

New Evidence on Sino-Soviet Rapprochement

“All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos”

Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-69

Introduction and annotation by Chen Jian and David L. Wilson

In retrospect, the years 1968-1969 witnessed profound changes in both the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) external relations and the international history of the Cold War. In August 1968, the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. In the months following the invasion, long-accumulated tensions between China and the Soviet Union evolved into open confrontation. In March 1969, a bloody border conflict erupted between the two Communist giants, bringing them to the brink of a general war (Soviet leaders even reportedly considered using nuclear weapons).

With Sino-Soviet relations in deep crisis, Beijing's policy toward the United States began to change subtly. After two decades of total confrontation, the first signs of Beijing's changing attitude toward the United States came in autumn 1968, when the Chinese responded positively and with unprecedented speed to a U.S. proposal to resume the stagnant Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, and in early 1969, when, in a highly unusual manner, Mao Zedong ordered the publication of newly-elected U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's inaugural address in all major Chinese newspapers (see Document 3).¹ Three years later, Nixon would visit China and meet face to face with Mao in Beijing.

The Sino-Soviet border confrontation and Sino-American rapprochement represented two of the most important events in the international history of the Cold War. The great Sino-Soviet ideological and, now, military rivalry further drained both material and spiritual resources from international communism. Beijing's emergence as a dangerous enemy forced Moscow into an ever-worsening overextension of power. In the meantime, the Sino-American opening enormously enhanced Washington's strategic position in its global competition with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War did not occur until the late 1980s and early 1990s when both the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc collapsed, but one of the most crucial roots of that collapse certainly can be traced to 1968-1969.

Why did the Sino-Soviet border conflict erupt in March 1969? Did the border clashes relate to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia? Did the clash relate to

Beijing's changing attitude toward Washington—and if so, how? To answer these questions, we need to dig into Chinese documentation. The fifteen documents and extracts translated in the following pages do not offer complete answers to these questions. But they provide useful clues to help us understand the motive of Beijing's leaders, Mao Zedong in particular.

As shown in Mao's wide-ranging discussions with Albanian defense minister Baur Balluku and Australian Communist Party leader E. F. Hill, in October and November 1968, respectively, Mao was deeply concerned by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the Soviet action confirmed Mao's long-existing suspicions about Soviet expansionist ambitions, the Chinese leader tried hard to comprehend the meanings of Soviet behavior on deeper levels. Most importantly, he wondered out loud if the Soviet invasion should be interpreted as the prelude to a more general war, which, he believed, might trigger “revolution” and could only be prevented by “revolution.” In any case, China had to be prepared.

Against this background, Mao in January 1969 ordered the publication of Nixon's inaugural address in which the American president implied a willingness to improve relations with *all* countries in the world. When the Sino-Soviet border battles erupted in March, Mao further instructed four marshals (all of whom had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution but had long enjoyed reputations as being experienced in practical policymaking) to discuss the changing international situation and present proposals on how China should deal with new circumstances. The four marshals produced two insightful reports, providing powerful strategic justification for Beijing to improve relations with the United States (see Documents No. 9 and 11). The escalation of the Sino-Soviet confrontation did not provide a complete explanation for Beijing's rapprochement with Washington, but it represented one of the most important factors underlying the decision.

Reading Mao's talks, a striking feature is his sense of space. Several times Mao used the expression “all under the heaven is (was) great chaos” to describe China's domestic and international settings as he perceived them.

This important concept dominated Mao's vision. The chairman was China's single most important policymaker (much more so during the 1968-69 period), but he was also a philosopher. (Mao's desire to be regarded as such is clearly demonstrated in his discussion with Hill.) In his conceptual world, China's domestic and international policies were closely interrelated. This explains why in his various talks he freely jumped between domestic and international topics. But his vision certainly was China-centric. When Mao stated that the languages of the world should be unified one day, one must ask, what language would the human race then use? The answer is clear: it should be the language that the chairman speaks. That, of course, is Chinese, with terms and expressions incorporated from other languages, such as the chairman occasionally did during his talks with Hill.

All documents have been translated by Chen Jian from Chinese to English, with Li Di, a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Southern Illinois University, contributing to the translation of Documents No. 9 and 11. Material appearing in the text in brackets has been supplied to clarify meaning or to provide missing words. The notes include explanatory information to place key individuals and events in context or to provide additional background on the material being discussed.

Document No. 1
Conversation between Mao Zedong and Beqir Balluku,² 1 October 1968

Mao Zedong: We have not seen each other for quite a while. When did we meet the last time? Did Liu Shaoqi³ and Deng Xiaoping⁴ also attend one of our meetings?

Balluku: That was in 1964. The last time I met with you was in February 1967, that is, twenty months ago. I came together with Comrade Kapo.⁵

Mao Zedong: Oh, yes. At that time, all under the heaven was great chaos, and the working class had just been mobilized.

Balluku: Now you have realized your own strategic plans. At that time, you told me and Kapo that the Cultural Revolution was facing two possibilities, success or failure, and that the problem concerning which path [socialism or capitalism] would overwhelm the other had not been solved. But now this great revolution has achieved great victory.

Mao Zedong: Now the working class dominates everything in the major cities. In most areas in the countryside, the peasants occupy a dominant position too. In the past, until the first half of this year, the students were the vanguards of the revolutionary movement, but now they have lagged behind.

Balluku: Yesterday, our delegation visited the Beijing Textile Knitting Plant. There a cadre who had committed mistakes in the past used his personal experience to give us a vivid introduction, which for me was a good lesson of

class education. He had committed mistakes, and originally was not convinced by the criticism of the masses. But later he not only accepted the criticism of the masses, but also recognized and corrected his mistakes.

Mao Zedong: How is he now?

Balluku: He has been elected vice chairman of the factory's Revolutionary Committee.⁶ The revolutionary masses helped him with Marxist-Leninist patience. In our country, a Revolutionization Movement is now under way. We should educate our cadres and expose the bad elements. Some traitors and rich peasants have penetrated our state agencies. A revolutionization movement like this one will provide good education to the youth.

Mao Zedong: Many young people have not lived a bitter life. (Mao pointed to the interpreter) The Foreign Ministry has been divided into two factions. The one headed by Wang Zhongqi is an ultra-leftist faction, and has been strongly influenced by anarchism. (Pointing to the interpreter) He stood at the middle at that time and did not stand on the side of Wang Zhongqi's ultra-leftist faction. Even among that faction, ultra-leftists were only a small minority, and the majority can be won over to the correct side. The Foreign Ministry is a big department, with more than 3,000 people working there. Intellectuals are piled up there.

Balluku: The ministry should be downsized in the future.

Mao Zedong: Downsize it by ninety percent.

Balluku: In the Soviet Union there emerged the Khrushchev revisionism. This is a bad thing, but revolutionary communists in various countries have learned a lesson from it.

Mao Zedong: In a historical sense this is only a temporary phenomenon.

Balluku: During such turmoil, it is surprising that no significant [anti-revisionist] activities exist within the Soviet Union.

Mao Zedong: There are some small organizations, and they are secret organizations. It is true that the Soviet Union is bad, but it can still provide material supplies [to its people]. For example, it does not have enough food, but it can buy from abroad. Unless a famine erupts there, the people there will not rebel. Another example is France, a capitalist and imperialist country. Although a big rebellion movement emerged there in May this year, it did not stop providing material supplies to the people. It is difficult to try to overthrow a government under such circumstances.

Balluku: Will your Party soon convene a national congress?

Mao Zedong: Yes. We need to sum up our work and elect a new central leadership.

Balluku: The comrades at the Textile Knitting Plant also introduced us to the problem of rectifying the Party organizations.

Mao Zedong: All factories must go through reforms. All people's communes, schools, and party and government organs must go through reforms. We should

mobilize the masses. For a department as large as the Foreign Ministry, with 3,000 people working there, nothing can be done without mobilizing the masses. Among the ambassadors we dispatched to your country, two are bad. We did not know this in the past. One issued an anti-Communist statement in the newspaper, and the other, though no evidence to show that he had issued such a statement, surrendered to the enemy. They have not just committed mistakes; their problems belong to the category of the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy.

Balluku: As far as those who have committed mistakes are concerned, as you have taught us, we should save them by curing their disease. "Cure the disease and save the person." But we certainly should not do the same thing toward the enemy. When the masses have been mobilized, everything is easy to handle. This is your genius teaching: We must trust the masses.

Mao Zedong: We have no other choice. Because they will not listen to us, but they will have to listen to the masses. The Bulgarian news agency, in negating so-called "rumors," claimed that no [Soviet] foreign troops were stationed on Bulgarian territory. But our embassy has learned that foreign troops are there.

Balluku: We have intelligence reports to prove that Soviet troops are stationed on Bulgarian territory. The Italian ambassador to Bulgaria revealed to us that the Soviet Union has nine to ten airborne divisions in Bulgaria.

Mao: That many?

Balluku: Yes. Because these are airborne divisions, each with 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, the total number of soldiers is between 35,000-40,000. They also have missile units stationed on Bulgaria's naval and air bases. The Soviet troops are wearing Bulgarian uniforms.

Mao Zedong: For what purposes does the Soviet Union send troops to Bulgaria?

Balluku: First, the situation in Bulgaria is not stable, and great chaos exists in Bulgaria. The Soviets know that Zhivkov⁷ is without authority. They thus are afraid that he will collapse, and that the leftists will take the power. They are also afraid that a pro-Western, Dubček-style⁸ revisionist may seize power. Second, they claim that they are there to prevent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from attacking Bulgaria. But now there is no sign for such an attack, and no such possibility exists.

Mao Zedong: Even Tito⁹ becomes quite nervous. Yugoslavia thus becomes our indirect ally. It has problems with the Soviet Union, and we must utilize the contradiction between them. If we include the Romanians and Dubček, East European countries are now divided into two groups. The Soviet Union occupied Czechoslovakia by using force, and many in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany are not satisfied with it. They do not support the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Balluku: Yes. Even among the [Soviet] occupation forces there are many problems. Between the commanding

officers and the soldiers there are problems. Now the Soviet Union sends soldiers from such Soviet republics as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who do not speak Russian to Czechoslovakia to take over defenses there. At present Yugoslavia is strengthening its border defense against Bulgaria, preventing the Soviet troops from attacking the territory of Yugoslavia from Macedonia.

[Source: Chinese Communist Party Central Archives (hereafter CCA).]

Document No. 2

Conversation between Mao Zedong and E. F. Hill,¹⁰ 28 November 1968

Mao Zedong: Did you visit China last year also at this time?

Hill: Yes, I came here last year around this time.

Mao Zedong: At that time, the working class in Beijing was not so united, and bad elements were stirring up trouble among the workers and dividing them into two factions in many factories.

Hill: Now the situation has improved tremendously.

Mao Zedong: Yes. When the bad elements have been exposed, things become better.

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: We have never cleaned up the factories in the past. Our schools had been dominated by bourgeois intellectuals. A large portion of the countryside had been controlled by bad elements. It seems to me that it is not so difficult for revisionism to prevail.

Hill: Indeed, it is not.

Mao Zedong: For example, in a People's Commune, some brigades have been composed of several hundred households, some have been composed of several thousand households. Let's say, 2000 households and 10,000 people, and they are under the leadership of a party branch committee. If the branch secretary is not a good person, the whole brigade will be in trouble. Have you visited two factories in Beijing?

Hill: Yes, I did.

Mao Zedong: Are the party secretaries at the factories bad elements?

Hill: I cannot remember exactly what they told me. But the leadership of the factories has been changed.

Mao Zedong: (Turning to Yao Wenyan¹¹) Have you been to the Xinhua Printing Plant?

Yao: Yes. Neither the plant manager nor the party secretary were good persons.

Mao Zedong: This plant has 3,000 workers. Together with family members, almost 10,000. It printed money during the Qing times, and served the Beiyang warlords during the Beiyang period.¹² When the Japanese took over, it served the Japanese. When the Guomindang took over, it served the Guomindang. During the ten-odd years since we took over the plant, it has served us. Many

workers have remained unchanged. The main body of the work force has not changed, still consisting those who had served during the late Qing period and the Beiyang period.

Zhou Enlai:¹³ Now we have added some workers. We have expanded the number of the workers.

Mao Zedong: I mean that those who are in charge have not changed. This is the social foundation for revisionism to prevail in China. Without mobilizing the masses, without thoroughly mobilizing the working class, these problems will never be solved. But if this is not enough, we should send in the People's Liberation Army, and only then can the problems be solved.

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: I want to ask you a question. Do you know what the imperialists will do? I mean, are they going to start a world war? Or maybe they will not start the war at this moment, but will start it after a while? According to your experience in your own country and in other countries, what do you feel?

Hill: In my opinion, they have not decided to start the war. They are facing tremendous difficulties now. And it seems to me that they will not start the war for a while. At least they do not have the strength to start a war on a global scale at the present time. This is the view held by the majority of people I know. However, viewing the situation from another angle, as they have lost the ability to make correct judgments, danger for military confrontation exists. But in an overall sense, they are not in a position to start a world war now.

Mao Zedong: Both the United States and the Soviet Union have the capacity to start a war. Next to them are such defeated countries as Japan, West Germany and Italy. Neither Britain nor France is much interested in fighting a war.

Zhou Enlai: [Charles] De Gaulle even has reduced [France's] military expenditure.

Mao Zedong: Even in Japan and West Germany, I cannot find signs to show that they are willing to fight a war. West Germany wants to annex East Germany so that Germany will be unified. Japan hopes to take back Okinawa. In actuality, Japan has not won its independence.

Zhou Enlai: The United States controls Japan militarily. There are so many American military bases there.

Mao Zedong: The situation after the end of the Second World War has been different from that after the end of the First World War. I do not know whether or not these of my opinions are correct. After World War II, the defeated countries have been unable to separate themselves from the victors. Not only in the field of finance and investment, but also in international and military affairs, they are unable to be independent from the victors. This is different from the situation after World War I. After World War I, Hitler emerged only after he had tried for a few short years.

Zhou Enlai: He did not recognize the Versailles Treaty.

Mao Zedong: He did not recognize the Versailles Treaty. At that time, the workers, intellectuals and the students in those [capitalist] countries were still willing to support the governments. The German Communist Party was such a big party, but it collapsed quickly.

Zhou Enlai: The Italian Communist Party collapsed even earlier.

Mao Zedong: The [German] Socialist Democratic Party also collapsed. The Nationalist Socialist Party and the Storm Troopers (*Sturmabteilung*) emerged in Germany. According to the rules of the two world wars, the United States always let other countries fight the war first, and it would take action to enter the war only after the war had been fought for two years. Now both in Korea and in Vietnam, the United States was the first to bear the brunt. It has stationed 200,000 troops in Europe, mainly in Germany. In Vietnam, there are half million. In Korea, two divisions, more than 70,000. There are also [American troops] in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Its military forces are scattered. It has extended two arms, one in Europe, one in Asia, involved in some small battles. Of course, the capitalists have their own calculations.

Zhou Enlai: They can make money.

Mao Zedong: The capitalists are not happy if there is no war for a long period. The capitalists in Australia are also included. They want to dispatch some troops [to Vietnam], but not many.

Kang Sheng:¹⁴ Only four battalions and 22 planes.

Zhou Enlai: They dispatch some troops, and the Americans will give them some money.

Mao Zedong: And they can also make some money.

Hill: Now the capitalists in Australia think that they have not made enough money, and they are not satisfied.

Mao Zedong: When they are not satisfied, they will quarrel with the Americans, hoping to get more money. How could [Harold] Holt¹⁵ have drowned during swimming.

Hill: In that area the seashore is somewhat dangerous, and many people have drowned there in the past. He went there to have fun by taking risk.

Mao Zedong: That is not bad.

Hill: This is a good way to finish them.

Mao Zedong: What is the name of your prime minister now?

Hill: [John] Gorton.¹⁶

Mao Zedong: This name sounds good, Gorton.

Hill: It only sounds good.

Mao Zedong: Your name also sounds good—Hill.

Hill: It only sounds good.

Mao Zedong: Indeed, it sounds good. Is it "Hill" (Mao pronounced it in English)?

Hill: Yes, it is Hill.

Mao Zedong: How about changing it to "Mountain" (Mao pronounced it in English)? I have read many articles you have written. I am not so diligent as you are. I am

lazy. I have not revised some of my own writings. Some of them should be revised. For example, when some of them are to be published in a second edition, I should revise them a little bit. When there is a third edition, I should revise a little bit once more. It is not necessary for some articles to be that long. Comrade Lin Biao¹⁷ has invented a new method, that is, to compile quotations.

Kang Sheng: The Greek language edition of *Chairman Mao's Quotations* is translated by them (pointing to Hill).

Mao Zedong: Oh, it is translated by them. Confucius' *Analects* is a collection of quotations. Buddhism also has collections of quotations.

Zhou Enlai: The *Adamantine*.

Mao Zedong: I am a very lazy person. I have never read the Bible. It does not attract me, and I do not know what is said there. Occasionally I will pick it up, but simply do not want to read it.

Hill: I fully understand what you mean as I often have the same feeling. I cannot read through it. But when I was a small boy, I was forced to read the Bible.

Mao Zedong: That is good. When you are forced to read something, that probably is good for you. Some say that I have never committed any mistake. As a matter of fact, I believed in Confucius' feudalism when I was a little boy. Later, when I entered school, I believed in capitalism, taking [George] Washington and Napoleon as great heroes, and looking upon [Oliver] Cromwell, [Duke of] Wellington, and Admiral [Horatio] Nelson as wonderful human beings. During [Nikita] Khrushchev's times, he often claimed that war was inevitable. But now they [the Soviet leaders] no longer make this kind of noise. To say that war is inevitable really means that war is avoidable. In recent years they no longer mention this issue. Isn't that they seldom touch upon this issue?

Kang Sheng: They never mention this issue now. They sent troops to Czechoslovakia. At the Polish Party's Fifth National Congress [Ed. note: 11-16 November 1968], this issue was not mentioned.

Mao Zedong: If that is the case, they, both the United States and the Soviet Union, and some other countries, are preparing to spread the war. As far as this is concerned, it seems that a war might begin. I am not quite sure about this question. Therefore I want to ask for your advice. But I can not force you to answer this question immediately. Can you reflect on this issue? We will come back to discuss this issue in one year's time. But we must take people's consciousness into our consideration. When the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam, American soldiers in Vietnam were very glad, and they even cheered. This indicates that their morale is not high. Is the morale of American soldiers high? Is the morale of Soviet soldiers high? Is the morale of the French, British, German, and Japanese soldiers high? The student strike is a new phenomenon in European history. Students in the capitalist countries usually do not strike. But now, all under the heaven is great chaos. Mainly in Europe, in the

United States, in Latin America, and in Japan, there are student strikes. Are there also student strikes in your country?

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: In another five years, our country, in a relative sense, will be in a better position to serve the revolutions of the people in various countries, the workers' movement, the students, and the development and expansion of real Marxist parties. Since Japan's surrender in 1945, 23 years have passed. In another five years, 28 years will have passed. Without a war in 28 years? In reality, all kinds of wars have occurred since the end of World War II. According to Lenin, capitalism is war, and capitalism cannot exist without war. There are two superpowers in the world today. They not only have conventional weapons, but also have nuclear weapons. This is something that is not easy to deal with. They themselves also know this. Khrushchev's theory was that if the atomic bomb were used the earth would be destroyed, and that no winner would emerge in the war. The United States also holds the same view. These two superpowers are nuclear powers. Our country, in a sense, is still a non-nuclear power. With this little nuclear weaponry, we cannot be counted as a nuclear country.¹⁸ If we are to fight a war, we must use conventional weapons. Since we are neither the chief of staff of the Americans nor the chief of staff of the Soviets, we have no idea what exactly they are going to do, and we can only make our judgment by observing the situation. The populations of these two countries are similar, if they are to fight a large war, they will feel shortage in manpower. Now, by fighting a middle-size war, such as the war in Vietnam, the United States already has difficulties with manpower, the shortage in pilots in particular.

(Mao Zedong turned to Chen Boda¹⁹ and Kang Sheng) What have you discussed with them?

Kang Sheng: We have discussed our Party's Twelfth Plenum and that we are planning to convene the Ninth Party Congress. We also have discussed the true Marxist parties and groups in the world, such as the Stalin Group in the Soviet Union and some new Marxist-Leninist groups in Czechoslovakia and Poland. We also have discussed the parliamentary election questions you have discussed with the Italian comrades. Comrade Hill is particularly interested in your opinions on the "thoroughly establish" issue and on the "absolute authority" issue. He says that this discussion has been particularly enlightening for him.

Mao Zedong: The so-called "thoroughly establish" issue was mainly put forward by our former acting chief of staff Yang Chengwu.²⁰ Actually he was to "thoroughly establish" the authority of himself, while at the same time pursuing polycentrism. So far as "absolute authority" is concerned, I do not believe that such a thing ever exists on the earth. Marx, Engels, and Lenin seldom mentioned absolute authority, they only talked about the absolute truth. The so-called "absolute truth" is nothing but the

total sum of various relative truths. This was what they had discussed, and this is what many philosophers have mentioned. I say that I have never seen “house” and I have never eaten “fruit.” What I have seen is the Great Hall of the People, or such things like the Beijing Hotel where you are staying. Except for these things, the so-called “house” is something that you cannot see. I have not eaten “fruit.” Probably you have, but I have not. I have not had peach, or pear, or apple. These are all very special names. All apples — big apples and small apples; apples produced in this province, and apples produced in that province; apples from this country, and apples from that country — are in the final analysis apples. “Fruit” is an abstract concept, although it is impossible to leave abstract concepts aside. Therefore, to follow people’s customs, we may still say that we eat fruit, or say that we live in houses. Lenin points out that the specific is one aspect or one part of the general. For example, Comrade Hill, you have a very common name, and there are people with the surname Hill everywhere. Where did the name come from?

Hill: According to the tradition in England, people often take the place where they live as their name. The name Hill probably came from people who lived on a hill. For another example, there is a name Mill, which probably comes from those whose work was related to the mill.

Mao Zedong: Do you have people with the surname Water in your country?

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: In China, there are the surnames *Sui* (water) and *Jin* (gold). But there is no such surname *Yin* (silver) in China, though Silver is a surname in foreign countries. In China there is also the surname *Tian* (field).

Zhou Enlai: Even the surname *Xi* (tin).

Hill: This is quite similar to tradition in England.

Mao Zedong: Is Stone a surname in your country?

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: The situations in China and in other countries are quite similar, and many surnames come from feudal states in ancient times. For example, my surname is Mao, which came from a small state about 2,000 years ago under the rule of a dynasty. It was the Zhou Dynasty, Comrade Zhou Enlai’s Zhou. (Pointing to Yao Wenyan) Your surname is Yao, and you are the descendent of Emperor Yao. You are a descendant of an Emperor. In reality, whether or not Emperor Yao ever existed is a question.

Yao: It was legendary.

Mao Zedong: There is no evidence for the existence of Emperor Yao, Emperor Shun, or Da Yu.²¹ Probably there were some tribes with those names at that time.

Zhou Enlai: And they have changed from legendary figures to historical figures.

Mao Zedong: It is said that the Zhou, which had only about 3,000 slaves, defeated the state ruled by King Zhou of the Yin,²² which had several hundred thousand slaves. You see, how did we shift our discussion from the war issue to historical issues?

Hill: It is a pleasure to discuss them anyway.

Mao Zedong: Have you been to the United States?

Hill: No. They do not welcome a person like me and refuse to issue me a visa.

Mao Zedong: How about Europe?

Hill: That is OK.

Mao Zedong: Do you need a visa to travel from Australia to Britain?

Hill: In the past we did not need a visa. But now permission is required mainly because of labor laws. This is a problem concerning labor. For example, if I want to travel to Britain, I must first go to the British consul’s office to have my passport stamped, proving what I am going to do in Britain.

Mao Zedong: What do you tell them?

Hill: During my last two visits, I had legitimate reasons. So long as you tell them that you are a tourist and that you will be staying there only for a limited time period, they will approve your application. However, the change indicates that Great Britain has been declining. In the past traveling [from Australia] to Britain was completely [dependent] upon one’s free will. But now procedures have changed.

Mao Zedong: I am told that this is for solving the problem of unemployment. Britain has been sending its people to Canada, and sometimes also sends its people to the United States. Do they also send people to your country?

Hill: Yes, there are many British residents immigrating to Australia.

Mao Zedong: I do not mean immigration. I mean whether or not they still send people to your country now.

Hill: Yes, there are still people moving from Britain to Australia now. But they are not sent by the government; they move there by themselves.

Mao Zedong: The British government allows them to do so?

Hill: Not just allow, but even encourage.

Mao Zedong: This is for reducing the pressure on employment in its own country. I am told that the population in your country has doubled in thirty years, from six million to twelve million.

Hill: That is correct.

Mao Zedong: How long does it take to fly from your country to Hong Kong?

Hill: More than ten hours by air. The distance between Australia and Hong Kong is about 4,500 miles, which is equal to more than 7,000 kilometers.

Mao Zedong: In my opinion, the world needs to be unified. There are miles, kilometers, and sea miles, and there are also so many different languages. It is difficult to unify the language immediately, but if the world is unified these problems can be solved. In the past, many, including the Mongols, the Romans in the West, Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and the British Empire, wanted to unify the world. Today, both the United States and the Soviet Union want to unify the world. Hitler wanted to unify the

world. The Japanese wanted to unify the Pacific area. But they all failed. It seems to me that the possibility to unify the world has not disappeared. The capitalist system is forcing the peoples in the world to accept capitalism, and this is a way by which to unify the world. Another way is that the peoples of the world will rise to make revolution and then unite together. In my view, the world can be unified. Now the United States is maneuvering the United Nations. I am afraid that it is not easy for either the imperialists or the revisionists to unify the world. Can they make a nuclear war, by which they will almost eliminate the population of the world, and then let the United States and the Soviet Union unify the world? But these two countries have too small a population, and they will not have enough manpower if it is dispersed. Further, they are also afraid of fighting a nuclear war. They are not afraid of eliminating population in other countries, but they are afraid of their own population being eliminated. Those countries located in the second intermediate zone, such as Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy, are secondary powers. I am afraid that they are unwilling to fight a war. After all, I am afraid that we still must go the path directed by Marxism, first let peoples in various countries make revolution, and then freely unite together. Why is it necessary to have all these differences at this time? At first, the Americans loved to talk about cosmopolitanism, but later they no longer talked so much about it. In fact, they favor unifying the world. I have read your articles. The intrusion of American capital into your country has caused discontent with the Americans. There is a difference between the Vietnam War and the Korean War, that is, the European countries are not there. Britain, France, Turkey, and Belgium all participated in the Korean War. Let me put forward a question, I will try to answer it, and you will try to answer it. I will consider it, and I ask you also to consider it. This is an issue with worldwide significance. This is the issue about war. The issue about war and peace. Will we see a war, or will we see a revolution? Will the war give rise to revolution, or will revolution prevent war? All in all, now there is neither war nor revolution. Such a situation will not last long. Is it about the time to finish the meeting?

Hill: Thank you very much.

Mao Zedong: I am told that you are leaving tomorrow?

Hill: Yes:

Mao Zedong: Have a safe journey.

Hill: Thank you very much. I thank the Chairman and the Chinese Communist Party for inviting us to visit China again. This visit is of great value for me, and it is also a great inspiration for my comrades.

Mao Zedong: Is it valuable?

Hill: Yes, extremely valuable. I fully agree with the Chairman's opinions on the "absolute authority" issue, and I also fully agree with the Chairman's opinion about the "thoroughly establish" question. But I also feel that we have a very important task, that is, we should go all out to

spread and to apply Chairman Mao's thoughts. In this regard, we had not anticipated the great developments that have been achieved as we see it now.

Mao Zedong: We are planning to compile a collection of quotations by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. (Pointing toward Chen Boda and others) You are compiling the collection. Do not make it too long. If it is too long, people will have no time to read it. But do not make it too short either, if it is too short their basic ideas cannot be reflected. For example, capitalism is war. It seems that this rule no longer works now.

Zhou Enlai: Certainly it still works. After the end of World War II, small wars have never ended.

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: There were also big wars, such as China's War of Liberation.²³

Hill: I have debated with the revisionists in Australia on this issue.

Mao Zedong: After World War I, there were China's Northern Expedition and the ten-year Land Revolution War.²⁴ There was also the Spanish Civil War. (Pointing toward Zhou Enlai) Where did those five persons go?

Zhou Enlai: They were sent to Algeria by train.

Mao Zedong: We have five students in Morocco to study the language. The Moroccan government did not like these five students and expelled them. They were expelled to Algeria. Are they staying at our embassy?

Zhou Enlai: Yes, they are staying at our embassy. It (the Moroccan government) fears students.

Mao Zedong: Now some governments fear students very much. How can these five students be feared?

Yao Wenyuan: Somehow they also fear the Red Guards.

Mao Zedong: Let's stop here.

[Source: CCA.]

Document No. 3

Mao Zedong's Comments on an Article by Commentator of *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily) and *Hongqi* (Red Flag),²⁵ January 1969

Publish the article as it is. Nixon's [inaugural] speech should also be published in the paper.

[Source: *Wenhua dageming yanjiu ziliao [Research Materials on the Great Cultural Revolution]* (Beijing: National Defense University, 1988), vol. 2, p. 517.]

Document No. 4

Mao Zedong's Talk at a Meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (Excerpt),²⁶ 15 March 1969

Mao Zedong: Every county should establish a [militia] regiment, this should be done all over the country.

In a big county, three battalions should be established; in a middle-size county, two battalions; and in a small county, one battalion. During peacetime, they will stay in the locality; when the war breaks out, they will supplement the field army. When the war breaks out, it will not be enough to rely upon the annual conscription....

Mao Zedong: The northeast, the north, and the northwest should be prepared. Once we are prepared, if the enemy does not come, that does not matter. We are now confronted with a formidable enemy. It is advantageous to have the mobilization and the preparation. The Soviets know that we will not invade their country as it is so cold there. We will try to gain mastery by striking the enemy only after he has struck. Our nuclear bases should be prepared, be prepared for the enemy's air bombardment.

Lin Biao: The actions today [by the Soviet border forces]²⁷ were directed by Moscow. It was initiated [by the commanders] on the front.

Mao Zedong: We protest, but they will not listen to us. Both sides are competing to gain time. They try to save face.

[Source: *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu [A Factual History of the People's Republic of China] (Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1994), vol. 3, Part 1, pp. 467-469]*

Document No. 5
Zhou Enlai's Report to Mao Zedong and Mao's
Comments, 22 March 1969

Zhou Enlai's Report (main points)

During the evening of [March] 22 the Soviet side has inquired several times about Chairman [Mao]'s phone number. The Soviet embassy in China also has visited our foreign ministry several times, stating that "following the instructions of the Soviet Council of Ministers, [we] have messages to convey." In the meantime, our side discovered that the Soviet Army was moving in the Zhenbao Island area, and, through reconnaissance, we learned that superiors on the Soviet side had been pushing the [units on the] front-line to take action. It is estimated that it is possible for the enemy to occupy the Zhenbao Island by force today, and that what they have been doing is no more than making an empty gesture. After discussions with comrades in relevant positions, we have reached the decision to strengthen our troop and weapon deployment on the river bank, wait for the enemy's fatigue, and prepare to defeat the enemy by letting him initiate offensive action. In the meantime, we will present a formal diplomatic note to the Soviet side in a meeting with the Soviet charge d'affaires. The note will point out that considering the current status of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union, it is no longer proper for the two sides to maintain contact via telephone. If the Soviet government has something to say, it should present

its opinions to the Chinese government through formal diplomatic channels.²⁸

Mao Zedong's comments on Zhou Enlai's report:

[I] agree with the stand of the minute. Immediately prepare to hold diplomatic negotiations.

[Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987-1997), vol. 13, p. 21]*

Document No. 6
Mao Zedong's Addition to Lin Biao's Political Report
at the Party's Ninth Congress, April 1969²⁹

With regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibilities: that the war will give rise to revolution and that revolution will prevent the war.

[Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, p.32.*]

Document No. 7
Report, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao,
3 April 1969

Chairman [Mao] and Vice Chairman Lin:

It is estimated that the Soviet military border garrisons acted and put forward their demands to follow the instruction from the Soviet Party Center to respond to the public announcement of the opening of our Party's Ninth Congress. They intended to make an empty show of strength, a show that was designed for others to watch. Our proposals are: (1) Our border garrisons should not respond to the demands of the Soviet border garrisons. (2) We should adjust the positions of our cannons, aiming at the enemy's artillery posts and concealed concentration areas for T-62 tanks and armored vehicles. After the enemy artillery has fired for a few days, we should suddenly fire back, causing heavy casualties for them. We should then issue our protest statement. The timing [for taking this action] should be on the eve of the publication of Vice Chairman Lin's report. We are waiting for Chairman [Mao]'s instructions on whether or not this idea is appropriate.³⁰

Zhou Enlai

[Source: *Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan [Zhou Enlai's Military Papers] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1998), vol. 4, pp. 554-555.*]

Document No. 8

Mao Zedong's Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP's Ninth Central Committee, 28 April 1969³¹

What I am going to say is what I have said before, which you all know, and I am not going to say anything new. Simply I am going to talk about unity. The purpose of unity is to pursue even greater victory.

Now the Soviet revisionists attack us. Some broadcast reports by Tass, the materials prepared by Wang Ming,³² and the lengthy essay in *Kommunist* all attack us, claiming that our Party is no longer one of the proletariat and calling it a "petit-bourgeois party." They claim that what we are doing is the imposition of a monolithic order and that we have returned to the old years of the base areas. What they mean is that we have regressed. What is a monolithic order? According to them, it is a military-bureaucratic system. Using a Japanese term, this is a "system." In the words used by the Soviets, this is called "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." They look at our list of names, and find many military men, and they call it "military."³³ As for "bureaucratic," probably they mean a batch of "bureaucrats," including myself, [Zhou] Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda.³⁴ All in all, those of you who do not belong to the military belong to this "bureaucratic" system. Therefore it is called the "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." I say, let them talk, talk about all of this. Whatever they want to say, let them say it. But there is a characteristic in what they say, that is, they never scold us as a bourgeois party. They label us a "petit-bourgeois party." On our part, we call theirs a bourgeois dictatorship. They are restoring the bourgeois dictatorship.

We are talking about victory, this means that we must guarantee that we should unite the vast masses of the entire country to pursue victory under the leadership of the proletariat. The socialist revolution must continue. There are still unfinished tasks for this revolution to fulfill, such as to conduct struggle, to conduct criticism, and to conduct transformation. After a few years, we will probably need to carry out another revolution.

Several of our old comrades have been stationed in the factories for a period. I hope that when you have opportunities in the future you will go down to have a look again, and to study the problems existing in various factories. It seems to me that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution must be carried out. Our foundation was not solid and stable. According to my observation, not in all factories, not in an overwhelming majority of the factories, but in quite a large majority of the factories, the leadership is not controlled by true Marxists, or controlled by the masses of the workers. Among those who led the factories in the past, I cannot say that there were no good people. There were good people for sure. Among party committee secretaries, assistant secretaries, committee members, there were good people; and among party branch secretaries, there were good people. But they followed Liu Shaoqi's lines, which emphasized material incentives and

put making profits as the top priority, while at the same time failing to promote the proletarian politics, but instead pursued a system of bonuses. In some factories, they have been liberated now, and they have participated in the new leadership, combining the three elements.³⁵ But in some factories, this has not been done. There are indeed bad elements hiding in the factories. For example, the February Seventh Factory, which repairs railway locomotives and carriages at Changxindian, is a big factory, with 8,000 workers and, if you include them, several tens of thousands of workers' family members. In the past, there once existed nine Guomindang district branches, three *Sanmin zhuyi* Youth League³⁶ organs, and eight [Guomindang] secret service organs. Of course, a careful analysis of the situation is needed here. In those days, it wouldn't do if one refused to join such a thing called Guomindang. Some of them are old workers. Are we going to get rid of these old workers? We should not do that. We should make distinctions between those big and small cases. Some of them were only nominal members of the Guomindang, and they were forced to join it. They only need to talk [to clarify the situation]. Some of them were in relatively more responsible positions. A small minority of them were deeply involved and have done bad things. We must make distinctions between these different cases. Even for those who have done bad things, we should also make distinctions among them. Leniency to those who confess, and severity to those who resist. If they conduct a satisfactory self-criticism, we should let them keep their jobs. But, of course, we should not allow them to stay in the leadership. If we do not give these people jobs, what will they do at home? What will their children do? Further, old workers usually are skillful, although some of them are not so skillful.

I have brought up this example to point out that the revolution has not been completed. Therefore, all members of the Central Committee, including those alternate members, should pay attention to conducting your work in a very careful style. In dealing with things like this, you should be very careful. It is not good to be crude and careless, which often leads to mistakes. In some places, many people have been arrested. This is not right. You have arrested so many people, why did you do so? Have the arrested committed homicide, arson, or poisoning? It is my opinion that if someone has not committed any of these crimes, you should not arrest him. As for those who have mistakenly followed the capitalist path, it is even less necessary for you to arrest them. In the factories, they should be allowed to work, and should be allowed to participate in the mass movement. They have committed mistakes, and have committed the mistakes in the past. They either joined the Guomindang, or did some bad things, or have committed mistakes in the recent past, that is, have committed the mistake of following the capitalist path. You should allow them to be with the masses. If you do not allow them to be with the masses, that is not good. Some of them have been detained for two

years, detained in the “cattle pens.”³⁷ As a result, they know nothing about what is happening in the world. When they come out and listen to other people, they find the language the other people use is different. They are still talking in the language of two years ago. They have been separated from life for two years. We should help these people and should hold study sessions for them. We should tell them about history and tell them about the history of the advance of the Great Cultural Revolution in the past two years, so that they gradually will awaken.

We should unite together for one purpose, that is, to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship. This should be solidly carried out in every factory, every village, every office, and every school. In the beginning, we should not spread this out too widely. We may spread it out, but should not stop taking charge of it when it has been spread out. We should not just do this for half a year or a little bit longer, and then have no one take charge of it. The experiences must be summarized factory by factory, school by school, and office by office. Therefore, Comrade Lin Biao emphasizes in his report that this must be done factory by factory, school by school, commune by commune, party branch by party branch, and working unit by working unit. There is also the question of rectifying the [Communist] Youth League, which should be done League branch by League branch.

In addition, there is the question of being prepared for war, which I have mentioned in the past. We should be prepared for war year by year. People may ask: What if they do not come? No matter whether they come or not, we should be prepared. Do not wait for the Party Center to distribute materials even for manufacturing hand grenades. Hand grenades can be manufactured everywhere, can be manufactured in every province. Such things as rifles and light weapons can be manufactured in every province. I am talking here about being prepared in a material sense. But what is more important is to be prepared in a spiritual sense. To be prepared in a spiritual sense is to be prepared for war. Not only [members of] our Central Committee, but also the majority of the people of the whole country, should have such spiritual preparation. Here I do not mean to include the enemies of the [proletarian] dictatorship, such as landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, and bad elements. This is because these people are quite happy to see the imperialists and revisionists invade our country. They suppose that if the invasion occurred, the world would be turned upside down, and that they would come out on top. We should also be prepared for dealing with this situation. In carrying out the socialist revolution, we should also carry out this revolution.

When others invade our territory and attack us, we shall not invade others' territory. We must not invade others' territory. I say this because we should not be provoked. Even if they invited me to come out, I will not come out. But if they invade my territory and attack me, I will deal with them. My response depends on whether they come on a small scale or a large scale. If it is a small-

scale invasion the fighting will be waged on the border. If it is a large-scale invasion, I am in favor of giving up some land. China is not a small country. If there is no benefit waiting for them, they will not come. We must let the whole world see that when we are fighting the war we have both reason and advantage in our hands. If they do come, I think it is more advantageous to us, as we will have both reason and advantage in our hands. It is easy for us to fight [an invading enemy] since he will fall into the people's encirclement. As far as such things like planes, tanks, and armored vehicles are concerned, experiences everywhere prove that they are easy for us to deal with.

In order to achieve victory, we must have more people. Isn't this correct? [We must have] people from all backgrounds, no matter to which “mountain stronghold” they used to belong or in which province they used to work, either in the north or in the south. Is it better to unite with more people or to unite with fewer people? It is always better to unite with more people. Some people may have different opinions from ours, but that is not a relationship between us and the enemy. I simply do not believe, to take a specific example, that the relationship between Wang Xiaoyu³⁸ and Yang Dezhi³⁹ is, as some people say, one between us and the enemy. Is the relationship between you two one between us and the enemy, or is it one among the people? In my opinion, it is a quarrel among the people. The Central Committee has been somewhat bureaucratic, and has failed to pay enough attention to you. On your part, you never bring this matter to the Central Committee for discussion. Shandong is such a big province, and there are contradictions among the people. Would you two please take this opportunity to have a good discussion? In my opinion, there are such contradictions among the people in East China too. There is also the case of Shanxi province, which involves problems among the people too. You support one faction, and I will support another faction. But is this endless quarreling necessary? There are also problems in Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces. Every province has some problems, but, compared with the situation of last year or the year before last, things are already much better. You, comrade, isn't your name Xu Shiyu⁴⁰? When we were in Shanghai the year before last, during the three months from July to September, all under the heaven was great chaos. Now life is a bit better. What I am talking about is the whole situation. In Nanjing, where you are, there emerged a so-called “Red Headquarters.”⁴¹ You have worked on them and they became cooperative. In the end, the “August 27th”⁴² and the “Red Headquarters” are united together.

I believe that the main problem still lies in how we conduct our own work. Did I make two statements in the past? The problems of the localities lay in the army, and the problems of the army lay in its own work. You are not enemies of life and death, why should you treat each other like that? If personal gratitude or hatred is involved, it is not such a big matter and so much weight should not be

put on it. All in all, I find no injustice in your previous life or hatred in your present life [to make you unyielding enemies]. You simply encounter one another, and find some differences in your opinions. Others have either criticized you or opposed you, and you have attacked back. Consequently, contradictions emerge. Those who oppose you are not necessarily bad people. One person in Beijing whom many have wanted to overthrow is Xie Fuzhi.⁴³ He then adopted a method: he told all organizations which hoped to overthrow him that there was nothing wrong with them, and that the organizations which favored him were not necessarily good.

Therefore, what I want to say is what I have said in the past, that is, to unite together to achieve even greater victories. There is concrete content in this statement. It concerns what we are going to do, what kind of victory we are going to pursue, and how we should unite together.

I still have faith in those old comrades who have committed mistakes. Originally, we had a long list, including thirty-odd names, and we thought that it was good if all of them could be elected to the politburo. Later someone put forward a shorter list with less than twenty names, and we felt that that list was too short. The majority held a position in between. They oppose both the longer list and the shorter list, favoring a medium list with some twenty-odd names. So we can only elect representatives [from them]. This is not to say that all those alternate members of the Central Committee are not as good as full members of the Central Committee in terms of their political consciousness, working ability, virtue, talents and seniority. This is not the real question. There is unfairness involved here. Do you think that everything is so fair? In my view, there are many things that are not so fair. There are many things that are not so just.

Everyone of us should be prudent and cautious. No matter who one is, an alternate member of the Central Committee, a full member of the Central Committee, or a member of the Politburo, everyone should be prudent and cautious. We should not forget who we are when there is a sudden inspiration. Since the time of Marx [the Communists] never talk about who should take more or less credit. We are Communist Party members, and we belong to the part of the masses which is more conscious than others, and we belong to the part of the proletariat which is more conscious than others. So I am an advocate of this slogan, that is: "First we should not be scared by hard work; second we should not be scared by death." And I do not favor the slogan: "Even if I have not achieved anything, at least I have worked hard; even if I have not worked hard, at least I have made myself tired." This slogan is in opposition to "First we should not be scared by hard work; and second we should not be scared by death." You see, how many of us have died in the past? All the old comrades who remain here today are lucky survivors who have survived by chance. Comrade Pi Dingjun,⁴⁴ how many were with you when you worked in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area? How many survived?

There were many people there at that time, but not many alive today. At that time, in the Jiangxi Soviet Area, the Jinggang Mountain Soviet Area, the base areas in northeastern Jiangxi, western Fujian, western Hunan and Hubei, and northern Shaanxi, the wars resulted in tremendous sacrifices. Not many old comrades survived. This is what we call "first we should not be scared by hard work; second we should not be scared by death." For many years, we did not have any salary, and there was nothing like the eight-tier wage system. We had only a fixed amount of food. At best we could get three *qian* of cooking oil, five *qian* of salt, and one-and-a-half *jin* of rice.⁴⁵ How about vegetables? How could we get vegetables everywhere the troops passed through? Now we have entered the cities. It is a good thing for us to enter the cities. Without entering the cities, they would still be occupied by Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek].⁴⁶ But it is also a bad thing for us to enter the cities because it has made our Party no longer pure. Therefore, some foreigners and reporters say that our party is being rebuilt. Now, we ourselves have also put forward this slogan, that is, Party-rectification and Party-rebuilding. The Party needs to be rebuilt. Every Party branch needs to be rectified with the supervision of the masses. The whole thing must go through the masses. It should not just involve a few Party members. The masses outside the Party should attend the meetings and should participate in providing comments. A few individual Party members are really not good, and they should be advised to leave the Party. A very small number of Party members may need to be disciplined. This is included in the Party's constitution, isn't it? It also needs to be passed by the Party branch meeting and should be approved by the superior Party committee. All in all, we must adopt prudent methods. This should be done, and this must be done. However, this should be done in prudent ways.

It seems that this national congress is a very good one. In my opinion, it is a congress of unity and a congress of victory. We use the method of issuing communiqués [to announce the convening of the congress], and the foreigners cannot get our news. They say that we are holding a secret meeting. We are both open and secret. It seems to me that the reporters in Beijing are not so good. Probably we have uprooted almost all of the traitors and special agents who were hidden among us. In the past, when there was a meeting, its content were leaked out immediately, appearing in Red Guards papers. After the downfall of Wang [Li], Guan [Feng], and Qi [Benyu],⁴⁷ and Yang [Chengwu], Yu [Lijin],⁴⁸ and Fu [Chongbi],⁴⁹ they no longer know anything about the activities of our Central Committee.

More or less that is what I want to say. The meeting is adjourned.

[Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, pp. 35-41.]

Document No. 9**Report by Four Chinese Marshals—Chen Yi,⁵⁰ Ye Jianying,⁵¹ Xu Xiangqian,⁵² and Nie Rongzhen,⁵³—to the Central Committee, “A Preliminary Evaluation of the War Situation” (excerpt),⁵⁴ 11 July 1969**

I. The struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

The present struggle between these three powers is different from the ones between the “seven powers” before World War II or the American-Soviet confrontation in the early post-war era.

(1) China represents the fundamental interests of the world proletariat class. The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party declared that China and the true Marxists-Leninists and the revolutionary people all over the world should fight resolutely side by side until “the system of man exploiting man is eliminated on the earth and that the whole of mankind is emancipated.”

(2) The U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are two “brands” of representatives of the international bourgeoisie class. On the one hand, they both take China as the enemy; on the other, they take each other as the enemy. U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists are hostile toward China, spreading slanderous rumors about China’s “expansionist ambition.” In fact, socialist China does not have even a single soldier stationed abroad.⁵⁵ China’s behavior during the last twenty years, especially during the war against the Indian invaders⁵⁶ and the war to resist U.S. aggression and assist Vietnam, has fully proven that China has no expansionist intentions. In fact, the imperialists, the revisionists, and the counterrevolutionaries are not really scared by China’s so-called military aggression. What scares them most is the prospect that people’s revolutions of all nations, under the guidance of the invincible Mao Zedong Thought, will send them to the grave. Therefore, the U.S. imperialists’ and the Soviet revisionists’ hostility toward China, in the final analysis, is hostility toward the Mao Zedong Thought, toward the revolutions in their own countries as well as the world revolution, and toward the people of their own countries and the people all over the world. However, it should be noted that Nixon takes China as a “potential threat,” rather than a real threat.⁵⁷

For the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists, the real threat is the one existing between themselves. For all other countries, the real threat comes from U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. Covered by the banner of opposing China, U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists collaborate with each other while at the same time fighting against each other. The contradictions between them, however, are not reduced because of the collaboration between them; rather, their hostilities toward each other are more fierce than ever before.

(3) The other countries, controlled by either the United States or the Soviet Union, have yet to become a force to contend with them. While only a few of them follow the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists to

carry out an anti-China policy, the majority of them maintain a different attitude toward China. Some adopt a dual stand toward China; some maintain an onlooker’s position; some use friendship with China to resist the attempts by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists to control them; some resent U.S. and Soviet plots to re-divide the world and openly challenge them. As China becomes more and more powerful and the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists become weaker and weaker, this situation will develop further, making it more difficult for them to form an anti-China united front, let alone to find hatchet men to use against China in military affairs.

II. Our opinions on the war against China.

We believe that in the foreseeable future it is unlikely that U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists will launch a large-scale war against China, either jointly or separately.

(1) The U.S. imperialists do not dare to attack China rashly. The main reasons are as follows:

(a) The United States and China are separated by the vast Pacific Ocean. The U.S. imperialists’ defeats in the Korean War and the Vietnam War have taught them a bitter lesson causing a deeper crisis both at home and abroad, thus forcing them to claim that they would never again be involved in wars similar to the ones in Korea and Vietnam. China is different from Korea and Vietnam, and the U.S. imperialists must be even more careful while dealing with China.

(b) The strategic emphasis of the U.S. imperialists lies in the West. The U.S. imperialists have been bogged down in South Vietnam, which has seriously weakened their position in the West. If they were to enter a war against China, it would last longer and the result would be more miserable for them. The last thing the U.S. imperialists want to see is involvement in a war against China, allowing the Soviet revisionists to take advantage of it.

(c) The U.S. imperialists wish to push Asian countries to the front in a war against China, especially by using Japan as the vanguard. Japan, however, does not dare to take reckless actions, not only because it suffered seriously in the defeat of its aggression against China, but also because the strength of the new China today is much stronger than that of the old China. Japan’s strength is becoming full-fledged. Although Sato Eisaku⁵⁸ and his like raise an anti-China hullabaloo, their actual intentions are to make money through anti-China war propaganda, to recover Japan’s lost territory occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union, to expand southward, to pursue a leadership role in Asia, and to contend with the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan is unwilling to serve as the scapegoat in a war against China, and the U.S. imperialists are even less willing to do so.

Therefore, it is unlikely that the U.S. imperialists will rashly launch or enter a war against China.

(2) The Soviet revisionists have made China their main enemy, imposing a more serious threat to our

security than the U.S. imperialists. The Soviet revisionists are creating tensions along the long Sino-Soviet border, concentrating troops in the border area and making military intrusions. They are creating anti-China public opinion [in the Soviet Union], creating chaos on the international scene, while at the same time forcing some Asian countries to join an anti-China ring of encirclement with a "carrot-and-stick" method. All these are serious steps that the Soviet revisionists are taking in preparation for a war of aggression against China. However, before they can enter a major war with China, the Soviet revisionists still must deal with many concerns and difficulties.

(a) Both China and the United States take the Soviet Union as their enemy thus the Soviet revisionists do not dare to fight a two-front war. In appearance, the U.S. imperialists are taking a hands-off policy toward the Sino-Soviet dispute, claiming that they will neither take sides nor intervene. In reality, however, they are relaxing their relationship with the Soviet revisionists in the West, and pushing the Soviet revisionists to stand on the first front of a major war against China. By "sitting on top of the mountain to watch a fight between two tigers," they will see the weakening of both China and the Soviet Union. They may even use this opportunity to take over Eastern Europe, or even press forward to the heart area of the Soviet revisionists.

(b) If the Soviet revisionists decide to launch a large-scale attack on China, they will try to fight a quick war. Or they may follow the example of Japan's aggression against China, adopting a strategy of encroaching on China piece by piece, so that they will have time for rectification, as well as to observe the reactions of the U.S. imperialists and other countries. But, once they start a major war against us, we certainly will not allow them to fight a quick war and achieve quick results. We will not give them any breathing spell or freedom of action, and will act in accordance with Chairman Mao's teaching to "fight to the end." We will change the war into a protracted ground war. This will create great difficulties for the Soviet revisionists:

First, the Soviet revisionists' anti-China policy is without any popular support. As of now, they have used defensive excuses to deceive the people. If they are to launch an all-out offensive against China, they will arouse the people's opposition. In addition, the Soviet revisionists have carried out propaganda emphasizing the terror of war for many years, which may produce a negative impact upon their effort to start a war.

Second, the main industry of the Soviet Union is distributed in its European part. It is difficult for the Soviet revisionists to get supplies in Siberia, and everything must be transported from Europe. There is only one railroad. An exhausted army on a long expedition cannot last long. At present the revisionist Soviet Union already faces great shortages of daily necessities. It would be even more difficult for it to hold on in a war.

Third, in order to win a war, a consolidated rear is indispensable. The rear area of the Soviet revisionists is far from consolidated, where domestic class and national contradictions have been intensifying. A war of aggression against China inevitably would be a long-lasting one, and changes are inevitable over a long period, the worst of which will be troubles emerging in the rear area. When the problems on the front have not been solved, troubles at home break out. If American military forces penetrate the Soviet revisionists' spheres of influence in Europe, they will be bogged down there.

(c) We believe that, like the U.S. imperialists, when the Soviet revisionists are moving their troops eastward, it does not mean that their strategic emphasis is also moving eastward. The strategic emphasis of the Soviet revisionists remains in Europe. Eastern Europe is the Soviet Union's main market and defensive barrier, on which it will never let down its guard. To be sure, the Soviet revisionists indeed are preparing for a war against China. But their main purpose is to use military mobilization to consolidate their political control and to suppress resistance to them at home and in Eastern Europe. They are making a show of readiness to fight. This is designed, on the one hand, to serve their attempt to occupy a strong position to negotiate with us, and, on the other hand, to convince the U.S. imperialists that they really intend to fight a major war against China. They hope that this will bring stability to them on the western front, and that the U.S. imperialists will endorse their action of establishing an anti-China ring of encirclement. Consequently, they, with their expansionist attempts in Southeast Asia and other areas being covered, will be able to put their hands into the pockets of the Americans and the British and to redivide the world. The U.S. imperialists, on their part, are pushing the Soviet revisionists to attack China so that they may use this opportunity to take over the Soviet revisionists' spheres of influence.

(3) Will the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists launch a surprise nuclear attack on us? We must be fully prepared for this. However, it is not an easy matter to use a nuclear weapon. When a country uses nuclear weapons to threaten another country, it places itself under the threat of other country's nuclear weapons, and will thus inevitably face the strong opposition of its own people. Even the use of nuclear weapons cannot conquer an unbending people. In the final analysis, the outcome of a war will be determined by the continuous fighting of the ground forces. Therefore, nuclear weapons cannot save the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists.

(4) According to the current situation, it is difficult for U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists to attack China, either jointly or independently, or by gathering [on their side] such countries as Japan and India. In fact, when they argue for the need to attack China, either jointly or independently, they have other purposes in mind. In reality, they know that it is not easy to bully China, and

once they are bogged down in China, it is not easy to get out. Both the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists want others to take the lead, allowing them to take advantage by hiding in the back. We are ready in full battle array. No matter how the aggressors will come, jointly or independently, they will be thoroughly defeated.

III. Analyzing the American-Soviet contradiction

(1) The Soviet revisionists have adopted a “one-leg” policy in the construction of their country. They first pursued partial development in heavy industry, and then pursued a deformed development in advanced military industry. This provided them with the capacity for expansion. The U.S. imperialists have been trapped in South Vietnam, and the British imperialists have decided to withdraw from areas east of the Suez Canal, which has created a new opportunity for Soviet expansion. The Soviet revisionists also carry out expansion in the name of anti-imperialism or under the cover of opposing China. They often begin with the vulnerable spots, occupying grounds in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. They even have extended their hands into the U.S. Imperialists’ backyard: Latin America. One of the most conspicuous indications of Soviet expansionism is the all-out effort to develop a navy. The ocean was controlled by the United States and Britain in the past, and the Soviet revisionists are vigorously expanding in the ocean, causing conflicts with the capitalist-imperialists.

(2) The expansion by the Soviet revisionists has been conducted for the purpose of squeezing out the U.S. imperialists. The Soviet revisionists hope to divide the world equally with the U.S. imperialists, as well as take charge of world affairs together with the U.S. imperialists. The U.S. imperialists are determined to maintain their superior position, and are unwilling to give up their hegemony and the world hegemon’s position. The U.S. imperialists will not allow the Soviet revisionists to consolidate their position in the Middle East. The U.S. imperialists do not believe that the Soviet revisionists will really enter a major war against China, and they thus will not allow the Soviet revisionists to expand at will.

(3) Both the Soviet revisionists and the U.S. imperialists are making plans for action now. The Soviet revisionists want to extend their influence into Western Europe, and the U.S. imperialists hope to put a leg into Eastern Europe. They give tit for tat, competing to seize what is possessed by the other side. What exists between them is a real and concrete conflict of interests. The struggles between them are both constant and severe.

(4) Both the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists face crises at home and abroad, but they will not shrink back simply because they are facing difficulties. The Soviet revisionists are making active preparations in the East, not relaxing efforts in the West, and hoping to develop in the South. The U.S. imperialists also want to pursue a path of expansion. It is necessary that the contradictions between them will intensify.

(5) The contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union concentrate on Europe and the Middle East. The unification of Germany is the core of the European problem. The strength of West Germany has been increasing. Eastern Europe was Germany’s traditional market, and at present, the influence of France has reduced to a certain extent. In the Middle East, the conflict between Arabic countries and Israel has been characterized by an indirect confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Europe, if the contradictions develop further, the possibility cannot be excluded that a conflict might happen between the United States and the Soviet Union. We must pay close attention to this development.

We have made full preparations, and we are ready to defeat any enemy who dares to invade our territory. However, it is more beneficial to us to postpone the war. We should make full use of time and strengthen preparations in all respects, “making revolution, while promoting production, promoting our work, and promoting war preparation.” We must promote the continuous great leap forward of our industrial and agricultural production, build China into an unshakable proletarian country with stronger economic power and stronger land, naval and air forces. In the struggle against the enemy, we should adopt a military strategy of active defense and a political strategy of active offense. We should continue to expose and criticize the Soviet revisionists and the U.S. imperialists. We should enhance our embassies and consulates in other countries, and actively carry out diplomatic activities. We should expand the international united front of anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism. We should strive for greater victory in the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists.

[Source: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao [CCP Party History Materials], no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 70-75.]

Document No. 10

The CCP Central Committee’s Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and Regions,⁵⁹ 28 August 1969

The borders of our great motherland are sacred and inviolable. To defend the motherland is the sacred obligation of the people of the whole country. In this regard, the soldiers and people in the border areas in particular have direct responsibility. In order to defend the motherland, to defend our borders, to defend the great achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship, to prepare to smash the armed provocations by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists at any time, and to prevent them from launching sudden attacks [against our motherland], the Party Central Committee orders:

(1) Chairman Mao's great instructions on "raising our vigilance and defending our motherland" and "preparing for fighting a war" must be followed resolutely, and a high alertness to the presence of the enemy must be established. You should overcome the status of lacking alertness because of peace, and should not look down upon the enemy. You should be fully prepared to fight a war against aggression, should strengthen unity between the army and the people, and should be prepared to eliminate any enemy who dares to invade our territory.

(2) In face of a formidable enemy, the whole army and the whole people should unite together as one person, confronting the enemy with one stand. The unity within the army should be enhanced; the unity between the army and the people, as well as the unity between the army and the government, should be enhanced; and the unity among the revolutionary people of all nationalities should be enhanced. The leadership role of the revolutionary committees at all levels should be consolidated. All activities to divide our own strength should be opposed. Any actions against unity should be opposed. Bourgeois factionalism should be opposed. Class enemies who provoke others to damage the unity between the army and the people and the unity between different nationalities should be cracked down upon without mercy. The main culprits should be punished in accordance with the law.

3. The commanders and soldiers of army units stationed on the border area must stick to their fighting posts, must carry out all orders resolutely, must obey orders and be strictly disciplined, and must be combat-ready in all aspects and pay close attention to the enemy's movement, so that they will be able immediately to take action when they are ordered to do so. For members of the army, no action damaging discipline will be tolerated. Members of the army must not leave their posts without approval, and are not allowed to establish liaison with other units by traveling there. Those who fail to correct wrongdoings after education will be severely punished.

4. All revolutionary mass organizations should follow the great leader Chairman Mao's teaching to realize the "great revolutionary unification" in accordance with their working systems, professions, working branches, and working units. All mass organizations that are established across professions will be dissolved immediately. Any attempt to establish a separate organization or to reestablish an organization is illegal, and organizations of this kind should be ordered to dissolve.

5. The Party Central Committee's "July 23 Order"⁶⁰ should be carried out resolutely. All factional struggle by violent means should be stopped unconditionally and immediately. All professional teams for struggle by violent means should be dissolved. All strongholds for struggle by violent means should be eliminated. All weapons should be handed back. If any team for struggle by violent means continues to occupy a stronghold and stubbornly refuses to surrender, the People's Liberation Army can surround the stronghold by force, launch a

political offensive toward it, and confiscate the weapons [held by the team] by force.

6. In no circumstance should anyone be allowed to attack the People's Liberation Army. In no circumstance should anyone be allowed to seize the Army's weapons, equipment, and vehicles. In no circumstance should anyone hinder the Army's war preparations, or expose and steal military intelligence. Any violation of the above will be treated as current reactionary behavior. Key military positions and war preparation facilities must be protected resolutely. The secrets of national defense must be carefully maintained. The People's Liberation Army's preparations for war should be aided and supported.

7. Transportation must be protected, and the working condition of the communication system must be guaranteed. Any actions damaging railway, highway, and water transportation, damaging the communication liaison system, and of cutting off electricity lines will be regarded as counter-revolution activities, and must be investigated and severely punished.

8. The revolution must be carried out resolutely, and production must be promoted vigorously, so that extensive support can be given to the front-line. Laboring disciplines should be observed, production posts should be maintained, and the industrial and agricultural production should be carried out smoothly. Anyone who has left his production or work post must return to his work unit to take part in "making revolution, promoting production, promoting work, and promoting war preparation." Anyone who fails to return to his own unit on time will not get salary as a worker or clerk, or will not get workpoints as a peasant. He will be disciplined in accordance with the seriousness of the violation, and can be expelled from the work force. Those who provoke or threaten the workers and peasants to leave their production and work posts must be punished severely in accordance with the law.

9. The counterrevolutionary elements must be suppressed without mercy. Those counterrevolutionaries who have connections with foreign countries or plan to escape abroad, who sabotage social safety and stability, who plunder state property, who sabotage production, who conduct homicide, arson, poisoning, and who utilize feudal superstition to provoke rebellion, must be suppressed without mercy. Landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements, and rightists who have not been transformed must be placed under tight supervision of the revolutionary masses and accept transformation through labor.

[Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, pp. 59-61.]

Document No. 11**Report by Four Chinese Marshals—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian—to the CCP Central Committee, “Our Views about the Current Situation” (Excerpt), 17 September 1969**

The international class struggle is intricate and complex, and its core is the struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. At present a question of overwhelming importance is whether or not the Soviet revisionists will launch a large-scale attack on China. Just at the time when the Soviet revisionists have daggers drawn, the U.S. imperialists are fanning the flames, and China is making war preparations, Kosygin⁶¹ suddenly made a detour to Beijing, expressing to us a willingness to relax border tensions, as well as to improve the relations between our two countries.⁶² What is his purpose? This is a question worth analyzing.

1. The Soviet revisionists indeed intend to wage a war of aggression against China. Their strategic goal is to re-divide the world with the U.S. imperialists. They vainly hope to bring China into the orbit of social-imperialism. Recently the Soviet revisionists have intensified whipping up public opinion for a war against China, openly threatening us with a nuclear strike, and conspiring to launch a surprise attack on our nuclear facilities. The Cultural Revolution in our country is still under way, our nuclear weapons are still under development, and the Vietnam War has not ended. A group of adventurers in the Soviet revisionist leadership want to seize this opportunity to use missiles and tanks to launch a quick war against China and thoroughly destroy China, so that a “mortal danger” for them will be removed.

2. Although the Soviet revisionists intend to wage a war of aggression against China and, accordingly, have made war deployments, they cannot reach a final decision because of political considerations. Launching a war against China is a matter of life and death importance, and the Soviet revisionists are not certain that they can win the war. To a large extent, the Soviet revisionists’ decision to launch a war of aggression against China depends on the attitude of the U.S. imperialists, which is far from satisfactory to them so far, and is their utmost worry in a strategic sense. The last thing the U.S. imperialists are willing to see is a victory by the Soviet revisionists in a Sino-Soviet war, as this would [allow the Soviets] to build up a big empire more powerful than the American empire in resources and manpower. Several times the U.S. imperialists have expressed a willingness to improve relations with China, which reached a peak during Nixon’s recent trip to Asia.⁶³ The Soviet revisionists are scared by the prospect that we might ally ourselves with the U.S. imperialists to confront them. On July 26, the first day of Nixon’s trip to Asia, the Soviet revisionists hurriedly handed to our side the statement issued by the Soviet Council of Ministers to our government. This move fully revealed the anxiousness on the part of the Soviet

revisionists. The Soviet revisionists’ fears about possible Sino-American unity makes it more difficult for them to launch an all-out attack on China. Considering several other factors, it can be concluded that the Soviet revisionists dare not start a major war against China.

3. Kosygin’s trip to Beijing reflected [the Soviet revisionists’] reactionary pragmatism. The Soviet revisionists want to get out of difficulties at home and abroad by attempting to modify a brink-of-war policy toward China and hoisting the banner of peace. It was also aimed at exploring our intentions to provide the Soviet revisionists with a basis for their decision-making. It is estimated that the Soviet revisionists might enter negotiations with us, and to ask us to adopt their stand to either maintain the status quo of the border or solve the border problem. While maintaining an anti-China policy, the Soviet revisionists hope to relax, or to improve, the state-to-state relations with our country in order to gain a respite to stabilize their domestic situation and the situation in East Europe, while at the same time consolidating and expanding their interests in the Middle East, Asia, and other areas. They especially hope to take advantage through adopting a reactionary two-faced policy toward China, thus gaining strength and winning initiative in the conflict with the U.S. imperialists.

4. Premier Zhou Enlai’s meeting with Kosygin has shocked the whole world, and has caused confusion in the strategic thinking of the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, and the reactionaries in other countries. Though we have never retreated from the stand of beating down U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, Kosygin still visited Beijing in person. All of this is China’s great victory. In the struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, the United States hopes to utilize China and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union hopes to exploit China and the United States, so that one of them will gain the utmost strategic advantages. We must wage a tit-for-tat struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union, including using negotiation as a means of fighting against them. We should be firm on principles and flexible on tactics. The Soviet revisionists have requested holding negotiations on the border issue, to which we have agreed. The U.S. imperialists have suggested resuming the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, to which we should respond positively when the timing is proper. Such tactical actions may bring about results of strategic significance.

[Source: *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 84-86.]

Document No. 12**Further Thoughts by Marshal Chen Yi on Sino-American Relations**

This report [the report by the four marshals] mainly deals with Kosygin’s trip to China and the possibility for the Soviet revisionists to launch a large-scale attack on

China, and it thus fails to provide a detailed analysis of whether or not the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw should be resumed. I have considered for a long time on how to achieve a breakthrough in Sino-American relations. The talks in Warsaw have been conducted for more than ten years without producing anything. Even if the talks are resumed now, they will not bring about breakthrough in Sino-American relations. I have read relevant reference materials. On 27 October 1955, we suggested that China and the United States hold talks at the foreign minister's level to relax and eliminate tension in the Taiwan region. On 18 and 24 January 1956, our Foreign Ministry spokesman issued two statements, pointing out that the Taiwan problem had proven too serious to be solved by the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and that only talks at the foreign minister's level could relax and eliminate tension in the Taiwan region. This suggestion, though with great significance, was rejected by the United States. The situation has changed today. Because of the strategic need for dealing with the Soviet revisionists, Nixon hopes to win over China. It is necessary for us to utilize the contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union in a strategic sense, and pursue a breakthrough in the Sino-American relations. Thus, we must adopt due measures, about which I have some "wild" ideas. First, when the meetings in Warsaw are resumed, we may take the initiative in proposing to hold Sino-American talks at the ministerial or even higher levels, so that basic and related problems in Sino-American relations can be solved. We should only make suggestion about at which level and on which topics talks should be held. In my judgment, the Americans may accept the suggestion. It is possible that if we do not take the initiative, the Americans may make such a suggestion. If that is the case, we should accept it. Second, a Sino-American meeting at higher levels holds strategic significance. We should not raise any prerequisite, which does not mean that we have departed from our previous stand on the Taiwan question. The Taiwan question can be gradually solved by talks at higher levels. Furthermore, we may discuss with the Americans other questions of strategic significance. These tasks cannot be fulfilled with talks at the ambassadorial level. Third, when the talks in Warsaw are resumed, we do not need to use the meeting place provided by the Polish government. To keep the meetings secret, the talks should be held at the Chinese embassy.

[Source: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 86-87.]

Document No. 13
Letter, Zhou Enlai to Alexei Kosygin,
18 September 1969

Chairman Alexei Kosygin
The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

On 11 September 1969, our two sides agreed during our meeting at the Beijing airport: that the long-existing Sino-Soviet border disputes should be settled through peaceful negotiation without threats of any kind; and that before the settlement has been reached the two sides should take temporary measures to maintain the status quo of the borders and to avoid armed conflict. The two sides have also exchanged opinions upon the measures that should be taken. They are as follows:

I. The two sides agree that until the border dispute is settled, the status quo of the border should be strictly maintained.

1. Taking the maps exchanged in the 1964 Sino-Soviet border negotiations as the basis, in the sections of the border where the two sides have identical opinions on the maps, the two sides promise to observe strictly the border line as set up by the treaty, and will not cross the border line.

2. In the sections of the border where the two sides have different opinions on the map, that is, the areas under dispute, the two sides promise: the residents of the two sides should live, conduct productive activity (including plowing, digging irrigation ditches, grazing, cutting grass, and cutting firewood both on land and on island, and fishing in the river), and pass through, only in the area where they used to live, conduct productive activity, and pass through. Neither side should advance into the other side's area, or should interfere with each other. In the area where no one lived, conducted productive activity, or passed through in the past, neither side should enter now.

The coverage of the above (1) and (2) areas should be defined by the border administrations of the two sides through discussion and negotiation, and should be defined in one decision, saving the need to inform the other side repeatedly in the future. This agreement will be in effect until the border dispute is settled.

II. The two sides agree to avoid armed conflict.

1. The two sides promise that the armed forces of each side, including nuclear forces, will not attack and open fire on the other side.

2. The two sides promise that the planes of each side will not violate the air space of the other side.

3. The two sides promise that the military ships and vessels and other ships and vessels, while navigating in the main channel of a border river, should strictly observe the existing navigation rules, and should not hinder the normal navigation of the ships of the other side and menace the safety of the ships of the other side.

III. The armed forces of the two sides should be separated from direct contact in the border area under dispute.

1. All armed forces of the two sides should withdraw from, or should not enter, all border areas under dispute, so that they will be separated from direct contact.

2. In the areas where the armed forces of the two sides have been separated from direct dispute, if there are existing places of residence, necessary unarmed civil

service personnel may be maintained.

IV. The two sides agree that in case a dispute occurs on the border, the relative agencies of the two sides should follow a spirit of equality and mutual respect to pursue reasonable solution through discussion. If a solution cannot be reached, each side should report to its superior to pursue solution by discussion through diplomatic channels.

V. The two sides agree that the above temporary measures are designed to maintain the status quo of the border and to avoid armed conflict, and that they do not change each side's stand toward the border, as well as toward the sovereignty of the area under dispute.

If you confirm the above temporary measures in writing, I will treat them as the agreement between the governments of China and the Soviet Union. These measures thus will be effective immediately, and should be put into execution.

It is my belief that this agreement, if it can be reached, will contribute to the relaxation of the situation on the border between our two countries, as well as the convening of Sino-Soviet border negotiations.⁶⁴

With Respect
Zhou Enlai
Premier of the State Council
The People's Republic of China

[Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [*Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai*], (Beijing: *The Central Press of Historical Documents*, 1990), pp. 462-464]

Document No. 14

Mao Zedong's Conversation with North Korean Official Choi Yong Kun⁶⁵ (Excerpt), 1 October 1969, at the Tiananmen Gate

Mao Zedong: The relations between our two countries are special, and we should improve our relations. Our aims are identical. During the years of resistance against Japan, the Korean comrades fought against the enemy together with us for a long time. During the war against the Americans, we also fought side by side with the Korean comrades. In the future, it is possible that we will do the same thing again. In opposing Khrushchev's revisionism, we stood together on the same side! Toward the Soviet revisionists, we may not condemn them every day. It does not necessarily work if we condemn them every day. But we will continuously condemn them.... We have been old friends. We both opposed de-Stalinization, and we reached a consensus on this issue a long time ago. Stalin did commit mistakes, I cannot say that he did not commit any mistakes, but basically he was a good person. Stalin made big contributions to the revolution in the Soviet Union and to world revolution. Opposing Stalin was in fact for the purpose of refusing to carry out the Leninist policy line

after the October Revolution.... The United States is happy to see the split between China and the Soviet Union. In the past ten days or so, there has been no fighting along the Chinese-Soviet borders. So long as there is no fighting, we are anxious to see it. We do not want to fight a war.

[Source: *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu*, vol. 3, part 1, p. 522]

Document No. 15

Zhou Enlai's talk at a Meeting of the Chinese Delegation Attending the Sino-Soviet Border Negotiation (Excerpt), 7 October 1969

Zhou Enlai: The governments of China and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement to begin negotiations on the border dispute on October 20.

(Zhou Enlai then announced the composition of the Chinese governmental delegation with Qiao Guanhua⁶⁶ as the head, and Yu Zhan⁶⁷ and Chai Chengwen⁶⁸ as the deputy heads.)

Zhou Enlai: During the meeting of the heads of the two governments on September 11, the two sides agreed that they should not go to war because of the border dispute. I told Kosygin seriously and sincerely that we do not want to fight a war. We even cannot fully take care of our own business now, why should we go to a war? But we will never be scared by war threats, including nuclear war threats. In the statement issued by our government today, we publicly announced this attitude to the whole world. The negotiation can only be carried out smoothly without being placed under any threat. This is also one of the lessons we have learned from the 1964 negotiations. The understandings that were reached at the meeting at the airport were clearly defined and should be put into execution. However, when we followed the procedures that had been agreed upon by the two sides to list the understandings in writing on September 18 to get their confirmation,⁶⁹ in their letter of reply, they only mentioned that they had issued the order to their border forces, without mentioning the mutual understandings that had been reached. Therefore, the number one task for this delegation is to reach an agreement on the temporary measures [to relax the border tension]. Otherwise, it is impossible for the situation to be relaxed.

(Concerning the Soviet government's statement on June 13) We have made it clear during the meeting by the heads of the two governments [on September 11] that we will respond to that statement. But, before beginning the border negotiation, we do not want to let this issue jeopardize the already tense atmosphere. Therefore, together with the Foreign Ministry, we have decided that the statement will be issued as a Foreign Ministry document, rather than a statement by the [Chinese] government. From a diplomatic perspective, this response is not made on an equal level; but from a political perspective, this is more reasonable and advantageous.

(Concerning the leadership of the negotiation delegation) It should be divided into the first, the second, and third lines. Qiao Guanhua and Chai Chengwen belong to the first line Ji Pengfei,⁷⁰ Huang Yongsheng⁷¹ belong to the second line. The third line is the Party's Central Committee.

(Concerning the preparations for the negotiation:) All members of the delegation should put down all other work and be concentrated, and should go all out to prepare for the negotiation. They should first get familiar with the statements of, as well as notes, between the two governments. They should also get familiar with the history and current status of the [Sino-Soviet] border. The temporary measures, which should be solved as the first step in handling the negotiation, are closely related to the whole situation. You are not just negotiating to settle the border dispute; you are negotiating about the relationship between the two countries.⁷²

[Source: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 523-524]

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¹ [Editor's note: See John H. Holdrige, *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p.25. Thanks to William Burr (National Security Archive) for drawing attention to this source.]

² Beqir Balluku was defense minister of the Albanian People's Republic and a Politburo member of the Albanian Labor Party. Later the Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha charged Balluku as a "Chinese spy" and ordered his execution.

³ Liu Shaoqi was the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) second most important leader from 1949 to 1966. Labeled as China's "largest Khrushchev" during the Cultural Revolution, he was purged and died in disgrace in 1969.

⁴ Deng Xiaoping served as Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) general secretary from 1956 to 1966, but was then purged and labeled as China's "second largest Khrushchev" during the Cultural Revolution. However, he reemerged in China's political scene in the 1970s. For a discussion of Deng's purge and his reemergence, see Chen Jian, "Deng Xiaoping, Mao's 'Continuous Revolution,' and the Sino-Soviet Split," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 162-165.

⁵ Hysni Kapo was a member of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat of the Albanian Labor Party.

⁶ During the Cultural Revolution, a process of "seizing the power" by the revolutionaries swept across the country between

early 1967 and late 1968. During this process, the "old" Party and administrative authorities were replaced by new Revolutionary Committees in China's cities and countryside. The composition of the Revolutionary Committee usually adopted a "three-in-one" formula, meaning that it should include representatives of the revolutionary masses, the leading revolutionary cadres, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

⁷ Todor Zhivkov served as first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party from 1954 to 1989.

⁸ Alexander Dubček, first secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in 1968, initiated a wide-ranging program to liberalize and democratize all aspects of communism in Czechoslovakia. This reform effort ended abruptly when Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968.

⁹ Joseph Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia from 1944 until his death in 1980, was famous for his independent stand against Soviet domination.

¹⁰ E. F. Hill, chairman of the Australian Communist Party (Marxism-Leninism) Central Committee (CC), frequently visited China during the Cultural Revolution.

¹¹ Yao Wenyuan was then a member of the Central Cultural Group. He would be elected a member of the CCP Politburo at the Party's Ninth Congress in April 1969. As one of the "Gang of Four" (together with Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's wife), he was arrested in October 1976.

¹² Mao Zedong alluded to the period from 1912 to 1928.

¹³ Zhou Enlai was the premier of the PRC State Council and, then, a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.

¹⁴ Kang Sheng was then a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and an advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group. He had been in charge of the CCP's external liaison affairs, as well as the Party's secret service for many years.

¹⁵ Harold Holt was Australia's prime minister from January 1966 to December 1967. On 17 December 1967, while swimming at Portsea, Victoria, he disappeared and was presumed to have drowned.

¹⁶ John Gorton was Australia's prime minister from December 1967 to March 1971.

¹⁷ Lin Biao was then vice chairman of the CCP CC, defense minister, and Mao Zedong's designated successor. In September 1971, after the failure of an alleged coup attempt aimed at assassinating Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, together with his wife and son, escaped by plane from China. They all died, however, when the plane crashed in Outer Mongolia after failing to make an emergency landing.

¹⁸ China tested its first atomic (fission) bomb in October 1964 and the first hydrogen bomb in May 1967.

¹⁹ Chen Boda was then a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and head of the Cultural Revolution Group. He would be purged by Mao Zedong in 1970 and disappeared from China's political arena.

²⁰ Yang Chengwu, acting PLA chief of staff from early 1966 to March 1968, was purged in March 1968 for alleged involvement in activities against Lin Biao. After Lin Biao's death, he was "rehabilitated" in the 1970s. Mao Zedong here referred to an article, published in Yang Chengwu's name, entitled "Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao and His Great Thought." For an English translation, see *Peking Review*, 10 November 1967, pp. 17-24.

²¹ Yao, Shun, and Da Yu were all legendary figures in pre-dawn Chinese history.

²² King Zhou, an infamous tyrant, was the last king of the Yin

dynasty, which existed in the middle-reach of the Yellow River from around the 17th to 11th centuries BC.

²³ Mao refers to the Chinese civil war between the CCP and the Guomindang in 1946-1949, ending with the CCP's victory.

²⁴ The Northern Expedition occurred in 1926-1927, and the Land Revolution War lasted from 1927 to 1936.

²⁵ On 20 January 1969, Richard M. Nixon delivered his inaugural address, in which he suggested American willingness to develop relations with *all* countries in the world. When *Renmin ribao* and *Hongqi*, both CCP's mouthpieces, planned to publish a commentator's article, entitled "Confession in an Impasse — A Comment on Nixon's Inaugural Address and the Contemptible Applause by the Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique," and sent it to Mao for approval for publication, Mao wrote down these comments. Following Mao's instructions, all major Chinese newspapers published the complete text of Nixon's speech. For Nixon's speech see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 1-4.

²⁶ On 2 March 1969, a bloody armed conflict occurred between Chinese and Soviet border garrison forces on Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island in Russian), a small island located near the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River on the Chinese-Soviet border. According to the Xinhua News Agency: "At 9:17 AM on March 2, large numbers of fully armed soldiers, together with four armored vehicles and cars, dispatched by the Soviet border authorities, flagrantly intruded into the area of Zhenbao Island, which is indisputably China's territory, to carry out blatant provocation against the Chinese border garrisons on normal patrol duty. They first opened cannon and gun fire, killing and wounding many Chinese soldiers. The Chinese border garrisons were compelled to fight back in self-defense when they reached the end of their tolerance. The grave incident was entirely and solely created by the Soviet authorities." (See *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], 3 March 1969). [Editor's note: For the Soviet version of the 2 March 1969 incident as related to the East German leadership, see Christian F. Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 189-90.]

²⁷ On March 15, a second bloody battle occurred between Chinese and Soviet troops on Zhenbao Island.

²⁸ [Editor's Note: For more information on the refusal to receive phone calls from the Soviet side, see Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71," pp. 190-91 (Telegram from GDR Ambassador to PRC to East German Foreign Ministry, 2 April 1969).]

²⁹ Mao Zedong added these sentences to the text of Lin Biao's political report to the CCP's Ninth Congress. Lin Biao's report was published by *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily] on 28 April 1969.

³⁰ Mao Zedong commented on the report: "This is fine."

³¹ Based on a different version of the Chinese original of the speech, Stuart Schram translated the speech into English and included it in his *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 282-289.

³² Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) was one of the leaders of the "international section" within the CCP in the 1930s. Since 1956, he had lived in the Soviet Union and frequently published books and articles criticizing Mao Zedong. He died in Moscow in 1974.

³³ Mao Zedong refers to the new Central Committee elected at the CCP's Ninth National Congress, held from 1 April to 24 April 1969.

³⁴ All of them were members of the CCP's Politburo Standing Committee.

³⁵ The three elements were revolutionary masses, revolutionary cadres, and PLA representatives. Please refer to note 5 for explanations of the "three-in-one" combination.

³⁶ The Sanmin Zhuyi Youth League was the Guomindang's youth organization. Sanmin zhuyi was Sun Yat-sen's political ideology and philosophy, sometimes translated as the "Three Principles of the People."

³⁷ The "cattle pens," unofficial prisons created by the "revolutionary masses" to detain "bad elements," widely existed during the Cultural Revolution, especially between 1966-1969.

³⁸ Wang Xiaoyu was then chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Shandong province and a member of the CCP CC.

³⁹ Yang Dezhi was then vice chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Shandong province, commander of the PLA's Jinan Military Region, and a member of the CCP CC.

⁴⁰ Xu Shiyu commanded the PLA's Nanjing Military Region and served as chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Jiangsu Province. At the Party's Ninth Congress, he was elected a member of the Politburo.

⁴¹ The "Red Headquarters" was a "revolutionary rebel organization" in Jiangsu Province.

⁴² The "August 27th" was another "revolutionary rebel organization" in Jiangsu Province, opposed to the "Red Headquarters."

⁴³ Xie Fuzhi, then chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Beijing City, was elected a member of the Politburo at the CCP's Ninth Congress. He died in 1973 of cancer.

⁴⁴ Pi Dingjun, then vice chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Fujian province, vice commander of the PLA's Fuzhou Military Region, was a member of the CCP CC.

⁴⁵ One *jin* is equal to half kilogram and is composed of sixteen *qian*.

⁴⁶ Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] ruled the Chinese mainland from 1927-1949 as the leader of Nationalist China.

⁴⁷ Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu were all members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. Wang and Guan were arrested in August 1967, and Qi was arrested in February 1968.

⁴⁸ Yu Lijin was political commissar of the Chinese air force until his purge, together with Yang Chengwu and Fu Chongbi, in March 1968. He would be rehabilitated after Lin Biao's death.

⁴⁹ Fu Chongbi was commander of the People's Liberation Army's Beijing garrison headquarters until his purge, together with Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin, in March 1968. He would be rehabilitated after Lin Biao's death.

⁵⁰ Chen Yi was one of China's ten marshals in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1969, he was China's foreign minister and a member of the CCP CC. He had been a member of the CCP Politburo from 1956 to 1969. During the Cultural Revolution, he was repeatedly criticized for his "rightist tendencies and mistakes," and, after summer 1967, his position as China's foreign minister became no more than nominal.

⁵¹ Ye Jianying, a member of the CCP Politburo and vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (which did not have a single meeting between March 1968 and early 1972), was another one of the ten marshals. During the Cultural Revolution, he was also criticized, especially for the leading role he played in challenging the Central Cultural Revolution Group in February 1967, known as the "February Counter Current" (*eryue niliu*).

⁵² Xu Xiangqian, another one of the ten marshals, was then a member of the CCP CC and vice chairman of the CCP Central

Military Commission. During the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, he was appointed the head of the PLA's Cultural Revolution Leading Group, but lost the position in late 1967.

⁵³ Nie Rongzhen, also one of the ten marshals, was then a member of the CCP CC and vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission. He had been in charge of China's national defense industry (including the building of China's A bomb and H bomb) and, during the Cultural Revolution, was the least criticized of the four marshals.

⁵⁴ After the CCP's Ninth Congress in April 1969, Mao Zedong instructed the four marshals to study the international situation together and to present to the Party's central leadership a written report. Zhou Enlai then assigned Xiong Xianghui, one of his long-time top aids, to assist the four marshals in preparing the report. From June 7 to July 10, the four marshals held six meetings for a total of 19 hours. On July 11, they completed this report and presented it to Zhou Enlai. Xiong Xianghui took detailed notes at these meetings. The excerpt of the report translated here is based on the material released in his memoir, "The Prelude to the Opening of Sino-American Relations," *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao* (CCP History Materials), no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 56-96.

⁵⁵ We now know, however, that China dispatched a total of 320,000 engineering and anti-aircraft artillery troops to Vietnam in 1965-1969. For a discussion, see Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," *China Quarterly* 142 (June 1995), pp. 357-386.

⁵⁶ This refers to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.

⁵⁷ The four marshals are probably alluding to Nixon's press conference remark of 14 March 1969. Nixon's reference to "a potential Chinese Communist threat" is cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 246, citing *Presidential Documents*, vol. 5 (March 17, 1969), p. 404. The context for Nixon's statement was the new administration's announcement that it would proceed with an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, which had been justified by the Johnson Administration by the need to be prepared for a potential Chinese danger, and the implication that the Soviets, too, had an interest in containing the Chinese threat: "I would imagine," Nixon said, "that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat." We thank William Burr (National Security Archive) for alerting us to this quotation.

⁵⁸ Sato Eisaku served as Japan's prime minister from 1964 to 1972.

⁵⁹ The CCP CC issued the order on 28 August 1969. The order, primarily intended to bring about a general mobilization in border provinces and regions, especially Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Helongjiang, was also widely carried out in other parts of China. The order thus resulted in a nationwide mobilization in China late in 1969.

⁶⁰ On 23 July 1969, using Shanxi province as a case, the CCP CC ordered that all mass organizations should end "struggle with violent means," that the PLA should take resolute measures to restore order, that transportation and communication systems should be unconditionally restored, that all counter-revolutionaries should be severely punished, and that production should be unconditionally resumed. See *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, vol. 13, pp. 54-55.

⁶¹ Alexei Kosygin was a member of the Soviet Party Politburo and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

⁶² On 11 September 1969, Kosygin, after attending Ho Chi Minh's funeral in Hanoi, made a short stop in Beijing and met with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai at the Beijing airport. The meeting lasted for 3 hours and 40 minutes. According to the Chinese records, the two sides reached four tentative agreements at the meeting: (1) The two sides agree to maintain the status quo of the border; (2) the two sides agree to avoid military conflict on the border; (3) the two sides agree that their military forces should avoid contact in disputed areas; and (4) the two sides agree to let their border authorities consult and negotiate with each in case a dispute emerges. Zhou Enlai and Kosygin also agreed that, after reporting the results of the meeting to the two Party's central leadership, they would confirm these results by exchanging formal letters. (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 510-511.) For Zhou Enlai's letter to Kosygin dated 18 September 1969, see Document 13. [Editor's Note: for English translations of Soviet records pertaining to the meeting see Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71," pp. 191-193; and *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 197-199.]

⁶³ Richard Nixon made a round-the-world journey in July-August 1969, and spent time in Asia. During a stop in Guam, Nixon announced at a news conference that while in the past Asian nations had received both men and money from the United States to fight communist threats, in the future, to receive American military and financial support, they would have to furnish their own troops. This notion of a new American Asian policy became the "Nixon Doctrine." In China, *Caokao xiaoxi* (Reference news), an internally circulated daily newspaper, immediately reported Nixon's remarks.

⁶⁴ Following his agreement with Kosygin reached at their 11 September 1969 meeting at the Beijing airport, Zhou Enlai wrote the letter to Kosygin with the expectation that he would receive a letter with the same content from Kosygin. However, Kosygin did not reply positively to Zhou because of opposition from other Soviet leaders, especially those from the military.

⁶⁵ Choi Yong Kun was a member of the Presidium of the Political Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and chairman of the supreme People's Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He headed a North Korean party and governmental delegation sent to attend the celebrations for the 20th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. This visit substantially improved Sino-North Korean relations, which reached a low ebb during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, paving the way for Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to lead a high-ranking Chinese Party and Governmental delegation to visit North Korea in April 1970 (the first such visit by Chinese leaders since 1966).

⁶⁶ Qiao Guanhua, China's vice foreign minister, later served as China's foreign minister from 1975 to 1976.

⁶⁷ Yu Zhan headed the Soviet-East European Section of Chinese Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁸ Chai Chengwen headed the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of Defense.

⁶⁹ Please refer to Document 13.

⁷⁰ Ji Pengfei was China's vice foreign minister.

⁷¹ Huang Yongsheng was PLA chief of staff and a member of the CCP Politburo. He was purged and disappeared from China's political scene after Lin Biao's death in September 1971.

⁷² The Sino-Soviet border negotiations began on 20 October 1969, without producing any concrete results. Tensions along Sino-Soviet borders did not relax until the late 1980s.