
New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982

Introduction

By Malcolm Byrne

In November 1997, an extraordinary multinational gathering took place of personalities who figured in the tumultuous 1980-81 Solidarity crisis. For two-and-a-half days two dozen Poles, Americans, and Russians, one-time allies and adversaries alike, met in the village of Jachranka just outside Warsaw, to revisit the events of that crucial period.

On the Polish Communist Party and government side, former Party leaders Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and Stanisław Kania, former Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski, and several of their colleagues sat across from ex-Solidarity figures Tadeusz Mazowiecki (later the country's first post-Communist prime minister), Karol Modzelewski, Zbigniew Bujak, and others. Filling out the spaces at the large, square meeting table were representatives of the two superpowers whose involvement in the crisis (albeit in very different forms) ensured its global impact. From the American side: Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser; Richard Pipes, a senior member of President Reagan's National Security Council (NSC) staff; Gen. William Odom, NSC military aide in 1980 and head of U.S. Army Intelligence in 1981-82; Jan Nowak, formerly of Radio Free Europe and a consultant on Poland to the Carter and Reagan administrations; and Carter NSC staff aide, Stephen Larrabee, were present. From the former Soviet side: Marshal Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces; Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, Warsaw Pact chief of staff; Central Committee expert Georgi Shakhnazarov; and Valerii Moussatov of the Foreign Ministry.

The conference, "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," was one of a series of meetings organized by the National Security Archive in partnership with scholars and institutions in Russia and Eastern Europe—and in close cooperation with the Cold War International History Project—aimed at expanding the historical record and informing the public debate over key crises in the Cold War.¹ Shouldering most of the responsibility for the Jachranka event were Andrzej Paczkowski, Ryszard Zelichowski, Pawel Machcewicz, Dariusz Stola, Krzysztof Persak, Ewa Balcerek and their colleagues at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Highlights of the conference were numerous, and have been written about elsewhere.² The discussions brought out new facts and perspectives on the internal dynamics of the crisis, the roles of Kania and Jaruzelski, the question of whether the Soviets intended to invade,

and the impact of American efforts to forestall such an outcome. One issue that came under intense scrutiny was whether Jaruzelski was a hero or a traitor: Did he declare martial law on 13 December 1981, as a patriotic act to prevent the slaughter of tens of thousands of Poles that would surely have followed from a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion? Or was he simply doing Moscow's bidding, using the threat (spurious in this view) of an invasion as a pretext and/or justification for martial law, and thus sparing the Soviets the multiple costs of intervention?

As with all Archive/CWIHP conferences, documents played a crucial part. For several years before the Jachranka gathering, directed research had been underway in the archives of the former Soviet bloc and the United States specifically geared toward preparation of a "briefing book" for each of the participants. Over 100 top-level documents were selected, ranging from Soviet and Polish politburo minutes and Warsaw Pact meeting transcripts, to Solidarity National Coordination Commission materials, to U.S. National Security Council records and Defense Intelligence Agency reports.³ The goal was not only to bolster the public record but also to help jog the memories of participants and keep the discussions as closely anchored to the facts as possible. As often happens, additional materials emerged during the course of the conference itself.⁴

Several new documents dealt with the central, and related, questions of Soviet intentions and Jaruzelski's motivations. They seemed to seriously undermine the former Polish leader's published rationales. For example, a telegram from Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, the CIA's long-time source inside the Polish general staff, reported in early December 1980 that Jaruzelski had ordered his Defense Ministry to approve Kremlin-sponsored plans to allow 18 divisions of Soviet, Czechoslovak and East German troops to enter the country, a revelation that left every Pole privy to the decision "very depressed and crestfallen," Kuklinski reported.⁵ A Czechoslovak military document around the same date appeared to confirm this report.

Apparently even more damning to Jaruzelski was a series of handwritten notebook pages prepared in the early 1980s by Soviet Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin, for years an adjutant to Marshal Kulikov and his principal notetaker throughout the Polish crisis. During the planning stages of the conference, the organizers had asked every prospective participant to dig through their own files for documents to bring to the table. Kulikov agreed to ask Anoshkin to bring along his notes.⁶ Immediately after the Marshal

referred to those notes during the conference to back up his claim that the Soviets never intended to intervene militarily in Poland, he and Anoshkin were approached (accosted?) by various participants. Anoshkin eventually agreed to let several pages be copied, which, as Mark Kramer's piece below suggests, appear to show that contrary to Jaruzelski's assertion that he tried to keep Soviet troops out of the country, he actually counted on them to back up Polish forces in case martial law failed.

Revelations of this sort prompted some of the most dramatic interactions of the conference, such as when Jaruzelski confronted Kulikov during a break following the Marshal's denial that Moscow contemplated an invasion. In front of several witnesses, an emotional Jaruzelski said, in Russian: "You know what you said to me then. How could you let them do this to me—in front of the Americans!"

Questions about the crisis persist, of course, even about Jaruzelski. But the truly multinational, cooperative effort by scholars, archivists and others involved in this project has helped to advance our understanding of key aspects of the 1980-81 crisis. The essays that follow below both add to the growing databank and represent some of the first attempts to come to grips with the new evidence. As documentary and oral history work continues, these interpretations will no doubt themselves become grist for further debate.

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¹ Under the rubric of the "Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project," the Archive, along with CWIHP and its other partners, have run conferences on the Prague Spring and the subsequent Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia (Prague, April 1994), the Hungarian revolution (Budapest, September 1996), and the 1953 uprising in East Germany (Potsdam, November 1996). The Archive's principal partners include: the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences; the Institute of Contemporary History and the recently-formed Center for Advanced Studies of the Anti-totalitarian Resistance of the Czech Academy of Sciences; the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; the Civic Academy Foundation (Bucharest); the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and "Memorial" (Moscow). Generous support over the years has come mainly from the Open Society Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States—in addition to local sponsors for each event.

² For a summary, CWIHP *Bulletin* readers can refer to Raymond Garthoff's report in Issue 10, pp. 229-232. Other accounts appeared in *The New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *International Herald Tribune*.

³ Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, Christian Ostermann, eds., *Poland 1980-1982 Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events* (Washington, DC: National Security

Archive, 1997).

⁴ Many scholars and archivists throughout Eastern Europe, in Russia and the United States contributed materials (and translations), all of which are available as part of the Archive/CWIHP's Russian and East European Archival Documents Database (READD) in the National Security Archive's reading room in the Gelman Library, Suite 701, 2130 H Str., NW., Washington, DC 20037. The 1980-81 collection includes hundreds of other documents obtained by the Archive through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and other sources. An early exchange of source materials on the 1980-81 crisis took place at a workshop organized by the Archive/CWIHP and Institute of Political Studies (Warsaw) in the Polish capital in August 1995.

⁵ Mark Kramer, director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, contributed (and translated) this and two other Kuklinski telegrams, among other materials, for the briefing book.

⁶ In addition to Gen. Anoshkin, other former officials who generously contributed documents were Zbigniew Brzezinski, Valerii Moussatov, and Gen. Jaruzelski.

"When foreign troops invaded our country on the night of the 20th to the 21st of August, 1968, and abducted its political representatives, something happened for which a parallel would be difficult to find in modern history. Within several hours our society began to unite quite unexpectedly in a peaceful and dignified demonstration in defense of the independence of the state and the civic freedoms that had been achieved."



"I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation 'Prague Spring 1968,' has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents, which, I hope, will lead readers to a closer understanding of the dramatic events that the then Czechoslovakia lived through three decades ago."

***From the preface by Václav Havel,
President of the Czech Republic***

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Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981

By Mark Kramer

The behavior of General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the Polish crisis of 1980-81 remains a source of great controversy.

On the one hand, newly declassified documentation leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union was exerting relentless pressure on Polish leaders in 1980-81.¹ The Soviet authorities deployed many divisions of combat-ready troops around Poland's borders and in the western USSR, conducted a long series of conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed Polish officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led invasion, and made repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and multilateral channels. These various actions may have caused Jaruzelski to fear that the Soviet Army would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law. Whether Soviet leaders actually *intended* to invade is a very different matter. All the latest evidence suggests that by mid- to late 1981, Soviet officials were extremely reluctant to consider sending troops into Poland. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this new evidence, persuasive though it seems in retrospect, was unavailable at the time. In 1980-81, Polish leaders were not privy to the internal deliberations of the Soviet Politburo and could never be fully certain about Soviet intentions. Hence, they may have genuinely believed that an invasion would occur if a solution "from within" Poland (i.e., martial law) did not materialize. Indeed, Soviet leaders themselves may have *wanted* to create that impression—even if they did not intend to follow up on it—because they believed it would induce the Polish authorities to take action.² In that respect, the declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzelski's claim that he introduced martial law because he viewed it as a "tragic necessity" and the "lesser of two evils."³

On the other hand, much of the new documentary evidence raises serious doubts about Jaruzelski's veracity on this matter, and specifically about his position in December 1981 during the lead-up to martial law. First-hand accounts and newly released documents suggest that, by December 1981 (and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was reluctant to impose martial law without external (i.e., Soviet) military assistance or at least a solid guarantee that Soviet troops would move in if the martial law operation failed. The documents also suggest that Soviet leaders by then were unwilling to provide direct military support to Jaruzelski, telling him that it would be "impossible" to bring Soviet troops into Poland and that he must instead proceed with martial law on his own. Jaruzelski's failure to obtain Soviet military assistance, as revealed in the latest evidence, nearly caused him to postpone the whole

operation in the hope that he would then be given a concrete external assurance.

The notion that Jaruzelski was asking for Soviet military support in December 1981 was first propounded in September 1992 by a retired Soviet officer, Army-General Anatolii Gribkov. Gribkov had served for many years as Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. In that capacity, he played a key role *vis-a-vis* Poland in 1980-81. Looking back on the Polish crisis in 1992, Gribkov denied that Jaruzelski imposed martial law to forestall a Soviet invasion. The Soviet general claimed that, rather than trying to stave off Soviet military intervention, Jaruzelski did just the opposite in December 1981 by repeatedly seeking a "guarantee of military assistance [from the USSR] if the situation in Poland becomes critical."⁴ The Soviet Politburo, according to Gribkov, promptly turned down the Polish leader's requests, informing him that "Soviet troops will not be sent to Poland." Gribkov noted that even after this decision was conveyed, Jaruzelski pleaded with Soviet officials to reconsider and warned them that "if military assistance is not offered, Poland will be lost to the Warsaw Pact." Gribkov surmised that Jaruzelski's last-minute pleas for a Soviet military guarantee must have reflected "the nervousness and diffidence that the top Polish leaders were feeling about their ability to carry out the plans for martial law."⁵

Gribkov's account appeared at the very time when Jaruzelski had been gaining a favorable reputation in Poland, both among the public and even among some of his former opponents such as Adam Michnik. Most Poles were willing to accept Jaruzelski's claim that he reluctantly chose the "lesser of two evils" in December 1981.⁶ Confronted by Gribkov's revelations, Jaruzelski strenuously denied that he had ever requested a Soviet military guarantee and argued that Gribkov himself had been an advocate of Soviet military pressure and intervention in 1981.⁷ An acrimonious standoff between the two men ensued.

Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to bear out Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence includes Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and secret records of meetings and conversations. Until recently, the new evidence was very strong—strong enough to raise serious doubts about Jaruzelski's self-exculpatory claims—but it was not yet conclusive. That changed in November 1997, when I obtained a document that provides much clearer evidence about Jaruzelski's behavior in the lead-up to martial law.

Combined with all the previous disclosures, this document (which I have translated and annotated below) offers powerful confirmation of Gribkov's article.

Before turning to this new document, it is worth reviewing the other evidence that corroborates Gribkov's account. Some of the evidence has come from unexpected sources, including Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo during the Polish crisis. Gorbachev was and is an admirer and close friend of Jaruzelski and has described him as "a true hero" who in 1981 "had no choice" and "acted correctly."⁸ In an interview in late 1992, Gorbachev affirmed that he "always had complete trust in Jaruzelski" and had "talked to him more openly and honestly than I did with some members of the CPSU Politburo."⁹ Gorbachev also has insisted that Jaruzelski's reputation will be secure as "a Polish patriot and a man of great honor" who "saved his country."¹⁰ Hence, Gorbachev has no reason to say anything that would impugn Jaruzelski's honesty. Nor does Gorbachev have any reason to defend the reputation of those on the Soviet Politburo in 1981 who may have wanted to dispatch Soviet military forces to Poland unless Jaruzelski imposed martial law. If anything, Gorbachev might have been expected to go out of his way to substantiate Jaruzelski's claims about what happened in December 1981.

Yet in several interviews with Polish journalists in October and November 1992, Gorbachev averred that the CPSU Politburo made no threat of military intervention in December 1981, contrary to the assertions in Jaruzelski's memoirs. Gorbachev also recalled that shortly before martial law was introduced, a top Polish official (who Gorbachev deduced was Jaruzelski) had placed an urgent phone call to Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU Politburo and CPSU Secretariat who chaired the Politburo's special commission on the Polish crisis. Gorbachev maintained that Suslov had informed the Polish leader that Soviet troops would continue to protect Poland against external threats, but would not be used against internal dangers.¹¹ According to Gorbachev, Suslov's refusal to provide a military guarantee came as a shock to the Polish leader, who tried in vain to persuade Suslov to change his mind.

On all key points, Gorbachev's testimony closely parallels and reinforces Gribkov's account, even though the two men obviously did not consult with one another and were unaware of each other's comments until at least several weeks afterwards, when a controversy ensued in Poland. The accounts overlap both in their broad themes and in many of the details they contain (e.g., about Suslov's role). Because Gorbachev and Gribkov were both in a position to know first-hand about the events they described, the inadvertent similarity of their remarks enhances their credibility.

The accounts provided by Gorbachev and Gribkov were endorsed by a retired general of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), Vitalii Pavlov, who was the

KGB station chief in Warsaw from 1973 to 1984. In a series of interviews with the Polish press in early 1993, and in his memoirs (published in Poland in 1994 and in Moscow in 1996), Pavlov argued that Jaruzelski desperately wanted an assurance of military intervention in December 1981, but that Suslov and other Soviet leaders refused to comply.¹² Pavlov claimed that Suslov had spoken with Jaruzelski by phone on December 12 and had told the Polish leader that "direct military assistance" from the Soviet Union was "out of the question," adding that "we will help you materially, financially, and politically, but not with armed force."¹³ Pavlov recalled that Yurii Andropov, a CPSU Politburo member and chairman of the KGB, sent the same message to General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs.

The main elements of Pavlov's account were substantiated by Kiszczak himself, who is a close friend of Jaruzelski. In an interview in 1993, Kiszczak confirmed that Pavlov is one of the very few people who can speak authoritatively about the KGB's operations and Soviet policy during the Polish crisis.¹⁴ Elsewhere, Kiszczak acknowledged that Jaruzelski placed an urgent phone call to Moscow on December 12 to inquire about military "help from the allies." Because Brezhnev declined to take the phone, Jaruzelski ended up speaking with Suslov.¹⁵ Kiszczak recalled, as Pavlov did, that Suslov admonished Jaruzelski not to expect Soviet military support "under any circumstances." Although Kiszczak's recollections differ on some points from Pavlov's, the similarities between the two are striking.

These various first-hand accounts have been supplemented over the past five to six years by the release of crucial documentation in Russia, Poland, and other former Warsaw Pact countries. Although many Soviet and Polish documents have not yet been declassified, the items that have emerged lend credence to Gribkov's account of what happened in December 1981. Selected transcripts from some of the CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980-81 were released in late 1992, August 1993, and early 1994.¹⁶ A few of these transcripts, including one from 10 December 1981, bear directly on the question of Jaruzelski's stance in December 1981. Documents from some of the East European countries, notably Hungary and East Germany, also shed valuable light on the matter.¹⁷

One of the consistent themes in these documents is the lack of confidence that Jaruzelski and his close aides had about their ability to sustain martial law without external military aid. Even after mid-September 1981, when Poland's Homeland Defense Committee (*Komitet obrony kraju*, or KOK) reached a final decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law (leaving only the precise date to be determined), Polish leaders remained doubtful that they could handle it on their own.¹⁸ Although the Polish authorities had repeatedly assured the Soviet Union over the previous twelve months that they would "resolve the crisis with our own means," they had said this in the hope of somehow finding a political

solution that would not require the opposition to be wiped out (at least not all at once). The imposition of martial law, aimed at crushing the opposition, was an entirely different matter.

Newly released documents indicate that a few days after the KOK's watershed meeting in September 1981, "the Polish Communist leaders assessed their forces [and] found that their resources would be insufficient for this sort of action [i.e., martial law] and that the support of allied forces would therefore be needed."¹⁹ Because Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania, the head of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) from September 1980 to mid-October 1981 (when he was replaced by Jaruzelski), both realized that "direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries" would "set back the development of socialism by decades" and "would be exploited by the imperialist forces," they were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision. Although Kania claimed that he would not "exclude the possibility of steps that would unavoidably require the intervention of [Poland's] allies," he was still hoping that some alternative to martial law could be found.²⁰ Kania's continued hesitancy sparked a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to "prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland."²¹ Soon thereafter, on October 18, Kania was replaced as PUWP First Secretary by Jaruzelski, under Soviet auspices. (By that point, Soviet leaders had correctly surmised that Kania was doing his best to avoid imposing martial law.)

Once Jaruzelski assumed the top party post and began making all the final preparations for martial law, his demeanor seems to have changed a good deal compared to the previous thirteen months, when he had been working with Kania. The evidence suggests that Jaruzelski increasingly sought a concrete military guarantee from the Soviet Union, a request that Soviet leaders declined to fulfill. His position on this matter was discussed at a Soviet Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981 by Andropov and the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov:

ANDROPOV: The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line—that our troops will not be sent to Poland.

USTINOV: In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our troops to Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops.²²

To be sure, this passage can lend itself to different interpretations. Andropov's and Ustinov's perceptions of Jaruzelski's position may not have been fully accurate. Moreover, it is unclear precisely what Ustinov meant when he said that "the Poles are not ready to receive our troops." Most likely, he was arguing that if Soviet military units entered Poland to support Jaruzelski, they would

encounter vigorous armed resistance.²³

Even if some ambiguity about this passage remains, Andropov's and Ustinov's comments tend to bear out the view that Jaruzelski was requesting Soviet military intervention or at least the assurance of military support if the martial law operation collapsed. Their remarks also imply that Soviet leaders had no intention of sending troops to Poland (either in support of or against Jaruzelski) unless some unforeseeable circumstance arose. In both respects the transcript bears out a key episode recorded by Gribkov, who recalled that just after a Soviet Politburo session in late October 1981, he and the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, were ordered by Ustinov to inform Jaruzelski that the Poles "had better rely more on their own forces to restore order in the country and not hope that some big brother will step in and take care of everything for them."²⁴ Gribkov's recollection of this matter is especially credible because his account of it was published well before he could have seen the transcript of the Politburo meeting, which was not declassified until more than a year later.

Further evidence that Jaruzelski was hoping to receive Soviet military backing in late 1981 comes from two highly classified documents prepared by the Polish General Staff and the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of November 1981, which reviewed the ongoing preparations for martial law. One of the documents, compiled by the Polish General Staff on November 23, indicated that "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [*wojsk własnych i sojusznicych*] can be carried out fully and properly."²⁵ This phrasing does not necessarily indicate that the "allied troops" would be intervening in support of the martial law operation—after all, the Soviet Politburo had consistently emphasized that lines of communication between the USSR's Northern Group of Forces and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany must be protected—but it certainly is compatible with the notion that Polish leaders would seek external military assistance. That notion is borne out even more strongly by another document, prepared two days later by the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, which noted that "assistance from Warsaw Pact forces would not be ruled out" if the martial law operation produced widespread violent turmoil.²⁶ This position was in line with the views expressed earlier in the year by senior ministry officials, who argued that martial law would be unfeasible unless the Polish authorities received external military support.²⁷

Another indication that Jaruzelski was hoping to gain outside backing for the martial law operation came a week later, in early December 1981, when he sought an explicit Warsaw Pact statement "condemning the actions of the counterrevolution [in Poland] and the interference by NATO in [Poland's] internal affairs."²⁸ Jaruzelski was unable to travel to Moscow for a meeting of the Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on December 2-4, but in his place he sent his closest aide, the chief of the Polish

General Staff, General Florian Siwicki. Jaruzelski instructed Siwicki to urge the assembled ministers and Warsaw Pact commanders to issue a strong statement “demonstrating to the whole world that the Polish Communists are not alone.” Drafts of the proposed statement referred to “the fulfillment of alliance obligations by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states” and pledged “complete support for the Polish people” in their “struggle against counterrevolution.”²⁹ These formulations sparked a protracted discussion, but in the end the meeting failed to produce the type of statement Jaruzelski had sought. The Romanian and Hungarian defense ministers, Colonel-General Constantin Olteanu and Army-General Lajos Csinege, argued that their governments had not given them authority to endorse such a statement, and the other ministers decided it would be inadvisable to release a document that was not approved unanimously.³⁰

When Siwicki informed Jaruzelski about the disappointing results of the meeting, the Polish leader complained that “the allies have forced us into an impasse” and “left us on our own.”³¹ He could not understand why “the allies do not want to shoulder any of the responsibility even though they have constantly asserted that the Polish problem is a problem for the whole Warsaw Pact, not just for Poland.” Jaruzelski added that he was “still hoping for a miracle,” but could sense that his “options [were] running out.”³² Implicit in all these comments was Jaruzelski’s distinct lack of confidence that martial law could be imposed without external military support.

Even more intriguing, for an assessment of Jaruzelski’s position in late 1981, is the transcript of a Soviet Politburo meeting on December 10, barely two days before martial law was imposed. A number of the participants in the meeting were dismayed that Jaruzelski was seeking—or at least they believed he was seeking—a military guarantee. Among those putting forth this view was Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-bloc affairs, who had been keeping close track of the situation from Moscow and was the main contact point in December 1981 for high-ranking Soviet officials in Poland who needed to convey information to, or receive instructions from, the CPSU Politburo:

Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this matter [martial law] with his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up by “Solidarity,” the Polish comrades *hope* to receive assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the territory of Poland.³³

Rusakov noted that “Jaruzelski, in expressing this hope, has been citing remarks by Com. Kulikov, who supposedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I know, Com. Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the

words voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in the lurch.”³⁴

If Jaruzelski was indeed citing Kulikov at this point, as Rusakov reported, that would be interesting in itself. It is possible that Kulikov did in fact say something to Jaruzelski on December 8—if only inadvertently—that seemed (in Jaruzelski’s view) to be a pledge of Soviet military assistance if the martial law operation collapsed. During at least one previous occasion when Kulikov was in Poland in 1981 he brought up this very matter with Jaruzelski. In a conversation with East German military officials on 7 April 1981, Kulikov said he had indicated to Jaruzelski and Kania a few days earlier that “unless [the Polish authorities] used the Polish security organs and army [to impose martial law], outside support could not be expected because of the international complications that would arise.” Kulikov said he “emphasized to the Polish comrades that they must first seek to resolve their problems on their own.” However, he was careful to add that “if the Polish authorities tried to resolve these problems on their own and were unable to, and were then to ask [the Soviet Union] for assistance, that would be a very different situation from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed [to Poland] from the outset.”³⁵ Kulikov probably did not intend these remarks to be an ironclad pledge of a Soviet military guarantee, but he certainly may have given Jaruzelski and Kania the *impression* (whether rightly or wrongly) in April 1981 that they could count on Soviet military help if the martial law operation went awry. Although there is no evidence that Kulikov said something identical when he met with Jaruzelski in December 1981, Jaruzelski may have construed some of Kulikov’s remarks at that time as a reaffirmation of what Kulikov had been saying to him earlier in the year. A misunderstanding in a tense situation like this would hardly be unusual. (Nor is it inconceivable that Kulikov mistakenly went beyond his brief in December 1981 and gave Jaruzelski the wrong idea about Soviet policy.)

Whatever the case may be, Jaruzelski’s invocation of Kulikov’s remarks (as Jaruzelski interpreted them) tends to bear out the hypothesis that—at least in Rusakov’s view—the Polish leader expected and wanted to receive Soviet military backing.

That same inference can be drawn from a comment by Yurii Andropov at the December 10 meeting of the Soviet Politburo. Andropov voiced dismay that “Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our willingness to offer . . . military assistance,” and he urged his colleagues to resist any temptation to fulfill Jaruzelski’s request:

Although we support the notion of internationalist assistance and are alarmed by the situation in Poland, the matter must entirely and unequivocally be handled by the Polish comrades themselves. We do not intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end.³⁶

Andropov's sentiments were echoed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who argued that "we must somehow try to dispel the notion that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland have about the introduction of [Soviet] troops. There cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate it to him."³⁷ Andropov's and Gromyko's statements were endorsed by others at the meeting, all of whom agreed that Jaruzelski's last-minute effort to receive external military support for the martial law operation should not induce the Soviet Politburo to alter its stance.

Taken together, the documents and memoirs that were just cited provide powerful evidence that Jaruzelski was calling for and expecting Soviet troops to be sent to Poland in December 1981. Even so, a number of doubts—or at least differences of interpretation—could remain. For example, one could argue, after poring over these materials, that Soviet leaders might have misperceived Jaruzelski's actions, or that Jaruzelski was raising the question of Soviet military intervention not because he wanted it to occur, but because he was probing Soviet intentions. One also might argue that without precise records of what Jaruzelski was doing and saying at the time, it would be impossible to reconstruct his motives with any certainty.

Fortunately, a first-hand, contemporaneous record of Jaruzelski's behavior in the last few days before martial law—including his repeated requests for Soviet military support and the consternation he felt when those requests were turned down—is now finally available. It turns out that Marshal Kulikov's personal adjutant, Lieutenant-General Viktor Anoshkin, kept daily notes of Kulikov's phone calls, telegrams, conversations, and meetings.³⁸ As Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, Kulikov had been a frequent envoy to Poland throughout the 1980-81 crisis, performing sensitive missions on behalf of the CPSU Politburo. He and Anoshkin had been in Warsaw in late November 1981 when the final preparations for martial law were completed, and they were again in Poland from 7 to 17 December 1981, when the preparations were transformed into action. Anoshkin's records of Kulikov's interactions with Jaruzelski in the lead-up to martial law show that Jaruzelski wanted and requested Soviet military assistance, and that he was distraught when Soviet leaders informed him that no troops would be sent.

Among other things, Anoshkin's notebook reveals that Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev early in the morning of December 10, right after a late-night meeting at the Polish General Staff where Jaruzelski and other top Polish military commanders unanimously approved a final decision to proceed with martial law.³⁹ The Polish leader informed Brezhnev that the decision had been adopted, and he then asked "whether Poland can count on [Soviet] military assistance if the situation in the country becomes critical." Brezhnev evaded a direct response, but just a few hours later Kulikov received specific instructions from

Ustinov to let Jaruzelski know that "the Poles themselves must resolve the Polish question. We are not preparing to send troops onto the territory of Poland." When Jaruzelski received this message, he expressed concern that "you [the Soviet Union] are distancing yourselves from us," and he tried to find out whether the decision could be reversed.⁴⁰

The following day, Jaruzelski sent an urgent request to Moscow via the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov. In that cable, the Polish leader again flatly asked: "Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR—the additional sending of troops?" Rusakov promptly transmitted a response to Warsaw: "No troops will be sent." When Aristov informed Jaruzelski that his request had been turned down, the Polish leader exclaimed: "This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went on—now everything is gone!" Jaruzelski's comment here, as recorded by Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do all other documents combined. Any notion that Jaruzelski was simply probing Soviet intentions no longer seems tenable.

Jaruzelski's profound disappointment upon learning that he would not receive external military assistance was due to his continued lack of confidence that the martial law operation would succeed. According to Kania, Jaruzelski had long feared that chaotic turmoil might ensue and that Polish units would be unable to cope with violent upheavals on their own.⁴¹ He was convinced that if opposition forces withstood the "first stage" of the crackdown, the whole operation would collapse unless external aid were forthcoming. Although Jaruzelski may have "continued to hope for a miracle" (as he himself put it in a conversation with Siwicki), he could no longer contain his misgivings when the decisive moment arrived in December 1981. Having led himself to believe that the "first stage" of the operation would be unsuccessful, he desperately hoped that Soviet troops would come bail him out, just as Gribkov had claimed.

When Jaruzelski suddenly realized that "the Poles [would] have to fend for themselves," he seemed at a loss about what to do. Rather than steeling himself for the impending martial law crackdown, he repeatedly tried to persuade Soviet leaders to change their minds. In addition to conveying his "great concern" to Kulikov that "no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale . . . military assistance," Jaruzelski spoke by secure telephone with Andropov, warning him that military support was urgently needed. These overtures, however, bore no fruit, as Andropov bluntly informed the Polish leader that "there can be no consideration at all of sending [Soviet] troops."

Following this second rebuff, Jaruzelski was more unnerved than ever. Soviet officials had already been complaining, at the CPSU Politburo meeting on December 10, that Jaruzelski seemed "extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities" and was "back to his vacillations" and "lack of resolution."⁴² Those qualities became even more

pronounced after the exchanges on December 11. At Jaruzelski's behest, Siwicki met with Kulikov on the evening of the 11th and warned him that "we cannot embark on any adventurist actions [*avanturyura*] if the Soviet comrades will not support us." Siwicki noted that Jaruzelski seemed "very upset and very nervous," and that "psychologically, . . . Jaruzelski has gone to pieces [*rasstroen*]." Siwicki emphasized that Jaruzelski would rather "postpone the introduction of [martial law] by a day" than proceed without Soviet military backing.

The possibility of delaying the crackdown had already been broached by Jaruzelski the previous day in an exchange with Konstantin Rusakov. Rusakov informed the Soviet Politburo on December 10 that Jaruzelski was "not presenting a clear, straightforward line" about the date of "Operation X," the code name in Moscow for the martial law operation:

No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was changed to the night of the 12th and 13th. And now they're already saying it won't be until around the 20th.⁴³

Actually, Siwicki was proposing to defer the martial law crackdown by only a day—indeed, he emphasized several times that a delay of more than a day would be infeasible—but Rusakov may have suspected that a daylong postponement would be extended indefinitely.

In any case, Kulikov's discussion with Siwicki reveals that Jaruzelski's motivation for a possible delay, of whatever length, was to persuade Soviet leaders to send troops to Poland. The implication was that if the Soviet Union failed to respond, the whole operation might have to be called off. Underscoring this point, Siwicki declared: "[I]f there will be no . . . military support from the USSR, our country might be lost for the Warsaw Pact. Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step [of imposing martial law]." All these statements are essentially identical to comments recorded by Gribkov in his 1992 article.⁴⁴

In response, Kulikov argued that the martial law operation would succeed if Jaruzelski implemented it as planned, and he sought to disabuse Siwicki of the idea of postponing the operation. The Soviet marshal pointed out that Polish leaders had repeatedly "insisted that Poland is able to resolve its problems on its own," and that Soviet officials had accepted and agreed with that view. Kulikov expressed dismay that Jaruzelski's position had now changed: "Why has this question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law." Kulikov added that "you carried out a great deal of work in preparing for the introduction of martial law" and "you have enough strength" to succeed. "It's now time to act," he argued. "The date should not be postponed, and indeed a

postponement is now impossible." Kulikov also expressed concern that the talk about a postponement and about the need for Soviet military support might signify that Jaruzelski was backing away from his "final decision" to impose martial law. "If that is so," Kulikov declared, "we would like to know about it."

Siwicki assured Kulikov that "the decision has been made," and that Jaruzelski was not going to renege on his plans to introduce martial law. At the same time, he emphasized, once again, that "without [military] help from outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles," to sustain martial law. Siwicki said that both he and Jaruzelski hoped that Soviet leaders would "look upon these matters with understanding" and would "consider [our] requests," but Kulikov displayed no inclination to consider any changes in the earlier arrangements, which stipulated that Polish units would introduce martial law on their own. By the time the meeting ended, Siwicki had pledged to embark on "a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution," as Soviet leaders had long demanded. Even so, Anoshkin could tell that "Siwicki left here dissatisfied because he got nothing new and heard nothing new from [Kulikov]."

The extent of the Polish leaders' continued nervousness and dissatisfaction became clear the following day (December 12) as the hour approached for the introduction of martial law. Despite what had happened over the previous two days, Jaruzelski was still urging the Soviet Union to "provide military help." So insistent were Jaruzelski's pleas that Kulikov began to suspect that the Polish leader was trying to "make the introduction of martial law dependent on the fulfillment of [his demand for Soviet intervention]." Although Soviet officials eventually were able to convince Jaruzelski that no direct military support would be forthcoming, the fate of the martial law operation seemed in doubt just hours before the crackdown was due to begin. Arrangements had even been made for a high-level Soviet delegation, led by Suslov, to fly to Warsaw for urgent consultations at Jaruzelski's request, but at the last minute this visit was called off, apparently because Suslov's phone conversation with Jaruzelski obviated the need for a direct visit.

Anoshkin's notebook continues after December 12 into early 1982, reporting on the martial law crackdown and the various units involved. But on the specific question of what Jaruzelski was seeking in the lead-up to martial law, the crucial entries are the ones Anoshkin jotted down on December 11 and 12, as translated below. These notes, combined with the other evidence mentioned above, overwhelmingly suggest that Jaruzelski's role in December 1981 was very different from the portrayal he offers in his memoirs. Far from having "saved" Poland from a Soviet invasion, Jaruzelski was desperately promoting the very thing he now claims to have prevented.

None of this is meant to gloss over the excruciating pressure that Jaruzelski had been encountering throughout

the crisis. From the fall of 1980 on, Soviet leaders had kept up a relentless campaign of intimidation and belligerent reproaches. It would have taken enormous strength and courage to withstand that pressure. Kania was not a particularly strong leader, but somehow he was continually able to defer the implementation of martial law. He repeatedly assured Brezhnev that “decisive measures” would soon be imposed, but invariably he refrained from carrying out his pledges. Jaruzelski in some ways was a stronger figure than Kania, but, unlike Kania, he was willing in the end to comply with Moscow’s demands. His compliance initially gave rise to final preparations for the “lesser of two evils”—that is, martial law—but when the critical moment came in late 1981, he seems to have embraced the “greater of two evils,” Soviet military intervention. By December 1981 (and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was pleading with Soviet leaders to send troops into Poland to assist with the martial law operation, and by all indications he was devastated when his requests were turned down. For Jaruzelski, it seems, Soviet interests ultimately took precedence over all else.

The evidence provided by the Anoshkin notebook and by the other materials cited above will serve an especially useful purpose if it prompts Jaruzelski and Siwicki to seek the declassification of Polish documents that would shed additional light on the events of December 1981. Jaruzelski’s and Siwicki’s own contemporaneous records of their meetings and conversations with Soviet officials during that crucial period have not yet been made available (assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with). It is at least remotely possible that such materials, if they exist, would result in a more favorable assessment of the Polish leaders’ actions.

Jaruzelski, in particular, should have a strong incentive to pursue the release of new documents, for he is well aware that the issue is of more than purely historical or scholarly interest. Since leaving office in December 1990, Jaruzelski has been viewed with respect, even admiration, by a majority of Poles. Although charges were filed against him in the early 1990s for his role in imposing martial law, and although he was required to testify a number of times before the Polish Sejm’s Commission for Constitutional Oversight, the last of the charges relating to the 1980-81 crisis were dropped in 1996, when the Sejm voted to pardon Jaruzelski and other former leaders who had been due to go on trial for violating the constitution.⁴⁵ (Separate charges were retained against Kiszczak and 22 former members of the security forces for one specific incident—the deaths of miners in Katowice on 13 December 1981—but all the defendants were eventually acquitted.) After the September 1997 parliamentary elections in Poland, a court in Gdansk proposed to resume its proceedings against Jaruzelski and four other former officials, but this case pertained only to the shootings of workers in December 1970. No suggestion was made of reinstating charges related to the 1981 crackdown.

No doubt, the lenient treatment of Jaruzelski has been based primarily on a widespread belief that he did indeed choose the “lesser of two evils” in December 1981 and spared his country great bloodshed and a military occupation. That view may yet be borne out. But if, as the evidence above suggests, Jaruzelski was actually urging, rather than opposing, Soviet military intervention in late 1981, his status in Poland today—not to mention his place in history—deserves a full-scale reassessment.

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¹ A preliminary discussion of the new evidence is Mark Kramer, “Poland, 1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126. A much more extensive analysis will be presented in my forthcoming CWHIP Working Paper.

² For example, at a Soviet Politburo meeting in January 1981, Soviet defense minister Dmitrii Ustinov argued that “constant pressure on the Polish leadership” would not work unless “we make clear that we have forces ready” to move in at short notice. Cited from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 22 yanvarya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki delegatsii partiinykh rabotnikov KPSS vo glave L. M. Zamyatynym v Pol’shu,” 22 January 1981 (Top Secret), in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis’ (Op.) 42, Delo (D.), 36, List (L.) 5. Similarly, at a Politburo meeting on 16 April 1981, the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, said it was “necessary to exert constant pressure” on the Polish authorities through political contacts and the staging of military exercises, though he added that “we should not harass them needlessly or increase the level of tension so much that they would just give up.” Cited from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 g.: O razgovore L. I. Brezhneva s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP S. Kanei (po telefonu),” 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 1-3.

³ This has been the basic theme of all of Jaruzelski’s comments on the subject since late 1991, including his two volumes of memoirs: *Stan wojenny dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); and *Les chaines et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992). Until 1990, Jaruzelski staunchly denied that the Soviet Union had intended to invade Poland in 1981; and even as late as September 1991, in an interview in *Novoe vremya* (Moscow), No. 38 (21 September 1991), pp. 26-30, he was evasive about the matter. No doubt, his discretion prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union was attributable to his long-standing deference to Soviet wishes.

⁴ Army-General A. I. Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva” i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 52.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, *Opinie o generalu Jaruzelskim i pulkowniku Kuklinskim* (Warsaw: CBOS, October 1992), pp. 1-4. See also Leonid Kornilov, “Dlya bol’shinstva polyakov Yaruzel’skii ostaetsya patriotom,” *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 30 October 1992, p. 5.

⁷ “Ironiczny grymas historii,” *Prawo i zycie* (Warsaw), No. 49 (December 1992), p. 11.

⁸"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil prawidlowo," *Trybuna* (Warsaw), 9 November 1992, pp. 1, 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁰M. S. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1996), vol. 2, pp. 336-351.

¹¹"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce," p. 2. See also "Wywiad z Michaiłem Gorbaczowem: 'Jestem inny, niz probuja mnie przedstawic'," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 23 October 1992, p. 9.

¹²Among the interviews, see "Dostep do wszystkiego," *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15; and Leon Bojko, "A wejsc nie chcieli?" *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 10 February 1993, p. 6. The Polish version of Pavlov's memoirs is *Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1994); the Russian version is *Operatsiya "Sneg": Polveka vo vneshnei razvedke KGB* (Moscow: TOO-Geya, 1996).

¹³*Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce*, p. 185.

¹⁴"Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak," *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15.

¹⁵Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., *General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 129-130.

¹⁶Most, but not all, of the declassified transcripts are stored in Fond 89 at TsKhSD. My annotated translations of an initial batch (as well as my translations of some East German documents) appeared in "Declassified Documents on the Polish Crisis," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 117, 129-139.

¹⁷A sample of these documents was included in a briefing book edited by Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz and Christian Ostermann, for the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," in Jachranka, Poland in November 1997, which was co-organized by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and the Institute for Political Studies (ISP) in Warsaw. Many other documents pertaining to the 1980-81 Polish crisis are stored in the Magyar Orszagos Leveltar (MOL) in Budapest, the Statni Ustredni Archiv (SUA) in Prague, the Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) in Prague, the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED (SAPMDB/ZPA) in Berlin, the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium für Staatssicherheit Zentralarchiv (BUS-MSZ) in Berlin, the Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (MZA) in Potsdam, the Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv (TsDA) in Sofia, and the Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman (Arh. CCPCR) in Bucharest. A useful selection of relevant documents from the former East German archives can be found in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "*Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen*," *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).

¹⁸For a complete record of the KOK meeting on 13 September 1981, see the handwritten notes by General Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981 r.," 13 September 1981, now stored in Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (CAW), Posiedzenia Kok, Teczka Sygn. 48. A translation of this document was published as an appendix in Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, *On The Decision To Introduce Martial Law In Poland In 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper 21 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997). Tuczapski

was the only one at the meeting who was permitted to take notes. Until his 10-page account was released at the Jachranka conference in November 1997, it was generally thought that no formal record of the meeting had been kept. The importance of the KOK meeting was first disclosed by Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in his lengthy interview, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 32-33. Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff and a top aide to Jaruzelski in 1980-81, was part of a small group responsible for planning the martial law operation. He also was a crucial intelligence source for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), having provided invaluable information to the West since the early 1970s about Warsaw Pact military developments. (He had to escape from Poland in early November 1981, and now lives in the United States.) Several years after the interview with Kuklinski appeared, Stanislaw Kania briefly discussed the KOK meeting in his memoirs (after being asked about it by the interviewer who compiled the book); see *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 110-111. More recently, it has come to light that Kuklinski sent a long cable to the CIA on 15 September 1981—two days after the KOK meeting—outlining the plans for martial law and warning that Operation "Wiosna" (the codename of the martial law crackdown) would soon follow. In May 1997, with help from Richard T. Davies, the former U.S. ambassador to Poland, I obtained a copy of the Polish text of Kuklinski's cable and then translated it for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference and this issue of the *Bulletin*.

¹⁹"Jelentes a MSzMP Politikai Bizottsagnak," memorandum from Jozsef Garamvolgyi, Hungarian ambassador in Poland, to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 19 September 1981 (Top Secret), in MOL, 288, F. 11/4400, o.e., fol. 128-134. This document records a conversation with Kania and exchanges between Kania and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar.

²⁰*Ibid.*, fol. 133-134.

²¹"Oswiadczenie KC KPZR i rządu ZSRR przedstawione kierownictwu KC PZPR i rządu PRL," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 18 September 1981, p. 1.

²²"Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki K. V. Rusakova v GDR, ChSSR, VNR i BPR," 29 October 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, Ll. 3-4.

²³A contingency plan devised in 1980 would have brought up to fifteen Soviet divisions into Poland to "provide military assistance." Ostensibly, the Soviet troops would have been taking part in military exercises, but in reality they would have joined with the Polish army and security forces to impose a crackdown. The plan evidently was conceived as early as August 1980 (see my translation below of a key Soviet document from 28 August 1980), and preparations for it gained momentum in early December 1980, as is evident from the cable that Kuklinski sent to the United States at that point (which I also have translated below). Subsequently, the contingency plan was updated and refined, becoming a full-fledged operational plan. In mid-1981, according to Vitalii Pavlov (in *Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce*, p. 219), the operational plan was largely set aside; but as late as the fall of 1981 Soviet military planners evidently retained—at least on paper—the option of sending Soviet troops into Polish territory under the guise of military exercises scheduled for November 1981. The existence of the updated plan was divulged to the U.S. government in the fall of 1981 by two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officials who defected, Colonel Jerzy Suminski and Colonel Wladyslaw

Ostaszewicz. See the comments of General Czeslaw Kiszczak, who had been head of Polish military intelligence until he became minister of internal affairs in 1981, in Beres and Skoczylas, eds., *General Kiszczak mowi*, pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until well into December 1981, though he emphasizes that Soviet leaders never decided whether they would implement it if martial law collapsed. See “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 54-56.

²⁴ “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” p. 56.

²⁵ “Notatka w sprawie najwazniejszych przedsiwziec wykonanych w Silach Zbrojnych od lipca br. w sferze przygotowan do ewentualnego wprowadzenia stanu wojennego,” 23 November 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygnatura (Sygn.) 1813/92/1 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for providing me with a copy of this document and the next two documents cited here. See Paczkowski’s own brief but illuminating discussion in *O Stanie Wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 134-152.

²⁶ “Zalacznik Nr. 2: Zamierzenia resortu spraw wewnetrznych,” attachment to Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych, “Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w kraju wg. stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.,” 25 November 1981 (Secret/Special Dossier), in Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (CA/MSW), Sygn. 228/1B, L. 19.

²⁷ Comments by Mirosław Milewski, then-Minister of Internal Affairs, transcribed in “Ocena sytuacji operacyjno-politycznej,” 12 June 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygn. 2308/IV.

²⁸ Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 50-51. A more detailed, contemporaneous account of this meeting is available in “Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau,” GVS-Nr. A 465 831 (Strictly Secret/Special Classification), 5 December 1981, from Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, East German minister of defense, to Erich Honecker, in MZA, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32641, Bl. 313-316.

²⁹ See “Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 1—Vorschlag, der am 03.12.1981 beraten wurde” and “Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 2—Vorschlag, der am 04.12.1981 beraten wurde,” 3 December 1981 and 4 December 1981, respectively, attached as appendices to Hoffmann’s report cited in the previous note.

³⁰ “Bericht über die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau.” See also Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 50-51.

³¹ Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 378-379. See also the comments by Siwicki and Jaruzelski in “Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.,” 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a ‘Solidarnosc,’ 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 555, 567-568.

³² Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 379.

³³ “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’she,” 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 6, L. 5 (emphasis added).

³⁴ *Ibid.* On both 7 and 8 December 1981, Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev, who assured the Polish leader that “the Soviet Union will not leave Poland in the lurch” (Sovetskii Soyuz

ne ostavit v bede Pol’shu), a formulation that Soviet officials had frequently used during the crisis (along with the nearly identical formulation of Sovetskii Soyuz ne dast v obidu Pol’shu—that is, “the Soviet Union will stick up for Poland.”). On December 9, Jaruzelski and other high-ranking Polish military officers, including all the top General Staff officers, deputy defense ministers, military district commanders, and service commanders, held a late-night meeting in the Polish General Staff building, where they reached a final decision to proceed with martial law. Evidently, Brezhnev’s rather vague statement of the previous day had been viewed—at least temporarily—as a sufficient basis on which to act. See Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 387-394; and the entries for 8 and 9 December 1981 in “Rabochaya tetrad’” No. 5, by Lieutenant-General V. I. Anoshkin, adjutant to Marshal Kulikov. (This document will be discussed and cited at greater length below.)

³⁵ Quoted from “Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübung ‘SOJUS 81’,” Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-Potsdam, AZN 32642, Bl. 54.

³⁶ “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” L. 7.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Ll. 8-9.

³⁸ Each “working notebook” (*rabochaya tetrad’*) that Anoshkin kept was given a number, reflecting the chronological order of a particular theme. The relevant notebook for December 1981 and early 1982 was No. 5. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in the next ten paragraphs are from that notebook.

³⁹ This entry for December 10 is not translated below because Anoshkin did not permit me to photocopy the relevant page. However, he did permit me to take brief notes of what appeared there. The final decision on martial law was prefigured at meetings of the PUWP Politburo on December 5 and of the Polish Council of Ministers on December 7, but the actual decision was adopted by the top military command, not by the PUWP Politburo. The session of the PUWP Politburo on December 5 (No. 18) was the last one before the imposition of martial law. In his adjourning comments at the meeting, Jaruzelski affirmed that “at today’s session of the Politburo we will not make any final decision.” See “Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.,” 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, p. 568. The meeting of the Polish Council of Ministers two days later also left the final decision to be approved by the military High Command on December 9. When Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev on the evening of December 7, he acknowledged that “a final decision has not yet been adopted.” See Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 387-388, as well as Jaruzelski’s first-hand account of the meeting on December 9 in *ibid.*, pp. 391-394. See also the entries in Anoshkin’s notebook for December 7-10. Interestingly enough, after Jaruzelski informed Soviet leaders on December 10 about the “final decision,” they mistakenly inferred that it had been approved by the PUWP Politburo. See “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 5-7.

⁴⁰ This same statement is recorded, word for word, in Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” p. 55.

⁴¹ Conversation in Jachranka, Poland, 10 November 1997, between Kania and Thomas S. Blanton of the National Security Archive. No doubt, one of the reasons for Jaruzelski’s lack of

confidence was his concern about the impact of Colonel Kuklinski's defection. According to Gribkov, Kuklinski's departure "forced the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to set about hurriedly reworking some aspects of the plans for martial law" ("Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," p. 49), but even after these changes were made, Jaruzelski feared that Solidarity would be fully tipped off about the details and timing of the operation, and would be ready to put up armed resistance. Soviet leaders shared some of Jaruzelski's concerns, but they believed that the martial law operation could still succeed if it were implemented forcefully enough. As it turned out, the concerns about a tip-off to Solidarity were largely unfounded. Even if the U.S. government had provided greater information to Solidarity, the timetable of the operation was not finalized until 9 December 1981, five weeks after Kuklinski left.

⁴²Comments by Nikolai Baibakov, Andrei Gromyko, and

Dmitrii Ustinov, recorded in "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4, 10, 12.

⁴³Ibid., L. 6.

⁴⁴See, in particular, Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 55-56.

⁴⁵For intriguing excerpts from the opening rounds of testimony by Jaruzelski and other former officials, see Anna Karas, ed., *Sad nad autorami stanu wojennego: Oskarzenia/wyjasnienia/obrona—przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). On the parliament's extension of a pardon, see "Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later.

Preface to the Translation of the Anoshkin Notebook

By Mark Kramer

A few comments are in order about the provenance and translation of these pages from General Anoshkin's notebook.

It had been known for some time that Anoshkin was present during Marshal Kulikov's meetings with General Jaruzelski in Poland in 1980-81. In a book published in 1995, another Soviet general who took part in some of the meetings described a typical scene:

The leader of Poland, Wojciech Jaruzelski, would come to the Helenow castle just south of Warsaw, where Kulikov, after receiving periodic instructions from Moscow, would hold arduous conversations with the clever Pole. General V. Anoshkin and I would sit on either side of the marshal.¹

What had not been known until very recently, however, is that Anoshkin kept notebooks with records of Kulikov's meetings, phone calls, and conversations in 1981.

The existence of these notebooks was first disclosed at the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," which was co-organized in Jachranka, Poland on 8-10 November 1997 by the Cold War International History Project, the National Security Archive, and the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kulikov and Anoshkin were among the participants. At one point during the conference, Kulikov referred in passing to Anoshkin's notebooks. As soon as the session ended, several participants went over to Anoshkin and asked him whether they could see the notebook that Kulikov had mentioned. Anoshkin took a red, hardbound volume out of his briefcase and showed us the page with notes of events that Kulikov had been discussing. Anoshkin pointed out the significance of a few phrases and explained to us when particular entries had been recorded. He answered questions I had about

the different types of ink and different handwriting.

When I asked Anoshkin for permission to photocopy the notebook, he initially demurred, but we then spoke with Marshal Kulikov, who gave his consent. I am grateful to Anoshkin and Kulikov for allowing me to photocopy pages from the notebook. I am also grateful to them for allowing me to publish the translation of those pages.

Unfortunately, the aging photocopy machine at the Jachranka facility was too slow for me to copy all the pages, but I was able to look through the entire notebook and ask Anoshkin questions about it. I asked him a few additional questions about it when I was in Moscow in March 1998.

Both in Jachranka and after returning to the United States, I went carefully over the notebook (including the pages I was unable to photocopy) to ensure that it was authentic. I cross-checked the entries with other newly declassified materials, and I asked Anoshkin several questions about specific points in the notes. In no case did I find even the slightest reason to doubt the authenticity of the document. Based on my scrutiny of the notebook and Anoshkin's extreme reluctance to let me photocopy it, I am fully confident that the document is precisely what it purports to be, namely a record of Kulikov's dealings in Poland in December 1981.

Anoshkin's notebook was very difficult to translate because of the frequent illegibility of his handwriting, the idiosyncratic abbreviations he used, and the enigmatic quality of some of his transliterations of Polish surnames and place names. At times I was forced to spend many hours poring over a few lines. Even after I became accustomed to Anoshkin's handwriting, the translation was onerous work. The finished product below is the result of more than ten preliminary drafts, which I extensively revised and smoothed out. I have tried to replicate the style and flavor of the original as best as possible, but for clarity's sake I have used full words to

translate a few Russian abbreviations and acronyms that would be incomprehensible in English. I also have included annotations to point out certain features of the text and to identify or comment on events that Anoshkin discusses. In addition, I have compiled a list of people [printed above] mentioned in the notebook, indicating the

main positions they held in December 1981. The list omits a few individuals of minor importance, but all key Polish and Soviet officials are identified there.

Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the

Key Individuals Mentioned In The Anoshkin Notebook

Positions listed are those held in December 1981

ANDROPOV, Yurii Vladimirovich — Chairman of the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB); member of the CPSU Politburo; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

ANOSHKIN, Lieutenant-General Viktor Ivanovich — personal adjutant to Marshal Kulikov

ARISTOV, Boris Ivanovich — Soviet Ambassador in Poland

BAIBAKOV, Nikolai Konstantinovich — Chief of Soviet State Planning Administration

BORISOV, Colonel-General Grigorii Ivanovich — Deputy Chief for Political Affairs, USSR's Communication Forces

BREZHNEV, Leonid Il'ich — CPSU General Secretary

BUJAK, Zbigniew — charismatic union organizer and leading official in the Warsaw branch of Solidarity

CHERNENKO, Konstantin Ustinovich — Member of the CPSU Politburo and CPSU Secretariat; Head of the CPSU CC General Department; long-time aide to Leonid Brezhnev; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

DZUR, General Martin — Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense

EMELYANOV, Colonel Fyodor Dmitrievich — Chief, Staff Political Department, Volga Military District

FEDOROV, Lieutenant-General Konstantin Vladimirovich — Deputy Chief, Central Military Medical Directorate

GROMYKO, Andrei Andreevich — Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; member of the CPSU Politburo; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

GURUNOV, Colonel Svet Semenovich — Officer for the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff

HUPALOWSKI, Division-General Tadeusz — First Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

HUSAK, Gustav — General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party

JANCZYSZYN, Admiral Ludwik — Commander of the Polish Navy; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

JARUZELSKI, Army-General Wojciech — General Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP); Polish Prime Minister; Polish Minister of National Defense; Chairman of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

JASINSKI, Division-General Antoni — Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff

KHOMENKO, Major-General Aleksandr Andreevich — Soviet military, naval, and air attache in Poland; Soviet GRU station chief in Warsaw

KREPSKI, Division-General Tadeusz — Commander of the Polish Air Force; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

KRYUCHKOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich — Deputy Chairman of the Soviet KGB; Chief, KGB First Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence)

KULIKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Georgievich — Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeevich — Soviet KGB deputy station chief in Warsaw

LOZOWICKI, Division-General Longin — Commander of Polish Air Defense Forces; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

MEREZHKO, Colonel-General Anatolii Grigor'evich — Deputy Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

MICHNIK, Adam — Polish historian and leading Solidarity intellectual

MIKHAILIN, Admiral Vladimir Vasil'evich — Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Naval Forces, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

MILEWSKI, Miroslaw — Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, October 1980-July 1981; member of the PUWP Politburo and PUWP Secretariat from July 1981

director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies. is the director of the Harvard Project of Cold War Studies at the Davis Center

¹Colonel-General Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Sem' vozhdai: Galereya liderov SSSR*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. 2, p. 64. A more recent collection of Volkogonov's unfinished memoirs and

writings, *Etyudy o vremeni* (Moscow: Novosti, 1998), offers a few additional comments (on pp. 82 and 90-91) about the meetings at Helenow between Kulikov and Jaruzelski in 1981, which Anoshkin and Volkogonov attended. Volkogonov writes that they received "detailed instructions by coded telegram every day from Moscow specifying what to do and say," and that Kulikov "in turn sent coded telegrams back to Moscow, spoke by secure telephone, and submitted reports" to the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov.

...Key Individuals Continued

MOLCZYK, General of Arms Eugeniusz — Polish Deputy Minister of National Defense; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

NAZAROV, Colonel Vadim Mikhailovich — Chief, Sanatorium and Health Resort Department, Central Military Medical Directorate

OGARKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Vasil'evich — Chief of the Soviet General Staff; Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense

OLIWA, Division-General Wlodzimierz — member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation; Presidium member of League for Defense of the Homeland

PASZKOWSKI, Division-General Roman — Governor of Katowice Province (installed with the introduction of martial law)

PAVLOV, Vitalii Grigor'evich — Soviet KGB station chief in Warsaw

PROSKURIN, Colonel Mikhail Vasil'evich — Soviet GRU officer

PUCHALA, Colonel Franciszek — Deputy Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff

RAKHMANNIN, Oleg Borisovich — First Deputy Head of the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

RAPACEWICZ, Division-General Henryk — Commander of Poland's Silesian Military District; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

RUSAKOV, Konstantin Viktorovich — CPSU Secretary; Head of the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries

SHCHEGLOV, Army-General Afanasii Fedorovich — Representative in Poland of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

SIWICKI, General of Arms Florian — Chief, Polish General Staff; Polish First Deputy Minister of National Defense; Candidate Member of the PUWP Politburo; member of Poland's

Military Council for National Salvation

SKACHKOV, Semyon Andreevich — Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations

SKALSKI, Division-General Jerzy — Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff

SOLOV'EV, Colonel Viktor Kirillovich — Chief, Food Supply Department, USSR's Northern Group of Forces

SPIRIN, Vasilii Vasil'evich — Charge d'Affaires at Soviet embassy in Poland

SUSLOV, Mikhail Andreevich — Member of the CPSU Politburo; CPSU Secretary responsible for ideology, international affairs, and many other issues; Head of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

SZKLARSKI, General Wacław — Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff

TERESHCHENKO, Colonel-General Mikhail Nikitovich — First Deputy Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

TITOV, Major-General Igor Nikolaevich — First Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, Volga Military District

TUCZAPSKI, Army-General Tadeusz — Polish Deputy Minister of National Defense; coordinator of martial law planning; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

USTINOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitrii Fedorovich — Soviet Minister of Defense; Member of the CPSU Politburo

UZYCKI, Division-General Jozef — member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

WALESA, Lech — founding leader of Solidarity

ZARUDIN, Colonel-General Yuri Fedorovich — Commander, USSR's Northern Group of Forces

ZIELINSKI, Division-General Zygmunt — Head of the Cadre Department in the Polish Ministry of National Defense

The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981

Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer

WORKING NOTEBOOK

Lieutenant-General

V. I. ANOSHKIN

[dotted line indicates new page in Notebook]

Embassy of the USSR in Poland

Cde. Boris Ivanovich Aristov

Cde. Vasil Vasilevich Spirin

KGB Station in Poland

Cde. Vitalii Georgevich Pavlov

Cde. Nikolai Sergeevich Leonov

CONTENTS:

(1981 - 1982)

- (1) Trip to Poland (7-17.12.1981) during the introduction of “**Martial Law**”
- (2) Trip to the CSSR for the “Druzhiba-82” Exercises (Czechoslovak People’s Army, Central Group of Forces, and the Hungarian People’s Army), 25-30.1.82
Meeting with Cdes. Husak and Dzur and the Armed Forces of the Central Group of Forces
3. Trip to Other Warsaw Pact Countries¹
(Up to 20.3.82)

[...]

[10 December]

18:10

Conversation with
Cde. S. S. Gurunov

— We arrived from the Embassy. Meetings with Aristov and Pavlov. The news is that no teleg. has yet come. We sent a 2nd ciphered teleg. under three signatures.²

— Senior officers/generals are working in the Gen. Staff bldg.³

1. Simultan. they are stepping up their attacks against Poland's allied ties with the USSR.⁴

Pravda on
11.12, p. 5

on tele
vis

They are pressing demagogic demands about Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and CMEA, as well as about the use of lines of communication passing through Polish territory for alliance purposes.⁵

Individual provocateurs are raising doubts about the existing Soviet-Polish borders⁶ and are maliciously defaming the history of the Soviet Army's role in liberating Poland from the Hitlerite occupiers.

All of this has caused legitimate consternation among the Soviet people.

11 DECEMBER

From 7:30 a.m. (Moscow time) VG⁷ gathered the generals to size up the situation. We reported it to DF⁸ — the tone of the conversation was moderate!!
After breakfast we went to the Embassy.

Com. B. I. Aristov raises the following:

Questions: — working out the withdrawal of families;

— aircraft to Brest for an evacuation;

— kitchens to the Embassy to feed the Emb. guards;

11:30 Talks Between VG and Siwicki. They exchanged views. Siwicki requested that we come for lunch at around 14-15:00 today.

Com. Pavlov requested VG to speak with D. F. Ustinov about receiving Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov in Poland.

“At this stage there will be no Soviet presence” — that is the answer we gave to Com. Milewski in Moscow⁹ (see the telegram of B. I. Aristov on 10.12.81)

— “You are distancing yourselves from us” - Jaruzelski

9:00 a.m. (Moscow time) 10.12.81¹⁰

Instructions of D. F. Ustinov.

When you hold negotiations with the Polish side, it is essential to emphasize that “the Poles themselves must resolve the Polish question.”

“We are not preparing to send troops onto the territory of Poland.”¹¹

This is terrible news for us!!
A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went on—now everything has disappeared.
What is Jaruzelski's situation now?!

16:35 ?! VG arrived from the residence of Com. Aristov, who reported on an extremely confidential basis that:

1. As instructed — Called - Jaruzelski and Milewski and raised questions:
 - (1) — We request that someone from the political leadership come to our country.
Who will and when?
 - (2) — To send a message of support to us. Aristov said that representation at the Center has been arranged.
 - (3) — Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR? (about the additional sending of troops)
 - (4) — What sort of measures of economic aid can the USSR provide to Poland?

ARISTOV ← RUSAKOV:



1. No one will be coming.
2. Measures will be taken.
3. No troops will be sent.
4. Baibakov is providing an answer.¹³

RUSAKOV'S ANSWER:



For the Decision of the WTO C-in-C:¹⁴
(My suggestions) — 11.12.81

1. To find a position with a site in the Embassy (work, relaxation, eating)
(Titov, Fedorov)
2. “Bulava” communications in the Embassy.¹⁵ From where to put it. A crew, eating, toilet facilities . . . , etc.¹⁶
Borisov is to drive the commander along the route on 12.12
3. Guards and defense — Armored pers. carr. . . . Shilka artil.¹⁷
Polish identification marks. Merezhko Must remove **their own** unit’s marks.¹⁸
4. Merezhko —> Oliwa, a unit for the guards of the Embassy
5. A kitchen — one for meals. Groceries Fedorov —> to get them
6. To Borisov —> Molczyk, Gen. Staff, via Oliwa
Scheme of communications District, Representative Zarudin, Rembertow¹⁹
7. Transport for conveyance —> a site in the DefMin 1-2 armored tank regiments
Merezhko, Titov
8. Pilots — to stay at Solnewice on the night of 12-13.12
(Tu-134)
An-24 — on alert at the airport
Titov
9. One more office — Anoshkin
10. To 7 offices — “end of Bulava”
Borisov

.....
Allocation of people:

Embassy:

V. G. Kulikov
Anoshkin
Titov
Bredun
Popov
Lakna²⁰

Send To:

Rembertow:
Merezhko

To hotels:

— Saventsov
— Lozhechnikov
— Larisa
— Grechiko
— Fedorov
— Nazarov - on duty

11. Zarudin — groceries for meals!
12. Supply of maps — Grechiko

Instructions of the C-in-C:

- 2 An-26 — in Brest
 - 2 An-26 — in Krzywa²¹
 1. 1 An-24 | Okecie
Tu-134 |
Il-78 as a liaison — Brest (Krzywa)
 2. To have physicians: from Zarudin.
 3. Regarding weapons for the officers corps? Request in the Gen. Staff
 - 4.²²
-

Report to Def Min D. F. Ustinov

17:35 (Moscow time) 11.12.81

The report overall is the same. Without any sort of changes. In the volume of ciphered telegrams and supplements

Discussion with Com. Siwicki

from 19:40 (Moscow time) 11.12.81

Very Important!

Helenow²³

VG put forth a request to focus on arrangements for unloading meat.

There are some occasions when even meat is being incinerated — subversion.²⁴

Siwicki. The date of the Actions is set for the eve of Saturday-Sunday.

Until this decision is implemented, it will not be made known.

Only a narrow circle of people know about it.

The situation is getting complicated. A session of “S”²⁵ at the factory. Roughly 200 young thugs gathered.²⁶

Per Jaruzelski’s instruction, he reported:

When everything is prepared for the culmination, he requests that the following questions be answered:

(1) The Soviet side would send for consultations on political matters in the plan for the introduction of martial law.²⁷

(2) later - a request to consult on economic matters. The economic situation is dramatic. He thanked Baibakov. We understand

the inconvenience in the USSR, but we are counting on the provision of aid in accordance with the decisions that were adopted

— we also viewed your arrival favorably.

For us this gives support in the matter of introducing martial law and struggling to overcome the crisis.

WW²⁸ is very worried that no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale economic and military aid.

|| Just 24 hours remains until the very painful moment.
|| But we aren’t having political consultations on the
|| part of the USSR.

At this stage there can be no consideration at all of sending troops.³⁰

|| In a conversation via secure telephone
|| with Com. Andropov, we understood
|| that we could count on assistance at
|| a 2nd stage of our operations.²⁹

But we don’t know how the Soviet Union understands the 2nd stage.

WW raises this question because even though it was clear earlier, the situation recently has changed.

The adversary is supported from outside and is making the situation more tense.

The church — whereas earlier it took a neutral position, it now is creating tension.³¹

It might join forces with “S” and draw young people to its ranks, forcing a confrontation.³²

A week ago we appealed to the Sov. leadership — but there is no answer.

Com. Jaruz. met yesterday with Aristov and raised questions of a political and economic nature. What is the reaction now of the USSR to our actions?

But we received no answer.

— We are very worried about what the ambassador’s adviser on economic relations (trade) is reporting today to the Min. of Foreign Trade (of 30,000 tons — 12,000 to be sent to Legnica).³³

This concerns only the deliveries that are already coming to us.

Summing up these problems:

Very Imp.	— have had no meeting at the level of the leadership. Consultations — the economic question
--------------	---

and we cannot embark on any adventurist actions if the Sov. comrades do not support us.³⁴

Whereas Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov earlier would come and see us, now no one is coming. We aren’t receiving an answer to our questions.

Politb memb. Econom aid Sending of troop		35	W Wlad is very upset and nervous and put forth a request that while there is time they receive an answer by <u>10:00 a.m. on 12.12.</u>
--	--	----	---

Otherwise we can extend the schedule for initiating it by one day, this is the most we can wait.

!! || “We are soberly evaluating the situation, and if there will be no politic., econ., and mil. support from the USSR, our country might be lost” (for the WTO)”³⁶

Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step.

Psychologically, WW’s state of mind is very nervous.

With a heavy heart I report all of this to you.

— The leadership is resolute, but it’s necessary to decide matters.

WW wanted to travel to the USSR. But the time wasn't suitable for us. I suggested traveling a bit earlier. But the situation did not permit it.

We transmitted the requests to the ambassador, but have received no answer.

With what sort of polit. slogan must we act against the adversary. "The mechanism is operating; the bow is stretched tight." — This is along military lines.

We can defer the schedule for starting by a day: from Sunday to Monday (13./14.12). But no later.

VG I am not fully informed about what you transmitted to the ambassador.

I know what sort of work you carried out in preparing the introduction of martial law. It is very significant.

You do have the forces. That much we know.

If the church is stepping up its activity, that's because you did not give a rebuff to the enemy. And the church is continuing to exert pressure on the leadership.³⁷

The leading officers for martial law are in good spirits, and there is no need to speak about any sort of adventurist action.

.....

You have real strength. You insisted that Poland is able to resolve its problems on its own. The friends spoke to you about this matter, and you remember it.

We also spoke a lot about this at the DefMin Comm. mtg.³⁸
It's now time to act. The date should not be postponed, and indeed a postponement is now impossible.

I don't know what Andropov was saying.
But friends remain friends.

I will report all the questions to my leadership, and you must act decisively.

If the Church had caused tension, you obviously would feel your weakness. Evidently, that weakness lies at the center of this deterioration.

Yes, the mechanism has been neglected. We understand, and the leadership in Moscow understands. But does this mean that Com. Jaruz. has not made a final decision?? Is that so? We would like to know this.³⁹

As far as the arrival of Baibakov is concerned, he examined all the questions and said that the gov't will consider them.⁴⁰

Siwicki About "Adventurism." We link this word with polit. consultations.
We don't want to show the role of the party in this conflict
How does the Soviet leadership assess our polit. our line.⁴¹

.....

We are embarking on this action under the slogan “Salvation of the Motherland” and “National Salvation.”
It was in this sense that the term “adventurist action” was being used.

VG Why has the question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law.

Siw. The decision has been made. The premier requests that you look upon these matters with understanding. And again reminds you about his requests. Without help from outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles.

The enemy has said his final word. The sides have clearly staked out their positions. Now what is needed is a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution.

A “Military-Revolutionary Council of National Salvation” has been formed and is already beginning to act.

“They want to arrest 50 people from the old leadership.”

Mutual thanks and greetings.

P.S.⁴² Siwicki left here dissatisfied. He got nothing new and heard nothing new from V.G. The WTO C-in-C has been restrained by Moscow!!

.....
12 12

9:30 The WTO C-in-C held talks with Com. Gurunov and gave an explanation along the lines of our telegram of yesterday under three signatures: Aristov, Kulikov, and Pavlov

The ciphered message is very bad. The introduction of martial law is made dependent on the fulfillment of four points. Jaruzelski is demanding a meeting at the highest level, an answer about the provision of military assistance, etc.

Com. M. V. Proskurin (10:00 a.m. Moscow time) — on duty by group (of ours)

Assault front at 6:30 a.m. — moved out to 3 command pts.	} together for 1.5-2 km
Warsaw Mil. Dist. at 20:00 — →	
Pomeranian Mil. Dist. at 2:40 a.m. in the vicinity of Bydgoszcz (to the north)	3 command pts.
Silesian Mil. Dist. at 22:00 toward Wroclaw	3 command pts.
55th mot. reg. of 16th tank div. at 5:00 a.m. on 12.12 concent. south toward Szczytno	
13th mot. reg. of 5th tank div. at 5:30 a.m. on 12.12 was in the vicinity of Gniezno at 14:00 awaiting a concentra.	

During the night, the district commanders brought to combat readiness.⁴³

34th mot. reg. of 7th mech. brig.
32nd mot. reg. of 8th mot. div.
49th mot. reg. of 20th tank div. (Kolobrzeg)
12th mot. reg. of 4th mot. div. (Gorzow Wielkopolski)
17th mot. reg. of 4th mot. div.
42nd mot. reg. of 11th tank div. (Zary)
33rd mot. reg. of 2nd mot. div. (Nysa)

.....

25th tank reg. of 10th tank div. — Opole

In all, 10 regiments

The remaining formations and units for martial law — at their sites

— at 10:00 (Moscow time) Operational Groups from the Northern Group of Forces will be sent to the Pomer. and Sil. Mil. Dists. linked by a communications hub

8 divisions brought to combat readiness

9:15 10 people from the United Armed Forces Staff flew in from Moscow.

My disagreements with VG about
the possible composition of our gov't
group at the request of Jaruzelski

The suggestions were
justified (see next page)⁴⁴

<p>Suslov (Gromyko) Andropov (Ustinov) Rusakov Kryuchkov Gosplan (one of the Deputies)</p>
--

13:00

Conversation with D. F. Ustinov

VG briefly reported on the situation.

|| D. F. informed them that the following
|| have flown to Poland at the
|| request of the Polish side.⁴⁵

Suslov
Chernenko
Rusakov
Rakhmanin

13. 12. 81

23:30 — communications

24:00 — 00 — introduction of “Martial Law”⁴⁶

5:00 13.12 — beginning of deployment of communications

Mil. Coun. of National Salvation — 15 people

During the night, information came in that a “Revolutionary Council of National Salvation” has been formed, consisting of 15 people. M. V. Proskurin also relayed this information to me, though there are other reports that the title of this council included 16 — but others!!⁴⁷

analyzing it — in the title and
by surnames, of whom does it consist?

At 6:00 a.m. (local time) on 13.12.81 — Com. Jaruzelski addressed the nation on radio and TV⁴⁸

Jaruzelski
 Siwicki asks regarding
 Molczyk apture
 + 3 commdrs., navy
 Tuczapski
 div. commdr.

?! At 3:00 — signal for troops to shift to military alert with departure to regions of concentration

! ? Walesa (Bujak, Michnik) have fled from ask. Some of the leadership of “S” have been arrested.

5:25 Zarudin: Police in Legnica did not act.

5:50 N. V. Ogarkov — about comm ons
 — covering the ne?

Departure of Troops — at 5:00 depa the Wars. Mil. Dis.
 — at 6:00 all th

83-18 Siwicki

Walesa + captured (Siwicki reported)
 The navy — begins coastline operations at 6:00 (at was assigned the mission)

89-71 Shcheglov

! ? Mikhailin — must be redeployed and sent to the here)
 — They handled the situation with the Main Ope Directorate

Tereshchenko — based in Legnica; reported

Legnica — work is proceeding. They began with th tion of as many as 20 people.

A signal — to Rapacewicz, Uzycki

— Uzycki 8th Mech. Div. — to Gdansk
 20th Tank Div. — to Bydgoszcz
 11th Tank Div. — Wroclaw

Merezhko reported that they have everything in ord Wroclaw and Legnica, crowds gathered. Wroclaw —
 250-300 people. But no resistance was shown. Th stn. has been placed under guard.

5:00 — 10,000 soldiers move into Warsaw

Bujak and Michnik — have left

Lublin — scuffles with the police
 Bialystok — all have been detained In Wa 0-70 % have been detained

Szczecin — good
 Leczna — 100 %
 Gdansk — good

LISTS of the Oper. Grps Mil. Dist. Navy, Air Def., Air Force

II. Solov’ev — 15 peop. / 25 peop.

_____ Economic (Shupov, Dept. Frnt. Hosp.).

NATIONAL UNDERGROUND
COMMITTEE OF "SOLIDARITY"

First Session of the
Military Council of Nat.
Salvation, from 11:00 to 19:30

1.5 hours W. Jaruzelski (Dep. Min.)

To let the people know that the Army has saved the nation and the country

The moment is chosen — successful, there were no such things, and it is impossible to delay it any further

Ideally taking account of the public mood and other factors.

I. there is success, but difficulties lie ahead.

The West will boycott, but the allies will help.⁴⁹

Martial law can be extended by several months. But in accordance with measures to restore order in the provinces, they must display resolve, careful organization, and exactingness

Sympathy for the Army and Navy is growing.

I thought about dispatching a unit of honor guards — square caps

A profound change⁵⁰ of cadres is necessary: a purge in the PZPR and the gov't.

.....
Carry it out immediately; all unworthy officials will be removed from their posts.

Comdrs. allotted by zones. He believes they must allot zones for the commanders

— Gdansk — Janczyszyn
— Katowice — Lozowicki
— Poznan — Krepski

Appoint Gen. Zielinski — a secretary

WRON. (head of Main Pers. Direct. in Min. of Nat.Def.)

Remove the Katowice governor; appoint Gen. Paszkowski (former ambass. to Mongolia)

Operation has begun — in Warsaw

In Khust Lenina — measures were taken to restore order.

20 commissars at the Ministry

Repeated — (all the generals), repeated for everyone what was earlier

I explained that it all would be in a historical sense
and

My
assessment
→
personal
opinion

Assessing the behavior of W. Jaruzelski:

many "I"s; the army is forgotten
a certain ostentatiousness and bombast came through
Walesa — this is the politic. map
"We are still using him."
Walesa today declared a hunger strike

.....

Krepski gave a speech. The content?

Siwicki spoke and gave instructions to every

Draft of a Ciph. Teleg. to Moscow

I. ??

II. The Military Council of National Salvation will concentrate all polit. power in the country, but the nature of its activity so far in our view is not that of a collegial leadership.

Com. W. Jaruzelski has preserved for himself all aspects of political and military leadership.

Preliminary results of the struggle to wipe out the counterrevol.⁵¹ confirm that there are sufficient forces to destroy it successfully on their own without the provision of any sort of military help from outside.

The active work of the MVD and State Sec. organs in detaining the leaders of the counterrevolution has strengthened the position of the military-political leadership of the country, and this creates the necessary preconditions for the stabilization of

the social-polit. situation in the country. The alignment of forces is gradually shifting in favor of the leadership of the country.⁵²

The Economy see Oleg Nikonov

Foreign Policy Activity — N. S. Leonov

In addition to this, the participation of a large proportion of the working class in strikes shows that the ideas of the counterrevolution are still alive among the broad popular masses. For this reason, the only way to prevent the remaining part of the leading core from resorting to an illegal situation and launching a variety of anti-government actions is by thoroughly destroying the counterrevolution.

¹Translator's Note: A slight grammatical error in the original has been corrected in the translation.

²Translator's Note: These ellipses were in the original. The three signatures on the ciphered telegram were those of Boris Aristov, Vitalii Pavlov, and Viktor Kulikov (see entry below). Pavlov, the KGB station chief in Warsaw, wrote in his memoirs that his "close contact with the Soviet ambassador, B. I. Aristov, who kept in constant touch with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko, enabled me to have a good sense of how the MFA was assessing things. I also was aware of the close relations among Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, and the defense minister, D. F. Ustinov. Grasping this, the ambassador and I began to prepare joint reports under two signatures. This practice facilitated a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of all the circumstances and facts that became known to us both through embassy channels and through the KGB residency's channels. My closest contact of all was with the representative in Poland of the Main Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Army-General A. F. Shcheglov, who naturally had a good sense of how our Military High Command viewed things. He sometimes added his efforts to the joint reports that the ambassador and I sent back to the Center, especially when they dealt with military issues. During the most critical phases of the situation in Poland, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Marshal V. G. Kulikov, would come here to meet urgently with the ambassador and me. I gave him thorough briefings on the most important aspects of the situation, naturally without referring to the sources of my information. The marshal and I had a very good rapport, and I retain a good impression of him to this day. . . . Only with the military attache, Major-General Fomenko [it should be Khomenko — M.K.] did I somehow fail to develop close relations. Perhaps this was partly due to the well-known rivalry between the GRU, which he represented, and the foreign intelligence branch of the KGB." Pavlov added that Khomenko's reports were "not sufficiently competent and did not always take account of the social and economic dimensions of the Polish crisis." See *Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1994), pp. 186-187.

³Translator's Note: The General Staff building was the hub of the martial law operation. It was also the site where Jaruzelski and other top military commanders made a final decision on 9 December to proceed with martial law.

⁴Translator's Note: From here to the bottom of the page, Anoshkin records sentences that appeared the next day as a paragraph in a scathing Soviet article about the situation in Poland. See "K polozheniyu v Pol'she," *Pravda* (Moscow), 11 December 1981, p. 5. On the 11th, Anoshkin added a brief reference to this article in the left-hand margin below. The *Pravda* article diverges very slightly from what Anoshkin records here, as indicated below.

⁵Translator's Note: In the *Pravda* article, the latter part of this sentence reads: ". . . about the use of lines of communication passing through Polish territory to exert pressure on Poland's allies." —CMEA is the acronym for the "Council on Mutual Economic Assistance."

⁶Translator's Note: The *Pravda* article refers to just the Soviet-Polish "border" rather than the plural "borders."

⁷Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Viktor Georgievich Kulikov.

⁸Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Dmitrii Fedorovich Ustinov.

⁹Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981, the Soviet KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, noted that he had "spoken yesterday with Milewski." Andropov expressed puzzlement that Milewski "doesn't know about 'Operation X' [the martial law operation] and about the concrete timeframe in which it would be carried out." Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 g.: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in *Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 6, List (L.) 7*, which I translated in Issue No. 5 of the CWIHP *Bulletin*, pp. 134-138. Because of unavoidable ambiguities in the Russian language, it is possible that the "we" in this sentence from Anoshkin's notebook should be translated as "they," but the meaning in either case is the same.

¹⁰Translator's Note: This entire page is in Kulikov's handwriting.

¹¹Translator's Note: These comments are fully in line with the CPSU Politburo's decisions on the 10th. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," esp. Ll. 5-12.

¹²Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (in a conversation at the Jachranka conference on 11 November 1997), these lines report what Jaruzelski said after being informed of Rusakov's response.

¹³Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on December 10, Soviet leaders instructed "Cdes. Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue studying the issue of economic aid to Poland, taking account of the exchange of views at the CC Politburo session." (See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 14.)

¹⁴Translator's Note: Diagonally across the upper left-hand corner of this page is the following: "Reported to the WTO C-in-C at 14:45 (local time). Approved. I will take action."

¹⁵Translator's Note: "Bulava" is the Russian word for "mace."

¹⁶Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original.

¹⁷Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original. The nickname "Shilka," derived from a famous battle, was used for the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense artillery system. The Soviet Army deployed thousands of ZSU-23-4s, and the East European armies also possessed large quantities.

¹⁸Translator's Note: These lines indicate that Soviet armored combat vehicles in Poland, when moved out to various sites, were to be disguised as Polish vehicles.

¹⁹Translator's Note: Rembertow, on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw, was a key Soviet military base and military communications center. It is currently the site of the Polish National Defense Academy, the Polish Military Staff College, and—most important of all—the Central Military Archive.

²⁰Translator's Note: Two additional names, Saventsov and Grechiko, were listed here but then crossed out.

²¹Translator's Note: Krzywa is an airfield in Legnica Province, some 33 kilometers outside the city of Legnica in southwestern Poland near the Czech and German borders. Legnica was the headquarters of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of Forces, and Krzywa was the main air base for those forces. With a 2,500-meter airstrip, the Krzywa airfield can accommodate any type of aircraft.

²²Translator's Note: There is no fourth point listed after the number.

²³Translator's Note: Helenow is a small village approximately 100 kilometers south of Warsaw, which was used by the Polish government. In a castle there, Kulikov frequently held meetings with Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders during the 1980-81

crisis.

²⁴Translator's Note: Kulikov's concern about this matter can be better understood in light of remarks made at the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December by Nikolai Baibakov, the head of the Soviet State Planning Administration, who had been in Warsaw from 8 to 10 December: "In accordance with the [Soviet] Politburo's decision and at the request of the Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat. . . . The produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. When the produce is being transported to the Polish stations, blatant sabotage has been taking place. Poles have been expressing outrageously obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even begin to keep track of all the insults that have been directed against us." See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4-5.

²⁵Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Solidarity.

²⁶Translator's Note: These two sentences recapitulate a passage in the December 11 *Pravda* article (cited above), which reads: "As Polish television reports, the leaders of local 'Solidarity' organizations have begun to create 'fighting groups' at enterprises. Each shock group includes up to 250-300 people. . . . Young thugs from the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland' have shown up on Polish streets sporting symbols of the Homeland Army, which in its time, as is known, took up arms in a struggle against the establishment of a people's-democratic order in Poland."

²⁷Translator's Note: This is the way the sentence reads in the original. The word "someone" appears to be missing after the word "send."

²⁸Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Wojciech Wladyslawowich—that is, Jaruzelski. Patronymics are used only in Russian, not in Polish. However, Soviet leaders often referred this way to their closest Polish, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian counterparts.

²⁹Translator's Note: The "2nd stage" of the operation, slated to begin as early as December 14, would have been gravely complicated if the initial crackdown had not prevented widespread turmoil and resistance.

³⁰Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (conversation at Jachranka, 9 November 1997), these remarks at the left were Andropov's response to Jaruzelski's request.

³¹Translator's Note: Anoshkin's comments here are very similar to remarks by Andropov at the CPSU Politburo session on December 10: "The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its position, which in essence is now completely supportive of 'Solidarity.'" That view was echoed by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who declared that "there are no longer any neutrals." (Both cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 6, 8.) The same point was made in the December 11 *Pravda* article (cited above), which reads: "Church circles and organizations have noticeably stepped up their activity. The number of sermons in the churches aimed at discrediting the government's efforts to defend socialism has increased."

³²Translator's Note: Baibakov reported to the CPSU Politburo on December 10 that Jaruzelski "was deeply disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as you know, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish authorities." (Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 4.)

Archbishop Jozef Glemp had met with Lech Walesa on 5 December 1981 and then, two days later, sent separate letters to Jaruzelski, Walesa, all the deputies in the Polish Sejm, and the National Students' Union. In the letters to Jaruzelski and Walesa, the primate called for the resumption of tripartite (government-Solidarity-Church) talks. In the letters to Sejm deputies, he urged that Jaruzelski not be granted "extraordinary powers." In his letter to the National Students's Union, Glemp called for an end to the recent spate of university strikes. In none of the letters did he even remotely call for anything tantamount to "a holy war against the Polish authorities."

³³Translator's Note: This again refers to the 30,000 tons of meat that the Soviet Union had promised to ship to Poland. At the Politburo meeting on 10 December, Baibakov indicated that 15,000 tons of the meat had already been sent. (Suslov later cited the figure of 16,000 tons already sent, but Baibakov's figure is probably more reliable.) See *ibid.*, Ll. 4-5, 13.

³⁴Translator's Note: The word translated here as "adventurist action," *aventyura*, can also be translated as a "dangerous" or "hazardous" action, but the word "adventurist" is more appropriate for reasons that will become clear below.

³⁵Translator's Note: The three points to the left of this vertical line are the three issues raised by Jaruzelski. Scrawled diagonally to the right of the vertical line is: "4 questions—a request."

³⁶Translator's Note: This sentence in Anoshkin's book contained two quotation marks at the end, as indicated.

³⁷Translator's Note: Evidently, Anoshkin means that the church was continuing to urge caution and restraint on the Solidarity leadership.

³⁸Translator's Note: This refers to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on 2-4 December 1981 in Moscow. Jaruzelski was Poland's national defense minister (as well as prime minister and PUPP First Secretary), but because he was so preoccupied at home, Siwicki attended the meeting in his place.

³⁹Translator's Note: Kulikov was aware that a "final" decision to proceed with martial law had been adopted on the night of December 9, but his comments here suggest that he was beginning to worry that Jaruzelski might try to back away from the decision.

⁴⁰Translator's Note: Baibakov, as noted earlier, had recently been in Warsaw to consult with the Polish leadership. When Baibakov returned to Moscow on December 10, he briefed the Soviet Politburo. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 1-4.

⁴¹Translator's Note: The extra "our" is in the original.

⁴²Translator's Note: Anoshkin rendered this abbreviation for "postscript" in the Latin alphabet.

⁴³Translator's Note: All troop deployments listed here and on

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the next page refer exclusively to Polish, not Soviet, units. The two Soviet divisions in Poland were ordered to keep a low profile throughout the martial law operation. In addition to the units mentioned by Anoshkin, three other Polish army regiments—the 2nd Mechanized Regiment of the 1st Mechanized Division in Warsaw, the 3rd Air Regiment of the 6th Airborne Division in Krakow, and the 14th Mechanized Regiment of the 12th Mechanized Division in Szczecin—took part in the operation, performing administrative tasks and providing support for the Mechanized Detachments of Civil Police (ZOMO) and other security forces that actually carried out the crackdown. Siwicki later noted that these army units constituted an elite force selected for their “outstanding level of political readiness”—that is, their willingness to use force on behalf of the Communist regime. See “Pełna gotowosc obrony socjalistycznego panstwa: Konferencja sprawozdawcza PZPR Instytucji Centralnych MON,” *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 25 February 1983, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴ Translator’s Note: Anoshkin drew a curved arrow from these lines to the names on the right.

⁴⁵ Translator’s Note: This sentence and the four names were crossed out with a diagonal line running downward from left to right. It is unclear why Ustinov would have claimed that these officials had already flown to Poland. It is also not known why they ended up not coming to Poland. Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in 1981, has claimed that the Soviet Politburo proved unable to reach a consensus on whether to send this high-ranking delegation to Poland as a gesture of solidarity—see Gribkov’s “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 56—but he provides no specific evidence to support this claim or to explain why a consensus was infeasible.

⁴⁶ Translator’s Note: Just below this line, written diagonally from left to right, is the following:

- “1) to Merezhko
- 2) to Borisov
- 3) Emelyanov—answer
Clock—mine”

The word *chasy* in this last line might also be translated as “wristwatch.” The context leaves open either possibility.

⁴⁷ Translator’s Note: In fact, the Military Council of National Salvation (*Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego*, or WRON) consisted of 21—not 15 or 16—high-ranking military officers, chaired by Jaruzelski. The other members were Jozef Baryla, Kazimierz Garbacik, Mirosław Hermaszewski, Tadeusz Hupałowski, Ludwik Janczyszyn, Michał Janiszewski, Jerzy Jarosz, Czesław Kiszczak, Tadeusz Krepski, Roman Les, Longin Łozowicki, Tadeusz Makarewicz, Eugeniusz Molczyk, Włodzimierz Oliwa, Czesław Piotrowski, Henryk Rapacewicz, Florian Siwicki, Tadeusz Tuczapski, Jozef Uzycki, and Jerzy Włosinski.

⁴⁸ Translator’s Note: For the full text of the speech, see “Ukonstytuowała się Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego: Przemowienie gen. armii W. Jaruzelskiego,” *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (Warsaw), 15 December 1981, pp. 1-3.

⁴⁹ Translator’s Note: Soviet and Polish leaders expected all along that Western countries would adopt sanctions against Poland (and perhaps against the Soviet Union) if martial law were imposed. Gromyko had noted on 10 December 1981 that “of course if the Poles deliver a blow against ‘Solidarity,’ the West in all likelihood will not give them [further] credits and will not offer any other kind of help. [The Poles] are aware of

this, and this obviously is something that we, too, have to bear in mind.” (The actual sanctions that materialized were probably less severe than Soviet and Polish leaders had feared.) In early December 1981, Polish vessels were ordered to avoid entering foreign ports and to stay in neutral waters so that their property could not be seized. Baibakov had assured Jaruzelski on December 9 that Poland’s requests for economic aid to offset the sanctions “will be given due consideration in Moscow,” but at the December 10 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Soviet leaders displayed relatively little willingness to consider large-scale economic assistance for Poland. Andropov remarked that “as far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been proposed. No doubt, something will have to give.” He accused the Polish authorities of being “insolent” and of “approaching things this way merely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they will be able to lay all the blame on us.” The Soviet Politburo decided simply to give further consideration to the “question of economic assistance to Poland.” All quotations here are from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 6, 8-9.

⁵⁰ Translator’s Note: This word was inadvertently omitted by Anoshkin, but the context and the adjectival endings make clear that “change” or “replacement” (*smena* or *peremena* or *zamena* or *perestanovka*) should be here.

⁵¹ Translator’s Note: The preceding line was inserted by Anoshkin to replace the following words, which he had crossed out: “Supervision of the struggle against the counterrevolution in locales around the country . . .” Initially, he had replaced this with “An analysis of the situation in the country . . .,” but then he chose a third way of phrasing it. Anoshkin crossed out “An analysis of,” but he neglected to cross out the words “situation in the country,” which are squeezed above crossed-out lines.

⁵² Translator’s Note: Anoshkin had another brief sentence here—“The authority of the leading organs has been strengthened”—which he subsequently crossed out.

Commentary

Editor's Note: Earlier this year, CWIHP asked General Wojciech Jaruzelski, former Polish Prime Minister and a key participant in the Polish events of 1980-81, to comment on Mark Kramer's introduction and translation of the Anoshkin notebook. We are pleased to print his commentary below. A few editorial changes (indicated by brackets) were necessary due to the fact that General Jaruzelski commented on a Polish translation (and differently paginated version) of Mark Kramer's article. CWIHP encourages the release of further documents from Polish and other archives on the events of 1980-81.

By Wojciech Jaruzelski

The limitations of time, as well as an eye ailment, make it difficult for me at this time to comment fully and essentially on Mr. Mark Kramer's article entitled, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland"—all the more since General Florian Siwicki and I are simultaneously preparing materials in relation to General Anoshkin's "working notebook." These materials will contain concrete, factually argued comments dealing also with some questions not dealt with or discussed at length in this letter.

Trusting in the professional competence of Mr. Kramer, I wish to avoid the inevitable polemics should his text be published in its present form. Polemics as such, of course, are not a bad thing, they can even be useful and desirable, but it would not be good if I had to present publicly specific criticisms questioning not only the logic, but also the veracity, of many statements, facts, and quotations cited in the above mentioned text. I believe Mr. Kramer wrote the text under the pressure of a deadline and that is why he was unable to consult other supplementary and verifiable documents. He was unable at the same time to confront and appraise in a more profound way the credibility of the sources he summoned. As a result, his outlook on a very complicated weave of facts, events, and processes at the time through the prism of only a few and selectively revealed sources is by its nature restrictive, simplified, and on a series of issues completely pointless. Unfortunately, the summary judgments in Mr. Kramer's text go quite far. If this was simply a historical debate about the distant past, I would not see it as a serious problem. In this case, however, the matter refers to a "hot" topic that is still, and lately even more so, the object of political games and confrontations.

Moving to matters of substance, I will limit myself to commenting on just some. First, let me deal with those that have to do with manifest facts as well as with elementary logic. From the sources quoted by Mr. Kramer, it is allegedly clear that during those few days of December 1981 he describes I was supposedly depressed, "unnerved," "extremely neurotic and diffident about [my] abilities," vacillating, "psychologically...gone to pieces." Consequently, not seeing any possibility of implementing martial law with my own forces, I "desperately implore[d], want[ed], ask[ed]" for foreign troops to be brought into Poland. I would like to put aside the moral and political aspects of such a statement, which, for me as a Pole, a front-line soldier, and a commander of many years are, to

put it simply, offensive. I would like to put aside the "poetic" moods from which I allegedly suffered. There is no question that deciding to implement martial law was an unusually and dramatically difficult step, and it was extremely hard on me. But there are scores, even hundreds, of people with whom I met and talked directly at the time, and nobody can say that I lacked in decisiveness or self-control. Let me describe one event to illustrate this. In the afternoon hours on December 13, that is, after the decision had already been made, I met (and proof of that can be found in newspapers) with a delegation (consisting of several score people) of the Housing Cooperative Congress, which was taking place in Warsaw at the time. I wonder what those people would have said about my behavior at the time. I am supposed to have been "crushed by the refusal" [i.e., of Suslov to guarantee Soviet intervention — trans.]. Nothing of the sort was in fact the case—I was relaxed and calm. Besides, the course of the whole operation confirms this. At this point, one question comes to mind: In whose interests was it to portray my mood in such an extremely deformed way? What about the entry in Anoshkin's "notebook" that says, "The Commander-in-Chief of Unified Armed Forces had his hands tied by Moscow"? Perhaps historians should analyze this track.

The core of the "vivisection" of the state of my soul conducted by Mr. Kramer in his article is to show my thinking to have been as follows: First, that the reaction and resistance of the opposition and of the majority of the society would be so strong that we would not be able to deal with it using our own forces; and second, that the Polish Army was not sufficiently reliable or loyal.

Neither the former nor the latter makes any sense, which was very convincingly proved by real life. In another place describing Anoshkin's "notebook," I will prove this point in a more concrete way. Before that, however, I would like to ask a question that has been stubbornly on my mind since I read Mr. Kramer's article. If Jaruzelski indeed was almost panic-stricken, full of fear, apprehension, and doubts whether we would be able to impose martial law by ourselves, why then did he not abandon the idea of imposing it in the first place? Or did he, by imposing martial law, entangle himself in a hopeless, suicidal mess that would end in unavoidable ruin?! As everyone knows, neither the former nor the latter happened.

Another piece of information cited by Mr. Kramer is

the supposed readiness expressed by Gen. Siwicki to move the date of the imposition of martial law back one day if Soviet military aid were to be secured. That would have meant not Sunday, December 13, but Monday, December 14. Gen. Siwicki flatly denies that any such considerations took place. After all one of the *key conditions* for an effective imposition of martial law, particularly to avoid bloodshed, was to impose it on a holiday (I have no doubt that the appropriate documents could be found at the General Headquarters of the Polish Army; one of the main authors, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, can definitely attest to their authenticity). I do not know what kind of a crazy mind could have come up with the absurd notion that it could all be done on Monday or any other weekday, when millions of people would be starting for work at dawn and getting ready to begin the workday. *It was never considered, not even for a moment.* Such an entry completely disqualifies not only the credibility, but also the intelligence of the person who wrote such a thing in the said “notebook,” or passed such information to their political superiors.

On page 7 [page numbers have been corrected to conform to page numbers in this *Bulletin*—ed.] of Mr. Kramer’s article there is a claim that Gen. Anatolii Gribkov “played a key role *vis-a-vis* Poland in 1980-81.” It is not my intention to judge that role at this time. However, bringing Gribkov up in the context of the days preceding the imposition of martial law is more than amusing, the reason being that Gribkov himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen. Stanisław Antos, who at the time was Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces) of the situation in which he found himself on 13 December 1981. For a week he had been on vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about the imposition of martial law in Poland he called Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov (Kulikov was in Poland at the time), asking whether he should come back to Moscow. Ustinov told him to continue his vacation. And now Gribkov turns out to be one of the main witnesses. But there is one more meaningful fact. Namely, many fragments of his reminiscences included in an article published in 1992 by *Istoricheskii Zhurnal* are almost *literally* identical with some phrases from Anoshkin’s “notebook.” It looks as though many roads lead to that very same “source.”

The choice of evidence in Mr. Kramer’s article is strangely one-sided. Why does he not mention Gen. Siwicki’s polemical response to the above-mentioned article by Gribkov, which was published in *Polska Zbrojna* on 22 December 1992? Is the voice of the weaker side, which was at the time threatened in different ways, less credible than the voice of the stronger side, which put Poland under overwhelming pressure? A facetious phrase from Gogol comes to mind here about the “sergeant’s widow who whipped herself.”

On page [7] of his article, Mr. Kramer talks about a document which allegedly constitutes “powerful” evidence. He means Anoshkin’s “notebook.” Treating the

“notebook” in this way is surprising. First of all, there is something about it which should cause one to distance oneself from it on moral grounds. After all, the most controversial and shocking statements contained there—claiming that we allegedly demanded military aid—were not presented by the “Russian side” during the Jachranka conference.¹ This made it impossible for the [Polish] “government side” to take a stance concerning them and to directly confront the facts and arguments, the more so because it is not clear if and when all of the materials from the Jachranka conference will be published.² As a result, the “notebook”—which, as it turns out, is being prepared for publication as a separate brochure—has become an independent fact, removed from the context of the debate. And not a historical fact, either, but a political one, given the present political realities in Poland.

I have learned that Mr. Kramer is a specialist on Soviet and Russian issues. Therefore he undoubtedly knows the characteristic mechanisms and techniques of documenting events there. After all, the Soviet Union, and above all the Soviet Army, implemented almost obsessively rigorous rules for creating and protecting any kind of document, including working notes and records, particularly if they concerned highly secretive matters of great importance for the state. Even the smallest slips in this area resulted in very drastic consequences. And now what do we have here? A super-secret notebook, not registered anywhere, not affixed with any seals [*gryf*] or marked by page numbers, a notebook that has for years been kept nobody knows where. It starts with Kulikov’s arrival in Poland on 7 December 1981. But the first entry is from December 10. It is surprising that there is no note of a conversation with me the night of the 8th, which Baibakov reported about on December 10 during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Marshal Kulikov took part in this. Yet what is peculiar is that *there is not even one word in Baibakov’s report about the Polish side waiting for military help.* Maybe that is the reason why there is no mention of that conversation on the night of the 8th in Anoshkin’s notebook.

As I mentioned before, Gen. Siwicki and I will soon present a more detailed description of, on the one hand, some strange omissions, and, on the other hand, of even stranger entries included in the notebook. At this time, I only want to point out that during the whole time noted there by date, that is, from December 10 to 16, not even one conversation takes place between me and Marshal Kulikov, who was in Poland at the time (except for one note of December 16 about a phone conversation during which Kulikov asked for a short discussion, which is not noted later anyway). Could it be that during the ten days Kulikov spent in Poland, Gen. Siwicki was the only Polish person he talked to? Was he the only source of information? And finally, how was this information recorded and interpreted?

I am sorry to say that regardless of what might

generously be described as the “defects” of the notebook, Mr. Kramer’s interpretations sometimes go well beyond what can be deduced from an entry. Take, for example, the alleged answer given by Rusakov to Ambassador Aristov. [In the notebook entry for December 11] that answer is written across the margin. It goes: “This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about sending of troops went on —now everything has disappeared.” [In his introduction on page 11], Mr. Kramer omits the last words of this entry, which say, “What is Jaruzelski’s situation now?!” But these words make it obvious that somebody else has uttered this statement, not me. Here Mr. Kramer’s intentions become obvious. He says: “Jaruzelski’s comment here as recorded by Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader’s stance in December 1981 than do all other documents combined. (my emphasis — W.J.)” Thus this carefully prepared quotation, in fact “robbed” of the element clearly indicating that it was not me who said those words, becomes to the author more important “than all other documents.” This is scandalous manipulation.

Besides, what does the talk of “a year-and-a-half of chattering” mean when my reactions (if someone is skeptical, please consult Kuklinski’s report in an interview for the Paris *Kultura*, April 1987) and many public statements, as well as statements [made] during the top-secret meetings when I talked about the necessity to solve Polish problems by ourselves, with our own means, are known? And as far as Aristov is concerned, I know one thing—that he judged the situation in Poland very seriously, much like Kulikov. He was constantly passing signals, as well as complaints and warnings, about the Kremlin’s dissatisfaction to the Polish leadership, many of which he must have co-authored (this was apparently the case with the famous letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) in June 1981, which was in fact to open the way to a kind of political coup). I know from Stanislaw Kania that Aristov even went so far as to call me “general-liberal.”

On page [7-8] some alleged opinions of Gorbachev’s are also quoted. Mr. Kramer writes in particular about how in October and November 1992 Gorbachev gave several interviews to Polish journalists. [. . .] The focus is on an interview for the Warsaw newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* [*The*

Republic]. Mr. Kramer, who usually uses plenty of quotations, this time when talking about Gorbachev, chooses to relate his alleged statements using mainly his own words, even venturing to say what Gorbachev allegedly “meant.” Since I do not have the said interview in *Rzeczpospolita* handy, I cannot take a firm stance. I will try to do this later. However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev said officially. He was invited as a witness by the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm [Parliament] of the Republic of Poland, but he could not come personally and sent a letter, dated 31 August 1995, instead. He wrote:

It was obvious to me as a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee that Gen. Jaruzelski as the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee took all the measures that were available to him in order to lead Poland out of the economic and political crisis in a peaceful way and aimed at excluding any possibility of using troops of member countries of the Warsaw Pact to interfere in internal affairs of his country (my emphasis — W.J.). It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that the imposition of martial law in Poland was conditioned not only by the growing social and political internal crisis, but also by an increased tension in Polish-Soviet relations closely related to this crisis. Under such conditions, Gen. Jaruzelski was forced to take upon himself this altogether difficult decision, which at the time was, in my opinion, the choice of a lesser evil. [. . .] The Soviet leadership was frantically looking for a solution between two equally unacceptable solutions: To make peace with the chaos spreading in Poland threatening the breakdown of the whole socialist bloc, or to react to the events in Poland with military force. However, I want to repeat that the view was that both solutions were unacceptable. At the same time, our troops and tank columns were there along the Polish border, along with the sufficiently strong Northern Group of the Soviet Army in Poland itself. All could have been used in extreme circumstances.

Gorbachev wrote in a similar tone a letter to Maciej Płażyński, the Speaker of the Sejm (published in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 5 December 1997). And all this is what has been stated not secretly, not privately, but officially by a man who not only was a member of the highest Soviet

RECENT CUIHP SEMINARS AT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER

VOJTECH MASTNY, “NEW EVIDENCE ON THE HISTORY OF THE WARSAW PACT” (OCTOBER 26, 1998)

MILTON LEITENBERG, KATHRYN WEATHERSBY, AND SHU GUANG ZHANG, “NEW EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DURING THE KOREAN WAR” (NOVEMBER 10, 1998)

HOPE HARRISON AND DAVID MURPHY, “REASSESSING THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958-62” CO-SPONSORED BY THE KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES (DECEMBER 4, 1998)

leadership, but also a member of the Suslov Commission, which followed and reacted to the situation in Poland. It turns out that he knew about columns of tanks along the Polish border, while the highest Soviet commanders [claim they] did not (as they also did not know about the respective preparations of the divisions of former GDR and Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by archival materials). They stick to the opinion that there would have been no intervention in any event. Moreover, according to what Marshal Kulikov said at Jachranka, there was not even any pressure put on Poland (“*davleniia ne bylo*”). However, other Soviet politicians and military officials talk about what really happened and quote actual facts (I will refer to some of those sources in the piece I mentioned before).

One page [8] Kramer also refers to a book by Vitalii Pavlov (*Byłem rezydentem KGB w Polsce [I Was a KGB Resident in Poland]*). I read the Polish edition carefully. Pavlov, who understands and reads Polish, authorized the translation. (I know the person who picked up the manuscript after it had been authorized.) There is absolutely no mention there that I was desperately trying to obtain some guarantee of military intervention and that Suslov “refused.” Actually, before the so-called Suslov Archive (1993) or Pavlov’s book (1994) were published in Poland, I spoke (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, 12 December 1992) about my conversation with Suslov on the morning of 12 December 1981. I quote:

JARUZELSKI: We were always pressured by the external factor, but I never put it forward [as the main thing]. An examination of conscience must always begin with oneself. Only the people who gave up power are being judged today, but it is the authorities as well as the opposition who should be pouring ash on their heads. With the international situation becoming ignited, our Polish brawl meant playing with fire. Our conversations with the representatives of the Kremlin were often a way for them to check the effectiveness of their pressure and, for us a way to check their inclinations for intervention. In a way, it was mutual testing, a mutual game. We kept getting the impression that they were keeping some cards hidden.

(Jaruzelski met on 12 December 1981 at 9 am with Generals Czesław Kiszczak, Florian Siwicki, and Michał Janiszewski.)

JARUZELSKI: In my office we assessed the situation. It had reached the brink. We knew that if the Gdansk debate [brought] no glimmer of hope then we [would] have to choose the lesser evil. Siwicki, who was still under the depressing impression of talks in Moscow on December 4, asked, “And what is the guarantee that even if we go ahead they are not going to come in?” With the generals present I tried to call Brezhnev. Mikhail Suslov came on the phone. He wasn’t very easy to communicate with; he must have already been very sick. I asked whether it would be our internal affair if we imposed martial law. He said, “Yes.” “And if the situation becomes more complicated?” I asked (I remembered the words

Brezhnev never took back: ‘Esli bud’et uslozhniatsia, veid’em’ [If it turns out to be necessary, we will go in] as well as the constantly repeated ‘my Pol’shi ne ostavim v b’ede’ [We will not leave Poland in the lurch]). The gist of Suslov’s answer was, “But you have always said that you can manage by yourselves.”

That was a lot, but of course, it was not everything. In Bratislava in August 1968 there were even kisses, yet, as we all know, everything ended very quickly. Therefore, we had to pay attention above all to numerous worrisome facts and signals.

In relation to the above, it is worth quoting a passage from the book by Pavlov, which for some strange reason was omitted by Mr. Kramer. When writing about my phone conversation with Suslov, Pavlov claims that Suslov “confirmed then that the Soviet Union will not directly interfere in Polish affairs and will under no circumstance send troops to Poland, which, it seemed, put Jaruzelski at ease.” In saying that it “put me at ease,” Pavlov admits that there were indeed reasons to feel uneasy.

On page [8] Kramer writes with reference to the same book by Pavlov, that Andropov sent the same message to Kiszczak (i.e. that the direct military aid from the USSR is out of the question). Mr. Kramer must not have read the book carefully. There is no mention there of “sending a message.” However, there is a description of a visit to Moscow in September 1981 by Gen. Kiszczak, the newly nominated Minister of Internal Affairs. During that visit, Andropov allegedly informed him of the above. Gen. Kiszczak denies this categorically. I believe him, but the facts are most important. First, after his return from Moscow, Kiszczak did not pass any message of such great importance to me or to Kania. Second, Pavlov claims that he was present during the conversation between Andropov and Kiszczak. However, although he met with Kania often (he had had close relations with him for a long time, since Kania for many years was a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for the issues of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), and met with me several times, he never mentioned a word about that matter. And the scale of the matter was such that it required asking our opinion about what Andropov [allegedly] said to Kiszczak. He [Pavlov] never brought up this topic, which he himself in fact confirms by not mentioning it in his book.

On page [8] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in “[mid-September] 1981, [. . .] Poland’s Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final decision at Jaruzelski’s behest to proceed with martial law.” The documents are all there to see (they were discussed and assessed in great detail during the meetings of the Commission for Constitutional Oversight, and there are minutes of those meetings), showing that materials concerning martial law were already being prepared in the mid-sixties. The practical verification of some solutions was conducted during a large-scale military exercise under the code name of “Kraj-73” (“Country-73”). The

intensification and concretization of work took place in the fall of 1980, when a special task-group led by then-premier, Jozef Pinkowski, was formed. Later, there were further developments in the following stages. For example, on 27 March 1981, S. Kania and I signed a document called “The Fundamental Idea of Martial Law.” There is also a protocol of the meeting of the National Defense Committee from 13 September 1981 (the last meeting before martial law was imposed). One can read what Kania said and what I said. Typically, whenever I referred there to the “imposition of martial law” (four times), I always preceded it with the word “potential” [*ewentualne*]. Moreover, when the protocol summarizes my statement, it says that “he pointed out the particular importance and necessity of solving internal problems by ourselves, with the political and economic support from neighboring socialist countries.” So where does “Jaruzelski’s demand” come from? Is the image [of a decision] personified *exclusively in myself* necessary, and if so, then to whom? I speak of this not to avoid responsibility. I have always openly declared that I accept the responsibility. But I do think that a historian should have more finesse in forming *ad hominem* attacks.

Moreover, on pages [8-9], there is additional confusion. It is said that our own forces may not be enough to impose martial law “and that the support of allied forces would therefore be needed.” Then follows a statement that does not accord well with the previous one: “Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania . . . both realized that ‘direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries’ would ‘set back the development of socialism by decades’ and ‘would be exploited by the imperialist forces.’” Therefore “they were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK’s decision.” Such hesitation resulted in “a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to ‘prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland.’” Again, if we are to talk about strict historical accuracy, the letter was from the CPSU Central Committee and the government of the USSR to the PUWP Central Committee and the government of Poland, and concerned mainly the anti-Soviet campaign in Poland. On what grounds is the claim about the National Defense Committee’s statement made? On September 13, the Committee made no decisions about martial law (there is a protocol). However, the whole process of preparations for this eventuality with all the hesitations lasted, as I said before, from at least the fall of 1980 until 12 December 1981. And finally, how is one to understand that Jaruzelski thought at the time that an intervention would “set back the development of socialism by decades,” and three months later “he desperately hoped for it.” What brought on this change? Particularly since the prognosis for successful imposition of martial law was much better in December than in September.

On page [8] Mark Kramer also claims that Jaruzelski replaced Kania “under Soviet auspices.” I regret that Mr.

Kramer, who after all participated in the Jachranka conference, makes such a generalization. He probably heard me quote from an East German document (acquired by the [Sejm] Commission for Constitutional Oversight) that records a conversation between Honecker and Rusakov which took place 21 October 1981. (I was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP on October 18). Rusakov informed Honecker that I had all kinds of doubts and did not want to accept the position. Soviet suggestions turned out to be ineffective. I agreed only as a result of the insistence of *Polish comrades*. Prof. Jerzy Holzer has confirmed this, adding that it was the “good” Polish comrades who mattered. I also said that it was Kazimierz Barcikowski, always fought against by the conservative forces in the party and by the allies at the time, who recommended me for that function. It is interesting that when referring to a statement made by Andropov at the previously mentioned CPSU Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981, Mr. Kramer does not notice that it was at that time that Andropov said, “Barcikowski and Kubiak are big obstacles in the Politburo.” Finally, does the word “auspices” not sound offensive with respect to the CC PUWP members of the time? It is true that four of them were against my candidacy, but 179 supported me in a *secret ballot*. Were they all “agents of the Kremlin”?

On page [9] Mark Kramer also informs us that during the above-mentioned October 29 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Andropov said, “the Polish leaders are talking about [Russian: ‘pogovarivaiut’] military assistance from fraternal countries.” But which leaders? It is a fact known from former Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak documents that there were people in the leadership of the party who held very different views and who enjoyed a very different degree of trust from the allies at the time. During that meeting Brezhnev also made the following statement: “I don’t believe that Com. Jaruzelski will do anything constructive. I think he is not bold enough.” But Mr. Kramer does not notice any of that. Following the words “Polish leaders,” just a few lines below he deduces that it was Jaruzelski who “was requesting military intervention from the Soviet Union.” It seems that there is a great need to put me in the worst possible light. But it should have been done in a less obvious way. On what grounds does the plural “Polish leaders” immediately change into the name “Jaruzelski?”

On page [10] we find the following quotation from Andropov’s statement of December 10: “Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our willingness to offer . . . military assistance.” I must here confirm a very unpleasant, even ugly thing. That quotation has been made up. The actual statement went *exactly* as follows: “Jaruzelski states economic demands strongly and makes our economic aid a condition for conducting Operation X; I would even go further to say that he brings up, but not directly, the question of military aid.” Andropov does not refer to any conversation with me. The only Pole he mentions as somebody he talked to

is Mirosław Milewski. What he says conflicts with what Anoshkin's "notebook" says about Milewski. There we find no "but," no "not directly," but simply: "Can we count on military aid put before economic aid[?]" And as far as the "not directly" is concerned, Gen. Siwicki has written about it long ago in the above mentioned article in *Polska Zbrojna*.

On page [11] of the article, we find [one] evident lie. I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure phone?" [. . .] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit that there are no documents, declarations, or statements from which it could be deduced that I indeed had such conversations. Gen. Siwicki also firmly states that this is the first time he has heard of a conversation with Andropov. If there are references to my alleged opinions and assessments stated during the meeting of December 10, there is no indication where they came from. The only reference to a direct conversation with me can be found in the above-mentioned report of Baibakov. However, Brezhnev, who of course talked to me on the phone on December 7, does not say anything about that conversation, and certainly not that I asked for military aid.

It is a pity that when quoting different voices from the Soviet Politburo meeting of December 10, Mr. Kramer omits such statements as the following by Rusakov: "Jaruzelski is leading us by the nose" (Russian: "Vodit nas za nos."); or by Suslov: "Jaruzelski is showing a certain cunning. Through his requests to the Soviet Union he wants to create an alibi for himself. Of course, it is perfectly obvious that we are not able to actually fulfill those requests, and Jaruzelski will later say 'but I addressed the Soviet Union, asked for help, and they did not give me any.' At the same time, the Poles are clearly stating that they are against bringing the troops in. If the army enters Poland, it will be a catastrophe." There were many other shocking statements made there, some of them reminding one of a surrealistic spectacle. But all this "does not fit" the picture, a picture in which a *de facto* accusatory statement against me is being concluded.

On page [9] a General Staff document dated 23 November 1981 is quoted. In the document we read: "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [. . .] can be carried out." On that basis, Mr. Kramer claims that it "certainly is compatible with the notion that the Polish leaders would seek external military assistance." On the contrary, it is an argument to the advantage of the so-called authors of martial law. I must explain some obvious things here, unfortunately. Anyone who lived in Poland at that time remembers the fears that



Marshal Viktor Kulikov and General Wojciech Jaruzelski at the Jachranka Conference (November 1997). Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

any little damage to the interest of the Warsaw Pact might become a pretext for intervention. Possible difficulties in military transport would, after all, be a classic violation of the rules according to which the strategic infrastructure of the bloc functioned. This is what was constantly on our minds. Let the fact that I stated, publicly in the Sejm as well as during a Central Committee plenary meeting, that the Polish Army takes responsibility for the smooth functioning of this transportation infrastructure attest to how important and sensitive this point was. Imputing that a concern that this transportation should function smoothly (especially under the conditions of martial law) meant looking for help from the outside is not only absurd, but politically and strategically infantile.

One pages [9-10] is another example of how Mr. Kramer is being led up a “blind alley.” He is, as far as I am aware, a historian by profession and therefore I assume that he will read the addendum I have enclosed in the proper spirit. It will become clear to him from it how thin the different arguments are of people wishing at any cost to accuse the so-called authors of martial law, if they are reduced to using such “evidence.”

On page [13] Mr. Kramer also suggests that Gen. Siwicki and I attempt to make secret Polish documents public. There are already many documents (particularly protocols from the PUWP Politburo meetings, different materials from other institutions and bodies) that have been made public in different ways, but Mr. Kramer is clearly not interested in them. On the other hand, it is true that there is no access to many documents, particularly those of the Ministry of National Defense. Perhaps Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski did not have time to inform Mr. Kramer that several times I addressed the organizers of the Jachranka conference and asked for access to be made possible in Polish institutions. I even wrote statements which were intended to help in those efforts. Unfortunately, in many cases these efforts ended unsuccessfully (it is true that I did not at the time foresee the possibility that after the conclusion of such an important international conference some kind of “work notebook” would be “pulled out of a pocket” and become a “decisive” source for Mr. Kramer).

However very distasteful—to use just such a term—is this statement about our notes (Gen. Siwicki’s and mine)—“assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with.” So only Polish generals would falsify things, while Soviet notes are above any suspicion? I would like to ask here whether we really can treat them [i.e., the Anoshkin notes] as reliable “evidence” (Mr. Kramer calls it “decisive”) for describing events of great political, historical, and moral importance? At the same time, considering the threats and announcements coming even from the highest offices and leading political circles, should one treat the suggestions of an American historian as a welcome gesture in this campaign? I trust that this was not Mr. Kramer’s intention. All the more so, since when he wrote his article he did not know many of the

circumstances, facts, and arguments I have presented here.

I understand that Mr. Kramer’s article is based exclusively on words written then as well as years later. But this is only a partial base. I do not deny the necessity and importance of his research. But to make the picture objective, one needs to look also at evident facts, phenomena, and symptoms from the time in question. Many of them have been presented by many witnesses who testified before the Commission of Constitutional Oversight under the rules of the Penal Code. I did not notice even a trace of those testimonies in Mr. Kramer’s article. But the most important thing is to avoid a situation of “if the facts indicate something different, then too bad for the facts.”

Therefore, counting on the support of Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski, an outstanding specialist in contemporary history, I would like to ask Mr. Kramer to reevaluate the text of the inaugural brochure, the main substance of which is to be Anoshkin’s “working notebook.” Gen. Siwicki, myself, and other people have a number of important comments about it, which we will present at a later point. I am ready for conversations which will lead to better mutual understanding, will confront and verify views, and above all, which will bring us closer to the very complex truth.

To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation. Many people who for years were sworn enemies of the USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all kinds of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities—I am not talking of Mr. Kramer, of course, since I don’t know his views—are suddenly turning into defenders of the USSR. Everything that comes from that country is true and constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this [tendency] seems exclusively to concern things that make it possible to condemn and accuse the Polish People’s Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I always have said and to this day keep saying openly that the Soviet Union was our ally within the “sick” reality of those years and with all the heavy load of limited sovereignty. To the Soviet Union we owe what is actually the most advantageous configuration of Polish territory in history (although I admit that such a configuration suited Soviet interests). For many years, the Soviet Union was the sole guarantor of that territory. I respect and like the Russians. I think that the relations between our countries which are now equal should be good and mutually advantageous. Also, when I look back at those years I try to keep a rational distance, since as a politician and a general I know the ruthless logic of that divided world. I used to say that if I had been a Soviet marshal or general I would have perceived Poland as a territory endangering the bloc, with all the consequences of that for us, of course. We were fully aware of that situation, which was assessed similarly in the American documents disclosed at Jachranka. All this required from us, the Polish authorities, the appropriate measures and countermeasures. Their effectiveness was proved by life itself. We imposed

and carried out martial law alone, and then, walking along a rough road, reached the Round Table [of 1989] and the groundbreaking changes which became an impulse and model for other countries of the region.

Wojciech Jaruzelski
Warsaw, 27 April 1998

Appendix

The supposition that Poland was interested in so-called “fraternal aid” is disgraceful and absurd. People included in the Preliminary Summons, the witnesses, and some historians have explained this in detail. However, some members of the Commission (Parliament member Jacek Taylor in particular) during the Commission’s deliberations referred to a “document” from the MSW (Ministry of Internal Affairs) files which can presently be found in the Sejm archives (file 228/IB). The document is called *An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country on 25 November 1981*.³ The following passage can be found in appendix No. 2 to that *Assessment of the Situation*:

Implementation of martial law may result in the following developments:

Scenario 1: Political organizations submit to the requirements of martial law. At the same time, there is a possibility of small-scale strikes and limited hostile propaganda.

Scenario 2: Massive strikes are organized in some parts of the country without workers leaving the workplace.

Scenario 3: A general occupation strike, with workplaces taken over; some workers go out in the streets; there are street demonstrations and attacks occur on buildings housing party offices and state administration, on police stations, etc. Strong intervention of police and armed forces takes place. Aid from Warsaw Pact troops is not out of the question.

People who attempt to use this [document] as evidence against those included in the Preliminary Summons are misusing it. The reasons I say this are as follows. First, [the document was] in a file in which only loose, preliminary materials can be found. Secondly, the said *Assessment of the Current Situation* is really only a draft, without any filing number, without any annotations, and was not signed by anybody or distributed anywhere. There is also another telling factor, one that remains conveniently not mentioned, which proves the ill will of the people who insist on the basis of such material the contention that Poland allegedly expected so-called “aid.” This is the fact that in the same file—about which there was no mention—there is another, later document, called *An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country and Proposals for Solutions*, dated 5 December 1981. There is

not even one word concerning any kind of “aid” there. However, unlike the earlier document of November 25, there are many hand-written comments and corrections of Czesław Kiszczak, who was at the time the Minister of Internal Affairs. And although that document has not been signed or distributed either, the very fact that the Minister made many annotations on it makes it more trustworthy. But in spite of that it remains unmentioned.

It is necessary to add here that although the Commission had access to an enormous amount of different material and documents, no traces of expectations or requests for this so-called “military aid” have been found. On the contrary, the claim that we need to solve our Polish problems on our own appears repeatedly in many secret as well as public statements made by the representatives of the PPR government at the time. Therefore, using the said “*Assessment of the Situation*” of 25 November 1981 as an argument is evident manipulation. Perhaps it was hoped that nobody would be inclined to go through the pile of files where less important, loose materials were kept.

The selective character of omissions described above can be further illustrated by the following fact. Solidarity activists have been claiming that all kinds of anti-Soviet excesses, such as the desecration of monuments and graves of soldiers were provocations organized by the State Security. But surprisingly enough, in the *Assessment of the Situation* of November 25 (appendix no. 1), is the information that from the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (18 October 1981) until the time the said *Assessment* was written, 26 criminal investigations concerning the above mentioned acts were started. At that time eighteen people had been found who had vandalized monuments in Jędrzejów and one person who had desecrated the graves of Soviet soldiers in Gryfin. Remembering these facts is not convenient now. Nor is remembering (in accordance with the described *Assessment*) that on November 25, eleven public buildings were under occupation, and a note made of plans to occupy another fourteen.

[Translated from Polish by Anna Zielinska-Elliott and Jan Chowaniec.]

Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski served as prime minister of Polish People’s Republic from 1980-1989.

¹ Editor’s note: For the Jachranka conference, see Malcolm Byrne’s introduction to this *Bulletin* section and Ray Garthoff’s report in *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1997), pp. 229-232

² Editor’s note: The conference organizers are planning to publish the Jachranka proceedings; transcription of the audio tapes of the conference is in progress.

³ Editor’s note: On this document, see also the article by Paweł Machcewicz in this *Bulletin*.

“The Assistance Of Warsaw Pact Forces Is Not Ruled Out”

By Pawel Machcewicz

The document published below can be regarded as one of the key Polish sources, so far declassified, regarding the preparations for martial law in Poland in 1981. The document was released (upon appeal by the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences) by the Ministry of Interior in connection with the international conference, “Poland 1980-1981: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions” which took place in Jachranka (outside Warsaw) in November 1997. The “Supplement No. 2” was prepared as an attachment to the document “Assessment of the present situation in the country as of 25 November 1981” (“*Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w kraju wg stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.*”)

“Supplement No. 2” (original title “*Zalacznik nr 2: Zamierzenia Resortu Spraw Wewnetrznych*”) is not signed, but both its content and classification (“Secret, For Special Use. Single Copy”), suggest that it is a top-level document, presumably prepared in the highest ranks of the Polish government or Communist Party. “The Supplement” considers various possible developments of the political situation and the alternative strategies to suppress the “Solidarity” movement. The special legislative act on extraordinary measures, mentioned in the first paragraph, was never passed in the parliament, and the only option which was implemented was martial law. The repressive strategy which prevailed was Option 2 of the “Supplement”—the mass-scale internments of Solidarity and opposition activists.

However, the most revealing part of the “Supplement” is its last paragraph. Option (Contingency) No. 3 predicts that in case of massive and violent resistance to the imposition of martial law, “assistance of Warsaw Pact forces is not ruled out.” The importance of this statement consists in the fact that it is the only Polish document thus far declassified which explicitly mentions potential Soviet military help as part of the martial law planning.¹ It seems to contradict the basic argument, upheld by Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and his supporters, that the decision to introduce martial law was exclusively Polish and that its ultimate goal was to keep the Soviets away from Poland. This idea—specifically that the operation started on 13 December 1981 was aimed at saving the nation from Soviet intervention, which would inevitably lead to the bloodshed—was the core of the martial law propaganda (obviously, given the circumstances, it used subtle but perfectly understandable language). To present day it remains the main line of Jaruzelski’s political struggle to defend his past actions.

There is abundant evidence, coming mostly from the Russian side, suggesting that the real situation was quite

different.² Many Soviet documents, including the diary of General Victor Anoshkin’s (Marshal Kulivov’s personal adjutant) presented at the recent Jachranka conference,³ describe several occasions on which Jaruzelski or his aides insisted on obtaining guarantees of “fraternal” help in case the imposition of the martial law encountered excessive difficulties. As Jaruzelski and others, however, point out, the Russian archives have thus far released only selected minutes of the CPSU Politburo meetings. All of them suggest that the Soviet leadership rejected the idea of intervening militarily in Poland. But what about the minutes of other Politburo meetings? Do they mention other options? Without free access to the Russian documentation, the discussion on the Polish crisis will remain inconclusive. It heightens the significance of Polish documents, among them “Supplement No. 2,” which reveal the planning for and the mechanisms of martial law.

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SUPPLEMENT NO. 2
PLANNED ACTIVITY OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY

1. Taking into account the current course of events in the country as well as the need to discipline society and reinforce the execution of power, it is necessary to introduce a legislative act (without an introduction of the martial law) on extraordinary means of action. The latter act foresees, among others:

- heightened responsibility for the public goods which one is in charge of, including a prohibition on using factory goods for purposes not associated with the duties which are carried out;
- extension of the rights of the managers of workplaces to give orders to their employees including ones exceeding their area of responsibility;
- attaching conditions to the rights of strike action such as the requirement of an earlier exhaustion of compromise ways of settling arguments, pursuing secret ballots, receiving approval from a higher trade union organ;
- complete prohibition of the right to strike action in certain units of the national economy and institutions as well as authorization of the Council of State to introduce a prohibition of strike and protest action for a predetermined period in part or in the whole territory of the state;
- limitation of the right to hold public meetings (also those of trade unions). Legal use of the means of direct

enforcement is provided in order to dissolve public meetings. The latter means can be used in the case of illegal taking over of a building (apartment);

- introduction of the curfew, a ban on artistic, entertainment and sports events as well as on public collections (except carried out by the Church), suspension of the activity of selected associations as well as limitation of the post, telecommunications, personal and cargo traffic with foreign countries;
- stepping up of censorship of selected publications and a ban on leaflet-poster type propaganda;
- authorization of the *voievodes* to turn to the military for assistance in certain situations of danger to public order;
- transfer of cases concerning certain violations of law into the domain of military prosecutors and courts.

Passing the above legislation as well as its implementation will allow the government of the Polish People's Republic as well as the organs of state administration and the units of the public economy to take special actions aiming at strengthening the national economy, preventing anarchy and hindering the activity of counterrevolutionary forces. They will also lead to an increase of social discipline and public order—as conditions necessary for eliminating the consequences of the crisis which threatens the normal functioning of the state and the vital needs of the people.

The legislative act will create conditions for the gradual (selective) introduction of bans and orders (limitations of citizen freedoms and placement of obligations) in part or on the whole territory of the country depending on the development of the situation. Authorization to introduce certain degrees of limitations will also be given to the territorial organs of the authorities and the state administration (*voievodes* and mayors of *voievodeship* cities).

The passage of the act and its subsequent introduction will undoubtedly cause various social repercussions—both positive and negative ones. It will certainly strengthen the morale and attitudes of the party members and all advocates of the socialist system so as to participate in the defense of the state. On the other hand, it will stimulate greater activity of the extremist and anti-socialist elements in the direction of destructive actions, for example the calling of a general strike and other things.

2. If the application of the act on extraordinary measures in the interest of the protection of citizens and the state is not effective, the introduction of martial law will be necessary. The extension of the preparations of the Interior Ministry in the case of the introduction of martial law has been stipulated in relevant documents.

Among the fundamental tasks which will determine the efficient functioning of martial law and which ought to be carried out at the moment of its introduction or several hours in beforehand, are:

a) internment of persons who threaten the security of the state—which is the principle endeavor. Two variations of

implementing this operation are being considered:

Option 1

- internment of particularly dangerous persons in the main centres of the opposition such as Warsaw, Katowice, Szczecin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk;

Option 2

- simultaneous internment of all specified persons in the whole country. Internment would cover 1,500-4,500 persons. The feasibility of this operation will be determined by the course of events.

The most effective factor to ensure the successful conclusion of the operation would be if it came as a complete surprise to the opponent. It is only possible if the operation were to be carried out sufficiently in advance of the introduction of the martial law.

The operation can also be carried out as a response to the specific activity of the opponent, although its impact would be limited.

It is assumed that the internment operation would be accompanied by an inclusion of the public use of telecommunications and preventive warning conversations with less sinister persons as well as the taking of initiative in the branches of "Solidarity" by people with moderate views (replacement structures—work is in progress on this question).

b) the remaining important endeavors are:

- introduction of censorship of postal and telecommunication correspondence as well as control of telephone conversations, especially in the public network;
- introduction of limitations in the cross-border traffic, changes in place of residence, the activity of selected associations, the freedom of movement and activity of personnel of diplomatic missions of capitalist countries, correspondents from capitalist countries; making it impossible for Polish citizens to enter diplomatic missions of the capitalist countries;
- withholding of armed weapons as well as radio broadcasting and broadcast-receiving equipment from certain citizens;
- extension of protection over 441 sites of the national economy by the Polish armed forces and protection over 891 sites mainly of the food-supply sector by the Citizen Militia (MO);
- protection and defense of the sites of the central authorities by the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry forces;
- mobilization of the maneuver units of the Citizen Militia (MO), countryside outposts of the MO, WOP and NJW MSW—it has been planned to draft about 46,000 reserves;
- engaging in actions some selected ORM members, including combined sub-units.

Some of the aforementioned endeavors will be carried out with the participation of the armed forces. Those questions are agreed upon with the Ministry of Defense and an action concept has been jointly worked out.

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The introduction of martial law may—among other things—cause the following development of events:

Scenario 1

- subordination of political and socio-economic organizations to the demands of the martial law with the simultaneous possibility of limited strike action and restricted hostile propaganda activity.

Scenario 2

- in some regions of the country, mass strikes are organized with the tendency to extend beyond the workplace. Sabotage activities take place.

Scenario 3

- general labor strike, some workers go out onto the streets, there are street demonstrations and attacks on party buildings and those of the state administration, the Citizen Militia and others. It leads to a sharp intervention of the MO forces and the military. The assistance of Warsaw Pact forces is not ruled out.

[Source: *Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych*, t. 228/1 B. Translated by Pawel Machcewicz]

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¹ For the discussion of other evidence of the Polish Party, the military and the Ministry of Interior's counts on the Soviet and Warsaw Pact participation in the implementation of martial law see the report by Andrzej Paczkowski: "The Conditions and Mechanisms Leading to The Introduction of Martial Law: Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight" (translated from Polish by Leo Gluchowski), in "On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland," Working Paper No. 21, Preliminary Conference Edition, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 1997 (Polish original in: "O Stanie Wojennym. W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997).

² For the detailed and updated analysis of the Soviet evidence see: Mark Kramer, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981," paper delivered at a seminar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2 April 1998, and Kramer's articles in this *Bulletin*.

³ For the analysis of the findings of the Jachranka conference see: Pawel Machcewicz and Malcolm Byrne, "Revealing a New Side of Poland's Martial Law," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 December 1997.



From left to right: Georgii Shakhnazarov, Anatoli Gribkov, and Viktor Kulikov (General Anoshkin—to left behind Kulikov) at the Jachranka Conference (November 1997). Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

Reflections on the Polish Crisis

By Francis J. Meehan

As I made my way around Washington in September 1980 for briefings in various US government departments before leaving for Warsaw, the predominant theme was the likelihood, as most people saw it, of Soviet military intervention, sooner rather than later, to suppress the Polish reform movement. The 1956 and 1968 precedents were much in the minds of US specialists in Soviet and East European affairs. They knew the current situation in Poland was bigger, tougher, and more complex than either Hungary or Czechoslovakia had been, but they knew also it was much more important, as Poland's position was that of the linchpin in Central Europe. The widely held view was that the USSR would not hesitate for long before stamping out a threat to Polish Communist rule and its own hegemonic position.

I received little encouragement that Moscow would stay its hand. In fact, I came away from almost all my meetings feeling that I would be lucky to get to Warsaw before the Soviet tanks. I can remember only two dissenting voices—but they were important ones. [National Security Advisor] Zbigniew Brzezinski told me he thought the Poles would have some time to try and work out their own affairs and achieve an internal political balance. The Soviet menace would continue to brood over the scene, but Moscow was restrained by the knowledge that the Poles could and would fight, while the Poles for their part realized they should not push the Soviets too far. Here was some encouragement at least. The other exception was Richard Davies, ambassador to Poland during the seventies, who was a member of a briefing panel organized by the Department of State. Davies, with his instinct for Poland, the USSR, and the Russian-Polish historical relationship, felt the Soviets would think long and hard about sending in troops. This was the only note of optimism in his forceful, stark analysis.

I got to Warsaw in late October. From then until the imposition of martial law, fourteen months later, the twin threats—suppression of the reform movement by the Polish regime or through Soviet military action—dominated US official thinking. There was good reason for this. We had Colonel [Ryszard] Kuklinski's reporting on the regime's plans for a strike against [the independent labor union] Solidarity. Substantial intelligence information on Soviet troop movements on the Polish frontiers pointed at various times to intervention. The Soviet threat ebbed and flowed—early December 1980 was perhaps the high water mark—but it looked real enough. It would have been imprudent to ignore or discount the evidence.

The outgoing Carter administration and the new

Reagan team were unlikely to do so. The previous year, Carter had been criticized for failing to make clear the accumulating evidence of impending Soviet military action in Afghanistan. He was not about to run a similar risk in the case of Poland. In addition, and weighing more heavily, private and public warnings against intervention were main elements in the official approach, of both the Carter and Reagan administrations, to a dramatic, fast-moving situation, which was of broad public and political interest in the US but was largely beyond our ability to influence decisively.

I arrived in Warsaw as the Solidarity registration crisis was moving into the final phase. Rumors ran through town that the regime was about to use the security forces to put down the reform movement and that Soviet troops were on their way in—the usual thing whenever there was a political crunch. There was some evidence to support both conjectures. I did not, however, find it persuasive, and played it cool in my reporting, but quickly learned that Polish scare stuff grabbed Washington. There was a lot of it, and there continued to be a lot of it in the time ahead, from all sorts of open as well as intelligence sources. We spent a lot of time running the scares down.

It was not an easy situation to stay on top of, not because we were short of information—the usual thing in Eastern Europe—but because we had so much. Poles were not afraid to talk. What struck me, coming as I did from Prague, was the remarkably good access we had, which reached into the upper levels of the civilian side of the Party (not the military, who retained their organizational discipline and control). Our range of contacts with Solidarity, particularly its Warsaw regional organization, and with the Church gave us the necessary balance. Even so, hard information was not easy to come by in the flood of rumors that washed around us, and analysis and judgement were at times little more than half-educated hunches. All the same, Washington had a hefty appetite for our reporting.

We were hardly over the registration crisis when we dropped down the next, really big dip in the roller-coaster—the early December (1980) events. I was struck by further differences of perception—dealing with Poland in Washington and looking at it close up in Warsaw, both perceptions were entirely valid.

We received urgent instructions Sunday, December 7, the height of the crisis, to check for unusual activity at key Polish government and party buildings, military installations, communication and transportation facilities, as well as at the Soviet embassy chancery and housing complex. Washington was clearly alarmed by intelligence indicating that Soviet military action was imminent.

Presumably we would be able to see signs and portents locally in Warsaw.

As it happened, the instructions came in when we were in the final stages of an embassy paddle tennis tournament, not the biggest thing in the world of sport but an event taken with commendable seriousness in the local US community. Washington would probably not have been greatly amused to know we finished the tournament first before setting about the duties that had been laid upon us, but I like to think we showed a proper sense of proportion at a tense moment.

It was one of those raw, bone-chilling nights you get in Eastern Europe as embassy officers made their way across town in twos and threes, some on foot, others driving. I saw the teams as they returned, tired, half-frozen. They all told the same story. They had seen absolutely nothing. Government buildings were pitch black, with the normal complement of semi-comatose guards. Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, Party Central Committee building, railroad stations, airport, barracks areas, Soviet embassy and housing area—all quiet as was usual in Warsaw on a freezing Sunday night in December. The only unusual activity in the entire city, they reported dryly, was the American embassy, lit up like a transatlantic liner on a dark and empty ocean. We fired in a late-night message to the Department, knowing wiser heads would make sense of these unremarkable findings.

In part because the November and December scares came to nothing, in part because of what I had heard from Brzezinski and Davies, in part because of my own developing sense of the realities around me, I soon found myself almost completely preoccupied with the Polish domestic political situation and less intent on the Soviet military threat. From what we continued to hear and read, Moscow seemed deeply frustrated over Poland, exasperated at the inability of the Polish party leadership to grasp the nettle and put Solidarity in its place with whatever means necessary. The Soviets seemed unsure themselves of the course they should take. Sending troops in looked more and more problematic as time went on.

While I grew skeptical about Soviet intervention in late 1980 and impressed as the various crises came and went in the succeeding months with their concurrent difficulties and uncertainties, I have to say I thought Soviet intervention was again in the cards in the fall of 1981. The Polish leadership looked increasingly feckless—[Stanisław] Kania's replacement as First Secretary by [Wojciech] Jaruzelski did not seem to indicate a radically new course. I ruled out the possibility that Moscow was prepared to lose control of Poland—just to let it go, like that. If the political slide continued, if Solidarity won a substantial measure of power, if Soviet strategic interests were seriously threatened, then it seemed to me they would send in troops.

With these judgements in mind, I find the record of the Soviet Politburo 10 December 1981 session contained in the Jachranka documents quite extraordinary—I feel I

owe an apology for the dark thoughts I used to harbor about what I now see was an amiable, laid-back bunch of geriatric Rotarians. Who could have imagined, apart maybe from his mother—she knew her boy had a heart of gold—[KGB chief Iurii] Andropov saying that “even if Poland falls under the control of ‘Solidarity,’ that’s the way it will be”? (Had no one ever bothered to tell him about the Brezhnev Doctrine?)

Equally curious is the absence of any dissent from this revolutionary (better, counterrevolutionary) view on the part of the others. It is true, the records of earlier 1981 Politburo sessions document a temporizing, undynamic Soviet leadership, but it is a revelation to see they had become such complete pussycats. And if that was their *shirokaya natura* showing, and they were all that relaxed about Poland doing its own thing, it sure would have made things an awful lot easier for Kania and Jaruzelski if they had told them earlier, instead of doing things like sending that nasty June [1981] letter.

I find equally striking, suspicious even—which shows I am geriatric Soviet hand myself—the unanimity with which the Politburo rejects at the same meeting the idea of military action in Poland, without anything resembling real debate. Admittedly they knew by now they had bitten off more than they felt like chewing in Afghanistan, and could not have relished the risks a massive Polish operation would have brought with it. Even so, to read in the record someone of [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko's steel declaring that “there cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland” has a surreal quality. Just as mind-bending is the fact that someone with Suslov's *curriculum vitae* is reported as speaking after Gromyko of only press handling of the Polish “counterrevolutionary forces.” Press handling? Did he hear what Gromyko said?

I was struck by Jaruzelski's reaction—as noted in Raymond Garthoff's report¹—to Kulikov's insistence that the USSR at no time had plans to intervene militarily. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons for Jaruzelski's exasperation. If anyone on the Polish side could judge the reality of the Soviet threat, it must surely be he. Of course, the General wanted the threat to be seen and accepted as real so that he could sell the Polish people, and the world at large, the patriotic explanation for martial law, so he might not have been wholly candid. I still think, however, that his exasperation springs from experience of how close the threat came at times.

Brzezinski was a central player in the late 1980 events and his views on Carter's hot line message of December 3, as a factor in the Soviet decision not to intervene, have to be given due weight. I can only say that the US warnings, in general, struck me as largely *pro forma* exercises. It was right for us to do it—we had to do something—and I have no doubt the Soviets took them seriously, as they took any major US statement seriously. However, I would judge the imponderables of taking military action in Poland as

by far the most crucial element for them.

A couple of personal Polish views of our warnings to the Soviets give other insights. Deputy Premier Mieczysław Rakowski told me in mid-December 1980 that we were greatly exaggerating the danger. The Soviets had no intention of coming in. He welcomed the warnings nevertheless if only because they had the effect of slowing Solidarity down, making it behave more responsibly. Rakowski was pleased at this unexpected bonus. Bogdan Lis of Solidarity, on the other hand, was extremely unhappy with the US statements when I saw him not long afterwards. He complained they were exactly what the Soviets and the Polish regime wanted—here he corroborated Rakowski—in that they made the reform movement cautious at a time when it should have gone all out to exert maximum pressure on the regime. Lis, who gave the impression of being one of the hard men of Polish politics, went on to excoriate Radio Free Europe broadcasts for taking the regime's side—a view, I tried to convince him, I had never heard from any official Polish quarter.

I described Poland in 1980-81 as largely outside our ability to influence decisively. Some might think this less than red-blooded. The “can-do” strain in US policy-making runs strong, which is a good thing, too. Washington players conceptualize, sloganize—that goes with the scene. Warsaw again brought me up against the limits of US action on the ground in Eastern Europe. My judgement was that while there were useful things we could and should do to help the Polish reformers, we remained marginal on the basics: the power struggle in Poland itself and the Soviet intervention threat.

I was concerned that we not over-extend ourselves in a situation that could easily get away from us. I got a flash message from the Department in the summer of 1981 asking my views on a US military airlift of food (discussed in Romuald Spasowski's 1986 autobiography *The Liberation of One*). I argued strongly against it on various grounds, the most important being that a US Air Force airlift would raise Poland to a direct US-Soviet confrontation in a region that was much easier for them to control. If the Soviets challenged us, our options would be unattractive—either to back off with major loss of face, or hang tough and run serious risks. The Department did not return to the matter.

I cannot claim more than a general sense of the relations between the Polish government and Solidarity in the month or so before martial law—specifically, whether there was either room for compromise or the will on either side for a genuine search for compromise. The relations were highly complex. Negotiations covered the entire range of social, economic and political issues—virtually the whole life of the country. The inner workings on both sides were often opaque. I was impressed by the Poles ability to find ways out of a seemingly total impasse and to step back from the brink. Everyone realized it was a struggle for power, however. The stakes grew larger, the

room for maneuver smaller as time went on. Both sides knew their Lenin—there was no mistake, it was *kto kogo*.

I went back to the US the last week of November [1981] on consultation, and did not return to Poland until after martial law was declared. Before leaving Warsaw I arranged to meet with (then) Archbishop Glemp, Jaruzelski, and [Solidarity leader Lech] Wałęsa in order to be able to give Washington a sense of how the three main Polish players saw things. The meetings remain vivid political snapshots practically on the eve of martial law.

The Primate spoke of a seriously deteriorating situation and of how he was trying to mediate between the regime and Solidarity, to hold them together in negotiation. He was not optimistic. The overriding problem was that the party hardliners were in the ascendant. I was struck by the bearish tone, which contrasted sharply with my meeting with him the previous month. He told me then that there was a good chance of martial law. I reported this to Washington but without giving it particular weight.

Wałęsa was deeply concerned about the fate of the reform movement. Solidarity was entering an absolutely crucial phase in its forthcoming negotiations with the government. It was, as he put it, very near the top of the hill, but it would have to be careful or else it could go over the top and slide quickly down the other side—a prophecy soon fulfilled.

He gave me a scheme for the next month or so, until the end of the year. Solidarity planned to drag its feet in negotiations during that time. In the meantime he wanted a massive economic aid offer from Western governments—to be made to Solidarity, not to the regime. This would be his trump card which he could produce in the latter stages of the negotiations, when he would make clear the aid was available to the government only on condition that Solidarity's basic demands were met.

I cannot say whether Wałęsa was giving a finished Solidarity position to which they were committed, or if he was floating personal views. Nor do I know if Solidarity actually followed the Wałęsa scheme in the time remaining before martial law—there was certainly no aid offer for him to work with. I tried to disabuse him of the idea that massive aid would be forthcoming quickly, if it could be realized at all. I knew the debate on aid on the US side was not particularly promising, and I did not see the West Europeans doing all that much. Wałęsa said the reform movement could still achieve its goals without major aid, but the struggle would last longer and the Polish people would have to endure even greater hardships.

Wałęsa was in tremendous form all evening—we had dinner at our house with our wives and a few other Americans and Poles. He completely dominated the conversation with rapid-fire delivery of ideas and opinions on everything under the sun, hardly letting the rest of us get a word in, moving from the very serious to quick wisecracks without any loss of pace or force. We talked about Jaruzelski, and I said I had only made it to

army sergeant and still had a queasy feeling when dealing with four-star generals. He came back immediately—sergeants were nothing much—it was corporals you had to watch out for—he had been a corporal himself—and there was Napoleon—and then “there was that other corporal as well.” We knew we were looking at one of the great political naturals.

I met with Jaruzelski the same day the Primate warned me there was a good chance of martial law. I still regret the professional goof of not telling the general I had heard martial law was coming and asking his views. I doubt he would have “fessed up” and given dates and times, but I should have had the wit to get him on the record.

By the time I saw him Jaruzelski must have assumed Colonel Kukliński, now missing from his duties for a couple of weeks, was in US hands, and we were fully aware of the planning for a military strike against Solidarity. He could easily have avoided a meeting. For all he knew I might have appeared armed with instructions to ask awkward questions about the regime’s intentions. The US might have been about to launch a political campaign that could cause problems in the immediate run-up to martial law. Perhaps a reason for seeing me was to mislead deliberately by a pretence of business as usual even after the Kukliński affair. The hour was unusual—we met from eight-thirty till ten at night—but there was certainly nothing vastly new or different in what he had to say from our previous meetings.

Jaruzelski restated the government’s commitment to broad national consensus. It did not have to follow this policy—it had reserves of power that had not been used. “Some people” accused it of being weak for negotiating with Solidarity “with the strike pistol aimed at us,” but it intended to continue seeking agreement. However, the crisis facing the state could not continue indefinitely.

Not everything Solidarity did suited him, he said, but there were forces in the union that could be worked with. Marginal, radical elements were moving way from the mainstream. Solidarity realized it was not enough just to fight the authorities. It was essential to reach a settlement on the enterprise self-management law, otherwise all the other agreements would be useless.

On our bilateral relations Jaruzelski said the West Europeans were waiting for a positive US lead on economic aid, and he asked for a positive approach from us in advance of the EC summit which was to be held shortly. He stressed the importance of our agricultural deliveries within the Commodity Credit Corporation framework, and said he wanted to send the minister of agriculture to the US to discuss technology, fertilizers, pesticides and related matters. We had their list of requirements in industrial and semi-finished goods, spare parts, and raw materials. Vice Premier Zbigniew Madej’s visit to Washington in December would be a good occasion to pursue these topics.

If this was all an act, the general did it well—worth an Oscar nomination. It sounded much the same in tone and

substance as I had heard from him before. He struck me again as moderate, realistic—the cool political soldier. Personally he seemed, as before, reserved, tense, basically a loner. Had he already set the date for martial law when he saw me? I am inclined to think the decision to strike was taken closer to the actual event, but I might only be trying to excuse my inability to see the cloven hoof sticking out at the foot of those razor-crease uniform pants with the broad red stripe.

Debate on Jaruzelski’s patriotism strikes me as a more than slightly red herring. He was and is a Pole—I suspect more now than he was then. People who were in a position to know told me he thought the worst thing the US ever did to him was [U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper] Weinberger’s one-liner in a TV show that he was a Soviet general in a Polish uniform. That really got to him. But if he was a Pole, he was the top Polish Communist power handler in a tight spot, completely devoted to maintaining party control of the system, and also completely committed to the Soviet connection. He may well have wanted to avoid Soviet military intervention, possible occupation, but he also wanted to put the reform movement back in its cage. My guess is the latter objective was the primary motivation in a convenient coincidence of goals and interests—but I was wrong on the Soviet politburo and I could be wrong again.

Colonel Kukliński was a very brave man. The operation to bring him and his family to the West—the planning and the action itself—made for an edgy week or so in the embassy, and no doubt it was an excruciatingly anxious time for the Kuklińskis themselves. The operation’s success reflected much credit on the Kuklińskis for their courage and on the professionalism of those involved on the US side. My role was minimal—to support the people who were doing the work. I hope I looked calmer than I felt. If it had all gone wrong, if the colonel had been caught before he could get away, or if the extraction operation had been discovered while it was in progress, things would have been messy.

I am not sure it would have made all that much difference if we had tipped off the Solidarity leadership about the regime’s planning for a strike against them on the basis of the information Kukliński provided. They would not have been much surprised to learn the generals were thinking nasty things about them. I believe they assumed that to be the case from very early on. What they would have wanted to know—as I would have—was the date of martial law, and Kukliński did not give us that so far as I know.

I say “so far as I know” because I did not see all of his reporting. The CIA provided me with summaries from time to time. I remember the material as largely technical-organizational in nature. It must have been of great use to our military analysts, but what I saw lacked broader political scope, and I lost sight somewhat of the colonel’s reporting in the press of more urgent business in the months before martial law.

Francis J. Meehan retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 1989. He was the U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980-1983.

¹ See Raymond Garthoff, "The Conference on Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp.229-232.

NEH SUMMER 1999 INSTITUTE
AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY ON

"NEW SOURCES AND FINDINGS ON COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY"

The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, in association with the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive, will hold a National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Summer Institute on "New Sources and Findings on Cold War International History" from 12 July-6 August 1999. This four-week program, intended primarily for university and college professors teaching courses on the history of U.S. foreign policy, diplomatic history, and international affairs/relations during the Cold War period, will offer an opportunity to study and assess emerging new sources and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, particularly those from the former communist bloc, and their potential for use in teaching.

Since faculty will be derived primarily from area studies specialists familiar with archival and other sources from the former Soviet Union, China, and other East-bloc countries, the summer institute will provide a forum for a dialogue between these specialists on the "other side" of Cold War history and participants who have researched, written, and taught from an American perspective, working primarily from U.S. and other English-language sources. The Director of the Institute is James R. Millar, Director of GWU's Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES); principal faculty include James G. Hershberg (George Washington University), former Director of the Cold War International History Project and author of "James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age"; Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), co-author of "Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev"; and Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University), author of "China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation."

Sections will cover new findings and interpretations on important Cold War history topics ranging from the conflict's origins to its ending, including major crises, regional flare-ups, alliances, and the nuclear arms race. Sessions will also be devoted to issues in teaching Cold War history, including the use of new technologies such as the internet as well as multimedia sources such as documentaries. Assigned readings for discussion will include important recent publications, including both secondary accounts and primary sources, as well as recently declassified documents from both Eastern and Western archives. Participants will also have an opportunity to tap Cold War history resources in the Washington, D.C., area, such as the National Archives, government agencies, research organizations, etc.

Under NEH guidelines, applicants (with limited exceptions) must be teaching American undergraduate students. Thirty visiting scholars will be selected. Those accepted will receive a \$2800 stipend for a month's expenses in Washington. **Applications must be postmarked no later than 1 March 1999.**

For further information, including application packages, contact
Dr. James R. Millar, IERES
George Washington University
2013 G St. NW, Room #401
Washington, DC 20052
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or send e-mail inquiries to FREEDMAN@staff.esia.gwu.edu

Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis, 1980-81

By Mark Kramer

From the early 1970s until November 1981, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski was a crucial intelligence source for the United States. Having become profoundly disillusioned with Communism and the Soviet Union's heavy-handed presence in Poland, Kuklinski began supplying the United States with highly sensitive information about Soviet-bloc military planning and weapons developments. Altogether, he smuggled out copies of more than 30,000 classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents, numbering tens of thousands of pages, including war plans, military maps, mobilization schedules, allied command procedures, summaries of exercises, technical data on weapons, blueprints of command bunkers, electronic warfare manuals, military targeting guidelines, and allied nuclear doctrine. To ensure that his motives would not be questioned, Kuklinski refused to take any payment for his work. For roughly a decade, his efforts gave the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) an unparalleled look inside the Warsaw Pact.¹

Kuklinski was in an especially important position when a prolonged crisis swept over Poland in 1980-81. Not only was he an aide to the Polish national defense minister (and later prime minister and Communist Party leader), Army-Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski; he also was one of a handful of senior officers on the Polish General Staff who helped draw up plans for the imposition of martial law. The Polish General Staff's formal role in planning the military aspects of martial law began on 22 October 1980, when Jaruzelski ordered the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Florian Siwicki, to set up an elite planning unit. This unit, which worked closely with a martial law planning staff at the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry, consisted predominantly of general officers, including all of Siwicki's deputies. Kuklinski, as the head of the General Planning Department and deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, was a key member of the martial law planning unit from the very start. Among other tasks, he served as a liaison with Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces, and with other high-ranking Soviet military officers from the Pact's Joint Command. Kuklinski also was frequently responsible for drafting operational plans, helping to design exercises, and compiling notes of secret meetings and discussions. These functions proved invaluable when he sought to transmit detailed information to the United States.

Until November 1981, when Kuklinski was forced to escape from Poland to avert arrest, his reports were indispensable for the CIA's efforts to monitor the Polish crisis. Kuklinski was not the only senior Polish military

officer who was working for the CIA at the time—it is known that at least four others, including two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officers, Col. Jerzy Szuminski and Col. Wladyslaw Ostaszewicz; a military adviser to Jaruzelski, Gen. Leon Dubicki; and a Polish military liaison in West Germany, Col. Antoni Tykocinski, were all supplying information to the United States—but no one was more crucial than Kuklinski.² His voluminous dispatches and transfers of documents allowed the CIA to keep close track of the martial law planning, the status of the Polish army, and the dynamics of Soviet-Polish relations in 1980-81.

During the crisis, Kuklinski transmitted daily reports and operated with relatively few hindrances (albeit at great risk) until September 1981, when the Polish internal affairs minister, Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, was informed that Solidarity had learned many of the details of the planning for martial law, including the codename of the opening phase of the operation. That codename, "Wiosna" (Spring), denoted the part of the operation that involved mass arrests of Solidarity activists and dissident intellectuals all around the country.³ (The codename was promptly changed to "Wrzos," meaning "Heather.") Because the codename had been a very tightly-held secret—only a small number of people from the General Staff and the Internal Affairs Ministry were permitted to know it—Kiszczak immediately realized that a serious leak had occurred. He launched an investigation into the matter, which naturally focused on Kuklinski among others. Kuklinski managed to evade detection for another several weeks, but he had to exercise greater caution and to scale back the frequency of his reports.

By the beginning of November, the finger of suspicion increasingly pointed at him. On November 2, the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) warned the Polish authorities that the U.S. government had obtained the full plans for martial law.⁴ It is not known how the KGB learned of this matter—whether it was through signals intelligence, a mole within the CIA, a leak from another NATO intelligence service, or some other means—but the disclosure clearly came as a great jolt to Jaruzelski and Siwicki.⁵ A much more intensive investigation began, which was bound to focus on Kuklinski. He and another deputy chief of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, Col. Franciszek Puchala, were the only ones who had had regular access to the full plans for martial law. Moreover, one of the speeches that Kuklinski had prepared for Siwicki, which Siwicki later amended by deleting a sentence about the possible use of deadly force, had been transferred by Kuklinski to the United States before the offending sentence had been removed. The discovery of

the original draft, with the sentence still in it, would be a telltale sign that Kuklinski was the source.⁶

Facing imminent arrest in early November, Kuklinski finally decided he had no alternative but to escape as soon as possible. The precise way he and his family were spirited out of Poland has never been disclosed—one of the chief participants in the exfiltration described it as a “real cloak-and-dagger affair”—but it is clear that the operation was a great success.⁷ Kuklinski, his wife, and his two sons left Poland on 7 November 1981 and by the 8th were safely in West Germany. On November 11, the colonel was flown on a military aircraft to the United States, where he has lived ever since.⁸ At least two attempts are thought to have been made by Soviet-bloc agents against Kuklinski’s life after he left Poland.⁹ What has troubled him far more, however, are the tragic deaths of his two sons, both of whom were killed in 1994 in mysterious circumstances.¹⁰ To this day, Kuklinski is extremely reluctant to disclose his place of residence.

A few hints of Kuklinski’s role in 1980-81 surfaced in the West in the early to mid-1980s (most notably when a Polish government press spokesman, Jerzy Urban, suddenly mentioned at a news conference that the U.S. government had known in advance about the martial law operation and had failed to warn Solidarity), but it was not until April 1987 that Kuklinski’s name and exploits became publicly known. In a remarkable, 53-page interview that appeared in the Paris-based monthly journal *Kultura*, Kuklinski provided a fascinating account of what he had witnessed in 1980-81.¹¹ This interview remains a vital source for anyone interested in the Polish crisis.

Despite the wide-ranging nature of the *Kultura* interview, Kuklinski refrained at that time from disclosing that he had been working for the CIA since the early 1970s, not just in 1980 and 1981. Details about his earlier work first came to light in September 1992, when a reporter for *The Washington Post*, Benjamin Weiser, published the first of two important articles on Kuklinski, based on some 50 hours of interviews with the colonel as well as many hours of interviews with some of Kuklinski’s former colleagues, including Kiszczak and Jaruzelski.¹² The two articles make a valuable supplement to the *Kultura* interview. (Weiser, who later left the *Post* to join *The New York Times*, has been working on a book about Kuklinski.) Further documents and information about Kuklinski’s career and legal case, including interviews with him, have been published in Poland in three recent Polish-language books, and a fourth collection of newly released documents is due out soon.¹³

Back in Poland, nothing was said in public about Kuklinski for many years. In May 1984, after a secret court-martial *in absentia*, the Warsaw Military District Court sentenced Kuklinski to death on charges of high treason and stripped him of his citizenship and military rank. In March 1990, the District Court commuted his death sentence to a prison term of 25 years (under an amnesty bill adopted in December 1989, shortly after a

non-Communist government came to power in Warsaw), but the guilty verdict remained in effect for another five years. In May 1990, the Polish justice minister, Aleksander Bentkowski, who for many years had served under Communist governments, rejected an appeal of Kuklinski’s conviction. Even though the founding leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa, was elected president of Poland in December 1990, he, too, refused to exonerate Kuklinski of the charges.

Not until March 1995 did the Polish Supreme Court finally annul the prison sentence and send the case back for review. In passing down its verdict, the Court excoriated the District Court’s “blatant violations of legal procedures,” and left no doubt about one of the factors that influenced the decision to annul the sentence:

One must take into account the widely-known fact that the sovereignty of Poland was severely diminished [during the Communist era] and that there was an imminent threat of an invasion by the Soviet Union and other contiguous member-states of the Warsaw Pact. One also must take into account the fact that R. Kuklinski was fully informed then about the situation and, through his desperate actions, tried to head off the impending threat of invasion by conveying this information to the leaders of states that are strong enough to alter the world’s fate. . . . The security of the [Polish] state unquestionably takes precedence over the disclosure of a secret, especially if the disclosure is intended to serve a higher cause.¹⁴

Col. Kuklinski’s actions, the Court added, “were in the interest of [Polish] sovereignty and independence.”

Over the next two years, while the final review of Kuklinski’s case was under way, some former Communist officials, especially Jaruzelski, led a bitter campaign to prevent the colonel from being fully exonerated. (Ironically, in 1996 Jaruzelski himself, the chief overseer of martial law, was absolved by the Polish parliament of all charges brought against him in the early 1990s for his role in 1980-81.¹⁵) Despite Jaruzelski’s recalcitrance, Kuklinski cleared his final legal hurdle in September 1997, when, with the grudging approval of Walesa’s successor, Aleksander Kwasniewski (a former high-ranking Polish Communist official), the Chief Military Procurator of the Warsaw Military District revoked the charges against Kuklinski, allowing him to return home as a free man. All his rights of citizenship and his military rank were restored. The basis for the Military Procurator’s decision was that Kuklinski “acted out of a higher necessity” (*w stanie wyższej konieczności*), and that his “cooperation with the American intelligence service” was “intended to benefit the nation.”¹⁶

Even after the Military Procurator’s decision, Jaruzelski and his supporters kept up a rearguard action against Kuklinski. Their efforts were not enough, however, to deter Kuklinski from making an emotional visit back to Poland in April and May 1998. In Kraków, he

was awarded honorary citizenship for his contribution to the restoration of Polish independence.¹⁷ In many other stops around the country he was hailed as a “true patriot.” Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek met with Kuklinski for two hours and declared afterwards that the colonel’s “decisions spared our country great bloodshed.”¹⁸ The visit sparked complaints in some quarters, notably from Adam Michnik, who in recent years has become an unabashed supporter of Jaruzelski.¹⁹ Jaruzelski himself lamented that the “praise for Kuklinski’s actions automatically places the moral blame on myself and other generals.”²⁰ Public ambivalence about Kuklinski, which had been relatively widespread in the early 1990s, has steadily abated (though it has not wholly disappeared).²¹ Overall, then, the visit marked a decisive vindication for a man who only recently had been under sentence of death in his homeland.

* * *

Almost all of the materials that Kuklinski supplied to the U.S. government, including thousands of photographed documents and a vast quantity of his own reports, are still sealed in classified CIA files. Efforts to pry loose those materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) have run into frustrating bureaucratic obstacles. However, some of the reports that Kuklinski sent in 1980 and 1981 were released in the early 1990s so that he could use them in preparing for the judicial review of his case in Poland. Three of those dispatches are featured below in chronological order. Each is preceded by an introduction that provides a brief context for understanding what the report covers and what its significance is. Although these three items are only a minuscule fraction of the materials that Kuklinski provided to the CIA, they give some idea of the extraordinary contribution he made to the security of both Poland and the West.

REPORT No. 1: Early December 1980 Warning of Soviet Intervention

This first report, headed “Very Urgent!,” was sent in early December 1980 under the codename Jack Strong. It had a profound impact on U.S. policy. Kuklinski’s message seemed to corroborate a number of other indications in early December 1980 that the Soviet Union was about to undertake a large-scale military intervention in Poland. On December 3, a day-and-a-half before Kuklinski’s report arrived at CIA headquarters, President Jimmy Carter had sent an urgent communication via the Hot Line to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid I. Brezhnev. Carter promised that the United States would “not exploit the events in Poland” and would not “threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region,” but warned that East-West relations “would be most adversely affected” if the Soviet Army tried “to impose a solution upon the

Polish nation.”²² Kuklinski’s report reinforced the sense of foreboding that had prompted Carter’s use of the Hot Line, and it convinced U.S. officials that very little time was left before Soviet troops moved *en masse* into Poland.

There is no question that events in the latter half of November 1980 and the first few days of December had provided grounds for concern in the West about the prospect of Soviet military action. Tensions in Poland had steadily increased in mid- to late November, culminating in a two-hour warning strike on November 25 by Polish railway workers, who threatened to call a general strike unless their demands were met. These developments provoked alarm in Moscow about the security of the USSR’s lines of communication through Poland with the nearly 400,000 Soviet troops based in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).²³ Unease about Poland was even more acute in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the media in late November had stepped up their condemnations of the “counterrevolutionary forces who are endangering Poland’s socialist order.”²⁴ On November 29, the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Army-Gen. Evgenii Ivanovskii, suddenly informed members of the Western Military Liaison Missions in East Germany that they would be prohibited from traveling into territory along the GDR-Polish border.²⁵ A few days later, on December 3, rumors surfaced that an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders would be held in Moscow on the 5th. This news, coming right after the conclusion of a meeting in Bucharest of the Warsaw Pact’s Council of Defense Ministers (on 1-2 December), raised further apprehension among Western leaders about the possible use of Soviet troops.

Anxiety in the West continued to grow over the next few days as unconfirmed (and, it turned out, largely inaccurate) reports filtered in about a huge buildup of Soviet forces around Poland’s borders. Dense clouds over Poland and the western Soviet Union prevented U.S. reconnaissance satellites from focusing in on Soviet tank and mechanized divisions based there.²⁶ Not until the latter half of December, when the cloud cover temporarily receded, were U.S. satellites able to provide good coverage of Soviet forces in the western USSR. Before the photoreconnaissance became available, many high-ranking U.S. intelligence officials simply assumed that reports of a massive mobilization were accurate. That assumption seemed to be vindicated when reports also began streaming in about last-minute preparations by Soviet troops to set up emergency medical tents and stockpiles of ammunition.²⁷

Against this backdrop, Kuklinski’s dispatch was bound to spark great anxiety when it arrived at the CIA’s headquarters in the early morning hours of December 5. The CIA director, Stansfield Turner, promptly informed Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, that “eighteen Soviet divisions” would move into Poland on December 8. Brzezinski immediately relayed the

information to Carter. At a meeting of top U.S. officials the following day, Turner repeated his warning.²⁸ Although his estimate on December 6 of the number of Soviet divisions that would enter Poland “from the east” was slightly lower than it had been the previous day (fifteen versus eighteen), he averred that “more [Soviet] divisions will follow” the initial fifteen. On December 7, Turner conveyed an even gloomier assessment, claiming that “all the preparations for a [Soviet] invasion of Poland were completed” two days earlier, and that a final “decision to invade” on the night of December 7-8 had been adopted by Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders on the 5th.²⁹ Turner made these predictions without any confirmation from U.S. reconnaissance satellites about a purported buildup of Soviet forces around Poland.

Under the circumstances, Turner’s assumptions may have seemed reasonable, but a close analysis of the period from mid-November to early December 1980 suggests that he and most other U.S. officials misperceived Soviet intentions. A careful analysis also suggests that Kuklinski’s message, written in great haste and with only partial information, unavoidably left out certain key points that bore directly on the question of Soviet intentions. U.S. intelligence officials who apprised political leaders of Kuklinski’s message were remiss in failing to highlight the great uncertainty that remained about Soviet policy. (The uncertainty was especially pronounced in early December 1980 because so little was known at that point about the actual state of readiness of Soviet forces in the western USSR.)

Newly declassified materials confirm that in the latter half of November 1980, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were preparing to hold Soyuz-80 military “exercises” in Poland in early to mid-December.³⁰ The new archival evidence also suggests that these “exercises” were intended mainly as a cover for the Polish authorities to impose martial law. Documents from the East German military archive reveal that four Soviet divisions, two Czechoslovak divisions, and one East German division were supposed to join four Polish army divisions and the Polish security forces in introducing military rule.³¹ If these operations proved insufficient, another fourteen Warsaw Pact divisions (eleven Soviet and three East German) were supposed to move in as reinforcements, according to the documents. It is not clear when and how the second stage of Soyuz-80 would have begun—or where the Soviet forces would have come from—but the option of a second stage was clearly specified in the plans.

This general scenario was consistent with a document prepared by the Soviet Politburo’s Commission on Poland (the so-called Suslov Commission) in late August 1980.³² That document, subsequently approved by the full CPSU Politburo, authorized the Soviet defense ministry to bring four Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the three military districts adjoining Poland up to full combat readiness “in case military assistance is provided to Poland.” It also authorized the defense ministry to plan

for—though not yet to carry out—the “call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000 additional vehicles” to fill out at least “another five to seven [Soviet] divisions” that would be mobilized “if the situation in Poland deteriorates further.” The number of additional reservists and vehicles was large enough to fill out as many as eleven extra Soviet divisions, if necessary, rather than just five to seven.

If final approval had been given for the Soyuz-80 “maneuvers” to begin as scheduled on December 8, enough Soviet forces were in place to carry out the first stage of the operation, but not the second. In mid- to late December 1980, U.S. intelligence sources (photoreconnaissance satellites and electronic intercepts) revealed that only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR had been brought up to full combat readiness.³³ These units constituted three of the four Soviet divisions slated to enter Poland on December 8 in the first stage of Soyuz-80. The fourth Soviet division, according to East German military documents, was to be an airborne division.³⁴ (Soviet airborne divisions were always maintained at full readiness. The unit in question was based in the Baltic Military District.) There is no evidence that any of the additional eleven Soviet tank and mechanized divisions were ever mobilized. Although planning for the mobilization of these divisions had been under way since late August—something that presumably would have enabled Soviet military officials to proceed with the mobilization quite expeditiously if so ordered—the number of Soviet divisions actually available for immediate deployment was extremely limited.

Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on December 8 was very different from the impression one might have gained from Kuklinski’s dispatch (not to mention from Turner’s briefings). Kuklinski was not present when Soviet and Polish military commanders discussed the “exercise” scenario at a secret meeting in Moscow on December 1. Instead, he had to rely on what he could hurriedly learn afterwards from a few documents (maps and charts) and from comments by the “very restricted group of people” who had seen the full plans, especially the officers who had traveled to Moscow. Kuklinski’s dispatch accurately reported the projected size of the *full* operation (both the first and the second stages), but it did not mention that only four of the projected fifteen Soviet divisions would be used in the first stage. This omission obviously was crucial. Although Kuklinski can hardly be faulted, in the face of such extreme uncertainty and time pressure, for having inadvertently left out a key part of the scenario, the difference between his version and the real plan can hardly be overstated. Rather than being a single, massive operation, the projected “exercises” were in fact divided into two stages: a limited first stage, and, if necessary, a much larger second stage. There is no doubt, based on the East German documents, the Suslov Commission’s memorandum, and the evidence from U.S. intelligence sources, that the number of Soviet

divisions slated to take part in the first stage of Soyuz-80 was no more than four. The much larger number of Soviet divisions cited by Kuklinski and Turner (i.e., at least fifteen) represented the *combined* total of forces in both the first and the second stages.

As it turned out, of course, even a limited intervention from outside—by four Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions—did not take place. This non-event points to something else that is missing in Kuklinski's dispatch—an omission that, once again, is perfectly understandable. Kuklinski could not possibly have known that the Soviet Politburo was unwilling to proceed with the "maneuvers" *unless* the Polish authorities were ready to use the outside military support to impose martial law. Soviet leaders never regarded the entry of Warsaw Pact forces into Poland as being the same type of operation conducted against Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When Soviet and East European troops intervened on a massive scale in Czechoslovakia, they did so to halt the Prague Spring and remove the regime headed by Alexander Dubcek. At no point before the invasion were the military plans ever disclosed to Dubcek or the other Czechoslovak reformers. Nor did Soviet commanders in 1968 enlist Czechoslovak troops to help pinpoint entry routes and deployment sites for incoming Soviet forces. In 1980, by contrast, plans for the Soyuz "maneuvers" were coordinated very carefully with the Polish authorities, and Polish officers were assigned to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units.³⁵ Moscow's aim in November-December 1980 was not to move *against* Kania [First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP)] and Jaruzelski, but to offer them support. Soviet leaders did their best, using a mix of coercion and inducements, to ensure that the two Polish officials would seize this opportunity to impose martial law; but the fate of Soyuz-80 ultimately depended on whether Kania and Jaruzelski themselves believed they could crush Solidarity without sparking a civil war.

The Soviet Union's desire to stick with Kania and Jaruzelski came as a disappointment to East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders, who tended to espouse a more belligerent position. On 26 November 1980, the East German leader, Erich Honecker, wrote a letter to Brezhnev urging the immediate adoption of "collective [military] measures to help the Polish friends overcome the crisis."³⁶ Honecker emphasized his "extraordinary fears" about what would happen in Poland if the Soviet Union and its allies failed to send in troops. "Any delay in acting against the counterrevolutionaries," he warned, "would mean death—the death of socialist Poland." To bolster his case, the East German leader authorized a hasty search for possible hardline alternatives to Kania and Jaruzelski. On November 30, the East German defense minister, Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, assured Honecker that certain "leading comrades from the [Polish United Workers' Party] have expressed the view that a [violent] confrontation with the counterrevolution

can no longer be avoided and [that] they expect to receive help from outside."³⁷ Evidently, Honecker helped encourage the leading Polish hardliner, Stefan Olszowski, to travel secretly to Moscow on December 4 for an emergency consultation. The SED General Secretary clearly was hoping that if he could come up with a suitable alternative in Warsaw, Soviet leaders would agree to install a new Polish regime once Soyuz-80 began. Honecker's perspective was fully shared in Sofia and Prague.

In the end, however, the only thing that mattered was what Brezhnev and the rest of the Soviet Politburo wanted. The final decision ultimately was theirs. Even though they heeded the concerns expressed by the other Warsaw Pact states, they were convinced that military action would be worthwhile only if the Polish authorities were ready and able to take full advantage of it. Up to the last moment, Honecker was hoping that Soviet leaders would change their minds. On December 6 and 7, East German military commanders ordered units of the National People's Army (*Nationale Volksarmee*, or NVA) to be ready to move into Poland at a moment's notice, just in case Soviet leaders decided that the intervention should proceed as originally planned.³⁸ To Honecker's dismay, these preparations were all for naught. The Soviet Politburo had firmly decided by then that no Warsaw Pact troops should enter Poland unless a more propitious opportunity arose.

None of this is to suggest that Soviet leaders were merely leaving things to chance. By actively preparing for the "exercise" scenario, they were seeking to force Kania's and Jaruzelski's hand, giving the Polish leaders little option but to move ahead with a crackdown. The impending start of Soyuz-80, it was thought, would compel Kania and Jaruzelski to accelerate their preparations for martial law. (It is even conceivable, albeit unlikely, that Soviet leaders were *never* actually intending to send troops to Poland and, instead, were simply using the preparations for Soyuz-80 as a means of pressuring Kania to implement martial law.³⁹)

Whatever the Soviet Union's precise intentions may have been, it soon became clear that the intense pressure from outside in November-December 1980 would not in itself generate a workable plan for the imposition of martial law. Kania and Jaruzelski constantly stressed the need for more time when they spoke with Soviet leaders in the latter half of November, both directly and through Marshal Kulikov, who served as an envoy for the CPSU Politburo. Kania continued to emphasize the desirability of seeking an "honorable compromise," rather than resorting immediately to violent repression.⁴⁰ Although he did not rule out the eventual "use of force" and formed a new high-level staff to speed up the preparations for martial law, he was convinced that a "political solution" was still feasible.

Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance

units locate the best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland. Despite these gestures, Kania and Jaruzelski had never been enthusiastic about the maneuvers, and they decided that they had to make their views clear after two senior Polish officers, Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski, the first deputy chief of the Polish General Staff, and Col. Franciszek Puchala, a deputy head of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, traveled to Moscow on December 1 to receive "instructions" from the Soviet High Command.⁴¹ The information that Hupalowski and Puchala brought back to Poland, which indicated that an immediate, full-scale crackdown was an integral part of the scenario, was enough to spur Kania and Jaruzelski to warn Soviet leaders that any attempt to bring Warsaw Pact forces into Poland would greatly exacerbate the situation and risk widespread violence. They promised that if they were given a bit more time, they would be able to resolve the crisis on their own.

Kania's and Jaruzelski's wariness about Soyuz-80 was determined mainly by three factors: first, their awareness that preparations for an internal crackdown were still too rudimentary to give any assurance of success without the risk of large-scale bloodshed; second, their belief that the use of any Warsaw Pact troops for policing functions in Poland would stir widespread public outrage and resistance; and third, their specific concern (for obvious historical reasons) about the proposed use of East German troops. This last point was something on which almost all Polish officials, including most of the "healthy forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners), could agree. Even some of the hardline Polish military officers who were secretly encouraging the Soviet Union to send troops to crush Solidarity were averse to any notion that East German divisions should take part as well. In a typical case, a Polish army officer told Soviet officials in early December 1980 that "Poland can now be saved only by the introduction of Soviet troops," but he then warned that he himself "would be the first to take up arms against [East] German or Czech troops if they are sent in. They merely wish us harm and secretly revel in all our misfortunes. Only your [Soviet] troops should be involved in this."⁴²

Once Kania and Jaruzelski had made clear that the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Poland would risk a "bloody confrontation that would roil the whole socialist world," and once they had pledged to take "decisive action" against "hostile" and "anti-socialist" elements in the near future, Soviet leaders were willing to defer the provision of outside military assistance, at least for the time being.⁴³ Although Kania and Jaruzelski both claim in their memoirs that Brezhnev agreed to call off the entry of Warsaw Pact troops only after the hastily arranged meeting of East-bloc leaders in Moscow on December 5, newly declassified documents undercut that assertion.⁴⁴ Numerous documents, including the top-secret transcript of the December 5 meeting (which was unavailable when Kania and Jaruzelski compiled their memoirs), indicate

that the decision to leave troops out of the Soyuz-80 exercises must have been approved well before the Moscow meeting, perhaps as early as December 2.⁴⁵ (A speech that Kania delivered at a PUWP Central Committee plenum on December 2 suggests that he already had been assured that Warsaw Pact forces would not be moving into Poland on the 8th.) Although Kania faced serious criticism in Moscow on December 5, the transcript of the meeting leaves little doubt that he and the other participants already knew that the Soviet Union would give the Polish leaders more time to take care of the crisis "with their own forces."⁴⁶ Kania himself emphasized this point the following day (on December 6) when he gave the PUWP Politburo an overview of the Moscow meeting. Among other things, he reported that all the participating states had expressed confidence that the Polish authorities could "manage the situation on their own" (*ze sytuacji opanujemy własnymi siłami*).⁴⁷

Thus, Kuklinski's dispatch outlined a scenario that, by the time it was reviewed by U.S. officials, had already been put on hold. Soyuz-80 secretly began on December 8, but only as a command-staff exercise (CPX), rather than as full-fledged troop maneuvers.⁴⁸ The CPX continued rather aimlessly for several weeks, long after its value had been exhausted. Although the four Soviet divisions, one East German division, and two Czechoslovak divisions remained at full alert from December 1980 on, the prospect of bringing them into Poland had been postponed indefinitely.

Document No. 1

VERY URGENT!

At a meeting with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in accordance with orders from Gen. Jaruzelski's Defense Ministry, Gen. Hupalowski and Col. Puchala endorsed a plan to admit into Poland (under the pretext of maneuvers) the Soviet Army (SA), the National People's Army of the GDR (NVA), and the Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA). Documents and reproduced portions of the plans [for joint intervention] were presented to show that the following forces are to be sent into Poland: three armies comprising 15 SA divisions, one army comprising two CLA divisions, and the staff of one army and one division from the NVA. In total, the intervening group initially will consist of 18 divisions. (A state of readiness to cross the Polish borders was set for 8 December.) At present, representatives from the "fraternal armies," dressed in civilian clothing, are undertaking reconnaissance of invasion routes as well as the distances and terrain for future operations. The scenario of operations for the intervening armies envisages a regrouping of armies to all major Polish Army bases to conduct maneuvers with live ammunition. Then, depending on how things develop, all major Polish cities, especially industrial cities, are to be sealed off.

According to the plan of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Polish Army will remain within its permanent units while its “allies” are regrouping on Polish territory. The only exceptions will be supervisory officers and military traffic control units, which will ensure a collision-free regrouping of the SA, CLA, and NVA armies from the border to the territories of future operations. Four Polish divisions (the 5th and 2nd Tank Divisions and the 4th and 12th Mechanized Divisions) will be called into operation at a later point.

Finally, I very much regret to say that although everyone who has seen the plans (a very restricted group of people) is very depressed and crestfallen, no one is even contemplating putting up active resistance against the Warsaw Pact action.⁴⁹ There are even those (Jasinski, Puchala) who say that the very presence of such enormous military forces on the territory of Poland may calm the nation.

JACK STRONG

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REPORT No. 2: 26 April 1981
A “Hopeless” Situation

This next report, addressed to Kuklinski’s closest contact at the CIA, who used the codename Daniel, was signed with two initials (PV) that Kuklinski included on his very first written message to the U.S. government in 1971, when he was initially offering to supply information. He chose these initials because the letter V is very rarely used in Polish, and he wanted to disguise his nationality in case the message was somehow intercepted.

The report was sent during a relative lull in the Polish crisis. The Warsaw Pact’s Soyuz-81 exercises, which had begun on 23 March 1981 and were due to end on March 31, had been extended to April 7 at the request of the Polish authorities. Jaruzelski and Kania also had secretly urged that the exercises be continued after April 7 so that the PUWP leaders could “strengthen their position, give inspiration to the progressive forces [i.e., orthodox Communists] in Poland, make Solidarity and KOR [Committee to Defend Workers] realize that the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to provide help of all kinds to Poland, and thereby exert pressure on the leaders of Solidarity.”⁵⁰ Soviet military commanders turned down the request, arguing that it was merely “further proof that the Polish leaders believe others should do their work for them.”⁵¹

While the Soyuz-81 exercises were still under way, Kania and Jaruzelski had met secretly in Brest on the Polish-Soviet border with Andropov and Ustinov on April 3-4. The two Polish leaders were extremely apprehensive before the meeting, but they left with much greater confidence that they would be given more time to resolve the crisis on their own. A week after the Brest talks, Marshal Kulikov sought to meet with Kania and Jaruzelski

to get them to sign the implementation directives for martial law (which would effectively set a date for the operation to begin), but the Polish leaders first postponed the meeting and then told Kulikov on April 13 that they would have to wait before signing the documents. For the time being, the Polish authorities had gained a further respite.

Soviet leaders, for their part, realized by mid-April that they would have to ease up a bit in their relentless pressure on Kania and Jaruzelski. Brezhnev summed up this view at a CPSU Politburo meeting on April 16 when he affirmed that “we shouldn’t badger [the Polish leaders], and we should avoid making them so nervous that they simply throw up their hands in despair.”⁵² When Suslov and another key member of the Suslov Commission, Konstantin Rusakov, visited Warsaw on April 23-24, they “attacked the [Polish leaders’] indecisiveness” and “sharply criticized their actions,” but also sought to “support and encourage them” and to ensure that “they will have a distinct degree of trust in us.”⁵³ Although Brezhnev and his colleagues realized that “the current lull is only a temporary phenomenon” and although they were determined to “exert constant pressure” on Kania and Jaruzelski, the Soviet leaders were also convinced that “we must now maintain a more equitable tone in our relations with our [Polish] friends.”

Thus, the pessimistic outlook of Kuklinski’s message on April 26 was not so much a reflection of the immediate political climate as it was a venting of frustration about two things:

First, the Warsaw Pact states were continuing to exert enormous pressure on the Polish army. In his report, Kuklinski indicated in the dispatch that he and other General Staff officers had recently returned from Bulgaria, where they had been attending a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Military Council on April 21-23.⁵⁴ Marshal Kulikov, his chief deputy, Army-Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, and other Warsaw Pact military leaders reemphasized at this session that they were as determined as ever to keep Poland and the Polish army fully within the socialist commonwealth.

Second, the progress toward martial law seemed inexorable. By mid-April 1981, the conceptual phase of the martial law planning was over, and work was proceeding apace on the practical steps needed to implement the plans.⁵⁵ Kuklinski could see that in the seeming absence of an opportunity for the Polish army to defy the Soviet Union, the imposition of martial law was drawing ever nearer.

Document No. 2

WARSAW, 26 April 1981

Dear Daniel!⁵⁶

After returning from Sofia with several officers from the General Staff,⁵⁷ we discussed the current situation in

Poland, a situation that, from the military point of view, is hopeless. In this extremely gloomy atmosphere, one of the most committed officers openly said that Poland had to undertake far-reaching political reforms. Gen. XXX⁵⁸ bitterly accused “the Americans [of having] sold us out to Russia. Without the Americans’ silent assent, the ‘comrades’ would not dare to act this way.” We are now very desperate, but we have not lost hope that Gen. XXX is wrong! Appropriate use must be made of the flood of information he is sending to you.

We Poles realize that we must fight for our own freedom, if necessary making the ultimate sacrifice. I remained convinced that the support your country has been giving to all who are fighting for that freedom will bring us closer to our goal.

Thank you for your most recent, pleasant letter.

With heartfelt greetings. Yours, PV

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**REPORT No. 3: 15 September 1981—
Plans for Martial Law**

This third message recounts a landmark meeting of Poland’s Homeland Defense Committee (*Komitet Obrony Kraju*, or KOK) on 13 September 1981. The KOK consisted of high-ranking military and political officials and was chaired by Jaruzelski in his capacity as prime minister. During the 1980-81 crisis, the KOK took on a supreme decision-making role, overseeing all the planning for martial law. On 13 September 1981, the KOK made a firm decision to press ahead with the martial law operation, leaving only the precise timetable to be determined. The great importance of this secret meeting was first revealed by Kuklinski in his 1987 interview, and it was then briefly discussed by Kania in his book-length interview (published in 1991) and by Jaruzelski in his two volumes of memoirs.⁵⁹ Kuklinski’s report says that notetaking was forbidden at the KOK meeting, but that is not quite true. One of the participants, Gen. Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, was responsible for taking notes of the session. His eight pages of handwritten notes, classified top-secret, were released from the Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) in Warsaw in 1997.⁶⁰

Kuklinski was not present at the KOK meeting, but he was briefed about it immediately afterwards. Although Tuczapski’s notes (which are not a verbatim record, but merely summaries of remarks) do not record Kiszczak’s agitated comments about the leak of the martial law plans to Solidarity, all evidence suggests that Kiszczak did in fact deal with that issue at length in his opening speech, as Kuklinski indicates. It is unclear precisely how the Polish security forces discovered the leak, but it has long been

known that the Internal Affairs Ministry had a dedicated campaign under way to infiltrate Solidarity. The aim was not only to compromise the organization and discredit its leaders, but also to gather intelligence about its plans and activities.⁶¹ Kuklinski himself has recently described the infiltration programs about which he knew first-hand in 1980 and 1981.⁶² These programs were aimed mainly at recruiting informers and *agents provocateurs* in Solidarity.

Kuklinski’s dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak was discovered, security was tightened within the General Staff’s martial law planning unit, and an investigation was launched. Because Kuklinski was one of a very small group of suspects, he had to curtail his activities and avoid doing anything that might arouse suspicion. It is interesting, however, that even at this perilous juncture, he showed no sign of wanting to leave Poland. Clearly, he regarded his work there as too crucial to abandon.

At the same time, the report suggests that Kuklinski was surprised by the CIA’s decision to transfer this highly sensitive information to Solidarity at a moment when no crackdown appeared imminent. Because the disclosure of secret codenames risked exposing Kuklinski, it seemed to be a rather short-sighted step that might undermine his whole mission. Kuklinski obviously realized that Solidarity needed to be warned in general terms about the planning for martial law, but he knew that the receipt of highly detailed information, especially codenames, would be reported immediately to the PUWP leadership by infiltrators within Solidarity. The colonel seemed to be hoping that the CIA would be more discreet in the future, at least until a more precise timetable for martial law had been set.

Document No. 3

WARSAW
2030, 15 September 1981

At an extraordinary session of the KOK on Sunday, which Kania attended for the first time, no final decision was made about the imposition of martial law. Almost all of the participants supported it. It seems that the tenor of the meeting surprised Kania. Although he did not question that such a development was inevitable, he reportedly said, in these precise words, that “a confrontation with the class enemy is unavoidable. This involves first a struggle using political means, but if that should fail, repression may be adopted.” Note-taking was forbidden at the session. During the KOK’s meeting, Kiszczak declared that Solidarity knew the details of our plans, including Operation “Wiosna”⁶³ and its secret codename. I should emphasize that this is a codename—the secret title of the operation—and not the codeword needed to put it into effect. The officials responsible for implementing the plans don’t know the codename; hence, it will be easy to compile a group of suspects. (The

MSW⁶⁴ was given urgent orders to find the source.) The first steps have already been taken. Except for Szklarski and me, everyone was excluded in operational directives from the planning. A counterintelligence officer visited Szklarski⁶⁵ and me yesterday. He spoke about ways of preventing future leaks. At present, Jasinski⁶⁶ has taken command of planning at the national level. Szklarski has temporarily withdrawn. Since this morning we have been working, under Jasinski's supervision and in cooperation with a PUWP CC official,⁶⁷ with the KOK Secretariat, with the KPPRM, and with Pawlikowski from MSW,⁶⁸ on a unified plan of command for the surprise introduction of martial law. The document is still being put together, so I am unable to give a detailed account of it. (I proposed a break so that I could send this telegram.) In brief, martial law will be introduced at night, either between Friday and a work-free Saturday or between Saturday and Sunday, when industrial plants will be closed. Arrests will begin around midnight, six hours before an announcement of martial law is broadcast over the radio and television. Roughly 600 people will be arrested in Warsaw, which will require the use of around 1,000 police in unmarked cars. That same night, the army will seal off the most important areas of Warsaw and other major cities. Initially, only the MSW's forces will take part. A separate political decision will be made about "improving the deployment of armies," that is, redeploying entire divisions to major cities. This will be done only if reports come in about larger pockets of unrest. One cannot rule out, however, that redeployments of divisions based far away from the areas of future operations will commence with the introduction of martial law or even earlier. For example, it would take roughly 54 hours to redeploy the 4th Mechanized Division to the vicinity of Warsaw.

Because the investigation is proceeding, I will have to forgo my daily reports about current developments. Please treat with caution the information I am conveying to you, since it appears that my mission is coming to an end. The nature of the information makes it quite easy to detect the source. I do not object to, and indeed welcome, having the information I have conveyed serve those who fight for the freedom of Poland with their heads raised high. I am prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but the best way to achieve something is with our actions and not with our sacrifices.

Long live free Poland!

Long live Solidarity, which brings freedom to all oppressed nations!

JACK STRONG

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¹Biographical information here has been compiled from a number of the sources adduced below as well as from personal contacts with Richard T. Davies, Douglas J. MacEachin, and Col. Kuklinski himself. It is worth noting that some of Kuklinski's former military colleagues in Poland, notably Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czeslaw Kiszczak, have raised questions about Kuklinski's motives for working with the United States, and a few Communist (or former Communist) officials in Poland have tried to challenge some aspects of Kuklinski's story. For a sample of opposing views, see Andrzej Bober, "Ujawniamy tresc akt sprawy karnej Plk. Ryszarda Kuklinskiego," *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 2 May 1998, pp. 1-2, and the lurid charges raised in Robert Walenciak, "Zagadka Kuklinskiego," *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (Warsaw), no. 17 (29 April 1998), p. 4. I have carefully checked into all of these allegations and have found them, without exception, to be utterly groundless. The information provided here has been carefully vetted for its accuracy.

²For information on the other Polish officers who cooperated with the United States, see the comments of Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak in Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., *General Kiszczak mówi: Prawie wszystko* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Dubicki, who defected to the West in 1981 shortly before the introduction of martial law, was killed in Germany under mysterious circumstances in early 1998. See "Tajemnica śmierć Leona Dubickiego," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 9 March 1998, p. 4.

³See "Komenda Stoieczna: Plany przedsięwzięć dotyczących drugiego etapu akcji 'Jodla'," October 1981 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych (AMSW), Warsaw, Sygnatura (Sygn.) Spis 156, Pozycja (Poz.) 81, Tom (T.) IV.

⁴See Kuklinski's comments about the source of the disclosure in "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," *Tygodnik Solidarność* (Warsaw), No. 49 (9 December 1994), pp. 1, 12-14. See also his comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 48-49.

⁵In "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," pp. 13-14, Kuklinski reports that the head of the Polish General Staff's Operations Directorate, Gen. Jerzy Skalski, claimed that Siwicki believed the information had come via Rome (presumably meaning an agent in the Italian intelligence service). Skalski was very upset and nervous when he was discussing this matter, so it is possible that he was in error. Kuklinski himself is uncertain.

⁶See Kuklinski's interesting comments in "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," pp. 13-14.

⁷The quotation comes from Francis Meehan, U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980 to 1982, in a conversation with the author in June 1990.

⁸Kuklinski revealed this date for the first time in an interview in October 1997, excerpts of which were broadcast on Polish radio in November 1997 on the program "Trojka pod Ksiezycem," which I heard while riding to Warsaw's Okęcie airport after having attended a conference in Jachranka on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

⁹These incidents, one in Washington and the other in Chicago, were described by Andrzej Krajewski and Sylwia Wysocka in "Trojka pod Ksiezycem."

¹⁰His younger son, Boguslaw, an avid yachtsman, was lost at

sea in early January 1994 while sailing in the Gulf of Mexico. No trace of his body was ever found. The elder son, Waldemar, was killed in an automobile accident during the 4th of July weekend.

¹¹"Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," pp. 3-55.

¹²Weiser's first article was "Polish Officer Was U.S.'s Window on Soviet War Plans," *Washington Post* 27 September 1992, pp. A1, A38, and the second was "A Question of Loyalty," *Washington Post Magazine*, 13 December 1992, pp. 9-13, 24-29.

¹³Maciej Lukaszewicz, ed., *Bohater czy zdrajca: Fakty i dokumenty sprawy pułkownika Kuklinskiego* (Warsaw: Most, 1992); Krzysztof Dubinski and Iwona Jurczenko, *Oko Pentagonu: Rzecz o pułkowniku Ryszardzie Kuklinskim* (Warsaw: KMSO, 1995); and Bernard Nowak, ed., *Pułkownik Kuklinski: Wywiady, Opinie, Dokumenty* (Lublin: Test, 1998). Although Kuklinski is still reluctant to be interviewed, several lengthy interviews have appeared in recent years; see especially the interview cited above, "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," pp. 1, 12-14.

¹⁴The full text of the Court's verdict is reproduced in "Rewizje nadzwyczajna," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 7 April 1995, p. 17.

¹⁵"Komisja rozgrzesza autorów stanu wojennego: Większość rządowa PSL-SLD przegłosowała mniejszość opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later. The parliament's action did not cover the separate charges brought against Jaruzelski for his role in the bloody crackdown of December 1970. A trial resumed in mid-1998 of Jaruzelski and eleven other senior officials charged with the massacres. See "Proces-Grudzień '70, krotka: Rozpoczal się proces oskarżonych ws. Grudnia '70," *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 16 June 1998, p. 2.

¹⁶"Umorzono śledztwo przeciw płk. Kuklinskiemu," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 23 September 1997, p. 1.

¹⁷Jerzy Sadecki, "Kuklinski na Wawelu: Honorowy Obywatel Stołecznego Królewskiego Miasta Krakowa," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 29 April 1998, p. 2; and Jerzy Sadecki, "Honorowe obywatelstwo dla Ryszarda Kuklinskiego: Zwykły żołnierz Rzeczypospolitej," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 30 April 1998, p. 2.

¹⁸"Już nie chce stad wyjeżdżać: Uratował przed rozlewem krwi—oswiadczył premier," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.

¹⁹Adam Michnik, "Pułapka politycznej beatyfikacji," *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 10-11 May 1998, pp. 10-11.

²⁰Jaruzelski: Przyjazd Kuklinskiego nie budzi moich zastrzeżeń," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.

²¹Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, *Opinie o pułkowniku Kuklinskim* (Warsaw: CBOS, May 1998), pp. 1-3.

²²For the genesis and full text of Carter's message, see the reproduced entries from the diary of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the Carter administration, in "White House Diary, 1980," *Orbis*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 33-38. See also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1985), pp. 495-498; and Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 583-585.

²³At the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December 1980, Brezhnev remarked that "the situation with the lines of communication [in Poland], especially with the railroads and harbors, deserves urgent attention. Poland would experience an economic catastrophe if transportation facilities were paralyzed. This would also be a great blow to the economic interests of other

socialist states. Let me reiterate: Under no circumstances can we tolerate it if the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries are endangered by difficulties with the transportation system.

An elaborate plan must be devised to use the [Polish] army and security forces to assert control over the transportation facilities and the main lines of communication [in Poland], and this plan must be implemented. Even before martial law is declared, it would be worthwhile to set up military command posts and to initiate military patrols along the railroads." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Repräsentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," 5 December 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, (Berlin) J IV, 2/2 A-2368; reproduced in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), p. 173.

²⁴See, among many examples, "Unüberwindliche Barriere gegen imperialistischen Feind," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 1 December 1980, p. 3; "Walesa über Zusammenarbeit mit KOR," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 27 November 1980, p. 5; Jan Lipavsky, "Konfrontace: Od naseho varsavskeho zpravodaje," *Rude pravo* (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; "V boji o socialisticky charakter obnovy zeme," *Rude pravo* (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; and "Strana se upevnuje v akciji," *Rude Pravo*, 1 December 1980, p. 6.

²⁵Ivanovskii was replaced as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany on 4 December 1980 by Army-Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev. Ivanovskii was then appointed commander of the Belorussian Military District, the post that Zaitsev had held. See "Verdienste um Bruderbund UdSSR-DDR gewürdigt: Herzliche Begegnung mit Armeegeneral Iwanowski und Armeegeneral Saizew im Staatsrat," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 5 December 1980, pp. 1-2.

²⁶The problems posed by cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. A *Special Analysis* issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid determination that only three Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the western USSR were on full alert.

²⁷See Brzezinski, "White House Diary, 1980," p. 45.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

³⁰The emphasis here is on the word "preparing." It is unclear whether Soviet leaders were actually *intending* to bring troops into Poland, or were perhaps simply using the preparations as a means of spurring the Polish authorities to accelerate their plans for martial law. I will return briefly to this point below.

³¹See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in Militärisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or 2 December. See also "Erläuterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st).

³²See my article about, and translation of, the Commission's document in this same issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*.

³³U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign

Assessment Center, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), pp. 1-5.

³⁴ "Einweisung," Bl. 16.

³⁵ "Wesentlicher Inhalt der Meldung des Chefs des Militärbezirkes V, General-major Gehmert, über die Ergebnisse der Rekognoszierung auf dem Territorium der Volksrepublik Polen zur Durchführung der gemeinsamen Übung," Report No. A-575-702 (Top Secret), 16 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, chief-of-staff of the East German National People's Army, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 23-27.

³⁶ "Anlage Nr. 2," 26 November 1980 (Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5-6. My translation of, and commentary on, this letter appeared in "The Warsaw Pact and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: Honecker's Call for Military Intervention," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), p. 124.

³⁷ "Werter Genosse Honecker!" letter from Hoffmann to Honecker, 30 November 1980 (Top Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 4-5.

³⁸ "Befehl Nr. 118/80 des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung über die Vorbereitung und Durchführung einer gemeinsamen Ausbildungsmaßnahme der der Vereinten Streitkräfte vom 06.12.1980," Nr. A-265-992 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 32-37; "Anordnung Nr. 54/80 des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Hauptstabes zur Gewährleistung des Passierens der Staatsgrenze der DDR zur VR Polen mit Staben und Truppen der Nationalen Volksarmee zur Teilnahme an einer auf dem Territorium der VR Polen stattfindenden gemeinsamen Truppenübung vom 06.12.1980," No. A-477-624 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 38-41; "Schreiben des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Hauptstabes, Generaloberst Streletz, an den Chef Verwaltung Aufklärung," No. A-575-704 (Top Secret), December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 149; and numerous other documents reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., "*Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen*," pp. 197-208.

³⁹ No matter how much new evidence eventually becomes available, this matter may never be conclusively resolved. One item that suggests Soviet leaders may not have been intending to send troops into Poland is the huge turnover that occurred within the Soviet High Command in early December 1980. Most of the officers who would have been overseeing a large-scale operation in Poland were suddenly replaced. These included the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces, the commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany, the commander of the USSR's Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia), the commander of the Belorussian Military District, and the commander of the Baltic Military District. This reshuffling would have been highly unusual if Soviet leaders knew they were about to embark on a potentially dangerous military operation. The reshuffling evidently was connected with changes in Soviet command-and-control procedures (including the establishment of new Theater Commands), but it clearly could have had a detrimental effect on near-term military contingencies in Poland. See Jack Sullivan and Tom Symonds, *Soviet Theaters, High Commands and Commanders* (Fort Meade, MD: Air Force Intelligence Service, 1986); Michael J. Deane, et al., "The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 55-70; and Gregory C. Baird, "The Soviet Theater Command—An Update," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 34, No. 6

(November-December 1981), pp. 90-94.

⁴⁰ "Protokol Nr. 51 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 26 listopada 1980 r.," 26 November 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc" 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 180-188.

⁴¹ For more on this, see Kuklinski's comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," pp. 21-22.

⁴² "O vyskazaniyakh turistov iz PNR v svyazi s resheniyami VII Plenuma TsK PORP i vstrechei partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh deyateli stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora," Memorandum No. 135-s (Secret), 9 December 1980, from V. D. Dobrotvor, head of the Ukrainian Main Directorate for Foreign Tourism, in Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Ob'ednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), Kiev, Fond (F.) 1, Opis' (Op.) 25, Spravka (Spr.), Listy (Ll.) 170-172.

⁴³ The quoted passage is from Kania's speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December. "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Repräsentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," p. 143.

⁴⁴ Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaînes et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992), pp. 237-241; and Stanislaw Kania, *Zatrzymać konfrontacje* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 90-93.

⁴⁵ "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Repräsentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," pp. 140-196.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ "Protokol Nr. 53 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 grudnia 1980 r.," 6 December 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, p. 189.

⁴⁸ Army-Gen. A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 1980-kh godov," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 54-55.

⁴⁹ This is an important statement because it confirms that the Polish General Staff had no plans to resist Soviet military intervention. That does not mean all troops from the Polish army would have simply stood by while Soviet units moved in, but it does indicate that the highest-ranking Polish commanders were not going to oppose the Soviet Union.

⁵⁰ "Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübung 'SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-P, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhnva L. I. s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu)," 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation [TsKhSD], F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, L. 3.

⁵³ "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 30 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh peregovorov delegatsii KPSS s rukovodstvom PORP," in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 42, Ll. 2-4.

⁵⁴ "V Ob'edinennykh voozruzhennykh silakh gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 24 April 1981, p. 1.

⁵⁵ The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet officials: "Myśl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze wzgledu na bezpieczenstwo panstwa," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret),

“Centralny plan działania organów politycznych władzy i administracji państwowej na wypadek konieczności wprowadzenia w PRL stanu wojennego,” 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), “Ramowy plan działania sił zbrojnych,” 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), “Ramowy plan przedsięwzięć gospodarczych,” 2 April 1981 (Top Secret), all in Centralne Archyiwum Wojskore [CAW], Warsaw, 1813/92, Sygn. 2304/IV.

⁵⁶ Daniel was the codename of Kuklinski’s main contact at the CIA.

⁵⁷ A long-planned session of the Warsaw Pact’s Military Council was held in Bulgaria on 21-23 April 1981.

⁵⁸ Kuklinski himself redacted the surname of this Polish general. It may have referred to Gen. Leon Dubicki, who was an adviser to Jaruzelski at the time.

⁵⁹ “Wojna z narodem widziana od środka,” pp. 32-34; Kania, *Zatrzymać konfrontacje*, pp. 110-111; Jaruzelski, *Les chaînes et le refuge*, pp. 384-385; and Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dla czego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), pp. 269-271.

⁶⁰ “Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981 r.,” 13 September 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Protokoly z posiedzen Komitetu Obrony Kraju, Teczka Sygn. 48. I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for giving me a copy of these notes.

⁶¹ See “Informatsiya o poezdke delegatsii Yaroslavskogo obkoma KPSS v Radomskoe voevodstvo PNR,” Memorandum No. 0035 (Top Secret), 21 January 1981, from I. Zaramenskii, first secretary of the CPSU’s Yaroslavl oblast committee, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 85, Ll. 298-301; and “Vermerk über

ein Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politbüros und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei,” 20 November 1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV, 2/2 A-2363; reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., “*Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen*,” p. 105.

⁶² “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” p. 26.

⁶³ “Wiosna” (Spring) was the codename for the opening stage of the martial law operation. It involved mass arrests of leading Solidarity officials and dissident intellectuals.

⁶⁴ The acronym for Ministerstwo spraw wewnetrznych (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

⁶⁵ Gen. Waclaw Szklarski, the head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, was Kuklinski’s commanding officer.

⁶⁶ Gen. Antoni Jasinski, the deputy chief of the Polish General Staff for organization, played a crucial role in supervising the planning of martial law, as did the deputy chief of the General Staff for operations, Gen. Jerzy Skalski.

⁶⁷ Presumably this official would have been from the PUWP CC Propaganda Department, which had been actively taking part in the initial martial law planning.

⁶⁸ Col. Bronislaw Pawlikowski, the head of a directorate in the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry, was one of the main liaisons with Kuklinski and other officers on the Polish General Staff. He played an especially important role in designing the mass-arrest operation.



Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Polish Defense Minister Florian Siwicki, and PUWP First Secretary Stanisław Kania at the November 1997 Jachranka Conference. Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

The Czechoslovak Communist Regime and the Polish Crisis 1980-1981

By Oldřich Tůma

One of the best books on the history of communism, written by Martin Malia, is devoted to Poland's Solidarity movement, "which began the task of dismantling communism in 1980."¹ In looking at the formation and actions of Poland's Solidarity as beginning a process that finally led to the end of communism in Czechoslovakia as well, it is necessary to consider the reaction of the Czechoslovak regime to the Polish events of 1980-1981. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) viewed the developments in Poland as a direct threat, paid extraordinary attention to them, and made considerable efforts to influence them.

We should say at the outset, however, that it is only possible to reconstruct in part the Czechoslovak Communist regime's reaction to the developments in Poland of that time in part as the relevant archival sources have not yet been sorted and filed and are still not wholly accessible. I have been able to use some documents from the archive of the CPCz Central Committee (CC), primarily materials from meetings of the Presidium. While the minutes of individual meetings are missing, basic documentation e.g. various memoranda, notes of meetings with delegations from other communist parties are preserved. Documents of the Ministry of the Interior and materials from the Ministry of National Defense or the Czechoslovak Army are only partially available. For this reason, the military measures had to be reconstructed not only from primary documents, but from other sources—specifically oral history, and some documents produced after 1992 within the framework of the parliamentary commission that investigated abuses by the Czechoslovak Army during the Communist period, *inter alia* in relation to Poland in the years 1980-1981.

The CPCz and its leadership closely monitored the developments in Poland from the very beginning of the strike movement. Documents from the file of General Secretary Gustáv Husák contain a wide variety of detailed material about the situation in Poland (several analyses, reports about individual events, programs of opposition groups, and news about workers' activities). The digests of selected information put together by the CC apparatus and designed for the highest CPCz functionaries also devoted continuous attention to events in Poland. Beginning in August 1980, when the bulletins first reported rumors circulating especially in northern Moravia of impending Polish price rises, until 1982, these internal party information bulletins contained a section of information devoted to Polish developments and their reverberations in Czechoslovakia. Citizens' reactions to

the rumors and events as documented in the bulletins were not positive for the Czechoslovak regime. The information spoke of fears about a decline in living standards,² tales of imminent military actions against Poland that would include the Czechoslovak army, and the concerns of parents whose sons were serving in the military (especially in December 1980).³ The information also referred to the appearance of graffiti slogans such as "Solidarity with Solidarity," and "Wafesa is a hero," etc.⁴ By the end of August 1980, the organs of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior recommended certain preventive measures even before the signing of the Gdańsk agreement. The Czechoslovak media monitored Polish events very closely, although they reported them, of course, in a decidedly distorted and negative manner.

Noteworthy, for instance, are the pages of the CPCz daily *Rudé právo* which, in the second half of 1980 and throughout 1981, printed material about Poland practically every day, often running more than one story. A mere perusal of the headlines indicates very clearly in what direction the regime's propaganda attempted to orient Czechoslovak public opinion. The headlines were full of negative terms such as violence, disruption, provocation, vandalism, and hooliganism,⁵ suggesting to readers dangerous and risky developments. Other headlines reflected the regime's attempts to characterize Solidarity's progress as the result of foreign manipulation: "Together with the BND [West German Intelligence Service] against Poland," "Who does the White House applaud?," "Who does Wall Street applaud?," "With the blessing of the Vatican," "The directives come from Paris," "The CIA pays for Wafesa's union."⁶ Other articles documented the regime's not entirely unsuccessful attempts to call to mind the catastrophic economic situation in Poland, to link it to the actions of Solidarity, and, against this background, to emphasize the relatively tolerable economic situation at home.⁷

It is also possible to reconstruct fairly accurately the attitude of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership towards events in Poland. Its attitude is reflected in a whole range of documents—in the speeches delivered at the sessions of the CPCz CC where evaluations of the Polish developments were presented, mainly by the leader of the Central Committee's International Relations Department, Vasil Bilak; in talks which leading CPCz functionaries conducted with their Polish counterparts and with representatives of other communist parties. Especially important are the two extensive presentations of Gustáv Husák at the joint meetings of the leaders of East European Communist parties in Moscow in November

1980 and May 1981⁸ and the letter addressed by the CC CPCz to the Polish United Workers' Party (CC) in June 1981.⁹

The CPCz leadership evaluated the situation in Poland as a counterrevolution prepared and controlled by international imperialist centers and by secret counterrevolutionary centers in the country itself. They believed that these centers were exploiting the severe economic situation, the workers' dissatisfaction and—as was heavily emphasized—the serious mistakes of the Polish leadership. This evaluation may be illustrated by a few key sentences from Bilak's speeches. According to him, the anti-socialist plan began with the election of a Pole as Pope:

“The choice of Krakow bishop [Karol] Wojtyła for Pope was not an accident, nor was it due to the fact that he had been endowed with supernatural qualities. It was part of a plan worked out by the United States with the aim of attacking another socialist country... It is necessary to realize that on the basis of the defeat of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, the centers of international imperialism advanced to the view that they could only hope for success if they managed to take advantage of the mass dissatisfaction of the workers, focusing their plans in practice on factories and plants... The current representatives of the anti-socialist forces who stand before the public, such as Lech Wałęsa for example, are not the main organizers. There exists in the background a driving center which so far cannot be revealed.”¹⁰ “What is happening in Poland is a great crime being committed against socialism and the Polish people. The blame lies both with the forces of counter-revolution and in those who have made it possible for imperialism to turn Poland into a detonator of socialist society.”¹¹

Above all, Czechoslovak representatives accused the Polish leadership of pursuing an incorrect economic policy, which had led to a high debt with the West; and of acting irresolutely in the resulting crisis, of being willing to compromise too much, and of being unable to regain the initiative. Such critical judgements were not leveled equally at all members of the Polish leadership. Full trust was still placed in PUWP Politburo members Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski. While Stanisław Kania was severely criticized, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski earned respect only when he declared martial law in December 1981.

The CPCz leaders constantly compared the developments in Poland with the unfolding of the 1968-1969 Czechoslovak crisis. They sought and found analogies, and tried to apply their own experience in renewing control over Czechoslovak society to the Polish situation. Repeated reminders of “Lessons from the Critical Development in the Party and in Society” (a basic Party document issued by the leaders of the CPCz at the end of 1970, which evaluated and interpreted the Czechoslovak crisis, which the CPCz adhered to like

gospel up to 1989) were obligatory in all meetings with Polish colleagues, with the main emphasis on the recommendation to act decisively, not to fear the risks, and to overthrow the counterrevolution. The resolute and violent repression of public protests on the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact intervention in August 1969 was often held up as a model.¹² Husák himself based his whole presentation at the Moscow meeting on 5 December 1980 on the exposition of the Czechoslovak crisis, and sought a parallel with the unfolding developments in Poland.

It is interesting that the Czechoslovak Communists sometimes spoke of their comrades in the PUWP leadership with a certain disrespect. It was not simply a matter of repeatedly stressing their disagreement with PUWP policies; in materials prepared for meetings of the CPCz CC Presidium there were a number of unflattering comments aimed at individual PUWP functionaries. It is extraordinary to see such material in the records of meetings with representatives of other Communist parties and in internal Party documents. For example, in the notes of a meeting of a Czechoslovak delegation led by CPCz CC Presidium member Karel Hoffmann in Warsaw in March 1981,¹³ we find the following comments on Stanisław Kania: “During Comrade Hoffmann's remarks one could notice Comrade Kania nervously shifting in his seat while his facial expressions betrayed his disagreement and dissatisfaction.” According to the report, “the exposition and certain further statements by Comrade Kania bear witness to the fact that he idealizes the situation and [they] also contain claims which are simply in conflict with reality.”¹⁴

Representatives of other Communist parties in the Soviet bloc spoke similarly about the Polish leaders in conversations with Czechoslovak representatives.¹⁵ In the Czechoslovak case however, the fact that the situation of 1968, which the CPCz representatives still remembered, now seemed to be reversed, played an important role. The events of 1968 had evidently lowered the prestige and worsened the standing of the CPCz inside the Soviet bloc.¹⁶ Now it was as if that dishonor had at last been erased. The Czechoslovak leaders now advised, instructed, made their own experience available, and offered their help. Revenge for 1968, malicious joy, and appeal to anti-Polish sentiments was also an unspoken, unconscious part of the regime's propaganda with a view of rallying support among Czechoslovak society. That Czechoslovaks should turn against Solidarity and the Poles because the Polish Army had taken part in the intervention of August 1968 certainly was a very perverse logic. Nevertheless the regime tried to imbue this idea in the units assembled for possible deployment on Polish territory at the end of 1980. The Czechoslovak leadership also tried to influence Polish developments and to aid the PUWP in its struggle against the opposition. Economic, propaganda, military and security measures were taken primarily within the framework of closer cooperation and coordination with

other countries of the Eastern bloc; above all with those countries most affected by the Polish events—the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

Given the growing economic crisis in the country, the Polish leadership turned to their allies with requests for extraordinary aid. The greater part of such aid came from the Soviet Union, but Czechoslovakia also contributed. It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the crisis the CPCz leadership was much less inclined to accede to Polish requests than they were later on. As early as the end of August 1980, the Poles had requested emergency assistance.¹⁷ The Czechoslovak leadership complied, but only on a significantly reduced scale: instead of the requested 20 thousand tons of meat they promised to provide 2 thousand tons; instead of 8 thousand tons of butter they offered 1 to 1.5 thousand tons in exchange for an equivalent quantity of cheese; instead of the requested 20 tons of sugar, they offered to lend 5 thousand tons; and instead of 3 thousand tons of newsprint paper they agreed to lend 500 to 800 tons.¹⁸ In November 1980, the CPCz CC Presidium agreed to Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's suggestion of a temporary reduction of Soviet deliveries of oil to Czechoslovakia.¹⁹ But only after the declaration of martial law, "as an expression of the attempt to help the normalization of life in the country," was much larger-scale assistance offered: goods valued at more than 800 million Czechoslovak crowns, partly as a gift, the rest not to be accounted for until after 1982.²⁰

The CPCz also tried to influence Polish developments through political contacts and propaganda. The exchange of delegations was intensified at various levels as were partnerships between towns, districts and regions. Every day Czechoslovak radio broadcast several hours of programs in Polish across the border (which were supposed to, according to Husák "comment on Polish events from our point of view")²¹. Posters and leaflets, printed on Czechoslovak territory, "were directed against Solidarity."²² This activity had, however, as Husák himself admitted, "relatively little effect."²³ The regime also prepared far more direct measures—as seen for instance in the frequently repeated instructions to find Czechoslovak citizens with Polish language skills, especially journalists and broadcasters.²⁴

The most important measures taken in response to the Polish crisis were of a military nature. Code-named "Exercise Krkonoše" [Krkonoše—or Giant mountains—are the frontier mountains between Poland and Czechoslovakia], these military measures reached their peak at the beginning of December 1980, when according to all indications, military intervention in Poland—with the Czechoslovak Army participating—seemed imminent. A lack of primary documents²⁵ permits only cautious assumptions about these events. In general, rather than talking about certainties, we can only talk about great probabilities, based on indirect evidence. On the other hand there are widely preserved and published East German documents,²⁶ which allow us to place

Czechoslovak events in a wider context, and to interpret them fairly confidently.

On 1 December 1980, the Chief of the Czechoslovak Army's General Staff, General Colonel Miloslav Blahník, participated in a quickly convened meeting in Moscow, in which the commanding officers of the East German and Polish Armies took part as well. The Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, acquainted them with the disposition of forces for a tactical and operational exercise. The ensuing preparations and actions were officially presented—at least as far as the Czechoslovak Army was concerned—as part of this common exercise. It is, however, probable, that the Poles (as well as the Czechoslovaks and East Germans) were not informed about the entire plan of operation, only acquainted with those parts which concerned them. After Blahník returned from Moscow, a meeting of the leading ministerial and Army functionaries took place on December 2, as a result of which plans were speedily prepared for the proposed exercise.

The ČSSR would provide two Czechoslovak tank divisions—the 1st and 9th—reinforced by two motor rifle regiments and other units, under the command of the officers and staff of the Western Military District. The 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces stationed in Czechoslovakia would also participate. According to the plan, these divisions would at first move up to the Polish border in Northern and Eastern Bohemia and later, in the second part of the exercise, move into Poland. The signal to cross the border was to be given by the General Staff of the Soviet Army. At this point the exercises were to continue, supposedly with the participation of Polish Army units. The target area for the movement of the 1st tank division was the territory north of Opole; the 9th division would advance to the space south of Katowice; and the 31st tank division of the Soviet Army to east of Cracow. The commencement of the exercise was set for 3 p.m. on December 6. In preparation, a special group led by General Major Jaroslav Gottwald, the deputy commander of the Western Military District, carried out a reconnaissance mission on Polish territory.²⁷

On December 6 at 5 p.m., "Exercise Krkonoše" commenced with the announcement of a military alert. During the night of December 6-7 troop movement began. It was completed in the evening (instead of the morning as originally planned) of December 8. The 1st division moved to its exercise ground in North Bohemia and the 9th division was moved into the area of the towns of Jaromer, Kolín, Cášlav and Pardubice and prepared for a further movement to Náchod, on the Polish border. On December 9, Minister of National Defense Martin Džúr suddenly terminated the exercise, and ordered all the formations to return to their peace-time positions. By December 11, all troops had returned to their barracks.

It is only possible to speculate about what this unfinished operation could mean. It is certain, however, that it was not a normal tactical-operational exercise

although the responsible ministerial and army functionaries of that time might have said otherwise. Moreover, the documents of the time do not speak of an “exercise”, but of an “action,” “operation,” or of “Special Task Krkonoše.” No exercises of such scale were ever prepared or planned in the short period of a few days. Much larger quantities of munitions, fuel, spare parts, and other supplies were made available than would have been necessary for the declared purpose of an exercise lasting a few days. Moreover, the assembled forces were fully war-capable and prepared to fulfill tasks in a tactical and operational depth covering the territory of Poland. Additionally, exceptional political and counter-intelligence measures were linked to “Exercise Krkonoše.” The political apparatus and the military counter-intelligence departments of participating units were brought up to wartime numbers. Soldiers with assumed “negative” political attitudes were removed from their units and left behind on their home bases. It is also noteworthy that units used in “Exercise Krkonoše” belonged to front-line units of the Czechoslovak Army, which formed more than one third of the border defense between Czechoslovakia and West Germany. Their sudden displacement to the North and the East left the Western border of Czechoslovakia, and therefore part of the Warsaw Pact, temporarily undefended. This too points to the unusual character of the whole operation.

Constituting a special chapter in this story are the activities of a group of Czechoslovak Army officers on Polish territory on December 4-5. A similar group of East German Army officers was operating in the northwestern part of Poland during this same time period.²⁸ These well-documented reconnaissance missions by the Czechoslovak and East German armies cast strong doubts on the claims by the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, General Anatoly Gribkov, that in December 1980 no plans existed for “allied” troops to enter Polish territory and that in no instance did a single foreign soldier cross the Polish frontier.²⁹ The official task of the group was to reconnoiter for the needs of the units on exercise, and to provide liaison with the Polish units meant to be participating in the exercise. In reality, however, its tasks were mainly of a military-political character. They reported on the professional and political character of selected officers in the Silesian military district of the Polish Army, as well as on their views about a resolution to the political crisis in Poland. Units of the Silesian military district supposed to be preparing for the joint exercises did not show up. The commander of the district, General Rapaczewicz, issued no instructions for bilateral meetings and his deputy, General Wilczynski, who waited to meet the Czechoslovak group at the border on December 4, was not informed as to the purpose of their visit.³⁰

That this was not just an ordinary exercise is also evident from the concurrently implemented measures by the Ministry of the Interior, which explicitly referred to “the events in Polish People’s Republic”³¹ or the possible

“critical deterioration of the situation in Poland.”³² These “extraordinary security measures of the third level” were managed by the Federal Minister of the Interior [Jaromír Obzina], from December 5 at 4 p.m., and extended on December 8 to 6 a.m. On December 9, however, they were down-graded, and on December 16 called off.³³ Lieutenant Colonel Šobán reported on December 11 at a meeting of the operational staff at the Regional Department of the Corps of National Security Ostrava: “The advance of the Warsaw Pact against Poland reached a halt; time was given for the PUWP CC to realize the conclusions of the 7th Plenum.”³⁴

It is clear that “Operation Krkonoše” could not have been a normal exercise. Whether it was the preparation for an intervention, an act of pressure on the Polish leadership, or an attempt to provide the Polish leadership with the means for sudden action against the opposition, is not possible to say for certain without access to Soviet documents. The number of units described in the Czechoslovak (and also East German)³⁵ documents—5-6 Soviet divisions, 2 reinforced Czechoslovak divisions, and 1 reinforced East German division—would certainly not have been sufficient for the first alternative. In that case, however, it is possible that the main tasks could have been carried out by troops of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts of the Soviet Army,³⁶ and that state leaders and army commanders (who would have played only a partial role) were not provided with complete information. In any case, the military operation was terminated before it was fully developed—and it was terminated from the place that the orders had come, that is, the military and political leadership of the USSR. The course and dynamics of the military and security operation in Czechoslovakia in December 1980 seem to indicate, however, that the principal decision to terminate the operation did not come on December 5, immediately after the summit in Moscow, as Gen. Jaruzelski,³⁷ or Stanisław Kania,³⁸ for example, have argued, but apparently some time later.³⁹

It is not easy to reconstruct precisely the position of the CPCz leadership in December 1980 regarding the possibility of military intervention. In the records of the CPCz CC Presidium, no material has survived concerning a debate on this problem. On December 2 it was decided to send a delegation to Moscow for a key meeting *per rollam*, without convening a session of the Presidium. The corresponding decision, included in the minutes of a meeting of the Presidium on December 8, only states the make-up of the Czechoslovak delegation.⁴⁰ The Presidium certainly discussed the Polish situation and the Czechoslovak point of view at the forthcoming summit; only indirect information, however, is contained in the record of conversation between East German Premier Willy Stoph, who was in Prague December 2 and 3, and Gustáv Husák.⁴¹ According to the SED minutes, Husák informed Stoph that the CPCz CC Presidium had discussed Poland and reached the same conclusions as the

SED Politburo. The December 2 SED Politburo meeting's conclusions sounded ominous, however: they authorized Erich Honecker to agree to whatever measures the situation called for. In other words, Honecker received a blank check to consent to anything, including eventual intervention.⁴² One can speculate only to a limited extent as to the position of the CPCz leadership. All things considered, however, it seems the CPCz leadership was less active and less decisive than that of the SED. It could also be significant that the Czechoslovak delegation at the Moscow meeting was comprised of only political functionaries—in contrast to the East German delegation, which also included the ministers of national defense and state security. Husák's speech in Moscow⁴³ was not as pointed as Honecker's.⁴⁴ Husák did not speak openly of a military solution (neither did anyone else). Nevertheless, according to the testimony of Stanisław Kania,⁴⁵ his awareness of the gravity of the situation even brought tears to Husák's eyes at one point in his speech. As the military and police measures carried out indicate, the CPCz leadership evidently would have complied with and was prepared to take part in an eventual decision to intervene. The plans for implementing "Operation Krkonoše," remained valid beyond December 1980, and the units assembled to carry it out were kept in a state of readiness until 1982.

The operations of the security apparatus were less striking, but just as long-term and important as the military operations. They were aimed not just at Poland, but also at the Czechoslovak population with the goal of eliminating potential public sympathies for the Polish developments. As early as 29 August 1980, the regional police commands had received circulars warning them that U.S. and West German special services were trying to encourage Czechoslovaks to act in solidarity with the striking workers in Poland. In the following days and weeks, frequent monitoring and analysis of the situation in Poland showed an attempt to evaluate the exact nature of the situation there. For example, on 3 September 1980 Czechoslovak police received instruction on how to secure contacts with agents of the State Security service in the event that they found themselves in a situation comparable to that of their Polish counterparts in which Polish agents were isolated in striking plants and had lost contact with their directing organs.⁴⁶ Other measures were concerned with: increasing the security of state borders; controlling opposition figures; controlling Czechoslovak citizens of Polish nationality, and Polish citizens working in Czechoslovakia; and limiting travel and tourism in Poland.

Particularly intense activity by the security units occurred twice during the "extraordinary third level security alert:" first, from the 5 to 6 December 1980; and second, during the period of martial law, specifically from 13 December 1981 to 4 January 1982, which the Czechoslovak security organs were informed of beforehand.⁴⁷ At that time various other measures were taken. High functionaries of the state security and the

police were "on call," special public order units were in operation, control of state borders increased (as did the control of Poles on Czechoslovak territory), movements of foreign diplomats were followed more intensely, and counter-intelligence provided protection for the Polish consulate in Ostrava. Special attention was paid in December 1980 to securing communication channels in connection with the movement of Czechoslovak Army units to the Polish border. In December 1981, Czechoslovak Security forces attempted to prevent any utterances of solidarity with Solidarity or the Polish opposition. The chief of the operational staff, Deputy Interior Minister Major General Hrušecký, emphasized, "pay attention to the activities of unfriendly persons (especially Chartists [members of Charter 77] and members of VONS [Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted]). Do not permit any kind of protest against the measures taken by the state organs of the Polish People's Republic to neutralize the counterrevolution. Immediately arrest anybody attempting to protest, or preparing to do so."⁴⁸ He also talked about "sending picked secret collaborators to Poland" and again about preparing linguistically qualified members of the Interior Ministry for deployment in Poland. All these measures were actually implemented, and further actions were also planned in the event the situation in Poland should worsen.

The Czechoslovak regime could not, however, completely obstruct acts of solidarity with Solidarity and the Polish opposition. Charter 77 reacted to developments in Poland by publishing a wide range of documents, which expressed solidarity with the Polish striking workers, criticized Czechoslovak media coverage of Polish events, raised concerns about the movement of Czechoslovak Army units to the Polish border, and protested against the imposition of martial law.⁴⁹

The wider public followed developments in Poland with interest and visible sympathy. It speaks to the success of the regime, however, that no important public manifestations of solidarity with the Polish opposition took place in Czechoslovakia in 1980-1981. Gustáv Husák was essentially right, when in talks in Moscow on 16 May 1981 he proudly declared that "there exists no danger that the masses [in Czechoslovakia] would support it [i.e. the Solidarity movement in Poland]... We are not

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afraid that the Polish events could have any influence in our country.” In the long-term view, however, Soviet Premier Nicolav Tikhonov demonstrated greater foresight, when he interrupted Husák with the observation that this situation could still change.⁵⁰

Selected Documents

As we have discussed, there are considerable gaps in the preserved (and now accessible) documents in the Czech archives regarding the Polish developments of 1980-1981. For example, no record has survived of the debates on the Polish situation in the leading CPCz bodies. It is therefore difficult to choose the one or two most important documents that would reflect this perspective in its entirety. In any case, most of the preceding text devoted to the reconstruction of the CPCz leadership’s position on the Polish developments and the Solidarity phenomenon has been drawn from a range of documents. The opinions of Czechoslovak representatives have been captured by two presentations delivered by Gustáv Husák in Moscow in December 1980 and May 1981, and in a CC CPCz letter to the Polish communist party from June 1981.

Most appropriate for publication seems to be the record of the Warsaw meeting in March 1981 (Document No. 3) between Stanisław Kania and Karel Hoffmann, the matador of the post-invasion Czechoslovak regime.⁵¹ This record presents the opinions of the Czechoslovak leadership in perhaps the most complete and most pointed form, while at the same time reflecting both the acquiescent as well as polemical arguments of the Polish leadership.

The report of Colonel General Miroslav Blahník, Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, to the Minister of National Defense Martin Dzúr (Document No. 2) sums up the plan for the common Warsaw Pact army “exercises” on Polish territory in December 1980, or rather, that which the Soviet Army Command considered necessary to tell their Czechoslovak “allies.” Among other evidence, a comparison of this document with its East German equivalent confirms that the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks received from the Soviets only the information and directives directly concerning them, and were not necessarily fully aware of Soviet intentions.⁵² In the German document there is no mention of the 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces which was to operate on the Olomouc-Cracow route. Part of Blahník’s report is a map marked with the anticipated movements of “exercise” units in southern and western Poland.

The Czech archives also contain a whole series of documents which illustrate the positions and opinions of other East European leaderships. Though they do not provide any new information, they do confirm and supplement our knowledge. This can be said particularly with regard to two documents which outline the position of the Soviet leadership in the spring and fall of 1981. The first of these is a private speech given by Brezhnev while

in Prague for the CPCz’s 16th Congress⁵³ in April 1981 (Document No. 4), and the second, of slightly unclear origin, is located in a folder marked “Poland” in the yet un-archived materials of Gustáv Husák (Document No. 6). The record of the meeting between Husák and János Kádár in November 1980 nicely reflects the Hungarian position (Document No. 1). Although it does contain sharp criticism of the Polish leadership, Kádár also attempted to keep a certain distance—neither directly interfere in the Polish developments nor participate in economic assistance. In contrast, the interpretation given in the fall of 1981 by Günther Sieber, the head of the SED CC International Relations Department, is characteristic of the East German leadership’s approach, which apparently felt most threatened by the developments in Poland (Document No. 5). It is a systematic, comprehensive analysis comprising well thought-out, enterprising approaches to the problem.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMV	Archiv Ministerva vnitra (Archive of the Minister of the Interior)
A ÚV KSC	Archiv Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa (Archive of the CC CPCz), Prague, Czech Republic
Barch	Bundesarchiv
BND	<i>Bundesnachrichtendienst</i>
CC	Central Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPCz	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSPA	Czechoslovak People’s Army
ČSSR	<i>Československá Socialistická Republika</i> (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HPR	Hungarian People’s Republic
HSWP	Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
KOR	<i>Komitet obrony robotnikow</i> (Workers’ Defense Committee)
KS SNB	<i>Krajská správa Sboru národní bezpečnosti</i> (Regional Department of the Corps of National Security)
NVA	<i>Nationale Volksarmee</i> (National People’s Army of East Germany)
PPA	Polish People’s Army
PPR	Polish People’s Republic
PÚV	<i>Predsednictvo Ústředního výboru</i> (Presidium of the CC)
PUWP	Polish United Workers’ Party
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i> (Socialist Unity Part of Germany)
SÚA	<i>Státní ústřední archiv</i> (Central State Archive)
VI	<i>Vnitrostanická informace</i> (Internal Party Information)
VONS	Výbor na obranu nespravedlive stíhaných (Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted)

Document No. 1**Record of a Meeting between CPCz CC General Secretary Gustáv Husák and HSWP CC First Secretary János Kádár in Bratislava, 12 November 1980 (excerpt from Kádár)**

25 November 1980.

[...] Comrade Kádár laid out the position of the HPR [Hungarian People's Republic] on the developments in Poland. A serious, dangerous situation has emerged here, one which represents a serious problem. It concerns a socialist state which is a member of the Warsaw Pact. Its geographic location places it in a zone of great importance.

[Kádár continued:] One of the sources of this crisis is the economic situation. Our Polish Comrades have themselves spoken of the excessive tempo of economic development. Lacking the necessary base they set an economic tempo which they could not maintain, a statement which also holds true with regard to the increases in wages and debt. The steep rise in wages was impossible to cover with goods, and the rapidly rising level of indebtedness was not covered either by corresponding production nor, particularly, by funds from exports. The poorly resolved agricultural issue is also a serious problem.

The second source of this crisis can be found in the mistakes of the leadership. The information [we have] received is almost unbelievable to us. A serious situation already existed in the PPR [Polish People's Republic] in 1956. Serious tremors occurred in 1970, 1976, and now once again. It is not our role to evaluate the level of their work. The present leadership says that they had drawn apart from the masses and from reality. In our opinion there also was a large degree of carelessness on the part of the leadership. I [Kádár] spoke with Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev in the summer, at the end of July in the Crimea, just before the arrival of Polish party leader Comrade Edward Gierek.⁵⁴ Comrade Brezhnev was disturbed by the strikes taking place in Poland. I mentioned that Poland reminded me of a drunk who staggers from side to side, but thanks to the grip of his guardian angel doesn't actually fall. It seemed to me that the Polish leaders were thinking in a similar manner. They were very careless. Comrade Gierek arrived in the Crimea and in his discussions understated the seriousness of the situation. It was noted by our Hungarian comrades, on holiday in the USSR at the time, that the Polish leadership was calmly continuing their holidays while the situation in Poland was developing along very unfavorable lines.

In conversations with our Polish comrades we [Hungarians] pointed out the need to consider that neither the West, nor the Church nor any other anti-socialist force had yet decided on a full overthrow of the socialist system, but that if they wished, there was indeed an opportunity to do so. We regard the situation in Poland as very serious; the crisis is still a long way from being over.

Comrade Kádár recently spoke of the developments in Poland during the visit of the British Foreign Secretary [Lord Carrington], whom he cautioned that the situation had not yet climaxed, and warned that it would not be in the interest of Great Britain to attempt a reversal of relations. Responding to the Foreign Secretary's question, Comrade Kádár had stated that an attempt of that sort would be a threat to the entire policy of détente. He spoke of the Polish situation during his discussions with Yugoslav representatives as well. In answer to their question about the possibility of external assistance to Poland, Kádár responded that Yugoslavia would also have to help to prevent such assistance from becoming necessary.

The situation in Poland is exceptionally important, not just for the Polish People's Republic and the socialist community, but for all European states. The Hungarian People's Republic does not have any special concerns about these developments as there have not yet been any noticeable effects of the Polish events on Hungarian political life. The HPR long ago solved the problems which have led to the Polish crisis. They do not fully understand the situation in Poland and are disturbed by various reports that workers and in some places even "free elections" are implementing things which are taken for granted in the HPR.

They do not understand the approach of the Polish leadership in increasing prices in 1976. This serious action was taken without any preparations, and even the members of the Central Committee and the Government Presidium were not informed. In this situation it is obvious that Communists could not defend the implementation of the policy. The consequences of this step were not fully thought through and the whole approach was very lightly and carelessly conceived.

The opinions of the HPR were explained in detail to Comrade Demichev on his recent visit to Hungary.

Comrade Emil Wojtaszek,⁵⁵ who has kept the Hungarian leadership informed of the Polish situation expressed thanks for the help provided by the HPR to the Polish leadership. I [Kádár] told him that there was no need to mention solidarity, as we regard it as a given. We are also prepared to give immediate assistance. They do not have great means, but are prepared to give everything which is available. They can rush some deliveries etc. At the same time, I cautioned them that if these were ongoing deliveries within the framework of economic cooperation then it is necessary for both sides to act as partners for if the PPR does not deliver coal, honey, sulfur, etc. as agreed upon then we can not produce. Then, understandably, we cannot help you.

The HPR does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. They [the Hungarian leaders] have, however, pointed out in conversations that as long as the leadership is not united it cannot handle the situation. To achieve unity one condition must be met: a clear, concrete platform must be developed. So long as such a platform

does not exist it is impossible to speak of unity among the leadership or within the party itself. Were Hungary to find itself in such a situation we would not count the number of party members. We would attempt to set forward a clear platform and then count the number of people who could support that platform. There is not much point in talking about 3 million Communists if you do not know how they will react in a particular conflict situation. It is more important to have perhaps fewer people, but know that they will act resolutely for a commonly-accepted platform. We have clearly told our Polish comrades that the basic condition is to clarify the situation and develop a clear, concrete platform for resolving it in a socialist manner and on a socialist basis. In this manner a basis can be built for effective solidarity and assistance from the states of the socialist community.

In a conversation with Comrade Brezhnev three days before Comrade Gierek stepped down, I [János Kádár] stated that the situation was so unclear that from the outside it was impossible to reasonably suggest an appropriate solution. As long as positive forces act reasonably then the HPR will support them in full. However, in the midst of a critical situation the Polish leadership let a man fall whom the Hungarian party believed to be a reliable and strong worker. In such a situation it is difficult from the outside to take a firm position. The basic assumption is that the Polish leadership must develop a clear platform.

It is necessary to ask where these developments may lead. During the meeting between representatives of these [Hungarian and Polish] Ministries of the Interior, the Polish representative informed the meeting that the Politburo had long since decided that there was no longer anywhere to retreat to, and that it was thus necessary to take things firmly in hand and, if necessary, use administrative restrictions. This is indeed the correct position and was discussed at an internal meeting. They should, however, say so openly, including in the Central Committee. In that forum it needs to be firmly said that things can progress only within definite limits. At the present time it seems that there is complete confusion in Poland. Many people reject contemporary politics, yet many Poles support socialism. There are many wholesome forces who are aware of how serious and dangerous a situation has been created. [...]

[Source: *Státní ústřední archiv (SÚA), A ÚV KSC, PÚV 155/1980, 25 November 1980; translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 2
Report of the Chief of the General Staff of the
Czechoslovak Army, Colonel General Miroslav
Blahník, to Minister of National Defense Army General
Martin Dzúr, 3 December 1980

3 December 1980.

Respected Comrade,

Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. OGARKOV, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, with the participation of General Colonel ABOLINS, Vice-Chief of the General Staff and General Colonel TIERESHCHENKO, First Vice-Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, provided clarification of the planned exercise. Present were General Colonel [Horst] ŠTECHBART,⁵⁶ Commander of the NVA [National People's Army] Land Forces of the GDR, and Armed Forces General [Tadreuš] CHUPALOVSKI,⁵⁷ First Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the PPA [Polish People's Army]. The plans assume carrying out two exercises. The first is a divisional tactical exercise independently carried out on each division's home territory and on the territory of the Polish People's Republic [PPR] over a period of 5-6 days. The second is a command and control field exercise with communication equipment and partly-deployed forces on PPR territory. 4 to 5 divisions of the Soviet Army (of the Baltic, Belarussian and Carpathian Military District and the 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces) will take part in both exercises. From the other armies: one division from the NVA of the GDR, four divisions of the PPA and two tank divisions of the CSPA [Czechoslovak People's Army].

Divisional tactical exercises will be carried out in two phases. The first phase will be carried out independently on each division's home territory over two to three days (see map). Following the completion of the divisional tactical exercises, both tank divisions of the CSPA shall gather together near the border with the Polish People's Republic.

An order from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces will set the date and time for crossing the state border into the territory of the PPR (the 1st tank division along one axis the 9th tank division along two axes—see map [not printed]).

The issuing of this order from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces initiates the second phase of the tactical exercise. The CSPA in coordination with one division of the PPA (the 11th tank division) will operate in the Zagan exercise area, where both exercises will take place, under the control of the CSPA and in coordination with the Wrocław Military Circle's operational group.

Following the realization of the tactical exercise the CSPA and PPA divisions will move to the allotted places on the territory of the PPR (see map [not printed]).

Following a short rest (1 day), the second exercise will begin—a command and control field exercise with

communication equipment and partly-deployed forces.

[...]

More detailed preparations for the second exercise will likely take place between 8 and the 10 of December 1980.

In conclusion Marshal Ogarkov noted that at the present time the exercise is merely prepared. Its execution, including the timing of the exercise, will be decided by the political leadership. This allied action will probably be announced in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, though with less than the 21 days notice specified.

Respected Comrade, I am also including at this time a draft information bulletin for the CPCz CC General Secretary and President of the ČSSR and, provided that you have no objections to its content, I would like to ask you to sign it.

[*Ed. note:* Map not printed]

[*Source: Investigation Commission of the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic (copy in the possession of the author); translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 3

Information regarding the meeting between Karel Hoffmann, President of the Central Unions' Council and Member of the CPCz CC Presidium, and Stanislav Kania, PUWP CC First Secretary, Warsaw, 17 March 1981 (excerpt)

17 March 1981.

[...]

Comrade Hoffmann then pointed out that our Party and the public are also increasingly disturbed by the fact that the PUWP has not managed to achieve that which was discussed by Comrade Husák and Comrade Kania⁵⁸ and approved by the CC (i.e.—“we shall take the initiative into our own hands,” “we are developing an offensive and we shall suppress the antisocialist forces,” “the attitude of party members who have joined Solidarity has not changed,” etc.).

Comrade Hoffmann continued with his breakdown of the Czechoslovak experience in the fifties and sixties, and particularly of the crisis years to demonstrate the generally applicable preconditions by which one can determine when, and whether, unions can support the Party. He stated that union members in the ČSSR and functionaries in the branch unions do not understand why Solidarity is supported and preferred when it so sharply stands up to the Party. Nor do they understand why there is no support for the class unions (branch unions), which are the only ones actively supporting the Party and fighting for its policies. He emphasized the importance of unity and effective action that a renewal of the class unions' national body in

the PPR would have on both the internal and international level (without repressing the specificity of the unions or restricting their activity), and also mentioned the possibility of the unions publishing a daily newspaper, without which branch union activities are considerably restricted. This is particularly important now that Solidarity has been granted permission to put out its own publications.

At the end of his presentation Comrade Hoffmann mentioned that we regard as great mistakes of the ČSSR crisis period the fact that we did not call things and phenomena by their real names, that we did not speak specifically about the messengers of right-wing, anti-socialist expressions and tendencies, that we did not isolate enemy forces and, on the other hand, that we did not organize and unite the healthy forces, and that we permitted moral and political terror and the harassment of honest comrades. We were thus unable by means of our own internal forces to forestall the counter-revolutionaries. This experience is also generally applicable.

Comrade Hoffmann expressed once again the support and solidarity of the Czechoslovak Communists and wished the PUWP full success.

During Comrade Hoffmann's remarks one could notice Comrade Kania nervously shifting in his seat, his facial expressions betraying his disagreement and dissatisfaction.

Following Comrade Hoffmann's presentation, Comrade Kania gave the floor to Comrade Grabski, who very briefly and concretely spoke about the current problems, the efforts of the Party, and the question of the unions in the PPR and their international contacts.

Then Comrade Kania spoke. His first reaction was to state that the events in Poland could not be evaluated through Czechoslovak eyes, as the crisis in the ČSSR had a completely different character.

According to Comrade Kania, in comparison with that of the ČSSR in 1968/69, the Polish situation is worse in only two ways—in the ČSSR there had only been one crisis, whereas in Poland there had been a number of what could be termed mass crises, and further, “in Czechoslovakia the economic situation had been good and in Poland it was bad.”

He further stressed that the CPCz CC and the Presidium had adopted opportunistic slogans, whereas the PUWP had not, that here the CC and the Presidium were united and properly oriented; the PUWP had the media firmly under control; the Polish army and security services held firm, whereas in the ČSSR these institutions had fragmented; Czechoslovakia had been helped by the allied armies, while in the PPR we were solving the crisis on our own and we are succeeding in mobilizing the people. We have many allies—we are supported by youth, independent unions, other political parties etc. As proof of the improving situation he pointed out the reduced visibility of Solidarity symbols.

Comrade Kania openly stated that there is no danger that Marxism-Leninism or Russian [classes] will disappear from the universities, as in the agreement signed these aspects are to be decided upon by Faculty Councils (he did not, of course, mention that these Councils are, at the majority of universities, under the influence of Solidarity).

Comrade Kania also reacted rather irately to the comments regarding the unions. He stated that he was trying to get Solidarity to become a union organization, that the branch unions needed a dynamic program and that it was impossible to rush the creation of their central body. He objected to the idea that the unions should have their own daily paper, as they obviously already have *Głos prace*. Comrade Hoffmann stepped forward and asked Comrade Szyszka directly whether the unions really run *Głos prace* or not, and was answered that it had been taken from them and did not serve the class unions at all. Comrade Kania reacted sharply to this and stated that this did not matter as *Głos prace* was run by a department of the PUWP CC, and thus he did not see any reason why the branch unions should have a daily of their own.

Comrade Kania's presentation as outlined here, along with further comments made, testify to the fact that he has been idealizing the situation and made statements which are in total conflict with reality.

From Comrade Kania's remarks and arguments it is obvious that:

- a) he fears Solidarity, and that the party leadership takes account in its actions of how Solidarity will react,
- b) the PUWP leadership is taking into consideration its Western creditors (and has stated openly that we must understand that they are dependent on credit),
- c) there is no real presumption that the present leadership has set out on a resolute course of putting into practice the statements made by Comrade Kania during his conversations with our Soviet Comrades, his discussions with Comrade Husák, his presentations in the CC, in the Congress Commission and so on.

On the basis of the present situation in the PPR, the continuing tendency towards unfavorable development, the verified opinions of a broad Party gathering in the class unions (i.e. the Communists, who are the participants in the daily struggle for Party policy and the defense of socialism and who are being placed under higher and higher psychological pressure) and the conversation with Comrade Kania, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

- a) In both the Party and society of the PPR there are strong forces, which have, even outside of the Party, an organizational foundation (class unions, anti-fascist fighters' organizations). These forces, in the case of active, comprehensive, resolute action by the Party leadership, and gradually by the Party as a whole, are capable of ensuring the socialist evolution of the PPR during the process of bitter political struggle and essential intervention against anti-socialist forces. They need only an urging to the struggle and purposeful leadership of the

fight.

- b) This kind of stance from the party leadership would quicken the differentiation process in society as well as hasten the departure from Solidarity of honest, disorientated workers, with an inclination to the class unions (of their 5 million members, nearly 2 million are party members). If however, the party leadership continues in its present indecisive, defensive course of action there is a real danger that the anti-socialist forces will succeed in weakening the unions and other progressive organizations, break up their structure and fully control social life, and the socialist character of the country will come under threat.

- c) All of this leads to the conclusion that the leadership of the PUWP under Comrade Kania does not provide the guarantees of resolute action against the counterrevolution and in defense of socialism. The present course of the party leadership threatens the foundation and primary pillar of a socialist society in the PPR. (In private conversations the members of the PUWP—high functionaries of the class unions—term the present PUWP leadership the Dubček leadership.)

[Source: *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981, 19 March 1981; translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 4
Speech of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Ilyich
Brezhnev before the CPCz CC Presidium in Prague, 9
April 1981 (excerpt)

9 April 1981.

[...]

Now to the matter which is disturbing us all first and foremost—about the situation in Poland.

I will not speak here about the facts of the situation in that country, you know them as well as we do. The situation is—it can be said without exaggeration—critical. This concerns both politics and the economy. However the latter is the result of the former incorrect policies that have also brought the economy to the verge of collapse. The extent to which the actions of the opposition, that is “Solidarity,” and the counterrevolutionaries and enemies of socialism who inspire it, are active and well-thought out in terms of organization and propaganda, is the extent to which the actions of the PUWP leadership and Polish government are indecisive and powerless.

You know, comrades, that on March 4, after our congress ended, we met with representatives of the Polish leadership and once again we told them directly that the situation is becoming dangerous. We recommended quite emphatically that they finally take decisive action against counterrevolution.

After that I had several more talks with Comrade Kania by telephone during which I presented the same ideas, I pointed out the new facts arising from

developments. And also in recent days, in April, we had some contact with the Polish leadership.

We strongly recommended that the Polish authorities pursue an active and offensive course in internal policy; we directly, boldly, and plainly made clear to everyone the situation in the country, its causes, and ways out of the crisis proposed by the party and government in the interest of the people. At the same time it is especially important to show with actual examples the destructiveness of the actions of those who are sowing anarchy, aggravating strikes and undermining governmental authority.

We strongly recommended that the Polish comrades actively make use of valid legal norms and if necessary introduce new ones (by declaring a state of emergency) in an effort to isolate and suppress the evident counter-revolutionaries, leaders of the anti-socialist campaign who are directed by imperialist forces from abroad.

In our opinion all that does not have to mean bloodshed, which Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski fear. Rather on the contrary, continuing to make concessions to the hostile forces could lead to the shedding of the blood of Communists, honorable patriots of Socialist Poland.

That which has been said of course does not preclude, but rather on the contrary assumes contact and work with the working masses, which are currently in the ranks of "Solidarity." And also with a certain part of the leadership of that organization, since it is far from homogeneous both in the center and also especially in the localities. Our friends must above all endeavor to expand the mass basis of their policies and in support of these unite patriots on whose hearts lies the fate of Poland.

We are having talks with the Polish leadership roughly along these lines. I have been telling them that there is still a chance to act decisively against the forces of counterrevolution by gathering and mobilizing the healthy forces in the party and by making use of instruments of state power such as the public security forces and the army.

Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski have agreed in words that it is no longer possible to retreat, but in reality they continue to retreat and are not taking decisive measures against the enemies of socialism. Take for example developments after the provocation in Bydgoszcz,⁵⁹ which was provoked by Solidarity. Impressions are rather gloomy. Our friends succeeded in averting a general strike. But at what price? At the price of further capitulation. Kania himself now recognizes that they made great mistakes and he blames [Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław] Rakowski but the latter is losing control.

It is difficult to say now how events will develop further. Given the present tactics of the PUWP leadership it is hardly possible to expect that the pressure of the anti-socialist forces will diminish. Of course, that disturbs us all, all members of our community. The Polish comrades are preparing to undertake something at the upcoming session of the Sejm. We'll see what comes of that.

In my opinion our common obligation is to help the Polish Communists to take a stand against counterrevolution. They still have opportunities to do that if the leadership would only demonstrate sufficient political will.

As far as I know, comrades, we assess events in the same way and therefore we can influence the Polish comrades and so work in the same direction. It is not out of the question that developments will require a further meeting of the leaders of the fraternal countries on the Polish question. We will not decide on that now.

The crisis in Poland will of course have negative long-term consequences. We must all learn appropriate lessons from it.

For example such a fundamental question as this: how did it happen that within a few months a country was—in a word—thrown into chaos, with the economy on the verge of collapse and anarchy reigning? Whenever this question is addressed, what is usually mentioned is the continuation of private farming in the countryside, the activities of dissidents, the influence of the church, the diversions of Western intelligence agencies. That's without argument. But to be sure the forces hostile towards socialism were [present] in Poland even earlier. What has enabled them to emerge? It is obviously the erosion of relations between the party and the working class.

All socio-economic policies of the former leadership were basically calculated to achieve a leap forward with the aid of Western loans. Indeed they succeeded in some respects in modernizing industry. But what sense is there if the new factories are fully dependent on raw products, materials and assembled products which must then be obtained with hard currency?

Furthermore whole plants for prestigious production for example of color television sets, were bought from the West.

And when it was necessary to repay for the loans, they did not find any other way than to place this burden primarily on the working class. Living conditions of workers have worsened in recent years. The party began to lose its main societal support. And that enabled the enemies of socialism to engage in a struggle for power.

Capitalists will not voluntarily assist in the building of socialism—such is the truth that you all must be clearly aware of. If they provide us with loans, if they trade with us, then the best case is that they are applying market principles, and a worse case that they are pursuing purely political objectives.

When Polish representatives explain why it is difficult for them to take the offensive against counter-revolution, they openly say—we're dependent on the West.

That is the greatest lesson for socialist countries. All of them ought to once again assess the extent of their indebtedness abroad and do everything to prevent it from increasing and approaching a dangerous limit.

[...]

[Source: *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 2/1981, 16 April 1981; translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 5

**Record of a Meeting between Representatives of the
CPCz CC and SED CC International Relations
Department in East Germany, 8 October 1981
(excerpt)**

8 October 1981.

[...]

The Situation Inside the Party

The [PUWP] Party Congress has solved nothing. The change which took place at the highest party levels has led nowhere. Logically, it could not lead anywhere under the present conceptual conditions of maintaining dialogue with a class enemy. Following the end of the Solidarity Congress, however, a change in thinking has occurred, particularly amongst the party rank and file. Opinion groups are forming, representing different conceptualizations of the optimal solution in the Polish situation.

1. Particularly at the district level there is a group of honest comrades who had suffered illusions regarding the possibility of dialogue with Solidarity. Everyday reality, however, has shown them something quite different. The leaders of certain districts, with the exception of Poznan, Gdansk, and Cracow, have come to the conclusion that Kania's capitulationist policy has collapsed.

2. A crystallization of opinion is also taking place at the level of the CC. Recently even Kania and [Politburo member Kazimierz] Barczikowski have undergone a slight shift in position, particularly under pressure from their district comrades and from the Soviet leadership.

3. Definite changes in the positions of certain individuals can also be seen. Rakowski for example is turning from the right wing towards the center and is gradually acquiring a leftist flair. On the other hand, [hardline Politburo member Stefan] Olszowski is moving to the right. One can also note differences of opinion between Kania and Jaruzelski. This results from the fact that Rakowski is essentially the brains behind Jaruzelski and thus a change in Rakowski's position influences Jaruzelski's point of view, which then leads to his differences in opinion with Kania.

4. The CC apparatus is very strongly opposed to Kania. This emerges from conversations with PUWP CC members during both private and official visits to the GDR. The common thread of these changes in opinion is the realization that the tactic of dialogue, which permits the steady advance of the counterrevolution, is at an end. It is not known, though, how deep or expansive these differentiating changes are. Our Polish comrades themselves say that confrontation is unavoidable, as Kania's leadership, bereft of ideas, has failed to take steps

to mobilize the Party and is hostage to its own illusions regarding the last Party Congress. Kania and Barczikowski apparently fear more than anything else a general strike, a civil war, and the occupation of Polish territory by the Soviet Union. These are apparently the main reasons why they have chosen a tactic of dialogue. The district party committees are showing an increase in their own initiatives. Comrades are organizing their own actions against Solidarity with the goal of preventing illegality, maintaining the industrial process, organizing the supply of goods, and maintaining order at least at the district level. Yet this approach cannot be credited to all districts. It is dependent on two factors:

1. the personality of the district party secretary
2. the politico-ideological level of the membership base

For example, in Wrocław the First Secretary is good, but the membership base is bad. In Leszno, Jelenia Gora, and Zelenia Gora the membership base is average, but the leading secretaries are not worth much.

Discussion circles in Katowice, Poznan and other cities are increasing and are changing into Marxist-Leninist circles. These are increasing their influence. However, they have large conceptual problems (often leftist deviations), as well as organizational difficulties and poor material conditions. From all of this the question emerges—where to next? By all accounts the counterrevolution has its own objective laws. Under certain conditions it escapes from the hands of its organizers and takes on an uncontrollable character. The factors which have so far acted as a brake on the Polish counterrevolution (the influence of socialist society, moderate tendencies in the West, the Polish Church) will not continue to operate forever. The question emerges as to when this will all cease to function. American imperialism plays itself out in Polish events in two directions:

- a) rapidly escalating the situation in Poland, and in an attempt at system change creating a bonfire of international provocation,
- b) continuing the furtive process, institutionalizing and legalizing the achieved gains of the counterrevolution.

The Polish Church has been a supporter of the latter course, and under [Cardinal Stefan] Wysziński restrained the most radical wing of Solidarity, as the Church does not wish to lose what influence they have managed to gain within the country. The departure of Wysziński has thus meant a weakening of the Church's restraining role.

Increasing anarchy is proof that the counterrevolution's furtive phase is coming to an end. Destruction and the uncontrollable course of certain mass actions could change into an open stand-off. The spark could be provided by the emerging chaos in the supply of goods. The onset of winter will most likely speed up the mechanics of confrontation. This is not, however, in the interest of any of the parties. The question thus emerges of how to avoid the coming conflict.

In Poland a variety of solutions, at different levels, have been proposed:

I. Calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, at which Kania and the Polish delegation would be forced to sign a list of demands. Kania would, upon his return, have to carry out radical measures, for example declaring a state of emergency, during which it would be necessary to count on the occurrence of a general strike including armed confrontation. Both these clashes would definitely reduce the blood which would have to be spilled later in a larger confrontation. This point of view is prevalent in the Warsaw region.

II. Another prospect assumes intensively working on those Congress delegates who have a permanent mandate, gaining a majority, calling a new Congress, and electing a new leadership which would be capable of radical measures in both the Party and the state (purge the Party, make the state apparatus capable of action, declare a state of emergency, create an armed militia and partially arm party members). This is a perspective which is widely adhered to in the GDR border regions. [Tadeusz] Grabski is apparently also thinking along these lines.

III. A different opinion relies on the Soviet Union, the ČSSR and the GDR withholding military intervention against and hermetically sealing Poland inside its borders until the Poles solve their problems on their own. This would, however, mean an end to wholesome forces in the country.

IV. In the case of increasing anarchy we can presume that Kania and Jaruzelski, with the consent of Solidarity, will declare a state of emergency and put the army on alert, not, however, with the purpose of solving internal problems but in order to prevent the intervention of the Soviet Union and other countries. (This is the model of Polish history, of which Pilsudski once remarked, that "he got on the red tram and got off the white one.")

The opinion of the SED regarding these opinions is that it is worth discussing the first and second of them. The SED is working in 15 districts where it has cooperative contacts. It is sending the maximum possible number of delegates and also welcoming as many Polish party delegates as possible. It is trying to strengthen the confidence of healthy forces, but will send material support only where it can be sure that it will be properly utilized. The healthy forces need copying technology, communication technology, and propaganda and agitation materials. The GDR will send this by various channels and in varying quantities. It will send them perhaps to district committees, for example to Comrade [Tadeusz] Porembski⁶⁰ in Wrocław, to Marxist circles in Poznan, and so on. The SED is working with the Polish state apparatus and especially with its headquarters through old and new contacts. (The Minister of Education is, for example, an accessible and reasonable comrade.) The SED leadership adopted last week a resolution by which all members of the Politburo, Secretariat, and leading divisions of the CC

should seek out contacts with their Polish partners and as far as possible influence them in a Marxist-Leninist sense. Comrade [Konrad] Naumann, who is a member of the SED CC Politburo and First Secretary of the Berlin Municipal Party Committee, has begun a visit to Poland. A similar approach has been taken by the leadership of the GDR Army, Security Services and militia. These, however, are organizing themselves along their own lines. The SED has contacts with all the deputy ministers in the PPR Department of National Defense. Jaruzelski himself is avoiding all contact with the GDR. Contacts with the security apparatus are good and take place at various levels.

Recently, our Polish comrades have requested that the GDR accept those comrades from the PUWP party apparatus who are unemployed. The GDR is prepared to do so and is just waiting for a list of these people.

The SED CC, following the lead of the ČSSR, will begin radio broadcasts to Poland on October 12. There are, however, personnel, language, and other difficulties with this.

Contacts with our Polish comrades show that great attention is paid to the Czechoslovak broadcasts. The broadcasts are interesting and evaluated positively. This has encouraged the SED CC to begin a similar type of broadcast, though from a historical perspective this is more difficult for the GDR than for the ČSSR.

The evaluation of certain comrades, with whom it is necessary to cooperate, is approximately as follows: Grabski is a good comrade, brave, willing to get actively engaged, but he is not a strategist and does not think in a very forward-looking manner. The best impression has been made by [Warsaw voivodeship secretary Stanisław] Kociolek. Kania wished to eliminate him and send him (as ambassador) to the USSR. However, the Soviets rejected him, which has saved him for future political developments. It seems that Kociolek is prepared to fight.

Last week comrades from the CPSU CC consulted with comrades from the SED CC International Relations Department. Discussions with Comrades [CPSU CC Secretary Konstantin] Rusakov, [Deputy CC Department head Oleg B.] Rakhmaninov, and [Deputy CC Department head George] Shakhnazarov show that we and our Soviet comrades evaluate the Polish situation almost identically. Comrade Rusakov pointed out that while the large maneuvers embarked upon, the sending of delegates and discussions by telephone, are indeed useful, so far they have brought no returns. Comrade Rusakov regards the situation as very dangerous, and anticipates that October will show when and to what degree the operation will be carried out. For the time being, though, he does not know how this will take place. Our Soviet comrades are continuing to pressure the Poles intensively, as they do not see for the moment any other choice. The Poles must fight on their own, and no-one can fight for them against KOR and the enemies of socialism. Comrade Rusakov does not agree with the prevailing sentiment in Poland that the

Soviet Union should be in the front line of the fight against the enemies of socialism in Poland. The Soviet Ambassador Aristov visited Kania and protested against the sharp anti-Sovietism in Poland. Kania asked for this to be given to him in writing. This request was met. All of this has led to the realization that Kania's concern is to be able to show concrete proof that he is only doing what he has been forced to do by the Soviet Union.

According to our Soviet comrades, 1968 will not repeat itself in Poland. Polish comrades cannot simply acquire power by means of Soviet tanks. They must fight for that power on their own. Our Soviet comrades state that they did not choose Kania and thus they themselves cannot remove him. That must be done by the Poles.

The idea of calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee should be discussed. We should not let ourselves be influenced by Polish statements about the possibility of a general strike, a civil war or the like. The Polish leadership is using this to threaten and blackmail the USSR. The counterrevolution is horrible everywhere. Its street activity too is equally awful everywhere. It is necessary to remain calm and even more necessary to avoid losing patience.

The SED suggested to our Soviet [comrades] that due to the serious situation, closer contact should be maintained between the USSR, GDR, and the ČSSR. Rusakov expressed however, that this was too early, even though they do not rule the possibility out for the future. It is only necessary to coordinate on a bilateral basis.

The SED CC feels that our Soviet comrades are having difficulty determining an effective approach towards Poland. In addition to wanting to continue with the present mechanisms, they lack a concept. Their present evaluation of the Polish situation is one hundred percent identical to the evaluation of the SED, unlike their evaluation following the last PUWP Congress. Following the Congress our Soviet comrades acted upon an illusory hope of a possible consolidation of the situation in Poland. The SED very critically evaluated the course and results of the Congress, as Comrade Honecker told Comrade Brezhnev in the Crimea.

Comrade Sieber asked that the CPCz CC inform them about the assistance they were giving Poland, as the SED would like to share in some of the activities. For historical reasons Poles do not like to cooperate with Russians and Germans. This mostly concerns printers, paper and the like. [...]

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents; translated by Oldřich Tůma.]

Document No. 6

Information on the Position of the CPSU Regarding the Polish Situation [n.d., late fall 1981]

Regarding the Polish crisis and our viewpoint

(Information)

For a long time developments in Poland have caused anxiety and concern in our country and in other countries of the socialist community.

The evaluation of events in Poland was presented by L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

The CPSU CC has always kept the party and its friends informed of the situation in Poland, of our steps and of help in stabilizing the situation.

In October and November this year the situation heated up further. The "Solidarity" congress revealed counterrevolutionary intentions to seize power to change the basis of socialism in Poland by:

- transforming socialist public ownership into group and gradually private ownership;
- gaining political power by taking over the Sejm;
- weakening Poland's ties to the countries of the socialist community with an appeal to the peoples of Eastern European countries.

In reality, "Solidarity" has been changing into a political party.

In Poland:

- 1) The leading role of the party has been weakened.
- 2) Deformation of economic and political life is continuing.
- 3) The take-over of plants and distribution of production by "Solidarity" is continuing.

In fact, two actual governments exist. The disruption of the economy is evident in the reduction of the volume of industrial production by 15%, of coal output by 40 million tons and in great inflation.

- 4) Continuing attacks on the PUWP and as a result of that the disintegration and gradual extinction of the party.

The causes of the crisis have their roots in the past:

- long-standing disquiet in the country, created by the strong position of the Church, where more than 85 % are believers.
- the reality of 74% of agricultural land in individual ownership;
- the influence of petit-bourgeois ideology through the opening of opportunities for the infliction of all contagions of petit-bourgeois ideology;
- voluntarism in economic policy—efforts to achieve a "great leap" in the economy of the country at the price of Western loans;
- in these circumstances a stream of bourgeois ideology arose, especially from the 12 million Poles living in Western countries;
- underestimation of the growth of consumer petit-bourgeois views among the people and members of the PUWP;
- severing of the party from the masses;
- violation of Lenin's principles of building the party. Quick acceptance [of new members] into the party in an effort to reach 3 million party members—they drew in everyone;
- we drew all these facts to the attention of the

Polish leadership and many times made them aware of them, including at the 7th Congress of the PUWP.

But the Polish comrades failed to take measures.

Nationalist smugness predominated. Many things were kept from us, particularly the economic relations with the West.

Nationalist forces joined with internal reaction—resulting in “Solidarity.”

The leadership of the party and state showed itself to be unprepared and unresponsive. Regarding the international situation, great circumspection is necessary.

After Kania took office we advised him (in September 1980) and emphasized that, with the legalization of the counterrevolutionary forces, it was necessary under the circumstances:

- to strengthen the party and its connection to the masses;
- to strengthen the army and security organs;
- to launch an open and decisive attack on counter-revolution.

Kania agreed with our recommendations but [only] in words, but pursued a policy of compromise with counter-revolution. This occurred out of unwillingness or disinterest. Instead of an attack—defensive tactics and retreat.

30 October 1980 meeting with Kania in Moscow. He agreed with our recommendations and criticisms, made promises but his deeds didn’t follow.

5 December 1980 meeting with the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow, where all participants made the Polish leaders aware of their responsibilities. They also agreed and made promises, but in reality they made concessions.

4 March 1981 meeting with a PUWP delegation after the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

April 1981 Comrades Andropov and Ustinov hold discussions in Warsaw.

May 1981 meeting between Comrades Suslov and Rusakov and Polish representatives.

June 1981 meeting between Comrades Gromyko and Kania.

5 June 1981 letter from the CC CPSU to Polish Communists, which caused a clear delineation between the compromisers and the healthy forces in the CC of the PUWP and in the party.

Telephone conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and Kania before the congress, informing [the latter] of the necessity to defend the healthy forces and revolutionary line, the work of comrades [Politburo member Victor Vasil’evich] Grishin and [Politburo member Arvid Yanovich] Pel’she during the congress.

The letter prevented the destruction of the party, but the leadership continued on its original path.

At the meeting in Crimea in August L.I. Brezhnev again underscored that the PUWP was continuing to make concessions. But even despite this, further concessions were made to “Solidarity.” The path of “renewal” through

compromise: “We Poles will come to an understanding.”

During that time 37 of 49 county council secretaries had to give up their leadership positions. Kania was the main hindrance in the struggle for socialism. The question arose of restoring the leadership to a sound footing. The Poles put forward Jaruzelski. The army and security forces stand behind him. The healthy forces supported this. Change in the leadership is a positive fact, assuming that the results of the 4th plenum of the PUWP CC⁶¹ are followed up on.

The difficulties in the PUWP as well as in the country remain, the situation is difficult.

Further developments will depend on how consistently the new leadership will work and struggle against Kania’s course without Kania.

A conversation took place between Jaruzelski and L.I. Brezhnev⁶² in which it was stressed that

- choosing reliable co-workers was the most important thing;
- it was time to take decisive measures against counter-revolution.

The PUWP CC, the Sejm and the PPR government are taking some measures, but so far the outcome of this has somehow not been clearly apparent. So far they are relying on discussions. They are considering solving [the situation] by means of a National Unity Front.

We are pointing out the possibility that the party may lose its leading role in a coalition with “Solidarity” and the church.

We are securing the supplies of goods in their original volumes and also in the future. But hereafter everything will depend on the character of the internal political situation in Poland. The support of the healthy forces— one of our tasks.

Overall our course lies in:

- preserving the PUWP as the leading force;
- preserving the Polish People’s Republic as an ally;
- saving socialism in the PPR.

The danger has not been eliminated, the struggle will continue.

Lessons from the crisis in Poland.

1. The successful building of socialism is [only] possible under conditions when general principles are consistently implemented in the building of a new society. Deviation from these [principles] leads to crises.

2. Maintaining high political vigilance. To see not only successes, but also errors and failures in time to analyze and eliminate [them].

3. We attach great importance to strengthening the party’s leading role and of the party’s connection to the masses, to the strengthening and development of socialist democracy, to internationalist education in the socialist spirit, to intensifying of the ideological struggle against bourgeois ideology.

4. The present international situation has become worse and the enemies would like to “feather their own nest” provoking us to become involved in Polish affairs,

hoping that our nerves will fail.

In this situation a special vigilance and self-control is essential so it will not lead to their [the enemies'] coming in the other countries, to the isolation of the socialist community and to an increasing danger of military conflict.

5. We are looking for ways to find a political solution. There is still a possibility to prevent disaster. The PUWP must find ways to alter developments.

The tasks facing our party:

1) To strengthen the connection with the working class, to lead a decisive struggle against failures.

2) To increase awareness, not to permit deviations from the policy of the party.

3) Our line towards Poland is correct. The support of the healthy forces and working with the leadership of the PUWP and the country.

4) The USSR will make use of its influence in the international arena so as not to allow an escalation of Polish events in other countries.

The plenary session of the CC fully approved the political line and the practical action of the Politburo of the CC CPSU relating to the crisis situation in Poland.

[Source: *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents, box "Poland;" translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

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¹ Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

² *Státní ústřední archiv (SÚA), A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 10, VI 23* (12 August 1980), p. 10.

³ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 30* (12 December 1980), p. 3 and 31 (9 January 1981), p. 4.

⁴ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 31* (9 January 1981), p. 5 and VI 36 (1 April 1981), p. 6. One piece of data from November 1980 might perhaps, find a honorable place in any textbook of history of the labor movement: "... under the influence of events in the PRP [People's Republic of Poland] demands are appearing among the miners in the Sokolov mines in West Bohemia for new safety aids, because the old ones are worn out." *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 29* (26 November 1980), p. 3.

⁵ E.g. *Rudé právo*, 22 and 28 October 1980; 5, 25, 28 and 29 November 1980; 2 and 15 December 1980; 3 and 29 January 1981; 9 February 1981; 10, 13, and 23 March 1981; 12 May 1981, and many others.

⁶ *Rudé právo*, 4 November 1980; 13, 27, and 31 January 1981; 17 March 1981. This type of interpretation is represented also in some subsequently published brochures, e.g., Milan Matouš, *Spiknutí proti Polsku* (Praha, 1982), and J. Kobr, *Vývoj Nemecké demokratické republiky a Polské lidové republiky v letech 1944-1984* (Praha: Svoboda, 1985), esp. pp. 137-221.

⁷ E.g. "The Problems of Polish Market", "Unfortunate Consequences of Strikes", "Conflicts That Will Not Multiply Bread", *Rudé právo*, 5 January, 18 February, 6 March 1981.

⁸ Preserved only in the archive of the SED in German, published in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds. "*Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen.*" *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung*, (Berlin: Akademie, 1995), pp. 178-187 and 280-282.

⁹ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 12/1981*, 19 June 1981.

¹⁰ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC*, record of 18th session of the CC CPCz, 7 to 9 October 1980, p. 55.

¹¹ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC*, record of 4th session of the CC CPCz, 28 and 29 October 1981, p. 33.

¹² *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 148/80*, 19 September 1980—Husák's speech in Moscow, *Hart und kompromisslos*, pp. 186-187; Husák argued in a similar way in an interview with Stefan Olszowski in Prague, 15 September 1980 (*SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 148/80*, 19 September 1980).

¹³ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981*, 19 March 1981 - see doc. 3 below.

¹⁴ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981*, 19 March 1981 - see doc. 3 below

¹⁵ For example János Kádár in an interview with Husák, 25 November 1980 (*SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 155/80*, 28 November 1980) or Günther Sieber during a meeting with Bilak, 8 October 1981 (*SÚA, A ÚV KSC*, unsorted materials file Husák) - see Doc. 1 and 5 below - the records of which are deposited in the CC CPCz archive.

¹⁶ General Jaruzelski also remembers awkward situations when his Czechoslovak comrades during the 70s always felt obliged to express their thanks for the "fraternal help" of 1968. Cf. Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dla czego...* (Warszawa: BGW, 1992), p. 110.

¹⁷ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 147/80*, 12 September 1980—letter of the chairman of the government of the PPR, Józef Pinkowsky, to Lubomir Strougal.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* According to the same document the leaders of the GDR behaved in a similar way. The Hungarian leaders, on the other hand, answered very evasively and promised no extraordinary aid.

¹⁹ The suggestion was for a reduction of 600 thousand tons in 1981. *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 154/80*, 14 November 1980. See also Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny*, p. 34.

²⁰ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 28/1982*, 8 January 1982.

²¹ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und kompromisslos*, p. 281.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ E.g. *A MV, Kanice*, 0, 1-1, Fund KS SNB Ostrava, Internal political situation in Poland, box 24, inventory unit 8.

²⁵ The bulk of the original documents concerning "Krkonoše" were liquidated in 1982!

²⁶ See Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und kompromisslos*, esp. doc. nos. 19-30.

²⁷ One member of this was also the later first post-November 1989 Minister of Defense, Gen. Miroslav Vacek.

²⁸ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und kompromisslos*, p. 207.

²⁹ Anatoli Gribkow, *Der Warschauer Pakt. Geschichte und Hintergründe des östlichen Militärbündnisses* (Berlin: edition 9 1995), pp. 181-5.

³⁰ This account of "Operation Krkonoše" is drawn from copies of some original documents assembled during the activities of the investigation commission of the House of Representatives of

the Czech Republic (notably the report of General Blahník on the meeting in Moscow – see doc. 2 below, the order of Minister of National Defense Džúr to conduct the “Krkonoše” exercise from December 5, the report of Gen. Gottwald on the reconnaissance mission to Poland, the minutes of the meeting of the Advisory Council of the Minister of National Defense on December 8), from expert reports for the use of the same commission (notably the report prepared by Lieut. Col. Antonín Kríz) and from several interviews conducted by the author in 1997 (with Lieut. Col. Antonín Kríz, Lieut. Col. Jirí Horák, and Gen. Stanislav Procházka).

³¹ A *MV, Praha*, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 46/80 pronouncing the extraordinary security alert of the third level (5 December 1980).

³² A *MV, Kanice*, 0 1-1, inventory unit 8, fund KS SNB Ostrava, Operational plan of the Regional Department of the Corps of National Security Ostrava in relation to the third level extraordinary security measures in response to the development of the situation in Poland, 1980. Emergency security measures were declared in various situations, if there were an imminent danger of so-called “mass anti-socialist behaviors.” In accordance with Decree no. 1/79 of the Minister of the Interior (A *MV, Praha*), a uniform system was set up of such measures that had earlier been declared on an *ad hoc* basis. The system included seven levels of emergency security measures. Levels five to seven presupposed an impending disturbance or one already in progress on a large scale and was never declared. Level four was declared only once, in January 1989 in anticipation of protests on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Jan Palach’s death by self-immolation. Level three (and the measures corresponding to it before the decree was issued in 1979) was declared in more than a dozen instances between 1970 and 1989, although prior to 1988 in the main as prevention. The third level involved a rather extensive activation of the security apparatus: the setting up of central and regional or local operational staffs, an emergency alert and the Availability of on duty members of the police force and of the Interior Ministry troops, the setting apart of special order units, etc., etc.

³³ A *MV, Praha*, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 46/80, his decision from 9 December and order no. 49/80 (16 December 1980).

³⁴ A *MV, Kanice*, 0 1-1, box 24, inventory unit 8, minutes of the operational staff. The CC PUWP held its 7th Plenum on 1-3 December 1980.

³⁵ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und Kompromisslos*, pp. 136-137.

³⁶ Contemporaneous Western sources spoke about 15 or even 30 divisions; see Wojciech Jaruzelski *Mein Leben für Polen* (München-Zürich: Piper, 1993), p. 235 and/or *Strategic Survey 1980-1981*, p. 74.

³⁷ Jaruzelski, *Mein Leben für Polen*, p. 239.

³⁸ Stanisław Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Wrocław: BGW: 1991), p. 91.

³⁹ On the general discussion concerning the threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Poland in 1980 see e.g., Mark Kramer, “Soviet

Policy during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126.

⁴⁰ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV* 156/80, 8 December 1980.

⁴¹ *BArch, Abt. GDR*, Ministerrat DC 20, I/4-4684, 192. Sitzung, 10 December 1980.

⁴² Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und Kompromisslos*, p. 139.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 178-187.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-171.

⁴⁵ Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje*, pp. 88-89.

⁴⁶ A *MV, Kanice*, fund KS SNB Hradec Králové, bundle 15, Security situation in Poland.

⁴⁷ A *MV, Praha*, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 29/81.

⁴⁸ A *MV, Kanice*, 0 1-1, fund KS SNB Ostrava, box 24, inventory unit 8. – Telegram from the Ministry of Interior from 31 December 1981.

⁴⁹ Documents from 8 August 1980, 14 December 1980, 10 January 1981, 7 and 30 January 1982. See V. Prečan, ed., *Charta 77 1977-1989* (Bratislava: Cs. stredisko nezaviste literatury: Archa, 1990), pp. 403-408.

⁵⁰ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und Kompromisslos*, pp. 282-283.

⁵¹ He played an important role in safeguarding the intervention in August 1968, was a CPCz CC Presidium member from 1971 to 1989, and was head of the Czechoslovak trade unions from 1971 to 1989.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138.

⁵³ Held 6 to 10 April 1981.

⁵⁴ Gierek, since late 1970 PUWP First Secretary, resigned in August 1980.

⁵⁵ Polish foreign minister from 1976 to August 1980, then CC Secretary. As CC emissary, he informed the Hungarian leadership on the Gdansk Agreement on 12 September 1980.

⁵⁶ Correctly Stechbarth.

⁵⁷ Correctly Hupalowski.

⁵⁸ During Kania’s visit to Prague, 15 February 1981. For the minutes see *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV* 162/1981, 19 February 1981.

⁵⁹ Editor’s note: Following the expulsion of Solidarity and other union leaders from the provincial assembly building in Bydgoszcz, beatings of Solidarity members by police and the security service occurred. Tensions between the regime and Solidarity rose dramatically.

⁶⁰ Editor’s note: In July 1981 Poremski became a member of the PUWP Politburo.

⁶¹ The 4th Plenum of the CC PUWP was held 16-18 October 1981.

⁶² Telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Jaruzelski, 19 October 1981.

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The Hungarian Party Leadership and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981

By János Tischler

The beginning of the 1980-1981 crisis in Poland coincided with the beginning of the decline of the Kádár regime in Hungary. János Kádár—who had come to power with the backing of Moscow by quelling the Hungarian Revolution in 1956—had long tried to preserve social law and order and to establish political legitimacy for himself, following the bloody repression after the revolution, by not interfering with people's private lives, by providing greater freedom within the framework of the existing political regime, and most importantly, by guaranteeing a constant increase in the living standard, thus creating an atmosphere of safety. From 1979 on, the Kádár regime subordinated other priorities to this latter aspect. Hoarding decreased to a minimum level and virtually all foreign loans served as subsidies of consumer prices and of unprofitable companies (which ensured full employment in return). However, an ever-growing part of the budget had to be spent on the repayment of loans and their interest.

While publicly emphasizing the solidarity of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) with Polish Communists and assuring Poland all possible economic and political assistance, Kádár believed from the very outset of the Polish crisis that the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) had to overcome its difficulties by political means and in a "socialist way." This latter phrase implied that Poland was expected to remain a socialist country and a member-state of the Warsaw Pact. In Kádár's opinion, the use of so-called "administrative means," that is, the deployment of the armed forces, would be acceptable only if no peaceful solution could be found or if the Communist regime itself were threatened. In this case, the challenge would have affected the whole socialist bloc and could have seriously endangered his (Kádár's) personal power as well. Nevertheless, he implied that even in such a case the crisis would best be dealt with by using internal Polish forces such as the state security organizations, the army, or the police. In Kádár's view, even in the event of a Soviet intervention as a final resort, Polish Communists would have to orchestrate the so-called "consolidation," that is, to "sort out all political and social difficulties," just as he and his Hungarian comrades had done after 1956. He knew all too well from his own experience how troublesome, or rather how much more troublesome, it was to seize power against the wishes of a nation, following a Soviet intervention.

Unlike other socialist countries which relentlessly attacked the PUWP and its leaders for their "opportunism," their chronic inability to act, and their backsliding, the HSWP tried to support its Polish counterpart by not interfering (either publicly or through

"inter-party channels") with any of the steps taken by the Polish leadership. After all, Kádár considered the Polish crisis to be a "family affair" relating exclusively to Soviet-bloc countries, a view he consistently upheld in the course of negotiations with various Western parties and politicians.

From the point of view of Hungarian internal affairs, events in Poland put Budapest in a simultaneously awkward and favorable position. Budapest could overtly claim how much better the situation was in Hungary compared with that in Poland, in terms of public order and the system of supplies. The efficacy of Kádár's policy could thus be neatly demonstrated, which was, in fact, what the HSWP leaders and the State-run media did. Besides approaching the 25th anniversary of the "counterrevolution," it was the "Polish affair" that offered Kádár an excellent opportunity to render a positive verdict on the HSWP's performance since 1956. He took pride in saying that he and his comrades had successfully avoided mistakes that were, alas, continuously and repeatedly being committed by the Polish leaders.

At the same time, the events in Poland evoked unease among the members of the HSWP leadership, for they constituted a kind of operational malfunction within the socialist bloc which later turned out to be a challenge to the internal state of affairs of other Soviet-bloc countries as well. Although Kádár publicly declared in September 1980 that HSWP policy would not get any stricter due to the events in Poland, the Hungarian party worried seriously about the Polish crisis even as it proclaimed the opposite. The HSWP asserted that the Polish example was not attractive to Hungarians since they had achieved a decent standard of living that they wished to preserve rather than imperil by allowing unrest comparable to that in Poland. (Nevertheless, the party leadership conceded that "there were—insignificantly few—people who supported 'Solidarity' and would gladly have seen the Polish example spread in Hungary.")

Hungarian government and party propaganda strongly condemned Solidarity and the strikes it organized. This propaganda emphasized that the mere existence of a free and independent trade union contradicted and undermined the power of the working class, furthermore, that strikes endangered the standard of living and socialist achievements. From the summer of 1981 on, this kind of propaganda expanded into a general anti-Polish campaign—lest the "Polish disease" spread to Hungary—and disseminated news about the alleged work-shyness, worthlessness, and parasitism of the Polish people. The Hungarian mass media used the fact that, when the living standard in Hungary first stagnated, then slowly began to decrease, a minor part of society was truly frightened

about the incessant news about strikes in Poland. The media increasingly encouraged such views in Hungarian public opinion as “the Polish situation costs us a lot of money;” “the Polish expect other socialist countries to provide for them;” “not strikes but more and better work can improve living and working conditions;” and “it is impossible to distribute more without work and to go on strike while the people of other socialist countries keep on working.”¹

In 1980-81 three members of the Polish leadership, among them PUWP Secretary Stanisław Kania, visited Budapest to discuss current events and hear the advice of the fraternal Hungarian party. From August 1980 on, the Polish leadership regarded Hungary as a model to be followed. Kania and his comrades listened to the opinion of the First Secretary of the Hungarian Party with keen interest since they would have liked to transplant the success of Kádár’s policy to the Polish situation. Kádár was, no doubt, widely popular in Poland, and the PUWP tried to capitalize on this politically. It was little wonder that both Kania, then Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski (right after imposing martial law), requested and received a detailed report on how the HSWP leadership had set about “consolidating” the situation in Hungary after 4 November 1956. (The Polish leadership tried to benefit from the living memories of the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary by showing at home the Hungarian documentary on the “Counterrevolution in 1956” under the title “So it happened,” evidently believing that the evocation of “the Hungarian scenario” would terrify the Polish people.) On every occasion, the Hungarian leadership urged its Polish guests to draft a brief but clear program on the basis of which party members could be activated and which could draw wide masses and ordinary followers of socialism “yearning for law and order.” They also underlined the need for unity in the party leadership which would then “manifest itself” in the rank-and-file as well, and that it was of prime importance for the Polish party to carry out an accurate analysis of the events.

The meeting of Warsaw Pact party and government leaders in Moscow on 5 December 1980 concentrated on one issue: the situation in Poland. The Hungarian delegation was led by János Kádár, whose speech differed markedly from those of the so-called “hardliners” from East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia (E. Honecker, T. Zhivkov and G. Husák respectively). While they seemed to urge an armed intervention, Kádár insisted on finding a political solution. He repeatedly stressed that Polish Communists were responsible for finding a way out of their own predicament. Integral to that aim, he added, was the preservation of the leading role of the party, the socialist constitutional order, the government’s authority, as well as control of the mass media. He also warned that it was vital to correct earlier mistakes and stressed they should not focus attention on the search for scapegoats. In this connection, he referred to the fact that ex-Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi—who had been deposed from

power in the summer of 1956—and his comrades “had been called to account [i.e., expelled from the HSWP] only in 1962.” He added that the platform that the PUWP was to work out should reflect firm determination. Finally, Kádár recalled the event of November 1956—throughout which he could rely only on Soviet arms and on members of the Rakosi regime’s apparatus—“when the Soviet comrades encouraged Hungarian Communists by telling them that they were stronger than they had ever thought,” and added that “the same applied to the Polish Communists.”²

When Kania visited Budapest in March 1981 the conflict between the Warsaw authorities and Solidarity was escalating quickly. Though Kádár confirmed the HSWP’s earlier stand and stated that he remained in favor of promoting contacts with the masses on the basis of mutual trust and open and sincere relations, he asserted that “if the class-enemy launches an attack there can be no clemency, for a fight like that is by no means to be fought on the basis of principles of humanism. We have to be prepared to deal with bouts of mass frenzy as well.” Kádár drew conclusions from the 1956 “counter-revolution,” then compared the evolution of the Hungarian and Polish state of affairs and pointed out their differing characteristics. He concluded that “the events in Hungary got at least 3 stages further and the extent of ‘purification’ was more profound and far-reaching than in Poland.” Finally, he suggested that the “fight had to be fought through to the end by the Polish comrades, first with political means or, if need be, by applying other means of main force.” The basic requirement was, above all, that Poland remain a socialist country.³

From September 1981 on, Kádár took an even more hard-line view on the Polish events, especially after the first Solidarity congress, at which the “Message” to East European workers was accepted by public acclamation. Solidarity’s “Message” encouraged those people “who made up their mind to fight for the free trade union movement” in the hope that their “representatives would soon have the opportunity to meet one another so as to be able to exchange their experiences on trade unions.” The “Message” provoked extreme fits of anger in the leaderships of all socialist countries. Authorities throughout the bloc, including Hungary, launched an all-out press campaign to reject Solidarity’s supposedly gross intervention—although, in an Orwellian touch, they took pains to prevent the text of the “Message” from becoming public and requested workers’ collectives to condemn the extremist and anti-communist Solidarity ringleaders for sending it. It was this “Message” that prompted the HSWP Central Committee to draft and send a letter in Kádár’s name to the PUWP CC and its First Secretary. This letter expressed all the worries that had so discomfited the HSWP leadership since the Solidarity congress.⁴

When General Jaruzelski became PUWP CC First Secretary in October 1981 (in addition to his former titles

of Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense) Kádár warmly congratulated him. A couple of days later the Hungarian leader declared that “polarization had increased in Poland and as a result, their long-established opinion and viewpoint had also grown stronger by virtue of which the launching of a more determined, proper and rational fight—that appeals to all honest people—would rapidly gain popularity against counterrevolution.” At any rate, in the autumn of 1981 the Hungarian Party, urged immediate action and was not only relieved by but also fully agreed with Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, a step which in Hungary was somewhat euphemistically translated as a “state of emergency.” The HSWP Secretariat assembled the same day and passed a resolution to provide Poland with immediate economic relief in accordance with Jaruzelski’s request, endorsing “Comrade János Kádár’s telegram to Comrade W. Jaruzelski assuring him of Hungarian assistance.”⁵

Jaruzelski requested not only economic aid from Budapest but also his “Hungarian comrades” guidance concerning the struggle with “counterrevolutionary forces” 25 years earlier, and the experience obtained “in the field of socialist consolidation and the building of socialism in Hungary.” Upon Jaruzelski’s invitation, a three-person HSWP delegation led by Politburo member György Aczél went to Warsaw between 27 and 29 December 1981. Jaruzelski seemed to pay great attention to the representatives of the Hungarian fraternal party, who later noted in their official reports on the visit that “there had been an enormous and general interest shown in the Hungarian experience.” They added that the Polish comrades often took Hungarian achievements as “a basis and they seem to know little about the first steps of the hard-won consolidation. When they are about to introduce the introduction of harsh measures, they often refer to these results without proper knowledge of these experiences.” Jaruzelski’s and his team’s attention to the Hungarian lessons did not slacken in the years to come. Kádár, in turn, even in a private talk with Jaruzelski during his visit to Poland in October 1983, “warmly thanked the Polish leaders for having put a stop to counterrevolution and anarchy by way of relying on their own resources and thus rendering an enormous service to Poland and to the whole socialist community as well.”⁶

All that, however, had little influence on the fact that, as in Hungary in 1956, the Communist dictatorship in Poland in 1981 could be maintained solely with the help of armed forces. In the end, the oft-cited “Hungarian experience” could save none of the Communist regimes from ultimate downfall.

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(Budapest), is the deputy director of the Hungarian Cultural Institute in Warsaw.

¹ Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives, MOL), Department of Hungarian Workers’ Party, 288. f 12/216-217; 11/4471; 11/4389.

² See Document No. 1 and the East German minutes of the Communist leaders’ summit on 5 December 1980 in this *Bulletin*.

³ MOL 288, f. 11/4397.

⁴ Népszabadság [HSWP central organ], 27 September 1981; see Document No. 3 (below).

⁵ MOL, 288, f. 4/181 and 7/641.

⁶ MOL 288, f. 5/844 and f. 5/895.

SELECTED HUNGARIAN DOCUMENTS

Document No. 1

Report to the Politburo by the Department of International relations of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 8 December 1980

CENTRAL COMMITTEE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party No. copies: 23
Department of International Relations Budapest, 8 Dec. 1980

REPORT to the Politburo

On the initiative of the Central Committee [CC] of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and on the basis of the Politburo’s resolution, a Hungarian delegation, led by Comrade János Kádár, took part in the Moscow meeting of top-level party leaders and high-ranking state officials of the Warsaw Pact countries on December 5. The Hungarian delegation included Comrade András Gyenes, Secretary of the CC and Comrade János Borbándi, Deputy Prime Minister.

The representatives of the member-states issued a joint statement on the meeting which was published in full in Hungarian daily papers on December 6.

The only issue on the agenda—relating to the international situation—was a discussion of the situation in Poland.

In his opening, Comrade Stanisław Kania outlined the Polish evaluation of the crisis and spoke about the work of the Polish United Workers’ Party [PUWP]. He emphasized that a very severe situation had arisen in Poland, which posed a threat to socialism and also carried elements of anarchy and counterrevolution. He added that the PUWP leadership was aware of its internationalist

responsibility, namely that it has to resolve the crisis on its own and that the party already had plans for its resolution. "The leadership is in constant contact with the CPSU with which it consults regularly and it is relying heavily on multi-lateral assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, on which it is counting in the future as well."

[Kania continued: "] The crisis has been made worse by the fact that it is the fourth one since 1956, that it is affecting the working class and other strata of society including the youth, that it looks likely to be prolonged, that strikes are making the situation more intense and that anti-socialist forces are trying to use the trade unions to their advantage.["]

["] In spite of present difficulties, it can be stated that the situation report of the [Polish] Party was correct: the cause of the crisis lies in the justified dissatisfaction of the working class. Ideologically, the Party did not prove equal to its task, it swept away the class-character of society and declared a 'developed socialist society' too soon in a situation where small-commodity production still existed in agriculture. Hostile forces took advantage of the dissatisfaction politically as well and provoked fierce class conflicts. When there were waves of strikes, it was correct to find a solution by political means, as only compromise was able to resolve the situation. ["]

["] The trade union 'Solidarity' was formed by opposition forces, but is popular with workers too. It has some 6 million members at present while sectoral trade unions comprise about 5 million members. The Church has become stronger also as a protector of the social rights of the masses. Hostile Western forces and reactionary émigrés have also been active and aggressive. ["]

["] In the present situation the Party has to strengthen itself on that basis in order to find a way out of the crisis by political means. It is very important to point out that it was neither socialism nor the Party that led the country into crisis but the mistakes committed in the course of its work and the violation of the norms of Leninism in party life. For this reason the Party devised the notion of renewal. This was accepted at the 6th plenary meeting, but, unfortunately, rather than the steps to be taken, invariably it has been the problems of the past that have come to fore. The membership of the Party is decreasing, yet, at the same time there are some 26 thousand new candidates for membership. The situation is getting worse in the coastal region (Pomerania), in Wrocław and Warsaw but positive processes have begun in Silesia, Katowice, Kraków, Poznań, and in Bydgoszcz. ["]

["] There are many calls for those who have committed mistakes to be brought to account. The Party delegated this matter to the party control bodies and people's control committees. ["]

["] A positive factor has been that, despite the enemy's active work in the universities, their efforts did not produce the results they hoped for. As a consequence of the correct decision taken by the Party, the conditions

are good for cooperation with the Peasants' Party. ["]

["] Lately anti-socialist forces have been taking advantage of workers' strike movements and using them for political purposes. Representatives of 'Solidarity' have even made statements against the state. Workers' protection commissions have become active, against which the Party is fighting by political means. A group of leaders of the 'Independent Confederation of Poland' movement has already been arrested, and lately more people are being taken into custody. (Due to these opposition activities it was necessary to set up the Committee for Administrative Measures).

["] There is an operational body working alongside the Prime Minister which is prepared for the introduction of a state of emergency. Combat-ready units are being set up by members of the Party and they will also be provided with arms. Today these number 19 thousand men, by the end of December their number will reach 30 thousand. In an emergency these units would launch surprise arrests of the main opposition elements, and would take control of the mass media, the railways and principal strategic points.

However, the Party intends to seek a solution by political means. The 7th plenary meeting created a more favorable atmosphere for this. Democratic centralism gained strength in the Party. The Party appealed to the Polish people more pointedly than before. This has been made necessary, in fact, by the demands of the crisis as well as those of society.

["] The Party holds a key position in the search for a solution, since it is important for the Party itself to escape the 'mutual settling of accounts.' The enemy also wants to break down organizational unity in the Party. The unified forces are putting up a consistent fight against factionalism and are taking measures to strengthen ideological unity. The convocation of the extraordinary Congress of the Party was scheduled between the first and second quarters of the next year. However, a potential danger has emerged, as circumstances are not right for the party organizations to elect Marxist delegates. It seems that the Congress would not be able to take place on the scheduled date. The leadership of the Party is currently dealing with the replacement of cadres, which is proceeding according to plan."

Comrade Kania admitted that the PUWP deserved criticism for the work of the organs of the mass media. Determined and conscious cadre work has been launched in this field as well, in order to radically change the character of the propaganda. The situation was adequate in the organizations of the CC, in the Warsaw and other voivodeship party newspapers, but they need to take proper control of all mass media organs.

As far as the trade unions were concerned, Comrade Kania added that they wanted to restore the class character of the movement and that sectoral trade unions were already functioning in line with this aim. "It is possible that a trade union federation will be formed. It is

necessary to force Solidarity to hold elections. Experience has proved that, through elections, counterrevolutionary forces are voted out of leading positions, while a number of honest Communists get in." He described Wałęsa as a "sly half-wit," stressing that his movement had leaders influenced by extremists (such as anarchists and terrorists). He added that it is necessary to prevent him from establishing closer relations with the workers' protection commissions.

[Kania continued: "] At the Polish Armed Forces everything is in order and the effective force follows the party line. However, political-educational work is important, as these forces too, are influenced by the events and one-quarter of the effective force has been replaced as a consequence of new recruits to the army. ["]

["] The situation of the Sejm and local councils is improving. Their work has to be made even more popular, so they will discuss certain issues in public and thus respect for them will grow among the masses. ["]

["] The country's economic situation is extremely grave, market supplies are insufficient and rationing has to be gradually introduced. Poland is striving to export more goods (e.g. color televisions) in order to be able to import food products. In 1981 the national income will decrease again. Coal production is expected to decrease, as miners are unwilling to work on Sundays. ["]

["] Poland is largely dependent on the West, above all on the German Federal Republic and the USA. Its capital debt stock is some 27 billion dollars. In 1981 Poland will have to take up another 10 billion dollar loan, since the value of its exports to capitalist markets does not cover the compulsory amortization installments. On the other hand imports will have to be financed from further credits. The USA and other capitalist countries have brought it to their attention that in the event of Poland joining the International Monetary Fund, more favorable credit terms would be granted. However, for reasons of principle, Poland rejects this proposal. ["]

["] According to the plan for economic stabilization, it will take about 3 years to surmount the present difficulties. They wish to rely on the assistance of financial experts of the Soviet Union and would also like to make use of the experiences of other socialist countries. ["]

["] On December 16 it will be the 10th anniversary of the events in Gdansk which will obviously be commemorated. The PUWP cannot completely isolate itself from this and cannot yield ground to the class enemy. Presumably, the anniversary will be dealt with by the 6th Party Congress and the 7th plenary meeting. ["]

Finally, Comrade Kania emphasized that the Polish Communists will do their utmost to defend socialism in their country.

After Comrade Kania and before Comrade T. Zhivkov, Comrade János Kádár rose to speak. Comrade Kádár emphasized the following in his speech. "The aim of the meeting is to coordinate our views, to encourage the supporters of socialism in Poland and around the world

and to give a warning to the class enemy. In the present complicated international situation, the events in Poland directly affect both Europe and the Warsaw Pact." Talking briefly about the current issues of the international situation, Comrade Kádár passed on to an analysis of the circumstances in Poland. He emphasized that the roots of the crisis ran deep and that its causes were to be found in agriculture, in the overdemanding pace of industrial development and investment, in the continuous increase in wages, in failing to meet the demand for goods and also in mistakes in state leadership. "All this has led to tensions, strikes and started the process of disintegration and erosion. The class enemy has learned more from past events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland than we have. Formally, for example, they agree with the leading role of the Party, with building socialism and with membership in the Warsaw Pact. However, in reality they want to drive socialist forces back in all areas. ["]

["] The imperialist forces assert that other socialist countries are afraid of the "Polish infection." From the point of view of internal affairs, we are less anxious about the events, we rather deal with the issue as a common, international one." To avoid misunderstandings, in his appeal to Comrade Kania, János Kádár clarified that it was the public feeling he was referring to. He added that during the events in Pomerania, the Hungarian public was of the opinion—in spite of the long-standing historic friendship between the two nations—that it was impossible to distribute more goods without work or to go on striking while other socialist countries worked normally. János Kádár said that they were also concerned with the issue of participation of a Polish delegation in the Congress of the Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions. He believed that the absence of the Polish delegation from the Congress would be regrettable, yet the composition of the delegation was of prime importance as Hungary was not willing to provide assistance to the international legalization of 'Solidarity.' Thus Comrade Kádár requested the leadership of the PUWP to take this into consideration when selecting the delegation.

Kádár stressed the solidarity of the Hungarian nation and pointed out that the socialist way out of the crisis was to be found by Polish Communists themselves. He said: "We are neither able to, nor do we want to determine this solution, nonetheless we would like to make some comradely remarks. The preservation of the leading role of the Party is absolutely necessary, as is the maintenance of socialist constitutional order and the preservation of national state power in which mass communication agencies play an important and integral role. Another important point in question is the protection provided by the Warsaw Pact. ["]

["] In international relations our Party has invariably emphasized the same position, when addressing either fraternal parties or the representatives of capitalist governments, that it is adopting now. We told our Yugoslav comrades, British Foreign Minister [Lord]

Carrington, [Hans-Jürgen] Wischnewsky, Vice President of the SPD, and others that Poland had never been and would never be for sale and that she cannot be torn out of the Warsaw Pact. There are powerful forces in Poland which believe the same and that the crisis has to be overcome by the Polish people themselves. It seems that these negotiating parties have understood this point. ["]

[“] We do not wish to give advice to the Polish comrades, however, we do have some revolutionary experience from which it would be useful to exchange our opinions. Yet, it should be taken into consideration that it is not advisable to copy anything. If we were in the same situation, we would strongly suggest that first of all the Party take a firm stand and then that it start a counter-attack. It is of prime importance to determine urgently—and more explicitly than before—the political platform of development. The emergency congress would then be able to carry out useful work only on the basis of such a political platform. In the case of examination and judgment of cadres, their actual activity should be taken into account. This work is to be started at the Central Committee and the Politburo. If the controlling organs form an integral whole this unity will manifest itself in the Party as well. [”]

[“]There is a unique situation in the Party now as it is events which are selecting the Party members. In this process the most important is not the number of members, but rather the number of those who support the Party’s platform. It is also important to distance oneself from the mistakes of the past, but attention should not be concentrated on the search for scapegoats. [”] (In this connection, Comrade Kádár referred to the fact that Rákosi and his clique had been called to account only in 1962.)

“A clear situation has to be created within the Party and others are not allowed to interfere with its decisions with democratic slogans. The same holds for the questions of state power. The Party’s platform has to reflect a kind of determination and it also has to make clear that the PUWP will not look for bloodshed in the future either; however, that it will ensure the protection of certain things by all possible means. A distinct, straightforward policy will be supported at least by half of the population of the country. In this they (i.e. the leadership of the PUWP) can count not only on the communist, but also on other progressive, patriotic forces, including even religious people.” Comrade Kádár recalled the events following 1956 when the Soviet comrades encouraged Hungarian Communists by telling them that they were stronger than they had ever thought. He added that the same applied now to Polish Communists.

Finally he emphasized that the existing situation was the PUWP’s and the Polish nation’s own affair, which was nevertheless inseparable from the socialist community and from European and international political questions. Comrade Kádár then declared: “With joint effort we shall overcome the difficulties. We stand by you. In finding

the way out you can rely on the progressive forces of the world and, in a sense, even on sensible capitalist circles which would rather avoid confrontation.”

Comrade Leonid Brezhnev requested permission to speak towards the end of the meeting. He underlined that the processes in Poland could have been prevented and that he had called Comrade Gierek’s attention to the mistakes several times, the last time during the meeting in the Crimea in 1980. Comrade Gierek, however, kept reassuring him that their Party had control over the situation. However, the events had serious consequences, which then affected the international state of affairs and the cause of peace as well.

Comrade Brezhnev also said: “It is completely inexplicable why the Party withdrew following the first attack. The PUWP should not be concerned with the past for it only provides the enemy with a weapon in this way. The hostile forces are working on the basis of a realistic evaluation of the present circumstances. However, despite unanimous evaluation just a month earlier by leaders of both the PUWP and the CPSU both of the situation and of the measures to be taken, things became worse. It was determined that further withdrawal was out of the question, that an offensive had to be launched and that the Party had to be made ready to strike. The basis for all this was prepared and the Party was able to rely on so-called ‘sound’ forces, the army, the police and on a section of the trade unions. At the same time the Party retreated again. Hostile forces became active and the class-conflict grew tense. The counterrevolutionary center accelerates processes: it seeks to form a party on the basis of the ‘Solidarity’ organization and it tries to win over the Peasants’ Party to its cause. On top of that a Christian Democratic Party is about to be formed, while the same counterrevolutionary center is working on the development of a bourgeois election system, is determined to split the Party, the intelligentsia and the youth apart, is cooperating with the Church, is gradually taking over the mass media apparatus, is becoming active even within the army, where it exerts its influence with the help of the Church. [”]

[“]The CPSU did agree with the idea of finding a political solution for the crisis. Today, however, the class enemy does not show restraint. It regards the work of the PUWP as its weakness and is increasing the pressure on it. In practical terms, there is dual power in Poland today. [”]

[“]To put it bluntly, the Party has to admit that socialism is in great danger in Poland. It has to be emphasized that the present situation is not merely the consequence of mistakes committed in the past, but also that of five months of strike movements. We must make it absolutely clear that we shall not take any steps backwards, that we support the further development of socialist democracy, the rights of the trade unions and that we will determinedly fight back anti-socialist forces. [”]

[“]The Soviet Union and the socialist countries support the Polish communists economically as well. We

have provided them with 2 billion dollars of aid, credits, transports of goods and collective sales of oil. We will be looking for opportunities for assistance in the future too, although Poland will also have to make efforts. [”]

[“]The execution of common resolutions is more pressing now than it was a month ago. The Party needs reinforcement. Party members have to be mobilized, the principle of democratic centralism and the Leninist norm of Party life have to be observed. The time to call ‘Solidarity’ to order has come, for it is already pursuing political objectives. The mass media apparatus has to be taken back.”

Comrade Brezhnev pointed out that progressive forces were able to exert influence even on moderate clerical elements. Comrade Brezhnev emphasized that imperialist forces were also carrying out considerable subversive work and that the situation in Poland was extraordinary, which accordingly required the adoption of extraordinary means. He considered it very important to have a definite plan in the case of the army taking over major strategic points, to organize the security system and to guarantee the safety of railway and public transport. He added that it was of importance not only to the economy but also to the security of the Warsaw Pact.

In his analysis of the period preceding the events in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, Comrade G. Husák dealt with the aspects of political settlement of the crisis in Poland in an indirect way, just as Comrade Kádár did. Touching on each topical issue in detail, and drawing on Czechoslovak experience, he examined the situation and tasks in a very humane and comradely manner. He pointed out that in the spring and early summer of 1968, the crisis in Czechoslovakia could have been settled from within, with their own resources. However, the Party was slow to act, had no clear-cut program, lost its initiative role and thus, by August, socialism could only be upheld in Czechoslovakia with help from outside.

Comrade N. Ceausescu pointed out the consequences of economic difficulties in his speech and stressed that socialist countries were not able to solve their economic problems satisfactorily, including, in particular their energy needs and the supply of raw materials, within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON]. In this connection, he underlined the need for further development of socialist economic integration and concluded that the Polish events served as a warning for other socialist countries to tighten cooperation, especially in economic and social fields. He also suggested that another meeting be held in the near future on the same topic and at the same level.

Comrade Ceausescu pointed out that Poland had to solve the problems on its own and by political means. In connection with this he repeatedly talked of the significance of the working class and stressed that, whatever the strength of the army and the police, the situation can be solved only with the support of the working class and the people. He added that it was also

necessary to take firm action against groups endangering the people’s power. Finally, Comrade Ceausescu stressed that a possible “intervention” from outside would entail very serious dangers.

Comrade T. Zhivkov’s evaluation of the situation tallied fully with those of the previous speakers. In the search for a solution, he, however, emphasized the simultaneous application of political and administrative measures, with a major stress on the latter. He explained this by stating that there was a real threat of change in Poland’s socialist order, since political means had been almost totally used up, while counterrevolutionary forces were gaining more and more ground. In his opinion the reason for the relative calm at the time was that the enemy felt it [was] still [too] early to reveal its real power. Comrade Zhivkov pointed out that the continual postponement of the open class confrontation was extremely dangerous and therefore firm action needed to be taken.

In Comrade E. Honecker’s opinion the first “capitulation” of the PUWP was a serious mistake and the Party had been continually backing down since then. “That kind of attitude disappoints even people loyal to socialism,” he said. He wondered why the Polish comrades failed to introduce measures that they had agreed upon with Comrade Brezhnev just a month before. He referred to the lesson learned from the events in Czechoslovakia and also to the experiences of the German Democratic Republic [GDR]. He pointed out emphatically that, besides political measures, administrative means had to be introduced. He talked of the particular situation of the GDR which formed a dividing line between the two existing social orders and added that capitalist countries wanted to smuggle the Polish events into the GDR as well. However, the German Socialist Unity Party [SED] made it clear that it would persist in its principles which had become clear through the restriction of tourism in East Germany.

Comrade Honecker emphasized that the PUWP was strong enough to restore order in the country and that the activity of counterrevolutionaries made it evident that, in order to defend the power of the people, the resources of worker-peasant power had to be deployed.

In our evaluation the meeting fulfilled its purpose: it served to coordinate the opinions of fraternal parties, supported the followers of socialism within Poland and beyond her borders and at the same time it gave a distinct warning to the internal and external forces of reaction.

The report was compiled by:
András Gyenes
Géza Kótai

Approved by:
János Kádár

[Source: *Hungarian National Archives (Budapest), Department of Documents on the Hungarian Workers’ Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 288, f. 5/815. ö.e., pp. 17-28.*]

Document No. 2**Report to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Politburo containing verbatim transcript of 21 July 1981 telephone conversation between Stanisław Kania and Leonid Brezhnev, 22 July 1981**

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Seen and approved, ad acta No. copies made: 2
Kádár
22 July [1981]

REPORT

Comrade János Kádár received Comrade Valeri Musatov, the chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, at his request on 22 July 1981. Comrade Musatov reported that Comrade Stanisław Kania phoned Comrade Leonid Brezhnev on July 21, while the latter was on holiday in the Crimea. The following conversation took place between them:

S. Kania: Good morning, Comrade Leonid Ilyich.
L. Brezhnev: Good morning, Stanisław.

First of all I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of your re-election to the post of First Secretary of the CC of PUWP.

I closely followed the work of the Congress. It was a difficult Congress. What is your assessment of it?

S. Kania: You are right, the Congress took place in a difficult situation. But after all, it created conditions for development. There can be no doubt about that. I wonder whether Comrades [V.V.] Grishin and [Konstantin V.] Rusakov informed you about the course of the Congress.
L. Brezhnev: I read all the reports coming from Warsaw during those days. I followed with interest the television coverage of the work of the Congress.

S. Kania: You probably know how the Congress received Comrade V.V. Grishin's speech. The delegates applauded every remark referring to the Soviet Union and supported the idea of friendship with your country and our solidarity in the struggle for the principles of socialism. It made the proper impression.

The Congress adopted good resolutions. This holds especially for the rules and regulations of the party which your comrades helped us with. In other documents, however, the wording may not be perfectly correct. Nevertheless, we hope that we will be able to amend them when they are put into practice. Unfortunately, some

comrades did not get in the Politburo whom we would have liked to see in it. I am thinking of Comrades [Andrzej] Żabiński and [Tadeusz] Grabski. Grabski obtained few votes in the secret ballot. In my opinion he had committed a number of mistakes and therefore he lost the votes not only of the revisionists but also those of the reliable comrades.

The present composition of the Politburo will ensure fully that we will work more effectively in the future. Comrade [Miroslaw] Milewski, Minister for Home Affairs, became a member of the Politburo. We plan to give him the post of administrative secretary of the Central Committee. You probably know him well.

L. Brezhnev: I have heard about him but I have never met him in person.

S. Kania: Foreign Minister J. Czyrek became a member of the Politburo and the secretary of the CC. We elected two comrades for the post of secretaries of the CC who had been previously doing lower-grade party work. These are Z. Michałek and M. Woźniak. The former will deal with agricultural issues and the latter with economic ones. We hope that Michałek, who used to work as the director of a major state farm, will be able to help us in reshaping the village-structure.

The composition of the Politburo is good all in all. It is made up of reliable people.

L. Brezhnev: If this is the case, then it is good.

S. Kania: We managed to elect all the people into the controlling organs, whom I had wanted. There were 18 candidates on the list of politburo members, of which 14 had to be elected. Those whom I did not consider suitable dropped out in the secret ballot.

Comrade Rusakov was quite afraid that [Mieczysław] Rakowski would get into the leadership. I promised him that this would not happen. It was not easy to fulfill this as they wanted to elect Rakowski even to the post of First Secretary of the CC of the PUWP. However, it all fell through and I am satisfied now.

Economic circumstances are, indeed, terrible in Poland. Due to the shortage of market supplies the possibility of rioting is most likely. We are short of a number of products, including even cigarettes. We spoke in detail of all this to your delegation which we met yesterday. We informed the delegates in detail about the economic situation of the country. They promised to report this to you.

L. Brezhnev: We are examining everything closely here in Moscow.

S. Kania: Comrade Jaruzelski and all members of the Politburo send you their best regards.

L. Brezhnev: Thank you. Give my best regards to Comrade Jaruzelski and the others.

S. Kania: Now we are going to draft a specific plan for our further action, which will have to be more offensive.

L. Brezhnev: That is right. Thank you for the information. I would like to give you my own opinion. We think that the Congress was a serious trial of strength

for both the Party and you personally. It clearly cast light on the extent of opportunism and the threat represented by opportunists. If they had been given a free hand they would have diverted the party from Leninism to social democracy. Besides, they behaved in a mean way and launched a campaign of slander.

In spite of this, the final outcome of the Congress and the fact that the highest party authority chose you for the post of First Secretary, create a reliable basis for resolute and consistent measures for the solution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation.

The most important thing is that we do not waste time. People must feel right away that the leadership is in reliable hands.

I was informed that Solidarity is threatening a strike which is to be organized at your airline company. You have to show them that times have changed. There will be no more capitulations. Don't you agree?

S. Kania: I absolutely agree.

L. Brezhnev: After all, the whole struggle is still ahead of you. It is not going to be an easy fight. The counterrevolution—the danger of which we have already talked about several times—does not intend to lay down its arms.

I would like to believe that, holding together the party *aktiv* and all the Communists, you and your comrades will be able to stop the course of events, fight back the enemies of socialism and defend the achievements of socialist Poland.

In such circumstances, Stanisław, be assured that you can rely on our solidarity and support.

The Soviet people express their pleasure on your election as leader of the Party and they will follow attentively further happenings in Poland. This is natural as everything that is going on in your country is close to the hearts of the Soviet people. The development of Soviet-Polish economic, political and other relations will develop according to the settlement of events in Poland.

Taking the opportunity of your phone call I invite you to visit us. You could have a rest and, naturally, we would then have the occasion for a more profound discussion.

I wish you, Stanisław, strength and health.

S. Kania: I thank you for all that you have said.

L. Brezhnev: I always say openly and sincerely what I think.

S. Kania: I know what you expect from us. You are absolutely right to say that we have to mobilize all our forces in order to take the offensive. We understand that. I assure you that I will do my best to eliminate difficulties. We shall seize the counterrevolution by its throat.

L. Brezhnev: I wish you and your comrades success in this.

S. Kania: Thank you for your invitation for a holiday. I have practically no time to rest. I have already told all my comrades that I would not go on holiday. Yet, I might travel to you for a couple of days so we could talk.

L. Brezhnev: I will meet Comrade Husák and Kádár in

the next few days.

S. Kania: If you agree, I would let you know the date of my arrival later, when I can see more clearly.

L. Brezhnev: I understand that you have got a lot of work to do. The resolutions of the congress have to be carried out.

S. Kania: Leonid Ilyich, I wish you a good rest and gathered strength. Not only Soviet Communists, but all of us need this.

L. Brezhnev: Thank you for your kindness. I cannot, however, free myself from work even during my holidays. Just before your call I was talking on the phone with the leaders of Georgia, Kazakhstan and the regional leaders of Rostov, Volgograd and Stavropol. And it is the same every day.

S. Kania: Nevertheless, you should find some time for a rest.

L. Brezhnev: Thank you. Again, I wish you success, Stanisław. Good bye."

Budapest, 22 July 1981

[Source: *Hungarian National Archives (Budapest), Department of Documents on the Hungarian Workers' Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*, 288. f. 5/832. ö.e., pp. 20-24.]

Document No. 3

Letter from the HSWP CC [signed by János Kádár] to the PUWP CC, attention Stanisław Kania, 17 September 1981

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST
WORKERS' PARTY

No. copies made: 210
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Budapest, 17 September 1981

to the Central Committee of
the Polish United Workers Party
For the attention of Comrade Stanisław Kania
First Secretary
WARSAW

Dear Comrades:

The Hungarian Communists and our working people are paying close attention to the extraordinary events in the Polish People's Republic which have been going on for over a year now. Public opinion in our country has been very concerned with the work of the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP and people welcomed its resolutions on socialist development, the

necessity of the persistent fight against anti-socialist forces, and Poland's commitment and her responsibility towards our alliance system.

Despite justified expectations and hopes, the events of the period since the Party Congress have proved that it was not the followers of socialism, but its enemies who took the offensive and sought confrontation and the seizure of power. This fact has been stated and acknowledged by you, the leaders of the Polish Party and the Polish State, and by other factors concerned with the welfare of the country and the people.

The traditional friendship that binds the Hungarian and Polish people and also our Parties together, our common socialist goals, as well as the collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace and safety in our countries, prompt us to express repeatedly our deep anxiety for you in the present acute situation. We are also urged to do so as we are receiving questions from our own people—expressing sincere concern and sometimes even impatience—which we find more and more difficult to answer. These repeated questions tend to ask where Poland is heading, how long will it take for the escalation of forces and action to destroy the socialist system, what Polish Communists and Polish supporters of socialism are doing, when they are going to take resolute action to protect the real interests of the Polish working people and the common interests of our nations.

We were all astonished by the atmosphere of the congress of the trade union Solidarity: the series of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet statements, the unrestrained demagoguery of ringleaders by which they mislead and deceive masses of workers who want to remedy mistakes but not to do away with socialism. In fact, your Politburo and the communiqué of September 15 dealing with the character of the "Solidarity" congress came to the same conclusion. It is obvious that definite steps must be taken to repel an attack which disregards and imperils the achievements of the Polish people attained by blood and sweat, which, in the difficult situation in Poland, announces a program of devastation and anarchy instead of social reconciliation and constructive programs, which foully abuses the ideas of freedom and democracy, denies the principles of socialism and keeps on stirring up uncontrolled emotions, instead of enhancing common sense and a sense of responsibility.

Dear Polish Comrades:

The provocative message of the "Solidarity" congress directed to the workers of socialist countries is nothing other than the propagation of the same unrealistic, irresponsible demagoguery on an international level. It is evidently a step suggested by international reactionary forces to divide and set the people of socialist countries against one another.

The Hungarian people highly appreciate their socialist achievements obtained at the cost of painful experiences

and exhausting work. The ringleaders of Solidarity cherish vain hopes. The Hungarian workers flatly reject the blatant provocation and any undisguised effort to intervene in their domestic affairs.

The greatest concern of our Party and people now is the activity of counterrevolutionary forces in Poland which is directed not merely against the Polish working-class and the vital national interests of the Polish people, but towards a weakening of our friendly relations, our multilateral cooperation and the system of our alliance as well. Their continued activity would definitely have an influence on the security of the community of socialist countries. It is in our and all European nations' basic interest that Poland not be a source of an escalation of international tension but should rather stay a stabilizing factor in Europe in the future.

Comrades:

Since the outbreak of the crisis, the CC of the HSWP has several times expressed its opinion concerning the events in Poland, as it also did in the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP. While stressing the maintenance of our earlier standpoint, we think that an even more urgent task is to curb counterrevolution by way of joint action taken by forces of the Polish Communists, true Polish patriots and forces that are ready to act for the sake of development. Only action and consistent measures can create the conditions for the successful execution of tasks specified by the Congress.

We are certain that in Poland today the supporters of socialism are in a majority, that they can count on the Polish working class, the peasantry, the loyal youth of the intelligentsia and on realistically minded powers of the society. The protection of the achievements of socialism is the most fundamental national interest of the Polish people today, which is, at the same time the international interest of forces fighting for peace and social progress.

Hereby we declare our belief that if the leadership of the PUWP shows a definite sense of direction, being aware of its national and international responsibility, and if the PUWP calls for immediate action in the spirit of the PUWP Politburo declaration of September 15, then the union of Polish Communists and patriots and their active campaign will still be able to drive back the open attack of anti-socialist forces and to defend the achievements of socialism attained during a decade's work. Then Poland too, will have the opportunity to start out, having successfully resolved the present severe crisis, toward socialist development, that is, on the way to real social and national prosperity.

The supporters of socialism in Poland—amongst them the international powers of socialism and progress—can rely absolutely on the internationalist help of Hungarian communists and the fraternal Hungarian people in their fight to protect their people's power.

on behalf of the Central Committee of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
(signed) János Kádár

[Source: *Hungarian National Archives (Budapest),
Department of documents on the Hungarian Workers'
Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 288. f.
11/4400. ö.e., pp. 120 - 123.*]

Document No. 4

**“Report to the [HSWP CC] Politburo,” from János
Berecz, György Aczél, Jenő Fock, 30 December 1981**

Department of Foreign Affairs
of the Central Committee STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
of the Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party Seen and approved, can be sent!

J. Kádár, 30 December [1981]

REPORT
for the Politburo

On the invitation of Comrade Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the CC of the PUWP and leader of the Military Council for National Defense and following the decision of the Politburo of the HSWP, a delegation of the HSWP was sent to Warsaw between December 27 and 29. The delegation was led by György Aczél, member of the Politburo. He was accompanied by Jenő Fock and János Berecz, members of the CC of HSWP. István Pataki, associate of the Department of Foreign Affairs and József Garamvölgyi, our ambassador in Warsaw, took part in the discussions. At the request of the Polish comrades, the Hungarian delegation went to Warsaw in order to provide information on our experiences in our fight against counterrevolutionary forces and our experience in socialist consolidation and the building of socialism. The exchange of opinions also offered an opportunity to assess the political situation in Poland that has arisen since the introduction of martial law.

In the framework of a plenary meeting, our delegation met the members of an operational committee of 10 which was comprised of representatives of the Military Council for National Defense, the Politburo of the PUWP and the Polish government. The talks were led by Comrade W. Jaruzelski who analyzed the Polish situation thoroughly and pointed out those fields where they particularly needed Hungarian experience. The delegation held talks with Deputy Prime Minister M. Rakowski, member of the PUWP Politburo and Secretary of the CC, Stefan Olszowski, and with the Secretary of the CC of the PUWP, Marian Orzechowski. Comrade Jenő Fock had a talk with Deputy Prime Ministers Janusz Obodowski and Zbigniew Madej, furthermore with the Secretary of the CC of the

PUWP, Marian Woźniak. There were talks also between Comrade János Berecz and Włodzimierz Natorf, leader of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the PUWP CC. In the headquarters of the PUWP CC, Comrade György Aczél took part in a nearly 3-hour Party assembly where 120 people were present. At the dinner party hosted by Comrade Ambassador Garamvölgyi, we had an informal talk with Kazimierz Barcikowski and Józef Czyrek, members of the PUWP Politburo and secretaries of the CC, furthermore with Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski. At the end of the visit Comrade W. Jaruzelski and György Aczél had a one-hour discussion. This took place after the all-day meeting of first secretaries of the voivodships and military representatives, where, as Comrade Jaruzelski bitterly remarked, again only the military representatives were active.

I.

Comrade W. Jaruzelski expressed his thanks to the leadership of the HSWP and first of all to Comrade János Kádár for the opportunity that the Hungarian party delegation's visit to Warsaw provided for them. He said that although he was aware of the significant difference between Hungarian circumstances 25 years earlier and the present Polish situation, but as regards the political progress he recognized quite a lot of similarities and for that reason Hungarian experiences, proven by subsequent developments, were of great value to them. He spoke of the situation that came about after the introduction of martial law. In reference to the tasks and action to be carried out, he formulated his words in such a way that they took the shape of questions referring to the Hungarian experiences.

“Today, the most important task in Poland is to get out of the deep crisis, strengthen the people's power and create the conditions of further socialist development. The most decisive and at the same time the most problematic factor now is the situation of the Party. The PUWP, as it exists formally, has to be revived, however a number of difficulties lie ahead. In the course of three and a half decades the Party has experienced more crises and does not enjoy the confidence of society. Under extremely complex ideological, moral and political conditions, the Party must restore sincere and open relations with the masses as soon as possible.”

Comrade Jaruzelski suggested that, although martial law created favorable conditions and the forces of socialism had won the first battle, the present activity of the whole of the Party and of its organs was still alarming considering future potential developments. A section of the party members, especially in areas where strikes had to be stopped using military force, feels ill at ease, is inactive and lacks initiative. Others became far too self-assured as a consequence of the conditions and order imposed by the presence of the military. This too gave rise to unjustified self-confidence amongst those people and some of the

party members even had a tendency to take revenge. Taking into consideration Comrade Kádár's often repeated advice, they regard the drawing up of a statement, which could be suitable as a concise political program, to be one of the most important preconditions of political development. At present they are working on the establishment of a political platform which they would like to make public in the near future.

Counterrevolutionary forces were very well-organized within Solidarity. With the introduction of martial law they managed to break the leadership of Solidarity, to interrupt its activity, to paralyze its propaganda campaign and sometimes even to expose it. In practice, however, the several-million-strong base of the organization still exists. Solidarity is a unique organization in the world and it has demonstrated an indescribable destructive power both within the economy and the affairs of the state. It is a fact, that this organization has become a symbol of dynamism in the eyes of several million well-meaning workers. The real aspirations of the extremist counterrevolutionary leaders of Solidarity will have to be revealed by steadfast work, but this struggle is going to be hard one, for it is in fact a fight against myths.

Furthermore, an aggravating factor is that the majority of Solidarity supporters and the source of its dynamism are the youth, who joined Solidarity in order to knock down the obstacles that thwart and frustrate their aspirations for intellectual and material well-being. Their attitude may be characterized as nothing less than pro-Western and anti-Soviet. All that goes hand in hand with the intoxicating feeling of their hitherto often successful political fight against the authorities. Therefore they have to be offered attractive goals and suitable conditions in a political and economic situation which is by far the worse than ever.

The other main character of the Solidarity movement is clericalism. The Polish Catholic Church, unlike the Hungarian [Catholic Church], did not get exposed in the course of events. What is more, it has gained ground within Solidarity and reinforced its social position through it. While remaining realistic, the Polish leadership is still looking for possibilities of coexistence between the State and the Church. They are maintaining relations with the Church and trying to keep them from deteriorating beyond a minimum level.

Comrade Jaruzelski pointed out that in the fields of ideological work, propaganda and mass communication they are employing administrative measures first of all. Though there is a strict censorship they believe, based on Hungarian experience, that in the course of time they will be able to use more flexible and more efficient means in this field too.

Presently, the poor condition of the national economy is a major burden. Even without the destruction of the last 15 months the situation would be grave, but now economic conditions have become catastrophic. There is a general shortage of supplies, prices and wages are unrealistic, the supply of energy and raw materials for

industrial plants keeps breaking down. To make things worse, the USA has just imposed an economic blockade, thus badly affecting the economy which has developed a cooperative dependence on the economies of capitalist countries over the past 10 years. In spite of the extraordinary circumstances, economic reform is going to be implemented in a limited form at the beginning of the year. Poland is in great need of the economic assistance from the socialist countries and Comrade Jaruzelski repeatedly expressed his thanks for the prompt Hungarian economic aid. He also added that it was clear to them that this kind of assistance could be only provisional as the real solution, in the long run, is undoubtedly the transformation of the Polish economy into a viable economy.

As a summary of his comments, Comrade Jaruzelski underlined that the tasks ahead were huge and that there is presently no organized force in Poland, beyond the armed forces, which could provide reliable support. Only the multilateral assistance of the allied socialist countries could bring real support and clean sources. They wish to pursue the line they took when they introduced martial law; they are aware that they must pull back but have to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the exceptional circumstances.

II.

Our experience and impressions of intensive formal and informal discussions held with members of the Polish leadership can be summarized as follows:

1. The activity of the Military Council for National Defense is very well-organized, the armed forces and police authorities are carrying out their historic duties with commendable discipline. Their actions have stabilized the government institutions, eliminated open and organized resistance and apparently restored public law and order. The indispensable primary conditions thus are in place for socialist consolidation.

2. The favorable conditions created by the introduction of martial law and the stability attained so far are in danger mainly due to the lack of political power or rather its disintegration.

3. The Party is invariably divided and has become less active. Party leaders regard the situation created by the army's actions, that is, the so-called "conditions of artificial defense," as natural and this is delaying the development of the political offensive. Within the party there are heated debates amongst the various trends and tendencies and no determined political platform until now. It would seem that there is a mutual understanding that the Party must not return either to the position before August 1980, nor to the one preceding 13 December 1981. Consequently, there has to be concordance between the general principles of building socialism and Polish

national characteristics. However, in practice, differences of opinion are emerging even in the process of setting the specific tasks and direct objectives. According to representatives of one of the main trends, national characteristics—the role of the Catholic Church, the degree of Polish national consciousness, the situation of the agriculture and so forth—have to be given a decisive role, furthermore the past 35 years of the construction of socialism has to be fundamentally revised and reassessed. According to the other trend, which is less perceptible now amongst the topmost circles of the Party, due to the immediate counterrevolutionary threat and highly sensitive national feelings, the balance has to be restored by way of laying a larger emphasis on the general principles of building socialism and on the basic categories of Marxism-Leninism.

4. Hostile forces were successfully disabled, but not liquidated. The enemy's tactics could be now either of two kinds:

a/ To go underground and consistently hamper consolidation by staging terrorist actions and sabotages, or

b/ To call for the restoration of quiet and order, and so to emphasize the senselessness of continued maintenance of martial law, and then to demand its earliest possible cessation.

5. There was a keen and general interest in the Hungarian experience everywhere. We are of the opinion that in this respect they repeatedly took our previous results as a basis and they seem to know little about the initial steps of the hard-won consolidation. When they are about to announce the introduction of harsh measures, they often refer to these results without proper knowledge of these experiences.

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The delegation of the HSWP fulfilled its mission. The exchange of opinions was useful and we are convinced that our fraternal Polish Party needs all-embracing and concrete support in the future too. As far as we could tell, beyond their expediency, our suggestions provided first of all moral encouragement and support for the Polish leadership.

We suggest that, depending on the Polish comrades' needs, a similar discussion take place in Warsaw in the near future and that, at their request, a consultation be held in Budapest on the relevant issues.

Budapest, 30 December 1981

János Berecz

György Aczél

Jenő Fock

[Source: Hungarian National Archives (Budapest), Department of Documents on the Hungarian Workers' Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 288. f. 5/844. ö.e., pp. 14 - 20.]

NEW CWIHP FELLOWS

THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THE AWARD OF CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS FOR THE 1998-1999 ACADEMIC YEAR TO

MRS. LI DANHUI (doctoral candidate, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing), "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Vietnam War"

MR. KRZYSZTOF PERSAK (PhD candidate and junior fellow at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences), "The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland"

DR. JORDAN BAEV (Senior Fellow at the Institute of Military History, Sofia), "The Cold War and the Build-up of Military-Political Alliances in the Balkans, 1945-1990."

Moscow's Man in the SED Politburo and the Crisis in Poland in Autumn 1980

By Michael Kubina¹

By the late 1970s, Soviet-East German relations had become tense due to East German leader Erich Honecker's *Westpolitik* and the increasing economic dependence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Evidence of these strains can be found in minutes recorded by Gerhard Schürer, head of planning for the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), of a March 1979 conversation during the 24th convention of the GDR/USSR Parity Government Commission. According to Schürer's account, USSR Council of Ministers chairman N. A. Tikhonov, a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo, complained about the GDR's increasing co-operation with the West at Soviet expense. Schürer wrote: "Comrade Tikhonov had a five-page long document, which he under no circumstances was willing to hand over to me. I answered [sic] as follows: The material you are using was obviously created by someone who doesn't know anything about the co-operation between the GDR and the USSR or was one-sidedly searching for negative facts or unfounded insinuations."²

It remains unclear from whom Tikhonov had received his material. Moscow however, was not only informed through official channels about what was going on within the SED's most senior decision-making body, but had its own informants in the East German party politburo itself. One of them was Werner Krolikowski,³ a postwar cadre of the SED, who from 1973 to 1976 displaced Günter Mittag as the SED Central Committee (CC) secretary for economic affairs. Krolikowski became a personal enemy of Mittag and Honecker when Honecker in 1977 once again reinstated Mittag in his former position. Krolikowski in turn became first deputy to the head of the government, prime minister Willi Stoph, with responsibility for economic matters.

In the first half of the 1970's Krolikowski began to inform Moscow regularly about developments within the SED politburo which in any way could jeopardize Moscow's position in East Germany. As an ideological puritan, loyalty to Moscow was his first priority. Both ideological purity and the close alliance with Moscow were—in Krolikowski's view—being increasingly jeopardized by Honecker's and Mittag's policy towards Bonn.

Until the GDR's demise, Krolikowski remained a reliable informant for Moscow. His behavior in the SED politburo did not reflect his sharp criticism of Honecker and Mittag in his communications with Moscow. But he frequently warned the Soviets of the potentially disastrous

results Honecker's policy could have for Moscow's position in Germany. In 1984, for example, he urgently warned the Soviets about Honecker's cadre policy: "The cadre-political changes within the politburo carried out by the 8th CC Plenum of the SED,⁴ following the proposal and suggestion of EH [Erich Honecker]"—so the title of a report for Moscow dated 4 June 1984—served only "to strengthen the personal power of EH." One could count on the fact that, at Honecker's behest, all "comrades, [who were] old warriors and attached to the Soviet Union, will be systematically neutralized, dismissed from the politburo and replaced by other persons."⁵ Two years later Krolikowski tried in vain to win Moscow's support for Honecker's removal.⁶

Krolikowski kept detailed notes, which I utilize in this paper. They are often grammatically incorrect, and his handwritten corrections appear on many of the typewritten pages. His handwritten comments preceding each date are blotted out or indecipherable. These dates seem to indicate the date on which they were handed over to the Soviets rather than the day on which they were written. Erich Honecker and Günter Mittag are mentioned only by their initials (EH and GM).⁷

Krolikowski's reports provide new evidence on the question of whether Honecker really pressed for a Soviet invasion of Poland in autumn 1980. This issue, as well as the question of whether and when a serious military invasion by the Soviets might have occurred, is still a matter of controversy. There are good reasons to believe that the danger of a military invasion was rather small, at least after the Moscow summit on 5 December 1980.⁸ But one should not assume that, in the autumn 1980, Honecker was not convinced of the necessity of an invasion, and that the Soviet preparations for it were not to be taken seriously.⁹ Similar arguments have already been made in detail elsewhere and do not need to be restated here.¹⁰ Since some scholars still argue¹¹ that some "interpretational doubts"¹² remain, new evidence that seems to corroborate the thesis stated above is provided below.

Honecker's annual meeting with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev in the Crimea in August 1980 turned out to be a rather unpleasant experience for him. At this meeting Brezhnev sharply criticized Günter Mittag. Former Soviet diplomat Yuli Kvizinskij remembers Brezhnev at the airport telling Honecker straight to his face that "he had no trust in Günter Mittag. But Honecker ignored the remark."¹³ Immediately after Honecker's return from the Crimea, the strikes in Poland escalated to crisis proportions all over the country. Beginning on 12 August

1980, one day after the Crimea meeting, the SED leadership began receiving several telegrams per day from Warsaw on developments in Poland. On August 18, the State Security Ministry (MfS), began producing regular reports on the public mood within East Germany regarding the Polish events.¹⁴ At the same time the Intelligence Department (Verwaltung Aufklärung) of the East German National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee - NVA) began issuing regular reports on the situation in Poland. On August 19, for example it was reported that the situation would probably escalate further. The report also warned that the aim of the counterrevolutionary forces was the "elimination of the socialist state order", and that the intervention of "armed counterrevolutionary forces" should be reckoned with.¹⁵ Reports to the SED and NVA leadership usually revolved around the key question as to whether or not the Polish comrades were willing and able to destroy the strike movement using their own force on their own—and gave a rather skeptical appraisal.

Though the SED leadership feared the Polish developments and their possible effects¹⁶ on the GDR,¹⁷ the crisis temporarily provided Honecker with an opportunity to divert attention from internal problems. He skillfully tried to deflect Brezhnev's criticism that the SED lacked ideological steadfastness and loyalty to the Kremlin. Krolikowski later complained to Moscow that Honecker did not inform the Politburo about Brezhnev's harsh critique of Mittag's economic course and that he tried to "brush CPSU criticism of EH made at the Crimea by L.I. Brezhnev under the table."¹⁸

In light of what had happened, Krolikowski saw a chance to settle accounts with Honecker and Mittag and their "political mistakes." Before the 13th SED CC

Plenum¹⁹ in December 1980, he drew up a working paper in preparation of the forthcoming 10th SED Party Congress in spring 1981, claiming "to deal frankly and critically with the condemnable practice of ideological co-existence in the policy by EH and GM toward the imperialistic FRG. They are pursuing a policy of ideological appeasement [*Burgfrieden*] toward the FRG and the USA for stinking money."²⁰ Of course, Krolikowski did not put forth such demands, neither at the 13th CC Plenum nor at the 10th Party Congress. He only talked about them within a small group of Honecker critics, especially with Willi Stoph and with contacts in Moscow. Often informed of important decisions only afterwards and lacking clear signals from Moscow where nobody was interested in provoking another leadership crisis within the empire, no one within the SED Politburo was willing to attack Honecker. Honecker instead had made an ally in Mittag, who, according to Krolikowski, was ready "to be at Honecker's command in any mess."²¹

Honecker's "extremist" attitude towards Poland, as Krolikowski put it, served to divert attention from his own problems. In particular, Honecker wanted to prevent any parallels being drawn between himself and the ousted Polish party chief, Edward Gierek. Both had started a decade before as "reformers," and both had led their countries into tremendous indebtedness towards the West. Krolikowski complained to his Soviet comrades, "[h]e did everything entirely on his own, without [the] PB [Politburo], and then only after the fact cynically informed his dummies in the PB [...]. Every week EH and GM go hunting together—discussing and planning their further political doings."²²

While Honecker was on a state visit to Austria in

More Documents and Information on the Polish Crisis

Vojtech Mastny, *The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War: CWIHP Working Paper No. 23* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998)

Institute of Political Studies (ed.), *Zeszyt roboczy" generala Anoszkina 9-16 grudnia 1981 r.* (Warsaw: IPS, 1998)

Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, *On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the SEJM of the Republic of Poland: CWIHP Working Paper No 21* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998)

Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, Christian Ostermann (eds.), *Poland 1980-82: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. A compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events* (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1997)

Russian and Eastern European Archival Documents Database (REEAD), sponsored by CWIHP and the National Security Archive (contact The National Security Archive at nsarchiv@gwu.edu or by phone: 202-994-7000).

Cold War International History Project's website at cwihip.si.edu.

Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke (eds.), *"Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." Die SED contra Polen 1980/81.*

Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995)

"Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis. Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), pp 116-117, 129-139.

November 1980, Stoph and MfS chief Erich Mielke had a brief conversation about which Stoph informed Krolkowski, who then made a note of it. Mielke was reported to have declared his determined opposition to Honecker's "unilateral actions."²³ Stoph said he had asked Mielke to "change his tactics," adding that "it was not sufficient to inform only EH. Whenever it was possible he was to inform the other PB members as well. Mielke said that this was quite difficult, since EH specified who was to be informed and who was not. [...] He plotted only with GM. He usually hunted only with GM. Mielke was only invited when [Soviet Ambassador P.A.] Abrasimov²⁴ was invited as well."²⁵ Concerning Poland, Mielke reportedly stated: "When EH makes super-demanding claims on the FRG, it is not due to Brezhnev's criticism at the Crimea, but rather because EH got frightened to the bones by the events in Poland. He fears that he could have similar problems in the GDR, and he is afraid of FRG influence!"²⁶ Mielke, best informed within the SED leadership about Honecker's intentions second only to Mittag, had no doubts "that EH reckoned on the Soviets marching into Poland." Mielke himself, he said, had "always pointed out the strong anti-Sovietism in Poland to the Soviet friends," which made it difficult, "to achieve the necessary changes."²⁷

The fact that Honecker, right before the December 1980 Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow—which had been initiated by him—wanted the SED Politburo to give him a blank check for a decision to intervene, is also confirmed by another politburo member, the head of the so-called Free Trade Union Federation (FDGB) of East Germany, Harry Tisch. After the collapse of SED rule, but before the party's documents became accessible, Tisch recalled the crucial "extraordinary politburo session" in Strausberg, the site of the GDR Defense Ministry near Berlin: "I believe that Honecker at that time had the idea to prevent Poland from breaking out militarily, meaning among other things, possibly intervening ... I know that today nobody wants to remember. But I remember that there was a politburo session in Strausberg—it was, I think, the Day of the People's Army—when we talked about the situation in Poland and Honecker asked for the authority to take all [necessary] steps so that nothing could happen and he wouldn't need to ask the Politburo again."²⁸ And he got the agreement. So he got the right to take all steps, including military steps."²⁹

When Egon Krenz, Honecker's short-time successor as SED General Secretary (18 October—3 December 1989) was asked about the special session in Strausberg, he professed to memory gaps: "I can't remember such a secret session of the politburo in Strausberg. And it would have been strange that we should have gone to Strausberg in order to have a politburo session there. In Strausberg the sessions of the National Defense Council, not those of the politburo, usually took place. Well, there was strong interest in resolving the situation in Poland, but I know of no case in which the GDR ever called for aggression

toward Poland. Who told you that joke?"³⁰ But, according to Politburo minutes No. 48/80, Krenz, as a candidate of the Politburo, did in fact join the "extraordinary session of the Politburo" on the 28 November 1980, in Strausberg.³¹ It is quite astonishing that Krenz could not remember this session, because it was indeed "strange" that a politburo session took place in Strausberg.

The reason, however, for transferring the session to Strausberg was not, as Tisch remembered, because it was the Day of the People's Army.³² The location for the session rather indicated that it was due to the growing military crisis. The only topic under discussion was what possible action might be taken toward Poland. After Brezhnev had given his long-awaited approval for a summit of Warsaw Pact leaders, the SED politburo authorized (even if only *ex post facto*!) Honecker's letter to Brezhnev of 26 November 1980. In his letter, Honecker had emphasized his urgent proposal "that we meet together in Moscow for a day right after the 7th Plenum of the PUWP [Polish United Workers' Party] CC [on 1-2 December 1980], the decisions of which, in our view, will not be able to change the course of events in Poland in any fundamental way." The summit should devise "measures of collective assistance for the Polish friends to permit them to overcome the crisis."³³ In Strausberg, Honecker was given authorization by his Politburo "to take necessary measures in agreement with the CC of the CPSU."³⁴

Today, even high-ranking NVA personnel assume that Honecker "recommended an intervention as a last way 'to stabilize socialism' in Poland."³⁵ As is evident from the documents, for Honecker, the crucial point had already been reached in the fall of 1980.³⁶ However, the summit on December 5 in Moscow gave the Polish leadership one more "chance." Honecker, after realizing that there was little likelihood of a military intervention, deleted the sharpest phrases from his speech manuscript.³⁷ But nevertheless, he was the only party chief who refrained from saying anything about the possible impact a military intervention could have on the process of détente.³⁸ Only the Romanian state and party chief, Nikolaie Ceausescu, dared to use the word "intervention," seriously warning of its consequences.³⁹

Back in Berlin, Honecker tried to sell his defeat in Moscow as a success. Krolkowski announced to Moscow, "EH's and GM's attitude towards Moscow is still bad, hypocritical and demagogic. EH learned nothing from the Crimea meeting. He takes the events in Poland as confirmation [handwritten: for the correctness of his policy and proof] for the mistakes of L.I. Brezhnev and the CPSU PB according to the evaluation of EH and GM [handwritten: during the Crimea meeting]. Cleverly, he tries to capitalize on the events in Poland. [...] EH and GM assume that the CPSU leadership, facing the crisis in Poland, highly value each positive word which EH utters about the Soviet Union and that their criticism at the Crimea meeting will be forgotten."⁴⁰ Hermann Axen,

SED CC secretary for international relations and member of the GDR delegation, briefed the SED politburo about the meeting in Moscow on December 9,⁴¹ emphasizing, “of primary importance: that the meeting occurred. Due to several initiatives of Comrade E. Honecker.” Axen’s report made clear what Honecker’s intentions in Moscow had been: “Impressive was the argumentation by [Czechoslovak] comrade [Gustáv] Husák on the basis of the CPCz [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] experience of 1968. Comrade Ceausescu repeated the Romanian objection against a military relief campaign.” Axen also stressed the SED’s skepticism with regard to an “inner Polish” solution. The “assistance” provided to the PUWP leadership in Moscow, he underlined, “will only be effective if (I stress ‘if’) it is used the way it has to be and was meant.” According to Axen, Polish party leader Stanisław Kania had indeed announced that “measures for introduction of the ‘martial law’ were in preparation. But [Kania’s] speech shows that no clear concept and program of action exists.” The meeting therefore told the “PUWP and the public: Up to here and no further! Sort things out, otherwise extreme measures must be taken! [...] However, nothing has been decided yet.”

To conclude, Krolikowski’s notes corroborate the thesis that SED leader Erich Honecker indeed sought a hardline—military—solution in the fall/winter of 1980 and—for one—very likely took initial Soviet preparations for an intervention seriously.

Document

Werner Krolikowski, “Comment on the Report of the PB to the 13th Plenum of the SED CC, which was prepared and submitted by Günther Mittag,” handwritten, 5 December 1980 [excerpt]

[...]

4. While a principled argument with FRG imperialism is missing, the assessment of the situation in the People’s Republic of Poland lasts for 20 pages. Indeed, the comrades and many workers watch the developments in Poland with great concern. They also expect a response by the party leadership, its assessment of the situation and of what is to be done in order to change the situation in favor of socialism.

However, it simply cannot be true that patronizing statements are made before the Plenum of the CC of our party, about what the PUWP must and must not do in order to smash the counterrevolution and guarantee the continued socialist development of Poland. Fraternal assistance and even advice for the solution of the extremely complicated crisis situation in Poland are necessary. There is no doubt about that. But the way this has been discussed on the CC Plenum, based on the report

by GM, is certainly wrong.

And though absolutely necessary, no conclusions are being drawn from the events in Poland for the policy of our party, concerning e.g.:

- the application of Leninist standards of party work;
- the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation and the consequences resulting from it;
- the acknowledgement of criticism and self-criticism from top to bottom;
- to take action against the ‘spin’ towards the West in the GDR;
- the fight against spreading nationalism here, which is also fed by the events in Poland;
- the penetration by bourgeois ideology via the Western mass media and visitors;
- measures to prevent further indebtedness of the GDR [to the West];
- overcoming the gaps between purchasing power and production.

These extremely important questions, however, are not mentioned in the report at all, much less treated in a profound way. The opposite is the case. The internal situation of the GDR is represented as if there are no difficulties, although changes are necessary and are ever more forcefully demanded within and outside of the party.

[...]

[Addition to point 4 - page 5]

What are the crucial motives behind EH’s and GM’s use of the events in Poland for their plans in such an extraordinary manner?

1. They use them in order to make others forget the CPSU critique, ventured at EH by L.I. Brezhnev in the Crimea; they pretend to be super-revolutionaries, the initiators of the current consultation among the General Secretaries and First Secretaries of the fraternal parties in Moscow. At the same time, they think, they are countering the unsatisfactory Soviet incapacity to act in the Polish question.

Their extraordinary handling of the Polish events pursues the domestic goal of defeating all attempts to draw parallels between EH and Gierek.

2. EH and GM use the Polish events to allow GDR achievements to appear still more beautiful and brighter, as an example of the almost sole intact socialist system in the world.

3. Their extreme condemnation of the events in Poland strike at the Soviet Union, and in an indirect way, accuse the Soviet Union of being unable to keep the socialist states in its realm, unable any longer to strengthen their unity and unanimity.

[Source: *Personal papers; document obtained by Michael Kubina and translated by Bernhard Streitwieser.*]

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¹ The author would like to thank Bernhard Streitwieser for assistance with the translation.

² Information on an internal talk between Comrade Tichonov and Comrade Schürer. Recorded by Schürer for Honecker's attention: 21.3.1979, Bundesarchiv Berlin [BArch-Bln] DE 1-56257.

³ Not to be mistaken for his brother, Herbert Krolikowski, who at that time was serving as Undersecretary and First Deputy of the GDR Foreign Minister, as well as General Secretary of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries.

⁴ Hermann Weber, *Geschichte der DDR* (München: dtv, 1985), pp. 475 ff.

⁵ "The cadre-political changes", handwritten, 4 June 1984.

⁶ See "Schmeichelei und Unterwürfigkeit," Interview mit Sowjetbotschafter Wjatscheslaw Kotschemassow, in *Der Spiegel* 47 (16 November 1992), pp. 148-149; Vjaczeslav Koczemasov, *Meine letzte Mission. Botschafter der UdSSR in der DDR von 1983 bis 1990* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994), pp. 56 ff., 69 ff.

⁷ For legal reasons the source of these notes cannot be disclosed. Some of Krolikowski's notes, also without their source specified, have already been published; however, in these publications no differentiation was made between typewritten and handwritten sections. See Peter Przybylski: *Tatort Politbüro* (vol. 1): *Die Akte Honecker* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991) and (vol. 2): *Honecker, Mittag, Schalck-Golodkowski* (Berlin, Rowohlt, 1992). Przybylski served for 25 years as press spokesman of the GDR, chief public prosecutor, and as such presented the educational crime film series, "The public prosecutor takes the floor," on GDR TV. It is interesting to note that after reunification, Przybylski was accused of plagiarism by former co-workers at the "Institute for Marxism-Leninism" at the SED CC. To avoid criticism of the book before its publication, Przybylski's publisher decided to advertise the book under an anonymous author. Immediately after its publication, Hans Modrow, the last SED Prime Minister of the GDR, vainly tried to take legal action against the circulation of the book. Erich

Honecker, *Zu dramatischen Ereignissen* (Hamburg n.d.: Runge, 1992), pp. 65 ff. The Krolikowski notes, both those published by Przybylski as well as those quoted here, appear authentic.

⁸ See the introduction in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), esp. pp. 24 ff.; Jerzy Holzer, "Drohte Polen 1980/81 eine sowjetische Intervention? Zur Verkündung des Kriegsrechts in Polen am 13.12.1981," *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte* 1(1997), pp. 197-230; see also the outstanding contemporary analysis by Richard D. Anderson, "Soviet decision-making and Poland," *Problems of Communism* 2:25 (1982) pp. 22-36; and Mark Kramer, "Poland 1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-139.

⁹ See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Conference on Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 229-232.

¹⁰ See Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 20 ff., and Michael Kubina, "Honecker wäre einmarschiert. Die Rolle der SED-Führung während der Krise in Polen 1980/81," *Eicholz Brief: Zeitschrift zur politischen Bildung* 2 (1996), pp. 40-47.

¹¹ See Holzer, "Sowjetische Intervention?" pp. 201 ff.; also Armin Mitter, "Ein Hauch von Freiheit. Akten der SED-Führung zur Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 August 1995.

¹² Jerzy Holzer, "Stan wojenny: dla Polski czy dla socjalizmu?" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 June 1994, pp. 19-21, here p. 20. Holzer's argument here, among other things, is based on a falsely dated document, which, he quotes without marking his omissions. He incorrectly dates minutes of two talks between the CC Secretaries, Joachim Herrmann and M.V. Zimyanin, respectively, at the end of November, as occurring immediately before the crisis summit in Moscow on 5 December 1980, when in fact the talks took place at the end of October, a whole month earlier. See the discussion in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 96 ff.

¹³ Julij A. Kvicinskij, *Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten*. (o.O. [Berlin] Siedler, o.J. [1993]), p. 262. Günter Mittag, *Um jeden Preis. Im Spannungsfeld zweier Systeme* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1991), pp. 35 ff.

Cold War International History Project Internships Available

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is currently seeking interns for the spring and summer 1999. Interns at the CWIHP will be at the forefront of the debate and research over the historiography of the Cold War and will gain valuable knowledge from interaction with Woodrow Wilson Center Fellows as well as visiting scholars. Interns are requested to have a high level of motivation; knowledge of a foreign language is desirable, but not required. Interns at the Project will assist with archival and library research, editing document manuscripts, publishing, translation, the dissemination of CWIHP bulletins and working papers, coordination of scholarly conferences, CWIHP web page maintenance and answering various information requests.

Applicants should send a resume and statement of interest to Nancy L. Meyers, the CWIHP Project Administrator.

¹⁴ See Monika Tantzsch, "'Was in Polen geschieht, ist für die DDR eine Lebensfrage!'"—Das MfS und die polnische Krise 1980/81," *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland" (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages)*, Deutscher Bundestag, vol. V/3: *Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), pp. 2601-2760, here p. 2616 ff.

¹⁵ "Information on the Situation in Poland," Militärisches Zwischenarchiv im Bundesarchiv (MZA-BArch) Strb AZN 28895, ll. 5-10. These files of the former Military Archive in Potsdam are now available in the Military Archive in Freiburg/Br. See, e.g. "Information on the Situation in Poland," 20 August 1980, MZA Strb AZN 28895, ll. 11-14.

¹⁶ For an analysis of the attitude of GDR workers toward the events in Poland see Burkhard Olschowsky, *Die Haltung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands und der DDR-Gesellschaft gegenüber den Ereignissen in Polen in den Jahren 1980-1983* Magisterarbeit (Ms.), Berlin, April 1997, pp. 53 ff.; and Olschowsky, "Die Haltung der Berliner Arbeitnehmer zu den Ereignissen in Polen 1980/81," in *Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat*, No. 6, to be published in Summer 1998.

¹⁷ See Kubina and Wilke, eds., *SED contra Polen*, pp. 17 ff.

¹⁸ See Krolikowski's note documented in the annex "Comment on the report of the PB to the 13th plenum of the SED CC, which was prepared and submitted by Guenther Mittag," handwritten, 5 December 1980; his "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13th November, 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980, also Przybylski vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

¹⁹ On the CC plenum on 11-12 December 1980 and the politburo report, see Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 126-134.

²⁰ Krolikowski, "The lessons for the X. Party Congress of the SED," handwritten, 12 November 1980.

²¹ Krolikowski, "On the relationship between EH und GM," handwritten, 12 November 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²² Krolikowski, "On the relationship between EH und GM," handwritten, 12 November 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²³ On the attitude of Stoph and Mielke toward Honecker see, "Byl li Chonekker igrushkoy v rukach Moskvyy," interview by Sergej Guky with Yury Andropov, *Izvestia*, 11 August 1992, p. 6; "Wir wechselten zum Du," *Der Spiegel*, 17, August 1992, pp. 20-22. According to Abrasimov, Mielke in Moscow often "dumped on him," whereby Honecker is to have been completely unsuspecting of Mielke's double role.

²⁴ P.A. Abrasimov was Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin from 1975 until 1983.

²⁵ See "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13th November 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²⁶ Mielke is talking here about Honecker's so-called "Gera Demands." After the SPD-FDP coalition in West Germany had won the elections, Honecker demanded that the FRG clear up some fundamental questions with the GDR before talks could resume on "humanitarian improvements." For further information, see the literature cited in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 11 (fn. 10).

²⁷ "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13 November 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980,

also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²⁸ Tisch is not expressing himself here in a grammatically correct way, and this particular sentence, as it is in the source, is confusing. From the context, however, follows quite clearly what he wanted to say. The passage has been translated to reflect what he meant to say. The German original reads as follows: "... und wo Honecker um die Vollmacht gebeten hat, alle Schritte einzuleiten, daß da nichts passieren kann, ohne daß er das Politbüro noch mal fragen muß."

²⁹ Interview with Harry Tisch for the TV documentary *That was the GDR—a history of the other Germany*, broadcast on 3 October 1993 by German television (ARD). The quoted passage can be found in the book which was published under the same title by Wolfgang Kenntemich, Manfred Durniok, and Thomas Karlan (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1993). The omission in the quotation is in the source. Despite permission from the broadcasting corporation, MDR, to see the complete interview with Harry Tisch, Manfred Durniok, whose film company produced the documentary on behalf of the MDR, rejected the author's request to view the entire interview, "because we made the interviews with the contemporary witnesses only for the MDR." Letter to the author, 29 August 1996.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

³¹ See politburo minutes No. 48/80 of the extraordinary session from 28 November 1980 in Strausberg, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 123 ff.

³² *Editor's note*: On this day in 1956, all units of the National People's Army declared their combat readiness.

³³ Honecker to Brezhnev, 26 November 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 122 ff.; for an English translation, see *Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5* (Spring 1995), p. 127.

³⁴ See politburo minutes No. 48/80 of the extraordinary session of 28 November 1980, in Strausberg, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 123 f.

³⁵ See "'Es war eine sowjetische Intervention.' Oberst a.D. Wolfgang Wünsche zur militärischen Erdrosselung des Prager Reformkurses 1968," interview with Karlen Vesper in *Neues Deutschland*, 21 August 1995, p. 12.

³⁶ See Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 17-31.

³⁷ See politburo minutes No. 49/80 of the session from 2 December 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 138 ff.

³⁸ See stenographic record of the meeting of leading representatives of Warsaw Pact states in Moscow on 5 December 1980 in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 140-195; for Honecker's speech see pp. 166-171. For an English translation, see this issue of the *Bulletin* (below).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-178.

⁴⁰ "Commentary," handwritten, 16 December 80, also in Przybylski, vol. 1, pp. 340-344.

⁴¹ See politburo minutes No. 50/80 of the session of 9 December 1980, in Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin G. Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, und Hans-Peter Mueller, eds., *SED-Politbüro und polnische Krise 1980-82. Aus den Protokollen des Politbüros des ZK der SED zu Polen, den innerdeutschen Beziehungen und der Wirtschaftskrise der DDR, vol. I: 1980*, Berlin, January 1993 (Arbeitspapiere des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat No. 3/1993), p. 533.

Bulgaria and the Political Crises in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980/81)

By Jordan Baev

In recent years, new evidence has come to light from Bulgarian archives concerning the position of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and state leadership on the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980/81.¹

Bulgaria and the Prague Spring

In the fall 1993 issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*, Mark Kramer presented hypotheses on the role Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov played in the suppression of the “Prague Spring.”² The documents kept in the former BCP Central Committee (CC) archive clarify this matter unambiguously and definitely discredit the statements made by Živkov in his memoirs thirty years later, claiming that he had opposed the August 1968 Soviet invasion and had been sympathetic to the reform efforts.³ We now also have at our disposal clear evidence of the Bulgarian leadership’s attitude toward the Polish crisis of 1980/1981, which was presented at the Jachranka conference on “Poland 1980-82: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions” (in November 1997). Less information is available, however, concerning the Bulgarian society’s reaction to the political crises in the two East-European countries as well as to Bulgarian military participation in the Warsaw Pact “Danube ‘68” operation against Czechoslovakia.

In February 1968, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the February 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact leaders met in Prague. In the speeches delivered by the attending heads-of-state there was no hint whatsoever of any discord. The Bulgarian leader, Zhivkov, declared “full unity” with the “expert and wise” leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) and stated: “Between us there have never been and there are not any matters of difference.”⁴ A session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee took place ten days later, on 6-7 March 1968, in Sofia. The official communiqué regarding the “open exchange of opinions” did not even mention Czechoslovakia. Nor did it appear in the text of the declaration made at the joint session of the BCP CC and the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) Council of Ministers which heard a report by first Deputy Prime Minister Živko about the PCC session in Sofia. In another, confidential report however, Živkov said: “During the session of the Political [Consultative] Committee of the Warsaw Pact we decided to share with the Soviet comrades our anxiety over the events in Czechoslovakia... We categorically declared to Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev and Comrade [Alexei] Kosygin that we had to be prepared to

put our armies in action.” The statement of Zhivkov is indirectly confirmed by documents from the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) archives in Moscow. At a CPSU CC Plenum on 21 March 1968 dedicated to the situation in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev remarked: “In Sofia and afterwards Com[rades] Živkov, [Polish Leader Władysław] Gomułka, [and Hungarian leader János] Kádár addressed us with requests to undertake some steps for regulation of the situation in Czechoslovakia.” Consequently, it was decided to convene a meeting of Soviet, East German, Polish, and Hungarian representatives with the Czechoslovak leadership in Dresden [on 23 March 1968]. At Živkov’s explicit insistence, a Bulgarian delegation was invited to take part in the meeting, too.⁵ Expressions such as the following are typical of those delivered to the BCP CC Politburo regarding the Dresden discussions: “The attention of the Czechoslovak comrades has been drawn to the necessity of looking more closely at their people, at those whose heads are not quite in order. . . so that the incipient counter-revolution will be cut down...” Should the Czechoslovak leadership fail to undertake the necessary measures for “smashing counterrevolutionary acts,” the remaining Warsaw Pact countries would not be able “to remain indifferent since they have bonds of unity with Czechoslovakia as well as common interests, and they cannot permit a counterrevolution in the heart of Europe.”⁶ At a special BCP CC Plenum on 29 March 1968, CC Secretary Stanko Todorov, delivered a detailed report (55 pages) on the Dresden meeting which lasted for 11 hours.⁷

The line marked out in BCP CC Politburo’s decision gives a perfectly clear idea of the direction which the reports of the Bulgarian Embassy in Prague were to follow and the way in which the Bulgarian mass media portrayed the Czechoslovak events. While previous reports of Rayko Nikolov, Political Counselor at the Bulgarian Embassy, attempted to analyze the “interesting processes” taking place in Czechoslovakia, the reports of Ambassador Stoyan Nedelchev after March 1968 put forward the idea of a “creeping counterrevolution” which was in full harmony with Sofia’s views. On June 30, Nedelchev sent a report couched in dark terms stating that the internal political crisis in Czechoslovakia could develop into an irrevocable process which would bring about important consequences unfavorable to “socialism” if “sound forces” in the CPCz did not immediately intervene.⁸

Todor Živkov headed the Bulgarian delegation at the meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Bulgaria, East

Germany, Poland and Hungary on 14-15 July 1968 in Warsaw. Several influential BCP Politburo members—Stanko Todorov, Boris Velchev, and Pencho Kubadinsky—also attended. In the letter to the CPCz CC adopted by the five parties at the meeting, the Brezhnev Doctrine's postulates of "limited sovereignty" of members of the Socialist Commonwealth were outlined.

After the Bulgarian delegation returned from Warsaw the BCP CC Politburo discussed the situation on July 16.⁹ At a special Party Plenum, Stanko Todorov delivered a detailed informational report on the results of the Warsaw meeting. Its content completely undermines later claims made in the West¹⁰ that Bulgaria took a special position against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. In compliance with the plenum's resolutions the Bulgarian press opened a "campaign of clarification" of the situation in Czechoslovakia in the spirit of the five Warsaw Pact Parties' letter. This activity provoked an official protest on the Czechoslovak side, expressed at the meeting of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiří Hájek with the Bulgarian Ambassador Nedelchev on 27 July 1968.¹¹

At 1 a.m. on August 21 the armed forces of the five Warsaw Pact countries taking part in Operation "Danube '68" entered Czechoslovak territory. Bulgarian participation consisted of military formations of two regiments of the Third Army numbering 2,164 troops. (The size of the Bulgarian contingent, compared with that of other Warsaw Pact forces sent into Czechoslovakia, shows that Bulgarian participation in the operation was mainly symbolic.) As early as mid-July the Bulgarian forces that were to take part in the Warsaw Pact military action were installed in field camps and started intensive military and psychological preparation. They trained in strict isolation from the civil population in order to preserve military secrecy. After a written battle order for "participation in a military exercise" on Soviet territory, on July 21 the formations of 12th "Elhovskiy" regiment under the command of Col. Alexander Genchev were transported to USSR by sea, where, according to the order, they came under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Odessa Military District. From there, they were transferred in mid-August to a location near Uzhgorod, close to the Soviet-Slovak border. On August 21 in accelerated battle march, the Elhovo regiment formations reached (via Košice) their assigned regions of Slovakia (Banska Bistrica, Zvolen, Brezno). Formations of the 22nd Harmanli regiment under the command of Col. Ivan Chavdarov were transported by air to Prague, in order to guard Czechoslovakia's primary airport, Ruzyně.

During their stay in Czechoslovakia, the Bulgarian military units did not participate directly in any military actions. The entire time they were on Czechoslovak territory (August 21—October 23) they were under direct Soviet command. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian soldiers also felt the hostility of Czechoslovak citizens who opposed the foreign military intervention on their territory. The field diaries of the Bulgarian military formations reported a

number of incidents during their two-month stay on Czechoslovak territory. In the only existing Bulgarian study on this matter, Maj. Gen. Dimiter Naidenov mentioned some of the armed incidents: "On August 22nd at 01.55 A.M. positions of two of our formations were fired on. Around 02.40 A.M. two shots were [fired] over the company of Captain Gochkov, and around 02.44 A.M. there was shooting at the battle row of Captain Valkov's company originating from nearby buildings. On August 24th by 01.07 A.M. an intensive round of firing from automatic guns towards Officer Sabi Dimitrov's formation was noted." At the end of August the Bulgarian newspapers published an account entitled, "A sentry at Ruzyně," in which it was stated: "On the night of August 26th to 27th shots were fired toward the position of Warrant-Officer Vassilev from the near-by houses...."¹²

There is no information on the participation of Bulgarian soldiers in military actions against Czechoslovak citizens, and Bulgarian military units in Czechoslovakia suffered only one casualty. On the evening of 9 September 1968, in a Prague suburb, Junior-Sergeant Nikolay Nikolov was kidnapped and shot with three bullets from a 7.65 mm gun.

During the "Prague Spring" and after the intervention of the five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, there were isolated acts of protest among Bulgarian intellectuals. Three History Department students at the University of Sofia were arrested and sentenced to varying prison terms; several of their professors were expelled from the Communist Party.¹³ The State Security services carefully observed any reactions among Czechoslovak youth vacationing in the Bulgarian Black Sea resorts at the time of the invasion.

The Bulgarian Embassy in Prague and General Consulate in Bratislava documented numerous protests of different strata of Czechoslovak society against the armed intervention. In the various reports from Czechoslovakia, opinions were quoted regarding the "great mistake" made by the Warsaw Pact countries, who with their action, had "hurt the feelings of national dignity of Czechs and Slovaks." Prior to the invasion, Gen. Koday, Commandant of the East Czechoslovak Military District, had supported a hard-line position, often stating that more decisive actions were required against the "anti-socialist forces." Yet, early in November 1968, Gen. Koday admitted to Stefan Velikov, Bulgarian General Consul in Bratislava: "The shock was too great." He told about the offense he suffered on the night of August 21st: "He was nearly arrested, his headquarters were surrounded and machine-guns rushed into his office." The Czechoslovak military leader underlined several times during the confidential talks there had been no need to send Warsaw Pact regiments. The Commander of the Bratislava Garrison backed this opinion, saying that "our countries have lost a lot with the invasion."¹⁴

The Bulgarian authorities, however, were explicit and unanimous in their statements concerning the necessity of

their actions which had saved the Czechoslovak people from a “counterrevolution” and had prevented an inevitable Western intervention. They firmly maintained this position in front of representatives of Western Communist Parties who had opposed the military action in Czechoslovakia as well. During the extremely controversial and long discussions with the head of the International Department of the Italian Communist Party, Carlo Galuzi, on 16 September 1968, the BCP leaders repeated many times: “We do not consider that our interference was a mistake. We believe that by our intervention undertaken in a timely manner, we terminated the dangerous process of counterrevolution which could have only ended with a victory of the counterrevolution and in no other way... That could have been a dreadful flaw in the defense of the Socialist camp in Europe...”¹⁵ Five years later Zhivkov maintained the same view in his talks with Italian CP leader Enrico Berlinguer.

The position of the Bulgarian Party and State leadership regarding the 1980-81 Polish Crisis

Until the beginning of August 1980 no particular concern with the Polish crisis was shown in Bulgaria, though reports of public discontent and incipient upheaval had begun circulating. On the eve of Bulgarian Prime Minister Stanko Todorov’s visit to Poland in July 1980 the usual memos and references were prepared, one of which stated: “The dissidents are now in fact an insignificant group of people isolated from society, they have lost their public influence, are people disunited from inward struggles... The people are in a state of sound moral and political unity... Poland is a strong socialist unit...” After his official visit on July 14-15, Todorov, in a report to the BCP CC Politburo, declared: “I believe that the Party and State leadership in Poland, with regard to their current economic problems, are approaching the complicated problems with a sense of realism and are taking active steps to overcome them, taking into consideration the working people’s feelings.”¹⁶ One would hardly assume that in such confidential documents propaganda clichés would be deliberately used in place of a real evaluation. Obviously, at the time Bulgarian ruling circles did not realize the real social and political situation in Poland. In August - September 1980, however, the Embassy in Warsaw sent several informational reports on the changes in the situation and the formation of the political opposition to the Communist regime. No doubt, such news should have reached Sofia from Moscow as well.

On 15 September 1980, Todor Živkov received Politburo member Kazimierz Barcikowski who was sent to Sofia to inform the Bulgarian leaders of the situation in his country. During that conversation, Živkov said: “We do not dramatize the events in Poland but they require all the socialist countries to draw certain conclusions for themselves, too.” He added that the Bulgarian leadership would “follow the development of the matters in Poland” and concluded: “We, the Socialist countries, work in a

hostile environment and we have to admit that our enemies won certain points. Your case, one could say, is a link in the chain of the total imperialistic offensive against us...”¹⁷ Soon after the meeting, Živkov prepared a special memo on the matter, and the Polish situation was discussed at two Politburo sessions, on October 21 and 25. Živkov also maintained the hard line of an “offensive against the anti-socialist forces” at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders on 5 December 1980 in Moscow. Following instructions, the State Security structures became more active in their “preventive” measures and in their periodic analyses of the Polish crisis which laid particular stress on its influence in Bulgaria.

In the first half of 1981, nearly all information coming from the Bulgarian Embassy in Warsaw referred to the development of the political crisis. In a memo regarding bilateral Bulgarian-Polish relations in May 1981, Mariy Ivanov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated to the BCP CC: “In the last ten months relations between the mass trade unions, youth, women’s and other public organizations [in both countries] have practically been cut off...”¹⁸ In a report to the Foreign Ministry, the Bulgarian ambassador in Poland, Ivan Nedev, related the reaction of a high ranking Polish army officer: “[We will put up with] anything rather than Soviet-style socialism!”¹⁹

The review of the political and diplomatic documents on the Polish crisis, compared to other important archival sources as well, prompts the following conclusions:

Though publicly not as active as his Czechoslovak and East German colleagues Gustáv Husák and Erich Honecker, the Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov was another firm supporter of the hard line of “decisive struggle” against the “counterrevolution” and the “anti-socialist forces” in Poland. In the spirit of the times, the expert evaluation and the diplomatic analyses usually accorded with Živkov’s and his entourage’s attitudes. The position of Foreign Minister Peter Mladenov, who often backed Živkov’s opinions, did not stray much. The Bulgarian leadership’s reaction demonstrated the unwillingness and incapability of the administration to draw even most general conclusions from the Polish events and to undertake political reforms even to the slightest degree.

As in previous decades, the development of the latest internal political crisis in the East European countries failed to provoke Bulgarian leaders to reconsider prevailing conceptions and attitudes, a rethinking which might have contributed to a transformation and modernization of the existing political regime. On the contrary, those crises induced a “hardening” of the Kremlin and East European rulers’ positions. Just as in the case of the 1956 and 1968 events, after those in Poland in 1980-1981 led to increased bitterness in Bulgarian party politics, resulting, e.g. in the dismissal of well-known figures in political and cultural circles, such as Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. This line of behavior fit very well with the general pattern of confrontation between Moscow and Washington in the early 1980s. At the same time, however it exposed an important feature of the

Bulgarian regime: its lack of adaptive mechanisms for overcoming the contradictions and crisis in the political elite under existing circumstances of a dictatorial personal rule. That, together with the no less important outside factors, such as U.S. policy, predetermined the unavoidable collapse of the system at the end of the decade without any choice of alternative paths.

¹ The author has also contributed newly declassified Bulgarian documents on the 1956 events in Hungary to the forthcoming National Security Archive reader on the crisis. I am grateful to Georgi Chernev, Chief of the Central State Archive; Avgustina Daskalova, Chief of the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Serafim Stoykov, Chief of the Archive of the Ministry of the Interior; and Danail Danailov, Division Head at the same archive, for their assistance in getting access to some confidential records. I would like to stress in particular that for the first time diplomatic and State Security confidential documents of the period are declassified especially for the *CWIHP Bulletin* and *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.

² Mark Kramer, "The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: New Interpretations (part 2)," *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 4-6.

³ T. Zhivkov, *Memoirs* (Sofia 1997) [in Bulgarian].

⁴ *Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Documents*, vol. II (Sofia, 1971), p. 422 (in Bulgarian).

⁵ R. Pichoya, "Czechoslovakia 1968: Vzgliad iz Moskvi. Po dokumentam CC CPSU," *Novaja I noveishaja istorija* No. 6 (1994), p. 11.

⁶ Central State Archive [CDA], Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 35, A. E. [File] 127, List 6-13.

⁷ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 58, A. E. 4, l. 2-57.

⁸ Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DA MVNR), Sofia, Opis 24-P, A. E. 2988.

⁹ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 35, A. E. 255, l. 1-2.

¹⁰ RFE Report, Open Society Archives, Budapest, Fond 300, Subfond 20, Folder 1, Box 89.

¹¹ DA MVNR, Opis 24-P, A. E. 3020, l. 202-203. Hájek delivered also a letter from Czechoslovak Prime Minister Černík to Zhivkov regarding the additional measures taken with respect to the protection of the State border with West Germany.

¹² Main Political Department of Bulgarian People's Army. Classified. For official use only. Major-General D. Naidenov, *Internationalism in action: Socio-political and military-historic analysis on the struggle against the counterrevolution in CSSR-1968* (Sofia 1979), pp. 102, 117 (In Bulgarian).

¹³ *Homo Bohemicus* No. 3, (1994). One of the mentioned students, Valentin Radev, was a friend of mine. He was in jail for 18 months and later worked at the National History Museum in Sofia. He died from a heart attack at age 48 in 1995.

¹⁴ DA MVNR, Opis 24-P, A. E. 2987, l. 58-64.

¹⁵ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 60, A. E. 11, l. 1-39.

¹⁶ DA MVNR, Opis 36, A. E. 2308, l. 37-40.

¹⁷ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 60, A. E. 272, l. 1-20.

¹⁸ DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2137, l. 7.

¹⁹ DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2192, l. 2-4.

Record of the Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Communist, Sofia, 29 March 1968 [excerpt]

TODOR ŽHIVKOV:¹ [...] The discussions have shown that no concluding speech is needed as it has turned out we are unanimous with regard to the evaluation of the situation in Czechoslovakia made by the fraternal [Communist] parties in Dresden [on 23 March 1968]. Let us hope that no extreme steps will be required but if the worst comes to worst we will use our armies.

MISHO MISHEV:² In what state is the Czechoslovak army?

ŽIVKO ŽIVKOV:³ It is in state of ineffectiveness.

TODOR ŽIVKOV: The situation is extremely difficult. What is the state of Politburo? The forces backing the Soviet Union and our policy are all now nearly driven out of the Politburo. You have the [Oldřich] Černík's statement. He is behind all this. Now, he is supposed to become the next prime minister. Other vacillating persons have been admitted to the leadership as well. [Alexander] Dubček himself has neither the experience nor the intellectual capacity and willpower to take the leadership of the party into his own hands. One can only hope that there will be forces in the Presidium and the Central Committee capable of moving things ahead firmly. The situation there is much more difficult than the one we had to face after the April Plenary Session⁴ here. Here, too, the situation could have turned very difficult but we immediately thought and found the support of our party members, our working class, of the sound forces within our intellectual circles. In our country the blow aimed at the army's leadership. It was repeated at the meeting of the Central Committee that those were [Stepan] Chervenkov's people, the DC [State Security] institutions were attacked. What did we do? We gave credit to the leaderships of the Army and the DC, we mobilized the Party's resources and the situation was saved. That is the thing they ought to do now in Czechoslovakia. Let us hope that inner strength can be found there to carry this out. If this is not done, the situation will get even more complicated. We should openly inform our party that there is a counterrevolutionary situation there. They are not yet out in the streets with arms but who can guarantee they will not do that tomorrow? It is quite possible that the counterrevolution could take a temporary hold and stabilize gradually. They have drawn their conclusions from the events in Hungary.

What does the present leadership have under its control? Nothing. It has no control over the army; it is demoralized, ineffective. They keep calling sessions, meetings, vote on resolutions to oust this or that person from his post in the army. The trade unions, the organized force of the working class, are crushed. Their official newspaper has turned into hotbed of the counterrevolution. The editorial staff of *Rude Pravo* is not under the Party's control. What does that mean? You do understand that the Dresden meeting was not called for

nothing. Obviously, one could not be fully open in front of the Czechoslovak comrades, but the situation is extremely grave.

During the sessions of the Political [Consultative] Committee of the Warsaw Pact [in Sofia], we decided to share with our Soviet comrades our anxiety over the events in Czechoslovakia. I had a special meeting with Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev and Comrade [Alexei] Kosygin at which I expressed our concern with the situation, pointing out that we must do all we can, including taking even the ultimate risk, but we cannot permit counterrevolution to go into full swing in Czechoslovakia and to lose that country as a consequence. What is Czechoslovakia's significance? Czechoslovakia is in the middle of the socialist bloc; it is a state of relatively great importance in the socialist system, both politically and economically. We categorically declared to Comrade Brezhnev and Comrade Kosygin that we were prepared to mobilize our armies. We should act even with our cause at stake. Events confirm our assessment [of the situation]. We are very happy that the Soviet comrades took the initiative of calling the Dresden meeting. Let us hope that it will help. The most recent facts, though, do not show any reversal [of the situation]. They have postponed the debate on the program to Monday. We have no information about this program, what its appeal will be what it will aim at, whether it might or might not be a signal to activate the counterrevolution. At the Dresden meeting we were informed that the counterrevolutionaries had prepared a manifesto to the people and would make it public at the right time. Western intelligence services are operating there. As in Poland, Zionism plays an important role there. However, comrades, we should consider another aspect of this matter. The Yugoslav leadership has a part in these events too. They have been trying to use Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia to create their own coalition within our family. There is no need for us to use the Stalinist methods of the past but we are obligated to take measures to introduce order in Czechoslovakia as well as in Romania. Afterwards we will introduce order in Yugoslavia, too.

VOICES: Right [applause].

TODOR ŽIVKOV: The West will make use of this. We will be criticized but we will strengthen our position in the international Communist movement, we shall turn the correlation of forces in our favor.

What is the line followed by the Yugoslav leadership? Counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet! What is the line followed by the Romanian leadership? Counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet! In whose favor is such a political line? Who permits the heads of the Romanian leadership to play with the fate of the Romanian working class, with the interests of our system, which has been struggling for so many years? Who has permitted them that, who has given them such right?! If we allow all this we will bear great responsibility for our cause and fate before our generation. Indeed, we realize that nothing rash should be done but we must act. We are a revolutionary

organization which use revolutionary forces, our methods coincide with the interests of our cause. [...]

[Source: Central State Archive (CDA), fond 1-B, opis 58, a. e. 4, l. 96-99. Obtained by Jordan Baev.]

¹ Bulgarian party chief and prime minister.

² Member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP).

³ Member of Politburo CC BCP, First Deputy Prime Minister.

⁴ In 2-6 April 1956, a Plenum of the CC BCP removed former pro-Stalinist leader Chervenkov and strengthened Živkov's own position in the Party leadership.

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**Memorandum of Conversation between Bulgarian
foreign Minister P. Mladenov and Polish ambassador Vl.
Naperaj, 6 October 1981**

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

C-54-00-26/7.X.81

M E M O

On October 6th this year the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, P. Mladenov received at his request Vl. Naperaj, Polish Ambassador to this country.

1. The Ambassador confirmed that the visit of Stanisław Kania in our country would be held on October 15 as had been agreed so long as no extraordinary events occurred in Poland on that date. Stanisław Kania's flight is to arrive in Sofia at 10:00 a.m. and to fly back to Warsaw between 8 and 9 p.m. Stanisław Kania will be accompanied by 1-2 assistants only and it is possible that the talks will be held *tête a tête*. [...]

2. [Information regarding the celebration of the 1300th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bulgarian state on October 29]

3. The Ambassador expressed his view of the situation in Poland. He believed it had become more complicated. Their expectations that the second stage of the Solidarity Congress would change the line of aggressive behavior, adopted during the first stage, after the declaration by the Politburo of the Central Committee and the government of the P[olish] P[eople's] R[epublic], were not justified. The draft program and the resolutions voted, and especially that for referendum on the laws passed by the Sejm regarding self-government and the state enterprises, with the purpose to change them, strained the situation again, as did the negative reaction of the Congress to the decision of the government to increase the prices of cigarettes and tobacco products.

According to Naperaj confrontation is unavoidable. The issue "who gets the better of whom" is now being

resolved. The extremists and the Western saboteurs are staging new provocations—prisons are broken open, strikes or preparations for strikes are declared, state orders are boycotted, anti-socialist and anti-Soviet literature, pamphlets and leaflets are distributed, the union of the PPR with the Soviet Union is under attack, they demonstrate openly their aspiration to take over power. Urgent actions are, therefore, required. The army, the militia and the Party activists have been put on the alert, ready for action. It is quite possible all this might bring about the introduction of martial law. If this point is reached, all public organizations with the exception of the PUWP, UAP and DP are to be banned, and about 20,000 people will be detained. Solidarity might respond with strikes but the situation is different now—Solidarity is no longer as popular as it used to be. A lot of people have realized what position the country has been driven to as a result of the strikes, and appeals to go on strike will not again evoke an unanimous response.

Naperaj underlined that the Party held the key for solving the crisis. He expressed his admiration of the enormous achievements of our country after the April Plenum of the BCPCC in 1956, resulting from the right policy of our Party. These achievements can be seen in industry, agriculture and in the markets. In their country [Poland], the errors in Party policy brought about the events in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976. The present critical situation is due to their Party's loss of prestige due to its inability to draw the right conclusions from those events. The enemy now lays all fault at the communists' door. Therefore, the main task now is to strengthen the party and its reputation. Discussions were carried out with Communists, members of the Solidarity, and with members of Solidarity elected to the leading bodies of the PUWP in an attempt to persuade them to differ from the resolutions of the Gdansk Congress.

Naperaj underlined the difficult market situation. This year they produced 2.5 million tons grain more [than last year] but the state was able to buy only 50% of the quantity it had bought at the same time last year. The peasants, under the influence of Solidarity, refuse to sell meat, grains and other food products to the government, selling them instead on the black market for profit.

According to Naperaj, they are no longer in a position to make any more concessions. If the reactionary forces come to power, they will deal cruelly with the communists. In his speech delivered in Krakow, Bogdan Lis declared that all communists had to be hanged. Naperaj expected that Stanisław Kania would tell Com. T. Zhivkov about the situation in their country in full.

Com. P. Mladenov said that we were very much concerned with the development of the events in PPR. Poland is heading for an extremely difficult time. The issue "who will win" is being contested, the fate of Poland is at stake. This requires urgent and resolute actions. Any

further compromise will result in yielding power and the annihilation of the Communists. The counterrevolution will not miss the chance for savage reprisals. Lists of those who are to be physically destroyed have probably already been made up. It is known from experience that counterrevolution is very much the same everywhere. In Poland it is not any better than it was in Hungary in 1956. If steps for its suppression are not taken now, it might be too late later, especially when the newly recruited conscripts enter the army. A delay in delivering a blow [against the counterrevolution] will result in loss of power and the restoration of capitalism. It should be clear that if new elections were to be held, anti-socialist forces would take power.

Com. Mladenov drew attention to the fact that the West's speculations on a Soviet intervention in Poland were discontinued. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be indifferent towards the future developments in Poland, and Poland cannot go ahead without Soviet deliveries of petrol, gas, ores and other raw materials, [in short] without the comprehensive Soviet aid. That is why the Polish comrades must undertake the necessary steps for defeating the counter-revolution themselves, and the sooner it is done, the less bloodshed there will be. They should not fear strikes. If strikes are declared they will last a week or two, and then will be given up. This is not the worst that could be.

Comrade Mladenov told Naperaj that Com. Zhivkov will openly express our position on the events in PPR to Stanisław Kania.

Georgi Georgiev, deputy-chief of the Second Department [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was present on the meeting.

Sofia, 7 Oct[ober] 1981

signature: (illegible)

[Source: DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2192, l. 180-184. Obtained and translated by Jordan Baev.]

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“In Case Military Assistance Is Provided To Poland:” Soviet Preparations for Military Contingencies, August 1980

Introduction and translation by Mark Kramer

The strikes and unrest that engulfed Poland in July and August 1980, culminating in the formation of a “free, self-governing trade union, Solidarity,” sparked great concern among Soviet leaders. On 25 August 1980, the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) secretly established a special Commission on Poland under the supervision of Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat.¹ One of the first actions taken by the Suslov Commission (as it was known informally) was the drafting of a one-page memorandum and a Politburo resolution that authorized the Soviet defense ministry to prepare for the mobilization of “up to 100,000 military reservists and 15,000 vehicles, [which] would have to be requisitioned from the national economy.” The rationale for this step, according to the Commission, was to ensure that a large “group of [Soviet] forces” would be at “full combat readiness . . . in case military assistance is provided to the Polish People’s Republic.”

The Suslov Commission’s memorandum and the draft Politburo resolution were given the classification of “Top Secret/Special Dossier,” which meant that the documents later on were stored in a highly secure part of the Politburo Archive. (In 1991 the Politburo Archive was transferred to the newly-formed Presidential Archive.) A photocopy of the Commission’s memorandum was obtained in 1993 by the late Russian military historian Dmitrii Volkogonov, whose family generously provided me with a copy. Unfortunately, the draft resolution was not included with the photocopy. If the draft resolution merely affirmed the content of the memorandum, the omission of it is not significant. But it is possible that the resolution, which evidently was two pages long, also provided a more specific timetable for the second stage of the mobilization.² Although the memorandum is extremely interesting in itself, one can only hope that the Russian Presidential Archive (which has full jurisdiction over its own holdings) will agree to release the draft resolution.

A sizable number of words and phrases in the translation are underlined. The underlining corresponds to blank portions of the typewritten text that were filled in by hand in the original document. This manner of composition was a standard practice used by Soviet leaders when they were dealing with highly classified and delicate matters.³ In some cases, the leaders themselves wrote out the documents (often in nearly illegible handwriting), but in other cases they relied on senior policy advisers or clerical staff. The handwriting on this memorandum appears to have been done by a clerical aide, who wrote neatly and clearly.

The Commission’s memorandum was signed by Suslov and four other senior members of the body: the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko; the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov; the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov; and the head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin Chernenko. All were full members of the CPSU Politburo. Although only Suslov and Chernenko belonged to both the Politburo and the Secretariat, the other three wielded nearly as great authority, especially on questions of foreign policy and national security. The five men together constituted a core decision-making group (a sub-group of the Politburo) throughout the Polish crisis. The appearance of their signatures on this memorandum, and the special classification it was given, reflect the extraordinary importance attached to the document.

Even before this operational directive was declassified, there was abundant evidence that the Soviet Union made extensive preparations and drafted elaborate plans for military intervention in Poland in 1980-81. U.S. intelligence sources, both technical and human, picked up an enormous amount at the time about these preparations. (Most of that intelligence, unfortunately, is still classified, but some fascinating items have been released through Freedom of Information Act requests and first-hand accounts by retired U.S. and Polish officials.) Some aspects of Soviet preparations were conveyed in 1980-81 by U.S. officials to Western journalists covering the Polish crisis.⁴ Among topics widely reported in the Western press were the establishment of an integrated Warsaw Pact communications network, joint exercises by Soviet and East European troops, and practice landings by Soviet military units on the Lithuanian and Polish coasts. All these measures would have been of great use if Soviet troops had been called into action.

Declassified East-bloc documents and new first-hand accounts by former Soviet and East European officials have confirmed that extensive planning for military operations in Poland took place and that these plans were thoroughly tested. Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact’s Joint Armed Forces from 1976 to 1988, who was deeply involved in Soviet military planning vis-à-vis Poland, wrote in 1992:

Was there a viable plan to send allied troops into Poland? Yes, there was such a plan. What is more, reconnaissance of entry routes and of concentration points for allied forces was carried out with the active participation of Polish officials. . . . Recently, the view has been put forth that if martial law had not

been introduced in Poland on 13 December 1981, allied troops would have entered Poland. Let me emphasize that there were indeed such plans, and the Polish state and military leadership knew about them. But there was not, and could not have been, any final decision on whether to send in troops . . .⁵

Gribkov would have had no incentive to acknowledge the existence of these plans unless his motivation was simply to tell the truth. As a former high-ranking Soviet military officer who takes great pride in his many years of service, Gribkov might have been expected to deny that any plans for a Soviet invasion of Poland were ever drafted. His willingness to admit that full-fledged plans did exist lends a great deal of credibility to his account. Moreover, his remarks are borne out by a large number of newly declassified documents, including East German and Warsaw Pact maps, military charts, and mobilization orders that show entry routes into Poland and the specific allied units that were slated to take part in joint military operations.⁶ Even though a large number of crucial items in the former East-bloc archives (especially the Russian archives) are still off-limits, all evidence to date fully corroborates what Gribkov said.

The release of the Suslov Commission's memorandum not only adds to, but helps clarify what has already been known about Soviet and Warsaw Pact military planning in 1980-81. Several points are worth highlighting.

First, the date of the memorandum, 28 August 1980, is significant. Just three days after the Suslov Commission was formed on August 25, the five senior members of that body were seeking to authorize extensive military preparations "in case military assistance is provided to Poland." This suggests that military contingencies were taken very seriously by the CPSU Politburo, and that Soviet leaders were not just bluffing when they asked Polish leaders several times in 1980-81 whether it would help matters if Soviet and allied troops entered Poland to help impose martial law. (On each occasion when the two Polish leaders, Stanisław Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski, were asked about "fraternal assistance," they warned Soviet officials that the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland to help implement martial law would exacerbate the situation and lead to a "catastrophe."⁷ They insisted that if they were given more time to devise appropriate arrangements, they would be able to handle the situation on their own. New evidence suggests that Jaruzelski may have sharply changed his view of this matter in the final few days before martial law, but there is little doubt that earlier in the crisis, he, like Kania, had cautioned strongly against the entry of Warsaw Pact forces.⁸)

Second, the directive stipulates that the Soviet defense ministry should be able to bring the initial four divisions up to full combat strength by 6:00 p.m. on August 29, that is, just twenty-four hours after the memorandum was drafted. It is not entirely clear why such haste was deemed necessary. One possible explanation is

that Soviet leaders were preparing to send troops to Poland in the very near term. Presumably, this would have been a limited operation to help the Polish authorities crush the strikes and impose martial law. The most logical timing would have been at the end of August 1980, before the Polish government had signed any agreements with the Inter-Factory Strike Committee.

It is not yet known for certain whether this option was under serious consideration in Moscow on August 28. Soviet Politburo transcripts from the final week of August 1980 are still classified. Despite this limitation, enough other evidence is available to suggest that Soviet leaders might indeed have been contemplating a limited military intervention. U.S. intelligence sources at the time picked up evidence that the Soviet Army was mobilizing three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division in the western USSR.⁹ That in itself would not necessarily imply an intention to use the mobilized forces, but there is no doubt that by August 28 the Soviet Politburo was alarmed by the growing strength of the workers' movement in Poland. After refraining from public criticism in July and the first few weeks of August, the Soviet media on August 27 began denouncing the "subversive actions" of "anti-socialist forces" in Poland.¹⁰ That same day, the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov, secretly delivered a stern letter of warning from the CPSU Politburo to the then-First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), Edward Gierek.¹¹ The letter demanded tougher action to quell the unrest. Gierek, for his part, had been making overtures to Soviet leaders since mid-August about the possibility of sending Soviet troops to Poland on his behalf.¹² Soviet officials had not yet responded directly to Gierek's pleas, but that does not necessarily mean they had rejected the idea outright. Although they may not have wanted to keep Gierek in power, they might have been considering bringing in a hardline successor, such as Stefan Olszowski.

Another factor that could have induced Soviet leaders to contemplate the prospect of military intervention in Poland was a meeting of the PUWP Politburo that was due to take place the following day, on August 29. The session was being convened to decide whether to sign the agreements with Solidarity or, instead, to introduce martial law. A special task force, known as Lato-80 (Summer 80), had been set up at the Polish internal affairs ministry in mid-August 1980 to prepare for a sweeping crackdown.¹³ The head of the task force, General Bogusław Stachura, a deputy minister of internal affairs, was ready to assure the PUWP Politburo on 29 August that his troops would be able to "exterminate the counterrevolutionary nest in Gdańsk" if the PUWP leadership gave him the go-ahead.¹⁴ Soviet leaders clearly were aware of both Lato-80 and the forthcoming PUWP Politburo meeting, and they may have wanted to be ready to help out.

An intervention by the four mobilized Soviet divisions, perhaps supplemented by a Soviet airborne division and units from the USSR's Northern Group of Forces, would

have been designed to prop up Gierek or, more likely, to replace him with a more credible hardliner who would forcibly suppress the nascent Solidarity movement. The intervention thus would have been similar to the Soviet army's limited incursion into Hungary on 24 October 1956, which came in response to an urgent request from the Hungarian leader, Erno Gero.¹⁵ The intervention on 24 October 1956 was intended to help Gero impose a crackdown and put an end to the violent unrest that began the previous day. As it turned out, the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary, far from improving the situation, caused a sharp escalation of tension and violence. A full-scale revolution ensued, and the Soviet Union had to send a much larger contingent of troops to Hungary to crush the rebellion.

It is impossible to know whether anything comparable would have happened in Poland if the PZPR Politburo had decided on 29 August 1980 to pursue a crackdown. A few PZPR hardliners, such as Władysław Kruczek, did want to impose martial law, but a substantial majority of the Politburo members were convinced that, as Kania put it, it was a "fantasy" to expect that a large-scale crackdown could be carried out at such short notice.¹⁶ Hence, the Politburo authorized the Polish government to press ahead with the Gdańsk accords. No one on the Politburo welcomed this decision—Gierek insisted that "under threat of a general strike, we must choose the lesser evil and then find a way to get out of it"—but in the absence of a viable alternative, the Politburo reluctantly concluded that, for the time being, the strikers' demands would have to be fulfilled.¹⁷

Third, the Suslov Commission's directive specified two related but separate tasks. The first was the granting of authority to the Soviet defense ministry to mobilize "up to 25,000 military reservists and 6,000 vehicles" to flesh out three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division in the Belorussian, Baltic, and Transcarpathian Military Districts. As mentioned above, this task was carried out right away. The four divisions in question were all mobilized within a day or two, but they were not intended to remain that way indefinitely. Soon after the Soviet Politburo decided in late August 1980 that the time was not yet ripe to "provide military assistance" to Poland, these initial four divisions were brought back to a lower state of readiness and the mobilized reservists were released.

Even so, this did not mean that the first part of the August 28 directive ceased to be relevant. The scenario envisaged in the directive was largely preserved in the subsequent mobilization of Soviet troops in late 1980 and 1981. In the fall of 1980, after the initial four Soviet divisions had been demobilized, the Soviet Union gradually brought three motorized rifle divisions up to full troop strength and put them on high alert. In mid- to late December 1980, U.S. electronic intercepts and satellite reconnaissance were able to confirm that these three divisions could have joined an airborne division and the two divisions of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of

Forces to deal with military contingencies in Poland.¹⁸

The other task specified in the August 28 directive was the granting of authorization for the Soviet defense ministry to "*plan for* the call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000 additional vehicles" (emphasis added). The difference between this task and the initial one is that in this case the authorization covered only *planning* for a further mobilization, not the mobilization itself. Although this planning was retained (and updated) for future contingencies, there is no evidence that any of the second-stage forces were actually mobilized at any point. In early December 1980, when the clouds covering Poland and the western Soviet Union were still too dense to permit clear satellite reconnaissance, U.S. officials had expected to find that some 15 Soviet tank and motorized divisions near Poland's borders were fully combat-ready. When the clouds abated in the latter half of December 1980 and the satellites were able to home in on Soviet units, U.S. intelligence analysts were surprised to learn that only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were actually mobilized.¹⁹ There is no evidence that any further Soviet tank or motorized divisions in the USSR were brought up to full combat readiness over the next year. Although the Soviet defense ministry was authorized to plan and prepare for further mobilizations (of five to seven divisions), the ministry did not actually go beyond the initial mobilization of four divisions on August 28-29 (which were then soon demobilized) and the gradual mobilization of three motorized rifle divisions in the fall of 1980.

Fourth, the number of reservists to be mobilized for the hypothetical follow-on operation seems on the high side. Soviet tank divisions at full strength numbered some 10,500 troops, and Soviet motorized rifle divisions numbered 12,500. The divisions in the four Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe were normally maintained at full strength (a level of readiness designated as Category 1), but divisions in the western USSR were maintained at a much lower level of readiness. As of late 1980, roughly one-quarter of the 33 Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts were maintained at 50-75 percent of full strength (Category 2 readiness), and the other three-quarters were kept at only around 20 percent of full strength (Category 3).²⁰ The allocation of these units is shown in Table 1. (Other Category 2 divisions, it is worth noting, could have been brought in from elsewhere in the western USSR.) Curiously, even though both types of line divisions were *not* combat-ready, they were described in Soviet parlance as "constantly ready divisions" (*divizii postoyannoi gotovnosti*).²¹

The initial mobilization covered by the Suslov Commission's directive, encompassing three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, seems just about right in size. This mobilization would have had to involve four Category 2 divisions, which could be

mobilized very rapidly when necessary. Because Category 3 forces would have taken at least one to three months to bring up to full readiness, they obviously could not have been part of the initial mobilization on 28-29 August. Only Category 2 forces would have been mobilized at this stage. Using the lower figure of 50 percent as the manpower strength of the four Category 2 divisions, one can see that some 22,000 reservists would have been needed to bring the four up to full strength. The other 3,000 reservists presumably would have been allocated to various support and logistical roles. Hence, the total number of mobilized reservists in this initial phase on 28-29 August 1980—that is, 25,000—seems perfectly plausible.

Table 1.

Soviet Line Divisions in the Western USSR, Late 1980

<u>Readiness Category</u>	<u>Tank Divisions</u>	<u>Motorized Rifle Divisions</u>
Category 2	4	4
Category 3	10	15
Totals	14	19

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

Note: These forces potentially could have been supplemented by other forces in the western USSR outside the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts.

The authorized numbers for the hypothetical second phase, however, are somewhat less easy to reconcile. If the additional 75,000 reservists were designated to flesh out five to seven more Category 2 divisions, the number of reservists was considerably higher than it should have been. Even if one assumes that seven (rather than five) additional Category 2 divisions would have been mobilized and that all seven were motorized divisions (with higher troop strength), only 43,750 reservists would have been needed to bring the seven divisions up to full strength. Some of the remaining 31,250 reservists might have been assigned to support and logistical roles, but it is unlikely that this would have accounted for more than about 8,000 to 10,000. Hence, a gap of well over 20,000 remains.

Two possible factors may account for this gap.

First, it might be argued that some or all of the five to seven extra divisions would have been Category 3 forces (so-called “cadre divisions” or “inactive divisions”) rather than Category 2. If all seven were Category 3 motorized rifle divisions (of the fifteen that were available), roughly 70,000 reservists would have been needed to bring them up to full strength. The other 5,000 reservists could then have been assigned to support and logistical functions.²²

This explanation may seem plausible at first glance, but it actually is problematic. It is true that all three of the Soviet motorized rifle divisions that were brought up to full strength as of December 1980 were originally Category 3 divisions. The weeks that passed in the autumn of 1980 had permitted enough time for all the pre-mobilization training and preparations of those units to be completed. But there is no evidence that Category 3 forces were slated for a potential second stage of mobilization (whose planning was authorized by the 28 August directive). On the contrary, there is strong reason to believe that the “constantly ready divisions” designated for a hypothetical second stage were Category 2 forces (of which at least eight were available, as shown in Table 1) rather than Category 3. Soviet military commanders were willing to draw on Category 3 forces when they had ample time in the fall of 1980 to carry out pre-mobilization training and preparations for the projected Soyuz-80 “exercises” (scheduled for early December); but because they were not actually mobilizing any of the additional five to seven Soviet divisions needed for a possible second stage, they would have wanted to be able to mobilize the extra divisions very rapidly if circumstances so warranted. Hence, it is highly unlikely that they would have relied on anything other than Category 2 forces for a second-stage mobilization if such a mobilization had been deemed necessary. The much more numerous Category 3 forces were useful when sufficient lead-time was available to mobilize for the first stage of Soyuz-80, but if a second stage had been necessary at short notice, the Soviet Army would have wanted to rely on the eight Category 2 forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts, supplemented perhaps by Category 2 forces in other parts of the western USSR and by combat-ready units from the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe.

A more plausible explanation for the high number of reserves in the projected second phase is that Soviet military planners wanted a margin of safety in case they needed to mobilize more than seven extra divisions. Authorization to plan for the mobilization of just five to seven extra divisions, as stipulated in the directive, may have seemed enough for an initial request. But Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted leeway to proceed with a larger mobilization if circumstances so warranted. They could have mobilized at least eight Category 2 divisions in the western USSR (as shown in Table 1), and they might have wanted additional reservists to fill out Category 2 divisions that could have been brought in from elsewhere. Indeed, it seems likely that by December 1980 the Soviet Army was planning for the possible mobilization of another eleven divisions rather than just five to seven. East German military documents and the testimony of a former Polish General Staff officer, Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, both refer to a total of as many as fifteen Soviet divisions that would have taken part in a two-stage process.²³ (Four would have come in initially, and eleven could have served as reinforcements in a second stage.)

Clearly, the planning that began in late August 1980 for the possible mobilization of an additional 75,000 reservists — the level stipulated in the Suslov Commission's memorandum — enabled Soviet military officials to expand their efforts very quickly so that a second-stage mobilization might have covered as many as eleven extra divisions. Although some of the extra divisions might have come from the combat-ready divisions in the USSR's Northern Group of Forces (which had two) and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (which had nineteen), Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted to minimize their drawdown of the Groups of Soviet Forces. Hence, they would have wanted to be ready to rely on as many Category 2 divisions as possible.

Whatever the precise explanation may be, there is no doubt that the numbers in the memorandum pertaining to a second phase of troop mobilization were large enough to give Soviet military planners a substantial degree of latitude.

Fifth, the projected size of each of the two stages of mobilization, as laid out in the memorandum, sheds valuable light on Soviet military options vis-à-vis Poland. The initial mobilization, on 28-29 August, applied to four Soviet divisions in the western USSR: three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division. These four divisions were soon demobilized, but the scenario outlined in the 28 August directive, as noted above, was largely preserved. Top-secret East German military documents regarding units slated to take part in the Soyuz-80 "exercises" in Poland in early December 1980 mentioned four Soviet divisions.²⁴ According to the East German documents, the four Soviet divisions were supposed to join two Czechoslovak tank divisions, one East German tank division, and four Polish mechanized divisions in the first stage of "exercises." (The four Polish divisions were included only after Jaruzelski insisted on it.) Because the numbers of Soviet divisions cited in the East German documents are identical to figures in the Suslov Commission's directive, this implies that the option of a limited Soviet intervention in Poland, as envisaged in the directive for late August 1980, was basically the same option under consideration in early December.

The numbers in the East German materials and the Suslov Commission's directive are fully in line with evidence from U.S. photoreconnaissance satellites, which in mid- to late December 1980 revealed that three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were combat-ready. Even though the satellites detected only three mobilized Soviet divisions rather than four (the number specified in the East German documents and the initial number mobilized on August 28 under the Suslov Commission's directive), the difference is readily explained by East German military charts prepared for Soyuz-81.²⁵ These charts reveal that after four Soviet divisions were mobilized on August 28-29 and then demobilized, and after pre-mobilization training got under way in the fall of 1980 for three Category 3 motorized rifle

divisions, the complexion of the scenario was altered somewhat. Instead of three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, the contingent of four Soviet divisions was supposed to include an airborne division to go with three motorized rifle divisions. Because Soviet airborne divisions were always maintained at full combat readiness, one of these divisions could have immediately joined the three full-strength Soviet motorized rifle divisions in early December 1980 to move into Poland under the guise of an "exercise." (U.S. intelligence sources at the time detected unusual preparations by a Soviet airborne division in the Baltic Military District, which presumably would have been the unit sent in.)

Thus, the fundamental scenario for the entry of Soviet forces into Poland, adjusted for the types of divisions included, is corroborated by evidence from all the newly available sources.

To the extent that this scenario was intended as a real option and not just a means of exerting pressure, these findings suggest that Soviet leaders in late November 1980 were seriously preparing to send troops to Poland in early December to help the authorities there impose martial law. It is crucial to note, however, that any such intervention would have been intended to support the regime, not to dislodge it. In that sense, the scenario was very different from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which was intended to eliminate the reform-minded Communists led by Alexander Dubcek and bring in a hardline regime.

The reason that this option ultimately was not carried out is that by early December 1980 both Jaruzelski and Kania had made clear to Soviet leaders that they were not yet ready to impose martial law. Under those circumstances, they warned, the entry of Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak troops would greatly aggravate the situation. The result, according to Kania and Jaruzelski, might be large-scale violence, which could spiral out of control. The two Polish leaders promised that if they were given a bit more time, they could resolve the crisis without having to rely on intervention by Soviet troops. If Kania and Jaruzelski had instead been amenable to the entry of Soviet forces on December 8 (the scheduled starting date for the "exercises"), the scenario undoubtedly would have been carried out as planned. But because the Polish leaders were not yet ready to accept allied troops, Moscow's plans had to be put on hold.

The second stage of troop mobilizations, involving another five to seven Soviet divisions, would have been carried out only if "the situation in Poland deteriorates further" and "the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces." These rather vague formulations do not shed much light on the prospective timing of a second-phase mobilization, but even if the second phase were fully implemented, the numbers involved do not suggest that Soviet leaders were ever seriously planning to invade Poland in the same way they intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The numbers

in question were simply too small. Judging from the size of the invading force deployed in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it seems likely that Soviet leaders would have wanted to mobilize at least 30 Soviet divisions if they were contemplating an invasion of Poland that would have been aimed at neutralizing the Polish army, crushing all armed resistance, and establishing a pro-Soviet regime. Secret estimates by U.S. military intelligence analysts in the fall of 1980 predicted that Soviet leaders would want to mobilize at least 30 divisions for a full-scale invasion of Poland.²⁶ Some U.S. intelligence cables from Eastern Europe put the figure even higher, at around 45.²⁷ These numbers would have made sense if the Soviet Politburo had been contemplating an invasion of Poland similar to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the numbers given in the August 28 memorandum fall so far short of that level that they could not possibly be for the same type of contingency.

It is conceivable, of course, that the August 28 memorandum was superseded by other documents that authorized the Soviet defense ministry to plan for the mobilization of some 15 to 20 further divisions, making a total of at least 30. There is no evidence, however, that this was the case. Following the demobilization of the three Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions that were briefly mobilized on 28-29 August 1980, only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were fully mobilized during the crisis. The figures provided by East German military sources and by Ryszard Kukliński indicate that as many as fifteen Soviet divisions might eventually have been brought up to full combat readiness if the situation had deteriorated. However, that figure, which was never attained, was still vastly short of 30 (not to mention 45, a figure that many U.S. intelligence officials were wont to cite all through the crisis). No documentation or other evidence gives any reason to believe that the Soviet defense ministry at any time was planning for a Czechoslovak-style operation.

On the other hand, the new evidence does suggest that, at least for a while, Soviet leaders were seriously considering the option of a limited military intervention in Poland. This option loomed large in late August 1980 and again in early December 1980. The Soviet leadership's preference all along was to have the Polish authorities implement martial law on their own as soon as possible. But if that goal proved infeasible, the Soviet Politburo was willing to provide help, at least during the first several months of the crisis. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, emphasized this point when he spoke with Kania and Jaruzelski in Warsaw in early April 1981:

Our common goal should be to resolve the crisis without having to send allied armies into Poland. All socialist states should strive toward this end. Unless the Polish state security organs and Polish army are deployed, outside support cannot be expected, since it

would cause international complications. The Polish comrades must try first to solve their problems on their own. But if they cannot manage on their own and appeal for help, that type of situation would be very different from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed in Poland from the outset.²⁸

It is far from clear that Soviet intervention under these circumstances would have made much sense. Polish officials had discreetly warned Kulikov that "it is even possible that if other Warsaw Pact troops move into Poland, certain units [of the Polish army] might rebel."²⁹ Because Soviet troops were already deeply embroiled in Afghanistan, the last thing the Soviet Politburo wanted was to provoke a large-scale conflict in Europe, which might drag on for months. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union went to such great lengths in 1980-81 to ensure that any prospective intervention by allied forces would be fully supported by Polish leaders.

Even though a good deal of new evidence shows that the Soviet Union made extensive plans and preparations for military intervention in Poland in 1980-81, this does not necessarily mean that there was ever a firm *intention* in Moscow to send in troops, especially if the Polish Communist regime was actively opposed to such a step. There is still not—and may never be—any way to know whether the Soviet Union would have invaded Poland if Polish leaders had openly refused to impose martial law or if the martial law operation in December 1981 had collapsed and widespread violence had broken out. None of the new evidence has resolved that question, and perhaps none ever will. Nevertheless, three things do now seem clear: first, that Soviet leaders for some time were willing to send in a limited number of Soviet divisions to help the Polish authorities impose martial law; second, that this option would have been pursued only if Polish leaders had supported and been willing to make good use of the incoming forces; and third, that Soviet leaders wanted to give themselves fall-back options for other military contingencies in case the situation in Poland took a disastrous turn.

Not until mid- to late 1981 did the situation in Poland change enough to permit Soviet leaders to deemphasize the military option. Once Kania was gone from the scene and Jaruzelski was ensconced in all the top posts, Soviet officials had much greater confidence that martial law could be introduced in Poland without outside help. Some form of military option was still present, but the scenarios that loomed so large in late August and early December 1980 had largely receded by late 1981. Even so, the Suslov Commission's operational directive of 28 August 1980 is a telling reminder of how close the Polish crisis came to escalating into a much wider conflict.

Document

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The situation in the PPR remains tense. The strike movement is operating on a countrywide scale.

Taking account of the emerging situation, the Ministry of Defense requests permission, in the first instance, to bring three tank divisions (1 in the Baltic MD, 2 in the Beloruss. MD) and one mechanized rifle division (Transcarp. MD) up to full combat readiness as of 6:00 p.m. on 29 August to form a group of forces in case military assistance is provided to the PPR.

To fill out these divisions, it will be necessary to requisition from the national economy up to 25 thous. military reservists and 6 thous. vehicles, including 3 thous. to replace the vehicles taken from these troops to help out with the harvest. Without the extra vehicles, the divisions cannot bring their mobile reserves up to full readiness. The necessity to fill out the divisions at the expense of resources from the national economy arises because they are maintained at a reduced level in peacetime. The successful fulfillment of tasks during the entry of these divisions into the territory of the PPR requires combat arrangements to be established some 5-7 days in advance.

If the situation in Poland deteriorates further, we will also have to fill out the constantly ready divisions of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts up to wartime level. If the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces, we must increase the group of our own forces by another five-seven divisions. To these ends, the Ministry of Defense should be permitted to plan the call-up of as many as 75 thous. additional military reservists and 9 thous. additional vehicles.

In this case, it would mean that a total of up to 100 thous. military reservists and 15 thous. vehicles would have to be requisitioned from the national economy.

The draft of a CPSU CC directive is attached.

(signed) (signed) (signed)
M. SUSLOV A. GROMYKO Yu. ANDROPOV D.

(signed) (signed)
USTINOV K. CHERNENKO

28 August 1980

No. 682-op (3 pp.)

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¹"Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," No. P210/II (Top Secret), 25 August 1980, in Tsentral'noye Khraneniye Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 1, List (L.) 1.

²The length of the draft resolution can be gauged from a handwritten notation at the bottom of the memorandum, which indicates that the document is a total of three pages.

³Among the countless other documents composed in this way were dozens of memoranda outlining the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles and other weaponry in Cuba in 1962 and the vast quantity of forms filled out by the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) to supply arms, intelligence equipment, and combat training to Communist and pro-Soviet guerrillas in the Third World. A good sample of these latter documents are available in Fond 89 of TsKhSD.

⁴Of particular relevance to this article is an item by Kevin Klose that appeared on 2 December 1980 in *The Washington Post* under the title "Soviet Reservists Activated Since August" (pp. A-1, A-14). Klose reported that "according to stories circulating here [in Moscow], reservists in the Carpathian Military District were activated in great haste in August [and will] remain on duty until the end of the year." The Suslov Commission memorandum corroborates this report. It is interesting to see that even a limited call-up of reservists eventually became known to well-situated observers.

⁵A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 55, 57.

⁶Several such maps are available from the former East German military archive, all of which deal with the same general scenario discussed below. Some of the relevant East German military documents, from the Militärisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam, are cited below.

⁷See, e.g., several clear-cut references to the Polish leaders' objections in the Soviet Politburo transcripts I have translated for publication by CWIHP. See also "Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübung 'SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in Militärisches Zwischenarchiv-Potsdam (MZA-P), Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54. See translation in this *Bulletin*.

⁸On Jaruzelski's change of heart, see my article, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland," in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

⁹U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), declassified in December 1998. I am grateful to Douglas J. MacEachin for providing me with a copy of this valuable document, which, among other things, contains a map showing the location of Soviet divisions in the western USSR.

¹⁰TASS dispatch, 27 August 1980, reprinted as "K sobytiyam v Pol'she," *Pravda* (Moscow), 28 August 1980, p. 4.

¹¹Gierek discussed this letter at the PUWP Politburo meeting on August 28. See "Protokół Nr. 27 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 28 sierpnia 1980 r.," 28 August 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Włodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarność" 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 78-82.

¹²See the account by Stanisław Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 33-34.

¹³"Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 29.VIII.1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Urzędu Ochrony Państwa (AUOP), Sygnatura (Sygn.) 2309/IV, Tom (T.) 2. See also the contributions by Janusz Krupski and Jarema Maciszewski in Kancelaria Sejmu, *O stanie wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 108-110 and 126-128, respectively.

¹⁴"Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 29. VIII. 1980r.," Stronica (S.)1.

¹⁵See Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 183-185.

¹⁶"Protokół Nr. 28 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 29 sierpnia 1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Secret), in Włodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, pp. 84-90.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸CIA, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 2-3. These preparations were first reported by the CIA in a "Special Analysis" on 24 December 1980.

¹⁹The problems posed by the cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. The Special Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid determination since the cloud cover had receded over the western USSR that only three Soviet divisions were on full alert. For further information, see CIA "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 1-5.

²⁰CIA, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 2-4. For further comments on the state of Soviet line divisions, see U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1986*, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1986), pp. 98-99, which indicates that 40 percent, not 25 percent, of Soviet forces in the "western USSR" were Category 2. The discrepancy presumably arises because of different definitions of what the "western USSR" comprises.

²¹All Soviet line divisions other than depot divisions were officially described as "constantly ready." In Soviet parlance, "constant readiness" was the lowest of four levels of combat readiness: constant, increased, "threat of war," and full.

²²This proportion of reservists for support and logistical roles may seem low, but two factors may account for that. First, the support requirements for "exercises," involving mainly rations and transportation, would have been lower than those for "war," which would entailed much more demanding requirements for ammunition and the like. Second, logistical preparations do not proceed in a strictly linear fashion. Once a certain threshold has been reached, it is possible to expand logistical/support effectiveness without a commensurate increase in the number of support personnel.

²³"Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or

2 December. The lengthy interview with Colonel Kukliński is in "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-55. Kukliński was one of the officers on the Polish General Staff responsible for drafting the martial law plans. He also had long been working for the CIA. He had to escape from Poland in November 1981. See my article in this *Bulletin*.

²⁴See, for example, "Erläuterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st). See also "Einweisung," Bl. 16.

²⁵See the two documents cited in the previous note.

²⁶Gates, *From the Shadows*, pp. 163-164.

²⁷U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Estimates on Polish Intervention Forces," Cable No. 14933, 7 November 1980, in National Security Archive, Flashpoints Collection, Polish Crisis 1980-1981. This cable evidently is based on comments by a high-ranking Romanian military officer.

²⁸"Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA," Bl. 54.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Bl. 55.

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More Documents on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1982

Editor's Note: The translations of the following documents were prepared for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized and sponsored by the National Security Archive (Washington), the Institute of Political Studies/Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw), and CWIHP. Copies of these and other documents (as well as translations) are accessible in the Archive/CWIHP "Russian and Eastern European Archival Documents Database." (For further information, contact: The National Security Archive; 2130 H St., NW; Gelman 701; Washington, DC 20037; tel: 202/994-7000.)

Stenographic Minutes of the Meeting of Leading Representatives of the Warsaw Pact Countries in Moscow, 5 December 1980

(Start: 11:00 a.m.)

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Dear Comrades! I warmly welcome you, our allies in the Warsaw Pact, our friends, in the name of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU and thank you for your speedy and positive response to the invitation for the meeting.

[...]

There are also events in Poland, difficult and alarming ones. This is the main question. We understand the great concerns of Comrade Kania and of all our political friends who are in a difficult situation.

The crisis in Poland concerns, of course, all of us. Various forces are mobilizing against socialism in Poland, from the so-called liberals to the fascists. They are dealing blows against socialist Poland. The objective, however, is the entire socialist community.

As we all know, the Polish comrades only recently held the 7th CC Plenum. Perhaps we will ask them to provide us with information about this work. They will probably not mind discussing, here in the circle of friends, measures, the implementation of which could result in overcoming the crisis situation, strengthening socialist Poland.

I think the comrades will agree with me that Comrade Kania will speak first. Then the other comrades will have the opportunity to speak.

We should agree on the procedure of our consultation. What proposals do we have regarding the chairman?

Todor Živkov:

I think we should not chair our meeting today in alphabetical order. Since our meeting will only have two sessions, I would propose that the Soviet delegation as hosts chair this meeting.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Are there objections?—Thank you, comrades, for your confidence. [...] Comrade Kania now has the floor.

Stanisław Kania:

Dearest Comrade Leonid Ilyich! Dearest Comrades! It is difficult for me to speak to you here today as a representative of the leadership of the Polish Party. This is not only difficult because it is the first time that I speak to you, the party leaders, in this circle, but it is also difficult for us as representatives of the Polish leadership to speak here and before our compatriots at home; it is difficult to speak to you here in particular because the main sources of the political crisis which has gripped our country are concentrated at the level of our Party. The crisis is also the topic of our meeting today which we interpret as an expression of the internationalist concerns about the situation in our country.

Our situation is indeed very complicated. There are great dangers to socialism. The dangers pose themselves in the economic field and bring anarchy and counterrevolution into our country.

We are quite conscious what responsibility we carry for our Party, for our workers' class, and for the Polish people in order to resolve this crisis effectively. We are also aware of the internationalist responsibility for the socialist camp and the international Communist movement.

We are an important and inseparable part of the socialist community of states, and we know that the situation in Poland is also causing various complications for our neighbors. We know very well that we ourselves must lead the country out of this difficult situation. This is our responsibility, and we are convinced that we have a real chance for the resolution of these tasks.

We keep in constant contact with the leadership of the CPSU and very much appreciate your views and advice, which you have given us, Comrade Leonid Ilyich. We realize the fundamental importance of your views of our difficulties, and it conforms to our opinion on the causes of the problems that are occurring in Poland.

For the second time, your name stands for sensitivity not only for a class-conscious assessment but also for the national peculiarities and for the situation in Poland. [...]

What are the causes of the crisis? This is not the first, but one of several profound crises in Poland. We had the year 1956 and the bloody events in Poznań, with the ensuing changes in the leadership of the Party and the great wave of revisionism in Poland. There was the year 1968, the well-known incidents by students, but there were dramatic, bloody events in 1970 as well, in December of that year, along the coast. In 1976, major incidents were

staged in Radom and Ursus in connection with the preparation for price increases.

Today's crisis affects the working class, but also other segments of the population, and the crisis is of a mass character. Young people prove to be particularly active, especially young workers, technicians, and engineers, and this crisis has lasted for a long time. The strike phase is behind us, but the crisis persists, and we are affected by the results on a daily basis. The situation has become demoralizing because one cannot hand out more than one produces.

The crisis also created new structures which are not of our making, in particular the new labor unions which create a lot of difficulties for us and pose an attempt by the enemy of socialism in Poland to test us.

There are various causes for [these] concerns, and questions can indeed be asked whether the estimate of the conflict in Poland is correct, whether we are on the right track to get out of this crisis.

We completely agree with Comrade Leonid Ilyich that it is necessary to analyze more thoroughly the anatomy of these occurrences which have led to the crisis, of all mechanisms which caused the undermining of the Party, the government, and even the economy of the country and which have allowed enemy forces, the forces of counterrevolution, to penetrate the working class.

Despite the various difficulties, we are of the opinion that our estimates accord with the reality of the situation. The main reason for the problems was dissatisfaction among the workers. There were, of course, real reasons for this dissatisfaction. That was the reason for the mass character of the strike movement. There were strikes in many major Polish plants, even in those which can look back to a long revolutionary tradition.

The Party proved to be extremely weak in the ideological field. We were faced with the results of policy which ignored the class character of society. The slogan of the achievement of modern socialist society was proclaimed much too early. This took place at a time when individual farmers in Poland still constituted the majority in the countryside, and in the 1970s, private enterprise spread over large parts of the trade business as well as other areas of the economy. [...]

Looking back today at these difficulties in the situation, we believe that the use of political measures for the resolution of the strike conflicts was a correct decision. Other solutions and other decisions could have provoked an avalanche of incidents and led to a bloody confrontation, the results of which would have affected the entire socialist world. Despite the difficult problems, it seems to us that there was no other resort than to compromise in the question of permitting the establishment of the new labor union. [...]

What is there to say about the period after the great wave of strikes? How should it be evaluated? It is a period of a very hard political battle, a difficult period for the Party. The new union "Solidarity" developed out of the

strike committees, not at the initiative of the workers but at the initiative of anti-socialist elements. But by and large, this organization was supported by the workers throughout the entire country, and it is popular nationwide since the workers achieved social benefits through the strikes. [...]

Foreign imperialist diversion centers have shown great activity and even aggressiveness towards Poland, in particular the radio station "[Radio] Free Europe," the centers of reactionary emigration, which have supported anti-socialist actions by means of propaganda and also by giving financial support to "Solidarity". We have protested sharply against this, and there are certain positive results, a certain retreat of the enemy forces.

[...]

We have, of course, lost some of our prestige in the eyes of party activists, due to these compromises. Even if a certain state of criticism has been reached, we nevertheless managed to isolate some of the anti-socialist elements. The public did not react too agreeably to this. A situation occurred in which it was necessary to put a number of repressive measures, including administrative measures, into effect.

Created by the Politburo, a group which operates under the direction of the premier, is preparing a series of different measures. This includes among other things the question of introducing martial law in Poland.—Actually, under our constitution we only have the option of declaring martial law.

It is also preparing an operation with the aim of arresting the most active functionaries of the counterrevolution.

It also developed guidelines for communications in the case of an emergency, and the same for the mass media, the newspapers, railroads and the (automobile) transport facilities in general.

We will also create special groups of particularly trustworthy party members which, if necessary, can be armed. We have already selected 19,000 such party members and are of the opinion that we will have about 30,000 by the end of December.

Information on these preparations has in part fallen into the hands of leading of the counterrevolution.

The assessment of the 7th Plenum has further toughened our policy. We think that it created a more favorable atmosphere for a counteroffensive than had previously existed.

[...]

We have to become active, on all fronts. Most important is the internal unity of the Party, its stamina, its influence on the working class. These are the main pre-conditions of taming the counterrevolutionary forces.

The course of events might naturally confront us with the necessity of implementing other measures, measures not limited to the political confrontation which we have expected, but measures of confrontation associated with repressive measures. Believe me, comrades, that in that case we will have sufficient determination with respect to

the counterrevolution, in order to defend socialism, the socialist position, in Poland.

Todor Živkov:

Dear Comrades! In consideration of the nature of our meeting, I would like to address some key questions and explain the views of our Party with regard to the situation in Poland. [...]

What is our estimate of the situation in Poland, our general estimate? For five months now, events have been shaking Poland, which causes us great concern. We all understand that what is happening there is above all a Polish question and concerns the development of socialism in Poland. But we also understand quite well that it is not solely a Polish question. The developments in Poland concern all socialist countries, the entire socialist community. [...]

The general estimate of the situation has two aspects, I think. The first one concerns the question of what is actually happening in Poland, of the character of the processes which are taking place there, what the causes are, and what forces are behind these events.

A second aspect is the answer to the question of what the situation in this country actually is, what the reality of the situation is, what the main danger is.

It is important, for example, if we take the first, and we have no chance and time to analyze this very thoroughly, we will be able to do that later, to give the first estimate now. This is even more important given that other political forces are actively trying to force their estimate on the public. The Eurocommunists, for example, talk about the historical events in Poland and about the necessity for all socialist countries to go through this development. Yugoslavia is massively spreading its own interpretation of the Polish events, as if they were new evidence of the correctness of the Yugoslav way and the Yugoslav brand of socialism. Not to mention the Western countries which attentively and actively watch and react to the Polish events. They are spreading the opinion that the Polish events have proved again that the political and economic system of socialism is not viable.

Our general opinion is that we are dealing with a very serious political and economic crisis in Poland which on the one hand was caused by flaws in the policy under the current leadership of the Polish Party and Government, on the other hand by the plans and activities of anti-socialist forces which without doubt have for quite some time been active inside and outside of Poland.

What concerns us is that there is no clear and reasonable estimate, and there is no program for a way out of the situation that has developed. Our opinion is that the lack of such a program is one of the reasons why change is only occurring very slowly here. Up to this point, there has now not been a mobilization of forces to the fullest extent possible. It is lacking! The defensive actions are continued. There are even certain steps back from the

political plan.

We understand the necessity for compromises but one should clearly look ahead and consider for what purpose one makes these compromises and where they might lead. As long as no major changes occur, until the party does not seize the initiative, we can not speak at all of a turn of events.

What is our opinion on the ways out of this situation? We think that the solution has to be found in the People's Republic of Poland itself. One should work out various options which are appropriate for the situation, and our Polish comrades should be ready to apply these options in the country by means of the Polish United Workers' Party and the People's Republic of Poland. Our estimate is that such possibilities exist at this very moment.

Secondly, in our opinion, the Polish Party should try and consistently pursue going on the offensive. Of course, the Polish comrades know best which possibilities and ways exist for such an offensive. But some aspects should also be viewed from our point of view. There is, for example, a certain degree of fatigue in view of the events of the last five months, which, of course, affects the social situation of the people. There is the prospect that the economic situation and the situation of the workers will further deteriorate. One should state very clearly who is to blame for this and who creates obstacles [to improvement]. One cannot strike endlessly, one cannot live endlessly on credit, and one cannot demand a better life without improving production. This should be stated quite clearly.

There are healthy forces—the army, security forces, and the larger part of Party and population. These are forces that the Party and the state organs can rely on. While it is indeed necessary in today's situation to be flexible, too, it is also right to defend the socialist position in the current situation with greater certainty and greater vigor. [...] I would like to address briefly the question of strategic goals the class enemy is pursuing and the eminently important strategic dangers which result from the events in Poland.

It seems that the West now hardly harbors any illusions of changing the social order in Poland in such a way that Poland would leave the Warsaw Pact and pull back to the extent that it would change the political landscape. Of course, the enemy has done and is doing everything to effect a change of the social system, the economic system in our countries, among them Poland. But now the strategic plan of the West is clearly to put a different system into practice in Poland which diverges from real socialism and heads into the direction of liberal socialism, a model which then could pose as an example and provoke changes in the social order in other countries of the socialist community.

Imperialism pursues its policy of interference in internal Polish affairs, and is accompanied by the massive propaganda drums about an alleged intervention by the Soviet Union and the other countries. Nationalist feelings

are stirred, attempts [are made] to hide the class character of the events, to cover up the counterrevolution, and to extol friends as foes and vice versa.

I want to state quite frankly: To our mind, there is at this moment a real chance of a change of the social order in Poland. We should not underestimate this! If we had to give a strict class-based estimate now, we would have to say that the possibilities of a political approach, which the Polish comrades have taken thus far, have been exhausted. In our opinion, the situation in Poland is clear and no further clarification is required.[...]

János Kádár:

Dear Comrades!

[...] For us, the views of the Polish comrades on the situation in their country are very important. Of course, we base our own evaluation of the political situation above all on the opinion of the Polish comrades and also on the publications in the Polish press, on the international press and on our own experience. [...]

How could one describe the Hungarian position in this question?

Before I address this question, I would like to make one more remark. I fully agree with Comrade Žhivkov and would like to express the view that the imperialist propaganda concerning Poland, which is also broadcast to Hungary, implies that the other European socialist countries are equally nervous and concerned about the Polish events, claiming that we feared, as they say, the Polish pest. They declare that this could also undermine our order, etc.

I would like to say the following about that in order to avoid any misunderstandings: for the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and for the Hungarian people, a number of concerns exist in the current period of socialist construction. We have our own problems and worries, we are struggling with them, and we will resolve them in the appropriate manner.

In consideration of this I would like to state nevertheless: As far as we are concerned, the Polish events are of little concern to us in terms of [our] domestic politics. We do not fear any great disruption in connection with them. But our Party, our Government, our entire people are particularly concerned about the Polish question in international terms, and this is of concern to us all. [...]

What do we have to be aware of? It will, to a certain degree, surely be helpful for the Polish comrades to know what the mood is in our countries. They should know.

When we got the first news about the strikes on the coast, there were certain reactions [in Hungary]. I am speaking now not about the party members and the party leadership but about the man in the street, thus *de facto* about the ideologically and politically less qualified masses. The first reaction was as follows: What do the Polish comrades think they are doing? To work less and

earn more? Then it was said: What do the Polish comrades think they are doing: they want to strike and we are supposed to do the work?—I must frankly state here that this is what the feeling was. These feelings were there though everybody knows that there exists a historical friendship between our two nations. [...]

Now further on our attitude. We are in complete solidarity with the Polish Communists, with the PUWP, with the Polish working class, and—in the traditional sense of the word—with the Polish nation. We would like for the Polish comrades to solve their problems by themselves, to find a socialist solution of the problem under the leadership of their party. This is our attitude, which we publicly announced in parliament.

We can not, of course, determine the tasks of the Polish comrades and have no intention of doing so. Nevertheless, I would like to state a few things. We think that, in their current struggle, the Polish comrades should focus on maintaining the leading role of the Party and the socialist, constitutionally-determined social order as well as the political system in Poland. This includes the mass media, radio and TV. These media are integrally linked to the question of power, and I welcome Comrade Kania's words on this subject.

The third, central task is, it seems to me, the defense, and the protection of the Warsaw Defense Pact.

I would like to address one other point here. As other fraternal parties represented here, we maintain very broad international contacts with organizations, parties etc. Practically every week we entertain visitors. In the course of the last week, representatives of a number of fraternal parties were with us; we had a meeting with the Yugoslavs; and in the context of peaceful coexistence we met last week with capitalists as well. What I state here as the Hungarian position is the same thing which we presented in our conversations with the respective partners, be it Latin American Communists or any imperialist representatives; everywhere we state the same thing as I am doing here.

About ten days ago, a meeting with the British foreign minister [Lord Carrington] took place, and last week, [Hans-Jürgen] Wischniewski, the deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party in West Germany, was here at the request of [West German Chancellor Helmut] Schmidt. I categorically told the Yugoslav comrades as well as Wischniewski and the British foreign minister the following: Our position is that this is an internal Polish question which has to be resolved by the Poles; that we were in solidarity with the Poles; but I also stated that there were certain limits to this, I could not put it any other way for the gentlemen. Poland is not for sale, and Poland can not be bought. Poland can't be detached from the Warsaw Pact. This is what I stated and I declared that I was deeply convinced that there were strong forces in Hungary which held the same opinion and would not permit this to happen. That's how I represented my point of view and that's how I told them, in order to let them know what they have to

expect.

The British asked: What does this mean? Is this the end of détente?—I said: No, but if these limits are reached, then détente would really be over. He said yes and then shut up. The West German representative reacted similarly.

Recently, we have used certain exchanges of opinion and consultations [sic], and we are asked: Well, if you had to give us advice, would you recommend that we act as you did. I would like to address this [issue] very frankly.

As far as the Hungarian Party is concerned, we have no authority and no ambitions as well, to give advice to anybody or to consider ourselves a model. But at the same time, we ascribe importance to the great revolutionary experiences of all fraternal parties. We think consultations such as today's are very important, and let me add:

You cannot copy or mechanically transfer revolutionary experience. This does not work. And whenever I am talking about our position, about our attitude, it is in friendship that I would like to state what the Polish fraternal party should do or what we would do if we were in its place.

To my mind it is now of decisive importance to maintain the position since retreat, the slippery slope downward, has not yet ended. One has to get one's act together and go on the offensive.

The second thing I would say is the following: The decisive thing is that there is an unequivocal, decisive socialist platform for future developments. And this has to happen right away. While you now have a program, it has to become more consistent.

Comrade Kania spoke of the plenum, of re-elections in the base organizations. I am glad to hear you say that the plenum would have to be postponed a bit further; because I think: without a precise platform one cannot conduct a good plenum; then one cannot elect good leading organs in the local organizations, since one does not know exactly which of the cadres are good and which are bad.

When we stewed in our own bitter juice in 1956, we dealt with this question in this way. When I asked people: Is this person still alive? Does he work?, I was often told: I have known him for 30 years. I responded: 30 years are not enough. Tell me how he acted last week. People change their behavior in such situations [as in 1956].

For this, you need a program, so that everybody can determine his attitude towards the Party and its program. You have to start at the top.

We do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish Party, but our own experiences tell us: in the critical times, the most important organ for the unity and action of the Party is the Central Committee, the highest organ. If there is a clear program and unity [of opinion] in this organ, everything is all set. But if there are 20 different opinions in the CC, nothing will come of it.[...]

As far as we know, the Polish Party now has 3.5 million members. I know that the situation there is somewhat odd.

One should probably not conduct purges now, but unfortunately the events themselves have resulted in such a purge. It is not important what the membership numbers are; it is instead important how many people participate in the struggle, how many adhere to your program.

Put the other way: there is no point in trying to achieve the unity of the Party based on compromises at any price. We need a clear platform, which will serve as a rallying point and a purge device. I think such a program could easily be used to set oneself apart from certain things, to distance oneself from the mistakes of the previous leadership very clearly and decisively, not just in words but also in deed and action.

This is one aspect. I will neither praise Gierek nor insult him. While one has to distance oneself, I would like to state, comrades, that the entire Party, the entire country, is now looking for scapegoats, and it will again lead you nowhere to spend most of your time calling people to account.

I am reminded again of 1956. Initially, we completely ignored Rákosi, we distanced ourselves from him and other comrades, quickly distanced ourselves politically from their policies, and we postponed the calling-into-account until 1962. I am not arguing that the Party Control Commission should not do its work now, but it should not be the primary focus of your work. It can't be that the entire Party now preoccupies itself with this. People will have to know: once we regain our strength, we will call those responsible into account. It is now important that the people's government builds a socialist Poland and protects the constitution.

The second thing we need is the following: We have to watch very carefully as to what are the limits up to which one can go in great [public] speeches. One should now be able to defend the fundamental order of the republic, even in party matters, and the party members will vote. What function they will serve within the Party is a matter for the Party, not for the entire nation. The Communists first need to establish order within their own ranks. We do not need some democratic forces for that. Therefore this has to be the limit.

For example, when people are arrested and then set free again, then there will again be discussions about militia work. Even in the Western press it has been stated that no country on earth could permit such things to happen at all. This is not a matter of ideological argument but a matter of the legal order, which has to be upheld throughout the country.

In order to make clear the limits of democraticism [sic], you have to have a program and be determined to do certain things.

Certain events, for example, took place without bloodshed. This is, of course, not a small matter. It has to be evident that the Polish Party and the Polish Government are not exactly looking for confrontation. They above all are not out to have people shot. But the defense of certain things has to be guaranteed—a defense by all means. And

this has to become evident. This is the best way to avoid bloodshed. Because if it is clear that every means possible will be employed, bloodshed will be avoided. This is the best solution. [...]

Finally, I would like to say the following: There are other effects in Hungary. I don't want to tell you what a depressed state of affairs we were in during the months from October to December 1956, thus during the decisive hours. We were very pessimistic but our foreign comrades supported us. Above all the Soviet comrades came to our help and told us—I well remember this, this is not just propaganda—you now need a reasonable policy. You are stronger than you think! And the Polish comrades should know this too: in reality, the forces of socialism in Poland are stronger than they appear at a first, superficial glance. Within a short time, positive decisions should be reached. Once again: you are stronger than you think. [...]

Erich Honecker:

Dear Comrades! [...]

These consultations were urgently necessary in view of the developments in the People's Republic of Poland. The events in our neighboring country Poland greatly worry the leadership of our Party, the Communists, the citizens of the German Democratic Republic. Nobody who cares for the cause of peace and socialism can be indifferent to what is happening in the PR Poland. [...]

We fully share the opinion that the survival of socialism in Poland is in acute danger. We recently spoke to comrades Kania, Żabiński, Olszowski and others about this and have pointed out that it was necessary to put an end to these developments. At the same time, we provided Poland in this difficult situation with major material support. [...] The citizens of our republic are also aware of the huge amount of aid for Poland from the Soviet Union, the CSSR and other socialist countries. Our people are well aware of this. But there are many questions as to what exactly has improved since the 6th Plenum of the CC of the PUPW. Workers, members of the intelligentsia and others have expressed their disappointment that the visit by comrades Kania and Pińkowski with Comrade Brezhnev has not lived up to their expectations.

We fully agreed with the results of this Moscow trip. Comrade Kania assured us on November 8 that the PUPW leadership would not withdraw one more step. But then there was the decision of the Supreme Court of the PR Poland which revised the decision of the Warsaw court. The Party and Government once more retreated from the counterrevolutionary forces. This resulted in a rapid escalation of counterrevolutionary activities and a massive deterioration of the situation. This was a major setback for all those who had hoped that the PUPW would master the problems. This is the main reason for the widespread discussions of the current situation in Poland within our Party and among our people and for the growing serious concerns about socialism in Poland which marks these

discussions.

There is obviously no disagreement among us about the fact that already the capitulation towards the strike committees in Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie was a mistake. But we don't want to judge this here. The fact is that following this capitulation, the enemy of the government sensed a chance to spread the strike and riots throughout the country. While weeks ago the strikes were confined above all to social demands, more recently political slogans have come increasingly to the fore.

The decision of the Supreme Court prevented a general strike, but "Solidarity" proved that it could initiate strikes at any time and thus blackmail the Party and Government. It even managed to force the liberation of people who had clearly been proved to have committed crimes. Yes, it even gained the assurance that it would be allowed to enter into negotiations on security matters. Such concessions inevitably will undermine the authority of the Party, other state and its organs. This has to worry everybody who is faithfully committed to the cause of socialism.

I was in Austria at the time of the Supreme Court deliberations. Kirchschräger and Kreisky asked my opinion about the events in Poland. We agreed, despite differing class positions, that Poland would be able to manage its affairs. Then, in the midst of a conversation with Kirchschräger, the news of the Supreme Court decision arrived. Honestly, I would never have been able to come up with such an idea: The Party becomes an appendix to the statute. I had gone to Vienna, basing my assumptions on what Comrade Kania had said. As many others, I never expected such a result.

As the current events show, the leadership of "Solidarity" and the forces behind it, especially KOR, consistently follow well-known counterrevolutionary strategy. Taking advantage of a wave of strikes, they established their organization in the shape of a union. Today they already have a legal political party. Their blackmail tactics have now resulted in a direct struggle for political power. The counterrevolutionary leaders—as Comrade Kania has stated—do not hide the fact that their objective is the elimination of the PUPW as the leading power [and] the elimination of socialist achievements. Initially, the strike organizations prevented anti-socialist and anti-Soviet slogans. Today they feel strong enough to pay homage to Piłsudski and to attack the Soviet Union, the GDR, the CSSR and the other fraternal socialist countries. As the facts prove, they are about to inflame a nationalist, anti-socialist hysteria.

Dear Comrades! One can hardly ignore that the events in Poland are for the main part the result of a coordinated plan of the internal and foreign counterrevolution. It is a part of the imperialist policy of confrontation and increased diversion against the socialist countries. It is important to recognize that the PUPW is confronted with an irreconcilable enemy. In order to defeat the counterrevolution, we think one needs an unambiguous

concept, an unambiguous policy of the Party, from top to the bottom.

You won't get anywhere with a boundless discussion of mistakes, to our mind. I would like to state that the damage of "propaganda of failures" is much higher than any "propaganda of success." In any case, you can't permit a situation in which the truth is suppressed in the public. This truth is that socialism, its shortcomings and mistakes notwithstanding, has brought the Polish nation great achievements, that not the Polish United Workers' Party but the leaders of "Solidarity" and the people who direct them are responsible for the current situation. Of course, one has to differentiate between a manipulated worker and the anti-socialist forces, but one also has to say clearly who the enemy is. [...]

Dear Comrades! We have to assume that, unfortunately, the situation in the PR Poland has developed to a point where administrative measures are necessary in addition to political measures, in order to destroy the counterrevolutionary conspiracy and stabilize the government. As you well know, we also had a difficult situation in the German Democratic Republic in 1953. Back then we still had an open border with the Federal Republic of Germany. The imperialists were instigating the fall of the workers-and-peasant power from without and counted on the counterrevolution from within. We therefore had to act quickly. We combined political with administrative measures. We made a public appeal to the party members and functionaries of our Party, to all who were committed to the defense and strengthening of the workers-and-peasants state. Within a short time we managed to isolate the counterrevolutionary forces from the workers and to defeat them.

It was stated here rightfully that the revolution could develop peacefully or in a non-peaceful manner, as we all know. As a Communist you have to be ready to consider both options as the situation demands and to act accordingly in the decisive moments. If the workers-and-peasants power, the government, is at risk, if it has to be protected from counterrevolutionary forces which are determined to go all the way, then there remains no other choice than to deploy the security organs of the workers-and-peasants state. This was our experience in 1953. This became evident in the events of 1956 in Hungary, about which Comrade Kádár spoke, and [in the events] of 1968 in the CSSR.

The representatives of the various groups, which now are mushrooming in Poland, state as a cover-up of their true intentions that their objective was the "democratic renewal of socialism" in Poland. But the opposite is the case. NATO and the EC declare quite frankly that this was a matter that falls under their protection.

I can remember quite well the conversation with Dubček on the occasion of the Dresden meeting in 1968 when I got him from the airport and took him to his residence. In the course of one hour Dubček tried to convince me what was happening in the CSSR was not a

counterrevolution but a "process of democratic renewal of socialism." What happened later, everybody knows. The Czechoslovak comrades under the leadership of Comrade Husák have composed a document about this that taught us a lot.

We are of the opinion that PUWP has enough healthy forces to solve the urgent tasks, based on the announcement of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, its directives and a clear plan. As we know, the PUWP has available reliable forces in its security organs, and we are convinced that the army as well will fulfill its patriotic and internationalist duty. This is how we understood the declaration of the Military Council of the Ministry for National Defense of the PR Poland, which was published after the 7th Plenum of the CC of the PUWP. In addition, there is the possibility of arming the healthy forces, about which Comrade Kania spoke here, within the Party and among the workers. We agree with Comrade Kania that there can be no further steps in retreat in the current situation. Only through the struggle against the counterrevolution can the Party unite its members and functionaries, [and] all class-conscious workers and lead them to success.

We in the German Democratic Republic are situated along the line that separates us from the Federal Republic and NATO. On a daily basis, we feel how the imperialist enemy tries to transfer counterrevolutionary activities from Poland to our country as well. The TV stations of the FRG, which can be received in our republic, have never previously reported so much about Poland and have never shown so much interest in the events in Polish factories. They have associated this for five months now with the call to do the same thing [in the GDR] as is now happening in Poland. They describe the developments in the PR Poland as an example of "democratic reform" and "necessary changes" in all socialist countries. That is why we were forced to tell our Party clearly what we thought of the developments in our socialist neighbor country. I stated in a speech before the party activists in Gera that insurmountable limits have been set on the counterrevolution west of the Elbe and Wera. This was not only understood well on our side [of the border]. Our Party takes a class-conscious view of the events in Poland. This also concerns the measures on the temporary limitation of the cross-border traffic.

Dear Comrades! We have gathered here in order to consult collectively on the possible support by the fraternal countries, which might be useful to Comrade Kania and all the comrades in the PUWP in strengthening the people's power in Poland. Our Party and our people have great expectations with regard to this meeting.

Never before has our Party felt so closely connected with the PUWP as in these difficult days and weeks. In this vein we have given orientation to the members of our Party. We remain in solidarity with the fraternal Polish people and its Party, the Polish United Workers' Party. And we are convinced: the cause of socialism will win.

Thank you for your attention.

Nicolae Ceaușescu:

Esteemed comrades! [...]

There are difficulties in some socialist countries. This is true for the events in Poland. This ought to give us cause to analyze the situation very seriously, to solve all problems, the problems of socialist and Communist construction, through collaboration among the socialist countries, based on our own strength. This is all the more important now that we approach the conclusion of the five-year plans and are passing to a new phase of economic and social development for the years 1981 to 1985.

I think I am not wrong in assuming: if we had analyzed the problems of the construction of socialism in our countries more frequently and thoroughly, we would have been able to avoid even the events in Poland. One has to assume that the cooperation of the socialist countries, the successful construction of socialism and Communism, is of special importance to our countries, but at the same time to the maintenance of socialist principles throughout the world, the entire international situation, the policy of détente, peace, and national independence. The socialist countries should demonstrate that they can indeed solve complex problems in the appropriate manner, that socialism provides a firm basis for economic development. One can say that socialism is quite capable of overcoming the appearances of an economic crisis situation and of giving the people greater independence and economic stability.

In the context of our discussions, it was emphasized that the events in Poland stand at the center of attention of the Communist parties and of the people of our community of states as well as all communist parties and progressive forces in the world. The entire international public also watches these events. There is no doubt that differing interpretations exist [as well as] different possibilities of analyzing the events.

But one can only say one thing: There is the concern and indeed the desire to have these problems resolved by the Poles themselves and to avoid their damaging the policy of détente, peace and cooperation. [...]

I would like to state initially that the Romanian Communist Party, our Central Committee and the Romanian people, are of the opinion that the problems in Poland should be solved by the PUWP, the Polish working class, the Polish people in complete unity and based on the assumption that it is necessary to assure the socialist development of Poland, to strengthen the economic base of Poland's independence and sovereignty and the material wealth of the Polish people, and to strengthen the cooperation between the socialist countries.

It is not the time now (and there is no reason) to have a thorough discussion about the reasons for this development. One thing is clear: economic difficulties

have exerted a strong influence on developments. As is evident from the decisions of the Plenum, today's state of crisis was also caused by some mistakes which happened in implementing socialist principles and the leading role of the Party, in securing the unity of the working class and the broad masses of the people. [...]

Comrade Kania has correctly stated that—and this is also evident from the Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party—attention has been called to the intensification the activities of the anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary elements in the country. To our mind, today's state of affairs could have been avoided if greater determination had been demonstrated previously. Even if there is dissatisfaction, you could have prevented the current dangerous course of events by greater determination. [...]

We do not want to interfere here in the internal events of Poland. The PUWP, the Polish working class and the Polish people as well as all the progressive forces in Poland know that they have to find the appropriate ways to overcome this situation, develop the economy, increase the standard of living, based on socialist construction and according to conditions in Poland.

Everything should be done to have an unambiguous orientation, to develop a program which makes it clear how the problems are to be solved—a program which the broad masses of the people will understand well and which then becomes the action program of above all the working class. One cannot imagine overcoming the current crisis situation without such a political program, which involves the working class and the people. [...]

We also do not understand how it was possible for so-called independent free unions to be established. But they are a reality today, and you indeed have to take them into consideration. One ought to act in [such] a way [so] that the unity of the workers and the unity of the unions—based on socialism—are regained. But for this purpose, you will need a clear policy and an unambiguous program even in this area, and that will take some time. [...]

I would like to underline again that the Polish comrades will have to do everything—it is their great international and national obligation—to assure socialist construction on their own. One also can not neglect the fact that the possibility of an external intervention would pose a great danger for socialism in general, for the policy of détente, and for the policy of peace. That's why we should give the Polish comrades all-out support to allow them to fulfill the tasks of securing the socialist construction of Poland on their own and in their own ways, which they indeed have. [...]

Gustáv Husák:

Dear Comrades! [...]

You can sense great concern about the current events in Poland in our Party and our people. This is not just because we are immediate neighbors—we have a common

border line of some 1,300 km, and this is, by the way, our longest border—but also because the threat to socialism in Poland constitutes a threat to our joint interests.

We in Czechoslovakia underwent a complicated process of development as well, when the counterrevolution went on the counteroffensive in our country, when the danger of civil war in the CSSR arose, and when there was a deadly danger to socialism. Comrade Kádár has reminded us of the events in Hungary in 1956, and Comrade Honecker has spoken about the events in the GDR.

The events which took place 12 years ago in Czechoslovakia still live in our memories, and in watching the events unfold in Poland today, we compare them to our own experience, even though we, of course, recognize the differences in time and circumstances.

But all these events in Hungary, in the GDR, in Czechoslovakia and now in Poland are characterized by a common goal on the part of the anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary forces of the forces which want to roll back socialism in Poland and detach these countries from the socialist camp. [...]

In our country, dissatisfaction also grew among the people, and we had to eliminate deformations, mistakes and shortcomings within the Party as well as within society.[...]

The imperialists quickly realized that an excellent opportunity had been given in Czechoslovakia to reach their long-term goal of destabilizing socialism. What took place there in those summer months in 1968 had long been prepared by imperialist circles and various reactionary, anti-socialist forces. This is also what has happened this summer in Poland.

The enemy has drawn conclusions from the events in Poland and in the CSSR. He proceeded differently in the CSSR than in Hungary, and he drew his conclusions from the events in the CSSR. He now acts differently in Poland than he did in the CSSR. He takes advantage of social dissatisfaction, of economic shortcomings, and tries to win over the masses by social demagoguery and to direct them towards anti-socialist actions, towards actions against the Party.

As it was, in the bourgeois propaganda, the CSSR became the best model of the democratic reform of socialism, that is, socialism with a human face. The CSSR was held up to all other socialist countries as a model. Even the Pope prayed for this process, for the rebirth of Czechoslovakia, and for Dubček as well, and if anything bad was done in the socialist countries, our country was pointed out as an example. As Comrade Honecker said, the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia. Now they would like to export Poland's crisis to the CSSR, the GDR and the other countries. We, of course, have introduced all necessary measures against this, and as far as we are concerned, there is no reason to be concerned.

[...]

The situation [in Czechoslovakia in 1968] culminated

to the point at which we could not fight off the attack of the counterrevolution by ourselves. In order to prevent a civil war and to defend socialism, the socialist fraternal countries were asked for internationalist support. This is our view of the situation back then. This support prevented the detachment of the CSSR from the socialist camp. It gave the Party the chance to solve the problems. The CSSR economy had been disrupted. The internal market, the economy and the entire structure of society had been shaken and shattered, and the Party had been torn apart.

It took great efforts to repair the damage that had been done. The CPCz managed to do this after 1969 thanks to the help by the other fraternal countries. I am not reminding you of our experience in order to argue for extreme and radical solutions, but I do this in order to demonstrate that due to the inconsistency of our previous leadership it was necessary to resort to an extreme solution in the interest of defending socialism.

Following the installation of the new leadership, it became clear that the enemy, which had maintained that it would completely support the people and the Party, actually had a petit-bourgeois attitude. We uncovered the counterrevolution and its representatives, precisely with the goal of showing the people what they had been after. We juxtaposed this with the progressive program of our Party. As a result, our people have completely supported the Marxist-Leninist program of our Party and have defeated the counterrevolution.

We know, dear comrades, that these problems of which I have spoken, were of a different sort. It seems to me that the PUWP has a better leadership today than we in the CSSR had back then. But the question of decisiveness and determination to solve the problems energetically remains acute.

With my contribution, dear comrades, I wanted to show the creeping manner that the counterrevolution acted in the CSSR and what experience our Party had. The development of recent years shows that you need a Marxist-Leninist party to defend socialism adequately and to defeat the opportunist, counterrevolutionary and revanchist forces. You need firm unity, courage, and determination for the solution of the most complicated problems and to avoid departing from the right point of view. One needs to have a clear, consistent program and on this basis mobilize the Communists.

[...]

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Permit me as well to make a few remarks. —Dear Comrades! [...]

The Polish events worry us in particular. We for the most part have talked about Poland. It pains us to see fraternal Poland going through a profound, difficult crisis. The crisis could have been avoided. It could have been suppressed and turned around in its initial phase, prior to the negative turn of events. But this did not happen.

In the course of the past four years, we have asked questions about the alarming tendencies in the People's Republic of Poland in our talks with Comrade Gierek. This summer in the Crimea, I emphasized again that a decisive political fight against the anti-socialist elements was necessary. In response, we were told that nothing of special concern was happening, that there was no opposition, and that the PPR and the Party were in control of the situation. —What had happened? Was it carelessness, hubris? Were certain ambitions the cause? —I don't know.

And now the crisis, as we can see, has developed into a difficult question not for Poland and its Communists alone. The crisis hurts the entire socialist community, the international Communist movement. It can have a negative impact on the general balance of power. [...]

The situation, which the comrades have described here, demands a different way of thinking and acting. One has to realize that the counterrevolution is oriented towards the real conditions as they exist today. It would not risk, and would not have risked, raising itself against the government, if the Polish United Workers' Party had been completely mobilized in the face of the events, if its actions had been characterized by determination and toughness.

This might sound too sharp or too harsh. But it would be completely justified to say that the crisis throughout the country accords with the crisis within the Party. [...]

One month ago we spoke at length with comrades Kania and Pińkowski. The topic of conversation was the situation as it had developed. We completely agreed in the evaluation of the situation and our determination of ways to overcome the crisis. We assumed that there was no room for retreat. We have to turn the course of events around and should not wait until the enemy has the Party with its back against the wall. In one word: the Polish comrades themselves must go on the offensive against the counterrevolution and its intellectual heads. The Polish comrades and we were of the opinion that the core of the matter and the most important thing was to restore the fighting spirit of the Party, to restore unity in its ranks and to mobilize all units of the Party. We were all of the opinion that the PUWP could rely on the healthy forces within the nation, the army, the militia, and the state security organs as well as on that part of the union that has remained faithful to the Party.

As far as I know, the comrades of the other fraternal parties share our point of view.

As you know, Comrade Kania has explained that the situation has gotten worse and could not be stabilized. [...]

The comrades here have emphasized that a bitter class struggle is occurring in Poland. What is lacking? The objective is clear: Socialism must be defended! It is also clear from where the danger is emanating. The enemy's scheme has become fairly evident, and it is clear which positions he intends to take next. There is most likely a center which directs the actions of the counterrevolution

and which coordinates the various departments' tactics and strategy within and outside of Poland. [...]

Particularly acute is the problem of the mass media. Unfortunately one has to admit that the situation most recently has not worked out in favor of the PUWP.

As far as the army is concerned, it would be wrong to assume that the events have not left any traces there. Through various channels, among others the Polish Church, obstinate attempts are being made to neutralize and subvert the armed forces.

We are not exaggerating at all concerning the question of responsibility, but instead are basing our views on the information from the Polish friends. During the entire crisis we have shown complete understanding for the Polish comrades' [desire] to solve the crisis by political means. We do not favor taking extreme measures without extreme circumstances, and we understand the caution. But this is certain: should the enemy assume power, he would not hold back like that. From experience we know that the enemy, once in power, immediately takes extreme measures in order to eliminate the Party and destroy socialism. He is, after all, no longer discreet in his choice of weapons: Unauthorized occupation of plants, of universities, administrative buildings, the nerve centers of transport and media, which affect the vital interests of the Warsaw Pact organization. Are these legitimate weapons? And the dishonoring of honest workers, of Communists by forcing them to join "Solidarity", the increasing incidents of ridiculing people in military uniforms, the incidents of sabotage in the distribution of food stuffs and consumer goods, in the transport of Polish newspapers, the cases of hiding of food which further worsen the situation, and the uncontrolled import of foreign currencies, typewriters and TVs into Poland, not to speak of the threat to life to which Communists and their families have been subjected. One can certainly not say that the opposition has held back, and hence the ongoing confrontation.

The reserve of the Polish Party is interpreted by the opposition as a sign of weakness and indetermination, as a loss of faith in the [Party's] own capabilities and power. The Supreme Court has annulled the decision of the Warsaw court and registered "Solidarity". Wałęsa has drawn the conclusion that one can press further. I brought Gierek to power and I deposed him, and I can also bring the new leadership down, if I want to, he declared in an interview. This is the tone in which such things are already discussed!

It would be unforgivable not to draw any basic conclusions from such a difficult text. It is our duty not to mince words. A terrible danger hovers over socialism in Poland. The enemy has managed to open up a rift between the Party and a major part of the workers.

The Polish comrades have thus far not found a method to open the eyes of the masses, showing them that the counterrevolution intends to throw out not only the Communists but also the best elements of the entire nation.

The strategic point is that the Polish comrades have to

state harshly and confidently: No step back, only ahead! Hence the lost positions have to be regained one after another. One has to secure the restoration of the leading role of the PUWP, one has to go on the offensive.

I have already mentioned our talks with Comrade Kania and Pińkowski. Unfortunately, by far not all the measures for a normalization of the situation in Poland, which we talked about, have been implemented. Today these measures are even more necessary and less avoidable. That is the conclusion one can draw from an analysis of the work of the Plenum of the CC of the PUWP. Based on the decisions of this Plenum, the Polish friends could do a lot to improve of the situation within the Party as well as within society.

The task of all tasks is to strengthen the Party organizationally, to enhance its fighting capabilities. It seems to us that one has to pose sharply the question of maintaining the norm of democratic socialism within the Party, the Leninist norms and methods of the Party. [...]

Our experience proves—and the CPSU has gone through many trials in its history: In extraordinary circumstances it can be helpful to establish a special commission of CC delegates who have full plenipotentiary power. They should be deployed wherever they can be helpful to the country, wherever vital areas are concerned. [...]

Comrade Kania and others have talked about the Polish Church. Hence I will be brief. It is clear to us that a confrontation with the Church would only worsen the situation. But with this in mind we should influence as far as possible the moderate circles within the Catholic Church in our direction and keep them from closely allying themselves with the extreme anti-socialist forces and those who desire the fall of socialism in Poland and to take over power.

I repeat once again and once more: It is extremely important to restore control over the mass media. To let the mass media slip out of the control of the Party would mean to hand the enemy a very sharp weapon. We know that this is one of the greatest problems for the PUWP. [...]

A lot of correct things have already been said here about the intentions and actions of the imperialist reaction. The West does not limit itself to watching the events in Poland unfold, it is directly involved. There are probably certain connections between the attempts of the international reactionary forces to launch an offensive on the position of the socialist system and an activation of the counterrevolution in Poland. I sense this in our contacts with the US and other capitalist countries. We have unequivocally warned them against interference in internal Polish affairs. We have made it clear to them that neither Poland's Communists nor the friends and allies of Poland would allow them to tear Poland out of the socialist community. It has been and will be an inseparable member of the political, economic and military system of socialism.

Comrades! Officially the situation in Poland is not termed an emergency situation [martial law]. But in reality it is! Of course, the formal act does not matter. Hence the Polish comrades are acting correctly when they prepare for extraordinary measures. Intermediate steps have to be taken immediately since there is no time left until the start of the counteroffensive. Tomorrow it will be more difficult than today to cope with the counterrevolution.

The situation at communication lines, especially in the railroads and harbors, merits extreme attention. An economic catastrophe threatens Poland in the event of the stoppage of transport facilities. It would constitute a blow against the economic interests of a number of socialist states. I repeat: In no case can we allow the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries to be endangered due to transportation difficulties. A precise plan has to be developed as to how army and security forces can secure control over the transportation facilities and main communication lines, and this plan has to be effectively implemented. Without declaring martial law it is useful to establish military command posts and introduce patrolling services along the railroads.

[Concluding remarks regarding public communiqué.]

End of the Meeting: 15:30

[Source: *SAPMO-BArch, J IV 2/2 A-2368. Published in Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." The SED contra Polen. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 140-195. Translated by Christian F. Ostermann]*

Report regarding a confidential discussion with the Supreme Commander of the Combined Military Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries on 7 April 1981 in LEGNICA (PR Poland) following the evaluation meeting of the Joint Operative-Strategic Command Staff Exercise "SOYUZ-81"

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In accordance with the instructions of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED and the Chairman of the National Defense Council of the GDR, Comrade Erich Honecker, and on the basis of the tasks as given by the Minister for National Defense, Comrade Army General Hoffmann, Comrade Lieutenant General Keßler, and Comrade Lieutenant General Streletz, had a confidential discussion with the Supreme Commander of the United Military Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov on 7 April 1981, following the evaluation meeting by the Joint Operative-Strategic Command Staff Exercise "SOYUZ-81."

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov began with thanks for the greetings communicated from Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Minister Hoffmann and emphasized that he had obtained authorization for the discussion from Politburo member and Minister for Defense of the Soviet Union, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov.

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov continued:

He had been in the PR Poland now already a month and, due to personal cooperation with the leadership of the Polish party and government was able to obtain a picture of the situation in the PR Poland.

For the duration of his stay, he had been in constant contact with the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Comrade Kania, as well as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister for National Defense of the PR Poland, Comrade Army General Jaruzelski. Usually, the bilateral meetings took place without witnesses in an open, party-minded atmosphere. Due to this it was possible to explain openly and directly the point of view of the Soviet comrades to the leadership of party and government as well as to the army leadership of the PR Poland.

For the past four weeks, the Soviet side has placed an array of specialists in WARSAW, e.g. members of the State Planning Commission, the organs of committees for State Security, General Staff of the Military Forces and of the Department of Rearward Services [Bereich Rückwärtige Dienste] of the Soviet Army. They have all received instructions from Comrade Brezhnev to help the Polish comrades.

All of the work that Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov and the other Soviet comrades in WARSAW have conducted in the past weeks is based strictly on the results of the consultations with the General and First Secretaries of the fraternal parties in MOSCOW.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov has continually reported to Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov on the activities and the situation in the PR Poland, who in turn periodically has informed the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

The prolongation of the exercise "SOYUZ-81" came explicitly as a result of the requests of comrades Jaruzelski and Kania. They wanted to utilize the exercises to strengthen their position. Simultaneously they hoped to exert a positive influence on the progressive forces in Poland and to show "Solidarity" and "KOR," that the Warsaw Pact countries are prepared to render Poland help all around. Thereby a certain pressure should also be exerted upon the leadership of "Solidarity."

It was of great political significance that Comrade Minister Hoffmann and Comrade Minister Dzur [Czechoslovak defense minister] participated in the joint exercises "DRUSHBA-81" of the Soviet army and the

Polish army on the territory of the PR Poland. With that, proletarian internationalism was demonstrated in action for friend and enemy alike.

Overall, Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski correctly assess the situation. They view the causes for the crisis, however, in the political, ideological, and economic spheres, particularly in the mistakes that were made in the past; primarily in mistakes in party work, in the neglect of ideological work and in work among the youth, as well as in other spheres. A realistic evaluation of the counterrevolution in Poland from a class standpoint is unfortunately not to be found with either. They do not see the entire development in Poland as a socio-political process with profound class causes. They also do not see that "Solidarity" is increasingly gaining power, and has the goal of ending the leading role of the party. The counterrevolution in Poland is carefully planned, meticulously prepared, and supported in many ways both by the FRG and the USA. The goal of the counterrevolutionary machinations in Poland in particular is to bring the GDR, the CSSR, and the Soviet Union into a difficult situation so as to shake violently the entire socialist bloc.

Until the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP, the work proceeded more or less normally during every meeting of Comrade Kulikov with Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski. It was frankly explained to the Polish comrades how the work should continue to proceed, to which they all agreed.

Meetings with Comrades Erich Honecker, Gustav Husák, and János Kádár had made a lasting impression on Comrade Kania.

Before the 9th Plenum the Polish comrades were made aware that it was absolutely necessary to present clearly the general line of party work before the Central Committee, to define and fix the phases of the future work and the ways the Polish party and government leadership want to settle the situation. It should be made clear how the battle against "Solidarity" and "KOR" can be led offensively and how a proper relationship towards the Church could be produced.

The course and results of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP prove, however, that these hints and suggestions that had been previously agreed upon, were not given the necessary attention. The 9th Plenum took the decision to arrive at a stabilization of the situation in the PR Poland through military means. The statements, however, lacked objective conditions.

There was no unity within the Politburo, although it still formally existed after the 9th Plenum. The Gdansk party organization demanded a report regarding the fulfillment of the decisions of the Central Committee. Since the decisions until then had not been fulfilled, the Party leadership was to be dismissed due to incompetence.

Negative forces were to establish a new Politburo. Consequently, Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Comrade Grabski spoke

up, emphasizing that the Politburo should not capitulate and he would not resign. His determined and positive appearance brought about a turning point in the meeting of the Central Committee. The Politburo then received a vote of confidence. There was, however, considerable criticism of the performance of the Politburo leadership.

One worker who came before the Plenum spoke better than all the leading party functionaries. He brought to attention the fact that everyone waits for instructions from above. Since the situation in every region is different, the lower party cadres must show more initiative, and not constantly wait for instructions from above.

The demand was once again stated at the 9th Plenum to convene a party conference within a short time, to begin with the electoral meetings in the local organizations, and to convene a meeting of the Sejm in the following days in any case.

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov had spoken with Comrade Kania for that reason, and he had to concede that the goal of the 9th Plenum had not been achieved.

After the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee Comrade Kania declared surprisingly that

- the party is too weak to lead an offensive against “Solidarity;”
- many party members are organized within “Solidarity”, and defend its ideas;
- an open confrontation, an open attack through the organs of the party, government, and instruments of force is not possible at this point;
- while it is true that there are a number of “bridgeheads,” they are, however, not sufficient for an open counterattack against “Solidarity” and “KOR.”
- While the balance of power has changed now in favor of “Solidarity,” three to four months ago it still seemed to be considerably more favorable, and that it would have been good had certain offensive measures been conducted at this time.

Comrade Kania further stated that the Polish army in the present circumstances can only fulfill its tasks in the interior of the country with great difficulties. The organs of state security would have little success fighting offensively either.

Until the 9th Plenum, Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski had always agreed with the estimate of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov that the Polish Army and the security organs were prepared to fulfill any assignment given to them by the party and state leadership.

Following the 9th Plenum, however, Comrade Kania took the position that they could not rely on the army and the security organs, and was not certain whether they would uphold the party and state leadership in a critical situation.

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov tried to dissuade Comrade Kania from this view, showing him positive examples of the Polish army, and underlined that Soviet comrades were of the opinion that the army and

security organs were prepared to end the counterrevolution at the order of the party and government leadership. Comrade Kania did not share this opinion.

That had generally negative consequences. The very next day Comrade Jaruzelski also defended this view that the army and security forces were not prepared for internal deployment, and that one could not rely fully upon them. This position of Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski is their own invention. Comrade Kulikov said to Comrade Jaruzelski, “You have now broken off the branch upon which you sit. How will things go for you now?”

Due to the view of the Polish party, state, and army leadership, the subordinate generals and admirals up to division commanders immediately joined their superiors in their estimate. Even those commanders who had previously affirmed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov that they and their troops would follow any order of the party and state leadership, now swore that at once that they could not rely upon 50 to 60 percent of their soldiers and non-commissioned officers. Following the 9th Plenum, the commander of the air-land division in KRAKOW also advanced the view that he could only rely upon 50% of his personal forces.

It was also subtly brought to Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov’s attention that it could even be possible that, in the event of an invasion by other Warsaw Pact troops, certain units might rebel.

In this connection, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov emphasized and made clear that one could not lead an army or make policy with sharp appearances, boot-heels clicking, and a good posture, but that one rather needs a realistic evaluation of the situation and a clear class position.

The view of Comrade Jaruzelski that the Polish party and state leadership had won a strategic battle in BYDGOSZCZ was also incomprehensible to Comrade Kulikov. In order to correctly evaluate the situation, one must understand that Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski are personal friends and lay down the course of the party. Comrade Jaruzelski is the theoretical brain who lays the direction for the further work.

Regarding the health condition of Comrade Jaruzelski, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov called to attention the fact that he is currently stricken by the flu and is physically and mentally exhausted. The estimate by the Foreign Minister of the GDR, Comrade Fischer, was totally correct, even though there were some who did not want to admit it.

During the last conversations with Comrade Jaruzelski one could notice that he did not always have control over himself. He always wore darkened eyeglasses, even on official occasions, in order to conceal nervous eye movements.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov concluded that Comrade Jaruzelski is very self-confident, and that he is not expecting his eventual removal, for he assumes that the people trust him. Regarding how the situation should

develop after the 90 days agreed to by “Solidarity,” he did not say.

A part of the Politburo is for Comrade Jaruzelski and supports him completely. He acts extremely liberally and enjoys therefore a reputation through broad segments of society.

The Soviet comrades believe that Comrade Jaruzelski is not the man who can turn the course of events. Until now he has made great concessions in all areas, for instance with respect to:

- the events in BYDGOSZCZ
- the work among the youth
- Russian instructions in school as well as
- with respect to the Catholic Church.

He has very frequent discussions with the Polish Cardinal Wyszynski and hopes for the support of the Catholic Church. Wyszynski also holds Comrade Jaruzelski in high esteem, which is evident from many of his statements.

One must frankly admit that the Polish United Workers Party is currently weaker than the Catholic Church and “Solidarity.”

No one knows yet exactly how many members “Solidarity” has. One estimate is from 8 to 10 million, of which one million are supposed to be party members.

On 10 April 1981, a meeting of the Sejm is to be convened. One should not count on any fundamentally new questions. There are two papers on the economic situation provided by Comrades Jagielski and Kiesiel. Afterwards Comrade Jaruzelski wants to give an evaluation of the situation in Poland. The adoption of decisions regarding the limitation on the right to strike, censorship and the utilization of mass media is also on the agenda. In any case, it would be desirable if the Sejm were to make decisions that would set specific limits on the counterrevolution.

Leading Polish comrades unfortunately believe that they can solve all problems through political means—hoping especially that everything will clear up on its own. One cannot share such a view. It must frankly be stated that the moment to act was not taken by the Polish party and state leadership.

Altogether one has the impression that Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski do not wish to use force in order to remain “clean Poles.”

Both fear utilizing the power of the state (army and security organs) to restore order. They argue formally that the Polish constitution does not provide for a state of emergency, and that [Article 33](#) of the Polish constitution only refers to the national defense. Although Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov repeatedly called to their attention that in such a situation Article 33 on national defense could and had to be used, both remained unwilling to take such a decision.

The entire documentation for martial law was prepared

in close cooperation by Soviet and Polish comrades. This cooperation proceeded in an open and candid atmosphere. The Soviet comrades did not have the impression that the Polish generals and officers were concealing anything from them. Nevertheless, this documentation remains only on paper for it has not yet been implemented.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov tried to make it clear to Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski that they do not need to fear a strike. They should follow the example of the capitalists in reacting to strikes. Since “Solidarity” knows that the party and state leadership of the PR Poland fear a general strike, they utilize this to exert pressure and implement their demands.

A difficulty exists in the fact that a great part of the workers in Poland are also independent farmers and would not be greatly affected by the strikes, for they would be working in their own fields during this time. The size of the well-organized working class in Poland is small.

In the countryside, current production is limited to what is necessary for one’s own needs, which means that only private fields are cultivated. How national food supplies will develop no one knows.

Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski estimate that the greatest economic support by the capitalist countries comes from France and the FRG. The USA drags its feet when it comes to aid.

The sooner the phase of obliterating the counterrevolution would begin, the better for the development of Poland and for the stabilization of the socialist bloc collectively. Not only Comrade Kania, but also Comrade Jaruzelski, however, lack determination and resoluteness in their work.

Half a year ago, Comrade Jaruzelski had announced at the meetings of the commanders that he would not give any orders for the deployment of the army against the workers.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov made it clear to him that the army would not be deployed against the working class, but rather against the counterrevolution, against the enemies of the working class as well as violent criminals and bandits. He did not answer the question in a concrete manner. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov hopes that Comrade Jaruzelski will revise his position. Although Minister Jaruzelski holds all the power in his hands, he does not wield it decisively. Since the Poles, being devout Catholics, all pray on Saturday and Sunday, the weekend would present itself as an opportunity to take effective measures.

The Polish army remains at this time, however, in the barracks, and is not allowed on the exercise grounds and accordingly therefore does not conduct marches—for fear of the people (in reality of “Solidarity”).

Upon the suggestion by Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov that columns of the Polish army be permitted to drive through the big cities in particular as a demonstration of power, he was told that this would only unleash more criticism.

On 12 April 1981, 52,000 Polish soldiers were to be dismissed. The Soviet comrades suggested to the Polish army leadership postponing the dismissal until 27 April 1981. They did not agree and the dismissal took place on 12 April 1981. It was stated that five battalions comprised of 3,000 men were always ready to accomplish any mission. That would be sufficient. A suspension of the dismissal would only cause negative moods among the army.

Among the leading cadres of the army, currently the following things are notable:

The chief of the General Staff, General Siwicki, creates an impression of helplessness in decisive matters, and waits for orders from above.

He's always going around in circles. At first, he was proactive, but increasingly is showing an attitude of surrender.

General Melczyk, seen as a positive force, is always kept in the background by the Polish comrades.

The chief of the Head Political Administration, Division General Baryla is a loyal comrade, but does nothing, and hides behind the orders of Minister Jaruzelski.

The chiefs of the military districts SILESIA and POMORZE, Division General Rapacewicz and Division General Uzycki, follow in the wake of Minister Jaruzelski.

The most progressive soldier at this point is the chief of the Warsaw Military District, Division General Oliwa.

The chief of the Navy, Admiral Janczyszyn, first was in favor of "Solidarity," but suddenly, however, he is taking a different stand. This is not seen as honest. The leadership of the security organs confronts sizeable difficulties, since it receives no support from party and state leadership.

Within the rank and file, occurrences of resignation and capitulation are spreading in the face of difficulties.

The reported situation notwithstanding, the Soviet comrades are of the opinion that we should continue to support Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski, for there are no other alternatives at this point.

Comrades Grabski and Kiesiel are currently the most progressive forces within the Polish leadership. They do not, however, succeed with their demands.

Comrade Barcikowski, who is the Second Secretary within the Central Committee of the PUWP, is a comrade without a particular profile. His statements and his overall appearance during the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP prove this.

Comrade Olszowski also does not live up to expectations.

Comrade Pinkowski, the second-in-command to Comrade Jaruzelski, should be released from his duties, but remains in office.

Central Committee member and Minister of the Interior, Comrade Milewski, who possesses a clear position on all questions, and is prepared to shoulder responsibility, impressed Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov in a positive way.

The greatest share of the intelligentsia is reactionary and supports "Solidarity." For example, the director of the Institute for Marxism/Leninism, Werblan, should be dismissed due to his reactionary views but he still remains in his position.

Now more than ever we must exert influence upon the Polish comrades using any and all means and methods. The situation in Poland must be studied thoroughly and demands constant attention. An estimate must be based on the fact—and one has to face this truth—that a civil war is not out of the question.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov finally stressed once again that the common goal should be to solve the problems without the deployment of allied armies into Poland. All socialist states should exert their influence to this end.

The Soviet comrades assume that unless the Polish security organs and army would be deployed, outside support cannot be expected, for otherwise considerable international complications would result. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov emphatically brought it to the attention of the Polish comrades that they have to try first to solve their problems by themselves. If they cannot do so alone and then ask for help, the situation is different from one in which troops had been deployed from the outset.

As far as a possible deployment of the NVA is concerned, there are no longer reservations among the Polish comrades. There were increasing public musings as to how long the Soviet staffs and troops would remain in Poland.

If the Polish comrades were prepared to solve their problems on their own, the Soviet leadership organs and troops could be withdrawn. Except for empty words, however, nothing concrete has been done. Presently the counterrevolutionary forces are regrouping.

He does not know how much longer Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov and parts of the staff of the Allied Military Forces as well as the other organs of the Soviet Union will remain in Poland. For now, an order to withdraw will not be given, since one should not relinquish the seized positions.

According to the wishes of Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski, the exercise "SOYUZ-81" should not be officially terminated on 7 April 1981, but rather continue for another few days or weeks. The Soviet comrades, however, took the point of view that this was not possible and would create international complications. It only proves that the Poles think that others should do their work for them.

Regarding international aid in the suppression of the counterrevolution, both Comrade Kania as well as Comrade Jaruzelski spoke with great caution.

Comrade Kulikov strongly emphasized again that this discussion took place with the approval of Comrade Minister Ustinov. He had told everything that was known to him as a Communist and as the Supreme Commander of

the Allied Military Forces, because he has complete faith in Comrade Lieutenant General Keßler and Comrade Lieutenant General Streletz, and is convinced that the substance of this conversation would only be conveyed to Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Minister Hoffmann.

At the end, he asked that his most heartfelt greetings be conveyed to the General Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the National Defense Council of the GDR, Comrade Erich Honecker, and to the Minister for National Defense, Comrade Army General Hoffmann. At the same time he extended his thanks for the generous support provided during the preparation and implementation of the joint operative-strategic commander's staff exercise "SOYUZ-81."

The conversation lasted two hours and was conducted in an open and friendly atmosphere.

[Source: *Militärisches Zwischenarchiv Potsdam, AZN 32642. Document provided by Tomasz Mianowicz (Munich) and translated by Christiaan Hetzner (National Security Archive/CWIHP).*]

Memorandum regarding the Meeting between Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Erich Honecker, and Gustav Husák in the Kremlin, 16 May 1981

Participating in the meeting on the Soviet side were Comrades [CPSU Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Aleksandrovich] Tikhonov, [Foreign Minister, Andrei Andreivich] Gromyko, [Politburo member, Konstantin Ustinovich] Chernenko, [Defense Minister, Dmitri Fyodorovich] Ustinov, [KGB chief, Yuri Vladimirovich] Andropov, [CC Secretary, Konstantin Viktorovich] Rusakov, and [Deputy head of the CC Department, Georgi Khosroyevich] Shakhnazarov.

Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev opened the meeting with the remark that this gathering is being held at the suggestion of Comrade Erich [Honecker], to exchange mutual views, appraise the situation, and draw conclusions.

We must, as he said, proceed from the fact that the situation in Poland has further deteriorated. The party is not just being attacked by "Solidarity". It also finds itself in a process of dissolution, created by internal contradictions. At present this process is self-limiting due to the fear of external intervention.

The information before us, concerning the preparation for the party congress of the PUWP [to be held on 14-18 July 1981], is negative. With the election of delegates to the party congress, not only are new people becoming involved, but hostile forces as well. The 10th Plenum [held on 29-30 April 1981] approved a very weak draft for a [party] program. Thereupon, "Solidarity" published a document containing enemy nationalist positions, and Kania did not call them to order.

Kania spoke briefly before the party *aktiv* in Gdańsk, like Gierek back in those days, that Poles can always come to an agreement with fellow Poles. Consequently, the events in Otwock are a disgrace, which encourages new anti-socialist acts.

Recently, our Comrades Andropov and Ustinov met privately with Polish comrades in Brest, and gave them recommendations on a whole number of concrete matters. To prevent these matters from remaining in a narrow circle, Comrade Suslov traveled to Warsaw to talk things over with all the comrades from the Politburo one more time. We have delivered this information to you.

Verbally, they assented to our suggestions, but in reality the situation further deteriorated. The Polish leadership is panicking from fear, they stare—as if hypnotized—at "Solidarity," without taking any concrete action.

The PUWP can still rely on the Polish army, the security organs, and the party *aktiv*, but Kania continues to be indecisive and soft, they are not prepared to take a calculated risk. Some comrades believe that [Stefan] Olszowski and [Tadeusz] Grabski are men on whom one can rely. We must see, however, that a change of leadership can also have negative repercussions. We see no real personality who can assume command. We see the danger even that [Mieczysław] Rakowski could assume this position. For us there is no other way now than strengthening the present leadership and bringing pressure to bear on the healthy forces.

[Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union] Comrade Viktor Kulikov worked out plans for several options to be implemented in case of emergency. To strengthen our influence over the mass media, we have sent the Chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television, Comrade Lyapin, to Warsaw.

To stimulate party relations between the municipality and voivodeship committees, eleven delegations headed by the first municipal secretaries will travel to the voivodeships in May/June.

The youth organization is also intensifying its relations with the Polish youth, in order to exercise greater influence. For the time being, though, the opposition still wields its influence on the PUWP. That is why we must bolster our influence on the healthy forces. On the other side, imperialism is attempting also to exert influence on Poland economically, and to gain control of the economy, leading to a weakening of our community. Due to the absence of coal shipments from Poland, for example, the economies of the GDR and the ČSSR have fallen into a difficult position. We have provided the Poles with assistance amounting to four billion dollars.

The situation is at present so grave, that we must elaborate a number of options for a resolution. It would be useful to draft a joint analysis and in doing so spare nothing. We must deliberate on what has to be done. At stake is the fate of Poland.

Then Comrade Erich Honecker spoke.

Comrade E. Honecker agreed with the statements made by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and underlined the full agreement of our parties. Then he proceeded:

1. Recently the Politburo of the SED CC, with great attention, familiarized itself with the report on the result of the discussions between the delegation of the CPSU and the PUWP. The [CPSU] delegation, which was headed by Comrade Suslov, stopped in Warsaw. Our Politburo agreed fully and completely with the assessment of the situation in Poland and the conclusions drawn from it. It articulated its displeasure with the fact that the leadership of the PUWP was apparently not prepared to see matters as they really were, and then draw the necessary conclusions.

2. I would not like, with all due earnestness, to conceal our deep concern over the most recent developments in the People's [Republic of] Poland. From all discussions and material before us, it follows that that the PUWP finds itself in the stranglehold of the counterrevolution. Solidarity [members within the party] obviously took the renewal of the PUWP [sic!] propagated by Kania into their own hands. According to the information before us, over 60% of the elected delegates to the Extraordinary Party Congress at this point are members of Solidarity. Among them there are few workers. A large portion of the delegates is part of the scientific-technological intelligentsia. It is already foreseeable that the planned Party Congress implicates the danger of the PUWP being transformed into a social-democratic party that works closely together with the Church and the leadership of Solidarity with the sole goal of leading a renewal process, in the spirit of the goals of the counterrevolution, to its victory.

3. The CPSU, the CPCz, and the SED have given the PUWP leadership a lot of good advice. Comrade Kania and Jaruzelski have agreed with them. Unfortunately one must state that they not only have not implemented it [the good advice], but rather encouraged the enormous process of degeneration in the party and state apparatus through their actions. Now there are already statements in the Polish mass media demanding a democratization of the Polish Army and slandering the organs of the interior, party and state. One must look with open eyes at these things, and recognize that the fate of socialism in the People's Republic of Poland, with all its consequences for Poland and all of its allies, is at stake. Wałęsa declared publicly in Gdańsk on 7 May 1981 that Solidarity is prepared to take over the government's authority in Poland at a given time.

4. In weighing all the details, one can only doubt the sincerity of a large portion of the members of the state and party leadership vis-a-vis their alliance partners. The pressure exerted upon Poland by the imperialist powers, above all the USA and the FRG, is supposed to prevent the healthy forces from taking measures against the counterrevolutionary forces. Comrade Kania uses this for

his argument that all matters should be solved politically, repudiating Leninist principle that the party must be prepared to utilize all forms of combat to destroy the counterrevolution and guarantee the socialist development of the People's [Republic of] Poland.

5. At the Moscow conference, all realized that the developments in the People's [Republic of] Poland weren't just a matter for the People's Poland, but an affair of the entire socialist community. From all of this, no conclusions were drawn by the leadership of the People's [Republic of] Poland. What followed is a complicated situation, not just for Poland, but for the entire socialist community.

Let's take the middle and long-term consequences for the GDR.

Politically:

The GDR is located as you know in the center of Europe—we have German imperialism in front of us, and would possibly have a capitalist Poland behind us. The ČSSR would find itself in a similar position.

Today already we must wage the battle on two fronts—we have to deal with the FRG and Poland.

I would only like to mention the role of the West German mass media and the large stream of agitation and slander that pours in as a result. The West German television broadcasts its daily programs on Poland, most of all, to influence our people.

Economically:

As per [trade] agreements, we must receive from Peoples' [Republic of] Poland per year 1.9 million tons of bituminous [hard] coal by direct route and 3 million tons by diversion, hence 4.9 million tons altogether. In actuality we received 1.1 million tons in 1980, and in the first quarter of 1981, 1.2 million tons [less than the amount that had been set.—*Ed.'s note: Added in handwriting by E. Honecker.*]

A large portion of our imports and exports to and from the USSR is transported through Poland. That comes out to be 10 million tonnes of goods per year.

It must not be forgotten that Soviet Group of Forces in Germany communicate via Poland. But Comrade Ustinov is even a better judge of that [than I].

Now, regarding some information that our comrades recently received during talks with Polish comrades.

From May 12-14, a delegation from the Berlin district leadership was in Warsaw. They reported:

1. The situation in the party organization is not unified but very confused.

2. From the rank and file (science and production center for semiconductors "Cemi," housing construction collective combine) there is a pronounced hatred of the old and new party leadership. This concerns in particular the contradictory behavior and decisions of "Rural Solidarity."

3. Among all the comrades there are bitter words regarding the destructive information by the mass media. What the party secretaries defend is revoked, placed into question, and discredited in television programs and press publications. (Good comrades not only feel deserted in their struggle to implement the party line, but also

betrayed and even stabbed in the back.)

4. The base organizations [*Grundorganisationen*] are not familiar with the documents decreed at the 10th CC Plenum for the preparation of the Party Congress. In the election campaign, they occupy themselves primarily with “settling” the mistakes of the past and with the procedural matters regarding the nomination of candidates to the leadership, delegates to the municipal and city delegation conference as well as to the 9th Party Congress. (As a rule, the election assemblies last 8 to 10 hours, most of which is spent on procedural matters)

Among the cadres there is great uncertainty about the future and the coming work. No one knows whether he will be reelected or elected to the municipal or city delegation conference. On May 13, four of the seven First Municipal Secretaries were appointed as delegates to their own conference. About 50% of the secretaries of the municipal leaderships were not chosen to be delegates.

80% of the members of base organization leaderships are new cadres, chiefly young, inexperienced comrades. The number of Solidarity members in the party leadership has rapidly increased.

5. Our impression of the personnel:

The First Secretary of the Voivodeship Committee, Comrade Stanisław Kociołek, is an upstanding Communist, who realistically appraises the situation in the country and demonstrates an internationalist attitude. He repeatedly expressed clear positions on the CPSU, the SED, and the CPCz in public.

Unlike Politburo candidate and CC Secretary Jerzy Waszczuk, he stated repeatedly that he couldn't imagine the 9th Party Congress taking place without the participation of the fraternal parties. He repeatedly emphasized that the situation in Poland would only be mastered when the party was built up anew upon the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism.

Of the seven secretaries of the Warsaw Voivodship Committee, two so far have been chosen as delegates to the city conference (Kociołek, Bolesławski—2nd Secretary). Two secretaries have declared from the outset that there is no chance that they would be elected as delegates. (Com. J. Matuczewicz did not run as delegate for the conference from the concern “Rosa Luxembourg” on the 12 May 1981.) The chances of the three other secretaries are uncertain.

6. The talks with the First Secretaries of the municipal leaderships of [the Warsaw districts] Mokotów, Praga North, and Żoliborz reflected the lack of unity in the party.

While the First Secretary from Mokotów (graduate of the Party School of the CPSU) stated a clear position on the situation, its causes, and the activities of the counterrevolution, an unprincipled social-democratic attitude could be seen on the part of the first secretaries from Żoliborz and Praga North. Their main topics were the causes of the “mistakes” and the guarantees against future repetition. Based on the “feelings of the masses,” the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and the honesty of the party and of the whole society was to be guaranteed.

While visiting a construction site for a new bridge over the Vistula, we found the slogan “Down with the dictatorship of the CPSU—Long live Lech Wałęsa” on a barrel.

The First Secretary from Praga North did not say anything that was party line, when we addressed this anti-Soviet statement as well as the anti-socialist event at Katyn⁵. All in all, the cadres are becoming used to anti-socialist statements, writings, slogans and other machinations. No one thinks about measures to take against the counterrevolutionary intrigues.

7. The statements of the Politburo candidate and CC Secretary, Comrade Jerzy Waszczuk, in the presence of Comrade Kociołek (1 1/2 hours), were extremely vague. The fundamental political questions were not clearly addressed. An attempt was made to justify the capitulationist attitude of the leadership when we mentioned it. Questioned about the participation of foreign delegations to the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress, he answered evasively. Essentially it was answered in the negative. (We do not know how the Party Congress proceeded. There may be provocations, which would be very unpleasant for the fraternal parties.) Comrade Kociołek explicitly spoke out in favor of the participation of the fraternal parties. Otherwise, holding the party congress would be inconceivable. Comrade Kociołek repeatedly stressed that there cannot be a second 14th CPCz Party Congress in Poland. Therefore the remaining days must be used to guarantee a correct composition of the party congress. In relation to this he expressed his opinion on the creation of a clear personnel structure. It was clear from his remarks, that he knew of the statements made by Comrade Mikhail Suslov and supported the implementation of the recommendations given there.

8. Comrade Kociołek beseeched the Berlin District leadership of the SED to take thorough advantage of the various possibilities to influence the Warsaw party organization in the next 30 days, in order to consolidate the party and prepare the party congress in an internationalist spirit. A corresponding proposal of Comrade Kociołek was strictly rejected by Kania. It seems advisable to implement this offer to work with the Warsaw party organization, and to extend further the existing personal contacts with Comrade Kociołek.

– The head of the SED CC International Relations Department, Comrade [Günther] Sieber, had a discussion with his Polish counterpart, Comrade Waclaw Piątkowski, on May 14, in Berlin.

Comrade Piątkowski is a candidate member of the PUWP CC and since 1977 has held the position of head of the CC International Relations Department. Before he was the PPR's ambassador to the FRG for over 8 years. He is 60 years old and possesses a command of the German language without an accent. Piątkowski was a partisan during the Second World War in the area around Lublin, and, during the Soviet army's invasion of Poland, became a regular member of the 1st Polish Army, with which he

advanced to the Elbe River. During wartime he was employed as a scout in reconnaissance due to his language abilities. Through the cooperation between the GDR embassy in Warsaw and the PUWP CC International Relations Department, Piątkowski is known as a class-conscious comrade devoted to the party, who assumes internationalist positions and has an unambiguous relationship to the Soviet Union.

Responding to a question on the present situation in the PPR, he stated:

The situation is more dangerous and graver than is generally assumed. The Poles are in a state such that they not only betray their own interests and their own country but brought the socialist community of states the gravest difficulties, and endanger world peace.

The unprincipled degeneration of the party has progressed far, the contradictions are getting ever more critical. What is going on in Poland, and where the development is heading, cannot be read about in the party newspaper, but rather learned about most clearly from the broadcasters “[Radio] Free Europe” and “Deutschlandfunk [Radio Germany]” and other foreign centers.

What is the situation in the Central Committee *apparat*?

Answer:

I am actually no longer head of the International Relations Department. My retirement has been arranged. After the Party Congress in Kampuchea [Cambodia], to which I am still going, I must retire.

Was that your own decision?

Answer:

No. Although I am 60 years old, I feel intellectually and physically able to continue working for the party in these difficult times. But my opinions and my attitude do not agree with our present leadership, and so it came to retirement, which I however only see as temporary.

Is it the same for other comrades as well?

Answer:

Absolutely. In the CC a commission was formed which would make a through study of the entire *apparat* according to different criteria. Among others, [one would be] whether the comrade was a industrious worker in his development to this point, or not. Those who have ordered this (Kania), cannot so much as once correctly pronounce the word “industrious worker” and do not know at all what industrious work is. The main criterion is, however, the unconditional support of Kania’s policy. This policy I can no longer support or reconcile with my conscience. That is a betrayal of the party and of Poland. Kania is incompetent. He possesses neither political knowledge nor political stature. He is a spineless tool, who conforms to opinion polls, without political principles.

Jaruzelski is a hollow dummy, who mostly flatters himself, as he plays the Prime Minister. Nothing good can be expected from him.

What is the situation among the first secretaries?

Answer:

At the last meeting with the first secretaries and the CC department heads, more comrades came forward against the policies of Kania. Among them was Wrocław First Secretary, Comrade Porębski. He enumerated to Kania how many opportunities to change the situation have come and gone since August 1980. After this speech he no longer has a chance to run for his office again and now wants to resign. Other comrades came forward similarly, and face the same question.

How do you appraise the party program?

Answer:

It is possible to get something out of the party program, if it is interpreted in a Marxist-Leninist fashion. Given the current situation and the balance of power, however, it will become a program of revisionism and social democracy.

Would a new leadership in this position be able to change the revisionist-right course and put an end to the developments?

Answer:

I think so, but there is not much more time for that. I estimate that at most another 14 days remain before the opportunity for such a change has passed.

In your opinion, which people could assume the leadership of the state and the party?

Answer:

I believe absolutely that Olszowski is the man who can do that and who wants to. Grabski is also very strong, and the two of them are on very good terms with one another. The First Secretary of Warsaw, Comrade Kociołek, is a capable person too, with great political experience, whom one must keep in mind. I must, however, say once again, there is only little time left for such thoughts.

What went on at the 10th Plenum?

Answer:

In my opinion, Rakowski exposed himself as an overt traitor. He made a motion to demand the Soviet Union to publicly state their policy west of the Bug River. Kania remained silent on this. Olszowski replied sharply to that and brought about the motion’s collapse.

Comrade Piątkowski repeatedly indicated that the revisionist-right development in the party, state, and in the economy, had advanced much farther than the most negative formulations of the program show.

– Some time ago, the First Secretary of the Frankfurt/Oder SED district leadership met with the First Secretary of the Voivodship Committee of Gorzów. He reported that in the voivodship, according to instructions that the comrades should not participate in the warning strike (March 1981), everything was done in this direction. Hence 65% of the workers did not take part in the strike. Then, however, everything was called off. Those who went on strike received full wages. There was a very negative reaction coming from those who followed the call of the party and did not go on strike.

– From the head of the PUWP CC Security and State Organs Department [i.e. Michał Ałtas] our comrades in

Warsaw learned that the deployment of the police in Bydgoszcz was envisaged timely in connection with the provocative demonstrations planned there [March 1981]. The nationwide warning strike announced by “Solidarity” immediately after the incident in Bydgoszcz so frightened the leadership that they were ready to concede everything. The government then also capitulated in the negotiations with Wałęsa, although at the 9th Plenum a mandate for negotiations had not been debated or decided upon. One result was that the deployment readiness of the police and the state security, which was relatively good beforehand, has been dealt a great blow since.

This appraisal is confirmed by information such as the following:

The “Solidarity” leadership in Białystok has announced a warning strike for the May 19, Polish radio reported. The decision was justified by the brutal actions of the militia against a disabled person. “Solidarity” demanded the immediate dismissal of those militia men who directly took part in the incident, as well as an investigation into the further members of the police organs. The local militia chief has already stated that both policemen are being relieved of their positions.

A further report stated: at a three-day national meeting of representatives of 16 large-scale combines, theses on a law on worker self-government were formulated. Among other things, it was suggested that a second chamber of the Sejm, a chamber for self-government, be created, whose members would be elected democratically.

During the envisaged new election of the Sejm, they want to depart from the previous practice and vote for lists—meaning the PUWP—“Solidarity”, National Front among others separately.

What are the resulting conclusions?

1. The role of the party must be fortified. That means
 - purging the party;
 - utilizing all means of combat and not allowing the enemy to gain further ground.
2. The present leadership of the PUWP is pulling the wool over our eyes. For us the question now is, who can take over the leadership?
 - Comrade Olszowski
 - Comrade Grabski
 - Comrade Kociołek
 - Comrade Żabiński
3. Comrade Jaruzelski has stated that he is prepared to relinquish his post. Accordingly we can comply with his request. The only thing that needs to be clarified is who should take over his office.
4. I am not for a military intervention, although the allies have that right as stipulated in the Warsaw Pact. It would be correct to create a leadership which is prepared to impose a state of emergency, and which takes decisive action against the counterrevolution.

Comrade Honecker handed over a list of the members of the PUWP CC, which shows their present position according to our information. The results are:

51.4% of the CC members might have a positive attitude

41.4% have a negative attitude

7.2% are wavering

Comrade Gustav Husák:

I agree with the statements made by Comrade Brezhnev and Honecker. We also are greatly concerned about the development in Poland, by the PUWP and socialism in Poland. There is plenty of evidence of negative developments, I need not repeat them.

It is a matter now of being able to aid the healthy forces in Poland. For that reason, the CPCz is publishing the documents from its party congress in Polish, and distributing them in Poland.

Tangentially, I would like to mention a tragicomic story: when Kania was with us in the ČSSR, he asked me to autograph a brochure on the conclusions of the events of 1968 before he departed.

We also publish a trade union brochure on the conclusions of the events in 1968. Comrade [Albin] Szyszka, head of the branch trade unions, but also other representatives of the branch trade unions have appeared well in principle. They are, however, supported only weakly by the party.

We are now also organizing 3 hours of Polish language radio programs every day, in which we comment on the Polish events from our perspective. At the same time we are strengthening our relationship as partners with the voidvodships, printing flyers and posters which criticize “Solidarity”. Unfortunately, though, our actions are not coordinated with others and therefore have a relatively scant effect.

It will be bad if the Polish Communists lose their perspective and do not know how to continue.

As for the comrades whom one can rely on, we also think of such comrades as Olszowski. We also have close relations with Grabski. Our ambassador is expanding his activities here as well. But these and other comrades have great difficulties in becoming elected as delegates to the party congress. With the exception of Kania and Jaruzelski, the possibility exists that others will be elected into the leadership.

It is absolutely possible that a stalemate could develop at the party congress, with neither the present leadership nor the Right achieving a victory.

The healthy forces think that it would be difficult to fight friends and former friends, but Kania and Jaruzelski are capable of being manipulated. Public order is disintegrating more and more, and it is possible that a social democratic or Christian democratic party may develop, disguised with socialist slogans. The Poles have drawn no conclusions from their conversation with Comrade Suslov.

In our estimation, “Rural Solidarity” is more dangerous than “Wałęsa-Solidarity”, because it is oriented to the West. The anti-Soviet currents are very strong,

which are restrained only out of fear of Soviet action.

Of the 3 million members of the PUWP, 1 million are estimated to be positively disposed, but poor or very little work is done with them, and more and more good Communists are leaving, or being forced out. They say openly that the politicians look to the left but go to the right, and thus the good Communists see no prospects.

Olszowski, himself, said that he did not know how to continue since the Politburo was giving ground to the increasingly stronger pressure from the right. Jaruzelski is incapable and gives ground.

There are already 7,000 civil servants in the army who are members of "Solidarity," and the influence of "Solidarity" grows in the organs of the Interior Ministry and in particular in the mass media.

Żabiński is losing the ground beneath his feet and fears not being elected, which would mean the end of his activity.

We will support every option:

A new [Warsaw Pact] consultative meeting, like that held in December [1980], would strengthen the healthy forces in Poland. Until now they have not brought much, they have only promised much. The main question remains how to successfully strengthen the healthy forces, which are not few.

At present a hysterical [historical?—Ed.] situation exists, difficult for the good comrades, and therefore we must aid them, we must support them.

We support the proposals by Comrades Brezhnev and Honecker, and have however no illusions of the selection of delegates to the party congress.

Comrade Kapek, First Secretary of the CPCz district leadership in Prague, who was with a delegation in Poland, said, however, that it has become impossible to approach the masses. It is only possible to speak to a narrow circle.

Once again, Kania is constantly disappointing [us]. As for the postponement of the party congress, that is very doubtful. Olszowski is afraid of the party congress, for whoever will come forth against the present leadership is thrown out of the CC [*fliegt aus dem ZK heraus*]. They are disappointed by Kania and Jaruzelski. Olszowski and Grabski take a positive position, but are they the people to lead Poland out of its present situation?

Have they enough courage, do they have sufficient experience—the question remains then, with whom to work, whom to support[?] There are a million good Communists, but they are scattered, they live like partisans.

If Kania can now carry out his policy of horizontal structures, the healthy forces should also formulate their tactics.

An advisory meeting could be the impetus for a change, but the elections, which are going on at present for the preparation of the party congress, are under the influence of "Solidarity," and it is very difficult to say how the party congress will turn out.

When Kania was in Prague, he stated that he supported convening the party congress, in order to call it

off shortly before the date. But you cannot trust Kania. Moreover, he already has his hands tied.

In a discussion with church leaders, they said that the Catholic Church in its history has found itself in different situations, but it has never allowed the condemnation of its own clergymen.

Comrade Brezhnev said that different options are being formulated as to how the positions of the good Communists can be strengthened. The enemy acts always with greater force. We, however, pay too much heed to diplomacy and protocol. The Polish comrades want contact with us, and we must fortify these contacts.

As for the ČSSR, it is true that the West intensifies its propaganda, however, it meets with no response. The Polish events arouse in our people dissatisfaction and anger. There is no danger that the masses support it.

At this point Comrade Tikhonov interjected the remark that this situation can change though.

Comrade Husák: The atmosphere in the ČSSR is good. We are preparing for elections, holding election assemblies, and we have no fear that the Polish events could have an effect on our country.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: What Erich said is correct—something must be done before the party congress. The appraisal of Kania, and of a necessary change in the leadership is also correct, though the main question is "how" to do so.

Comrade Gromyko: After the Poles had just arranged with Leonid Ilyich to postpone convening the party congress, they convened without consulting with us and merely informed us about their decision.

Comrade Erich Honecker asked the question whether the party congress could be postponed. I think that—although it would be good—it is not realistic. We cannot surely have any great hopes, since Kania and Jaruzelski exercise idle, unprincipled capitulation. We must therefore work with the healthy forces, though none can say how influential these people are.

Comrade Tikhonov: We all have the same appraisal, the facts correspond. We also have information. "Solidarity" has even now formed a militia. What is going to happen? An intervention in the present international situation is out of the question, so the opposition of the healthy forces must be actively supported, but these healthy forces have no outstanding leader.

The healthy forces must appear strong, they must meet in preparation of the party congress. If at present horizontal structures appear in the foreground, then the healthy forces must create their own structures. The healthy forces must be visible, since they are presently not active in the mass media. [The idea of postponing the party congress is not unrealistic. The Polish comrades told us as well, that the meeting of the Sejm could not be postponed. Afterwards they did exactly that.—*Ed. note: Added in handwriting by E. Honecker.*]

Comrade Andropov: It is surely not possible to find an array of decisive measures to resolve the problems.

Therefore we must act in several directions. The postponement of the date of the party congress is not realistic, there I have the same evaluation. They speak, promise, but do nothing. Comrade L.I. [Brezhnev] had a very thorough discussion with Kania. It is then a matter not only who to replace, but also how to do so. According to our information, the balance of power stands at roughly 50-50. But the question remains, who will seize the initiative, who will convene a plenum. In my opinion, this way is unrealistic.

The party congress is the crossroad, where either the party takes the Marxist-Leninist path or it disintegrates. Consequently the healthy forces must use the 11th Plenum to fight the battle.

Four or more good comrades also are well spirited, but we do not know whether it [leading the party into new directions] will work. We know that for example already 26 voivodship committee secretaries, members of the CC, were dismissed as secretaries.

Kociołek is a serious man.

Żabiński is distantly related to Gierek.

We must not forget also that there is a rivalry between the three.

On the June 10 we will have the names of all party congress delegates, then we will know more, see better.

Comrade Ustinov: I am in agreement with the statements made by Comrades Brezhnev, Honecker, and Husák. Everything points to the failure to formulate lengthy principled proposals. It is a matter now of fighting for every healthy man. We must all support the healthy forces.

It is certainly difficult to postpone the party congress, but one should remember that it also meant that the Sejm cannot be adjourned, then it will have worked though.

It was said correctly that Kania was not living up to our expectations, but who shall take over the leadership[?] There is the 11th Plenum on the daily agenda.

Perhaps a state of emergency should be imposed, if even just partly.

Comrade Rusakov: A postponement of the party congress is no longer possible. The delegates from the factories have already been elected. On the May 30, the delegates from the voivodships will be elected. Until then, nothing more can be done for the healthy forces.

We also have information that enraged anti-Soviet forces are appearing.

Rakowski wanted Olszowski and Grabski voted out of the Politburo, but we were able to achieve their remaining in the Politburo.

On the May 18 comrades from our Central Committee will travel to Warsaw to discuss with the comrades from the PUWP Politburo and bring them to Marxist-Leninist positions. The comrades from the SED are also exerting their influence on the party congress documents.

We are intensifying the criticism of the events in Poland in the press and radio. It is very important to come forward unambiguously because there are some, like

Rakowski for example, who try to hide behind the CPSU.

Our delegations, which have traveled to Poland, were well prepared and armed with well-composed information. That is the way we can usefully support the healthy forces.

At that point Comrade Erich Honecker began to speak. He stated his agreement with the observations of Comrade Ustinov, to consider precisely the possibility of a postponement of the party congress and throwing all force now into preparing for the 11th Plenum as well as possible, proceeding from what is known of the situation, to formulate all essential options.

To conclude the meeting Comrade Brezhnev determined that the exchange of opinions was useful, even if there is no light in sight in regards to a positive change. The comrades are right when they stress that it is essential to employ all levers of pressure. It would be undoubtedly better to postpone the party congress or cancel it shortly before its meeting, as Kania had promised at the time, but that is scarcely possible at this point.

The worst [scenario] would be if the party congress took an openly revisionist position. The central matter remains therefore that the present leadership cannot be depended upon, we see however on the other hand there are no real potential candidates to replace them. We must think of how we will find suitable people and prepare them for extraordinary situations.

For the time being we have the ability to exert economic pressure, since we are the main supplier of petroleum and other raw materials.

We must now task comrades to form operational contacts with comrades in the PUWP in Poland.

We will confidentially inform Comrades János Kádár, Todor Zhivkov, and Fidel Castro of this meeting.

Comrade Husák's question whether publication will follow, was answered negatively.

Should information reach the West, a possibility excluded by the Soviet comrades and Comrade Erich Honecker, it will be denied.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch ZPA, vorl.SED 41559. Published in Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." Die SED contra Polen. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 270-285. Translated by Christiaan Hetzner (National Security Archive/CWIHP)]

Transcript of the Meeting between Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and Comrade E. Honecker at the Crimea on 3 August 1981 (excerpt)

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: [...] A tremendous concern to all of us naturally is the situation in Poland. Recently we spoke with you and Comrade Husák in detail about Polish affairs. We all have reason to say that the CPSU and the

SED follow a unified [political] line in the interests of overcoming the Polish crisis and of stabilizing the situation in that country. This applies as well to the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress of the PUWP. The work with the Poles in connection with the Party Congress was not futile. By implementing an entire system of measures—starting with my telephone conversation with Kania and Jaruzelski, to the dispatching of party delegations to the rank and file, and up to the CPSU CC's direct appeal to the PUWP CC—we were able to prevent the Polish leadership from becoming instruments of the revisionists. We kept the centrists from further slipping towards the right. The most important thing, however, consisted of the true Communists regaining their confidence, their seeing that they can firmly rely on us.

The Party Congress has naturally brought no radical change for the better in the situation in the party and in the country. But that could not be expected. The crisis in Poland has severely shaken society. The people are confused, with a significant number of them having fallen under the influence of demagogues and screamers [*Schreihälsen*] from the counterrevolutionary wing of "Solidarity."

At the same time there is reason to conclude that the Right has not succeeded in pushing the party onto a social-democratic path or in seizing the leadership. The Party Congress confirmed what was already shown at the 11th Plenum of the PUWP CC: the majority of the party supports Kania and Jaruzelski, to them there is no alternative at present. Their positions were solidified, which allowed them then to act more boldly and decisively.

I have sent you the notes of my telephone conversation with Kania after the Party Congress [on 21 July 1981]. Several days later, I sent him a telegram in which I posed sharply-pointed questions to him: concerning the disgraceful spread of anti-Soviet behavior; regarding the demand by "Solidarity" to introduce group ownership into socialist factories; about the danger of the formation of a new mass party—a so-called labor party, etc.

Surmounting the crisis in Poland obviously necessitates long-term efforts. We must all bring [our] influence to bear on the Polish leadership to urge them to take consistent offensive action against the forces of anarchy [in order] to end the counterrevolution.

We receive information that the situation is not improving. "Hunger marches," in which women and children participate, are taking place, for example. I think that I will have a very open conversation with Kania and Jaruzelski here in the Crimea [on 14 August 1981]. I plan to ask them there how [things in] Poland should evolve. As a socialist country—this is one thing, on the social-democratic path, that is something else entirely. I have also referred to these questions in the telegram to Kania.

The composition of a new Politburo in the PUWP CC is not yet definitively clear. But there are people there on whom one can rely. Therefore, Erich, let us be patient and steadfast in ensuring the necessary change in the

situation. To digress from the prepared text, I would like to say that the Poles will seek economic assistance, loan credits and food supplies. Naturally they will inform [us] of their Party Congress. One cannot help but see that for ourselves even the economic situation is very precarious. Problems weigh heavily on us. We have in our leadership a group—consisting of Comrades Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, [deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1980, Ivan Vasilyevich] Archipov, and Rusakov—who every day follow the situation in Poland very closely. If necessary, we will provide the Poles with certain assistance—depending on what they bring to the table.

The events in Poland are an eye-opener for a lot of things. What could earlier only be foreseen, now has been confirmed through harsh and bitter experience. [...]

Comrade E. Honecker: [...] We all agree that the Polish events help the U.S. course of confrontation. This was also confirmed by the recent debate in the U.S. House of Representatives. Regarding the development in the People's Republic of Poland, continual coordination between us is particularly important.

Our Politburo has just recently received the report by the SED delegation to the 9th Party Congress of the PUWP led by Comrade [SED Politburo member Werner] Felde. We came to the conclusion that the complicated situation at this Party Congress mirrored that in the PUWP and in the PR Poland. It is evident, in our judgment, that the Marxist-Leninist forces within the PUWP are in the minority, and are not in the position to prevent straying to the right. Apparently the healthy forces are presently still too weak politically and ideologically, as well as organizationally, to bring about a change for the better. The forces of the right were able to influence considerably the political opinions and the elections to the central party organs in a revisionist fashion.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: That is correct.

Comrade E. Honecker: Through the letter by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the stance of a number of fraternal parties of socialist countries the worst was prevented. In this sense—and here I agree with you—our common attitude led to certain consequences. The Party Congress, however, had debated and decided no concrete solutions through which Poland would be led out of its political and economic misery, and through which the advancing counterrevolution would be crushed.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: That's correct.

Comrade E. Honecker: Our delegation returned with the impression that the PUWP is torn from within and unfit for the struggle, a party which constantly loses its Marxist-Leninist character. As the analysis shows, the forces of the right have consolidated their positions in the Central

Committee, Politburo, and Central Committee Secretariat. More than 40% of the members and candidates of the Central Committee belong to "Solidarity," three are members of "KOR." Things have gone so far that an advisor to "KOR" (H. Kubiak) has been elected to the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Every day the counterrevolution under the leadership of "Solidarity" undertakes new campaigns for the subversion, destruction, and seizing of the state's power, for which they exploit the economic difficulties. Among these are the so-called "hunger marches" organized recently in Kutno, Łódź (with the participation of 10,000 women and children) and in other locations, which were held under anti-socialist slogans. Our citizens may see all of this on Western television.

The opportunity at the Party Congress to label "Solidarity" as the true culprit for the economic misery of Poland was not utilized. Instead the members of the former leadership exclusively were blamed for it. With that, the path to capitulation was justified and continued. That is also shown in the recent retreat in the case of the strike threat by [the Polish national airline] LOT.

The enemy is now trying to fan the flames of general dissatisfaction and, through pressure, to achieve further division of power, premature Sejm elections, and the strengthening of capitalist structures. The Party Congress produced neither clear short-term nor long-term programs. The revisionist forces speak openly of a new Polish model of socialism, that will have an international impact. We must not underestimate the possibility that the Polish disease will spread.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: That is a correct evaluation.

Comrade A.A. Gromyko: The evaluation is sober and correct.

Comrade E. Honecker: Clearly we must put up with Kania for a certain amount of time, as you have already determined. Perhaps it would be advisable to agree how we can integrate the Poles more firmly into our community. It would be possible to tie that to some of the correct statements at the Party Congress, for example the speech by Jaruzelski, in order to strengthen the people's power, to contain the enemy, and to tighten up our alliance.

I propose to you, Comrade Leonid Ilyich, that the CPSU, the CPCz, the SED, and possibly other fraternal parties, in close cooperation, further assist the PUWP to form a reliable, combat-ready Marxist-Leninist leadership. To this end we will make use of all our contacts.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: When were you, Erich, last in contact with Kania?

Comrade E. Honecker: That was just before the Polish Party Congress. Afterwards I was in touch with other Polish comrades. Comrades from our Politburo were in Poland (e.g. Comrade [Konrad] Naumann in Warsaw). We

were in close contact with at least 15 voivodships.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: Answer a delicate question for me please, Erich. Can Kania take control of the situation? Do you personally have confidence in him?

Comrade E. Honecker: No. I don't have any confidence in him. He has disappointed us, and he never kept his promises. Only recently, at an advisory session of the Politburo with the First Voivodship Secretaries, have most of them criticized Kania, because he has taken no decisive measures.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: Did this advisory session take place before the 9th Party Congress?

Comrade E. Honecker: No, afterwards. We know this from Polish comrades.

Poland is a cause for our entire movement. It would be good for our socialist community, good for the Communist movement and the restraint of opportunism, if we all gather in the near future to discuss political and theoretical matters which result from the development in Poland for the Communist world movement, for the convincing propagation of real socialism.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: Are you thinking then of a meeting of the first secretaries of the fraternal parties of the socialist community?

Comrade E. Honecker: Yes. [...]

(Around 9 p.m., the conversation was briefly interrupted to watch the television broadcast of the meeting between Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and E. Honecker.)

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: I would like once again return to your proposed meeting in Poland of general secretaries of the fraternal parties of the socialist community, Erich. It seems advisable to me to discuss these matters again later—in other words after our discussions with Kania and Jaruzelski and in consideration of the results of these talks. Let us see how Kania will behave after these discussions.

Dear Erich, I would like to express my satisfaction over my meeting with you, over the discussion of significant matters regarding our joint work. I hope that this will bring progress towards a resolution of important questions of our cooperation.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch ZPA, J IV 2/2/A-2419. Published in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und komprimiðlos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 331-336. Translated by Christiaan Hetzner (CWIHP/National Security Archive).]