Research Notes and Conference Reports

The Moldovan Communist Party Archives

By Jim Hershberg

In a development that could assist research into the history of nationalism in the former Soviet Union, communist party archives in the Republic of Moldova—until 1991 known as Moldavia, one of the fifteen constituent republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—have partially opened to researchers. On 20-22 July 1997, I visited the capital city of Chișinău (formerly Kishinev) as part of a visit to archives in several former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, Lithuania, and Latvia, undertaken by a delegation consisting of former CWIHP Director David Wolff, Mark Kramer of Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian Studies, Vladislav Zubok of the National Security Archive, and myself, organized by CWIHP and the National Security Archive.

Arriving by train from Moscow with no advance notice or arrangements, I was able to conduct research in the “Archive of Social-Political Organizations in the Moldovan Republic” (Arhiva Organizatiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova), the repository containing the records of the former Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee (MCP CC) and other party organs. In contrast to the often cumbersome procedures in Russian archives, I was also permitted to order, pay for (at a rate of roughly $0.25/page), and receive photocopies (despite a shortage of toner in the only available machine, alas) within the space of a few hours. Most documents are in Russian, although most of the population also speaks Romanian/Moldovan, which became the republic’s official language in 1994. Below are printed two MCP CC documents (translated and introduced by Mark Kramer) on party concerns about the circulation in Moldavia of Romanian publications containing criticisms of the 21 August 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia to crush the reformist “Prague Spring”; further materials obtained on the trip, including records on the rise of Moldovan nationalism in 1989, are slated for publication in future CWIHP publications.

Nevertheless, some restrictions apply. According to archival authorities, Moldovan legislation provides for a 10-year restriction on documents labelled “secret”, a 25-year restriction on documents with higher secrecy classifications such as “osobaya papka” or “special dossier”, and a 75-year closure on materials considered “personal”—a term which unfortunately was interpreted as applying to the “lichne” or “personal” collections (fondy) of MCP leaders and other officials. (I worked mostly in Fond 51, which contains the MCP CC records.) In addition, before being permitted to conduct research in the archive, I was required to obtain a letter of endorsement from the Institute of History of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Moldova (Institutul de Istorie al Academiei de Stiinte a Republicii Moldova), located in an upper floor of the same building as the archive, at 82, str. 31 August 1989. The Institute was kind enough to provide a letter endorsing my research on the broad topic of “Moldavia and the Cold War, 1945-1991,” despite my pigeon Russian and lack of advance notice, but researchers would be advised to write or fax ahead to make prior arrangements and ensure that the archives will be open and accessible on the dates and topics desired. In particular, I was assisted by the director, Demir Dragnev, and Ion Siscana, Institutul de Istorie, str. 31 August [1989], 82, Chișinău, Republica MOLDOVA 2012, tel. (3732) 23-73-27; fax: (3732) 23-45-90. (For additional assistance in arranging a visit to Chișinău— I was able to hire an English-language translator here— researchers may also wish to contact the Soros Foundation-associated Independent Journalism Center at the Open World House, 20 Armeneasca St., 2012, Chișinău, MOLDOVA, tel. (3732) 264225, 222507, fax: (3732) 228691, e-mail: prog.jc@owhmoldnet.md)

The Institutul de Istorie also publishes a quarterly journal, the Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, founded in 1990. According to the masthead of issue 4, 1996, the publication’s chief editor is Dr. Dragnev, and Dr. Siscana belongs to the editorial collegium as well as serving as the chief editor of ArenaAPoliticii, a monthly publication of culture and political science. Revista de Istorie is in Moldovan (Romanian) with English summaries and tables of contents; however, Dr. Siscana co-edited an English-language collection of translated documents from various archives on the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact’s secret protocol, particularly the provisions which led to the incorporation of Bessarabia (later Moldavia) into the Soviet Union (along with the Baltic states and other territories): see I. Shishcanu and V. Variatec, eds., V. Matei, intro., The Pact Molotov-Ribbentrop and its Consequences for Bessarabia (Chisinau: “Universitas” Publishing House, 1991).

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Moldova, Romania, and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia

Introduction, translation, and annotation by Mark Kramer

Until recently, nothing was known about the impact of the 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis on Soviet Moldavia, a small republic located in the far west of the USSR along eastern Romania and southwestern Ukraine. At the end of 1991, Soviet Moldavia became the independent country of Moldova.1 A few Western scholars in the 1970s and 1980s were able to trace the extensive “spillover” of ferment from the sweeping reforms in Czechoslovakia into Soviet Ukraine, but no comparable studies existed of the other Soviet republics.2 In an analysis of Moldavia’s role in Soviet foreign policy published in 1976, Stephen Fischer-Galati refrained from discussing the impact of the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis.3 Instead, he simply noted that “reports in the foreign press immediately after the military crisis of the summer of 1968 make no mention of the attitude of the Romanian inhabitants of Moldavia when Soviet tanks and troops were moving toward the Romanian frontier.” The lack of concrete information, Fischer-Galati added, meant that any comments about the effect of the crisis on Moldavia would be purely “a matter of conjecture.”4

The state of knowledge about the spillover from the 1968 crisis into the Soviet Union remained extremely limited until the USSR was dissolved at the end of 1991. The subsequent opening of archives in countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union (as well as the archives in East-Central Europe) has enabled scholars to gain a much better sense of the impact of the Prague Spring and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 on the western Soviet republics. It is now clear that the degree of ferment in the Soviet Union connected with the events in Czechoslovakia was much greater than previously assumed.5 Abundant evidence of this exists in the Russian archives (including a document pertaining to Moldavia that I published in Issue No. 11 of the CWIHP Bulletin), and equally valuable documentation is available in the archives of the other former Soviet republics, including Moldova.

The two documents below from the “Archive of Social-Political Organizations in the Moldovan Republic” (AOSPRM), the former repository of the Communist Party (CP) of Soviet Moldavia, highlight the efforts that Moldavian officials made in late August and September 1968 to prevent the local population from learning about Romania’s “hostile,” “irrational,” and “chauvinist” assessment of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The two documents are among many items in the AOSPRM that shed interesting light on Soviet-Romanian relations, Soviet foreign policy-making, and internal Soviet politics. (See the accompanying report on the Moldovan archive by James G. Hershberg, who obtained these two documents during a visit to Chișinău in July 1997.)

The first document, prepared in early October 1968 by the head of the Department for Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian CP Central Committee (CC), Anton Sidorovich Konstantinov, criticized the Moldavian minister of communications, Vasili (Vasile) Petrovich Russu, for his “blatant violation of party discipline.” Russu had failed to instruct the Moldavian postal service to withhold all Romanian newspapers and journals beginning on 21 August 1968. Not until 28 September did Russu belatedly order the head of the Kishinev branch of the postal service, P. P. Grigorashchenko, to prevent any Romanian publications from being distributed within Moldavia.

The second document, a stenographic account of a meeting of the highest organ of the Moldavian Communist Party (known as the Bureau of the Central Committee) on 11 October 1968, contains Russu’s explanation of his behavior as well as further details about problems within the Moldavian ministry of communications. Russu insisted that he had been absent from his office for several days immediately after the invasion because he was serving in a reserve military communications battalion that was mobilized and sent to Czechoslovakia. He faulted two of his subordinates—the first deputy minister, Mikhail (Mihai) Nikolaevich Severinov, and the head of the ministry’s foreign communications section, Konstantin (Constantin) Aleksandrovich Kucia—for having failed to carry out essential tasks while he was gone. The document makes clear that although the members of the Moldavian CP Bureau wanted to condemn Russu’s behavior, they were unwilling to impose a severe punishment. Russu received a “stern warning” but was permitted to retain his ministerial post, a job he continued to perform for many years afterward.

It is not surprising that Romanian publications were at the center of this controversy. The emergence of a rift between the Soviet Union and Romania in the mid-1960s had sparked concern among Moldavian CP officials about the possible effects on the “Moldavian” (ethnic Romanian) inhabitants of Moldavia, who made up roughly two-thirds of the republic’s total population. In November 1965, the First Secretary of the Moldavian CP, Ivan (Ioan) Ivanovich Bodiul, accused the Romanian authorities of spreading “lies” and “distortions” about Moldavia.6 A few months later, at the 12th Congress of the Moldavian CP, he launched a stronger attack on the “hostile remarks” and “nationalist propaganda” that were being broadcast into Moldavia on Romanian television and radio.7 As tensions between Moscow and Bucharest continued to mount in 1967 and 1968 on a number of foreign policy issues, especially the question of Czechoslovakia, Moldavian CP leaders became all the more concerned about the spread of Romanian influence into their republic. Bodiul was one of
several republic party first secretaries who spoke at a Central Committee plenum of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) in April 1968, which was specially convened to assess the implications of recent developments in Czechoslovakia. Bodíul expressed anxiety there about Romania’s enthusiastic support of the Prague Spring. Bucharest’s subsequent opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia stirred deep unease in both Kishinev and Moscow about the possible spread of “unsavory” influences into Moldavia.

The risk of “contagion” from Romania loomed especially large during the first few days after the invasion, which marked the high point of Bucharest’s defiance of the Soviet Union. A recent book by the Romanian scholar Mihai Retegan, drawing on newly declassified materials from the Romanian foreign ministry and Communist party archives, underscores how tense the Soviet-Romanian relationship became during the period immediately after the invasion. In a famous speech from the balcony of the CC headquarters of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) in Bucharest on 21 August, just hours after Soviet troops had begun moving en masse into Czechoslovakia, the leader of the RCP, Nicolae Ceaușescu, denounced the Soviet Union for having “flagrantly violated the freedom and independence of another state.” Speaking before a vast crowd of ordinary citizens as well as party loyalists, he described the invasion as “a colossal error and a grave danger to peace in Europe and to the fate of socialism around the world.” Ceaușescu vowed that Romania would take all necessary steps to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity:

It has been said that in Czechoslovakia there was a danger of counterrevolution. Perhaps tomorrow they will claim that our meeting here has reflected counterrevolutionary trends. If that should be the case, we warn all of them that the entire Romanian people will never permit anyone to infringe on the territory of our homeland.

Shortly after Ceaușescu finished his speech, the RCP Central Committee and the Romanian government met in an emergency session and adopted a joint communique expressing “great alarm” at the “flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a fraternal, socialist, free, and independent state, an action that contravenes all the principles on which relations between socialist countries are based as well as universally recognized norms of international law.” The joint statement called for the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet and East European troops to “allow the Czechoslovak people to handle their internal affairs themselves, without any outside interference.”

Romania’s bold opposition to the Soviet invasion caused a brief but ominous escalation of the crisis, prompting fears in Bucharest (and elsewhere) that Soviet and allied troops might soon be dispatched to Romania. Romanian leaders were well aware that a military clash with the Soviet Union would entail grave, and potentially catastrophic, consequences for Romania. Faced with that prospect, they sought to defuse the confrontation. Although Ceaușescu and his colleagues did their best to avoid any steps that would appear to legitimize the invasion, their change of tone was quickly perceptible. Throughout the last week of August, they steadily curtailed their criticisms of the invasion, and they even began downplaying other issues that had provoked tensions with Moscow in recent years. In particular, Romanian officials temporarily eschewed any further polemics over Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, two former Romanian territories that had been allocated to the Soviet Union under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact and then incorporated into Soviet Moldavia and Soviet Ukraine at the end of World War II. This marked the first major lull in the territorial dispute since the early 1960s.

Important though these efforts to ease tensions and avert a military conflict proved to be, they did not signify a complete reversal of Romania’s stance toward the invasion. The Romanian authorities never explicitly disavowed Ceaușescu’s balcony speech or the joint resolution adopted on 21 August. Although Ceaușescu ceased most of his public criticisms, he maintained a negative view of the intervention—a view that inevitably continued to be reflected in RCP periodicals and newspapers. Soviet leaders therefore were anxious to prevent Romanian publications from being disseminated within the Soviet Union, especially in Moldavia, where a substantial majority of the population could understand the language.

The documents here show that efforts to halt the influx of Romanian materials into Soviet Moldavia were by no means always successful. For one reason or another—the precise culprit is difficult to pin down—Romanian newspapers replete with comments by Ceaușescu and other senior RCP officials were circulated relatively widely in Moldavia in late August and September 1968. These papers enabled some residents of Moldavia to obtain much more detailed and much harsher information about the invasion than they ever could have received from the official Soviet media.

One small point should be noted about the translations. Both documents below, especially the stenographic account, are fairly rough and, in certain places, ungrammatical in the original. The translation seeks to replicate the style of the original, but without sacrificing comprehensibility. For the sake of clarity, the translation in a few places is slightly smoother than the original stenogram, and some minor typographical errors in the original have been corrected.
DOCUMENT No. 1
To the First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Moldavia, 4 October 1968

Cde. I. I. BODIUL

Insofar as the Romanian leadership adopted a special and harmful position on a whole range of important issues pertaining to the international Communist and workers’ movement, and expressed sharp opposition to the measures taken by the five socialist states to halt the counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, and insofar as the Romanian press published materials and statements by Romanian and foreign authors that were hostile to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and republished anti-Soviet materials from foreign press organs, the Bureau of the CC of the Communist Party of Moldavia gave instructions to the minister of communications of the Moldavian SSR, Cde. V. P. Russu, that, beginning on 21 August 1968, he should prevent Romanian periodicals from being distributed within the republic until special instructions were received.16

After checking information that flowed into the CC Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party, it was established that Cde. V. P. Russu did not carry out the instructions of the Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party CC. The Kishinev branch of the postal delivery system (headed by Cde. P. P. Grigorashchenko) withheld and destroyed, in accordance with the order, only the Romanian newspapers for 22-28 and 30 August and for 1, 28, and 29 September. The remaining journals and newspapers were sent to subscribers, often for retail sale.

By way of explanation, Cde. P. P. Grigorashchenko reported that the processing and forwarding of Romanian periodicals and other publications from 21 August to 28 September were handled on the basis of a written directive from the USSR Ministry of Communications and from the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Communications, according to which all incoming Romanian newspapers should be stored in the mail delivery branch’s facilities for two days and journals should be stored for four days. If during this time, no further directive arrived by telegram from the Moscow International Post Office to continue holding back the items in questions, they should be sent out to the subscribers. Until 28 September, no other sorts of instructions about this matter were received at the postal delivery branch. Only on 28 September did Cde. V. P. Russu transmit an instruction that all Romanian newspapers and journals should be held back. This was promptly carried out.

In the meantime, the subscribers received Romanian newspapers containing items of disinformation that misled readers and damaged efforts to promote a Communist outlook among the republic’s population. They received copies of “Scînteia,” “România Liberă,” “Muncă,” “Scînteia Țineretului,” and other papers for 31 August containing the speech by J. Smrkovský, in which he provided an ominous account of the Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations in Moscow on 23-26 August and described the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia as the most trying moment in his own life and in the life of the Czechoslovak nation.17 The subscribers also received copies of “Scînteia” and other newspapers for 29 August with a statement by the Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party CC, which demanded that all troops of the five socialist states be withdrawn immediately from Czechoslovakia.18

This same issue of “Scînteia” features Ceaușescu’s speech in Cluj, in which he compared “certain theoreticians of Marxism” with Louis XIV and claimed, among other things, that these theoreticians are trying to affirm the principle of “Marxisme c’est moi.”19 The subscribers received not only the newspapers featuring speeches by Ceaușescu and other Romanian leaders, which are filled with venomous nationalism and which attempt to prove the correctness of Romania’s policy toward the events in Czechoslovakia, but also a number of items highlighting the positions of other [Communist] parties that share the Romanians’ point of view about the unity of the socialist countries and the Communist movement and about the date for convening a new conference of Communist and workers’ parties.20

The CC Propaganda Department of the Moldavian Communist Party believes that this blatant violation of party discipline by Cde. V. P. Russu and other officials of the Ministry of Communications on such an important political issue deserves condemnation by the Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

Head of the Department for Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the Moldavian Communist Party

A. Konstantinov

[SOURCE: Arhiva Organizatiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova (AOSPRM), Fond (F.) 51, Inventar (I.) 29, Dosar (D.) 49, Foaie (ff.) 41-42. Translated by Mark Kramer.]
DOCUMENT No. 2
Stenogram of a Session of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, 11 October 1968

Taking Part:
CC Bureau Members Cdes. Antosik, Bodiul, Diordica, Il’yashchenko, Steshov, Voronin
CC Bureau Candidate Member Cde. Sidorenko
Cde. Volosiuk
Cde. Konstantinov
Cde. Stepanov — department heads of the CP CC
Cde. Savochko
Cde. Pasikovskii

Cde. Malakhov
Cde. Gorsa — department heads of
Cde. Kondrat’ev the CP CC

5. On the Violation of Party Discipline by the Minister of Communications of the Moldavian SSR, Cde. V. P. Russu

Cde. BODIUL: The decision of the CPSU CC says that insofar as materials of an anti-Soviet character are being published in Romanian newspapers and journals, USSR Glavlit is ordered to monitor Romanian publications and, if anti-Soviet materials should appear, to remove them from circulation. As you know, we decided to limit the circulation of Romanian newspapers in which undesirable materials are published, but unfortunately the Ministry of Communications did not uphold this decision.

(Report of Cde. Konstantinov)

Cde. BODIUL: Up to that point, communications officials had both propagated and distributed Romanian literature. It was then brought to your attention, Cde. Russu, that too much Romanian literature was being circulated. And this year a huge number [of people] had begun subscribing to Romanian newspapers! You were given an instruction to halt the circulation of Romanian newspapers. There’s a journalist law in Moscow, and do you really think the CC is not empowered? Are you somehow above it? Why are you not controlling the ministry?

Cde. RUSSU: This was in fact done from the time of the first conversation in 1966, when the circulation of Romanian periodicals and publications was widespread. In 1967 the volume of subscriptions to Romanian newspapers and journals was sharply reduced. The greatest possible reduction was carried out. The circulation was coordinated with the CC department. We reduced the number of issues to a fifteenth of what it had been at the time of the first conversation.

I traveled to the Ministry of Communications in Moscow. They did not want to apply this huge reduction. I linked up with the CPSU CC department, and, with the department of propaganda and agitation, I called the all-union Ministry of Communications.

Cde. BODIUL: There’s a USSR Minister [of Communications], Cde. Psurtsev, and you should have solved all matters with him.

How many issues of the newspapers are entering Moldavia?

Cde. RUSSU: 388 copies for professional purposes—“Scînteia”—48 copies and by retail trade some 90 copies. 5 copies to Ungeny, 2-3 copies to a camping-site, and several copies to the Soyuzpechat kiosk in the CC.

In August and September all issues of the newspapers were held back except for 20 copies designated for border points.

Cde. KONSTANTINOV: But the newspapers showed up in our hotel and at the airport, and they were selling them at the kiosks and in the Intourist hotel.

Cde. RUSSU: In connection with the long-anticipated events in Czechoslovakia, I was mobilized. We were in a difficult situation. We had no experience in this sort of thing. Since the end of the Great Patriotic War, we had never once conducted a training exercise. Several months before August, the designation of the battalion was changed. As a result, the battalion was deprived of its most important and vital asset. I was not in my office at the Ministry, since I conducted the work directly there. There was nowhere to deploy the equipment. I was in contact with Minsk, Moscow, and Kyiv. On 23 August the battalion was brought up to combat readiness. On the 24th, it was sent to Czechoslovakia to reestablish communications. I was preoccupied with the creation of this military formation.

On the 22nd, the first department reported to me that there was an urgent instruction from Moscow. I rode over there and received a ciphered telegram, which said that all [Czechoslovak] newspapers must be held back for two days and all journals for four days until a directive is received from Moscow. This was brought on by the events in Czechoslovakia.

On 22 August, when I was in my military unit, some soldiers said to me that a meeting was under way in Romania, and I listened in to a bit of the meeting where Ceausescu delivered his speech. I then told D. S. Cornovan that we must also hold back all Romanian newspapers. Events unfolded that way in the future. The deputy minister, Severinov, assumed leadership of the ministry. He reported that there was an instruction from the CC ordering newspapers and journals to be held back for two days.

But Severinov and Kucia decided to act in accordance with the instructions from Moscow, in accordance with the instructions of the USSR Ministry of Communications, which are issued at the behest of the CPSU CC.
During the first two to three days when the newspapers were held back, we accepted the participation of Glavlit. And then they said: “You have instructions from Moscow; you should act in accordance with these instructions.”

Cde. BODIUL: Who in the USSR Ministry of Communications reads Romanian newspapers? They issue their regulations on the basis of general instructions. With regard to Czechoslovakia, they perhaps gave a directive from the CPSU CC. But in Moldavia itself it was clearer which newspapers must be held back.

Cde. RUSSU: On 26 August, I received instructions to do the same with Romanian newspapers as I had been doing with Czechoslovak publications.

Cde. BODIUL: You report to your ministry how their actions are in conformity with our actions, which must be in accordance with instructions from the CPSU CC. We received consent and even instructions from the CPSU CC not to distribute Romanian newspapers on the 21st. If the all-union Ministry is interested and is following the materials, let them consult with the CPSU CC and the CC of the Moldavian Communist Party. What happened was a lack of coordination. And this happened because in the [all-union] ministry they don’t read Romanian newspapers.

Cde. IL’YASHCHENKO: You received instructions from the [Moldavian] CC, and even if you did not agree with them, you can disregard them only if you check with the CPSU CC. You received instructions from the CC of the Moldavian Communist Party and did not fulfill them. You instead acted on your own. You did not come and say that this is not in accord with the instructions of the CC of the Moldavian Communist party and the USSR Monistry of Communications. You say that people there also are well-versed in politics. This is a very dangerous approach. This is a very dangerous approach when you place party organs against one another. This did enormous political damage.

Cde. RUSSU: I would like to say that I am very much guilty of this, but it was not through any design.

Cde. IL’YASHCHENKO: You distributed counterrevolutionary propaganda against the will of the CC of the Moldavian Communist Party. You distributed harmful propaganda, even though you must realize that it is forbidden to distribute it. Irrespective of the fact that you did a lot on this matter, you committed a serious political mistake in the process.

Cde. BODIUL: It is extremely easy to give a correct assessment of this matter. You disregarded the instructions you were given. The assessment by K. F. Il’yashchenko is completely correct.

Cde. STESHOV: I would say that this is due not only to a lack of control, but to a lack of supervision over your employees. They began distributing things, but the minister did not know about it; it was done without his knowledge.

Cde. BODIUL: You informed us about the penalties imposed against everyone, including the first deputy minister, and informed us about the sorts of measures you adopted. What’s at issue here are the interests of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and our policy. The Romanian press features hostile items, but you approach it just as you would any old thing.

Cde. RUSSU: There are more than 400,000 radio receivers in the republic and nearly half a million televisions. The broadcasts are in all the major languages: Ukrainian, Moldavian, and Russian.59 We must take urgent measures for the accelerated creation of technical means to carry out counterpropaganda.60 Construction of the radio relay station from Kishinev to Kagul is going very poorly.17 It seems to me that help must be provided to the builders, who do not regard the project as an important matter.

Cde. BODIUL: The main thing is not the builders, but the project planners. Everything possible must now be done so that these facilities can be built. We must consider and adopt measures to this end. We must act more quickly in creating a zone and beginning construction of the facility.

Cde. RUSSU: We have to expedite the construction of the Kishinev-Kagul radio relay station. We need to have powerful means of communication.

Cde. BODIUL: To do that, we’ll have to come up with the money.

The formulation should be left as “for violations of party discipline, either to reprimand or to give a stern warning.”

Cde. IL’YASHCHENKO: This isn’t the first incident with Kucia. I’ve known him for many years.

Cde. KONSTANTINOV: He behaved outrageously when they began to explain it to him.

Cde. BODIUL: Kucia and others let Russu down. The proposal is to issue a stern warning to Russu.


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1 The Soviet republic of Moldavia (and now the independent country of Moldova) should not be confused with the region of eastern Romania that is also known as Moldova. From 1945 on, the western border of Soviet Moldavia lay along the Prut River, and the eastern border lay along the Dniestr River. The Romanian region of Moldova is bordered on the east by the Prut River and extends westward to the southern Carpathian mountains, covering the provinces of Botoșani, Iași, Vaslui, and Galați (from north to south).
2 See, in particular, Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj,


2 Ibid., p. 247.


4 I. I. Bodiu, “Pust’ druzhba sovetskikh narodov ukrepitsya i tsvetet,” Sovetskaya Moldaviya (Kishinev), 23-24 November 1965, p. 1


7 Soviet perceptions of Romania’s opposition to the invasion can be discerned in a large number of documents, including “O pozitsii Rumyny k sobytiyam v Chekhoslovakii,” Report No. MB-4809/65 (Top Secret), 16 October 1968, from Vladimir Makashev, Deputy Secretary General of the Soviet foreign ministry, to the CPSU Secretariat, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 339, Ll. 188-194; “Ob otnoshenii Rumyny k sobytiyam v Chekhoslovakii,” Report No. 1000 (Top Secret), 20 September 1968, from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to the CPSU Secretariat, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 130-154; and “O nektorykh problemakh v sovetsk-sovetskikh otnoshenyakh v svete pozitsii zanyatykh rukovodstvom RKP k sobytiyam v Chekhoslovakii,” Report No. 686 (Top Secret), 23 September 1968, from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 106-121. These three documents and many others in the Russian archives pertaining to Romania’s role during the 1968 crisis were “reclassified” (i.e., once again made secret) in April 1993 and are no longer accessible, but I translated all three (and several others) in early 1993 when I was poring over thousands of pages of documents about Soviet-Romanian relations in the 1960s. I plan to publish an annotated version of them along with a commentary in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

9 Mihai Retegan, 1968: Din primăvară pana în toamnă (Bucharest: Editura RAO, 1998), which also includes transcriptions of four key documents in an appendix. An English edition was recently published by the Center for Romanian Studies, based in Portland, Oregon. Valuable as Retegan’s book is, his analysis of a few crucial matters is severely limited by the unwillingness of the Romanian military and intelligence archives to declassify any documents pertaining to the military situation that confronted Romania on 21-24 August 1968 and the specific steps implemented by the Romanian authorities (as opposed to steps that were mentioned in public but were not actually carried out) to deal with the situation. When discussing these issues, Retegan had to rely exclusively on a paper prepared more than 25 years after the fact by the former chief of the Romanian General Staff, General Ion Gheorghe. Although Gheorghe was in an excellent position to know what was going on in August 1968, it is unclear how carefully his paper distinguishes between measures that were proposed and those that were actually implemented. It is also unclear how well his paper conveys the military situation that was actually confronting Romania at the time. In the absence of declassified military and intelligence documents from 1968, uncertainty about these matters will persist.


12 Romania’s decision to curb its attacks on the Soviet-led invasion was immediately picked up and welcomed by Soviet officials; see, for example, the sources adduced in footnote 8 supra.

13 Nicholas Dima, From Moldavia to Moldova: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute, 2nd ed. (Boulder: East European Quarterly Monographs, 1991), pp. 149-150. In 1940, the Soviet government annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and placed both of them under the jurisdiction of Soviet Moldavia. At the end of World War II, however, Northern Bukovina was incorporated into Soviet Ukraine, which also received smaller portions of territory from northern and southern Bessarabia (around Chernivtsi in the north and Izmail in the south) that were inhabited mainly by Ukrainians. The rest of Bessarabia was incorporated into Soviet Moldavia.

14 Translator’s Note: Ivan (Ioan) Ivanovich Bodiu was the First Secretary of the Moldavian CP CC.

15 Translator’s Note: Vasili (Vasile) Petrovich Russu had been serving as minister of communications in Moldavia since January 1966.

16 Translator’s Note: The reference here is to a speech delivered by Josef Smrkovský, a senior member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ), on 29 August 1968, two days after he and other senior KSČ officials had returned from Moscow. Smrkovský had joined the KSČ First Secretary, Alexander Dubček, the Czechoslo-
vák prime minister, Oldřich Černík, and the Czechoslovak president, Ludvík Svoboda, in issuing a statement on the 27th appealing for public calm and pleading with Czechoslovak citizens to avoid steps that might precipitate a “national catastrophe.” That same day, Svoboda and Dубčек delivered radio addresses to the nation, and on the 28th Černík did the same. Smrkovský’s speech to the nation on 29 August was more detailed and more candid than the addresses by Svoboda, Dубčек, and Černík in conveying the harshness of the Moscow agreements and the severity of the constraints imposed by the “cruel reality of the Warsaw Pact’s military occupation of our country.” Although Smrkovský, like the others, made no mention of the Moscow Protocol (the secret agreement requiring the Czechoslovak leaders to abandon key reforms), he did explicitly cite many of the steps that the Czechoslovak leadership would have to take to comply with the Protocol. The somber and even downcast tone of his speech dispelled any illusions people might have had that things would eventually return to the way they had been before 20 August. The full text of Smrkovský’s speech, as well as the speeches by Svoboda, Dубčек, and Černík, are all in the Institute for History, Sedm pražských dní: 21.-27. srpen 1968: Dokumentace (Prague: ČSFD, September 1968), pp. 380-407.


19 Translator’s Note: Actually, Ceaușescu did not deliver his speech in Cluj until 30 August. The text therefore could not have been published in Scînteia on 29 August. It appeared instead in the 31 August issue. See “Cuvîntarea tovarîșului Nicolae Ceaușescu la marea adunare populară din orașul Cluj,” Scînteia (Bucharest), 31 August 1968, p. 5. The speech, delivered at a gathering of Romanian intellectuals, had been scheduled well before the invasion, but it took on much greater significance in light of the military action.

20 Translator’s Note: This last point refers to an International Communist Conference scheduled for November 1968, which was designed as a follow-up to the World Communist Conference of November 1960. Preparations for the 1968 conference had been under way for many months, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia provoked widespread objections by non-ruling Communist parties, which induced Soviet leaders to postpone the world gathering of Communist parties for seven months. The conference was finally convened in June 1969, with 78 parties in attendance.

21 Translator’s Note: In addition to Bodiul, these officials included Georgii (Gheorghe) Fedorovich Antosiatik, the first deputy chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers (responsible for economic affairs); Aleksandr (Alexandru) Filippovich Diordica, chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers; Kirill’FYodorovich Il’yashchenko, chairman of the Presidium of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet; Boris Aleksandrovich Steshov, Moldavian CP CC Secretary (responsible for industry); and Pyotr (Petre) Vasil’evich Voronin.

22 Translator’s Note: Sergei Stepanovich Sidorenko was the chairman of the official Moldavian trade unions.

23 Translator’s Note: The officials listed here were: Vasiliy (Vasile) Mikhailovich Volosuik, head of the Moldavian CP CC Administrative Organs Department; Anton Sidorovich Konstantinov, head of the Moldavian CP CC Propaganda and Agitation Department; Georgii (Gheorghe) Afanasyevich Stepanov, head of the Moldavian CC Agriculture Department; Boris Nikolaevich Savochko, head of the Moldavian CP CC Department for Industry and Transportation; and Aleksandr (Alexandru) Ignat’evich Pasikovskii, head of the Moldavian CP CC General Department.

24 Translator’s Note: The officials listed here were: Vladimir Nikolaevich Malakhov, deputy head of the Moldavian CP CC Propaganda and Agitation Department; Georgii (Gheorghe) Ivanovich Gorsa, deputy head of the Moldavian CP CC Oganizational-Party Work Department; and Vasiliy (Vasile) Fedorovich Kondrat’ev, deputy head of the Moldavian CP CC Department for Industry and Transportation.

25 Translator’s Note: Glavlit was the widely-used nickname of the main organ responsible for enforcing censorship in the Soviet Union, the State Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press, which was reestablished in August 1966 as a body directly accountable to the USSR Council of Ministers. Glavlit was originally set up by the Bolsheviks in 1922 and existed under various names thereafter. From August 1963 to August 1966, the agency (then known as the State Directorate for the Protection of Military and State Secrets in the Press) was subordinated to the USSR Committee on the Press. A decree issued by the USSR Council of Ministers on 18 August 1966 restored Glavlit to its previous status as a constituent body of the Council of Ministers. See “Postanovlenie Soveta Ministrov SSSR o Glavnom upravlenii po okhrane gosudarstvennykh tain v pechati pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR (Glavlit),” 18 August 1966, in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), F. R-9425, Op. 2, D. 432, L. 1.

26 Translator’s Note: See the Document No. 1 above.

27 Translator’s Note: The reference to a “journalist law in Moscow” is somewhat peculiar. There was no comprehensive press law in the Soviet Union until June 1990: “Zakon SSSR o pechati i drugikh sredstvakh massovoi informatsii,” 12 June 1990, in Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (Moscow), No. 26 (1990), pp. 492-508. Earlier on, several laws and provisions of the Soviet constitution relating to the press were enforced by Glavlit, the Committee on the Press, and other agencies, but a comprehensive law on the press was never adopted, despite considerable discussion of the idea in 1966 and 1967. The monthly journal Zhurnalizet, edited by E. V. Yakovlev, which began publication in January 1967 after its predecessor, Sovetskaya pechat’, fell into official disfavor, was
especially active in 1967 in promoting consideration of the possibility of a press law. On this point, see Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 133. The proposal for a press law ran into difficulty, however, after the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) forcibly cracked down on a group of over 100 intellectuals and scholars in November 1967 for allegedly preparing a draft press law that would have abolished censorship. Soon thereafter, in April 1968, E. V. Yakovlev was removed as editor-in-chief of *Zhurnalizist* and accused of “committing serious mistakes,” “exercising unsatisfactory leadership,” and “frequently publishing ideologically weak material.” For declassified materials about these events, see “TsK KPSS,” 14 November 1967 (Secret), from Yu. V. Andropov, head of the KGB, plus the accompanying draft “Proekt zakona o rasprostranenii otsykanii i poluchenii informatiss,” in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiisilkoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 78, D. 8, Ll. 46-56; and “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS: O serevnikh nedostatkakh v rabote zhurnala ‘Zhurnalizist,’” St No. 50/5s (Top Secret), 26 April 1968, in RGANI, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 101, L. 11. The idea of a press law was thus largely stillborn. In the absence of such a law, Glavlit, the Committee on the Press, the KGB, and other bodies responsible for overseeing the press acted in accordance with guidelines set forth by the CPSU Politburo, the CPSU Secretariat, and the USSR Council of Ministers. Various problems that arose in 1967 and especially 1968 (in part because of ferment connected with the Prague Spring) led to the adoption in January 1969 of stringent, new guidelines laid out in a CPSU Secretariat directive: “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS: O povyshenii otvetstvennosti rukovoditelei organov, pechati, radio, televizii, kinematografii, uchrezhdenii kul’tury i iskusstva za ideino-politicheskii uroven’ publikuemikh materialov i repertuara.” St No. 64/1s (Top Secret), 7 January 1969, in RGANI, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 131, Ll. 2-6. For published materials bearing on control of the press during this period, see A. Z. Okorokov et al., *O partiinoi i kommunisticheskikh i rabochimi partiym sotsialisticheskikh stran* (Moscow: Mysl’, 1972), esp. pp. 357-372.

29 Translator’s Note: The phrase “CC department” is shorthand for the “CPSU CC Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries” (Otdel TsK KPSS po svyazym s kommunisticheskimi i rabochimi partiym sotsialisticheskikh stran), which oversaw relations among Communist states. Because of the department’s long and unwieldy name, it was often referred to as simply the “CPSU CC department” or the ‘CC department.”

30 Translator’s Note: Bodiol is referring here to Nikolai Demyanovich Psurtsev, who had been serving as Soviet minister of communications since March 1948.

31 Translator’s Note: Ungeny is a Moldovan city roughly 75-80 kilometers to the west of Kishinev (Chișinău), along the Romanian border.

32 Translator’s Note: Russu’s comments here are interesting insofar as they show how many reservists were being mobilized in the leadup to the invasion.

33 Translator’s Note: Severinov was the Moldavian first deputy minister of communications.

34 Translator’s Note: Severinov was identified in the previous footnote. Konstantin (Constantin) Aleksandrovich Kucia was head of the foreign communications section of the Moldavian ministry of communications.

35 Translator’s Note: The population of Soviet Moldavia at this time, according to official Soviet census data, consisted of roughly 16 percent Ukrainians, 11-11 percent Russians, 66 percent “Moldavians” (ethnic Romanians), and small percentages of other ethnic groups (officially referred to as “cohabiting nationalities”). Russian was the most widely used language in the republic, especially in urban areas, but Ukrainian and so-called Moldavian were also permitted. The supposedly distinct language of “Moldavian” was purely a Soviet artifact. It was identical to Romanian except that it used the Cyrillic alphabet instead of the Latin.

36 Translator’s Note: The comments here about the lack of progress in countering Romanian radio and television broadcasts are especially important in light of the concerns that Bodiol had been expressing since 1965-66 about “hostile” Romanian broadcasts.

37 Translator’s Note: Kagul is a small city in the far southwest of Moldova along the Romanian border, roughly 200 kilometers south of Kishinev (Chișinău).
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The Sino-Soviet Alliance: New Publications

By David Wolff

The hottest conflicts of the Cold War took place in Asia and CWIHP has played an important role in revealing the internal dynamics of the Communist camp in that region. Whether Stalin’s decision to give Kim Il Sung the green light for aggressive unification in Korea or the Chinese foot-dragging that weighed against Soviet-American efforts to negotiate peace in Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet military relationship remains a core issue. The first volume in the CWIHP Book Series, Brothers in Arms gathered together essays by a team of international historians to evaluate the evidence declassified from Russian and Chinese archives since the late 1980s and to pinpoint the remaining lacunae in our knowledge of this crucial relationship. Two years later, a new publication adds both significant fresh documentation and analysis.

Tatiana Zazerskaia makes use of previously unexamined materials from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Comintern successor institutions and others to write the most comprehensive study to date of Soviet specialists in China and their contribution to the development of the Chinese military. Both in its extensive use of Russian archival sources and supplementary use of Chinese published document and memoir collections, Soviet Specialists represents a very significant step forward in our knowledge of this issue as previously covered in Sergei Goncharenko’s and Deborah Kaple’s contributions to the Brothers in Arms collection. Although the MIG wing that accompanied Mao back from Moscow might be seen as a symbolic gesture, Stalin’s way of saving the Chairman’s “face” after a bruising summit, the continuing high percentages (80%) of Soviet aid to China that were spent on military-related imports, advice and factories make clear the centrality of the military dimension.

Although until 1953 this was largely about the Korean war (making it difficult to separate aid to China from aid to Korea), thereafter it reflected the PRC’s January 1955 decision to become self-reliant in high-technology, including nuclear matters. Zazerskaia’s book is especially strong on the pivotal years of the post-Stalin interregnum, when the Chinese played the tensions in the Russian leadership to obtain state-of-the-art technology. Li Fuchun’s 15 January 1956 request to Khrushchev for Soviet aid in nuclear physics is our earliest detailed documentation from Soviet archives on the fraternal development of nuclear technology. It seems likely that it was the product of a meeting of over 200 Chinese scientists held in Beijing in December 1955. Interestingly (and probably not coincidentally), this was the first anniversary of the PRC Central Secretariat meeting at which Chinese Politburo members “jubilantly” played with a Geiger counter and a uranium sample, top scientists inducted powerful comrades into the hall of atomic secrets, and the Chairman himself raised a glass of fiery maotai to announce “that China would immediately devote major efforts to developing atomic energy research.”

Zazerskaia’s monograph also argues persuasively against the ideological view that Soviet aid was “given” to China. She presents considerable evidence of the economic calculations behind each Soviet act of “generosity.” For example, the $300 million credit authorized by Stalin during Mao’s visit to Moscow was applied retroactively to the goods and weapons used by the Chinese Communists in the 1940s to win their civil war and everything was calculated at “world market prices,” a distinct disadvantage for the Chinese. The lists of strategic commodities to be extracted from the PRC in return for deliveries of military goods leave little room to wonder why Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders considered the relationship neo-colonial in nature. The discussion of the infamous withdrawal of Soviet experts from China by Khrushchev adds documentary detail to our previous knowledge of this key moment. It is less clear why the USSR stepped up aid to China’s missile program at the same time that nuclear cooperation was being terminated. Possibly, this was meant as a consolation of sorts. Or maybe the Soviets still thought they could still learn something useful from Chinese returnees previously employed in US laboratories.

DOCUMENT

To CC CPSU SECRETARY
Com. N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

Per instructions of the CC CCP, I am reporting to You regarding the expected completion of the first five-year plan and the preliminarily formulation of the basic tasks and indicators (pokazateli’) for the projects of the second and third five-year economic development plans of the People’s Republic of China.

We are requesting that the CC CPSU study our preliminary projections.

After the final elaboration of the draft of the PRC’s second five-year economic development plan this April, we will present our plan to the CC CPSU and will request that the CC CPSU look over and comment on this plan.

We are also requesting that the CC CPSU examine our requests and provide appropriate aid on the matters presented in the attached report.
With communist greetings,
Li Fuchun

15 January 1956

[The memorandum is followed by four attachments. The first is a list of installations being built with Soviet aid. The second is a list of top secret (sovershenny sekretno) installations. The third is a memo on the coal industry and the fourth follows in full.]

Top Secret
Attachment No. 4

PRELIMINARY PROGRAM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY

In order to quickly and efficiently organize and develop an atomic energy industry in the People’s Republic of China, in order to further develop nuclear physics research, and also in order to apply atomic energy broadly in the economy, we are asking the CC CPSU to discuss the possibility of helping China to organize an atomic energy industry and elaborate a long-term development plan for the production of nuclear energy and to provide us with the following aid in this area:

1. We ask [you] to discuss the possibility of helping China in the construction of one or two modern atomic industry installations, providing us with comprehensive aid in preparing plans, supplying equipment, construction-assembly and provision of raw material [i.e., nuclear fuel, trans.].

2. Assuming that the atomic industry installations mentioned above will be considered, we ask [you] to discuss whether it is possible in 1956 to send a group of Soviet specialists-advisors in nuclear technology to lead and aid China in the elaboration of a comprehensive plan for the development of an atomic energy industry.

3. We ask [you] to accept three groups of Chinese scientific and technical workers for short-term study in the Soviet Union in 1956:
   a. to accept various technical workers corresponding to needs generated by the tasks in point one [above] for study in the Soviet Union of various technical areas of the atomic energy industry. We ask the appropriate Soviet organization to help us to designate concretely the number of people and their specialties;
   b. to accept fifty or more Chinese scientific-technical workers for studies in the Soviet Union regarding the use of radioactive isotopes (including their use for industry, agriculture, defense, biology, medicine, etc.)
   c. to accept a team of scientific-technical specialists sent by China for study and participation in project development (proektinaia rabota) for a powerful focused accelerator (fokistrovannyi uskoritel’). We also ask permission to send from China one or two specialists to the Moscow scientific-research institute for the physics of warm nuclei (teplovye iadra) in order to take part in scientific research.

   1. We ask the Soviet government to help our country:
      to create a central laboratory for radioactive isotopes in the physics institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; to create two laboratories [each] (po dve laboratorii) for radioactive isotopes within the Ministry of Heavy Industry and the Ministry of Health; to create one laboratory [each] for radioactive isotopes in the first and second Ministries of Machine-Building and in the Ministry of Agriculture; We ask the Soviet Union to provide multi-faceted aid in planning the above-mentioned eight laboratories, their provision with equipment and necessary instruments as well as the appropriate radioactive isotopes and scientific-technical materials, [i.e., documentation]. We also ask that specialists be sent to guide the research in these laboratories.

[Source: TsKhSD (Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation), f.5, op.30, d.164, ll. 7a, 48-9; obtained by Tatiana Zazerskaia and translated from Russian by David Wolff]

David Wolff is a former CWIHP Director and is currently as well as Visiting Professor of East Asian History at the University of Chicago. He is the author of To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914 (Stanford, 1999).

Bulgarian Documents on CD

NATO IN THE BALKANS.
(Sofia: IK 96plus LTD, 2000)

Editor-in-Chief Dr Jordan Baev; Computer Design Dr. Boyko Mladenov; Preface Dr. V. Mastny

The Documentary CD Volume, No. 2, contains more than 110 selected and recently declassified documents from different Bulgarian and foreign archives, including the NATO archive in Brussels, about the NATO policy, strategy and presence in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean area.
Policymakers and the Cold War’s End: Micro and Macro Assessments of Contingency

By Richard K. Herrman and Richard Ned Lebow

The Mershon Center (Ohio University) hosted a conference on the “End of the Cold War” on 15-17 October 1999. This conference was made possible by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Participants addressed important decisions and events leading to the end of the Cold War that transpired between 1988-1992. Special attention was devoted to arms control negotiations and regional conflicts in the recognition that arms control agreements and Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan were concrete turning points in the Cold War’s end. The conference brought together important policy-makers from the Gorbachev and Bush administrations (in particular the heads of Soviet and American arms control delegations and senior advisors on regional conflicts) as well as interested scholars. The National Security Archive prepared a briefing book of newly-released documents germane to the discussion.

The October conference was a follow-on to the conference the Mershon Center organized in Moscow in June which focused on domestic opposition to Gorbachev’s foreign policy. This conference in turn, built on an earlier conference held at Brown University, co-sponsored by the Watson Institute and the Mershon Center in May 1998. That meeting had featured senior policy-makers from the Reagan administration and the Gorbachev administration who played central roles in the 1983-1988 period.

The conference in Columbus began with a discussion of the relationship between military security and foreign policy strategy. Introductory comments by Raymond Garthoff (The Brookings Institution) were followed by testimonies by Vitaly Kataev (former secretary of Gorbachev’s Big Five), and Robert Blackwell (former U.S. National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union). The discussion outlined the leading role arms control was seen to play in negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. Both American and Russian participants agreed that arms control was considered a central arena in which to pursue East-West détente, and, at the same time, as an issue that mobilized large and powerful vested interests on both sides, making progress in this arena difficult. The discussion turned rather quickly to the broader questions of confidence-building measures in Europe and the CSBM talks in Stockholm. Ambassador Lynn Hansen (former Head of the U.S. delegation to the CSBM talks) and Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky (former Head of the USSR’s CSBM delegation) reported in some detail both their initial suspicions about the purpose of the endeavor and described the evolution in their thinking as they came to see prospects for meaningful agreements.

Much of the early discussion in the meeting concentrated on the motives behind Soviet and American interest in arms control and confidence-building measures. Several Russian participants addressed in the detail the argument that Moscow was anxious to travel down these avenues in order to lower the budgetary burden or redirect resources. They argued that economic motives were, in fact, secondary, and that in important cases disarmament cost more than the continued acquisition of arms. The participants then spent considerable time analyzing the domestic political maneuvering inside the Kremlin and White House as heads of the delegations worked to build consensus, or at least prevailing political support, in favor of agreeing to positions that the other side would accept. Particularly interesting in this regard was the crucial role attributed to Gorbachev in overcoming objections from the Soviet military and his decision to have senior Soviet military leaders, like Marshal Akhromeev, make key proposals to the West themselves, both as a signal to the West and, more importantly, as a signal to domestic Soviet audiences.

Most of the first afternoon of the conference was occupied with discussing the importance of regional conflicts in general and the Gulf War in particular. Ambassador Dennis Ross opened the discussion by reporting that there had been an important evolution in American thinking about regional conflicts. In the Reagan period, Ross reported, the prevailing American notion was to make it clear to Moscow that the Soviet Union’s involvement in regional conflicts would have real costs. With the changes Gorbachev was calling for, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the development of a positive working relationship between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze, Ross recalled, thinking about regional conflicts in Washington began to change, at least among the group closest to Baker. In essence, the change was to use regional conflicts as the leading edge to test what was possible in the emerging new period. Regional conflicts were not burdened with the same bureaucratic constraints as arms control and had been at the forefront of issues leading to the demise of the previous era of détente. According to Ross, Baker making progress on making regional conflicts a key area in which to see whether the Soviet “new thinking” would translate into concrete achievements, a role traditionally played by arms control.

Although no single regional conflict became a make-or-break turning point, the Gulf War came very close to this. Ross related in detail the U.S.-Soviet negotiations...
regarding the Gulf War, including both his own and Baker's talks in Moscow as well as their meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister (and later premier) Yevgeny Primakov and other Soviet officials as the crisis wore on and the war ensued. Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin (former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for regional conflicts) in turn captured the change in thinking that was underway in Moscow with regard to regional conflicts in general and to the Gulf War in particular. In his view, the process of change had reasonably deep roots and involved as much a change in personnel, or at least in who was being listened to, as it involved a change in thinking of any particular person. Adamishin, and several other Russian participants, argued that Moscow's relationship with Iraq had been much more complex than often thought in the West and did not accept the characterization of Iraq as a Soviet ally in the traditional sense.

On the second day of the conference discussions returned to the issue of arms control and dealt with both the nuclear arms and conventional forces negotiations. Ambassador Richard Burt (head of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks - START) began by describing the evolution in American thinking about nuclear arms control that occurred between the middle Reagan years and the middle Bush years. Burt explained that nuclear arms control in the early period of the Bush administration was constrained by an ongoing policy review and important bureaucratic divisions. He explained how this was eventually overcome and progress made.

Yuri Nazarkin (former Head of the Soviet delegation to START) recounted the Soviet side of the negotiation and emphasized the importance of his relationship with Burt and the determination of Shevardnadze to go forward. Nazarkin spend considerable time, as did Vitaly Kataev, described the political opposition within the Kremlin to the concessions Moscow was making. They also noted the importance of the shifting domestic balance in this regard and the significance of Shevardnadze's resignation.

Ambassador James Woolsey (former head of the U.S. delegation to Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) negotiations in Vienna and former Director of Central Intelligence) explained how he had entered the Conventional Force Talks negotiations with what he perceived to be a mandate from the president to make progress quickly if possible. Woolsey discussed how potential bureaucratic obstacles on the U.S. side were overcome, in part by his decision to include in the U.S. delegation key military representatives and in part by a set of personal contacts with the four key administration decision-makers on this issue. Oleg Grinevsky (head of the Soviet delegation to the CFE talks) explained why the Soviet military wanted to exclude certain forces by designating them as naval forces. Woolsey recounted his confrontation with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov regarding this matter, and both Woolsey and Grinevsky explained how the agreement was eventually put back on track.

The final two sessions involved discussing possible counterfactual pasts that could have occurred or almost occurred and what happened to prevent history from unfolding in that other direction. We spent considerable time using the posing of counterfactual questions to highlight underlying causal assumptions and to test through thought experiments the plausibility of the explanations we were accepting.

Following the Mershon Center conference, the fourth and final conference took place in the Bavarian Alps, at the former Wittelsbach spa in Wildbad Kreuth. Organized by the Geschwister-Scholl-Institut of the University of Munich in cooperation with the Mershon Center and the Watson Institute, this meeting examined the European role in ending the Cold War. It featured former German, French, British, and Soviet policy-makers along with the Mershon project scholars and experts affiliated with German universities. The discussion centered on the decisions within NATO leading up to German unification and the extent to which other outcomes were possible.

Perhaps the most striking finding of the Mershon and Munich conferences is in the realm of psychological dynamics, and the support the retrospective judgment of policy-makers provides for the “certainty of hindsight” bias. Baruch Fischhoff has demonstrated that “outcome knowledge” affects our understanding of the past by making it difficult for us to recall that we were once unsure about what was going to happen. Events deemed improbable by experts (e.g., peace between Egypt and Israel, the end of the Cold War), are often considered “over-determined” and all but inevitable after they have occurred.²

Looking back on events, most of the policymakers, independently of their country or ideology, see the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Union as more or less inevitable. But almost all of them confessed that they were surprised by these events as they unfolded, even incredulous. The contradiction in their belief systems was also made apparent by almost every policymaker’s insistence that the outcome of any decision or negotiation in which they personally participated was highly contingent. In the conference discussions and over drinks or coffee, they told amusing stories of how clever tactics, the nature of the personal relationship between them and their opposites, or just sheer coincidence, frequently played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of negotiations. Some policymakers—including a few who characterized the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union as inevitable—were nevertheless responsive to suggestions that components of the process might have been different. There was widespread agreement at the Wildbad Kreuth conference that there was nothing foreordained about the Two-plus-Four format for negotiations over the future of Germany. When pushed, some of the Russian, American and German policymakers present at this conference agreed that a different format, say one that involved more European
countries as participants, might well have resulted in a different outcome given the widespread opposition to unification by Germany’s neighbors. While there was general agreement that Gorbachev had little freedom to maneuver on the German question at the time of the Two-plus-Four talks, several Soviet officials suggested that he might have been able to negotiate a better deal if he broached the issue in 1987.

The experimental literature in psychology indicates that counterfactual scenarios can be used to increase receptivity to contingency. Counterfactuals can assist people in retrieving and making explicit their massive but largely latent uncertainty about historical junctures, that is to recognize that they once thought, perhaps correctly, that events could easily have taken a different turn. The proposed correctives hence uses one cognitive bias to reduce the effect of another. Ross, Lepper, Strack and Steinmetz exploited the tendency of people to inflate the perceived likelihood of vivid scenarios to make them more responsive to contingency. People they presented with scenarios describing possible life histories of post-therapy patients evaluated these possibilities as more likely than did members of the control group who were not given the scenarios. This effect persisted even when all the participants in the experiment were told that the post-therapy scenarios were entirely hypothetical.1 Philip E. Tetlock and one of the authors conducted a series of experiments to test the extent to which counterfactual “unpacking” leads foreign policy experts to upgrade the contingency of international crises. In the first experiment, one group of experts was asked to assess the inevitability of the Cuban Missile Crisis. A second group was asked the same questions, but given three junctures at which the course of the crisis might have taken a different turn. A third group was given the same three junctures, and three arguments for why each of them was plausible. Judgments of contingency varied in proportion to the degree of counterfactual unpacking.2 The discussions in Columbus and Bavaria provide anecdotal support for these findings, and suggest the value of conducting more focused, scientific experiments with policymakers as participants.

Are there any provisional conclusions we might draw about the certainty of hindsight bias and the Cold War? First, the discovery of the bias should come as no surprise. Policymakers and scholars routinely upgrade the probability of major events once they have occurred. World War I and the Middle East peace accord are cases in point.3 Second, we would expect policy-makers to stress the contingency of events in which they were personally involved. By showing how they made a difference, they buttress their self-esteem. Further research might make policy-makers face this contradiction between their micro and macro beliefs. Would they invoke complicated arguments to attempt to reconcile the contradiction? Or, would they alter one component of their belief system to bring it in line with the other? And if so, which belief will the change? Will there be systematic differences in how policy-makers respond as a function of their personalities, political beliefs, nationalities or past and present positions? These are fascinating subjects for future research. In the interim, one thing is certain: we must be wary of accepting at face value the judgments and reconstructions policymakers offer of the past.

Richard K. Herrmann is associate director of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University. Richard N. Lebow is the director of the Mershon Center.

1 Although the conference revolved around the oral history provided by the former policy-makers, each discussion was framed by a scholar engaged in doing research on the end of the Cold War. Policy-makers were not asked to give speeches; to the contrary, they were asked to react to opening questions and to engage in an open discussion with the scholars who had been doing archival and analytical research. The scholars participating in the discussion included: George Breslauer (University of California, Berkeley), Matthew Evangelista (Cornell University), Raymond Garthoff (The Brookings Institute), Richard Herrmann and Ned Lebow (Ohio State), Jacques Levesque (Université de Laval), Janice Stein (University of Toronto), and William Wohlfforth (Georgetown University). William Burr (National Security Archive) and Christian Ostermann (Cold War International History Project) took part in the conference. The briefing book of documents is available through the NSA. The Russian and English language transcripts for both the Moscow and Columbus conferences are posted on the Mershon home page (http://www.mershon.ohio-state.edu/) and are also available from the National Security Archive.


The first of these experiments, involving alternative outcomes for the Cuban Missile Crisis, is described in an as yet unpublished paper, Philip E. Tetlock and Richard Ned Lebow, “Poking Counterfactual Holes in Covering Laws: Alternative Histories of the Cuban Missile Crisis.”

This point is made by Steven Weber, “Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process,” Security Studies 6 (Summer 1997), p. 196.

New Cold War Group at George Washington University

We are pleased to announce the creation of a new group, based at George Washington University, to promote research and scholarship on the Cold War. GWCW will encourage multi-lingual, multi-disciplinary, multi-national explorations of the Cold War experience and hopes to serve as a meeting place for scholars working in fields ranging from US diplomatic history to various area studies fields to political science, sociology, journalism, economics, and security and cultural studies. With close ties to the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive as well as proximity to U.S. national archives and the Library of Congress, GWCW will organize activities to foster the growth of an intellectual community at GWU and in the Washington, DC, area dedicated to studying various aspects of the Cold War. This will include gathering not only faculty and interested scholars from various departments at GWU and Washington-area universities and think-tanks, but also graduate students pursuing research topics relevant to the Cold War, for regular and special symposia, workshops, and conferences. In addition to working closely with CWIHP and the National Security Archive, GWCW also seeks to cooperate and collaborate with like-minded organizations and efforts beyond the Washington-area—such as Cold War-studies groups formed in recent years at the University of California at Santa Barbara, Harvard University, the London School of Economics, and in Beijing, Budapest, and Moscow—to pool resources and expertise in order to organize activities.

We welcome ideas and suggestions for activities and collaboration, as well as your names and contact information (both e-mail and surface) for mailing list purposes. Core members of the group include GWU Profs. Jim Goldgeier (Director, Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies) of the Political Science Department, and Jim Hershberg and Hope Harrison at the History Department; Tom Blanton, Malcolm Byrne, and Vlad Zubok at the National Security Archive; and Christian Ostermann at the Cold War International History Project. We look forward to hearing from you and working with you in the future.

James Goldgeier (jimg@gwu.edu), James Hershberg (jhershb@gwu.edu), and Hope Harrison (hopeharr@gwu.edu)
Conference on Cold War Endgame

[Editor's Note: The following is a brief description of the Conference, “Cold War Endgame,” held at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School on 29-30 March, 1996. The conference was sponsored by the John Foster Dulles Program for the Study of Leadership in International Affairs, Princeton University, and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. Excerpts from the conference transcript were published as “Cold War Endgame,” Fred I. Greenstein and William C. Wohlforth eds., (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies Monograph Number 10, 1997). A book based on the conference transcript is under review. For information, contact William C. Wohlforth, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University (tel: 202-687-5071; fax: 202-687-5116; e-mail: wohlforw@gunet.georgetown.edu.)]

By Fred I. Greenstein and William C. Wohlforth

On 29-30 March 1996, Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School hosted nine former top officials of the US and Soviet governments who played critical roles in the tumultuous diplomacy at the end of the Cold War. The conference on the “Cold War Endgame” followed an earlier Princeton conference on the period from 1983 to 1989 (the transcript of which was published in Witnesses to the End of the Cold War, ed. W. C. Wohlforth [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996]). Led by former US Secretary of State James A. Baker III and former Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh, the conferees spent two days analyzing and “reliving” the major events affecting world politics from 1989 to 1992: the forging of a new relationship between the incoming Bush administration and the Gorbachev team in the winter and spring of 1989; the collapse of Communism in Europe in the fall of that year; the new relationship that developed between Bush and Gorbachev at the shipboard summit in Malta in December; the genesis and management of the “two-plus-four” talks on Germany in early 1990; collaboration between the superpowers against Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, which was cemented by the two leaders at the Helsinki summit in September 1990; and the dramatic domestic developments in the Soviet Union that culminated in the August 1991 coup and the collapse of the Soviet state four months later.

On the American side, Secretary Baker was accompanied by National Security Advisor Gen. Brent Scowcroft; Counselor of the State Department Robert Zoellick; Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock, Jr.; and National Security Council staffer Phillip Zelikow. Minister Bessmertnykh was joined by Anatoly S. Chernyaev, personal advisor on foreign affairs to Gorbachev; Sergei Tarasenko, principal foreign policy assistant to Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze; and Pavel Palazchenko, special assistant and interpreter to Gorbachev. Journalist and author Don Oberdorfer—who covered the events under consideration as chief diplomatic correspondent of the Washington Post and chronicled them in From the Cold War to a New Era—moderated the discussion.

The National Security Archive’s Vladislav Zubok prepared a briefing book for the conference that featured a number of noteworthy documents, including Ambassador Matlock’s “long telegrams” from Moscow in February 1989, declassified CIA intelligence assessments of Gorbachev’s domestic situation and Soviet stability (September 1989) and the Soviet Union’s prospects for survival in the face of the nationalist challenge (April 1991); and previously unpublished extracts from Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary (courtesy of the Gorbachev Foundation) concerning the critical politburo discussion in January 1990 of the “+2” formula on German unification. In addition, Chernyaev read extensive diary extracts that recorded Gorbachev’s remarks on Saddam Hussein and the last minute negotiations to avert a US-led ground assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

The discussions were extraordinarily frank. While many of these policy veterans have written memoirs, at the conference they were able to argue with each other, prod each other’s memories, compare recollections, and debate policy options and possible “missed opportunities” as they relived the most important years of their careers. The conferees discussed both domestic politics and grand strategy; they debated underlying causes of events as well as the details of statecraft; they recalled specific meetings and decisions as well as the general perceptions that underlay decision-making on both sides. And the conference covered the critical years that bridged the end of the Cold War and the new post-Cold War epoch. The transcript of the conference—which will be published in a forthcoming book—thus provides important context for the memoirs that have already been published and for documents that have yet to be released.

James Baker and Anatoly Chernyaev opened the conference with brief presentations on the causes of the Cold War’s end and the Soviet collapse. The opening remarks were followed by four roundtable discussions. The first session examined the recasting of the US-Soviet relationship following the Bush Administration’s inauguration and Gorbachev’s acceleration of reforms in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It illustrated both the perceptual gap between the two sides that still existed in this period and the complex relationship between international interactions and domestic coalitions. The fundamental question was, why were the Americans so
much more uncertain of Soviet intentions than vice versa? Scowcroft “plead guilty” to having been the administration’s chief skeptic while Chernyaev explained why the Gorbachev team maintained its “trust” in the Americans even as Washington stalled the relationship in early 1989 with a prolonged “strategic review.”

The perceptual gap and the complex links between domestic and foreign policy were dramatically illustrated by the two sides’ different reactions to Gorbachev’s offer of a “third zero” on short-range nuclear forces, which he conveyed to Baker during the secretary of state’s visit to Moscow in May 1989. The former Soviet officials insisted that this offer was not intended to sow discord in the NATO alliance, while the Americans assumed that it was precisely such a classic Cold War ploy. It temporarily set back Baker’s efforts to reengage with Moscow and strengthened the administration’s harder-line wing. The perception in Washington was that the administration’s chief advocate of improved relations had gone to Moscow only to be duped by the wily Gorbachev. “I loved it!” Scowcroft admitted.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany were discussed in the second session. The participants debated the extent to which unification-in-NATO was a consequence of superior Western statecraft or the unintended outcome of a chaotic and uncontrolled process, with the former Soviet officials tending to argue in favor of the latter view. Chernyaev detailed the reasoning behind Gorbachev’s acquiescence to American and German terms while Tarasenko explained Shervardnadze’s resistance to the “2+4” formula. Palazchenko and Bessmertnykh described the assessments and expectations that lay behind Moscow’s decision not to form a coalition with Paris and London to prevent or slow unification. The Soviet policy veterans also offered numerous glimpses into the details of the Soviet decision-making process in this period. They contended that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze played a complex strategic game designed to stave off the polarization of Soviet domestic politics—a game that required unorthodox decision-making procedures. According to Tarasenko, for example, a major problem confronting Shevardnadze was the ingrained conservatism of the foreign ministry’s German experts. As a result, bureaucratic strategems had to be employed to circumvent them and present them with faits accomplis. Such tactics help account for the erratic character of Soviet policy during this period.

The third session dealing with US-Soviet cooperation in countering Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait and restarting the peace process in the Middle East generated the most new information. We learned how Shevardnadze—against the views of most of his ministry and with only partial advance approval from Gorbachev—agreed to a joint statement with Baker that condemned Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and endorsed an arms embargo: how Moscow came to support UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq; how Iraq special envoy Yevgeny Primakov and Shevardnadze battled for Gorbachev’s allegiance; and how Bessmertnykh single-handedly revised a Soviet plan presented to Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz by Gorbachev and Primakov that might have derailed US-Soviet cooperation. Chernyaev detailed Gorbachev’s frenetic efforts to negotiate a diplomatic solution, quoting extensively from transcripts of Gorbachev’s talks with Aziz. It is quite clear from the conference discussions that US-Soviet cooperation was fragile and contradictory. Gorbachev desperately wanted to avoid the bombardment of Iraq and the eventual ground assault on Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. Primakov continually kept alive in Gorbachev the hope that he could elicit concessions from Saddam Hussein. Had Primakov succeeded, the conference discussions leave little doubt that a major rift in US-Soviet relations would have followed.

The final session directly addressed the crucial backdrop to all the preceding diplomacy of the Cold War’s end: Soviet domestic politics and the mounting dual crises of the communist system and the Soviet empire. The conferees discussed efforts by Bush, Baker and Matlock to warn Gorbachev of an impending coup. Since many of the principals were present, the conference provided an opportunity to clarify the flow and eventual fate of information during this unusual episode. The discussants also explored the collapse of Gorbachev’s support and the final crisis and dissolution of the Soviet Union. They discussed the extent to which the policies and actions of the United States and its allies played a part in these events. There was a sharp debate on the question of whether the Soviet Union could have been saved in some form, and whether US policy could have done more to support Soviet reforms. Baker made a strong case for the US policy of supporting Gorbachev to the end, but responding conservatively to the Soviet leader’s pleas for financial support. By contrast, even Moscow’s most ardent Westernizers were disappointed by the extent of the aid the United States and its allies were able or willing to extend. As Chernyaev noted, “my feeling is that eventually the Group of 7 did not come through and it did not help Gorbachev the way it could have helped Gorbachev at a crucial moment.”

As the Cold War recedes into memory it is all to easy to forget how potentially apocalyptic it was. It stagers the imagination that a conflict that could have ended civilized life on the planet rapidly drew to a close in the second half of the 1980s and the two years leading up to the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991. How that transpired is very much a human story of leaders engaged in the responsible pursuit of conflict resolution. The testimony of the participants in the Princeton conference not only adds to the historical record, but also provides instructive insights into conflict resolution in general.
Fred I. Greenstein is Professor of Politics and Director of the John Foster Dulles Program for the Study of Leadership in International Affairs at Princeton University.

William Wohlforth is Assistant Professor of International Affairs in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.


COLD WAR DOCUMENTS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

CPUSA Records Microfilm: The Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI) has delivered to Library of Congress representatives in Moscow the final set of microfilm of its Communist Party USA (CPUSA) records, fond 515. The first set, delivered last fall, contained 177,098 frames spanning the origins of the American Communist movement to 1929. This final set contains 258,067 frames and covers the period from 1929 to 1944 (fond 515 has no post-1944 material). Most of the total of 435,165 frames contain a single page from the original RGASPI collection. After the film reaches the Library of Congress a positive copy will be made for research use and the negative original retained for preservation. The positive copy of the first set, organized on 144 reels, is already available for research in the Manuscript Reading Room of the Library of Congress. John Earl Haynes, the Manuscript Division’s 20th century political historian, said that it is hoped that the positive copy of the final set will be available in fall 2001. It will be several years before a detailed finding aid is available, but Haynes is preparing a temporary finding aid that will provide the date (year) and a limited indication of the type of material (political bureau minutes, trade union secretariat, district and local party reports, agit-prop department records, foreign language and ethnic affiliate reports, and so forth) found on each reel. The microfilming costs, in excess of $100,000, were paid for by the Library of Congress’s James B. Wilbur Fund for Foreign Copying and by a gift from John W. Kluge.

Library of Congress Joins Incomka: The Library of Congress has become a partner in the International Computerization of the Comintern Archives (Incomka) Project. Incomka is a project of the International Council on Archives and its partners are the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), the Russian Archival Service (Rosarchive), the federal archives of Germany, the national archives of France, the federal archives of Switzerland, and the ministry of culture of Spain. Although not a full partner, the Soros Foundation has provided some financial support for the project. (Incomka is currently seeking additional partners to assist with the cost of the project.) John Van Oudenaren, chief of the Library of Congress’s European Division, is the Library’s representative on the Incomka governing board while John Earl Haynes of the Library’s Manuscript Division serves on Incomka’s historians committee.

Incomka has two parts. First, Incomka will digitize the finding aids (more than 25,000 pages) to Communist International collections at RGASPI into a text-searchable data base. When completed, a researcher will be able to make a rapid computer search of all of the Comintern finding aids (the opisi) for specific persons, organizations, and topics under a variety of search options in either Russian or English. Second, Incomka will digitize as images 5% (one million pages) of the most used and historically significant documents of the Comintern. The project will scan entire sections (opisi) of Comintern documents, not selected individual items. The opisi to be scanned in their entirety, chosen by a committee of historians, include the records of the Comintern’s political secretariat, the secretariats of individual members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), all of its regional (lander) secretariats (Anglo-American, Latin American, Balkan, Polish-Baltic, Scandinavian, Central European, and Eastern), as well as the records of various Comintern commissions and affiliates. When the project is finished, each partner will receive a complete set of the software, the data base, and the digitized images for placement at an institution in their home country. The software is a version of “ArchiDOC,” an electronic archival descriptive system first developed for the archive of Spain’s Council on the Indies. Among the scanned documents researchers will be able to call up a particular folder or file (delo) of a particular collection (opis) and examine the images of all of the documents in that file.

For further information, contact John Earl Haynes, 20th Century Political Historian Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, LM-102, Washington, D.C. 20540-4689 Phone: 202-707-1089, Fax: 202-707-6336, E-mail: jhay@loc.gov
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

COLD WAR IN THE BALKANS:
HISTORY AND CONSEQUENCES

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9:30-11:00 a.m. Panel 1: The Superpowers and the Balkans in the Early Cold War Years
11.30 a.m.-1:30 p.m. Panel 2: Balkan Diplomacy
3:00-5:00 p.m. Panel 3: The Balkans and the Cold War: The Military Issues

19 May 2000

9:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m. Panel 4: Intelligence Issues: A Critical Oral History Roundtable
2-5:30 p.m. Panel 5: The Cold War in the Balkans: Ethnic and Religious Factors

20 May 2000

9:00-10:15 a.m. Panel 6: Repression and Opposition
10.30-12.30 Panel 7: Critical Oral History Roundtable “Repression and Opposition”
2-5 p.m. Panel 8: The Year 1989 in the Balkans: The Transition to Democracy

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New Evidence on China, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War: Conference Report

By Priscilla Roberts

On 11-12 January 2000, the University of Hong Kong and the Cold War International History Project held the second in a planned series of collaborative international meetings on the Cold War. A first conference, organized by the Cold War International History Project and the University of Hong Kong, on “The Cold War in Asia” had been held in January 1996. Over two dozen scholars from China, Vietnam, Russia, the United States, Israel, and Europe gathered at the University of Hong Kong to present and discuss their most recent research findings on “China, Southeast Asia, and the Vietnam War.” Within the University of Hong Kong, the organizers were the Centre of Asian Studies, the Centre of American Studies, and the Department of History. Financial sponsorship was provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago); the Smith Richardson Foundation (Westport, CT); and the Louis Cha Fund for East-West Studies of the University of Hong Kong.

An overriding theme of the conference was the diversity which characterized the Communist camp during the Vietnam war period, a marked break with the old Western stereotype, so prominent during the war itself, of a monolithic Communist bloc. In the final session, Chen Jian (University of Virginia) commented specifically on the degree to which intra-Communist bloc relations and alliance dynamics thematically dominated the conference. The conference was marked by papers, based on archival evidence from Chinese, American, British, Russian, and Central and East European archives which brought out the existence of major divisions within the People’s Republic of China and between Chinese Communist leaders and their counterparts in other Southeast Asian countries. With sometimes heated and passionate debates between Chinese and Vietnamese scholars as to the merits of various decisions on Vietnam, the discussion was highly stimulating. Two leading Vietnamese scholars, Luu Doan Huynh and Doan Van Thang, (Institute of International Relations, Hanoi) who acted as commentators added a genuine Vietnamese perspective to the discussions which would otherwise have been lacking. The presence of prominent Chinese scholars, one of whom was privy to many Foreign Office deliberations during the later part of the Vietnam War, also gave discussions an immediacy and personal flavor.

A stimulating roundtable discussion of sources, archives, and methodology, featuring European and mainland Chinese scholars, some based in the People’s Republic of China and some at U.S. academic institutions, began the conference. Notable was the ingenuity with which Chinese scholars, often still denied access to central records, are utilizing provincial archives, railway administration archives, and similar materials in the quest to illuminate their own country’s past. The juxtaposition of these sources with American, British, and Soviet-bloc records, and Vietnamese oral histories, is enabling historians to begin to reach a far richer and deeper understanding of the Vietnam war’s internal and international dynamics and context, and of the often conflicting pressures that ideology and the pursuit of individual countries’ perceived national interests exerted.

The initial session, “The Path to Confrontation,” focused largely upon what is sometimes called “The First Indochina War” from 1945 to 1954. Ilya Gaiduk (Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow) and Tao Wenzhao (Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing [CASS]) focused on their countries’ respective policies at the 1954 Geneva conference. Both brought out the degree to which Ho Chi Minh’s two major Communist patrons pressured him to accept a solution partitioning Vietnam and to leave Cambodia and Laos under separate, non-communist governments. Charles Cogan (Harvard University) concentrated on the growing United States identification with the government of South Vietnam from 1954 to 1956. Fredrik Logevall (University of California, Santa Barbara) argued that Charles de Gaulle’s recognition of and negotiations with the People’s Republic of China in 1964 suggested the possibility existed of reaching a settlement which would have neutralized Vietnam.

The second and third sessions, “China and the Escalation of the Vietnam War” and “Chinese Aid to Vietnam,” dealt particularly with Chinese policy during the war years, drawing heavily on a variety of Chinese sources. Yang Kuishong (Institute of Modern History, CAS) provided an overview of Mao Zedong’s changing views on the Vietnam conflict, and their relationship to China’s own domestic and international concerns, the Sino-Soviet split, and to Mao’s personal preoccupation with revolution. Li Xiangqian (CCP’s Central Committee Party History Research Center) suggested that, even before the Tonkin Gulf Incident, the Sino-Soviet split and fears of Soviet hostility had led Mao to shift the national emphasis from economic development to defense. Niu Jun (Institute of American Studies, CASS) charted China’s growing concern with the American threat in the post-Tonkin Gulf period, how the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia finally convinced Chinese leaders that the Soviets posed a greater threat to them than the Americans did. Noam Kochavi’s paper concentrated on United States policy during the period, especially on the vexed question as to whether in the early 1960s President John F. Kennedy contemplated a
rapprochement with China. Kochavi argued that, though the evidence on Kennedy’s intentions is decidedly inconclusive, it must in any case be doubted whether at this particular juncture an ideology-conscious Mao would have sanctioned such a move.

Three papers dealt in detail with Chinese aid to Vietnam during the war, including the controversial issue of whether China deliberately delayed the trans-shipping of Soviet aid shipments to Vietnam. Drawing on Railway Administration archives, Li Danhui (Contemporary China Institute, CASS) suggested that any such delays were bureaucratic rather than political in nature. She also pointed out that, although China pressured Vietnam to make a peace settlement in the 1969-1973 period, Chinese aid to Vietnam simultaneously increased, in the expectation that this would facilitate a later North Vietnamese takeover of the south. Qu Aiguo (Academy of Military History) provided an overview of Chinese military assistance from 1958 to 1973, arguing that the contribution of both supplies and military “volunteer” personnel was substantial. Zhang Shuguang (University of Maryland) suggested that the Chinese contribution to Vietnam was relatively limited and, in a theme taken up in later papers, that Chinese policy was relatively cautious and designed to avoid any full-scale war with the United States.

The session “Negotiations and Missed Opportunities” dealt with the often tortuous mediation and peace negotiation efforts of the mid-1960s. James Hershberg (George Washington University) presented a lengthy account of the abortive “Marigold” peace initiative of 1966, an East-bloc effort to end the war, brokered by Poland, which may have been derailed by a crucial miscommunication among the various negotiators. Robert Brigham (Vassar College) described the 1967 Pennsylvania peace initiative, whose failure helped to precipitate next year’s Tet offensive, by convincing the North Vietnamese that it would take further military pressure to persuade the United States to offer terms acceptable to them. Qu Xing (Beijing Foreign Affairs College) made it clear that Chinese leaders shared this perspective, and were in fact disappointed and skeptical when in May 1968—giving them only two hours’ notice—the North Vietnamese opened peace negotiations with the United States. In further revelations as to intra-Communist bloc divisions, he also mentioned that in 1971 the North Vietnamese were less than happy when Kissinger visited Beijing and the Chinese began to pressure them to reach a peace settlement.

A session on “The Vietnam War in Its Regional Context” gave rise to some of the most animated discussion of an always lively conference. Stein Toennesson (University of Oslo) and Christopher Goscha (Paris) presented a translation of a memoir written in 1979, just before the Sino-Vietnamese War, by the leading North Vietnamese Communist party official Le Duan. Often highly critical of his one-time fraternal Chinese communist allies, the manuscript provoked strong reactions from both Chinese and Vietnamese scholars as to its reliability and accuracy and the light it threw on Sino-Vietnamese relations. Mark Bradley (University of Wisconsin) made extensive use of both film and Vietnamese archives to provide fascinating insights into Vietnamese memories of the war and its impact. As with other wars in other countries, it seems that many Vietnamese are now eager either simply to forget the war or to derive whatever collateral benefits or advantages may accrue to them from it. Qiang Zhai (Auburn University) presented an overview of Sino-Cambodian relations, suggesting that, when dealing with Cambodia, Chinese officials were prepared to subordinate ideological loyalties to their desire to maintain a Cambodian government of any complexion so long as it was not dominated by Vietnam.

A final session, “The Vietnam War and Triangular Relations,” put the war in the broader context of international great power relations. Giving a revisionist view of Lyndon B. Johnson, Thomas A. Schwartz (Vanderbilt University) suggested that the president’s major foreign policy preoccupation was to accomplish an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, which defeat in Vietnam might have jeopardized. Chen Jian and James Hershberg gave a stimulating account of secret Chinese signalling to the United States in 1965, deliberately designed to limit the war’s scope and thereby prevent the Vietnam war from escalating into a major superpower confrontation, as had occurred with the Korean war in 1950. Drawing on a wide variety of archival sources, Jeffrey Kimball (Miami University of Ohio) suggested that Chinese initiatives were as important as those of the United States in the reopening of Sino-American relations, and that while the United States played the China card against the Soviet Union, China likewise played the U.S. card against the Soviet Union, and the North Vietnamese played all three big powers against each other for their own benefit. In the conference’s final paper, Shen Zhihua (Beijing Center for Oriental History Research) directly raised the question of whether China, in its eagerness for rapprochement with the United States, betrayed North Vietnamese interests. He suggested that, although the United States was eager to persuade China to pressure North Vietnam to make peace, in fact China also exerted pressure on Saigon and the United States to do so and to accept terms which would facilitate an eventual North Vietnamese takeover of the south.

Intense discussions, reportedly continuing into the small hours in the University of Hong Kong’s guesthouse, marked the entire conference, making it clear that numerous issues relating to the Vietnam war remain as controversial among Chinese and Vietnamese scholars as they are to their American and European counterparts.

This conference and its January 1996 predecessor will be only the first and second of a series of such gatherings. Several themes for potential future meetings have already been suggested, among them: Southeast Asian communism during the Cold War; Sino-Indian relations in the 1950s and 1960s; and the United States opening to China.
1969-1973. Efforts to build on various intra-university initiatives and establish an Asian branch of the Cold War International History Project at the University of Hong Kong are also currently under way. It is hoped that these will include, among other things, the establishment of an Asian Cold War website and the provision of Cold War fellowships for scholars from around the region.

Priscilla Roberts is a Lecturer in History and Director of the Centre of American Studies of the University of Hong Kong. She received her undergraduate and doctoral degrees from King's College, Cambridge. She has published numerous articles on twentieth-century international diplomacy and is the author of The Cold War (2000), has edited Sino-American Relations Since 1900 (1991) and The Chinese Diaries of David K. E. Bruce (forthcoming), and is assistant editor of An Encyclopedia of the Korean War

Update on the Stasi Archives

By Gary Bruce

I. Background

In expectation of vast amounts of documentation, East Germany’s Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit) built its central archive in East Berlin out of reinforced concrete.1 Within the walls of this archive, and the regional MfS archives, lie over 102 miles of documents.2 Although the amount of archival material is enormous, it would have been even greater had the MfS’ successor, the Office for National Security (Amt für Nationale Sicherheit - AfNS), not destroyed considerable amounts of the holdings in the fall of 1989. Ironically, the order by Wolfgang Schwanitz, the last head of the AfNS, on 7 December 1989 to systematically destroy incriminating material hastened the demise of the secret police.3 Smoke billowing out of the chimneys of MfS regional offices incited citizens to storm the buildings and secure the documents.4 The security of the archival material was also a primary motivation for the several thousand citizens who stormed the MfS headquarters in East Berlin on 15 January 1990.5

On the same day of the storming of the headquarters, a “citizens’ committee” was created to oversee the dismantling of the AfNS.6 Present right of access to the MfS documents is primarily a result of pressure from this committee, and other East German grass roots movements, for full access to the files. This pressure forced the East German parliament, which had been freely elected in March 1990, to pass a law on 24 August 1990 requiring that MfS records remain on the territory of the GDR, rather than be transferred to the West German federal archives in Koblenz, as foreseen in the draft unification treaty, where they would have been subject to stricter West German classification rules.7 The draft unification treaty was subsequently adjusted to reflect that MfS files would remain on GDR territory. Furthermore, an addendum to the treaty stated that a future all-German parliament would address other issues concerning the files, such as the conditions of access to MfS files for the victims of the secret police, and the ban on file use by the new German secret service.8

The German Unification Treaty of 1990 created a special body to administer the MfS files called the “Special Commissioner of the Federal Government for the Files of the former State Security Service” (Sonderbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des ehemaligen Staats sicherheitsdienstes) under the leadership of Rostock pastor Joachim Gauck.9 The use of MfS files was codified in the “Law on the Files of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic” (Gesetz über die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, or simply Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz) of 20 December 1991. This law came into force on 1 January 1992.

II. Holdings

The central MfS archives contain two broad categories of documents: personal files, and files relating to the administration of the MfS (Sachakte). The personal files, which make up 80 percent of the archival holdings, consist of records on approximately four million East Germans and two million West Germans.10 Due to privacy considerations, these documents are only accessible to those individuals personally affected, or to researchers who have obtained permission from those affected for use of their files.11 In general, these files deal solely with the conduct of certain individuals. The remaining 20 percent of MfS files will be of greater interest to historians of the GDR, for these documents provide more information on GDR society, the functioning of the MfS, and its place within the state apparatus.12

The documents of three record groups of the Sachakte are particularly noteworthy: the “documenta-
tion section” (Dokumentenstelle), the Secretariat of the Minister (Sekretariat des Ministers - SdM), and the Central Evaluation and Information Group (Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe -ZAIG.) The “documentation section” contains a collection of instructions, directives, guidelines and other similar orders from the MfS leadership, as well as a series of documents from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for National Defense.13 These documents provide detail on the operational conduct of the MfS and insight into its internal divisions and organization. Documents in this group cover a wide range of topics, from relatively straightforward orders for securing May Day festivities in the GDR, to detailed instructions regarding the recruitment of informants, to often 40-50 page long directives outlining operations against particular targets.

The documents in the “Secretariat of the Minister” record group are critical to the understanding of the hierarchy of the MfS and shifting priorities for the organization. These documents cover the period from 1945 to 1989 and contain, among other items, the protocols of conferences of the MfS leadership, the Kollegium sessions from 1954 to 1989, and other meetings of the MfS leadership.14 Because of the lack of information on the foreign espionage branch of the MfS, this record group will be of considerable interest to researchers dealing with the GDR’s foreign espionage, for Markus Wolf’s comments occupy a prominent position in the discussions of the MfS leadership. These documents are also important for tracing the careers of the leading figures in the MfS. They do not, however, contain much information relating to developments within the Socialist Unity Party.15
The “Secretariat of the Minister” documents often provide insight into GDR society through the speeches of the various department heads on the situation in their jurisdiction, but they do not provide the detail found in documents of the Central Evaluation and Information Group. The ZAIG collected and evaluated information from unofficial informants from the general population on the situation in the GDR, and prepared a summary and analysis for the leadership of the MfS, the Party, and the government. Furthermore, this branch was responsible for ensuring that the leadership plans were carried out at the lower levels of the MfS. This record group contains enormous documentation on popular opinion towards developments in the GDR, especially for the 1970s and 1980s. Because the ZAIG was not founded until the mid-1950s, researchers who are interested in MfS evaluation of the popular mood prior to that date will have to turn to the files of the ZAIG predecessor, the Central Information Group (Zentrale Informationsgruppe.) The reports on the population on which the Central Information Group based its analysis are contained in a general record group called the Allgemeine Sachablage. The files of the ZAIG and its forerunner are especially useful in determining the popular perception of the SED and its politics, and therefore researchers dealing with opposition and resistance in East Germany will have to consider these sources.

III. Limitations

It is, of course, the responsibility of each researcher to judge the value of MfS documents for their own topics. A few general words about the limitations of the documents, and the archives themselves, are nevertheless in order. The extent to which the MfS documents were deficient in reflecting actual developments in GDR society should be kept in mind. On the citizens’ movement (Bürgerbewegung) of the 1980s, for example, the MfS documents are important because the movement itself did not leave much written material and there is little information on the movement in the archives of the SED. Yet one would be unwise to accept MfS documents as an accurate reflection of opposition in the 1980s. In the spring of 1989, the MfS reported approximately 150 oppositional groups with an active membership of 2,500 and a further 5,000 who were sympathetic to the groups or passive supporters. However, present estimates suggest that there were at least 325 oppositional groups, and between 10,000 and 15,000 people who were actively involved with the groups. Historians interested in gaining insight into GDR society would be advised to consult other sources in addition to the MfS files, such as the police records, files of the non-Marxist parties, SED reports, church files, or the records of the Free German Trade Union.

There are certain subjects for which, due to several reasons, MfS files are unavailable. There is little documentation on the foreign espionage branch of the MfS because of the widespread destruction of documents that took place in the fall of 1989. It should be noted, however, that it is by no means clear how much of this documentation survived, be it in eastern Germany or Washington. The recent discovery of a data base of HVA informants and a catalogue of their reports (the so-called “Sira” data base for System, Information, Recherche der Aufklärung), and the corresponding revelation that CIA-held Stasi files acquired after 1989 hold a key to deciphering the code names, are testimony to the above points.

There is also little material on the role of the KGB in the MfS in the 1950s. Due to classification, there are a number of files that remain closed to researchers, including files relating to supranational organizations and foreign countries, counter-intelligence, terrorism, and secret West German matters. Much material still remains inaccessible because of the chaotic state in which the archives were left. Roughly one third of archival material has yet to be catalogued.

The “unofficial classification” taking place in the archive also poses a barrier to researchers. External researchers are not guaranteed the same complete access to non-classified materials as the researchers of the internal research branch (Abteilung Bildung und Forschung). What is worse, external researchers are usually unaware of this practice because they are not informed that information is being withheld and, because of the manner in which the archive operates (outlined below), are not able to verify for themselves what documentation should be available. This unacceptable practice likely has its roots in the territorialism of the internal research division. A much-needed breakdown of the early organization of the MfS which has been produced by the BStU, for example, is for the exclusive use of the in-house researchers.

Apart from limitations of the holdings, the procedure for processing a research application also poses certain limitations for researchers. After a researcher has applied and received permission to use the archives—which is presently a process of between 1 1/2 and 2 years—the researcher is invited to the archives to discuss his/her topic with a Sachbearbeiter. The Sachbearbeiter then commissions a search for relevant material. Once material has been located, the researcher is invited back to the archives to see the material. Because there are no finding aids, the researcher is entirely dependent on the Sachbearbeiter and their instructions to the locators for retrieval of information. The dependence on the Sachbearbeiter is a drawback for researchers, as Sachbearbeiter often have little knowledge of the topic at hand, nor are they always aware of the most important archival holdings on the subject. This deficiency in the archives is largely due to the inefficient manner in which research applications are assigned to Sachbearbeiter. Topics are assigned to Sachbearbeiter based on the Sachbearbeiter’s general area of responsibility, such as “Border Issues,” with little regard for periodization. As a result, each Sachbearbeiter handles an enormous range of topics from all eras of the MfS that fall loosely under their jurisdiction, and, to be fair, they cannot be expected to
provide a thorough treatment of the application. This problem is compounded by the clear lack of cooperation between the division of the archives responsible for external researchers, and the internal research division. Sachbearbeiter are too often unaware of the research projects being carried out by their colleagues in the research division and thus are unable to take advantage of their colleagues’ knowledge of archival holdings. There is, however, usually little difficulty in retrieving material if the researcher already has the archival call number.

IV. Present research

The research division of the archives has already published a series of valuable documentation on and analyses of the MfS.29 At present, the research division continues to research its main project, the MfS-Handbuch, which will provide a detailed history of the institution from its beginning until 1990 once completed. Several installments of the MfS-Handbuch have already been published.30 Other projects underway include “Women in the MfS,” “The prison system of the GDR under the influence of the Ministry for State Security,” and “The Influence of the MfS on the Human Rights Debate in the GDR.” Researchers interested in the latest research projects being carried out by the internal research division should consult Aktuelles aus der DDR-Forschung, available on-line at http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/ddr-forschung/Projekt.html. The forth official update produced by the BStU (4. Tätigkeitsbericht) appeared in 1999.

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4 Ibid., p. 372.
7 John Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent: The East German Opposition and its Legacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 188.
8 Ibid.
10 Gauck, p. 11.
11 See Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, Paragraph 32
14 Ibid., p. 28.
15 Suckut, “Die Bedeutung,” p. 204.
16 Engelmann, p. 28.
17 Ibid., p. 28.
19 Ibid, p. 203.
21 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Telephone interview with Karin Göpel, BStU, 14 April 1997.
27 Interview with Herr Wiedmann, BStU, 28 April 1997.
28 Approximately 3,000 applications for academic research had been received by the BStU in its first five years in operation. Telephone interview with Karin Göpel, BstU, 14 April 1997.
29 See the list contained at the end of Henke, Engelmann, Aktenlage.
NEW RUSSIAN, CHINESE, KOREAN AND EUROPEAN EVIDENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR

21 June 2000

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Washington, D.C.

Sponsored by
The Cold War International History Project
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars),
The Korea Society (New York),
and the
Asia Program
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars)

9:00 AM  Breakfast and Registration

9:30 AM  Opening and Welcome Remarks (Warren Cohen, Robert Hathaway)

9:45 AM  New Russian and Eastern European Evidence on the Korean War

CHAIR: Nicholas Eberstadt (American Enterprise Institute)

PRESENTATIONS:
Kathryn Weathersby (CWIHP): “New Evidence on Stalin and the Korean War”
Mark O’Neill (Florida State University): “The Soviet Air Force in the Korean War”

Discussion

11:15 AM  New Chinese and Korean Evidence on the Korean War

CHAIR: Warren Cohen (University of Maryland—Baltimore)

PRESENTATIONS:
Zhai Qiang (Auburn University): “Mao Zedong and the Korean War”
William Stueck (University of Georgia): “Moving Beyond Origins: Korean War Revisionism and the New Evidence from Russian and Chinese Archives”
Fred Beck (Falls Church, VA): “A North Korean War Memoir”

COMMENT: Hyuh In-Taek (Korea University, Seoul)

Discussion
Western Intelligence Gathering and the Division of German Science

By Paul Maddrell

The three documents below\(^1\) shed light on two neglected themes of Cold War history: first, how scientists returning to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1950s were bribed and flattered to become members of its privileged nomenklatura, and, second, which of the scientists who refused these privileges and became valuable to Western intelligence services, particularly those of the United States and Britain. The reports depict one aspect of the division of Germany in the 1950s: the division of its scientific community, and its significant consequences for intelligence-gathering in the two Germanies. Scientists who returned to East Germany in the years 1950-58 from compulsory work in the Soviet Union promised to be of value to the GDR authorities for the contributions they could make to its scientific progress; they were of great interest to the intelligence services of Britain and the United States because they could provide much sought-after information on the military-industrial complex of the USSR. Some fled to the West soon after their return to East Germany, either by arrangement with a Western intelligence service or on their own initiative; some, for one reason or another, threw in their lot with the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and some (generally the less important scientists) were allowed to go West. Others, who stayed in the GDR, may have been recruited by Western intelligence services as “agents-in-place” in important research institutes, factories and ministries. Their controllers were particularly interested in any connections between these institutions and institutes, factories and ministries in the USSR itself.

Loyalty and how to buy it is the dominant theme of the first report.\(^2\) Dated 31 December 1954, the report was written in anticipation of the return to East Germany in 1955 of the most important of the atomic scientists taken by force to the Soviet Union in 1945. The SED was eager to keep in the GDR those scientists, engineers and technicians who had been employed on atomic tasks in the Soviet Union. The well-informed Soviets (referred to in the report with the characteristic SED term “die Freunde” — “our Friends”) provided its officials with information on the returning men and women. Both Soviet and East German officials examined the returning scientists and their background closely, looking for sympathy towards Communism, affection for the Soviet Union, and a lack of ties to the West, all of which would help to prevent them from going West as soon as they found themselves on German soil. Equally useful to the Party were flaws in the character of each scientific worker. Financial greed and a need for admiration from others (Geltungsbedürfnis) would lay the target open to bribery and flattery, activities at which the nomenklatura state excelled. Both failings were rightly detected in abundance in Baron Manfred von Ardenne, who is discussed in the first report below. The SED’s officials saw it would be worthwhile to make a show of admiration for von Ardenne, and Ulbricht made sure to send a personal representative, Fritz Zeiler, to greet him when he arrived in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder three months later. Zeiler’s report to Ulbricht on the encounter is the second document below. Zeiler was an appropriate choice to meet von Ardenne, as he was the department chief in the SED’s Central Committee responsible for economic management. In his autobiography, von Ardenne mistakenly remembers his name as Eichler.

Just as the SED waited expectantly for the return of scientists it saw as likely to be useful to the development of science in the fledgling GDR, the CIA, British Intelligence and the CIA-controlled Gehlen Organization\(^3\) also prized these people for their value to intelligence. Thus, on the other side of the Berlin sectoral divide, the Western intelligence services also waited for the returnees. The East German Ministry of State Security [Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, or MfS], aware of the Western intelligence services’ interests in these scientists, kept two lists. The first list is of eleven men whom the SED regarded as security risks because it suspected that the men had “links with secret services, were formerly counter-intelligence officers in the Gestapo, displayed a hostile attitude at work and have interesting connections with persons in foreign capitalist countries.” The MfS would investigate these men [Des weiteren müssen folgende Spezialisten operativ bearbeitet werden].

The second list, the A-list of eighteen scientists, is composed of men who, for security reasons, were to be kept in the GDR. They had worked on important research projects in the USSR, and the Soviets did not want their knowledge to become available to the Americans, British or West Germans. Misspellings complicate the task of establishing to whom the surnames on the list refer, but an additional list, prepared at about the same time entitled “List of German specialists, workers and their families who are being released from work in the USSR and wish to return to their homeland” [Liste der deutschen Spezialisten, Arbeiter und ihrer Familien, die von der Arbeit in der UdSSR entbunden werden und in die Heimat zurückkehren wollen] contained in the same SAPMO-Bundesarchiv file, eases this task, since those on it with the same or similar names are likely the same as those on the A-list. All but two of those on the A-list had certainly worked on atomic projects in the USSR; it is likely that they all had.

The A-list is dominated by the “Riehl Group,” a group...
of fourteen scientists who, in the years just after World War II, had worked on the production of pure uranium at Factory No. 12 at Elektrostal, not far from Moscow. Of the nine remaining people on the A-list, at least seven were employed on atomic research projects conducted at the Hertz and von Ardenne Institutes at Sukhumi on the Black Sea.

Many of those on these two lists were awarded particularly high salaries on their return to the GDR. In July 1955, the Secretariat of the SED’s Central Committee decided to award a salary of DM 12,000 to Nikolaus Riehl and one of DM 8,000 to Heinz Barwich. Other leading atomic scientists, such as Ludwig Ziehl, Hans Born, Henry Ortmann, Walter Herrmann, Justus Mühlendörft, Herbert Thieme and Fritz Bernhardt were also awarded large salaries. The highest salary of all—DM 15,000—was awarded to another repatriated atomic scientist, Max Volmer.4 Remarkably, the Central Committee Secretariat decided to award Riehl this salary some six weeks after he had defected to the West. It was either hopelessly inefficient or desperately wanted his return.

The choice of the people mentioned in the first report—whether, after their return to East Germany, to stay or to defect—reflects the country’s growing division. The SED was successful in enlisting the support of some of those on the lists. As the report shows, the communist officials correctly perceived that Manfred von Ardenne had no commitment to communism, the GDR or the USSR. But they saw that he was an egotistical opportunist who could therefore be kept in East Germany. He was both very greedy and horribly vain and thus a perfect collaborator. Of course, von Ardenne drove a hard bargain for remaining in East Germany. He was allowed to set up a private research institute in Dresden, which became the largest private employer in the GDR.5 This makes a mockery of the nickname he later acquired—“the Red Baron.” The institute’s financial security in its early years was guaranteed through an agreement by Walter Ulbricht to allocate to it, every year, a number of state research tasks. The First Secretary thus hoped to keep scientific and technical staff in the East. In agreeing to this arrangement, he responded to the stress laid on the crucial importance of finding proper employment for von Ardenne’s team. Von Ardenne himself became an aristocrat in Ulbricht’s nomenklatura state, the winner of a National Prize 1st Class (in 1958) and other awards, and a member of the Volkskammer [the GDR Parliament].

As suggested in the reports, Ulbricht did indeed apply the personal touch to impress on certain scientists how highly the regime thought of them. He visited von Ardenne the day after he arrived at his new institute. The visit had the desired effect on the vain baron who, thirty years later, wrote in his autobiography: “He seemed to be extraordinarily interested in our plans and stayed past lunch into the afternoon.” A week later, the mayor of Dresden turned up at von Ardenne’s front door and presented him with a gift from Ulbricht—a Soviet SIS limousine. Von Ardenne never had to drive the car himself; a chauffeur came with it. Nor was the First Secretary von Ardenne’s only visitor of consequence. A month later, the Interior Minister, Willi Stoph, made a trip to Dresden, and over the years, much of the GDR’s elite followed in the two men’s wake. Stoph had overall responsibility for the “loyalty measures”[Betreuungsmaßnahmen] taken to provide for the well-being of the returning scientists.6

The SED’s purchase of von Ardenne reflects the problem the Party faced building communism in East Germany. In the absence of strong popular support for the creation of a communist society, the Party had to build it on opportunism within the political elite. Even those bought “for the GDR” were often just as opportunistic. Von Ardenne was only committed to communism insofar as he expected to derive some benefit from it. Of course, he was not the only “specialist” to be bought. Werner Hartmann became a professor and the director of one of the most important factories in East Germany, the VEB RFT Meßelektronik Dresden.7 Honors were piled on Max Volmer to keep him in the GDR. In 1956, only one year after his return to Germany, he was made president of the Academy of Sciences.8

Von Ardenne was so satisfied with the treatment accorded to him by the SED that he proved willing to spy for it at international conferences abroad. The last document is a report sent by von Ardenne to Ulbricht about a possible defense being considered in the United States against attack by long-range ballistic missiles. This report by “our Professor Manfred von Ardenne” was sent by Ulbricht to the CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. It is of interest not only because it shows how successful the SED had been in buying von Ardenne’s loyalty, but also because the radar-absorbing shield described in it anticipated modern Stealth technology. The idea foreshadowed current theories regarding a missile defense project.

However, many atomic scientists defected to the West soon after their return to Germany and were interrogated by the intelligence services of Britain, the United States and West Germany. The names of some appear on the two lists. According to a recent history of the CIA’s operations in Germany, in the 1950s these informants identified scientists working on Soviet atomic programs and revealed the locations of atomic installations in the USSR. This intelligence was checked against similar information acquired at the same time from the Soviet high-security cables tapped in the famous Berlin tunnel enterprise, Operation “Gold.”9

The West’s prize catch among the returned atomic scientists was the star of the A-list, a “Hero of Socialist Labor” and winner of the “Stalin Prize 1st Class,” the man described in this report as “the most important person among the remaining scientists.” Dr. Nikolaus Riehl. Since he was well-informed about scientific developments in the USSR, the report demands that he be kept in the GDR.10 However, Riehl defected to the British a few weeks after returning to East Berlin. He arrived back in East Germany
on 4 April 1955; by the beginning of June he was in the hands of the British Intelligence Organization (Germany). Others on the A-list also fled West such as: Günther Wirths, Karl Zimmer, Alexander Catsch and Karl-Franz Zühlke. Riehl, Wirths, Zimmer and Zühlke were all interrogated by British and American intelligence officers.

Interestingly, the name of Heinz Barwich appears on both the A-list of scientists with knowledge of value to the West and on the list of security suspects. The fact seems surprising at first, for he was known for his communist views, yet his subsequent actions justify the SED’s uncertainty about him in 1954. A considerable effort was made to enlist him in the service of the Communist state and he was named director of the GDR’s Central Institute for Nuclear Research and even vice-president of the Soviet Bloc’s United Institute for Nuclear Research, based near Moscow. He became such a trusted figure that in 1964 he was allowed to attend a conference on nuclear matters in Geneva. He used this opportunity to defect and settled in West Germany.

**DOCUMENT No. 1**

**Report on the Specialists Returning from the Soviet Union,**

**31 December 1954**

After consultation with the responsible administration and State Security representatives, perusal of the available documents and personal discussions with 100 specialists in Sukhumi and Moscow, the following material has been put together:

1. A general professional evaluation of the individual specialists.
2. Their political attitude towards the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.
3. Their links with West Berlin, West Germany and foreign capitalist countries.
4. Operational information which has been obtained on 48 people.
5. The possibilities of tying them to the German Democratic Republic.
6. Specialists intending to go to West Germany.

Currently, there are in:

- **Sukhumi**: 104 families=309 persons
- **Volga**: 26 families=77 persons
- **Moscow**: 5 families=11 persons
- **Kharkov**: 2 families= 5 persons
- **Voronezh**: 1 family=2 persons
- **Rostov-on-Don**: 1 family =1 persons

Total, 139 families=405 persons

**Sub-division according to profession**

- 1 professor of chemistry
- 19 doctors of physics
- 6 doctors of chemistry
- 4 doctors of medicine
- 22 engineers/designers
- 9 chemists
- 2 physicists
- 57 skilled workers
- 1 journalist
- 1 student
- 17 without a profession

**The von Ardenne Collective**

The von Ardenne group forms a closed collective of 15 people. This group will work with him at the institute in Dresden.

The responsible comrades of the Soviet administration said that among the remaining specialists are experts, some of greater scientific importance than von Ardenne. The following is known about von Ardenne:

- Von Ardenne is an engineer and has no further scientific qualification. He is an outstanding specialist.
- Our information is that upon his return he intends to undertake research projects which are of great importance to the USSR and the GDR.
- Our Friends [the Soviets] do not yet know anything about these [projects]; they still intend to talk to him some time about them.
- He was head of an institute in Berlin and had connections with Himmler, Göring and Goebbels.
- He paid financial contributions to the NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers’ Party] and carried out military research tasks during the war.
- His conduct up to recent times has still displayed an anti-Soviet attitude, though outwardly he presents himself as loyal.
- He has a bank account in West Germany into which sums of money are regularly deposited by the Americans in respect of patents and [of] his house.
- He is very greedy and makes thorough and inconsiderate use of his co-workers.
- One of his characteristics is a need for [personal] admiration.
- He has links with West Berlin, West Germany and foreign, capitalist countries.
- At the end of the war he intended to work for the Americans, however as the Soviet troops were quicker into Berlin he offered his services to the Soviet government.
- A letter [in this regard] to the American Military Government is available.
- In our opinion and that of our Friends, it is necessary to bring von Ardenne home with the first transport, so as to make it clear that his importance is fully recognized.
- By making use of his greed and his need for admiration, it is possible to keep him in the GDR.

Upon their return, seven people in von Ardenne’s
collective must be subjected to operational processing. The reasons are suspicions of espionage, anti-Soviet views, connections with the Gestapo and anti-democratic opinions. [...] Concerning the other people, nothing of importance is known.

The most important person among the remaining scientists is:

Riehl, Nikolaus - Dr. of Physics
Riehl is an internationally-known scientist, he is a member of many scientific societies, has extensive connections with West Germany and foreign, capitalist countries and has visited almost all European countries.
He is a “Hero of Socialist Labor” and has once won the “Stalin Prize 1st Class” (receiving 200,000 rubles). In the Soviet Union all his wishes were fulfilled.
It is known that the Americans, as well as West Germany, for scientific and political reasons, are very interested in him and will try, by all means, to convince him to leave the GDR.
He is politically inscrutable, extremely cunning and knows how to adapt himself to the prevailing circumstances. He thinks very highly of himself and knows his worth.
In the opinion of our Friends it is imperative to keep him in the GDR. He is well-informed about a number of developments in the USSR. Only by showing him appropriate respect and by finding him appropriate employment can he be kept in the GDR.
Information is available, according to which he intends to leave the German Democratic Republic. [...] The following specialists must be subjected to operational processing:

Barwich, Heinz
Dr. of Physics
Bumm, Helmut
Dr. of Physics
Siewert, Gerhard
Dr. of Chemistry
Ottmann, Henry
Dr. of Chemistry
Herrmann, Walter
Dr. of Physics
Hartmann, Werner
Dr. of Physics
Schütze, Werner
Dr. of Physics
Fröhlich, Heinz
Dr. of Physics
Kirst, Werner
Engineer, Chemistry
Bernhardt, Fritz
Engineer, Physics
Sille, Karl
Engineer, Fine Mechanics

These people have links to secret services, were formerly counter-intelligence officers in the Gestapo, displayed a hostile attitude at work or have interesting connections with persons in foreign, capitalist countries.

No operational material of importance exists concerning the remaining specialists. They did their work satisfactorily. [...] The following people have shown a positive attitude towards developments in the USSR:

Prof. Vollmer
Mühlenfort
Dr. of Physics

No operational material of importance exists concerning the skilled workers and those people who are not doing any work. In general, they have done their work satisfactorily and did not display a negative attitude. 3 skilled workers were members of the SED. [...] Once the specialists had been consulted and the available information examined, a final discussion was held with the management of the Sukhumi Institute and with Comrade Colonel Kuznetsov.
By way of summary, on the basis of the personal impressions formed in the discussions with the specialists, of the available information and [of the] the opinion of our Friends, the following conclusion can be reached:
The majority of the scientists and engineers will only make a decision upon their return to the GDR and according to the criterion of [the availability of] work. Almost all of them intend to obtain a good job. Their employment will be decisive in tying them to the GDR. For this reason it is imperative to arrange an appropriate reception for the specialists.
Our Friends are interested in the following scientists remaining in the GDR, since they worked on important research projects:

Schimor [misspelled: actually Schimohr] Schilling
Barwich Born
Mühlenfort [misspelled: actually Mühlenpfordt] Ziel
[misspelled: actually Ziehl]
Schmidt Lange
Wirts [misspelled: actually Wirths] Riehl
Kirst Thieme
Toppin [misspelled: actually Tobin] Siewert
Katsch [misspelled: actually Catsch] Zimmer
Zühlke Schibilla [perhaps misspelled and actually Przybilla]

Further, our Friends are further of the opinion that those of the specialists’ children who express the wish to complete their study in the USSR should be assigned to the “Deutsche Landsmannschaft.” 14 Furthermore, the Soviet administration explained that there were no contracts with the specialists which placed obligations on the GDR.
The Soviets are again examining whether the
specialists have entitlements deriving from their contracts. Should this be the case, the GDR government will be notified.

A list is available with the names of those individuals who are considered for the first transport.

Of importance are the von Ardenne collective and Prof. Vollmer (1st transport).

The Soviet administration again asks for official confirmation via the GDR embassy that the GDR government is ready to admit the planned 139 families to the GDR. This will also facilitate the organization of the transports.

The private notes of some scientists will be examined by a commission and handed over to the embassy for forwarding. Thus it will be possible to ascertain whether any research results have been achieved which are of importance for the GDR. The result of the examination and the documents will be handed over to the embassy.

It is proposed to send the first transport from Sukhumi to Dresden, since in it will be chiefly composed of specialists who will live and work in Dresden. For reasons of competence, the transport from the Volga must be sent to Berlin, since 11 families are to be accommodated in Berlin and 6 families are going to West Berlin.

The remaining 9 families will be distributed among the various cities in the GDR.

The same applies to the Moscow group. 3 people must be accommodated in Berlin, and one person is going to West Berlin.

In accordance with the wishes of the individual specialists, a list was drawn up concerning:
(a) the specialists who will work at the Academy [of Sciences],
(b) the specialists who want to work in industry,
(c) the specialists who want to study or work at the universities and technical high schools,
(d) other persons, as well as those who will pursue no profession,
(e) persons who will go to West Berlin or West Germany.

[Source: DY 30/3732, SAPMO-Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde. Translated by Paul Maddrell.]

Soviet Union

1. Collective of Mr. von Ardenne

Comrades Dr. Wittbrodt and Zeiler greeted each and every member of the collective, led by Mr. von Ardenne. Owing to the smooth unfolding of events and the excellent service in the Mitropa restaurant, von Ardenne said that they were immensely impressed and still could not believe that in a few hours they would be in their future home, Dresden.

After a large lunch we accompanied the transport by the train to Dresden.

During the journey to Dresden we had the opportunity, in a four-hour conversation with von Ardenne, to exchange a number of thoughts, the essence of which I pass on [to you] as follows:

Our overall impression is that von Ardenne wants to proceed at once, with great energy and zest, to implement a number of excellent new inventions or developments in his field.

During the journey I had the opportunity, owing to the long absence of Dr. Wittbrodt in another compartment, to speak privately with Mr. von Ardenne. I informed him that the Deputy Prime Minister, Cde. Walter Ulbricht, had expressed the wish, if it were possible, to speak personally with him on Saturday.

This news filled von Ardenne with enthusiasm. He asked me to tell the Deputy Prime Minister that, naturally, he would be at his disposal at any time and in particular would like [me] to express his pleasure that he saw in this offer the extraordinary generosity and interest of a member of the government, which, as he said, would not have been possible at all in earlier times (he meant before 1945).

Von Ardenne continued that he would like to express the modest wish, that, if it were possible, he could be allowed to set out before Mr. Ulbricht his plan of action and thoughts, and in addition, that he could with all his strength satisfy at once all the wishes and demands that the government might have. In this regard, von Ardenne informed me that he and his collective could undertake the manufacture of all the necessary prerequisites for the operation of an atomic pile, but not the construction itself.

Furthermore, he stressed that another, smaller collective led by (Dr. of Physics) Werner Hartmann would arrive, which would be very important in co-ordinating the work of the Ardenne collective. Later in the conversation, which continued in the presence of Comrade Dr. Wittbrodt, I had the impression that Dr. Wittbrodt and probably, through him, a number of people at the Academy, displayed extraordinary interest in the work of Mr. von Ardenne. I would like to back up this conjecture of mine by quoting a remark Dr. Wittbrodt made before the arrival of the collective in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder. He said that he could not entirely understand why he had to greet the collective as the representative of the Academy, as Comrade Ziller told him some time before that the Academy would have no connections at all with the Ardenne
collective and, moreover, did not need to concern itself with it.

Although this is only conjecture on my part, I must mention all the same that even the form of the conversation which Dr. Wittbrodt conducted in my presence during the journey from Frankfurt to Dresden led me to this view, since Dr. Wittbrodt showed particular interest, whenever possible, in learning much about the things which von Ardenne was thinking about building for us.

It should be mentioned, though, that von Ardenne was very careful, and when I was alone with him also said that he would not discuss his future work at all until he had talked about it with Cde. Ulbricht and heard what he had to recommend.

Drawing conclusions from the conversation we had, I would like to make the following remarks about the discussion:

(a) Remarks were made about the situation in the GDR with regard to the influence of the West and, in particular, its efforts to lure away well-qualified scientists. In this regard, von Ardenne, and in particular his wife, said that she was very afraid that when her husband went alone in the streets there was a danger that he might be kidnapped and taken by force to the West.

In this regard, of course, I supplied some general explanations, but considered further advice from an authorized body to be called for.

(b) [We discussed] the relation of his activity to that of particular scientific institutions in the GDR and in the West.

(c) [There were] questions concerning his personal relationship with our government bodies and particular branches of industry, which are connected with the production of devices developed by him.

It should also be mentioned that von Ardenne told me that there were a number of specialists in the Soviet Union who had let it be known that they wanted to go West, but he is utterly convinced that, if they are given employment in accord with their wishes and qualifications they will remain here [in the GDR]; he is prepared, at any time, to use his own influence in our support.

In this connection I had the impression that von Ardenne’s wife has very great influence over the wives of particular specialists.

On our arrival in Dresden we drove to the Hotel Astoria where, among other things, the Chairman of the District Council, Comrade Jahn, was present. He congratulated each of the specialists on their return to their homeland and expressed the hope that they would quickly settle in Dresden. He himself would do everything possible in his.

1. Some issues in connection with Prof. Dr. Max Vollmer

As I was informed by Comrade Hager and some of his colleagues, Prof. Vollmer is the most famous authority in the field of physical chemistry in Germany.

Prof. Vollmer, Prof. Herz and Prof. von Laue (formerly head of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute in West Berlin) are known as the Big Three scientists in this field in all of Germany.

Prof. Vollmer, who until 1945 was a full professor and director of the Institute for Physical Chemistry at the TH [Technical University] in Berlin, in a conversation with Comrade Professor Rompe and in the presence of Comrade Reetz of our Department for Academic Life, asked for advice in the following matter:

Prof. von Laue, from West Berlin, whom I mentioned above, probably at the direction of the Americans at the Technical University in West Berlin, had a big celebration arranged at the TH to greet Prof. Vollmer, at which Prof. Vollmer is to be awarded an honorary doctorate from the Technical High School in West Berlin.

Furthermore, his former institute and some rooms have been named after him.

Prof. Rompe suggested to Prof. Vollmer to do nothing for the time being and not to accept the invitation to [go to] West Berlin himself, but, if Prof. von Laue attends a further discussion with members of the Academy in the Democratic [East] Sector [of Berlin], to speak with him then.

For all the reasons given, Comrade Hager took the view that, if at all possible, Comrade Ulbricht should pay a personal visit to Prof. Vollmer in Potsdam. At the same time, Prof. Herz should likewise be asked to visit Prof. Vollmer.

Moreover, I was able to discover that Prof. Vollmer, after consulting with Prof. Brucksch about his kidneys, wants to apply himself to a large research project concerned with the defense against atomic emissions.

In my opinion, the visit suggested by Comrade Hager would undoubtedly be of great significance, since, as the evidence shows, Prof. Vollmer is an outstanding authority and personally refuses to take up work in the West.

2. Prof. Max Vollmer (Dr. in Chemistry), born 3 May 1885 in Hilden.

1910-1914: Assistant at Institute for Physical Chemistry of Leipzig University
1914-1918: Soldier
1918-1920: Chemist at the Auer Company
1920-1922: Full Professor at Hamburg University
1922-1945: Professor and Director of the Institute for Physical Chemistry at the Technical University, Berlin 1945: USSR

1. von Ardenne, Manfred, born 20 January 1907 in Hamburg.
1923: High School
1923-1925: Faculty of Mathematics of Berlin University-not completed
1943: Awarded title “Private Lecturer” at Berlin University. He has published approx. 250 scientific treatises in German journals and 15 books about high frequency, superheterodyne reception15, micro-
phones\textsuperscript{16} and television.
1925-1942: Head of his own scientific research institute in Berlin
1942-1945: Head of the scientific research institute of the Ministry for Post and Telecommunications.

F. Zeiler

[Source: DY 30/3732, SAPMO-Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde. Translated by Paul Maddrell.]

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\textbf{DOCUMENT No. 3}
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SED First Secretary Walter Ulbricht to CPSU First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev, 25 September 1958

25 September 1958

To the First Secretary of the CC of the CPSU Comrade N. S. Khrushchev

Dear Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich!

On the occasion of the international congress on electron microscopy in West Berlin, our Professor Manfred von Ardenne spoke with the former head of radar of the West German enterprise Telefunken, as well as with American experts on electronics. Their conversations touched on defense against long-range ballistic rockets. Professor von Ardenne is of the view that it would be necessary to make a protective surface for the rocket hull, which switches off the radar detection.

In the enclosure I pass on to you the ideas of Professor von Ardenne.

With friendly greetings,

W. Ulbricht.

Enclosure

Highly confidential!

Subject: Defense against long-range ballistic rockets with nuclear payloads

At an international scientific congress, conversations took place with leading scientists from Washington in the field of radar technology and electronics. In these conversations the Americans talked very openly about the above-mentioned topic. It transpires that in leading scientific-technical circles in the USA hold the view that, in approximately 5 to 8 years, a defense against long-range ballistic rockets will be possible, using counter-rockets charged with atomic explosive. The idea is that both the incoming ballistic rocket and its flight path are detected in good time by “long-range” radar sets. Then, in fractions of a second, electronic calculating machines calculate all the quantities which are necessary for the unerring control of the defensive rocket. That is as far as the American information goes, which in view of the current state of technology reveals very natural development trends.

The following technical conclusion, drawn by us from these conversations, seems important, since taking it promptly into account could be crucial for future military potential. This technical conclusion is [that] we must expect the opposite side to introduce the following developments. That is to say, [we must] make our own study of these questions, and we should begin the following developments at once:

Structuring long-range ballistic rockets in such a way that during their flight outside the Earth’s atmosphere they can no longer be detected by “long-range” radar sets. This could be achieved if, from the time the rocket broke out of the atmosphere until it re-entered it—therefore during its flight in a vacuum—a screen, equipped with a surface which absorbed the radar waves, were automatically to appear and open up on the rocket’s head. Such surfaces are in fact already known. However, owing to their structure, [the screen] would be destroyed by air friction as the rocket broke out of the atmosphere. Hence, the suggestion that the screen first be opened out after breaking out of the atmosphere. The method described would make a sufficiently precise analysis of the flight path of an incoming rocket impossible.

15 September 1958

[Source: DY 30/3733, SAPMO-Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde. Translated by Paul Maddrell.]

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\end{center}

Dr. Paul Maddrell is a Lecturer in the History of International Relations at the University of Salford, Manchester (U.K.).

\textsuperscript{1} These reports are today to be found in the archive of the office of Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the GDR’s Socialist Unity Party (\textit{Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands}, or SED) and Deputy Prime Minister, at the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv [SAPMO-Bundesarchiv] in
Berlin.

2 “Über die zurückkehrenden SU-Spezialisten”—the GDR authorities adopted the Soviet term, “specialists,” for the returning scientists, engineers and technicians.

3 The Gehlen Organization became West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) in 1956.

4 Minutes of the meeting of the Secretariat of the SED Central Committee on 13 July 1955, DY 301 IV 2/3/479, SAPMO-Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde.


7 “VEB” stands for “Volkseigener Betrieb” (factory owned by the people) and “RFT” for “Rundfunk-und-Fernmeldewesen” (radio and telecommunications technology), while “Messentechnik” means “measurement electronics”.


9 These cables were tapped from May 1955 until April 1956 and the information gathered for this cross-checking was “the tunnel’s main contribution to scientific-technical information.” However, the contribution of the human sources was clearly as important as that of the tunnel. For more information see David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev & George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 425.

10 In the German document: “Nach Meinung der Freunde ist es unbedingt notwendig, ihn in der DDR zu halten. Er ist über einige Entwicklungsthemen in der UdSSR gut informiert.”

11 STIB/P/I/843 dated 2 June 1955, DEFE 41/142, Public Record Office (PRO), London. In this telegram David Evans, the Director of the BIO(G)’s Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch informed the Ministry of Defense in London that, “Dr. Nikolaus Riehl ex 1037 now in West under British auspices”. “1037(P) Moscow” had been the German atomic scientists’ postal address in the Soviet Union.

12 STIB Interview Reports Nos. 234 & 261 on Dr. Nikolaus Riehl, DEFE 41/104 & DEFE 41/106; No. 232 on Dr. Günther Wirths, DEFE 41/104; No. 253 on Dr. Karl-Franz Zühlke, DEFE 41/106; No. 221 on Dr. Karl Zimmer, DEFE 21/43, PRO.

13 Fröhlich went to the West and was interrogated by British Intelligence. See STIB Interview Report No. 300 on Dr. Heinz Fröhlich, DEFE 41/107, PRO.

14 The “Deutsche Landsmannschaft” was an association of university students from the Eastern areas of the former German Reich.

15 This is a form of radio reception.

16 This is a mistake. von Ardenne was a pioneer of electron microscopy, not of microphony.

Bulgarian Documents on CD

BULGARIA IN THE WARSAW PACT (Sofia: IK 96plus LTD, 2000)

Editor-in-Chief Dr Jordan Baev; Computer Design Dr. Boyko Mladenov; Preface Dr. V. Mastny; Foreword Gen. A. Semerdjievb

The Documentary CD Volume, No. 1, contains about 150 selected and recently declassified documents from different Bulgarian, Russian, US, British and French archives about the establishment, development and dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty organization, as well as Bulgaria’s participation in it.
Letters to the Editor

I received today the latest issue of the Bulletin, and found it as fascinating as always.

I noted the exchange between Raymond Garthoff and T. Naftali and A. Fursenko. Perhaps I can shed a little light on a few of the technical issues raised in the article. I am currently working with a team of authors on a history of the Scud missile, and my research has touched on some of the issues raised in the recent Bulletin.

The reason why Khrushchev rejected the deployment of the Scud brigade to Cuba was more likely a technical decision than a policy decision. A Scud brigade could not be deployed by air in September 1962 whether Khrushchev wished it or not. The 8U218 launcher vehicle was simply too large and heavy for any existing Soviet cargo aircraft until the advent of the Antonov An-22 which did not enter service until later in the decade. Khrushchev probably rejected the deployment after having been told of this problem. The Cuban experience led the Soviet Army to push for the development of a lighter, air transportable version of the Scud launcher in 1963 based on this experience (the 9K73 system). Secondly, the R-11 M missile is called SS-1 b Scud A under the US/NATO intelligence nomenclature system, not the Scud B as mentioned in the Garthoff notes. This is worth noting as the R-11 M had a range of only 150 km, vs. 300 km for the Scud B (Russian: R-1 7) and is a fundamentally different system.

Related to this, Raymond Garthoff correctly pointed out the translation problems relating to the S-75 missile system from the previous article. However, the implications of this issue have not been adequately drawn out in either article. The S-75 is the Soviet designation for the SA-2 Guideline air defense missile system of the type deployed on Cuba during the crisis. In the early 1960s, the Soviets were conducting tests on this system to use it in a secondary role for the delivery of tactical nuclear warheads, much as the US Army was doing with the Nike Hercules missile. Given the missile’s small conventional warhead and mediocre accuracy in the surface-to-surface role, it made no sense to use it in such a fashion with a conventional warhead. The implication that can be drawn from this document is that the Soviet Ministry of Defense was considering a secondary use of the S-75 batteries already in Cuba as a means to deliver tactical nuclear warheads.

A clearer explanation should be made about the Russian word for division. The problem stems from the fact that there are actually two Russian words involved, diviziya and divizion. These two words are an endless source of confusion when dealing with military units in Russian, and the problem crops up in other Slavic languages as well, including Polish. The Russian word diviziya means a division or other large unit, divizion means a battalion or other small unit. I am sure that Raymond Garthoff understands this distinction, but his explanation was not very clear, especially to readers who may not be familiar with Russian.

On some other missile issues: the S-2 Sopka was known by the US/NATO nomenclature SSC-2b Samlet and was a Navy coastal defense version of the Mikoyan KS-1 Kometa (AS-1 Kennel) air-launched anti-ship missile. The FKR-1 Meteor was known by the US/NATO nomenclature SSC-2a Salish, and was a Soviet Air Force surface-to-surface version of the same Mikoyan missile. Although both systems used a related missile, the FKR-1 missile used inertial guidance and was armed exclusively with nuclear warheads, while the S-2 missile used active radar guidance and was usually armed with a large shaped-charge high explosive warhead. The two systems also differed in their launchers and support equipment, the S-2 Sopka using a four-wheel semi-trailer, and the FKR-1 Meteor using a longer semi-fixed ramp.

These details are worth noting as there has been continuing confusion over these missiles in accounts of the crisis. This confusion is not confined to historians of the crisis. It would appear that US intelligence was unaware of the FKR-1 Meteor configuration of this missile at the time of the missile crisis, and considered all of these missiles deployed in Cuba to be the conventionally armed anti-ship version. As a result, there was apparently no attempt to have them removed along with the other Soviet nuclear-capable missiles. Indeed, there is some evidence that the nuclear-capable FKR-1 Meteor missiles remained in Cuba after the crisis. I am not suggesting that their warheads remained there. But considering that more than half of the nuclear warheads deployed to Cuba were intended for this system, it is surprising that this weapon has received so little attention in recent accounts of the missile crisis. I think that some of this lack of attention has been due to this confusion over the nature and role of the different types of cruise missiles deployed on Cuba.

Sincerely,

Steven Zaloga
Stamford, CT
Response by Raymond Garthoff

I welcome Steven Zaloga’s commentary on my article, in particular his correction in identifying the R-11M as the Scud-1b (or Scud A) rather than the Scud-1c (Scud B). The history on which he is working will be most welcome, in particular inasmuch as Western publications almost always have used only NATO designations without relating them to the designations used in Soviet archival documents.

The suggestions that Krushchev’s decision not to send such missiles to Cuba was probably owing to the technical consideration that the system could not have been sent by air is, I believe, not supported. Indeed, as the Memorandum of 6 September points out, neither could the Luna system—yet it was sent to Cuba, by ship. The R-11M could equally well have been sent by ship, as were the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and all the warheads.

Mr. Zaloga’s suggestion that the discussion of possible employment of the S-75 (SA-2) surface-to-air missile system as a surface-to-surface tactical delivery system in that same Memorandum implied that the Ministry of Defense was “considering” its possible use as a means of tactical nuclear weapons delivery is, I believe, well taken. Both by technical qualities, which he notes, and by virtue of its inclusion in a memorandum discussing possible tactical nuclear reinforcement, it would seem that the Ministry was drawing attention to an additional possible tactical nuclear delivery capability. It was not, however, followed up and no tactical nuclear warheads for converted S-75 missile delivery were sent to Cuba.

Mr. Zaloga reiterates the distinction between diviziya (division) and divizion which I had noted. I am puzzled why he did not find my statement of the distinction sufficiently clear. I noted that divizion was not “division,” but in artillery and missile elements referred to a battalion sized unit. I even illustrated the point by noting “The air defense missile units in Cuba comprised two divisions (divizi), with 24 subordinate battalions (diviziony).” I thought I had made the distinction quite clear.

Mr. Zaloga spells out very well the differences between the naval coastal cruise missile system Sopka (SSC-2b Samlet) and the Air Force surface-to-surface tactical ground support FKR-1 (SSC-2a Salish). He further notes the confusion of some commentaries on the Cuban missile crisis, and apparently of US intelligence analysts at the time, in not recognizing the presence of the nuclear-capable FKR-1 cruise missile system in Cuba. He is quite right. I did not go into this subject in my brief article accompanying the translated archival documents, but perhaps I should at least have made reference to an extensive discussion of the matter in my recent article on “US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Intelligence and National Security (Vol. 13, No. 3, Autumn 1998), in which (pp. 29, 41 and 51) I explained that US intelligence analysts at the time had detected 100-115 crated cruise missiles in Cuba, but had failed to realize that only 32 were for the 4 Sopka naval coastal defense barriers (with 8 launchers, four missiles per launcher), and that the other 80—with nuclear warheads—were loading of five each for 16 FKR cruise missiles launchers in 2 ground support air force regiments. It is only since 1994 that we have had first the testimony of former Soviet officers and the archival documentation establishing the presence of the FKR with tactical nuclear warheads for that system.

Indeed, as I noted in that article, if US intelligence had in 1962 correctly identified the presence of the two different cruise missile systems, and the presence of about 100 tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba (80 warheads for the FKR cruise missiles, 12 for Luna rockets, 6 IL-28 bombs, and possibly 4-6 naval mines), “uncertainties over whether they all had later been removed would have seriously plagued the settlement of the crisis” (p. 29, and see 53-53). This may be one time when less that perfect intelligence was a boon. In any case, clarifying these matters now is surely important to a correct historical evaluation of the whole missile crisis.

Raymond L. Garthoff
Washington, DC
“Goodbye, Comrade”—Images from the Revolutions of ’89

During 1999, to mark the tenth anniversary of the revolution that toppled communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Cold War International History Project, together with the National Security Archive and the Gelman Library at George Washington University, supported an exhibition of political posters and other memorabilia of those dramatic events collected during the visits to Easter Europe and the former Soviet Union by former CWIHP Director James G. Hershberg, now an associate professor of history and international affairs at GWU. Taking its title from a Romanian poster depicting a Ceausescu-like figure skulking off into the distance carrying a hurriedly-packed suitcase, the exhibition was called “‘Goodbye, Comrade’—Images from the Revolutions of ’89,” and curated by the Special Collections Branch of the Gelman Library. To kick the exhibition off, the full-day symposium was held at Gelman at which scholars and participants presented findings and memories of the anti-communist uprisings. The 50 posters displayed ranged from official Soviet images of hailing glasnost and perestroika, to nationalist exhortations from Georgia and the Baltic former USSR republics, to anti-communist and dissident signs from all of the East-Central European countries as they made their escape from the Soviet empire. In their own way, they vividly illustrate the process of change and the power of images in the sweeping transformations that changed the world and ended the Cold War. Also on display were various items Hershberg collected, such as chunks of the Berlin Wall and bullet casings from the Romanian revolution, sample publications taking advantage of the new sources opened as a result of the revolutions, and examples of the Soviet underground rock n’ roll movement, including samizdat fanzines, donated by Gelman’s Mark Yoffe. Two catalogues were also printed—one, published by Gelman, contains glossy images of selected posters, while the other contains Hershberg’s detailed commentaries; a few copies remain available at the National Security Archive.

After the exhibition concluded at Gelman in December 1999, it was shown in the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency for several months in 2000. The materials were donated to Gelman and are available for display at other institutions. For further information, contact Hershberg at jhershb@gwu.edu