URBAN REGENERATION AND REVITALIZATION IN THE AMERICAS: TOWARD A STABLE STATE

Edited by
Fernando Carrion M.
and Lisa M. Hanley

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Comparative Urban Studies Project
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Cover Photo: Blair A. Ruble

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FORWARD

In the mid-20th century, scholars and policymakers began the difficult task of rethinking urban centers in a way that moved beyond the traditional focus on architectural concepts and the conservation of historical monuments. This new focus seeks to understand urban processes as essential to the construction of a stable state and a sustainable economy, based on a collective urban project that can contribute to economic development and the strengthening of culture. Here, the important issues related to the city are, on the one hand, political stability, governance and economic sustainability, and, on the other hand, the creation of identities—all elements that should be explored in order to understand the regeneration of an historic center with citizen participation.

These topics, perspectives and debates animated the international seminar "Urban Regeneration and Revitalization in the Americas: Toward a Stable State," which was organized by the Comparative Urban Studies Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) and the Program on the Study of the City at the Latin American School of Social Sciences, the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), in Ecuador. The seminar was held on December 16 and 17, 2004, and included the participation of architects, sociologists, anthropologists and economists, which allowed for a multidisciplinary analysis of urban development and its relationship to the construction of stable states.

With this book, we hope to contribute new ideas for thinking about cities and urban development, while recovering historical processes and putting a human face on renovation so that it can be a platform for urban innovation.

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URBAN RENOVATION AND THE NATIONAL PROJECT

FernandoCarrión M. and Lisa M. Hanley

Introduction

The Comparative Urban Studies Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Program on the Study of the City, FLACSO-Ecuador organized an international seminar on December 16 and 17, 2004 entitled "Urban Regeneration and Revitalization in the Americas: Toward a Stable State."

There were 14 papers presented by academics, authorities and functionaries from a variety of different professions who focused their presentations on local, national and Latin American examples. A similarly diverse group of more than 80 people attended the meeting. These varied approaches to urban questions greatly enriched both the presentations and the discussions; indeed, the heterogeneity of the seminar was noted as a positive factor.

Today, with the publication of this book, the results of the debates and reflections are offered to a wider audience in order to share the important information presented at the seminar, and to promote the validity and importance of the proposal to contribute to the social, political and economic sustainability of our countries through an urban project. In other words, with this publication we want to consolidate and share the main idea behind the seminar—that a collective project on the city can contribute to the stability of our states and to the economic and social development of our countries.

The City as Protagonist

The academic proposal of the seminar and publication is related to the following hypothesis: today urban processes are very significant in the constitution of stable states and sustainable economies. This is an important vision because until now urban issues have been understood more as a result of structural decisions made by public institutions than as contributions in their own right to economic development, political stability and creating a strong culture.

A hypothesis like this leads us to ask how an urban project can strengthen institutions. Even more directly related to the topic of the event, we ask how an urban renovation project can be an important component of a national project leading to the construction of a legitimate and stable state.

It is important to discuss the meaning of urban renovation for public administration, governance, economic sustainability and social development. Previously, urban renovation was thought of in its inverse relationship to public management and governance of the urban area. It is more interesting to understand what the city can do for the economy, culture, society and politics at the local, national and international levels, based on a conception of the city as a solution and not as a problem or pathology.

For example, local authorities gain political legitimacy when they focus their urban policies on city centers. This increased legitimacy, in turn, allows for greater stability and governability. Here we have the illustrative cases of Quito and Bogota. The current mayor of Quito, Paco Moncayo, saw his popularity rise from the moment he advocated the relocation of informal street commerce in the historic center of Quito. In Bogota, former mayors Antanas Mockus and Enrique Peñalosa forwarded an interesting notion of public space as the principle axis of the city. These interventions in city centers gave authorities legitimacy, strengthened a pattern of urbanization and promoted a broad sense of belonging among city residents.

We should not underestimate the economic importance of municipal investment in city centers. For example, investment in Puerto Madero in Buenos Aires has helped generate economic activity and strengthen the city center. Growth in the technological infrastructure of a neighborhood in Santiago, Chile has helped promote competition. In Guayaquil, the "Malecón 2000" project has strengthened the local and regional identities of the residents and produced an important economic zone. Similarly, a proposal for the development of tourism in Old Havana makes the historic center a platform for innovation within the sector, the city and the Cuban state.

These kinds of development show the importance of renovation projects in city centers that seek to contribute to and be part of national projects. Furthermore, they demonstrate that such efforts must be based on a social consensus resulting from broad and varied forms of participation. This presupposes a collective project in which there are public-private and public-public mechanisms of cooperation.

The seminar sought to rethink the relationship between the city and urban areas in terms of the market, the state, the private sector and the public sector, on both the local and national levels. It is essential to address these issues now that the market is more important to urban development than before, especially when state public policies control such development. This leads us to examine the new functions of the state related to the city and how the city can, at the same time, strengthen state institutions.

This discussion is even more important in the context of state reform processes through privatization and decentralization, and in the context of globalization, which forces us to conceive of the city simultaneously in its supranationality and subnationality,[1] with the market playing a significant role. In other words, the city today is experiencing the denationalization of political dimensions (greater importance of local government), cultural dimensions (local symbols of identity) and economic dimensions (local development) in the context of globalization.

It could even be said that we are seeing a return to city-states because the municipality—the level of government closest to civil society—becomes the nucleus of social integration and because urban area becomes a political and economic actor on the international scene (Sassen and Patel 1996). Today's Latin American municipality is highly competent, has greater economic resources and is more democratic. In this context, cities compete amongst themselves, thereby dissolving the borders of national states.

All of this forces us to rethink the state, the public sector and the nation in their relationship with the market from an urban perspective, and more specifically, from the point of view of urban and historic centers. In other words, we must ask how we can construct a historic center project that contributes to a national project that, in turn, strengthens state stability and economic sustainability. Historically this is possible in Latin America due to the fact that the demographic transition has produced a decrease in rates of urbanization, which makes it possible to think about the existing city, about the return to the built city and about a city of quality over quantity. However, due to the process of globalization, the city is also positioned as a protagonist

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1. Following Borja and Castells, "it could be said that national states are too small to control and direct the new system's global flows of power, wealth, and technology and too big to represent the plurality of the society's interests and cultural identities, therefore losing legitimacy at once as representative institutions and as efficient organziations" (1998: 18).

in a global, urban network. In other words, today more than ever a policy on urban and historic centers should be part of a national project.

THE CITY AS A COMPONENT OF STABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

In the last half century there has been a rapid increase in the urban population and the number of cities in all the countries of Latin America, to the extent that the region is primarily urban. In 1950, 41 percent of the population lived in cities; it was estimated that for the year 2000 it would be 77 percent (Lates 2001). This means that the percentage of the population concentrated in cities practically doubled in half a century and that, at the same time, the majority of the region's population lives an urban lifestyle. Currently, more than 300 million people live in urban areas.

On the other hand, the urban universe of Latin America is characterized by having two cities with more than 15 million inhabitants, 28 cities with more than a million inhabitants, and 35 cities with more than 600,000 inhabitants. This means that there are 65 metropolitan areas in Latin America.

This pattern of urbanization leads us to put forward two propositions that guide this chapter. First, the fact that population, economy and politics are concentrated in urban areas in a context of internationalization and localization, of globalization (Robertson 1992), makes us think that cities have become significant political actors. In other words, today global cities are a new world actor in addition to national states and the world economy (Sassen and Patel 1996). In the context of globalization—with the opening of economies and processes of decentralization taking place throughout the world—the functions and weight of cities tend to be redefined, making cities into spaces of integration, belonging and social representation. In other words, cities today are less of a problem and more of a solution in that they contribute significantly to political stability,[2] the reduction of poverty[3] and economic sustainability.[4]

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2. The city is the political space (polis) where citizenry is constituted. After the decentralization of the state, municipalities have become the main nucleus of representation, proximity to society, stability, and legitimacy.

3. It is easier to change patterns of gender inequality in urban rather than rural areas. It is more feasible to reduce poverty in cities through improvements in unsatisfied basic needs, employment, and income.

4. Supply and demand are concentrated in urban areas and the city is the axis of the model of accumulation on a global scale.

Second, the built city and its distinct centers have acquired greater weight as a result of the demographic transition experienced in the region. There has been a significant reduction in the rates of urbanization as well as in the growth rates of the largest cities (Villa 1994). The rate of urbanization for Latin America was reduced from 4.6 in 1950, to 4.2 in 1960, to 3.7 in 1970, to 2.6 in 1990, and to 2.3 in the year 2000 (Habitat 1996). It is estimated that for the year 2030, the rate of urbanization will be around one percent. This new demographic condition reduces the pressure for urban growth and redirects focus to urban centers. In other words, we move from a logic of centrifugal urbanization to a logic of centripetal urbanization, where center areas play an important role.

As cities grow less than before, it is possible to begin to think about the quality—not just quantity—of urban areas. Since cities, now have new, more global functions, it is also possible to think that the existing city and, more precisely, the renovation of city centers, could become a platform for urban innovation and projects that contribute to economic and political stability at the national level.

Nevertheless, in the cities of Latin America there are two related intra-urban bottlenecks that complicate the chances of this occurring. One has to do with the symbolic universe contained in urban and historic centers, which are currently subject to permanent social, economic and cultural deterioration. This erosion of memory damages the population's feelings of integration, representation and belonging beyond the space that contains them (supra-spatiality) and the time in which they were produced (history). In addition, the center, as a public space, suffers due to the weight of the market and urban fragmentation, which become an impediment to urban development, social integration and a strong citizenry. In other words, the deterioration of symbolic patrimony and the erosion of mechanisms of integration contribute to factors of social instability.

In addition, poverty has become a typically urban problem as the number of poor in Latin American cities has increased. At the end of the 1990s, 61.7 percent of poor people lived in urban areas while in 1970 it was 36.9 percent, which means that there has been an accelerated process of urbanization of poverty. Currently, there are more than 130 million poor people living in Latin America's cities. According to CEPAL (2001), 37 percent of urban inhabitants are poor and 12 percent are indigent. This kind of poverty has several effects. First, it significantly reduces the internal mar-

ket. Second, it degrades historic heritage because of the intensive use of historic infrastructure. Lastly, cities of poor people make the cities poor. Ultimately, the concentration of urban poverty is a source of political and economic instability.

In Latin American cities, poverty tends to predominate in two geographic areas—the center and the periphery.[5] In both areas, there is a high intensity of use of historic infrastructure, which leads to a decreased quality of life of those living there, creating a vicious circle,[6] where the deterioration of both the natural and built urban environment becomes the cause and effect of the existence of poverty in the population. The growth in density and overcrowding in city centers is evidence of this phenomenon because it leads to the intensive use of space. The logic of the slum leads to the destructive use of historical heritage in city centers. Therefore, central areas of the region have attracted high concentrations of poverty, and degradation of the city center has become an impediment to economic development and a bottleneck for social integration.

Nevertheless, centers have the opportunity to overcome these limitations through urban renovation, as long as the center is understood as a public space that determines the way of life for local society (integration, belonging and representation) and a way of organizing a territory (urban structure), inscribed in larger urban projects that are part of a national proposal. This kind of approach must focus on historic value (economic, political and cultural) and not on conservation.

Renovation can also foster economic growth and sustained urban development. This allows popular sectors to be able to benefit from economic growth through job creation and direct or indirect salary increases. In this way, the improvement in quality of life occurs through social mobility and the formation of social capital with networks, solid institutions and social cohesion.

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5. "Households in neighborhoods and consolidated housing where jobs and income—formal as well as informal—are qualified as poor. This expression of urban poverty has increased significantly in the cities of the region. We find it, on one hand, in central and peri-central neighborhoods in decay and stagnantion and, on the other hand, in low-quality residential complexes which were built to house the poorest of the poor. Because of their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and fluctuations in the job market, these families demonstrate today, in many cases, impoverishment associated with their residential location, the deterioration of their housing and the inability to afford formal housing" (MacDonald 2003).
6. "Recent studies (PNUD/CEPAL 1999) demonstrate with data from Montevideo that the social level of the sector or neighborhood has its own effects on student advancement and the inactivity of youth, even after controlling for the educational climate of the home" (Arriagada 2000: 17).

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The book is organized into three parts. The first part, "Historic Centers, Public Space and Government," discusses the existence of heterogeneous, fragmented cities with a diversity of spaces having explicit functions that end up prefiguring poli-centered urban areas, on the one hand, and, on the other, centers and peripheries related in a complex way. The equilibrium between historic and modern centers and peripheries is essential. This equilibrium will ensure that the renovation of the center does not produce an exodus of the population that will expand and degrade the peripheries or a periphery with no infrastructure or patrimony. If the city is fragmented or split, its centers and peripheries are too. For this reason, urbanism should be understood as a democratic strategy to revitalize the center, where poverty and degradation have historically been concentrated, and produce central services and infrastructure in the periphery. In other words, the fragmented city must be stitched together through a process of social integration.

In his opening remarks at the seminar, Blair A. Ruble, Co-Director of the Comparative Urban Studies Project at the Wilson Center, reflected on the meaning of public space in strengthening national states. In this volume, Ruble expands on these remarks using the case of the plaza—or *maydan*—in Ukraine, which became the salvation of democratic values in that country recently.

Fernando Carrión, Coordinator of the Program on the Study of the City at FLACSO, discusses "The Historic Center as an Object of Desire" in chapter 2, where he develops several hypotheses regarding the relationship between the historic center, public space, and large urban projects, working from the understanding that the historic center is the public space par excellence, and, for that reason, it is an articulating element of the city. This proposal is developed in the optimistic context of the city as a solution and considers the historic center as an object of desire. Carrión distinguishes the model of the future city that symbolizes public space as s place for civic interaction in a way that elevates the role of space to one of symbolic centrality and heterogeneity.

In his chapter, "The Relationship between State Stability and Urban Regeneration: The Contrast between Presidential and Municipal Administrations in Large Latin American Cities," Gabriel Murillo, from the University of the Andes in Bogota, Colombia, posits there is an interdependent relationship between the government of large cities and state

political stability. There is no doubt that successful management in the municipal government of a large city can contribute to national political stability. To further his point, he analyzes the case of Bogota in the context of urban primacy and national macro-economic limitations. The public policies of the last five administrations of the city of Bogota serve to show the logic of interdependency between good local administration and state political stability.

In chapter 4, Alfredo Rodríguez, SUR Corporación de Estudios Sociales y Educación, and Ana Sugranyes, Habitat Internacional Coalition (HIC), call attention to a new housing problem—not people without housing, as was the situation 20 years ago, but rather people living in substandard housing that may negatively impact the city. Rodríguez and Sugranyes challenge Chilean housing policy, considered a successful model for financing that has sparked interest throughout the region, to the extent that some governments are indiscriminately copying it without the benefit of analysis. The reality of the situation in Santiago shows that successful housing financing policies can create new urban problems in the absence of comprehensive housing policy.

The second part of the book, "The Politics of Urban Identity: Patrimony and Memory in the Democratic System," refers to the relationship of history (memory) and culture (identity), which should lead to a strengthening of democracy, the construction and social appropriation of the symbolic powers as well as in the socialization of patrimony. The axis of the debate proposed is focused on the relationship between history and patrimony and between public policies of innovation and conservation. What becomes clear is that there are different notions of heritage and patrimony. Indeed, patrimony is a continual creation that is constantly being reinvented; there is no one memory but rather a proliferation of memories.

In chapter 5, "Patrimony as a Disciplinary Device and the Banalization of Memory: An Historic Reading from the Andes," Eduardo Kingman Garcés and Ana María Goetschel, FLACSO Ecuador, seek to recuperate the historical character of the patrimony. They try to show the arbitrary nature of the notion of memory forwarded by policies of renovation and propose, at the same time, that the idea of patrimony leads to loss instead of reinforcing historical meaning. Furthermore, they claim that the political dimension of patrimony is ignored; it is presented as something inherent and natural or else defined in a technical, and in this sense, neutral, way with no political context.

Josep Subirós, GAO, Idees i Proyectes and the Accademia di Architectura Mendrisio, in chapter 6, reflects upon "Cultural Strategies and Urban Renovation: The Experience of Barcelona." He argues that the urban renovation projects undertaken in Barcelona do not respond as much to urban conceptions as to political strategies of reinvention, normalization, and democratic consolidation after three years of civil war and 36 years of the Franco dictatorship. An important characteristic of the urban renovation that took place in Barcelona between 1979 and 1997 is the marriage of urban and civic concerns, the use of urban planning as an instrument of civility, as a tool with which to contribute to the construction of a certain civic identity and new forms of bringing together an infinite variety of groups, interests, attitudes, values, and memories inherent in a large city. In this chapter, he addresses the urban renovation process in Barcelona in terms of the political and cultural dimensions of the main architectonic and urban operations in the period analyzed and their connection with the general process of reestablishing democracy in Spain after the death of Franco.

In chapter 7, "'More City,' Less Citizenship: Urban Renovation and the Anihilation of Public Space," X. Andrade, New School University, draws upon ethnographic research conducted between 2001 and 2004 to analyze the "urban renewal" of Guayaquil. He uses two case studies to make his argument. The first addresses urban reforms in the city's center that lead to a strictly disciplined and privatized public space. The second case study is related to a case of social hysteria about gang violence and provides a clear example of urban polarization and its expression in the construction of a market of fear. In the background, the municipality's "More Security" plan promotes the privatization of public space by conceding policing control of the streets to private security companies. This chapter describes what can happen when communities close themselves off and limit their interaction with other sectors of society.

Silvia Fajre, Government of Buenos Aires, discusses "Cultural Heritage and Urban Identity: Shared Management for Economic Development" in chapter 8. The chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of cultural heritage as being charged with content by the community. Therefore, patrimony requires a community-based definition not a purely technical one. Beyond that, it is important to understand cultural heritage as an economic value that generates resources and employment and, therefore, contributes to sustainability. Policies concerning cultural heritage should support the supply of cul-

tural events and assets, which, in turn, increase social capital and make patrimony sustainable in the framework of the market economy.

In chapter 9, Diego Carrión Mena, Municipality of the Metropolitan District of Quito, reflects on "Quito: The Challenges of a New Age." Carrión outlines a series of projects for the city and notes the importance of convoking citizen participation in implementing these plans. He also discusses the challenges facing Quito—and other cities—in terms of coordinating and carrying out urban projects that lead to more efficient, democratic, and inclusive cities.

The third part, "The Ties between Historic Centers and Social Participation," leads us directly to the topic of the relationship between space and power, where historic centers become disputed territories where some actors dominate others and where the image of power is permanently present. In sum, it could be said that power is not expressed in just one center, just as there is not only one power in the center.

In his chapter, "The Center Divided," Paulo Ormindo de Azevedo, Universidade Federal da Bahía, develops the idea of the divided city that Milton Santos and Aníbal Quijano have discussed. In historic centers there is a predominantly poor population and a series of important monuments. The importance of this center is disputed by the central business district, where the most dynamic activities of the city are located. In this way, the center is divided and the city itself is a series of fragments.

In chapter 11, Lisa M. Hanley and Meg Ruthenburg, Woodrow Wilson Center, investigate the "The Symbolic Consequences of Urban Revitalization: The Case of Quito," in which they take a historical approach to the policies developed since the city was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO to the present day, trying to evaluate the impacts of such policies on the population and on the city. The authors suggest that with the growth of the city in the 1970s due to the oil boom, there was a significant deterioration of the center, which is only beginning to be reversed now. They focus on the process of formalization of informal street commerce and how it has achieved important results in other areas, such as citizen security, transportation, municipal resources, and the legitimacy of authority. The authors conclude by noting that the incorporation of public participation in local governance could provide a certain level of local and national stability.

Mónica Moreira, White March for Security and Life Foundation, reflects on "Participatory Government for the Sustainability of Historic Centers" in

chapter 12. She bases her study on the case of Quito and points out the particularities and difficulties of participation in the historic center. For example, there is a great diversity of actors or subjects, some from the historic center itself and some from outside, each with its own interests and institutional expressions. She discusses different forms of participation and concludes with a series of important recommendations.

Despite at least 50 years of interventions in Latin American historic centers, these centers continue to have concentrations of poverty. When there are not high levels of poverty, it has been due to the expulsion of the resident population through processes of residential and commercial gentrification. All of this is based on a conservationist discourse that tends to reify heritage and memory.

It is time to put a human face on urban renovation, so that it can be a platform for innovation in the city, a mechanism for the reinvention of local government, and a contribution toward social integration and economic sustainability.

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PART I: HISTORIC CENTERS, PUBLIC SPACE, AND GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER 1
PAINTING THE TOWN ORANGE:
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SPACE IN
STRENGTHENING NATIONAL STATES

BLAIR A. RUBLE

Thousands of protestors took up residence on Kyiv's central Maydan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), and premier street, the Khreshchtyk, throughout November and December 2004, and into January 2005. Their numbers swelled into the tens and even hundreds of thousands at times, perhaps surpassing one-and-a-half million at pivotal moments over the course of these cold winter weeks. The demonstrations and negotiations unfolding in the city's streets and behind closed doors followed massive election fraud in a November 21, 2004 presidential runoff. They would lead eventually to the annulment of the disputed election results and the ratification of far-reaching constitutional reforms. These events became known as Ukraine's "Orange Revolution." The election campaign had reached full fury as summer came to an end, by which time 26 candidates were registered officially to run for the post of president of Ukraine. The contest narrowed quickly around two large opposing political positions represented by the candidacies of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. Both men emerged as symbols for deep philosophical divisions within Ukraine. Yanukovich, and his "party of power," stood for a continuation of the status quo; Yushchenko, on the other hand, stood for a more "modern" approach to governance in which the state served citizens who would themselves become the primary autonomous actors within society.

Kyiv literally shaped events firstly by its physical form. The city's main street—the Khreshchatyk—was rebuilt as one of the Soviet Union's premier examples of Stalinist urban planning following its total destruction during World War II. The avenue arose refreshed by huge, florid examples of totalitarian architecture matched in scale and extent only in parts of Moscow and East Berlin. Approximately one-third of the way along its route from what was once Komsomol (Young Communist League) Square in the east to Bessarabskaya Square in the west, the Khreshchatyk explodes outwards

into a large square to be used for appropriately grand official Communist Party demonstrations. This square was renamed Maydan Nezalezhnosti, or Independence Square, following 1991. Mayor Omelchenko sponsored the construction of underground shopping malls along the Khreshatyk both at Maydan Nezalezhnosti and under Bessarabskaya Square. President Kuchma and Mayor Omelchenko oversaw a simultaneous tacky tarting up of the above ground areas to mark the 10th anniversary of Ukrainian Independence in 2001. Overtime, Omelchenko's city government built a "temporary" stage for rock concerts that was outfitted with stadium-size television screens and sound systems. The mayor sponsored closing the Khreshchatyk and the Maydan to vehicular traffic on Sundays, creating an enormous outdoor space for promenading. Kyvians adopted the entire area as their own, with upwards of half-a-million people strolling about, shopping and listening to music on any given Sunday.

The Maydan was a perfect location for such a central public space. Nestled in a small valley among various fragments of the overall city (Pechersk, "Old Kyiv," Bessarabka, etc.), the Maydan exerts a central gravitational force, giving form and definition to Kyiv's urban life. As many as a dozen streets flow down into the Maydan and the Khreshchatyk from various angles. Nearly all of the city's major institutions are located nearby. The Parliament (Verkhovna Rada), Presidential Administration, St. Sophia's Cathedral, offices of the Central Election Commission, City Hall, and the headquarters building of Ukraine's trade unions are all within a brisk fifteen minute walk of Omelchenko's sound stage. Apartment houses first built for prominent members of the Soviet regime similarly are close by, many occupied with residents ready to cook a warm meal to feed demonstrators camped on their doorsteps. Connected to the entire city by several subway and major bus lines, the Maydan had become the focal point for civic life well before demonstrators turned it orange. Protestors naturally headed straight for the Maydan on the night of November 21–22 as it appeared that someone was trying to steal the country's presidential election. The Orange Revolution represents a classic instance in which the form and function of the physical urban space can determine a city's history.

The political city joined with the physical city in support of efforts to bring Viktor Yushchenko to power. As noted above, the Kyiv City Council was among the first to reject the results of the November 21 presidential run-off being released by the Central Election Commission. Mayor

Omelchenko immediately rejected the use of force to disperse the growing throngs of demonstrators and protestors. The mayor went further, paying back Kuchma for the president's various attempts to drive him from office, by literally keeping the lights on in the Maydan. City officials kept the subways and busses running, the sound stage volume turned up high, the enormous stadium-sized television screens switched on. City officials spurred on revolution merely by operating as if all were normal. Omelchenko chose, in the end, to treat the presence of well over a million protestors as if it were just a particularly large turn out for the annual City Day celebrations held each fall. The city streets of a once totalitarian city better known for its Stalinist architecture have become symbols of democratic national rebirth and the Ukrainian word for plaza, *maydan*, has now become synonymous with democracy.

THE HISTORIC CENTER AS AN OBJECT OF DESIRE

FERNANDO CARRIÓN M.

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I present several hypotheses about the relationship between historic centers, public space, and large urban projects, with the understanding that the historic center is the public space par excellence. This proposal will be developed in an optimistic context that views the city as a solution and considers the historic center an object of desire. It is necessary to overcome the stigma and pessimism often associated with the city. This pessimism is two-fold. On one hand, the city is often seen as a source of anomie and chaos expressed, for example, in the idea of a cement jungle. This neo-Malthusianist view of the city is of something that creates violence and poverty. On the other hand, the city has been periodically declared dead.[1] From these negative conceptions of the city came the notion that the process of rural to urban migration had to be stopped to halt the growth of cities and, consequently, halt the growth of urban problems. However, we now see after a period of accelerated urbanization in Latin America[2] that poverty is greatly reduced in cities.[3]

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1. "Has the city died? Now it is globalization that kills it. Before, it was the metropoliza-tion that developed with the Industrial Revolution. And before it was the baroque city, which extended outside medieval boundaries. Periodically, when historic change appears to accelerate and is perceptible in the expansive forms of urban development, the death of the city is declared" (Borja 2003: 23).
2. "Taking note of the high degree of urbanization reaching the region, the Regional Action Plan proposed the challenge of making this characteristic an advantage, instead of continuing to consider it a problem as had been the usual discourse in the previous decade" (Mac Donald and Simioni 1999: 7).
3. "In all countries, poverty tends to be greater in rural areas than in urban areas, and it tends to be lesser in the larger cities than in the intermediate and small cities…. On the contrary, in the majority of countries urban concentration has not been a negative fac-tor, since it has allowed for access to goods and services to a greater measure than what prevailed in the time of rural dominance" (Jordan and Simioni 2002: 15).

Furthermore, in the cities it is easier to change patterns of gender inequality than in rural areas (Arboleda 1999).[4]

A second point that guides this chapter is related to revaluing the built city and the two types of city centers—the historic and the urban. In some cases, the historic and urban centers are the same. This revaluing has to do with two explicit determinants—the processes of globalization and demographic transition. In 1950, 41 percent of the population in Latin America lived in urban areas. Today, that percentage has almost doubled to 80 percent. This demographic transition also means that size of the population migrating to cities has significantly been reduced. In 1950, it was 60 percent; today it is only 20 percent. This demographic change has two direct consequences for the analysis that interests us. On one hand, the quick growth that had been occurring in cities has stopped,[5] which allows us to think about the city less in terms of quantity and more in terms of quality. On the other hand, the fact that the cycle of rural to urban migration has ended opens up new forms of migration, such as international and peri-urban migration. International migration has formed our countries' second, third, and fourth largest cities outside the national territory. This phenomenon is also important because the region receives about $30 billion annually in remittances from abroad.[6] Globalization and demographic transition also lead to the concept of cosmopolitan introspection. This is a distinctive feature of urbanization in Latin America today, which differs from the previous period that was characterized by the growth of the peripheries and the formation of metropolitan areas.

In the context of the changes that the Latin American city is experiencing, the historic center must readjust to new functions, making large urban

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4. "According to Anderson, this growing presence of women in the cities reveals complex social and economic factors, among which can be included the fact that cities provide conditions of 'viability' for single women, women who wish to become independent, and single mothers. Independence and the initiative to which such institutions refer are part of the so-called 'vitality' of the cities" (Arboleda 1999).

5. In 50 years the rate of urbanization in the region is reduced by half. It goes from 4.6 percent annually in 1950 to 2.3 percent in the year 2000.

6. "According to the Multilateral Investment Fund (FOMIN in Spanish) of the Inter-American Development Bank, remittances in Latin America reach around $25 billion per year and it is projected to continuing with the current growth rates, the value of accumulated remittances for the next decade 2001–2010 could reach $3 trillion" (Avalos 2002).

projects necessary. This readjustment of urban development requires enormous investments in the city.[7] The importance of the historic center as the public space par excellence cannot be overstated. Because it is the premier public space, the historic center should become the platform for innovation and the promise of the possible city, therefore, an object of desire. In other words, the historic center should be understood as a forward-looking project and not only as a memory.

To develop this proposal, I will explore several points. In the first, I will formulate three hypotheses related to the destiny of historic centers. The second point deals with the historic center as a public space par excellence and, as such, a strategic element of the city structure. In the third, I seek to present the historic center as a project and, therefore, a something capable of transforming the city. Finally, I will present some conclusions that have been born of these reflections.

THE FUTURE OF HISTORIC CENTERS

In Latin America, the pattern of urbanization has entered into a process of transformation. If in the decade of the 1940s, urbanization was directed toward the expansion of the periphery, today it is toward the existing city; it has gone from an exogenous and centrifugal tendency of urban development to an endogenous and centripetal one.

With this change in priorities in the built urban area, the historic center has particular weight and faces new challenges. These challenges are related to accessibility, intraurban centers, and to the existing symbolism and the social relations that sustain it. The historic center is revalued. There is a challenge to develop new methodologies, techniques, and concepts that open new analytical perspectives and mechanisms of intervention which go beyond previous monumentalist paradigms.

What could happen to historic centers in this context, if we keep in mind that they are a historical product, which are born, develop, and die just like any social process? It is also necessary to ask ourselves

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7. In the historic center of Quito there is an average annual investment of no less than $20 million, in Havana a similar figure, and in Mexico City a larger amount. In the three cases, this investment is growing.

about the future of the transformation and refunctionalization of the urban center in relation to the entirety of urban structures.[8]

To respond to these questions leads us to formulate three hypotheses with respect to what is to come. Historic centers are experiencing a dynamic that makes us think that their future is at risk and that much of their fate will depend on the policies designed. This is particularly so if we do not recognize the limitations of conservationist and developmental perspectives.[9] The three hypotheses are that we could be experiencing the end of historic centers, the appearance of other kinds of centers, or the strengthening of the historic center.

The End of Historic Centers

To start with the most negative and pessimistic possibility, we could posit that historic centers are dying. The hypothesis about the death of historic centers is based on the principle that every historic process evolves from birth to death. From its birth, the center it is associated with crisis and with the difficult death[10] brought about through the process of differentiation between the urban center and the historic center. The urban center extracts its central functions from the historic center; therefore, the historic center is degraded due to the loss of its central functions. The moment that historic centers lose their central functions they begin to die and, consequently, require renovation.

Historic centers suffer different kinds of losses. They may lose their functions related to the politics of representation, the creation of identities, and

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8. "To conserve a historic center means to transform the city on top of the city, with the aim of avoiding the loss of the city center" (Bohigas 1997: 130).
9. In the first, the old is privileged as historical and in the second, there is a negation of the old for the new based on the end of history because renovation is void of historic references.
10. "The birth of the historic center is produced in the moment it enters into decadence. That is, it sees the light with the stigma of crisis and, as a consequence, one of the essential characteristics of historic centers is that they are born with their deaths on their backs. This crisis is born of urban dysfunctionality, because of the deterioration of the center due to the reduction over time, the concentration of poverty, and environmental problems, among others. It is important to remark on this fact because since its birth—consequently, since its crisis—it carries the sign of opportunity, not only for this important part of the city but for the whole city. Because of this, renovation points more toward a sense of future than of reconstruction of the initial conditions" (Carrión 2001: 64).

social integration. In this sense, the relocation of a country's president can be devastating for a historic center. Here we have the illustrative cases of Mexico and Cuba, where the presidencies were moved to other parts of the city, and the extreme case of Rio de Janeiro, where the central government was moved outside of the urban area altogether.

Historic centers also suffer the loss of commercial relocation through the movement of headquarters to new centers (in some cases, branches are left in the historic center), the creation of economic firms outside of the historic center, and of the precariousness of commerce, industry, and services through the informalization of these economic activities in the historic center.

Historic centers lose their centrality when they are homogenized, for example, by tipping the balance of the structural contradiction between historical-cultural wealth and socio-economic poverty through tourism or poverty. In the first case, while tourist activity has been justified as a mechanism of internationalization, economic development, and environmental improvement (industry without smokestacks), it has been revealed to pollute culture, the economy, politics, architecture, and urbanism. In terms of the tension between poverty and historic wealth, historic centers full of poor people become poor historic centers. In this condition, the tendancy is toward the erosion of wealth because poverty operates like King Midas backwards—instead of being turned to gold, everything touched by poverty turns to rubble.

Historic centers also lose their centrality when accessibility, speed, and connection with the city are reduced, for example, with pedestrian thoroughfares, technological lag, the rupture of social networks, and the lack of connectivity.[11] However, it is important to point out that the historic centers do not lose their centrality only due to general processes but also due to incorrect urban policies. Society is exiled from historic centers by monumentalist policies that tend to privilege so-called physical heritage, that focus on the past, and ignore the existing rich social capital. Developmental policies, on the other hand, do away with the past, increase land prices, and advance processes of gentrification.

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11. Forwarding the topic of technology for historic centers is a central way to reconstitute lost competitiveness, connectivity, and positioning and, on the other hand, to posit the value of history again.

San Telmo in Buenos Aires or La Candelaria in Bogota are examples of historic centers that lost their centrality in order to become historic areas. The same occurred in Santo Domingo and Cartagena due to tourism. In sum, with the loss of centrality, historic centers become soley historic. In this sense, they are no longer centers because they have been made peripheral.

The Appearance of Other Kinds of Centers

The appearance of other kinds of centers has to do with the transformation of the historic center from a space of encounter to one of flows.[12] An interesting case to analyze is the formation of longitudinal centers, where the center is not a concentric point but a succession of points in a line. Two types of cases illustrate this phenomenon. One is the case of what is happening in the city of Bogota due to the newly-instituted transportation system called the Transmilenio, which structures an area of public spaces along the axis of the Transmilenio line. Two other cities with lineal centers are La Paz, with its historic center configured around El Prado Avenue, and Mexico City, which also develops from its historic center toward Reforma Avenue.

A second way in which other kinds of centers are appearing is through the integration of diverse centers, each one of them coming about at different historic moments of the city in a continuum or a network. One could point to the case of Quito, where its historic center, which was the place the city was founded, is articulated with the urban center, known as Mariscal Sucre, which was born in the middle of the 20th century. Today these two centers go together to comprise a new center, each emphasizing different functions, but articulated along a continuum. The same thing happens in the historic center of Mexico City when it is connected to the centers of Coyoacán and Xochimilco.

A third kind of center is the spatially discontinuous center. How are we to understand historic centers in discontinuous spaces which go beyond the defined borders? With the processes of globalization and international immi-

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12. This distinction between identities of belonging and roles has been proposed by Jiménez (1999) and applied by Villena (2003) for the sociocultural analysis of soccer. It is pertinent in the case of historic centers because there is tension between subjects of heritage imbued primarily in their role as identity (function), which could be real estate capital, and the subjects of belonging, which may be the case of tenants.

gration, a group of symbolic centers begins to develop. Immigrants often create a new city within a city, which may have a particular relationship with a center in their country of origen. In Ecuador, the historic center of Cuenca is tied to the city of Murcia through the Retiro Park, a place where Ecuadorians congregate for economic and cultural exchanges as well as to constitute social networks and establish ties to discontinuous spaces belonging to the symbolic communities in transnational social spaces (Beck 1998). The same thing happens with Lima and Constitution Plaza in Santiago or between Managua with the Merced Plaza in San José. These centers are socially, culturally, and economically integrated without having a continuous space.

A fourth kind of historic center is found in the definition of the "non places" (Augé 1998) that belong to globalization. It could be a center that is built in the periphery with highly differentiated and exclusionary technology and accessibility. The most emblematic and interesting examples are the cases of centers built in the periphery in Mexico City, under the name Centro Corporativo Santa Fe or Centro Berrini in San Pablo. Here a new form of center appears, which is also historic despite having low value in terms of antiquity, but which creates order in the city and its urban development. We could also mention those smaller-scale central places that are artifacts of globalization, such as airports (Rio de Janeiro), ports (Valparaiso), World Trade Centers[13] (Bogota), malls (Lima), stadiums (Buenos Aires), convention centers (Cartagena), markets (San Pablo), theme parks (Mexico City), and business centers (Santiago)[14] (De Mattos 2002).

The last configuration is the virtual center, where Internet portals constitue a diffuse center with no territorial references.

The Strengthening of the Historic Center

The third hypothesis has to do with the strengthening of historic centers, which is more of a project than a reality. If the tensions between wealth and poverty, local and global, historic center and urban center are taken into account, it is possible to strengthening the historic center (Carrión 2001).

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13. World Trade Centers exist in more than 100 countries and they represent in an emblematic way the presence of globalization of the urban territory (see www.worldtradecenter.org).
14. The Business City of Santiago, which is named as a city and not as a business center, is an interesting example. It is located in Huechuraba.

The historic center is a public space that allows for renovation not only of the center but of the entire city[15] because it is the space that integrates and organizes.[16] What is considered the historic center today was once the entire city and, therefore, had its own government. When the city grew, the government was no longer focused on or in the historic center. Because of this, an important aspect of strengthening historic centers is to have an legitimate, autonomous, representative government.

It is essential to have an economic vision of the historic center that creates competitiveness and connectivity through the incorporation of technology and productivity (handicrafts, services, industry) in a context of modernization that adds more value and time to the past; in other words, it is important to have a process that adds historic value to the center. If you want a historic center to be what it originally was, you will freeze it in time, but if you follow the path of history, you should propose policies of transformation, development, and sustainability and not policies of conservation and preservation.

It is important to have social policies dealing with health, education, housing, and employment in historic centers. If attention is not paid to social issues, the reverse figure of King Midas will end up eroding the great historic and cultural wealth of historic centers. It is imperative that there be a redistribution of social resources and an improvement in the quality of life of the population that resides there.

THE HISTORIC CENTER AS PUBLIC SPACE

According to Bohigas, the city is a public space because it belongs to the public domain. In other words, it is a space where collective wills are

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15. The urban renovation of Old Havana has allowed it to become a platform for innovation not only for the city of Havana but also for all of Cuba because it has been conceived of as public space that structures the functions, land use, and activities of the city (Carrión 2004).
16. "Urbanism should be organized from the public and not from the private, from the collective and not from the individual. Interesting examples are the founding of Spanish cities in the New World. In 1523 King Carlos I of Spain dictated an ordinance that determined that the urban structure should be defined by its plazas, streets, and undeveloped plots of land, beginning from the Plaza Mayor or main plaza. From there and to there the streets converged that united other plazas, from which the undeveloped plots of land were distributed in such a way that the population growth could always follow the same form and logic. In other words, the city was organized from the public space, from the Plaza Mayor, which along with other plazas, functioned as the 'center' of the city, due to the conditions of public space" (Carrión 2004).

expressed and formed so that society may be represented in its rights and obligations (citizenship). It is the place where diverse populations meet, where the quality of a city and its urbanism is expressed. However, according to Borja, the city is a grouping of meeting points or a system of important places (2003).

These important points of encounter are public spaces because they bring together the following three fundamental components: the symbiotic, the symbolic, and the polis. The public space is a symbiotic space in the sense that it creates integration, articulation, encounter, and connectivity between different groups of people.

In this context, the historic center is the space of encounter par excellence because of its centrality, which makes it a focal point for the city, and because of its historical value. Due to the duality of space (centrality) and temporality (history), it is the place of encounter for a population that lives beyond the center itself (transterritoriality) and it is also the area where different societies from different times and historical moments encounter each other (transtemporality). The symbiosis in the plurality of spaces and times in the center introduces the concept of derived citizenship,[17] in which different societies from different periods of time encounter each other. The historic center transcends time and space, producing generational transmission and otherness in symbolic transnational communities.

As a public space, the historic center is a symbolic space because of the patrimony of symbols that creates multiple identities, both collectively and simultaneously. This symbolic element allows the citizenry to identify itself and represent itself through its functional quality (center) and through its sense of belonging (history).[18] The center's symbolic power concentrated in space and time is so important that it gives its character to the whole urban area.

Due to the immense symbolic power that the historic center has, it is the place where society becomes visible. Politics, for example, becomes vis-

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17. We understand as "derived citizenship" the rights and obligations that are transferred from one subject of patrimony in a historical moment to another, who socially appropriates it in another moment in time.

18. This distinction between identities of belonging and roles has been proposed by Jiménez (1999) and applied by Villena (2003) for the sociocultural analysis of soccer. It is pertinent in the case of historic centers because there is tension between subjects of heritage imbued primarily in their role as identity (function), which could be real estate capital, and the subjects of belonging, which may be the case of tenants.

ible in the center. The indigenous peoples of Ecuador or Bolivia have used the space of the center to make their demands visible to the nation. Other examples include the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina or the Zapatistas in Mexico. The institutions of government themselves are represented in the center through the presence of government buildings, whether national or local. In the same way, economic function and religious activity reach important degrees of social projection. For this reason, historic centers must be heterogeneous to allow for multiple and simultaneous forms of identity.

In addition, the historic center, again as public space, is the realm of the polis because it is the place in the city where both real and symbolic ideas are disputed. There is no other place in the city that is capable of channeling these disputes. Subjects confront each other in the historic center and, in doing so, construct citizenship.

Urban and historic centers are the basic elements of all public spaces. Nevertheless, in Latin America, there is a process of depopulation of the center, as is illustrated in the cases of Bogota, Quito, Santiago, Mexico City, and Lima, among others. Contrary to this residential exodus, there is a wave of population that goes to the centers on a daily basis for other purposes. In Quito, Lima, and Mexico City around eight times the number of people who live in the centers go to the centers each day. Why? Because the center is a public space that concentrates information, forms of representation, and markets, in addition to organizing the collective life of the city. Because of this, urban and historic centers are public space par excellence; they are a starting point, a point where people arrive, and a point from which the city is structured.

The historic center is a public space not because of its parts (which would be the monumentalist vision) but rather because of the great public and collective meaning contained therein. It is a space for everyone because it gives the population a sense of collective identity while providing the space to dispute symbolic power. It is a place of encounter where the population has disputes, socializes, and exchanges goods, services, and information. The historic center is able to have these functions, however, because it has a highly specialized and defined public order including laws, ordinances, and codes in addition to a complex institutional framework that is capable of producing the public administration of coercion, regulation, and management. In this collective space, there is public appropriation, a form

of public administration, a collective view, and multiple identities originating from inside as well as outside and from yesterday as well as today.

Nevertheless, today the city is organized more from the private sphere than the public one. Currently the market has a greater weight than it used to, to the extent that public administration is subordinated to it and public space has moved from being a structuring space to being structures, residual or marginal, which may lose their original functions or be substituted by other more functional spaces, such as shopping centers or social clubs. In this way, the public space taken up by plazas, for example, end up being a loss in the economic logic of profit maximization and a necessary evil to comply with the norms of urbanism.

We are experiencing an agoraphobia (Borja 2003: 39) that attacks the historic center, breaking up the center's unity through isolated projects, privatization of forms of administration (companies and corporations), the presence of capital (Benetton in Havana and Carlos Slim in Mexico City), and gentrification of prestige activities. Each one of these forms leads to new forms of identity construction based on the market and therefore, on consumption. Globalization homogenizes, undermining the basis for the existence of the historic center.

At the same time, we are also experiencing the transition to the segregated city—typical of the first modernity—where the parts that made up the city were integrated with everything through public space, toward the fragmented city—typical of the second modernity—with its discontinuous constellations of spatial fragments (Castells 1999: 438), which end up diluting urban unity[19] and lead to urban foreignness. Today cities are full of people who do not meet in any place,[20] who have lost that sense of belonging to the urban area, and who have created social and physical boundaries to keep themselves separate from "the other."

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19. There are the examples of closed autarkic neighborhoods (Cáceres and Sabatini 2004), exclusive government units (Santiago has 34 autonomous communities), public spaces to which a private foundation reserves rights to admission (Malecón 2000 in Guayaquil), and inaccessible centers (Santa Fe), among others.

20. People do not meet at school because the person who enters the public system will never end up meeting the person who studies in the private system. The same occurs with the health systems. The poor person will go to the market and the rich one will go to the shopping mall. The worker will be in the factory located in the periphery and the owner will be in his office in the center.

Public space should not play a marginal or residual role. It is essential that it regain is place in society in order to be the strategic space that integrates society and structures the city. The historic center should be a platform for innovation for the entire city. It should become the large urban project.

THE HISTORIC CENTER AS A PROJECT

The historic center should not be thought of as a return to what it was in past times or what it is currently. The historic center should be conceived of in forward-looking terms. In other words, it should become a project that seeks out the desired future. In this way, project and desire go hand in hand. The historic center should be renovated as a way of consciously moving forward toward the future. That is to say, it should become an object of desire through a social subject with a conscious will.[21]

Large urban projects were always constructed in central areas. These initiatives tended to focus on improving accessibility, molding spaces to fit new demands (such as commerce and parking), rehabilitating old buildings or monuments, or replacing architectural structures with tall buildings. These interventions were usually isolated and insufficient, and, in many cases, broke historical continuity. Today, due to poor results from these projects and to new approaches, historic centers should be seen in their totality as large urban projects.[22]

It is important to consider that the most important urban transformations historically have developed as large projects. Their scale varies from the changes produced at the neighborhood level to its upper limit of the

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21. It is possible to say that the historic center does not exist in reality and what confers its existence is its condition as a project.
22. "The Large Urban Projects of the Second Modernity are immersed in the framework of a neoliberal policy of urban development that has changed the urban condition of the previous periods. The simultaneous effects of the transformations produced by new information and communication technologies, the application of neoliberal policies, and economic and socio-cultural globalization have contributed to the great spatial polarization of the large urban centers, the development of large infrastructure works, and the concentration of real estate capital in large urban projects in specific parts of the city. This period is characterized by a growth in social segregation and the extension of the metropolization toward neighboring zones at an unprecedented pace. The change of a manufacturing economy toward a service economy has increased the meaning of the central business districts (CBD) and the need to revitalize the city centers is due to this" (Carmona 2003).

construction of new cities, such as the cases of Brasilia and Chandigarh. There is a way of thinking that posits that in times of historic breakdown, the city should change and re-condition itself through large urban investments. We can find two key examples in recent history: the industrial revolution and globalization.

With the industrial revolution there is an acceleration of urbanization, which leads to the execution of large projects that seek to adapt the city to industrialization.[23] The growth of the population through rural to urban migration, the transfer of the means of production to the places where demand was concentrated, the presence of the automobile, and the appearance of iron and concrete lead to the transformation of the peripheries and urban centers through large projects. For examples we can look to the construction of the great boulevards and road systems (the urban renovation of Paris with Haussmann) and the construction of new buildings (rail stations, stores, hotels). There are massive construction programs of public housing in the peripheral areas as well (garden cities).

A century after the industrial revolution, we have a new wave of large urban projects that are supported by technological change and by the new logic of global accumulation. In globalization, the city becomes a relevant political actor and a strategic place for neoliberal accumulation, which are typical of the second modernity (Beck 1998). In Latin America, we are experiencing these processes through the lens of regional particularities, where demographic transformations, changes in the institutional framework of city government, and new forms of immigration stand out. In this way, the city goes from being a space of places to being one of flows; urban development is conceived of as growth in the city's productivity through competition, connectivity, and positioning.

In this context, four types of large urban projects are developed. The first type of large urban project could be the appearance of new cities, born in strategic places for globalization, such as in certain border areas between Mexico and the United States or between Brazil and Argentina.

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23. "The industrial and technical revolution provoked profound transformations in the fabric of the historic cities of Europe, but it also engenders a marked consciousness of a feeling of attachment to the historical and aesthetic values of the historic monuments and sites that are testimony of a complex age" (Bouchenaki 2001: 11).

There are also ports that obey new strategic positioning of the global urban network or certain cities that, despite having existed before, are totally different today. A second type of large urban project entails the recycling and conversion of old urban and architectural structures that come from an industrial past (in Mexico City, the conversion of Loreto y Peña Pobre paper plant in Plaza Cuicuilco), a port-oriented past (in Buenos Aires with Puerto Madero), or are focused on airports (Cerrillos in Santiago) or historic centers (the historic center of Quito). There is a re-functionalization of certain degraded architectural structures to integrate them with the new modernity. Here, for instance, we have the examples of a supply center made into a shopping center (Buenos Aires), a rail station transformed into a cultural center (Santiago), a convent made into a hotel (Cartagena, Cuzco, Santo Domingo), a hospital housing a city museum (Quito), and a housing complex becoming a university (Candelaria, Bogota). A third type of large urban project has to do with the construction of new structures related to the times, such artifacts of globalization as shopping centers, airports, stadiums, and World Trade Centers, which seek to position the city as a strategic place in the globalized world. The fourth type of large urban project is related to the conversion of old historic centers (Malecón 2000 in Guayaquil), the development of new centers (Santa Fe in Mexico, the Cité in Buenos Aires), and the formation of extended centers (Transmilenio in Bogota).

In the context of neoliberal politics, from the crisis of the national state and the weight of the market on urban development, urban planning loses meaning. Physical planning born in the industrial revolution falls into disuse and strategic planning cedes territory. Faced with this and with the prevailing pragmatism, large urban projects can have the double virtue of delivering results in the short term and becoming the engines propelling other initiatives.

The development of large urban projects brings urban planning in its different versions (physical, strategic) into question because regulations are seen as hindering competition and long-term proposals are not very viable in a rapidly changing world. Furthermore, urban planning's technocratic form and content are an important social limitation. The crisis of urban planning goes along with the crisis of the public sphere. Nevertheless, large urban projects and urban planning should not be seen as opposing but rather complementary activities. The historic center

should been seen as a public space and an object of desire; it should be thought of as a large urban project of supra-local reach.[24]

Conclusions

As a whole, the historic center is the public space par excellence of the city and, as such, the fundamental element for social integration and structuring the city. Since this does not currently happen, due to agoraphobia, the historic center is an object of desire and a project of variable scale, according to its importance in patrimonial terms.

With the new pattern of urbanization in Latin America—cosmopolitan introspection—the built city acquires a new function and a greater weight within the context of the city. This fact determines that urban and historic centers can assume—as a project and desire—roles of encounter (symbiotic), representation (symbolic), and dispute (polis) in social and urban terms.

In the current historical context, historic centers have become privileged places for the production of memory. In this way, they break with the uniformity that globalization seeks to impose and become symbols of the resistance of local identities.[25] Furthermore, they are platforms for innovation in the larger context of the city.

Historic centers are civic places where the invisible elements of society become visible. Here, a public organism that can institutionalize this civic character (representation) is needed to move them forward as a large urban projects (legitimacy), and be held accountable (transparency).

Just as there are no cities without citizenship, there is no citizenship without a state. For this reason, the irreducible triad of citizenship, city, and state must be present in any proposal concerning the historic center. Only in this way will there be more citizens for more city and, at the same time, more city for more citizens.

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24. "The deterioration and underuse of the central areas can only be tackled through public action. Not only because the public sector is the social actor responsible for procuring the common good, but also because it is the only one with the ability to develop a long-term vision and posseses the necessary instruments to tackle the problem of coordination that private actors face in these areas" (Rojas 2004).

25. "Faced with the real dangers of uniformity and depersonalization of housing that modern urbanism implies, the survival of historical complexes has supreme importance for each society that seeks to conserve its true cultural dimension and its individuality" (Bouchenaki 2001: 13).

The importance of historic centers, then, is found in the possibility to preserve memory and make it potent, to create a sense of identity, and to become platforms for innovation. Because of this, it is important to have a social subject with conscious will (planning). For this reason, the construction of a public government that is transparent, legitimate, representative, and able to confront this challenge is so important. This is why the historic center continues to be more a project and an object of desire than a reality.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE STABILITY AND URBAN REGENERATION: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN LARGE LATIN AMERICAN CITIES [1]

GABRIEL MURILLO

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the relationship of interdependence between the government of large cities in Latin American countries and the political stability of states. In order to do this, it lays out a series of analytical approaches related to the phenomena of urban primacy and macro-economic limitations in region.

The extended phenomenon of urban primacy serves as a transversal axis to analyze several contrasts that, despite their respective characteristics and properties, are intimately tied to urban primacy. There are four main contrasts that will be developed in relation to the fundamental elements of this interdependency. The first is related to the reach of each administrative realm; the second, the competition among the city and national state in terms of governmental agendas; the third addresses the syndrome of upward mobility of political actors in Latin America; and the fourth points out two of the main paradoxes of the urban center—the first is related to the agglomeration of material resources in the urban area and the resulting myth of this concentration of wealth, and the second concerns the convergence of a broad array of political interests represented in the capital of the country by the politicians that come from all the levels of territorial legislatures.

The second component of the chapter, addresses the macro-economic limitations of the countries of the region and the resulting implications for the relationship of interdependency. Additionally, an analysis of the public

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policies under the last five administrations of the city of Bogota will serve to point out how the logic of interdependence between good local administration and the political stability of the state is not exclusively determined by economic factors coming from the management of the so-called inter-governmental finances or by traditional politics. Furthermore, there is significant interference from factors tied to alliances between the formal exercise of government and the deliberate and conscious incorporation of citizen participation through government actions, thereby promoting a democratic political culture.

Before proceding with the arguments laid out in this chapter, it is important to note that a good part of the reflections and approaches presented here are preliminary and intend to propose analytical directions that future studies may use in order to better respond to some of the questions formulated.

URBAN PRIMACY

There is no doubt that, at first glance, successful local administration in a large city's municipal government, wherever it may be, can be synonymous with national political stability. Indeed, truly democratic governance in major urban centers, where an important percentage of the country's population (for

Figure 1. Levels of Urban Primacy in Latin America

Levels of Urban Primacy	Country	City	% of National Population Living in City
Advanced	Argentina	Buenos Aires	34.50%
	Uruguay	Montevideo	56.5%
	Venezuela	Caracas	21.95%
	Peru	Lima	31.86%
Full	Mexico	Federal District	17.23%
	Colombia	Bogota	15.79%
Moderate	Ecuador	Quito	11.35%
	Paraguay	Asuncion	12.06%
Incipient	Bolivia	La Paz	11.11%
	Guatemala	Guatemala City	9.48%
	Brazil	Brasilia	4.03%
Average Total			20.53%

Percentages calculated for this chapter. Source: www.eclal.cl.

example, 20 percent) is concentrated, has a positive impact on state political stability. The phenomenon of urban primacy supports this argument. In Latin America today, a country's principal city, in addition to almost always being the capital, often contains more than a fifth of the total population of the country. Figure 1 attests to the extent of urban primacy in Latin America.

Even in Mexico and Colombia, countries that along with Brazil would fall outside the general rule of urban primacy because they are cases where there are important urban networks made up of a significant number of large and medium-sized cities[2], the population of the capital city still represents a significant percentage of the total population (17.23 percent for the Federal District of Mexico and 15.79 percent for Bogota). The most obvious exception to this pattern is the case of Brazil, which can be explained by the federal government's decision in 1957 to establish a capital in the jungle region in order to create an urban pole of political importance away from the dominant population concentration on the coasts of this enormous country. The intention of this decision was to help balance historical patterns of population dispersement. In all Latin American countries, with the exception noted, there is a large urban area that houses a very significant part of the total population and has become the epicenter of a large part of that country's political and social activities and national economy.[3]

The convergence of these political, economic, and social elements in these urban areas is the main factor leading to the relationship between good governmental administration and urban revitalization and national stability. Nevertheless, not even predominant phenomenon of urban primacy in the region is enough to fully understand the meaning and logic of this relationship. It is important to include other factors in our analysis and not to underestimate the importance of the idiosyncratic particularities of each case.

In any case, these factors are tied to the relationship of interdependence between the administration of the mayor of the capital city of each country and the presidential administration on the national level. This relationship of interdependence is complex and because of this can be analyzed on sev-

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2. According to the Colombian National Planning Department, intermediary cities are those that have between 100,000 and 1 million inhabitants. Large cities have between one and five million inhabitants.

3. For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of this phenomenon of urban primacy, see Hardoy 1972 and Melchor 1972.

eral different levels. First it is important to contrast the realm and reach of each administration and the disjunctions that the respective governors face. When the phenomenon of primacy is advanced, that is, when the proportion of the population in the capital city is large (as is true in the cases of Uruguay, Argentina, and Peru), the presidential administration will have to face a difficult crossroads. This is due to the fact that a significant portion of the decisions concerning the country's public finance budget will inevitably be tied to the fiscal appetite and to the cost associated with the public income where the largest concentration of the national population, in other words, the principal city, live.

This situation is clearer when seen from the perspective of urban government and of the importance for the mayor of achieving a rational economic equilibrium in a dual perspective. First, it has to do with the very resources generated by the logic of its urban status, that is, the resources earned through the payment of real estate taxes, vehicle taxes, of industry and commerce, of the value added to sales, customs duties, and sometimes surcharges on the consumption of specific products, for example, gasoline. On the other hand, the urban government also receives transfers from the national government.

Second, it is related to the logical fact that the urban government should make sure that the resources generated by its city are not diminished by the national government's diverting resources produced by the city to the national budget to distribute to other smaller municipalities where sufficient value added is not generated to cover costs and public investment. In the case of Bogota, for example, it is known that "in a country with such accentuated economic centralism, the residents in large cities should contribute with their taxes to put into equilibrium the regional imbalance to achieve a better territorial distribution of revenues. Nevertheless, there is a certain sense of injustice in the capital upon comparing the *national and local taxes* paid by residents of Bogota as opposed to the quality of life in the city, the delay in its physical infrastructure and the unsatisfied social needs of that 20 percent of the country's population that lives in Bogota."[4]

The area in which we could analytically contemplate the interdependency between the mayor's administration in the urban realm and the presidential administration at the national level is related to the competition between

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4. This argument is put forth by Julio Roberto Piza R., ex-secretary of Bogota's Internal Revenue office in a mimeographed document with no title or date.

government agendas. This competition is sometimes tacit and sometimes explicit. It is a result of differences in the order of priorities of each governmental level's agendas. Here too urban primacy becomes an intervening variable in this relationship of interdependence. The greater the expression of this phenomenon in a country, the greater the proclivity to conflictive competition between the mayor of the large city and the president.

Even if it is possible to expect the existence of a close agreement on problematic matters and items within each of the agendas in question, there will always be differences and specifities in each of them. It is obvious that in the municipal-urban agenda there will be fewer items and components than in the national agenda. It is also clear that this discrepancy is a result of the simple gradual and hierarchical differences among the difference levels of territorial legislature. That is to say, it has to do with the preponderance of national order over subaltern orders of that hierarchical structuration.

However, we come to a point in which the coincidences mentioned turn out to a large extent to be the source of conflictive competitions that, in turn, impose the prevailing lack of resources in Latin American countries, which will be further discussed below. This is where the budget of the large cities and the national budget collide. It is due to the lack of agreements between the two political actors that, instead of establishing and constructing strategies of complementarity and harmony to understand the common problem of their respective agendas, make it difficult to coordinate and rationalize policies in order to increase national stability. This insufficiency of intergovernmental cooperation is accentuated in circumstances in which the political projects of the mayor and the president are antagonistic or different. The simple fact that both actors have been elected by popular vote when they represent different party forces becomes a determinant in the disagreements and differences in the order of priorities on the agendas.

The Latin American experience can offer several examples of this. Here it is sufficient to mention the recent cases of Mexico and Colombia. In the case of Mexico, there were ideological and pragmatic differences between the PRD platform of the mayor of the Federal District, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and the PRI government of President Ernesto Zedillo in the period of 1994 to 2000. The case of Colombia, which is even more recent, alludes to the discrepancies between the government agenda of Mayor Luis Eduardo Garzón as the mayor elected with a leftist political project, the Democratic Pole, in marked contrast with the government of President Álvaro Uribe, who, despite formally repre-

senting a project that is independent of the historical Liberal and Conservative parties, is unmistakably center-right.

A third aspect of the analytical approach to the interdependent relationship between the urban and national governments is tied to the syndrome of upward mobility in the careers of political actors in Latin America. Even if this is not generalizable in absolute terms, it is possible to identify a recurring pattern under which a good number of political actors who gain formal access to the mayor's office of the principal cities of their respective countries also attain such a status that they could be in the running for the office of president. This leads to a belief in these countries that the mayor's office of the capital city is the second most important national post after the presidency of the republic. Although not all everyone who could possibly become president has been able to attain this position, there are successful cases. In Colombia, there are the examples of the ex-presidents Virgilio Barco (Liberal, 1986–1990) and Andrés Pastrana (Conservative, 1998–2002). Both were mayor of Bogota (Barco from 1966 to 1968 and Pastrana from 1988 to 1990) before being elected president. Another example is the ex-president of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), Armando Calderón (1994–1999) in El Salvador. Also, in Ecuador there is the case of Jamil Mahuad of the Popular Democracy party, who became president of his country in 1998, a position in which he did not have the same recognition as he had achieved as mayor of Quito between 1992 and 1998, and was driven from office in 2000.

On the other hand, there are abundant examples of politicians who, despite having been mayors of important cities, did not or have not yet attained the highest position in government. In Mexico, there is the case of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas for the Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD. There is also the case of the current mayor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who could compete against Cárdenas himself for the PRD candidacy for the presidency to succeed President Vicente Fox. In Peru, there are also interesting examples. Luis Bedoya of the Christian Popular Party (PPC), was mayor of Lima twice (from 1964 to 1966 and from 1967 to 1969) and twice an unsuccessful presidential candidate (in 1980 and in 1985). Alfonso Barrantes of the United Left (IU), was mayor of Lima from 1984 to 1986 and later a serious competitor against Alan García of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), in the 1985 elections, in which Barrantes reached the second round of voting. Later, Ricardo Belmot of Nacional Solidarity, who was also mayor twice made an unsuccessful run for president in 2001. Finally, there is the case of Alberto

Andrade of We Are Peru, who was mayor of Lima twice, and unsuccessfully sought the office of president in 2002. Currently in Colombia, the independent ex-mayors Antanas Mockus (1995–1997 and 2001–2003) and Enrique Peñalosa (1998–2000) have already shown serious intentions to compete for the presidency of the country for the 2006–2010 term, the first one as a candidate for the democratic left but with no particular specific party, and the second as a possible candidate for the Colombian Liberal Party.

In this sense, one would expect these presidents to have a predisposition to support those urban contexts because, due to their own experience, they know all their limitations and precariousness, on one hand, and because they realize their importance as spaces for good public governance indispensable for macro-political stability of the country, on the other. In the same way, one would expect that the mayor would be open and clearly sensitive to the fact that the president has to prioritize macro-level topic that cannot necessarily be reduced to the urban level, despite any sympathies there might be. Detailed research on this type of historical situation would allow us to validate these proposals and advance the study of the interdependency that exists between good administration of urban government and national stability.

A fourth area of analysis in which to examine the meaning of this interdependent relationship between good local administration and a stable state is the paradox of the center, understood as an agglomeration of resources in just one pole of the territory that, at the same time, consolidates the myth that the entity that benefits most from this resource concentration is the very city that contains it. This myth is intensified by the belief that these cities are voracious and insatiable. The case of Bogota offers a good example of this paradox. In contrast with the generalized belief that the capital of Colombia is the user of all the resources that make up its macrocephalic economy and that its appetite and consumption are exaggerated, the reality is that what this urban center of more than eight million inhabitants distributes to the rest of the country is more than what it rightfully should absorb due to the fact that so much population, production, and wealth is located there.

In 1999, Bogota contributed 35 percent of its revenues to the gross domestic product and received in turn less than nine percent.[5] "Bogota

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5. See http://univerciudad.redbogota.com/ediciones/002/opina01.htm. Page visited on February 7, 2005.

contributes the highest proportion of taxes to the national treasury and receives less and less in transfers so that its inhabitants have to make a larger fiscal effort to compensate for what it does not receive from the national level. But despite the economic importance of the city in the national context, charging local level taxes is limited by the contribution capacity of its inhabitants and the competitiveness of local economic agents in the District. Because of this, in cities like Bogota national transfers in adequate volume are necessary to drive efficiency in urban administration and attend to complex social problems" (Vargas).

The undeniable involvement of Bogota in the logic of centrality (just as in other large Latin American cities), in a context where the voices for socio-economic and political decentralization are becoming louder and more demanding, gives the "city of Colombians" the inevitable obligation of diverting resources to other national geographic spaces. It is also very important for a more profound study of the meaning and impact of this reality on urban and national public finances to better understand the nature of fiscal deficit and the poverty that affects the majority of the population.

The second type of paradox of the urban center has to do with the fact that because in the majority of these cases the principal city is also the capital city these urban areas become the point of convergence and super-imposition of representatives of the interests of all the circumscriptions that make up the geo-politics and legislature of the national territory. These agents of representation of the rights and aspirations of the provinces are partially located in the capitals because all of the sources of power, economics, and politics are located there. The resulting competition is another difficulty the mayor of the capital must face as he or she must compete to gain recognition for the city's aspirations and rights. It is as if in one's own house you had to stand in line in order get into to the dining room!

Factors that Explain the Interdependence between Good Urban Management and National Political Stability

Another factor that must be mentioned in this examination of the relationship between local governance and national stability is the macro-economic situation. This factor will only be briefly discussed. The latest aggregated reports on the state of democracy in Latin America demonstrate a

broad agreement in pointing out the fragility of most of the economies of the region. Whether they deal with specialized economic and socio-demographic reports, like the ones from ECLA in 2002 and 2004, or others that are more focused on the behavior of political actors and institutions, such as the report by the United Nations Development Programme or the Index of Democratic Development from 2004 carried out by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, all of these reports recognize serious problems in and marked disequilibrium of macro-economic management.

Poverty and indigence continue to rise while the concentration of wealth and poor distribution of revenue are consolidated. Between 2001 and 2002, the percentage of people with incomes below the poverty line grew from 43.2 percent to 44 percent; levels of indigence grew from 18.5 percent to 19.4 percent.[6] This is the equivalent of 196 million people living in conditions of poverty, of which 94 milllion are in extreme poverty, according to Patricio Aylwin's (ex-president of Chile) interpretation of these data (Kliksberg 2002). Open unemployment and informal employment reflect a devastating panorama in family incomes and precariousness of social security policies.[7]

The few countries in which growth of the gross domestic product—such as Chile and Mexico—has made it possible to glimpse a reduction in poverty are also affected by socio-economic asymmetries and by the weight of social debt. Others factors, such as the decrease in reserves, the fiscal deficit, and high cost of servicing the external debt, severely limit these region's ability to implement significant policies to satisfy the basic necessities of the impoverished majority. To further compound this situation, the markedly high figures of administrative corruption[8] and military and bureaucratic public expenses makes Latin American (in general) the most unequal region of the world in socio-economic terms.

It is not difficult to understand that this accumulation of economic problems greatly affects the possibilities for an efficient and satisfactory

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6. Data obtained from the ECLA website, www.eclac.cl. Page visited on February 2, 2005.
7. The ECLA website indicates that unemployment in Latin America between 1990 and 2000 grew by 2.3 percent. It went from 8.1 percent to 10.4 percent. In the same way, the informality of employment for these same years was 47.4 percent and 50.3 percent, respectively.
8. According to the reports by Transparency International, the majority of Latin American countries have poor indices of corruption according to the "Index of Perception of Corruption."

exercise of state public management. Nevertheless, if we generalize and accept this direct causality, the acritical recognition of the relationship between good management of the urban government and national political stability, we come to a dead-end street that does not agree with specific and singular situations like the one in Bogota. Even though Colombia's macro-economic situation still reflects the same general difficulties experienced in almost all of Latin America, based on what has happened with the capital city we cannot easily establish the direction connection between the quality of municipal-urban administration and national administration.

Until just a decade ago, Bogota was characterized by a sense of anomie and a lack of belonging in the city. Colombians from the whole country gradually arrived at the country's urban center. By the mid-20th century, it is difficult to determine from where the inhabitants of the capital had come. It was difficult to know if they were natives or migrants. The overflowing and anarchic growth of Bogota became the reflection of incongruous governmental administrations in which the formal exercise of government under personal interests was given priority instead of pledges to strengthen the institutional meaning of public administration. The policies of government were discontinuous, segmented, and did not reflect an integral, systematic vision of the official agendas.

Most of the mayors, with their interests tied to clientelism and personalism, did not worry about encouraging responsible and conscious political participation of the inhabitants of the capital city. It was a city that the inhabitants used according to their own interests and necessities without giving anything back to the city in return. It was a city in which the collective interest and use of public space were relegated to the plane of immediate convenience. It was, in sum, a city without citizenship. Nevertheless, the decade of the 1990s marked a change in styles and forms of governing. With the 1991 Political Constitution, the tenuous political history that had been promoting administrative and political decentralization in the country also found the possibility to fuse participation of citizens with the democratic opening reflected in this new political project.[9]

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9. A good analytical vision of the reach of the new Colombian Constitution of 1991 can be found in Dugas 1993.

Under the new constitutional framework, a public administration that reflected the beginning of a new form of governance in Bogota began in 1993 and it began by articulating urban decentralization and the reorganization of public finances with a policy promoting citizen culture in the long term in the nine localities into which the vast urban territory was initially fragmented, each one under the rule of a minor mayor.[10] With these bases the following administration, already provided with a decentralizing framework and a financial reorganization, could emphasize the arduous gradual process of constructing a citizen culture based on a pedagogical strategy oriented toward voluntarily complying with the norms, mutual regulation, encouragement of the ability to make and keep agreements, the promotion of intercommunication and solidarity among citizens, and mutual help based on friendly and conscious social regulation.[11]

The successor followed the line begun and followed by his predecessors and, without a particular ideological or party preference, developed a governance based on the promotion and execution of infrastructure works for the recuperation of public space, on one hand, and the continuation of the citizen pedagogy in addition to the creation of a 10-year territorial organization plan, on the other.[12] When this administration ended, his predecessor, after a failed presidential attempt, went back to the mayor's office of Bogota to continue the policies promoting a citizen culture and political participation in the improvement of public space and the transparent and responsible financial management of the city.[13]

After these four linked administrations that reflect the beginning of a continuity in urban public policies, the mayor's office is currently occupied by a leader of the democratic left party, the Democratic Pole, who debates between the continuity of the policies mentioned and the destination of the few resources in the budget for investment in relieving the overwhelming poverty and indigence.

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10. Here I am alluding to the principal political lines of the mayoral period of ex-minister for the Liberal party, Jaime Castro (1992–1994).

11. These were the main lines for ex-mayor Antanas Mockus' creation of a citizen culture.

12. This fusion of tangible and intangible urban public policies was successfully Developer by the ex-mayor for the liberals, who was a self-proclaimed independent, Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000).

13. This took place during the second term of Antanas Mockus (2001-2003).

This continuity in positive public policies[14] allows us to see how the good management of a large city is not necessarily achieved through the designation of resources from the national budget or from a comfortable macro-economic situation—which is inexistent in this case. It also allows us to see that the relative recuperation and transformation of a metropolis can be achieved even through the use of intangible elements instead of material resources. These policies have lead to an increase in citizen motivation and feeling of obligation. Upon seeing the changes and improvements in their city, they not only developed a better attachment to the city and sense of belonging but also accepted the tax increases that the urban government imposed when faced with the insufficiency of the resources designated by the national government.

However, with these indications we cannot leave the reader with the feeling that citizen participation in these matters of public interest in the large cities has been consolidated and that political decentralization has been fully developed. In the nearly 14 years that the new constitution has been in effect neither residents of Bogota, specifically, nor the rest of the national population, in general, have fully appropriated the institutional framework of participatory democratic model that, furthermore, consecrates the social state of rights, which advocates for social justice. There is still a need to strengthen and extend participatory citizen culture not only in Colombia but in the rest of Latin American countries as well. It is also indispensable to overcome the asymmetry in the implementation of the different dimensions of decentralization: the political, the administrative, and the fiscal. The first should need to get up to speed with the other two because it continues to be outdistanced.[15]

COROLLARY

Thus, although urban primacy is insufficient to fully explain the interdependence between good management in the large urban centers in Latin

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14. It is important to mention here that a more systematic and detailed treatment of Bogota's public policies during the last decade is being carried out by the author. It is part of the international project "Decentralization, Local Initiatives, and Citizenship in Latin America" being carried about the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program.

15. With respect to the recent study of the development of decentralization in Colombia, it was demonstrated that in a revision of 47 of its regulations, only four are related to political decentralization and all the others are fiscal or administrative. For further details, see Jolly 2004.

American and national political stability, it is very useful as an analytical tool to establish and review different aspects between these two variables and, in this way, better understand the complexity of this relationship. In is also important to note that the consideration of the economic crisis in the Latin America and its impact on the existing relationship between public administrations at different levels is better understood if we also consider the role of citizen participation in themes of public administration.

The preexistence of a Hobbesian and Weberian liberal vision that formal power in its different expressions has to do with the monopoly on the exercise of coercion should give more space to an alternative republican vision that views the recognition of authority as the product of responsible, democratic public management.[16] This is what broadens citizen participation for the conscious exercise of politics and what blurs the unidirectional interdependencies based only on the management of resources of power instead of transforming them into the results of consensuses, agreements, and the work pooled for the benefit of a truly public ethic. It is here where the good management and urban governance dialectically reinforce themselves with national stability.

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16. To go deeper into this paradigmatic contrast between liberalism and republicanism see Conill 2001: 89–99.

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THE NEW HOUSING PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA[1]

ALFREDO RODRÍGUEZ AND ANA SUGRANYES

A HYPOTHESIS: A POLICY FOR PUBLIC HOUSING FINANCING IS NOT A PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY

In Chile, the housing subsidy mechanism, which is financed by the national budget, has allowed for the construction of more than half a million public housing units in the last 25 years. These are finished units on urban lots, which the users receive as their property. This public housing financing policy started in the mid-1980s with the main objective of reducing the accumulated housing deficit. This goal has been obtained. Chile is the only South American country that has sustained the production of housing units greater than growth and the degree of obsolescence of construction for more than 15 years. As a result of this financing policy, 20 percent of the 15 million inhabitants in the country have been given a roof over their heads, thereby reducing the housing deficit. The beneficiaries primarily belong to the first two quintiles of the Chilean population.

This model of financing has created interest in the countries of the region and different governments have indiscriminately copied it. This worries us because this model, which has been successful in terms of the number of units constructed, has not been analyzed in terms of the quality of its products or the social and urban impacts that this massive production of housing has caused. Recent studies regarding the production of public housing demonstrate that quantity has been more important than quality, tradition more important than technological innovation, social fragmentation more than integration, and the relationship between the government and construction companies more important than user participation.[2]

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1. This article is based on the results of studies on public housing policy in Santiago, 1980–2000, undertaken by SUR, Corporation of Social Studies and Education, between 2001 and 2004.
2. With respect to this, numerous voices have emerged in recent years. See, for example, Cámara Chilena 1997, Ducci 1997, Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 2000 and 2001, Sugranyes 2000, Rodríguez 2001, SUR Corporación de Estudios Sociales y Educación 2002.

In other words, we have a model of public housing financing that has been successful in terms of the number of units produced, but at the same time has serious limitations in terms of the product offered. To give a figure, 65 percent of families who live in the public housing projects in Santiago intend to leave these developments and the neighborhoods where they currently live. They say they want to leave but cannot because they are poor and have no other alternatives. The success of this massive production of housing causes us to be faced with a new housing problem of hundreds of thousands of families who have housing. If twenty years ago the dominant housing problem was families with no roof over their heads, today in Santiago the problem is with the families who have housing that is substandard, inflexible, and at the core of a series of urban problems.

The government, academics, and non-governmental organizations continue to view the housing issue from the perspective of what it was in 1987, the International Year of People without Housing: the accumulated deficit of housing, land takeovers, the topic of people without housing. For many, the problem continues to be how to provide housing and, therefore, it continues to be necessary to build more new public housing facilities. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the problem has changed and there are new actors in the population. On one hand, in the last ten years, the quantitative housing deficit has been reduced annually and there has only been one important land takeover. On the other hand, organizations of public housing residents have cropped up to protest the construction companies and the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, which is known as Minvu, because of problems related to the quality of housing, services, and facilities in the housing developments where they live. Crime and domestic violence are also problems that have appeared related to large concentrations of public housing projects.

Since the housing problem has traditionally been conceived of from the perspective of how to reduce the housing deficit and move families from camps to new housing units, it is taken for granted that the constructed stock is part of the solution to the problem. Our hypothesis is different. What reality is showing us is that a successful housing financing policy has ended up creating a new housing and urban problem— an enormous stock of inadequate public housing units requiring urgent attention.

A Bit of History

The topic of housing in Chile has been important since the end of the 1970s. During the military dictatorship and under the auspices of the "Chicago boys," Minvu created a system linking subsidies, savings, and credits to ensure the participation of construction companies in housing programs. The system is unique in Latin America. It combines a long tradition of state intervention in social issues with the protection of the housing market.

Private enterprise's answer to this state initiative was swift. During the deepest economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, the business sector bought large tracts of land in what was then the periphery of Santiago.[3] These reserves of land were seen as a kind of guarantee, but now they are an indication that this system of mass production of public housing is being exhausted. The companies have defined the location of public housing through these land reserves. However, now these lots and the public housing projects on them are no longer on the periphery. Due to the way in which Santiago has grown and expanded, they are now part of the consolidated city. The increase in urban land value, especially during the decade of the 1990s, contributed to putting the system in jeopardy. The business world decided that these land reserves no longer supported low-level investment like the investment in public housing, which is now being constructed farther away, outside of the greater Santiago area.

Since 1985, the Chilean state has concentrated its housing financing policy on lowering the accumulated housing deficit; this has been achieved.[4] The reduction in the deficit has lead to construction rates similar to those in Europe after World War II—a yearly construction rate of ten housing units for each 1,000 inhabitants. However, after more than 20 years of this, the objective of reducing the deficit is no longer sufficient. There is a greater deficit now in the quality of life offered by the public housing projects that the state has financed. It is a problem that many

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3. See Rodríguez and Sugranyes 2002: 111–116.
4. Since it was purchased, this land has been thought of in terms of the profit that its owners could make with the low-cost housing financing policy. In Santiago, from the first eradications of camps at the end of the 1950s, real estate interests have defined the settlement of poor people in the southern periphery, from Zanjón del Aguada to La Granja, La Pintana, and later Puente Alto and San Bernardo.

other countries, particularly European countries, have experienced and overcome. In Chile, however, the possibility of formulating a policy of housing improvement is still very remote.

One of the greatest obstacles to innovation and the proposal of alternatives is that the model for the production of public housing in Chile is imprisoned in a captive market with very satisfied protagonists. The understanding between the state that finances the housing and the few companies that produce it is perfect: Minvu grants subsidies, assigns the units to the companies that have bid, the companies construct them, and at the end of the year the state returns 31 percent of the value added taxes of the cost of construction to the companies. The state protects not only the companies but also the financial market that has agreed to finance the credits of those companies that seek the subsidy. Minvu helps the banks that finance the credits by financing the insurance on the loans and assuming responsibility for the real estate if the debtor cannot pay.

There is no risk and no competition. There are very few companies specialized in public housing that are able to bid for the annual contracts. There is no innovation either. The technology of public housing in Chile is the same as it was 20 years ago.[5] In this captive market, the low-quality construction companies do not need to look at the contributions, ideas, and essays that non-governmental organizations, universities, and professional organizations have developed. The Ministry and the businesses have not had to open a debate on the social and urban costs of the mass production of public housing, which include the costs of locating services and facilities on the periphery versus the advantages that already consolidated areas of the city offer.[6]

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5. Almost all of the poor people in the country have low-quality housing on urbanized land. Those who are not part of this model are the residents of camps or irregular settlements, who are about four percent of the total population after Pinochet's radical eradication programs. The "Chile Barrio" program will finish eradicating the camp settlements. We will have even more poor people with substandard housing.

6. The technology of public housing has not evolved over time, and it is the same in the north, center, and south of Chile. Because there was one construction system throughout time and region, without any competition, there was a tendency for the quality of construction to deteriorate until 1997. During that year in Puente Alto—the Santiago community that has received the most public housing units in the 1990s—the case of the *nylon houses* showed the limitations of the technical specifications used in the bids for this type of housing complex. The houses flooded due to the rains. The cement blocks were not sufficiently waterproof. Minvu has invested important additional subsidies to repair these failures in the system and has corrected basic aspects of the quality of housing.

There is no criticism of the architecture either. The designs of the projects and housing units are not criticized. There is no innovation in them, no proposals for progressive growth of housing. The idea of being able to make future improvements is not part of the agenda of public housing.

There is no need for change, then, because the sustained production of hundreds of thousands of housing units throughout the country is positively evaluated politically. Since the democratic transition in 1990, the ministers of Housing have been praised by government and the opposition. Indeed, this housing policy has created votes for the government, at least until 1997, when the first became apparent that the model was exhausted. Only in Parliament has there been some questioning of the distribution of state resources and the protection of the banks versus the lack of protection for beneficiaries.

THE CONSTRUCTED STOCK OF PUBLIC HOUSING[7]

In Santiago, during the last 20 years, the housing subsidy has allowed for the construction of more than 200,000 low-quality public housing units, which were never designed to allow for the creation of additions or improvements. Almost one fifth of the population of the city lives in public housing. The phenomenon of transition from residents without housing to residents with housing is illustrated by the following facts.

Half of these public housing projects are on individual lots of one, two, or three floors. The lot makes processes of appropriation and occupation of all the available space easier. The size of these lots has varied over the years. At the beginning of the 1980s, the military eradicated temporary housing camps, moving the residents to basic housing with lots of about 100 and 120 square meters. During the 1990s, the pressure for mass production reduced the size of individual lots to less than 60 square meters.

The other half of the housing units consists of apartments in three or four-story buildings. It is a condominium system, or a system of horizontal ownership, that its inhabitants are not able to understand because no one

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7. This model of growth was established in the second half of the 1980s. Before that, there were at least three studies—one from the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile's School of Economics, another from the Municipality of Santiago, and the third from the Regional Secretary of the Housing Ministry—which demonstrated the lower economic costs of constructing public housing in central areas of Santiago than in the periphery.

has explained. The relationship between the inhabitants of these housing projects and the neighboring buildings is difficult. The common spaces, which are really residual spaces between the buildings, do not make it easy for neighbors to meet each other or enjoy leisure activities.

Despite the restrictions of the initial design and the norms in force, people have done all kinds of informal additions to the units. The large majority of beneficiaries with housing construct some kind of addition, often the additions are almost as large as the original unit. The risks of earthquakes, fires, or municipal fines do not outweigh the urgent need for more space. These additions occupy gardens, hallways, and communal spaces, or are tacked onto building façades and supported by weak poles.

The projects convoked by Minvu and constructed on the bidding companies' lands can come to have, in some cases, more than 2,000 units, with densities greater than 600 inhabitants per hectare.[8] The design criteria for the projects are secondary to the interests of the construction companies and that results in a monotonous repetition of houses, of rows of houses, and residual spaces. The buildings are poorly distributed. Minvu, the architects, and the construction company have not thought about the impacts of such conditions on the people and the city, much less about the greater social cost of these impacts.

The land reserves of some construction companies have created a configuration of large urban stains covered by housing units that are isolated from each other. Minvu has never participated in these examples of urbanism. Its regulatory function in terms of land use has not been translated into a master plan for these areas.[9] Around these large concentrations of public housing, some municipalities or private organizations have constructed rudimentary social facilities like schools, health centers, and transportation services. There are services, but they are disorganized and deficient.

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8. In the past four years, we have undertaken studies in different-sized four cities to understand the impact of this successful policy. One of these was a survey of 1,700 households in public housing projects. In Santiago, we analyzed 489 projects with a total of 202,026 public housing units financed by Minvu between 1980 and 2000. We also undertook a geo-referenced survey (Geographic Information System) of these projects with the data from Minvu's annual report.
9. The Metropolitan Santiago Regulatory Plan establishes that the gross minimum density should be 150 inhabitants per hectare. In reality, the average density of the greater area Santiago is 83 inhabitants per hectare.

Many things have changed in Chile during the last 15 years. The per capita income has doubled, for instance, and there is greater inequality and a lack of social networks. The production model and type of public housing, however, continues to be exactly the same.

THE ACTORS' PERCEPTION OF THE HOUSING FINANCE POLICY

Surveys and interviews have shown that users, Minvu functionaries, and businesses belonging to the Chilean Chamber of Construction have different perceptions about public housing. The users want to leave, Minvu wants to focus, and the construction companies want a secondary market for public housing. None of this is happening.

The Users

One important fact is obvious from the survey conducted among residents of the stock of public housing: 64.5 percent of the users want "to leave the housing."[10] The reasons for this are social, mainly reasons having to do with the relationships with neighbors, and the perception of security, crime, and drugs. This is what 52.6 percent of residents think. The image that the resident has of his or her housing development is also important, according to 21.6 percent of respondents. Other important factors include physical aspects, such as the small size of the housing units (13.4 percent), isolation from the urban fabric, and the lack of services and parks (12.4 percent), although these factors are less important than the relationships with neighbors.

Cross checking data from the survey about residents' intentions to move and their level of satisfaction with their housing, we learn that among those residents who wish to leave, 90 percent are afraid and feel ashamed of their neighborhood, while those who are satisfied feel affection for the neighborhood. These reactions have to do with the relationship between problems between neighbors and problems with physical space. If we map the distribution of these opinions by housing type, we see that more people who live in

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10. Homogeneous concentration of low-cost housing, here called *manchones*, have developed especially in the southern and western areas of greater Santiago. The largest and oldest of these extends over 350 hectares of communities in La Florida, La Granja, La Pintana, San Ramón, and El Bosque. There have been 82 projects with 34,000 public housing units. Other important *manchones* are those found in the communities of San Bernardo and Puente Alto.

multifamily housing as opposed to those who live in individual lots (70 percent and 55 percent, respectively) want to move. This tendency grows from the indigent to the non-poor (from 55 to 65 percent), with a greater concentration among those who obtained their housing between 1986 and 1990 (70 percent) when compared to the more recent recipients (from 1998 to 2000), where "only" 50 percent wish to leave.[11] Several studies done on the residents' level of satisfaction in the public housing stock[12] have shown that the sense of appreciation decreases with each year of residence. The disenchantment of the users, who dreamed of having their own house, appears between six months and two years after the housing project opens. The intention to leave and the perception of satisfaction or dissatisfaction demonstrates the importance of peoples' feelings regarding place and their urban area.

In comparison with other Latin American cities, Santiago does not have a very serious level of violence, but the perception of violence is proportionally very elevated.[13] Accoring to Tudela, there is no direct relationship between actual levels of violence and the perception of violence (2003). For the well-being of the city, the fact that the population perceives insecurity is just as serious as crime rates themselves. In speaking with residents in the large majority of the public housing complexes, especially those who live

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11. The large majority of public housing owners (68 percent) would be willing to sell their houses to look for larger houses. In terms of preferences for another option, almost half of the residents (46 percent) would look for it in another community in greater Santiago; 30 percent would center their search in the same community; others (18 percent) say they would like to leave the metropolitan area; only five percent would opt for another housing unit in the same neighborhood or would look to improve or add on to their current unit. The preferences are almost the same between new and used housing, but there is a marked preference for a house over an apartment. Beyond the preference for a house on its own lot, this large difference is better explained by the architectonic deficiencies of the apartment buildings than by the type of housing solution itself. These preferences reflect once again the socio-economic differences among public housing residents: 10 percent—the poorest residents—would opt for a solution with no debt, applying for new subsidies and minimal savings. Analyzing this fact with others (type of housing, the different time periods in which the projects were constructed, the size of the projects, as a function of the age and sex of the person interviewed), the percentage of residents who intend to leave the public housing project is practically in the same range of between 58 and 70 percent, always with more interest from those living in apartment buildings.

12. This sense appreciation and its relationship to time periods coincides with the satisfaction studies done by Minvu. It is important to keep in mind that the sample selection in the Minvu evaluation prioritizes new projects (no more than five years old), which distorts the perception of the quality of life in the majority of the complexes, which were constructed between 1986 and 1997.

13. See Arriagada and Sepúlveda 2001 and 2002.

where there are large concentrations of this kind of homogeneous housing, the first concern mentioned was violence: "Living here is like being in jail." "We have the children cooped up in the house." "We are poor, but good, people; the bad people are the ones over there," pointing toward any neighboring housing complex. Another worrisome indicator is that the large majority of violent acts reported on television occur in the areas of public housing. Living in public housing, particularly in the multifamily buildings, is a daily practice in exclusion and insecurity (de la Jara 2002).

Institutional Actors

The territorial dimension of housing—that is, the place where public housing projects are located, the relationship among projects and between projects and the city—is not a main concern for Minvu. Minvu seeks to concentrate state resources in the poorest sectors, without worrying about the importance of place and the area where poor families have to live. This occurs even though Serviu functionaries are very conscious of the kind of social conflict that could grow out of the poor relationships among beneficiaries of public housing.

The Chilean Chamber of Construction is highly interested in understanding public housing residents' level of satisfaction. However, the Chamber is hoping that the stock of housing will serve as an answer to the demand of the poorest sectors and, therefore, allow for residential mobility. This mobility that would allow the construction companies to dedicate themselves to the construction of higher-priced housing and, a result, to not continue "sacrificing" land for such low-level investments as public housing.[14]

The Market

Despite the fact that the majority of residents declare their desire to leave public housing, despite there being a small market for renting out units for more than the mortgage payment, the conditions do not exist for there to be mobility in the public housing stock. The intention residents have to leave public housing and their neighborhoods cannot be understood as an

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14. Comparing the topic of violence in the main cities of Latin America, the crime rates in Santiago are among the lowest in the region. The problems related to the perception of violence, however, are much higher than in other cities. For more on this phenomenon, see Acero et al. 2000.

indicator of residential mobility. As is explained below, the opportunities for mobility are very complex. They cross cultural values and socio-economic situations that do not correspond to a market interpretation. The differences in the value that people place on their units demonstrate that there is no homogeneity in the problems or options of about a million residents of the public housing stock. The design of any response to these problems and any incentive for these options demands a detailed analysis of the demand.

The consolidation of a secondary market in public housing would be a good alternative for the demand of poor sectors that have not yet had access to their own housing. Then, there would be housing offered to the poorest members of society within the current boundaries of the greater Santiago area, without having to move to the new housing projects far from the urban area. An agile market in used public housing also interests construction businesses because they would be able to extract more value from housing complexes that would have higher values than public housing complexes.

With a stable real estate market, in a context of economic growth, the theoretical conditions for housing mobility would be present. Nevertheless, more than six years after Minvu created a support mechanism for this mobility, which allows for state support for both new and used housing, the secondary market for public housing has not been consolidated. In Santiago in 2002, there was only one private case[15] dedicated to promoting this secondary market and it only was able to support the sale of 300 housing units a year in the formal market. It is possible that this limited number of transactions is higher in the informal market, but this is not monitored and its impact is not known. The possibilities for mobility are also limited by the complexity and high cost of the red tape associated with such transaction. The system to register real estate has not been modernized in Chile. It continues to be updated by hand in books. In addition, notary fees are high, especially in the case of public housing, because they are fixed fees and not dependent on the value of the house.

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15. Real estate requests that serve low-income sectors consider since 2000 that the land price/value in Santiago cannot withstand investments less than 600 UF for the construction of housing. Due to the close dependence between Minvu and the private sector, this situation also explains that public housing units with nominal values of less than 400 UF have been in construction since 2000 outside of the traditional borders of the greater Santiago area. These are located in communities in the south, west, and north of the city, more than 50 kilometers from the city center (Buin, in the south; Padre Hurtado and Talagante in the west; Lampa and Colina, in the north).

The possibilities for housing mobility in the public housing stock are determined by many complex social, cultural, economic, and urban factors, and cannot be compared with other sectors of the real estate market. Security problems and problematic relationships among neighbors in the housing developments determine the will for change. These problems also limit the market for those who have a subsidy they could apply to used housing and who end up opting for something new, even though it is located far outside the city, with the hope that in this new neighborhood there will be no violence or drugs.

The public housing stock is full of apparent contradictions. The initial satisfaction with having one's own house disappears quickly over the first two or three years of living in public housing. The desire to leave one's own house is complicated by the low level of social mobility and, consequently, residential mobility. The use value or the social capital of a house goes beyond the commercial, and you cannot apply market reasoning to this value. Despite the guarantee of tenancy in the house and despite the levels of urbanization demanded by the norms, the area is a marginalized area of the city, like a new Chilean style of marginality or informality, particularly since informal settlements have almost disappeared from the urban area.

The possibilities of housing mobility in the public housing stock are also determined by the production process. These possibilities are limited because the stock is a result of a base of productive understanding between a sector and companies that provide housing for poor people without their participation. This policy located the projects according to the profitability of the land, with no attention to the territory of demand or the impact on the city. The physical reality of the public housing stock demands intervention in order to rehabilitate the living conditions, facilitate the appropriation of public spaces, create incentives for conservation and improvements, and to allow for additions and modification to be added to these housing units.

AN EMPIRICAL PROOF: URBAN PROBLEMS

As we indicated, one part of our study was to undertake a survey of all the public housing projects and locate them on a geo-referenced map. We have compared this database with the cartographic information about crimes provided by the Ministry of the Interior's Division of Citizen Security. This information indicated there is a high relationship between the places where

there are larger concentrations of reports of domestic violence and the places where public housing complexes are located. There is also a relationship between the places where crimes are concentrated in private places and places where public housing complexes are located. These relationships are stable; there are no variations throughout the year or between different years.

The inevitable result of 25 years of a successful public housing finance policy is that quantity in and of itself is not enough because urban effects, such as segregation and fragmentation, and the effects on the families or the people, including a lack of security and difficult relationships, create new problems for the people, the society, and the state.

These data validate our hypothesis that a public housing finance policy has ended up creating new social problems. Our empirical study shows that in Santiago today the major public housing problem has to do with people who actually have housing. The most serious aspect of this matter—which reminds us of the story of the emperor's new clothes—is that there is no social, housing, or urban policy that addresses the demands for better living conditions of the one million residents of public housing projects in Santiago.

What is there to do then? A sensible public housing policy would recognize that the first step has already been taken and a sufficient number of housing units exists. It would focus instead on the quality of the units by renovating and improving the existing housing stock. All of this leads us back to John Turner, who asserted that the place and the participation of people is very important. Without both, there is no possible public housing policy.

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PART II: THE POLITICS OF URBAN IDENTITY: PATRIMONY AND MEMORY IN THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

PATRIMONY AS A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE AND THE BANALIZATION OF MEMORY: AN HISTORIC READING FROM THE ANDES[1]

EDUARDO KINGMAN GARCÉS AND ANA MARÍA GOETSCHEL

One of the aspects that is generally forgotten when talking about patrimony is its historic character. This could seem contradictory since the people who are in charge of the policies governing historic centers emphasize just this: rescuing a tradition or a memory. We will try to show the arbitrary nature of that memory and, at the same time, argue that the notion of heritage leads to a loss rather than a reinforcement of historic meaning.[1] Furthermore, we will argue that the political dimension of patrimony is often left out, presented as inherent to the topic, or defined in a technical (and, in this sense, neutral) way without any context or tie to politics.[2]

The idea of heritage only has meaning in relation to the past or, to be more exact, to certain uses of the past, which we will call patrimonial. We refer to an assumed relationship in terms of origin and abstract identity (as meaning and sustenance of the present), instead of a search for profound connections with the present (such as, for example, among the current social configuration and colonialism). It is a purified vision that serves as a basis for the construction of controlled identities and democracies. From a social science perspective, what is really interesting is the possibility of deconstructing this.

What makes the waterfront, or malecón, in Guayaquil so important is the everyday memory that ties it to the coming and going of men, merchandise, and news, as well as popular forms of socialization tied to the activities of the port. Furthermore, there has been a production of milestones and references related to "Guayaquilness," with the idea of the patrician city (the malecón as a stage for native ceremonials). The interesting thing is to see how those representations belonging to a society and a repub-

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1. We have relied on our own experience as historians of the city to draw these conclusions.
2. See Kingman 2004: 25–34.

lican order have been incorporated, in recent years, to a project of modernity, urban renovation, and land speculation promoted by local powers. On one hand, there is a concrete historical process of construction of hegemony in which the images of "Guayaquilness" have played and play a fundamental role. On the other hand, we have the unfolding of economic interests. Furthermore, the "Malecón 2000" project is not unrelated to a proposal to build citizenship on authoritarian bases.[3]

In the case of Quito or of Lima, the reinvention of patrimony has been (and, in part, is) related to a historiography of the past that idealizes the colonial and republican legacy as well as to the monumental history of architecture, art, and the notion of high culture. There is also concordance between heritage and a kind of programmed nostalgia that tellers of historical anecdotes and studies based on "innocent certainties"[4] have proliferated. We refer to the catalog of streets, neighborhoods, characters, and legends of the city, through which a pedagogical narrative lacking any content is constructed.

When we speak of the politics of memory, we refer to selective processes undertaken from institutional centers such as academies of history, event commissions, urban beautification groups or, more contemporarily, the corporations charged with managing historic areas, the global tourism industry, and the mass media. On the one hand, there is the role of memory in legitimizing heritage and, on the other, how the idea of heritage, made into a cultural device, closely related to the action of the media and publicity, allows for the legitimization of some forms of relating to the past and delegitimizing (and, more than anything, ignoring) others. We do not wish to say with this that a serious effort to do historical research, with radically different avenues of production and circulation, is not taking place, but it is not through these kinds of studies that the publicity that accompanies patrimonial action is defined.

FIRST MODERNITY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE IDEA OF HERITAGE

The first contemporary approaches to the history of Andean cities were undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s through the transition model. What was attractive about this model was the possibility to take on the city in a structural way,

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3. On the case of Guayaquil, see Garcés 2004: 53–63.
4. See de Certau 1995.

relate it to the development of the internal market and nation formation, as well as understanding the process of constructing new sectors and social actors, who are urban in the context of a predominantly agrarian society. The interest of historians was focused on examining the changes that have taken place in the relations of production, life styles, and mentalities.

Upon doing this, it was possible to see the extent to which what we call modernity was not so much a result of ruptures as of different types of transactions with servitude and clientelism. In this sense, when speaking of the past, reference was not made to something dead, but rather to processes that came from the world that was supposed to be left behind (the stately city) and continued to reproduce themselves in the present; they formed part of reality, to the extent of marking norms for its development. In this sense, what we call past due to a cultural expedient is not something that is left or reproduced like a hindrance or inertia, but rather one of the elements of the present: one of the conditions of existence of what Beatriz Sarlo calls peripheral modernity (1988).

What our cities experienced (and, in part, continue to experience) was not a modernization in the classic sense, but rather a post-colonial modernization that gave rise to the co-existence of distinct economic, social, and cultural processes from both modernity and the Ancien Regime. Like de Certau, we can affirm that the past continued to act on the present through repression, like a shadow or haunting. It is what is repressed by modernity and what is reproduced by it.

In Ecuador as well as in Peru, the hacienda system was legally changed in the second half of the 20th century and capitalism began to develop in a gradual and deformed way. In the case of the cities, modernity was seen as tidying up, civility, separation instead of a process of changes in the organization of economic and social life, even less as the development of an advanced modern culture or as the construction of citizenship. It could be said the promoters of the first modernity wanted to construct modern cities without renouncing the privileges of the patrician city.

In the case of Lima, modernity was conceived of as the separation from "the other," the recently arrived, the unknown, particularly Asians and Andeans.[5] In the case of Quito, the modernization of the city (the con-

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5. See Ramón 1999.

struction of avenues, theaters, public plazas, filling in ravines to make use of this space for expansion) was on based the system of subsidiary work (forced labor from the nearby indigenous communities).[6]

We are talking about the last third of the 20th century, when the idea of progress and, with it, nostalgia for the future had developed among the elites. The problem that was seen in this period was how to join two distinct temporalities in one space—innovations in lifestyle and in the morphology of the city with an aristocratic tradition and a type of social organization with colonial roots that was necessary for the very development of an incipient modernity.

The rise of the first modernity in Ecuador, as in Peru or Bolivia, led to a first rupture between the culture of the elites and the rest of society (indigenous people and the urban masses). It was a process of distinction or differentiation of the urban base in a context in which capitalism was little developed and the society was still predominantly agrarian. It was not that there was no previous historical class separation; there had been a differentiation between the republic of the Spanish and the republic of the indigenous people in a corporatively and hierarchically stratified society. These separations, however, always left open the possibility for encounter and juxtapositions, which was inherited from the baroque city. The "lettered city" that Ángel Rama spoke of co-existed with "the other neighborhoods of the lettered city" (Rolena Adorno). Although we cannot speak of patrimony in the strict sense in this era, the seeds for its later development were doubtless planted.

It is a paradoxical moment. While an image of progress is being constructed, nostalgia for the past, a concern for colonial history and inventories of monumental architecture, and the reinvention of a white society grows. In the midst of this process, old public plazas become garden spaces closed off from the public, popular activities and festivals are regulated, and places of popular and indigenous socialization—like chicherías, a kind of tavern where traditional Andean corn beer is served—are driven from the center. All of this is in opposition to the old baroque city conceived of as a community of festivals. This inaugural moment of modernity marked its later development.

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6. These and other criteria on Quito can be found in Kingman 2005.

HISTORIC CENTERS AND ANDEAN CITIES: THE PLACE OF HISTORY

A second moment in the perception of our cities was the discovery of their Andean nature. We speak of discovery since until the late 1980s, the "Andean" was assumed to be something that belonged in the countryside and not in the cities. On the other hand, the "urban" was thought of as a synonym of city and not as an overall process of incorporation of the group of spaces to a dynamic of social flows and transformations. Some theorists of modernization ended up speaking of dual realities and "super-imposed worlds."

On the contrary, studies done on Bolivia by Xavier Albó, Godofredo Sandoval, and Rossana Barragán, or on Peru by Jurgen Golte, Carlos Iván Degregori, and Teófilo Altamirano noted the strong indigenous presence in urban areas. This should be understood in economic as well as social and cultural terms. This presence, as has been analyzed in the case of Quito, can be studied from two—or even three—perspectives. One perspective is that of the indigenous population arriving in the city, in successive waves, from the very days of colonial servitude or as a result of much more recent phenomena, such as agrarian reform. A second perspective is that of the indigenous population in neighboring towns, which had maintained a relationship of permanent exchange with the city through the market and work, and which became incorporated into the urban area as part of its expansion, without ceasing to be and feel indigenous (a good part of the population of Santa Clara de San Millán, Chilibulo, Nayón, and Zámbiza). These populations did not reconcile their place in relation to the city of Quito and the national society until very recently. A final perspective could view the presence of the Andean in the city as a result of an important process of de-identification or declassification that took the form of mixtures, mestizajes, and hybrids.

These different perspectives on the composition of social life in the Andes cannot be understood without the disciplines of history and anthropology. By addressing the problem of the historic center of Quito at the beginning of the 1990s, these analytical perspectives put forward several basic criteria for analyzing the Andean city addressing the relationship between space and power, as architectural and not just architectonic processes; the changing nature of spaces according to their social uses and image; the specificity of our cities and historic centers due to the Andean presence as well as the need

to conceive of them in the long term and from a perspective of diversity; the existence of multiple centers or spaces with symbolic meaning in neighborhoods or communities and not just the center.

This does not imply we should ignore the role of the center of Quito in the image of power and even less so its importance in the social life as a place of diversity and as a disputed space. The historic center of Quito has been and, in part, continues to be, despite erroneous policies in this respect, the privileged space of culture and popular religiosity. Furthermore, there has also been a constant relationship between center and periphery in the case of Quito, as well as in Michon or Salomon. This should be understood not only in an economic and social sense but also a symbolic sense. The older residents of Santa Clara de San Millán recount that Santa Clara, whose image is in a church in the center, had to be locked up at night to stop her from escaping to go dance with the Indians of the community.

HERITAGE AS A DEVICE

A third axis of historical questions concerns the ties between policies of rehabilitation and power. Power is a relationship that does not have just one center, so it does not make sense to talk about the colonial, modern, or globalized city as if they were different moments in the organization of power, without studying how their different devices functioned and function.

A device is comprised in a discursive and practical way and through a specific force field. Therefore, to understand what is happening with patrimony, it has to be understood as a device, just like a school, a sanitation system, or the police. This does not mean that there is no relationship between heritage and school, heritage and hygiene practices, or heritage and policing, but it is necessary to understand in what way, when, and how heritage appears in each place and time as a specific device, and through which discursive systems, which teachings, which practices.

The production of patrimony has come to be something that is defined by experts, as creators of policies as well as ideologies. At the same time, there is a perverse relationship between heritage conceived of as culture and its civilizing and disciplinary practices.

If we conceive of power in Foucaultian terms, as a relationship or force field instead of domination, we should concern ourselves not only with the function of devices such as patrimony but with the way in which popula-

tions respond to them. De Certau speaks of tactics to escape from the strategies coming from the center. Nancy Frazer thinks in terms of counter-publics. If patrimony is related to the organization of the public sphere, we should focus on what processes of inclusion and exclusion occur as a result of patrimony and also how individuals and social groups respond to it.

We know that during the first modernity, the spaces around which public opinion was formed—in the case of Quito, Independence Plaza—were closed to the indigenous population. However, it is also important to research where the indigenous sectors congregated, what their concerns were with the city and the white and mestizo citizenry, what their response was to municipal rules. In recent years, studies have been done throughout Latin America that show cities and particularly historic centers as spaces of dispute, in which different forms of conceiving of the everyday economy and culture have clashed and been negotiated.[7]

The history of women, on the other hand, has made it possible to visualize the formation of feminine spaces, such as school teachers, in a context in which the public center is dominantly masculine.[8] We are referring to schools, women's magazines, and everyday practices that are not recognized as public or important for the nation. Institutional historiography has made these processes invisible, reducing the history of women to domestic spaces.[9] If we think about historically developed forms of socialization for women (washing clothes in ravines or public laundries, making purchases and sales in the market, caring for children and for the sick), we see a series of places that have not been included in the inventory of patrimony.

What role does a historical or anthropological perspective play today in reflecting on historic centers? In cities, festivals are organized, museums are restructured, monuments are built, and rehabilitation undertaken—all demanding the work of historians. Heritage creates resources for historiographic work and many historians have been able to make creative use of heritage. Tour guides base their discourse on history and a notion of diversity. Cinematography and the history of mass media is even being developed related to heritage.

7. An interesting text on this topic is Viqueira Albán 1995. Also see Aguirre 2002.
8. These topics have been discussed in Goestchel 2002.
9. On this topic, see Wallach Scott 1997: 38–65.

Nevertheless, there is a basic contradiction between heritage and historical research, which has not received enough attention. Heritage is directly related to its origins while the discipline of history, in its critical perspective, tries to establish distance with any abstract entity such as Quitoness, Limaness, or Guayaquilness, or with history as a continuum. If we speak of origins it must be in the Nietzchean sense as a beginning point or inaugural moment in which reality shows it rawness and perversity (Foucault 1980: 7–29). The function of the historian is to reveal those origins as a resource for understanding the present; this is the opposite of patrimonial history. In the case of the Andes, those origins are related to colonial and postcolonial conditions and the dominion of patriarchy. These factors have conditioned our political, social, and historical development. For this reason, patrimony or heritage cannot be understood outside the construction of social, ethnic, and gender boundaries.

When one speaks of heritage, the tendency is to do so in terms of identity. The history of the fatherland as it was designed during the first modernity had a patrimonial nature (it was based on the production of milestones, monuments, and festivals), but even today patrimony is thought to be the equivalent of the memory of a city or a country. A part of patrimonial action is directed at recuperating memory, including the memory of others, and affirming a supposed identity of the urban area.

In any case, it is a process of deification or banalization of memory which coincides with the banalization of other fields. The uses of memory, like identity, under policies of heritage become rhetorical strategies, stereotypes devoid of content. Heritage contributes to the dehistorization of memory, the forgetting of the substantial, a superficial look at the past and its relationship to the present. It becomes memory as decoration or as spectacle.

In general terms, we could say, that we are experiencing a process of patrimonialization of culture. It is a gradual process undertaken by experts, which, as part of urban renovation, develops through recuperated spaces, through conquering spaces, or through the opposition between liberated spaces (ordered, secure, aesthetic) and spaces to be liberated (dangerous, dirty, degraded). It tries to imitate models from other places although it does not always have the imagination to do so. Making Quito into a space of high culture, for example, is based on the importation of elements like the opera in a place that has no tradition in this field. In the case of Guayaquil, the model is that of theme parks from Miami and other places.

Overall, however, it has to do with projects that are undertaken behind the back of cultural production itself and based on the folklorization of "the other". Feminist historiography, like social history, has discovered, on the other hand, other possible memories of the city. There is not one monolithic history of the city which we are slowly discovering; what exists is power, relationships, problematics, which are discovered through fragments. Lastly, we not only consist of different temporalities (something that is generally accepted since it forms part of the process of the banalization of memory) but we are also consist of disputed temporalities.

HERITAGE, TOURISM, DISCIPLINE

Heritage also implies another aspect on which it is important to reflect and that is the idea of the monument. A monument is always constructed in relation to something that has disappeared, but which tries to reproduce itself as an aura. Indeed, there is an international concern with certain natural areas, historic zones, and world cultures, which become patrimony, thereby impeding their final disappearance. The development of selective tourism in the global realm has contributed to this. What is not said is that these are processes of appropriation of the other and the production of purified identities or of nostalgia in conditions that are provoking the generalized destruction of nature, habitat, cultures, and conditions of life for most of the planet.

This kind of tourism has brought the world closer together, but this has occurred in conditions of inequality. In reality, our cities, cultures, and nature have become part of the decoration, the desires, and the consumption needs of the first world. Diversity itself has become merchandise, something that can be constructed through the media, turned into a souvenir, sold at a mall or in a plaza. During the first modernity, the notion of heritage was related to the elite's production of myths of origin. It was related to Spanishness (in the case of Lima and Quito) or to the image of the patrician city (in the case of Guayaquil), while today heritage cannot be understood outside of the economy of tourism, the sterilization of populations, and real estate speculation.

Tourism does not lead to homogenization since it is sustained by the diversification of offerings for tourists, including the exotic and foreign, but it is a diversity that has been emptied of content, oriented toward the con-

struction of theme parks or brand names offered to the global market of opportunities. Tourism, Debord affirms, is based on visiting something that has become banal, as part of the society of spectacle (2003). In the case of heritage, this banalization also takes on the form of high culture. In current conditions, heritage is measured in terms of profitability (to be managed by businesses) but, at the same time, in terms of a symbolic economy, as a resource for humanity, located in limbo, outside of market or the interests of urban renovation.

The center becomes a historical center that is dehistoricized—a civilized, ordered, safe, and decent space, with its back to the city and history. Indeed, the current model of the center is the model of the mall, an aseptic, secured space where people can freely move about, look, buy, but as part of an order or micro-policitics. This kind of order is only possible as control and, at the same time, as the creation of a middle-class culture and consensus.

Unlike the patrimonial actions that occurred during the first modernity, conceived of as strategies of separation and distinction, the new policies try to be inclusive. They are devices oriented toward the incorporation of a disciplinary order although it may be in a more localized and experimental way. As part of this order, local cultures loose their content: music, popular religiosity, daily practices. They become stylized and become part of the spectacle. In a parody of Agamben, it could be said that in many historic centers, there is a concern for organizing environments and events, but these are aimed toward "discouraging life" (Agamben 2000: 67).

The policies of heritage are the best expression of the urban utopia and, at the same time, a demonstration of its failure. Investments are made to fix up the historic centers while the cities get uglier and deteriorate and the quality of life for the city's residents worsen. The city cannot be administered, but authorities practice administering through the organization of experimental spaces. One of the most relevant cases where this has taken place is that of the Malecón 2000 in Guayaquil, which is conceived of as a guarded space with restricted access but also a civilized and civilizing space. In this respect, there is a difference between Quito—where actions with respect to the population or the ties between heritage and urban renovation are not completely defined (there is talk of planning and negotiation, although in everyday practice there is not always negotiation)—and the blatant, cold, and frankly biased use of patrimony in Guayaquil.

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CULTURAL STRATEGIES AND URBAN RENOVATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF BARCELONA

JOSEP SUBIRÓS

For several years, Barcelona has been a privileged—almost obligatory—reference point not only for architects and urban planners from all over the world but also for everyone who is interested in the creation and renovation of urban forms of life and collective life. Many people talk about a *Barcelona model* of urban renovation. How does a relatively small city that does not have any special role in politics or economics in comparison with large world metropolises become a model, the focus of attention and debate? Is there a real basis for this interest or is it just a fad? Is this image a collective mirage resulting from the media impact the city had during the Olympic Games in the summer of 1992?

Without a doubt, the Olympics contributed decisively to the international attention Barcelona received, just as it is equally obvious that the organization of the Games was one of the main leverage points to undertake an important part of the different urban renovation projects. However, it is also apparent that the renovation strategy began to develop before, developed independently from, and continued after the Olympic Games. It is perfectly understandable that many studies have focused on Barcelona's experience of urban transformation in physical and spatial terms since these are the most tangible and obvious aspects of renovation. There is no intention here to deny the importance of this process of physical transformation. Nevertheless, the central argument of this chapter is that the main value of Barcelona's recent experience is found in the political strategy of reinvention, normalization, and democratic consolidation after the three years of the civil war (1936–1939) and the 36 years of Franco's dictatorship (1939–1975). In effect, what is most characteristic of the urban renovation process that took place in Barcelona that between 1979 and 1997, is the systematic use of urban planning as an instrument of civility which contributed to the construction of a certain civic identity and new forms of collective life. This chapter does not intend to address Barcelona's urban renovation process in its

totality and complexity, but to highlight the political-cultural dimension of the main architectonic and urban operations of the period analyzed and their connection with the general process of re-establishing democracy in Spain after the death of Franco.

Urbanism and Urbanity

This analysis is based on an understanding of the city not only as a functional structure and an administrative, economic, and commercial center but also as a meaningful device, of incarnation and promotion of certain codes, values, and political and cultural rules that facilitate determined forms of collective life and social cohesion. Every city is always, in this respect, a social turbine and a spiritual spider web, a mix of heterogeneous people, a space where people of different characteristics and origins—who have equally diverse jobs and functions—live together. If this heterogeneity does not exist, there is no city. But if this heterogeneity does not have, or create, common references, spaces, moments of encounter, collective life and memory, a shared project, debate, celebration, there is no city either.

In the city, monuments are as important as sewage systems, the filled spaces as important as the empty ones. Cities are places where people make stones and stones make people, where sometimes the screams are as meaningful as the silences, the memories and histories as the illusions and projects. In cities, sometimes one can only construct by destroying what was there. They are spaces of life where collective life is based on difference and freedom, but difference and freedom continually threaten the stability and quality of collective life. The diversity that is inherent in a large city also constitutes a great difficult for collective life in the city.

How is it possible to articulate a shared civic identity based on the recognition of and respect for urban diversity? This is, without a doubt, one of the main challenges, if not the main challenge, that any urban democratic project faces. It is a challenge that is always important, but even more so in periods of transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one because the creation and establishment of democratic forms of government and collective life are played out at the local level.

The scope of the challenge becomes obvious when one observes the general evolution of large urban centers in the majority of the world, be it in highly developed societies or societies that lack much of the infra-

structure and public services considered basic in the first; be it in societies that have a long, stable democratic trajectory or in societies subject to strong, frequent political convulsions. In the vast majority of cases, urban development does not lead to a strong sense of identity and civic cohesion but rather is serves to spatially crystallize social, economic, ethnic, and cultural divisions of the diverse groups that make up the city. Furthermore, this spatial fragmentation reinforces social, ethnic, and political-cultural divisions.

The easy answer, sometimes planned, sometimes spontaneous, to the challenge of urban diversity is denial, avoidance, exclusion of the diverse, of "the other" (the other in relation, of course, to the dominant normality). In authoritarian regimes, the challenge of diversity is often resolved through clear and open denial of its existence. In formally democratic societies, it tends to be the economic mechanisms that, in a more subtle and impersonal way, put each person—and each group—in its physical and symbolic place. In all cases, the result is a city that is divided and fragmented, in its physical, tangible dimensions as well as cultural and intangible ones.

Without purporting to posit that Barcelona has completely resolved this challenge, it is true that the city's recent experience is a highly interesting example of an urban strategy that is consciously oriented to creating a civic identity through the recognition of differences and a vision of the city as a common physical and symbolic space of diversity. It is true that the social, economic, and cultural diversity of Barcelona during the period of reference is not comparable to the traditionally cosmopolitan cities of New York, Los Angeles, Paris, or London, nor of the emerging metropolises of Lagos or Johannesburg, to offer extreme examples, but it is not totally different from many European and Latin American cities.

It is important to remember that at the beginning of the 1970s, Barcelona was made up of two clearly differentiated demographic conglomerates of practically identical dimensions: on one hand, one half of the population was Catalan, with their own language, tradition, and sensibility, politically and culturally based on a highly-professional middle class, in relation to the rest of Spain; on the other hand, half of the population was made up of migrants from different regions of Spain and especially from the south. The majority of these migrants, who were ejected from their lands due to poverty and attracted to the superior economic development of the city and of the Catalan region in general, went to Barcelona beginning in

the 1950s and makes up the majority of the working class. A smaller, but significant population, which is culturally close to the migrant population but politically and socially very distinct from it, is made up of thousands of functionaries—teachers, judges, police officers, military officers, etc.—from Franco's administration.[1]

In its simplicity, Barcelona's social, economic, and cultural divisions have all the necessary elements to make the fracture between these two communities intractably deep. On one hand, the Catalan population, with a solid economic base, a high level of cohesion due to a shared language and culture, and a common historical suspicion of the Francoist state, occupied the central zones of the city and the best residential neighborhoods. On the other, the migrant population was of diverse origins but cohered due to the subaltern economic position and the Spanish language, lived mainly in areas that were recently urbanized on the periphery of the city, frequently without basic services and infrastructure.

The urban renovation strategy developed in Barcelona beginning in 1979 has consciously sought to neutralize and deactivate this threat with the modest but effective media and resources of a municipal government. Urban policy has constituted a privileged instrument of this urban strategy, but an urban policy strongly tied to cultural and temporal considerations. That is, the urban renovation strategy of Barcelona has acted not only on space, but on culture and time.

SPACE AND TIME

Space—and especially urban space—is not only the place that produces human experience, just as it is not only the framework in which historic vagaries materialize. It is also, simultaneously, one of the great mechanisms that gives form and meaning to this experience, that values and stimulates encounter, dialogue, exchange, tolerance, responsibility, communitarian sense, identity, and collective memory.

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1. In the first phase, during the years immediately following the civil war, the public administration becomes a stronghold, and frequently a privilege, for the addicts of the new political regime. This trend continued throughout the Franco era in the "hard" sectors of the administration, such as security, defense, and taxes. Nevertheless, in other areas, such as teaching, sanitation, and local administration, certain normalization was produced that translated to a growing presence of Catalan functionaries in these sectors.

To play this part as an organizational device and producer of meaning, the spatial stages need to incorporate and express two essential traits. On one hand, they need to participate in certain collective codes of meaning, they need to come to configure themselves as memory and as a shared project. On the other hand, they need a certain stability and duration. Indeed, the first aspect directly depends on the second. As Richard Sennet has said, the meaning never appears as an immediate realization but rather as a process of time, in history (1991: 225). Said in another way, when there is less temporality and historicity found in a space, it is more difficult to produce meaning. This is, to a certain extent, the problem of modern urban space: the lack of stability and duration to constitute itself as a significant support for broader codes. Meaning needs space and common time; it needs order, hierarchy, coherence, accumulation, continuity, memory. Contemporary urban space is a stage for diversity and confusion, movement, and constant change, for fermentation and fleeting nature, for discontinuity and oblivion.

One of the major problems of the contemporary city is that frequently the new areas of urban development are organized as islands outside of history and the traditional codes of meaning. The discomfort of urban life—and especially suburban life—frequently has to do with this dysfunction of space as an articulating device and producer of meaning, that is, with its inadequacy as a stage for collective life. And this inadequacy depends, in large measure, on the lack of coming together of times in a place. That is, there is a lack of articulation between very different experiences of the diverse groups that make up the city, between historical referents and contemporary expressive forms, between memories, images, and traditional values and innovative projects. A second aspect of Barcelona's recent revitalization has been the articulation and synthesis of diverse cultures and time periods, with the aim of avoiding fragmentation into isolated time periods and memories and partial projects. In other words, there has been attention dedicated to culture through both space and time.

Since 1979, the year of the first local level elections after the restoration of democracy, this has been translated into municipal policies addressing public space, infrastructures, and facilities characterized by the close relationship between general urban renovation strategies and the specifically cultural approaches and objectives developed during this same period of time and by a special sensibility, when designing and undertaking the most

diverse urban projects, toward the systematic integration of recuperation and innovation, of restoration and new creation, of functionality and meaning. The different operations for the city's economic renovation have always contributed not only the function and instrumental dimensions but also to a clearly cultural component, systematically incorporating in its planning and design, elements and mechanisms related to memory and creativity, to equilibrium and social cohesion. In specifically cultural territory, the established priorities have been inseparable from a general conception of the city in which the important cultural facilities (museums, theaters, auditoriums, for example) are not only understood as centers of conservation, documentation, and the dissemination of historical-artistic patrimony but also as spaces that structure the urban fabric, territorial equilibrium, and the creation of important reference points in public space.

The Context: Analysis of the Original Situation and Environment

To develop this policy of cohesion and territorial and social re-equilibrium through spatial renovation, the articulation of historical times, and the promotion of collective codes of meaning, memory, and projects, Barcelona has based its work on contradictory—but favorable—premises. Undoubtedly, one of the most important aspects of present-day Barcelona is the 2,000 years of history behind it. In Asia and Europe, there is no lack of urban centers with thousands of years of history. Nevertheless, there are relatively few that have incorporated and actively participated in the processes of modernization related to the economic, political, and cultural revolutions of the last 200 years. There are many fewer such cities that, having incorporated these processes, have preserved substantial parts of their fabric and historical patrimony to integrate them into a modern city.

It is known that large contemporary cities have been constituted through a complex set of socio-economic factors and political decisions during the last two centuries, regardless of whether their foundational nuclei have a more or less remote origin. However, almost all these cities have done this by denying and destroying their past. In Barcelona, however, the modernizing impulse of industrialization does not destroy the old medieval city but rather preserves its general layout and a substantial part of its constructed patrimony. What is more, urban growth in Barcelona leads to one of the

most achieved projects of 19th century urban planning—the Ensanche[2] de Ildefons Cerdà and later the emergence of modernism at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century.

The periods of intense urban growth in the 20th century—the 1920s or the 1960s—did not substantially destroy inherited patrimony. Real estate speculation protected and fed by antidemocratic governments turns out to be negative for the new peripheries, but it does not irreparably affect the pre-existing urban fabric. The historic center does become degraded and impoverished; there was construction in the interior spaces on the Ensanche block, which were originally planned as open space, but, for a variety of reasons the main projects of *sventramento* and high-speed roadways never come to fruition and the physical characteristics of the historic areas, Ensanche, and even the little towns annexed at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, are preserved. The perception, then, of the city as continuum in which different historical layers are articulated, even during a sustained process of change, is continued without major difficulties. It is important to mention that this process is the result of both strengths and weaknesses, including political and economic weaknesses.

In effect, the urban structure of many essential pieces of medieval Barcelona is, paradoxically, the fruit of a great absence and relative poverty: the absence of strong political power and the relative poverty of the bourgeoisie class that have never been wealthy enough to radically renovate the urban fabric. The relative luck of Barcelona, which is one of its great singularities, is that, after the period of political and economic splendor of the Low Middle Age, the city has never been wealthy and powerful enough to be able to seriously propose the destruction of its history, to carry out sanitation and monumentalization projects in the style of other international capitals. (Although this relative poverty also explains the degradation the city has been subject to since the beginning of the Ildefons Cerdà project as well as the absence of monumental spaces and public facilities in the Ensanche.) All of this does not mean, however, that political powers have not had an important role in the configuration of modern Barcelona. Unlike in other big cities, in Barcelona and in general in Cataluña, the decisive institutions have been local governments and, in particular, the City Council. Economic powers have also

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2. This refers to the plan to extend the city beyond the walls conceived of as a boundary. The basic unit is made up of square blocks 110 meters long with spacious gardens on the inside for collective use.

had an important role, but these powers have always been local economic powers. In practice, creation and huge steps in modern Barcelona have come about when there has been some kind of de facto alliance between the local government and the most dynamic economic and social forces.

It must be said that this civility, which is a major force in Barcelona, also reveals its great weakness. In Barcelona we do not have the large spaces, huge monuments, or great representative buildings that characterize the other main political and/or economic capitals on the international scene. Essential infrastructure projects for a city that intends to be a great economic and cultural center and with decisive local political power would be carried out quickly, in Barcelona such projects have been drug out for years and sometimes have been left partially finished. This was the case with the Cerdà plan, several large infrastructure projects, and metropolitan transport.

At times, it has been said that Barcelona is a mix between Florence and Manchester. The comparison is, without a doubt, inadequate in many respects, but it is, at the same time, suggestive of the singular thesis in Barcelona between tradition and modernity, between patrimony and new creation, and between art and industry. This synthesis is incomprehensible, however, without keeping in mind the peculiar economic and political dynamic of the city, the role played by public powers, and the political and social aspirations of the bourgeoisie and popular classes in Barcelona. In other words, in the same way that it would be ingenuous to think that the preservation of medieval Barcelona was due to a historical perceptiveness that was able to anticipate the current cultural revaluing of this patrimony, it would also be simplistic to attribute the preservation of this urban and architectonic legacy solely to the absence of economic resources. It is clear that political and ideological motives—not economic ones—were behind the struggle for the rebirth of Barcelona at the end of the 19th century in the midst of a country that had succumbed to decadence. This struggle relied on the glorious—and mythologized—medieval past of the city as a point of reference.

It is not a coincidence that the architectonic and artistic style that Barcelona's bourgeoisie class uses to express its new wealth and aspirations at the end of the 19th century is called "modernism"[3]—a movement in

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3. This movement is similar to the Franco-Belgium "Art nouveau" or Central European "Jungendstil." The architecture of Antoni Gaudí in Barcelona is its most famous, though not only, expression.

which the most daring innovations are mixed with the most traditional and medieval stylistic forms and techniques. In the same way, it is no coincidence that the new emerging Barcelona of the 1960s, 1970s, and today rediscovers and exalts the modernist legacy that had fallen during the Franco regime, due, in part, to the taste of the era, but also to the strong representative character of a Catalan rebirth that is totally contrary to the political ideas of the Franco dictatorship in terms of its historical meaning.

The cultural life of Barcelona has been, and continues to be, a fundamentally civil life, promoted by the city in the form of initiatives from the private sector, the local and the regional administrations, or the Generalitat, but never from the central state. Although it seems incredible, apart from the Archive of the old Aragón crown, there is not one cultural institution related to the central state in Barcelona—not one theater, museum, auditorium, or library. Nevertheless, in Barcelona there are important cultural entities, some of which are private (such as the Great Theater of Liceo or the Palace of Music), but they are all supported and exist due to the participation of public administrations. The majority of the cultural entities are direct initiatives of the local administration, as are almost all the museums and public libraries. A tour of our museums sketches out a clear picture of the highs and lows of our history: the splendor of Low Middle Ages; the crisis and relative decadence between the 16th and 18th centuries; the revitalization of the end of the 18th century; the explosion of wealth and creativity at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries; the moral and cultural misery of the Franco period; and the rebirth, dynamism, and creativity of the present day. The Museum of Art of Cataluña brings together the best collections of medieval art. Until the recent incorporation of the Generalitat de Cataluña, the museum was a municipal museum, like the Picasso Museum—an exceptional museum based entirely on private donations, beginning with the artist himself. The Miró Foundation, the Tàpies Foundation, and the new Museum of Contemporary Art are also fruits of the collaboration between the generosity of our great artists, the political will of local and regional governments, and the private sector. A result of this process is that, in its urban morphology and its historical-cultural patrimony, present day Barcelona is a privileged expression of three historical moments: the late medieval period, the modernist period at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, and the contemporary renovation and experimentation.

Finally, a decisive element in the singularity of Barcelona is also related to it being the gravitational center of a clearly differentiated linguistic and cultural area. In this respect, Catalan history is one of the rare examples of the survival of a language that did not have state support. On the contrary, Catalan has long suffered from adverse linguistic and cultural policies. Catalan has not only persisted and been consolidated as a colloquial language but has also advanced in the last century as a language of high culture. Despite this, however, it is probably an error to consider, as has often been done, that the vitality and cultural personality of Barcelona is based on the Catalan difference.

It is true that the presence of Catalan language and culture is essential to understanding the personality and life of Barcelona, but the fact that the language and culture have been able to survive and be consolidated at the margin of and against the state is also due to cultural vitality of a city like Barcelona, which has been an open, active, enterprising, and integrated city. It is also important to note that this occurred during European economic and social modernization while the rest of Spain collapsed on itself in terms of values, attitudes, and form of social and economic organization, which were clearly behind the rest of Europe. During practically the whole decisive process of industrialization and modernization, Barcelona has been the capital of a region with well defined economic and cultural characteristics and, nevertheless, without its own institutional expression.[4] During the last two centuries, local governments and, in particular, the Barcelona City Council and mayors have had an important symbolic and real role in the non-existent Catalan institutions. To a lesser degree, the provincial government of Barcelona has also played such a role.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

All of these elements of historical continuity should not make us lose sight of the profundity of the changes the city has experienced—economic, political, social, and cultural changes. These are the changes that make up the city, above and beyond the city's physical forms. Up to this point, only historic

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4. Between 1714 and 1977, the date on which the autonomous government of Cataluña was re-established, there are only two brief periods in which this institutional expression is found: the Mancomunitat of Cataluña, between 1914 and 1925, and the Generalitat de la Segunda República, between 1931 and 1939.

Barcelona, the Old City, the Ensanche, and areas added at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries have been discussed. The panorama changes substantially if we open our view to the periphery. Despite its singularity, Barcelona has not escaped the fate of many large modern cities.

It is well known that along with a general process of urbanization in industrial societies there is also a parallel process of blurring, disintegration, and loss of autonomy in cities. The borders of cities disappear into a plainly urbanized framework. On the other hand, as many old and medieval cities were practically city-states, in the modern era local governments occupy a secondary place on the larger political scene. Great political options and economic movements escape them. In terms of the political stage, national states are the most important. In economic terms, large national and transnational companies have the most power.

In this way, a paradoxical phenomenon is produced: modern societies are continually more urban and, at the same time, cities are less and less able to control the conditions of their existence. In a way, cities become passive subjects of political and economic changes powered by forces that are closely related to urban development, but which act independently of it. The organization of urban space and its changes no longer depend on a system in which qualitative criteria and meaning play an important role, but rather the value of land is governed by strictly mercantile and instrumental criteria. Urban land becomes merchandise just like anything else. Barcelona has not escaped this dynamic.

From the first third of the 20th century and especially during the Franco period (1939–1975) the relative preservation of the central city has gone hand in hand with disorganized growth of the periphery, with real estate speculation as the only ordering element. Entire neighborhoods have grown up on the borders of the municipality without the most minimum facilities. In Barcelona, examples include Ciutat Meridiana, Torre Baró, Can Caralleu, Bellvitge, and Sant Ildefons. Small populations in the industrial belt have grown dramatically, subject to accelerated industrialization and an avalanche of migration that has transformed not only their physical structure but also their social and cultural composition because this migration came from the poorest regions of Spain, particularly from the south (Andalucía, Extremadura, Murcia) but also from Galicia in the northeast. Even though the legal and administrative limits of Barcelona have not changed at all since 1920, the city has been greatly transformed. By the mid-1970s, Barcelona is a diffuse metropolis of three million inhabitants.

It is a metropolis in which the center—the municipality of Barcelona and particularly the 19th century Ensanche—maintains a notable urban and cultural quality while the periphery has been urbanized without any long-term planning, with economic profitability as the only decision-making criteria. It is a periphery where accelerated and chaotic industrial development has been concentrated as intensive construction of low-quality residences, without the most minimum social facilities (schools, health centers, parks, recreation facilities, etc.). It is a periphery in which old social and cultural structures and old urban nuclei have been buried in an amorphous metropolitan macro-city, rich only in deficits of all kinds—infrastructure, facilities, services, community spaces, transportation and communication networks. It is a periphery mainly inhabited by migrants and their families, who have different cultural and linguistic traditions than the Catalan population. These problems are not particular to Barcelona or the region of Cataluña. Although they are made worse by uncontrolled speculation and by the lack of democratic rights imposed by the Franco dictatorshop, they are very similar problems to those faced by many cities in Europe and the whole world. They are derived from industrialization, migratory movements, motorization, and suburbanization.

It is not necessary to expound on this excessively, but it is important to remember because the situation that any renovation project in Barcelona will face when, after three years of civil war and 36 of dictatorship, the citizens finally recuperate the right to intervene decisively in the urban environment. It is especially important to remember that even if during the period analyzed in Barcelona there were no ethnic divisions comparable to those found in the United States or Eastern Europe, there is a clear cultural and linguistic differentiation between the Catalan population and the migrant population. There is the risk that this differentiation be expressed politically through options that emphasize the diversity of cultural and linguistic origins and identities. This would probably lead to the consolidation of a divided city. In general terms, however, this has not been the case in Barcelona.

POLITICS, URBANISM, AND CULTURE

In a normal political and cultural situation, the evolution of Barcelona would have been similar to the evolution of other European cities with similar socio-economic characteristics, such as Milan, Lyon, Munich, and

Glasgow. In other words, there would have been a gradual questioning of modern zoning policies, revaluing and rehabilitating the historic center and its conversion as a commercial zone, and a series of actions to alleviate functional and social problems in modern cities. However, in the mid-1970s, Barcelona was not facing just a conventional problem. It is not that the problems were more severe, but they were of a different order. The city—the center and engine of Catalan life—aspired to be more than a rationalization of its infrastructures and services. During the last years of the Franco dictatorship, and especially when Franco died in 1975, important political-social movements develop in Barcelona. These movements focused on the struggle for democratic rights and greater social justice in Cataluña as well as the rest of Spain, on the one hand. On the other, they dealt with the struggle for the autonomy of Cataluña and for the recuperation of the institutions of self-government as well as the defense and reconstruction of the region's own linguistic and cultural patrimony.

During the Franco period and the first years of the transition to democracy, the two movements came together at times and different political, labor, and cultural organizations united their efforts in order to ensure basic democratic objectives. This fusion was brought about by different processes and general factors. In the first place, it is important to keep in mind that the long, abusive self-identification of the Franco regime with a monolithic, antidemocratic idea of Spain had seriously weakened the attraction of a possible Spanish neo-nationalism and, therefore, facilitated the confluence of diverse sectors of the democratic opposition in Cataluña, with little regard for territorial, linguistic, and cultural origin. In fact, the non-Catalan population in Barcelona is not a homogeneous group but rather has origins in different parts of Spain, with strong regional differences. Furthermore, an important part of these migrants are descendents of families that fought against Franco during the Spanish Civil War and almost all of them had suffered the political repression and economic misery of the post-war era. There is nothing strange, then, in the fact that in Cataluña and especially in Barcelona democratic solidarities have more weight than affinities of origins that were devalued by Franco himself.

Secondly, Spain in the 1970s, and this is particularly true of Cataluña, has its eye on the process of European unification. This interested both the movements of the democratic opposition and of the socio-economic sectors that had long benefited from the Franco dictatorship. For the first group,

entrance in the nascent European Union is an important political objective because it would guarantee democratic stability. For the second group, entering the European Union is an inevitable step toward reinforcing Spain's fragile economic structure and reducing the distance with more developed countries. For both groups, then, the installation of a new political order after Franco is clearly focused on a European perspective, which minimizes the regional and cultural differences and conflicts that had previously contributed to ruining democratic order in Spain.

In this sense, the process of bringing together and eventually fusing in 1976 of the young Socialist Party of Cataluña (PSC, in Spanish), a fundamentally professional and intellectual party, and the Catalan section of the historic Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE, in Spanish), which despite practically disappearing during the Franco period quickly regains strong roots among the non-Catalan working classes. This fusion becomes decisive in order to avoid differences in origin and language being used politically as a divisive factor between the original population and the immigrant population, as had occurred in previous periods and, in particular, during the second Spanish Republic. At any rate, after the new Spanish Constitution was approved in December 1977, the different political organizations recuperate their freedom and again put their specific objectives forward.

In Barcelona and Cataluña this supposes a clear division between the center-right block, which had hegemony due to conservative regional positions both in terms of socio-economic and cultural aspects, and a center-left block in which the confluence between Catalan professionals and intellectuals and the migrant population is crystallized. In a revealing moment, the center-left block headed by the PSC-PSEO won the first democratic municipal elections in April 1979, while in the first elections for the autonomous government of Cataluña in May 1980[5] the center-right block won, establishing an important duality in electoral behavior, which has continued unaltered for more than 20 years.[6]

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5. The Spanish Constitution of 1977 establishes the semi-federal organization of the state through which, in each region, there is an autonomous government and a legislative chamber, which have limited but important roles in almost all areas except defense and foreign relations.

6. This dynamic has been broken in the latest autonomous elections, which took place in November 2003, in which the majority obtained by the center-left block has given the socialist Pasqual Maragall, who was mayor of Barcelona from 1983 to 1997, the presidency of the Generalitat.

The struggle, then, for the reconstruction of Barcelona is inseparable from the transition from a long period of resistance of the dictatorship to a period of creation and mobilizing democratic institutions, the reinvention of the relationships between the administration and social forces, the establishment of new ways to live together in civic and political senses, the definition and administration of projects, and the renovation of the collective imagination. It is on the basis of this physical, historical, and moral background that, beginning in 1979, a renovation and reconstruction project begins to take form. It is born out of the affirmation of urban dignity and a vision of the city in which—and this is the new element with respect to the previous civic and political history of Barcelona—the popular classes are not just seen as labor but as citizens with full rights. It is a vision in which the peripheral areas are no longer seen just as areas for speculative investment or as in inevitable problem but rather as one of the main problems to be solved. It is a vision in which the objective of integrating the diverse physical and cultural parts of the city in a common structure of functioning and meaning finally becomes key.

The first democratically-elected municipal government since 1934 took power on April 19, 1979. It had been more than three years since the dictator had died, but the situation was far from stimulating. What will come to be judged by the world as a singularly fortunate experience—the slow, pacific transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain—is faced with contradictory consequences in the beginning. The slow unraveling of the argument that had unified diverse social, political, and cultural forces—the struggle against Franco and for liberty—leads to profound disorder and disagreement.

Faced with liberty, the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy, and a serious economic recession, the traditional set of demands soon revealed its limitations. In the area of local government, everything had to be reinvented. This reinvention had to occur by addressing social, economic, and cultural realities that had been buried under the priorities of the fight against Franco. Where to begin reconstruction? What should receive priority? Democracy had to be consolidated, of course, but how could democracy be consolidated when faced with such a profound economic crisis with no quick fix to improve the material quality of life?

In the Catalan region, the alternative is relatively easy and clear; the struggle for Catalan political and cultural autonomy becomes the top priority. The restoration of the Generalitat, an autonomous institution of government with little operational power but rich symbolic power, paves the

way for the political reconstruction of Cataluña. The situation is far different, however, in the local, civic realm of Barcelona.

It is relatively easy to construct and recreate a mythology and poetics of the historical past of a country, especially if that past has been interrupted and lies in the distant past, the further the better. It is much more difficult to construct and create a mythology and poetics about the life of a city. You cannot go back in a city; it is not possible to appeal to the intractable inheritance of the past. You cannot erase, even mentally, the destruction of the urban fabric, the savage urbanization of the periphery, the migratory avalanche. The construction and reconstruction of a country can only be based on a series of abstract, distant, intangible goals. The city must be remade in concrete and operational terms. In other words, while the national democracy can appeal to historical wrongs and external enemies, municipal democracy must confront the real city.

It is not strange, then, the city council grants an important role to urban planning as a political instrument. Urban issues are areas with important social and economic repercussions in which local governments have autonomy and decision-making power. On the other hand, it is one of the areas where neighborhood associations have a history of demands and, therefore, one of the few areas in which to try and re-establish social dialogue and translate it to concrete improvements. At any rate, given the economic limitation as well as the lack of urban models, urban actions in Barcelona in this first period are small scale and very local and grant top priority to the recuperation of public space.

1979–1986: GENERAL URBAN-CULTURAL STRATEGIES

In this first phase, begun in 1979, emphasis is placed on the revalorization of public spaces and infrastructure in the local (neighborhood) realm as an instrument not only to satisfy immediate basic needs but also to articulate the different times and mentalities of the city in a common structure for memory and meaning. In a highly dense city, subject to strong speculative pressures and weakly equipped, such as the Barcelona that was inherited from Franco, this policy is developed through a series of complementary actions:

- Improving accessibility and physical integration between the center and periphery;

- Preserving and modernizing buildings and public spaces of historical interest;
- Re-using old industrial facilities, normally located in the least favored zones of the city (for example, obsolete manufacturing garages, workshops, and railway stations in disuse), as public parks and facilities;
- Promoting relatively marginal areas as new urban centers;
- Reconstructing or creating historical memory through specific monumental projects.[7]

In any case, the most important aspect is to struggle against fragmentation and isolation in the different parts of the city, to integrate them in a common structure (transportation, public services, new centers) and meaning (public spaces, monuments, etc.).

A second common denominator is the public recuperation of spaces that were previously private or clearly degraded and their rehabilitation for uses and programs that serve the collective interest through renovation projects that combine the preservation of the most valuable historical elements with a decidedly functional and formal modernization. A clear example of this general policy is found in the creation of neighborhood civic-cultural facilities (civic centers). These centers are systematically installed in old buildings—frequently buildings of private origin—that have historical interest, and which are reference points in the area—old factories, cooperatives, or residential palaces. Their rehabilitation and remodeling as civic centers satisfies needs that were previously ignored and also collectively reappropriates history, symbols of place, and saves cultural heritage.

Another important aspect of this policy is the monumentalization of public spaces. In peripheral areas that experienced intensive growth in the 1950s and 1960s, the urbanization process had developed without attention to basic facilities (education, sanitation, transportation, etc.), nor was attention paid to creating important references related to culture and memory of citizens who were recently arrived in the city. Because of this, after 1979, all the reconditioning projects or the creation of new public

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7. For a detailed explanation of the urban criteria of this period, see Acebillo 1994.

spaces (plazas and parks, especially) have been also included the preservation of important elements of place and, at the same time, the installation of contemporary artistic or monumental elements so the collective identity and memory encompasses past and present.

In some cases, this articulation of historical eras has gone even further and has used sculptures or other architectonic elements that are representative of a denied past, of a hidden memory. Such is the case of the reconstruction of the Valley of Hebron Park (Parque del Valle de Hebrón), from the Spanish Republic Pavilion of the 1937[8] World's Fair in Paris, or the recuperation of the Lluchmajor Plaza of an allegorical sculpture from the First Spanish Republic. Both works have been installed in areas with a high degree of migration, which were hit especially hard during the Franco era and were particularly devoid of historical markers of identity. In the majority of cases, however, artistic or monumental interventions have been works of contemporary, sometimes abstract, art, without any direct relationship with a particular event or historical meaning. The goal of Barcelona has been to combine a monumentalization project and a project of dignifying the city with a political will that is more attentive to democratic values. It has not tried to reconstruct old, lost identities but to construct a new civic identity that recognizes and integrates both local history that has long been ignored as well as the reality of new citizens.

1987-Ongoing: Major Cultural Facilities

After 1986, without ceasing to work on public space and extend the network of civic centers and other local facilities, such as historical archives and public libraries, the accent has been on the renovation or creation of major museum and cultural centers. These include renovation projects such as the Cataluña Museum of Art in the National Palace of Montjuic, the Picasso Museum, and the Palace of Music; new projects, such as the Contemporary Museum of Art, the Auditorium of Music, the Center for the Contemporary Culture of Barcelona in the old Charity House, the scenic space of Mercat de les Flors; and news projects being contemplated today for the new City of Theater or the Technologies Forum in the

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8. This is the pavilion for which Picasso painted "Guernica," a symbol of anti-fascist resistence.

old Mental Hospital. Apart from the first two cases, which try to consolidate an already existing patrimonial culture, the rest of the projects aim to create infrastructures directly related to contemporary creation—an area in which the city had accumulated an important deficit in the Franco era—in clear support of the cultural sector, of knowledge and creation as a device for urban renovation and competitiveness.

In the irreversible configuration of large cities as centers of knowledge, information, and services, culture plays an important part. For this reason, cultural life and facilities have a growing importance. This not only has to do with offering a good selection of spectacles and prestigious museums. It also has to do with having the ability to receive, recycle, and export ideas, sensibilities, and projects that improve the quality of life. Indeed, there is no city with a rich cultural life that does not have cultural structures and facilities in the area of contemporary creation.

On the other hand, situations like those affecting the Ciutat Vella occur in any city with a patrimonial history and wealth like that of Barcelona. There are historic areas that are demographically old, economically impoverished with housing that does not comply with current regulations. This often leads to the creation of nuclei of marginality in the heart of the city. One of the formulas used to confront this problem with a certain level of success—in Marais in París, the Old Port of Marsella, the City in London, or the port areas in Boston, Baltimore, or San Francisco—is to implant in these kinds of areas new types of activity and, above all, cultural and commercial services that promote urban creativity.

The policy of creation and renovation of cultural infrastructure promoted in Barcelona since 1986 has been characterized by the close relationship between the objectives and specifically cultural proposals and the general strategy of urban renovation developed during the same period. In all cases, the objective of giving the city facilities in accordance with its historic patrimony and its contemporary potential has been integrated in a general process of urban restructuring in which the interventions on public space and facilities are the dominant factor. In the end, conditioning the policy of cultural facilities to a general strategy of reorganizing urban space is derived from a general conception of the city, in its totality, as cultural infrastructure par excellence, as a privileged space of communication and exchange and, therefore, of cohesion, innovation, and creation.

SINGULAR MOMENTS: CELEBRATIONS
AND OCCURRENCES AS A STRATEGY

A third aspect of the cultural policy developed under the Barcelona City Council has been the encouragement of popular, festive cultural programs that allow for the expression of social creativity and, at the same time, reinforce urban cohesion. One of the most attractive aspects—but also one of the most problematic—of urban life in the big city is that diverse people must live together in a common space without rigid lines of division: the mixture of social classes, religious creeds, ideologies, ethnic origins, the co-existence of lifestyles, and forms of production. All of these manifestations of diversity contain important potential to enrich the lives of the citizenry. On one hand, as spaces of diversity and contradictory interests, cities are always the place where democratic forms of social and political organization germinate and develop. It is in the cities where forms of government and administration not based on lineage or violent imposition but rather on dialogue, discussion, and consensus are developed.

Large cities, however, can also lead to new types of hierarchy and segregation, especially based on economic factors. They can also promote anomic and marginal forms of existence. This fact, which occurs in all large cities to some extent, including Barcelona, can favor the creation of social enclaves that make the city a compartmentalized, inhospitable, and dangerous space. One of the ways to combat this tendency is to ensure the existence of collective moments of celebration and cohesion, moments in which the citizenry feels like active, equal participants. Traditionally, these moments were materialized in rituals and community ceremonies, both religious and profane. In the development of the modern city, these moments tend to disappear or, at least, to lose importance.

In Barcelona one of the main cultural strategies has been to maintain and even reinvent these collective moments. A particularly important example is the recuperation of popular festivals, at the neighborhood as well as city-wide level. The best example of this is the event known as Fiestas de la Mercè, an event that created an environment of identification of the individuals with the social collective, citizens among themselves and with the city. In Barcelona, as in any large historic city, the oldest neighborhoods have serious problems with economic, social, and cultural degradation. Creating moments in which all of Barcelona comes together in the Old

City—as occurs in Fiestas de la Mercè—is a main factor in the struggle for the area's urban revitalization and rehabilitation, which keeps it from become an abandoned space.

THE CULTURAL OLYMPICS

Along with promoting singular moments of cultural celebration for the purposes of advancing urban revitalization and civic cohesion, Barcelona has also used the organization of the extraordinary events as leverage for major development operations. The 1992 Olympic Games is the best example of this phenomenon. In this context, the organization of an ambitious program of cultural activities and initiatives during the four years of the 25th Olympiad was, undoubtedly, one of the most emphatic and novel parts of the urban renovation process in Barcelona.

Traditionally, all the organizing cities had undertaken some kind of artistic festival in order to cover the cultural element of the Games. Barcelona's Olympic project, however, gave culture a major role from the beginning. This served as a coherent complement to the general planning designed during the candidacy phase. In other words, the task was to ensure that the Olympic Games were organized in the most dignified and brilliant way and, at the same time, guarantee that the Olympic project did not end when the sporting competitions were over. The idea was for the Games to mobilize energy, ideas, and resources to better the city and the country before and after the summer of 1992.

The so-called Cultural Olympics was a group of initiatives aimed at revaluing the historic-artistic patrimony of the city, of promoting Barcelona's cultural creativity and its international image, and contributing through pilot projects to improving cultural infrastructure and the renovation of existing facilities. In this way, practically every aspects of the investments foreseen for the Games fit squarely in the master plan for the urban and economic renovation and recuperation of the city. In the same way, the basic criteria and main lines of work for the Cultural Olympics had the aim of reinforcing and consolidating Barcelona's historic patrimony and cultural creativity and its international image.

In terms of infrastructure, the Olympic project was a golden opportunity to obtain the decided participation of other administrations in the renovation of major cultural facilities. In the wake of the wave of general col-

laboration around the Olympic project and with the explicit will of giving Barcelona an adequate level of facilities, inter-institutional collaboration agreements were undertaken for the creation and remodeling of the major facilities that Barcelona needed and which were desirable to carry out the Cultural Olympics program. The contribution of the Olympic Games and the Cultural Olympics to the cultural life of Barcelona was to constitute a framework for agreements and calendars that would make the execution of large projects irreversible.

This does not mean that everything is resolved today. Much has been done and much is left to do. What was relatively easy has been done: construct the containers. But a cultural infrastructure project is much more than a large container. The most difficult task is yet to come—giving these projects meaning and content and making them work. One of the greatest difficulties, if not the main difficulty, will be to ensure that these new centers are not just showcases of cultural production but rather spaces that allows for the promotion and articulation of creation, education, and artistic distribution.

DESIGN FEVER: THE CITY AS A WORK OF ART

One of the most frequently heard critiques of Barcelona's urban renovation project and, in particular, the projects developed around the 1992 Olympic Games is of the aestheticism that impregnates the urban and architectonic interventions undertaken, especially those done by the public administration. Many of the serious problems, some say, were ignored in order to undertaket of purely cosmetic projects.

Although there is no doubt that the city continues to have serious problems—for example, the scarcity of housing—I think the critique in general is wrongheaded. In the first place, an important part of the Barcelona '92 operation is comprised of acts that are hard to see or even invisible, for example, renovation of the sewer system, the waste water system, and new telecommunications networks. On the other hand, it is doubtful that the Olympics absorbed resources that would have been put to other uses. Indeed, it could be said that they Olympic project was forced to its limits to take on many projects that did not have anything to do with the Games themselves. Finally, it costs practically the same, in strictly economic terms, to build something beautiful as to build something ugly. However, if it is

beautiful, it is much more probable that citizens will make it their own, become one of their references, contribute to a shared identity and time and, consequently, have fewer problems with conservation and maintenance. At any rate, the criticism highlights one real fact: the extraordinary importance in Barcelona placed on the formal and aesthetic aspects in all the urban interventions, including the strictly functional ones. As one astute commentator observed: "Barcelona enters the 90s obsessed with design…. In what other city would we find a bilingual guide where its bars, discotheques, and restaurants are reviewed not according to the quality of the food or service but only and exclusively in function of the atmosphere of its design (Hugues 1992: page).

Indeed, it is a perennial obsession that year after year, for example, results in intense public debate on the aesthetic legitimacy of continuing work on the Sagrada Familia, over which their have been demonstrations, contests, and jokes. This is nothing strange, however, for a city in which, during every municipal electoral campaign, polemics about the design of plazas and public spaces occupy an important part of the public debate. It is a city that has made urban design elements one of its main trademarks and exports.

It is an obsession that, like many other things, probably has to do with the general modesty of public and private works undertaken in the city during the last two centuries, with the exception of the modernist period. In particular during the Franco era, the lack of local political and economic powers to execute major works, Barcelona's and Cataluña's architectonic tradition after the civil war was specialized in small-scale projects of a residential or domestic nature, in interiorism, and the design of the details. Recent history, on the other hand, has allowed Barcelona to go from the small to the grand scale, in both the public and private realms. In both cases, the obsession with design is evident, to the extent of becoming an authentic fever.

In the end, it would be extremely simplistic to reduce Barcelona's process of transformation to a question of architecture, urbanism, and urban design. What is characteristic in Barcelona is that the physical transformations respond to a certain vision and a certain political will, particularly in the administrations of the two mayors who have been in office since 1979: Narcís Serra (1979–1982) and, above all, Pasqual Maragall (1982–1997). It is, in very general terms, a vision that understands the city as an extremely complex artifact in which renovation projects must keep in mind very diverse functions and dimensions and a political will that wants these trans-

formations to articulate solutions of synthesis and equilibrium among equally diverse social interests.

It is from this concern for the city as a complex social structure that we are able to understand the concern for the formal quality of architecture and public spaces, a concern that reflects the hope that urban projects respond not only to the objective of resolving defined functional problems—transportation, communication, economic efficiency—but also to promoting public spaces as the basic element of collective life, as a community reference charged with meaning. This is a task that is especially difficult today.

MONUMENTALIZE THE CITY

In effect, the formal treatment of public spaces has become one of the central problems not only of contemporary urban planning but also of the very phenomenon of urbanity, a phenomenon that always demands collective values and reference points that favor cohesion and integration. For centuries, this has been resolved through spaces and constructions of strong symbolic and representative content—temples, palaces, avenues, public plazas—constructed according to canons and with the parallel implantation of figurative or allegorical representations of characters or histories, whether they be related to classical mythology or Bible stories or the foundation of the nation, elements that tie the present with the past and project it toward a certain future.

Today, however, the only permanent value is change and renovation and, furthermore, we find ourselves in a democratic context that lacks a glorious tradition, in a situation without absolute values or indisputable heroes. In this situation, on what basis can we structure public spaces of monumental nature with collective meaning? How can we have the spaces of the cities favorably reflect shared values, reference points, and a certain sense of collective integration? Who decides on questions of aesthetics? Who guarantees art? The answer is the experts, of course, and, in the case of public space, the experts are architects and urban planners.

Therefore, it frequently happens that "the attempts to equip plazas and public spaces with meaning put emphasis on treating public space as if it were an artist's canvas. We are offered designs signed by artists, architects, or urban landscapers, each with his or her unique, personal, and creative vision. Instead of the kind of social experience that was traditionally the public plaza—the free interaction among citizens—it gives us the possibili-

ty to consume an aesthetic experience. Current-day plazas reject the traditional nature of neutral spaces in service of architecture, civic monuments, and people: today it is the space itself that demands to be interpreted, admired, enjoyed, as if it were a theme park" (Kostof 1991: 181). Indeed, public space today is often like a theme park, or even more frequently, at least in many urban design spaces, a gallery of contemporary art, with all its values, contradictions, and difficulties to tune into collective sensibilities.

This tendency of public space toward formalism presents some serious problems. Expressed in schematic form, the danger of artistic urban planning is of conceiving of the city as a field for experimentation in which the subjective sensibilities and expressions of the artist—the architect or designer—come to dominate any other consideration. To subordinate the structure, form, and urban life of a city to the circulation of automobiles, an example that occurs in many cities in the United States, is terrible. But so is formalist and aesthetic reductionism too. The result is not a beautiful city, but a city-museum or a city-Kuntshalle, a gallery for architects and designers. Here is the real problem and danger. If it is not contaminated by other variables, by other criteria, the most vanguard architectonic logic can lead to mere decorativism. Formalist and scenographic abstraction of the city— "Every building a monument, every public space a theater" (Bofill 1992: 226)—can lead to a city-spectacle, which may be more or less interesting for tourists, but not for its inhabitants.

It would be inadequate to say that Barcelona '92 has succumbed to this danger, but in the city's renovation process there are at least two large projects that exemplify this: the so-called Olympic Ring of Montjuïc and the residential area of the Olympic Village. In the first case, the juxtaposition of some historicist reconstructions such as the Stadium and National Palace of Montjuïc, with a handful of great works—by Isozaki, Bofill, and Calatrava—lead to a sort of kitsch museum of contemporary architecture. In the case of the Olympic Village, it is difficult to withdraw from the impression that the new neighborhood is an artistic-mercantile demonstration of Barcelona's architectonic know how and its stylistic repertoire. On the other hand, the two skyscrapers by the ocean do not appear to have any justification other than to fill an empty space in Barcelona's skyline, an empty space that some consider unforgivable in a modern city. Identity and meaning is constructed not only through affirmations and presence but also through silences and absences.

The general tonic, however, of the recent experience in Barcelona has been that of not twisting your neck in the name of beauty or efficiency and when some situation has been forced or particular interests touched, it has been in the historically privileged social sectors. What is more, sometimes there has been contamination of an intense—and sometimes openly conflictive—social dialectic between the administration, professional, and citizens-neighbors-end users. There is no better example than the Rondas, a series of roads or rings that encircle the city which could have been, as has happened in so many places, an enormous wound in the urban fabric and which, on the contrary, has improved mobility and the connections between the neighborhoods through which they run.

It is in projects like the Rondas where one of the essential and differential characteristics of the Barcelona experience is revealed. The urban renovation process has not been the result of blind forces, forces from outside the city, or a basically commercial and speculative internal logic but rather of conscious, organized will in a democratic political context without any particularly strong power. It is not the expression of a state strategy but rather a rethinking and restructuring from inside, a self-affirmation of urbanity, carried out and executed by local powers. The accumulation of partial changes, sometimes on a very small scale, end up leading to substantial, profound changes. For this reason, it does not seem like an exaggeration to speak of the Barcelona's renovation process as the reinvention of the city.

Beyond the possible errors and design excesses, the experience of Barcelona makes clear that it is possible to successfully struggle against some of the main problems threatening contemporary urban life. It shows it is still possible to reinvent a city when, despite social and cultural heterogeneity and political discrepancies, the different social forces can agree on some things in common. It is a reinvention in which the need for functionality and effectiveness does not create an impediment to, but rather improves the articulation of, the different physical and social parts of the city and allows for the development of revitalization strategies in public spaces. It is a reinvention, therefore, that caters to the citizenry's will for reencounter and the appropriation of the physical city as a common space. It is a reinvention, then, that reveals that the symbolic and even poetic factors that are as important for the life of a community as the immediate physical and economic conditions.

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"MORE CITY," LESS CITIZENSHIP: URBAN RENOVATION AND THE ANNIHILATION OF PUBLIC SPACE

X. ANDRADE

Can the corporate interests that dominate the public sphere develop inclusive and democratizing agendas? What is the meaning of urban renovations promoted by local governments that respond to political, business, religious, and private forces? What type of urban landscape is created under the rhetoric of advancement and modernization? Which sectors are the beneficiaries? Can the discussions of local governance fail to question the meanings of citizenship that drive some political-administrative projects? Is it possible to conceive of local governance as a purely administrative task and not as an essentially political exercise? Is it feasible to talk about urban renovation without conceiving of it in terms of a political economy made up of multiple interests and exclusionary agendas? What are the consequences of urban renovation processes that lead to the gradual elimination of the public sphere and the annihilation of public space? Similarly, what is the political meaning of "citizen culture" emerging in contexts characterized by these types of sociological effects? Is that concept aseptic and neutral, as the language of "local governance" claims?

The path of urban renovations can be paradoxical and illusory. This chapter questions the celebratory tone of urban renovation in the case of Guayaquil, Ecuador, through a reflection on the creation of civil disciplines based on spatial re-engineering and architectonic, aesthetic, and disciplinary devices that serve to catalyze authoritarian ideologies. Keeping some of the preceding questions in mind, the argument of this chapter is developed through ethnographic observations carried out between 2001 and 2005 in the city of Guayaquil, the largest city and main port of Ecuador. The urban footprint of Guayaquil extends from the complex fluvial system of the Guayas River, passes through a series of estuaries, and continues, generally through squatter settlements, to the Santa Elena Peninsula in the north and the banana exportation region in the south.

With more than 2,000,000 inhabitants, Guayaquil has been subject to an accelerated process of urban transformation during the last five years.[1] Brought together under the political slogan of "More City" ("Más Ciudad" in Spanish) by those who hold local power, the reforms are locally known as "urban regeneration" to emphasize the contrast with previous periods characterized by chaotic municipal management.[2] The Social Christian Party (PSC, in Spanish) has held the municipal administration for 13 years through two historic leaders: León Febres Cordero in the 1990s and Jaime Nebot currently. This kind of stability in local power is unprecedented and in its most recent stage is due, in good part, to the symbolic efficiency of the changes promoted by urban renovation. Nebot's current administration is his second since he was re-elected for four more years in 2004. His first term (2000–2004) saw the beginning of projects that were conceived of during the second administration of Febres Cordero (1992–1996, 1996–2000), who is also ex-president of Ecuador (1984–1988) and the most influential political figure in the country since Ecuador's return to democracy in 1979. The PSC brings together conservative, Catholic, business-oriented, and despotic values characteristic of the modern right in Ecuador and a discourse on culture and identity—"Guayaquilness"—associated with a heroic, masculine, and patrician version of history, elements that are exploited politically to create alliances against the central state based in the capital of Quito.[3]

The urban renovation project in Guayaquil has been recognized nationally and internationally (UN prize in 2004) as a successful model

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1. The current settlement of the city dates to 1537. It was initially founded by the Spanish in 1534. The demographic estimate is approximate. According to data from the latest 2001 census, Guayaquil had a population of 2,039,789 inhabitants. The growth rate in the 1990s was 2.38 percent (INEC 2001) and growth from migration to the city was mainly from indigenous people from areas of the highlands, Colombians, Peruvians, and Chinese.
2. The term "regeneration" includes conservative religious suppositions and frequently alludes to the preservation of "morals and good habits." The tie between the Catholic Church, especially through the Archbishop of Guayaquil, which is in the hands of the Opus Dei, and the municipality is close and both institutions, along with other elite corporations, act as a political front. As an analytical exercise, the notion of "urban renovation" is used in this chapter to create distance with the political use of these processes and establish the need to deconstruct the underlying ideology of these terms and their effects on citizen life.
3. For more on the ideology of "Guayaquilness," see Archivo Histórico del Guayas 2002.

of local governance mainly due to the resurgence of the tourism sector and services associated with that industry and—although it is couched in the rhetoric of the benefits of the new established order—also for the effectiveness of the sociological cleansing undertaken with its consequent displacement of actors in the informal sector of the economy and other unprotected social groups. The main renovation projects took place originally in the center of the city, which is on the banks of the Guayas River.[4]

As a model of local governance, Guayaquil is characterized by the tendency for the public administration to give contracts for key services, such as potable water, sewage, and trash, to private, third-party companies. In the medium term, the municipality plans on doing the same with other services areas, such as public health and electric power. Its work on public security—the main aspect explored in this chapter—and education is growing in a similar way. In order to undertake public works, the municipality takes advantage of a parallel structure of private foundations, such as the Guayaquil 21st Century Foundation and Malecón 2000 Foundation,[5] which manage municipal funds as executors and, eventually, as administrators for the public works related to reform, control, and policing of space and even cultural policing carried out by the mayor. For example, in the last two years, the Guayaquil 21st Century Foundation managed 10 percent of the municipal budget to carry out urban renovation projects; this is close to $30,000,000 annually from public funds. The project being carried out included, for that period, 45 renovation-related endeavors and 32 related to broadening and paving streets.[6]

The legal status of these private foundations—especially in relation to the transparent management of public funds, plans designed without consulting the community, and the dominance of the foundations in the control of public space—has been questioned by civil society and the

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4. Maps and official information on the "benefits" of renovation are accessible at www.visitaguayaquil.com, a web page that brings together the discourses on urban reorganization and the emergence of tourism.
5. The term "Malecón 2000" refers to a major project of the same name that renovated the city's "malecón" or waterfront, pier area.
6. The total budget for municipal public works increased to $275,652,235 last year (see Coello and Neira 2004:7D and "Nuevos" 2005: 1D).

academic community. Both of these sectors, however, are just beginning to reflect on these matters.[7] With the delegation of local power through these paramunicipal foundations, there is a perverse tendency toward the gradual elimination of public space and the public sphere, not to mention that the foundations' labor practices are questionable.[8] This tendency is expressed in the priority given to security and repression, in the design of a kind of citizenship where citizens are mere spectators of urban changes, and in the absence of a public debate about these processes. In this context, the emergence of tourism in the renovated zones—the main reason for the celebratory tone of the local administration and the citizenry in general, at least, as its opinion is constructed by the media—is only the visible face of renovation. Finally, the political hegemony of the Social Christian municipality that has been achieved in the last decade and a half would not have been possible without the convergence of institutions of Guayaquil's elite, which operates simultaneously in business, political, and social sectors through the Chambers of Production, the Civic Board, and the Charity Board.[9]

Critically addressing certain sociological effects created by the process of urban renovation in Guayaquil, ethnographic observations reveal that this renovation is essentially a production for tourism, and its counterpart is the gradual annihilation of public space through policies of control and security, the participation and incorporation of the choreographies of local power

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7. See Damerval 2004 and "Dr. Damerval" 2004. A problematization of the disciplinary role of such institutions is found in Garcés 2004: 53–63. On cultural management as a battlefield where notions of "Guayaquilness" are instrumentalized, see Andrade 2004: 64–72. In a recent case of cultural policing, an exhibition of photojournalism on the history of the country (El Ojo Detrás del Lente, Junio-Julio 2005) that included a photograph of León Febres Cordero brandishing a gun when he was a deputy in the chamber of deputies, was initially censured by the Malecón 2000 Foundation under the premise that an offensive image of the person who conceived of the malecón project could not be included. The exhibition took place in one of the rehabilitated cultural areas and the photograph was included after the event was made public electronically.

8. The foundations contract out the activities for which they are responsible to other companies, and they frequently do not give benefits to the workers hired. Evidently, the paramunicipal foundations do not necessarily concern themselves with the legal and social responsibilities of the labor practices they promote (see "Obreros" 2005). Contracting work to third parties is currently under debate in Ecuador precisely because of the way in which the majority of the businesses—and even ghost institutions created by the state itself—have been in the habit of providing only minimum benefits to the workers.

by the urbanites,[10] and the exacerbation of class divisions expressed in the policies of exclusionary urban settlements. This chapter uses an ethnographic approach—focused on the relationship between micro-level aspects of everyday life and the relationship with spatial renovation as a process that affects the macro-level dimensions of social life in the city of Guayaquil—to examining two case studies. In the first part, some of the transformations that have happened in the regenerated center and the resulting creation of a generic cityscape are discussed; the second section analyzes a phenomenon of social hysteria related to the emerging physical and spatial fragmentation of the city and the effects on stereotypes of social class and race resulting from these environmental differentiations.

The first case study deals with the spatial heart of the urban renovation—the city center. The second case takes place in Samborondón, an elite satellite city. While the urban reforms in the first case refer to a strictly disciplined public space, the second case serves as an example of the tendency toward urban polarization and the marketing of fear that encourages urban policies of population segregation. The background of the analysis, the thread that runs through both cases, is the municipal "More Security" plan, which promotes the accelerated privatization of public space based on the gradual concession of control over the streets to

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9. The Chambers of Production bring together representatives of private business groups. The Civic Board functions as a committee of notable individuals mainly related by family ties, whose opinion is instrumental every time a regional confrontation between Guayaquil and Quito is necessary. The Charity Board of Guayaquil is the only institution of this kind that has been critically studied; it exemplifies how the exercise of these public institutions responds to corporate strategies and the network of Guayaquil's elite families. See de la Torre Aráuz 2004 for more on the Charity Board. The response of the press in Guayaquil to de la Torre's book, expressed in terms of the defense of "Guayaquilness" makes obvious the hegemony of this type of rhetoric to defend institutions, such as the Charity Board, that historically have catalyzed discourses of local empowerment based on regional oppositions and xenophobic prejudices (the second edition of the book by de la Torre Aráuz—a sociologist from Quito—includes two articles published in the *El Telégrafo* newspaper, the most recalcitrant of publications of this kind). The fact that, according to the author herself, the Charity Board threatened her directly with buying the whole print run of the book so that it would not be in circulation highlights the practices that accompany corporate action leading to the management of local power and the precariousness of public debate on the matter.

10. The concept of "urbanite" indicates that there are social subjects and formations that depend on urban economies on a daily basis. The concept in Spanish of "urbanita" is equivalent to "urbanite" in English and does not refer to "urbanists" or those people who carry out spatial planning in cities from within local administrations.

private security companies. The most repressive version of this plan was designed in 2004 and is currently in place.[11]

Death[12]

The center of the city was subject to an aggressive process of displacement of actors from the informal economy, who had based their businesses in the center for decades. The amount of exclusion—a key word which is absent from public references to urban renovation in Guayaquil—and the

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11. This chapter is based on the presentation given at the conference that led to this book, which took place in December 2004. A preliminary version was published in Carrión and Hanley 2005. The current, revised version was written in July 2005. The dizzying transformation that took place during this period with the "More Security" plan and which correspond to new political alignments that came about after the democratic crisis that led to the ouster of President Lucio Gutiérrez (2002–2005) and the installation of the current administration (Alfredo Palacio, 2005–present) point to a process of public implementation and discussion about its sociological effects. The volatile nature of Ecuadorian democracy in the last decade notwithstanding, the Social Christian administration of the Municipality of Guayaquil has known how to impose its agenda. In the last elections, in October 2004, nevertheless, a populist candidate received almost a third of the mayoral vote, a fact that could point toward the gradual reappearance of the PSCs traditional enemies and local contenders, the populist Roldosist Party of Ecuador (PRE, in Spanish), whose maximum figure and ex-president of the country, Abdalá Bucaram, has been exiled for the fourth time due to accusations of corruption (on Bucaram's populism, see de la Torre 2000). The greater stability of local governments in Ecuador in the last decade is also true in the case of Quito and other smaller cities (see the pertinent essays in this same volume).

12. My first editorial in a series on urban renovation was published under the title "The Death of the Center" ("La Muerte del Centro") in *El Universo*, the newspaper with the largest local and national circulation. This article tries to reflect the profundity of the spatial homogenization at an aesthetic and architectonic level and the marginalization of sectors of the population. This series of articles plus two unpublished articles are available on the Internet at www.experimentosculturales.com in the section titled "tubo de ensayos." The purpose of these articles was to point out the role of urban devices, such as parks, private guards, and traffic light systems, in the creation of authoritarian forms of citizenship. I have cited them here individually to show current day Guayaquil through micro-level aspects of renovation. Except for the articles by Jaime Damerval, an intellectual, politician, and writer for the editorial page of *El Universo*, and those by Santiago Roldós in *Vistazo* magazine, there are no analytical perspectives on these processes in the mass media. On television, for example, the topic has been completely absent. Nevertheless, the public opinion section of *El Universo* periodically includes the citizenry's non-favorable commentaries on the changes. Exhaustive research by the media on the pernicious effects of the renovation, however, is still necessary. In Guayaquil, the media discourse is generally celebratory and the media themselves, both print and television, have been important in consistently legitimating the Social Christian project. In this context, it is important to point out that *El Universo* occasionally includes reports on citizens' negative reaction to the lack of basic services or the social exclusion promoted by the renovation.

relocation of the merchants to a network of municipal markets in other areas of the city is in dispute, although the decrease in the number of street vendors in the center is obvious.

To put the process of sociological cleansing promoted by the renovation into dimension, a decade ago there were 25,000 vendors on the streets, according to numbers managed by high municipal functionaries. According to the same source, around 18,000 vendors have been placed in the municipal market system, which consists of 26 markets and other parallel structures. The changes to the informal economy been protested, frequently with the subsequent jailing of protest leaders and organizers, by vendors who sustain that, on one hand, the municipal markets are not fully occupied (around 10 percent of the stalls are unoccupied) of these establishments because they are located in areas where the flow of shoppers is not sufficient and, on the other hand, there are still around 5,000 informal vendors spread throughout the city who compete directly with the formally established markets.[13]

A microeconomic study done by a local university discovered the existence of 2,800 informal workers who mobilized a daily capital of approximately $400,000 only in the sale of vegetables in the center of Guayaquil. This corresponds to 17 percent of the economically active population and 4.2 percent of the unemployed population of the city (Olmos 2005: page).[14] The volume of the operations described and the dimension of the informal market is important because half of the city's population is either involved in the informal economy or unemployed. Three phenomena characterize today's urban landscape: 1) the grouping of informal vendors along the boundaries of the renovated space; 2) the re-emergence of dispossessed sectors, such as vagabonds, beggars, and street children at night when there is less security; 3) and the slow return of certain displaced sectors, such as the disabled and lottery vendors.[15] Therefore, making these sectors of the population invisible has only been partially successful.

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13. Although the statistics outlined by the municipality and informal workers are contradictory, and there is a lack of more reliable quantitative information, this information is cited here to give the reader who is not familiar with Guayaquil an approximate idea of the area in dispute. The information was compiled in the newspaper *El Universo* (Olmos and Vicuña 2005: 6B; 2005: 1B; and 2005: 1B).

14. The information does not include an explanation of the statistical data and the investigation done for the article is not available.

It is in this disputed territory where urban renovation as a sociological phenomenon should be located. To understand renovation in Guayaquil—and in particular the emergence of the tourism industry as the engine and public façade of renovation, an effect that has been ideologically exploited to reinforce citizen pride and, in this way, guarantee political allegiance to the Social Christian project—it is important to discuss some theoretical premises concerning tourism as a topic of historical and anthropological reflection. Tourism has been analyzed mainly as an industry based on the creation of difference and the exportation of an identity created as a local attraction, on the one hand, and, on the other, as the addition of economic and symbolic value to specific objects, architecture, and ecologies (both human and natural). The construction of identities for tourist consumption is dependent on notions of historical legacies with material references that are socially considered as "patrimonial."[16] This type of analysis only partially helps to understand the case of Guayaquil, where discourses constructed on notions of authenticity are articulated under the hegemonic ideology of "Guayaquilness," an essentialist discourse on cultural identity that brings together a broad historical perspective (an exercise which is, in itself, ahistorical) and interpretations about the warrior inheritance prescribed to the prehispanic past; the independent spirit of the city in the

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15. This is demonstrated in "Los loteros" 2003: page. The article refers to a lawsuit by 150 lottery and newspaper vendors due to their forced displacement. Some of them were part of an association of disabled people who had operated rental telephones and sold lottery tickets since at least the 1990s until their stalls were eliminated by the renovation of 9 de Octubre Avenue, the main artery of the city. The marginalization of these sectors contradicts the declared intent to democratize access to the streets and avenues for the disabled population in general (see M.I. Municipalidad de Guayaquil year). In practice, nevertheless, the private guards who control the regenerated spaces allow the disabled people who beg for money to be in certain areas, particularly around churches and the banking zone. On other regenerated streets, this policy is applied to street vendors in general. The disabled people who work on those streets, however, have been ejected and condemned to marginality.

16. Along this line of analysis, the question of historical legacy is the explanatory aspect of tourism and forms of exhibiting "otherness" in general (see Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998: 149–176). Nevertheless, the argument fails to discuss globalized tourism phenomena such as theme parks and contemporary forms of tourist attractions such as shopping malls—models of spatial creation that serve to analyze the case being discussed. On the other hand, the patrimonial aspects require ahistorical interpretations and constantly excludes alternative voices on historical value of archeological and architectonic assets (Kingman Garcés and Goestchel 2005; Kingman Garcés 2004: 26–34). For a more rigorous analysis of the relationship between notions of historical inheritance and the tourism industry in the Ecuadorian case, see Benavides 2004.

colonial period; and the oppositional, autonomous, and demanding zeal of the capital, Quito, in the present day.[17]

The interpretations of the connection between the past and patrimony in this type of analysis, however, ignore contemporary forms of transnational tourism that play with the homogenizing aesthetic of globalization. Where there is the construction of difference, there is also the re-creation of likeness. The exoticism is opposed to niches that speak the language of commercial familiarity. Architectonic assets that date to the past find their counterpoint in the shopping malls applied to spaces that would otherwise be public. In sum, the essential spirit of these cityscapes, and of the newly created patrimonies, come from a model that flows directly from the centers of power. Indeed, the case of Guayaquil specifically uses Miami as a reference point and public works have been designed by companies based in Miami.

In this context, it is not enough to consider that tourism is a "cultural" production, as the established literature has done, but rather tourism must be considered as a discursive and practical language that, being applied to urban renovation processes, can create new patrimonial forms. By "tourist production" I am referring to—in the case of renovation in Guayaquil—the construction of an urban landscape characterized by the establishment of a generic patrimonial language directed at the commercial exploitation and the restricted use of the space where the interventions have taken place. In this landscape, both the ecological elements (made up of untouchable fragments of ornamental gardens) and the architectonic elements are constructed according to an exclusionary agenda because the dominant form of circulation in these areas is based on the logic of tourism: a way to contemplate, consume, and stroll in the space that tends to reproduce the pastoral etiquette of a tour but not a citizen experience that, until the intervention, was based on the spontaneous appropriation of spaces and the consolidation of diverse social formations.[18] These new mean-

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17. On the normalizing role of archeology in encouraging these kinds of hegemonic discourses, see Benavides 2002: 68–103. On the political use of identity stereotypes based on region, see Andrade 2002: 235–257.

18. Given the climatic conditions in Guayaquil, the fact that it is a port, and that its traditional architecture is characterized by two-story buildings, where the first floors have porches providing shade for pedestrians, the city was historically characterized by a robust life of urbanites on the streets, which sometimes functioned, like in popular sectors today, as a kind of extension of domestic space. Even 9 de Octubre Avenue, the main street for the flow of inhabitants, still has something of this structure, which is under an accelerated transformation.

ings of etiquette are the result of disciplinary codes, which are reinforced through a set of prohibitions and security devices.[19]

As tourist productions, all the major pieces of the development of the regenerated center of Guayaquil, including the Malecón 2000, the Malecón of the Saltwater Estuary, Santa Ana Hill, 9 de Octubre Avenue (the main artery of the city which extends between the two piers), and the maximum projected extension to be inaugurated in 2006, Santa Ana Port, are governed by four basic elements, which will be explored in greater detail below:

1. The new architecture uses an aesthetic language of generic global tourism.
2. The renovated space is organized around a series of commercial parks, food courts, and shopping centers offering all kinds of goods.
3. The ecological elements are constructed like complementary ornamental artifices.
4. The use of the space is carefully regulated, disciplined, and guarded by private companies.

First, the majority of the massive architectonic projects implemented in Guayaquil are geared toward the creation of a tourist market and generic patrimonial forms that attract Ecuadorian and foreign visitors—the foreign visitors in particular because the city functions as an almost mandatory stop to be able to visit the Galápagos Islands. Contrary to one of the main principles of the tourism industry, which is to produce feelings of "difference"

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19. Such prohibitions can even include norms of etiquette and dress, as in the case of a regulation governing one of the renovated areas, Santa Ana Hill, which is where the first residents of the city settled in colonial times. Such norms include a prohibition against men wearing shorts and sleeveless shirts and women using "clothing that goes against decorum and good manners." In the words of Mayor Nebot, the creator of these norms: "I will not tolerate mangy dogs or men drinking alcohol or naked women offending good manners and morality in this emblematic face of the city." The allusion to stray dogs here can serve as a metaphor for the effects of the sociological cleansing used against the informal economy and the unemployed since a massive campaign of extermination was undertaken in the center against dogs and cats as part of the creation of a friendlier image for national and international tourism. The private guards that guard parks and plazas also have specific powers to punish and eject any pet that circulates in the renovated areas. These measures have been executed with barely a timid public reaction. Of course, the mayor would not mind placing a Hollywood-style sign directly over the "emblematic face of this city," as is planned in the construction of Santa Ana Port.

that give the landscape a particularly local feeling, Guayaquil has become an example of a transnational destination that depends on the familiar (read commercial) character of the space created.

There are two examples of this phenomenon. At the Malecón 2000, which is approximately three kilometers long, a boat named Captain Morgan circulates along the Guayas River leaving from a wharf that has a McDonald's sign next to it.[20] Indeed, the Ronald McDonald sculpture outside the restaurant on the malecón has become one of the main photo opportunities for local visitors. The nursery for ornamental plants on this malecón was made into a small "eco park" for children but instead of a green space but it is dominated by Coca-Cola, hotdog, and popcorn stands. The stairs on the renovated section of Santa Ana Hill lead to a naval museum with pictorial recreations of the pirate past of the port—one of the most idealized times from the warrior past including wooden dolls with eye patches and wooden legs and stories that resemble the clever historical reconstructions of Disneyland.[21] All the food courts on the two renovated piers include at least one Kentucky Fried Chicken or similar fast food chain. The live music heard in these areas is frequently "Andean new age"—the most ascetic and neutral version of the music of the region, which confirms the "global" nature of the attraction and, at the same time, gives the area a rustic, "typical" flavor. Upon entering these supposedly public spaces, signs warning that "the right of admission is reserved" clearly denote what has happened to the public space. Such signs serve to exclude people who are not properly dressed, street vendors, and marginal sectors of society, such as street children, young people who look like gang members, transvestites, and, at least initially, homosexuals.[22] The visual scrutiny of the poorly educated, poorly trained private guards regularly guarantees open practices of discrimination.

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20. Indeed, the old name of the malecón, Simón Bolívar, which honored the hero of Latin American independence, was replaced in practice by a publicity-related brand name— Malecón 2000—which goes along well with the commercial spirit of the new area. An emblematic space that includes the monuments to Bolívar and another independence hero, José de San Martín, has been reorganizad without contradictions with the new monumental showcase that make up the newly denominated "Civic Plaza" on the pier, dedicated exclusively to presidents who came from Guayaquil.
21. See Wallace 1985: 33–57.
22. The exclusion of homosexuals was publicly protested by gay organizations until their free admission was guaranteed. Sectors that are not well organized, such as transvestites and vagabonds, are regularly denied permission to enter the premises.

The wooden signs that decorate the shops on Santa Ana Hill have been made aesthetically uniform as if the traditional names and signs of such establishments were "offensive" to visitors. Similarly, the signs in the historic center have been changed to use a gigantographic language and neon panels, where they were previously hand painted using vernacular aesthetics. The façades of the renovated houses—the only thing on the Hill that was subject to intervention apart from repairing the stairs that are the main access point—include a photograph of each house's previous incarnation to produce a perverse contrast between the local history (typified in the eyes of the visitor as poor and degrading) and the progress provided by tourism. The façades of the houses were also painted in uniform colors, a policy that continues to be imposed in newly affected sectors.[23]

The Santa Ana Port will include a sign at the entrance to the Hill that the local government functionaries proudly declared to be "in Hollywood style." This project has been publicized as a native version of Coconut Grove, which will emulate both Los Angeles and, due to the spatial design, Miami simultaneously.[24] In a city historically characterized by the socialization of streets around the sale of regionally typical food, the fast food kiosks that have supplanted the traditional supply systems privilege hamburgers, hotdogs, and sandwiches, and medium-sized chains instead of the small independent vendors who have been displaced to the borders of the regenerated areas when they have not been directly condemned to misery.[25] In sum, the large projects in the

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23. Recently, in other areas where houses were painted by force, the residents have complained about the quality of the paint used, the fact that they were not consulted on the matter, and the poor quality of the materials used in the restoration ("La regeneración" 2005: 2B). The mayor responded to these complaints with threats to sue those people who made such remarks in the press for "providing false and tendentious information."

24. The construction of said property, also administered by the Malecón 2000 Foundation, began in the first half of 2005 and its first phase will be inaugurated next year at an estimated cost of $15,000,000 financed by the municipality. Its design was handled by the same company that conceived of projects such as Coconut Grove and Coco Walk in Miami. Santa Ana Port is an extension of Malecón 2000, which will include residential and commercial zones. Once the Port is constructed, Santa Ana Hill will be located half-way between the two projects.

25. A renovation project of the main avenue of Ciudadela Alborada, a neighborhood in the north of Guayaquil, took place in March 2004. Out of the 42 informal workers who worked in this zone, only nine received permits to operate fast food businesses. Because products such as grilled corn and shish kabobs were prohibited, the alternatives were obvious, according to the Director of Markets of the Municipality of Guayaquil, "if they [the informal vendors] need to return they should sell hamburgers or hotdogs" ("El sabor" 2005: page).

center rely on the logic of commercial streets and theme parks, which they try to recreate or simulate so the visitor will feel "at home," but in the case of Guayaquil, the feeling of "home" comes through a simulacrum of American-style tourism, where the marks of familiarity are copied from commercial and architectonic brand names.

The main problem with this policy is that, while the patrimony of historic buildings and structures in the city has virtually been erased, new generic patrimonial forms have been consecrated by being considered the only urban language of the renovation. Although the notion of "generic patrimony" could seem inherently contradictory, it serves to designate those physical devices of the renovation that are seen as ideologically appropriate by the authorities and citizens with the aim of establishing discourses on "identity," with no concern for the fact that the invented landscape has no relationship whatsoever with any "tradition," whether it be historical, ecological, or architectonic. The generic patrimony is, then, a result of the ability to activate meanings ad hoc for a given infrastructure.

From this perspective, the municipality—with the support of the tourist industry—has been successful in making these patrimonial forms icons of the "new Guayaquil," a city that is gradually being constituted in a generic space. For example, in the central sector of Urdesa, a residential sector created in the 1950s for the elite which has gradually been supplanted by the middle classes, the same aesthetic of tiled sidewalks, cobblestone streets, and palm trees has been implanted all along its main street.[26] Where one once perceived the history of the area, vestiges of this are being eliminated along with the minimum devices needed, such as benches, to provide a place to rest or socialize with others.[27]

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26. For a critique of the uniformization of space in Urdesa, see Damerval 2004: page. The question that this editorialist asks is basic: why invest resources in sidewalks and pavement in one commercial strip when we could have invested in a broader renovation of the sectors involved? One of the recurring aspects of the homogenization of space is, precisely, the exchange of pavement and cement for cobblestones and tiles in streets and sidewalks.

27. For a description of the resulting landscape in Urdesa and the center as a result of the decrease in the quality of life for pedestrians promoted by devices of the renovation, such as gardens, traffic lights, and benches, see Andrade "Hasta": Tubos de Ensayos section. The approximately two-kilometer long renovated strip of Urdesa includes dozens of private guards, but not one single bench for pedestrians to rest. There are gardens arranged around parking spaces for the shopping center, eliminating the sidewalk for pedestrian use and forcing pedestrians to walk in the street against vehicular traffic.

Except for historical monuments in plazas—the majority of which are male heroes associated with the period of independence or the founding of the city—the environment of which was dramatically changed to make them the central objects of contemplation in new guarded spaces, the rest of the architecture and iconography is, literally, new. In the Malecón 2000, some of the landmarks that had traditionally been there were saved, for instance, a certain section of trees, a few monuments, and, at the southern end of the malecón, the Old Market, now sanitized and made into an exhibition hall, pompously called the "Crystal Palace," which could really be called the "Crystal Urn," given the fact that it eliminates the social relationships tied to the old market. Similarly, certain elements of the renovation itself—like the new posts that adorn every corner and the 171 benches located between the two piers—bear the name of Mayor Jaime Nebot, thereby becoming material homages reminding the pedestrian, step by step, of the new patrimony created there and of the politics that has sustained it.

Second, the renovated space is similar to commercial promenades with broad avenues, squares, and ornamental gardens. The renovated piers and the future Santa Ana Port are arranged around shopping centers and food courts around which pedestrians will flow. Although the Port is announced as a "great contemplative park," there is an enormous difference between the marketing strategies and reality.[28] Santa Ana Port will include four museums and art centers, restaurants, and shopping areas as well as residential areas.[29] Of course, if the dominant logic is that of the

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28. For a critical description of the Santa Ana Port project, see Andrade 2004: page, now available www.experimentosculturales.com, "tubo de ensayos" section.

29. The original Santa Ana Port project initially included only three museums: the beer museum since part of the facilities were donated by the National Brewery; the Julio Jaramillo museum, icon of the *pasillo*, an Ecuadorian musical genre, and held up as a symbol of "Guayaquilness"; and, the Barcelona museum, Barcelona being the most popular local soccer team. Not coincidentally, there is a very close relationship between politics and sports in Guayaquil, with a marked affinity between the interests of the directors of Barcelona and Social Christian leaders. The announcement of a museum to celebrate the history of the soccer club led to the only public debate about the Santa Ana Port projects. Fans of the rival team, Emelec, accused the municipality of discrimination in the opinion pages of the press. Now, another museum will be included—a museum dedicated to Emelec. The fact that the debate is centered on this type of complaint points out the level of hegemony established by the municipal discourse, when, for example, the fact that there was no public consultation was not discussed.

shopping center and gardens are to be seen but not touched, the display of guards from the private security companies, administered through the system of paramunicipal foundations previously described, ensures order for the pedestrians. From techniques of bodily control (prohibitions against kissing on the regenerated piers, codified forms of sitting on the benches and circulating in the space) to verbal warnings or whistles, abuses of power, and arrests have been used by armed guards who watch every corner of these renovated zones.[30]

Third, the ecology is ornamental and non-inclusive.[31] Guayaquil suffers from a deficit of green spaces—officially, there are currently three square meters of vegetation per inhabitant, even when access to the spaces is highly questionable precisely because of policies that restrict access to the ornamental gardens of the Malecón 2000 and the Forest Park—the only two lungs in the center of the city. There is a lack of green spaces throughout the city. In this context, the municipality has opted to encourage planting species that add little oxygenation, mainly palm trees in the regenerated areas and avenues; plant decorative gardens that are carefully guarded; and, lay waste to the treed areas up to the boundaries of where the regeneration ends.

The problem with the palm trees is a crucial one in a tropical city. This type of tree does not produce enough shade nor does it oxygenate the environment as well as the native species that were gradually replaced. The native trees (saman, locust, guachapelí, tulip, and jacaranda), all characterized by being leafy and by their capacity to circulate air and attract diverse species of birds, have largely been displaced by a policy that

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30. In practice, the guards are flexible or, from another point of view, arbitrary with the practice of kissing, strongly rooted in the old malecón, but they are vigorous in making the users behave properly and in threatening them when they infringe on one of the laws of etiquette.
31. Article 33 of the Official Registry # 127 from July 25, 2000 establishes as a norm providing each inhabitant with 10 square meters of green space. According to municipal statistics, in 1992 the average was one meter per inhabitant; in the last decade, that number should have theoretically been tripled with forests, parks, and gardens (Ortiz 2004: page). Nevertheless, if the director of Green Spaces in the Municipality affirms in this same source that 1,200 trees were planted as part of urban renovation up to 2004, there have only been declarations made about environmental protection areas in the outskirts of the city where there is little supervision of these norms and there has not been massive infrastructure to create access to green spaces, it is difficult to estimate the quality of the official evolution. The problem gets worse if we consider that most of the species planted are palms and ficus, two trees whose ecological function is poor, as will be considered in greater detail below.

has replaced them with palm trees, once again copying imported models despite the negative consequences for pedestrians now and, in the long run, for the temperature of the city. In a context where the system of awnings—an old architectonic structure that helps lower temperatures in urban areas—has also been gradually eliminated and, in large sections of the renovated areas, replaced by entire blocks of public parking. The palm trees, on the other hand, only offer a decorative effect. Even in areas such as 9 de Octubre Avenue, where the idea that the boulevard should make it easy for pedestrians to get around has been privileged over the older idea of encouraging the spontaneous appropriation of public space, palm trees and other species have been planted not to provide shade for pedestrians but rather over to serve as dividers for street parking spaces.[32]

It is obvious that ecological concerns have taken second place to the spirit of showcasing the renovation through the use of trees that, like the palm tree, obviously do not provide an environmental solution. This is also obvious due to the illusory nature of the ecological offerings in the regenerated areas through the privileging of ornamental gardens that cannot be directly enjoyed—as the classic definition of "green space" supposes—but only observed. In other words, when the municipality publicizes its work in this area, it ignores the fact that the ability to enjoy green spaces is a quality of life problem and that subjecting these areas to a logic of security is far from improving the rights of the citizenry.

Finally, there are two fluvial systems in the city—the Guayas River and the saltwater estuary. The Guayas River no longer functions as the main port because it has been replaced by the construction of maritime shipment systems. The saltwater estuary is made up of a winding complex of mangrove trees that goes through broad sectors of the city.[33] Both ecosys-

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32. According to the municipality's original plans, 171 trees as well as 171 benches should have been located along 9 de Octubre Avenue. Of the trees, 76 should have been palm trees. In this case, trees and palm trees were installed to provide shade to pedestrians (see Phillips 2005). According to this descriptive study about the availability of benches in renovated areas, the majority of the bench users interviewed demanded more shade.

33. The system of mangroves will be affected at an accelerated rate. Due to the lack of follow-up on this matter, I refer to the data published in the article already cited by Ortiz, a source that refers to a university thesis that establishes that, only between 1982 and 1991, 4,642 available hectares were reduced to 3,510. The environmental degradation that precedes the installation of new urban infrastructure is also obvious in the new constructions going up on the road that goes along the Pacific coast.

tems, river and estuary, which have been like visual oases in a city that feels like a desert due to the lack of green spaces, will be privatized through the rhetoric of ecological tourism and access to nature. The first system will be directly affected by Santa Ana Port when piers are constructed for the wealthy classes. In the second case, the saltwater estuary, tourism has already begun to take off with boats to visit the mangrove area through contracts that were made with companies that were initially charged with cleaning the water. Although this has had a positive impact so far in terms of the reforestation of the mangrove and the proliferation of birds, instituting tours in these areas also brings potential problems of saturation and disturbing the peace in these zones.

Fourth, the use of "public" space is carefully regulated, disciplined, policed, and repressed by private security companies.[34] It has been demonstrated that urban renovation, at least in the emblematic areas described, is basically a production for tourism carried out with public funds through a paramunicipal apparatus of private foundations managing the renovation with the open aim of privatizing public space; that the spaces created authorize these private foundation to fix rules for admiting citizens to spaces that have been financed with funds paid by their taxes; and that the ecologies created by the renovation depend solely on a logic of consumption, as if they were large commercial parks formulated in the transnational language of fast food. The final element to discuss in this panorama is the security apparatus that, as a result of the internalization of the everyday presence of armed guards, creates a new hyper-policed civic discipline.

Through the rhetoric of efficiency, productivity, and the economic resurgence of the port, the municipal administration has been able to legitimize policies that have had negative effects on public space. The success of the renovation in terms of the public's positive reception has been channeled by the mass media and the municipality itself through the concept of "self-esteem." Self-esteem here refers to the feeling of pride that has grown in the population of Guayaquil, or, at least, is made visible through the official discourse, as a result of the regenerated landscape. The illusory nature of the benefits achieved, however, continually emerge

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34. For a critical description of security on one of the renovated piers, see Andrade 2004:12A, now available at www.experimentosculturales.com, "tubo de ensayos" section).

through the presence of those sectors of society that local powers systematically try to make invisible, but who return to the renovated areas for subsistence work and/or to live.

The social conflict that arises from the high rates of poverty is expressed mainly through complaints about the fragmentation of the city into modernized sectors and the hidden face made up of vast territories of squatter settlements and marginal neighborhoods, and the lack of access to the resources of basic urban infrastructure. All of these are elements that put the celebratory tone of the renovation in doubt. The emerging urban landscape would be incomplete, however, without considering the gradual and recurring presence of private security companies that, thanks to a municipality beholden to corporate interests, have received control over citizens. The true magic of the urban renovation in Guayaquil is in reinvesting the citizens' taxes into everyday ways to repress them, discipline them, and restrict their access to pseudo public spaces that characterize the new urban ecology, all of this to the benefit of another buoyant sector of the economy—the security sector.

SECURITY

In September 2000, the municipality of Guayaquil launched the "More Security" plan, which was originally overseen by the National Police, an institution of the central state, and the Metropolitan Police, which is a repressive entity directly administered by the city to control informal vendors and other dispossessed sectors. The plan's initial purpose was to control crime in the city.[35] A year later, in September 2001, Mayor Nebot asked for the advice of William Bratton—a proponent of viewing public security as a business activity and ex-commissioner of police in New York City in the age of Republican Party mayor Rudolph Giulliani, whose

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35. For a broader diagnostic of the problem of citizen security in Ecuador, see Palomeque Vallejo 2002: 235–258. This study argues that, to the contrary of generalized perceptions, the homicide rates in the country are higher in the cities in the northern border region with Colombia than in the major urban centers (240–1). Nevertheless, of the total number of deaths due to external causes—homicide, suicide, traffic accidents—75 percent occur in urban areas. Of these, Guayaquil and Quito—the two largest cities on the coast and the highlands, respectively—have the highest homicide rates (253). Finally, Guayaquil has the highest rate of homicides involving firearms, but Quito has higher rates of violence in general (258).

administration was credited with reducing the crime rate in that metropolis during the late 1990s.[36] In mid-2002 key strategies following Bratton's vision began to be applied with the aim of broadening and professionalizing the control forces from an organic perspective. The municipality established a reliable system of crime statistics, created specialized investigation units, designed patrols of predetermined areas based on a crime map, trained special forces in investigation and repression techniques, and established periodic evaluations of the effects of such strategies.[37] Since October of that year, high technology devices, such as video cameras hooked up to a security circuit, were placed in supposedly key areas of the city; a year and a half later, satellite tracking systems were incorporated in patrol vehicles.[38]

A broadening of the most repressive aspects of the municipal vision began at the beginning of 2004, when two local institutions, headed by the municipality, the National Police's Provincial Command of Guayas, and the Transit Commission of Guayas, which normally controlled vehicular traffic, designed a joint plan at a cost of $4 million. The package initially included 160 additional police officers between the national and metropolitan corps, 80 patrol cars, and 120 motorcycles, without counting the private support channeled by the Chambers of Production and important in establishing the Immediate Help Posts (PAI, in Spanish) and

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36. There have been a number of criticisms of the Giulliani era and his repressive vision of citizen security. Some arguments indicate that an economic resurgence in the period was the main factor in the reduction of different crimes. Others emphasize the racist and abusive nature of the police interventions in a society where race, ethnicity, and class are closely intertwined. Finally, micro-level studies on some fundamental aspects of the Bratton/Giulliani agenda, such as, for example, the ejection of drug dealers from the streets of Manhattan, Queens, and Brooklyn, indicate there were questionable effects. For example, it would appear that the drug trade was not eliminated but rather forced to professionalize. The flexibility in sale strategies, the adoption of marketing strategies via cell phones, and the consolidation of more fixed and stable consumer networks were evidenced in the studies of the topic. Concomitantly, drug distribution networks moved toward the white suburbs (see Andrade et al. 1999: 271–298).
37. The municipality signed an agreement with ESPOL, a local university, to establish a reliable statistical system. Its database is available at www.icm.espol.edu.ec/delitos/index.htm.
38. Guayaquil is not the only Latin American city where the Bratton model is used as the main reference. For the case of Mexico City, see Gaytán Santiago 2004. The demographic and spatial dimension of the historic center of Mexico City and the profound historical involvement between informal economies and organized mafias of spatial control, of course, make the panorama in Mexico City much more complicated.

additional vehicles.[39] In July 2004, Mayor Nebot signed a cooperation agreement with the national government, in which the state agreed to contribute $7 million and the municipality $3 million more until 2006. These funds were to be used to sophisticate the control forces in terms of arms, communications equipment, and greater coverage of the system of security cameras.[40]

The logical radicalization of the Bratton model, which is implicit in the repressive language used since signing the agreement, happened after a conflict between the local and central governments in November 2004, when there was a change in the inter-institutional cooperation with the participation of private industry through their representatives who helped equip the city with such items as motorcycles for better street coverage.[41] This transformation in the initial spirit of the More Security plan from a rhetoric that emphasized crime control toward one that privileges business interests over open public space—and not just the spaces that were initially semi-privatized, such as the piers and parks. This would be unthinkable as municipal policy in other urban contexts due to its effects on the nature of the public sphere, the use of private armed guards under the orders of a faction of political interests, and the perverse effects that result from the structural fragility of the repressive system in Ecuador and of the private guards (low salaries, high indices of corruption, little or non-existent technical training and education on human and community rights).[42]

The municipality of Guayaquil was able to turn this around and legitimize it with barely any discussion with citizens through by inscribing a topic as delicate as public security within hegemonic discourses on cultural identity, in this case, the idea of "Guayaquilness" and using the always fructiferous oppositional rhetoric against the central state. The conflict of November 2004 was

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39. The cost of private investment in the maintenance of such devices will be $500,000 ("Empresarios: 2004: 2A). The PAI have been re-baptized as "Community Police Units" (UPI, in Spanish).
40. For a review of the evolution of the More Security plan up to November 2004, see "Guayaquil sin plan" 2004: 2A.
41. The conflict in November led to an official order to temporarily suspend the operating permit of the security companies hired by the municipality, declared on December 13, 2004 by the Minister of Government at the time, Jaime Damerval, precisely because of the illegality or unconstitutionality of the control of public space in private hands.
42. The salaries of the private guards hired by the municipality were fixed at $280 a month, approximately double the minimum wage in Ecuador ("Guardias vigilarán" 2005: page).

the beginning, a consecratory ritual of politization of the concept of public security that legitimized the project in January 2005, and, the state license to privatize public space through private security companies in June of this year.

Within the plan originally agreed to with the state in July 2004, the mayor agreed to provide assets such as trucks for policing activity and hiring four private security companies to cover 40 observation points located, supposedly, in the areas with the highest levels of crime activity in the city, an activity financed by the private company through the Chambers of Production. For their part, the National Police broadened the police force in Guayaquil and committed to the coordination and supervision of control activities assigned to private guards. Finally, the guards offered, under municipal contracts, the human contingent to cover the points assigned.[43] The alliance of diverse interests, of course, was not without problems.[44]

There have been multiple armed forces controlling public space since then, including the National Police, Metropolitan Police, private guards, and even the armed forces. One can frequently find representatives of all these forces on the same block in the renovated areas.[45] The gradual militarization of street space generally went unnoticed, except when abuses or excesses by the private guards occurred and this occasionally led to forums

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43. Two hundred guards were hired through the private companies Sesei, Laar, Mac, and Seguire Inc. Each company is paid $27,000 a month by the municipality, funds which are administered by the Chamber of Industries.

44. The mayor of the city himself ordered the National Police trucks to be withdrawn for a weekend to "shake up the conscience" of the state authorities. The order was a reaction to the supposed inappropriate use of these assets, which, according to the complaints, would have been assigned to other cantons in the Province of Guayas and were not to be restricted to the city of Guayaquil. The Police reluctantly responded offering not only to execute the plan as laid out, but also to increase the number of troops in the city.

45. For example, on any given morning, after the recent negotiations on said plan, one can find the same space being policed by Metropolitan police, National Police, armed forces, private guards from area offices, and private guards from companies hired through the More Security plan. All of them are armed and, at least in theory, ready to act. In practice, they combat any move made by informal vendors and use the occasion to cat call women pedestrians. However, the fact that they are armed could lead to an explosive situation at any time. Indeed, private guards tend not to act like community police officers who privilege direct interaction and dialogue with citizens but rather prefer to use whistles to make their presence known and publicly threaten anyone who breaks the rules of decorum and veneration in the created space. The whistle, furthermore, ridiculizes a person in front of the rest of the pedestrians or occupants of the plaza, street, or park. When they make use of words, due to their lack of training, they end up having the same aggressive attitude as with the whistle.

on human rights or reaction in the public opinion sections of the main newspapers. At a cost of approximately $100,000 a month, paid by private industry, 40 points in the city were conceded to four private companies, despite the declaration of the Ministry at the time to temporarily suspend the measure until there was an adequate legal framework to consider the evaluation and supervision of private guards. With this measure, the use of private guards was officially expanded for the first time, in what is expected to be the first step in the constitution of an "autonomous police," separate from the municipal force—the Metropolitan Police—which is famous for its abuses against the indigent and street vendors.

Invoking notions of "Guayaquilness," Mayor Nebot has accused the city's occasional detractors of being its "enemies."[46] The argument of the Ministry of Government and the Police was basic: if private industry is investing in private security companies, these resources could be channeled to the training of National Police personnel and the broadening of its operational ability, to strengthen the apparatus of the state and preserve the common good.[47] Additionally, the Ministry of Government and Police questioned the contracts made through the More Security plan due to its unconstitutionality and the potential dangers of citizens being controlled by private guards with doubtful training, and, possibly in the long term, by paramilitary bands controlled directly by the municipality. The fact that public questions of this nature become a problem of loyalties reveals the political dimension of the debate about the More Security plan and the macabre meanings it has acquired.

If, until now, private security has been limited to the closed perimeters of the massive projects created by the renovation, the official discourse of "inter-institutional cooperation" has served to legitimize the expansion of armed

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46. Damerval had had an openly critical attitude toward the Social Christian leader León Febres Cordero and Mayor Jaime Nebot, especially through editorial space in *El Universo*. An exception among Guayaquil's editorialists, Damerval criticized the legally doubtful nature of the paramunicipal foundations that function as entities executing works for the local administration throughout his articles. In a context where any type of public critique is seen as an act of dissidence and belligerence, it is not strange that the mayor used a personalized language to forward his privatizing agenda, a language that divides the city into "friends" and "enemies" and is often exploited in political and media spheres in the city.

47. Additional investigation is still needed on the relationship between the municipality and certain private companies through the 21st Century Guayaquil Foundation; in other words, we need a study on the political economy of public security and on the business-oriented and political nature of the processes discussed here.

policing in different areas. All of this occurs in a context in which the hegemony of the municipal administration is well consolidated Indeed, there is no public debate on the perverse effects of urban renovation, or the sociological cleansing that has occurred, or the massive extermination of cats and dogs that lived in the old center, or the everyday abuses of the private guards in the renovated spaces, or the wastefulness of electric energy in over illuminated lamp posts, or the restricted distribution of food kiosks that favors medium-sized businesses and fast food chains to the detriment of small traditional merchants, or the destruction of the city's architectonic patrimony by institutional negligence, or the lack of consultation on massive projects such as Santa Ana Port, or the authoritarian agenda behind all the mechanisms of control and security. It is, then, a state of control legitimized by the fear of insecurity and dependent on the artificial nature of security and the citizenry's sense of belonging.

The radicalization of the Bratton model was consecrated by a political protest convoked by the municipality as a way to pressure the government. This march took place at the beginning of 2005 as a consequence of the tensions between the state and local authorities that began in November 2004. It was a spectacular show that included enormous screens along 9 de Octubre Avenue projecting propaganda about municipal public works and music by mariachis and other musical groups. The "White March" promoted the use of white t-shirts by protesters as a symbol of the spirit of adherence to the mayor's set of demands. While originally the demand was for greater public security, the event gradually turned into a new call for the autonomy of local government and opposition to a central government that had weakening support at that time. Regionalist discourses, of course, were not absent, particularly because the president at the time, Lucio Gutiérrez, was from the highland region. In other words, the topic of public security was packaged in the rhetoric of regional identity and, in this way, made restrictions on citizen rights seem natural. Disguised as "cooperation" and "support" for the National Police, the More Security plan was implemented with a repressive contingent that tripled the number of troops. Nevertheless, it has not yet had expected results in terms of the amount and seriousness of criminal activity in the city.[48] At the peak of municipal propaganda about the benefits of the new plan, three pigs began to appear paint-

48. The real number of National Police agents was only 6,600 ("Gándara" 2005: page).

ed on walls in different areas of the city. As will be shown below, these three pigs were enough to crack the illusion of security in a walled city.

PIGOCRACY[49]

In early December 2004, a wave of rumors began in the satellite city of Samborondón—the new stronghold of the well-to-do classes, which is a conglomerate of little fortresses with access restricted by private security systems. This canton is located in what was previously a different town in front of Guayaquil, on the other side of the Guayas River. Complete with schools and the most modern shopping centers, Samborondón became a self-contained enclave for the privileged sectors of society. Indeed, many of the adolescents and young people in the area admit being incapable of getting around the big city—Guayaquil. In the sense of protection provided by the security features and physical barriers separating one house from another, they find a very unique experience of citizenship. In the media, they have been referred to as "bubble children" because of the protective nature of their experience. The population's sense of security comes not only from the patrolled physical environment but also from the fact that everyone belongs to the same social class and is ethnically homogeneous.

One of the keys to this experience of security is the artificiality of it; it is found in a sense of belonging that is discriminatory and the illusory creation of an oasis that is unaffected by the structural changes of the broader society. The commercialization of housing in closed, gated communities—which generally include private lakes and imported palm trees—is preceded by the marketing of fear, where the trope of security becomes part of a promotional package guaranteeing access to a material world that includes a house or apartment, pools, and, above all, boundaries that are walled off and guarded 24 hours a day, every day of the year. The feeling of security offered, therefore, depends on everyday policing.

Samborondón is the most obvious expression of the spatial polarization of Guayaquil's society and of a new urban landscape that finds its counterpart in the massive growth of marginal neighborhoods. These two types of

49. The expression "pigocracy" (in Spanish "chanchocracia"), created by the artist Daniel Adum Gilbert, alludes to the corrupt nature (pigs or hogs are associated with filth) of democracy in Ecuador. The meaning of the expression is explored in greater detail below.

ecologies, one of opulence and one of poverty, also have different ways of becoming news in the mass media. While Samborondón regularly appears in the society pages, the marginal neighborhoods are found either on the crime pages or in news sections demanding access to basic urban services. The criminalization of the popular sectors of society is a dynamic inherent in the very discourse of urban modernity. In reaction, hyper-privileged satellite cities are created based on a model imported from the suburbs of cities in developed countries.[50] Although it is not particular to Guayaquil, youth gangs have been one of the most exploited agents of violence by the media. At the beginning of December 2004, the gangs served to bring together elements of social hysteria, citizen security, and cultural policing. The detonator for this unprecedented form of fear in the media was the mysterious appearance of three pigs.

The phenomenon of gang activity in Ecuador dates to the 1980s, with the most notorious manifestations in Guayaquil, although Quito also has its own gang tradition. It was in Guayaquil, however, where the juvenile delinquency associated with gangs served to legitimize broader policies of control and repression at the end of the 80s. "States of emergency" were declared by the provincial authorities with military and police support from the central state, with the aim of calming presumed crime waves that, incidently, coincided with situations of broad economic and political crisis at the beginning and end of the last decade, with the last time coinciding with the generalized bankruptcy of the country's financial system in 1999. The consequences of these decisions were obvious: the city was militarized and young people from poor and marginalized classes were massively jailed. The manipulation of information on the dimensions of the gang phenomenon, in particular, and of crime, in general, was one of the strategies used by the authorities and the media to control social discontent (Andrade 1994: 131–160). At the beginning of the 21st century, gang violence has continued to be one of the main objects of repressive policies like those of the current city administration in Guayaquil.

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50. The criminalization of the unprotected sectors in Guayaquil, however, can be somewhat unusual in the hands of the Transit Commission of Guayas and its chief, Roberto Pólit, who has the support of the Social Christian Party to prohibit the circulation of tricycles used to transport goods for commercial entities in the center of the city and the rest of the renovated areas. This plan considered including any person on a bicycle (see "Pólit" 2005: 5B).

Gang violence in recent years is characterized by two tendencies. The first is a fusion of different groupings with the aim of broadening their territorial control through associative structures of broad scope known as "nations." The second, related to but not entirely dependent on the first, is the presumed globalization of such associations. In practice, however, the essential aspects of crime associated with gangs continued to be the same. On one hand, the violence is circular, which means it continues to be produced and resolved within territories mainly in popular and marginal neighborhoods, although presumably the level of sophistication of crime is higher and the revenge bloodier. On the other hand, the global connections are expressed through symbols and styles from Latin gangs based in different American cities, such as the "Latin Kings" and the "Netas," as part of a group of expressions that include graffiti, music, gestures, and styles of dress.

The pigs that began to appear throughout the city are visually the result of the application of a negative template of the lateral relief of a pig's body, which, once paint is applied on the template, leaves a positive mark on the chosen surface. It is, therefore, a classic signage technique in a city where this very technique is rapidly being replaced by computer design and the monotonous, standardized display of gigantographics in illuminated boxes. Indeed, the pigs, in this sense, are an anomaly in the new aesthetic of a public space homogenized at different levels: façades that must painted certain colors, tiles that cover the new sidewalks, cobblestones on the streets, illuminated posts imprinted with the mayor's name, and commercial establishments that must change their signs to fit the new standardized style.

The pigs originally appeared one by one in residential sectors such as Urdesa and parts of the center, without causing any worries. Then, they emerged in threes in a different location: the main street in Samborondón, along which there are schools that mainly cater to inhabitants of the area.[51]

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51. The pigs were originally part of a failed marketing campaign for a chain of pork sandwiches, a popular food in Guayaquil. The details of the phenomenon retold in this paragraph come from an interview with the artist and his only helper, Ani Pual, in the artist's house at the beginning of December 2004. The campaign was done in the most domestic way; the paintings were done by the artist and his helper for one night each week, extending gradually into different sectors of the city and along the road to the beach (for details, see Andrade "Cerditos": Tubo de Ensayos section).

From there, the social life of the Three Little Pigs was embellished in ways that would be almost funny and absurd, if it had not exemplified decisive aspects in the destiny of public space in Guayaquil.

An e-mail message began to circulate indicating the meaning of these now worrying symbols: it had to do with the transnational revenge of the Latin Kings, a Latin gang based in the United States with branches in Latin America and Spain, one of whose members was killed in Spain either by an Ecuadorian millionaire or by wealthy teenagers from the La Puntilla area of Samborondón. Since the pigs were painted in three different colors, the colors would serve as the key to the violent spectacle that would be unleashed in the days when the rumor began to circulate. Black pigs would indicate death; red pigs would indicate rape; white pigs fear.[52] It is important to point out that televised news programs were directly responsible for the interpretation of the e-mail, which described the association between the pigs and the Latin Kings, as evidence of the conspiracy underway, and served to flesh out a rumor that, through the magic of mass media, quickly became breaking news.[53]

In the eye-for-an-eye class struggle, in this hypothetical transnational settling of accounts that would take place in the very antechamber of the residential area of extraditable bankers, the authorities from high schools and universities in the area, along with parents associations, pressed for cautionary measures. For example, classes were immediately suspended in some schools and impromptu informative talks about gangs were organized. In one week, all the local television new programs began treating the rumor as news; broadened the rumor to society in general, as if it were about gang revenge with international connections; picked up on the elite's hysteria that promoted the basic rhetoric of "the anti-social" as related to young people from the marginalized social strata and indian, mixed, black, and *montubian* ethnicities; and moralized—once the person responsible revealed himself—on the punishment necessary for those responsible for this potential social damage. During this media drama, "experts" were consulted, wor-

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52. As with all rumors, different versions of the meanings associated with the colors and the dimension of the hypothetical massacre circulated simultaneously.

53. Channel One, for example, superimposed the electronic text with images of gang members attesting to the reliability of the connection between both elements. After that, the rest of the television channels followed similar strategies.

ried but skeptical students in the area affected were interviewed, and police statements taken into account. The night before the person responsible came forward, after days of scandal, an official said in front of the cameras, begging the citizens to be calm, that the "hypothesis they were considering was that it was an art student doing a marketing exercise."[54]

The rumor and scandal began with terror and ended in the territory of public art, the pen where the little pigs had belonged from the beginning. A photograph of the artist, Daniel Adum Gilbert—a young graphic designer who has a reputation as a visual artist and has even been awarded prizes in festivals organized by the municipality itself—erasing, with his girlfriend's, the images of the original pigs was the epilogue to this story. It was initially a marketing project in September 2004, but due to the elections in October of that year, the artist conceived of the project as a critique of "pigocracy," a term he invented to make a criticize the country's political establishment. It was a convenient play on words at the time since, due to the frequent quarrels and devices used by the political class, Ecuador was internationally declared as the country with the most corrupt political parties in the country.

However, the "pigocracy" project, having been conceived of initially during the election of local and sectional representatives and having received the reactions that have been described here, is really related not only to democracy in abstract but also to the new urban order as well. Indeed, the resolution of the project—and the culmination of the wave of rumors—happened when the artist turned himself in to the Municipal Office of Justice and Security, with paint cans in hand, ready to correct the damage. In one final act of poetic justice, the artist used grey paint to cover the pigs, leaving a ghostly, ephemeral vestige impregnated as the memory of a commentary on politics and public space, which was forbidden because it had not channeled the proselytizing party propaganda but was a spontaneous, individual expression, completely unrelated to movements that see the

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54. *El Universo*, reported on it as front page news, but maintained a certain distance from the speculation happening in the televised media (see "Dibujos" 2004: page; "Daniel Adum" 2004: 1A; "Pandilleros" 2004: page; "Policía" 2004: page; "Figuras" 2004: page; "Figuras de credos" 2004: page; Aguilar 2004: page; "Una ciudad" 2004: page). Extensive documentation, including photographs of the process, are found at www.danieladumgilbert.com, which also includes a poem titled "Terror Porcino" ("Pig Terror," in English) that alludes to the state of fear created by local authorities and the media.

organized discourse of the citizenry and civil society as the only legitimate way of having a voice in social conflict.

In Guayaquil, cultural life, in general, and art is public spaces, in particular, is mainly in official hands. Indeed, another important rhetorical element to propagandize the benefits of urban renovation has to do with the growth in cultural opportunities and, as a result, in the "self-esteem" of residents of Guayaquil. For example, there are more festivals, contests, and exhibitions organized by the city periodically; a series of murals has been commissioned by the municipality under bridges on busy thoroughfares. Mechanisms like festivals and contests, in a medium where alternative spaces are limited, have led to the promotional exploitation of artistic work. The rhetoric of urban renovation, indeed, is crucial for the underpinning of new notions of civic culture, one of the expressions of which is respect for public and private property, which is reinforced by a legal apparatus that literally reads: "… maladapted individuals who stain or disfigure public or private property will be sanctioned with a fine (double the value of the paint and labor) … and, furthermore, with a seven-day prison sentence and the daily community service work of painting the disfigured or damaged walls."[55]

Any kind of art in public space without the municipality's blessing, therefore, is vandalism. The fact that the public reaction to this act, which was scandalously constructed by the media, was formulated in terms of the language of class war ("a millionaire" or "young millionaires," versus "the Latin Kings" or poor gang members), however, alludes to urban organization as a form of creating spatial boundaries and separations between prosperous areas—here Samborondón—and marginal areas. The terror awakened is an effect of the transgression of those carefully guarded boundaries. The hysterical emergence of the problem is found in the cloistering of the inhabitants of Samborondón and the poor young people of Guayaquil in mutually exclusionary enclaves. A delineated stain in the shape of pigs

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55. This is article 4 of the pertinent municipal ordinance. The language of the law is full of ideological connotations such as the use of the term "maladapted." Adum Gilbert only paid the fine and repainted the walls. The prison sentence was suspended possibly because he has family connections with important municipal officials. In an ironic twist on these events, the artist himself lives in Samborondón. In other words, he was one of the "maladapted," but he was not part of the marginalized socio-economic groups of society. When he had to paint the walls, however, some of the drivers in the area yelled out epithets such as "drug addict" and "crazy," perfectly in line with the criminalization of marginalized sectors.

invaded protected areas. The "damage" to public and private property took on conspiratorial and terrorist dimensions because the objects of potential attacks were the young people of the privileged enclaves.

CONCLUSION

The More Security plan radicalizes these illusory effects and extends them to the rest of the urban area, using private security companies with armed personnel who have doubtful preparation in human relations, exposing the citizenry to the internalization of ideas about security that, in practice, restrict their citizen rights and point toward a logic of security and silence that the case of the Three Little Pigs put in doubt in a most ingenuous and funny way, but, at the same time, a prejudiced, racist, and paranoiac way. The order incarnated by the urbanites as an effect of the choreography of local power orchestrated under the rhetoric of More Security, is part of the disciplinary effects of urban renovation, which are also related to a historical attitude toward democracy and power that has been deposited in a determined political project—the Social Christian project—the ability to decide on key aspects of the public sphere that end up influencing the intimate life of citizens.

The emergent authoritarianism at the beginning of the 21st century in Guayaquil, therefore, depends on a series of architectonic and urban reforms, such as the creation of an environment of change and security, or even social hysteria, that legitimize the control of people and the gradual annihilation of public space. The center of the city itself is a clear example of this dynamic, with renovated piers where walking and resting is strictly controlled (even with prohibitions against public kissing, which is considered obscene, and, as has been seen, codes of etiquette for using benches and other assets). Indeed, the main artery of the city, 9 de Octubre Avenue—the corners of which were traditionally appropriated by different citizen sectors, from retirees and disabled people to groups of young people from marginalized classes—was redesigned with the idea of promoting the best flow of pedestrians possible. Pedestrians are far from being top priority, as is evidenced in the lack of benches available dangerously close to the street and the same level as vehicular traffic, palm trees that barely produce shade since they have been placed to provide parking for vehicles, and with a system of traffic lights that lead to blind corners.

The ceramic tiles installed on the sidewalks, for example, represent a serious danger since they are extremely slippery when they are wet.

Ornamental gardens have been installed in such a way as to force pedestrians onto the cobblestone streets, competing directly with vehicular traffic. Plazas that previously allowed for the people to gather spontaneously to enjoy performances by different kinds of artists are now controlled in detail, with warnings by whistles when someone dares to rest on the edge of a fountain, for example.

The process of sociological cleansing has been successful up to the borders of the renovated areas. Informal vendors were either confined to markets with few shoppers or were simply expelled from the area. In one of the most dramatic cases, associations of disabled people who sold lottery tickets and rented telephones were displaced without being offered any alternative type of employment. Disabled people as well as beggars and food vendors selling traditional foods have been made invisible. Many disabled people reappear at night and on the weekend to reappropriate the space that still has the system of awnings, which they use to protect themselves from the elements during the night. The food vendors were replaced by a system of kiosks that promote the consumption of fast food that favors medium-sized businesses instead of the small businesses that had depended on the economy of the center for decades. The same actors can be found beyond the borders of the renovation, but they are more marginalized especially because their displacement has left them in areas of decreased circulation.

Presented with the concept of sociological cleansing and architectonic organization as benefits creating a market for tourism—one of the main beneficiaries of these processes—the urbanites themselves internalize the contemporary asceticism, which includes impeccable façades and walls the most minimum disfiguration of which, as in the case of the Three Little Pigs, ends up creating negative reactions from the common citizenry. Making the center into a spectacle goes hand in hand with silencing the public sphere under sentences and punishments, which are generally not necessary except in the case of informal vendors or beggars who pay for their presence with prison or forced displacement.

For the majority of common citizens, however, the renovation has been appropriated from any crack that they system allows. It is essentially a spectacle orchestrated by local power to create democratizing illusions that end up convincing the urbanites of the change—a change that is idolized with the cult of a showcase spirit. The notion of "self-esteem" has been the

rhetorical formula under which the power and its disciples end up joining the commercial magic of local power and the state. The logic of a "tourist production" is the key to understanding urban renovation in the case of Guayaquil. The control, security, and privatization of public space go along with the creation of simulacra of modernity solely for consumer pleasure, a pleasure that has never been very democratic.

To return to the questions asked at the beginning of the chapter, to ask about the meanings of citizenship that are constructed by the urban reform policies, in the case of Guayaquil, is to point to the emergence of a city based on the elimination of its own architectonic languages, the repetition of models of spatial reorganization that privilege physical renovation, the exacerbation of exclusionary population policies, and the radical privatization of public space. The urban renovation has meant the gradual elimination of public space and the silence that rules in the public sphere points to a parallel tendency. The result is "More City," but less citizenship.

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CULTURAL HERITAGE AND URBAN IDENTITY: SHARED MANAGEMENT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

SILVIA FAJRE

The words "cultural heritage" have many meanings and connotations, just like the cultural goods that make up our identity, that we inherited from our ancestors, and which we will leave in perpetuity to the generations to come. Cultural heritage should be recognized as a cultural good and that creates multiple interests. These interests are what the community recognizes and imbues with certain meanings. This is why it is unthinkable to have a merely technical definition of patrimony since heritage cannot be recognized and taken care of unless is it with and for the community. We have evolved from the conception of value based on the aesthetic, moving on to the historical, and arriving at the documentary and symbolic. Today it is possible to affirm that in recent years society has begun to understand the social value of cultural assets as an important part of the construction and strengthening of community identity.

It is important to explore the economic value and potential of patrimony to dynamize resources, create jobs, and further economic development. Heritage, a non-renewable good, is constructed in a capital through the diversity of society. It possesses an intrinsic social and cultural value to which economic value is added. It is important not only to protect heritage but to incorporate it into the cultural and economic development of a society. This incorporation should take place within a framework of sustainability of resources. The conservation, preservation, and sustainability of patrimony increases social capital by maintaining identity and collective memory at the local level, optimizing the internal relationships of the social fabric, and creating jobs and wealth. Sustained heritage revitalizes degraded or non-productive uses and improves the urban commercial supply in general in order to achieve a city that attracts the citizens and visitors.

The delay in getting this topic on the political agenda of Argentina led to a great dispersion of efforts and an erratic, confusing policy. The results of these erratic attempts are fragmentary in their focus because many of them are subsumed by different areas, are discontinuous through time, suffer random development according to the importance placed on each

advance, with strong backward movement. However, today we can affirm that a level of consciousness of patrimonial value is present in the management of the state and in the interests of intermediary and private organizations. In this chapter, I will outline some of the efforts made in the city of Buenos Aires to promote the conservation of our cultural heritage and make it profitable and sustainable.

A patrimonial resource accompanied by interactive cultural management is presented on the market as cultural supply through promotion and commercialization channels. Once incorporated in the market, it is appropriated as a cultural product by citizens and tourists. This incorporation in the market requires measures that articulate the interests and benefits of the actors involved in function of the search for proven social demand. To the extent that the interests of those who are benefited by management and those who promote and pay for it complement each other, the process will guarantee the sustainability of the resource and its expansion in direct relation to the magnitude and value of the patrimony.

The protection and increase in patrimony as social inheritance and citizen identity requires that the cultural products attain:

- Sustainability. They must be able to recuperate and protect themselves. They must be economically dynamic since this is what will sustain them throughout time. They also require forms of exterior support.
- Attractiveness. It is important to support the singularity and quality of the characteristics of cultural products. This attractiveness should be based on authenticity and originality.
- Profitability. These products should be able to generate resources. There should be a good profitability-investment equation and clearly express positive balances in order to be considered profitable.

In Buenos Aires, different areas of government have coordinated to take advantage of the opportunities that cultural heritage present for our city. Buenos Aires is a city with actions and strategies to support the prolific cultural activity and rich urban heritage of the city. It has programs that propose to organize, articulate, and stimulate acts and initiatives related to the production of cultural goods and with the offerings available for visitors and inhabitants. These programs are aimed at the whole city while some proj-

ects focus specifically on one area of concentrated patrimony—the historic areas of San Telmo and Montserrat.

These programs propose a new form of administration. The neighborhood user is understood not only as the recipient of the plan but as a subject who participates in decision-making and is, therefore, consulted and integrated in different ways during different periods. This gives these programs a territorial aspect that is important to ensuring their permanence.

The programs are executed jointly by the government of the city of Buenos Aires, intermediary associations, other local and national institutions, external organizations, and neighbors in general. This creates a greater level of participation and responsibility for the different actors involved. The aim is to create more open mechanisms that allow the available resources to be maximized. The strengthening of the social framework is an important part of the benefits. The policies of the Under Secretary of Cultural Patrimony have encouraged numerous programs focusing on the city's cultural potential. The search for sustainability, the potential of the attractions, and profitability of the cultural and patrimonial supply has been the focus of these initiatives, three of which I will explore in greater detail below.

The Noteable Bars Program

The notable bars of Buenos Aires are part of the identity of the city. This was the motivation for the Program for the Protection and Promotion of Notable Cafes, Bars, Pool Halls, and Confectioner's Shops in the city of Buenos Aires, which is based on Law Number 35, which establishes: "A bar, pool hall, or confectioner's shop is considered notable, insofar as this Law is concerned, when it is related to cultural events or activities of meaning; the age, architectonic design, or relevance of which gives it its own value." This law created by the Bar Commission, establishes the institutions involved— Executive Department, legislature, and business representatives[1]—and for-

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1. The different entities include the Secretary of Culture; the Under Secretary of Cultural Patrimony; the Under Secretary of Tourism; the Commission for the Preservation of Cultural Patrimony; the General Office of Patrimony; the Commission of Culture and Social Communication; the Commission for Economic Development, Employment, and Mercosur; thr Commission on Tourism and Sports; and business organizations tied to the sector.

wards the objective of using public-private partnerships to rescue and protect places that belong to the collective memory and form part of the everyday life of the city, contribute to valuing these assets, disseminate the diversity of spaces, of revitalize these important places.

It is very difficult to protect a use if its self-sustainability is not strengthened. Therefore, the Program lays out the following areas of action: dissemination, promotion, and undertaking cultural activities; authorization of subsidies, consulting, and execution of works; and marketing consultation. Dissemination, through localization plans, pamphlets in each bar in Spanish and English, the notable bars book (second edition), signs, and posters are very important to position the bars in the collective imagination.

To encourage a loyal clientele loyal and cultivate a new clientele as well, art exhibitions that change monthly have been established in recent years in these establishments. The kind of exhibit depends on the profile of each place; the city government pays the artists and provides funds for the necessary technical aspects (sound and light, for example). These efforts make the bar a new cultural attraction and mean that neighbors can enjoy quality art in their neighborhoods while the artists gain greater visibility.

There have been technical consultations to value to buildings and subsidies for improvements. These include tasks such as diagnostics, technical sheets, and work control in some bars and removing pathologies in others. With respect to marketing advice, this line of action has been vital since many bars cannot afford to hire marketing firms. The city government hired a specialist to analyze the different strengths and weaknesses of these bars and improve their sustainability. There are three main benefits: valuing tangible and intangible patrimony through the use of subsidies, technical, and professional advice; the relationship between public and private action in shared management; the important dynamizing action on the economy by the creation of activities and consulting in marketing to re-position the bars. The effectiveness of the program is seen in the immediate desire for bars and artists to be incorporated into the program. In some cases, the artists who were convoked by the city were re-hired by the bars themselves. It is interesting to note that bars that did not participate in the program are now repeating the mode of artistic programming in their locales because it was so successful.

THE OPEN STUDIO PROGRAM

The Open Studio Program is a multidisciplinary festival of arts. Since November of 2000, it has taken place in six neighborhoods in the city. The objective of the program is to promote the formidable cultural energy of a neighborhood giving it greater visibility and creating a community space where artists and the public have the opportunity to come together and exchange experiences. Local and foreign artists participate. The shows, which are organized by prominent curators, are recognized as an experience of different generations where consecrated and emergent groups come together. With activities for the public, artists, and neighbors, each program is extremely versatile.

The main aspect of the event is the opening of artists' studios in the neighborhood to the public. Studios are accessed through tours with specialized guides. There are contemporary art exhibitions, urban interventions, video art, and experimental film alongside works in progress in dance, theater, poetry, and debate. Fashion shows, design fairs, magazines, and independent music labels sponsoring live music area another aspect of the festival. To date, the Open Studio Program has taken place in San Telmo in 2000, Palermo and La Boca in 2001, Abasto and San Telmo/Montserrat in 2002, and Retiro in 2003, where there were 250,000 people present. In 2004, the Program took place in the Avenida de Mayo and Congress neighborhood.

The Open Study Program sought to bring together the cultural capital of a territory to give neighborhood activity mass projection. While local life is the focus point, the objective is to integrate new publics from different interest groups and generations. This program acquires more depth with each event and has now become part of the city's artistic calendar, which includes the majority of people involved in artistic production. At the same time, it is an excellent window on new activities and a good vehicle to create an audience for the arts. The effect produced by the Open Studio Program in a particular territory is not limited to the time period in which the event is carried out because it inspires activities and creates new ties between actors.

PLAN FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE HISTORIC ZONE

The historic area is an urban sector with patrimonial and symbolic value; it is an important part of the history and memory of our country. This urban

memory makes the area relevant for the city and for the country as a whole. It is a valuable physical base for the construction of memory for the inhabitants. There is growing community interest in conserving the patrimony of the historic zone. The central location of cultural resources in the country gives the sector a distinctive character and strong tourist and economic potential.

The whole sector has a sustained state policy, formulated through the General Office of the Historical District, within the Under Secretary of Cultural Patrimony of the Government of Buenos Aires. This is expressed in the Management Plan, which was first implemented in 1989 and deals with patrimonial as well as social and economic questions. The Plan has an integral vision and not only acts on physical space but also promotes cultural activities for revitalization. It is fundamentally based on two interdependent structural aspects: urban norms that define the possibilities for state action, where instruments to protect patrimony are established, and use is regulated; and the urban project and its management, which defines strategies for intervention in the sector through programs, subprograms, and specific projects.

The main objectives of the Management Plan are to revitalize the central and strategic area for the development of the city, improving the quality of life of its inhabitants; improve the feeling of identity and belonging; and strengthen the historic area as a resource for cultural tourism. Three of the main objectives for the conservation of the historic zone are sustainability, attractiveness, and profitability. Revitalization and reactivation are considered central to sustainability.

The Management Plan includes programs to raise consciousness on the topic of patrimony; to improve the environment of urban space; to conservation and value patrimonial buildings; promote economic and socio-cultural activities; and implement the School Workshop Program and programs for residential consolidation and community facilities and services. These programs aim to establish more open mechanisms of administration and allow for the available resources to be optimized and for the participation of all the actors involved. Strengthening the social fabric is an important part of the benefits.

RESULTS OF SHARED MANAGEMENT

The concept of patrimonial value in protected areas and not only in valuable buildings makes us understand that the policies aimed at sustainabili-

ty should bring together all the variables necessary for vitality. The impact of the programs described above is clearly geo-referenced and, therefore, creates territorial effects. To evaluate the territorial impact, the most emblematic area in the city, the polygon of the historic area, is taken as an example. The policy of patrimonial administration of the area and actions to strengthen and add value aimed at sustainability allow us to establish some conclusions.[2]

The vitality of the whole historic area depends on three components: residential, cultural, and commercial activities. We see the greatest indices of vitality when all three are related. The contribution of the residential elements is a plus that broadens hourly uses, daily consumption, and pedestrian movement.

The existence of the Integral Management Plan speaks to sustained planning. Some of the incentives created by the Under Secretary for Cultural Patrimony and the Secretary for Economic Development include free consultations to improve building façades, proposals for illumination of public and private buildings, and subsidies and lines of credit for small businesses in the sector. Annual cultural and recreational activities are also created and promoted.

Measuring the variation of growth of locales has been an important instrument to evaluate the effects that the activities and investments—such as those described in this chapter—produce on a territory. The three programs presented a synthesis of the model carried out by the Under Secretary of Cultural Patrimony. The programs undertaken in Buenos Aires demonstrate that patrimony and cultural heritage constitute elements of identity and, at the same time, economic capital that creates productive activities and mobilizes resources.

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2. These come from a study undertaken by the Program for Management of Patrimony as an Economic Resources (GEPRE, in Spanish) with the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Economic Development (CEDEM, in Spanish).

CHAPTER 9
QUITO: THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW AGE

Diego Carrión Mena

Introduction

The Overall Environment of Development and Urbanization

During the last decades and at the beginning of the 21st century, humanity faces great, accelerated, and continuous changes. Among other phenomena, technical and scientific evolution has meant a shift from the industrial economy to another, based on the ability to apply and develop knowledge, in constant innovation.

The new age of civilization is expressed in the invasion of three phenomena that influence the economic, cultural, and politic dynamic of contemporary societies: the globalization of the economy, the knowledge society, and the emergence of the city-region.

Contemporary Geopolitics and the City-Region

In the overall environment, we have observed substantial changes being experienced by the nation-state, which are expressed in two phenomena: regionalization (which responds to the demands of autonomy for cities and regions) and supranationalization (which provides regulatory frameworks for globalization). There is an obvious emergence of a subnational power: the exhaustion of the central administration of the state, the city-region as a space for democratic governance, and innovative districts in the new circuits of the world economy.

Cities in Contemporary Society
It is broadly recognized that cities and regions will be the engines of development in the 21st century. Large cities are nodes of advanced infrastructure, complex networks of flows of information, capital, merchandise, and people. This is how cities organize and sustain the global economy.

To achieve an adequate insertion in the new global tendencies, the city-regions are forced to relate to global systems of flow; qualify their human

resources, infrastructure, and services to create conditions that attract investment, create jobs, increase exports, and assure the quality of life for the whole community; and, to govern with the co-responsibility and co-participation of all the social and institutional actors and municipalities that modify their traditional roles.

Processes of Urbanization

The process of urbanization in Latin America, associated with changes in the rural area and with the industrialization of the urban base, sped up migratory flows to the cities in the mid-20th century. The demographic map of the region changed drastically and now, at the beginning of the 21st century, we live in highly urbanized societies. Almost three quarters of the population of Latin America lives in cities. Due to the speed of the demographic changes, economic models, and the inability of the public sector to attend to the demands of the new urban population, cities have accumulated a variety of different problems.

The problems resulting from urbanization include the growth of social inequality and poverty, a lack of basic services such as water and sewage, the precariousness of housing solutions, the increase in pollution, inadequate solutions for urban transit needs, limited coverage and quality of education and health services, increase in insecurity, and difficulties in governance.

Local Governments and Economic and Social Development

The New Role of Municipalities Facing Contemporary Challenges

At the outset of the 21st century, municipalities must overcome outmoded patterns and roles and must modify and complement their role as simply providing goods and services and become real local governments promoting the integral development of their territories. They must promote the development of centers of production and distribution of knowledge. Finally, they must create conditions so that the creativity and the capacity for innovation of people, businesses, and institutions allow for the accelerated development of local society.

Dimensions of Local Development

Local development consists of a process of growth and structural change that encompasses three dimensions economic, socio-cultural, and political-

administrative dimension. In terms of the economic, local businesspeople efficiently use the factors of production, increase productivity, and improve market competitiveness. The socio-cultural realm must strengthen local institutions and creating relationships of confidence that serve as a base for development. Finally, the policies and actions of local government must create an environment favorable to production and encourage development.

Strategic Planning

To confront the challenges of urbanization and the new conditions of the environment requires taking action now with a long-term vision, in coordination with all the urban actors. The traditions and experiences of Latin America demonstrate that physical planning alone has not been enough to confront the problems of cities. Therefore, it is necessary to use strategic projects that aim to solve synergetic processes of economic and social development and it is necessary that the local population participate in these processes.

   In 2004, the Metropolitan District of Quito, through the Municipality, encouraged an initiative that has allowed for a long-term Strategic Plan. The "Equinox 21 Plan, Quito toward the Year 2025," is a plan coordinated with the society of Quito. It is a navigational map that transcends municipal administrations and has been sanctioned as a Metropolitan Ordinance. Mayor Paco Moncayo began his second term as mayor of Quito in January of 2005 with an agenda established in the "2005–2009 Government Plan, Quito toward the Bicentennial," which is outlined in the Equinox 21 Plan.

Governance in Democracy

Citizen Participation as an Engine for Local Development
The new challenges that cities must face to achieve greater equality, solidarity, and efficiency require deeper democracy. To achieve this, the municipality should assume leadership to promote and sustain citizen participation. The citizenry—in all its diversity—should become a central actor in planning and decision-making. Transparent systems to formulate and apply public policy, with accountability and social oversight, must be established.

System of Participatory Administration
Since 2000, the municipality of the Metropolitan District of Quito has used the System of Participatory Administration with the aim of establishing mechanisms that deepen democracy and create co-responsibility and social co-participation in the management of local development. The system includes meetings in Quito, territorial meetings (by zones, sectors, and neighborhoods), social and thematic councils (metropolitan and zonal), and meetings with corporations (public-private participation).

The Association of Public and Private Actors
To confront the challenges facing Quito, the successful processes of association and public-private participation in strategic projects must be supported. This involves the public sector (municipality, provincial government, and institutions of the national government), the private business sector (chambers of production and business and professional guilds), the academic sector (research institutions, universities, and other educational centers) and organized civil society

Quito's Major Challenges

The main challenge is to have the whole population of the Metropolitan District of Quito living in conditions of quality, equality, and solidarity. The challenge for the municipality is create this development in a framework of democratic governance, where respect and dialogue reign as ways to resolve conflicts.

The national and international environment demands that Quito advance quickly toward the improvement in efficiency to develop conditions of competitiveness and for which the local government should promote and facilitate investment, business, and productivity so that the conditions to be able increase the quality and quantity of jobs are created.

The major challenges that Quito will face fall into four major areas: economic development and productivity, social development and well-being, territory and environment, and democratic governance. Quito's main challenges to encouraging economic development and local productivity are to encourage the endowment of infrastructure and facilities and to elevate the level of preparation of human resources and adapt the institutional framework in strategic sectors, such as tourism, agri-exportation production, high technol-

ogy, education, culture, and health. It is also important to develop facilities and services aimed at strengthening human capital and improvements in the quality of life, to have a healthy and educated population; improve the conditions of attention to the vulnerable population; develop innovative capacities; increase self-esteem and sense of belonging; and develop the potential of social capital. In terms of territory and environment, it is imperative to develop and manage the territory to consolidate environments favorable for human achievement and for the development of productive activities that lead to create quality spaces and environments; overcome the imbalance in the development of the territory; improve conditions for urban transit; sustainable management and environmental control; sufficient endowment of potable water and basic sanitation; and protect and conserve historic patrimony. Finally, in terms of democratic governance, Quito must achieve the creation of conditions favorable to the development of an active citizenry to deepen democracy and governance, based on tolerance, respect, dialogue, and solidarity. At the same time, levels of participation and citizen control should be improved, mechanisms of transparency strengthen and control of municipal administration and create consciousness and a community sense of responsibility.

Some Examples

In Quito, several successful projects have been developed recently that include the sustained participation of the public and private sectors and create positive dynamics for local development since they articulate diverse interests related to the collective interest. Associative projects in Quito have allowed for the promotion of important investments for the local economy and to create bases for stable job creation in the District. The experience and practice of the municipality of Quito in the development of associative schemes for substantive projects is an important pillar of democratic management and cements the processes of adequate governance. Some examples of large strategic projects that have been developed with public-private participation in Quito are the new Quito airport, the Pichincha cable-car, the promotion and development of tourism, environmental management (metropolitan parks, recuperation of rivers and ravines, forestation, vehicle inspection), citizen security, recuperation of the historic center, the METROBUS Q system of public transportation, promotion of housing programs, health services (ConsaludQ), and the Mitad del Mundo Tourism Center.

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PART III: THE TIES BETWEEN HISTORIC CENTERS AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

CHAPTER 10
THE CENTER DIVIDED

Paulo Ormindo de Azevedo

The policies implemented in the historic centers of Latin America date to at least 40 years ago. Many advances have been made in this period of time including investments that surpass $100 million in cities such as Quito, Mexico City, Salvador de Bahia, and Santo Domingo. The results, however, differ according to the effort made and the amount of money invested. This movement in Latin America has been compared to what happened in Europe in the same time period, where the historic centers, after a crisis in the 1960s, today are perfectly integrated with their cities.

The reasons that this has happened are complex and have not been studied adequately. The problem of the Latin American city and, consequently, the city center is very different from the situation of European cities. This explains the lack of success in some experiences to recuperate cities in Latin America that have been based on European models introduced by international organizations with the cooperation of local elites. One of the most urgent tasks at this time is to evaluate Latin American experiences in this field to determine what has worked well and what has not. This will help us determine how to carry out future interventions.

Certain factors occurring in the region—lessened demographic pressure, the revolution of electronic media, globalization—have opened up new opportunities for Latin American cities and their centers. But these factors alone are not able to change anything. We cannot forget that the major technological advances of the last 100 years were appropriated exclusively by Latin American elites to carry out their project of modernization without any social changes—a fact born out by the latest social indicators.

Changes are going to depend on the democratization of our societies and on the way in which the lowest socio-economic levels become conscious of these opportunities and fight for them. At any rate, there are old urban problems that have not been resolved and an enormous social demand that has been repressed, both of which are going to require a lot of time to be overcome.

To discuss our city centers, their development and governance, we cannot limit ourselves to a purely local vision. We have to take our national

problems—such as the rusty machinery of the state, the poor distribution of wealth, regional inequities, and social conflicts—into account. We have to be aware of truly global problems, such as economic and technological dependency, protectionism, and cultural homogenization—factors that exercise strong pressure on our cities. Since the solutions to these problems are not within our reach, we know that all of the advances made at the local level are only going to solve part of the problem.

HISTORIC CENTER: A CONCEPT IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION

The concepts of cultural good and historic center appear for the first time in an international document in the Convention of The Hague, UNESCO, 1954.

This document classifies cultural goods in three categories:

a) Goods that are important to the cultural heritage of a people;
b) Buildings the principal purpose of which is to conserve and show cultural goods as defined above;
c) Centers that comprise a considerable number of cultural goods as defined above, which are called "cultural centers".

The 1964 Venice Letter does not distinguish the historic center from the rest of the city when it defines "monument": "The notion of monument encompasses both the isolated architectonic creation as well as the urban or landscape environment that comprises a testament to a particular civilization, from an important evolution or a historical event." The 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage and the 1976 UNESCO Recommendation for the Preservation of Historic Groupings and the Function in Contemporary Life prefer to use the phrase "historic groupings."

But the 1977 UNESCO/UNDP Colloquium on the Preservation of Historic Centers Faced with the Growth of Contemporary Cities has the merit of refocusing the question toward Latin America, and defines historic center in the following way:

"This colloquium defines historic centers as those settlements of humans strongly conditioned by a physical structure from the past,

recognizable as representatives of the evolution of a people. As such, they consist of settlements that are integral, from towns to cities, as well as those settlements that, due to growth, today constitute part or parts of a larger structure. Historic centers, for themselves and for their monumental structures they contain, represent not only an unquestionable cultural value but also an economic and social one as well. Historic centers are not only cultural patrimony for all of humanity but also belong in a particular way to all the social sectors that inhabit them."

The International Letter for the Conservation of Historic Cities, Washington, ICOMOS, 1987, maintains that generality and ambiguity of the concept when it declares: "This Letter refers to historic urban areas, large and small, including cities, towns, and centers, or historic neighborhoods, with their natural or constructed environments which have, in addition to historical quality, the particular values of traditional urban civilizations."

Another regional document, the 1992 Letter from Veracruz, Mexico, that proposes Criteria for a Policy of Action in the Historic Centers of Ibero-America, defines the question in the following way: "We understand a historic center to be an urban area of irreproducible character in which distinct monuments to the life of a people leave their fingerprint, forming the basis for their identity and social memory."

As an operational instrument, the concept of historic center is not clear. Does it include a whole city, just its center, or even areas that were never central? Furthermore, the "term urban center designates a geographic place and its social content. Indeed the distinction between one and the other is difficult, but it is true that the confusion easily becomes, on the contrary, a connotation, that is, that by recognizing the theoretical disjunction, there is a tendency to suppose that in practice the social content designated by such a definition is located in one or in several concrete points, which is the same as a fixation on the social content of urban center itself, ignoring the whole relationship with the whole area of the structure"(Castells 1976: 262).

Even when the expression refers to an effective center, upon qualifying it as a historic center we are implicitly denying the historicity of the rest of the city. This is reflected in practice, in the adoption of a norm of preservation for the so-called historic center and the deregulation of the rest of the city, which is supposed to not have historical value. A city—whether old or new,

ugly or beautiful—is historic. For this reason, perhaps it would be more appropriate to call those preindustrial urban areas "traditional urban areas." In this way, we reserve the expression "traditional center" to places that have had a central function, even if they have lost some of their centrality.

At any rate, considering the traditional center as a space differentiated from the city, in general with a defined urban function and under norms emanating from the central government, which is the entity that, in general, promotes its classification, when it is not directly controlled by a central organ, makes its urban integration more difficult. The socio-economic dynamic of the urban center presupposes nimble management closely integrated with the management of the whole city.

In Europe, for the same reasons, the expression "historic center" is not often used. French legislation designates these areas as protected sectors and promotes their renovation through urban planning in conjunction with municipal governments.[1] This is a tendency observed throughout Europe, but it still has not been adopted frequently in Latin America.

THE CENTER DIVIDED

Except for honorable exceptions, traditional centers in the region continue to be sectors that are occupied by low-income populations living in inhumane conditions and with public spaces occupied by the informal economy. However, the principal monuments of the city and the seats of the local and/or central governments are located there. In this way, the traditional center continues to be the symbolic center and the force of integration in the city. However, this rich heritage and culture contrasts with the poverty of those who are condemned to live and work there.

The large corporations tied to transnational economic flows construct their large stores and office towers, consolidating a center of exchange and coordination of decentralized activities. In this way, they create a new center that carries out functions very similar to the concept of the central business district, which has been much studied by American sociologists. On the one hand, there is the traditional center, which is occupied by people from the lowest socio-economic levels. On the other, there is the new busi-

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1. Law 62-903, Law Malraux from 8/4/62, and Decree 63-691 from 7/13/63.

ness center, where all the activities coordinating the most dynamic sector of the economy are located. In this way, a divided center emerges—one center for the informal economy and the popular classes and another for the formal economy and the elites.[2]

The two sub-centers are not exclusive; they have complementary functions. The traditional center has the function of integration while the new center has the function of coordination. The products sold by street vendors are mainly industrial and are supplied by large stores. The middle class as well as the lower classes supply themselves alternately in the two sub-centers. In reality, the divided center is a reflection of the divided city that Milton Santos and Aníbal Quijano discuss (Santos 1967; Quijano 1970).

The traditional center continues to be the space of "otherness"; social, ethnic, and cultural interaction; popular festivals; and parades. But it is, at the same time, a space of explicit conflicts, such as protests and battles between the police and street merchants, and implicit conflicts, such as tension between landlords and tenants, between the formal and informal economies, between municipal and street economies.

Urban policies implemented in these cities deliberately ignore the social problems of the traditional center. They do not address property regularization, improvements in the quality of life, job creation, and professional qualifications. The policies of the center are promotional; they concentrate mainly on the recuperation of public spaces, including gardens and parks, parking spaces, and sidewalks. This is why they have had little success.

What is the origin of these conflicts and how can they be reduced? It is important to remember that since World War II economic development in the region has concentrated on capital and technology, using less and less labor. The competition of industrial products disorganizes and distorts other precapitalist forms of production in the countryside, provoking a great exodus to the big cities and leaving small rural areas abandoned.

In addition to the migrants from rural areas, there are also the excluded members of urban areas who reproduce at high rate. This enormous contingent of population without access to employment and services and industrial products invent new services and products as survival strategies.

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2. In truth, this happens in the big cities. In the small and medium-sized cities of less than 500,000 inhabitants, this division has not been verified and it is still possible to implement an urban development model with a unitary center.

They collect aluminum and cardboard, wash and guard cars; they are shoe shiners, street vendors, prostitutes, or simply beggars.

Since these activities take place through face to face contact this population gathers along streets and in plazas in the traditional centers where transportation stations and popular markets offer their products and services. Inevitably, many of the buildings in the center are turned into store houses for this merchandise and housing for the informal merchants, due to the convenience of living close to their place of work.[3]

The existence of two peripheries completes the division of the city. On one hand, there are the large slum neighborhoods and *favelas* in inaccessible, unattractive areas that have no infrastructure. On the other hand, there are upper middle class neighborhoods located in the areas with the best natural attributes, such as beaches, on the edge of natural parks, and elevated areas. It seems impossible to change this layout of the urban ecology in Latin America. All attempts to eradicate or move marginal neighborhoods undertaken since the 1970s have failed. Attempts to reurbanize with verticalization have not been successful either for the simple fact that these areas are already too dense.

The only projects that have been successful are property regularization programs, work on infrastructure, and improvements in marginal sectors, such as the Proyecto Favela-Barrio in Río de Janeiro and similar programs carried out in other Latin American capitals in the 1990s. The problems of traditional centers—with obsolete infrastructure, slums, and streets occupied by street vendors—are not very different from the problems encountered in the poor periphery. These areas can only be recuperated through the regularization of tenancy in the residences, recycling the infrastructure, recuperating residences, and the regularization of street vendors, as some cities in the region have begun to do.

But to intervene in these sectors it is necessary to keep in mind what happened in the last century:

- The urban bourgeoisie that originally occupied these areas migrated to peripheral urbanizations and no longer has a sense of belonging to the traditional center nor the ability to promote its rehabilitation. The lack of conservation of these buildings is due to the current occupants.

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3. On this matter, see Azevedo 1985:147–161.

- These centers have suffered a double change in this period. In the first place, the primitive occupants are substituted by poorer social strata, in large part made up of migrants from the interior. Secondly, there is an intense process of degradation of the buildings in the center and occupation of public spaces by street vendors.
- The majority of buildings in these centers are in disrepair. These buildings have been successively subdivided and rented out as sublets.
- The legal status of these buildings is very complicated. Apart from a great concentration of property, two or three generations of heirs have not done the necessary inheritance processes and, for this reason, it is very difficult to regularize the buildings. In these circumstances, expropriation is practically the only option for any intervention.

If we want to preserve these areas, this vicious circle must be broken. This will be difficult to achieve without state intervention. It is necessary to recycle the infrastructure, re-organize property, consolidate and distribute the architectonic spaces, and introduce new functions.

WHAT GOOD ARE EARTHQUAKES

Interventions in cities and traditional centers in the region have always been motivated by external reasons. In the same way that the first major operations to rescue traditional centers in Europe only came about due to destruction caused by aerial bombing in World War II, in Latin America natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tornadoes, provoke the first attempts to preserve cities and traditional centers.

The Andean region and the Caribbean are the two regions most subject to natural disasters. Many cities in the region have been erased from the map by earthquakes, such as the earthquakes that destroyed Antigua, Guatemala in 1773, or Riobamba and Otavalo, in Ecuador. Some cities have been hit several times by earthquakes, such as Arequipa, in 1600, 1687, and 1868; Cuzco, in 1650, 1950, and 1986; and Quito, in 1755, 1797, 1859, and 1987. Since the colonial period, the reconstruction of monuments after earthquakes has served to perfect construction and design techniques and to make structures more resistant to natural disasters. The light, flexible round coverings used on the dry Pacific coast were

developed in this way after the 1746 earthquake in Lima. The same is true of the multiple cupolas of churches in the Peruvian-Bolivian high plateau.

The same thing occurs in the second half of the 20th century in the cities of the region that are hit by natural disasters. A violent earthquake that happened in May 1950 in Cuzco led to the first UNESCO mission to provide aid to a historic city. The head of the mission, George Kubler, who was one of the most renowned historians of Ibero-American art, laid out a rigorous preservation zone in the city and in doing so created the first preservation norms for a historic Ibero-American city (Kubler 1953). The Peruvian government was not only able to restore monuments and reconstruct destroyed housing but also encouraged sustainability in the city, developing large economic projects in the region, such as electrification and agricultural modernization. In order to do this, it creates the Corporation for Reconstruction and Promotion of Cuzco, which is maintained by a national tax on tobacco products. This is the first attempt in Latin America to rehabilitate and create sustainability in a traditional center through urban and territorial planning mechanisms.

Popayán, Colombia was shook by a violent earthquake in March of 1983. Practically all of the large monuments as well as whole neighborhoods and housing complexes were seriously damaged. The commotion over what had happened led to restoration of the city in detail, in a process that lasted for a decade.

Perhaps one of the most interesting experiences related to natural disasters in cities happened as a result of the tragic earthquakes that hit Mexico City on September 19, 1985 and killed 20,000 people. In the first hours after the incident and in the following days, a network of neighborhood associations took control of the situation, surprising the civil defense corps and the authorities. This allowed their representatives to have an important role in the reconstruction plans in the affected areas of the traditional center. For the first time in the region, a traditional center was recuperated as a function of community needs and not based the interests of outsiders, such as tourism or saving buildings for families who had abandoned them three or four generations previously.

The emergency and the magnitude of the human drama forced the Mexican authorities and the Inter-American Development Bank to allow the expropriation of 3,569 buildings and community participation in the design and development of the project, which allowed 90,000 families to own their own homes. Seven months after the earthquake, the Technical Committee for Democratic Decision-Making, brought together the four main actors that had

been acting separately: the neighborhood associations, governmental housing agencies, universities like UNAM and UAM, and groups of independent consultants tied to social movements.[4]

Due to the emergency situation, some old buildings, which could have been rehabilitated, were lost to new construction. However, a second stage of the project, to deal with 12,670 families that were not included in the first stage, allowed for the conscientious restoration of buildings for housing and social purposes. This experience alerted national and international agencies to the seriousness of the social problems of these areas and demonstrated the feasibility of working with the residents of these areas.[5]

A third earthquake has served to destroy one of the most consistent traditional center renovation programs in Latin America. I refer to the earthquake that damaged the majority of monuments and houses in Quito in 1987. The ability of the municipality to quickly mobilize the central government and international cooperation agencies was key in aiding the great monuments and in beginning the process of the systematic rehabilitation of the traditional center through urban planning.[6]

The search for an alternative model for intervention in these areas, one that overcomes the vision of an isolated monument as an absolute value apart from its social, economic, and historical context, has helped consolidate the process of urban-territorial planning that takes culture into account.

THE INVENTION OF THE HISTORIC CENTER

Except for circumstantial interventions for commemorative reasons or natural disasters, until the second half of the 1970s, there was no policy in the region for traditional centers except for passive legislation that prohibited the demolition of buildings without contributing to their conservation. Urban policies ignored traditional centers. They sought to mitigate social tensions by introducing improvements in the peripheries, with the help of central governments

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4. Alternative housing in popular neighborhoods: documentation and evaluation of projects undertaken by independent organizations alter the September 1985 earthquake in Mexico City. Mexico City: UAM-X, SEDUE-2 1988.
5. Emerging housing in Mexico City, second phase. Mexico City: Trust for Program on Emerging Housing 1988.
6. Historic Center of Quito: Problems and Perspectives. Quito: Municipality of Quito, Andalucia Board 1990.

and international agencies. This financing allowed for large infrastructure and public housing programs throughout the region. Nevertheless, such programs have not solved the problems, nor have they reinforced social cohesion, with immediate results seen in urban insecurity.

The center of the city was left to market forces. In cities where economic development took place rapidly, the centers were almost completely stripped of their traditional characteristics and reconstructed. Such are the cases of Sao Paulo and Caracas, where restrictions on the transformation of the historic centers were imposed and, as a result, new business centers were created close to the traditional centers, creating cities with divided centers.

With the promulgation of the OAS Quito Norms in 1968 and the intensification of the technical missions of UNESCO and the OAS in Latin America, the countries of the region wake up to the notion of the economic potential of their monumental heritage, particularly the monumental or historic center (OEA 1968).

Inspired by European experiences, cultural tourism became the word of the day not only for the OAS and UNESCO. In the Quito Norms, cultural tourism is presented as a lifesaver, not only for the historic centers but for the very economies of the countries of the region. With this inspiration, some large urban and regional development projects were undertaken, such as the so-called Esso Plan for the historic center of Santo Domingo from 1967 and the Copesco Plan (1969 and 1975), for the development of a 500-kilometer tract of the Andean mountain range in Peru between Cuzco and Puno, with a $72.4 million budget financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (Pérez Monta 1967; Azevedo 1988). In Brazil, the Ministries of Planning and Education and Culture created the Northeast Historic Cities Program in 1973 (Santa'Ana 1995).

These attempts at regional development based on cultural tourism did not work in Peru or Brazil or in other countries, where there were similar projects on a smaller scale. It is undeniable, however, that these programs led to the restoration of many monuments. Their error was to suppose that the introduction of a new activity would be able to change the region without addressing the real issues of socio-economic development (Azevedo 1992: 17–41).

During the decade of the 1980s, with less ambitious intentions, central organizations for preservation working with some municipalities tried to transform traditional centers into tourist zones. With few resources and in

the midst of the so-called "lost decade" in Latin America, these projects were not successful either.

A Change of Scenery

Hardoy and Gutman attributed the problems of traditional centers in the region to the impact of urbanization (1992). If there thesis is true, we have reason to believe that the worst has past. Indeed, between 1920 and 1980, the population of three cities in the region—Lima, Mexico City, and Bogota—was multiplied by 20, applying enormous pressure on their centers (Azevedo 1990). However, since the decade of the 70s, the birth and urbanization rates have been falling in the region. Today more than 75 percent of the population of the region lives in cities.

In the last few decades, migration trends have changed as well. Population flows have been directed toward Europe and the United States and, in some cases, back to the countryside, such as in the landless movement (Movimento Sem Terra) in Brazil. This has led to less pressure on the peripheries and centers of our cities.

This decreased pressure on urban peripheries led municipalities to begin to pay more attention to central areas. This greater interest in the center is also associated with the revolution in electronic media and globalization, which made the cities—and centers, in particular, where public space and monuments are concentrated—more visible.

City marketing is tied to so-called advanced capitalism. It had already appeared in the United States and Europe in the 1980s, with important projects in Baltimore and Barcelona. The phenomenon is repeated in Latin America in the 1990s. Some examples of such projects in the region are the Historic Center Rehabilitation Program in Quito, undertaken as a result of the 1987 earthquake; the Rehabilitation Program of Old Havana, executed by the Office of the Historian, after the crisis resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet bloc; the Program to Recuperate the Historic Center of Salvador de Bahia beginning in 1992; and the Plan to Recuperate the Plaza de Armas and Other Public Spaces in Metropolitan Lima, beginning in 1996.[7]

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7. On this matter, see Carrión 2001 and The Posible City: Lima, World Heritage Site. Lima 1999.

Even though they privileged traditional centers because of their high visibility and cultural density, these plans sought to sell the city as a whole, on the national and global level, not only as a site for tourism but also as a site for business and investment opportunities. These interventions are also associated with the promotion of the image of those people undertaking the projects—dynamic administrators and lovers of the culture—with enormous political ambition. In this way, we can see that city marketing is not far removed from political marketing.

While the objective of these projects is not against urban renovation, these projects tend to take a very scenic approach, using cosmetic, impressionist approaches, without confronting the true problems of these areas. The most consistent interventions, such as those undertaken in Quito and Havana, begin to address issues of social inclusion, including the rehabilitation of housing, construction of community centers, and regularization of informal vendors.

In other cases, these projects have concentrated on the recuperation of façades and the transformation of the traditional center, ousting the residents of the area and making the traditional center a big stage void of any meaning, aimed mainly at tourists. The artificial nature of this inevitably leads to a lack of sustainability in the area, as was evident in the case of Salvador de Bahia. In this city, the provincial government financed an expensive program of management, policing, maintenance, and culture for tourism, which deposits its resources in the hotels on the periphery of the city. The project continues to be maintained by the provincial government for political reasons as an area of popular entertainment with free musical shows.

As city marketing projects, it is undeniable that some of these projects have been successful. Even from a socio-economic point of view, their benefits are very unequal and are necessarily reflected in the traditional center but in the wealthy peripheries, where the main hotels and shopping centers are located. In some cases, however, there are positive urban outcomes. One of the major achievements of this new policy is the reappropriation of public spaces for the citizenry. This experience, begun in Lima in 1996 and repeated in Quito beginning in 2003, has demonstrated that the majority of informal street vendors have the ability to become formal small businesspeople and acquire a small shop in a popular shopping center created by the state. In Lima, 20,000 of these shops or stalls have been created with the participation of the private sector. But the displacement of a large num-

ber of street vendors from the historic center has created some conflicts (Guerrero 1999: 125–142).

In the case of Quito, the process has been negotiated for five years and one of the main concerns of the informal merchants—being able to stay in the center—has been addressed. In this way, 8,000 informal vendors have been relocated. Even those merchants who originally refused to participate in the program now demand to be included. This happens because the cost of remaining part of the informal economy—which includes street mafias as well as municipal and police fines—is now higher than participating in the formal economy, with its taxes and fees.

Another new aspect of these projects is that they are normally provincial or municipal initiatives. They tend to break with the official policies of the central preservation organizations and appear to be a response to the traditional policies of these areas, which focus exclusively on patrimony.

The proliferation of these programs in the region is also due to the financing offered by international agencies. The Inter-American Development Bank began financing large investments in tourism and patrimony in the region in 1994, such as the Prodetur ($80 million) and Monumenta projects ($50 million) in Brazil, and the rehabilitation of historic centers in Quito ($41 million), Montevideo ($28 million), and Buenos Aires ($18 million) (Rojas 2001: 15–22). All of this represented a major change in attitude by this and other agencies, which previously did not finance this type of project because it was considered to lack economic feasibility.

This change in actors also led to new management models. Traditionally the organisms that were in charge of preservation of the so-called historic centers were local departments of national institutions, with little autonomy and material and human resources. Due to pressure from the financing agencies, the models of management and administration for traditional centers are changing. In Quito, the Historic Center Corporation was created through public and private financing. Similar arrangements have been made with other Inter-American Development Bank financed projects. Such is the case of the Trust for Historic Center of Mexico City, which was completely privatized in the last municipal administration, with disturbing results.

The model adopted by the Cubans in Old Havana is a new model in the region. This new model began in 1982 and became law in 1994. The law transformed the center into a completely autonomous administrative and economic district that can levy taxes. The Office of the Historian, the enti-

ty that is responsible for the rehabilitation of Old Havana, charges a five percent tax on the gross profits of all the businesses for the rehabilitation of the area. Curiously, this model is very similar to the business improvement district model that came about 25 years ago in Canada and later was used throughout the United States. The business improvement district was originally made up of groups of businesspeople that voluntarily contributed to improve services and businesses in central areas. Later, the system evolved to include taxation by the municipality to benefit civil associations that administer these areas (Houston Jr. 1997).

In the case of Havana, a corporation, Habaguanex, has also been created with the ability to import, export, offer services, buy, reform, sell, and rent buildings. In this way, an enormous amount of resources are created for investment in infrastructure works and the restoration and rehabilitation of housing. Its administration, however, is very centered on the figure of the Historian of the City and depends on its relationships with the Council of Ministries. The model has functioned very well in Havana, but has had little success when applied to other cities.

New Opportunities for Governance

New perspectives are, without a doubt, being opened for our cities. The new factors include decreased demographic pressure, new actors in the management of rehabilitation program in traditional centers, a change in attitude toward the importance of offering quality of life and investment for the centers instead of just tourism, and, finally, new lines of financing for these projects.

We have to assume that we will continue to have a divided center—a traditional center for the whole population and an aseptic center for elite businesses. However, the two can be integrated. It must be kept in mind that the only way to renovate and create sustainability in the traditional center is by making true urban reforms that give greater control over land use and end the system of subletting buildings. It is necessary to turn these huge mansions, which are now run-down, into condominiums with apartments and stores, where the users of different social status are the owners and know it is important to conserve the buildings. Merchants in the informal economy must have access to shops in popular shopping centers and be liberated from the exploitation of street mafias.

This can only be achieved through a framework of democratic and participatory administration. However, we must recognize that this is a slow task, which must be undertaken by the whole community and by the residents of the sector, in particular. A tradition of centralism and authoritarianism from the colonial era concentrates power and economic resources in the hands of the central government and, to a lesser degree, the provincial government, leaving the municipalities without the resources to carry out the necessary projects and maintain a technical team. This situation also affects the relationship with the community—without which it is practically impossible to implement any program aiming to improve the quality of urban life.

There have been some improvements in the distribution of economic resources in recent years, but central governments have also transferred more responsibilities than resources to municipalities and many of these resources are already designated for certain investments decided on by the central government. Due to this lack of resources and community support, municipal power is weak, resulting is a great crisis of governance in the cities of the region.

Consequently, the planning process is also weak. Except in some provincial capitals, the majority of cities do not have planning offices. Small and medium-sized cities do not have the ability to maintain a reasonably qualified technical team and mayors view urban plans as a limitation of the decision-making power and ability to negotiate with local, provincial, and national political powers.

In Latin America, we do not have a long tradition of community participation, as in Anglo-Saxon countries. We have been accustomed since the colonial period to the crown providing everything; later, frequent periods of republican authoritarianism did not encourage participatory practices either. Even now, when Latin America is democratic, the public administrator fears citizen participation because he or she considers it more of a hindrance than an aid to governance.

In traditional centers, the problem is more serious because the current residents do not own the buildings but rather are tenants three or four times over. As such, they have no legitimacy to demand anything. They are often evicted by the owners or by the government itself in so-called urban reform interventions. The same occurs with the street vendors, due to the informal nature of their activity. Another possible actor, the private sector, has not demonstrated interest in these areas so far.

To complicate the situation, from a legal perspective there is an uncomfortable division of responsibilities between the central government, responsible for classification, and the municipal government, that regulates land use. We must also consider that preservation legislation in Latin America and the Caribbean is outdated, often from the 1930s, and aimed at the concept of the national monument as an absolute value. None of this legislation contemplates the social or economic aspects that urban centers present. In other words, preservation legislation in these centers does not take into account mechanisms of urban law, as does European legislation beginning in the 1970s. In this way, the traditional center is in a kind of limbo, neither local nor national, which produces a power vacuum.

In sum, there has been a lot of progress in traditional centers in the region. The errors and successes of this trajectory cannot be attributed solely to national and local entities because international agencies, without any knowledge of local problems, have often forced the adoption of models developed in countries with very different problems and histories. The most obvious example of this is cultural tourism.

Today there is more recognition of the fact that the solution to the problems of our traditional centers must involve the solutions to the problems that directly affect the local population, such as the poor living conditions and informal work. We must construct sustainable forms of development based on the economy of the center. For this reason, it is important to integrate the traditional and new centers in one administrative unit, strengthen housing opportunities, formalize the informal economy, and introduce dynamism in the traditional center.

From an academic perspective, it is important to analyze the experiences undertaken in the region, promote the exchange of ideas and experiences, and form a critical mass on the topic in order to encourage and aid new projects. Furthermore, these studies should be shared with the communities through publications and workshops because without the struggle of these communities, there cannot be stable, democratic, and participatory administration in our cities.

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CHAPTER 11
THE SYMBOLIC CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN REVITALIZATION: THE CASE OF QUITO, ECUADOR

LISA M. HANLEY AND MEG RUTHENBURG

INTRODUCTION

Urbanization is one of the most powerful and insistent emerging realities of the 21st century. Cities are the engines of economic growth and the agents of cultural and political transformations in developing countries. However, if they are not planned and governed well, their economic and social development roles cannot be optimized. Latin America is the most urbanized region of the developing world, with over 75 percent of the population living in urban areas (World Bank 2002). Nearly 70 percent of these urban residents live at or below the poverty line, with limited access to basic services. Growing numbers of these poor residents live in slums and squatter settlements. Residents are exposed to high environmental risks, limited access to services, inadequate solid waste management, deficient sewage and drainage, limited access to transport, congestion and poor hygiene due to overcrowded conditions and inadequate shelter. Many such areas are also subject to excessive violence and crime.

Generally slums and squatter settlements can be found in periurban areas or the outskirts of town. However many historic centers of Latin America have come to share these slum-like characteristics, as wealthy residents leave for newer accommodations where modern infrastructure and services are readily accessible. This paper will focus on the capital city of Ecuador, Quito, and will examine the urban renewal and revitalization process of the historic center with a view to the effects of land development and use and urban policy on all sectors of society, including marginalized groups.

This chapter will review the historical development of Quito to examine the impacts of the historic revitalization project on the contemporary city and its citizens. An overview of planning trends and models of urban reform in Latin America will be examined to determine how these projects fit into the broader Latin American experience. The case of Quito represents the constant dynamic tangle and struggle between the forces of planning and order and the informal sector. The renewal project of Quito has attempted to unify and recuperate a sense of local and national identity and pride. In addition, the project

attempted to clean up and formalize the informal sector, which dominated the historic center of Quito (CHQ). However, revitalizing and redeveloping the colonial areas may not benefit all sectors of society, particularly the urban poor. The benefits and costs of this project have yet to be properly examined, particularly for those on the periphery of society.

This chapter will explore the issues and actors involved in these processes, to include the symbolic consequences of the projects, particularly for the urban poor, the impacts on the informal sector, and on the drastic changes of land use. A concluding section will discuss the implications of this study for a general understanding of urban strategies, which seek to provide a favorable environment for the urban poor, particularly informal traders.

OVERVIEW OF PLANNING TRENDS: HISTORY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN CITY

Latin American cities have had as many as four principal periods of development: the Pre-Columbian period, colonial period and *Laws of the Indies*, the post-colonial period, and the industrial expansion. The roots of urbanization in Latin America are not recent, but rather have four centuries of urban history and problems.

The Pre-Columbian City

The Pre-Columbian civilizations of the Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas built flourishing cities throughout Latin America. Between 500 and 1500 the first inhabitants of Quito, the Quitus, settled in the valley that is now the modern day capital of Ecuador. It remained a settlement of the indigenous nation Quitu and was a principal economic and religious center of the region. Between 1470 and 1500, the Incan Empire began its conquest to the northern part of the Andes, and conquered the settlement of Quito. The Incan Empire, which by 1500 extended from Southern Columbia to Northern Chile and Argentina, was known as *Tawantinsuyo*.[1] The Empire was divided into four parts, with its center in Cuzco, Peru, and Quito as the center of the northern portion. After the invasion of the Incas, Quito's position as the central city of the northern part of the empire facilitated a strong relationship with Cuzco and resulted in

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1. Tawantisuyo is a Quechua word meaning four (tawa) nations or corners (suyo).

the spread of the Quechua language throughout Ecuador. It is important to note that the Incan planning style went beyond the physical layouts of a city and they were the first to practice economic planning in the Western Hemisphere; this lead to a high level of social development of Incan cities, including Quito. A number of factors contributed to the success of the Incan cities; communication, an emphasis on the general welfare of community rather than the individual, and economic planning were among some of the contributing factors.

The Colonial City

The Incan city was transformed to a colonial city after the Spanish conquest of the 16th century. The European colonial city was a functional city, serving as the center for trade and government, rather than an architectural work of art. During the colonial period, all urban functions were primarily related to imperial administration. The colonial city was a place where a representative of the Spanish crown exerted control over all aspects of society, including economic, political, and socio-cultural. The primary economic function of the colonial city was to provide raw materials for the mother country. The Spanish opened up Latin American cities to the mercantile system. However, little economic growth occurred in the Latin American city during this era. In 1523, the Laws of the Indies were written and became the first planning legislation in the Americas. The Laws of the Indies were based on Greek and Roman colonial building laws, which took into account the quality of soil, availability of water, suitability for defense, among other site selection factors. These laws established consistent standards for design, which included plaza size, street width, orientation of gates and walls, location of government and administrative buildings, and the subdivision of land into lots. Few modern cities in Latin America escaped the patterns implemented under the Laws of the Indies and many characteristics of the spatial pattern can be seen in cities across Latin America today. As a result of these regulations, the distance from the central plaza, the most exclusive and convenient area of the city, meant a decreased social and economic standing in the Americas in this period. This is no longer true for most Latin American cities today.

The Industrial Expansion

The post-colonial city is the product of independence in Latin America. The small young capitals of Latin America were re-planned, incorporating baroque

lines against an architectural background formed by already existing buildings and monuments. Tree-lined avenues and public parks were created, but were far less comprehensive than the European and American transformation. The post-colonial city in Latin America is characterized by its commercial and industrial nature. It is equipped with more services and a variety of economic functions. In spite of the newfound political freedom, the former colonies remained economically dependent on Europe. Additionally, the spatial extent and population is much larger than the colonial city, due to the influx of rural migrants and improved health and hygiene conditions.

The industrial expansion at the turn of the century was a time of growth and expansion. It is characterized by the expansion of the central business district (CBD), development of public transportation systems, rapid in-migration, emergence of a middle class, and in some cases the ownership of automobiles. The CBD or the historic center for most cities, has always been the core of the economic and administrative functions of the city, however most Latin American cities did not experience an expansion of the CBD until the 1930's. The result was very similar to the Anglo-American experience, in that the upper classes, who traditionally resided in this zone, moved outward for two reasons: to avoid commercial rents and congestion and disruption associated with the new landscape. Although few Latin American cities are "classically" industrial, most cities house a number of activities such as food processing, clothing plants, and even automobile assembly. These activities are rarely centrally located, but they do require an accessible urban location. This industrialization has disorganized the city landscape, as it has upset the traditional social structure and increased the cost of central city space (Ford and Griffin 1980: 401). This transformation has resulted in a loss of status for the historic center, and gave way to new functions for the downtown area.

The modern Latin American city has typically accommodated the influx of migrants in slum or squatter settlements during this period, characterized by self-built housing and a lack of services. Since services are costly and not uniform in the Latin American city, those on the periphery or living in poorer areas are generally not serviced. New squatter settlements appear near the urban periphery, so the lowest quality housing tends to be located on the edge of the city, as older slum and squatter settlements are constantly in processes of improving houses and services, these older settlements tend to be in better shape and closer to the CBD or historic center than the new ones.

Although historic centers may provide improved services and infrastructure than their periurban counterparts, the tolls of urban population pressures, crumbling infrastructure, and diminishing economic bases pose huge challenges for local government. Many local governments have been confronted with tasks of balancing the provision of basic services to the urban poor in historic centers and preserving the cultural heritage of cities. This is why we believe that cultural heritage preservation and poverty reduction are closely intertwined. The fight against poverty and social exclusion require a better understanding of the obstacles of participatory development and the empowerment of marginalized sectors of society. Participation and empowerment cannot occur unless there exists a shared sense of values, common purpose, and sense of place (Serageldin et. al 2001).

THE CASE OF QUITO

Latin American urban centers have evolved in a culturally specific way, deeply reflecting their cultural perceptions of urban space and local economic and social conditions. Most cities support a dynamic central business district, a primary commercial spine associated with an elite residential sector and three concentric zones of decreasing residential quality (Ford and Griffin 1980). The history of urban place and culture is crucial to examining the present day realities of a city. As discussed earlier, and similar to other Latin American cities, Quito's history spans four phases of development, all critical elements of what Quito represents both physically and in terms of national and local identity as the Ecuadorian capital today.

In 1779 Quito consisted of five urban parishes and 33 rural parishes; today Quito occupies 16 urban parishes and 33 rural parishes, a small city in both population and spatial extent. Quito's growth throughout the 1800s and early 1900s was slow and steady. However, Quito, like many other Latin American cities experienced an unusual influx of migrants in the 1940s, caused by the cacao crisis and a general economic recession. The city struggled under new pressures to provide services, housing, and infrastructure to new urban citizens. In the 1950s a partial recuperation of the economy came about, in conjunction with political stability, which resulted in a surge in construction. The city expanded primarily to the North, and a modernization process took place, primarily focusing on the construction of new markets, streets, public buildings, and the airport. In the 60s and

70s the oil industry boomed, but at the same time, the agrarian reform caused a new wave of rural migrants to flood the urban centers. The city began to expand, however Quito's unique topography and altitude have made the expansion of urban services difficult in many areas, particularly on the urban periphery. The most extensive demographic and spatial growth took place during the 1970s and 1980s, due to mass rural-urban migration and improvements in longevity. In 1962, the population of Quito was only 354,746 (Delaunay et. al 1990). However, in 1974 the population had increased to 599, 828 and to 866,472 in 1982 (Delaunay et. al 1990). The proportion of this population increase attributed to migrants is 42 percent and 43 percent respectively (Delaunay et. al 1990). Ecuadorian census data from 1983 indicated that of every 10 people that live in Quito, four are migrants (Dubly 1990). The restructuring of the agrarian system and its integration into the capital market in the 1970s reduced jobs and encouraged migration (Carrion F. 1992). In addition, improved transportation, communication, and the growth of Ecuador's internal market also attributed to this migratory movement (Carrion F. 1992).

Today Quito's population is over one million inhabitants. Although Quito has grown from a colonial city to a metropolitan giant, it still maintains characteristics of local cultures and its colonial past. Quito could be considered a migrant city, even though the rural to urban migration movement has slowed in the past decade, it is a diverse city representing a mixture of traditional cultures from the various areas of the country. A number of the urban migrants represent indigenous groups from both the Sierra and the Oriente, many still speak their native tongue and limited Spanish, making the urban environment even more hostile. Nevertheless, Quito is certainly a representation of Ecuador's colonial past, and the historic center provides a unique representation of the Ecuadorian people's rich and diverse history and culture.

THE HISTORIC CENTER OF QUITO

The historic center is composed of 14 neighborhoods and spans a geographic space equal to approximately 606 hectares; 376 of these hectares are occupied by urban buildings for residential and commercial use and 230 hectares are green spaces. The central nucleus is 54 acres and comprises over half of the historic buildings and monuments of the CHQ (Inter-American

Development Bank 2004). The historic center of Quito today, like many other Latin American capitals, is the node of a number of administrative and economic functions of the city, particularly those pertaining to government. It is both the seat of national and local government and the majority of the principal administrative offices of the municipal government. It is the place of popular commerce and it still remains a primary residential area, although this role has diminished over the years, giving way to small businesses. In 2001 the residential population of the CHQ was approximately 50,000 inhabitants, with the majority of the population concentrated on the periphery of the center (INEC 2001).

The principal bus terminal is found in this district, one of the primary transport functions of the country, and is generally where incoming travelers from other provinces first arrive in the city. According to Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Census (INEC), approximately 250,000 people travel to the CHQ daily for work, school, and commercial reasons. The historic center was also a locus for the informal economy and markets until 2003. It was evidenced by a strong concentration of markets, which thrived in part due to the proximity of a large low-income population, frequent transport services through the historic center, and a high pedestrian movement. The historic center represents a zone of competing interests. It represents the city as it was in colonial times, through the colonial buildings and monuments scattered throughout the 54 hectares which compose the central area, and approximately 65 percent of the historic and cultural monuments. It is also the principal administrative district housing the presidential palace and the national congress. In the 1970s and 1980s, the decentralization of some government activities and the development of new offices and retail locations in the north has led to the decline of land value and the overall economic status of the historic center. Many wealthy residents moved to the North of the city where contemporary houses, wider streets to accommodate automobile traffic, and modern services were available. As the wealthy residents moved out, low-income residents began to occupy the historic center, subdividing many of the larger homes into multiple units, which were generally overcrowded and inadequately serviced. Although Quito has grown significantly, the CHQ still remains centrally located within the modern city. This is perhaps due to Quito's unique geography, so city growth is constrained.

The rapid growth of Quito combined with the economic decline since the 1970s had a significant impact on the informal economy, and therefore

the historic center. Since the historic center is the first point migrants reach upon their arrival in Quito, as the central bus terminal is located in the center and almost all long distance public transport passes through this terminal, combined with the out-migration of wealthy residents, the historic center became home to an increasing poor migrant community. In addition, the earthquake of 1987 damaged a number of buildings and residences in the area, that were later converted into storage buildings and shops, converting a number of residential buildings into commercial properties. This poverty of the growing population has dictated a continued reliance on the informal sector for employment, where the majority are women, and over half are migrants (Farrell 1985: 146).

Since the 1990's, the historic center has contained a number of diverse economic activities, unique cultural attractions, primarily attributed to the historic built environment, and some government offices. According to Rosemary Bromely, in 1990 about 23.6 percent of the residents of the historic center were employed in trading activities, compared to the city of average of 15.5 percent (Bromely 2000). The majority of shops in the historic center are small, family businesses, which are closely integrated with the street traders.

Informal Economy/Street Vendors
The informal markets are a growing and consistent sector of the economy in most developing countries, and is estimated to constitute between 40 and 60 percent of the urban workforce in many countries (Chen 2002). It is both an essential part of the economy on one hand, and a controversial part of the economy on the other, as it covers a wide range of activities, many illegal. The informal sector provides a coping strategy for job seekers in an environment where labor opportunities are limited and insufficient. It is also a place where rational entrepreneurs can evade labor regulations, tax laws, environmental standards, and other regulatory policies that can diminish profits. Nevertheless, the informal market is a place where job seekers have easy access to low paid, unstable jobs.

In recent decades, the CHQ became a principal receiving point for rural migrants, due to its low rent costs, proximity to work, and the domination of the informal economy. It is a very important component of the labor market, particularly for rural migrants, and according to a recent ILO report 7 out of 10 new jobs in Latin America were created in the informal economy since 1990 (ILO 2003).

In the 1970s and 1980s, the historic center of Quito had transformed into the one of the principal informal market areas of the city, which occupied the plazas, pedestrian sidewalks, and streets, making vehicular and pedestrian traffic congested. The intense colonization of street space, particularly near the Ipiales and Tejar market, which are located in the heart of the historic center, was such that the streets no longer functioned as public space during the daytime, but rather as a string of makeshift market stalls generally constructed from plastic and wood materials. During the daytime streets in this area functioned under traders organizations, or essentially the "traders mafia," where temporary market stalls are set up and then later taken down at the end of the day, with the products stored in a local storage building for the night. According to Bromley, in the 1990's there was an even greater intensification of commercial activity in the historic center, which were attributed to increases in both daily and periodic markets, invasion of additional streets, and the emergence of new market sites, for both daily and periodic markets (Bromley 2000: 254).

The loss of the historic center to the informal economy and a continuing deterioration of the built environment concerned a number of citizens, local officials, and advocates of historic preservation internationally. However, informal traders are not only an important and accepted sector of the economy in Ecuador, they are also a well organized and powerful interest group.

Municipality

Daily and periodic markets have posed a number of challenges for the municipality, particularly in terms of maintaining order and healthy conditions. Concerns regarding hygiene and informal commerce are a key issue for markets worldwide (Dewar and Watson 1990). Lack of infrastructure, including toilets, access to water and washing facilities, and garbage removal is an argument for municipalities to either invest in markets or for the removal of traders. Congestion associated with informal markets is another problem. Automobile and pedestrian traffic is hindered due to market stalls occupying the sidewalk or ambulant traders interfering with traffic. According to Hardoy and Dos Santos, increased congestion has contributed to the "decentralization" of informal markets; encouraging municipalities to move traders and markets outside of the city, in order to alleviate congestion and traffic (Hardoy and Dos Santos 1984). Lastly, traders are often associated with crime, a further argument for municipal intervention. Fixed

market stalls have a long history of regulation due their important role in providing the goods and services to the city. However, municipal intervention has generally been restricted to trading hours, days, location, and occasionally price and quality of goods. In Quito, there were no regulations for ambulant street traders until 1957, when they were first recognized as a problem (IMQ Dirrecion de Planificacion 1976).

Quito was designated as World Heritage site in 1978. Since then, there has been considerable investment, both public and international, in the conservation of the historic center of Quito. A general perception that a changed image of the historic center is crucial to the promotion of private sector investment has prompted local government and citizens to begin to encourage a number of changes in the land use of the CHQ. This also initiated the first controversy over the conflicting use of space in the historic center; in particular, the occupation of public space by informal markets and traders and alternative uses of space.

Throughout out the 1970s and 1980s, the municipal government of Quito had a relatively tolerant attitude toward informal markets and street traders. Traders were occasionally fined, however a lack of clarity on the rules and regulations regarding zoning made this difficult and infrequent (Farrell 1983). In the 1970s and 1980s, the plazas of the CHQ were sites of active and thriving economic activity. The image of the plaza as symbolic urban spaces for leisure and pastime activities had disappeared. In the 1990's, municipal authorities started to become increasingly concerned with re-imaging the historic center as a whole. This prompted municipal action, which resulted in the ban of trading in the plazas and squares of the CHQ, which have been free of informal commerce by the early 1990s—maintained only though police presence (Bromley 2000). The broader policy concerns combined with new perceptions of public space, conservation planning, which came about in the 1990s, and the continuing expansion of informal markets caused the municipality to take a less tolerant view of informal commerce. This new attitude is most clearly demonstrated through municipal plans starting in the mid-1990s.

One of the first municipal plans that specifically proposed preserving the historic-cultural patrimony and strengthening national identity was in 1994. The goal was a visible improvement of the urban image, with a particular emphasis towards encouraging tourism. The creation of a new urban image was also considered a crucial component to creating new economies

in the CHQ. This plan displayed the greatest emphasis thus far with respect to excluding informal commerce, than any other put forth previously by the municipality. This plan also aimed to reduce the overuse of the historic center, which included the displacement or relocation of commercial uses within and around the historic center. Although informal commerce was included in the 1991 plan, the issue was focused on congestion and the will to effect policy was lacking. Moreover, the 1991 plan demonstrated a high level of tolerance toward informal traders.

The 1994 plan also coincided with negotiations for a loan with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Municipality of Quito (MQ), guaranteed by the Ecuadorian Government, for 41 million US dollars to assist in the conservation and preservation of the historic center. The project description of this loan specifically stated that the current land uses of CHQ, which are dominated by the informal sector and the presence and expansion of informal commerce in the historic center has, displaced other forms of investment. "[In order] to restore its functional importance, revitalize traditional services and commerce by affording easier access to goods and services these businesses supply and foster the appropriate use and maintenance of its public and private buildings…. The program will also promote tourism, urban renewal and historic preservation and help halt spreading urban problems, such as traffic congestion, pollution, crime, and overcrowding…and promote private sector investment in the Historic Center of Quito (IDB 1994: 1)." The IDB loan project description stated that the situation facilitates environmental deterioration and discourages investment, a principal requirement for a sustainable conservation process. The loan also provided funds, $100,000, for the an action plan and investment program for the reorganization of public markets, since the "occupancy of street traders" was considered a risk which could jeopardize the execution of the project (IDB 1994: 17). In fact, one of the conditions for disbursements after the first 12 months of the project was "the implementation by the MQ of the revised version of the municipal ordinance that regulates street vending and the use of public space (IDB 1994: 20)."

In 1994, the municipality and the IDB created the Empresa del Desarrollo del Centro Histórico de Quito, also a condition of the loan. Consequently, the municipality began meeting with the trader associations. The trader associations are a powerful and well-organized interest groups and moving forward with such a project without the support of public opinion could create

significant barriers to the execution of the revitalization of the CHQ. In 1999 the municipality created the Operative Plan for Informal Commerce and between 1999 and 2003, signed agreements with a number of trader associations for the relocation of over 7,000 small traders into municipal market buildings in both the CHQ and in other parts of the city.

The prerequisites for registration in one of the new municipal market buildings that would house the small businesses were: demonstrate that you are a trader in the historic center with a stall, an identification card, and pay the registration fee in the bank (Municipalidad del Districto Metropolitano de Quito 2004). Many small traders do not have a national identification card, since many are migrants and women. Although the municipality subsidized the registration fee by 50 percent, many small traders did not have the capital to buy into the market buildings. The pamphlets distributed were also not accessible to the illiterate, since many traders cannot read or write, or do so at a very basic level. In addition, since the negotiations and process took so long, a number of traders simply did not believe this was actually going to happen, although they were given full warning.

Governance and Planning

According to Aprodicio Laquian, urban governance is defined as, "…a common vision of the good life by political leaders and the polity; inclusion of citizens, interest groups, and stakeholders in the electoral, policy-making, and administrative process, which requires that those who govern are responsive to the wishes and demands of citizens and various groups; formulation, adoption, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of governmental programs and projects, which requires accountability of those who govern to their constituents within a system of laws, rules, regulations, and standards; mobilization of resources to pursue developmental vision and achieve good outcomes; and finally institutionalized resolution of differences and conflicts without resorting to physical violence (1995: 241)." Establishing inclusive urban policies requires all of the above components. However, contemporary urban policies do not provide the agent or the bond to make these policies a reality and constricted urban management schemes made up of planners, architects, and corporate interests often do not adequately address real urban problems and social divisions (Amin and Graham 1997).

According to John Friedman, the urban environment takes the form of multiple forces which interact with each other in ways that are not fully pre-

dictable; these factors include the socio-spatial processes of urbanization, regional economic growth and change, city-building, cultural differentiation and change, the transformation of nature, and urban politics and empowerment (Friedmann 1998). In dealing with this environment, planners need to have a good understanding of how individual cities grow and form before implementing models of urban structure or mediating the various community interests. It is important to note that the meaning of community and civil society has changed in recent decades, prompted by civil protests in a world that seems to be gradually moving towards an inclusive city, a participatory model of democracy. The new role of civil society, coupled with the limited withdrawal of the central government's traditional role, has dramatically changed the role of planning.

Today, planning has many faces and names. However, traditionally, master planning and comprehensive strategic and participatory planning have been the general approaches to planning in developing countries. According to UNHABITAT, master planning assumes a long-term fixed plan, where the future can be determined and ideal circumstances formulated, and serves as a basis for investment and infrastructure (UNHABITAT 2002). The master plan typically emphasizes physical planning and includes characteristics such as road and transport systems, service delivery schemes, which include water and sanitation, and zoning and regulation codes. However, master plans have proved inflexible and rigid. Since cities in the developing world tend to grow faster than infrastructure and services, master plans in the strict sense are inappropriate and ineffective. In many cases, the master plan is a far stretch from reality, as a lack of adequate information and the inability to adequately predict future circumstances provided incorrect scenarios for future planning. In many cases, poor settlements were not consulted in the planning process, nor were they included in the plan. Ultimately, master plans proved too inflexible to respond to the rapid growth of informal settlements and in many cases in fact contributed to their proliferation.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, strategic and comprehensive plans were introduced and incorporated a more general and flexible approach, which aimed to include social, economic, and environmental dimensions. Plans are designed to fit dynamic circumstances that cities pose and careful attention is given to making the planning process fully participatory, ensuring that actors, stakeholders, and concerned groups are not only consulted, but included in all phases of the process. Strategic planning continues to evolve

and includes strong elements of participatory planning and promoting stakeholder involvement, as well as incorporating various elements of the urban environment. Most important of all, strategic and comprehensive plans are theoretically placed in the context of economic, social, and other activities so that they are accessible, affordable, efficient, and equal.

Trends in Local Governance

Since the 1980s, the role of local government in Latin American countries has become more significant, challenging them to fulfill both responsibilities to provide services and support for local development, especially in terms of city planning, regulation, investment, and urban administration. This devolution of responsibilities for social and urban services to local governments fosters greater efficiency in the delivery of services and in resource allocation. Local governments have the ability to provide a better match between the supply of public goods and services and the preferences of the communities. They are also in a more favorable position to work with local civil society organizations in order to enhance economic opportunities and promote public-private partnerships, fostering greater levels of community engagement and a sense of ownership of local development programs. This can result in increased accountability and improved governance, as decisions are adopted in conjunction with the community. However, the regulatory and fiscal framework under which the process is taking place is not perfect and far too often the institutional capacity of local governments to take on these new responsibilities is not adequate to meet the challenges of rapidly growing urban areas. Latin American municipal governments have tried to meet these challenges by engaging civil society in the development process through participatory planning and seeking out public-private partnerships in order alleviate the financial burden on local government. Local governments have also sought to create better governance by emphasizing the role of citizen participation and the construction of democratic citizenship in promoting vibrant, democratic cities.

Examples of Innovations in Local Governance

Attempts to strengthen local governance can be found throughout Spain and Latin America. One of the most successful examples of local governance in a post-authoritarian transition has been in Barcelona, Spain. Through the use of culture and urban heritage, Barcelona was able to create an effective local government with plentiful civic engagement. Looking

back at the Barcelona experience, the post-Franco government drew upon historic and cultural preservation as a means of fostering local economic development. In an attempt to create a strong democracy, Barcelona also created a great city in the process. The Barcelona experience found common ground that motivated residents to be actively involved in the political process and has become a model for urban revitalization. It remains unclear, however, if this approach is effective for cities of weak states.

Another important example of the role a participatory citizenry plays in local governance can be found in Brazil, where over one hundred municipalities have embarked on processes of participatory budgeting that allow residents to set priorities for spending in their neighborhoods and monitor government expenditures. In addition, over 35,000 tripartite councils have been set up throughout the country allowing average citizens to work with government officials and service providers to monitor public services in healthcare, education, housing, poverty alleviation, and other areas. Almost all Brazilian municipalities have at least one tripartite council, and they are, surprisingly perhaps, most common in the poorest areas of the country.

In Bogota, Colombia, two successive non-partisan administrations have invested heavily in public space. These administrations have also forwarded the notion of a "cultura ciudadana," which makes citizens co-creators of and active participants in their city. Examples of these citizen culture initiatives include the creation of the Order of the Knights of the Crosswalk and the "Bogotá Coqueta" campaign. The Order of the Knights of the Crosswalk project involved taxi drivers in Bogotá. Good drivers, those who consistently respected traffic laws and regulations, were invited to be members of the Order and were given the power to extend membership to other taxi drivers who also consistently respected traffic laws. In a similar project, the Bogotá Coqueta campaign, citizens were given a card showing a "thumbs up" sign on one side and a "thumbs down" sign on the other. Citizens were encouraged to use the card to sanction or criticize the behavior of other citizens in a non-confrontational manner.

In Ecuador, the case of governance in Cotacachi under the leadership of indigenous mayor Auki Tituaña has gained international attention. Because of its innovations in participatory planning and budgeting, the city won the Dubai International Award for Best Practices in Democratization of Municipal Management for Equitable and Sustainable Development in 2000 and the UNESCO "Cities for Peace" award in 2000–2001.

In Mexico, several cities and towns, including Tijuana and Guanajuato, have set up municipal planning councils to give citizens a voice in setting policy priorities of the local government, and also created Community Councils that give citizens a chance to advise municipal officials on spending priorities for neighborhood improvements. In addition, a few small towns, such as Cuquío and Beriozabal, have implemented participatory budgeting processes similar to those in Brazil.

In Guatemala, several municipalities, including Quetzaltenango and Sololá, both majority indigenous cities, have set up community planning processes that allow neighborhood associations to present plans for demand-driven municipal investments. These are credited with re-orienting spending to lower-income areas within municipalities, and they have generally been implemented in cities and towns with non-partisan governments.

In Bolivia, the 1992 Popular Participation Law that decentralized a majority of the country's government revenues to local governments also mandated the creation of monitoring and oversight committees that would hold elected governments accountable for the transparent use of resources. These committees are reported to play a significant role in the workings of local government with a range of political affiliations.

All of these examples demonstrate that important innovations in democratic governance, in the relationship between state and society, are occurring throughout Latin America at the local level. While this may be true at the local level, national level politics in the region, particularly in the Andean region, are in crisis. National governments continue to face questions of illegitimacy, corruption, and low levels of citizen satisfaction. Moreover, while some local level governments are making a concerted effort to alter the negative dynamic between the state and society, national governments do not appear to making similar efforts.

Citizenship and Participation

Recent research on Latin American democracies has focused on social movements, the role of civil society, and citizenship. Indeed, the study of citizenship is now at the forefront of democratic theory, perhaps primarily because the exercise of citizenship through various modes of citizen participation has had such an enormous impact in recent years in Latin America. Mass mobilizations in Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina, among other Latin American countries, have had a significant impact on

democratic outcomes. Protest, however, is only one form of citizen participation. Citizens have also become active in local governance, as exemplified in the cases outlined above.

To understand the question of citizen participation requires that we examine the concept of citizenship itself—a concept that has only recently begun to be treated in mainstream democratic theory. Most modern analyses of citizenship follow T.H. Marshall's framework of citizenship rights, conceived of as encompassing civil, political, and social rights. This framework, however, is not unproblematic. For instance, in the 1980s when "basic human and civil rights could no longer be dismissed or taken for granted" (Jelin and Hershberg 1996: 3) the triad of civil, political, and social rights came into question. The demands of indigenous peoples and the debate about individual and collective rights present another kind of challenge to Marshall's framework. In addition, it has been shown that the various kinds of citizenship rights may be unevenly distributed resulting in a kind of democracy that could be characterized as disjunctive (Holston and Caldeira 1998), an adjective used to refer to the expansion and contraction in different areas of citizenship rights. Whereas the transition to democracy in most Latin American countries expanded citizens' political rights through suffrage, most Latin Americans do not enjoy full civil rights, to say nothing of social, or welfare, rights in the region that continues to possess the ignoble distinction of having the most unequal distribution of wealth in the world. Citizens' civil rights are curtailed by a weak rule of law, evidenced by police misconduct and ineffective legal systems, while their political rights are hindered by imperfect institutions or parties, or by inefficient or corrupt states.

Debate notwithstanding, Marshall's conception of citizenship rights continues to be of key importance for discussions of democratic governance. Therefore, there must be a persistent effort to refine the definition of citizenship rights, define their relative importance, and explore their uneven distribution. Nevertheless, there is a danger in "reifying the concept, and in identifying citizenship rights with a group of concrete activities—voting, enjoying freedom of speech, receiving public benefits of any kind, and so on" (Jelin 1996: 104). Indeed, there is more to citizenship than citizenship rights; other aspects of citizenship must be considered. Does citizenship, for instance, not encompass citizens' responsibilities and duties? Democracy is a two-way street and requires a stable state capable of guaranteeing citizens'

rights as well as an engaged citizenry, which is able to fulfill the responsibilities and obligations required of a democratic society.

In order to place citizen participation in the proper context, we must begin to re-envision the concept of citizenship. Democracy and citizenship must be conceived of as inherently connected, and both must be extended beyond the political to include the civil and socio-economic aspects as well (Holston and Caldeira 1998). In other words, both democracy and citizenship must be conceived of and studied in context, with consideration given to the particular cultural, historical, and economic situation of each country. We must study the "full experience of democratic citizenship" (Holston and Caldeira 1998: 288).

During the 1990s, participation began to be heralded as a condition of democratic governance, by democracy theorists, and as a necessary element in development, by development practitioners. The fourth Human Development Report published by the UNDP in 1993 focused on citizen participation and advocated the creation of mechanisms for participation (PNUD 1993). Both the World Bank and IDB have published documents stressing the importance of including participation in their programs. Recent publications such as the World Bank's *Historic Cities and Sacred Sites* (2001), the IDB's *Heritage Conservation in Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Bank Experience* (1998), and the *2004/2005 State of the World's Cities Report: Globalization and Urban Culture* (2004) all demonstrate the importance of the interconnections between culture, place, development, and democracy. Incorporating culture and identity into urban development, as demonstrated through the Barcelona case, as well as being mindful of the important relationship between development and governance, have proved to be invaluable components of successful and sustainable projects.

PARTICIPATION IN QUITO

In Quito, non-governmental organizations have fomented participation through training and empowerment initiatives. There have been some attempts by NGOs to implement participatory planning, most notably perhaps by the Centro de Investigaciones CIUDAD. One example of participatory planning carried out by CIUDAD took place through the Servicios Integrales para Sectores Populares (SIPSEP) Project in poor neighborhoods in Quito (Pitkin 1997). The municipality of Quito, however, did not systematically use or institutionalize citizen participation

until February 2001, when it began implementing the *Sistema de Gestión Participativa* (System of Participatory Administration, SGP). The SGP was made possible through earlier reforms such as the 1993 Ley Especial del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito, which allowed for the decentralization of local power and services (Torres 2002).

The SGP was an attempt to provide better communication between the municipal government and the population through meetings organized around four territorial levels: the city as a whole, metropolitan zones, rural parishes, and neighborhoods. Apart from these territorially-based meetings, community meetings with women, youth, children, the indigenous population, and the Afro-Quiteño population werealso a part of the SGP (Torres 2002).

The SGP process conceived of participation as dialogue, but did not significantly alter the decision-making power of the citizens who participated. Nor did it significantly alter the clientelistic relations of power that it sought to circumvent. In many cases, it wasbeen difficult for participants to realize the importance of dialogue, with citizens desiring instead tangible programs of public works. As citizens were given little opportunity to impact actual policies, the SGP as a participatory system left citizens as passive receptors of policy. Whereas the SGP may have intended to allow citizens to be more active co-creators of policy and to make them more engaged, other municipal initiatives may have had more success at achieving these goals.

We will discuss several examples of municipal initiatives that have fostered greater citizen participation. Several campaigns have utilized high school or college students increase awareness of traffic regulations among pedestrians and drivers. Students from public high schools have participated in such projects, particularly in the center where vehicle and pedestrian traffic are often at odds with one another. In these campaigns, students line up at major intersections in the center and, by holding hands, create a barrier so pedestrians do not cross against traffic. With university-level students, the municipality reproduced the "Bogotá Coqueta" campaign in which cards with a "thumbs up" and "thumbs down" are distributed to citizens which they then uses to approve of or self-correct certain behaviors.

An important aspect of Quito's revitalization is occurring at a symbolic level. An integral part of the municipality's campaign has been the recuperation of a Quiteño identity and pride. The slogan "*recuperemos nuestra*

identidad" has been widely used in recent years. As citizens began to notice tangible changes, particularly in the renovation of the historic center, they have also begun to become more responsible and accountable. In this way, citizens are on the path to becoming the ultimate guarantor of the rule of law. The results of a campaign to keep Quito free of trash serves as good example here. The campaign was announced and the fine for littering was widely circulated and often enforced. In addition, the municipality improved trash removal in the center and even implemented the daily use of modern street sweepers to clean the streets and plazas of the center. Citizens began to take pride in this clean, newly revitalized center. With the heightened consciousness this campaign brought and because citizens saw that the municipality was also doing its part too, citizens began correcting each other's behavior and directing others to throw their trash in the new trash receptacles, not on the ground. This is but a small example of how initiatives aimed at increasing a sense of urban identity have also resulted in increased citizen participation in the daily functioning of the city; they have begun to create the kind of "citizen culture" strived for by recent administrations in Bogotá. In the end, these kinds of cultural changes may be the most difficult to effect, but they are also apt to produce lasting, powerful results.

Public-Private Partnerships: Metropolitan Corporations

Another trend in local governance throughout Latin America has been the upsurge in public-private partnerships in order to stimulate development. In order to attract private sector investment, however, the public sector must encourage stability and be a strong, pioneering partner. The government must be in a position to offer stability in the regulatory environment because investors "always fear the risks associated with entering an area with an unknown future" (Rojas 2001: 397). At the same time, the public sector must be able to demonstrate that such investments in untested markets will be viable. While these partnerships are based on economic collaboration, they also produce greater state stability by promoting a more stable regulatory environment.

Perhaps the most important example of a public-private partnership in Quito is the Empresa del Centro Histórico (ECH), a mixed-capital company owned by the municipality and a non-governmental organization, the Fundación Caspicara. The ECH was begun with financing from the Inter-

American Development Bank supplemented by some local financing; it has been primarily responsible for the revitalization of Quito's center.

In 1978, in recognition of being the best-preserved, least altered historic center in Latin America, UNESCO declared Quito's colonial center a World Heritage Site. In 1992, with the Ley del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito, the National Institute of Cultural Patrimony gave the municipality custody of the historical patrimony in the center. The Fondo de Salvamento del Patrimonio Cultural (FONSAL) is one of the principle entities, along with the ECH, responsible for maintaining the historic center. Over the past decade, FONSAL has executed more than 350 rehabilitation or restoration projects in the historic center.

The other metropolitan corporations are responsible for basic services and utilities. They are: the Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Públicas (EMOP), which is responsible for public works; the Empresa Metropolitana de Aseo (EMASEO), which is responsible for trash collection; the Empresa Metropolitana de Alcantarillado y Agua Potable, the water and sewer utility; and the Empresa Metropolitana de Servicio y Administración de Transporte, with responsibilities over transportation.

CONCLUSIONS

The spatial shifting in public space in the historic center has had both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, there is more citizen security, land value and access to public space has increased, as well as better hygiene and more sanitary and safe working conditions, less urban congestion and traffic, and improved infrastructure. These positive effects benefit all of Quiteño society, including members of the informal economy. The economic impacts of the renovation projects, however, have not been as uniform. On one hand, the formalization of informal economies provides income to the municipality through taxes and fees for fixed stalls in the municipal market buildings. Formalizing the informal sector has also decreased the power of illegal trader associations and organized crime, which previously controlled the informal economy to a large extent. On the other hand, the wholesale elimination of the informal economy is not unproblematic. The informal economy has traditionally been an area of the economy that is open and inclusive to the entire population. While the work available through the informal economy may not always provide

a stable or sufficient income and may expose workers to unsafe conditions, it fills a necessary gap in the labor market and provides at least marginal income to social sectors that may be excluded from the formal economy. While all members of the informal economy of the historic center had the opportunity to buy one of the new market stalls in the municipal market buildings, the stalls were expensive and required initial capital. The need for capital excluded a number of traders because the informal economy is generally a place where work requires little capital investment.

There were also other barriers to entry in the formal economy. The process of deconcentrating the informal markets from the historic center began in the early 1990s. In some ways, the prolonged process of formalizing the informal sector itself was an impediment for many traders. Many traders thought the change would never actually take place since it had been discussed for so long with little action taken. Others were unable to figure themselves into such long-range planning because the informal economy is typified by short-term employment goals rather than long-term planning and investment. In addition, many informal traders did not buy into the market buildings because they did not think the new markets would be successful. The traders were also resistant to having their livelihoods formalized and being responsible for paying taxes and fees to the municipality. Whereas traders previously paid fees to the trader associations for stall rental, electricity, and services, the uncertainty of changing to a formalized economy controlled by the government—which they believe favors the elite class—caused many to relocate their activities or services to the peripheral markets outside of the historic center. This may cause an increase in transportation costs as the center previously provided a central location in which to work and live, making it a convenient and economical choice for informal traders. Peripheral markets may also receive fewer buyers due to their location. On the other hand, traders that did buy into the new municipal market buildings face challenges as well. While the buildings are well maintained, safe, and attractive, they are also large often consisting of multiple floors of stalls. This discourages buyers from patronizing all of the stalls, therefore putting traders located on the top floors at a disadvantage.

The revitalization of the historic center was a recuperation of public space from the informal sector. This recuperation of public space has created a shared sense of place for members of different social sectors of

Quiteño society. While the city continues to be highly divided between north and south, the revitalized center provides a central space where all can shop, eat, socialize and enjoy their cultural heritage together, including the indigenous and Spanish roots of the city.

The issue of identity has long been a contentious one in Ecuador, where identity is fragmented by social class, ethnicity, language, race, and region. Regionalism, particularly the rivalry between Quito and Guayaquil, is seen to define—or undermine—what it means to be Ecuadorian. These struggles have put the question of identity at the forefront of the national imagination (see Radcliffe and Westwood 1996, and Silva 1995). For these reasons, the aspect of Quito's revitalization process that appeals to a sense of identity is particularly important. If more residents of varying classes, races, and ethnicities are able to identify themselves as Quiteños and take pride in their city, it will go a long way to creating a citizenry that is able and willing to carry out the responsibilities and fulfill the obligations required of members of a democractic society.

While national-level politics in Ecuador has been characterized by chaos in recent years as presidents have been forced out of office due to coups and popular pressure, the municipality of Quito has been able to engage citizens and provide them with a higher level of satisfaction than that offered by the national government. Because local governments have been able to connect better with their constituents, they tend to provide a certain level of stability within the nation; here, Quito is no exception. The political, cultural, and economic importance of Quito for the country as a whole means that better governance and more stability at the local level is not only fundamentally important for the nation but could even be a the first step toward greater national stability. In Ecuador in recent years, there has been a high level of dissatisfaction with the national government, demonstrated through the overwhelming social mobilization that has been responsible, in part, for the ouster of two presidents. The high level of dissatisfaction, therefore, is directly correlated with the high level of political instability. This also demonstrates that the Ecuadorian citizenry expects a level of social responsibility from their government officials. Once people see that government can work at the local level and citizens can have confidence that local government can carry out its duties and responsibilities in a transparent manner, citizens may begin to create the political space for a more stable and successful national government.

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CHAPTER 12
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF HISTORIC CENTERS

Mónica Moreira

Introduction

Social participation in historic centers is not an easy topic because the citizens, interests, and meanings of the center are much more diverse than in other areas of the city that do not have the component of cultural heritage and centrality that occurs in the historic center because it was the original city. This is why it is important to analyze the topic of historic centers and social participation. It is important to remember the specific reality that makes the historic center different from other areas, especially when we want to propose effective social participation, in other words, participation that reconciles the need to preserve historical elements and the need to have development. To feel part of the historic center is not necessarily related to ancestry or age, rather it is something conscious, a decision, an interest.

Although the historic center is different from other parts of the city, it also has some of the same conditions. For exactly this reason, it is important to do these kinds of analyses to share ideas and experiences that can serve different areas (what has gone well, what has failed, and what the limits are in different areas). In the case of the historic center of Quito we recognize a history of drastic transformation and also elements that been present in the past and that, despite recent interventions, still continue today.

Twenty six years after the historic center of Quito was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO, we have moved from a period in which few people wanted to support the center to a time when there is a large public interested in it. From the time when residents of other parts of the city did not go to the center except to take care of official business, we have entered an age in which people go to the center to visit. Before no national or local authority mentioned the importance of the city; now many do. While no mass media would have used the spaces of the historic center before, they now take advantage of its originality to make short films, movies, and com-

mercials there. We have gone from the time when no international event was held in the center, to a period when many are held there because many of the historic buildings have been restored (70 percent of the historic buildings have been restored). From the era when there were no housing projects in historic buildings, at least 1,000 housing units have been produced. Before 20 percent of public space in the center was occupied by street vendors; now this commerce functions in closed commercial spaces. We could go on, but suffice it to say that these are the changes that have taken place in recent decades.

Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the center of Quito, before and after being named a World Heritage Site, has been the site of many cultural, religious, and political manifestations in the everyday life of the center. These customs along with ways of working and relating to one another have not been lost. It is also important to remember that a number of functions that create friction as well as dynamism continue to be concentrated in the center of Quito. The center has been transformed throughout history by strong economic factors. These transformations also included a concentration of poverty and marginality, both of which persist today. This general problem is not unique to the center of Quito, however. In greater or lesser degrees, the historic centers of the Americas, which are now in processes of recuperation, have had similar experiences and, perhaps, should all be part of the analysis needed to discuss the topic of citizen participation.

PARTICULARITIES OF HISTORIC CENTERS
THAT IMPACT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Historic centers have particularities that affect social participation, sometimes making it more viable and sometimes complicating it. It is important to keep these particularities in mind as we analyze citizen participation. The relationship between the local government and participation in the historic center has more variables than in other parts of the city. The actors present in the historic center run the gammit because the everyday user of the center comes from the whole city, other parts of the country, and even other countries. The conflicts in historic urban areas are also diverse and permanent.

In academic research done by FLACSO for the "Politics and Administration of Historic Centers" course in 1998, a survey was done asking participants what the historic center was for them. The answers received

clearly demonstrated that at the citizen level, there was also a consciousness of the diversity and the contradictions present in the historic center, in this case the center of Quito.

Some of the people surveyed made reference to the number of important institutions in the center and the number of protests that take place in front of these institutions ("it is a place to protest"). Others alluded to the contradiction between the rich heritage present in the city and the social and economic difficulties that can be witnessed there everyday. Still others made mention of the center as a large marketplace where you can buy anything you want to buy. Referring to the idea of diversity, one respondent said, "it is a place where anything and everything can happen." Finally, some respondents referred to the center as the place that created the people's identity.

The center is an element that inspires pride and allows for collective identity and memory. At the same time, however, it is perceived as problematic and complex. Apart from the question of whether these opinions come from real knowledge or from prejudice, the fact is that the historic center of Quito continues to be a strong historical, symbolic, religious, political, and commercial reference point. It is this state of confluence that leads to its qualities and problems.

How can we reconcile the life, the dynamics, flows, activities, and users with the conservation of historic patrimony and the objectives of producing an friendly center? How can we do this through social participation?

In an attempt to point out the particularities of the center and their effects on social participation, we must consider four important four conditions present in the center: patrimony, centrality, concentration of poor migrants, and the concentration of marginality.

Historic Patrimony

The naming of Quito as a World Heritage Site made this space more visible at the international level, making it part of a larger grouping of world heritage sites and, as a result, created the comparisons with these other sites. A number of things happen due to this higher level of visibility. On the one hand, processes of rehabilitation occur adding value to many of the historic elements and fill them with new uses. International organizations reacted with credits and donations for rehabilitation projects. On the other hand, this part of the city begins to be used for symbolic events once the majority of the historic buildings and monuments have been restored. Tourism

begins to be an important reality. Inhabitants of other areas of the city who rarely went to the center begin to visit it.

The processes of rehabilitation begun at this time were undertaken with no or little participation of the inhabitants and users of the historic center or of the citizenry in general. These plans were born within institutions and through international cooperation. An element of these plans was to make the population participate in them. Many city centers, among them Quito's historic center, have been characterized by the vitality of the citizenry and their participation in everyday activities.

The participation of the citizenry in the preservation of the city's heritage is found in answer to finished works or calls for new proposals, but not through decision-making, at least not with the most important decisions. There is very little consensus about intervention in historic areas. This has a certain logic in terms of technical or emergent topics that cannot wait for some kind of consultation or that could create a polemic (such as the restoration of a convent or a church). As a result, it is important to define what would be the best form of social participation related to preservation in historic centers. Participation at the neighborhood level has been more frequent. We can see examples of this in some of the topics discussed and prioritized in meetings or "cabildos" organized by the municipality of Quito, in which we see a citizen concern to understand and participate in processes in the historic center. Nevertheless, citizen participation continues to be more visible in neighborhoods that are not historic.

On the other hand, the inclusion of intangible kinds of heritage (such as customs, foods, festivals, and cults) is a very recent occurrence that has gained ground little by little. In this kind of heritage, social participation is indeed a determinant and perhaps more viable. The municipality currently has publications about intangible kinds of heritage in several neighborhoods in the center. To produce these publications, the collaboration and agreement of many citizens was necessary.

The situation of heritage makes the center a perfect stage for many events. To live or work in a site of such historical importance as the historic center of Quito, World Heritage Site, means being involved in activities related to this historic area almost on a daily basis. Just as an example, in 2004 at least three international events took place in Quito, at least partially in the center: the Miss Universe pageant, the meeting of the Organization of American States, and the Pan-American Biennale of Architecture. On the

one hand, it is motivating to know that this heritage is in use and, on the other, the development of daily activities has been affected. Knowing that these events are of great importance to the city and the country, a more harmonious arrangement could be found by working conjointly with the local government and citizen participation.

The area of action on social participation in this case is found in the agreements between those who live in the center and those who need it as a stage for relevant events. Activities that require greater levels of security and more movement than usual need to be coordinated; it is also necessary to coordinate with the people affected so that both parties can be accommodated. This is even more urgent since the Program of Culture proposed in the Quito 21st Century Plan views Quito as a priority destination for international festivals, cultural activities with broad participation, and the use of cultural centers—both those that currently in use and those being rehabilitated—some of which are found in the historic center. In other words, many changes are coming and it is important that those people who will be affected are included in the framework.

National, Provincial, and Urban Centers

When the local government proposes to work on social participation in a historic area, which, at the same time, concentrates national, provincial, and urban functions, such as is the case in the historic center of Quito, a great diversity of actors and interests are clashing all the time and often cause friction. To take a few examples, the presence of the Presidency of the Republic has repercussions on daily life in the historic center and fills it with symbolism at the same time. The presence of the National Prison in the historic center creates a conflictive environment in a zone that still has greater historical value a few blocks away from the plaza of San Francisco.

In reference to the center, the municipality's recent *Special Plan for the Historic Center* points out that "in the case of the Historic Center of Quito, its centrality is constituted by several factors: there is a centrality derived from urban aspects and another that comes from intangible topics that are of a social, cultural, and political nature."

"The Historic Center of Quito reflects the capital of the country. From the political perspective, it is the seat of the central government, the local government, and the primary jurisdiction of the Catholic Church. From a symbolic point of view, the Historic Center condenses a sense of local and

national identity, while from an economic perspective, it has become a great center for popular commerce."

"Additionally, it is also important to recognize the existence of multiple minor centers within the very Historic Center itself in the area of communities and neighborhoods. It is on these scales that it creates an important sense of belonging and identity. The grouping of these characteristics makes the Historic Center constitute the epicenter of the city and the country" (2003: 12)

Governance and social participation in an epicenter is very complex because everyday life is complex. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the vitality of this center is an important kind of heritage even if its administration is complex. The *Special Plan* cited the fact that it is a living, diverse city as one of the positive aspects of Quito's historic center.

This complexity is found in some of the current uses of the historic center including education, religion, and commerce. Most of Quito's primary and secondary schools are located in the historic center. Around 18,000 students arrive in the center everyday from other areas of the city. From a functional perspective, this is irrational because of the displacement of students and vehicles and the economic loss that this represents. This situation is further exacerbated because studies show that almost none of the schools comply with the currently required norms. Beginning with the 1989–1991 Master Plan, the relocation of these education establishments has been discussed. In all subsequent studies, this need continues to be mentioned; it was insisted upon in the latest study in 2003. However, apart from this honest and logical argument, there is nothing more desirable from the perspective of the historic center than the fact that its users are young students. If they left this space, with whom would they be replaced? What actors would be as harmonious with the center as these children and young people?

If we insist on the social participation of the new generations and if these new generations at this time congregate daily in the space in which we want to create a sense of belonging and identity, maybe we should be asking ourselves how we can achieve the social participation of the students who, on the other hand, also reflect the perspectives of their parents, siblings, and relatives. In other words, we are not only talking about the 18,000 students. In the future, perhaps we will be able to say that after the school bell rings in these schools that the streets do not fill up with trash and that those children and young people who go to the center on a daily basis go beyond just

studying there and begin to appreciate and protect the center. For the time being, there are citizen participation initiatives, such as "The Historic Center without Litter" campaign, in which the municipality works jointly with the leaders of the cabildos grouped in "The Historic Center is Ours" committee and with students from 29 schools in the center that have a total of 8,750 students. This campaign was begun in June of 2003.

In time, the location of schools should be effectively rationalized, but in the time being while we have the opportunity to have the students congregated in the center, it is more logical to encourage the social participation of this group of youths and children through the local government. This would, without a doubt, be more pleasant and productive than the eternal discussion of how complicated it is to relocate the schools, a step that requires a high degree of consensus, capital that does not exist, and national political will from a national government for which it is not a priority.

Another important use of the center has to do with religion. In the historic center of Quito there is an important concentration of monumental religious structures that continue to exercise a religious function. Monumental religious complexes such as the churches and monasteries of San Francisco or Santo Domingo continue to be scenes for many cultural manifestations, many of which are religious in nature. There are yearly celebrations that bring together the faithful of the whole city, citizens from other parts of the country, tourists, and the mass media. Apart from these massive celebrations, there are other ceremonies of lesser magnitude that occur on a daily basis in the churches in the center.

If, on the one hand, new spaces of participation are being created, such as pedestrian Sundays, which have made it possible once again to walk in the center, we could begin to think of ways to make events that have traditionally occurred in the historic center of Quito permanent and make a greater effort to conserve this intangible patrimony as a space for participation. In the neighborhood meetings in the center called by the municipality, the need to reinforce these spaces has been mentioned.

A final important use of the historic center has to do with its role in commerce. Like previous plans, The *Special Plan for the Historic Center* mentions commerce as the activity that is flourishing most in this area: "The Historic Center of Quito continues to be a powerful space for the development of the economy of the city and of attention to the commercial demand, in particular, of the social groups of fewer economic resources."

The plan recognizes three types of commerce: formal, markets, and popular. With respect to the last type, it is important to mention the municipal and citizen experience of relocating street vendors, which I will discuss more fully below as an example of social participation. Just like the inhabitants and students from the center, the vendors who spend the better part of their time in this area should be subjects of broad social participation in which the obligations and rights that contribute to the sustainability of the historic center are established. Among these are agreements so that inadequate or degraded facilities in the area can be relocated or repaired.

Migration of Poor People

For decades—even in the 1990s—many historic centers have been the principal receptors of poor migrants from rural areas. One of the results of this phenomenon is poor housing conditions. A part of the reality of the center, then, are the building inhabited by tenants in rented houses, who are difficult to organize because, on one hand, psychologically they do not belong to the space they inhabit, even if they have been living in the center for many years, and, on the other hand, they do not have any kind of motivation to improve their own housing or area because they do not have ownership of it. Sixty five percent of the housing in the historic center of Quito is rented and 25 percent of the total housing is in a critical state of deterioration (Special Plan for the Historic Center 2003).

It is necessary to reflect on social participation in an environment where more than half of the people who reside in it do not own their own homes and where a large percentage of inhabitants live in deteriorated housing. Despite the existence of neighborhoods where the population feels a greater level of belonging and, consequently, the proposals for participation are more viable, the overall proposals for the historic center must have these general statistics in mind in order to be effective. It would also be important to know what percentage of the population currently living in the center would like to stay there.

Concentration of Marginality

In addition to receiving poor migrants, other vulnerable social groups are concentrated in the center of Quito. These groups have even been the object of specific studies, such as the Social Development Project of the Historic Center financed by the European Union. On the one hand, there

are areas, for example, around the defunct García Moreno prison and the streets bordering 24 de Mayo Avenue in which there is a great deal of marginality. On the other hand, begging of all types is concentrated in the center and some plazas are nocturnal gathering spots for the indigent. Because of this, different humanitarian organizations work in the center. The Quito 21st Century Plan cites a Social Protection Plan, with projects aimed toward the vulnerable population located in the historic center. In the center, there are facilities such as the program for Integral Support of the Family or childcare centers for the children of prostitutes, where there is also attention to the vulnerable population. The *Special Plan for the Historic Center* has no proposal related to these vulnerable populations. If we want to have broad social participation, we also have to address marginality as a palpable reality of the historic center.

HISTORY OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE HISTORIC CENTER OF QUITO

The Historic Taking of the Center

By initiative of the School of Architecture and Urbanism of the Central University, Sunday, March 27, 1988 was named a "Symbolic Taking of the Historic Center." This occurred as a result of various activities undertaken in defense of the center due to the 1987 earthquake that laid bare its vulnerability. The actors involved were painters, sculptors, poets, dancers, singers, teachers, students, housewives, priests, journalists, and shopkeepers—all of whom congregated in the historic center.

The purpose was to take the center for a day, With this in mind, pedestrian zones, artistic presentations, and games for children were organized. The center was without cars for the first time in a long time and the enormous number of people who entered the center did it on foot or by bicycle. Now, the center is turned into a pedestrian zone every Sunday. Sixteen years ago it was completely unique. The cleanliness of the center was also very notable that day.

Despite the existence of clear financing, the success of this collective consensus and the enthusiasm stirred up in such varied groups of people was due to the common cause that motivated the occurrence: they were all participants of the taking of the city, they all were owners of and responsible

for the center for one day. The importance of this event from a perspective on participation is in its ability to bring people together and create an accord among so many actors.

OTHER CASES OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION IN HISTORIC AREAS

There have been other projects to create participation in the center. The municipal program "August, Month of the Arts" began in 1992 and has continued although now it is known as "August, Art and Culture." This month offers many presentations of art, music, theater, and film. It also offers extended hours for services in the city. It is a popular event in which the general population of Quito participates and in which the historic center has been an important part.

In 1994, the rehabilitation of the hacienda La Delicia is undertaken by the Fund for the Salvation of Cultural Heritage (FONSAL, in Spanish). Its uses were decided through broad participation from the sector. Although it is not in the historic center of Quito, it is important due to its historic architecture. Currently, the Administration of the Northwest Zone functions in the building.

For the rehabilitation of the three buildings that later will be the Three Manuelas Center for Family Support located in the historic center, a serious job of research and participation in the surrounding areas was undertaken. The uses were decided upon through this participation, as a policy of FONSAL.

The Color Study undertaken by FONSAL on Junín Street in the neighborhood of San Marcos was done with the support of the neighbors.

The creation of a pedestrian zone on Sundays in Quito was also an initiative that had existed before. Around 1990, the Council's Commission of Historic Areas called for a pedestrian zone and organized events. Unfortunately, it was an initiative that was continued only until 1992, until it was reinstituted in 2001.

PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS FOR THE HISTORIC CENTER OF QUITO

I have chosen three examples to demonstrate the dynamics of social participation because they illustrate the potentials and limitations of participa-

tion, they are replicable, and could perhaps form part of a national project. Although not all of the examples cited are strictly participation projects, I have mentioned them because of the potential they demonstrate. My priority is to show the relative potential of participation, not to exhaustively discuss the proposals.

The Experience of Cabildos in the Central Zone

The management of the historic center of Quito is the responsibility of the Central Zone (one of eight administrative zones in Quito that were instituted after the process of administrative deconcentration). In this zone, there are five sectors, one of which corresponds to the historic center. As in the rest of the city, in 2001 a series of Zonal Meetings was convoked, as part of the System of Participatory Administration. This process is further explained in the section below on the legal framework for participation.

What is relevant about these meetings for the topic of patrimony is that in the meetings, in addition to demands for solutions to everyday problems, there are demands for the recuperation of traditions, improvement of the image of historic buildings, illumination of historic monuments, rehabilitation of cultural centers, and information for the community on plans and projects for the historic center. Although the majority of the topics discussed do not deal with heritage, the process itself makes the inhabitants more skilled in order to be part of a discussion of more specialized projects, not because there is no one who could be part of that discussion now but because participation is becoming more of a habit through the System of Participatory Administration.

One of the limitations that needs to be resolved is the topic of large-scale investment in the center that is not subject to popular consultation. Much of this investment is foreign to the inhabitants of the center and often can affect this population as in the example of the construction of more parking areas in high-traffic and residential sectors such as on 24 de Mayo Avenue (400 parking spaces), the Basilica (300 parking spaces), and Plaza San Francisco (500 parking spaces)—all of which were interventions included in the Quito 21st Century Plan.

Another limitation is the high number of institutional actors in the center. The Central Zone Administration is not the only municipal entity that has a relationship with inhabitants and users of the historic center of Quito. The Historic Center Corporation, FONSAL, and the Office of Territory

and Housing are among the other government actors involved in the administration of the historic center. In the end, the administrative support for effective participation is still not adequate in the historic center.

The Process of Relocation of Street Vendors
The need to relocate the vendors who, for decades, had occupied the streets of the historic center of Quito was recognized by four consecutive mayors. From 1992 to 1998 several steps were taken to relocate the vendors, such as the agreements not to occupy and control the streets during the Christmas season, which served as examples of a shared effort to address the problem of the vendors. Nevertheless, real solutions were only found through political decisiveness in the direction of consensus in 1998 as part of the Modernization of Popular Commerce Plan, which included other parts of the city as well and proposed the creation of a Popular Commerce System.

The relocation of about 8,000 street vendors was achieved through the integration of actors, objectives, and interests assuming the risk of the inherent difficulty of said processes. After getting over the initial lack of trust between the parties, the basic postulates were agreed upon including the the citizenry's right to enjoy the public spaces of the historic center and the need to seek alternatives to the development and modernization of the popular economy of the historic center, with an emphasis on keeping this important actor in the center. Instead of seeking the expulsion of the vendors in the historic center, what was done was to concretely relate this commerce to the economic sustainability of the area. The popular economy, as an economic subsystem structured around domestic or community units, is also part of the economic sustainability of historic centers.

The process culminated in May 2003, when relocation finally took place and Popular Shopping Centers were created that improved conditions for the informal vendors (new services included child care, security, storage, and ownership of the stores thus avoiding payments to third parties). Along with the training of vendors, there has been an improvement in infrastructure, services, and education—all of which was very much needed in the informal economy and which would have been impossible without public support and donations.

With adequate support and follow up by the municipality, this project will be, without a doubt, one of the important points of economic development in the historic center of Quito. The vendors would be perfect targets for housing projects and also for raising the consciousness of other residents.

This process is important for what it teaches Quito and the country and, in the same way, for the institutional maturity that allows for the continuity of the project through different local administrations. Although the current administration campaigned by saying that vendors would stay on the streets, the vendors themselves sustained the process, which was already in the advanced stages of negotiation. Nevertheless, there has been little recognition of informal merchants as actors. In the text published by the municipality on the recuperation of public space, there is no reference made to the participation of merchants as a fundamental part of the success of the project, highlighting instead the institutional role.

The Recuperation of Public Space

Even though the public space of the historic center has always been the scene of many different demonstrations, the proposals carried out recently by the municipality have had a massive response and could be seen as evidence of the success of local participation in Quito. By initiative of the municipality, the Central Zone Administration reinaugurated pedestrian Sundays in 2001. This is a process of citizen participation through which the cultural heritage of the city is valued through different artistic and educational activities. More than 8,000 people gather every Sunday in this space due to this program. In addition to the previous work on public space, recently work has been done on 24 de Mayo Avenue, the Itchimbia park, and the park alongside the Machángara river. The use of these spaces has been impressive. In addition to improving security in public spaces, the project to illuminate monuments in the historic center using different colored lights has made nocturnal visits to the center a new activity for the residents of Quito.

Housing Programs in the Historic Center of Quito

To date, about 1,000 housing units have been rehabilitated in the center. This progress teaches us that there is a real possibility of seeing the center as a place for housing, due to the number of buildings and the demand that has existed for the projects already concluded. It also allows us to clearly see the costs of these projects and share them with others in the city. Also, through a study of the people occupying the housing units offered, we know the which social classes have been targeted by these projects and from what parts of the city and country the new inhabitants of the center come.

The rehabilitated housing units in the historic center of Quito have not been occupied under the same conditions. In some of the exercises, there was institutional support for helping establish the rules for successful coexistence. In other exercises, on the other hand, there has almost been no institutional presence. The difference between some housing complexes and other is manifested in social relationships as well as in the maintenance of the buildings. Having good relationships among the inhabitants of the buildings rehabilitated by the municipality is perhaps more important than the quality of the interventions because such positive relationships are the basis for the continued success of such projects.

THE MUNICIPAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

In this section, I discuss three legal instruments and their relationship to participation. The first has to do exclusively with the citizen participation while the other two instruments are not specifically formulated for citizen participation but rather for the protection of historic areas. It is important to note that the Legal Framework for the Historic Areas of Quito is very extensive. These two instruments have been selected, therefore, for their importance in terms of citizen participation.

Ordinance 046
Through the Council's Ordinance 046 "On its commission and the participation of the community," the municipality regulates citizen participation and establishes the System of Participatory Administration. In general terms, this system has the following attributes formulates policies with the participation of the community in planning, executing, following up, and evaluating program, projects, and activities; deals with social and participatory deliberation and social control of the execution of the municipal budget; and calls for shared management of decision-making and furthering programs and actions demanded by the community. Finally, this Ordinance calls for social control, follow up on projects and proposals, and the evaluation of municipal management.

The System of Participatory Administration includes different levels of participation and forms of representation. The levels of participation that exist include the Quito meeting, zonal meeting, parish meetings, and neighborhood and community cabildos. In the Quito meeting, over which the

mayor presides, there are two modes of representation—territorial and thematic. Territorial representation takes place through the delegates elected by parish assemblies. Thematic representation occurs through delegates elected by each of the Thematic Tables (the thematic tables are a form of participation that brings together the residents of the city around specific policies, which, in this case, are defined in the Quito 21st Century Plan).

Ordinance 046 and the System of Participatory Administration are tools that better order participation in Quito. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these elements must always be evaluated; they cannot be static tools.

The Commission of Historic Areas

This Commission manages knowledge and approval of interventions undertaken in the Historic Areas of the Metropolitan District of Quito, which, in addition to the historic center, consists of 11 neighborhoods and 34 suburban parishes containing historic structures. This commission is made up of three council members, a representative of the Central Zone Administration, a representative of the Historic Center Corporation, a representative from FONSAL, a representative from the Metropolitan Office on Territory and Housing, a representative of the College of Architects of Pichincha, and the Chronicler of the City. This commission can convoke discussion of important topics, such as the *Special Plan for the Historic Center of Quito*, which have not been discussed by the citizenry. This document is not well known or understood even by municipal officials even though it is a tool that specifically affects the historic center of Quito. The discussion and approval of this plan is a social participation exercise that still needs to be undertaken.

The Fund for the Salvation of Cultural Heritage

This fund was created by a national law and has to do with the designation of resources to a permanent fund for the restoration, conservation, and protection of historic, artistic, religious, and cultural structures and elements of Quito. For almost a decade after its creation in 1987, FONSAL was the entity that took charge of all the interventions in the historic center and other historic areas of Quito. Having a permanent fund that does not depend on political will has been a great advantage for Quito.

Social participation is not regulated in any part of the FONSAL law. Nevertheless, FONSAL has carried out several participatory efforts, particularly in interventions that were related to services for the community in his-

toric buildings. Likewise, FONSAL made an effort to raise the consciousness of the population about the importance of the recuperation of public spaces. In the future, it will be important to propagate a law that includes participation as an integral part of its operation, seeking the most effective way to encourage participation without creating complications for the protection of the city's heritage.

VICIOUS CIRCLES THAT IMPACT CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Citizen participation should be based on confidence and the possibility for continuity of public works and action throughout electoral periods and administrations. These two conditions are seriously affected by some practices. For example, confidence can be weakened when it passes through corrupt processes and the right to participate is not guaranteed. A clear example of this is using plazas and streets around the Presidency of the Republic as a parking lot for official vehicles, with the municipality not enforcing the same behavior that other citizens must use. Another factor that works against citizen participation is too much political leadership as opposed to citizen leadership. At times, processes that have been constructed with many actors appear to be the work of the authorities and that affects the citizenry's confidence in participatory mechanisms. Participation must be more closely related to the citizens so as not to be affected by changes in administration and electoral politics.

THE OPINIONS OF SOME ACTORS REGARDING SOCIAL PARTICIPATION, GOVERNMENT, AND THE HISTORIC CENTER OF QUITO

In order to get a sense of the different perspectives that exist on participation and governance in the historic center, I have compiled and present below the thoughts of several important actors.

Luis López
Builder of the Museum of the City and housing projects in the historic center, currently promoter of housing for the historic center of Quito

On the topic of participation in the historic center, there are two important perspectives—one from the point of view of cultural heritage and the other

from the point of view of democracy. Heritage is a very strong concept. We do not all agree on what heritage is. As a result, there should be an exchange of ideas and experiences that lead to agreements because when we use the word "heritage" is does not mean anything.

On the topic of democracy, in the case of the historic center, the municipality should open its own structures to citizens' opinions and decision-making through forums such as the Forum of the College of Architects. Despite good intentions, the participatory discourse of the municipality still does not have adequate channels to incorporate participation. Decision-making should not be the exclusive domain of the authorities.

Finally, there are still contradictions in what has occurred in the center of Quito. On one hand, there has been an effort to open the center to the citizenry through events such as pedestrian Sundays. However, on the other hand, there are still problems with the use of public space, such as in the area of La Marín. These are not easy problems to address, but they require work to further the idea of an open, participatory city.

Inés Pazmiño
Current Administrator of the Central Zone

Insofar as the cabildos and the System of Participatory Administration are concerned, participation is learned through participating, and that is the value of this exercise that took place throughout the city. Four years after using this mechanism, the local government and citizens have been brought much closer together. It is important to mention that the meetings have included proposals, not just requests. The attitude of residents toward the municipality has changed; they know that participation is a citizen right.

The majority of people in the Central Zone that is not part of the historic center participate. However, the historic neighborhoods have contributed projects such as the "Historic and Cultural Memory" publications, in which the residents have had a high level of interest and have been informants and the main proponents of the project. The important thing about this mechanism and the zonal administrations opening to participation is that if the personnel in the municipality is changed, the community will demand its rights because it is capable of doing so. They know how to prioritize public works. They know about the municipal budget and their rights in the budget.

In relation to the topic of retail and market commerce, it is necessary to continue resolving these issues through negotiation. There are several topics that will have to be tackled in the future, the San Roque Market and Plaza Arenas are being addressed by the Central Zone Administration and we hope to have positive results in the near future, through accords.

Diego Salazar
President of the College of Architects of Pichincha and Professor in the School of Architecture, Design, and Arts at the Pontificate Catholic University of Ecuador

In general, the project of the historic center must refine its objects. Some time ago, it was thought that the center should be like a museum. Today, however, a more vibrant center is envisioned. Through participation in the proposals for the center, these contradictions can be addressed. For example, there are now many high-priced restaurants and stores and the people who live in the center are not economically able to access these services. Therefore, it is important to create commerce and services for other economic sectors as well. It is also imperative to work with existing small business in the center and with the portion of the population that is left out of the economic interventions.

Young people make up another sector that deserves attention and should be incorporated into revitalization efforts. Schools and young people contribute to the vibrancy of the center. Schools should not abandon the center although a balance should be sought.

It is also important to work on activities for the leisure time of the residents of the center. The facilities of schools that are used during the school week could be offered to the residents on weekends. There are not many opportunities to locate new recreational facilities in the center. Therefore, existing facilities should be used. A social participation project should bear this in mind.

Rocío Estrella
Ex-Coordinator of the Retail Commerce Relocation Project and Consultant for the Unit for Administration of Retail Commerce

It is important to point out two moments related to participation and the cabildos in the Central Zone. During the administration of Lourdes Rodríguez as Central Zone Administrator, the exercise of participation was

seen as being more real and as something the community really wanted. Nothing much was accomplished, but it forwarded the notion of participation as a tool. At the beginning of the current administration in the Central Zone, the situation changed. Functionaries of the Central Zone confess a lack of confidence in community meetings. They go through the motions of community participation, but there is no consensus. Despite a positive image in the mass media, citizen opinion is not taken into account.

The Project for Retail Commerce also has two moments. In one, merchants participated in the project and its objective. In the other, the image of a participatory municipality continues, but other interests intervened.

What is left to do? Work so that citizen spaces can be taken into account by strengthening organizations that already exist or by creating a Permanent Forum that takes leadership of what has been achieved in the historic center. Strengthening efforts at participation by training leaders that can affect public opinion. Raising the level of consciousness of authorities and functionaries about the real value of the historic center of Quito.

Roque Sevilla
Ex-Mayor of Quito and President of the Pichincha Chamber of Tourism

A very important form of social participation was co-management with the neighborhoods. In the case of the historic center, this was especially important because it was a response to a moment of crisis. Public works were undertaken in neighborhoods with the support—both in materials and in manpower—of the users. The municipality contributed the technical direction and the majority of the materials. Working together enabled both a great sense of empowerment and real incorporation of the inhabitants and user in resolving their problems. In the historic center, the public works were mainly schools where parents and teachers participated actively alongside the municipality. In the Metropolitan District of Quito, 2,800 public works in two years were undertaken with this kind of community cooperation.

In terms of the historic center, it is imperative to focus on a balance of uses. For example, it is essential to balance the conservation of religious monuments with the tourist attraction of said churches, monasteries, and convents. In the first, the most intimate private character is present; the second, on the other hand, is a public use. In these religious sites in Quito, to the contrary of what happens in other parts, the majority of the people are

praying and a small minority is visiting as a tourist. It is important that this reality be maintained. That is to say, the religious elements present in the center should not become excessively touristy.

The public space of the rest of the historic center functions in a similar way. In the Plaza Grande, the majority of people gathered are enjoying the public space, the tourists are watching how the inhabitants enjoy the space. This is not something arranged for the benefit of tourism; it is authentic. Public goods that become excessively touristy lose their raison d'etre. The permanent inhabitants are displaced by the temporary ones, which in this case would be the tourists. The tourists do not create any sense of belonging. In fact, their excessive presence makes this feeling disappear because they do not belong there.

One could also mention political activities from demonstrations to repression, and that is part of everyday real life. If we have to protect the historic area at all costs, perhaps these activities are not the most convenient, but real political life, the authenticity of the recourse of protest, is important for the life of the center. The balance can be created with the very community activities that impart a sense of belonging. It is necessary to protect authenticity with forms of social participation involving the local community.

Having citizen participation is an ideal that has real limitations. The challenge is in knowing to what extent there should be direct participation and to what extent there should be delegation through a representative. It is not possible to expect participation that deals with small details—not on every topic, at least—because popular election would not have any meaning then. Nevertheless, it is important to strengthen systems of popular consultation by sectors, in which everyday topics affecting the neighborhood can be discussed, filter individual aspirations, and make them collective. If they are too individual they should be dealt with as such. Of course, there are topics that the whole population should be consulted about and they are those that directly affect the quality of life of the population. Nevertheless, many topics should be addressed through delegation because that is the raison d'etre of democratic representation.

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