“We Are in a Bind”: Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969

By Vojtech Mastny

The internal documents on the Warsaw Pact that are becoming available from the archives of its former Central and Eastern European members (hardly any are yet open from the former Soviet ones) reveal how misconceived the Western disposition to regard the Communist alliance as the functional counterpart of NATO was. Yet equally mistaken was the supposition that Moscow’s allies uniformly resented their membership in the organization, and consequently strove to loosen or even abolish it. As evident from the diverse attempts at reforming the Warsaw Pact, the reality was not so straightforward, nor was it the same at different times. The documents printed below, which have never been published in English before, show that Polish generals in 1956 and their Czechoslovak counterparts in 1968 sought to preserve the alliance but to alter it in unexpected ways.

The attempts at reforming the Warsaw Pact must be measured against the overwhelming dependence of Central and Eastern European countries on Moscow at the time of the launching of the alliance in 1955 and consider that initially its purpose was very different from what it became later. The establishment of the Communist alliance six years after the creation of NATO has always been something of a puzzle. It occurred when the Soviet Union under the leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev was actively pursuing détente with the West and seeking to demilitarize the Cold War.1

Only recently has archival evidence from the defunct Soviet bloc allowed us to place the signing of the Warsaw Pact firmly within the context of Khrushchev’s effort to bring about a new European security system, dominated by the Soviet Union.2 The effort, prompted by the prospective admission of West Germany into NATO in accordance with the October 1954 Paris agreements, was aimed at radically reshaping the European security environment formed by the Cold War. It rested on the fallacious assumption that the Western powers could be maneuvered by political means into a position in which they would have no choice but to acquiesce against their will in changes they considered incompatible with their vital interests.

According to the scenario initiated by Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav M. Molotov but elaborated and increasingly masterminded by Khrushchev, the feat was to be accomplished by staging an all-European security conference from which the United States would be excluded and the agenda of which would be set and controlled by Moscow posing as the main guarantor of European security. The Soviet-sponsored gathering of Communist chiefs in the Polish capital in May 1955, at which the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was formally inaugurated, had initially been intended as a step toward such a conference. The text of the treaty, intended for publication, was drafted by Molotov’s assistants at the Foreign Ministry in December 1954.3 It was only a month before the originally scheduled date of April 25 that the Soviet leadership decided to give the Warsaw meeting a military character by instructing Minister of Defense Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov at short notice to draft the appropriate documents.4 By the time they were forwarded to the East European party secretaries for information on May 2, the inauguration of the alliance had been moved to May 11-14.5

At the founding session, which amounted to little more than a ritual consecration of the project prepared in Moscow, the alliance treaty was passed with but minor amendments. These were proposed by some of the Central and Eastern European participants but—judging from the exceedingly orderly minutes of the session—had probably been commissioned in advance by Molotov for the sole purpose of providing the appearance of a “discussion.”6 Similarly perfunctory was the acceptance of the secret provisions specifying the size of the army, navy, and air force contingents the Soviet Union made its dependencies contribute for the supposedly common cause.7 Polish general Tadeusz Pióro, who as a young colonel was given the task of taking minutes at the meeting where Zhukov made the assignments, has recalled how the originally comprehensive record had to be repeatedly whittled down until nothing of substance was left on paper, thus allowing the Soviet managers to set the quotas as they pleased.8

The important omission at the Warsaw gathering was the statute of the unified command, the draft of which was only sent to the Eastern European leaders by Khrushchev four months later and was approved at the first meeting of the alliance’s political consultative committee in Prague on 27-28 January 1956.9 It was this top secret document [Document No. 1], classified during the entire existence...
of the Warsaw Pact, that later became a major cause of dissatisfaction among its members. The statute, which gave its military chief extensive prerogatives in controlling their armed forces, grew in importance once the original purpose of the alliance—Khrushchev’s promotion of a new European security system—foundered on Western resistance. Moscow’s latitude in running the Warsaw Pact through its Soviet supreme commander and Soviet chief of staff then became all the greater since its supposedly collective institutions, namely, a permanent secretariat and a standing commission on foreign affairs envisaged at the Prague meeting, were in fact not created. Still, in view of the bilateral “mutual defense” treaties that had already before put Eastern European armed forces at Soviet disposal, the added chain of command was largely superfluous. This justified a contemporary NATO assessment of the Warsaw Pact as “a cardboard castle . . . carefully erected over what most observers considered an already perfectly adequate blockhouse, . . . intended to be advertised as being capable of being dismantled, piece by piece, in return for corresponding segments of NATO.”

The lack of substance would not have mattered if the unexpected crises in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 had not compelled the Soviet Union to take its allies more seriously. Its declaration on relations among socialist states, issued on October 30 in a vain attempt to stem the tide of revolution in Hungary by political means, signaled a willingness to revise the arbitrary provisions of the Warsaw Pact, regulate the presence of Soviet forces on the territory of its members states, and recall the unwanted Soviet military advisers there. The Polish proposals printed below [Document No. 2] were prepared on November 3 in direct response to the declaration. They show how much the self-confidence of the Soviet empire’s largest nation had increased after the Kremlin’s reluctant acceptance of its new national communist leadership under party secretary Władysław Gomułka, followed by the dismissal of the widely resented Soviet marshal Konstantin K. Rokossovskii as defense minister. The Poles prepared their proposals regardless of the progressing Soviet military intervention in Hungary, which Moscow defended as being allegedly justified under the provisions of the Warsaw Pact. Gomułka disapproved of the intervention, being understandably concerned about its possible effect upon Soviet intentions towards his own regime which, as we know today, the Kremlin leaders had only provisionally decided to tolerate under Chinese pressure. He let the Polish general staff form a special commission to elaborate proposals for a reform of the Warsaw Pact and Poland’s future role in it.

On behalf of the commission, deputy chief of staff Gen. Jan Drzewiecki prepared not only a biting commentary on the secret May 1955 statute on the powers of the supreme commander but also a “legal analysis” of the “agreements” about the ten-year plan for the development of Poland’s armed forces, imposed by Moscow before and after the Warsaw Pact was signed. He argued that the two agreements lacked proper legal basis and were not truly bilateral because they consisted of Polish obligations only. Referring to the secret military annexes to the Warsaw treaty, Drzewiecki noted that not even his country’s foreign minister had been informed about them.

The final text of Drzewiecki’s proposal, sent to Gomułka on 7 November 1956, summed up the Polish case for the reform of the alliance and spelled out the country’s proposed obligations within it. Taking into account the international situation—meaning NATO member West Germany’s pending claim to the German territories annexed by Poland after World War II—the document did not question the desirability of the Warsaw Pact to bolster Poland’s national security but found its military provisions in need of a thorough revision. The author took exception to the status of the supreme commander and his chief of staff as supranational officials with prerogatives incompatible with the maintenance of Polish independence and sovereignty, to the signatories’ “purely formal” representation on the unified command, to the arbitrary assignment of national contingents to the alliance, and—most topically in view of the Soviet intervention in Hungary—to the lack of regulations concerning Soviet military deployments on the territories of the other member states. As the Soviet intervention in Hungary became an accomplished fact (which caused Gomułka to abandon his opposition to it) the Poles found it preferable to separate their radical critique of the Warsaw Pact from their demand for the regulation of Soviet military presence on their territory. This had been maintained since the end of World War II mainly to facilitate Moscow’s communication with its occupation troops in East Germany. Invoking the status of foreign forces within NATO territory as an example and alluding even to the manner in which American military presence was made acceptable in such countries as the Philippines, Libya, and Ethiopia, the Polish demand proved fortunate in its timing. Still defensive about the crackdown in Hungary, the Soviet Union on December 17 granted Poland a more favorable status-of-forces agreement than any other country. It provided for Polish jurisdiction in case of violations of Polish law by Soviet military personnel and for advance notice to the Polish government of any movement of Soviet troops. Although the former provision was subsequently evaded in practice, the latter was generally honored—the exception being the surreptitious stationing of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Poland without the knowledge of its government.

Having thus made one concession granting Poland special status within the Soviet empire, Moscow was not in a mood to entertain in addition a proposal for revamping the Warsaw Pact. When Polish Defense Minister Marian Spychalski brought up the subject during his visit to the Soviet capital in January 1957, the alliance’s supreme commander Marshal Ivan S. Konev felt
personally offended. He was aghast at the idea that his office should be filled by rotation. “What do you imagine,” he exploded, “that we will make some NATO here?” As a result, the proposal was shelved, leaving the Warsaw Pact unreformed for another decade. Although Khrushchev did relieve the East Europeans’ military burden as part of his overall reduction of expenditures on conventional forces, he had no incentive to further develop the Warsaw Pact. In the years that followed, he instead tried to use it mainly as a platform for launching his assorted diplomatic initiatives during irregular meetings of the alliance’s political consultative committee.

When the idea of reform re-emerged ten years later, the circumstances were altogether different. Khrushchev’s innovative attempt to reduce the Soviet Union’s dependence on military power by cutting its conventional forces had failed. The Soviet military had succeeded in instilling the Warsaw Pact with more substance in 1961 by instituting the annual practice of joint maneuvers that imitated both nuclear and conventional warfare in an increasingly realistic fashion. Three years later Khrushchev was replaced as party general secretary by Leonid I. Brezhnev, who was dedicated to reversing his predecessor’s reductions of conventional forces while accelerating the expansion of the nuclear ones as well. Still, the growing utilization of the Warsaw Pact for military purposes proceeded without building up its structure. And when the initiative in this direction was finally taken in January 1966, it originated with the Soviet Union rather than its junior partners.

Seeking to compensate by expanded military competition for the increasingly palpable Soviet deficiencies in other fields, Brezhnev opened the drive for a reform of the Warsaw Pact to make it into a genuine, rather than merely formal, counterpart of NATO. The Soviet Union envisaged strengthening the alliance’s original statute and establishing additional institutions along the lines already decided in 1956. This meant particularly the clarification of the powers of the supreme commander and the creation of a unified military staff, a standing commission on foreign policy, a committee on technology, and a permanent secretariat. Recognizing how much Moscow’s relationship with its Central and Eastern European dependencies had changed since the Stalin and early Khrushchev years, Brezhnev invited their input rather than attempting merely to dictate what was to be done and how.

In deference to Soviet wishes, the Poles deleted the most radical of these ideas, particularly the transformation of the political consultative committee into a deliberative and decision-making body akin to the North Atlantic Council, before the Warsaw Pact’s deputy foreign ministers convened under Moscow’s auspices in February 1966 to push the reform forward. The more radical initiative came instead from the Romanian representative Mirea Malțița who, pleading insufficient authority to agree to anything, shocked the other participants by what some of them rightly perceived as trying to paralyze the alliance by transforming it into a noncommittal discussion club. Unlike the Poles, who wanted expanded room for action as partners in a revitalized Warsaw Pact, the Romanians tried to achieve their freedom of action by minimizing Soviet role in its functioning.

It was with rather than against Moscow that Poland under Gomulka, who had since 1956 deteriorated from Eastern Europe’s foremost champion of reform to a political reactionery, became the most enthusiastic supporter of the Soviet-sponsored reorganization of the alliance into an institutional counterpart of NATO. While Polish officials again sought to alleviate their country’s recently increased defense burden, they no longer clamored for doing so at the expense of the alliance’s cohesion; that role had meanwhile been adopted by the Romanians.

Bucharest steadfastly resisted the establishment of any organs that would make it easier for Moscow to use and abuse the Warsaw Pact for its own purposes, especially in wartime. While the brush with a nuclear disaster during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis had thoroughly frightened Moscow’s allies, only the Romanians had gone so far as to betray their alliance commitments by secretly offering the United States assurances of neutrality in case of a nuclear conflict between the two blocs. Afterward, they consistently pursued the policy of limiting their obligations within the Warsaw Pact and loosening it as best as they could.

The cause of transforming the alliance to make it both stronger and more acceptable to all its members, including the Soviet Union, was embraced in 1968 by the
Czechoslovak communist reformers. Their desire to change the Warsaw Pact was broadly known at the time, particularly from the candid interview given on 15 July 1968 by the Czechoslovak army’s chief political officer, Gen. Václav Prchlik, and contributed to the Soviet decision to crush the reform movement by force of arms.29 Yet the extent of their efforts, as well as its limitations remained obscure until the recent publication in Prague of selected documents on the military aspects of the 1968 crisis,30 which can now be supplemented by extensive additional sources from the Czech Military Historical Archives.

Of the two documents printed below, the rambling exposé by the Czechoslovak chief of general staff, Gen. Otakar Rytíř, [Document No. 5] gives a vivid account of the “great bind” in which the Warsaw Pact countries found themselves by the late nineteen-sixties. This was the result of the Soviet-dictated resumption of high military spending aimed at the expansion and modernization of their conventional armed forces. The policy was in part an attempt to respond in kind to NATO’s strategy of flexible response, formally adopted in 1967 but anticipated for at least six years before.31 Rytíř’s remarks were suggestive of the resulting tensions within the Soviet-led alliance, the full extent of which can be gleaned from many other archival documents.32 The often acrimonious negotiations with Moscow about the military budget paralleled the perennial disputes between Washington and its NATO allies about burden-sharing. Unlike its Communist counterpart, however, the Western alliance was able to develop effective institutions and procedures which, besides its members’ dedication to the democratic bargaining process, ensured NATO’s continued viability.

For all his lack of sophistication and crudeness of expression, the Czech general grasped better than the Soviet marshals and their political mentors the heart of the problem that in the fullness of time would critically contribute to the collapse of the communist alliance—its inability to keep up with its capitalist rival in economic and technological competition. He neither desired nor anticipated this outcome but did not see any good way out of the bind either. Rather than solving the essential problem, he could only demand for his country an equal position in the alliance.

The question of how such a position would make the Warsaw Pact more viable is addressed in Document No. 6, which originated with the staff of the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy—the institution designed to supply the ideological underpinning of the Czechoslovak military establishment. The text, misleadingly referred to in earlier Western literature as the “Gottwald memorandum”33 (as if it had been composed by the deceased Stalinist chief of the Czechoslovak Communist Party after whom the school was named), was published in a Prague newspaper in 1968,34 but never received abroad the attention it deserves. This has been no doubt in part because of its often awkward prose, mixing Marxist-Leninist jargon with the phraseology of Western “defense intellectuals.” Yet amid some pontificating and belaboring the obvious, there are remarkably fresh ideas that put the document way ahead of its time.

If Rytíř’s remarks sometimes read like wisecracks of the Good Soldier Schweik35 in a general’s uniform, the memorandum is dead-serious. Its stands out for its utter lack of illusions about the small Central European nations’ chances of physical survival in a general war between the two alliances and for its commendably level-headed rejection of the concept of mutual deterrence on which Europe’s security was often believed to be resting. While attracted to the then-fashionable systems analysis approach to military affairs, the authors of the document in fact puncture the pretensions of both the Western proponents of mutual deterrence, who tried to use it to prop up the intensely ambiguous strategy of flexible response,36 and of their Soviet imitators, who were vainly searching for a way to defeat NATO without provoking a nuclear war.37

The memorandum offers revealing insights into the thinking that motivated Moscow’s military posture in the early years of the Cold War. It maintains retrospectively that under Stalin the Soviet and East European armies under his control were being prepared to respond to an expected Western attack by launching a counteroffensive aimed at establishing complete Soviet hegemony in Europe. Although such a plan has not been corroborated by contemporary Soviet evidence it would have been consistent with the prevailing Western fears at the time. For their part, the authors of the memorandum, while paying the customary obeisance to the vision of a final victory of “socialism,” scarcely hide their preference for a Europe whose ideological divisions have been gradually erased by common security concerns.

In deriding attempts at “directing an army’s development in accordance with simple logic, empiricism, and historical analogy,” the memorandum dismisses as fallacy Moscow’s insistence on the alleged Western military threat. That fallacy, nourished by the Soviet memory of a narrow escape from defeat after the Nazi surprise attack in 1941, was not shared by any of Moscow’s Warsaw Pact partners, who had not experienced the same trauma of their regime tottering under enemy assault. The Czech authors’ criticism of the “naively pragmatic realist approach [that] analyzes relations among sovereign states from the point of view of either war or peace” foreshadowed the frame of mind that would eventually bring the Cold War to an end. Once a later generation of Soviet leaders would divest themselves from the notion that their state was being threatened from the outside, they would defy the realist mantra by declining to defend its supposedly vital interests, and allow their empire to disintegrate.

Free from the security preconceptions weighing on both superpowers, the Czechoslovak theorists sensed that the very feasibility and acceptability of war had radically
changed, at least in the European context, thus anticipating the post-Cold War era better than most of their contemporaries. Yet the conditions of their time, besides their residual Marxist thinking, prevented them from drawing any substantive conclusions. Instead, fascinated by the Israeli feats in the 1967 Six Days’ War, in their conclusion they focused instead merely on the desirability of replacing the outdated concept of an offensive à outrance by one aiming at the destruction of the enemy’s vital vulnerability.

Otherwise, no practical consequences for the development of a Czechoslovak military doctrine were spelled out with any clarity. Nor did the reformers’ plea for the formulation of an overall Warsaw Pact military doctrine and a restructuring of the alliance find an expression in specific proposals—a significant difference from the action taken by their Polish counterparts in 1956 and again ten years later. During meetings in February and March 1968, when the Soviet-proposed reform of the Warsaw Pact was successively discussed by its deputy foreign ministers in Berlin, its chiefs of staff in Prague, and finally the party chiefs convened as its political consultative committee in Sofia, the Czechoslovak representatives remained passive.

It was again the contentious Romanians who lambasted the Soviet concept of “unified armed forces,” included in the obnoxious secret annex to the Warsaw treaty but not in its published main text. Demanding the limitation of the powers of the supreme commander and the national governments’ right of veto over any deployment of foreign troops or armaments on their territories, Bucharest even tried to renounce on the agreements concerning the creation of a military council, joint staff, and committee on technology, that it had already consented to in May 1966. At the same time, the Romanian party chief Nicolae Ceausescu tried to derail the Warsaw Pact’s accession to the nearly finished nonproliferation treaty, which he condemned as allegedly giving the superpowers license at the expense of their smaller allies. During his Prague visit in February 1968, he minced no words in privately describing the proposed document as even “worse and more dangerous than the Soviet-German treaty of 1939.”

Although none of the other Warsaw Pact members joined Romania’s efforts to derail what on balance was to prove a generally beneficial treaty, Polish foreign minister Rapacki and his Czechoslovak counterpart Václav David met in Prague on 29 February-1 March 1968, to discuss without Soviet supervision the possible freezing and subsequent removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of the states that had no control over them—or at least from their own countries and the two German states. The initiative was Rapacki’s: Having already discussed the idea with Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel—the author of the celebrated report advocating the simultaneous strengthening of NATO and its promotion of détente with its Eastern counterpart—the Pole agreed with him to try to make the denuclearization acceptable to the Warsaw Pact. The Czechoslovaks, however, hesitated. The Prague general staff noted timorously that, even though Moscow had not yet expressed its view, the proposal was presumably disadvantageous for its alliance system and should not, in any case, be considered in Czechoslovakia’s current political climate.

In that climate, the authors of the memorandum did not find enough support for their ideas among their superiors. At the beginning of June, they sent copies of the document to the higher authorities in the hope of contributing to the preparation of the “action program” for the development of the country’s armed forces. No response came from party general secretary Alexander Dubček while his newly appointed minister of defense, Martin Dzúr, took a distinctly reserved position. This was not the case with Soviet defense minister Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, who, even before the memorandum was officially submitted to the Prague leadership, had evidently gotten wind of it, and proceeded to extract from Dzúr the promise to dismantle the academy that had produced it. And when one of the reform-minded officers, Gen. Egyd Pepich, tried to explain to the marshal that loyalty to the alliance was not in question, Grechko disrupted his presentation by noisily banging on his desk with a spoon.

Then followed Gen. Prchlik’s July 15 interview with Prague journalists which, though not intended for publication, nevertheless became public, bringing Moscow to a rage because of his demand for the rectification of the Warsaw Pact’s inequities. In a protest letter to Dubček, Warsaw Pact supreme commander Marshal Ivan I. Iakubovskii disingenuously accused Prchlik of insulting Soviet officers besides revealing military secrets, namely, the contents of the unpublished 1955 annex to the Warsaw treaty. Significantly, Iakubovskii’s protest was received approvingly by the conservative majority of the Czechoslovak officer corps who, concerned more about their jobs than about reform, remained unreservedly loyal to the Soviet alliance. These notably included defense minister Dzúr, who subsequently earned Moscow’s gratitude for having on his own responsibility ordered the army not to resist the Soviet invasion. For this accomplishment he was subsequently rewarded by being allowed to keep his job for another sixteen years.

Soviet criticism of Prchlik’s remarks was seconded in an anonymous “official” statement publicly disseminated by the national press agency on July 28 and secretly endorsed by the minister’s military council. Such circumstances did not augur well for the report drafted by the general for the planned party congress and including many of the ideas of the reformist memorandum. The report went even further in its unorthodox description of Czechoslovakia’s desirable defense policy as striving “to be a policy of European security, a policy that helps ease international tensions, and a policy of friendly cooperation...
with all who have a direct interest in this." 49 Although the document did not question the country’s alliance obligations and did not specifically demand any changes in the Warsaw Pact, it was guaranteed to infuriate Moscow when it was leaked to the Soviet embassy in Prague about the middle of August. Yet although it was forwarded to the top Soviet leaders by Ambassador Stepan V. Chervonenko, with the remark that it had originated with the “infamous Gen. Prchlík,” it came too late to make a difference in influencing their decision to invade.

Moscow may have been right in suspecting that some of the reformers wanted Czechoslovakia to leave the Warsaw Pact. They reportedly considered the following options for their country: staying in the alliance but reconsidering membership in another 10 to 15 years, preparing to defend Central Europe without the Soviet Union through another “Little Entente” concluded without regard to ideological boundaries, and neutralization or neutrality providing for defense by national means along the Yugoslav model. 50 However plausible, these suggestions have not been reliably documented; the only source of information about them is the hostile polemics published in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. 51

Because of the lack of support within the conservative Czechoslovak military and even the reformist party establishment, it is hardly surprising that none of the proposals included in the memorandum was acted upon; what is surprising is that its authors continued to pursue them despite the country’s occupation by Soviet forces. They organized the first major discussion of their document at the already formally dissolved political academy as late as 18 April 1969 — eight months after the invasion. 52 But the first discussion was also the last, ending both the project and soon afterward also the careers of those of its architects who did not quickly repent.

The month before, the Warsaw Pact had at last been reformed, largely in accordance with Soviet wishes, at the Budapest session of its political consultative committee. Following agreements among its member states concluded in the fall of 1968 under the impact of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, even the Romanians went along with the reorganization, although they continued to dissent on a host of issues pertaining to the actual functioning of the alliance. The public communiqué of the Budapest meeting, at which Moscow also stepped up in earnest its campaign for the convocation of an European security conference that would lead six years later to the conclusion of the Helsinki agreements, could only be adopted after a heated discussion and painstaking revision of nearly every item. 53

The resulting institutionalization of the Warsaw Pact as a true military alliance, soon to be recognized by NATO as its effective counterpart, influenced the course of the Cold War in important ways for its remaining twenty years. The restructuring facilitated a continued arms race and fostered the development of increasingly realistic military plans rehearsed during more frequent Warsaw Pact maneuvers imitating conventional war in Europe, the progress of East-West détente notwithstanding. It further gave the non-Soviet officers, who became more extensively involved in the alliance’s mushrooming agencies, a greater stake in its existence—a critical development that made possible the resolution of the 1980-81 Polish crisis by Poland’s own military. 54 In the long run, however, the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into an extended arm of the Moscow defense ministry, rather than of the foreign ministry or the central committee, made its eventual fate more dependent on the fate of Soviet security doctrine. This dependence made the alliance’s collapse a foregone conclusion as soon as that doctrine was changed in the late nineteen-eighties—by effectively adopting the views of the 1968 Czechoslovak reformers about the non-existence of Western military threat and consequently allowing the reluctant allies to go their own ways.

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Document No. 1

“Statute of the Unified Command of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty,” [7 September 1955]

Draft

Strictly confidential

GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE WARSAW TREATY

ARMED FORCES JOINT COMMAND

PART I.

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The Supreme Commander chairs the joint armed forces of the members of the Warsaw Treaty agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid adopted on 14 May 1955. The responsibilities of the Supreme Commander are:

To carry out resolutions of the Political Consultative Committee, which deal directly with the joint armed forces.

To supervise and direct operational and combat preparation of the joint armed forces and to organize the joint exercises of troops, fleets and staff under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

To have a comprehensive knowledge of the state of troops and fleets under the command of the Joint Armed Forces, and to take all necessary measures in cooperation with the Governments and Ministers of Defense of the respective countries in order to ensure permanent combat readiness of the forces.

To work out and present the Political Consultative Committee with constructive proposals on further improvement of the qualitative and quantitative state of the available staff. The rights of the Chief-of-Staff:
To evaluate the fighting trim, strategic and fighting readiness of the Joint Armed Forces and to give orders and recommendations based on the results of the evaluations;
To address the Political Consultative Committee and the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries with any questions regarding his activities;
To call for meetings with his deputies representing their governments within the Armed Forces, in order to discuss and solve the occurring problems.

PART II

The Deputies of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The Deputies to the Supreme Commander carry the full responsibility for:
Combat and mobilization readiness, as well as operational, combat, and political preparation of the troops under the command of the Joint Military Forces;
For making of troops and fleets under the supervision of the Joint Military Forces; for the available personnel; for supplying armaments, technical equipment and other military items; as well as for the accommodation arrangements and service of troops;
The Deputies to the Supreme Commander are obliged to report the state of the military and mobilizing readiness as well as the state of the political, strategic and combat instruction of troops and fleets at the disposition of the Joint Command.

PART III

The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces

The Chief of Staff supervises the activities of the Staff subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the Joint Armed Forces.

The composition of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces:
Permanent representatives of General Staff from the Warsaw Treaty countries;
Special bodies responsible for the strategic, tactical and organizational issues;
Inspectors of arms of service;

3. The responsibilities of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces:
a) to possess comprehensive knowledge of the state and conditions within the troops and fleets, to take necessary measures in cooperation with the General Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries to ensure permanent combat readiness of the Armed Forces;
b) to work out plans for further qualitative and quantitative improvement of the Joint Armed Forces; to evaluate the technical and military property needs of the troops who are under the command of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Chief of Staff has a right to:
- discuss his activities with the Deputies of the Supreme Commander and with the Chiefs of the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries;
- determine information about the state and conditions of troops and fleets who are under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

PART IV

The relationships between the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries

The activities of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces must be carried out in cooperation with General Army Staff of the member countries.

The General Army Staff of the member-countries are obliged to:
Inform the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces about the combat and quantitative composition of troops, about their mobilizing and fighting readiness; military and political training of troops and fleets under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;
Coordinate deployment of troops, fleets and Staff with the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

PART V

Communications

The Supreme Commander and the Chief of the Staff can use the diplomatic mail and other means of communication provided by the member countries for their communication with the Deputies to the Supreme Commander and the Chiefs of the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

[Source: “Polozhenie ob obedinennom komandovanii vooruzhenykh sil gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora Varshavskogo soveshchaniia,” undated [7 September 1955], KC PZPR 2661/16-19, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw. Translated by Lena Sirota, CWIHP.]

Document No. 2

“Memorandum on the Warsaw Treaty and the Development of the Armed Forces of the People’s Republic of Poland,” 10 January 1957

MEMORANDUM

“The Warsaw Treaty and the Development of the Armed Forces of People’s Republic of Poland”
The Warsaw Treaty agreement, adopted in May 1955 (especially its military provisions), as well as different bilateral agreements signed by the representatives of the USSR and the People’s Republic of Poland prior to the Warsaw Treaty and ratified after the adoption of the Treaty require a thorough analysis and revision. This mostly concerns Polish obligations regarding organizational, quantitative and technical supplies of the Armed Forces, in the production of military equipment and the strategic positioning of the country.

The need to revise earlier agreements is caused by the political and economic conditions of our country. The earlier agreements and the ensuing obligations do not correspond to the policy of independence and sovereignty of our country pronounced by the Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of Poland. Despite the constant changes of obligations acquired by Poland on the basis of the bilateral agreements, their implementation would not be feasible without considerable financial expenditures assigned to the Armed Forces and military industry. Such a policy would be inconsistent with the course of the Party and the Government aimed on constant improvement of the living standards of the Polish people.

Taking into consideration above-mentioned situation, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has analyzed the obligations and provisions deriving from bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Treaty and our obligations deriving from them. Our proposals are listed below:

Military obligations originating from the Warsaw Treaty.

The present balance of power in the world, our strategic position as well as our ideological ties with the socialist camp prove the importance of the Warsaw Treaty and of the unification of the military efforts of the member countries for the further protection of our common interests.

Nevertheless, we believe that the military protocols originating from the Treaty require radical revision. The organizational concept of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces foresees the allocation of the part of the member countries’ Armies under a Joint Command.

The above-mentioned concept is similar to the structural concept of NATO. Some parts of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries are placed under the Joint Command. Nevertheless, the structural position of the NATO countries is somewhat different from the position of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The only exception to the rule is the Soviet Union.

The strategic interest of the major participants of NATO is applied to the numerous theaters of war operations, therefore the specific theater of war would require only part of the Armed forces of the respective countries, with the remainder of the forces allocated to different pacts, the Baghdad Pact, for instance.

The conditions under which the Warsaw Treaty was created are completely different. Our interest is in the European War Theater that involves all the participants of the Treaty, excluding the Soviet Union (the interests of the latter only partly lie in Europe). Therefore we believe that the total composition of our Armed forces should participate in our common defense initiative in Europe.

The above-mentioned facts illustrate the superficiality of the partitioning of the Armed forces by the participants of the Warsaw Treaty; namely, the structure in which one part of the armed forces is under the joint command and other part is under the command of the national armed forces. In the current situation, Poland cannot allot one part of the Armed forces under the joint command due to the unrealistically large number of divisions required (see part II of the memorandum). Despite the recent reduction of 5 divisions in Polish Armed forces, the number of required divisions for the joint command was only reduced by 1.

The organizational structure of the Joint Command of the armed forces is based on a single authority. The collective decision-making process bears only a formal character (it is not mentioned in a treaty). The process of the Supreme Commander’s subordination to the international political body is not clear.

The above-mentioned determines the supranational character of the Supreme Commander and his Staff, which does not correspond to the idea of independence and sovereignty of the Warsaw Treaty participating countries. The supranational positioning of the Supreme Commander and of his Staff is illustrated in the “Statute” in the chapters dealing with the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and his Staff.

The authority of the Supreme Commander in questions of leadership in combat and strategic training is incompatible with the national character of the armies of the corresponding states. This imposes the introduction of common rules and regulations determining the order and conditions of military life (for example, the Garrison Duty Regulations, Drill Regulations, Disciplinary regulations, etc).

The Supreme Commander has widespread rights in the sphere of control. The volume of the report information required from the General Staff is tremendous. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is not an international body in a full sense. The rights and responsibilities of the representatives of the corresponding armies are not stated clearly. The existing practice demonstrates the formal character of their functions.

The relations between the Staff of the Joint Command and the General Staff are based on the complete subordination of the latter to the former.

Current events prove continuously the unilateral character of the obligations acquired by the People’s Republic of Poland. No international agreement dealt with
the judicial state of troops located or passing through the territory of Warsaw Treaty country.

The above listed questions should be regulated in the spirit of the Declaration of the Soviet Government issued on 30 October 1956.

In order to correct the above-mentioned organizational and structural concepts, we suggest the following changes to the military articles of the Warsaw Treaty agreement.

a) the Warsaw Treaty countries are interested in using all their armed forces for defense purposes; the Soviet Union would agree with other member countries on the quantity of Soviet troops to be allotted to the Warsaw Treaty common actions in Europe;

b) the involvement of troops of any of the Warsaw Treaty countries in military operations would require the prior approval by the appropriate body in its home country according to the Constitution;

c) in peace-time the armed forces of each of the countries are subordinated to their national command.

d) we recognize the need for close cooperation of all Warsaw Treaty countries in the following areas:
   in strategic plans and tactical issues;
   in logistics prior to tactical moves;
   in standardization of the major types of weapons;
   in regulations of military production and deliveries in times of war and peace;
   in joint strategic training on the territory of one of the countries.

e) we recognize the need to create a “Military Consultative Committee” for the implementation of the above mentioned proposals. The Military Consultative Committee would consist of the Ministers of National Defense and the Chairmen of the General Staffs of the Warsaw Treaty Countries. The Chairman of the Committee would be one of the members of the Committee elected once a year.

f) the working body of the Military Consultative Committee would be the Permanent Staff Committee. It would consist of the officers and generals of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Supreme International Political Body would stipulate the number of the officers allotted to the Permanent Staff Committee by each country.

g) the Supreme International Political Body would determine location of the Military Consultative Committee.

h) all proposals concerning the issues listed in part b) must be approved by the Supreme Political Body. They become compulsory to all Warsaw Treaty countries if approved.

i) the Permanent Staff Committee can present its recommendations regarding the issues in part d) to the General Staff.

The implementation of these recommendations depends on the decisions of the responsible parties of the national governments of Warsaw Treaty countries.

In the situation of war the International Political Body can appoint the Supreme Command of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Staff of the Supreme Command will consist of officers and generals of the respective states, and their appointments will be confirmed by the Supreme International Political Body.

[...]


Document No. 3
Memorandum by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, 21 January 1966

SECRET

57/Rap./66 21 January 1966

AN URGENT NOTE
Exclusively to the person concerned

/- Majchrzak

Addressees:

Comr. Gomułka Comr. Szyr
Comr. Cyranekiewicz Comr. Waniółka
Comr. Gierek Comr. Jagielski
Comr. Jędrzychowski Comr. Jaroszewicz
Comr. Kliszko Comr. Jaszczuk
Comr. Loga-Sowiński Comr. Jarosinski
Comr. Ochab Comr. Starewicz
Comr. Rapacki Comr. Tejchma
Comr. Spychalski Comr. Wicha
Comr. Strzelecki Comr. Czesak

In connection with a letter of Comrade Brezhnev to Comrade Gomułka dealing with the provision of a better elasticity and efficiency for the Warsaw Pact organization, I am hereby presenting some remarks and conclusions:

I. The Warsaw Pact organization comprises two sets of questions that require separate treatment:

1) Improvement of operating instruments in the military area, which relates to the proposal of holding a meeting of defense ministers. Improvement in coordination is required particularly in this area, where the chief responsibility rests overwhelmingly upon the Soviet Union.

2) Coordination in the area of political activities of the Pact, which requires a steady consultative effort, an
exchange of views in order to reach common grounds not only on major issues, but often also on current policy matters.

II. We appraise the USSR’s initiative positively. It meets the basic need to define and improve the organization of the Warsaw Pact. So far the Warsaw Pact organization has not been precisely defined, its forms of work were volatile and dependent on extemporaneous initiatives, mostly by the USSR. This situation has created loopholes in the coordination of policies and actions of Pact members with regard to the Pact itself, as well as in relations among its members. It also did not ensure the proper system of consultations, which would enable to take into consideration the positions of all member states. This condition was shaped at a time when the Warsaw Pact Treaty was concluded and when its forms of operation were just emerging. It does not meet its current needs.

III. The Soviet initiative to improve the instruments of the Pact’s operation is coming at the right time, when a greater need to strengthen the unity of actions of the member states is emerging. In the present circumstances elaboration of a common political line of the Pact, which would take into account positions of all interested parties calls for systematic and frequent consultations and contacts.

IV. The Warsaw Pact Treaty has created a Political Consultative Committee for consultations among member states and for consideration of questions arising from the Pact’s operation. According to the Pact’s provisions each state is to be represented in the Consultative Committee by a government’s member or another especially appointed representative. The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as are deemed necessary. In practice, however, that Committee has been transformed into summit meetings, called up sporadically, generally not properly prepared, which adopt spectacular resolutions (declarations, communiqués).

In fact, this is inconsistent with either the consultative tasks of the Committee, or with its originally intended composition (Government members), or with its name (to whom a gathering of top party and government leaders is to be advisory?). In such circumstances meetings of the Political Consultative Committee cannot be held with proper frequency, as meetings of the Party and Government leaders by their very nature are held when there are very important matters to be considered or decided upon (reminder: a resolution of the Committee from January 1956 was calling for meetings of the Committee at least twice a year, not counting extraordinary meetings).

Thus, as the Committee has transformed itself into a Council, there is no body which would ensure the opportunity for systematic and frequent consultations among member countries, despite the fact that they were suggesting such need.

V. To improve and rationalize the operation of the Pact consistent with the existing needs, it would be proper to specify the decision-making organs, as well as consultative and advisory bodies.

1. This objective could be achieved by setting up a Pact’s Council, which would take over functions heretofore exercised by the Political Consultative Committee. The Council would be holding meetings at a summit level; it would decide on key issues, with the rule of unanimity. It would be hearing and approving reports of the Unified Command. It would be meeting whenever needed.

2. The Political Consultative Committee should be restored to its original character provided for in the Pact. It could thus become an elastic forum for consultations of foreign ministers. In some cases, when needed, with the participation of defense ministers. In particular cases the ministers might delegate their deputies. This Committee would become a consultative and advisory body, preparing positions for the governments, or the Council. The Committee should be meeting at least 2-3 times a year. In this way consultations which are now difficult to hold or which are held only as a result of arduous procedures, would obtain an institutional character.

3. A Permanent Secretariat of the Pact should be set up at a proper level and with a proper composition. It is necessary to properly prepare meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee, to ensure regular liaison among member countries during the intersession periods, for providing continuity of coordination and information on matters related to the decisions adopted, or the ones that should be submitted for discussion. The shortcomings resulting from the lack of such body have been felt frequently. To be sure, according to the Resolution adopted by the Political Consultative Committee in 1956 (Prague), a United Secretariat of the Committee, composed of a General Secretary and his deputies, one from each country, has been set up. This Secretariat, according to the Resolution, is functioning only during the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee. In practice, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR served as Secretary General. His activity as a Secretary General was limited to organizational functions and only during the sessions of the Political Consultative Committee. During the inter-session periods neither the Secretary General nor the Secretariat are in practice performing any functions. The fact that up to now the Secretary General was not disconnected from state functions in his own country was in some situations causing even political difficulties (e.g. in case of inviting Albania to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw in January 1964, Poland took over functions which should have normally belonged to the Secretary General). To satisfy the needs mentioned earlier
in pt. 3, the institution of the Secretary General and the Permanent Secretariat should be organized and set to be able to:

a) provide a steady organizational link among member countries during the inter-session periods;

b) perform functions connected with the preparation and servicing of meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee;

c) provide current information to the member states on the implementation of adopted resolutions and decisions, as well as on matters calling for consideration. Circulate documents relating to the activities of the Pact;

d) submit to the member governments motions regarding consultations, convening meetings of the Consultative Committee and in exceptional cases also the Council;

e) submit proposals for consultations on working levels regarding matters of lesser importance (e.g. preparations for U.N. sessions, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, etc.);

f) organize an exchange of information among foreign ministries of the member states regarding the assessment of political situation, in the area of analytical and research work carried out by the foreign ministries of member states.

The position of the Secretary General should be situated in such a way that he would be able to stay in touch with member governments at the highest levels (prime ministers, foreign ministers) and obtain the necessary information. He should not be combining this function with any other state function in his own country. He should be nominated by a resolution of the Council for a period of 2-3 years. The headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat should be in Moscow. The Permanent Secretariat should be staffed by representatives from all member states, including the country of the Secretary General. They would be cooperating and fulfilling the role of liaison officers between the Secretariat and member governments (foreign ministries) and the Secretary General. Such representatives could be responsible employees of member countries’ embassies. The Permanent Secretariat should also have its own small, but indispensable and qualified staff.

VI. In our opinion the new measures in the area of organizational improvement of the Pact should be made public (published). It would emphasize the political vitality of the of the Warsaw Pact.

On the other hand, similar measures undertaken in the military area should be published at the proper time and in the proper form, so as not to be exploited by NATO states, interested in counteracting the current process of NATO’s disintegration, but quite the contrary, they should evoke a desired effect in the given political situation.

/-/ A. RAPACKI

[Source: KC PZPR 2948/48-53, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.]

Document No. 4
Memorandum by the Polish Ministry of National Defense, 26 January 1966

Ministry of National Defense

Copy No. 3

A NOTE

In connection with a letter by Comrade Brezhnev to Comrade Gomulka regarding the improving and ameliorating the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact and proposing to call up a conference of defense ministers on the reorganization of the command and general staff, it is known to us that the Soviet side—unwilling to impose its proposals upon the leadership of other countries—does not intend to put forward any preliminary proposals on the organization of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, but instead expects such proposals from the countries concerned.

From unofficial talks with Soviet comrades it looks that their position can be outlined as follows:

1. There is no intention to either change or amend the Warsaw Pact provisions, but rather to base [any changes] on its art. 5 and 6.

2. The intention is to set up a command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the prerogatives and real possibilities of coordinating defense efforts of member states relating to forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces in the operational, training, organization and technical area.

It is intended to position more properly than up to now the status of the Supreme Commander and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, and to define the place of commanders of troops assigned to these forces. A need is also seen for a different, more independent positioning of defense ministers of member countries vis-à-vis the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

3. It is also expected that a Military Advisory Council is to be established within the Political Consultative Committee—as an advisory body to the Committee.

Such Council would be composed of defense ministers and the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, on equal footing. Secretary of the Council would be the chief of staff of the Unified Forces. Chairmanship of the Council meetings will be rotated consecutively among all its members. The Council would be considering general questions of development and readiness of the Unified Armed Forces, preparing
proposals for the Political Committee and recommendations for the national military commands. The issues will be dealt with according to the rule of full equality.

4. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces would coordinate operational-training preparedness of the Unified Armed Forces, as well as matters relating to the enhancement of their development and military readiness.

The Supreme Commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces would be relieved of their functions in the Soviet Army.

5. Strategic weapons will not be included in the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and operational plans will be developed by the General Staff of the Soviet Army, as well as by general staffs of member countries in the areas of concern to them.

6. It is envisaged that in peacetime the staff of the Unified Armed Forces, employing about 600 people, will be in charge of coordinating preparations of the military to the realization of tasks assigned to them.

However, the position of the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces as a command organ in war time is still a matter too premature to be considered, as there is, among other things, a need to maintain the current procedure of working out strategic and operational plans, the rules for using strategic weapons, as well as to maneuver forces and equipment from one war theater to another.

7. The general staff of the Unified Armed Forces will be composed of the representatives of all armies in proportion to the number of forces assigned to them. It is assumed that Soviet participation in the staff will be percentage-wise smaller than their actual contribution to the Pact.

8. The following are projections of a new percentage share in the command budget of the Unified Armed Forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Percentage share in the budget currently</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>13.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>13.5 %</td>
<td>16.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>44.5 %</td>
<td>31 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. In the organizational structure of the command and general staff the following positions are envisaged: supreme commander, first deputy, chief of staff, air force commander, two deputies for naval operations (for the Baltic and the Black Seas), deputy chief of air force, an inspector and a quartermaster in the rank of deputies, a deputy for technical questions and chiefs of military formations: rocket and artillery, engineering and chemical. Also included into the command as deputies to the supreme commander would be commanders of assigned forces of member countries.

Key positions, such as supreme commander, chief of staff, chief of air defense, deputy chief of air force, quartermaster, deputy for technical questions, would be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.

In view of this purely tentative recognition, one can state the following:

The Soviet side, initiating the question of improvement of the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact, has not presented so far any specific and official preliminary materials in this regard.

Therefore, during the forthcoming conference of ministers of national defense it would be useful to obtain in the first place the Soviet position on the following questions:

a) Defining the role and competence of chief command of the Unified Armed Forces for a threat of war and war period;

b) The scope of participation of member countries’ political-military leadership in drawing up strategic-operational plans for particular war theaters;

c) The subordination of the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

It is now difficult to foresee what kind of position will the Soviet side and other interested countries take on the above questions. Nevertheless, the Ministry of National Defense is presenting the following point of view, which, if accepted, might be the basis for our position at the conference of Defense Ministers and for further works on proposals for detailed solutions:

1. It is proposed to set up an Advisory Committee for Defense as a body of the Council, which is the top organ of the party and government leadership.

The Advisory Committee should be composed of ministers of national defense of the Pact members, the supreme commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces as its secretary.

The rule of rotation should be introduced in chairing Committee meetings.

In addition, it would also be advisable to set up a Consultative Commission of the Chiefs of Staff, which would deal with operational planning and the resulting tasks for preparing the armed forces.

2. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, his deputies and the chief of staff should be appointed by the Pact’s Council, with the Supreme Commander and the chief of staff being relieved of their duties in the armed forces of their country.

The Supreme Commander is to be subordinated to the Council and carries out its decisions. In the intersession periods he personally coordinates with members of the Council basic questions requiring joint decisions, or does this within the Advisory Committee for Defense.
In peace time, the command and chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces should play the role of a coordinating body, preparing the designated military forces, while in a war time they should take command of those forces on the European War Theater. The Supreme Commander and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should participate, based on a common defense strategy of Pact members and jointly with their general staffs, in developing plans for the particular strategic directions of the European War Theater. On the basis of such plans the Supreme Commander is coordinating and preparing the staff of the Unified Armed Forces and the designated forces to the execution of tasks faced by them. Thus, he is carrying on proper operational and training activities, as well as coordinating organizational, technical-manufacturing and scientific-research activities.

The internal structure of the command and general staff should correspond to the needs of directing activities in the particular strategic areas. The position of Polish representatives in the chain of command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces on the Western front should correspond with the place and tasks of the Polish armed forces scheduled to be deployed in that area.

Organizational structure of the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should ensure realization of the above tasks in peace time and constitute a nucleus of proper organs envisioned for a period of war. A preliminary assumption is that these tasks could be tackled by a staff of approximately 200 professional workers. But, it should be assumed that most of the key positions will be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.

Development of the command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces for a war period should be carried out through the inclusion of the proper chains from the general staff and other institutions of the Soviet Army, provided for in the operational plan for use in the European War Theater. It is also assumed that the backup and support units for the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should be assigned from the Soviet Army within their peacetime activities and consistent with a plan of their deployment in case of war. The command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should continue to be headquartered in Moscow.

3. There is a need in all Warsaw Pact countries, without exception, for a clear-cut definition of commands being in charge of forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces, as well to define both the formations and size of those forces.

The strategic assault forces are still to be at the disposal of the Soviet Army. Their use is being planned by the general staff of the Soviet Army. However, commander of the Unified Armed Forces should be inducted in planning their use in favor of forces entrusted to his command. It also seems necessary to define an obligatory scope and method for use of the strategic assault forces for the common defense of the Pact members.

Ministers of national defense and the general staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries are to fully exercise their superior command and leadership role with regard to formations assigned to the Unified Armed Forces. They are to be held responsible for their moral-political condition, their mobilization and fighting readiness, for their operational and tactical preparedness and completeness in terms of numbers, arms and equipment.

4. Together with establishing broader tasks and new organizational structures of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces there is a need to fix the size and percentage share of contributions borne by the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

It is suggested that this question should be considered in terms of proportional efforts resulting from a threat that we face the European War Theater.

The population, economic and military potential of the NATO countries in Europe is, in comparison with the potential of the people’s democracies, clearly unfavorable to us. Creation of the indispensable superiority for defense and defeat of the enemy—can be ensured by the engagement in this theater of the proper Soviet forces in the dimension of approximately two-thirds of the total Warsaw Pact potential.

The above indicator of indispensable USSR’s share corresponds with the real place and potential of that country. It reflects both a probable size of its armed forces provided for the European war theater, as well as its population potential (counted for the European area of the USSR) and its share in the production of basic raw materials and strategic materials. The share of the above factors can roughly be estimated at 65-90% in relation to the total potential of all other Warsaw Pact countries.

Besides, the relative weight of the USSR is determined by its strategic assault power on behalf of the whole Warsaw Pact.

In view of the above statements it does not seem feasible to accept unofficial suggestions regarding the percentage share of the USSR in the budget of the command of the Unified Armed Forces (merely about 31%).

In the opinion of the Ministry of National Defense the share of member countries in the command of the Unified Armed Forces should:
- correspond percentage-wise to the share of positions held in the command and the general staff the Unified Armed Forces (this indicator with regard to the Soviet Army representatives should be 50% as a minimum);
- remain basically within the actual percentage share kept in the budget up to now;
- take into consideration national income per capita in the particular countries;
- take into consideration a particular country’s effort in the development of its territorial defense and its contribution to securing the redeployment of allied forces and thus bringing a relief to operational forces.

Taking into consideration these premises, Poland’s
in the area of armaments and military staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the proper bodies service, mode of rotation, remuneration, promotion, etc.;

the Unified Armed Forces;

general staff and a possible creation of a political body of talks on the following questions:

a need is to clarify and then to decide in the forthcoming building up inventories, constructing facilities, etc. This budget, however, should not be designed to cover expenses related to preparations for military operations, building up inventories, constructing facilities, etc.

5. Besides the above mentioned problems there is also a need is to clarify and then to decide in the forthcoming talks on the following questions:

the rules for party and political activism within the general staff and a possible creation of a political body of the Unified Armed Forces;

the legal status of the staff employees (duration of service, mode of rotation, remuneration, promotion, etc.);

defining the scope of cooperation of the reorganized staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the proper bodies of the CMEA in the area of armaments and military equipment, research and experimental-construction activities.

x x x

According to the present orientation, the conference of the Ministers of National Defense is to be held in the first days of February of this year. The conference is to set up a working body with a task of developing within the next two-three weeks a specific draft of organizational structure of the command and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces.

Submitting for approval the setting up of the above working body, the Ministry of National Defense considers it advisable that the guidelines for our representatives in that body should be the proposals set out in this note.

In case that in the course of further works a situation arises where other proposals will need to be considered, the Ministry of National Defense will submit to the leadership additional motions.

Warsaw, 26 January 1966.

[Source: KC PZPR 2948/27-36, Archiwum Akt Nowych.

Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.]

Document No. 5

Informal remarks by Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, Gen. Otakar Rytíř, at a Confidential Meeting of General Staff Officials, Prague, 13 March 1968

. . . Finally, there is our foreign policy. It has been said that while staying loyal to our friendship with the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism we must show greater independence. This also concerns our armed forces, and quite considerably so. I am going to spend some time on this, because it is at the root of the problem that you, too, have touched upon in your presentations.

What is it about, comrades? The thing is, to tell you the truth, we are in a bind today, we have no room, no material means, no people. We’ve got into a situation when our task, as it has been set, is beyond the means of our state—both human and economic. What’s the reason, comrades? The reason is, I think, at the heart of the Warsaw Treaty. We’ve been talking for ten years and can’t agree about creating an organ, a military organ of the Warsaw Treaty, the staff and the military council that is, which would work out the military concept of the Warsaw Treaty as its top priority.

We can’t do without a concept. But the concept must not only come out of the General Staff of the Soviet army. Since it is a coalition concept it must come out of the coalition. This means that the members of the Warsaw Treaty must take part. It’s a fundamental question, comrades. I’m sorry I can’t talk much about it in any great detail, it would lead me too far; it would get me into the area of strategic operational plans, and this I can’t do no matter how much I am trying, and believe me I am sincerely trying, to make the complexity of this problem clearer to you.

This is the thing, comrades. If there were an organ we could agree on this matter. Through that organ, we would be able to make our voice heard, so that we would be listened to. Today our voice comes through as our views or opinions but certainly not as pressure. That’s because we have no legal grounds for being effective. And so we are getting the assignment for our army in case of war from the joint command, which does not really exist except as some transmission office. I have no doubt, of course, that, as far as the Soviet army is concerned, this assignment is backed by the economic and human potential of the Soviet Union. But it does not reflect our economic and human possibilities. And this applies not only to us but to our neighbors as well.

This is a situation we can’t tolerate any longer; we have to act on it. We have called it to the attention of both our leaders and the Soviet leaders, but so far we’ve had no solution. Just take the following question, comrades. Look, once there used to be a doctrine—maybe for some of you, comrades, this will sound a bit complicated, but allow me
to say it. Under Khrushchev, there used to be a doctrine: if there is a war, seven strikes at Germany, and Germany is liquidated. Eight, not seven, they said; I made a mistake. Count another number of strikes to destroy America. Comrades, it’s hard to say it was bad, hard to say. Just look, comrades, maybe I’m wrong, but I would characterize the situation like this: thank God we have nuclear weapons. In my view, thanks to them there has been no World War III. I think—and here, mind you, I am telling you my opinion, and I have told this opinion to our Soviet comrades, too—that this point has also been noticed over there, by our potential enemies. And what have they done? They came up with the theory of limited war: Because for them the threat of a nuclear strike was a real threat. They were really scared. There was panic. Not only among the public. There was panic in the staffs. And they realized what it meant, they took Khrushchev at his word; maybe what Khrushchev was saying was eighty-nine per cent propaganda, but they took him at his word, and said: Well, if you do this to us, we shall go at you another way—with the theory of limited war. The limited war theory allows for the possibility of conducting war without nuclear weapons. And with this theory, it seems to me, they a little bit, to put it plainly, cheated and misled our Soviet comrades, who took the bait—the limited war theory, that is. Maybe the theory suits the Soviet Union from its point of view. But from the point of view of our republic, it doesn’t suit us. Why doesn’t it suit us, comrades? Because the limited war theory means—what? Orientation toward classical warfare. And classical warfare means—what? It means saturating the troops with high technology and high manpower. In today’s situation, in today’s economic situation of the capitalist and the socialist camps, this is something that the capitalist system can afford. Because its economy, like it or not, is superior, has greater possibilities. That’s today. Maybe ten years from now it will be different. But today, that’s the way it is. This means that we have agreed to—what, comrades? If we have accepted the limited war theory we have agreed to arming our units in competition with the West. Well, comrades, such a competition we can’t win. Because their economy is vastly more powerful than ours. Today we say: careful, we must not stay behind. Of course, we can use the slogan: catch up and overtake the West in technology. But if we try to do that, comrades, we would be walking in lapti [Russian peasant footwear], or else barefooted.

Because we are not capable of keeping up in this competition. This, comrades, is the most vital question if you take the position of our republic. And we, the general staff and the ministry of defense, we must defend the interests of our army, even if we acknowledge our duties to international friendship under the Warsaw Treaty. But we must defend our interests.

I don’t want to scare you, comrades, but we have made calculations, of course, what would happen in a possible conflict in a normal, classical war. This is not advantageous for us. I myself, comrades, am not for any kind of war, also not for nuclear war—it’s clear to me, that would mean destruction of the world, destruction of mankind, even though the threat worked, it really did, under Khrushchev. Now, because of that threat—and this is my opinion but I can prove it—our Soviet comrades are going to push us to speed up the arming and buildup of our units; this was proved last year in the signing of the protocol.38 I had sharp clashes with the unified command when they came up with the demand to increase the number of our divisions. It took two days, two days it took, before I managed to convince one army general what is the economic and human potential of our republic. Unfortunately, comrades, I have to say that our political representatives do not pay enough attention to these questions. And yet these are fundamental questions. And this point, that is, more independence in foreign policy, I see, in a way, as being relevant to the Warsaw Treaty politics, not only in relation to the West, to West Germany.

We have to struggle to get a position of equality within the Warsaw Treaty.


**Document No. 6**

**Memorandum by Thirty Scholarly Associates of the Military Political Academy and Military Technical Academy for the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, 4 June 1968**

**Formulation and Constitution of Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Area**

The draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak People’s Army poses with a particular urgency the question of elaborating the state military doctrine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In our opinion, the point of departure ought to be the state interests of Czechoslovakia in the military area which, however, have not yet been formulated and constituted.

The signatories of this memorandum, who are scholarly associates working for the Czechoslovak armed forces, wish to contribute to the scientific examination and formulation of those state interests. In sections 1 and 2, they express their position concerning the present state of our military doctrine and military policy. In sections 3 and 4, they outline the procedure for a theoretical examination of the data aimed at the formulation of doctrinal conclusions. In section 5, they justify the necessity of
using scientific methods to solve these problems. They are sending this memorandum to provide the basis for an exchange of opinion. They consider a dialogue necessary for the development of scientific research. Prague, May 1968

1. Political and Military Doctrine

1.1. The political doctrine of a socialist state is primarily influenced by the choice of wider goals within the international community and its relationship with the diverse forces representative of social progress. The principle of socialist internationalism is organically linked with the national responsibility of a sovereign state. This is normally the more important as well as more difficult the smaller is the physical power of the state. The choice cannot solely depend on “national interest,” which cannot be defined in a pure form—neither as an interest of one’s own state, nor as an interest of the leading state of a coalition. Decisive is the interest of the societal movement, of which sovereign states are part, specifically the interest of European socialism and its dynamic development. Mere defense of what has been accomplished fosters stagnation and degeneration; wrong choice of an offensive strategy has destructive effect on the progress of the whole societal movement. 

1.2. Military policy as an aggregate of actions in military matters implements military interests and needs through a chosen strategy. In regard to national interest, the military doctrine of the state can be described as a comprehensive formulation of its military interests and needs. The doctrine is a binding theoretical and ideological base for the formulation of military policy and the resulting measures as well as for negotiations with the alliance partners. It amounts to a compromise between the maximum requirements and actual resources, between the dynamics of the evolving military knowledge and the findings of the social sciences, between the development of technology and the requirement of an effective defense system corresponding to the military circumstances at any given time. 

1.3. The formulation of the state’s military doctrine influences retroactively its political doctrine and strategy. It substantially affects its capability to project itself internationally by nonmilitary means. Giving up one’s own military doctrine means giving up responsibility for one’s own national and international action. A surrender to spontaneity, this entails depoliticization of military thought, which in turn leads to a paralysis of the army. It is the fundamental source of crisis of the army organism by tearing it out of society. It disrupts the metabolism between the army and the society. It deprives the army of its raison d’être for the national community by limiting the interaction between national goals and the goals of the socialist community.

2. The Past, Present, and Future of Czechoslovakia’s Military Policy

2.1. The foundations of Czechoslovakia’s present defense systems were laid at the beginning of the nineteen-fifties, at which time the responsible political actors of the socialist countries assumed that a military conflict in Europe was imminent. It was a strategy based on the slogan of defense against imperialist aggression, but at the same time assuming the possibility of transition to strategic offensive with the goal of achieving complete Soviet hegemony in Europe. No explicit reassessment of this coalition strategy by taking into account the potential of nuclear missiles has ever taken place.

2.2. The Czechoslovak army, created with great urgency and extraordinary exertion, became a substantial strategic force by the time when Europe’s political and military situation had fundamentally changed. Although in 1953 we noted a relaxation of international tension and in 1956 introduced the new strategy of peaceful coexistence, no formulation of Czechoslovakia’s own military doctrine or reform of its army took place. Invoking the threat of German aggression, the alliance continued to be tightened up. Increasingly the threat of German aggression has taken on the role of an extraneous factor employed with the intent to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist community. Once the original notions about the applicability of a universal economic and political model had to be revised, military cooperation was supposed to compensate for insufficient economic cooperation and the inadequacy of other relationships among the socialist countries.

2.3. In politics, there is a lack of clarity about the probable trends of development in the progressive movement to which we belong. There is a prevailing tendency to cling to the obsolete notions that have become part of the ideological legacy of the socialist countries. There is a prevailing tendency to try to influence all the segments of the movement, regardless of the sharply growing differences in their respective needs resulting from social and economic development.

In 1956 and 1961 we proved by our deeds that we were ready to bear any global risks without claiming a share of responsibility for the political decisions and their implementation. By doing so, we proved that we did not understand even the European situation and were guided not by sober analysis but by political and ideological stereotypes. (Hence also the surprise with regard to Hungary in 1956 and the inadequate response in 1961.)

2.4. Our military policy did not rest on an analysis of our own national needs and interests. It did not rest on our own military doctrine. Instead it was a reflection of the former sectarian party leadership, which prevented the party from conducting a realistic policy of harmonizing the interests of different groups with national and international interests for the benefit of socialism. The development of the army was deprived of both rational criteria and an institutionalized opposition. Military policy
was reduced to the search for optimally matching our resources with the demands of the alliance. Devoid of principles, it was bound to create contradictions and crises within the army.

Inevitably the twenty years of deformed development affected the ability, or rather inability, of the cadres to overcome the deformations. Theoretical backwardness in military theory and the formulation of a military doctrine has been a great obstacle to the overcoming of the past errors.

2.5. Czechoslovakia’s military policy will continue being built upon the alliance with other Warsaw Treaty partners, above all the U.S.S.R. At the same time, however, it will be a policy based on state sovereignty, and designed to provide our input into developing the alliance’s common positions. A modern conception of the Warsaw Treaty can only have one meaning: increased external security of its member states to foster the development of both the socialist states and the states of Western Europe. Our military policy will not shun global risks, but only in the role of a partner rather than of a victim of a development that it cannot influence.

It will essentially be an European security policy, supportive of international détente in Europe, all-European cooperation, and Europe’s progressive forces. It will serve as an instrument of a broader, but not self-serving policy. A military policy that needs to construe and exaggerate an enemy threat fosters conservative tendencies in both socialism and capitalism. While in the short run it may seem to “strengthen” socialism, in the long run it weakens it.

2.6. Czechoslovakia’s military policy must rest on a scientific analysis of a whole range of possible war situations in Europe, formulate its own sovereign interests and needs accordingly, estimate its military capabilities in particular situations within the framework of the coalition, and act on its own scientifically elaborated strategic doctrine.

3. The Contemporary War-Peace Situation

3.1. The naively pragmatic realist approach considers relations among sovereign states from the point of view of either war or peace. In actuality there is a whole range of situations whose common denominator is the availability of instruments of armed violence but which differ in the manner of their use. As a result of substantive social and political changes and the scientific-technological revolution in military affairs, such a range of situations is considerably more complex and diverse not only in comparison with the situation before World War II but also with the situation in the early fifties.

Yet, at this very time of incipient gigantic transformations of social and political as well as scientific and technological nature, our military policy and doctrine applied the Soviet model as universally valid.

3.2. The above-mentioned range of possible situations may be summarized as follows:

---absolute war (in different variations),
---limited wars (of several types),
---situation between war and peace resulting from the long-term legalization of an originally temporary armistice as a result of which the adversaries are no longer fighting but peace treaties have not been concluded either,
---potential war, i.e. indirect use of instruments of armed violence as means of foreign policy,
---peace among potential adversaries,
---peace among allied sovereign states,
---peace among neutrals,
---absolute peace through general and complete disarmament.

This description is a distillation of specific situations, which are in turn combinations of an indefinite number of possible situations that make sovereign states and military coalitions implement their foreign and military policies.

3.3. The stereotype of class struggle, with its dichotomy of friends and foes, has reduced substantive political distinctions among sovereign states to basic class antagonism, with pernicious consequences for our political strategy and tactics. Yet the Leninist postulate of specific analysis of a concrete situation differentiates according to actual distinctions.

At the very least, the typology should consider:
---actual and potential allies,
---neutrals,
---potential adversaries,
---actual adversaries,
---war enemies.

Czechoslovakia’s state interests and needs require giving justice to different situational variants while rejecting illusions and dangerous simplifications.

4. Possible Formulation of Czechoslovakia’s Military Interests and Needs Related to the War-Peace Situation in Contemporary Europe

The doctrinal formulation and constitution of Czechoslovak military interests and needs first requires a substantive analysis of particular war-peace situations, especially in Europe. Our own military interests and needs should then be formulated accordingly. This should be the point of departure for practical measures in accordance with the doctrine. Following is a brief outline of how one might proceed in some of the basic situations.

4.1. Absolute war in Europe

Given the accumulation of nuclear missiles by both major military coalitions, the possible outbreak of such a war in Europe is wrought with catastrophic consequences for most of its European participants. At the same time, the permanent lead time in the offensive rather than the defensive deployment of nuclear missiles, as well our unfavorable geographical position, make it impossible to substantially limit the destructiveness of enemy first strikes against our territory to an extent compatible with the preservation of our national and state existence. It must
be said openly that the outbreak and conduct of a global nuclear war in the European theater would be tantamount to the national extinction and demise of state sovereignty especially of the frontline states, including Czechoslovakia. The futility of such a war as a means of settling European disputes, as demonstrated by the development of the so-called Berlin crisis of 1961, of course does not exclude its possibility.

In such a situation, we consider it appropriate to formulate Czechoslovakia’s military interests and needs as a matter of primary existential importance:
—preventing the conduct of a nuclear war on our territory is a fundamental existential need of our society;
—Czechoslovakia has a strategic interest in actively contributing to the reduction of the real possibility of absolute war in Europe.

Our fundamental needs and interests in the event of such a war should determine a foreign policy aimed at limiting the possibility of a nuclear attack against Czechoslovakia. The appropriate measures are, for example, the conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and supplementary guarantees of the status quo in Europe.

4.2. Limited war in Europe

The analysis of the possible scenarios in Europe obviously starts with the recognition of a growing danger of such a war and its growing strategic and political significance.

In recognizing the futility of limited war as a means of Czechoslovak foreign policy and in emphasizing our interest in eliminating it as a means of settlement of European disputes, we assume the necessity of purposefully waging war against an attack in a fashion conducive to limiting its destructive effects on our territory and population.

The formulation and constitution of Czechoslovakia’s particular interests and needs will determine the practical measures to be taken:
—Preparation of Czechoslovakia’s armed forces and its entire defense system within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, with the goal of normalizing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.
—Czechoslovakia has a strategic interest in actively contributing to the reduction of the real possibility of absolute war in Europe.

4.4. Potential war in Europe

At issue is the indirect use of the potential for armed violence as an instrument of foreign policy, as implied in the policy of deterrence, practiced especially by the nuclear powers. Czechoslovakia cannot use deterrence against the Western powers. Its deterrence posture is declaratory and politically ineffective if it is not supported by strategic measures against potential adversaries geographically distant from us. At the same time, the use of deterrence against Czechoslovakia by some of its potential adversaries forces us to respond in kind.

These characteristics determine the formulation of Czechoslovakia's needs and interests, namely:
—our primary strategic and political need to prevent such a military and political crisis at the present time,
—our interest in reducing the possibility of a transition from the absence of war to a limited war while searching for a solution of the German question as the key question of contemporary Europe.

This further postulates measures to be taken in both military and foreign policy, above all through the Warsaw Pact, with the goal of normalizing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.5. Peace among potential adversaries in Europe

This is the situation obtaining in Europe among potential adversaries who have no mutually exclusive interests and do not apply the policy of deterrence against one another.

Here Czechoslovakia’s interests and needs lay in the legal codification of the state of peace with a growing number of potential adversaries.

Our practical goals should be the conclusion with such partners of non-aggression treaties and arms limitation agreements. In this way, we can contribute to the reduction of tensions between potential adversaries, the growth of peace in Europe, and the reciprocal gradual neutralization of instruments of armed violence.

4.6. In other possible peace situations in Europe, as enumerated earlier, military interests and needs represent a share in Czechoslovakia’s overall interests and needs. The
closer the peace, of course, the lower the share. Absolute peace entails the abolition of the material and technological base for war, and thus also of the base for the military interests and needs.

In view of Czechoslovakia’s current foreign and military policy predicament, our main task is the formulation and constitution of its military interests and needs pertinent to the situations referred to in points 4.2 through 4.5.

If the formulation of Czechoslovak military doctrine is to be more scientific, the main question is that of choosing the right approach and avoiding the wrong ones.

5. Systems Analysis and the Use of Modern Research Methods

5.1. In constituting a Czechoslovak military doctrine, the most dangerous and precarious approach is the one-sided use of simple logic and old-fashioned working habits.

If Czechoslovakia is to be preserved as an entity, giving absolute priority to the possibility of a general war in Europe that involves the massive use of nuclear weapons makes no sense, for this entails a high probability of our country’s physical liquidation regardless of how much money and resources are spent on its armed forces and regardless even of the final outcome of the war.

5.2. For each of the variants under 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, systems analysis and other modern methods of research allow us to determine the correlation between, on the one hand, the material, financial, and personnel expenditures on the armed forces (assuming perfect rationality of their development) and, on the other hand, the degree of risk of the state’s physical destruction and the loss of its sovereignty, while taking into account the chances of a further advance of socialism, or even the elimination of the threat of war.

At issue is the attainment of pragmatic stability in national defense and army development, corresponding to political needs and related to foreign policy by striving to avert war by increasing the risks for the potential adversary while preserving the sovereign existence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, thus giving substance to its contribution to the coalition in fulfillment of its internationalist duty.

Managing the development of our armed forces solely on the basis of simple logic, empiricism, and historical analogy, perhaps solely in the interest of the coalition without regard to one’s own sovereign interests, is in its final effect inappropriate and contradicts the coalition’s interests.

Besides the reconciliation of our own and the coalition’s interests in our military doctrine, we consider it necessary to utilize systems analysis and all other available methods of scientific prognosis, including model-building. Thus the preparedness of our armed forces in different variants can be assessed and related to the evolving political needs and economic possibilities. This concerns not so much tactical, operational, and organizational issues as the confrontation of political and doctrinal problems with the reality.

We regard systems analysis as the new quality that can raise the effectiveness of our armed forces above the current level.

5.3. At the most general level, we can see two possible ways of managing our army’s development:

— The first way is proceeding from the recognition of the personnel, technological, and financial limitations imposed by society upon the armed forces toward the evaluation of the risks resulting from the failure to achieve desirable political goals under the different variants of European development described in the preceding section. The decision about the extent of acceptable risk must be made by the supreme political organ of the state.

— The second way is proceeding from the recognition of the acceptable risk as set by the political leadership toward the provision of the necessary personnel, technological, and financial means corresponding to the different variants of European development.

Either of these ways presupposes elaboration of less than optimal models of army development for each of the variants, applying the requirements of national defense regardless of the existing structure of the system. Confrontation of the model with the available resources should then determine the specific measures to be taken in managing the development of the armed forces and their components.

The proposed procedure would not make sense if we were to keep the non-systemic, compartmentalized approach to building our armed forces without being able to prove to the political leadership that the available personnel, financial, and technological means are being used with maximum effectiveness to prepare our armed forces for any of the different variants of European development rather than merely show their apparent preparedness at parades and exercises organized according to a prepared scenario.

5.4. Increasingly strategic thought has been shifting away from seeking the overall destruction of all enemy assets to the disruption of the enemy defense system by destroying its selected elements, thus leading to its collapse. In some cases, such as in the Israeli-Arab war, the theory proved its superiority in practice as well. Its application in developing our army, elaborating our strategy, and designing our operational plans can result not only in substantial military savings but also increased effectiveness of our defense system. In case of a relative (but scientifically arrived at and justified) decrease of those expenditures, it may help limit the consequences of the exponential growth of the prices of the new combat and management technology. Most importantly, it may help impress on the armed forces command and the political leadership the best way of discharging their responsibilities toward both the state and the coalition.
5.5. The proposed procedures and methods toward the constitution of Czechoslovak military doctrine can of course be implemented only through a qualitatively new utilization of our state’s scientific potential. We regard science as being critically conducive to working methods that practitioners are inhibited from using because of their particular way of thinking, their time limitations, and for reasons of expediency. We regard science as a counterweight that could block and balance arbitrary tendencies in the conduct of the armed forces command and the political leadership. In this we see the fundamental prerequisite for a qualitatively new Czechoslovak military doctrine and the corresponding management of our armed forces.


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3 Draft of mutual defense treaty by Gromyko, Zorin, and Semenov, 31 December 1954, Sekretariat Ministra/14/12/1-6, Archiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiskoi Federatsii [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation], Moscow [AVP RF].

4 Decision by Central Committee, 1 April 1955, Sekretariat Ministra 14/54/4/39, AVP RF.

5 Krushchev to Ulbricht, 2 May 1955, J IV 2/202/244 Bd 1, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin [SAPMO].

6 Stenographical record of meeting, 12 May 1955, Varshavskoe soveshchanie 1/11, AVP RF. The creation of the Warsaw Pact under Krushchev was thus even more tightly controlled than the creation of the Cominform in 1948 had been under Stalin. At that time, the participants had not been told in advance what to expect, prompting some of them to express opinions of their own. See Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 32, and The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1047/1948/1949, ed. Giuliano Procacci (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

7 “Protokoll über die Schaffung eines Vereinigten Kommandos der bewaffneten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten am Vertrag über Freundschaft, Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitige Hilfe,” 14 May 1955, AZN 32347, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg.


9 Khrushchev to Bierut, 7 September 1955, KC PZPR, 2661/2, 16-19, Archivum Akt Nowych [Modern Records Archives], Warsaw [AAN].


16 Vice Minister of Defense Bordziowski to Gomułka, 7 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/53, AAN; “Memorandum w sprawie Układu Warszawskiego oraz planu rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych PRL” [Memorandum Concerning the Warsaw Treaty and the Plan for the Development of Poland’s Armed Forces], microfilm (o) 96/6398, reel W-25, LoC.

17 Cf. “Wykaz zagadnie wojskowych wymagających omówienia i uregulowania na nowych zasadach” [An Outline of Military Problems Requiring Discussion and Regulation according to New Principles], by Drzewiecki, 8 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/137-38, AAN.


19 Commentary by Drzewiecki, undated (November-December
1956), KC PZPR 2661/124, AAN.
2 Piórko, Armia ze skazać, pp. 277-80.
3 Ibid., pp. 280-82.
4 Marginal note on Document No. 2.
5 Brezhnev to Ulbricht, 7 January 1966, J IV 2/202-248, SAPMO.
6 Memorandum by Rapacki, 21 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/48-53, AAN.
7 Memorandum by Polish Ministry of National Defense, 26 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/27-36, AAN.
8 Memorandum by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, 31 May 1966, KC PZPR 2948/54-57, AAN.
9 Record of the Berlin meeting of deputy foreign ministers, 10-12 February 1966, J IV 2/202-257 Bd 9, SAPMO; report by Naszkowski, 17 February 1966, KC PZPR 2948/64-69, AAN.
14 For example, Černík to Novotný, 20 May 1966, in Benčík, Vojenské otázky, pp. 314-16.
16 Lidová armáda, 2 July 1968.
17 The comical hero of Jaroslav Hašek’s antiwar novel of 1920.
20 The assertion in the 6 March 1968, commentary on Prague radio by Luboš Dobrovský (later minister of defense in postcommunist Czechoslovakia), according to which a Czechoslovak delegate at the Sofia meeting joined Romania in expressing his doubts about the credibility of the Soviet nuclear umbrella for Eastern Europe and alluded approvingly to De Gaulle’s decision to leave NATO’s integrated command because of his similar doubts about U.S. protection (cited in Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970], p. 489), cannot be substantiated from the records of the Sofia meeting in Polish, Czech, and former East German archives: KC PZPR 2663/381-411, AAN; MNO/sekr. min., 1968/boxes 4 and 5, VHA; J IV 2/202-263 Bd 15, SAPMO.
21 „Notatka o wynikach narady szefów sztabów generalnych armii państw-członków Ukladu Warszawskiego” [Note about the Results of the Consultation of the Chiefs of Staffs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty], undated [March 1968], KC PZPR 2663/366-80, AAN.
22 Speech by Ceaușescu and rejoinder by Gomułka at the Sofia meeting, 7 March 1968, KC PZPR 2663/389-411, AAN; Soviet party central committee to Romanian party central committee, undated (early 1968), KC PZPR 2663/359-61, AAN.
24 Report for cabinet meeting, 12 March 1968, MNO/sekr. min. 1968/10, Vojenský historický archiv [Military Historical Archives], Prague, VHA.
26 Ibid., p. 125.
32 Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, pp. 95-97.
34 Milan Ždimal, Memorandum: 1968-1990 (Bratislava: Vysoká pedagogická škola, katedra poliologie, 1992), pp. 3-5. The author was one of the signatories of the memorandum.
35 Successive drafts of the appeal for the convocation of European security conference, 17 March 1969, J IV 2/202-264 Bd 16, SAPMO.
37 Ryszard Majchrzak, at the time Director of Minister Rapacki’s Secretariat.
38 Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet bloc’s organization for economic cooperation.
39 In the original, the term “local war” is used.
40 Three-year agreement on the development of the Czechoslovak armed forces, signed in 1967.
41 The Hungarian and Berlin crises.
New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis:
Khrushchev, Nuclear Weapons, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Editor’s Note: With the following essay and documents, CWIHP continues its efforts to document the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. At our request, Raymond L. Garthoff has prepared new, full translations of the memoranda of 6 and 8 September 1962, which were featured in CWIHP Bulletin 10, following the article by Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko on “The Pitsunda Decision.” He has also translated, at our request, several additional memoranda from May, June, and October 1962. All of these are photocopies from the General Staff archives now in the Volkogonov papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). In some cases these copies contain passages difficult or impossible to read, not only because the originals are handwritten but also because Volkogonov’s photocopies in some cases do not fully reproduce the original pages. Nonetheless, the texts are nearly complete, and the documents are of considerable interest and value to research on this important subject.

By Raymond L. Garthoff

My colleagues Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have advanced new information and new insights in their CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March 1998) article on “The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons.”¹ Based on two Soviet Defense Ministry documents from September 1962, it is an interesting and provocative account, building on their important earlier study One Hell of a Gamble.² These documents are among others related to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Volkogonov Papers, a collection gathered by the late Colonel General Dmitry Volkogonov and now held by the Library of Congress. Partial translations of these two documents are appended to their article.

Each new tranche of revelations about the Cuban missile crisis helps to answer some old questions about it, but also raises new ones. It is clear from these materials (and some others earlier addressed in One Hell of a Gamble) that Khrushchev made certain adjustments in Operation Anadyr, his plan for military deployments in Cuba, in September 1962, evidently in reaction to President Kennedy’s public warning of September 4. It is less certain, much less certain, that Khrushchev saw Kennedy’s warning as a “signal” that he knew about the planned deployment of missiles, as suggested by Fursenko and Naftali. Khrushchev may simply have become less confident that the deployment could be kept secret. It is also not clear that Khrushchev had, in any meaningful sense, “a chance to stop the operation” on September 5, when he learned of Kennedy’s warning. True, as the authors state, on that date “there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba.” But the first missiles were already en route. Khrushchev theoretically could have “terminated the deployment” at that time, but in practical (and political) terms he could hardly have done so. Instead, these documents show, he sought to expedite the dispatch of weaponry already underway, and also to send some additional tactical nuclear weapons (6 bombs for an additional squadron of 9 specially fitted IL-28 bombers, and 12 warheads for 12 Luna (FROG) short-range tactical

rockets). According to Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s response to Kennedy’s warning was thus “to ratchet up the incipient crisis by introducing tactical nuclear weapons into the picture.”

Although it is true that Khrushchev sought to expedite the remaining planned shipments, and on September 7 added the Lunas and nuclear-equipped IL-28s, he also rejected a Ministry of Defense proposal to add a brigade of 18 R-11M nuclear-armed missiles—the SCUD B (SS-1c) missile with an 80 mile range (for nuclear delivery). And the augmentation did not “introduce” tactical nuclear weapons; the original General Staff Anadyr plan of 24 May 1962, finally approved by Khrushchev and the Presidium on June 10, had provided for 80 nuclear-armed tactical cruise missiles (with 16 launchers), with a range of 90 miles. Moreover, not mentioned by Fursenko and Naftali in their article, although noted in their book, two weeks later, on September 25, Khrushchev canceled the planned deployment to Cuba of the major part of the Soviet Navy surface and submarine fleet previously planned for deployment. This included canceling the planned deployment of seven missile-launching submarines, as well as two cruisers, two missile-armed destroyers, and two conventionally armed destroyers.

In sum, in September Khrushchev added 6 IL-28 nuclear bombs and 12 short-range Luna tactical nuclear rockets to the 80 tactical cruise missile warheads previously authorized, but rejected addition of 18 longer-range tactical ballistic missiles. And he canceled most of the Navy deployment, including 7 missile-launching submarines with 21 nuclear ballistic missiles. In short, I do not believe it is correct to conclude, as do the authors, that Khrushchev “chose to put the maximum reliance on nuclear weapons.”

In their article, Fursenko and Naftali have misread the second document, reporting that Khrushchev approved an order to arm Soviet attack submarines with nuclear torpedoes to be prepared, upon receipt of specific orders from Moscow, “to launch nuclear torpedo attacks on U.S.
coastal targets,” the list of targets being appended to the revised mission statement (but regrettably missing from the copy available in the Volkogonov Papers). As the authors had previously reported in their book, the four Soviet Foxtrot-class diesel attack submarines sent on patrol to the area in October were each equipped with one nuclear-armed torpedo in addition to conventionally armed torpedoes. These nuclear torpedoes were, however, as we know from other sources, intended for use against U.S. Navy ships, in particular aircraft carriers, in case of confirmed U.S. Navy attacks on the submarines. The submarine-launched nuclear attacks against “the most important coastal targets in the USA” mentioned in the September 8 document were explicitly identified as strikes by “nuclear-missile equipped submarines,” still scheduled for deployment to Cuba until that deployment was canceled on September 25. Incidentally, the seven missile submarines planned for deployment in Cuba until September 25 were the diesel-powered Golf-class, not the nuclear-powered Hotel-class (as misidentified in One Hell of a Gamble), and they each carried three relatively short-range ballistic missiles (325 mile R-13, SS-N-4, missiles), not “intermediate-range” missiles.

I agree fully with the conclusion by Fursenko and Naftali that “Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on the [potential] battlefield without any analysis of the threshold between limited and general nuclear war.” I am less certain that an “inescapable” further conclusion is that “Khrushchev sent the tactical weapons to Cuba for use in battle, not as a deterrent.” That may well be, but I do not believe it is that clear that the Soviet leadership necessarily “intended to use” the nuclear weapons in Cuba, although it clearly did deploy the weapons for possible use against an invading force. In all, I believe it goes too far to see Khrushchev’s decision on dispatch of additional tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba as “embrace of a nuclear warfighting strategy in September 1962.” We know that as the crisis arose in October Khrushchev clearly reiterated that no use of any nuclear weapons was authorized without explicit approval from Moscow, that is, by himself.

I do, however, agree with what I believe to be the main thrust of the argument by Fursenko and Naftali, that Khrushchev had no conception of the risks of escalation in any use of tactical nuclear weapons against a U.S. invading force. Moreover, the fact that the maximum range of some systems meant they conceivably could have been fired at southern Florida (the IL-28s and the FKR-1 cruise missiles), even though their designated role was to attack an invasion force on or around Cuba, was unnecessarily dangerous. The fact that the four F-class diesel attack submarines each carried a nuclear torpedo for use against attacking U.S. Navy ships on the high seas was particularly provocative, inasmuch as their use would not only have escalated to nuclear warfare but also geographically extended beyond Cuba to war at sea. These are the submarines that the U.S. Navy repeatedly forced to surface during the crisis, sometimes by dropping small depth charges!

Perhaps additional documents will be found that further clarify these issues.

It is very helpful to have the texts of key documents made available in translation, as the Cold War International History Project has sought to do in connection with the article by Fursenko and Naftali. In this case, however, there are extensive unacknowledged omissions and errors in the translations. In the September 6 document, several paragraphs have been omitted with no ellipses or other indication of that fact. And the second, September 8, document should probably be identified as “Extracts,” inasmuch as over half the document has been omitted, again without indication. Moreover, while much of the omitted material may be of little interest to most readers, it does include such things as unit identifications and a number of other new data. One interesting disclosure in the September 8 document, not included in the translated extracts, is the fact that one of the nuclear-armed cruise missile regiments had as its designated target the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. It is of interest that the full text of the September 8 guidance to the Soviet commander in Cuba gives as a mission for the four Army ground force regiments not only protection of other Soviet forces and assistance to the Cuban armed forces in combating invading forces, but also assistance in liquidating “counterrevolutionary groups” in Cuba.

Another interesting fact not noted in the article or included in the translated extracts is that the separate IL-28 squadron for nuclear bomb delivery (comprising 9 aircraft) was a Soviet Air Force unit and was located at Holguin airbase in eastern Cuba (at the time of the September 8 document it was postulated as “10-12 aircraft,” and was designated for Santa Clara airfield). The IL-28 regiment originally assigned under Anadyr in May-June was a Navy unit (comprising 30 light torpedo bombers and 3 training aircraft) and was located in the far west of Cuba at San Julian airfield. After the climax of the missile crisis on October 28, it was observed that uncrating of IL-28s at San Julian continued in early November while the issue of withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers was thrashed out in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations (and between Mikoyan and Castro in Havana). At that time, observers in Washington were perplexed by the fact that IL-28s at San Julian continued to be uncrated and assembled, while no effort was made to uncrate or assemble the nine crated IL-28s at Holguin. In retrospect, it seems clear that the Soviet command in Cuba was uncertain about the future of the nuclear-armed bomber squadron, but assumed the conventionally armed coastal defense torpedo-bomber regiment would remain. Thus one minor mystery of the crisis denouement is clarified by these details in the September 8 document. It also is clear that the failure during the crisis even to begin the assembly of the nuclear-capable IL-28s shows that these tactical nuclear systems
were not given any priority, as one would expect if
Khrushchev’s decision in September had meant greater
reliance on nuclear warfighting.

To note but one other item of interest in the
untranslated portions of the document of September 8, the
instructions on employment in combat of the air defense
forces assigned responsibility to the Commander of the
Group of Forces in Cuba, in contrast to the guidance on
employment of the nuclear MRBM and IRBM missile
forces (and the planned Naval submarine nuclear missile
forces) which was specifically reserved for a signal from
Moscow. The employment of Army (Luna) and Air Force
(cruise missile FKR-1 and IL-28) tactical nuclear forces
was not specifically limited to advance approval from
Moscow, with one interesting exception: the employment
of nuclear cruise missiles against the U.S. base at
Guantanamo was reserved for a “signal from the General
Staff.” This relative laxity in the general guidance for
most tactical nuclear forces tends to support the general
argument by Fursenko and Naftali, although they do not
note it and incorrectly state that the September 8 document
revised the original Anadyr plan to provide that any use of
nuclear weapons required direct orders from Moscow.
Nonetheless, while the original and revised plans are
ambiguous on possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in
meeting an invasion of Cuba, as Fursenko and Naftali
acknowledge at the outset of the crisis on October 22, and
again on October 27, Khrushchev clearly reaffirmed a
requirement for advance approval by Moscow for use of
any nuclear weapon.

In addition to omissions in the appended documents,
there are many infelicities and downright errors in the
translation. For example, the Group of Soviet Forces in
Cuba is variously translated as “Soviet armed force
group”, “Soviet Military Group”,”group of Soviet
troops”, but never by the standard translation which would
have indicated it was considered a major expeditionary
force equivalent to the Groups of Soviet Forces in
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The
term divizion is translated throughout as “division,”
which is inaccurate. For artillery and missile units the standard
translation is battle parts. For distances of 24
kilometers, [they were] exact within 100-120 meters” is
incomprehensible; it should refer to “successful firing tests
of the S-75 antiaircraft system against surface targets on
level terrain; at distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of
plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved.” Admittedly,
some of the terminology is specialized, but greater
accuracy is required to make such documentation reliable
and, indeed, usable.

There are also a few errors of detail in the article.
Fursenko and Naftali, in addition to misidentifying the R-
11M as a cruise missile rather than the Scud ballistic
missile, follow the translation in using divisions, rather
than battalions, for divizion. They also state that the
Indigirka carried 45 warheads for the R-12 MRBMs; the
correct figure is 36. Finally, in a footnote they refer to the
Ilyushin (IL-)114, referred to as “the workhorse of the
Soviet air force,” as unsuitable for carrying missiles and
nuclear weapons. There was no IL-114; the aircraft in
question is the Tupolev (Tu-)114, and it was not used in
the Soviet air force at all—it was configured as a civilian
passenger liner, and for that reason was not suitable for
loading and carrying the missiles or warheads (as
indicated in the full text of the document).

Again, these corrections are noted only because the
article and documents are so important, and the Bulletin
is the only available reference for those who are not able to
personally research the Volkogonov Papers.

In concluding, I would like to note that there are a
couple dozen other documents on the missile crisis in the
Volkogonov Papers. Among them are the original
Ministry of Defense military deployment plan for Anadyr
(dated 24 May 1962), and a one page summary of
meetings of May 24, May 25, and June 10 with the
decisions to proceed, and a diagram of the whole
deployment prepared by the General Staff on June 20.
These documents are translated below. Not translated here
are others, including Instructions from Defense Minister
Malinovsky to the chief of the advance military group sent
to Cuba (issued July 4), and the list of the 161 members of
that group (including a change noted in pen, naming
General of the Army Issa Pliyev as commander in place of
Lt. General of Aviation Pavel Dankevich of the Strategic
Missile Forces).

There are also a number of Defense Ministry
documents on preparations for the dispatch of the forces,
instructions on loading and transporting them, and the like.
One of the most interesting of these documents is a revised
instruction to ship captains and troop leaders ordering that
in the event of “a clear threat of seizure of our ship by
foreign ships” the ship is to be scuttled. This change
appears, although undated, to represent another response
to Kennedy’s warning of September 4. Other documents
from mid-September describe the arming of these
merchant ships with 23 mm. antiaircraft guns.

Also of interest are draft instructions to the
commander of the Soviet forces in Cuba prepared in
August stressing the need for all personnel in Cuba to be
“examples of the Soviet socialist ideology” (and not to
visit “restaurants, cabarets and beaches” or take walks
unaccompanied or “become acquainted with any unknown
person"). Finally, Marshal Malinovsky’s laconic one page report to Khrushchev on the shooting down of the American U-2 aircraft on October 27 (signed on October 28 nearly 15 hours after the incident) makes no excuses. It simply states as a fact that the plane was shot down “in order not to permit the photography to reach the United States.” As we know from other sources, Khrushchev rightly took a very different view of this unauthorized action. (This document is translated below.)

In sum, these documents are of interest on many aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. Certainly one of the most important is the subject of Khrushchev’s views on nuclear weapons, raised by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali in their article, which I have sought also to address in this discussion.

1 In CWHP Bulletin No. 10 (March 1998), pp. 223-25.
3 Ibid., p. 214.
4 See Aleksandr Mozgovoi, “Order: In Case of Firing, Use Nuclear Weapons,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 27 June 1995, an account by the commander of one of the submarines.
5 “One Hell of a Gamble,” p. 213.

Document No. 1
R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov, Memorandum on Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba, 24 May 1962

To the Chairman of the Defense Council
Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

In accordance with your instructions the Ministry of Defense proposes:

1. To deploy on the island of Cuba a Group of Soviet Forces comprising all branches of the Armed Forces, under a single integrated staff of the Group of Forces headed by a Commander in Chief of Soviet forces in Cuba.

2. To send to Cuba the 43rd Missile Division (commander of the division Major General Statsenko) comprising five missile regiments:
— The 79th, 181st and 664th R-12 [SS-4] missile regiments with eight launchers each, in all 24 launchers.
— The 665th and 668th R-14 [SS-5] missile regiments

with eight launchers each, in all 16 launchers.
— In all, 40 R-12 and R-14 launchers.

With the missile units to send 1.5 missiles and 1.5 warheads per each launcher (in all 60 missiles and 60 warheads), with one field missile technical base (PRTB) per regiment for equipping the warheads and rocket fuel in mobile tanks with 1.75 loadings per R-12 missile and 1.5 per R-14 missile at each launcher.

Deployment of the R-12 missiles is planned in the [illegible] variant with the use of SP-6. Prepared assembly-disassembly elements of the SP-6 for equipping the missile pads will be prepared at construction enterprises of the Ministry of Defense by 20 June and shipped together with the regiments. Upon arrival at the designated locations, personnel of the missile regiments will within ten days equip the launch positions by their own efforts, and will be ready to launch missiles.

For deployment of the missile units armed with R-14 missiles, construction on site will last about four months. This work can be handled by the personnel of the units, but it will be necessary to augment them with a group of 25 engineer-construction personnel and 100 construction personnel of basic specialties and up to 100 construction fitters from State Committees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology and radioelectronics.

For accomplishing the work it is necessary to send:
— 16 complete sets of earth equipment for the R-14 produced by [the machine] industry in the current year;
— machinery and vehicles:
  Mobile cranes (5 ton) —10
  Bulldozers —20
  Mobile graders —10
  Excavators —10
  Dump trucks —120
  Cement mixers (GVSU) —6

— Special technical equipment for [illegible] and testing apparatuses
— Basic materials
  Cement —2,000 tons
  Reinforced concrete —15,000 sq. meters (not counting access roads)
  Metal —2,000 tons
  SP-6 sets —30
  GR-2 Barracks —20
  Prefabricated wooden houses —10
  Cable, equipment and other materials.

Further accumulation of missile fuel, missiles, and warheads for the units is possible depending on the creation of reserve space and storage in Cuba, inasmuch as it would be possible to include in each missile regiment a third battalion with four launchers.

The staff of the Group and of the missile division can expediently be sent from the Soviet Union in the first days of July 1962 in two echelons: the 1st echelon (R-12 regiments) and the 2nd (R-14 regiments).

3. For air defense of the island of Cuba and protection of the Group of Forces to send 2 antiaircraft
divisions, including in their composition 6 antiaircraft missile regiments (24 battalions), 6 technical battalions, one fighter air regiment with MiG-21 F-13 (three squadrons—40 aircraft), and two radar battalions.

With the divisions to ship 4 missiles per launcher, in all 576 [SAM] missiles.

To send the antiaircraft divisions: one in July, and one in August, 1962.

4. For defense of coasts and bases in the sectors of probable enemy attack on the island of Cuba to send one regiment of Sopka ["little volcano"] comprising three battalions (6 launchers) with three missiles per launcher —on the coast in the vicinity of Havana, one regiment (4 launchers)
—on the coast in the vicinity of Banes, one battalion (2 launchers)
On the southern coast in the vicinity of Cienfuegos to locate one battalion (2 launchers), [already] planned for delivery to Cuba in 1962.

The Sopka complex is capable of destroying surface ships at a range of up to 80 km.

5. To send to Cuba as part of the Group of Forces:
—a brigade of missile patrol boats of the class Project 183-R, comprising two units with 6 patrol boats in each (in all 12 patrol boats), each armed with two P-15 [trans: NATO SS-N-2 Styx] missiles with a range up to 40 km.;
—a detachment of support ships comprising: 1 tanker, 2 dry cargo transports, and 4 repair afloat ships;
—two combat sets of the P-15 missile (24 missiles) and one for the R-13 (21 missiles).

Shipments of the missile patrol boats Project 183-R class, the battalions of Sopka, technical equipment for the missile patrol boats and technical batteries for the Sopka battalions, and also the missiles, missile fuel, and other equipment for communications to be carried on ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

Shipments of the warheads, in readiness state 4, will be handled by ships of the Navy.

6. To send as part of the Group of Forces in Cuba in July-August:
—Two regiments of FKR (16 launchers) with PRTB, with their missiles and 5 special [Trans: nuclear] warheads for each launcher. Range of the FKR is up to 180 km.;
—A mine-torpedo aviation regiment with IL-28 aircraft, comprising three squadrons (33 aircraft) with RAT-52 jet torpedoes (150 torpedoes), and air dropped mines (150 mines) for destruction of surface ships;
—An Mi-4 helicopter regiment, two squadrons, 33 helicopters;
—A separate communications [liaison] air squadron (two IL-14, five Li-2, four Yak-12, and two An-2 aircraft).

7. With the objective of combat security of our technical troops, to send to Cuba four separate motorized rifle regiments, with a tank battalion in each, at the expense of the 64th Motorized Rifle Division in the Leningrad Military District, with an overall personnel strength of 7300. The regiments to be sent in June-July 1962.

8. Upon completion of the concentration of Soviet troops planned for Cuba, or in case of necessity, to send to Cuba on a friendly visit, tentatively in September:

A) A squadron of surface ships of the Navy under the command of Vice Admiral G.S. Abashvili (deputy commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet) comprising:
—two cruisers, Mikhail Kutuzov (Black Sea Fleet) and Sverdlov (Red Banner Baltic Fleet);
—two destroyer battalions of the Project 57-bis class, the Boiki and Gnevny (Black Sea Fleet);
—two destroyers of the Project 76 class, the Skromnyi and Svedushchii (Northern Fleet);
Along with the squadron to send one refueling tanker.
On the ships to send one full combat set of standard ammunition (including one combat set of KSSHCh missiles—24 missiles) and standard equipment.
Sailing time of the ships 15 days.
B) A squadron of submarines, comprising:
—18th Division of missile submarines of the Project 629 class [Trans: NATO Golf or G-class] (7 submarines each with 3 R-13 [SS-N-4] missiles with range of 540 km.);
—a brigade of torpedo submarines of Project 641 class [NATO: Foxtrot or F-class] (4 submarines with torpedo armament);
—two submarine tenders.
Sailing time for the submarines, 20-22 days.
If necessary, the squadrons can be sent separately. Time for preparation to depart, after 1 July, is 10 days.
Upon arrival of the squadrons in Cuba, they would be incorporated into the Group of Soviet Forces.

9. For rear area security of the Group of Forces in Cuba to send:
—three hospitals (200 beds each);
—one anti-epidemic sanitary detachment;
—seven warehouses (2 for food, 1 for general storage, 4 for fuel, including two for automotive and aviation fuel and two for liquid fuel for the Navy);
—one company for servicing a trans-shipping base;
—one field bakery factory;
Create reserves:
—in the Group—fuel and provisions for routine maintenance of the troops for three months;
in the troops—mobile (fuel, ammunition, provisions) by established norms;
—for follow-up secure provisions for 25 days.

10. The overall number of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be about 44,000 military personnel and 1300 workers and civilians. For transport of the troops and combat equipment in summertime a simultaneous lift of about 70-80 ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR will be required.

11. To establish a staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba to command the Soviet troops. To form the staff of the Group convert the staff of the 49th Missile Army from Vinnitsa, which has a well qualified integrated apparatus with support and service elements.

To incorporate into the staff of the Group a naval section, an air force section, and an air defense section. The Commander in Chief of the Group to have four deputies—one for general matters, one for the Navy (VMF), one for Air Defense (PVO), and one for the Air Force (VVS).

12. The form of dress envisioned for the troops sent to Cuba, except for the Navy, is one set of civilian clothes and one tropical uniform (as for troops in the Turkestan Military District).

13. Food for the personnel of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be arranged from the USSR.

14. Financial support will be paid on the same general basis as for other troops located abroad.

15. Measures for creation of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will proceed under the codename Anadyr.

We request your review.

[signature]
R. Malinovsky

24 May 1962

Prepared in one copy on seven pages, no draft
Attested Colonel General S.P. Ivanov

[signature]

Document No. 2
S.P. Ivanov, Untitled notes on the back of the May 24 Memorandum to Khrushchev

24.5.62

The question of aid to Cuba was discussed by the Presidium of the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU. N.S. Khrushchev presented a report. Statements were made by Kozlov, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Voronov, Polyansky and all other members of the Presidium and [illegible] approval of the decision.

The Decision

1. The measures in Anadyr are approved entirely and unanimously. The document was approved subject to receiving agreement by F. Castro.

2. A commission is to be sent to [Castro, or Cuba; this copy of the text cut off] for negotiation. Comrade
Biryuzov [Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, recently named commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces], Comrade Ivanov [Colonel General Semyon P. Ivanov, deputy chief of the General Staff and head of its Main Operations Directorate] [illegible]

[Translator’s Note:  R. Rashidov, head of the planned agricultural delegation chosen as cover, and A. Alekseyev, selected to be the new ambassador in Havana, were also named but are not indicated in the visible text available]

25.5.62 11:00 AM  
1. N.S. Khrushchev [met with] Malinovsky, Gromyko, Andropov, Troyanovsky, Rashidov, Alekseyev [Translator’s Note: text partly missing on available copy, probably included Biryuzov and Ivanov, although by this time it had been decided Ivanov would remain in Moscow. Portion of text here was not readable.]  
[signed:] S.P. Ivanov

[The sheet at this point bears a notation made after the original notes of the meeting on Many 24. It reads:]  
Executed in one copy, on seven pages, no draft.  
Attested: Colonel General S.P. Ivanov [signature]
24.5.62

[A formal classification stamp by the Operations Directorate of the General Staff dated 26.5.62 gives the classification “Special Importance” and a record number 394-illegible]

[There then follows on the same page a third notation by General Ivanov entered on June 10:]  

10.6.62 11:00 AM  
Presidium of the CC CPSU meeting, with participation also of Gromyko, Malinovsky, [Zakharov], Yepishev, Biryuzov, and Chuikov [all deputy ministers of Defense].  
Rashidov and Biryuzov reported [on their mission]. [Remainder of the notation, four lines of script, is truncated and illegible on the Volkogonov copy.]

[Translator’s Note: An account of this Presidium meeting, based on reading this same document in the General Staff archive, is provided by Aleksandr Fursenko, in Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, pp. 187-89. He also summarizes a presentation to that meeting by Malinovsky reading from the basic May 24 Anadyr plan which, as earlier noted, was then signed by all Presidium members and Party Secretaries present.]
I am reporting

I. On the Possibility of Reinforcing Cuba by Air.

1. About the transport by air of special warheads \( \text{spetsial'nye boevye chast'i; nuclear warheads} \) for the Luna [FROG] and R-11M [SCUD-B] missiles. Tests have been conducted at the test range and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of special warheads for R-11M missiles, two on AN-8 aircraft, and four on AN-12 aircraft.

   The alternatives for transport of warheads for the Luna missile are analogous to those for the R-11M.

   The transport of special warheads by Tu-114 is not possible owing to the absence of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by air of R-11M and Luna missiles.

   Practice loading, securing and transport of training R-11M and Luna missiles has been carried out on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft, with 2 Luna or 1 R-11M missiles on AN-8 or AN-12 aircraft.

   The Tu-114 aircraft, notwithstanding its large loading capacity (up to 30 tons) and long range (up to 8,000 km.), is not suitable for transport of missile equipment as it is not adapted in a transport mode.

II. Proposals of the Ministry of Defense for Reinforcing Forces of the Group in Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group of Forces in Cuba, send:
1) One squadron of IL-28 bombers, comprising 10-12 aircraft including delivery and countermeasures aircraft, with a mobile PRTB and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons;

[In Khrushchev’s handwriting on top of “II.1)” above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads [three words illegible] [signed] N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M missile brigade made up of three battalions (total: 1221 men, 18 R-11M missiles) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special warheads, which the PRTB is capable of storing;

3) Two-three battalions of Luna for inclusion in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna battalions. N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

Each Luna battalion will have two launchers and 102 men.
With the Luna battalions, send 8-12 missiles and 8-12 special warheads.

For the preparation and custody of special warheads for the Luna missiles, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of IL-28s, one R-11M missile brigade with PRTB, and two-three Luna battalions with PRTB, and the missiles are to be sent to Cuba in the first half of October.
Atom bombs (6), special warheads for the R-11M missiles (18) and for the Luna missiles (8-12) are to be sent on the transport Indigirka on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful firing tests of the S-75 anti-aircraft system against surface targets on level terrain. At distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved.
The results of computer calculations indicate the possibility also of successful use against naval targets.

In order to fire against land or sea targets using S-75 complexes with the troops [in Cuba], small modifications in the missile guidance stations will be required by factory brigades together with some additional equipment prepared by industry.

Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovsky [signature]

6 September 1962

[Translator’s Note: A detailed two-page informational addendum provides specifications of the Luna and R-11M missiles (diameter, length, width, height, and weight); the full range of possible transport aircraft (range, loading capacity, doors and hatches) of the AN-8, AN-12, IL-18, Tu-104, Tu-114, and the not yet available larger AN-22 aircraft; and bomber aircraft (the Tu-95 [Bear], Mya-4 [Bison], Tu-16 [Badger], and IL-28 [Beagle] bombers), although none were suitable for transporting the rockets both for technical and political-strategic routing reasons. This informational annex was signed on the same date, 6 September 1962, by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. It is not translated here.]

Document No. 5
Memorandum, R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov to Commander of Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba, 8 September 1962

Top Secret
Special Importance
Copy #1

Personally

To the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint defense against possible aggression toward the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.

A decision on employment of the Soviet Armed Forces in combat actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement [of the situation] will be made by the Soviet Government.

1. The task of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba is not to permit an enemy landing on Cuban territory from the sea or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress.

Forces and means: Soviet troops together with the Cuban Armed forces.

2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces on the island of Cuba will be guided by the following considerations:

a) With Respect to Missile Forces

The missile forces, constituting the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow, to deal a nuclear missile strike on the most important targets in the United States of America (list of targets included in Attachment #1) [Translator’s Note: This attachment was not included in the Volkogonov Papers].
Upon arrival of the missile division in Cuba, two R-12 [SS-4] regiments (539th and 546th) and one R-14 [SS-5] regiment (564th) will deploy in the western region, and one R-12 regiment (the 514th) and one R-14 regiment (the 657th) in the central region of Cuba.

The missile units will deploy to the positional areas and take up their launch positions; for R-12 missiles, not later than [illegible] days; for the R-14 missiles with fixed launch facilities [illegible] period.

With the establishment of launchers on combat duty, [illegible—all?] regiments will maintain Readiness No.4 [Translator’s Note: The lowest level of combat readiness, and the least provocative.].

b) With Respect to Air Defense (PVO) Forces

PVO forces of the Group will not permit incursion of foreign aircraft into the air space of the Republic of Cuba [illegible words] and strikes by enemy air against the Group, the most important administrative political [and industrial] centers, naval bases, ports [illegible]. Combat use of PVO forces will be activated by the Commander of the Group of Forces.

The PVO divisions will be deployed:
—12th Division [surface to air missiles]—the Western region of Cuban territory [illegible]
—27th Division [surface to air missiles]—the Eastern region of Cuban territory [illegible]

213th Fighter Air Division will be deployed at Santa Clara airfield.

After unloading in Cuba of the surface-to-air missiles and fighter aviation will be deployed [illegible] and organization of combat readiness.

c) With Respect to the Ground Forces

Ground forces troops will protect the missile and other technical troops and the Group command center, and be prepared to provide assistance to the Cuban Armed Forces in liquidating [illegible] enemy landings and counterrevolutionary groups on the territory of the Republic of Cuba.

The independent motorized rifle regiments (OMSP) will deploy:
—The 74th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the Western part of Cuba in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [trans: in the San Cristobal and Guanajay areas] and to operate in the sectors Havana and Pinar del Rio;
—The 43rd OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the vicinity of Santiago de las Vegas in readiness to protect the Command of the Group of Forces and to operate in the sectors Havana, Artemisa, Batabano, and Matanzas;
—The 146th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the area Camajuani, Placetas, Sulu...[illegible], in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [Translator’s Note: in the Sagua la Grande and Remedios areas] and to operate in the sectors: Caibarien, Colon, Cienfuegos, Fomento;
—The 106th OMSP in the eastern part of Cuba in the vicinity of Holguin in readiness to operate in the sectors Banes, Victoria de las Tunas, Manzanillo, and Santiago de Cuba.

d) With Respect to the Navy

The Naval element of the Group must not permit combat ships and transports of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, and provide cover for our transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.

Missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, nuclear missile strikes on the most important coastal targets in the USA (List of targets in Attachment #1).

The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One detachment of the brigade of missile patrol boats should be located in the vicinity of Banes.

The battalions of Sopka [coastal defense cruise missiles] should be deployed on the coast:
—One battalion east of Havana in the region of Santa Cruz del Norte;
—One battalion southeast of Cienfuegos in the vicinity of Gavilan;
—One battalion northeast of Banes in the vicinity of Cape Mulas;
—One battalion on the island Piños [Isle of Pines] in the vicinity of Cape Buenavista.

The torpedo-mine air regiment [IL-28s] will deploy at the airfield San Julian Asiento, and plan and instruct in destroying combat ships and enemy landings from the sea.

e) With Respect to the Air Force

The squadron of IL-28 delivery aircraft will be based on Santa Clara airfield in readiness to operate in the directions of Havana, Guantanamo, and the Isle of Pines. [Translator’s Note: This deployment was later changed to Holguin airfield]

The independent aviation engineering regiments [OAIP] (FKR) [cruise missiles] [trans. note - The OAIP designation was a cover; the real designation was FKR]regiments will deploy:
—231st OAIP—in the western region of Cuba, designated as the main means to fire on the coast in the northeastern and northern sectors, and as a secondary mission in the direction of the Isle of Pines.
—222nd OAIP—in the eastern part of the island. This regiment must be prepared, upon signal from the General Staff, in the main sector of the southeastern direction to strike the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. Secondary firing sectors in the northeastern and southwestern directions.

The fighter aviation regiment armed with MiG-21 F-13 aircraft is included as a PVO [air defense] division, but crews of all fighters will train also for operations in support of the Ground Forces and Navy.
3. Organize security and economy of missiles, warheads, and special technical equipment, and all combat equipment in the armament of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba.

4. Carry out daily cooperation and combat collaboration with the armed forces of the Republic of Cuba, and work together in instructing the personnel of the Cuban armed forces in maintaining the arms and combat equipment being transferred by the Soviet Union to the Republic of Cuba.

5. Deploy the rear units and offices and organize all-round material, technical, and medical support of the troops.

Rear area bases will be located in the regions as follows:
—Main Base—comprising: the 758th command base, separate service companies, the 3rd automotive platoon, 784th POL fuel station, the 860th food supply depot, the 964th warehouse, the 71st bakery factory, the 176th field technical medical detachment—Mariel, Artemisa, Guira de Melena, Rincon;
—Separate rear base—comprising: 782nd POL station, 883rd food supply depot, a detachment of the 964th warehouse, [the 1st] field medical detachment, a detachment of the 71st bakery factory—Caibarien, Camajuani, Placetas;
—Separate rear base—comprising: separate detachments of the 784th POL station, 883rd food supply depot, a detachment of the 964th warehouse, [the 1st] field medical detachment, a detachment of the 71st bakery factory—Gibara, Holguin, Camasan.

Fuel stocks for the Navy will be:
Depot No. 4472—Mariel, a branch at Guanabacoa,
Depot No. 4465—vicinity of Banes.
Hospitals will be set up in the regions: Field hospitals No. 965 with blood transfusion unit—Guanajay; No. 121—Camajuani, Placetas; No. 50—Holguin.
The transport of material to be organized by troop transport means, and also do not use local rail or water transport.

6. The operational plan for the employment of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba should be worked out by 01 November 1962. [Translator’s Note: Date filled in by a different hand; probably omitted for security reasons or for later decision by a higher authority.]

Attachments:
1. List of targets for missile forces and missile submarines for working out flight missions—attached separately.
2. List of the order of battle of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba in 3 pages, record r/t #164
3. List of launchers, missiles and nuclear warheads possessed by the Group of Forces, on 2 pages r/t #164.

[Translator’s Note: All the Attachments are missing.]

USSR Minister of Defense [signature] Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovsky
Chief of the General Staff [signature] Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov

8 September 1962 [Translator’s Note: 8 September is written over the original version of “____ July 1962,” suggesting that this document was drafted in July]

No. 76438
Send in cipher

[Various illegible signatures dated July 9, and one noting it was read by General V.I. Davidkov on 3 October 1962]

Document No. 6
Handwritten Note for the Record by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, 5 October 1962

By VCh [secure telephone]
17:20 hours 5 October 1962

N.S. Khrushchev telephoned from [illegible] and inquired how the shipment [of nuclear weapons] was going.

Ivanov reported: The Indigirka arrived 4 October. No overflights [by U.S. surveillance aircraft]. [word illegible] shipment 22 [? unclear reference]. In transit 20 [days].

Transport with special [nuclear] munitions Aleksandrovsk is loaded and ready for dispatch. Permission requested to send it.

N.S. Khrushchev: Send the Aleksandrovsk. Where are the Lunas and IL-28s?

I responded: en route.

[NSK:] Everything is clear. Thanks. [two words illegible]

Written by S.P. Ivanov [signature]
Document No. 7
R. Malinovsky to N.S. Khrushchev, 28 October 1962

Top Secret
Copy No. 2
CC CPSU

To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

I am reporting:

27 October 1962 a U-2 aircraft entered the territory of Cuba at an altitude of 16,000 meters at 1700 hours Moscow time with the objective of photographing the combat disposition of troops, and in the course of 1 hour 21 minutes proceeded along a flight route over Yaguajay—Ciego de Avila—Camagney—Manzanillo—San Luis—Guantanamo—Preston.

With the aim of not permitting the photographs to fall into U.S. hands, at 1820 Moscow time this aircraft was shot down by two antiaircraft missiles of the 507th Antiaircraft Missile Regiment at an altitude of 21,000 meters. The aircraft fell in the vicinity of Antilla; a search has been organized.

On the same day there were 8 violations of Cuban airspace by U.S. aircraft.

R Malinovsky

28 October 1962
10:45

No. 80819

Attested: Colonel General

[signature]
S.P. Ivanov

28 October 1962

[illegible notation and additional signatures]

[Translator’s Note: The text of a subsequent message from Marshal Malinovsky to General Pliyev has not been released, but several Russian sources who are familiar with it note that the Defense Minister only mildly rebuked Pliyev, saying, “You were too hasty,” and that political negotiations for a settlement of the crisis were underway. For one account, including quotation of the sentence cited here, see Na krayu propasti (Karibskii krizis 1962 goda) [On the Brink: The Caribbean Crisis of 1962], published in 30 copies by the Institute of Military History, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 1994, p.113].]

Introduction and translation by Mark Kramer

This brief memorandum to the CPSU Secretariat was prepared by the Second Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party, Yurii Mel’kov, on 1 August 1968. As a rule, the Communist Party in each of the union republics in the USSR was headed by an official whose ethnic background was that of the titular nationality, while the Second Secretary was an ethnic Russian. Often the Second Secretary carried as much weight in Moscow as the republic’s First Secretary did. (The main exception was when the First Secretary was also a member or candidate member of the CPSU Politburo.) In this particular case, Mel’kov did indeed seem as influential as the Moldavian CP’s First Secretary, Ivan Bodiul.

Although Bodiul was one of several union-republic First Secretaries who delivered speeches at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in April 1968—a plenum that focused on the situation in Czechoslovakia—he played little discernible role after that.

It has long been known that Soviet officials in both Moscow and Kyiv were worried about the political spill-over from Czechoslovakia into neighboring Ukraine (see, for example, the passages from Shelest’s diary in issue No.10 of the Bulletin), but new archival materials show that official concerns about the spill-over extended well beyond Ukraine. This document reveals the effects that the crisis was having in Moldavia, a small republic abutting Romania and southern Ukraine. Other newly declassified materials indicate similar concerns about Soviet Georgia and the three Baltic states. (See, for example, the top-secret memorandum No. 13995, “TsK KPSS,” 23 May 1968, from V. Mzhavanadze, First Secretary of the Georgian CP CC, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 22, Li. 5-9.) All materials about a possible spill-over from Czechoslovakia were closely reviewed by Mikhail Suslov, one of the most powerful members of the CPSU Politburo who was also the CPSU Secretary responsible for ideological affairs. He often wrote comments and instructions in the margins of these documents. The materials were then routed to other members of the CPSU Secretariat and to top officials in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

Mel’kov’s cable notes that “certain individuals” in Moldavia failed to “comprehend the essence of events in Czechoslovakia” and had “expressed support for the KSC’s course toward ‘liberalization.’” He reported with dismay that publications, letters, and other materials casting a positive light on the Prague Spring were pouring into Moldavia from Czechoslovakia. Mel’kov assured the CPSU Secretariat that the Moldavian party was carrying out “increased political work” and related measures to counteract the adverse effects of the Czechoslovak crisis. Nevertheless, the very fact that his memorandum concentrated so heavily on the problems that were arising, rather than on the “absolute majority of the republic’s population [that] wholeheartedly supports the policy of the CPSU,” suggests that the spill-over was even worse than he let on.

From Kishinev
1 August 1968 (Secret)             22132

TO THE CC CPSU
INFORMATION

In connection with the events in the CSSR, the party aktiv in Moldavia, including lecturers, political workers, and agitators, are conducting necessary explanatory work among blue-collar workers. An absolute majority of the republic’s population wholeheartedly supports the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government aimed at strengthening the positions of socialism and consolidating the unity of the world socialist commonwealth. At present, all blue-collar workers are awaiting the conclusion of the negotiations at Cierna nad Tisou with great hope.

At the same time, certain individuals have shown that they do not comprehend the essence of events occurring in Czechoslovakia, and some express support for the course of the KSC toward so-called “liberalization.” Individual explanatory work is being undertaken with these people.

Recently it has been noted that some Soviet citizens who have relatives or friends in the CSSR have been receiving letters with articles enclosed from Czechoslovak newspapers and magazines. The director of the Czechoslovak public-relations firm “Merkur” in Prague, Jiri Donda, sent to the Moscow directorate of advertising of the State Committee on the Press of the USSR Council of Ministers a letter appealing to Soviet citizens, which attempts to convince the Soviet people that the policy conducted by the KSC leadership is correct. This letter is signed by the secretary of the firm’s party organization and by other people.

The party organizations are taking measures aimed at further increasing political work among the population.

CC Secretary of the CP of Moldavia — Mel’kov

Microfilm Projects in East European Military Archives

By Ronald D. Landa

A U.S. Government initiative has been quietly opening new avenues of research. In 1996 the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Library of Congress (LC) inaugurated a program to microfilm military records and inventories in former Soviet-bloc countries focusing primarily on World War II and the early Cold War years. Expected to continue at least through the year 2000, the program has so far generated more than 300 reels of microfilm.

Projects are now underway at three institutions: the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe) outside Warsaw, the National Defense Ministry Archives (Archivole Militarie ale Ministerului Apararii Nationale) in Bucharest, and the Archive for Military History (Hadtortenelmi Leveltar) in Budapest. The projects are designed to assist these archives with their records preservation programs, to make their records more accessible to scholars in the United States, and to promote closer contacts between former Cold War adversaries. Alfred Goldberg, Historian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, coordinates the program, with assistance from historians in the military services and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Several non-governmental specialists render advice and assistance.

Under the terms of formal agreements, DoD provides the military archives with microfilm cameras on a long-term loan basis, along with other equipment, film, and supplies. DoD also pays the cost of processing the microfilm. The archives furnish the labor to do the filming. Records are selected for filming by mutual consent. One copy of the processed microfilm is given to the Library of Congress, where it is available to researchers in the European Division’s Reading Room in the Jefferson Building. The archives retain both a positive and negative copy for themselves.

The program involves the reproduction of records inventories as well as records themselves. The intention is not only to facilitate research by American scholars at a centralized location in the United States, but also to allow them to prepare for and more knowledgeably plan their visits to the East European military archives.

Consideration is being given to starting similar projects with the Slovak Military History Institute in Bratislava and the Russian Central Naval Archive at Gatchina near St. Petersburg. Earlier attempts to establish microfilm projects in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria and with other Russian archives did not yield results.

The Library of Congress and the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) are planning a conference on the theme, “Early Cold War Military History,” with the presentation of papers utilizing the microfilmed records from the East European military archives.

Origins of the Program

The microfilm program has its roots in two developments growing out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loosening of its hold over countries in Eastern Europe.

First, the opening of formerly closed Soviet-bloc archives, for the most part, made available to researchers diplomatic and Communist party records. Military and intelligence records remained less accessible. In 1991, for example, an American scholar noted that little was known about records at the Polish Central Military Archive, which is located in Rembertow just east of Warsaw. Military documents here, he observed, were “still considered to be ‘top secret’—even for the 1940s and 1950s.” Researchers were allowed access to the records only by special permission of the Ministry of Defense, but apparently no one had yet received such permission. Thus, the need became apparent to encourage the opening of military records, not only in Poland, but also throughout the former Soviet bloc.

Second, the end of the Cold War allowed greatly increased contacts and communication between Department of Defense historical offices and their counterparts in Russia and Eastern Europe. During the late eighties and early nineties a series of bilateral visits kindled a new spirit of cooperation among them. A key milestone was the April 1990 address to a standing-room only audience in the Pentagon auditorium by the former director of the Russian Military History Institute, General Dmitri A. Volkogonov, about the research and writing of his biography of Josef Stalin.

Out of this new atmosphere emerged plans by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to hold a conference in Washington, D.C., in March 1994 on the military history and records of the Cold War. Nearly 140 representatives from 17 countries, including former Warsaw Pact nations, attended the conference, which was hosted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Military archivists from Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Hungary presented papers describing their holdings. Participants also discussed a number of ways to continue their collaboration, including bilateral research visits, publication of a newsletter on Cold War history, joint publications, and the microfilming of archival materials.

Following the conference a Department of Defense Cold War Historical Committee, chaired by John Greenwood of the U.S. Army Center of Military History,
was established to promote the exchange of information between the historical offices of DoD and various U.S. government agencies and other countries’ official history programs. In August and September 1994, the committee sponsored the visits to the United States of 15 military historians and archivists from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria, Romania, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada to conduct short-term research on Cold War topics. That winter the first issue of the committee’s Cold War History Newsletter was published.6

Although several private commercial ventures had been undertaken to microfilm materials in former Soviet-bloc countries, a model program existed close at hand within the U.S. Government. In 1992 the Department of Defense and the Library of Congress had begun collaborating to microfilm rare books, manuscripts, and pamphlets in libraries in Moscow and St. Petersburg,7 and subsequently in Vilnius. Building on the experience gained from this program, the DoD historical offices approached several military archives in 1995 with formal proposals to begin joint microfilm projects.

Polish Central Military Archive

Since filming began in May 1996, 69 reels—on selected topics primarily from the Cold War years—have been filmed at the Polish Central Military Archive.8

They cover such subjects as “Operation Vistula” (the suppression of underground resistance in the period 1946-48); General Staff organizational and planning files, directives, and instructions, 1945-60; and records of the Polish representative on the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission and Korean Repatriation Commission, 1953-54. Some World War II records have also been microfilmed, including files of General Zygmunt Berling, Commander of the 1st Polish Army, relating to the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, and records of the Polish General Staff in London, 2nd Bureau, on support for the Home Army in Poland. A list of the contents of the first 55 Polish reels is on LC’s website at lcweb.loc.gov/rr/european/archiwum/archiwum.html.

For 1998-99 agreement has been reached to film (1) additional World War II records concerning the outbreak of war in 1939 and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, (2) records relating to Operation “Dunaj”—the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, (3) portions of the previously classified 30-volume (11,000-page) internal history, “Development of the Polish People’s Armed Forces, 1945-1980,” written during the mid-1980s, (4) selected reports of Polish military attaches in Washington, 1945-50, and (5) records relating to the reduction of Polish armed forces after the Korean War.

Two comments are in order about the Polish records scheduled for filming. First, while the heavy ideological slant to the 30-volume internal history diminishes its value as a scholarly work, its numerous footnotes make it an indispensable guide to the location of important documents in the archive. Second, the relatively small collection of attaché reports held by the Central Military Archive generally deal with routine meetings and ceremonial and administrative matters (the main body of substantive reports are held by another archive), but there are bits of information in these reports useful to scholars.

The Library of Congress has also received records inventories from the Polish Central Military Archive. Reels 63 and 64 contain inventories for 15 collections of Cold War records, including the Office of the Minister of National Defense, 1945-49; the Finance-Budget Department, 1945-49; the Finance Department, 1950-56; the Organization and Planning Department, 1944-50; and most of the 2,200-page inventory for the General Staff records, 1945-50. In addition, LC has received duplicate printed copies of the 1961 Inwentarz Akt Ludowego Wojska Polskiego z lat 1943-45: Jednostki Bojowe [Inventory of the Records of the Polish People’s Army, 1943-45: Fighting Units] (3 parts, 780 pages).

Finally, the Central Military Archive published in 1996 a comprehensive guide (154 pages) to its holdings, thought to be the first such publication issued by a former Soviet-bloc military archive, entitled Informator o Zasobie [Informational Guide to the Holdings]. A copy of the informational guide, as well as a 28-page supplement, Zimna Wojna w Wojskowym Zasobie Archiwalnym [The Cold War in Military Archival Holdings], have been given to the Library of Congress.

Romanian National Defense Ministry Archive

Since work began in February 1997, the Romanian National Defense Ministry Archive has produced 234 microfilm reels. They focus exclusively on records of military elements connected with the Romanian Commission for the Terms of the Armistice and the Peace Treaty, 1942-47. The reels are being catalogued and soon will be available to researchers. LC intends to post a list of the contents of the Romanian microfilm on its website.9

Future microfilming will include selected records of the information, i.e. intelligence, section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1944-48, and the records of the Superior Directorate of the Armed Forces, 1945-65. The Library of Congress has received photocopies of two major inventories: the 90-page inventory to the fond Marele Stat Major, Sectia 2—Informatii (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Section 2—Information), 1944-49, and the 306-page inventory to the fond Consiliul Politic Superior al Armatei (Superior Directorate of the Armed Forces), 1945-48.

Hungarian Archive for Military History

The last of the three archives to begin filming, the Archive for Military History in Budapest, since August 1997 has filmed 44 reels of records from the Ministry of Defense Central Files for the year 1949. The 1949 records cover the Ministry of Defense Secretariat, the Ministry’s Chief Directorate for Political Matters, and the General Staff’s Organizational and Mobilization Section,
Directorate for Materiel Planning, and 2nd Directorate. The Hungarian reels at LC are still being processed and are not yet open for research. LC also intends to post a list of the contents of the Hungarian microfilm on its website.

The plan is to continue filming selected portions of files for the period 1949-56, to be followed by documents and reminiscences related to the 1956 Revolution (about 9,300 pages) and the Ministry of Defense’s Presidential Directorate register books for 1945-49 (about 8,300 pages). Time and resources permitting, records of the Hungarian Royal Chief of Staff and of the Presidential Section of the Royal Ministry of Defense for the period 1938-45 will be filmed last.

At present there are no plans to film inventories in the Hungarian Archive for Military History.

Further information regarding the microfilm from the three archives can be obtained from LC’s European Division specialists: Ron Bachman (Poland), 202-707-8484, Grant Harris (Romania), 202-707-5859, and Ken Nyirady (Hungary), 202-707-8493.

Since 1987 Ronald D. Landa has been a member of the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. From 1973 to 1987 he worked as a historian at the Department of State, where he was one of the editors of the documentary series, Foreign Relations of the United States.

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"Pacifistic Blowback"?

By Nigel Gould-Davies

It has been argued by Columbia University political scientist Jack Snyder and others that imperial powers can suffer from ideological “blowback”: an excessive belief among a population in the imperial propaganda disseminated by political elites. The following document, dating from the Soviet peace campaign of the early 1950s, suggests that the opposite can occur: that peace propaganda directed at the outside world can take root, even within so regulated a society as the Soviet Union, to a degree that evokes alarm among the leadership.

By the end of the 1940s Soviet foreign policy had suffered a series of reverses as relations with the West hardened into a pattern of Cold War confrontation. Neither Soviet diplomacy nor the use of “class” relations between communist parties had succeeded in halting the consolidation of unity and purpose within the Western camp, culminating in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. The Soviet Union responded to the failure of both arms of its traditional “dual foreign policy” by fashioning a massive peace campaign to exert the pressure of broad, non-communist public opinion on Western governments against rearmament. The first World Peace Congress was held in Paris in April 1949, and the first mass signature campaign, the Stockholm appeal, was launched in March 1950. Its organizers subsequently claimed the signature of 15 million French and 17 million Italians, as well as those of the entire Soviet adult population, among the 500 million collected world-wide. While the use of peace propaganda and front organizations was by no means new to Soviet foreign policy, the scale of these efforts distinguished them from earlier attempts to mobilize Western opinion. However, apparently not only Western opinion was affected. The draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshhevik) (CC VKP(b)) printed below sharply criticized Soviet media that “inadequately mobilize Soviet people to raise their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors” with “pacifist arguments,” that ignore the “aggressive measures and plans” of imperialism, and neglect “Marxism-Leninist teaching on the character, sources and causes of war.” It is shot through with a concern that by emphasizing the common danger of war, the peace campaign distracts attention from the true nature of the struggle between ideological systems—exactly the intended effect of this campaign in capitalist countries. A letter dated 16 September 1952 proposing this resolution, addressed to Mikhail Suslov, the CC VKP(b) Secretary responsible for supervising the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, is even more explicit and cites several examples of “superficial and even harmful materials.”

Special hostility is reserved for those in which “the magic power of the white dove, as the savior of the world, is glorified.” One author of an article about such doves is accused of coming out “as a pacifist, against war in general . . . He argues as if ‘not one war has benefited a single people.’”

It is a familiar argument that the Soviet Union enjoyed an asymmetric advantage during the Cold War in being able to disseminate propaganda among the more open societies of its adversaries without having to worry about internal public opinion. This document, however, suggests the existence of “pacifistic blowback” of such propaganda, sufficient to concern the leadership, within the Soviet Union itself; it also points to flaws and limitations in ideological control over the mass media, even under Stalinism, that made this possible.

Document

[September 1952]
DRAFT
RESOLUTION OF THE CC VKP(b)
On shortcomings in the treatment of the struggle for peace by the press

The CC VKP(b) notes that serious shortcomings and mistakes have been permitted of late in the coverage of the struggle for peace in a series of central and local newspapers and journals.

Comprehensive and thorough propaganda of the struggle for peace and of the successes of the movement of supporters of peace is frequently substituted in the press by the publication of superficial materials full of pacifist arguments. The movement of supporters of peace is often portrayed in these materials as an organization of people who hate all war, and not as a force that is capable of averting imperialist war and of giving a decisive rebuff to imperialist aggressors. Certain newspapers and journals, in explaining the peaceful character of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, inadequately mobilize Soviet people to raise their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors, weakly link the struggle for peace with the might of the Soviet Union, and are carried away by outward symbols, publishing images of doves, primitive drawings and pacifistic stories and poems that have little value.
In the press the basic theses of Leninism on the origin and character of wars under imperialism are explained in insufficient depth, the designs of the Americo-English imperialists who are conducting an aggressive policy of unleashing a new war are poorly unmasked, and the profound contradictions in the camp of the imperialist aggressors are not properly reflected.

The CC VKP(b) resolves:

1. To oblige the editorial staff of the central and local newspapers, and also the staff of social-political and literary-artistic journals, to eliminate the shortcomings in the propaganda of the struggle for peace noted in this resolution.

2. To require the editorial staff of newspapers and journals to improve the coverage of the struggle for peace, bearing in mind the necessity of raising the political and labor activity of the masses and their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors, and of mobilizing the workers to selfless labor, overfulfillment of production plans, and improvement of work in all spheres of economic and cultural construction. In the press it is necessary to unmask the criminal machinations of the war hawks – their mendacious, ostensible peacefulness in word, their aggressive measures and plans in deed. The successes of the movement of supporters of peace and the growth of the forces of the international camp of peace, democracy and socialism should be fully reflected in the pages of newspapers and journals. It is necessary to explain that the Soviet peace-loving foreign policy relies on the might of the Soviet state and, that reinforcing its might with their creative labor, Soviet people are strengthening the security of the people of our country and the cause of peace in the whole world, and that a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, can lead only to the collapse of the capitalist system and its replacement by the socialist system.

3. To instruct the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC VKP(b) and the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC VKP (b) to carry out the following measures:

a) to conduct a meeting of editors of central newspapers and of social-political and literary-artistic journals, to discuss measures for eliminating shortcomings in the coverage in the press of the struggle for peace.

b) jointly with the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge to organize the reading of lectures explaining the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the character, sources and causes of wars, on the significance of an organized front of peace in the struggle for the preservation of peace against those who seek to ignite a new war, on the sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism in the post-war period, and on other subjects.

4. To oblige Gospolizdat in the next one to two months to publish in mass editions works of Lenin and Stalin devoted to Marxist-Leninist teachings on wars, on the defence of the fatherland and on the struggle for peace.

[Source: Rossiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izuchenii Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI), Fond 17, op.132, d.507, ll.18-19; obtained and translated by Nigel Gould-Davies.]

Nigel Gould-Davies is Lecturer in Politics at Hertford College, Oxford University. He is completing a study on “The Logic of Ideational Agency: the Soviet experience in World Politics”.

NEW CWIHP FELLOWS

THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THE AWARD OF CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS FOR THE 1998-1999 ACADEMIC YEAR TO

MRS. LI DANHUI (doctoral candidate, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing), “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Vietnam War”

MR. KRZYSZTOF PERSAK (PhD candidate and junior fellow at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences), “The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland”

Between Solidarity and Neutrality: The Nordic Countries and the Cold War 1945-1991

By Valur Ingimundarson

Any attempt to point out the similarities in the Nordic experience during the Cold War is futile without taking into account the differences. For one thing, Sweden and Finland (despite its treaty obligations with the Soviet Union) opted for neutrality in the East-West struggle, but Denmark, Norway, and Iceland for NATO membership. Some saw this diversity as a unifying strand, arguing that what became euphemistically known as the “Nordic Balance” gave the Nordic countries some freedom of action within the sphere of low politics and mitigated Cold War tensions in Northern Europe. The Nordics were reluctant Cold Warriors and tried, with varying degrees of success, to assume some sort of a “bridgebuilding” function in the Cold War. But there were many things that set the Nordic countries apart. All efforts to create a Nordic bloc in the military, economic, and political field were doomed to fail. Despite shared cultural values, the Nordic countries were simply too small, too diverse, and too weak to offer a credible alternative. Yet the only way to grasp their importance in the Cold War is to put them in a broader Nordic framework—to pay attention to common characteristics, as expressed in interlocking relationships, interactions, and mutual influences.

In recent years a major scholarly reassessment has been undertaken over the role of the Nordic countries in the Cold War. Numerous books and articles have attracted much scholarly and public attention. The Cold War International History Project, the London School of Economics, and the Historical Institute of the University of Iceland brought together about 30 scholars and officials, in Reykjavik, to discuss these new findings at an international conference 24-27 June 1998. To put the topic in a broader international context, the Reykjavik conference began with a lively roundtable on the “New Cold War History” with the participation of John Lewis Gaddis (Yale University), Geir Lundestad (Norwegian Nobel Institute), Odd Arne Westad (London School of Economics), James Hershberg (George Washington University), and Krister Wahlbäck (Swedish Foreign Ministry). Gaddis’s We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History has stirred up the scholarly community, and the roundtable centered—to a large degree—on his argument about the role of Soviet conduct and ideology in the origins of the Cold War. Taking issue with Gaddis’s line of reasoning, Lundestad argued that the “New Cold War History” is too moralistic and too much preoccupied with questions of guilt and Communist ideology. Odd Arne Westad stressed, however, that ideology was an important element in Soviet foreign policy, as evidenced by Stalin’s belief, in the 1940s, that the Chinese nationalists were better suited to rule the country than the Communists because of the historical-developmental state of China. To James Hershberg, the verdict is still out on the question of ideology in Soviet (and particularly Stalin’s) foreign policy until more archival evidence is uncovered.

Within the Nordic context, most participants at the Reykjavik conference seemed to agree that Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Nordic countries was determined by a mixture of Realpolitik and ideology. On the basis of the evidence presented, one can detect several strands in Soviet foreign policy during the early Cold War. First, the Soviets pursued a cautious, if erratic course in the Nordic region. An “expansionist tendency” was curbed by “one that was soberly pragmatic,” as Alexei Komarov (Russian Academy of Sciences) put it.1 While the Soviets never saw Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden as belonging to their sphere of influence, they showed considerable interest in the Nordic area based on their historical experience and ideological outlook. They made, for example, territorial demands on Norway and Finland. Buoyed by the imminent defeat of Nazism, in 1944, they insisted on a joint Norwegian-Soviet condominium over the Norwegian archipelago of Spitzbergen. According to the armistice agreement, the Finns had to cede the Petsamo region to the Soviets and to accept a 50-year Soviet lease on a naval base at Porrkala. At the same time, the Soviets made conciliatory moves by withdrawing their military forces from Northern Norway in 1945 and the Danish island of Bornholm in 1946. And when the Norwegian rejected the Soviet claim to Spitzbergen, the Soviets abandoned it in 1947.

The Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (FCMA) of 1948 was, of course, concluded under strong Soviet pressure. Kimmo Rentola (University of Helsinki) showed, however, that after encouraging the Finnish Communist Party to go on the offensive in the spring of 1948, the Soviets suddenly changed course after the FCMA was signed.2 Whether the Finnish Communists were, in fact, prepared to go as far as staging a coup from above (as in Czechoslovakia shortly before) is a matter of debate among Finnish historians. Yet the Communist Party was clearly intent on raising the stakes in its efforts to assume a predominant role in Finnish political life.

Rentola and Maxim L. Korobochkin (Russian Academic of Sciences) credited skillful Finnish “diplomacy of consent” with achieving semi-neutral status for Finland in the late 1940s.3 The Soviets initially wanted to conclude a military treaty with Finland akin to those signed by Hungary and Romania that would reaffirm
Soviet hegemony in these countries. In the end, the FCMA gave the Soviets less than they bargained for and recognized the limits of Soviet influence in Finland. By offering Stalin the necessary minimum in terms of military security, the Finns managed to prevent the Sovietization of the country. This does not mean that no costs were involved: Finland always had to take into account Soviet foreign policy priorities—a fact which did not go unnoticed in the other Nordic countries. Soviet pressure on Finland and the Friendship Treaty gave strong impetus to Norway’s insistence on establishing a formal military relationship with the West in the spring of 1948. According to Korobochkin no evidence has been found to confirm Norwegian fears that a similar Soviet treaty offer to Norway was in the works. Yet the Finnish case showed how a superpower’s hard-line approach toward one Nordic country could affect threat perceptions in another.

The Soviets reacted with diplomatic threats against Norway’s NATO membership and extracted, in 1949, a promise from the Norwegians not to allow foreign military bases on their soil. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union spared Denmark, even as it stressed in Soviet propaganda that the political leaders of the Nordic members of the Western alliance had sold out to American “imperialists.” It was not until 1953 that the Danes under Soviet pressure prohibited foreign bases in Denmark. The policy prohibiting nuclear weapons on Danish and Norwegian soil also reflected a desire not to provoke the Soviets. Iceland, however, did not adopt such a policy, even if it shared Norwegian and Danish anxieties about the role of nuclear weapons in Western military strategy.

The Soviets gradually came to see the Nordic countries in less threatening terms than other members of the Western Bloc. Since the attitude of the Nordic countries was friendlier, they had the potential of becoming what a leading former Soviet official, Georgi Arbatov (Director Emeritus of the then-Soviet Academy of Sciences’ Institute of USA and Canada) termed “a weaker link in the chain of the enemies of the Soviet Union.” Thus by returning the Porkkala military base and allowing Finnish membership in the Nordic Council in 1955, the Soviets wanted to strengthen anti-NATO elements in Denmark and Norway as well as to elevate Sweden’s neutral position. The Soviets scored some propaganda points in these efforts, but did not succeed in splitting NATO. And although less suspicious of the Nordic countries than other NATO-members, they did not treat them more leniently in their military planning. According to K.G.H. Hillingsø (Royal Danish Defense College), the Soviets consistently overestimated NATO forces, underrated effects of NATO nuclear weapons, and planned to use nuclear weapons as heavy artillery. What was surprising from the Western perspective was the planning for the early and massive Soviet use of nuclear weapons, if war broke out in Northern Europe.

Secondly, during the early Cold War, the Soviets took an inflexible attitude toward the Nordic Communist parties and displayed—on ideological grounds—unmitigated hostility toward Social Democracy in the Nordic region. One can argue that the relationship between the Soviet Communist Party and those of the Nordic countries was problematic from the beginning. Having adopted National Front tactics in 1945 (promoting Communist participation in mixed governments) the Soviets changed course in 1947, partly in response to the Marshall Plan. By forming the Cominform, the Kremlin sought to keep the emerging Communist parties as pure as possible and rejected any cooperation with Social Democrats. This position would, of course, allow the Soviets to exert more influence on these parties’ policies, but deprived them of tactical flexibility and tended to reinforce their marginal status.

Only the Finnish Communist Party and the Icelandic Socialist Party maintained substantial electoral strength throughout the early Cold War. This did not, however, translate into tangible power gains. After its electoral defeat and removal from the Finnish Government in 1948, the Finnish Communist Party did not hold ministerial posts until the 1960s. The Icelandic Socialist Party had a similar experience, even if the circumstances were different. In contrast to the ouster of the Communists from coalition governments in Europe in 1947-1948, the Icelandic Socialist Party itself had been responsible for the downfall of a Left-to-Right coalition government in 1946 by opposing a treaty on landing rights for American military aircraft. After a 10-year exclusion, it managed briefly to join a coalition government from 1956 to 1958 as part of an electoral alliance with the non-Communist Left. After that sobering experience, they were left out in the cold for another 12 years.

There was a marked tendency within the Nordic Communist Parties to rely on nationalism to maintain political viability. Jón Ólafsson (Columbia University) emphasized that the Soviets could never accept the nationalist agenda of the Icelandic Socialist Party, even if they knew that it was politically effective, especially in the struggle against U.S. military interests in Iceland. When the head of the Danish Communist Party, Aksel Larsen, decided to renounce Soviet ties and to form a new party in Denmark, the Soviets did nothing to repair the damage and turned down an offer by Einar Olgeirsson, the chairman of the Icelandic Socialist Party, to act as a mediator between the Danish Communist factions. The Soviets were, of course, fully aware of the limited influence of the Nordic Communist parties, especially after their electoral defeats in 1947-1948. But during the late 1940s and early 1950s, they relied to a large extent on local Communists parties for information. Only slowly did the Soviets begin to establish contacts with center parties, particularly farmers’ parties in Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. The close relationship with Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, the leader of the Agrarian Party, was in a special category. But the Soviets also cultivated influential members of the Icelandic agrarian Progressive Party and the Danish Liberal-Agrarian Party (Venstre).
The Bulgarian Communist Party did the same thing, as Jordan Baev (Bulgarian Defense Ministry) pointed out. The relationship did not result in any political victories for the Soviets, but it gave them greater access to the political elite in these countries.

Conference participants stressed the negative Soviet position towards Nordic Social Democracy in the early Cold War. The Social Democratic parties dominated political life in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, and were not prepared to give ground to the Communist Parties in these countries. As governing parties, however, they sought to avoid a confrontational course in international affairs and hoped to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. The Finnish and Icelandic Social Democratic parties, in contrast, were far smaller and much more anti-Soviet than their other Nordic counterparts. As Mikko Majander (University of Helsinki) showed, the Finnish Social Democratic Party was extremely hostile toward the Communists at home and played an important role in keeping them out of power during the crucial years 1948-1949. A similar scenario was played out in Iceland, where there was a sharp divide between the Social Democrats and the Socialists.

With some justification, the Soviets blamed right-wing Social Democrats for the decision by Sweden, Norway, Denmark to join the Marshall Plan and for the integration of the Nordic countries into Western economic structures. As it turned out, only Iceland and Finland came close to dependence on barter trade with the Soviet Union during the 1950s. In the former case, the trade volume with the East Bloc reached a record of 35% of the total trade volume in 1957. But this trade was conducted for political rather than economic advantage. For a while in the early 1950s, the Soviet Bloc trade was approximately 18-20% of Finland’s total trade. There is more than a touch of irony in the statistics. The Nordic country with the closest military and economic ties with the United States proved to be more dependent on the Soviet Bloc than the country with the closest political ties with the Soviet Union!

Third, the Soviets were, at the outset, suspicious of any attempts to promote Nordic cooperation or neutrality in the region. In the 1940s, the Soviet Union considered Nordic cooperation only a prelude to Western integration. It opposed, for example, the creation of a Scandinavian Defense Union in 1948-1949 and it prevented Finland from joining the Nordic Council until 1955, four years after its foundation. This policy could be criticized on the grounds that the Scandinavian Defense Union served the function of weakening Western solidarity in the crucial months leading up the formation of NATO. Similar arguments could be made with respect to the initial Soviet opposition to Swedish neutrality policies. In the 1950s, the Soviets finally reversed course and began to support Nordic cooperation and neutrality schemes. What was more, they began to prod—with no success, it turned out—the Nordic members of NATO to leave the Western Alliance and to revert to their traditional policy of neutrality. In the end, Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution effectively scuttled Moscow’s neutralist offensive in the Nordic countries. These twists and turns—so characteristic of Soviet policies vis-a-vis the Nordic countries—pointed to a sense of improvisation and probing rather than extensive planning in the postwar period. The Soviets realized that they would not be able to reverse the Western integration of Denmark, Norway, and Iceland in the 1950s. By playing the neutralist card, however, they managed to weaken it.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Reykjavik conference was how intertwined were the seemingly disparate security issues in the Nordic region. Self-interest certainly constituted the overriding foreign policy guide. But the Nordic countries were extremely sensitive to the impact of great power politics as well as of their own actions on each other during the East-West struggle. The question of military bases in Greenland, Bornholm, and Iceland is a case in point. In 1945, the Danes were reluctant to allow the Americans to maintain the military presence in Greenland established during World War II, because they were afraid that the Soviets would insist on analogous military rights in Bornholm. For the same reason, the Danes did not welcome the American request for a long-term lease of military bases in Iceland in 1945. This view was shared by the Norwegians, who feared that U.S. base rights in Iceland would strengthen the Soviet demand for joint control over Spitzbergen.

The story of how the Americans achieved their military goals in Greenland and Iceland is another example of these interlocking relationships. During the early postwar period, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores a military base area of primary importance. But when they sought military rights in these areas, they quickly ran into opposition. The Danes wanted to terminate the U.S. military presence in Greenland in the early postwar period, even if they did not press the issue. But to the surprise of the Danish Government—and in stark contrast to their anti-colonial public posture—the Americans went so far as to offer to buy Greenland in 1947! As Thorsten B. Olesen (University of Aarhus) showed, the war scare triggered by the Korean War neutralized Danish resistance to continued U.S. pressure, paving the way for the Danish-American base treaty in 1951. What transpired in Iceland was very similar. Because of Icelandic domestic political opposition, the Americans obtained only landing rights in 1946, but no military rights. Iceland even made the non-stationing of foreign troops a precondition for its NATO membership in 1949. Yet, in the wake of the Korean War, it abandoned this principle and concluded a bilateral defense treaty with the United States in 1951. These actions showed that the need for an American defense umbrella overrode, in the end, any qualms about the risks of being drawn into an East-West conflict and about the potential offensive use of Greenland and Iceland.
The process leading to NATO membership for Denmark, Norway, and Iceland is also illustrative of how the action of one Nordic country influenced the foreign policies of the others. If the Norwegians had not decided to join the Western Alliance for their own security reasons in 1949, the Danes—who had been the most enthusiastic supporters of the failed Scandinavian Defense Union—and the Icelanders undoubtedly would have rejected NATO membership. This display of interdependence was not limited to Nordic governments. The British and Americans often used Nordic contacts to influence the foreign policies of other Nordic countries. In 1950, the Norwegian foreign minister, Halvard Lange, agreed to press the Icelandic government to beef up military security in Iceland. When a left-wing government in Iceland threatened to close down the U.S. military base in 1956, the Norwegians tried to have the decision reversed. These Norwegian efforts were never decisive in influencing Icelandic policy. But the Americans and British got what they wanted in both cases.

The question of why the Norwegians played such a role cannot be explained solely in terms of Western military solidarity. There was an important element of self-interest at play here. Rolf Tamnes (Norwegian Defense Institute) demonstrated that the Norwegians placed much emphasis on a strong U.S. military presence in Iceland.11 During the tenure of another left-wing government in Iceland from 1971 to 1974, which promised to abrogate the defense agreement with the United States, the Norwegian government feared that a reduced U.S. military activity in Iceland would result in added American pressure on Norway in the military field. As it turned out, the Keflavik Base played a very important role in this area during the 1970s and 1980s. As Albert Jónsson (Office of the Icelandic Prime Ministry) pointed out, the U.S. Air Force aircraft intercepted more Soviet military aircraft near Iceland than anywhere in the world in the early 1980s.12

A central point made by many participants at the Reykjavik conference was the influence of domestic political opinion on foreign policy. Specific policies—such as the Danish and Norwegian decisions to exclude foreign bases or the stationing of nuclear weapons in Denmark and Norway—reflected public unease about the military costs and dangers of the Cold War. In some areas, the Americans seemed to have taken into account these preferences. According to Mats Berdal (Oxford University), there was hardly any U.S. pressure to reverse the Norwegian policy on military bases and nuclear weapons.13 To be sure, these declared policies amounted to little in practice, because NATO was a nuclear alliance. But the crux of the matter is that the political elites in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland always had to take one thing into account: that public sentiments were heavily influenced by a tradition of neutrality. Indeed, cabinet ministers in all the Nordic countries strove to refrain from taking any steps that could be interpreted by the Soviets as being provocative. In the words of Bent Jensen (University of Odense), the Danes often behaved as if they were “semi-aligned” after having “half-heartedly joined the Western Alliance.”14 Poul Villaume (University of Copenhagen) stressed the aversion of the Danes to crude American Cold War propaganda and showed how the United States increasingly relied on local organizations in Denmark to do the work for them, albeit with mixed results.15

The downside of this political timidity was a government tendency in all the Nordic countries to minimize public debate about security issues—a tendency that, in some cases, came dangerously close to being a concerted effort to deceive the public. This has, for example, led to a major reassessment of key factors in Finnish, Swedish, and Danish foreign policies during the Cold War, one that has received much media attention in the Nordic countries in the last few years. Iceland was, to some degree, in a special category because of the U.S. military presence and because of its status as an unarmed country in NATO. This author argued that compared to other NATO-members, Iceland was in an inferior role in the Western Alliance from the beginning.16 It was considered a security risk, because it had no adequate system for protecting classified information during the 1940s and 1950s. It was NATO policy not to send any military documents classified above “confidential” or any important strategic-military plans to Iceland. The frequent tensions in U.S./NATO-Icelandic relations during the 1950s can no doubt be explained in part by this lack of communication.

The revelation, in 1995, that contrary to official policy, Danish Prime Minister H.C. Hansen gave the Americans a “green light” to station nuclear weapons in Greenland in 1957 has been widely debated in Denmark. In his presentation, Svend Aage Christensen—who was among the authors of a highly publicized Danish government report on the issue in 1997—made it clear that Hansen’s concession was made under conditions of secrecy.17 In this way, the Soviet Union was not only prevented from exploiting this issue in the Cold War but also from exerting pressure on the Danes. Even more important, Hansen avoided a public debate about the new nuclear policy at a time when it did not have full backing at home or abroad. This policy put much strain on the Danish decision-making system. On the one hand, very few people had direct knowledge of the American storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland or of nuclear overflights over the island. On the other hand, many in government circles suspected what was going on. From 1959 to 1965, the Americans stationed NIKE surface-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads in Greenland. Interestingly enough, they also planned to store such weapons in Iceland during this period, but decided against it in the end, because they were needed in elsewhere.18 The Danes abandoned their dual nuclear policy in 1968 after a SAC B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons crashed in Thule. From then on,
the Danes prohibited the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland.

The Danes were not the only ones who decided to appoint a government commission to study a controversial aspect of their foreign policy during the Cold War. During this decade, a major debate has taken place in Sweden over its role in the Cold War. One reason was the attempt to keep security policy out of the public domain. It has been argued that Swedish parliamentary debates were well-orchestrated performances with little informative value designed to calm public opinion. What sparked the debate in Sweden was the publication, in the early 1990s, of a number of highly critical revisionist books and articles on the record of Sweden’s foreign policy during the Cold War. A double standard — the argument went — guided Swedish foreign policy over the previous decades, when officially neutral Sweden almost seemed like a NATO member. In 1992, the Swedish government set up the Commission on Swedish Policy to study Sweden’s military contacts with the Western Powers during the Cold War. In its 1994 report, the Commission revealed that extensive planning and preparatory work had been conducted in Sweden to facilitate wartime cooperation with NATO in the case of a Soviet attack. It concluded, however, that these contacts were not as extensive as the revisionists had claimed. Moreover, it argued that the Swedish government did not overstep the basic self-imposed boundaries of peacetime non-alignment. The Swedes did not enter into any binding military commitments with the Western Powers. In that sense, Sweden remained “neutral,” even if the public was not informed of the country’s preparations for different contingencies.

All the conference participants in Reykjavik who dealt with Sweden touched on this debate in one way or another. Juhana Aunesluoma (Oxford University) argued that the British played a pivotal role in establishing contacts between the West and Sweden in the early Cold War. The British Government showed understanding for Sweden’s neutrality policy and influenced the evolution of U.S. thinking on the issue. Having taken a very critical attitude toward Swedish neutrality policies in 1948, the Americans gradually accepted it for geopolitical reasons, albeit without enthusiasm. While taking note of the discrepancy between what was officially said and tacitly done, Mikael af Malmborg (University of Lund) argued that the West and Sweden struck a good deal. Through Sweden’s significant military resources, the United States and NATO assured a satisfactory defense along the long northern European Flank without any costs and binding commitments. An overt agreement would have meant a mutual pledge of automatic support in a future war.

Despite its concessions to NATO, Sweden maintained its policy of non-confrontation towards the Soviet Union, which was regarded as important as a strong military defense. This raises important questions of interdependence. Ingemar Dörfer (Swedish Institute for Defense Studies) disagreed with Malmborg, arguing that Sweden was totally dependent on the Western Alliance militarily and economically. For this reason, he argues, it should have made a formal commitment to the West by taking sides in the Cold War. Jaakko Iloniemi (former Finnish Ambassador to the United States) went even so far as to argue that despite the 1948 Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union Finland was, in fact, more neutral than Sweden during the Cold War, since it did not enter into any informal military arrangements with the Soviets.

There was always a strong undercurrent in Swedish society on the center-right to abandon non-alignment under the Social Democrats based on Sweden’s Western democratic traditions and ideology. Thus Sune Persson (University of Gothenburg)—co-director of a major research project on Sweden during the Cold War—argued that Swedish security policy was a “consensus under disagreement.” Domestic contradictions as well as the dramatic change in the implementation of Sweden’s security policy during the Cold War was rooted in a failed effort to bridge idealism and Realpolitik. This was reflected in the tension between national sovereignty and international dependence, between ideological pro-Western orientation and non-alignment, and between a democratic open society and military demands for secrecy.

This is another indication of the important role of public opinion in the calculations of Nordic policymakers. As Krister Wahlhäck (Swedish Foreign Ministry) pointed out, the Swedish Social Democrats always had to take the left-wing of the party into account in the implementation of Sweden’s neutrality policy and make sure that leftist voters did not defect to the Communists. This dilemma of juggling Realpolitik and idealism resulted in excessive secrecy and efforts by political leaders to conceal military contacts with the West from their own party members and the public.

The impact of the Cold War on Nordic culture remains an understudied field. One need not dwell on the pervasive influence of American culture in the Nordic countries. Juusi Hanhimäki (London School of Economics) argued, however, that no major cultural conflicts existed between Scandinavia and the United States during this period. There were certainly tensions in some areas, reaching a climax with the near breakdown in Swedish-American relations during the Vietnam War. And the presence of U.S. forces in Iceland was so unpopular that it led to a ban on off-base movements of soldiers. Indeed, as Olafur Hardarsson (University of Iceland) pointed out, a large majority of the Icelanders wanted to close down the base in Keflavik in 1955 on cultural grounds, according to a secret public opinion poll sponsored by the U.S. Government. There were also persistent Nordic criticisms of McCarthyism and the reputedly excessive role of religion, racism, and poverty in American society. Conversely, the Americans found fault with “the goddess Middle Way” as expressed—stereotypically—in “sin, suicide, socialism, and
smorgasbord.” Yet, Hanhimäki maintained that there were many more factors drawing the countries together than apart and that the Scandinavians thought of themselves as part of the same Western value system as the Americans.

Soviet cultural influence was, of course, far less pronounced in the Nordic countries. Again, Finland and Iceland seem to have provided the most fertile ground. Given the proximity and close political relations with the Soviet Union, this was logical in the Finnish case. In Iceland, the Soviets were surprisingly active, not least because of the strong position of the Icelandic Socialist Party, because of the high level of trade between the two countries, and because of the U.S. military presence. Apart from funding the activities of the Soviet-Icelandic Friendship Society, the Soviets sponsored lavish cultural events in Iceland. Americans realized that they could not sit idly by, and what followed was a sort of a Kulturkampf: in the 1950s, both superpowers spent large sums of money to influence the hearts and minds of the Icelanders in the political-cultural sphere. As it turned out, this worked both ways. As Árni Bergmann (University of Iceland) argued, the Soviets began to project an image of Iceland that was far more positive than of Western societies in general. To be sure, the Nordic countries in general got much credit for their cultural achievement— and Finland and Sweden some extra bonus for their neutrality policies in the late 1950s. But Iceland was somehow put in a special category in terms of the level of Soviet praise heaped upon its culture.

Given the divergent paths taken by the Nordic countries in the Cold War, one is reluctant to lump them together in a geopolitical sense. Pan-Nordic interests were never allowed to determine the direction of the foreign policies of the states involved. Indeed, the Cold War tended to underscore Nordic disunity rather than harmony. That the Nordic countries belonged to the West, and— with the exception of Finland— were closely integrated into Western economic structures is, of course, a well known fact. Yet, they all had to take into account the policies of the Soviet Union for political, economic, or security reasons. As reluctant participants in the Cold War, they were striving for an imaginary middle ground designed to lessen (or remain aloof from) East-West tensions. For this reason, they could never be taken for granted by the Great Powers. Whether “non-aligned” (Sweden and Finland) or “aligned” (Denmark, Norway, and Iceland), they were dressed in gray—and they adopted a foreign policy stance that closely matched the color, laying somewhere between solidarity and neutrality.

Dr. Valur Ingimundarson teaches at the University of Iceland in Reykjavik. He was the main organizer and host of the CWIHP-sponsored conference “The Nordic Countries and the Cold War.” He has published extensively on Iceland’s and East Germany’s role in the Cold War.

1 Alexei A. Komarov, “From World War II to the Cold War: Soviet Interests in Finland and Norway, 1944-47.”
5 Georgi Arbatov, “The Cold War and the Nordic Countries.”
6 K.G.H. Hillingsø, “The Role of Denmark in Warsaw Pact War Plans.”
9 Jordan Baev, “Two Poles of the Cold War Confrontation in Europe: Bulgaria and the Nordic Countries.”
10 Thorsten Boring Olesen, “‘The Jewel in the Crown’: Denmark, the United States, and Greenland, 1941-1951.”
12 Albert Jónsson, “Iceland and Soviet Military Activity During the Second Cold War.”
16 Valur Ingimundarson, “The Illogic of Passivity: The Role of Iceland in NATO and U.S. Strategic Thinking, 1945-1965.”
17 Svend Aage Christensen et al.: “Greenland in Danish and American Nuclear Policy, 1951-1968.”
18 Valur Ingimundarson, “The Illogic of Passivity.”
20 Mikael af Malmborg, “Neutrality as Political Identity: Sweden in the Cold War.”
21 Ingemar Dörfer, “Swedish Neutrality and the Second Cold War.”
23 Jussi Hanhimäki, “A Culture Clash? The United States and Scandinavia during the Cold War.”
24 Ólafur Th. Hardarsson, “Public Opinion and Iceland’s Western Integration.”
25 Árni Bergmann, “Soviet Perceptions of Icelandic Culture.”
News from Hanoi Archives: Summer 1998

By David Wolff

In July 1998 I visited Hanoi to attend the first International Conference of Vietnamese Studies on behalf of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). The conference, sponsored by two of Vietnam's most prestigious academic units, the National Centre for Social and Human Sciences and Vietnam National University, was a big success. A projected attendance of 300 mushroomed to 700, drawing attention from governmental top brass. Not only were the proceedings opened by the Prime Minister and a meeting arranged with the Party General Secretary (as described in Vietnam News coverage), but when the conference outgrew the International Convention Center Facilities, it was moved to the National Assembly building, an appropriate setting for what was probably Vietnam's largest and most open exchange of views to date between foreign and Vietnamese academics and specialists in a wide range of fields.

The conference's multiple sections met simultaneously, so I alternated between "Contemporary History" and "Archives." In the former session, papers by Stein Tønnesson, Amer Ramses, and Pierre Asselin highlighted such key Cold War Vietnam subjects as the 1946 Constitution, the expulsion of the Chinese minority, and the life of Le Duan, respectively. David Elliott noted the as yet insufficient answers to the most basic questions about the Southern revolutionary movement, the 1959 decision for armed struggle, and the roots of the Tet offensive. Unfortunately, none of the Vietnamese participants seemed to be in a position to shed new light on any of these issues.

The Archives session, chaired by the general director of the archival administration, Dr. Duong Van Kham, covered matters from antiquity to the present. Of greatest interest was the paper by the director of National Archives Center No. 3, Nguyen Thi Man, describing the holdings of her repository. These materials cover the governmental files of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (later, Socialist Republic of Vietnam) from 1945 until 10 October 1995, the founding date of Archives No. 3. Nguyen expressed the wish that "cooperative relation[s] between Archives of the [foreign] countries would be broadened," while assuring that Archives No. 3 was "ready to serve all kinds of readers who come to us to do research about Vietnam."

Although it should be mentioned that Archives 3 does not contain documents from the Communist Party (Lao Dong: Vietnamese Workers' Party), the Army or the Foreign Ministry, materials from the National Assembly, Government Council and Premier's Office may add to our knowledge of Cold War topics related to Southeast Asia.

In the hopes that the recent opening of Archives No. 3 will inspire scholars to try to make use of this new resource for contemporary history, I will conclude this brief note with a rough translation of the rough, handwritten finding aid as provided in the archive's reading room. Please forward updates on holdings that you may receive to CWIHP. In 1999-2000, CWIHP will be preparing a special Bulletin issue on the Cold War in Southeast Asia and the Indochina and Vietnam Wars. All those with new documents or other suggested contributions are invited to contact the CWIHP.

National Archives Center No. 3 – Finding Aid (Excerpt)

1. Industry Ministry
2. Finance Ministry
3. Heavy Industry
4. Light Industry
6. Ministry of Food and Food Processing
7. Labor
8. Communications
9. Water Resources
10. Public Works
11. Water Resources
12. Water Resources and Construction
13. Veterans Affairs
14. Economics
15. Commerce
16, 18, 27, 31 Communications
19. Statistics
20. Food
20b Prime Minister
21 Land/Water Transport
22. Commerce Commission
23. State Planning
25. Denunciations of American and Puppet Crimes
26. Committee to Protect Mothers and Children
28. NW Autonomous Region Communications Office
29. Railroad Bureau
30. Nha Cong chinh
32. Water Resources
33. Central Statistical Office
34. Minerals
35-41. Resistance and Administration in Nambo
(1945-54)
42-47 Interzone 3 (Various Admin)
48-52 Interzone 4
53-56 Interzone 3
57-74 Viet Bac Region
75-80, 88-90 Tay Bac Region
81-84 Ta Ngan
85-86 Salt Office
87 School for Agriculture and Industry
91 Central Area
[. . .]
97-99 Thai-Hmong Autonomous Region
100 Office of Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries
101 Local Industry
102 Construction
103 Water Transport
104 Land Transport
105 Construction
106 Machine Production
107 Food Resources
108 Tools and Implements
109 General Statistical Institute
110 Development Bank
111 Chuong Duong Bridge
112 Ben Thuy Bridge
113 Specialist Office
114 Ministry of Industry and Commerce
115 Sports Office
116 Culture and Arts
117 Interior Ministry
118 Government Commerce Commission
119 Prime Minister's Office
120 Films
121 Files transmitted by Ngo Dau on 26 March 1980
122 Documents with [Chairman] Ho's signature
[. . .]
124 Interzone 5 Resistance and Administration Committee

A 1998 addendum to this list includes:

1. Viet Bac Autonomous Region Administration Comm. (1950-75)
3-4. Finance Ministry
5. Health Ministry
6. Meterology Office
7. Water Measurement
8. Communications
9. Viet Bac Interzone Land Reform
10. Commodity organizations
11. Equipment office
12. Tay Bac Autonomous Region
13. The Long Bridge

It should also be mentioned that the Ministry of Culture collection also includes more than 30 personal archives for important Vietnamese cultural figures. Furthermore, a brief perusal of the catalog for f. 113 revealed files on the Soviet contribution to the construction of the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum and on the withdrawal of the Chinese experts in 1978 as well as the daily business of hosting socialist-camp specialists in North Vietnam.

For further information, contact:

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Dr. David Wolff is a former CWIHP director and currently a CWIHP Senior Research Scholar. In 1999, he will be a Council on Foreign Relations, International Affairs, Fellow in Japan (sponsered by Hitachi Ltd.).
First Conference on Understanding the End of the Cold War

[Editor’s note: The following is the first report on the conference, “Understanding the End of the Cold War,” held at Brown University, Providence, RI, 7-10 May 1998. Co-organized with the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, the conference was the first in a series of four oral history conferences that will reexamine key turning points leading to the end of the Cold War. The collaborating institutions include the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the University of Munich. The conference was made possible by the financial support of the Carnegie Corporation. The efforts of Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive), particularly in assembling Russian participants and documents, made a major contribution to its success. Subsequent conferences of the project will be held in Columbus (OH), Bavaria, and Moscow. For further information on the conference, contact Nina Tannenwald, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (tel: 401-863-7428; fax: 401-863-1270; Email: ninat@brown.edu).]

By Nina Tannenwald

On 7-10 May 1998, a dozen former Soviet and Reagan administration high-ranking officials convened at Brown University in Providence, RI, for a three-and-a-half-day conference reexamining key issues and events leading to the end of the Cold War, focusing on the years 1980-87. The conference, the first in a series of four conferences that will probe key causes of the end of the Cold War, was sponsored by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, and the Mershon Center at Ohio State University. Participants included both former policymakers of the Reagan administration and the Gorbachev government, as well as academic experts in Soviet and post-Soviet studies and international relations. A briefing book of newly declassified documents from Russian and U.S. archives, assembled by the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project, provided the documentary basis for the discussions. Especially noteworthy were extensive excerpts of the diary notes of Anatoly Chernyaev, senior foreign policy adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, on Politburo sessions. A number of newly declassified U.S. documents, including the background materials for the 1986 Reykjavik summit, were also made available.

The U.S. side was represented by Michael Guhin, counselor in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Douglas MacEachin, Soviet analyst at the CIA during the early 1980s; Jack Matlock, Jr., the Soviet specialist on President Reagan’s National Security Council and then U.S. Ambassador to Moscow from 1987-1991; Robert McFarlane, National Security Adviser 1983-86; General Edward Rowny, chief U.S. negotiator on the START talks; and John Whitehead, deputy to Secretary of State George Shultz.

The former Soviet participants included the senior foreign policy advisers to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Anatoly Chernyaev and Georgy Shakhnazarov; Sergei Tarasenko, chief foreign policy adviser to Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze; Oleg Grinevsky, ambassador and head of the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) arms control negotiations in Stockholm from 1983-86; General Nikolai Detinov, arms control expert in the Soviet Ministry of Defense; and Gen. Vladimir Slipchenko, a military scientist who served on the general staff. Yegor Ligachev, secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and the “number two” man in the Soviet government, was expected but had to cancel at the last minute for health reasons.

Absent from the conference were the hardliners within the Soviet leadership, those who had disagreed with Gorbachev’s reformist course. Four conservatives who declined to attend (Oleg Baklanov, Central Committee secretary of defense and a key figure resisting Gorbachev’s reforms; Army Gen. Valentin Varennikov, and top KGB officials Vladimir Kryuchkov and Nicolai Leonov) stated in a joint letter to the organizers that they were very interested in the project in principle and pleased to be invited, but had two objections: they were offended by being asked to sit at the same table as close associates of Gorbachev (who they feel “lost” the Soviet Union), and they felt that the Cold War was not over yet. In their view, what needed to be explored were links between the end of the Cold War and current US-Russian relations - an issue which came up near the end of the conference.

The conference began by examining the initial mindsets on both sides at the beginning of the 1980s and the rise of Gorbachev. A fair amount is already known about this early period, and the session covered a certain amount of familiar terrain, as participants easily fell into their old roles and found themselves arguing old debates about who was ahead or behind in the arms race in the early 1980s and about measures of the strategic balance.

The most revealing new information emerged on the Soviet side. The conference filled in gaps in several areas, particularly on the national security decisions made in the Soviet Union. We learned some interesting details about the role of Marshal Akhромеев, Chief of the General Staff, and the origins of Soviet arms control policies. For example, Sergei Tarasenko recounted for the first time the origins of Gorbachev’s proposal to abolish all nuclear weapons. He and a colleague originally came up with the idea in April 1985, but it later surfaced as an official proposal from Akhромеев in December 1985. It was thus “planted” in the military, contradicting Akhромеев’s account in his memoirs, that this was the
military’s idea. Oleg Grinevsky expressed his surprise at hearing this story for the first time, commenting, “We had a suspicion that Marshal Akhromeev did not personally pen the program of the general non-nuclear world.”

According to Grinevsky, during a meeting of the “small five” on 6 January 1986, Akhromeev had burst in the door to announce that the proposal to abolish nuclear weapons would replace the less radical arms control proposal the group had been working on. Few in the meeting believed Akhromeev’s explanation that the general staff had been working secretly on this. Participants suggested that Georgy Kornienko, First Deputy Head of Foreign Affairs, had likely played a key role in persuading Akhromeev to accept the more radical proposal.

Ironically, in contrast to what many outside observers perceived at the time—that the Reagan administration thought this proposal to abolish nuclear weapons was just another piece of Soviet propaganda—top U.S. officials, including Reagan himself, seem to have taken it seriously. Thus what started as propaganda, or at least appeared that way to those Soviet officials assigned to develop it, ended up being taken seriously by top leaders on both sides.

Grinevsky also recounted how inspections were finally accepted on the Soviet side in 1986 as part of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe. The military strongly opposed inspections, viewing them as spying. The Politburo decided to accept inspections but had Akhromeev present the decision at the Geneva talks as if it came from the military, even though Akhromeev had bitterly opposed it in a key Politburo meeting. In describing how this came about, Grinevsky offered a very interesting account of real disagreements within a Politburo meeting.

A more puzzling and unresolved discussion
concerned the Soviet decision to finally delink INF from SDI, eliminating a major obstacle to concluding an INF agreement. According to Chernyaev’s notes, the proposal to de-link INF seems to have come from—all people—Andrei Gromyko, with support from Ligachev and Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov, all known for their conservative viewpoints in a Politburo meeting in February 1987. Gorbachev, on the other hand, seemed to hesitate. Chernyaev explained that Gromyko, who by that point was no longer foreign minister and had been “promoted” to a position of little influence, was no longer taken seriously. He could thus argue in favor of positions he had earlier strongly opposed (including withdrawal from Afghanistan). It remained unclear, however, why Ligachev was persistently urging the de-linking while Gorbachev seemingly played devil’s advocate, or why Shevardnadze was apparently not part of the discussion.

While less new information came out on the American side—not surprising since the major transformations of the end of the Cold War occurred on the Soviet side, and also because we know more about the American decision-making process, thanks in part to many high-quality memoirs—we did learn more about the nature of threat perceptions on both sides in the 1980s, particularly the period 1983-86. McFarlane challenged arguments from the Russians that they had been thinking about reform for a long time, provoking Chernyaev to ask, “Did you really think we were going to attack you?” There was often as much disagreement within the sides as between them, especially on the American side, providing a useful reminder of the complex array of domestic actors involved on each side. An interesting exchange came near the end when CIA Soviet specialist Doug MacEachin raised the issue of the Able Archer of NATO military exercises November 1983, and scholar Raymond Garthoff pointed to the highly provocative movements of U.S. fleets in Soviet waters, explicitly challenging Jack Matlock’s depiction of U.S. policy as relatively benign and defensive.

In addition to providing new empirical information about specific decisions and events, the discussions provided more general contextual insights that will be valuable in interpreting the large numbers of documents now coming out of the archives. Other issues the sessions illuminated were the importance of personal relationships in building trust between the two sides, and the degree of misperception and miscommunication on each side. A recurring theme was the failure of the other side to perceive what each regarded as major shifts in its own position. During a discussion of the causes of the U.S. adoption of the “four-point agenda” in January 1984, which marked a shift by the Reagan administration to a much more accommodating stance toward the Soviet Union, Chernyaev confessed that he had been completely unaware of this agenda. A stunned Matlock expressed amazement that this could be the case, since it formed the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.