of March 16-23, 1999) has been estimated at

between 200,000 and 450,000.<sup>153</sup>

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had indicated, in unambiguous terms, the alliance's readiness to make good on its many threats if Belgrade did not come to some agreement at Rambouillet.<sup>154</sup> NATO set a deadline of March 24 for Belgrade to acquiesce, and, as the deadline approached, then British Foreign Secretary George Lord Robertson and Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark flew to Belgrade for talks with Milosevic. However, the CIA allegedly feared that the Serbs were planning to use shoulder-launched SAMs to shoot down the helicopter bearing Lord Robertson and General Clark; as a result, their itinerary was changed, delaying their arrival by more than five hours.<sup>155</sup> In any event, Milosevic refused to budge, and, when Holbrooke visited Belgrade on March 23, for a "last chance" offer, Milosevic received him but sent him home empty-handed. By that point, Milosevic had brought additional troops close to the border with Kosovo and had sent an unspecified number of heavy M-84 tanks into Kosovo, in overt violation of the October 1998 agreement.<sup>156</sup> Since tanks are not used in defense against aerial attacks, the only conceivable purpose of this build-up was to use the impending attack by NATO as a "cover" to intensify the drive against Albanian civilians.

#### **'Til Great Birnam Wood to High Dunsinane Hill Shall Come...<sup>157</sup>**

At 2 p.m., EST, March 24, 1999, after seemingly endless threats and hesitations, NATO began a campaign of aerial strikes against targets in Serbia, Kosovo, and, initially, Montenegro. Instead of backing down, however, Serbian forces on the ground intensified their "scorched earth" attacks on the noncombatant Albanian civilians, torching villages, driving the Albanians out, and even confiscating documents from the fleeing Albanians.

At peak, some 855,000 Albanians fled Kosovo to neighboring countries,<sup>158</sup> fulfilling the horrific prediction made by Bukoshi in 1992. At first, Serbs rallied around their government, holding outdoor anti-NATO rock concerts in Belgrade, while anti-war activists took to the streets in many European cities. But NATO remained united and conducted some 12,575 strike sorties against the FRY, over a period of 78 days.<sup>159</sup> On May 28, 1999, a day after the International War Crimes Tribunal announced its indictment of FRY President Slobodan Milosevic and four other high-ranking Yugoslav officials on three counts of crimes against humanity and one count of violation of the laws or customs of war, for their role in the terror being perpetrated by Serbian forces in Kosovo,<sup>160</sup> the FRY government announced its acceptance, in principle, of the peace resolution drafted by the Group of 8. Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari flew to Belgrade at the beginning of June for discussions with Milosevic, but the latter stalled, haggling over details,<sup>161</sup> while Yugoslav forces shelled several locations in neighboring Albania on June 6.<sup>162</sup> Deputy Premier Vojislav Seselj predictably repudiated the proffered peace plan as "extremely unfavorable for Serbia," warning that "the Western aggressors will not stop at that [at Kosovo], but will attack the Raska region, Montenegro, and Vojvodina," and demanded that the government continue to defy NATO.<sup>163</sup> Disputing Seselj's desire to adopt General Custer as a role model, DSS

President Kostunica urged Belgrade to capitulate, stressing that Serbia had no reasonable alternative.<sup>164</sup> Finally, on June 9, Belgrade signed a military-technical agreement with NATO, effectively establishing an international protectorate in Kosovo and ending the NATO aerial campaign. In the course of the preceding 78 days, NATO bombs had killed an estimated 500 Serb and Albanian civilians in 90 separate incidents, according to Human Rights Watch Helsinki,<sup>165</sup> while Serbian forces killed between 10,000 and 12,000 Albanian civilians, according to American governmental and private sources.<sup>166</sup>

As KFOR troops entered Kosovo, GSS chair Vesna Pesic commented, “People are beginning to draw the conclusion that there is no future with Milosevic.”<sup>167</sup> Momcilo Trajkovic, head of an anti-regime grouping of Serbs in Kosovo, was even more explicit: “The Milosevic policy [has been] catastrophic, and he is most responsible for the situation in which we have found ourselves. His policy regarding the national issue is traitorous.”<sup>168</sup>

### **Milosevic’s Last Stand**

As early as 1993, there were reports that increasing numbers of Montenegrins favored separation from Serbia.<sup>169</sup> By 1996, when Milosevic’s ally Momir Bulatovic was still Montenegro’s President, the gulf between Serbia and Montenegro seemed to some observers to have grown wider.<sup>170</sup> Later, when Milosevic had himself elected FRY president in July 1997, Montenegrin authorities protested vociferously.

Soon after the war ended,<sup>171</sup> the Montenegrin government, now headed by President Milo Djukanovic, no friend of Milosevic’s, drafted a plan to redefine the FRY as a confederal union of two equal states, with separate monetary systems, separate foreign ministries, even separate defense systems.<sup>172</sup> Belgrade’s newspapers denounced the proposal,<sup>173</sup> but by the end of the summer, Montenegrin separatism was clearly gaining steam.<sup>174</sup> In February 1999, only 21 percent of Montenegrins had favored secession, but seven months later, 43.9 percent of Montenegrin citizens favored this option (versus 38.9 percent opposed, 9 percent having no opinion, and 8.2 percent declaring that they would not vote in any eventual referendum on the question).<sup>175</sup> By late May 2000, 65 percent of Montenegrins were said to be in favor of independence.<sup>176</sup>

The Montenegrin government introduced the German DM as its official currency (alongside the Yugoslav dinar) on November 2, 1999 in a first step toward establishing a separate Montenegrin currency,<sup>177</sup> and made a bid to take control of the republic’s main airport at Podgorica in early December.<sup>178</sup> Meanwhile, as inter-republic dialogue reached a dead-end,<sup>179</sup> a battalion of military police loyal to now-federal prime minister Momir Bulatovic was formed, while Belgrade established and armed paramilitary units in Montenegro, in a pattern reminiscent of preparations in Croatia and Bosnia a decade earlier.<sup>180</sup>

By early March 2000, Serb-Montenegrin tensions seemed to be rising dangerously as Serb authorities imposed a blockade of supplies of medicine to

Montenegro,<sup>181</sup> and imposed a total blockade “on the import of raw materials and semi-finished goods for Montenegrin industry and the export of industrial products from Montenegro.”<sup>182</sup> Montenegrin President Djukanovic was frank about his fear that Belgrade might provoke civil war in the republic, and admitted, in an interview with the Vienna daily, *Der Standard*, that Podgorica was already preparing for the worst.<sup>183</sup>

As tensions mounted in late March, Djukanovic speculated that Milosevic had only two possible strategies to stay in power: extend his control over wayward Montenegro or cut the republic loose and be content to rule in rump Serbia.<sup>184</sup> In April, amid reports of an increasing number of defections by Yugoslav Army officers and soldiers to join the Montenegrin police,<sup>185</sup> Belgrade announced that it was organizing a new military police battalion inside Montenegro.<sup>186</sup> Meanwhile, Montenegrin authorities tightened security in the republic, appointing three dismissed Yugoslav Army generals to serve as advisers for security and defense.<sup>187</sup>

Milosevic adopted a series of measures, which seemed to constitute preparations for a fifth war, against Montenegro. In a telling signal of his intentions, Milosevic omitted Montenegrin officers from a list of 17 senior officers being appointed to new posts in mid-March 2000.<sup>188</sup> The regime also called for “loyal forces” to volunteer for military service,<sup>189</sup> organized paramilitary units within Montenegro (as already mentioned), set up an “illegal” television station inside Montenegro using military equipment to broadcast programs prepared in Belgrade,<sup>190</sup> and initiated verbal attacks on the Montenegrin government, charging that it “...had ‘massively’ armed the local police with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, had armed trusted civilians, and had employed foreign experts to provide training in ‘terrorism and sabotage’.”<sup>191</sup> Meanwhile, the chairman of the opposition Democratic Alternative, Nebojsa Covic, accused Belgrade authorities of using scare tactics to persuade the citizens of Serbia to vote for the ruling party in the next elections, but threatening that an opposition victory would mean the start of a civil war in Serbia itself.<sup>192</sup> These steps replicated the pattern of events which had preceded the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia and Bosnia a decade before.<sup>193</sup>

In addition, making use of repressive legislation on the media passed in October 1998,<sup>194</sup> Milosevic moved decisively to quash or suffocate independent media across a broad range. Already in December 1999, police raided the premises of the independent ABC Grafika printing company, which published the independent daily newspaper *Glas javnosti*, and confiscated about \$400,000 worth of equipment. While the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS) demanded the retraction of the 1998 Law on Public Information and the cessation of all repression against independent media and journalists,<sup>195</sup> Serbian police confiscated the complete consignment (24,000 copies) of the Banja Luka-based independent weekly, *Reporter*, two weeks in a row.<sup>196</sup> Goran Matic, Yugoslavia’s Minister of Information, justified pressures on the independent media by chastizing journalists critical of the government as “terrorists.”<sup>197</sup> As for the opposition, whose leading figures had spoken out in defense of the independent media, Milosevic characterized it, in a speech before a mid-February 2000 congress of the Socialist Party, as “a group of bribed weaklings and blackmailed profiteers and thieves.”<sup>198</sup>

In late February, the authorities escalated their campaign against independent media, imposing stiff fines on *Danas* (for having quoted local pharmacists who had complained about the allegedly low quality of imported pharmaceuticals),<sup>199</sup> on Vuk Draskovic's newspaper *Srpska rec* (for having implicated a police officer in the October traffic collision in which Draskovic had barely escaped death),<sup>200</sup> and on Studio B (repeatedly),<sup>201</sup> taking control of the popular daily, *Vecernje novosti*, which had become more critical of the government,<sup>202</sup> and dispatching police to the broadcasting facility operated jointly by Studio B and Radio B2-92, to cut their cables, resulting in an interruption of service.<sup>203</sup> Authorities also shut down a series of independent television and radio stations in the first two weeks of March, including Radio Boom 93 (in Pozarevac), Radio-Television Pozega, Radio Golf, Nemanja TV, Tir Radio (in Cuprija), and Pirot Television (in southwestern Serbia), while Seselj's Radical Party illegally interfered with the frequency allocated to Lav TV (in Vrsac).<sup>204</sup> In justification of these forced closures, Matic accused the independent media of "advancing American interests in Serbia."<sup>205</sup>

In April, the government served several independent media outlets with fines. The newspaper *Narodne novine* (Nis) was fined 400,000 dinars (\$40,000 at the official exchange rate) on 10 April in a suit filed by the Yugoslav Army.<sup>206</sup> The prestigious weekly magazine, *Vreme*, was fined 350,000 dinars on 11 April, on the grounds that the magazine had mistakenly held the Minister of Information, Zeljko Simic – personally, rather than the government as such – responsible for the firing of a Belgrade theater director.<sup>207</sup> Belgrade's television station Studio B and the independent news agency Beta were likewise fined – 450,000 dinars and 310,000 dinars respectively.<sup>208</sup>

On May 17, in a decisive blow, government authorities seized control of the broadcasting facilities shared by Studio B television and Radio B2-92, simultaneously assuming control of Radio Index, located in the same building. Police also confiscated Radio Pancevo's transmitter and began broadcasting Serbian folk songs, in place of the station's habitual critical commentary.<sup>209</sup>

The repression of the media continued over the succeeding months, with the detention in June of Radio Yugoslavia journalists who had gone to Montenegro to report about local elections in Podgorica and Herceg Novi,<sup>210</sup> the fining of the independent daily, *Danas*, in early August,<sup>211</sup> and the filing of misdemeanor charges against the director and editor-in-chief of *Kikindske novine*, because they had attended a gathering organized by the unregistered opposition group, "Otpor" – a "crime" by which, in the words of the indictment, the two journalists figured as "unregistered civil conspirators."<sup>212</sup>

About the same time, Slobodan Cekic, the director of Radio Index, an independent Belgrade radio station, died in a mysterious water sports accident at the Adriatic resort town of Herceg Novi. Montenegrin police considered the circumstances suspicious and immediately launched an investigation.<sup>213</sup> Meanwhile, Radio B2-92, banned by Belgrade authorities in May 2000, made arrangements to broadcast from Kosovo (via Radio Kontakt in Pristina) and from Hungary (via Radio Tilos), *inter alia*.<sup>214</sup>

Reviewing this dismal record, Veran Matic, the editor-in-chief of Radio B2-92, noted, in June 2000, that, over the preceding two years, 26 employees of broadcast or print media had been killed, at least 60 journalists had been taken into custody, and six had been given prison terms.<sup>215</sup>

In late March 2000, Milosevic arranged for the government to propose a new law to the federal government. Under the provisions of this law, the composition of the deputations sent by the Serbian and Montenegrin legislatures to the Chamber of the Republics, the upper house of parliament, would be changed in such a way that Djukanovic would be constrained to include also delegates from Momir Bulatovic's Socialist People's Party. This, in turn, promised to give Milosevic the needed two-thirds majority to change the constitution. In spite of opposition from Djukanovic's party, the law was passed by the Serbian parliament on April 11.<sup>216</sup> The law also provided that only a political party with at least 12 deputies in the republic's legislature could send deputies to the Chamber of Republics. Dragan Veselinov, chair of the Vojvodinan Coalition, characterized the passage of this law as "an internal coup in the Serbian Assembly."<sup>217</sup>

Three days after the passage of this law, between 100,000 and 200,000 persons turned out for a protest rally in downtown Belgrade.<sup>218</sup> The sheer size of the turnout raised opposition spirits,<sup>219</sup> but the regime responded in force; throughout April and May, police repeatedly beat protesters with batons and used tear gas to break up peaceful gatherings. Even so, more than 50,000 persons demonstrated against the regime in several Serbian cities on May 19, with some 15,000 persons turning out for an anti-regime rally in Belgrade on May 27.<sup>220</sup> The regime responded to these latter protests by arresting opposition activists in Cacak, Novi Sad, Uzice, and other cities,<sup>221</sup> and by accusing opposition leaders of trying to break up what remained of the country.<sup>222</sup> On May 23, masked men attacked a sit-in protest at the university, beating up several dozen students; three days later, Jevrem Janjic, the Serbian Minister of Education, ordered the immediate closure of all universities and colleges, a week ahead of schedule, and declared that all university premises would remain out-of-bounds to professors and students until further notice.<sup>223</sup> As students marched in protest, Serbian Patriarch Pavle lent his support to the students,<sup>224</sup> even as authorities showed their contempt for world public opinion by characterizing the International Tribunal for War Crimes (in The Hague) as a criminal organization.<sup>225</sup> Finally, at month's end, with the opposition parties still unable to formulate an effective strategy, the 25,000-strong "Otpor" (Resistance) student movement announced its transformation into a broader citizens' association, to be called the Popular Resistance Movement (Narodni Pokret Otpor, or NPO).<sup>226</sup>

Predictably, the restructured Chamber of Republics played the role assigned to it by Milosevic, and on July 6, the bicameral legislature adopted amendments to the constitution, prescribing the direct popular vote of both the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the deputies to the Chamber of Republics.<sup>227</sup> This move allowed citizens of Serbia to outvote citizens of Montenegro, thereby nullifying Montenegro's constitutionally guaranteed equality with Serbia. Montenegro's government repudiated the amendments which, it said, had been adopted by "an illegal

and illegitimate federal parliament.”<sup>228</sup>

With the constitution “fixed”, Milosevic now called for elections on September 24, 2000. Djukanovic predictably declared that his republic would boycott the elections.<sup>229</sup> The Serbian opposition, coordinated by Zoran Djindjic, rallied around a single candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, the president of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), although Draskovic characteristically refused to cooperate and, instead, offered his own candidate for the presidency – Mayor of Belgrade Vojislav Mihailovic, grandson of the Chetnik commander, Draza Mihailovic.

As the election campaign got underway, Ivan Stambolic, whom Milosevic had removed from office in 1987, gave several interviews to Montenegrin television. In these interviews, he described the Serbian leader as a “master of consuming and reproducing chaos,” a “Frankenstein’s monster,” and declared that “At the end, he must be destroyed, most people are against him and they will get him. He will never go in peace.”<sup>230</sup> On August 25, the 64-year-old Stambolic, who had maintained contact with opposition circles, was kidnapped in broad daylight in the Banovo Brdo area of Belgrade. While police announced the launching of an intensive investigation, opposition figures speculated that Stambolic had been kidnapped on Milosevic’s orders.<sup>231</sup> Radio 2-B92 adopted Stambolic’s case as its own cause, and frequently reminded its listeners of the kidnapping. As of this writing, Stambolic remains missing.

Milosevic had increasingly been surrounding himself with sycophants, who told him what he wanted to hear. When independent opinion polls indicated that about three out of every four Serbs disapproved of his performance in office, his sycophants told him that this was Western propaganda. When rumors reached him that the Yugoslav economy was not doing well, his trusted associates assured him that Yugoslavia was recovering, that citizens were facing only a few shortages, and that post-war reconstruction was proceeding at a satisfactory pace.<sup>232</sup> Gorica Gajevic, general-secretary of the Socialist Party, and other close aides assured Milosevic that his electoral victory in September was “certain,” and when Zoran Lilic, the party’s vice president, dared to level with Milosevic and described the holding of an election as “an adventure,” Milosevic rejected Lilic’s analysis out of hand. In August, Lilic resigned from the Socialist Party in frustration. Indeed, as late as August 2000, it seemed likely that Milosevic would simply have himself declared the winner in the September 24 elections. Had Milosevic achieved his objectives in the elections, it is likely that he would have moved quickly to execute plans – already drawn up by then – to arrest Montenegrin President Djukanovic.<sup>233</sup> But as election day approached and as the tangible strength of the opposition became all too obvious, foreign observers began to speculate that Milosevic would “concede” the need for a run-off election and then set his sights on stealing the run-off. This was, apparently, Milosevic’s strategy when the Federal Electoral Commission released its official results, holding that 56-year-old Vojislav Kostunica, candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, had won 48.22 percent of the votes, versus 40.23 percent for Milosevic himself, with the remainder of the votes spread among three other candidates. The opposition, on the other hand, had been monitoring the voting independently and claimed that Kostunica had won



54.6 percent of the vote, against 35.01 percent for Milosevic.<sup>234</sup> Under FRY election rules, a run-off was required if no candidate garnered more than 50 percent of the votes. The Federal Election Commission now set the run-off elections for October 8, even as the US and West European states announced their recognition of Kostunica's first-round victory.

## **The Fall**

With Milosevic's announcement of a run-off election for October 8; Kostunica replied that he had already won and that he would therefore not enter into any run-off. The opposition charged fraud,<sup>235</sup> while hundreds of riot police were deployed in downtown Belgrade. Even as Milosevic was pressing the opposition to agree to a run-off, tens of thousands of opposition supporters crowded Belgrade's streets on September 25 to celebrate their victory, chanting, "Kill yourself, Slobodan, and save Serbia!"<sup>236</sup> In spite of his failure with this tactic in 1996, Milosevic held fast to the notion of holding a run-off and, at 2.a.m. on September 28, confirmed his intention to stage a run-off election on October 8. That same day (September 28), Vuk Obradovic, a former Army general and now leading opposition figure, met with other opposition leaders to plan protest actions. Massive street demonstrations involving 100,000 or more followed, and on October 2, the opposition announced a general strike, to bring the government down.<sup>237</sup> Roads and railways were blockaded, and miners at the Kolubara mines – who had hitherto been a bulwark of support for Milosevic – now turned against him and went on strike. By this point, Milosevic's friend, Russian President Vladimir Putin, had also endorsed Kostunica's victory.<sup>238</sup> As the strike spread, two television stations in provincial cities were taken over by opposition supporters. But the regime drew its wagons in a circle and there were reports of police beatings in at least two locations. On October 3, the government read a statement over state television, warning,

“The violent behavior of individuals and groups that threatens citizens' lives, disrupts [the] normal functioning of traffic, prevents normal work of industry, schools, institutions and health facilities will be proscribed by law. Special measures will be taken against the organizers of these criminal activities. These measures also apply to media that are financed from abroad and are breeding lies [and] untruths, and inciting bloodshed.”<sup>239</sup>

The opposition however, had taken the precaution of organizing its own armed units, recruiting about a thousand military veterans, including former members of the famed 63<sup>rd</sup> Parachute Brigade, special anti-terrorist units, and paramilitaries; these forces disposed of automatic rifles, pistols, and anti-tank weapons.<sup>240</sup> In the meantime, many of the police were defecting to the opposition, while the army had already begun to distance itself from the Milosevic regime.<sup>241</sup>

At this point, riot police were sent to crush the strike at the Kolubara mines, and to arrest 13 of the strike's organizers. When the police arrived, they ordered the miners to leave the mine. When the miners refused and some 20,000 working people rallied in

support of the miners, police forces simply melted away.<sup>242</sup> This was a turning point. Meanwhile, about 40,000 people rallied in support of Kostunica in the industrial town of Kragujevac.

Velimir Ilic, mayor of Cacak, played a key role in these days, organizing a caravan of protesters who streamed into Belgrade from the Cacak district. Some 25 busloads of protesters from Novi Sad also arrived in Belgrade by mid-day October 5, 2000.<sup>243</sup> Protesters quickly took control of the facilities of leading media outlets in Belgrade and Novi Sad.<sup>244</sup>

At this point, Milosevic sent a list of 50 DOS leaders who, in his view, should be arrested or liquidated, to the army general staff. Six of the names on the list were for “liquidations”; these included Kostunica, Djindjic, DOS coordinator Vladan Batic, Nebojsa Covic, Cacak mayor Velimir Ilic, and former General Momcilo Perisic, now head of the Movement for a Democratic Serbia.<sup>245</sup> The army refused to act. Milosevic, by now ensconced in a presidential hunting lodge in the village of Garesnica in eastern Serbia, picked up the phone and ordered Army Chief-of-Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic to bring tanks onto Belgrade’s street and to shoot protesters who were storming the Skupstina and other critical buildings, such as Radio-Television Serbia; Pavkovic refused. Milosevic then called Vlado Stojiljkovic, the Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, and ordered him to send helicopters to spray protesters with tear gas and other chemical agents. Stojiljkovic passed along Milosevic’s orders, but his subordinates refused to obey.<sup>246</sup> By this point, crowds of angry Serbs, estimated in the hundreds of thousands, had taken over the Skupstina and set it on fire.<sup>247</sup> Milosevic finally resigned, and Kostunica was officially declared the FRY’s new president.<sup>248</sup>

Kostunica enjoyed moral authority, but, under the constitution, his prescribed powers were actually rather limited. In addition, the Socialist Party was still the strongest bloc in the Skupstina. Thus, for DOS, the first order of business was to set legislative elections, in order to clean the Socialists out of office. Elections were set for December 23. In the meantime, FRY Prime Minister Bulatovic and Serbian Interior Minister Stojiljkovic resigned and a transitional government was named, consisting of, among others, FRY Prime Minister Zoran Zizic, Serbian Prime Minister Milomir Minic, FRY Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic, FRY Defense Minister Slobodan Krapovic, FRY Interior Minister Zoran Zivkovic, and FRY Finance Minister Dragisa Pesic.<sup>249</sup> Yet, until the new elections would be held, DOS’s power was too limited, and Serbia remained in a state of political suspended animation, in which relatively little could be done.<sup>250</sup> DOS was unable, for example, to prevent state security police from shredding important files containing incriminating information.<sup>251</sup> Moreover, in spite of firm indications from the Tribunal in The Hague that the arrest of Milosevic remained a high priority,<sup>252</sup> no action was taken to restrict Milosevic’s freedom of movement, and the former strongman even attended his party’s congress, where he was reelected party president. Indeed, even as late as early January 2001, some 39 of Milosevic’s closest associates retained automatic and sniper rifles and other armaments; Interior Minister Zivkovic set a deadline of January 10 for the return of these weapons to the ministry’s arsenal.<sup>253</sup>

Kostunica visited Montenegro as early as October 17, in an endeavor to find a common ground with Montenegrin President Djukanovic. But Djukanovic felt that Montenegro's fate had been tied to Serbian political uncertainty for too long, and insisted that Montenegro would settle for nothing less than full independence, while suggesting a confederal union with limited shared activities.<sup>254</sup> On November 1, the Montenegrin parliament approved legislation establishing a central bank of Montenegro, and on November 11, the German DM became Montenegro's sole legal tender, in a clear signal of Djukanovic's determination to stay on an independence course. His political nemesis, Momir Bulatovic, leader of Montenegro's Socialist National Party and former FRY Prime Minister, declared his party's opposition to this course, however, and promised to wage "a decisive and wide anti-referendum campaign...by way of citizens' peaceful protests."<sup>255</sup> Kostunica, a former law professor, worried, for his part, that if Montenegro were to secede from the FRY, then the FRY would cease to exist and, under the circumstances, the UN Security Council 1244, which guaranteed FRY sovereignty, but not Serbian sovereignty as such, over Kosovo, would become a dead letter; a Montenegrin secession, thus, could make Kosovo's secession unavoidable.<sup>256</sup> Kostunica and Svilanovic also expressed their convictions that the secession of Kosovo could also prove destabilizing to Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus to the entire region. Even the collapse of the Montenegrin government at the end of December 2000, when a small coalition partner withdrew its support,<sup>257</sup> seemed unlikely to abort the momentum toward at least a referendum on independence, if not independence itself.<sup>258</sup> At a minimum, Montenegro's self-assertion promised to bring about significant changes to the FRY constitution, an option endorsed by FRY Prime Minister Zoran Zizic in January 2001.<sup>259</sup> Indeed, after the failure of talks between Kostunica and Djukanovic on January 19, the Montenegrin parliament agreed to hold legislative elections on April 22, which President Djukanovic promised would be followed by a referendum on Montenegro's future relationship with Serbia.<sup>260</sup>

EU and American criticism of Djukanovic's aspirations for independence<sup>261</sup> may have dampened the support for Djukanovic. The margin of victory won by Djukanovic's party on April 22 – a plurality of 42.05 percent, against 40.67 percent captured by Predrag Bulatovic's pro-Yugoslav coalition, "Together with Yugoslavia" – was razor thin.<sup>262</sup> The result came as a surprise for Djukanovic, who had expected a more decisive victory, as opinion polls had suggested he might anticipate. In February 2001, for example, some 58 percent of Montenegrins were said to favor independence for their republic.<sup>263</sup> The narrow victory also encouraged the EU to reiterate its caution against pursuing independence.<sup>264</sup>

For his part, Djukanovic continued to insist that a referendum would provide the best means of resolving the issue, even while entering into negotiations with Serbian politicians concerning a possible revamping of the federal state.<sup>265</sup> Meanwhile, the Montenegrin news agency *Vijesti* set up an on-line opinion poll asking the question: "Will Montenegro become independent in 2001?" As of May 27, 2001, some 34,186 persons had answered "yes," 30,915 persons had answered "no," and 3,110 persons had answered "I couldn't care less" (Svejedno mi je).<sup>266</sup>

Meanwhile, Montenegrin secessionism was having repercussions elsewhere in the FRY. In Vojvodina, Miodrag Isakov, chair of the Vojvodina Reformist Party, lent his support to Montenegro's confederalist platform, while calls for a restoration of Vojvodina's autonomy became more insistent.<sup>267</sup> As of April 2001, only 5 percent of Vojvodinans wanted to see a complete severing of relations with Serbia, while some 8 percent supported the notion of a confederal union with Serbia.<sup>268</sup> But support for a restoration of Vojvodina's autonomy – snuffed out in early 1989 – is widespread. Within Serbia itself, a new, rather anomalous organization now made an appearance; calling itself the State-Forming Movement of Serbia (Državnotvorni Pokret Srbije), the organization was founded by journalist Ratko Dmitrovic, television broadcaster Dina Colic, and political scientist Vinko Djuric. Dmitrovic explained his organization's orientation in these words: "We [Serbs] are the only nation in Europe without a state. The blunder that was Yugoslavia must be replaced with an internationally recognized and independent Serbia."<sup>269</sup> If Montenegro could secede from Serbia, then Serbia, in Dmitrovic's view, could also secede from Montenegro.

With the fall of Milosevic, the FRY was rapidly reintegrated into the international family of state, being admitted to the UN and the Balkan Stability Pact, and readmitted to the OSCE as well as to international finance institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Belgrade's new government also moved expeditiously to normalize relations with the other Yugoslav successor states.<sup>270</sup> The international community also moved quickly with pledges of financial assistance, supplies of gas and electricity, emergency food supplies, and pharmaceuticals. US President Clinton also promised to support a rapid lifting of all sanctions against the FRY. Yugoslavia also filed for membership in the Council of Europe, admission into which was likely to be a more involved process, insofar as the Council requires that domestic legislation meet certain uniform standards.

The arrest of corrupt and otherwise culpable officials internally was a slower process, by contrast, though Mihalij Kertes who, as director of the Yugoslav Customs Bureau, had supervised a massive smuggling operation designed to evade UN sanctions, was arrested on December 15.<sup>271</sup> The new government also reopened an investigation of former Tanjug director Zoran Jevdjovic and several other employees of Tanjug on charges of corruption.<sup>272</sup> But the new government was, in fact, moving very slowly until the elections of December 23 would not only confirm its mandate but also consolidate its strength.

The December 23 elections lived fully up to DOS' expectations. The coalition won about 65 percent of the votes (garnering 178 of the 250 seats in the Serbian Assembly), while the Socialists won only 13.35 percent (for 36 seats), the Radicals 8.51 percent (22 seats), and the SSJ 5.13 percent (14 seats). Draskovic's SPO, like JUL, failed to win any seats in the Serbian Assembly.<sup>273</sup> To almost no one's surprise, Zoran Djindjic was now named Serbian Prime Minister.

In the wake of this electoral victory, the new government now announced further arrests and investigations. Among the first to be arrested were the members of the Federal Electoral Commission, who had initially wanted to deny Kostunica his first-

round victory; they were brought before the court on charges of electoral fraud.<sup>274</sup> In the meantime, Kostunica also fired many of the military's top brass, though not Chief-of-Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic. On January 26, 2001, the new Serbian parliament removed the controversial Rade Markovic as head of the State Security Forces, appointing Goran Petrovic, a police official fired during the Milosevic era, in his stead. The government also promised to arrest Milosevic in January, later deferring this to March.<sup>275</sup> Although the new authorities conceded that Milosevic had committed crimes against humanity, they were proved to be unwilling to remand the fallen dictator to the international war crimes tribunal. Instead, the authorities insisted that "the world would accept [having Milosevic tried in] Belgrade." Meanwhile, international pressure for the arrest of Milosevic and for his remand to The Hague continued. Then, on January 24, Carla del Ponte, the UN war crimes chief prosecutor, was rebuffed by Kostunica and left the presidential office fuming. Kostunica argued that Milosevic had to be first tried under Yugoslav law, not under international law; in effect, in my view, Kostunica was insisting that Yugoslavia was above international law. This, in turn, suggested that while Kostunica and his DOS partners might enjoy the mantle of political legitimacy, they had yet to come to grips with the liberal project, or to realize the incompatibility of narrow nationalism with the cosmopolitan imperatives of the liberal project. In essence, this rebuff suggested that the new authorities had not yet proven themselves *morally* legitimate.<sup>276</sup>

The West, however, kept up its pressure on Belgrade to arrest Milosevic. On March 10, in a significant move, Washington advised Belgrade that if it wished to continue to receive American assistance (non-relief aid amounting to \$100 million for the 2000—2001 fiscal year), Milosevic should be under arrest by the end of March.<sup>277</sup> Belgrade, desperate for every bit of assistance it could obtain, took the threat seriously, and in the early hours of March 31, sent 100—150 police to Milosevic's villa in Dedinje, to place him under arrest. But the handful of hard core Milosevic loyalists guarding the village exchanged gunfire with the police, who withdrew in confusion.<sup>278</sup> Negotiations were now undertaken with Milosevic, lasting deep into the following night. Finally, at 4:50 a.m. on April 1, after several police deadlines had passed and after five gunshots from his residence, Milosevic surrendered and was taken into custody.<sup>279</sup> The UN war crimes tribunal wasted no time in delivering a warrant for the surrender of former president Milosevic to international authorities.<sup>280</sup>

Indicted by Yugoslav authorities on charges of corruption and ostensibly protected by a Yugoslav law prohibiting the extradition of Yugoslav citizens to foreign or international authorities, Milosevic hoped at least to be able to stay in Yugoslavia. But Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic increasingly felt it was imperative to meet this demand of the international community, fueling frictions with Kostunica, who insisted on the primacy of Yugoslav law over international law. But in May 2001, officials at the Serbian Ministry of the Interior presented evidence that Milosevic had ordered then-Interior Minister Vlatko Stojiljkovic in March 1999 to remove evidence of crimes committed against Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo; this concerned, in particular, the removal and reinterment (or dumping) of the bodies of dead Albanians.<sup>281</sup> The following month, the government introduced legislation in the Skupstina to legalize the

extradition of Yugoslav citizens who are wanted for trial by international authorities. When members of the Socialist People's Party (SNP) from Montenegro, opposed to Djukanovic and still loyal to Milosevic, declared that they would refuse to vote in support of this legislation, the government simply by-passed the Skupstina by issuing a decree, on June 23, committing itself to extradite all persons indicted by international authorities, including Milosevic.<sup>282</sup> The Serbian public was equally divided, with an estimated 37 per cent of citizens favoring Milosevic's extradition, and 43 per cent of citizens opposed, according to the report of an opinion poll conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, released in June 2001.<sup>283</sup>

In mid-June, Mira Markovic, Milosevic's wife, tried to organize a national uprising in order to save her husband from extradition.<sup>284</sup> The rally on June 26, attended by some 20,000 adherents of the Socialist Party of Serbia, fell far short of realizing her goal. Then, on June 28, known to Serbs as Vidovdan (named for a pre-Christian Slavic god) and having a special resonance with Serbs as the day on which a Serb assassin killed Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand (in 1914), the day on which the interwar constitution was adopted, and the day on which communist Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform (in 1948), Yugoslav authorities remanded Milosevic to the custody of the international tribunal. As he boarded the helicopter which would carry him to The Hague, Milosevic turned to the assembled crowd and asked them, "Do you know that today is Vidovdan?"<sup>285</sup>

Even with Milosevic's extradition, however, there is, at this writing, little change in Serbs' willingness, or perhaps ability, to confront their own recent past honestly. Part of the problem is that many Serbs are simply ignorant about some of the most basic facts about the war. A poll conducted in April 2001, among 2,200 Serbs, for example, found that most Serbs could talk at length about their sufferings at the hands of Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians, but that about half of those polled could not cite a single crime committed by Serbian forces anywhere. A plurality among respondents also blamed Croatian nationalism for the breakup of the SFRY, apparently unaware that the SANU Memorandum, the rise to power of Milosevic, the quashing of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and the Serbian media campaign against Croats (e.g., for "stealing" Serbian factories after June 28, 1948, when Tito decided to move factories exposed to possible Soviet invasion to more mountainous areas), all *preceded* the wave of Croatian nationalism which carried retired General Franjo Tudjman into the office of president of Croatia.<sup>286</sup>

Some things have changed, to be sure. Turbo, for one thing, has now been certified to be dead and buried.<sup>287</sup> On the other hand, as *The New York Times* reported, the media have quickly slipped into the old habits, endeavoring to do for the new authorities what they had done for Milosevic for the previous 13 years.<sup>288</sup> More particularly, the culture of nationalism is, at this writing, still dominant, while liberal culture remains underdeveloped.<sup>289</sup> Between nationalism – in which the collective interests of one's own nation are exalted over both the collective interests of other nations and the individual rights of the members of both one's own nation and other nations – and liberalism – which promotes the individual rights (and duties) to first place and

denies that there are national *rights* as such – there can be no peace. There can be no reconciliation between the liberal project and nationalism. Attempts to fuse these two enemies into a patchwork hybrid risk the subversion of the liberal project and serve, at the most, to provide justifications for the further despoliation of the poor by the rich. Nor should one be too sanguine about the prospects for the growth of liberal culture in a democratic setting. The most successful liberal democracies developed liberal cultures long before they became truly democratic in anything like the modern sense of the word. To reverse the process and endeavor to build democracy first, and defer the development of liberal culture to sometime in the future is, at best, to undertake a risky political experiment. In the Bosnian setting, the OHR creates the possibility to emphasize the development of liberal culture “first” as it were, while setting up the façade of democratic institutions. In Serbia, if there is to be any hope of fashioning a liberal democracy, the two tasks need to be undertaken *at the same time*. And that, in turn, will require, of necessity, the remanding of Milosevic and other key figures in the pre-October regime, to international authorities in The Hague.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> . “Milosevic - nenacionalista,” in *Dani* (Sarajevo), (117) (August 27, 1999): 37.
- <sup>2</sup> . The notion that there is no right to harm another person except in self-defense or in defense of another innocent person, or in the defense of property
- <sup>3</sup> . Unidentified source (1995), quoted in Eric D. Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives* (University Park, PA.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 14. For discussion of the cultural and political gulf between city and countryside in Serbia, see Sabrina P. Ramet, “Nationalism and the ‘idiocy’ of the countryside: the case of Serbia,” in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 19(1) (January 1996).
- <sup>4</sup> . Eric Gordy, “Why Milosevic Still?,” in *Current History*, 99(635) (March 2000), 100-101.
- <sup>5</sup> . See Sabrina P. Ramet, *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), introduction.
- <sup>6</sup> . For a more complete list, see Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 69-70.
- <sup>7</sup> . Agence France Presse (March 6, 2000), on *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (hereafter, LNAU); and Beta news agency (Belgrade), March 5, 2000, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 7, 2000), on LNAU. See also *Star Tribune* (Minneapolis), (May 12, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com).
- <sup>8</sup> . Itar-TASS (Moscow), (May 21, 1992), on nexis.com.
- <sup>9</sup> . Gordy, *Culture of Power*, 98.
- <sup>10</sup> . “Testimony of Nebojsa Covic, coordinator of the Alliance for Change,” in *The Milosevic Regime versus Serbian Democracy and Balkan Stability*, hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 105<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> session, December 10, 1998 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 6.
- <sup>11</sup> . Quoted in UPI (July 9, 1992), on nexis.com.
- <sup>12</sup> . Details and documentation in Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming in January 2002), chapter 14.
- <sup>13</sup> . Re: arms smuggling, see *Politika* (Belgrade), (May 19, 1993): 13, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (June 18, 1993): 44.
- <sup>14</sup> . Herbert Buschenfeld, “Die wirtschaftliche Lage der Nachfolgestaaten Jugoslawiens vor dem Kosovokrieg,” in Dunja Melcic (ed.), *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg. Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Konsequenzen* (Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), 513.
- <sup>15</sup> . At one point, hyperinflation had so distorted the Serbian economy that, at least in theory, a bunch of carrots cost a year’s salary. See Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 259.
- <sup>16</sup> . Buschenfeld, “Die wirtschaftliche Lage,” 513.
- <sup>17</sup> . Robert Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s* (London: Hurst & Co., 1999), 161.
- <sup>18</sup> . *Glas javnosti* (Belgrade), (October 31, 2000), at [www.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu); and “Ko je pratio Curuviju?,” in *Nezavisna Svetlost* (Kragujevac), (267) (November 5-12, 2000), at [www.svetlost.co.yu/arhiva](http://www.svetlost.co.yu/arhiva).
- <sup>19</sup> . AP Worldstream (December 15, 1993), on nexis.com.
- <sup>20</sup> . *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (February 19, 1995), on nexis.com; *The Guardian* (London), (August 7, 1995): T13, on nexis.com; and “Yugoslav Independent Press: Nasa Borba” (12/2/99), at [server1.cdsp.neu.edu/students/marko/nasaborba/nasaborbaindex.html](http://server1.cdsp.neu.edu/students/marko/nasaborba/nasaborbaindex.html).
- <sup>21</sup> . For discussion, see *Financial Times* (April 29, 1995): III, on nexis.com.
- <sup>22</sup> . Mark Thompson, *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, completely revised and expanded ed. (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1999), 90, quoting from *Borba* (December 28, 1992).
- <sup>23</sup> . For details and examples, see Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., chap. 14.
- <sup>24</sup> . Interview with Dr. Bora Kuzmanovic, in *Duga* (Belgrade), (October 28-November 10, 1995): 23-25, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (April 23, 1996): 66-70.
- <sup>25</sup> . Thompson, *Forging War*, 85.
- <sup>26</sup> . *Ibid.*, 108.
- <sup>27</sup> . Quoted in Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 112.



- <sup>28</sup> . See Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Serbian Church and the Serbian Nation," in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Donald W. Treadgold (eds.), *Render Unto Caesar: The Religious Sphere in World Politics* (Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1995), 317-318.
- <sup>29</sup> . For details, see Douglas E. Schoen, "How Milosevic Stole the Elections," in *New York Times Magazine* (February 14, 1993); and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (December 19, 1992): 5.
- <sup>30</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (December 25, 1992), on nexis.com.
- <sup>31</sup> . *Daily Telegraph* (London), (December 28, 1992): 8, on nexis.com.
- <sup>32</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (December 29, 1992), on nexis.com.
- <sup>33</sup> . Quoted in *Agence France Presse* (June 1, 1993), on nexis.com. See also *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), (June 2, 1993): 9; and *Glas istre* (Pula), (June 2, 1993): 16.
- <sup>34</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (June 1, 1993), on nexis.com; Associated Press (June 1, 1993), on nexis.com; Inter Press Service (June 2, 1993), on nexis.com; *The Independent* (London), (June 3, 1993): 10, on nexis.com; *Agence France Presse* (June 3, 1993), on nexis.com; *Vjesnik* (June 4, 1993): 9; *Glas Istre* (June 6, 1993): 5; *The Independent* (June 7, 1993): 8, on nexis.com; Inter Press Service (June 8, 1993), on nexis.com; *Chicago Tribune* (June 8, 1993): 7, on nexis.com; and Associated Press (June 9, 1993), on nexis.com.
- <sup>35</sup> . Quoted in *Agence France Presse* (June 5, 1993), on nexis.com. I have corrected the incorrect syntax in the original translation.
- <sup>36</sup> . Radio Croatia Network (Zagreb), (December 8, 1992), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (December 10, 1992): 59.
- <sup>37</sup> . 50,000 Hungarians according to MTI (Budapest), (July 29, 1999), on *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (hereafter, LNAU); 100,000 Hungarians according to MTI (September 13, 1999), in *BBC Monitoring Europe: Political* (September 14, 1999), on LNAU; and 45,000 Croats according to Larisa Inic, "Lutanje po drzavi pravnih iluzija," in *Nezavisni* (Novi Sad), (February 11, 2000), at [www.nezavisni.co.yu/327/htm/327subotica.htm](http://www.nezavisni.co.yu/327/htm/327subotica.htm), 2.
- <sup>38</sup> . Miroslav Filipovic, "The Sandzak Dilemma" (BCR No. 125, March 17, 2000), published by *The Institute for War & Peace Reporting* (August 1, 2000), at [www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?archive/bcr/bcr\\_2000317\\_2\\_eng.txt](http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl5?archive/bcr/bcr_2000317_2_eng.txt).
- <sup>39</sup> . For details, see *Christian Science Monitor* (April 11, 1994): 2, on LNAU; *Washington Post* (May 29, 1993): A2, on LNAU; and Serbian Radio (Belgrade), (February 20, 1993), in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (February 22, 1993), on LNAU. See also "Sandzak: Calm for Now," in *International Crisis Group* (November 9, 1998), at [www.crisisweb.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/yu04rep.htm](http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/yu04rep.htm).
- <sup>40</sup> . International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Annual Report 1997: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)* (Vienna, July 15, 1997), at [www.ihf-hr.org/ar97yug.htm](http://www.ihf-hr.org/ar97yug.htm), 12 of 21.
- <sup>41</sup> . Quoted in Sreten Vujovic, "An Uneasy View of the City," in Nebojsa Popov (ed.), *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, English version by Drinka Gojkovic (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 131.
- <sup>42</sup> . Judah, *The Serbs*, 230-231.
- <sup>43</sup> . Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 149.
- <sup>44</sup> . Quoted in Vujovic, "Uneasy View", 138.
- <sup>45</sup> . Quoted in Radmila Radic, "The Church and the 'Serbian Question'," in Popov (ed.), *The Road to War*, 263.
- <sup>46</sup> . Quoted in Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 143.
- <sup>47</sup> . Quoted in *New York Times* (January 19, 1997): 46.
- <sup>48</sup> . *Sunday Times* (London), (July 2, 1995), on nexis.com.
- <sup>49</sup> . Quoted in Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 173.
- <sup>50</sup> . Quoted in Gordy, *Culture of Power*, 132.
- <sup>51</sup> . Quoted in *Ibid.*, 154.
- <sup>52</sup> . Quoted in *Dallas Morning News* (December 28, 1995): 5C, at [ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story](http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story). See also *The Observer* (London), (July 17, 1994): 14, on nexis.com; and *Wall Street Journal* (June 28, 1995): 1.
- <sup>53</sup> . *The Independent* (September 25, 1994): 16, on nexis.com.
- <sup>54</sup> . *The Guardian* (March 24, 1995): 14, on nexis.com.
- <sup>55</sup> . Mentioned in *New York Times* (February 6, 1997): A8.
- <sup>56</sup> . Associated Press (July 13, 1993), on nexis.com.

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- <sup>57</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (January 3, 1994), on nexis.com; and *Japan Times* (March 6, 1994): 10.
- <sup>58</sup> . *Illyria* (November 9-11, 1996): 3.
- <sup>59</sup> . *The Times* (London), (March 4, 1997), on AmeriCast.com.
- <sup>60</sup> . Quoted in Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 227.
- <sup>61</sup> . *Ibid.*, 238-239.
- <sup>62</sup> . *taz* (Berlin), (August 11, 1995): 8, on nexis.com.
- <sup>63</sup> . This was Seselj's third jail sentence in the Milosevic era. Earlier, on September 29, 1994, Seselj had been imprisoned for a month, on charges of spitting on Radoman Bozovic, the speaker of the lower house of parliament. On October 28, 1994, having barely been released from detention, Seselj was returned to prison for three months, following fisticuffs with security agents in parliament. See *Daily Telegraph* (September 30, 1994): 18, on nexis.com; *OONachrichten* (September 30, 1994), at [www.nachrichten.at/archiv](http://www.nachrichten.at/archiv); *Agence France Presse* (June 4, 1995), on nexis.com; and Inter Press Service (June 5, 1995), on nexis.com.
- <sup>64</sup> . *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (December 22, 1995), on nexis.com.
- <sup>65</sup> . Quoted in Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 278.
- <sup>66</sup> . *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (November 19, 1996): 1. See also *Vreme* (Belgrade), (November 16, 1996): 16-17.
- <sup>67</sup> . *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (November 21, 1996): 5, (November 23-24, 1996): 3, (November 25, 1996): 3, (November 26, 1996): 2, and (December 2, 1996): 2; SRNA (Bosnian Serb news agency), (November 30, 1996), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (December 2, 1996), on Nexis; and *New York Times* (December 16, 1996): A4.
- <sup>68</sup> . See the chronology for November 17 - December 2, 1996 in *Agence France Presse* (December 2, 1996), on Nexis.
- <sup>69</sup> . 150,000 on November 30, SRNA (November 30, 1996), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (December 2, 1996), on Nexis; 200,000 on November 30, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (December 2, 1996): 2; more than 150,000 on 4 December, *Christian Science Monitor* (December 6, 1996): 5; 100,000 on December 6, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (December 7-8, 1996): 1; and 100,000 on December 15, *New York Times* (December 16, 1996): A4.
- <sup>70</sup> . *Sunday Telegraph* (December 1, 1996): 23.
- <sup>71</sup> . Radio B92 (Belgrade), (December 2, 1996), trans. in *BBC Monitoring Service: Eastern Europe* (December 3, 1996), on Nexis; SRNA (December 2, 1996), trans. in *BBC Monitoring Service: Eastern Europe* (December 3, 1996), on Nexis; and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (December 4, 1996): 1.
- <sup>72</sup> . Quoted in *New York Times* (December 4, 1996): A10.
- <sup>73</sup> . *Illyria* (The Bronx), (December 28-30, 1996): 1; and *New York Times* (December 29, 1996): 6.
- <sup>74</sup> . Serbian TV (Belgrade), (December 1, 1996), trans. in *BBC Monitoring Service: Eastern Europe* (December 3, 1996), on Nexis.
- <sup>75</sup> . *Illyria* (December 7-9, 1996): 2.
- <sup>76</sup> . Quoted in AFX News (December 3, 1996), on Nexis.
- <sup>77</sup> . *New York Times* (December 4, 1996): A1.
- <sup>78</sup> . *New York Times* (December 8, 1996): 1.
- <sup>79</sup> . *New York Times* (December 30, 1996): A3.
- <sup>80</sup> . *New York Times* (December 17, 1996): A6.
- <sup>81</sup> . Quoted in *Ibid.*
- <sup>82</sup> . *New Europe* (Athens), (December 22-28, 1996): 4; and *New York Times* (December 28, 1996): 1, 5.
- <sup>83</sup> . Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 295-297.
- <sup>84</sup> . Quoted in *Ibid.*, 308.
- <sup>85</sup> . *Christian Science Monitor* (February 5, 1997): 2.
- <sup>86</sup> . *New York Times* (February 6, 1997): A1.
- <sup>87</sup> . *Jerusalem Post* (September 19, 1997): 10, on nexis.com.
- <sup>88</sup> . *New Europe* (March 16-22, 1997): 32.
- <sup>89</sup> . Seselj, of course, denied that he was a fascist. As the *Los Angeles Times* reported at the time, "Asked once if he was bothered that many people fear his fascist tendencies, Seselj responded: 'I've been accused of being a homosexual and of being a Croat. Those are far worse accusations...We are chauvinists. We hate Croats. What is fascist about that?,'" *Los Angeles Times* (September 20, 1997): A2, on nexis.com. See also *New York Times* (December 7, 1997): 9, on nexis.com.

- <sup>90</sup> . Sonja Biserko and Seska Stanojlovic (eds.), *Radicalisation of the Serbian Society: Collection of Documents*, trans. by Mirka Jankovic and Ivana Damjanovic (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, December 1997), 22.
- <sup>91</sup> . *Ibid.*, 41.
- <sup>92</sup> . Quoted in *Ibid.*, 42.
- <sup>93</sup> . Quoted in *The Times* (London), (February 27, 1997), on AmeriCast.com.
- <sup>94</sup> . Inter Press Service (September 26, 1997), on nexis.com.
- <sup>95</sup> . Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 347-349.
- <sup>96</sup> . AP Worldstream (September 30, 1997), on nexis.com.
- <sup>97</sup> . *Il Sole 24 Ore* (October 7, 1997), on nexis.com.
- <sup>98</sup> . Serbian TV (Belgrade), (November 29, 1997), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (2 December 1997), on nexis.com.
- <sup>99</sup> . *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (December 8, 1997), on nexis.com; and *La Stampa* (Torino), (December 8, 1997): 6, on nexis.com.
- <sup>100</sup> . AP Worldstream (December 23, 1997), on nexis.com.
- <sup>101</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (December 22, 1997), on nexis.com; and *Der Tagesspiegel* (Berlin), (December 23, 1997): 2.
- <sup>102</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (December 29, 1997), on nexis.com.
- <sup>103</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (February 17, 1998), on nexis.com; and *The Times* (February 18, 1998), on nexis.com.
- <sup>104</sup> . Re. 8 cabinet ministries, *Beta news agency* (Belgrade), (February 18, 1998), trans. in FBIS-EEU-98-049; and *Beta news agency* (February 19, 1998), in FBIS-EEU-98-050. Re: *Politika*, *Beta news agency* (January 22, 1998), trans. in FBIS-EEU-98-022. Re: negotiations, see also *Beta news agency* (March 5, 1998), in FBIS-EEU-98-064; and *Beta news agency* (February 17, 1998), trans. in FBIS-EEU-98-048.
- <sup>105</sup> . *Beta news agency* (February 16, 1998), trans. in FBIS-EEU-98-047.
- <sup>106</sup> . Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 415; and *Beta news agency* (March 1998), in FBIS-EEU-98-085.
- <sup>107</sup> . Jens Reuter, "Die innere Situation Serbiens 1998 – Politische Sauberungen im Windschatten der Kosovo-Krise," in *Sudost-Europa*, VI. 48(1-2) (January-February 1999): 1; and *Duga* (Belgrade), (1702) (October 10-23, 1998): 14-15.
- <sup>108</sup> . Elez Biberaj, *Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 14.
- <sup>109</sup> . Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 247.
- <sup>110</sup> . *What the Kosovars Say and Demand* (Tirana: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1990), 25.
- <sup>111</sup> . *Rilindja* (Tirana), (February 22, 1995): 5, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (February 24, 1995): 43; and Radio Tirana Network (October 27, 1992), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (October 28, 1992): 30.
- <sup>112</sup> . Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 250, 256-259.
- <sup>113</sup> . *Ibid.*, 251.
- <sup>114</sup> . Predrag Tasic, *Kako je ubijena druga Jugoslavija* (Skopje: Self-published by the author, 1994), 69.
- <sup>115</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (September 23, 1992), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (September 24, 1992): 44.
- <sup>116</sup> . See, inter alia: Radio Croatia in Albanian (May 14, 1991), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (May 15, 1991): 40; TVSH Television Network (February 28, 1994), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (March 1, 1994): 42; TVSH Television Network (22 June 1994), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (June 23, 1994): 30; TVSH Television Network (15 October 1994), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (October 17, 1994): 75; TVSH Television Network (February 16, 1995), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (February 17, 1995): 58; *Rilindja* (Tirana), (February 22, 1995): 5, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (February 24, 1995): 43; ATA (May 20, 1995), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 24, 1995), on Nexis; *Kosova Daily Report* (Pristina), (October 4, 1995), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (October 12, 1995): 71; and Julie Mertus and Vlatka Mihelic, *Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo* (New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, March 1993), Xiv-xv, 2-17, 31-37, 98-99.

- <sup>117</sup> . Tanjug Domestic Service (January 16, 1995), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (January 18, 1995): 60; *Vecernji list* (Zagreb), (April 1, 1995): 24; and Fabian Schmidt, "Kosovo: The Time Bomb That Has Not Gone Off," *RFE/RL Research Report* (February 6, 1995): 56.
- <sup>118</sup> . "News briefing with Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister, Republic of Kosova, National Press Club, Washington D.C.," in *Federal News Service* (October 21, 1992), on *Lexis-Nexis Congressional Universe* (hereafter, LNCU).
- <sup>119</sup> . *Ibid.*
- <sup>120</sup> . *Miami Herald* (June 3, 1999), at [www.herald.com](http://www.herald.com).
- <sup>121</sup> . *Borba* (Belgrade), (April 20, 1993): 8, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (May 7, 1993): 44.
- <sup>122</sup> . *The Times* (March 31, 1994): 15.
- <sup>123</sup> . "Testimony October 5, 1994 Dr. Bujar Bukoshi on behalf of the Government of Kosova, House Foreign Affairs Committee," in *Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony* (October 5, 1994), on LNCU.
- <sup>124</sup> . Quoted in Stefan Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation, 1992-1998*, ECMI Working Paper No. 1 (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 1998), 33.
- <sup>125</sup> . *Kosova Daily Report* (Pristina), (March 19, 1996), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (March 20, 1996): 60-61.
- <sup>126</sup> . See Ramet, *Whose Democracy*, 152, and documentation in note 80 on 216.
- <sup>127</sup> . *Kosova Daily Report* (March 11, 1996), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (March 14, 1996): 60-61.
- <sup>128</sup> . *Kosova Daily Report* (March 21, 1996), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (March 25, 1996): 56.
- <sup>129</sup> . *Kosova Daily Report* (March 22, 1996), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (March 25, 1996): 57.
- <sup>130</sup> . *Kosova Daily Report* (March 18-19, 1996), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (March 21, 1996): 58; see also *Kosova Daily Report* (March 21, 1996), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (March 25, 1996): 58.
- <sup>131</sup> . See the discussion in *Bota Sot* (Zurich), (December 16, 1995): 2, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (East Europe), (December 19, 1995): 58-59.
- <sup>132</sup> . Matthias Rub, "'Phonix aus der Asche'. Die UCK: Von der Terrororganisation zur Bodentruppe der Nato?," in Thomas Schmid (ed.), *Krieg im Kosovo* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), 50-51.
- <sup>133</sup> . Regarding the origins of the KLA, see Jens Reuter, "Zur Geschichte der UCK," in Konrad Clewing and Jens Reuter (eds.), *Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen - Akteure - Verlauf* (Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 2000), 171ff.
- <sup>134</sup> . Rub, "'Phonix aus der Asche'," 53.
- <sup>135</sup> . Fabian Schmidt, "Upheaval in Albania," in *Current History*, 97(617) (March 1998): 129.
- <sup>136</sup> . Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 275.
- <sup>137</sup> . Biberaj, *Albania in Transition*, 330.
- <sup>138</sup> . Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic*, 403-404.
- <sup>139</sup> . Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo*, 11, 23.
- <sup>140</sup> . Pointed out in James Pettifer, "Kosova and its Neighbours – Perspectives after the Catastrophe," in *Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen*, 39 (1999): 88.
- <sup>141</sup> . Quoted in Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo*, 46.
- <sup>142</sup> . *The Australian* (July 22, 1998): 9.
- <sup>143</sup> . Re: tanks and helicopter gunships, *The Times* (June 8, 1998): 11. Re: deaths and homeless, *International Herald Tribune* (Tokyo ed.), (June 30, 1998): 1; and *Daily Yomiuri* (September 13, 1998): 3.
- <sup>144</sup> . International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Annual Report 1999: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo)* (Vienna, July 5, 1999), at [www.ihf-hr.org/reports/ar99/ar99yug.htm](http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/ar99/ar99yug.htm), 15 of 18.
- <sup>145</sup> . *Frankfurter Rundschau* (May 18, 1998): 1.
- <sup>146</sup> . Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo*, 16.
- <sup>147</sup> . *New York Times* (February 26, 1999): A7, and (April 14, 1999): A12.

- <sup>148</sup> . “Conflict with NATO Would Bring Survival of Both the Country and the People into Question, We Clearly Told the State Leadership,” in *Nedeljni telegraf* (Belgrade), (August 4, 1999), trans. by Snezana Lazovic and posted at [www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/telegraf/telegraf4.html](http://www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/telegraf/telegraf4.html), 3, 5.
- <sup>149</sup> . For details and documentation, see *Kosova Daily Report*, #1697 (February 19, 1999), at [www.kosova.com](http://www.kosova.com); and *Washington Post* (April 11, 1999): A26. For more details and documentation, see *Los Angeles Times* (August 8, 1999): A1, on LNAU.
- <sup>150</sup> . Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 245-246.
- <sup>151</sup> . *Illyria* (January 27 - February 3, 1999): 1.
- <sup>152</sup> . Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 205.
- <sup>153</sup> . Re. pounding of villages, *Kosova Daily Report* #1681 (February 2, 1999), #1698 (February 20, 1999), #1700 (February 22, 1999), #1702 (February 24, 1999), #1703 (February 25, 1999), #1704 (February 26, 1999), and #1707 (March 1, 1999) – all at [www.kosova.com](http://www.kosova.com). Re: reinforcements, *Washington Post* (April 11, 1999): A26; and *Sunday Oregonian* (Portland), (April 18, 1999): A13. Re: death toll, *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (March 16, 1999): 1. Re: the number of homeless: 200,00 according to *New York Times* (March 17, 1999): A8; 450,000 according to comments by U.S. Representative Christopher Smith (R-N.J.), in “Hearing of Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission),” 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington D.C., April 6, 1999, in *Federal News Service* (April 6, 1999), on LNCU.
- <sup>154</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (February 18, 1999), in FBIS-EEU-1999-0218.
- <sup>155</sup> . *Illyria* (March 31 - April 3, 2000): 3.
- <sup>156</sup> . *New York Times* (March 17, 1999): A1.
- <sup>157</sup> . From Wm. Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, Act IV, Sc. I, lines 104—106.
- <sup>158</sup> . *Miami Herald* (June 3, 1999), at [www.herald.com](http://www.herald.com). Tim Judah gives a slightly lower figure, reporting 848,000 Kosovar Albanians leaving the province by early June 1999. See Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 250.
- <sup>159</sup> . *Wall Street Journal* (June 4, 1999): A7.
- <sup>160</sup> . Press release from the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (May 27, 1999), at [www.latimes.com](http://www.latimes.com).
- <sup>161</sup> . *Frankfurter Rundschau* (June 8, 1999), trans. in FBIS-EEU-1999-0608.
- <sup>162</sup> . *CNN Headline News* (June 6, 1999).
- <sup>163</sup> . Quoted in *Beta news agency* (June 7, 1999), trans. in FBIS-EEU-1999-0607.
- <sup>164</sup> . See Kostunica’s comments in *Beta news agency* (June 7, 1999), trans. in FBIS-EEU-1999-0607. [The sources listed in notes 162 and 163 are distinct, even though FBIS assigned them the same code number.]
- <sup>165</sup> . As reported in *Star Tribune* (Minneapolis), (February 7, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com).
- <sup>166</sup> . 10,000 according to a US government report dated December 1999, cited in *Illyria* (December 14-16, 1999): 1; and 12,000 according to a report prepared by Paul Spiegel and Peter Salama of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, dated June 2000, cited in *Illyria* (June 27-29, 2000): 2. As early as August 1999, Pajazit Nushi, chair of Kosovo’s oldest human rights group, the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, claimed to have a register of more than 10,000 names of persons confirmed to have been killed by Serbian forces and said that the list continued to grow longer. Re. Nushi’s list, see *Los Angeles Times* (August 8, 1999): A1, on LNAU.
- <sup>167</sup> . Vesna Pesic, in interview with *Le Monde* (Paris), (June 17, 1999), trans. in FBIS-EEU-1999-0617.
- <sup>168</sup> . Quoted in *Beta news agency* (August 11, 1999), trans. in FBIS-EEU-1999-0811.
- <sup>169</sup> . *Vreme* (March 8, 1993): 22-24, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (April 6, 1993): 51.
- <sup>170</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (May 3, 1996), in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), (May 3, 1996): 25.
- <sup>171</sup> . The remainder of this section follows closely, albeit in abbreviated form, the text in my *Balkan Babel*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., chapter 14.
- <sup>172</sup> . “Montenegrin Government Adopts Platform Redefining Relations with Serbia,” *Tanjug* (August 6, 1999), at [www.freaserbia.net/News.html](http://www.freaserbia.net/News.html). See also Olja Obradovic, “Cekajuci demokratsku Srbiju,” in *Helsinkiška povelja*, 4(20-21) (September - October 1999): 11-12.
- <sup>173</sup> . “Narod ne prihvata odvajanje Crne Gore od Srbije,” in *Politika ekspres* (Belgrade), (August 29, 1999): 4.
- <sup>174</sup> . *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, as reprinted in *Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rumänien* (Bucharest), (September 4, 1999): 3.



- <sup>175</sup> . Zoran Radulovic, "Montenegrin Public Opinion at a Turning Point," *AIM-Press* (October 4, 1999), at [www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data](http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data), 1.
- <sup>176</sup> . *Volksblatt* (Würzburg), (May 25, 2000), at [www.volksblatt-wuerzburg.de](http://www.volksblatt-wuerzburg.de). For background, see Zoran Radulovic, "Život na klackalici," in *Monitor* (Podgorica), (500), at [www.monitor.cg.yu/a\\_500-03.html](http://www.monitor.cg.yu/a_500-03.html).
- <sup>177</sup> . *Die Welt* (November 3, 1999), at [www.welt.de/daten](http://www.welt.de/daten); and Montena-fax news agency (Podgorica), (March 27, 2000), in *BBC Monitoring Europe – Political* (March 27, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>178</sup> . *New York Times* (December 9, 1999): A12; and *Star Tribune* (December 14, 1999), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com).
- <sup>179</sup> . *Die Presse* (Vienna), (October 20, 1999), at [www.diepresse.at](http://www.diepresse.at).
- <sup>180</sup> . According to charges registered by Andrija Perišić, a member of Montenegro's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, as reported in *Star Tribune* (February 1, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com). On March 20, Montenegrin police confiscated a cache of explosives and guns from Aleksandar Vujovic, chairman of the Andrijevića municipal committee of JUL (Mirjana Marković's party). On this, see *Vijesti* (Podgorica), (March 21, 2000), in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 23, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>181</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (March 8, 2000), on LNAU; also *OÖNachrichten* (March 7, 2000): 4, at [www.oon.at/public/dcarchiv.ht](http://www.oon.at/public/dcarchiv.ht).
- <sup>182</sup> . Montena-fax news agency (March 8, 2000), in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 10, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>183</sup> . *Der Standard* (Vienna), (March 20, 2000), in *BBC Monitoring Europe – Political* (March 20, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>184</sup> . Radio Montenegro (Podgorica), (March 28, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 30, 2000), on LNAU; and *Agence France Presse* (April 5, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>185</sup> . *BH Press news agency* (Sarajevo), (April 5, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (April 7, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>186</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (April 8, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>187</sup> . UPI (April 1, 2000), on LNAU. See also *Die Presse* (March 31, 2000), at [www.diepresse.at](http://www.diepresse.at).
- <sup>188</sup> . TV Crna Gora (Podgorica), (March 13, 2000), in *BBC Monitoring Europe – Political* (March 13, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>189</sup> . *Frankfurter Rundschau* (March 16, 2000), at [www.fr-aktuell.de/english/401/t401013.htm](http://www.fr-aktuell.de/english/401/t401013.htm).
- <sup>190</sup> . *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (March 14, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>191</sup> . *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (March 16, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>192</sup> . Radio Montenegro (Podgorica), (February 15, 2000), in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (February 17, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>193</sup> . The opposition has taken the threat seriously. See "Režim spreman za dramaticne sukobe," in *Blic* (March 6, 2000), at [blic.gates96.com/daily-pages/politika.htm](http://blic.gates96.com/daily-pages/politika.htm).
- <sup>194</sup> . See text of the law in *Politika* (Belgrade), (October 22, 1998): 21-22.
- <sup>195</sup> . Beta news agency (January 31, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (February 2, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>196</sup> . BH Press agency (Sarajevo), (February 1, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (February 3, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>197</sup> . Quoted in *Agence France Presse* (February 11, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>198</sup> . Quoted in *Independent Herald Tribune* (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), (February 23, 2000): 5, on LNAU.
- <sup>199</sup> . *Ibid.*
- <sup>200</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (March 11, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>201</sup> . *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (March 5, 2000), on LNAU; Radio B2-92 (March 7, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 9, 2000), on LNAU; *Beta news agency* (March 7, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 9, 2000), on LNAU; Radio B2-92 (March 8, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 10, 2000), on LNAU; and Studio B television (Belgrade), (March 9, 2000), trans. in *BBC Monitoring Europe – Political* (March 9, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>202</sup> . *Star Tribune* (March 2, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com); and *Beta news agency* (March 8, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 10, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>203</sup> . This occurred on March 6, 2000. See UPI (March 6, 2000), on LNAU; and Radio B2-92 (March 7, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 9, 2000), on LNAU.

- <sup>204</sup> . *Beta news agency* (March 7, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 9, 2000), on LNAU; *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (March 8, 2000), on LNAU; *Beta news agency* (March 8, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (March 10, 2000), on LNAU; *Radio B2-92* (March 9, 2000), trans. in *BBC Monitoring Europe – Political* (March 9, 2000), on LNAU; *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (March 12, 2000), on LNAU; *Star Tribune* (March 12, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com); and *Star Tribune* (March 16, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com).
- <sup>205</sup> . Quoted in *Die Presse* (March 3, 2000), at [www.diepresse.at](http://www.diepresse.at). See also *Pregled vesti* (February 14, 2000), at [www.beocity.com/vesti](http://www.beocity.com/vesti).
- <sup>206</sup> . *Star Tribune* (April 10, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com).
- <sup>207</sup> . *Star Tribune* (April 11, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com); and *International Herald Tribune* (Neuilly-sur-Seine), (April 12, 2000): 4, on LNAU.
- <sup>208</sup> . *Beta news agency* (April 10, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (April 12, 2000), on LNAU; *Beta news agency* (April 18, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (April 20, 2000), on LNAU; and *Agence France Presse* (April 18, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>209</sup> . *Star Tribune* (May 17, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com); *Los Angeles Times* (May 17, 2000), at [www.latimes.com](http://www.latimes.com); *New York Times* (May 18, 2000): A1, A10; *Star Tribune* (May 18, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com); *Die Presse* (May 20, 2000), at [www.diepresse.at](http://www.diepresse.at); and *Radio B2-92* (May 25, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 27, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>210</sup> . *Tanjug* (June 12, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (June 14, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>211</sup> . *SRNA news agency* (August 9, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (August 11, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>212</sup> . Quoted in *Radio B2-92* (August 7, 2000), in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (August 9, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>213</sup> . *Deutsche Presse Agentur* (August 6, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>214</sup> . Regarding Kosovo, *FoNet news agency* (July 26, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (July 28, 2000), on LNAU; regarding Hungary, *Hungarian TV2 satellite service* (Budapest), (July 29, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (August 1, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>215</sup> . Veran Matic, “Independent Serbian Media Should be Supported,” in *International Herald Tribune* (Tel Aviv ed.), (June 16, 2000): 6.
- <sup>216</sup> . *Beta news agency* (March 30, 2000), trans. in *BBC Monitoring Europe – Political* (March 30, 2000), on LNAU; and *Agence France Presse* (April 11, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>217</sup> . *Radio B2-92* (April 11, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (April 13, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>218</sup> . State radio claimed that only 30,000 persons took part. Regarding “at least 100,000,” *Radio B2-92* (April 14, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (April 17, 2000), on LNAU; regarding “nearly 200,000,” *Beta news agency* (April 14, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (April 17, 2000), on LNAU; regarding “around 30,000,” *Radio Belgrade* (April 14, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (April 17, 2000), on LNAU. AFP reported that “more than 70,000 people” took part in the protest, see *Agence France Presse* (April 14, 2000), on LNAU. DPA accepted the opposition figure and reported attendance at “more than 100,000 people,” see *Deutsche Presse Agentur* (April 14, 2000), on LNAU. The *New York Times* reported “at least 100,000 people” in attendance. See *New York Times* (April 15, 2000): A3.
- <sup>219</sup> . “Dobar dan za srpsku opoziciju,” in *Vreme*, (485) (April 22, 2000): 6-8.
- <sup>220</sup> . *taz* (Berlin), (May 12, 2000):10, at [www.taz.de/tpl/2000/05/12/a0195.fr](http://www.taz.de/tpl/2000/05/12/a0195.fr); *Die Presse* (May 19, 2000), at [www.diepresse.at](http://www.diepresse.at); *Main Post newsline* (May 19, 2000), at [www.mainpost.de](http://www.mainpost.de); *Holsteiner Courier* (May 19, 2000), on Powerball; *tirol online* (May 19, 2000), at [www.tirol.com/online/politik/welt/article](http://www.tirol.com/online/politik/welt/article); *Berliner Zeitung* (May 20, 2000), at [www.berlinonline.de](http://www.berlinonline.de); *Holsteiner Courier* (May 20, 2000), on Powerball; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (May 20, 2000), at [www.sueddeutsche.de](http://www.sueddeutsche.de); *taz* (May 22, 2000), at [www.taz.de](http://www.taz.de); *Beta news agency* (May 24, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 27, 2000), on LNAU; *Beta news agency* (May 25, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 27, 2000), on LNAU; “Srbi skloni pobuni”, in *NIN* (Belgrade), (May 25, 2000), at [www.nin.co.yu/2000-05/25/12882.html](http://www.nin.co.yu/2000-05/25/12882.html); and *Financial Times* (May 27, 2000): 6, at LNAU.
- <sup>221</sup> . *Berliner Zeitung* (May 19, 2000), at [www.berlinonline.de/aktuelles/berliner-zeitung/politik.html](http://www.berlinonline.de/aktuelles/berliner-zeitung/politik.html); *SonntagsZeitung* (May 21, 2000), at [www.sonntagszeitung.ch/sz](http://www.sonntagszeitung.ch/sz); and *Die Presse* (May 23, 2000), at [www.diepresse.at](http://www.diepresse.at).

- <sup>222</sup> . *Star Tribune* (May 19, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com).
- <sup>223</sup> . Regarding the beating, *Star Tribune* (May 24, 2000), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com); and *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (May 25, 2000), at [www.sueddeutsche.de](http://www.sueddeutsche.de). Regarding the closure, UPI (May 26, 2000), on LNAU; Radio B2-92 (May 25, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 27, 2000), on LNAU; and “Profesori Beogradskog univerziteta o odluci da se okonce nastava,” in *Blic-online* (May 27, 2000), at [blic.gates9696.com/danas/broj/strane/drustvo.htm](http://blic.gates9696.com/danas/broj/strane/drustvo.htm). For background, see also “Za 26. Maj najavljen studentski miting,” in *Pobjeda* (Podgorica), (May 24, 2000), at [www.pobjeda.co.yu/arhiva/maj\\_00/2405/rubrike/politika/politika\\_13.htm](http://www.pobjeda.co.yu/arhiva/maj_00/2405/rubrike/politika/politika_13.htm).
- <sup>224</sup> . Radio B2-92 (May 25, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 27, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>225</sup> . *Tanjug* (Belgrade), (May 24, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 26, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>226</sup> . *Beta news agency* (May 25, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 27, 2000), on LNAU; and UPI (June 14, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>227</sup> . *Tanjug* (July 5, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (July 7, 2000), on LNAU; *Beta news agency* (July 6, 2000), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (July 8, 2000); and *Tanjug* (July 6, 2000), in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (July 8, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>228</sup> . Governmental draft submitted to the Montenegrin parliament on July 7, as quoted in *Agence France Presse* (July 7, 2000), on LNAU. See also *Stuttgarter Zeitung* (July 11, 2000), at [www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de](http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de).
- <sup>229</sup> . *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), (August 22, 2000), at [www.vjesnik.hr/html/2000/08/22/](http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2000/08/22/).
- <sup>230</sup> . Quoted in *Sunday Times* (London), (August 27, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>231</sup> . “Nastavlja se istraga povodom nestanka Ivana Stambolica,” in *Politika* (Belgrade), (September 1, 2000), at [www.politika.co.yu/2000/0901/01\\_35.htm](http://www.politika.co.yu/2000/0901/01_35.htm); *Christian Science Monitor* (August 29, 2000): 7, on LNAU; and UPI (August 30, 2000), on LNAU.
- <sup>232</sup> . *Washington Post* (October 15, 2000): A30.
- <sup>233</sup> . See the report in *Aftenposten* (Oslo), September 9, 2000, at [www.aftenposten.no/english/world/d163191.htm](http://www.aftenposten.no/english/world/d163191.htm).
- <sup>234</sup> . Official results in *Borba* (September 27, 2000), at [www.borba.co.yu](http://www.borba.co.yu); opposition figures as reported in *Monitor* (Podgorica), #519 (September 29, 2000), at [www.monitor.cg.yu/str\\_01.html](http://www.monitor.cg.yu/str_01.html).
- <sup>235</sup> . See, for example, the report in *Washington Post* (September 27, 2000): A1.
- <sup>236</sup> . Quoted in *Star Tribune* (September 25, 2000), at [webserv3.startribune.com](http://webserv3.startribune.com). See also *Oslobodjenje* (Sarajevo), (September 23/24, 2000): 9.
- <sup>237</sup> . *La Repubblica* (Rome), (September 25, 2000), at [www.repubblica.it](http://www.repubblica.it); *The Sun* (Baltimore), (September 28, 2000): 1A; *Washington Post* (September 29, 2000): A22; *Glas javnosti* (October 2, 2000), at [www.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu); and *Die Presse* (October 2, 2000), at [www.diepresse.at](http://www.diepresse.at).
- <sup>238</sup> . *Glas javnosti* (October 1, 2000), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>239</sup> . Quoted in *New York Times* (October 4, 2000): A1, A10.
- <sup>240</sup> . *Washington Post* (October 15, 2000): A30.
- <sup>241</sup> . Re: the police, *New York Times* (October 5, 2000): A1; re: the army, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), (September 22, 2000), at [www.sueddeutsche.de](http://www.sueddeutsche.de).
- <sup>242</sup> . CWI Statement (Committee for a Workers’ International), October 2000, accessed via [www.ilor.com](http://www.ilor.com); and *The Militant*, 64(39), (October 16, 2000), accessed via [www.ilor.com](http://www.ilor.com).
- <sup>243</sup> . *Beta news agency* (October 5, 2000), trans. in FBIS-EEU-2000-1005, on *World News Connection*.
- <sup>244</sup> . *Radio B2-92* (October 5, 2000).
- <sup>245</sup> . Re: the strike leader, *Star Tribune* (October 3, 2000), at [webserv3.startribune.com](http://webserv3.startribune.com); re: the list of 50, UPI (November 1, 2000), on [nexis.com](http://nexis.com).
- <sup>246</sup> . *Washington Post* (October 15, 2000): A30.
- <sup>247</sup> . See the detailed account in *New York Times* (October 6, 2000): A1, A14-A15.
- <sup>248</sup> . The Federal Election Commission “admitted its error,” as *Glas javnosti* put it. See *Glas javnosti* (October 6, 2000), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>249</sup> . *Deutsche Presse-Agentur* (November 3, 2000), on [nexis.com](http://nexis.com).
- <sup>250</sup> . See “Demokratski kaos,” in *Nezavisna Svetlost*, (265) (October 22-29, 2000), at [www.svetlost.co.yu](http://www.svetlost.co.yu).
- <sup>251</sup> . Details in *Agence France Presse* (November 6, 2000), on [nexis.com](http://nexis.com).



- <sup>252</sup> . Bozo Nikolic, “Milosevic kao prioritet”, in *Monitor* (Podgorica), (530) (December 15, 2000), at [www.monitor.cg.yu](http://www.monitor.cg.yu).
- <sup>253</sup> . *Los Angeles Times* (January 5, 2001), at [www.latimes.com](http://www.latimes.com).
- <sup>254</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (October 22, 2000), on nexis.com.
- <sup>255</sup> . Quoted in *Beta news agency* (December 15, 2000), trans. in FBIS-EEU-2000-1215.
- <sup>256</sup> . *The Observer* (London), (December 31, 2000): 19, on nexis.com; and *Glas javnosti* (January 9, 2001), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>257</sup> . *Netzeitung* (December 28, 2000), at [www.netzeitung.de](http://www.netzeitung.de); and UPI (December 31, 2000), on nexis.com.
- <sup>258</sup> . See the comments by Dragan Soc, leader of the People’s Party, in *Glas javnosti* (January 5, 2001), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>259</sup> . *Vecernje novosti* (Belgrade), (January 4, 2001), trans. in FBIS-EEU-2001-0104.
- <sup>260</sup> . *Pobjeda* (Podgorica), (January 25, 2001), at [www.pobjeda.co.yu](http://www.pobjeda.co.yu); and *Vijesti on-line* (Podgorica), (January 26, 2001), at [www.vijesti.cg.yu](http://www.vijesti.cg.yu).
- <sup>261</sup> . See, for example, the report in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), (January 24, 2001), at [www.vjesnik.hr/html](http://www.vjesnik.hr/html).
- <sup>262</sup> . *Telegraf* (Belgrade), (April 24, 2001): 3. See also *Die Presse* (Vienna), (April 24, 2001): 1, 4.
- <sup>263</sup> . *Agence France Presse* (February 19, 2001), on nexis.com.
- <sup>264</sup> . *Aftenposten* (April 23, 2001), at [www.aftenposten.no/english/world/d205748.htm](http://www.aftenposten.no/english/world/d205748.htm).
- <sup>265</sup> . *Star Tribune* (June 2, 2001), at [www.startribune.com](http://www.startribune.com). See also *Vecernje novosti* (Belgrade), (April 27, 2001): 5.
- <sup>266</sup> . *Vijesti on-line* (Podgorica), Rezultati glasanja, at [www.vijesti.cg.yu/naslovna.phtml?akcija=glasanje](http://www.vijesti.cg.yu/naslovna.phtml?akcija=glasanje) (accessed May 27, 2001).
- <sup>267</sup> . Re. Isakov, *Beta news agency* (January 8, 2001), trans. in FBIS-EEU-2001-0108; re: autonomy, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (October 21, 2000): 7, in nexis.com.
- <sup>268</sup> . *Nedeljni telegraf* (Belgrade), (April 18, 2001): 7.
- <sup>269</sup> . *Beta news agency* (December 13, 2000), trans. in FBIS-EEU-2000-1213.
- <sup>270</sup> . On Bosnia, see *Glas javnosti* (December 16, 2000), at [www.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>271</sup> . *Washington Post* (November 29, 2000): A32, on nexis.com; and *Glas javnosti* (December 20, 2000), at [www.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>272</sup> . *Beta news agency* (December 11, 2000), on FBIS-EEU-2000-1211.
- <sup>273</sup> . *Glas javnosti* (December 24, 2000), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu); *Washington Post* (December 25, 2000): A30; and *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), (December 27, 2000), at [www.vjesnik.hr/html](http://www.vjesnik.hr/html).
- <sup>274</sup> . *Glas javnosti* (January 19, 2001), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>275</sup> . Re: Milosevic’s January arrest see, “Uphapsicemo Milosevica u januaru”, in *Glas javnosti* (December 27, 2000), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu); and *Ostsee-Zeitung* (December 29, 2000), at [www.ostsee-zeitung.de](http://www.ostsee-zeitung.de). Re. March, *Glas javnosti* (February 25, 2001), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu); and *Vjesnik* (January 23, 2001), at [www.vjesnik.hr/html](http://www.vjesnik.hr/html).
- <sup>276</sup> . Military purges, *Agence France Presse* (December 30, 2000), on nexis.com; arrest of Milosevic in January, *Glas javnosti* (January 27, 2000), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu), and *Ostsee-Zeitung* (December 29, 2000), at [www.ostsee-zeitung.de](http://www.ostsee-zeitung.de); arrest of Milosevic in March, *Vjesnik* (January 23, 2001), at [www.vjesnik.hr/html](http://www.vjesnik.hr/html); crimes against humanity, *Beta news agency* (December 19, 2000), on FBIS-EEU-2000-1218; world acceptance of Belgrade, *Glas javnosti* (January 4, 2001), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu); pressures for the arrest of Milosevic, “Uhapsite Milosevica,” in *Nezavisna Svetlost*, (273) (December 16-23, 2000), at [www.svetlost.co.yu](http://www.svetlost.co.yu), and *Agence France Presse* (January 6, 2001), on nexis.com; visit by del Ponte, *Glas javnosti* (January 25, 2001), at [www.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu), *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), (January 25, 2001): 5, and *Chicago Tribune* (January 25, 2001), at [www.chicagotribune.com/news](http://www.chicagotribune.com/news). See also the editorial in *Washington Post* (January 26, 2001): A22.
- <sup>277</sup> . *Chicago Tribune* (March 11, 2001), p. 10, on nexis.com.
- <sup>278</sup> . Re. Handful: *Beta news agency* (March 1, 2001), trans. in FBIS-EEU-2001-0301. Re. The failed siege: *Boston Globe* (March 31, 2001), pp. A1, A10; *New York Times* (March 31, 2001), pp. A1, A6; and *Washington Post* (March 21, 2001), pp. A1, A16.
- <sup>279</sup> . *New York Times* (April 1, 2001), pp. 1, 6.
- <sup>280</sup> . *Aftenposten* (April 5, 2001), at [www.aftenposten.no/english/world/d202668.htm](http://www.aftenposten.no/english/world/d202668.htm).
- <sup>281</sup> . BBC News (May 25, 2001), 14:31 GMT, 15:31 UK, at [news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid\\_1351000/1351317.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1351000/1351317.stm); and Maroje Mihovilovic, “Puc protiv Kostunice”, in *Nacional* (Zagreb), no. 292 (June 19, 2001), pp. 32—34.

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- <sup>282</sup> . *Jutarnji list* (Zagreb), June 23, 2001, p. 12; *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Split), June 23, 2001, p. 6; and *Jutarnji list* (June 25, 2001), p. 9.
- <sup>283</sup> . *Jutarnji list* (June 20, 2001), p. 12.
- <sup>284</sup> . *Vjesnik* (25 June 2001), p. 1, citing a report in the *London Sunday Times*.
- <sup>285</sup> . Quoted in *Glas javnosti* (29 June 2001), at [www.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu).
- <sup>286</sup> . Poll results reported in *Beta news agency* (May 17, 2001), trans. in FBIS-EEU-2001-0517, on *World News Connection*.
- <sup>287</sup> . “Turbo je mrtav,” in *Nezavisna Svetlost*, (265) (October 22-29, 2000), at [www.svetlost.co.yu](http://www.svetlost.co.yu).
- <sup>288</sup> . *New York Times* (December 17, 2000): 30, on [nexus.com](http://nexus.com).
- <sup>289</sup> . On the continuing strength of nationalist culture, see the commemoration of the first anniversary of Arkan’s death, as reported in *Glas javnosti* (January 13, 2001), at [arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu).