New Findings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution

By Csaba Békés

Since the revolutionary changes in 1989 and the 1990 free elections in Hungary, the majority of archival sources in Hungary on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution have become available to scholars. Similarly, a number of Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav archival documents have been discovered and released. Although the Soviet sources, which are of utmost importance, are still largely unavailable, some helpful clues to Soviet decision-making and actions have been provided through articles published in the former Soviet Union in the last few months.

As a result of declassification trends in East-Central Europe, as well as the release of numerous Western sources on 1956 during the latter part of the 1980s, members of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and other scholars in Hungary and abroad have already produced articles presenting hitherto unknown data, important evidence and new interpretations. This article will summarize some of the most significant findings of scholars concerning 1956.*

Internal Aspects of the Revolution

Many authors in recent years have attempted to define the character of the revolt. These studies were recently enhanced by the research of Dr. György Litván, director of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution Budapest, who has...
were set up with the participation of uncompromised and reliable local personalities. The new "revolutionary" or "national" councils then organized and directed the locality peacefully, without sparking any bloodshed. In many cases, the local revolutionary leaders established agreements of non-intervention with Soviet commanders; as a result, the Soviets did not intervene in the countryside before November 4.

Scholars researching the events of 1956 have thus far been unable to obtain exact data on the number of active participants in the revolution. Yet the new evidence allows researchers to confirm that there were 2,100 workers' councils in the country with 28,000 members, and tens of thousands of local revolutionary committees—far more than previously known. Several hundred thousand persons participated in the demonstrations during and after the revolution, according to the work of M. János Rainer (Institute of History, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest).

One of the remaining blank spots of the history of the revolution concerns the activity of the rebel groups fighting against the Soviet troops and Hungarian armed police force units in Budapest. The research in this area, begun just a year ago, requires a delicate approach, since there is much distortion in the memoirs of the fighters and in the records of the police and court proceedings. Despite the discrepancies, sociological examination of the records has shown that the fighters were not all criminals, as the Kadarist historians claimed; rather, those who fought were mostly young, unskilled workers, and, in some cases, students, soldiers and army officers. It is also clear that the political motivation of the fighters was weakly defined and stemmed from a unanimous rejection of the Stalinist regime; similarly, Gábor Kresalek (Budapest Municipal Archives) has maintained that their decision to take up arms was actually due to personal motives.

International Aspects of the Revolution

New archival discoveries have shed considerable light on the individuals responsible for the Soviet decision to intervene in Hungary. Dr. Tibor Hajdu (Institute of History, Budapest) recently uncovered a Czechoslovak document in the party archives in Prague which reveals the decisive roles played by Erno Gero, first secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party, and Yuri Andropov, then Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, in encouraging Soviet intervention on October 23; their support was especially significant in light of Khrushchev’s initial reluctance to provide armed support. The document is the minutes of an October 24 meeting of the Communist Bloc leaders in Moscow taken by Jan Svoboda, an aide to the Czechoslovak Communist Party leader, Antonin Novotny; they include Khrushchev’s account of the Polish situation and, as an unplanned item on the agenda, a discussion of the events in Budapest on the previous day, including Khrushchev’s telephone conversations with Gero, Defense Minister Marshal G. Zhukov, and others.

Until recently, it was uncertain when A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, representatives of the Soviet party, came to Budapest; the research of Tibor Hajdu and V. Muszatov (former deputy head, International Department, CPSU Central Committee) now proves that they arrived on October 24, right after the outbreak of the revolution, and left the country on October 31.

The CPSU Central Committee made two important decisions at its meeting on October 30-31: (1) it adopted a declaration concerning reformed relations between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries; and (2) it instructed Marshal Zhukov, the Minister of Defense, to develop a plan for resolving the Hungarian situation (V. Muszatov). As far as the declaration is concerned, British sources strongly support the assertion that the declaration was being prepared as early as mid-October, and was only “updated” after the events in Poland and in Hungary (Csaba Békés).

Details of the Soviet plan to invade Hungary, “Operation Whirlwind,” have also been uncovered. The plan was launched on November 1 by its commander-in-chief, Koniev, when he began the re-deployment of the Soviet troops. While only five Soviet divisions were stationed in the country dur-
ing October 23-30, the campaign which began on November 4 included three army corps consisting of at least 60,000 Soviet soldiers and officers. According to Soviet sources, 669 Soviet soldiers and officers were killed in the fighting, 1,450 were wounded and 51 were declared missing. The same sources claim that there were approximately 4,000 Hungarian victims—a number somewhat higher than had been estimated by Hungarian scholars (V. Muszatov).

Another clarification due to newly available documentation concerns the role of the Yugoslav leaders in the revolution, which was previously unclear. It now appears that the Yugoslavs cooperated with the Soviets in eliminating Imre Nagy and his colleagues from Hungarian political life by offering them asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest (László Varga, Budapest Municipal Archives; Pierre Maurer, Lausanne, Switzerland).

Recently opened Polish sources also provide interesting new information. They show that the Political Committee of the Polish United Workers Party condemned the use of Soviet troops in Hungary on November 1, but modified its position during subsequent days, presumably because of the Hungarian government’s unacceptable decision to leave the Warsaw Pact and declaration of Hungary’s neutrality (János Tischler, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest).

Western reaction to the revolution is now understood more clearly because of the recent declassification of Western documents. Among the most significant releases is a July 1956 policy paper adopted by the U.S. National Security Council, in which the United States government disavowed any political and military intervention in the Soviet satellites. This position was maintained throughout the events in Poland and Hungary in October-November of the same year (John C. Campbell, Columbia University). Similarly, newly available documents disprove Communist allegations that the U.S., Great Britain, France, and NATO were responsible for instigating the revolution. On the contrary, the Western powers were caught by surprise with news of the revolt in Budapest, and thereafter pursued a cautious policy of non-intervention to avoid antagonizing the Soviets.

Recent scholarship has also elucidated the connection (or lack thereof) between the Hungarian revolt and the Suez Crisis. Contradicting earlier assumptions, new sources on Suez show that the Hungarian events did not affect the timing of the secretly planned Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.

Similarly, scholars can now better understand the dynamics of the debates over Hungary in the United Nations. Surprisingly, a significant behind-the-scenes conflict arose between the United States on one side, and Great Britain and France on the other. The documents pertaining to the discussions among the three Western states prove that after the Suez action began, the British and the French—against American wishes—endeavored to divert attention from their Middle East campaign by attempting to bring the Hungarian issue to the UN spotlight. Their plan was to transfer the Hungarian question from the UN Security Council agenda to that of the General Assembly Emergency Session which had convened to discuss the Suez Crisis. However, the Americans, attempting to end the fighting in Egypt, blocked this plan by delaying the UN resolution process concerning Hungary until November 4 (Csaba Békés).

The Reprisals following the Revolution

Scholars have known for years that the retaliation following the uprising was massive and brutal, but recent research has uncovered reliable data. Between 1956 and 1959, 35,000 people were summoned for their activities during the revolution. Of those, 26,000 were brought to trial and 22,000 were sentenced. From 1957 to 1960, 13,000 people were interned. Between December 1956 and the summer of 1961, 350-400 death sentences were commuted in Hungary; 280-300 of those sentenced were executed because of their involvement in the revolution. The retaliation was mainly aimed at three major groups: (1) the armed insurgents; (2) the members of the revolutionary and workers’ councils; and (3) the representatives of the pre-1956 party opposition and intellectuals, including many writers (M. János Rainer).

The exact role of the Soviets in the reprisals is slowly but gradually becoming more clear. Recently published factual information shows that the Soviet security organs operating in Hungary arrested and handed over 1,326 individuals to the Hungarian authorities by mid-November 1956 (V. Muszatov). The new research leads scholars to assign more blame to Hungarian leaders in this area, especially concerning the fate of revolutionary prime minister Imre Nagy. The decision to bring Nagy to trial was made by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party at its 21 December 1957 session; the decision shows that Hungarian leader János Kadar and his collaborators wanted to avoid assuming individual responsibility for decisions involving forthcoming trials. A few months later, on 14 February 1958, at the next meeting of the party’s Political Committee, it was noted that the date set for Imre Nagy’s trial was inconvenient for the Soviets because of a scheduled East-West summit meeting. Kadar then offered two alternatives: either to have the trial take place as scheduled and pass a light sentence, or to postpone the trial and pass severe sentences as originally planned. The Central Committee eventually voted, at Kadar’s suggestion, for the latter option (Charles Gati, Union College; György Litván, M. János Rainer).

*Note: Rather than provide bibliographical references, the author has indicated the name of the scholar(s) to whom particular information should be attributed. Scholars interested in more details on sources should consult the forthcoming 1992 Yearbook of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. In addition to containing several papers on the aforementioned topics, the Yearbook will include a selected bibliography of publications on 1956 in the last three years. The author thanks M. János Rainer and György Litván for their useful advice and comments on the draft of this article.

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deed, given the sensitivity of the topic, the closed nature of the Soviet and East European societies, and the lack of any procedures in the Eastern bloc for requesting the declassification of documents (even for purely historical purposes), the chances of obtaining secret archival materials about the Prague Spring seemed all but non-existent as recently as five to six years ago.

It is true, of course, that even before the advent of “glasnost” and the collapse of the Communist bloc, valuable new sources about the events of 1968 were turning up from time to time. For example, a lengthy and revealing interview with Josef Smrkovsky, one of Alexander Dubček’s closest aides throughout the Prague Spring, was published in 1975, one year after Smrkovsky’s death. Similarly, in 1978 two outstanding retrospective accounts—one by Jiří Hajek, the Czechoslovak foreign minister in 1968, and the other by Zdeněk Mlynar, a top adviser to Dubček during most of the crisis—were published in the West. Both books went well beyond existing accounts by former Czechoslovak officials (including earlier works by Mlynar and Hajek themselves) in providing a wealth of first-hand information about the Soviet Union’s role in the crisis.

Nevertheless, the occasional appearances of memoirs and interviews with high-ranking participants in the Czechoslovak crisis could not make up for the total lack of scholarly access to original documentation in the Soviet Union and East European countries, although declassified cables, memoranda, and reports from U.S. government agencies and document repositories were useful in filling certain gaps.

As with so many other things, however, opportunities for research on the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis were fundamentally and permanently altered by the liberalization and collapse of Communism under Mikhail Gorbachev. Not only did a flood of new materials become available in the age of glasnost, but the whole question of the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion eventually became an integral part of Gorbachev’s reform program. Although several years had to pass before the Soviet leader was willing to condemn the invasion in public, the Soviet reassessment of the events of 1968 came to symbolize Gorbachev’s drastic reorientation of policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. This auspicious trend gained even greater momentum after free elections brought non-Communist governments to power all over Eastern Europe in 1989 and the Soviet Communist Party and state disintegrated in late 1991. Sensitive documents and first-hand accounts of the events leading up to and following the invasion, which once would have been wholly off-limits to Western (and Eastern) scholars, suddenly were available in abundance. Although many difficulties persist in gaining access to certain archival collections (especially in Moscow), students of the Prague Spring are at last able to explore documents that only recently were kept under tight guard.

This two-part article will discuss the nature and importance of newly available materials pertaining to the crisis of 1968, as well as the impact that these sources have had on long-accepted historical interpretations. The first part will attempt to give some idea of the vast scope of new evidence, including published and unpublished documents, interviews with key actors, and memoirs and reminiscences. The second article, to be published in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, will consider how—and to what extent—this new evidence has changed the historical record, both in the broad sense and with regard to specific details, and enumerate five broader issues that need further exploration once the requisite archives have been opened up.

NEW SOURCES

So many documents and other materials about the Prague Spring and the Soviet-led invasion have become available since the late 1980s that it would be impossible to compile an exhaustive list. The discussion here is intended merely to point out some of the most important and intriguing new sources, grouped under five broad headings: (1) published documents and reports; (2) unpublished documents (in archives); (3) published interviews with key participants in the crisis; (4) unpublished interviews; and (5) memoirs and other first-hand accounts.

1. Published Documents

Because of continued problems with archives in Russia and most of the East European countries (as discussed below), one of the most valuable sources of new evidence about the Czechoslovak crisis has been the large number of documents that have been published over the last few years in East European and Russian/Soviet newspapers, journals, and books. The existence of many of these documents was previously unknown, and they have been of profound importance in understanding certain aspects of the crisis. Other documents, such as the letter that Leonid Brezhnev sent to Dubček four days before the invasion, have long been known to exist, but their precise contents had never been disclosed. The publication of this latter group of items has helped round out the historical record. Until the archives in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are much better organized and catalogued, the publication of documents will remain an indispensable source for scholars in both East and West.

In some cases, documents that have been published since the late 1980s might otherwise have remained off-limits for several years or longer. In Czechoslovakia a government-sponsored commission that was assigned the task of reassessing the country’s fate between 1967 and 1970 has kept tight control over tens of thousands of important documents from that period. Fortunately, the commission has agreed from time to time to release key items (along with its own analyses) to newspapers and periodicals.

Such was the case, for example, with a collection of secret letters that Brezhnev wrote to Dubček between March and August 1968. These letters, along with a brief introductory essay by the commission, were published in a military-historical journal in early 1991, and they have certainly shed new light on the crisis. Other recently published items from the commission’s holdings include transcripts of multilateral Soviet-East European conferences (most of which were obtained from the Polish archives), transcripts of bilateral Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations and communiques, secret military directives, records from the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, reports prepared soon after the invasion by the Czechoslovak ministry of internal affairs, and the full Czech text of the so-called Moscow Protocols. Of particular interest are two letters that were clandestinely passed to the top Soviet authorities in August 1968 by a senior group of anti-reformist Czechoslovak officials led by Vasil Bilak; both letters (copies of which were finally turned over to the commission...
by the Russian government in July 1992) urged the Soviet Union to intervene with military force as soon as possible to forestall “the imminent threat of counterrevolution.”12 (The full text of the first letter is reprinted on page 35.) Now that the commission has largely completed its work, several members have spoken hopefully about pressing ahead with a more ambitious publication project, which will encompass thousands of previously unavailable documents and reports. This project, if it proves feasible, will keep scholars busy for many years to come.

The publication of documents in the Soviet Union and Russia also has been exceptionally valuable, not least because the archival situation in Moscow is still so uncertain. Had these materials not been obtained by the press, there is no telling when scholars might have gained access to them. Although the number of documents published in Soviet/Russian newspapers and periodicals is minuscule compared to the large quantity appearing in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries, the publication of even a few key items is a refreshing contrast to the past. Among documents that have appeared in Moscow over the last few years (either with or without the government’s consent) are transcripts of multilateral conferences, records of bilateral consultations between Brezhnev and his East European counterparts during the crisis, deliberations of top CPSU officials, and appeals from the Czechoslovak anti-reformist faction for “fraternal assistance” from the Soviet Union.13 Most of these materials (including all the transcripts of multilateral meetings) had already been published abroad, but at least a few appeared for the first time in the Russian/Soviet press. Because it may take years or even decades before the most important archives in Moscow are genuinely accessible, the publication of newly released documents about the Prague Spring is likely to remain a key source of evidence for scholars.

In addition to the publication of once-secret materials from the Soviet and East European archives, declassified U.S. documents pertaining to the Czechoslovak crisis have recently been disseminated on microfilm. The University Publications of America (UPA) has microfilmed the relevant country files for 1963-1969 from the National Security Files at the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. Although the UPA collection is necessarily incomplete (in part because new materials are being released all the time), the publisher has offered to update the series with periodic supplements. Moreover, UPA has compiled an extremely useful printed index that gives detailed information about every document, complete with a handy subject index. Another relevant microfilm series put out by UPA—a multi-reel collection of declassified reports on the Soviet Union prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency between 1946 and 1976—also includes a printed guide. Although most of the CIA reports do not bear directly on the Czechoslovak crisis, some agency assessments of the invasion (and the events leading up to it) are included. As with the National Security Files collection, this series cannot be all-inclusive, but the large amount of material it does cover provides an excellent complement to on-site work in American archives.

One final collection of materials about the Czechoslovak crisis that deserves special mention is the microfiche project entitled “Prague Spring ’68,” which was recently put out by a Dutch publisher, the Inter-Documentation Company, and its North American representative, Norman Ross Publishing. The project, edited by Jan Obrman of Radio Free Europe, is an extraordinarily useful compilation of some 50 Czechoslovak newspapers and periodicals from the period 1967-1969. It includes all the major Czech and Slovak dailies (e.g., Rude pravo, Pravda (Bratislava), Lidova demokracie, Mlada fronta, Hospodarske noviny, Vecerni Praha, Zemedelske noviny, Prace), the most daring of the literary and cultural outlets (e.g., Literarni listy, Filmovy prehled), plus a large number of specialized and regional publications and the full transcript from the 4th Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers’ Union in 1967. Of particular value are the two military publications A-Revue and Obrana liddi (though it would have been desirable to include one or two other military newspapers and journals, especially Lidova armada, which was the first publication in 1968 to carry the full text of the “Gottwald Memorandum”).

The “Prague Spring ’68” microfiche series will be welcomed by all those who have had the frustrating experience of trying to locate back issues of Czech and Slovak newspapers and periodicals. Even the largest of research libraries are unlikely to have a collection as complete and comprehensive as this series (in most cases, no issues at all are missing from the vast number of publications included), and scholars are free to choose the titles they wish to consult. The price of the full set (approximately $6,200 in 1992) puts it far beyond the reach of individual scholars, but it is not so exorbitant that it will deter purchases by major university libraries. IDC and Obroman should be commended for having put together such a valuable research project.

2. Unpublished Documents

In the former Communist countries, the availability of unpublished documents about the Czechoslovak crisis varies markedly. Unfortunately, in Russia, which is obviously the site of the most valuable items about the Soviet Union’s role, the new archival centers have barely begun to operate, and a large number of key documents are known to have been destroyed both before and especially after the August 1991 coup attempt.14 Moreover, it is unclear whether the three most important document repositories—the Presidential (or Kremlin) archive, the KGB archives, and the central military archives of the Ministry of Defense—will ever be opened for detailed research on post-1945 events. Thus far, access to the Kremlin and military archives has been routinely denied, and only a few postwar files from the KGB archives have been made available on a highly selective basis.15 No files at all pertaining to the Czechoslovak crisis have been released from any of the three archives. Individual scholars who have tried to use the Foreign Ministry archives for research on the 1968 invasion have not fared better. Although the Foreign Ministry presented a limited collection of relevant documents to the Czechoslovak government in late 1991, all the items were designated for official use only and were in no way intended as a signal of a less restrictive policy for scholars.16

Despite these persistent obstacles, there is at least some basis for hoping that genuine access to one or more of the archives will eventually be granted. The Russian government already has agreed, in principle, to open all (or most) of the files pertaining to the Czechoslovak crisis that are now located in the archives of the former Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). Those files, and others previously stored at the former Institute for Marxism-
Leninism, were recently consolidated in the huge “Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation” (Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii, or TsKhSD) at Staraya Ploschad, the former headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee. Because virtually all of the relevant files at TsKhSD are still classified and the procedures for declassification have yet to be worked out, it remains to be seen whether (and when) materials about the Prague Spring will be released. But if Russian officials do follow through on their pledge, it will be an encouraging sign that other collections may soon be opened as well.

In addition to the main document centers in Moscow, the new state archive in Ukraine includes at least a few valuable materials relating to the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. The chief Ukrainian document repository, known officially as the “Central State Archive of Ukraine’s Public Unions,” is now responsible for all files formerly in the Central Committee archives of the Ukrainian Communist Party. The new archive also contains documents from regional party committees. The problem, however, is that the Ukrainian archive is at an even more rudimentary stage of organization than the Russian archives. Files documenting the internal deliberations of the Ukrainian Communist Party’s top organs in 1968 might shed light on the fears that Ukrainian leaders had about a possible reformist “contagion” from the Prague Spring; but these files have not yet been properly catalogued or stored. Moreover, there is no telling when (or whether) they will be made available even if they are all eventually organized and catalogued. Ukrainian officials have already indicated that they will not release “secret materials concerning defense issues,” which presumably would include anything connected with military preparations before the invasion. Files revealing the hostility of Ukrainian party officials to the Czechoslovak reforms should be available earlier, but for now there is no telling when.

Outside Russia and Ukraine, many archives that contain key documents about the events of 1968 have been made available to scholars, but numerous problems have arisen in obtaining specific materials:

In Czechoslovakia itself, a commission was set up by the federal government in 1990 to assess the events between 1967 and 1970. The commission, headed by Professor Vojtech Menc, was given broad jurisdiction over all relevant documents from that period, including large quantities of previously classified materials obtained from archives in Hungary, Poland, the former East Germany, and Bulgaria. Although the documents were supposed to become freely available to other researchers once the commission had issued its final report, the work has progressed slowly and some members of the panel have been reluctant to divulge any of their materials prematurely. To its credit, the commission has published many crucial documents (or reports based on those documents) and has occasionally permitted a few outside scholars to pore through some of its vast collection. For the most part, however, the limited availability of the commission’s holdings has been a hindrance to research on the Prague Spring. Fortunately, that situation will (one hopes) soon change as the commission winds up its work and releases all remaining documents for public use. Some of Menc’s colleagues, as noted above, have even developed ambitious plans—perhaps overly ambitious plans—to publish a multivolume, 5,000-page compilation of the most important materials in Czech and Slovak, as well as a compact (single-volume) edition in English translation. Even if this project turns out to be financially impractical, the documents and reports that the commission has put together will be an invaluable source for all those studying the crisis of 1968.

In addition to the documents held by the Menc commission, other archives in Czechoslovakia are—or will be—of considerable value for research on the Prague Spring. In particular, the Central State Archive (Státní ústřední archiv), which contains the vast bulk of materials once belonging to the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive have both yielded documents relevant to the internal and external dimensions of the crisis. Access to these materials is often extremely difficult to obtain because of rigid time limitations (30- and 50-year rules, etc.), the chaotic state of the KSC’s files, inadequate funding and a dearth of trained archivists, and restrictions placed on items dealing with living persons. Nevertheless, persistence—and, even better, personal connections—should eventually permit scholars to locate documents at these archives that have not yet been released elsewhere.

In Poland the most useful sites for primary research on the 1968 crisis have been the Central Modern Records Archive (Archiwum Akt Nowych, or AAN), which contains documents from the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, which (for some reason that is not entirely clear) has a substantial number of items in addition to those produced by or belonging to the ministry. At both institutions, access to documents about an event as recent as the invasion of Czechoslovakia usually would be denied, or at least would be extremely limited. But fortunately, efforts by the Menc commission to obtain documents from the Polish archives have induced some of the AAN’s officials to ease restrictions for other researchers as well. It is also true, of course, that having a well-placed friend in the Foreign Ministry can be immensely helpful in prompting the archivists to look more favorably upon specific requests. In any case, even if the effort initially proves frustrating, researchers would do well to be persistent at both Polish archives, for they can find here transcripts or detailed summaries of multilateral conferences, as well as many documents attesting to Władysław Gomułka’s vehement opposition to the Prague Spring and his role in encouraging the invasion.

In Germany the central archives for the Socialist Unity Party (SED) will be an invaluable source for research about intra-Pact politics and especially about Walter Ulbricht’s early and outspoken support for the invasion; more work in cataloguing the materials is needed, however. Extremely useful sources pertaining to the military dimension of the crisis can be found in two defense ministry archives that received thousands of documents left from the East German National People’s Army (NVA) following German reunification in October 1990: the Office for Information Sources of the Bundeswehr (Amt fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr); and the Documents Division of the Seventh Regional Administration of the Armed Forces (Der Dokumentation der Wehrbereichsverwaltung VII). Materials at these archives are far more accessible than are military documents in the other East European countries, and for this reason alone they would be worth consulting. Although some of the most sensitive items were destroyed before reunification, and although many of the documents do not bear directly (or at all)
on the events of 1968, the archives are still useful in conveying a sense of the Warsaw Pact’s status during the Prague Spring.

Until recently, the United States was by far the most valuable source of new archival materials about the Czechoslovak crisis. Although the document collections that are becoming available in the ex-Communist world will be of much greater importance in the long run, newly declassified items from U.S. government agencies and repositories are still enormously beneficial to scholars studying the events of 1968. Of particular value has been the vast collection of files at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. The chief archivist at the library, David Humphrey, is extremely knowledgeable and has been unusually helpful to visiting scholars. The main drawback with the library is the lengthy time required for declassification requests to be processed and approved (or rejected). Attimes, several years will go by before a request is granted. To make matters worse, a large group of files, especially those containing sensitive intelligence reports, is unlikely to be released at all. Moreover, even when mandatory review requests are approved, some documents are so heavily sanitized that they turn out to be almost worthless.

Nevertheless, despite these nettlesome problems, the LBJ Library remains an indispensable source for research on the Prague Spring. Over the last five years alone, the library has declassified thousands of pages of State Department cables, National Security Council (NSC) papers, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports, transcripts of briefings and Presidential meetings, military analyses, and other items pertaining to the crisis in Czechoslovakia. Although much of what is in these documents merely substantiates what has already been known from other sources, the corroboration of existing knowledge is itself worthwhile. Moreover, the library’s collections are an unrivaled source for scholars studying the West’s response to the crisis and invasion: Many of the documents shed new light on such matters as the Johnson administration’s perceptions of the Prague Spring, the concerns that U.S. officials had about Soviet military intervention, and the ineffectual steps they took to try to forestall an invasion. Finally, on occasion, materials from the LBJ Library have contained surprising revelations—either about the events in Czechoslovakia or about the Soviet Union’s role—that necessitate changes in the traditional understanding of what happened. This was the case, for example, with recently declassified intelligence reports about the Soviet-Romanian standoff that occurred just after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, as will be discussed at greater length in part two of this article.

In addition to the LBJ Library, other U.S. archival centers such as the Modern Military Branch of the National Archives (especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff files) contain important new documents about the Czechoslovak crisis. However, many of these items (or copies of them) can be found in Austin as well. A more important supplement to the LBJ Library holdings are documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Karen Dawisha obtained numerous reports and cables under the FOIA from the State Department, CIA, and NSC when she was writing her book in the early 1980s. The willingness of these agencies, and of others such as the Defense Department, to grant requests for documents about the crisis has increased since then, but significant problems remain with delays in processing requests and with deletions made in certain reports, especially those from the intelligence community. Even so, the value of some of the newly-released documents is great enough that it is worth spending the time to investigate and file careful requests. Also, the National Security Archive, a research institute based in Washington, D.C., has begun a project to assemble declassified U.S. documents on the crisis in a collection to be made available to scholars.

3. Published Interviews

One of the earliest and most intriguing new sources about the crisis of 1968 was the series of interviews with key participants that began appearing in the latter half of the 1980s. Perhaps the most noteworthy example, which was also among the earliest, was the interview that the Italian Communist newspaper L’Unita published in January 1988 with Alexander Dubcek. Until that time, Dubcek had refrained from granting interviews or offering anything more than cursory remarks to Western journalists (aside from a letter he sent to several newspapers in the fall of 1985 rebutting comments made earlier that year by Vasil Bilak in an interview with Der Spiegel). The L’Unita interview marked a new stage in public disclo-
slovakia had collapsed, any remaining inhibitions that Soviet and East European journalists may have felt about interviewing senior participants in the 1968 crisis evaporated. Interviews with Dubček began appearing as frequently as the ex-KSC leader could grant them.28 These were accompanied by a deluge of other interviews and round-table conversations with former officials, especially in the last few months of 1989 and the first several months of 1990, when items about the Prague Spring and the invasion were appearing on an almost daily basis in some Czech and Slovak newspapers, and only slightly less frequently in Soviet publications.29 In the process, many valuable new details and broader insights emerged. Of particular interest were lengthy posthumously published interviews focusing on the Czechoslovak crisis with the former Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, which appeared in both Hungary and the USSR.30 Also intriguing were revelations from published interviews with former high-ranking KGB officers such as Oleg Kalugin and Oleg Gordievskii.31

On a less positive note, however, some of those interviewed, especially the former Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, and the former Ukrainian Communist party first secretary, Pyotr Shelest (who was also a full member of the CPSU Politburo in 1968), either were prevaricating or were very confused in their recollections of the crisis. In Shelest’s case, for example, all evidence suggests that he was one of the Politburo’s earliest and most ardent supporters of the invasion, yet in an interview with the Moscow daily Komsomolskaya pravda in late 1989 he claimed he had opposed the use of force in 1968 and had always believed that “the whole matter could have been resolved peacefully, by political means.”32 Similarly, when Zhivkov was interviewed by Western journalists in late 1990, he asserted—against all evidence—that he had gone along with the “totally unjustified” invasion in 1968 only because the Soviet Union had threatened to impose economic sanctions against Bulgaria if it did not take part.33 Fortunately, most of the senior officials from 1968 who went on record over the last few years, including former members of the CPSU Politburo such as Mazurov and Aleksandr Shelepin, were not as disingenuous as Shelest and Zhivkov were. Moreover, the number of interviews published in late 1989 and 1990 was so great that scholars were able to cross-check specific claims and sift out what was patently untrue.

By 1991 and the first half of 1992, as interest in the crisis (and other historical matters) began to fade in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the number of interviews pertaining to the Czechoslovak crisis declined substantially. Even then, however, lengthy discussions about the invasion still appeared from time to time (and even more might have appeared had the anniversary of the invasion, on August 21, not been preempted in 1991 by the coup in Moscow). Interviews with Dubček, Hajek, Mlynar, and others continued to be published regularly (though they often focused on current events rather than on 1968).34 By now, so many of the key actors in the crisis have gone on record (often more than once) that it would be difficult for scholars to glean much more in the future from published interviews alone. Only if additional interviews are combined with the release of supporting documentation will the historical record continue to advance as rapidly as it did between 1988 and 1992.

Western analysts will clearly profit if they pore through the hundreds of interviews that have appeared, but some strong words of caution are in order. Human memories, especially those of elderly retired officials, are fallible. The participants in events of 20-25 years ago will recall those events selectively, and all but a few will exaggerate or put the best gloss on their own roles. Much of what happened they will not remember at all. These unavoidable shortcomings of oral history can be compensated for—at least in part—if adequate documentary evidence is available.35 By combining the oral recollections of former officials with declassified archival materials, scholars can cross-check and verify the accuracy of claims made in specific interviews. The whole process is contingent, however, on the availability of extensive supporting documentation. Only if Western (and Eastern) scholars can obtain full access to Soviet/Russian archives on the Czechoslovak crisis will the large body of interviews be as valuable as they potentially could be. Until such access is granted, these oral histories must be approached with caution and healthy skepticism.

4. Unpublished Interviews

Opportunities for scholars to interview former Soviet and East European leaders...
who played key roles in the Czechoslovak crisis, as well as with lower-ranking participants, increased exponentially from the mid-1980s on. As recently as 1986-87, it was virtually impossible to find a Soviet official who would talk candidly about the Prague Spring or Moscow’s role in the crisis. The invasion was still invariably depicted as a necessary step to thwart the machinations of “internal counterrevolutionaries and external reactionary forces.” Some senior officials, such as Gromyko and Marshal Sergei Akhromeev (of the Soviet General Staff), continued to speak in those terms until the day they died. As late as June 1991 the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Yazov (who was arrested two months later for his part in the failed coup attempt), staunchly defended Soviet actions in August 1968 and claimed that no “invasion” had taken place.36 Other officials, however, including some who were members of the CPSU Politburo in 1968, have offered more critical appraisals of the Soviet response.

Among the Soviet participants in the crisis who consented to interviews over the last few years, either by phone or in person, are Mazurov, Shelest, Gennadii Voronov (a member of the Politburo in 1968), the late Viktor Grishin (a candidate member of the Politburo), Dinmukhamed Kunaev (a candidate member of the Politburo), and Boris Ponomarev (a candidate member of the Politburo and head of the CPSU International Department). Some, but not all, of the interviews were highly informative, and only a few of the ex-officials deliberately tried to mislead their Western interlocutor. Below the highest political levels, countless other ex-officials have been willing to be interviewed about their experiences during the crisis. These include senior figures such as Anatoliy Dobrynin (the Soviet ambassador to the United States in 1968), Konstantin Katushev (the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-bloc relations), Vadim Zagladin (deputy head of the CPSU International Department), Georgii Korniyenko (an assistant to Gromyko), and Stepan Chervonenko (the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia), as well as lower-ranking individuals such as Evgeni Ambartsumov, Aleksandr Bovin, Evgenii Primakov, Oleg Bogomolov, and Vladimir Lukin.

Other useful insights have come from the two Soviet generals who directed the whole invasion on behalf of the Soviet High Command. Ivan Pavlovskii, the former commander-in-chief of Soviet Ground Forces, still firmly supported the decision to intervene when he was interviewed in Moscow in September 1990.37 But he was willing to talk in general terms about both the military and the political aspects of his role as supreme commander. Ivan Ershov, the deputy to Pavlovskii in August 1968, later came to believe that the invasion was a mistake, and he elaborated on the reasons for his change of heart in an interview in Providence, Rhode Island in late 1989. Ershov’s views were decisively influenced by the problems his daughter encountered when seeking to emigrate with her husband in the 1970s (an action that Ershov himself initially opposed), and it was illuminating to discover how this incident prompted him to reassess the wisdom of the invasion.38 Also, Ershov was willing (as Pavlovskii was) to discuss in broad terms the tasks that high-ranking military officers had to carry out in preparing for the invasion.

In Eastern Europe, too, some of the most intriguing interviews have been with senior military personnel who took part in the invasion, such as General Bela Gyaruzica, who later was appointed commander of the Fifth Army in Hungary, and General Krzysztof Owczarek, who later served on the Polish General Staff. They were able to provide first-hand information about preparations undertaken before the invasion (e.g., trial runs during maneuvers, the use of deception, the stockpiling of supplies and ammunition, the diversion of Czechoslovak troops) and about the way the operation was actually carried out (e.g., how and when their units entered Czechoslovakia, what sorts of missions they were assigned, the command structure used for Soviet and East European forces, and the schedules for rotation and replacement of troops).39 They also were able to shed light on the broader military implications of the invasion, especially regarding the confusion and disaffection that cropped up among Hungarian and Polish troops, who had been told they were going to defend an ally against American “imperialists” and West German “revanchists.”40 Although the invasion did not impose strenuous demands on the East European armies (none of whom had to take part in actual fighting), it hardly inspired great confidence about their future role in intra-bloc policing, especially if actual combat were required.

Interviews with former East European political officials also have been valuable in clarifying certain aspects of the 1968 crisis. In the pre-Gorbachev era, only a limited number of senior Czechoslovak, East German, Polish, and Hungarian participants were available for discussions with Western analysts. Some Western scholars, including Karen Dawisha, H. Gordon Skilling, and Jiri Valenta, were able to make good use of interviews with Mlynar, Pelikan, Edward Goldstucker (a leading reformer in the writers’ union in 1968), Ota Sik (a deputy prime minister), and a few other former Czechoslovak officials; and Dawisha also spoke with Artur Starzewicz, a PZPR secretary in 1968 who took part in the Bratislava conference. Other prominent figures such as Hajek and Jiri Dientsbier also were occasionally able to grant interviews with Western scholars. Nevertheless, the large majority of top Czechoslovak officials from 1968, such as Dubcek, Cernik, Cisar, Smrkovsky, Bohumil Simon, and Frantisek Kriegel, were never (or almost never) available for extended interviews. Much the same was true of former authorities in other East European countries. Not until the late 1980s did this situation finally change, and by then, unfortunately, several leading figures (e.g., Smrkovsky and Kriegel) were already long dead. Despite that problem, the opportunity to speak with former leaders such as Dubcek, Cernik, Cisar, and Simon has obviously provided Western scholars with an invaluable source of new evidence. Interviews with numerous ex-officials in Poland, Hungary, Germany, Romania, and Bulgaria also have produced important disclosures about their countries’ roles in the crisis.41 The number of former officials in Eastern Europe who are worth interviewing (and who are still alive) is so large that weeks or months would be needed to cover them all, but the insights that can be gained in the process are valuable enough to make the effort worthwhile.

Still, the words of caution that apply to published interviews, as noted above, apply equally to unpublished interviews. In all cases, even when the subjects are doing their best to recall events faithfully, Western scholars must treat their statements with extreme caution. If the recollections of former officials can be corroborated by documentary evidence, that will certainly help matters. But even if the archives were fully open (which they obviously are not), direct cor-
roboration is not always possible.

5. Memoirs and Other First-Hand Accounts

Since the late 1980s a plethora of new memoirs and first-hand accounts of the Czechoslovak crisis have appeared in both Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as in the West. Not surprisingly, the quality of these publications varies widely. Some of the memoirs by former Soviet officials provide little more than canned apologies for Soviet military intervention in 1968. This was the approach taken by the long-time Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, who neglected even to mention the invasion in the two-volume (893-page) Russian edition of his memoirs, published in 1988.42 At the urging of his Western publisher, Gromyko included a few brief paragraphs about the Czechoslovak crisis in the English version of his memoirs, but these paragraphs were merely a turgid and cliche-ridden justification of the Soviet Union’s actions.43 Anyone hoping for new insights about the crisis will miss nothing by skipping Gromyko’s book.

Fortunately, most other recent accounts by former Soviet officials are of greater value. Of particular interest is a brief article by Valerii Musatov, a former CPSU Central Committee staffer, which appeared in the weekly Novoe vremya.44 Musatov commented on the internal deliberations and political wrangling in Moscow (as best he could discern them via his limited access to top bodies), and discussed the role that East European governments played in the lead-up to the invasion. His account not only provides a useful context for understanding the decision to intervene, but also includes some fascinating new details. A lengthier treatment of the crisis that has also proven extremely worthwhile is in a recent book co-authored by Oleg Gordievskii, a former high-ranking KGB official who served in Europe.45 Gordievskii focuses on the KGB’s role in the crisis, revealing, among other things, how intelligence was channeled to the top Soviet political authorities, how the KGB maintained surveillance of senior KSC officials via wiretaps, SIGINT (signals intelligence), and human agents, and how special paramilitary forces assisted the Soviet Army (rather ineptly) during the invasion. Although some of these topics had been discussed in the past by other former intelligence agents, Gordievskii’s senior status and first-hand knowledge of the KGB’s espionage techniques and foreign operations lend a new dimension to Western research on the crisis. Another specialized memoir (from the pre-Gorbachev era) that contains fresh insights is by the late Petro Grigorenko, a former Soviet army general who became a celebrated dissident.46 His book, published in 1982, is valuable not only in conveying the impact that the Prague Spring had on the dissident community in the Soviet Union, but also in providing a thoughtful assessment of the feasibility of defending Czechoslovakia against an invasion in 1968. On this latter point, Grigorenko recounts the military advice he offered at the time in a letter to Dubcek, which was transmitted through the Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow.

In Czechoslovakia itself, the post-Communist era has brought with it a trove of memoirs by ex-officials on both sides of the conflict in 1968. Those who supported the Prague Spring had been forced to write only for samizdat or for foreign publication before 1989, so they have been making up for lost time now in documenting their experiences. Although Dubcek had not yet completed his memoirs as of mid-1992, he promised that the finished work would resolve a number of still-unanswered questions. Most of the other surviving reformist leaders, including Simon, Cernik, and Cisar, have already written new first-hand accounts of the crisis which not only contain their broad reflections on the invasion, but also reveal previously unknown details.47 In both respects, these memoirs are a major contribution to the historical record. In addition, the memoirs have enabled the former leaders to assess, more extensively and candidly than they had in the past, what went wrong in 1968 and what, if anything, might have been done to prevent the invasion.

Of all the recent accounts of the crisis by former Czechoslovak officials, perhaps the most illuminating is a volume of three essays published in 1990 under the title Srpen 1968 (August 1968). The first of the three chapters is by two prominent radio correspondents in 1968, Jiri Dienstbier and Karel Lansky, both of whom had close contact with top KSC and government officials. Their essay analyzes events both before and after the invasion while weaving in the unique insights they gleaned from working in the media.48 Accompanying their narrative are two important documents pertaining to events in late August and September 1968: the transcript of a radio program in September 1968 featuring analyses of the Moscow Protocols by Mlynar and two other prominent Czechoslovak officials; and a transcript of negotiations between Smrkovsky and Vasilii Kuznetsov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister who helped iron out the Moscow Protocol. The second essay in Srpen 1968, by Venek Silhan, a former official in Prague who took part in the Extraordinary 14th KSC Congress at Vysocany, cogently describes events in the first ten days after the invasion, focusing on the role of the congress.49 The book’s third chapter is by Bohumil Simon, a candidate member of the KSC Presidium in 1968 who was among the most influential proponents of reform. He discusses the post-invasion talks in Moscow, based on his experiences as one of the Czechoslovak negotiators.50 Although these talks had already been described at great length by Mlynar (who was also one of the negotiators) in his Nachtfrost, Simon’s narrative is a valuable supplement to this account. Moreover, even though transcripts from some of the Moscow negotiations have now been declassified and published, Simon’s chapter adds to them by covering certain matters that necessarily lie outside the formal record.

On the anti-reformist side, many new assessments of the crisis also have appeared, even though most of the senior KSC officials who were arrayed against Dubcek in 1968 have died in recent years. Some of the latest memoirs touch only briefly on the Prague Spring and dismiss Dubcek as merely “a tragic figure . . . in whose hands everything turned out wrong.”51 Other memoirs are far more substantive and detailed, however. Without question, the most intriguing and provocative account—tendentious and self-serving though it may be—is the two-volume memoir by Vasil Bilak, the leader of the KSC’s anti-reformist clique in 1968.52 Bilak’s hostility to the Prague Spring has not diminished with age. He spends most of the two volumes casting aspersions on the reformers and justifying his own stance before and after the invasion. Of particular interest from a historical standpoint are his versions of the bilateral Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations at Czerna-nad-Tisou and of the multilateral session at Bratislava two days later. (He acknowledges, among other things, that he secretly passed on a letter to Brezhnev
during the Bratislava meeting.) If nothing else, the memoir provides unique insights into the mindset of the anti-reformist forces, and helps explain why Dubček’s opponents were so eager to receive “fraternal” assistance from the Soviet Union.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland and the former East Germany, recently published memoirs and first-hand accounts by former high-ranking officials also have helped shed light on the 1968 crisis. The publication in the late 1980s of secret documents from the PZPR Central Committee and Politburo included lengthy tracts that Gomulka wrote (in hindsight) about the events surrounding his removal as first secretary in December 1970.53 His reports not only discussed the internal pressures that had intensified his hostility to the Prague Spring, but also revealed the parallels he discerned in 1968 between his own increasingly tenuous position in Warsaw and the misfortunes that Novotny was suffering in Czechoslovakia.54 A different perspective on the internal situation in Poland during the Czechoslovak crisis can be found in the recent memoir-by-interview of Edward Gierek, who succeeded Gomulka as PZPR first secretary.55 Of particular interest are Gierek’s comments about the way Gomulka’s policies both at home and abroad, including his belligerent stance vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia, were shaped by the student riots of March 1968, by intra-PZPR struggles, and by the aftershocks of the so-called Moczar Affair (an unsuccessful attempt in March 1968 by the then-internal affairs minister, Mieczysław Moczar, and his “partisan” nationalistic supporters to displace Gomulka).56 Gierek also discusses the impact of the Brezhnev Doctrine, with its “new formula for Soviet intervention in our continent’s affairs,” on the Polish upheavals in late 1970, “barely two years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.”57

Other first-hand insights about Poland’s role in the Czechoslovak crisis are provided in the new memoir by Wojciech Jaruzelski, who served as Polish defense minister from April 1968 on (and who later, of course, became first secretary of the PZPR and president of Poland).58 Jaruzelski’s appointment as defense minister came at a time when both Gomulka and the Soviet authorities wanted a competent and trustworthy officer to gear up the Polish army for a possible military incursion into Czechoslovakia. Jaruzelski was one of the few who could meet those criteria, and he ended up playing a key role in the military preparations for the invasion. Although his book does not cover his experiences in 1968 in great detail, Jaruzelski does provide some useful observations about the political and military climate during the crisis and about the coordination among Warsaw Pact defense ministers.

Memoirs and shorter first-hand accounts by former East German leaders have appeared in abundance since late 1989, but they are of widely disparate quality. Some ex-officials who commented about the Czechoslovak crisis, such as the late Horst Sindermann, still erroneously claimed that troops from the GDR did not take part in the invasion.59 Other accounts are more reliable, however, especially in their descriptions of the internal political maneuvering in East Berlin between 1968 and 1970 that heightened Ulbricht’s concerns about developments in Czechoslovakia.60 Especially worthwhile are memoirs showing how Ulbricht’s rivals such as Erich Honecker sought to outflank Ulbricht on the Czechoslovak crisis and thus bolster their own hard-line credentials.61 Other first-hand accounts discuss the economic discontent and adverse social trends plaguing the GDR in 1968, which were a further constraint on the East German leader’s actions. These narratives help clarify the way domestic factors and foreign considerations (above all, East-bloc policy toward West Germany) combined to produce Ulbricht’s deep enmity toward Dubček and the Czechoslovak reform program. Other East German memoirs that shed light on the Czechoslovak crisis are the recent books by former agents of the State Security Ministry (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit, or Stasi).62 These accounts reveal the elaborate support that the Stasi gave the KGB in combating “anti-socialist and reactionary forces” in 1968. Many of the latest accounts draw extensively on documents from the Stasi archives as well as on the first-hand recollections of the authors.

The spate of recent memoirs and other written accounts by Soviet and East European participants in the Czechoslovak crisis must, of course, be treated with care, especially when they are not supported by documentation. Almost all the caveats regarding interviews are just as relevant here. This is not to say that memoirs should never be cited as evidence on their own. A few events, after all, are more fully and accurately discussed in memoirs than they are—or can be—in archival records. (This is true not only of orders and directives that are transmitted orally rather than on paper, but also of sensitive military and intelligence-related materials that are routinely destroyed rather than being preserved for archives.) Most of the time, however, scholars would be well advised to avoid relying solely on memoirs unless they can find documents or other physical evidence that will at least partly corroborate their claims. First-hand accounts, when used properly, can be an invaluable source of evidence that is unavailable elsewhere; but even then, a healthy dose of skepticism and detachment is in order.

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ary-February 1991), 141-58.


19. For a valuable report based on new documentation, by one of the members of the commission, see Jan Moravec, “Could the Prague Spring Have Been Saved?: The Ultimatum of Cierna nad Tisou,” *Orbis* 35:4 (Fall 1981), 587-95, as well as the accompanying essays by Jiri Valenta, “The Search for a Political Solution” (pp. 581-87) and “The Last Chance” (pp. 595-601). Valenta also made good use of documents from the commission in the two new chapters in *Soviet Intervention in Czecho-

slovakia* (rev. ed.), 165-211.

20. For brevity’s sake, this article will provide only a short description of the relevant archives in Czecho-


21. On occasion, I have received documents via the FOIA that contain substantial deletions even though the same items have been available at the LBJ Library without any deletions. Once in a great while, however, the opposite is true, as with a June 1968 “Special Memorandum” (entitled *Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Pause*) from the CIA’s Board of National Esti-

mates, which I obtained in June 1991 with remarkably few deletions. This has also been the case for most of the hundreds of once-secret diplomatic cables I have received under the FOIA from the State Department.

22. “Dopis Rudemu pravu,” 8 November 1985, type-

script, Widener Library, Harvard University. This let-

ter, too, was first published in *L’Unita* after several newspapers in Prague and Bratislava refused to carry it. For an English translation of Dubcek’s letter, see “Pub-


26. One of the round-table participants, Vladimir Lukin, later complained that “against the will of the participants the text was mercilessly cut and drained of its general message.” See “Vesna i kolokvium,” *Deistuyushchie litsa i pokroviteli,* *KGB poka ne menyaet printsipov,”* *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 20 June 1990, 2; and “Lubyanka: Deistvuyschie litsa i pokroviteli,” *Sozhednik* (Moscow) 36 (September 1990), 6.


33. *Brezhnev requesting “fraternal assistance” from the Soviet archives, see James G. Hershberg, “Soviet Ar-

Cheredera, 5. Dubcek’s film was endorsed by Moscow at least as early as December 1989, 3; the interview with Lubomir Strougal in *Pravda* (Bratislava), 16 January 1990, 4; and the interview with Pyotr Shelest in *Moskovskii komsoomolets* (Moscow), 30 August 1990.

38. For a published interview with Ershov in which he covers some of the same ground, see Andrew Rosenthal, “A Soviet General’s Second Thoughts,” *New York
from a very different perspective, is by Franciszek Szczechic, who in 1968 was deputy internal affairs minister and a close friend of Moczar, in “Zewspomien Ministra Spraw Wewn., trzynych,” Zycie literackie (Warsaw) 10 (6 March 1988), 4-5.

57. Przerwana dekada, 63.


60. For a useful overview of this phenomenon, see Gerhard Naumann and Eckhard Trumpler, Von Ulbricht zu Honecker: 1970—ein Krisenjahr der DDR (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1990).


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**PLANNING**

Continued from page 1

possession of the Federal Ministry of Defense after 3 October 1990. The following report is based on a thorough analysis of these documents by the command staffs of the armed forces. The report is a major contribution to the study of recent history and is available not only to the Bundeswehr but also to research institutions and interested centers. The examples of key documents cited in the study, and an evaluation of numerous other sources, clearly show how, through political decisions at the highest levels, the armed forces of the former Eastern Bloc were organized and constantly trained in exercises to carry out the option of an offensive war.

Only in the mid-1980s, with the advent of the Gorbachev era, was greater emphasis given to defensive tasks, though even this did not lead in any fundamental way to the abandonment of earlier plans. The decisive, decades-long role of the Western Alliance and its armed forces in the maintenance of peace and freedom is obvious enough. NATO’s determined stance, as well as the responsible policy that the Western democracies pursued when the leadership of the former Warsaw Pact finally decided on a course of dialogue and negotiation, was the most important factor in the collapse of the Communist dictatorships and the emergence of a fundamentally new situation.

The time of military confrontation in Central Europe is over; the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved. The consequences of these developments can be seen in our new policies and in the fundamental changes in the structures and plans of our alliance. In the future, however, measures to protect the military security of Germany and its allies in a changed world must be maintained. This principle will underlie the further service of our soldiers for peace and freedom.

Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg
Federal Defense Minister
Even so, 25,000 sealed documents came into the possession of the Federal Defense Ministry after reunification. Essentially, these involved transcripts of meetings of the NVA’s highest political and military leadership, directives, orders, reports, and records of every kind, maneuver and training materials, situation reports on the enemy, and mobilization plans.

The maneuver and training documents focused above all on the preparation and duties of troops and staffs in the event of war. From these one can deduce, with high degree of accuracy, the operational plans and military preparations of the Warsaw Pact.

The documents clearly reveal the offensive nature of the WP’s war plans against NATO in Central Europe. These plans were not modified at all until the latter half of the 1980s, when it was deemed that strategic offensive operations would begin only after an initial defense. In conjunction with what has already been known, the documents present and clarify a reliable picture: to wit, that the preliminary and advanced training of the military leadership, the training of troops and staffs, and the infrastructure, personnel, and communications of the WP were all aimed at preparing for a rapid attack deep into France.

This finding will be discussed under the following headings:

* Operational Planning of the WP;
* Planning for the Use of Nuclear Weapons;
* Efforts to Deceive the Military and the Public About NATO’s Intentions and Defense Preparations.

Supporting references will be provided in the appendix.

1. Operational Planning of the Warsaw Pact

Under Soviet guidance, Warsaw Pact planning envisaged an attack by a total of five Fronts (a Front corresponds to a full-strength NATO army group) against NATO forces in Northern and Central Europe. The ground forces for these five Fronts were to consist of:

* Soviet military forces in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia;
* the NVA, the Czechoslovak People’s Army, and the Polish People’s Army; and
* Soviet military forces from Belorussia and the Ukraine.

The Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Polish Navy, and the People’s Navy of the GDR, as well as the air forces of numerous countries, were also included within the plan.

The NVA documents show that this deployment of forces served as the basis for many command exercises and staff exercises in the WP and NVA. The chronicle of the GDR Defense Ministry for 1977/78 lists, among other things, the following theme of the General Officers’ Training Course: “Preparation and Conduct of Offensive Operations Along the Front with and without Nuclear Weapons.” Additional tasks were stipulated for “Offensive Operations in the Direction of the Coast” in the Northern-Lower Saxony/Schleswig-Holstein area.

In 1978 the same chronicle describes a staff exercise under the leadership of the then Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ogarkov, in which a five-Front “attack in the western and southwestern military theaters” was to be rehearsed.

In 1980 the NVA hosted the Warsaw Pact’s “Comrades-in-Arms-80” maneuvers. The aim of the exercises was formulated in the following way by the WP High Command:

1. Conduct of operations at the outset of a war:
   * Breaking through a prepared defense by overwhelming a security sector.
   * Prevention of a counter-attack.

2. Conduct of operations in the depth of the enemy’s defense, in conjunction with naval and amphibious forces.

3. Completion of the subsequent duties of the first-echelon armies.

Corresponding to each of these points were training exercises that convincingly showed how NATO’s defense-in-depth could be ruptured. The penetration was to occur in three stages at the operational and tactical levels (Army, Division), as can be seen in the briefing materials prepared for high-ranking political and military visitors:

* **Stage One**: Breaking through the defense.
* **Stage Two**: Overcoming the defensive sector, deployment of the second echelon.
* **Stage Three**: Paratroop landings, deep attacks over water, and offensives in combination with the paratroopers.

The aims and conduct of the exercise are but one example among many of how the Warsaw Pact was poised for offensive operations from the very beginning of a military conflict with NATO. Except for a few exercises in the late 1980s, defense against a NATO attack was not practiced because such an attack obviously was considered implausible.

Planning for military operations at the operational and strategic levels of the Front (known in the West as army groups) also reflected this general set of aims. After the WP exercise “Soyuz-83,” the GDR defense minister at the time presented the whole concept in the following way, according to the sealed minutes of the National Defense Council:

The strategic groupings of troops and naval forces of the armed forces of the USSR, the Poland People’s Republic, the GDR, and the CSSR have the following mission:

The principal aim of the first strategic operation with troops on four Fronts is a rapid advance, reaching the frontiers of France by the 13th or 15th day, and thereby:

* taking the territories of Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands, and Belgium;
* forcing the withdrawal of these West European countries from the war; and
* continuing the strategic operation by establishing two additional Fronts inside France, shattering the strategic reserves on French territory, and reaching Vizcaya and the Spanish border by day 30 or 35, thus accomplishing the final aims of the first strategic operation by removing France from the war.

These examples and the above-mentioned documents clearly show how dominant the offensive was in the operational and strategic thinking of both the NVA and the WP. This offensive orientation persisted until the end of the 1980s despite the intervening political changes in the Soviet Union. Even in 1988-89 there was an advanced course for the senior officer corps of the NVA in which the “instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact’s Joint Armed Forces regarding the operational mission of troops and naval forces” set forth the following aims:

The goal of the operation is to liberate the territories of the GDR and CSSR, to occupy the economically important regions of the FRG east of the Rhine, and to create the right circumstances for a transition to a general offensive aimed at bringing about the withdrawal of the European NATO.
Formulated in this way, the goals of the exercise remained in a long tradition of earlier exercises. As a general justification for the Warsaw Pact’s attack plans and as a way of quelling any possible criticism, the scenario for the exercise was based on the assumption that NATO had committed prior aggression. This assumption was a standard one within the ideological framework of the WP. From the documents, however, it is clear that the prospect of an attack by NATO could not possibly have been taken seriously.

A sure sign of the hypothetical character of the assumptions in this and other exercises is that the supposed starting conditions were not actually reflected in the course of the exercise. Normally, only mobilization and counterattacks were practiced. The preparation and conduct of a defense against an attack, which was the principal aim and central feature of all NATO exercises, was certainly not of comparable importance as an exercise topic for the NVA and WP.

In 1984, when Czechoslovakia was hosting the Warsaw Pact’s “Shield” exercise, one of the five parts of the exercise was, for the first time, devoted to the practice of defensive operations. The remaining parts of the exercise were then dominated, as in the past, by rehearsals for a massive offensive against the West. In the treatment of this new exercise goal, and in the subsequent discussions that Gorbachev obviously inspired among military specialists about a defensive military doctrine, the Czechoslovak People’s Army played a distinct leadership role within the Warsaw Pact, while the NVA acted as a braking force.

The changes in security policy that followed Gorbachev’s rise to power were accompanied, albeit hesitantly, by similar revisions in military-strategic thinking. The first serious proposals for the development of joint defensive options for the Warsaw Pact came in 1985 when, for the first time, a joint staff training exercise was held at the highest levels of the WP on the theme of “Strategic Deployments and Preparations to Defend Against Aggression.” The basic principles laid down in that exercise were tested in subsequent staff exercises; and in September 1989 they were incorporated into revised orders on defense, as the chronicle of the NVA reveals. The offensive components of planning and exercises clearly remained, but they came only after the initial defensive phases of operational and strategic counterattack.

2. Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Employment

The use of tactical nuclear weapons was an integral part of the Warsaw Pact’s training of personnel at army command level and higher. As conceived by the military leadership, these weapons were to serve above all as a means of breaking through the enemy’s defenses. In 1979, for example, a staff training exercise was held to prepare WP forces for “Attacks Along the Front with or without Nuclear Weapons.” In 1981, the command staff training exercise “Soyuz-81,” led by the then Commander-in-Chief of the WP, Marshal Kulikov, included, as one of its main objectives, “The Conduct of Strategic Attack Operations Involving the Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

Two years later, at the “Soyuz-83” exercise, the same marshal declared that “a future war will be carried out relentlessly until the total defeat of the enemy is achieved. This compels us to take into account the entire arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, with the uncontrollable dimensions of strategic actions.” The conceptual mindset that lies behind this businesslike discussion need not be further explored here.

In accord with such ideas, the use of nuclear weapons was treated either as a surprise first strike or as a response/counterstrike in numerous WP exercises led by the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Union’s Western Group of Forces (in the GDR) or by the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Central and West European military theater, as well as in NVA staff exercises. In some exercises there was also a follow-on nuclear strike against reserves and any remaining forces.

The “Comrades-in-Arms-80” exercise, which was hosted by the NVA, is an illuminating example of the Warsaw Pact’s intention of resorting to the comprehensive use of nuclear weapons. In this exercise, a Soviet, a Polish, and a German Army commander each had to report on his decision regarding the conduct of nuclear war. These reports, and the plans that were based on them, were depicted by the defense minister of the GDR, in the presence of all his WP colleagues, as the main purpose of the exercise. The following scenario emerged from these discussions:

The Warsaw Pact’s first Front, consisting of the Soviet Union’s Western Group of Forces and the NVA, would have had some 840 tactical nuclear weapons at its disposal, consisting of 205 operational-tactical missiles (Scuds) for the armies; 380 tactical missiles (FROGs) for the divisions; and 255 nuclear bombs.

Of these, the first-echelon armies were to be equipped with some 20 operational-tactical missiles, 55 tactical missiles, and 10 nuclear bombs. In addition, the air forces on the Front, and their missile brigades, were to have 125 nuclear bombs, 60 operational-tactical missiles, and 50 tactical missiles.

The targets in a Warsaw Pact nuclear offensive would have been primarily as follows:

- NATO nuclear installations and equipment;
- air force and air defense installations;
- war command posts at the divisional level, and communications facilities;
- troops either in position or on the move; and
- naval detachments and bases of the Federal navy.

Given the quantity and effect of the designated warheads, nuclear target planning at the army- and Front-level was aimed at subduing any resistance on the part of the defenders by achieving wide destruction of installations and troops, and by allowing for intermediate targets to be taken, along with the final objectives, within a certain timetable. To support the initial nuclear strikes along the Front, four fighter divisions stood ready. In addition, substantial nuclear forces were to be held in reserve.

For some time after 1981 the exercise documents contained no other operational plans regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Not until 1988, in exercises of the NVA’s military districts (the level of command corresponding to a Bundeswehr corps), do we again find the use of nuclear weapons in an offensive and—what is new—defensive role, as can be seen in numerous official exercise documents and in the private notes of NVA officers who took part in several of the exercises.

The new defensive role of nuclear weapons was limited solely to tasks conducted at the army level of command. However, divisions also were now partly responsible for
the actual use of the weapons. Although the extent, target distribution, and depth of nuclear strikes still corresponded to the usual picture of a massive attack, a new development in 1988 was the planned massive use of operational-tactical and tactical missiles equipped with conventional cassette-warheads (i.e., reentry vehicles carrying a number of smaller, non-nuclear munitions).

Not until 1990 did the political changes in the GDR appear to have affected the training and exercise postures of the NVA. By then, the use of nuclear weapons was no longer an integral part of the NVA’s exercises; instead, nuclear operations were left for procedural exercises geared toward specialists.

This kind of exercise on the planning and release of nuclear arms, as seen, for example, in parts of the staff exercise “Staff Training- 89,” provided for the devastation of border areas in Schleswig-Holstein by 76 nuclear weapons, including some of high destructive yield. Although there is very extensive information about the operational-tactical planning and military-technical aspects of nuclear weapons use, there is no documentation regarding the political decision-making process involved. In particular, there are no indications of the exact release provisions for the use of nuclear weapons, other than the well-known fact that the basic decision on when to “go nuclear” lay in the hands of the CPSU General Secretary.

The participation of other Warsaw Pact states in nuclear planning also remains obscure. As former officials of the ex-Defense Ministry of the GDR have indicated, non-Soviet members of the WP did not learn anything about real Soviet planning outside the exercises.

3. Deception of the Military and the Public About the Intentions, Military Strength and Defense Preparations of NATO

To conform with the Warsaw Pact’s fundamental assumptions about the enemy, the operational planning of the Pact had to depict the intentions and capabilities of NATO’s armed forces in an extremely exaggerated and false way. This campaign of falsification included statements and assertions about:

* NATO’s defense system;
* NATO’s planning for nuclear use; and
* assessments of NATO’s strength and intentions to attack.

Depiction of NATO’s Defense System

NATO long ago prepared an in-depth defense system along the borders of the Warsaw Pact. For many years, this system barely figured at all in the exercises and staff planning documents of the NVA intelligence director. The system was kept secret from the participants in exercises, and therefore had no influence on the Warsaw Pact’s offensive operations. Not until 1987 did the
first general references to NATO’s system appear in NVA documents, and the system was not fully described until 1990.

In earlier years, indications of NATO’s defense planning would already have been apparent to a patient and thorough reader of the military-geographical descriptions and specialized maps prepared by NVA scouts. These documents, however, were available to only a very small and restricted group of people.

In 1986 a colonel at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy departed from earlier treatments of the subject when he wrote about the so-called “Luxembourg Operational Direction” (sic!):

NATO has devoted great attention to the preparation and construction of defenses and barriers. . . . A high concentration of defenses . . . is in place at a depth of some 50 to 70 km just west of the borders of the GDR and CSSR.8

These defenses could be found in specialized maps as early as 1982—that is, at the high-point of the Warsaw Pact’s offensive wargames. But all such maps, along with the statement cited above and any documents on this theme, were classified as top secret, and were therefore available to only an exclusive circle of people.

It is clear, however, that the NVA’s so-called Intelligence Directorate did not subscribe to its own obvious falsifications. Intelligence chiefs at senior levels of command possessed a “Catalog of Intelligence Features,” which was based on the NVA’s assessment of NATO’s mobilization and alert plans.9 Among other things, the catalog provided a meticulous list of known indicators of an attack and the corresponding warning times.

For example, the catalog accurately reported that at Alert Level II (4-6 days before war would start), the depth of NATO’s frontier defenses might extend up to 100 kilometers. Such information would be crucial for preparations to destroy and disable those defenses.

This detailed catalog, prepared as of 1982, had only one drawback: It was intended for only a very restricted group of officers in certain high-level command positions; and, on security grounds, it was not to be circulated further. A footnote on the very first page explicitly prohibited readers from relying on or quoting from the catalog because the material was so highly classified.

Depiction of NATO’s Plans for the Use of Nuclear Weapons

At least as early as 1973, the GDR political leadership was well aware of NATO’s approach to the use of nuclear weapons.10 That year, the NVA’s intelligence director wrote, on the basis of his knowledge of the WINTEX-73 exercise, the following assessment: “WINTEX-73: . . . a further gradation of nuclear weapons use, even at the latest possible moment after a
100-km invading depth was achieved by Warsaw Pact troops . . . ."

An internal report prepared by the deputy director of intelligence, General Gottwald, for the defense minister in 1988 confirms that he had a completely accurate understanding of the policy that NATO had long maintained regarding the possible selective use of nuclear weapons. An attentive reader of the report would note that “NATO’s military strategy [is] oriented more strongly toward a selective use of nuclear weapons . . . ."

Briefing documents on “Probable Groupings and Activities of NATO’s Armed Forces,” prepared for troops in an instruction exercise, presented the following data:12

* A massive first strike by NATO with nuclear weapons in the Western Theater of War
  * a total of 2,714 strikes (without France)
  * a total of 2,874 strikes (with France)
* Follow-on nuclear strikes by NATO
  * a total of 1,528 strikes (without France)
  * a total of 1,624 strikes (with France)

It is illustrative of the climate of deception, secrecy, and obfuscation in the NVA regarding the intentions and capabilities of NATO that despite information to the contrary provided by the NVA intelligence director, a then-deputy Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact could declare at the GDR Defense Ministry in 1983 that “if operational targets are not met, NATO plans to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons with a total of over 5,000 nuclear warheads, of which 2,800 would be used in the first nuclear strike.”

Depiction of NATO’s Forces and Intentions

This ideological depiction of an aggressive NATO and Bundeswehr was maintained—despite military evidence to the contrary—via the propagation of a falsely menacing image of both entities throughout the NVA. For example, to convey the suppos edly offensive nature of NATO’s military planning, a standard assumption in the plans and exercises of both the NVA and the Warsaw Pact was that NATO intended to attack in the direction of Berlin with four attack groups.14

The fact that NATO did not have sufficient forces for such an attack posed no problem at all for NVA planners. On paper, for example, the Bundeswehr (without its territorial forces) could simply be increased by 2 corps with a total of 12 divisions. By supplementing this with other deliberately false information, NVA planners could create the illusion of a 6-to-1 NATO force advantage in the “Berlin Direction,” which certainly appeared to be an alarming threat. Considering that such manipulations went on for many years, it is not surprising that as late as August 1990 (!), at a command training session of a military district, NATO was depicted as harboring far-reaching aggressive intentions.

Naturally, the NVA’s intelligence directors at the time did individually have, in their spheres of responsibility, an accurate assessment of NATO’s force strength. Their assessments were based on intelligence findings and judgments derived by the Ministry for State Security and the military intelligence organs of the NVA from original NATO and Bundeswehr documents, which included such items as data from the logistics command of the West German army during 1984 and all the WINTEREX materials since 1983. These assessments, however, were simply disregarded during the NVA’s exercises.

Evidence from the time attests to frequent disagreements between the directors of intelligence and the officers on the NVA’s Main Staff responsible for military operations, who found that the enemy numbers were insufficient for their planning. Under orders from the Main Staff, extra NATO forces were ingeniously “located,” so that, for example, in addition to the 12 Bundeswehr divisions there were now 17 (!) French divisions. Even the Spanish armed forces were factored in as a source of additional offensive potential in Central Europe.

There is no doubt that the highest-ranking commanders of the NVA were fully aware of the true situation. It is possible, however, that even the National Defense Council of the GDR was not kept accurately informed by the defense minister at the time. There are documents from briefings given by defense ministers to the National Defense Council that contain descriptions of the enemy similar to those discussed above.16 The documents give no indication that there were any critical questions or demands for evidence at these sessions, either about the depiction of the force balance between NATO and the WP or about concrete indications of NATO’s offensive intent.

Only a few insiders could see through this mechanism of falsification. Normal staffers and NVA troops, as well as the broader population, had no correct information at their disposal that would have enabled them to challenge the official figures when negotiations began on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The convincing way that these assessments of the enemy were presented gave them even greater credibility.

In the three examples cited above it is clear that in the GDR, and within the NVA itself, all information about NATO’s armed forces and operational plans was suppressed or kept secret if it in any way revealed the defensive orientation of the Western alliance or raised questions about the Warsaw Pact’s offensive plans. Moreover, NATO’s forces and operational plans were systematically misrepresented to conform with an ideologically-grounded, aggressive image of the enemy, which in turn served as a rationale for the Warsaw Pact’s own offensive military doctrine and planning.

APPENDIX (ENDNOTES)

Unless otherwise indicated, original documents cited in this report can be found in the Document Division of the Seventh Regional Administration of the Armed Forces.

1. Over the years, the GDR Defense Ministry maintained a very detailed chronicle of the most important results of all training exercises. The chronicle, which is relatively free of political overtones, offers a clear view of the activities and status of the NVA. The chronicle will remain a basic source for scholarly research on the NVA for many years to come, even though some portions of the text, unfortunately, have been destroyed or are missing.

2. There are some 30 cartons of detailed NVA documents on the “Comrades-in-Arms-80” exercises. This material makes a good source for both historical research and operational-tactical matters.

3. The Soyuz-83 exercise is the only one of the Soyuz maneuvers in which all documents were not destroyed at the end of the exercise in accordance with standard orders. It thus provides outstanding insights into the Warsaw Pact’s operational and strategic thinking as of the early 1980s. A longer version of the Defense Minister’s speaking notes is also located in the documents on Soyuz-83. A summary can be found in the minutes of the National Defense Council meetings.

4. Because of the aim of “Staff Training-88/89” (advanced training of commanders and staff officers), the restricted number of participants, and the high degree of security and secrecy (with no radio traffic), the contents of this staff training exercise reveal much more than other exercises do about the real plans and intentions at the time.

5. The joint “Staff Training-85” exercise of the Warsaw Pact, as discussed by the NVA, was a turning point in
the WP’s approach to the serious investigation of ways of conducting defensive operations. The training exercise is fully documented, and includes even the results of the participants.

6. Chief of the NVA’s Main Staff, Colonel-General Streletz, in a report to his minister in follow-up briefings to Soyuz-83. From the exercise documents of Soyuz-83.

7. The following have been analyzed: “Staff-Training-79” (see also note 4); “Comrades-in-Arms-80” (see also note 2); “Staff-Training-89” and “90” of the Neubrandenburg (5th) Military District; the service book of a staff officer at the information directorate for “88/89”; the “Barricade-90” exercise of the heads of missile and artillery forces of the 5th Military District; and the command staff exercise “Sever-88” of the 5th Military District. Overall, they present a constant picture of nuclear planning in the 5th Military District.

8. Copies and originals of military-geographical depictions of operational directions (used as training material at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy) are at the Office for Information Sources of the Bundeswehr (ANBw). These pertain specifically to the “Jutland Operational Direction” and the “Coasts and Luxembourg Operational Direction” for 1986-88, from which the section on “Military-Political Significance” was cited.

9. An original copy of the “Catalog of Intelligence Features” is available at the ANBw. This catalog was intended only for senior officers of the Intelligence Directorate, and thus permits excellent comparisons with what was available to personnel outside the directorate and at lower levels of command.

10. The following are from minutes of GDR National Defense Council meetings.

11. These documents, from the ANBw publishing house, provide an overview of NATO strategy from 1967 on, with predictions through the year 2000. Starting in August 1988, NATO’s nuclear policy was depicted relatively accurately, but the specter of a short-warning attack by NATO was preserved.

12. This document, from the ANBw’s Documents of the NVA Intelligence Directorate, is entirely dedicated to the presentation of figures supporting the notion that NATO’s activities and intentions were aggressive. By means of frequent “arithmetical adjustments,” it gives an absolutely false assessment of NATO’s force strength.


14. This scenario is found in all documents on the enemy’s status. The force estimates were corrected in 1988-89, but the assumption that NATO’s intentions were aggressive was maintained until the final exercise, planned for September 1990 (“North Wind-90” in the 5th Military District; the documents on “North Wind-90” are at the ANBw).

15. Speechnotes of the head of military intelligence in the NVA, for a meeting of the heads of WP military intelligence in 1983.

16. Soyuz-83 is an example of this point. Senior members of the National Defense Council (such as E. Honecker) must have recalled that analyses of earlier WINTEX maneuvers (e.g., the 1973 exercises at the Council’s 43rd Session, the 1977 exercises at the 51st Session) yielded an entirely different picture, with NATO inferior by a ratio of 2:3-4:1 vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. Honecker also received unembellished reports about the status and force levels of NATO and the Bundeswehr from the State Security Ministry; these provided him with a timely military assessment independent of the Ministry of National Defense.

**TRANSLATOR’S NOTES**

A. In Soviet military parlance, a Front was defined as “an operational-strategic formation of the armed forces... which is designated to carry out operational-strategic missions along a single strategic direction or along several operational directions in a continental theater of military operations.” See S.F. Akhромеев, ed., Voenný entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), 787. The size of a Front would vary considerably depending on its specific mission, but it could include as many as 200,000-300,000 troops. For further information about Soviet levels of command, see Christopher W. Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1988), 213-18.

B. There is a small inaccuracy here. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov had been commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact until 1976, when he was appointed chief of the Soviet General Staff. At the time of this exercises (“Soyuz-78,” held in Romania), Marshal Viktor Kulikov was commander-in-chief of the Pact. The exercise was under Kulikov’s, not Ogarkov’s command.


D. Until 1989 the USSR’s Western Group of Forces was known as the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSGF), an indication of its special status in Soviet military planning. The change of name was intended to put the former GSGF on an equal level with the Southern Group of Forces (in Hungary), the Northern Group of Forces (in Poland), and the Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia). Unlike the other three Groups of Forces, however, the Western Group of Forces was still headed by a full “commander-in-chief,” rather than by a mere “commander.”

E. The distinction here between “operational-tactical” missiles comes originally from the Soviet military lexicon, and has no direct equivalent in the West. The difference can be easily understood, however, by considering the range of the Scud-B (320 km) versus the FROG (70 km). F. This statement about the CPSU General Secretary’s powers was true until March 1990, when the new office of the “President of the USSR” was created. (See “Zakon SSSR ob uchrezhdenii posta Prezidenta SSSR i vneseni o sovetstvu vstupivsich izmeneni i dopolnien v Konstitutsiyu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR,” Izvestiya, 5 March 1990, 1-2.) The president was endowed with the title of “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,” and in that capacity was the actual head of the Soviet armed forces, and not merely the commander-in-chief of the forces. G. Western analysts have long assumed that the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states would not have taken part in (and perhaps would not even have been consulted about) decisions to use nuclear weapons based in Eastern Europe. This hypothesis has been strengthened by the lack of any references in the East German documents to the political decision-making process. H. It should be noted, however, that in Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) military doctrine, the graduated or selective use of nuclear weapons in Europe was not particularly meaningful—or at least not as meaningful as the basic distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare. This would have been especially true if the fighting had extended to Soviet territory. See Stephen M. Mayer, Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces (Part 1); Development of Doctrine and Objectives, Adelphi Paper No. 187 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/4), 21-25.

**CWIH Fellowship Opportunities**

The Cold War International History Project offers a limited number of fellowships to junior scholars from the former Communist bloc to conduct from three months to one year of archival research in the United States on topics related to the history of the Cold War. Fellows are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Applicants should submit a CV, a statement of proposed research, a letter of nomination and three letters of recommendation; writing samples (particularly in English) are welcomed, though not required. Applicants should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States.

For the 1992-93 academic year, CWIHP awarded fellowships to: Chen Xiaolou, Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies (3 months); Csaba Bekes, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest (3 months); Petr Mares, Charles University, Prague (9 months); Niu Dayong, Department of History, Beijing University (1 year); Ila Gaiduk, Institute of General History, Moscow (6 months); and Vladimir Batyuk, Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Moscow (6 months). Applications for the 1993-94 academic year will be evaluated and recipients chosen during the winter of 1992-93.

Send applications to: Jim Hershberg, Coordinator, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1000 Jefferson Dr. S.W., Washington, D.C. 20560, fax: (202) 357-4439.
Inside the SED Archives: A Researcher’s Diary

By Hope M. Harrison

The records of the Socialist Unity Party (SED, for Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), which governed the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for more than four decades following its establishment in October 1949, are now available to researchers at the Central Party Archive of the Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement (known in German as IfGA, ZPA, for Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Zentrales Parteiarchiv) in Berlin.1 As with most formerly Communist archives, conducting research there is not particularly easy. There is no published overview of the archival holdings and this is, of course, part of the game. You quickly learn that, although the archivists are very nice, they don’t really want to make it easy for you to find any remotely sensitive documents (assuming, of course, that such documents are in fact there). A researcher has to be patient, on the one hand, yet persistent and other countries and contains reports from East German embassies in Moscow, Peking, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, and other capitals. A complete reference book is devoted to East German-Soviet relations: Spezial-Inventar ueber die Beziehungen zwischen der revolutionaren russischen bzw. Sowjetischen und deutschen Arbeiterbewegung von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart [Special Inventory on Relations between the Revolutionary Russian or Soviet and German Labor Movements from the Beginning to the Present]. Part three covers the period from 1945 through 1979. This book covers a broad range of sources on East German-Soviet relations culled from the files of many officials and party and state organizations.

For the files of some officials and issues, the archives has little card drawers (Kartei). There is a Kartei for security questions containing much detailed information, but it seems to have been sanitized of the most sensitive files. The files include some information on the Ministry of State Security (Stasi), the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and various military units. I have seen a few “safe” files from the old Stasi chief, Wilhelm Zaisser, from his Kartei, NL 277. There are also Kartei on Hermann Matern (NL 76), Fred Oellner (NL 215), Anton Ackermann (NL 109), Heinrich Rau (NL 62), Georg Handke (NL 128), and others. Memoirs begin with the letters EA. Recently some files from the Internes Parteiarchiv (Internal Party Archive) have been opened up (J IV 2/21). This could be a goldmine and contains, for example, files from Ulbricht’s office.

There are many other files, but these are the key categories that I have seen. Although I have not listed any files specifically on economics, the poor state of the economy was at the top of the government’s agenda, and the Central Committee plenums and the files of individual officials are filled with economic concerns. And now to the diary.

October 16, 1991

I am overwhelmed at the government’s totalitarian efforts — it attempted to control everything: the press,4 the economy, the schools,5 culture, every aspect of life down to the smallest detail. It’s unbelievable. Maybe that’s why it never worked—it’s impossible to control so much. The East German regime really tried to indoctrinate every single East German to the righteousness and peace-lovingness of East Germany, the hostility and illegitimacy of West Germany, and the great friendship of the Soviet Union with East Germany. Every member of every single organization in East Germany had to go through political (re-)training to become a staunch defender of the East German cause. Most of it seems artificial in the documents; for many East Germans, it was as if they were forced to put on new, ill-fitting shoes and walk. For most, the first steps were very wobbly. There are all sorts of reports (often rather funny, from the point of view of a non-Communist outsider) sent to the party leadership about workers or teachers or soldiers having “false” views or being confused about this or that aspect of East German or Soviet policy and needing clearer explanations.6 For example, Comrade Langer of the Flakregiment (anti-aircraft regiment) asked, “Wouldn’t the Soviet proposal for a peace treaty deepen the division of Germany?”7 Noncommissioned Officer Lauschke of the National People’s Army gave another critique of Soviet policy: “The eternal notes of the USSR to the Western powers are pointless anyway. The Western powers aren’t the so-called Auswärige Abteilungen, which were in charge of the official relations be

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Archives in the New World

By Axel Frohn

[Editor’s note: The following report by Axel Frohn on the East German archives appeared in the Spring 1992 Bulletin of the German Historical Institute. It is reprinted here, with the institute’s permission, along with updated material in endnotes supplied by Stephen Connors, a research associate of the Cold War International History Project.]

East German archives are presently undergoing a period of profound change. Some have been or are in the process of being absorbed by federal or other major archives in order to reunite and consolidate collections that, as a result of World War II, were arbitrarily or coincidentally separated.1 Access to the Stasi files is now governed by a federal law, but other questions of highest concern still need to be settled such as where the records of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the former state party, will remain and under whose custody. The same is
New Sources on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962

By William Burr*

The Berlin Crisis of 1958-1962 is one of the most under-studied Cold War crises in the scholarly literature. This relative inattention cannot be due to lack of interest, as the Crisis was marked by dramatic and extraordinary developments, including Khrushchev’s nuclear saber rattling, Kennedy’s military mobilization in the summer of 1961, the erection of the Berlin Wall that August, and the October 1961 tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie. Rather, the fundamental reason for scholarly neglect has been the dearth of primary sources. In contrast to the relative ease with which researchers have won declassification of documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, efforts to obtain the release of key documents on the Berlin Crisis have been repeatedly blocked by U.S. government agencies. Until recently, U.S. decision-making on policy toward Berlin remained elusive, since researchers could only rely on heavily screened files at the National Archives and presidential libraries, and on the memoirs of participants.

And—again, until recently—prospects for gaining access to internal documentation on “the other side” were even worse; Soviet policy-making remained opaque due to the virtual absence of high-quality primary sources with the exception of Khrushchev’s tape-recorded and posthumously published memoirs. But scholars have recently begun to explore the archives of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), and of the Central Committee of Soviet communist Party, and a preliminary assessment of the motives of Moscow and East Berlin during the crisis may soon be possible. The lack of critical documents on the Berlin Crisis has hindered the study of the Cold War because, to a great extent, the Crisis was a turning point in that crisis marking the last U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Europe, and because the abatement of the Crisis, in the wake of the Cuban imbroglio, contributed to the environment for detente later in the decade. Berlin also embodied the transition from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” in U.S. and NATO military strategy, with all that implied for conventional and nuclear planning. That shift, in turn, along with disagreements over the Berlin negotiations, added to the U.S-French tensions that led to France’s departure from NATO in 1966. Moreover, Berlin meant a growing role for West Germany in the informal mechanisms by which the U.S. and more influential Allies coordinated NATO policy. At the same time, the Crisis brought an end to Western efforts to reunify Germany and enhanced the willingness of Allied (if not West German) policymakers tacitly to recognize the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Until recently, the significance of the Berlin Crisis made State Department and other federal agency officials very wary of releasing documents describing diplomatic negotiations and political and military contingency plans. During the 1958-1962 period, U.S. and Allied officials took great pains to prepare contingency plans for U.S. and Allied action in the event that the East Germans and the Soviets restricted Western access to Berlin or otherwise threatened the Allied position there. Moreover, the U.S. participated in a series of inconclusive discussions with the Soviets on the problems of Berlin and German reunification. Although the chances of a confrontation greatly diminished after the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, U.S. government officials were unwilling to release documents that revealed fallback negotiating positions and contingency plans so long as Germany and Berlin remained divided. Because these records also disclosed the views of Allied governments—including France, the U.K., and West Germany—declassifiers were even more reluctant to release material.

With the reunification of Germany (and Berlin) in 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the Department of State began to take a more relaxed view and once-sensitive documents suddenly became releasable. This development, along with important releases of British records under the thirty-year rule, puts historians in a better position than ever to ascertain what happened as well as to explain Western decision-making during the Crisis.

Federal agency decisions to declassify documents on the Berlin Crisis have not been spontaneous, but result primarily from a cooperative effort involving the National Security Archive, a foreign policy research institute in Washington, D.C., and the Nuclear History Program at the University of Maryland. With the NHP’s assistance, the NSA in 1989 began a systematic effort to: 1) request the declassification of all identifiable Berlin-related material withheld from State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff collections maintained at the National Archives; 2) file Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to federal agencies—particularly the State Department, the Pentagon, CIA, and the NSC—for significant documents; and 3) initiate mandatory review requests to the Eisenhower and Kennedy Presidential Libraries for key documents in their collections.

Since the National Security Archive and collaborating researchers began making FOIA requests, the State Department (both through the National Archives and its own FOIA office) and the Eisenhower Library have been the most responsive. For example, out of a total of 865 documents previously withheld from decimal files at the National Archives, the State Department has released 611 documents in whole or in part— exactly 70 percent. The remaining documents are either under review or under appeal. Moreover, the Eisenhower Library has expedited the release of a number of State Department and White House documents formerly denied to researchers. In contrast to the State Department and the

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Eisenhower Library, the military agencies, the CIA, and the NSC have been extraordinarily slow in processing requests for Berlin documentation. Because those agencies (as well as State) are still reviewing documents, new material on the Berlin Crisis will be trickling in from the U.S. government for some time to come.9

The new documentation is so varied and complex that it defies casual generalization or itemization in a few pages. One item worth singling out, however, is Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threat to Berlin November 1958-December 1962, a top secret history prepared by Department of State historian Arthur J. Kogan during the late 1960s. Although unfinished, this six-part study has been almost completely declassified and is now an essential starting point for identifying major developments and decisions, particularly in the diplomatic and contingency planning spheres. In addition, this study’s abundant footnoting makes it an invaluable guide to the primary sources.

One of the most important features of the new material is the documentation on Western contingency plans in the event the Soviets turned over to the GDR, by a peace treaty, control over the Berlin access routes and the East Germans then impeded military or civilian traffic. The documents tell us much about the politics of inter-Allied contingency planning, especially U.S. concern about West German expectations as well as controversies over tacit recognition of the GDR and the use of force in a crisis over access to Berlin. Seeing the risk as relatively low, the Eisenhower Administration accepted the danger of general nuclear war as the outcome of a military confrontation over Berlin because it believed that that risk was worth taking in order to deter the Soviets. The documents also suggest that the Allies, particularly the British, were more worried about the possibility of war and rejected U.S. proposals for an advance decision on the use of limited military force to break through a blockade; Eisenhower and Dulles viewed such a decision as crucial to their deterrence strategy.11

Besides illuminating controversies between foreign offices, the documents—including those released at the British Public Records Office—disclose the early history of LIVE OAK, the top secret quadripartite Allied military planning group led by Supreme Allied Commander General Lauris Norstad, which came into existence in April 1959 and ceased operations the day after Germany was reunified. Documents on this tripartite (later quadripartite) planning body disclose the scope of LIVE OAK plans as well as the diplomatic and political context in which Allied military officials conducted planning. British records confirm what the American documents only hint at: London was apprehensive that Norstad’s planning concepts would lead the Allies to a military disaster if a crisis materialized.12

New documents also clarify important aspects of the Eisenhower Administration’s emphasis on negotiations to postpone, prevent, or even to solve a Berlin Crisis. New material adds detail to existing documentation on Allied efforts to concert negotiating positions, on Anglo-American debates over the possibility of a Great Power summit, on private meetings between Secretary of State Christian Herter and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and on the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meetings at Camp David (which are now declassified in their entirety). Documentation on preparations for the aborted Paris Summit of May 1960 suggest the serious difficulties involved in any effort to solve the Berlin Crisis through negotiations. They present Eisenhower as flexible about a Berlin settlement but stymied by his unwillingness to challenge Konrad Adenauer’s adamant commitment to the Berlin status quo. As Eisenhower explained to Macmillan in April 1960: “If we let the Germans down they might shift their own position and even go neutralistic. [Eisenhower] was very worried about who would then hold the central bastion in Europe.”13

Although the latest releases from the Eisenhower Library and the National Archives provide new information about Eisenhower’s thinking on the Berlin problem, the same cannot be said about Kennedy-era documentation. Part of the problem with Berlin Crisis documentation is that the Kennedy Library’s management, unlike that of the Johnson or Eisenhower Libraries, has shown relatively little practical interest in declassifying the record of Kennedy’s foreign policy.14 Whereas many Berlin-related documents have emanated from the Eisenhower Library in recent years, the only significant recent release from the Kennedy Library has been the record of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meetings at Vienna. This leaves the State Department as the only agency that has made a significant effort to release material relating to the Kennedy Administration’s Berlin policy. Indeed, when supplemented by the Kogan history, recent Public Record Office releases, and the Vienna summit record, new material from the State Department makes it possible to reconstruct the main lines of Kennedy’s Berlin policy. But little of the new documentation offers direct evidence on Kennedy’s own thinking.15

One of the most important recently declassified documents is Dean Acheson’s report to Kennedy on Berlin, dated 28 June 1961 and submitted a few weeks after the Vienna meeting. When this document is read alongside the summit records, historians may draw preliminary conclusions about the degree to which the militant response urged by Acheson and largely implemented by Kennedy was justified by Khrushchev’s remarks. Small portions of the Acheson report remain classified, but the excisions do not hide the arresting tone of the document. One quote: “There is a substantial chance ... that the preparations for war and negotiation outlined here would convince Khrushchev that what he wants is not possible without war, and cause him to change his purpose. There is, also, a substantial possibility that war might result.”16

Another significant recent release of Kennedy-era materials consists of Dean Rusk’s memoranda of conversations among U.S., Allied, and Soviet officials dating from early 1961 to the end of 1962. These include the record of most of the Rusk-Dobrynin and Rusk-Gromyko “exploratory conversations” in New York and Geneva, of talks between Gromyko and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow, and of quadripartite and tripartite discussions of military contingency plans and diplomatic strategy. This material conveys well the anxious mood of the time, including Rusk’s fears of German neutralism. Most striking is Rusk’s statement to West German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe that nuclear war would “mean the obliteration of Germany, not just injury to a piece of German territory.” Grewe then “made a sound indicating that this was appreciated.”17 Additional documents describe a Bonn-Washington flap in April 1962, when high level German officials, dissatisfied with the U.S. posture on talks with Moscow, embarrassed the Kennedy Administration...
by leaking sensitive negotiating papers. This incident led to Grewe’s resignation.18

The Rusk “memcons” provide detail on the Kennedy Administration’s efforts to work with Allies in framing contingency plans that would become the foundation of the flexible response doctrine that shaped NATO strategy from 1967 until 1991. Initially formalized in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 109 on 20 October 1961, the new contingency plans sharply contrasted with the Eisenhower Administration’s emphasis on general nuclear war and rejection of conventional options in a conflict over Berlin. Although NSAM 109 remains secret, the State Department declassified its main points by releasing the text of a briefing on Berlin planning given to President Kennedy in early August 1962—just following another unsuccessful series of Rusk-Gromyko discussions at Geneva. Prepared by John Ausland of the Berlin Task Force, the briefing shows how the Kennedy Administration sought to redefine and refine the nuclear deterrent by finding alternatives to the threat of general war that probably lacked credibility in Moscow. Thus, the Ausland briefing presented a multi-phased contingency plan, including covert operations, naval and economic countermeasures, and non-nuclear operations in GDR territory, with nuclear weapons reserved to only if other means failed.19

New documents also illuminate the Wall Crisis of August 1961—the most infamous and tragic moment of the Berlin Crisis and one which the contingency plans did not anticipate. As the number of refugees from the GDR mounted during the summer of 1961, U.S. diplomats did not rule out the possibility that East Germany might impose “severe restrictions” on—if not actually close—the border between East and West Berlin. Declassified documents strengthen the view that what most worried and surprised Washington policymakers was not so much the sector border closing itself, but the bitter West German reaction which compelled the Administration hastily to improvise measures to alleviate a “crisis of confidence.” As Rusk put it, “the immediate problem was the sense of outrage that existed in Berlin and Germany. . . . It was not easy to know just what to do.”20

Besides the Wall crisis, newly declassified documents elucidate other incidents in the Greater Berlin area during both administrations, including the controversies over Soviet processing of Allied convoys at Autobahn checkpoints and the events that culminated in the tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie on 27 October 1961. They reveal the debates among U.S. officials during November 1958 and February 1959 when the Soviets detained U.S. convoys because military authorities refused to let the Soviets inspect the contents of closed vehicles. After the first incident, Gen. Norstad proposed that the U.S. test Soviet intentions by sending in another convoy with closed vehicles and, if it was detained, to extricate it with “minimum force.” In response, the State Department argued that this was “the wrong time, place, and issue on which to resort to force”—and it prevailed. Other material illustrates the complex series of events that constituted the “Tailgate Crisis” of October-November 1963, perhaps the last episode of the Berlin Crisis. This altercation, occasioned by Soviet insistence that U.S. soldiers dismount from trucks to be counted, showed Kennedy in the role of a crisis manager, having to decide about sending convoys to test Soviet intentions.21

In a recent article, Raymond Garthoff argued that the October 1961 tank standoff at Checkpoint Charlie was more serious than has been thought because both sides held mistaken perceptions of each other’s intentions. Using the testimony of former Soviet officials, Garthoff shows that Khrushchev had reason to fear a U.S. push through the Wall because Soviet intelligence had spotted U.S. Army units in Berlin covertly practicing such an exercise using bulldozer tanks. However understandable, Khrushchev was in error; local U.S. military authorities had dispatched the tanks only to enforce access to East Berlin by American officials. A recently declassified U.S. Army history provides more information on the events leading up to the confrontation, but also confirms the existence of contingency planning that corresponds to covert exercises described by Garthoff. In late 1961, U.S. Army Berlin developed two operational plans (OPLANS), one to force entrance into East Berlin at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, the other “designed for ‘nosing down’ designated portions of the sector wall.”22

Enough documents have been released for historians to delineate the main developments in the United States’ Berlin policy. Nevertheless, certain areas remain obscure and will not be clarified until additional documentation becomes available. Among these are the ways in which NSAM 109 was translated into NATO policy as well as Kennedy’s management of Berlin policy, particularly negotiating strategy, from late 1961 forward. Just as significant is the question of intelligence operations and estimates. Most of the National Intelligence Estimates on Berlin are classified; until the CIA makes them available, we will not know how the intelligence community assessed the risks involved in courses of action undertaken by Eisenhower and Kennedy. In addition, the picture of U.S. policy will be fragmentary until more is known about U.S. and Allied intelligence operations and activities in the Berlin area.23

Even if new releases of U.S. material elucidate the obscure areas of American policy, our understanding of the Berlin Crisis will be necessarily incomplete until European primary sources are available, particularly those of the former Soviet Union and its allies. With Soviet records it may be possible to assess Marc Trachtenberg’s provocative thesis that U.S. nuclear sharing policy was a taproot of the Berlin Crisis.24 In addition, Soviet and East German documents may verify U.S. diplomatic reports of late 1958 that cited East German pressure as central to understanding the timing of Khrushchev’s Berlin speech in November 1958.25 Certainly, Soviet records are necessary to grasp more fully Khrushchev’s intentions and negotiating strategy as well as the impact of Soviet and Soviet bloc politics on Khrushchev’s Berlin plans.

Soviet documents may also help analysts evaluate the impact of American actions, such as the U.S. military buildup of 1961, on Soviet policy. Declassified U.S. material discloses that after Kennedy’s Berlin crisis speech of 25 July 1961, Khrushchev was “very upset” because he regarded it as an “ultimatum.” In September he wrote Kennedy urging a settlement of the crisis through personal communications. More than two weeks later, on October 16, Kennedy wrote Khrushchev that the “alternatives [to a settlement] are so dire.” Subsequently, the Soviet leader withdrew the six-month deadline for a German peace treaty that he had established when he met with Kennedy at Vienna. Access to Khrushchev material, the records of the Communist Party Central Committee, as well as the complete
Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, may help resolve the mystery of whether the U.S. buildup induced Khrushchev to pull back.26 Soviet files could also clarify the degree to which the Berlin problem influenced Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear capable Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba in 1962. During and after the Cuban Crisis, the U.S. civilian and military intelligence analysts who estimated Soviet intentions took it for granted that Moscow had believed that the Cuban deployment would strengthen its hand in making demands on the West regarding Berlin after the missiles were in place. A newly declassified Army intelligence report depicts a disappointed Khrushchev—surprised by the U.S. non-nuclear Berlin buildup, aware that the “missile gap” favored the U.S. (and “that the U.S. knew it”), compelled to withdraw his Berlin deadline, and determined to strengthen a “weak” deterrent posture by “installing his most reliable missile system in Cuba.” Without Soviet documents, it will be impossible to know if such estimates were accurate. One hopes that Soviet documents will clarify Khrushchev’s plans and confirm or refute the proposition that the Soviets were preparing militarily for a “face-off” over Berlin once the MRBMs were in Cuba.27

Although greater knowledge of the Berlin Crisis depends upon European, particularly Soviet, primary sources, there remain significant obstacles to a better understanding of U.S. policy, particularly during the Kennedy period. Although the CIA now has a professed policy of openness, it is likely that considerable pressure from scholars and other interested groups will have to be exerted before the Agency releases significant historical material on the Cold War. Another problem is the Kennedy Library: until its management chooses to make declassification a priority, studies of Kennedy documentation are hard working and courteous. 14. This is no reflection on the archivists at JFKL who are working and courteous. 15. In addition, during the last few years the Defense Department has declassified in heavily excised form a number of documents from the Maxwell Taylor Papers held at the National War College. Copies of these are also on file at the National Security Archive. 16. McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 5 July 1961, Acheson report on Berlin attached. For a perspective on Acheson’s thinking at the time, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), 372-76. 17. For the Rusk-Grewe exchange, see Memorandum of Conversation, “Berlin, 13 March 1961.” 18. Memorandum of conversation by Foy Kohler, 13 April 1962; Embassy Bonn to Secretary of State, Nos. 2472 and 2504, 13 and 18 April 1962; Secretary of State to Embassy Bonn, No. 3095, 12 May 1962; Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, 200-02. 19. J.C. Ausland to Mr. Hillenbrand, "Briefing for President on Berlin," 2 August 1962. John Ausland generously provided a copy of the briefing, among other documents. See also, U.S. Air Force, "History of the Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, HQ USAF, Volume 22, 1 January 1961 to 31 December 1961." 20. See John C. Ausland, "Discontent in East Germany," 18 July 1961, and Moscow Embassy Telegram 258, 24 July 1961. For Rusk’s statement, Department of State, Crisis Over Berlin, VI, 86. In 1959, when State Department officials had considered the possibility that the Soviets might close the Berlin sector border, they

1. Except for Marc Trachtenberg’s important essay, “The Berlin Crisis,” in his History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 169-234, the most significant work has been by political scientists such as Jack Schick, Hannes Adomeit, and Robert Sussman. Michael Beschloss’s The Crisis Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) is full of useful information and analysis but its endnotes are sometimes confusing and insufficiently specific.

2. For the most complete documentation available on the Cuban Missile Crisis, see The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, The Making of U.S. Policy, published by the National Security Archive and Chadwyck-Healey, Ltd. (Washington, D.C., 1990).


5. This is not to say that the State Department is releasing everything; it has withheld some material in whole or in part, but even substantial portions of the denied material is being released through additional appeals. 6. The National Security Archive has recently published The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962 (Washington, D.C., 1992). To provide as comprehensive picture of Berlin policy-making as possible, this 3,000-document collection collates the most important material already available at the National Archives and presidential libraries, as well as in other public sources, with a large number of newly declassified documents. Most of the materials mentioned in this essay are included in the set. Copies of documents declassified since the publication of The Berlin Crisis are on file at the National Security Archive, 1755 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036.

7. David Rosenberg and Marc Trachtenberg, both associated with NHP, played central roles by generously sharing released material that they obtained through FOIA efforts.

8. Most of this material is from State Department files covering the years 1957 through 1959. The Department of State has not yet released material from after 31 December 1959.

9. Some material has been undergoing review for an inordinate period of time. In April 1988, the NSA requested the Pentagon to declassify the ICS’s history of the Berlin Crisis. This request remains under review. 10. Originally, Crisis Over Berlin was to include a seventh volume on the period late 1961 through the end of 1962, as well as an introductory volume giving background on the Crisis. Unfortunately, Kogan did not have the opportunity to prepare this material. 11. For the discussion of risk, the use of force in U.S. contingency planning and the inter-Allied debate, see ICS 1967, 158, “State Defense-JCS Ad Hoc Working Group Report on Possible Courses of Action on Berlin,” 28 November 1958; DOS, Crisis Over Berlin, I, 97-99; “Substance of Discussions of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting....,” 14 January 1959; J. N. Greene, Memorandum for Mr. Herter, 6 March 1959; and Herter, “Memo-

* I would like to thank Tomoko Onozawa for her research assistance. I also thank David Rosenberg, Marc Trachtenberg, and Georg Schild, all associated with the Nuclear History Program (NHP), for sharing their insights about the Berlin Crisis.
EAST GERMAN ARCHIVES  
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equipment, and the mounting number of inquiries regarding legal and property questions, especially rehabilitation and expropriation matters, greatly increased the workload of the archives’ personnel. An additional task will be the compilation of new or updated inventories and finding aids.

The former Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Dienststelle Potsdam, has been integrated into the Bundesarchiv and now forms its Sections III and V (Deutsches Reich, 1867/71-1945, and Deutsche Demokratische Republik, 1945/49-1990, respectively). Thus, the records of most of East Germany’s central governmental agencies have become part of the holdings of the Bundesarchiv. Exceptions are the records of the East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which have been acquired by the Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, and those of the Nationale Volksarmee, which for the time being are under the custody of the Bundeswehr. All of these source materials will remain in Berlin. Although they are not presently available for research, they will eventually be accessible in accordance with the federal law governing the archives and the 30-year rule. The Bundesarchiv has also absorbed the Staatliches Filmarchiv der DDR and now possesses 125,000 documentary and feature films. The Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz will soon receive the holdings of the Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Dienststelle 2, in Merseburg. They will then once again be deposited in the Prussian Geheimes Staatsarchiv, where they were kept until 1945.

The Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Agency (Stasi) of the former GDR (Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik) has custody of its files. They are stored in the central archives of the former Ministerium für Staatssicherheit in Berlin and in regional archives in the former district capitals of Rostock, Schwerin, Neubrandenburg, Magdeburg, Potsdam, Frankfurt/Oder, Erfurt, Halle, Leipzig, Cottbus, Dresden, Suhl, Gera, and Chemnitz. Access to these files is governed by a special law, the so-called Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, which the Bundestag passed on December 20, 1991. According to this law, the Stasi records will be available for research—with the exception of documents of inter- or supernatural organizations and foreign countries that the Stasi had in its possession, if the Federal Republic is bound by international treaty to protect their confidentiality. Also excepted will be secret West German documents, East German court and attorneys’ records, files on agents of West German or Allied intelligence services, and documents on methods and techniques of intelligence gathering, counter intelligence, and terrorism, but only if the Federal Minister of the Interior decides in each case that the disclosure of a document would be detrimental to Germany’s national security. Administrative and policy records of the Stasi not containing personal information (i.e. Sachvorgänge) will be open to researchers, as will be copies of personal records from which names have been deleted (Personenvorgänge). Personal records of former Stasi officials or beneficiaries and of personalities of contemporary historical interest (Personen der Zeitgeschichte) will also be accessible. The 30-year rule will not apply to the Stasi files, but documents will only be available for research after they have been screened. This of course will take some time, since the Stasi archives contain more than 540 million feet of material.

The Stasi files will be crucial for any scholar dealing with the history of the GDR, although if viewed isolated from the SED party records, these files will not even allow for an adequate analysis of the history and functioning of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit itself. The task of this ministry was to safeguard the absolute political power of the SED, and it was set up accordingly by resolutions of the party’s Politbüro and directives of its Central Committee. But all these basic documents are in the SED archive, which is still administered by the SED’s successor organization, the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). The Central Party Archive (Zentrales Parteiarchiv, ZPA) is located in the Institut für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Berlin, the former Institut für Marxismus-Leninizmus. Since the largest amount of SED party records can hardly be separated from state records, and since decisive documents are more likely to be found in the SED Central Committee files than in the records of GDR ministries, a partial change in the ownership of the SED archive in favor of the Bundesarchiv or the East German Landesarchive is quite probable and may take place in the near future. Personal papers, however, including the important papers of Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and Wilhelm Pieck, which were donated to the SED archive, are unlikely to be removed from the ZPA’s collections. The current access situation is rather complicated: sometimes the 30-year rule is applied, sometimes there is no time limit, sometimes no access is allowed at all, and sometimes finding aids are withheld. How a change in ownership will affect the accessibility of the records is as yet uncertain.

The East German state archives, following long-suppressed federative principles, readopted their traditional name Landesarchiv in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, and Saxon-Anhalt; in Dresden and in Weimar, they reclaimed their old designations Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv and Thüringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv. Each Land also maintains a number of Staats- or Landesarchive. For the four-and-a-half decades from 1945 to 1990, their holdings consist of two large record groups: the records of the Länder governments on the one hand, and the files of the fifteen district (Bezirk) administrations (including East Berlin), which were established after the Länder were abolished in 1952, on the other.

The records of the Länder include the papers of the Länder assemblies that were elected in 1946. Minutes of their sessions and committee meetings reflect the intense conflicts over land reform and collectivism, expropriations, and de-Nazification in the early postwar period. Particularly telling are the files of the ministers president. From 1948/49 onward, they show the ever-increasing tendency to strengthen the Communist central power to the disadvantage of the Länder governments. They also provide insight into the deep changes brought about by the KPD/SED and the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD), which transformed the East German anti-fascist-democratic society into a statist one. Of special interest in this context are the orders of the SMAD, which are otherwise only available in the archives of the former Soviet Union, where they once were or still are classified as top secret.

Other collections include the correspondence between the Länder governments and the German central administrations, the predecessors of the GDR ministries; the files of
tween the East German Länder and the three Western zones; and the very important records of the Länder ministries of the interior, which, as levers of power, were controlled by Communist functionaries who made the decisions about personnel and were responsible for the fundamental changes in the East German economic, legal, and educational system. Interestingly enough, there are no records in these files on the unconstitutional abolition of the East German Länder and the establishment of the districts, which was planned and carried out by the ministries of the interior. Records from the plebiscite in Saxony in 1946, which are also in this collection, reveal how the Soviet-German stock companies were founded, which, under the pressure of the occupying power, transferred economically crucial heavy industry plants from German to Soviet-dominated ownership, but no material could be found on the enormous East German reparation payments to the Soviet Union. There is hope, however, that some Länder provenances may be recovered from the files of the Central Office for Reparations (Zentrales Amt für Reparationen) and the East German ministries.

The archival materials of the district administrations (1952-1990) form the second highly significant record group in the East German Landes- and Staatsarchive for the history of the GDR. The administrations of the districts and the counties were subordinate agencies of the centralized state. It was their obligation to carry out the directives of the Council of Ministers and the party leadership. For this reason, their records present themselves in far greater uniformity than the records of the Länder, and their informational value is secondary compared to the holdings of the SED party archive. These administrations were characterized by a large number of specialized divisions; for instance, internal affairs, economics, agriculture and forestry, commerce, transport, finance, culture, education, and public health. The chiefs of these divisions formed a council, and the minutes of the council meetings are the most important records of the districts and counties. Although the councils had to deal with a broad spectrum of issues, their concern with economic matters grew steadily with the increasing preeminence of the planned economy. The minutes of their meetings also contain indirect information on key political decisions, while the corresponding primary documents were kept in the secret files of the central authorities and destroyed periodically. They reflect, in many ways, the uprisings in the GDR on June 17, 1953, and in Hungary in 1956, as well as the measures that were taken on August 13, 1961, to seal off East from West Berlin, culminating in the construction of the Berlin Wall. Finding aids, usually in the form of card indices, make this record group accessible. It is available for research, but rules for the protection of personal data and the 30-year rule apply.

One more component of the holdings of the Landes- and Staatsarchive should be mentioned: the records of the socialized industries and state-owned businesses. These will be of utmost importance to the scholar of the GDR’s economic and social history. While several thousand business archives were established in 1950, only a limited number have survived. These include the records of the Carl-Zeiss-Jena company; shipyards on the coast of the Baltic Sea; heavy machinery businesses; mining companies and chemical combinations of the potassium industry in Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia; the metallurgical and petrochemical combines on the Oder; the lignite and energy combines in Lusatia; and the textile industry in Saxony. They are complemented by archival materials of state-owned farms and forest enterprises. It is important to note that the records of banks and other financial institutions are missing.

Since the Akademie der Wissenschaften (Academy of Sciences) and the Akademie der Künste der DDR (Academy of Arts of the GDR) are currently being dissolved, the future status of their archives is uncertain. They may either be divided between existing institutions, like the manuscript divisions of the two branches of the Prussian State Library and the Academy of Arts, or they may be turned over to a future Academy of Sciences in Berlin. There are no indications that the status of university archives will be changed, but they are more accessible now than they were before 1989.

Over the past one-and-a-half years, the German Historical Institute has continued its efforts to acquire inventories and finding aids of East German archives. For its general reference section, the library was able to obtain copies of Friedrich Kahlenberg’s Deutsche Archive in West und Ost: Zur Entwicklung des staatlichen Archivwesens seit 1945 (Düsseldorf, 1972); Lexikon Archivwesen der DDR (Berlin, 1979); Taschenbuch Archivwesen der DDR (Berlin, 1970); and a special inventory on Albert Einstein in Berlin 1913-1933: Regesten der Einstein-Dokumente in Archiven der DDR (Berlin, 1979). Among the inventories of state archives (the titles of the publications refer to the archives’ former names) are Übersicht über die Bestände des Deutschen Zentralarchives Potsdam; Spezialinventar des Staatsarchivs Potsdam zur Geschichte der bürgerlichen Parteien und Verbände in Deutschland bis 1945; and inventories of the Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv in Potsdam (from its beginnings until 1945), the Sächsisches Landeshauptarchiv and its subordinate Landesarchive, and the Landesarchiv in Rudolstadt. An inventory of the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin may be consulted at the Institute, as well as the Handbuch 1982-1986 of the Academy of Arts and finding aids for a number of literary holdings, among them the papers of Arnold Zweig, Leo Weismantel, and Willi Bredel. Also available is an inventory of the papers of Friedrich von Schiller in the Goethe- und Schiller-Archiv in Weimar.

The Institute has also purchased inventories of the city archives of Bitterfeld, Erfurt, Haldensleben, Lauenburg/Elbe, and Weimar; if unpublished, they were kindly photocopied by the archives. The city archive of Leipzig, one of the largest municipal archives in Germany, deserves special credit. It provided the Institute with a complete set of photocopies of its typewritten finding aids, which amount to more than 2,000 pages. They include an inventory of Johann Sebastian Bach’s papers at the archive; a list of sources on the history of the book trade and censorship in Leipzig from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century; finding aids to sources on the impact of the French Revolution in Leipzig, 1789-1805; the city’s occupation by French troops in 1806; events of the war in 1813; the state of unrest in Leipzig in 1830/31 and 1845 as well as the revolutionary events in 1848/49; finding aids to records of the city’s bureau of criminal investigation, 1810-1852, its trade and industry court, 1863-1927, and its merchants’ court, 1904-1927; and, finally, finding aids to the records of the assembly and
Unfortunately, as the Cold War progressed, the GDR stopped its archivists from attending German Archival Days, especially designed to maintain high levels of professional archival cooperation. By 1961, with tensions leading to the erection of the Berlin Wall, archival cooperation between the two states collapsed.

In 1950, according to Dr. Friedrich Kahlenberg, President of the German Bundesarchiv, the East Germans created the National Archival Fonds, which essentially placed all of East Germany's archival materials—encompassing central state, district, municipal, mass organization, socialized industry and business archives—under the direction of the GDR's Interior Ministry. By 1976, this National Archival Administration had become highly centralized and run by politically reliable members of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED). Despite political and ideological pressures, the system remained remarkably professional and well-organized. In the West, the decentralized federalist archival tradition flourished. The different archival Länder administrations met biannually at the Conference of the Archive Department Heads of the Union, and by the 1980s, a high degree of legal uniformity had developed. (Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, “Democracy and Federalism: Changes in the National Archival System in a United Germany.” American Archivist (Winter 1992), 72-84.)

2. Since this article was written, the German Bundestag (in January 1992) and Bundesrat (in March 1992) passed an amendment to the Federal German archive Law which went into effect on 28 March 1992. The amendment created an independent “Stiftung Archiv der Massenorganisation (Stasi-Archiva) within the existing West German Bundesarchiv. Although independent, the new Stiftung will provide the financial and legal means for securing the archives for researchers and scholars. According to Mannheim historian Hermann Weber, however, problems remain. On 31 December 1991, for example, the “Bibliotek im Haus Koellnischen Park” closed. The library contains over 400,000 volumes, including records from the Socialist Unity Party’s high school, the Academy of Sociology, and some files from the Central Committee of the SED. The library also contains over 18,000 historical tracts, 36,000 books on economics, 17,000 periodicals, and over 30,000 philosophical tracts. Similarly unavailable at present are the newspaper/magazine clippings of the Gesamtdeutsches Archiv of the Foundation for East German Parties and Mass Organization (Archiv und Bibliotheken zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung) in Berlin, now housed in various cells on Fehrbelliner Platz. Other archives, such as the Stasi’s Attorney General archive, remained closed. In short, many gaps still exist, particularly among the party and mass organization records at the regional level. (Hermann Weber, “Immer Noch Probleme mit Archiven.” [Problems Still Exist with the Archives], Deutschland Archiv 6 (June 1992), 580.)

3. By June 1992 alone, there had been nearly 500,000 requests to see files, and nearly 550,000 requests to see the files of specific individuals. Nearly 2,300 staff are working to fulfill these requests. Joachim Gauck, the federal director of the Stasi files, expects to have 3,500 staff working full time in the near future. (“Die Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart” [The Past in the Present], Deutschland Archiv 4 (April 1992), 436-40, and “Return of the Prodigal Son Jeopardised by Stasi File.” German Tribune, 6/592, 4.)

4. In February 1992, representatives from the Central Party Archives met with representatives from the PDS regional archives and reported on the following: a) Materials from the archives in Rostock, Schwerin, and Neubrandenburg are now under the control of an archival specialist in Bolz/Kries/Sternberg (Address: 0-2751 Bolz/Kries/Sternberg or LV der PDS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Grosses Moor 2-6, 0-2751 Schwerin, telephone 894/5315); b) Since 1 January 1992, as a result of an agreement between the regional leaders of the PDS and the regional Land Archive, the records from the PDS archives in Potsdam, Frankfurt/Oder, and Cottbus have been integrated into the Potsdam Land Archive (Address: Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv Potsdam, Sansouci, Orangerie, 0-1500 Potsdam, telephone 023/22971/22972 or LV der PDS Brandenburg, Johannes-Dieckmann-Allee, 3, 0-1501 Potsdam, telephone: 023/22448/22028); c) In Sachsen-Anhalt, the archives are waiting on a decision from the privatization agency Treuhandanstalt—in the meantime, the archive is being supervised by PDS archival specialists—(Address: Lenninallee 70, 0-4020 Halbe, telephone: 0046/8365281 and Gerhard-Hauptmann Strasse 16, 0-3060 Magdeburg, telephone: 0091/32223); d) Sachsen: the financial situation of the archives in Dresden/Daveninstreasse 2, 0-8010 Dresden, telephone: 0051/4858244, Leipzig (Richtig-Knecht-Strasse 143, 0-7030 Leipzig, telephone: 0941/39882620) and Chemnitz (Bruckenerstrasse 12, 0-9010 Chemnitz, telephone: 0071/6552878 or 6552239) is extremely unstable and urgent. The archivists are working under a very limited contract. e) Thuringen: the archives in Erfurt (Eisdebrner Strasse 1, 0-5066 Erfurt, telephone: 0061/5732287, Suhl (Wilhelm-Pieck-Strasse 42, 0-6017 Suhl, telephone 0966/518493 and Gera (Amthorstrasse 42, 0-6017 Gera, telephone 0966/ 518493) have new staff and archive use has grown steadily. In Thuringen, there have been demands on the government to take over the PDS archive and limit access by passing new restrictive legislation. It appears that these individual archives will eventually be brought into the national “Stiftung” so that the archives will be preserved properly. Questions remain about the future of other area archives—the Betriebs-, Kreis-, and Gemeindearchiven, as well as various collections and libraries that have sprung up since 1989. All of these institutions are facing financial difficulties. (“Um die Zukunft der ehemaligen SED-Bezirksparteiarchieve” [On the Future of the Former Socialist Unity Party Regional Archives], Mitteilungen des Foerderkreises (Archive und Bibliotheken zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung) 1 (March 1992), 7-8.)
SED Archives
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giving up their ideas, just as the Soviet Union also won’t give up its ideas. The Soviet Union is always giving in on its policies. It should firmly for once and for all push them through. Hopefully it will stay strong on the Berlin question.” Many others asked: “Doesn’t the stationing of rocket weapons in the GDR stand in conflict to the Potsdam Treaties?” Often, it’s clear, the official propaganda did not sink in very quickly or effectively.

There is increasing unease here as to whether and when the archives will be closed by the Treuhandanstalt, the agency set up after reunification by the Federal Republic to privatize the assets of the East German state. A group of supporters of the archives has been formed (Verein zur Förderung von Archiven und Bibliotheken zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung e.V., the Group for the Promotion of Archives and Libraries on the History of the Labor Movement) to keep the archives open and independent. Right now, the facility is only guaranteed to stay open through December. After lunch today, I asked one of the archivists if he could help me find something. He said that I should ask someone else, since he is so worried about losing his job that he had a beer with lunch and was not up to clear thinking.

November 26, 1991

The ratification of the Paris Treaties (making West Germany independent, armed, and a member of NATO) by the West German parliament in February 1955 was clearly a turning point in East German and Soviet thinking about the possibility of reunification. All of the Soviet and East German secondary literature says this, and it is absolutely confirmed in the documents. There are many references before the ratification about how it would change matters and many discussions of plans to deal with the changed situation afterward.

The Central Committee plenums are filled with discussions of economics. Party officials constantly talked about how they had to improve the economic situation. Their vocabulary was so defensive about the West German and U.S. imperialist enemy and about how they had to keep fighting and defending themselves. How could they keep fighting? They saw enemies everywhere.

The 15th and 16th plenums in July and September 1953 make incredibly exciting reading. Various members of the party leadership argued vigorously with each other about the causes of the 17 June 1953 uprising against Communist rule in East Berlin and East Germany. Rudolf Herrnstadt (the editor-in-chief of the party newspaper Neues Deutschland) and Wilhelm Zaisser (the Stasi chief) tried unsuccessfully to defend themselves. The insecurity among the East German leaders, it is clear, deepened after the June 17 uprising. If it happened once, they feared, it could happen again. (Ernst Wollweber, in the excerpt from his memoirs published in Beiträge zur Geschichte [Contributions to History], says that this was particularly the case with Ulbricht.)

The 26th (March 1956), 33rd (October 1957), and 36th (June 1958) plenums dealing with the aftermath of the Soviet 20th Party Congress are equally interesting, and the Wollweber and Schridewan excerpts published in BzG from accounts by Wollweber and Karl Schridewan usefully supplement the archival material.

January 24, 1992

I’ve just finished Herrnstadt’s book and decide that Zaisser’s (Stasi Chief 1950-53) and Erich Mielke’s (Stasi number two man in the 1950s, who became chief in 1958) notes from the 1950s and especially 1953 would be important for me to see. Zaisser and Herrnstadt, both of whom were in the Politbüro, were ousted from power a couple of weeks after the June 17 uprising. As head of the Stasi, Zaisser was blamed for not having foreseen and prevented the revolt. Both were blamed for being “capitalizationists” and wanting to give East Germany up to capitalist West Germany—the same charge on which Soviet KGB chief Beria was arrested in late June and subsequently executed.

Basically, Zaisser and Herrnstadt felt that Ulbricht was a total dictator, that power had to be more equitably shared, and that the country needed more democracy. The Soviets actually supported this line in May and early June, and even considered removing Ulbricht in early June—until the uprising, at which point the Soviets became frightened of losing East Germany and threw all their eggs into Ulbricht’s basket. I have been reading a lot on the events of May-June 1953, and decide to try to see Zaisser’s files. So, I ask one of the archivists.

At first he says that there is nothing and I should keep my topic narrow and not go off on tangents. (Who is he to decide this?!) I tell him that this absolutely is not a tangent, but central to my topic. He asks me what exactly I want to see. So, I tell him. Then he shows me some trivial items, like formal birthday greetings to Zaisser when he was in power. Keep pushing, though: there MUST be some files on him. Are they only in the Stasi archives (those that haven’t been destroyed, that is), or are there some here in the party archives? Then, a few minutes later, he returns with a xerox of an index card with a list of files on Zaisser, a.k.a. “Gomez” in the Spanish Civil War in the late ’30s! Some of them had “G’s” after them, for “Gespptt”—closed. He says they were personnel files, and could only be seen by party members, I ask: “But what’s in them?” He replies: “Nothing, just personnel stuff, nothing that would be interesting to you.” I answer: “But party policy regarding Zaisser is exactly what I want to see.” He says that Zaisser’s wife is still alive and may be writing something about him, implying that I would need her permission to see Zaisser’s files. As we sit there looking at this xerox of an index card on my desk listing Zaisser’s files, he folds it up and puts it in my folder—not wanting anyone to see it. So, I’ve been requesting some of these files. I may request some of the closed ones, and see if he gives them to me anyway. Might as well try.

February 12, 1992

It has become clear that the assumptions in the Western literature about near total Soviet control of East Germany are correct. Throughout the 1950s at least one Soviet representative sat in on East German Politbüro and plenum meetings. In September 1953 Fred Oelßner, the SED Central Committee secretary for press and radio, received a detailed 12-page outline (“On the Question of the Press of the GDR”) from the Soviets about how the press should be structured, including descriptions of every type of article the press should publish. Similarly, in 1957 there was a conference of Soviet and East German diplomats in which the Soviets told the East Germans all the problems with the East German Foreign Ministry and how it should be run.

February 25, 1992

Aside from the arguments going on in
the Central Committee plenums, the most interesting things I have found are reports from the East German embassy in Peking. There has been much speculation in Western literature about the influence of the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s on Soviet policy towards Germany and on East German-Soviet relations. The argument goes that Mao’s revolutionary zeal made Khrushchev look like he was selling out to the West, so Khrushchev launched the Berlin Crisis to prove how tough he could be. Was there some sort of hard-line political alliance between the Chinese and East Germans to push Khrushchev to take a harder stance on West Berlin and on the German question generally?

To test these theories I have been looking at documents on China, particularly the embassy reports from Peking, which for the most part are much more detailed and interesting than the comparable reports I have seen from the East German embassy in Moscow. As one former East German diplomat told me, this may be because policy regarding the Soviet Union was made not at the East German embassy in Moscow, but back in Berlin. The envos in Moscow evidently did not have much power and were not told very much; it is possible, of course, that the files were destroyed or may exist somewhere else. In any case, the reports from the East German embassy in Peking are fascinating, relating new conversations between East German and Chinese diplomats about two major Cold War disputes of the time, over Germany and Taiwan. Both China and East Germany considered part of “their territory” to be “occupied by the imperialists.” Both had a strong desire to evict the imperialists from “their” territory and pledged to help each other publicize their cause. All of this is very clear in the documents. What is not in the documents, but was probably an underlying feeling, was the belief that the Soviets were not doing enough to help them accomplish this goal.

While the documents on East German-Chinese meetings for the most part indicate good relations, they also reveal some clear indications of disagreements which parallel the increasing Sino-Soviet friction. Horst Brie, who worked in the East German embassy in Peking from 1958 to 1964, said that East Germany was 95% dependent upon the Soviet Union and he knew that he had to respect Soviet interests. This fundamental East German loyalty to the Soviets is reflected in the archival documents about the East German treatment of a high-level Chinese delegation in 1961, at the height of the Sino-Soviet split. There are pages and pages of Chinese complaints about terrible treatment—being ignored, seated in the back of the room “behind the Yugoslav traitors,” not being given time to speak to the press, having no food on their return flight home, etc.

**March 6, 1992**

The archivists here may not be great at coming up with revealing documents, but they are very good about introducing you to people working on similar topics. This morning, as one of the archivists had suggested, I spoke with a Prof. Krüger, who worked in the East German Foreign Ministry on East German-Chinese relations and has studied those ties in 1957-58. I told him of my frustration with reading reports in which the East German ambassador in Peking said things such as, “They were confused about the issue of a peace treaty and West Berlin, so I explained our policy, and then they understood and agreed.” without ever writing out exactly what he had said. Prof. Krüger said that that was diplomatic practice—it was safer not to report exactly what you had said, because maybe the center might disagree. So, if you just kept it in general terms—“I told them our policy”—it was much safer.

When I ask one of the archivists how to find notes from a March 1961 Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow, he replies, “Oh, haven’t you looked in the Kartei für Sicherheitsfragen [Card-Index for Security Issues]?” “No, I’ve never heard about it.” “Well,” he says, “you never asked.”

**March 18, 1992**

I’ve just found a very interesting letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev dated 30 October 1961. In the 13-page letter, Ulbricht gives Khrushchev detailed guidelines for policy regarding Berlin and the division of Germany and strongly disagrees with the views of Mikhail Pervuchin, the Soviet ambassador to East Germany. The condescending tone of the letter is shocking in comparison with anything I have seen so far. For example, at one point Ulbricht writes: “We request … that the representatives of the USSR categorically demand in talks with representatives of the Western powers that the control routes of U.S. military patrols be immediately stopped on the Helmstedt-Berlin stretch. The present situation in which jeeps with U.S. control officers are accompanied by a Soviet vehicle does not improve the situation.”

Ulbricht’s letter came just a few days after the brief but tense U.S.-Soviet tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie, where a dispute over American transit rights in Berlin escalated dramatically before it was defused via backchannel communications between Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy, and may have reflected irritation at Moscow’s handling of that episode. But I suspect that the letter should be seen in the context of the growing tensions between Moscow and Peking, for in documents surrounding the letter, there are strong hints that Ulbricht’s increased feelings of strength and independence were connected to the Sino-Soviet split. At a meeting of Communist and workers’ parties in Moscow shortly before the letter was written, the Soviets were on the defensive due to China’s charges of being dictatorial in the communist world but weak vis-a-vis the capitalist world. Afterward, they sent letters to the East German leadership soliciting their views on various issues in a serious and respectful manner. Perhaps Ulbricht took this too seriously.

**March 31, 1992**

As I approach the archives this morning, I see police vans and dogs everywhere, and a crowd outside the building. Police, vans, and dogs block every entrance. Given that the former Stasi chief Mielke has been on trial here for months and that the Germans are trying to get Honecker back from Moscow to stand trial, I figure that the police must be searching the archives for incriminating evidence for the trials, and that turns out to be the case.

The ridiculous thing, of course, is that if the police were going to storm the archives to find files, they should have done it as soon as the country unified (October 1990) instead of waiting a year-and-a-half. The whole process doesn’t make sense. About two hundred armed police with dogs arrived at 6:30 a.m. On the TV news tonight, there is footage of the police outside the archives taking typewriters out of their vans; why they don’t have xerox machines or computers, I have no idea.

For the next five working days I call the
archives to see what is going on. Every morning they say the police and the dogs are still there with the state lawyers who are going through documents; they don’t know when the archives will reopen. The police remove the dogs after a couple of days.

April 21, 1992

The archives reopened on April 15. The state lawyers are still here, although working on a different floor. Up in the cafeteria for lunch, the woman at the cash register says, “Oh, you’re back again.” I say, “Yes, the archives were closed for a while. How are you?” “Not very well. Things aren’t very good here, because there is no business. No one could come when the police were here, and now it’s vacation, so there aren’t very many people.”

April 28, 1992

The state lawyers are still here reading in their own private room; no one knows for how long. There is still speculation as to whether the archives will remain open after funding runs out in June. Then the challenge will be to stay open until next January, when they are to be absorbed by Bundesarchiv (the German Federal Archive in Koblenz) and be run by a new independent foundation (Stiftung) that is being created for archives of former East German parties. I ask an archivist when the Central Committee plenums (which were removed without any prior notice in January to be microfilmed) will be back. He promises to try to find out. I have been reading documents about the Berlin Wachregiment (Guard regiment) and the Stasi, which drive home the impression that the East Germans perceived problems everywhere. The Soviet advisors and the East Germans incessantly criticize the preparedness, cadres, education, etc. of the armed forces. Nothing was good enough in their eyes—not the economy, the military, etc. Nothing.

April 29, 1992

We can’t get any new files today, tomorrow, and maybe even for three weeks. Why? Because, an archivist tells me, “the police and the lawyers started with the wrong strategy.” Apparently, they took until yesterday to review the card catalogues and document source books to determine the archives’ holdings, and only today have they started asking for files. Now the archivists are so busy getting files for the lawyers that they have no time to get files for researchers.

May 15, 1992

I just spoke with Prof. Ernst Labour, formerly affiliated with the Academy of Sciences in East Berlin and now working on the Rapacki Plan from 1957-64 and Polish-East German-Soviet relations. He said that he had found useful materials here, but not detailed reports of East German-Soviet conversations or reports from the East German embassy in Moscow, which, he speculated, may have been destroyed. When I told him that I had found much better materials from the East German embassy in Peking than from the Moscow outpost, he said the same disparity held true for reports from the East German embassy in Warsaw compared to those from Moscow. Labour expressed frustration that there was no set of files called “Ulbricht-Khrushchev Letters”; perhaps it was destroyed. When I gave him my card, he said that he didn’t have any cards with him, but that even if he did it wouldn’t matter. Everything on the card except his name is no longer true, since the East Berlin Academy of Sciences doesn’t exist any more. He gave me his phone number instead.

After lunch, I visit another archivist to enlist her help in locating better materials. I explain my frustration, and she says that the Internes Parteiarchiv files probably have some good files, including some Ulbricht-Khrushchev letters. I tell her that I would be particularly interested in seeing documents pertaining to plans to build the Wall—specifically, who had the idea first (Khrushchev or Ulbricht?) and when. She said, “Oh, you certainly won’t find anything like that here. It’s much more likely to be in the archives in Moscow or in the U.S. And I’m sure it wasn’t Ulbricht—the Wall had to do with East-West relations. I don’t think you’ll find anything on it here.” Maybe she is telling the truth, maybe she just doesn’t know, or maybe she doesn’t want to give anything away. There is no way for me to know, and this is one of the most frustrating things about working in the archives, both in East Berlin and in Moscow. You never can tell for sure how full a picture you are getting.

May 18, 1992

I’m finding lots of quite good material on East German-Soviet relations in Grotwohl’s file NL 90/472. A German graduate student also working in the archives told me about this file. I’ve got to find more like this—the first documents that come close to being as good as the reports from the East German embassy in Peking.

June 1, 1992

Had a very interesting interview today with Horst Brie, who was in the East German embassy in Peking from 1958-1964. Brie told me about a group of officials around Mao who felt that the East Germans should precipitate a crisis that would lead to their seizure of West Berlin. The Chinese, he said, could never understand how East Berlin could acquiesce to a policy of two German states, since Peking certainly had never reconciled itself to China’s division. It seems that the Chinese repeatedly accused the East Germans of caving in to Soviet pressure on the Berlin issue and not protecting their own interests. I would never find it in any documents, Brie said, but the East German party leadership tended to use its relationship with China as a bargaining lever vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Ulbricht adeptly sided with Moscow against Peking in the Sino-Soviet split, but in such a way as to avoid alienating China. Brie sensed that Ulbricht felt that one day the Soviet Union would sacrifice East Germany to appease the West, though of course this was never said openly. Therefore, in this analysis, Ulbricht tried to downplay the Sino-Soviet split and to maintain cordial relations with China, even at the price of exacerbating Soviet mistrust.

Brie also talked about the pre-1949 history of ties between the German and Chinese communists and about how some East German communists were disillusioned with how communism had turned out in the Soviet Union and were more inspired by the Chinese example. He also spoke about the particular importance of East German-Chinese economic relations for East Germany. Both Mr. Brie and Prof. Krüger say that the Chinese did not learn about the Wall until it was announced on the radio. The documents show that once the Chinese knew, they enthusiastically welcomed the move and only believed that the East Germans should have acted sooner to stem the outflow of refugees.

June 10, 1992

Today there is a sign in the cafeteria saying that it will be closed for good on June
30. The staff is selling boxes of glasses. It’s sad. More people will be unemployed.

Had a long talk today with a (West) German graduate student, who has also been working in the SED archives. He had heard from a researcher who interviewed a former high-ranking official that most sensitive discussions weren’t recorded in writing, including Ulbricht’s communications with the Soviets. He said that the officials were old friends with the Soviets, so they just talked. Also, apparently the East Germans weren’t allowed to take any notes in meetings with Soviets, although Wilhelm Pieck supposedly took a lot of his secretly at night afterward. At a conference in 1953, Fred Oellner described recent meetings with a Soviet delegation at which “our friends” (the term used by the East Germans to refer to the Soviets) forbade the East Germans to take notes.24

We also discussed the sensation of Wollweber’s memoirs referring over and over to the Soviet Chefberater (chief advisor) and how Herrnstadt just swept all that kind of information under the rug. This student also said that the archives saved some key documents to be published suddenly and with great fanfare in the journal Beiträge zur Geschichte or elsewhere. He said he knows of a key document, that it is here, but he can’t get it because some SED/PDS person is going to publish it, and the archivists want to wait for that. He also said that connections can determine what you get to see in the archives (e.g. Potsdam) and in the Gauck Behörde/Stasi Archives.

August 27, 1992

After spending six-and-a-half weeks in archives in Moscow (at the Foreign Ministry and at the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation), I can now say that the SED archives are not the place to look for documents on Soviet-East German relations; Moscow is. However, for documents on domestic developments within East Germany, the SED archives are very helpful, containing thousands and thousands of pages on the economy, the educational system, the media, the church, the military, and the political views of all different kinds of people. One can get quite a good picture of how the system operated. I am sure that as more and more people read these documents and share their conclusions, we will be able to piece together a very detailed picture of the East German regime.

September 21, 1992

In light of some documents from the “Bestand: Zentralkomitee, Büro Ulbricht” (file # J IV 2/202/127, 128, 129 and 130) in the Internes Parteiarchiv of the former SED archives that I was given last week, I feel the need to tone down the conclusions that I made in my last entry. Who knows, perhaps the archivists were saving the best for last?

The documents in the files on 1959-1961 (including after 13 August 1961) show that the East Germans absolutely believed that Khrushchev would carry through the threats he made during the Berlin Crisis to turn over Soviet responsibilities in Berlin to the East Germans. There are detailed draft agreements that East Germany would sign with the new “free city” of West Berlin, and some letters between Ulbricht and Khrushchev discussing how quickly the East Germans should take over Soviet functions. There is the same condescending tone that I saw in Ulbricht’s letter to Khrushchev on 30 October 1961. There are also a couple of letters from the East German Ambassador in Moscow, König, to Ulbricht reporting intense Soviet concern that the East Germans might act too provocatively with regard to the treatment of representatives of the Western powers in Berlin without Soviet knowledge or agreement. By 1960, the Soviets were increasingly worried and angry about independent East German moves in Berlin that could threaten Soviet relations with the West. The longer the Berlin crisis went on, it seems, the more Ulbricht felt emboldened to do what he wanted to do in Berlin with or without Soviet assent or even knowledge.

There are also very interesting letters between Ulbricht and Khrushchev, written after the Wall was erected, about the process of constructing the Wall, the need for it, its impact, and the Western response. On 15 September 1961 (J IV 2/202/130), Ulbricht wrote to Khrushchev: “The tactic of gradually carrying out the measures made it more difficult for the enemy to orient himself with regard to the extent of our measures and made it easier for us to find the weak places in the border. I must say that the enemy undertook fewer countermeasures than was expected.” Unfortunately, Ulbricht does not mention whose idea it was to adopt these gradualist “salami” tactics. He also wrote: “The experience of the last years have proven that it is not possible that a socialist country such as the DDR can carry out a peaceful competition with an imperialist country such as West Germany with open borders. Such possibilities are first produced when the socialist world system has surpassed the capitalist countries in per-capita production.”

In Khrushchev’s response, on September 28, he wrote: “Under the present conditions, since the measures for the securing and control of the borders of the DDR with West Berlin were carried out successfully, and since the Western powers have bowed [neigen] to negotiations, and there have already been contacts established between the USSR and the USA in New York, steps should be avoided which could sharpen the situation, especially in Berlin.” If Khrushchev felt that he had Ulbricht on a leash, he would not have felt the need to caution Ulbricht from acting too provocatively.

The documents clearly indicate that there is more to the story of the Berlin crisis than has been previously known. In addition the combination of these and other documents and recent conversations I have had with other researchers and archivists here indicate that my earlier skepticism that the archivists were saving materials back from us may not be justified.

1. Wilhelm-Pieck-Str. 1, 0-1054 Berlin. Phone: 282-4687. Fax: 281-4186. The director of the archives is Dr. Inge Pardon. The new title of archive, library and related things in the building is: Verband Archiv/ Bibliothek/Technische Werkstätten beim Parteivorstand der PDS. PDS refers to the Party of Democratic Socialism, the successor party to the SED.

2. My archival research has been supplemented by recently published books and articles and interviews. One of the best sources is Beiträge zur Geschichte (Contributions to History), which is put out by the Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in the same building as the SED archives and which publishes in each issue some new documents from the archives. They have published some very interesting documents regarding East German-Soviet relations and the German question based on notes taken by former East German State President Wilhelm Pieck. The following articles published in B/G based on documents from the SED archive have been very helpful: “Ernst Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen. Ein Porträt Walter Ulbrichts” [Ernst Wollweber: From His Memoirs. A Portrait of Walter Ulbricht] (#3, 1990); “Karl Schirdevan: Fraktionsmacherei oder gegen Ulbrichts Diktat? Eine Stellungnahme vom 1. Januar 1958” [Karl Schirdevan: Faction Maker or Against Ulbricht’s Dictator? A Statement from January 1958 (#3, 1990); “Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953” (A Document of Great Historical Significance from May 1953) (#5, 1990); “Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung in der SED 1953” (Documents on the Conflict in the SED 1953) (#5, 1990); “Antwort auf die Fragen zur Besprechung am 18.12.48” (Answers to Questions at a Meeting on 18.12.48 [with Stalin]) (#3, 1991); “Sowjetische Deutschlandnotiz 1952, Stalin und die


6. See Ulbricht’s file NL 184/494, leaf 29. (Leaf numbers refer to the archival numbering in each file folder. Page numbers refer to how the document was originally numbered.) See especially Sicherheitsfragen [Security Issues] file IV 2/121, leaves 31-72 and IV 2/124, leaves 163-166.

7. IV 2/121, leaf 41.

8. Ibid, leaf 47.

9. IV 2/121/4, leaf 164.

10. See Georg Handke’s file NL 128/12, “2 Referat zum Kompf der Sowjetunion um Frieden (mit 1 Durchschlag)” [2 Speeches on the Struggle of the Soviet Union for Peace (with 1 Copy)] , p. 7.


13. The first documented indication I have seen was in Herrnstadt’s book. Herrnstadt describes the East German leadership being taken to Soviet command post in Karlshorst during the June 17 uprising and having no control over events and no idea what was going on except for what the Soviets told them. After two days of this, Ulbricht apparently got fed up and returned to his own headquarters in East Berlin.


15. IV 2/2088 “Erfahrungsaustausch zwischen den Außenministern der UdSSR und der DDR” [Exchange of Experiences between the Foreign Ministries of the USSR and the GDR].

16. The files 1 have found on China are all in the International Relations Department of the Central Committee: IV 2/20/72, IV 2/20/114, IV 2/20/119, IV 2/20/120, IV 2/20/121, and IV 2/20/123.

17. One small exception is a letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev on 1 September 1954 proposing East German policy regarding the Paris Treaties. For this letter and for Ulbricht’s 30 October 1961 letter to Khruschev, see Ulbricht’s file NL 182/120/12.

18. Ibid., p. 3.


20. See Ulbricht’s file NL 182/1206, 23 January 1959 letter from the CPSU to the SED.

21. A couple of months later, the Federal lawyers announced that they had gathered enough evidence to accuse Honecker, Mielke, and others of various crimes, including the order to shoot people trying to flee the GDR at the border.

22. The people in the archives put together a little booklet (“Dokumentation über die polizeiliche Besetzung und staatsanwaltliche Durchsuchung der Räumlichkeiten desVerbundes vom 31.3. bis zum 6.4.1992”) detailing the events concerning the police takeover of the archives. It turns out that there had been state lawyers working in the archives for several weeks before the police came. The director of the archives found out just before that the police were going to come and gave all the keys to the PDS office a block away. This drove the police nuts and were about to break down the doors on the morning of March 31 when the director finally handed over the keys. Apparently, the police escorted the archivists everywhere they went in the building, including to the bathroom. (In the old days the archivists used to escort the few foreign researchers there to the bathroom, so maybe this was some sort of poetic justice.) For most of the time, the staff had to sit up in the cafeteria on the top floor. Finally, the police and state lawyers realized that if they were going to get what they wanted, they needed the archivists’ help, so they let up a little.

23. IV 2/121/19 and IV 2/12/20.


25. See for example, U.S. Embassy Prague to U.S. Embassy Bonn, 9 December 1958, No. 58, National Archives, Record Group 59, State Department Decimal Files, 762.00/12-358.


Čzechoslovak Archive Seeks Aid

The State Central Archives in Prague, which contains the former archives of the Čzechoslovak Communist Party’s Central Committee, is seeking what its director calls a “wealth of yet unpublished historical sources of first-rate importance for the history of the Cold War.” Contact: Dr. V. Babicka, Director, State Central Archives, Karmelitska 2, 118 01 Praha 1, Czechoslovakia; telephone and fax: (02) 532-567.
Editor’s note: The opening of the Russian archives has prompted a re-examination of one of the Cold War's most controversial and mystifying episodes — the case of Alger Hiss. A former State Department official during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, Hiss was accused in the summer of 1948 of having been a Soviet spy. The charge was lodged by an editor of *Time* magazine (and a penitent former Communist Party member) named Whittaker Chambers during hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Hiss, at the time the head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, vehemently denied the charges. The case, which gripped public attention for months, occurred against a backdrop of worsening Cold War tensions, and contributed to the atmosphere in which the intense domestic anti-Communism of the McCarthy era thrived. It also gave a boost to the career of a first-term Republican member of HUAC, Rep. Richard M. Nixon, who championed Chambers’ cause. Hiss himself, after unsuccessfully suing Chambers for slander, was convicted of perjury (the statute of limitations on the espionage charge had expired) in January 1950 and imprisoned. But his guilt or innocence has never been conclusively proven — or at least, unanimously agreed upon — and has remained a matter of fierce dispute among historians and partisans of the era. (For a detailed account, which concludes that Hiss was guilty, see Allen Weinstein, *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982); for a countering view, see Victor A. Navasky, “Weinstein, Hiss, and the Transformation of Historical Ambiguity into Cold War Verity,” in Athan G. Theoharis, ed., *Beyond the Hiss Case: The FBI, Congress, and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), 215-45.)

Hiss, now 88, has long campaigned to establish his innocence. Last summer, after the collapse of the Soviet Union had improved prospects for the opening of previously unavailable archives, he wrote to the head of the Russian commission in charge of the KGB archives — the historian Dmitri A. Volkogonov — asking him to clear his name and authorizing a New York historian, John Lowenthal, the director of The Nation Institute’s Cold War Archive Project, to act on his behalf. In October, Volkogonov responded with a letter to Lowenthal stating that after reviewing Soviet intelligence archives he had concluded that “Alger Hiss was never an agent of the intelligence services of the Soviet Union.” The statement by Volkogonov, whose biography of Stalin was recently published in the United States (*Stalin: Triumph & Tragedy* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991)), is unlikely to end the controversy, and several historians have pointed out that any definitive statements may be premature given the confused state of Soviet archives and the possibility that relevant records had been misplaced or tampered with. Nevertheless, it has drawn renewed attention to the case. “It means that every serious scholar has to take a fresh look,” Weinstein was quoted as saying by the *New York Times*. “But we can’t take Volkogonov’s word alone. We really have to see all the documents on Soviet espionage.” (David Margolick, “After 40 Years, a Postscript on Hiss: Russian Official Calls Him Innocent,” *NYT*, 10/29/92; for skeptical reactions to Volkogonov’s statements see Sam Tanenhaus, “The Hiss Case Isn’t Over Yet,” *NYT*, 10/31/92, Weinstein, “Reopening a Cold War Mystery,” *Washington Post*, 11/4/92, and William F. Buckley, “Making a travesty of history,” *Washington Times*, 11/10/92.)

Given the widespread interest in the case, the Cold War International History Project Bulletin is reprinting Hiss’s letter and an English translation of Volkogonov’s response to Lowenthal, both of which were released at a news conference organized by The Nation Institute in New York on 29 October 1992:
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Editor’s Note: For historians of the Cold War, a central source has long been the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which "presents the official documentary historical record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government.” A statute passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bush in late 1991 mandates that the volumes shall be published no more than 30 years after the events they document, and imposes new requirements to ensure the maximum feasible declassification of materials. The State Department’s Office of the Historian, which is responsible for publishing the volumes, provided the CWHP Bulletin with its most recent “Production Status and Projections Chart,” dated 27 October 1992, and it is published below. Individual FRUS volumes can be ordered from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, D.C. 20402-9328. Further information, including a listing of availability, prices, and ISBN numbers for volumes in print, can be obtained from Glenn Lefebvre, Director, Office of the Historian, PA/ HO Room 3100, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
A LETTER TO BREZHNEV:
THE CZECH HARDLINERS' "REQUEST" FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION, AUGUST 1968

Translated and Introduced by Mark Kramer

In August 1968 a small group of pro-Moscow hardliners in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, led by Vasil Bilak, wrote two letters requesting urgent assistance from the Soviet Union to thwart the imminent "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia. Both letters were addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), and both were written in Russian to ensure that they would be read promptly. The first (and more important) letter was signed by Bilak and four of his colleagues: Drahomir Kolder, Alois Indra, Oldrich Svestka, and Antonin Kapek. The second letter was signed only by Kapek on behalf of the others.

The first letter was secretly handed over to Brezhnev at the Bratislava conference on 3 August 1968 by an intermediary who worked for Kolder. Brezhnev cited the letter when he met in Moscow with the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria on 18 August, the day after the CPSU Politburo decided to proceed with the invasion. Brezhnev proposed to his East European colleagues that the letter be used with minor modifications (the deletion of the last paragraph, and a change in the address) as a formal justification for the impending military intervention. All the participants supported the idea, and the letter did indeed become a pretext for the invasion. The second letter, which reached Brezhnev on August 19, urged the CPSU to respond positively to the first letter; but as it turned out this appeal was no longer necessary. By then the decision to invade had already been made.

Both letters had long been known to exist, but the precise texts had remained sealed in the Soviet archives (in a folder marked "NEVER TO BE OPENED") until July 1992, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin finally handed over copies to the Czechoslovak government. The full text of the letter is provided here in translation from the Czech version which was published in Hospodarske noviny, 17 July 1992. Of the five signatories of this letter, only Bilak is still alive. Bilak was indicted on several counts in 1992, including charges of treason for his part in the "letter of invitation," but it is unclear whether he will ever be convicted. The Prague daily Lidove noviny has reported that unless Bilak, who is a Slovak, is tried and sentenced before the end of 1992, he is likely to receive amnesty from the Slovak government when the Czechoslovak state splits apart.

Esteemed Leonid Ilich,

Conscious of the full responsibility for our decision, we appeal to you with the following statement.

The basically correct post-January democratic process, the correction of mistakes and shortcomings from the past, as well as the overall political management of society, have gradually eluded the control of the Party's Central Committee. The press, radio, and television, which are effectively in the hands of right-wing forces, have influenced popular opinion to such an extent that elements hostile to the Party have begun to take part in the political life of our country, without any opposition from the public. These elements are fomenting a wave of nationalism and chauvinism, and are provoking an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet psychosis.

Our collective -- the Party leadership -- has made a number of mistakes. We have not properly defended or put into effect the Marxist-Leninist norms of party work and above all the principles of democratic centralism. The Party leadership is no longer able to defend itself successfully against attacks on socialism, and it is unable to organize either ideological or political resistance against the right-wing forces. The very existence of socialism in our country is under threat.

At present, all political instruments and the instruments of state power are paralyzed to a considerable degree. The right-wing forces have created conditions suitable for a counterrevolutionary coup.

In such trying circumstances we are appealing to you, Soviet Communists, the lending representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with a request for you to lend support and assistance with all the means at your disposal. Only with your assistance can the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic be extricated from the imminent danger of counterrevolution.

We realize that for both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, this ultimate step to preserve socialism in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will not be easy. Therefore, we will struggle with all our power and all our means. But if our strength and capabilities are depleted or fail to bring positive results, then our statement should be regarded as an urgent request and plea for your intervention and all-round assistance.

In connection with the complex and dangerous course of the situation in our country, we request that you treat our statement with the utmost secrecy, and for that reason we are writing to you, personally, in Russian.

Alois Indra  Drahomir Kolder  Antonin Kapek  Oldrich Svestka  Vasil Bilak
The Update section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist bloc. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP of relevant citations.

Abbreviations:
DA = Deutschland Archiv [German Archives]
FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service
MN = Moscow News
NYT = New York Times
SHAFR = Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
VfG = Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte [Quarterly for History]
WP = Washington Post
ZfG = Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft [Magazine for History]

Former Soviet Union/Russia

Moscow archives disclose evidence of decades of Soviet financial aid to the U.S. Communist Party, correspondence and receipts bearing signature of CPSUA chairman Gus Halff reprinted. (John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ‘“Moscow Gold,” Confirmed at Last?” Labor History 33:2 (Spring 1992), 279-93.)

Sox espionage against Manhattan Project was wider than realized, according to recently published reports. (Yakov Yakovlevich Etinger, “Nazis in the Near East: Who Knew, but Stayed Silent?” International Life 13, 7/15/91, 38-40.)


Soviet-Finnish relations after World War II analyzed. (Yelena Kamenskaya, “In Search of the Lost Style,” Nezavisamaya Gazeta, 2/18/92, 73.)

Russian archives official Dimitrii A. Volkogonov declares that review of Soviet intelligence files shows that Alger Hiss was not a spy for Moscow. (David Margolick, “After 40 Years, a Postscript on Hiss: Russian Official Calls Him Innocent,” NYT, 10/29/92, B14; “In Re Alger Hiss,” The Nation 255:16 (11/6/92, 564).) Skepticism urged. (Sam Tanenhaus, “The Hiss Case Isn’t Over Yet,” NYT, 10/31/92; Allen Weinstein, “Reopening A Cold War Mystery,” WP, 11/4/92, A 19.)


Reports that North Korea has tried to obtain secret Soviet documents on the Korean War (FBIS-SOV-92-124, 6/26/92). Account of Soviet efforts in 1950s to bar U.S. diplomats from purchasing reference books and other statistical data materials. (“KBG is Against Bibliophile Morton,” Izvestia, 4/3/92, 3.)

Soviet shooting down of Swedish airliner over Baltic Sea on 13 June 1953 ir-examined. (G. Bocharov, “When and How the Shooting of Planes Began,” Izvestia, 6/18/92, 3.)

Account of Soviet suppression of June 1953 East German revolt. (Irina Scherbakova, “When Our Tanks Moved in Berlin Again,” MN 27, 7/5/92.)

Author recounts meeting with Malenkov. (Yakov Azienstadt, “Malenkov and the Others,” Kontinent 66 (1991), 277-82.)


Vladimir Semichastny, KGB chief in 1963, denies any KGB role in assassination of John F. Kennedy. (“Ex-KGB Chief on Kennedy Assassination,” FBIS-SOV-92-114, 6/12/92, 4.)

Excerpts from biography of Brezhnev reprinted. (Lev Osotyuk, L. L’s Mystery,” MN 21, 5/24/92, 24.)


Former KGB member describes failed 1971 assassination plot against author Alexander Solzhenitsyn in newspaper Top Secret. (David Restauck, “KGB Plot to Assassinate Solzhenitsyn Reported,” WP, 4/21/92.)

Communist Party documents disclose that in the mid-1970s the Soviet government supplied weapons and training to Palestinian guerrilla groups for use in terrorist actions against U.S. and Israeli targets, according to Russian officials close to president Boris Yeltsin. (I.N. Buryaga, “Missiles for Colonel Kaddafi,” Izvestia, 6/12/92, 4.)

Documents on Soviet arms sales to Libya are published. (V. Skosyrev, “Missiles for Colonel Kaddafi,” Izvestia, 6/12/92, 4.)

Controversial 1976 “Team B” report, newly declassified by the CIA, stated that the Soviet Union was “preparing for a Third World War as if it were inevitable.” (Don Oberdorfer, “Report Saw Soviet Buildup for War,” WP, 10/12/92.)


Extensive excerpts from documents in CPSU archives on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. (Moscow Russian Television Network report, 7/14/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-138, 7/17/92.)

Ex-KGB agent recalls assignment in Iran, participation in Amin assassination. (Natallya Gegovlyan, “Resident’s Mistakes,” MN 45 (1991), 10.) CPSU ties with Iranian Communists discussed. (V. Skosyrev, “Confessing the Betrayal,” Izvestia, 6/20/92.)

Documents in CPSU Central Committee archives detail connections between Communist Party and KGB, including cooperation in aiding “fraternal” parties and security services abroad, particularly in the Third World. (Svetlana Shevchenko, “From the Staraya Ploschad Archives: The KGB and the Party—Twin Brothers,” Rosyskaya Gazeta, 6/26/92, in FBIS-USR-92-088, 7/15/92; also Evgeniya Albat, “CPSI and KGB Special Files,” MN 24 (1992), 16-17; I.V. Rudnev, “CPSU Money: Two Million Dollars to ‘Comrade Fedor’ for ‘Comrade Palma,’” Izvestia, 7/14/92.)

Italian investigators looking into CPSU financing of Italian Communist Party. (Mikhail Illyinsky, “Italian Investigators Know Who Accepted Money from the CPSU: But the Name of the Person Who Passed It On is Missing,” Izvestia, 6/9/92; “Italians Obtain CPSU Financing Document,” FBIS-SOV-92-116, 6/16/92, 5-6; and V. Belykh and V. Rudnev, “CPSU Affairs: Moscow Launderers the Money of Italian Communists,” Izvestia, 6/15/92, 3.)


Ex-KGB colonel testifies that he personally passed $300,000 to Danish Communist leaders. (M. Savvaitova, “The Intelligence Officer is Writing ‘Contromemories,’” New Times 9 (1992), 60.)

French journalist discusses findings in investigation of CPSU financing sources, operations, and international networks. (Eric Loron: “The West Had Al-
ways been happy to cooperate with Staraya Square.”

Former diplomat George F. Kennan. (“The G.O.P. Won

Chief of former Soviet navy denies Swedish ac-

CIA Director Gates gives Yeltsin details of the

Former KGB Director of Foreign Intelligence

More than 50 U.S. personnel remain unaccounted

Account of April 1950 Soviet downing of U.S. B-

Russian historian who covered Vietnam War

Russian journalist who covered Vietnam War

Initial search of Soviet archives fails to clarify

Archives Developments

Researcher calls for “real revolution in archivists’

Gaining access to Russian archives sometimes

Russian governmental commission declassifying

Russian parliament temporarily limits access to

Russian government commission declassifying

Access to Russian archives sometimes

Russian scholars’ attempts to use the Soviet

Researcher calls for “real revolution in archivists’

Russianuanaya Gazeta, 7/19/92, in FBIS-USR-92-087, 7/11/92, 19–20.)

Soviet weapons aid to African National Congress

Chief of former Soviet navy denies Swedish ac-

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A Gazeta, 7/11/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-136, 7/15/92.)

Newspaper archives are “undoubtedly essential to the head of state’s divided into two sections; materials covering the 1920s-archives committee, says “presidential archive” will be agreement, in former Soviet Union. (Rajiv Russia, Old Lies,” NYT, 7/11/92.)

KGB documents in Moscow on events surrounding the
ments Go On Display,” WP, 6/16/92.)

NYT 6/15/92; John Wagner, “Secret Soviet Docu-

Russian Foreign Ministry and international advi-

Crown Publishing Group announces pact with Russian intelligence service for exclusive access to KGB documents for use in books on major Cold War events. (Jeffrey A. Frank, “The Spies Out in the Sunshine,” WP, 6/25/92.)

Yale University Press announces agreement with Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History (formerly the Central Party Archive) to publish document collections. (Yale University Press press release, 7/27/92.)


Mannheim historian, citing SED records (including transcripts of leadership meetings), argues that the decision to transform East Germany into a Soviet-style “people’s democracy” had been made by the USSR and SED leaders before the GDR was officially founded in October 1949. (Siegfried Suckut, “Die Entscheidung zur Grundung der DDR: Die Protokolle der Beratungen des SED-Parteivorstandes am 4. und 9. Oktober 19499.”)

Bulgaria

Interior Ministry announces that documents in its archives implicate the former Bulgarian Communist Party in international terrorism and interference in the affairs of sovereign states. (BTA announcement, 6/10/92, in RFE/RL 110 (6/10/92).) Ex-Communist leader Todor Zhivkov is indicted for having set up two labor camps at which 149 people died of brutality and inhuman treatment between 1959-62. (RFE/RL 120 (6/26/92).) About twenty ex-ministers and high ranking communist officials, including former prime minister Andrey Lukanov, face charges for approving the use of state funds to aid communist movements in developing countries. (RFE/RL 123 (7/1/92); RFE/RL 130 (7/10/92).)


Gen. Vladimir Todorov, former head of Bulgaria’s Intelligence Service, is sentenced to 14 months imprisonment for destruction of files on Georgi Markov, an emigre writer murdered in London in 1978. Gen. Stoyan Savov, a codefendant, committed suicide before the trial began. (RFE/RL 116 (7/22/92).)

Czech and Slovak Republic

Lists of militia personnel and requests for a 150 percent increase in weapons and ammunition for 1988-90 were found in two sealed packages in the State Central Archives by Federal Deputy Michal Maly. Czechoslovak TV also reported that information on the organization’s activities in Hungary during the 1956 anticommunist uprising and in Czechoslovakia during 1968-69 were also included. (RFE/RL 94 (5/18/92).)


Russia turns over to President Vaclav Havel two secret letters from hardline Czech Communists to Leonid Brezhnev in August 1968 seeking Soviet intervention to crush “Prague Spring.” (“Czech Letters Inviting ’68 Invasion Found,” NY 7/17/92; L. Shinkarev, “Who Invited the Soviet Tanks to Prague?” ZfG, 7/17/92; RFE/RL, 7/16/92, 6, 7/17/92; 4; and 7/21/92, 5.)

Major Slavic archives and library, closed to public for 45 years, reopen to research after revolution. (Richard J. Kneeley and Edward Kasinec, “The Slovanska knihovna in Prague and its RZIA Collection, Slavic Review 51:1 (Spring 1992), 122-30.)

Transitional difficulties in archives situation assessed. (Jan Kren, “Czech Historiography at the Turning-Point,” East European Politics and Societies, Spring 1992.)

Germany

Review of recent scholarship and conferences on Soviet occupation of Germany after World War II, 1945-49, including the founding of the GDR, (ZIG 5 (1992), 476-78; DA 3 (March 1992), 318-20.)

Mannheim historian, citing SED records (including transcripts of leadership meetings), argues that the decision to transform East Germany into a Soviet-style “people’s democracy” had been made by the USSR and SED leaders before the GDR was officially founded in October 1949. (Siegfried Suckut, “Die Entscheidung zur Grundung der DDR: Die Protokolle der Beratungen des SED-Parteivorstandes am 4. und 9. Oktober 1949.”)

Report on Soviet and East German agents inside the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the early postwar period. (Wolfgang Buschfort, “Geheimagenten um Dr. Kurt Schumacher. Die SED und das SPD-Ostbureau” [Secret Agents around Dr. Kurt Schumacher: The SED and the East German Office of the SPD] DA 7 (July 1992), 691-97.)


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A look at the 1971 depositing of Walter Ulbricht as SECD chief, using recently released files from the SECD Parteiarchiv ("Zwischen Tat und einer Gefahr zur," Der Spiegel, 14/1991, 48.)

Ex-East German Ambassador to East Germany (1962- 71, 1975-83) recounts events. (Piotr Abrasimov"Wir wechselten zum Du," (We changed to You [informal greeting]), Der Spiegel, 8/17/1992, 20-22.)

At least 350 people died trying to flee East Germany—nearly twice the previously documented number—says head of Berlin police unit investigating crimes by former East German leaders. (WP, 8/15/92.)

Former Stasi chief Mielke discusses his relationship with Erich Honecker and the GDR’s downfall ("Ich sterbe in diesem Kasten," [I will die in this ship with Erich Honecker and the GDR’s downfall excerpted in (Munich: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1991)], Victims of the Wall:The Secret Protocols of Walter Ulbricht and Eric Honecker decided to (1992), 531-43.)

Apartheid archival developments in unified Germany are discussed by the President of the German Bundesarchiv; contact information for archives is appended. (Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, "Democratic and Federalism: Changes in the National Archival System in a United Germany," American Archivist 55 (Winter 1992), 72-85.)

A parliamentary commission is investigating four decades of Communist rule in the German Democratic Republic, chaired by former East German dissident Rainer Eppelmann; its report is not expected before 1994. ("Commission to Examine the Eastern Past," German Tribune, 3/20/92; Stephen Kinzer, "German Votes to Release Files on Communist Collaborators," RFE/RL 199 (10/15/92), 2.)

Historian recounts recent archives developments in the former East Germany in two Deutschland Archiv articles. (Hermann Weber, "Die Wissenschaft benötigt die Unterlagen der Archive" ["Scholarship Needs the Support of the Archives"], DA 5 (May 1991), 452-57, and "Immer noch Probleme mit Archiven" ["Problems Still Exist with the Archives"], DA 6 (June 1992), 580-87.)

Stasi archive director Joachim Gauk and Bundestag member Konrad Weiss discuss opening of files to the German public. ("Die Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart" ["The Past and the Present"], DA 4 (April 1992), 436-46.)


The German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C. is preparing new editions of its Reference Guide #1: German-American Scholarship Guide for Historians and Social Scientists (German Historical Institute 1989) and Reference Guide #2: Guide to Inventories and Finding Aids of German Archives at the German Historical Institute (German Historical Institute 1989). For information, contact: Ms. Mueller-Olrichs, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C 20009. Phone: (202) 387-3355; fax: (202) 483-3430.

Update on the former East German archives: Mitteilungen des Foerderkreises (Archive und Social Scientists) #1: German-American Scholarship Guide for Historians and Social Scientists (German Historical Institute 1989) and Reference Guide #2: Guide to Inventories and Finding Aids of German Archives at the German Historical Institute (1989). For information, contact: Ms. Mueller-Olrichs, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C 20009. Phone: (202) 387-3355; fax: (202) 483-3430.

Update on the former East German archives: Mitteilungen des Foerderkreises (Archive und Social Scientists) #1: German-American Scholarship Guide for Historians and Social Scientists (German Historical Institute 1989) and Reference Guide #2: Guide to Inventories and Finding Aids of German Archives at the German Historical Institute. (Imre Ress, "The Effects of Democratization on Archival Administration and Use in Eastern Middle Europe," American Archivist 55 (Winter 1992), 86-91.)

Oficials of the Hungarian Socialist Party, an ofshoot of the reform wing of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), revealed that before 1960 and 1987, $5.05 million was transferred by the party to a Moscow account to finance Communist parties around the world. (RFE/RL 647 (4/6/92), 5.)

Poland

Russian government releases March 1940 Polish-bureau minutes and other documents showing that Joseph Stalin personally ordered the execution of 20,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forest, an act that poisoned Soviet-Polish relations during the Cold War. Yeltsin spokesman alleges that Mikhail Gorbachev covered up the evidence, which was found in the so-called presidential archives and had been removed from the sixth division of the Central Committee archives in March 1990. (Celestine Bohlen, “Russian Files Show Stalin Ordered Massacre of 20,000 Poles in 1940,” NYT, 10/ 15/92; Michael Dobbs, “Yeltsin Turns Over K.A.I. Jet Transcripts,” 10/15/92; RFE/RL 199 (10/15/92), 2.)

Gorbachev denies covering up the matter, saying he reviewed the material with Yeltsin shortly after it was located in December 1991. ("Hiding of a Stalin File Denied by Gorbachev," NYT, 10/16/92; Margaret Shapiro, “In Russia, a New Loss of Control: The Yeltsin-Gorbachev Brawl," WP, 10/16/92; "Novosti" TV report, in RFE/RL 200 (10/16/92), 1; Andrew Nagorski, "At Last, a Victory for Truth," Newsweek, 10/26/92, 41.) Sejm welcomes the release, says it will foster stronger relations with Russia. (RFE/RL 201 (10/ 19/92), 4.) Walewa says documents show CPSU was a "criminal organization," states opening of documents will improve Polish-Russian relations. (Novoe Vremya, 10/20/92, in RFE/RL 203 (10/21/92), 6.)

Reversing earlier policy, Polish Parliament votes to open records on collaborators with the Communist Party between 1945 and 1990. ("Polish Assembly Votes to Release Files on Communist Collaborators," NYT, 5/29/92.)

East German President Wojciech Jaruzelski discusses his reasons for declaring martial law in Poland in 1981; comparing the political situation in Poland at the time to Budapest in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979, he states that otherwise the Soviets would have marched in. ("Das war psychische Folter" [That was Mental Torture], Der Spiegel, 5/11/1992, 181-94.)

Once secret East German Socialist Unity Party files (SED) documents now prove that former East German leader Erich Honecker favored allowing the East German Army to march into Poland along with other Warsaw Pact troops in December 1981 to crush Solidarity. Only the declaration of martial law prevented this from occurring. ("Wir Bruderländer stehen fest" [Brother countries must stand firm], Der Spiegel, 10/12/92, 95-99.)

People’s Republic of China

CCP Research Newsletter 8 (Spring 1991) carries two items of special interest to Cold War historians: 1) an introduction to China’s Central Archives in Beijing;
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and 2) a bibliography of recent Russian works on modern China. Subscriptions: Colorado College, 14 E. Cache La Poudre, Colorado Springs, CO 80903; $20/2 yrs. (4 issues).

Auburn University historian describes Beijing’s relations with Vietnamese Communists during the 1954 Geneva Conference, including pressure on Ho Chi Minh to accept the 17th parallel as the temporary north-south border. (Zhai Qiang, “China and the Geneva Conference of 1954,” China Quarterly (March 1992).)

Newly available cables and telegram from Chinese leaders should modify historical explanations of and theoretical conclusions drawn from Beijing’s decision to intervene in the Korean War in the fall of 1950; English translations of Mao’s cables to Stalin and Zhou Enlai reprinted. (Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chances for Peace” Interna-
tional Security 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-54; also see Michael Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951,” Political Science Quarterly 107:3 (Fall 1992), 453-78.)

A catalogue of new PRC publications and journals is available from China Publications Service, P.O. Box 49614, Chicago, IL 60664; fax: (312)288-8570. The John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research puts out an occasional listing of new books purchased in China now at the Center; contact Nancy Hearst, Librarian, Fairbank Center, Archibald Cray Coolidge Hall, 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138. Various document collections (including compilations of Mao’s manuscripts) and CCP journals are available from the Center for Chinese Research Materials, P.O. Box 3090, Oakton, VA 22124; tel.: (703) 281-7731.

Vietnam


Cuban Missile Crisis


Declassified documents put crisis in new light, but obstacles to releases remain. (Peter Kornbluh and Sheryl Walter “History Held Hostage,” WP Outlook, 10/11/92.)

CIA holds public conference on missile crisis, releases documents. (Walter Pincus, “CIA Records Offer Behind-the-Senes Look at Cuban Missile Crisis,” WP, 10/19/92; Eric Schmitt, “Once More Unto the Brink,” NYT, 10/20/92.)

Review of recently released evidence concludes that revised history of crisis is “far less reassuring than the more familiar version.” (Tom Morganthau, “At the Brink of Disaster,” Newsweek, 10/26/92, 36-39.)

Soviet General Anatoly Gribkov, who commanded forces in Cuba during crisis, recounts deployment of missiles, including plans to use tactical nuclear weapons against invading U.S. forces. (Anatoly Gribkov, “An der Schwelle zum Atomkrieg” [On the Threshold of Nuclear War], Der Spiegel, 4/13/92, 144 ff., and “Operation Anadyr,” Der Spiegel, 4/20/92, 196 ff.)

Soviet Defense Ministry declassifies documents substantiating Gribkov’s assertion that Soviet forces in Cuba during crisis possessed tactical nuclear weapons and authority to use them. In a letter printed in the November 2, 1992, New York Times, Bruce J. Allyn and James G. Blight quoted the following translated extract from an order delivered in late September-early October 1962 from Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky to Gen. Issa Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces in Cuba (General Staff Archives, “Anadyr” File 6, Volume 2, page 144): “Only in the event of a landing of the opponent’s forces on the island of Cuba and if there is a concentration of enemy ships with landing forces near the coast of Cuba, in its territorial waters ..., and there is no possibility to receive directives from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, you are personally allowed as an exception to take the decision to apply the tactical nuclear Luna missiles as a means of local war for the destruction of the opponent on land and on the coast with the aim of a full crushing defeat of troops on the territory of Cuba and the defense of the Cuban Revolution.” (Bruce J. Allyn and James G. Blight, 10/26/92 letter, NYT, 11/2/92, A18.)


The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in late 1991 with the help of a generous grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and in particular seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” — the former Communist bloc — through publications, exhibitions, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences.

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Cold War International History Project Bulletin
Issue 2 (Fall 1992)
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