COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

BULLETIN

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Dear Colleague:

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. in late 1991 with the help of a generous three-year grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War emerging from previously inaccessible sources on "the other side" of the superpower rivalry that dominated international relations after World War II.

The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and aims to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former "Communist bloc" with the historiography of the Cold War evolved over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history.

The project is overseen by an advisory board chaired by Prof. John Lewis Gaddis of Ohio University, and including Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Deputy Director of the Wilson Center; Prof. Warren Cohen of Michigan State University; and Prof. William Taubman of Amherst College. Inside the Wilson Center, the project is located in the International Studies Program, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak, and run on a day-to-day basis by Dr. James G. Hershberg.

The project's undertakings fall under several categories:

First, by publishing the *Bulletin* and periodic *working papers* (see page 27), CWIHP hopes to serve as a bulletin board and clearinghouse for information on new sources, findings, and activities related to Cold War history.

Second, CWIHP awards *fellowships* to young historians of the cold war from

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Post Cold War Sources:

REPORT FROM EASTERN EUROPE

In November 1991, CWIHP researcher ***P.J. Simmons*** *visited Budapest, Prague and Warsaw to investigate the situation of Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Polish archives relevant to Cold War research. His findings are based on interviews with scholars and archivists in the three capitals, and are available in more extensive form in a working paper ("Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw") obtainable free of charge on request from CWIHP.*

The situation and conditions of access to archives in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw differ strikingly. Yet one all-too-familiar theme of the communist period is sadly common to all three—the importance of personal connections and influence. Existing archival laws are sufficiently vague to give archive directors room for wide-ranging interpretations. Consequently their decisions to provide documents are often based on the extent an archivist trusts or knows the scholar or institute seeking access. Yet the extent to which influence plays a role varies greatly in these countries, and a wealth of information concerning the post-war period is nevertheless now available.

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Report from Moscow:

SOVIET ARCHIVES: The Opening Door

By James G. Hershberg

For Cold War historians, frustrated for decades by the secrecy enshrouding the Soviet archives, the long wait appears to be ending. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist Party last year and the rise of a fledgling democracy in Russia prompts high hopes that scholars will finally be able to sift through the secret files of Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev to explore the myriad mysteries and controversies of the Soviet-American relationship and the Cold War era. Indeed, since last August's failed coup, the international race to exhume discoveries from the Soviet crypt has produced a fast-growing number of ambitious initiatives, agreements, exchanges, and plans for scholarly cooperation and publications involving Russian and Western partners, as well as a stream of titillating revelations.

At the same time, the excitement has been tempered by the continuing political and economic crisis in Moscow that is complicating efforts to organize and make available for international scholarly research the vast amount of Soviet state and party materials inherited by the Russian Government. Logistical, technical, political, bureaucratic, psychological, and fiscal obstacles will inevitably hamper a smooth and rapid transition to archival transparency and accessibility. Already, confusion over rules, jurisdic-

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INSIDE:

Tactical Weapons Disclosure Stuns Gathering

The Havana Conference On the Cuban Missile Crisis:

No event in the Cold War has received more popular and scholarly attention than the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet only recently has the study of the crisis expanded beyond the United States to include scholars and officials from the Soviet Union and Cuba. In this article, ***Raymond L. Garthoff*** *reports on a meeting of U.S., Russian, and Cuban scholars and officials (including Fidel Castro) in Havana in January to discuss the crisis. It culminated a five-year international scholarly experiment, organized at first by Harvard University's Center for International Affairs and later by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University, in what its sponsors called "critical oral history" — the synthesis of recollections of participants with declassified documentation and the analyses of historians. The first gathering, in March 1987, involved only U.S. scholars, officials and documents, but three Soviets attended the second meeting, held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that October. A third conference, sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences, was held in Moscow in January 1989.*[1] *For the first time Cubans participated, and they subsequently offered to host a meeting. After a preparatory session in Antigua in January 1991, and after considerable uncertainty over the declassification of documents by all three governments and over the Soviet collapse, the Havana meeting finally took place, yielding new disclosures and a further exchange of views among Americans, Cubans, and, now, Russians. Garthoff's report:*

In addition to further documents and some new participants from all three countries, President Fidel Castro attended the entire three days of formal conference meetings and provided his own recollections and interpretations, as well as introducing some new materials: the Soviet-Cuban agreement on stationing Soviet forces in Cuba, two letters from Khrushchev to Castro, and Castro's conversations with UN Secretary General U Thant.[2] The Soviet military also reported some interesting new (but not documented) information. A few days earlier, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the National Security Archive, the State Department released those Kennedy-Khrushchev letters concerning the crisis that had not previously been available.[3] The Havana meeting was a useful and successful conclusion to the series of conferences.

Highlights of the Havana conference can be summarized under four headings, reflecting a subjective analytical framework, but concentrating on what was new.

Factors Leading to the Crisis. From the Moscow conference on, three different perspectives were developed: the Cubans (and Soviets) emphasized what they had perceived to be a growing threat of U.S. invasion throughout 1961-62, the Russians stressed their desire to deter an American attack on Cuba and later to get U.S. assurances against an invasion, and the Americans highlighted concerns over Cuban subversion and threats to U.S. security allegedly presented by a Cuban-Soviet military tie confirmed by the secret installation of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba. As the three sides attempted to integrate these perspectives at Havana, the most interesting new element was Castro's declarations that: (1) the Cubans had accepted the Soviet offer of missile deployment not to defend Cuba, but to strengthen the camp of Socialism in the global correlation of forces; and (2) he now believed that the main Soviet motivation had been to shore up Moscow's then very weak position in the strategic nuclear balance with the United States. Moreover, he acknowledged that he had, in 1962, believed Soviet propaganda about being stronger than the United States in missiles, and indeed only now at the Havana conference had come to realize how weak the Soviet Union was then. "If I had known," he said, "I would have counseled prudence."

This Cuban view intersected sharply divided views among the Americans; some had concluded that the Soviets' primary motivation was to deter a U.S. attack, as the Soviets had claimed, while others continued to believe (as almost all had in 1962) that defending Cuba had been only contributory to Moscow's principal interest in improving its strategic position.

Nature of the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba. Beginning at Moscow, and in still greater detail at Havana, the Soviets disclosed the extent of the nuclear and conventional buildup in Cuba their country had planned and actually carried out in 1962. The intermediate-range missile force was sufficiently identified by U.S. intelligence at the time: 24 launchers for SS-4 (R-12 in Soviet designation) missiles with ranges of 1,020 nautical miles (n.m.), and 16 launchers for SS-5 (R-14) missiles with ranges of 2,200 n.m. Deployment of the SS-4 launchers fully equipped with missiles was completed during the crisis; the SS-5 facilities were still under construction and the missiles were in transit when cut off by the U.S. "quarantine" blockade. What U.S. officials had not known during the crisis was whether the nuclear warheads were yet in Cuba; in October 1962 it was believed they probably were not, but the consensus prudent assumption was nonetheless that they must be assumed to be there. At Moscow a Soviet general said that 20 warheads reached Cuba and that 20 more were cut off in transit. At Havana, a different Soviet general—General of the Army Anatoly Gribkov, who was responsible for planning the operation in 1962—said they had assigned fifty percent refire missiles (36 in all), and the 36 nuclear warheads for the SS-4s were there; those for the SS-5s, as well as the SS-5 missiles themselves, he confirmed, never reached Cuba. (The best retrospective U.S. intelligence analysis concluded that probably 24 nuclear warheads for the SS-4s had been there.)

By far the most interesting and unexpected revelation was a statement by General Gribkov that the contingent of Soviet ground troops in Cuba also had available six short-range tactical rocket launchers with nine tactical nuclear warheads (in the 2-25 kiloton range) for contingent use against any U.S. invasion force that landed in Cuba. While U.S. intelligence had spotted the dual-capable tactical (30-40 km. range) rocket launchers in 1962, there was no evidence, and no presumption, that they were armed with nuclear weapons. But the most alarm-

ing disclosure was General Gribkov's assertion that the Soviet military commander in Cuba (General of the Army Pliyev) had been given discretionary authority to fire the tactical nuclear rockets at a U.S. invasion force if he considered it necessary, without need to seek further authority from Moscow. (Not the least disturbing aspect of the discussion that followed was General Gribkov's apparent inability to understand why his disclosure caused such consternation among the Americans—and this from the man who had been chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact from 1976 through 1988!)

Historians must also ponder the belated realization that the Soviet expeditionary force included not only the 40 strategic missile launchers but also a ground, naval, and air defense combined command (a "Group of Forces") totaling some 42,000 men, about twice the size estimated by U.S. intelligence after the crisis, and four times the number estimated at the time the missiles were discovered. In 1962, U.S. intelligence identified 4 reinforced motorized rifle regiments, 4 coastal defense cruise missile sites (with 8 launchers and 32 missiles), 12 missile-armed patrol boats, 24 surface-to-air missile sites with 144 launchers, 42 MiG-21 fighters, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers. But they were assumed either to be weapons that Moscow had provided to the Cuban armed forces or, in the case of the four army regiments, to have been sent to protect the Soviet strategic missile sites. U.S. intelligence missed altogether 20 launchers with 80 conventionally armed cruise missiles for tactical ground force support; the cruise missiles were sighted but assumed to be backup for the similar coastal defense launchers.

What if the Soviet Union had sent only a conventionally armed combat force to Cuba? President Kennedy had warned against that possibility, but it would have been much more difficult to argue that the force posed a threat to U.S. and hemispheric security. What if the Soviet Union and Cuba had publicly announced their plans to deploy Soviet forces, even the missiles, in Cuba? The Cuban leadership wished to do so, and urged at least publication of an agreement on stationing Soviet forces that had been negotiated and drafted that did not explicitly mention the missiles. But Khrushchev insisted on doing it surreptitiously and planned to spring the deployment on the United States in late November as a *fait accompli*.

Management of the Crisis. This subject for twenty-five years dominated discussion of the crisis, and to a large extent the first three conferences. But at Havana there was little more to add, with one major and one minor exception. The minor one was a further explanation (beyond the Moscow conference) of the Soviet decision to shoot down the U.S. U-2 aircraft on October 27, resulting in the pilot's death and spurring fears of further military escalation. It now is clear that local Soviet air defense commanders decided, once Castro had ordered his own anti-aircraft artillery into action, to interpret freely their own instructions to fire only in case of hostilities, or if attacked (we don't have the text). For this initiative—important in Washington's deliberations, and so unexpected by Khrushchev that at first he believed the Cubans had shot the plane down—the local Soviet military command received only a mild reprimand from Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet Defense Minister.

At the Moscow conference, Sergei Khrushchev (son of the late Soviet leader) had said that Castro had urged his father to initiate a nuclear strike on the United States if it invaded Cuba. Castro denied later press reports of that disclosure that he had recommended a "preemptive strike," and last year released the text of his message of October 27.[4] But the text seemed to justify the charge—Castro urged Khrushchev that in case of an invasion the Soviet Union "must not permit the creation of conditions such that the imperialists dealt a nuclear strike on the USSR first." In Havana it became clear from Castro's own explanation that he had regarded an invasion to destroy socialism in Cuba as an attack by Imperialism on Socialism, so that a Soviet nuclear strike on the United States would be a response to an aggression already launched. As a tactical matter, he reasoned, Khrushchev should not wait for the United States to strike the first blow on the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, of course, did not see things that way and would not have regarded a U.S. invasion of Cuba as an attack on the Soviet Union or as an initiation of a global war. But Castro, it now appears, was thinking in those terms.

Settlement after the Crisis. In view of the fresh release of the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters and press coverage placing emphasis on the absence of a firm U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba,[5] the subject of Washington's assurances against an invasion was expected to be a lively subject at the conference. Yet there was no discussion whatsoever on this point until after the formal conference had ended. Then, at a joint press conference in Havana, the official U.S. view was given in answer to a question and Russian and Cuban objections were promptly raised. I believe the Russian representatives, aware of the differing U.S. interpretations, had preferred to leave the matter in abeyance. The Cubans had, of course, strongly argued to the Soviets in 1962 that the alleged U.S. assurances were worthless—and the U.S. position seemed to justify that criticism. In fact, President Kennedy had made clear publicly and privately after the crisis that the United States did not intend to invade Cuba. But the United States would not make any formal commitment unless it was clear and explicit that its obligations and rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Rio Treaty, and other treaties would not be diminished. In short, if the situation changed owing to Cuban or Soviet actions, U.S. hands would *not* be bound.

Fidel Castro reiterated the strong Cuban unhappiness over Khrushchev's actions in negotiating and reaching an agreement with Kennedy to conclude the crisis without even informing the Cuban leadership, much less consulting it. Castro and his associates resented the fact that this cut Cuba out of the action—Cuban desires and interests were ignored, and Cuba was not brought into a diplomatic dialogue with the United States.

Clearly, Castro saw the 1992 Havana conference not only as an opportunity 30 years later at least to enter the dialogue on past history, but also to get into a dialogue with the United States today as the Soviet Union vanishes and Russia rapidly disengages from the special relationship of the past 32 years. The Havana conference represented for Castro not only an opportunity to present for posterity his views on the 1962 crisis, but also to turn a historical review to current political purpose.

1. For the results of the Cambridge and Moscow Conferences, see James G. Blight and David A. Welch *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989; rev. ed., Noonday Press, 1990). Other recent reassessments include Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington: Brookings, 1987, rev.ed., 1989), and Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-*

1963 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).
2. Ed. note: The documents released by the Cubans at Havana are available from the Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, RI 02912, (tel.: 401-863-3465). See also statements at the Center's press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, 21 January 1992.
3. Ed. note: The newly released Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, dated between 30 October and 14 December 1962, offers a glimpse into the tense bargaining between the two leaders to defuse the crisis, as Moscow sought a lifting of the blockade of Cuba and Washington insisted that the Soviets withdraw their long-range bombers from the island as well as the offending missiles. For copies, contact the State Department or the National Security Archive (1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20036), which in cooperation with Prof. Philip Brenner of American University filed the Freedom of Information Act request that led to the documents' release. On 24 April 1992, the National Security Archive released several hundred additional documents relating to the crisis which it obtained from the State Department through a FOIA lawsuit.
4. Available from the National Security Archive--ed.
5. "The Cuba Missile Crisis: Kennedy Left a Loophole," *New York Times,* 22 January 1992.

Raymond L. Garthoff, a senior fellow at the Bookings Institution in Washington, D.C., was an analyst at the State Department during the Cuban Missile Crisis and later served as an arms control negotiator and as U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria from 1977 to 1979. He has authored numerous works on U.S.-Soviet relations and the Cold War, including Detente and Confrontation *and* Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Post-Cold War Sources:

NEW CHINESE SOURCES ON THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

By Steven M. Goldstein and He Di

Before the post-Mao reform movement, scholars studying China's foreign policy during the Cold War worked with documents familiar to students of Soviet foreign policy: official Chinese statements, contemporaneous periodical literature, American archival materials, etc. However, after the mid-1980's the situation underwent a dramatic change. Although the official archives of China remained inaccessible to most scholars, a wide range of materials became available which contained much new material on the major events and political figures of these years.

At a workshop on Chinese foreign policy held at Michigan State University on 1-2 November 1991 under the auspices of the Cold War International History Project, several papers which drew on these new data were presented on topics ranging from the origins of the Korean War to the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954 to China's role in the first Indochina War.[1] The purpose of this note is to introduce readers to the sources found in these papers as well as to discuss some of the opportunities and pitfalls inherent in their use.

In general, these materials can be placed under eight general rubrics:

a. **Collections Which Contain Previously Unpublished Speeches or Documents.** Included in this category would be: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong from the Period after the Nation's Founding] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987-1991, five volumes published thus far covering 1949-1955). This is a generally reliable compilation of original and unedited notes, letters and cables written by Mao to others—both Chinese and foreign (e.g. Stalin). This should be used in conjunction with other collections of Mao's writings such as *Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan* [Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1981) as well as with the published compilations of writings by other major Chinese leaders such as Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang and Chen Yun. *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan* [The Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990) collects some of the writings of China's first foreign minister and its premier until his death in 1976.

Document collections include: *Zhonggong zhongyang kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian* [A Selection of Chinese Communist Central Committee Documents on the Anti-Japanese National United Front] (Bejing: Zhonggong zhongyang tongyixian bu, 1984, three volumes); *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* [Selected CCP Central Committee documents] (Beijing: Zhonggong dang'anguan, 1987, fourteen internal volumes plus two supplements covering up to the early 1940s.) These documents are unedited and were selected from larger collections of documents found in Party archives. In contrast to Mao's five-volume *Selected Works* published from the 1950s until the 1970s, documents in these compilations have not been emended. The problem is rather one of selectivity—not all documents have been included.

b. **Diaries.** Included in this category would be that of the principal Chinese military adviser to the Vietminh, *Chen Geng Riji* [The Diary of Chen Geng] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984).

c. **Interviews.** Since the mid-1980s a number of scholars have had access to Chinese decision-makers and historians. In some cases the results have appeared in articles. In others, some of their substance has been published. An example of the former can be found in Han Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *The China Quarterly* 121 (March 1990), 94-115. An example of the latter is Warren Cohen, "Conversations with Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai's Associates Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940's and the Korean War," *Diplomatic History* 11:3 (Summer 1987), 283-89.

d. **Memoirs.** This is probably the area where the quantity of publications has been the greatest. Since the mid-1980s there has been a veritable flood of memoirs by China's political leaders and people close to them. The most important include: **Wu Xiuquan** (diplomat), *Zai waijiaobu banian di jingli* [Eight Years Experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1983), translated as *Eight Years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Beijing: New World Press, 1985); **Li Yingqiao** (Mao's bodyguard), *Zhouxia shentan de Mao Zedong* [Mao Zedong—No Longer a God] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenhua chubanshe, 1989); **Hong Xuezhi** (military figure), *KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huiyi* [Recollections of the War to Resist America and Aid Korea] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990); **She Zhi** (interpreter for Mao and Liu Shaoqi in talks with the Soviets) "Peitong Mao zhuxi fang Su" [Accompanying Chairman Mao on a Visit to the Soviet Union],

Renwu 2 (1988); **Liu Xiao** (diplomat) *Chushi Sulian banian* [Eight Years as Ambassador to the Soviet Union] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986); **Nie Rongzhen** (military figure), *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu* [Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing: Jiefang chubanshe, 1984) translated as *Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen* (Beijing: New World Press, 1988); **Wang Bingnan** (diplomat), "Zhong-Mei huitan jiunian" [Nine Years of Sino-American Talks] *Shijie Zhishi* 4-8 (1985) translated as "Nine Years of Sino-US Talks in Retrospect—Memoirs of Wang Bingnan," *JPRS: China Report, Political, Sociological and Military Affairs* 079 (7 August 1985); and **Bo Yibo** (party bureaucrat), *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [Reflections on Certain Important Decisions and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991).

e. **Official or Semi-Official Histories.** Such works are usually collective efforts which draw on unique access to archival material. Of particular use are histories of military institutions or activities which provide much information on Chinese security policy as well as on international cooperation and confrontation. Examples are: Han Nianlong, et. al., eds., *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese foreign affairs] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui kexueyuan, 1988); *Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanYue kangFa douzheng shishi* [A Factual Account of the Participation of the Chinese Military Adviser Group in the Aid Vietnam, Resist-France struggle] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990); Han Huaizhi, et. al., eds., *Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo* [The Military Activities of the Contemporary Chinese Army] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1989); Yang Guo, et. al., *Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun* [The Contemporary Chinese Navy] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1987); *Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun* [The Contemporary Chinese Air Force] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1989); *Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun* [The Diplomatic Experiences of the New China] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1990); and Sheng Zenghong, et. al. *Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangMei yuanChao zhanshi* [A Wartime History of the Resist-America, Aid-Korea War of the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1989).

Also useful are chronologies (*nianbiao*) such as *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao* [Major Events in the Party History of the Chinese Communists] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989); *Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishi nian, 1949-1989* [Forty Years of the Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1989] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989); *Nanfangju Dangshi ziliao dashiji* [Materials from the Party History of Southern Bureau, a Chronicle of Events] (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1989); and *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dashiji* [Chronicle of Events of the Chinese People's Republic] (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1989).

f. **Biography.** These are often hagiographies rather than biographies, often taking the form of chronicles (*nianpu*), collected reminiscences of colleagues or more conventional narratives. Among the most useful are: He Xiaolu, *Yuanshuai waijiao jia* [Marshal, diplomat (biography of foreign minister Chen Yi)] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1985); He Jinxiu, *Mianhuai Liu Shaoqi* [Remembering Liu Shaoqi] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988); Jin Chongji, et. al. *Zhou Enlai zhuan* [A Biography of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989); Pei Jianzhang, *Yanjiu Zhou Enlai waijiao sixiang yu shijian* [Studying Zhou Enlai' s Diplomatic Thought and Practice] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989); *Chen Geng jiangjun zhuan* [A Biography of General Chen Geng] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988); *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949* [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989); *Zhu De nianpu* [Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986); and *Dong Biwu nianpu* [Chronicle of Dong Biwu] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990)

g. **Monographs or articles.** These are usually by scholars or bureaucrats who have been granted unique access to archives, personal papers and historical figures. Examples include: Yao Xu, *Cong Yalujiang dao Panmendian* [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985); Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, *Panmendian tanpan* [The Panmunjom Negotiations] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989); Supplementary Issue on the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu* [Studies in the History of the Chinese Communist Party]; Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi yijiusijiu nian mimi fangSu" [Liu Shaoqi's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in 1949], *Dangde wenxian* (Party historical documents) 3 (1989); and Huang Zhen, *Hu Zhiming yu Zhongguo* [Ho Chi Minh and China] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987).

There are a number of magazines that routinely carry articles of historical interest: *Zhongyang wenxian* [Central documents]; *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu* [Studies in the History of the Chinese Communist Party]; *Junshi yanjiu* [Studies in Military History]; *Junshi ziliao* [Materials in Military History]; and *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao xuanbian* [Selected Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party].

h. **Fictional Accounts.** It is not uncommon for historical novels to lend insights into the background of actual events. However, they are still fiction and must be used warily. One prominent example: *Hei xuezi* [Black Snow] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1986), a novel of the Korean War.

Let us close with a few *caveats*. First, readers should know that this inventory is limited in two senses. We have only presented materials from the period of the Cold War which was covered at the workshop (the late 1940s through the mid-1950s) and, even within that period, we have merely presented a sampling of the available materials.

Second and more important are the qualitative limitations of these materials. Since the readers of this newsletter are not without experience in the uses of these types of materials, it may be presumptuous for us to add some cautionary notes; but they are in order. Although they add geometrically to our knowledge of the events of these years, none of these sources is pure archival data in the strictest sense of the word. Researchers must not allow their excitement over the richness of these new materials to dull the intellectual skepticism and sensitivity to context that are so necessary in analyzing any body of historical documentation.

For example, as noted above, there is no assurance that the documentary collections are complete. Moreover, the body of memoir literature is vast and is in need of a more thorough evaluation than can be provided here. Such writings are, of course, vulnerable to the special pleadings of the source as well as to the fallibilities of aging memories. These problems seem to be particularly com-

mon in those memoirs that have been written by the historical figures themselves (e.g. Liu Xiao). Recently, writing groups have been organized by leaders and given access to their archives. The quality of these works is much higher than that of their predecessors, although they often seem more like archival collections than memoirs. Examples of such works are Bo and Hong's memoirs.

Because so little of the policy process in China is documented, interviews are particularly important. Chinese scholars have been actively interviewing since 1986 and in recent years many non-Chinese scholars have also done so. Of course, facts referenced as "interview with an official" with no further attribution, and even the infrequently available interview protocols, should be used at the scholar's own risk. Where possible, such interview material should be checked against documentary information or other interviews. Still, despite all the pitfalls, interview material can be extremely valuable to the judicious researcher. Finally, when dealing with secondary works based on archival resources, we are at the mercy of the author's judgement as well as the limitations of the materials to which he or she may been given access.

However, perhaps the most important area for researchers to exercise caution is in regard to the political context within which published materials emerge. Very often historical figures such as Mao or Zhou are cast and recast to suit present political needs. Similarly, the presentation of past diplomacy has clearly been shaped by contemporary circumstances. For example, the relative abundance of materials on Chinese aid to Vietnam during the 1950s is unquestionably related to Beijing's efforts to score propaganda points by demonstrating Hanoi's ingratitude for past generosity. Similarly, the complex configuration over the past decade of China's relations with North Korea, the United States, and the Soviet Union has undoubtedly influenced the quantity and substance of recent documentation.

The domestic political context is also important. Most of this new material became available in the post-Mao reform period—particularly after 1978 when greater intellectual openness and a mandate to scrutinize the past encouraged their publication. The impact of the Tiananmen events of 1989 has been somewhat contradictory. Publication of new works has continued. This can be attributed to the desire of many of China's aging leaders to publish their memoirs as well as to the simple fact that much was already in press at the time of the demonstrations. However, in general, it has been noted that the materials now becoming available seem more repetitive and less revealing than has been the case in the past.

Still, despite all these cautionary notes we should not lose sight of the fact that the study of China's foreign policy has been enriched enormously by the release of materials such as those described above. It would be no exaggeration to say that our understanding of post-revolutionary Chinese diplomacy has been advanced more in the past five years than in any other period since 1949. Indeed, at no time in the last forty-two years has it been so absolutely essential for students of China's foreign policy to keep up with the scholarship of the Chinese themselves. It has become an indispensable and exciting source of knowledge that is likely to grow in importance in the years ahead.

1. Chen Jian (State University of New York at Geneseo), Qing Zhai (Auburn University) and Zhang Shuguang (Capital University) presented papers that are pioneering works in the skillful use of the sources discussed below. (Chen Jian's paper, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," is available as a working paper from the Cold War International History Project.) In addition, Chen Jian was kind enough to share additional papers with us. The bulk of citations listed below come from these fine papers. We thank these scholars, as well as Nancy Hearst, for sharing their materials and knowledge with us.

Special note should also be made of another article on this topic which discusses several of the sources included here: Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems," *The China Quarterly* 122 (June 1990), 258-72. This article provides important information on the nature, origins, opportunities, and pitfalls of this new documentation.

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Cold War International History Project

Continued from page 1

the former Communist bloc (including but not limited to the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China) to study in the United States and to work in U.S. archives. Agreement has been reached for the scholars to be based at George Washington University's Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies. The initial round has resulted in grants to: **Vladimir Batyuk**, Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Moscow (6 months); **Chen Xialou**, Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies, Beijing (3 months); **Csaba Bekes**, Institute for the Study and Documentation of the 1956 Revolution, Budapest (3 months); **Ilia Gaiduk**, Institute of General History, Moscow (6 months); **Petr Mares**, Charles University, Prague (9 months); and **Niu Dayong**, Department of History, Beijing University (1 year). We welcome additional nominations and applications (with CV, three letters of recommendation, and a proposed research project).

Third, CWIHP will organize *international conferences and meetings* for scholars from east and west to present and debate new findings. So far, workshops have been held on Chinese foreign policy last November at Michigan State University and on Soviet archival sources in January at the Institute of General History in Moscow. CWIHP is exploring ideas for future conferences, including a proposed meeting in Moscow in cooperation with the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, which contains the files of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, and with the Russian Academy of Sciences. CWIHP also organizes a *speaker series* at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. (For further information on CWIHP activities, see the box on page 22.)

I hope you will check the box on the enclosed insert indicating your desire to continue receiving the *Bulletin*, and I look forward to working with you in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Jim Hershberg, Coordinator

EASTERN EUROPE

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HUNGARY

GENERAL RESEARCH CLIMATE

Among the three countries visited, I found the situation of archives and research in Budapest most encouraging. In 1989, a "30-year rule" was passed at the urging of historian and then-Cultural Minister Ferenc Glatz. This new law effectively opened access to most State and Party records up to 1961. Several problems remain, however: individual archives and departments can arbitrarily deny any requests they view unfavorably; the Cultural Ministry— which generally controls all archives except the Party Archives—is heavily staffed by bureaucratic holdovers from the communist era; and existing legislation on the major issues of declassification and personal rights to privacy is either unclear or nonexistent. Nevertheless, permission to research documents created over 30 years ago is almost always granted, and exceptions to the 30-year rule are increasing.

Paradoxically, the Party archive is the most easily accessible, according to Hungarian researchers. This relative openness derives from the Socialist Party's struggle to maintain control over its documents. A movement is underway to transfer the authority over the party archive to the State, and the Socialist Party is trying to impede this movement by avoiding accusations that it withholds information or blocks access.

A relatively new group, the Committee for Contemporary History (whose board includes György Litván, director of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution), is trying to promote the opening of archives through the legislative process. Committee members and many archivists recognize the need for legislation that more precisely clarifies the meanings of "personal rights" and "state secrets." Under the current ambiguous laws, archivists make their own legal interpretations, and thereby assume ultimate responsibility for the release of sensitive information. So although archivists wield considerable power in making declassification decisions, they also risk future political backlash and legal action. Presently, however, there are no bills under consideration that would establish clear criteria for archive-related decisions involving personal rights or declassification. Therefore archivists can be expected to remain justifiably cautious of providing access to personal papers and information they fear will be misused for sensational purposes.

The archivists' and researchers' fears of being accused of "misusing" personal information were exacerbated recently by the passage of a law aimed at punishing former communist officials. In November 1991, the Hungarian Parliament approved a law lifting the statute of limitations on "treason, murder and grievous harm committed in the name of communism." In March 1992, however, the Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled that the November law was "vague, ambiguous and unreliable" and found unconstitutional its provision to remove the statute of limitations (*Washington Post*, 4 March 1992). One suspects that this ruling may lead to a less incendiary and vengeful political atmosphere and therefore to a more liberal and less fearful situation for researchers and archivists alike.

A related committee of the Council of Ministers was created in August 1991 to oversee the declassification process. This declassification council includes representatives from the offices of the Prime Minister, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, Finance Ministry, State Prosecutor, and the director of the New Hungarian Central Archive, István Vass. It is currently reviewing sensitive documents of the late 1940s for declassification.

Overall, gaining access to archival information in Hungary is relatively easy; however, connections play a significant role when one is trying to *locate* documents. Archivists exert considerable control over the research process by denying or offering information that facilitates the location of documents. The more connections one has, the greater the likelihood of finding important papers.

Researchers interested in working in any Hungarian archive are advised to contact the director of each archive first. The director will then forward research proposals, usually with a recommendation, to the ministry that created the documents. If permission to research is secured, however, it does not automatically entitle a researcher to publish documents. Special permission is almost always needed to publish documents from Party archives, and it is sometimes required from other archives. Since legislation governing publication of such information is broad, it is important that appropriate permissions be obtained. The directors of both the State and Party Archives insist that foreign and domestic researchers are treated identically and are governed by identical rules.

INDIVIDUAL ARCHIVES

The Archives of the Institute of Political (formerly "Party") History

This archive remains under the control of the Hungarian Socialist Party. It contains Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) documents which are well organized and easily accessible to 1961. The collection was expanded in 1989 when the Social Democratic Party, Hungarian Peoples' Party, and the Smallholders' Party relinquished their documents to this archive. Of greatest interest to Cold War researchers are: materials of the Politburo, Central Committee, and Secretariat; documents of various organs of the Central Committee such as the International Department, Propaganda Department, State Economic & Administrative Department, Organizing Committee, and Military Economic Committee; and materials of various secretaries, including those of Gerö, Nagy, Farkós, and Rákosi.

On 1 October 1991, a new director, György Földes, was appointed to replace Sandor Balogh. Földes' deputy who oversees international affairs-related documents is Dr. Székelj. Hungarian researchers from the 1956 Institute and Institute of History find this archive to be most accessible among the Hungarian archives, and view Földes as likely to waive the 30-year or "personal rights" rules.

The documents here may clarify inter-bloc relations, Soviet-East European relations, Soviet-Yugoslav relations (since Hungary was assigned the lead role in the bloc in representing Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia), and Soviet-West European relations.

In addition to the HSWP documents, the archive also holds Russian documents concerning the USSR's attempts to conceal its involvement in the 1956 invasion and in various show trials, including the January 1957 trial of József Dudas, the leader of the "Hungarian Revolutionary Committee." In addition, there are evidently quite interesting letters from Rákosi to Stalin and to Dimitrov, the Bulgarian party leader who was Secretary-General of the Comintern and

who oversaw inter-bloc affairs. Some documents here— as well as in the Interior Ministry— reveal connections between the KGB and the Hungarian Secret Police, but access to them requires permission from the less cooperative Interior Ministry.

Miklós Dérer, a founder of the Center for Security and Defense Studies, explained that documents of the Military Economic Committee would reveal the Hungarian Communist Party's attitude towards Soviet military goals and agenda more than any in the archives of the Institute of Military History. Party archive director György Földes said some Warsaw Pact proposals and minutes of full sessions can be found in this archive, but the related military contracts, plans and strategies can only be found at the Institute of Military Affairs.

In 1990, the Institute of Political History published a general "Fund List" of its holdings, organized by topic. More detailed finding aids on individual topics exist, though finding aids for post-1957 documents are less comprehensive and are under revision. Documents affecting "personal rights" require special permission from the director.

The New Hungarian Central Archive

This archive houses all central State documents from 1945 to the present. It includes papers from all ministries (except the Ministries of Interior and Defense), the Council of Ministers, the Parliamentary Commission, the Prime Minister's office, the People's Patriotic Front and other state-controlled organs such as the Refugee Office. Documents are well organized and generally accessible to 1961. Access to documents whose release would affect "personal rights" (such as debates concerning the appointment of a new ambassador or high official or personal information on an accused criminal) is problematic and dependent on individual cases. An unpublished, general list of holdings is available to researchers upon request, and several detailed finding aids exist for individual topics—many of which are in manuscript form. This archive appears to be adequately staffed and helpful to researchers, and the director recently decided to provide researchers with *all* finding aids.

The director, István Vass, seems inclined to grant researchers exceptions to both the 30-year and "personal rights" rules. He was described by one young researcher as "kind and liberal."

Each government ministry is required to deposit documents older than 15 years at this Central Archive. However, each ministry has the broad right to retain any documents it uses regularly. According to Vass, the Interior Ministry has not complied with this requirement to surrender documents since it plans to create its own archive.

Similarly, the Foreign Ministry has not turned over all its documents older than 30 years, but instead retains some important historical documents because it considers them "operational documents." Vass has no idea which records are being withheld, so he cannot catalog the foreign policy documents which may still be at the Foreign Ministry. However, he believes that most Foreign Ministry documents created before 1975 have been turned over.

The 30-year rule generally applies, except in the following circumstances: (1) a 70-year rule "to protect the individual" applies to documents of the State Prosecutor's Office concerning closed hearings; (2) A 50-year rule applies to all other documents which might adversely affect an individual; (3) documents originally designated as "classified" which have not yet been declassified (about 1200 meters of Council of Ministers documents and 800 meters of Foreign Ministry documents out of 20,000) are presently unavailable. The last category requires "special permission," leading researchers to claim that access is more difficult than at the Party Archives. Some researchers, such as Union College political science professor Charles Gati, have been granted special permission to view many of these documents.

Photocopying is uniformly allowed except for documents requiring special permission to be researched. In that case, special permission must also be granted to photocopy and publish materials.

Foreign Ministry Documents (not yet surrendered to New Hungarian Central Archive)

The post-1945 Foreign Ministry documents are supposed to be forwarded to the New Hungarian Central Archive, yet numerous documents are still held at the Ministry as "living documents." Access to documents still possessed by the Ministry is difficult to obtain and requires special permission from the Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry. To view Ministry documents, one must first approach the director of the New Hungarian Central Archives, who will then submit an application to the Foreign Ministry. Among those documents available at the Ministry are interesting papers on the Comintern materials, as well as aide-memoirs recounting visits by Soviet officials.

Some Hungarian researchers have waited six months for approval of research applications, while others have utilized personal connections in the Ministry and have thus gained speedy access. István Vida and his colleagues at the Institute of History have been the most successful at retrieving important Foreign Ministry papers, as evidenced by their numerous foreign policy publication projects.

But for scholars without connections, access has been elusive. One prominent young researcher reported his research efforts had been repeatedly frustrated by "mindless" bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry. He said the excuses given for keeping certain foreign policy documents classified are "frightening" and reflected bureaucrats' ignorance of foreign policy matters. Apparently, he said, many ministry officials fear the release of certain documents would harm Hungary's "world image," potentially "upsetting the British or the Americans." He noted that if the bureaucrats had read appropriate volumes of the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, they would realize that many of the very documents they perceive to be sensitive have already been published in the West.

In contrast to the situation at the Institute of Political History, the Foreign Ministry requires special permission be obtained for the photocopying of any materials.

The Interior Ministry Papers

The Interior Ministry is required to deposit its papers in the New Hungarian Central Archive, but it is withholding documents with intent to create its own official archive. The ministry's most valuable papers to Cold War researchers reportedly include the intelligence department papers of the State Security Police and reports of foreign embassies in Budapest that were intercepted by the Ministry. Access is difficult, and researchers are often denied access for reasons of "reorganization" and "disorder." According to 1956 Institute director György Litván, the documents concerning political investigations are well organized, while those of the Ministry itself are in

complete disorder.

The new director of the documents collection at the Interior Ministry is Gábor Baconi. His cooperation is essential to winning access. Yet his relatively liberal influence is hampered by the foot-dragging of the bureaucratic holdovers who actually review documents and release only a handful of "appropriate" ones. Baconi said that the 30-year rule generally applies, except in the following cases: (1) a 50-year rule for State Prosecutor's documents; (2) a 70-year rule for personal papers and documents; (3) a 90-year rule for documents concerning someone whose name was changed (presumably for espionage purposes). Foreign researchers need permission from both Baconi or the Interior Minister and the Foreign Ministry.

I learned of only a few researchers allowed to review Interior Ministry documents. They include Professor Charles Gati and four members of the 1956 Institute—György Litván, János Rainer, Eva Stándeisky and András Hegedüs. Litván has played a key role in gaining access for researchers, and has been asked by the Ministry to write recommendations for individual researchers applying to work in the Interior Ministry. According to Litván, Charles Gati has been most successful, and the others have seen quite a number of key documents.

Those who emerged successfully from the lengthy application process have been given the documents that the Ministry bureaucrats (former secret police members, not archivists) have deemed relevant to their topic. According to one researcher, "the Ministry provides free coffee and even free photocopies—but no finding aids." Baconi quipped that the only finding aid he could offer would be a "long conversation." Scholars who learn of the existence of certain documents before applying have a clear advantage. Yet, without permission to sift through documents and review inventories, most researchers can see only what the Ministry wants them to see.

Even with access to Interior Ministry documents, researchers will not benefit from complete files in the Interior Ministry because of deliberate document destruction on at least two occasions. The first occurred in the early 1960s, when a secret party resolution called for the destruction of papers relating to Laszlo Rajk's trial; a second wave reportedly coincided with the rise of non-communist leaders in Hungary during the winter of 1989-90.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

GENERAL RESEARCH CLIMATE

Researchers interested in delving into the Prague archives should initially expect considerable frustration. A 50-year rule exists concerning document release, archives are short-staffed and inadequately funded and organized, and scholars interested in Cold War research are in short supply. In addition, information is often contradictory and hard to come by, and one must often dig deep below the surface to uncover the reality. Yet those who persevere will find that what appears at first to be impossible is often quite possible in the end.

For example, one can often turn a seemingly bleak situation into a bright one through the use of good connections. Similarly, scholars can usually bypass obstructionist bureaucrats and gain access to documents by winning the trust of the right authorities. Archivists are still reluctant to trust and grant access to newcomers. In this reluctance one sees much of the legacy of the communist period: people are still hesitant to give information freely, to take responsibility for their actions, and to trust others. They are especially wary of allowing researchers to sift through unorganized files; this is a major hindrance, since most State and Party documents are not well organized. Researchers who understand the concerns of archivists and approach them accordingly may ultimately be most successful.

The archivists' hesitation to provide freer access is also partially due to fears generated by the recently enacted and controversial *lustrace* or screening law, which aims to identify collaborators of the communist regime and to prevent them from holding office in the civil service. In this climate, archivists are understandably wary of anyone who is seeking out information solely for its sensational value. In addition, archivists face mounting pressure from the State Prosecutor's office to restrict access.

A new law on archives has been proposed to the Parliament that would reduce the 50-year rule to a 30-year one. Though it will likely encounter little opposition once it reaches debate, the bill's passage has been delayed due to the Parliament's current preoccupation with the fate of the federation itself. Lawmakers were advised by the Czechoslovak "Council of Archivists" as the law was being drafted, but the Council has since been ineffective in promoting the law's passage. The Council's chair, Ivan Hlavácek, believed the group would have no influence in speeding up the legislative process.

INDIVIDUAL ARCHIVES

The State Archival Administration

This body, headed by Dr. Oldrich Sládek, oversees all the State and Party archival documents in Czechoslovakia, except those of the "special" archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Ministry, post-1949 Interior Ministry documents, National Museum, and Chancellory of the Presidency. The Administration provides only technical advice to these "special" archives. According to Sládek, "the directors of individual State archives make the final decisions" regarding permission and exceptions to the 50-year rule, but he can greatly influence the process. He said, however, that exceptions are rarely granted unless a research project is part of a government-sponsored project or program.

The Central State Archive

The Central State Archive's director, Ivan Pechácek, seems very cooperative. His archive holds most State documents and since January 1991 has also controlled the documents of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz).

The CPCz documents were poorly organized before the transition to the Central State Archive, and the archivists here have had neither the staff nor the funds since to improve the situation. At present, there is only one archivist working exclusively on revising the existing vague inventories and organizing the CPCz documents. The archivists themselves are not yet entirely familiar with the contents of the CPCz collection, and have not had much time to evaluate existing finding aids since much of their time has been spent on research for official government projects. They readily admit that outside researchers probably know more details about the contents of the CPCz archives than they do.

The archivists showed us general inventories of documents but would not provide copies because they said they were too "incomplete" and "inadequate." They insisted that finding aids are readily available to researchers, and that good finding aids

exist for documents up to 1965. The present state of disorganization and the shortage of archivists, however, are the major impediments to allowing access. Nevertheless, Pechácek insists that he will allow serious foreign researchers to work with documents more than 30 years old, as long as they respect the personal rights of those mentioned in the documents. One can be optimistic that Pechácek will follow through on this commitment, as he and Sládek have allowed some members of the Institute of Contemporary History and the Institute of International Relations to research CPCz documents created before 1961.

The CPCz collection includes all documents from the Central Committee archives, documents of all CPCz decision-making bodies, and papers, memoirs, photographs and other items from the former Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee. Sládek of the Archival Administration suspects that many documents of the Internal and Security Departments of the CPCz are missing, as are documents of other Central Committee CPCz counterparts to state departments. Some of these documents are now suspected to be housed in the archives of the former Soviet Union.

Besides the CPCz collection, the Central State Archive houses documents of the Office of the Prime Minister and all the federal government ministries, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defense Ministry, and post-1949 Interior Ministry documents. The post-1949 Interior Ministry documents are under the control of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and are generally inaccessible. The Prime Minister's Office documents, however, are well organized to 1964 and easier to research. In general, all of these State documents are much better organized than CPCz documents, yet only 15 archivists are assigned to all documents from 1945-1991. Consequently, scholars cannot expect the poorly paid and understaffed group of archivists to locate documents quickly. Researchers are thus encouraged to request specific documents and boxes by number whenever possible.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives

Though researchers may be told that access to Ministry documents younger than 50 years is nearly impossible, one should nevertheless persevere. The director of the MFA Archives, Marta Kapalínová, and her deputy director, Véra Kozinkova, generally do not make exceptions to the 50-year rule, but may consider if convinced that a researcher will use information responsibly. The directors encourage foreign researchers interested in working at the archive to become affiliated with a Czechoslovak institution first. Chances of approval would be better with affiliations, they said, since these institutions would be less inclined to use materials for commercial purposes.

CZECH COMMISSION NEEDS WESTERN AID TO PUBLISH DOCUMENTS ON PRAGUE SPRING

The Government Commission to Analyze the Years 1967-1970 has set up an Editorial Board to oversee the publication of Czech sources on the history of the Prague Spring. It hopes to publish by the end of 1993 a nine volume collection of formerly secret documents in Czech and Slovak as well as a one volume abridged edition in English. The entire set is expected to total 5,000 pages and cost more than 1,000,000 Czech crowns (about $30,000).

The Board seeks financial aid to subsidize the project. Interested individuals or institutions may contact Prof. Radomir Luza, History Dept., Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118, (504) 865-5162.

Foreign Ministry documents older than 50 years are well-organized and completely accessible. And despite the absence of computers and a staff of only three people, even later records seem to be in excellent order through at least 1970, with detailed finding aids prepared by professional archivists. While many subject inventories exist, only chronological inventories are available for the Cold War period. Finding aids covering documents younger than 50-years are only available to researchers whose application for research has been approved.

Kapalínová says she hopes the 30-year rule will be passed, since the ambiguities of the present law put her in a difficult situation. When the law is passed, she said, approving access will be a mere formality and "everything will be available—including previously classified materials." The only exception will be documents concerning personal property or violating personal privacy. Kapalínová said "personal" documents are already physically separated from other documents, so there will be no need for a formal declassification process.

Military Archive

This archive, formally controlled by the Federal Ministry of Defense, receives only technical advice from the State Archival Administration. The directors of the archive cannot allow researchers to review documents without permission of the Ministry, which is extremely difficult to obtain.

Archivists said that finding aids do not exist for the years 1947-1955, that post-1955 materials are better organized, and that materials from World War II are in the best condition. While more important documents on decision-making will undoubtedly be found in Party archives, researchers in the Military Historical Institute said interesting documents do exist in the Military Archives— including papers of political organizations established to maintain Party control over the army.

Oddly, the Military Archive has held the Benes archival collection since the former owner— the Institute of Marxism-Leninism— was evicted from its building. The Masaryk papers are contained here as well. The Benes papers are apparently well organized and less difficult to see than other military documents.

National Museum Archive

According to the director, Dr. Cechura, all documents in this archive are accessible to any researcher who will use materials for "serious purposes." Since the archive is not under Sládek's State Archival Administration, Cechura is able to grant exceptions to the 50-year rule and has thus far refused no one. This collection includes private papers which might be of interest to Cold War scholars, including 140 boxes of President Benes' personal papers, acquired when his widow died. Detailed finding aids exist, but have not been published due to lack of funds. A descriptive inventory of all the private papers collections is available.

Interior Ministry Archive

I did not meet with the director of this archive, Mr. Frolík, but was repeatedly told that access to documents of the Cold War period would be nearly impossible. According to Czech scholars, the heads of the Ministry's collection are not archivists, but former secret policemen who are not willing to grant exceptions to the 50-year rule. As a result, scholars doubt that even the directors know exactly what information the files hold.

The Institute for Contemporary History

is the only institute of which I am aware which has an agreement with the Ministry. The Ministry has agreed to provide data to the Institute on the dates of death of ex-diplomats and ambassadors who were purged after 1948. No one in the Institute, however, enjoys direct access to the archive. There is little hope that anything will change before the passage of the 30-year rule.

Archive of the Chancellory of the Presidency

The documents of the President's Office are located in the "Hrad" (Castle) and organized under two categories: (1) "general" documents existing to 1964; and (2) "secret" documents existing to 1953. The Benes, Masaryk, and other collections were originally sent to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and are now housed at the Military Archives and the CPCz archives.

Until recently, very few historians were allowed to work in this archive. Yet the director, Eva Javoroká, is more than willing to allow researchers to use documents younger than 50 years, provided the documents are organized. She showed me inventories of documents, organized chronologically and sometimes by subject, for both the general and secret collection. The general documents, consisting of such items as birthday wishes to Gottwald, seem irrelevant to most Cold War topics. Yet the secret documents might be useful, and titles listed in the inventory include: confiscation of land of dissenters and collaborators; American Embassy in Prague; American military material; takeover and purges; Czechoslovak diplomatic mission reports; prosecution of German war criminals; Czechoslovak delegations to the U.N.; Czechoslovaks in Poland; refugees; secret Slovak radio broadcasts; requests for pardons for collaborators. Many items in the Archive are duplicates of documents in the MFA and Interior Ministry Archives.

POLAND

GENERAL RESEARCH CLIMATE

The number of serious historians actively working on recent history has dwindled to a small number, due to a massive migration by historians from academia to public service. Researchers in Polish archives must contend with a host of obstacles similar to those in Czechoslovakia, including a strict 30-year rule, bureaucratic holdovers reluctant to provide information, and disorganization due to lack of space, understaffing, and poor funding.

Yet the greatest challenge to Polish and foreign scholars interested in the Cold War period is the necessity of tracking down private collections to obtain the most interesting documents. Apparently, very few minutes were taken at high level meetings after 1948 due to fears of Soviet recrimination and mistrust among the Party elites. Because of the unusually gradual transfer of power to non-communist forces, the ruling communist elites had ample time to confiscate remaining sensitive and/or incriminating documents from archives, files and private safes.

To make matters worse, Polish scholars and journalists said, numerous documents were destroyed— especially in 1955-1956, 1970, and August 1989. The 1989 burning of documents reportedly took place two weeks after the Sejm created a special commission to study the activities of the secret police. As a result, the archives are apparently missing crucial documents, such as many minutes of Politburo and other high-level meetings. Hence, connections to those who know "who has what" play a crucial role in conducting successful research on the contemporary period. In addition, most researchers believe that connections are vital in obtaining permission to research within the 30-year limit.

A new law on archives has been proposed which would more clearly define rules concerning document access and organization of archives. It has been virtually ignored, however, due to the confusion surrounding the November 1991 elections and the formation of a new government.

INDIVIDUAL ARCHIVES

Supreme Board of National Archives

As in Czechoslovakia, a central body oversees all archives, except for "special" archives such as those of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defense. Its director is Marian Wojciechowski, and foreign researchers must secure his permission to work in the Central Archives of Modern Records. Wojciechowski says he abides firmly by the 30-year rule, and will only make finding aids available once permission to research is granted. He said inventories are available only to 1958, and that none can be seen for the 1960s or later. He also said that his permission is required before publication of any materials from the Central Archives.

Central Archives of Modern Records

This archive preserves 15 kilometers of Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) documents, as well as all post-World War II State documents (except post-1944 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministry files). Regional Party documents are held in the 17 district Party Archives. Included are files of the Central Committee of the PUWP and its various key organs, including the International Department, the Council of Ministers, the Chancellory of the Parliament, the Supreme Control Chamber, and the Central Planning Office and other central administration offices. Also available are trade union documents and workers' movement materials from as early as the mid-19th century. Private collections include those of B. Bierut, W. Gomólka, J. Bermen, Z. Modzelewski and materials and memoirs of other PUWP officials. While the minutes of many key Politburo meetings are said to have been destroyed or fallen into private hands, political scientist Andrzej Paczkowski reported seeing some minutes of Politburo meetings from as recent as January 1990— three weeks before the Party dissolved itself.

Archivists here said that Party documents were well organized to 1970, yet historian Andrzej Garlicki said that finding aids are often vague and documents are misfiled. The archive is now organizing the PUWP documents and revising finding aids, and approximately ten people are assigned to the task. The director feels this is an adequate number of experts to arrange the materials. A total of 90 people are employed at the Central Archives.

The Central Archive's director, Bogdan Kroll, has worked at the archive for 20 years, serving as its director for the past ten. Edward Kolodziej, the chief of the archive's Department of Information, has been employed by the archive for 27 years. Kolodziej told me that all documents older than 30 years are fully accessible, but that exceptions to the 30-year rule are rarely granted. He contradicted Wojciechowski of the Supreme Board of National Archives by insisting that researchers with permission to work in the archive are entitled to publish any materials over 30-years old without prior

approval. He also said that the archive is working with the Pilsudski Institute in New York and Maciej Siekierski of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace to exchange documents and microfilm. The archive hopes to obtain many important Foreign Ministry documents of the World War II period now only available at Hoover.

The archive is moving many documents to a larger building since it has no more room to store documents. Only five people are coordinating the move. Three major complications have resulted: (1) state agencies and ministries are forced to withhold many important documents due to "lack of space"; (2) ministries can conveniently cite the space problem if they do not wish to surrender sensitive documents; and (3) researchers are often told that documents are "unavailable" since they are being "moved," yet they have no way of verifying such information or tracking down documents. Andrzej Garlicki told me that in some instances, people have waited 2-6 months for specific documents they requested.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive

Marek Sedek, a professional archivist, has been the director of this archive since the fall of 1990. The MFA Archive holds post-World War II documents, while older documents are being handed over to the Central Archives of Modern Records. Sedek said he would allow access to files older than 30 years, though he must first receive permission from the director general of the Ministry, Ryszard Fijalkowski.

One third of the finding aids are arranged in card catalogues, while the remainder is in the form of "lists of transfer"—the lists created when documents were relinquished by various departments of the Foreign Ministry. Although the most important documents concerning foreign affairs are in the Party Archives, various cables and reports of ambassadors and embassies may prove interesting.

Office of State Protection (UOP)

This office, according to Wojciech Roszkowski, is comparable to the FBI and holds the important materials of the Interior Ministry. Access to archival documents is extremely difficult, and many important materials are still considered "operational" and are therefore inaccessible. According to Andrzej Paczkowski of the Institute of Political Science, a "gold mine" of interesting documents exist here, yet there are virtually no finding aids. Consequently, one is often a "servant of the archivists," who provide what materials they deem relevant and appropriate for research projects. He told me that the 30-year rule is irrelevant here if you have good contacts, and suggests that researchers write to the Ministry with detailed proposals well in advance of arriving.

Paczkowski is one of the few scholars allowed to work in the Office of State Protection on the Stalinist period. His contacts have allowed him to access to important, classified materials, including orders from ministries— organized in 100 volumes chronologically—concerning all security matters, such as preparations to arrest "collaborators" or suspect individuals; the organization of secret agents before planned demonstrations on the anniversary of 1956 events; minutes of high-level meetings on security issues, organized chronologically so he can determine which items are missing; and documents linking activities of the Polish Secret Police (UB) with those of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak police.

Military Documents

Little is known about the documents at the Central Army Archive or the files of the Army's General Staff, located in the outskirts of Warsaw. Military documents are still considered to be "top-secret"—even for the 1940's and 1950's The Minister of National Defense can technically intervene and grant access to researchers, but I learned of no researchers for whom any exceptions had been made. Scholars interested in military documents should contact Dr. J. Poksínski at the Academy of National Defense.

Paczkowski said, interesting and more accessible military documents of the Polish Border Security Service are located are located in Ketscyn, about 200 kilometers from Warsaw. He believes these hitherto unexplored materials concerning Poles who escaped the country might interest Cold War historians and should be researched.

P.J. Simmons, a graduate of Tufts University, spent a year in Belgrade as a Fulbright Scholar. He will enter the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy in the fall of 1992.

SOVIET ARCHIVES

Continued from page 1

tion, and norms of scholarly conduct has become rampant. It is a sad irony that contemporaneous with the disappearance of long-running political obstacles to unfettered historical research in the former Soviet Union (censorship, closed archives) , economic pressures are provoking many researchers to shift into business ventures to obtain the hard currency they need to keep food on their tables. Still, barring the resurgence of dictatorial rule, the flow of events clearly points to a dramatic increase in the accessibility of Soviet and Communist archives compared even to the flowering of glasnost during the 1985-91 reign of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and, eventually, to undreamed of opportunities to research and write the history of the Cold War on the basis of significant access to the internal documents of both major actors.

These are among the conclusions that emerge from conversations and published reports in recent months on the situation of archives in the former Soviet Union.[1] This report draws on various sources, especially: comments by Russian historians and archives officials gathered during visits to Moscow in January and March by representatives of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), which organized a workshop on Soviet Cold War sources in coordination with the Institute for General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences; detailed surveys of the post-coup Soviet archives situation by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted;[2] and presentations by scholars and archivists, including the head of the Russian Government's archives commission, Rudolf G. Pikhoia, to a conference sponsored by the Norwegian Nobel Institute and held near Oslo, Norway, on 28 February-1 March 1992.[3]

To put the present situation in context, a brief look back is necessary. While Gorbachev's glasnost significantly relaxed taboos on the discussion of sensitive "blank spots" in Soviet history, permitted the emergence of a far more self-critical analysis of Kremlin actions by Russian scholars, and fostered a more liberal attitude toward cooperation with Western historians, only a trickle of internal documents on the post-World War II era became available for scholarly study. Moreover, the entrenched state bureaucracy of the Communist era — embod-

ied by *Glavarkhiv*, the Main Archival Administration of the USSR Council of Ministers, and its cautious leader, Feodor Vaganov —kept a firm grip on the archives system and regulations, closely monitoring and tightly restricting outsiders' access to the records most vital to the study of Soviet foreign policy and the Cold War.[4]

After the failure last August of the hardliners' coup in Moscow, President Boris Yeltsin moved quickly on behalf of the Russian Federation government to seize control of the records and archives of the old guard institutions accused of supporting the military takeover. Reasoning that "the CPSU was part of the state apparatus," Yeltsin issued on August 24 decrees placing the archives of the Soviet Communist Party and the KGB under the authority of the Russian government's Committee for Archival Affairs (*Roskomarkiv*), and local police and prosecutors impounded records belonging to both in search of incriminating evidence.[5] Rudolph G. Pikhoia, an historian of prerevolutionary Russia from Yeltsin's political base of Sverdlovsk (now Yekatarinaburg), chairs the Russian Committee on Archival Affairs, with Anatolii Stefanovich Prokopenko, Vladimir Alekseevich Tiuneev, and Valerii Ivanovich Abramov as deputies.[6]

Pikhoia's commission was given broad authority to chart the new direction of Russian archival management, although of course in conformity with Yeltsin's own wishes and in consultation with the Russian parliament, which created its own commission on archival matters, headed by military historian Dmitrii Volkogonov. Pikhoia also has considered a number of Western initiatives, including an effort by the Library of Congress to begin exchanges of archivists, documents, scholars, and exhibitions, and a technically ambitious plan put forward by the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution, and Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe to begin putting the Russian archives in desktop-accessible computer storage.[7] According to a recent interview with Pikhoia, another "memorandum of intention" envisions microfilm copies of materials from both Hoover and Russian state archives to be deposited at the Hoover Institution and the Library of Congress in the United States, and at *Roskomarkhiv* and the Lenin Library in Moscow. The British publishing firm Chadwyck-Healey is to handle worldwide sales and marketing, with proceeds divided among themselves, *Roskomarkhiv*, and Hoover, Pikhoia noted.[8]

In late 1991, as the all-union government staggered toward official dissolution in December, the transition to Russian authority over archives accelerated despite resistance from *Glavarkhiv*. With *Glavarkhiv*'s official disbanding, *Roskomarkiv* took full authority to oversee archival affairs in the Russian republic and took control over the Soviet archival agency's vast network of assets and holdings.[9]

The scale of the takeover was massive — and simply taking inventory of the holdings of the Soviet state and Communist Party has proven to be a time-consuming and complicated task. Pikhoia reported recently that the number of files under the control of the Russian Government jumped from 100 million files at the beginning of 1991 to over 204 million files a year later, including 70 million files of the defunct Communist party, 4 million files belonging to the KGB, and 20 million files previously under the control of *Glavarkhiv*.[10] As the USSR officially lapsed, moreover, the preservation and organization of the archives of 72 Soviet ministries that had gone out of existence suddenly became the responsibility of the financially-strapped Russian Government, Pikhoia said.[11]

Although most of the documentary collections appear to be well-preserved (with the exception of potentially-incriminating records destroyed as last August's coup went down to defeat), Russian archival officials universally bemoan shortages of technical equipment needed to process, declassify, and handle the expected flood of requests for, documents. When speaking to archive officials, it was common to hear pleas for photocopiers, paper, microfilm readers and cameras, and fax machines, as well as for money to pay trained staff. Besides the general economic collapse, contributing factors to the sad state of affairs include the devaluation of the ruble, which has left many archivists and scholars receiving monthly salaries of 500 or so rubles (about $5), and the termination or drastic curtailment of state subsidies as the archives system and the Academy of Sciences institutes network shifted from Soviet to Russian control.[12]

(Nevertheless, the Academy of Sciences institutes continue to be important centers of academic research and logical contact points for Western scholars, particularly the Institute of General History, the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, the Institute for Slavic and Balkan Studies, the Institute of the Far East, and the Institute of International Economic and Political Studies [formerly the Institute for the Study of the World Socialist System]. In addition, a growing number of private enterprises have been created by scholars offering translation and research services in exchange for hard currency; though such groups could serve a valuable function for foreign scholars lacking Russian language skills or resources to visit Moscow, their reliability and capabilities remain to be tested. Two groups soliciting inquiries are the **Russian Scientific Foundation**,[13] created in the summer of 1991 by scholars of the USA/Canada institute, and the **Social-Scientific Center for Humanitarian Problems** [*Obschchestvennyi Nauchnyi Tsentr Gumanitarnykh Problem*] at Moscow State University.)[14]

The status and fate of the archives have also been clouded by the legal and constitutional vacuum opened up by the lapsing of Soviet authority and the rough transition to Russian rule, and by the uncertainty looming over the Commonwealth of Independent States. As of last fall, the all-union USSR Congress of People's Deputies was considering competing draft laws on archives, but that debate was mooted when the Congress went out of existence and decision-making power passed to the Russian government. In the Russian parliament, a draft law on archives has been under consideration since last fall; scholars say it contains some ambiguous language but generally favors the principle of equal scholarly access (for Russians and foreigners alike) to materials more than thirty years old and enjoins state agencies from destroying records. As of late April 1992, no final action had been taken on the bill. When and if it passes, however, the archives law must also be meshed with new legislation on secrecy that is expected to establish criteria for deciding what sort of materials can finally be released.[15] On 14 January 1992, Yeltsin issued a decree "On the protection of state secrets" that reportedly barred the release of minutes of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU less than ten years old, to all KGB and GRU (Central Intelligence Department)

documents, and to materials related to CPSU foreign policy for the period 1961-1981.[16] However, as of late April, a detailed law on secrecy still awaited parliamentary approval.

Until the legal situation is clarified, U.S. and Russian scholars say, the potential is increased for mercenary exploitation and abuses since individual Russian archivists and officials, under intense economic pressures, are tempted to make deals to grant exclusive access to high-paying Western customers. "Why should I bother to talk to you when German television will offer us $20,000 for one file?" a senior Russian archives official asked us during our visit to Moscow in January. At one major archive, officials said individual researchers would be given equal access to archival materials—but then offered an exclusive access agreement in exchange for a lump sum payment of $25,000 to pay staff salaries. Though few cases have been documented, stories abound of Western professors and journalists handing out $100 bills to Russian archivists or former officials to buy access to documents.

Many Western scholars warn that such practices will hamper the development of fair policies and procedures to permit scholars full and equal access to Soviet archives, with less wealthy or connected scholars frozen out; they may also inflate Russian expectations, causing documents to be dribbled out piecemeal to the highest bidder. One appeal to U.S. scholars to refrain from exploiting the current "anything goes" atmosphere in Moscow emerged from an academic meeting last fall sponsored by the Social Science Research Council. "Unfortunately," its authors stated, "the dramatic relaxation of traditional Soviet restrictions on permissible research activities has prompted some Western and Soviet researchers to engage in practices whose long-range consequences could be detrimental to the health of scholarly research on the Soviet Union, its history and its culture." In particular, the authors discouraged practices leading to "hierarchies of access" and urged scholars to assure that their contacts with and any payments to Russian partners do not create bad precedents that will hamper the creation of normal and uniform policies for archival access.[17]

Russian political and psychological sensitivities also pose dangers to future prospects for open archival access, particularly in the turbulent atmosphere of post-revolutionary Moscow. There is, to start with, a large percentage of archive workers who were trained as *apparatchiks* under the communist regime, when archives dealing with sensitive political, military, and foreign policy topics were designed to serve the party and state, not independent researchers. In this context, even the routine provision of finding aids to scholars is a major breakthrough. But as Patricia Grimsted notes in her new report on the subject, even with new regulations mandating openness, the extent of support, flexibility, reference aids, and accessibility considered normal and prerequisite to foster "intellectual access" in Western archives may develop slowly. "Time will tell," Grimsted concludes, "how quickly nascent computerization under democratically-oriented new regimes can counteract the legacy of seventy years of authoritarian rule and ideological restraints on access to information that have shaped archival policies and procedures."[18]

Misunderstandings between Russians and foreigners trying to adjust to the new situation constitute another potential trouble spot. Some Russian archivists and scholars may resent any implication, even unintended, that Western scholars have gained the upper hand as a result of Russia's political and economic problems, and are likely to demand reciprocity in exchanges and collaboration as evidence that they are not simply selling off Russia's treasures (or even photocopies of them) to foreigners. The newspaper *Izvestia* and the archivist Yuri Afanasiev, rector of the Russian State Humanitarian University, are among those who have raised questions about *Roskomarkhiv*'s dealings with Western partners, suggesting that Pikhoia may have sold the rights to microfilm copies of archival materials too quickly and for too low a price. While applauding the principal of exchanging information, Afanasiev lamented what he said was the "incomprehensible speed and secrecy with which these deals are being made" and asked: "Aren't we rushing to hand things over—even if for a seemingly large sum—large chunks of our historical memory?" Pikhoia promptly contested such charges and asserted that the arrangements that *Roskomarkhiv* was contemplating with Hoover, Chadwyck-Healey and other foreign partners were equitable and mutually profitable and in the best interests of Russian and world scholarship.[19]

These concerns can also reverberate politically, as was shown in two recent incidents that drew much comment in Moscow. Historians scavenging the Comintern archives reported locating a 1943 letter from the Italian Communist party leader expressing indifference to the fate of tens of thousands of Mussolini's troops held in Soviet prison camps. The discovery elicited pained protests from communists and an official inquiry in Italy. Nevertheless, Pikhoia insisted that he would not constrict access.[20]

Another, potentially more serious controversy erupted in early February when, in the midst of the British election campaign, the London *Sunday Times* printed what it said was evidence from Central Committee archives documenting a cozy liaison in the early 1980s between the Labor Party and its leader, Neil Kinnock, and the Soviet Embassy in London.[21] The story caused an uproar in England, and it was later shown that the records were essentially routine and also documented conversations with Conservative officials. But complaints arose in Moscow that foreigners were gaining privileged access to documents, and that sensitive materials on foreign relations had been improperly and prematurely disclosed.

Archives officials denied any impropriety. But Sergei Mironenko, deputy director of the archive housing the Communist Party Central Committee files of the post-Stalin era, said the incident "made us understand that before giving out such delicate internal documents, we must expose them to a serious examination. What is more, we have no law on state archives in Russia. We are operating in a legal vacuum. We must be very cautious."[22]

Finally, issues of personal privacy also have political implications. As in Eastern Europe, political, academic and archival figures must balance imperatives to study and ventilate past abuses and at the same time to safeguard the privacy rights of individuals; this dilemma is particularly acute in the case of the KGB (see below). Pikhoia said current plans call for a 75-year restriction on materials that impinge on personal privacy, except for official documents and those documenting state persecution or criminal activity.[23]

MAJOR RUSSIAN ARCHIVES RELATING TO COLD WAR HISTORY

Communist Party Archives

Since last August, two major centers have been created by the Russian Government to house collections of CPSU documents; their somewhat cumbersome names reflect both the changed political situation and a declared ambition to become scholarly research centers as well as mere storage facilities.

1. Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, also translated as the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents *[Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi dokumentatsii — TsKhSD]*. Address: ul. Ilyinka [formerly ul. Kuibysheva], 12, driveway 8; 103132 Moscow; Metro: Kitai Gorod; Telephones: 208-3814; 206-2936; 206-2321; 206-5228. Key officials: director, **Rem Andreevich Usikov**; deputy director, **Sergei Vladimirovich Mironenko**; director of publication department, **Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernous** (formerly director of the Moscow Obkom and Gorkom Party Archives).

The Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD) houses the CPSU Central Committee Archives from October 1952 through August 1991, as well as selected earlier materials transferred from the Central Party archives because of their sensitivity or usefulness to party and state officials in the post-Stalin era. Located in the former headquarters of the Central Committee in Old Square (Staraya Ploshad') near the Kremlin, the building and its vast central hall, now used as a reading room, drip with the red-carpeted splendor and iconographic solemnity befitting the nerve center of the CPSU apparatus.

According to one report, the materials are roughly divided into two main archives, the Party Leadership Archives [*Arkhiv rukovodlashchikh kadrov*], containing the files of ranking party officials, and the Current Affairs Archives [*Tedushchii arkhiv KPSS*] or Leading Bodies' Archives [*Arkhiv rukovodlashchikh organov*].[24] Although some of the most sensitive materials for this period, such as Politburo transcripts and the personal/political archives of Party general secretaries apparently remain in the Kremlin or Presidential archives (see below), the SCCD contains massive and well-preserved holdings documenting the internal workings of the Soviet Communist Party and its ties to Communist parties around the world. Included in its collections, said to constitute the largest archive in the former USSR but not necessarily declassified and available to scholars, are the papers of the Central Committee secretariat, whose departments dealt with both domestic and international affairs. A recent perusal of finding aids indicated that substantial materials exist on Soviet policy toward China, Eastern Europe, Austria, Germany, Indochina, and the Cuban Missile Crisis; materials on Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia are said by SCCD officials to be substantial, though there have been reports that documentation on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been deliberately destroyed. In addition, the Central Committee archives presumably contain reports from other agencies, such as the KGB and foreign ministry, that were used to formulate policy.

The SCCD's leadership troika presents an interesting assortment; director **Usikov** is a long-time official who has worked in the Central Committee archives for a generation; his deputy, **Mironenko**, a much younger man, specialized in 19th-century Russian history until receiving his new assignment last fall from Pikhoia and *Roskomarkhiv*; **Chernous**, who formerly headed the Moscow Obkom and Gorkom party archives and was deputy director of the Scholarly and Information Center for the Political History of Moscow, has gained a particularly good reputation among Western visitors for his cooperative outlook in working with outside scholars; he is currently overseeing the new SCCD reading room, open two-and-a-half days a week as of 2 March 1992. All express interest not only in joint ventures with Western academic projects, but in developing the SCCD as a research center in its own right as well as a resource for outside scholars.

A major problem in using the SCCD archives concerns declassification. A vast majority (estimated at from to two-thirds to 95-98 percent)[25] of the thirty million files of Central Committee materials at the SCCD is still secret, particularly those dealing with international affairs, and problems involved in declassification range from political sensitivities to legal uncertainties to fiscal austerity. At a news conference on February 25 heralding an exhibition of documents and the opening of a reading room for outside researchers, it was announced that initial research would be confined to internal records of the Central Committee's domestic departments, with access probably granted for materials more than ten years old. The release of foreign relations materials will be delayed, however, pending clarification of declassification procedures, SCCD officials said.[26]

2. Russian Center for Preservation and Study of Contemporary Historical Documents, also translated as Russian Storage and Research Center for Documents on Recent History *[Rossiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii]*. Address: Pushkinskaia ul., 15; 103009 Moscow; Metro: Pushkinskaia; Telephone: 229-9726; 220-5112, 292-5951; 292-9566. Key officials: director, **Vladimir Petrovich Kozlov**; deputy directors, **Oleg Vladimirovich Naumov**, **Kiril Andersen**, **Yuri Nikolayevich Amiantov**; director of publications & research, **Yuri Alexeyevich Buranof.**

Known until last October as the Central Party Archives (TsPA) of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism (later renamed the Institute of the History and Theory of Socialism), the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Contemporary Historical Documents contains the holdings of the Soviet Communist Party central committee and leadership from the Bolshevik revolution through the 19th CPSU party congress in October 1952. In addition to housing the archives of the original Institute of the History of the CPSU and of the October Revolution, it holds Lenin's personal papers and collections of papers of many other leading Russian and European Communists, including Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Zdhanov, Vyshinsky, Molotov, and others. (According to Pikhoia, it is also destined to receive much of the so-called Stalin papers, although the timing and terms of the transfer remain unknown; see below.)

Although the center contains only about 1.5 million files as compared to SCCD's 30 million files, reports indicate that historians of the Cold War's origins and early evolution will find much of interest here, including extensive documentation of relations between the Soviet communist parties and its counterparts in Eastern Europe, Germany, and the Far East; materials relating to the creation and activities of the Comintern and Cominform; and Central Committee, Secretariat, and Politburo materials that could

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A DIPLOMAT REPORTS

By Scott Parrish

Nikolai V. Novikov, *Vospominaniya Diplomata: Zapiski 1938-1947* [Recollections of a Diplomat: Notes, 1938-1947], Moscow: Politizdat, 1989.

Despite all the revelations about Soviet history which have emerged from the former Soviet Union in the past few years, many unexplained "blank spots" remain. This gap in understanding is especially evident in the area of Soviet foreign policy, which was among the last issues to be opened to public discussion under Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of glasnost. One question of great interest which remains relatively undocumented concerns Soviet foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War. We still have a very incomplete picture of both how that policy was formulated and on what information it was based. Nikolai V. Novikov's memoir, *Reflections of a Diplomat*, makes some small contributions to filling in some of those blank spots, although it leaves many questions unanswered.

Novikov, who served as charge d'affaires and then ambassador at the Soviet embassy in Washington from 1945 to 1947, has become familiar to many Western scholars as the author of the recently declassified and released "Novikov Letter," a report on American foreign policy written in September 1946.[1] His memoir, published in 1989, offers some additional insights into the sources of the letter itself, the Soviet perception of the United States in the period 1945-47, and the functioning of the Soviet diplomatic service during those years.

Novikov's biography typifies the career pattern of many Soviet diplomats of his generation. In the early 1930s, in Leningrad, he took a degree in the economics of the Near East. After a few years in Soviet Central Asia, he returned to Moscow to pursue graduate studies and a career in academia. His ambitions were cut short, however, by the closing of his institute in 1938. He was then drafted, over his objections, into service at the purge-depleted Commissariat of Foreign Affairs because of his knowledge of foreign languages and academic training. He thus entered the diplomatic service with relatively little specialized training, but, like many of his colleagues, nevertheless advanced rapidly because of the shortage of trained personnel resulting from Stalin's purges. Novikov worked until 1943 in the central apparat of the Commissariat, and then was sent to Cairo as ambassador to Egypt, where he also served as ambassador to the Yugoslav and Greek governments-in-exile.

In early 1945, Novikov arrived in Washington and assumed the duties of deputy chief of mission under then-ambassador Andrei Gromyko. Because Gromyko was constantly absent attending to other diplomatic business, such as the formation of the United Nations, Novikov quickly became charge d'affaires and de facto head of the Soviet embassy in Washington from January 1945 until his appointment as Gromyko's successor in April 1946. He remained in that capacity until his return to Moscow in October 1947. He was thus quite well situated to observe the transformation of Soviet-American relations in those years.

Overall, Novikov's memoir delivers a typical pre-glasnost interpretation of Soviet-American ties in the 1945-47 period. He never really deviates from the premise that it was U.S. "imperialism" which caused the falling out between Moscow and Washington after 1945. As in his "letter" of 1946, he never mentions the possibility that Soviet actions during these years could have reasonably aroused American suspicions. Although this portrait is one-sided, it should not be dismissed as mere posturing. By 1989, Novikov could have published an account more critical of Soviet policy. That he did not, and that his analysis utilizes the same terms and categories as Soviet public statements of the late 1940s, suggests that the views he expresses were sincerely held. His interpretation, then, should not be simply rejected, but rather looked upon as broadly indicative of Soviet perceptions of the United States at the time. One should not forget that even if Novikov constituted one channel of information about the United States available to the Soviet leadership at this time, he was an important one. From this perspective his views are worth examining, even if we do not know how much influence they had in the Soviet policy-making process.

In accordance with his overall interpretation, Novikov views Roosevelt's death as a turning point in American policy towards the USSR. While Roosevelt had pursued a far-sighted policy of cooperation with Moscow, Novikov views Truman as driven by altogether different motives. Novikov describes Truman's first speech before Congress, on 15 April 1945, as a call to "world hegemony," signalling a radical shift of U.S. policy. He also notes the negative impact on Soviet-American relations of the first meeting, later that month, between Truman and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov. Truman's uncompromising stance on Poland, Novikov recalls, caused the Soviet government to reach "the appropriate conclusions" as to the possibility of future cooperation with the United States.

Novikov goes on to observe that by the summer of 1945, Truman had removed most cabinet members who supported cooperation with the USSR, and appointed James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State. Describing Byrnes as an active proponent of a "bipartisan" foreign policy, Novikov argues that this policy was only a "screen for the interests of the monopolies within the country and the expansion of American imperialism abroad." After the appointment of Byrnes, Novikov writes, "there was no need of further speculation as to which direction the

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NEW EVIDENCE ON

"O prestupniix antipartiniix antigosudarstveniix diestviax Beria." ["On the Crimes and Anti-Party, Anti-Government Activities of Beria."] Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2-7 July 1953, from *Isvestia CC - CPSU*:1991, 1:140-214 & 2:141-208.

The minutes of the July 1953 Central Committee sessions discussing the alleged crimes of Interior Minister and secret police chief Lavrenti Beria are divided into two installments and found in the "Political Archives" section of the Isvestia CC - CPSU journal. Most of the key political figures of that time (Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Kaganovich) speak in the first section with the exception of Mikoyan whose address appears in the second installment.

The sessions occurred four months after the death of Stalin, and two weeks after the June 16-17 anti-communist uprising in East Berlin. The Soviet leadership, the transcript shows, is terrified by the ongoing exodus of East Germans to West Germany. At the time of the plenum Beria, the former head of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), has already been secretly arrested and expelled from the Party. He was accused of attempting to seize total power, being an imperialist spy, plotting to allow the German Democratic Republic

MOLOTOV REMEMBERS

By Woodford McClellan

Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz dnevnika F. Chuyeva [One Hundred Forty Conversations with Molotov: From the Diary of F.Chuyev], Moscow: Terra, 1991.

During a meeting at one of his dachas in the summer of 1945, Stalin pinned a map showing the new frontiers to a wall, stepped back, pointed to the north, said he liked what he saw. Same in the northwest: "The Baltic area—Russian from time immemorial!" He then looked to the east, now under the Soviet flag: "all of Sakhalin, the Kuriles, Port Arthur, and Dalny are ours—Well done! China, Mongolia, the Chinese Eastern Railway—all under control." Then, stabbing a finger at the southern Caucasus, he exclaimed "But *here* is where I don't like our frontiers!" (p. 14)

Reading The Boss's mind correctly, the Azerbaijanis demanded the doubling in size of their republic, chiefly at Iran's expense. They would seize a bit of Turkey in the bargain and give Ararat to the Armenians, perhaps to ease their minds about an enclave Stalin had mischievously given Azerbaijan years earlier: Nagorno-Karabakh. The Georgians, who knew Koba even better, claimed a piece of Turkish territory adjacent to Batumi on the grounds that some of their brothers—or maybe second or third cousins—lived there. The southern frontiers simply had to be redrawn (pp. 193-204).

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, who considered it his chief task as foreign minister "to extend the frontier of our Fatherland to the maximum" (p. 14), sounded out diplomatic opinion but found no support for the southern scheme. It's worth noting he thought there might be some.

Another project encountered a similar lack of enthusiasm:

> It wouldn't have been appropriate to take Manchuria. Impossible. Contradicts our policy. We took a lot . . . [but Manchuria] was quite a different matter (p. 101).

Born in 1890, when Alexander III was on the throne, Molotov died peacefully in his sleep ("went to Mogilyov Province,"[1] he said of contemporaries who predeceased him [p. 550]) in November 1986, six weeks before Gorbachev liberated Andrei Sakharov. Of the Communist Party's 88-year existence, he spent all but eight in its ranks: as CPSU full Politburo member from 1925 onwards, as chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars (Premier) from 1930 to 1941, and as Commissar (later minister) for foreign affairs from 1939 to 1949, and again from 1953 to 1956. To be sure, Khrushchev formally expelled him in 1962, but he continued to have all the rights and privileges of a high-ranking party retiree, and in another formality Chernenko brought him back into the fold in 1984.

For hundreds of hours over the last 17 years of his life, in what he called the "has-beens' hamlet" (p. 519) of Zhukovka near Moscow, Molotov regaled a young friend with stories and patiently replied to questions. The transcripts of 139 conversations—the "140th" was the neighbor's remarks at Molotov's funeral—added up to more than 5,000 pages, from which Felix Chuyev has distilled 700 for this eerily fascinating book, which in effect is Molotov's memoirs.

The spell is cast in the first few pages. One does not so much as read this book as engage in a one-on-one conversation with a major figure in a gigantic criminal organization. The answers come readily, couched not in anything resembling normal human emotions but rather in the stupefyingly cynical amorality that characterized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Minor poet,[2] major Stalinist, Chuyev is devoted to the Leader and his disciple. He concluded his funeral oration, "Today we bid farewell to Lenin's last coworker, a fighter for communism. . . ." (p. 553) That helps confirm this book's savage authenticity; it also renders an outside review of the tapes and transcripts—which we are unlikely to get—all the more desirable.

One may as well speculate about God's memoirs, several versions of which are being peddled in Moscow in these parlous times, as to raise the question of Stalin's. And because what Khrushchev concocted is so often dishonest, *Sto sorok besed* is probably the best—most accurate and useful to history—insider account we will ever have.

Contrast, for example, Khrushchev's lies, disavowals, and silence with Molotov's unreconstructed defiance:

> I have defended Stalin and defend him today, including the terror. I believe that, without terror, we wouldn't have gotten through the prewar period, and after the war we wouldn't have had a more or less stable situation in the country (pp. 338, 389-480).

> They say Lenin would have carried out collectivization without so much sacrifice. But how else could it have been done? I don't repudiate anything. We did it rather cruelly, but absolutely correctly (p. 227).

But Khrushchev, who reminded Molotov of a "cattle dealer" (p. 347), tried to slither away from responsibility in his own posthumously published memoirs:

> I've always stood for complete truthfulness before the Party, before the Lenin League of Communist Youth, and before the people—and I stand for truthfulness all the more now [late 1960s].

> Soon [after Kirov's murder in 1934] the political terror started. I caught only an

BERIA'S DOWNFALL

occasional, accidental glimpse of its inner workings.

> [After Stalin's death, f]or three years we were unable to break with the past, unable to muster the courage and the determination to lift the curtain and see what had been hidden from us about the arrests, the trials, the arbitrary rule, the executions, and everything else that had happened during Stalin's reign . . . Then came Beria's arrest and the investigation into his case. There were shocking revelations about the secret machinery which had been hidden from us and which had caused the death of so many people.[3]

This from a man who carried out mass murder in the Ukraine, where he became party first secretary in—fateful time!—January 1938.

Molotov was honest enough to defend the terror in which Khrushchev proved his mettle, but he maintained that it involved only clean kills. This exchange took place in October 1983:

> **Chuyev**: I've heard that you and Stalin issued a directive to the NKVD [secret police] instructing it to use torture.
> **Molotov**: Torture?
> **Chuyev**: Did that really happen?
> **Molotov**: No—no, there wasn't any of that (p. 396).

Chuyev compiles a montage of several such conversations, setting the scene by asking whether it was true, as Suslov charged, that Molotov once intervened to change a woman's sentence from ten years in the Gulag to death:

> **Molotov**: There was such a case. A decision had been made. I had a list [on which the woman's name appeared], and corrected it. So I did.
> **Chuyev**: Who was this woman, what was she?
> **Molotov**: That's not important.
> **Chuyev**: Why did the repressions extend to wives and children?
> **Molotov**: What do you mean, why? They had to be isolated to some extent. They would have spread all sorts of complaints, demoralization. That's a fact (p. 415).

Molotov would have found incomprehensible the charge that Stalin destroyed the country in order to save it. For him, the country—the nation—*was composed of* Stalin, his personal staff in the form of the Communist party, and a segmentally expendable service organization, i.e., everyone else.

His own words reveal Molotov to be an amoral, intellectually limited bureaucrat who thought in slogans, a man whose instinctual devotion to Stalin was that of a robot to its creator, a robot that could even be programmed to weep at the funeral. His dominant emotion was the anger that fueled his hatred of "imperialism," the "right deviation," Churchill, Truman, Khrushchev ("in his time a Trotskyite" [p. 392]), and ultimately Brezhnev, whom Molotov accused in 1986 of having resurrected the "khrushchevshchina" (p. 550).

Searching for a clue to the man's personality, one may ask what he felt for his wife, Polina Semyanova, in whose arrest he acquiesced without a whimper. This is what he tells us:

> It was my great good fortune that she was my wife. She was pretty, intelligent, and most important—a real Bolshevik, a real Soviet person (p. 473).

> Stalin came up to me in the Central Committee and said, "You've got to divorce your wife!" And she herself told me, "If the party needs this, then we'll divorce." Late in 1948 we did (p. 475).

When Stalin decided Polina Semyonova needed some jail time, that real Bolshevik went cheerfully, thanking him all the way. Her husband of course knew the charges were false (conspiring with Zionist organizations through Golda Meir, seeking to establish a Jewish autonomous region in the Crimea, planning an attempt on Stalin's life), but what could *he* do? He was Number Two "only for the press, for public opinion," and anyway, Polina "should have been more

Molotov on the Marshall Plan

Chuyev: In the West they write that failure to accept the Marshall Plan was a major mistake of Soviet diplomacy.

Molotov: It was the other way around—a great success. By the way, at first I agreed [with the Plan] and proposed to the Central Committee that we participate—not only we but the Czechs and Poles too—in the Paris Conference. But then I came to my senses and sent a second note the same day, saying: Let's refuse. We'll go, but suggest [to the Central Committee] that the Czechs and the others decline because we still couldn't rely on them or their experience.

And right away we passed a resolution and sent it around. We advised them not to agree, but they—especially the Czechs—had already made preparations. The Czech foreign minister was rather doubtful—I've forgotten, I think it was Clementis. Having received instructions from us not to participate, they didn't go.

Well, such a gang assembled there that you couldn't expect honorable relations. We clashed, and I gave as good as I got. It was just as well I didn't take along any aides who might have muddled the issue. Clementis, the Czechoslovak—such a Rightist, dangerous man. That was in 1948, after Benes.

There was a lot of confusion. But if <u>they</u> think we made a mistake in rejecting the Marshall Plan, that means we acted correctly. No question about it—today you can prove it the way you can two times two is four.

They'd have inveigled us into their company, but as a subordinate member. We'd have been dependent on them, but we wouldn't have gotten anything—we'd have been dependent, that's for sure. Even more so the Czechs and Poles—they were in a difficult situation.

Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, pp. 88-89

fastidious in picking her acquaintances." She had been on cordial terms with Solomon Mikhoels, for whom the NKVD had arranged a fatal automobile accident on Stalin's direct order (pp. 473-75).

Polina's first words on her release were, "How's Stalin?" When they told her they'd buried him two days earlier she surely wondered whether she had committed a mortal political sin, and in Beria's presence at that. But—outrunning her husband—Lavrenti Pavlovich merely rushed to embrace her, crying, "You're a heroine!" (p. 474)

In those few instances when Molotov concedes that innocent, loyal people—in his view a handful of obscure individuals—suffered and perished, the bloodshed troubles his sleep not at all. "There wasn't time or opportunity," he insists, "to sort things out" (p. 356). He defends the state murder of the military commanders on the ground that no one knew whether they would be loyal in the event of war—for which, he declares, "not even the Lord God could have been ready!" (pp. 35, 37, 544)

While Chuyev's conversations shed considerable light on the Soviet domestic scene, less than a quarter of the book deals with foreign policy. The 4,300 pages of transcripts Chuyev decided not to use must surely contain much more on that subject; *Sto sorok besed* aims chiefly to settle scores with Stalin's Soviet opponents, including posthumously "rehabilitated" victims. It outraged Molotov, for example, that his predecessor as foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov ("turned out to be quite rotten"), was not shot. "Only by accident," Vyacheslav Mikhailovich reveals, "did he remain alive."[4] (pp. 95-98) His first spectacular feat after replacing the Jewish diplomat was cutting a deal with that erstwhile Nazi wine salesman, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop: the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939. His second was convincing the West there was no secret codicil carving up Eastern Europe between Stalin and Hitler. So successful were his lies that Molotov apparently believed them himself: in April 1983 he repeated this one ("No, that's absurd") to Chuyev, who did not question it (p. 20).

Molotov had great misgivings about the wording of the Yalta communique and says he told Stalin that the American statement on the liberation of Europe was "too much." The generalissimo with the disgraceful record in two wars is said to have remarked, "Never mind . . . we'll work on it . . . do it our own way later." (p. 76)

Molotov detested Churchill as an "arch-imperialist" and mocked his prayers for Stalin's health (p. 71), but held him in wary respect. The Americans, whose politicians he dismissed as "stupid," rated his contempt (p. 77). He succumbed just a bit to Roosevelt's charm, accepting a night's lodging in the White House and an autographed photo ("To my friend Vyacheslav Molotov from Franklin Roosevelt"). He found Eisenhower "good-hearted," but a more typical assessment is this:

> Dulles was such a pettifogger . . . and his brother . . . an intelligence officer. These brothers were the sort who would pick your pockets and cut off your head in one stroke (pp. 69, 75, 77, 101).

This echoes—perhaps not accidently—Westbrook Pegler's characterization of Harry Truman, who next to Khrushchev was Molotov's darkest *bete noir:*

> thin-lipped, a hater, a bad man in any fight. Malicious and unforgiving and not above offering you his hand to yank you off balance and work you over with a chair leg, pool cue, or something out of his pocket.[5]

Molotov had a similarly shrill assessment of the term "cold war":

> I think it's Khrushchevian. It was in the Western press in Stalin's day, then came to us. "The Iron Curtain." Goebbels invented that, and Churchill used it a lot. That's for sure. But what does "cold war" mean? Tense relations. They were responsible. . .[perhaps because] we were on the offensive. They were of course bitter about us, but we had to consolidate our conquests. Create our own, socialist Germany out of a part of [the country]. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia—they were feeble, we had to restore order everywhere. Squeeze out capitalist regimes. That's the "cold war." Of course, you have to know when to stop. In this regard I think Stalin observed strict limits (p. 86).

The Soviet Union wanted peace, but "according to American plans, 200 of our cities would be subjected to simultaneous nuclear attack." Stalin, he indicates, did not share Mao's casual dismissal of The Bomb but had no doubt another war was coming: "The First World War ripped one country out of the grip of capitalist slavery. The Second created a socialist system. The Third will finish off imperialism forever." (p. 90)

War was always on Molotov's mind. Like so many desk-bound warriors he did not know how to use a weapon yet advocated violence as a means of settling almost every dispute. When on the eve of the 1972 signing of SALT I Chuyev observed that the Soviet people were fond of saying, "If only we can avoid war," he replied,

> That's a short-sighted Khrushchevian point of view. It's quite dangerous. We have to think about preparing for a new war. It will come to that. Yes, we've got to be ready. Then they'll be more cautious. . . (p. 95)

And four years later, even as the USSR seemed to be surging ahead in the arms race:

> Today we've dropped our trousers in front of the West. It's as though the main goal isn't the struggle against imperialism but the struggle for peace. Of course it's necessary to fight for peace, but you won't get anything with words and wishes—you've got to have strength (p. 109).

The heart and mentality of a bully lay behind that diminutive, grandfatherly, pincenez'd exterior. When the Latvian foreign minister came to Moscow in 1939 for what he hoped would be civilized negotiations, Molotov put him on notice: "You're not going home until you sign the unification agreement." (p. 15)

Stalin's creature reveals little really new about Soviet foreign policy. We learn a few details of the dreams of regaining Alaska; of the demand for joint control of the Dardanelles; of Libya and Iran; of expropriating some Greek shoreline to bestow on the Bulgarians; of Soviet options in the Arab-Israeli dispute; and of "salami-tactics" used by Moscow to consolidate control over East European satellites. Every initiative had his approval, but he and Stalin knew when to fold (pp. 92-104).

Molotov repeatedly tries to persuade us that every move was calibrated to precision,

with little left to chance. He revels in the memory of those stunningly accurate post-war calculations which up to 1953 produced more successes than failures, convinced that the wire in his ear was invisible, and that we can't see Kim Philby smirking just offstage.

But no Philby lurked behind a prediction Molotov made in 1973:

> There'll be a fight in the party yet. Khrushchev was no accident. It's a peasant country—the right deviation is strong. Where's the guarantee they won't take power? It's entirely possible that the anti-Stalinists—most likely the Bukharinists—will soon come to power (pp. 375, 538).

Molotov and everyone who thought like him rejoiced when Andropov took the top job; he was one of theirs. They even welcomed Gorbachev after Gromyko reassured them about those "iron teeth."

Yet, lacking even the modest vision necessary to discern that Gorbachev wanted to "reform" the system in order to strengthen it, the Stalinists were soon disappointed. Molotov himself, however, hurrying now to keep his appointment in Samara, probably did not realize that his prophecy had come true, and that at least for a while Andropov would be the last to preach the old-time religion—in public, anyway.

The backwoods deacons who cobbled together the 1991 "vodka putsch" trying to set Soviet communism back on track will likely be reading the second volume of these memoirs—if there is one—in prison. They're probably already berating themselves for not consulting the first volume in time:

> There wasn't any unity in our group [Molotov says of the 1957 conspiracy against Khrushchev], and we didn't have any program. We just agreed to oust him, but we ourselves weren't ready to seize power. . .The only thing was to dispose him, name him minister of agriculture. . . We weren't prepared to offer any [new policies] (pp. 347, 354, 357).

When Chuyev asks whether the people who expelled him from the party after that fiasco blamed him for the terror, Molotov replies, "Yes. They claimed that the anti-party group feared exposure. But it was namely Khrushchev who had to be afraid. This was a well-played game . . . ."(p. 357)

Through the medium of *Sto sorok besed*, the ghost of one of Stalin's prime henchmen sends this message: "Here I am, outside evolution, all muscle and fang and venom, with just enough brain to synchronize them. There are many like me."

Terra publishers mercifully tack Professor Sergei Kuleshov's scholarly essay, "He Seeks Laws in Lawlessness" (pp. 554-604), to the back of this herpetorium, noting that Chuyev "does not share the point of view of the afterword's author." Our gentle poet prefers the man from Mogilyov Province.

1. A double entendre in a folk saying that fell out of usage around the turn of the century. Mogilyov Province and town are in Byelorussia, but "mogila," from which adjectival "Mogilyov," means "grave," hence "Graves Province" or "Province of Graves."
2. *Izbrannoye: Stikhi* (A Selection: Verses), (Moscow: Khudohestvennaya Literatura, 1984); *Nagrada: Kniga stikhotvorenii* (The Award: A Book of Verses) (Moscow: Sovremenik, 1985).
3. *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 9, 79, 343.
4. There was indeed a plan to kill Litvinov a la Mikhoel: Nikita Khrushchev, *Vospominaniia: Izbrannye otryyvki*, compiled by V. Chalidze (New York: Chalidze Publications, 1982), 195-196.
5. Oliver Pilat, *Pegler: Angry Man of the Press* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 13; also quoted in Finis Farr, *Fair Enough: The Life of Westbrook Pegler* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington, House, 1975), 180.

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Molotov on the Atomic Bomb

Truman decided to surprise us at Potsdam. So far as I recall, after a lunch given by the American delegation, he took Stalin and me aside and—looking secretive—informed us they had a unique weapon of a wholly new type, an extraordinary weapon . . . It's difficult to say what he was thinking, but it seemed to me he wanted to throw us into consternation.

Stalin, however, reacted to this quite calmly, and Truman decided he hadn't understood. The words "atomic bomb" hadn't been spoken, but we immediately guessed what was meant. We also understood they weren't in a position to unleash a war. They only had one or two bombs, and when they blew those up over Hiroshima and Nagasaki they didn't have any left. Even if they had had some, they wouldn't have played any special role.

We'd been working on this since 1943. I was ordered to take charge, find someone who could build an atomic bomb. The Chekists [secret police] gave me a list of reliable physicists. I made my choice and summoned [Pytor] Kapista, an Academician.

He indicated we weren't prepared, that the atomic bomb was a weapon not for this war but for the next. We asked [Abram] Iofe—his position was likewise unclear. To make a long story short, there was the youngest, still quite unknown [Igor] Kurchatov, whom they didn't want to promote. I summoned him, we spoke, and he made a good impression. But he said a lot was still unclear to him.

I decided to give him the material from our intelligence service—the agents had done something very important. Kurchatov stayed in my office in the Kremlin several days, working on this material. This was sometime after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. I asked him, "Well, what about it?"

I myself didn't understand anything about the material, but I knew it had been obtained from good, reliable sources.

He said, "It's excellent—it adds exactly what we were missing."

This was a fine operation on the part of our Chekists. They did well in getting what we needed—at precisely the right time, when we had just begun this project.

There was something in my memory, but now I'm afraid I've forgotten the details. The Rosenberg couple . . . I tried not to ask any questions about that, but I think they were connected with [our] intelligence . . . Somebody helped us a great deal with the atomic bomb. The secret service played a very big role. In America, the Rosenbergs paid for this. It's not excluded that they were involved in helping us. But we musn't talk about that. It might be quite useful in the future.

Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, pp. 81-82

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ship of state would turn." From that point forward, in his opinion, U.S. foreign policy aimed to restrict Soviet influence and establish American hegemony.

That Novikov indeed held such an interpretation of U.S. policy can be confirmed, not only from the published "letter," but also from unpublished documents in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When in November 1945, after an Anglo-American summit conference, the Truman administration publicly announced its desire to discuss with the USSR the idea of the international control of atomic energy, Novikov cabled Moscow that this decision

> represents a new tactical approach in relation to the USSR, the substance of which can be reduced to the following: on the one hand, to use the atomic bomb as a means of political pressure to oblige the Soviet Union to accept its [Washington's] will and to weaken the position of the USSR in the U.N., Eastern Europe and so on, but on the other hand, to accomplish all of this in such a form as to somewhat ameliorate the aggressive character of the Anglo-Saxon alliance of "atomic powers."[2]

This cable, which Novikov does not cite in his memoirs, confirms that by late 1945 he had formed an image of the United States as a hostile power, intent on using its power to extort political concessions from the USSR. From this standpoint, even potentially conciliatory gestures such as the opening of discussions on controlling atomic energy were automatically interpreted as merely tactical maneuvers in a zero-sum struggle with the Soviet Union. As he operated under such assumptions, one can scarcely imagine that Novikov sent many cables to Moscow which suggested the possibility of anything more than limited, short-term cooperation with Washington.

Novikov offers some interesting insights into how the Soviet diplomatic service functioned, largely confirming the assumption that Molotov wielded tight control over the actions of Soviet diplomatic missions. Novikov several times recounts how he postponed action on various questions, sometimes rather trivial ones, pending receipt of explicit instructions from Moscow. In one particularly vivid example Novikov writes that by the fall of 1945, he felt the political climate had changed so radically from that of the war years that he could no longer report effectively without being recalled to Moscow for consultations and "political reorientation" from the foreign ministry. After some months of pressuring Moscow to recall him for such consultations, Novikov finally received orders to return to Moscow in January 1946. There he was given the necessary political orientation to the new international situation—by Molotov personally. It appears that Novikov felt incapable of sending "correct" reports without instruction in the proper assumptions and approach from Molotov. Even in their internal reports, then, it appears that Soviet diplomats were constrained to follow the prevailing interpretation of events in Moscow. Such a practice drastically affected not only the quality of information that the Soviet leadership received, but also its ability to react to developments in the outside world. Policy formulated in this sort of environment was not likely to prove flexible.

This conclusion is reinforced by Novikov's description of the writing of the now published September 1946 report on American foreign policy. At that time, Novikov was serving as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (July-October 1946). In mid-September, Molotov approached Novikov and asked him to write a report on the tendencies of U.S. foreign policy in the post-war period. Molotov wanted the report written and submitted by the end of the month. Novikov objected, asserting that such a report demanded more time for preparation, and could only be written properly in Washington or New York, where he would have access to documents from his embassy which were unavailable in Paris. Molotov, however, insisted that Novikov could write the report perfectly well during his spare hours away from the conference table, and the underling set to work.

Within a few days, Molotov requested a rough draft of the report, with an outline of its main conclusions. When Novikov showed him the draft, Molotov suggested several changes, essentially dictating its major conclusions. Novikov objected that perhaps it would be better to discuss the report after its completion, but Molotov insisted and proceeded to prescribe to Novikov the conclusions he should reach in the report. In summing up this episode, Novikov notes that when he turned in the report on the day Molotov requested, he could "only symbolically consider it my own."[3]

Thus the "Novikov letter" might be better termed the "Molotov letter" if one gives credence to Novikov's account. That Molotov pushed Novikov to write the report and also served as its anonymous co-author suggests that George Kennan is correct when he asserts that Molotov needed the report either to gain the support of the East European countries at the Peace Conference, or as ammunition in an internal Kremlin debate over Soviet American policy.[4] The memoir does not provide enough evidence to choose between these two possibilities, however, and Novikov himself probably did not know exactly why his boss needed the report. Still, the memoirs place the letter in a clearer context, making it easier to interpret.

What strikes one as curious, after reading this account, is the rift between Novikov's contemporary analysis and the policies the Soviets were actually following at that time. Novikov, apparently with the support of Molotov, had already concluded by the fall of 1945 that the United States was pursuing an expansionist and imperialist policy which made cooperation between it and the Soviet Union all but impossible. Yet in November 1945, in the annual speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution, Molotov himself gave a positive appraisal of the possibilities of future Anglo-Soviet-American cooperation. Stalin made similar public statements in 1946, and throughout that year Soviet foreign policy remained relatively moderate. Western communist parties were encouraged by Moscow to pursue coalitions with "bourgeois" parties, and coalition governments led by non-communists continued to govern Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

What explains this divergence? Molotov, judging from his role in the drafting of the September report, had by sometime in 1946 concluded that a more aggressive and bellicose policy was necessary to counter American assertiveness. However, he apparently failed to convince Stalin of the wisdom of this course for some time. One may infer, then, that Stalin had not given up all hope of finding some form of accommodation with Washington until the June 1947

American announcement of the Marshall Plan, which precipitated a hostile and wide-ranging Soviet reaction. But while the Marshall Plan may have precipitated the final break in Soviet-American relations, one should not underestimate the role played by Novikov's reports in preparing the ground for this event. His earlier pessimistic appraisals of American foreign policy provided a ready-made framework for interpreting the Marshall Plan as the first step in an American plan to gain control over Europe and to isolate the USSR.

In August 1947, again in response to a request from Molotov, Novikov wrote a report evaluating the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In this case, however, he does suggest that its conclusions were dictated in advance. In this report, Novikov reached the unsurprising conclusion that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were linked together as integral parts of an American strategy to surround and coerce the USSR, economically, politically, and militarily. He concluded:

> The implementation of these measures [the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and U.S. military base construction overseas] would allow the creation of a strategic encirclement of the Soviet Union, running from the west—through West Germany and the Western European countries, in the north—through the line of bases on the northern islands of the Atlantic, and also in Canada and Alaska, in the east—through Japan and China, and in the south—through the Middle East and the Mediterranean.[5]

This report, though unreleased, corresponds in its conclusions to later internal Soviet evaluations of the Marshall Plan, and suggests that the Soviet leadership indeed viewed the Marshall Plan, backed by U.S. capital and economic power, as a significant threat to its security interests, severe enough to require immediate counteraction in the form of the Cominform.[6]

Shortly after he finished this report, Novikov retired from the diplomatic service to pursue a career as a writer. He was relieved of his post as ambassador in October 1947. Novikov himself explains his retirement as motivated by his longstanding desire to leave the Foreign Ministry, where he never wanted to work in the first place. However, documents uncovered by Soviet historians in the Soviet Foreign Ministry archives suggest that Novikov was regarded as insufficiently "vigilant" in that he perceived American foreign policy primarily as a political, and not military, threat to Soviet interests. By late 1947, internal Soviet reports stressed that the United States was becoming a direct military threat and was preparing for eventual war against the Soviet Union.[7] We still do not possess sufficient information to judge whether Novikov's resignation was related to this supposed failing on his part. But Novikov states that Molotov released him from the diplomatic service only grudgingly, and afterwards Novikov was able to undertake his writing career. In light of these facts it seems unlikely that he was removed because of his unsound analysis. During the late Stalin years, those who failed were not simply retired; they faced more severe punishments.

There are many interesting questions which Novikov does not discuss. Although he lacked access to the highest-level discussions of Soviet policy, he could have written in more detail about the parts of the process to which he was exposed. It would, for example, have been quite interesting to hear in more detail about the "political orientation" which Molotov provided during Novikov's recall to Moscow for consultations in January 1946. One would also like to know just which of the conclusions of the September 1946 report were dictated by Molotov, which were drawn independently by Novikov, and what their points of disagreement were. Novikov omits these details, and leaves much else unexplained.[8] Nevertheless, his memoir is still an interesting historical document, deserving of consideration as yet another small piece of the larger puzzle of Soviet foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War.

1. For an English translation of this report and commentary on it by several scholars, see "The Novikov Telegram," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Fall 1991), 523-563, and Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991).
2. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the USSR (AVP USSR), f. 048g, op. 28g, p. 19, d. 1, l. 120, citing AVP USSR, f. 059, op. 15, p. 47, d. 274, ll. 202-203.
3. Novikov, *Recollections*, 352-53.
4. See Kennan's comment on the Novikov letter in *Diplomatic History* 15 (Winter 1991), 539-543.
5. Novikov, *Recollections*, 394.
6. See the Annual political report for 1947 from the Soviet Embassy in the U.S., AVP USSR, f. 0129, op. 31a, p. 241, d. 1.
7. See Viktor Mal'kov's comment on the Novikov letter in *Diplomatic History* 15 (Fall 1991), 554-58.
8. Unfortunately, these details will probably remain unelucidated. While in Moscow in the fall of 1990, the present author tried to obtain an interview with Novikov, but learned that the former diplomat was deceased.

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CWIHP Activities (1991-92)

November 1-2, 1991. Workshop on Chinese Foreign Policy, Michigan State University.

January 8-9, 1992. Workshop on Soviet Cold War Archives, Institute of General History, Moscow.

March 18. "Reconsidering Cold War Origins after the Cold War." Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia.

April 2. "The Cold War as Seen from the Other Side." Organization of American Historians, Chicago. Moderator: James G. Hershberg, CWIHP Coordinator. Panelists: He Di, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Geza Mezei, Budapest University; Vladislav Zubok, Russian Academy of Sciences.

April 8. "'A Terrible, Monstrous Sight': New Evidence on the Soviet H-Bomb Program, 1948-55." David Holloway, Stanford University. Commentator: Gregg Herken, National Air and Space Museum.

April 10. "Russia's Foreign Policy: Dilemmas and Choices." Vladislav Zubok, Senior Researcher, Russian Academy of Sciences.

April 21. "Cuban and Soviet Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Assessing the New Evidence." Philip J. Brenner, American University, and Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution.

May 14. Noon Discussion: "The Role of Threat-Based Strategies in Soviet-American Relations: New Evidence from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Middle East War." Richard Ned Lebow, Cornell University.

June 1. Seminar (3:30-5:30 p.m.): "The Soviet Suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Trials of Imre Nagy: New Evidence from Budapest and Moscow." Charles Gati, Union College. Commentator: Geza Mezei, Budapest University.

June 22. Seminar (3:30-5:30 p.m.): "Warsaw Pact Politics and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: New Evidence from East-bloc Archives." Mark Kramer, Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Commentator: Karen Dawisha, University of Maryland.

June 30. Seminar (3:30-5:30 p.m.): "A Complicated War: Mozambique, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the East-West Conflict in the 1980s." Chester A. Crocker, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; William Finnegan, *The New Yorker*. Commentator: Kenneth Mokoena, National Security Archive.

SOVIET ARCHIVES

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shed light on policy formulation and decision-making in the Stalin era.[27] However, scholars who have reviewed materials such as Politburo minutes report that they often come across references to special dossiers [*osobaya papka*] that were transferred to the post-1952 Central Committee archives at Staraya Ploshad'; for the moment those files, which have generally not been declassified, remain under the control of the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, which plans to return them to the former Central Party archives while retaining a microfilm duplicate.

Since the coup, some Western and Russian scholars have gained access to the Russian Center and its spacious, well-lit reading room, where finding aids are readily available (a welcome departure from past Soviet practice in many archives). When we visited in January, two U.S. scholars, one on an IREX exchange and one who had been received with the help of letter of recommendation from a Russian friend, were quietly taking notes. Scholars from the Russian Academy of Sciences reported that they had been able to gain access to Cominform materials, part of a section on "The Documents of the International Communist and Working Movement" that the center had opened.[28] For foreign scholars, the center recommends that interested scholars write letters of application bearing the sponsorship of their institution and indicating the theme, time span, and date of their proposed research. Some scholars report logistical problems even after gaining access, however, with photocopies discouraged and xerox paper and powder in short supply.

Not surprisingly, given the dire economic situation, the center has actively sought out commercial relationships with Western partners. "Nothing is easy for us," Kozlov lamented, "because having decided to grant freedom of access to archives we now face another situation: This freedom cannot be implemented because the situation in the country is awful." At the Central Party archives alone, he reported, 48 archivists had left their jobs in the last two-and-a-half months of 1991.[29] On January 21, apparently in synch with *Roskomarkhiv*'s contacts with the British firm, the Russian Center announced an agreement with Chadwyck-Healey for the microfilming and international release of major collections.[30] The center's officials also seem eager to reach bilateral agreements with U.S. institutions to provide research assistance in exchange for financial support.

3. "Presidential" or "Kremlin" Archives

While the two centers described above clearly contain much CPSU material of critical interest to Cold War historians, several additional crucial collections pertinent to the decisions of Soviet leaders during the postwar period remain to be integrated into the archival system. These include a collection known variously as the **Kremlin** or **Presidential** archives, which are said to include the most sensitive files of the Communist Party leadership, including protocols (though probably *not* minutes or stenographic transcripts)[31] of Politburo meetings, through 1991. These materials apparently constituted the "working archive" of the Soviet leadership, and were under the direct control of Mikhail S. Gorbachev behind the Kremlin walls until he left office and the complex came under Russian authority. Despite statements by Gorbachev before he left office indicating a willingness to grant access to these papers, their disposition remains uncertain. SCCD officials said that their center will receive these documents for eventual release to scholars, but the details and timing of the transfer remain to be worked out. Asked in mid-March when the documents were likely to be turned over, one SCCD official gave a reply reflective of the prevailing uncertainty: "Maybe tomorrow, maybe next year, maybe twenty years."[32]

One of the most tantalizing collections within the Presidential archives is **Stalin's personal papers**, whose very existence as a corporate archival entity has long remained unconfirmed. According to Pikhoia, roughly 17,000 files of documents, some with Stalin's handwritten notation to be placed "in my archives," constitute what is known as the "Sixth Section" in the Politburo collection in the Kremlin or Presidential archives formerly under Gorbachev's control. Pikhoia said in March that these presidential archives, including the Stalin collection, were to be divided among two research centers: the recent materials, including post-1985 Politburo records and recent files on economic and strategic matters, will go to a new presidential archives center created by Yeltsin; while older materials, including the Stalin papers, will go to the two aforementioned centers housing the papers of the CPSU Central Committee for the appropriate chronological period (e.g., most of the Stalin archive would end up in the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Contemporary Historical Documents).[33]

Foreign Ministry archives

After the Soviet collapse, control over the USSR Foreign Ministry and its archives devolved to the Russian Ministry of External Relations. But the archive's physical location and key officials dealing with archival matters have not changed. Interested scholars may contact the **Russian Ministry of External Relations** (now in the headquarters of the former USSR Foreign Ministry), 121200, Moscow, Smolenskaia Ploshad', 32/34; or the archive directly: **Archives of the Foreign Policy of the USSR** [*Arkhiv vneshnei politiki SSSR*, or *AVP SSSR*], Plotnikov per., 11; 121200 Moscow, metro: Smolenskaya: director, **Vladimir Vasil'evich Sokolov**; telephones: 236-5201; reading room, 241-0296 or 241-0296; ask for **Anatoly Alexandrovich Bykov** or **Shirokova Alla Ivanovna**).

Prior to last August's failed coup, selected Soviet and foreign researchers had been gaining limited access to Foreign Ministry files from the early postwar period. The trickle of outsiders permitted entry had been increasing since August 1990, when the Soviet Government decreed that materials more than 30 years old could be declassified and that a committee of retired diplomats would be created to begin reviewing documents for release. Though constrained by limited facilities (the reading room seats only eight researchers at a time), non-availability of finding aids, and prohibitions on photocopying those documents one was grudgingly permitted to see, U.S. researchers were able to take notes from an internal administrative history of U.S.-Soviet relations, 1945-1952, and to use the footnotes to request additional documents.[34]

Prior to the August 1991 coup, however, few interesting documents on the postwar era escaped the Foreign Ministry archives into the public domain. Declassification went forward slowly with only a handful of former diplomats hired to review secret materials. In 1990-91 the ministry journal *Vestnik* began featuring selected docu-

ments on Soviet diplomacy during and after World War II, including such topics as the Nazi-Soviet pact and Soviet-Japanese exchanges in the summer of 1945. In 1990, in connection with Soviet-American conferences in Washington and Moscow organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Foreign Ministry released the September 1946 "Novikov telegram" from the Soviet ambassador to Washington analyzing U.S. policy towards Moscow.[35] That document, though inspiring much discussion, occasioned as much frustration as excitement. In a survey in the fall 1991 *Diplomatic History*, Melvyn Leffler called the Novikov document "a tease"[36] while Steven M. Miner commented that it "raises more questions than it answers.

"If we are truly to understand the history of Soviet foreign policy we will need more than the release of a single memorandum each year—or decade—no matter how important," Miner added. "Until we do receive access to more information, we can only recall Stalin's insight that all information is incomplete, and some is even intentionally misleading."[37] Soviet scholars who participated in the two 1990 conferences were also acutely disappointed with the failure of Foreign Ministry archivists to release more materials to them, especially after Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had assured them that they would enjoy greater access to archives while researching their papers.[38]

Last fall, hopes rose that the Foreign Ministry might take a more open view towards releasing materials on important Cold War events when it released documents to the official Czech commission studying the Kremlin's crushing of the 1968 Prague Spring, and permitted scholars from the Academy of Sciences to prepare papers based on these materials.[39] However, more than a half year after the coup, complaints from Russian and foreign scholars regarding the Foreign Ministry persist in regard to both the quality of materials and the procedures required for using them. "To my point of view the progress is very slow," Andrei Edemskii of the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies recently stated. "The traditional psychology of the leadership's approach to the scholars remains unchanged."[40]

Denied access to finding aids, scholars had been forced to rely on archivists to produce relevant files; suspicion persisted that important records were being withheld, either intentionally or due to disorganization. On the other hand, some scholars speculate that the Foreign Ministry records, even if fully opened, may be inherently less revealing because in the most vital areas the ministry tended to merely implement decisions made by the CPSU leadership. Researchers also encountered problems in photocopying materials, and were forced to depend on handwritten notes.[41]

Evidence of the cautious attitude of the old guard in the Foreign Ministry archives surfaced at the CWIHP archives workshop in Moscow in January. **Vladimir Sokolov**, deputy chief of the ministry's historical research division, sternly proclaimed his opposition to a proposed law on archives advanced by Yuri Afanasiev that would give all citizens over 16 years of age the right to use the archives (Sokolov preferred careful screening of scholars) and complained that foreigners might pilfer the national heritage by making hundreds of photocopies of ministry documents during research visits. Another senior official **Vladimir Shustov**, said he favored joint projects with foreign scholars to work in Foreign Ministry archives, but also sounded cautious about the notion of unrestricted access.

Not surprisingly, given the political turmoil, a shake-up in the old line-up seems to be in progress within the Foreign Ministry as it shifted from Soviet to Russian hands. The most important recent change was the removal in January of **Feliks N. Kovalev** as head of the historical research division and his replacement by **Igor Lebedev**, the former deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's USA/Canada Desk.

More recently, the ministry has made clear its assent to the principle of declassifying archives and its intensified interest in obtaining hard currency support from Western partners. That attitude strongly flavored the first meeting between ministry officials and an international advisory panel assembled by the Norwegian Nobel Institute and consisting of U.S., British, and German historians. At that meeting, held in March after a planned January session was postponed, both sides agreed *in principle* — the Russians pointing out that they would be bound to comply with the upcoming Law on Archives of the Russian Federation — that the ministry should promote the declassification as quickly as possible of all materials except for those that might "demonstrably impede" current Russian security or other fundamental state interest or disclose information of a personal nature that could cause "danger or distress" to individuals.[42] They also agreed that the international advisory group should aid the ministry's search for Western financial assistance to publish a guide to the archives, to xerox finding aids (which would then be made available to researchers), to expand the reading room, and to pay the salaries of former diplomats who would review secret materials for declassification.[43] Roughly $100,000 is sought from Western donors to pay for staff to declassify and process still-secret foreign ministry files.[44]

According to Russian scholars who have gained limited access to Foreign Ministry files, they are divided into two main categories — a central file and a cable file — and also include the collections (fonds) of all Foreign Ministers and their deputies.[45] Foreign scholars interested in gaining access to the Foreign Ministry archives should send a letter to Sokolov on university or institutional stationary, specifying the types of documents and subjects they would like to see. In addition, a letter of endorsement from the researcher's institution, or from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, can be helpful. Prospective researchers from the United States should allow ample time for delays in mail service and for the archive to gather documents before their arrival in Moscow.

KGB Archives

Discredited by the involvement of its chairman, Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, in the failed August coup, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (KGB) officially went out of existence last fall and was replaced by two Russian intelligence services, one each for domestic and foreign activities. The Soviet secret police agency's files ended up in the hands of the Russian government, but by the time Russian authorities impounded KGB records in late August, they found signs that massive amounts of documents had already been destroyed—not only compromising evidence pertaining to the coup, but other politically sensitive materials; Vadim Bakatin, who served temporarily as KGB chairman last fall, reported that more than 580 volumes of Andrei Sakharov's confiscated diaries had

been destroyed in July 1989,[46] and evidence emerged to show that the KGB had doctored records regarding the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared into Soviet custody in Budapest at the end of World War II.[47] While many Russians called for a rapid release of KGB materials, others raised concern that full disclosure could fuel the sort of witch-hunt for secret police operatives that has occurred in many Eastern European countries. Files concerning agents, Bakatin declared, "would be handed over only his dead body."[48] Yevgeny Primakov, named to head the foreign intelligence service, promised that the agency would make some information available to scholars outside the government, but few practical steps are known to have been taken in this direction.[49]

Last fall, Russian authorities turned the prickly issue of what should be done with the KGB files over to a parliamentary commission. While the issue was studied by the commission, which was chaired by Col. Dmitri Volkogonov and included Rudolf G. Pikhoia, reports surfaced that KGB officers were retailing choice documents for hard currency to Western publications and institutions.[50] Illustrating the confused situation that ensued in the constitutional vacuum after the coup, ABC's *Nightline* was first granted, and later denied, access to the KGB's file on Lee Harvey Oswald. Taking after the enterprising spirit of former agents such as Oleg Gordievsky and Boris Kalugin, who were busy marketing their stories to Western audiences,[51] the KGB even signed an agreement with a Hollywood production company to produce popular entertainments allegedly based on confidential files.[52] In another sign of the agency's desperation for dollars, the KGB opened its doors to Western tourists for a time in December and January. For $30 per person, visitors were ushered through an exhibit-filled museum—largely devoted to extolling KGB success stories against counter-revolutionaries, the Nazis, and the CIA, and to the virtues of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Bolshevist secret police—and escorted to the well-appointed former office of chairman Yuri Andropov in KGB headquarters overlooking the stump of Dzerzhinsky's statue in Lubyanka Square. During one such tour in January, the author was told by the group's escort, a rather embittered former counterespionage specialist, that the KGB desired to open its files to rebut smear stories in the media; but he hedged when asked when, how, and under what procedures this would be done.

Summarizing the situation recently, a journalist for the newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* [Independent Newspaper] underlined two major problems relating to KGB records: the need for outside, independent staff and historians; and the danger of commercialization. Citing a roster of cases where evidence appeared to have been deliberately distorted—"a minimum of authentic documents and a maximum of invention"—Vladimir Abarimov called for the examination of KGB files "by independent, impartial researchers, not KGB officials and/or those who actually committed the crimes."[53] One sign of willingness to allow outsiders at least limited access to KGB records emerged with Russian agreement to allow American historians to investigate charges that the Soviet secret police interrogated U.S. prisoners-of-war seized during the Vietnam War.[54]

In February 1992, the parliamentary commission ruled that KGB records more than 15 years old must be turned over to state archives for declassification, unless they concern "still effective orders and instructions concerning operation of agents," "sensitive technical details," and certain other categories—in which case they can be withheld from the state archives for up to 30 years and may require a "special political decision" prior to release to state archives. Nikita Petrov, a representative of the commission, said materials related to political persecutions and criminal actions may be transferred to state archives even if they are under 15 years old.[55] Documents impinging on personal privacy may be withheld for up to 75 years, according to Pikhoia, who said the Russian Government is likely to create a new center to store KGB archives.[56]

Yet, while the parliamentary commission's report helped clarify the obligations of the Russian intelligence services to turn over KGB records to state archives, it remains unclear when and to what extent outside historians will be able to see and use those records. Even after documents are turned over to state archives, Petrov notes, "researchers won't be guaranteed access to any such files. An[y] access to the KGB archives will have to be regulated by special rules yet to be designed. But this cannot be done before we have an act on archives and official secrets."[57]

Defense Ministry Archives

For inquiries regarding military documents, contact the **History-Archival and Military Memorial Center** [*Istoriko-arkhivnyi i voenno-memorialnyi tsentr General'nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil*]; ul. Znamenko, 19; 103160 Moscow; Telephone: 296-53-48 / 203-43-48 / 296-88-46. This center, created in 1991, handles inquiries from foreigners to see holdings at military archives, including the two major known repositories for Ministry of Defense holdings dealing with the post-World War II period: the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO) in Podol'sk outside Moscow[58]—the largest archive in USSR second to the CPSU Central Committee archives—and the main Naval archives center near St. Petersburg.[59]

Until 1991, access was rarely given to foreigners to see military materials during the Soviet era, and the military archives policy was generally regarded as thoroughly resistant to change. These attitudes surfaced most prominently in June 1991, when a Moscow newspaper printed a transcript of a conference held a few months earlier to review the first volume of a projected ten-volume official military history of the Soviet role in World War II. The Soviet General Staff's leaders expressed horror and shock at the draft, which they labelled as derogatory to the heroic accomplishments of the Soviet military. They vowed never to open up Defense Ministry archives, and accused the project's head, military historian Volkogonov, of unpatriotic behavior.

Soviet military top brass "want to control history, as usual, and for them, World War II can only be the victory of socialism and nothing else," responded Volkogonov, who resigned in protest from his post as head of the Military History Institute. "I don't want to write a fake history."[60]

Since the coup the tone has changed dramatically, but questions of archival access have been complicated by the fact that many assets of the USSR military were intended to be under the shared control of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Even with materials less explosive than nuclear weapons, it is taking some time to sort out new lines of authority and jurisdiction, and to a society accustomed to extreme secrecy

the notion of declassifying military planning documents still strikes a nerve.

Nevertheless, some steps have been taken to make Defense Ministry records more accessible to outsiders. At the CWIHP archives workshop in January, a representative of the Historico-Archival and Military-Memorial Center indicated a genial willingness, in principle, to share materials with foreign scholars in joint research programs conducted on a basis of strict reciprocity; he expressed particular interest in collaborating with U.S. military historians.[61] Even before the coup the military archives had begun to show a new willingness to enter into commercial relationships with Western firms interested in marketing formerly confidential Defense Ministry finding aids and journals. One such enterprise that has made a special effort to publish Soviet military and secret police records, as well as other newly available Soviet journals, records, and finding aids, is the Minneapolis-based East View Publications.[62] Materials from Defense Ministry sources on subjects such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and Afghanistan invasion also began to seep out in 1990-91 through the *Military-Historical Journal* [*Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal*].[63]

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The archival situation, in sum, is not altogether unlike that in the political and economic spheres. Just as it will take some time to convert the rhetoric of "democracy" and "free market" into concrete and stable realities, the now widely-proclaimed goal of "open access" to the documentary holdings of the late Soviet Union will unavoidably require traversing a bumpy and zigzagging path before the destination is finally reached. To belabor the metaphor: many potholes remain—but the roadblocks are fast disappearing.

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2. Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*: Soviet Area Archives After the August Coup," International Research & Exchanges Board, Princeton, NJ, Jan. 1992, prepared for publication in *American Archivist* 55 (Winter 1992); and Grimsted, "Intellectual Access and Descriptive Standards for Post-Soviet Archives: *What Is to Be Done?*" IREX preliminary preprint, March 1992.

3. For further information on this conference contact Odd Arne Westad, Research Director, The Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensveien 19, N-0255, Oslo, Norway; tel. (+472) 443680, fax: (+472) 430168.

4. For the most comprehensive reviews of the Soviet archives situation prior to the coup, see Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *A Handbook for Archival Research in the USSR* (International Research and Exchanges Board and Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 1989) and a 1991 supplement circulated by IREX, "Major Archives and Manuscript Repositories in Moscow and Leningrad"; and Grimsted, "*Perestroika* in the Archives?: Further Efforts at Soviet Archival Reform," *American Archivist* 54 (Winter 1991), 70-95.

5. For an informed account of archive-related events immediately following the coup attempt, see Vera Tolz, "New Situation for CPSU and KGB Archives," *Report on the USSR* 3:38 (20 September 1991), 1-4.

6. RSFSR Committee on Archival Affairs, ul. Ilyinka [formerly ul. Kuibysheva], 12, 103132 Moscow; metro: Kitai Gorod; telephone: 206-3531/206-2785/240-3075; fax: 200-4205.

7. Eleanor Randolph, "On the Soviet Paper Trail," *Washington Post*, 5 November 1991; interviews with Stephen D. Bryen (American Enterprise Institute) and Mario Corti (RFE/RL), November and December 1991. For other Western initiatives, see Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 35-40.

8. Ella Maksimov, interview with Pikhoia, "*Krupneishaia arkhivnaia sdelka s amerikantsami, kotoroi protiviatsia nashi istoriki*" [The largest archival deal with the Americans, opposed by our historians], *Izvestia*, 7 March 1992. Further announcements concerning details of the agreement among Hoover, Chadwyck-Healey, and *Roskomarkhiv* were expected as the *Bulletin* went to press in late April.

9. Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 11.

10. Pikhoia, "Russian Archives and the New Realities," oral presentation to Norwegian Nobel Institute conference on "The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989," 28 February-1 March 1992; Pikhoia comments at CWIHP workshop on Soviet sources, Institute of General History, Moscow, 8 January 1992. Patricia Grimsted quoted *Roskomarkhiv* officials as estimating that the Central Committee had held some 30 million files (over 75 million documents), compared to only 1.5 million files in 1991 at the Central Party archives (TsPA). Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 5.

11. Pikhoia, "Russian Archives and the New Realities."

12. Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 32-35; interviews in Moscow, January 1992.

13. For further information contact Andrei Kortunov, Dmitrii Akhalkatci or Sergei Tikhonov: Russian Scientific Foundation, 2/3 Klebny per., suite 407, Moscow 121814, Russia, tel.: 202-9635/202-6438; fax: 253-9291; 205-1207.

14. Valery Koretskii, its director, has two fax numbers. The first, at the Central Telegraph, is 292-6511; messages must include the notation, "BOX 5769, Za Koretskogo." The second, at the office, is said to be less reliable: 248-30-95.

15. Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 14-16; Vera Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:16 (17 April 1992), 1-7; "Draft of Law on Archives of the Russian Republic: RSFSR Law on the Archival Legacy and on Archives," Nov. 1991 draft, trans. Harold Leich, Library of Congress; interviews with Leich, Nov. 1991 and April 1992; Pikhoia, comments at CWIHP Moscow workshop, 8 January 1992, and in "Russian Archives and the New Realities."

16. V. Bukovsky, "To Oppose the Right Forces, A Strong Left Opposition is Necessary," *Izvestia*, 3 April 1992, 3; Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," 3.

17. Steven Solnick and Susan Bronson, "The Toronto Initiative," reprinted in the *American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies [AAASS] Newsletter*, Jan. 1992, 10-11.

18. Grimsted, "Intellectual Access," 132, *passim.*; Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 30-31.

19. See Ella Maksimov, interview with Pikhoia, "*Krupneishaia arkhivnaia sdelka s amerikantsami, kotoroi protiviatsia nashi istoriki*" [The largest archival deal with the Americans, opposed by our historians], *Izvestia* 57 (7 March 1992); Yuri Afanasiev, "*Proizvol v obrashchenii s obshchestvennoi pamiat'iu nedopustim*" [Tyranny in the treatment of our collective memory is impermissible], Yuri Afanasiev, *Izvestia* 58 (9 March 1992); Rudolf Pikhoia, *"Fakty i vymysly o 'rasprodazhe istoricheskoi pamiati'"* ["Fact and fiction about the 'sale of our historical memory'"], *Izvestia*, 18 March 1992; Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," 3.

20. Clare Pedrick, "Revelations From the Communist Files: Letter Alleges Italian's Role in Soldier's Deaths," *Washington Post*, 8 February 1992; Pikhoia, "Russian Archives & the New Realities."

21. Tim Sebastian, "Dialogue with the Kremlin," *The Sunday Times* (London), 2 February 1992.

22. Michael Dobbs, "Opening of Soviet Party Archives Draws Crowd," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1992.

23. Pikhoia, "Russian Archives and the New Realities."

24. Mario Corti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "A Brief Survey of the Archives Visited," Oct. 1991.

25. The higher figure is from the report of Andrei Edemskii, Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, "The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989: New Archival Possibilities and Present and Ongoing Researches in Russia—A Survey," presented to the Norwegian Nobel Institute conference; the lower figure was quoted by Mironenko, according to press accounts: "Opening of Soviet Party Archives Draws Crowd," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1992.

26. "Opening of Soviet Party Archives Draws Crowd," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1992; on the exhibition also see Evgenii Kuz'min, "The secret life of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 26 February 1992, 13.

27. For an early example of scholarship based on this archive, see Sergei Kudryashov, "Soviet Ideological Influence and Control Over Eastern Europe, 1945-1953," presented to the Norwegian Nobel Institute conference.

28. Comments at CWIHP workshop on Soviet sources, Institute of General History, Moscow, 8-9 January 1992; Edemskii, "Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989: New Archival Possibilities and Present and Ongoing Researches in Russia — A Survey."

29. Comments at CWIHP workshop on Soviet sources, Institute of General History, Moscow, 8 January 1992.

30. William E. Schmidt, "Files to Be Opened, From Lenin to Gorbachev," *New York Times*, 22 January 1992.

31. Personal communication from William Taubman, 16 April 1992.

32. Comment by SCCD official to Prof. William Taubman during a visit to Moscow in mid-March 1992; see also Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," 1-2.

33. Pikhoia, "Russian Archives and the New Realities."
34. N.P. Pavlova, "Soviet-American Relations, 1945-1952" (1965), fond 048g, opis 24g, p. 19, d. 1 & 2. Official internal administrative histories are said also to exist at the Foreign Ministry on such topics as Anglo-American-Soviet relations, and the German question.
35. For the Novikov telegram and analyses of its significance, see *Diplomatic History* 15:4 (Fall 1991), 523-63; Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991); and Scott Parrish, "A Diplomat Reports," CWIHP *Bulletin* 1 (Spring 1992), 16, 21-22.
36. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Commentary on 'The Molotov Telegram,'" *Diplomatic History* 15:4 (Fall 1991), 548.
37. Steven Merritt Miner, "Commentary on `The Novikov Telegram,'" *Diplomatic History* 15:4 (Fall 1991), 563.
38. Constantine Pleshakov, comments at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 24 April 1992.
39. Two Russian scholars who have made use of these materials are Michael Latysh (Institute for Slavic and Balkan Studies) and Maxim Korobochkin (Institute for General History).
40. Edemskii, "Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989: New Archival Possibilities and Present and Ongoing Researches in Russia — A Survey." See also the letter of researcher Georgy Chernyavsky, who complained last fall that the Soviet Foreign Ministry archives remain "virtually inaccessible." "Foreign Ministry archives," *Moscow News* 41 (3496), 13-20 October 1991 [English edition].
41. This assessment is based on interviews with Russian scholars during a visit to Moscow in January 1992.
42. This language closely follows the formulation used in the latest U.S. State Department regulations for its *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.
43. "Western Members of the International Advisory Group, Summing Up of the Nakhabino Meeting March 14-18, 1992," Regulations for Declassification.
44. Prospective funders are urged to contact Dr. Odd Arne Westad, Research Director, The Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensveien 19, N-0255, Oslo, Norway; tel. (+472) 443680, fax: (+472) 430168, or the members of the international advisory committee: Prof. Jonathan Haslam (Cambridge University); Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College); and Prof. Gerhard Wettig (Bundestinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien).
45 . Personal communication from Vladislav Zubok, 16 April 1992.
46 . Interview with Vadim Bakatin, *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 18 December 1991, in FBIS-SOV-91-249, 27 December 1991; Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 9.
47. Serge Schmemann, "Soviet Files Show K.G.B. Cover-Up In the Disappearance of Wallenberg," *New York Times*, 28 December 1991.
48. Viktor Loshak, interview with Vadim Bakatin, "Nam nuzhno mnogoe drug drugu prostit'," *Moskovskii Novosti*, 9 September 1991; see also Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," 5-7.
49. Michael Dobbs, "KGB Spy War With U.S. Falls Victim to Glasnost," *Washington Post*, 3 October 1991.
50. "The spies who came in for the gold," *The Guardian*, 30 October 1991; *Boston Globe*, 22 December 1991; *New York Times*, 22 January 1992; Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 27; Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," 3.
51. Of particular interest are purported KGB documents disclosed by Gordievsky, who served as a senior KGB agent in Copenhagen in London before defecting to the West in 1985. See Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1990); Andrew and Gordievsky, eds., *Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), and "More 'Instructions from the Centre': Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985," special issue, *Intelligence and National Security* 7:1 (Jan. 1992), *passim*.
52. Lloyd Grove, "The KGB Breaks Into The Movies," *Washington Post*, 17 January 1992.
53. Vladimir Abarimov, "Troubled Waters in K.G.B. Files," presentation to the Norwegian Nobel Institute conference.
54. "Russian Offers Americans Access to K.G.B. Files," *New York Times*, 30 January 1992.
55. "The KGB archives will be made more accessible, in theory," *Moscow News* 8 (3515), 23 February-1 March 1992, 8.
56. Pikhoia, "Russian Archives and the New Realities."
57. "The KGB archives will be made more accessible, in theory," *Moscow News* 8 (3515), 23 February-1 March 1992, 8.
58. TsAMO address: *Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony SSSR*; ul. Kirova, 74; g. Podol'sk; 142117 Moscow oblast'.
59. The Central Naval Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsVMA) in Gatchina: TsVMA: *Tsentral'nyi voenno-morskoi arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony*; Krasnoarmeiskii prospekt, 2; g. Gatchina; 188350 St. Petersburg oblast'.
60. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 18 June 1991; Eleanor Randolph, "Top Kremlin Generals Criticize Revisionist Account of WW II," *Washington Post*, 21 June 1991; Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*," 12.
61. Comments of Col. Victor Vasilievich Muchin, CWIHP workshop, 8-9 January 1992.
62. For further information contact Kent Lee, East View Publications, 12215 North 28th Place, Minneapolis, MN 55441, telephone: (612) 550-0961; fax: (612) 559-2931; toll-free (U.S. only): 1-800-477-1005.
63. *Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal* [*Military-Historical Journal*], Moscow 103160, K-160, tel: 296-4487; 296-4495; 296-4501; 296-4535.

James G. Hershberg is the coordinator of the Cold War International History Project and the author of From Harvard to Hiroshima: James B. Conant and the Birth of the Nuclear Age *to be published in 1993 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.*

CWIHP Working Papers:

#1: Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War."
#2: P.J. Simmons, "Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw."
#3: James Richter, "Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum."

Working papers are available upon request from CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20560.

BERIA

Continued from page 17

While the bulk of attacks against Beria focus on his alleged anti-party activities and eavesdropping on his colleagues in the Politburo, his erstwhile colleagues also attacked his personal life. Comments were made about how Beria had numerous contacts with prostitutes and had contracted syphilis from these women.

Malenkov and Khrushchev are the dominant figures in the meeting. However, in a moment of tension Malenkov goes out of his way to state that there is no one who would "pretend to play the role of Stalin's successor." "The successors to Stalin" he continues, "are a strong, united group of party leaders dedicated to the motherland, the population of the Union, and united by the great principles of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin." (2:197) Despite these comments, the U.S. government was correct in its judgement at the time that the power struggle in Moscow was not resolved with the expulsion of Beria and that the repeated declarations by Stalin's successors that collective leadership was their primary goal masked continuing internal tensions.

The final evaluation of the case by the U.S. Embassy, described in a secret telegram from Ambassador Charles Bohlen to the State Department on Christmas Eve, 1953,[1] the day Beria's execution was officially announced, coincides with many of the conclusions of the Central Committee plenum. It was of critical importance to Malenkov and his associates, Bohlen noted, to reduce the role of the internal police if the Party were to maintain administrative power over the Soviet Union. That job, they evidently believed, was simply impossible as long as Beria stayed at the MVD's helm.

Moreover, the Bohlen cable states, due to the "half-hearted" attempt to prove the guilt of one of their closest colleagues, it was "doubtful if the present leadership wished the Soviet population really to believe most of these charges against Beria." As the envoy later recalled in his memoirs: "The aim was to take away the power of one man to look down the throats of his associates through his control of the secret police."[2]

An English translation of the July 1953 Plenum transcript is scheduled to be issued this summer by Nova Science Publishers (6080 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 207, Commack, NY 11725; tel.: 516-499-3103; fax: 516-499-3146). The hardcover edition, roughly 165 pages and priced at $49, is edited by D. M. Stickle and will be released under the title, *The Beria Affair* (ISBN 1-56072-065-4).

1 . Bohlen to Department of State, 24 December 1953, U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988) 8:1222-23.
2. Bohlen, Charles. *Witness to History* (New York; W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), 357.

--- --- ***Rachel A. Connell***

The Update *section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist bloc. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP of relevant citations.*

Former Soviet Union

Updated, post-coup reports on status of Soviet archives by leading U.S. specialist. (Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, "Beyond *Perestroika*: Soviet Area Archives after the August Coup," available from IREX and forthcoming in *American Archivist* 55, Winter 1992, and "Intellectual Access and Descriptive Standards for Post-Soviet Archives: *What Is to Be Done?*" IREX preliminary preprint, March 1992.) For reviews of post-coup developments concerning archives, also see Vera Tolz, "New Situation for CPSU and KGB Archives," *Report on the USSR* 3:38 (9/20/91), 1-4; Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:16 (4/17/92), 1-7; and Irvin Molotsky, "Russians Get U.S. Help On Baring Soviet Files," *New York Times [NYT]*, 3/11/92.

Exhibition of formerly secret records is held at the headquarters of the former CPSU Central Committee. Officials of the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents say roughly one-third of the center's files have been opened. Records already opened include domestic departments of the Central Committee, but the release of foreign policy documents has been slowed by a political controversy in Britain stemming from a *Sunday Times* article using diplomatic reports from the Soviet embassy in London "to seek to demonstrate a link between the opposition Labor Party and the Kremlin." (Michael Dobbs, "Opening of Soviet Party Archives Draws Crowd," *Washington Post [WP*], 3/3/92; Tim Sebastian, "Dialogue with the Kremlin," *Sunday Times* (London), 2/2/92.)

Former Institute for Marxism-Leninism, renamed the Russian Center for the Study of Documents of Modern History, contains well-kept and thorough records of Communist Party Central Committee that it is now making available to scholars. ("Temple to Lenin Opens Its Doors to Freethinkers," *NYT*, 1/22/92.)

Chadwyck-Healey, British publishing firm, announces agreement with Russian Government to microfilm archives of Soviet Communist Party, beginning with personal files of key figures such as Trotsky, Molotov, and Zhdanov. ("Files to Be Opened, From Lenin to Gorbachev," *NYT*, 1/22/92; "Microfilming the CPSU Archives," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL] Daily Report* 15, 1/23/92, 2.)

U.S. Librarian of Congress James H. Billington signed an agreement with Russian archives chief Rudolph Pikhoia to create a "task force of Western scholars" to advise Moscow on how to organize and open Soviet archives for research. ("On the Soviet Paper Trail," *WP* Style Section, 11/5/91.)

Representatives from the American Enterprise Institute, Hoover Institution, and Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty meet Russian officials to discuss an agreement to make archival records under Russian control available in the United States. (*The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 11/23/91.)

Soviet Foreign Ministry archives remain "virtually inaccessible," researcher complains. (Georgy Chernyavsky letter under heading "Foreign Ministry archives," *Moscow News* 41 (3496), 13-20 October 1991.)

Ukraine president Leonid M. Kravchuk promises Ukrainian-American scholars greater access to historical archives. ("Ukraine Chief Faces Hurdles In Quest for U.S. Recognition," *NYT*, 9/30/91.)

A Hollywood production company, Davis Entertainment Television, announces that it has concluded an agreement with the KGB to bring out a series of TV movies and feature films on Cold War espionage cases based on secret KGB files. ("The KGB Breaks Into The Movies," *WP* Style Section, 1/17/92.)

KGB documents on Cold War mysteries are offered for sale to the West. ("The spies who came in for the gold," *Guardian*, 10/30/91; "KGB Sells Documents Abroad," *RFE/RL Daily Report* 192 (10/9/91).)

Russian parliamentary commission reports guidelines for transferring KGB files to archives; rules for release to public await new laws on secrecy. "The KGB archives will be made more accessible, in theory," *Moscow News* 8 (3515), 23 February-1 March 1992, 8. For further information on the KGB archives, see Jonas Bernstein, "Secrets of the KGB," *Insight* magazine, 11/11/91, 6-9, 34-37; and Oleg Gordievsky, "The KGB Archives," *Intelligence and National Security* 6:1 (Jan. 1991). Gordievsky and Cambridge historian Christopher Andrews, co-authors of *KGB: The Inside Story*, have also co-edited two collections of purported KGB documents: *Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Relations, 1975-85* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991) and "More 'Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985," special issue, *Intelligence and National Security* 7:1 (Jan. 1992).

Soviet foreign intelligence head vows his agency will disclose historical documents to scholars. ("KGB Spy War With U.S. Falls Victim to Glasnost," *WP*, 10/3/91.) Outgoing Soviet foreign minister estimates half of all diplomats posted abroad were KGB agents. ("KGB Staffed Embassies, Top Soviet Diplomat Says," *WP*, 11/26/91.)

Series based on formerly secret documents from CPSU Central Committee archives alleges excesses, from secret orders by Lenin that "could be interpreted as incitement to violent actions against sovereign states," to a perestroika-era scheme to disguise party involvement in hard currency money-laundering enterprises and banks, to hidden support for "fraternal" communist parties. (Pavel Voshchanov in Moscow *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 10/2,3,4/91, excerpted in FBIS-SOV-91-195, 10/8/91; also see "Soviet Papers Show Party Took Up Shadow Capitalism," *WP*, 10/8/91.)

Secrets of Lenin's mausoleum disclosed: (A. Fyodorov, "Lenin's Tomb: from the top down," *Moscow News* 41 (3496), 13-20 October 1991.)

"Memorial" society, dedicated to preserving the memory of victims of Stalinism, announces plans to publish anthologies of documents and memoirs describing repression in the Soviet Union between 1918 and 1958. First volume, *Zven'ya* [Links], put out jointly by Progress Publishers and Atheneum Press, appeared in late 1991; for a review, see *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 10/30/91. (Vera Tolz, "`Memorial' Society Launches New Series of Historical Anthologies," *Report on the USSR*, 12/13/91, 8-10.)

Recollections by former foreign minister V.M. Molotov on domestic and foreign policy during the Stalin era. (Vitaly Lelchuk, "Meaningful Revelations by Stalinist Number Two," *Moscow News* 18 (3473), 5-12 May 1991, 9.)

The first volume of a projected 10-volume official history of the Soviet role in World War II, whose preparation was overseen by Dmitri Volkogonov, irks military leaders at a secret March 1991 conference; the revisionist account is blasted by hardliners as "anti-communist," and Volkogonov resigns in protest from Military History Institute. (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 6/18/91; "Top Kremlin Generals Criticize Revisionist Account of World War II," *WP*, 6/21/91.)

New evidence from Soviet and East European archives could illuminate relationship between World War II and the onset of the Cold War. (R.C. Raack, "Clearing Up the History of World War II," The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter* 23:4 (Dec. 1991), 41-47.)

Documents reveal that the K.G.B. attempted to cover up its involvement in the imprisonment and death of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. ("Soviet Files Show K.G.B. Cover-Up In the Disappearance of Wallenberg," *NYT*, 12/28/91.) See also "New Information on Raoul Wallenberg Promised," *RFE/RL Daily Report* 225, 11/27/91.

Two assessments of Cold War origins: in *Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoria* [New and Newest History] 3 (May-June 1991): A.O. Chubaryan, "The Origin of the Cold War in Eastern and Western Europe," 63-67, and A.A. Yazkova, "Eastern Europe in Soviet and American Policy (1944-1945)," 68-76.

Retired diplomat focuses on German issue in Soviet foreign policy and its impact on the escalation of the Cold War, 1947-1949. (V. Yerofeev, "Ten Years of Secretaryship in Foreign Commissariat," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* [International Life], Sept. 1991, 108-116.)

Former atomic project employee recalls Germans' contribution to the early Soviet nuclear weapons program, condemns silence on this subject. ("Germans' Role in A-Bomb Project Recalled," *JPRS [Joint Publications Research Service]-UMA-91-013*, 5/20/91, 68-69, citing *Literaturnaya Gazeta* 14, 4/10/91, 5.)

Soviet ties with China and Mao Zedong, 1948-1950, analyzed on the basis of recollections and documents of I.V. Kovalev, Stalin's special envoy to the Chinese Communists. (S. Goncharov, interview with Kovalev, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," part one of two, *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka* [Problems of the Far East] 6 (1991), 83-93; see also S. Goncharov, M. Morozov, "A Secret Adviser to Two Leaders," *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 10/10/91, 3.)

Three-part series by scholar describes Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Tito-Stalin rift, 1948-1953. (L. Ia. [Leonid Iaonovich] Gibianskii, "*Otkrytyi arkhiv. K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 1948-1953 gg.*" [Open Archive: Toward a History of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict, 1948-53], part one: "*U nachala konflikta: balkanskii uzel* [At the beginning of the conflict: The Balkan Knot]," *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir* [The Working Class and the Contemporary World] 2 (March-April 1990), 171-85; part two: "*Pervye shagi konflikta* [First Steps of the Conflict]," *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir* 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1990), 152-63; part three: "*Vyzov v Moskvu* [Summons to Moscow]," *Politicheskie Issledovaniya* [Political Research] 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1991; the journal's name was changed beginning with this issue), 195-207. For a roundtable discussion of the Stalin-Tito rift, see "We All Stemmed from Stalin's Overcoat," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* 12 (5286), 3/21/90. For an interview with Gibianskii on the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav crisis, see A. Kartzev, "How Josef Quarrelled with Josip," *Komsomoskaia Pravda*, 8/7/91.

Stalin's "main double," a man resembling the Soviet leader who stood in for him at meetings and banquets, dies in the southern city of Krasnodar. ("Stalin's Double Reported Dead," *NYT*, 6/16/91, AP report quoting *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 6/15/91.)

Arrest of Stalin's secret police chief, described by a participant. ("Beria's Arrest: From the Unpublished Memoirs of Marshal Moskalenko," *Moscow News* 23,

17-24 June 1991, 8-9.)

Documents in Soviet archives disclose Foreign Ministry deliberations leading up to Moscow's acceptance of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty providing for the departure of Soviet troops in return for Vienna's pledge to remain neutral. Writing in an Austrian daily newspaper, historian Manfried Rauchensteiner concludes that Moscow did not wish to use Austrian neutrality as a wedge to divide NATO but merely wanted to assure that the country did not enter the Western military alliance. (*Die Presse*, 5/11-12/91.)

Investigation discloses new details of 1957 nuclear disaster in Urals, including figures on amount of radioactivity and number of people affected. ("Chelyabinsk: Nuclear Nightmare," ABC News *Nightline*, 1/31/92.)

Soviet Communist Party records disclose payments of $2 million per year to the U.S. Communist Party, according to Aleksandr A. Drosdov, editor of the newspaper Rossiya. ("Kremlin Reportedly Gave $2 Million a Year to U.S. Communist Party," *NYT*, 12/1/91.) Russian prosecutors describes plans to investigate secret CPSU funding program of U.S. party. ("Revelations From the Communist Files: U.S. Party Said Funded By Kremlin," *WP*, 2/8/92.)

Communist archives also reveal large-scale operation to counterfeit foreign passports, official government seals, immigration stamps and documents. ("Soviet Party Made Bogus Documents," *WP*, 10/31/91.)

John Cairncross, a former British intelligence agent, acknowledges being the "fifth man" in the famous Soviet spy ring in Britain along with Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Anthony Blunt. ("A Briton Admits Spying for Soviets," *NYT*, 9/23/91.)

Limited review of KGB files on Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in Soviet Union after defecting from the Marines depicts a discontented loner, fail to substantiate charge that he worked for Soviet intelligence. (ABC News *Nightline*, 11/22/91.)

First installment of Roy Medvedev's biography of Leonid Brezhnev, including his rise to power and handling of tense Soviet relations with China and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. (Roy Medvedev, "L.I. Brezhnev: The Individual and the Epoch," *Druzhba Narodov* [Friendship of Peoples] 1 (1991), 169-215.)

Former KGB official Boris Kalugin asserts that Soviet intelligence agents questioned 3 U.S. prisoners-of-war in Vietnam in 1978, 5 years after all American POWs were supposedly released, seeking to recruit candidates for spying against the United States. Vietnam later confirms one interrogation in 1973; head of a Russian parliamentary commission overseeing the KGB archives, invites U.S. historians to inspect files. ("Russian Offers Americans Access to K.G.B. Files," *NYT*, 1/30/92; "Vietnam Admits K.G.B. Interrogated American," *NYT*, 1/22/92; "KGB Plan `Flopped,' Ex-Official Says," *WP*, 1/22/92; "Soviets Questioned 3 U.S. POWs in Vietnam in '78, KGB Ex-Officer Says," *WP*, 1/3/92.) For a review of reports of U.S. soldiers who allegedly disappeared on Soviet territory: Vladimir Abarinov, "The Sad Tale of American Captives," *Independent Newspaper*, 4/10/92.

Kalugin is also reported to be involved in starting a new Russian magazine, *The Red Archives*, that will publish "political commentary, fiction and previously secret government documents." ("K.G.B. Telltale Is Tattling, But Is He Telling U.S. All?" *NYT*, 1/20/92.)

Soviet diplomat recounts background to 1981 incident in which Soviet submarine was discovered intruding in Swedish waters, triggering international incident. (E. Rymko, "Submarine 137," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, Nov. 1991, 123-27.)

New details on the 1983 Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines flight 007, strengthen argument that the 747 intruded into Soviet airspace accidentally rather than intentionally (as Moscow originally charged); transcripts of conversations with Soviet pilots were allegedly "doctored" to support the official story. (John Lepingwell, "New Soviet Revelations about KAL-007, *Report on the USSR*, 4/26/91, 9-15, citing 10-part series by Andrei Illesh published in *Izvestia* in January 1991 and in English translation in FBIS-SOV-91-025, 2/6/91, 3-27, and FBIS-SOV-91-031-S, 2/14/91, 1-4.)

Soviet ambassador recalls unofficial meeting with Vice President Bush in Geneva in 1984 at which Bush suggested that Gorbachev might succeed Chernenko. (V. Izraelyan, "The Meeting That Did Not Happen," *Argumenti i Fakti* (558), 7/25/91, 5.

A previously hushed-up 1985 accident on a Soviet nuclear submarine in the Pacific killed 10 persons and created a serious environmental hazard, according to Soviet military officials quoted by Greenpeace. ("Soviet A-Sub Blast Killed 10," *WP*, 10/25/91.)

Andrei Gromyko's career as foreign minister is analyzed. (A. Alexandrov-Agentov, "Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Gromyko," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, July 1991, 114-25.)

Germany

The German government has published a new guide to German archives that represents the first attempt by the German Federal Archive in Koblenz to include the archives of the former East Germany. Scholars interested in receiving the new directory should write Prof. Hans Booms or Dr. Tilman Koops, Deutsch Bundesarchiv, Potsdamerstrasse 1, 5400 Koblenz Germany, tel.: (49) 261-5050.

Notes found in the archives of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) describe a 4 June 1945 meeting in Moscow between Soviet leaders and German communists suggesting that the Kremlin's plans for the postwar period were predicated on the belief that two rival German states would emerge. Participants in the meeting included Soviet leaders Stalin, Molotov, and Zdanov, and a German communist delegation including party head Wilhelm Pieck (who took the notes) and Walter Ulbricht, who later became prime minister. ["`*Es wird zwei Deutschlands geben': Entscheidung uber die Zusammensetzung der Kader*" ["`There Will Be Two Germanies': Decisions over the Future Leadership of the Cadre"], *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/30/91, 6; also see "The SED, Stalin, and the Founding of the GDR," *Das Parliament*, 2/25/91, "*Wart nur ab!*," *Der Spiegel*, 4/15/91, and the documentary, "*Poker um Deutschland*" ["Poker for Germany"], a co-production of Bavarian Broadcasting and the Defa-Studio for Documentary Films aired on the German television show "Report" on 3/2/91.]

Newly available East German documents shed light on the fusion of SPD and KPD in the Soviet zone of Germany in 1946; article by Wolfgang Malanowski details postwar pressures on East German Social Democrats to cooperate with Communists. Includes excerpts from Harold Hurwitz's *Fuehrungsanspruch und Isolation der Sozialdemokraten* and *Zwischen Selbstta uschung und Zivilcourage: der Fusionskampf* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik). (*Der Spiegel*, 9/24/90, 116, and 10/1/90, 127.)

Former SED Central Committee member's diary published, containing details of maneuvering inside East Germany party after Stalin's death. (Rudolf Herrnstadt, *Das Herrnstadt Dokument* (Reinbek: Rohwolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990); see also *Der Spiegel*, "*Walter, du hast Schuld*," 6/11/90, 126, and "*Sind wir alle Speichellecker?*" 6/18/90, 126.)

Interview with former 26-year Politburo veteran discloses information on SED history, Warsaw Pact, and other matters. (*Der Spiegel*, 5/7/90, 53.)

Warsaw Pact documents seized from the East German government by West German authorities indicate that as late as 1990 Soviet-bloc forces plotted offensive military operations against Western Europe in the event of war, even after political leaders announced primarily defensive doctrines. (Lothar Ruhl, "Offensive defence in the Warsaw Pact," *Survival* 33:5 (Sept./Oct. 1991), 442-450; also Yevgeny Bovkun, "The Danger From the East: What Was It?" *Izvestia*, 2/5/92, 4, in FBIS-SOV-92-035, 6.)

Text of Gorbachev's speech to SED members on 7 October 1989, the 40th anniversary of the East German state, in which the Soviet leader urged the GDR leadership to be ready to make courageous decisions for change. (*Der Spiegel*, 9/9/91, 107.)

Hundreds of thousands of Germans line up to read files of the Stasi, the East German secret police, after they are opened for public inspection in early January. The decision followed months of controversy and debate over whether to open the Stasi records and who would be permitted to see them. Revelations from files spark recriminations, debates. ("Bonn Closing Books, Opening Controversy," *WP*, 11/13/91; "East Germans Face Pain of Redefining Pasts," *WP*, 1/19/92; "Files of East German Secret Police Are Opened but Few Seek Access," *NYT*, 1/3/92; "`Friends' Revealed as Stasi Spies," *Guardian*, 1/3/92; "Secret Files Haunting Eastern Europe," *Los Angeles Times*, 1/21/92; "Game Is Up, So Informers Inform on Themselves," *NYT*, 1/30/92.)

Albania

The Supreme Military Court overturns 22 death sentences of citizens accused of "treason and terrorist acts" in 1951. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe Report [FBIS-EER], 8/12/91.)

Angry crowds seize and destroy documents in Archives of Cooperatives and People's Councils. (FBIS-EER, 8/14/91.)

Bulgaria

The weekly *Reporter 7* announces a "Do You Remember Prague, My Friend?" initiative to collect memoirs of military officers and soldiers who took part in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. (FBIS-EER, 8/5/91.) The chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff declassifies all archives related to the 1968 invasion and endorses *Reporter 7*'s initiative. (FBIS-EER, 8/23/91.)

The government Commission of Inquiry Into Police Files is working on a "white paper" on the "wrongful acts" of the state security apparatus prior to November 1989. Research continues despite the destruction of 1,500 of the 1,700 archive units of the former political police. Newspaper report alleges that the Soviet KGB signed an agreement with its Bulgarian counterpart to gain access to all spheres of Bulgarian life, and includes information on the murder of Georgi Markov, the 1981 papal assassination attempt, and other events. (FBIS-EER, 9/5/91.)

Reporter 7 quotes an unidentified ex-colonel of the former state security forces as saying that journalist Vladimir Kostov and emigre writer Georgi Markov were "wasted to teach the rest a lesson," and that operations to kill them must have involved the Soviet KGB. (FBIS-EER, 9/6/91.)

The "umbrella murder" trial of former intelli-

gence chief Gen. Vladimir Todorov begins. Todorov is accused of destroying the police file of emigre writer Georgi Markov, murdered in London in 1978. Charges against former deputy interior minister Stoyan Savov were dropped after Savov was found shot dead. Former KGB officer Oleg Kalugin is expected to testify that ten KGB agents carried out the murder. (FBIS-EER, 1/9/92.)

Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier sees Soviet officials to arrange joint investigation of Moscow's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, using CPSU Central Committee, Foreign Ministry, and KGB archives. (FBIS-EER, 9/17/91.)

Visiting Soviet foreign and interior ministers promise Czech officials that Moscow would intensify efforts to locate documents in Soviet archives relevant to the 1968 invasion. (FBIS-SOV-91-221, 11/15/91).

President Vaclav Havel signs controversial screening ("lustrace") law banning former communist officials, secret police collaborators and former members of the People's Militia from top state posts for the next five years. Federal Assembly chairman Alexander Dubcek refuses to sign the law. (FBIS-EER, 10/22/91.)

In December 1991, the head of the Czech government commission to analyze the years 1967-1970 received archival documents, mainly coded diplomatic messages, from Aleksandr Lebedev, then the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia. ("East Europe Offering Astounding Access to Official Papers," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2/12/92.) In April 1992, Yeltsin presented Havel with additional archival documents from the CPSU Central Committee archives relating to the 1968 invasion. (FBIS-EER, 4/3/92.) For initial findings see "August 1968 in Staraya Ploschad Files," *Moscow News* 17 (3524), 26 April-3 May 1992.

Interior Minster seeks additional information on KGB activities in Czechoslovakia from 1948 onwards from Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin. (FBIS-EER, 4/8/92 and 4/10/92, citing *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 4/8/92 and 4/8/92.)

Minutes of 9 July 1947 meeting in Moscow between Stalin and Czech leaders which led to the Prague reversal of earlier intent to participate in Paris Marshall Plan discussions. Document is one of a series to be made available by the Prague Institute of Contemporary History and published in *Bohemia*. ("Stalin, Czechoslovakia, and the Marshall Plan: New Documentation from Czecho-Slovak Archives," intro. by Karel Kaplan, commentary by Vojtech Mastny. *Bohemia* 32:1 (1991), 133-44.)

Hungary

According to the Soviet weekly *Novoe Vremya*, 669 Soviet officers and soldiers died in the 1956 invasion of Hungary. Hungarian radio also stated that 1,500 were wounded and 51 reported missing. (*RFE/RL Daily Report* 232 (12/12/91), 5.)

Poland

Poland's reaction to the Marshall Plan recounted, using unpublished Polish archival sources. (Sheldon Anderson, "Poland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-1949," *Diplomatic History* 15:4 (Fall 1991), 473-94.)

In a recently-published memoir, *The General's Dossier*, Jaruzelski cites a threat by Brezhnev to invade Poland to defend his 1981 imposition of martial law. ("Many Poles Now See '81 Martial Law as Justified," *NYT*, 12/22/91.) Two Soviet accounts detail the invasion plans: Leonid Kornilov, "According to General Dubynin, General Jaruzelski prevented the intervention of Soviet troops planned for December 14, 1981," *Izvestia*, 3/16/92, 4; Maj.-Gen. (res.) Vladimir Dudnik, "'Dark Room' Secrets," *Moskovski Novisti* 14 (4/5/92), 17; reprinted in *Moscow News*, English edition, 15 (3522), 12-19 April 1992, 13.

Jan Rokita, chairman of the Sejm's Commission for Studying the Activities of the Internal Affairs Ministry, MSW, 1981-1988, presents a report which accuses the ministry of improperly investigating 98 cases of mysterious deaths and holds the ministry responsible for numerous unlawful acts, including murder and falsification of documents. (FBIS-EER, 10/10/91.)

United States

President Bush signs legislation aimed at requiring declassification and publication of key State Department documents no more than 30 years after date of creation and giving outside historical advisory panel more power to ensure integrity of declassification procedures. ("Documents Law: 30 Years and Out," *WP*, 10/31/91; Warren F. Kimball, letter, *NYT*, 10/9/91.)

Chairman of historians' watchdog panel urges passage of new law on declassification, explains political obstacles. (Warren Kimball, "Re: the State Department Historical Advisory Committee," The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter* 22:3 (Sept. 1991), 38-42.)

CIA panel urges faster declassification of older documents. ("Panel from C.I.A. Urges Curtailing of Agency Secrecy," *NYT*, 1/12/92; "CIA Task Force Urges Speedier Declassifications," *WP*, 1/13/92. "CIA Report on Openness Classified Secret," WP, 4/23/92.)

People's Republic of China

Chinese Historians: The Journal of Chinese Historians in the United States devotes issue 5:1 to China and the Cold War. Contact: Prof. Chen Jian, Chinese Historians, Department of History, SUNY-Geneseo, Geneseo, NY 14454. Subs: $20/yr. (inst.), $12/yr. (individ.). Sino-American relations, 1949-50, and China's aims in the Korean War are among the topics scrutinized in the inaugural issue (Spring 1992) of *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* (Imprint Publications, Inc., 100 E. Ohio St., Suite 630, Chicago, IL 60611). Subs: $60/yr. (inst.), $30/yr. (individ.), $22/yr. (stud.).

Korean War

Publication of Mao's cables to Stalin and Zhou Enlai sheds new light on Chinese decision to intervene in Korean War in the fall of 1950. ("Mao's Cable Explains Drive Into Korea," *NYT*, 2/26/92.)

Two recent South Korean publications containing Soviet and North Korean accounts are: Korean War Research Conference Committee, *The Historical Re-Illumination of the Korean War* (War Memorial Service-Korea, 8 Yongsan-dong 1-ga, Yongsan-ku, Seoul, Korea 140-021) and Kim Chullbaum, ed., *The Truth About the Korean War: Testimony 40 Years Later* (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing Co., Ltd., 46-1 Susoug-dong, Chongno-gu, Seoul 110-603).

Berlin Crisis

New details on construction of Berlin Wall, including deliberations of Ulbricht and Honecker, emerge from book by Werner Filmer and Heribert Schwan, *Opfer der Mauer: Die geheimen Protokolle des Todes* (Munich: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1991); see also *Der Spiegel*, 8/12/91, 102.

Interviews with Soviet officials indicate October 1961 U.S.-Soviet tank standoff in Berlin was more dangerous than previously believed. (Raymond L. Garthoff, "Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991), 142-56.)

Cuban Missile Crisis

Former KGB agent in Washington Alexander Feklisov recounts meeting with ABC correspondent John Scali during crisis to pass message to U.S. administration. (V.P. Krikunov, "The Unknown Facts About the Outcome of the Caribbean Crisis," *Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal* 10 (1990), 33-38.)

Khrushchev's correspondence with Castro during the crisis. (*Vestnik* MID SSSR 24 (Dec. 1990).)

Ex-Soviet envoy analyzes crisis. (G.M. Kornienko, "New Facts about the Caribbean Crisis," *Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoria* 3 (May-June 1991), 77-92.)

State Department releases previously classified Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence from Oct.-Dec. 1962. ("The Cuba Missile Crisis: Kennedy Left a Loophole," *NYT*, 1/7/92.) Columnists report that still-classified documents show that only in 1983 did the State Department close a loophole in the U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. ("Secrets of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *WP* Op-Ed page, 2/2/92.)

Conference in Havana discloses new information on missile crisis, including revelation by Soviet military official that Moscow had deployed tactical nuclear launchers on the island with local commanders given permission to use the warheads against invading U.S. soldiers. Castro takes an active part in meeting, which gathered Cuban, American, and former Soviet officials and scholars. ("In Letter, Khrushchev Tells Of Mockery Over Cuba Crisis," *NYT*, 1/22/92; "Cuban Missile Crisis More Volatile Than Thought," *WP*, 1/14/92; J. Anthony Lukas, "Fidel Castro's Theater of Now," *NYT* Op-Ed page, 1/20/92; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Four Days with Fidel: A Havana Diary," *New York Review of Books* 39:6 (3/26/92), 22-29.) Former CIA analyst asserts U.S. intelligence knew of short-range nuclear-capable Soviet missiles in Cuba during crisis. (Dino A. Brugiono, letter, *WP*, 2/8/92.)

Afghanistan

Babrak Karmal and other former Communist officials recount Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its aftermath, analyzing the war's relationship to the larger Cold War conflict. (Steve Coll, "Orphan of the Cold War: The Last Battleground," *WP Magazine*, 4/26/92, 10-15, 24-28.)

Recently-released documents on political background to 1979 Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan. (D. Muratov, "Afghanistan," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 12/27/90, 3.)

Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan is recounted, along with details of military operations there. ("How the Decision Was Being Made," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* [Military-Historical Journal] 7 (1991), 40-52.)

KGB chief in Kabul describes events leading to invasion. (Alexander Morozov, "Our Man in Kabul," *Novoe Vremya* [New Times] 41 (1991), 32-38.

Information presented about activities of Soviet delegation at United Nations regarding Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (N. Ivanov, "Limited Contingent," *Literaturnaya Rossiya* 4 (1/25/91), 12-15.)

During Senate confirmation hearings last fall, incoming Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates promised that the Central Intelligence Agency would be more forthcoming in declassifying and releasing historical materials. To this end, Gates appointed a "Task Force on Greater CIA Openness" to explore ways of making good on this promise. That report was completed in late December 1991 and its major conclusions have since been made public in the form of a speech by Gates to the Oklahoma Press Association on 21 February 1992, although the task force report itself was stamped "secret" and the CIA declassified a sanitized version (with the names of consulted individuals blacked out) in late April in response to a request from the House Intelligence committee. (George Lardner, "CIA Report On Openness Classified Secret," Washington Post, *23 April 1992) Though the CIA as of late April had not formally released the documents, the* Bulletin *of the Cold War International History Project has obtained a copy of the 15-page report as well as Gates' responding directive. Excerpts of particular relevance to scholars interested in historical research pertaining to the CIA, as well as from Gates' speech, appear below.*

Excerpts from the task force report, dated 20 December 1991

3. Many of those interviewed said the CIA was sufficiently open; all thought the CIA could do more to declassify and make available portions of its historical archives, especially regarding CIA successes and scientific/technical accomplishments; some said the CIA will have to work harder at explaining the need for intelligence in the post-cold war world.

All agreed that an effective public affairs program for the CIA was necessary and that whatever changes were made to increase openness, all would expect the CIA to keep the secrets it is charged to protect.

4. In whatever program we pursue, we should:

* get our employees on board first
* be consistent
* be excellent
* be credible—admit when we are wrong
* personalize the Agency
* preserve the mystique

7. We have an important story to tell, a story that bears repeating. We are the most open intelligence agency in the world which is proper in our form of democracy. (In fact, several foreign intelligence organizations have sought advice from PAO [*Public Affairs Office—ed.*] on how to establish a mechanism for dealing with the public.) That said, many Americans do not understand the intelligence process and the role of intelligence in national security policymaking. Many still operate with a romanticized or erroneous view of intelligence from the movies, TV, books and newspapers. These views often damage our reputation and make it harder for us to fulfill our mission. There are steps we can take which will benefit us and the American people.

8. To increase CIA openness and signal a change in how we do business, we need to take initiatives to share our history through the declassification of old records, explain our mission and functions in a changing world through an expanded briefing program within and outside of government, and develop a strategy for expanding our work with the media as a means of reaching an even broader audience. Our major recommendations address these issues:

A. Declassifying and releasing records that describe CIA's history and activities would go a long way to educating the public on the work of intelligence. Our voluntary Historical Review Program has proceeded very slowly, and recent legislation (H.R. 1415) has mandated greater access to our records by State Department historians. Presently, policy and resource constraints severely limit the amount of historical records released by the CIA. Therefore, we recommend that you:

1) Establish a senior-led, Agency-wide group to review the Agency's policy and practices related to the declassification and release of records under the Historical Review and FOIA programs, as they relate to the changing international environment and counterintelligence threat, and with a view to accelerating the process.

_____Approve _____Disapprove

2) Initiate in the near-term the declassification of historical materials on specific events, particularly those which are repeatedly the subject of false allegations, such as the 1948 Italian Elections, 1953 Iranian Coup, 1954 Guatemalan Coup, 1958 Indonesian Coup and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Notify the public of the availability of the resulting materials.

_____Approve _____Disapprove

3) Have OTE [*Office of Training & Education—ed.*] publish an unclassified version of Studies in Intelligence and make it available to the public for sale through the National Technical Information Service and have it listed in the Social Science Index.[1]

_____Approve _____Disapprove

4) Publish compendiums of papers delivered at conferences sponsored or cosponsored by CIA.

_____Approve _____Disapprove

9. In most of our discussions we defined the audiences for greater CIA openness as the following: the media, academia, business, the private sector, government, and our own employees. We have used these categories to describe our current program related to openness which provides a context for offering our other recommendations.

B. ACADEMIA

2) Recommendations:

d. Sponsor either unilaterally or in cooperation with academic institutions or other government agencies conferences on the history and craft of intelligence. PAO will work with OTE's Center for the Study of Intelligence on these programs.[4]

_____Approve _____Disapprove

e. Conduct more academic conferences here at Langley. Take the successful DI [*Directorate of Intelligence—ed.*] model of substantive conferences with the academic community and explore how it could be valuable to S&T [*Directorate of Science and Technology—ed.*] and DA [*Directorate of Administration—ed.*].

_____Approve _____Disapprove

[*Footnotes*:]

1 . The Editorial Board of Studies has identified several hundred unclassified or declassified articles and taken steps to interest scholars and publishers in them. About half a dozen university presses have expressed interest, but to date none have [sic] actively begun the editorial process.

4. For example, PAO is currently talking with the Truman Library about a conference in late 1992 or 1993 on the origins of the Intelligence Community. A similar conference with the Wilson Center is being considered to mark the 30th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis next fall. [*Editor's note: Such a proposal was made to the Coordinator of the Cold War International History Project, James G. Hershberg, on 14 February 1992 by James A. Barry, Director of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, who had contacted CWIHP to solicit suggestions. Hershberg suggested that, rather than begin with a conference on CIA documentation on the missile crisis, it might make more sense, both for the purposes of Cold War historical research and to address straightforwardly widespread skepticism among academics, for the CIA to (1) declassify materials on earlier controversial events following the creation of the CIA, such as the Italian elections and the Iranian and Guatemalan coups; (2) declassify and publish National Intelligence Estimates from 1947 onwards; and (3) systematically review, with a tilt towards declassification in light of the Cold War's end, materials previously deleted by the CIA from volumes of the State Department's* Foreign Relations of the United States *series. The Wilson Center did not agree to hold any meetings sponsored by the CIA.*]

Gates' response, dated 6 January 1992:

5. Reference paragraph 8.A. (1) and (2) of the report: The Executive Committee should establish a senior-led Agency-wide group to review CIA policy and practices related to declassification and release of records under the historical review and FOIA programs with a view to accelerating the process. Additionally, this senior-level group should examine the initiation of a program in the near term to declassify historical materials on specific events as suggested by the task force report—a suggestion that I am inclined to support. (Further to this issue, see paragraph 18.a.) At the same time, this group should identify what additional resources would be necessary to augment our efforts in both of these areas.

6. Reference paragraph 8.A.(3): The editorial board of Studies in Intelligence should intensify its efforts to find a university prepared to publish unclassified or declassified articles from Studies in Intelligence. If no university has made a firm commitment by the end of May, OTE should begin publishing compendia of unclassified articles from past Studies. These should be made available in the same way as other unclassified CIA publications.

7. Reference paragraph 8.A.(4): We should not publish compendiums of papers delivered at conferences sponsored or co-sponsored by CIA. However, when such conferences are unclassified, we should indicate to participants that we have no objection to their publishing their papers—with appropriate disclaimers—and referencing a CIA conference. The choice should be up to the scholar.

11. Reference paragraph 9.B.(2): . . . I support participation of Agency employees in relevant scientific and professional societies and approve the recommendation for updating procedures for individuals to present papers in such meetings. I am not persuaded that CIA should become an institutional member of these societies. I support conducting more academic conferences at Langley, examining ways to continue to enhance the program of disseminating unclassified publications, and encouraging the establishment of intelligence studies programs at academic institutions.

12. . . .I endorse the recommendation that the Center [for the Study of Intelligence] should sponsor either unilaterally or in cooperation with academic institutions conferences on the history and craft of intelligence.

18. I received a number of useful comments from several of the addresses of this memorandum, as well as a number of others in the Agency . . . I commend you:

a. [*name deleted-ed.*] memorandum, particularly that part suggesting that the senior group reviewing our policy and practices relating to declassification and release of records under the historical review and the FOIA programs consider beyond these programs what kinds of information, and under what circumstances exceptions should be made. As [*name deleted-ed.*] says, "Mere expedience and a perceived need to respond to the Hill or press quickly should not be the driving factor in whether we declassify information." Above all, [*name deleted-ed.*] contends we should be consistent in the way that we release information.

The task force recommendations were incorporated into Gates' 21 February 1992 speech to the Oklahoma Press Association ["CIA and Openness"; available from the CIA Public Affairs Office, Office of Public and Agency Information, CIA, Washington, DC 20505; 703-482-7676]. Excerpts follow.

We are under no illusions that CIA, whatever the level of its efforts, will be able to win recognition as an 'open' institution. What we hope to do is all we can to be as forthcoming, candid, informative and helpful as possible to the public, the media and academia consistent with our mission and the protection of sources and methods.

Bearing in mind these considerations, CIA will take the following initiatives with respect to the public and the media, the academic community, and the declassification of historical documents . . . .

First, the public and media. . .

* For decades, CIA has had a high quality classified internal journal, *Studies in Intelligence.* Over the years, many hundreds of articles have been written by intelligence professionals on every aspect of our work. I have directed the open publication of unclassified articles as well as articles that can be declassified from this journal. As one example, I will soon release to the Smithsonian Institution such an article dealing with CIA's role in the early development and operation of the SR-71. We are currently discussing with several university presses their publishing compendia of these articles. We also are considering publishing them ourselves and making them available to the public in the same way as other unclassified CIA publications.

* CIA will develop additional unclassified information on the agency, its history, mission, function and role, and also will expand its briefing program for schools, civic groups and other organizations.

Second, with respect to academia: . . .

* The Center for the Study of Intelligence will sponsor, both unilaterally and in cooperation with academic institutions, conferences on the history and craft of intelligence. [*Ed. note: For further information contact: Mr. James A. Barry, Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Office of Training & Education, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505, tel.: (703) 351-2378*]

. . . Third, with respect to declassification:

* CIA for years has complied with requirements to review documents for declassification under the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act and Executive Orders. Congress, in recognition of the special sensitivity of intelligence operations, in 1984 passed the CIA Information Act exempting certain categories of operations, security and technical files from search and review under the Freedom of Information Act. In conformity with these laws, last year CIA received over 4,500 new requests for document declassification and completed action on some 4,000. Some 5,700 pages of CIA documents were declassified. [*Ed. note: For further information or to file FOIA requests, contact John Wright, Freedom of Information Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505.*]

* Separately, CIA has had a voluntary historical review program since 1985 to review and declassify historical CIA records. However, apart from a very limited volume of documents declassified from the files of CIA's history staff and turned over to the national archives, we must acknowledge that the results of our historical review program have been quite meager—the consequences of low priority, few resources, and rigid agency policies and procedures heavily biased toward denial of declassification.

I have directed a new approach that will change this situation while still protecting intelligence sources and methods and conforming to the 1984 CIA Information Act.

* I am transferring the unit responsible for historical review for declassification to the Center for the Study of Intelligence, where there will be a bias toward declassification of historical documents. Line components seeking to appeal a decision by the center staff to declassify a document can appeal only to the head of the center and from there only to the DCI, to me.

* In this time of scarce and diminishing resources, as a measure of the priority I attach to this effort, I am directing the allocation of 15 full-time positions to form the historical review unit.

* Subject to the 1984 CIA Information Act, the unit will review for declassification all documents over 30 years old.

* Beyond this, the unit will review for declassification all national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union ten years old or older.

* In addition to systematic review of 30 year old and older documents, I have directed that several of the reviewers be assigned to focus on events of particular interest to historians from the late 1940s to the early 1960s so that these materials need not await their turn in the queue. Such events might include the 1954 Guatemalan coup, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

* This unit will be responsible for CIA participation in preparation of the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series and compliance with related statutes governing the review of historical material.

* CIA will publish on an annual basis an index of all documents it has declassified under all categories of review, including historical review.

* I am transferring custody of all documents CIA possesses relating to the assassination of President Kennedy to the Historical Review Program. As I have told Senator Boren, Congressman McCurdy and Congressman Louis Stokes, CIA will cooperate fully and willingly in any government-wide effort to declassify these documents. Our ability to act unilaterally is hindered by the Privacy Act, sequestration of many documents we have by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many other documents we hold on this tragedy belong to other agencies. But CIA will not be found lagging in any broader government effort to review and declassify these documents.

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