RESEARCH NOTE:
DOCUMENTING THE EARLY SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

by Mark Kramer

Two recent developments pertaining to the early Soviet nuclear weapons program—the declassification of an edict promulgated by Josif Stalin in August 1945, and the issuance of a directive by the Russian government in mid-1995—are worth noting. Each development is covered here briefly, and the relevant documentation is provided at the end.

The Establishment of Beria’s Special Committee

Exploration of the basic processes involved in nuclear fission began in the Soviet Union well before World War II, and serious work aimed at building nuclear weapons was initiated at a top-secret research facility in Moscow, known simply as Laboratory No. 2, in early 1943. Over the next two years the Soviet nuclear bomb program was spurred on by intelligence disclosures about the Manhattan Project in the United States, but it was not until after the fighting ended—and the technical feasibility of nuclear weaponry had been vividly demonstrated by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—that an all-out program was launched in the USSR. On 20 August 1945, the supreme leader of the Soviet Union and chairman of the wartime State Defense Committee (GKO), Josif Stalin, formed a nine-member “Special Committee” under the GKO’s auspices to oversee the whole Soviet bomb effort. The Special Committee was placed under the direction of Stalin’s top aide, Lavrentii Beria, the notorious secret police chief. The edict that Stalin issued (No. GKO-9877ss/op) to establish the Special Committee and its two main subordinate organizations was declassified and published in the July-August 1995 issue of Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal (“Military-Historical Journal”), pp. 65-67. The full text is provided below in translation.

Several points about the document are worth noting:

First, Stalin’s edict placed the Special Committee under the control of the GKO, the supreme organ in the Soviet Union during World War II. When the GKO was disbanded on 4 September 1945, the Special Committee was recast as a “Special Committee of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars.” (The Council of People’s Commissars was itself renamed the USSR Council of Ministers in March 1946.) Shortly after Beria’s arrest on 26 June 1953, the Special Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers (as it was then known) was dissolved, and the staff and organizations under its control were transferred to the newly formed Ministry of Medium Machine-Building.

Second, the edict provided for the creation of a Technical Council, which was to report directly to the GKO’s Special Committee. Until now, Western experts such as David Holloway had thought that the Technical Council was set up as an integral part of the newly-created First Main Directorate of the Council of People’s Commissars (an entity that is discussed below). A close look at Stalin’s edict shows that on this point Holloway was incorrect. The Technical Council was established as a separate body under the Special Committee, not under the First Main Directorate (which itself was subordinated to the Special Committee).

Third, of the nine members of the GKO’s Special Committee, five were also members of the 11-man Technical Council. The exceptions were Beria, Georgii Malenkov, Nikolai Voznesenskii, and Mikhail Pervukhin. (N.B.: Nikolai Voznesenskii, the director of the State Planning Committee—known as Gosplan for short—should not be confused with the distinguished physicist Ivan Voznesenskii, who was a member of the Technical Council.) It stands to reason that the three senior political officials on the Special Committee—Beria, Malenkov, and Nikolai Voznesenskii—would not have been included on the Technical Council, but Pervukhin’s absence is somewhat more puzzling, since he was in charge of the USSR’s chemical industry at the time. The Technical Council consisted predominantly of renowned physicists: Igor Kurchatov, Pyotr Kapitsa, Abram Ioffe, Abram Alikhanov, Yulii Khariton, Isaak Kikoin, and Ivan Voznesenskii. The other four members included a radiochemist, Vitalii Khlopin, and three highly capable industrial managers and engineers: Boris Vannikov, Avraamii Zavenyagin, and Vasilii Makhnev. Zavenyagin, among other things, had been a deputy to Beria at the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) since 1941, serving with the rank of general.

Fourth, Vannikov was appointed chairman of the Technical Council, and Alikhanov was appointed the scientific secretary of the Council. The text of Stalin’s edict does not bear out David Holloway’s assertion (in Stalin and the Bomb, p. 135) that Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, and Kurchatov were appointed deputies to Vannikov on the Council. In fact, Pervukhin, as noted above, was not on the Technical Council at all. Zavenyagin and Kurchatov were members of the Council, but were not listed as deputy chairmen.

Fifth, the other new subordinate organ created by Stalin’s edict—a First Main Directorate of the Council of People’s Commissars—also was placed under Vannikov’s supervision, and Zavenyagin was appointed a first deputy. Vannikov and Zavenyagin thus enjoyed the distinction of serving on all three of the main bodies created by Stalin’s edict. Four officials who were not on either the GKO’s Special Committee or the Technical Council were appointed deputy heads of the First Main Directorate: Nikolai Borisov, the deputy chairman of Gosplan; Pyotr Meshik, the head of the NKVD’s economic directorate and deputy head of the “Smersh” Main Counterintelligence Directorate; Andrei Kasatkin, the First Deputy People’s Commissar for the Chemical Industry (which Pervukhin headed); and Pyotr Antropov, a geologist and deputy member of the GKO. Antropov was placed in charge of a commission responsible for the exploration and mining of uranium.

Sixth, the document was forthright about the need for the Soviet Union to ensure access to foreign sources of uranium, including deposits “in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries.” Although it did not specifically mention eastern Germany as a source of uranium, the Soviet zone in Germany (which was transformed into the German Democratic Republic in 1949) became the largest supplier by far for the Soviet bomb program. The importance of uranium in Soviet policy toward Germany in the late 1940s should not be underestimated, as Norman Naimark points out in his recent book, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 235-250.

Seventh, the GKO’s Special Committee was given almost unlimited discretion over
its own funding and operations, a sign of the overriding priority that Stalin attached to the development of nuclear weapons. An entire directorate was set up within Gosplan to ensure that all necessary resources were available. Despite the ravages of the war and the need for mass reconstruction, no expense was spared in the drive to build a nuclear bomb. Although the extravagance of Beria’s efforts proved troubling to some of the participants, their objections were on practical, not moral, grounds. Pyotr Kapitsa cited this matter (as well as his sharp personal differences with Beria) when he wrote a letter to Stalin in November 1945 asking to be removed from the program. Kapitsa argued that the path chosen by Beria was “beyond our means and will take a long time,” and he insisted that a “methodical and well-planned” program would enable the Soviet Union to build nuclear weapons “quickly and cheaply.”

Eighth, Stalin’s edict specified the need for increased espionage vis-a-vis the U.S. nuclear program. Until this time, responsibility for Soviet foreign intelligence had been spread among several agencies (and the NKVD’s role in the process was very limited), but the edict gave Beria direct control over all nuclear espionage carried out by Soviet intelligence organs, including the People’s Commissariat on State Security (NKGB, later renamed the Committee on State Security, or KGB), the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (RUKA, later renamed the Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU, of the Soviet General Staff), and other unspecified intelligence bodies. Copies of this part of the edict (Point 13) were distributed to Vsevolod Merkulov, the People’s Commissar for State Security, and Fyodor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, the chief of the RUKA. (Incidentally, the mention of Kuznetsov’s surname on the distribution list confirms, for the first time, that he was head of Soviet military intelligence in the 1940s. Kuznetsov is described in Soviet military reference works as having been the deputy chief of the General Staff from 1943 to 1949, but he was never explicitly identified as head of the RUKA.)

Both Merkulov and Kuznetsov had been overseeing a massive operation to gain intelligence about nuclear weapons technology, as the newly released “Venona” documents amply show (for more about these documents, partially decrypted Soviet intelligence cables recently declassified by the U.S. National Security Agency, see below). Merkulov had been giving periodic reports to Beria before August 1945 about the technical progress of the Manhattan Project and about the prospects of locating adequate stores of fissionable material. In mid-October 1945, shortly after the GKO’s Special Committee was formed, Merkulov sent a follow-up report to Beria, which drew on elaborate information supplied by the spy Klaus Fuchs in June and September. The report provided a detailed technical overview of the design, dimensions, and components of a plutonium bomb (the type of bomb dropped on Nagasaki). In subsequent months, Merkulov and Kuznetsov continued to furnish invaluable data about bomb technology and uranium supplies. The inclusion of Point 13 in Stalin’s edict is one further indication of the crucial role of intelligence in the Soviet nuclear bomb program.

The Russian Government’s May 1995 Directive

On 17 February 1995 Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree “On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Compilation of Archival Documents Pertaining to the History of the Development of Nuclear Weapons in the USSR.” This decree (No. 180) was published in the 1 March 1995 issue of Rossiiskaya gazeta, and an English translation was provided in the Spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (p. 57). The decree stipulated that certain archival materials were to be released for an official compilation (shornik) of documents (presumably a single volume) on the Soviet Union’s pursuit of nuclear weapons between 1945 and 1954. It did not, however, provide for any broader declassification of materials related to the early Soviet nuclear program.

The February 1995 decree indicated that a Working Group was to be established within one month (i.e., by mid-March 1995) to begin considering which documents might be released for an official compilation. This Working Group, formed under the auspices of the Russian government’s Commission for the Comprehensive Solution of the Problem of Nuclear Weapons, was not actually set up until 24 May 1995, some two months behind schedule. Directive No. 728-R, signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and published in Rossiiskaya gazeta on 7 June 1995 (p. 5), listed 20 individuals who were given responsibility for “studying archival documents and developing proposals concerning their declassification” for an official anthology. The full text of that directive, including the 20 members of the Working Group, is featured below.

The combination of Yeltsin’s decree and Chernomyrdin’s directive provides some cause for concern. The announcement of plans for an official anthology is a welcome step, but unless it is followed by a more systematic declassification of archival materials, the proposed anthology will give only a very limited—and perhaps misleading—depiction of the early Soviet nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately, judging from the instructions approved by Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin, it appears that, at least for now, no broader release of documents is under consideration.

The composition of the Working Group also does not bode well. The affiliations and backgrounds of most of the 20 members imply that archival openness will not be their paramount concern:

***) The panel is chaired by Lev Dmitrievich Ryabev, a first deputy Minister of Atomic Energy. Ryabev has decades of experience in the Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons program, including several years (beginning in 1986) when he served as head of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building, the body now known as the Ministry of Atomic Energy. (Although Ryabev currently is only a first deputy minister rather than a minister, his retention of a senior post in the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex is a sign of his trustworthiness and political acumen.) As an institution, the Ministry of Atomic Energy has been extremely wary of releasing documents that would shed any light on Soviet nuclear weapons developments. Ryabev has been among those who have expressed the need for “great caution.”

**** One of the two deputy chairmen of the Working Group, G. A. Tsyrkov, is also a senior official in the Ministry of Atomic Energy. Like Ryabev, Tsyrkov has been leery of divulging any information about Soviet nuclear technology and design practices.

**** Of the other 18 members of the Working Group, five are senior officials from the Atomic Energy Ministry and five...
are high-ranking military officers from the Ministry of Defense, including the General Staff. The Defense Ministry, like the Atomic Energy Ministry, has been highly skeptical as an institution about the merits of releasing documents for scholarly purposes. Russian military archivists have been especially disinclined to release items pertaining to nuclear weapons, ostensibly because of concerns about nuclear proliferation. (This policy can be taken to ludicrous extremes. When I worked in the Russian General Staff archive in the summer of 1994, I was told that all documents pertaining to nuclear operations—just operations, not technology—would be sealed off until the year 2046. I asked why that particular year was chosen, but no one seemed to know.)

*** Other members of the Working Group include senior officials from the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Security Service, the Department for the Defense Industry, and the State Technical Commission. (The first two bodies are the main successors to the Soviet KGB, and the last two bodies are under the jurisdiction of the Russian President’s apparatus. The State Technical Commission is housed in the same building as the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.) These four agencies have hardly been noted as champions of archival openness. Documents held by the Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service, in particular, have been kept tightly sealed away. The role of these two agencies is bound to be critical in the release of documentation, whether for an official anthology or for other purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Service archive houses the most sensitive documents on the role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear weapons program, and the Federal Security Service archive contains documents generated by the Special Committee headed by Lavrentii Beria from August 1945 until his arrest in late June 1953 (see above). So far, there is little indication that access to either agency’s document holdings will be expanded.

However, two factors may induce the Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service to be more willing to release documents about nuclear espionage: First, the U.S. National Security Agency has begun declassifying some of its huge collection of “Venona” transcripts of intercepted Soviet communications from 1939 through 1945. The initial batch, released in July 1995, contained numerous documents that shed light on the activities of Soviet spies in the Manhattan Project. The disclosure of these materials may erode the traditional secrecy about such matters in Moscow. Second, some officials in the Russian security and intelligence organs may want to release sensitive documents to spotlight the role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb projects. A fierce debate emerged in Russia in the early 1990s about the relative importance of espionage versus indigenous scientific achievements in the Soviet nuclear/thermonuclear programs. Most observers in both Russia and the West now agree that information provided by Soviet spies was vital in accelerating the construction of the first Soviet fission bomb, but that espionage was of much less importance for the Soviet thermonuclear program. If the release of documents could show that the extent of Soviet nuclear spying was even greater than previously thought, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service might be somewhat less averse to the prospects of declassification.

*** Two heads of research institutes specializing in the history of science and technology—V. V. Alekseev and V. M. Orel—are included on the Working Group, but even if they are inclined to press for greater openness (which is by no means certain), they will be far outweighed by officials from the nuclear weapons complex and military establishment.

*** Rudolf Pikhoya, the director of the Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), is the only panel member from Rosarkhiv. Even if Pikhoya seeks the release of as many documents as possible—and it is far from clear that he will—his influence on the Working Group is inherently limited, despite his position as a deputy chairman. The most valuable documents on the early Soviet nuclear weapons program are stored in archives outside Rosarkhiv’s jurisdiction.

*** The presence of Yuli Kharton on the Working Group is encouraging, but it may be largely symbolic. Kharton, who was born in 1904, was one of the key physicists in the early Soviet nuclear program, and is the only living member of the Technical Council that was established in August 1945 to advise Beria’s Special Committee (see above). Kharton has given lengthy written and oral testimony over the past few years about the early Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb programs, and he provided useful information to David Holloway for the book Stalin and the Bomb. No doubt, Kharton is more inclined than the other panel members to urge the release of extensive documentation, especially materials that would shed light on the role of espionage versus indigenous scientific achievements. But because he is in his early 90s, it is unlikely that he will be able to play a central role on the Working Group.

Quite apart from obstacles posed by the composition of the Working Group, it is possible that the Russian government’s directive (and Yeltsin’s decree) will go largely unimplemented. Several impressive-looking decrees and directives about the declassification of archival materials have been issued by Yeltsin and the Russian government over the past two years, but very little has come of them. Now that the political outlook in Russia is so uncertain, there is little chance that the archival situation will improve anytime soon. If anything, the increased strength of Communist delegates in the Russian parliament could lead to further restrictions on access to major repositories.

If an official anthology of documents about the early Soviet nuclear weapons program is eventually published, it undoubtedly will contain many interesting and valuable materials. Even the release of individual documents can add a good deal to the historical record (see above). But in the absence of a wider declassification of relevant items, the one-time compilation of an official anthology will not reveal as much about early Soviet nuclear developments as one might hope.

2. See also Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 174–180.
6. The directive was published under the rubric “Sbornik
DOCUMENT 1:  TOP SECRET SPECIAL DOSSIER

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
EDICT No. GKO-9887/SS/op

20 August 1945
Moscow, the Kremlin.

On a Special Committee Under the GKO’s Auspices

The State Defense Committee orders:

1. That a Special Committee be formed under the GKO’s auspices consisting of:
   - Beria, L. P. (chairman)
   - Malenkov, G. M.
   - Voznesenskii, N. A.
   - Vannikov, B. L.
   - Zavenyagin, A. P.
   - Kurchatov, I. V.
   - Kapitsa, P. L.
   - Makhnev, V. A.
   - Pervukhin, M. G.

2. That the GKO’s Special Committee be empowered to supervise all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium: — the development of scientific research in this sphere; — the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium, as well as the exploitation of uranium deposits outside the USSR (in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries); — the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and — the construction of atomic energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb.

3. That a Technical Council be created under the GKO’s Special Committee to conduct a preliminary examination of scientific and technical matters submitted for review by the Special Committee, as well as an examination of plans for scientific research and accounts for it, plus technical designs of installations, structures, and facilities for the use of atomic energy of uranium. The Council will consist of the following:
   - Vannikov, B. L. (chairman)
   - Alikhanov, A. I. — academician (scientific secretary)
   - Voznesenskii, I. N. — corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences
   - Zavenyagin, A. P.
   - Ioffe, A. F. — academician
   - Kapitsa, P. L. — academician
   - Kikoin, I. K. — corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences
   - Kurchatov, I. V. — academician
   - Makhnev, V. A.
   - Khariton, Yu. B. — professor
   - Khlopin V. G. — academician

4. That a special directorate be organized under the USSR Council of People’s Commissars—the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, subordinated to the GKO’s Special Committee—to exercise direct supervision over scientific research, development, and design organizations and industrial enterprises for the use of atomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs.

5. That the GKO’s Special Committee be obligated to devise a work plan for the Committee and the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC and measures to carry out this plan, and to present it to the Chairman of the GKO for approval.

6. That the GKO’s Special Committee take operative measures to ensure the fulfillment of tasks assigned to it under the present edict; that it promulgate directives requiring fulfillment by agencies and departments; and that when a government decision is needed, the GKO’s Special Committee should present its recommendations directly for the approval of the Chairman of the GKO.

The GKO’s Special Committee will have its own staff and funding estimates and an expense account at the USSR State Bank.

7. That the GKO’s Special Committee define and approve for the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC the level of funding, the size of the workforce, and the volume of material-technical resources that it requires, so that USSR Gosplan can include these resources in the spending category listed as “Special Expenditures of the GKO.”

8. That the chairman of USSR Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Voznesenskii, organize within Gosplan a directorate to help carry out the assignments of the GKO’s Special Committee.

That the dep. chairman of USSR Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Borisov, be placed in charge of the aforementioned directorate, and that he be relieved of other work for Gosplan and the GKO.

9. That the financial expenditures and upkeeps of the GKO’s Special Committee, of the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, of the First Main Directorate’s scientific research, design, and engineering organizations and industrial enterprises, as well as the work carried out by other agencies and departments at the behest of the Directorate, are to be included in the union budget through the category “Special Expenditures of the GKO.”

That financing of capital construction for the First Main Directorate be carried out through the State Bank.

That the First Main Directorate and the institutes and enterprises under its auspices be freed from the registration of staffs in financial organs.

10. That Cde. B. L. Vannikov be confirmed as the deputy chairman of the GKO’s Special Committee and director of the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and that he be discharged from his duties as People’s Commissar of Munitions.

That the following be approved as deputy directors of the Main Directorate:
   - A. P. Zavenyagin — first deputy
   - N. A. Borisov — deputy
   - P. Ya. Meshik — deputy
   - P. Ya. Antropov — deputy

11. That the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC and its enterprises and institutes, as well as work carried out by other agencies and departments for it, are to be controlled by the GKO’s Special Committee.

Without special permission from the GKO, no organizations, institutes, or individuals have any right whatsoever to interfere in the administrative or operational ac-
activities of the First Main Directorate and its enterprises and institutes, or to demand information about its work or work carried out at the behest of the First Main Directorate. All records of such work are to be directed only to the GKO’s Special Committee.

12. That within 10 days the Special Committee be instructed to provide recommendations for approval by the Chairman of the GKO concerning the transfer of all necessary scientific, design, engineering, and production organizations and industrial enterprises to the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and to affirm the structure, organization, and number of workers on the staffs of the Committee and the First Main Directorate of the USSR CPC.

13. That Cde. Beria be instructed to take measures aimed at organizing foreign intelligence work to gain more complete technical and economic information about the uranium industry and about atomic bombs. He is empowered to supervise all intelligence work in this sphere carried out by intelligence organs (NKGB, RUKA, etc.).

Chairman of the State Defense Committee
J. STALIN

Distributed to Cdes.:
Beria, Molotov, Voznesenskii, Malenkov, Mikoyan: all points; Borisov: 8, 10; Zverev, Golev: 9; Meshik, Abakumov, Antropov, Kasatkine: 10; Pervukhin: 1, 10; Merkulov, Kuznetsov (RUKA): 13; Chadaev: 4, 9, 10, 11.

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DOCUMENT 2

No. 728-r, Issued on 24 May 1995 in Moscow

To implement the decree “On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Compilation of Archival Documents Pertaining to the History of the Development of Nuclear Weapons in the USSR,” issued on 17 February 1995 by the President of the Russian Federation:

1. A Working Group of the Government Commission on the Comprehensive Solution of the Problem of Nuclear Weapons (referred to hereinafter as the Working Group) is to be set up to study archival documents connected with the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR and to devise recommendations for their declassification. The Working Group is to consist of the following:

- L. D. RYABEV — first deputy Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (director of the Working Group);
- R. G. PIKOYA — director of Rosarkhiv (deputy director of the Working Group);
- G. A. TSYRKOV — head of a main directorate in the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia (deputy director of the Working Group);
- V. V. ALEKSEEV — director of the Institute of History and Archaeology of the Urals Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
- V. I. ANIKEEV — deputy head of a directorate in the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia
- V. V. BOGDAN — chief of affairs at the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- A. A. BRISH — senior designer at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- V. N. VERKHOVETSEV — head of a command sector in a main directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
- G. A. GONCHAROV — department head at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- Yu. V. GRAFOV — deputy head of a directorate of the Navy;
- S. A. ZELENTSOV — consultant for a main directorate of the Defense Ministry of Russia;
- A. P. KALANDIN — deputy chairman of the State Technology Commission of Russia;
- N. I. KOMOV — senior specialist in a main directorate of the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- V. N. KOSORUKOV — senior engineer in a main directorate of the Defense Ministry of Russia;
- A. A. KRAYUSHKIN — head of a
directorate in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation;
- B. V. LITVINOV — senior designer at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia;
- V. M. OREL — director of the S. I. Vavilov Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences;
- V. A. PIDZHAKOV — deputy head of the Central Physics and Technical Institute at the Defense Ministry of Russia;
- Yu. B. KHRITON — honorary research director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia.

2. Within three months, the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia, the Defense Ministry of Russia, the State Committee on the Defense Industry of Russia, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Rosarkhiv, and the Russian Academy of Sciences will prepare, and present to the Working Group, lists of archival documents proposed for declassification and for inclusion in an official compilation of archival documents pertaining to the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period through 1954.

3. In the third quarter of 1995, the Working Group will determine a thematic way of dividing archival documents proposed for declassification in accordance with established procedures and for inclusion in an official compilation of archival documents pertaining to the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period through 1954, and will prepare a general list of these documents.

4. In the fourth quarter of 1995, the State Technology Commission of Russia, in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia, the Defense of Russia, the State Committee on the Defense Industry of Russia, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, Rosarkhiv, and the Russian Academy of Sciences will, on the basis of established procedures, arrange for the declassification of archival documents pertaining to the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period through 1954, drawing on the list
3. After that date, Chinese press reports were virtually identical to the coverage in other Communist countries, all of which condemned the Hungarian revolution and strongly supported the Soviet invasion. Until November 2, however, the Chinese press was bolder and more evenhanded in its treatment of the Hungarian crisis than the other East-bloc newspapers were, as Liebermann’s report makes clear. The East German diplomat even expressed anxiety about the detail of Chinese coverage, saying that “they would have been better off leaving out” some of the most vivid descriptions of the revolutionary ferment. Liebermann left no doubt that the kind of reports featured in the Chinese press would have been unacceptable in East Germany.

The concluding paragraph of Liebermann’s report is intriguing insofar as it reveals high-level East German concerns about China’s efforts to establish a “special position” within the socialist camp and about Beijing’s general commitment to the Communist bloc. Although Liebermann assured his superiors that China “stands solidly behind” the socialist camp and “is not taking up any sort of ‘special position,’” the very fact that he had to rebut these accusations implies that some officials in Eastern Europe already sensed that the “steadfast alliance” between the Soviet Union and China might one day be called into question.

Thus, the document is valuable in showing how even a seemingly arcane item from the East-Central European archives can shed light on the dynamics of Sino-Soviet relations.

No. 212/02/ Peking, 30 November 1956

Report on the Stance of the People’s Republic of China toward the Crisis in Hungary

The form of reporting in the Chinese press was obviously geared toward the Chinese reader. Even though the Chinese people were following the crisis in Hungary very closely, it is quite natural that for the Chinese people the crisis seemed more distant than it did for, say, the peoples of the European People’s Democracies. In addition, the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt at that time was given priority coverage in the Chinese press. This explains why until the formation of the Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, much more information about Hungary appeared in the Chinese press than in the GDR press. Under the special conditions of the PRC, they can pursue this type of reporting without fear that it will cause agitation and disquiet among the Chinese people of the sort one can detect among some of the GDR citizens currently here in Peking.

Although the Chinese press during the early days was factual and objective in its reports on the crisis in Hungary, there were some things reported in the press that they would have been better off leaving out, even if one takes account of the special conditions in the PRC. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this point.

1) The “People’s Daily” on 1 Nov. quoted the following passage from a speech by Nagy: “The continual growth of the revolution in our country has brought the movement of democratic forces to a crossroads.”

2) The “People’s Daily” on 1 Nov. also reported that Nagy on 30 Oct. had commenced negotiations with representatives of the armed forces committee of the freedom fighters and the revolutionary committee of the revolutionary intelligentsia and students.

A clear statement about the crisis in Hungary was published in a lead article in the “People’s Daily” on 3 Nov. In this lead article, which covers the Soviet Union’s declaration on ties with socialist countries, a portion concerns the crisis in Hungary: “The Chinese people are wholeheartedly on the side of the honest Hungarian workers and on the side of the true Hungarian patriots and resolute socialist fighters for Hungary. We are dismayed to see that a small group of counterrevolutionary conspirators are exploiting the situation with the aim of restoring capitalism and fascist terror and of using Hungary to disrupt the unity of the socialist countries and undermine the Warsaw Pact.”

Judging by the stance of the PRC toward the crisis in Hungary, one again can confidently emphasize that the PRC stands solidly behind the camp of socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union. It is also clear that the PRC is not taking up any sort of “special position” within the socialist camp, as certain Western circles would have preferred. The stance of the People’s Republic of China toward the crisis in Hungary was no different from the stance of the other socialist countries.

(H. Liebermann)
“A VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS”: THE PROFESSIONAL’S REVENGE

by David R. Stone


After a Soviet fighter plane shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September 1983, Georgii Kornienko was assigned by his superior Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to prepare TASS’s official press release on the incident. In particular, Gromyko instructed Kornienko to claim that the Soviet Union had absolutely no knowledge of the fate of the airliner, though the Soviet leadership was quite certain that it had indeed shot down the plane. Kornienko vehemently protested that the truth of the matter would inevitably come out and that the best course was to reveal just that: the Soviet Union had shot down an unidentified intruder in the full conviction that it was an American spy plane. Gromyko was indecisive, but invited Kornienko to call KGB head Yurii Andropov to state his case. In Kornienko’s opinion, Andropov was prepared to accept an honest account of the event, but was swayed by Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, long-time master of Soviet defense industry, and the Soviet military leadership. At the meeting to make the final decision, Ustinov won this internal battle and Kornienko was only “a voice crying in the wilderness.” The consequences proved Kornienko right: a human tragedy was turned by the Soviet leadership’s short-sightedness and the Reagan Administration’s intense criticism into a public-relations disaster for the USSR.

Moments like these, in which political leaders ignore at their peril the advice of their professional advisors, recur frequently in Kornienko’s memoirs. Covering his over forty years of serving the Soviet state from junior translator in intelligence work to Deputy Foreign Minister, Kornienko’s observations are those of a Soviet patriot intent on settling scores both with the West and with his Soviet comrades. It is perhaps a universal failing of memoirs that they emphasize those times when the hero-author is right and all about are mistaken; Kornienko’s are a sterling example, concentrating particularly on moments when diplomats’ prerogatives were violated, whether by party functionaries, military officers, or the highest leadership of the Soviet state. After Henry Kissinger’s April 1972 visit to Moscow, in which he worked closely with Kornienko, the innocuously bland final statement noted that talks had been “open and productive.” N. V. Podgorny, Chair of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and thus nominally Soviet head of state, objected to this positive spin on Soviet-American relations despite his complete ignorance of diplomacy. Only Kissinger’s acquiescence avoided more serious diplomatic consequences. Still later, as political instability in Afghanistan grew at the end of the 1970s, the universal opinion within the Soviet Foreign Ministry against military intervention was disregarded—Andropov and Ustinov eventually browbeat Gromyko into agreeing to an invasion, Kornienko informs us, producing a bloody and ultimately frustrating war with disastrous consequences at home and abroad.

Despite these tales of underappreciated diplomats, Kornienko’s book is surprisingly unrevealing about the inner workings of Soviet foreign policy; while discussing Ustinov and Andropov’s pressure on Gromyko for intervention in Afghanistan, he never satisfactorily explains why they themselves had abandoned the general conviction that military intervention in Afghanistan was a terrible idea. Extraordinarily cagey, he never draws upon personal experience or Soviet documentary evidence when a Western secondary source will do. Personal observations in his work serve either to prove his own acuity and point up the mistakes of others or to disparage the talents and character of those Kornienko worked with. His memoirs produce the impression that Kornienko had no friends, was particularly unimpressed by Brezhnev, Ford, and Reagan, and of all those he dealt with admired only Gromyko and Andropov. This does not mean that Kornienko’s book is without value, but it must be used to understand the mindset and mental world of a member of the Soviet foreign policy elite, not to find new facts and revealed secrets.

Kornienko’s first three chapters, on the sources of the Cold War, on the Eisenhower presidency, and on Kennedy and Khrushchev, offer very little that is new or especially interesting to students of the Cold War. Though he claims to have based his accounts on his own experiences and on his conversations with other Soviet diplomats, in particular Gromyko, the reader finds little from an insider’s point of view. As a low-ranking diplomat, Kornienko may indeed have seen and done little worthy of reporting. Even so, an occasional personal glimpse of life in Soviet intelligence and the diplomatic corps slips through. Kornienko relates, for example, that hawkish officials in the KGB, hoping to present Stalin with a translation of George Kennan’s seminal 1947 Foreign Affairs article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in which “containment” was translated as “suffocation,” pressured Kornienko to spice his translation. The cooler heads of Kornienko and his fellow translators succeeded in standing up for the integrity of the translator’s art.

These earlier chapters are most noteworthy for the general theory Kornienko offers of the Cold War and its origins, which has a direct bearing on his interpretation of how the Cold War ended. For Kornienko, there were no vast impersonal forces or inevitable class contradictions dictating the growth of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Neither class struggle nor geopolitical necessity mandated confrontation. Soviet policy in Eastern Europe was also no obstacle to normal relations, as Kornienko argues that American methods in Japan did not differ from Stalin’s methods in Eastern Europe. (Poles and Czechoslovaks might be puzzled here at their implicit inclusion in the camp of defeated Axis powers.) Instead, the Cold War stemmed from the pragmatic Roosevelt’s untimely death and his replacement by the ideologue Truman. Kornienko notes Truman’s notorious suggestion that the Nazis and Soviets be left to kill each other off; he likes it so much he repeats it twice. Kornienko asks rhetorically, “Was another path possible? It seems to me yes. But Truman consciously rejected it.” That is, confrontation was a specific political choice, and one for which the Soviets bore at least some measure of responsibility, for “if the American side said ‘A’ in the Cold War, then Stalin didn’t hold himself back from saying ‘B’.” Since the West never seriously undertook an end to the Cold War, when the end finally did come under Gorbachev, the only possible explanation was unilateral Soviet surrender.

Chapter 4 on the Cuban missile crisis is
nearly as frustrating as the first three in terms of lacking new revelations. Kornienko approves the document collections that have been published since the advent of glasnost, but does not enrich the story they tell with any significant new information of his own. Despite serving as a counselor in the Soviet Union’s Washington embassy during the crisis, Kornienko tells us little of his own experiences. He does relate (as does then-Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in his recently published memoirs) that the Soviet embassy was kept in complete ignorance of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and was in fact unwittingly used to pass along disinformation.

The meat of Kornienko’s story is his role in one of the key moments of the crisis: Khrushchev’s two letters to Kennedy, the first of 26 October 1962 promising withdrawal of Soviet missiles in return for an American pledge of non-intervention in Cuba, the second of the next day additionally demanding the corresponding withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey. According to Kornienko, his own detective work played a central role in Khrushchev’s decision to sharpen his demands. Soviet intelligence sources reported a conversation with an American journalist on his immediate departure for Florida to cover the imminent American invasion. Hearing these reports as well as taking into account the heightened alert status of American armed forces, Khrushchev accordingly acted to calm the situation by sending his first letter. Kornienko himself knew the journalist, scheduled lunch with him (itself proving that the journalist was not due for immediate departure), and convinced himself that the earlier intelligence reports of imminent invasion had been mistaken. Armed with Kornienko’s information, Khrushchev felt prepared to drive a harder bargain with the Americans.

Chapter 5 on the prelude to détente and Chapter 6 on détente itself offer slightly more. Détente came not from any alterations on the Soviet side, but from Nixon and Kissinger’s decision to undertake a more pragmatic and conciliatory policy towards Moscow. In early 1972, Kornienko worked closely with Henry Kissinger on the “Basic Principles” statement on Soviet-American relations. Despite being at the heart of political decision-making at the highest levels, Kornienko strays from standard accounts of the most important stages of détente—Kissinger’s secret visit to Moscow, Nixon’s Moscow summit and Ford’s Vladivostok summit with Brezhnev—only to comment bitingly on Brezhnev and Ford’s lack of mental ability, or to claim that Kissinger deliberately scheduled meetings in Moscow to keep his deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt away from discussions on the Middle East (allegedly due to fear of Sonnenfeldt’s “zionist inclinations”).

Détente was short-lived. In Kornienko’s interpretation, the beginning of the end was the 1975-76 Angolan Civil War; Carter’s presidency only furthered the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations already begun and represented another missed chance at an end to the Cold War. The main obstacle to improving relations, in Kornienko’s account, was not Carter’s concern for human rights, which was irritating but rather insignificant to Soviet leaders, but instead more concrete issues of international politics. While Carter himself might have been prepared for a more open-minded approach to the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration, hamstrung by unnamed (but easily identifiable) hawks within its ranks, was not prepared for a full settlement. The United States’ fundamental goals still included superiority not equality in arms control policy, and even the Carter-brokered Camp David accord only underlined the chances for a general Mideast peace via U.S.-Soviet joint action, Kornienko alleges.

Chapters 8 and 9 cover the war in Afghanistan and the downing of KAL 007 as discussed above; Chapter 10 brings us to the Reagan years and the beginnings of glasnost, for which Kornienko has saved his bitterest venom. His target is not Stalin, Brezhnev, or any Western cold warrior, but his last two superiors: Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze. In Chapter 10 and his conclusion, he presents the case for the prosecution in Mikhail Gorbachev’s treason trial. Traitor is not too strong a word to express Kornienko’s evaluation of Mikhail Gorbachev, but Kornienko admits that blunders began before Gorbachev took power in 1985. Chapter 10 first examines at the pre-Gorbachev decision to replace aging Soviet medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in Europe with SS-20s. In keeping with Kornienko’s general portrait of the late Brezhnev years, in contrast with more effective policy under Stalin and Khrushchev, Soviet efforts in foreign policy were sabotaged by bungling and short-sightedness. He tells us that West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt suggested to Aleksei Kosygin that the replacement SS-20s be limited to a quantity significantly less than the outgoing SS-4s and SS-5s, given the qualitative superiority of the new missiles, and that this policy be linked explicitly to an attempt to head off a new arms race in Europe. Kornienko, an invited guest at the Politburo meeting that discussed Schmidt’s suggestion, spoke above his station and out of turn to support this initiative. Ustinov challenged him with the possibility of an American arms buildup even after conciliatory Soviet gestures. Even in this worst-case outcome, Kornienko believed, any temporary advantage the Americans might gain in medium-range missiles would be far outweighed by the beneficial effects of the resulting strains in the Western alliance and strengthening of Western Europe’s anti-nuclear movement. With Brezhnev too feeble to make his presence felt, and Gromyko’s refusal to speak up for Kornienko, Ustinov simply proved too powerful. Once again Kornienko, the lone voice of reason, had his advice unthinkingly disregarded, and the upgrade went forward as planned.

The second half of Chapter 10 examines the fate of the SS-23 “Oka” missile. This is one episode of the Cold War whose significance is interpreted in radically different ways on either side of the former iron curtain. Barely noticed in the West, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’s decision to include the SS-23 with its 400km range in the list of intermediate range (that is, with range 500 km and higher) missiles slated for elimination is the touchstone of Russian military and conservative condemnation of Gorbachev, what one officer terms the “crime of the century.” While the opposition to Gorbachev can hardly argue that the elimination of a single missile system was the root cause of the downfall of the Soviet Union, they do see the case of the Oka as an example of all the worst in Gorbachev’s diplomacy: unpreparedness, unwillingness to listen to expert opinion, and, most seriously, sacrifice of Soviet national interests in the name of agreement, any agreement, with the West. As Kornienko puts it, the inclusion of the Oka under the provisions of a treaty that did not concern it was “only one of the examples of what serious consequences occur when
high-placed leaders ignore the competent judgment of specialists and as a result sacrifice the very interests of the state trying for one thing—to that much quickly finish the preparation of this or that treaty and light off fireworks in celebration.”

The conclusion of Kornienko’s book, a shortened version of a case set forth earlier at greater length and in greater detail in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (16 August 1994), is what his argument has been leading to all along: the Gorbachev era as the epitome of unprofessionalism in foreign policy. It is a full-fledged condemnation of almost every action undertaken by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze from 1985 through the final collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, Kornienko strives to discredit the idea that Gorbachev offered something truly new and revolutionary in international politics. As Kornienko reminds us, it was Lenin who first enunciated the principle of “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist world (as another form of class struggle), and Stalin actively endorsed the idea of coexistence with the West as late as 1951. Ever since a rough nuclear parity had been achieved in the 1960s, reasonable people on each side had seen the need for an end to the arms race and confrontation. Gorbachev’s innovation was not living in peace with the West, but the unilateral “betrayal of the Soviet Union’s vital interests.”

Kornienko enunciates a number of specific examples of Gorbachev’s craven behavior—submission to the United States over the Krasnoyarsk radar station and Soviet acquiescence in the use of force against Iraq—but his most substantial comments are reserved for the reunification of Germany. Kornienko, having passed over in silence the Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, takes pains to emphasize the right of the German people to self-determination, free from outside influence. His objection is to the manner in which this unification took place and the status of the resulting German state. Why, he asks, should Germany remain in NATO and why should NATO troops remain in Germany with Soviet troops completely evacuated from Eastern Europe? The fact that Germany has stayed in NATO he attributes to the absolutely incompetent way in which Gorbachev handled the German question, avoiding the enunciation of any clear policy until too late, insisting on the unacceptability of German NATO membership to George Bush in Washington only in February 1990 and then conceding Germany’s right to remain in NATO without receiving guarantees and concessions in return.

Here Kholodnoia voina particularly suffers by comparison to Kornienko’s 1992 collaboration with Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, former Chief of the General Staff and one-time personal aide to Mikhail Gorbachev. This earlier book, Glazami marshala i diplomat [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat] (Moscow, 1992), covers in book-length form the Gorbachev years which Kornienko discusses in a chapter. The lion’s share is Akhromeev’s work, and he was a much more sensitive and forthcoming observer, on occasion even revealing the details of Soviet tactics in arms control negotiations. While nearly as condemnatory of Gorbachev as Kornienko, Akhromeev as Chief of the General Staff was in a position to truly appreciate the steady decline of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev and the need for radical reform, though he parted company with Gorbachev on how precisely reform needed to be implemented. (Akhromeev killed himself in the wake of the failed coup of August 1991.) What Kornienko misses in his evaluation of the Gorbachev years is precisely how desperate Gorbachev’s position was by the end of the 1980s. With opposition to Gorbachev growing on all sides, an economy spiraling into free fall, Soviet troops on hostile ground in Eastern Europe, and the specter of nationalism haunting the Soviet Union, Gorbachev simply had no ground to stand on. It is this last factor—nationalism—that Kornienko (and for that matter Akhromeev) consistently ignores. It seems he imagines that a stable end to the Cold War could have occurred with Eastern Europe still occupied by Soviet troops, and he never noticed that half the Soviet Union’s population was non-Russian.

Kornienko, then, continues to be a devoted patriot of the collapsed empire he served for four decades. While there is likely some truth to his assertions that Gorbachev might have driven marginally harder bargains with the West than he in fact did, the real significance of any diplomatic triumphs Gorbachev might have achieved is questionable. What can any diplomat achieve when the state he or she represents crumbles away? Kornienko can complain that his voice was never heard, but the rejection of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet state itself are what truly demolished Soviet foreign policy. It is just these events that Kornienko cannot bring himself to look at, and to ask whether he and his fellow professionals bear any responsibility for them.

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CHEN HANSHENG’S MEMOIRS AND CHINESE COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE

by Maochen Yu

Chen Hansheng, My Life During Four Eras [Sige shidai de wo] (Beijing: China Culture and History Press [zhongguo wenshi chupan she], 1988).

Post-Mao China has been marked by a transition from a combination of totalitarianism and socialism to one of authoritarianism and a “socialist market economy.” Along with this transition is the gradual “withering away of the state,” which in turn has resulted in a looser government control over publication on some historical issues previously considered taboo during the Mao era. One of the most fascinating new academic interests in China is the sudden surge of materials on Chinese Communist intelligence, triggered by a massive “political rehabilitation” of those Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intelligence veterans who were vanquished in Mao’s ruthless campaigns.¹ The publication of Chen Hansheng’s memoirs, My Life During Four Eras, is just one of the telling examples.

Chen Hansheng became an agent for the Comintern in 1926 while a young professor at Beijing University (p.35). His life as a communist intelligence official spans many decades of the 20th century and involves some of the most important espionage cases. Chen Hansheng’s memoirs add some new and revealing dimensions to the present understanding of the much debated history of Chinese and international communism. In an authoritative manner, this publication helps answer many nagging questions long in the minds of historians, chief among which
are the following:

To What Extent Were the Chinese Communists Involved in Soviet-Dominated Communist International Espionage in China in the 20th Century? Recent memoirs in Chinese, notably by Chen Hansheng and Shi Zhe, suggest that the Chinese Communists were deeply involved. In the 1930s and 1940s, for example, as the Shi Zhe memoirs reveal, both the NKVD and GRU of the USSR and the Department of International Res. (OMS) of the Comintern ran a large spy training school in Yanan; Chinese Communist spies penetrated deep into the Nationalists’ (GMD) wartime intelligence organizations for Moscow. Chen Hansheng’s story further illustrates this Moscow-Yanan tie. Chen was recruited by the Russians as a Comintern intelligence agent in 1926. One year later, the warlord Zhang Zuolin raided the Soviet Embassy in Beijing which was being used as an intelligence base. This raid exposed a large international espionage scheme controlled by Moscow. Chen Hansheng then fled to Moscow and returned to China in 1928 to become a member of the well-known Richard Sorge Spy Ring, then based in Shanghai. When Sorge was reassigned to Moscow to Tokyo, Chen went along and worked closely with Ozaki Hozumi and others of the ring until 1935, when the unexpected arrest of a messenger from Moscow almost exposed Chen’s real identity. Chen sensed the danger and fled to Moscow again (pp.61-62). For much of his early life, he was directly controlled by Moscow, and highly active in international intelligence. Chen’s identity as a Comintern agent was so important and secret that Richard Sorge, during his marathon interrogation in Tokyo by the Japanese police, never gave out Chen’s real name to the Japanese.

What Was the True Relationship Between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists during WWII? Some historians have minimized the extent and importance of the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union during World War II. Chen Hansheng’s memoirs and other recently available documents from various sources fundamentally challenge this interpretation.

Instead, these new publications show that from the very beginning the CCP was intrinsically connected with the international communist movement centered in Moscow. Every major step of the CCP followed orders from Moscow. In 1935, when the Soviet Union was threatened by rising fascism in Europe and Asia, the CCP followed Moscow’s order to adopt a policy of a “United Front” (Popular Front) with the Nationalists in a joint effort to fight Japanese expansion in Asia. Yet, when Stalin stunned the world by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in late August 1939, the United Front policy collapsed in China. Mao Zedong followed Stalin most closely among all the Comintern party chiefs, hailing the Hitler-Stalin deal as a major victory against the West and the partition of Poland as necessary for the communist cause. In January 1940, Mao Zedong proclaimed that “the center of the Anti-Soviet movement is no longer Nazi Germany, but among the so-called democratic countries.”

The modus vivendi of communism and fascism in late 1939 created such intense friction between the Chinese Nationalists, who had been engaged in an all-out and bitter war with the Japanese imperial army in China, and the Chinese Communists, who were following Stalin’s rapprochement with Germany, whose ally was Japan, that in early 1940, an army of communist troops was ambushed by the Nationalists in Southern Anhui, an event which essentially ended the superflcial United Front. Yet when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin reversed his policy on the Popular Front: all member parties of the Comintern, both in Europe and in Asia, were now ordered to fight fascism. Unfortunately, in China this did not mean the re-establishment of the former United Front against the Japanese, because the Soviet Union had already signed the notorious Neutrality Pact with Japan. The Chinese Nationalists, not the Japanese, remained the CCP’s main enemy.

In fact, a stunning recent discovery at the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives of a secret Soviet-Japanese treaty at the outset of WWII reveals a deeply conspiratorial scheme worked out between Moscow and Tokyo. On 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese diplomats reached a secret deal that stipulated, “The USSR will abandon its active support for Chiang [Kai-shek; Jiang Jieshi] and will repress the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chinese Communist Party will retain as a base the three (Chinese) Northwest provinces (Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia).”

Chen Hansheng’s memoirs have made a significant contribution to reconnecting this CCP-Moscow tie.

Was Agnes Smedley A Comintern Agent? Despite vigorous denials by Smedley herself, Chen Hansheng discloses unequivocally that Smedley was no less than an agent of the Comintern (p.52). (Historian Stephen MacKinnon has only established that Smedley was Sorge’s mistress in Shanghai.) Further, we also know from Chen’s memoirs that Smedley was involved in every major step of the Sorge group’s espionage activities. In fact, it was Smedley herself who recruited Chen into Sorge’s Tokyo operations (p.58). Recent Comintern archives also confirm Smedley’s identity as a Comintern agent.

Was Owen Lattimore A Communist Spy? Lattimore topped Senator Joseph McCarthy’s list of alleged communist spies in the early 1950s. McCarthy accused Lattimore of not only having manufactured a Far East policy leading to the loss of China to the communists, but also of being a “top Soviet agent.”\(^7\) Chen’s memoirs provide surprising insights on this matter from the perspective of a communist intelligence agent. After Chen fled from Tokyo to Moscow in 1935 to prevent the Sorge Ring’s operations from exposure, Owen Lattimore, then the editor of the New York-based journal Pacific Affairs, the mouthpiece of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), asked the Soviet Union, a member nation of IPR, for an assistant (p.63). In 1936, Moscow recommended Chen Hansheng to Lattimore, who readily accepted the nomination. Chen then went to New York, this time under the direct control of Kang Sheng, who was also in Moscow, to work with Lattimore from 1936 until 1939, when Chen was reassigned by Kang Sheng to a Hong Kong-based operation.

However, Chen states in his memoirs that Lattimore was kept in the dark as to his true identity as a Communist agent directly dispatched from Moscow (p.64). Lattimore’s scholarly activities were only to be used as a cover for Chen. Further, Kang Sheng specifically instructed Chen that while in New York, his position at the IPR should only be used as a means of getting a salary; and that Chen’s real task was to help Rao Shushi, a Comintern and CCP chief also in New York, organize underground activities (p.65). Therefore, Chen’s memoirs seem to clear Lattimore from any complicity associated with Chen Hansheng’s secret operations in
When Intellect And Intelligence Join, What Happens?  Chen is a seasoned intelligence officer with high academic accomplishment as an economic historian. While his erudition has provided him with excellent covers for intelligence operations, it was also to become a source of his own demise. Chinese intellectuals are frequently willing to serve the state, to be its eyes and ears, yet in the end the state often turns against the intellectuals without mercy. Chen Hansheng’s life thus becomes a classic example of this supreme irony. While in Moscow in 1935 and 1936, Chen witnessed the bloody purge of the intelligence apparatus in the Soviet Union by Stalin. Many of his Soviet comrades, some of them highly respected scholars, including the former Soviet Ambassador to Beijing who originally recruited Chen in China in 1926, were shot by Stalin as traitors and foreign spies. Chen wrote in raw pessimism about the Soviet purge, “I could not understand what was going on then. Yet it was beyond my imagination that some thirty years later, this horrible drama would be replayed in China and I myself would be a target of the persecution” (p.64). During the Cultural Revolution, Chen did not escape the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. From 1966 to 1968, Chen was put under house arrest. His wife was tortured to death in late 1968. By 1971 when Chen was allowed to leave the “thought reform” Cadre School in remote Hunan province, he had become almost completely blind.

New York.

Was Solomon Adler A Communist? Solomon Adler, chief intelligence agent for the U.S. Treasury Department in China during WWII, was also prominent on McCarthy’s communist list. In the 1950s, Elizabeth Bentley, a courier of a Soviet apparatus in Washington, further identified Adler as a member of Soviet intelligence. Adler at the time denied Bentley’s accusation. Surprisingly, in Chen’s memoirs, as well as in some other recent Chinese documents, Adler has resurfaced in Beijing as a bona fide communist intelligence official. According to these sources, Adler moved to Beijing permanently in the late 1950s and has since worked in various capacities in CCP intelligence. Today, he is identified in Chinese documents as an “Advisor” to the External Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, the department that handles such well-known figures as Larry Wu-tai Ching of the CIA, who was arrested by the FBI in 1983 for espionage, and committed suicide in jail in 1986.

Were the Chinese Communists Part of the International Communist Movement or Merely “Agrarian Reformers” in the 1930s and 1940s? Chen Hansheng’s memoirs provide much new information about the Chinese Communist Party’s extensive international connections. Besides the Sorge and Lattimore cases, Chen served as a chief communist intelligence officer in Hong Kong in the late 1930s and early 1940s, running a cover organization funneling huge amounts of funds—$20 million in two and a half years—from outside China to Yanan, mostly for the purpose of purchasing Japanese-made weapons from the “Puppet” troops in North China, with considerable Japanese acquiescence. When wanted in 1944 by the Nationalist secret police for pro-Soviet activities in Guilin (China), Chen was rescued by the British and airlifted to India where he was miraculously put on the payroll of British intelligence in New Delhi. Between 1946 and 1950, while undercover as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins University in Maryland, Chen became Beijing’s secret liaison with the Communist Party of the U.S.A. (CPUSA) (p.81). After the CPCP took over mainland China, Chen was summoned back from America to Beijing by Zhou Enlai in 1950 and has remained a major figure in his own business for much of the rest of his life.
THE 1980-1981 POLISH CRISIS:
THE NEED FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS

by Mark Kramer


Many books about the rise of Solidarity in Poland and the subsequent martial-law crackdown have been published in the West, but nearly all of them appeared in the early to mid-1980s. In recent years, particularly since the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, scholarly interest in the 1980-81 Polish crisis has largely subsided. Although a few laudable books about the origins of Solidarity, notably those by Roman Laba (The Roots of Solidarity), Lawrence C. Goodwyn (Breaking the Barrier), and Michael H. Bernhard (The Origins of Democratization in Poland), were published in the early 1990s, the large majority of Western scholars no longer seem interested in reexamining the dramatic events of 1980-81. Even in Poland only a handful of experts, mainly those connected with the parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Oversight, are still devoting much effort to a reassessment of the 18-month confrontation that followed the emergence of Solidarity in the summer of 1980. The dearth of academic interest in the Polish crisis is ironic, for it is only now, when the archives in Poland, Russia, and other former Communist countries have become accessible and when a large number of valuable first-hand accounts of the crisis have appeared, that a fuller and more nuanced analysis of the events of 1980-81 is finally possible.

For that reason alone, the two books under review could have made a far-reaching contribution. Both were completed after several of the former East-bloc archives had been opened and after the initial spate of memoirs and other first-hand accounts of the Polish crisis had appeared. But unfortunately, neither author has made any use of archival sources. Although both draw on at least a few of the new first-hand accounts, the use of this new evidence, especially in Yakov Grishin’s narrative, is often problematic. Robert Zuzowski’s volume provides cogent insights into the origins and functions of the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) and Grishin’s monograph has a few bright moments, but neither book offers as much as one might hope.

Zuzowski’s study of the origins, activities, and consequences of KOR is enriched by citations from a wide range of open and underground publications. Of necessity, his book relies extensively on (and overlaps with) Jan Jozef Lipski’s acclaimed two-volume history of the Workers’ Defense Committee, which was first published in 1983. Zuzowski’s analysis, however, has three advantages over Lipski’s book. First, as one would expect, Zuzowski is more detached and critical than Lipski, whose perspective as one of the co-founders and leading members of KOR was unavoidably reflected in his lengthy account. Second, Zuzowski’s book extends chronologically well beyond Lipski’s, which ended with KOR’s formal dissolution in September 1981. Third, Zuzowski uses his case study of KOR to derive broader conclusions about the nature and methods of political dissent in highly authoritarian societies. His discussion of the term “intelligentsia” and his overall analytical framework are not always persuasive, but his assessment provides a useful basis for historical and cross-country comparisons.

Hence, the overlap with Lipski’s book does not really detract from Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland. A more serious problem arises, however, from the overlap with a recent book by Michael Bernhard (cited above), which was published at almost the same time as Zuzowski’s monograph. Bernhard’s volume, like Zuzowski’s, focuses on the origins and political significance of KOR. Both books depict the Workers’ Defense Committee as a crucial factor in the rise of Solidarity and a leading influence on the opposition movement in 1980-81. This view of KOR’s importance has been accepted by many scholars, but it has been challenged in recent years by Roman Laba, who has claimed that Polish workers, rather than Polish intellectuals, provided the overwhelming impetus for Solidarity and were themselves responsible for shaping the union’s agenda. Laba’s publications (including the book cited above) have prompted spirited replies from Bernhard, and the debate is likely to continue for many years to come.

Zuzowski devotes less attention than Bernhard to Laba’s thesis, and as a result his book leaves some key questions unresolved. For example, Zuzowski acknowledges that when the decisive moment came in mid-1980, top KOR members were skeptical about the prospects for achieving a genuinely independent trade union. (Some KOR officials even hoped that striking workers would not press too hard for this goal, lest it become a pretext for a harsh crackdown.) This is difficult to square with the author’s contention that “KOR significantly contributed to the formation of Solidarity and to its performance, shaping the union’s program, structure, and strategy (p. 169). Nor does Zuzowski explain why so many workers who had probably never heard of KOR and never seen its publications were nevertheless ready to demand a wide array of fundamental political changes. It may well be, as both Zuzowski and Bernhard argue, that KOR decisively changed the broader milieu in which the strikes of 1980 occurred and that this helped Polish workers eschew violence and sustain an organized protest movement. But it is not clear that the evidence produced by Zuzowski is enough to contra- vene Laba’s basic point.

This reservation notwithstanding, the surveys of KOR that Zuzowski and Bernhard provide, combined with Laba’s earlier book, are about as far as one can go with non-archival sources. Both authors have done an admirable job of poring over KOR’s publications and other dissident works as well as relevant secondary sources. Both have brought new analytical perspectives to bear on their topic. Now that Zuzowski’s and Bernhard’s books have appeared, other scholars who wish to write about KOR will have to draw on recently declassified materials in the Archiwum Akt Nowych and other archives in Poland (materials not consulted by Zuzowski or Bernhard) if they are going to add anything of significance to the historical record.

Zuzowski’s failure to make use of newly released documentation is regrettable, but by no means wholly unreasonable. Several features of his book (e.g., his frequent use of the present tense to describe things that ceased to exist after 1989) suggest that he wrote most of the text in the 1980s before the continued on page 294
1 September 1995
To the Editor:

I read with great interest “The Sudoplatov Controversy” in the CWIHP Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 155-158). In its own time I also read Special Tasks with no less interest.

I believed earlier and now presume that the appearance of the recollections of such a high-ranking employee of the Stalinist NKVD is an outstanding event, no matter what they are like in terms of quality. In any case, such recollections better than anything else characterize the era, and the storyteller. We can only be sorry that the recollections, of, for example, Lavrentii Beria, do not exist.

Of course, I cannot read without a smile Pavel Sudoplatov’s “assertion” that in the development of my career I am obliged “through KGB connections.” This is a desperate (consistent with the time!) lunge, a relic of the past, at a time when it is already impossible, as was done in the Stalinist time, to register innocent people as German, English, and other “spies,” and to make short work of them. Now this relapse of the past is nothing more than an expressive coloring on the portrait of Sudoplatov himself. And it is evidence of the fact that my article offended him very much.

In Special Tasks the episode connected with Yaacov Terletskii’s mission to Niels Bohr. My critical article, published in the Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994), touched only on that episode. Since I am not a specialist in Sudoplatov’s professional element, but do have a definite conception of the Soviet atomic project and its history, in this letter, expressing myself, I will limit myself only to the mission to Niels Bohr.

I assert that nothing in Sudoplatov’s version regarding this mission stands up to a comparison with the facts (reason for the trip, significance for the Soviet physicists of the information which was brought; the shadow which Sudoplatov casts on Niels Bohr, etc.), and it is a total hoax. Only the naked fact that the trip to visit Bohr really did take place remains certain. But even here Sudoplatov is not the one who discovered it: several years ago already Professor Igor Golovin mentioned this operation of Beria’s department in the Soviet press.

I do not believe it possible here to dwell particularly on Sudoplatov’s new fantasies, contained in his letter to the Bulletin and which repeat his Appendix Eight of the paperback edition of Special Tasks (p. 491).

In such a way as was already, for example, analyzed by me, it was shown that the reader should very, very critically regard Sudoplatov’s “improvisations:” the principal defect of the “recollections” was evident even in a “limited space.” Here the assistance and co-authorship in the drafting of Special Tasks of such brilliant journalists as Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, and the fact that the flattering forward to this book belongs to the pen of the famous historian Robert Conquest, are powerless.

Of course, the point of view of the Schecters is interesting, when they assert that “the battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov’s memoirs continues. On one side are Russian scientists who fear the downgrading of their prestige and a threat to the medals they received for building the atomic bomb” (Special Tasks, Addendum, Paperback Edition). And in “The Sudoplatov Controversy,” they even introduce a list of former intelligence operatives and historians who, evidently, do not know atomic technology professionally, but who applaud Sudoplatov. The truth, however, is that in the fact of the matter, the “battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov” ended long ago. People understood that only specialists, physicists-atomic scientists, are in a position to resolve whether or not Niels Bohr gave atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.

Then why did the Schecters, while ignoring the opinion of Russian physicists, not wish to listen, for example, to one of the leading U.S. authorities, the prominent participant in the American atomic project, Prof. Hans A. Bethe? In a recent article in Scientific American together with his co-authors observed: “Thus, the allegation that Bohr shared nuclear secrets with the Soviets is refuted by Beria’s own account of the encounter between his agent and Bohr.” (Scientific American, May 1995, p. 90.) Or does he too fear for his awards and prestige?

It will be useful to pose still one question. Was the U.S. government decision to publish in the summer of 1945 Henry Smyth’s well-known treatise “Atomic Energy for Military Purposes” really dictated by a wish to share atomic secrets with the Soviet Union? Especially since from the point of view of informativeness it exceeded by many times Bohr’s responses to Terletskii’s questions. Responding to this principal issue, it is easier to understand why the attempts to find nonexistent “flaws,” from the point of view of the demands of secrecy, in Niels Bohr’s responses, are continuing. And in precisely the same way, it will become clear why the efforts to defend the indefensible fantasies of Sudoplatov are continuing.

Finally, let’s turn to the eloquent acknowledgment of the former Soviet intelligence officer Col. Mikhail Liubimov (Top Secret 3 (1994), 27): “Reading Sudoplatov, one ought to remember that in intelligence activity (possibly like science) there is an inclination to twist facts, particularly because under the conditions of the totalitarian regime it was easy to do without fear of consequences. An intelligence officer or agent could meet and talk with Oppenheimer or with Fermi, who would not have had any idea to whom they were talking, and then later they could give them a code name and with dispatch submit the information to his superiors and cast their deed in bronze.” A trusting man in the street could be misled by the report on the meeting between Terletskii and Bohr. But for Liubimov, who saw that “in every line (of the report) the traditional, old-fashioned character of the operation is revealed,” it was as clear as two times two equals four that “Sudoplatov would portray the whole trip to Bohr as a colossal success, Beria would be pleased, and he will report everything to Joseph Vissarionovich (Stalin). And Kurchatov would not dare to articulate any doubts about the success of the operation, [for] like other scientists, he is subordinate to the system. And just try to squeal about the organs.”

Sincerely,

Yuri N. Smirnov (Moscow)
To the Editor:

In the letter from the well-known KGB functionary Pavel A. Sudoplatov, published in the American journal Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Fall 1995, pp. 156-158), a suggestion or, rather, direct charge, is made against my colleague of many years, Yuri Smirnov, all of whose scientific and literary efforts I have witnessed, that these efforts were in some way connected with the KGB. As is usual in such cases, in place of evidence the letter provides only murky references to a conversation between Sudoplatov and his former colleagues on this matter.

Fairly or unfairly, the reputation of the KGB, as well as that of similar agencies in other countries has always been very low. There has never been a better way to ruin a person in the eyes of public opinion and his close friends than to suggest that he has connections with these services.

An unparalleled expert in the life of Russian bureaucrats and behind the scenes dealings, the author Nikolai Leskov, described a similar intrigue in his story Administrative Grace. In this story, a police official wishing to compromise a provincial public figure organizes what we would now call a “leak” at the suggestion of a highly-placed church official. Simply put, having invited an opponent of the victim to visit him on some pretext, the police official slips him, as if by accident, a specially-prepared letter which refers to payments received from the police department by the individual to be compromised.

In this and similar situations, the “patriotic” attitude of these employees towards their agencies is touching. They of all people understand that the discovery of an individual’s links to their services lead to compromising him in the public’s eyes, and that this works. It is not clear whether they consider that such actions strengthen the negative image of their agencies. Perhaps, considering its own reputation to be beyond salvage, this is of no concern to them.

Knowing Yuri N. Smirnov to be a historian of science, who has objectively evaluated the contribution of our agents in obtaining “atomic secrets,” who neither diminishes nor exaggerates this contribution, Sudoplatov and his colleagues, apparently, decided to “smear” Smirnov as a protective measure.

As a colleague of Yuri Nikolaevich, who began to work with me 35 years ago and to this day is in constant professional and social contact with me, I am in a better position than anyone else to say that Yuri Smirnov is a professional atomic scientist who received his training at Arzamas-16, who took part in the design and testing of the 50-megaton nuclear bomb, who completed his doctoral work under the direction of the well-known scientist D.A. Frank-Kamenetsky. During the period in which he worked at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, he was responsible for a major line of research into the peaceful use of nuclear explosions.

Such a list of accomplishments does not require any embellishments, and any professional would be pleased to call it his own. It was entirely natural that Yuri Nikolaevich, as a possessor of such a rich and varied set of experiences, would turn his sights to the history of science, and particularly the history of nuclear explosive technology. These efforts have borne fruit, as is witnessed by his string of publications. He is recognized among historians of modern science, and no attempts by Sudoplatov and his colleagues to blacken his reputation will stick.

Sincerely,

Victor Adamsky
Arzamas-16

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THE KOREAN WAR:
AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD

On 24-25 July 1995, The Korea Society, Georgetown University, and the Korea-America Society sponsored a conference at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. on “The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record.” Papers were presented by leading scholars from Korea, China, Russia, and the United States.

To obtain further information or to order the conference report or participant papers, contact:

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There is a fee of $5.00 for the conference report and $2.50 per paper; checks can be made payable to the Korea Society.
More on the 1956 Polish Crisis

9 October 1995

To the Editor:

I read the essay “Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka and the Polish October,” by L.W. Gluchowski, and the accompanying documents in CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49, with enormous interest, the reason for which will be evident in a moment.

Upon completion of the reading, however, I was thoroughly puzzled by what I saw as a major omission from the author’s introductory essay. Though the material appears in the documents and in footnotes to them, there is no mention at all in the body of the essay concerning one of the most crucial aspects that determined the ultimate outcome of the confrontation between the Soviet and Polish communist party leaders in Warsaw. It concerns the movement of Soviet military forces toward Warsaw, the circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the movements, and the threatened response of Polish military units. It appears as a single line in Document 3 (p. 43), is amplified in Gomulka’s rendition of the events to the Chinese in Document 4 (p. 44), and in footnote 61, quoting Mikoyan’s notes. The threatened response of Polish military units is not mentioned in the documents at all, or by the author.

Gluchowski also quotes two of the comments in Khrushchev’s memoirs; the first—“...the people of Warsaw had been prepared to defend themselves and resist Soviet troops entering the city...”—without asking what “Soviet troops,” from where; and the second—“...our own armed strength far exceeded that of Polish, but we didn’t want to resort to the use of our own troops”—without pointing out that it is belied by Khrushchev’s outburst at the October 19 meeting (quoted on page 40): “That number won’t pass here. We are ready for active intervention...I would like the comrades to voice their views on this matter: intervention or...”

It seems very likely, even obvious, that Khrushchev gave the order for the movement of Soviet forces based in Poland in his meeting with Marshals Konev and Rokossovski in the Soviet embassy on October 19, also referred to in his memoirs (p. 41). The troop movements, which the Soviets then claimed were a long-planned army “exercise” (p. 44), were certainly very much larger than the “one military battalion” (p. 40) that Rokossovski admitted to putting “on alert” (p. 44). Gomulka’s phrase is “the Soviet Army stationed in Poland” (p. 44).

In 1980 or thereabouts, I was given a description of the same climactic meeting between the Soviet and Polish leaderships by a former Polish party and government official who had before 1956 been close to the Polish First Secretary, Central Committee Chairman and Prime Minister, Boleslaw Bierut. That rendition adds information beyond that which appears in Gomulka’s description to the Chinese party in Document 4. I recorded the comments at the time. The note which a Polish official handed to Gomulka during the meeting with the Soviets and which informed him of the Soviet troop movements resulted from information reported to Warsaw by Polish military officers (“colonels”). In addition, Polish Air Force General Frey-Bielecki requested permission to bomb the Soviet columns as they converged on Warsaw. Some Polish Air Force units apparently threatened such action whether they received authority to do so or not. (As I recall, Frey-Bielecki agreed to make the request when some of his officers informed him of those threats, telling him what they intended to do. With that, he decided to approach the political leadership.) The Polish internal security forces were also preparing some sort of resistance. Gomulka was the source of Khrushchev’s assessment that “the people of Warsaw had been prepared to defend themselves.” Gomulka apparently told him, in effect, “Leave us alone and everything will be OK; if not, there will be a popular uprising.” And the Russians thought that the Poles would fight; in the words of the Polish official, “All the Czech traditions are different.”

One might add one more point. Gluchowski never comments on the proposals for union, although Khrushchev refers to “...a number of comrades who are supporters of a Polish-Soviet union...” (p. 40).

Sincerely yours,

Milton Leitenberg
Senior Fellow
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
University of Maryland (College Park)

L.W. Gluchowski responds:

I would like to thank Mr. Leitenberg for his thoughtful comments on my documentary essay, “Poland 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the Polish October,” in the Spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. With regard to Mr. Leitenberg’s comment that he was “thoroughly puzzled” by “a major omission from” my “introductory essay” concerning “one of the most crucial aspects that determined the ultimate outcome of the confrontation,” notably “the movement of Soviet military forces towards Warsaw...[and] the circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the movements,” I shall be brief. Any discussion about the military aspects of the Soviet-Polish confrontation of October 1956 is bound to be controversial at this early stage of archival research in Poland. In any case, I decided to let this set of documents speak for themselves, and no less than six endnotes include extensive discussions of military matters during the crisis. Even Mr. Leitenberg acknowledges that the “material appears in the documents and in the footnotes to them.” Furthermore, in the body of my essay, I noted: “Three days in October [18 to 20] 1956 resolved four outstanding and interrelated conflicts of the de-Stalinization period in Poland.” The second conflict I outlined reads as follows: “the Soviet threat to intervene militarily in the affairs of the Polish Party ended with a compromise agreement on the part of the CPSU leadership and the PUWP leadership.” It is clear that I agree with Mr. Leitenberg: “one of the most crucial aspects” of the confrontation in Warsaw had to
do with the threat of Soviet military intervention.

My first departure with Mr. Leitenberg comes when he elevates “the circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the movements” to some kind of special moment in the negotiations. We still don’t have enough Soviet evidence to draw Mr. Leitenberg’s conclusions. This is particularly true when we consider his comment: “It seems very likely, even obvious, that Khrushchev gave the order for the movement of Soviet forces based in Poland in his meeting with Marshals Konev and Rokossowski in the Soviet embassy on October 19, also referred to in his memoirs.” In this case, an omission on my part may have resulted in the confusion, and I am grateful to Mr. Leitenberg for bringing it to my attention.

In my attempt to edit out a number of long historiographical comments about the documents from the essay I submitted to the Bulletin, I deleted a remark about the reliability of Khrushchev’s memoirs on the Polish crisis, which was originally included with Molotov’s characterization of Rokossowski in the Felix Chuev interview (contained in One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov) cited in endnote 28. I should have left in place the following observation:

This is another example of how Khrushchev’s memoirs are accurate in so far as the general atmosphere of the discussions are concerned, and at the same time confusing because he again tends to take what were obviously a series of discussions and compress them into one important conversation. Surely, as Document 1 clearly shows, Rokossowski could not have gone with Khrushchev to the Soviet embassy on 19 October [1956], although Khrushchev’s emphasis on Rokossowski as a main source of information for what was happening in Poland at the time tells us a lot about what everyone in Poland took for public knowledge: Rokossowski was Moscow’s man in Warsaw. The Polish Minister of Defense was at the Politburo meeting, held immediately after First Secretary Ochab put the 8th Plenum on hold, to further discuss the Polish position towards Khrushchev, while the Soviets went to their own embassy. Rokossowski attended all the meetings of the Polish Politburo during this tense period. The Stenographic report of the 8th Plenum also notes that Rokossowski attended all sittings of the 8th Plenum from 19-21 October 1956. It would be difficult to imagine Rokossowski not attending meetings of the only legal bodies that could force him from the leadership. Khrushchev probably decided to let the Poles begin the 8th Plenum for a number of reasons, including the necessity of providing Gomulka with the legal status he needed to negotiate on behalf of the Polish side at the Belvedere talks. More important, Rokossowski was a full member of the PUWP Politburo and Central Committee. Gomulka had to treat Rokossowski as part of the Polish negotiation team, at least officially, and no one on either side would have suggested, at least in public, otherwise.

Military aspects of the 1956 crisis, with which I have been grappling since 1986, have been among the most difficult issues to date to discuss with any degree of confidence. Documentary evidence, until recently, has been limited, while humanist sociology, brushed with rumors, hearsay, and unsubstantiated gossip, grows with every memoir. With some exceptions, the latter part of the little story from the long Belvedere meeting recited to Mr. Leitenberg by his Polish source has a ring of truth. I can imagine, during the most heated moments, Khrushchev and Gomulka exchanging veiled threats, using language that spawned images of heroic Polish resistance and Soviet military glory. Khrushchev and Gomulka were not the quiet diplomatic types. But it would be a leap to suggest that “one of the most crucial aspects” determining the “ultimate outcome of the confrontation” was the “circumstances in which the Polish party leadership learned of the [Soviet military] movements,” at least with the limited selection of documents I included in my essay.

However, I will let Mr. Leitenberg and the readers of the Bulletin decide for themselves the merits of my case when I present it in full, in a second documentary essay I have begun to put together, this time with Edward Nalepa of the Military Historical Institute in Warsaw, before I was made aware of Mr. Leitenberg’s letter, for an upcoming issue of the Bulletin. Our documents include a series of reports prepared by Polish military counter-espionage (Informacja) officers throughout the period of the crisis.

In my first essay I wanted to focus on the political aspects of the crisis, particularly the bottom line positions staked out by the two key personalities in this struggle: Khrushchev and Gomulka. Reflecting the tendency at these high level meetings to focus on personalities, both sides argued over the symbolic significance of Marshal Rokossowski’s continued presence in People’s Poland. Almost all other outstanding issues that divided the Soviets and the Poles were left for further negotiations. I am currently preparing a list of the documents that cover this vast subject. The documents I selected for translation or cited in the footnotes of my first Bulletin essay make up the most up to date collection on the Polish version of what happened at the Belvedere Palace on 19-20 October 1956. The Czech document recording a 24 October 1956 meeting at the Belvedere, which outlines the Soviet version of events—a document introduced and translated by Mark Kramer and published in the same issue of the Bulletin (pp.1, 50-56)—helps to complete the documentary part of the whole puzzle, but more Soviet documents are still required to draw less tentative conclusions.

My thesis, not in dispute insofar as Mr. Leitenberg’s letter is concerned, is that the Polish crisis of October 1956 ended in a political settlement. Khrushchev made the final compromise which ended the standoff: Rokossowski’s future was left to the PUWP CC; and they later voted to oust him from the Politburo. Both sides compromised and claimed victory, although Gomulka came out of the stormy negotiations especially in a strong position. Khrushchev, on the other hand, managed, as I argue, “to put the Polish question to rest for almost 25 years.” The Soviet compromise should not go unnoticed.

Indeed, all this was accomplished at a time of great international tension, ideologi-
cal confusion, social unrest in the country where the negotiations were taking place, and led by two leaders who still had to operate within some kind of collective leadership framework. Other than “active intervention,” as Khrushchev called it, could the Soviet leader (or Gomulka for that matter) have guaranteed anything other than the threat of military intervention during the talks at the Belvedere Palace, without a prolonged and exhaustive period of face-to-face negotiation? We already know, for example, that Khrushchev only knew what others had told him about Gomulka or the situation in Poland, and that he was already suspicious of half the Polish Politburo, whom he met in March 1956. In fact, Khrushchev positively despised Roman Zambrowski, the leading Gomulka supporter in the PUWP Politburo at the time. Mikoyan’s warning to Gomulka that he would “be pulled to the top by the Jews and then again they will drop him” was directed at Zambrowski, who again became the target of Soviet scorn during informal Soviet-Polish meetings over the future of Soviet-Polish relations after October 1956.

With regard to the second assertion by Mr. Leitenberg; namely my refusal to discuss “the threatened response of Polish military units” to the Soviet troop movements, which “is not mentioned in the documents at all, or by the author,” I will add this for the moment. The Soviet control of the Polish Army, acknowledged in the body of my essay, extensively discussed in my footnotes, and covered by Document 5 (Khrushchev’s letter to Gomulka on 22 October 1956), as well as the Soviet threat to intervene militarily in the affairs of the Polish party, cannot be separated. If any communist in Poland at the time can make a claim to have threatened to go to battle against Soviet tanks and troops, who also marched with some Polish military units towards Warsaw, it was the commanders of the security troops under the command of the Polish interior ministry, and perhaps some individual Polish Army officers who turned to them. But all these matters need further clarification. Edward Nalepa and I will try to sort through the myth and draw some more appropriate conclusions in the essay we will present in a future Bulletin.

We will also try to put into context Mr. Leitenberg’s presentation of the observations shared to him during a talk in 1980 with “a former Polish party and government official who had before 1956 been close to the Polish First Secretary...Bierut.” At this stage, I will only emphasize that this too is a problem. How Polish communists, sharply divided before October 1956, immediately after the crisis, appropriated and transformed the October events and then continued to reinvent the “Polish October” after each successive period of conflict during the Cold War, is worthy of note.

I take full responsibility for a number of misprints that appear in the published text. Mr. Leitenberg’s final critical remark to me, “Gluchowski never comments on the [Soviet] proposal for union,” is one of the most serious errors. Three separate letters with corrections were sent to the Bulletin, but it appears the last one did not make it into the final text. The sentence from which Mr. Leitenberg cites (p. 40), where Gomulka is outlining to the Polish Politburo Khrushchev’s comments, should read as follows: “They are upset with us because the Politburo Commission proposed a new list of members to the Politburo without a number of comrades who are supporters of a Polish-Soviet alliance [not union—sojusz polskoradzieckiego], namely, comrades Rokosowski, [Zenon] Nowak, Mazur, Joziwick.” The next two sentences should read: “I explained to them that we don’t have such tendencies. We do not want to break the friendly relations [not alliance—zrywac przyjazni z Zwiakiem Radzieckim] with the Soviet Union.”

Incidentally, Khrushchev’s comment to Gomulka about Poland’s leading supporters of a Soviet-Polish alliance is closely related to Khrushchev’s previous comment, cited by Gomulka in Russian: “The treacherous activity of Comrade Ochab has become evident, this number won’t pass here.” It was not obvious to me when I prepared the first essay, although I now hope to make my case shortly elsewhere, but it appears that Khrushchev’s anger, directed as it was towards Ochab, probably stemmed from Ochab’s September 1956 meeting with the Chinese, as mentioned in Document 5, and subsequent negotiations between Warsaw and Beijing. Soviet-Chinese talks over Poland appear to have led Beijing to demand from Moscow a more collective approach to the way the Kremlin dealt with the Warsaw Treaty Organization states. In a telegram to Gomulka from the Polish ambassador to China, dated 27 October 1956, Stanislaw Kiriyluk wrote:

...at two in the morning I was invited to meet with the CPCh [Communist Party of China] leadership. Talks with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun lasted for three hours... [The Chinese leaders stated:] ‘Between 19-23 October a CPCh delegation... in Moscow convinced Khrushchev about the rightness of the political changes in Poland... Matters of independent Polish activities cannot be questioned despite the reservations of the CPSU Politburo, which has become accustomed to methods and forms of behavior that must be eliminated from relations within the socialist camp.’ Mao used, in this context, the phrase “great power chauvinism.” [See Archive of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collection of telegrams from Beijing in 1956, Telegram no. 17599, 27 October 1956]

It appears the Chinese may also need to be given some credit for the success of the “Polish October.”

Centre for Russian and East European Studies. University of Toronto
25 November 1995
23 October 1995

To the Editor:

The Spring 1995 issue of the Bulletin, as rich and as informative as ever, contains two stimulating articles by Professor Johanna Granville. Permit me to make a few comments on both.

In the first article—"Imre Nagy, Hesitant Revolutionary"—Professor Granville correctly argues that Prime Minister Nagy, a lifelong Communist, hesitated to side with the revolutionaries during the early days of the 1956 Hungarian uprising (October 23-27); that he created a new, reform-minded party leadership that was more congenial to his way of thinking only on October 28th; and that, finally, he embraced the revolution’s main demands of neutrality and political pluralism on November 1st, after he realized that Moscow had deceived him.

Alas, this is not a new interpretation, nor do the documents that follow Professor Granville’s article provide important new evidence to confirm it. Hence your claim, not hers, made in the Table of Contents Box on p. 1—"Imre Nagy Reassessed"—is misleading. Ten years ago, and thus long before the archives opened, this is what I wrote in Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, 1986, pp. 128-29 (all emphases in the original):

[I]t is one of the paradoxes of political life in Eastern Europe that, until the last days of this short-lived revolution, Nagy was the man Moscow counted on, and could count on, to save its cause in Hungary. Indeed, from the time of the first demonstration on October 23 to October 31, Nagy could only envisage a Hungarian future based on Soviet tutelage. With Soviet consent, he sought to make order by promising ‘reforms,’ assuming that the promise of such reforms would end the uprising.

Nagy’s first turning point came on October 28 when he reached the conclusion that the party had to be changed, too. He had come to understand—and the Kremlin con-

urred—that the time for reform had passed, and his all but impossible historic mission was to reconcile Soviet power-political interests with those of a new—somewhat independent and somewhat pluralistic—Hungarian political order. He consulted with Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslov, the two Politburo members who were in Budapest, and with Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet ambassador to Hungary, to gain their approval for the transfer of the functions of the hapless Central Committee to a new, six-member party Presidium. So anxious was Nagy not to circumvent Moscow that he called the Kremlin from Andropov’s office that morning to obtain confirmation of the authorization he had just received from the Soviet representatives in Budapest....

Only his second turning point, which came on November 1, signified a parting of the ways between Nagy and Moscow. Soviet troops having reentered Hungary the night before, Nagy realized that morning that the Kremlin was no longer interested in finding a political solution to the crisis under his leadership. He felt betrayed. In vain had he consulted with the Kremlin; in vain had he gained Soviet approval for every major measure he had adopted between October 23 and 31. The party was over. From the loyal Muscovite he had been all his life, this is when Nagy became a Hungarian revolutionary. On November 1, acting for the first time without Soviet concurrence, his government declared Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the country’s neutrality. On November 4, when its troops reached the Hungarian capital, the Soviet Union overthrew the Nagy government and crushed the revolution.

To the extent this was a “reassessment” ten years ago, Professor Granville’s article must be regarded as a “restatement” of that interpretation, albeit a useful one. I am not aware of a single scholarly book or article published anywhere in recent years that has claimed that Nagy was anything but “hesitant.”

In her second article and in the documents from the archives of the KGB that are attached to it—"Imre Nagy, aka ‘Volodya’—A Dent in the Martyr’s Halo?"—Professor Granville does offer a reassessment of Nagy’s life in Moscow in the 1930s. While the documents make wild claims, Professor Granville prudently and correctly indicates some of the circumstances under which they were released in mid-1989. She puts it well: “The story of how these materials came to light is a story that has more to do with Soviet, Hungarian, and communist party politics amidst the revolutionary upheaval of the late 1980s and early 1990s than with historical or scholarly investigation” (p. 34). My purpose here is to add a few comments, including some new information on the role of a key player, about how and why the KGB released parts of its file on “Volodya.”

On the basic issue at hand: Having read the four KGB documents published by Professor Granville (pp. 36-37), and having read fragments of others in 1991-92, I share Professor Granville’s suspicion that Imre Nagy was almost certainly an informer for the NKVD, the KGB’s predecessor, in the 1930s. Like most other Communist exiles, Nagy was also a Soviet citizen and a member of the Soviet Communist Party. He was attached to the Soviet-dominated Communist International.

However, the claims about the consequences of Nagy’s reporting made by KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov in his letter of transmittal to the Soviet Central Committee on 16 June 1989 (p. 36) are almost certainly not true. His suggestion that Nagy alone was responsible for the arrest, exile, or execution of dozens of high-ranking Communist exiles defies common sense. Nagy, after all, was hardly an important figure at that time; he did not even belong to the inner circle of Hungarian activists. He was a lonely man, writing on Hungarian agriculture in an obscure émigré journal no one read and com-
menting on the Hungarian-language broadcasts of Radio Moscow no one heard, let alone listened to. As one of his Muscovite colleagues would observe many years later, even the leading émigrés “had nothing of consequence to do but they behaved as if they had. They practiced assiduously something they referred to as politics, plotted one another’s downfall, and generally pranced and cantered like superannuated parade horses at the knacker’s gates.” (Julius Hay, Born 1900: Memoirs [La Salle, Ill.: Library Press, 1975], pp. 218-19.) Given the atmosphere of suspicion prevailing in Moscow at the time, the Russian commissars did not trust information conveyed by foreign Communists.

Could Nagy, a nonentity among the nonentities, have been a petty mole, then? Yes. Could his reporting have contributed to the bloody purge of foreign, especially Hungarian, Communists in the 1930s? Yes. Could he have been directly responsible for the arrest of 25 Hungarian Communist émigrés, of whom 12 were executed and the rest sent to prison or exile? No. One: The Soviet authorities were always both suspicious of and contemptuous toward all foreign Communists; the NKVD surely did not rely on one such informant’s reports. Two: As Kryuchkov put it, the 1989 release of the “Volodya File” to Károly Grósz, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP), was meant to be “expedient” and Grósz was to be advised “about their possible use” (p. 36). Three: Given the KGB’s aptitude for falsifying documents, the authenticity of anything emerging from its archives must be carefully scrutinized. A few hitherto unknown details will amplify the skepticism implicit in these reservations and supplement Professor Granville’s able account of the political circumstances of 1989.

In 1988, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov flew to Budapest on a secret fact-finding mission. Long familiar with, and reportedly very fond of, Hungary, he stayed for several days. He met a few party leaders, the head of the political police, and at least one mole the police had planted in the country’s increasingly vocal democratic opposition movement. Judging by the questions he asked and the people he met, he wanted to gain a first-hand impression of the bitter struggle that engulfed the HSWP leadership after the forced resignation of János Kádár earlier that year and of the character, composition, and objectives of the democratic opposition. His visit confirmed what he must have known: that the critics both inside and outside the party were gaining new adherents by using Imre Nagy’s execution in 1958 to discredit not only Kádár and his associates but to undermine the whole post-1956 Hungarian political order. As in 1955-56, Nagy—a man Kryuchkov knew while he was the Soviet Embassy’s press attaché in Budapest—had once again become the flag for the gathering storm.

I do not know if it was Kryuchkov who then initiated the KGB’s search for information on Nagy’s past. Nor does it much matter. Both he and Grósz were anxious to discredit Nagy in order to deprive the Hungarian people—and the anti-Kádár, anti-Grósz reformers in the HSWP—of a symbol of courage and sacrifice, of a reformer who broke ranks with Moscow. An astute Kremlinologist may also interpret their effort as an attempt to disparage Nagy in order to undermine Mikhaïl S. Gorbatchev’s reputation.

I do know, however, who went over to the headquarters of the KGB to authenticate Nagy’s handwriting and pick up the newly found “Volodya File.” Accompanied by Gyula Thürmer—Grósz’s special assistant for Soviet affairs who, married to a Russian woman, spoke excellent Russian—and possibly by a “Third Man,” also from Budapest, the Hungarian in charge of the transaction was Sándor Rajnai, the Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow. Unlike the young Thürmer and the “Third Man,” Rajnai had long known Nagy and his handwriting very well indeed. For, in 1957-58, Lieutenant-Colonel Rajnai of the Hungarian political police was responsible for Nagy’s arrest in and forced return from his involuntary exile in Romania; for Nagy’s year-long interrogation in a Budapest jail where even his presence was to secret; and for the preparation of Nagy’s equally secret trial whose scenario Rajnai had drafted. (Loyal, competent, sophisticated, and admired by his superiors and subordinates alike, this creative author of the last bloody Communist purge was subsequently richly rewarded for a job well done. After a long tenure as head of Hungarian foreign intelligence, he served as Ambassador to Romania and then—the top prize—to the Soviet Union. In the 1980s he became a member of the HSWP Central Committee as well.)

By the time Rajnai “authenticated” Nagy’s handwriting in July or early August of 1989, Nagy had received—on 16 June 1989—a ceremonial reburial at Budapest’s Heroes Square in front of hundreds of thousands of people while millions watched the event live on Hungarian TV all day. Still, Rajnai clung to the hope that he could save the regime in which he believed and his own skin, too, by publicizing damaging information about Nagy—by portraying him as a false pretender, a deceiver who sold out his friends and comrades, a Stalinist stooge. Only in this way could Rajnai help the hardliners in the HSWP, notably Károly Grósz, to defeat such critics as Imre Pozsgay who used Nagy’s name to gain political ground. Not incidentally, only in this way could Rajnai justify his own past and clarify the meaning of his life. He told me as much during the course of some 40 hours of conversation over several months in 1991 and ’92.

As it happened, Rajnai forwarded the “Volodya File” to Grósz; it was translated from Russian into Hungarian by Mrs. Thürmer. Grósz presented a verbal summary, similar to Kryuchkov’s, to the HSWP Central Committee on 1 September 1989. In his speech Grósz told the Central Committee of Nagy’s direct responsibility for the arrest and sentencing of 25 leading Hungarian cadres in Moscow and the execution of 12 of them. But then Grósz declined to open the floor for discussion or answer any questions. The Central Committee resolved to send the “Volodya File” to the archives where it was shelved. Oddly enough, even Grósz seemed doubtful of Volodya’s political value at this late date. “It is my conviction,” he declared, “that what you have just heard will not be decisive when it comes to making the ultimate judgment about Imre Nagy’s whole life.” (The text of Grósz’s speech was published on 15 June 1990—ten long months later—in the hardline Szabadság, a small-circulation Communist weekly edited by Gyula Thürmer.)

In the end, Rajnai’s hope of saving the one-party Communist regime by publicizing the “Volodya File” was dashed, and his fear of being held accountable for the phony charges he had concocted against Nagy in 1957-58 turned out to be unwarranted. For, while the Hungarian Supreme Court in 1989 declared the trial of Imre Nagy and his associates null and void, it declined to charge
those responsible for it. (Several Politburo members deeply involved in the case, including Kádár’s Minister of Internal Affairs, were then—and are still—alive and well. However, the chief prosecutor committed suicide in the 1970s; János Kádár, the main culprit, died minutes before the Court “retried” and rehabilitated his nemesis; and the head of the kangaroo court that had sent Nagy to the gallows in 1958, who remained unrepentant to the end, died in 1991.)

As for Rajnai, by the time we got acquainted in 1991 he had resigned his ambassadorship and retired. He was in semi-hiding, worried about retribution. A few months after our last conversation in 1992, I received a letter from him in which he asked for my help in getting an American visa. I have since heard that he died abroad, not in the United States, of natural causes. Perhaps so. But in his last years, the memory of Imre Nagy appeared to consume his mind and cripple his will to live.

Sincerely,

Charles Gati

* * * * *

22 November 1995

To the Editor:

The articles by Janos Rainer and Johanna Granville in Issue 5 of the Bulletin make a major contribution to our understanding of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Soviet decisions relating to it. Both articles tend to conclude that the Soviet decision to intervene decisively to suppress the Nagy government was probably made in the period October 26-30. The documents available to date do not answer the question, but I read them as consistent with a conclusion that the Soviet decision was not made until October 30-31—after the Hungarians had disclosed their intention to declare neutrality and leave the Warsaw Pact. Mikoyan and Suslov, in their telegram of October 30, may have been reporting on their assurances to Nagy as implementation of a deception plan, but why then would they say to their Politburo colleagues ‘If the situation deteriorates further, then, of course, it will be necessary to reexamine the whole issue in its entirety.”

If a decision to intervene had been taken earlier, what was there to “reexamine in its entirety”? Moreover, the Soviet public declaration of October 30 advanced a liberal interpretation of Warsaw Pact relationships, and included an explicit promise to negotiate a possible complete Soviet military withdrawal from Hungary. That may, of course, have been intended only to deceive Hungarian, Western and world opinion. But if so, it was a costly device—its brutal repudiation in practice a few days later was a serious blow to the Soviet Union in the Western socialist world as well as in Eastern Europe.

I continue to believe what I first wrote in a RAND paper (P-984) on November 28, 1956 (first published in Problems of Communism in January 1957, and later in my book Soviet Military Policy): while Soviet contingent preparations for possible intervention were no doubt underway, it was only on October 30-31 that the final decision to intervene was made.

On October 31, when Mikoyan and Suslov met with Imre Nagy and Zoltan Tildy, the latter rejected an offer to withdraw immediately all Soviet troops that had not earlier been present in the country. Moreover, Tildy told Mikoyan that Hungary would definitely repudiate the Warsaw Pact in any case—that is, even if the Soviet leaders accepted their demand to withdraw all Soviet forces immediately. (This was disclosed in a monitored broadcast by [Hungarian Defense Minister] General Pal Maleter on November 1 or 2.) I believe that that was the final straw that tipped the decision to intervene. The new documents, while not conclusive, are consistent with that interpretation. We can hope that other documents not yet discovered or published will clarify this matter.

I do not argue that the thesis I have outlined briefly above has been confirmed, but it has not been disconfirmed by the new evidence available, and in my view the new material tends to substantiate it. I believe we should continue to regard the question as an open one.

Other important developments were also occurring, including the Anglo-French intervention in Suez on October 30 (which, as Vladislav Zubok has pointed out, the Soviet leaders initially interpreted as blessed by the United States). Further attention should also be given to the intriguing comment in KGB Chief Serov’s report of October 28, cited in the Bulletin on pp. 30-31. In para. 5 (on p. 31) he cites an alleged conversation by a KGB Hungarian source with some Americans (named but not identified) who were reported to have said that “if the uprising is not liquidated in the shortest possible time, the UN troops will move in at the proposal of the USA and a second Korea will take place.” Nagy had told Andropov on November 1 that Hungary was not only withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact immediately, but would seek UN and Big Four guarantees of its neutrality. Did the Soviet leaders on October 30-November 1 fear a U.S. intervention, possible under UN auspices circumventing their veto, if they withdrew? Perhaps new documents will clarify that issue.

In closing, I would like also to correct one small error in the translation of one of the documents. A report by Deputy MVD Minister Perevertkin on 24 October 1956, is cited (on p. 22 of the Bulletin) as saying that the Soviet intervention force at that time numbered in all “128 rifle divisions and 39 mechanized divisions”—which would have meant almost the entire Soviet Army! The figures evidently refer to 128 rifle and 39 mechanized companies, not divisions. As correctly noted in the text of Mark Kramer’s commentary (on p. 51), the Soviet force in Hungary on October 24 totaled some 31,500 men drawn from five divisions in and near Hungary.

Sincerely,

Raymond L. Garthoff
The Update section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist realm. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP to relevant citations. Readers should consult references in Bulletin articles for additional sources.

Abbreviations:
DA = Deutschland Archiv
FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service
NYT = New York Times
RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
WH = Washington Post
ZfG=Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft

Russia/Former Soviet Union

Interview with Stalin granddaughter Galina Iakovkevnoi Dzhugashvili. (Yuri Dmitriev and Samarii Gurarii, “Syn Stalina” [Stalin’s Son], Trud, 31 May 1994, 3.)


December 1945 documents from Russian Foreign Ministry archives illuminate Moscow’s refusal to join International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (Harold James and Marzenna James, “The Origins of the Cold War: Some New Documents,” The Historical Journal 37, 3 (1994), 615-622.)

Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov announces (2 December 1994) plans to revise estimate of total Soviet deaths during World War II; says 44 Soviet soldiers and officers remain MIA from the 1956 invasion of Hungary, 300 were still missing from the war in Afghanistan, and a Col. Udanov, missing in Ethiopia in 1978, was reported to be alive and working in a Somali stone quarry as late as 1989. (RFE/RL Daily Report 229 (6 December 1994).) Dispute over number of Soviet deaths in World War II reviewed. (Boris Sokolov, “New Estimates of World War II Losses,” Moscow News [English] 16 (28 April-4 May 1995), 7.)

Stalin’s handling of Nuremberg trials assessed by historian Natalya Lebedeva. (“Stalin and the Nuremberg Trial,” Moscow News [English] 11 (24-30 March 1995), 12.)


Report on persecution and isolation of Russians who returned from WW II German POW camps includes April 1956 recommendation from commission headed by Defense Minister Zhukov to relax measures. (Vladimir Naumov and Alexander Korotkov, “WWII POWs Condemned as Traitors,” Moscow News [English] 17 (5-11 May 1995), 11.)


Stalin’s postwar policy in Eastern Europe assessed. (Vadim Tarlinskii, “Sud’ba federatsii” [Fate of the Federation], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 December 1993, 4.)


Beria’s letters from prison, 1953. (Istochnik 4 (1994), 3-14.)


Archival evidence yields new view on Beria’s role in post-Stalin power struggle. (Boris Starkov, “Koe-chto noven’koe o Berii” [Something New About Beria], Argumenty i Fakty 46 (November 1993), 6.)

Nina Vacil’evna Alekseeva on her relationship with L.P. Beria. (Irina Mastykina, “Ya Byla Ne Liubovnistei Berii, a Ego Zhertvoi” [I Was Not Beria’s Lover, I Was His Victim], Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 25-28 March 1994, 8-9; 8-11 April 1994, 6-7.)

Ex-CPSU official L.N. Efremov discusses memories of Nikita Sergeevich. (Valery Alekseev, “Takoi Raznoi Khrushchev” [The Varied Khrushchev], Pravda, 16 April 1994, 4.)


Dissident perspective on 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. (Viktor Trofimov, “Neordinarnye otnosheniia” [Unusual relations], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 June 1994, 4.)

Conversations recalled with Prime Minister


Previously unpublished 1963 interview with Khrushchev from CPSU CC archives. (“Vesloe ozhivelenie” [A Happy Revival], Moskovskaia Pravda, 27 November 1993, 3.)

Account of Soviet officials’ reaction to assassination of John F. Kennedy. (Melor Account of Soviet officials’ reaction to assassination of John F. Kennedy, 22 November 1963 goda” [22 November 1993, 3.])


Story of search for rare German stamps to give Brezhnev on 1979 tripto GDR. (Mikhail Pogorelyi, “’Tspeppelin’ dlia Brezhneva” [Zeppelin for Brezhnev], Krasnaia Zvezda, 7 May 1994, 6.)

Memoir of more than three decades in Soloviev Psychiatric Hospital. (Maia Mikhailovna Korol’, ’Sudby zhen sovetskoi elity” [The Fate of the Wives of the Soviet Elites], Rossiskie Vestsi, 20 May 1994, 5.)


Excerpts from personal papers of late Foreign Ministry official, focusing on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. (Anatoly Adamoishin, “’Evreiskii Anekdot” [Jewish Anecdote], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 September 1994, 5.)

Memories of Chernenko from his niece. (Aleksandr Khinshtein, “Ne uspeli nichego...” [And the Armor-Piercing Bullet Ricocheted...], Moskovskiaia Pravda, 20 November 1993, 8.)

Documents on Khrushchev’s 1964 meetings with Danish leaders. (“About a 1964 Visit to Denmark on the Highest Level,” Diplomaticeskii Vestnik 7-8 (April 1994), 70-5.)


Eyewitness account of 1969 assassination attempt against Brezhnev. (Mikhail Rudenko, “I broneboinaia pulia dala rikoshet...” [And the Armor-Piercing Bullet Ricocheted...], Moskovskiaia Pravda, 5 October 1994, 4.)

Khrushchev’s interrogation upon Western publication of his memoirs in 1970. (Istochnik 4 (1994), 64-75.)


Nuclear Weapons Issues:

Historian Zhores Medvedev on various aspects of the Soviet atomic program, including the roles of prison labor and the KGB. (Zhores Medvedev, “’KGB i Sovetskaia Atomnaia Bomba’” [The KGB and the Soviet Atomic Bomb], Smena [Change], 24 August 1994, 4; Medvedev, “Bomba c kleimom LON” [Bomb with the Mark of LON (Camp of Special Significance]... (Zhores Medvedev, “KGB i Sovetskaia Atomnaia Bomba” [The KGB and the Soviet Atomic Bomb], Smena [Change], 24 August 1994, 4; Medvedev, “Bomba c kleimom LON” [Bomb with the Mark of LON (Camp of Special Significance], Rabochaia Tribuna, 30 September 1994, 5; 1 October 1994, 3; Medvedev, “The KGB and the Atomic Bomb,” Rossia, 31 January 1995, 6.)


Evidence from the archives of D.V. Skobel’tsyn. (Mikhail Rebrov, “Mog li Sovetskii Soiuz pervym sdelat’ atomniu bombu?” [Could the Soviet Union Have Been the First to Make an Atomic Bomb?], Krasnaia Zvezda, 30 April 1994, 5.)
Interview with Arkadii Brishch on his work on Soviet atom bomb. (Oleg Moroz, “Skopirovna byla ne bomba, a skhema zariada” [It wasn’t the Bomb that Was Copied, It Was the Storage System], Literaturnaiia Gazeta 36 (7 September 1995), 10.)


Interview with I. Zavashin, director of “Avangard” factory at Arzamas-16, formerly secret Soviet nuclear center. (Vladimir Gubarev, “Yuri Zavashin: Pontiatie ‘nado’ my vpitali s molokom materi” [Yuri Zavashin: The Concept of “Must” We Imbibed with our Mother’s Milk], Segodnia, 28 September 1994, 9.)

Description of Soviet Air Force 1956 training maneuver for nuclear war, in which 272 troops were ordered to land at ground zero. (Aleksandr Kyrov, “Dernyi Desant” [Turf Landing], Rossiskaia Gazeta, 26 May 1994, 7.)


Environmental impact of nuclear tests on Totskii proving grounds, and increased cancer rates in city of Orenburzh, assessed by Duma representative. (Tamara Zlotnikova, “Zabytyi genotsid” [Forgotten Genocide], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 14 September 1994, 2.)

Soviet KGB head Kryuchkov noted disappearance of several tons of uranium in 1989, according to German report. (Berlin DDPR, 21 August 1994, in “Secret Nuclear Depots Reported in FRG, East Europe, in FBIS-WU-94-162 (22 August 1994), 12.)


Military Issues:

Dmitrii Volkogonov interviewed on search for missing U.S. military from World War II. (Valerii Rudnev, “Rossiia prodolzhaet iskati’ It Was the Storage System”, It Was the Storage System” [Russia Continues to Search], Izvestiia, 28 October 1993, 6.) U.S.-Russian commission frustrated by lack of evidence behind claims captured US pilots were held on USSR territory. (“MIA’s from the cold war,” Moscow News [English] 23 (10-16 June 1994, 14.)

On 15 September 1952, Russia returns body of U.S. Air Force captain whose RB-29 reconnaissance aircraft was downed over the Kurile Islands on 7 October 1952. (Reuters cited in RFE/RL Daily Report 178 (19 September 1994).) Revelations on plight of American soldiers downed over USSR, Vietnam, including case of B-52 crewman Lt.-Col. Robert Standervik. (Komsomolskaya Pravda, in FBIS-SOV-95-040 (1 March 1995).)


On 1962 Soviet naval campaign in Indonesia. (Andrei Zhdkankin, “Do voiny ostavalos’ tri chasa” [There Were Three Hours Left Until War], Rossiia, 1-7 June 1994, 1.)


Investigation into 1970 fire aboard nuclear submarine “K-8.” (Vladimir Shigin, “Tragedia v Biskaiskom Zalive” [Tragedy in the Bay of Biscay], Moskovskaiia Pravda, 12 April 1994, 9.)

New data on disaster aboard nuclear submarine PL-574 which claimed 89 lives. (“Taina gibeli PL-574” [The Secret of the Disaster of PL-574], Komsohol’skaia Pravda, 30 December 1993, 7.)

Former vice-admiral recalls 1974 mine-sweeping operation in Gulf of Suez. (Aleksandr Apollonov, “6,000 chasov na minnykh poliakh” [6,000 Hours on the Minefields], Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 September 1994, 6.)

Series on Pacific Ocean battles covered up by Soviet regimes. (Nikolai Burbyga, “Zhertiheo iavlennykh voin” [Victims of Unannounced Wars], Izvestiia, 5 January 1994, 6; 9 February 1994, 8.)


New data on Soviet ballistic missile development. (Krasnaia Zvezda, 18 June 1994, 6.)

Sino-Soviet Relations:

Correspondence printed between Stalin and Mao from January 1949 reveals disagreement on tactics regarding potential media-
tion of Chinese Civil War. (Sergei L. Tikhvininskii, “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tsetsunom v yanvale 1949 g.” [From the Presidential Archives of the RF (Russian Federation): Correspondence of I.V. Stalin with Mao Tsetung of January 1949], Novaya i noveisha istoriya 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.)


Mao’s reactions to Khrushchev’s 20th Party Congress speech, as told to Soviet ambassador in Beijing. (P. Yudin, “Zapis besedy s tovarishchom Mao,” Problemi Dalnego Vostok 5 (1994).)


Interview with Li Iuzhan, Mao’s interpreter for meetings with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. (Andrei Kabannikov, “Mao v okruzheni vragov i tantsovshchits” [Mao, Surrounded by Enemies and Dancers], Komsomolskaia Pravda, 6 January 1994, 14.)

Intelligence/ Espionage Issues:

Former defenders of Rosenbergs say Venona decrypts of KGB messages seem genuine and indicate Julius Rosenberg indeed ran Communist spy ring, though some key evidence of atomic espionage still lacking. (Walter Schneir and Miriam Schneir, “Cryptic Answers,” The Nation, 14/21 August 1995, 152-53.)

Christine Keeler, call-girl who was key figure in 1963 Profumo spy scandal in England, reportedly admitted for first time to having been a Soviet spy. (British magazine OK, 4 November 1994, quoted in RFE/RL Daily Report 211 (7 November 1994).)

Story behind publication of Yuri Shvets’s Washington Station: My Life as a KGB Spy in America. (Dmitry Radyshevsky and Nataliya Gevorkyan, “The memoirs of a Soviet intelligence officer have created a big panic,” Moscow News [English] 16 (22-28 April 1994), 14.)

Recollections of Andropov from ex-KGB colleagues. (Aleksandr Cherniak, “Andropov—Izvestnyi i neizvestnyi” [Andropov—The Known and Unknown], Pravda, 15 June 1994, 3; Aleksei Grishin, “V ego stikakh bylo mnogo ostrykh slovochek” [In His Poems There Were Many Sharp Words], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 21 June 1994, 6.)

Interview of Vladimir Barkovskii, who worked with Soviet spies in London, on role of espionage in development of Soviet atomic bombs. (Andrei Vaganov, “Sorok p’iat’ let nazad, 29 avgusta, byla ispytana pervaia v CCCR atomnaia bomba” [Forty-Five Years Ago, On August 29, the USSR’s First Atom Bomb Was Tested], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 30 August 1993, 1.)


Interview with ex-KGB official Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Nikolay Leonov, author of Seditious Times (1994); comments on Ames case, KGB defectors, etc. (“KGB Lieutenant General Nikolay Leonov: Failure by Ames in the United States was Impossible: He Was Betrayed in Moscow,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, 22 December 1994, 6, in FBIS-SOV-94-248 (27 December 1994), 17-19.)

Interview with Vladimir Stanchenko about Soviet and Russian espionage. (“The Spy Who Returned to the Cold,” Izvestia, 2 September 1994, 9.)


KGB watched Russian National Unity Movement leader Aleksey Vedenkin for “keenness on fascist ideas” since 1981, authorities say; other report says Vedenkin probably belonged to KGB. (Moscow RIA, 1 March 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-046-A (9 March 1995), 3-4; also Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 1 March 1995, 1, as “Article Links Vedenkin to KGB,” FBIS-SOV-95-055 (22 March 1995), 20.)

Interview with ex-KGB double agent-defector Oleg Gordievsky on publication of his memoirs; Sunday Times (London) publishes excerpt with names of KGB sources. (“Ex-Spy Causes Uproar in Britain” and “Times Publishes Names of British KGB Informers,” Moscow News [English] 8 (24 February-2 March 1995), 11; see also “KGB: Michael Foot was our agent,” The Sunday Times (London), 19 February 1995.)

New official publication, White Paper on Russian Secret Services (Moscow:...


Archival/Research Developments:

Complaints persist on difficulties of archival access. (Anna Repina, “Komu oni nuzhny, eti tainy” [They are Secrets to those Who Need Them], Smena, 12 October 1993, 4.)

Archive official’s report, based on a December 1993 speech at RTsKhIDNI. (V.P. Kozlov, “Zarubezhnaia arkhivnaiia Rossika: Problemy i Napravlenia Raboty” [Foreign Archives Relating to Russia: Problems and the Direction of Work], Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 3 (1994), 13-23.)

Russia and France complete first of series of planned archival exchanges. (“Archival Files Are Returned to Russia from France,” Diplomaticeskii Vestnik 3-4 (February 1994), 79.)

Archival regulations. (“Polozhenie ob arkhivom fonde Rossiskoi Federatsii” [The State of the Archives in the Russian Federation], Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 1 April 1994, 4.)


Interview with head of the Russian Presidential Archives (APRF) Aleksandr Korotkov. (“Dla chevo otkrivaiem ‘osobuyu papki’” [Why Open the “Special Files”], Krasnaia Zvezda, 9 August 1995, 2.)

Armenia


Belarus


Estonia


Parliamentary committee reports results of two-year investigation of KGB activities in Estonia, including review of archives.

Law calling on ex-KGB agents in Estonia to confess or face public exposure working “surprisingly well,” police say. (Tallinn BNS, 3 April 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-064 (4 April 1995), 73.)

Latvia

Court finds Saeima deputy Roberts Milbergs not guilty of having collaborated with KGB. (RFE/RL Daily Report 22 (23 November 1994).)

KGB recruiter says current parliamentarian Andrejs Silins was listed as KGB agent in 1972 without his knowledge. (Tallinn BNS, 9 December 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-238 (12 December 1994), 86-87.)

KGB document found dating from 1982 granting access to secret documents to present day Defense League volunteer paramilitary organization head Johannes Kert, who says he cannot explain document. (Rahva Hää, 21 December 1994, in Tallinn ETA, 21 December 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-246 (22 December 1994), 52.)

Estonian security policy say KGB files refute allegations that Kert was linked to the KGB. (Tallinn BNS, 24 January 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-016 (25 January 1995), 52.)

Controversy erupts in parliament over fate of unopened archives of Latvian KGB. (Tallinn BNS, 5 May 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-087 (5 May 1995), 88.)

Lithuania

Mystery and controversy continue to surround status and fate of estimated 300,000 files left behind by Lithuanian KGB. (Nikolay Lashkevich, “Lithuania: Who Has Got the KGB Archives.” Ivestititsa (Moscow), 10 March 1995, 4, in FBIS-SOV-95-049 (14 March 1995), 103-105.)

Ukraine


Ukrainian archives yield new data on 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. (N.V. Makovs’ka, “Politichnaia Retrospekttiva Chernobyly’s’koj Katastrofy v Dokumentakh” [A Political Retrospective of the Chernobyl Catastrophe in Documents], Arkkhiv Ukrainy 1-3 (1993), 99-105.)

Detailed recounting of how glasnost in late 1980s permitted freer airing of true dimensions of 1933 famine in Ukraine. (James E. Mace, “How Ukraine Was Permitted to Remember,” The Ukrainian Quarterly 49:2 (Summer 1993), 121-151.)

Czech Republic/Former Czechoslovakia

Czech parliamentary commission investigating late 1980 Warsaw Pact maneuvers may have had political overtones, but link to possible invasion of Poland still unclear. (Prague CTK, 8 February 1995, in “No Direct Proof of 1980 Poland Invasion Found,” FBIS-EEU-94-027-A (9 February 1995), 6-7.)

Government approves principle of opening StB (secret police files). Interior Minister Ruml denies it will lead to wave of lawsuits. (Prague CTK, 30 March 1995, in “Ruml Outlines Provisions of Bill on StB Files,” FBIS-EEU-95-062-A (31 March 1995), 5.)

Former East Germany


Social Democratic Party (SPD) chair Rudolph Scharping seeks Stasi files to rebut charges by Helmut Kohl and others that the SPD betrayed the goal of German unification in talks with GDR officials. (Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 8 February 1994, 4, in “Scharping Rejects CDU Accusations of SPD-Stasi Cooperation,” FBIS-WEU-94-027 (9 February 1994), 31.)


Interview with Markus Wolf, former head of GDR external intelligence service. (“East Germany’s Old Spymaster Talks: So Many Regrets, but Uncontrite,” NYT, 6 June 1995, A11.)


**Hungary**

Recounting of case of school-teacher arrested in connection with show trials in Hungary under Matyas Rakosi in Stalin’s last years. (Eva V. Deak, “A Show Trial Case History: The Story of Gyorgyi Tarisnyas,” _The Hungarian Quarterly_ 35:134 (Summer 1994), 75-91.)

Budapest Military Prosecutor’s Office on 28 October 1994 presses charges against three army officers accused of killing unarmed demonstrators during 1956 events, according to MTI. ( _RFE/RL Daily Report_ 207 (31 October 1994).)


Ex-Soviet base near Szczecin seen as economical hazard. ( _Glos Szczeciński_ , 1 February 1995, 1, in JPRS-TEN-95-004 (28 February 1995), 21-22.)

**Poland**

Sejm considering State Secrets Bill barring release of information on intelligence activities for 80 years, national security or defense information for 40 years, and economic secrets for 30 years; media, liberals, oppose bill, which is returned to committee. ( _RFE/RL Daily Report_ 163 (29 August 1994).) Government and media agree new constitution will guarantee freedom of information, press; parliament rejects restrictive secrecy law. ( _Rzeczpospolita_ and _Gazeta Wyborcza_ reports, 25 October 1994, quoted in _RFE/RL Daily Report_ 203 (25 October 1994).)


**Romania**

Report on Soviet policy toward December 1989 Romanian events, including letter from Shevardnadze to Gorbachev and minutes of meetings. (“On the Events of 1989 in Romania,” _Diplomaticheskii Vestnik_ (Moscow) 21-22 (November 1994), 74-80.)

Controversy erupts over documents claiming past collaboration by Bishop Laszlo Tokes, ethnic Hungarian priest whose arrest sparked 1989 revolt, with Romanian Securitate secret police [Romanian Intelligence Service, or SRI]. (Gyorgy Jakab, “UDMR Will Ask to See the SRI Files of All Political Leaders,” Adevarul (Bucharest), 29 December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-001 (3 January 1995), 24.) Paper publishes purported documents showing Tokes was paid Securitate informer. (“According to Renasterea Banateana, Laszlo Tokes Informed the Securitate Under the Name of Laszlo Kolozsvár,” Curierul National (Bucharest), 31 December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-003 (5 January 1995), 19.)

Mongolia


People’s Republic of China

[Ed. note: For detailed lists of recent sources, see the essays by Michael Hunt and Chen Jiaru in this issue of the Bulletin.]

Evidence on early wrangling between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Moscow over Soviet seizure of Chinese industrial equipment in Manchuria at close of World War II. (Liu Guowu, “Zhanhou zhongsu liangguo chuli dongbei rewei chanyede jiufen” [The Argument Between China and the USSR After the War Over How to Deal with the Japanese Puppet’s Industry], Modern Chinese History (Chinese People’s University Publications Reprint Series) 1 (1995), 100-104.


Article based on CCP sources explores Zhou Enlai’s handling of the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis, including data on secret communications between PRC and Taiwan. (Liao Xinwen, “Zhou Enlai yu heping jiejue taiwan wentide dangban” [Zhou Enlai and the Initiative to Peacefully Solve the Taiwan Problem], Dangde Wenzian [Party Documents] 5 (1994), 32-38.)


Korean War


Soviet documents on the Korean War, including military reports to Stalin. (“The Participation of the USSR in the Korean War (New Documents),” Voprosi istorii 11 (1994), 30-46.)


A conference on “The Korean War: An Assessment of the Historical Record,” was held at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, on June 24-25 1995, sponsored by The Korea Society, Korea-America Society, and Georgetown University. Please consult the sponsors for copies of papers delivered.

1960s because he believed weapons were being wasted. (Reported in Xinwen ziyou daobao [Press Freedom Guardian], 29 September 1995, 3.)


Cuba/Cuban Missile Crisis


POLISH CRISIS

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collapse of Communism. Although he added some observations about events through the end of 1991, he decided to proceed with the publication of his book before he had consulted any newly opened archives. This decision was unfortunate, but it was not inexcusable for a scholar who had already completed a manuscript and who would have had to travel many thousands of miles to work in the former East-bloc archives, perhaps delaying the appearance of his book for a considerable time. The delay would have been worthwhile, but it was a judgment call for Zuzowski in 1992, and he obviously believed he should press ahead.

In Grishin’s case, the decision to forgo archival research is far less explicable. His overview of the Polish crisis covers very familiar ground, and thus he should have done his best to adduce new documentary evidence. Grishin did not complete his monograph until early 1993, well after secret materials in both Warsaw and Moscow had been released and at the very time when sensitive files on the 1980-81 events were still freely available at the former CPSU Central Committee archive in Moscow. (Severe restrictions were reimposed at the former Central Committee archive in April 1983, but that was after Grishin’s book was finished.) Although Grishin is based at Kazan University in Tatarstan, rather than in Moscow, he could have traveled to the Russian capital (and ideally to Warsaw, too) at relatively little expense to consult the archives. His decision to rely exclusively on contemporaneous newspaper articles and on a few recent first-hand accounts largely negates whatever contribution his book might have made.

Perhaps if Grishin had pursued archival research, he would have been able to come up with a more sophisticated presentation. To be sure, his book is a vast improvement over the lurid Soviet-era publications on the Polish crisis (e.g., Georgii Korchadnze’s Zagovor protiv Pol’shi), and Grishin’s discussion of Soviet policy toward Poland in 1980-81 is often insightful. But his book is a far cry from the scholarly standards that most Western (and, increasingly, many Russian) analysts would accept. Grishin is primarily interested in showing why the Polish leader, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, was justified in crushing Solidarity in December 1981. Grishin draws extensively and uncritically on Jaruzelski’s own account, Stan wojenny: dlaczego (published in Poland in 1992), and his book often seems little more than a reprise of the memoir. Aside from reiterating Jaruzelski’s arguments, Grishin’s other main goal (as he declares without any subtlety in his introduction) is to depict Solidarity in as negative a light as possible. For polemical purposes his book may have some value, but from a scholarly standpoint it is sorely deficient.

It is a pity that neither of the books under review takes advantages of opportunities afforded by the post-Communist era. Zuzowski’s analysis has much to recommend it, and even Grishin occasionally has interesting things to say, but an authoritative reassessment of the Polish crisis will require detailed and critical archival research.

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Amb. Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.

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