Top Secret. Extremely Sensitive

Committee of State Security [KGB]
of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR

TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF CC CPSU

6 May 1968
Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV
no. 1025-A/ov
Moscow


[For information–P.B. Ulanov]
[Signatures: L. Brezhnev, A. Kosygin, D. Polianskii, A. Pel’she, K. Mazurov, Podgorny, Suslov, Kuusinen]

Guided by the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and by the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State Security and its local branches took measures during the year [covered in this] report to raise Chekist work to a level adequate for the needs flowing from the present international situation and the interests of communist construction in our country. [Ed. Note: The original KGB founded in 1917 was known as the Chrezvychainyi komitet or Extraordinary Committee, from which comes the acronym ChK. One who worked for the ChK was known as a “Chekist.”]

In accordance with the tasks set by the June (1967) CC CPSU plenum, the main attention of the KGB has been devoted first and foremost to strengthening foreign intelligence, so that it could actively contribute to the successful implementation of Soviet foreign policy and could reliably ensure the timely discovery, foiling and unmasking of subversive plans of imperialist countries and their intelligence services. One of the first-priority measures in this regard was the reinforcement of the intelligence services by experienced KGB professionals in the central apparat, as well as in the KGB stations abroad.

In the period under review, special attention was given to the organization of active countermeasures against the enemy’s ideological diversions. Following the decree of the CC CPSU on this issue, passed on 17 June 1967, a Fifth Directorate was created in the Committee of State Security and fifth bureaus, divisions and departments in territorial branches of the KGB.

In the interests of increasing the level of agent work [agenturno-operativnoi raboty] in the local branches of the KGB, Chekist organs were created in regions and cities that in recent years have grown economically or acquired important military significance and have therefore now become objects of intelligence interest for the enemy. The local party organizations gave positive marks to the intensification of the Chekist work in those regions. At the present time, the Committee is examining a number of proposals from the CCs of Communist Parties of the Union Republics, area [krai] and regional [oblast’] party committees forwarded during 1967 to create KGB offices in other cities and districts where this is dictated by interests of state security.

Implementing the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State Security carried out a set of measures aimed at increasing the struggle with the anti-Soviet activities of the Chinese splitters [raskolniki] and at ensuring the reliable protection of the borders of the USSR with the PRC. To this end, we set up a Trans-Baikal border district, organized new detachments, maritime units, checkpoints of the border troops and battalions of government communications troops. In the KGB branches of the [Union] republics, areas and regions bordering on the PRC, we organized intelligence subdivisions, and in the frontier areas we created several new city and regional offices of the KGB.

The improvement of the operational and service activities of the KGB branches and troops has also been ensured through administrative measures aimed at further perfection of their structure and personnel. In particular, to achieve more efficient use of operative equipment we transformed the second department of the Operational-Technical Directorate into a separate department of the Committee. We carried out some required structural changes in the subdivisions of the KGB in charge of engineering, cryptography and the development of new special devices. We set up several special departments in the KGB in connection with the establishment of new and the deployment of existing large formations and large units [ob’edinienia i soedineniia] of the Soviet Army. We set up an Inspectorate under the Chairman of the KGB with the purpose of improving the system of control and inspection of activities of the Chekist offices and units of the KGB.
In the period under review the branches of State Security had to fulfill their prescribed tasks in an aggravated operational situation. The governments and intelligence services of the USA and other imperialist states have intensified their aggressive policies and subversive activities with respect to the socialist countries. They made intense efforts to take advantage of this jubilee year in the life of the Soviet people [Ed. Note: 50th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution] to carry out ideological operations and to organize large-scale anti-Soviet propaganda.

In view of the developing situation, the intelligence service of the KGB carried out a number of measures to help promotion of foreign policy and other initiatives of the Soviet Union, to unmask aggressive plans of imperialist states, to compromise policies of the American government and the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet state as well as to foil subversive ideological operations targeted by the enemy at the 50th anniversary of Soviet power.

The intelligence service of the KGB attributed primary significance to the timely acquisition of secret information on subversive plots of the enemy and took measures to develop agents’ access, primarily in the USA and other countries of the main enemy, but also took measures to create intelligence potential for operations against the Chinese splitters. During 1967 the KGB recruited 218 foreigners, among whom 64 possess operational capacities for work against the USA.

Reinforcement of agent networks of the intelligence service contributed to obtaining important information on political, military and scientific-technological problems. During 1967 the KGB stations abroad received and acted on a total of 25,645 informational materials. Beside that, the intelligence services of socialist countries sent 7,290 materials in the course of informational exchange. During 1967 the KGB carried out operations of clandestine pilfering of secret documents from intelligence services of the enemy. These and other measures resulted in obtaining the codes of seven capitalist countries and in implanting eavesdropping radio-devices at 36 installations of interest for Soviet intelligence.

On the basis of the data obtained by the intelligence services, there were prepared and sent to the CC CPSU 4,260 informational reports, to the CC CPSU departments—4,728, to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR—4,832, to the Ministry of Defense and the GRU [Military Intelligence] of the General Staff of the Soviet Army—4,639. The Politburo CC CPSU members received 42 bulletins of foreign intelligence information. At the same time we sent to various ministries and agencies of the USSR 1,495 informational reports, as well as 9,910 materials and 1,403 samples of foreign technology. This year, at the request of the Military-Industrial Commission, we obtained 1,376 works on 210 subjects and over 330 most recent samples of foreign technology.

In carrying out measures of counterintelligence, KGB stations prevented the compromise of 22 officers and agents of the KGB and GRU and 8 officers and agents of the intelligence services of socialist countries. They also uncovered 42 double agents planted by the enemy.

The main attention in improvement of counterintelligence work inside the country was focused on its further perfection so as to ensure more efficient struggle with military, economic and political espionage.

Fulfilling this task in practical terms, the counterintelligence branches directed their efforts at carrying out measures to gain agents’ access to intelligence and other special services of imperialist states. During 1967 to this end the KGB arranged the planting of 31 agents in the enemy’s intelligence; of them 12 were located by the enemy’s special services and subjected to their intense scrutiny, which creates preconditions for the accomplishment of these “plants” in the future. Measures were also carried out to ensure agents’ access to foreign centers that plan and implement ideological diversions, and also to anti-Soviet nationalist and religious organizations. Seven agents were planted into their leadership structures.

In order to intercept and control channels of penetration by the enemy into our country, [the KGB] continued working on successful accomplishment of operational games. Currently, 9 such games are being conducted, including 4 games with the intelligence of the USA, 8 games with the center of the [Russian émigré organization] NTS and 2 games with the centers of Ukrainian nationalists abroad.

As a result of these measures we succeeded in uncovering the encroachments of the enemy intelligence services in some regions of the Soviet Union, particular in the Far East, the Baltic, frontier areas of Ukraine, as well as at a number of enterprises and scientific research institutes. We also succeeded in obtaining data on some modes of communication between the enemy’s intelligence and agent networks in spotting specific intelligence officers engaged in enemy activities against the USSR, and in passing to the enemy advantageous information and disinformation, [even] regarding operational activities.

More successful fulfillment of the task of penetrating the enemy’s special services has been facilitated also by measures of recruiting foreigners. During 1967, 42 agents were recruited, among them 8 diplomats.

The counterintelligence service carried out special measures which resulted in photocopying 54 documents of ambassadors from member countries of NATO, annual reports of some embassies, reports of military attachés, and other classified materials on political, military-economic, operational and other matters. In addition, we worked out ciphers and codes in 11 embassies of capitalist countries, which will allow us to decode their correspondence.

Among the personnel of diplomatic missions as well as tourists, businessmen and members of various delegations arriving in the USSR (in 1967 their numbers came up to more than 250 thousand), we spotted over 270 foreigners suspected of links to the enemy’s special services. On the charges of intelligence activities, participation in acts.
of ideological diversion, smuggling, illegal currency operations and violations of the norms of behavior, [the KGB] deported from the USSR 108 foreigners and brought 11 foreigners to justice. The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB, jointly with the organs of security of the GDR, unmasked 17 agents of Western intelligence services who conducted espionage work against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

In the course of counterintelligence countermeasures with regard to enemy intelligence officers under diplomatic cover and other foreigners under suspicion of being affiliated to the enemy’s special services, a number of Soviet citizens who established contact with the aim of passing secret information were discovered and unmasked. Among those persons brought to justice were a senior economist of the scientific research institute of the MVT [Foreign Trade Ministry] of the USSR Salov, a senior engineer of the all-union association “Stankoimport” of the MVT of the USSR Seregin, and a technician from an installation of special significance of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building [cover for the Atomic Energy Program] Malyshev.

While organizing ever more effective struggle with military and economic espionage, the counterintelligence branches of the KGB took measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy, to bring to further perfection the protection of state secrets from the radio-technical and aerial-space means of reconnaissance of the enemy and to foil the enemy’s attempts to use for reconnaissance purposes the expansion of the scientific-technical exchange between the USSR and capitalist countries.

The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB did significant work on camouflaging rocket launching pads, depots of nuclear weapons and other objects from the enemy’s space reconnaissance. They worked hard on spotting and prevention of violations in concealed control and command of troops and operating means of communication, as well as on the counterintelligence support of military exercises and maneuvers, and transfers of military equipment.

A place of high visibility in counterintelligence activity went to the measures taken along the lines of trips of Soviet citizens abroad, with the purposes of their protection from machinations of the enemy’s intelligence services and for the solution of other operative tasks. As part of delegations, tourist groups and exhibition participants in 1967 the KGB sent 378 operatives to the capitalist countries, and also over 2,200 agents and 4,400 persons-in-confidence [doveremenykh list]. With their help we spotted 192 foreigners affiliated or suspected of being affiliated with special services of the enemy, thwarted 60 attempts to work on Soviet citizens [to persuade them] not to return to the Motherland; disclosed 230 persons who compromised themselves through incorrect behavior (18 of whom were recalled early to the USSR).

The establishment of subdivisions of the so-called fifth line in the structure of the KGB branches allowed us to concentrate the needed efforts and means on the countermeasures to fight ideological diversions from outside and anti-Soviet manifestations inside the country. The measures taken in this regard succeeded in general in paralyzing the attempts of enemy special services and propaganda centers to carry out in the Soviet Union a series of ideological diversions, time-linked with the half-century anniversary of Great October. Along with unmasking a number of foreigners who arrived in the USSR with assignments of a subversive character, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press disclosing subversive activities of the enemy’s special services, and over 114 thousand letters and banderoles containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful printed materials were confiscated in the international mail.

Since the enemy, in its calculations to unsettle socialism from inside, places its stake mainly on nationalistic propaganda, the KGB branches carried out a number of measures to disrupt attempts to conduct organized nationalist activities in a number of areas of the country (Ukraine, the Baltics, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Armenia, Kabardino-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, Tatar and Abkhaz Autonomous SSRs).

The measures to spot and undercut the hostile activity of anti-Soviet elements, including church officials and sectarians, were carried out with consideration of the existing data on the growth of hostile and ideologically harmful activity by religious and Zionist centers. To uncover their plots and to foil their subversive actions under preparation, and serve other counterintelligence tasks, the KGB dispatched 122 agents abroad. We also managed to suppress and disrupt hostile activities by the emissaries of foreign religious centers who were sent to the USSR, and to unmask and bring to justice for illegal activity a number of active sectarians.

In 1967 the distribution of 11,856 leaflets and other anti-Soviet anonymous documents on the territory of the USSR was registered. In addition, in the Armenian SSR we confiscated and prevented distribution of another 6,255 leaflets. During the year the KGB established the identity of 1,198 anonymous authors. The majority among them did this because of their political immaturity, and also because of shortcomings in required educational work at the collectives where they work or study. At the same time some select hostile elements chose this way to struggle against Soviet power. Because the number of anonymous authors who distributed malicious anti-Soviet documents owing to hostile convictions increased, there was an increase of those convicted for this type of crime: in 1966 there were 41 of them, and in 1967—114.

An integral part of the activities of KGB military counterintelligence in maintaining combat readiness of Soviet Armed Forces is the prevention of ideological diversions in smaller and larger units of the Army and Navy, to sever in a timely manner the penetration channels of bourgeois ideology. During 1967 we aborted 456 attempts at distribution among military personnel of
In 1967 the KGB branches subjected to prophylactic character aimed at prevention of state crimes. In 3,783 cases the conclusion was reached to close them. KGB investigators, acting upon citizen appeals, in 1967 led to 13 court trials with wide public participation. The cases prepared by the KGB organs a number of effective measures to strengthen legality in espionage.

Foreigner and one Soviet citizen have been arrested for bezzlement of state and public property in large amounts, 100 persons—for espionage and diversion, 221 persons—for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, 96 persons—for Fascist occupation, 34 were indicted for treason to the Motherland and for treasonous plotting, 96 persons—for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, 221 persons—for illegal crossing of state borders, 100 persons—for embezzlement of state and public property in large amounts and for corruption; 148—for illegal smuggling of goods and for violations of currency operations rules; and one foreigner and one Soviet citizen have been arrested for espionage.

During this year the Committee of State Security took a number of effective measures to strengthen legality in the work of the state security organs. Investigation of criminal cases was conducted according to the norms of legal procedures. The cases prepared by the KGB organs in 1967 led to 13 court trials with wide public participation. KGB investigators, acting upon citizen appeals, reviewed 6,732 criminal cases involving 12,376 persons; in 3,783 cases the conclusion was reached to close them.

Great importance was attached to measures of a prophylactic character aimed at prevention of state crimes. In 1967 the KGB branches subjected to prophylactic treatment 12,115 persons, most of whom revealed manifestations of an anti-Soviet and politically harmful character without hostile intent.

Great importance was attached to further improvement of the protection of the state borders. As before, the borders with Turkey, Iran and Norway were guarded with high-density concentrations of forces and measures. The concentration of forces guarding the borders with the PRC has been almost tripled. To ensure border control along the seacoasts of the Arctic Ocean, a separate Arctic borderguards detachment and a separate air wing were formed.

The borderguard troops in 1967 processed through the borders more than 7.8 million persons, including over 3.5 million foreigners; they did paperwork on and searched 815,564 vehicles; detained 2,026 violators of state borders, among whom they discovered 2 enemy agents and 3 traitors to the Motherland.

In 1967 the border-guard troops at frontier checkpoints and the investigative personnel of the KGB confiscated from smugglers and currency-traders about 30 kilograms of gold bullion and coins, artifacts in precious metals and stones, foreign and Soviet currency and other goods totaling 2,645,000 rubles.

A special service of the KGB carried on interception of encoded communication from 2,002 active radio stations of 115 countries of the world. The units of radio counterintelligence of the service worked on 24 radio-centers of intelligence services of capitalist countries which maintained communications to 108 agent points. 3 new agents’ radio-transmitters were detected in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. No agent radio-transmissions were found on the territory of the Soviet Union. The search squads established the addresses of 500 owners of unregistered radio-transmitters in the USSR.

As a result of decoding and deciphering work we read communications in 152 cipher-systems of 72 capitalist countries; in 1967 we broke 11 cipher-systems, and decoded 188,400 telegrams overall.

For the needs of ministries and agencies of the USSR, [the KGB] created 217 codes and other means of hand-ciphering, prepared 1,241,113 key- and recyclable cipher pads, 29,908 copies of codes and code tables, and 305,182 copies of other special documents. All current requests from ministries and agencies of the USSR have been entirely fulfilled. Industry supplied to the lines of communications 8,785 sets of cipher-making and scrambling equipment, which accounted for 100.6% of the planned amount. Tests of operational quality in 217 ciphering bodies and the departments of classified communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR were carried out, and also in 190 ciphering units in Soviet institutions abroad. Random radio-surveillance of 200 radio-networks of public communications and of 102 secret lines of communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR was carried out.

Cooperation of the organs of the KGB with the
security organs of socialist countries developed successfully. The mutual exchange of intelligence data increased considerably. In bilateral consultations, prospective plans for intelligence work were periodically shared, joint measures to study enemy intelligence officers for recruitment purposes and to work on and check on those who were suspected of espionage and other hostile activity, were carried out. The security organs of Poland and Hungary gave us assistance in maintaining security of Soviet troops abroad. There was interaction in counterintelligence protection for training exercises of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. Cooperation with the organs of security of Romania was limited to the minor exchange of information. The restored contacts with the MOB [Ministry of Security] of the KNDR [North Korea] have received some further development.

In the last year [the KGB] guaranteed security for leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet government during their 134 trips on the territory of the USSR and abroad. Special measures of a protective nature were also carried out for more than 70 events of the party and the state and during the most important visits by foreign delegations.

Measures were also carried out to raise the quality and reliability of the national system of [internal] government communication, to ensure its further development and automatization, and also to keep it equipped with secure equipment; a new communication network linking government objects was put into effect that increases the combat-ready qualities of the whole communication system.

For the purposes of increasing mobilization readiness, a set of measures to create the conditions propitious for organization of intelligence and counterintelligence work was carried out, and also for timely deployment of organs and troops of the Committee in a special [wartime] period.

As far as decisions related to financial and economic activities of the organs and forces of the KGB were concerned, special importance was attached to further reinforcement of the regime of savings of material and financial resources, as well as to strict observation of state and accounting discipline.

Last year more systematic efforts were made to exercise control over the activities of local branches of the KGB and to provide them with assistance in implementing decisions and instructions of the party, state, and KGB. Improvements were made in the way collegiums of the committees of state security and councils advising the heads of KGB directorates worked in that field.

Higher quality of operative-service activities has been achieved in the period under question due to measures to upgrade selection, appointment and education of the Chekist cadres. In 1967 the organs and forces of the KGB enrolled 11,103 new employees, including 4,502 to positions requiring officer ranks. Simultaneously, the KGB laid off 6,582 persons, including 2,102 officers. The new recruits to the KGB included 470 employees who were recruited from positions in Party, Komsomol [communist youth movement] and soviet organizations. Six hundred one persons were selected and appointed to positions of nomenklatura leadership in the CC CPSU and KGB.

All organizational and educational work with KGB cadres during the last year has been aimed at paying homage to the half-century anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution as well as all-sided improvement of the operative-service activities of the branches of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the Committee of State Security. To commemorate successes in fulfilling the tasks set by the Party and government, 10 military units received awards—memorial banners of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Seven military units and three educational institutions have been decorated. For exemplary results in work and achievements in building Soviet state security, 5,665 servicemen, workers and employees of the organs and forces of the KGB have been decorated with orders and medals of the USSR; 24 [KGB] officers and generals have been promoted to the ranks of major general, lieutenant-general, colonel general and general by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The measures adopted in accordance with the resolutions of the CC CPSU June (1967) plenum increased the role of the party organizations of the central apparatus, organs and forces of the KGB in the area of more successful implementation of Chekist tasks, in their greater impact on the improvement of work with cadres, in reinforcement of military discipline, and in the growth of political vigilance over personnel.

In their constant building and expanding of their ties with the Soviet people, the organs and forces of the KGB in all their practical activities rely on the assistance and care of the CC CPSU, the CC of the Communist Parties of Union republics, area and regional party committees. Receiving with enthusiasm the congratulation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the 50th anniversary of the VChK-KGB and [gratified] by the high evaluation of the work of the Chekist organs, the personnel of the organs and forces of the KGB continues to toil selflessly in fulfillment of the decisions of the Twenty-Third Party Congress, considering as their main task a further improvement of work to ensure state security.

One of the conditions for a successful resolution of this task is removal of important weaknesses in intelligence and counterintelligence work, as well as in other activities of the Committee of State Security and its local branches.

First of all, one should mention that the intelligence service of the KGB has not yet established the necessary agent access to governmental, military, intelligence and ideological centers of the enemy. Therefore it is not
possible to obtain information on the enemy’s plans and designs, to inform in a timely manner the CC CPSU and Soviet government about the most important actions of imperialist states along the major lines of their foreign and domestic policies. For the same reason the intelligence service of the KGB exercises, as yet, only weak influence on the development of political events in crisis situations in the direction advantageous for the Soviet Union, and it is not always able to exploit weaknesses in the imperialist camp and contradictions among capitalist countries.

The counterintelligence service of the KGB, possessing data on the presence of an enemy agent network [agentura] inside the USSR, failed to achieve during the period under review any substantial results in unmasking these agents, in revealing and plugging all possible channels for leaks of state secrets. One still has to work out a system of effective countermeasures to thwart the enemy, who is using illegal means to penetrate our country. The organization of the work of the counterintelligence service needs further improvement, including broader use of active measures to spot and foil subversive plans and designs of the enemy.

The struggle with the enemy’s ideological subversion is still not sufficiently capable and effective. Chekist work along these lines could not as yet be unfolded in full because of weak development of agent networks of the KGB organs in those layers of the population which might provide a good breeding ground for the acts of ideological subversion. This in part can explain the fact that the KGB organs failed to prevent in a timely manner individual anti-Soviet and anti-public manifestations, including mass disorders that took place in several cities.

One should also note that, because of insufficient quality and the not always timely manner of initial investigations and because of weaknesses in the operative-investigative work in local branches of the KGB, it failed to uncover over 50 crimes, on which the preliminary investigation had to be suspended and the culprits were not found.

In the practical work of some of the KGB organs there were examples of superficial study of persons suspected of committing state crimes. This resulted in three arrests of people without sufficiently checked materials, who then were released in the course of investigation.

The potential of counterintelligence for acting against the enemy’s attempts to carry out acts of ideological subversion by encouraging politically and morally unstable persons to defect [while abroad], was weakly employed. This factor largely explains the fact that in 1967 seventeen persons stayed abroad; it also failed to prevent 3 cases of betrayal of the Motherland by service-men of the Soviet Army.

There is a number of shortcomings in the practice of selection, appointment and education of cadres. Of special importance is the problem of preparation of officer cadres for the organs and troops of the KGB. For years there was no well-organized practical system in this field. As a result officer personnel fell short of the required number by 7% (about 4,000), and perhaps will do so even more, when one considers increasing demand in cadres and expected retirement of officers in view of the new law of universal military conscription. Meanwhile, the existing sources of replenishment of officer cadres do not meet current demand and will not do so in the future. To this effect testifies the relative decrease, for various reasons, of the number of graduates of the educational institutions of the KGB in the new cohorts of officers (from 75% in 1966 to 51% in 1967). The task of persuading young officers to remain on service in the organs and forces of the KGB still remains problematic: recently, on the average, about 140 of them submitted resignations annually, and moreover half of this number are graduates of the educational institutions of the KGB.

The Committee of State Security and its local branches suffer from visible lack of other cadres: a certain delay in wage increases for a number of categories of the personnel of state security, particularly technical personnel, not only creates certain difficulties in their recruitment, but also affects negatively the maintenance of security in certain aspects of operational work, and also the attitude of this part of the personnel to their fulfillment of service duties.

In taking measures to remove the above-mentioned and other shortcomings, the Committee of State Security attaches particular importance to the practical solution of tasks related to reinforcement of the Chekist cadres, improvement of their selection, appointment and increasing qualification to meet the present-day requirements.

The Committee deems necessary first of all to attract the most promising workers from the periphery to the central apparatus of the KGB and the apparatus of the republican committees of state security, as part of the process of retraining and promotion. It is advisable also to send to the peripheral organs some experienced officers of the central apparatus of the KGB and the republican committees of state security, as part of the process of promotion to command positions, and to make them aware of the local working conditions. In order to increase the quality of selection and training of national [natsional’nye] cadres, there are plans to expand the practice of promotion of Chekists from the major national [Union] republics to positions in the central apparatus of the KGB, having in mind their preparation for subsequent employment as leading cadres in the organs of the KGB in those republics.

In resolving the tasks of qualitative improvement of cadres, particularly the directorates of intelligence, counterintelligence and investigation, the Committee of State Security acts on the assumption that these cadres should by their qualifications and Chekist acumen be able to ensure under modern conditions further upgrading of methods and means of struggle with the enemy on the basis of the newest achievements in the social science and scientific-technological spheres.

This report has been discussed and approved at a
meeting of the Collegium of the Committee of State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY

ANDROPOV

[Source: TsKhSD f. 89, op. 5, d. 3, ll. 1-14. Translated by Vladislav Zubok who thanks Ray Garthoff for his kind assistance.]

Andropov’s Report to Brezhnev on the KGB in 1967

by Raymond L. Garthoff

Although, with a few exceptions, the archives of the KGB remain closed, a number of KGB reports in the files of the Communist Party are now available. Among the most revealing are several annual reports sent by the head of the KGB to the paramount Soviet leader, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party. The report covering the year 1960, although the text is not available, has been read and reported on in the Bulletin. (See the discussion of that report, together with other contemporary KGB reports, in Vladimir Zubok, “Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-62,” CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 22-33.) The annual KGB reports covering 1985, 1986, 1988 and 1989 are now also available and have been summarized and analyzed elsewhere. (See Raymond L. Garthoff, “The KGB Reports to Gorbachev,” Intelligence and National Security 11:2 (April 1996), pp. 224-244.)

The report on the work of the KGB in 1967 is the only other such report now available. It is presented below in full translation. It was submitted by Iurii Andropov, his first annual report since becoming chairman of the KGB, to General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, on 8 May 1968. Brezhnev, in turn, had the report circulated to members of the Politburo. (Gorbachev, incidentally, did not circulate the reports he received twenty years later.) The reports on 1967 (and 1960) were more detailed than the later reports on 1985-89. In all cases, the sensitivity of the information is reflected not only in the highest classification and single-copy distribution, but also in the fact that virtually all of the specific details on numbers of recruitments, agents, hostile penetrations, and the like had been left blank in the typed version of the report and subsequently filled in by hand, so that even the KGB typist would not see them.

I will not summarize the contents since the full text is provided, but it may be useful to note some of the key disclosures and their implications. Perhaps first of all, although not surprising, is the explicit reaffirmation at the outset that the KGB was working on the basis of Communist Party guidance and direction. In addition to routine references to the most recent Party Congress and Central Committee plenum, for 1967 this included the creation in accordance with a Central Committee decree of 17 June 1967, of a new special directorate with local branches to counter more actively “ideological diversions of the enemy,” in practice, to suppress dissidence. This infamous Fifth Directorate carried on the struggle against ideological and political nonconformity until it was abolished under Gorbachev in 1989.

A substantial portion of the report deals with the concerns and activities of the KGB with respect to the situation inside the country. This no doubt reflected the concern of the political leadership as well, and of course is a reminder that the major part of the KGB was devoted to ensuring internal security. One reference in the report indirectly indicates that the total number of KGB “agents” within the USSR in 1967 was 167,000 people. The total number of KGB staff officers, in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as well as internal security, was evidently about 57,000—judging by a reference that the KGB was then 4,000 officers short, representing seven percent of the total authorized complement.

Incidentally, this report (and the others we have seen) pays a great deal of attention to statistics, rather than to qualitative assessments. Perhaps that is understandable in an annual accountability report (as indeed they were called in the 1980s). But it also reveals something of the Soviet mindset. For example, learning that the KGB had sent nearly 5,000 “informational reports” to the Central Committee (and similar numbers of reports to departments of the Central Committee, to the Foreign Ministry, to the Defense Ministry, and to the General Staff) is less interesting and important than knowing what they had learned. (Having seen a number of these KGB “informational reports,” I can attest that they varied greatly in quality, competence, and value—and many look as though they were designed to meet and beat quantitative quotas.)

There are several interesting sidelights on foreign policy. The West, and in particular the United States, was of course “the main enemy.” (Incidentally, Western analysts frequently state that the United States was identified as “the main enemy”; sometimes it was, but the term was also applied to the West as a whole, as in this report which refers specifically to “the USA and other countries of the main enemy.”) Western efforts at subversion were taken for granted and the KGB report indicates that enough real or apparent cases were found to warrant that assumption, although it was clearly much exaggerated in scope and as an element in Western policy.

One foreign policy matter of particular concern to the KGB was the hostile activity of the People’s Republic of China, the “anti-Soviet splitting activity” of which clearly referred to the then ongoing struggle within the fractured
world communist movement. The KGB also reported that in 1967 it had almost tripled its borderguard posts on the Chinese frontier. While several references were made to routine cooperation and exchanges of information with Warsaw Pact allies, it was noted that KGB cooperation with the security services of Romania was extremely limited.

The statistics on KGB interception and decoding of foreign communications is quite interesting. Although in this report the countries whose systems were compromised are not identified, the statement that the KGB was reading communications in 152 ciphers of 72 capitalist countries, and in 1967 had decoded in all 188,400 telegrams, shows the wide scale of this activity. So, too, do the reports of microphone plants at 36 installations and the stealing of 7 Western codes (as well as, apparently, “breaking” four others).

During the year, the KGB recruited in all 218 foreigners, of whom 64 were believed to have potential for operational work against the United States. In addition, in targeting possible penetration of Western intelligence services they had recruited 47 foreigners, including 8 diplomats. In attempting to neutralize and control enemy and emigre penetration of the USSR, KGB counterintelligence was conducting nine “operational games,” as they called them, involving infiltration of such channels, intended for subversive or intelligence penetration of the Soviet Union. (The report says that of these 9 operational games, 4 involved U.S. intelligence, 8 the Russian emigre organization NTS, and 2 Ukrainian nationalist emigres. Although there could have been an overlap, as U.S. intelligence did have ties to the NTS, more likely the person writing in the numbers by hand made a mistake and wrote “8” instead of “3” for the NTS; if that was the case, the numbers total nine.)

The KGB also reported on the successes of its counterintelligence in unmasking Soviet traitors who were found to have passed secret information to the enemy, naming three cases and referring to others in various categories (34 tried for “treason and attempted treason,” three attempting to sneak out of the country, and one for espionage). Nonetheless, despite all its statistics on successes, in an admission of shortcomings toward the conclusion of the report, it was said that despite “possessing data on the presence of an enemy agent network (agentura) inside the USSR” KGB counterintelligence had “failed to achieve during the period under review any substantial results in unmasking these agents.” Moreover, “the struggle with the enemy’s ideological subversion is still not sufficiently capable and effective,” in part because of “weak development of agent networks of the KGB organs in those layers of the population which might provide a good breeding ground for acts of ideological subversion.” And this notwithstanding 167,000 KGB agents!

Similarly, in its foreign intelligence work the KGB had “not yet established the necessary agent access in government, military, intelligence and ideological centers of the enemy,” and as a result could not “obtain information on the enemy’s plans and designs” or influence the development of events in crisis situations to the advantage of the Soviet Union or to exploit contradictions in the enemy camp.

The report, then, while reviewing in some statistical detail the accomplishments of the KGB in its foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and internal security functions, still had to acknowledge considerable shortcomings. We do not have subsequent annual reports by Andropov over his long incumbency as chairman of the KGB for comparison, but it seems likely that they too would have described the large-scale efforts, and cited extensive accomplishments, but would still have had to acknowledge incomplete success.

The report on the work of the KGB in 1967 in any case provides a window not only into the Soviet security and intelligence services, but more broadly into the Soviet political world of that day. The flavor and general impression that the report provides can, of course, best be appreciated by reading the full text.

Raymond Garthoff is a retired senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of many books on the Cold War.

Annual Report of the KGB to Leonid Brezhnev on its Operations for 1967

by Amy Knight

This document, submitted to Brezhnev in May 1968 by KGB Chairman Iurii Andropov, is one of five annual KGB reports now available from the former Central Committee archives, the others being reports for the years 1985, 1986, 1988 and 1989. As Raymond Garthoff pointed out in his analysis of the four reports for the 1980s, these materials provide unique insights into the activities of the KGB at home and abroad, as well as new perspectives on its relationship to the party leadership.

1967 was a key year for the KGB, in large part because of the appointment of Andropov to the chairmanship in May. Widely considered to be a “party man” because of his years of service in the Central Committee Secretariat overseeing relations with socialist states, Andropov was made a candidate member of the Politburo in June 1967. His expertise in foreign affairs (he had served as ambassador to Hungary in the 1950s before moving to the Central Committee) and the fact that he was not linked to any faction or coalition within the party leadership conferred a new legitimacy and professionalism upon the KGB.
This did not mean, however, that Andropov would attempt to reform the KGB in a liberal direction. By 1967 Brezhnev had consolidated much of his power as party leader and was able to implement his program of re-Stalinization without obstacles. A harsh crackdown on dissent and curbs on cultural freedom at home were accompanied by an increasingly aggressive and anti-Western foreign policy, all of which were implemented effectively by Andropov in 1967.

The report reveals that, just a month after Andropov became KGB chairman, a new directorate, the Fifth Directorate, was created within the KGB, with divisions and departments in the KGB’s local branches. This Directorate, charged with struggling against “ideological subversion,” carried out a ruthless campaign of repression against political, ethnic and religious dissent for the next twenty years. The statistics presented in this document confirm that the KGB was devoting significant resources to suppressing any manifestations of discontent within the Soviet system. In 1967 the KGB not only arrested and charged 96 citizens with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, it also searched 2,293 persons and shadowed 6,747. In addition, over 12,000 individuals were subjected to so-called prophylactic treatment, which means the KGB called them in for a “chat” and threatened them with severe sanctions if they manifested any anti-Soviet tendencies.

Because the Soviet regime considered internal security problems to be inspired by foreign subversion, a crackdown domestically usually went hand in hand with increased suspicion of and hostility toward the West. The document claims that in 1967 the KGB identified over 270 foreigners in Russia with links to western intelligence services and uncovered 22 double agents. The KGB also carried out an active program of foreign intelligence-gathering, strengthening its agent network in the United States and other enemy countries by recruiting 218 foreigners, 64 of whom possessed “operational capacities for work against the USA.” The KGB also obtained the codes of seven capitalist countries and had intercepted coded messages from 2,002 radio transmitters from 115 countries. On the basis of its intelligence-gathering abroad, the KGB sent over 4,000 informational reports to the party’s Central Committee and several thousand reports to various ministries.

In addition to providing the party leadership with information about the KGB’s accomplishments, the 1967 report also contains the requisite “self-criticism.” There were, it seems, three arrests without sufficient justification, and several Soviet citizens did not return from abroad, which was considered treason. The biggest problem, according to the report, was in recruitment. The KGB’s officer corps fell significantly short of the required numbers, and greater attention was required, it seems, to attract and train qualified personnel.

The 1967 annual report offers concrete evidence, often in terms of numbers, that the KGB was engaged in a massive program of intelligence collection and “active measures” abroad, along with a rigorous campaign against internal dissent. As the report suggests, the party leadership, which had the ultimate authority over the KGB, was the inspiration for these policies.

Amy Knight is Senior Research Analyst at the Library of Congress and Professorial Lecturer in Russian History and Politics at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC. She is the author of The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union and Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton).


Memorandum from the KGB Regarding the Planning of a Demonstration in Memory of John Lennon

To the Central Committee.

The KGB has learned that in many of Moscow’s establishments of higher education ([Moscow State] University, Institute of History and Archives, Radiotechnical Institute...) anonymous posters have appeared calling for all interested persons to take part on 21 December at 11:00, on the esplanade of the university, in a demonstration organized in memory of the English singer, John Lennon, composer and founder of the “Beatles.” The tragic disappearance [murder] of the singer was announced in a number of major newspapers (Komsomolskaia Pravda, Sovetskaia Rossiia, Moskovskii Komsomolets), as well as on major television broadcasts.

The KGB has taken the necessary measures to identify the instigators of this gathering and is in control of the situation. The management of the cited establishments is cooperating in the prevention of all participation by their students in this unauthorized meeting. Communicated for informational purposes only.

KGB Chairman
Iu. V. Andropov

[Source: TsKhSD, f.5, op.77, d.994, l.164 obtained by Gael Moulec and translated by Christa Sheehan Matthew.]
A NKVD/NKGB Report to Stalin: A Glimpse into Soviet Intelligence in the United States in the 1940s

by Vladimir Pozniakov

The Soviet intelligence community, comprising the NKVD/NKGB First Chief Directorate (FCD), the Fourth Department of the Red Army General Staff (later called the GRU), the Communist International’s Division of International Communications (DIC), and the Intelligence Department of the People’s Commissariat of the Navy, had built a number of formidable networks abroad by the outset of World War Two. Working separately and coordinated by I.V. Stalin himself, they were severely decimated during the Great Terror but still managed to supply the Soviet political leadership with all kinds of information to counter the Axis. The majority of these networks, aside from notable exceptions such as the Sorge ring in Tokyo, Rote Kapelle centered on Germany and the Sandor Rado group in Switzerland, survived the war. A November 1944 joint report sent to Stalin by L.P. Beria and V.N. Merkulov gives a clear indication of the scale of NKVD/NKGB activities abroad, particularly in the United States.

Moscow
The State Defense Committee
To: Comrade Stalin I.V.

During the period of the Patriotic War employees of the 1st (intelligence) directorate, NKVD/NKGB undertook substantial work in organizing intelligence networks abroad and in obtaining political, economic, technical and military information.

During this period 566 officers have been sent abroad for illegal work, 1,240 agents and informers have been recruited, 41,718 various items including many documents have been obtained by intelligence. Out of 1,167 documents obtained by technical intelligence, 616 have been used by our country’s industries!

Attaching herewith a draft for a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree, we request that the most distinguished employees of the 1st (intelligence) directorate, NKVD/NKGB, USSR, mostly those who have served and do serve abroad, be decorated with orders of the Soviet Union.

Appendix: according to attached text.

November 4, 1944
No. 1186
1st copy

L.P. Beria
People’s Commissar
Of Interior, USSR

V.N. Merkulov
People’s Commissar of State Security, USSR

Unfortunately, the appendix mentioned above—the so called “award list”—is still classified and can not be reproduced here. It contains names of officers who in the opinion of Beria and Merkulov deserved medals for “successful realization of tasks safeguarding state security during the period of the Patriotic War” in ways that might interest an international audience. The list reflects the growing importance of Soviet intelligence activities in the United States from the pre-war to wartime to the post-war period.

Before the war, the United States was at the periphery of Soviet intelligence’s main interests, especially regarding military intelligence. In late May 1934, in setting the tasks for Soviet military intelligence (then called the Fourth Directorate of the Red Army), the Politburo made a decision to focus intelligence activities primarily on Europe and the Far East. The decision of the Politburo read: “The center of gravity of military intelligence’s work is to be transferred to Poland, Germany, Finland, Romania, England, Japan, Manchuria and China. Any studies of other states’ armed forces are to be undertaken by legal means by official military representatives [military attaches], visitors and trainees, examiners of military equipment, etc.” Thus, the principal efforts of the NKVD/NKGB New York and Washington rezidenturas [intelligence mission] as well as those of the GRU and DIC were focused on the collection of economic, scientific and industrial information. At least four out of the eight officers mentioned in the appendix were occupied with such matters, with heavy emphasis on information related to radio and electronic equipment, weapons, military aircraft construction, shipbuilding, chemical technology, etc.

World War Two brought a dramatic rise in the United States’ standing in Soviet political, and especially military, priorities, including a number of important mission changes for Soviet intelligence in America. According to A. Feklisov’s memoirs, these tasks were stated by Stalin to Vasilii Zarubin as follows: “...to watch Churchill and Roosevelt and to learn whether they are going to reach a separate peace agreement with Hitler and then go to war against the Soviet Union together; to obtain Hitler’s plans of war against the USSR which the Allies might possess; to learn any secret goals and plans of the Allies related to the war; to find out when exactly the Allies are going to open the second front in Europe; to obtain information on the newest secret military equipment designed and produced in the USA, England and Canada.” According to the instruction received by the FCD rezident in the United States, Stalin had also requested any information related to the “Allies’ secret plans on postwar global settlement.”

The broader spectrum of tasks facing Soviet intelligence in the US required additional personnel, both Soviet and local. The pre-war staff of the NKGB and GRU rezidenturas was rather modest. For example, in the New York consulate and in Amtorg there were only 13 intelligence officers, most of them well known to the FBI. Also, because the USSR and the US had become wartime
allies, both branches of Soviet intelligence had to limit their usage of the clandestine structures of the American Communist Party (CPUSA). The usage of local Communists was also limited by two other reasons: many of them were well known to the FBI, while many others were drafted after Pearl Harbor by the US Army and Navy or interned, as had happened to a number of CPUSA members of Japanese extraction on the West Coast.

The lack of trained personnel in 1941 and early 1942 was soon supplemented by the growing flow of Soviet military and civilian specialists coming to the United States to work in the Soviet Purchasing Commission (SPC) and other agencies that mushroomed after the USSR became a part of the Lend-Lease program. According to Feklisov, by 1944 the staff of Amtorg and the SPC in New York City alone reached some 2,500, with an equal number of officials, engineers and other specialists serving at the SPC branch in Washington, DC. The majority of these people worked directly or indirectly either for the GRU or NKVD. Also, the limitations imposed on the usage of the CPUSA membership did not mean that Soviet intelligence ceased recruiting both Americans and non-Americans in America. And though the actual number of agents and informers recruited by Soviet intelligence officers in the United States will probably never be known, according to British estimates, out of 1,200 cryptonyms that “littered the traffic” of the New York/Moscow and Washington/Moscow channels of the FCD and GRU communications, “more than 800 were assessed as recruited Soviet agents.”

The first name mentioned in the appendix was that of Lieutenant Colonel Ishkhâ A. Akhmerov, the NKGB illegal rezident [chief of intelligence mission] in the United States during the prewar period. In 1940 he returned to Moscow for a short tenure in the American division of the 5th Department of the NKGB (the FCD since 1941) only to be sent back in 1942 to Washington, DC as the head of an illegal sub-rezidentura. A Volga Tartar by origin, he spoke English better than Russian and was married to an American who worked along with him in the United States both before and during the war. Throughout his second stay in the US, he ran a number of agents supplying Soviet intelligence with a large amount of extremely valuable political, military and scientific-technical information.

The next high ranking officer recommended for decoration with the Red Banner Medal, number five on the list, was NKGB Commissar III (roughly equal to the army rank of Major General) Gaik B. Ovakimyan, a veteran of Soviet intelligence in America, operating there since 1932. Working under the cover of an Amtorg official and nick-named by the Federal Bureau of Investigation “the wily Armenian,” he controlled in 1933-1941 a vast network of agents scattered not only throughout the United States, but also as far afield as Mexico and Canada. His name first cropped up in the 1930s in conjunction with an extensive industrial espionage operation tied to a certain Armand Feldman. He also laid the foundation for a network later used by Moscow “Center” to penetrate the American nuclear program by recruiting a number of its important agents, including Harry Gold, who was approached in 1935 through Thomas L. Black and in the late 1940s became a key member of the Klaus Fuchs-David Greenglass spy ring. Ovakimyan was caught red-handed by the FBI in April 1941 while contacting one of his agents who, according to the memoirs of another FCD officer, Aleksandr S. Feklisov, was a plant. In July, Ovakimyan was exchanged for a number of Americans detained in Russia. He was replaced in the New York City rezidentura temporarily by his deputy Pavel P. Pastel’nyak and then by Vasili Zarubin who headed both the NYC and Washington, DC branches of the NKGB American networks until late 1944.

Several other names mentioned in the appendix should also be familiar: NKGB Major Stepan Z. Apresyan, who in 1944 replaced Vasili Zarubin as the Soviet rezident in Washington, and Major Leonid R. Kvasnikov, deputy rezident in NYC and the chief of scientific and technical intelligence in the United States. Captain Semion M. Semenov is there, the other “Amtorg official” who played an important part in sci/tech intelligence and later, in 1944-1947, played a crucial role in Soviet atomic espionage in the United States. Lieut. Col. Grigory G. Dolbin is also listed, since 1946 the NKGB (MGB) rezident in Washington, DC. Among the younger generation of FCD officers mentioned in the appendix were Captain Alexander S. Feklisov of the NYC network, who in 1947-1949 ran Klaus Fuchs in Britain and in 1960-1964 became the KGB rezident in Washington, DC, and Senior (First) Lieut. Constantin A. Chugunov, also in the NYC FCD group.

Among those Americans who (in the NKGB parlance) helped Soviet spymasters were the names of several Red Star medal nominees. These included: 1) Elizabeth T. Bentley, a liaison agent assigned by her Soviet controller (along with Joseph Katz) to collect information from some of the Washington rings, 2) Harry Gold, a courier for Klaus Fuchs, and 3) George Silvermaster (an apparent NKGB typist misprint [Ed note: Or tongue-in-cheek alias]), a top official of the Department of the Treasury and one of the most successful and productive Soviet agents. By Pearl Harbor he had gathered together “a group of ten government officials working in Washington” in various branches of the Roosevelt administration.

The results appear to be impressive. Tons of “diplomatic” mail was being sent home monthly by the Soviet embassy in the US. Hundreds of NKGB informants provided a wide range of information, with scientific-technical secrets in the forefront. With the release of further intelligence documents, the structure and importance of Soviet espionage efforts in the US will become clearer. For now, the available documentation can only sketch some outlines and whet the appetite.
Vladimir Pozniakov is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

1 Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs), and Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (People’s Commissariat of State Security) are the predecessors of the KGB.

2 In early 1937 the NKVD/NKGB Chief N.I. Ezhov sent a special agent (code name “Jornalist”) to the US and Britain to investigate supposed penetration of the US and British Communist Parties’ apparatus by the Trotskyites as well as by the FBI and MI5. Though the investigation was focused on “Trotskyist functionaries and their entourage” it led to accusations that a number of Soviet illegals working within the underground structures of the CPUSA and British Communist Party had ties to Trotsky and his followers.—see: Minaev (NKGB Deputy Chief) to Dimitrov (Comintern Secretary General) 23 April 1937—Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary History Documents (RTsKhIDNI), Moscow, f. 495 (Communist International), op. 74 (G. Dimitrov’s Secretariat), d. 465, ll. 1-4. Soon after this mission, many Soviet residents and agents abroad were charged with being a part of a Trotskyist conspiracy. They were summoned to Moscow for execution. Among them were such outstanding intelligence officers as Theodor Maly, Ignace Poretsky (aka Reiss), Walter Krivitski and Alexander Orlov. Krivitski defected and Poretsky refused to return and was subsequently killed in Switzerland. For details see: E. Pretsky, Our Own People. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1969), pp. 214-216, 231; A. Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. (New York, 1953), pp. 231; B. Starkov, “The Tragedy of Soviet Military Intelligence” in V. Krivitski, I Was Stalin’s Agent. (Moscow, 1991), pp. 39-52 (in Russian); J. Costello, O. Tsarev, The Deadly Illusion. (New York, 1993), pp. 293-314, 315-340.


6 State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 9401 (Stalin and Molotov Special Files), op. 2, d. 67, l. 275.

7 Ed. Note: The evaluation of intelligence’s historical role is problematic. The case of atom spying will serve to illustrate, since the procurement of an industrial method or bomb design represents an idea that might take a Russian scientist but a moment to have. It is also possible that the crucial moment might not come for years. Furthermore, since the Venona project had cracked the Soviet radio code, most of this information was available to the enemy.

8 Minutes of Politburo Decisions, No. 7, paragraph 229/213, 25 May 1934—RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 16, l. 65. One can probably assume that NKVD/NKGB priorities were basically the same.

9 Dallin, pp. 396-414; Andrew and Gordievsky, pp. 226, 228-229, 279.


11 Circumstantial evidence of this shift was reflected in the list of salaries set by Politburo decision for Soviet diplomats posted abroad. According to this “Table of Ranks” the United States was listed second, right after Germany. Britain, Japan and China followed.

12 Feklisov, pp. 51-52.

13 Feklisov, pp. 50, 60-63. [Ed. note: Amtorg was the Soviet organization responsible for trade with America.]

14 Sudoplatov, pp. 186-187. [Ed. note: The Comintern, previously the main conduit to the American party, was disbanded in 1943.]


16 Information from “Brother” and “Son” for G. Dimitrov, ca. Jan. 1943—ibid., ll. 3-4.


19 Feklisov, pp. 65-105; M. Vorontsov, Capt. 1st rank, Chief Navy Main Staff, Intelligence Directorate, and Petrov, Military Commissar, NMS, ID to G. Dimitrov, 15 August 1942, No. 492533, typewritten original; G. Dimitrov to Pavel M. Fitin, 20 November 1942, No. 663, t/w copy; P. M. Fitin to G. Dimitrov, 14 July 1944, No. 1/3/10987, t/w copy; P. M. Fitin to G. Dimitrov, 29 September 1944, No. 1/3/16895, t/w copy. All these documents are NMS ID and FCD Chiefs’ requests for information related to Americans and naturalized American citizens working in various US Government agencies and private corporations, some of whom had been CPUSA members. The last two are related to a certain Donald Wheeler (an OSS official), Charles Floto or Flato (who in 1943 worked for the “...Dept. of Economic Warfare”), and Harry Magoff (War Production Board)—the request dated 29 Sept. 1944—and to Judith Coplon who according to the FCD information worked for the Dept. of Justice.—RTSKhIDNI, f. 495, op. 74, d. 478, l. 7; d. 484, l. 34; d. 485, l. 10, 14, 17, 31, 44.

20 P. Wright, Spy Catcher. (New York, 1987), p. 182. This is close to the NKVD/NKGB statistics cited above in the Beria/Merkulov document.

21 GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 67, l. 276.

22 Feklisov, pp. 14, 106.

23 GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 67, l. 276.


26 Feklisov, pp. 23, 51.

27 Lamphere and Shachtman, pp. 25-26; Feklisov, p. 51.

28 Feklisov, pp. 23, 51-53.


30 GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 67, l. 278.

31 Dallin, pp.436-7.
The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons

By Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali

Nikita Khrushchev has left us with tantalizing clues with which to solve one of the essential mysteries of the Cold War: were the Soviets ever close to using nuclear weapons? Two documents photocopied by General Dmitrii Volkogonov from the Defense Ministry files in Moscow and now available at the Library of Congress (where they were located and obtained for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok, James G. Hershberg, and David Wolff) shed additional light on what we described in our book, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (WW Norton and John Murray, 1997), as the Pitsunda decision.¹

On the face of it, these two Defense Ministry documents do not appear that startling. The first discusses the movement of tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba. The second lists all of the components of Operation ANADYR. But it is the dates of these documents, 6 September and 8 September, respectively, that arguably make them more revelatory about Khrushchev’s understanding of nuclear weapons than any other documents currently available from Russian archives. As has been known for some time, Khrushchev decided to send ballistic missiles to Cuba in May 1962. Since the Havana conference organized by James Blight, David Welch and Brown University in January 1992,² we have known that the Kremlin included tactical nuclear weapons along with the ballistic weapons. But Khrushchev’s personal role in adding the tactical weapons, which, unlike the SS-4s (R-12) and SS-5s (R-14), were not primarily weapons of deterrence, was not known. Moreover, it was assumed by some scholars that the Defense Ministry simply added these weapons as a matter of course to the large shipment.

Historians naturally look for turning points, when actions of human beings or a timely gust of force majeure shifted or could have shifted subsequent events. September 1962, as these documents attest, belongs in the pantheon of Cold War turning points. The planners of the original version of Operation ANADYR, and Khrushchev himself, assumed that the United States would not try to invade Cuba in 1962. Soviet intelligence detected increased US planning, without creating any basis for belief that an attack would come that year. The single most important piece of information in shaping Khrushchev’s understanding of the threat to Soviet interests in the Western Hemisphere seems to have come from President Kennedy himself. At a meeting with Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei on 30 January 1962, Kennedy promised the Kremlin that he expected to be able to treat Cuba as Khrushchev had handled Hungary in 1956. Neither the KGB nor the GRU could detect a timetable for aggression, but Khrushchev understood that Kennedy was as unwilling to accept a challenge to the US sphere of influence in the Caribbean as the Soviets had been to theirs in Eastern Europe.

From May 1962 to September 1962, the Kremlin mounted an operation to create a deterrent to US aggression in Cuba. “The thing is we were not going to unleash war,” Khrushchev later explained to his Kremlin colleagues when the operation began to unravel in October, “[w]e just wanted to intimidate them, to deter the anti-Cuban forces.”³ The operation was cloaked in secrecy because the Kremlin assumed that Kennedy would only accept a deterrent if presented as a fait accompli.

From the very beginning, the Kremlin was aware that the plan had a glaring flaw. As of spring 1962, Soviet intelligence and presumably the Communist Party leadership knew that Washington regularly flew U-2 reconnaissance missions over Cuba. Yet Khrushchev apparently only began to worry about the effect these flights would have on the secrecy of the operation in July, two months after the plan was adopted. He decided at that point that SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, which were credited with shooting down Gary Powers’ U-2 in May 1960, would be erected around the island before the strategic missiles arrived. Up to that point, no priority had been assigned to these weapons. Later, American analysts, chiefly CIA Director John McCone, would “deduce” the existence of nuclear missiles in Cuba from the elaborate SA-2 net arrayed around the island. Until July 1962, however, the Kremlin had not considered the SA-2s as a possible shield to ward off U-2 spying.

By September 1962, Khrushchev had successfully willed himself to believe that the operation would remain secret and, even if it did not, that Kennedy would somehow swallow the deployment without incident. Then an event in Washington roiled these assumptions, triggering a dramatic reassessment by Khrushchev of ANADYR. On September 4, in an effort primarily to quell domestic criticisms of his Cuba policy, John F. Kennedy had his press secretary, Pierre Salinger, read a statement that “[t]he gravest issues would arise” if the Soviets sent organized combat troops, offensive ground-to-ground missiles or anything else with “significant offensive capability” to the island.⁴ This was the signal that Khrushchev had dreaded. There had been some information from the Cubans in August that suggested the Americans knew the missiles...
were going to the island. In Khrushchev’s mind, it appears, the Kennedy statement was Washington’s way of signaling that it knew about ANADYR and was planning to do something about it.

Khrushchev had a chance to stop the operation. As of September 5, when he learned of Kennedy’s statement, there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba. As he would do on October 25, he could have terminated the deployment. But he didn’t. As these two “Pitsunda” documents show, Khrushchev not only decided to stay the course, but his reaction to Kennedy’s effort to deter the deployment of missiles was to ratchet up the incipient crisis by introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the picture.

Pitsunda was the location of Khrushchev’s dacha on the Black Sea. As his daughter Rada Adzhubei recalls, Khrushchev ordered this dacha to be built after he discovered that his rival Georgii Malenkov had a similar one down the road. It was here that foreign leaders caught a glimpse of the famous Khrushchev pool and the rotund Khrushchev posed in his inflatable rubber ring. As he did every summer, Khrushchev had left Moscow in August and was carrying on the affairs of state by his pool when the news from Washington arrived.

The first thing that needs to be said about the two Volkogonov documents evidently sent to Khrushchev at Pitsunda is that they were handwritten. So obsessive was Soviet security that the marshals and generals at the Defense Ministry, who did not themselves know how to type, did not trust their own secretaries to prepare these documents on nuclear deployments.

The first document, which is a report to Khrushchev from Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, makes plain that Khrushchev had asked his armed forces for a crash program to save Cuba. The US military might be preparing to move against Cuba in the next few days or weeks and as of September 5, the Soviet Union was in no position to save Castro. According to the schedule of deployments approved in July, the medium-range missiles would not be operational until mid-October, and the intermediate range missiles would not be ready until even later, at least the end of November. Since abandoning Cuba was not an option that Khrushchev would consider at that time, the Soviet leader reached for a dramatic stopgap measure. He needed weapons that were small enough that they could be rushed to Cuba in a matter of days, but powerful enough to stop a US amphibious landing. In 1962, only tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons could meet both criteria. With this in mind, Khrushchev asked his defense minister Rodion Malinovskii whether tactical nuclear weapons could be flown to Cuba immediately.

In this report, Malinovskii explained that the short-range Luna missiles, with their nuclear warheads, and the newest nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the “R-11m” could go by plane. Although the operation was feasible, the Defense Ministry discouraged rushing the tactical weapons to Cuba by airplane. Either the generals did not share Khrushchev’s anxiety or the risk of flying nuclear weapons was too great. In light of these concerns, the Ministry recommended to Khrushchev that one squadron of Il-28 light bombers, with six 8-12 kiloton nuclear bombs, be shipped in crates. The Soviet Defense Ministry also recommended sending an R-11m missile brigade and between two and three divisions of Luna missiles. In terms of the timing of these reinforcements, the Ministry suggested sending the missiles and the bombers in the first half of October. The warheads would go separately on board the ship Indigirka, which was already supposed to take 45 warheads for the medium range ballistic missiles, and would be leaving the Soviet Union on September 15.

Because Khrushchev annotated the report in his own hand, we can see Khrushchev’s extraordinary response to the Defense Ministry. On 7 September 1962, he chose to put the maximum reliance on nuclear weapons. The document bears his signature where that day he personally authorized the sending of 6 atomic bombs for the Il-28s and where he asked for Luna missiles. The Ministry had suggested two or three detachments, with 8-12 missiles.

Khrushchev, betraying his concerns and his belief in the value of battlefield nuclear weapons, chose the higher figure. Khrushchev, however, decided not to send a regiment of R-11m cruise missiles.

Khrushchev understood the importance of the decision he had just made and took pains to maintain direct control of these special weapons. The day after Khrushchev authorized the new shipment, the Defense Ministry drafted an order permitting the Soviet Commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliev, to use these battlefield nuclear weapons in the event that communications to Moscow were cut and a US-led invasion had begun. The order required two signatures. Malinovskii’s deputy, Marshal Zakharov, signed in his capacity as Army Chief of Staff, but Malinovskii did not. Malinovskii was Khrushchev’s man, selected to replace the independent-minded Marshal Georgii Zhukov in 1957.

[Ed. Note: On Zhukov’s replacement, see Mark Kramer’s essay in the “Plenums” section of this Bulletin.] Since Khrushchev did not want to lose control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, the document would sit unsigned in the files until events in Cuba warranted a change.

The second document, also classified the equivalent of “eyes only” for Khrushchev and dated 8 September, reflected the Soviet leader’s new concerns in September 1962, too. A revised operation plan for ANADYR, it stresses two very significant points:

a) That the mission of ANADYR was to defend Cuba

b) That the use of nuclear weapons can only be authorized by a direct order from Moscow (po signalu iz Moskvy). Khrushchev is clearly girding himself for a limited war in Cuba, something he had perhaps not really contemplated before. To be able to defend the island, he might have to use nuclear weapons; but he wished to retain final control over that momentous decision. This second
Kennedy's maneuver had the opposite effect from what he statement. Now we can say with confidence that deterring (or placating) domestic critics with a stern placing missiles on Cuba—an unlikely event—while purpose deterrence. He hoped to deter Khrushchev from Kennedy designed his statement of 4 September for dual- implications for students of US foreign policy. A general nuclear war. Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield for Khrushchev. The sequence of events happened too the Defense Ministry provided Khrushchev with any nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Malinovskii or decision about the Soviet Union's willingness to use learned from the celerity with which Khrushchev made this battle, not as a deterrent. In addition, there is much to ballistic missiles. The conclusion is inescapable that Khrushchev would have envisioned making nuclear strikes on the US coastline as a means of retaliating for a US strike on Cuba. Certainly, these coastal attacks were designed only to play a part in a general US-Soviet war. Khrushchev read and approved the revised plan as he did the new tactical deployments. Although the formal date on the document is 8 September, it bears Khrushchev’s signature and the marking 9.7.62 (7 September 1962). Khrushchev was shown this reworked plan in Pitsunda at the same time he formally selected which additional means would be deployed to defend Cuba (Document 1).

Khrushchev’s embrace of a nuclear warfighting strategy in September 1962 has widespread implications for understanding the Cold War. Few would have predicted that in response to a US challenge to Cuba that Moscow would put tactical weapons in harm’s way. There is no evidence, and there is unlikely to be any, that Khrushchev intended to announce the existence of the Lunas, the FKR cruise missiles and the nuclear payloads for the IL-28s as he was planning to do in the case of the ballistic missiles. The conclusion is inescapable that Khrushchev sent the tactical weapons to Cuba for use in battle, not as a deterrent. In addition, there is much to learn from the celerity with which Khrushchev made this decision about the Soviet Union’s willingness to use nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Malinovskii or the Defense Ministry provided Khrushchev with any military assessment of the implications of placing tactical weapons in Cuba.8 This was not included with the report for Khrushchev. The sequence of events happened too fast. It seems we must come to the conclusion that Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield without any analysis of the threshold between limited and general nuclear war.

The timing of Khrushchev’s decision also has interesting implications for students of US foreign policy. Kennedy designed his statement of 4 September for dual-purpose deterrence. He hoped to deter Khrushchev from placing missiles on Cuba—an unlikely event—while deterring (or placating) domestic critics with a stern statement. Now we can say with confidence that Kennedy’s maneuver had the opposite effect from what he had intended. Instead of deterring Khrushchev, Kennedy provoked him to take a greater risk of nuclearizing the superpower conflict over Cuba. The presence of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Soviet leadership intended to use, increased the danger of nuclear war far more than the presence of ballistic missiles, which Khrushchev had always understood to be a deterrent.

What should one make of this? In brief, as we demonstrated in One Hell of a Gambler, the Soviet Union in 1962 was both an insecure and a risk-taking power. These two characteristics are the equivalents in international politics of dry wood and gasoline. All that was needed was a spark to set off a conflagration. In his “Long Telegram” of 1946, the father of containment theory, George F. Kennan, argued that Soviet leaders were insecure but unlike Adolf Hitler, they were risk-averse.9 Paul Nitze, in NSC-68, suggested that the Kremlin was self-confident and prepared to take reasonable risks for world domination. But, as high-level materials from the Cuban crisis make clear, the Soviet Union did not consider itself equal to the United States, or as Khrushchev put it so colorfully, “a member of the World Club”: yet Khrushchev was prepared to risk the battlefield use of nuclear weapons to defend his interests in the Caribbean. It is no wonder that Washington proved incapable of predicting Khrushchev’s behavior in the summer of 1962.

Aleksandr Fursenko is a historian and member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Timothy Naftali teaches history at Yale, where he is a fellow at International Security Studies.

2 Ed. Note: For a description of the Havana Conference and an account of the discussions among the participants, see CWIHP Bulletin 1, 2-4.
3 “Kratkie zametki o zasedaniakh Prezidiuma TsK KPSS” [Brief notes on the sessions of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU], Protocol 60, 22 October 1962, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation.
5 Interview with Rada Khrushchev Adzhubei, 5 January 1995.
6 For technical reasons, only two aircraft in the Soviet Air Force, the AN-8 and AN-12, were capable of transporting the missiles and the warheads. The workhorse of the Soviet air force, the larger Illyushin 114, had the necessary range, 8,000 kilometers, but lacked a cargo opening large enough to move the nuclear weapons and the missiles onto the plane intact. The Defense Ministry calculated that the smaller AN-8 and AN-12 could each carry 2 Lunas and one R-11m. Because these planes were smaller than the IL-114, there would be no room for any additional equipment or the personnel to operate the missiles.
7 An R-11m brigade comprised three divisions, 18 missiles, and a support crew of 324. A Luna division would have two missile launchers and 102 people.
8 We did not find any in the Cuba files at the APRF; and Volkogonov apparently did not find any in the files he consulted at the Defense Ministry archives.
9 Ed. Note: The “Long Telegram” can be found in Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, Vol. 6, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, pp. 696-709; NSC-68 is in the same series, 1950, Vol. 1, pp. 238ff.
To the Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev

I am reporting (dokladivaiu)

I. About the possibility of strengthening Cuba by airplane

1. [Numeration follows the original] About the transport by plane of special battle parts (spetsial’nye boevye chasti) [Trans. note: atomic warheads] for the Luna and R-11M rockets.

Training tests have been conducted and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of the special battle parts for R-11M rockets on board AN-8 aircraft for two [rockets] and AN-12 for four.

The transport of battle parts for the Luna rocket is practically analogous to that for the R-11M. The transport of special battle parts by TU-114 is not possible for lack of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by plane of R-11M and Luna rockets

The loading, fastening and transport of training R-11M and Luna rockets has been carried out in practice on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft

3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launch pads, [etc.]

II. Proposal of the Defense Ministry for reinforcing Group troops on Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group troops on Cuba, send:

1) one squadron of IL-28 bombers in a group of 10-12 aircraft including cargo and guard (countermeasures) (postanovshchiki pomekh) planes, with PRTB (?) of the automobile kind and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons [of explosive] power.

[In Khrushchev’s handwriting on top of “II.” and “1” above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads (atomnymyi golovkami). [three words illegible] [signed] N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M rocket brigade made up of three divisions (total : 1221 men, 18 R-11M rockets) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special battle parts which the PRTB is capable of storing/defending(khranit’)

3) Two-three divisions of Luna included in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba. Each Luna division will have two launch installations and 102 men.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna divisions. N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

With the Luna divisions, send 8-12 rockets and 8-12 special battle parts. For the preparation and storage of special battle parts for the Luna rockets, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of one R-11M rocket brigade with PRTB and two-three Luna divisions with PRTB with rockets to be sent to Cuba in the first half of this October. Atom bombs (six pieces), special head pieces [warheads] for the R-11M rockets (18 pieces) and for the Luna rockets (8-12) to be transported on board the [ship] Indigirka on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful onland firing tests of C-75 anti-aircraft installations in flat areas. For distances of 24 kilometers, [they were] exact within 100-120 meters. The results of computer checks indicate the possibility of successful use on naval targets.

Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskii
6 September 1962

[Source: Volkogonov Papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress—Manuscript Division). Translated by David Wolff.]

Top Secret
Highly Important
Personally

To the commander of the Soviet Armed Forces Group in Cuba

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint [defense] against possible aggression toward the Union of SSR and the Republic of Cuba.

The decision to use Soviet Armed Forces for [illegible] actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement of [illegible] is undertaken by the Soviet Government.

1. The task of the Soviet armed forces group on the island of Cuba is not to allow an enemy landing on Cuban territory [either from the sea] or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress (nepristupnuiu krepost’).

Forces and means: Soviet troops together with [Cuban] Armed forces.

2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of [the group] of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba must use the following considerations (rakovodstvovat’ sia sleduiushchim):
a) Regarding missile forces

The missile forces that form the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and the island of Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow (po signalu iz Moskvy), to deal a nuclear missile strike to the most important targets [ob'ekty] in the United States of America (list of targets included in attachment #1) [Ed. Note: This attachment has yet to be located].

d) Regarding the Naval Fleet

The Naval Fleet Group must not allow ships and transport vessels of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the US naval base in Guantanamo and provide cover for their transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.

Nuclear missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, a nuclear missile strike on the most important coastal targets in the USA (list of targets provided in attachment #1).

The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One divisional brigade of high-speed cruisers should be located around Banes.

6. The operational uses of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba should be formulated by 01 November 1962. [Ed. Note: 1 November is written in a different hand from the rest of the document.]

Attachments:
1. List of targets for missile forces and nuclear missile submarines for working out flight paths—attached separately.
2. List of the battle composition of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba on 3 pages, record r/t #164
3. List of launching mechanisms, missiles and nuclear warheads possessed by the Military Group, on 2 pages, record r/t #164.

USSR Minister of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
R. Malinovskii

Chief of the General Staff
Marshal of the Soviet Union
M. Zakharov

8 September 1962 [Ed. Note: 8 September is written over the original version of “______July 1962,” suggesting the possibility that this document was drafted at an earlier date.]

Send in cipher
[Various illegible signatures dated July and October 1962]

Source: Volkogonov Papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress—Manuscript Division). Translated by Daniel Rozas.

---

**Zhou Enlai Explains China’s Decision to Explode the Second Atomic Bomb**

**Introduction and Translation by Qiang Zhai**

On 16 October 1964, China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, an underground explosion at the Lop Nur test facility. Seven months later on 14 May 1965, Beijing succeeded in testing its second atomic bomb, this one an aerial drop. On May 21, Zhou Enlai made a speech at a war-planning meeting of the Central Military Commission, explaining the party’s decision for the explosion of the second bomb. Zhou’s remarks are notable for two things: first they highlight Mao Zedong’s role in setting the general time frame for the test; second, they demonstrate that Chinese leaders fully considered the pros and cons of the possible effects of the explosion on international opinion, especially in the Third World, and believed that they could persuade world opinion to support China’s action.

Zhou’s speech was published in *Dangde wenxian* (Party Documents), No. 3, 1994. Translation excerpts follow.

Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the War-Planning Meeting of the Central Military Commission, 21 May 1965

The current international situation—particularly the national, democratic, and revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—is a developing one. Take a look at Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are incidents everywhere and all of them are the direct results of American imperialism. The United States has created all these problems, causing many of its allies and friends to break away. [Ed. Note: Within the past month, the United States had sent Marines to suppress what it called a communist revolt in the Dominican Republic, arousing heavy international criticism.] The atomic test we have just conducted is the best proof. We decided this year to explode the second atomic bomb. Because the bomb would be air dropped, we decided to carry out the test between April and May. The test could not be done too early. It had to be done between April and May. We chose May. Are we going to encounter more opposition this time than we did last year? Just the opposite. It was a test for us when we set the time during the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. The Chairman [Mao Zedong] made the decision to press ahead with the explosion in anticipation of condemnation. Of course, the specific date of explosion was left for the Special Committee to decide. The front command made decisions on specifics, and in the rear I discussed [broader issues] with Luo Ruiqing. Politically, this was the moment when the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference met in Ghana.

There is a historical lesson, that is, at the time of the
First Non-Aligned Meeting in Yugoslavia in [autumn] 1961, Khrushchev wanted to test a big atomic bomb in order to show off, to intimidate and frighten people, but he triggered opposition from all over the world. Delegations were sent to the United States and the Soviet Union to appeal for a suspension of the test. Last year, before we exploded our bomb, India asked China not to conduct the nuclear test. But India obtained only two votes and its proposal did not pass. We went ahead with our explosion. Last year, we selected the time of explosion after the Second Non-Aligned Meeting. This time we chose to test before the Second Afro-Asian Conference. We did consider the issue of possible reactions when the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting was in session. Maybe the situation has changed this time. At the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting, we met a lot of people, who in public expressed regret and advised us to stop testing. But in private they congratulated us. This shows that nationalism has two sides. On the one hand, because nationalist countries oppose imperialism, they support us. Our possession of the nuclear bomb has not only encouraged them but also strengthened their power. On the other hand, pressured by imperialism, induced by the Soviet Union, and influenced by the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [signed by the United States and Soviet Union in the summer of 1963], they expressed regret. Wherever we went, we came across such mixed feelings. But this time we did not expect that so many people would hail our test. This year, only the United States showed little reaction because it wanted to downplay our role. Although it did not respond in public, it was actually worried at heart. This time, the people of the world, including the Japanese people, hailed and congratulated us, and expressed happiness.

I have also conducted a survey: when we were carrying out the nuclear test, two entertainment groups from Japan were in China. Because Japan has been attacked by two atomic bombs and has suffered, it opposes nuclear tests. The members of the two groups were middle-of-the-roaders. Some were to the left of the middle and others to the right of the middle. I had two conversations with them. I said: “When we possess atomic bombs, it means that the Japanese also possess them. We all oppose nuclear bombs. You have been hit by two atomic bombs and you have made contributions to the whole world, because everybody in the world now opposes nuclear war. Without the sacrifice caused by those two atomic bombs, how could international attention be focused? Without the harm done by poisonous gas, how could people come to oppose gas warfare? There is always a price to pay.” Chairman Mao has also said that when a heavy price had been paid, people would not dare to use such weapons again. At the moment, there is the atomic bomb [in China’s possession]. In the future, there will be the hydrogen bomb as well as long-distance missiles. The United States may employ tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. It may use such weapons against China later. As Chinese we must be confident that no matter how many people will die in a nuclear war in the future, we will win world peace eventually. Just as Chairman Mao has pointed out, we will win peace, and win the victory of anti-imperialist war. If the United States attacks us, it will mean the coming of the time to eliminate nuclear war once and for all. That is because, when the United States drops a nuclear bomb on us and causes damage to part of China, it will alienate the people of the world, including the American people. If the Soviet Union refuses to intervene in such a situation, then it is taking the first step in the direction of sitting on the top of a mountain to watch tigers fight. In that case, the American people need to consider the consequences and so do the Japanese people. When the atomic bomb is shot over their heads toward us, the Japanese will suffer more damages than we will. Japan has a population of one hundred million concentrated on several large islands. It has many industries. At present, Japan is doing the opposite of what we are doing: instead of building an underground railway, it is constructing a railway above ground from Tokyo to Osaka. We can not do that. If we do that, we do not know how much damage we will incur when nuclear war comes. Therefore, we must be prepared to pay a price to win international sympathy and support. As to those visitors from the Japanese entertainment world, most of them are afraid of war. After my talks with them, they felt that they had confidence when they stood beside China. One of them revealed his true feeling. He said that “I was unhappy when I first learned about your test. After hearing your talk, I have come to believe that we should hail your test. We should stand together.” This shows that people’s minds can be changed. From this perspective, our current prestige in the world has risen.

At present, the Soviet Union is also deliberately underestimating us. In reality, it is afraid of us. At the moment, the United States is afraid of us and so is Britain. France also feels that it is lagging behind. It realizes that it has not developed the manufacturing technique that we have now. Although France has been engaged in its nuclear program for many years, it has only tested a few devices and it can not air drop the atomic bomb. Its uranium-235 factory will not be put into production until 1969. For this reason, the United States has decided to fight a large war and the Soviet Union will participate. But it will take many steps to reach that point. It is not a simple matter. We should be prepared for that eventuality. The more we are prepared, the more the enemy wants to retreat.

Qiang ZHAI teaches history at Auburn University at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994).
1 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), is by far the best source available in English on the history of China’s nuclear weapons program, but its treatment of the explosion of China’s second atomic bomb is quite brief (see p. 208).

Since the publication of Lewis and Xue’s book, a number of fresh Chinese sources have emerged, adding new detail to the knowledge of the role of such leading figures as Mao, Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, and Song Renqiong in the development of China’s nuclear weapons. The most notable among them are: Wei Wei, chief comp., *Nie Rongzhen zhujuan* (Biography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1994) and Song Renqiong, *Song Renqiong huayilu* (Memoirs of Song Renqiong) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1994). Based on party and military archives, Wei’s book is the official biography of Marshal Nie Rongzhen and part of the Contemporary China series. Song Renqiong served as head of the ministry in charge of nuclear industry between 1956-1960. Among other revelations in his memoirs, Song described the rise and fall of Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation between 1956-1959. He discussed in detail his participation in Nie Rongzhen’s 1957 trip to Moscow, where the two countries signed the New Defense Technical Accord, in which the Soviet Union agreed to provide China with the prototype atomic bomb, missiles, and related data.

2 This refers to the Fifteen-Member Special Committee, headed by Zhou Enlai, which was created in November 1962 to take charge of China’s nuclear program.

3 Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army.

---


Raymond L. Garthoff

[Co-editor’s Note: The following essay by Raymond Garthoff is a first report on the conference “Poland 1980/81: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions,” held in Jachranka/Warsaw on 7-10 November 1997, opening what promises to be a controversial debate on the results of the meeting. Co-organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and CWIHP, the conference produced a great amount of new documentation and testimony by participants from all sides of the conflict. The conference was covered in New York Times articles (by Jane Perlez and Tina Rosenberg), the Los Angeles Times (by Malcolm Byrne and Pawel Machcewicz), and the international press. Future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin and CWIHP Working Papers, as well as a comprehensive National Security Archive Document Reader will feature further new evidence and analyses. The conference was made possible by financial support from the Open Society Institute (New York), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago), the Smith Richardson Foundation (Westport, CT), the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Washington, D.C.), the Committee for Scientific Research (Warsaw), as well as the Batory Foundation (Warsaw). CWIHP is pleased to note the efforts of major contributors to the success of both conferences: Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), Jim Hershberg (George Washington University), Andrzej Paczkowski, Pawel Machcewicz, Dariusz Stola and Ryszard Zelichowski (all at the Institute of Political Studies/PAS). For further information on the conference, contact Malcolm Byrne at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. (Fax: 202-994-7005; Tel: 202-994-7000; email: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) or Andrzej Paczkowski at the Institute of Political Studies in Warsaw (Fax: 48-22-252146, email: POLITIC@ISPPAN.WAW.PL).]

The fourth in the series of international conferences on Eastern European “flashpoints” in the Cold War, dealing with the crisis in Poland in 1980-82, was held in Jachranka, Poland, on 8-10 November 1997. The conference was co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. As in the earlier conferences in this series, new documentary sources were made available, mostly before the conference began, and the conference included both participants in the crisis and the scholars studying it. Most of the new archival materials in this instance were Polish, but some very useful new documents were found in other Eastern European and Moscow archives. A number of
newly declassified U.S. documents were also made available. Partly owing to the fact that this was historically the most recent of the crises examined, a large number of important participants in the events were present, especially among the Polish leaders and Solidarity protagonists (not, however, including Lech Walesa, who had been expected). General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who as party First Secretary and Prime Minister promulgated martial law in December 1981, his colleague and predecessor Stanislaw Kania, who held back from martial law in 1980-81, and their colleague and in 1982 Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, were among the Polish leaders. Zbigniew Bujak, Karol Modzelewski, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and others represented Solidarity.

American policy advisors present included Zbigniew Brzezinski, a key figure in 1980 as President Carter’s National Security Advisor and Richard Pipes, as the senior Soviet and East European affairs NSC staff officer in President Reagan’s administration in 1981. (Secretary Alexander Haig was unable to attend, and no U.S. representatives from the Departments of State and Defense or CIA were present.) From Moscow, Marshal Viktor Kulikov and General of the Army Anatolii Gribkov, in 1980-82 respectively the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact, were joined by Georgii Shakhnazarov and Valerii Musatov, well-placed senior Central Committee experts on relations with Eastern Europe in 1980-82, with Shakhnazarov having served as secretary of a key Politburo subcommittee on Poland chaired by Mikhail Suslov. These, and others (for example Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, the influential long-time head of Radio Free Europe’s Polish Service), held forth in very interesting exchanges.

Marshal Kulikov, resplendent in the beribboned regalia of a Marshal of the Soviet Union, and with a bevy of aides, was the only participant to come in uniform. General Jaruzelski wore the dark glasses that are his hallmark (not an affectation, but needed ever since his eyes were weakened during his family’s early wartime exile in Siberia). Initially nervous, and high strung, he clearly was still reliving the experience of 1980-82 more than any of the others (and was constantly attended by bodyguards). Kania, often short-changed as a weak leader in 1980-82, was unexpectedly impressive, and an articulate spokesman. Some of the Solidarity leaders, in particular Bujak who was the only one to escape internment in 1981 and remain underground, are still young men even fifteen years later, in contrast to the fading generation of the leaders of that time.

The conference began by examining the internal Polish situation, and as was to be expected that part of the program could have been titled “Poles apart.” One of the key questions directly and indirectly addressed, but never fully answered, was whether there had been sufficient common ground for a compromise between the government and the opposition that could have averted martial law, had there been better reciprocal understanding of the minimum requirements of the sides. With a realistic evaluation of the perceptions of the two sides at that time, I believe there was not. In the concluding session, there was however a striking comment by Rakowski, who had negotiated with Solidarity leaders on behalf of the regime in 1981, that at that time he had never received signs of Solidarity thinking on a possible compromise modus vivendi that had just been expressed at the conference by former Solidarity leader Modzelewski. On the other hand, another Solidarity spokesman, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, admitted that some in Solidarity had sought to provoke repression so as activate popular participation in a show-down. As was acknowledged, one problem was that Solidarity was a diffuse movement with differing views.

An important related question was whether Soviet hegemonic influence permitted any alternative to martial law, other than Soviet military intervention. Some, perhaps most, participants regarded martial law as a serious setback, as in some respects it undoubtedly was. Yet Jaruzelski had a point in reminding the conference that martial law not only brought a virtually bloodless end to the immediate crisis, it was also not the end of the road. Only eight years later, the same Polish leaders and the same leaders of Solidarity agreed on a peaceful evolutionary transfer of power with revolutionary consequences. One of the Solidarity leaders suggested there had been eight years wasted, but it was far from clear that the events of 1989 could have taken place in 1981—not only in terms of the internal political dynamics in Poland, but also in terms of critical differences in Moscow between Brezhnev’s encrusted policies and those born of Gorbachev’s new thinking, and in East-West relations.

Much of the discussion, not least by Jaruzelski himself, was directed to the question of whether General Jaruzelski was a traitor to Poland doing Moscow’s bidding in imposing martial law and suppressing Solidarity, or a hero in taking the only action that could have saved Poland from the burden (and possible internal explosion) following Soviet military intervention and occupation. Such extreme characterizations are hardly appropriate for historical analysis but the matter is not in Poland merely a matter of historical curiosity. (In fact, having been in effect tried on a treason charge by a special commission of the Polish parliament and found not guilty last year, Jaruzelski faces a possible retrial on reformulated charges by the recently elected parliament, in which the Socialists have lost the majority they held when the first commission reached its verdict.)

The conference could not of course reconcile divergent Polish views on such questions (and possibly not even differing views among non-Polish historians), but much of the conference deliberation turned and returned to such questions as whether the Soviet leaders planned (or even might have decided) to intervene, justifying Jaruzelski’s position, or whether Moscow had decided not to intervene and Jaruzelski could have avoided martial law.
Marshal Kulikov adamantly contended that the Soviet Union at no time had plans to intervene militarily. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, he retreated into distinctions between full and final plans for a specific action, and mere outline plans. The distinction may be valid, but he did not explain evidence of concrete plans for use of East German and Czech forces (or the published account of one Russian general at the time commanding a division earmarked for intervention). He seemed to protest too much, and finally General Jaruzelski in exasperation noted that only since the question of entry of Poland into NATO had been posed in 1993 did Russian officials argue that Moscow had never intended to intervene in Poland in 1980-82 (thus presumably seeking to deny Polish justification of a requirement for security against a possible Russian threat). Again, though the conference could not establish the full picture, the preponderance of evidence supports a conclusion that the Soviet leaders were planning (and certainly had fully prepared for) an intervention on 8 December 1980, but decided not to do so only on December 5 after a long discussion with Kania and Jaruzelski in which the latter argued that they could deal with the situation. The Soviet leaders may also have been influenced by a Hot Line message from President Carter on June 3 warning that the U.S.-Soviet “relationship” would be “most adversely affected if force was used” (while also reasserting that it was “the firm intention of the United States not to exploit the events in Poland, nor to threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region”).

Brzezinski, in particular, argued that this warning was a crucial element, along with the pleas of the Polish leaders. No doubt it did play some part, but there is no available evidence as to whether it was a contributory re-enforcing element or a decisive factor in the thinking of the Soviet leaders.

Whether there was a specific plan to intervene in December 1981, before Jaruzelski made his decision to impose martial law, is less clear. Notes of a Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981 (two days before Jaruzelski’s decision) show a Politburo consensus at that time not to intervene with Soviet troops. Whether that was known to Jaruzelski is not certain, but in any event it would be surprising if he had not believed that the Soviet leaders might intervene at some point, and he evidently decided for that reason (and perhaps also others) to act. He vividly recalled personally seeing Brezhnev embrace and reassure Alexander Dubcek at Bratislava in the summer of 1968, not long before the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Whether the Soviet leaders ever went beyond preparing for contingent intervention, they clearly did use the capability for intervention to place pressure on the Polish leaders to suppress Solidarity. Kulikov and Gribkov acknowledged that the partially mobilized forces in military “exercises” ending in late 1980 were ordered by Moscow to be kept going for another three months or so, through the next crisis in March 1981, for political reasons.

In sum, it is clear that there was a strong preference, if not determination, by the Politburo not to resort to direct Soviet military intervention. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests at least a short-lived reluctant decision to act in early December 1980, soon set aside. There were probably also contingent preparations for possible intervention in March and November-December 1981, although these military preparations in 1980 and 1981 were also calculated to exert pressure on the Polish leaders. In an extreme situation, such as an outbreak of civil war in Poland or threat of US-NATO intervention, most observers believe Soviet military forces would almost certainly have been sent in. But as in so many cases, this must remain a judgment rather than a certainty, and will probably remain so even after the archives are fully opened.

There were also disputed questions as to whether General Jaruzelski had agreed in late 1980 to open Polish borders to Soviet troops, a contention Jaruzelski vehemently denied. East German documents showed that Polish officers had assisted in route reconnaissance in Poland for German officers who would have led an intervention contingent. Similarly, there was an issue as to whether Polish leaders had encouraged the Soviet Union to keep their military exercises going in early 1981 in order to justify resort to martial law. There were indications to that effect, yet it is clear that Kania and Jaruzelski held back from imposing martial law on those occasions despite Soviet pressure to do so. In short, uncertainties on a number of matters remain.

This conference, as the earlier ones in the series, brought out that the other communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact were also parties to these crises and more generally to Soviet bloc politics. Although the Soviet Union was the hegemonic power in the bloc and made the final decisions, its leaders also were influenced by considerations as to the impact of developments, in this case in Poland, on the other Eastern European bloc countries, and to some extent by the views of their leaders. As in 1968, the leaders of East Germany and Bulgaria, and in 1980-81 of Czechoslovakia as well, urged Soviet intervention in Poland before the virus of Solidarity would spread to their countries. They were quite prepared to participate. In this case their views were not adopted, but this does not mean that the Soviet leaders in Moscow did not weigh considerations of the impact of events in Poland on the other bloc countries seriously. Indeed, in a very different way, the evident brittle weakness of these Communist regimes later played a role in a more enlightened Moscow leadership’s conclusion that the whole edifice of the bloc and internally of its members required restructuring.

These questions of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and U.S., decisions and influences on the situation in Poland, interacting with the decisions of the Polish leaders, were the second major focus of the conference deliberations.

In November-December 1981, unlike December 1980, the United States did not issue a clear warning, despite the
fact that an American spy, Polish General Staff Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, had delivered the full plans for martial law, except for the date. Moreover, on November 7 Kuklinski was spirited out of the country, and the Polish and Soviet governments became aware that the United States knew all about those plans. (Kuklinski had also provided CIA with the most explicit and full information on the planned Soviet intervention in December 1980.) Yet neither the Soviet nor Polish leaders were warned, and public American warnings that the Polish crisis must be solved by the Poles themselves, intended to discourage possible direct Soviet intervention, could by December 1981 be seen almost as an invitation for Polish resolution of the crisis by martial law. Kuklinski himself had intended that the United States at least warn Solidarity, and some Solidarity representatives at the conference were still asking why the United States had not done so. The answer appears to have been a desire not to trigger bloodshed, although there were no U.S. documents or authorities to confirm that assumption or clarify the U.S. inaction. Kuklinski himself, living incognito in the United States, although recently pardoned by the present Polish government (rescinding fully a death penalty earlier imposed by a trial in absentia) and invited to the conference, feared to attend. Three of his hundreds of messages to CIA, the only three declassified by CIA for Kuklinski’s use in successfully appealing his earlier conviction, were however made available.

Shakhnazarov several times posed the question of the extent of a U.S. role in inspiring and supporting Solidarity. There was no clear answer, but the consensus seemed to be that Solidarity arose and acted on its own initiative, that Western sources including private American entities such as the AFL-CIO and later the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy provided valuable support in communications and printing supplies. Brzezinski and Pipes affirmed that direct covert U.S. government assistance was given only after martial law was imposed. (Even then, one Solidarity leader remarked, a requested computer was denied because its dispatch would have contravened the U.S. embargo imposed as a sanction!)

In a broader sense, however, a much more important U.S. role was ascribed by two rather disparate groups at the table. Marshal Kulikov and General Gribkov blamed the United States government for having carried out a master plan for breaking up the Warsaw Pact (and the Soviet Union), Gribkov even referring back to Churchill’s proposed wartime second front in the Balkans to head off a Soviet presence in central Europe! Kulikov brandished a paperback Russian translation of Peter Schweizer’s book Victory, ascribing victory in the Cold War to Reagan’s early militancy including covert operations in Poland. This charge was, to many unexpectedly, supported by Richard Pipes and General William Odom, Brzezinski’s NSC military aide in 1980 and the chief of U.S. Army Intelligence in 1981-82. (Brzezinski was no longer present at this session of the conference, but had earlier ascribed a major role to the Carter administration’s policy of seeking the “delegitimization” of the Soviet Union and bloc.)

Some other American participants disagreed with this view that the United States had played the main role in bringing about the fundamental changes in the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and none of the Poles even addressed the question. Much as such changes may have been consistent with U.S. aims and desires, and were welcomed, they were not caused by U.S. policies or actions. Rather, these historical (and historic) changes in the 1980s occurred because of objective internal necessities, and subjective actions by Soviet and Eastern European leaders and peoples.

The ultimate transformation of Eastern Europe climaxing in 1989 deserves, however, to be the subject of another conference—and such a conference is planned.


Raymond Garthoff is a retired senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of many books on the Cold War.
“You, Mr. Vance, are a new person.”

Talks Between A.A. Gromyko and C[yrus] Vance
28-30 March 1977

[Ed. Note: In Bulletin 5, pp. 144-154, 160, CWIHP published a selection of declassified documents generated by the multi-year Carter-Brezhnev Project on US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of Détente. Supported by a multinational consortium of research institutions and organizations, the Carter-Brezhnev Project was spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University. The documents in Bulletin 5 brought the reader up to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s departure for Moscow, but the fateful visit itself was not covered. At both ends of his stay, Vance met with CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev. Sandwiched in between were four meetings with veteran Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. The main topic of discussion was US President Jimmy Carter’s “comprehensive” proposals for the SALT-2 Treaty, views that the Soviets saw as contravening the Vladivostok accords reached with US President Gerald Ford in 1974. The Soviet rejection of Carter’s initiative was certainly the newsmaking centerpiece of the Vance visit. Other, more positive, discussions covered a wide range of topics, including the Vienna talks on arms limitations in Central Europe, the Middle East, non-proliferation, Cyprus, and others. Below is a brief sampler.]

28 March (17:30-20:00)

A.A. GROMYKO. [Opening the attack on the SALT-2 issue] How should we evaluate the current situation in this light? You, Mr. Vance, are a new person. But try to see the situation with our eyes. What conclusion should the Soviet side come to for itself on the basis of the experience which we have had so far with the new American administration, the conclusion that the next government of the USA which will replace the current one, will just as easily throw everything that we are able to agree upon now into the trash? If such is the case, one must ask where is the minimum of stability that should exist in the relations between our two countries?

29 March (11:00-13:00)

GROMYKO. The situation in the Middle East has been a subject of discussion between our countries, including on the highest level, for many years. We discussed this issue with President Johnson, with President Nixon, and with President Ford. We discussed it, although not in such a deep or detailed way, with the new Administration. However, there is [still] no solution to the problem, and the situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous and fraught with the possibility of a new explosion. We are deeply convinced that you are mistaken if you believe that it is possible to buy peace in the Middle East by giving 200-300 million, even a billion dollars to some country.

C. VANCE. We don’t believe that (My tak ne schitaem).

GROMYKO. Good. That is encouraging. Consequently, it is necessary to seek political solutions. Does the USA consider that Israel is ready to recognize the right of the Palestinians to an independent nation-state? You understand that these issues are interconnected.

VANCE. I cannot speak for Israel, but I agree that this is the stumbling block (kamen’ pretknoveniia).

GROMYKO. I can say the same regarding the Palestinians. If Israel will recognize the rights of the Palestinians, they will recognize Israel’s rights. The issue here is who will speak first, but we do not consider that an insoluble issue. This is why diplomacy exists.

29 March (16:30-19:45)

VANCE. I agree that cessation of the state of war is the most important issue. But normalization of relations can facilitate the preservation of peace.

GROMYKO. That does not contradict what I said. May we consider that we have here with you a common understanding?

VANCE. We have an understanding.

GROMYKO. Can’t we say that our positions coincide?

VANCE. We put a somewhat greater accent than you on normalization of relations as a means of maintaining peace.

GROMYKO. We stress the significance of achieving peace, not belittling the significance of normal relations between states. For example, in a state of normal relations with Israel, we would with satisfaction eat Israeli oranges. I have heard that they have good oranges.

30 March (11:00-14:00)

VANCE. I want now to touch on the issue of the radiation which the employees at our embassy in Moscow are subject to. I know that in the recent past its level has decreased, but it is still being observed, which, of course, provokes concern among our people. The full cessation of this radiation would be valued highly and positively by us.

GROMYKO. I must say quite frankly that I am pretty fed up with this issue. I cannot add anything to the response which has been given by us to the American side. Despite the fact that in the recent past some industrial enterprises have been moved out of Moscow, they are, unfortunately, still inside the city limits, including its central part.

Of course, I will keep in mind what you have said, but I must frankly state that in the USA you have lovers (liubiteli) of various contrived “issues.” Without this, they simply get bored (Bez etogo im prosto skuchno zhit’).…


[Source: TsKhSD f. 89, op. 76, d. 1, ll. 1-80. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

Edited, Introduced, Translated, and Annotated by Mark Kramer

Petro Shelest served for many years in the upper levels of the Soviet hierarchy. From 1961 to 1975 he was a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), and from 1964 to 1973 he was a full member of the CPSU Presidium/Politburo. He also served as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UkrCP) from 1963 to 1972 and as Soviet first deputy prime minister in 1972 and 1973. Following the removal of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964, Shelest was a close ally of the new CPSU First Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. Later on, however, the two men had a falling-out, which culminated in Shelest’s ouster from the leadership in April 1973. Shelest remained in a low-level economic post in Moscow until 1978, when he was forced to retire. He lived as a private pensioner in Moscow until his death in early 1996.

During his years in power, Shelest kept a meticulous, handwritten diary, which eventually came to thousands of pages. The diary is an invaluable source for those studying key events in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. An abridged edition was put out in Russian in 1995 by the German publisher “edition q” and the “Kvintessentsiya” publishing house in Moscow, but unfortunately the publishers omitted many crucial passages, including detailed remarks about the role of Ukrainian nationalism in Shelest’s removal. The publishers also allowed Shelest to insert occasional post-hoc clarifications and reminiscences alongside his original diary entries. Through most of the book it is easy to distinguish between the original entries and Shelest’s later comments, but in a few cases the two are not easily separated. It would have been much better if the publisher had typeset the diary in its original, unabridged form without supplementary material, and if Shelest’s memoirs had then appeared separately. To prevent any confusion, researchers are well advised to consult the original diary, which is now stored along with the rest of Shelest’s personal and official papers at the former Central Party Archive in Moscow.

The diary, written mostly in Russian but interspersed with Ukrainian, covers both domestic and foreign developments. Of particular interest are the lengthy sections dealing with the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Western scholars long ago surmised that Shelest played a key role during the 1968 crisis, and that he was a strong proponent of military intervention. Those judgments have been amply confirmed by the diary as well as by the newly released transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings from 1968 and a vast quantity of other declassified materials in the Ukrainian and Russian archives (a selection of which will be published along with my commentary in the next CWIHP Bulletin). During interviews in 1989 and the early 1990s, Shelest insisted that he had not favored military action in 1968, but his diary, the CPSU Politburo transcripts, and countless other items in the Ukrainian and Russian archives all belie this claim. The diary also sheds fascinating light on aspects of the 1968 crisis that had not previously been known from the many thousands of documents that have been declassified since 1990 in Moscow, Kyiv, Prague, and other former Warsaw Pact capitals. No serious study of the 1968 crisis will be able to neglect this remarkable source.

The four excerpts below will be introduced separately. The first excerpt highlights the concerns that Shelest had in 1968 about the political spillover from Czechoslovakia into Ukraine. The second, third, and fourth excerpts deal with the function that Shelest carried out on behalf of the CPSU Politburo as an intermediary with the pro-Soviet hardliners in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska, or KSC). That function, as shown below, was a vital factor in the emerging consensus in Moscow on the need to use military force.

EXCERPT No. 1
Shelest’s Concerns About the Spill-Over Into Ukraine

Throughout the 1968 crisis Shelest and other Soviet leaders feared that events in Czechoslovakia were emboldening Ukrainian intellectuals and nationalist elements. Newly declassified materials, including Shelest’s diary, the CPSU Politburo transcripts, and a plethora of other documents from the Ukrainian and Russian archives (a selection of which will be published in the next CWIHP Bulletin), bear out Grey Hodnett’s and Peter Potichnyj’s earlier conclusion that “there was an important linkage between the situation in the Ukraine and the developments in Czechoslovakia.” The new sources also confirm that Soviet leaders themselves, especially Shelest, were fully aware of this linkage. On numerous occasions, Shelest informed Brezhnev that Ukrainian intellectuals and students were being affected by “the stepped-up activity of anti-socialist, opportunist, and anarchist elements” in Czechoslovakia. He warned that the media in Czechoslovakia were “adopting rightist, anti-socialist positions” to “weaken the role of the [Communist Party],” causing “disarray” among residents of western
Ukraine. Heeding Shelest’s complaints, Brezhnev raised the matter with the KSC leadership during a meeting in Moscow in early May 1968:

Comrades, you know about the CPSU’s principled position based on full respect for the independence of all fraternal Parties and countries. But not every question is a purely internal matter. . . . After all, your newspapers are read also by Soviet citizens, your radio is listened to in our country as well, which means that all such propaganda affects us, too.6

Shelest, for his part, complained in much stronger terms to the Czechoslovak authorities. During bilateral negotiations with the KSC Presidium at Cierna nad Tisou in late July, he explained why the “alarming developments” in Czechoslovakia were a matter of “common concern” to the Soviet Union:

Soviet Ukraine is an integral and inseparable part of the USSR. We have a population of 46 million, including many nationalities, of whom nearly 2.5 million are Communists. We and you, our Czech friends, are direct neighbors, and, as is customary with neighbors, we know a lot about each other that is not known or even noticed by those further away. . . . We see and hear your radio and television broadcasts, and read your newspapers. Hence, for us in Ukraine it is all the more insulting what is going on in Czechoslovakia, a state supposedly friendly to us.7

Shelest accused the KSC leaders of approving “the publication of counterrevolutionary tracts which are then sent through special channels into Ukraine.”8 In the weeks after the Cierna negotiations, Shelest continued to warn that the “counterrevolutionary and revanchist” influences in Czechoslovakia would increasingly filter into Ukraine unless “decisive measures” were taken.

This first set of excerpts from Shelest’s diary provides further evidence of the Ukrainian leader’s belief that events in Czechoslovakia were “causing unsavory phenomena here in Ukraine as well.” The situation, he wrote, was especially bad in Ukraine’s “western provinces, where the inhabitants receive information directly from their neighbors across the border” and “watch both Czechoslovak and Western radio and television.” Shelest also noted that vigorous steps had to be taken to curb the “distribution of political and nationalist leaflets” and to prevent the circulation within Ukraine of newspapers published by the Ukrainian community in Czechoslovakia. He repeatedly warned his colleagues on the CPSU Politburo about these matters, as is evident not only from the Politburo transcripts but from the documents in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

Because of Shelest’s standing as a full member of the CPSU Politburo, his close ties with Brezhnev, his role as the leader of a key Soviet republic bordering on Czechoslovakia, and his participation in high-level bilateral and multilateral talks with KSC officials, his views about a growing spill-over from the Prague Spring were bound to have a major effect on Soviet decision-making.

26 March: . . . I had a lengthy conversation with the first secretary of the UkrCP Kyiv municipal committee, A. P. Bovin. He reported to me that political and nationalist leaflets were being widely disseminated at T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kyiv and at the agricultural academy. In these two institutions of higher education, roughly 600 leaflets had been discovered. Measures are being devised to prevent the distribution of such leaflets.

An unhealthy situation has arisen in the Kyiv branch of the Union of Writers with respect to organizational, creative, and political matters. We also considered this matter and proposed measures to improve the [party’s] work among artists.

28 March: . . . The first secretary of the party’s Ivano-Frankiv’sk oblast committee, Ya. P. Pogrebnyak, called to inform me about the situation in his oblast. He said that in certain regions former members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground had begun to turn up, and that in the oblast as a whole there were more than 40 thousand of them.9 Local authorities were taking measures to intensify ideological and organizational work among the population.

11 April: . . . I arranged a conversation in my office with the UkrCP CC Secretary responsible for ideological matters, Ovcharenko, and the head of the UkrCP CC department for academia and higher educational institutions, Tsvetkov.10 We reviewed matters connected with the work of the republic’s scholarly establishments and higher educational institutions. We concluded that we needed to conduct further study of the state of instruction and how to improve the lectures in economics and humanities departments and faculties in the republic’s universities and colleges. We must give special attention to the state of affairs in T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kyiv. Here, as before, there is great confusion and political disorientation [induced by the events in Czechoslovakia]. All sorts of leaflets and pamphlets are being distributed. All of this is being done not by students or instructors, but by outsiders, since there is free access to the university. A decision was reached to restrict free attendance at the university’s building.

21 May: Today I had a phone conversation with L. Brezhnev; we considered all aspects of my forthcoming meeting and negotiations with A. Koscelansky11 and V. Bil’ak about the state of affairs in the KSC and in the country as a whole, as well as about the political situation.12 Unsavory phenomena are beginning to show up in Ukraine as well— we’ve found pamphlets intended for the leadership of the country. Brezhnev requested that I give him a detailed report
after my meeting with the Czechoslovak comrades.

14 June: I informed Brezhnev about my impressions of popular sentiments in the western oblasts, which I was visiting yesterday evening. In those oblasts the population has a much more vivid sense of the alarming events in Czechoslovakia, and is receiving information through direct contacts with inhabitants of regions along the border. For this reason, they can more urgently and objectively assess all the events in Czechoslovakia.

24 July: The chairmen of the party’s Volyns’ka and Chernihiv oblast committees gave reports at the UkrCP CC Secretariat: “The situation in these oblasts regarding social science instruction and training of university and high school students is deplorable, especially in rural areas. The situation with radio, television, and telephones is very bad. Extremely urgent measures must be adopted to set matters straight. We have received no answer to the letters and requests we have sent about these matters to the CPSU CC and to the Council of Ministers and Gosplan in the hope of getting suitable technical equipment for the republic. In these oblasts the [official] radio and television practically don’t work at all. At the same time, the residents are listening to Western radio stations and watching Western television.” I instructed the oblast party chairmen to write, for the third time, a letter to the center requesting help.

21 August: . . . . Some young person called the switchboard of the UkrCP CC, identified himself as a student of Kyiv University, and said: “Cde. Shelest know that we don’t attach any truth to the items published in Pravda about Czechoslovakia. We, the youth of the country, will do the same thing here that young people in Czechoslovakia were doing. We regret that our troops have invaded Czechoslovakia.”

29-30 August: I spoke with the oblast committee secretaries about current economic, administrative, and political matters. Overall, according to the information available to the secretaries, the population’s reaction to the communiqué from our negotiations with the Czechs in Moscow was positive. However, in two parts of Kyiv and in numerous other cities in the republic, leaflets and graffiti turned up in public places denouncing the CPSU and Brezhnev, calling for freedom of speech, expressing support for the Czechoslovak events, and condemning our military intervention in Czechoslovakia’s affairs and our political pressure on the new elements in Czechoslovakia. Measures have been taken to track down and bring to account the authors of the leaflets and graffiti.

There have been instances, especially in Crimea, Odessa, and Voroshlyovgrad, when some members of the party as well as non-party members have expressed their disagreement with our actions in Czechoslovakia. All of this must make us very wary.

EXCERPT No. 2
Shelest’s First Meeting with Vasil Bil’ak

On 6 May 1968 the CPSU Politburo, at Brezhnev’s behest, authorized Shelest to begin serving as a clandestine liaison with the “healthy forces” (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners) in Czechoslovakia headed by the Slovak Communist Party leader, Vasil Bil’ak. This action, coming two days after Brezhnev and his colleagues had denounced the Prague Spring during bilateral negotiations in Moscow with senior KSC officials, reflected Brezhnev’s growing belief that the existing leadership in Czechoslovakia might be unwilling to fulfill Soviet demands. Although Brezhnev maintained close contacts with the KSC First Secretary, Alexander Dubcek, until mid-August (just a few days before the invasion), the establishment of back-channel contacts with Bil’ak facilitated Soviet planning for an invasion and the installation of a new regime.

This excerpt from Shelest’s diary describes his first meeting with Bil’ak. The initiative for the discussion had come from Bil’ak in mid-April, but Shelest had not wanted to set up a meeting without Brezhnev’s approval. When Shelest spoke about the matter with Brezhnev in late April, the Soviet leader was wary of establishing a back-channel liaison with Bil’ak; but after the 4 May negotiations, Brezhnev’s view of the situation changed, and he decided to have the Politburo authorize Shelest’s secret contacts with Bil’ak. With help from the secretary of the UkrCP’s Transcarpathian oblast committee, Yu. Il’nyts’kyi, Shelest arranged to meet with Bil’ak and Jan Koscelansky in Uzhhorod on 24-25 May.

Shelest’s detailed account of his discussions with Bil’ak was based both on notes and on a tape-recording of the sessions. The account in his diary is identical to a classified report he provided to the other members of the CPSU Politburo on 27 and 29 May. Hence, there is no doubt about its authenticity.

Shelest’s account of the meeting proved to have a far-reaching impact on Soviet decision-making. During the first part of the CPSU Politburo’s session on 27 May, Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin offered impressions from his recent visit to Czechoslovakia, which had ended the same day that Shelest was meeting with Bil’ak. Kosygin had gone to Czechoslovakia ostensibly for a vacation at the spas in Karlovy Vary, but the real purpose of his trip was to assess the state of the KSC leadership. Kosygin’s report on 27 May largely discredited the notion that the Soviet Union would be able to work with “healthy forces” in the KSC to establish an alternative regime.

An analysis of all my conversations, meetings, and materials indicates that at present, in the given situation, there are no more authoritative people in the party and the country than Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, and Svoboda. For this reason, obviously, we must shape our policy accordingly.
By the time Kosygin finished his presentation, the other members of the CPSU Politburo were largely in agreement that, at least for the time being, attempts to rely on “healthy forces” were bound to be fruitless. Without a suitable alternative, Soviet leaders would have to deal as best they could with the existing authorities in Prague.

No sooner had this consensus emerged, however, than Brezhnev received an urgent phone call from Shelest, who wanted to convey the results of his discussions with Bil’ak. Shelest offered a detailed account of the trends described by the Slovak leader: the growing strength of “rightist” and “anti-socialist” forces, the persecution of “honest Communists,” the use of sabotage by “rightists” to prevent Warsaw Pact military exercises in Czechoslovakia, the emergence of a “second center” of latent “counterrevolutionaries” in the upper levels of the KSC, and the possible “loss of Czechoslovakia” as a member of the socialist camp. Shelest left no doubt that the only hope of salvaging the situation was by relying on Bil’ak and the other “healthy forces,” who assured Shelest that they were “ready to move openly against the creeping counterrevolution, even to the point of waging an armed confrontation” against the KSC’s “second center.”

When Brezhnev reported back to his colleagues on the alarming picture conveyed by Shelest, the mood within the Soviet Politburo changed. The notion of relying solely on Dubček and his aides no longer seemed particularly viable. Brezhnev summed up the new consensus when he argued that Bil’ak was “more perceptive” than Dubček in his assessment of events, and that “we must maintain close contact with the healthy forces.” The impact of Kosygin’s visit was thus largely dissipated.

Although Soviet leaders continued to have serious doubts over the next few months about the ability of the “healthy forces” to rectify the situation in Czechoslovakia, Shelest’s initial meeting with Bil’ak marked a turning point in the crisis. Had Shelest not provided such a dire report and spoken so strongly about the need to work with the “healthy forces,” the Soviet Politburo might well have been inclined to wait longer before resorting to military force. But once the prospect of relying on “healthy forces” seemed feasible, the Soviet authorities had an incentive to act before the Slovak Party Congress on 26 August and the KSC’s Extraordinary 14th Congress in September, when these “healthy forces” were likely to be removed from the scene. Hence, a tentative deadline for resolving the crisis, either peacefully or through military force, was set by Shelest’s meeting with Bil’ak.

---

18 April: ... From information provided by Yu. Il’nyts’kyi and V. Nikitchenko (KGB) I learned that V. Bil’ak and A. Koscelansky from Slovakia expressed a desire to meet with me in Uzhhorod. It would be good to receive information about the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia from first-hand sources. But I can’t do this independently, without permission from Moscow.

---

30 April: On the eve of the May Day holiday, I called L. Brezhnev and wished him well for the forthcoming holiday. I laid out my thoughts about a possible meeting I might have with Bil’ak and Koscelansky at their request. Brezhnev reacted quite agitatedly and warily to what I said, and his mood even seemed to change. He only managed to say: “It would be better if Bil’ak and Koscelansky came to Kyiv for a meeting with you.”

19-20 May: I carefully pored through the briefing materials coming in from various sources in the Czech lands and Slovakia about my forthcoming meeting with A. Koscelansky and V. Bil’ak.

21 May: The secretary of the UkrCP’s Transcarpathian oblast committee, Yu. Il’nyts’kyi, called me and reported that my meeting with V. Bil’ak and A. Koscelansky might take place on 24-25 May. They’re requesting that we put them up for the night on our territory on 23 May, and that this be done very covertly and inconspicuously. They’re afraid that they will be persecuted for having contacts with us. We cleared up all matters pertaining to the organization of the meeting and the “covert” lodging for Bil’ak and Koscelansky. We decided that we’ll put them up for the night and hold the first meeting and negotiations in the same place (at a dacha in the mountains, not far from Uzhhorod). . . .

24-25 May: In Uzhhorod I twice met and had prolonged discussions with V. Bil’ak and A. Koscelansky. The first meeting occurred outside the city in a cottage in the Carpathians, where we spent almost the whole night having a discussion. The second was in Uzhhorod, at the headquarters of the party’s Transcarpathian oblast committee. I tried to memorize both discussions as accurately as possible, and in addition I made notes from recording equipment, knowing that I would have to write a detailed and precise memorandum to the CPSU CC because this information is of great importance to us—it is first-hand, objective, and truthful. I spoke very little because I mainly wanted to listen and to clarify numerous points.

Here is the basic outline of the discussion.

Bil’ak and Koscelansky informed me in detail about the situation in the party and the country in the leadup to the May plenum of the KSC CC. They informed me about the complexities of the struggle against rightists. A. Dubček is at loose ends, and he is unable (and isn’t particularly willing) to expose the role of rightist elements in the country and the rightist forces in the party. There is no unity of action in the KSC CC Presidium. “We, the Slovaks, will fight to the end in the struggle for a Marxist-Leninist line in the party; we will not retreat a single step. It’s obvious that we, the Slovaks, together with you will again have to liberate the Czechs.”

Continuing his remarks, V. Bil’ak said: “To cool off the hotheads, it’s urgently necessary that you conduct maneuvers.
of your troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Once
Russian soldiers turn up, all of these political rats will go
hide in their burrows. The appearance of your I. Yakubovskii
(commander of the Warsaw Pact forces) alone will do a lot to
cool down the situation. In the struggle against the rightist
elements, the nation, including all Communists, must behave
more boldly.”

Among the party activists and state security agents there
have been many instances of suicide induced by threats from
rightists. For their part, the rightist elements have been
making open threats: “Soon the time will come when we will
hang all Communists, stringing them up by their feet.”
Without any let-up, the extremist elements are demanding and
achieving the retirement of Communists, particularly the
leaders of regional committees and municipal committees
who support Leninist positions. This is happening often.
Murders of secretaries of party organizations in enterprises
and collective farms and other such incidents are occurring
even in Slovakia. Former kulaks are infiltrating the agricul-
tural cooperatives and are threatening the leaders of the
farms and the secretaries of party organizations. They’re
demanding the return of their land and property. Sabotage
is being carried out at the railroad junctions to hinder the
transport of Soviet troops who are coming to take part in the
exercises planned by the Warsaw Pact. They’re disconnecting
the water fountains so that the locomotives will fill up with
water and are diverting them from the switching points.

We’re all afraid of the upcoming KSC CC plenum; we’re
not fully certain that we will win because of the divisions
within the Presidium. We also don’t have an organizational
plan for our actions. A. Dubcek is not capable of doing
anything even if it would “stabilize” our acrimonious
situation. If we don’t gain control of the situation within a
month, Dubcek will perish, and so will we along with him.
I’ve been discussing matters a good deal with A. Dubcek, and
I say to him: “Sasha (and I myself lament), why don’t you
return to Bratislava, this isn’t what you were after, Sasha.”
If today Slovakia were to deviate from the line of the KSC CC,
this would lead to the collapse of the Czechoslovak republic.
We will do everything possible to preserve Czechoslovakia as
a socialist country. In Slovakia threats have been made
against Communist activists. If something extraordinary
should happen, we request that you grant refuge in Uzhhorod
to our wives and children. The directives of the minister of
internal affairs are not being carried out in Slovakia because
we know that he is taking part in another “center,” headed by
Kriegl and Spacek.

The loss of Czechoslovakia would be equivalent to
sacrificing the gains of the Great Patriotic War. This
cannot be permitted. Czechoslovakia occupies a very
important place on the map of Europe; the dark forces simply
want to blackmail the entire socialist camp. You are our
friends, and you won’t allow this to happen. We are ready to
move openly against the creeping counterrevolution, even to
the point of waging an armed confrontation. We’re certain
that you will help us in our trying hour. Perhaps if this should
happen, even that “apostle” A. Dubcek would sober up and
begin acting decisively.

Bil’ak again began characterizing A. Dubcek. He said:
“Dubcek is now the most popular man in the country. The
rightist elements revere him as their standard-bearer. They’re
shrewdly and slyly using him in pursuit of their nefarious
aims. I regard Dubcek himself to be honorable, but very
ambitious; he’s clearly not a politician of such scale. He has
come to believe, based on their assurances and suggestions,
that Czechoslovakia can provide an example of a new
development of socialist society—a new, socialist democ-

cry—and that Czechoslovakia will become the ‘hub of the
’ world.’ But I’m worried that this little hub could come
undone and cause a bad stomach ache.”

I asked V. Bil’ak a leading question: “On whom can you
rely in your struggle against the rightist forces? Who and
where are your healthy forces?” Bil’ak then characterized
several leaders of the KSC and the government.

D. Kolder: Bil’ak said about him that he is an honest,
fine, and committed Communist, who himself is a worker; but
he has little tact in his dealings with comrades, and recently
has been consuming too much hard liquor. He believes 100
percent in A. Dubcek, and Dubcek believes in him. It’s true
that they [i.e., the rightists] view him with hostility and regard
him as a dangerous man, and that at the first opportunity they
will try to remove him from the political arena through
Dubcek’s own hands.

J. Lenart: He’s an honorable man, an engineer by
training, who is versed in both technology and economics.
He’s rather frightened by the events under way in the country
and the party, but he’s not sufficiently resolute in his actions.
One can count on him in the right circumstances, but he
wavers in his positions. He is preparing to speak at the CC
plenum and to expose Dubcek’s mistakes, but Sasha (Dubcek)
is recommending to him not to do this. Lenart is now
perplexed and has become withdrawn. He has consulted with
me several times. I support him in every way.

J. Janik: He’s a principled Communist; he firmly
supports Leninist positions and believes that without the
Soviet Union there can be no socialist Czechoslovakia.
Against him, too, the rightists are waging vicious attacks and
are trying, through all possible means, to find or create some
pretext for compromising him.

C. Cisar: He has known Moscow for many years and
has been to the Soviet Union numerous times. Outwardly he’s
well disposed toward you. But now his position toward you
has changed 180 degrees; he has even begun displaying a
certain degree of contempt for Russians. I don’t myself
understand what happened, but it’s obvious that it was
spawned under the influence of the rightists. Cisar has great
influence in Czechoslovakia and especially in the Czech
lands. For the sake of achieving his aims, he’s capable of
engaging in all manner of political fraud and deception.

A. Indra: He’s the most honest and truthful of all the
KSC CC secretaries. He’s 46 years old and is a railroad
engineer who acquired practical leadership experience from
work at a factory. He knows economics reasonably well.

He’s a cultured and thoughtful man with a good moral
character, but unfortunately he doesn’t have adequate schooling in political leadership. Dubcek could rely on him in his work, but for some reason he ignores him, seeing in him a rival.

V. Bil’ak: I’ll speak personally about him. I also knew him previously. I’d met briefly with him on occasion, and had heard a lot about him from the comrades in Transcarpathia. He is a fine and vigorous Communist, who is himself a Ukrainian, a native of our Transcarpathia. His mother, sisters, and brothers live in a mountain village in Transcarpathian oblast. Bil’ak often visits them. He has good professional contacts with the party and council officials of Transcarpathian oblast, particularly with the first secretary of the oblast committee, Yu. Il’nyts’kyi. Their families are friendly with one another. V. Bil’ak is a politically literate, cultured, and well-read individual, with a fine knowledge of the history of his country, especially the period of the Austro-Hungarian empire. My impression of Bil’ak is of a principled man who supports correct positions, and of a cunning, far-sighted politician.

V. Bil’ak spoke further about some aspects of A. Dubcek’s activity: “At his (Dubcek’s) suggestion, to please the rightist forces, the department in the KSC CC for security and defense matters was disbanded. As a result, the CC was essentially deprived of the instrument needed to supervise the activity of the administrative organs, the army, and the state security forces.” He gave a detailed description of the activity of the right-opportunist Czech center in the KSC, and cited the following names: J. Smrkovsky, O. Sik, F. Kriegel, C. Cisar, V. Slavik, V. Prcilik, M. Vaculik, and B. Simon. The forces of this center define the tactics and strategy of the anti-party struggle within the KSC. This, in essence, is an alternative Central Committee of the KSC. In the territories and regions, groups and cells have been well conceived and organized for a struggle against Communists who support correct positions.

Bil’ak and I arranged to maintain contact. He requested that all due assistance be given to the healthy forces in the party and the government. I assured V. Bil’ak that all matters of a confidential nature would be reported personally by me to L. Brezhnev. The political and economic situation in the party and the country will be reported by me in an official memorandum to the CPSU CC Politburo. Bil’ak and I agreed that we would definitely meet after the May plenum of the KSC CC. He will let me know about this through appropriate channels.

EXCERPT No. 3
Shelest’s Account of His Secret Meeting on Lake Balaton with Vasil Bil’ak, 20-21 July 1968.

This next excerpt from Shelest’s diary recounts his secret meeting with the Slovak Communist Party leader, Vasil Bil’ak, on the shore of Lake Balaton in Hungary. The meeting took place late in the evening of 20-21 July, exactly a month before the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nothing was known about this meeting—not even the fact that it was held—until Shelest released his diary in the mid-1990s. Other information that had previously been available, particularly about Shelest’s contacts with hardline, antireformist members of the KSC Presidium led by Bil’ak, lends strong credence to the diary account. The excerpts below are therefore of immense historical significance, filling in a crucial and hitherto unknown part of the 1968 crisis. All existing accounts of the crucial period between mid-July and early August 1968 will need major revision.

As noted above, in early May 1968 Brezhnev and the other members of the CPSU Politburo designated Shelest to act as a liaison with the anti-reformist members of the KSC Presidium. It is now clear from Shelest’s diary that this role took on enormous importance in the latter half of July, shortly after the Warsaw Meeting (14-15 July) and the publication of the Warsaw Letter on the 18th. In his diary Shelest describes how he suddenly received a phone call from Brezhnev on the afternoon of 20 July. Brezhnev instructed the Ukrainian party leader to be ready to fly within a few hours to Hungary, where he would first meet with the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSzMP), Janos Kadar, and then set off for a highly confidential discussion with Bil’ak. Shelest duly complied with Brezhnev’s wishes, flying first to Budapest and then traveling to Kadar’s dacha on Lake Balaton. (Balaton is the largest inland lake in central Europe, and Kadar’s main dacha was on the northwestern shore.) Shelest encountered some difficulty in finding Bil’ak along the shoreline, but with the help of a few assistants who had come along from Kyiv, he finally hooked up with the Slovak party leader.

Shelest’s detailed notes of his conversation with Bil’ak were derived from a tape recording that was made of the entire session without Bil’ak’s knowledge. The full recording has not yet been released (though presumably it is stored in some archive in Moscow, perhaps in Shelest’s personal file in the Russian Presidential Archive), but the diary account is a worthy substitute. The relevant portions from the diary are translated here in full because of their great historical value.

Five key points about the Shelest-Bil’ak meeting are worth highlighting:

First, it shows, once again, what an overriding priority the Czechoslovak problem was for the Soviet leadership in 1968. Shelest had many pressing duties to attend to in Kyiv, but he was willing to fly off immediately to Hungary when Brezhnev called him on the afternoon of 20 July. Because Shelest believed that a resolution of the Czechoslovak crisis would be essential for the future stability of Ukraine (and thus for the stability of the USSR as a whole), he was willing to subordinate his immediate concerns at home to the management of the foreign crisis.

Second, the meeting casts a whole new light on Janos Kadar’s role after the Warsaw meeting. It is clear, both from newly released documents and from Kadar’s own
recollections published in 1989, that the Hungarian leader’s position on Czechoslovakia became much less conciliatory after Dubček declined to attend the Warsaw Meeting. Shelest’s account underscores just how far-reaching Kadar’s change of heart was. Not only did Kadar express strong criticism of Dubček at the Warsaw Meeting, but he followed this up by abetting the formation of an anti-Dubček group of hardliners who could “request” Soviet military assistance. No doubt, Kadar was still hoping that military intervention could somehow be averted, but he was actively taking part in the secret political and military preparations for an invasion. Just two days after the Shelest-Bil’ak meeting, Soviet troops in Hungary were ordered by Moscow to make final arrangements for large-scale military “exercises” north of the border, a process that was completed by the beginning of August. Hungarian leaders, despite their earlier reservations about military action and their efforts to find a compromise, were now finally willing to concede that a military solution might be unavoidable.

Third, it is striking how diffident Bil’ak was during the meeting with Shelest and how unconvincing his assurances were. Shelest himself noted at several points that Bil’ak seemed to be promising far more than he could deliver, at least at the time. Later on, when Bil’ak finally transmitted the “letter of invitation” to Shelest, it was signed by fewer than a dozen officials, hardly an encouraging sign that an alternative regime could be swiftly established. Yet by mid-August, in the buildup to the invasion, Soviet leaders deluded themselves into believing that the “healthy forces” had “consolidated themselves and now constitute a majority.” Shelest’s own view may have been less sanguine—not least because in the meeting on 20-21 July, Bil’ak had been “inhibited and guarded” and had “failed to clear up certain matters and to discuss certain things fully”—but Shelest was willing to overlook or at least downplay these concerns in the Politburo’s subsequent deliberations.

Fourth, Shelest’s account reveals that the “letter of invitation” was more important than often thought. Interestingly, the reason that Soviet leaders wanted the letter well in advance was not so that they could foster an appearance of legality around the invasion. They planned to do that instead with a letter to be published in Moscow Pravda the day after Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia, when hardline KSC officials presumably would no longer be hesitant to associate themselves openly with a call for “fraternal assistance.” Shelest promised Bil’ak that the initial letter would be kept secret and that the signatories would not be disclosed—a promise that was steadfastly upheld. (The letter was tightly sealed away for 24 years.) It is clear, therefore, that the reason Brezhnev was so intent on securing a letter from Bil’ak was to ensure that the anti-reformist group would consolidate its ranks and act cohesively in the buildup to the invasion and at the moment when Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia. The “letter of invitation” was thus intended to establish a “credible commitment” by the hardliners to form an alternative regime. As Shelest put it during his secret conversation with Bil’ak:

Wouldn’t it be worthwhile if your [hardline] group now wrote a letter to us requesting help? For you, won’t this provide a guarantee that you will be bolder and more cohesive in your struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, and won’t it strengthen your actions?

The hope in Moscow was that if the “healthy forces” took the decisive step of affixing their signatures to a document, they would no longer have any leeway to “opt out” of their projected role in welcoming an invasion.

Fifth, the fact that Shelest was chosen by Brezhnev to play such a sensitive role in late July and early August militates against the notion that there was a power struggle between the two men in 1968. A senior Czechoslovak official in 1968, Zdenek Mlynar, claimed in his first-hand account of the 1968 crisis (published in the West in the late 1970s) that someone on the Soviet Politburo—whom he presumed to be Aleksandr Shelepın—was seeking to exploit the crisis to replace Brezhnev. Subsequently, a few Western observers speculated that Shelest might have been the one who was trying to dislodge Brezhnev in 1968. Neither the CPSU Politburo transcripts nor Shelest’s diary provides any substantiation for this argument (or for Mlynar’s claims about Shelepın). On the contrary, both the transcripts and the diary suggest that, at least in 1968, Brezhnev still looked warmly upon Shelest and was willing to entrust the Ukrainian leader with a vital political function in the preparations for military action. Although Shelest clearly ran afoul of Brezhnev later on and was ousted from the Politburo in 1973, the falling-out between the two seems to have followed, rather than accompanied, the 1968 crisis. It is certainly conceivable that the events of 1968 helped embolden Shelest in the early 1970s and contributed to Brezhnev’s perception of a threat from the Ukrainian leader, but there is no evidence that Brezhnev was already seeking to fend off such a challenge in 1968. Had he perceived an urgent threat from Shelest during the Czechoslovak crisis, he never would have selected him for the crucial role of liaison with the “healthy forces.”

Sometime after noon, L. Brezhnev telephoned me from Moscow and said that today, 20 July, I must urgently fly to Budapest, where I would have a meeting and discussion with J. Kadar: “He will tell you everything and what you need to do.” And Brezhnev added: “You are to have a meeting on Lake Balaton with Bil’ak. He’s vacationing there with a group of Czechoslovak comrades. You must act cautiously and discreetly there so that you don’t attract the attention of the rest of the Czechoslovak group. During the meeting with Vasil, act independently and try to gauge what V. Bil’ak’s..."
situation and mood are like.” A special military transport plane of the Air Force had left from Moscow at 1:00 p.m. to fly to Kyie, and I would fly on that plane to Budapest, landing at a military airbase of our Southern Group of Forces. Guards from the KGB, a technician with hidden recording equipment, and my assistant, A. Pakhareenko, will fly with me.

From Borispol airport, we left for Budapest at 5:00 p.m. At the military airbase I was met by representatives of the military administration and a representative of the Hungarian Party’s CC. One of Kadar’s automobiles was driven up to avoid attracting attention with an embassy car, and no one from our embassy met me. Nonetheless, after the meeting with Kadar, I stopped by our embassy and met and talked with Ambassador F. Titov and all the embassy staff. They told me a good deal about the reaction in Hungary to the Czechoslovak events. Hungary itself had many problems of its own, and J. Kadar had to do a lot of finagling.

The meeting with J. Kadar was held in the CC building in his office, in the constant presence of his attractive and charming Nadja. J. Kadar’s mood was good, and he was expecting me. At L. Brežnjev’s instruction, I conveyed greetings to Kadar from Brežnjev, Podhornyi, Kosygin, and the other members of the Politburo. Kadar thanked me for the greetings and best wishes. Then he and I discussed all matters pertaining to my trip to Lake Balaton to meet with V. Bil’ak. Kadar assigned a trusted aide, the head of the MSMP CC’s International Relations Department, to accompany me.41 “You’ll stay at my dacha,” Kadar said. “This will be a good cover. You are my guest. As far as the meeting with Bil’ak is concerned, you yourself must take care of it. He knows that you must fly to Budapest and that you must be on Lake Balaton, but he doesn’t know when and where the meeting must take place. You’ll need to arrange all of that once you arrive at Lake Balaton.”

At L. Brežnjev’s instruction, I informed J. Kadar about the recent CPSU CC plenum and about the consideration being given to the plenum documents around the country and in the republics, territories, and provinces.42 At the CPSU CC Plenum our delegation’s actions at the Warsaw Meeting were endorsed. Kadar, in turn, told me that their CC Presidium had just endorsed the actions of their delegation at the Warsaw Meeting. He has information that overall the Party and the people support measures aimed at regulating the situation in the KSC and the country. Continuing the conversation, Kadar said: “It’s too bad that the Czechoslovak comrades so far don’t understand or don’t want to understand the full seriousness and, above all, the danger for the KSC and their whole country.”

Kadar told me that this morning, 20 July, he had spoken for around two hours in the CC with some Czechoslovak comrades, including Svestka, the editor of Rude pravo. “The conversation took place by chance under the following circumstances: Our editor of the Party newspaper long ago knew Svestka very well; they even became good friends with one another. For some days with our permission he visited Prague and had detailed conversations there at various levels. Our editor invited Svestka to visit us in Budapest, where he could meet with journalists and have a bit of a vacation on Balaton.” Svestka mentioned that the situation was quite complicated in the KSC and the country, as well as in the CC itself and in the mass media, where the rightist elements have seized all the key positions and are successfully carrying out their activities.”

After a long but extremely important conversation with J. Kadar, which was very useful in clarifying all points, I left for Balaton. We arrived there when it was already dusk, around 7:00 p.m. local time. We stayed at Kadar’s personal dacha. It was a modest, two-story house that was quite comfortable and cozy, and was located on the very shore of the lake. The weather we encountered on Balaton was not very hospitable; it was cold and a strong wind was blowing, causing yellowish-gray waves to rise up on the lake amidst a great roar. I went out onto the shore for a walk in the hope of meeting V. Bil’ak, since he was out for a walk. Although I also knew which dacha Bil’ak was staying in with his family, I decided not to go there lest I attract the attention of the Czechs.

Time passed, it was already 9:00 p.m., but I hadn’t yet succeeded in making contact with Bil’ak. I decided to send my comrades who arrived with me, A. Pakhareenko and K. Glushko, to the club to see Bil’ak. They reported to me that Bil’ak was there, and that they, the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, were having some sort of heated and lively conversation. I had to solicit the help of the Hungarian comrade who had been assigned to me by J. Kadar. He went to the club and discreetly informed Bil’ak that I had arrived and was waiting to meet him at Kadar’s dacha. But Bil’ak requested that we arrange to meet on the shore of the lake at 10:00 p.m.

I went out along the shore: It was dark and there was noise from the waves and the wind. It was hard even at a close distance to notice anyone, much less hear his voice distinctly. The designated time passed, and Bil’ak was still not there, when suddenly, close beside me, a man came up. I was about to call out to him “Vasil,” but I restrained myself. It turned out that this was a man who had been sent out on a “reconnaissance mission.” Within a certain time Vasil himself showed up; I called out to him, and he responded. That is how we met. We initially decided to hold the meeting on the shoreline by Kadar’s dacha, but the wind and the noise of the waves on Balaton interfered too much with our talk, and besides that, it was impossible to record our conversation.

We went inside the dacha, and our conversation lasted from 11:00 p.m. until 5:00 in the morning. This is what I heard and recorded, and how I kept track of our discussion and the entire conversation:

In his side of the conversation, V. Bil’ak dwelt mainly on the general situation and the state of affairs in the KSC and in the country as a whole. He said that in the KSC CC and in the country, and especially among rightist elements, the publication of the letter from the five Warsaw Pact countries had caused shock, terror, and even panic. Kriegel had ordered an overseas passport for himself, and Dubcek had...
said that the letter was like a knife stabbing him in the heart. In addition to this a nationalist frenzy had surged; they spoke a good deal about how the letter of the five Parties infringed on the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. This gave a strong fillip to anti-Soviet hysteria.

"The situation is such that even the fiercest and most notorious enemies of the Party are ready to support us, the Communists, so long as we are united in opposing the Soviet Union. But Dubcek and Cernik are persuaded that these people support their policy." Continuing the conversation, V. Bil'ak said: "I will frankly tell you that you were quite fortunate in having chosen Warsaw as the place to hold the conference. There are many reasons for this, but one of the most important is the vehement position that Gomulka has adopted toward our leadership.

It is of the utmost importance to hold a bilateral meeting with you, the Soviet Union. If there isn't one in the near future, this might lead to the final rupture and the departure of the KSC from our common line, which means it will collapse. We—and I have in mind here my comrades—are speaking in favor of the soonest possible meeting with you. But you are correct in insisting that you don't want to come to Prague for such a meeting and negotiations. If you were to come to Prague, these 'Schweikists' would think they had triumphed.

I think that they won't come to bilateral negotiations with you with the full membership of the Presidium—they're afraid. Indeed, Cernik, Smrkovsky, Krieger, and Dubcek are afraid to travel to the Soviet Union at all for a meeting with you: They're afraid that they won't be permitted to go back to Czechoslovakia. If a bilateral meeting with you is to be held, the issues must be discussed sharply, precisely, and concretely, a timeframe must be set for rectifying the situation in the country, and they must be warned about the possible serious consequences. Undoubtedly, a demand must be put forth to seal off all of Czechoslovakia's borders on the West.

Continuing his line of thought, Bil'ak said: "I say to you personally and directly that you must shield us with your 'umbrella' against the acrimonious attacks of the leaders of Poland and the GDR. These attacks have provoked well-founded annoyance and indignation, since they say a lot that is non-objective. Bil'ak further said: "Our economy is stretched to the limit; you must give us help through solid credits. Preparations for the 14th KSC Congress are going badly, and we're not sure that we'll be able to win out at this congress; although A. Dubcek is placing all his hopes on victory, there is no basis for such hopes. The KSC statutes are revisionist; rightist elements helped draft them. If we publish these statutes, all the Communist and workers' parties will criticize us and not one of them will come to our congress."46

I asked Bil'ak to express his opinion about Smrkovsky. He did so in four words: "He's a political prostitute." He said no more about Smrkovsky at this point. Continuing the conversation, Bil'ak said: "Cernik is under the complete influence of the Yugoslav ambassador; he won't do anything without him and consults with him about all matters. We even were waiting for Tito to arrive in Prague; we'd prepared a grandiose reception and lavish meeting for him. Tito was at the airport all set to take off, but for some reason, Prague didn't end up receiving him." (V. Bil'ak didn't know the real reason that Prague had declined to receive Tito's plane.Essentially it was because we had expressed an ultimatum against Tito's arrival in Prague, and the leadership in Czechoslovakia became frightened and beat a retreat.47)

I asked Bil'ak a question: "Tell me who among you in the KSC CC Presidium supports correct positions, and which of you is it possible to depend on in organizing a strong bloc of healthy forces?" Bil'ak named about a dozen-and-a-half people. Of these, the top spot goes to Indra, Kolder, Svestka, Rigo, Barbirek, J. Piller, and Kapek. Not to mention Bil'ak himself. After that I asked him: "Why haven't you been making a greater effort?" Bil'ak thought a bit and said: "We're afraid that they'll accuse us of betraying the mother-land, with all the consequences that implies. We're prepared to support you with all possible means, but we don't know what we need to do." I said to Bil'ak: "We need a letter from you containing your request for assistance. We give a full guarantee that neither the letter nor its authors will be revealed in public." To this, Bil'ak responded: "You must understand our position; we are ashamed that, having done nothing in our country, we are appealing to you for help. What must you think about us?" Bil'ak continued: "We have certain measures in place, and our devoted, pro-Soviet party activists are mobilized. The Workers' Militia and many military officers support us, and, in the event of danger, will come to our defense. Our program and declaration are all ready to go." (When he was saying all this, I sensed that he was speaking with a degree of ambivalence, and it seemed to me that he was conflating what he wished with what was actually the case.) I said to V. Bil'ak that they are clearly letting the chance slip away to put up an active struggle. "No," said Bil'ak firmly, "we won't permit this. We simply don't have enough forces on our own. We will appeal to you for help." "But wouldn't it be better if your group now wrote us a letter requesting help? For you, won't this provide a guarantee that you will be bolder and more organized in your struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, and won't it strengthen your actions?" "Yes, this would strengthen our cohesion and our resolute actions." I openly raised a question with Bil'ak: "Perhaps we could act through Slovakia?" Bil'ak said: "We'll see; if there's an absolute necessity for that, we can proceed without the Czechs in order to save Czechoslovakia." Bil'ak further said that they had frittered away time, including the moment when they could have put up a resolute struggle against the rightists with their "2000 Words Platform." In response to this I said to Bil'ak: "You made a mistake; you let the moment slip away when you could have strengthened your influence and the solidity of the struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, the moment when they refused to take part in the Warsaw Meeting. The KSC CC plenum, which you sought and proposed, essentially gave no greater hopes to you and created even deeper fissures.
in the ranks of the KSC. In response to this Bil’ak said: “That wasn’t a plenum, it was a carnival or a circus. Pressure was brought to bear against us, and we were unable to do anything at that plenum.” I said to Bil’ak: “Perhaps you can do something at your forthcoming KSC Congress?” He answered: “We will appeal then to you for assistance.” I responded to him: “Your request for assistance might come too late. We need an appeal today.” Bil’ak fell silent in response to this.

Taking the discussion further, he said: “We need a conflict; we can get into gear within a week, but you’re right that time is already working against us. When we gave final consideration to the question of a possible trip to the Soviet Union for negotiations with you, three of them—Cernik, Smrkovsky, and Kriegel—said they’re afraid to travel to Moscow, and Dubcek, for his part, said ‘I won’t go without you.’ That’s how the most important issues and complex questions get decided in our country.”

Bil’ak spoke about “freedom of speech” and the press and cited this instance: “After the ill-fated CC Plenum I returned to Bratislava. Representatives of the press, radio, and cinema asked me what I could say about the recent Warsaw Meeting and the letter from the five Parties of socialist countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. I said that I had a positive view of the meeting and the letter from the five socialist countries, and that we should pay heed to their voice and their reason. Following this, the entire press assailed me with invective and threats; the radio didn’t broadcast my words; and the television suddenly found that all the lamps in its cameras had ‘burned out.’”

“Everyone of course knows that we have an alliance treaty with you, and indeed the journalists asked Cernik and Smrkovsky to express their views about the Warsaw Pact and the letter from the five socialist countries. Cernik and Smrkovsky were unable to say anything more intelligent than to recommend to the journalists that they not write anything about this anywhere before the 14th of August.” I asked Bil’ak: “What’s so important about the 14th of August?” Bil’ak was unable to answer me directly, but later he said: “Cernik and Smrkovsky said to the journalists: ‘Then you will write about how the Soviet Army is occupying our country.’”

My conversation with V. Bil’ak was open and candid, but nonetheless there was a certain inhibition and guardedness about it, and Vasil failed to clear up certain questions and did not fully discuss certain things.

Dawn came, and we both were exhausted, but both of us were satisfied by the meeting and the conversation we had had. He and I drank a glass of Hungarian port and warmly bid farewell. I promised V. Bil’ak that I would personally convey to L. Brezhnev the content of our entire meeting and our whole discussion, as well as give a presentation about it to the CPSU CC Politburo.

EXCERPT No. 4
Shelest’s Account of the Transfer of the “Letter of Invitation”

In early August 1968 a small group of pro-Moscow hardliners in the KSC, led by Vasil Bil’ak, prepared a written appeal for urgent military assistance from the Soviet Union to thwart an imminent “counterrevolution” in Czechoslovakia. As shown above, Soviet leaders had been urging Bil’ak for some time to turn over such a document. One of the signatories of the appeal, Antonin Kapek, had already written a letter of his own to Brezhnev in late July in which he deplored the “anti-socialist and anti-Soviet” trends in Czechoslovakia and requested “fraternal assistance” from the Soviet Union. Kapek’s letter, however, evidently had little or no impact. The collective “letter of invitation” that was transmitted to Brezhnev on 3 August at the Bratislava conference proved to be far more significant.

The passages below from Shelest’s diary reveal how the collective “letter of invitation” was conveyed by the KSC hardliners to Brezhnev. Some of this story has been known since the early 1990s, but the account here adds some crucial information. In particular, Shelest’s diary provides strong reason to believe that more than one “letter of invitation” was handed over to the Soviet Politburo, most likely at different times. The letter that was released from the Russian Presidential Archive in July 1992 contained only five signatures: those of Bil’ak, Alois Indra, Drahomir Korder, Oldrich Svestka, and Antonin Kapek. By contrast, Shelest reports that eleven KSC officials signed the letter. In addition to the five who were previously known to have signed the document, the signatories mentioned by Shelest include Frantisek Barbirek, Emil Rigo, Jan Piller, Karel Hoffmann, Jozef Lenart, and Lubomir Strougal. The appearance of Strougal’s name among the signatories is particularly striking. Although Strougal never was a supporter of the Prague Spring, he had not yet taken a vigorous public stance against the reforms. Documents released from the Czechoslovak archives in 1990 revealed that Strougal had been pursuing secret contacts with Brezhnev in the leadup to the invasion, but Shelest’s diary indicates that Strougal’s complicity in the military action was even greater than had been suspected.

Five weeks after the invasion, on 25 September 1968, Kapek’s letter and the collective appeals were transferred to the Kremlin archive and locked up in a folder stamped “TOP SECRET” and marked with personal instructions from the head of the CPSU CC General Department, Konstantin Chernenko: “To be preserved in the Politburo Archive. Not to be opened without my express permission.” For many years afterwards, one or more letters were thought to exist, but no one except Bil’ak and the members of the CPSU Politburo was quite sure how many had signed and who the signatories were, or even whether such documents had actually been sent to Moscow.
until July 1992, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin gave
the Czechoslovak government a copy of one of the
collective letters and of Kapek’s earlier appeal, was the
existence of these documents finally confirmed. Several
observers in Czechoslovakia, citing materials from the
KSC archives, speculated at the time that more than one
collective letter must have been turned over in 1968.
Some evidence supporting that notion had surfaced as
early as 1989. This contemporary account by Shelest,
who was the actual conduit for the letter at Bratislava,
leaves little doubt that at least two (and perhaps more)
collective letters were dispatched to the CPSU Politburo as
the number of signatories gradually increased.

On 1 August 1968 we were at the border station of Chop.
From there we were due to go to Bratislava. This is the first
time I’ve ridden by train to Czechoslovakia. We will be
passing by the Lower Tatra mountains, one of the most
beautiful spots in the Czechoslovak Republic. Aside from
the meeting itself among the fraternal Parties, I’m particu-
larly eager to link up with V. Bil’ak to receive the letter that is
of such great interest to us. During one of my conversations
with Bil’ak in Cierna, he told me that he’ll have the letter and
will transmit it to me. It’s very difficult to believe there will be
positive results from the Bratislava meeting. It would be nice
if there were such results, but things have gone so far already
that you can’t believe anything.

Late in the evening I managed to link up and speak with
V. Bil’ak. All of this was done after taking great precautions.
I reminded Bil’ak that we were awaiting the letter promised
by him and his group. During the conversation with me,
Bil’ak was very ill at ease and disturbed by something, but he
did not renege on his promise and requested only that he be
given a bit more time, until the following day. Bil’ak was not
terribly clear in indicating the reason for this delay. I
consulted with our liaison, Savchenko, a KGB employee, and
he knew that I must receive a letter from Bil’ak. We decided
to wait for a while and give Bil’ak more time to snap into
action, since the step he was taking was important and risky.

Toward evening [of 3 August] I met again with Bil’ak,
and he and I arranged that at 8:00 p.m. he would go into the
public lavatory, and that I also should show up there at that
time. He would then transmit the letter to me via our KGB
employee, Savchenko. This is precisely what happened. We
met “by chance” in the lavatory, and Savchenko inconspicu-
ously transferred from his hand to mine an envelope contain-
ing the long-awaited letter. It assessed the situation in the
KSC and the country, the nefarious activities of rightist
elements, and the political and psychological terror being
waged against Communists, that is, people supporting correct
positions. The gains of socialism are under threat. An anti-

Soviet frenzy has overtaken the country, and the economy and
politics of Czechoslovakia are fully oriented toward the West.

A very alarming and complicated situation has emerged in the
country. The letter expresses a request that if circumstances
so warrant, we should intervene to block the path of counter-
revolution and prevent the outbreak of civil war and blood-
shed. The letter was signed by Indra, Bil’ak, Kolder,
Barbirek, Kapek, Rigo, Piller, Svestka, Hoffmann, Lenart, and
Strougal.

Aside from me and the authors of the letter I received,
no one knew about the contents of the document. Finally, the
[top-level] commission finished its work, and Brezhnev
appeared. I went up to him and said, “Leonid Il’yich! I have
good news.” He somehow pricked up his ears, and I hurried
to tell him that I’d received the letter from Bil’ak. I then gave
the letter to Brezhnev. He took it with his hands trembling
and his face pale. . . . While I was handing over the letter to
Brezhnev, he expressed gratitude to me by saying: “Many
thanks to you, Petro; we won’t forget this.”

Mark Kramer is a senior associate at the Davis Center for
Russian Studies, Harvard University, and the director of the
Harvard Project on Cold War Studies.

1 Da ne sudimy budete: Dnevnikovye zapisi, vosproinimaniya
chlenov Politburo TsK KPSS (Moscow: Kviintessentiya, 1995).
2 Shelest’s large personal archive in Moscow, amounting to 135
voluminous files, is stored in Fond (F.) 666 of what is now
known as Rossiskii Tsentr Khrameniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov
Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI). For a brief summary of the
contents of Fond 666, see RTsKhIDNI, Putevoditel’ po fondam i
kkolektisyam lichnogo proiskhozhdeniya (Moscow: RTsKhIDNI,
1996), pp. 321-322. I am grateful to Shelest’s son Vitalii (a
distinguished theoretical physicist), who has arranged for me to
have unrestricted access to Fond 666 as well as all of Shelest’s
materials stored in Ukrainian repositories.
3 For typical denials by Shelest in the waning years of the Soviet
regime, see “Cheloveku svoistvenno oshibatsya . . .: Uroki
istorii,” Komsomol’skaya pravda (Moscow), 19 October 1989, p.
2; “Petr Shelest: ‘On umel vesti apparatnye igry, a stranu
zabrosil,’” in Yu. V. Aksyutin, ed., L. I. Brezhnev: Materialy k
biografii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 217-218; and
“Brezhnevu ya tak i skazal: ‘Ty plokho konchish,’” in Andrei
Karulov, Vokrug kremliya, 2 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Slovo,
1993), Vol. 1, pp. 121-123.
4 Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, The Ukraine and the
Czechoslovak Crisis, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Canberra:
Australian National University’s Research School of Social
5 “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum No. 15782, 1/51 (Secret), 11 June
1968, from P. Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Commu-
nist Party, to the CPSU Secretariat, in Tsentr Khrameniya
Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 5,
Opis’ (Op.) 60, Delo (D.) 1, Listy (Ll.) 86-90.
6 “Zapis’ peregovorov s delegatsiei ChSSR 4 maya 1968 goda,”
4 May 1968 (Top Secret), in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiskoi
Federatsii (APRF), Moscow, F. 3, Op. 91, D. 100 L. 31.
7 “Zaznam jednhy predsedniatuv KSC a UV KSSS v Cerna
n. T., 29-7-1.8.1968,” 1 August 1968 (Top Secret), in Statni
Ustredni Archiv, Prague, Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru KSC, F. 07/
15, Svazeck (Sv.) 12, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 274, LI. 297-298.
8 Ibid., LI. 311, 313.
9 From the mid-1940s through the mid- to late 1950s, underground nationalist groups in western Ukraine put up armed resistance against the Soviet security forces. Much the same occurred in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. An enormous amount of declassified documentation pertaining to these campaigns has been released since 1991 in the Baltic republics and Ukraine (in Kyiv, L’viv, Kharkiv, and numerous other cities). The resurgence of underground nationalist activity in 1967-68 is highlighted in the Soviet KGB’s massive, top-secret history of its own activities, edited by V. M. Chebrikov et al., Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti No. 12179, Moscow, 1977, pp. 543-545.

10 The officials mentioned here are Leonid Ovcharenko and Mykhailo Tsvetkov.

11 Shelest is referring here to Jan Koscelansky, a senior Slovak Communist party secretary. In Russian or Ukrainian, Koscelansky’s first initial should have been “Yu,” not “A.”

12 For Shelest’s lengthy account of this meeting, see Excerpt No. 2 below.

13 See Document No. 2 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives to be published in the next CWIHP Bulletin.

14 For further complaints about this matter from the Chernihiv party secretary, see the memorandum from Shelest cited in Note 5 supra.


16 Shelest is referring here to the negotiations held on 23-26 August, which culminated in the signing of the Moscow Protocol.

17 See Document No. 30 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives to be published in the next CWIHP Bulletin.


20 Ibid., L. 268.

21 Shelest followed up on these themes many times in June and July, as is evident from the collection of documents to be published in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

22 Ibid., L. 275.

23 As noted above, Shelest is referring here to Jan (not A.) Koscelansky.

24 See Document No. 4 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives to be published in the next CWIHP Bulletin.

25 Most likely, these concerns about secrecy were attributable mainly to Bil’ak, not Koscelansky. Documents from the Ukrainian archives in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin show that Koscelansky was not as preoccupied with secrecy as Bil’ak was in his contacts with Soviet officials.

26 As elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, Czechoslovakia underwent a rapid process of forced collectivization in the early 1950s, which caused great upheaval and bloodshed. Peasants who tried to resist were simply branded as “kulaks” (wealthy farmers), leaving them vulnerable to persecution, arrest, and confiscation of all their property. Although rural areas in Czechoslovakia were not as heavily affected by the Prague Spring as urban areas were, demands were soon raised in 1968 for the rectification of injustices committed against farmers. Proposed remedies included rehabilitation and compensation of the roughly 30,000 peasants who had been unjustly accused of being “kulaks” and the return of property that had been illegally confiscated. Although Czechoslovak leaders ruled out the possibility of doing away with collectivization, anti-reformist members of the KSC began complaining (as Bil’ak does here) that genuine kulaks were reemerging to exploit the situation. It turned out, however, that the proposals for rehabilitation and compensation were never implemented, and the Soviet invasion put an end to any further consideration of the matter.

27 The notion that reformist officials in Prague had formed a “second center” outside the Communist Party, which they would convert into a “counterrevolutionary underground,” was a common theme in Soviet and anti-reformist KSC propaganda in 1968. This alleged “second center” would have included such figures as Frantisek Kriegel, Cestmir Cisar, Josef Spacek, Vaclav Slavik, Bohumil Simon, Vaclav Pehlik, Jiri Pelikan, Ota Sik, and Jiri Hajek. The interior minister, Josef Pavel, also was regarded as belonging to this group.

28 In Soviet parlance, World War II was known as the “Great Patriotic War” (Velikaya otechestvennaya voina).

29 The Russian word “pup” literally means “navel,” but the phrase “pup mira” (as used by Bil’ak) is appropriately translated as “hub of the world.” Bil’ak’s play on the literal meaning of the word therefore does not come through in the translation.

30 Shelest mistakenly gives Drhomir Kolder’s first initial as “O” rather than “D.”

31 Shelest misspells Jozef Lenart’s surname as “Lopart” and gives an incorrect first initial (Zh).

32 Shelest mistakenly gives Jan Janik’s surname as Jasik. It is remotely possible that he was referring to Ladislav Jasik (who was then the head of the Slovak National Council’s Economics Department), but it is far more likely that he meant Janik. (The information provided by Shelest is too general to make a conclusive identification.)

33 Shelest mistakenly lists Alois Indra’s first initial as “Zh” rather than “A.”

34 Shelest temporarily has shifted back to his own observations here rather than recording what Bil’ak said.

35 In fact, this department (formally known as the State Administrative Department) had not yet been disbanded. The KSC Action Program, adopted in April 1968, pledged to eliminate the State Administrative Department, which had been a notorious organ of repression under Dubcek’s predecessor, Antonin Novotny. Not until late July, however, was this proposal actually implemented. Bil’ak must have been referring to the proposal, not to the implementation of it.

36 At the time, most Soviet leaders would not have placed Josef Smrkovsky in this group. Although they were wary of Smrkovsky, they believed that he and Dubcek might still be willing to heed Soviet demands.

37 The Polish transcript of the Warsaw Meeting, “Protokol ze spotkania przywodcow partii i rządow krajow sozialistycznych—
Hungarian military officials were suddenly arrested by Soviet KGB troops during what were supposed to be negotiations about a Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary. The head of the Hungarian delegation, General Pal Maleter, who had recently been appointed national defense minister, was imprisoned for twenty months and then executed.

45 Bil’ak’s statements here about Polish and East German leaders provide important evidence that there was little attempt made by the KSC hardliners to forge a direct alliance with Ulbricht or Gomulka. Instead, Bil’ak’s group worked almost exclusively with the Soviet Union. Previously, some Western analysts, notably Jiri Valenta in his Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: The Anatomy of a Decision, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), had argued (without citing specific documentation) that there was direct and active collaboration between the KSC hardliners and the East German and Polish authorities. This excerpt tends to undercut Valenta’s claim.

46 The draft KSC statutes were published as a supplement to Rude pravo on 10 August. Local and regional party elections in Czechoslovakia in early and mid-July for the KSC’s upcoming 14th Congress had given an overwhelming share of seats to reform-minded officials.

47 It is unclear whether Shelest is referring to a specific incident here or a more general statement by the Soviet leadership. In any event, Tito arrived in Prague on 9 August and was accorded a lavish welcome, so the Soviet “ultimatum” may not have been as efficacious as Shelest had evidently believed.

48 Bil’ak is underestimating the growth of reformist sentiment among senior military officers, but it is true that on 21 June 1968 a “letter to the Soviet people” from the KSC People’s Militia, the paramilitary units who were traditionally among the most orthodox, pro-Soviet elements of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, had been published in the Soviet press. The letter and a resolution were approved on 19 June at a nationwide gathering in Prague of some 10,000 to 12,000 members of the People’s Militia. According to the declassified transcript of Brezhnev’s speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July 1968, the People’s Militia conference was convened on the basis of the Soviet Union’s “repeated recommendations and urgent advice.” See “Reč’ tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva,” in “Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS—17 iyulya 1968 g.,” L. 18. Newly declassified documents (e.g., the items in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 101-104 and D. 24, Ll. 104-126) also reveal that a highly publicized campaign of letter-writing by Soviet “workers” in support of the KSC People’s Militia in late June and early July was entirely orchestrated by the CPSU CC Propaganda Department.

49 It is not entirely clear what Shelest had in mind here. Soviet leaders assumed, with some justification, that support for the Prague Spring was stronger in the Czech lands than in Slovakia, and that the Slovak Communist Party was a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist party than the KSC was. (Bil’ak had said so to Shelest during their first meeting on 24 May 1968 that “we, the Slovaks, will fight to the end in the struggle for a Marxist-Leninist line in the party; we won’t retreat a single step. It’s obvious that we, the Slovaks, together with you will again have to liberate the Czechs.”) This latter point was virtually identical to a statement by Koscelskansky during a conversation with Il’nyts’kyi on 14 May. See Document No. 8 in the collection of documents from the Ukrainian archives in the next CWIHP Bulletin.) Even so, it is doubtful that these differences alone would have provided much basis for action. After all, Alexander...
Dubcek himself was a Slovak, and the Prague Spring held out the promise of fulfilling Slovak demands for federalized representation and greater autonomy. Shelest may have been implying that the Soviet Union could exploit latent Slovak desires for outright independence. During the closing months of World War II, when Slovakia was still an independent entity, some prominent members of the Slovak Communist Party had proposed to Stalin that Slovakia be absorbed as a union-republic of the Soviet Union, rather than being reintegrated with Bohemia and Moravia in a Czechoslovak state. Stalin did not take up this suggestion, but Shelest may have believed that something roughly similar could be pursued if no other options were left.

50 Dubcek hastily convened an extraordinary plenum of the KSC Central Committee on 19 July to approve the KSC Presidium’s response to the Warsaw Letter. The Warsaw Letter had been addressed to the KSC Central Committee, but Dubcek initially handled it within the KSC Presidium, at a session on 16-17 July. Using a draft prepared by Cestmir Cisar and Zdenek Mlynar, the Presidium adopted a point-by-point response to the Warsaw Letter. The final document, entitled “Stanovisko Predsednictva UV KSC k dopisu peti komunistickych a delnickych stran,” was not originally intended for publication, but after the Soviet Union and the other participants in the Warsaw Meeting unexpectedly published their collective letter on 18 July—despite Dubcek’s urgings that the matter be handled quietly—Czechoslovak leaders realized they would have to publish a full reply. They did so the following day (19 July), the same day that the extraordinary plenum of the KSC Central Committee voted unanimitously in support of the Presidium’s actions.

51 See my translation of the letter released in July 1992 in “A Letter to Brezhnev: The Czech Hardliners’ ‘Request’ for Soviet Intervention, August 1968,” Cold War International History Bulletin, Issue No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 35. The text of the letter released in 1992 is clearly identical to the version that Brezhnev received on 3 August 1968, but Shelest’s diary indicates that the two documents are not the same (i.e., more than one collective letter was sent to Brezhnev), as explained below.

52 For example, in a detailed, first-hand account of the Prague Spring published in Hungary in 1989, Janos Kadar recalled that the collective letter had been signed by eighteen, not five, KSC officials. See “Yanosh Kadar o ‘prazhskoi vesne’,” Kommunist (Moscow), No. 7 (May 1990), p. 102. Kadar first saw the letter during a hastily convened meeting in Moscow on 18 August (when Brezhnev informed Hungarian, East German, Polish, and Bulgarian leaders about the previous day’s decision by the CPSU Politburo to send troops into Czechoslovakia on the night of 20/21 August), so it is possible that by the 18th Bil’ak would have dispatched another letter to Moscow (perhaps via the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Stepan Chervonenko) with seven additional signatories.

53 The Tatra mountains, located in the central portion of the Carpathian mountain range along the Slovakian-Polish border, include the highest peak in the Carpathians, Mt. Gerlachovka.

54 Shelest lists the surname “Kofman” rather than Hoffmann, but he clearly meant Karel Hoffmann, a notorious hardliner who abetted the Soviet invasion. No official with the name Kofman was around at the time.
3. The third group of documents is contained in 28 volumes of the *Litopys UPA* (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), Old Series, edited by P.J. Potichnyj and Ie. Shtendera (Toronto: Litopys, 1976-1997). These volumes contain underground documents that were deposited in the Archive of the ZP UHVR (Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council) of New York City. Each volume has an introduction and summaries of documents in English as well as an index. A New Series of the *Litopys UPA*, which is based on the rich archival holdings in Ukraine has appeared in a volume that was published in Kiev in 1995 through the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Chief Archival Directorate of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, is also part of the PJP Collection. The *Litopys UPA* is currently being prepared for the Internet and can be reached at the following address: [http://www.infoukes.com/commercial/litopys-upa/index.html](http://www.infoukes.com/commercial/litopys-upa/index.html).

4. The fourth group contains the published and as yet unpublished materials of the *Litopys UPA*, such as memoir materials, which contain very interesting, personal accounts of the underground struggle. These papers are currently being processed and will be available to scholars in the near future.

5. The fifth group of documents contains archival holdings of the two veteran organizations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of the USA and Canada. Of special interest are the papers of Wolodymyr Makar, who played a visible role in the anti-German resistance, and especially his wide correspondence with various Ukrainian political figures. These materials are in the process of being classified and will be available to scholars sometime in the near future.

6. The sixth item is immediately and completely accessible. This is a microfilm of the Toronto newspaper *Homin Ukrainy*, and includes some 50 reels. It contains much that is of direct value to the collection, such as the special page “Voiats’ka Vatra”, edited by the late Wolodymyr Makar.

**Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine**

1. The first group of materials covers the years 1941-1945 and pertains to the counter-insurgency activities of the German occupational forces. These documents, some 100 reels of microfilm, come mostly from the National Archives of the United States in Washington, D.C., and represent a portion of the documents that were seized by the Allies at the end of World War II. These documents can be used almost immediately. They contain not only counter-insurgency material, but also some underground material in German translation. Here one will also find a wealth of material on the activities of the notorious Einsatzgruppen against the Jews and Ukrainians. Some materials from this collection have already been published in three volumes under the title: “The UPA in Light of German Documents” in the *Litopys UPA* series. There are also a number of paper documents that come from various German archives, mostly from Koblenz, but they still need to be catalogued.

2. The second group of the Counter-Insurgency documents comes directly from Soviet archives. This collection of over 150,000 pages of documents, on 428 reels of film, covers the activities of the NKVD-NKGB, and the MVD-MGB internal forces of the Ukrainian Okrug against the Ukrainian Liberation Movement during the years 1944-1954. After Ukraine proclaimed independence in August 1990, this archive was removed to Moscow. With the assistance of the Ukrainian Government, a microfilm copy of the archive was returned to Kiev. A second complete copy of this invaluable archive is now a part of the PJP Collection.

   This collection contains detailed operational information on the activities of Soviet internal forces against the Ukrainian underground. It will give researchers an opportunity to learn not only how the Soviet security apparatus actually functioned in the seven *oblasti* of Western Ukraine, but also many other details about the underground itself, including its tactics, its successes and failures, its leading personalities, its heroes and traitors, etc. For example, in these documents there are over 400 detailed drawings of underground hideouts and bunkers. Based on this information, a book is being prepared under the title *Architecture of Resistance: Hideouts and Bunkers of the Ukrainian Underground in KGB Documents*. Call number: DK/508/.79/P48/1994 MICR mfm reel. 1-60, 70-437.

3. A third group contains Soviet paper documents which come from the Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads’kyh Ob’ednan’ Ukrainy (State Archive of Community Organizations of Ukraine) in Kiev, the former Central Party Archive. These are largely political decisions pertaining to the underground, reports by the Obkom First Secretaries, orders from the top, speeches by N.S. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, summaries of Soviet and underground casualties, the deportation of the civilian population, etc. A list of these documents is currently being prepared.

   The PJP Collection is a unique archival holding of great value that brings together both sides of the story on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, 1941-1954. All interested scholars of the early Cold War period are invited to take advantage of this historic collection.
Report From Sarajevo: The Bosnian Archives Survive

By Jim Hershberg

The cover of Glasnik, the official journal of the archives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, starkly captures the impact of the four-year war on archival holdings, historical research, and other such civilized endeavors: it pictures a close-up of a wrecked building, with twisted metal grating surrounding a gaping hole, inside which one can see a bomb atop an ancient historical document.1

In August 1997, I visited Sarajevo on behalf of the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive in order to meet with archival authorities and scholars in the Bosnian capital, to establish contacts for CWIHP and the Archive, to ascertain the prospects for future scholarly collaboration, and to obtain information regarding the condition of the Bosnian archives and their availability for research—if, indeed, they had survived the war and the Serb siege which lasted from March 1992 until the Dayton Accords ended the fighting (at least temporarily) in late 1995.2

Two days of conversations and meetings yielded more positive assessments than one might expect, given the years of bloody fighting that killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of Bosnians, destroyed thousands of homes and buildings, and left the country a divided, angry, smoldering wreck—littered with millions of landmines, divided into ethnic enclaves (a “Serb Republic” and a still largely theoretical Bosnian-Croat federation), and patrolled by an international military force trying to prevent the tensions from re-igniting all-out war. The good news is, first of all, that despite serious damage and disarray caused by the fighting and the division of the country, the Bosnian archives still exist and that the records of the post-World War II Bosnian government and communist party in Sarajevo survived the war; and second of all, there are no legal barriers to unhindered scholarly research into these materials, according to Matko Kovacevic, Director of the Archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his deputy, Slobodan Kristic, whom I interviewed in their offices in the Bosnian government headquarters building on Marshal Tito Boulevard.3 At the same time, the archivists said, little if any work along these lines had taken place since the cease-fire due to the lack of international scholarly interest in conducting such research; to limited resources on the part of Bosnian archival authorities to consolidate, repair, and organize collections; to legal confusion and uncertainty over access rules; and, of course, to the higher priority of other reconstruction projects.

Although many materials had been lost, Kovacevic and Kristic said, archivists had managed to preserve most of the records of the Yugoslav-era Bosnian government and communist party—prior to Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991-2, Bosnia and Herzegovina had constituted one of the country’s six federated republics, along with Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro—by dispersing them at the beginning of the war to four different sites. Even though those buildings sustained varying levels of damage, Kovacevic said, the documents were kept below ground where they reportedly escaped destruction. To illustrate this unorthodox preservation method, the two archivists, accompanied by a Yale University doctoral candidate in history, Attila Hoare, who was in Sarajevo to research a dissertation on World War II Bosnian partisan activities and kindly helped translate during my visit, escorted me to the underground archives in the bullet-scarred government building in which we were meeting. There, in the musty warren of crowded shelves and pulpy aromas common to pre-electronic archives, several staff members of the archive spread out some yellowing documents and matter-of-factly confirmed that they had continued to work regularly at the archive throughout the four-year Serb siege, despite regular sniping and shelling outside.

Kovacevic and Kristic said that, in principle, Bosnian communist party documents for the period 1945-1977 were freely available in the state archives, although no researchers had worked in them since the war and the collections remained largely disorganized; as for more recent party materials, they were said to be temporarily in the possession of the CP’s successor, the Bosnian Social Democratic Party, pending transfer to the Bosnian National Archives when resources and circumstances permit. For the time being, access was said to be “not a problem,” although the SDP was not under any legal obligation to open the materials.4 They also said that until 1974, most important decisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (at least those left to Sarajevo by the central government in Belgrade) were made by the party rather than the state, but that after that date state ministries and authorities exerted greater power. These post-1974 state materials, the archivists said, are open (again, in principle), but not well-organized, and many state documents for the period 1960-1990 had been lost in the war.

Kovacevic said that despite archives receiving some limited assistance (notably from the Soros Foundation, which underwrote the publication of the archives journal referred to above), the Bosnian-Herzegovinian archives desperately need help to recover from the war, for such basic requirements as microfilm equipment, computers, education, photocopiers, catalogs, “everything.” Sitting in a darkened, empty office, Kovacevic noted what he said were two typical examples of the sad straits of the archives amidst the war’s debris: a project on the holdings from the Austro-Hungarian period had to be abandoned and a lack of contacts with international archival colleagues reached a nadir when he was denied a visa to attend a conference in London. As for Bosnia’s archival relations within the former Yugoslavia, Kovacevic said...
some contacts had taken place with Croatian and Slovenian colleagues, but that such exchanges had not yet occurred with Serbian archivists in Belgrade.

Other archival and scholarly centers in Sarajevo also appeared hungry for foreign aid and contacts. From a brief visit and conversation with staff members (the director was absent), I gathered that the Sarajevo Municipal Archives, whose collections were said to include the city’s communist party records from the Yugoslav period, was at an early stage of reorganization and reconstruction after the war. Furthermore, scholars interested in modern Bosnian history and Bosnian-Soviet/Russian relations, or simply in initiating exchanges with colleagues and students struggling to maintain academic life amid hardship and ruin, may wish to contact Prof. Ibrahim Tepic in the History Department at Sarajevo University. During a relaxed evening conversation over Cokes and tea in an office building with blown-out windows, Prof. Tepic and his colleagues expressed enthusiasm at the prospect of visits from foreign scholars and collaborative work in Bosnian archives and sources.

Probably the best method of arranging a research trip to Sarajevo, of course, would be to contact local archivists and scholars for help. The Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive look forward to working with colleagues (both historians and archivists) in Bosnia, as well as in other parts of the former Yugoslavia and in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey, as part of their joint project on the Cold War in the Balkans. The project seeks to gather new sources and perspectives on events in southeastern Europe from the end of World War II through the beginning of the Yugoslav war of 1991-2, including such topics as the Greek Civil War, the Stalin-Tito split, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Scholars interested in participating in the project—which is slated to encompass conferences and publications—should contact CWIHP and the National Security Archive.

Jim Hershberg, the former CWIHP Director, is assistant professor of history and international relations at The George Washington University, and editor of the CWIHP book series.

1 Glasnik: Arhiva i Društva Arhivskih Radnika Bosne i Hercegovine, XXXII/1992-93 and XXXIII/1994-95 (financed by Soros Foundation) Arhivu R/F Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, tel 071/640-175. The journal was designed and printed at amh studio 9, Livanska Broj 32, Sarajevo BiH, tel. 071/440-824; tel./fax 071/655-841. According to the journal’s editor, Matko Kovacevic, a 1997 issue was scheduled for publication, but had not yet appeared by the time of my visit in August.

2 I am grateful to CWIHP and the National Security Archive for their support in enabling this visit, which marked the final leg of a survey trip to former communist countries in the summer of 1997 that included stops in Laos, Vietnam, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Moldova, and others. Materials gathered during these visits, by Mark Kramer, David Wolff, Vladislav Zubok, and myself, will appear in future CWIHP Bulletins.

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina National Archives: Matko Kovacevic, Director Arhiva BiH; Kristic Slobodan, Deputy (Assistant) Director; Anto Marsanovic, Direktor Arhiva Federacije; Address: Reisa Causevica 6, Sarajevo 71000 BiH Tel/fax: 071/640-175.

4 I visited the SDP’s headquarters at 41 Alipasina street near the U.S. Embassy in an effort to clarify the situation but was unable to meet with anyone in authority who could describe research regulations and conditions. Scholars interested in further information may contact the SDP-BiH [Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovina], Alipasina 41, Sarajevo BiH; telephone: 071/663-750, 071/664-044, or 071/663-753; fax: 071/664-042 or 071/663-625.

5 For further information regarding the Sarajevo city archives, contact: Grbela Tonci, Director; Istorinski Arhiv Sarajevo; Koturova 3; Sarajevo, BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina).

6 For further information, contact Universitet u Sarajevu/University of Sarajevo, Filozofski Fakultet/Faculty of Philosophy; Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Franje Rackov br. 1;Postanski pretinac br. 653; Ziro racun: 10100-603-8404; Dev. Racun: 10100-603-2008404; Prof. Dr. IBRAHIM TEPIC, tel. 444-805; Prodekan: Doc. Dr. Ilijas Tanovic, tel. 444-805; Prof. Dr. Josip Baotic, tel. 444-805; Sekretar: Azra Kreso, tel. 444-279; Telefax: 667-873; Tel. Centrala: 667-844; 667-845; 667-846; 667-847. All Sarajevo numbers are preceded by the prefix 071.
To subscribe to our mailing list, please return to:

Cold War International History Project
Woodrow Wilson Center
1000 Jefferson Dr. SW
Washington, DC 20650
Attn: Mailing List

1. Name: ______________________________________
2. Mailing Address: ____________________________________________________________________
3. Phone work:_____________________home_________________________F AX__________________
4. E-mail___________________________________________________
5. Profession:________________________________________________
6. Company/Employer:________________________________________
  5. Military Science  6. Other (specify)_________________
8. Area Studies Interest (Choose up to three)  1. Former Soviet Union/Russia  2. Eastern Europe  3. Asia
9. Main Publications Related to Cold War:__________________________________________________
10. Do you do archival work on the Cold War?______In East-bloc archives?________Which archives?______
    On what topics?_______________________________________
11. With what languages other than English do you work?_______________________________________
    (specify)_____________________________________
    6. Other (specify)_________________________________
14. What topic(s) do you want to see more on?_________________________________________________
15. Which articles/features of Bulletins have you found most useful/enjoyable?_____________________
16. In addition to reading the Bulletin, would you be interested in purchasing books produced by CWIHP containing
    new findings from communist archives?  yes/no  Would you consider assigning them for courses?  yes/no
17. In future Bulletins, would you prefer more documents__ analyses__ archival updates__ same mix__
18. Is the Bulletin available at a local library/research institute?  Please recommend a local site.____________
19. How many people read your copy of the Bulletin?___________
20. Do you use e-mail__ the WWW__ which search engine____________________________
21. Could you get on the internet to access and print out additional Cold War documents and materials available
    only online?  yes/no
22. Would how-to instructions help you “go electronic?”  Have you tried to visit our website yet (cwihp.si.edu)?
    yes/no  Success?  yes/no
23. Additional comments, suggestions or ideas: ________________________________________________
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    __________________________________________________________________________________
    __________________________________________________________________________________