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“One Finger’s Worth of Historical
Events”

New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the
Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959

by
David Wolff

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**“One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events”:
New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959**

When I. V. Stalin and Mao Zedong capped their Moscow summit in the winter of 1949-50 by concluding a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the agreement triggered deep apprehension in the West, but also aroused intense speculation over how long the accord between the two communist giants would last. Although contradictions of state interests, ideological visions, and leadership personalities would sour the alliance in less than a decade, the suddenness with which the turn came, especially in 1958-1959, still lacks full explanation. Ten months after Mao and Khrushchev chatted familiarly about missiles and rocket scientists, bombs and bases, Dulles’ “idiocy” and Eisenhower’s “decency,” the Soviets would cancel aid to China’s nuclear program. In the course of a year, simmering tensions, ranging from Khrushchev’s anxieties regarding Chinese belligerence on both Eastern and Western borders to Mao’s anger over what he saw as the Kremlin’s unwarranted intimacy with their American enemy and his own domestic opposition, escalated explosively to create a second Cold War chasm, the Sino-Soviet split.¹

Interestingly, the sudden turn immediately grew roots in leadership memories of earlier grievances. Though Chinese leaders placed much weight on Khrushchev’s “naiveté,” their complaints dated back to earlier eras, when the image of Stalin dominated the political landscape. This had deep personal meaning for both Mao and Khrushchev for as the latter noted: “We speak of Stalin’s achievements and we are also among these achievements.” Mao simply concurred: “Correct.” Thus, an evaluation of Stalin, his ways and deeds, was integral to the

¹ The author would like to express his gratitude to Jim Hershberg, Chen Jian, Christian Ostermann, and Vladislav Zubok, as well as the Cold War International History Project and National Security Archive, for their help in preparing this working paper. All materials cited as *CWIHP Bulletin* are available at cwihp.si.edu.

competing visions of historical process deployed by the Marxist-Leninist hegemons in an ideological rationality peculiar to the “Weltanschauung” of the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai, the Communist leadership compounds.²

New documents from Chinese and Russian archives now make it possible, not only to see these tensions in previously unavailable detail, but to note that even Communist unity’s brightest moments concealed suspicious maneuvering and mutual discontent, later available for negative interpretations as the relationship deteriorated. Whether Mao’s visit to Stalin in the winter of 1949-50, the Chinese deference to Soviet zigzags in Yugoslav policy, the mutual victory over Japan or the shared stalemate in Korea, all had negative dimensions that would come to the fore as the Sino-Soviet alliance eroded. And any conversation to review differences of opinion regarding Taiwan or Tibet, then as now two of China’s touchiest issues, was bound to be contentious. The essay below introduces English translations of 25 Chinese and Russian documents, further illuminating the dynamics and evolution of the Sino-Soviet relationship, a central issue in the history of the Cold War.³

Thorns for the Rosy Years: Stalin and Mao

Mao later said he did not care much for Stalin’s 70th birthday party on 21 December 1949, but he leaped at the chance to attend it as a pretext for a long-sought visit to Moscow.⁴

² Additional thoughts on the role of teleological historical narration in East-bloc diplomacy can be found in David Wolff, “L’ouverture de la boîte de Pandore: les versions asiatiques de la guerre froide,” *Perspectives chinoises* 57 (jan.-fev. 2000), pp. 19-29.

³ The Russian documents presented here come from three archives, the Presidential (or “Kremlin”) Archive [*Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*], the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (*Tsentral’noe Khraneniie Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii*), the former document center of the CC CPSU, and the Russian Foreign Ministry archive (*Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*). The Chinese materials are drawn from three published collections prepared by institutes close to the CC PRC for internal consumption (*neibu*).

⁴ His absence would also have provoked much speculation, since most of world Communism’s top leaders, including Chervenkov (Bulgaria), Gheorghiu-Dej (Romania), Ibarurri (Spain), Rakosi (Hungary), Togliatti (Italy), Tsendenbal (Mongolia), and Ulbricht (East Germany) attended. Mao himself celebrated a birthday, his 56th, while in

Ever since the Soviet ambassador had arrived in Beijing on 16 October 1949 (Document 2), two weeks after the PRC's establishment, the Chairman's meetings with him had been punctuated with compliments and toasts to the great tyrant whose support seemed crucial for Mao, his party, and his revolution—despite the fact that Mao was furious that Stalin had sent the same envoy, N. V. Roshchin, who had lingered with the Guomindang (GMD) during its 1949 flight from Nanjing to Guangdong [Canton], before returning to Moscow for reassignment to the new government in Beijing.⁵ By the time of their first meeting (notwithstanding Mao's pointed reference to having last seen Roshchin in the Nationalist wartime capital, Chongqing), Mao needed recognition, cash, and “friendship” from Stalin and knew that the road to them led through Moscow. Roshchin, Stalin's man in China and later Korea, ignored Mao's needling, at least in the version he presented for his boss's reading pleasure, by congratulating Mao on the People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) occupation of Guangdong, an additional reminder of his previous posting.

This victorious sense of “people's power” expanding towards the borderlands of China also pervaded the discussions between Roshchin and PLA Commander-in-Chief Zhu De (Document 4) in which the latter described military progress in Sichuan and logistical problems in the Southeast, since the GMD had taken all fuel, depriving the advancing army of “trophy gasoline.”⁶ Possibilities for Sino-Soviet cooperation in Xinjiang [Sinkiang] were also broached. One can imagine Stalin reading this, while his imaginary “correlation of forces” map reddened.

Moscow, but it appears that no special ceremonies marked this occasion.

⁵ Zhou Enlai had queried A. I. Mikoian on this during the latter's visit to CCP headquarters at Xibaipo in January-February 1949. Mikoian reported to Stalin that he had replied that this was “appropriate (*zakonomerno*), since for the moment China has only one government...” A. Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia missiia A. I. Mikoian v Kitai,” *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* 3 (1995), p. 96, citing APRF, f.39, op.1, d.39, l.20. Mikoian's report describes his own trip as a substitute for the “multiple delays” in Mao's visit that should have followed from the Soviet invitation to Moscow in June 1947. Difficulties in transport, Mao's health, the military situation, and “other reasons” are blamed. See Ledovskii, *op.cit.*, 2 (1995), p.101.

⁶ In the southeast provinces an invasion of Taiwan was slowed by the Guomindang practice of removing all boats,

Despite these triumphs for Communism, with only six weeks remaining until the birthday party, Mao had still not been invited. Preparation time was running out, so on 10 November 1949 Mao empowered Zhou Enlai to visit Roshchin and press his case (Document 5). Zhou recounted the long history of Mao's desire and Roshchin asked about the nature of the proposed trip.⁷ A month later, on 9 December at 4 p.m. Beijing time, Mao crossed the USSR border at Manchuria Station for the seven-day trip to Moscow (Document 7). The only encounter between two of the 20th century's giants was only a week and 4000 trans-Siberian rail miles away.

In recent years an ever-larger body of material has illuminated this summit. Russian memoranda of the two principal conversations between the titans were published, as were many of the frequent coded telegrams Mao sent back from Moscow to Beijing reporting on his progress.⁸ At the 21 December 1949 birthday celebration held in the Bolshoi Theater, Mao stood beside Stalin and gave the first speech, both his special place and shared subordination reaffirmed by the same action. Again, Mao's privileged position allowed for the re-negotiation of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, but only following the basic premises imposed by Stalin on Jiang

both public and private, from the coast to Taiwan.

⁷ Mao's blunt, explicit statement indicating a desire to replace the Sino-Soviet treaty Stalin had signed with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] and the GMD in 1945 as the substantive goal of his trip set the stage for Stalin's rejection of that idea in their first meeting on 16 December 1949. Mao's intentions and Stalin's dilatory tactics are also in plain view in the 4 July 1949 report presented by Liu Shaoqi to Stalin and the Russian leader's marginalia: "Decide this question when Mao Zedong comes to Moscow at the end of 1949 after the est. of diplomatic relations." See A. Ledovskii, "Vizit v Moskvu delegatsii Kommunisticheskoi partii Kitaia v 1949 g.," *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* 4 (1996), pp. 81-82. By 1 January 1950, Stalin had reconsidered and Mao summoned Zhou Enlai to negotiate and sign the new treaty.

⁸ See *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 5-9, and 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 226-236. A wider range of related Chinese materials in translation from 16 document collections can be found in Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds. *Chinese Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996). A mixture of the most crucial documents in all the above can be found in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington, DC/Stanford, CA: Cold War International History Project Book Series, Woodrow Wilson Press/Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 298-328. The most important memoir account is by Mao's translator Shi Zhe in *Zai lishi juren shenbian* [*With History's Giants*] (Beijing, 1991). The best exposition and analysis of Mao's visit, including extensive coverage of the treaty negotiations, is in Dieter Heinzig, *Die Sowjetunion und das Kommunistische China, 1945-1950: Der beschwerliche Weg zum Bündnis* (Baden Baden, 1998), pp. 429-626. An insightful treatment making especially effective use of hard-to-find Chinese collections is Yang Kuisong, *Zouxiang polie: Mao Zedong yu Moseke de enenyuanyuan* [*Towards the Split: Mao and Moscow, Gratuities and Grievances*] (Hong Kong, 1999), pp. 272-298.

Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]—an anti-Japanese orientation, the independence of Mongolia, and exclusive, extensive Soviet influence in the northern borderlands, Xinjiang and Manchuria. Documents 2-7 provide more information on the period leading up to the meeting as the two Cold War titans sparred long-distance for the psychological upper hand. Document 17, an excerpt from a 31 July 1958 conversation in Beijing between Mao and Khrushchev, offers the Chinese leader's jaundiced memories of his visit,⁹ including his comment that he had learned from Soviet leaders during his return trip to Moscow in fall 1957 that Stalin had spied on his conversations. ("Yes, I said that," Khrushchev confirmed. "He had us tapped, too. He even bugged himself.")

The tensions of the trip aside, an important point for the Chinese was the fear that the Soviets would consider them "Titoists," a broad category that, among others, could include nationalist, independent-minded, war-hardened leaders capable of acting independently of Moscow's direction.¹⁰ Later, in the wake of Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress of February 1956, Mao elaborated to the Soviet ambassador on Stalin's errors and distrust:

This lack of belief remained in Stalin even during the first stages of the formation of the PRC, i.e., already after the victory of the revolution. It is possible that Stalin's lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused by the Yugoslav events, particularly since at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain disappointment, many conversations took place to the effect that the Chinese Communist Party was going along the Yugoslav path, that Mao Zedong is a "Chinese Tito."¹¹

In this atmosphere, when the Yugoslavs sent offers of recognition immediately following the PRC's founding in 1949, the Chinese simply did not answer until mid-1955 when Khrushchev

⁹ For a careful presentation of the differences between the evidence on how Mao experienced Moscow and later materials representing Mao's distorted memories, see Yang, *Zouxiang polie*, pp. 282-286.

¹⁰ That Stalin himself consciously compared the cases is suggested by his acknowledgement to the Yugoslavs of his errors in China policy at a meeting in Moscow on 10 February 1948, the very eve of his split with Tito. For the Yugoslav and Bulgarian records, see *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 130, 131, 133 fn. 20.

¹¹ "Record of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to Beijing Pavel Iudin and Mao Zedong, March 31, 1956," in

flew to Belgrade to heal the wounds of old allies. As one would expect, the Soviets were told in Mao's first meeting with Roshchin about the Titoist plot to sow distrust between Russia and China (Document 2). Conversely, in his first session (in June 1955) with freshly-accredited Yugoslav ambassador V. Popovic (Document 12), Mao pointed out that recognition had been impossible earlier because of the Soviet Union and went on to praise Tito's letter to him as "comradely correspondence (Document 12)." Later, as the thaw persisted, Mao used the alleged Soviet belief that "there were two Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the other in China" to build rapport with a Yugoslav Communist Party delegation.¹²

Mao was also quick to catch on to the logic that suggests that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. At the 20 October 1949 send-off dinner for the departing first Communist Chinese ambassador to the USSR, Wang Jiexiang, Mao solicited Soviet help in establishing relations with Albania, noting in a jocular vein that the Chinese did not even know the Albanian foreign minister's name (Document 3). One suspects that Mao recognized immediately that if he must prove his unswerving loyalty to Stalin by spitting on Yugoslavia, at least Albanian-Chinese friendship would be the closer for it.¹³ Zhou also exhibited a similar line of pragmatic thought in 1951, when he explained Chinese non-recognition of Israel in terms of potential Arab displeasure (Document 9).

Four documents in this selection speak to the ever-important, yet poorly-understood Sino-Japanese relationship, especially its reflection in Russian archives. In June 1948, Roshchin's conversation with Jiang Jieshi regarding policy towards occupied Japan represents a probing of the extent to which Sino-Soviet mutual dissatisfaction with the United States' unilateral decision

Westad, ed., *Brothers In Arms*, pp. 338-339, and *CWIHP Bulletin 6-7* (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 164-167.

¹² Westad, ed., *Brothers In Arms*, p. 204. For a September 1956 meeting with a Yugoslav delegation in which Mao discusses Stalin's suspicions that Mao himself was a "half-Tito" [*bange Tietuo*], see Yang, *Zouxiang polie*, p. 185, and *CWIHP Bulletin 6-7* (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 148-152.

to reduce reparations and “rearm” Japan could result in coordinated demarches towards a peace treaty.¹⁴ Possibly most interesting is Jiang’s answer to Roshchin’s question on “what kind of Japan the Chinese people would like to see.” Jiang replied: “We do not want vengeance, but in Japan it is necessary to liquidate the foundation on which her military industry and her military potential could be revived” (Document 1).

In September 1951, when Zhou Enlai addressed the CCP CC, literally on the eve of the San Francisco Treaty Conference (to which Beijing had not been invited), he repeatedly attacked “American imperialism’s frenzied nature [*fengkuangxing*] and opportunism” (Document 11). Future judgment of the Japanese victims of the “colonizing” treaty was held in reserve. Between 1955 and 1958, this suspension in judgement made possible a tentative rapprochement between the Mainland and Japan, with growing trade in contradiction to the US-led Western economic embargo of the PRC and taking place under the auspices of a semi-official Sino-Japanese Import-Export Union [*nichu yushutsunyu kumiai*].¹⁵

In early 1958, when the Chinese Communists and the Soviets discussed Japan, China raised the specter of the “hidden imperialism” of “Japanese monopolistic capital,” but without any reference to an American role. The Japanese had been ruled competent for trial and immediately judged responsible for their own “rightist actions.” Beijing took action. The Chinese informed Moscow that they had decided to change tactics toward Tokyo in order to influence the upcoming Japanese Diet elections. By bruising enough interests and sensibilities,

¹³ Albania would remain Beijing’s only European friend throughout the Sino-Soviet split.

¹⁴ Shared GMD/Soviet dissatisfaction was occasioned by the US “reverse course” in Japan, which halted the dismantling of the core conglomerates of the Japanese pre-war economy and the political sidelining of war criminals.

¹⁵ On Sino-Japanese ties, see Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 106-110; Yoshihide Soeya, *Nihongaiko to Chugoku, 1945-1972* [Japanese Foreign Policy and China, 1945-1972] (Tokyo, 1995), pp. 74-76; Yoshihide Soeya *Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978* (Oxford, 1998), Chap.2. For more on the embargo and its loopholes, see Shu Guang Zhang, “*Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance*” (Cold War International

the Chinese hoped to prevent the ruling Liberal Democrats from obtaining a two-thirds majority, the percentage needed to change the Japanese constitution, in particular the famous renunciation of war contained in Article 9. Towards this end the Chinese vented spleen at the Kishi government, which they labeled “the most reactionary Japanese cabinet since the capitulation of 1945,” without even mentioning the Americans (Document 16). In a meeting with ambassadors from socialist countries on 5 June 1958, PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi went so far as to state that “our forces are sufficient to repeat 1945.”¹⁶ The Soviets, though generally content with the Chinese tactics, were disconcerted by the lack of prior consultation. As the myriad ties between Japan and China were rewoven after the war, the Americans and the Russians became a bit less central to the Sino-Japanese relationship. The Chinese had come a long way since Mao’s January 1950 acquiescence (admittedly while Stalin’s “guest” in Moscow) in the Soviet condemnation of Nosaka Sanzo, a Japanese Communist Party leader who had shared hard times with the CCP leadership in their wartime capital of Yanan.¹⁷

Five documents from 1950-1951 also give us a more nuanced understanding of the Korean War from the Chinese perspective, a killing-ground where under-armed Chinese forces bled in large numbers. It is not that Mao hesitated to sacrifice men, but certainly he at least considered the possibility that those lives would have been better spent “liberating” Taiwan and Tibet, as originally planned. Given Mao’s summer plans to capture Taiwan from the 400,000

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¹⁶ TsKhSD, f.2, op.1, d.495, l.24 (Suslov Report to CC CPSU Plenum). At the plenum, Suslov would characterize this approach as diplomatic over-stretch. He believed that the Chinese had exaggerated their ability to influence Japanese internal politics.

¹⁷ In all fairness one should add that Nosaka took asylum in the PRC a few months later. This suggests that Mao’s criticism was strictly for Soviet consumption. For more on the Nosaka affair, see John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922-1972* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 160-162 and Wada Haruki, “The Korean War, Stalin’s Policy, and Japan,” *Social Science Japan Journal* 1:1 (April 1998) as well as his paper, “Stalin and the Japanese Communist Party, 1945-1953,” presented at the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia, Hong Kong, 1996. An English translation of Mao’s directive from Moscow to Beijing to publish a criticism of Nosaka can be found in Zhang and Chen, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, p. 137, and *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 232.

GMD troops dug in there, and to invade Tibet even earlier, thereby completing the unification of China, 1950 was going to be a bloody year in any case (Document 6).¹⁸ Kim Il Sung's impatience, coupled with Stalin's wiles, moved the first field of battle a thousand miles north. Only in July did the Chinese transfer the focus of their military preparations from the Southeast to the Northeast. The Chinese would have to fight and die for Korea before they could do so to achieve final victory in their own civil war. Document 8 shows an optimistic faith in military means as late as April 1951, although the Tibet invasion planned in Document 6 had by this time become negotiations with the Tibetan leadership. Eighteen months after its establishment, the PRC's was not yet ready for two-front war. When the spring offensive bogged down in May, the fate of the Korean War was revealed as a bloody stalemate, and the communist sides soon agreed to negotiations with the United States.

Documents 9-11 provide glimpses of Communist perceptions of the Panmunjom cease-fire negotiations that dragged on until 1953. The Chinese appear clearly ready to reach an agreement and hope that the 1952 elections will force the US hand, but are afraid to show any eagerness, either to the Americans or the Russians. None of this is surprising in light of recent revelations of the tense Sino-Soviet exchanges and negotiations in 1952 regarding the deployment of Chinese "volunteers" to Korea.¹⁹ If unity on making war was difficult, agreement on a cease-fire proved no less elusive. The complex linkages between the cease fire negotiations and the simultaneous San Francisco Peace Conference preparations are also visible, though far from clear. Zhou Enlai's speech covers both topics.²⁰

¹⁸ On the aborted Taiwan campaign, see He Di, "'The Last Campaign to Unify China': The CCP's Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949-1950," *Chinese Historians* 5:1 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-16. The author thanks Chen Jian for pointing out this article.

¹⁹ See the article by Alexandre Mansourov and accompanying documents in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 94-119.

²⁰ For more on this, see David Wolff, "'People might not believe that it is our work': Stalin's Meetings with the Japanese Communist Party, Spring 1951," presented at the CWIHP conference on Stalin and the Cold War, Yale

Sino-Soviet Summits, 1958-1959

This document selection also vividly illuminates the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship in 1958-59, often considered key years in Mao's maturing conviction that the USSR was not to be trusted.²¹ In the spring of 1958, aside from the divergent approaches toward Japan discussed above, Sino-Soviet relations seemed outwardly to be in good shape. Soviet initiatives in recent months had been welcomed warmly. On 9 March 1958, Zhu De, for example, visited Ambassador Iudin at home on a Sunday in order to express deep and fawning interest in Khrushchev's supposed brainchild, "the ruble zone," seen as a "counterbalance to the dollar and sterling zones (Document 13)." The ambassador had not been briefed and had to content himself with generalities. Zhu De concluded in an uncritical vein that "the ideas of N. S. Khrushchev are good in all respects." A month later, on 5 April, Iudin and Mao indulged in a genial session of Tito-bashing, during which "Mao noted that Tito had proved himself an unreliable partner more than once." Zhou Enlai, in his turn, said that "Tito is simply being a hooligan (Document 14)."

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Less than four months later, however, on the 22 July, Iudin was on the receiving end of a furious outburst by Mao, triggered by Khrushchev's purported proposal for a "joint fleet" and other forms of military cooperation. Once aroused, however, the Chairman let loose a long list

University, 24-26 September 1999.

²¹ Mao's private doctor asserts that "It was in early 1958 that I first sensed a change in Mao, a new and often irrational suspicion that grew stronger over the years..." Zhisui Li, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (New York, 1994), p.232.

²² Mao was already nursing his grievances against the USSR in front of select audiences, an exercise that required a reformulation of his perspectives on Stalin. In March 1958 he explained that "Buddhas are made several times life-size in order to frighten people....Stalin was that kind of person. The Chinese people had got so used to being slaves that they seemed to want to go on. When Chinese artists painted pictures of me together with Stalin, they always made me a little shorter, thus blindly knuckling under to the moral pressure exerted by the Soviet Union." The following month he stated: "This Comrade Stalin of ours had something of the flavour of the mandarins of old... In

of grievances allegedly incurred by current and previous Kremlin leaders, and, in his anger, the Tito issue returned as a powerful complaint not against Yugoslavia, but against the Soviet leadership.²³

Much has been made of the suspicions raised by the 1958 Soviet proposal for a joint fleet and/or long-wave radio station. Meeting with Khrushchev (who had rushed to Beijing on hearing Iudin's report of his conversation with Mao) on 31 July 1958 in Zhongnanhai's Huairan Hall, the Chinese leader predicted longevity for the alliance, judged the ratio of cooperation to differences as 9:1 (with only one "finger" of contention out of ten), and then demanded (and received) Khrushchev's repeated and total disavowal of the "joint fleet" concept (Document 17). The Soviet leader deflected blame onto Ambassador Iudin (absent pleading illness), claiming the whole contretemps had been a misunderstanding. Mao again replayed his historic slights at Stalin's hands, claiming that "of Stalin's ten fingers, three were rotten [*gnilykh*]." Khrushchev replied, "I think more," seeking common ground in denigrating Stalin, while simultaneously justifying his own actions at the 20th CPSU Congress. The Soviet leader also sought comity with Mao through a round of Tito-bashing, but Mao declined the offer. Finally, a tenuous unity was found in the traditional way by invoking the common enemy: US imperialism, and its "bases, like nails pounded in around us." Mao, apparently assuaged for the moment, flattered Khrushchev's prowess in rocketry, and the meeting ended on an upbeat note.²⁴

the past, the relations between us and the Soviet Union were those between father and son, cat and mouse." Stuart Schram, "Mao's Thought" *Cambridge History of China* 15,2 (1991), p.63.

²³ Among other harsh words, Mao stated: "You [Russians] have never had faith in the Chinese people, and Stalin was among the worst. The Chinese [Communists] were regarded as Tito the Second; [the Chinese people] were considered a backward nation. You [Russians] have often stated that the Europeans looked down on the Russians. I believe that some Russians look down upon the Chinese people. These remarks of mine may not sound so pleasing to your ear. You may accuse me of being a nationalist or another Tito. My counter-argument is that you have extended Russian nationalism to China's coast." Mao Zedong and Pavel Iudin, 22 July 1958 in Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms*, pp. 348, 352, and *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 155-159.

²⁴ One of Mao's Russian interpreters, Li Yueran, has described the Mao-Khrushchev altercation in July 1958 as follows:

After the meeting began with a round of conventional greetings, Mao asked Khrushchev, "you say you want to

A few days later, on August 3, a short, rather aimless discussion directly preceded the signing of a joint communique (Document 18).²⁵ According to Khrushchev, and without objection from Mao, John Foster Dulles was a “fool,” Stalin “senile,” and Eisenhower “not without decency.” Mao wanted to know more about atomic testing and missile targeting and Khrushchev obliged in rather general terms, while noting that Soviet generals had recently concluded that “there was no basis to consider the danger of war to be near [at hand].” Nonetheless, Khrushchev’s disclaimer of “obligations” with reference to his unilateral moratorium on atomic testing allowed Mao to keep alive the hope that peaceful coexistence was more provisional tactic than longterm strategy. Mao exhibited considerably more paranoia, telling Khrushchev that he should not take the risks of “foreign travel,” showing concern for the Russian leader’s well-being, while implying his insufficient attention to security issues.²⁶ Even

build a ‘joint navy’ with me [us]? What does that mean?” Khrushchev thereupon began to explain. Of course, he had a bunch of arguments. Halfway through Mao stood up and pointing at his [Khrushchev’s] nose, said: “You’ve been talking a lot, but you still haven’t cut to the quick [*qieti*], so I’m asking you : What on earth are you calling a ‘joint fleet’? Do you want to control us? You would have taken our coastal areas.”

The actual transcript cannot tell us if indeed Mao pointed at Khrushchev’s nose, but it does show Khrushchev, insisting that it was all a mere misunderstanding, very eager to disavow the joint fleet concept. Mao, in turn, insists on his grievance, but in language more moderate than in Li Yueran’s memory. Li’s version seems more similar to the Iudin-Mao meeting of 22 July 1958 (see below). It is also interesting to note that Yan Mingfu, another of Mao’s Russian translators, told Salisbury of Deng’s verbal attacks on Khrushchev at the 31 July 1958 meeting, but the transcript reveals minimal and mild participation from Deng, at least as translated into Russian. On this, see Harrison Salisbury, *The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng* (New York, 1992), p.156. On the perils and payback of critical oral history, see James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Soviets and Americans Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, 1989).

On the other hand, Boris Kulik, former head of the Chinese Section of the CPSU CC International Department, insists that the proposal was just some idea thrown out by the generals for discussion. The implication is that most of the drama came from Mao’s persecution complex rather than Soviet evil intentions. See Li’s and Kulik’s comments from Chinese-language transcript of oral history session at “The Cold War and Sino-Soviet Relations” (Beijing, 24 October 1997), pp. 3 (Li), 6-7 (Kulik).

²⁵ The Soviet record identifies this as the fourth conversation of the summit, and the July 31st conversation as the first; unfortunately, records of the second and third conversation have evidently not yet become available.

²⁶ Perhaps this warning popped up in Khrushchev’s memory at his first private meeting with Eisenhower on 15 September 1959. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s close aide since 1954, has recently remembered that Eisenhower then invited his guest to include in his schedule a helicopter flight around the city. Just see what Washington was like and what Americans’ daily life looked like from the air. Khrushchev immediately said, ‘No, no, no, that would not be possible.’

Eisenhower said that this was his decision, but that he was very disappointed. He had wanted to point out a number of things around the city. Khrushchev asked, ‘Oh, would you be going with me?’ Eisenhower said, ‘Of course.’

here Khrushchev found grounds for agreement, adding that, “Yes, there is a certain risk, especially if a meeting is in New York, where there are many angry [*ozloblennye*] Hungarians and other enemies. Conditions are better in Geneva.” And finally, Khrushchev tried to leave the door open to future military cooperation by stating: “Our own territory is not enough for this [rocket testing],” but Mao again reacted frigidly, suggesting: “Can’t you fire over the North Pole?”

The penultimate document group examines Tibet (Documents 8,19-21), an issue which, its intrinsic interest aside, proved to be the first wedge in what would become a bitter Sino-Soviet disagreement over relations with India.²⁷ A March 1959 CPSU CC International Department report on Tibet (Document 21), based on Chinese sources and signed by Iurii Andropov, briefly reviews Chinese-Tibetan relations and the current situation, only a week after Chinese military forces crushed an uprising in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama, who had been whisked across the Indian border by CIA-trained agents, had not yet surfaced and the Chinese were bracing themselves to deal with another government-in-exile. Andropov’s critique of PRC policy would prepare Khrushchev to accuse the Chinese leadership of “letting the Dalai Lama get away” [*ba dalai lama fangpaole*].²⁸ Beijing’s anger toward India’s involvement in Tibetan affairs mounted visibly, leading towards the clashes of autumn 1959. China’s demand for Soviet support against India would also soon become a source of tension with the USSR. On the Chinese side, Mao’s working notes reaffirm the Chinese knowledge of both Indian and American involvement in the Tibetan events, but also clarify Mao’s Machiavellian encouragement of the

‘In that case, I will be happy to go,’ Khrushchev responded. There was just a sliver of suspicion there that came through.

Cited with permission from James Spurlock’s interview of General Goodpaster (transcript in possession of James Spurlock (GWU)). Khrushchev did eventually take the helicopter with Eisenhower up to Gettysburg.

²⁷ Interestingly, Document 8’s discussion of the 1951 negotiations with Tibetan leaders shows that the PRC’s original concerns had been of Nepalese intervention preventing the smooth “liberation” of Tibet by the PLA.

²⁸ Transcript of oral history session, conference on “The Cold War and Sino-Soviet Relations” (Beijing, 24 October

uprising in February in order to be able to intervene with troops in March (Documents 19-20).²⁹

In October 1959, Khrushchev returned to Beijing for the tenth anniversary celebrations of the PRC's establishment. He arrived in the Chinese capital just days after sharing the "spirit of Camp David" with Eisenhower, and the 2 October 1959 transcript shows how far Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated since the 1958 visit. The collapse of the Great Leap and Mao's other domestic challenges had left the Chinese tyrant more prickly and paranoid than ever. Despite Mao's later accusation that Khrushchev "doesn't research [China] and believes a whole bunch of incorrect information," the Soviets fully grasped the PRC's dire straits (Document 22). Meanwhile, Khrushchev's big head over Camp David and his fear that Chinese aggression, in the east and in the west, could embroil the USSR in unnecessary conflict, further contributed to the mutual intransigence.³⁰ Unlike the discussions over the joint fleet and radio station a year earlier, Mao would no longer find Khrushchev pliant and apologetic.³¹ Instead, discussions of Taiwan, American prisoners, and Tibet only reinforced disagreement.

Highlights from the last section, excerpted here (Document 23), include Khrushchev's apportioning of full blame to the Chinese for battling India, a recipient of Soviet aid at the time, and Mao's return accusation of "adaptation." Khrushchev further blamed the PRC for the

1997), p. 7.

²⁹ For an important recent study of the Tibetan resistance to Chinese communist rule after 1949, and US ties to it, see John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999).

³⁰ Eisenhower's strategy had specifically aimed at massaging Khrushchev's ego in order to get a favorable outcome on the Berlin ultimatum. This inflated state of mind may have made compromise in Beijing difficult. For example, on 15 September 1959 in their first one-on-one, Eisenhower "said he believed that Mr. Khrushchev had an opportunity to become the greatest political figure in history because he has tremendous power in a complex of states with great might. For this reason, the President said, he believed that Mr. Khrushchev could be the man to do a great deal to secure peace in the world." U.S. Department of State (ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1958-1960, vol. 10, pt. 1, p. 409.

³¹ Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita's son, was 24 in 1959 and accompanied his father to the US. He has recently written: "I allow myself to express the supposition – based on my personal impressions – that the warm reception given Father in the United States, his great success there, and the prospect for improved world relations had inclined Father toward euphoria. It seemed to Father that talks with Mao Zedong in Beijing would enable him to resolve any disagreements. He was bitterly disappointed." (Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a*

Tibetan imbroglio, wishing that the Dalai Lama were “in the grave” [*v grobu*]. Unimpressed by their explanation of events, Khrushchev prodded the Chinese to shoulder responsibility for the border war with India, contrary to Beijing’s official pronouncements. Angrily rejecting Khrushchev’s charges, Mao and his foreign minister, Chen Yi, in turn, accused Khrushchev of “adaptation” [*prisposoblenchestvo*], a charge he vehemently rejected. Chen Yi, the Soviet retorted, was himself guilty of such extreme leftism that “if you go left [from here], you may come out on the right. The oak is strong, but it too can *break*.” Khrushchev was reaching the limits of his tolerance. Lin Biao then offered an analogy from the Soviet destruction of the German army and Suslov rejected the suggestion that a “trivial incident” could be compared with the “killings of tens of millions.” Nor was Khrushchev ready to accept Mao’s parallel between the escape of the Dalai Lama and the much earlier departures of Aleksandr Kerenskii and Leon Trotskii from the USSR.³² Although by the end of the meeting a civil tone had been re-established, it was clear that neither common language nor common cause could be maintained much longer. This would be the last meeting ever between the now firmly estranged Communist titans.³³

A week after returning to Moscow, ideologist-in-chief, M. A. Suslov, who along with foreign minister, A. A. Gromyko, had accompanied Khrushchev to Beijing, began to compile a report on the trip to be presented at the 22-26 December 1959 CC CPSU Plenum ([Document 24](#)).

Superpower (University Park, PA, 2000), p.346.

³² Less than a week earlier, it was Khrushchev who had suggested to Eisenhower that US support of Jiang Jieshi was comparable to supporting a come-back by the aging Kerenskii. *FRUS, 1958-1960*, vol. 10, pt. 1, p. 480.

³³ The October 2 conversation was considered so damaging to Sino-Soviet relations that it has been rumored that both sides agreed to destroy their copies of the transcript. Now, thanks to the late General Volkogonov’s belief in the principles of *glasnost*, the Soviet copy has surfaced. Possibly, both Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s memoirs are so thin, even misleading, on the 1959 meeting, because they wished to maintain the spirit of the agreement with the Chinese by not revealing too much. We can only hope that Beijing also violated its alleged commitment to shred the memcon and that the Chinese version will be available soon.

³⁴ After circulation to and minor editing by Presidium³⁵ members and candidates, this analysis would become the most explicit statement yet to the top managers of Soviet government and society that all was not well in Sino-Soviet relations. It described the 2 October talks as “not completely pleasant at times” and criticized Chinese policies along a broad spectrum, both ideological and geopolitical. Although Suslov invoked Mao’s “one finger” analogy from the 1958 summit to claim that the relationship could and would be salvaged, despite “serious disagreements,” his references to Mao’s neo-Stalinist cult of personality must have left the audience wondering if the relationship could be repaired under the PRC’s current leadership. Certainly, this powerful personal critique of Mao could not have been distributed without Khrushchev’s concurrence.³⁶ Whatever doubts the Soviet leader had previously entertained regarding his Chinese counterpart, they now were fast hardening into conviction.³⁷

In December 1959 Mao also disseminated his conclusions from the October meeting in an internal CCP speech (Document 25).³⁸ The talk outline reveals that Mao had now made up his mind about Khrushchev and was ready to spread the word among his cadres. Something is “not good about the style of the [Soviet] party and people. Lenin died early and didn’t have time to reform it.” Sino-Soviet relations since 1945 are viewed as a prologue to the split. Almost

³⁴ For a discussion of the role of plenum materials in Soviet and Cold War history as well as a sampling of transcripts in translation, see *CWIHP Bulletin 10* (March 1998), pp. 5-60. For an insightful analysis of Suslov’s speech, see Mark Kramer, “Declassified Materials from CPSU Central Committee Plenums: Sources, Context, Highlights,” *op.cit.*, pp. 13-16. For additional quotations from the report, see *CWIHP Bulletin 8-9* (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 244, 248, 259-262.

³⁵ Politburo before 1952 and after 1962

³⁶ On 10 December 1959, the new Soviet ambassador to the PRC, Stepan Chervonenko, informed Liu Shaoqi that “attempts to sabotage Soviet foreign policy would affect all sides of the bilateral relationship” (*Brothers in Arms*, pp.177-8). Suslov also had unfailing guidance, although in more cryptic language, from Khrushchev’s speeches on 31 October and 1 December, published in *Pravda* on 1 November and 2 December, respectively. The fact that Suslov delivered the plenum report, together with his arrival in Beijing in advance of Khrushchev, may have been calculated to disabuse speculation that Suslov headed a “China lobby” in the Kremlin. See Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61* (Princeton, 1962), p. 278.

³⁷ For a perceptive discussion of the Mao-Khrushchev dynamic, see William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split,” *CWIHP Bulletin 8-9* (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 243-8.

every year contributes a landmark grudge against Stalin, Khrushchev, and the Soviet leadership. Mao repeats the finger analogy, claiming that sources of disunity are but one in ten, just “one finger’s worth of historical events.”

Nonetheless, the prospects appear grim. “Khrushchev and his group are very naïve. He does not understand Marxism-Leninism and is easily fooled by imperialism. If he doesn’t correct [his mistakes], in a few years he’ll be completely bankrupt (after 8 years). He panics over China. The panic has reached its extreme.” Mao integrates this into a world view that includes both Europe and Asia, both the capitalist enemy and the Third World. Mao was now conceptually ready to begin the all-fronts confrontation with the USSR, a cold war within the Cold War, that would culminate a decade later in the strategic turn towards the Americans and the bloody March 1969 clashes along the Sino-Soviet border.³⁹ In the meantime, it would be an over-arching force field, snaring and distorting all relations within the socialist camp.

Conclusions

Although none of these documents changes the basic outline of the Sino-Soviet relationship between 1948 and 1959, they remind us of the many levels at which the communist neighbors interacted. The Japanese and Tibetan/Indian topics hint at China’s increasingly independent regional role.⁴⁰ The Yugoslav issue suggests the complexities of intra-bloc politics and reminds us of the key role of nationalism in the twentieth century, important contexts for both the Soviets and Chinese. The Mao-Stalin and Mao-Khrushchev summit materials help

³⁸ Shu Guang Zhang has written that these notes were intended for a CCP Politburo meeting. See Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms*, p. 225, fn. 91.

³⁹ For more on the events of 1968-9, see *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 186-193, 194-201, and 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 155-175.

recreate the psychological duel between the great dictators and the ideological rift over the crucial question: to whose advantage would long-term peaceful coexistence work? Conflicting views on Korean affairs and unspoken resentment that Stalin had deprived the PRC of the historic opportunity to “liberate” Taiwan would persist until Stalin’s death and after.

Khrushchev’s rise, however, failed to produce a more felicitous pairing. Instead, the darker view of a decade of shared difficulties and mutual accomplishments became increasingly available for the scuttling of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The memoranda of conversation from the Mao-Khrushchev summits of 1958-9 reaffirms the importance assigned to this period by scholars re-evaluating the relationship in the light of documentary releases since the late 1980s.⁴¹ The first aid administered to the alliance by a well-behaved, even apologetic, Khrushchev during his 1958 visit to Beijing would no longer be effective a year later. During the 14-month interim, the Soviet leadership would become convinced that Mao’s recklessness could wreck Khrushchev’s push for peaceful coexistence, his updating of Marxism-Leninism for a nuclear age. Border skirmishes in the Himalayas were a reminder that China could easily manufacture quandaries and embarrassments for USSR foreign policy. And the standoff in the Taiwan straits suggested that an even higher price might have to be paid for insufficient coordination between Beijing and Moscow.⁴²

⁴⁰ Additional materials on Sino-Soviet-Indian triangular relations in this period can be found in *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 251-269.

⁴¹ Salisbury states that after September 1958 “the course of Sino-Soviet relations would be all downhill.” In *Brothers in Arms*, Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong refer to 1959 as a “low point,” while Constantine Pleshakov makes 1959 the year in which it became “obvious to the Kremlin that the concrete difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations were not ad hoc nuisances but the manifestations of basic ideological disagreements between the two parties.” (pp. 238, 272) Although recently published Chinese secondary sources made clear the topics discussed and the damage done, the Russian memcon lives up to worst expectations.

⁴² It is important to keep in mind that Khrushchev only extended his nuclear guarantee to China after Zhou Enlai called for renewed talks with the Americans. As Suslov’s first draft, but not his second, would state a year later in affirming support for the Chinese position: “But we are unable to agree that a world war [should be] ignited because of Taiwan.” So far, no documentation is available on Gromyko’s visit to Beijing on 5 September 1958, but if his memoirs are any guide, transcripts will be very revealing both regarding PRC views on Taiwan and on nuclear warfare. Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs* (New York, 1990), pp. 251-2.

In the meantime, Mao contemplated the shortfalls of the Great Leap Forward and understood that acceptance of Soviet moderation, both as developmental and diplomatic model, could never generate the militant enthusiasms he needed to achieve his national and personal goals. For him, the second Taiwan Straits crisis clarified that the USSR with Khrushchev at the helm could not undo the evil that Stalin had made by (in effect) transferring the Taiwan campaign to Korea. The demarches of 4-7 September 1958 effectively ended the crisis, but also showed that the Sino-Soviet alliance could not stand up to the pressures of intimate coordination over matters of war and peace. In the spring and summer of 1959, the Chinese Chairman reflected on all this and retooled “Mao Zedong thought” for the Lushan meetings, where domestic and foreign challenges merged, at least in Mao’s vision.⁴³ Simultaneously, in preparation for the PRC’s tenth anniversary, he reshaped Tiananmen, the square at the symbolic heart of Beijing politics, into a monumental and almost unrecognizable stage on which the last act of Sino-Soviet friendship would be played. As for Tibet and the Indians, where Khrushchev may have considered his “neutral” TASS communique of 9 September 1959 a successful lid on Sino-Soviet disagreements, for Mao it became an invitation to open polemics in front of ever broader audiences.⁴⁴

⁴³ Although Document 25, Mao’s notes for an internal speech, clearly links the Peng Dehuai affair at Lushan to “the friends,” this remains a point of historical contention. David Charles concluded in favor with Peng’s visit to Eastern Europe and the USSR in April-June 1959 offering the opportunity for consultation and collusion, while Frederick Teiwes has more recently argued that “...Peng seems guilty of little more than indiscretion in his dealings with the Soviet leaders. Unfortunately for him, by the time of the Lushan meetings the Sino-Soviet question had become extremely sensitive, particularly in the eyes of Mao.” See David Charles, “The Dismissal of Marshal P’eng Teh-Huai” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed. *China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command* (MIT, 1966), pp. 20-33 and Frederick Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China* (2nd Edition), (Armonk, NY, 1993), p. 329. Both Mao’s sense of looking down on the world from a higher plain and his confounding of domestic and foreign issues come through nicely in this poem extract from July 1959, entitled, “Ascent of Lushan.”

Perching as after flight, the mountain towers over the Yangtze,
I have overleapt four hundred twists to its green crest.

Cold-eyed I survey the world beyond the seas;

Mao Tsetung Poems (Beijing, 1976), p. 38.

⁴⁴ During the 2 October 1959 conversation, Mao characterized the Communist leadership summit’s “confidential” exchange of thoughts as “useful,” but the “open” TASS announcement as “not good.” (p. 27)

Although a careful examination of these new documents is necessary before evaluating their import for the ongoing argument regarding the relative roles of ideology, national interests, and leadership personalities in the making of foreign policy and alliance politics, it should be noted that summit materials are, by their very nature, inevitably more prone to emphasize the role of individuals and personalities. In October 1959, for example, Khrushchev is not calculating any of these larger factors as he angrily rebuts Mao's henchmen, who take turns at argument and insult. In this case, since both men were dictators with relatively few restrictions on their actions, the weave of ideological vision and national interest perception could fit individual desires pretty closely. As id and ideology corresponded, national interest and self-interest blended together.

It is also worth noting that the 1959 conversation is especially tense, offering little opportunity for compromise and mutual comprehension, because the issues covered are handled by the two sides from very different perspectives. For example, Khrushchev's position on the Sino-Indian border conflict is a political balancing act designed to maintain interests involving both warring parties. Mao's condemnation of the TASS communique is based on his ideological interpretation of Khrushchev's refusal to support the socialist camp, i.e., the PRC. Furthermore, Khrushchev's Taiwan analogies pragmatically plot the road to a Two-China policy, ignoring Mao's ideological imperative as ruler of the Central Kingdom to reunify his domain. The choice of topics that could be broached from the same perspective would have allowed more room for agreement.

Content analysis also shows that none of the topics that would become subjects of strife on 2 October 1959 are central to the main briefing materials provided to Khrushchev by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his trip to Beijing—the September 1959 Zimianin report.

Although providing historical background into the Stalin period and analysis of ongoing ideological tensions, it appears that Mikhail Zimianin, head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern Department, failed to include information on such issues as Taiwan, the Indian-Tibet affair, and Mao's possible reactions to Khrushchev's visit to Eisenhower. Document 21, the analysis of the Tibetan uprising based on Chinese sources, suggests that for many issues the crucial information was only forthcoming from the Central Committee's International Department. If it is true that Gromyko's Foreign Ministry was attempting to increase its influence, failure to predict the bones of immediate contention could hardly have helped (of course, it is conceivable, that such foreign policy divergences were deemed too sensitive to be included in the report, and were discussed elsewhere). As China policy deteriorated, alliance management continued, in large part, to be handled by such CC *apparatchiki* as Suslov, Andropov, and Kozlov.⁴⁵

As this discussion of possible bureaucratic frictions within the USSR shows, many of our conclusions remain speculative, for many key documents, especially internal evaluations at the highest levels of foreign policy issues, remain classified and unavailable. The role of military and intelligence inputs in the Sino-Soviet relationship is also almost impossible to evaluate at our present state of knowledge. A wish list of materials that could shed further light on matters covered in this working paper would certainly include: Stalin-Kim meetings, April 1950; Zhou-Stalin, October 1950; Khrushchev-Mikoian-Mao, October 1954; Khrushchev-Mao, November 1957 and August 1958 (Conversations 2 and 3); Gromyko-Zhou, September 1958.

This collection sheds no additional direct light on Khrushchev-Mao nuclear calculations.

⁴⁵ For a translation and analysis of Zimianin's report, see Mark Kramer, "The USSR Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September 1959," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 170-185. Kramer suggests that bureaucratic tensions existed between the CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries and the Foreign Ministry (p.176). The Foreign Ministry had been a secondary channel of Sino-Soviet relationship since Molotov's exclusion from the Soviet delegation to the PRC 5th Anniversary celebrations in October 1954. Only Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoian went to Beijing. We have no documentation on this visit to date. Interestingly, photographs in Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament

On the other hand, reading the 31 July Khrushchev-Mao discussion of the joint fleet idea and a proposed shared military radio facility, one can well imagine the Soviet leaders' unspoken reaction to Mao's nationalistic hostility to military cooperation to help the USSR: "And I'm going to give him nuclear weapons?" As Constantine Pleshakov has pointed out, Khrushchev could hardly have passed through this conversation without wondering "what would happen when Khrushchev would have to bring up the problem of the command of joint nuclear forces?"⁴⁶ The two 1958 memcons also help us narrow our sights on the infamous "pool meeting," probably the dramatic nadir of the Sino-Soviet plunge. Both Salisbury's Chinese sources and Khrushchev's memoirs mention this venue, Mao's pool inside Zhongnanhai, at which two conversations took place, one in the water, and the second, afterwards in a shaded poolside setting. These may well be the Second and Third Conversations, still unavailable. By the process of elimination it turns out that this incongruous venue hosted Mao-Khrushchev "informal discussions on political matters" (II, 259), including spirited exchanges on nuclear strategy (I, 467-71; II, 259-61; III, 148-50). In fact, Mao's bellicose visions and strange strategies, together with the pool, were what Khrushchev remembered most from the 1958 talks. He concludes that: "Clearly, there was a fairly basic disagreement between us. But our split with China went even deeper" (I, 471).⁴⁷

The handling of the Taiwan straits crisis the following month also left "a sour taste" in Khrushchev's mouth, although he ascribes it mainly to another military technology incident, this time an accusation that the Chinese withheld a captured American missile the Soviets wanted to reverse-engineer. To counter this ungrateful behavior, the USSR then slowed the delivery of

(Boston, 1974), n.p., show Molotov as part of the delegation.

⁴⁶ *Brothers in Arms*, p.236.

⁴⁷ In the next pages, references to Khrushchev's memoir editions will be made as follows: I = *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, 1970); II = *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston, 1974); III = *Khrushchev*

“some military equipment” to the Chinese. This was just another reminder that joint military ventures would be difficult in any sphere. When Khrushchev says that this incident had a “sobering effect on us,” it is not hard to imagine the consequences for the nuclear agreement, where “some military equipment” had been promised, but not yet delivered (III, 151-2). If we choose the Taiwan Straits crisis as the moment of doom for the Sino-Soviet nuclear agreement, it also provides an alternative explanation for Khrushchev’s atomic guarantee, issued the day after the crisis showed signs of ebb. After all, the loud re-affirmation of the Soviet nuclear umbrella’s coverage of China would be the absolute minimum required to retain some measure of Chinese friendship after renegeing on atomic assistance.

Khrushchev’s memoirs shed much light on the issue of Stalin discussed above, clearly stating some of the ways in which Mao had become a “second Stalin,” but only the Stalin of “the three rotten fingers,” the embodiment of the “cult of personality” and the terror. Each of the fingers is a comparison. The first states that “Stalin was exposed and condemned at the Congress for having had hundreds of thousands of people shot and for his abuse of power. Mao Tse-tung was following in Stalin’s footsteps” (I, 471). Then Khrushchev illustrates how Mao reminded him of Stalin : “‘Let’s try to imagine a future war,’ he began. He sounded just like Stalin, who also loved to raise hypothetical questions of that sort” (II, 260). And of what “sort” one might ask? The image of war reinforces the implication of bloodthirstiness laid out by the first comparison, but on an even grander scale. The final image condemns Mao both on national interest grounds as “trying to dictate policy to other socialist countries” and for ideological sins, “one individual masquerading as the dictatorship of the proletariat...just as Stalin had done before him.” (II, 308) Clearly, Khrushchev’s thoughts about Mao and memories about Stalin

Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston, 1990). Again by the process of elimination, Lebanon, Yugoslavia and Taiwan were also probably discussed in Conversations Two and Three, but are little mentioned in the *Memoirs*.

were closely connected. In the end, how to exorcise one without alienating the other proved an insoluble problem.

In contrast, Khrushchev's memoirs are downright misleading regarding the October 1959 showdown in Beijing.⁴⁸ The 1970 volume presents the background to the 1958 trip and then states: "This was our last trip to China. It was in 1959." It then goes on to describe the discussion of 31 July 1958, published here as Document 17. 1959 should read 1958 and there is nothing further about the 1959 visit. The 1974 continuation added much more, noting the brevity of the stopover in Moscow after the US visit and identifying India as the main object of contention. Chen Yi's rudeness, performed at Mao's behest, is singled out. There is no mention of any other topics. The 1990 *Glasnost Tapes* volume made no mention of the 1959 visit. Chinese memoir material had already demonstrated how incomplete Khrushchev's memoirs are on the October 1959 meetings, but the memcon itself gives us complete clarity on the content and many insights into the larger strategies and psychologies in play.⁴⁹

In the last decade, we have come far in filling gaps in the Sino-Soviet alliance story. First, the openness aspects [*kaifang*] of Deng Xiaoping's revolution really took hold after 1985 and revealing materials began to appear in Chinese "internal" [*neibu*] publications. Soon available in the US and Japan, these memoirs and republished documents added a wealth of information (albeit without archival location information) to our knowledge of early PRC foreign policy, including Soviet relations.⁵⁰ Then, Gorbachev's *glasnost* and the USSR's collapse led to unprecedented declassification on Soviet foreign policy in many areas, including ties with China.

⁴⁸ Gromyko is uninformative, limiting his comments on 1959 to: "Once again, deep differences emerged between us." His comment, further down the page, implies that Chen Yi tried to help build conversational bridges between Mao and Khrushchev, an almost ironic misrepresentation of the Chinese Foreign Minister's fierce attacks on Khrushchev. Gromyko, p.252.

⁴⁹ For the most impressive reconstruction, see Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong in *Brothers in Arms*, p. 274.

⁵⁰ For an overview of these materials, see Michael Hunt, "CCP Foreign Relations: A Guide to the Literature" in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7, pp. 129, 136-43 and Chen Jian, "CCP Leaders' Selected Works" in *op.cit.*, pp. 131, 144-6.

One handy measure of recent successes is an examination of the authoritative *Cambridge History of China*, whose first volume dealing with the PRC appeared in 1987, just before crucial releases on both the Chinese and Russian sides. In general, these accounts prepared by lifelong students, i.e., senior professors, of Chinese foreign policy are on the mark. Nakajima Mineo's analysis of the Mao-Stalin relationship notes the tensions in the relationship and characterizes the summit in a wonderful quote from a January 1957 Mao speech to CCP cadres: "Our opinions differed from Stalin's. We wanted to sign a Sino-Soviet Treaty but he wouldn't. We wanted the Chinese Changchun Railway but he wouldn't return it. However, one can pull the meat out of the tiger's mouth after all." Nakajima contends that the \$300 million loan of 1950 "soured [Sino-Soviet relations] from the very start." Although the Chinese may have considered it "stingy," none of the new documentation reveals particular tensions on this issue. Soviet insistence on payment for Korean War military supplies would soon overshadow earlier economic grievances. In any case, over the next decade, aid in kind and technical advice would become more important than this original cash infusion of 1950.⁵¹

On the other hand, new documentation has completely rewritten the history of the Chinese entry into the Korean war. Nakajima is almost contradictory in claiming that "However much advance knowledge Mao and his senior colleagues may have had about the preparations for, and timing of, the war, they clearly did not envisage it as being of direct concern to them when hostilities broke out" (p. 271) and then writing about "the Chinese, who had been regrouping forces in case of involvement almost from the outset of the war" (p. 274). Now we know that Mao's first direct knowledge of the North Korean war plan came from Kim Il Sung over dinner on 13 May, five weeks before the planned attack and shortly after Kim's own secret

⁵¹ Mineo Nakajima, "Foreign relations: from the Korean War to the Bandung Line," in *Cambridge History of China* 14 (1987), pp. 259-282, esp. p. 269. Curiously, Nakajima uses Stalin's birthday according to the Julian calendar

visit to Moscow to obtain Stalin's consent for the attack.⁵² At 11:30 that night, Zhou asked the Soviet ambassador to wire for the "personal clarifications of comrade Filippov [Stalin's pseudonym]."⁵³ We also know that Mao and his senior comrades were quite concerned.

For Nakajima, the Chinese decision for war has mainly Chinese and Korean dimensions.

He states that:

The decisive moment occurred on China's National Day, 1 October, when South Korean troops crossed the frontier at the 38th parallel. On that day, Mao circulated a secret directive that Chinese troops would enter the war, using the name of Chinese People's [sic] Volunteers (CPV) as a device to try to limit the war to the Korean peninsula.

Stalin simply catalyzes this independent move when he "informs Peking that Kim Il-sung would have to set up a government in exile on Chinese soil."⁵⁴

In the fifteen years since this was written, new documentation has substantially altered the order, direction, and dominant emotions encountered in the decision-making process. The level of detail is altogether different. The new version shows Stalin specifically requesting the insertion of the Chinese volunteers on October 1 at 3 AM, only 70 minutes after receiving Kim Il Sung's desperate and obsequious telegram. Mao drafted an acceptance, but then, for reasons we still don't understand, actually replied that the Chinese were undecided, but leaning away from intervention. The typed copy was on Stalin's desk at 1:20 PM on October 3. By the next day Stalin had a three-page draft telegram which he edited for over a day until he sent it at 11 PM on the fifth. Roshchin, almost a year in Beijing by this point, delivered the message on the sixth at 10:30 PM. Mao replied conditionally in the affirmative, while emphasizing that "he was very happy that in your answer, you speak of the joint struggle of China and the USSR against the

("Old Style"), instead of the twentieth century date of 21 December. (p. 265)

⁵² A detailed report on this visit is cited extensively in E. P. and N. Bajanovy, "The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 : The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century Based on Secret Soviet Archives," unpublished, pp. 40-42.

⁵³ See documentation in *CWIHP Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 60-61.

Americans.” In the 5 October telegram, Stalin had indeed allowed himself a reference to the contingency (described in his draft, but not the telegram, as “not very likely” [malo veroiatno]), in which China and the USSR would be drawn into a “big war” with the Americans. An important addition to the final version of the 5 October telegram, not found in the draft of 4 October or any other telegrams from Stalin to Mao that I have seen, is the sign-off, “with respect” [*s uvazheniem*]. Mao, it seems, was ready to pay the price of Stalin’s respect.⁵⁵

Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao left for the USSR on October 8 to negotiate directly with Stalin. The Stalin-Zhou talks on 9-10 October remain unavailable, but appear to have been contentious and inconclusive. Clearly, Zhou and Lin were not impressed by Stalin’s concrete ideas about “joint struggle against the Americans.” Thus, only after considerable vacillation, on 14 October, the day after Stalin told Kim Il Sung to begin his evacuation of Korea, did Mao finally relent and agree to rescue Kim. Decisive socialist internationalism turns out to be a little less cohesive than at first glance, at least on matters of war and peace. Soviet input as well as Korean factors were central to the dispatch of the Chinese volunteers, for Stalin had made it clear to Mao implicitly that the future of the embryonic Sino-Soviet alliance and explicitly that all hopes of recovering Taiwan depended on Beijing’s positive action to save the situation in Korea.

It is on such issues, that the alliance would eventually founder. Allen Whiting wrote the chapter on the Sino-Soviet split for the same volume of *The Cambridge History of China* and is uncannily accurate in most of his analyses, although detail is sometimes sparse. Whiting targets 1958 as a watershed year, with Sino-Soviet relations entering it “framed through favorable

⁵⁴ Nakajima, p. 274. 1 October 1950 was the PRC’s first anniversary.

⁵⁵ In Mao’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Iudin on 22 July 1958, he reminisced that : “Upon your return [to Moscow] you spoke highly of us. Your first comment to Stalin was ‘the Chinese [comrades] are truly Marxists.’ Nevertheless Stalin remained doubtful. Only when [we entered] the Korean War did he change his view [about us].” *CWIHP Bulletin #6-7*, p.156. The 4-5 and 7 October documents mentioned above are all in Volkogonov Collection, Reel 17, Library of Congress. On October 8, Stalin forwarded an amalgamated version of this

negotiations at the highest level," while "the two Khrushchev-Mao encounters in Peking in 1958 and 1959 fueled a growing dispute in the Sino-Soviet alliance that ultimately blew it apart in all but the formal sense." The ad hoc nature of the 1958 summit, the likelihood that the upcoming Taiwan straits crisis was not discussed (or at least not in full), and the issue of "shared Sino-Soviet military facilities" as a point of "contention and ultimate disagreement," are all mentioned. Whiting laments that, "Unfortunately, no detailed accounts have ever been released on either event," but this is now no longer true. By examining the 1958 transcripts attached to the present working paper, we can see that Whiting's conclusion ("No agreement was reached, however. Instead, the two sides probably parted on worse terms than before.") differs from the actual texts.⁵⁶ By furious backpedaling, Khrushchev succeeded in defusing the military facilities issue at the first conversation and the mood was fairly convivial at the final fourth meeting.

Whiting's analysis of the 1959 meeting is only two sentences long, noting the sequencing of Khrushchev's US visit, as well as a "sharp exchange" over the Indian border conflict.⁵⁷ All of this is accurate, although very incomplete. It is interesting to speculate that Whiting's accuracy is the result of being able to read Chinese published memoirs and documents, and perhaps intelligence reports, through the informational framework developed during his government career.⁵⁸ This new body of material now also provided citations for many points that Whiting knew to be true, but could not write about solely on the basis of "closed" sources.

Donald Zagoria's much acclaimed classic of double demonology, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61*, also raises these hermeneutic points. The sophisticated textual analyses

telegraphic exchange to Kim Il Sung, placing the blame for delays firmly on the shoulders of the "Chinese comrades." The telegram to Kim has been published in *CWIHP Bulletin #6-7*, pp. 116-7.

⁵⁶ Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split," in *Cambridge History of China* (1987), pp. 478-538, esp. pp. 478, 484, 486, 490, 493.

⁵⁷ Whiting, p. 512.

⁵⁸ For Whiting's early adherence to the view that the Sino-Soviet conflict was genuine and serious, see Harold Ford, "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split: The CIA and Double Demonology," *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1998/99, p. 65.

employed by Zagoria deliver nearly complete accuracy. For example, his examination of the 3 August 1958 communique correctly concludes that it "was ambiguous, phrased in such a way that the two parties could persist in differing positions without flatly contradicting the terms of the 'agreement' [sic]." He also notes that even if we still do not know if "Khrushchev concurred even in a limited venture in the Strait it seems likely that the Strait venture left much ill feeling on both sides." For this, we will need the remaining two conversations from the 1958 summit and the Gromyko September visit documentation. For 1959, Zagoria's analysis of the Khrushchev speeches, both in Beijing and on the way home in Siberia, is brilliant Kremlinology, teasing meaning from the fine points of language. Much is made of the divisive implications of Khrushchev's departure statement that "we Communists of the Soviet Union consider it our sacred duty, our primary task to utilize all possibilities in order to liquidate the cold war."⁵⁹

Zagoria's analyses of Khrushchev's reports, published in Pravda, to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1959 and to the Hungarian Party Congress on 1 December 1959, draw out most of the conclusions presented more baldly by Suslov in his December report to the CC CPSU plenum. Not only Suslov and the CIA, but also Mao was carefully monitoring these signals. Document 25 shows Mao citing Khrushchev as "anti-Marxist" and "anti-Leninist" for the "synchronization" concept in his Budapest speech. Zagoria's chapter titled "Khrushchev in Peking" concludes:

In September 1959, then, Khrushchev apparently came to Peking in the mistaken belief that China's dependence on the USSR would force the CCP to accommodate its foreign policies.

His visit seemed only to sharpen the already considerable differences. By the end of 1959, Khrushchev was suggesting in a fairly open way that the relationship between the two leading Communist parties had deteriorated to a dangerous point.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Khrushchev did not succeed in ending the Cold War, but he did move it into a new phase.

⁶⁰ Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*, pp. 202, 216, 277-87.

As the 2 October 1959 memcon shows, Khrushchev instead found the Chinese comrades charging him with accommodating the imperialists. Here again, one is tempted to credit Zagoria's long tenure in the CIA's Sino-Soviet Studies Group to explain his ability to interpret cryptic language so effectively.⁶¹

The secret analytical successes of Whiting, Zagoria, and other students of Sino-Soviet relations made 1959 a turning point for the United States, too. In the wake of Khrushchev's visit to the US, a number of memoranda circulated at the top levels of US foreign policy formulation proposing tactics predicated on greater or lesser degrees of Sino-Soviet disagreement or estrangement.⁶² On 10 December 1959, CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell told the National Security Council that the intelligence community "is unanimous that strains are genuine and not a fabrication."⁶³ In the course of 1960, the processing of purloined Communist internal documents containing Sino-Soviet recriminations and the increasingly open nature of the attacks made it possible to convince most if not all doubters in the US foreign policy team.⁶⁴ In 1961, both the State and Defense Departments would set up their own Sino-Soviet task forces.⁶⁵ These were all important steps on the way towards an emergent consciousness of global relations as triangular rather than bipolar.

⁶¹ Ford, pp. 59-60. The Sino-Soviet Studies Group (SSSG) was one of the earliest monitors to detect "the split," and advocate institutionally for this viewpoint in the policy world. In 1959-1961, SSSG's *Esau* studies documented the behaviors of the not-so-fraternal brothers, showing "how Sino-Soviet discord had become more acute during 1958-60."

⁶² Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-72* (Stanford, 1990), p. 213 states that the Eisenhower administration was "immensely encouraged by what it sensed from Khrushchev's public statements." Also see *FRUS, 1958-1960* vol.19, pp. 600-610 for Khrushchev visit post facto analyses supporting Chang's view and p.616, where Jiang Jieshi, on the contrary, continues to insist that Sino-Soviet conflict is simply not possible.

⁶³ Coincidentally, on this very day Soviet ambassador Stepan Chervonenko informed Liu Shaoqi that "attempts to sabotage Soviet foreign policy would affect all sides of the bilateral relationship." Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms*, p.178

⁶⁴ Despite these high level briefings on Sino-Soviet discord, Zagoria argues that : "Top American officials recognized the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute only belatedly..." Donald Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York, 1967), p.26.

⁶⁵ Ford, pp. 62, 66.

If one accepts the proposition that the Sino-Soviet monolith was more imaginary than real for most of its purported existence, then we can also conclude that both Russia and China moved towards triangular diplomacy long before the Americans. As early as January 1950, during Mao's visit to Moscow, Stalin provided him with a translation of Dean Acheson's National Press Club speech for discussion and rebuttal of its claims that Mao had betrayed Chinese national interests at Stalin's behest (ironically foreshadowing Mao's own resentments once the *vozhd* had left the scene).⁶⁶ In this sense, at least the shadow of America was present at the creation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Similarly, Eisenhower hovered over the Mao-Khrushchev talks of 1958 and 1959. One could argue that the Soviet plans for building "joint" bases in China represented a parallel attempt to counter the American policy of forward deployment in the Pacific, just as the Warsaw Pact mirrored Western allied cooperation within NATO. According to the memoirs of Mao's doctor, the second Taiwan Straits incident was intended as a demonstration to Khrushchev as well as Eisenhower, for Mao feared being used as a pawn in US-USSR relations and wanted to recover the initiative within the triangle.⁶⁷

Donald Zagoria's 1965 testimony to Congress that "Indeed, since 1959, Moscow has been caught between Peiping and Washington," sketches a clear triangle.⁶⁸ Thus, in 1959, the US President's thoughts and desires accompanied Khrushchev to Beijing, both as agenda items (two of three issues, i.e., Taiwan and prisoners, were also raised between Khrushchev and Eisenhower), and as Mao's paranoid bent fleshed out the possibility of superpower condominium at China's expense. Khrushchev's presentation to Mao of excerpts from his memcons with Eisenhower and the mention of his U.S. voyage in public speeches for the PRC's anniversary

⁶⁶ See memcon of Molotov and Vyshinsky with Mao, 17 January 1950, *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 232-234.

⁶⁷ Zhisui Li, *Private Life*, p. 262. Li remembers Mao's apparent eagerness to see the US drop an atomic bomb on Fujian. "Let them use it [the atomic bomb]. Let's see what Khrushchev says then."

only served to fan Mao's suspicions.

By July 1963, the "virtual" triangle of 1950 and 1959 would become more tangible, as Moscow hosted a CC CCP delegation headed by Deng Xiaoping and an American partial nuclear test-ban negotiating team headed by Averell Harriman simultaneously. The violent polemics of the former could only be exacerbated by the knowledge that US-USSR collusion was proceeding simultaneously.⁶⁹ The Chinese presence may also have added urgency to the US task of cultivating détente with the USSR, but probably reminded Khrushchev as well of the necessary limits on cooperation with capitalists and imperialists. When Harriman, as instructed by JFK, floated the idea of collusion in a preemptive action against the PRC nuclear potential, Khrushchev refused even to discuss the idea.⁷⁰ On the other side of town, the Chinese were accusing him of entertaining sinister intentions of just that kind.

By the time the next series of triangular summits took place in 1972, it was the Soviet and Chinese leaders who would appear *in absentia*, as Richard Nixon traveled to Beijing and then Moscow. Just as Stalin's ghost would trouble Sino-Soviet relations until they broke down, the history of triangular psychology has its roots in the bipolar diplomacy of the 1950s (witness Nixon's exorcising of the ghost of his former mentor, John Foster Dulles, who had legendarily snubbed the Chinese at Geneva in 1954, by demonstratively shaking Zhou Enlai's hand upon alighting from his jet in Beijing 18 years later). The close examination of documentary fallout from the Sino-Soviet split helps us to see these bridges between distinct phases of the Cold War, while waiting for additional archival releases to fill in further.

⁶⁸ *Sino-Soviet Conflict* (House Committee on Foreign Affairs: March 1965), (Washington, DC, 1965), p. 112

⁶⁹ Highlights of the Deng-Suslov debates can be found in *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 175-82.

⁷⁰ "Khrushchev does not seem to be receptive to US probing in this sensitive area, particularly on the question of a Chinese threat to the USSR, or joint US-Soviet action against China," reported Harriman. See Harriman telegram to JFK, 15 July 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 7, p. 801; 1 August 1963 memo for Harriman, box FCL 18, folder "USSR General 1963," Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

APPENDIX

Selected Russian and Chinese Documents on Sino-Soviet Relations, 1948-1959DOCUMENT 1

Secret, Copy 1, 20 June 1948, No. 108

Memorandum of Conversation

USSR Ambassador to China, N. V. ROSHCHIN with the president of the Chinese Republic
JIANG JIESHI [Chang Kaishi; Chiang Kai-shek] on 2 June 1948

On 2 June Jiang Jieshi gave a luncheon. Before lunch the conversation was of a protocol nature. Jiang asked how long it was from Moscow by plane and by train; what was the weather; how was Ambassador Petrov's [unclear word] health, the health of our government officials? During the meal, Jiang asked about economic reconstruction, the climate in various parts of our country, prospects for the harvest, etc.

After lunch Jiang immediately got down to business. He asked who heads our mission in Japan at present and my opinion on the American policy towards Japan. To the president's question I replied that he probably knows the situation in Japan, since the head of the Chinese mission General [name illegible] and the many Chinese Japan-experts working in the Chinese mission in Japan can see the American policy well enough. I then added that the policy being carried out by [U.S. Gen. Douglas W.] MacArthur contradicts all agreements on the Japanese question and that the Americans, ignoring these, are carrying out their own policy. Questions of Japan's demilitarization, democratization and war criminals ... [6 words unclear]. Regarding reparations, the American forces are considering suspending reparations. Therefore, naturally, these American intentions have called forth a wave of discontent among the Chinese public. The Chinese press is publishing more and more comments on this question from all over the country.

Here I asked the president his opinion of the American policy in Japan. He replied that he considered the American policy incorrect [*nepravil'naia*].

Continuing the conversation, he asked the opinion of the Soviet Government regarding the question of peace with Japan, should we conclude peace sooner or should we wait [?] To this I replied that the president knows the opinion of the Soviet Government from previous correspondence with the Chinese Government and this has not changed. The question of peace discussions with Japan is ripe. This should have been preceded by the fulfillment of the conditions stated in the decisions of the [December 1945] Moscow [U.S.-U.K.-Soviet foreign ministers] conference, but the Americans don't want to do this.

Having asked Jiang his point of view on the question of peace with Japan, I received the answer that he considers the question of concluding peace ripened [*nazrevshii*].

I asked Jiang what kind of Japan the Chinese people would like to see and in the president's [Jiang's] opinion what should be done with Japan. He, having thought it over, answered that "We do not want vengeance, but in Japan it is necessary to liquidate the fundament on which her military industry and her military potential could be revived," adding that it will be possible to exchange opinions on the Japanese question another time. And now he

would like to ask me about the situation in Korea.

[Roshchin then attacks US policy in Korea as not leading to reunification, while referring Jiang to previously published statements of the Soviet government. Jiang agrees vaguely that the “Americans are not carrying out a completely correct policy ...” In closing, Roshchin adds that:]

As can be seen from the conversation and from published newspaper articles from the anti-American campaign against the new US policy in Japan, it is clear that the Chinese are mainly troubled by the reparations question. Everything else is for the moment [unclear word]. Jiang did not say a word about Japanese politics. He did not answer the question asked him. We will watch the Chinese policy towards Japan carefully. Earlier materials pointed out that the Chinese bargain [vytorgovvaiut] their [unclear word] on the Japanese question with the Americans for surplus [unclear word]. This continues even today.

The conversation was translated by Com. Fedorenko and Pu Daomin.

USSR Ambassador in China

N. Roshchin

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100 (Chinese embassy - secret section), op. 41, por. 19, pap. 276, ll. 32-35; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 2

From the Diary of N. V. ROSHCHIN

Top Secret, Copy 4, 1 December 1949, No.109

Memorandum of Conversation

with the chairman of the People's government of China MAO ZEDONG [MAO TSE-TUNG] on
16 October 1949

On 16 October at 1700 hours Beijing time in the palace hall Qingzhendian the ceremony in which Ambassador to China N. V. Roshchin transmitted his credentials to Mao Zedong took place. Present on the Chinese side were the General Secretary of the Government Lin Boju, Chief of Staff General Nie Rongzhen, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, the Foreign Ministry Director Wang Bingnan and the Head of Foreign Ministry Protocol Yan Baohang. On the Soviet side, aside from the ambassador, ten embassy officials and the VAT. The transmittal took place in a solemn setting.

After the ceremony Mao Zedong invited the Ambassador and the foreign minister Zhou Enlai for a talk.

During the talk Mao Zedong expressed his satisfaction on the swift arrival of the Ambassador from Moscow and hopes for a quick establishment of regular air ties between Beijing and Moscow.

Mao Zedong expressed a feeling of deep gratitude to Comrade Stalin and toasted his health.

Then Mao expressed his gratitude to the Soviet government for recognizing the PRC on the second day after its creation and for the swift arrival of the Ambassador, expressing

confidence that all questions that arise in the future between China and the USSR will be decided by both governments in the spirit of sincere friendship.

Reminding the Ambassador of their last meeting in 1945 in Chongqing, Mao noted that in the four years since then historic changes took place in China and the whole world and the camp of democracy grew steadily in strength. The victory of the Chinese people is a new contribution to the goal of peace and security and it is not by chance that the Soviet Union and new democratic countries recognized the PRC and its government so quickly and unanimously.

Even Yugoslavia, continued Mao, announced its recognition, although the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not send any formal requests for recognition. [underlined in original from “although”—trans.] The Chinese government, said Mao, decided to ignore the recognition decision of the Yugoslav government and not to reply.

The Ambassador asked Mao if he knew Moscow’s official point of view on this question as passed to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Mao said yes and again hurried to assure that the Chinese government would not reply to Yugoslavia and would ignore all attempts by the Yugoslavs to entrap [zaviazat’] China into relations. The Ambassador noted that this question was within the competence of the Chinese government.

After this Mao returned to the question of the new victories in the camp of peace and democracy, pausing on the creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), underlining that the importance of this event is clear from the fact that Com. Stalin personally sent a message to the president of the GDR. The way that Mao spoke of reading the text of this message, made it completely clear that he was extremely upset that China still has not received congratulations from Com. Stalin on the creation of the PRC. In the course of the conversation, Mao underlined several times that the GDR was created 12 days later than the PRC.

Then Mao expressed the intention of the Chinese government to recognize the GDR as soon as it is recognized by the Soviet Union. He asked, however, [for me] to tell the Soviet government that he would like advice on the GDR’s recognition by the PRC.

At the end of the conversation I congratulated Mao on the occupation by the People’s Army of Canton [Guangzhou] and toasted his health as chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee.

In an answering toast Mao wished me success in my work for the strengthening of friendship between our great peoples and in the name of the Chinese government promised me full aid and support. The conversation with Mao took place in an entirely friendly atmosphere. Zhou Enlai, the foreign minister, also was present, as were translator Shi Zhe and Embassy Counselor S. L. Tikhvinskii.

USSR Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China

N. Roshchin

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 42, por. 19, pap. 288, ll. 28-31; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 3

From the Diary of N. V. ROSHCHIN

Top Secret, Copy 4, 1 December 1949, No.110

Memorandum of Conversation
with the chairman of the People's Government of China MAO ZEDONG on 20 October 1949

On 20 October at 2000 hours, the Ambassador was invited to dinner with the head of the government Mao Zedong. Making use of the opportunity, the Ambassador transmitted the contents of telegram #154 from the USSR Foreign Ministry regarding the recognition of the GDR. Mao thanked me and announced that the Chinese government had already sent a greeting and tomorrow would discuss recognition and the exchange of diplomatic missions with the GDR.

After this, Com. Mao Zedong told me that until now they have [heard] nothing from the government of Albania, and they would like to establish diplomatic relations. At present, said Mao, we don't even know the family name of the foreign minister. [Sino-Albanian relations were established on 23 November 1949—ed.]

He also said that it would be desirable for me to transmit this opinion to the Soviet government. I replied that I would report this most urgently.

During dinner Mao thrice toasted Com. Stalin's health and also toasted the Soviet people and Soviet army. Mao Zedong also made a short toast to the final victory of the camp of peace, democracy, progress, and revolution and the final defeat of the camp of war, reaction, and counterrevolution, noting that the tempo of events continues to increase; The People's Liberation Army (PLA) cut a path from Kharbin [Haerbin] to Canton [Guangzhou] in less than a year, for which all calculations required 2-3 years.

Mao Zedong was extremely friendly at the table and in very good humor. He joked, told Chinese historical anecdotes, in particular about the Han-dynasty ambassador Su Yue, who lived in captivity for nearly 20 years.

The Ambassador returned with toasts to Mao's health, to the government, to the Chinese people, to the PLA. The dinner ended at 2130, after which the Ambassador went immediately to the station to send off Ambassador Wang Jiexiang, leaving at 2200 for Moscow.

Present at the dinner were Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Gao Gang, Liu Shaoqi, Nie Rongzhen, Lin Zhuhan, Li Kenong, Wang Jiexiang, Shi Zhe (Karskii), and also the chairman of the GMD [Guomindang] Revolutionary Committee Li Jishen, chairman of the Democratic League Zhang Lan, and the newly appointed deputy chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee the Hunan general who went over to the PLA Cheng Qian.

Because the presence of these last three, Com. Mao Zedong avoided conversations on serious political matters. On our side, present were Embassy Counselor S. L. Tikhvinskii and the Director of the Beijing General Consulate Com. S. S. Seregin.

USSR Ambassador to the PRC

N. Roshchin

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 42, por. 19, pap.288, ll. 32-33; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 4

Top Secret, Copy 1, 7 November 1949, No. 68

Memorandum of Conversation

of USSR Ambassador in China Com. N. V. ROSHCHIN with deputy chairman of the People's Government of China and the Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ZHU DE on 24 October 1949

On 24 October at 1600 the Ambassador paid an official visit to the deputy chairman of the People's Government of China and Commander in Chief of the PLA, Zhu De in the reception hall Yinyangtang in Zhongnanhai [the Chinese leadership compound].

After questions of a protocol nature between the Ambassador and Zhu De there was a friendly talk in the course of which Zhu De stated the following.

I. Military operations on the fronts of the Chinese civil war are developing in a fully satisfactory manner. If they continue thus, then Sichuan province will be completely liberated towards the end of this year. In Sichuan among the local militarists there is a strong tendency to come over to the PLA and practical steps are being taken in this direction. The PLA's progress in Southeast China will be determined by the average hourly speed at which the PLA infantry units march, for there is no serious resistance. The PLA troops operating in Southern China are not able to use auto transport, because there is little gas. The GMD [Guomindang; Kuomintang; KMT] successfully removed all fuel to Hainan Island in advance and the PLA transport lacks "trophy" gasoline.

II. The preparation of new PLA units, in particular anti-aircraft units, is going forward in Manchuria and Northern China and soon five anti-aircraft regiments will be sent into the central and southern ports of China – Shanghai, Nanking, Hanzhou and others. In this matter, as in the PLA's movement into Xinjiang, the PLA command received large-scale, valuable aid from Soviet comrades.

III. Regarding further aid to China by the Soviet side, Zhu De especially mentioned Xinjiang, where in his words PLA units will settle right away to provide for themselves in order to be fully self-supporting and not harm the interests of the local Muslim population in Xinjiang. In order to help the PLA to successfully carry out its spring seeding, in Zhu De's opinion, the Chinese government should agree with the Soviet government about sending the PLA powerful tractors, hoes, and other agricultural tools and machines, so that the army, on one hand, can clearly demonstrate to the local population the advantages of machine agriculture and, on the other hand, can feed itself. This will also be a valuable contribution to Sino-Soviet friendship and a demonstration of USSR help to China. Zhu De warned the Ambassador several times that his suggestion was personal in nature and that the government had not discussed this issue.

IV. Regarding the General Staff Zhu De stated that the General Staff was an extremely important institution, completely new in Chinese conditions. Presently General Xu Xiangqian, the Chief of the General Staff, an old CCP [Chinese Communist Party] military worker, who before the Japanese invasion commanded troops of the fourth direction of the Chinese soviet [council] districts, is seriously sick and his functions are carried out by Nie Rongzhen. At present the PLA officers' corps does not have enough generals and officers to work in a General Staff since the war is continuing and victory is decided at the front, from where it is presently premature to recall generals and officers to work in a General Staff. However, soon the PLA Command will be obliged to bring back cadres for the General Staff from the fronts.

The conversation with Zhu De continued for one-and-a-half hours and Embassy Advisor

S. L Tikhvinskii and the Head of the [Chinese] Foreign Ministry Yan Baohang. The conversation was interpreted by Embassy Advisor S. L. Tikhvinskii.

USSR Ambassador in China

N. Roshchin.

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 42, por. 19, pap. 288, ll. 34-36; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 5

From the Diary of N. V. ROSHCHIN

Top Secret, Copy 4, 1 December 1949

Memorandum of Conversation
with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ZHOU ENLAI on 10 November 1949

On 10 November at 1700 on his own initiative the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai visited the Ambassador at the Embassy and after conversations of a protocol nature according to the instruction of Mao Zedong communicated the following for transmittal to the Soviet government:

I. Mao Zedong has long cherished the hope of visiting the Soviet Union. When this summer a Chinese delegation under Liu Shaoqi went to Moscow, Mao Zedong himself wanted to lead the delegation, but at that time the CCP leadership had just arrived in Beijing and the government was not yet organized, with massive organizational work in the offing that could not be carried out without Mao Zedong, who therefore stayed in Beijing. Additionally, Liu Shaoqi's trip was unofficial and under the cover of Gao Gang's Manchurian mission.

When Liu Shaoqi was in Moscow, while talking with Com. Stalin he communicated Mao's desire to meet with Com. Stalin and that Com. Stalin said that he would be glad to meet Mao Zedong in Moscow at any time. Stalin communicated an analogous position via Com. [I.V.] Kovalev in the 5 November talk. When Mao Zedong met Kovalev, he expressed his desire to visit Com. Stalin in Moscow in December in order to personally congratulate Com. Stalin on his birthday. In Mao's opinion, delegations of friends of the USSR from all over the world will come to Moscow for Com. Stalin's 70th birthday and therefore Mao's trip to Moscow can be completely in the open.

On 8 November Mao Zedong personally sent a corresponding telegram to Moscow.

Today Mao Zedong gave Zhou Enlai plenipotentiary rights to visit the Ambassador, to present Mao's wish to visit Com. Stalin and to ask the Ambassador to communicate this to Moscow.

To the Ambassador's question, what will be the nature of Mao's visit to Moscow and which Chinese government leaders would accompany him, Zhou Enlai answered that aside from establishing personal friendly contact with Com. Stalin, Mao will also, of course, raise the question of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. No one other than Mao will travel to Moscow, and if as a result of Mao's trip, a new Sino-Soviet Treaty can be worked out, then Zhou Enlai can travel quickly by plane to Moscow to sign this document.

Then Zhou Enlai asked if the Ambassador would accompany Mao Zedong to Moscow

and the Ambassador replied that he would follow instructions from Moscow.

2. Zhou Enlai asked if there was any answer regarding the disavowal of the GMD delegation at the UN. The Ambassador answered in the negative, but promised to ask the Foreign Ministry again.

3, 4. [Contains Zhou report on ties between retreating GMD troops and Indochinese colonial governments.]

5. [Roshchin requests aid in moving his embassy's materials from Nanjing to Beijing.]

USSR Ambassador to the PRC

N. Roshchin

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 42, por. 19, pap. 288, ll. 81-85; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 6

From the Diary of N. V. ROSHCHIN

Top Secret, Copy 4, 1 December 1949

Memorandum of Conversation
with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ZHOU ENLAI on 15 November 1949

[After a long discussion of China's internal finances and prospects, Zhou Enlai turns to the military operations of the ongoing civil war. As part of this he mentions his timetable for unifying China.]

Right after the liberation of Sichuan and Xinjiang, we will carry out an attack on Tibet. In March we will land on Hainan Island, where we have had large partisan units for many years. Our leadership's further plans are the preparation in the spring of 1950 for landing operations against Formosa and a landing in the summer of 1950. We think this operation should be carried out only after careful preparation for a combined air and sea strike.

For the landing operations against Formosa we will certainly draw lessons from the sad experience of the battles for Shantou (Swatow), where we lost three and a half regiments (7 thousand fighters) in one small landing operation.

USSR Ambassador to the PRC

N. Roshchin

[Source : AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 42, por. 19, pap. 288, ll. 91-92; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 7

Top Secret, Copy No.1, 31 January 1950

Memorandum of Conversation
Charge d'affaires of the USSR Embassy in the PRC Com. P. A. SHIBAEV with PRC Foreign
Minister ZHOU ENLAI on 9 December 1949

On 9 December 1949 at 2300 I visited Zhou Enlai at his residence.
[Shibaev reports the intrusion of Chinese troops into Mongolia, but it is unclear if they are under GMD or Communist command. Zhou apologizes if they are Communist.]

During the talk Zhou Enlai told me that he had received information that at 1600 Mao Zedong and Ambassador Roshchin had crossed the Sino-Soviet border and that at 1800 Li Kenong and Tikhvinskii had started back to Beijing. Zhou added that the Chinese were thinking of publicizing Mao's departure and his arrival in Moscow simultaneously on 17-18 December.

Then Zhou Enlai announced that he is expecting recognition of the PRC by India, Burma, and possibly England soon. I noted that today's press had announcements about this and asked him if his statement was based on these or did he have more reliable sources. Zhou said that he had more reliable information from America and Hong Kong.

Charge d'affaires of the USSR Embassy in the PRC P. Shibaev

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 43, por. 10, pap. 302, ll. 57-59; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 8

From the diary of
N. V. Roshchin

Top Secret
6 May 1951
No. 65

Memorandum of Conversation

USSR Ambassador to the PRC N. V. Roshchin with CC CCP Secretary com. Liu Shaoqi

Today at my request I was received by Liu Shaoqi.

[A discussion of the PRC economy and domestic situation follows]

Furthermore, Liu Shaoqi said that the Chinese troops had begun a serious attack in Korea. The battles of recent days show that the American defense is not solid enough, as a result of which the Chinese units are moving forward successfully. However, it is also clear that the Americans do not want to be drawn into serious battles, so that as soon as the Chinese units try to strike them, they retreat south taking their equipment and arms with them.

Regarding the possibility of Jiang Jieshi's troops landing on the mainland, Liu Shaoqi pointed out that despite the noise [*shumikha*] of the Americans and Guomindang on this matter, it is hardly to be expected that Jiang Jieshi would undertake such an adventure. However, it would be good if they did land on the continent. We would strike them hard and a significant portion [of the troops] would simply come over to our side.

Regarding Tibet, Liu Shaoqi said that the Tibetan delegation is coming to Beijing. Some members are already in the capital. We will hold negotiations with this delegation in order to introduce Chinese troops into Tibet peacefully. Preliminary conversations show that the Tibetan delegation's position does not permit the introduction of Chinese troops into Tibet.

With a population of two million Tibet cannot put up any serious resistance to the PLA [People's Liberation Army]. But if Nepal, a country with a warlike [*voinstvennyi*] population of five million that serves in the Indian and other armies, interferes in the Tibetan question, the matter could become complicated.

On this, the conversation ended.

Embassy Advisor com. T. F. Skvortsov was present during the conversation.

USSR Ambassador to the PRC [signed]
N. V. Roshchin

[Source: AVP RF f. 0100, op. 44, por. 13, pap. 322, ll. 17-22; translated from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 9

From the Diary of N. V. ROSHCHIN

Secret, Copy 1, 27 July 1951

Memorandum of Conversation with PRC Premier ZHOU ENLAI on 24 July 1951

On 24 July I visited Zhou Enlai ... [discussion of Dal'dok joint shipping enterprise—trans.]. Then a conversation developed during which I asked Zhou Enlai his opinion on the negotiations in Korea and on some questions regarding [Chinese] internal politics. Zhou willingly agreed and gave the following evaluation of the chances for the negotiations in Korea as well as on several Chinese internal politics questions.

After a year of war in Korea, said Zhou Enlai, the Americans have lost 150 thousand men and the war has cost 10-12 billion dollars and nonetheless they can't occupy North Korea and approach the borders of China ... [Describes the basic military stalemate in Korea and the negotiation positions, with emphasis on the issues of the 38th parallel and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the peninsula.] ... Then Zhou touched on the moods of the various groups of the population in China towards the Korean events and said that the laboring masses in China are full of determination to fight and drive off American troops out of Korea and liberate Taiwan island. [Detail on various groups within Chinese society and their reaction to the Korean War.]

Among the right-wing elements is a group of people, who in their time were closely tied to the Jiang Jieshi regime and with the Americans. Some of these people who carried out subversive work have been discovered. For each discovery we provided the democratic parties and groups with irrefutable evidence and they were unable to object to our repression of these elements. Others of whose subversive activities we still have no evidence have been isolated.

They are under observation. We are trying to determine if they are tied in any degree to the GMD [intelligence] agency ... [Chinese internal politics are discussed.]

Then I asked Zhou Enlai what are the fundamental problems facing the Chinese government. Zhou answered that there are two, both aggravated by continuation of the war. The first is enormous financial tension. Sixty percent of the budget goes to the war. At the same time, the economy demands urgent investment. The standard of living of the working class and intelligentsia is extremely low. However, added Zhou, if the war in Korea ends, then China will quickly escape from this situation, conduct a monetary reform, increase the budget for economic construction and raise the standard of living for workers and the intelligentsia.

The other huge problem is the acute lack of technical cadres. The Chinese revolution developed for many years in the village. Senior cadres have village and army experience. Among 5 million party members, 5 million soldiers and officers and 6 million [government] employees, there are almost no specialists with contemporary technical knowledge. The young, just out of higher education, lack experience and qualifications. The old GMD technical cadres do not have the level necessary for the industrialization of China. Without the war in Korea and the huge outlays on this war, the Chinese government would quickly deal with this problem by organizing courses, technical universities and study for many [Chinese] students in the USSR. However, so long as the war goes on, it will be hard to solve this problem and it will be a fundamental constraint on Chinese industrialization.

In closing I asked Zhou Enlai to give me an overview of Chinese foreign policy towards capitalist countries. Zhou said that China divides the capitalist countries into two groups. The first group holds India, Burma, Indonesia, the countries of the Arab League and others dependent on imperialist governments. The Chinese government has friendly relations with them and contact with their representatives in Beijing has been established. China tries to use them in [China's] interest, sharpening the contradictions between them and the imperialist metropolises. In this group China will not establish relations only with Israel. Establishing relations with Israel will not bring anything substantial and besides, this can lead to a worsening of relations with the countries of the Arab League, who in a number of cases have supported the PRC.

In the other group are England, France, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland, etc. With these countries China conducts the same policy that they conduct with China. China always willingly supports each friendly initiative and decisively rejects their inimical acts. Of these countries, England and France are afraid of over-exacerbating relations with China, fearing for the fate of their colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, if the war in Korea ends, they will want to broaden trade with China. China can sell them agricultural products, unnecessary materials (excluding strategic materials) and will buy tools and machines.

USSR Embassy First Secretary M. S. Kapitsa was present for the talk.

USSR Ambassador to the PRC

N. V. Roshchin

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 44, por. 13, pap. 322, ll. 44-57; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 10

USSR Foreign Ministry to N. V. Roshchin (Soviet Ambassador in Beijing), 12 August 1951

Visit Zhou Enlai and tell him that you have been told to inform the PRC government that the Soviet government has decided to send a delegation to the conference on the Japanese peace treaty to be held in San Francisco starting on 4 September of this year.

The Soviet government considers that it is difficult for the USSR to refuse participation in this conference, since such a refusal might be taken by public opinion as the Soviet Union's lack of desire to have normal relations with Japan. The Soviet representatives will take part in the San Francisco conference and will try to bring about the acceptance of the Soviet Union's proposals.

Of course, our delegation to the conference will voice the necessity of inviting the representatives of the People's Republic of China, without whose participation a peace treaty with Japan cannot be concluded. We will inform the government of the People's Republic of China about the conference.

[From B. N. Slavinskii, "The 1951 San Francisco Conference," *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* 1 (1994) citing AVPRF, fond A. Ia. Vyshinskogo 1951 g., op. 24, por. 371, pap. 32, d. 193, SShA t. 2, ll. 38-39.]

DOCUMENT 11

ZHOU ENLAI's Speech to the Central People's Government Council ⁷¹

The Korean Cease-fire Negotiations and Making Peace with Japan
3 September 1951

1. US imperialism fears both long-term war and enduring peace.

Over a year of war and two months of [cease-fire] negotiations in Korea have proved that [the Americans] fear a high-casualty, long-term [war] as well as the development of the peace movement and détente [songjin] at home and abroad. Thus, [US Secretary of Defense George C.] Marshall said that after ten [sic] years of tension, the Korean War should end.

Now that truce negotiations are being held, why do the American imperialists so shamelessly continue to carry out provocations to disrupt the negotiations? They attempt to delay the negotiations by displaying their strength, creating tension and pressuring us in order to reach a cease-fire on favorable terms. But there is also a possibility that the negotiations will collapse and the war will escalate.

2. If the negotiations break down and the war escalates, is it equivalent to the adoption of

⁷¹ This organ brought together 56 top government leaders, including patriotic front figures from outside the CCP. Therefore, this was not a foreign policy decision-making body *per se*. Zhou is presenting decisions in an analytical format, probably for discussion and certainly for execution.

MacArthur's adventurist policy?

We cannot say that there is no risk of adventurism. If American imperialism does so, there is no doubt that, facing opposition at home and abroad, they will fail.

But viewed overall, at present American imperialism's provocations and adventures are not strategic, but tactical or campaign-level. Various conditions restrict it.

Furthermore, should the negotiations break down, people will continue to die and the war will be protracted. Military preparations will deteriorate and flaws of every kind will increase. This will not only fail to solve problems, but threaten [the American] election next year and their leading position in the reactionary world.

All this demonstrates American imperialism's frenzied nature [*fengkuangxing*] and opportunism.

3. Therefore, at present negotiations are stalled, not settled.

At the end of all delays, we must keep our eye on the bottom line [*fenxiaode*]. Since American imperialism cannot obtain a unilaterally favorable truce, it will either cause a breakdown in negotiations as discussed above or accept a just and reasonable truce. Stalling the negotiations until after the San Francisco Conference [on a peace treaty with Japan] is crucial. When delays cannot be delayed further, either they'll put their cards on the table [*tanpai*] or change direction [*zhuanwan*].

4. We fear neither war nor peace. We recognize that the anti-American struggle is long-term and that American imperialism wants a peace by threats, a humiliating peace, a peace of aggression. Otherwise, they'll undertake this goal through war. Only if we are not afraid of war can we have peace. We are willing to settle the Korean, Far East and world problems peacefully, but we must not fear righteous, anti-aggressor wars for that is the only possibility of obtaining a lasting peace. Furthermore, only by training in just war can we become a mainstay of world peace. Through this experience, our strength becomes daily greater. An enemy who has suffered [*chiku*] thus, will not carelessly play with fire again. The possibility of preventing war will then increase further.

5. Therefore, only if we do not fear the [negotiations'] breakdown can the armistice be reached.

The peace we strive for is an agreement on just and reasonable terms. Only by not fearing collapse, while not giving cause for collapse ourselves, can we force the opponent's acceptance of such conditions. And that is but the first step towards peacefully solving the Korean question. Solving the whole Far East problem will be a long-term and complicated struggle.

6. The American-English Japanese Peace Treaty is not acceptable and the San Francisco Conference is not recognized.

The treaty itself is hostile to China and the USSR, dividing the countries that previously fought Japan. [The treaty] colonizes Japan, arms Japan, which is detrimental to the Japanese people and threatens the peace of Asia and the Pacific.

Like the North Atlantic Treaty and the arming of West Germany, the treaty with Japan speeds up preparations for world war and the enslavement of the world's people. Its contradictions and difficulties will facilitate the development of the world people's peace movement.

7. The strongest weapon against the American-English Japanese peace treaty is the strengthening of the “resist America, aid Korea” movement and the world peoples peace movement.

The “resist America, aid Korea” [movement’s] three main tasks should be carried out to support the long-term struggle. To strengthen the world peace movement, we should first strengthen the Asian peace movement.

This time the countries that oppose the American-English Japanese peace treaty will perhaps have two kinds of approaches. One is to attend the San Francisco conference to uphold one’s own opinions and to struggle for them. The other is to refuse to sign this peace treaty and therefore refuse to attend the conference. We should welcome both attitudes. The USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia belong to the former group, while India and Burma [Myanmar] belong to the latter. This opposition line-up hit American imperialism hard. We were in contact with the USSR, India, Burma, and Indonesia. It is possible to strengthen the Asian peace movement. After the American-English Japanese peace treaty has been signed, we will consider our approach to Japan.

As for the diplomatic line-up, aside from the development of the peace and democracy camp, we should separate Asian and Arab countries from the influence of the imperialist war group. At least we should get them to adopt neutrality. It will be better if we can get them to waver for this could shake the war group itself, widening the influence of the world peace and democracy camp. This is of great significance to us.

[Source : Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Writings of Zhou Enlai], v. 4 (Beijing, 1997), pp. 234-237; translated from Chinese by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 12

Conversation of MAO ZEDONG and the Yugoslav Ambassador [V.] POPOVIC
30 June 1955

[Mao:] The Yugoslavs are a heroic people and have carried out a heroic struggle. Your party has also carried out a heroic struggle. Your country achieved liberation, all the countries of Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea achieved liberation. Now half of Vietnam, led by Chairman Ho Chi Minh, has also achieved liberation and this all is a contribution to humanity. It makes the imperialists unhappy. When we quarrel, the imperialists are happy. Recently the Soviet and Yugoslav leading comrades held talks. The Soviet Union took initiative as did Yugoslavia. The Soviet delegation received a warm welcome from the Yugoslav people and a joint statement was issued after the talks. We and all the world’s progressive people were very happy with this joint statement.

Now we are establishing diplomatic relations with you and this is a good thing. You recognized us long ago. Since the establishment of our country, you have supported us and this position has never altered. Our reason for delaying the establishment of relations with you is that we hoped to mend relations with you together with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has now mended its relations to you and so have we. This was a better way, so establishment of relations was delayed for a few years. From the point of view of the international situation, now is an

even more appropriate time to establish relations.

The Chinese people harbor a friendly feeling for the Yugoslav people. The Comrade Ambassador can see this while in China.

Now the deadlocked issues between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have already been resolved. The international situation encouraged this solution and the improvement in mutual relations. This is [a step] for peace and socialism, in accordance with Marxism-Leninism. This is not to say that all views are already unanimous, but we only have to make the main views unanimous to make problems easier to manage.

We recently received Comrade Tito's letter in which he presented you as ambassador to our country. I was very happy to get this letter. This was not only correspondence between two countries, but also a comradely correspondence. When Tito received our ambassador on the 27th [of June], he expressed his friendship for which I am grateful and ask you to relay this to Tito. Yugoslav and Soviet and other countries' relations can always get a little better. We hear that Tito is preparing to visit Moscow, but we don't know if this is true. (Popovic: This news is true.) This is a very good thing. History and the present require that we unite and cooperate. We still have time and there is no need to rush. It's possible there are still unfrozen spots, but in a while, they'll slowly get better. We want to emphasize common points, and where there is difference, we can talk slowly, opening up a discussion. If we can't reach consensus, we can put it aside and talk again later. We shouldn't let it hinder relations. This is advantageous.

Our country was established late and is backwards, so the construction we are now beginning will take a long time. We need every country's communist party and people to help us. We need help and we want to help. If you discover our weak points, please tell us and we can exchange opinions.

[Source: Zhongsu guanxi dangan wenxian xuanbian [A Selection of Archival Documents on Sino-Soviet Relations], 1945-1989 (*Beijing, 1997*), pp. 83-4; translation from Chinese by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 13

From the diary of P. F. IUDIN

Top Secret, Copy 4, 15 March 1958

Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade ZHU DE 9 March 1958

On Sunday on his own initiative Zhu De visited me at home. Aside from general questions touched on in the conversation, Zhu De dwelled on several problems on which he clarified my opinion as well.

Like Mao Zedong in the previous conversation, he emphasized that the CC CCP received with pleasure the [memorandum of] conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with [PRC Ambassador to Moscow] Liu Xiao. In particular, said Zhu De, "we were greatly interested and pleased by N. S. Khrushchev's idea about a 'ruble zone,' as a counterbalance to the dollar and sterling zones." He said that "after the major consolidation of forces and the further strengthening of unity among socialist countries achieved at the [November 1957] Moscow Conference of communist parties,

the need has matured to work out how to strengthen the economic unity of the socialist camp.”
 “It can hardly be considered normal and profitable for the socialist camp that there is an existing practice of conducting trade among socialist countries in dollars.”

In the creation of a ruble zone, continued Zhu De, “we see major prospects. This measure could solve many economic problems arising among socialist countries, in China, in particular ...” [The conversation continues with discussions on transport and trade.]

During the conversation Zhu De asked about my views on the creation of a “ruble zone.” Since I had not been informed on this question, I answered generally that with serious joint efforts the socialist countries by creating this form of economic cooperation will become stronger in facing the capitalist world. This will especially strengthen the position of our camp, I added, if we keep in mind the worsening economic conjuncture of the imperialist countries and the possibility of an economic crisis of capitalism.

Zhu De approved of my comments and said that “the ideas of N. S. Khrushchev are good in all respects.” He underscored that the CPSU should work out all these important problems. “As in any other matter, this should be done by our head, the Soviet Union ...”

[The conversation covers many aspects of bilateral trade, transport, labor, aid, etc.]

USSR Ambassador to the PRC

P. Iudin

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 51, por. 6, pap. 432, ll. 97-103; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 14

From the diary of P. F. IUDIN

Secret, Copy 1, 19 April 1958

Memorandum of Conversation with MAO ZEDONG 5 April 1958

[Excerpt on Chinese-Yugoslav relations.]

In the course of the talks I [Iudin] reminded them that we in our time had informed the CC CCP of the Bucharest negotiations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, headed by Com. Khrushchev and Tito. I pointed out that the obligations contained in the secret communique signed in Bucharest have now been broken by the Yugoslavs. Mao Zedong noted that Tito had proved himself an unreliable partner more than once. Zhou Enlai, in his turn, said that “Tito is simply being a hooligan [*khuliganit*].”⁷²

Then Mao spoke on Chinese-Yugoslav relations. We, he said, never repudiated our support of the Cominform decision of 1948, but we were not in agreement with the Cominform resolution of 1949. It put us all in a passive situation and Tito even today constantly reminds us of this resolution. Stalin didn’t have to take such rude actions toward Yugoslavia, noted Mao. After Stalin’s death, as you know, energetic efforts were undertaken to normalize relations with

⁷² One can only wonder which of Chinese’s rich vocabulary of insults was used by Zhou and rendered into Russian as the rather vague *khuliganit*.

Yugoslavia. We want to have good relations with the Yugoslavs, but Tito remains the same. He undertook two maneuvers against us: In 1956 / in connection with the Hungarian events / and now. These maneuvers had the same general goal: to export his ideas and force them on others ...

[Mao then retells the story of ignoring Yugoslav recognition in 1949. See Doc.2 above.]

The PRC did not answer the Yugoslavs' offer of recognition until 1955. In this way, said Mao Zedong, we broke up their intention to drive a wedge into Soviet-Chinese relations.

[Source: AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 51, por. 6, pap. 432, ll. 132-33; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 15

From the diary of S. F. ANTONOV

Secret, Copy 2, 15 May 1958, No. 165

Memorandum of Conversation
with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC ZHANG WENTIAN
9 May 1958

I visited Zhang Wentian at his invitation. Zhang Wentian informed me of tactical changes that the Chinese comrades are undertaking in their policy toward Japan.

Zhang Wentian noted that recently the Kishi government [headed by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, wartime chief of the Japanese munitions industry and Class-A war criminal suspect until 1948] has occupied a very bad position toward the PRC. The Japanese government had blocked the fulfillment of the "fourth" non-governmental trade agreement in order to please the Jiang Jieshi clique and the Americans. Not long ago, the national [Chinese] flag was torn off the building of a Chinese exhibition in Japan [in Nagasaki]. Recently, the Japanese side has rudely violated the Chinese-Japanese (non-governmental) fishing agreement; Japanese fishing vessels are entering forbidden zones. Leading figures in Japan often make statements inimical to the PRC, emphasizing that Japan can trade with the PRC, but does not plan "to recognize Communist China."

Therefore, said Zhang Wentian, we decided "to counterattack against Japan." Taking into account the upcoming elections to the Japanese Diet [legislature], the Chinese intend to pressure the Kishi government and support the Japanese socialists and communists. They are trying to prevent the liberal-democrats from reaching a two-thirds majority in the Diet, which would allow them to change the constitution ... [A description of propaganda and trade measures to be taken follows.]

The Japanese, said Zhang Wentian, think that we cannot get on without them. Of course, he continued, we need steel, but we, in case of need, can turn to the fraternal countries, who will help us. Curtailing the import of the indicated goods from Japan will be a significant blow ... [Cultural and social exchanges will also be curtailed.]

When asked about recent articles in the Chinese press containing sharp criticisms of the Japanese government, Zhang said that "that is only the beginning." We, he continued, aim the principal blow at the Kishi government. We will use a different approach to the Japanese socialists and various minor political groups, since they are in the opposition. In this manner the

Chinese friends count on helping to isolate Kishi. According to the Chinese comrades, the above-mentioned measures will be useful for the Japanese Communist Party.

Touching on the upcoming elections in Japan, Zhang Wentian expressed the opinion that the socialist party cannot come to power and that, in all probability, the present government will remain. He said that at present it is important to fight to prevent Kishi from getting two-thirds of the Diet seats. However, underlined Zhang, even if Kishi gets two-thirds, we will continue our battle with him.⁷³

The Chinese comrades hope that the indicated measures will help the forces in Japan who are openly for friendship with the PRC. Zhang said that contemporary Japanese monopolistic capital is “secretly imperialistic.” If you don’t pressure it, he said, using a Chinese saying, “It will raise its tail [*podnimet khvost*].” In the past, said Zhang, we made many friendly steps towards Japan, but the Japanese interpreted this as meaning that we couldn’t get on without them. Therefore, we have to show that things are otherwise. Zhang underlined that the basic course of fighting for Japan [*za Iaponiiu*] is not changing and that at present we are only talking about a change in the tactical line.

Of the above, Zhang asked that I inform the Soviet government so that “they know in Moscow what measures we are taking and what goals we are pursuing.”

Then Zhang told of the article in today’s *Pravda*, “The unity and cohesion of the Marxist-Leninist parties is the guarantee of the future victories of the world socialist system.”

Speaking of the reaction of the diplomatic community in Beijing to the latest session of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and reactions of the fraternal parties, Zhang noted, that the Polish ambassador Kiryliuk sympathizes with the Yugoslavs. He is very close to the Yugoslav ambassador V. Popovic. These two ambassadors, said Zhang, are perfect for the Chinese saying, “They walk in the same pants.” According to Zhang Wentian, Kiryliuk recently talked with the deputy foreign minister Zeng Yongquan. During this conversation Kiryliuk said that he is not a theoretician and therefore he will not judge the substance of the answer given to the Yugoslavs, but he does not like the form of the answer. Considering the above remarks of the Polish ambassador, Zhang Wentian said that after the events in Hungary and Poland, Kiryliuk openly espoused revisionist positions and his views were identical with those of the Chinese right. Zhang Wentian also said that of late, however, Kiryliuk has become more careful and behaves himself a bit better than before.

Present for the conversation were the Asia Section Head of the PRC Foreign Ministry, Zhang Wenjin and the interpreter Fang Quan and the Embassy attache A. A. Brezhnev.

Temporary USSR Charge d’affaires in the PRC

S. Antonov

[Source: *Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, f. 5, op. 49, d. 136, ll. 77-81 (R. 8893); translation from Russian by David Wolff.]*

DOCUMENT 16

⁷³ For a contrasting view of the May 1958 Diet elections from the inside of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, see Michael Schaller, *Altered States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 135-137.

26 July 1958
 “On the Economic and Political Situation in the PRC”
 Report to the Presidium [excerpts]

[S. Antonov’s 75-page report, “On the Economic and Political Situation in the PRC” was distributed to all members and candidate members of the CPSU Presidium. Its general conclusions were positive, especially on the economy. “The sharp rise in the PRC economy,” it stated, “creates the conditions for a significant shortening of the time necessary to liquidate China’s economic backwardness and, in particular to accomplish the CCP slogan of catching up with England in the production of steel and other important kinds of industrial production within 15 years. There are reasons to think that this slogan can be realized during the second five-year plan [1958-62], and in certain important indicators in the next 2-3 years.” The discussion of foreign policy begins with the echoes of the Yugoslav issue and continued with the new Japan “tactics.”—ed.]

Changes in the tactical line of the PRC toward Japan

In the last three-four months, there is a sharp aggravation of Chinese-Japanese relations

...

[A lengthy presentation of the information in the memorandum of the 9 May 1958 Antonov-Zhang conversation provided above follows. The phrases below provide a few additional points.]

These measures, however, are not short-term. The basic reason for these changes is that recently it has become clearer that there is a danger of aggressive Japanese militarism reviving. Our task, said Com. Deng Xiaoping in a conversation with the charge d’affaires of the USSR, is to strike as great a blow as possible at this potential danger ...

The Chinese friends consider that under the present conditions this tactic is the best way to expose the imperialistic designs of the Kishi government and strengthen Japan’s contradictions with the US and the Chang Kaishekists ... [The Chinese insistence that this is only a tactical measure and it will help the Japanese opposition follows.]

It is possible to consider that the PRC pressure on Japan has had some results in the past 2-3 months. It appears that it played a useful role in the Japanese election campaign, increasing the role of Japanese-Chinese relations in the country’s political life. If at first many Japanese considered the Chinese measures an election maneuver and did not believe the Chinese would take such decisive measures, now the PRC actions have begun to cause serious anxiety. Evidently, the bourgeois press reports of disagreements on China policy among various government and liberal-democratic-party groups are not without foundation. Since the end of June, the tone of Kishi and other Cabinet members has clearly changed, emphasizing less the non-recognition of the PRC and more the need for improved relations, the development of tourism, and cultural exchanges. They sometimes even express “regret” for the flag incident in Nagasaki and some other “misunderstandings.” Although, of course, these statements are demagoguery and are often intended to probe the PRC’s intentions, the very fact that the Japanese leaders feel they must respond in this way testifies to the strong pressure on the government from various circles in Japanese society. This pressure has become significantly stronger, in particular, because the deterioration in Japanese-Chinese relations tangibly wounded

the direct interests of a large number of Japanese industrialists, traders and figures tied to the fishing industry.

Definitely in the near term it is hard to expect the Japanese government to change its policy towards China. Therefore, the Chinese comrades will clearly occupy a firm position aimed at pressing Japan for a while. For example, on 7 July, Renmin Ribao published an editorial in which the Kishi government was criticized further and called “the most reactionary Japanese cabinet since the capitulation of 1945.”

In our opinion, the measures taken by the PRC government towards Japan recently are on the whole strongly positive. The main thing is that the Chinese comrades are seriously evaluating the danger of Japanese imperialism and are undertaking measures to counteract this danger... [Continued affirmation is followed by a few minor reservations.]

It must be noted that in changing their tactics toward Japan, the Chinese comrades did not consider it necessary to consult with the Soviet government in advance, only informing us of steps already taken.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 135, ll. 52-59; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 17

FIRST TALK

Of N.S. KHRUSHCHEV with MAO ZEDONG

31 July 1958 in Huairen Hall [in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound]

Present: Coms. B.N. Ponomarev, Deng Xiaoping

KHRUSHCHEV N.S. transmits greetings and [good] wishes from the CC CPSU Presidium members.

MAO ZEDONG thanks him and says it is easier to solve world problems when there is cooperation between the leaders of the two parties.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S. agrees.

MAO ZEDONG: Without guessing at more distant periods, it is possible to say that our cooperation is assured for ten thousand years. [Ten thousand is a symbolic number in Chinese (*wan*) expressing any large quantity.]

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: In that case, we can meet again in 9,999 years to agree on cooperation for the next ten thousand years.

MAO ZEDONG: There are, however, several differences of opinion between us. On individual questions, such differences were, are and will be. If you compare this with ten fingers, our cooperation is nine fingers and our differences are one [finger] ...

[Khrushchev suggests that they focus on areas of disagreement.]

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I would like to discuss the question that disconcerted [*ogoroshi*] us directly. This is about the construction of a navy. You said you couldn't sleep because of this. I also couldn't sleep, when I heard about this.

MAO ZEDONG: I was amazed [*porazhen*] and therefore couldn't sleep.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Never did anyone, starting with myself for I in the main talked with Iudin and then he was given instructions by the Presidium, understand the matter as your comrades interpreted it. There was no thought of a joint fleet. You know my point of view. I was against joint companies during Stalin's lifetime and against his senile foolishness [*starcheskaia glupost'*] about the canned pineapple concession. I emphasize aging foolishness, for Stalin was not so stupid as to not understand this. Here sclerosis was at work.

MAO ZEDONG: I also gave these examples and said Khrushchev eliminated this heritage.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I was one of the Politburo members who told Stalin directly that he shouldn't send such a telegram about concessions to Mao Zedong, since this was incorrect at the level of principle. There were other Politburo members, with whom I have now parted, who also did not support Stalin's suggestion. Right after Stalin's death we liquidated the mixed companies and now we don't have them anywhere.

MAO ZEDONG: There were also the two semi-colonies – Xinjiang and Manchuria.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: The abnormal situation there was also eliminated.

MAO ZEDONG: Citizens of third countries were not even allowed to live there according to the agreement. You also eliminated these semi-colonies.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes, for this contradicted basic Communist principles.

MAO ZEDONG: I agree completely.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Even in Finland, a capitalist country, we eliminated our military base.

MAO ZEDONG: And you yourself eliminated the base in Port Arthur ...

[Khrushchev repeatedly assures Mao that Iudin simply misunderstood and therefore misrepresented for lack of a military background. Iudin, "seriously ill," was not present to respond. Mao finally agrees that he lost sleep over nothing. Then Mao suggests ways of satisfying Soviet military needs without building a joint fleet.]

MAO ZEDONG: A fifth variant is that we give you Port Arthur. We'd still have several ports.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: What? Do you consider us red imperialists [*krasnye imperialisty*]?

MAO ZEDONG: It's not a matter of red or white imperialists. There was a man by the name of Stalin who took Port Arthur and changed Xinjiang and Manchuria into semi-colonies, and also created four mixed companies. These were all his good deeds ... [Probably with irony, but not marked in original text]

[Khrushchev defends the Port Arthur decision and Mao continues to attack Stalin.]

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: You defended Stalin. They criticized me for criticizing Stalin. And now it's the other way around.

MAO ZEDONG: You criticized him for other [matters].

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: At the [20th CPSU Party] Congress [in February 1956], I spoke of this too.

MAO ZEDONG: I always said, both now and then in Moscow, that criticism of Stalin's mistakes is correct. We only disagree with the absence of a clear limit to the criticism. We consider that of Stalin's ten fingers, three were rotten [*gnilykh*].

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I think more [were rotten].

MAO ZEDONG: Wrong. His life was mainly one of merit. [*v ego zhizni osnovnoe – zaslugi*]

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes. We speak of Stalin's achievements and we are also among those achievements.

MAO ZEDONG: Correct.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Stalin was and remains Stalin. But we criticized the scum [*nakip'*] and scabs [*korostu*] that accumulated in his old age. It's another matter when Tito criticizes him. In 20 years, students will search the dictionary to discover who Tito was, but they'll all know the name of Stalin. The dictionary will say that Tito was a splittist [*raskolnik*] of the socialist camp who tried to undermine it, but Stalin will be [described as] a fighter, who battled the enemies of the working class, but committed major errors.

MAO ZEDONG; Stalin's main errors regarding China are not about the semi-colonies.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I know. He incorrectly evaluated the CCP's revolutionary possibilities, wrote obliging [*liubeznye*] letters to Jiang Jieshi, and supported Wang Ming.

MAO ZEDONG: Even more important is something else. His first major error left the CCP with only a tenth of the territory it had had. His second error was that when the revolution in China had ripened, he advised us not to carry out the revolution, saying that if we began to fight with Jiang Jieshi, it might threaten the whole nation with destruction.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Incorrect. It couldn't destroy the nation.

MAO ZEDONG: But that's what it said in Stalin's telegram. Therefore, I think that the relations between the parties were incorrect. After the victory of our revolution, Stalin doubted its character. He thought that China was a second Yugoslavia.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes, he thought that possible.

MAO ZEDONG: When I arrived in Moscow, he didn't want to conclude a friendship treaty with us and annul the previous treaty with the Guomindang. I remember Fedorenko and Kovalev passed on his [Stalin's] advice to travel around the country and have a look. But I told them that I had only three tasks: eating, sleeping and defecating [*isprazhniatsiia*]. I didn't come to Moscow just to congratulate Stalin on his birthday. Therefore, I said, if you don't want to conclude a treaty, it's not necessary. I'll carry out my three tasks. Last year when we were in Moscow, when Bulganin was still present, we heard that Stalin had us tapped.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes, I said that. He had us tapped too. He even bugged himself. Once, when we were relaxing together, he admitted he didn't trust himself. I'm a hopeless case [*propashchi*], he said. I don't trust myself.

[Mao switches back to the joint fleet discussion.]

MAO ZEDONG: We'll talk about the international situation tomorrow. I consider that the naval question is decided.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Without a battle and without a defeat for both sides.

MAO ZEDONG: There won't be a joint fleet?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: We didn't raise this question at all.

MAO ZEDONG: But three Soviet comrades spoke of a joint fleet.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Now there are four Soviet comrades here. And we say there will not be a joint fleet.

MAO ZEDONG: We won't return to this question.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: The question does not exist. It was a misunderstanding.

MAO ZEDONG: I agree. Let's write – question removed.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I agree. Let's write: there neither was, is, nor will be a question. It's the result of a misunderstanding, the incorrect presentation of this matter by Iudin. I think we've exhausted it.

MAO ZEDONG: Now I'm calm.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Me too. We'll sleep calmly now. Now I'd like to talk about the radar [*radiolokatsionnyi*] station.

[The Soviet military needed a radio transmitter to control its Pacific submarine fleet and the Chinese agreed that one should be built in China for joint use, but constructed and owned by China. Khrushchev offers funding at a 70/30 ratio and Mao refuses, threatening not to build at all. The Soviet military's lack of political sensitivity is blamed for any misunderstandings that may have occurred. Mao then goes on to complain about A. I. Mikoian's "patronizing" (*otnoshenie ottsa k synu*) speech at the Eighth CCP Congress in September 1956 and "high-handed" (*vysokomernyi*) attitude during his earlier visit, in Jan.-Feb. 1949, to Xibaipo. Mao then complains about some of the Soviet advisors in China, in particular military and security specialists, and Khrushchev pleads ignorance of these matters, but offers to remove them all. Mao demurs and accuses Khrushchev.]

MAO ZEDONG: We are asking you to leave them and you want to take away the advisors.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: We won't do anything without you[r consent].

MAO ZEDONG: The difference between them [the advisors] and our own workers is only one of citizenship.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I agree that it is a temporary difference. The main thing is communist ties.

MAO ZEDONG: Yes. Even inside the nation there are contradictions. For example, our northern workers are not very welcome in Southern China ...

[A short discussion of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe concludes with Mao encouraging aid to Albania.]

MAO ZEDONG: In case of war, we'll definitely have to cooperate. Look at all the bases, like nails pounded in around us: in Japan, in Taiwan, in South Korea, in [South] Vietnam, in Malaya, and so on.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes. And how many in Europe? Bases all around. It's a good thing we developed the economy and our scientists invented rockets.

MAO ZEDONG: We're all living off [*za schet*] your rockets.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes, in some degree, we can say that without excessive modesty. It's holding back the enemies ...

[Source: *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF)*, f. 52, op. 1, d. 498, ll. 44-77, copy in Reel 17, Dmitrii Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 18

FOURTH CONVERSATION

Of N. S. KHRUSHCHEV with MAO ZEDONG

3 August, 1958, in the Qinzhendian Hall [date handwritten on typescript]

Present: Comrades Khrushchev, Malinovskii, Kuznetsov, Ponomarev, Antonov
Comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun
Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi,
Wang Jiayang, Huang Kecheng, Yang Shangkun, Hu Qiaomu

MAO ZEDONG: I would like to clarify two minor, but important questions. First, about the moratorium on atomic weapons' testing. You unilaterally stopped, but the West continues. Don't you think it will be necessary to renew testing?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: They liberated us from obligations by not stopping [their] testing. We carried out our tests. Now we are continuing to work on atom and hydrogen bombs. As soon as we need to, we'll renew testing, if, of course, there is no agreement on a test-ban by then.

MAO ZEDONG: That's clear. You said that intercontinental rockets fly through space. Don't they burn up when they reenter the atmosphere?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: No, this problem has been solved.

MAO ZEDONG: How do you evaluate [the fact] that the US has placed its military bases around the Soviet Union?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: It's bad for us. The bases are close to us. But the main bases are far away, in America. It's hard to get to them with bombers. But now with rockets, the balance of forces has evened out [*vyravnialos*']. We're having troubles now in long-distance rocket tests. Our own territory is not enough for this.

MAO ZEDONG: Can't you fire over the North Pole?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: That is exactly the shortest distance and in case of war we will

fire over the pole. That is why the Americans are suggesting inspections in the Arctic zone in order to cut off [*zasech*] our missile bases and defend itself [*obezopasit' sebia*].

MAO ZEDONG: I read Eisenhower's answer to your offer on the prevention of surprise attacks [*vnezapnoe napadenie*]. Not a bad answer, it seems he is ready for an experts meeting on this question. It appears they fear a surprise attack.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I still haven't seen that letter.

MAO ZEDONG: We'd like to consult regarding the delegation's departure. Maybe we should change the send-offs, gather a crowd at the airport, have an honor guard, invite the diplomatic corps?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I thought we agreed yesterday to organize the departure to be the same as the arrival. Let's let our agreement be firm. In this way, we'll give less food for the gossipers [*krivotolkov*], otherwise in the West they'll say that the arrival was secret, because we hoped for the success of the negotiations, and clearly there are some contradictions between China and the Soviet Union, and then after meeting, they decided to organize showy [*pyshnye*] send-offs. Rather let them guess, let the very fact of our meeting have its effect.

MAO ZEDONG: I thought it necessary for your arrival to be in secret, so the imperialists couldn't take advantage of your absence to carry out a surprise attack.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I don't think they are decided on this, the correlation of forces is not in their favor. And now they have to swallow another bitter pill – recognizing Iraq. Even if they were 50 percent ready for war, they wouldn't start one.

MAO ZEDONG: Yes, of course, England wouldn't start [a war].

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: And neither France or Germany would dare [*osmelilis'*]. They know we would dust them [*steret' v poroshok*]. If the British suffered from the German V-1 and V-2, that is now nothing compared with rockets. They know it.

MAO ZEDONG: But they have bases all around. In Turkey alone there are over 100 bases.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: No, there are fewer in Turkey and they are all in our sights [*pod pritselom*]. They're planning to build bases in Greece, but that's even easier. Throw a rock down from the Bulgarian mountains and they'll be gone. Even America is under the gun now. [*pod udarom*]. We must thank our scholars for the creation of intercontinental missiles.

MAO ZEDONG: And the Germans?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: No, they took part only at the beginning. You couldn't entrust such an important task to Germans. Now they've returned to Germany and told about what they worked on. Using their stories, the Americans concluded that we did not have intercontinental

missiles. When we announced [successful] testing, they did not believe us. But afterwards we put up a satellite. Now the Americans are saying that the Russians themselves created the intercontinental missile. In the papers, we read that Germans also worked in America, but America did not send up the first satellite.

MAO ZEDONG: I still think that your travels abroad to summits are dangerous. I would recommend to you the naming of a deputy during your absence. We are all worried when you travel.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes, there is a certain risk, especially if the meeting is in New York. There are a lot of angry [*ozloblennye*] Hungarians and other enemies there.

[Khrushchev then tells a long story about how Eisenhower's armored car in Geneva had secret service guards running alongside, but Khrushchev and Bulganin rode in a convertible.]

MAO ZEDONG: Stalin refused to even go to Geneva, but I didn't mean that kind of danger.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: That was senility [*starcheskii defekt uma*]. We do not consider the outbreak of war possible now. Sometimes we ask our military to prepare situational analyses based on their data. Recently they reported that there is presently no basis to consider the danger of war to be near.

MAO ZEDONG: What do you think, will Dulles remain at his post?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: No, it seems he's leaving, although it would be better for us if he stayed. Better to deal with a fool than a wise man.

MAO ZEDONG: Do you think Stevenson could become president?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: He's better [*bolee polozhitel'naia lichnost'*].

MAO ZEDONG: If the Republicans keep power, probably Nixon will be president.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes, more than likely. That will be worse than Eisenhower. Eisenhower came on the political stage as a national war hero. As a politician, he's not among the best. He doesn't have any political experience. He doesn't shine as a military man either. In the Ardennes at the end of the war, the Germans almost knocked him out. Churchill asked Stalin to help the Western allies.

MAO ZEDONG: You shouldn't have helped them. Maybe without that, we wouldn't have a West Berlin or a West Germany now.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Yes, maybe we'd now be visiting Thorez [in power]. But that was a different situation then. The Germans were giving up to the Americans without a fight, but kept stubbornly resisting us. The situation could have prevented us from taking Berlin. At that point,

Stalin reached an agreement with Eisenhower and he let us take Berlin. In the battle near Vienna, the Germans also ran from us to Eisenhower, but he wouldn't take them prisoner. You see, Eisenhower was not without some measure of decency [*ne lishen nekotroi poriadochnosti*]. But now he does what the American monopolists recommend.

MAO ZEDONG says that all is ready for the signing of the communique.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Good. Let's sign.

On this the meeting ends.

Conversation recorded N. Fedorenko
A. Filev

[Source: APRF, f. 52, op. 1, d. 498, ll. 151-6, copy in Volkogonov Collection, LC, Reel 17; translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 19

[This short marginal note/directive was written onto a "situation report" [*qingkuang jianbao*] by MAO ZEDONG on 18 February 1959]

Liu [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], Chen Yi, [Deng] Xiaoping. After reading return to Comrade Peng Dehuai.

The more chaotic [*luan*] Tibet gets, the better. We can train troops and toughen the masses. Furthermore, this furnishes sufficient reason for future pacification and reform.

Mao Zedong
18 February

[Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao's Manuscripts since the establishment of the PRC], v. 8 (Beijing, 1993), p. 46; translation from Chinese by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 20

[This marginal note was written onto a report by MAO ZEDONG at the point where the Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on 29 March 1959 that Tibetans in India had not undertaken "illegal activities."]

Note: Dear Indian friends: Don't be credulous with the Tibetans. Their direction of the Tibet uprising is secret. Maybe we know what you don't know!⁷⁴

[Source : Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao's Manuscripts since the establishment of the PRC], v. 8 (Beijing, 1993), p. 182-3; translation from Chinese by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 21

To the Central Committee of the CPSU

We present this report "On the situation in Tibet," prepared on the basis of information provided by the Chinese friends on the latest events, and [using] other materials available to the [International] Department of the CC CPSU.

Head of CC CPSU Department of ties with communist and worker parties in socialist countries.
IU. ANDROPOV
31 March 1959

On the Situation in Tibet

Tibet is one of the largest territories of the border provinces of China, occupying more than 1.2 million square kilometers. According to the 1953 census, the Tibetan population in the PRC numbers 2.775 million. In Tibet itself, however, less than half is concentrated (1.27 million). The remainder live in the areas of the PRC next to Tibet and are autonomous (autonomous districts and provinces in Qinghai, Sichuan, and others).

In the past Tibet was long the object of English and then American influence. The Indian bourgeoisie also had significant interests in Tibet. Tibet's leadership cultivated ties with these countries and came up with the idea of creating an "independent Tibet." When the Guomindang regime fell in 1949, the Tibetan ruling circles tried to realize the idea of Tibetan independence. They asked all governments for help "in the struggle for independence," drove out the Guomindang men, refused the peaceful suggestions of the PRC and prepared for military action against China.

In 1951 PRC troops entered Tibet and these leaders had to end their resistance. Officially, Tibet was liberated peacefully on the basis of an agreement concluded in Beijing in May 1951 between the PRC central government and the Tibetan local government. The Tibetan delegation to the negotiations was headed by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, who had previously handed over Eastern Tibet to the PRC troops. The Panchen Lama also took part in the negotiations. He had established contact earlier with the Chinese friends and was interested in returning from exile to Tibet to recoup his position as second only to the Dalai Lama.

The agreement contained the following planned measures: as a part of China, Tibet's troops would be reorganized and integrated into the PRC's armed forces, while in Tibet a

⁷⁴ Mao's tone seems to imply that he suspects the Indians of feigning ignorance.

military-administrative committee would include representatives of the local Tibetan government. The agreement also stipulated continuation of the political system in Tibet and also the functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama as well as preserving the religion, language, writing and customs of the Tibetan people. Foreign affairs were concentrated in the hands of the PRC central government. An agreement on realizing national autonomy under the leadership of the PRC government was achieved. The agreement noted that the Central People's Government of China would not force matters regarding reform in Tibet and that the carrying out of one or another reform would be agreed upon [in advance] with the Tibetan authorities. Measures for helping Tibet to develop its economy and culture were also planned.

Although in recent years the PRC government has carried out several measures to raise its economy and culture, Tibet remains, even today, one of the most backward provinces of China. Some of the most important enterprises are the completion of major highways: Xikang-Tibet (length 2255 km), Qinghai-Tibet (2100 km) and Xinjiang-Tibet (under construction). Local industrial enterprises, several state farms, and experimental agricultural stations have been established. Much has been accomplished in providing the population of Tibet with goods and food. Previously, there were no lay schools in Tibet. Now there are over 60 schools, including one middle school in Lhasa. Much has also been done in public health, including the training of some Tibetans.

Despite some successes achieved by the Chinese comrades, the political situation in Tibet remained complicated. There were periodic disturbances. Major unrest occurred in 1954-56. In 1955, the CC CCP sent Deputy Premier and Politburo member Chen Yi to Tibet. To calm things down a part of the Chinese organization and troops were withdrawn from Tibet. The region of Chamdo, populated by Tibetans, was joined to Tibet. The military-administrative committee was reorganized into a preparatory committee for the creation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with the Dalai Lama at its head.

The Dalai Lama and his reactionary retinue continually prevented democratic transformation. Because of this, in Tibet neither land nor other democratic reforms have been carried out. Land remains in the hands of the monasteries, lay and spiritual feudals [*feodaly*]. In the socio-political realm, the feudal-serf order under the rule of religion, monasteries, and lamas remains almost untouched. There are over 100,000 lamas in Tibet constituting the basic reactionary force actively supporting the Dalai Lama. Even now there are no elective organs of popular power in Tibet. In this respect the PRC Constitution has not yet been extended to Tibet.

In his 1957 speech "On the question of the correct solution of contradictions within the people," Com. Mao Zedong pointed out that conditions for democratic changes in Tibet were not yet ripe, and therefore they would not be carried out in the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62). In Mao's words, the Tibetans themselves would decide on carrying them out in the Third Five-Year Plan.

The Communist Party of China has made the realization of Tibetan autonomy depend on the general political situation in that province, the carrying out of democratic transformations and the preparation of new cadres capable of carrying out the party's policy. The joining to Tibet of other areas of the PRC with Tibetan populations also depends on this.

Anglo-American intelligence is always active in Tibet, including around the Dalai Lama. The nearest relatives of the Dalai Lama (three brothers) are abroad and systematically propagandize against the PRC and for the "liberation" of Tibet. [Calls for support from African and Asian countries are detailed.]

The Chinese comrades try to lead a careful policy in Tibet in order to avoid unnecessary

complications. Despite these efforts, however, the situation in Tibet recently became more strained. At the end of 1958, disorders and open revolts began in some Tibetan areas. With the help of foreign intelligence agencies, reactionary nationalists began to broaden their subversive work. In January-February 1959 a major revolt erupted in the region of Kham (eastern Tibet). The rebels cut the eastern highway into Tibet and established communication abroad, including with Jiang Jieshi's troops in Burma.

According to Chinese comrades, the situation in Tibet in March took on a military character. On 19 March about 30,000 rebels blockaded the Chinese garrisons of Lhasa and other places and began to fire on them. The internal center of the uprising was Lhasa and the foreign one was the Indian city of Kalimpong. The revolt took place under the battle slogan: "For the independence of Tibet and her separation from China."

According to information held by the Chinese comrades, the Tibetans' actions are inspired by the Americans and English. The Americans are sending help to the rebels through Pakistan and Burma. India, despite Nehru's assurances of non-interference in Tibetan affairs, also according to the Chinese comrades' information, has not stood aside. Help to Tibet, including cannons and machine guns, is coming from India via Nepal. The Indian consulate in Lhasa took a direct part in organizing the revolt. The uprising's foreign center has been founded in the Indian city of Kalimpong.

In this situation the Chinese friends took decisive measures to put down the uprising. According to them, the revolt was crushed in Lhasa on 22 March. The Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa and his whereabouts are still not known. In other parts of Tibet the uprising continues, but the Chinese friends are sure that they will soon re-establish order throughout Tibet. This is made easier, because the Panchen Lama, the above-mentioned Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, is on the PRC's side. The friends intend to rally the workers of Tibet around him and other Tibetan progressive figures to carry out reforms, agricultural, first of all. The friends for political reasons intend to draw the Dalai Lama to their side again.

From the Chinese friends' communications, we can see that the uprising in Tibet has a national-religious tint. In the main, the central, eastern, and southern areas of Tibet are involved in the uprising. The main forces of the Tibetan counter-revolution are religious circles, who have drawn local Tibetan military units and one of the Tibetan mountain tribes, the Khampa, to their side. Spies from imperialist countries were the inspirers and, in large part, the organizers of the uprising. We can also assume that the majority of the population, especially laboring peasants stayed away from the action, supporting neither side. Here we clearly need to find the reasons in aspects of CCP policy in Tibet. First of all, it is necessary to note that eight years after liberation [by the PLA], Tibetan peasants remain in serf-like dependence, while in other minority regions, socialist transformations have already been carried through, with the party's policy receiving broader social support there. In Tibet the main effort was through peaceful solution of all problems by agreement with the feudal-theocratic circles and their "re-education". In the main, the working masses saw few real results from living in a socialist state.

The Chinese friends are aware that the wide publicity of the Tibetan events in the capitalist world may bring certain international complications for China. In their opinion, England and the US will try to use the Tibetan events for inimical propaganda against China to strengthen the "cold war," possibly [including] putting the Tibet question in front of the UN. It is possible that the escaped rebels with the aid of the US and other imperialist states will create a Tibetan emigre government. This will become even more complicated, if the Dalai Lama is hiding abroad.

As can be seen from the Chinese friends' messages, they are especially concerned about PRC relations with India and the events in Tibet. Since Indian circles were mixed up in the Tibetan events, it will effect Chinese-Indian relations in some measure. Recently, the reactionary parties and groups in India are demanding a parliamentary discussion of the Tibetan events. The Indian Popular-Socialist Party is organizing anti-Chinese meetings and demonstrations. Many Indian newspapers have begun an anti-Chinese campaign. Religious circles in India also are trying to use the Tibetan events to aggravate relations between India and the PRC.

Since Nehru in his 23 March speech separated himself from the events in Tibet, the Chinese friends plan for the moment to withhold from publication the information in their possession on the interference of India in Tibetan affairs. In the present situation, said Chen Yi, the main task is to neutralize India and then attract her to our side ...

[An overview of "bourgeois" press coverage of the Tibetan uprising follows, in which Tibet is described as an "Asian Hungary." Special attention is paid to official remarks by Nehru, the U.S. State Department, and Jiang Jieshi.]

The Chinese friends are more concerned about the international aspects of the disturbances in Tibet. Here, evidently, sooner or later they will have to make appropriate statements and take practical steps.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 238, ll. 42-48 (R. 8929); translated from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 22

State Committee on the USSR Council of Ministers
on International Economic Ties [GKES], 2 July 1959

Secret

To the Central Committee

I am sending a report on the present economic situation in the People's Republic of China, as prepared by the Department of Economic Cooperation with Socialist Countries of GKES.

Attachment : As mentioned on 7 pages.

Chairman of the State Committee

S. Skachkov

On the Present Economic Situation in the People's Republic of China

Starting from the economic results obtained in 1958, the Chinese friends originally planned to continue at a high rate of economic development. Compared to 1958, growth was foreseen at 41% for steel, at 62% for coal, at 26% for capital investment, etc.

However, as the Chinese friends admit, the economic plan for 1959 was set too high,

since it was made without taking into account objective conditions and the real capacities of the country and without adequate analysis of the results of 1958. During the realization of the “great leap” already in 1958 serious difficulties and imbalances among various branches of the economy appeared. These include the backwardness of the electric, metallurgical and, especially, transport [sectors], a sharp decline in the quality of industrial production, a tense situation in food and product provisioning.

[The gradual discovery that the economy was not doing well is detailed in many sectors.]

The norms of provision of deficit goods, one must say, are very tough. In Beijing, for example, cooking oil is rationed at 330 grams per month. Cadres get 500 grams.

Meat rations are set this year at 500 grams per month. Sugar is provided at 500 grams per month for a three-person family. Soap is at one piece per month per family, and cotton cloth is at 8 meters per person per year.

In accordance with the decisions of directing organs, a lowering of existing norms of grain provision is planned. It will be carried out on a voluntary basis, with agitational work carried out by street committees ...

Department Head for Economic Cooperation with Socialist Countries

G. Sheviakov

[Source : *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 49, d. 243, ll. 1-8 (R. 8931); translation from Russian by David Wolff.]

DOCUMENT 23

TOP SECRET
ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT
Copy No. 1

RECORD of CONVERSATION of COMRADE KHRUSHCHEV N.S.

With CC CCP Chairman MAO ZEDONG, Deputy Chairman CC CCP LIU SHAOQI, ZHOU ENLAI, ZHU DE, LIN BIAO, Politburo members PENG ZHEN and CHEN YI, and Secretariat member WANG JIAXIANG

2 October 1959

[After a tense and disagreeable discussion of the Taiwan issue and U.S. prisoners held by the PRC (raised by Eisenhower at Camp David), Mao and Khrushchev decide to take a break for an hour. After this, they begin a conversation regarding the uprising in Tibet and the border war with India.]

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: [Discusses the flexibility of the USSR in territorial issues giving Persia and Turkey as examples.] During many years, you and India had good relations. And

suddenly a bloody incident as a result of which Nehru is in a difficult position. You could say that Nehru is a bourgeois figure, but we know this. If Nehru leaves [the scene], who will be better than him? The Dalai Lama has left Tibet and he is a bourgeois figure. This matter is also unclear to us ... If you will allow me to say what it is not permitted for a guest to say, the events in Tibet are your fault. You ruled in Tibet and should have had your intelligence agencies to know the Dalai Lama's plans and intentions.

MAO ZEDONG: Nehru also says that the events in Tibet are our fault. Furthermore, the Soviet Union published a TASS announcement on the conflict with India.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: What do you want, that we approve your conflict with India? That would be stupid of us. The TASS announcement was necessary. You, of course, nonetheless see some difference between me and Nehru. If we had not made the TASS announcement, then there would have been an impression that Nehru faced a united front of socialist countries. The TASS announcement made the question into one between you and India.

MAO ZEDONG: Our mistake was that we should have disarmed the Dalai Lama right away. But at that time we had no contact with the Tibetan masses.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: And now too you have no contact with the population of Tibet.

MAO ZEDONG: We understand this question differently.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Of course. Exactly for this reason we touched on this question. We could speak as follows: Both we and you [host] Koreans who ran away from Kim Il Sung. But this is not a reason to ruin our relations with Kim Il Sung, with whom we remain good friends, as before. As for the Dalai Lama's departure from Tibet, had we been in your place, we would not have given him the chance to leave. It would be better if he was in the grave. [*Luchshe by, esli by on byl v grobu.*] But now he is in India and maybe will go to the USA. Is it possible that this is advantageous for the socialist countries?

MAO ZEDONG: It's impossible. We couldn't arrest him. We couldn't prevent his departure, because the border with India is long and he could cross it at any point.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: It's not a matter of arrest. I'm only saying you let him go in vain [*naprasno*]. If you gave him the chance to escape to India, what would be Nehru's role? We think that the Tibetan events are the Chinese Communist Party's fault and not Nehru's.

MAO ZEDONG: No, they are Nehru's fault.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Then should I understand you [as saying] that we then are not at fault for the events in Hungary, but the United States of America [is]. You understand, we had an army in Hungary and we supported [that] fool [*durak*] Rakosi. That was our mistake, not the United States'.

MAO ZEDONG: Is it possible to compare Rakosi with the Dalai Lama?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: If you will, to a certain extent, yes.

MAO ZEDONG: The Indians acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: We know this. As you know, Nepal wanted [us to post] a Soviet ambassador and we for a long time didn't send one there. You did the same. The reason is that Nehru did not want Soviet and Chinese ambassadors there. This should not surprise, since nothing other than this could be expected from Nehru. But this should still not be a reason to break off relations with him.

MAO ZEDONG: We also support Nehru, but he should be beaten on the Tibet question.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Why did you have to kill people on the Indian border?

MAO ZEDONG: They attacked us first. They crossed the border and fired during 12 hours.

ZHOU ENLAI: Whose information do you believe – ours or the Indians'?

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Although the Indians attacked, there are no Chinese dead, [only] Indians.

ZHOU ENLAI: What are we to do if they attack us first? We can't fire into the air. They even crossed the McMahon line. Besides, [Indian] Vice President [Sarvepalli] Radhakrishnan will visit China soon. This shows we are taking measures to solve the problem peacefully, by negotiations. In my 9 September letter to Nehru, we explained in detail all that happened between ourselves and India.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: Comrade Zhou Enlai, you were Foreign Minister for many years and know as well as I do how to solve disagreements without [spilling] blood. I am not now talking about the border, for if the Chinese and Indians do not know where the border between us [sic] is, then it's not worth it for me, a Russian, to get involved [*vmeshivat'sia*]. I'm just against the methods that were applied.

ZHOU ENLAI: Until a certain point, we didn't know anything about the border incident and all the measures were undertaken by the local authorities without central directives. Besides, this is about three contested areas between China and India. The Indians crossed the McMahon line first and opened fire first. No government of China has [ever] recognized the McMahon line. If [someone] attacked the borders of the USSR, say the Finns, wouldn't you answer [fire]?

SUSLOV, M.A.: We have no claims on the Finns.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: That the Center didn't know about the incident is news for me. I can only tell you something that I was against. On 22 June 1941, the Germans began an attack on the Soviet Union. Stalin forbade [us] to open answering fire and the directive to open fire

came only somewhat later. Stalin explained this by the possibility that this was a provocation. Of course, this was one of Stalin's errors. He was simply a coward [*strusil*]. Here we have a completely different matter...

[A series of unpleasantries ensued with the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi calling Khrushchev's policy "time-serving" (*prisposoblenchestvo*) and Suslov taking umbrage at Lin Biao's comparison of the "trivial [border] incident" with the "fatherland war in which tens of millions died."]

MAO ZEDONG: [The Indians were] repulsed by a decision of the local military organs.

LIN BIAO: There were no orders from above.

MAO ZEDONG: We were unable to hold the Dalai Lama, because the border with India is long and he could cross it at any point.

SUSLOV, M.A.: You should have known his intentions and plots in advance.

MAO ZEDONG: We wanted to delay the transformation of Tibet for four years.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: And that was your error.

MAO ZEDONG: The decision to delay the transformation was made earlier, after the Dalai Lama had been in India [and returned, in early 1957.] Without an excuse, we couldn't begin the attack. And this time we had a good reason, so we acted. It is this that you don't understand. You'll see later that the McMahon line with India will be maintained and the border conflict will end.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: This is good. But the matter is not about the line. We don't know it and don't want to.

MAO ZEDONG: We will solve the border question with India through negotiations.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: We welcome this intention.

ZHOU ENLAI: We suggested to Nehru that we negotiate this [coming] year on 22 January. Then he didn't agree. Now he does.

MAO ZEDONG: You pasted two labels on us, saying that the conflict with India was our fault and that the Dalai Lama's escape was our fault. We pasted one label on you – time-servers. Here.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: We don't accept. We hold a principled, Communist position.

[Khrushchev wonders out loud, why the Chinese can criticize the Russians, but not the other way around. He concludes that: "You want to subordinate (*podchinit*) us ..." Mao compares the

Dalai Lama's escape to the departures of Kerenskii and Trotskii from the USSR, but Khrushchev rejects the comparison.]

CHEN YI: I am upset [*vozmushchen*] by your statement that the "worsening of relations with India was our fault."

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: I am upset by your statement that we are time-servers. We should support Nehru, help him to keep power.

MAO ZEDONG: The Tibetan events and the border conflict are passing matters. Best that we end our discussion of these questions. Can't we evaluate our relations as on the whole united, with some disagreements that do not prevent our friendship.

KHRUSHCHEV N.S.: We held and hold exactly that point of view.

[The conversation flares up once again between Chen Yi and Khrushchev with Wang Jiayang defusing the tension by claiming that Chen Yi was mistranslated. The final note is one of agreement on avoiding war in Laos.]

[Source: *APRF, copy on Reel 17, Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; translation from Russian by David Wolff.*]

DOCUMENT 24

TO THE CC CPSU PRESIDUM

I present the draft report for the upcoming CC CPSU Plenum "About the Visit of the Soviet Party-Governmental Delegation to the PRC."

I request members and candidate members of the Presidium to send comments, if they have [any].

[Signed] M. Suslov

18 December 1959

TO MEMBERS OF THE CC CPSU PRESIDUM TO CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE CC CPSU PRESIDUM

Please substitute the attached pages, which have been modified and made more exact on the basis of comments received, to your copy of the draft report "About the Visit of the Soviet Party-Governmental Delegation to the People's Republic of China."

[Signed] M. Suslov

24 December 1959

From our side in the discussion of foreign policy issues took part comrades Khrushchev, Suslov and Gromyko. From the Chinese side participated comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Wang Jiaxiang.

The discussion took place on 2 October in the residence of the Politburo of the CC Communist Party of China. Comrade Khrushchev informed the Chinese friends about his trip to the USA and his talks with President D. Eisenhower. He stressed that among American political figures there is growing sentiment in favor of peaceful settlement of unresolved, disputed questions and that at the present time there is a very real possibility for further resolute steps toward a more durable peace. In this regard he brought the attention of the Chinese friends to the necessity for the socialist camp to avoid anything that could be exploited by the reactionaries to drive the world back into the cold war "rut".

Comrade Khrushchev told the Chinese comrades that we do not completely understand their foreign policy, particularly with regard to India and Taiwan. [Our position is for the peaceful resolution of disagreements. The just demands of the PRC regarding the Taiwan question are clear to us and we support them. But we are unable to agree that a world war [should be] ignited because of Taiwan.]⁷⁵

Comrade Khrushchev raised the question regarding the necessity of improving mutual information between the leadership of our parties on the issues of foreign policy. One cannot regard as normal the situation, when we, China's ally, do not know what the Chinese comrades may undertake tomorrow in the area of foreign policy. Indeed, all countries of the socialist camp are linked not only by the common ideas and goals, but also by the alliance commitments. Incorrect actions of one country may hurt the international situation of the whole socialist camp. One should keep in mind that imperialist propaganda directly links activity of Chinese comrades to the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. Indeed, communist parties always emphasize that the socialist camp has one line in foreign policy.

As far as the CC CPSU is concerned, we systematically inform the leadership of fraternal parties of socialist countries about most important foreign policy steps of the USSR and, in special cases, we seek their advice.

One must admit that the Chinese comrades reacted to the remarks of comrade Khrushchev painfully [*boleznenno*]. They claimed that their policy with regard to Taiwan and the off-shore straits is fully justified and is being carried out skillfully, that their line toward the Nehru government is correct. At times the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when a member of the Politburo CC Communist Party of China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly opportunistic [*prisposoblencheskaia*], and the policy of China is more firm and correct. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements.

In connection with the remarks of the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering

⁷⁵ [Bold brackets indicate text eliminated from the second draft of Suslov's report after 24 December 1959.] At the October 2 meeting, Khrushchev stated that: "Between us, confidentially, we say that we will not fight because of Taiwan, but outside [*vo vne*], so to speak, we say that should the situation worsen because of Taiwan, the USSR will defend China." This appears to be a substantial reversal of Khrushchev's "nuclear promise" to Mao made public in his 7 September 1958 letter to US President Eisenhower. On this, see Vladislav Zubok, "Khrushchev's Nuclear Promise to Beijing during the 1958 Crisis" *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 219, 226-227.

how they understand the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it as a general line of foreign policy of the socialist camp, whether they think it is necessary to struggle for the relaxation of international tension and for securing general peace.⁷⁶

We are getting the impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver. [The Chinese, it appears, consider that since the forces of peace and socialism outweigh the forces of war, and since in the next 15-20 years this superiority will become decisive, a frontal [*lobovoe*] attack on capitalism by direct pressure and all means is necessary. Several times the Chinese comrades have expressed the conviction that the USA and other imperialist countries are not ready for a big war at the present time and the socialist camp must make use of this in its foreign policy.]

The Chinese comrades incorrectly explain the motives that have led many leaders in the USA and other imperialist states to recognize the idea of negotiating with the socialist camp ...

[Suslov expatiates on the Chinese misperception of capitalist perceptions and policies, noting in particular that the film of Khrushchev's US visit did not receive sufficient airtime.]

When we speak of the principle of peaceful coexistence and of our struggle for the relaxation of international tension, we clearly admit that success in this matter depends not only on us, but also on the other side – on the ruling circles of the Western powers. We understand that in these circles there are quite a few passionate supporters of “cold” and hot war. Not a few influential individuals have interests linked to the arms race. Finally, there are simply crazy⁷⁷ maniacs [*man'iaki*], hating the new socialist system and ready in their blind passion to rush into any adventure. Of course, it's impossible to count on the actions of such people. [If such adventuristic moods predominated in the ruling circles of the Western powers even temporarily, if the smell of [gun] powder was in the air again, it's possible that some people in China would start to say: you see, we warned you that you can't trust the imperialists.]

[Suslov insists that the correct focus is not on the imperialists ability to “unleash war,” but on the mobilization of world public opinion against the would-be aggressors.]

One should say that at the end of the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and other Chinese comrades declared that they did not want war; that they would resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and would settle the conflict with India through negotiations. They confirmed again that the Communist party of China has a common line and common goals with us. We expressed our satisfaction in this regard.

[Common policy towards Laos was mentioned and Khrushchev, noting the oversensitive behavior of the Chinese, called for “equality and comradely relations in the fraternal family of Communist parties.”]

“Our road is one with that of the Chinese Communists. We consider them our friends,” said comrade Khrushchev. “However, we cannot live with even our friends talking down [*svysoka*] to us.”

⁷⁶ In the original text, the phrase after “struggle” reads “for avoiding war.”

⁷⁷ This is *sumasshedshie* in the first draft and *bezumnye* in the second.

Toward the end of our meeting the Chinese comrades became calmer and explained to us in greater detail their position on the indicated matters. We were of the impression that they too were disturbed by our differences of opinion and were trying to smooth them over [*sgradit*].

Although the conversation was not completely pleasant at times, we consider that it was necessary and extremely useful. As a result of our conversation, at the end of our stay in Beijing and after the delegation's departure, the Chinese comrades made all kinds of efforts to emphasize the basic unity between our parties.

On October 4, the Soviet party-governmental delegation left Beijing for the Motherland. Before leaving Beijing comrade Khrushchev told Mao Zedong that the Soviet party-governmental delegation was leaving with an open heart, that our friendship should not be darkened by differences on concrete questions. The Chinese comrades responded that they fully shared our opinion. Several days later, comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai sent a telegram in which they expressed their support for the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union and stated their conviction that Soviet-Chinese friendship will strengthen and develop in the future.

One should not omit the fact that the aforementioned mistakes and shortcomings in the field of domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party of China are largely explained by the atmosphere of the cult of personality of com. Mao Zedong. Formally the CC of the Communist Party of China observes the norms of collective leadership, but in effect the most important decisions are made single-handedly, and thus are often touched by subjectivism, and in some instances are simply not well thought through. Glorification of com. Mao Zedong is visibly and unrestrainedly on the rise in China. In the party press one can increasingly find such statements as "we, the Chinese, live in the great epoch of Mao Zedong," comrade Mao Zedong is portrayed as a great genius. They call him the beacon illuminating the path to communism, the embodiment of communist ideas. The name of com. Mao Zedong is equated with the party, etc. One presents the works of com. Mao Zedong in China as the last word of creative Marxism, of the same rank as the works of the classics [*klassiki*] of Marxism-Leninism. In effect, the works of com. Mao Zedong are at the foundation of all educational work in the party and in the country. Even in the PRC's colleges and universities the teaching of social sciences during the last two-three years has been reduced to the study of Mao's works. All this, unfortunately, pleases [*imponiruet*] com. Mao Zedong, who, by all accounts, himself has come to believe in his own infallibility. This is reminiscent of the atmosphere that existed in our country during the last years of I.V. Stalin. Of course, we could not talk with the Chinese comrades about it, but the Plenum should also know of this aspect of life of the Communist Party of China ...

In recent years, the CC Presidium has been firmly guided [by the idea] that in relations with the Chinese comrades there should be nothing unclear or unsettled and has done everything necessary to that end. The CC CPSU removed several negative aspects linked to violations of China's sovereign rights during Stalin's life and strictly checks that our relations are built on a healthy basis.

CC CPSU Presidium members also met earlier with the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party for discussion of a broad array of matters regarding Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation. The meeting of comrade Khrushchev with Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1958 was important in this respect. This meeting took place as the international situation became tense because of the American-English intervention in the Near East. At that time we discussed several matters related to measures of mutual defense in case of broader imperialist aggression and worked out a common line on avoiding conflict in the Near East. At

that time Mao Zedong more than once emphasized that the Chinese Communist Party and the CPSU were always basically and mainly united [*ediny v osnovnom, glavnom*]. “If our relations are like ten fingers, Mao Zedong said to us, then nine of them are full of unity and only in one, the little finger, are their differences of opinion.” We consider it necessary to remove these differences, too.

[Suslov finishes his report with assurances that both Soviet and Chinese comrades will make efforts to remain united, despite “various forces” who would like to sow quarrels. To this end, the Soviet Union will continue its “all-around aid” to China both in the domestic and international arenas.]

[Source: *TsKhSD f. 2 (Plenums), op. 1, d. 495, ll. 5-55; translation from Russian by David Wolff and Vladislav Zubok.*]

DOCUMENT 25

[Mao Zedong,]

An outline for a speech on the international situation
December 1959

The scope of the discussion is to be expressed by myself.

What is the enemy’s tactics?

(1) [Waving] the flag of peace, building lots of missiles, establishing lots of [military] bases, preparing to use war to eliminate socialism. This is the first.

(2) [Waving] the flag of peace, [through] cultural intercourse and personnel exchange, prepare to use corrosion [*fushi*] to eliminate socialism. This is the second.

Self-preservation and elimination of enemies is the fundamental concept [we should follow].

[The enemy’s strategy]: Sometimes conciliating, sometimes strained; Conciliating here, straining there; Conciliating in Europe, tense in Asia; Striving the opportunists, isolating the Marxism-Leninists.

Has revisionism already been systemized and will it determinedly continue?

Maybe it’s that way, but maybe it can still be changed.

Maybe it is long term (for example, more than 10 years)

Maybe it is short term, for example, 1-4 years.

The basic interests of China and the Soviet Union have determined that after all these two great powers should unite. Where they don’t unite, it is only a temporary phenomenon, only one finger in ten.

One finger’s worth of historical events.

In 1945, they did not permit [us to make] revolution, but afterwards they consented.

From 1949 until 1951, they doubted that [ours was] a real revolution and begin by being unwilling to conclude a mutual-aid alliance treaty, but changed their mind. In the last ten years, they have helped us build many factories.

In 1953, Gao [Gang], Rao [Shushi], Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng] started a subversive movement with Moscow's support.⁷⁸

In 1954, they liquidated the Luda [Port Arthur – Dalnii port complex] military base and four joint companies.

In 1956, they had the anti-Stalin affair and the doctrine of peaceful transition appeared. We have two articles on this.⁷⁹

In 1957, the Chinese Anti-Right Rectification [campaign] brought out internal contradictions in the people; The Moscow Declaration issued in the fall [caused] us to criticize the [Soviet] friends.

In 1958, China formulated the general line for the period of socialist construction, started the Great Leap and the People's Communes. [During] the Sino-Soviet talks in Beijing in August, [discussion of] the joint fleet and 70% investment to build a radio station [took place], but we resisted these attacks. The Jinmen Shelling Incident really frightened our friends.

In 1959, [there occurred] the Tibetan affair, the Sino-Indian border affair, the November exchange of documents between the two parties. At the October Beijing talks [with Khrushchev], [we] resisted the friends' fallacies.

In the same year, the remainder of the Gao-Rao group carried out a subversive movement with the friends' support.⁸⁰

Also in 1959, since March, our friends have been organizing a big anti-Chinese chorus together with the imperialists and reactionary nationalists, and the Tito revisionists.

In the long term, China will, on the one hand, be isolated, but on the other, gain the support of many Communist parties, many countries, and many peoples. In these difficult conditions, China will become a very strong country in 8 years.

In another 8 years, China will complete the first-phase construction of the industrial system, first-phase construction of cutting-edge industry, first-phase preparation of a technology contingent [personnel], will complete preparation of a theoretical (contingent); will greatly raise political consciousness in the party and among the people. (Either all three cannot be completed or they can be completed.)

Careful, careful; [We should] respect facts and refer to rationality.

Study the Soviet Union's merits and support all the Soviet Union's correct positions.

There are two good things about the reactionaries' anti-Chinese [activities]: one is that they have revealed the reactionaries, reducing their prestige among the people; the second is that they have stimulated the consciousness of the majority of the peoples in the world, who can then see that reactionary imperialism, nationalism, and revisionism are enemies, swindlers, and contraband, whereas the Chinese flag is bright red.

The whole world is very bright. The darker the clouds, the greater the light.

Marxism and Leninism will get the greatest development in China. There is no doubt of this.

Khrushchev and his group are very naïve. He does not understand Marxism-Leninism and is easily fooled by imperialism.

He does not understand China, to an extreme extent. He doesn't research [China] and

⁷⁸ Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, two top CCP leaders, were purged in 1954. Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng, two top military leaders of the PRC, were purged in 1959.

⁷⁹ This refers to two *People's Daily* editorials entitled "On the Lessons of the Proletarian Dictatorship" and "Another Discussion of the Proletarian Dictatorship," respectively published in April and November 1956.

⁸⁰ Mao here, again, refers to Peng Dehuai's and Huang Kecheng's purge in July 1959, labeling them as subversive elements supported by Moscow.

believes a whole bunch of incorrect information. He gives irresponsible talks. If he doesn't correct [his mistakes], in a few years he'll be completely bankrupt (after 8 years).

He panics over China. The panic has reached its extreme.

He has two main fears: imperialism and Chinese Communism.

He fears that Eastern European or other Communist parties will believe us and not them.

His world view is pragmatism. This is an extreme kind of subjective idealism. He lacks a workable agenda and will follow gain wherever it goes.

The Soviet people are good as is the [Soviet] party. There is something not good about the style of the party and people, a somewhat metaphysical style, a kind of capitalist-liberalism inherited from history. Lenin died early and didn't have time to reform it.

Liberalism and big-power chauvinism will turn to their opposite one day, and will turn out to be something good. Nothing in the world will not fail to turn to its opposite. Our country will also turn to its opposite, and then the opposite will turn to its opposite. It thus returns to the positive.

Continuous revolution.

In the competition for building communism, unbalanced development is a rule, which exists without yielding to people's subjective will. The notion of "comparing the time of each other's watch"⁸¹ is an anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist one. The introduction of the notion demonstrates how scared they [the Soviet leaders] are.

[Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao's Manuscripts since the establishment of the PRC], v. 8 (Beijing, 1993), pp. 599-602; translation from the Chinese by David Wolff.]

⁸¹ Mao here refers to Khrushchev's speech at the Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on 1 December 1959, in which the Soviet leader claimed that it was necessary for members of the socialist camp to "compare the time of each other's watch," meaning that no one should intentionally go ahead or lag behind.