

THE EMERGING DISPUTES BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW: TEN NEWLY AVAILABLE CHINESE DOCUMENTS, 1956-1958

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Translators' Notes: In February 1950, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two "brotherly" Communist countries, would last forever. However, serious problems soon emerged between the Chinese and Soviet parties and governments. Starting in 1960, the two parties became engaged in an increasingly heated polemical debate over the nature of true communism and which party represented it. By the late 1960s, the relationship between the two countries had deteriorated to such an extent that a major border war erupted between them in March 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union change from allies to enemies? What problems caused the decline and final collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to answer these questions, scholars need access to contemporary documentary sources, and these translations of the newly available Chinese documents provide a basis for beginning to answer these questions.

The documents are divided into three groups. The first group includes two speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the Chinese Communist view on such important questions as Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin, the general principles underlying the relations among "brotherly parties and states," and their perception of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Chinese revolution. Particularly interesting is Mao Zedong's repeated reference to the "unequal" relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet Union during Stalin's era. Through these documents one is able to sense some of the deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group includes three documents reflecting the CCP leadership's response to the Soviet proposals in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet submarine flotilla in 1958. In his long

conversation with the Soviet Ambassador P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to a series of more general questions concerning the overall relationship between the two countries, revealing comprehensively (often in cynical tones) his understanding of the historical, philosophical, and political origins of the problems existing between Beijing and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again emphasized the issue of "equality," emphasizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow's treatment of the CCP as a junior partner. The third group includes four Chinese documents from Russian Foreign Ministry archives, which demonstrate the extent to which China had been dependent upon the military and other material support of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. These documents make it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet relations from another perspective.

Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences

1. Minutes, Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, [undated] September 1956¹

Source: *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1993), 251-262

We welcome you to China. We are very pleased at your visit. We have been supported by you, as well as by other brotherly [Communist] parties. We are invariably supporting you as much as all the other brotherly parties. In today's world, the Marxist and Communist front remains united, whether in places where success [of Communist revolution] is achieved or not yet achieved. However, there were times when we were not so united; there were times when we let you down. We listened to the opinions of the Information Bureau² in the past. Although we did not take part in the Bureau's [business], we found it difficult not to support it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you

as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we kept silent on the resolution [condemning you], although we published articles to criticize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should not have done that; we should have discussed [this issue] with you: if some of your viewpoints were incorrect, [we should have let] you conduct self-criticism, and there was no need to hurry [into the controversy] as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: should you disagree with us, you should do the same thing, that is, the adoption of a method of persuasion and consultation. There have not been that many successful cases in which one criticizes foreign parties in newspapers. [Your] case offers a profound historical lesson for the international communist movement. Although you have suffered from it, the international communist movement has learned a lesson from this mistake. [The international communist movement] must fully understand [the seriousness of] this mistake.

When you offered to recognize new China, we did not respond, nor did we decline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have rejected it, because there was no reason for us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we did not say no to it. How could we find any excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist country?

There was, however, another factor which prevented us from responding to you: the Soviet friends did not want us to form diplomatic relations with you. If so, was China an independent state? Of course, yes. If an independent state, why, then, did we follow their instructions? [My] comrades, when the Soviet Union requested us to follow their suit at that time, it was difficult for us to oppose it. It was because at that time some people claimed that there were two Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the other in China, even if no one passed a resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that [they] suspected that I was a half-hearted Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito

from my head? The tag was removed after [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] and came to [North] Korea's aid and when [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow.

The Wang Ming line³ was in fact Stalin's line. It ended up destroying ninety percent of our strength in our bases, and one hundred percent of [our strength] in the white areas.⁴ Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi⁵ pointed this out in his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.⁶ Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the losses] to the [impact of] Stalin's line? There is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself could criticize Stalin; but it would be inappropriate for us to criticize him. We should maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union. Maybe [we] could make our criticism public sometime in the future. It has to be that way in today's world, because facts are facts. The Comintern made numerous mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages were not so bad, but its middle stage was not so good: it was all right when Lenin was alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in charge.⁷ The first Wang Ming line dominated [our party] for four years, and the Chinese revolution suffered the biggest losses.⁸ Wang Ming is now in Moscow taking a sick leave, but still we are going to elect him to be a member of the party's Central Committee. He indeed is an instructor for our party; he is a professor, an invaluable one who could not be purchased by money. He has taught the whole party, so that it would not follow his line.

That was the first time when we got the worst of Stalin.

The second time was during the anti-Japanese war. Speaking Russian and good at flattering Stalin, Wang Ming could directly communicate with Stalin. Sent back to China by Stalin, he tried to set [us] toward right deviation this time, instead of following the leftist line he had previously advocated. Advocating [CCP] collaboration with the Guomindang [the Nationalist Party or GMD], he can be described as "decking himself out and self-inviting [to the GMD];" he wanted [us] to obey the GMD wholeheartedly. The Six-Principle Program he put forward was to overturn our Party's Ten-Principle Policy. [His program] opposed establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated giving up our Party's own armed force, and preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] was in power, there would be peace [in China]. We redressed this devia-

tion. [Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us correct this mistake: while Wang Ming "decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang]," Jiang Jieshi "slapped his face and kicked him out." Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China's best instructor: he had educated the people of the whole nation as well as all of our Party members. Jiang lectured with his machine guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with his own words.

The third time was after Japan's surrender and the end of the Second World War. Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give the whole of China to America and Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin hardly gave any to us, the Communist Party, but supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in his autobiography.

Only after the dissolution of the Comintern did we start to enjoy more freedom. We had already begun to criticize opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and unfolded the rectification movement. The rectification, in fact, was aimed at denouncing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern had committed in directing the Chinese revolution; however, we did not openly mention a word about Stalin and the Comintern. Sometime in the near future, [we] may openly do so. There are two explanations of why we did not openly criticize [Stalin and the Comintern]: first, as we followed their instructions, we have to take some responsibility ourselves. Nobody compelled us to follow their instructions! Nobody forced us to be wrongfully deviated to right and left directions! There are two kinds of Chinese: one kind is a dogmatist who completely accepts Stalin's line; the other opposes dogmatism, thus refusing to obey [Stalin's] instructions. Second, we do not want to displease [the Soviets], to disrupt our relations with the Soviet Union. The Comintern has never made self-criticism on these mistakes; nor has the Soviet Union ever mentioned these mistakes. We would have fallen out with them had we raised our criticism.

The fourth time was when [Moscow] regarded me as a half-hearted Tito or semi-Titoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist countries and some non-socialist countries were there some

people who had suspected whether China's was a real revolution.

You might wonder why [we] still pay a tribute to Stalin in China by hanging his portrait on the wall. Comrades from Moscow have informed us that they no longer hang Stalin's portraits and only display Lenin's and current leaders' portraits in public parade. They, however, did not ask us to follow their suit. We find it very difficult to cope. The four mistakes committed by Stalin are yet to be made known to the Chinese people as well as to our whole party. Our situation is quite different from yours: your [suffering inflicted by Stalin] is known to the people and to the whole world. Within our party, the mistakes of the two Wang Ming lines are well known; but our people do not know that these mistakes originated in Stalin. Only our Central Committee was aware that Stalin blocked our revolution and regarded me as a half-hearted Tito.

We had no objection that the Soviet Union functions as a center [of the world revolution] because it benefits the socialist movement. You may disagree [with us] on this point. You wholeheartedly support Khrushchev's campaign to criticize Stalin, but we cannot do the same because our people would dislike it. In the previous parades [in China], we held up portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as those of a few Chinese [leaders]—Mao, Liu [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], and Zhu [De]⁹—and other brotherly parties' leaders. Now we adopt a measure of "overthrowing all": no one's portrait is handed out. For this year's "First of May" celebration, Ambassador Bobkoveshi¹⁰ already saw in Beijing that no one's portrait was held in parade. However, the portraits of five dead persons—Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and Sun [Yat-sen]—and a not yet dead person—Mao Zedong—are still hanging [on the wall]. Let them hang on the wall! You Yugoslavians may comment that the Soviet Union no longer hangs Stalin's portrait, but the Chinese still do.

As of this date some people remain suspicious of whether our socialism can be successfully constructed and stick to the assertion that our Communist Party is a phony one. What can we do? These people eat and sleep every day and then propagate that the Chinese Communist Party is not really a communist party, and that China's socialist construction is bound to fail. To

them, it would be a bewildering thing if socialism could be built in China! Look out, [they warn]. China might become an imperialist country—to follow America, Britain, and France to become the fourth imperialist country! At present China has little industry, thus is in no position [to be an imperialist country]; but [China] will become formidable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan¹¹ might be brought to life; consequently Europe would suffer again, and Yugoslavia might be conquered! The “Yellow Peril” must be prevented!

There is absolutely no ground for this to happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist Party. The Chinese people are peace-loving people. We believe that aggression is a crime, therefore, we will never seize an inch of territory or a piece of grass from others. We love peace and we are Marxists.

We oppose great power politics in international relations. Although our industry is small, all things considered, we can be regarded as a big power. Hence some people [in China] begin to be cocky. We then warn them: “Lower your heads and act with your tails tucked between your legs.” When I was little, my mother often taught me to behave “with tails tucked between legs.” This is a correct teaching and now I often mention it to my comrades.

Domestically, we oppose Pan-Hanism,¹² because this tendency is harmful to the unity of all ethnic groups. Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sectarianism. Those who have hegemonious tendencies only care about their own interests but ignore others’, whereas those Pan-Hanists only care about the Han people and regard the Han people as superior to others, thus damaging [the interests of] all the minorities.

Some people have asserted in the past that China has no intention to be friends with other countries, but wants to split with the Soviet Union, thus becoming a troublemaker. Now, however, this kind of people shrinks to only a handful in the socialist countries; their number has been reduced since the War to Resist America and Assist Korea.¹³ It is, however, a totally different thing for the imperialists: the stronger China becomes, the more scared they will be. They also understand that China is not that terrifying as long as China has no advanced industry, and as long as China continues to rely on human power. The Soviet Union

remains the most fearsome [for the imperialists] whereas China is merely the second. What they are afraid of is our politics and that we may have an enormous impact in Asia. That is why they keep spreading the words that China will be out of control and will invade others, so on and so forth.

We have been very cautious and modest, trying to overcome arrogance but adhering to the “Five Principles.”¹⁴ We know we have been bullied in the past; we understand how it feels to be bullied. You would have had the same feeling, wouldn’t you?

China’s future hinges upon socialism. It will take fifty or even one hundred years to turn China into a wealthy and powerful country. Now no [formidable] blocking force stands in China’s way. China is a huge country with a population of one fourth of that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribution to the world is yet to be compatible with her population size, and this situation will have to change, although my generation and even my son’s generation may not see the change taking place. How it will change in the future depends on how [China] develops. China may make mistakes or become corrupt; the current good situation may take a bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, that even if [China’s] situation takes a bad turn, it may not become as decadent a society as that of Jiang Jieshi’s. This anticipation is based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, and, then, negation of negation. The path in the future is bound to be tortuous.

Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, and arrogance all may take effect in China. However, the Chinese people are inclined to be modest and willing to learn from others. One explanation is that we have little “capital” at our disposal: first, we did not invent Marxism which we learned from others; second, we did not experience the October Revolution and our revolution did not achieve victory until 1949, some thirty-two years after the October Revolution; third, we were only a branch army, not a main force, during the Second World War; fourth, with little modern industry, we merely have agriculture and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Although there are some people among us who appear to be cocky, they are in no position to be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] their tails one or two meters high. But we must prevent this from happening in the future: it may become dangerous [for us] in

ten to twenty years and even more dangerous in forty to fifty years.

My comrades, let me advise you that you should also watch out for this potential. Your industry is much modernized and has experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin made you suffer and hence, justice is on your side. All of this, though, may become your [mental] burden.

The above-mentioned four mistakes Stalin committed [concerning China] may also become our burden. When China becomes industrialized in later years, it will be more likely that we get cocky. Upon your return to your country, please tell your youngsters that, should China stick her tail up in the future, even if the tail becomes ten thousand meters high, still they must criticize China. [You] must keep an eye on China, and the entire world must keep an eye on China. At that time, I definitely will not be here: I will already be attending a conference together with Marx.

We are sorry that we hurt you before, thus owing you a good deal. Killing must be compensated by life and debts must be paid in cash. We have criticized you before, but why do we still keep quiet? Before [Khrushchev’s] criticism of Stalin, we were not in a position to be as explicit about some issues as we are now. In my previous conversations with [Ambassador] Bobkoveshi, I could only say that as long as the Soviet Union did not criticize Stalin, we would be in no position to do so; as long as the Soviet Union did not restore [diplomatic] relations with Yugoslavia, we could not establish relations with you.¹⁵ Now these issues can be openly discussed. I have already talked to the Soviet comrades about the four mistakes that Stalin had committed [to China]; I talked to [Soviet Ambassador Pavel] Yudin¹⁶ about it, and I shall talk to Khrushchev about it next time when we meet. I talk to you about it because you are our comrades. However, we still cannot publish this in the newspapers, because the imperialists should not be allowed to know about it. We may openly talk about one or two mistakes of Stalin’s in the future. Our situation is quite different from yours: Tito’s autobiography mentions Stalin because you have already broken up with the Soviet Union.

Stalin advocated dialectical materialism, but sometimes he lacked materialism and, instead, practiced metaphysics; he wrote about historical materialism, but very often

suffered from historical idealism. Some of his behavior, such as going to extremes, fostering personal myth, and embarrassing others, are by no means [forms] of materialism.

Before I met with Stalin, I did not have much good feeling about him. I disliked reading his works, and I have read only "On the Basis of Leninism," a long article criticizing Trotsky, and "Be Carried Away by Success," etc. I disliked even more his articles on the Chinese revolution. He was very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his heart with others and treated others as equals whereas Stalin liked to stand above every one else and order others around. This style can be detected from his works. After I met with him, I became even more disgusted: I quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin was excitable by temperament. When he became agitated, he would spell out nasty things.

I have written altogether three pieces praising Stalin. The first was written in Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday [21 December 1939—ed.], the second was the congratulatory speech [I delivered] in Moscow [in December 1949—ed.], and the third was an article requested by *Pravda* after his death [March 1953—ed.]. I always dislike congratulating others as well as being congratulated by others. When I was in Moscow to celebrate his birthday, what else could I have done if I had chosen not to congratulate him? Could I have cursed him instead? After his death the Soviet Union needed our support and we also wanted to support the Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal feelings and treat him as the leader of a socialist country. Therefore, that piece was rather vigorous whereas the other two came out of [political] need, not my heart, nor at my will. Human life is just as contradictory as this: your emotion tells you not to write these pieces, but your rationality compels you to do so.

Now that Moscow has criticized Stalin, we are free to talk about these issues. Today I tell you about the four mistakes committed by Stalin, but, in order to maintain relations with the Soviet Union, [we] cannot publish them in our newspapers. Since Khrushchev's report only mentioned the conflict over the

sugar plant while discussing Stalin's mistakes concerning us, we feel it inappropriate to make them public. There are other issues involving conflicts and controversies.

Generally speaking, the Soviet Union is good. It is good because of four factors: Marxism-Leninism, the October Revolution, the main force [of the socialist camp], and industrialization. They have their negative side, and have made some mistakes. However, their achievements constitute the major part [of their past] while their shortcomings are of secondary significance. Now that the enemy is taking advantage of the criticism of Stalin to take the offensive on a world-wide scale, we ought to support the Soviet Union. They will certainly correct their mistakes. Khrushchev already corrected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. They are already aware of Wang Ming's mistakes, although in the past they were unhappy with our criticism of Wang Ming. They have also removed the "half-hearted Tito" [label from me], thus, eliminating altogether [the labels on] one and a half Titos. We are pleased to see that Tito's tag was removed.

Some of our people are still unhappy with the criticism of Stalin. However, such criticism has positive effects because it destroys mythologies, and opens [black] boxes. This entails liberation, indeed, a "war of liberation." With it, people are becoming so courageous that they will speak their minds, as well as be able to think about issues.

Liberty, equality, and fraternity are slogans of the bourgeoisie, but now we have to fight for them. Is [our relationship with Moscow] a father-and-son relationship or one between brothers? It was between father and son in the past; now it more or less resembles a brotherly relationship, but the shadow of the father-and-son relationship is not completely removed. This is understandable, because changes can never be completed in one day. With certain openness, people are now able to think freely and independently. Now there is, in a sense, the atmosphere of anti-feudalism: a father-and-son relationship is giving way to a brotherly relationship, and a patriarchal system is being toppled. During [Stalin's] time people's minds were so tightly controlled that even the feudal control had been surpassed. While some enlightened feudal lords or emperors would accept criticism, [Stalin] would tolerate none. Yugoslavia might also

have such a ruler [in your history] who might take it well even when people cursed him right in his face. The capitalist society has taken a step ahead of the feudalist society. The Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States are allowed to quarrel with each other.

We socialist countries must find [better] solutions. Certainly, we need concentration and unification; otherwise, uniformity cannot be maintained. The uniformity of people's minds is in our favor, enabling us to achieve industrialization in a short period and to deal with the imperialists. It, however, embodies some shortcomings, that is, people are made afraid of speaking out. Therefore, we must find some ways to encourage people to speak out. Our Politburo's comrades have recently been considering these issues.

Few people in China have ever openly criticized me. The [Chinese] people are tolerant of my shortcomings and mistakes. It is because we always want to serve the people and do good things for the people. Although we sometimes also suffer from bossism and bureaucracy, the people believe that we have done more good things than bad ones and, as a result, they praise us more than criticize us. Consequently, an idol is created: when some people criticize me, others would oppose them and accuse them of disrespecting the leader. Everyday I and other comrades of the central leadership receive some three hundred letters, some of which are critical of us. These letters, however, are either not signed or signed with a false name. The authors are not afraid that we would suppress them, but they are afraid that others around them would make them suffer.

You mentioned "On Ten Relationships."¹⁷ This resulted from one-and-a-half-months of discussions between me and thirty-four ministers [of the government]. What opinions could I myself have put forward without them? All I did was to put together their suggestions, and I did not create anything. Any creation requires materials and factories. However, I am no longer a good factory. All my equipment is out-of-date, I need to be improved and re-equipped as much as do the factories in Britain. I am getting old and can no longer play the major role but had to assume a minor part. As you can see, I merely played a minor role during this Party's National Congress whereas Liu

Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping¹⁸ and others assumed the primary functions.

2. Speech, Mao Zedong, "On Sino-American and Sino-Soviet Relations," 27 January 1957¹⁹

Source: *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 280-283

[Let me] talk about U.S.-China relations. At this conference we have circulated a copy of the letter from [Dwight D.] Eisenhower to Jiang Jieshi. This letter, in my view, aims largely at dampening the enthusiasm of Jiang Jieshi and, then, cheering him up a bit. The letter urges [Jiang] to keep calm, not to be impetuous, that is, to resolve the problems through the United Nations, but not through a war. This is to pour cold water [on Jiang]. It is easy for Jiang Jieshi to get excited. To cheer [Jiang] up is to continue the hard, uncompromising policy toward the [Chinese] Communist Party, and to hope that internal unrest would disable us. In his [Eisenhower's] calculation, internal unrest has already occurred and it is hard for the Communist Party to suppress it. Well, different people observe things differently!

I still believe that it is much better to establish diplomatic relations with the United States several years later than sooner. This is in our favor. The Soviet Union did not form diplomatic relations with the United States until seventeen years after the October Revolution. The global economic crisis erupted in 1929 and lasted until 1933. In that year Hitler came to power in Germany whereas Roosevelt took office in the United States. Only then was the Soviet-American diplomatic relationship established. [As far as I can anticipate], it will probably wait until when we have completed the Third Five-Year Plan²⁰ that we should consider forming diplomatic relations with the United States. In other words, it will take eighteen or even more years [before we do so]. We are not anxious to enter the United Nations either. This is based on exactly the same reasoning as why we are not anxious to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The objective of this policy is to deprive the U.S. of its political assets as much as possible, so that the U.S. will be placed in an unreasonable and isolated position. It is therefore all right if [the U.S.] blocks us from the United Nations and re-

fuses to establish diplomatic relation with us. The longer you drag on [these issues], the more debts you will owe us. The longer the issues linger there, the more unreasonable you will appear, and the more isolated you will become both domestically and in face of international public opinion. I once told an American in Yanan that even if you United States refused to recognize us for one hundred years, I simply did not believe that you United States could refuse to recognize us in the one hundred and first year. Sooner or later the U.S. will establish diplomatic relations with us. When the United States does so and when Americans finally come to visit China, they will feel deep regret. It is because by then, China will become completely different [from what it is now]: the house has been thoroughly swept and cleaned, "the four pests"²¹ have altogether been eliminated; and they can hardly find any of their "friends." Even if they spread some germs [in China], it will have no use at all.

Since the end of the Second World War, every capitalist country has suffered from instability which has led to disturbance and disorder. Every country in the world is disturbed, and China is no exception. However, we are much less disturbed than they are. I want you to think about this issue: between the socialist countries and the imperialist countries, especially the United States, which side is more afraid of the other after all? In my opinion, both are afraid [of the other], but the issue is who is afraid more. I am inclined to accept such an assessment: the imperialists are more afraid of us. However, such an assessment entails a danger, that is, it could put us into a three-day-long sleep. Therefore, [we] always have to stress two possibilities. Putting the positive possibility aside, the negative potential is that the imperialists may become crazy. Imperialists always harbor malicious intentions and constantly want to make trouble. Nevertheless, it will not be that easy for the imperialists to start a world war; they have to consider the consequences once war starts.

[Let me] also talk about Sino-Soviet relations. In my view, wrangling [between us] will continue. [We shall] never pretend that the Communist parties will not wrangle. Is there a place in the world where wrangling does not exist? Marxism itself is a wrangling-ism, and is about contradiction and struggle. Contradictions are everywhere, and contradictions invariably lead to struggle.

At present there exist some controversies between China and the Soviet Union. Their ways of thinking, behavior, and historical traditions differ from ours. Therefore, we must try to persuade them. Persuasion is what I have always advocated as a way to deal with our own comrades. Some may argue that since we are comrades, we must be of the same good quality, and why in the world is persuasion needed among comrades? Moreover, persuasion is often employed for building a common front and always targeted at the democratic figures²² and, why is it employed toward communist party members? This reasoning is wrong. Different opinions and views do exist even within a communist party. Some have joined the party, but have not changed their mindset. Some old cadres do not share the same language with us. Therefore, [we] have to engage in heart-to-heart talks with them: sometimes individually, sometimes in groups. In one meeting after another we will be able to persuade them.

As far as I can see, circumstances are beyond what persons, even those occupying high positions, can control. Under the pressure of circumstance, those in the Soviet Union who still want to practice big-power chauvinism will invariably encounter difficulties. To persuade them remains our current policy and requires us to engage in direct dialogue with them. The last time our delegation visited the Soviet Union, [we] openly talked about some [controversial] issues.²³ I told Comrade Zhou Enlai over the phone that, as those people are blinded by lust for gain, the best way to deal with them is to give them a tongue-lashing. What is [their] asset? It involves nothing more than 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of coal, and 80 million tons of oil. How much does this count? It does not count for a thing. With this asset, however, their heads have gotten really big. How can they be communists [by being so cocky]? How can they be Marxists? Let me stress, even ten times or a hundred times bigger, these things do not count for a thing. They have achieved nothing but digging a few things out of the earth, turning them into steel, thereby manufacturing some airplanes and automobiles. This is nothing to be proud of! They, however, turn these [achievements] into huge burdens on their back and hardly care about revolutionary principles. If this cannot be described as being blinded by lust for gain, what else

could this be? Taking the office of the first secretary can also become a source for being blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for one to be out of one's mind. Whenever one is out of his mind, there must be a way to bring him back to his senses. This time Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained a modest attitude but quarreled with them and, of course, they argued back. This is a correct attitude, because it is always better to make every [controversial] issue clear face to face. As much as they intend to influence us, we want to influence them too. However, we did not unveil everything this time, because we must save some magic weapons [in reserve]. Conflict will always exist. All we hope for at present is to avoid major clashes so as to seek common ground while reserving differences. Let these differences be dealt with in the future. Should they stick to the current path, one day, we will have to expose everything.

As for us, our external propaganda must not contain any exaggeration. In the future, we shall always remain cautious and modest, and shall tightly tuck our tails between our legs. We still need to learn from the Soviet Union. However, we shall learn from them rather selectively: only accept the good stuff, while at the same avoiding picking up the bad stuff. There is a way to deal with the bad stuff, that is, we shall not learn from it. As long as we are aware of their mistakes, [we] can avoid committing the same mistake. We, however, must learn from anything that is useful to us and, at the same time, we must grasp useful things all over the world. One ought to seek knowledge in all parts of the world. It would be monotonous if one only sticks to one place to receive education.

3. Report, "My Observations on the Soviet Union," Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the Central Leadership, 24 January 1957 (Excerpt)²⁴

Source: Shi Zhongquan, *Zhou Enlai de zhuoyue fengxian* [Remarkable Achievements and Contributions of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1993), 302-305

Having already spoken considerably about the achievements of the Soviet Communist leadership in public, now let [me] illustrate again the major mistakes it has made:

(1) In my view, the mistakes of the Soviet Communist leadership arise from erroneous thinking. They often set the interests of the Soviet Communist Party ahead of their brotherly parties; they often set their own interests as the leaders ahead of those of the party. As a result, they often fail to overcome subjectivity, narrow-mindedness, and emotion when they think about and resolve problems; they often fail to link together the interests of the above-stated sides in an objective, far-sighted, and calm fashion. Although they may correct one mistake, they are not free of making others. Sometimes they admit that they made mistakes; but it does not mean that they fully come to grips with their mistakes for they merely take a perfunctory attitude toward these mistakes.

For instance, the dispatch of their troops to Warsaw was clearly interference with the internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed forces, but not an action to suppress counter-revolutionaries. They admitted that they had committed a serious mistake, and they even stated in our meetings this time that no one should be allowed to interfere with other brotherly parties' internal affairs; but in the meantime, they denied that [their intervention in Poland] was a mistake.

When we had a general assessment of Stalin, analyzing the ideological and social roots of his [mistakes], they kept avoiding any real discussion. Although they seemingly have changed [their view] in measuring Stalin's achievements and mistakes, to me, such an alteration was to meet their temporary needs, not the result of profound contemplation.

We immediately sensed this shortly after our arrival in Moscow. At the dinner party hosted by Liu Xiao²⁵ on the 17th [of January], Khrushchev again raised the Stalin issue. Spelling out a good deal of inappropriate words, however, he made no self-criticism. We then pushed him by pointing out that, given the development of Stalin's authoritarianism, ossified way of thinking, and arrogant and conceited attitude over twenty years, how can those comrades, especially those [Soviet] Politburo members, who had worked with Stalin, decline to assume any responsibility? They then admitted that Stalin's errors came about gradually; had they not been afraid of getting killed, they could have at least done more to restrict the growth of Stalin's mistakes than

to encourage him. However, in open talks, they refused to admit this.

Khrushchev and Bulganin claimed that as members of the third generation [of Soviet] leadership, they could not do anything to persuade Stalin or prevent his mistakes. During [my visit] this time, however, I stressed the ideological and social roots of Stalin's mistakes, pointing out that the other leaders had to assume some responsibility for the gradual development of Stalin's mistakes. I also expressed our Chinese Party's conviction that open self-criticism will do no harm to, but will enhance, the Party's credibility and prestige. Before getting out of the car at the [Moscow] airport, Khrushchev explained to me that they could not conduct the same kind of self-criticism as we do; should they do so, their current leadership would be in trouble.

About the Poland question.²⁶ It is crystal-clear that the Poland incident was a result of the historical antagonism between the Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of [the Second World] War, many [outstanding and potential] conflicts have yet to be appropriately resolved. The recent [Soviet] dispatch of troops to Warsaw caused an even worse impact [in Poland]. Under these circumstances the Polish comrades have good reason not to accept the policy of "following the Soviet leadership." The Polish comrades, however, admitted that they had yet to build a whole-hearted trusting relationship with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, [Wladyslaw] Gomulka²⁷ is trying his best to retrieve the losses and reorient the Polish-Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing any anti-Soviet acts [in Poland]. Regardless, however, the Soviet comrades remain unwilling to accept the criticism that [they] practiced big-power politics [in resolving the Polish crisis]. This kind of attitude does not help at all to convince the Polish comrades.

It is safe to say that although every public communiqué [between the Soviet Union and] other brotherly states has repeatedly mentioned what the 30 October [1956] declaration²⁸ has announced as the principles to guide the relationship among brotherly parties and governments, [the Soviets] seem to recoil in fear when dealing with specific issues and tend to be inured to patronizing others and interfering with other brotherly parties' and governments' internal affairs.

(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Facing a [common] grave enemy, the Soviet comrades have ardent expectations about Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opinion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly convinced by our argument; nor have the differences between us disappeared completely. For instance, many leaders of the Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised our article "Another Comment on the Historical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictatorship."²⁹ Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, when we discussed with them the part of the article concerning criticism of Stalin, they said that this was what made them displeased (or put them in a difficult position, I can't remember the exact words). . . . Therefore, I believe that some of the Soviet leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, at the last day's meeting, I decided not to raise our requests concerning the abolition of the long-term supply and purchase contracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] experts, and [Soviet] aid and [Sino-Soviet] collaboration on nuclear energy and missile development. About these issues I didn't say a word. It was not because there wasn't enough time to do so, but because [I wanted to] avoid impressing upon them that we were taking advantage of their precarious position by raising these issues. These issues can be raised later or simply dropped.

(3) In assessing the international situation, I am convinced that they spend more time and effort on coping with specific and isolated events than on evaluating and anticipating the situations thoroughly from different angles. They explicitly demonstrate weakness in considering and discussing strategic and long-term issues. As far as tactics are concerned, on the other hand, lacking clearly defined principles, they tend to be on such a loose ground in handling specific affairs that they will fail to reach satisfactorily the strategic goals through resolving each specific conflict. As a result, it is very likely that some worrisome events may occur in international affairs. For instance, this time they conceded to our conviction that in today's world there existed two camps and three forces (socialist, imperialist, and nationalist) and agreed to our analysis. But the communiqué drafted by them included only vague statements about

the union among the Soviet Union, China and India, as well as [about] possible Sino-Soviet collaboration on the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs. We regarded these statements as swashbuckling, which is not good, and they were finally deleted from the communiqué. As a result, we did not use the Soviet draft. The published communiqué was largely based on our draft.

(4) In spite of all of the above, however, Sino-Soviet relations are far better now than during Stalin's era. First of all, facing the [common] grave enemy, both sides have realized and accepted the necessity of promoting Sino-Soviet unity and mutual support, which had been taken as the most important principle. Second, now the Soviet Union and China can sit down to discuss issues equally. Even if they have different ideas on certain issues, they must consult with us. The articles by the Chinese Party are having some impact on the cadres and people in the Soviet Union, and even on some [Soviet] leaders. Third, the previous dull situation in which the brotherly parties and states could hardly discuss or argue with one another no longer exists. Now, different opinions can be freely exchanged so that unity and progress are thereby promoted. Fourth, the majority of the Soviet people love China and feel happy for the Chinese people's achievements and growth in strength. Their admiration and friendship with the Chinese people are being enhanced on a daily basis. However, while [Russian] arrogance and self-importance have not been completely eliminated, an atmosphere lacking discipline and order is spreading. This time the [Soviet leadership] gave us a splendid and grand reception which indicated its intention to build a good image in front of its own people and the peoples all over the world. Fifth, on the one hand, extremely conceited, blinded by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and knowing little the ways of the world, some of their leaders have hardly improved themselves even with the several rebuffs they have met in the past year. On the other hand, however, they appear to lack confidence and suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs or relations with other brotherly parties. Although they did sometimes speak from the bottom of their hearts while talking with us, they nevertheless could not get down from their high horse. In short, it is absolutely inadvisable

for us not to persuade them [to make changes]; it is, however, equally inadvisable for us to be impatient in changing them. Therefore, changes on their part can only be achieved through a well-planned, step-by-step, persistent, patient, long-term persuasion.

Part II. Disputes over Long-wave Radio Stations and the Joint Submarine Flotilla

4. Report, Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong and the CCP Central Committee, 5 June 1958 (Excerpt)³⁰

Source, *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 634

With regard to Soviet Union's request for establishing long-wave radio stations in our country, the Soviet side insists on the original idea that the construction should be jointly invested by the two sides. They also propose to dispatch experts to China in early June to conduct such activities as selecting the proper location, making investigations and preparing for the design work, and drafting an agreement. It seems that the Soviet side will not quickly accept the opinion of our side. In order not to hinder the investigation and design work, [we] may permit the Soviet experts to come to China to conduct some technical work, leaving the question concerning investment and operation to be solved as the next step.

5. Remarks, Mao Zedong, concerning the Soviet Request on Establishing a Special Long-wave Radio Station in China, 7 June 1958³¹

Source, *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 316-317

For the eyes of Liu [Shaoqi], Lin Biao, [Deng] Xiaoping, Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], Chen [Yun], Peng Zhen, and Chen Yi only;³² return to Comrade Peng Dehuai for file:

I

This can be implemented as [you have] planned. China must come up with the money to pay for [the financial cost] which cannot be covered by the Soviet side.

Mao Zedong

7 June

If they try to put heavy pressure on us, [we] shall not respond and shall let it drag on for a while, or [we] may respond after the

central leadership discusses it. This issue must be settled through an agreement between the two governments.

Peng [Dehuai] ought to pay attention to the section about the conversation where Mao has added some comments.

II

*China must shoulder the responsibility of capital investment for this radio station; China is duty-bound in this case. [We] may have to ask for Soviet comrades' help with regard to construction and equipment, but all the costs must be priced and paid in cash by us. [We] may share its use after it is constructed, which ought to be determined by an agreement between the two governments.*³³ This is China's position, not purely the position of mine.³⁴

6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July 1958³⁵

Source: *Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan*, 322-333

After you left yesterday I could not fall asleep, nor did I have dinner. Today I invite you over to talk a bit more so that you can be [my] doctor: [after talking with you], I might be able to eat and sleep this afternoon. You are fortunate to have little difficulty in eating and sleeping.

Let us return to the main subject and chat about the issues we discussed yesterday. We will only talk about these issues here in this room! There exists no crisis situation between you and me. Our relationship can be described as: nine out of ten fingers of yours and ours are quite the same with only one finger differing. I have repeated this point two or three times. You haven't forgotten, have you?

I've thought over and again of the issues that were discussed yesterday. It is likely that I might have misunderstood you, but it is also possible that I was right. We may work out a solution after discussion or debate. It appears that [we] will have to withdraw [our] navy's request for [obtaining] nuclear-powered submarines [from the Soviet Union]. Barely remembering this matter, I have acquired some information about it only after asking others.³⁶ There are some warmhearted people at our navy's headquarters, namely, the Soviet advisers. They asserted that, now that the Soviet nuclear submarines have been developed, we can

obtain [them] simply by sending a cable [to Moscow].

Well, your navy's nuclear submarines are of a [top] secret advanced technology. The Chinese people are careless in handling things. If we are provided with them, we might put you to trouble.

The Soviet comrades have won victory for forty years, and are thus rich in experience. It has only been eight years since our victory and we have little experience. You therefore raised the question of joint ownership and operation. The issue of ownership has long before been dealt with: Lenin proposed the system of rent and lease which, however, was targeted at the capitalists.

China has some remnant capitalists, but the state is under the leadership of the Communist Party. You never trust the Chinese! You only trust the Russians! [To you] the Russians are the first-class [people] whereas the Chinese are among the inferior who are dumb and careless. Therefore [you] came up with the joint ownership and operation proposition. Well, if [you] want joint ownership and operation, how about have them all—let us turn into joint ownership and operation our army, navy, air force, industry, agriculture, culture, education. Can we do this? Or, [you] may have all of China's more than ten thousand kilometers of coastline and let us only maintain a guerrilla force. With a few atomic bombs, you think you are in a position to control us through asking for the right of rent and lease. Other than this, what else [do you have] to justify [your request]?

Lüshun [Port Arthur] and Dalian [Darinse] were under your control before. You departed from these places later. Why [were these places] under your control? It is because then China was under the Guomindang's rule. Why did you volunteer to leave? It is because the Communist Party had taken control of China.

Because of Stalin's pressure, the Northeast and Xinjiang became [a Soviet] sphere of influence, and four jointly owned and operated enterprises were established.³⁷ Comrade Khrushchev later proposed to have these [settlements] eliminated, and we were grateful for that.

You [Russians] have never had faith in the Chinese people, and Stalin was among the worst. The Chinese [Communists] were regarded as Tito the Second; [the Chinese people] were considered as a backward na-

tion. You [Russians] have often stated that the Europeans looked down upon the Russians. I believe that some Russians look down upon the Chinese people.

At the most critical juncture [of the Chinese revolution], Stalin did not allow us to carry out our revolution and opposed our carrying out the revolution. He made a huge mistake on this issue. So did [Grigory Y.] Zinoviev.

Neither were we pleased with [Anastas] Mikoyan. He flaunted his seniority and treated us as if [we were] his sons. He put on airs and looked very arrogant. He assumed the greatest airs when he first visited Xibaipo in 1949³⁸ and has been like that every time he came to China. Every time he came, he would urge me to visit Moscow. I asked him what for. He would then say that there was always something for you to do there. Nevertheless, only until later when Comrade Khrushchev proposed to hold a conference to work out a resolution [concerning the relationship among all the communist parties and socialist states] did [I go to Moscow].³⁹

It was our common duty to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. Up to that time, as I often pointed out, there had existed no such thing as brotherly relations among all the parties because, [your leaders] merely paid lip service and never meant it; as a result, the relations between [the brotherly] parties can be described as between father and son or between cats and mice. I have raised this issue in my private meetings with Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades. They all admitted that such a father-son relationship was not of European but Asian style. Present were Bulganin, Mikoyan, and [M. A.] Suslov. Were you also at the meeting? From the Chinese side, I and Deng Xiaoping were present.

I was unhappy with Mikoyan's congratulation speech which he delivered at our Eighth National Congress and I deliberately refused to attend that day's meeting as a protest. You did not know that many of our deputies were not happy with [Mikoyan's speech]. Acting as if he was the father, he regarded China as Russia's son.

China has her own revolutionary traditions, although China's revolution could not have succeeded without the October Revolution, nor without Marxism-Leninism.

We must learn from the Soviet experi-

ences. We will comply with the commonly accepted principles, especially the nine principles stated in the "Moscow Manifesto."⁴⁰ We ought to learn from all the experiences whether they are correct or erroneous. The erroneous lessons included Stalin's metaphysics and dogmatism. He was not totally metaphysical because he had acquired some dialectics in thinking; but a large part of his [thoughts] focused on metaphysics. What you termed as the cult of personality was one [example of his metaphysics]. Stalin loved to assume the greatest airs.

Although we support the Soviet Union, we won't endorse its mistakes. As for [the differences over] the issue of peaceful evolution, we have never openly discussed [these differences], nor have we published [them] in the newspapers. Cautious as we have been, we choose to exchange different opinions internally. I had discussed them with you before I went to Moscow. While in Moscow, [we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to raise five [controversial] issues. We won't openly talk about them even in the future, because our doing so would hurt Comrade Khrushchev's [political position]. In order to help consolidate his [Khrushchev's] leadership, we decided not to talk about these [controversies], although it does not mean that the justice is not on our side.

With regard to inter-governmental relations, we remain united and unified up to this date which even our adversaries have conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have objected to all the major criticism that the revisionists and imperialists have massed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has so far done the same thing [for us].

When did the Soviets begin to trust us Chinese? At the time when [we] entered the Korean War. From then on, the two countries got closer to one another [than before] and as a result, the 156 aid projects came about. When Stalin was alive, the [Soviet] aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade Khrushchev later added a few more.⁴¹

We have held no secrets from you. Because more than one thousand of your experts are working in our country, you are fully aware of the state of our military, political, economic, and cultural affairs. We trust your people, because you are from a socialist country, and you are sons and daughters of Lenin.

Problems have existed in our relations,

but it was mainly Stalin's responsibility. [We] have had three grievances [against Stalin]. The first concerns the two Wang Ming lines. Wang Ming was Stalin's follower. The second was [Stalin's] discouragement of and opposition to our revolution. Even after the dissolution of the Third International, he still issued orders claiming that, if we did not strike a peace deal with Jiang Jieshi, China would risk a grave danger of national elimination.⁴² Well, for whatever reason, we are not eliminated. The third was during my first visit to Moscow during which Stalin, [V.M.] Molotov, and [Lavrenti] Beria personally attacked me.

Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar [to China] to read my works?⁴³ Was it because I so lacked confidence that I would even have to have you read my works? Or was it because I had nothing to do myself? Not a chance! [My real intention] was to get you over to China to see with your own eyes whether China was truly practicing Marxism or only half-hearted toward Marxism.

Upon your return [to Moscow] you spoke highly of us. Your first comment to Stalin was "the Chinese [comrades] are truly Marxists." Nevertheless Stalin remained doubtful. Only when [we entered] the Korean War did he change his view [about us], and so did East European and other brotherly parties drop their doubts [about us].

It appears that there are reasons for us to be suspect: "First, you opposed Wang Ming; second, you simply insisted on carrying out your revolution regardless of [our] opposition; third, you looked so smart when you went all the way to Moscow desiring Stalin to sign an agreement so that [China] would regain authority over the [Manchurian] railroad." In Moscow it was [I. V.] Kovalev who took care of me with [N. T.] Fedorenko as my interpreter.⁴⁴ I got so angry that I once pounded on the table. I only had three tasks to eat, the second was to sleep, and the third was to shit.

There was a [Soviet] adviser in [our] military academy who, in discussing war cases, would only allow [the Chinese trainees] to talk about those of the Soviet Union, not China's, would only allow them to talk about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army, not [ours] in the Korean War.

Please allow us to talk about these cases! [Can you imagine] he wouldn't even allow us to talk about [our own war experiences]!

For God's sake, we fought wars for twenty-two years; we fought in Korea for three years! Let [me ask] the Central Military Commission to prepare some materials concerning [our war experiences] and give them to Comrade Yudin, of course, if he is interested.

We did not speak out on some [controversial] issues because we did not want to cause problems in the Sino-Soviet relations. This was particularly true when the Polish Incident broke out. When Poland demanded that all of your specialists go home, Comrade Liu Shaoqi suggested in Moscow that you withdraw some. You accepted [Liu's] suggestion which made the Polish people happy because they then tasted some freedom. At that time we did not raise our problems with your specialists [in China] because, we believe, it would have caused you to be suspicious that we took the advantage [of your crisis situation] to send all the specialists home. We will not send your specialists home; we will not do so even if Poland does so ten more times. We need Soviet aid.

Once I have persuaded the Polish people that [we all] should learn from the Soviet Union, and that after putting the anti-dogmatism campaign at rest, [they] ought to advocate a "learn from the Soviet Union" slogan. Who will benefit in learning from the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union or Poland? Of course, it will benefit Poland more.

Although we shall learn from the Soviet Union, we must first of all take into account our own experiences and mainly rely on our own experiences.

There should be some agreed limits on the terms of [Soviet] specialists. For instance, there have never been restrictions on your chief advisers in [our] military and public security branches, who can come and go without even notifying or consulting with us in advance. Presumably, if you leave your post, is it all right that another ambassador be sent [to China] without discussing it with us? No, absolutely not! How much information could your advisers to our ministry of public security obtain if they merely sit there totally uninformed by their Chinese colleagues?

Let me advise you [and your specialists] to pay more visits to each of our provinces so as to get in touch with the people and obtain first-hand information. This have I

mentioned to Comrade Yudin many times: if not ten thousand times, at least one thousand times!

With some exceptions, though, most of the [Soviet] specialists are of a good quality. We have also made mistakes before: we did not take the initiative to pass on information to the Soviet comrades. Now we must correct these mistakes by adopting a more active attitude [toward the Soviet comrades]. Next time [we] ought to introduce to them China's general line. If the first time [we] fail to get the information through, [we] will try a second time, third time, and so forth.

Indeed, it was [your] proposition for establishing a "cooperative" on nuclear submarines which led to these remarks. Now that we've decided not to build our nuclear submarines, we are withdrawing our request [for obtaining submarines from the Soviet Union]. Otherwise, we would have to let you have the entire coast, much larger areas than [what you used to control in] Lüshun and Dalian. Either way, however, we will not get mixed up with you: we must be independent from one another. Since we will in the end build our own flotilla, it is not in our interest that [we] play a minor role in

this regard.

Certainly [the arrangements] will be totally different in war time. Your army can operate in our [land], and our army can move to your places to fight. If your army operates on our territory, however, it must be commanded by us. When our army fights in your land, as long as it does not outnumber your army, it has to be directed by you.

These remarks of mine may not sound so pleasing to your ear. You may accuse me of being an nationalist or another Tito. My counter argument is that you have extended Russian nationalism to China's coast.

MAO ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador

Introduction by Odd Arne Westad

Soviet Ambassador to the People's Republic of China Pavel Yudin's two conversations with Mao on 31 March (printed below) and 2 May 1956¹, form some of the best evidence we have on the Chairman's reaction to Khrushchev's secret speech at the February 1956 CPSU 20th Congress. The conversations provide a fascinating insight into how Mao Zedong manipulated history and the myth of his own role in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They also show that Mao's concrete views on the "Stalin issue" in the spring of 1956 were much different from those to which the Chinese party later subscribed.

In his long monologues to Yudin—with whom he was on personally friendly terms—Mao gave vent to three decades of frustrations with Stalin's China policy—frustrations which up to 1956 he could neither present fully to the Soviets nor share openly with his Chinese colleagues. In terms of CCP history, Mao's spring 1956 version was not radically different from what had been dogmatically accepted in the party since 1945, with the major exception that Stalin's role had been filled in. In this version, the major "mistakes" which almost destroyed the party before Mao took the helm were ascribed not only to the CCP leaders who implemented the policies (Li Lisan, Wang Ming and others), but to Stalin, who had inspired and abetted "the mistakes." Likewise, the resistance to Mao's "correct" leadership since the late 1930s could again be traced back to Stalin's errors, which even influenced the negotiating of the Sino-So-

viet treaty of 1950—the very text on which the relationship between the two Communist states was built.

To Mao, more than to most CCP leaders, Khrushchev's speech was a golden opportunity not only to restate China's past and present relationship with the Soviet Union, but also to sanction his and the party's turn to more radical policies since the start of 1955. These policies, including the sweeping collectivization of agriculture which had just been completed (of which the Soviets had been rather critical) and the further steps in speeding up the revolutionary process which Mao contemplated (fueled in part by a nascent concern about the lack of revolutionary fervor within the CCP), could now be advanced without too much interference from Moscow. Since the CPSU had, in effect, repudiated much of its own past, it could no longer insist on having a monopoly on theoretical guidance. Mao could—in a dual sense—liberate himself from Stalin's ghost.

It was not until, first, half a year later, after the Polish and Hungarian events in October-November 1956, that Mao's concern with the political effects of de-Stalinization came to the fore. The disintegration of Communist authority in Eastern Europe frightened the Chinese leaders and compelled them to adopt a much more cautious attitude to the "Stalin issue," including an indirect criticism of the Soviets for having gone too far in their revision of the Communist past. (For revealing insights into the causes of Mao's change of heart, see Bo Yibo's and Wu Lengxi's recent memoirs.)

Mao's conversation with the somewhat startled Soviet ambassador S.V. Chervonenko on 26 December 1960 (also

printed below) is as difficult to interpret for historians today as it must have been for Moscow Center 35 years ago. 1960 was the year when the Sino-Soviet split broke into the open, first with newspaper polemics in the spring, and then the recall of all Soviet advisory personnel from China in July. Meetings between the two sides had been increasingly frosty, even if the compromises reached on some issues during the meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in the fall momentarily reduced the intensity of the confrontation.

Mao had not met Chervonenko earlier in the year, but in this meeting he seemed to be eager to depreciate his own role in Chinese policymaking, and thereby in the responsibility for the split. Granted, Mao's description of his political status is not totally inaccurate; in the wake of his disastrous economic experiments in the late 1950s, he had—not of his own free will—taken less part in day-to-day governance than before. But here he overstated his case and he did so to the Soviet ambassador. In addition, when it came to the Sino-Soviet conflict, we know that Mao had been fully in charge, even during this period.

So what was Mao's purpose? To behave civilly to a well-wisher bringing birthday greetings? To give away as little as possible about how he really felt about Sino-Soviet relations? Or to position himself so that in case his game with real or perceived enemies within his own party went against him, he could still play the "Soviet card" to strengthen his hand? As of yet, we still do not know.

Translations of the two documents follow below:

It was Comrade Khrushchev who had eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before his death, Stalin demanded the right to build a plant to manufacture canned food in our country. My response was that [we] would accept [the demand] as long as you provide us equipment, help us build it, and import all the products [from us]. Comrade Khrushchev praised me for giving [Stalin] a good answer. But why in the world do [you Russians] want to build a naval “cooperative” now? How would you explain to the rest of the world that you propose to build a naval “cooperative”? How would you explain to the Chinese people? For the sake of struggling against the imperialists, you may, as advisers, train the Chinese people. Otherwise, you would have to lease Lüshun and other [ports] for ninety-nine years; but your “cooperative” proposal involves the question of ownership, as you propose that each side will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday you made me so enraged that I could not sleep at all last night. They (pointing at other CCP leaders present) are not angry. Only me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my sole responsibility.

(Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unanimously agreed upon these points.)

If we fail to get our messages through this time, we may have to arrange another meeting; if not, we may have to meet every day. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to Comrade Khrushchev; or we can invite Comrade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to clarify every issue.

(Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky cabled me requesting to build a long-wave radio station along China’s coast to direct the [Soviet] submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As the project will cost a total of 110 million rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 million and China will pay 40 million.)⁴⁵

This request is of the same nature as the naval “cooperative” proposal which [we] cannot explain to the people. [We] will be put in a politically disadvantageous position if [we] reveal these requests to the world.

(Peng Dehuai: Petroshevskii [a Soviet military adviser] also has a rude attitude and rough style. He is not very pleased because some of our principles for army building do not completely follow the Soviet military codes. Once at an enlarged CMC meeting, when Comrade Ye Fei from the Fujian Military District⁴⁶ pointed out that, as the Soviet

military codes were basically to guide operations on flatlands, and as Fujian [province] had nothing but mountains, the Soviet codes were not entirely applicable [to Fujian’s reality]. Very upset at hearing this, Petroshevskii immediately responded: “You have insulted the great military science invented by the great Stalin!” His remarks made everyone at the meeting very nervous.)

Some of the above-mentioned [controversial] issues have been raised [by us] before, some have not. You have greatly aided us but now we are downplaying your [role]; you may feel very bad about it. Our relationship, however, resembles that between professor and student: the professor may make mistakes, do not you agree that the student has to point them out? Pointing out mistakes does not mean that the [student] will drive the professor out. After all the professor is a good one.

You are assisting us to build a navy! Your [people] can serve as advisers. Why would you have to have fifty percent of the ownership? This is a political issue. We plan to build two or three hundred submarines of this kind.

If you insist on attaching political conditions [to our submarine request], we will not satisfy you at all, not even give you a tiny [piece of our] finger. You may inform Comrade Khrushchev that, if [he] still [insists on] these conditions, there is no point for us to talk about this issue. If he accepts our requirement, he may come [to Beijing]; if not, he does not have to come, because there is nothing for us to talk about. Even one tiny condition is unacceptable [for us]!

When this issue is involved, we will refuse to accept your aid for ten thousand years. However, it is still possible for us to cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely that we would break up. We will, from beginning to the end, support the Soviet Union, although we may quarrel with each other inside the house.

While I was in Moscow, I once made it clear to Comrade Khrushchev that you did not have to satisfy every one of our requests. Because if you hold back your aid from us, [you] in effect would compel us to work harder [to be self-reliant]; should we get everything from you, we will end up in an disadvantageous position.

It is, however, extremely important for us to cooperate politically. Because, if we undermine your political positions, you will

encounter considerable problems; the same is true with us: if you undermine our [political] positions, we will be in trouble.

In wartime, you can utilize all our naval ports, military bases, and other [facilities]. [In return] our [military] can operate in your places including your port or bases at Vladivostok and shall return home when war is over. We may sign an agreement on wartime cooperation in advance which does not have to wait until war breaks out. Such an agreement must contain a stipulation that our [forces] can operate on your territory; even if we might not do so, such a stipulation is required, because it involves the issue of equality. In peacetime, however, such an arrangement cannot be accepted. In peacetime, you are only to help us construct [military] bases and build armed forces.

We would not have accepted [your] proposition for building a naval “cooperative” even it had been during Stalin’s time. I quarreled with him in Moscow!

Comrade Khrushchev has established his credibility by having the [previous] “cooperative” projects eliminated. Now that such an issue involving ownership is raised again, we are reminded of Stalin’s positions. I might be mistaken, but I must express my opinion.

You explained [to me] yesterday that [your proposition] was based on the consideration that [Russia’s coastal] conditions were not as good for nuclear submarines to function fully as China’s, thus hamstringing future development of nuclear submarines. You can reach [the Pacific] Ocean from Vladivostok through the Kurile Islands. The condition is very good!

What you said [yesterday] made me very uneasy and displeased. Please report all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: you must tell him exactly what I have said without any polishing so as to make him uneasy. He has criticized Stalin’s [policy] lines but now adopts the same policies as Stalin did.

We will still have controversies. You do not endorse some of our positions; we cannot accept some of your policies. For instance, your [leadership] is not pleased at our policy regarding “internal contradictions among the people,” and the policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend.”

Stalin endorsed the Wang Ming line, causing the losses of our revolutionary

strength up to more than ninety percent. At the critical junctures [of our revolution], he wanted to hold us back and opposed our revolution. Even after [we] achieved victory, he remained doubtful about us. At the same time, he boasted that it was because of the direction of his theories that China's [revolution] succeeded. [We] must do away with any superstition about him. Before I die, I am prepared to write an article on what Stalin had done to China, which is to be published in one thousand years.

(Yudin: The Soviet central leadership's attitude toward the policies of the Chinese central leadership is: it is completely up to the Chinese comrades how to resolve the Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese comrades who understand the situation best. Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and arrogant to judge and assess whether or not the CCP's policies are correct, for the CCP is a great party.)

Well, [we] can only say that we have been basically correct. I myself have committed errors before. Because of my mistakes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and two other campaigns.⁴⁷ I will be very content if I am refuted as being basically correct, because such an assessment is close to reality.

Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will be built is a policy issue: only China is in a position to decide whether we should build it with your assistance or it should be "jointly owned." Comrade Khrushchev ought to come to China [to discuss this issue] because I have already visited him [in Moscow].

[We] should by no means have blind faith in [authorities]. For instance, one of your specialists asserted on the basis of a book written by one [of your] academy scholars that our coal from Shanxi [province] cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an assertion has despaired us: we therefore would have no coal which can be turned into coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit!

Comrade Xining [transliteration], a Soviet specialist who helped us build the Yangtze River Bridge [in Wuhan], is a very good comrade. His bridge-building method has never been utilized in your country: [you] never allowed him to try his method, either to build a big or medium or even small sized bridge. When he came here, however, his explanation of his method sounded all right. Since we knew little about it, [we] let

him try his method! As a result, his trial achieved a remarkable success which has become a first-rate, world-class scientific invention.

I have never met with Comrade Xining, but I have talked to many cadres who participated in the construction of the Yangtze Bridge. They all told me that Comrade Xining was a very good comrade because he took part in every part of the work, adopted a very pleasant working style, and worked very closely with the Chinese comrades. When the bridge was built, the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from him]. Any of you who knows him personally please convey my regards to him.

Please do not create any tensions among the specialists regarding the relations between our two parties and two countries. I never advocate that. Our cooperation has covered a large ground and is by far very satisfactory. You ought to make this point clear to your embassy staff members and your experts so that they will not panic when they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criticized [Soviet leaders].

I have long before wanted to talk about some of these issues. However, it has not been appropriate to talk about them because the incidents in Poland and Hungary put your [leadership] in political trouble. For instance, we then did not feel it right to talk about the problem concerning the experts [in China].

Even Stalin did improve himself: he let China and the Soviet Union sign the [alliance] treaty, supported [us] during the Korean War, and provided [us] with a total of 141 aid projects. Certainly these achievements did not belong to him but to the entire Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we do not want to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes.

Part III. China's Request for Soviet Military and Material Support⁴⁸

7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. Bulganin, 12 December 1956

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

On 30 April 1956, our government proposed to the USSR that [China] would order a total of 890 million rubles worth of military supplies [from the USSR] for the year of 1957. As large areas [of China] have suf-

fered severe flood this year thus encountering a shortage of material supplies, however, [we] have to reallocate materials that have originally been designated for export so as to meet the needs of our domestic supply and, therefore, to reduce our export for next year. In order to maintain the balance between our import and export for the year of 1957, we have no other alternatives but to reduce purchases of foreign goods. As we have calculated, however, we cannot afford to cut down such items as complete sets of equipment and general trade items so as to avoid casting an adverse effect on the ongoing capital construction. Therefore, we have decided that our original order worth 890 million rubles of materials from the USSR for 1957 be reduced to that of 426 million rubles.

We understand that our reduction of purchase orders of Soviet military materials will cause the Soviet Government some problems. But [our request for the change] is an act against our will. [We] wish that the Soviet Government will accept our request. Provided that you accept our request, we will dispatch Tang Tianji,⁴⁹ our representative with full authority in military material orders, to Moscow for the purpose of conducting negotiations with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. We will also submit a detailed list of orders which are reduced and verified to the Soviet Economic Office to China soon. We look forward to hearing from you.

8. Memo, PRC Foreign Ministry to the USSR Embassy to Beijing, 13 March 1957

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

The Chinese Government asserts that, although generally acceptable, the draft paper on a review of Far Eastern economic development, compiled by the [Soviet] Far East Economic Committee has made several errors on China's economic development.

(1) The sentence that "[China's] agrarian collectivization has encountered peasants' opposition," under the section of "Speedy Advance toward Socialism" (page 1), does not correspond with reality. The speed of our country's agricultural collectivization, which has been fully explained by Liu Shaoqi in his report to the [National]

People's Congress, completely refutes such an assertion. In discussing [China's] price problem, the draft paper deliberately distorts and obliterates our basic achievements which are clearly presented in Li Xiannian's⁵⁰ report [to the People's Congress], and instead, exaggerates our isolated weakness and mistakes. Given this fact, therefore, the paper could not help but draw erroneous conclusions (page 20).

(2) The draft paper has also made errors merely by comparing our published statistics which are, indeed, to serve different purposes. There are several such errors:

1. The section titled "Speedy Advance toward Socialism" mentions that "[China] plans to raise the percentage of handicrafts [as an industry] in the nation's GNP up to 15.3% in 1956, whereas the First Five-Year Plan has originally planned to have [the handicrafts] reach 9.4% in 1957" (page 4). In actuality, the former [figure] refers to a combined output of "handicrafts factories" and "handicrafts individuals" while the later [figure] only reflects the percentage of "handicrafts individuals' outputs" in GNP.

2. The section on "National Income and Capital Accumulation" asserts that "[China] in one way or another exaggerates its [per capita] increase, given the [Chinese] statistics on the nation's per capita increase from 1953 to 1956, that is, 1953, 127 yuan, 1954, 137 yuan, 1955, 141 yuan, 1956, 154 yuan. This is because, according to Liu Shaoqi's report, the increase of industrial production during 1953-1956 is no higher than 90.3%, whereas the above listed figures seem to assume that the increase would be 104%" (page 5). The 90.3% increase mentioned in Liu Shaoqi's report covers all industrial increase including modern [heavy] and factory industries, and individual production, while Bo Yibo's⁵¹ reported 104% increase only refers to the increase of production by modern [heavy] and factory [machinery] industries.

3. The section on "National Income and Capital Accumulation" also points out that the total of [China's] capital construction during 1953-1956 exceeds the five-year budget's 42.74 billion yuan by 1%, but State Planning Commission Chairman Li Fuchun's⁵² report [to the People's Congress] only states that [China] will by 1956 complete up to 87.6% of the planned capital construction (page 7). In fact, the amount of capital construction as designed by the five-

year plan only includes the main part of economic and cultural [entertaining and educational] construction, whereas the total of [China's] capital construction during 1953-1956 covers much wider grounds.

4. The session on "Development Plans" notes that the Second Five-Year Plan originally set 98.3% as the [overall] increase objective, but Premier Zhou [Enlai] in his report on the Second Five-Year Plan reduces this objective to 90.3% (page 23). There is indeed no reduction of the original increase objective. Because the former [figure] excludes the outputs of individual production whereas the latter includes the outputs of individual production, thus becoming 90.3%. Since there are detailed explanations and illustrations as to exactly what the above mentioned figures cover when these reports are publicized, there exists no excuse why such errors have been committed. Other than the above listed mistakes, [the draft paper] still contains minor errors which are of no significant concern [of ours].

9. Memo, Embassy of the PRC in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 December 1957

Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, delo 3, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet cooperation and close links regarding national defense industry, the Chinese Government proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commission in charge of national defense industry be established which, consisting of several delegates from each side, is to meet once or twice annually.

The joint commission's major responsibilities include:

(1) exchange published and unpublished books, journals, handbooks, directories, technical criteria, or other materials both sides deem appropriate;

(2) discuss such issues as standardization of weaponry, technical conditions, specifications, and national criteria, and commonly acceptable differences of weaponry production;

(3) discuss standardization of [technical] specifications, and provide [each other] with standard products and measuring apparatus;

(4) discuss invitation and engagement—including procedures, terms limits, and

amount—of technical experts and aides;

(5) invite and dispatch on a reciprocal basis experts and delegations for the purpose of on-site inspection, participation in conferences, delivery of research reports, and short-term internships;

(6) establish frequent contacts on scientific research and production conditions in [each side's] national defense industry;

(7) discuss the exchange and provision of teaching guides, textbooks, or other materials on national defense industry training, or materials necessary to enhance national defense industry personnel's techniques and skills;

(8) exchange lessons and experiences of employing new machinery, new facilities, and new technology as well as new applications of research results to weaponry production;

(9) study the issue of warranties for technical materiel [one side] provides [the other side] for production;

(10) discuss other issues concerning national defense industry that both sides deem necessary.

During the period when the joint commission adjourns, the Chinese Government will authorize the Second Machinery Ministry and the Commercial Office of the PRC embassy [in Moscow] to take charge of communications and contacts regarding routine affairs and issues of national defense industry. Whichever agency [of the Soviet side] will be in charge [during this period] is left to the Soviet Government to decide.

Before every meeting of the joint commission, each side is to provide the other side with a memorandum containing the agenda [and] schedule as well as supplementary materials.

All minutes and records of the joint commission's meetings are to be prepared respectively in Chinese and Russian languages and co-signed by the representatives of each side's delegation to the joint commission.

All results of the joint commission's discussions are to be references for each Government which, if deemed necessary, will authorize certain agencies for their implementation.

All costs of organizing the joint commission's meetings will be charged to the Government where the meeting is held, whereas each Government will be responsible for expenditures of its own delegation

during the meeting.

Please consider our above-stated propositions. The Chinese side wishes to know the Soviet Government's response.

10. Memo, [PRC] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 4 September 1958

Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow

(1) As China's influence in the international community rises day by day, the US imperialists' policy of disregarding the Chinese people and not recognizing but shutting out the Chinese [Government] from international life is getting increasingly difficult and losing support of the peoples [all over the world]. In order to extricate itself from such a difficult position as well as to assure continuous control of Taiwan, [the US Government] has stepped up the realization of its "two-China" conspiracy.

(2) The following is the Chinese Government's counter-measure against the [US] "two-China" plot:

1. With regard to the situation in which China's delegation and Jiang [Jieshi] Clique's "delegation" join the same international organization or attend the same international conference. Facing this situation, the Chinese side will resolutely demand to have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If [our request is] rejected, China will not cooperate with such an organization or conference and, thus, will have to withdraw with no hesitation. In the past year China has already done this many times, including withdrawing from the Nineteenth World Convention of the Red Cross. [China] has recently decided not to recognize the International Olympic Committee. From now on, China will resolutely refuse to participate in any international organizations or conferences which invite or tolerate the participation of the Jiang Clique's representatives.

2. With regard to the situation in which China's delegation or individual and Jiang Clique's individuals participate in the same international organization or international conference. Such a situation, although in formality constituting no "two-China," will in effect impress upon the [international] community that "two Chinas" co-exist, and is very likely to be used by [our] adversaries

to their advantage. Therefore, China will from now on refuse to participate in any international organizations or conferences involving such a situation. China will also consider withdrawing from those international organizations, such as the International Law Association, at an appropriate moment.

For those overseas Chinese individuals who participate in the international organizations or conferences which have already invited Chinese delegates, [we] will decide by looking at these [overseas Chinese individuals'] attitude toward politics. If they do not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but represent their [residential] countries, [we] will not treat them as complicating the "two-China" issue. However, [we] must not relax our vigilance because they might disguise their appearance but in effect carry out conspiratorial activities [related to the creation of "two Chinas"].

3. With regard to the situation in which an international organization which has already had the Jiang representatives, or its branch organization, invites us to attend conferences even if Jiang Clique's delegates are not invited. Such a situation definitely constitutes a "two-China" reality. Moreover, it will leave others with a wrong impression that China is anxious to participate in the activities of those international organizations. Therefore, China will not be part of these organizations or conferences.

(3) Controlled by the United States, the United Nations and its Special Organizations have generally retained Jiang's representatives and kept rejecting the restoration of China's legitimate positions [in these international organizations]. The following are our counter-measures.

1. China will not dispatch any representatives (either of the Chinese Government or of other organizations) to participate in any conferences organized by the United Nations and its Special Organizations. No individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a representative or a staff member of other international organizations, is permitted to contact or conduct negotiations with the United Nations and its special organizations.

2. China will not provide the United Nations or its special organizations with any materials or statistics, nor will China endorse that [our] brother countries publish any materials concerning China in the jour-

nals of the United Nations and its special organizations.

3. With regard to those international conferences already having certain relations with the United Nations or its special organizations which China considers participating, our policy is as follows:

a. China will support any resolutions of the conferences which only generally mention the United Nations Charter. China will not comply with any resolutions of the conferences which have a good deal to do with the United Nations or its special organizations. However, if these resolutions are favorable to world peace and friendly cooperation [among all the nations], China will not oppose.

b. China will not attend any sessions [of the conferences] which are designated to discuss the United Nations or its special organizations.

c. China will refuse to attend any sessions where United Nations representatives speak in the name of conference advisers or as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese [delegates] listen to United Nations representatives' report or presentation. However, Chinese delegates will be allowed to participate in sessions where United Nations representatives participate in or give speeches as ordinary participants. If UN representatives deliver speeches or remarks to insult or slander China, Chinese delegates will have to refute them right on the spot and then leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are included in the UN delegation, Chinese delegates must point out that this ignored China's interests and then, protest and refuse to participate.

d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to express any opinion on whether China will establish, in some fashion, a consultative relationship with the United Nations or its special organizations. If any international conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese delegates cannot but abstain from the voting.

(4) China asserts that [its] participation in international conferences and organizations is only one way to establish contacts and relations in the international community, which may bring about some results in terms of enhancing China's visibility and obtaining some information on how certain specific [international] projects progress. However, no or minimum participation in the international conferences or organiza-

tions will not keep China from developing vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese people from getting acquainted or making friends with other nations; no or minimum participation in some international conferences or organizations does not mean that China adopts a negative or protective attitude toward [international] cultural exchange activities. [In regard to these activities], China may take part in other fashions. On the other hand, China's non-participation may put so much pressure on these conferences or organizations that they will have difficulties in organizing activities thus making them discontented with the United States. As a result, more and more criticism and condemnation of the "two-China" policy may be aroused. In short, China remains willing to cooperate with those international conferences and organizations which are in China's interests [and] have no intention to impair China's sovereignty.

[We are certain] that, as long as we have the Soviet-led socialist countries' support, our just cause of smashing America's "two-China" conspiracy will achieve a complete success.

1. The content of this conversation suggests that it occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the CCP's Eighth National Congress was in session.
2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform), which was established in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau announced that it was ending its activities in April 1956.
3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union and a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that Wang Ming committed "ultra-leftist" mistakes in the early 1930s and "ultra-rightist" mistakes in the late 1930s.
4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas.
5. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress. He was China's second most important leader.
6. The Chinese Communist party's eighth national congress was held in Beijing on 15-27 September 1956.
7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian communist, was the Comintern's secretary general from 1935 to 1943.
8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935, during which the "international section," of which Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and vice chairman of the PRC.

10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia's first ambassador to the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time on 30 June 1955.
11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes still lacked a common name. He became their great organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Chinggis established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by conquering its inner zone across Central Asia. The Mongols are remembered for their wanton aggressiveness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was certainly present in Chinggis.
12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese population.
13. The "War to Resist America and Assist Korea" describes China's participation in the Korean War from October 1950 to July 1953.
14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 December 1953. These principles—(1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence—were later repeatedly claimed by the Chinese government as the foundation of the PRC's foreign policy.
15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugoslavian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 October 1949, four days after the PRC's establishment.
16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet ambassador to China from 1953 to 1959.
17. "On Ten Relationships" was one of Mao's major works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship between industry and agriculture and heavy industry and light industry, between coastal industry and industry in the interior, between economic construction and national defense, between the state, the unit of production, and individual producers, between the center and the regions, between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities, between party and non-party, between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right and wrong, and between China and other countries. For an English translation of one version of the article, see Stuart Schram, ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83.
18. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At the Party's Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and Zhou were elected the Party's vice chairmen, and Deng the Party's general secretary.
19. This was part of Mao Zedong's speech to a conference attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal secretaries.
20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, the year of completing the third five-year plan would be 1968.
21. The elimination of the "four pests" (rats, bedbugs, flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a national hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and late 1950s.
22. "Democratic figures" is a term used by Mao and the Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or communist sympathizers in China.
23. This refers to Zhou Enlai's visit to the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou Enlai's report on the visit, see the next document.
24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation

to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January 1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan. After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership, summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese and Soviet parties.

25. Liu Xiaoyu was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union from February 1955 to October 1962.
26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland. This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved Zhou's Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a formal state visit in India): "The Polish ambassador visited us, mentioning that their congress election is scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon. There exists the danger that the United Workers' Party might lose the majority support. He hoped that China would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Comrade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip. Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one between the United Workers' Party and other parties (with bourgeois character) over attracting votes from the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon. But if the United Workers' Party loses control, it would be disadvantageous [to the socialist camp]. Therefore, we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will allow you to have four to five days to have the Sino-Soviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help." (Shi Zhongquan, *Zhou Enlai de zhuyou fengxian*, 299-300).
27. Wladyslaw Gomulka was the leader of the Polish Communist regime.
28. This refers to the "Declaration on Developing and Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries" issued by the Soviet government on the evening of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its relations with other communist countries and promised that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges with them in the future.
29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP Politburo and published in the name of the editorial board of *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily) on 29 December 1956.
30. Peng Dehuai, China's minister of defense, submitted this report in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of establishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On 18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union's defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai:
In order to command the Soviet Union's submarines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high command urgently hopes that between 1958 and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will

jointly construct a high-power long-wave radio transmission center and a long-wave radio receiving station specially designed for long distance communication. In terms of the fund that is needed for the construction of the two stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller portion (30%).

The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a matter related to China's sovereignty and integrity. Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and to have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 112-113.)

31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai's report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document.

32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and China's vice premier; Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and China's vice premier in charge of financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a member of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi was a member of the CCP Politburo, China's vice premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting in February 1958).

33. Words in italics were added by Mao.

34. Following Mao Zedong's instructions, Peng Dehuai sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June 1958: "The Chinese government agrees to the construction of high-power long-wave radio stations, and welcomes the technological assistance from the Soviet Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union after the completion of their construction. Therefore, it is necessary for the governments of the two countries to sign an agreement on the project." On 11 July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement to construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did not understand the nature of Beijing's concern over having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft insisted that the stations should be constructed and jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese responded with several suggestions for revision: China would take the responsibility for constructing the station and its ownership belongs to China; China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to help construct the station; after the station's completion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union.

35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance for China's naval buildup, especially the designs for new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev's name, Yudin told Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type submarines. Because China had a long coastline and good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: "First, we should make clear the guiding principle. [Do you mean that] we should create [the flotilla] with your

assistance? Or [do you mean] that we should jointly create [the flotilla], otherwise you will not offer any assistance?" Mao emphasized that he was not interested in creating a Sino-Soviet "military cooperative." (Source: Han Nianlong et al. *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao*, 113-114.) The next day, Mao discussed the proposal with Yudin at length.

36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who were present during this discussion.

37. In March 1950 and July 1951, the Chinese and Soviet government signed four agreements, establishing a civil aviation company, an oil company, a non-ferrous and rare metal company, and a shipbuilding company jointly owned by the two countries.

38. Xibaipo was tiny village in Hebei Province where the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin, Mikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo from 31 January to 7 February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account of Mikoyan's visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian), "With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese Interpreter," *Chinese Historians* 5:1 (Spring 1992), 45-56. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei Ledovsky, "Mikoyan's Secret Mission to China in January and February 1949," *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit are in accord.

39. Mao Zedong attended the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution.

40. The "Moscow Manifesto" was adopted by the Moscow conference of leaders of communist and workers' parties from socialist countries in November 1957.

41. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for China's first five-year plan, focusing on energy development, heavy industry and defense industry.

42. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin's telegrams to the CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause "the danger of national elimination."

43. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao's works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October 1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao Zedong's works.

44. I. V. Kovalev, Stalin's representative to China from 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950; N. T. Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.

45. See note 30.

46. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District.

47. Mao commanded these military operations during the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934.

48. Documents in this group are found in Russian Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chinese.

49. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People's Liberation Army's General Logistics Department.

50. Li Xiannian was a member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier and finance minister.

51. Bo Yibo was then alternate member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier, chairman of National Economic Commission.

52. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and China's vice premier, chairman of State Planning Commission.

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MAO'S CONVERSATIONS

continued from page 157

Document I:**Mao's Conversation with Yudin,
31 March 1956**

From the Journal of
P.F. Yudin
"5" April 1956
No. 289

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION
with Comrade Mao Zedong**

31 March 1956

Today I visited Mao Zedong and gave him Comrade Khrushchev's letter about the assistance which the Soviet Union will provide: 1) in the construction of 51 enterprises and 3 scientific research institutes for military industry, 2) in the construction of a railroad line from Urumqi to the Soviet-Chinese border. Mao Zedong asked me to send his deep gratitude to the CC CPSU and the Soviet government.

Further I said that I had wanted to visit him (Mao Zedong) in the very first days following my return to Beijing and to tell about the work of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and, in particular, about Comrade Khrushchev's speech at the closed session regarding the cult of personality. Mao Zedong responded that because of his illness he had found it necessary to put off the meeting with me. Mao Zedong said that the members of the CPC delegation who had attended the 20th Congress had told him something about the work of the Congress and had brought one copy of Comrade Khrushchev's speech regarding the cult of personality. That speech has already been translated into Chinese and he had managed to become acquainted with it.

During a conversation about I.V. Stalin's mistakes Mao Zedong noted that Stalin's line on the China question, though it had basically been correct, in certain periods he, Stalin, had made serious mistakes. In his speeches in 1926 Stalin had exaggerated the revolutionary capabilities of the Guomintang, had spoken about the Guomintang as the main revolutionary force in China. In 1926 Stalin had given the Chinese Communists an instruction about

the orientation to the Guomintang, having viewed it as a united front of the revolutionary forces of China. Stalin said that it is necessary to depend on the Guomintang, to follow after that party, i.e. he spoke directly about the subordination of the Communist Party of China to the Guomintang. This was a great mistake which had held back the independent work of the Communist Party of China on the mobilization of the masses and on attracting them to the side of the Communist Party.

Through the Comintern, Mao Zedong continued, Stalin, having become after the death of V.I. Lenin the de facto leader of the Comintern, gave to the CC CPC a great number of incorrect directives. These mistaken and incorrect directives resulted from the fact that Stalin did not take into account the opinion of the CPC. At that time Van Minh, being a Comintern worker, met frequently with Stalin and tendentially had informed him about the situation in the CPC. Stalin, evidently, considered Van Minh the single exponent of the opinion of the CC CPC.

Van Minh and Li Lisan, who represented the CPC in the Comintern, tried to concentrate the whole leadership of the CPC in their own hands. They tried to present all the Communists who criticized the mistakes of Van Minh and Li Lisan as opportunists. Mao Zedong said, they called me a right opportunist and a narrow empiricist. As an example of how the Comintern acted incorrectly in relation to the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong introduced the following.

Under the pretext that the Third Plenum of the CC CPC, while considering the coup-plotting errors of Li Lisan, had not carried the successive criticism of these mistakes to its conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the mistakes of the Third Plenum of the CC CPC, the Comintern after 3-4 months had sent to China two of its own workers - [Pavel] Mif and Van Minh - charged with the task of conducting the Fourth Plenum of the CPC. Nonetheless the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CC CPC made under the pressure of Mif and Van Minh, were in fact more ultra-leftist than Li Lisan's line. In them it was stated that it is necessary to move into the large cities, to take control of them, and not to conduct the struggle in rural regions. In the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CC CPC there was permitted such, for ex-

ample, a deviation, that in the Soviet regions of China which were blockaded by the Guomintang even the petty trading bourgeoisie was liquidated and all kinds of internal trade was stopped. As a result of this policy the Chinese Red Army, which in 1929 was comprised of 300,000 fighters, was reduced by 1934-35 to 25,000, and the territory which made up the Soviet regions of China was reduced by 99%. CPC organizations in the cities were routed by the Guomintang and the number of Communists was reduced from 300,000 to 26,000 people. The Soviet regions were totally isolated from the remaining part of the country and remained without any products, even without salt. All this caused serious discontent among the population of the Soviet regions.

As a result of the ultra-leftist policy of Van Minh, the more or less large regions which remained under CPC leadership were mostly in North China (the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia), to which Van Minh's power did not extend. Van Minh, backed by the Comintern, essentially managed it so that the 8th and 4th armies removed themselves from subordination to the CC CPC.

Van Minh and his successors saw the Guomintang as the "young power," which absorbs all the best and will be able to gain a victory over Japan. They spoke against the independent and autonomous policy of the Communist Party in the united front, and against the strengthening of the armed forces of the CPC and revolutionary bases, against the unification of all strata of the population around the policy of the CPC. Van Minh's supporters tried to replace the genuinely revolutionary program of the CPC, which consisted of 10 points, with their own six-point program, the author of which was Van Minh, although this was, in the essence of the matter, a capitulationist program. In conducting this whole program Van Minh, backed by the Comintern and in Stalin's name, spoke as the main authority.

Van Minh's supporters, taking advantage of the fact that they had captured a majority in the Southern bureau of the CC CPC in Wuhan, gave incorrect directives to the army and to the local authorities. So, for example, once, to our surprise, said Mao Zedong, even in Yanan the slogans of the CPC which were posted on the walls of the houses were replaced, on Van Minh's order,

with slogans “about a stable union with the Guomintang,” etc.

As a result of the serious ideological struggle and the great explanatory work following the 7th Congress of the Communist Party, especially in the last four years, the majority of Communists who made left or right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van Minh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter with acknowledgement of his mistakes, however he then once again returned to his old positions. All of the former activity of Van Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried out under the direct leadership of the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious loss to the Chinese revolution.

Characterizing the Comintern’s activity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Lenin was alive he had played the most prominent role in bringing together the forces of the Communist movement, in the creation and consolidation of the Communist parties in various countries, in the fight with the opportunists from the Second International. But that had been a short period in the activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh more than the CC CPC. In the last period of the Comintern’s work, especially when Dimitrov worked there, certain movements were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van Minh. However, in this period as well, not just a few mistakes were made by the Comintern, for example, the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and others. In this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to discern three periods in the activity of the Comintern, of which the second, longest period, brought the biggest loss to the Chinese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, precisely in this period the Comintern dealt most of all with the East. We can say directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the defeat of the Chinese revolution at that time was, right along with other reasons, also the result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when we found out about the dissolution of the Comintern.

In the last period, continued Mao Zedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated the situation in China and the possibilities for the development of the revolution. He

continued to believe more in the power of the Guomintang than of the Communist Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] supporters, on a united front with the Guomintang and the creation in China of a “democratic republic.” In particular, in 1945 the CC CPC received a secret telegram, for some reason in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against this journey, since a provocation from Jiang Jieshi’s side was expected. However, said Mao Zedong, I was required to go since Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the armed struggle against the forces of Jiang Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he doubted the forces of the Chinese revolution. This lack of belief remained in Stalin even during the first stages of the formation of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of the revolution. It is possible that Stalin’s lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain disappointment, many conversations took place to the effect that the Chinese Communist Party was going along the Yugoslav path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito.” I told Mao Zedong that there were no such moods and conversations in our Party.

The bourgeois press around the world, continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right socialists, had taken up the version of “China’s third way,” and extolled it. At that time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, did not believe us, while the bourgeoisie and laborites sustained the illusion of the “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang Jieshi alone “defended” Mao Zedong, shrieking that the capitalist powers should not in any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that “he will not turn from his path,” etc. This behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, since he knows us too well, he more than once had to stand in confrontation to us and to fight with us.

The distrust of Stalin to the CPC, Mao Zedong continued further, was apparent also during the time of Mao Zedong’s visit to the Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The Chinese

people asked us whether a treaty of the USSR with the new China will be signed, why until now legally there continues to exist a treaty with the supporters of the Guomintang, etc. The issue of the treaty was an extremely important matter for us, which determined the possibilities for the further development of the PRC. At the first conversation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along government lines, but Stalin declined to answer. During the second conversation I returned once again to that issue, showing Stalin a telegram from the CC CPC with the same type of proposal about a treaty. I proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow to sign the treaty, since he is the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Stalin used this suggestion as a pretext for refusal and said that “it is inconvenient to act in this way, since the bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chinese government is located in Moscow.” Subsequently, Stalin refrained from any meetings with me. From my side there was an attempt to phone him in his apartment, but they responded to me that Stalin is not home, and recommended that I meet with [A.I.] Mikoyan. All this offended me, Mao Zedong said, and I decided to undertake nothing further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then an unpleasant conversation took place with [I.V.] Kovalev and [N.T.] Fedorenko, who proposed that I go on an excursion around the country. I sharply rejected this proposal and responded that I prefer “to sleep through it at the dacha.”

Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, they handed me a draft of my interview for publication which had been signed by Stalin. In this document it was reported that negotiations are being held in Moscow on concluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This already was a significant step forward. It is possible that in Stalin’s change of position, said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the Indians and the English, who had recognized the PRC in January 1950. Negotiations began right after this, in which Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Beria took part. During the negotiations, at Stalin’s initiative there was undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union to assume sole ownership of the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway. Subsequently, however, a decision was made about the joint exploitation of the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway, besides

which the PRC gave the USSR the naval base in Port Arthur, and four joint stock companies were opened in China. At Stalin's initiative, said Mao Zedong, Manchuria and Xinjiang were practically turned into spheres of influence of the USSR. Stalin insisted on the fact that in these regions only Chinese people and Soviet citizens be permitted to live. Representatives of other foreign states, including Czechs, Polish people, and Englishmen who were living permanently in those regions should be evicted from there. The only ones whom Stalin skipped over through his silence were Koreans, of whom there are counted one and a half million in Manchuria. These types of pretensions from Stalin's side, said Mao Zedong, were incomprehensible to us. All this also was fodder for the bourgeois press and representatives of capitalist states. In fact, continued Mao Zedong, in the course of the negotiations around this treaty, there was the most genuine trading going on. It was an unattractive way to pose the issue, in which Stalin's distrust and suspicion of the CPC was brightly expressed.

We are glad to note, said Mao Zedong, that the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway and Port Arthur have been returned to China, and the joint stock companies have ceased to exist. In this part of the conversation Mao Zedong stressed that Khrushchev did not attend these negotiations, and that Bulganin's participation in them was minimal. Stalin's distrust of the CPC was apparent in a number of other issues, including Kovalev's notorious document about anti-Soviet moods in the leadership of the CPC. Stalin, in passing this document to the CC CPC, wanted, evidently, to stress his mistrust and suspicions.

Over the course of the time I spent in Moscow, said Mao Zedong, I felt that distrust of us even more strongly and there I asked that a Marxist-representative of the CC CPSU be sent to China in order to become acquainted with the true situation in China and to get to know the works of the Chinese theoreticians, and simultaneously to examine the works of Mao Zedong, since these works in the Chinese edition were not reviewed by the author in advance, while the Soviet comrades, counter to the wish of the author, insisted on their publication.

Mao Zedong reminded me that upon my (Yudin's) arrival in China he had persistently and specially recommended to me to

complete a trip around the whole country. In relation to this I told Mao Zedong about a conversation which I had with Stalin, in the presence of several members of the Politburo, upon my return from the trip to China. Stalin at that time asked me whether the ruling Chinese comrades are Marxists. Having heard my affirming response, Stalin said, "That's good! We can be calm. They've grown up themselves, without our help."

Mao Zedong noted that in the very posing of this question Stalin's distrust of the Chinese Communists was also made apparent.

Important things which, evidently, to some extent strengthened Stalin's belief in the CPC, were your (Yudin's) report about the journey to China and the Korean War-performance of the Chinese people's volunteers.

In such a way, said Mao Zedong, if we look historically at the development of the Chinese revolution and at Stalin's attitude to it, then it is possible to see that serious mistakes were made, which were especially widespread during the time of the Comintern's work. After 1945, during the period of the struggle with Jiang Jieshi, because of the overestimation of the forces of the Guomintang and the underestimation of the forces of the Chinese revolution, Stalin undertook attempts at pacification, at restraining the development of the revolutionary events. And even after the victory of the revolution Stalin continued to express mistrust of the Chinese Communists. Despite all that, said Mao Zedong, we have stood firmly behind the revolutionary positions, for if we had permitted vacillations and indecisiveness, then, no doubt, long ago we would not have been among the living.

Then Mao Zedong moved on to a general evaluation of Stalin's role. He noted that Stalin, without a doubt, is a great Marxist, a good and honest revolutionary. However, in his great work in the course of a long period of time he made a number of great and serious mistakes, the primary ones of which were listed in Khrushchev's speech. These fundamental mistakes, said Mao Zedong, could be summed up in seven points:

1. Unlawful repressions;
2. Mistakes made in the course of the war, moreover, in particular in the beginning, rather than in the concluding period of the war;
3. Mistakes which dealt a serious blow

to the union of the working class and the peasantry. Mao Zedong observed that this group of mistakes, in particular, the incorrect policy in relation to the peasantry, was discussed during Comrade Khrushchev's conversation with [PRC military leader] Zhu De in Moscow;

4. Mistakes in the nationality question connected to the unlawful resettlement of certain nationalities and others. However, overall, said Mao Zedong, nationality policy was implemented correctly;

5. Rejection of the principle of collective leadership, conceit and surrounding himself with toadies;

6. Dictatorial methods and leadership style;

7. Serious mistakes in foreign policy (Yugoslavia, etc.).

Mao Zedong further stressed a thought to the effect that overall in the Communist movement great victories were won. The single fact of the growth of the Socialist camp from 200 million people to 900 million people speaks for itself. However, in the course of successful forward advance in some certain countries, in some certain parties these or other mistakes arose. Mistakes similar to these and others, he said, can arise in the future too. I observed that it would be better not to repeat mistakes like Stalin's. To this, Mao Zedong answered that, evidently, there will be these types of mistakes again. The appearance of these mistakes are entirely explicable from the point of view of dialectical materialism, since it is well known that society develops through a struggle of contradictions, the fight of the old with the new, the new-born with the obsolete. In our consciousness, said Mao Zedong, there are still too many vestiges of the past. It lags behind the constantly developing material world, behind everyday life.

In our countries, continued Mao Zedong, much has come from the former, capitalist society. Take, for example, the issue of the application of corporal punishments to the accused. For China too, this is not a new issue. Even in 1930 in the Red Army during interrogations beatings were broadly applied. I, said Mao Zedong, at that time personally was a witness to how they beat up the accused. Already at that time a corresponding decision was made regarding a ban on corporal punishment. However, this decision was violated, and in Yanan, it is true, we tried not to allow unlawful executions. With

the creation of the PRC we undertook a further struggle with this ugly manifestation. It is entirely evident, continued Mao Zedong, that according to the logic of things during a beating the one who is being beaten begins to give false testimony, while the one who is conducting the interrogation accepts that testimony as truth. This and other vestiges which have come to us from the bourgeois past, will still for a long time be preserved in the consciousness of people. A striving for pomposity, for ostentatiousness, for broad anniversary celebrations, this is also a vestige of the psychology of bourgeois man, since such customs and such psychology objectively could not arise among the poorest peasantry and the working class. The presence of these and other circumstances, said Mao Zedong, creates the conditions for the arising of those or other mistakes with which the Communist parties will have to deal.

I observed that the main reason for Stalin's mistakes was the cult of personality, bordering on deification.

Mao Zedong, having agreed with me, noted that Stalin's mistakes accumulated gradually, from small ones growing to huge ones. To crown all this, he did not acknowledge his own mistakes, although it is well known that it is characteristic of a person to make mistakes. Mao Zedong told how, reviewing Lenin's manuscripts, he had become convinced of the fact that even Lenin crossed out and re-wrote some phrases or other in his own works. In conclusion to his characterization of Stalin, Mao Zedong once again stressed that Stalin had made mistakes not in everything, but on some certain issues.

Overall, he stressed that the materials from the Congress made a strong impression on him. The spirit of criticism and self-criticism and the atmosphere which was created after the Congress will help us, he said, to express our thoughts more freely on a range of issues. It is good that the CPSU has posed all these issues. For us, said Mao Zedong, it would be difficult to take the initiative on this matter.

Mao Zedong declared that he proposes to continue in the future the exchange of opinions on these issues during Comrade Mikoyan's visit, and also at a convenient time with Comrades Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Then Mao Zedong got distracted from

this topic and getting greatly carried away briefly touched on a few philosophical questions (about the struggle of materialism with idealism, etc.). In particular he stressed that it is incorrect to imagine to oneself Communist society as a society which is free from any sort of contradictions, from ideological struggle, from any sort of vestiges of the past. In a Communist society too, said Mao Zedong, there will be good and bad people. Further he said that the ideological work of China still to a significant extent suffers from a spirit of puffery [*nachetnichestva*] and cliches. The Chinese press, in particular, still cannot answer to the demands which are presented to it. On the pages of the newspapers the struggle of opinions is lacking, there are no serious theoretical discussions. Because of insufficient time Mao Zedong expressed a wish to meet with me again to talk a little specifically about issues of philosophy.

At the end of the discussion I inquired of Mao Zedong whether he had become acquainted with the *Pravda* editorial about the harm of the cult of personality, a translation of which was placed in [*Renmin Ribao*] on 30 March. He responded that he still had not managed to read through that article, but they had told him that it is a very good article. Now, said Mao Zedong, we are preparing for publication in *Renmin Ribao* a lead article which is dedicated to this issue, which should appear in the newspapers in the coming week. Beginning on 16 March, he noted jokingly, all the newspapers in the world raised a ruckus about this issue—China alone for the time being is silent.

Then I briefly told Mao Zedong about the arrival in the PRC of 16 prominent Soviet scholars and about the beginning of the work of a theoretical conference dedicated to the 20th Congress, which is opening today in the Club of Soviet specialists. Soviet and Chinese scholars will deliver speeches at the conference.

Mao Zedong listened to these thoughts with great interest.

The conversation continued for three hours. Mao Zedong was in a good mood, and joked often.

The Deputy Head of the Administration of Affairs of the CPC Yang Shankun, the Chief of the CC CPC Translation Bureau Shi Zhe and Counselor of the USSR Embassy in the PRC Skvortsov, T.F. attended the conversation.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE PRC P. YUDIN

[Source: *Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, delo 9, listy 87-98; also Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), fond 5, opis 30, delo 163, listy 88-99; see also Problemi Dalnego Vostok 5 (1994), 101-110. Translation for CWIHP by Mark Doctoroff, National Security Archive]*

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Document II:

Mao's Conversation with Chervonenko, 26 December 1960

From the diary of TOP SECRET
S. V. CHERVONENKO Copy No.3

"6" January 1961

Outgoing No. 9

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

with comrade Mao Zedong

26 December 1960

According to the instructions of the Center I visited Mao Zedong today.

In the name of the CPSU CC and comrade N.S. Khrushchev personally, I congratulated Mao Zedong with his 67th birthday and wished him good health, long life and fruitful work.

Mao Zedong was very impressed by this warm attention from the CPSU CC and comrade N.S. Khrushchev. He was deeply moved, and, without concealing his emotions, he most warmly expressed his thanks for the friendly congratulations and wishes. Mao Zedong stated that it is a great honor for him to receive these high congratulations on his birthday. He asked to give his warmest thanks to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and wished him, personally, as well as all the members of the CPSU CC Presidium, good health and big fruitful successes in their work.

Then, on Mao Zedong's initiative, we had a conversation. He told me that the Chinese leaders have to work a lot now. "As for myself - he mentioned - I am now work-

ing much less than before. Though - Mao Zedong went on - I mostly work 8 hours a day (sometimes more), the productivity is not the same as it used to be. His comprehension of the material studied is less effective, and the necessity arose [for him] to read documents printed in large characters." He mentioned in this connection that "this must be a general rule that people of advanced age are in an unequal position to the young as regards the efficiency of their work."

Mao Zedong then emphasized that his resignation from the post of the Chairman of the PRC had lessened the load of state activities on him. Speaking about this he mentioned that at the time when he had submitted this proposal he had been supported only by the Politburo members, while many members of the CPC CC had objected. "There was even more disagreement among the rank and file communists." By now, he said, everybody was supporting this decision.

As he continued talking about his work and the activities of the leadership of the CPC CC, Mao Zedong said that for several years, practically from 1953-54 he was not chairing the Politbureau meetings any more. He said that from 1956 Liu Shaoqi is in charge of all the routine activities of the Politbureau, while he is taking part in some of the meetings from time to time. Mao Zedong mentioned that he personally is usually working and consulting mostly with the members of the Permanent Committee of the CPC CC Politbureau. Sometimes specially invited persons also take part in the meetings of the Permanent Committee.

Then Mao Zedong told that on some occasions he takes part in the enlarged Politbureau meetings. Leading party executives from the periphery are usually invited to these meetings, for instance the secretaries and deputy secretaries of the CPC CC bureaus from certain regions, the secretaries of the CPC Provincial Committees. Mao Zedong said that now he practically never speaks at the CPC CC Plenums, and even at the CPC Congress he just delivers a short introductory speech. His resignation from the post of the Chairman of the Republic gave him also an opportunity to refrain from participating in the work of the Supreme State Conference. However, he mentioned in this connection, I systematically study the documents and materials

(before they are adopted) of the most important party and state conferences and meetings.

Mao Zedong agreed with my statement, that in spite of a certain redistribution of authority between the CPC CC leaders he (Mao Zedong) still has great responsibilities in the leadership of the party and the country. He said that he still often has to work at night. "The principal workload is connected with the reading of numerous documents and materials." Twice a day, for instance, he said, "they bring me two big volumes of routine information on international affairs, which of course it is necessary to look through to keep updated, not to lose contact with life."

In the course of the conversation I mentioned that the rapidly developing international affairs demand constant attention and timely analysis. I stressed the outstanding significance of the Moscow Conference where the recent international developments were submitted to deep Marxist-Leninist analysis.

Mao Zedong agreed with this statement and quickly responded to the topic, saying: "The Moscow Conference was a success, it was thoroughly prepared, and the editing commission, which included the representatives of 26 parties, worked fruitfully." Foreign representatives, he went on, are often puzzled and ask why was the conference so long. Mao Zedong said that they apparently do not have a full understanding of the real situation when it took more than 10 days for each of the representatives of 81 parties to deliver his speech. Then there were repeated speeches, not to mention the work on the documents themselves. He stated: "It is very good that there were arguments and discussions at the conference. This is not bad."

Then, agreeing with my statement on the deep theoretical character of the documents of the Moscow Conference, Mao Zedong added that these documents caused a great confusion in the Western imperialist circles, among our common enemies.

During the conversation I gave a brief review of the work to popularize the results of the Moscow Conference in the Soviet Union, to study the Conference's documents within the political education network.

In his turn Mao Zedong told me that the study of the Moscow Conference documents is also being organized by the CPC. As for the summarizing of the Conference's results, the CPC CC has not yet sent any precise

instructions on this question to the provinces.

Then he told me that the CPC CC Plenum will take place in January 1961 (the last Plenum was in April 1960), where the CPC CC delegation at the Moscow Conference will present its report. It is planned to adopt a short Plenum resolution on this question, expressing support of the Moscow Conference's decisions. Apart from the results of the Conference the January Plenum of the CPC CC will also discuss the economic plan of the PRC for 1961.

After that Mao Zedong told me that there are certain difficulties in the PRC which make it impossible to elaborate a perspective plan, "and we also lack the experience for this." At first, he went on, the CPC CC wanted to work out a plan for the three remaining years of the second five year plan. However, 1960 is already over. So it was decided to make separate plans for the two remaining years of the five year plan. He said that the current plan of economic development for the first quarter of 1961 exists and is practically put into implementation.

For my part I told him about the favorable conditions for planning achieved in the Soviet Union, of the adoption of the economic plan and budget for 1961 by the Supreme Council of the USSR.

Expressing a critical opinion of the lag with the adoption of economic plans in the PRC, Mao Zedong said that the plan for 1960, for instance, was adopted only in April 1960, and on some occasions plans were adopted by the sessions of CAPR [Chinese Assembly of People's Representatives] only in June-July. He explained it by the lack of sufficient experience in the PRC.

I told Mao Zedong of the forthcoming Plenum of the CPSU CC, of the serious attention paid by the party and government to the problems of agricultural development in the Soviet Union, including some special features of the forthcoming Plenum, where the most important questions of further increase of agricultural production will be discussed and resolved.

Mao Zedong said that the CPC CC is now also "specializing" on agriculture. Increasing the attention to this question, he continued, "we are even thinking about narrowing the industrial front to some extent." Explaining this idea he said that it is about a certain lowering of the scale of capital investments into the industrial production, in-

cluding some branches of heavy industry; capital investments into the construction of public buildings will also be cut.

In the course of the conversation he briefly mentioned the bottlenecks of the PRC's industry, pointing, for instance, at the mining and coal industry, and the transport as well, talked about the interconnection of these industries, their influence on the development of many other branches (steel production etc.).

Returning to the problem of agriculture, he emphasized that the lack of appropriate attention to this most important field of the PRC's economy, as well as to the development of the light industry, would make it impossible to satisfy the requirements of the population for foodstuffs, clothing and consumer goods. Our own experience, Mao Zedong went on, persuaded us that "organizing the production of living plants and animals is much more difficult than the production of lifeless items - metals, ore, coal etc." He stated jokingly that "the dead will not run away from us and can wait."

In the course of the conversation Mao Zedong repeatedly stressed that after the revolution in the PRC the material requirements of the Chinese population have been steadily growing. So the CPC must seriously contemplate these problems, and the way to overcome the arising difficulties. Of course, it is not the difficulties only that matter. Even when we have successes, new problems and tasks are appearing all the same. He stated in this connection, that even in 300-400 years new problems will be still arising, demanding to be solved, "no development will be possible without them."

I shared with Mao Zedong some of the impressions from my trip around the Soviet Union together with the Chinese delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi, stressing the significance of the trip for the strengthening of friendship and solidarity between the USSR and the PRC.

Mao Zedong actively supported this part of the conversation. He said that in China they are very happy with this visit, "it is very good that it took place." Both our peoples, he said with emphasis, demanded such an action to be taken. "By making this decision, the Central Committees of both parties satisfied the demands of both peoples."

I told him as if jokingly, that many republics of the USSR, Ukraine for instance,

were however "displeased" that the Chinese delegation was not able to visit them. He said, laughing, that this protest should be addressed to the members of the delegation, for instance to Yang Shankun, who is present here at the conversation, as the Politburo had no objections against prolonging the visit. I noted in the same tone that the Chinese friends had disarmed the "displeased" Soviet comrades, saying that it was not their last visit to the Soviet Union. So, Mao Zedong said, one can maintain that they owe you.

When he broadened the topic of the usefulness of these meetings and visits I told him that during the trip of the Chinese delegation Soviet citizens had repeatedly asked to give him (Mao Zedong) their best wishes and expressed their hope that he will also come to the Soviet Union when he finds it convenient, visit different cities, enterprises, collective farms, especially that he had had no chance to get better acquainted with the country during his previous visits. He reacted warmly and stated that he "must certainly find the time for such a visit."

Then Mao Zedong told that in China he is criticized by the functionaries from the periphery, who are displeased that he has not been able yet to visit a number of cities and regions - Xinjiang, Yanan, Guizhou, Tibet, Taiyuan, Baotou, Xian, Lanzhou etc. These workers, he said, used to call me "the Chairman for half of the Republic," and when I resigned from this post in favor of Liu Shaoqi, they started to call me "the Chairman of the CPC for half of the country."

In the final part of the conversation Mao Zedong returned to the notion of his alleged retirement from active state and party work, saying half jokingly that now "he will wait for the moment when he will become an ordinary member of the Politburo." I have not consulted anybody in the party on this matter, he mentioned, even him, Mao Zedong said, pointing at Yang Shankun, you are the first whom I am telling about my "conspiracy."

I expressed assurance that the members of the CPC will apparently not agree to such a proposal from Mao Zedong. Then, he said jokingly, I will have to wait until everybody realizes its necessity; "in several years they will have mercy for me."

The conversation lasted more than an hour in an exceptionally cordial, friendly atmosphere. When it was over Mao Zedong

came to see us to our car. Bidding us a warm farewell, he once again asked to give his warm greetings to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and the members of the CPSU CC Presidium and most sincere thanks for their congratulations and warm wishes.

Candidate member of the CPC CC Secretariat Yang Shankun, the functionaries of the CPC CC apparatus Yan Min Fu and Zhu Jueren, Counsellor Minister of the USSR Embassy in the PRC Sudarikov N.G. and the counsellor of the embassy Rakhmanin O.B. were present at the conversation.

The Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

[signature]

S. CHERVONENKO

[Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 55, papka 454, delo 9, listy 98-105; translation for CWIHP by Maxim Korobochkin.]

1. Memorandum of conversation, Yudin-Mao Zedong, 2 May 1956, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, delo 9, listy 124-130.

**THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY'S
APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE
SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959**

by Mark Kramer

In early September 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed the head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a detailed background report on China for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of September and early October to take part in ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of the Communist victory in China. The Soviet leader's trip, as Gromyko was well aware, was also intended to alleviate a growing rift between Moscow and Beijing—a rift that had not yet flared up in public. Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to travel to China because he had numerous other commitments at around the same time; but after discussing the matter with his colleagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided that face-to-face negotiations with Mao Zedong and other top Chinese officials would be the only way to “clear the atmosphere” and restore a “sense of friendship between our peoples.”¹

Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30-page survey of “The Political, Economic, and International Standing of the PRC” (Report No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the same day that Khrushchev began a highly publicized visit to the United States. The Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 September, just a day before he was due to leave for China. On his way back from the United States, he was given a copy of Zimyanin's report. That copy is now housed in the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD).² The final section of Zimyanin's report, which focuses on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the most interesting portion of the document, is translated here in full except for a few extraneous passages at the beginning and end.³

Zimyanin's appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations is intriguing not only because of its substance, but also because of the light it sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. Both points will be briefly taken up in this introduction, which is divided into two main

parts. The first part will discuss the content of the Foreign Ministry's report, highlighting items of particular interest as well as several important lacunae. The second part will consider how Zimyanin's assessment contributed to, and was affected by, changes under way in Soviet policy-making toward China. Those changes, as explained below, temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Ministry and therefore gave increased prominence to Zimyanin's report.

Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations

In both substance and tone, Zimyanin's analysis of Soviet relations with China reflected the burgeoning unease among Soviet officials. Although his view of the relationship was still distinctly favorable overall, he was quick to point out many areas of incipient conflict between the two countries. His report suggested that a full-fledged rift could be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent differences were bound to cause growing acrimony and recriminations unless appropriate steps were taken. In citing a litany of disagreements about key ideological and practical questions, the report drew a causal link between internal political conditions in China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, a theme emphasized by many Western analysts as well.⁴ Although Zimyanin concluded the document on an upbeat note—claiming that “relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year”—his analysis left little doubt that existing tensions between Moscow and Beijing could eventually take a sharp turn for the worse.

Four specific points about the document are worth highlighting.

First, the report acknowledged that friction between the two Communist states had been present, to some degree, since the very start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin did not imply that China had been merely a “reluctant and suspicious ally” of Moscow in the early 1950s, he emphasized that the Soviet Union under Stalin had “violated the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic” and had “kept the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR.”⁵ No doubt, these criticisms were motivated in part by the then-prevailing line of de-Stalinization, but Zimyanin provided concrete examples of “negative” actions on

Moscow's part between 1950 and 1953 that had “impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.”⁶

His views on this matter, interestingly enough, were very similar to conclusions reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and Beijing to project an image of monolithic unity (an image, incidentally, that was not far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time could sense that negotiations leading to the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will between the two countries. According to a secret background report, Mao was “highly dissatisfied with [Moscow's] attempted exactions on China,” and Zhou Enlai said he “would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] demands as presented.”⁷ Although Soviet and Chinese officials did their best to conceal any further hints of bilateral discord over the next few years, word continued to filter into Washington about “strain and difficulties between Communist China and Russia”—the same strain and difficulties that Zimyanin noted.⁸

By tracing the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict back to the Stalin period, Zimyanin's report was quite different from the public statements made later on by officials in both Moscow and Beijing, who averred that the split had begun when the two sides disagreed about Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956.⁹ Until recently, the large majority of Western (and Russian) scholars had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in which to pinpoint the origins of the dispute.¹⁰ It is now clear, both from Zimyanin's report and from other new evidence (see below), that tensions actually had begun emerging much earlier.

This is not to say that the whole Sino-Soviet rift, especially the bitter confrontation of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, but the reality is usually more complex. Far from being a “reluctant and suspicious ally” of the Soviet Union during the first half of the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet experience and to forge close, comprehensive ties with Moscow in the name of socialist internationalism. Even so, the latest memoirs and archival revelations, including Zimyanin's report, leave little doubt that the seeds of a conflict between Moscow and

Beijing were present, at least in some fashion, as early as 1950-53.

Second, while giving due emphasis to problems that arose during the Stalin era, Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th Soviet Party Congress and by the “Hundred Flowers” campaign in China. Zimyanin claimed that the Chinese leadership had “fully supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences” after the 20th Party Congress, but he conceded that Beijing’s assessment of Stalin was considerably “different from our own” and that the Congress had prompted “the Chinese friends . . . to express critical comments about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations.” Even more damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He cited a wide range of “hostile statements” and “denunciations of the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship” that had surfaced in China. “The airing of these types of statements,” he wrote, “can in no way be justified.” The report expressed particular concern about a number of territorial demands that had been raised against the Soviet Union.¹¹

Third, as one might expect, Zimyanin devoted considerable attention to the Sino-Soviet ideological quarrels that began to surface during the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the form of disagreements about the establishment of “people’s communes,” the role of material versus ideological incentives, the nature of the transition to socialism and Communism, and other aspects of Marxism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter disputes erupted over territorial demands and questions of global strategy (not to mention a clash of personalities between Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had not yet come to dominate the relationship in September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideological differences that were particularly salient at the time. His report provides further evidence that ideological aspects of the conflict must be taken seriously on their own merits, rather than being seen as a mere smokescreen for geopolitical or other concerns.

Finally, there are a few conspicuous

omissions in Zimyanin’s assessment, which are worth briefly explicating here because they provide a better context for understanding the document:

• *Stalin’s relationship with Mao*. Although Zimyanin discussed problems in Sino-Soviet relations that arose during the Stalin era, he did not explicitly refer to the way Stalin behaved when Mao visited the Soviet Union for nearly two-and-a-half months beginning in December 1949. This omission is unfortunate because even a few brief comments might have helped clarify what has been a matter of great confusion. First-hand accounts of the Stalin-Mao relationship by former Soviet and Chinese officials offer sharply conflicting interpretations. One of the most jaundiced descriptions of the way Stalin treated Mao can be found in Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs:

Stalin would sometimes not lay eyes on [the Chinese leader] for days at a time—and since Stalin neither saw Mao nor ordered anyone else to entertain him, no one dared to go see him. We began hearing rumors that Mao was very unhappy because he was being kept under lock and key and everyone was ignoring him. Mao let it be known that if the situation continued, he would leave. . . . In this way, Stalin sowed the seeds of hostility and anti-Soviet, anti-Russian sentiment in China.¹²

A similar appraisal of Stalin’s demeanor was offered by Andrei Gromyko, who claimed in his memoirs that when Stalin hosted a special dinner for Mao in February 1950, the atmosphere was “oppressive” and the two leaders “seemed personally to have nothing in common that would enable them to establish the necessary rapport.”¹³ Because Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s observations fit so well with everything that is known about Stalin’s general behavior, their accounts have been widely accepted in the West.

More recently, though, a very different picture of the Stalin-Mao relationship has emerged from testimony by Nikolai Fedorenko, a former diplomat at the Soviet embassy in China who served as an interpreter for Stalin, and by Shi Zhe, a former official in the Chinese foreign ministry who interpreted for Mao. Both men were present

during all the high-level Sino-Soviet meetings in 1949-1950.¹⁴ Although Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that several points of contention had surfaced between Stalin and Mao, they both emphasized that the relationship overall was amicable. Fedorenko specifically took issue with Khrushchev’s account:

Later on it was claimed that Stalin had not received Mao Zedong for nearly a month, and in general had not displayed appropriate courtesy toward the Chinese leader. These reports created a false impression of the host and his guest. In actual fact, everything happened quite differently. Judging from what I saw first-hand, the behavior of the two leaders and the overall atmosphere were totally different from subsequent depictions. . . . From the very first meeting, Stalin invariably displayed the utmost courtesy toward his Chinese counterpart. . . . Throughout the talks with Mao Zedong, Stalin was equable, restrained, and attentive to his guest. His thoughts never wandered and were always completely focused on the conversation.

Likewise, Shi Zhe noted that “Stalin was visibly moved [when he met the Chinese leader] and continuously dispensed compliments to Chairman Mao.” Shi dismissed rumors in the West that “Stalin had put Chairman Mao under house arrest” during a particularly tense stage in the negotiations leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance.

Even with the benefit of new evidence, it is difficult to sort out the discrepancies between these accounts. So far, transcripts of only the first two private meetings between Mao and Stalin—on 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950—are available.¹⁵ Both transcripts shed a good deal of light on the Stalin-Mao relationship (not least by confirming how long the interval was between meetings), but they do not, and indeed cannot, convey a full sense of Stalin’s behavior toward Mao. Gestures, facial expressions, and even some unflattering comments are apt to be omitted from these stenographic reports either deliberately or inadvertently, just as there are crucial gaps in numerous

other East-bloc documents.¹⁶ The two transcripts also do not reveal anything about unpleasant incidents that may have occurred outside the formal talks. Although retrospective accounts by aides to Stalin and Mao who took part in the meetings can be helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs must be used with extreme caution, especially when they are published long after the events they describe. Khrushchev's recollections were compiled more than 15 years after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko's, Fedorenko's, and Shi's accounts were written nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the memoir-writers relied on notes and documents from the period they were discussing and depicted events as faithfully as they could, the passage of so many years is bound to cause certain failings of memory.¹⁷

Two important factors might lead one to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko's version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than to Khrushchev's. First, Fedorenko and Shi participated in all the private talks between Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and Gromyko were present at only the public meetings.¹⁸ Second, it is conceivable that Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin's behavior in an unduly negative light. (Khrushchev may have done this sub-consciously, or he may have been seeking to lay the "blame" on Stalin for the subsequent rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Stalin. One could therefore make a *prima facie* case on behalf of Fedorenko's account.

On the other hand, most of the latest evidence tends to support Khrushchev's and Gromyko's versions, rather than Fedorenko's. One of the most trusted aides to Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, who remained a staunch defender of the Soviet dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that when the Chinese delegation came to Moscow in December 1949, Mao had to wait many days or even weeks after his initial perfunctory meeting with Stalin until the Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him again.¹⁹ This corresponds precisely to what Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. Khrushchev's account is further strengthened by the recollections of General Ivan

Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military officer who served as Stalin's personal envoy to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev recounted the tribulations and rudeness that Mao had experienced during his visit:

Mao was met [on 16 December] by Bulganin and Molotov, who brusquely turned down his invitation to join him for a meal, saying that it would be contrary to protocol. For the same reason, they declined Mao's invitation to ride with him to his assigned dacha. . . . Mao was clearly upset by the cool reception. That same day, Stalin received Mao Zedong, but they held no confidential talks of the sort that Mao had wanted. After that, Mao spent numerous boring days at the dacha. Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan stopped by to see him, but had only very brief official conversations. I was in touch with Mao and saw him every day, and I was aware that he was upset and apprehensive.²⁰

Kovalev also noted that in late December, Mao asked him to convey a formal request to Stalin for another private meeting, indicating that "the resolution of all matters, including the question of [Mao's] spare time and medical treatment, [would] be left entirely to your [i.e., Stalin's] discretion."²¹ According to Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and "as before, Mao remained practically in isolation." Even when Mao "retaliated by refusing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador to China," it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev emphasized that it was "not until Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow at the end of January 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more successfully." All this amply corroborates what Khrushchev wrote.

Khrushchev's depiction of the Stalin-Mao relationship is also borne out by newly declassified testimony from another key source, namely Mao himself. In a private meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about the "ugly atmosphere" he had confronted in Moscow in 1950 and about the "profound distrust and suspicion" that Stalin had shown toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. Mao also recalled the "insulting" treatment he had suffered after his prelimi-

nary discussions with Stalin:

From then on, Stalin sought to avoid me. I tried, for my part, to phone Stalin's apartment, but was told that he was not home and that I should meet with Mikoyan instead. I was offended by all this, and so I decided that I would not do anything more and would simply spend my time resting at the dacha. Then I had an unpleasant conversation with Kovalev and Fedorenko, who suggested that I go for a trip around the country. I flatly rejected this proposal and said that I might as well just "go on sleeping at my dacha."²²

Mao revealed these "problems and difficulties" to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech at the CCP's Chengdu conference in March 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight years earlier:

In 1950, Stalin and I argued with each other in Moscow for two months about our mutual defense treaty, about the Chungchang railroad, about joint economic ventures, and about our boundary lines. Our attitudes were such that when he offered a proposal which was unacceptable to me, I would resist it; but when he insisted on it, I would give in. I did so for the sake of socialism.²³

Mao noted with particular distaste that he had allowed Stalin to get away with treating Manchuria and Xinjiang as mere "colonies" of the Soviet Union—a point mentioned by Zimyanin as well.²⁴ At Chengdu and in numerous other speeches before closed CCP gatherings, Mao repeatedly condemned Stalin's "serious mistakes" and "shortcomings," a practice that suggests long pent-up feelings of animosity toward the late Soviet dictator.²⁵

Furthermore, even some of the comments in Fedorenko's and Shi's own articles imply—if only inadvertently—that the relationship between Stalin and Mao was not really so cordial after all. Both Fedorenko and Shi acknowledged that a residue of tension still plagued Sino-Soviet relations in

the early 1950s because of Stalin's refusal during the Chinese civil war to provide greater support for the Communist rebels.²⁶ This tension inevitably caused personal strains between the two leaders, as Mao himself observed during his March 1956 meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in one of his secret speeches two years later at the Chengdu conference:

The victory of the Chinese revolution was against Stalin's wishes.... When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake. We made no protest.²⁷

Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into a "sullen" mood during the 1949-50 meetings whenever Mao was being deliberately "evasive." This was particularly evident, according to Shi, when negotiations on the treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to "gauge Chairman Mao's intentions." Shi added that the testy exchanges between the two leaders prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcastically that Stalin was wont to "blame the Chinese for all the mistakes" in bilateral relations. Similarly, Fedorenko alluded to Stalin's extreme suspiciousness during the talks, as reflected in the Soviet dictator's incessant complaints about "conspiracies," "plots," and "illegal murmurs." This behavior, too, suggests that Stalin may not have been quite as hospitable as Fedorenko initially implied.

Despite the wealth of new evidence, there are still many unresolved questions about the nature of Stalin's relationship with Mao. Further scrutiny of the emerging documentation and first-hand accounts will be essential to set the record straight. Khrushchev's and Gromyko's recollections seem to be corroborated by the latest disclosures, but Fedorenko's and Shi's accounts must be taken seriously, at least for now. Zimyanin's analysis, with its strong criticism of Soviet policy during the early 1950s, is more compatible with Khrushchev's version than with Fedorenko's, but the report provides no conclusive evidence one way or the other.

• *The crises in Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956.* During the standoff between the Soviet Union and Poland in October 1956, Chinese officials generally supported the defiant Polish leader,

Wladyslaw Gomulka, and urged the Soviet Union to forgo military intervention in Poland. Ultimately, Khrushchev did accept a peaceful settlement with Gomulka. Senior Chinese officials also initially counseled against an invasion of Hungary when they traveled to Moscow on October 30 for emergency consultations. By that point, Khrushchev and his colleagues were no longer confident that "the Hungarian working class" could "regain control of the situation and suppress the uprising on its own," but they agreed for the time being to desist from further intervention in Hungary.²⁸ Less than 24 hours later, however, the Soviet authorities reversed their decision and voted in favor of a large-scale invasion.²⁹ When Mao Zedong was informed of this last-minute change, he immediately and strongly endorsed the Soviet decision, not least because Imre Nagy had announced on November 1 (the day after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade) that Hungary was pulling out of the Warsaw Pact and establishing itself as a neutral state.

China subsequently became the most vocal supporter of the invasion and even publicly welcomed the execution of Imre Nagy in June 1958, but the whole episode, as Chinese officials later confirmed, had a jarring effect in Beijing. Zimyanin prominently cited the Soviet declaration of 30 October 1956 in his report, but he made no mention of the turmoil that had given rise to the declaration or of the actions that followed.

• *Sino-Soviet policies in the Third World.* In the late 1950s, Chinese leaders began vigorously championing—and, where possible, actively promoting—"wars of national liberation" and "anti-imperialist struggles" in the developing world.³⁰ This strategy mirrored the growing radicalization of China's domestic politics at the time. It also flowed naturally from Mao's view, first enunciated in November 1957, that "the East Wind is now stronger than the West Wind." Recent Soviet breakthroughs with long-range nuclear missiles, according to Mao, would deter Western countries from responding to Communist-backed guerrilla movements. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautious—at least rhetorically—than their Chinese counterparts, not least because they were aware that the East-West military balance had not improved as much as most Chinese officials assumed. Soviet leaders periodi-

cally warned that local Third World conflicts could escalate to a highly destructive global war if the superpowers directly intervened on opposing sides.

In terms of actual policy, however, the difference between Soviet and Chinese approaches was relatively small.³¹ If only for logistical reasons, it was the Soviet Union, not China, that had been the primary arms supplier to Communist insurgents in numerous Third World countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaya, South Vietnam, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Cuba).³² Moreover, Chinese leaders, for all their seeming belligerence, were often hesitant about translating rhetoric into concrete policy. In private discussions with Soviet officials, senior Chinese representatives argued that "reasonable caution" was needed even when "conditions were ripe for the spread of progressive ideas in certain [Third World] countries."³³

Despite the underlying similarities between Chinese and Soviet policies, the two Communist states were bound to disagree at times. This was evident in July 1958 when a leftist coup against Iraq's pro-Western government sparked a brief but intense crisis in the Middle East, leading to U.S. and British troop landings in Lebanon and Jordan. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials urged the Soviet Union to take a firm stand against "American imperialist aggression" in the Middle East, a task that China itself could not perform because of its lack of power-projection capabilities. Contrary to Beijing's wishes, however, Soviet leaders quickly decided there was little to be gained by risking a direct East-West confrontation.³⁴ Rather than sending "volunteers" to the Middle East or extending an overt military guarantee to the new Iraqi regime (as urged by Beijing), the Soviet Union relied mainly on diplomacy and called for a special UN-sponsored meeting to resolve the situation. Although the peak of the crisis had subsided (and Sino-Soviet differences on this score had seemingly waned) by the time Khrushchev arrived in China at the end of July 1958, the ongoing tensions in the Middle East were a prominent topic of discussion during his visit.³⁵ The resulting exchanges may have been partly responsible for the bolder stance that the Soviet Union took during the Quemoy Islands crisis a few weeks later (see below).

Judging from numerous documents prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far

Eastern department in 1958 and early 1959, there is no doubt Zimyanin was aware that Chinese leaders had been disappointed by Soviet policy during the first ten days of the 1958 Middle Eastern crisis, when it still appeared that U.S. and British forces might try to restore a pro-Western government in Iraq. The initial phase of the crisis marked one of the first times that Soviet and Chinese policies in the Third World had diverged, albeit only temporarily.³⁶ It is odd, therefore, that Zimyanin's briefing report for Khrushchev barely mentioned the crisis and gave no intimation that Beijing and Moscow had been at odds about the best way to handle it.

• *Lessons derived from the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis.* Shortly before Khrushchev's trip to Beijing in July-August 1958, the Chinese Communist Party's Military Affairs Committee (which had been meeting in an extraordinary two-month session since 27 May 1958) approved Mao's plans for a major operation in late August to recapture China's small offshore islands. The aim of the operation was to weaken or even undermine the Guomintang (Chinese Nationalist) government in Taiwan by exposing its inability to defend against an attack from the mainland.³⁷ Khrushchev was not explicitly informed of the proposed undertaking during his visit to Beijing, but he was told in general terms that a military operation was being planned to "bring Taiwan back under China's jurisdiction."³⁸ The Soviet leader welcomed the news and offered both political and military backing for China's efforts. In the first few weeks of August the Soviet Union transferred long-range artillery, amphibious equipment, air-to-air missiles, and combat aircraft to China in the expectation that those weapons would facilitate a "decisive move against the Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] regime."³⁹ Soviet military advisers also were sent to China to help supervise—and, if necessary, take part in—the upcoming operation.

Although Chinese and Soviet leaders assumed (or at least hoped) that the action would not provoke a direct military response from the United States, this assumption proved erroneous from the very start. After the Chinese army launched a heavy artillery bombardment of the Quemoy Islands on August 23 and Chinese patrol boats were sent to blockade Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts,

the United States responded by deploying a huge naval contingent to the Taiwan Straits. Simultaneously, top U.S. officials, including President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, publicly reaffirmed their commitment to protect Taiwan against Chinese incursions and to counter any naval threats in the Taiwan Straits.⁴⁰ The strongest warning to this effect came on September 4, three days before heavily armed U.S. ships began escorting Taiwanese vessels on resupply missions to Quemoy. U.S. naval aircraft also were called into action to support the Taiwanese air force as it established control of the region's airspace. In a rapid series of air battles, Taiwanese pilots flying U.S.-made fighters routed their Chinese opponents, casting serious doubt on the quality of China's air crews and Soviet-made MiGs.⁴¹ These humiliating defeats forced Mao and several of his top military commanders onto the defensive during subsequent intra-party debates.⁴²

The unexpectedly forceful U.S. response posed a dilemma for Chinese and Soviet leaders.⁴³ On September 5, Mao privately acknowledged to the PRC's Supreme State Conference that he "simply had not anticipated how roiled and turbulent the world would become" if China "fired a few rounds of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu."⁴⁴ Confronted by the threat of U.S. military retaliation, Mao abandoned any hopes he may have had at the time of seizing the offshore islands or, perhaps, attacking Taiwan.⁴⁵ Although Chinese artillery units continued in September and early October to shell U.S.-escorted convoys as they landed with resupplies in Quemoy, these actions were coupled with efforts to defuse the crisis by diplomatic means. Most notably, on September 6, Zhou Enlai proposed a resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and on October 6 the Chinese government announced a provisional cease-fire, effectively bringing the crisis to an end. The continued bombardment of Quemoy had posed some risk that wider hostilities would break out, but Chinese leaders were careful throughout the crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Mao's retreat came as a disappointment to some of his colleagues because of his earlier claims that the United States was merely a "paper tiger." At a meeting of senior Chinese officials in late November (several weeks after the crisis had been defused), Mao even found it necessary to re-

buke the "many people both inside and outside the Party who do not understand the paper tiger problem."⁴⁶

Soviet leaders, for their part, were convinced until late September that the PRC's effort to get rid of Jiang Jieshi was still on track. When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko flew secretly to Beijing shortly after the crisis began, he found that Mao was still expressing hope of "responding with force against force."⁴⁷ After hearing back from Gromyko, Khrushchev followed up on his earlier pledge to support the Chinese operation. On September 7, while U.S. ships were embarking on their first escort missions, the Soviet leader issued a public warning that any attack against mainland China would be deemed an attack against the Soviet Union as well.⁴⁸ This warning was followed two weeks later by a declaration that any use of nuclear weapons against China would be grounds for a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. Many Western analysts have claimed that these two Soviet statements were largely cosmetic, and that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric only when he believed there was no longer any danger of war. New evidence does not bear out this long-standing view. A week after Khrushchev issued his initial warning, he met secretly with the Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, and gave every indication that he still expected and hoped that China would proceed with its "decisive" military action against Taiwan.⁴⁹ Although Khrushchev clearly wanted to avoid a war with the United States, the failure of U.S. aircraft carriers to attack mainland China after Chinese artillery units resumed their bombardment of Quemoy gave the Soviet leader reason to believe (or at least hope) that U.S. forces would not follow through on their commitment to defend Taiwan. Later on, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had felt betrayed when he finally realized in late September/early October that Mao had decided to bail out of the operation.⁵⁰

To that extent, the Quemoy crisis ended up sparking discord between Soviet and Chinese officials, but for a much different reason from what has usually been suggested. Most Western analysts have argued that Chinese leaders were dismayed when the Soviet Union allegedly provided only lukewarm military backing for the probe against Taiwan.⁵¹ New evidence suggests that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union did

everything it had promised to do in support of the Chinese operation, and that it was China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to follow through.⁵² This outcome explains why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned once, was determined not to let it happen again. From then on he emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These different views became a sore point in Sino-Soviet relations, as was evident during Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in the autumn of 1959.⁵³ Zimyanin's brief discussion of Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does not mention the frustration that Soviet leaders felt and the lasting impact this had on Khrushchev's approach to the Taiwan issue.

• *Soviet assistance to China's nuclear weapons program.* When Chinese leaders formally decided in January 1955 to pursue an independent nuclear weapons program, they did so in the expectation that they would receive elaborate advice and backing from Moscow. Between January 1955 and December 1956 the Soviet Union and China concluded four preliminary agreements on bilateral cooperation in uranium mining, nuclear research, and uranium enrichment, and these were followed in October 1957 by the signing of a New Defense Technology Agreement (NDTA), which provided for broad Soviet assistance to China in the development of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.⁵⁴ Soon thereafter, Soviet nuclear weapons scientists and engineers were dispatched to China, sensitive information was transferred, equipment was sold for uranium processing and enrichment, and preparations were made to ship a prototype nuclear bomb to the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute for training and instruction purposes. In addition, a group of high-ranking Soviet military specialists were sent to help the Chinese establish new regiments for nuclear-capable SS-1 (8A11) and SS-2 (8Zh38) tactical missiles.⁵⁵ The Soviet officers not only gave detailed advice on the technology and operational uses of the missiles, but also helped find suitable locations for SS-1/SS-2 test ranges and deployment fields. Similar cooperative arrangements were established for naval delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union provided China with technical data, designs, components, and production equipment for liquid-fueled R-11FM

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the naval version of the SS-1B.⁵⁶ Although the R-11FM had a maximum range of just 162 kilometers and could be fired only from the surface, it was the most advanced Soviet SLBM at the time.

Despite the initial success of these efforts, Soviet leaders decided by early 1958 that it would be inadvisable, in light of Beijing's territorial claims against the Soviet Union, to fulfill the pledge undertaken in the NDTA to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to the PRC.⁵⁷ Chinese officials were not informed of this decision until nearly a year and a half later, and in the meantime mutual recriminations occurred behind the scenes when the promised shipment repeatedly failed to materialize. Khrushchev tried to alleviate the burgeoning tension when he traveled to Beijing at the end of July 1958, but his trip proved of little avail in this respect and tensions continued to increase. Finally, in a secret letter dated 20 June 1959, Soviet leaders formally notified their Chinese counterparts that no prototype bombs or detailed technical blueprints would be provided. The letter infuriated the Chinese, but Khrushchev and his colleagues were willing to pay that price at a time when, in their view, Sino-Soviet "relations were steadily deteriorating" and the NDTA was "already coming unraveled."⁵⁸ Curiously, the letter did not yet cause officials in Beijing to give up all hope of obtaining further assistance from Moscow on nuclear arms. At the summit in October 1959, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai formally requested Soviet aid in the development and production of nuclear-powered strategic submarines and longer-range, solid-fueled SLBMs. Khrushchev immediately turned down both proposals, thus dashing any lingering expectations that Mao and Zhou still had of pursuing new forms of nuclear-weapons cooperation or of at least reviving the NDTA.⁵⁹

The Soviet Foreign Ministry had not been involved in the implementation of the NDTA, but senior ministry officials most likely were aware that nuclear assistance was being provided to China. (After all, the Foreign Ministry had been the initial contact point for Chinese leaders in mid-1957 when they sought to open negotiations for the agreement.) Hence, it is surprising that Zimyanin did not bring up this matter at all, apart from two oblique references to "questions of defense cooperation."

• *Differences about Soviet efforts to seek improved ties with the United States.* Starting in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union pursued a line of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. Chinese leaders, by contrast, wanted to step up the confrontation between the Communist world and the capitalist world and to avoid any hint of compromise. Chinese leaders even claimed that they were willing, *in extremis*, to risk a global nuclear war in the "struggle against imperialism." To be sure, the connection between rhetoric and concrete policy was often tenuous; in 1958, China quickly backed down when confronted by a massive U.S. naval force in the Taiwan Straits. Nevertheless, even after that humiliating retreat, officials in Beijing continued to insist that "if the imperialists launch an all-out war," it inevitably would result in "victory" for the Communist states and "inspire hundreds of millions of people to turn to socialism." Mao's seeming indifference to the potential consequences of nuclear war chastened Soviet leaders, who were concerned that the Soviet Union might be drawn into a large-scale conflict against its will.⁶⁰ Soviet officials like Zimyanin were fully cognizant of these divergent outlooks (and the high-level concern they had provoked in Moscow), so it is odd that he made no more than an oblique reference to the matter.

Nor did Zimyanin mention the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing about the value of East-West arms control. Chinese officials were deeply suspicious of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the late 1950s aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Chinese leaders feared that their country, too, would come under pressure to sign a test ban treaty (even though they had taken no part in the negotiations), and that this would effectively end China's hopes of becoming a nuclear power.⁶¹ The inception of a U.S.-Soviet test moratorium in the spring of 1958, coupled with the Soviet letter of 20 June 1959 (which explicitly cited the test ban negotiations as a reason not to supply a prototype nuclear bomb to China), intensified Beijing's concerns that arms control talks were antithetical to China's nuclear ambitions.⁶² Zimyanin was well aware of these differences, but chose not to bring them up.

• *China's deepening confrontation with India.* Sino-Indian relations had been harmonious for several years after the Commu-

nists took power in Beijing, but the relationship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as a result of differences over Tibet and the disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the Himalayas.⁶³ In the spring of 1959 China crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and deployed many thousands of extra troops on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with great apprehension in neighboring India. Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian border dispute heated up, leading to a serious incident in late August 1959, when Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a contested border post at Longju. Although each side blamed the other for the incident, the clash apparently was motivated in part by the Chinese authorities' desire to take a firm stand against India before Khrushchev arrived in Beijing.

As recriminations between India and China escalated, Chinese officials secretly urged "the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries to exploit all possible opportunities" to "conduct propaganda measures against India" and "expose the subversive role of imperialist and reactionary Tibetan forces" armed and supported by India.⁶⁴ These pleas were of no avail. Instead of rallying to China's defense, the Soviet Union scrupulously avoided taking sides during the skirmishes, and released a statement on 9 September 1959 expressing hope that China and India would soon resolve the matter "in the spirit of their traditional friendship."⁶⁵ Chinese officials were shown the TASS statement before it went out, and they did their best to persuade Moscow not to release it; but far from helping matters, Beijing's latest remonstrations merely induced Soviet leaders to issue the statement a day earlier than planned, without any amendments.⁶⁶ Mao and his colleagues were so dismayed by the Soviet Union's refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a dispute with a non-Communist state that they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow on September 13 claiming that "the TASS statement has revealed to the whole world the divergence of views between China and the Soviet Union regarding the incident on the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that has literally brought joy and jubilation to the Indian bourgeoisie and to American and British imperialism."⁶⁷ The irritation and sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two days later when Soviet and Indian leaders signed a much-publicized agreement that

provided for subsidized credits to India of some \$385 million over five years.

These events were still under way—and tensions along the Sino-Indian border were still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his report, so it was probably too early for him to gauge the significance of Moscow's decision to remain neutral.⁶⁸ Even so, it is odd that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up having such a deleterious effect on Khrushchev's visit.⁶⁹

Zimyanin's Report and Soviet Policy-Making

The submission of Zimyanin's report to Khrushchev was one of several indicators of a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy-making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the 1950s the Soviet Union's dealings with the PRC, as with other Communist states, had been handled mainly along party-to-party lines. A special CPSU Central Committee department, known after February 1957 as the Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, was responsible for keeping track of developments in East-bloc countries and for managing relations with those countries on a day-to-day basis.⁷⁰ (Matters requiring high-level decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded from Soviet policy-making toward China. On some issues, such as the effort to gain a seat for Communist China in the United Nations, the MFA was the only important actor involved. Also, the foreign minister himself at times played a key role, notably in the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold secret negotiations with Mao about "issues of war and peace, the international situation, and the policy of American imperialism."⁷¹ Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign Ministry's input was limited. Apart from standard diplomatic support, the MFA had contributed relatively little during Khrushchev's two previous visits to China (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as well as his visits to most other Communist states. The bulk of the preparations had been handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Central Committee departments and by Khrushchev's own staff.

In that respect, the September 1959 trip

to China was quite different. The MFA ended up with a dominant role in the preparations for the trip, thanks in part to a deliberate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater say for the Foreign Ministry in policy toward China.⁷² When Gromyko first asked Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on China, the foreign minister knew that he would soon be accompanying Khrushchev on a two-week visit to the United States, a task that would enable him to bolster the Foreign Ministry's standing (as well as his own influence) on other issues, especially Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in between Khrushchev's two visits in late September was so limited, briefings for the China trip had to occur almost entirely on the plane. Gromyko was aware that the other senior members of the Soviet "party-government delegation," led by Mikhail Suslov, were scheduled to depart for China on September 26-27, while Khrushchev and Gromyko were still in the United States. Hence, the foreign minister knew he would be the only top official accompanying Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the 29th and 30th.⁷³ (Gromyko, of course, also intended to make good use of his privileged access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and flight back from, the United States.⁷⁴)

Under those circumstances, the Foreign Ministry's report on China, prepared by Zimyanin, became the main briefing material for Khrushchev, along with a short update (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent personnel changes in the Chinese military High Command.⁷⁵ What is more, Zimyanin (who was a member of the MFA Collegium as well as head of the ministry's Far Eastern department) and a number of other senior MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing to provide on-site advice and support, something that had not happened during Khrushchev's earlier visits to China.⁷⁶ Although the head of the CPSU CC department for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and a few other CC department heads also traveled to China as advisers, the Foreign Ministry's role during the visit was far more salient than in the past. (This was reflected in Gromyko's own role as well; among other things, he was the only Soviet official besides Suslov who took part in all of Khrushchev's talks with Mao and Zhou Enlai.⁷⁷) Hence, Zimyanin's report proved highly influential.

As things worked out, however, the

MFA's expanded role had little effect one way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. The trip in September-October 1959 left crucial differences unresolved, and the two sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet Union quietly began pulling some of its key military technicians out of China.⁷⁸ Tensions increased rapidly over the next several months, culminating in the publication of a lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birthday.⁷⁹ The statement, entitled "Long Live Leninism!" removed any doubts that Soviet officials and diplomats still had about the magnitude of the rift between the two countries.⁸⁰ Soon thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East European governments became aware of the conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Beijing of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a few weeks later at the Third Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, where Khrushchev sought to rebut the comments expressed at the WFTU meeting and to retaliate for China's decision to provide other delegates with copies of a confidential letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP leadership. The top Chinese official in Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.⁸¹

Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet Union withdrew all its remaining military technicians and advisers from China in July and August 1960, and simultaneously began recalling its thousands of non-military personnel, causing disarray in many of China's largest economic and technical projects and scientific research programs.⁸² Although Soviet and Chinese officials managed to gloss over the dispute at a "world conference" of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960, the polemics and recriminations soon resumed, with ever greater stridency. Subsequently, as news of the conflict spread throughout the world, Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional attempts to reconcile their differences; but the split, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes of restoring a semblance of unity in the international Communist movement were dashed.

The downward spiral of Sino-Soviet relations after Khrushchev's visit in 1959 tended to rigidify Soviet policy-making. Se-

nior ideological officials from the CPSU, especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail Suslov, ended up handling most of the Soviet Union's polemical exchanges and other dealings with China. Throughout the late 1950s (and even well into 1960) Suslov had been the chief proponent within the Soviet leadership of a conciliatory posture toward China; but as attitudes on both sides steadily hardened and the split became irreparable, Suslov embraced the anti-Chinese line with a vengeance, in part to compensate for his earlier, more accommodating stance. Oleg Rakhmanin, a senior official and expert on China in the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, also gained an increasing role in policy toward the PRC.⁸³ Rakhmanin's expertise and aggressive anti-Maoist stance gave Soviet leaders precisely what they needed as the split widened, and the result was an even more confrontational policy toward Beijing.

Foreign Ministry employees were not necessarily any more favorably disposed toward China than senior party officials were, but the demand for input from the MFA tended to decline as bilateral tensions grew. Although Soviet diplomats in China still had important liaison and information-gathering roles, the expertise of the MFA's Far Eastern department was largely eclipsed during the 1960s. Zimyanin left the department as early as February 1960, having been appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Subsequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin served briefly as a deputy foreign minister and then gained prominence within the CPSU in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief of *Pravda* (from 1965 to 1976), as a full Central Committee member (from 1966 on), and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC Secretary, beginning in 1976.

Like Zimyanin, the new head of the Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern department, I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appointment, but aside from that one distinction, Tugarinov was an obscure official whose tenure at the department lasted only until August 1963. His successor, N. G. Sudarikov, was not yet even a member of the MFA Collegium when he became head of the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of the department's waning influence. (Sudarikov was not appointed to the Collegium until November 1964, some 15

months after he took over the Far Eastern department and a month after Khrushchev's ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the Foreign Ministry's role in policy-making toward China remained well short of what it had been in September 1959.

The MFA's diminished impact on Sino-Soviet relations was largely unchanged until mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department was bifurcated, and the ministry's senior expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed in charge of the new "First Far Eastern" department.⁸⁴ That department, under Kapitsa's highly visible direction for well over a decade (until he was promoted to be a deputy foreign minister in December 1982), was responsible for China, Korea, and Mongolia, while the "Second Far Eastern" department handled Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines.⁸⁵ Even after separate departments were established, however, the continued hostility between China and the Soviet Union left the MFA's First Far Eastern department with a relatively modest role in policy-making, in part because the department overlapped so much with the sections on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. Not until the 1980s, when relations between Moscow and Beijing finally began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry regain extensive influence over policy toward China. That trend was under way as early as 1982, but it gathered much greater momentum after 1986, as Eduard Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, the MFA had acquired a dominant role in policy-making toward China.

The status of the Foreign Ministry on this issue was never quite as prominent during Andrei Gromyko's long tenure as foreign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA's influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin's report thus symbolized a high point for the ministry vis-a-vis China in the pre-Gorbachev era.

The translation of Zimyanin's report follows below:

* * * * *

Soviet-Chinese Relations

The victory of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries.

When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock companies, and to set the rate of exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.⁸⁶

Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.⁸⁷ Over time, the above-mentioned agreements were annulled or revised if they did not accord with the spirit of fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on relations with Japan.⁸⁸ In addition, a communique and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth.⁸⁹

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela-

tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Communist Party of China Central Committee] fully supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences. It is worth noting, however, that the CPC CC, while not speaking about this directly, took a position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin.⁹⁰ A bit later the Chinese comrades reexamined their evaluation of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in Mao Zedong's pronouncements when he was visiting Moscow.⁹¹ For example, he said: ". . . Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now have the same view as the CPSU." In a number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. Stalin.

Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a campaign was launched in China to combat dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to "let a hundred flowers bloom."⁹² In connection with this the Chinese press began, with increasing frequency, to express criticism of specific conditions and of works by Soviet authors in the fields of philosophy, natural history, literature, and art. This inevitably gave strong impetus to hostile statements by rightist forces who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality. They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers.⁹³ In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR. The airing of these types of statements during the struggle against rightists can in no way be justified, even if one takes account of the tactical aims of our friends, who were seeking to unmask the rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against them for all their statements. It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crush-

ing the rightist elements, did not offer any open condemnation of statements expressed by them about so-called "territorial claims on the USSR."

The Soviet government's declaration of 30 October 1956 [endorsing the principle of equality in relations between the Soviet Union and other communist countries—ed.] was received with great satisfaction in China.⁹⁴ In January 1957 a government delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.⁹⁵ The Declaration emphasized the complete unity of the USSR and PRC as an important factor in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched claims about a "struggle between the CPSU and CPC for the right to leadership of world Communism." In accordance with the Declaration, the Soviet Union devised and implemented concrete measures aimed at the further development of Soviet-Chinese friendship and cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual interest, and complete trust.

In 1957 a series of consultations took place between the CPSU CC and the CPC CC on common, concrete matters pertaining to the international situation and the Communist movement. The Chinese friends actively participated in the preparations and conduct of the Moscow conference of officials from Communist and workers' parties in November 1957.⁹⁶ While the Chinese delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong spoke approvingly about the positive experience of such consultations and the constant readiness of the Chinese comrades to undertake a joint review of these and other matters.⁹⁷

The steps to reorganize the management of the national economy in the USSR were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the June [1957] and other plenary sessions of the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press did not feature an official commentary or reactions to the decisions of these sessions. After details about the activity of the Anti-Party faction had been explained to the CPC CC, the friends began to speak more resolutely about these matters. "If Molotov's line had prevailed within the CPSU," Mao declared in Moscow, "that would have been dangerous not only for the USSR, but for other socialist countries as well."⁹⁸

Taking account of the divisive activity

of revisionists and the surge of imperialist propaganda, which tried to use several ideological campaigns in China in 1957—and, in particular, the campaign to “let a hundred flowers bloom” as well as the publication of a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among the People”—to provoke a schism in relations between the Soviet Union and PRC, the leadership of the CPC CC and the government of the PRC emphasized the close unity of the socialist camp and the leading role of the CPSU among Communist and workers’ parties. Mao Zedong stated this very definitively in his speech to Chinese students attending Moscow State University (November 1957), and he spoke about it at length with officials from Yugoslavia and also during meetings that PRC government delegations had with delegations from Poland and other countries of the socialist camp.⁹⁹ In 1959 the CPC CC, having reexamined the proposal of the CPSU CC to clarify its formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again affirmed that this formula must be preserved in the future.

The durability of Soviet-Chinese relations and the role of Soviet-Chinese friendship gained new strength as the international situation deteriorated in the Middle East and also in connection with the provocations by the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the summer of 1958. The most important political event that year in Soviet-Chinese relations, which had an enormously positive influence on the development of the whole international situation, was the July-August meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong.¹⁰⁰ During an exchange of views they considered a number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chinese relations and, in particular, questions of military cooperation.¹⁰¹ The speech by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his statement that an attack on the PRC would be regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union itself, was fervently greeted with expressions of gratitude and approval in China.¹⁰² The government of the PRC displayed great satisfaction at our assurance about our readiness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation for a nuclear strike against China.¹⁰³ In turn, the Chinese government declared that the PRC will come to the assistance of the USSR in any part of the globe if an attack is carried out against it.

The letter from Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, and a variety of reports from the CPSU CC—about the provision of assistance to the PRC to continue strengthening its defense capability, about a reduction in the number of Soviet specialists in the PRC and the elimination of the network of Soviet “adviser-consultants,” about the CPSU CC’s views of the Yugoslav Communist League’s draft program, and about other matters—had important political benefits.

The results of the CPSU’s 21st Congress provided a great boost to the practical activity of the CPC in overseeing socialist construction in the country.¹⁰⁴ It is worth noting that after the publication of the theses of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev at the CPSU’s 21st Congress and during the proceedings of the Congress, the Chinese friends, while giving a generally positive evaluation of the achievements of socialist construction in the USSR, made almost no mention of the theoretical portions of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev and said that those portions related only to the practice of socialist and Communist construction in the USSR.¹⁰⁵

In a similar vein, the provisions adopted at the Second Session of the CPC’s 8th Congress (May 1958) regarding a struggle against “blind faith” and regarding the need to foster sentiments of national pride among the people, as well as some preliminary success in implementing the “Great Leap Forward,” caused a number of cadre workers in the PRC to take on airs.¹⁰⁶ They began excessively emphasizing China’s uniqueness and displaying a guarded attitude toward Soviet experience and the recommendations of Soviet specialists.¹⁰⁷ Some began declaring that the Soviet Union had stayed too long at the socialist stage of development, while China was moving valiantly ahead toward Communism. The Chinese press quite actively featured criticism of the socialist principles implemented in the USSR for the distribution of material goods in accordance with one’s labor, for the compensation of labor on a job-by-job basis, and so forth. Some authors essentially argued that communes were incompatible with kolkhozes.¹⁰⁸

Later on, after studying materials from the Congress and after numerous mistakes arose during the establishment of the peasant communes and during the implementation of the “Great Leap Forward,” the CPC

began to display a more proper understanding of matters considered by the 21st Congress, such as the question of the significance of creating a material-technical base and increasing the productivity of labor for the construction of socialism, the question of the role of the principle of material incentives and labor distribution under socialism, and other questions.

The CPSU’s position in offering a principled explanation of a number of Marxist-Leninist precepts and laws of the building of socialism and Communism, which were ignored in China during the implementation of the “Great Leap Forward” and the establishment of communes (see the report and speech by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Congress and the speeches that followed), helped the Chinese comrades to evaluate the situation correctly and to begin rectifying the mistakes and shortcomings that had arisen. The statement by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev about the permanent foundations of Soviet-Chinese friendship swept the rug out from under imperialist and Yugoslav revisionist propaganda, which was intended to sow mistrust between our countries and provoke a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. . . .

An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations over the past decade confirms that relations of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation have been established on a lasting basis and are growing wider and stronger with every passing year. These relations are a decisive factor in the further growth of the might and cohesion of the world socialist camp and in the consolidation of world peace and the security of nations.

1. N. S. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, 6 vols. (Moscow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. 5 (“Vzaimootnosheniya s sotsialisticheskimi stranami”), Part G (“Vzaimootnosheniya s Kitaem”), pp. 77-78.

2. “Vnutripoliticheskoe, ekonomicheskoe i mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie KNR,” Fond (F.) 5, Opis’ (Op.) 30, Delo (D.) 307, Listy (Ll.) 49-79, TsKhSD.

3. The section, entitled “Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya,” is on Ll. 71-79.

4. For two quite different versions of this theme, see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); and Steven M. Goldstein, “Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 224-265, esp. 224-248. Zagoria argues that China’s policy vis-a-vis other countries (including the Soviet Union) was largely determined by the shifting fortunes of “left” and “right” factions within the Chinese leadership. Goldstein attributes the collapse of

- Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in [Mao’s own] domestic political priorities,” which elevated “national” over “internationalist” concerns. Although Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone and the agenda of Chinese politics” himself, and that China’s relations with the Soviet Union were therefore “decisively altered” when “Mao’s thought about China’s *domestic condition* underwent a sea change in the years 1956-9” (emphasis added). For an opposing view, see John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922-1972* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Unlike Zagoria and Goldstein (and many others), Gittings avers that changes in the external climate led to shifts in Chinese domestic politics, rather than the other way around. For a similar, though more qualified, assessment, see Michael B. Yahuda, *China’s Role in World Affairs* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), esp. 11-42 and 102-129. Curiously, very few Western scholars have attempted to connect shifts in *Soviet* domestic politics with changes in Soviet policy toward China (or *vice versa*). Alexander Dallin outlined a general framework in “The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1981), 335-408, but he made no specific application to Soviet ties with China. Carl A. Linden offered a few comments about the effect of Soviet leadership politics on Khrushchev’s stance vis-a-vis China in *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), and Victor Baras discussed the impact of China on Soviet leadership politics (1953-1956) in a brief research note, “China and the Rise of Khrushchev,” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 8:1-2 (Spring-Summer 1975), 183-191; but most of Baras’s and Linden’s observations are speculative and (particularly in Linden’s case) not wholly convincing. Even the illuminating book by James G. Richter, *Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), which focuses on the connection between Soviet domestic politics and foreign relations, barely mentions Soviet policy toward China. It may well be that domestic-external linkages in Sino-Soviet relations, to the extent they existed for either China or the USSR, were weaker in the Soviet case, but that remains a fitting topic for study.
5. The phrase “reluctant and suspicious ally” comes from two recent essays by Steven M. Goldstein which debunk the notion that China was “forced” into an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1949-50 because of hostility on the part of the United States. See Goldstein’s “Nationalism and Internationalism,” 231 ff. and “The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937 to 1962: Ideology and Unity,” forthcoming in Harry Harding, ed., *Patterns of Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of China*.
6. For further comments by Khrushchev on Stalin’s treatment of the PRC, see *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 6, Part G, pp. 5-13. See also Andrei Gromyko’s remarks on the same subject in A. A. Gromyko, *Pamyatnoe*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), Vol. 2, pp. 127-130.
7. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 11 February 1950, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1950, Vol. 6/China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 309.
8. Memorandum of Eisenhower-Churchill-Bidault meeting, 7 December 1953 (Secret), in U.S. Department of State, *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. 5/China, pp. 1808-1818.
9. See, e.g., “The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Editorial Departments of People’s *Daily* and *Red Flag*,” 6 September 1963, in *Peking Review* 6:37 (13 September 1963), 6-23.
10. Among countless studies citing 1956 as the start of the conflict are Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*; William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1964); Francois Fejo, *Chine-URSS, de l’alliance au conflit, 1950-1972* (Paris: Editions due Seuil, 1973); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, rev. and enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), esp. 271-308 and 357-432; Jean Baby, *La grande controverse sino-sovietique, 1956-66* (Paris: Grasset, 1966); G. F. Hudson, “Introduction,” in G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 1-8; and Thomas G. Hart, *Sino-Soviet Relations: Re-Examining the Prospects for Normalization* (Aldershot: Gower, 1987). For a variant of this point, see Goldstein, “Nationalism and Internationalism,” 224-242, which claims that Mao’s rethinking of Chinese domestic priorities, rather than Khrushchev’s secret speech, was the watershed event in 1956. Among those who cite 1958 as the beginning of the dispute are Yahuda, *China’s Role in World Affairs*, esp. 102-129; Allen S. Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 14: *The People’s Republic, Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 478-538; and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Vol. 2: *The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), esp. 36-40 and 255-292.
11. For documentation and analysis of these territorial issues, see Dennis J. Doolin, comp., *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1965); George Ginsburg and Carl F. Pinkes, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949-64* (New York: Praeger, 1978); W. A. Douglas Jackson, *Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict?*, rev. ed. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1968); Tai Sung An, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 13-73; and Luke T. Chang, *China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1982), 9-38 and 107-197. For an intriguing argument that territorial issues were not at the heart of the Sino-Soviet rift, see Klaus Mehnert, *China nach dem Sturm: Bericht und Kommentar* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971), esp. 228-234. Although Mehnert’s case is generally persuasive, Zimyanin’s report as well as other new evidence (see below) suggests that China’s territorial claims were a more serious irritant (at least from the Soviet perspective) than Mehnert implied.
12. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 6-7.
13. Gromyko, *Pamyatnoe*, Vol. 2, pp. 128-129.
14. Shi Zhe, “‘Soprovozhdaya Predsedatelya Mao,’” and N. Fedorenko, “Stalin i Mao: besedy v Moskve,” *Problemy Dal’nego vostoka* 2 (1989), 139-148 and 149-164, respectively. A slightly abridged version of Fedorenko’s article appeared as “Nochnye besedy: Stranitsy istorii,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 23 October 1988, 4.
15. “Zapis’ besedy tovarishcha Stalina I. V. s Predsedatelem Tsentral’nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Mao Tsze-dunom 16 dekabrya 1949 g.,” *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF)*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 9-17; and “Zapis’ besedy I. V. Stalina s Predsedatelem Tsentral’nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Mao-Tsze-Dunom, 22 yanvarya 1950 g.,” *APRF*, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38.
16. Among many examples of gaps in official transcripts are the exchanges deleted from the Polish record of the five-power meeting in Warsaw in July 1968 (“Protokol ze spotkania przywódców partii i rządów krajów socjalistycznych: Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Węgier, i ZSRR,” in *Archiwum Akt Nowych*, Arch. KC PZPR, Paczka 193, Tom 24, Dokument 4) and the Czechoslovak account of the Soviet-Czechoslovak meeting in Cierna nad Tisou in July-August 1968 (“Zaznam jednani predsednictva UV KSC a UV KSSS v Cierna n. T., 29.7.-1.8.1968,” in *Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska*, Prague, F. 07/15, Archivna jednotka 274.). In the former case, discussions held during a formal recess in the talks (as recorded verbatim in the diaries of a key participant, Pyotr Shelest’) were not included in the final transcript. This omission was important because the discussions pertained to military options vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. In the latter case, Shelest’s anti-Semitic slurs about a Czechoslovak official, Frantisek Kriegel, were omitted from the transcript. Fortunately, these derogatory comments were recorded by several participants, including (fittingly enough) Shelest’ himself in his diaries.
17. On the need for caution in using memoirs, see Mark Kramer, “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?” *International Security* 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-218; and Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” *Cold War International History Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-37.
18. The transcripts reveal that, in addition to Stalin, the Soviet participants in the talks included Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Andrei Vyshinskii, plus Anastas Mikoyan and Nikolai Bulganin at some of the meetings.
19. F. Chuev, ed., *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz dnevnika F. Chueva* (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 114.
20. “Istoriya i sovremennost’: Dialog Stalina s Mao Tszedunom,” *Problemy Dal’nego vostoka* (Moscow) 1/2 (1992), 109. This comes from the second part of a fascinating interview with Kovalev by the historian Sergei N. Goncharov. For the first part of the interview, as well as background on Kovalev’s career, see *Problemy Dal’nego vostoka* 6 (1991), 77-91.
21. “Istoriya i sovremennost’,” 110.
22. “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.,” Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Yudin, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in *TsKhSD*, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 93-94. Fedorenko’s article referred to the meeting that he and Kovalev had with Mao, but Fedorenko gave no intimation that Mao had found anything “unpleasant” about it.
23. Mao’s three speeches at the Chengdu conference were first published in 1969 in a CCP collection, *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought”), pp. 159-172, the text of which was later spirited to the West. The speech cited here is the one delivered on 10 March 1958. An English translation of the speech first appeared as “Address on March 10,” in *Issues & Studies* (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95-98.
24. Mao also discussed this point at length in his March 1956 meeting with Yudin, remarking that Dongbei and

Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influence.” See “Zapis” besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.,” L. 93.

25. For a useful list of collections of Mao’s secret speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*, Harvard Contemporary China Series No. 6 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University Press, 1989), 78-81.

26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more nuanced appraisal of Stalin’s policy. Among many items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection of documents being compiled under the auspices of the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents from Recent History (RTsKhIDNI): *Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bol’sheviki), Komintern, i Narodno-revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae*. The first volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been published in several recent issues of the journal *Problemy Dal’nego vostoka*. Perhaps the most intriguing of these is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in January-February 1949, which is presented along with supporting documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan’s report, were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Peregovora I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v yanvare 1949 g.,” *Novaya i noveisha istoriya* (Moscow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, Ll. 95-118.

27. “Address on March 10,” 98. For Mao’s extended comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, see “Zapis” besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.,” Ll. 88-92.

28. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part C (“O Vengrii”), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev’s version of events is borne out by a close reading of the Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chinese media spoke positively about the events in Hungary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers suddenly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chinese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht über die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev’s account. (Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev’s version is not inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 September 1963 (cited in note 9 *supra*), despite the way that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev’s

account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts Khrushchev’s account. The September 1963 statement goes on to claim that Chinese leaders “insisted on the adoption of all necessary measures to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev’s claim that Mao strongly supported the invasion *after* the Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any chronology, it creates the impression that Mao’s backing for an invasion *preceded* the Soviet decision, but the statement would hold up equally well if, as appears likely, Mao’s support for an invasion *followed* rather than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev’s account.

29. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/VI (STRICTLY SECRET), 31 October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41.

30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in particular Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the supposed contrast between Soviet and Chinese approaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking rhetorical flourishes for actual policy.

32. See Mark Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers and Military Aid to the Third World,” in S. Neil MacFarlane and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., *Gorbachev’s Third World Dilemmas* (London: Routledge, 1989), 66-110, esp. 68-70.

33. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi propandiy i kul’turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SECRET) of a speech by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the PRC’s Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, 24 April 1959, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, L. 26.

34. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 6 (“Otnosheniya s kapitalisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami”), Part H (“Otnosheniya s arabskimi stranami”), pp. 57-58.

35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-duna,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassador in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev during the 1958 trip.

36. In *Peking und Moskau* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern crisis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis began). Mehnert’s comments have no bearing on the initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here has shown, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely differed in their views about how to respond.

37. See Allen S. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958: Mao’s Miscalculations,” *The China Quarterly* 62 (June 1975), 263-270. The various post-hoc rationalizations that Mao offered (so that he could avoid admitting what a failure the whole venture had been) should not be

allowed to obscure the real purpose of the operation, as revealed in Mao’s secret speeches in September 1958. 38. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 72-73. The present author confirmed this point in an interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to Beijing.

39. *Ibid.*, 73.

40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 293-294, 691-693.

41. Richard M. Bueschel, *Communist Chinese Air Power* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54-55.

42. See, e.g., Mao’s speech on 9 November 1958 at the First Zhengzhou Conference, translated in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, esp. 460-461.

43. For a cogent assessment of Sino-Soviet dynamics during the crisis, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,” in Morton H. Halperin, ed., *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 265-303. Halperin’s and Tsou’s conclusions differ markedly from standard Western interpretations of the crisis, which posited it as a case of Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet timidity. For a typical example of this view (which, unlike Halperin’s and Tsou’s analysis, does not fare well in light of new evidence), see John R. Thomas, “The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958,” *Orbis* 6:1 (Spring 1962), 38-64. John Lewis Gaddis has noted that U.S. officials at the time “interpreted [the bombardment of Quemoy] as a joint Sino-Soviet probe intended to test Western resolve.” See “Dividing Adversaries: The United States and International Communism, 1945-1958,” in *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 186-187. Gaddis seems to believe that this perception was not quite accurate, but in fact the evidence amply bears out the views of President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles.

44. *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (1969), 233. Mao’s reference to “a few rounds of artillery” is disingenuous to say the least, since the Chinese leader himself acknowledged in a secret speech in April 1959 (*ibid.*, 290) that some 19,000 shells had been fired at Quemoy on 23 August 1958 alone. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated that the number of shells fired on the first day was closer to 41,000, but whichever figure may be correct, it is clear that far more than “a few rounds of artillery” were fired.

45. As Allen Whiting points out (“Quemoy 1958,” 266-267), there is little evidence that Mao intended at this point to attack Taiwan. Instead, he was hoping merely to destabilize the Guomintang government.

46. *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (1969), 255. See also Whiting, “Quemoy 1958,” 266-267.

47. Gromyko, *Pamyatnoe*, Vol. 2, p. 132-133.

48. Full citations for Khrushchev’s two major statements, as mentioned here and in the next sentence, are provided below in my annotations to Zimyanin’s report.

49. On this point, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 16.

50. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 73-74.

51. This also was a theme in official Chinese polemics beginning in 1963. Reliable documentation from 1958 undercuts these post-hoc Chinese accusations.

52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split," 499-500.
53. *Ibid.* and "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Pekine 2 oktyabrya 1959 g.," Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SECRET), APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 12-15.
54. For a brief but reliable overview of Sino-Soviet nuclear weapons cooperation, see the highly acclaimed book by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 39-46, 60-65, 71-72, and 221-222. Additional valuable details, especially about cooperation in delivery vehicle technology, are provided by Lewis and Xue in their subsequent study, *China's Strategic Seapower*, 2-4, 10-18, 47-49, and 130-134. See also Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, vol. 5: *British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 324-356. For a sample of earlier accounts, see Harold P. Ford, "The Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Problems, 1957-60," in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 100-113; Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 216-224; Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 8:2 (June 1964), 99-115 (Hsieh uses the Sino-Soviet exchanges of 1963 to look back at the earlier period of nuclear cooperation as well as the subsequent disputes); Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 70-109; Morton H. Halperin, "Sino-Soviet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960," in Halperin, ed., *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*, 117-143; and Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 78-82.
55. The information here was first revealed by the former head of the Soviet "missile group" in China, Major-General Aleksandr Savel'ev, in Aleksandr Dolinin, "Kak nashi raketniki kitaitsev obuchali," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 13 May 1995, 6.
56. Lewis and Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower*, 131-132. For more on the R-11FM, see Mikhail Turetsky, *The Introduction of Missile Systems Into the Soviet Navy (1945-1962)*, Monograph Series on Soviet Union No. 8 (Falls Church, VA: Delphic Associates, February 1983), 65-72.
57. This is discussed by Khrushchev in *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 98-99.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 98. Details of the NDTA and the June 1959 letter were first publicly revealed in a Chinese broadcast on 15 August 1963, which claimed that Khrushchev had reneged on the agreement so that he would have "a gift to take to Eisenhower when visiting the USA in September." A very similar formulation was used in the official Chinese statement cited in note 9 *supra*.
59. "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine," Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SECRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, Ll. 12-15. For an assessment of the Chinese leadership's perspective on this matter, see Lewis and Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower*, 17-18, 133.
60. Khrushchev deals with this point at length in his memoirs; see *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 71-76. See also Gromyko, *Pamyatnoe*, vol. 2, pp. 133-134.
61. On this point, see Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 64-65 and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Nuclear Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations," in Halperin, ed., *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*, 146-147. See also three official Chinese statements released in 1963: "Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons," *Peking Review* 6:31 (2 August 1963), 7-8; "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 3 August," *Peking Review* 6:33 (16 August 1963), 7-15, esp. 8-10; and "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 21 August," *Peking Review* 6:36 (6 September 1963), 7-16. These formed the basis of a booklet published in late 1963 by the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing, *People of the World, Unite for the Complete, Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons!*
62. On 21 January 1960 the Chinese National People's Congress adopted a resolution stipulating that China would not be bound by any arms control agreement unless it had participated in the negotiations and had given its express consent.
63. For background and widely differing perspectives on these matters, see Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 9-74; Wilhelm von Pochhammer, *Die Auseinandersetzung um Tibets Grenzen* (Frankfurt am Main: A. Metzner, 1962); Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Alastair Lamb, *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975); W. F. Van Eekelen, *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China*, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Pantheon, 1970), esp. 47-134; Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 1-41; R. K. Jain, ed., *China-South Asian Relations, 1947-1980*, 2 vols. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), Vol. 1: India, pp. 97-151; Chang, *China's Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes*, esp. 61-78; Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh* (New York: Praeger, 1963); G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962)* (New York: Paragon, 1964), 111-186, esp. 111-151; and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).
64. "Osnovnye napravleniya vneshepoliticheskoi propagandy v kul'turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi stranami," Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SECRET), 24 April 1959, by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the PRC's Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, Ll. 18, 27.
65. "Zayavlenie TASS," *Pravda* (Moscow), 10 September 1959, 3.
66. MacFarquhar, *The Great Leap Forward*, 258-260.
67. Cited in O. B. Borisov (pseud.) and B. T. Koloskov, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk* (Moscow: Mysl', 1972), 155.
68. A more serious incident occurred in late October, two-and-a-half weeks after Khrushchev's visit to China. Nine Indian policemen were killed or wounded and ten were taken prisoner after they clashed with Chinese troops near Kongka Pass in Ladakh (northeastern Kashmir, along the Tibetan border). The Soviet authorities again maintained a policy of strict neutrality in their coverage of this incident, further antagonizing the Chinese.
69. For the effect on Khrushchev's trip, see his *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 78-82. For the official Chinese perspective, see *The Truth About How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India Against China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1963).
70. CPSU CC General Department, "Otdel TsK KPSS po svyazyam sinostrannymi kompartiyami, mart 1953-fevral' 1957 g.," 1958 (Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 28, "Predislovie," L. 2.
71. Gromyko, *Pamyatnoe*, Vol. 2, pp. 132-135. According to Gromyko, the talks focused almost exclusively on recent developments in the Taiwan Straits, and were largely unproductive. He said he was "astounded" when Mao nonchalantly proposed that American troops be allowed to penetrate deep into China so that they could be wiped out by a Soviet nuclear strike (p. 133). Gromyko's retrospective assertions about this particular matter have been controversial from the time they appeared in 1988. A leading Western expert on political-military affairs in China, John Wilson Lewis, has discounted Gromyko's report (see Lewis and Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower*, 16 and 258), but has adduced no specific evidence to contradict it. What is known about China's cautious policy during the Quemoy crisis (see above) does raise doubts about Gromyko's claim, but it seems likely that Mao said something reasonably close, and that Gromyko may have somewhat misinterpreted it. After all, on 5 September 1958 Mao told a closed gathering of the PRC's Supreme State Conference that China should be ready, if necessary, for a "war in which hydrogen bombs" would be used: "If we must fight, we will fight. If half the people die, there is still nothing to fear." (See *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui*, 1969, p. 237.) Assuming that Mao said roughly the same thing to Gromyko, it is plausible that the Chinese leader also made comments similar to what Gromyko alleged. This is the view of Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader during his trip to China in 1958, a few weeks before Gromyko's visit. In an interview in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 6 October 1995, Troyanovskii said, "I recall hearing something about this at the time, after the crisis began. It fits in with what Mao said during the Moscow conference in November 1957, which shocked us all."
72. For background, see A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya diplomata, sovetskii A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. I. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K. U. Chernenko i M. S. Gorbacheva* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), 71-72; and O. Grinevskii, "Na Smolenskoi Ploshchadi v 1950-kh godakh," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow) 11 (November 1994), 120-126, esp. 124.
73. "Pribytie N. S. Khrushcheva v kitaiskuyu stolitsu: Vstrecha na aerodrome Shoudu," *Pravda* (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1.
74. A very useful account of Khrushchev's interactions with Gromyko during the trip is in Khrushchev's *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 6, Part E ("O poezdke v SShA"), pp. 7-25. Khrushchev notes that he "greatly respected Gromyko as foreign minister both during this time and afterwards" (p. 8).
75. A cover note on Zimyanin's report alludes to a one-page update, but the text has not yet been located. No doubt, the update cited the announcement on 17 September 1959 that the Chinese defense minister, Marshal Peng Dehuai, was being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao. Numerous other top military officials also were re-

moved at this time: the chief of the Chinese General Staff, General Huang Kecheng (who was replaced by the public security minister, General Luo Ruiching); two other deputy defense ministers, General Xiao Ke and General Li Da; and a half dozen lower-ranking generals. These officers and two deputy foreign ministers were all removed because of their purported links with Peng Dehuai, who was accused in mid-1959 of "rightist opportunism" and forming an "anti-Party clique." These charges, approved by the CCP Central Committee at its plenum in Lushan in the first half of August, stemmed from a secret "letter of opinion" that Peng sent to Mao in mid-July, which strongly criticized the "confusion," "shortcomings," "extravagance," and "waste" of Mao's economic policies. The letter was disclosed to other senior officials at an expanded session of the CCP Politburo in Lushan in the latter half of July. Mao regarded the document as a grave threat to his authority, and he responded with a furious counter-attack, forcing members of the Politburo to side either with him or with Peng. Although several top officials undoubtedly shared Peng's misgivings about recent policies, they were unwilling to take a stand against Mao. By the time the enlarged Politburo session in Lushan adjourned at the end of July and the Central Committee plenum convened a few days later, Peng's fate was sealed. For solid analyses of the Peng Dehuai affair, see Jurgen Domes, *Peng Teh-huai: The Man and the Image* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), esp. 77-106; MacFarquhar, *The Great Leap Forward*, 187-237; J. D. Simmonds, "Peng Teh-huai: A Chronological Re-Examination," *The China Quarterly* 37 (January-March 1969), 120-138; and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and Decline of Party Norms 1950-1965* (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), ch. 9. Another invaluable source on the affair is the "memoir" by Peng Dehuai himself, which was compiled posthumously on the basis of autobiographical notes Peng wrote in response to interrogators during the Cultural Revolution. An English version is now available: *Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898-1974)*, trans. by Zheng Longpu (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984). The book includes a whole chapter on the Lushan plenum (pp. 485-509) and an appendix with the full text of the letter that Peng sent to Mao in July 1959. For additional documentation, see *The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968* (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1968). Contrary to much speculation in the West, there is no reason to believe that Peng's challenge to Mao revolved around military issues *per se* or had anything to do with the Soviet Union. Peng undoubtedly was troubled by the growing frictions with Moscow because he knew how dependent China still was on the USSR for military technology, but he never raised this issue in his confrontation with Mao. Nor is there any evidence to substantiate claims about a "Soviet connection" made in David A. Charles (pseud.), "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-Huai," *The China Quarterly* 8 (October-December 1961), 63-76. Charles's article alleges that Peng's letter to Mao was prepared with Moscow's knowledge, and that "Khrushchev's refusal to apologize for this intervention in Chinese domestic affairs perhaps precipitated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute." These assertions are no more than dubious speculation.

76. On the role of senior MFA officials during the trip, see, *inter alia*, "Uzhin u Mao Tsze-duna" and "Prebyvanie v Pekine sovetskoi partiino-pravitel'stvennoi delegatsii," both in *Pravda* (Moscow), 3 October 1959, 1; and "Kitai teplo provozhaet

sovetskikh gostei: Ot'ezd iz Pekina partiino-pravitel'stvennoi delegatsii SSSR," *Pravda* (Moscow), 5 October 1959, 1. The MFA Collegium was a group of 12-15 of the most senior officials in the ministry, including the minister, all the first deputy and deputy ministers, and about a half dozen others, among them Zimyanin.

77. See "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine," Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SECRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, L. 1; and "Beseda N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-duna," *Pravda* (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1.

78. This is documented in Nie Rongzhen, *Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen*, trans. by (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), 572-573. Nie Rongzhen was the long-time head of China's strategic weapons program; his memoirs were first published in Chinese (*Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu*) in 1984.

79. "Long Live Leninism!" was first published in *Hongqi* 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in translation in *Peking Review* 3:17 (April 1960), 14-22. This statement and many others from 1959 and 1960 are available in well-annotated translation in Hudson, Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, eds., *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* and as appendices in John Gittings, ed., *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 287-394. The Gittings book also includes key statements from 1963-1967 organized thematically to shed light on events from the 1950s and early 1960s.

80. See, e.g., Dolinin, "Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali," 6.

81. For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which includes details omitted from the official transcript, see Edward Crankshaw, *The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 97-110.

82. For a useful account of this process by a participant, see Mikhail A. Klochko, *Soviet Scientist in Red China* (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, 1964), esp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, "Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali," 6.

83. For a good indication of Rakhmanin's views at the time, see his pseudonymously written book, O. B. Borisov, *Iz istorii sovetsko-kitaiskikh otoshenii v 50-kh godakh* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981). Although the book was written much later, his views were remarkably constant over the years. Rakhmanin wrote numerous other books about China (also under the pseudonym of O. B. Borisov), which are also worth consulting. See in particular O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk* (Moscow: Mysl', 1972).

84. For background on Kapitsa and his dealings with Rakhmanin, see Gilbert Rozman, *A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 51-53.

85. All other Southeast Asian countries came within the purview of the MFA's Southeast Asian Department, which remained a unified entity.

86. The provisions excluding foreigners from Manchuria and Xinjiang were not made public in February 1950 and indeed had not been publicly disclosed at the time Zimyanin was drafting his report. The existence of these agreements first came to light in 1969 when a secret speech delivered by Mao in March 1958 was published in a collection entitled *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* ("Long Live Mao Zedong Thought"), 159-172. An English translation of the speech was published in *Issues & Studies* (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95-98. Mao emphasized that these provisions relegated Manchuria and Xinjiang to the status of "colonies." For

other documents cited here by Zimyanin, see "Soglashenie mezhdru Soyuzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi o Kitaiskoi Chanchun'skoi zheleznoi doroge, Port-Arture i Dalnem," 14 February 1950; "Soobshchenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdru SSSR i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii dvukh Sovetsko-kitaiskikh aktsionernikh obshchestv," 29 March 1950; and "Soobshchenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdru SSSR i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii Sovetsko-kitaiskogo aktsionernogo obshchestva grazhdanskoi aviatsii," 2 April 1950, all in I. F. Kurdyukov, V. N. Nikiforov, and A. S. Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otosheniya, 1917-1957: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi literatury, 1959), 221-222, 227-228 and 228-229, respectively. For further commentary on these agreements, see Chang, *China's Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes*, 9-38, and for a detailed contemporary assessment of the inequitable nature of the joint stock companies, see the top-secret memorandum "O nedostatках deyatel'nosti Sovetsko-kitaiskikh obshchestv Sovkitmetall i Sovkitneft' v Sintszyane," from N. V. Vazhnov, secretary of the CPSU branch at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, 25 February 1954, in TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 9, D. 1933, Ll. 18-38.

87. For Khrushchev's version of these efforts, see *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 25-31.

88. "Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel'stva Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitel'stva Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki," 12 October 1954, and "Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel'stva Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitel'stva Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki ob otosheniyakh s Yaponiei," 12 October 1954, both in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otosheniya*, 299-301 and 301-302, respectively.

89. "Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o peredache Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike sovetskoi doli uchastiya v smeshannykh obshchestvakh," 12 October 1954, "Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o stroitel'stve zheleznoi dorogi Lan'chzhou-Urumchi-Alma Alta," 12 October 1954, "Sovmestnoe kommyunike pravitel'stva Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki i Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki o stroitel'stve zheleznoi dorogi ot Tsenina do Ulan-Batora i organizatsii pryamogo soobshcheniya v 1955 g.," 12 October 1955, *ibid.*, 303-304, 305, and 305-306, respectively.

90. Zimyanin's chronology here is slightly amiss. In private discussions with Soviet officials as early as March 1956 (a few weeks after Khrushchev's secret speech), Mao began condemning the "great and serious mistakes committed by Stalin," including his "erroneous and ill-considered" actions vis-a-vis China. See "Zapis' besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 g.," Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Yudin, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 88-99. Only after the upheavals in Eastern Europe in October-November 1956 did Chinese leaders express strong reservations about the de-Stalinization campaign. Zimyanin is right, however, that Mao had been uneasy about Khrushchev's secret speech from the very start. For reasons discussed above, it is unlikely that Mao's aversion to the reassessment of Stalin stemmed from any great feeling of personal warmth toward the late Soviet dictator. The more probable reasons for Mao's hostility toward the de-Stalinization campaign were threefold: (1) his irritation that Khrushchev had not consulted with him before delivering the secret speech; (2) his concern that

attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3) his belief that the chief features of Stalinism, especially the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on, after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Departments of People’s Daily and *Red Flag*,” 13 September 1963, in *Peking Review* 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8-15.

91. The reference here is to Mao’s trip in November 1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip outside China) since early 1950. On the point discussed in the next sentence, see Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105.

92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend”; and in the spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee published a directive inviting public criticism, many Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportunity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds.” Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter-revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000 eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (New York: Praeger, 1960), which includes extensive documentation as well as lengthy narrative and critical commentaries. For a perceptive analysis of the fundamental differences between the Hundred Flowers campaign in China and the post-Stalin “Thaw” in the Soviet Union, see S. H. Chen, “Artificial Flowers During a Natural ‘Thaw,’” in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), 220-254. Useful insights into Mao’s own goals for the Hundred Flowers campaign can be gained from 14 secret speeches he delivered between mid-February and late April 1957, collected in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, 113-372.

93. These particular complaints were expressed by a high-ranking Chinese military officer, General Lung Yun, the vice chairman of the PRC National Defense Council, in the newspaper *Xinhua* on 18 June 1957, at the very end of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He declared that it was “totally unfair that the People’s Republic of China had to bear all the expenses of the Korean War,” noting (accurately) that China had been forced to pay for all the military equipment it received from the Soviet Union. Lung contrasted Moscow’s position with the “more suitable” policy of the United States during World War I and World War II, when Allied debts were written off. He also emphasized that China’s debt to the Soviet Union should be reduced in any case as compensation for the large amount of industry that the Soviet Union extracted from Manchuria in 1945-46. Lung’s appeals went unheeded, and the Chinese government continued to pay off the bills it had accumulated, equivalent to nearly \$2 billion. The

debt was not fully repaid until 1965. During the “anti-rightist” crackdown after the Hundred Flowers campaign, Lung was punished for his remarks, but he managed to regain his spot on the National Defense Council in December 1958. See MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals*, 50. See also Mineo Nakajima, “Foreign Relations: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., *The People’s Republic, Part I*, 270, 277.

94. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva mezhdru SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/1 (STRICTLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30. Zimyanin’s description of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly praised the October 30 statement as evidence of Moscow’s “determination to eliminate certain abnormal features of its relations with other socialist states.”

95. “Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 January 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya*, 330-335. Zimyanin’s characterization of this declaration (see next sentence) is accurate.

96. The reference here is to a two-part conference in Moscow on 14-19 November 1957 marking the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of all 13 ruling Communist parties were invited to the first session on 14-16 November, but at the outset Yugoslavia declined to take any further part. As Zimyanin accurately observes below, China joined the other participants in issuing a statement that reaffirmed the CPSU’s preeminent role in the world Communist movement. See “Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostoyavshegosya v Moskve 14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 November 1957, 1-2. Yugoslav officials refused to endorse the 12-party statement, but they agreed to participate in the second phase of the conference, which was held immediately afterwards, on 16-19 November. A total of 64 Communist parties from around the world took part in that session, which culminated in the adoption of a so-called Peace Manifesto.

97. “Rech’ rukovoditelya delegatsii Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Mao Tsze-duna na yubileinoi sessii Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 7 November 1957, 2. See also Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 42-46.

98. This is a paraphrase of what Mao said in a speech at the 64-party conference on 18 November 1957, the only time he is known to have offered direct support for Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group. Excerpts from the speech were later published in *Renmin Ribao*, but all references to Khrushchev and the “Molotov clique” were omitted. As a result, until the mid-1980s Western scholars assumed that Mao had never spoken out against the Anti-Party Group. Fortunately, in 1985 the full text of Mao’s 18 November 1957 speech was published, along with the texts of two other unpublished speeches he gave during the November 1957 conference, in a collection entitled *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,” the same

title used for eight earlier compilations of secret speeches by Mao). All three speeches were translated into English, introduced, and annotated by Michael Schoenhals in “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 ‘Moscow Conference,’” *The Journal of Communist Studies* 2:2 (June 1986), 109-126. Mao’s comments about the Anti-Party Group were as follows: “I endorse the CPSU Central Committee’s resolution of the Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. The facts show that unity could not be achieved and that the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov clique took the opportunity to attack when Comrade Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, even though they launched a surprise attack, our Comrade Khrushchev is no fool; he is a smart man who immediately mobilized his forces and launched a victorious counterattack. That struggle was one between two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In the four or five years since Stalin’s death the situation in the Soviet Union has improved considerably in the sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This shows that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev is more correct and that opposition to this line is incorrect. Comrade Molotov is an old comrade with a long fighting history, but this time he made a mistake. The struggle between the two lines within the CPSU was of an antagonistic variety because the two sides could not accommodate each other and each side excluded the other. When this is the case, there need not be any trouble if everything is handled well, but there is the danger of trouble if things are not handled well.”

99. “Vstrecha Predsedatelya Mao Tsze-duna s kitaiskimi studentami i praktikantami v Moskve,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 November 1957, 3.

100. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze-duna,” 3 August 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya*, 403-406.

101. The “questions of military cooperation” discussed at this meeting were essentially fivefold. *First*, China sought new weapons and broader military backing from Moscow for a possible operation against Taiwan (see above). *Second*, Khrushchev sought, once again, to persuade China to permit a long-wave military communications center to be established on Chinese territory by 1962 for Soviet submarines operating in the Pacific. This idea was first broached to the Chinese by Soviet defense minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii in April 1958, and over the next few months the two sides haggled over the funding and operation rights. At the summit, Khrushchev and Mao concurred that China would build and operate the station with Soviet funding and technical assistance, and a formal agreement to that effect was signed. (The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from China in mid-1960 left the communications center only half-completed, but the Chinese eventually completed it on their own.) *Third*, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai requested Soviet aid in the development of nuclear-powered submarines, a proposal that Khrushchev quickly brushed aside, as he had in the past. *Fourth*, Khrushchev renewed an earlier proposal for a joint submarine flotilla, which effectively would have been a reciprocal basing arrangement for Soviet submarines at Chinese ports and Chinese submarines at Soviet Arctic ports. Mao summarily rejected this idea, just as he did when it was first raised via the Soviet ambassador in China, Pavel Yudin, ten days before Khrushchev’s visit. *Fifth*, the question of nuclear weapons cooperation came up. In accordance with the NDTA, the Soviet Union at the time was training Chinese nuclear weapons scientists and was providing

information needed to build nuclear weapons. But unbeknownst to Chinese officials, Soviet leaders had decided in early 1958 not to transfer a prototype nuclear bomb to China, despite having made a pledge to that effect in the October 1957 agreement. Mao raised this matter during the talks with Khrushchev, but got a non-committal response. Information here is derived from: (1) an interview with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader during this trip to China, in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 6 October 1995; (2) Lewis and Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower*, 14-15; and (3) Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 76-78.

102. Khrushchev declared that "an attack against the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, would be an attack against the USSR itself. True to its duty, our country will do everything necessary, in conjunction with People's China, to defend the security of both states." This statement was repeated, in more or less identical phrasing, in numerous high-level Soviet statements. See, e.g., "Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SShA D. Eizenkhaueru po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivanya," 7 September 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya*, 411. According to Khrushchev's memoirs, as soon as this statement was issued, Mao expressed doubt that the Soviet Union had any intention of fulfilling it; see *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 5, Part F ("Mao Tsze-dun"), pp. 4-5. This assertion is problematic, but there is not yet (and perhaps cannot be) any direct evidence to contravene it.

103. The clearest statement to this effect came in a letter Khrushchev sent to President Eisenhower during the Quemoy crisis, warning that "those who are concocting plans for an atomic attack against the PRC should not forget that it is not only the USA, but the other side as well that possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and the means of delivering them, and that if such an attack is carried out against the PRC, the aggressor will be dealt a swift and automatic rebuff in kind." See "Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SShA D. Eizenkhaueru o polozhenii v raione Taivanya," 19 September 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya*, 417. At the time, the Chinese authorities warmly praised Khrushchev's statement, describing it as "a lofty expression of our fraternal relations." See "Sotsialisticheskii lager v sovremennoi mezhdunarodnoi obstanovke," *Pravda* (Moscow), 10 November 1958, 3. Mao himself said he was "deeply touched by [the Soviet Union's] boundless devotion to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism" and wanted to "convey heartfelt gratitude" to Khrushchev for his support during the Taiwan Straits crisis. Several years later, however, Chinese leaders shifted their view (in accordance with the polemics of the time) and expressed contempt for Khrushchev's pledge, arguing that "Soviet leaders declared their support for China only when they were certain there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out and there was no longer any need for the Soviet Union to support China with its nuclear weapons." See "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of 21 August," 1 September 1963, in *Peking Review* 6:36 (6 September 1963), 9. New evidence suggests that these accusations were unfounded, and that Khrushchev's pledge was far more meaningful than the Chinese authorities later claimed; see Lewis and Xue, *China's*

Strategic Seapower, 15-17 and Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split," 499-500. For an earlier study reaching the same conclusion, see Halperin and Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," 265-303.

104. "Vneocherednoi XXI S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O kontrol'nykh tsifrakh razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistvo SSSR na 1959-1965 gody—Doklad tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva," *Pravda* (Moscow), 28 January 1959, 2-10; and "Vneocherednoi XXI S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Zaklyuchitel'noe slovo tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva," *Pravda* (Moscow), 6 February 1959, 1-3. These speeches and other materials from the Congress were republished in *XXII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962).

105. Zimyanin's characterization of the Chinese response to Khrushchev's report (especially the section on "The New Stage in Communist Construction and Certain Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory") is accurate. Beijing's tepid initial response appeared in the main daily *Renmin Ribao* on 5 February 1959, and a much more extended commentary was published in the theoretical journal *Hongqi* on 16 February.

106. Zimyanin is referring here to the momentous Second Session of the CPC's 8th Congress, which adopted a "General Line" of drastically accelerated economic development and ideological fervor. The hallmarks of the new line, as it evolved over the next few months, were: (1) the Great Leap Forward, a crash program of industrialization relying primarily on China's own resources; (2) the establishment of huge "people's communes" (the "basic social units of a Communist society"), which were intended to replace collective farms and to combine agriculture with industry (including "backyard" steel furnaces) all around the country; (3) the elimination of virtually all remaining forms of private property; (4) the further leveling of social classes and systematic depreciation of expertise; (5) the abandonment of earlier birth control efforts; and (6) the conversion of the army into a full-fledged people's militia (via the communes) and the establishment of an "Everyone a Soldier" campaign requiring Chinese military officers to spend at least one month a year performing the duties of a common soldier. Chinese leaders' hopes of achieving immediate, rapid growth via the Great Leap Forward were evident from the goals they set for steel output (to cite a typical case). In 1957 steel production in China had been 5.9 million tons, whereas the target for 1958 was nearly twice that, at 10.7 million tons, and the targets for subsequent years were even more ambitious. Not surprisingly, these goals proved unattainable, and the whole effort turned out to be a debilitating failure. The communes (which became smaller but more numerous after 1958) produced equally disastrous results, causing widespread food shortages and starvation in the early 1960s. The Chinese armed forces also suffered immense damage from both the demoralization of the officer corps and the disarray within the military-industrial complex. Of the many Western analyses of Chinese politics and society during this period, see in particular MacFarquhar, *The Great Leap Forward*.

107. This was indeed the thrust of China's campaign against "blind faith in foreigners" (quoted by Zimyanin in the previous sentence), as formulated in the spring and summer of 1958. Although Chinese officials and military commanders at this point were still hoping for an increase in Soviet military-technical aid, they wanted to limit the political and doctrinal effects of Soviet

assistance. (In other words, they wanted to receive Soviet weaponry and sensitive technology, but to use these in accordance with China's own doctrine, strategy, and political goals.) At Mao's behest, Chinese officials began speaking against the "mechanical imitation of foreign technology" and "excessive reliance on assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries," and warned that "there is no possibility for us to make wholesale use of the existing experiences of other countries." They emphasized that China "must carry out advanced research itself" instead of "simply hoping for outside aid." For more on this point, see Ford, "The Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Problems, 1957-60," esp. 102-104; Lewis and Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower*, 3-4, and MacFarquhar, *The Great Leap Forward*, 36-40, *passim*. For a good example of Mao's own thoughts on the topic, see his secret "Address on March 10" at the Chengdu Conference, published in *Issues & Studies* 10:2 (November 1973), 95-98.

108. For Soviet officials' views of these ideological disputes, see the voluminous files in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, Dd. 247, 301, 398, and 399.

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New Evidence on The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71

EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTS ON THE BORDER CONFLICT, 1969

by Christian F. Ostermann¹

The Sino-Soviet border crisis of March-September 1969 is one of the most intriguing crises of the Cold War. For several months, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) stood on the brink of war which—on the Soviet side—involved the threat of nuclear strikes. It resulted in a sharp increase in Soviet military strength in Central Asia and a fierce Sino-Chinese arms race. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1969 border conflict also reinforced the trend toward a fundamental realignment in the Cold War international system: polycentrism within world communism, Sino-Soviet tensions, U.S.-Chinese rapprochement and “triangular diplomacy”.² Unlike in the case of Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, however, the documentary evidence on the crisis is extremely sparse. Both Moscow and Beijing have published their mutual recriminations, but beyond official notes and journalistic accounts, few sources have become available on either side, nor, for that matter, in the United States.³

Numerous questions remain unanswered: What was the motivation on both sides behind the 1969 border incidents? How likely was the outbreak of a major war? How serious was the Soviet nuclear threat? Were there divisions within the Chinese leadership over the Zhen Bao/Damansky Island Incident? What was the debate in Moscow? How much did the United States know about the conflict? What was the U.S. role in the dispute? How was the crisis resolved? Even with the opening of the former Soviet archives, little new evidence on the crisis has emerged. The following three documents, obtained by the author in the “Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv” (SAPMO), the archives which house the records of the former East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in Berlin, are among the first authentic, previously secret documents on the crisis that

have become available.⁴

Border disputes between Russia and China had a long historical tradition.⁵ Competing territorial claims and differences over borderlines reached back to the seventeenth century. In 1860, the conclusion of the Treaty of Beijing provided for a temporary settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, Chinese and Russian cultures and territorial ambitions continued to clash in the border areas. Following the Communists' victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and Mao Zedong's option for an alliance with Moscow (1950), the Chinese Communists apparently accepted the territorial *status quo* along the 4,150 mile-long border with Russia.⁶ Largely dependent on the Soviet protection and support, the Chinese signed the 1951 Border Rivers Navigation Agreement which implied their consent to the existing border regime. This included acceptance of armed Soviet control of the Amur and Ussuri border rivers and of more than 600 of the 700 islands located in these strategically important waterways in the extreme northeastern border region. The agreement also required the Chinese to obtain Soviet permission before using the rivers and the islands. Similar procedures had been established for the use of Soviet-claimed pastures by Chinese herdsmen in the northwestern Xinjiang border province. Disagreements over the border never ceased to exist but local authorities kept them at a low level.⁷

With the emerging Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and the open collision of Soviet and Chinese leaders at the International Conference of Communist Parties in Bucharest in 1960, the dormant border issue resurfaced again. It now seems evident that the border issue was a symptom rather than a cause of heightening tensions between both countries. Both sides, however, found the issue extremely useful as an instrument in their ideological and power-political rivalry. For the Chinese, the border incidents were a way to underline their ideological challenge by quasi-military means and to put the Soviets on the defensive. Claiming that the borderline had been “dictated” by the Russian Empire in “unequal treaties” with a weak and

divided China, the Chinese leadership used the conflict over the border to draw attention to Czarist imperial legacies in Soviet foreign policy and serve as proof for what was later labeled Soviet “social imperialism.” Moreover, Beijing hoped that the incidents would serve notice to the USSR that the PRC would no longer put up with Soviet subversion in the volatile border regions. Chinese border violations had occurred in Xinjiang in 1959, and continued in the early 1960s.⁸

Moscow had initially refused to accept the Chinese notion of “unequal treaties” and enter into negotiations which Beijing had demanded possibly as early as 1957 and again in 1960. Negotiations, Moscow must have felt, would call into question the legitimacy of the border arrangement and open a Pandora's box of questions. As Sino-Chinese polemics and Chinese border intrusions mounted in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and as Beijing demonstrated its readiness to employ its growing military power in several military campaigns against India in 1962, Moscow finally agreed to consultations on the border. Following a letter by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to CCP Chairman Mao Zedong in November 1963, secret negotiations began in February 1964 but soon stalemated over Chinese claims to large territories in Siberia and demands for recognition of the “unequal” nature of the historical border arrangement. Disagreement also existed regarding the exact borderline. While Moscow was ready to concede that the thalway—a line following the deepest point of a valley or river—constituted the borderline in the northeastern border rivers, the Soviets were unwilling to relinquish control over most of the 700 islands in the frontier rivers. When Mao publicized the controversy and accused the Soviets of “imperialism,” Khrushchev decided to suspend the talks (October 1964).⁹

The onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution led to a further decline in Sino-Soviet relations. Following an abortive meeting with Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin in February 1965, Mao broke party relations with the CPSU in 1966 and reduced communications with Moscow to low-

level contacts. Concurrently, the situation on the borders worsened. In the spring, Beijing unilaterally announced stricter navigation regulations governing “foreign” (thus Soviet) vessels on the border rivers. Later that year small-scale skirmishes occurred along the Sino-Soviet and Chinese-Mongolian borders. Ever more aggressively, the Chinese asserted their claims to the islands within their half of the border rivers along the Chinese Northeast. Groups of Chinese soldiers and fishermen were now sent on the border islands instructed to fight if their normal patrol routes were blocked by Soviet guards. Later, Beijing claimed that a total of 4,189 border incidents had occurred between 1964 and 1969 alone.¹⁰

The new Soviet leadership under Leonid I. Brezhnev (which overthrew Khrushchev in October 1964) had responded to Beijing’s confrontational posture by increased economic and military pressure. Early on in the confrontation, the Soviets had withdrawn vital economic support and advisers from the PRC. Moscow had also initiated a major long-term build-up of its military power in the Soviet Far East. Soviet conventional force levels rose dramatically after 1965, from approximately 17 divisions to 27 divisions by 1969 (and about 48 divisions in the mid-1970s).¹¹ Moscow also decided to deploy SS-4 MRBMs as well as short-range rockets (SCUD and FROG). Other initiatives aimed at strengthening border controls along the frontier with the PRC. Increasing the geostrategic pressure on Beijing, Moscow also concluded a twenty-year treaty of friendship with Mongolia. The treaty provided for joint Soviet-Mongolian defense efforts and led to the stationing of two to three Soviet divisions in the Mongolian People’s Republic.¹²

Most importantly, Moscow did not shy away from thinly veiled nuclear threats. As early as September 1964, Khrushchev had announced that the Soviet Union would use all necessary measures including “up-to-date weapons of annihilation” to defend its borders.¹³ Repeatedly throughout the border crisis, Moscow secretly and publicly aired the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear installations. Faced with the PRC’s growing military capabilities and Mao’s apparent “mad” “opportunism”, Moscow increased its nuclear strength in Asia and, by 1969, had installed an anti-ballistic missile system directed

against China.

Despite heightened Chinese aggressiveness and Soviet nuclear sabre-rattling, the border conflict did not immediately or inevitably develop into shooting engagements. Chinese fishermen and soldiers continued to enter border islands on the Ussuri and Amur which they claimed as their own, thus encroaching on territory controlled by Soviets border guards. In each case, the Soviets dispatched border guard units which expelled the Chinese from the islands. Fighting was usually avoided. Over the years, Soviets and Chinese came to adopt a pattern of almost ritualistic practices and unwritten rules to resolve border violations in a non-shooting fashion. Even after Mao turned toward a more aggressive policy of “forceful forward patrolling” (which implied fighting if necessary) during the Cultural Revolution, shooting engagements were avoided by both sides. Neither Beijing nor Moscow was apparently interested in starting major fighting.¹⁴

The Sino-Soviet “cold war” on the border turned hot in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968) and the Soviet enunciation of the “Brezhnev doctrine.” It is likely that the Chinese leadership perceived the Soviet claim to intervene in any socialist state where socialism was considered “in danger”—and the potential application of the Brezhnev doctrine to Asia—as a threat and challenge to Chinese security interests. PRC Defense Minister Lin Biao, Mao’s heir apparent, allegedly warned the CCP Politburo and the Military Affairs Commission that China would be attacked by the the Soviet Union. In October 1968, he issued Directive No. 1 which put the People’s Republic on war footing. Others within the Politburo—including Premier Zhou Enlai and probably Mao Zedong—apparently doubted Moscow’s readiness for war with China.¹⁵ These differences notwithstanding, the Chinese leadership opted for a more forceful attitude towards Russia. Chinese border guards were now instructed to carry uniforms and weapons and to confront the Soviets and shoot if necessary. Incidents of growing violence (though still non-shooting) occurred in late 1968 and in January and February of 1969. But it was not until 2 March 1969 that the transition from non-shooting confrontations to fire-fighting was made. On this day, Chinese soldiers ambushed and opened fire on a

Soviet border patrol unit on the Zhen Bao/Damansky Island in the Ussuri, killing the Soviet officer and 30 soldiers. Document No. 1 (printed below), an informational note given to the East German leadership and circulated in the SED Politburo, provides the first internal Soviet account of this crucial incident.

The document accords with the publicized Soviet version of the incident, considered by scholars as closer to the truth than the opposing Chinese account which claimed that the Soviets started the gunfire and thus broke the most significant tacit principle of confrontation.¹⁶ According to the document, Soviet observations posts noted the presence of thirty armed Chinese soldiers on the island around 9 a.m. on March 2, causing the Soviets to send a unit of border guards to the island to expel the Chinese intruders. When, according to the long-established practice, the Soviet post commander and a small advance contingent of border guards confronted the Chinese and protested the border violation, demanding that the Chinese leave the island, the Chinese opened fire. In the ensuing fight, the Soviet commander and thirty Soviet soldiers were killed. Artillery fire was also opened on the unit from larger and well-equipped Chinese forces hidden on the island and from the Chinese shore. Only after Soviet reinforcements arrived were the Chinese expelled from the island.

Despite the assertion that the incident was the “logical consequence” of previous border provocations, the memorandum to the East German leadership, communicated a few days after the event took place, reflects Soviet anxiety over the new level of preparation, violence and weaponry exhibited by the Chinese in carrying out the ambush. The document reveals that the Soviet were nothing less than stunned over the fact that the Chinese had departed from the long-established practice of resolving border violations short of firefights. Was this a prelude to a full-fledged war? To some extent, the document thus corroborates evidence by high-level Soviet defector Arkady N. Shevchenko who has argued that “the events on Damansky had the effect of an electric shock in Moscow. The Politburo was terrified that the Chinese might make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet territory. ... A nightmare vision of invasion by millions of Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost fran-

tic. Despite our overwhelming superiority in weaponry, it would not be easy for the USSR to cope with an assault of such magnitude.”¹⁷

Soviet concerns that the border conflict would spin out of control were central to the Soviet response to the Chinese challenge. Yet so was the specter of an even more radical shift in Chinese foreign policy evident in the offensive posture displayed in the ambush and atrocities. For Moscow, the March 2 incident also carried geostrategic meaning: it revealed “Beijing’s intention to activate its opportunistic political flirtation with the imperialist countries—above all with the United States and West Germany.”

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership adopted a carrot-and-stick approach in response to the crisis: First, Moscow sought to isolate Beijing further and increase military pressure on the PRC. The March 2 clash had initially provoked a heated debate within the Soviet leadership. Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko reportedly advocated a “nuclear blockbuster” against China’s industrial centers, while others called for surgical strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities.¹⁸ Brezhnev eventually decided to opt for a more vigorous build-up of Soviet conventional forces in the East (including relocation of Soviet bomber fleets from the West), not necessarily precluding, however, the use of tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁹ Demonstrating their determination to retaliate with superior force, the Soviets, after a 12-day stand-off, attacked Chinese positions on the island with heavy artillery and overwhelming force, foregoing, however, the use of air or nuclear strikes.²⁰

To some extent, the Kremlin’s forceful but limited military response was influenced by heightened concern over the militarization of the crisis among Moscow’s European and Asian allies. Moscow, however, had no interest in escalating the crisis beyond control for other reasons as well. Added pressure on the PRC would not induce Mao to forego his “political flirtation” with the West—in fact, it might reinforce such a move, which would run counter to Soviet geostrategic interests. Thus, Brezhnev also sought to defuse the crisis by resuming negotiations with the Chinese. Within a week of the March 15 incident, Moscow sought to re-establish contact with Beijing.

Document No. 2, a telegram from the

East German Embassy in Beijing in early April 1969, documents one of the early Soviet peace feelers. The telegram reports information provided by the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Beijing according to which Kosygin, acting on behalf of the CPSU Politburo, tried to contact Mao on March 21 through the existing hotline between Moscow and Beijing. The Chinese, however, refused to put Kosygin through. Reflecting Moscow’s concern over the crisis, Kosygin reportedly indicated that, “if necessary,” he would agree to meet even with Zhou Enlai. When the Soviet Embassy communicated the Soviet desire for talks to the Chinese Foreign Ministry the following day, the Soviets were informed that a direct line between the CPSU Politburo and the CCP was no longer “advantageous.” Mao’s intransigence may well have stemmed from the realization that Moscow had only limited military leverage. Moreover, by publicly degrading Moscow, Mao probably sought to strengthen his position at the Chinese Communist Party conference in April 1969.²¹

Soviet overtures for border discussions continued, however. On March 29, Moscow publicly called for negotiations on the border issue. Two weeks later, on April 11, a Soviet Foreign Ministry note to the PRC again proposed the immediate resumption of the border talks, to no avail. Major Chinese intrusions occurred, according to these informational notes given by the Soviets to the East Germans, throughout May, climaxing in incursions on May 2, 9, 13, and 14 in the western border regions as well as along the controversial border rivers in the east.

Facing Chinese intransigence, Moscow continued its “coercive diplomacy” throughout the summer of 1969, launching a further military build-up to ensure complete superiority in strategic and conventional weapons. Indeed there is every reason to believe that following the March 2 engagement, the Soviets were largely responsible for incidents along the Sino-Soviet border, the most important of which occurred on August 13 along the Central Asian border in Xinjiang, six miles east of Zhalanashkol.²² Taking advantage of their superiority in armor and weaponry, the Soviets sought to demonstrate to the Chinese their determination through repeated border infringements. Apparently more anxious about Soviet policy, the Chinese, by September, were charging the Russians with 488 “deliberate” border violations

between June and August alone. Considering the concurrent hints of potential nuclear attack, the summer of 1969 can be seen, as the Thomas Robinson has put it, “as a textbook case of the use by Moscow of combined political, military, and propaganda means to force Peking to take an action—renew the talks—it otherwise resisted....”²³

Soviet strategy in the border conflict proved successful with regard to the resumption of border talks. In May, the Chinese Government signaled its readiness for talks through an official government note. Contrary to their refusal in previous year, the Chinese, in June, agreed to hold a meeting of the Commission on Border Rivers Navigation which had been created by the 1951 Agreement. After an abortive Chinese walk-out, negotiations resulted in the signing of a new protocol in August. More significantly, the Chinese finally agreed to a high-level meeting: on 11 September 1969, a meeting between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai took place in Beijing which laid the foundations for the eventual resolution of the border crisis.²⁴

Document No. 3, an informational memorandum handed by the Soviets to the East German leadership, is a record of the meeting which took place between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Few details of this crucial meeting have become known. According to the memorandum, the meeting was the result of “one more initiative” on the part of the CPSU Central Committee to effect a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Chinese responded “pretty quickly” to the Soviet proposal to take advantage of Kosygin’s presence in Hanoi on the occasion of Ho Chi Minh’s funeral. The Soviet delegation under Kosygin, however, learned of Chinese readiness to talk only one hour after its departure from Hanoi. Indicative of Moscow’s strong interest in de-escalation, Kosygin, who had already reached Soviet Central Asia, turned around and flew to Beijing, there he was met by Chinese leaders Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi.²⁵

The four-hour talk apparently centered on the border issue. According to the Soviet account, Zhou Enlai declared that “China has no territorial pretensions toward the Soviet Union” and—despite his assertions about the unequal nature of the treaties—“recognizes that border which exists in accord with these treaties.” While Zhou stated that China had no intentions of attacking the Soviet Union, Kosygin denied assertions of

“contrived imperialist propaganda” that Moscow was “preparing a preventive strike” against the PRC. Preparatory to further negotiations on border issues in Beijing, both sides were reported to have agreed to three principles: (1) the observance of the existing border; (2) the inadmissibility of armed confrontations; and (3) military disengagement from disputed border areas. Kosygin also proposed the expansion of trade relations and economic cooperation as well as the normalizing of railroad and aviation connections. Significantly, the Soviet premier also acquiesced when Zhou declared that Beijing would not curtail its political and ideological criticism of the Soviet Union. Letting the Chinese save face, Kosygin conceded that, while Sino-Soviet disagreements “played into the hands of world imperialism,” Moscow considered polemics on controversial issues as “permissible” if conducted in a “fitting tone.”

Moscow was successful in forcing the Chinese to accept the *status quo* along the Sino-Soviet border. But this victory came at a price in ideological and geostrategic terms. Not only did the Soviets concede the validity of a direct challenge to its leadership within the Communist bloc in ideological terms, a development long evident but rarely formulated as explicitly as in the Beijing meeting. In the long run, Moscow’s coercive diplomacy worsened relations with the United States and helped drive China into a rapprochement with the West, thus altering the balance of power in Asia to Soviet disadvantage.²⁶

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**Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR
Leadership on 2 March 1969
Sino-Soviet Border Clashes**

5 Copies
3/8/69

On March 2, 1969, at 11 o’clock local time, the Chinese organized a provocation on the Island Damansky which is located on the river Ussuri south of Khabarovsk, between the points Bikin and Iman (Primorsky Region).

The ascertained facts are that this action had been prepared by the Chinese government for a long time. In December 1968 and in January/February 1969, groups of armed

Chinese soldiers violated the border at the Damansky Island several times, operating from Hunzy. After protests by the Soviet border guards, the Chinese military returned to their border posts or marched along the line which constitutes the border between China and the USSR.

In the events of March 2, 1969, the border control forces at Hunzy played only a secondary role. An especially trained unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with a force of more than 200 men was used for the staging of this provocation. Secretly, this unit was brought on the Island Damanskiy during the night of March 2. The men in this unit had special gear and wore camouflage clothes. A telephone line to the unit was installed from the Chinese shore. Prior to this, reserves and munitions, among others PAC batteries, mines and armored artillery and heavy fire guns, had been pulled together near the Chinese shore. The stabilizers, shelling, mines and grenade splinters, and the kind of crates left in the tanks that were hit, found later provided the proof that these weapons had indeed been used.

Around 2 o’clock Moscow time (9 o’clock local time), our observation posts noted the advance of 30 armed Chinese military men on the Island of Damansky. Consequently, a group of Soviet border guards was dispatched to the location where the Chinese had violated the border. The officer in charge of the unit and a small contingent approached the border violators with the intention of registering protests and demanding (without using force) that they leave Soviet territory, as had been done repeatedly in the past. But within the first minutes of the exchange, our border guards came under crossfire and were insidiously shot without any warning. At the same time, fire on the remaining parts of our force was opened from an ambush on the island and from the Chinese shore. The guards then assumed combat order, and, reinforced by the approaching reserve from the nearby border post, threw back the Chinese surprise attack, and expelled them through decisive action from Soviet territory.

There were casualties and wounded men on both sides.

When the location on the island where the incident had happened was inspected, military equipment, telephones, and phone lines connecting to the Chinese mainland, as well as large numbers of scattered empty

liquor bottles (which had obviously been used by the Chinese provocateurs and the participants in this adventure beforehand to gain courage) were found.

There are no settlements on the Island of Damansky and it is of no economic importance at all; there are no villages in the vicinity for dozens of miles. One can obviously draw the conclusion that it [the island] was chosen as the site for the provocation because such an endeavor could be prepared there secretly and then presented to the world in a version advantageous to the organizers.

During the provocation, the Chinese military committed incredibly brutal and cruel acts against the wounded Soviet border guards. Based on the on-site inspection and the expert knowledge of the medical commission which examined the bodies of the dead Soviet border guards, it can be stated that the wounded were shot by the Chinese from close range [and/or] stabbed with bayonets and knives. The faces of some of the casualties were distorted beyond recognition, others had their uniforms and boots taken off by the Chinese. The cruelties committed by the Chinese toward the Soviet border guards can only be compared with the worst brutalities of the Chinese militarists and Chiang Kai-shek’s [Jiang Jieshi’s] men during the ’20s and ’30s.

The crime by the Mao Zedong group which caused loss of lives has far-reaching objectives.

The Maoists exacerbate the anti-Soviet hysteria and produce a chauvinist frenzy in the country, creating an atmosphere which enables them to establish Mao Zedong’s anti-Soviet and chauvinist-great power course as the general line of Chinese policy at the IX Party Convention of the CPC.

It is also obvious that the Mao group has the intention of using the anti-Soviet psychosis it created for its subversive and divisive policy in the international Communist movement. The Maoists apparently strive to make an all-out effort to complicate and prevent the convention of the International Consultation of Communist and Workers’ Parties in order to create distrust in the Soviet Union and the CCPU among the fraternal parties.

The new dangerous provocations of the Maoists reveal Beijing’s intention to activate the opportunistic political flirtation with the imperialist countries - above all with the United States and West Germany. It is no

accident that the ambush on the Soviet border unit was staged by the Chinese agencies at a time when Bonn started its provocation of holding the election of the Federal President in West Berlin.

The provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is part of the Maoists' policy which aims at forcing a radical reversal in the foreign and domestic policies of the PR [People's Republic] of China and at transforming the country de facto into a power hostile toward the socialist countries.

The Mao Zedong group has prepared the organization of armed provocations along the Soviet-Chinese border for a long time. The Chinese authorities have been creating artificial tensions at the Soviet-Chinese border since 1960. Since this time the Chinese have undertaken several thousand border violations with provocative goals.

At the beginning of 1967, the number of border violations by Chinese authorities increased sharply. In some districts they tried to install demonstratively border patrols on the islands and those parts of the rivers belonging to the USSR. In December 1967 and in January 1968, the Chinese undertook large provocative actions on the island of Kirkinsi on the Ussuri [River] and in the area of the Kasakevich Canal. On January 23, 1969, the Chinese staged an armed attack on the Island of Damansky.

The border in the area of the Island of Damansky was established according to the Treaty of Beijing of 1860 and the enclosed map which the representatives of Russia and China signed in June 1863. According to the then drawn-up demarcation line the Island of Damansky is located on the territory of the USSR. This line has always been protected by Soviet border guards.

Confronted with the Chinese provocations at the border, the Soviet side, for years, has taken active steps towards a regulation of the situation.

The question of the borderline was discussed in the bilateral Soviet-Chinese Consultations on the Determination of the Borderline in Certain Controversial Areas of 1964. The Soviet side made a number of proposals regarding the examination of the controversial border question. The Chinese leadership, however, was determined to let these consultations fail. The Chinese delegation put up the completely untenable demand to recognize the unequal character of the treaties delineating the Soviet-Chi-

nese border and raised territorial claims against the Soviet Union about an area of altogether 1,575,000 square kilometer. On July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong declared in a conversation with Japanese members of parliament with regard to the Chinese territorial demands against the Soviet Union that "we have not yet presented the bill for this territory."

On August 22, 1964, the consultations were interrupted. Despite our repeated proposals the Chinese did not resume the conversations and did not react even when the question was mentioned in the Soviet foreign ministry note of August 31, 1967.

Meanwhile the Chinese authorities continued to violate grossly the Soviet-Chinese agreement of 1951 on the regulation of the navigation in the border rivers. In 1967 and 1968 they blew up the consultations of the mixed Soviet-Chinese navigation commission which had been established on the basis of the agreement of 1951.

In the Chinese border areas large military preparations set in (construction of airports, access routes, barracks and depots, training of militia, etc.).

The Chinese authorities consciously conjure up situations of conflict along the border and stage provocations there. On our part, all measures have been taken to avoid an escalation of the situation and to prevent incidents and conflicts. The Soviet border troops have been instructed not to use their arms and, if possible, to avoid armed collisions. The instruction on the non-use of arms was strictly enforced, although the Chinese acted extremely provocatively in many cases, employed the most deceitful tricks, picked fights, and attacked our border guards with stabbing weapons, with steel rod and other such things.

The armed provocation in the area of the Island of Damansky is a logical consequence of this course of the Chinese authorities and is part of a far-reaching plan by Beijing aiming at increasing the Maoists' anti-Soviet campaign.

Since March 3, 1969, the Soviet Embassy in Beijing has been exposed again to an organized siege by specially trained groups of Maoists. Brutal acts of force and rowdylike excesses against the representatives of Soviet institutions are occurring throughout China every day. All over the country, an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign has been kindled. It is characteristic that this whole

campaign assumed a military coloration, that an atmosphere of chauvinistic frenzy has been created throughout the country.

Faced with this situation the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government are undertaking the necessary steps to prevent further border violations. They will do everything necessary in order to frustrate the criminal intentions of the Mao Zedong group which are to create hostility between the Soviet people and the Chinese people.

The Soviet Government is led in its relations with the Chinese people by feelings of friendship and is intent on pursuing this policy in the future. Ill-considered provocative actions of the Chinese authorities will, however, be decisively repudiated on our part and brought to an end with determination.

[Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from German by Christian F. Ostermann.]

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Document No. 2: Telegram to East German Foreign Ministry from GDR Ambassador to PRC, 2 April 1969

Council of Ministers of the
German Democratic Republic
The Minister for Foreign Affairs

Berlin, April 2, 1969

Comrade Walter Ulbricht
Willi Stoph
Erich Honecker
Hermann Axen

Berlin

Dear Comrades!

The following is the text of a telegram from Comrade Hertzfeld, Peking, for your information:

"Soviet Chargé stated that there is talk in Hanoi that Ho Chi Minh wants to go to Beijing soon to negotiate at the highest level with the Chinese side since the Vietnamese side is very concerned about the aggravation of Chinese-Soviet relations.

The Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic reported that the PR China

and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] [earlier] this year signed an agreement on Chinese aid for Vietnam in the sum of 800 million Yen. [...]

The Chargé was called on the evening of March 21 by Kosygin on direct line from Moscow. Com. Kosygin informed him that he had attempted to contact Mao Zedong through the existing direct telephone line. He was not put through by the Chinese side. If need be the conversation could also be held with Zhou Enlai. (Com. Kosygin was acting at the request of the politburo of the CPSU.)

After various attempts by the Soviet Embassy to contact the Foreign Ministry in this matter, a conversation between Kosygin and Mao Zedong was refused [by the Chinese] under rude abuse of the CPSU. Desire for talks with Zhou was to be communicated [to the Chinese].

3/22 Aide-mémoire by the deputy head of department in the foreign ministry; it stated that, because of the currently existing relations between the Soviet Union and the PR China, a direct telephone line was no longer

advantageous.

If the Soviet government had to communicate anything to the PR China, it is asked to do so via diplomatic channels.

Allegedly conference in Hongkong on questions of China policy organized by the US State Department. Dutch Chargé and Finnish Ambassador here are to attend."

With Socialist Greetings
Oskar Fischer

[Source: SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from German by Christian F. Ostermann.]

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Document No. 3: Soviet Report on 11 September 1969 Kosygin-Zhou Meeting

Secret
Only Copy

Information

About A.N. Kosygin's Conversation With
Zhou Enlai on
11 September 1969

The CC CPSU considers it necessary to inform You about A.N. Kosygin's conversation with Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai which took place on September 11 of this year in Beijing.

As is well known, relations between the USSR and China, and the leadership of the PRC is to blame for this, are extremely aggravated. The Chinese authorities are exacerbating tension on the border with the Soviet Union. In the PRC, appeals to prepare for war against the USSR are openly made. Trade relations have been reduced to a minimum, scientific-technological and cultural exchanges have ceased, contacts along diplomatic lines are limited. For more than three years ambassadors have been absent from Moscow and Beijing. The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership is being used by the imperialist powers in the struggle against world socialism and the Communist movement.

In the report of CC CPSU General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev to the Moscow meeting

**The Cold War in Asia:
Khabarovsk Conference Highlights
Role of Russian Far East**

by David L. Wolff

On 26-29 August 1995 an international, interdisciplinary conference focusing on the borderland nature of the Russian Far East took place in Khabarovsk, Russia. Brought together by funds from the Center for Global Partnership (*Abe kikin*), the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), 40 scholars made 38 presentations about their papers and responded to questions from the other participants.

A number of papers focused directly on Cold War issues, as can be seen in the full schedule printed below. There was an approximately equal number of papers covering events prior to the Cold War and those more contemporary. General themes touched on in discussions included:

1) the special nature of the Russian Far East as a borderland, historically much more in contact with neighbors than most of Russia;

2) Russo-Chinese, Russo-Japanese, Russo-Korean and Russo-American diplomatic, economic and cultural relations in Northeast Asia;

3) the special role of the military as a social and economic force in the borderland;

4) the great importance of migration in this region, whether as colonization, intra-regional mobility or expulsion, and

5) diaspora communities of the Russian Far East: Chinese, Germans, Japanese, Jews, Koreans and Russians;

The working language of the conference was Russian, although several talks were delivered in English with interpretation into Russian. There were a surprising number of people at the table (actually a big square of tables) fluent in three or more languages and I think everyone met and talked with just about everyone else.

Representatives from local archives presented papers on specific areas of strength and exhibited lists of holdings, covering such themes as Russo-Chinese relations, Chinese and Koreans in the Russian Far East, Russians in China and Birobidzhan. Additionally, aside from myself, six other scholars worked in the Khabarovsk Provin-

cial Archive and Russian State Archive of the Far East in Vladivostok. These sites hold materials on such Cold War related topics as border disputes and clashes, mobilizations, the draft, voluntary organizations to aid the Army, civil defense, military education, the military-industrial complex and cross-border contacts (trade, tourism, intergovernmental negotiations, etc.). Two interesting documents from the Khabarovsk archive concerning Sino-Soviet border-tensions appear in translation by Elizabeth Wishnick in this issue of the *Bulletin*. Russian participants have also made declassification requests in the course of preparing conference papers.

Significantly, a large group of the region's archivally active scholars, Americans, Chinese, Japanese and Russians became aware of the Cold War International History Project's past accomplishments, present activities and future plans. Several are now undertaking research on the Cold War and plan to attend the January 1996 CWIHP conference at the University of Hong Kong on the Cold War in Asia to present findings.

continued on page 206

of Communist and Workers' Parties the course of our policy in relation to China was clearly set forth. The CPSU and the Soviet government, proceeding from its unchanging policy oriented towards an improvement in relations between the USSR and the PRC, has repeatedly appealed to the Chinese leadership with concrete proposals about ways to normalize relations. The pronouncements of the government of the USSR of March 29 and June 13 of this year are very well known. The message of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the State Council of the PRC sent in July of this year, in which concrete proposals regarding the improvement of contacts between the Soviet Union and China along government lines were put forth, including the organization of a bilateral summit meeting, also served the aims of putting to rights Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations.

Undertaking these actions, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government proceeded from and proceeds from a principled course in Soviet-Chinese relations. According to our deep conviction, a softening of tensions in relations between the USSR and the PRC would correspond to the interests of our two countries, and also of the whole Socialist commonwealth overall, would facilitate the activation of the struggle against imperialism, would be an essential support to heroic Vietnam and to the peoples of other countries which are leading the struggle for social and national liberation.

Guided by these considerations, the CC CPSU decided to undertake one more initiative aimed at a softening of the situation in relations between the USSR and the PRC.

The Chinese side responded pretty quickly to our proposal to hold a meeting of A.N. Kosygin, who was present in Hanoi at Ho Chi Minh's funeral, with Zhou Enlai. However, the Chinese response arrived in Hanoi an hour after the departure of the Soviet Party-State delegation to Moscow via Calcutta, and therefore A.N. Kosygin set off for Beijing already from the territory of the Soviet Union.

The meeting of the Soviet delegation headed by Comrade A.N. Kosygin with Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi continued for about four hours. From the Soviet side efforts were applied to assure that the conversation took place in the spirit of a concrete consideration of the knotty issues of inter-governmental Soviet-Chi-

nese relations. In this regard, Zhou Enlai's various attempts to introduce into the conversation polemics on issues of ideological disagreements were decisively deflected. The Soviet side firmly declared the immutability of our principled positions and political course in the area of domestic and foreign policy.

A consideration of the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border occupied the central place in the conversation. The sides recognized the abnormality of the existing situation and exchanged opinions regarding the search for paths to the settlement of the border issues. Zhou Enlai declared that "China has no territorial pretensions toward the Soviet Union." At the same time he repeated his previous assertions about the unfair nature of the agreements which define the border, although he said that the Chinese side does not demand that they be annulled and "recognizes the border which exists in accord with these treaties." From the Soviet side a proposal was introduced to move toward the practical preparation for negotiations on border issues. *Vis-a-vis* these goals, we proposed to organize over the next week or two a meeting between delegations headed by the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries. In this regard it was noted by us that the place where these negotiations will be held has no particular significance for us. Zhou Enlai responded to our proposal about negotiations and expressed a wish that the negotiations would be held in Beijing.

As the bases for normalization of the situation on the border during the period before a final settlement which could be achieved as the result of negotiations between the delegations of the USSR and the PRC, the following principles were put forth: observance of the existing border, the inadmissibility of armed confrontations, the withdrawal of troops of both sides from direct contact in controversial sectors. It was agreed that issues which arise in relation to the economic activity of citizens of both countries in the controversial sectors will be decided according to the agreement between representatives of the border authorities. Both sides agreed to give an instruction to the appropriate border organizations to resolve misunderstandings which arise in the spirit of benevolence via the path of consultation.

Guided by the instructions of the CC CPSU, the Soviet side put forth concrete proposals on the establishment and development of economic contacts between the USSR

and the PRC. An initiative was revealed by us regarding an expansion of trade, the fulfillment of contracts which had been concluded, the signing of trade protocols for the current and next year, the working out of measures on trade and economic cooperation during the present five-year plan. Zhou Enlai promised to present these proposals to the Politburo of the CC CPC, and expressed his agreement to exchange supplemental lists of products for 1969.

We proposed to the Chinese side to normalize railroad and aviation connections between the two countries, and to reestablish the high-frequency link which had been interrupted by the Chinese authorities in March of this year.

From the Soviet side there also was raised the issue of mutually sending Ambassadors and the creation of conditions for the normal activity of diplomatic representatives.

Zhou Enlai stated that these proposals will be submitted to Mao Zedong.

During the consideration of issues of Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations Zhou Enlai stressed that the leadership of the CPC does not intend to curtail its political and ideological speeches against the CPSU and the other fraternal parties. He justified the current forms of "polemics" which are being used by the Beijing leaders as having nothing in common with theoretical discussions, and referred to the statement of Mao Zedong to the effect that "polemics will continue for 10 thousand more years."

The Soviet side stressed that the CPSU believes that polemics on controversial issues are permissible; however, it is important that they be conducted in an appropriate tone, and argued on a scientific basis. Lies and curses do not add persuasiveness and authority to a polemic, and only humiliate the feelings of the other people and aggravate the relations.

From our side it was also underlined that disagreements between the USSR and the PRC play into the hands of the world imperialism, weaken the Socialist system and the ranks of fighters for national and social liberation. It was noted that over the whole history of the struggle with Communism, imperialism has never received a greater gain than that which it has as a result of the deepening, which is not our fault, of the PRC's differences with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries.

We declared the provocative nature of the contrived imperialist propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Union allegedly is preparing a preventive strike on China. It was stressed that in the Soviet Union neither the Party nor the government has ever spoken about the unavailability of war and has not summoned the people to war. All of our documents, party decisions summon the people to peace. We never have said to the people that it is necessary to "pull the belt tighter," that war is unavoidable. Zhou Enlai, in his turn, said that "China has no intentions to attack the Soviet Union." He stressed that from the Chinese side measures will be undertaken not to allow armed confrontations with the USSR.

The conversation took place overall in a constructive, calm atmosphere, despite the sharp posing of a range of issues.

We evaluate the meeting which has taken place with representatives of the Chinese leadership as useful. The CC CPSU and the Soviet government made a decision about the members of the delegation and time frames for their meetings with the Chinese representatives for the realization of the concrete proposals which were put forth in the course of the conversation.

It goes without saying that for the time being it is still early to make conclusions about the results which this meeting will bring. The anti-Soviet campaign which is continuing in the PRC and also the fact that the agreed text of the communiqué about the meeting was changed, put us on our guard. Upon its publication in the Chinese press it had been omitted that both sides conducted "a constructive conversation." Time will tell whether Beijing's intention to move along the path of normalization will be serious or if this is only a tactical move dictated by the circumstances of the aggravated domestic struggle in the PRC and also of that isolation in which the Chinese leadership has found itself as a result of the consistent and firm policy of the Socialist countries, Communist parties, and all forces who have condemned the peculiar positions of the Chinese leadership. We believe it necessary to follow attentively and vigilantly the further development of the situation in China itself, the activity of the Beijing leadership in the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations, and also the international arena overall.

The CC CPSU and the Soviet government believe that if the Chinese leaders

demonstrate a sober and serious approach to the proposals which were put forth by us, that this will frustrate the designs of the imperialist circles to intensify the Soviet-Chinese disagreements, to provoke a conflict between our countries and in this way to weaken the common front of the anti-imperialist struggle.

The normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC, if they will demonstrate a desire to do this in Beijing, undoubtedly will facilitate the growth of the power of the camp of Socialism and peace, will correspond to the interests of a strengthening of unit of the anti-imperialist forces and to the successful resolution of the tasks which were posed by the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.

[Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; translation from Russian by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]

1. I would like to thank Malcolm Byrne and Jim Hershberg for their support and advice. Translations of documents nos. 1 and 2 are mine; translation of document No.3 from Russian was provided by Mark Doctoroff (The National Security Archive).
2. On the changing international system see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 228-242; Warren I. Cohen, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991* (Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. IV), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 186-187.
3. The best study of the crisis based mainly on published U.S., Soviet and Chinese sources is Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," in *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as an Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 265-313. See also Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development and the March 1969 Clashes," *American Political Science Review* 66 (December 1972), 1178-1182; and his *The Sino-Soviet Border Situation, 1969-1975: Military, Diplomatic, and Political Maneuvering*, HI-2364-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, November 1975). Other accounts of the crisis include Arthur A. Cohen, "The Sino-Soviet Border Crisis of 1969," in *Avoiding War: Problems in Crisis Management*, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 269-296; and Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980). On U.S. policy see National Security Archive, ed., *Presidential Directives on National Security From Truman to Clinton* (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), 286.
4. On research in the SED Archives see my "New Research on the GDR," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 34, 39-44.
5. Tai Sung An, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973).
6. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 270.
7. Harvey W. Nelson, *Power and Insecurity: Beijing,*

Moscow & Washington, 1949-1988 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), chap. 1; Oleg B. Borisov/B. T. Koloskov, *Soviet Chinese Relations, 1945-1970* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 327.

8. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 271; Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 27-28; Robinson, "Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," 266.
9. Nelson, *Power and Insecurity*, 68.
10. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 275; Nelson, *Power and Insecurity*, 70; Robinson, "Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," 268.
11. Nelson, *Power and Insecurity*, 72.
12. Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup*, (Dover, MA: Auburn House, 1986), 26-27; Avigdor Haselkorn, *The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy 1965-1975* (New York: Crane & Russak, 1978), 39-42; Nelson, *Power and Insecurity*, 70.
13. Cited in Nelson, *Power and Insecurity*, 68.
14. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 270-276.
15. On foreign minister Zhou En-lai's role see Han Suyin, *Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 359.
16. Neville Maxwell, "The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao," *The China Quarterly* 56 (October/December 1973), 730-739; Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 278.
17. Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 164-165.
18. Nelson, *Power and Insecurity*, 73.
19. Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945-1990* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), 191-193.
20. Cohen, "Sino-Soviet Border Crisis," 179.
21. According to Han Suyin, *Eldest Son*, 369-70, Kosygin was "more alert to the changing situation than Brezhnev," and tried to reach Zhou Enlai but failed "because the young telephone operator in Beijing, full of Cultural Revolution spirit, told Kosygin, "We do not speak to revisionists." See also Dick Wilson, *The Story of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976* (London: Hutchinson, 1984), 270.
22. Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 178.
23. Robinson, "Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," 280. See also O. Edmund Clubb, *China & Russia: The "Great Game"* (New York: Columbia UP, 1971), 501-506.
24. Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics*, 200.
25. The Kosygin-Zhou Enlai meeting is not mentioned in Suyin, *Eldest Son*. But see Wilson, *Zhou Enlai*, 359. Neville Maxwell, "The Chinese Account, 270; Seymour Topping, *Journey between Two Chinas* (New York: Harper, 1972), 356.
26. Robinson, "Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," 295-313.

Christian F. Ostermann, a doctoral candidate at the University of Hamburg based at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., contributes frequently to the Bulletin and authored CWIHP Working Paper 11, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Roll-back." This article was adapted from a longer analysis of SED archival documents on the Sino-Soviet border conflict to be presented at the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia at the University of Hong Kong in January 1996.

**IN THE REGION AND
IN THE CENTER:
SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE
BORDER RIFT**

by **Elizabeth Wishnick**

How did Soviet Communist Party officials and activists in the regions bordering the People's Republic of China respond to the news of Aleksei Kosygin's 11 September 1969 meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing? The two documents below, from the State Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray (territory) in the Russian Far East,¹ show the reactions of several leading party members in the frontier region to Central Committee and Soviet government efforts to defuse the rupture with China.

One document is the stenographic record of a 22 September 1969 meeting of the regional and city party aktiv convened to discuss the Central Committee's account of Kosygin's discussion of the border conflict with Zhou. The second document is the Khabarovskiy Kray party committee's report of the same meeting to the CPSU CC in Moscow.

In comparing the two documents, it is particularly interesting to note their differences in emphasis. The Khabarovskiy Kray report to the CPSU CC accentuates the positive, stressing that Kosygin's meeting with Zhou represented a step toward resolving Soviet-Chinese differences through peaceful means. According to the stenographic record, however, many of the speakers described the problems in the border region in much greater detail than was reported to Moscow. Although they all applauded Kosygin's meeting with Zhou, some speakers noted that little change in the border situation had been observed since their encounter eleven days before. Comrade I.K. Bokan', for example, the head of the political department of a military district in the region, noting that there had been over 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory in his district in 1969 alone, commented that no substantive changes were observed following the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. The Secretary of the Khabarovsk City committee of the CPSU, comrade V.S. Pasternak, made a similar remark, describing Sino-Soviet relations as "increasingly tense" and observing that the anti-Soviet hysteria and propa-

ganda in Beijing had not been abated. Bokan' urged his comrades to be prepared for any provocation on the border, while his colleague in the military district, comrade Popov, noted that Chinese ideological positions were dangerous for the international communist movement "and cannot but evoke alarm" among the Soviet people. Comrade N.V. Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute, called attention to the fact that Zhou had told Kosygin that China's ideological struggle with the CPSU would continue for another 10,000 years.

In its report, the Khabarovskiy Kray committee expressed the region's support for the Center's policy toward China. In so doing, the regional committee at times inserted comments which were not in the stenographic record, for example, praising the Kosygin-Zhou meeting for being mutually beneficial.

Because the region's reporting function had the result of legitimating the Center's policies, comments by the regional aktiv which raised uncomfortable questions for the party leadership were omitted. For example, the secretary of the Komsomolsk-na-Amure city committee of the CPSU, Comrade Shul'ga, restated the standard line that Soviet efforts to improve relations with China would resonate with the healthy forces² in Chinese society (i.e., among communists) and then noted that in Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union had correctly intervened in support of communists when the revolution's gains were endangered. Comrade Kadochnikov, a Khabarovsk worker, commented that he had trouble reconciling Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda with the PRC's claim to be a socialist state. Comrade Sverdlov stated that in the past polemics had some value for the international communist movement, and then cited the polemics with Palmiro Togliatti, the long-time leader of the Italian Communist Party, as an example. Still, he concluded that Chinese policies were so unrestrained that they went beyond the definition of useful polemics.

These two documents are valuable for showing the reluctance of the Khabarovskiy Kray committee to address substantive problems in their reports to the Central Committee in Moscow: the Center only found out what it wanted to hear. However, the documents also demonstrate that as far back as 1969 regional views on China policy did not always run exactly in step with Moscow's.

The new opportunities to examine the holdings of regional party archives will further expand our knowledge of regional concerns and center-regional relations in the Soviet period.

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**Document I: Stenographic Record of
Meeting of Khabarovsk regional and
city party officials, 22 September 1969**

STENOGRAPHIC RECORD

of the meeting of the Khabarovsk regional
and city party aktiv

22 September 1969

First Secretary of the Khabarovsk regional committee of the CPSU, comr. A.P. Shitikov, opened the meeting:

Comrades, we brought you together to familiarize you with the information of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union about the question of the visit by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and the discussion between comr. A.N Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Today I will acquaint you with the information. (Reads the information aloud).

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comrade Pasternak, secretary of the Khabarovsk city committee of the CPSU.

Comr. PASTERNAK

Comrades, the communists of the Khabarovsk city party organization and all the workers of the city of Khabarovsk directed particular attention to the report of the meeting in Beijing between the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai. It explains the increasingly tense situation between the PRC and the Soviet Union, which is the fault of the Chinese leaders.

Khabarovsk residents are well aware of the bandit-like character of the armed provocations, and therefore the mendacity of the Maoists' propaganda, the malicious attacks on the policy of our party and government, the kindling of hatred towards the Soviet Union, and the direct call for war with the Soviet Union, were particularly clear to us.

All this requires our government to pur-

sue a principled and consistent course vis-a-vis China. We understand that the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples coincide and we support the policy of our government to resolve disputed issues at the negotiating table.

We view the meeting between comrade Kosygin and Zhou Enlai as just such an effort by our government to resolve these issues by peaceful means. We support those principles which were proposed as fundamental groundwork for negotiations. We are convinced that the resolution of the disputed issues will depend on the position of the Chinese side.

We are all the more vigilant since after the meeting the anti-Soviet propaganda, the anti-Soviet hysteria in Beijing has hardly decreased. We fully support the principled position of our party, directed against the anti-Leninist position of the Mao Zedong clique.

We will direct all efforts, to mobilize the work of the enterprises to fulfill the socialist obligations in honor of the 100th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comrade Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute.

Comr. SVERDLOV

Comrades, the information we have been listening to clearly and convincingly demonstrates that our party and its decision-making nucleus, in the form of the Leninist Central Committee, persistently and consistently, in the spirit of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, pursues a policy of consolidating the international communist movement, of surmounting of problems and disagreements, temporarily arising in the contemporary revolutionary movement.

It is natural and understandable that the slightest positive shift in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations would be met with satisfaction by the Soviet people, and all the more by us, China's immediate neighbors.

The information clearly outlined the Soviet Union's proposals for stabilizing Soviet-Chinese relations. These proposals, which result from the situation at hand, are timely, reasonable, and fair, and are capable of fostering the correct resolution of inter-governmental disputes, certainly, once the other sides expresses the desire to facilitate an improvement in relations. It is unlikely

we will be able to say that about the Chinese leadership.

From the information we learned that Zhou Enlai, arbitrarily promised, just as Mao himself would have, to continue the ideological struggle against our party, and consequently, against the policy of all communist parties of the socialist countries, for another 10 thousand years.

This is not accidental and is evoked as a reserve option for the long-term anti-Soviet campaign, and it is impossible to overlook this. Our party, proceeding from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, from the richest practice of its own and the international communist movement, considers a polemic about disputed issues to be fully achievable, but this polemic must lead to the interests of the peoples, the interests of the cohesion of the ranks of the communist parties, on the basis of deep scientific argumentation, without insults and abuse vis-a-vis another people and party.

We saw that on a number of occasions polemics were useful in the revolutionary movement. In its time the CC of our party honestly, openly noted a series of erroneous views by the late respected Palmiro Togliatti. There were polemics with other parties. But such polemics do not have anything in common with the unrestrained policy of the Chinese leaders.

Therefore it is necessary for us to all the more steadfastly and firmly turn the ideological struggle against the Chinese revisionists. Permit me to state in the name of the workers in higher education that we unanimously support the proposals and efforts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations formulated by our party, and will not spare any effort to contribute to the consolidation of the strength and might of our great Motherland.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Kadochnikov, a milling cutter at the Khabarovsk heating equipment plant.

Comr. KADOCHNIKOV

Comrades, we, workers of the city of Khabarovsk, like the entire Soviet people, approve the initiative by the Central Committee of our party and the Soviet government, directed at the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

We were all witnesses to the fact that, as the leadership of the CPC [Communist Party of China] loosened its links to our party, the

Chinese leaders went so far as to stage military provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border. It is strange for us workers and all the Soviet people to hear such gibberish from people calling themselves communists.

It is fully understandable that we cannot passively watch the train of events in China. We approve the steadfast and principled line of our government for the settlement of disputed issues through negotiations and consider that our party and government will exert every effort so that normal relations with China can be achieved.

As far as we are concerned, we consider that it is necessary to strengthen the might of our Motherland through work. Our workers work calmly, confident in their strength and in the durability of the Soviet borders. I assure the regional committee of the party that the party can count on us workers, can be sure of our unreserved support for all its efforts to strengthen the international communist movement.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Shul'ga, secretary of the Komsomolsk-na-Amure city committee of the CPSU.

Comr. SHUL'GA

Comrades, the workers of the city of Komsomolsk were satisfied with the contents of the report about the meeting between the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR comr. Kosygin and the President of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, and hope that the initiative will be understood by the healthy forces among the Chinese people.

We know that the strengthening of friendly relations between the peoples of our countries is the basis for Soviet policy. We provide assistance to many countries in the socialist camp. Now, when the intrigues of imperialism are intensifying, it is especially incumbent upon us to stand on the forefront of those forces who are restraining the onslaught of the forces of reaction. We could not do otherwise than go to the assistance of real communists, when a threat hung over the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

It is pleasant for us Soviet communists to realize that we are the members of the party, which stands in the avant-garde of the international communist movement. Evaluating the contemporary policy of the CPC from a principled position, we seek paths to normalize relations between our two states. And it is not our fault that at a certain point

the leaders of China broke off relations between the Soviet Union and China. The results of this turned out to be deplorable. It began with [China's] isolation from absolutely the majority of the communist parties. The people of China, who were only just liberated from feudalism, again found themselves in a difficult economic situation.

We approve the policy of the CC of our party to decide all disputed issues by peaceful means, not by armed provocations. We fully understand that today a very difficult situation has been developing on the Far Eastern borders given the unleashing of anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Soviet hysteria. And we support the policy of our party to begin negotiations with China, to resolve all questions through peaceful means, particularly with a country which considers itself to be socialist.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Bokan', the head of the political department of the Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern border district.

Comr. BOKAN'

Comrades, the soldiers of the Krasnoznamennyi border district reacted to the report of the meeting between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai concerning the stabilization of relations on the Soviet-Chinese border with a feeling of deep understanding, satisfaction, and approval.

In the report it is apparent that the improvement of relations along the Soviet-Chinese border was the central question at this meeting. The border events attracted the attention not just of Soviet people but of people all over the world. Incursions by Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory became a daily occurrence.

In this year alone in the area guarded by the forces of our district there were about 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citizens onto our territory. Ideological diversions on the Chinese border increased noticeably.

The personnel in the district thoroughly understand the situation and show courage and the ability to counter the provocations. We feel the constant support of the people of Khabarovskiy Kray, the party, state, and youth organizations.

In the period since the meeting in Beijing, no substantive changes have occurred, with the exception of a certain de-

gree of restraint. We support the initiative which took place and the steps taken by our government, directed at the stabilization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Fully assessing the danger of the situation, we must be prepared for the outbreak of any type of provocation along the border. The personnel in the district is firmly resolved in these days of preparation for the 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin to further improve the level of political and military knowledge, increase the military preparedness of the forces, to merit with honor the great trust of the party and the people, to defend the inviolability of the borders of our Motherland.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Plotkin, the head of the "Energomash" construction bureau.

Comr. PLOTKIN

Comrades, today we heard the report in which we were informed about the humanitarian mission fulfilled by our delegation headed by comr. Kosygin. The entire Soviet people and we, Far Easterners, in particular, follow with great interest and undivided attention the development of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The report about the meeting in Peking between Kosygin and the Chinese leaders was very brief, but we understood the whole value of this step by our government. The trip to Peking, the organization of the meeting - all this expressed confidence in the correctness of our cause.

As a member of the plant collective many times I have heard the workers express their concerns about the criminal actions of the Chinese leaders. Therefore we are glad to hear that our government is searching for paths to stabilize relations. I totally and fully approve of the policy of our party.

Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. Popov, deputy director of the political directorate of the KDVO [Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern Military District].

Comr. POPOV

Comrades, communists and all the soldiers of our Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern military district are completely satisfied by the wise domestic and foreign policy of our party and the Soviet government.

Along with entire Soviet people the soldiers of the army and fleet unanimously

support the general line of our party, directed at the creation of all the necessary preconditions for the successful building of communism in our country.

V.I. Lenin's precepts about the necessity of a consistent struggle for the unity of the international communist movement against the forces of imperialist reaction, against all forms of opportunism are eternally dear to us. These Leninist ideas are the basis for all the documents passed by the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' parties.

The only correct policy - is a policy which is principled and consistent as is our policy towards China. We are building our policy on the basis of a long-term perspective.

The meeting between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking is evidence of the readiness of our party to establish normal relations between our countries. If the Chinese leaders exhibit prudence and undertake to respond with steps to stabilize relations, this would be received with approval by the Soviet people.

However the position of the Chinese leaders cannot but evoke alarm among our people. Now, in the period of preparation for the 20th anniversary [1 October 1969] of the founding of the PRC, Peking's propaganda continues to fuel an anti-Soviet campaign. The Peking radio programs talk about this daily.

All this conceals a serious danger for the international communist movement and the world socialism system. We, members of the military, know well that Maoism engendered the military provocations and this requires of us continuous vigilance and readiness to give a worthy rebuff to the provocations by the Maoists at any moment.

Permit me in the name of the soldiers of our district to assure the Central Committee of our party, that in the future the communists and Komsomol members of our district will guard our party's well-equipped weapons and will always be ready to fulfill any tasks of our party and people.

Comr. Shitikov - Who else would like to speak? There are no more speakers. The following two proposals are put forth for your consideration.

I. To approve completely and fully the initiative of the CC of our party and the Soviet government concerning the meeting between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai,

designed to ease the situation on the border and to consider this meeting to have been very useful.

II. The regional party aktiv completely and fully approves the policy of the party and government, aimed at normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and China.

What other proposals are there? There are proposals to accept such a resolution. No one is opposed? No.

After this the meeting of the aktiv was considered closed.

9/23/69

Stenographer Taran

[Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray, f. p-35, op. 96, d. 234, ll. 1-12; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

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**Document II: Information Report Sent
by Khabarovskiy Kray (Territory)
Committee to CPSU CC, 22 September
1969**

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION

**KHABAROVSKIY KRAY
COMMITTEE**

City of Khabarovsk

(Sent 9/22/69)

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPSU
DEPARTMENT OF
ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK

INFORMATION

regarding the familiarization of the electoral aktiv of the Khabarovskiy Kray party organization with the Information from the CC CPSU about the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to

Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin's discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969

On 22 September 1969 a regional meeting of the party electoral aktiv was held to acquaint them with the Information from the CC CPSU regarding the trip by the Soviet party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin's discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969.

The First Secretary of the regional party committee read the Information from the CC CPSU.

7 people spoke at the meeting. The participants noted with great satisfaction that our party, its Central Committee, persistently and consistently, in the spirit of the decisions of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' parties [in June 1969 - translator's note], take a hard line on strengthening of the peace and security of peoples, consolidating the ranks of the international communist movement, and overcoming the difficulties and disagreements within it. They [the members of the *aktiv*] unanimously approved the initiative of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, directed at taking concrete measures to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations, settle disputed issues through negotiations and the organization of the meeting in Peking.

The Secretary of the Khabarovsk city committee of the CPSU V.S. Pasternak said in his remarks:

"The communists and all the workers of the city were particularly attentive to the news of the meeting in Beijing between the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A.N. Kosygin, and the president of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. Khabarovsk residents always steadfastly follow the development of Soviet-Chinese relations, [and] angrily judge the great power, adventuristic course of the PRC leaders. The armed raids by the Maoists on the Soviet-Chinese border, the malicious slander against our Soviet people, our state, the Communist party, deeply trouble the workers of our city.

The initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet government to stabilize Soviet-Chinese relations and organize a meeting in Beijing in such a difficult current situation once again vividly affirms the wise policy of our party to resolve disputed issues by peaceful means.

The city party organization aims to improve the ideological work among the workers in every possible way, to mobilize the collectives of firms, construction compa-

nies, and institutions to fulfill socialist responsibilities in a manner worthy of the meeting in honor of the 100th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth."

I.P. Kadochnikov, member of the regional committee of the CPSU, a milling cutter at the Khabarovsk heating equipment plant, stated:

"We cannot passively observe the course of events in China, where the leaders increasingly aggravate relations with our country and the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border. We, Far Easterners, eagerly approve the practical steps by our party and government towards the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Our workers work calmly, confident in their own strength and in the durability of the Soviet borders. I feel this every day, every hour, working among with the collective of many thousands at the plant."

The rector of the Khabarovsk pedagogical institute, N.V. Sverdlov, noted:

"The Information concisely and clearly states all the proposals by the Soviet Union to settle the disputes and conflicts in Soviet-Chinese relations and to improve the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border and expand economic ties between our countries. These timely, reasonable, and fair proposals, which stem from our mutual interests, combine firmness and flexibility of policy, and, most importantly, are capable of fostering the correct resolution of intergovernmental disputes, of course, under circumstances when the other side expresses a similar understanding of the situation and the desire to find a way out of it."

E.A. Plotkin, member of the regional party committee of the CPSU, director of the construction bureau of the Khabarovsk Energomash plant, stated:

"The trip to Beijing by the president of the Council of Ministers, A.N. Kosygin, was very brief, but we understood how important this meeting was for the Soviet and Chinese peoples. The search for paths to stabilization, the reasonable resolution of foreign policy questions, which the Central Committee of the CPSU and our government put forth meet with approval at the plant."

The head of the political department of the Krasnoznamennyi border district, I.K. Bokan', expressed the thoughts and feelings of the border guards as follows:

"The troops of the Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern border district reacted to the

report of the meeting between the president of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, comrade A.N. Kosygin, with the premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, with feelings of deep understanding and satisfaction and consider that this discussion was useful for both sides. One of the central questions at this meeting was the question of the mitigation of the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border.

Relations along the border exemplify the relations between the states. The Maoists' provocative violations of the Soviet-Chinese border and their intervention in Soviet territory attest to the adventurist policy of the Chinese leadership, their aim to decide disputed questions through force.

The border forces in the district have at their disposal all that is necessary to fulfill their sacred duty before the Fatherland in an exemplary way. In these days of preparation for the 100th anniversary of the V.I. Lenin's birth, we will demonstrate our level of decisiveness by increasing the military preparedness of the troops in order to honorably merit the great trust of the party, government, and people, as well as of the military forces in the Army and Navy, to guarantee the inviolability of the Far Eastern border of our beloved Motherland."

The following resolution was approved by the participants in the meeting:

1. Completely and fully approve the initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet government about the meeting between the president of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin and the premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, aimed at ameliorating the state of relations between the USSR and China, and consider that this meeting was useful.

2. Unanimously support the actions of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, directed at normalizing relations with China, and rebuffing any encroachments by the Chinese leadership on the interests of our state, on the interests of our people.

Secretary of the Khabarovsk
(A. Shitikov)
regional committee of the CPSU

[Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray, f.p-35, op. 96, d. 374, ll. 16-21; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

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How did the Central Committee of the CPSU view Soviet-Chinese relations in the aftermath of the violent 1969 border clashes between the two communist powers? The following document, a February 1971 secret background report prepared for and approved by the CC CPSU, sheds some light on Soviet diplomatic initiatives aimed at ameliorating the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. Although the Central Committee analysis is relatively optimistic about the long-term prospects for normalizing of Soviet-Chinese relations, in the short term Chinese territorial claims on Soviet territory and anti-Sovietism among Chinese leaders were viewed as major obstacles to any improvement in relations. Written not long before the March 1971 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Central Committee analysis represented an attempt to explain to the Party leadership and aktiv why there was only limited progress in Soviet-Chinese relations [particularly at a time when Sino-American relations were improving]. The document outlines a series of diplomatic overtures made by the Soviet Union in 1969-1971 and attributes the minimal response by the Chinese leadership to their need to perpetuate anti-Sovietism for domestic reasons.

One of the most interesting points in the document pertains to the consequences of the 11 September 1969 discussions between Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the border clashes. According to the document, the People's Republic of China rejected a later Soviet proposal to sign a draft agreement on maintaining the status quo on the border, based on the oral agreement reportedly reached by Kosygin and Zhou during their meeting. The document notes that the Chinese side insisted on signing an agreement on "temporary measures" as a precondition, both at the 1969 meeting and subsequently. By "temporary measures" the Chinese meant the withdrawal of forces from what they viewed as disputed territories in the border regions. Such a precondition was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, fearing that a withdrawal of troops would pave the way for a Chinese attempt to occupy the 1.5 million square kilometers they claimed were wrested from China by Tsarist Russia.

The Central Committee document goes on to criticize the Chinese leadership for their lukewarm if not outright negative re-

sponses to Soviet diplomatic overtures for normalizing relations. What the document fails to mention is that Soviet negotiating efforts were backed up by threats. Five days after the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist reportedly employed by the KGB, published an article in the London Evening News arguing that an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities could not be excluded.

The document also neglects to address the discrepancy between the Soviet and Chinese understanding of the results of the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. Contrary to the Soviet position outlined here, China claimed that Kosygin had recognized the existence of "disputed territories" and agreed to discuss a withdrawal of forces from the border regions. The Central Committee document would seem to support the Soviet case, but in the absence of reliable verbatim contemporaneous documentation from the meeting itself it is difficult to evaluate the relative veracity of the Soviet and Chinese accounts. One recently published memoir supports the Soviet position, however. A.I. Elizavetin, a Soviet diplomat in Beijing who took notes during the Kosygin-Zhou meeting, reported in his own account of their encounter that Kosygin suggested the two sides should respect the status quo ante on the border and open talks on border demarcation as well as on confidence-building measures.³

The issue of a withdrawal of forces from the border regions was to remain a stumbling block in bilateral negotiations through the 1980s. By the early 1980s, the Chinese no longer spoke of disputed territories, but they contended that the stationing of Soviet military forces in the border regions represented an obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. A recently declassified transcript of a May 1983 CPSU CC Politburo meeting indicates that the Soviet military continued to oppose any withdrawal of forces, on the grounds that the Soviet Union had spent considerable time and effort to develop forward bases in the border region.⁴ Although Moscow and Beijing finally normalized relations in 1989 and have reduced their overall military presence due to cuts in their respective armed forces, the creation of a demilitarized zone in the border region continues to present difficulties even today. At present the main stumbling-block is geostrategic: Russia is unwilling to withdraw beyond 100km from the

than a year ago. This is the main reason why, despite all the constructive efforts made by our delegation, the negotiations on border issues in essence haven't made any progress.

To move things forward, the CC CPSU and the Soviet government came out with an important initiative, and sent a letter from the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we proposed in this letter to begin negotiations in Moscow, at the same time as the negotiations in Beijing, between special governmental delegations on a draft agreement between the USSR and the PRC on mutual non-use of force, including nuclear weapons, [and] the cessation of war propaganda and of preparations for war against the other side.

At the same time, to eliminate many controversial issues from the negotiations, a proposal was made to formulate an inter-governmental agreement on the demarcation of the eastern section of the Soviet-Chinese border (4300 km), consisting of more than half of its length, where most of the border incidents took place (from the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, MPR [Mongolia] meet in the east and further to the south along the Amur and Ussuri rivers).

The letter expressed the view that, in the interests of the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, it would be expedient to hold another meeting of the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, this time on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also restated a range of other constructive proposals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to speculate in the international arena and in domestic propaganda on the alleged existence of a "threat of force" from the USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet insinuations.

To deprive the Chinese government of a basis for such inventions and facilitate the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, the subject of the negotiations, on January 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet another step - it made a proposal to the leadership of the PRC to conclude an agreement between the USSR and the PRC on the non-use of force in any form whatsoever, including missiles and nuclear weapons,

and forwarded a draft of such an agreement to Beijing through the ambassador of the USSR.

In sending this draft agreement for consideration by the government of the PRC, the Soviet side expressed its belief that the fulfillment of our proposal - the most rapid conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of force [—] would create a more favorable atmosphere for the normalization of relations between our two states and, in particular, would facilitate the restoration of neighborly relations and friendship between the USSR and the PRC.

A positive answer from the Chinese side to the Soviet initiative could lead to a decisive shift forward in the negotiations. However there is still no answer whatsoever from the Chinese side. There is a growing impression that Beijing, as before, is interested in maintaining the "border territorial issue" in relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic goals.

Why have the Soviet steps towards the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations encountered such significant difficulties? The main reason, as was mentioned previously in our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism was and continues to be the main ingredient in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the present Chinese leadership. This is confirmed, in particular, by the materials of the 11th plenum of the CC CPC (August-September 1970), the nature of the celebration of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC [in October 1970], the continuing slanderous campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, carried out both in the outside world and especially through domestic Chinese channels. The strengthening of the anti-Soviet campaign is taking place in the pages of the Chinese press. In the last half a year alone the Chinese central newspapers published hundreds of materials containing rude assaults against our party and our country. The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities are covered with appeals to struggle against "Soviet revisionism." In China anti-Soviet brochures and posters are being published in huge numbers and widely distributed. For example, not long ago a series of brochures with clearly anti-Soviet content was recommended for children as study aids as well as for the repertoire of clubs and circles en-

gaged in amateur artistic performances. Anti-Soviet films are always playing in movie theaters. The Chinese population also is exposed to anti-Soviet messages in radio and television programs and through verbal propaganda.

Feigning a threat of attack by the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership actively uses anti-Sovietism to continue their propaganda about war and war preparations against the Soviet Union and to strengthen their control over the domestic situation in the country. The Chinese leadership fears that constructive steps by the USSR and progress in stabilizing relations between our countries would undermine the basic ideological premise: to convince the Chinese people that the difficult situation facing them is, as it were, the result of the policy of the Soviet Union, and not of the anti-Leninist adventurist policy of the Chinese leaders themselves.

Chinese provocations were met with a decisive rebuff and furthermore our initiative about carrying out negotiations for a border settlement created serious obstacles to the organizations of new adventures.

The PRC leadership is making efforts to emerge from the international isolation in which China found itself as a result of the Red Guard diplomacy in the years of the "Cultural Revolution." China activated its diplomatic contacts in a number of countries, achieved diplomatic recognition by a series of bourgeois states. Today even seven NATO countries have diplomatic relations with Beijing. However, the Chinese leadership is making concessions on major issues, on which they previously held implacable positions. It is not surprising that the capitalist states actively use this flirtation in their own interests.

The imperialist powers, the USA in particular, are playing a complex and sly game in their approach to China. On the one hand they would like to use the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists in the struggle against the USSR, but on the other hand, they would like to strengthen their own position in the PRC, in the vast Chinese market. As a side interest these states all the more loudly urge the PRC "to get actively involved in the international community."

Recently the Chinese leadership has been rather pointedly making outwardly friendly gestures towards some socialist states, promising them to open broad pros-

pects in the area of trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation. The Chinese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the effective political, economic, and other forms of cooperation among socialist states, as well as by their interaction, which facilitates the strengthening of the international positions of socialism, and their [socialist states'] ability to move forward with the resolution of major issues in world politics. The Beijing leadership aims to use any opportunity to break the unity and cohesion of the socialist states, to weaken their existing social structure. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases its provocative statements on the Czechoslovak question.⁵ Beijing has acted similarly with respect to the recent events in Poland.⁶

The communist and workers parties of the fellow socialist countries, which firmly stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, understand and respond appropriately to this tactical step of Beijing's, which is directed at splitting the socialist community and isolating the Soviet Union.

The Moscow conference of communist and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to split them. Convinced by the futility of their efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in individual countries into influential political parties, and to cobble them together into an international anti-Leninist movement, the Chinese leadership once again is counting on its ability to either attract individual communist parties to its side, or at least to achieve their refusal to publicly criticize the ideology and policy of the CPC leadership. To this end, Beijing's propaganda and CPC officials are concentrating their main efforts on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of foreign communists the foreign and domestic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the USSR, and in the socialist community. At the same time Chinese representatives are aiming to exacerbate disputes in the communist movement. They use any means to heat up nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Soviet dispositions in the ranks of the communist and national-liberation movement.

Beijing is trying to take the non-aligned movement and the developing countries under its own influence. For this purpose, and in order to alienate the states of the "third world" from their dependable support in the struggle with imperialism - the Soviet Union

and other fellow socialist countries, the Chinese leadership is tactically using the PRC's opposition to both "superpowers" (USSR and USA), which allegedly "came to terms" to "divide the world amongst them."

All this attests to the fact that the leaders of China have not changed their previous chauvinistic course in the international arena.

Domestically, the Chinese leadership, having suppressed the enemies of their policies during the so-called "Cultural Revolution", is now trying to overcome the disorder in economic and political life, brought about by the actions of the very same ruling groups over the course of recent years. The well-known stabilization of socio-political and economic life is occurring through all-encompassing militarization, leading to an atmosphere of "a besieged fortress." The army is continuing to occupy key positions in the country and serves as the main instrument of power. As before a cult of Mao is expanding, the regime of personal power is being strengthened in the constitution of the PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed in the country. This, of course, cannot but have a pernicious influence on the social life of the entire Chinese people.

In an oral statement made directly to Soviet officials about the desirability and possibility in the near future of the normalization of intergovernmental relations, the Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideological, and to a certain degree, the political struggle between the USSR and China, will continue for a lengthy period of time.

As long as the Chinese leadership sticks to ideological and political positions which are hostile to us, the stabilization and normalization of intergovernmental relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC would have to be achieved under conditions of sharp ideological and political struggle.

In informing the party aktiv about the current status of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Central Committee of the CPSU considers it important to emphasize that the practical measures, which, within the parameters of our long-term orientation, would lead to normalized relations with the PRC and the restoration of friendly relations with the Chinese people, are being supplemented by appropriate measures in case of possible provocations by the Chinese side, as well as by the necessary consistent ideological-political struggle against the anti-Leninist, anti-socialist views of the Chinese leadership.

The Central Committee of the CPSU attributes great importance to this work, since positive shifts in Chinese politics can be facilitated in the near future only by struggling relentlessly against the theory and practice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism figures prominently, by further strengthening the cohesion and unity of communist ranks, and by combining the efforts of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST
PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

45-mz
sa/ka

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li. 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.*]

1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed.

2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., communist, forces within society, and the Maoist leadership.

3. A.I. Elizavetin, "Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou Enlai v pekinskoy aeroportu," with commentary by S. Goncharov and V. Usov, *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* 5 (1992), 39-63, and 1 (1993), 107-119.

4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, *TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 43, D. 53, L.1. 1-14*, translated in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81.

5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist movement and Moscow's subsequent imposition of orthodox "normalization" there.

6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk in December 1970, and a subsequent government shake-up.

Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with China: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy, 1969-95.

SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980: TWO RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS

by Elizabeth Wishnick

The two Central Committee documents from 1980 printed below illustrate Soviet foreign policy concerns at a time when the Soviet Union was particularly isolated in the international arena as a result of its December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In these documents, Soviet policymakers express their fears that their principal adversaries, the United States and China, were drawing closer together due to their shared hostility toward the USSR. The documents contend that the Sino-American rapprochement had two particularly unfortunate consequences: the development of Sino-American military cooperation and increased efforts by China to undermine the socialist community.

The October 1980 document about Sino-American military cooperation was written for two audiences. On the one hand, Soviet representatives were given the task of convincing Western public opinion that military cooperation with China could backfire and engulf their countries in conflict. On the other hand, the document showed Soviet concern that some non-aligned and socialist states were choosing to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policies and warned of the perils of a neutral attitude towards them. Since China had invaded Vietnam soon after the Sino-American normalization of relations in February 1979, Soviet policymakers feared that the improved U.S.-China relationship had emboldened the Chinese leaders to act on their hostility toward pro-Soviet socialist states and that U.S. military assistance would provide the Chinese with the means to act on their ambitions.

Which states were neutral on the China question and why? The March 1980 document clarifies this in an analysis of China's policy of distinguishing among the socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR, a policy referred to here and in other Soviet analyses as China's "differentiated" approach to the socialist community. The document, a series of instructions about the China question to Soviet ambassadors to socialist states, notes China's hostility to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia and contrasts this with its development of

extensive relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea. China's efforts to foster economic and even political ties with the "fraternal countries"—Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—are portrayed here as being of utmost concern to the Central Committee. The document shows Soviet displeasure at China's interest in improving relations with these states at a time when it refused to continue negotiations with the USSR.¹

In the Soviet view, relations between the socialist community and China had to be coordinated with Soviet policy, and the "fraternal countries" were expected to wait for and then follow the Soviet Union's lead. To this end, representatives from the International Departments of these countries had been meeting regularly with the CPSU International Department for over a decade.² Despite all these efforts to coordinate China policy, the March 1980 document evokes Soviet fears that China had been making inroads into the socialist community and was achieving a certain measure of success in using economic cooperation to tempt individual states to stray from the fold. As a result, the document outlines a series of steps for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would foster skepticism about China's intentions and thwart efforts by Chinese representatives to make wide-ranging contacts in these states.

1. China claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it inappropriate to go ahead with the regularly scheduled political talks in 1980.

2. Several documents from these meetings attest to this aim. See, e.g., TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 19, d. 525, ll. 29, 107-110, 21 January 1969; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 19, d. 605, ll. 3, 40-42, 12 February 1971; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1077, ll. 21, 9 April 1973; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 242, ll. 4, 13 April 1975; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 24, d.878; ll. 4, 20 April 1979; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 24, d. 1268, ll. 5, 19 May 1980.

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Document I: CPSU CC Directive to Soviet Ambassadors in Communist Countries, 4 March 1980

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET
UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. St-200/4s
from March 4, 1980

Excerpt from the protocol No. 200
4s CC Secretariat

Regarding the instructions to USSR ambassadors to socialist countries about the China question

Approve the text of the instructions to
USSR ambassadors to socialist countries
(proposed).

CC SECRETARY

* * * * *

Secret

Enclosure
k.p.4s.pr.No 200

BERLIN, WARSAW, BUDAPEST,
PRAGUE, SOFIA, ULAN-BATOR,
HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE

SOVIET AMBASSADORS

Copy: BEIJING, PYONGYANG,
PHNOM PENH, BUCHAREST,
BELGRADE

SOVIET AMBASSADORS (for their
information)

Recently Beijing's policy towards socialist countries has become noticeably more active. Under conditions, when imperialist circles in the USA have undertaken to aggravate the international situation, the Chinese leadership, drawing ever closer to imperialism, is increasing its efforts to undermine the position of the socialist community. Beijing's goals, as before, are to break the unity and cohesion of the fraternal countries, inspire mutual distrust among them, incite them to opposition to the Soviet Union, destroy the unity of action of socialist states in the international arena including on the China question and finally, to subordinate them to its own influence.

Within the parameters of a policy involving a differentiated approach [to social-

ist states], the Chinese leadership is trying to stratify the socialist countries into various groups. With such states as Romania, Yugoslavia, and the DPRK, China is developing extensive relations, supporting the nationalistic tendencies in their policies in every possible way with the aim of creating its own group on this basis, and using it to counter the socialist community. In relations with other socialist countries the hostile character of China's policy is strengthening even more, as the unceasing attacks and pressure on the SRV [Vietnam], Cuba, DPRL [Laos], and MPR [Mongolia], attest. China uses a double-dealing tactic including pressure and promises in its approach to the PRB [Bulgaria], HPR [Hungary], GDR, PNR [Poland], and ChSSR [Czechoslovakia]: on the one hand China is continuing its gross interference in their internal affairs, while clearly ignoring their interests; on the other hand, it is giving assurances about its readiness to develop relations with them on a mutually advantageous basis. Thanks to such a tactic, Beijing is counting on at least forcing these countries into positions of "neutrality" regarding China's course, if not to achieve more.

Within the Chinese leadership demagogic and deceptive practices are widely used. It is affirmed, as if China's struggle against the USSR need not worry the other socialist countries, that the development of relations between them and China could even facilitate the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, that the expansion of ties between these states and China meets their national interests, and, in particular, could bring them major advantages in the trade-economic sphere.

Beijing has noticeably strengthened its efforts to penetrate into various spheres of life and activities in the countries of the socialist community. Chinese representatives are trying to become more active in developing relations with official institutions and government agencies, social organizations, educational institutions, and the mass media; they are establishing contacts with various strata of the population, particularly with the intelligentsia and youth, and widely distributing invitations to various events at the PRC embassies. Information is being collected about the domestic life of their post country, the decisions of party and state organs, the economic situation and the military potential, the military forces and weapons. Under the guise of

"study tours," attempts are being made to send Chinese delegations to some socialist countries and receive their delegations in the PRC.

There are signs that the Chinese may reevaluate their relations with the ruling parties of some socialist countries, and establish party-to-party ties with them. Party-to-party ties are already developing with Yugoslavia and Romania; the first Chinese party delegation in recent years went to participate in the RKP [Romanian Communist Party] congress.

Denying in essence the general regularities of development of the revolutionary processes and socialist economic construction in various countries, the Chinese leadership has once again returned to the use of the conception of the "national model" of socialism, and especially rises to the defense of the Yugoslav "model".

Beijing's divisive activity shows its limited, but nevertheless negative, influence in certain socialist states. Some of the workers do not always grasp the meaning of the Chinese tactic and in certain cases do not provide their own effective rebuff to Beijing's hegemonic policy. Moreover, the facts show that responsible leaders of certain fraternal countries, counter to the official positions of their parties, are expressing an interest in excluding some important directions in their ties with China from the sphere of multilateral coordination, that in certain situations they are taking steps to expand ties with the PRC without considering the level of relations between China and other states.

Judging from all of this, China's tactical use of a differentiated approach [to socialist states], which plays on various nuances and changes in the domestic political and economic situation in certain socialist states, on any type of temporary difficulties, will not only continue, but may even be more widely used in the near future. It can be inferred that attempts by the Chinese to penetrate into various areas of the domestic life of the socialist countries will be further intensified.

Under these conditions an important question in the work of ambassadors is the effective and systematic opposition of Beijing's splitting activities in socialist countries, the neutralization of its plans to shake the unity of the socialist states, to influence their positions. It is necessary to obstruct the

intensifying attempts by the Chinese leaders to penetrate into various spheres of the domestic life of the socialist countries. With the participation of the leaders and representatives of the political and social circles of your post countries, direct the following:

1. Pay attention to the noticeable activization of Chinese policy towards socialist states. Using the example of Beijing's recent maneuvers, continuously carry out measures to clarify the danger of the Chinese differentiated approach tactic and efforts to penetrate the socialist states. This danger is growing in connection with the fact that the splitting activity of the Chinese representatives is being coordinated all the more closely with imperialist circles, above all with the USA, and their intelligence services. Expose the false character of Chinese assertions, which allege that China is "concerned" about the improvement of relations with socialist states, and cares about their interests and security. In fact, Chinese policy, particularly its constant appeals to the USA, Japan, and the countries of Western Europe to unite with China in a "broad international front" and its pressure on the NATO countries to increase their armaments, including nuclear missiles, is totally and fully directed against the socialist states, their security. Calling for the economic integration and military-political consolidation of the West, Beijing is all the more intensively seeking to undermine the positions of the Organization of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

One must also keep in mind that the changes in domestic policy taking place in China, among them the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi at the Vth Plenum of the CC CPC and the promotion to leading posts of experienced political representatives who were victims of the "Cultural Revolution", do not mean, as the facts show, that Beijing has renounced its hostile policy towards socialist countries. On the contrary, one can expect that this policy will be pursued even more tenaciously.

2. Show the dangerous character of the Chinese leadership's aim to undermine the unity of the socialist states, its hypocritical efforts to separate the questions of bilateral relations between the socialist countries and China from Soviet-Chinese relations, to sow illusions concerning its goals in this area, for example by using for its own purposes the fact that Soviet-Chinese negotiations are

being held. As the leadership of the fraternal countries was informed, the results of the Moscow round of Soviet-Chinese negotiations showed that the Chinese side does not aim, in the near future in any case, to come to any agreements about the normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC; that China knowingly proposes unacceptable preconditions, and rejects the Soviet side's constructive proposals, directed at the elaboration of principles of relations between the two countries and the building of a political-juridical basis for them.

As far as the second round is concerned, now it is generally difficult to say anything about it, insofar as the Chinese press announced that it would be "inappropriate" to hold them at present. Recent events attest to the escalation of Beijing's hostility towards the Soviet Union.

3. Taking into account the hostile character of China's policy towards socialist states and the strengthening of its aggressiveness, note the necessity of a careful and deliberate approach to the development of economic ties and scientific-technical cooperation with the PRC, particularly in those areas which would facilitate the growth of its military-industrial potential. Beijing's efforts to exaggerate the brilliant perspectives of trade and economic cooperation with some socialist countries don't have any real basis and are only a tactical means of influencing these countries. Beijing now considers it advantageous to orient itself towards the West, and not to the development of trade-economic ties with the countries of the socialist community. The Chinese side is prepared to give any promises, however, as experience shows, among them the heralded experience of relations with Romania and Yugoslavia, China does not have sufficient foreign currency and trade resources to fulfill these promises. In 1979, for example, the planned trade balance with the FSRY [Yugoslavia] was fulfilled only to one fourth. China not only is an undesirable partner, but also often uses trade-economic relations as a means of pressure on socialist states (SRV, MNR, Albania), which refuse to undertake obligations for purely political motives.

4. Pay attention to the importance of continuing a consistent and broad coordination of actions towards China and its attempts to use a differentiated approach to undermine the cohesion of the socialist coun-

tries. Under present conditions, when the Chinese leadership is strengthening its subversive activities among countries of the socialist community, it is all the more important to meticulously observe the criteria elaborated at the meetings of the international departments of the CCs of the fraternal countries for approaching questions of bilateral relations between socialist countries and the PRC. These mandate that the rapprochement between Beijing and the USA (as their actions in Indochina and Afghanistan attest) is taking a more and more dangerous form and is directed against the interests of peace and the process of detente. Given the way the situation is progressing, keep in mind that the task of decisively repelling the strengthening attacks on the socialist community on the part of imperialism, reaction, and Chinese hegemonism, is all the more important.

5. Note the necessity of a vigilant approach to the activities of Beijing and its representatives in socialist countries, its attempts to penetrate various spheres of the domestic life of these countries, to spread its influence in various strata of the population, particularly among young people, some of whom are a part of the technical, scientific, and creative intelligentsia. It is important not to weaken control over their contacts with Chinese representatives, to monitor their visits to various organizations, including government agencies, scientific-research and educational institutions, and also to limit the attendance by citizens in the post countries of events at Chinese embassies.

It would be inadvisable to consider the explanatory work on this question to be an episodic campaign. It is necessary to conduct it consistently, taking into account the specifics of the post country, and, as much as possible, involve a wide range of leading party and government cadres, as well as the creative intelligentsia. As necessary, contribute any suitable proposals for effective opposition to Beijing's subversive activities and the neutralization of undesirable tendencies in the policies of specific socialist states.

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Document II. CPSU CC Politburo Directive to Soviet Ambassadors and Representatives, 2 October 1980

Subject to return within 7 days to the CC CPSU (General department, 1st

sector)

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P217/57

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin, Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol No. 217 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of October 2, 1980

Re: Carrying out additional measures to counter American-Chinese military cooperation

Approve the draft indicated for Soviet ambassadors and Soviet representatives (enclosed).

CC SECRETARY

* * * * *

For point 57 prot. No. 217

Secret

FOR ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES

At the present time the partnership between American imperialism and Beijing's hegemonism, which is spreading to the military sphere, is a new negative phenomenon in world politics and dangerous for all of humanity. Counting on using "strong and stable" China in its strategic interests, Washington is expanding the parameters for cooperation with Beijing in the military-technical sphere. In particular, the USA administration has affirmed its readiness to deliver modern American weapons and technology to China, which could be widely used for military purposes.

As American-Chinese military cooperation develops further, destructive elements

will grow in international relations.

In accordance with the instructions you received previously and taking into account the specifics of your post country, continue your work to reveal the dangerous character of the developing rapprochement between aggressive circles in the West, above all the USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling attention to the following aspects.

1. In developing military cooperation with China, the ruling circles in the USA count on the possibility of influencing China to act in a "desirable" way, of channeling its policies in an acceptable direction. Frequently the foreign policy activity of the PRC is presented as a "stabilizing" factor in the international arena. The Chinese leaders themselves are not adverse to playing up to such a discussion and, to this end, without withdrawing the thesis of the "inevitability of war," have begun to use a more flexible terminology. However, with the help of a sham "peaceful nature," invoked to add greater "respectability" to the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing is simply counting on gaining time to accomplish the forced arming of the country. Actually, more and more, the Chinese leadership is resorting to a policy of diktat and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and assumes on itself the improper functions of "teaching lessons" and "punishing" the unruly with the force of arms.

2. As before, the PRC government declines to make any international legal commitments to disarmament, tries to diminish the importance of results achieved in this area, and refuses to take part in measures to limit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set about to manufacture and experiment with intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and is working on the creation of neutron weapons. All this drives the global arms race forward and directly contradicts the interests of detente. This policy of Beijing's seriously threatens everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not just the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

3. There is absolutely no basis for concluding, as some do, that Beijing's alleged adoption of a "modernization program" represents a new political course to overcome China's economic backwardness. In fact this course was taken above all to contribute to the realization of pre-existing plans to speed up the process of transform-

ing China into a military "superpower," and the resolution of the most serious problems, such as increasing the extremely low material and cultural level of the Chinese people, has been relegated to an indefinite future. In China they don't hide the fact that "modernization" is the best means of preparing for war. In practice, unrestrained militarization accelerates economic collapse and increased instability in China. Thus, those countries who actively take part in the Chinese program of "modernization," actually contribute to the growth of its military potential and render a disservice to the Chinese people.

On the other hand, the policy of militarizing the country will inevitably engender unpredictable turns and zigzags and future evidence of foreign policy adventurism, leading to the dangerous destabilization of the international situation and the inflammation of international tension. Any injection of aid, particularly by the USA, either directly or indirectly contributing to China's militarization and to the development of the Chinese military potential, would enable China to find the striking power necessary for the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Under conditions when Beijing not only opposes all constructive proposals to strengthen peace and detente, but also directly provokes international conflict, this [aid] would mean an increased danger of war breaking out and the growth of threats to all humanity, including the Chinese and American peoples.

The fact that what is proposed for delivery to China is "non-lethal" equipment and technology, "defensive," and "dual-use," etc., does not change the situation. The issue is not that such distinctions are extremely relative, but that cooperation with military modernization will free up the forces within China and the means necessary for building up its principal strike force - its nuclear capability.

4. The plans Beijing has been developing for a long time to change the global correlation of forces and the entire structure of contemporary international relations elicit serious alarm. The transfer to China of any technology or equipment whatsoever—this would be a step in the direction of the erosion of the established military-balance in the world and of a new cycle in the arms race. The destruction of the balance of military forces would erode the basis for the arms limitation negotiations insofar as equal seizure is the main principle which the USSR

and USA have agreed to follow.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has every opportunity to defend its interests and repel the presumptions of other countries, including the PRC. The calculations of those who try to direct American-Chinese relations in such a way as to use China as a means of pressure and as a military counterweight to the Soviet Union are short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect Chinese expansion to the north risk major miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion of China's military potential increases the danger that certain countries would be inveigled into Beijing's orbit, and in the long-term, could lead to a situation in which these very countries could become the victims of Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking realistically, it would follow to recognize that a "strong" China would chose a different direction for its expansionist plans: in all likelihood it would swallow up neighboring countries, grab hold of all the vitally important regions of the world, and would certainly not serve as an instrument in the hands of the USA or any other country.

5. The development of military-political cooperation between China and the USA, which elicits concern among many states, has led already to a noticeable worsening of the international situation and complicated the search for real paths to strengthening peace and security in various regions of the world. In an effort to create favorable conditions for the realization of its hegemonic aims, the Beijing leadership counts on aggravating relations between countries, setting some states against others, and provoking military conflicts. Beijing does not hide the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the USA, and, from its ashes, assume world domination.

Those who insist on the necessity of "strengthening" China base their calculations on the assumption that Beijing would coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore would not be dangerous for the West. But taking into account the continuing domestic political struggle in China, no one can guarantee that in 5-10 years China would not bring into play an anti-American card or anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force against those countries which irresponsibly connived and assisted with the PRC's rearmament.

The experience of history attests to the fact that the extent of China's expansion will be proportional to the military might of the Chinese army. Even today China's neighbors, above all the countries of Southeast Asia which the Chinese leaders consider to be their traditional sphere of influence, experience an immediate threat. It would be easy to imagine how China will behave in relation to its neighbors once the USA and its neighbors assist China to acquire more modern weapons. Above all, China is trying to institute its control over Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Malacca and the straits of Singapore.

Under these conditions, attempts to ignore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese policy and to remain neutral will only encourage Beijing to undertake new adventures and to extend its expansion. Collective efforts by Asian states could, on the contrary, impede China's path to increased military might, which is directed above all against countries of this region.

(For New Delhi only. The connivance and outright support of the USA for military preparations in China can only contradict India's interests. Although the Chinese leadership is holding talks about normalizing relations with India, there is an entire array of means of pressure against it in China's arsenal of strategies. In American-Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India and as a base of support for the aggressive actions of the USA and China in Southeast Asia is expanding more and more. In cooperation with the USA, Beijing is flooding India's neighbors with arms and, by creating an atmosphere of war psychosis, is attempting to maintain in power unpopular regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. Beijing is speeding up its military preparations along the Chinese-Indian border, constructing missile bases and strategic roads in Tibet, and activating its support for separatist movements in northeast India, where it is practically waging an "undeclared war" against this country.)

There is no doubt that as China strengthens its military-industrial potential, it will advance further along the path to the realization of Chinese leadership's openly declared territorial pretensions against neighboring countries in Southeast, South, and West Asia. This will not only lead to a serious destabilization of the situation in

Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present a direct threat to other regions.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not only do we carefully monitor the direction of American-Chinese cooperation in the military sphere, but also we must take the necessary steps to strengthen the security of our borders. We cannot tolerate change in the military-strategic balance in favor of forces hostile to the cause of peace.

(Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul.

The post countries should inform MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Soviet ambassadors were sent instructions about carrying out work to counter the negative consequences for the causes of socialism, peace, and detente, of the establishment of an American-Chinese military alliance. Familiarize the recipient with the content of the aforementioned instructions.

Carry out your work in coordination with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Lao-tian People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), the Polish People's Republic (PPR), and the Czechoslovak People's Republic (CPR).)

It is necessary to attentively follow all foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans for the expansion of American-Chinese military cooperation, to regularly and effectively inform the Center about them, and to take the measures required to neutralize the tendencies that are undesirable for our interests.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10; translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.*]

Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with China: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy, 1969-95.

COLD WAR IN ASIA

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Lena Aurilena (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Youth Politics in Russian Emigre Organizations in Manchukuo, 1930s-40s"

Nadezhda Solov'eva (Khabarovsk Provincial Archive): "Khabarovsk's Archival Holdings on Russo-Chinese Relations"

David Wolff (Princeton U.): "Interlocking Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914"

Shuxiao LI (Heilongjiang Trade Corporation): "The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin's Rise as an Economic Center"

Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the Far East, Vladivostok): "Russia's Far Eastern Neighbors"

Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigration, 1920s-30s"

Afternoon: "Foreigners" in the Russian Far East (RFE): Settlement and Resettlement

Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "German Intelligence in the RFE during WWI: Suspicions and Realities"

Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Intervention and Civil War: New Documents and Approaches"

Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Sapporo, Japan): "The Japanese in Vladivostok, 1906-1922"

Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Forced Migrations in the Far East from the 1920s till mid-1950s"

Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing Economies): "Koreans in the Russian Far East: Collectivization and Deportation"

Viktoriiia Romanova (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): "The Jewish Diaspora in the making of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast"

Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Japan): "Reevaluating the 'Birobidzhan Project': The Regional Context"

27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Borderland: Options and Tensions

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Pavel Minakir and Nadezhda Mikheeva (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): "The Economy of the Russian Far East : Between Centralization and Regionalization"

Vladimir Syrkin (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): "Economic Regionalism: Conditions, Factors and Tendencies"

Katherine Burns (Massachusetts Inst. of Technology): "The Russian Far Eastern Initiative: Autonomous Decision-Making and Cooperation in Northeast Asia."

Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San Diego): "Politics and the Reform of the Primorsk Fuel and Energy Complex"

Afternoon: The RFE as "Outpost"

Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Cossack Revival in the Far East: From Borderguards to Émigrés to Interest Group"

Vladimir Sokolov (Primor'e Provincial Museum): "Russian Nationalism and the Cossacks of the Far East"

Jun NIU (Institute of American Studies, CASS): "Soviet Policy towards Northeast China, 1945-49"

Ping BU (Institute of Modern History, Heilongjiang Province Academy of Social Sciences): "Sino-Soviet Disposal of Japanese Chemical Weapons after 1945"

Evgeniia Gudkova (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): "Military Conversion in the Russian Far East"

James Hershberg (Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, DC): "Northeast Asia and the Cold War"

Tamara Troyakova (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Maritime Province on the Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok"

Late Afternoon: International Economic Considerations (I)

Natal'ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): "The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia and China"

Mikhail Koval'chuk (Institute of Transport, Khabarovsk): "Foreign Trade and Transport in the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s"

Anatolii Mandrik (Institute of History,

Vladivostok): "Foreign Investment in the Russian Fishing Industry 1920s-1930s"

Lidiia Varaksina (Khabarovsk Provincial Archive): "Foreign Concessions in the Russian Far East, 1920s-1930s"

Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): "Foreign Capital in the Far East in the 1920s"

Takeshi HAMASHITA (Tokyo U.): "Japanese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia"

28 August 1995: The Crossborder Learning Process: Perceptions, Research and Comparisons

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Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar): "Current Issues in Russo-Chinese Border Trade"

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Natal'ia Bezliudnaia (Far Eastern State U.): "'Geopolitical' Projects in the Southern Part of the Maritime Province"

Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin): "Sino-Russian Border Trade"

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Zhengyun NAN (Beijing Normal U.): "The Roots of Russian Studies in China : Harbin, 1950s-60s"

Stephen Kotkin (Princeton U.): "Frank Golder, Robert Kerner and the Northeast Asian Seminar, 1920s-1950s"

Evgenii Plaksen (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "Public Opinion in the Russian Far East: Accentuations and Priorities"

Thomas Lahusen (Duke University) : "Azhaev's Far East"

Tatsuo NAKAMI (Tokyo Foreign Languages U.), "Japanese Conceptions of Northeast Asia in the 20th century"

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