More New Evidence On
THE COLD WAR IN ASIA

Editor’s Note: “New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia” was not only the theme of the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 pages), but of a major international conference organized by CWIHP and hosted by the History Department of Hong Kong University (HKU) on 9-12 January 1996. Both the Bulletin and the conference presented and analyzed newly available archival materials and other primary sources from Russia, China, Eastern Europe and other locations in the former communist bloc on such topics as the Korean and Vietnam/Indochina Wars; the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split; Sino-American Relations and Crises; the Role of Key Figures such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Joseph Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev; the Sino-Indian Conflict; and more. The new information presented via both activities attracted considerable media attention, including articles or citations in the New York Times, Washington Post, Time Magazine, Pravda, The Guardian, and Newsweek, as well as a report on the Cable News Network (CNN); garnering particular notice in both popular and scholarly circles were the first publication of conversations between Stalin and Mao during the latter’s trip to Moscow in Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950, Russian versions of correspondence between Stalin and Mao surrounding China’s decision to enter the Korean War in the fall of 1950; and translations and analyses of Chinese-language sources on the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, particularly in light of the resurgence of tension in that region (including Chinese military exercises) in the period leading up to the March 1996 Taiwanese elections.

The Hong Kong Conference, as well as the double-issue of the Bulletin, culminated many months of preparations. The basic agreement to organize the conference was reached in May 1994 between CWIHP and the HKU History Department (particularly Prof. Priscilla Roberts and Prof. Thomas Stanley) during a visit by CWIHP’s director to Hong Kong and to Beijing, where the Institute of American Studies (IAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) agreed to help coordinate the participation of Chinese scholars (also joining the CWIHP delegation were Prof. David Wolff, then of Princeton University, and Dr. Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute). Materials for the Bulletin and papers for the conference were concurrently sought and gathered over the subsequent year-and-a-half, climaxing at the very end of December 1995 and beginning of January 1996 (in the midst of U.S. shutdown of the federal government and the worst blizzard to strike Washington, D.C. and the East Coast of the United States in many years) with the production of the double-issue and the holding of the conference, after some final fusillades of e-mails and faxes between the Wilson Center in Washington (CWIHP’s director as well as Michele Carus-Christian of the Division of International Studies and Li Zhao of the Asia Program) and Priscilla Roberts at HKU.

Despite last-minute obstacles posed by weather and bureaucrats (i.e., visa troubles), more than 50 Chinese, American, Russian, European, and other scholars gathered in Hong Kong for four days of discussions and debates. CWIHP provided primary organizational support for putting the program together and financial backing to bring the participants to Hong Kong (with the aid of the National Security Archive and the University of Toronto), while HKU provided the venue and covered on-site expenses, with the help of generous support from the Louis Cha Foundation. In addition, as noted above, the IAS, CASS in Beijing helped coordinate Chinese scholars’ participation; and Profs. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University/Carbondale) and Zhang Shuguang (University of Maryland/College Park) played a vital liaison role between CWIHP and the Chinese scholars. The grueling regime of panel discussions and debates (see program below) was eased by an evening boat trip to the island of Lantau for a seafood dinner; and a reception hosted by HKU at which CWIHP donated to the University a complete set of the roughly 1500 pages of documents on the Korean War it had obtained (with the help of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University) from the Russian Presidential Archives.

Following the Hong Kong conference, CWIHP brought a delegation of U.S., Russian, Chinese, and European scholars to Hanoi to meet with Vietnamese colleagues and to discuss possible future activities to research and reassess the international history of the Indochina and Vietnam conflicts with the aid of archival and other primary sources on all sides; the visit was hosted by the Institute for International Relations (IIR) of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. Contacts between CWIHP and IIR and other Vietnamese scholars continue on how best to organize activities to exchange and open new historical sources; these are likely to include the publication of a special Bulletin devoted to new evidence on the conflicts in Southeast Asia, and, in coordination with other partners (such as the National Security Archive, Brown University, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute), the holding of a series of conferences at which new evidence would be disseminated and debated.

To follow up these activities, CWIHP plans to publish a volume of papers from the Hong Kong Conference (and related materials); this volume, in turn, will complement another book containing several papers presented at Hong Kong: Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1953, scheduled for publication in 1997.
In addition, this section of the present Bulletin presents more information on several topics addressed both at Hong Kong and in the previous Bulletin:

* Russian and Chinese documents on the Mao-Stalin summit in Moscow that help flesh out the conversations between the two leaders published in the previous Bulletin;

* an analysis by William Taubman (first prepared for Hong Kong) of the personal conflict between Khrushchev and Mao and its role in the Sino-Soviet split, as well as contemporaneous Russian documents (from both Moscow and East Berlin archives);

* another paper prepared for Hong Kong, by M.Y. Prozumenschikov, on the significance of the Sino-Indian and Cuban Missile Crises of October 1962 for the open rupture between Moscow and Beijing, along with supplementary Russian and East German archival materials;

* and, perhaps most intriguingly, a Chinese response to a controversy opened in the previous Bulletin about the discrepancy between Russian archival documents and published Chinese documents regarding communications between Mao and Stalin on Beijing's entry into the Korean War in October 1950 (along with new evidence on a key omission from a Russian document in the last Bulletin).

Additional materials are slated for publication in CWIHP Working Papers, future Bulletins, and via the Internet on the CWIHP site on the National Security Archive’s home page on the World Wide Web: http://www.nsarchive.com

Following is the program of the Hong Kong Conference:

Cold War International History Project Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia
University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996

Panel I: New Evidence on the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance


Panel II: New Evidence on the Korean War

Chair: Jim Hershberg (CWIHP):

Session 1: The North Korean Dimension


Session 2: The Course of the War

Papers: Shen Zhihua (Ctr. for Oriental History Research, Beijing), “China Had to Send Its Troops to Korea: Policy-Making Processes and Reasons”; Kathryn Weathersby (Florida State Univ.), “Stalin and a Negotiated Settlement in Korea, 1950-53”; Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Univ./Carbondale), “China’s Strategy to End the Korean War”; Fernando Orlandi (Univ. of Trento, Italy), “The Alliance: Beijing, Moscow, the Korean War and Its End”

Comment: Allen S. Whiting (Univ. of Arizona), Warren I. Cohen (Univ. of Maryland/Baltimore)

Panel III: New Evidence on Sino-American Relations in the Early Cold War


Panel IV: Chinese Policy Beyond the Superpowers: Engaging India and the “Nationalist States”

Chair: Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Wilson Center); Papers: Ren Donglai (Nanjing Univ.), “From the ‘Two Camp’ Theory to the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’; A Transition of China’s Perception of and Policy Toward the Nationalist States, 1949-1954”; Roderick MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.), “War in the Himalayas, Crisis in the Caribbean: the Sino-Indian Conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962”; M.Y. Prozumenschikov (TsKhSD, Moscow), “The Influence of the Sino-Indian Border Conflict and the Caribbean Crisis on the Development of Sino-Soviet Relations” [presented in absentia by J. Hershberg (CWIHP)]; Comment: Norman Owen (Hong Kong Univ.)

Panel V: From Alliance to Schism: New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Split

Chair: Zi Zhongyun (IAS, CASS); Papers: Dayong Niu (Beijing Univ.), “From Cold War to Cultural Revolu-

Panel VI: Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Schism
Chair: Robert Hutchings (Wilson Center):

Session 1: Border Disputes:


Panel VII: New Evidence on Chinese and Soviet Leaders and the Cold War in Asia

Panel VIII: New Evidence on the Indochina/Vietnam Conflicts and the Cold War in Asia

Closing Roundtable on the New Evidence, Present and Future Prospects and Research Agenda:
Participants: Niu Jun (IAS, CASS), O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.), Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Univ./Carbondale), W. Cohen (Univ. of Maryland/Baltimore), R. MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.), K. Weathersby (Florida State Univ.)
MORE ON MAO IN MOSCOW, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950

Editor’s Note: The previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/96, pp. 4-9) contained translations of the Russian transcripts of two conversations (16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950) between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong during the latter’s visit to Moscow in December 1949-February 1950. Mao’s trip to the USSR, shortly after the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the establishment in October 1949 of the People’s Republic of China, marked the only personal encounter between these two giants of 20th-century history, and led to the signing on 14 February 1950 of a Sino-Soviet treaty formally establishing an alliance between the two communist powers—a landmark in the history of the Cold War.

To provide further examples of the newly-available East-bloc evidence on this crucial event, the Bulletin presents below a selection of translated additional materials from Russian and Chinese sources. They include three records of conversations between Mao and senior Soviet officials, on 1, 6, and 17 January 1950, located in the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, formally known as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), and provided to the Bulletin by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute (Oslo), author of Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993); Westad’s commentary precedes the documents.

In addition to immediate considerations relating to Mao’s activities in Moscow, the conversations cover a range of subjects concerning Sino-Soviet ties—political, diplomatic, economic, and military. Especially notable for Cold War historians concentrating on international relations are the exchanges on joint strategy in the United Nations to unseat the Guomindang (Kuomintang) representative (foregrounding a Soviet boycott that would enable the Security Council to approve U.N. participation in the Korean War) and a discussion of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950—particularly his efforts to foment discord between the USSR and China. These conversations, of course, should be read in the context of the two previously mentioned Stalin-Mao conversations, which bracket them (other talks are believed to have taken place, but no additional transcripts have emerged).

In contrast to the Russian documents, which were found by outside scholars working in the archives, the Chinese materials were published since the late 1980s in “neibu” or “internal” editions which have gradually made their way outside China, where they have been extensively used by scholars. Most of these collections were assembled by teams working for or with authorities of the Chinese state or the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with outside scholars receiving little or no access to high-level archives for the post-1949 period, and thus unable to inspect the originals (let alone the surrounding documentation) of the materials contained in these publications. Nonetheless, albeit with due caution, scholars’ use of such publications over the past decade has transformed the study of CCP and PRC foreign policy (at least through the 1950s), as well as the actions and motivations of senior figures such as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai).


The translations of Chinese materials below, mostly communications from Mao in Moscow back to other members of the PRC leadership left behind in Beijing, are among more than 200 translated texts included in that volume, the vast majority of which are either reports of the CC CCP or of Mao himself. Introduced by Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland/Baltimore), the volume also includes extensive annotations, a glossary, and a chronology; subsequent planned volumes include two volumes covering the 1950s. All the footnotes for the Chinese documents, as well as the translations themselves, are taken from Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950. All but one of the Chinese documents originally appeared in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s manuscripts since the founding of the People’s Republic], vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), the first in a series of compendia of collected Mao documents that has now appeared in more than ten volumes reaching into the early 1960s. Although they have made extensive efforts to ascertain the authenticity of the documents by consulting with officials and scholars who have had access to the archives, both editors stress the need for caution and critical analysis of these source materials and the importance of encouraging the fastest and fullest possible opening of PRC and CCP archives as a far preferable and more accurate method of exploring China’s recent past.

1 For an analysis of the opportunities and pitfalls of this source, see Chen Jian, “CCP Leaders’ Selected Works and the Historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution,” CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/96), 131, 144-146.
2 Cloth: ISBN 1-879176-20-3 ($55.00): Imprint Publications, Inc., 520 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 840, Chicago, IL 60611; tel.: (312) 595-0668; fax: (312) 595-0666; e-mail: IMPPUB@AOL.COM
3 Comments made at seminar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 4 December 1996.
Fighting for Friendship:
Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950

by Odd Arne Westad

Kremlinologists of yore used to liken analyzing political conflict in the Politburo to watching a dog-fight taking place under a rug. One could hear sounds of fighting, groans from those badly bitten, and see the rug moving as positions changed. But it was not until the rug was removed that it was possible to determine who had come out on top and what damage had been done to those who lost.

Until very recently, analyzing the events of the Sino-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow in late 1949–early 1950 has been a bit like watching the Kremlinologists’ dogs.1 We have not known much, except to register a general sense of unease on both sides when they alluded to these meetings over the subsequent decades. Until 1995—when the Cold War International History Project obtained and published records of two conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong during the summit2—no transcripts from the many conversations held during the summit were publicly available. The only documents which Western scholars could use were the published treaties, which on most issues were as uninformative as all other Soviet friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance agreements.3

This constituted a strangely limited harvest for what undoubtedly was among the most important political summit meetings of the 20th century. Not only were these the first and only face-to-face meetings between the two great Communist dictators. They provided the fundamental shape for the Sino-Soviet alliance, a compact which formed the political direction of both states and which Western leaders for many years during the most intense phase of the Cold War regarded as a deadly threat to the capitalist world system. The meetings also formed impressions and images among leaders on both sides, shades of which have been visible at all important junctures in Sino-Soviet relations since the Moscow summit.

Part of the reason why so little has been regarded as “known” about these meetings is the mythology which grew up around the physical encounter between the Stalin and Mao figures. Especially for Mao, these meetings were an integral part of the story of his rise to power, and, no less importantly, the growth of his unique knowledge and understanding. Mao loved to talk about his “humiliation” at Stalin’s hands in Moscow, and about how the Korean War had proven him (Mao) correct, and how the Soviet leader, once again, had come to realize his mistakes toward the end of his life. Until 1956, Mao told this story repeatedly to members of his inner circle, and after 1956—when open criticism of Stalin became acceptable following Khrushchev’s secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the Chinese leader told it to visitors of all sorts who came to call on him at Zhongnanhai, the compound for the Chinese leadership in Beijing. For Mao and for all members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chairman’s encounter with Stalin became a central part of revolutionary discourse.4

What do we then “know” almost fifty years after the event, as the cover is slowly sliding away?

The Moscow summit had a long and unhappy pre-history. Mao had requested a meeting with Stalin on at least three occasions since early 1947, but the Kremlin boss—the vozhd—had turned him down each time, with excuses ranging from the military situation in China, to international diplomacy, to the Soviet grain harvest. Even after Stalin promised senior CCP emissary Liu Shaoqi in July 1949 that Mao would be invited to Moscow as soon as the People’s Republic was set up,5 the Chinese in October and November had to pressure the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, N.V. Roshchin, to get Stalin’s OK. When Mao’s train finally left Beijing on December 6, the two sides had still not agreed on a framework for what should be discussed in Moscow.

Mao had three matters at the forefront of his mind as his train wound its way toward the Soviet capital. He wanted security against a potential American attack. He wanted Soviet assistance in the construction of socialism. And he wanted to remove the stigma which, in his view, had been inflicted on Chinese-Soviet relations by Stalin’s signing in 1945 (at the close of World War II) of a Sino-Soviet Treaty with Mao’s bitter rival, the Nationalist Government headed by Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. The best way to achieve all of these aims, Mao concluded, was to sign a new treaty between the two countries, based on Communist solidarity, discarding the 1945 pact. But the Chinese leader was in no way certain that Stalin would accept such a proposal, and he was prepared to act with great care, so that his wish for a new treaty did not stand in the way of the other aims, both of which could prove more obtainable.6

Stalin, on his side, wanted to test Mao, his commitment to “proletarian internationalism,” and his style of behavior in Moscow. With unflinching faith in his own ability to separate friends from enemies, Stalin agreed to a meeting with the new Chinese leader in order to see how Mao would hold up under scrutiny. Stalin had not yet decided whether or not to sign a new treaty, nor had he made up his mind about any major agreements with the new Chinese regime, prior to Mao’s arrival in Moscow. Based on what we know of his behavior in other contexts, it is likely that Stalin sought material for his conclusions primarily from the Chinese attitude to the post-World War II territorial arrangements in East Asia and from Mao’s attitude toward the
What happened between the two sides in Moscow from December 17 to January 2 remains shrouded in mystery. Stalin obviously wanted to impress the Chinese, to show them Soviet power by arranging visits to memorials and symbols of the achievements of Communism. It is also obvious that he did not want anyone to engage in any further discussions of the main political issues beyond what had been said at the meeting between Mao and himself on December 16.

Beyond that, everything is still conjecture. Mao may have feigned illness to avoid accepting the Soviet agenda for “sightseeing” and to insist on an immediate continuation of the political talks. The Soviets then used Mao’s “illness” to explain why substantive meetings with Stalin, or any Soviet leader, were impossible, thereby trying to force Mao to come up with suggestions for a specific agenda. Mao may indeed have been ill. We know that he was not in good health in October, and the strenuous journey to Moscow could hardly have helped.

Even more important is why Stalin decided to let his guest kill time over the New Year holidays holed up in a government dacha near Moscow. The most likely explanation is that the Soviet leader just could not make up his mind on what the outcome of the Chinese visit would be, and as long as the boss did not act, his subordinates could not take any initiatives on their own. The exertions of his own 70th birthday celebrations (on 21 December 1949) and the ensuing New Year functions may also have taken their toll on the vozhd and made it inopportune for him to seek out difficult negotiations just at that time.

We know that Stalin did meet with Mao on at least three occasions during this period, but existing sources indicate that those meetings were brief and dealt exclusively with specific practical issues, such as sending Soviet engineers from Manchuria and Xinjiang, and establishing joint Sino-Soviet companies in Xinjiang, Mao must have felt that he was forced to part with pieces of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Mongolia to get the Soviet assistance which he needed. Especially when the Soviets introduced the issues of excluding all non-Soviet foreigners from Manchuria and Xinjiang and establishing joint Sino-Soviet companies in Xinjiang, Mao must have felt that he paid a heavy price.

As we see clearly from the Chinese record, Stalin’s tactics, driven by suspicion and rancor, were unnecessary for preventing Sino-American rapprochement and most unhelpful for establishing a lasting Sino-Soviet relationship. Stalin kept his railway and naval concessions in Manchuria (although the leasing period was shortened), and secured phrasing in the secret additional
protocols on Xinjiang and Manchuria which gave him a sense of strategic control of these areas. But Stalin and his associates paid a price for their concessions which was considerably higher than the price Mao paid for signing the agreements which provided him with protection, legitimacy, and aid. By his actions, Stalin undermined Chinese faith in the commonality of ideological principles between the two sides.

The “lessons” of Soviet perfidy in 1949-50 poisoned China’s relationship to Moscow through the 1950s and beyond. Almost twenty years after the signing of the treaty, as Zhou Enlai advised Vietnam’s Communists on the diplomatic aspects of liberating their country, he recalled his and Mao’s experiences with the Soviets in the late 1940s. “The closer to victory your struggle is, the fiercer your struggle with the Soviet Union will be... The closer your war comes to victory, the more obstructive and treacherous the revisionist Soviets—who cannot compare even to Stalin—will be. I refer to [our] past experiences in order to make you vigilant.”

As the evidence now stands, it is hard to see it corroborating Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue Litai’s view of Stalin and Mao as, in Michael Hunt’s phrase, “shrewd nationalists and resolute realpolitikers engaged in an intricate game of international chess.” Where they see a well-considered plan, at least on Stalin’s part, the documents suggest a good deal of improvisation and decision on the part of the Soviet leadership. If one adds to this the multiple and often unintended consequences of cultural misperceptions and quirky personalities so clearly brought out in the memoirs, the picture which emerges is rather of two “giants of history” struggling, and ultimately failing, to construct a purpose to their bilateral relationship beyond the treaty text.

The Chinese side, if anything, came out better than the Soviets as far as a “realist,” interest-oriented agenda is concerned. Mao’s decision-making was, in 1950, still oriented toward consensus within his party and relied heavily on trusted advisers whose judgments influenced his own thinking.

Stalin, on the other hand, often made hasty decisions based on little or no information or consultation. And since there was, at least in this case, little room for initiatives by any of Stalin’s subordinates, the result was a disjointed policy-making process, through which the Soviets won a pyrrhic victory—acting Chinese concessions, but losing the opportunity to forge a lasting alliance.

1 By far the best survey of the summit available is in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 84-129. Although very little has been published in China in terms of documents (except the items which are included in the present collection), there are a number of memoirs dealing with the summit. The most important is Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian [Alongside giants in history] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991). Shi was Mao’s interpreter in Moscow.

2 The Mao-Stalin conversations of 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950 were published in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 5-9, with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok.


5 Soviet records on Liu Shaoqi’s trip to Moscow in the summer of 1949 have recently been released from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) and published in the journal Problemi Dalnego Vostok [Problems of the Far East] introduced by former Soviet ambassador to Mongolia Andrei Ledovsky. For an English translation, see Andrei Ledovsky, “The Moscow Visit of a Delegation of the Communist Party of China in June to August 1949,” Far Eastern Affairs 4 (1996), 64-86.


7 Former Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa, author’s interview, 7 September 1992.

8 Record of conversation, Shibaev-Li Kenong, 16 January 1950, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), f. 0100, o. 43, p. 302, d. 10, ll. 38-44.

9 See Vyshinsky to Stalin, 2 February 1950, and attached draft agreements, AVPRF, f. 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 234. On ll. 29-34 Vyshinsky summarized his conversation with Zhou earlier that day.

10 See Roshchin’s and Mikoian’s conversations with Zhou on February 12, summarized in AVPRF, f. 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 234, ll. 71-74 and 64-68. For a very interesting summary of prospects for trade, see Kosiachenko et al. to Molotov et al., “O torgovle s Kitaikskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi” [“On trade with the People’s Republic of China”], 12 February 1950, AVPRF, f. 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 237, ll. 1-249.

11 Transcript of talks between Vietnamese and Chinese party delegations, Beijing, 11 April 1967.


**TRANSLATED RUSSIAN AND CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON MAO ZEDONG’S VISIT TO MOSCOW, DECEMBER 1949-FEBRUARY 1950**

**Document 1: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 December 1949**

(1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the 16th and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. (Beijing time). His attitude was really sincere. The questions involved included the possibility of peace, the treaty, loan, Taiwan, and the publication of my selected works. (2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid of war. The Americans ask other countries to fight the war [for them], but other countries are also afraid to fight a war. According to him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, and we agree with his opinions. (3) With regard to the question of the treaty, Stalin said that because of the Yalta agreement, it is improper for us to overturn the legitimacy of the old Sino-Soviet treaty. If we abolish the old treaty and sign a new one, the status of the Kurile Islands will be changed and the United States will have an excuse to take them away. Therefore, on the question of the Soviet Union’s thirty-year lease of Lushun [Port Arthur], we should not change it in format; however, in reality, the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Lushun and will let Chinese troops occupy it. I expressed that too early a withdrawal [of the Soviet troop from Lushun] will create unfavorable conditions for us. He replied that
the Soviet withdrawal of troops [from Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet Union will stand by with folded arms [in a crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways through which China will not become the first to bear the brunt. His opinion is that we may sign a statement, which will solve the Lushun problem in accordance with the above-mentioned ideas, and that by doing so, China will also gain political capital [zhengzhi ziben]. I said that it is necessary for us to maintain the legitimacy of the Yalta agreement. However, public opinion in China believes that since the old treaty was signed by the GMD [Guomindang; Kuomintang, KMT], it has lost its ground with the GMD’s downfall. He replied that the old treaty needs to be revised and that the revision is necessarily substantial, but it will not come until two years from now. (4) Stalin said that it is unnecessary for the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai; Chou En-Lai] to fly here just for signing a statement. I told him that I will consider it. I hope that the commercial, loan, and aviation agreements will be signed at the same time, and the Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come. It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss how to solve the treaty problem and offer its opinions.


Document 2: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 19 December 1949 (excerpt)

(1) As to the question of the Burmese government’s request to establish diplomatic relations with us, you should ask it in a return telegram if it is willing to cut off its diplomatic relations with the Guomindang, and at the same time invite that government to dispatch a responsible representative to Beijing for discussions about establishing diplomatic relations between China and Burma. Whether the diplomatic relations will be established or not will be determined by the result of the discussions. It is necessary that we should go through this proce-
dure of discussion, and we should act in the same way toward all capitalist countries. If a certain capitalist country openly announces the desire to establish diplomatic relations with us, our side should telegraph that country and request that it dispatch its representative to China for discussions about establishing diplomatic relations, and at the same time, we may openly publish the main contents of the telegram. By doing so, we will be able to control the initiative.²

[Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wenbao [Mao Zedong’s manuscripts since the founding of the People’s Republic; hereafter JGYLMZDWG], vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), 193; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 129.]

Document 3: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 22 December 1949

Central Committee:
(1) According to [Wang] Jiaxiang, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany all want to do business with us. If this is true, we are going to have trade relations with three more countries besides the Soviet Union. In addition, we have done business or are going to do business with Britain, Japan, the United States, India and other countries. Therefore, in preparing the trade agreement with the Soviet Union, you should have a comprehensive perspective. While we should naturally give top priority to the Soviet Union, we should at the same time prepare to do business with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Britain, Japan, the United States, and other countries, and you need to have a general evaluation of its scope and volume. (2) The telegram of the 21st has been received. We have arranged with Stalin to have a discussion on the 23rd or 24th. After that discussion, we will be able to determine the guideline, which we will inform you by telegraph.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:197; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 129.]

Document 4: Memorandum, 1 January 1950 Conversation of Mao and USSR Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE’S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, COMRADE MAO ZEDONG
1 JANUARY 1950

Following the orders of the USSR Secretary of Foreign Affairs, comrade [Andrei] Vyshinskiy, on January 1 [I] visited the Chairman of the People’s Central Government of the People’s Republic of China, comrade Mao Zedong.

After an exchange of New Year greetings and other formalities, a friendly and warm conversation took place, during which comrade Mao Zedong related the following.

During the past few days he received a report from Beijing that the governments of Burma and India expressed their readiness to recognize the government of the People’s Republic of China. The position of the Chinese government on this matter is as follows: to inform the governments of Burma and India that if they are sincere in their wishes to mend diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, first they must completely break all ties with Jiang Jieshi, unconditionally refuse any kind of support and assistance to this regime, making it into an official declaration. Under the condition that the governments of these countries accept the aforementioned proposals of the Chinese government, the Indian and Burmese governments may send their representatives to Beijing for negotiations.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that there is also information, which states that in the very near future England and other countries of the British Commonwealth will evidently take steps toward recognizing the People’s Republic of China.

Touching upon the military situation in China, comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that as of now all of the main Guomindang forces on the mainland of China have been crushed. In the Szechuan and Xinjiang [Sinkiang] provinces approximately 400 thousand Guomindang troops were taken prisoner and switched to the side of the People’s Liberation army. For the remainder of the Khutzun cluster, numbering 30-40 thousand persons, all the routes for

SECRET

FROM THE DIARY OF

SHOSHCHIN N.V.

COPY NO. 2

CHINA, COMRADE MAO ZEDONG
Mao Zedong requested to transmit the following information concerning his health condition and his plans for further stay in Moscow to the leaders of the Soviet government:

“My health condition — says Mao Zedong, — has improved after a two-year resting period. For the last four days I have been sleeping 8 hours a day with no problems, without taking special sleeping medication. I feel much more energetic, but when going for a walk, I cannot remain out in the fresh air for more than a quarter of an hour - I get dizzy. With regard to this, I intend to rest one more week in total peace and completely restore a normal sleeping pattern.”

Further he pointed out that following the week-long rest period he would like to visit comrades Shvernik, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Vaselevskiy, and Vyshinskiy. These visits will have to take the nature of ordinary conversations. He will not talk about any specific topics nor discuss any business matters. There must be one visit per day, they must not be very lengthy, and he thinks that the best time for them would be after 5-6 pm.

During the same time period he would like to meet with I.V. Stalin to discuss business matters.

After completing the discussion concerning business matters, during the remainder of the stay he intends to place a wreath at Lenin’s mausoleum, see the subway system, visit a few collective farms, attend theaters, and with that finish his stay in Moscow.

Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized that he refrains from visiting factories, meetings with large audiences, and giving public speeches, because it is tiring to his health and may, once again, disturb his sleeping pattern and provoke a relapse of spells of dizziness. Previously he intended to visit different places in the Soviet Union, but presently, due to his health condition, he refrains from traveling around the Soviet Union, because there is a long trip home ahead of him.

Upon leaving Beijing he intended to stay in the USSR for three months, however, presently the circumstances of [his] work in China are forcing him to reduce the length of his stay to two months. Keeping in mind the eleven-day [train] travel to Beijing, he intends to leave Moscow at the end of January, counting on being in Beijing on February 6.

After listening to all of comrade Mao Zedong’s announcements, I stated that I will report all of his wishes to the government the very next day.

Further I asked comrade Mao Zedong if he is aware of the proposal made by the Soviet government in November [1949], to hand over a few hundred Japanese army officers to the Chinese government, in order to bring them to justice for crimes and atrocities which they committed while stationed in China.

Comrade Mao Zedong stated that he was aware of this even prior to his departure from Beijing, but because they were busy with preparations for the trip to Moscow, the Chinese government was not able to look into this matter seriously. His point of view on this matter is as follows: as a matter of principle, the Chinese government will take these criminals and will put them on trial for all their deeds. However, taking into consideration that presently the attention of the Chinese people is concentrated on the events surrounding the elimination of the final remnants of the Guomindang and that the Chinese court system has not yet been ironed out, the Chinese government cannot begin the trial process without preparing the population for it, because it will not have a proper political effect. Besides, the Chinese government must at the same time prepare the trials against the Guomindang military criminals.

Taking into consideration all of this — says Mao Zedong, — I suppose that we will be able to take the military criminals from Soviet territory after six months. I ask the Soviet government to keep these criminals for the first six months of 1950 on its territory and, if possible, to collect more information on them for the trial. In the beginning of the second half of the year we will take them and will put them on trial.

On this the business discussion was concluded. Following the discussion comrade Mao Zedong invited me to the table to have dinner together with him. I accepted the invitation.

The conversation was translated by Shi Zhe (Karskiy).

After parting with comrade Mao Zedong, I remained to wait for the car with Karskiy. The latter informed me that comrade Mao Zedong has been feeling much better for three days already. He sleeps fine, without taking medication, jokes, is cheerful and talkative with everyone, but, the same as before, cannot be out in the fresh air for long. He still gets spells of dizziness. Comrade Mao Zedong firmly decided to rest another week and not travel anywhere. On January 2 a conference of doctors will take place.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN CHINA

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 10, papka 302, ll. I-4; document provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

Document 5: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 2 January 1950

Central Committee:

(1) Our work here has achieved an important breakthrough in the past two days. Comrade Stalin has finally agreed to invite Comrade Zhou Enlai to Moscow and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and other agreements on credit, trade, and civil aviation. Yesterday, on 1 January, a decision was made to publish my interview with the Tass correspondent, and it is in the newspapers today (2 January), which you might have already received. At 8:00 p.m. today, Comrade Molotov and Comrade Mikoyan came to my quarters to have a talk, asking about my opinions on the Sino-Soviet treaty and other matters. I immediately gave them a detailed description of three options: (a) To sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. By taking this action, we will gain enormous advantages. Sino-Soviet relations will be solidified on the basis of the new treaty; in China, workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the left wing of the national bourgeoisie will be greatly inspired, while the right wing of the national bourgeoisie will be isolated; and internationally, we may acquire more political capital to deal with the imperialist countries and to examine all the treaties...
signed between China and each of the imperialist countries in the past. (b) To publish through the news agencies of the two countries a brief communique stating that the authorities of the two countries have exchanged opinions on the old Sino-Soviet treaty and other issues, and have achieved a consensus, without mentioning any of the details. In fact, by doing so we mean to put off the solution of the problem to the future, until a few years later. Accordingly, China’s foreign minister Zhou Enlai does not need to come here. (c) To sign a statement, not a treaty, that will summarize the key points in the two countries’ relations. If this is the option, Zhou Enlai will not have to come either. After I have analyzed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of these three options, Comrade Molotov said promptly that option (a) was good and that Zhou should come. I then asked: “Do you mean that the old treaty will be replaced by a new one?” Comrade Molotov replied: “Yes.” After that we calculated how long it would take for Zhou to come here and to sign the treaty. I said that my telegram would reach Beijing on 3 January, and that [Zhou] Enlai would need five days for preparations and could depart from Beijing on 9 January. It would take him eleven days by train [to travel to Moscow], so he could arrive in Moscow on 19 January. The negotiation and the signing of the treaty would need about ten days, from 20 January to the end of the month. Zhou and I would return home in early February. Meanwhile we also discussed the plans for my sightseeing outside [my quarters and Moscow], and we decided that I would visit Lenin’s tomb, travel to Leningrad, Gorky, and other places, and make tours of such places as an ordnance factory, the subway (Molotov and Mikoyan recommended these two items) and a collective farm. We also discussed the problem of my meeting with various Soviet leaders (so far I have not left my quarters to pay an individual visit to any of them).

(2) Please finish all the preparations [for Zhou’s departure] in five days after you receive this telegram. I hope that [Zhou] Enlai, together with the minister of trade and other necessary aides, and with the necessary documents and materials, will depart from Beijing for Moscow by train (not by air) on 9 January. Comrade Dong Biwu will assume the post of acting premier of the Government Administration Council. The news should not be publicized until Zhou has arrived in Moscow.

(3) Are the above-stated arrangements feasible? Will five days be enough for you to finish the preparations? Does [Zhou] need one or two more days for preparation? Is it necessary for Comrade Li Fuchun or other comrades to come to offer assistance? Please consider them and report to me in a return telegram.

[Source: JGZM, 1:211; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 131-2.]

Document 6: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 4 a.m., 3 January 1950

Central Committee:

My telegram of 11:00 p.m. yesterday must have reached you. Comrade [Zhou] Enlai’s trip to the Soviet Union must be officially approved at a meeting of the Government Administration Council. The Council should also be informed that the main purposes of Zhou’s trip are as follows: to negotiate and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (in comparison to the old treaty, there will be some changes concerning the status of Lushun [Port Arthur] and Dalian, although the details still have to be negotiated; however, the defense against possible aggression of Japan and its allies and the recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence will continue to constitute the basic spirit of the new treaty); to negotiate and sign a credit agreement (we have proposed the sum of $300 million, which will be provided over a few years; the reason why we have not requested more is that [we believe] it better for us to borrow less than to borrow more at present and for several years); and to negotiate and sign a civil aviation agreement (it will benefit the development of our own aviation industry) and a trade agreement (by defining the scope of the barter trade with the Soviet Union, we will be in a more favorable position to determine the orientation of our own production, as well as to conclude trade agreements with other countries). In addition, you should gather all the members of the Government Council now in Beijing for a briefing. At both meetings, you should point out that this move [the signing of an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union] will place the People’s Republic in a more advantageous position in the world. It will press the capitalist countries to come to our terms; it will be favorable for China to be recognized unconditionally by various countries, and for the old treaties to be abolished and new treaties to be signed; and it will deter the capitalist countries from taking reckless actions.

[Source: JGZM, 1:213; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 132-3.]

Document 7: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 6 a.m., 5 January 1950

[Your] telegram of 7:30 p.m., 4 January has been received. (1) We have already arranged [with the Soviet leaders] for Zhou to come here with approximately seventeen aides. He can come. There should be no problem. We have also informed the authorities here that the train will leave Beijing on the night of 9 January. (2) It is better if Bao Erhan, Deng Liqun and the head of the trade department of the Yili [Ili] region could arrive in Moscow on 21 or 22 January, two or three days after [Zhou] Enlai’s arrival; but it is fine if they come on 19 January, the same day Enlai arrives. Please inform me immediately about your decision on this matter. Please also decide and report to me what kind of transportation Bao Erhan and Deng Liqun will need for getting here. Do we need to dispatch a plane from here, or is it possible for the air transportation regiment now stationed in Xinjiang assign a plane for them? Please inform me of your decision immediately by telegraph. (3) Concerning the key points of the negotiation and the preparatory work [for the negotiation], all the points you have put forward should be carefully considered, and preparations should be made accordingly. Since we are going to engage in negotiations, we should present our views extensively, and should make our points clear. After Enlai’s departure, the Central Committee may continue to study these issues, and inform us of its opinions by telegraph at any time. As far as the materials on trade are concerned, if you are unable to have them ready in five days, you may continue working on them after Enlai’s departure, and report to us by telegraph at any time.
Document 8: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP Central Committee, 5 January 1950

Please pay attention to two matters: (1) When the question of replacing the [old] Sino-Soviet treaty with a new treaty has been reviewed by the Government Administrative Council and the [Central People’s] Government Council, please urge all the participants to maintain secrecy. (2) Before Zhou [Enlai] departs with his more than ten [assistants], or on their way [travelling to Moscow], it is necessary for him to assemble all those people to declare discipline to them, telling them that undisciplined words and actions are prohibited, and that they must obey orders on every occasion.

Do not hallucinate.

Document 9: Conversation between A. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong, Moscow, 6 January 1950

FROM THE DIARY OF A.Y. VYSHINSKY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE’S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAO ZEDONG

6 January 1950

On 6 January of the current year, I visited Mao Zedong. After a brief exchange of greetings and formalities conversation of the following content took place.

1. I informed Mao Zedong that with regard to the request of the People’s Central Government of the People’s Republic of China for assistance with the disastrous condition of the Jilin [Xiaofengman] hydro-electric power station, the Soviet government has made a decision—to send, within a period of five days, four Soviet experts to China for a month, who must write a report on the condition of the hydro-electric generating station and draft the necessary measures for putting an end to the disastrous condition of the Jilin [Xiaofengman] hydro-electric power station.

Mao Zedong voiced his gratitude to the Soviet Government for rendering the necessary assistance by answering that the help rendered by the Soviet Union in this matter is of great significance to China’s entire national economy.

2. I informed Mao Zedong that, with regard to Liu Shaoqi’s telegram concerning fuel supplies from the Soviet Union for the use of pilot training, [we] intend to answer that, according to calculations made by our experts, it has been determined that the need for fuel for the aforementioned purpose is determined by the standards of the Soviet Army in the following amounts: 13,400 tons of high-octane gasoline, 5,270 tons of low-octane gasoline, 1,315 tons of aviation oil, and 26 tons of product P-9.

The Soviet Government will give an order to direct the aforementioned amount of fuel to China in the course of the first half of the year, starting with January. As far as the methods and conditions of payment by China for the delivered fuel are concerned, they can be determined during the negotiations concerning the commodity circulation for the year 1950.

Mao Zedong voiced his agreement with the telegram and asked to express gratitude to the Soviet Government for this assistance. As far as the amount of fuel goes, he said that “our people would like to acquire more” and they have to be under strict control. He is grateful to the Soviet Government for reviewing the calculations in this situation, an action with which he completely agrees. Mao Zedong added that the matter of fuel expenditure has to be dealt with in a strict manner, because it will be in the interests of China itself, which must be more frugal in using the articles of outside assistance. Mao Zedong asked [me] to leave him the text of the telegram.

3. I asked Mao Zedong whether he thinks it would be more expedient for the People’s Republic of China to address the Security Council of the United Nations with a declaration that the remaining of the Guomindang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that he must be expelled from the Council. As for itself, the Soviet Union intends to support this kind of declaration and, in its turn, to demand the Security Council to expel the representative of the Guomindang group from the Council. In the event that the Guomindang representative remains in the Security Council, the Soviet representative will declare that he will not participate in the work done by the aforementioned Council so long as the Guomindang representative will be participating in it.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this course a hundred percent and thinks that copies of such a declaration from the People’s Republic of China to the Security Council can be directed to the members of the Security Council simultaneously.

I noted that after coordinating this matter from the Chinese side, I will have to present the proposal to the Soviet Government for consideration.

4. Mao Zedong said that, in regard to the message of the Soviet Government to the People’s Government of China concerning the Japanese military criminals /971 persons/, he would like to report the following:

1. In general, there is no doubt that the Japanese military criminals must be transferred to China to stand trial.

2. However, the Chinese Government intends to put the Japanese military criminals on trial at the same time as the Guomindang military criminals. The organization of such a trial process is planned to take place approximately during the first or second half of 1951. Therefore, it would be desirable for the Soviet Government to agree temporarily to keep the aforementioned Japanese military criminals in the Soviet Union, roughly until the second half of 1950.

I noted that, since the Soviet Union is bound by corresponding obligations — to repatriate all Japanese military prisoners by January of 1950, perhaps it would be more expedient to agree on formally considering the Japanese military criminals as having been transferred to China, but in fact to temporarily leave them on the Soviet territory.

Mao said that this is the exact formula he considers to be the most expedient.

5. Mao stated that he is increasingly coming to the conclusion that the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union need to draft a new treaty of friendship and alliance between the two nations. The drafting of a new treaty between us, he said, stems from the completely new relations, which have evolved between the People’s
Republic of China and the Soviet Union following the victory of the People’s Revolution. A review of the existing treaty is especially necessary, since two important components of the treaty, Japan and the Guomindang, have suffered major changes: Japan has ceased to exist as an armed force and the Guomindang has been broken up. Besides, as is well known, a certain group of the Chinese people is expressing dissatisfaction with the existing treaty between China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the drafting of a new treaty of friendship and alliance between China and the USSR would be in the best interests of both sides.

While answering Mao Zedong, I said that the question of a new treaty, in my eyes, seems to be a complicated matter, since the signing of a new treaty or reviewing of the existing treaty and introduction of any kind of corrections may be used as an excuse by the Americans and the English for reviewing and altering parts of the treaty, changing which may cause damage to Soviet and Chinese interests. This is not desirable and must not be allowed to occur.

Mao noted that, without a doubt, this circumstance must be taken into consideration when creating a formula for solving the given problem.

Persons present during the conversation: comrades Kovalev I.V., Fedorenko N.T., and also Wang Jiaxiang and Shi Zhe / Karskiy/.

The conversation lasted approximately 45 minutes.

A. Vyshinsky

[Source: AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 43, papka 302, ll. 1-5; provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

Document 10: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and CCP CC, 6 a.m., 7 January 1950

[Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

We have received the two telegrams on the management of the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Great Britain and India and the telegram on export-import trade, dated 8:00, 5 January. In regard with the question of export-import trade, you must pay special attention to making an overall plan on the total varieties and volume of exports to and imports from such countries as the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary, as well as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, India, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, Japan, Canada, and the United States, for the whole of 1950. Otherwise, we may find ourselves in a disadvantageous position. It is hoped that, after [Zhou] Enlai’s departure from Beijing, [Liu] Shaoqi, Chen Yun, and [Bo] Yibo will pay attention to this matter.

[Source: JGyLMZDwG, 1:218; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 134.]

Document 11: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and CCP CC, 6 a.m., 7 January 1950

[Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

At 1:00 a.m. today (the 7th), Vyshinskii came to my quarters to talk about three matters: (1) [The Soviet Union] is in a position to satisfy our request of purchasing airplane fuel. (2) [The Soviet Union] is in a position to satisfy our request of offering assistance in repairing the dam of the Xiaofengman waterpower station. A letter with formal response to these two issues will be passed to me tomorrow (the 8th). (3) [He] proposed that our foreign ministry should issue a statement to the United Nations Security Council, denying that Jiang Tingfu, the representative of the former Guomindang government, had the legitimate right to hold China’s seat at the Security Council. Vyshinskii made it clear that if China issued such a statement, the Soviet Union was ready to do one thing: if Jiang Tingfu remained at the Security Council, the foreign ministry of the United Nations Security Council, the foreign ministries of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France should also be notified by telegram, with the text of the telegram to the United Nations attached. Please let me know of the arrangement on this matter, as well as if you would be able to send out the telegram on 9 January.

[Source: JGyLMZDwG, 1:219-20; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 134-5.]

Document 12: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 12 p.m., 7 January 1950

[Liu] Shaoqi, [Zhou] Enlai:

Here is a draft of the statement 5 that Zhou is to telegraph to the president of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations secretary general, and the governments of the ten member states of the United Nations Security Council (do not send it to Yugoslavia). Please dispatch the telegram per this draft.

[Source: JGyLMZDwG, 1:221; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 135.]

Document 13: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC and CCP Northwest Bureau, 10 January 1950 (Excerpt)

The Central Committee, and pass on to Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], He [Long] and the Northwest Bureau:
(1) I fully agree to the plan to dispatch troops into Xizang [Tibet] contained in Liu [Bocheng’s] and Deng [Xiaoping’s] telegram of 7 January.⁶ Now Britain, India, and Pakistan have all recognized us, which is favorable to [our] dispatching troops into Xizang.

(2) According to Comrade Peng Dehuai, the four months needed for dispatching troops [to Xizang] will start in mid-May (in the previous telegram I mistakenly wrote “three months”).⁷

[Source: JGJLMDZWG, 1:226-7; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

**Document 14: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:  
(1) I will depart for Leningrad today (the 13th) in the evening and will be back to Moscow in two days. (2) I have arranged for Liu Yalou, Soviet advisor Kotov and two other men to come here. Please inform Nie Rongzhen of this matter. (3) Xiao Jinguang can now be appointed as commander of the navy; please also inform Nie Rongzhen about this appointment.

[Source: JGJLMDZWG, 1:234; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

**Document 15: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950**

(1) I agree with your telegram dated 13 January about implementing the order to requisition foreign military barracks and preparing to force the United States to evacuate all the former U.S. consulates from China.⁸ (2) I agree that the Shanghai Military Control Commission should confiscate or requisition immediately all the property left by the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration there. (3) As far as the problem of taking over the property left by the puppet regime in Hong Kong is concerned, please make a decision after the Foreign Ministry and the Central Finance and Economics Commission have provided their suggestions. I have no specific opinion on this matter. (4) Vyshinskii came to my quarters and talked with me this evening. He proposed that our government should send a telegram to the United Nations, addressing the question of sending our representative to the United Nations to replace the Guomindang’s representative, since a very serious struggle is now under way in the Security Council over the legitimacy of the GMD’s representative. While the Soviet Union supports our government’s statement about expelling the GMD’s representative, the United States, Great Britain, and the majority of the member states oppose the expulsion. Therefore, it is necessary for China to make a further statement. The telegram can be sent out a week from now. I have agreed to his proposal. The Central Committee may need to consider a nominee for our head representative and report to me by telegraph, and the final decision will be made after [Zhou] Enlai gets here. (5) I will leave for Leningrad tomorrow (the 14th), at 10:00 p.m., not today. I will stay in Leningrad for one day, the 15th, and will return on the 16th. [Wang] Jiaxiang, [Chen] Shaoqi has read them. Out Party should express its opinion by supporting the Cominform bulletin’s criticism of Nosaka and addressing our disappointment over the Japanese Communist Party Politburo’s failure to accept the criticism. It is hoped that the Japanese Communist Party will take appropriate steps to correct Nosaka’s mistakes.⁹

[Source: JGJLMDZWG, 1:235-6; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136-7.]

**Document 16: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950**

Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu:  
I shall leave for Leningrad today at 9:00 p.m. and will not be back for three days. I have not yet received the draft of the Renmin ribao [“People’s Daily”] editorial and the resolution of the Japanese Communist Party’s Politburo. If you prefer to let me read them, I will not be able to give you my response until the 17th. You may prefer to publish the editorial after Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi has read them. Out Party should express its opinion by supporting the Cominform bulletin’s criticism of Nosaka and addressing our disappointment over the Japanese Communist Party Politburo’s failure to accept the criticism. It is hoped that the Japanese Communist Party will take appropriate steps to correct Nosaka’s mistakes.

[Source: JGJLMDZWG, 1:237; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 137.]

**Document 17: Conversation, V.M. Molotov and A.Y. Vyshinsky with Mao Zedong, Moscow, 17 January 1950**

FROM THE DIARY OF TOP SECRET V.M. MOLOTOV


After an exchange of greetings and a brief dialogue on general topics, a conversation of the following content took place.

1. I told Mao Zedong, that on 12 January [1950] the USA Secretary of State Acheson gave a speech at the National Press Club, which touched on certain international matters, in particular, matters concerning China, USSR and their mutual relations. Acheson’s statements concerning these matters are a clear slander against the Soviet Union and were designed to deceive directly public opinion. The United States went bankrupt with its policy in China, and now Acheson is trying to justify himself, without shying away from deceitful means in the process. An example of the extent of Acheson’s fabrications can be seen in the following segment of his speech:

“The following is taking place in China: the Soviet Union, armed with these new means, is partitioning northern regions of China from China and incorporating them into the Soviet Union. This process has been completed in Outer Mongolia. It has been almost completed in Manchuria, and I am sure that Soviet agents are sending very favorable reports from Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang [Xinjiang]. This is what is happening. This is a partition of entire regions, vast regions, inhabited by Chinese, a partition of these regions from China, and their in-
corporation into the Soviet Union.

I want to announce this, and maybe I will sin against my doctrine of repudiating dogmatism. But, in any case, I want to say that the fact that the Soviet Union is taking over four northern regions of China, is the most important and the most significant factor in any great power’s relations with Asia.

What does this signify to us? This signifies something very, very important.”

I advised Mao Zedong to familiarize himself with Acheson’s entire speech and left him a full text of this speech (as reported by TASS).

Mao Zedong said that until now, as is known, these kinds of fabrications were the job of all kinds of scoundrels, represented by American journalists and correspondents. And now this dirty work has been taken up by the Secretary of State of the USA. As they say, the Americans are making progress!

I responded that, with regard to Acheson’s speech, we think the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China should respond accordingly. At the same time, I pointed out that according to a TASS announcement from Washington, on 14 January, the former consul general in Mukden, [Angus] Ward, while responding to questions from the press, stated the very opposite of what Acheson said in his speech on 12 January. In addition, I quoted the appropriate portion of Ward’s declaration, which stated that he did not see any signs which would point to the Soviet Union’s control over the administration of Manchuria or its attempt to incorporate Manchuria into the USSR, even though the Soviet Union is exercising its treaty rights concerning the joint administration of KChZhD [Chinese Changchun Railroad].

I said that I intend to react to Acheson’s aforementioned speech with a declaration from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. However, we would prefer for the Chinese government to be the first to make a statement on this matter, and afterwards, following the publication in our press of the declaration of the People’s Government of China and Ward’s statement, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs would make an appropriate statement.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this, and there is no place here for any doubts. At the same time, however, he inquired if it would not be better for Xinhua [Chinese News Agency] to make this kind of declaration.

I answered that since the matter concerns a speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USA on an important matter, the declaration should not be made by the telegraph agency, but rather by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

Mao Zedong said that he shares the same opinion and, after familiarizing himself with Acheson’s speech, tomorrow he will prepare the text for the declaration [to be made by] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, submit it to us for suggestions and corrections, and then telegraph it to Beijing, so that the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presently performing the duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, can publish this declaration. At the same time Mao Zedong pointed out that in this declaration he will expose Acheson’s slanderous fabrications against the Soviet Union.

Mao Zedong asked what, in our opinion, is the actual purpose of Acheson’s slanderous declaration and could it, this declaration, be a kind of smokescreen, using which, the American imperialists will attempt to occupy the island of Formosa?

I said that, after going bankrupt with their policy in China, the Americans are trying, with the help of slander and deception, to create misunderstandings in the relations between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. I also said it is impossible to disagree that they are using the dissemination of slander as a kind of smokescreen, in order to carry out their plans of occupation. In addition, I noted that, in our opinion, the declaration of the People’s Government of China regarding Acheson’s speech could point out that the fabrications of the USA Secretary of State are an insult to China, that the Chinese people did not lead a struggle, so that someone else could rule or establish control over one or another part of China, and that the Chinese people reject Acheson’s declaration.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this and will immediately start drafting the declaration. At the same time he asked for the text of Acheson’s speech and Ward’s declaration to the press to be transferred to Beijing for the Xinhua agency. I promised to do so this very evening and immediately make arrangements with comrade Vyshinsky.

Afterwards Mao Zedong said that during the past few days the Americans have mobilized the activities of their [diplomatic, intelligence and information] networks and are testing the ground for negotiations with the People’s Government of China. Thus, a few days ago, the head of the American telegraph agency in Paris addressed Mao Zedong with a question on how he would react to the famous American expert on far-eastern affairs [State Department official Philip C.] Jessup’s trip to Beijing for negotiations. Almost simultaneously, information was received from Shanghai stating that steps are being taken by the American consulate in Shanghai, through representatives of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, to obtain agreement from the People’s Government of China to send their representative to Hong Kong for negotiations with Jessup. However, we are paying no attention to this American ground testing, said Mao Zedong.

Furthermore, Mao Zedong said that, as he already informed comrade Vyshinsky earlier, the People’s Government of China is taking certain measures toward forcing the American consular representatives out of China. We need to win time, emphasized Mao Zedong, to put the country in order, which is why we are trying to postpone the hour of recognition by the USA. The later the Americans receive legal rights in China, the better it is for the People’s Republic of China. On 14 January of this year, the local government in Beijing informed the former American consul of their intention to appropriate for their own use the barracks formerly used by foreign armies, rights for which were acquired by foreigners through inequitable treaties. Occupation of the aforementioned buildings essentially means that the American consul will be deprived of the house he is inhabiting and will force him to leave Beijing. In response, the American consul in Beijing started threatening the Chinese government that USA, as a sign of protest, will be forced to recall all of their consular representatives from Beijing, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Nanking. This way, said Mao Zedong in a half-joking manner, the Americans are threatening us with exactly that which we are trying to accomplish.

I noted that this policy of the Central People’s Government of China is designed,
first and foremost, to reinforce the country’s internal situation, which is sufficiently clear and understandable to us.

2. Furthermore, I said that the declaration by the People’s Republic of China, which states that maintaining the Guomindang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that Jiang Tingfu must be removed from it, as well as simultaneous actions by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, caused a commotion and, to a certain extent, confused our enemies’ camp. However, in order to bring the struggle begun in the UN to a conclusion, we would consider it expedient for the People’s Republic of China to appoint its own representative to the Security Council. And it would be preferable for this appointment to take place as soon as possible.

Mao Zedong responded that he had a conversation with comrade Vyshinsky concerning this matter and completely agrees with such a proposal. However, for us, emphasized Mao Zedong, this matter presents a technical problem - selection of the candidate. The only suitable candidate is the present deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs comrade Zhang Hanfu, even though he is somewhat weak for the purpose. I would like to coordinate the question of appointing Zhang Hanfu with comrade Zhou Enlai upon his arrival in Moscow.

I said that if that is the only problem, he can talk to Zhou Enlai over the phone (VCh [a high frequency link] ), while he is en route.

Mao Zedong willingly agreed to communicate with Zhou Enlai over VCh and to coordinate this question immediately.

3. After this I said that according to our information the head of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan, General Zhu Shi-Min, wants to break with the Guomindang and switch to the side of the People’s Republic of China. However, we have no confidence that this information is sufficiently reliable and, in addition, we do not know Zhu Shi-Min well and it is difficult for us to arrive at any definite conclusion about him. For this reason we would like to discuss the matter with Mao Zedong and find out whether we should wait until Zhu Shi-Min announces his switch or, without waiting for it, demand the removal of the Guomindang representative from the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that from his point of view it would be more expedient to act through the Secretary of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan Chen Tin-Cho, who not long ago sent a letter through General Derevyanko concerning the work he is performing with regard to the switch of the aforementioned delegation in Tokyo to the side of the People’s Republic of China. We, noted Mao Zedong, need to exert influence on Zhu Shi-Min and convince him to switch to our side. This would allow us to reach a smoother solution to the question of our representative’s appointment to the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that he will prepare a response to Chen Tin-Cho’s letter and will send it to us for delivery to the addressee in Tokyo.

I said that this proposal is acceptable and we will be able to deliver comrade Mao Zedong’s answer to Chen Tin-Cho through General Derevyanko.

The conversation lasted 1 hour 20 minutes.

Persons present during the conversation: comrade N.T. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe (Karsky).

V. MOLOTOV [signature] 18.1.50

[Source: AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 234, pap. 18, ll. 1-7; provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.

Document 19: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

The telegram of 17 January has been received. (1) That the United States is evacuating all its official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us. However, those democratic figures who have suffered from the fear of the United States may have some disagreement with such actions as the requisition of foreign military barracks. Please pay attention to making explanations to them. (2) When the British charge d’affaires [John C.] Hutchinson arrives in Beijing, what questions should we raise in discussions with him? The Central Committee should draft a written document on the basis of a discussion with members of the foreign ministry, which should define the guidelines, approach that we are to adopt and the concrete issues that we are to address. The document should be reported to me in advance.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:241; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

Document 20: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5:30 p.m., 18 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) This afternoon, at 4:30, I had a telephone conversation with [Zhou] Enlai (he has arrived in Sverdlovsk and will, probably, arrive in Moscow on 20 January, at 5:00 p.m.), and we felt that as Zhang Hanfu does not have the necessary prestige and qualification, he should be assigned as a deputy. It is more appropriate to let Luo Fu become China’s chief representative to the United Nations. A telegram to the United Nations has been drafted, and if the Central Committee agrees, please dispatch it and publish it tomorrow, on the 19th. (2) According to [Zhou] Enlai, both Gao Gang and [Li] Fuchun agree that Luo Fu is qualified to be [China’s] diplomatic representative. But Luo Fu himself is yet to be informed. When you publish the telegram [to the United Nations], please send a telegram to Luo Fu at the same time, explaining that as we did not have
enough time, we were unable to get his consent in advance, and that we thus ask for his understanding. He will be notified in a separate telegram for the time of his departure for the United Nations. (3) The completion of the procedure on his nomination can be waited until the convening of the sixth session of the Government Council. If you feel necessary, you may summon the vice-chairpersons of the government and the leading members of the major parties for a discussion tomorrow, the 19th. (4) Since [Zhou] Enlai will soon come to Moscow, the statement can be issued in Li Kenong’s name.

(5) As what you did the last time, after the telegram is dispatched, copies of it should be sent to the diplomats of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other countries in Beijing. (6) When the Xinhua News Agency publishes the news, it must be introduced that Zhang Wentian is a member of the CCP Central Committee, that he participated in the 25,000-li Long March, and that he has been responsible for various kinds of revolutionary work. (7) Please let me know of the progress of your arrangement on this matter.

[Source: JGELMZDVG, 1:242; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138-9.]

Document 21: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 19 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and convey to [Hu] Qiaomu:

(1) I have written an article in the name of [Hu] Qiaomu. Please carefully scrutinize it and then publish it.12 (2) The article, “Japanese People’s Road (toward Liberation),” is very good.13 It is now being translated into Russian, and we are preparing to submit it to Stalin to read.

[Source: JGELMZDVG, 1:245; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 139.]

Document 22: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 25 January 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) [Zhou] Enlai, Li [Fuchun], and others arrived here on 20 [January]. On 21 [January], the twelve of us participated in a meeting in commemoration of Lenin. On 22 [January], six of us, including Shi Zhe, had a discussion with Comrade Stalin and others, in order to settle the questions concerning principles and the working procedures. On 23 [January], Zhou [Enlai], Wang [Jiaxiang] and Li [Fuchun] had a discussion with Mikoyan, Vysheiskii, and Roshchin about several concrete issues. On 24 [January], we handed to Vysheiskii a draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance worked out by us.14 We are now drafting a second document, that is, the agreement on Lushun, Dalian, and the Chinese Chanchun Railway, and, probably, the drafting can be finished today. We have also decided that we will make a third document, the Sino-Soviet barter agreement, ready in three days. All in all, our work is proceeding quite smoothly. (2) Attached here is the draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Please ask the Central Committee to discuss it and report its opinions to me by telegraph. Please pay attention to keeping it from the outsiders.

[Source: JGELMZDVG, 1:251-2; English translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 140-1.]

Document 23: Remark, Mao Zedong, “About the Negotiations on Establishing Diplomatic Relations with Britain,” 29 January 1950

Zhou [Enlai]: Please make the following response [to Beijing]: When [John C.] Hutchinson comes, only the problems concerning the relations between Britain and Jiang Jieshi and other problems related to establishing diplomatic relations [between Britain and the PRC] should be discussed. The question of the requisitioning of the military barracks should not be touched upon. While meeting the Dutch charge d’affairs, if he mentions the recognition of Indonesia in exchange for [Dutch recognition of the PRC], the matter should be reported to the superiors for consideration.

[Source: JGELMZDVG, 1:253; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 141.]

Document 24: Telegram, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Liu Shaoqi, 1 February 1950

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

Please convey our greetings to Comrade Ho Chi Minh.15 He has played the role as the leader and organizer in the heroic struggle for Vietnam’s national independence and the establishment of a people’s democratic government in Vietnam. China and Vietnam have recognized each other, and will soon establish diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union has already recognized Vietnam, and it is hoped that the other new people’s democratic countries will all give their recognition (our embassy in the Soviet Union has delivered Vietnam’s memorandum asking for foreign recognition and establishing diplomatic relations to the embassies of all new democratic countries in the Soviet Union). We sincerely congratulate Vietnam’s joining the anti-imperialist and democratic family headed by the Soviet Union. We wish that the unification of the entire Vietnam would be soon realized. We also wish Comrade Ho Chi Minh and his comrades-in-arms good health.

[Source: JGELMZDVG, 1:254; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 141-2.]

Document 25: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 10 February 1950

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

(1) It is approved that Su Yu may deploy four divisions in naval operation maneuver.16 (2) The first several phrases17 in the preface of the credit agreement, which mention China’s compensation to the Soviet Union, should not be omitted. (3) The treaty and the agreements should be published by both sides on the same day, and you will be specially informed about the date. (4) [Chen] Boda has written an editorial for the Xinhua News Agency, which we will look over and send to you tomorrow. Please ask [Hu] Qiaomu to scrutinize it, and then publish it at the same time the treaty is published.18

[Source: JGELMZDVG, 1:257-8; transla-
tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142.

Document 26: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 12 February 1950

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:
Here is an internal party telegram I have just drafted. Please give it some consideration as soon as you receive it and dispatch it quickly: 1

All central bureaus, bureau branches, and front-line committee:

A new Sino-Soviet treaty and a series of agreements will be signed and published in days. Then, when different regions hold mass rallies, conduct discussions, and offer opinions, it is essential to adhere to the position adopted by the Xinhua News Agency’s editorial. No inappropriate opinions should be allowed.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:260-1; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142-3.]

1 After leaving Beijing by train on 6 December 1949, Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on 16 December and stayed in the Soviet Union until 17 February 1950. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge during Mao’s absence. When Mao was in Moscow, he maintained daily telegraphic communications with his colleagues in Beijing, and all important affairs were reported to and decided by him.

2 After the Burmese government had cut off all formal relations with the GMD government in Taiwan, the PRC and Burma established diplomatic relations on 8 June 1950.

3 During the first two to three weeks of Mao Zedong’s visit in Moscow, little progress had been achieved in working out a new Sino-Soviet treaty that would replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. This telegram recorded the first major breakthrough during Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union.

4 China’s minister of trade at that time was Ye Jizhuang.

5 The full text of Zhou Enlai’s telegram to the United Nations, which was dispatched on 8 January 1950, was as follows: “Lake Success, to Mr. Carlos Romulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly; to Mr. Trygve Li, Secretary General of the United Nations; also to the member states of the United Nations Security Coun-

cil—the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, Ecuador, India, Cuba, Egypt, and Norway; The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China is of the opinion that it is illegal for the representatives of the remnants of the reactionary gang of the Chinese Nationalist Party to remain in the Security Council. It therefore holds that these representatives must be expelled from the Security Council immediately. I am specially calling your attention to this matter by this telegram, and I hope that you will act accordingly.”

6 In this telegram, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping reported that they planned to dispatch the 18th Army to Tibet by the summer and fall of 1950.

7 On 24 January 1950, the CCP Central Committee formally issued the order to dispatch the 18th Army to enter Tibet.

8 On 6 January 1950, Beijing Municipal Military Control Commission ordered the requisition of former military barracks of the American diplomatic compound in Beijing, which had long been transformed into regular offices. Mao Zedong is here referring to this matter.

9 On 6 January 1950, the Cominform Bulletin published an article criticizing Nosaka Sanzo, a member of the Japanese Communist Party’s Politburo, for his alleged “mistake” of putting too much emphasis on the peaceful path to power in Japan and his “wrong understandings” of the existence of U.S. influence in Japan. Although Nosaka had long been known as a faithful supporter of the CCP (he spent the war years in Yanan and attended the CCP’s Seventh Congress), the CCP leadership still decided to maintain as identical stand with the Cominform in criticizing Nosaka. For a more detailed description of the “Nosaka affair,” see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 160-162.

10 On 19 January 1950, Renmin ribao [People’s Daily, the CCP Central Committee’s official mouthpiece], published a statement by the Chinese government which formally recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, announcing that the PRC would be willing to establish diplomatic relations with DRV.

11 The Soviet Union and other East European countries quickly established diplomatic relations with the DRV.

12 As a response to Acheson’s speech made at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, this article particularly criticized Acheson’s comments on Sino-American relations. For the text of the article, see Renmin ribao, 21 January 1950.

13 This article was the CCP leadership’s response to the Nosaka affair (see above, Mao Zedong telegram to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950, and corresponding footnote).

14 This draft was worked out by Zhou Enlai under Mao’s direction.

15 Ho Chi Minh, after walking for seventeen days, arrived on the Chinese-Vietnamese border in late January 1950, and then he was taken to Beijing to meet Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders. He made it clear that his purpose to visit China was to pursue substantial Chinese military and other assistance to the Vietminh’s struggles against the French. He also expressed the desire to visit the Soviet Union. By the arrangement of the CCP, Ho Chi Minh then travelled to the Soviet Union and met Stalin and Mao and Zhou there. He would come back to China together with Mao and Zhou and to continue discussions with Chinese leaders. These discussions resulted in Beijing’s (but not Stalin’s) commitment to support Ho. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-1954,” The China Quarterly 132 (March 1993), 85-110.

16 This refers to Su Yu’s plan to attack the GMD-controlled Zhoushan islands.

17 The phrases to which Mao refers here are as follows: “The Government of the Soviet Union agrees to satisfy the request of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China for a loan that is to be used in payment for the machines, facilities, and other material that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide China.”

18 This editorial, entitled “The New Era of Sino-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation,” was published by the Xinhua News Agency on 14 February 1950.

FUTURE BULLETIN ISSUES

Future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin are already being compiled, and you are invited to contribute! Among the themes currently projected for upcoming issues are: New Evidence on the End of the Cold War (in both East-Central Europe and the USSR); New Evidence on the Indochina/Vietnam Wars; New Evidence the Cold War in the Balkans; Stalin and the Cold War; and the Intelligence Services and the Cold War.
THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE VERSIONS OF MAO’S 2 OCTOBER 1950 MESSAGE TO STALIN ON CHINESE ENTRY INTO THE KOREAN WAR: A CHINESE SCHOLAR’S REPLY

by SHEN Zhihua

translated by CHEN Jian*

[Translator’s Note: The Chinese Communist Party leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950. For several years, scholars have relied upon Chinese documents available since the late 1980s to discuss the process by which Beijing made that decision. Among these documents, one of the most crucial was a telegram Mao Zedong purportedly sent to Stalin on 2 October 1950, in which the CCP chairman informed the Soviet leader that Beijing had decided “to send a portion of our troops, under the name of Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee.”

With the opening of Russian archives in recent years, however, a sharply different version of Mao’s 2 October 1950 message to Stalin has emerged, according to which Mao related that because dispatching Chinese troops to Korea “may entail extremely serious consequences,” many CCP leaders believed China should “show caution” about entering the conflict, and consequently Beijing had tentatively decided against entering the war.

How did such a sharp discrepancy between the Chinese and Soviet versions of this communication occur? Which (if either) is correct? What really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950? In the previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter 1995/1996), which first published the Russian version of the disputed telegram, Russian scholar Alexandre Mansourov questioned the accuracy and even authenticity of the Chinese version. Debate continued in January 1996 at a conference on “New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia” organized by CWIHP and hosted by Hong Kong University. In this article, a participant in that conference, Chinese historian Shen Zhihua, presents the results of his investigation in Beijing concerning the Chinese version of Mao’s telegram and addresses Mansourov’s question. An earlier version appeared in spring 1996 in the Beijing publication Danshi yanju ziliao (Party History Research Materials.--C.J.)

As I have argued elsewhere,¹ China’s decision to enter the Korean War was based primarily on crucial national security (as opposed to ideological) considerations. After conflict on the peninsula broke out into large-scale war in June 1950, and especially when the military situation turned from North Korea’s favor to disfavor that autumn, the attitudes of China and the Soviet Union toward the Korean situation experienced profound changes, leading to divergent directions in policy. While the Soviet Union became increasingly cautious about engaging itself in Korea (at one point, Moscow even considered abandoning the North Korean communist regime to defeat), China began to adopt a strategy of positive defense, a strategy which would eventually lead to its entry into the War. The Chinese leaders’ primary concern was how to guarantee stable development—for the People’s Republic of China, which had only come into existence the previous fall after an exhausting civil war. However, if necessary, the Chinese leaders did not fear entering a direct military confrontation with the United States, the number one power in the world, under the banner of “resisting America and assisting Korea, defending our home and our nation.”

As it is by now well known, China’s final decision to enter the war was reached in the first three weeks of October 1950, after the successful U.S.-U.N. landing at Inchon put the North Korean regime in danger of imminent collapse. On 28 September 1950, the (North) Korean Labor Party politburo decided to solicit direct Soviet and Chinese military support. On September 29 and 30, Kim Il-song and Pak Hon-yong sent two urgent letters to, respectively, Stalin and Mao Zedong, requesting direct Soviet and Chinese military support.² Stalin immediately kicked the ball to the Chinese. In a telegram to Mao Zedong on October 1, Stalin urged the Chinese to “move at least five to six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once,” without mentioning what Moscow would do to support the North Koreans.³ At the most crucial moment of the Korean War, Mao and his comrades in Beijing had to decide if they would take on the main responsibility and burden for rescuing North Korea.

How did the Chinese leaders respond to Stalin’s and Kim Il-song’s requests to dispatch Chinese troops to Korea? Because of the recent emergence of two sharply different versions of Mao Zedong’s telegram to Stalin dated 2 October 1950, this has become an issue under serious debate among Chinese and foreign scholars.

In 1987, the first volume of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wenqiao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic] was published under the neiibu category (meaning “for internally circulation only”). It included the main part of what was identified as a telegram by Mao Zedong to Stalin on 2 October 1950, reading as follows:

(1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [Chinese People’s] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades in fighting the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary. If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary forces were substantially destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East.

(2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, that we are prepared to annihilate the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and to drive them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an American declaration of war...
on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China’s coastal areas.

(3) Of the two issues, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able to defeat American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the revolutionary front and China, even though the second question (the possibility that the United States would declare war on China) would still remain as a serious issue. In other words, the Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of [North] Korea for a long period). If this occurs, even though the United States had declared war on China, the ongoing confrontation would not be on a large-scale, nor would it last very long. We consider that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental to China’s economic reconstruction already under way, and would cause dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely afraid of war).

(4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops will employ defensive tactics, while engaging small groups of enemies and learning about the situation in every respect. Meanwhile, our troops will be awaiting the arrival of Soviet weapons and being equipped with those weapons. Only then will our troops, in cooperation with the Korean comrades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy the invading American forces.

(5) According to our information, every U.S. army (two infantry divisions and one mechanized division) is armed with 1500 pieces of artillery of various caliber ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each of our armies (three divisions) is equipped with only 36 pieces of artillery. The enemy would control the air while our air force, which has just started its training, will not be able to enter the war with some 300 planes until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we are not assured that our troops will be able to annihilate an entire U.S. army once and for all. But since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should be prepared that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete army to fight us in a campaign, we should be able to concentrate our forces four times greater than those of the enemy (that is, to use four of our armies to fight against one enemy army) and to marshal firing power one and a half to two times stronger than that of the enemy (that is, to use 2200 to 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and upward to deal with the enemy’s 1300 pieces of artillery of the same caliber), so that we can guarantee a complete and thorough destruction of one enemy army.

(6) In addition to the above-mentioned twelve divisions, we are transferring another twenty-four divisions, as the second and third echelons to assist Korea, from south of the Yangtze River and the Shaanxi-Gansu areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we expect to gradually employ these divisions next spring and summer in accordance with the situation at the time.4

Although the message was not published in its entirety,5 the above text has made its importance self-evident. Since the late 1980s, Korean War historians have widely cited this telegram as main evidence to support the notion that by early October 1950, the Chinese leadership, Mao Zedong in particular, had made the decision to send Chinese troops to Korea.6

However, the opening of Russian archives in recent years indicated that Mao, via Soviet ambassador to China N. V. Roshchin, had sent a message to Stalin on 2 October 1950 that drastically differs from the above-cited Chinese version. The Russian version reads as follows:

I received your telegram of 1 October 1950. We originally planned to move several volunteer division to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.

In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large.

Many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send our troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war. We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.

We await your reply.7
The obvious contradictions between these two versions of Mao Zedong’s 2 October 1950 telegram to Stalin have inevitably raised serious questions concerning what really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950. At a seminar held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on 13 December 1995, and in his article in the Winter 1995/1996 issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, the Russian scholar Alexandre Y. Mansourov cited the Russian version of Mao’s telegram to argue that the Chinese leaders were reluctant to send troops to Korea, and that they might have completely backed away from their original intention to send troops to Korea early in October 1950. Further, Mansourov questioned the authenticity of Mao’s telegram published in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. Comparing the styles and contents of the two versions, he pointed out that since the Russian version is a copy of an actual document kept at the Presidential Archive in Moscow, it should be regarded as more reliable than the published Chinese version, which, he argued, could be “unreliable, inaccurate, unsent, or perhaps mistated.” He even stated that one cannot “exclude the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history.”

Mansourov’s casting of doubt on the authenticity of the Chinese version of Mao’s telegram was based on a simple, yet seemingly reasonable, deduction: because the contents of the two versions are drastically different, and because the Russian version appeared authentic, something must have been seriously wrong with the Chinese version.

The situation, however, is more complicated. After the exposure of the Russian version of the telegram, party archivists in Beijing carefully searched Mao’s documents at CCP Central Archives, and confirmed that the original of the Chinese version of Mao’s 2 October 1950 message did indeed exist and is kept there (this author was provided access to it). The telegram was in Mao’s own handwriting and was longer than the version that was published in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (the published version did not include the sections about China’s requests for Soviet ammunition and military equipment). However, the format of this telegram differed from that of many of Mao’s other telegrams: while other telegrams usually (but not always) carried Mao’s office staff’s signature indicating how and when the telegram was dispatched, this telegram does not. So, while it is certain that the Chinese version of Mao’s telegram is a genuine document, there exist reasonable grounds on which to believe that it might not have been dispatched.

At the same time, the party archivists in Beijing could not find the Russian version of the 2 October 1950 telegram in Mao’s files at CCP Central Archives. This, however, does not mean that the Russian version is not a genuine document. One explanation of its absence in Mao’s files might be found in the format of the document: It is not a telegram Mao Zedong directly sent to Stalin, but is a message included in Roshchin’s telegram to the Soviet leader. Therefore, it is quite possible that Mao verbally delivered the message to Roshchin and authorized the Soviet ambassador to convey it to Stalin. Because the message may not have been in written form in the first place, it may not be so strange that one cannot locate a copy of it at the CCP Central Archives.

If the above analysis is correct, one must further ask a question: Why did Mao draft one telegram (the Chinese version) but deliver another message (the Russian version) to Stalin via the Soviet ambassador?

If we put this issue into the context of the tortuous processes through which the CCP leadership reached the decision to send troops to Korea, we may find that a major reason for Mao not to dispatch the draft telegram to Stalin could lie in the fact that the Chinese leadership had not yet reached a consensus on this issue. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong had been carefully considering the question of sending troops to Korea. After the Inchon landing in mid-September, he seemed to have been determined to do so. However, according to the materials now available, the Chinese leaders did not formally meet to discuss dispatching troops to Korea until after 1 October 1950. The reality was that many Chinese leaders had different views on this issue. We now know that after receiving Stalin’s October 1 telegram, Mao summoned a Central Secretariat meeting the same night. Attending the meeting were Mao, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. Unable to attain a consensus on sending troops to Korea, the group decided to continue to discuss the issue the next day at an enlarged Central Secretariat meeting (attendants would include high-ranking military leaders in Beijing). It was after this meeting that Mao sent an urgent telegram to Gao Gang, instructing him to travel from the Northeast to Beijing immediately. Mao also ordered the Northeast Border Defense Army to prepare to “enter operations [in Korea] at any time.”

According to the materials now available, as well as the recollections of those who had been involved, we are able to draw a general picture about the enlarged Central Secretariat meeting on the afternoon of 2 October. Mao Zedong emphasized at the meeting that it was urgent to send troops to Korea, and the meeting thus decided that Peng Dehuai should be asked to command the troops. Mao also instructed Zhou Enlai to arrange a special plane to pick up Peng in Xi’an (where Peng was then the military and Party head). However, the
meeting failed to yield a unanimous decision to send troops to Korea. It thus decided that an enlarged Politburo meeting would be convened to discuss the issue on October 4.\textsuperscript{14} Evidently, before the Party leadership had reached a final decision, it would have been impossible for Mao to give an affirmative response to Stalin’s October 1 request.\textsuperscript{15} In actuality, even at the October 4 enlarged Politburo meeting, which would last until October 5, the opinions of the CCP leaders were still deeply divided, with the majority, at one point, strongly opposing sending troops to Korea. The main tendency of the meeting was that “unless absolutely necessary, it was better not to fight the war.”\textsuperscript{16}

Within this context, it is easier to extrapolate what really happened with the Chinese version of Mao’s telegram. It is quite possible that as Mao was willing to send troops to Korea, he personally drafted this telegram after receiving Stalin’s October 1 telegram. However, because the opinions of the CCP leadership were still divided on the issue, and because the majority of Party leaders either opposed or had strong reservations about entering the war, Mao did not think it proper to dispatch the telegram. In fact, the Russian version of Mao’s message mentions that “many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution.” This indicated that the division of opinions among CCP leaders was a reason for Mao to send the message found in Russian archives, but not his personally drafted telegram, to Stalin. Of course, how, exactly, Mao changed his plans regarding the message is a question that might only be illuminated with further research, including the opening of additional archival materials in Moscow and, especially, Beijing.

Now, a question that needs further exploration is: Does Mao’s message via Roshchin, as regarded by Roshchin and Stalin at that time, as well as currently interpreted by Mansourov, indicate that Mao was reluctant to send troops to Korea, or that the CCP leadership had changed its original stand on the Korean issue? This question should be answered in relation to Mao Zedong’s

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**STALIN, MAO, KIM AND KOREAN WAR ORIGINS, 1950: A RUSSIAN DOCUMENTARY DISCREPANCY**

by Dieter Heinzig

There is some evidence that Stalin and Mao, during the latter’s stay in Moscow between December 1949 and February 1950, discussed the feasibility of a North Korean war against South Korea (cf. Chen Jian, *China’s Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], pp. 85-91). But what we are particularly keen on knowing is whether Stalin informed Mao Zedong about the fact that, on 30 January 1950, gave North Korean leader Kim II Sung, although in general terms, the green light for an attack on South Korea (cf. Kathryn Weathersby in the *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 [Spring 1995], pp. 3, 9).

At last I found strong evidence that he did not. It is contained in Mao’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on 31 March 1956, a version of which was published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 164-7. In this version, on page 166 a part of Yudin’s original record is omitted. It reads as follows (omitted part underlined):

“Important things which, evidently, to some extent strengthened Stalin’s belief in the CCP, were your (my) information about the journey to China and the Korean War—the performance of the Chinese People’s volunteers, although concerning this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not consulted in a sufficient way. Concerning the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) was in Moscow, there was no talk about conquering South Korea, but rather on strengthening North Korea significantly. But afterwards Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, where a certain agreement was reached about which nobody deemed it necessary to consult with me beforehand. It is noteworthy, said Mao Zedong, that in the Korean War a serious miscalculation took place regarding the possibility of the appearance of international forces on the side of South Korea.”

The source is contained in the documents on the Korean War declassified by the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) in Moscow which were cited by Kathryn Weathersby in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 30. It is Ciphered telegram; Strictly secret; Taking of copies forbidden; From Beijing; 20. IV. 56 (handwritten); Perechen III no. 63 kopii dokumentov Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossisskoi Federatsii po teme: “Voina v Koree 1950-1953,” p. 157; list of the archival delo: 150; nos. of fond, opis, and delo not given. Before the text quoted above: “On 31 March I visited Comr. Mao Zedong,” after “P. Yudin.” The text quoted above is introduced by the handwritten insertion (...), and it ends with the same insertion. Evidently, the text was included in the Presidential Archive’s collection as an excerpt as it is the only part of Yudin’s record which has to do with the Korean War.

For the CWIHP version of Yudin’s record three sources are quoted (see p. 167). One is Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 5 (1994), pp. 101-109. Responsible for this publication are A. Grigorev and T. Zazerskaia. Here no reference whatsoever is made indicating that something was omitted. I did not see the two other (archival) sources quoted in the *CWIHP Bulletin*. But obviously there is no reference to an omission either, otherwise this would certainly have been indicated in the *Bulletin* version.

The text quoted above not only adds to our knowledge about the decision-making process during the preparatory phase of the Korean War. In addition, the way the text was discovered shows that Russian censors are still active—not only by withholding documents, but also by offering incomplete documents.
considerations before and after October 2, as well as by comparing the contents of the Chinese and Russian versions of the telegram.

First of all, it should be emphasized that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced to make the decision to send troops to Korea. He fully understood that China’s involvement in the Korean War would entail great difficulties. On this point, his views basically coincided with those of his comrades who opposed or had strong reservations about sending troops to Korea. In actuality, those reasons that Mao listed in the Russian version, such as America’s technological superiority, the danger of an open war with the United States, and the possible negative domestic reactions, were all reflected in the Chinese version, though from a different angle. When Mao mentioned in the Russian version that “many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution,” this does not mean that he had changed his own determination. A careful comparison of the two versions leads to a different conclusion: Mao did not change his goals but rather the tactics he would use to achieve them. Instead of replying directly and positively to Stalin’s request, Mao adopted a more indirect and ambiguous response, so that he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door open for further communication (bargaining) with Stalin open. This interpretation would explain why the CCP chairman specifically informed Stalin in the Russian version that “A final decision has not been made on this question. This is our preliminary telegram.” It also explains why he proposed to send Zhou Enlai to consult with Stalin.

That Mao had not altered his determination to enter the war was most clearly demonstrated by his attitude at the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Although the majority of CCP leaders attending the meeting continued to express strong reservations about entering the Korean War, Mao told them that “all of what you have said is reasonable, but once another nation, one that is our neighbor, is in crisis, we’d feel sad if we stood idly by.”17 Mao finally convinced his comrades of the need to send troops to Korea at the October 5 meeting. Once the decision was made, the Chinese leaders acted immediately. (It is unclear whether this decision was taken before or after Mao received Stalin’s response—which strongly urged Chinese intervention in Korea, even at the risk of World War III—to his earlier telegram indicating doubt about entering the war.) After the October 5 meeting, Mao invited Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to dine with him, and they further discussed some of the details. Mao also instructed Peng and Gao to travel to Shenyang to convey the Politburo’s decision to division-level commanders of the Northeast Border Defense Army, preparing to enter operations in Korea by October 15. The next day, Zhou Enlai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which made concrete arrangements about how the troops should prepare to enter operations in Korea.18

It should also be noted that there exists no irreconcilable contradiction between the Chinese leaders’ previous agreement to send troops to Korea and Mao’s expression that China would “refrain from advancing troops” in the Russian version. Scholars who believe that China had completely changed its stand have ignored an important condition, that is, every time the Chinese leaders mentioned that China would send troops to Korea, they made it clear that a crucial precondition for taking action was that the enemy forces crossed the 38th parallel. In Zhou Enlai’s meeting with K. M. Pannikar, India’s ambassador to China, early in the morning of October 3, the Chinese premier particularly emphasized that if the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had crossed the 38th parallel, China would intervene.19 As of October 2, this precondition had not yet materialized.20

In addition to the above factors, Mao did not give Stalin a direct and positive response because he sensed the need to put more pressure on Stalin. An important condition for China to enter a war with the United States was that it would receive substantial military support, especially air cover for Chinese ground forces, from the Soviet Union. By analyzing the two versions of Mao’s telegram, a common point was that Mao believed that if China was to enter the war, it must win the war, and win it quickly. Only a speedy victory would solve all of China’s difficulties and worries. In order to achieve a rapid victory, it was necessary that the Soviet Union, China’s main ally, to provide the PRC with adequate military assistance, the air support in particular. However, Stalin, in his October 1 telegram to Mao, as well as in several other communications with the Chinese leadership before and afterward, failed to clarify this crucial issue. Without reaching clearly-defined and concrete agreements with the Soviets, Mao might have felt that it was better not to give Stalin’s request a direct and positive response. This could have been the most important reason underlying Mao’s proposal to send Zhou Enlai to the USSR to meet Stalin. And this also could explain why, under the circumstance that the Chinese leadership had already made the decision to enter the Korean War, Mao told Stalin on October 7 that China “would not be able to send troops [to Korea] at this moment, but would do so after some time.”21 The key question had now become Soviet air support for Chinese troops that were to fight in Korea.

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1 See my paper, “China Was Forced to Enter the Korean War: Causes and Decision-making Process,” prepared for “New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia,” international conference sponsored by the Cold War International History Project, University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996.
2 For Kim’s letter to Stalin of 29 September 1950, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 110-111; the original is kept in the Archives of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), Moscow, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 46-49.
3 Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 114.
4 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), 539-540.
5 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao makes it
clear that the text of the telegram published is incomplete. In the original of the telegram, according to Chen Jian, who based his description on “interviews with Shi Zhe and Beijing’s military researchers with access to Mao’s manuscripts,” Mao also asked Stalin to deliver to the Chinese large amounts of military equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, other heavy and light weapons, and thousands of trucks, as well as to confirm that the Soviet Union would provide the Chinese with air support when Chinese troops entered operations in Korea. See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 177.

6 For examples of such citations, see the editor’s note in footnote 30 of Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), at 107.


8 For the article and accompanying documents, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 94-119.

9 Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War,” 107, fn. 30.

10 Ibid.

11 By comparison, early on the morning of 2 October 1950, Mao sent another telegram to Gao Gang and Deng Hua which carries the record of when it was dispatched (2:00 am) and the signature of Yang Shangkun, director of CCP Central Administrative Office, to witness its dispatch. For the text of the telegram, see Jiangyu yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1:538.

12 See Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 173. My own interviews, as well as those of Xu Yan (a leading Chinese scholar on the history of the Korean War), also confirmed that the 1 October 1950 Central Secretariat meeting did not reach a consensus on sending troops to Korea.


15 Basing his discussion of the meeting on the Chinese version of Mao’s 2 October 1950 telegram, Chen Jian, in China’s Road to the Korean War (p. 175), asserted that top CCP leaders had reached general consensus on sending troops to Korea at the October 2 meeting, and that Mao proposed before the end of the meeting that he would personally send a telegram to Stalin to inform the Soviet leader of the decision. This points appears to be in error if the Russian version is correct.


18 Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang [The First Test of Strength] (Beijing: Chinese Television and Broadcasting Press, 1990), 24; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 185. For Stalin’s reply (n.d., probably October 5 or 6) to Mao’s earlier telegram, see Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, 8 [7] October 1950, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116-17.


20 According to the intelligence reports the Chinese leaders had received by October 2, only South Korean troops had crossed the parallel. As late as October 14, when U.S.-South Korean troops had broken up the North Korean defense line for Pyongyang, Mao, in accordance with the intelligence reports from the Chinese military, still believed that “it seems that the Americans are yet to decide whether or not and when they would attack Pyongyang... The American troops are now still stationed at the [38th] parallel.” Jiangyu yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1: 559-61.


KHRUSHCHEV VS. MAO: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN THE SINO-SOVET SPLIT

by William Taubman

Traditional and historical differences, ideological arguments, economic and geo-political issues, even racial tensions—these and other sources of the Sino-Soviet conflict have been analyzed along with the main episodes in the decades-long dispute. It has also been said that personalities of Chinese and Soviet leaders played a large role—how could they not given the likes of Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev?—but that side of events has been less studied.

Chinese sources indicate that Mao took the Sino-Soviet conflict quite personally, that he did not have a high regard (to say the least) for Khrushchev, and that he even tried deliberately to demean the Soviet leader. As for Khrushchev, his own memoirs indicate quite clearly that Mao got under his skin. Khrushchev prefaced his account of the conflict by condemning those who imply that the split stemmed from a mere “clash of personalities.” Yet he himself keeps coming back to that same cause. The trouble with Mao was his “unwillingness to consider anyone else his equal.” When it came to the question of who would lead the world communist movement, “everything depends on personal characteristics, on how one or another leader feels about himself, and in which direction he directs his efforts.”

As the Communist saying goes, these and other similar references aren’t accidental. Almost against his will, they register Khrushchev’s conviction that the personal dimension, and in particular the clash between himself and Mao, was central.

But what was it about Mao that so irritated Khrushchev? Was Mao’s ability to provoke him exceptional, or was Khrushchev in general easily provoked? What light does his conduct of Sino-Soviet relations shed on Khrushchev as a leader? And how did Khrushchev’s leadership affect Sino-Soviet relations?

Not all political leaders are equally good candidates for psychological study. Those who cry out for such scrutiny (as Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev all do) are distinguished by three traits. First, they have great power; to use Sidney Hook’s well-known phrase, they are “event-making” rather than “eventful” men or women, the difference being that the former truly transform situations, whereas the latter merely attempt to cope with or respond to great changes already in progress. As paramount leaders of totalitarian (or in Khrushchev’s case, perhaps, “post-totalitarian”) systems, all three men surely fit this description.

Second, all three were unique; although leaders, like ordinary citizens, are influenced by values and other ideas widely shared in their societies, Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev nevertheless took actions and made decisions that no one else in the Soviet or Chinese leaderships would have. It is that fact that invites us to examine their personalities as a prime source of their actions.

The third criterion is a pattern of behavior that seems contradictory, irrational, and ultimately self-defeating. The importance of this is that it suggests a leader is not simply doing what a situation dictates, or what a culture encourages or allows, but rather is driven by some internal compulsion that influences his or her behavior.

Although all three traits characterize all three leaders, the focus here is Khrushchev. Not only was he extremely powerful, he was also distinctive among Stalin’s potential successors. No one else in the Soviet leadership, I’d contend, would have (1) unmasked Stalin as Khrushchev did in his secret speech at the 20th Party Congress, (2) placed nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba, and (3) taken those same missiles out again as soon as he was caught in the act. In addition, he stood apart from his peers in three key elements of “political style”: in his rhetoric (Khrushchev was as voluble, earthy, and informal as Stalin and his other colleagues were not); in his approach to work (he was hyperactive far beyond the Bolshevik norm); and in inter-personal relations (in which he counted on face-to-face encounters to gauge and to best his opponents). Not only was this combination of characteristics unusual; in the end, all three traits were viewed as liabilities by Khrushchev’s Kremlin colleagues.

Khrushchev’s rise from the humblest of origins makes his a success story. Yet almost as soon as he reached the top, his self-defeating behavior began—far from all his troubles were of his own making, of course, but many were brought on by his own actions. The Secret Speech itself triggered turmoil in Poland and then revolution in Hungary in 1956. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the beginning of the end of Khrushchev’s decade in power. And there were many other such instances in which Khrushchev’s behavior ended up undermining his own position.

One of the them was the Sino-Soviet conflict itself. This article will look closely at several key episodes, focusing on Mao’s behavior and Khrushchev’s response, before trying to explain the pattern in terms of Khrushchev’s personality.

At first, Khrushchev’s relations with Mao went quite well. The Chinese need for assistance, even greater after the Korean War than before it, guaranteed Khrushchev would get a warm reception in Beijing in 1954, especially since he arrived bearing substantial gifts. Khrushchev claims in his memoirs that he returned from China warning his colleagues that “conflict between us and China is inevitable.” But the fact that those same memoirs misattribute to his 1954 visit the famous Khrushchev-Mao swimming pool encounter that actually occurred in the summer of 1958 suggests that he mistakenly read back into 1954 the alarm he clearly felt four years later.

Even in 1954, however, Khrushchev probably first felt experienced sort of irritation with Mao that would grow steadily over the ensuing years. It was then, for example, that he offered to return the Port Arthur naval base without even being asked to by the Chinese—only to have Mao demand that the Soviets also hand over free of charge the Soviet weaponry located there.

Until 1956, recalls Mao’s doctor,
Li Zhisui, the Chinese leader welcomed Khrushchev’s assumption of leadership in the Kremlin. But the latter’s speech denouncing Stalin soured Mao on Khrushchev for good. Despite his own personal and other grievances against Stalin, Mao now decided the new Soviet leader was “unreliable,” and after that “never forgave Khrushchev for attacking Stalin.” Moreover, Mao hardly bothered to conceal how he felt about Khrushchev, and later practically flaunted his contempt in Khrushchev’s face.

For example, during his November 1957 visit to Moscow, Mao hardly hid his disdain for his Russian hosts, their hospitality, their food, and their culture. Khrushchev was “friendly and respectful,” Dr. Li recalls, and went out of his way to treat Mao as a highly honored guest. Yet, from the moment he arrived, “Mao was reserved and even a bit cool with Khrushchev,” while in private conversations with his Chinese colleagues (which the KGB probably overheard and reported to Khrushchev), Mao overflowed with “private barbs against the Russian leader.”

During the first half of 1958, Mao’s attitude toward the Soviets darkened even more drastically as he launched the “Great Leap Forward,” and resolved to reduce Chinese dependence on Moscow. Ironically, it was just then that Khrushchev decided to propose still more military dependence to the Chinese in the form of a radio station on their territory to be used by Moscow for communicating with its new nuclear-powered, missile-toting submarines.

“We fully expected the Chinese to cooperate with us when we asked for a radio station on their territory,” Khrushchev recalls. When Mao abruptly refused to deal with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on the issue and instead rudely demanded that Khrushchev himself come to China, the Soviet leader dropped everything and hurried off to Beijing, only to find himself the target of a new round of Maoist condescension and humiliation.

Talks on the radio stations and other military matters began politely. But when Khrushchev took too long repeating points Yudin had made, Mao openly displayed his contempt. Mao smoked throughout despite Khrushchev’s well-known aversion to cigarettes. He also mocked his guest’s equally familiar penchant for rambling on in disorganized fashion. Mao waved

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[Ed. note: Though still masked from public view, the simmering tensions in the Khrushchev-Mao relationship burst into the open between them when the Soviet and Chinese leaderships met in Beijing on 2 October 1959. Khrushchev, who had led a delegation to attend celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, was shocked when his criticisms of recent Chinese policies provoked a furious response—and the resulting argument turned so angry that officials on both sides sought to suppress the transcript. (A secret Chinese compilation of Mao’s meetings with foreign communist leaders omits this encounter, and scholars have reported finding Soviet documents indicating that the record should be destroyed.)

Nevertheless, the Soviet transcript of the meeting has survived—it was cited in Dmitrii Volkogonov’s biography of Lenin—and the Cold War International History Project plans to publish it in full when it becomes available, with translation, commentary, and annotation by Mark Kramer (Harvard University). The excerpts below come from another recently-discovered document, a secret report on Khrushchev’s trip to Beijing and meeting with Mao delivered two months later by a senior member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Suslov, to a December 1959 Plenum of the Communist Party of China. The excerpts suggest how the fast developing Sino-Soviet split had moved beyond political and ideological disputes into a highly-personal conflict.

The document, part of a large collection of Plenum transcripts and supporting materials recently declassified by Russian authorities, was discovered in the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD, the former CC archives) in Moscow and translated for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. (Another excerpt, on the Sino-Indian conflict, is printed after M.Y. Prozumenschikov’s article elsewhere in this section of the Bulletin.) A full translation of the Suslov report is slated for publication by CWIHP along with the Mao-Khrushchev transcript noted above.]
his hand and said, “You’ve talked a long time but have still not gotten to the point.”

Shocked and embarrassed, Khrushchev is said by a Chinese witness to have mumbled, “Yes, don’t worry, I will continue,” and then blamed Yudin for not making things clear. Later, when Khrushchev explained his hope to build “a common fleet” to contend with America’s 7th fleet, Mao is said to have “banged his large hands against the sofa, and stood up angrily. His face turned red and his breath turned heavy. He used his finger to point impolitely at Khrushchev’s nose: ‘I asked you what a common fleet is. You still didn’t answer me.’”

By this time, Khrushchev’s lips were pursed and white with strain, while his small, bright eyes flared with anger. But he swallowed hard, and as if in answer to Mao’s pointing finger, spread out his arms. “I don’t understand why you are acting like this,” he said. “We came here just to discuss things together.”

“What does it mean to ‘discuss things together?’” Mao demanded. “Do we still have our sovereignty or don’t we? Do you want to take away all our coastal areas?” Tracing the shape of the Chinese coastline in the air with his finger, Mao added sarcastically, “Why don’t you take the whole Chinese seacoast?”

Struggling to stay calm, Khrushchev shifted to the subject of refueling stops and shore leaves for Soviet submarines at Chinese ports. But Mao rejected the idea out of hand and continued to do so even after Khrushchev noted how NATO countries mounted just such cooperation, and sweetened the pie by offering access the Chinese access to Soviet arctic ports in return.

“We aren’t interested,” replied Mao, looking at Khrushchev as if (re-)calls the Chinese witness) the Soviet leader “were a kid trying to do a trick in front of an adult.” Moreover, when Khrushchev’s face turned red with anger, Mao seemed positively pleased. “We don’t want to use your Murmansk, and we don’t want you to come to our country either.” After that he offered a further lecture as if to a particularly dense student: “The British, Japanese, and other foreigners who stayed in our country for a long time have already been driven away by us, Comrade Khrushchev. I’ll repeat it again. We do not want anyone to use our land to achieve their own purposes anymore.”

During the next day’s discussions beside the pool Mao invited Khrushchev for a swim. Since the Soviet leader couldn’t swim very well, he at first spluttered about in the shallow area, then clambered out with the help of attendants, and finally re-entered the pool with an inner tube. As for Mao, he watched Khrushchev’s clumsy efforts with obvious enjoyment, and then dove into the deep end and swam back and forth using several different strokes. For his next trick, Mao demonstrated his skill at floating and treading water, and then, highly satisfied with himself, he swam over to Khrushchev and struck up a conversation in what a Chinese onlooker called “a relaxed, friendly and open atmosphere.”

After all, Dr. Li continues, “the Chairman was deliberately playing the role of emperor, treating Khrushchev like the barbarian come to pay tribute. It was a way, Mao told me on the way back to Beidaihe, of ‘sticking a needle up his ass.’

To make matters worse, the substantive talks went badly. Moreover, Khrushchev’s trip was followed by Beijing’s shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy [Jinmen] and Matsu [Mazu], undertaken without warning Moscow, and in order, says Dr. Li, “to demonstrate to both Khrushchev and Eisenhower that [Mao] could not be controlled, and to undermine Khrushchev in his new quest for peace.” Or as Mao himself put it, “The islands are two batons that keep Khrushchev and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this way and that. Don’t you see how wonderful they are?”

In the late summer of 1959, with an explosion building in Sino-Soviet relations, Khrushchev made his third and last trip to Beijing. Behind a facade of politeness, a series of heated clashes made even the tense 1958 talks appear warm and friendly in comparison. Khrushchev’s infatuation with America, which he had just visited, was bad enough in Chinese eyes. His request that the Chinese release two American pilots who had parachuted into Northern China during and after the Korea War, and that they accommodate the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, whose strong “neutralist” and “anti-imperialist” positions were all-important to the socialist camp, enraged the Chinese.

At one point in the talks, Khrushchev charged that the Chinese hadn’t consulted Moscow before shelling Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. When Chen Yi counter-attacked, he provoked Khrushchev to a fury. His face turning bright red, Khrushchev shouted at Chen, “You may be a marshal in the army, and I a lieutenant general. But I am the First Secretary of the CPSU, and you are offending me.”

“You are the General Secretary, all right,” Chen responded. “But when you are right I listen to you, and when you are wrong I will certainly refute you.”

At this, Khrushchev looked at Mao, spread his arms widely, and complained that he and his delegation were badly outnumbered in a meeting with the Chinese political bureau. “How many people do you have and how many do I have? The negotiation is unfair and unequal.”

Mao smiled, recalls his interpreter, paused, and then began speaking slowly and in a low voice: “I have listened to you for a long time. You have accused us of quite a lot. You say we...did not unite with Nehru, that we shouldn’t have shelled Jinmen, that the Great Leap was wrong, that we brag about ourselves as orthodox Marxists. Therefore I have an accusation for you, too—that you are guilty of ‘right opportunism.’”

The talks ended abruptly and unhappily. In Vladivostok, where Khrushchev stopped on the way home, he looked depressed and withdrawn. Part of the problem was sheer exhaustion after trips to both the United States and China. But what was also showing in Khrushchev’s face was his frustration and rage with Chairman Mao.

The next summer, Khrushchev attacked Mao by name and was attacked in turn by Peng Chen in a fiery clash at
a Romanian Party Congress in Bucharest. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet leader decided to withdraw all Soviet advisors from China immediately, and to terminate all important contracts and projects. According to the Chinese, Moscow withdrew 1,390 experts, tore up 343 contracts, and scrapped 257 cooperative projects in science and technology, “all within the short span of a month.”15 The immediate effects were substantial; the longer-run result was to politicize trade by adding to the long list of issues over which the two sides were now in conflict.16 Now it was but a matter of time until a full and final rupture took place in the summer of 1963, featuring an exchange of public broadsides in which both Khrushchev and Mao came in for violent personal attacks.

With these highlights (or lowlights) of the dispute in mind, let’s return to certain personal characteristics of Khrushchev that help to explain his allergic reaction to Mao.

One such trait was a combination of vaunting ambition and an extraordinarily low level of culture. Just as important was a persistent sense of inadequacy centered around his lack of education and refinement. Khrushchev’s remarkable rise slaked both his ambition and his shaky sense of self-esteem. But with ever greater power and fame came more responsibility in areas about which he knew nothing, and over which he had little control. Under such circumstances there were bound to be failures, but with them came increased doubts about his own capacities, thus aggravating a moodiness, impulsiveness, and hyper-sensitivity to slight that had been there all along but were usually covered by gregariousness and extraversion.

Increasingly during his long career, Khrushchev reacted with hostility to actual or implied criticism (especially from better educated and more cultured intelligentsia types), going so far in some cases as to pursue what amounted to vendettas against his antagonists. Moreover, one round of failure led to another to which he reacted badly as well. None of this cycle, I hasten to add, can be isolated from troubles inherent in the Soviet system, and in any effort...
(of the sort Khrushchev, and later Gorbachev, mounted) to reform it. But neither can they be separated from the personal deterioration that Khrushchev (and Gorbachev, too?) underwent as the world they tried so hard to improve unravelled around them. The fact that Khrushchev’s Kremlin colleagues, who eventually ousted him, held his mishandling of relations with Mao against him, and that in part, they were correct to do so, underscores both Khrushchev’s self-destructiveness, and its impact on overall Sino-Soviet relations.

In the beginning of his decade in power, Khrushchev attached a very high priority to consolidating the relations with Beijing that he believed Stalin had put at risk. Khrushchev condemned Stalin for condescending to Mao, for regarding the Chinese leader as a kind of “cave-man Marxist,” and for manifesting “a kind of haughty arrogance” during the latter’s visit to Moscow in 1949-50. Khrushchev launched his own relationship with Mao with the feeling that he should, and would do much better by the Chinese leader than Stalin had done. But instead of evoking Mao’s gratitude and respect, the Chinese leader seemed to be condescending to him. Not only was such lack of fealty a problem in larger ideological and political terms, it grated irritably on Khrushchev’s uneasy self of superiority over the upstart Chinese. All the more devastating then that the upshot of Mao’s treatment of him was to make Khrushchev himself feel inferior.

Both in 1954 and during their later meetings, Mao’s negotiating methods suggested to Khrushchev that the Chinese leader was playing him for a fool. Yet that was precisely the sort of image which Khrushchev could not abide, particularly because he had been forced to trade on it for so long to survive Stalin’s terrible suspiciousness toward his top lieutenants.

As one who prided himself on taking the measure of his interlocutors, Khrushchev was particularly annoyed that he couldn’t figure Mao out. When Mao tried to convince him that the USSR should respond to an American attack by retreating beyond the Urals and holding out until the Chinese entered the war, Khrushchev was not only appalled by the idea itself, he was upset that he couldn’t tell whether the Chinese leader was being serious.

“I looked at him closely,” Khrushchev recalls. “I couldn’t tell from his face whether he was joking or not.” Later, when he better understood Mao’s bluster about standing up to the United States even at the risk of nuclear war, Khrushchev decided that “Mao obviously regarded me as a coward.”

Given his chip-on-the-shoulder attitude toward his own Soviet intelligentsia, the last thing Khrushchev needed was to feel intimidated by Mao’s philosophical pretensions. In this context, consider the pompous way Mao alluded to Khrushchev’s mistakes and then forgave them in a speech in Moscow in 1957: “Lenin once said that there is not a single person in the world who does not make mistakes. I have made many mistakes and these mistakes have been beneficial to me and taught me a lesson. Everyone needs support. An able fellow need the support of three other people, a fence needs the support of three stakes. These are Chinese proverbs. Still another Chinese proverb says with all its beauty the lotus needs the green of its leave to set it off. You, comrade Khrushchev, even though you are a beautiful lotus, you too need leaves to set you off. I, Mao Tse-tung, while not a beautiful lotus, also need leaves to set me off. Still another Chinese proverb says three cobbler with their wits combined equal Zhuge Liang, the master mind. This corresponds to comrade Khrushchev’s slogan—collective leadership.”

Even with a perfect translation into Russian, it wasn’t clear whether Mao’s words were a compliment. At this stage of their relationship, Mao’s sin wasn’t a direct personal challenge, but rather his maddening inscrutability.

Knowing Khrushchev’s aversion to being criticized, one can imagine the effort it took to contain himself in the face of Mao’s attacks. Ever since 1954 he had gone out of his way to give the Chinese almost everything they wanted. Khrushchev later claimed that he took Mao’s 1958 sallies equably and even self-critically, since he understood how the Soviet request for radio stations on Chinese territory could rub the Chinese the wrong way. But that claim reveals more about his desire to be seen by history as mature and statesman-like than about his actual mood at the time.

Khrushchev claims he wasn’t intimidated by Mao’s swimming prowess: “Of course, I couldn’t compete with Mao in the pool—as everyone knows, he’s since set a world record for both speed and distance. I’m a poor swimmer and I’m ready to take my hat off to Mao when it comes to swimming.” But if he didn’t acknowledge what Dr. Li calls this “insult,” surely that was because Khrushchev wouldn’t admit to being humiliated.

Khrushchev’s withdrawal of Soviet advisers was as self-defeating as it was crude and precipitous. The adverse economic impact affected both sides. Moreover, Moscow lost the chance to exert influence, and to derive invaluable intelligence from advisers in China. The then Soviet Ambassador in China, Stepan Chervonenko, recalls he was “amazed” at news of the withdrawal, and took steps to try to prevent it. “We sent a telegram to Moscow. We said the move would be a violation of international law. If our help to the Chinese must end, then at least let the advisers stay until their contracts were up. We hoped that in the meantime, things would get patched at the top.”

Nor was Chervonenko the only Soviet official appalled by Khrushchev’s action. Leonid Brezhnev’s former aide, Aleksandrov-Agentov later traced the beginning of “internal split between the leader [Khrushchev] and his own associates” to a series of “impulsive foreign policy measures that damaged our own state interests. All you have to remember is the unexpected pull-out from China of not only of our military but also economic advisers—all in spite of existing agreements and contracts. Why? Because of the ideological argument and the rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao...”

The withdrawal of advisers reflects...
particularly vividly the role of Khrushchev’s personality. Would any other Soviet leader have acted so rashly? Several times Khrushchev described Mao and the environment around him as “Asiatic,” referring especially to the Chinese leader’s reliance on “flattery and insidiousness.” Describing politics as “a game,” Khrushchev confessed his continuing frustration at the way Mao played it. “I believed him,” the Soviet leader complained at one point, but “he was simply playing.”

When Mao boasted about Chinese uniqueness, recalls Khrushchev, “I was jolted by all that bragging.” The true believing internationalist in Khrushchev was offended by Mao’s “nationalism and chauvinism.” But since no one was a bigger booster than Khrushchev himself, surely there is an element of projection in criticizing Mao for sins Khrushchev shared. Likewise when he charges that Mao’s “putting his own person first created friction, and even more than friction in relations between our two countries.”

Granted, then, that the Sino-Soviet dispute was personal as well as political, and that Khrushchev let himself be provoked by Mao for the sorts of reasons I have cited. To fill out the picture further, we would need to know why Mao reacted to so negatively to Khrushchev. What was it about Khrushchev personally that Mao found so irritating? Did Mao deliberately go out of his way to provoke his Soviet counterpart? Or was he unaware of how Khrushchev perceived and reacted to him? Did aides of either or both leaders play on their bosses’ sensitivities, either knowingly or unknowingly, so as intensify the antagonism between them? Or were they adept enough at outraging each other all by themselves?

Documents from still-closed Chinese archives, as well as additional materials from Russian archives, and not only memoir accounts, valuable as they may be, will be needed to address these and many other aspects of the Mao-Khrushchev relationship.

2. Ibid., 80.
7. Ibid., 220-224.
10. Quan, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu; Tracy B. Strong and Helene Keyssar, “Anna Louise Strong: Three Interviews with Chairman Mao Zedong,” China Quarterly 103 (September 1985), 503.
11. Quan, Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu, 126-128.
12. Li, Private Life, 261
13. Ibid.
14. Li Yueren, Waijiawo wutang de xin Zhongguo lingxiu (New China’s leaders on the diplomatic stage”) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chuban she, 1989), 182-183.
22. Ibid., p. 259.
23. Interview with Stepan Chervonenko, Moscow, 1993.
26. Ibid., 70, 80.

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SUSLOV ON MAO

cannot accept that even our friends talk to us down their nose [svisoka razgovarivali s namii]; later, after calling the discussions ultimately “quite useful,” Suslov noted.

One should not omit the fact that the aforementioned mistakes and shortcomings in the field of domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party of China are largely explained by the atmosphere of the cult of personality of com. Mao Zedong. Formally the CC of the Communist Party of China observes the norms of collective leadership, but in effect crucial decisions are made single-handedly, and thus are often touched by subjectivism, and in some instances are simply not well thought through. Glorification of com. Mao Zedong is visibly on the rise in China. In the press party one can increasingly find such statements that “we, the Chinese, live in the great epoch of Mao Zedong,” comrade Mao Zedong is portrayed as a great genius. They call him the beacon illuminating the path to communism, the embodiment of communist ideas. One equates the name of com. Mao Zedong with the party, etc. One presents the works of com. Mao Zedong in China as the last word of creative Marxism, of the same rank as the works of the classics [klassiki] of Marxism-Leninism. In effect, the works of com. Mao Zedong are put in the foundation of all educational work in the party and in the country. Even in PRC’s colleges and universities the teaching of social sciences during the last two-three years has been reduced to the study of Mao’s works. All this, unfortunately, pleases [imponiruiet] com. Mao Zedong, who, by all accounts, himself has come to believe in his own infallibility. This reminds of the atmosphere that existed in our country during the last years of life of I.V. Stalin. Of course, we could not talk with the Chinese comrades about it, but the Ple num should be aware of this, yet another aspect in the life of the Communist Party of China....

[Source: Excerpted from Suslov draft report to CC CPSU Plenum, 18 December 1959, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, listy 56-91; document provided and translated by V. M. Zubok.]
ment in June 1949 formalized the PRC’s foreign policy framework, essentially establishing the “new China” as the Soviet Union’s junior partner. Although never happy with such a relationship, Mao and his comrades believed that it had been necessary in order to promote China’s economic reconstruction, safeguard the nation’s security interests, and create momentum for the continuation of the Chinese revolution after its nationwide victory. The situation began to change, however, after Stalin’s death in March 1953, and especially after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Mao and his comrades increasingly believed that it was the CCP, not the CPSU, which should play the central role in the international communist movement. This growing sense of China’s superiority, which, in a historical-cultural sense, had a profound origin in the age-old “Middle Kingdom” mentality, combined with many other more specific problems (of the sort usually present in any alliance relationship) to create a widening rift between the Chinese and Soviet leaders. During Khrushchev’s visit to China in September-October 1959, the potential tension that had long accumulated between Beijing and Moscow exploded. Indeed, during a long meeting between Khrushchev and Mao and other Chinese leaders on 2 October 1959, the two sides emotionally criticized the other’s domestic and international policies, demonstrating that the Sino-Soviet alliance was facing a real crisis.4

The Soviet note recalling all Soviet experts from China further intensified the crisis. Beijing could see in it nothing but Moscow’s evil intention of imposing new “inequalities” upon them. This became particularly true when Moscow, according to Chinese sources, turned down Beijing’s request that the Soviet experts, at least some of them, should stay in China until they had fulfilled their assigned tasks.5 These developments virtually destroyed the foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Mao would take the Soviet withdrawal of experts from China as strong evidence to claim that Beijing’s struggle against Moscow was not just one for true communism but also one for China’s sovereignty and national integrity. Khrushchev and other leaders in Moscow seemed also determined to meet Beijing’s challenge to the Soviet Union’s position as the indisputable leader of the international movement.6 In retrospect, the Soviet decision of July 1960 can be interpreted as a crucial step toward the complete breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 18 July 1960

Strictly confidential

The Embassy of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics in the People’s Republic of China has been instructed to inform the Government of the People’s Republic of China of the following:

In strict observation of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PR of China, the Soviet Government sends, in compliance with the request of the Chinese Government, a considerable number of experts to work in China. For this purpose, the Soviet organizations have selected the best and most experienced experts, often bringing disadvantages to the national economy of the USSR. By taking part in the socialist construction of the PR of China, the Soviet experts consider their activities as fulfilling their brotherly international obligations towards the friendly Chinese people. All the while, the Soviet people staying in the PR of China, in true observance of the instructions they have received, refrain from any statements or actions that could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the PR of China or as criticism of this or that aspect of the domestic or foreign policy of the Communist Party of China or the Government of the PR of China.

During the visit of Soviet leaders to the PR of China at the beginning of August 1958, the Chinese side expressed their dissatisfaction with some of the Soviet experts and advisors. This could be understood as a reproach directed at the Soviet Union. It is, however, well known that the Soviet Union had never forced its specialists and advisors on anyone. Already at the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957, the Soviet Govern-
of this anthology, which, as it was known, contained anti-Leninist theses to which the Soviet people cannot give their agreement.

The deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Yang Zhengwu, and the head of the Propaganda Department of the General Political Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Fu Zhong, both used a consultation meeting attended by a group of Soviet military experts to propagate their views on questions about war and peace, as well as an assessment of the current international situation, that are incorrect, faulty and in contradiction to the basic theses of the [November] 1957 Moscow Declaration of fraternal [communist] parties. There exist also a whole series of other cases in which leading officials of Chinese institutions and enterprises endeavor to draw Soviet specialists into discussions, to put them under pressure, and to influence them by suggesting to them viewpoints quite different from the positions of the CPSU.

The Soviet experts working in the PR of China consider such activities on the part of the Chinese authorities as open disrespect of themselves and of their work, as activities intolerable in relations between socialist countries, and, in fact, as an open agitation against the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

The Soviet experts, taking into their consideration a variety of facts, have been compelled to conclude that they no longer have the trust of the Chinese side they need in order to fulfill the tasks put before them, not to mention the respect these experts have earned by providing assistance to the Chinese people for [China’s] economic and cultural development and military build-up. There exist several cases in which the opinions of the Soviet experts were grossly ignored, or in which there openly existed no wish [on the part of the Chinese] to take their recommendations into consideration, despite the fact that these recommendations were based upon the well-founded knowledge and rich experiences of these experts. This even went so far that the documents prepared by the Soviet experts, which included respective recommendations and technical rules, were demonstratively burned.

This information leads to the conclusion that the Soviet experts in the PR of China are being deprived of the opportunity to fulfill their useful functions and to contribute their knowledge and experiences to the fullest degree. They are practically put into such a situation that their selfless work is not being appreciated, and that they are encountering ingratitude from the Chinese side.

In view of these facts it is difficult not to believe the information provided by some [of our] experts indicating that they are being spied on. The meaning of these measures is at a minimum incomprehensible to the Soviet people who came to the PR of China with the deeply felt desire to help the Chinese people in building socialism.

Of course, all of this hurts the feeling of the Soviet experts and, even more so, it has caused such a just indignation that they, due to the fact that they are being denied the trust they need, are forced to present to the Soviet Government the request that they be allowed to return to their motherland.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare that the afore-mentioned actions on the part of the Chinese side are unfriendly towards the Soviet Union. They are in contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PR of China, according to which both sides have committed themselves, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual interests, to developing and consolidating the economic and cultural relations between them. Such activities on the part of the Chinese side make it practically impossible for the Soviet experts to continue to stay in the PR of China.

The Embassy is instructed to inform the Government of the PR of China that the Soviet experts and advisors, including the military, will be, in accordance with their own wishes, recalled to their motherland. While coming to this decision, the Soviet side has also taken into consideration the fact that the Government of the PR of China itself, in the past, has raised the question of ordering a number of Soviet experts working in the PR of China to return to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the PR of China will understand correctly the causes that have led to this decision.

[Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR” im Bundesarchiv. J IV 2/202/280. Translation from Russian: Dieter Heinzig and Anna Eckner. The copy of the Russian note is not dated but known from other sources.]

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CULTURAL REVOLUTION ARCHIVE ESTABLISHED

The following item appeared in the China News Digest of 26 November 1996; it was posted on H-Asia by Yi-Li Wu, a doctoral candidate in the History Department at Yale University, and brought to CWIHP’s attention by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research at the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo:

Documents of Cultural Revolution Moved to Archive

After nearly 37,000 documents, tape recordings, and exhibits of the Cultural Revolution era from 47 government ministries were moved to a new central Cultural Revolution archive in east Beijing, archivists said Tuesday that scores of them are either incomplete or in poor condition, United Press International reports from Beijing. A worker at the Beijing Municipal Government Archive said: “One of the biggest problems is there are no indices for the information and there is no way of knowing what is and isn’t there.”

Many of the documents were issued by the late Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The new archive will not be open to the public or academics, and government archivists will spend a year or so studying the materials and indexing them in the hope of finding what is missing. They will also attempt to search for more documents although some concede that many of the most sensitive documents will never resurface.”

Vic CHIN, YIN De An


[2] Khrushchev mentioned in the letter that as of August 1958, there were about 1,500 Soviet experts in China.

[3] The Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece, Hongqi (Red Flag) published this article in its April 1960 issue. It summarized the CCP’s viewpoints on international issues and the correct orientation of the international communist movement.

[4] For an internal Soviet account of Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing, see M. A. Suslov’s report to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 18 December 1959, contained in the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhISD), and excerpted in this issue of the Bulletin.


[6] In this regard, it is revealing that the Soviet note is found in the East German archives, a clear indication that Moscow was spreading its version of events to reassert its leadership role in the movement.

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The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives

by M.Y. Prozumenschikov

The year 1962 was marked by a further intensification of the discord between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and, correspondingly, between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s refusal to stay within the boundaries defined by Moscow, which was especially marked after the 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, caused serious anxiety among Soviet officials who frequently spoke of the CCP leadership’s deviation “from the generally fraternal countries and parties” and described Beijing’s authorities as seeking “to more widely bring into the open their disagreements [with us], both in theory and in practice.”

In the international arena, these disagreements touched on a wide circle of problems, including questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, evaluations of the character of the contemporary period, and others. Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, who was trying (albeit inconsistently) to conduct a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, could hardly agree with the declarations coming from Beijing to the effect that the aspiration “to achieve peace without wars is sheer nonsense,” that imperialism “will never fall if it isn’t pushed,” and which characterized the atom bomb as a “paper tiger.” Moscow reacted especially sensitively to Beijing’s efforts to depreciate the role of the socialist countries and the international communist movement, having declared the decisive factor of the development of human society in the contemporary epoch to be the national liberation movements of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the USSR it was feared, not without reason, that one reason why the “wind from the East had come to prevail over the wind from the West,” was the PRC’s desire to strengthen its influence in the “third world,” in the process squeezing the Soviet Union out.

Until the fall of 1962, however, both countries succeeded in preserving a semblance of outward unity: the “cracks” in the Soviet–Chinese “monolith” were already apparent to the naked eye, yet it was still not clear whether they were leading to an outright schism. The events of October 1962, when new clashes on the Sino–Indian border and the Caribbean Crisis (Cuban Missile Crisis) broke out practically simultaneously, constitute a turning point in the development of Sino–Soviet relations and signified the beginning of the open split between the two countries.

This article does not attempt to illuminate the causes or recount the courses of the border conflict or the Cuban crisis, but rather, on the basis of archival documents in the former Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU stored in the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in Moscow, to analyze the influence of these dual conflicts in the fall of 1962 on Sino–Soviet relations.

Armed conflicts on the Sino-Indian border first occurred in August 1959 and already caused at that time a mutual lack of understanding between the PRC and USSR. Moscow, having supported Beijing during the suppression of the uprising in Tibet in early 1959, refused to stand so unequivocally on China’s side in the border incident. Soviet leaders believed that in many ways the flare-up was provoked by the Chinese themselves, in order to demonstrate in practice their refusal to accept the McMahon line (a 1914 boundary agreed on by British and Tibetan officials which Indian accepted as the correct Sino-Indian frontier) as the state border between the PRC and India. Moscow clarified its stance in a September 1959 TASS statement calling on both warring sides to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. The fact that the USSR did not take a clear “class” position in a conflict between a socialist state and a bourgeois state provoked indignation in China. In a 13 September 1959 letter to the CC CPSU, the CC CCP accused the Soviet government (although in a veiled form) of “accommodation and compromise on important matters of principle” and noted that “the TASS statement showed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union in regard to the incident on the Indian–Chinese border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie and the American and English imperialists, who are in every way possible driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.”

The border conflict placed the USSR in a complicated position for a number of reasons. First of all, Mao Zedong persistently tried to confer on this conflict the character of an important question of the class struggle on an international scale and, accordingly, sought support for their actions from all “fraternal” parties. This did not at all correspond to Khrushchev’s views, neither in principle nor in the specific concrete case; while the Soviet leader earnestly desired to preserve good relations with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, for Mao Nehru was “half man, half devil” and the task of communists was to “wash off his face so that it won’t be frightening, like a devil’s.”

Secondly, the Soviet Union could not act as a peacemaker between socialist China and bourgeois India without violating the principles of proletarian internationalism. Not wishing simply to embrace the Chinese position in the border dispute, the USSR remained deaf to numerous Indian requests to act as a mediator. In this question, Moscow displayed extreme caution; the CC CPSU, for example, categorically rejected a proposal of the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Acad...
Threatening the outbreak of new armed conflict. From time to time Moscow cautiously attempted to influence Beijing to take a more moderate position and agree to compromise with India. At that time, Soviet officials believed that such a change in China’s approach could occur only “as a result of review by the leaders of the PRC of their foreign policy conceptions as a whole,” but this “in the near future is extremely problematic.”

In contrast to the diplomats, Khrushchev, displeased by the Mao’s refusal to heed Moscow’s advice, stated in a much sharper way that when he converses with Mao, when he listens to him, he gets the impression that he is speaking with Stalin, is listening to Stalin.

From their part, the Chinese persistently told Soviet representatives that resolving the border dispute required influencing India, not the PRC; that “Nehru is the central figure in the anti-Chinese campaign in India, that he does not in any case want to resolve the question of the Sino-Indian border, even in some fixed period.” Moscow listened to these statements in silence, leaving them without commentary.

Concurrently with the Sino-Indian border conflict, Soviet and Chinese attention was drawn to events in the Western hemisphere, where in 1959 the Cuban revolution triumphed. The chance to spread their respective understandings of Marxism among the Cuban revolutionaries sparked a lively competition between the two communist giants for ideological influence in Cuba.

Initially, Moscow seized the leadership in this “contest for Cuba,” which was in many ways determined by Soviet military and economic aid to Havana. By contrast, although Chinese leaders welcomed the Cuban revolution, if they took a wait-and-see approach with regard to its leader Fidel Castro, in part to preserve diplomatic communications with Taiwan via Cuba. In this regard, noted Soviet representatives in China, who closely monitored the development of Chinese-Cuban relations, in its propaganda during this early period the CCP leadership made no attempt to counterpose their policy toward Cuba to that of the CPSU.

The situation changed after Beijing and Havana established diplomatic relations in September 1960; now the PRC began actively to invite envoys from the “island of freedom” and recruit from them advocates of their own course.

Considering that the Chinese revolutionaries’ militant language in many respects echoed the Cubans’, Moscow tried by all means to lessen Chinese influence. These efforts did not go to waste. During a visit to China at the end of 1960, Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara in a joint Chinese–Cuban communiqué expressed approval of the PRC policy of “three red banners”; but one year later, Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos, in a visit to the PRC, did not once touch on this question despite considerable Chinese efforts.

In Cuba itself, authorities generally tried to minimize the disagreements that had arisen in the communist world. Havana even specially appealed to Moscow and Beijing with a request not to publish anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese materials in TASS and Xinhua bulletins distributed in Cuba, for this could, the Cuban leadership feared, damage the unity of the Cuban people and create additional political difficulties within the country. The Cuban press carefully “filtered” all statements by Chinese leaders critical of Soviet policy (in particular, most newspapers excised such remarks from the speech of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai at the CPSU 22nd congress); at the same time the Cubans politely but firmly suppressed Soviet attempts to distribute literature in Cuba that enunciated Moscow’s point of view on the dispute.

Both the Soviet Union and China naturally counted on extracting advantages from the “special relations” they hoped to establish with Cuba. However, if Beijing embarked on a path of propagandistic expansion through Cuba onto the Latin American continent, then in the USSR a plan took shape to use the island as an unsinkable nuclear base near the shores of the USA. Khrushchev preferred not to let Mao Zedong know about this plan, not only because of the existing disagreements, but also, perhaps, out of a wish to reap future laurels himself and at the same time to strengthen the Soviet position in the
“third world.” This desire might account for the thoroughness and satisfaction with which the CC CPSU apparatus collected the enthusiastic reactions from the developing countries to the TASS report of 11 September 1962 vowing that the USSR would protect Cuba against U.S. aggression. In China, despite the fact that this report fit Beijing’s propaganda style, only 32 lines were allotted to it in the periodical press.

The CC CCCP 10th Plenum, which took place in the fall of 1962, strengthened anti-Soviet moods in Beijing. On October 12, Chinese leaders stated that the conclusion of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty (which Khrushchev supported), would further the interests only of the USA, which was trying “to bind China by the hands and feet” in the development of its own nuclear arsenal.\(^{17}\) An October 20 memorandum from the PRC government to the USSR government on the nonproliferation question, distributed also to representatives of other socialist countries, declared: “However strong the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, it is not able to solve the defense issue of all the socialist nations. For example, on the question of the defense by the Chinese of their borders with India, the Soviet side played just the opposite role.”\(^{18}\) A similar announcement explained that the military conflict on the Sino-Indian border, which was again flaring in autumn 1962, had not only failed to move the Soviet Union to change its fundamental position but also, from the Chinese perspective, caused Moscow to become even more pro-Indian, since prior to these events it had given India the military helicopters and transport planes, which took part in the border clashes.

In October 1962, Beijing made a last attempt to compel Moscow to take a “class position” on China’s border dispute with India and “to teach certain comrades to separate truth from untruth.”\(^{19}\) On October 15, *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily) assistant editor Chen Tsejun organized in the newspaper’s editorial office a meeting with foreign correspondents, which was intended, according to the opinion of the Soviet journalists who were present, “to demonstrake the seriousness of the situation on the Indian–Chinese border,” and to urge “the press organs of the fraternal parties to come forward on the given question with accounts of the Chinese side’s positions.”\(^{20}\) A week later, Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, as he reported to Moscow, spoke on this very question with PRC Vice–Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu, and “emphatically declared to Zhang Hanfu that it was necessary to understand who was right and who was not right [in the border conflicts]. It would be incorrect not to distinguish between those who were guilty and those who were not guilty. It would likewise not be right to blur the distinction between the guilty and the innocent.”\(^{21}\) Such an answer could not be reassuring to Beijing. Chervonenko also mentioned certain problems which were raised by Zhang Hanfu and which evidently were connected “with the aggravation of the situation on the Sino-Indian border, in light of the fact that the Chinese leadership expected different reactions on the part of the Soviet leadership.”\(^{22}\)

One must also note that at first, the Soviet leadership, preoccupied with Cuban affairs, did not pay particular attention to the renewed aggravation of tensions on the Sino-Indian frontier. The documents relating to events on the border, which various organs of the CC CPSU issued during this period, did not, as a rule, go further than the International Department of the Central Committee, and they were labeled: “Informational Material. To the archive.”

The lack of upper-level Soviet engagement on the border conflict was reflected in Soviet newspaper articles which gave stingy information and, moreover, did not appear in prominent locations. The same lack of top level leadership manifested itself in the conversations of Soviet officials with foreign representatives, in which the Soviets reiterated the old thesis about the need to prevent world conflict.

The situation changed on October 22, when the speech of U.S. President John F. Kennedy effectively put a tough choice before Khrushchev: conflict, with likely use of nuclear weapons, or retreat. The first scenario threatened the whole world with catastrophe, the second was acutely painful for the USSR and its leader. Searching for a way out, Moscow, in the midst of everything, turned its attention to Beijing. The experience of recent years made it possible for Khrushchev to hope that, at this critical moment in the battle with international imperialism, China would at least momentarily “close its eyes” to the discord and steadfastly support any Soviet action. That had occurred (at least on the surface) in 1956 during the crises in Hungary and Poland, and in 1961 during the Berlin crisis.\(^{23}\) For his part, Khrushchev was ready to compromise with Mao on a whole series of issues, including the Sino-Indian conflict.

On October 25, with war with the United States potentially imminent, the newspaper *Pravda* published a front-page article, which had been approved by the CC CPSU, essentially rejecting the position that Moscow had maintained during the course of the whole Sino-Indian border conflict. The article called the McMahon line, which New Delhi accepted, “notorious,” “the result of British imperialism,” and consequently legally invalid. Moreover, having made this assertion on the eve of the execution of Chinese plans to settle the conflict, *Pravda* also accused India of being incited by imperialists and being the main ringleaders of the conflict and charged that the CPI was sliding toward chauvinism to the detriment of proletarian internationalism.\(^{24}\)

Moscow’s unexpected and abrupt reversal—clearly intended as a gesture to shore up all the but moribund Sino-Soviet alliance in the event of war with the West—provoked a sharp reaction, but not exactly the one that the Soviet leadership had expected. From the documents at TsKhSD, it is clear that the article came as a bombshell, especially in India. Nehru declared that he was very pained by the article, which caused significant damage to India’s friendship with the USSR.\(^{25}\) Even more severe embarrassment arose in the CPI; one party leader, Shripad Amrit Dange, sent the CC CPSU a telegram requesting that it take at least some action to repudiate some of the article’s statements. Very familiar with the sys-
tem, under which the representatives of the other fraternal nations and parties usually followed the Soviet position, unwaveringly supporting the Kremlin. Dange begged Moscow “to stop all the fraternal parties so that they would not write in their newspapers about the McMahon line, things which were similar to that which they would otherwise write.” The telegram went unanswered. Predictably, the pro–Chinese faction of the CPI became noticeably more active, announcing triumphantly that the CPSU was finally “convinced of the folly of its ways and accepted the Chinese perspective.”

In the tangled position in which Soviet diplomats in New Delhi found themselves, they were obliged, in conversations with Indians, to speak of the complicated and confused situation, about the impossibility of defining the reality of any border, even proposing that India wait while Chinese and Indian academicians defined the precise border on the basis of archival documents. The Indians understood what was happening, inferring that the appearance of “such bad articles” in the Soviet press could only be explained “by the situation of the Cuban crisis and the threat of war.”

Soviet leaders, it seems, did not grasp the fact that during this period the disagreements between the two governments had become too strong to be surmounted with the stroke of a newspaper writer’s pen. Nor did they realize that Khrushchev’s actions in Cuba created a dream-like situation for the Chinese—ensuring a positive outcome, from their standpoint, without requiring them to modify their basic position. For if Kennedy retreated and the missiles remained on the island, it would vindicate the CCP’s militant thesis that imperialism was a “paper tiger” to which one needed to apply the principle of intensified pressure; conversely, Khrushchev’s retreat would strengthen Beijing’s slogan denouncing “contemporary revisionists,” i.e., the Soviets. Moreover, the future of Sino–Soviet relations and the situation in the Communist world as a whole depended, in large measure, on the result of the Soviet-American stand-off. If events developed according to the first scenario, Khrushchev would probably conduct relations with Washington as if with a “paper tiger,” a development which Beijing could interpret as strengthening the correctness of the Chinese line. The second possibility would lead to a final split, between the USSR and China, and the anti-Soviet mood would intensify.

In the end an understanding of the lethal danger of nuclear conflict compelled Khrushchev to retreat. Although the Soviet Union understood that their leader lacked the absolute power over his allies in the communist camp to represent the defeat as a “victory in the name of peace,” nonetheless, the USSR did not expect the violent reaction to Khrushchev’s agreement to withdraw the missiles which was to come from Beijing.

As soon as the news of Khrushchev’s retreat reached them, the Chinese authorities put their propaganda machine to work at full throttle; newspapers displayed discussions about the situation in the Caribbean, the cities were covered in slogans in support of Cuba, and the speeches that Castro had given on Cuban television explaining the basic disagreements between the Cuban and the Soviet leaders actually became bestsellers in China at that time. Soviet diplomats in Beijing disconsolately reported that events on the Sino-Indian border, to which Chinese propaganda up until that time had been devoted most of its attention, had been swept aside and lost in this midst of the uproar over Cuba. Only now, after the Soviet concession had ended the crisis, came the rallies the Soviet leaders had desired in its first days, featuring appearances and speeches by the up-

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
per–level Chinese leadership: Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et al.35 The political campaign culminated with elaborately orchestrated mass demonstrations of solidarity at the Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took place non–stop from the 3rd to the 6th of November and in which, the Chinese media reported, more than five million people participated.37

Soviet officials well understood the ulterior motive behind these mass demonstrations. While under the ostensible slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they sharply criticized those “who were frightened in the face of imperial aggression,” who “bartered with the freedom and independence of another people,” and so on.38 However, at that moment Moscow was not up to a clarification of relations with China; rather, it sought at any price to get out of the conflict with minimal losses. In fact, in November 1962, Moscow switched roles with Beijing; if during the Sino-Indian border clashes China unsuccessfully appealed for the support of the Soviet Union, now the USSR faced the analogous response from the PRC. During this period, the Soviet ambassador repeatedly tried to secure a meeting directly with Mao, who cited various reasons for avoiding a personal encounter, instead sending much lower–ranking officials. The Soviet Embassy knew full well that during these very days, when Chinese officials asserted that Mao was feeling indisposed and could not receive the Soviet ambassador, the PRC leader was seeing party delegations and representatives of other states.39 All this amounted to a clear demonstration of the poor relations between the PRC and USSR.

Moscow might have put up with Beijing simply taking a neutral position. However, the PRC decided to exploit the Cuban crisis to explain to “certain comrades that under no conditions it is permissible to trade in the liberty and rights” of other states.40 The PRC Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, speaking on November 7 in the Soviet Embassy on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the October Revolution, as Soviet diplomats later reported, lectured them in a “mentor’s tone” about the inadmissibility of any sort of “wishy-washiness” in relations with the imperialist aggressors.41 Obviously with the approval of the PRC leadership, Renmin Ribao compared the Cuba situation with the 1938 Munich Pact—e.g., charging Moscow with appeasement of imperialism.42 At that moment, a stronger accusation was difficult to imagine.

The anti–Soviet orientation of statements in China was not limited only to means of mass communication. The CC CPSU received information that in enterprises, offices and even in certain schools across China closed meetings were being held to elucidate the situation around Cuba and the role of the Soviet Union. At these meetings it was essentially stated for the first time openly, and not through hints, that the USSR was conducting a “revisionist” foreign as well as domestic policy. It was true that the responsible party workers who conducted these meetings explained that accusing the Soviet Union of revisionism out loud—like, for example, Yugoslavia—for the time being was not permitted by the tense international situation. But they let it be known that this would be a matter for the coming months. At the same time, it was said in China that the peoples of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe could not sleep at night because of fear of a nuclear conflict.

Judging by the information which flowed into the CC CPSU, one reason behind Beijing’s extreme negative reaction to Moscow’s actions was the fact that the Soviet Union had deployed missiles to Cuba without saying a word to China. Reproaches that Khrushchev had hidden important international information from his allies were heard frequently in China in those days along with unfavorable comparisons to Sino-Soviet consultations during the events in Poland, Hungary, and Laos, when the sides informed each other in a timely manner and therefore made correct decisions.43 More to the point, on this issue it was as if Moscow and Beijing had traded places: now it fell to Khrushchev to listen to the reproaches which he had only recently addressed to Mao. In autumn 1958, during the Taiwan Straits crisis, and in 1959, at the outset of military actions on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviets had sought basic operational data from Chinese authorities about the situation, but for a long time was unable to get any. In fact, the USSR didn’t even know from the beginning that military operations already were going full steam: A secret report of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing noted that in 1958 the “Chinese friends” had informed Moscow “about the political goals which are being pursued by this action [in the Taiwan straits] only after two weeks,”44 while in 1959 Moscow received China’s report about the events on the border only after “a great delay.”45 Insofar as “the recognition and stressing by the Chinese comrades of the formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the Socialist [bloc] might create in world public opinion the impression that the harsh course and the foreign policy actions of the PRC were taken upon agreement with the Soviet Union,”46 Soviet officials viewed Beijing’s behavior very negatively, and demanded that China coordinate positions in situations where the collective security of the two countries—which under the 1950 treaty creating the Sino-Soviet alliance were linked together by, inter alia, the obligation to provide military assistance to one another—was involved.47

There was great amazement in Moscow when in November 1962 the Chinese virtually repeated the old Soviet theses, declaring that the Kremlin’s poorly thought out actions in the Caribbean might have involved the Chinese people in a nuclear war against its will, since although the PRC didn’t know anything about the Soviet preparations, by the terms of the 1950 alliance treaty in the event of the outbreak of war, it would have had to enter the conflict on the USSR’s side.48

All this taken together could not but attract the attention of Moscow, which decided, as soon as the clouds over Cuba began to disperse a little, “to bring affairs to order” in the socialist house. On November 5, Pravda published a new lead article on the situation on the Sino-Indian border, which in its content sharply contrasted with its predecessor of ten days before and on
the principal issues once again returned to the USSR’s old viewpoint on that conflict, in which China did not at all appear to be the victimized side.49 The new Pravda article, however, could scarcely seriously change anything, because by then the border situation had largely stabilized and, in the opinion of diplomats from the socialist countries, both combatants were searching for a means to withdraw from the conflict with as much dignity as possible.

In its main counterattack, Moscow turned to the congresses of the Communist parties of a number of countries which took place in late 1962 and early 1963, and also to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which took place in December 1962. Those who did not support Khrushchev were declared “babblers,” “ultra-revolutionaries,” and “reckless adventurers.” In his indignation, the Soviet leader went to the point that he named as the main instigators of war not U.S. President Kennedy or West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (which at the time would have been entirely normal), but... the Albanians! And although at these congresses there was still preserved the ritual, accepted in the last few years in the Communist world, when Moscow, cursing the Albanians, really had the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new step on the path to a total split had been taken. Khrushchev, in particular, stressed that “someone taught the Albanians to pronounce vile words,” and Wu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and former Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia, speaking in his capacity as the permanent member of the CPC delegation to the Communist party congresses which were taking place during that period, was subject to well-organized filibusters.50 In its turn, the CPC responded in a series of articles in Renmin Ribao showing that the world had by no means been put on the brink of nuclear war by “babblers” and that “the juggling of nuclear weapons as the solution to international arguments” was in no way a true Marxist–Leninist position.51

Analyzing Soviet policy toward the PRC during this period, it makes sense to take into account the inconsistency and well-known impulsiveness which marked Khrushchev’s actions. Indignant at Beijing’s position during the Caribbean crisis, Khrushchev, not thinking out very well the consequences of his actions, decided to activate all the levers of pressure in order to teach the Chinese a good lesson in the newly brought to light “classics of Marxism–Leninism.”52 However, the Soviet leader still hoped to preserve a certain unity of the Communist world, viewing these disagreements with the PRC as an annoying misunderstanding which could be settled. The limits to the Soviet leadership’s readiness to trumpet its fall-out with Beijing surfaced in December 1962 when the Indians decided to take advantage of the sharpening of Sino–Soviet contradictions and began to distribute in Moscow, through its embassy, materials about the events on the Sino-Indian border. This measure was immediately nipped in the bud by the Soviet side, prompting a sharp protest by the Indian representatives.53

The Kremlin also noted the strengthening of the “intellectual ferment” generated by these disagreements inside the Communist world itself. Romania’s leaders blatantly tried to exploit the situation to distance itself from the USSR and from China.54 One alarming tendency, to Soviet officials, was the new willingness of ambassadors from Romania, Hungary, and China, in conversations with Soviet counterparts, to criticize, albeit vaguely, certain actions of the USSR, complaining that Moscow often failed to consult with its allies.55 Under these conditions, Khrushchev was obliged to call for an end to polemics between parties so that passions could subside.

This appeal did not elicit, however, a positive response in Beijing, for China’s leaders had no desire to retreat from the positions which had been won, believing that the USSR’s actions in late 1962 had conclusively unmasked Moscow’s “revisionist policy.”56 If previously Mao had likened the divergences between the two countries to the gap between one finger and the remaining nine on a person’s hands, now Chinese officials described the differences as “diverse interpretations of Marxism–Leninism.”57 Sensing that the danger of isolation inside the Communist world no longer threatened China, Beijing began to say that “if the international Communist movement collapsed, this will not cause the sky to fall down.”58 The PRC derived confidence also from the fact that if before only Albania openly and unconditionally supported China, now a whole group of Asian communist parties, including those in power, shared clearly pro-Chinese positions. Exploiting another of Khrushchev’s ill-considered steps, which in the customs of the time mobilized “progressive people in the West” to criticize China, Beijing began a propaganda counterattack against the Communist parties of France, Italy, and the USA, posing a choice to the USSR itself—to take its satellites under its protection and in this way intensify the contradictions with China, or to stay silent, creating grounds for disagreement with the Western communist parties.

The events of the end of 1962 were a borderline, beyond which the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing and the corresponding split in the Communist world began to assume an irreversible character. For the first time during the whole period of the “Cold War” under conditions of the fierce confrontation between the USSR and the USA, China not only did not support the USSR, but even dared to condemn Moscow’s actions. For the first time disagreements were widely published not on questions of secondary importance, but on the principal ideological issues. Finally, for the first time a party which had incited a revolt against the hegemony of the Kremlin did not end up in total isolation; a number of Communist parties unequivocally expressed support for her, and inside Communist parties of pro–Soviet orientation there began to appear Maoist fractions. The trumpet call of the revolution became more muffled and unclear, and Communism itself turned out to be split not only as an ideological credo, but also as a movement which carried out practical work in various countries of the world.
Note of the Editor of the Newspaper

Kremlin unconditionally supported the PRC, pro-

ferness of some of Beijing's actions, overall the

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sharpening tension on the Sino-Indian border. As

4 The anti–Chinese position in this conflict of the

op. 49, d. 536, l. 58.

49, d. 536, l. 58.

Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for

TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, l. 58.

1 Ibid., l. 64.

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The anti–Chinese position in this conflict of the

1 The anti–Chinese position in this conflict of the

IV. 26 October 1962.

2 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in China

3 Let the Chinese express their displeasure by means

of political declarations, but the true relation of

Beijing to those parties.

5 Renmin Ribao, 15, 31 December 1962.

214x571

6 Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in China

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NEW EAST-BLOC DOCUMENTS ON THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, 1959 & 1962

Editor’s note: The following three selections from Russian and East German documents exemplify the new East-bloc archival evidence that is becoming available on the triangular Sino-Indian-Soviet relations examined in M.Y. Prozumenschikov’s article above. (Unfortunately, Chinese and Indian archives on these issues are currently unavailable.)


Although at this point the Sino-Soviet split remained publicly concealed, the angry exchanges at that meeting demonstrated that bitterness between the two communist powers was reaching the boiling point. Not only did Moscow and Beijing seem split on basic approaches to issues of foreign policy (the Soviets favored a more moderate rivalry with the West, the Chinese a more militant and confrontational approach), domestic policy (the Soviets found the “Great Leap Forward” an economic disaster), and ideology (both sides clearly sought the mantle of leadership within the communist world), but a bitter personal antagonism had been revealed. Suslov (clearly reflecting Khrushchev’s views) decried the “cult of personality” around Mao Zedong, likening it to that which had surrounded Stalin, while the Chinese did little to conceal their contempt for Khrushchev.

The excerpt reproduced below concentrates on Suslov’s criticism of China’s handling of Sino-Indian relations, particularly regarding the border clashes which erupted beginning in the summer of 1959. While agreeing with Beijing’s suppression of the “counter-revolutionary rebellion” in Tibet of March 1959, which had ended in the Dalai Lama’s receiving asylum in India, Suslov condemned as misguided and damaging China’s personal invective against Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and its strategy of using the border clashes to exacerbate Sino-Indian relations and push Nehru toward the West in hopes of inciting revolution in India. Rather than furthering the cause of revolution, Suslov stated, China’s actions were damaging “progressive forces” (i.e., the Communist Party) in India, weakening China’s (and improving Washington’s) standing in Asia, and also impeding Sino-Soviet relations—for the Chinese Communist Party blamed the CPSU for not openly siding with Beijing against India. Suslov, in fact, depicted China’s actions as directed not only against India but against the USSR, for they embarrassed Khrushchev on the eve of his own long-sought summit in the United States with President Eisenhower in September 1959, just prior to the trip to Beijing. In sum, Beijing’s policy toward India was putting Soviet leaders in an impossible quandary—either to back what they saw as Mao’s ill-conceived actions to preserve an increasingly illusory Sino-Soviet alliance (at the price of undercutting Soviet efforts to improve relations with India and the West), or to take a balanced position at the risk of an open split with Mao and the Chinese.

The Suslov report was obtained for the Cold War International History Project by Vladislav M. Zubok of the National Security Archive from the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD) in Moscow. The document was located in Fond 2, a newly-opened collection of declassified transcripts and related materials of CPSU Plenums. Zubok also translated the excerpt reprinted below from Russian into English. A translation and analysis of the entire Suslov report, as well as of the transcript of the climactic 2 October 1959 Mao-Khrushchev summit meeting in Beijing, is in preparation by Mark Kramer of the Davis Center for Russian Studies (formerly the Russian Research Center) at Harvard University for future publication by the Cold War International History Project.

The second section of excerpts, drawn from Russian documents on Soviet-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962, is culled from a much larger selection of documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). They were located during research at AVP RF in June 1996 by CWIHP Director James G. Hershberg in the so-called “referentura” (reference) files for Soviet relations with India, in Fond 090 (secret fonds or collection groups begin with a zero; Fond 90 contains “non-secret” records on Soviet relations with India, though these can also be revealing). The translations from Russian were done for CWIHP by Kathryn Weathersby, who also aided in selecting the materials for translation.

The excerpts, mostly from reports from the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, were chosen to illustrate such topics as Soviet ties to the Indian Communist Party, Soviet perceptions of the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the impact of the border crisis on Soviet-Indian relations, as shown in direct communi-
The document itself was located in the archives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in East Berlin by scholars collecting materials for a volume on relations between the People’s Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic: Werner Meissner, ed., Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und China, 1949–1990: Politik-Wirtschaft-Wissenschaft-Kultur. Eine Quellen­sammlung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). The document was not included in the published volume, but was recently obtained by David Wolff, who, thanks Prof. Meissner (Hong Kong Baptist University) and his colleagues at the Free University in Berlin, Anja Feege, M. Leutner, and Tim Trampedach, for providing access to this and other documents on China from the former East German archives.

The Zhou-Zedenbal record—which made its way into the East German archives and the German language in a manner that remains unclear—was translated into English by Wolff with assistance by Christian Ostermann, Oliver Corff, and James G. Hershberg.

It should be stressed that the materials reprinted below represent only an early sampling of the types of materials that could become available for studying the complicated Sino-Indian-Soviet triangle with the opening of new archives. In coming years, CWIHP hopes to work with scholars using American, Russian, and other archives—particularly the Chinese and Indian archives, should they relax their current secrecy—to explore this important subject, involving an issue that has outlasted the Cold War. While in late November 1996, during a visit to New Delhi by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, PRC and Indian leaders signed an agreement not to use force to resolve their border dispute, the sometimes tense recent history of relations between the world’s two most populous countries clearly merits further research and study.

—James G. Hershberg


Draft

ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

[lengthy sections on bilateral questions, including criticism of China’s domestic and ideological policies omitted—ed.]

...Now let me move to some issues of foreign policy where certain differences emerged between us and the Chinese comrades.

[here followed criticisms of Beijing’s exacerbations of international tensions, Mao’s thesis that imperialists were “paper tigers” and seemingly cavalier attitude toward nuclear war, and China’s “inconsistency” handling of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 and relations with Japan—ed.]

During this spring relations between the People’s Republic of China and India have seriously deteriorated. This deterioration is linked to the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. Reactionary circles of India to some extent were probably involved in this rebellion. However, the rebellion in Tibet would not have taken place, had one implemented timely democratic reforms and appropriate measures to improve economy and culture with a view on historical specifics of Tibet, and had one been duly vigilant with regard to reactionary elements. Unfortunately, Chinese comrades also did not draw appropriate conclusions from the warnings of the CC CPSU about the activities of reactionaries aimed at the forceful separation [otriv] of Tibet from the People’s Republic of China.

Chinese comrades were correct when they put down decisively the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet. They claim with justification that the issue of Tibet is a domestic affair of the PRC. We give them full support on this. We stand against the attempts of Western powers to sever Tibet from China, to exploit the Tibetan issue for aggravation of international situation. At the
last (16th) session of the UN General Assembly the representatives of the USSR and fraternal socialist countries resolutely supported the PRC, protesting against the discussion of the so-called “Tibetan question” and other attempts to blacken the People’s China, including the one using the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The imperialist tactics aim at making the Tibetan issue a bone of contention first of all between China and India, to pit these two great Asian powers against each other, to aggravate the situation in the South-East Asia, to undermine the influence of the socialist camp, including China, in this region of the world, to weaken the positions of communists in the movement of national liberation. The American press openly admits that one word from India compromises the prestige of the PRC more than one thousand words spoken in the USA.

Regrettably, the Chinese comrades did not take into account this tactic of the imperialists. Responding to the noisy campaign in imperialist mass media about Tibet, they unleashed their own propagandist campaign and concentrated their fire mainly on India and personally on [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru. They accused the Indian government and personally Nehru of an imperialist policy, aimed against China. This was the essence of a large editorial article in “Renmin Ribao” [“People’s Daily”] on 6 May 1959, under the title “The revolution in Tibet and the philosophy of Nehru.”

Nehru is a well-known politician. One cannot exclude that to some degree he was involved in the intrigues against the PRC. But Nehru is far-sighted enough to recognize the vital importance of India’s friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp. Nehru behaved with reserve. In his numerous speeches he admitted that Tibet is a part of China, he spoke against the establishment of a so-called “government of Dalai-Lama in exile,” stressing the significance of the Sino-Indian friendship. India repeatedly raised the issue of restoration of rights of the People’s Republic of China in the UN. Precisely these actions made the rightist bourgeois circles in India, who are linked to Anglo-American capital, to assail Nehru, blaming him for “indecisiveness” and “appeasement” with regard to the People’s China. Their goal is to unseat Nehru, to revise the neutralist foreign policy of India, to tilt it in a rightist direction, to the path of alliance with Western powers. If reactionary circles of India succeed in achieving these goals, it would cause serious damage to the socialist camp and the whole cause of peace, since the present foreign policy line of the Nehru government is a positive factor in the struggle for strengthening peace.

One should ask, what aims did Chinese comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so uncompromisingly? As they explained it themselves, they stood by the principle of “cohesion and struggle.” According to com. Mao Zedong, they unmask Nehru as a “double-dealer,” “half a man, half a devil,” “half a gentleman, half a hooligan,” and in doing this they allegedly “force” him to strengthen friendship with the PRC.

A question, naturally, was raised how to live side by side with this “devil”? How to build relations with India? The Chinese comrades found a solution in forcing Nehru to repent and in pressuring him into cooperation with China. At the same time the Chinese said that they visualize the possibility of the downfall of the Nehru government and see no great trouble if a reactionary pro-Western government comes to power in India. In their opinion, this would only bring us closer to a revolution in India.

Obviously this course inevitably had to lead to further aggravation of relations with India. And it happened, indeed, when after suppression of the Tibet rebellion the Chinese troops approached the borders with India.

The People’s China and India inherited from the past unresolved border issues. It is not possible here to dwell on the history and the essence of these issues that deal with some territories located in the Himalayas. But it is important to notice by what methods the Chinese comrades attempted to resolve this problem, so acute and painful for both sides.

For a long time the Chinese comrades postponed a solution of this question. They stressed that in the interests of maintaining good relations with India they would not press with demarcation of the borders and would reckon with the existing realities. However, in the heated atmosphere of the Sino-Indian disputes with regard to the rebellion of Tibet the issue of the border territories became extremely acute. On 25 August [1959] an armed clash took place between the Chinese and Indian border-guards, and as a result the Hindus lost several people as killed and wounded. Exploiting this conflict, imperialist propaganda raised the uproar about “the aggression of red China.” Reactionary nationalists inside India unleashed a fierce anti-Chinese campaign that was accompanied by attacks against Nehru, as well as [against] the Indian communist party.

One should mention that these events took place only a few days before the visit of comrade Khrushchev to the United States. The enemy propaganda did everything to exploit the Sino-Indian conflict for the purpose of disruption of the Soviet peace initiative, to lay blame for China’s actions on the Soviet Union and thereby to cause a quarrel between us and India.

With all this in mind, the CC CPSU decided to send a letter to Beijing, expressing our concern about the situation that emerged as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict. It also took a decision to publish a TASS announcement in order to encourage peaceful settlement of the conflict and to give the world public opinion the correct idea about our position. The declaration of the Soviet Union at that time halted escalation of the conflict and thwarted the dangerous game of the imperialists. The governments of the PRC and India announced that further intensification of the dispute would not be in the interests of peace nor in their own interests, and that they would resolve border issues according to “five principles” [pancha sila] of peaceful coexistence.

The course of events, however, demonstrated that the question of the Sino-Indian border is rife with new complications. It is known that on 21 October [1959] there was another armed clash on the Sino-Indian border that caused the loss of lives. After it the anti-Chinese campaign in India flared up with new vigor.

One should keep in mind that there are very influential forces in India that seek to aggravate relations with China. Regrettably, the position of the Chinese comrades on this question is such that it facilitates for the Indian reactionaries mobilization of public opinion in the country against the People’s China and puts the progressive forces of India in a quandary.

The Chinese comrades insist that they are guided by the considerations of self-defense and prestige of their country, that the
truth and justice is on China’s side. In this regard one must inform the Plenum that the letter we addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of China and the TASS announcement about the Indo-Chinese border conflict did not evoke a proper understanding among the Chinese leaders. In their answer to our letter the Chinese comrades claimed that the incident on the Sino-Indian border had been provoked by the Nehru government, which, as the letter of the Chinese friends reads, “has long been marching in its domestic and foreign policies in the reactionary direction.” It follows: “We believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government, not only would it not make them change their position for the better, but, on the contrary, in the situation of the growing offensive on their side, if China still does not rebuff them and denounce them, such a policy would only encourage their atrocity. It would not be advantageous for the friendship between China and India, and also not be advantageous to make Nehru and the Indian government improve, instead of moving toward further rapprochement with the West.”

The letter contains a reproach that “the TASS announcement displayed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union toward the incident on the Sino-Indian border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, who use this to drive a wedge into the relations between China and the Soviet Union. This cannot help evoking regrets.”

The analysis of this letter of the CC of the Communist Party of China leads us to two conclusions of fundamental importance. They are the following: the Chinese comrades could neither correctly assess their own mistakes committed in their relations with India, nor the measures taken by the CC CPSU for regulation of the Sino-Indian conflict. The Chinese leadership’s assessments of the situation in India and the behavior of Nehru with regard to the conflict are undoubtedly erroneous and arbitrary.

Let me refer to the opinion of our Indian friends expressed in their letters to the CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist Party of China. While registering the aggravation of the situation in India as a result of the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that “if the disputes continue, it would benefit reactionary forces in India and would cause a negative influence on the masses of the Indian population.” Indian comrades justifiably believe that further exacerbation of the Indo-Chinese relations could weaken the democratic movement in India, gravely undercut the position of the Indian communist party and threaten it with a ban. In the words of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India comr. [Ajoy Kumar] Ghosh, Indian communists do not know how to explain the position of the PRC, the reason why it raised the border issue if China at this time and what hides behind it. All leading officials of the Communist Party of India wonder why the government of the PRC let itself be pulled by Indian reaction into this border conflict.

And as to the statement of the Chinese comrades about the glee and jubilation of Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, with regard to dissimilar positions of China and the Soviet Union on the incident on the Sino-Indian border, it is erroneous in its basic premises. The imperialists rejoiced indeed, but they did so at the moment when the Indo-Chinese conflict flared up. One can imagine them exulting and rejoicing even more, if the Soviet Union had become enmeshed in this conflict and the impression had been created that there was a united front of all socialist countries against Nehru. Facts demonstrate that the uproar among imperialists seriously abated after the Soviet Union came forth in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict.

What did aggravation of relations between China and India and other foreign policy gaffes of the Chinese comrades lead to? They led to a diminution of the international prestige of the PRC, to the weakening of her positions in Asia, to an increased tendency, in a number of countries of Asia, to ally oneself with Western powers, with the USA, despite strong hatred among the peoples of Asian countries towards their perennial enemies - the colonizers.

Let me refer to the opinion of our Indian friends expressed in their letters to the CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist Party of China. While registering the aggravation of the situation in India as a result of the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that “if the disputes continue, it would benefit Khrushchev, Suslov and Gromyko. From the Chinese side participated comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Wang Jiaxiang.

The discussion took place on 2 October in the residence of the Politburo of the CC Communist Party of China. Comrade Khrushchev informed the Chinese friends about his trip to the USA and his talks with President D. Eisenhower. He stressed that among American political figures there is a growing sentiment in favor of peaceful settlement of unresolved, disputed questions and that at the present time there is a very real possibility for further resolute steps toward a more durable peace. In this regard he brought the attention of the Chinese friends to the necessity for the socialist camp to avoid anything that could be exploited by the reactionaries to push the world back to the tracks of the cold war.

Comrade Khrushchev told the Chinese comrades that we do not completely understand their foreign policy, particularly with regard to India, and on the issue of Taiwan.

Comrade Khrushchev pointed out at the necessity to improve mutual information between the leadership of our parties on the issues of foreign policy. One cannot regard as normal the situation, when we, China’s ally, do not know what the Chinese comrades may undertake tomorrow in the area of foreign policy. Indeed, all countries of the socialist camp are linked not only by the common ideas and goals, but also by the alliance commitments. Incorrect actions of one country may hurt international situation of the whole socialist camp. One should keep in mind that imperialist propaganda directly link activity of Chinese comrades to the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. Indeed, communist parties always emphasize that the socialist camp has one line in foreign policy.

As far as the CC CPSU is concerned, we systematically inform the leadership of fraternal parties of socialist countries about most important foreign policy steps of the USSR and, in special cases, we seek their advice.

One must admit that the Chinese comrades reacted to the remarks of comrade Khrushchev painfully. They claimed that their policy with regard to Taiwan and the off-shore straits has been fully justified and is conducted with skill, that their line toward
the Nehru government is correct. At times the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when a member of the Politiburo CC Communist Party of China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly opportunistic [prisposoblencheskaia], and the policy of China is more firm and correct. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements.

In connection with the remarks of the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering how they understand the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it as a general line of foreign policy of the socialist camp, whether they think it is necessary to struggle for relaxation of international tension and for securing general peace.

We are getting an impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver.

[ed. note: after additional critical remarks and recounting of discussion of other matters at the meeting, Suslov noted:]

One should say that at the end of the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and other Chinese comrades declared that they did not want war; that they would resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and would settle the conflict with India through negotiations. They confirmed again that the Communist party of China has a common line and common goals with us. We expressed our satisfaction in this regard.

[noting that Khrushchchev had pointed out the Chinese leadership’s “nervousness and touchiness” at being criticised, Suslov harshly criticized the “atmosphere of the cult of personality” surrounding Mao, which he likened to that of Stalin; recalling that during a 1958 conversation with Khrushchchev, Mao had compared Soviet-Chinese relations to two hands in which nine fingers were fully unified “and only in one, little finger we have disagreements,” Suslov ended his report on an optimistic note, vowing that the Soviet leadership would do its utmost to promote strong ties and friendship between Moscow and Beijing—ed.]

[Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKiSD), Moscow; fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, ll. 56-91; translation for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

II. Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on Soviet-Indian Relations and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 1962 (excerpts)

[The first excerpt is from a 17 January 1962 entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov describing a conversation with the Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India (CPI), Bhupesh Gupta. During the conversation, Gupta urgently requests Soviet financial aid for the Indian party for use in an upcoming election campaign; the answer conveyed by Benediktov ten days later suggests that the Soviets responded positively to the request, although the amount is not indicated:]

Today I received Gupta at his request. Gupta communicated that on 16-17 January a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPI took place in Delhi, at which was discussed the future work of the party apparatus in connection with the death of A[joy]. [Kumar] Ghosh....Gupta said that he desires that the ties of the CPI and CPSU do not become weakened in any way after the death of Ghosh. The assistance in various forms and the comradely advice of the CC CPSU have always been enormously useful to us, he underscored....Gupta said that no other party, not even the communist party of China, can occupy in the hearts of Indian communists the place which belongs to the CPSU...

Gupta reported that after the death of Ghosh at the present time in the party there is an acute insufficiency of means for the pre-election campaign. He expressed the fear that with the death of Ghosh the source for receiving means for the communist party from the CPSU might be closed. These questions were handled by Ghosh alone, Gupta underscored. He never consulted with him /Gupta/, and even less with [Elamulam M.S.] Namboodiripad and G. Nair/ with the latter two only about using the assistance. All these matters were held in strictest secrecy from other leaders of the party and members of the National Council. This explains the fact that not a single report on this question has appeared in the press. Gupta said that he cannot singlehandedly take on responsibility in questions of assistance, therefore he considers it necessary to consult with Nambudiripad, whom he characterized as a person of crystalline honesty and whom Ghosh trusted. Gupta confidentially reported that A. Ghosh had not consulted on this problem with Akhmed or with [Shripad Amrit] Dange, who once proposed that he entrust to him alone all matters connected with the receipt of aid from abroad.

Gupta categorically denied that the Chinese friends are giving the CC CPI [Central Committee of the Communist Party of India] financial assistance. The National Council has not received, is not receiving, and will not receive assistance from the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], Gupta declared, and we never will appeal to them with such a request. Moreover, the interlocutor underscored, the Chinese do not know anything about Soviet aid. Gupta noted that he knows this precisely, since he enjoys the trust of both groups in the party. The interlocutor further underscored that the only other channels of aid from abroad are the aid received by the Punjab organization from Sikhs living in England and also the aid at the trade union level through Dange.

Gupta repeated several times that the aid is needed precisely now, since the pre-election struggle must be concluded in the first week of February. After the elections we would like to receive your support in the matter of the theoretical preparation of party cadres, he said. Gupta expressed the conviction that the CPI not only will preserve its seats in parliament, but also will be able to increase their number.

Gupta said that in the election struggle the reactionary forces within the country are now directing their main blow at the authority of the USSR, which has increased in connection with its position on Goa, Kashmir and other questions. The main task of the CPI in the pre-election struggle, Gupta said, is to make clear to the population that the Soviet Union is giving selfless aid to India, is its true friend...

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Fond 090, Opis 24, Delo 5, Papka 80. Listy 14-19; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[Benediktov met with Gupta again on 27 January 1962 (as the Soviet envoy recorded
On 27 January of this year I and Comrade Zhukov G.A. had a conversation with the secretary of the CC CPI Comrade Gupta. We stated to him the answer of the CC CPSU in connection with his earlier conversation with me. Gupta expressed gratitude for the readiness of the CC and the Presidium of the CC CPSU to assist the leadership of the CPI in this difficult moment and to support it. He promised to inform the CC CPSU about the situation in the party in the future as well...

I received Comrade E. in connection with his departure for his homeland and had a conversation with him. Comrade E. on his own initiative dwelt in detail on the problem of the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that India has finally rejected the proposal of the PRC about negotiations [for] 15 October in Beijing. The Indian side continues to maintain that the recent clash on the eastern border occurred on Indian territory, south of the McMahon line, and was elicited by the advance of Chinese troops to the south and their attack on Indian posts. In fact, Comrade E. said, the entire affair was completely the opposite. Indian troops crossed the McMahon line and attacked Chinese posts far to the north of that line. Comrade E. talked about his last conversation in the Indian Foreign Ministry with the head of the China department, Menon. During this conversation Comrade E. asked Menon to take a map of the eastern part of the border, published in India in 1960, and find on it the region in which the clashes are now occurring, orienting by latitude and longitude the places indicated in the Indian notes. As a result it turned out that this region, the latitude and longitude of which were indicated by the Indians themselves, is located significantly to the north of the McMahon line on Chinese territory. Menon, in the words of Comrade E., was forced to acknowledge this, but maintained at the same time that it was not possible that the Indians had crossed the McMahon line and so forth.

Comrade E. stated that the main things that will motivate India to end the conflict with the PRC are, on the international level, the wish to receive money from the USA, and on the domestic level the desire to suppress political forces which are objectionable to the ruling circles. Moreover, in the opinion of Comrade E., the Indian government has already gone too far in this conflict to have the possibility of returning to normal relations...

I. 31-36; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.

The second excerpt, dealing with the brewing crisis over the Sino-Indian border dispute, is from a 10 October 1962 entry from Benediktov’s diary, this one describing a conversation with the provisional charge d’affaires of the Chinese Embassy in India, “Comrade E. Cheng-Chang,” referred to as “Comrade E.” in the document. In the conversation, the Chinese official gave Beijing’s version of the building confrontation, blaming India for attacking Chinese posts along the border, and asserting that India had “gone too far” to resume normal relations with the PRC. Ten days later, China launched a broad attack on Indian positions along the disputed frontier.

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today’s meeting pointed out that the Pravda article, while in fact criticizing the position of the Indian communists and India’s relation to this question as a whole, did not express any critical comments with regard to the PRC and the Chinese comrades. 

Nambudiripad reported that the secretariat of the CPI after the discussion of the Pravda article today reached the conclusion that “this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India.” The campaign that is going on everywhere against the PRC will, obviously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and then to all countries of the socialist system... He expressed the opinion of the secretariat that in connection with this statement of the Soviet press and in connection with the pressure on India from many neutral countries regarding a more rapid peaceful settlement of this conflict, the Indian government... can reach the conclusion that only western countries are our true friends...

“In this connection we very much would like to find out if Soviet leaders could help the CPI give an understanding to the Chinese comrades that it is extremely desirable to give the possibility to Nehru to move toward peace negotiations and cease military actions without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself. - Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has unanimously reached the conclusion that such a step by the PRC would have a huge significance for the cause of world peace, for all progressive forces, for the anti-imperialist struggle...”

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, II. 134-139; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

This fourth excerpt is from a 2 November 1962 entry from Benediktov’s diary, describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as “exceptionally busy, very tired”), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China’s actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai—with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier—opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow’s line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but “one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against.”

At a reception I met R.K. Nehru, who approached me and began a conversation. He set forth in great detail his views on the Indian-Chinese border conflict, noting that he had expressed them to the prime minister. R.K. Nehru said that the prime minister gave him a letter to N.S. Khrushchev and spoke about his conversation with the Soviet ambassador. In his words, the prime minister greatly appreciates the concern and anxiety of the government of the USSR and the general approach of N.S. Khrushchev to the problem of the Indian-Chinese conflict. “At another time, noted R.K. Nehru, it is possible that the prime minister himself would have spoken about this problem in detail, but now he is exceptionally busy, very tired and we must help him. Therefore I myself will tell you our views.”

1. “After my return from China two years ago I personally did everything possible for the peaceful settlement of the border dispute. No one else has played a more important role in this matter than I. To some degree I have weakened my authority by having taken the hardest line on resolving the conflict by means of negotiations. The foreign policy leaders of India tried to the best of their abilities to solve this dispute and preserve friendly relations with the PRC. We did not cease to hope for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and did not make any military preparations, completely not supposing that military actions on the border were possible. The result is our present retreat.”

2. “After many years in China, I know very well and am closely acquainted with all the leaders of China and with all the main party leaders. I [can] clearly present the views of each of them. I am convinced, for example, that Zhou Enlai does not approve the policy of the PRC regarding India, while Liu Shaoqi can approve it.”

3. “I am absolutely convinced that the given events are not simply a border conflict, but something more. This is part of a general strategy of Chinese leftist dogmatists - sectarians who obviously now have the upper hand in the leadership of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). This is the mainspring of the events. These sectarian elements in the CCP are trying to prove their thesis that India, as a capitalist country, will surely join the bloc of western countries, that it cannot conduct a policy of nonalignment for any length of time. They regard Nehru not as a nationalist leader but as a reactionary bourgeois. They are trying by their actions to force India to reject the policy of nonalignment, to draw it into the western bloc, to strike a blow at the entire policy of neutrality, nonalignment, peaceful coexistence. India, as the largest of the neutral countries of Asia, is their first and main target. Thus the issue is not this or that border or territory: the essence of the events is the attempts of the party sectarians of the CCP to prove in practice their theoretical position, an attempt to cross over to the offensive on the ideological front.”

4. “I am convinced that their actions are an extension of the CCP’s ideological disputes with the CPSU, and that the Chinese sectarians are directing the main blow against the Soviet Union and its foreign policy principles—against peaceful coexistence, the possibility of avoiding war in our atomic age, the possibility of the victory of communism not through war but through peaceful economic competition with the West. We value highly these principles of Soviet policy. I personally don’t have anything against the establishment of communism in the entire world, if communism proves its superiority by means of economic, social, and cultural achievements, but not by bombs.”

5. “However, the Chinese fanatics, who apparently have gained strength recently, are conducting (and intend to conduct in the future) a senseless course for achieving their goals by any means, including military actions, which is dangerous for all peoples. They, unlike the USSR and even the USA, do not understand the danger of nuclear war. The world is now divided not into East and
West, but into two camps: one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against.”

6. “We are on the leading edge of the struggle against the realization in practice by these fanatics of their theoretical program, which is a threat to the entire world, to all peoples. Therefore, everyone must assist our struggle. Therefore we must not in any case retreat before them, not submit to their threats, not agree to conditions which they dictate on the basis of force and seizure of our territory. On the contrary, we must without fail defeat them, smash their first practical attempt to prove their thesis. Only their defeat and the preservation by India of its policy of nonalignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical convictions.”...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 120-124; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

The fifth and final selection from Ambassador Benediktov’s diary is from a 12 December 1962 entry recording a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In the excerpt presented here, Nehru expressed a positive evaluation of Soviet-Indian relations, complimenting Khrushchev for his role in resolving the Cuban crisis, but in response to the Soviet envoy’s emphasis that the border crisis with China be settled peacefully he firmly defended India’s stand that PRC forces must withdraw from recently-occupied positions (e.g., return to the line held on September 8) before talks could start.

In accordance with the commission of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev today I visited prime minister of India J. Nehru. I gave him warm greetings and best wishes from N.S. Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet government.

Nehru first of all inquired about the health of N.S. Khrushchev...

I further set forth the substance of the questions which I was commissioned by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to communicate to Nehru. I said to Nehru that the Soviet government appreciates the efforts of the Indian government and of Nehru personally which are aimed at preserving the policy of nonalignment, at preserving and further developing the friendly relations with the Soviet Union. I set forth the opinion of N.S. Khrushchev on questions of the necessity of activating in every way the struggle for peace and general disarmament, for carrying out the policy of peaceful coexistence and resolution of disputed international questions through negotiations. I expressed the wish of N.S. Khrushchev that the border conflict between India and the PRC also will be resolved through peaceful means, through negotiations.

Nehru listened to all of this attentively and with great interest, taking notes in his notebook. He expressed great satisfaction with the friendly relations which exist between the USSR and India, between the governments of both countries and also between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and him personally. He expressed also the conviction that these relations will not only be preserved, but also will further develop in the future.

The prime minister stated further that he “fully agrees with Mr. Khrushchev in regard to the necessity of our general struggle for peace and disarmament.” He gave us to understand that the USSR can count on the support of India in these questions.

Concerning the question of the peaceful resolution of sharp international problems, Nehru stated that “in this regard Mr. Khrushchev has given us all a great example during the incident with Cuba.”

Nehru then dwelt in detail on the position of India in the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that “all this began not from our side, - it was thrust on us. We do not want it to be prolonged, we do not want to carry out military actions. We would like it to be settled....”

Nehru noted the truth of Khrushchev’s observation about the presence of reactionary forces that are trying to push the government to a resolution of the border dispute by military means. He stated in this regard that the government knows about the activities of these forces, but does not consider this the main thing. In his words a very important point is the fact that all the people of India, simple peasants, workers and employees, “all feel the harshest feelings toward China, toward what it did against India. They, of course, do not want war (no one wants it), but they demand the withdrawal of Chinese from Indian territory, they demand the defense of our territory. We, of course, never will make an incursion into Chinese territory, but it is necessary to consider that the people insist on the liberation of the territory that belongs to India.”

In answer to my statement about the necessity of a peaceful resolution of the problem and of explaining to the people the correctness of peaceful means, Nehru said: “We are trying to explain this necessity and will do this in the future.” He noted in this regard that attempts at peaceful resolution of the dispute have not yet given results. “We would like to sit at the negotiating table with the Chinese. We are ready. But the government has explained to them that for this it is necessary that the position on the border that existed 3 months ago be restored - the position on 8 September.”

Further J. Nehru in detail and confidentially illuminated the question of the relations of India with Pakistan...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 197-203; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

III. Record of Conversation (from East German archives) between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Mongolian leader J. Zedенbal, Beijing, 26 December 1962

4 Copy[ies].

II. About the Meeting of Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade J. Zedенbal

On 26 December the Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China [PRC; VRCh in German], Comrade Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People’s Republic [MPR; MVR in German], Comrade J. Zedенbal.

During this meeting, which took place in the residence of Comrade Zedенbal, a conversation [took place] between the two [men], which lasted from 11 until 14 hours.

Present during the conversation were: on the Mongolian side—the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, Comrade Shagwaral, the deputy Foreign Minister Schagdar[s]uren, the Ambassador of the MPR in Peking [Beijing], Zewegmid, the Deputy of the Great People’s Hural [Parliament] of the MPR, S. Bata, the Head of the 1st Division of the Foreign Ministry of
the MPR, Comrade Tschimiddorsh; on the Chinese side—the deputy Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister of the PRC, Comrade Tschen Ji [Chen Yi], the deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Tschif Peng-fei, the Head of the 2nd Asian Division of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Comrade Zhou Tscheu-je, the Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Jui Pei-weng, the Extraordinary and plenipotentiary Ambassador of the PRC in the MPR, Se Fu-schen. 

Erdenebulag served as translator on the Chinese side and Adja on the Mongolian side. 

After offering tea, fruit, and cigarettes to the guests, and after a short conversation of a protocol nature, photographs were taken and the guests entered a special room where a three-hour conversation occurred. 

Hereafter follows a presentation of the contents of the conversation between the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, Zendenbal. 

ZHOU ENLAI: We are very happy, Comrade Chairman Zendenbal, that you have come to our land, in order to sign a treaty concerning the border between our countries. This is a good thing, the meaning of which is to legally define the borders between our friendly lands. 

Yesterday you said quite correctly, that the signing of a border agreement would be very meaningful for peace and friendship. A reasonable settlement of the border question between China and Mongolia will be an example and an encouragement for border negotiations with other countries. 

Basically, we have reached an agreement concerning the border question with [North] Korea. But we are waiting still for an answer from Korea and therefore have not yet made a public announcement to the press. 

Since the Chinese-Mongolian and Chinese-Korean border issues are already settled, all that remains to be done, is to set up joint Commissions on Demarcation of Borders according to the agreed-upon principles. 

We are at present conducting negotiations regarding border demarcation with Burma and Nepal. We have the opportunity to resolve this question with the aforementioned countries on a mutually-agreed basis. In this manner we will officially pin down the border line with these countries. 

The border agreement between China and Mongolia will also contribute to the resolution of the border question with our other neighboring countries. 

China recently started border negotiations with Pakistan. We think that [we] will soon reach an agreement as our negotiations with Pakistan are taking place in a good atmosphere. The border question with Pakistan is also linked to the Kashmir question, that is, with the question that concerns both Pakistan and India directly. After the conclusion of the negotiations between China and Pakistan, we will sign a provisional protocol; the signing of an official treaty will follow if the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan has been settled. 

Anyway, the aforementioned border treaty will reflect the real situation. We are not going to define officially the border between China and Pakistan today. That would be to lead India into a dead end [Sackgasse]. The border between India and Pakistan is still officially unresolved. 

When you visited India in [September] 1959, Comrade Zendenbal, the border conflict between China and India had just reached a climax. At that time, I informed you regarding the Chinese-India border question, but during your stay in India you tried to avoid this question. We are very interested in this matter. 

The major border conflict between India and Pakistan is caused by the Kashmir question. At the western sector of our border with India, this [area] borders on the Aksai and on the Tibetan district of Ali. This was a historically established traditional border line. Pakistan’s position on the border question is correct. The border agreement between our countries will undoubtedly be signed, once the status [zugehörigkeit] of Kashmir is clarified. India, however, is trying in every way to prevent the conclusion of an agreement. But these attempts lack any grounds. 

The Western press—especially the English papers—write, that the Chinese-Pakistani border question corresponds completely to the norms of international relations. But this question only worries the Pakistanis. Nehru is searching for a way to subordinate India and Pakistan to American domination. Clearly, he has no other way out [Ausweg]. If this occurs, the situation will become even more complicated, and it will become difficult to explain this problem to the Indian people. 

We have sent a letter to the countries of Asia and Africa explaining the Chinese-Indian border question in detail. You have also received this letter, Comrade Chairman Zendenbal. 

Since 1961 India is conducting invasions into our border districts and has established 43 border posts there. The area in question is mountainous, has a raw climate, and it snows a lot there. 

After the Chinese-Indian border conflict broke out and India continued its invasion systematically, we were forced to remove the aforementioned 43 posts. Several of these were overrun and the entire district cleansed. 

On 21 November [1962] our government made the decision to cease fire and to withdraw the border units 20 kilometers into the hinterlands. We suggested the establishment of an unpopulated zone 20 kilometers deep [on each side—ed.]. One must say that in the past there were no Chinese troops involved in the border conflict. There was not a single border guard or [border]-post there, rather, only a patrol [service]. But, administratively, this district was subject to us [our authority]. Since 1949, however, India began to threaten and attack this area. Now, after this area is cleansed, we again have no border guard there. If India, under
these conditions, begins an invasion again, this will be a true challenge and provocation.

If India gives up Kashmir to Pakistan and tries to annex our Aksai district again, this will only be a proof that India is really working for and under the orders of the Americans.

India’s attempts to give Pakistan the rich, bounteous Kashmir and, in exchange, to occupy our unpopulated, poor district, only proves [India’s] aggressiveness. Under these conditions, we have ceased fire and withdrawn our troops.

The people of Asia and Africa, [and] all the peace-loving people of the Earth, support our policy and our measures. We thank you for the fact that your government welcomed the explanation of the government of the PRC.

Presently, India is in a difficult position. The countries of Asia and Africa are supporting our proposal, and that puts India in an even more exit-less [ausweglosere] situation.

Not long ago, a meeting of leading statesmen from many countries took place in Colombo [Ceylon; now Sri Lanka] concerning the Sino-Indian border question. They decided to send the Ceylonese prime minister [Sirimavo Bandaranaike] to China in order to inform us of the results of the conference. It was confirmed that the Ceylonese Minister-president would arrive [in China] on 31 December. We have already received a special plenipotentiary in order to confer on this question. The aforementioned countries are making efforts to reconcile India and China and to initiate negotiations between our countries in order to confirm our cease-fire. We are ready to respond to these efforts. The most important [thing] is that both sides do not allow any renewed clashes. That is our main goal. Many ask, why there is no settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict, because the border question between China and Pakistan is actively discussed?] We think that Pakistan negotiates with us without submitting itself to America and England, although it belongs to an aggressive bloc. India, however, speaks the language of America, although it maintains that it does not belong to any aggressive blocs.

J. ZEDENBAL: Do you consider India a neutral country?

ZHOU ENLAI: India is diverging from its so-called neutrality. Furthermore, there is a less important border question between China and Afghanistan. In short, we will start negotiations. Experience shows that we can solve the border problems handed down to us by history through friendly negotiations both with socialist countries and with the new states of Asia. The treaty regarding the Chinese-Mongolian border demonstrates this. Both of our states are socialist countries and in a short period we have solved the border question correctly, according to principles of friendship, equality, mutual understanding and mutual concessions. Our countries’ governmental delegations have successfully concluded negotiations over the border question. This opens the way to the signature of a border agreement. Consequently, we will have to form a joint commission that will undertake border demarcation on the spot.

J. ZEDENBAL: Thank you, Premier Zhou Enlai both for the information regarding the course of negotiations you are conducting with neighboring countries and for the information about your government’s position on this question.

The negotiations between our countries to define exactly and mark the borderline have been successfully concluded, and nothing more stands in the way of signing an agreement. Comrade Premier, you have correctly stated that our countries’ governmental delegations negotiated successfully on the basis of mutual understanding, mutual consideration of interests, mutual concessions and mutual regard. I value this as much as you do. Since socialist countries have a common goal and ideology, we definitely must solve all questions that come up between us in the spirit of friendship. The border question between our countries was settled on just such a basis. The goal of the peoples who are building socialism and communism is to eliminate once and for all exploitation of man by man. But for the time being borders will remain. I only say this, because I am taking our final goal, Communism, as my point of departure.

ZHOU ENLAI: There is a Chinese saying that says that in the end the world will be an unitary whole, that there will be no exploitation of man by man. But before we join in one whole, we must establish the borders and provide for our affairs and prosperity.

J. ZEDENBAL: The states and nations will strengthen their independence and develop their countries, consequently and definitely crossing over into a communist order. This is the dialectic of development.

ZHOU ENLAI: This is clearly a question of the distant future.

J. ZEDENBAL: Of course. Our government and our people deeply regret that there was a border conflict between China and India. They are convinced that this problem must be solved in a peaceful manner. That is our position. This conflict between two Asian great-powers and the disturbance of the friendship between them is disadvantageous both for the peoples of both countries and for the maintenance of peace in general.

Our visit to India in 1959 coincided with the heightening [of tensions] on the Chinese-Indian border. I remember, Comrade Premier, that you informed us at that time regarding the state of affairs.

As soon as we were on Indian soil, the correspondents fell upon us with questions regarding the border conflict. Our answer to the correspondents ran: we hope that the border question between these two great powers can be settled in a peaceful manner.

At the meeting with Nehru, I said to him that the correspondents had turned to us with this question; I assume that the border question between the two countries will be settled in a friendly manner. At that time the question was, it seems to me, mainly about a border area of 90,000 square kilometers.

Nehru said that if it was a border disagreement involving a few kilometers, one could make mutual concessions, but that in this case it was a matter of 90,000 square kilometers, whose inhabitants are Indian citizens, who elect representatives to the Indian parliament. Therefore, he said, this question is not so simply solved.

It seems to me that, in fact, it is not easy to reach an agreement involving such a large area. A longer time is clearly necessary for this. As it turned out, the outbreak of the border conflict and the armed clashes have, in essence, complicated the situation. Now, obviously, an even bigger area is involved than before.

We think that the Chinese government’s unilateral ceasefire is a reasonable step, taken after full consideration of the circumstances. We hold the view that you are un-
undertaking flexible measures towards settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict in a peaceful manner by negotiations.

In general, life confirms daily the need for flexible policies to solve international problems. We do not doubt that the Chinese-Indian border conflict can be settled peacefully.

By "speculating" on the Chinese-Indian border conflict, the reactionary forces in India have strengthened their activity and their offensive against the country’s [India’s] Communist Party and democratic forces.

We are convinced that the measures that your government has taken towards a ceasefire on the Indian-Chinese border, towards the withdrawal of border troops and towards the future settlement of this problem by negotiation will generate positive results. We are of the opinion that this would be, on the one hand a blow against reactionary forces in India itself, and on the other hand a blow against the forces of imperialism, with the USA at its head. We assume that such measures will strengthen India’s neutral stance and will prevent India from abandoning this position. This will advance the battle for peace in the whole world. The American imperialists are making efforts to derive advantages from this conflict. The peaceful settlement would undoubtedly be a serious [line illegible—trans.] for imperialism.

After the signing of the border agreement between our countries, we will begin the demarcation of the borderline. As is well known, during the negotiations our delegation raised the question of the village of Hurimt in the Balgan-Ulgisik district in western Mongolia. Our inhabitants have erected several buildings there and begun lumbering. Your delegation, however, replied that this place cannot be recognized as Mongolia, because this would meet with difficulties. At the same time, your delegation answered that the inhabitants on both sides have come to an agreement and can find a reasonable solution [to the problem of] the use of the forest’s riches. Therefore, I do not want to insist that Hurimt should necessarily belong inside Mongolian borders. Of course, I think that this question must be decided by taking both sides interests into consideration. We are grateful that you have declared yourselves ready to make possible our use of our buildings as well as the forests in this district. This problem occurred, because there are no other woods nearby. But it can be solved on the basis of friendly, mutual understanding.

Since the founding of the PRC it has become a good tradition that during temporary difficulties caused by drought and dry wind, the administrations of individual districts of our countries, in friendly contacts, have permitted the reciprocal use of pasture land. We hope that it will also be possible in the future, in case of difficulties, to continue this excellent tradition.

I suppose that our Comrade “Land-owner” [“Gutsbesitzer”] Shagwaral, who is responsible for agricultural questions would be very interested in this.

We thank you for the help that you have provided in difficult times to the cattle breeders in our Aimaks and Somons, especially in winter and spring. We also express further our satisfaction that the border question between our countries will soon be settled.

I would like to make use of this meeting, Comrade Premier, to broach two aspects [of Sino-Mongolian relations].

We were and are grateful that for the construction of our country the PRC has provided us with financial and economic help as well as qualified workers. The appropriate authorities in our countries are already negotiating regarding the building of objects agreed upon earlier by our governments. I suppose that these negotiations will continue.

I would like to pose the following two questions to you: First, has railway freight traffic gone down considerably in the last years? Maybe that is also an effect of your drought. We hope that railway freight traffic will go up in the future. The full use of the railway that will be built as a consequence of a three-sided agreement between us and the Soviet comrades is economically advantageous for our country, Comrade Premier. We are convinced that you will take this factor into consideration.

Secondly, one of the forms of help that you provide to us is the provision of workers from appropriate professions. This labor is a great help in the building up of our country. Recently, it has nevertheless happened that a few less conscientious and inexperienced people put down their work. I think you know about this.

[Segment of conversation not printed regarding Chinese guest workers, particularly those from Inner Mongolia (Zdenbal assured Zhou that these are needed for linguistic, not nationalistic reasons); resettlement of Mongolians in China; Sino-Mongolian trade relations—trans.]

ZHOU ENLAI: With regard to China’s economic help to Mongolia, we can discuss this tomorrow afternoon, since we have too little time today to negotiate concrete matters, such as workers, construction, trade and railway freight traffic.

I do not understand the word “regrettable”, that you used regarding the Chinese-Indian border conflict. If this refers to India, it is correct. If you said it in reference to China, in order to make us out to be the guilty [party], then that is false. On this question there are differences of opinion among the fraternal parties.

We have undertaken considerable work to inform and provide explanations to the appropriate states and countries. The Indian side put us in an intolerable position. We were forced to take measures. India began a new invasion and set off a conflict. We rebuffed them, since it was such a serious situation. We have taken measures to defuse the situation. We have ceased fire and pulled out troops back. These are unilateral steps. There is no guarantee that this problem is definitively solved. The cause is the aggressive policies of the ruling circles of the Indian government. The Nehru government is wavering and turning away from neutrality. India did indeed declare non-alignment to aggressive blocs, but became ever more dependent on American dollars. India received 640 million dollars from America for military purposes. Nehru’s government is turning away from the policy of peace. We must understand imperialism’s threat and danger. In India itself, the domestic forces of reaction are becoming ever more active. India is turning away from the policy of peace. Our country, however, ceased fire and took the initiative towards negotiations. The Indian government has not yet expressed itself regarding our proposals and the measures we took. Under these circumstances, I ask you to understand Indian-Chinese relations correctly.

The MPR, as is known, has entered the United Nations. Therefore, the circumstances must be understandable for you. India’s representative in the UN is following the policy of the Western countries. India supports the Western powers’ policy on
the Hungarian, Korean, and Chinese questions as well as on disarmament. In this way, India is getting ever further onto the side of the reactionary imperialists.

You, Comrade Zedenbal, will probably agree with some of what I’m saying and disagree with part. I am not forcing my opinion on you. Further development will show who is right. Our policy is a peace-loving foreign policy that is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

J. ZEDENBAL: Our main task is the signing of the Mongolian-Chinese border agreement. This work is on the verge of a successful conclusion.

Clearly, the Soviet Union, the PRC and the other countries of the socialist camp play a major role in keeping peace in the whole world. The socialist countries have taken on the goal to contribute to the fight for peace, each according to its strength. Naturally the socialist countries are interested in the peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict. It is my understanding that our discussion takes this standpoint, as a point of departure. We and you both know that Nehru is not a Communist, but a bourgeois politician. But we and you both understand how important it is, in the interests of the whole socialist camp, to exploit the positive sides of individual bourgeois politicians. We know that your party in its long history has garnered much experience in the exploitation of the deeds of individual bourgeois politicians. We know that your party in its long history has garnered much experience in the exploitation of the deeds of individuals, who are on the enemy’s side.

The exploitation of India’s policy of neutrality is very important for the socialist camp. We assume that this is what the five principles of co-existence that you, Comrade Premier Zhou Enlai, together with Nehru, proclaimed. It will be very disadvantageous for our camp, if in place of Nehru, a man such as [Moraji] Desai comes to power. Then there will be a danger that India will join an aggressive bloc. In general, we attach the greatest meaning to the preservation and exploitation of India’s neutrality. I think you will probably agree with this. The Chinese-Indian border conflict is now on all lips, since in contemporary international relations every event, even if of local character, becomes widely known.

We think that the ceasefire, the pulling back of troops and the readiness for a negotiated settlement of the border conflict through negotiations, a readiness that you decided on after appropriate evaluation of the conflict and its connections to international problems and in consideration of all the complicated factors, correspond to the interests of the peoples of the socialist camp and all progressive mankind.

ZHOU ENLAI: The hitch is that the Nehru government represents the Grossbourgeoisie and is two-faced. It is correct that in the fight for peace one must also exploit the bourgeoisie. Nehru is however a representative of the Grossbourgeoisie. The reactionary tendency has the upper hand in the Nehru government’s policies. We must lead a decisive struggle against him, we must unmask his treacherous machinations. In his pro-American policy, there is no difference between Nehru and Desai. Resumption of negotiations to strengthen peace will be useful. But the Communists see this question differently from other men. The Communist Party of England has differences of opinion with us on other matters, but on the Indian-Chinese border question, we are of the same opinion. It would be good, if in the future you kept this in mind.

J. ZEDENBAL: I understand that the Chinese side does not unconditionally insist on immediately incorporating a 90,000 square kilometer area on the eastern border, that this question will be decided in the future. Is that true or not?

ZHOU ENLAI: I already went to India with Comrade [Foreign Minister] Chen Yi in 1960 in order to settle the Chinese-Indian border question, but we returned with empty hands.

J. ZEDENBAL: The Chinese-Indian border question must not be solved only in the interests of China, but also in accordance with the interests of the whole international communist movement. Given this, I personally think that it would be somewhat better, if you didn’t bring up the matter of the 90,000 square kilometers on the eastern sector of the border, but, on the contrary, support the development of class struggle within India in favor of socialism and communism, so that it can contribute to the strengthening of the Communist Party and the democratic forces whereby you would help to accelerate India’s transition to communism. There can be no doubt that the border question will be resolved in the future. I repudiate the thought of your intending to weaken or undermine in any way the forces of the Communist Party of India. It would be absurd, if such an idea came into the head of a Communist.

The kindling of conflict and noise over some 5-10 kilometers of land will, in the end, result in the strengthening of the domestic reactionary forces in India and the fanning of nationalistic passions. This would effect the Communists negatively and be disadvantageous for Socialism.

You Chinese Communists are much more experienced than us, and tempered in revolutionary battle. I am only saying what I think about this question and how I understand it.

ZHOU ENLAI: (Becoming nervous, with altered facial expression)

If you are interested in the Indian-Chinese border question, please examine again the literature that we have provided for the Asian and African countries. Our government is not fighting with India because of a few dozen kilometers of area. We have made absolutely no territorial claims, only the Indian side has. One must understand this correctly. The essence of the matter is that the Indian side is trying to annex an even larger area on the Western sector of the border. How quickly India treads the path of socialism depends, above all, on the revolutionary struggle of the Indian Communist Party and the Indian people. It is important to expose to the world public the evil machinations and dangers, that the reactionary forces of India represent. If we do not expose their reactionary activity, they will go over to the American side, and that is even more disadvantageous.

J. ZEDENBAL: The main thing is not to play into the hands of American imperialism.

It was agreed to continue the conversation the next day.
29 December 1962

[Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv;” Berlin, JIV 2/202-283, B1.0; obtained by D. Wolff; translation by Wolff, O. Corff, and C. Ostermann, with the assistance of J. Hershberg.]

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