

Cold War Flashpoints



Featuring New Evidence on:

The Polish Crisis 1980-1981

Poland in the Early Cold War

The Sino-American Opening

The Korean War

The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962

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SPECIAL THANKS TO RESEARCH ASSISTANTS:

GREG DOMBER, RYAN GINGERAS, CHRISTINA HARTMAN,
CHRISTIAAN HETZNER, ALINA LI, ADAM KUTCHER, LENA SIROTA, AND JOHN TENT

SPECIAL THANKS ALSO TO: JORDAN BAEV, TOM BLANTON, MALCOLM BYRNE, MICHELE CARUS-CHRISTIAN, RAYMOND GARTHOFF, CHEN JIAN, MARK KRAMER, JOHN MARTINEZ, VOJTECH MASTNY, KRZYSZTOF PERSAK, DANIEL ROZAS, KATHRYN WEATHERSBY, VLADISLAV ZUBOK.

Photograph: Francois Lochon—Gamma Liaison: Warsaw Pact Maneuvers in Poland, March 1981. From left to right: East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann, Polish Premier General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Viktor Kulikov, and Czechoslovak Defense Minister Martin Dzur.

Editor's Note

This issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin presents new evidence from the Russian, Eastern European and Chinese archives on key Soviet "Flashpoints" from Europe to Asia. Focal point of this issue are documents prepared for or obtained at the November 1997 oral history conference "Poland 1980-82: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, CWIHP and the Institute of Political Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences. Many of the documents and essays—including the telegrams by CIA source Col. Ryzard Kuklinski (introduced by Mark Kramer) and documents provided by Oldrich Tuma and Janos Tischler—in this issue were initially prepared for this conference; others, such as the so-called "Anoshkin notebook" and the articles by Jordan Baev and Michael Kubina, were obtained during or after the conference. Given his pivotal role in the 1980/81 crisis—and the documents featured in this section, CWIHP asked former Polish Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski to provide Bulletin readers with an initial reaction to the new materials. The contribution by former U.S. ambassador to Poland Francis Meehan, eyewitness to the Polish events from the fall of 1980 to martial law, provides further context to the documents featured in this issue.

The section on "Poland in the Early Cold War,"—with contributions by Andrzej Werblan, Andrzej Paczkowski and Krzysztof Persak—continues CWIHP's efforts to document Stalin's role in the formative period of the Cold War. As an initial step in its "Stalin Project," inaugurated in 1997/98 with workshops in Budapest (October 1997), Beijing (October 1997), and Moscow (March 1998), CWIHP has been seeking to document as comprehensively as possible Stalin's conversations with foreign leaders as well as his communications with Molotov and other foreign policy advisors. Future issues of the *CWIHP Bulletin* will present additional materials as they become available.

In the section on the "Sino-American Rapprochement 1968/1969," Chen Jian and David L. Wilson present new Chinese materials on the Sino-American opening, just as the first American documents on the issue are becoming available.¹ In the coming months, CWIHP will increasingly focus on the international history of the late 1960s and early 1970s as documents from both sides of the Cold War become available. The section on the Korean War, featuring documents and commentaries by Kathryn Weathersby and Milton Leitenberg on the allegations of U.S. bacteriological warfare during the Korean War continue CWIHP's path-breaking efforts on that first major "hot war" of the Cold War.² Beyond the biological warfare issue, these documents shed also new light on Sino-Soviet-Korean relations as well the still murky history of the "Beria Interregnum" in 1953. CWIHP welcomes the discussion of these new findings and encourages the release of the originals and additional materials from

Russian, Chinese, Korean and U.S. archives on the issue

Nikita Khrushchev's conversations with Ulbricht and Gomulka, translated and introduced by Hope Harrison and Douglas Selvage, provide us an opportunity to be a "fly-on-the-wall" at key meetings during the 1958-1962 Berlin Crisis. The transcripts do not only provide fascinating insights into Moscow's relationship with key allies in a moment of crisis, but also into Khrushchev's personality. Similarly, Raymond Garthoff's translations of Russian documents from the Volkogonov Collection at the Library of Congress continue the debate about the role of nuclear missiles Khrushchev's thinking during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Vojtech's Mastny's introduction and (in part) translation of Polish and Czech documents opens another frontier in Cold War history—the military history of the "other side." Jointly with the National Security Archive and the Center for Conflict Studies and the Technical University of Zurich, CWIHP has launched a larger documentation project on the history of the Warsaw Pact. Documents deriving from this project will be featured in future CWIHP Bulletin issues, the CWIHP website database (cwihip.si.edu) as well as at CWIHP conferences.

The documents featured in this Bulletin are only the highlights of a much larger corpus of documents which have been translated for CWIHP, most of which will be accessible through the CWIHP website. Since September 1998, the CWIHP website database ("Virtual Library") contains more document translations than we have published in print. Beyond documents, the CWIHP website now contains updates on publications and events. Special website segments with information on archives, literature are "under construction."

CWIHP activities and publications have always been a team-effort, and this Bulletin issue is no exception. Too many people have contributed to this production to allow me to name them all, but I would like to express special thanks Robert Litwak, Nancy Meyers, Karin Mueller, Hope Harrison, Ray Garthoff, Mark Kramer, Chen Jian, Malcolm Byrne and Jim Hershberg.

- Christian Ostermann, Editor

¹ William Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts: Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: The New Press, 1999).

² See Kathryn Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18; "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 1, 2-9; "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-458; "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 30-84.

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New Evidence on the Polish Crisis 1980-1982

Introduction

By Malcolm Byrne

In November 1997, an extraordinary multinational gathering took place of personalities who figured in the tumultuous 1980-81 Solidarity crisis. For two-and-a-half days two dozen Poles, Americans, and Russians, one-time allies and adversaries alike, met in the village of Jachranka just outside Warsaw, to revisit the events of that crucial period.

On the Polish Communist Party and government side, former Party leaders Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and Stanisław Kania, former Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski, and several of their colleagues sat across from ex-Solidarity figures Tadeusz Mazowiecki (later the country's first post-Communist prime minister), Karol Modzelewski, Zbigniew Bujak, and others. Filling out the spaces at the large, square meeting table were representatives of the two superpowers whose involvement in the crisis (albeit in very different forms) ensured its global impact. From the American side: Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser; Richard Pipes, a senior member of President Reagan's National Security Council (NSC) staff; Gen. William Odom, NSC military aide in 1980 and head of U.S. Army Intelligence in 1981-82; Jan Nowak, formerly of Radio Free Europe and a consultant on Poland to the Carter and Reagan administrations; and Carter NSC staff aide, Stephen Larrabee, were present. From the former Soviet side: Marshal Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces; Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, Warsaw Pact chief of staff; Central Committee expert Georgi Shakhnazarov; and Valerii Moussatov of the Foreign Ministry.

The conference, "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," was one of a series of meetings organized by the National Security Archive in partnership with scholars and institutions in Russia and Eastern Europe—and in close cooperation with the Cold War International History Project—aimed at expanding the historical record and informing the public debate over key crises in the Cold War.¹ Shouldering most of the responsibility for the Jachranka event were Andrzej Paczkowski, Ryszard Zelichowski, Pawel Machcewicz, Dariusz Stola, Krzysztof Persak, Ewa Balcerek and their colleagues at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Highlights of the conference were numerous, and have been written about elsewhere.² The discussions brought out new facts and perspectives on the internal dynamics of the crisis, the roles of Kania and Jaruzelski, the question of whether the Soviets intended to invade,

and the impact of American efforts to forestall such an outcome. One issue that came under intense scrutiny was whether Jaruzelski was a hero or a traitor: Did he declare martial law on 13 December 1981, as a patriotic act to prevent the slaughter of tens of thousands of Poles that would surely have followed from a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion? Or was he simply doing Moscow's bidding, using the threat (spurious in this view) of an invasion as a pretext and/or justification for martial law, and thus sparing the Soviets the multiple costs of intervention?

As with all Archive/CWIHP conferences, documents played a crucial part. For several years before the Jachranka gathering, directed research had been underway in the archives of the former Soviet bloc and the United States specifically geared toward preparation of a "briefing book" for each of the participants. Over 100 top-level documents were selected, ranging from Soviet and Polish politburo minutes and Warsaw Pact meeting transcripts, to Solidarity National Coordination Commission materials, to U.S. National Security Council records and Defense Intelligence Agency reports.³ The goal was not only to bolster the public record but also to help jog the memories of participants and keep the discussions as closely anchored to the facts as possible. As often happens, additional materials emerged during the course of the conference itself.⁴

Several new documents dealt with the central, and related, questions of Soviet intentions and Jaruzelski's motivations. They seemed to seriously undermine the former Polish leader's published rationales. For example, a telegram from Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, the CIA's long-time source inside the Polish general staff, reported in early December 1980 that Jaruzelski had ordered his Defense Ministry to approve Kremlin-sponsored plans to allow 18 divisions of Soviet, Czechoslovak and East German troops to enter the country, a revelation that left every Pole privy to the decision "very depressed and crestfallen," Kuklinski reported.⁵ A Czechoslovak military document around the same date appeared to confirm this report.

Apparently even more damning to Jaruzelski was a series of handwritten notebook pages prepared in the early 1980s by Soviet Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin, for years an adjutant to Marshal Kulikov and his principal notetaker throughout the Polish crisis. During the planning stages of the conference, the organizers had asked every prospective participant to dig through their own files for documents to bring to the table. Kulikov agreed to ask Anoshkin to bring along his notes.⁶ Immediately after the Marshal

referred to those notes during the conference to back up his claim that the Soviets never intended to intervene militarily in Poland, he and Anoshkin were approached (accosted?) by various participants. Anoshkin eventually agreed to let several pages be copied, which, as Mark Kramer's piece below suggests, appear to show that contrary to Jaruzelski's assertion that he tried to keep Soviet troops out of the country, he actually counted on them to back up Polish forces in case martial law failed.

Revelations of this sort prompted some of the most dramatic interactions of the conference, such as when Jaruzelski confronted Kulikov during a break following the Marshal's denial that Moscow contemplated an invasion. In front of several witnesses, an emotional Jaruzelski said, in Russian: "You know what you said to me then. How could you let them do this to me—in front of the Americans!"

Questions about the crisis persist, of course, even about Jaruzelski. But the truly multinational, cooperative effort by scholars, archivists and others involved in this project has helped to advance our understanding of key aspects of the 1980-81 crisis. The essays that follow below both add to the growing databank and represent some of the first attempts to come to grips with the new evidence. As documentary and oral history work continues, these interpretations will no doubt themselves become grist for further debate.

Malcolm Byrne is the Deputy Director of the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and repository based at George Washington University.

¹ Under the rubric of the "Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe Project," the Archive, along with CWIHP and its other partners, have run conferences on the Prague Spring and the subsequent Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia (Prague, April 1994), the Hungarian revolution (Budapest, September 1996), and the 1953 uprising in East Germany (Potsdam, November 1996). The Archive's principal partners include: the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences; the Institute of Contemporary History and the recently-formed Center for Advanced Studies of the Anti-totalitarian Resistance of the Czech Academy of Sciences; the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution; the Civic Academy Foundation (Bucharest); the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and "Memorial" (Moscow). Generous support over the years has come mainly from the Open Society Institute, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States—in addition to local sponsors for each event.

² For a summary, CWIHP *Bulletin* readers can refer to Raymond Garthoff's report in Issue 10, pp. 229-232. Other accounts appeared in *The New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *International Herald Tribune*.

³ Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, Christian Ostermann, eds., *Poland 1980-1982 Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events* (Washington, DC: National Security

Archive, 1997).

⁴ Many scholars and archivists throughout Eastern Europe, in Russia and the United States contributed materials (and translations), all of which are available as part of the Archive/CWIHP's Russian and East European Archival Documents Database (READD) in the National Security Archive's reading room in the Gelman Library, Suite 701, 2130 H Str., NW., Washington, DC 20037. The 1980-81 collection includes hundreds of other documents obtained by the Archive through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and other sources. An early exchange of source materials on the 1980-81 crisis took place at a workshop organized by the Archive/CWIHP and Institute of Political Studies (Warsaw) in the Polish capital in August 1995.

⁵ Mark Kramer, director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, contributed (and translated) this and two other Kuklinski telegrams, among other materials, for the briefing book.

⁶ In addition to Gen. Anoshkin, other former officials who generously contributed documents were Zbigniew Brzezinski, Valerii Moussatov, and Gen. Jaruzelski.

"When foreign troops invaded our country on the night of the 20th to the 21st of August, 1968, and abducted its political representatives, something happened for which a parallel would be difficult to find in modern history. Within several hours our society began to unite quite unexpectedly in a peaceful and dignified demonstration in defense of the independence of the state and the civic freedoms that had been achieved."



"I am happy that the cooperation between the National Security Archive in Washington and the Czech foundation 'Prague Spring 1968,' has resulted in this voluminous collection of documents, which, I hope, will lead readers to a closer understanding of the dramatic events that the then Czechoslovakia lived through three decades ago."

***From the preface by Václav Havel,
President of the Czech Republic***

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Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981

By Mark Kramer

The behavior of General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the Polish crisis of 1980-81 remains a source of great controversy.

On the one hand, newly declassified documentation leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union was exerting relentless pressure on Polish leaders in 1980-81.¹ The Soviet authorities deployed many divisions of combat-ready troops around Poland's borders and in the western USSR, conducted a long series of conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed Polish officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led invasion, and made repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and multilateral channels. These various actions may have caused Jaruzelski to fear that the Soviet Army would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law. Whether Soviet leaders actually *intended* to invade is a very different matter. All the latest evidence suggests that by mid- to late 1981, Soviet officials were extremely reluctant to consider sending troops into Poland. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this new evidence, persuasive though it seems in retrospect, was unavailable at the time. In 1980-81, Polish leaders were not privy to the internal deliberations of the Soviet Politburo and could never be fully certain about Soviet intentions. Hence, they may have genuinely believed that an invasion would occur if a solution "from within" Poland (i.e., martial law) did not materialize. Indeed, Soviet leaders themselves may have *wanted* to create that impression—even if they did not intend to follow up on it—because they believed it would induce the Polish authorities to take action.² In that respect, the declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzelski's claim that he introduced martial law because he viewed it as a "tragic necessity" and the "lesser of two evils."³

On the other hand, much of the new documentary evidence raises serious doubts about Jaruzelski's veracity on this matter, and specifically about his position in December 1981 during the lead-up to martial law. First-hand accounts and newly released documents suggest that, by December 1981 (and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was reluctant to impose martial law without external (i.e., Soviet) military assistance or at least a solid guarantee that Soviet troops would move in if the martial law operation failed. The documents also suggest that Soviet leaders by then were unwilling to provide direct military support to Jaruzelski, telling him that it would be "impossible" to bring Soviet troops into Poland and that he must instead proceed with martial law on his own. Jaruzelski's failure to obtain Soviet military assistance, as revealed in the latest evidence, nearly caused him to postpone the whole

operation in the hope that he would then be given a concrete external assurance.

The notion that Jaruzelski was asking for Soviet military support in December 1981 was first propounded in September 1992 by a retired Soviet officer, Army-General Anatolii Gribkov. Gribkov had served for many years as Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact. In that capacity, he played a key role *vis-a-vis* Poland in 1980-81. Looking back on the Polish crisis in 1992, Gribkov denied that Jaruzelski imposed martial law to forestall a Soviet invasion. The Soviet general claimed that, rather than trying to stave off Soviet military intervention, Jaruzelski did just the opposite in December 1981 by repeatedly seeking a "guarantee of military assistance [from the USSR] if the situation in Poland becomes critical."⁴ The Soviet Politburo, according to Gribkov, promptly turned down the Polish leader's requests, informing him that "Soviet troops will not be sent to Poland." Gribkov noted that even after this decision was conveyed, Jaruzelski pleaded with Soviet officials to reconsider and warned them that "if military assistance is not offered, Poland will be lost to the Warsaw Pact." Gribkov surmised that Jaruzelski's last-minute pleas for a Soviet military guarantee must have reflected "the nervousness and diffidence that the top Polish leaders were feeling about their ability to carry out the plans for martial law."⁵

Gribkov's account appeared at the very time when Jaruzelski had been gaining a favorable reputation in Poland, both among the public and even among some of his former opponents such as Adam Michnik. Most Poles were willing to accept Jaruzelski's claim that he reluctantly chose the "lesser of two evils" in December 1981.⁶ Confronted by Gribkov's revelations, Jaruzelski strenuously denied that he had ever requested a Soviet military guarantee and argued that Gribkov himself had been an advocate of Soviet military pressure and intervention in 1981.⁷ An acrimonious standoff between the two men ensued.

Since that time, however, crucial evidence has emerged that seems to bear out Gribkov's article and undercut Jaruzelski's denials. This evidence includes Soviet Politburo transcripts, numerous first-hand accounts, and secret records of meetings and conversations. Until recently, the new evidence was very strong—strong enough to raise serious doubts about Jaruzelski's self-exculpatory claims—but it was not yet conclusive. That changed in November 1997, when I obtained a document that provides much clearer evidence about Jaruzelski's behavior in the lead-up to martial law.

Combined with all the previous disclosures, this document (which I have translated and annotated below) offers powerful confirmation of Gribkov's article.

Before turning to this new document, it is worth reviewing the other evidence that corroborates Gribkov's account. Some of the evidence has come from unexpected sources, including Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo during the Polish crisis. Gorbachev was and is an admirer and close friend of Jaruzelski and has described him as "a true hero" who in 1981 "had no choice" and "acted correctly."⁸ In an interview in late 1992, Gorbachev affirmed that he "always had complete trust in Jaruzelski" and had "talked to him more openly and honestly than I did with some members of the CPSU Politburo."⁹ Gorbachev also has insisted that Jaruzelski's reputation will be secure as "a Polish patriot and a man of great honor" who "saved his country."¹⁰ Hence, Gorbachev has no reason to say anything that would impugn Jaruzelski's honesty. Nor does Gorbachev have any reason to defend the reputation of those on the Soviet Politburo in 1981 who may have wanted to dispatch Soviet military forces to Poland unless Jaruzelski imposed martial law. If anything, Gorbachev might have been expected to go out of his way to substantiate Jaruzelski's claims about what happened in December 1981.

Yet in several interviews with Polish journalists in October and November 1992, Gorbachev averred that the CPSU Politburo made no threat of military intervention in December 1981, contrary to the assertions in Jaruzelski's memoirs. Gorbachev also recalled that shortly before martial law was introduced, a top Polish official (who Gorbachev deduced was Jaruzelski) had placed an urgent phone call to Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU Politburo and CPSU Secretariat who chaired the Politburo's special commission on the Polish crisis. Gorbachev maintained that Suslov had informed the Polish leader that Soviet troops would continue to protect Poland against external threats, but would not be used against internal dangers.¹¹ According to Gorbachev, Suslov's refusal to provide a military guarantee came as a shock to the Polish leader, who tried in vain to persuade Suslov to change his mind.

On all key points, Gorbachev's testimony closely parallels and reinforces Gribkov's account, even though the two men obviously did not consult with one another and were unaware of each other's comments until at least several weeks afterwards, when a controversy ensued in Poland. The accounts overlap both in their broad themes and in many of the details they contain (e.g., about Suslov's role). Because Gorbachev and Gribkov were both in a position to know first-hand about the events they described, the inadvertent similarity of their remarks enhances their credibility.

The accounts provided by Gorbachev and Gribkov were endorsed by a retired general of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB), Vitalii Pavlov, who was the

KGB station chief in Warsaw from 1973 to 1984. In a series of interviews with the Polish press in early 1993, and in his memoirs (published in Poland in 1994 and in Moscow in 1996), Pavlov argued that Jaruzelski desperately wanted an assurance of military intervention in December 1981, but that Suslov and other Soviet leaders refused to comply.¹² Pavlov claimed that Suslov had spoken with Jaruzelski by phone on December 12 and had told the Polish leader that "direct military assistance" from the Soviet Union was "out of the question," adding that "we will help you materially, financially, and politically, but not with armed force."¹³ Pavlov recalled that Yurii Andropov, a CPSU Politburo member and chairman of the KGB, sent the same message to General Czeslaw Kiszczak, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs.

The main elements of Pavlov's account were substantiated by Kiszczak himself, who is a close friend of Jaruzelski. In an interview in 1993, Kiszczak confirmed that Pavlov is one of the very few people who can speak authoritatively about the KGB's operations and Soviet policy during the Polish crisis.¹⁴ Elsewhere, Kiszczak acknowledged that Jaruzelski placed an urgent phone call to Moscow on December 12 to inquire about military "help from the allies." Because Brezhnev declined to take the phone, Jaruzelski ended up speaking with Suslov.¹⁵ Kiszczak recalled, as Pavlov did, that Suslov admonished Jaruzelski not to expect Soviet military support "under any circumstances." Although Kiszczak's recollections differ on some points from Pavlov's, the similarities between the two are striking.

These various first-hand accounts have been supplemented over the past five to six years by the release of crucial documentation in Russia, Poland, and other former Warsaw Pact countries. Although many Soviet and Polish documents have not yet been declassified, the items that have emerged lend credence to Gribkov's account of what happened in December 1981. Selected transcripts from some of the CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980-81 were released in late 1992, August 1993, and early 1994.¹⁶ A few of these transcripts, including one from 10 December 1981, bear directly on the question of Jaruzelski's stance in December 1981. Documents from some of the East European countries, notably Hungary and East Germany, also shed valuable light on the matter.¹⁷

One of the consistent themes in these documents is the lack of confidence that Jaruzelski and his close aides had about their ability to sustain martial law without external military aid. Even after mid-September 1981, when Poland's Homeland Defense Committee (*Komitet obrony kraju*, or KOK) reached a final decision at Jaruzelski's behest to proceed with martial law (leaving only the precise date to be determined), Polish leaders remained doubtful that they could handle it on their own.¹⁸ Although the Polish authorities had repeatedly assured the Soviet Union over the previous twelve months that they would "resolve the crisis with our own means," they had said this in the hope of somehow finding a political

solution that would not require the opposition to be wiped out (at least not all at once). The imposition of martial law, aimed at crushing the opposition, was an entirely different matter.

Newly released documents indicate that a few days after the KOK's watershed meeting in September 1981, "the Polish Communist leaders assessed their forces [and] found that their resources would be insufficient for this sort of action [i.e., martial law] and that the support of allied forces would therefore be needed."¹⁹ Because Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania, the head of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) from September 1980 to mid-October 1981 (when he was replaced by Jaruzelski), both realized that "direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries" would "set back the development of socialism by decades" and "would be exploited by the imperialist forces," they were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK's decision. Although Kania claimed that he would not "exclude the possibility of steps that would unavoidably require the intervention of [Poland's] allies," he was still hoping that some alternative to martial law could be found.²⁰ Kania's continued hesitancy sparked a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to "prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland."²¹ Soon thereafter, on October 18, Kania was replaced as PUWP First Secretary by Jaruzelski, under Soviet auspices. (By that point, Soviet leaders had correctly surmised that Kania was doing his best to avoid imposing martial law.)

Once Jaruzelski assumed the top party post and began making all the final preparations for martial law, his demeanor seems to have changed a good deal compared to the previous thirteen months, when he had been working with Kania. The evidence suggests that Jaruzelski increasingly sought a concrete military guarantee from the Soviet Union, a request that Soviet leaders declined to fulfill. His position on this matter was discussed at a Soviet Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981 by Andropov and the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov:

ANDROPOV: The Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from the fraternal countries. However, we need to adhere firmly to our line—that our troops will not be sent to Poland.

USTINOV: In general one might say that it would be impossible to send our troops to Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops.²²

To be sure, this passage can lend itself to different interpretations. Andropov's and Ustinov's perceptions of Jaruzelski's position may not have been fully accurate. Moreover, it is unclear precisely what Ustinov meant when he said that "the Poles are not ready to receive our troops." Most likely, he was arguing that if Soviet military units entered Poland to support Jaruzelski, they would

encounter vigorous armed resistance.²³

Even if some ambiguity about this passage remains, Andropov's and Ustinov's comments tend to bear out the view that Jaruzelski was requesting Soviet military intervention or at least the assurance of military support if the martial law operation collapsed. Their remarks also imply that Soviet leaders had no intention of sending troops to Poland (either in support of or against Jaruzelski) unless some unforeseeable circumstance arose. In both respects the transcript bears out a key episode recorded by Gribkov, who recalled that just after a Soviet Politburo session in late October 1981, he and the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, were ordered by Ustinov to inform Jaruzelski that the Poles "had better rely more on their own forces to restore order in the country and not hope that some big brother will step in and take care of everything for them."²⁴ Gribkov's recollection of this matter is especially credible because his account of it was published well before he could have seen the transcript of the Politburo meeting, which was not declassified until more than a year later.

Further evidence that Jaruzelski was hoping to receive Soviet military backing in late 1981 comes from two highly classified documents prepared by the Polish General Staff and the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of November 1981, which reviewed the ongoing preparations for martial law. One of the documents, compiled by the Polish General Staff on November 23, indicated that "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [*wojsk własnych i sojusznicych*] can be carried out fully and properly."²⁵ This phrasing does not necessarily indicate that the "allied troops" would be intervening in support of the martial law operation—after all, the Soviet Politburo had consistently emphasized that lines of communication between the USSR's Northern Group of Forces and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany must be protected—but it certainly is compatible with the notion that Polish leaders would seek external military assistance. That notion is borne out even more strongly by another document, prepared two days later by the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, which noted that "assistance from Warsaw Pact forces would not be ruled out" if the martial law operation produced widespread violent turmoil.²⁶ This position was in line with the views expressed earlier in the year by senior ministry officials, who argued that martial law would be unfeasible unless the Polish authorities received external military support.²⁷

Another indication that Jaruzelski was hoping to gain outside backing for the martial law operation came a week later, in early December 1981, when he sought an explicit Warsaw Pact statement "condemning the actions of the counterrevolution [in Poland] and the interference by NATO in [Poland's] internal affairs."²⁸ Jaruzelski was unable to travel to Moscow for a meeting of the Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on December 2-4, but in his place he sent his closest aide, the chief of the Polish

General Staff, General Florian Siwicki. Jaruzelski instructed Siwicki to urge the assembled ministers and Warsaw Pact commanders to issue a strong statement “demonstrating to the whole world that the Polish Communists are not alone.” Drafts of the proposed statement referred to “the fulfillment of alliance obligations by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states” and pledged “complete support for the Polish people” in their “struggle against counterrevolution.”²⁹ These formulations sparked a protracted discussion, but in the end the meeting failed to produce the type of statement Jaruzelski had sought. The Romanian and Hungarian defense ministers, Colonel-General Constantin Olteanu and Army-General Lajos Csinege, argued that their governments had not given them authority to endorse such a statement, and the other ministers decided it would be inadvisable to release a document that was not approved unanimously.³⁰

When Siwicki informed Jaruzelski about the disappointing results of the meeting, the Polish leader complained that “the allies have forced us into an impasse” and “left us on our own.”³¹ He could not understand why “the allies do not want to shoulder any of the responsibility even though they have constantly asserted that the Polish problem is a problem for the whole Warsaw Pact, not just for Poland.” Jaruzelski added that he was “still hoping for a miracle,” but could sense that his “options [were] running out.”³² Implicit in all these comments was Jaruzelski’s distinct lack of confidence that martial law could be imposed without external military support.

Even more intriguing, for an assessment of Jaruzelski’s position in late 1981, is the transcript of a Soviet Politburo meeting on December 10, barely two days before martial law was imposed. A number of the participants in the meeting were dismayed that Jaruzelski was seeking—or at least they believed he was seeking—a military guarantee. Among those putting forth this view was Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-bloc affairs, who had been keeping close track of the situation from Moscow and was the main contact point in December 1981 for high-ranking Soviet officials in Poland who needed to convey information to, or receive instructions from, the CPSU Politburo:

Jaruzelski intends to stay in close touch about this matter [martial law] with his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up by “Solidarity,” the Polish comrades *hope* to receive assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the territory of Poland.³³

Rusakov noted that “Jaruzelski, in expressing this hope, has been citing remarks by Com. Kulikov, who supposedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I know, Com. Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the

words voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in the lurch.”³⁴

If Jaruzelski was indeed citing Kulikov at this point, as Rusakov reported, that would be interesting in itself. It is possible that Kulikov did in fact say something to Jaruzelski on December 8—if only inadvertently—that seemed (in Jaruzelski’s view) to be a pledge of Soviet military assistance if the martial law operation collapsed. During at least one previous occasion when Kulikov was in Poland in 1981 he brought up this very matter with Jaruzelski. In a conversation with East German military officials on 7 April 1981, Kulikov said he had indicated to Jaruzelski and Kania a few days earlier that “unless [the Polish authorities] used the Polish security organs and army [to impose martial law], outside support could not be expected because of the international complications that would arise.” Kulikov said he “emphasized to the Polish comrades that they must first seek to resolve their problems on their own.” However, he was careful to add that “if the Polish authorities tried to resolve these problems on their own and were unable to, and were then to ask [the Soviet Union] for assistance, that would be a very different situation from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed [to Poland] from the outset.”³⁵ Kulikov probably did not intend these remarks to be an ironclad pledge of a Soviet military guarantee, but he certainly may have given Jaruzelski and Kania the *impression* (whether rightly or wrongly) in April 1981 that they could count on Soviet military help if the martial law operation went awry. Although there is no evidence that Kulikov said something identical when he met with Jaruzelski in December 1981, Jaruzelski may have construed some of Kulikov’s remarks at that time as a reaffirmation of what Kulikov had been saying to him earlier in the year. A misunderstanding in a tense situation like this would hardly be unusual. (Nor is it inconceivable that Kulikov mistakenly went beyond his brief in December 1981 and gave Jaruzelski the wrong idea about Soviet policy.)

Whatever the case may be, Jaruzelski’s invocation of Kulikov’s remarks (as Jaruzelski interpreted them) tends to bear out the hypothesis that—at least in Rusakov’s view—the Polish leader expected and wanted to receive Soviet military backing.

That same inference can be drawn from a comment by Yurii Andropov at the December 10 meeting of the Soviet Politburo. Andropov voiced dismay that “Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our willingness to offer . . . military assistance,” and he urged his colleagues to resist any temptation to fulfill Jaruzelski’s request:

Although we support the notion of internationalist assistance and are alarmed by the situation in Poland, the matter must entirely and unequivocally be handled by the Polish comrades themselves. We do not intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end.³⁶

Andropov's sentiments were echoed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who argued that "we must somehow try to dispel the notion that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland have about the introduction of [Soviet] troops. There cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate it to him."³⁷ Andropov's and Gromyko's statements were endorsed by others at the meeting, all of whom agreed that Jaruzelski's last-minute effort to receive external military support for the martial law operation should not induce the Soviet Politburo to alter its stance.

Taken together, the documents and memoirs that were just cited provide powerful evidence that Jaruzelski was calling for and expecting Soviet troops to be sent to Poland in December 1981. Even so, a number of doubts—or at least differences of interpretation—could remain. For example, one could argue, after poring over these materials, that Soviet leaders might have misperceived Jaruzelski's actions, or that Jaruzelski was raising the question of Soviet military intervention not because he wanted it to occur, but because he was probing Soviet intentions. One also might argue that without precise records of what Jaruzelski was doing and saying at the time, it would be impossible to reconstruct his motives with any certainty.

Fortunately, a first-hand, contemporaneous record of Jaruzelski's behavior in the last few days before martial law—including his repeated requests for Soviet military support and the consternation he felt when those requests were turned down—is now finally available. It turns out that Marshal Kulikov's personal adjutant, Lieutenant-General Viktor Anoshkin, kept daily notes of Kulikov's phone calls, telegrams, conversations, and meetings.³⁸ As Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, Kulikov had been a frequent envoy to Poland throughout the 1980-81 crisis, performing sensitive missions on behalf of the CPSU Politburo. He and Anoshkin had been in Warsaw in late November 1981 when the final preparations for martial law were completed, and they were again in Poland from 7 to 17 December 1981, when the preparations were transformed into action. Anoshkin's records of Kulikov's interactions with Jaruzelski in the lead-up to martial law show that Jaruzelski wanted and requested Soviet military assistance, and that he was distraught when Soviet leaders informed him that no troops would be sent.

Among other things, Anoshkin's notebook reveals that Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev early in the morning of December 10, right after a late-night meeting at the Polish General Staff where Jaruzelski and other top Polish military commanders unanimously approved a final decision to proceed with martial law.³⁹ The Polish leader informed Brezhnev that the decision had been adopted, and he then asked "whether Poland can count on [Soviet] military assistance if the situation in the country becomes critical." Brezhnev evaded a direct response, but just a few hours later Kulikov received specific instructions from

Ustinov to let Jaruzelski know that "the Poles themselves must resolve the Polish question. We are not preparing to send troops onto the territory of Poland." When Jaruzelski received this message, he expressed concern that "you [the Soviet Union] are distancing yourselves from us," and he tried to find out whether the decision could be reversed.⁴⁰

The following day, Jaruzelski sent an urgent request to Moscow via the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov. In that cable, the Polish leader again flatly asked: "Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR—the additional sending of troops?" Rusakov promptly transmitted a response to Warsaw: "No troops will be sent." When Aristov informed Jaruzelski that his request had been turned down, the Polish leader exclaimed: "This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went on—now everything is gone!" Jaruzelski's comment here, as recorded by Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader's stance in December 1981 than do all other documents combined. Any notion that Jaruzelski was simply probing Soviet intentions no longer seems tenable.

Jaruzelski's profound disappointment upon learning that he would not receive external military assistance was due to his continued lack of confidence that the martial law operation would succeed. According to Kania, Jaruzelski had long feared that chaotic turmoil might ensue and that Polish units would be unable to cope with violent upheavals on their own.⁴¹ He was convinced that if opposition forces withstood the "first stage" of the crackdown, the whole operation would collapse unless external aid were forthcoming. Although Jaruzelski may have "continued to hope for a miracle" (as he himself put it in a conversation with Siwicki), he could no longer contain his misgivings when the decisive moment arrived in December 1981. Having led himself to believe that the "first stage" of the operation would be unsuccessful, he desperately hoped that Soviet troops would come bail him out, just as Gribkov had claimed.

When Jaruzelski suddenly realized that "the Poles [would] have to fend for themselves," he seemed at a loss about what to do. Rather than steeling himself for the impending martial law crackdown, he repeatedly tried to persuade Soviet leaders to change their minds. In addition to conveying his "great concern" to Kulikov that "no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale . . . military assistance," Jaruzelski spoke by secure telephone with Andropov, warning him that military support was urgently needed. These overtures, however, bore no fruit, as Andropov bluntly informed the Polish leader that "there can be no consideration at all of sending [Soviet] troops."

Following this second rebuff, Jaruzelski was more unnerved than ever. Soviet officials had already been complaining, at the CPSU Politburo meeting on December 10, that Jaruzelski seemed "extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities" and was "back to his vacillations" and "lack of resolution."⁴² Those qualities became even more

pronounced after the exchanges on December 11. At Jaruzelski's behest, Siwicki met with Kulikov on the evening of the 11th and warned him that "we cannot embark on any adventurist actions [*avantyyura*] if the Soviet comrades will not support us." Siwicki noted that Jaruzelski seemed "very upset and very nervous," and that "psychologically, . . . Jaruzelski has gone to pieces [*rasstroen*]." Siwicki emphasized that Jaruzelski would rather "postpone the introduction of [martial law] by a day" than proceed without Soviet military backing.

The possibility of delaying the crackdown had already been broached by Jaruzelski the previous day in an exchange with Konstantin Rusakov. Rusakov informed the Soviet Politburo on December 10 that Jaruzelski was "not presenting a clear, straightforward line" about the date of "Operation X," the code name in Moscow for the martial law operation:

No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was changed to the night of the 12th and 13th. And now they're already saying it won't be until around the 20th.⁴³

Actually, Siwicki was proposing to defer the martial law crackdown by only a day—indeed, he emphasized several times that a delay of more than a day would be infeasible—but Rusakov may have suspected that a daylong postponement would be extended indefinitely.

In any case, Kulikov's discussion with Siwicki reveals that Jaruzelski's motivation for a possible delay, of whatever length, was to persuade Soviet leaders to send troops to Poland. The implication was that if the Soviet Union failed to respond, the whole operation might have to be called off. Underscoring this point, Siwicki declared: "[I]f there will be no . . . military support from the USSR, our country might be lost for the Warsaw Pact. Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step [of imposing martial law]." All these statements are essentially identical to comments recorded by Gribkov in his 1992 article.⁴⁴

In response, Kulikov argued that the martial law operation would succeed if Jaruzelski implemented it as planned, and he sought to disabuse Siwicki of the idea of postponing the operation. The Soviet marshal pointed out that Polish leaders had repeatedly "insisted that Poland is able to resolve its problems on its own," and that Soviet officials had accepted and agreed with that view. Kulikov expressed dismay that Jaruzelski's position had now changed: "Why has this question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law." Kulikov added that "you carried out a great deal of work in preparing for the introduction of martial law" and "you have enough strength" to succeed. "It's now time to act," he argued. "The date should not be postponed, and indeed a

postponement is now impossible." Kulikov also expressed concern that the talk about a postponement and about the need for Soviet military support might signify that Jaruzelski was backing away from his "final decision" to impose martial law. "If that is so," Kulikov declared, "we would like to know about it."

Siwicki assured Kulikov that "the decision has been made," and that Jaruzelski was not going to renege on his plans to introduce martial law. At the same time, he emphasized, once again, that "without [military] help from outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles," to sustain martial law. Siwicki said that both he and Jaruzelski hoped that Soviet leaders would "look upon these matters with understanding" and would "consider [our] requests," but Kulikov displayed no inclination to consider any changes in the earlier arrangements, which stipulated that Polish units would introduce martial law on their own. By the time the meeting ended, Siwicki had pledged to embark on "a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution," as Soviet leaders had long demanded. Even so, Anoshkin could tell that "Siwicki left here dissatisfied because he got nothing new and heard nothing new from [Kulikov]."

The extent of the Polish leaders' continued nervousness and dissatisfaction became clear the following day (December 12) as the hour approached for the introduction of martial law. Despite what had happened over the previous two days, Jaruzelski was still urging the Soviet Union to "provide military help." So insistent were Jaruzelski's pleas that Kulikov began to suspect that the Polish leader was trying to "make the introduction of martial law dependent on the fulfillment of [his demand for Soviet intervention]." Although Soviet officials eventually were able to convince Jaruzelski that no direct military support would be forthcoming, the fate of the martial law operation seemed in doubt just hours before the crackdown was due to begin. Arrangements had even been made for a high-level Soviet delegation, led by Suslov, to fly to Warsaw for urgent consultations at Jaruzelski's request, but at the last minute this visit was called off, apparently because Suslov's phone conversation with Jaruzelski obviated the need for a direct visit.

Anoshkin's notebook continues after December 12 into early 1982, reporting on the martial law crackdown and the various units involved. But on the specific question of what Jaruzelski was seeking in the lead-up to martial law, the crucial entries are the ones Anoshkin jotted down on December 11 and 12, as translated below. These notes, combined with the other evidence mentioned above, overwhelmingly suggest that Jaruzelski's role in December 1981 was very different from the portrayal he offers in his memoirs. Far from having "saved" Poland from a Soviet invasion, Jaruzelski was desperately promoting the very thing he now claims to have prevented.

None of this is meant to gloss over the excruciating pressure that Jaruzelski had been encountering throughout

the crisis. From the fall of 1980 on, Soviet leaders had kept up a relentless campaign of intimidation and belligerent reproaches. It would have taken enormous strength and courage to withstand that pressure. Kania was not a particularly strong leader, but somehow he was continually able to defer the implementation of martial law. He repeatedly assured Brezhnev that “decisive measures” would soon be imposed, but invariably he refrained from carrying out his pledges. Jaruzelski in some ways was a stronger figure than Kania, but, unlike Kania, he was willing in the end to comply with Moscow’s demands. His compliance initially gave rise to final preparations for the “lesser of two evils”—that is, martial law—but when the critical moment came in late 1981, he seems to have embraced the “greater of two evils,” Soviet military intervention. By December 1981 (and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was pleading with Soviet leaders to send troops into Poland to assist with the martial law operation, and by all indications he was devastated when his requests were turned down. For Jaruzelski, it seems, Soviet interests ultimately took precedence over all else.

The evidence provided by the Anoshkin notebook and by the other materials cited above will serve an especially useful purpose if it prompts Jaruzelski and Siwicki to seek the declassification of Polish documents that would shed additional light on the events of December 1981. Jaruzelski’s and Siwicki’s own contemporaneous records of their meetings and conversations with Soviet officials during that crucial period have not yet been made available (assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with). It is at least remotely possible that such materials, if they exist, would result in a more favorable assessment of the Polish leaders’ actions.

Jaruzelski, in particular, should have a strong incentive to pursue the release of new documents, for he is well aware that the issue is of more than purely historical or scholarly interest. Since leaving office in December 1990, Jaruzelski has been viewed with respect, even admiration, by a majority of Poles. Although charges were filed against him in the early 1990s for his role in imposing martial law, and although he was required to testify a number of times before the Polish Sejm’s Commission for Constitutional Oversight, the last of the charges relating to the 1980-81 crisis were dropped in 1996, when the Sejm voted to pardon Jaruzelski and other former leaders who had been due to go on trial for violating the constitution.⁴⁵ (Separate charges were retained against Kiszczak and 22 former members of the security forces for one specific incident—the deaths of miners in Katowice on 13 December 1981—but all the defendants were eventually acquitted.) After the September 1997 parliamentary elections in Poland, a court in Gdansk proposed to resume its proceedings against Jaruzelski and four other former officials, but this case pertained only to the shootings of workers in December 1970. No suggestion was made of reinstating charges related to the 1981 crackdown.

No doubt, the lenient treatment of Jaruzelski has been based primarily on a widespread belief that he did indeed choose the “lesser of two evils” in December 1981 and spared his country great bloodshed and a military occupation. That view may yet be borne out. But if, as the evidence above suggests, Jaruzelski was actually urging, rather than opposing, Soviet military intervention in late 1981, his status in Poland today—not to mention his place in history—deserves a full-scale reassessment.

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¹ A preliminary discussion of the new evidence is Mark Kramer, “Poland, 1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126. A much more extensive analysis will be presented in my forthcoming CUIHP Working Paper.

² For example, at a Soviet Politburo meeting in January 1981, Soviet defense minister Dmitrii Ustinov argued that “constant pressure on the Polish leadership” would not work unless “we make clear that we have forces ready” to move in at short notice. Cited from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 22 yanvarya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki delegatsii partiinykh rabotnikov KPSS vo glave L. M. Zamyatynym v Pol’shu,” 22 January 1981 (Top Secret), in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis’ (Op.) 42, Delo (D.), 36, List (L.) 5. Similarly, at a Politburo meeting on 16 April 1981, the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, said it was “necessary to exert constant pressure” on the Polish authorities through political contacts and the staging of military exercises, though he added that “we should not harass them needlessly or increase the level of tension so much that they would just give up.” Cited from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 g.: O razgovore L. I. Brezhneva s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP S. Kanei (po telefonu),” 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 1-3.

³ This has been the basic theme of all of Jaruzelski’s comments on the subject since late 1991, including his two volumes of memoirs: *Stan wojenny dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); and *Les chaines et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992). Until 1990, Jaruzelski staunchly denied that the Soviet Union had intended to invade Poland in 1981; and even as late as September 1991, in an interview in *Novoe vremya* (Moscow), No. 38 (21 September 1991), pp. 26-30, he was evasive about the matter. No doubt, his discretion prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union was attributable to his long-standing deference to Soviet wishes.

⁴ Army-General A. I. Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva” i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 52.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, *Opinie o generalu Jaruzelskim i pulkowniku Kuklinskim* (Warsaw: CBOS, October 1992), pp. 1-4. See also Leonid Kornilov, “Dlya bol’shinstva polyakov Yaruzel’skii ostaetsya patriotom,” *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 30 October 1992, p. 5.

⁷ “Ironiczny grymas historii,” *Prawo i zycie* (Warsaw), No. 49 (December 1992), p. 11.

⁸"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil prawidlowo," *Trybuna* (Warsaw), 9 November 1992, pp. 1, 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁰M. S. Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1996), vol. 2, pp. 336-351.

¹¹"Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce," p. 2. See also "Wywiad z Michaiłem Gorbaczowem: 'Jestem inny, niz probuja mnie przedstawic'," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 23 October 1992, p. 9.

¹²Among the interviews, see "Dostep do wszystkiego," *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15; and Leon Bojko, "A wejsc nie chcieli?" *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 10 February 1993, p. 6. The Polish version of Pavlov's memoirs is *Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1994); the Russian version is *Operatsiya "Sneg": Polveka vo vneshnei razvedke KGB* (Moscow: TOO-Geya, 1996).

¹³*Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce*, p. 185.

¹⁴"Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak," *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15.

¹⁵Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., *General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 129-130.

¹⁶Most, but not all, of the declassified transcripts are stored in Fond 89 at TsKhSD. My annotated translations of an initial batch (as well as my translations of some East German documents) appeared in "Declassified Documents on the Polish Crisis," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* No.5 (Spring 1995), pp. 117, 129-139.

¹⁷A sample of these documents was included in a briefing book edited by Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz and Christian Ostermann, for the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," in Jachranka, Poland in November 1997, which was co-organized by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and the Institute for Political Studies (ISP) in Warsaw. Many other documents pertaining to the 1980-81 Polish crisis are stored in the Magyar Orszagos Leveltar (MOL) in Budapest, the Statni Ustredni Archiv (SUA) in Prague, the Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) in Prague, the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED (SAPMDB/ZPA) in Berlin, the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium für Staatssicherheit Zentralarchiv (BUS-MSZ) in Berlin, the Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (MZA) in Potsdam, the Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv (TsDA) in Sofia, and the Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman (Arh. CCPCR) in Bucharest. A useful selection of relevant documents from the former East German archives can be found in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "*Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen*," *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).

¹⁸For a complete record of the KOK meeting on 13 September 1981, see the handwritten notes by General Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, "Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981 r.," 13 September 1981, now stored in Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (CAW), Posiedzenia Kok, Teczka Sygn. 48. A translation of this document was published as an appendix in Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, *On The Decision To Introduce Martial Law In Poland In 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper 21 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997). Tuczapski

was the only one at the meeting who was permitted to take notes. Until his 10-page account was released at the Jachranka conference in November 1997, it was generally thought that no formal record of the meeting had been kept. The importance of the KOK meeting was first disclosed by Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in his lengthy interview, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 32-33. Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff and a top aide to Jaruzelski in 1980-81, was part of a small group responsible for planning the martial law operation. He also was a crucial intelligence source for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), having provided invaluable information to the West since the early 1970s about Warsaw Pact military developments. (He had to escape from Poland in early November 1981, and now lives in the United States.) Several years after the interview with Kuklinski appeared, Stanislaw Kania briefly discussed the KOK meeting in his memoirs (after being asked about it by the interviewer who compiled the book); see *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 110-111. More recently, it has come to light that Kuklinski sent a long cable to the CIA on 15 September 1981—two days after the KOK meeting—outlining the plans for martial law and warning that Operation "Wiosna" (the codename of the martial law crackdown) would soon follow. In May 1997, with help from Richard T. Davies, the former U.S. ambassador to Poland, I obtained a copy of the Polish text of Kuklinski's cable and then translated it for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference and this issue of the *Bulletin*.

¹⁹"Jelentes a MSzMP Politikai Bizottsagnak," memorandum from Jozsef Garamvolgyi, Hungarian ambassador in Poland, to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 19 September 1981 (Top Secret), in MOL, 288, F. 11/4400, o.e., fol. 128-134. This document records a conversation with Kania and exchanges between Kania and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar.

²⁰*Ibid.*, fol. 133-134.

²¹"Oswiadczenie KC KPZR i rządu ZSRR przedstawione kierownictwu KC PZPR i rządu PRL," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 18 September 1981, p. 1.

²²"Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki K. V. Rusakova v GDR, ChSSR, VNR i BPR," 29 October 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, Ll. 3-4.

²³A contingency plan devised in 1980 would have brought up to fifteen Soviet divisions into Poland to "provide military assistance." Ostensibly, the Soviet troops would have been taking part in military exercises, but in reality they would have joined with the Polish army and security forces to impose a crackdown. The plan evidently was conceived as early as August 1980 (see my translation below of a key Soviet document from 28 August 1980), and preparations for it gained momentum in early December 1980, as is evident from the cable that Kuklinski sent to the United States at that point (which I also have translated below). Subsequently, the contingency plan was updated and refined, becoming a full-fledged operational plan. In mid-1981, according to Vitalii Pavlov (in *Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce*, p. 219), the operational plan was largely set aside; but as late as the fall of 1981 Soviet military planners evidently retained—at least on paper—the option of sending Soviet troops into Polish territory under the guise of military exercises scheduled for November 1981. The existence of the updated plan was divulged to the U.S. government in the fall of 1981 by two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officials who defected, Colonel Jerzy Suminski and Colonel Wladyslaw

Ostaszewicz. See the comments of General Czeslaw Kiszczak, who had been head of Polish military intelligence until he became minister of internal affairs in 1981, in Beres and Skoczylas, eds., *General Kiszczak mowi*, pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until well into December 1981, though he emphasizes that Soviet leaders never decided whether they would implement it if martial law collapsed. See “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 54-56.

²⁴ “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” p. 56.

²⁵ “Notatka w sprawie najwazniejszych przedsiwziec wykonanych w Silach Zbrojnych od lipca br. w sferze przygotowan do ewentualnego wprowadzenia stanu wojennego,” 23 November 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygnatura (Sygn.) 1813/92/1 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for providing me with a copy of this document and the next two documents cited here. See Paczkowski’s own brief but illuminating discussion in *O Stanie Wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 134-152.

²⁶ “Zalacznik Nr. 2: Zamierzenia resortu spraw wewnetrznych,” attachment to Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych, “Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w kraju wg. stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.,” 25 November 1981 (Secret/Special Dossier), in Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (CA/MSW), Sygn. 228/1B, L. 19.

²⁷ Comments by Miroslaw Milewski, then-Minister of Internal Affairs, transcribed in “Ocena sytuacji operacyjno-politycznej,” 12 June 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygn. 2308/IV.

²⁸ Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 50-51. A more detailed, contemporaneous account of this meeting is available in “Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau,” GVS-Nr. A 465 831 (Strictly Secret/Special Classification), 5 December 1981, from Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, East German minister of defense, to Erich Honecker, in MZA, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32641, Bl. 313-316.

²⁹ See “Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 1—Vorschlag, der am 03.12.1981 beraten wurde” and “Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 2—Vorschlag, der am 04.12.1981 beraten wurde,” 3 December 1981 and 4 December 1981, respectively, attached as appendices to Hoffmann’s report cited in the previous note.

³⁰ “Bericht über die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau.” See also Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” pp. 50-51.

³¹ Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 378-379. See also the comments by Siwicki and Jaruzelski in “Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.,” 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a ‘Solidarnosc,’ 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 555, 567-568.

³² Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 379.

³³ “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’she,” 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 6, L. 5 (emphasis added).

³⁴ *Ibid.* On both 7 and 8 December 1981, Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev, who assured the Polish leader that “the Soviet Union will not leave Poland in the lurch” (Sovetskii Soyuz

ne ostavit v bede Pol’shu), a formulation that Soviet officials had frequently used during the crisis (along with the nearly identical formulation of Sovetskii Soyuz ne dast v obidu Pol’shu—that is, “the Soviet Union will stick up for Poland.”). On December 9, Jaruzelski and other high-ranking Polish military officers, including all the top General Staff officers, deputy defense ministers, military district commanders, and service commanders, held a late-night meeting in the Polish General Staff building, where they reached a final decision to proceed with martial law. Evidently, Brezhnev’s rather vague statement of the previous day had been viewed—at least temporarily—as a sufficient basis on which to act. See Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 387-394; and the entries for 8 and 9 December 1981 in “Rabochaya tetrad’” No. 5, by Lieutenant-General V. I. Anoshkin, adjutant to Marshal Kulikov. (This document will be discussed and cited at greater length below.)

³⁵ Quoted from “Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübung ‘SOJUS 81’,” Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-Potsdam, AZN 32642, Bl. 54.

³⁶ “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” L. 7.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Ll. 8-9.

³⁸ Each “working notebook” (*rabochaya tetrad’*) that Anoshkin kept was given a number, reflecting the chronological order of a particular theme. The relevant notebook for December 1981 and early 1982 was No. 5. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in the next ten paragraphs are from that notebook.

³⁹ This entry for December 10 is not translated below because Anoshkin did not permit me to photocopy the relevant page. However, he did permit me to take brief notes of what appeared there. The final decision on martial law was prefigured at meetings of the PUWP Politburo on December 5 and of the Polish Council of Ministers on December 7, but the actual decision was adopted by the top military command, not by the PUWP Politburo. The session of the PUWP Politburo on December 5 (No. 18) was the last one before the imposition of martial law. In his adjourning comments at the meeting, Jaruzelski affirmed that “at today’s session of the Politburo we will not make any final decision.” See “Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.,” 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, p. 568. The meeting of the Polish Council of Ministers two days later also left the final decision to be approved by the military High Command on December 9. When Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev on the evening of December 7, he acknowledged that “a final decision has not yet been adopted.” See Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 387-388, as well as Jaruzelski’s first-hand account of the meeting on December 9 in *ibid.*, pp. 391-394. See also the entries in Anoshkin’s notebook for December 7-10. Interestingly enough, after Jaruzelski informed Soviet leaders on December 10 about the “final decision,” they mistakenly inferred that it had been approved by the PUWP Politburo. See “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 5-7.

⁴⁰ This same statement is recorded, word for word, in Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” p. 55.

⁴¹ Conversation in Jachranka, Poland, 10 November 1997, between Kania and Thomas S. Blanton of the National Security Archive. No doubt, one of the reasons for Jaruzelski’s lack of

confidence was his concern about the impact of Colonel Kuklinski's defection. According to Gribkov, Kuklinski's departure "forced the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to set about hurriedly reworking some aspects of the plans for martial law" ("Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," p. 49), but even after these changes were made, Jaruzelski feared that Solidarity would be fully tipped off about the details and timing of the operation, and would be ready to put up armed resistance. Soviet leaders shared some of Jaruzelski's concerns, but they believed that the martial law operation could still succeed if it were implemented forcefully enough. As it turned out, the concerns about a tip-off to Solidarity were largely unfounded. Even if the U.S. government had provided greater information to Solidarity, the timetable of the operation was not finalized until 9 December 1981, five weeks after Kuklinski left.

⁴²Comments by Nikolai Baibakov, Andrei Gromyko, and

Dmitrii Ustinov, recorded in "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4, 10, 12.

⁴³Ibid., L. 6.

⁴⁴See, in particular, Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 55-56.

⁴⁵For intriguing excerpts from the opening rounds of testimony by Jaruzelski and other former officials, see Anna Karas, ed., *Sad nad autorami stanu wojennego: Oskarzenia/wyjasnienia/obrona—przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). On the parliament's extension of a pardon, see "Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later.

Preface to the Translation of the Anoshkin Notebook

By Mark Kramer

A few comments are in order about the provenance and translation of these pages from General Anoshkin's notebook.

It had been known for some time that Anoshkin was present during Marshal Kulikov's meetings with General Jaruzelski in Poland in 1980-81. In a book published in 1995, another Soviet general who took part in some of the meetings described a typical scene:

The leader of Poland, Wojciech Jaruzelski, would come to the Helenow castle just south of Warsaw, where Kulikov, after receiving periodic instructions from Moscow, would hold arduous conversations with the clever Pole. General V. Anoshkin and I would sit on either side of the marshal.¹

What had not been known until very recently, however, is that Anoshkin kept notebooks with records of Kulikov's meetings, phone calls, and conversations in 1981.

The existence of these notebooks was first disclosed at the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," which was co-organized in Jachranka, Poland on 8-10 November 1997 by the Cold War International History Project, the National Security Archive, and the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kulikov and Anoshkin were among the participants. At one point during the conference, Kulikov referred in passing to Anoshkin's notebooks. As soon as the session ended, several participants went over to Anoshkin and asked him whether they could see the notebook that Kulikov had mentioned. Anoshkin took a red, hardbound volume out of his briefcase and showed us the page with notes of events that Kulikov had been discussing. Anoshkin pointed out the significance of a few phrases and explained to us when particular entries had been recorded. He answered questions I had about

the different types of ink and different handwriting.

When I asked Anoshkin for permission to photocopy the notebook, he initially demurred, but we then spoke with Marshal Kulikov, who gave his consent. I am grateful to Anoshkin and Kulikov for allowing me to photocopy pages from the notebook. I am also grateful to them for allowing me to publish the translation of those pages.

Unfortunately, the aging photocopy machine at the Jachranka facility was too slow for me to copy all the pages, but I was able to look through the entire notebook and ask Anoshkin questions about it. I asked him a few additional questions about it when I was in Moscow in March 1998.

Both in Jachranka and after returning to the United States, I went carefully over the notebook (including the pages I was unable to photocopy) to ensure that it was authentic. I cross-checked the entries with other newly declassified materials, and I asked Anoshkin several questions about specific points in the notes. In no case did I find even the slightest reason to doubt the authenticity of the document. Based on my scrutiny of the notebook and Anoshkin's extreme reluctance to let me photocopy it, I am fully confident that the document is precisely what it purports to be, namely a record of Kulikov's dealings in Poland in December 1981.

Anoshkin's notebook was very difficult to translate because of the frequent illegibility of his handwriting, the idiosyncratic abbreviations he used, and the enigmatic quality of some of his transliterations of Polish surnames and place names. At times I was forced to spend many hours poring over a few lines. Even after I became accustomed to Anoshkin's handwriting, the translation was onerous work. The finished product below is the result of more than ten preliminary drafts, which I extensively revised and smoothed out. I have tried to replicate the style and flavor of the original as best as possible, but for clarity's sake I have used full words to

translate a few Russian abbreviations and acronyms that would be incomprehensible in English. I also have included annotations to point out certain features of the text and to identify or comment on events that Anoshkin discusses. In addition, I have compiled a list of people [printed above] mentioned in the notebook, indicating the

main positions they held in December 1981. The list omits a few individuals of minor importance, but all key Polish and Soviet officials are identified there.

Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the

Key Individuals Mentioned In The Anoshkin Notebook

Positions listed are those held in December 1981

ANDROPOV, Yurii Vladimirovich — Chairman of the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB); member of the CPSU Politburo; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

ANOSHKIN, Lieutenant-General Viktor Ivanovich — personal adjutant to Marshal Kulikov

ARISTOV, Boris Ivanovich — Soviet Ambassador in Poland

BAIBAKOV, Nikolai Konstantinovich — Chief of Soviet State Planning Administration

BORISOV, Colonel-General Grigorii Ivanovich — Deputy Chief for Political Affairs, USSR's Communication Forces

BREZHNEV, Leonid Il'ich — CPSU General Secretary

BUJAK, Zbigniew — charismatic union organizer and leading official in the Warsaw branch of Solidarity

CHERNENKO, Konstantin Ustinovich — Member of the CPSU Politburo and CPSU Secretariat; Head of the CPSU CC General Department; long-time aide to Leonid Brezhnev; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

DZUR, General Martin — Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense

EMELYANOV, Colonel Fyodor Dmitrievich — Chief, Staff Political Department, Volga Military District

FEDOROV, Lieutenant-General Konstantin Vladimirovich — Deputy Chief, Central Military Medical Directorate

GROMYKO, Andrei Andreevich — Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; member of the CPSU Politburo; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

GURUNOV, Colonel Svet Semenovich — Officer for the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet General Staff

HUPALOWSKI, Division-General Tadeusz — First Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

HUSAK, Gustav — General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party

JANCZYSZYN, Admiral Ludwik — Commander of the Polish Navy; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

JARUZELSKI, Army-General Wojciech — General Secretary, Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP); Polish Prime Minister; Polish Minister of National Defense; Chairman of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

JASINSKI, Division-General Antoni — Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff

KHOMENKO, Major-General Aleksandr Andreevich — Soviet military, naval, and air attache in Poland; Soviet GRU station chief in Warsaw

KREPSKI, Division-General Tadeusz — Commander of the Polish Air Force; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

KRYUCHKOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich — Deputy Chairman of the Soviet KGB; Chief, KGB First Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence)

KULIKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Georgievich — Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeevich — Soviet KGB deputy station chief in Warsaw

LOZOWICKI, Division-General Longin — Commander of Polish Air Defense Forces; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

MEREZHKO, Colonel-General Anatolii Grigor'evich — Deputy Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

MICHNIK, Adam — Polish historian and leading Solidarity intellectual

MIKHAILIN, Admiral Vladimir Vasil'evich — Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Naval Forces, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

MILEWSKI, Miroslaw — Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, October 1980-July 1981; member of the PUWP Politburo and PUWP Secretariat from July 1981

director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies. is the director of the Harvard Project of Cold War Studies at the Davis Center

¹Colonel-General Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Sem' vozhdai: Galereya liderov SSSR*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. 2, p. 64. A more recent collection of Volkogonov's unfinished memoirs and

writings, *Etyudy o vremeni* (Moscow: Novosti, 1998), offers a few additional comments (on pp. 82 and 90-91) about the meetings at Helenow between Kulikov and Jaruzelski in 1981, which Anoshkin and Volkogonov attended. Volkogonov writes that they received "detailed instructions by coded telegram every day from Moscow specifying what to do and say," and that Kulikov "in turn sent coded telegrams back to Moscow, spoke by secure telephone, and submitted reports" to the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov.

...Key Individuals Continued

MOLCZYK, General of Arms Eugeniusz — Polish Deputy Minister of National Defense; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

NAZAROV, Colonel Vadim Mikhailovich — Chief, Sanatorium and Health Resort Department, Central Military Medical Directorate

OGARKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Vasil'evich — Chief of the Soviet General Staff; Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense

OLIWA, Division-General Wlodzimierz — member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation; Presidium member of League for Defense of the Homeland

PASZKOWSKI, Division-General Roman — Governor of Katowice Province (installed with the introduction of martial law)

PAVLOV, Vitalii Grigor'evich — Soviet KGB station chief in Warsaw

PROSKURIN, Colonel Mikhail Vasil'evich — Soviet GRU officer

PUCHALA, Colonel Franciszek — Deputy Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff

RAKHMANNIN, Oleg Borisovich — First Deputy Head of the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries; and member of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

RAPACEWICZ, Division-General Henryk — Commander of Poland's Silesian Military District; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

RUSAKOV, Konstantin Viktorovich — CPSU Secretary; Head of the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries

SHCHEGLOV, Army-General Afanasii Fedorovich — Representative in Poland of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

SIWICKI, General of Arms Florian — Chief, Polish General Staff; Polish First Deputy Minister of National Defense; Candidate Member of the PUWP Politburo; member of Poland's

Military Council for National Salvation

SKACHKOV, Semyon Andreevich — Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations

SKALSKI, Division-General Jerzy — Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff

SOLOV'EV, Colonel Viktor Kirillovich — Chief, Food Supply Department, USSR's Northern Group of Forces

SPIRIN, Vasili Vasil'evich — Charge d'Affaires at Soviet embassy in Poland

SUSLOV, Mikhail Andreevich — Member of the CPSU Politburo; CPSU Secretary responsible for ideology, international affairs, and many other issues; Head of the CPSU Politburo's Commission on the Polish Crisis

SZKLARSKI, General Wacław — Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff

TERESHCHENKO, Colonel-General Mikhail Nikitovich — First Deputy Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces

TITOV, Major-General Igor Nikolaevich — First Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, Volga Military District

TUCZAPSKI, Army-General Tadeusz — Polish Deputy Minister of National Defense; coordinator of martial law planning; member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

USTINOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitrii Fedorovich — Soviet Minister of Defense; Member of the CPSU Politburo

UZYCKI, Division-General Jozef — member of Poland's Military Council for National Salvation

WALESA, Lech — founding leader of Solidarity

ZARUDIN, Colonel-General Yurii Fedorovich — Commander, USSR's Northern Group of Forces

ZIELINSKI, Division-General Zygmunt — Head of the Cadre Department in the Polish Ministry of National Defense

The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981

Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer

WORKING NOTEBOOK

Lieutenant-General

V. I. ANOSHKIN

[dotted line indicates new page in Notebook]

Embassy of the USSR in Poland

Cde. Boris Ivanovich Aristov

Cde. Vasil Vasilevich Spirin

KGB Station in Poland

Cde. Vitalii Georgevich Pavlov

Cde. Nikolai Sergeevich Leonov

CONTENTS:

(1981 - 1982)

- (1) Trip to Poland (7-17.12.1981) during the introduction of “**Martial Law**”
- (2) Trip to the CSSR for the “Druzhiba-82” Exercises (Czechoslovak People’s Army, Central Group of Forces, and the Hungarian People’s Army), 25-30.1.82
Meeting with Cdes. Husak and Dzur and the Armed Forces of the Central Group of Forces
3. Trip to Other Warsaw Pact Countries¹
(Up to 20.3.82)

[...]

[10 December]

18:10

Conversation with
Cde. S. S. Gurunov

— We arrived from the Embassy. Meetings with Aristov and Pavlov. The news is that no teleg. has yet come. We sent a 2nd ciphered teleg. under three signatures.²

— Senior officers/generals are working in the Gen. Staff bldg.³

1. Simultan. they are stepping up their attacks against Poland's allied ties with the USSR.⁴

Pravda on
11.12, p. 5

on tele
vis

They are pressing demagogic demands about Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and CMEA, as well as about the use of lines of communication passing through Polish territory for alliance purposes.⁵

Individual provocateurs are raising doubts about the existing Soviet-Polish borders⁶ and are maliciously defaming the history of the Soviet Army's role in liberating Poland from the Hitlerite occupiers.

All of this has caused legitimate consternation among the Soviet people.

11 DECEMBER

From 7:30 a.m. (Moscow time) VG⁷ gathered the generals to size up the situation. We reported it to DF⁸ — the tone of the conversation was moderate!!
After breakfast we went to the Embassy.

Com. B. I. Aristov raises the following:

Questions: — working out the withdrawal of families;

— aircraft to Brest for an evacuation;

— kitchens to the Embassy to feed the Emb. guards;

11:30 Talks Between VG and Siwicki. They exchanged views. Siwicki requested that we come for lunch at around 14-15:00 today.

Com. Pavlov requested VG to speak with D. F. Ustinov about receiving Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov in Poland.

“At this stage there will be no Soviet presence” — that is the answer we gave to Com. Milewski in Moscow⁹ (see the telegram of B. I. Aristov on 10.12.81)

— “You are distancing yourselves from us” - Jaruzelski

9:00 a.m. (Moscow time) 10.12.81¹⁰

Instructions of D. F. Ustinov.

When you hold negotiations with the Polish side, it is essential to emphasize that “the Poles themselves must resolve the Polish question.”

“We are not preparing to send troops onto the territory of Poland.”¹¹

This is terrible news for us!
A year-and-a-half of chattering about the sending of troops went on—now everything has disappeared.
What is Jaruzelski's situation now?¹²

16:35 ?! VG arrived from the residence of Com. Aristov, who reported on an extremely confidential basis that:

1. As instructed — Called - Jaruzelski and Milewski and raised questions:
 - (1) — We request that someone from the political leadership come to our country.
Who will and when?
 - (2) — To send a message of support to us. Aristov said that representation at the Center has been arranged.
 - (3) — Can we count on assistance of a military sort from the USSR? (about the additional sending of troops)
 - (4) — What sort of measures of economic aid can the USSR provide to Poland?

ARISTOV ← RUSAKOV:



1. No one will be coming.
2. Measures will be taken.
3. No troops will be sent.
4. Baibakov is providing an answer.¹³

RUSAKOV'S ANSWER:



For the Decision of the WTO C-in-C:¹⁴
 (My suggestions) — 11.12.81

1. To find a position with a site in the Embassy (work, relaxation, eating)
 (Titov, Fedorov)
2. “Bulava” communications in the Embassy.¹⁵ From where to put it. A crew, eating, toilet facilities . . . , etc.¹⁶
 Borisov is to drive the commander along the route on 12.12
3. Guards and defense — Armored pers. carr. . . . Shilka artil.¹⁷
 Polish identification marks. Merezhko Must remove **their own** unit’s marks.¹⁸
4. Merezhko —> Oliwa, a unit for the guards of the Embassy
5. A kitchen — one for meals. Groceries Fedorov —> to get them
6. To Borisov —> Molczyk, Gen. Staff, via Oliwa
 Scheme of communications District, Representative Zarudin, Rembertow¹⁹
7. Transport for conveyance —> a site in the DefMin 1-2 armored tank regiments
Merezhko, Titov
8. Pilots — to stay at Solnewice on the night of 12-13.12
 (Tu-134)
 An-24 — on alert at the airport
Titov
9. One more office — Anoshkin
10. To 7 offices — “end of Bulava”
Borisov

Allocation of people:

Embassy:

V. G. Kulikov Anoshkin Titov Bredun Popov Lakna ²⁰	}
--	---

Send To:
 Rembertow:
 Merezhko

To hotels:
 — Saventsov
 — Lozhechnikov
 — Larisa
 — Grechiko
 — Fedorov
 — Nazarov - on duty

11. Zarudin — groceries for meals!
12. Supply of maps — Grechiko

Instructions of the C-in-C:

- 2 An-26 — in Brest
 - 2 An-26 — in Krzywa²¹
 1. 1 An-24 | Okecie
 Tu-134 |
 Il-78 as a liaison — Brest (Krzywa)
 2. To have physicians: from Zarudin.
 3. Regarding weapons for the officers corps? Request in the Gen. Staff
 - 4.²²
-

Report to Def Min D. F. Ustinov

17:35 (Moscow time) 11.12.81

The report overall is the same. Without any sort of changes. In the volume of ciphered telegrams and supplements

Discussion with Com. Siwicki

from 19:40 (Moscow time) 11.12.81

Very Important!

Helenow²³

VG put forth a request to focus on arrangements for unloading meat.

There are some occasions when even meat is being incinerated — subversion.²⁴

Siwicki. The date of the Actions is set for the eve of Saturday-Sunday.

Until this decision is implemented, it will not be made known.

Only a narrow circle of people know about it.

The situation is getting complicated. A session of “S”²⁵ at the factory. Roughly 200 young thugs gathered.²⁶

Per Jaruzelski’s instruction, he reported:

When everything is prepared for the culmination, he requests that the following questions be answered:

(1) The Soviet side would send for consultations on political matters in the plan for the introduction of martial law.²⁷

(2) later - a request to consult on economic matters. The economic situation is dramatic. He thanked Baibakov. We understand

the inconvenience in the USSR, but we are counting on the provision of aid in accordance with the decisions that were adopted

— we also viewed your arrival favorably.

For us this gives support in the matter of introducing martial law and struggling to overcome the crisis.

WW²⁸ is very worried that no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us about large-scale economic and military aid.

Just 24 hours remains until the very painful moment.

But we aren’t having political consultations on the part of the USSR.

At this stage there can be no consideration at all of sending troops.³⁰

In a conversation via secure telephone with Com. Andropov, we understood that we could count on assistance at a 2nd stage of our operations.²⁹

But we don’t know how the Soviet Union understands the 2nd stage.

WW raises this question because even though it was clear earlier, the situation recently has changed.

The adversary is supported from outside and is making the situation more tense.

The church — whereas earlier it took a neutral position, it now is creating tension.³¹

It might join forces with “S” and draw young people to its ranks, forcing a confrontation.³²

A week ago we appealed to the Sov. leadership — but there is no answer.

Com. Jaruz. met yesterday with Aristov and raised questions of a political and economic nature. What is the reaction now of the USSR to our actions?

But we received no answer.

— We are very worried about what the ambassador’s adviser on economic relations (trade) is reporting today to the Min. of Foreign Trade (of 30,000 tons — 12,000 to be sent to Legnica).³³

This concerns only the deliveries that are already coming to us.

Summing up these problems:

Very Imp. — have had no meeting at the level of the leadership. Consultations
— the economic question

and we cannot embark on any adventurist actions if the Sov. comrades do not support us.³⁴

Whereas Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov earlier would come and see us, now no one is coming. We aren’t receiving an answer to our questions.

Politb memb. |
Econom aid |
Sending of troop |
35 | W Wlad is very upset and nervous and put forth a request that while there is time they receive an answer by 10:00 a.m. on 12.12.

Otherwise we can extend the schedule for initiating it by one day, this is the most we can wait.

!! | “We are soberly evaluating the situation, and if there will be no politic., econ., and mil. support from the USSR, our country might be lost” (for the WTO)”³⁶

Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step.

Psychologically, WW’s state of mind is very nervous.

With a heavy heart I report all of this to you.

— The leadership is resolute, but it’s necessary to decide matters.

WW wanted to travel to the USSR. But the time wasn't suitable for us. I suggested traveling a bit earlier. But the situation did not permit it.

We transmitted the requests to the ambassador, but have received no answer.

With what sort of polit. slogan must we act against the adversary. "The mechanism is operating; the bow is stretched tight." — This is along military lines.

We can defer the schedule for starting by a day: from Sunday to Monday (13./14.12). But no later.

VG I am not fully informed about what you transmitted to the ambassador.

I know what sort of work you carried out in preparing the introduction of martial law. It is very significant.

You do have the forces. That much we know.

If the church is stepping up its activity, that's because you did not give a rebuff to the enemy. And the church is continuing to exert pressure on the leadership.³⁷

The leading officers for martial law are in good spirits, and there is no need to speak about any sort of adventurist action.

.....

You have real strength. You insisted that Poland is able to resolve its problems on its own. The friends spoke to you about this matter, and you remember it.

We also spoke a lot about this at the DefMin Comm. mtg.³⁸
It's now time to act. The date should not be postponed, and indeed a postponement is now impossible.

I don't know what Andropov was saying.
But friends remain friends.

I will report all the questions to my leadership, and you must act decisively.

If the Church had caused tension, you obviously would feel your weakness. Evidently, that weakness lies at the center of this deterioration.

Yes, the mechanism has been neglected. We understand, and the leadership in Moscow understands. But does this mean that Com. Jaruz. has not made a final decision?? Is that so? We would like to know this.³⁹

As far as the arrival of Baibakov is concerned, he examined all the questions and said that the gov't will consider them.⁴⁰

Siwicki About "Adventurism." We link this word with polit. consultations.
We don't want to show the role of the party in this conflict
How does the Soviet leadership assess our polit. our line.⁴¹

.....

We are embarking on this action under the slogan “Salvation of the Motherland” and “National Salvation.”
It was in this sense that the term “adventurist action” was being used.

VG Why has the question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law.

Siw. The decision has been made. The premier requests that you look upon these matters with understanding. And again reminds you about his requests. Without help from outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles.

The enemy has said his final word. The sides have clearly staked out their positions. Now what is needed is a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution.

A “Military-Revolutionary Council of National Salvation” has been formed and is already beginning to act.

“They want to arrest 50 people from the old leadership.”

Mutual thanks and greetings.

P.S.⁴² Siwicki left here dissatisfied. He got nothing new and heard nothing new from V.G. The WTO C-in-C has been restrained by Moscow!!

.....
12 12

9:30 The WTO C-in-C held talks with Com. Gurunov and gave an explanation along the lines of our telegram of yesterday under three signatures: Aristov, Kulikov, and Pavlov

The ciphered message is very bad. The introduction of martial law is made dependent on the fulfillment of four points. Jaruzelski is demanding a meeting at the highest level, an answer about the provision of military assistance, etc.

Com. M. V. Proskurin (10:00 a.m. Moscow time) — on duty by group (of ours)

Assault front at 6:30 a.m. — moved out to 3 command pts.	} together for 1.5-2 km
Warsaw Mil. Dist. at 20:00 — →	
Pomeranian Mil. Dist. at 2:40 a.m. in the vicinity of Bydgoszcz (to the north)	3 command pts.
Silesian Mil. Dist. at 22:00 toward Wroclaw	3 command pts.
55th mot. reg. of 16th tank div. at 5:00 a.m. on 12.12 concent. south toward Szczytno	
13th mot. reg. of 5th tank div. at 5:30 a.m. on 12.12 was in the vicinity of Gniezno at 14:00 awaiting a concentra.	

During the night, the district commanders brought to combat readiness.⁴³

34th mot. reg. of 7th mech. brig.
32nd mot. reg. of 8th mot. div.
49th mot. reg. of 20th tank div. (Kolobrzeg)
12th mot. reg. of 4th mot. div. (Gorzow Wielkopolski)
17th mot. reg. of 4th mot. div.
42nd mot. reg. of 11th tank div. (Zary)
33rd mot. reg. of 2nd mot. div. (Nysa)

25th tank reg. of 10th tank div. — Opole

In all, 10 regiments

The remaining formations and units for martial law — at their sites

— at 10:00 (Moscow time) Operational Groups from the Northern Group of Forces will be sent to the Pomer. and Sil. Mil. Dists. linked by a communications hub

8 divisions brought to combat readiness

9:15 10 people from the United Armed Forces Staff flew in from Moscow.

My disagreements with VG about
the possible composition of our gov't
group at the request of Jaruzelski

The suggestions were
justified (see next page)⁴⁴

Suslov (Gromyko)
Andropov (Ustinov)
Rusakov
Kryuchkov
Gosplan (one of the Deputies)

13:00

Conversation with D. F. Ustinov

VG briefly reported on the situation.

|| D. F. informed them that the following
|| have flown to Poland at the
|| request of the Polish side.⁴⁵

Suslov
Chernenko
Rusakov
Rakhmanin

13. 12. 81

23:30 — communications

24:00 — 00 — introduction of “Martial Law”⁴⁶

5:00 13.12 — beginning of deployment of communications

Mil. Coun. of National Salvation — 15 people

During the night, information came in that a “Revolutionary Council of National Salvation” has been formed, consisting of 15 people. M. V. Proskurin also relayed this information to me, though there are other reports that the title of this council included 16 — but others!!⁴⁷

analyzing it — in the title and
by surnames, of whom does it consist?

At 6:00 a.m. (local time) on 13.12.81 — Com. Jaruzelski addressed the nation on radio and TV⁴⁸

Jaruzelski
 Siwicki
 Molczyk
 + 3 commdrs., navy
 Tuczapski
 div. commdr.

asks regarding
 apture

?! At 3:00 — signal for troops to shift to military alert
 with departure to regions of concentration

! ? Walesa (Bujak, Michnik) have fled from

ask. Some of the leadership of “S” have been arrested.

5:25 Zarudin: Police in Legnica did not act.

5:50 N. V. Ogarkov — about comm
 — covering the

ons
 ne?

Departure of Troops — at 5:00 depa
 — at 6:00 all th

the Wars. Mil. Dis.

83-18 Siwicki

Walesa + captured (Siwicki reported)

The navy — begins coastline operations at 6:00 (at

was assigned the mission)

89-71 Shcheglov

! ? Mikhailin — must be redeployed and sent to the
 — They handled the situation with the Main Ope

here)
 Directorate

Tereshchenko — based in Legnica; reported

Legnica — work is proceeding. They began with th

tion of as many as 20 people.

A signal — to Rapacewicz, Uzycki

— Uzycki 8th Mech. Div. — to Gdansk
 20th Tank Div. — to Bydgoszcz
 11th Tank Div. — Wroclaw

Merezhko reported that they have everything in ord
 250-300 people. But no resistance was shown. Th

Wroclaw and Legnica, crowds gathered. Wroclaw —
 stn. has been placed under guard.

5:00 — 10,000 soldiers move into Warsaw

Bujak and Michnik — have left

Lublin — scuffles with the police
 Bialystok — all have been detained In Wa

0-70 % have been detained

Szczecin — good
 Leczna — 100 %
 Gdansk — good

LISTS of the Oper. Grps

Mil. Dist. Navy, Air Def., Air Force

II. Solov’ev — 15 peop. / 25 peop.

_____ Economic (Shupov, Dept. Frnt. Hosp.).

NATIONAL UNDERGROUND
COMMITTEE OF "SOLIDARITY"

First Session of the
Military Council of Nat.
Salvation, from 11:00 to 19:30

1.5 hours W. Jaruzelski (Dep. Min.)

To let the people know that the Army has saved the nation and the country

The moment is chosen — successful, there were no such things, and it is impossible to delay it any further

Ideally taking account of the public mood and other factors.

I. there is success, but difficulties lie ahead.

The West will boycott, but the allies will help.⁴⁹

Martial law can be extended by several months. But in accordance with measures to restore order in the provinces, they must display resolve, careful organization, and exactingness

Sympathy for the Army and Navy is growing.

I thought about dispatching a unit of honor guards — square caps

A profound change⁵⁰ of cadres is necessary: a purge in the PZPR and the gov't.

.....
Carry it out immediately; all unworthy officials will be removed from their posts.

Comdrs. allotted by zones. He believes they must allot zones for the commanders

— Gdansk — Janczyszyn
— Katowice — Lozowicki
— Poznan — Krepski

Appoint Gen. Zielinski — a secretary

WRON. (head of Main Pers. Direct. in Min. of Nat.Def.)

Remove the Katowice governor; appoint Gen. Paszkowski (former ambass. to Mongolia)

Operation has begun — in Warsaw

In Khust Lenina — measures were taken to restore order.

20 commissars at the Ministry

Repeated — (all the generals), repeated for everyone what was earlier

I explained that it all would be in a historical sense
and

My
assessment
→
personal
opinion

Assessing the behavior of W. Jaruzelski:

many "I"s; the army is forgotten
a certain ostentatiousness and bombast came through
Walesa — this is the politic. map
"We are still using him."
Walesa today declared a hunger strike

.....

Krepski gave a speech. The content?

Siwicki spoke and gave instructions to every

Draft of a Ciph. Teleg. to Moscow

I. ??

II. The Military Council of National Salvation will concentrate all polit. power in the country, but the nature of its activity so far in our view is not that of a collegial leadership.

Com. W. Jaruzelski has preserved for himself all aspects of political and military leadership.

Preliminary results of the struggle to wipe out the counterrevol.⁵¹ confirm that there are sufficient forces to destroy it successfully on their own without the provision of any sort of military help from outside.

The active work of the MVD and State Sec. organs in detaining the leaders of the counterrevolution has strengthened the position of the military-political leadership of the country, and this creates the necessary preconditions for the stabilization of

the social-polit. situation in the country. The alignment of forces is gradually shifting in favor of the leadership of the country.⁵²

The Economy see Oleg Nikonov

Foreign Policy Activity — N. S. Leonov

In addition to this, the participation of a large proportion of the working class in strikes shows that the ideas of the counterrevolution are still alive among the broad popular masses. For this reason, the only way to prevent the remaining part of the leading core from resorting to an illegal situation and launching a variety of anti-government actions is by thoroughly destroying the counterrevolution.

¹Translator's Note: A slight grammatical error in the original has been corrected in the translation.

²Translator's Note: These ellipses were in the original. The three signatures on the ciphered telegram were those of Boris Aristov, Vitalii Pavlov, and Viktor Kulikov (see entry below). Pavlov, the KGB station chief in Warsaw, wrote in his memoirs that his "close contact with the Soviet ambassador, B. I. Aristov, who kept in constant touch with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko, enabled me to have a good sense of how the MFA was assessing things. I also was aware of the close relations among Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, and the defense minister, D. F. Ustinov. Grasping this, the ambassador and I began to prepare joint reports under two signatures. This practice facilitated a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of all the circumstances and facts that became known to us both through embassy channels and through the KGB residency's channels. My closest contact of all was with the representative in Poland of the Main Command of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Army-General A. F. Shcheglov, who naturally had a good sense of how our Military High Command viewed things. He sometimes added his efforts to the joint reports that the ambassador and I sent back to the Center, especially when they dealt with military issues. During the most critical phases of the situation in Poland, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Marshal V. G. Kulikov, would come here to meet urgently with the ambassador and me. I gave him thorough briefings on the most important aspects of the situation, naturally without referring to the sources of my information. The marshal and I had a very good rapport, and I retain a good impression of him to this day. . . . Only with the military attache, Major-General Fomenko [it should be Khomenko — M.K.] did I somehow fail to develop close relations. Perhaps this was partly due to the well-known rivalry between the GRU, which he represented, and the foreign intelligence branch of the KGB." Pavlov added that Khomenko's reports were "not sufficiently competent and did not always take account of the social and economic dimensions of the Polish crisis." See *Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1994), pp. 186-187.

³Translator's Note: The General Staff building was the hub of the martial law operation. It was also the site where Jaruzelski and other top military commanders made a final decision on 9 December to proceed with martial law.

⁴Translator's Note: From here to the bottom of the page, Anoshkin records sentences that appeared the next day as a paragraph in a scathing Soviet article about the situation in Poland. See "K polozheniyu v Pol'she," *Pravda* (Moscow), 11 December 1981, p. 5. On the 11th, Anoshkin added a brief reference to this article in the left-hand margin below. The *Pravda* article diverges very slightly from what Anoshkin records here, as indicated below.

⁵Translator's Note: In the *Pravda* article, the latter part of this sentence reads: ". . . about the use of lines of communication passing through Polish territory to exert pressure on Poland's allies." —CMEA is the acronym for the "Council on Mutual Economic Assistance."

⁶Translator's Note: The *Pravda* article refers to just the Soviet-Polish "border" rather than the plural "borders."

⁷Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Viktor Georgievich Kulikov.

⁸Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Dmitrii Fedorovich Ustinov.

⁹Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981, the Soviet KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, noted that he had "spoken yesterday with Milewski." Andropov expressed puzzlement that Milewski "doesn't know about 'Operation X' [the martial law operation] and about the concrete timeframe in which it would be carried out." Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 g.: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in *Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 6, List (L.) 7*, which I translated in Issue No. 5 of the CWIHP *Bulletin*, pp. 134-138. Because of unavoidable ambiguities in the Russian language, it is possible that the "we" in this sentence from Anoshkin's notebook should be translated as "they," but the meaning in either case is the same.

¹⁰Translator's Note: This entire page is in Kulikov's handwriting.

¹¹Translator's Note: These comments are fully in line with the CPSU Politburo's decisions on the 10th. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," esp. Ll. 5-12.

¹²Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (in a conversation at the Jachranka conference on 11 November 1997), these lines report what Jaruzelski said after being informed of Rusakov's response.

¹³Translator's Note: At the CPSU Politburo meeting on December 10, Soviet leaders instructed "Cdes. Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue studying the issue of economic aid to Poland, taking account of the exchange of views at the CC Politburo session." (See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 14.)

¹⁴Translator's Note: Diagonally across the upper left-hand corner of this page is the following: "Reported to the WTO C-in-C at 14:45 (local time). Approved. I will take action."

¹⁵Translator's Note: "Bulava" is the Russian word for "mace."

¹⁶Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original.

¹⁷Translator's Note: The ellipses here were in the original. The nickname "Shilka," derived from a famous battle, was used for the ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense artillery system. The Soviet Army deployed thousands of ZSU-23-4s, and the East European armies also possessed large quantities.

¹⁸Translator's Note: These lines indicate that Soviet armored combat vehicles in Poland, when moved out to various sites, were to be disguised as Polish vehicles.

¹⁹Translator's Note: Rembertow, on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw, was a key Soviet military base and military communications center. It is currently the site of the Polish National Defense Academy, the Polish Military Staff College, and—most important of all—the Central Military Archive.

²⁰Translator's Note: Two additional names, Saventsov and Grechiko, were listed here but then crossed out.

²¹Translator's Note: Krzywa is an airfield in Legnica Province, some 33 kilometers outside the city of Legnica in southwestern Poland near the Czech and German borders. Legnica was the headquarters of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of Forces, and Krzywa was the main air base for those forces. With a 2,500-meter airstrip, the Krzywa airfield can accommodate any type of aircraft.

²²Translator's Note: There is no fourth point listed after the number.

²³Translator's Note: Helenow is a small village approximately 100 kilometers south of Warsaw, which was used by the Polish government. In a castle there, Kulikov frequently held meetings with Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders during the 1980-81

crisis.

²⁴Translator's Note: Kulikov's concern about this matter can be better understood in light of remarks made at the CPSU Politburo meeting on 10 December by Nikolai Baibakov, the head of the Soviet State Planning Administration, who had been in Warsaw from 8 to 10 December: "In accordance with the [Soviet] Politburo's decision and at the request of the Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat. . . . The produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. When the produce is being transported to the Polish stations, blatant sabotage has been taking place. Poles have been expressing outrageously obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even begin to keep track of all the insults that have been directed against us." See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 4-5.

²⁵Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Solidarity.

²⁶Translator's Note: These two sentences recapitulate a passage in the December 11 *Pravda* article (cited above), which reads: "As Polish television reports, the leaders of local 'Solidarity' organizations have begun to create 'fighting groups' at enterprises. Each shock group includes up to 250-300 people. . . . Young thugs from the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland' have shown up on Polish streets sporting symbols of the Homeland Army, which in its time, as is known, took up arms in a struggle against the establishment of a people's-democratic order in Poland."

²⁷Translator's Note: This is the way the sentence reads in the original. The word "someone" appears to be missing after the word "send."

²⁸Translator's Note: Abbreviation for Wojciech Wladyslawowich—that is, Jaruzelski. Patronymics are used only in Russian, not in Polish. However, Soviet leaders often referred this way to their closest Polish, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian counterparts.

²⁹Translator's Note: The "2nd stage" of the operation, slated to begin as early as December 14, would have been gravely complicated if the initial crackdown had not prevented widespread turmoil and resistance.

³⁰Translator's Note: According to Anoshkin (conversation at Jachranka, 9 November 1997), these remarks at the left were Andropov's response to Jaruzelski's request.

³¹Translator's Note: Anoshkin's comments here are very similar to remarks by Andropov at the CPSU Politburo session on December 10: "The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its position, which in essence is now completely supportive of 'Solidarity.'" That view was echoed by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who declared that "there are no longer any neutrals." (Both cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 6, 8.) The same point was made in the December 11 *Pravda* article (cited above), which reads: "Church circles and organizations have noticeably stepped up their activity. The number of sermons in the churches aimed at discrediting the government's efforts to defend socialism has increased."

³²Translator's Note: Baibakov reported to the CPSU Politburo on December 10 that Jaruzelski "was deeply disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as you know, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish authorities." (Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 4.)

Archbishop Jozef Glemp had met with Lech Walesa on 5 December 1981 and then, two days later, sent separate letters to Jaruzelski, Walesa, all the deputies in the Polish Sejm, and the National Students' Union. In the letters to Jaruzelski and Walesa, the primate called for the resumption of tripartite (government-Solidarity-Church) talks. In the letters to Sejm deputies, he urged that Jaruzelski not be granted "extraordinary powers." In his letter to the National Students's Union, Glemp called for an end to the recent spate of university strikes. In none of the letters did he even remotely call for anything tantamount to "a holy war against the Polish authorities."

³³Translator's Note: This again refers to the 30,000 tons of meat that the Soviet Union had promised to ship to Poland. At the Politburo meeting on 10 December, Baibakov indicated that 15,000 tons of the meat had already been sent. (Suslov later cited the figure of 16,000 tons already sent, but Baibakov's figure is probably more reliable.) See *ibid.*, Ll. 4-5, 13.

³⁴Translator's Note: The word translated here as "adventurist action," *aventyura*, can also be translated as a "dangerous" or "hazardous" action, but the word "adventurist" is more appropriate for reasons that will become clear below.

³⁵Translator's Note: The three points to the left of this vertical line are the three issues raised by Jaruzelski. Scrawled diagonally to the right of the vertical line is: "4 questions—a request."

³⁶Translator's Note: This sentence in Anoshkin's book contained two quotation marks at the end, as indicated.

³⁷Translator's Note: Evidently, Anoshkin means that the church was continuing to urge caution and restraint on the Solidarity leadership.

³⁸Translator's Note: This refers to the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers on 2-4 December 1981 in Moscow. Jaruzelski was Poland's national defense minister (as well as prime minister and PUPP First Secretary), but because he was so preoccupied at home, Siwicki attended the meeting in his place.

³⁹Translator's Note: Kulikov was aware that a "final" decision to proceed with martial law had been adopted on the night of December 9, but his comments here suggest that he was beginning to worry that Jaruzelski might try to back away from the decision.

⁴⁰Translator's Note: Baibakov, as noted earlier, had recently been in Warsaw to consult with the Polish leadership. When Baibakov returned to Moscow on December 10, he briefed the Soviet Politburo. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 1-4.

⁴¹Translator's Note: The extra "our" is in the original.

⁴²Translator's Note: Anoshkin rendered this abbreviation for "postscript" in the Latin alphabet.

⁴³Translator's Note: All troop deployments listed here and on

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the next page refer exclusively to Polish, not Soviet, units. The two Soviet divisions in Poland were ordered to keep a low profile throughout the martial law operation. In addition to the units mentioned by Anoshkin, three other Polish army regiments—the 2nd Mechanized Regiment of the 1st Mechanized Division in Warsaw, the 3rd Air Regiment of the 6th Airborne Division in Krakow, and the 14th Mechanized Regiment of the 12th Mechanized Division in Szczecin—took part in the operation, performing administrative tasks and providing support for the Mechanized Detachments of Civil Police (ZOMO) and other security forces that actually carried out the crackdown. Siwicki later noted that these army units constituted an elite force selected for their “outstanding level of political readiness”—that is, their willingness to use force on behalf of the Communist regime. See “Pełna gotowosc obrony socjalistycznego panstwa: Konferencja sprawozdawcza PZPR Instytucji Centralnych MON,” *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 25 February 1983, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴ Translator’s Note: Anoshkin drew a curved arrow from these lines to the names on the right.

⁴⁵ Translator’s Note: This sentence and the four names were crossed out with a diagonal line running downward from left to right. It is unclear why Ustinov would have claimed that these officials had already flown to Poland. It is also not known why they ended up not coming to Poland. Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in 1981, has claimed that the Soviet Politburo proved unable to reach a consensus on whether to send this high-ranking delegation to Poland as a gesture of solidarity—see Gribkov’s “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kih godov,” *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 56—but he provides no specific evidence to support this claim or to explain why a consensus was infeasible.

⁴⁶ Translator’s Note: Just below this line, written diagonally from left to right, is the following:

- “1) to Merezhko
- 2) to Borisov
- 3) Emelyanov—answer
Clock—mine”

The word *chasy* in this last line might also be translated as “wristwatch.” The context leaves open either possibility.

⁴⁷ Translator’s Note: In fact, the Military Council of National Salvation (*Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego*, or WRON) consisted of 21—not 15 or 16—high-ranking military officers, chaired by Jaruzelski. The other members were Jozef Baryla, Kazimierz Garbacik, Mirosław Hermaszewski, Tadeusz Hupałowski, Ludwik Janczyszyn, Michał Janiszewski, Jerzy Jarosz, Czesław Kiszczak, Tadeusz Krepski, Roman Les, Longin Łozowicki, Tadeusz Makarewicz, Eugeniusz Molczyk, Włodzimierz Oliwa, Czesław Piotrowski, Henryk Rapacewicz, Florian Siwicki, Tadeusz Tuczapski, Jozef Uzycki, and Jerzy Włosinski.

⁴⁸ Translator’s Note: For the full text of the speech, see “Ukonstytuowała się Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego: Przemowienie gen. armii W. Jaruzelskiego,” *Zolnierz Wolności* (Warsaw), 15 December 1981, pp. 1-3.

⁴⁹ Translator’s Note: Soviet and Polish leaders expected all along that Western countries would adopt sanctions against Poland (and perhaps against the Soviet Union) if martial law were imposed. Gromyko had noted on 10 December 1981 that “of course if the Poles deliver a blow against ‘Solidarity,’ the West in all likelihood will not give them [further] credits and will not offer any other kind of help. [The Poles] are aware of

this, and this obviously is something that we, too, have to bear in mind.” (The actual sanctions that materialized were probably less severe than Soviet and Polish leaders had feared.) In early December 1981, Polish vessels were ordered to avoid entering foreign ports and to stay in neutral waters so that their property could not be seized. Baibakov had assured Jaruzelski on December 9 that Poland’s requests for economic aid to offset the sanctions “will be given due consideration in Moscow,” but at the December 10 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Soviet leaders displayed relatively little willingness to consider large-scale economic assistance for Poland. Andropov remarked that “as far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been proposed. No doubt, something will have to give.” He accused the Polish authorities of being “insolent” and of “approaching things this way merely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they will be able to lay all the blame on us.” The Soviet Politburo decided simply to give further consideration to the “question of economic assistance to Poland.” All quotations here are from “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 6, 8-9.

⁵⁰ Translator’s Note: This word was inadvertently omitted by Anoshkin, but the context and the adjectival endings make clear that “change” or “replacement” (*smena* or *peremena* or *zamena* or *perestanovka*) should be here.

⁵¹ Translator’s Note: The preceding line was inserted by Anoshkin to replace the following words, which he had crossed out: “Supervision of the struggle against the counterrevolution in locales around the country . . .” Initially, he had replaced this with “An analysis of the situation in the country . . .,” but then he chose a third way of phrasing it. Anoshkin crossed out “An analysis of,” but he neglected to cross out the words “situation in the country,” which are squeezed above crossed-out lines.

⁵² Translator’s Note: Anoshkin had another brief sentence here—“The authority of the leading organs has been strengthened”—which he subsequently crossed out.

Commentary

Editor's Note: Earlier this year, CWIHP asked General Wojciech Jaruzelski, former Polish Prime Minister and a key participant in the Polish events of 1980-81, to comment on Mark Kramer's introduction and translation of the Anoshkin notebook. We are pleased to print his commentary below. A few editorial changes (indicated by brackets) were necessary due to the fact that General Jaruzelski commented on a Polish translation (and differently paginated version) of Mark Kramer's article. CWIHP encourages the release of further documents from Polish and other archives on the events of 1980-81.

By Wojciech Jaruzelski

The limitations of time, as well as an eye ailment, make it difficult for me at this time to comment fully and essentially on Mr. Mark Kramer's article entitled, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland"—all the more since General Florian Siwicki and I are simultaneously preparing materials in relation to General Anoshkin's "working notebook." These materials will contain concrete, factually argued comments dealing also with some questions not dealt with or discussed at length in this letter.

Trusting in the professional competence of Mr. Kramer, I wish to avoid the inevitable polemics should his text be published in its present form. Polemics as such, of course, are not a bad thing, they can even be useful and desirable, but it would not be good if I had to present publicly specific criticisms questioning not only the logic, but also the veracity, of many statements, facts, and quotations cited in the above mentioned text. I believe Mr. Kramer wrote the text under the pressure of a deadline and that is why he was unable to consult other supplementary and verifiable documents. He was unable at the same time to confront and appraise in a more profound way the credibility of the sources he summoned. As a result, his outlook on a very complicated weave of facts, events, and processes at the time through the prism of only a few and selectively revealed sources is by its nature restrictive, simplified, and on a series of issues completely pointless. Unfortunately, the summary judgments in Mr. Kramer's text go quite far. If this was simply a historical debate about the distant past, I would not see it as a serious problem. In this case, however, the matter refers to a "hot" topic that is still, and lately even more so, the object of political games and confrontations.

Moving to matters of substance, I will limit myself to commenting on just some. First, let me deal with those that have to do with manifest facts as well as with elementary logic. From the sources quoted by Mr. Kramer, it is allegedly clear that during those few days of December 1981 he describes I was supposedly depressed, "unnerved," "extremely neurotic and diffident about [my] abilities," vacillating, "psychologically...gone to pieces." Consequently, not seeing any possibility of implementing martial law with my own forces, I "desperately implore[d], want[ed], ask[ed]" for foreign troops to be brought into Poland. I would like to put aside the moral and political aspects of such a statement, which, for me as a Pole, a front-line soldier, and a commander of many years are, to

put it simply, offensive. I would like to put aside the "poetic" moods from which I allegedly suffered. There is no question that deciding to implement martial law was an unusually and dramatically difficult step, and it was extremely hard on me. But there are scores, even hundreds, of people with whom I met and talked directly at the time, and nobody can say that I lacked in decisiveness or self-control. Let me describe one event to illustrate this. In the afternoon hours on December 13, that is, after the decision had already been made, I met (and proof of that can be found in newspapers) with a delegation (consisting of several score people) of the Housing Cooperative Congress, which was taking place in Warsaw at the time. I wonder what those people would have said about my behavior at the time. I am supposed to have been "crushed by the refusal" [i.e., of Suslov to guarantee Soviet intervention — trans.]. Nothing of the sort was in fact the case—I was relaxed and calm. Besides, the course of the whole operation confirms this. At this point, one question comes to mind: In whose interests was it to portray my mood in such an extremely deformed way? What about the entry in Anoshkin's "notebook" that says, "The Commander-in-Chief of Unified Armed Forces had his hands tied by Moscow"? Perhaps historians should analyze this track.

The core of the "vivisection" of the state of my soul conducted by Mr. Kramer in his article is to show my thinking to have been as follows: First, that the reaction and resistance of the opposition and of the majority of the society would be so strong that we would not be able to deal with it using our own forces; and second, that the Polish Army was not sufficiently reliable or loyal.

Neither the former nor the latter makes any sense, which was very convincingly proved by real life. In another place describing Anoshkin's "notebook," I will prove this point in a more concrete way. Before that, however, I would like to ask a question that has been stubbornly on my mind since I read Mr. Kramer's article. If Jaruzelski indeed was almost panic-stricken, full of fear, apprehension, and doubts whether we would be able to impose martial law by ourselves, why then did he not abandon the idea of imposing it in the first place? Or did he, by imposing martial law, entangle himself in a hopeless, suicidal mess that would end in unavoidable ruin?! As everyone knows, neither the former nor the latter happened.

Another piece of information cited by Mr. Kramer is

the supposed readiness expressed by Gen. Siwicki to move the date of the imposition of martial law back one day if Soviet military aid were to be secured. That would have meant not Sunday, December 13, but Monday, December 14. Gen. Siwicki flatly denies that any such considerations took place. After all one of the *key conditions* for an effective imposition of martial law, particularly to avoid bloodshed, was to impose it on a holiday (I have no doubt that the appropriate documents could be found at the General Headquarters of the Polish Army; one of the main authors, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, can definitely attest to their authenticity). I do not know what kind of a crazy mind could have come up with the absurd notion that it could all be done on Monday or any other weekday, when millions of people would be starting for work at dawn and getting ready to begin the workday. *It was never considered, not even for a moment.* Such an entry completely disqualifies not only the credibility, but also the intelligence of the person who wrote such a thing in the said “notebook,” or passed such information to their political superiors.

On page 7 [page numbers have been corrected to conform to page numbers in this *Bulletin*—ed.] of Mr. Kramer’s article there is a claim that Gen. Anatolii Gribkov “played a key role *vis-a-vis* Poland in 1980-81.” It is not my intention to judge that role at this time. However, bringing Gribkov up in the context of the days preceding the imposition of martial law is more than amusing, the reason being that Gribkov himself told me, Gen. Siwicki, and other Polish generals (as confirmed by Gen. Stanisław Antos, who at the time was Polish Vice-Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces) of the situation in which he found himself on 13 December 1981. For a week he had been on vacation, far from Moscow. When he found out about the imposition of martial law in Poland he called Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov (Kulikov was in Poland at the time), asking whether he should come back to Moscow. Ustinov told him to continue his vacation. And now Gribkov turns out to be one of the main witnesses. But there is one more meaningful fact. Namely, many fragments of his reminiscences included in an article published in 1992 by *Istoricheskii Zhurnal* are almost *literally* identical with some phrases from Anoshkin’s “notebook.” It looks as though many roads lead to that very same “source.”

The choice of evidence in Mr. Kramer’s article is strangely one-sided. Why does he not mention Gen. Siwicki’s polemical response to the above-mentioned article by Gribkov, which was published in *Polska Zbrojna* on 22 December 1992? Is the voice of the weaker side, which was at the time threatened in different ways, less credible than the voice of the stronger side, which put Poland under overwhelming pressure? A facetious phrase from Gogol comes to mind here about the “sergeant’s widow who whipped herself.”

On page [7] of his article, Mr. Kramer talks about a document which allegedly constitutes “powerful” evidence. He means Anoshkin’s “notebook.” Treating the

“notebook” in this way is surprising. First of all, there is something about it which should cause one to distance oneself from it on moral grounds. After all, the most controversial and shocking statements contained there—claiming that we allegedly demanded military aid—were not presented by the “Russian side” during the Jachranka conference.¹ This made it impossible for the [Polish] “government side” to take a stance concerning them and to directly confront the facts and arguments, the more so because it is not clear if and when all of the materials from the Jachranka conference will be published.² As a result, the “notebook”—which, as it turns out, is being prepared for publication as a separate brochure—has become an independent fact, removed from the context of the debate. And not a historical fact, either, but a political one, given the present political realities in Poland.

I have learned that Mr. Kramer is a specialist on Soviet and Russian issues. Therefore he undoubtedly knows the characteristic mechanisms and techniques of documenting events there. After all, the Soviet Union, and above all the Soviet Army, implemented almost obsessively rigorous rules for creating and protecting any kind of document, including working notes and records, particularly if they concerned highly secretive matters of great importance for the state. Even the smallest slips in this area resulted in very drastic consequences. And now what do we have here? A super-secret notebook, not registered anywhere, not affixed with any seals [*gryf*] or marked by page numbers, a notebook that has for years been kept nobody knows where. It starts with Kulikov’s arrival in Poland on 7 December 1981. But the first entry is from December 10. It is surprising that there is no note of a conversation with me the night of the 8th, which Baibakov reported about on December 10 during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Marshal Kulikov took part in this. Yet what is peculiar is that *there is not even one word in Baibakov’s report about the Polish side waiting for military help.* Maybe that is the reason why there is no mention of that conversation on the night of the 8th in Anoshkin’s notebook.

As I mentioned before, Gen. Siwicki and I will soon present a more detailed description of, on the one hand, some strange omissions, and, on the other hand, of even stranger entries included in the notebook. At this time, I only want to point out that during the whole time noted there by date, that is, from December 10 to 16, not even one conversation takes place between me and Marshal Kulikov, who was in Poland at the time (except for one note of December 16 about a phone conversation during which Kulikov asked for a short discussion, which is not noted later anyway). Could it be that during the ten days Kulikov spent in Poland, Gen. Siwicki was the only Polish person he talked to? Was he the only source of information? And finally, how was this information recorded and interpreted?

I am sorry to say that regardless of what might

generously be described as the “defects” of the notebook, Mr. Kramer’s interpretations sometimes go well beyond what can be deduced from an entry. Take, for example, the alleged answer given by Rusakov to Ambassador Aristov. [In the notebook entry for December 11] that answer is written across the margin. It goes: “This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering about sending of troops went on —now everything has disappeared.” [In his introduction on page 11], Mr. Kramer omits the last words of this entry, which say, “What is Jaruzelski’s situation now?!” But these words make it obvious that somebody else has uttered this statement, not me. Here Mr. Kramer’s intentions become obvious. He says: “Jaruzelski’s comment here as recorded by Anoshkin, says more about the Polish leader’s stance in December 1981 than do all other documents combined. (my emphasis — W.J.)” Thus this carefully prepared quotation, in fact “robbed” of the element clearly indicating that it was not me who said those words, becomes to the author more important “than all other documents.” This is scandalous manipulation.

Besides, what does the talk of “a year-and-a-half of chattering” mean when my reactions (if someone is skeptical, please consult Kuklinski’s report in an interview for the Paris *Kultura*, April 1987) and many public statements, as well as statements [made] during the top-secret meetings when I talked about the necessity to solve Polish problems by ourselves, with our own means, are known? And as far as Aristov is concerned, I know one thing—that he judged the situation in Poland very seriously, much like Kulikov. He was constantly passing signals, as well as complaints and warnings, about the Kremlin’s dissatisfaction to the Polish leadership, many of which he must have co-authored (this was apparently the case with the famous letter from the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) in June 1981, which was in fact to open the way to a kind of political coup). I know from Stanislaw Kania that Aristov even went so far as to call me “general-liberal.”

On page [7-8] some alleged opinions of Gorbachev’s are also quoted. Mr. Kramer writes in particular about how in October and November 1992 Gorbachev gave several interviews to Polish journalists. [. . .] The focus is on an interview for the Warsaw newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* [*The*

Republic]. Mr. Kramer, who usually uses plenty of quotations, this time when talking about Gorbachev, chooses to relate his alleged statements using mainly his own words, even venturing to say what Gorbachev allegedly “meant.” Since I do not have the said interview in *Rzeczpospolita* handy, I cannot take a firm stance. I will try to do this later. However, what is much more important is what Gorbachev said officially. He was invited as a witness by the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm [Parliament] of the Republic of Poland, but he could not come personally and sent a letter, dated 31 August 1995, instead. He wrote:

It was obvious to me as a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee that Gen. Jaruzelski as the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee took all the measures that were available to him in order to lead Poland out of the economic and political crisis in a peaceful way and aimed at excluding any possibility of using troops of member countries of the Warsaw Pact to interfere in internal affairs of his country (my emphasis — W.J.). It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that the imposition of martial law in Poland was conditioned not only by the growing social and political internal crisis, but also by an increased tension in Polish-Soviet relations closely related to this crisis. Under such conditions, Gen. Jaruzelski was forced to take upon himself this altogether difficult decision, which at the time was, in my opinion, the choice of a lesser evil. [. . .] The Soviet leadership was frantically looking for a solution between two equally unacceptable solutions: To make peace with the chaos spreading in Poland threatening the breakdown of the whole socialist bloc, or to react to the events in Poland with military force. However, I want to repeat that the view was that both solutions were unacceptable. At the same time, our troops and tank columns were there along the Polish border, along with the sufficiently strong Northern Group of the Soviet Army in Poland itself. All could have been used in extreme circumstances.

Gorbachev wrote in a similar tone a letter to Maciej Płażyński, the Speaker of the Sejm (published in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 5 December 1997). And all this is what has been stated not secretly, not privately, but officially by a man who not only was a member of the highest Soviet

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HOPE HARRISON AND DAVID MURPHY, “REASSESSING THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958-62” CO-SPONSORED BY THE KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES (DECEMBER 4, 1998)

leadership, but also a member of the Suslov Commission, which followed and reacted to the situation in Poland. It turns out that he knew about columns of tanks along the Polish border, while the highest Soviet commanders [claim they] did not (as they also did not know about the respective preparations of the divisions of former GDR and Czechoslovakia, as confirmed by archival materials). They stick to the opinion that there would have been no intervention in any event. Moreover, according to what Marshal Kulikov said at Jachranka, there was not even any pressure put on Poland (“*davleniia ne bylo*”). However, other Soviet politicians and military officials talk about what really happened and quote actual facts (I will refer to some of those sources in the piece I mentioned before).

One page [8] Kramer also refers to a book by Vitalii Pavlov (*Byłem rezydentem KGB w Polsce [I Was a KGB Resident in Poland]*). I read the Polish edition carefully. Pavlov, who understands and reads Polish, authorized the translation. (I know the person who picked up the manuscript after it had been authorized.) There is absolutely no mention there that I was desperately trying to obtain some guarantee of military intervention and that Suslov “refused.” Actually, before the so-called Suslov Archive (1993) or Pavlov’s book (1994) were published in Poland, I spoke (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, 12 December 1992) about my conversation with Suslov on the morning of 12 December 1981. I quote:

JARUZELSKI: We were always pressured by the external factor, but I never put it forward [as the main thing]. An examination of conscience must always begin with oneself. Only the people who gave up power are being judged today, but it is the authorities as well as the opposition who should be pouring ash on their heads. With the international situation becoming ignited, our Polish brawl meant playing with fire. Our conversations with the representatives of the Kremlin were often a way for them to check the effectiveness of their pressure and, for us a way to check their inclinations for intervention. In a way, it was mutual testing, a mutual game. We kept getting the impression that they were keeping some cards hidden.

(Jaruzelski met on 12 December 1981 at 9 am with Generals Czesław Kiszczak, Florian Siwicki, and Michał Janiszewski.)

JARUZELSKI: In my office we assessed the situation. It had reached the brink. We knew that if the Gdansk debate [brought] no glimmer of hope then we [would] have to choose the lesser evil. Siwicki, who was still under the depressing impression of talks in Moscow on December 4, asked, “And what is the guarantee that even if we go ahead they are not going to come in?” With the generals present I tried to call Brezhnev. Mikhail Suslov came on the phone. He wasn’t very easy to communicate with; he must have already been very sick. I asked whether it would be our internal affair if we imposed martial law. He said, “Yes.” “And if the situation becomes more complicated?” I asked (I remembered the words

Brezhnev never took back: ‘Esli bud’et uslozhniatsia, veid’em’ [If it turns out to be necessary, we will go in] as well as the constantly repeated ‘my Pol’ shi ne ostavim v b’ede’ [We will not leave Poland in the lurch]). The gist of Suslov’s answer was, “But you have always said that you can manage by yourselves.”

That was a lot, but of course, it was not everything. In Bratislava in August 1968 there were even kisses, yet, as we all know, everything ended very quickly. Therefore, we had to pay attention above all to numerous worrisome facts and signals.

In relation to the above, it is worth quoting a passage from the book by Pavlov, which for some strange reason was omitted by Mr. Kramer. When writing about my phone conversation with Suslov, Pavlov claims that Suslov “confirmed then that the Soviet Union will not directly interfere in Polish affairs and will under no circumstance send troops to Poland, which, it seemed, put Jaruzelski at ease.” In saying that it “put me at ease,” Pavlov admits that there were indeed reasons to feel uneasy.

On page [8] Kramer writes with reference to the same book by Pavlov, that Andropov sent the same message to Kiszczak (i.e. that the direct military aid from the USSR is out of the question). Mr. Kramer must not have read the book carefully. There is no mention there of “sending a message.” However, there is a description of a visit to Moscow in September 1981 by Gen. Kiszczak, the newly nominated Minister of Internal Affairs. During that visit, Andropov allegedly informed him of the above. Gen. Kiszczak denies this categorically. I believe him, but the facts are most important. First, after his return from Moscow, Kiszczak did not pass any message of such great importance to me or to Kania. Second, Pavlov claims that he was present during the conversation between Andropov and Kiszczak. However, although he met with Kania often (he had had close relations with him for a long time, since Kania for many years was a Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for the issues of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), and met with me several times, he never mentioned a word about that matter. And the scale of the matter was such that it required asking our opinion about what Andropov [allegedly] said to Kiszczak. He [Pavlov] never brought up this topic, which he himself in fact confirms by not mentioning it in his book.

On page [8] Mr. Kramer also makes an odd statement that in “[mid-September] 1981, [. . .] Poland’s Homeland Defense Committee [. . .] reached a final decision at Jaruzelski’s behest to proceed with martial law.” The documents are all there to see (they were discussed and assessed in great detail during the meetings of the Commission for Constitutional Oversight, and there are minutes of those meetings), showing that materials concerning martial law were already being prepared in the mid-sixties. The practical verification of some solutions was conducted during a large-scale military exercise under the code name of “Kraj-73” (“Country-73”). The

intensification and concretization of work took place in the fall of 1980, when a special task-group led by then-premier, Jozef Pinkowski, was formed. Later, there were further developments in the following stages. For example, on 27 March 1981, S. Kania and I signed a document called “The Fundamental Idea of Martial Law.” There is also a protocol of the meeting of the National Defense Committee from 13 September 1981 (the last meeting before martial law was imposed). One can read what Kania said and what I said. Typically, whenever I referred there to the “imposition of martial law” (four times), I always preceded it with the word “potential” [*ewentualne*]. Moreover, when the protocol summarizes my statement, it says that “he pointed out the particular importance and necessity of solving internal problems by ourselves, with the political and economic support from neighboring socialist countries.” So where does “Jaruzelski’s demand” come from? Is the image [of a decision] personified *exclusively in myself* necessary, and if so, then to whom? I speak of this not to avoid responsibility. I have always openly declared that I accept the responsibility. But I do think that a historian should have more finesse in forming *ad hominem* attacks.

Moreover, on pages [8-9], there is additional confusion. It is said that our own forces may not be enough to impose martial law “and that the support of allied forces would therefore be needed.” Then follows a statement that does not accord well with the previous one: “Jaruzelski and Stanislaw Kania . . . both realized that ‘direct intervention by [troops from] other socialist countries’ would ‘set back the development of socialism by decades’ and ‘would be exploited by the imperialist forces.’” Therefore “they were extremely diffident as they prepared to implement the KOK’s decision.” Such hesitation resulted in “a stern public letter from the Soviet leadership on September 17, which urged that decisive measures be taken immediately to ‘prevent the imminent loss of socialism in Poland.’” Again, if we are to talk about strict historical accuracy, the letter was from the CPSU Central Committee and the government of the USSR to the PUWP Central Committee and the government of Poland, and concerned mainly the anti-Soviet campaign in Poland. On what grounds is the claim about the National Defense Committee’s statement made? On September 13, the Committee made no decisions about martial law (there is a protocol). However, the whole process of preparations for this eventuality with all the hesitations lasted, as I said before, from at least the fall of 1980 until 12 December 1981. And finally, how is one to understand that Jaruzelski thought at the time that an intervention would “set back the development of socialism by decades,” and three months later “he desperately hoped for it.” What brought on this change? Particularly since the prognosis for successful imposition of martial law was much better in December than in September.

On page [8] Mark Kramer also claims that Jaruzelski replaced Kania “under Soviet auspices.” I regret that Mr.

Kramer, who after all participated in the Jachranka conference, makes such a generalization. He probably heard me quote from an East German document (acquired by the [Sejm] Commission for Constitutional Oversight) that records a conversation between Honecker and Rusakov which took place 21 October 1981. (I was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP on October 18). Rusakov informed Honecker that I had all kinds of doubts and did not want to accept the position. Soviet suggestions turned out to be ineffective. I agreed only as a result of the insistence of *Polish comrades*. Prof. Jerzy Holzer has confirmed this, adding that it was the “good” Polish comrades who mattered. I also said that it was Kazimierz Barcikowski, always fought against by the conservative forces in the party and by the allies at the time, who recommended me for that function. It is interesting that when referring to a statement made by Andropov at the previously mentioned CPSU Politburo meeting on 29 October 1981, Mr. Kramer does not notice that it was at that time that Andropov said, “Barcikowski and Kubiak are big obstacles in the Politburo.” Finally, does the word “auspices” not sound offensive with respect to the CC PUWP members of the time? It is true that four of them were against my candidacy, but 179 supported me in a *secret ballot*. Were they all “agents of the Kremlin”?

On page [9] Mark Kramer also informs us that during the above-mentioned October 29 meeting of the CPSU Politburo, Andropov said, “the Polish leaders are talking about [Russian: ‘pogovarivaiut’] military assistance from fraternal countries.” But which leaders? It is a fact known from former Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak documents that there were people in the leadership of the party who held very different views and who enjoyed a very different degree of trust from the allies at the time. During that meeting Brezhnev also made the following statement: “I don’t believe that Com. Jaruzelski will do anything constructive. I think he is not bold enough.” But Mr. Kramer does not notice any of that. Following the words “Polish leaders,” just a few lines below he deduces that it was Jaruzelski who “was requesting military intervention from the Soviet Union.” It seems that there is a great need to put me in the worst possible light. But it should have been done in a less obvious way. On what grounds does the plural “Polish leaders” immediately change into the name “Jaruzelski?”

On page [10] we find the following quotation from Andropov’s statement of December 10: “Jaruzelski has made the implementation of martial law contingent on our willingness to offer . . . military assistance.” I must here confirm a very unpleasant, even ugly thing. That quotation has been made up. The actual statement went *exactly* as follows: “Jaruzelski states economic demands strongly and makes our economic aid a condition for conducting Operation X; I would even go further to say that he brings up, but not directly, the question of military aid.” Andropov does not refer to any conversation with me. The only Pole he mentions as somebody he talked to

is Mirosław Milewski. What he says conflicts with what Anoshkin's "notebook" says about Milewski. There we find no "but," no "not directly," but simply: "Can we count on military aid put before economic aid[?]" And as far as the "not directly" is concerned, Gen. Siwicki has written about it long ago in the above mentioned article in *Polska Zbrojna*.

On page [11] of the article, we find [one] evident lie. I do not want to suspect that Mr. Kramer wrote [it] on purpose. But on what grounds does he claim that I talked to Andropov and Rusakov through a "secure phone?" [. . .] Above all else, I want to state categorically that I conducted no conversations by telephone, much less by any other means, with the above-mentioned persons. If someone wishes to disbelieve me, let him at least admit that there are no documents, declarations, or statements from which it could be deduced that I indeed had such conversations. Gen. Siwicki also firmly states that this is the first time he has heard of a conversation with Andropov. If there are references to my alleged opinions and assessments stated during the meeting of December 10, there is no indication where they came from. The only reference to a direct conversation with me can be found in the above-mentioned report of Baibakov. However, Brezhnev, who of course talked to me on the phone on December 7, does not say anything about that conversation, and certainly not that I asked for military aid.

It is a pity that when quoting different voices from the Soviet Politburo meeting of December 10, Mr. Kramer omits such statements as the following by Rusakov: "Jaruzelski is leading us by the nose" (Russian: "Vodit nas za nos."); or by Suslov: "Jaruzelski is showing a certain cunning. Through his requests to the Soviet Union he wants to create an alibi for himself. Of course, it is perfectly obvious that we are not able to actually fulfill those requests, and Jaruzelski will later say 'but I addressed the Soviet Union, asked for help, and they did not give me any.' At the same time, the Poles are clearly stating that they are against bringing the troops in. If the army enters Poland, it will be a catastrophe." There were many other shocking statements made there, some of them reminding one of a surrealistic spectacle. But all this "does not fit" the picture, a picture in which a *de facto* accusatory statement against me is being concluded.

On page [9] a General Staff document dated 23 November 1981 is quoted. In the document we read: "additional arrangements have been implemented to ensure that the transport of our own troops and allied troops [. . .] can be carried out." On that basis, Mr. Kramer claims that it "certainly is compatible with the notion that the Polish leaders would seek external military assistance." On the contrary, it is an argument to the advantage of the so-called authors of martial law. I must explain some obvious things here, unfortunately. Anyone who lived in Poland at that time remembers the fears that



Marshal Viktor Kulikov and General Wojciech Jaruzelski at the Jachranka Conference (November 1997). Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

any little damage to the interest of the Warsaw Pact might become a pretext for intervention. Possible difficulties in military transport would, after all, be a classic violation of the rules according to which the strategic infrastructure of the bloc functioned. This is what was constantly on our minds. Let the fact that I stated, publicly in the Sejm as well as during a Central Committee plenary meeting, that the Polish Army takes responsibility for the smooth functioning of this transportation infrastructure attest to how important and sensitive this point was. Imputing that a concern that this transportation should function smoothly (especially under the conditions of martial law) meant looking for help from the outside is not only absurd, but politically and strategically infantile.

One pages [9-10] is another example of how Mr. Kramer is being led up a “blind alley.” He is, as far as I am aware, a historian by profession and therefore I assume that he will read the addendum I have enclosed in the proper spirit. It will become clear to him from it how thin the different arguments are of people wishing at any cost to accuse the so-called authors of martial law, if they are reduced to using such “evidence.”

On page [13] Mr. Kramer also suggests that Gen. Siwicki and I attempt to make secret Polish documents public. There are already many documents (particularly protocols from the PUWP Politburo meetings, different materials from other institutions and bodies) that have been made public in different ways, but Mr. Kramer is clearly not interested in them. On the other hand, it is true that there is no access to many documents, particularly those of the Ministry of National Defense. Perhaps Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski did not have time to inform Mr. Kramer that several times I addressed the organizers of the Jachranka conference and asked for access to be made possible in Polish institutions. I even wrote statements which were intended to help in those efforts. Unfortunately, in many cases these efforts ended unsuccessfully (it is true that I did not at the time foresee the possibility that after the conclusion of such an important international conference some kind of “work notebook” would be “pulled out of a pocket” and become a “decisive” source for Mr. Kramer).

However very distasteful—to use just such a term—is this statement about our notes (Gen. Siwicki’s and mine)—“assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with.” So only Polish generals would falsify things, while Soviet notes are above any suspicion? I would like to ask here whether we really can treat them [i.e., the Anoshkin notes] as reliable “evidence” (Mr. Kramer calls it “decisive”) for describing events of great political, historical, and moral importance? At the same time, considering the threats and announcements coming even from the highest offices and leading political circles, should one treat the suggestions of an American historian as a welcome gesture in this campaign? I trust that this was not Mr. Kramer’s intention. All the more so, since when he wrote his article he did not know many of the

circumstances, facts, and arguments I have presented here.

I understand that Mr. Kramer’s article is based exclusively on words written then as well as years later. But this is only a partial base. I do not deny the necessity and importance of his research. But to make the picture objective, one needs to look also at evident facts, phenomena, and symptoms from the time in question. Many of them have been presented by many witnesses who testified before the Commission of Constitutional Oversight under the rules of the Penal Code. I did not notice even a trace of those testimonies in Mr. Kramer’s article. But the most important thing is to avoid a situation of “if the facts indicate something different, then too bad for the facts.”

Therefore, counting on the support of Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski, an outstanding specialist in contemporary history, I would like to ask Mr. Kramer to reevaluate the text of the inaugural brochure, the main substance of which is to be Anoshkin’s “working notebook.” Gen. Siwicki, myself, and other people have a number of important comments about it, which we will present at a later point. I am ready for conversations which will lead to better mutual understanding, will confront and verify views, and above all, which will bring us closer to the very complex truth.

To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation. Many people who for years were sworn enemies of the USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all kinds of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities—I am not talking of Mr. Kramer, of course, since I don’t know his views—are suddenly turning into defenders of the USSR. Everything that comes from that country is true and constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this [tendency] seems exclusively to concern things that make it possible to condemn and accuse the Polish People’s Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I always have said and to this day keep saying openly that the Soviet Union was our ally within the “sick” reality of those years and with all the heavy load of limited sovereignty. To the Soviet Union we owe what is actually the most advantageous configuration of Polish territory in history (although I admit that such a configuration suited Soviet interests). For many years, the Soviet Union was the sole guarantor of that territory. I respect and like the Russians. I think that the relations between our countries which are now equal should be good and mutually advantageous. Also, when I look back at those years I try to keep a rational distance, since as a politician and a general I know the ruthless logic of that divided world. I used to say that if I had been a Soviet marshal or general I would have perceived Poland as a territory endangering the bloc, with all the consequences of that for us, of course. We were fully aware of that situation, which was assessed similarly in the American documents disclosed at Jachranka. All this required from us, the Polish authorities, the appropriate measures and countermeasures. Their effectiveness was proved by life itself. We imposed

and carried out martial law alone, and then, walking along a rough road, reached the Round Table [of 1989] and the groundbreaking changes which became an impulse and model for other countries of the region.

Wojciech Jaruzelski
Warsaw, 27 April 1998

Appendix

The supposition that Poland was interested in so-called “fraternal aid” is disgraceful and absurd. People included in the Preliminary Summons, the witnesses, and some historians have explained this in detail. However, some members of the Commission (Parliament member Jacek Taylor in particular) during the Commission’s deliberations referred to a “document” from the MSW (Ministry of Internal Affairs) files which can presently be found in the Sejm archives (file 228/IB). The document is called *An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country on 25 November 1981*.³ The following passage can be found in appendix No. 2 to that *Assessment of the Situation*:

Implementation of martial law may result in the following developments:

Scenario 1: Political organizations submit to the requirements of martial law. At the same time, there is a possibility of small-scale strikes and limited hostile propaganda.

Scenario 2: Massive strikes are organized in some parts of the country without workers leaving the workplace.

Scenario 3: A general occupation strike, with workplaces taken over; some workers go out in the streets; there are street demonstrations and attacks occur on buildings housing party offices and state administration, on police stations, etc. Strong intervention of police and armed forces takes place. Aid from Warsaw Pact troops is not out of the question.

People who attempt to use this [document] as evidence against those included in the Preliminary Summons are misusing it. The reasons I say this are as follows. First, [the document was] in a file in which only loose, preliminary materials can be found. Secondly, the said *Assessment of the Current Situation* is really only a draft, without any filing number, without any annotations, and was not signed by anybody or distributed anywhere. There is also another telling factor, one that remains conveniently not mentioned, which proves the ill will of the people who insist on the basis of such material the contention that Poland allegedly expected so-called “aid.” This is the fact that in the same file—about which there was no mention—there is another, later document, called *An Assessment of the Current Situation in the Country and Proposals for Solutions*, dated 5 December 1981. There is

not even one word concerning any kind of “aid” there. However, unlike the earlier document of November 25, there are many hand-written comments and corrections of Czeslaw Kiszczak, who was at the time the Minister of Internal Affairs. And although that document has not been signed or distributed either, the very fact that the Minister made many annotations on it makes it more trustworthy. But in spite of that it remains unmentioned.

It is necessary to add here that although the Commission had access to an enormous amount of different material and documents, no traces of expectations or requests for this so-called “military aid” have been found. On the contrary, the claim that we need to solve our Polish problems on our own appears repeatedly in many secret as well as public statements made by the representatives of the PPR government at the time. Therefore, using the said “*Assessment of the Situation*” of 25 November 1981 as an argument is evident manipulation. Perhaps it was hoped that nobody would be inclined to go through the pile of files where less important, loose materials were kept.

The selective character of omissions described above can be further illustrated by the following fact. Solidarity activists have been claiming that all kinds of anti-Soviet excesses, such as the desecration of monuments and graves of soldiers were provocations organized by the State Security. But surprisingly enough, in the *Assessment of the Situation* of November 25 (appendix no. 1), is the information that from the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (18 October 1981) until the time the said *Assessment* was written, 26 criminal investigations concerning the above mentioned acts were started. At that time eighteen people had been found who had vandalized monuments in Jędrzejów and one person who had desecrated the graves of Soviet soldiers in Gryfin. Remembering these facts is not convenient now. Nor is remembering (in accordance with the described *Assessment*) that on November 25, eleven public buildings were under occupation, and a note made of plans to occupy another fourteen.

[Translated from Polish by Anna Zielinska-Elliott and Jan Chowaniec.]

Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski served as prime minister of Polish People’s Republic from 1980-1989.

¹ Editor’s note: For the Jachranka conference, see Malcolm Byrne’s introduction to this *Bulletin* section and Ray Garthoff’s report in *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1997), pp. 229-232

² Editor’s note: The conference organizers are planning to publish the Jachranka proceedings; transcription of the audio tapes of the conference is in progress.

³ Editor’s note: On this document, see also the article by Pawel Machcewicz in this *Bulletin*.

“The Assistance Of Warsaw Pact Forces Is Not Ruled Out”

By Pawel Machcewicz

The document published below can be regarded as one of the key Polish sources, so far declassified, regarding the preparations for martial law in Poland in 1981. The document was released (upon appeal by the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences) by the Ministry of Interior in connection with the international conference, “Poland 1980-1981: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions” which took place in Jachranka (outside Warsaw) in November 1997. The “Supplement No. 2” was prepared as an attachment to the document “Assessment of the present situation in the country as of 25 November 1981” (“*Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w kraju wg stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.*”)

“Supplement No. 2” (original title “*Zalacznik nr 2: Zamierzenia Resortu Spraw Wewnetrznych*”) is not signed, but both its content and classification (“Secret, For Special Use. Single Copy”), suggest that it is a top-level document, presumably prepared in the highest ranks of the Polish government or Communist Party. “The Supplement” considers various possible developments of the political situation and the alternative strategies to suppress the “Solidarity” movement. The special legislative act on extraordinary measures, mentioned in the first paragraph, was never passed in the parliament, and the only option which was implemented was martial law. The repressive strategy which prevailed was Option 2 of the “Supplement”—the mass-scale internments of Solidarity and opposition activists.

However, the most revealing part of the “Supplement” is its last paragraph. Option (Contingency) No. 3 predicts that in case of massive and violent resistance to the imposition of martial law, “assistance of Warsaw Pact forces is not ruled out.” The importance of this statement consists in the fact that it is the only Polish document thus far declassified which explicitly mentions potential Soviet military help as part of the martial law planning.¹ It seems to contradict the basic argument, upheld by Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and his supporters, that the decision to introduce martial law was exclusively Polish and that its ultimate goal was to keep the Soviets away from Poland. This idea—specifically that the operation started on 13 December 1981 was aimed at saving the nation from Soviet intervention, which would inevitably lead to the bloodshed—was the core of the martial law propaganda (obviously, given the circumstances, it used subtle but perfectly understandable language). To present day it remains the main line of Jaruzelski’s political struggle to defend his past actions.

There is abundant evidence, coming mostly from the Russian side, suggesting that the real situation was quite

different.² Many Soviet documents, including the diary of General Victor Anoshkin’s (Marshal Kulivov’s personal adjutant) presented at the recent Jachranka conference,³ describe several occasions on which Jaruzelski or his aides insisted on obtaining guarantees of “fraternal” help in case the imposition of the martial law encountered excessive difficulties. As Jaruzelski and others, however, point out, the Russian archives have thus far released only selected minutes of the CPSU Politburo meetings. All of them suggest that the Soviet leadership rejected the idea of intervening militarily in Poland. But what about the minutes of other Politburo meetings? Do they mention other options? Without free access to the Russian documentation, the discussion on the Polish crisis will remain inconclusive. It heightens the significance of Polish documents, among them “Supplement No. 2,” which reveal the planning for and the mechanisms of martial law.

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SUPPLEMENT NO. 2
PLANNED ACTIVITY OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY

1. Taking into account the current course of events in the country as well as the need to discipline society and reinforce the execution of power, it is necessary to introduce a legislative act (without an introduction of the martial law) on extraordinary means of action. The latter act foresees, among others:

- heightened responsibility for the public goods which one is in charge of, including a prohibition on using factory goods for purposes not associated with the duties which are carried out;
- extension of the rights of the managers of workplaces to give orders to their employees including ones exceeding their area of responsibility;
- attaching conditions to the rights of strike action such as the requirement of an earlier exhaustion of compromise ways of settling arguments, pursuing secret ballots, receiving approval from a higher trade union organ;
- complete prohibition of the right to strike action in certain units of the national economy and institutions as well as authorization of the Council of State to introduce a prohibition of strike and protest action for a predetermined period in part or in the whole territory of the state;
- limitation of the right to hold public meetings (also those of trade unions). Legal use of the means of direct

enforcement is provided in order to dissolve public meetings. The latter means can be used in the case of illegal taking over of a building (apartment);

- introduction of the curfew, a ban on artistic, entertainment and sports events as well as on public collections (except carried out by the Church), suspension of the activity of selected associations as well as limitation of the post, telecommunications, personal and cargo traffic with foreign countries;
- stepping up of censorship of selected publications and a ban on leaflet-poster type propaganda;
- authorization of the *voievodes* to turn to the military for assistance in certain situations of danger to public order;
- transfer of cases concerning certain violations of law into the domain of military prosecutors and courts.

Passing the above legislation as well as its implementation will allow the government of the Polish People's Republic as well as the organs of state administration and the units of the public economy to take special actions aiming at strengthening the national economy, preventing anarchy and hindering the activity of counterrevolutionary forces. They will also lead to an increase of social discipline and public order—as conditions necessary for eliminating the consequences of the crisis which threatens the normal functioning of the state and the vital needs of the people.

The legislative act will create conditions for the gradual (selective) introduction of bans and orders (limitations of citizen freedoms and placement of obligations) in part or on the whole territory of the country depending on the development of the situation. Authorization to introduce certain degrees of limitations will also be given to the territorial organs of the authorities and the state administration (*voievodes* and mayors of *voievodeship* cities).

The passage of the act and its subsequent introduction will undoubtedly cause various social repercussions—both positive and negative ones. It will certainly strengthen the morale and attitudes of the party members and all advocates of the socialist system so as to participate in the defense of the state. On the other hand, it will stimulate greater activity of the extremist and anti-socialist elements in the direction of destructive actions, for example the calling of a general strike and other things.

2. If the application of the act on extraordinary measures in the interest of the protection of citizens and the state is not effective, the introduction of martial law will be necessary. The extension of the preparations of the Interior Ministry in the case of the introduction of martial law has been stipulated in relevant documents.

Among the fundamental tasks which will determine the efficient functioning of martial law and which ought to be carried out at the moment of its introduction or several hours in beforehand, are:

a) internment of persons who threaten the security of the state—which is the principle endeavor. Two variations of

implementing this operation are being considered:

Option 1

- internment of particularly dangerous persons in the main centres of the opposition such as Warsaw, Katowice, Szczecin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk;

Option 2

- simultaneous internment of all specified persons in the whole country. Internment would cover 1,500-4,500 persons. The feasibility of this operation will be determined by the course of events.

The most effective factor to ensure the successful conclusion of the operation would be if it came as a complete surprise to the opponent. It is only possible if the operation were to be carried out sufficiently in advance of the introduction of the martial law.

The operation can also be carried out as a response to the specific activity of the opponent, although its impact would be limited.

It is assumed that the internment operation would be accompanied by an inclusion of the public use of telecommunications and preventive warning conversations with less sinister persons as well as the taking of initiative in the branches of "Solidarity" by people with moderate views (replacement structures—work is in progress on this question).

b) the remaining important endeavors are:

- introduction of censorship of postal and telecommunication correspondence as well as control of telephone conversations, especially in the public network;
- introduction of limitations in the cross-border traffic, changes in place of residence, the activity of selected associations, the freedom of movement and activity of personnel of diplomatic missions of capitalist countries, correspondents from capitalist countries; making it impossible for Polish citizens to enter diplomatic missions of the capitalist countries;
- withholding of armed weapons as well as radio broadcasting and broadcast-receiving equipment from certain citizens;
- extension of protection over 441 sites of the national economy by the Polish armed forces and protection over 891 sites mainly of the food-supply sector by the Citizen Militia (MO);
- protection and defense of the sites of the central authorities by the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry forces;
- mobilization of the maneuver units of the Citizen Militia (MO), countryside outposts of the MO, WOP and NJW MSW—it has been planned to draft about 46,000 reserves;
- engaging in actions some selected ORM members, including combined sub-units.

Some of the aforementioned endeavors will be carried out with the participation of the armed forces. Those questions are agreed upon with the Ministry of Defense and an action concept has been jointly worked out.

XXX

The introduction of martial law may—among other things—cause the following development of events:

Scenario 1

- subordination of political and socio-economic organizations to the demands of the martial law with the simultaneous possibility of limited strike action and restricted hostile propaganda activity.

Scenario 2

- in some regions of the country, mass strikes are organized with the tendency to extend beyond the workplace. Sabotage activities take place.

Scenario 3

- general labor strike, some workers go out onto the streets, there are street demonstrations and attacks on party buildings and those of the state administration, the Citizen Militia and others. It leads to a sharp intervention of the MO forces and the military. The assistance of Warsaw Pact forces is not ruled out.

[Source: *Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych*, t. 228/1 B. Translated by Pawel Machcewicz]

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¹ For the discussion of other evidence of the Polish Party, the military and the Ministry of Interior's counts on the Soviet and Warsaw Pact participation in the implementation of martial law see the report by Andrzej Paczkowski: "The Conditions and Mechanisms Leading to The Introduction of Martial Law: Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight" (translated from Polish by Leo Gluchowski), in "On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland," Working Paper No. 21, Preliminary Conference Edition, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 1997 (Polish original in: "O Stanie Wojennym. W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997).

² For the detailed and updated analysis of the Soviet evidence see: Mark Kramer, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981," paper delivered at a seminar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2 April 1998, and Kramer's articles in this *Bulletin*.

³ For the analysis of the findings of the Jachranka conference see: Pawel Machcewicz and Malcolm Byrne, "Revealing a New Side of Poland's Martial Law," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 December 1997.



From left to right: Georgii Shakhnazarov, Anatoli Gribkov, and Viktor Kulikov (General Anoshkin—to left behind Kulikov) at the Jachranka Conference (November 1997). Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

Reflections on the Polish Crisis

By Francis J. Meehan

As I made my way around Washington in September 1980 for briefings in various US government departments before leaving for Warsaw, the predominant theme was the likelihood, as most people saw it, of Soviet military intervention, sooner rather than later, to suppress the Polish reform movement. The 1956 and 1968 precedents were much in the minds of US specialists in Soviet and East European affairs. They knew the current situation in Poland was bigger, tougher, and more complex than either Hungary or Czechoslovakia had been, but they knew also it was much more important, as Poland's position was that of the linchpin in Central Europe. The widely held view was that the USSR would not hesitate for long before stamping out a threat to Polish Communist rule and its own hegemonic position.

I received little encouragement that Moscow would stay its hand. In fact, I came away from almost all my meetings feeling that I would be lucky to get to Warsaw before the Soviet tanks. I can remember only two dissenting voices—but they were important ones. [National Security Advisor] Zbigniew Brzezinski told me he thought the Poles would have some time to try and work out their own affairs and achieve an internal political balance. The Soviet menace would continue to brood over the scene, but Moscow was restrained by the knowledge that the Poles could and would fight, while the Poles for their part realized they should not push the Soviets too far. Here was some encouragement at least. The other exception was Richard Davies, ambassador to Poland during the seventies, who was a member of a briefing panel organized by the Department of State. Davies, with his instinct for Poland, the USSR, and the Russian-Polish historical relationship, felt the Soviets would think long and hard about sending in troops. This was the only note of optimism in his forceful, stark analysis.

I got to Warsaw in late October. From then until the imposition of martial law, fourteen months later, the twin threats—suppression of the reform movement by the Polish regime or through Soviet military action—dominated US official thinking. There was good reason for this. We had Colonel [Ryszard] Kuklinski's reporting on the regime's plans for a strike against [the independent labor union] Solidarity. Substantial intelligence information on Soviet troop movements on the Polish frontiers pointed at various times to intervention. The Soviet threat ebbed and flowed—early December 1980 was perhaps the high water mark—but it looked real enough. It would have been imprudent to ignore or discount the evidence.

The outgoing Carter administration and the new

Reagan team were unlikely to do so. The previous year, Carter had been criticized for failing to make clear the accumulating evidence of impending Soviet military action in Afghanistan. He was not about to run a similar risk in the case of Poland. In addition, and weighing more heavily, private and public warnings against intervention were main elements in the official approach, of both the Carter and Reagan administrations, to a dramatic, fast-moving situation, which was of broad public and political interest in the US but was largely beyond our ability to influence decisively.

I arrived in Warsaw as the Solidarity registration crisis was moving into the final phase. Rumors ran through town that the regime was about to use the security forces to put down the reform movement and that Soviet troops were on their way in—the usual thing whenever there was a political crunch. There was some evidence to support both conjectures. I did not, however, find it persuasive, and played it cool in my reporting, but quickly learned that Polish scare stuff grabbed Washington. There was a lot of it, and there continued to be a lot of it in the time ahead, from all sorts of open as well as intelligence sources. We spent a lot of time running the scares down.

It was not an easy situation to stay on top of, not because we were short of information—the usual thing in Eastern Europe—but because we had so much. Poles were not afraid to talk. What struck me, coming as I did from Prague, was the remarkably good access we had, which reached into the upper levels of the civilian side of the Party (not the military, who retained their organizational discipline and control). Our range of contacts with Solidarity, particularly its Warsaw regional organization, and with the Church gave us the necessary balance. Even so, hard information was not easy to come by in the flood of rumors that washed around us, and analysis and judgement were at times little more than half-educated hunches. All the same, Washington had a hefty appetite for our reporting.

We were hardly over the registration crisis when we dropped down the next, really big dip in the roller-coaster—the early December (1980) events. I was struck by further differences of perception—dealing with Poland in Washington and looking at it close up in Warsaw, both perceptions were entirely valid.

We received urgent instructions Sunday, December 7, the height of the crisis, to check for unusual activity at key Polish government and party buildings, military installations, communication and transportation facilities, as well as at the Soviet embassy chancery and housing complex. Washington was clearly alarmed by intelligence indicating that Soviet military action was imminent.

Presumably we would be able to see signs and portents locally in Warsaw.

As it happened, the instructions came in when we were in the final stages of an embassy paddle tennis tournament, not the biggest thing in the world of sport but an event taken with commendable seriousness in the local US community. Washington would probably not have been greatly amused to know we finished the tournament first before setting about the duties that had been laid upon us, but I like to think we showed a proper sense of proportion at a tense moment.

It was one of those raw, bone-chilling nights you get in Eastern Europe as embassy officers made their way across town in twos and threes, some on foot, others driving. I saw the teams as they returned, tired, half-frozen. They all told the same story. They had seen absolutely nothing. Government buildings were pitch black, with the normal complement of semi-comatose guards. Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, Party Central Committee building, railroad stations, airport, barracks areas, Soviet embassy and housing area—all quiet as was usual in Warsaw on a freezing Sunday night in December. The only unusual activity in the entire city, they reported dryly, was the American embassy, lit up like a transatlantic liner on a dark and empty ocean. We fired in a late-night message to the Department, knowing wiser heads would make sense of these unremarkable findings.

In part because the November and December scares came to nothing, in part because of what I had heard from Brzezinski and Davies, in part because of my own developing sense of the realities around me, I soon found myself almost completely preoccupied with the Polish domestic political situation and less intent on the Soviet military threat. From what we continued to hear and read, Moscow seemed deeply frustrated over Poland, exasperated at the inability of the Polish party leadership to grasp the nettle and put Solidarity in its place with whatever means necessary. The Soviets seemed unsure themselves of the course they should take. Sending troops in looked more and more problematic as time went on.

While I grew skeptical about Soviet intervention in late 1980 and impressed as the various crises came and went in the succeeding months with their concurrent difficulties and uncertainties, I have to say I thought Soviet intervention was again in the cards in the fall of 1981. The Polish leadership looked increasingly feckless—[Stanisław] Kania's replacement as First Secretary by [Wojciech] Jaruzelski did not seem to indicate a radically new course. I ruled out the possibility that Moscow was prepared to lose control of Poland—just to let it go, like that. If the political slide continued, if Solidarity won a substantial measure of power, if Soviet strategic interests were seriously threatened, then it seemed to me they would send in troops.

With these judgements in mind, I find the record of the Soviet Politburo 10 December 1981 session contained in the Jachranka documents quite extraordinary—I feel I

owe an apology for the dark thoughts I used to harbor about what I now see was an amiable, laid-back bunch of geriatric Rotarians. Who could have imagined, apart maybe from his mother—she knew her boy had a heart of gold—[KGB chief Iurii] Andropov saying that “even if Poland falls under the control of ‘Solidarity,’ that’s the way it will be”? (Had no one ever bothered to tell him about the Brezhnev Doctrine?)

Equally curious is the absence of any dissent from this revolutionary (better, counterrevolutionary) view on the part of the others. It is true, the records of earlier 1981 Politburo sessions document a temporizing, undynamic Soviet leadership, but it is a revelation to see they had become such complete pussycats. And if that was their *shirokaya natura* showing, and they were all that relaxed about Poland doing its own thing, it sure would have made things an awful lot easier for Kania and Jaruzelski if they had told them earlier, instead of doing things like sending that nasty June [1981] letter.

I find equally striking, suspicious even—which shows I am geriatric Soviet hand myself—the unanimity with which the Politburo rejects at the same meeting the idea of military action in Poland, without anything resembling real debate. Admittedly they knew by now they had bitten off more than they felt like chewing in Afghanistan, and could not have relished the risks a massive Polish operation would have brought with it. Even so, to read in the record someone of [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko's steel declaring that “there cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland” has a surreal quality. Just as mind-bending is the fact that someone with Suslov's *curriculum vitae* is reported as speaking after Gromyko of only press handling of the Polish “counterrevolutionary forces.” Press handling? Did he hear what Gromyko said?

I was struck by Jaruzelski's reaction—as noted in Raymond Garthoff's report¹—to Kulikov's insistence that the USSR at no time had plans to intervene militarily. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons for Jaruzelski's exasperation. If anyone on the Polish side could judge the reality of the Soviet threat, it must surely be he. Of course, the General wanted the threat to be seen and accepted as real so that he could sell the Polish people, and the world at large, the patriotic explanation for martial law, so he might not have been wholly candid. I still think, however, that his exasperation springs from experience of how close the threat came at times.

Brzezinski was a central player in the late 1980 events and his views on Carter's hot line message of December 3, as a factor in the Soviet decision not to intervene, have to be given due weight. I can only say that the US warnings, in general, struck me as largely *pro forma* exercises. It was right for us to do it—we had to do something—and I have no doubt the Soviets took them seriously, as they took any major US statement seriously. However, I would judge the imponderables of taking military action in Poland as

by far the most crucial element for them.

A couple of personal Polish views of our warnings to the Soviets give other insights. Deputy Premier Mieczysław Rakowski told me in mid-December 1980 that we were greatly exaggerating the danger. The Soviets had no intention of coming in. He welcomed the warnings nevertheless if only because they had the effect of slowing Solidarity down, making it behave more responsibly. Rakowski was pleased at this unexpected bonus. Bogdan Lis of Solidarity, on the other hand, was extremely unhappy with the US statements when I saw him not long afterwards. He complained they were exactly what the Soviets and the Polish regime wanted—here he corroborated Rakowski—in that they made the reform movement cautious at a time when it should have gone all out to exert maximum pressure on the regime. Lis, who gave the impression of being one of the hard men of Polish politics, went on to excoriate Radio Free Europe broadcasts for taking the regime's side—a view, I tried to convince him, I had never heard from any official Polish quarter.

I described Poland in 1980-81 as largely outside our ability to influence decisively. Some might think this less than red-blooded. The “can-do” strain in US policy-making runs strong, which is a good thing, too. Washington players conceptualize, sloganize—that goes with the scene. Warsaw again brought me up against the limits of US action on the ground in Eastern Europe. My judgement was that while there were useful things we could and should do to help the Polish reformers, we remained marginal on the basics: the power struggle in Poland itself and the Soviet intervention threat.

I was concerned that we not over-extend ourselves in a situation that could easily get away from us. I got a flash message from the Department in the summer of 1981 asking my views on a US military airlift of food (discussed in Romuald Spasowski's 1986 autobiography *The Liberation of One*). I argued strongly against it on various grounds, the most important being that a US Air Force airlift would raise Poland to a direct US-Soviet confrontation in a region that was much easier for them to control. If the Soviets challenged us, our options would be unattractive—either to back off with major loss of face, or hang tough and run serious risks. The Department did not return to the matter.

I cannot claim more than a general sense of the relations between the Polish government and Solidarity in the month or so before martial law—specifically, whether there was either room for compromise or the will on either side for a genuine search for compromise. The relations were highly complex. Negotiations covered the entire range of social, economic and political issues—virtually the whole life of the country. The inner workings on both sides were often opaque. I was impressed by the Poles ability to find ways out of a seemingly total impasse and to step back from the brink. Everyone realized it was a struggle for power, however. The stakes grew larger, the

room for maneuver smaller as time went on. Both sides knew their Lenin—there was no mistake, it was *kto kogo*.

I went back to the US the last week of November [1981] on consultation, and did not return to Poland until after martial law was declared. Before leaving Warsaw I arranged to meet with (then) Archbishop Glemp, Jaruzelski, and [Solidarity leader Lech] Wałęsa in order to be able to give Washington a sense of how the three main Polish players saw things. The meetings remain vivid political snapshots practically on the eve of martial law.

The Primate spoke of a seriously deteriorating situation and of how he was trying to mediate between the regime and Solidarity, to hold them together in negotiation. He was not optimistic. The overriding problem was that the party hardliners were in the ascendant. I was struck by the bearish tone, which contrasted sharply with my meeting with him the previous month. He told me then that there was a good chance of martial law. I reported this to Washington but without giving it particular weight.

Wałęsa was deeply concerned about the fate of the reform movement. Solidarity was entering an absolutely crucial phase in its forthcoming negotiations with the government. It was, as he put it, very near the top of the hill, but it would have to be careful or else it could go over the top and slide quickly down the other side—a prophecy soon fulfilled.

He gave me a scheme for the next month or so, until the end of the year. Solidarity planned to drag its feet in negotiations during that time. In the meantime he wanted a massive economic aid offer from Western governments—to be made to Solidarity, not to the regime. This would be his trump card which he could produce in the latter stages of the negotiations, when he would make clear the aid was available to the government only on condition that Solidarity's basic demands were met.

I cannot say whether Wałęsa was giving a finished Solidarity position to which they were committed, or if he was floating personal views. Nor do I know if Solidarity actually followed the Wałęsa scheme in the time remaining before martial law—there was certainly no aid offer for him to work with. I tried to disabuse him of the idea that massive aid would be forthcoming quickly, if it could be realized at all. I knew the debate on aid on the US side was not particularly promising, and I did not see the West Europeans doing all that much. Wałęsa said the reform movement could still achieve its goals without major aid, but the struggle would last longer and the Polish people would have to endure even greater hardships.

Wałęsa was in tremendous form all evening—we had dinner at our house with our wives and a few other Americans and Poles. He completely dominated the conversation with rapid-fire delivery of ideas and opinions on everything under the sun, hardly letting the rest of us get a word in, moving from the very serious to quick wisecracks without any loss of pace or force. We talked about Jaruzelski, and I said I had only made it to

army sergeant and still had a queasy feeling when dealing with four-star generals. He came back immediately—sergeants were nothing much—it was corporals you had to watch out for—he had been a corporal himself—and there was Napoleon—and then “there was that other corporal as well.” We knew we were looking at one of the great political naturals.

I met with Jaruzelski the same day the Primate warned me there was a good chance of martial law. I still regret the professional goof of not telling the general I had heard martial law was coming and asking his views. I doubt he would have “fessed up” and given dates and times, but I should have had the wit to get him on the record.

By the time I saw him Jaruzelski must have assumed Colonel Kukliński, now missing from his duties for a couple of weeks, was in US hands, and we were fully aware of the planning for a military strike against Solidarity. He could easily have avoided a meeting. For all he knew I might have appeared armed with instructions to ask awkward questions about the regime’s intentions. The US might have been about to launch a political campaign that could cause problems in the immediate run-up to martial law. Perhaps a reason for seeing me was to mislead deliberately by a pretence of business as usual even after the Kukliński affair. The hour was unusual—we met from eight-thirty till ten at night—but there was certainly nothing vastly new or different in what he had to say from our previous meetings.

Jaruzelski restated the government’s commitment to broad national consensus. It did not have to follow this policy—it had reserves of power that had not been used. “Some people” accused it of being weak for negotiating with Solidarity “with the strike pistol aimed at us,” but it intended to continue seeking agreement. However, the crisis facing the state could not continue indefinitely.

Not everything Solidarity did suited him, he said, but there were forces in the union that could be worked with. Marginal, radical elements were moving way from the mainstream. Solidarity realized it was not enough just to fight the authorities. It was essential to reach a settlement on the enterprise self-management law, otherwise all the other agreements would be useless.

On our bilateral relations Jaruzelski said the West Europeans were waiting for a positive US lead on economic aid, and he asked for a positive approach from us in advance of the EC summit which was to be held shortly. He stressed the importance of our agricultural deliveries within the Commodity Credit Corporation framework, and said he wanted to send the minister of agriculture to the US to discuss technology, fertilizers, pesticides and related matters. We had their list of requirements in industrial and semi-finished goods, spare parts, and raw materials. Vice Premier Zbigniew Madej’s visit to Washington in December would be a good occasion to pursue these topics.

If this was all an act, the general did it well—worth an Oscar nomination. It sounded much the same in tone and

substance as I had heard from him before. He struck me again as moderate, realistic—the cool political soldier. Personally he seemed, as before, reserved, tense, basically a loner. Had he already set the date for martial law when he saw me? I am inclined to think the decision to strike was taken closer to the actual event, but I might only be trying to excuse my inability to see the cloven hoof sticking out at the foot of those razor-crease uniform pants with the broad red stripe.

Debate on Jaruzelski’s patriotism strikes me as a more than slightly red herring. He was and is a Pole—I suspect more now than he was then. People who were in a position to know told me he thought the worst thing the US ever did to him was [U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper] Weinberger’s one-liner in a TV show that he was a Soviet general in a Polish uniform. That really got to him. But if he was a Pole, he was the top Polish Communist power handler in a tight spot, completely devoted to maintaining party control of the system, and also completely committed to the Soviet connection. He may well have wanted to avoid Soviet military intervention, possible occupation, but he also wanted to put the reform movement back in its cage. My guess is the latter objective was the primary motivation in a convenient coincidence of goals and interests—but I was wrong on the Soviet politburo and I could be wrong again.

Colonel Kukliński was a very brave man. The operation to bring him and his family to the West—the planning and the action itself—made for an edgy week or so in the embassy, and no doubt it was an excruciatingly anxious time for the Kuklińskis themselves. The operation’s success reflected much credit on the Kuklińskis for their courage and on the professionalism of those involved on the US side. My role was minimal—to support the people who were doing the work. I hope I looked calmer than I felt. If it had all gone wrong, if the colonel had been caught before he could get away, or if the extraction operation had been discovered while it was in progress, things would have been messy.

I am not sure it would have made all that much difference if we had tipped off the Solidarity leadership about the regime’s planning for a strike against them on the basis of the information Kukliński provided. They would not have been much surprised to learn the generals were thinking nasty things about them. I believe they assumed that to be the case from very early on. What they would have wanted to know—as I would have—was the date of martial law, and Kukliński did not give us that so far as I know.

I say “so far as I know” because I did not see all of his reporting. The CIA provided me with summaries from time to time. I remember the material as largely technical-organizational in nature. It must have been of great use to our military analysts, but what I saw lacked broader political scope, and I lost sight somewhat of the colonel’s reporting in the press of more urgent business in the months before martial law.

Francis J. Meehan retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 1989. He was the U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980-1983.

¹ See Raymond Garthoff, "The Conference on Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp.229-232.

NEH SUMMER 1999 INSTITUTE
AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY ON

"NEW SOURCES AND FINDINGS ON COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY"

The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, in association with the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive, will hold a National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) Summer Institute on "New Sources and Findings on Cold War International History" from 12 July-6 August 1999. This four-week program, intended primarily for university and college professors teaching courses on the history of U.S. foreign policy, diplomatic history, and international affairs/relations during the Cold War period, will offer an opportunity to study and assess emerging new sources and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, particularly those from the former communist bloc, and their potential for use in teaching.

Since faculty will be derived primarily from area studies specialists familiar with archival and other sources from the former Soviet Union, China, and other East-bloc countries, the summer institute will provide a forum for a dialogue between these specialists on the "other side" of Cold War history and participants who have researched, written, and taught from an American perspective, working primarily from U.S. and other English-language sources. The Director of the Institute is James R. Millar, Director of GWU's Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES); principal faculty include James G. Hershberg (George Washington University), former Director of the Cold War International History Project and author of "James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age"; Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), co-author of "Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev"; and Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University), author of "China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation."

Sections will cover new findings and interpretations on important Cold War history topics ranging from the conflict's origins to its ending, including major crises, regional flare-ups, alliances, and the nuclear arms race. Sessions will also be devoted to issues in teaching Cold War history, including the use of new technologies such as the internet as well as multimedia sources such as documentaries. Assigned readings for discussion will include important recent publications, including both secondary accounts and primary sources, as well as recently declassified documents from both Eastern and Western archives. Participants will also have an opportunity to tap Cold War history resources in the Washington, D.C., area, such as the National Archives, government agencies, research organizations, etc.

Under NEH guidelines, applicants (with limited exceptions) must be teaching American undergraduate students. Thirty visiting scholars will be selected. Those accepted will receive a \$2800 stipend for a month's expenses in Washington. **Applications must be postmarked no later than 1 March 1999.**

For further information, including application packages, contact
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Colonel Kuklinski and the Polish Crisis, 1980-81

By Mark Kramer

From the early 1970s until November 1981, Col. Ryszard Kuklinski was a crucial intelligence source for the United States. Having become profoundly disillusioned with Communism and the Soviet Union's heavy-handed presence in Poland, Kuklinski began supplying the United States with highly sensitive information about Soviet-bloc military planning and weapons developments. Altogether, he smuggled out copies of more than 30,000 classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents, numbering tens of thousands of pages, including war plans, military maps, mobilization schedules, allied command procedures, summaries of exercises, technical data on weapons, blueprints of command bunkers, electronic warfare manuals, military targeting guidelines, and allied nuclear doctrine. To ensure that his motives would not be questioned, Kuklinski refused to take any payment for his work. For roughly a decade, his efforts gave the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) an unparalleled look inside the Warsaw Pact.¹

Kuklinski was in an especially important position when a prolonged crisis swept over Poland in 1980-81. Not only was he an aide to the Polish national defense minister (and later prime minister and Communist Party leader), Army-Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski; he also was one of a handful of senior officers on the Polish General Staff who helped draw up plans for the imposition of martial law. The Polish General Staff's formal role in planning the military aspects of martial law began on 22 October 1980, when Jaruzelski ordered the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Florian Siwicki, to set up an elite planning unit. This unit, which worked closely with a martial law planning staff at the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry, consisted predominantly of general officers, including all of Siwicki's deputies. Kuklinski, as the head of the General Planning Department and deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, was a key member of the martial law planning unit from the very start. Among other tasks, he served as a liaison with Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact's Joint Armed Forces, and with other high-ranking Soviet military officers from the Pact's Joint Command. Kuklinski also was frequently responsible for drafting operational plans, helping to design exercises, and compiling notes of secret meetings and discussions. These functions proved invaluable when he sought to transmit detailed information to the United States.

Until November 1981, when Kuklinski was forced to escape from Poland to avert arrest, his reports were indispensable for the CIA's efforts to monitor the Polish crisis. Kuklinski was not the only senior Polish military

officer who was working for the CIA at the time—it is known that at least four others, including two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officers, Col. Jerzy Szuminski and Col. Wladyslaw Ostaszewicz; a military adviser to Jaruzelski, Gen. Leon Dubicki; and a Polish military liaison in West Germany, Col. Antoni Tykocinski, were all supplying information to the United States—but no one was more crucial than Kuklinski.² His voluminous dispatches and transfers of documents allowed the CIA to keep close track of the martial law planning, the status of the Polish army, and the dynamics of Soviet-Polish relations in 1980-81.

During the crisis, Kuklinski transmitted daily reports and operated with relatively few hindrances (albeit at great risk) until September 1981, when the Polish internal affairs minister, Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak, was informed that Solidarity had learned many of the details of the planning for martial law, including the codename of the opening phase of the operation. That codename, "Wiosna" (Spring), denoted the part of the operation that involved mass arrests of Solidarity activists and dissident intellectuals all around the country.³ (The codename was promptly changed to "Wrzos," meaning "Heather.") Because the codename had been a very tightly-held secret—only a small number of people from the General Staff and the Internal Affairs Ministry were permitted to know it—Kiszczak immediately realized that a serious leak had occurred. He launched an investigation into the matter, which naturally focused on Kuklinski among others. Kuklinski managed to evade detection for another several weeks, but he had to exercise greater caution and to scale back the frequency of his reports.

By the beginning of November, the finger of suspicion increasingly pointed at him. On November 2, the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) warned the Polish authorities that the U.S. government had obtained the full plans for martial law.⁴ It is not known how the KGB learned of this matter—whether it was through signals intelligence, a mole within the CIA, a leak from another NATO intelligence service, or some other means—but the disclosure clearly came as a great jolt to Jaruzelski and Siwicki.⁵ A much more intensive investigation began, which was bound to focus on Kuklinski. He and another deputy chief of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, Col. Franciszek Puchala, were the only ones who had had regular access to the full plans for martial law. Moreover, one of the speeches that Kuklinski had prepared for Siwicki, which Siwicki later amended by deleting a sentence about the possible use of deadly force, had been transferred by Kuklinski to the United States before the offending sentence had been removed. The discovery of

the original draft, with the sentence still in it, would be a telltale sign that Kuklinski was the source.⁶

Facing imminent arrest in early November, Kuklinski finally decided he had no alternative but to escape as soon as possible. The precise way he and his family were spirited out of Poland has never been disclosed—one of the chief participants in the exfiltration described it as a “real cloak-and-dagger affair”—but it is clear that the operation was a great success.⁷ Kuklinski, his wife, and his two sons left Poland on 7 November 1981 and by the 8th were safely in West Germany. On November 11, the colonel was flown on a military aircraft to the United States, where he has lived ever since.⁸ At least two attempts are thought to have been made by Soviet-bloc agents against Kuklinski’s life after he left Poland.⁹ What has troubled him far more, however, are the tragic deaths of his two sons, both of whom were killed in 1994 in mysterious circumstances.¹⁰ To this day, Kuklinski is extremely reluctant to disclose his place of residence.

A few hints of Kuklinski’s role in 1980-81 surfaced in the West in the early to mid-1980s (most notably when a Polish government press spokesman, Jerzy Urban, suddenly mentioned at a news conference that the U.S. government had known in advance about the martial law operation and had failed to warn Solidarity), but it was not until April 1987 that Kuklinski’s name and exploits became publicly known. In a remarkable, 53-page interview that appeared in the Paris-based monthly journal *Kultura*, Kuklinski provided a fascinating account of what he had witnessed in 1980-81.¹¹ This interview remains a vital source for anyone interested in the Polish crisis.

Despite the wide-ranging nature of the *Kultura* interview, Kuklinski refrained at that time from disclosing that he had been working for the CIA since the early 1970s, not just in 1980 and 1981. Details about his earlier work first came to light in September 1992, when a reporter for *The Washington Post*, Benjamin Weiser, published the first of two important articles on Kuklinski, based on some 50 hours of interviews with the colonel as well as many hours of interviews with some of Kuklinski’s former colleagues, including Kiszczak and Jaruzelski.¹² The two articles make a valuable supplement to the *Kultura* interview. (Weiser, who later left the *Post* to join *The New York Times*, has been working on a book about Kuklinski.) Further documents and information about Kuklinski’s career and legal case, including interviews with him, have been published in Poland in three recent Polish-language books, and a fourth collection of newly released documents is due out soon.¹³

Back in Poland, nothing was said in public about Kuklinski for many years. In May 1984, after a secret court-martial *in absentia*, the Warsaw Military District Court sentenced Kuklinski to death on charges of high treason and stripped him of his citizenship and military rank. In March 1990, the District Court commuted his death sentence to a prison term of 25 years (under an amnesty bill adopted in December 1989, shortly after a

non-Communist government came to power in Warsaw), but the guilty verdict remained in effect for another five years. In May 1990, the Polish justice minister, Aleksander Bentkowski, who for many years had served under Communist governments, rejected an appeal of Kuklinski’s conviction. Even though the founding leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa, was elected president of Poland in December 1990, he, too, refused to exonerate Kuklinski of the charges.

Not until March 1995 did the Polish Supreme Court finally annul the prison sentence and send the case back for review. In passing down its verdict, the Court excoriated the District Court’s “blatant violations of legal procedures,” and left no doubt about one of the factors that influenced the decision to annul the sentence:

One must take into account the widely-known fact that the sovereignty of Poland was severely diminished [during the Communist era] and that there was an imminent threat of an invasion by the Soviet Union and other contiguous member-states of the Warsaw Pact. One also must take into account the fact that R. Kuklinski was fully informed then about the situation and, through his desperate actions, tried to head off the impending threat of invasion by conveying this information to the leaders of states that are strong enough to alter the world’s fate. . . . The security of the [Polish] state unquestionably takes precedence over the disclosure of a secret, especially if the disclosure is intended to serve a higher cause.¹⁴

Col. Kuklinski’s actions, the Court added, “were in the interest of [Polish] sovereignty and independence.”

Over the next two years, while the final review of Kuklinski’s case was under way, some former Communist officials, especially Jaruzelski, led a bitter campaign to prevent the colonel from being fully exonerated. (Ironically, in 1996 Jaruzelski himself, the chief overseer of martial law, was absolved by the Polish parliament of all charges brought against him in the early 1990s for his role in 1980-81.¹⁵) Despite Jaruzelski’s recalcitrance, Kuklinski cleared his final legal hurdle in September 1997, when, with the grudging approval of Walesa’s successor, Aleksander Kwasniewski (a former high-ranking Polish Communist official), the Chief Military Procurator of the Warsaw Military District revoked the charges against Kuklinski, allowing him to return home as a free man. All his rights of citizenship and his military rank were restored. The basis for the Military Procurator’s decision was that Kuklinski “acted out of a higher necessity” (*w stanie wyższej konieczności*), and that his “cooperation with the American intelligence service” was “intended to benefit the nation.”¹⁶

Even after the Military Procurator’s decision, Jaruzelski and his supporters kept up a rearguard action against Kuklinski. Their efforts were not enough, however, to deter Kuklinski from making an emotional visit back to Poland in April and May 1998. In Kraków, he

was awarded honorary citizenship for his contribution to the restoration of Polish independence.¹⁷ In many other stops around the country he was hailed as a “true patriot.” Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek met with Kuklinski for two hours and declared afterwards that the colonel’s “decisions spared our country great bloodshed.”¹⁸ The visit sparked complaints in some quarters, notably from Adam Michnik, who in recent years has become an unabashed supporter of Jaruzelski.¹⁹ Jaruzelski himself lamented that the “praise for Kuklinski’s actions automatically places the moral blame on myself and other generals.”²⁰ Public ambivalence about Kuklinski, which had been relatively widespread in the early 1990s, has steadily abated (though it has not wholly disappeared).²¹ Overall, then, the visit marked a decisive vindication for a man who only recently had been under sentence of death in his homeland.

* * *

Almost all of the materials that Kuklinski supplied to the U.S. government, including thousands of photographed documents and a vast quantity of his own reports, are still sealed in classified CIA files. Efforts to pry loose those materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) have run into frustrating bureaucratic obstacles. However, some of the reports that Kuklinski sent in 1980 and 1981 were released in the early 1990s so that he could use them in preparing for the judicial review of his case in Poland. Three of those dispatches are featured below in chronological order. Each is preceded by an introduction that provides a brief context for understanding what the report covers and what its significance is. Although these three items are only a minuscule fraction of the materials that Kuklinski provided to the CIA, they give some idea of the extraordinary contribution he made to the security of both Poland and the West.

REPORT No. 1: Early December 1980 Warning of Soviet Intervention

This first report, headed “Very Urgent!,” was sent in early December 1980 under the codename Jack Strong. It had a profound impact on U.S. policy. Kuklinski’s message seemed to corroborate a number of other indications in early December 1980 that the Soviet Union was about to undertake a large-scale military intervention in Poland. On December 3, a day-and-a-half before Kuklinski’s report arrived at CIA headquarters, President Jimmy Carter had sent an urgent communication via the Hot Line to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid I. Brezhnev. Carter promised that the United States would “not exploit the events in Poland” and would not “threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region,” but warned that East-West relations “would be most adversely affected” if the Soviet Army tried “to impose a solution upon the

Polish nation.”²² Kuklinski’s report reinforced the sense of foreboding that had prompted Carter’s use of the Hot Line, and it convinced U.S. officials that very little time was left before Soviet troops moved *en masse* into Poland.

There is no question that events in the latter half of November 1980 and the first few days of December had provided grounds for concern in the West about the prospect of Soviet military action. Tensions in Poland had steadily increased in mid- to late November, culminating in a two-hour warning strike on November 25 by Polish railway workers, who threatened to call a general strike unless their demands were met. These developments provoked alarm in Moscow about the security of the USSR’s lines of communication through Poland with the nearly 400,000 Soviet troops based in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).²³ Unease about Poland was even more acute in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the media in late November had stepped up their condemnations of the “counterrevolutionary forces who are endangering Poland’s socialist order.”²⁴ On November 29, the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Army-Gen. Evgenii Ivanovskii, suddenly informed members of the Western Military Liaison Missions in East Germany that they would be prohibited from traveling into territory along the GDR-Polish border.²⁵ A few days later, on December 3, rumors surfaced that an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders would be held in Moscow on the 5th. This news, coming right after the conclusion of a meeting in Bucharest of the Warsaw Pact’s Council of Defense Ministers (on 1-2 December), raised further apprehension among Western leaders about the possible use of Soviet troops.

Anxiety in the West continued to grow over the next few days as unconfirmed (and, it turned out, largely inaccurate) reports filtered in about a huge buildup of Soviet forces around Poland’s borders. Dense clouds over Poland and the western Soviet Union prevented U.S. reconnaissance satellites from focusing in on Soviet tank and mechanized divisions based there.²⁶ Not until the latter half of December, when the cloud cover temporarily receded, were U.S. satellites able to provide good coverage of Soviet forces in the western USSR. Before the photoreconnaissance became available, many high-ranking U.S. intelligence officials simply assumed that reports of a massive mobilization were accurate. That assumption seemed to be vindicated when reports also began streaming in about last-minute preparations by Soviet troops to set up emergency medical tents and stockpiles of ammunition.²⁷

Against this backdrop, Kuklinski’s dispatch was bound to spark great anxiety when it arrived at the CIA’s headquarters in the early morning hours of December 5. The CIA director, Stansfield Turner, promptly informed Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, that “eighteen Soviet divisions” would move into Poland on December 8. Brzezinski immediately relayed the

information to Carter. At a meeting of top U.S. officials the following day, Turner repeated his warning.²⁸ Although his estimate on December 6 of the number of Soviet divisions that would enter Poland “from the east” was slightly lower than it had been the previous day (fifteen versus eighteen), he averred that “more [Soviet] divisions will follow” the initial fifteen. On December 7, Turner conveyed an even gloomier assessment, claiming that “all the preparations for a [Soviet] invasion of Poland were completed” two days earlier, and that a final “decision to invade” on the night of December 7-8 had been adopted by Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders on the 5th.²⁹ Turner made these predictions without any confirmation from U.S. reconnaissance satellites about a purported buildup of Soviet forces around Poland.

Under the circumstances, Turner’s assumptions may have seemed reasonable, but a close analysis of the period from mid-November to early December 1980 suggests that he and most other U.S. officials misperceived Soviet intentions. A careful analysis also suggests that Kuklinski’s message, written in great haste and with only partial information, unavoidably left out certain key points that bore directly on the question of Soviet intentions. U.S. intelligence officials who apprised political leaders of Kuklinski’s message were remiss in failing to highlight the great uncertainty that remained about Soviet policy. (The uncertainty was especially pronounced in early December 1980 because so little was known at that point about the actual state of readiness of Soviet forces in the western USSR.)

Newly declassified materials confirm that in the latter half of November 1980, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were preparing to hold Soyuz-80 military “exercises” in Poland in early to mid-December.³⁰ The new archival evidence also suggests that these “exercises” were intended mainly as a cover for the Polish authorities to impose martial law. Documents from the East German military archive reveal that four Soviet divisions, two Czechoslovak divisions, and one East German division were supposed to join four Polish army divisions and the Polish security forces in introducing military rule.³¹ If these operations proved insufficient, another fourteen Warsaw Pact divisions (eleven Soviet and three East German) were supposed to move in as reinforcements, according to the documents. It is not clear when and how the second stage of Soyuz-80 would have begun—or where the Soviet forces would have come from—but the option of a second stage was clearly specified in the plans.

This general scenario was consistent with a document prepared by the Soviet Politburo’s Commission on Poland (the so-called Suslov Commission) in late August 1980.³² That document, subsequently approved by the full CPSU Politburo, authorized the Soviet defense ministry to bring four Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the three military districts adjoining Poland up to full combat readiness “in case military assistance is provided to Poland.” It also authorized the defense ministry to plan

for—though not yet to carry out—the “call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000 additional vehicles” to fill out at least “another five to seven [Soviet] divisions” that would be mobilized “if the situation in Poland deteriorates further.” The number of additional reservists and vehicles was large enough to fill out as many as eleven extra Soviet divisions, if necessary, rather than just five to seven.

If final approval had been given for the Soyuz-80 “maneuvers” to begin as scheduled on December 8, enough Soviet forces were in place to carry out the first stage of the operation, but not the second. In mid- to late December 1980, U.S. intelligence sources (photoreconnaissance satellites and electronic intercepts) revealed that only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR had been brought up to full combat readiness.³³ These units constituted three of the four Soviet divisions slated to enter Poland on December 8 in the first stage of Soyuz-80. The fourth Soviet division, according to East German military documents, was to be an airborne division.³⁴ (Soviet airborne divisions were always maintained at full readiness. The unit in question was based in the Baltic Military District.) There is no evidence that any of the additional eleven Soviet tank and mechanized divisions were ever mobilized. Although planning for the mobilization of these divisions had been under way since late August—something that presumably would have enabled Soviet military officials to proceed with the mobilization quite expeditiously if so ordered—the number of Soviet divisions actually available for immediate deployment was extremely limited.

Thus, the scale of what would have occurred on December 8 was very different from the impression one might have gained from Kuklinski’s dispatch (not to mention from Turner’s briefings). Kuklinski was not present when Soviet and Polish military commanders discussed the “exercise” scenario at a secret meeting in Moscow on December 1. Instead, he had to rely on what he could hurriedly learn afterwards from a few documents (maps and charts) and from comments by the “very restricted group of people” who had seen the full plans, especially the officers who had traveled to Moscow. Kuklinski’s dispatch accurately reported the projected size of the *full* operation (both the first and the second stages), but it did not mention that only four of the projected fifteen Soviet divisions would be used in the first stage. This omission obviously was crucial. Although Kuklinski can hardly be faulted, in the face of such extreme uncertainty and time pressure, for having inadvertently left out a key part of the scenario, the difference between his version and the real plan can hardly be overstated. Rather than being a single, massive operation, the projected “exercises” were in fact divided into two stages: a limited first stage, and, if necessary, a much larger second stage. There is no doubt, based on the East German documents, the Suslov Commission’s memorandum, and the evidence from U.S. intelligence sources, that the number of Soviet

divisions slated to take part in the first stage of Soyuz-80 was no more than four. The much larger number of Soviet divisions cited by Kuklinski and Turner (i.e., at least fifteen) represented the *combined* total of forces in both the first and the second stages.

As it turned out, of course, even a limited intervention from outside—by four Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions—did not take place. This non-event points to something else that is missing in Kuklinski's dispatch—an omission that, once again, is perfectly understandable. Kuklinski could not possibly have known that the Soviet Politburo was unwilling to proceed with the "maneuvers" *unless* the Polish authorities were ready to use the outside military support to impose martial law. Soviet leaders never regarded the entry of Warsaw Pact forces into Poland as being the same type of operation conducted against Czechoslovakia in August 1968. When Soviet and East European troops intervened on a massive scale in Czechoslovakia, they did so to halt the Prague Spring and remove the regime headed by Alexander Dubcek. At no point before the invasion were the military plans ever disclosed to Dubcek or the other Czechoslovak reformers. Nor did Soviet commanders in 1968 enlist Czechoslovak troops to help pinpoint entry routes and deployment sites for incoming Soviet forces. In 1980, by contrast, plans for the Soyuz "maneuvers" were coordinated very carefully with the Polish authorities, and Polish officers were assigned to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance units.³⁵ Moscow's aim in November-December 1980 was not to move *against* Kania [First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP)] and Jaruzelski, but to offer them support. Soviet leaders did their best, using a mix of coercion and inducements, to ensure that the two Polish officials would seize this opportunity to impose martial law; but the fate of Soyuz-80 ultimately depended on whether Kania and Jaruzelski themselves believed they could crush Solidarity without sparking a civil war.

The Soviet Union's desire to stick with Kania and Jaruzelski came as a disappointment to East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian leaders, who tended to espouse a more belligerent position. On 26 November 1980, the East German leader, Erich Honecker, wrote a letter to Brezhnev urging the immediate adoption of "collective [military] measures to help the Polish friends overcome the crisis."³⁶ Honecker emphasized his "extraordinary fears" about what would happen in Poland if the Soviet Union and its allies failed to send in troops. "Any delay in acting against the counterrevolutionaries," he warned, "would mean death—the death of socialist Poland." To bolster his case, the East German leader authorized a hasty search for possible hardline alternatives to Kania and Jaruzelski. On November 30, the East German defense minister, Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, assured Honecker that certain "leading comrades from the [Polish United Workers' Party] have expressed the view that a [violent] confrontation with the counterrevolution

can no longer be avoided and [that] they expect to receive help from outside."³⁷ Evidently, Honecker helped encourage the leading Polish hardliner, Stefan Olszowski, to travel secretly to Moscow on December 4 for an emergency consultation. The SED General Secretary clearly was hoping that if he could come up with a suitable alternative in Warsaw, Soviet leaders would agree to install a new Polish regime once Soyuz-80 began. Honecker's perspective was fully shared in Sofia and Prague.

In the end, however, the only thing that mattered was what Brezhnev and the rest of the Soviet Politburo wanted. The final decision ultimately was theirs. Even though they heeded the concerns expressed by the other Warsaw Pact states, they were convinced that military action would be worthwhile only if the Polish authorities were ready and able to take full advantage of it. Up to the last moment, Honecker was hoping that Soviet leaders would change their minds. On December 6 and 7, East German military commanders ordered units of the National People's Army (*Nationale Volksarmee*, or NVA) to be ready to move into Poland at a moment's notice, just in case Soviet leaders decided that the intervention should proceed as originally planned.³⁸ To Honecker's dismay, these preparations were all for naught. The Soviet Politburo had firmly decided by then that no Warsaw Pact troops should enter Poland unless a more propitious opportunity arose.

None of this is to suggest that Soviet leaders were merely leaving things to chance. By actively preparing for the "exercise" scenario, they were seeking to force Kania's and Jaruzelski's hand, giving the Polish leaders little option but to move ahead with a crackdown. The impending start of Soyuz-80, it was thought, would compel Kania and Jaruzelski to accelerate their preparations for martial law. (It is even conceivable, albeit unlikely, that Soviet leaders were *never* actually intending to send troops to Poland and, instead, were simply using the preparations for Soyuz-80 as a means of pressuring Kania to implement martial law.³⁹)

Whatever the Soviet Union's precise intentions may have been, it soon became clear that the intense pressure from outside in November-December 1980 would not in itself generate a workable plan for the imposition of martial law. Kania and Jaruzelski constantly stressed the need for more time when they spoke with Soviet leaders in the latter half of November, both directly and through Marshal Kulikov, who served as an envoy for the CPSU Politburo. Kania continued to emphasize the desirability of seeking an "honorable compromise," rather than resorting immediately to violent repression.⁴⁰ Although he did not rule out the eventual "use of force" and formed a new high-level staff to speed up the preparations for martial law, he was convinced that a "political solution" was still feasible.

Kania's position on this matter was firm even though he initially had been willing to host the Soyuz-80 "maneuvers" and had even condoned the use of Polish troops to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact reconnaissance

units locate the best entry routes and deployment sites in Poland. Despite these gestures, Kania and Jaruzelski had never been enthusiastic about the maneuvers, and they decided that they had to make their views clear after two senior Polish officers, Gen. Tadeusz Hupalowski, the first deputy chief of the Polish General Staff, and Col. Franciszek Puchala, a deputy head of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, traveled to Moscow on December 1 to receive "instructions" from the Soviet High Command.⁴¹ The information that Hupalowski and Puchala brought back to Poland, which indicated that an immediate, full-scale crackdown was an integral part of the scenario, was enough to spur Kania and Jaruzelski to warn Soviet leaders that any attempt to bring Warsaw Pact forces into Poland would greatly exacerbate the situation and risk widespread violence. They promised that if they were given a bit more time, they would be able to resolve the crisis on their own.

Kania's and Jaruzelski's wariness about Soyuz-80 was determined mainly by three factors: first, their awareness that preparations for an internal crackdown were still too rudimentary to give any assurance of success without the risk of large-scale bloodshed; second, their belief that the use of any Warsaw Pact troops for policing functions in Poland would stir widespread public outrage and resistance; and third, their specific concern (for obvious historical reasons) about the proposed use of East German troops. This last point was something on which almost all Polish officials, including most of the "healthy forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners), could agree. Even some of the hardline Polish military officers who were secretly encouraging the Soviet Union to send troops to crush Solidarity were averse to any notion that East German divisions should take part as well. In a typical case, a Polish army officer told Soviet officials in early December 1980 that "Poland can now be saved only by the introduction of Soviet troops," but he then warned that he himself "would be the first to take up arms against [East] German or Czech troops if they are sent in. They merely wish us harm and secretly revel in all our misfortunes. Only your [Soviet] troops should be involved in this."⁴²

Once Kania and Jaruzelski had made clear that the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Poland would risk a "bloody confrontation that would roil the whole socialist world," and once they had pledged to take "decisive action" against "hostile" and "anti-socialist" elements in the near future, Soviet leaders were willing to defer the provision of outside military assistance, at least for the time being.⁴³ Although Kania and Jaruzelski both claim in their memoirs that Brezhnev agreed to call off the entry of Warsaw Pact troops only after the hastily arranged meeting of East-bloc leaders in Moscow on December 5, newly declassified documents undercut that assertion.⁴⁴ Numerous documents, including the top-secret transcript of the December 5 meeting (which was unavailable when Kania and Jaruzelski compiled their memoirs), indicate

that the decision to leave troops out of the Soyuz-80 exercises must have been approved well before the Moscow meeting, perhaps as early as December 2.⁴⁵ (A speech that Kania delivered at a PUWP Central Committee plenum on December 2 suggests that he already had been assured that Warsaw Pact forces would not be moving into Poland on the 8th.) Although Kania faced serious criticism in Moscow on December 5, the transcript of the meeting leaves little doubt that he and the other participants already knew that the Soviet Union would give the Polish leaders more time to take care of the crisis "with their own forces."⁴⁶ Kania himself emphasized this point the following day (on December 6) when he gave the PUWP Politburo an overview of the Moscow meeting. Among other things, he reported that all the participating states had expressed confidence that the Polish authorities could "manage the situation on their own" (*ze sytuacji opanujemy własnymi siłami*).⁴⁷

Thus, Kuklinski's dispatch outlined a scenario that, by the time it was reviewed by U.S. officials, had already been put on hold. Soyuz-80 secretly began on December 8, but only as a command-staff exercise (CPX), rather than as full-fledged troop maneuvers.⁴⁸ The CPX continued rather aimlessly for several weeks, long after its value had been exhausted. Although the four Soviet divisions, one East German division, and two Czechoslovak divisions remained at full alert from December 1980 on, the prospect of bringing them into Poland had been postponed indefinitely.

Document No. 1

VERY URGENT!

At a meeting with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in accordance with orders from Gen. Jaruzelski's Defense Ministry, Gen. Hupalowski and Col. Puchala endorsed a plan to admit into Poland (under the pretext of maneuvers) the Soviet Army (SA), the National People's Army of the GDR (NVA), and the Czechoslovak People's Army (CLA). Documents and reproduced portions of the plans [for joint intervention] were presented to show that the following forces are to be sent into Poland: three armies comprising 15 SA divisions, one army comprising two CLA divisions, and the staff of one army and one division from the NVA. In total, the intervening group initially will consist of 18 divisions. (A state of readiness to cross the Polish borders was set for 8 December.) At present, representatives from the "fraternal armies," dressed in civilian clothing, are undertaking reconnaissance of invasion routes as well as the distances and terrain for future operations. The scenario of operations for the intervening armies envisages a regrouping of armies to all major Polish Army bases to conduct maneuvers with live ammunition. Then, depending on how things develop, all major Polish cities, especially industrial cities, are to be sealed off.

According to the plan of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Polish Army will remain within its permanent units while its “allies” are regrouping on Polish territory. The only exceptions will be supervisory officers and military traffic control units, which will ensure a collision-free regrouping of the SA, CLA, and NVA armies from the border to the territories of future operations. Four Polish divisions (the 5th and 2nd Tank Divisions and the 4th and 12th Mechanized Divisions) will be called into operation at a later point.

Finally, I very much regret to say that although everyone who has seen the plans (a very restricted group of people) is very depressed and crestfallen, no one is even contemplating putting up active resistance against the Warsaw Pact action.⁴⁹ There are even those (Jasinski, Puchala) who say that the very presence of such enormous military forces on the territory of Poland may calm the nation.

JACK STRONG

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REPORT No. 2: 26 April 1981
A “Hopeless” Situation

This next report, addressed to Kuklinski’s closest contact at the CIA, who used the codename Daniel, was signed with two initials (PV) that Kuklinski included on his very first written message to the U.S. government in 1971, when he was initially offering to supply information. He chose these initials because the letter V is very rarely used in Polish, and he wanted to disguise his nationality in case the message was somehow intercepted.

The report was sent during a relative lull in the Polish crisis. The Warsaw Pact’s Soyuz-81 exercises, which had begun on 23 March 1981 and were due to end on March 31, had been extended to April 7 at the request of the Polish authorities. Jaruzelski and Kania also had secretly urged that the exercises be continued after April 7 so that the PUWP leaders could “strengthen their position, give inspiration to the progressive forces [i.e., orthodox Communists] in Poland, make Solidarity and KOR [Committee to Defend Workers] realize that the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to provide help of all kinds to Poland, and thereby exert pressure on the leaders of Solidarity.”⁵⁰ Soviet military commanders turned down the request, arguing that it was merely “further proof that the Polish leaders believe others should do their work for them.”⁵¹

While the Soyuz-81 exercises were still under way, Kania and Jaruzelski had met secretly in Brest on the Polish-Soviet border with Andropov and Ustinov on April 3-4. The two Polish leaders were extremely apprehensive before the meeting, but they left with much greater confidence that they would be given more time to resolve the crisis on their own. A week after the Brest talks, Marshal Kulikov sought to meet with Kania and Jaruzelski

to get them to sign the implementation directives for martial law (which would effectively set a date for the operation to begin), but the Polish leaders first postponed the meeting and then told Kulikov on April 13 that they would have to wait before signing the documents. For the time being, the Polish authorities had gained a further respite.

Soviet leaders, for their part, realized by mid-April that they would have to ease up a bit in their relentless pressure on Kania and Jaruzelski. Brezhnev summed up this view at a CPSU Politburo meeting on April 16 when he affirmed that “we shouldn’t badger [the Polish leaders], and we should avoid making them so nervous that they simply throw up their hands in despair.”⁵² When Suslov and another key member of the Suslov Commission, Konstantin Rusakov, visited Warsaw on April 23-24, they “attacked the [Polish leaders’] indecisiveness” and “sharply criticized their actions,” but also sought to “support and encourage them” and to ensure that “they will have a distinct degree of trust in us.”⁵³ Although Brezhnev and his colleagues realized that “the current lull is only a temporary phenomenon” and although they were determined to “exert constant pressure” on Kania and Jaruzelski, the Soviet leaders were also convinced that “we must now maintain a more equitable tone in our relations with our [Polish] friends.”

Thus, the pessimistic outlook of Kuklinski’s message on April 26 was not so much a reflection of the immediate political climate as it was a venting of frustration about two things:

First, the Warsaw Pact states were continuing to exert enormous pressure on the Polish army. In his report, Kuklinski indicated in the dispatch that he and other General Staff officers had recently returned from Bulgaria, where they had been attending a meeting of the Warsaw Pact’s Military Council on April 21-23.⁵⁴ Marshal Kulikov, his chief deputy, Army-Gen. Anatolii Gribkov, and other Warsaw Pact military leaders reemphasized at this session that they were as determined as ever to keep Poland and the Polish army fully within the socialist commonwealth.

Second, the progress toward martial law seemed inexorable. By mid-April 1981, the conceptual phase of the martial law planning was over, and work was proceeding apace on the practical steps needed to implement the plans.⁵⁵ Kuklinski could see that in the seeming absence of an opportunity for the Polish army to defy the Soviet Union, the imposition of martial law was drawing ever nearer.

Document No. 2

WARSAW, 26 April 1981

Dear Daniel!⁵⁶

After returning from Sofia with several officers from the General Staff,⁵⁷ we discussed the current situation in

Poland, a situation that, from the military point of view, is hopeless. In this extremely gloomy atmosphere, one of the most committed officers openly said that Poland had to undertake far-reaching political reforms. Gen. XXX⁵⁸ bitterly accused “the Americans [of having] sold us out to Russia. Without the Americans’ silent assent, the ‘comrades’ would not dare to act this way.” We are now very desperate, but we have not lost hope that Gen. XXX is wrong! Appropriate use must be made of the flood of information he is sending to you.

We Poles realize that we must fight for our own freedom, if necessary making the ultimate sacrifice. I remained convinced that the support your country has been giving to all who are fighting for that freedom will bring us closer to our goal.

Thank you for your most recent, pleasant letter.

With heartfelt greetings. Yours, PV

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**REPORT No. 3: 15 September 1981—
Plans for Martial Law**

This third message recounts a landmark meeting of Poland’s Homeland Defense Committee (*Komitet Obrony Kraju*, or KOK) on 13 September 1981. The KOK consisted of high-ranking military and political officials and was chaired by Jaruzelski in his capacity as prime minister. During the 1980-81 crisis, the KOK took on a supreme decision-making role, overseeing all the planning for martial law. On 13 September 1981, the KOK made a firm decision to press ahead with the martial law operation, leaving only the precise timetable to be determined. The great importance of this secret meeting was first revealed by Kuklinski in his 1987 interview, and it was then briefly discussed by Kania in his book-length interview (published in 1991) and by Jaruzelski in his two volumes of memoirs.⁵⁹ Kuklinski’s report says that notetaking was forbidden at the KOK meeting, but that is not quite true. One of the participants, Gen. Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, was responsible for taking notes of the session. His eight pages of handwritten notes, classified top-secret, were released from the Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (Central Military Archive) in Warsaw in 1997.⁶⁰

Kuklinski was not present at the KOK meeting, but he was briefed about it immediately afterwards. Although Tuczapski’s notes (which are not a verbatim record, but merely summaries of remarks) do not record Kiszczak’s agitated comments about the leak of the martial law plans to Solidarity, all evidence suggests that Kiszczak did in fact deal with that issue at length in his opening speech, as Kuklinski indicates. It is unclear precisely how the Polish security forces discovered the leak, but it has long been

known that the Internal Affairs Ministry had a dedicated campaign under way to infiltrate Solidarity. The aim was not only to compromise the organization and discredit its leaders, but also to gather intelligence about its plans and activities.⁶¹ Kuklinski himself has recently described the infiltration programs about which he knew first-hand in 1980 and 1981.⁶² These programs were aimed mainly at recruiting informers and *agents provocateurs* in Solidarity.

Kuklinski’s dispatch reveals that as soon as the leak was discovered, security was tightened within the General Staff’s martial law planning unit, and an investigation was launched. Because Kuklinski was one of a very small group of suspects, he had to curtail his activities and avoid doing anything that might arouse suspicion. It is interesting, however, that even at this perilous juncture, he showed no sign of wanting to leave Poland. Clearly, he regarded his work there as too crucial to abandon.

At the same time, the report suggests that Kuklinski was surprised by the CIA’s decision to transfer this highly sensitive information to Solidarity at a moment when no crackdown appeared imminent. Because the disclosure of secret codenames risked exposing Kuklinski, it seemed to be a rather short-sighted step that might undermine his whole mission. Kuklinski obviously realized that Solidarity needed to be warned in general terms about the planning for martial law, but he knew that the receipt of highly detailed information, especially codenames, would be reported immediately to the PUWP leadership by infiltrators within Solidarity. The colonel seemed to be hoping that the CIA would be more discreet in the future, at least until a more precise timetable for martial law had been set.

Document No. 3

WARSAW

2030, 15 September 1981

At an extraordinary session of the KOK on Sunday, which Kania attended for the first time, no final decision was made about the imposition of martial law. Almost all of the participants supported it. It seems that the tenor of the meeting surprised Kania. Although he did not question that such a development was inevitable, he reportedly said, in these precise words, that “a confrontation with the class enemy is unavoidable. This involves first a struggle using political means, but if that should fail, repression may be adopted.” Note-taking was forbidden at the session. During the KOK’s meeting, Kiszczak declared that Solidarity knew the details of our plans, including Operation “Wiosna”⁶³ and its secret codename. I should emphasize that this is a codename—the secret title of the operation—and not the codeword needed to put it into effect. The officials responsible for implementing the plans don’t know the codename; hence, it will be easy to compile a group of suspects. (The

MSW⁶⁴ was given urgent orders to find the source.) The first steps have already been taken. Except for Szklarski and me, everyone was excluded in operational directives from the planning. A counterintelligence officer visited Szklarski⁶⁵ and me yesterday. He spoke about ways of preventing future leaks. At present, Jasinski⁶⁶ has taken command of planning at the national level. Szklarski has temporarily withdrawn. Since this morning we have been working, under Jasinski's supervision and in cooperation with a PUWP CC official,⁶⁷ with the KOK Secretariat, with the KPPRM, and with Pawlikowski from MSW,⁶⁸ on a unified plan of command for the surprise introduction of martial law. The document is still being put together, so I am unable to give a detailed account of it. (I proposed a break so that I could send this telegram.) In brief, martial law will be introduced at night, either between Friday and a work-free Saturday or between Saturday and Sunday, when industrial plants will be closed. Arrests will begin around midnight, six hours before an announcement of martial law is broadcast over the radio and television. Roughly 600 people will be arrested in Warsaw, which will require the use of around 1,000 police in unmarked cars. That same night, the army will seal off the most important areas of Warsaw and other major cities. Initially, only the MSW's forces will take part. A separate political decision will be made about "improving the deployment of armies," that is, redeploying entire divisions to major cities. This will be done only if reports come in about larger pockets of unrest. One cannot rule out, however, that redeployments of divisions based far away from the areas of future operations will commence with the introduction of martial law or even earlier. For example, it would take roughly 54 hours to redeploy the 4th Mechanized Division to the vicinity of Warsaw.

Because the investigation is proceeding, I will have to forgo my daily reports about current developments. Please treat with caution the information I am conveying to you, since it appears that my mission is coming to an end. The nature of the information makes it quite easy to detect the source. I do not object to, and indeed welcome, having the information I have conveyed serve those who fight for the freedom of Poland with their heads raised high. I am prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but the best way to achieve something is with our actions and not with our sacrifices.

Long live free Poland!

Long live Solidarity, which brings freedom to all oppressed nations!

JACK STRONG

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¹Biographical information here has been compiled from a number of the sources adduced below as well as from personal contacts with Richard T. Davies, Douglas J. MacEachin, and Col. Kuklinski himself. It is worth noting that some of Kuklinski's former military colleagues in Poland, notably Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czeslaw Kiszczak, have raised questions about Kuklinski's motives for working with the United States, and a few Communist (or former Communist) officials in Poland have tried to challenge some aspects of Kuklinski's story. For a sample of opposing views, see Andrzej Bober, "Ujawniamy tresc akt sprawy karnej Plk. Ryszarda Kuklinskiego," *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 2 May 1998, pp. 1-2, and the lurid charges raised in Robert Walenciak, "Zagadka Kuklinskiego," *Przegląd Tygodniowy* (Warsaw), no. 17 (29 April 1998), p. 4. I have carefully checked into all of these allegations and have found them, without exception, to be utterly groundless. The information provided here has been carefully vetted for its accuracy.

²For information on the other Polish officers who cooperated with the United States, see the comments of Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak in Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., *General Kiszczak mówi: Prawie wszystko* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Dubicki, who defected to the West in 1981 shortly before the introduction of martial law, was killed in Germany under mysterious circumstances in early 1998. See "Tajemnica śmierć Leona Dubickiego," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 9 March 1998, p. 4.

³See "Komenda Stoieczna: Plany przedsięwzięć dotyczących drugiego etapu akcji 'Jodla'," October 1981 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych (AMSW), Warsaw, Sygnatura (Sygn.) Spis 156, Pozycja (Poz.) 81, Tom (T.) IV.

⁴See Kuklinski's comments about the source of the disclosure in "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," *Tygodnik Solidarność* (Warsaw), No. 49 (9 December 1994), pp. 1, 12-14. See also his comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 48-49.

⁵In "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," pp. 13-14, Kuklinski reports that the head of the Polish General Staff's Operations Directorate, Gen. Jerzy Skalski, claimed that Siwicki believed the information had come via Rome (presumably meaning an agent in the Italian intelligence service). Skalski was very upset and nervous when he was discussing this matter, so it is possible that he was in error. Kuklinski himself is uncertain.

⁶See Kuklinski's interesting comments in "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," pp. 13-14.

⁷The quotation comes from Francis Meehan, U.S. ambassador to Poland from 1980 to 1982, in a conversation with the author in June 1990.

⁸Kuklinski revealed this date for the first time in an interview in October 1997, excerpts of which were broadcast on Polish radio in November 1997 on the program "Trojka pod Ksiezycem," which I heard while riding to Warsaw's Okęcie airport after having attended a conference in Jachranka on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

⁹These incidents, one in Washington and the other in Chicago, were described by Andrzej Krajewski and Sylwia Wysocka in "Trojka pod Ksiezycem."

¹⁰His younger son, Boguslaw, an avid yachtsman, was lost at

sea in early January 1994 while sailing in the Gulf of Mexico. No trace of his body was ever found. The elder son, Waldemar, was killed in an automobile accident during the 4th of July weekend.

¹¹"Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," pp. 3-55.

¹²Weiser's first article was "Polish Officer Was U.S.'s Window on Soviet War Plans," *Washington Post* 27 September 1992, pp. A1, A38, and the second was "A Question of Loyalty," *Washington Post Magazine*, 13 December 1992, pp. 9-13, 24-29.

¹³Maciej Lukaszewicz, ed., *Bohater czy zdrajca: Fakty i dokumenty sprawy pułkownika Kuklinskiego* (Warsaw: Most, 1992); Krzysztof Dubinski and Iwona Jurczenko, *Oko Pentagonu: Rzecz o pułkowniku Ryszardzie Kuklinskim* (Warsaw: KMSO, 1995); and Bernard Nowak, ed., *Pułkownik Kuklinski: Wywiady, Opinie, Dokumenty* (Lublin: Test, 1998). Although Kuklinski is still reluctant to be interviewed, several lengthy interviews have appeared in recent years; see especially the interview cited above, "Pułkownik Ryszard Kuklinski mówi," pp. 1, 12-14.

¹⁴The full text of the Court's verdict is reproduced in "Rewizje nadzwyczajna," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 7 April 1995, p. 17.

¹⁵"Komisja rozgrzesza autorów stanu wojennego: Większość rządowa PSL-SLD przegłosowała mniejszość opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later. The parliament's action did not cover the separate charges brought against Jaruzelski for his role in the bloody crackdown of December 1970. A trial resumed in mid-1998 of Jaruzelski and eleven other senior officials charged with the massacres. See "Proces-Grudzień '70, krotka: Rozpoczal się proces oskarżonych ws. Grudnia '70," *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 16 June 1998, p. 2.

¹⁶"Umorzono śledztwo przeciw płk. Kuklinskiemu," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 23 September 1997, p. 1.

¹⁷Jerzy Sadecki, "Kuklinski na Wawelu: Honorowy Obywatel Stołecznego Królewskiego Miasta Krakowa," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 29 April 1998, p. 2; and Jerzy Sadecki, "Honorowe obywatelstwo dla Ryszarda Kuklinskiego: Zwykły żołnierz Rzeczypospolitej," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 30 April 1998, p. 2.

¹⁸"Już nie chce stad wyjeżdżać: Uratował przed rozlewem krwi—oswiadczył premier," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.

¹⁹Adam Michnik, "Pułapka politycznej beatyfikacji," *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 10-11 May 1998, pp. 10-11.

²⁰Jaruzelski: Przyjazd Kuklinskiego nie budzi moich zastrzeżeń," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 28 April 1998, p. 2.

²¹Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, *Opinie o pułkowniku Kuklinskim* (Warsaw: CBOS, May 1998), pp. 1-3.

²²For the genesis and full text of Carter's message, see the reproduced entries from the diary of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the Carter administration, in "White House Diary, 1980," *Orbis*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 33-38. See also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1985), pp. 495-498; and Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 583-585.

²³At the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December 1980, Brezhnev remarked that "the situation with the lines of communication [in Poland], especially with the railroads and harbors, deserves urgent attention. Poland would experience an economic catastrophe if transportation facilities were paralyzed. This would also be a great blow to the economic interests of other

socialist states. Let me reiterate: Under no circumstances can we tolerate it if the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries are endangered by difficulties with the transportation system. An elaborate plan must be devised to use the [Polish] army and security forces to assert control over the transportation facilities and the main lines of communication [in Poland], and this plan must be implemented. Even before martial law is declared, it would be worthwhile to set up military command posts and to initiate military patrols along the railroads." Quoted from "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Repräsentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," 5 December 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, (Berlin) J IV, 2/2 A-2368; reproduced in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), p. 173.

²⁴See, among many examples, "Unüberwindliche Barriere gegen imperialistischen Feind," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 1 December 1980, p. 3; "Walesa über Zusammenarbeit mit KOR," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 27 November 1980, p. 5; Jan Lipavsky, "Konfrontace: Od naseho varsavskeho zpravodaje," *Rude pravo* (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; "V boji o socialisticky charakter obnovy zeme," *Rude pravo* (Prague), 2 December 1980, p. 7; and "Strana se upevnuje v akci," *Rude Pravo*, 1 December 1980, p. 6.

²⁵Ivanovskii was replaced as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany on 4 December 1980 by Army-Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev. Ivanovskii was then appointed commander of the Belorussian Military District, the post that Zaitsev had held. See "Verdienste um Bruderbund UdSSR-DDR gewürdigt: Herzliche Begegnung mit Armeegeneral Iwanowski und Armeegeneral Saizew im Staatsrat," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 5 December 1980, pp. 1-2.

²⁶The problems posed by cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. A *Special Analysis* issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid determination that only three Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the western USSR were on full alert.

²⁷See Brzezinski, "White House Diary, 1980," p. 45.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

³⁰The emphasis here is on the word "preparing." It is unclear whether Soviet leaders were actually *intending* to bring troops into Poland, or were perhaps simply using the preparations as a means of spurring the Polish authorities to accelerate their plans for martial law. I will return briefly to this point below.

³¹See, e.g., "Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in Militärisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or 2 December. See also "Erläuterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st).

³²See my article about, and translation of, the Commission's document in this same issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*.

³³U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign

Assessment Center, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), pp. 1-5.

³⁴ "Einweisung," Bl. 16.

³⁵ "Wesentlicher Inhalt der Meldung des Chefs des Militärbezirkes V, General-major Gehmert, über die Ergebnisse der Rekognoszierung auf dem Territorium der Volksrepublik Polen zur Durchführung der gemeinsamen Übung," Report No. A-575-702 (Top Secret), 16 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, chief-of-staff of the East German National People's Army, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 23-27.

³⁶ "Anlage Nr. 2," 26 November 1980 (Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5-6. My translation of, and commentary on, this letter appeared in "The Warsaw Pact and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: Honecker's Call for Military Intervention," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), p. 124.

³⁷ "Werter Genosse Honecker!" letter from Hoffmann to Honecker, 30 November 1980 (Top Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 4-5.

³⁸ "Befehl Nr. 118/80 des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung über die Vorbereitung und Durchführung einer gemeinsamen Ausbildungsmaßnahme der der Vereinten Streitkräfte vom 06.12.1980," Nr. A-265-992 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Army-Gen. Heinz Hoffmann, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 32-37; "Anordnung Nr. 54/80 des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Hauptstabes zur Gewährleistung des Passierens der Staatsgrenze der DDR zur VR Polen mit Staben und Truppen der Nationalen Volksarmee zur Teilnahme an einer auf dem Territorium der VR Polen stattfindenden gemeinsamen Truppenübung vom 06.12.1980," No. A-477-624 (Top Secret), 6 December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 38-41; "Schreiben des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Hauptstabes, Generaloberst Streletz, an den Chef Verwaltung Aufklärung," No. A-575-704 (Top Secret), December 1980, from Col.-Gen. Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 149; and numerous other documents reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., "*Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen*," pp. 197-208.

³⁹ No matter how much new evidence eventually becomes available, this matter may never be conclusively resolved. One item that suggests Soviet leaders may not have been intending to send troops into Poland is the huge turnover that occurred within the Soviet High Command in early December 1980. Most of the officers who would have been overseeing a large-scale operation in Poland were suddenly replaced. These included the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces, the commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany, the commander of the USSR's Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia), the commander of the Belorussian Military District, and the commander of the Baltic Military District. This reshuffling would have been highly unusual if Soviet leaders knew they were about to embark on a potentially dangerous military operation. The reshuffling evidently was connected with changes in Soviet command-and-control procedures (including the establishment of new Theater Commands), but it clearly could have had a detrimental effect on near-term military contingencies in Poland. See Jack Sullivan and Tom Symonds, *Soviet Theaters, High Commands and Commanders* (Fort Meade, MD: Air Force Intelligence Service, 1986); Michael J. Deane, et al., "The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 55-70; and Gregory C. Baird, "The Soviet Theater Command—An Update," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 34, No. 6

(November-December 1981), pp. 90-94.

⁴⁰ "Protokol Nr. 51 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 26 listopada 1980 r.," 26 November 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc" 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 180-188.

⁴¹ For more on this, see Kuklinski's comments in "Wojna z narodem widziana od środka," pp. 21-22.

⁴² "O vyskazaniyakh turistov iz PNR v svyazi s resheniyami VII Plenuma TsK PORP i vstrechei partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh deyateli stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora," Memorandum No. 135-s (Secret), 9 December 1980, from V. D. Dobrotvor, head of the Ukrainian Main Directorate for Foreign Tourism, in Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadnykh Ob'ednan Ukrainy (TsDAHOU), Kiev, Fond (F.) 1, Opis' (Op.) 25, Spravka (Spr.), Listy (Ll.) 170-172.

⁴³ The quoted passage is from Kania's speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting on 5 December. "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Repräsentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," p. 143.

⁴⁴ Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaînes et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992), pp. 237-241; and Stanislaw Kania, *Zatrzymać konfrontacje* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 90-93.

⁴⁵ "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Repräsentanten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau," pp. 140-196.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ "Protokol Nr. 53 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 grudnia 1980 r.," 6 December 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, p. 189.

⁴⁸ Army-Gen. A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 1980-kh godov," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 54-55.

⁴⁹ This is an important statement because it confirms that the Polish General Staff had no plans to resist Soviet military intervention. That does not mean all troops from the Polish army would have simply stood by while Soviet units moved in, but it does indicate that the highest-ranking Polish commanders were not going to oppose the Soviet Union.

⁵⁰ "Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübung 'SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZA-P, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhnva L. I. s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu)," 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation [TsKhSD], F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, L. 3.

⁵³ "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 30 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh peregovorov delegatsii KPSS s rukovodstvom PORP," in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 42, Ll. 2-4.

⁵⁴ "V Ob'edinennykh voozruzhennykh silakh gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 24 April 1981, p. 1.

⁵⁵ The conceptual phase of the planning ended once final approval was given to four documents that had been jointly devised by Polish and Soviet officials: "Myśl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze wzgledu na bezpieczenstwo panstwa," 27 March 1981 (Top Secret),

“Centralny plan działania organów politycznych władzy i administracji państwowej na wypadek konieczności wprowadzenia w PRL stanu wojennego,” 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), “Ramowy plan działania sił zbrojnych,” 27 March 1981 (Top Secret), “Ramowy plan przedsięwzięć gospodarczych,” 2 April 1981 (Top Secret), all in Centralne Archyiwum Wojskore [CAW], Warsaw, 1813/92, Sygn. 2304/IV.

⁵⁶ Daniel was the codename of Kuklinski’s main contact at the CIA.

⁵⁷ A long-planned session of the Warsaw Pact’s Military Council was held in Bulgaria on 21-23 April 1981.

⁵⁸ Kuklinski himself redacted the surname of this Polish general. It may have referred to Gen. Leon Dubicki, who was an adviser to Jaruzelski at the time.

⁵⁹ “Wojna z narodem widziana od środka,” pp. 32-34; Kania, *Zatrzymać konfrontacje*, pp. 110-111; Jaruzelski, *Les chaînes et le refuge*, pp. 384-385; and Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dla czego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), pp. 269-271.

⁶⁰ “Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981 r.,” 13 September 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Protokoly z posiedzen Komitetu Obrony Kraju, Teczka Sygn. 48. I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for giving me a copy of these notes.

⁶¹ See “Informatsiya o poezdke delegatsii Yaroslavskogo obkoma KPSS v Radomskoe voevodstvo PNR,” Memorandum No. 0035 (Top Secret), 21 January 1981, from I. Zaramenskii, first secretary of the CPSU’s Yaroslavl oblast committee, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 85, Ll. 298-301; and “Vermerk über

ein Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Genossen Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politbüros und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei,” 20 November 1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, J IV, 2/2 A-2363; reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., *Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen*, p. 105.

⁶² “Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” p. 26.

⁶³ “Wiosna” (Spring) was the codename for the opening stage of the martial law operation. It involved mass arrests of leading Solidarity officials and dissident intellectuals.

⁶⁴ The acronym for Ministerstwo spraw wewnetrznych (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

⁶⁵ Gen. Waclaw Szklarski, the head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff, was Kuklinski’s commanding officer.

⁶⁶ Gen. Antoni Jasinski, the deputy chief of the Polish General Staff for organization, played a crucial role in supervising the planning of martial law, as did the deputy chief of the General Staff for operations, Gen. Jerzy Skalski.

⁶⁷ Presumably this official would have been from the PUWP CC Propaganda Department, which had been actively taking part in the initial martial law planning.

⁶⁸ Col. Bronislaw Pawlikowski, the head of a directorate in the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry, was one of the main liaisons with Kuklinski and other officers on the Polish General Staff. He played an especially important role in designing the mass-arrest operation.



Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Polish Defense Minister Florian Siwicki, and PUWP First Secretary Stanisław Kania at the November 1997 Jachranka Conference. Photo courtesy of the Institute of Political Studies, Warsaw.

The Czechoslovak Communist Regime and the Polish Crisis 1980-1981

By Oldřich Tůma

One of the best books on the history of communism, written by Martin Malia, is devoted to Poland's Solidarity movement, "which began the task of dismantling communism in 1980."¹ In looking at the formation and actions of Poland's Solidarity as beginning a process that finally led to the end of communism in Czechoslovakia as well, it is necessary to consider the reaction of the Czechoslovak regime to the Polish events of 1980-1981. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) viewed the developments in Poland as a direct threat, paid extraordinary attention to them, and made considerable efforts to influence them.

We should say at the outset, however, that it is only possible to reconstruct in part the Czechoslovak Communist regime's reaction to the developments in Poland of that time in part as the relevant archival sources have not yet been sorted and filed and are still not wholly accessible. I have been able to use some documents from the archive of the CPCz Central Committee (CC), primarily materials from meetings of the Presidium. While the minutes of individual meetings are missing, basic documentation e.g. various memoranda, notes of meetings with delegations from other communist parties are preserved. Documents of the Ministry of the Interior and materials from the Ministry of National Defense or the Czechoslovak Army are only partially available. For this reason, the military measures had to be reconstructed not only from primary documents, but from other sources—specifically oral history, and some documents produced after 1992 within the framework of the parliamentary commission that investigated abuses by the Czechoslovak Army during the Communist period, *inter alia* in relation to Poland in the years 1980-1981.

The CPCz and its leadership closely monitored the developments in Poland from the very beginning of the strike movement. Documents from the file of General Secretary Gustáv Husák contain a wide variety of detailed material about the situation in Poland (several analyses, reports about individual events, programs of opposition groups, and news about workers' activities). The digests of selected information put together by the CC apparatus and designed for the highest CPCz functionaries also devoted continuous attention to events in Poland. Beginning in August 1980, when the bulletins first reported rumors circulating especially in northern Moravia of impending Polish price rises, until 1982, these internal party information bulletins contained a section of information devoted to Polish developments and their reverberations in Czechoslovakia. Citizens' reactions to

the rumors and events as documented in the bulletins were not positive for the Czechoslovak regime. The information spoke of fears about a decline in living standards,² tales of imminent military actions against Poland that would include the Czechoslovak army, and the concerns of parents whose sons were serving in the military (especially in December 1980).³ The information also referred to the appearance of graffiti slogans such as "Solidarity with Solidarity," and "Wałesa is a hero," etc.⁴ By the end of August 1980, the organs of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior recommended certain preventive measures even before the signing of the Gdańsk agreement. The Czechoslovak media monitored Polish events very closely, although they reported them, of course, in a decidedly distorted and negative manner.

Noteworthy, for instance, are the pages of the CPCz daily *Rudé právo* which, in the second half of 1980 and throughout 1981, printed material about Poland practically every day, often running more than one story. A mere perusal of the headlines indicates very clearly in what direction the regime's propaganda attempted to orient Czechoslovak public opinion. The headlines were full of negative terms such as violence, disruption, provocation, vandalism, and hooliganism,⁵ suggesting to readers dangerous and risky developments. Other headlines reflected the regime's attempts to characterize Solidarity's progress as the result of foreign manipulation: "Together with the BND [West German Intelligence Service] against Poland," "Who does the White House applaud?," "Who does Wall Street applaud?," "With the blessing of the Vatican," "The directives come from Paris," "The CIA pays for Wałesa's union."⁶ Other articles documented the regime's not entirely unsuccessful attempts to call to mind the catastrophic economic situation in Poland, to link it to the actions of Solidarity, and, against this background, to emphasize the relatively tolerable economic situation at home.⁷

It is also possible to reconstruct fairly accurately the attitude of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership towards events in Poland. Its attitude is reflected in a whole range of documents—in the speeches delivered at the sessions of the CPCz CC where evaluations of the Polish developments were presented, mainly by the leader of the Central Committee's International Relations Department, Vasil Bilak; in talks which leading CPCz functionaries conducted with their Polish counterparts and with representatives of other communist parties. Especially important are the two extensive presentations of Gustáv Husák at the joint meetings of the leaders of East European Communist parties in Moscow in November

1980 and May 1981⁸ and the letter addressed by the CC CPCz to the Polish United Workers' Party (CC) in June 1981.⁹

The CPCz leadership evaluated the situation in Poland as a counterrevolution prepared and controlled by international imperialist centers and by secret counterrevolutionary centers in the country itself. They believed that these centers were exploiting the severe economic situation, the workers' dissatisfaction and—as was heavily emphasized—the serious mistakes of the Polish leadership. This evaluation may be illustrated by a few key sentences from Bilak's speeches. According to him, the anti-socialist plan began with the election of a Pole as Pope:

“The choice of Krakow bishop [Karol] Wojtyła for Pope was not an accident, nor was it due to the fact that he had been endowed with supernatural qualities. It was part of a plan worked out by the United States with the aim of attacking another socialist country... It is necessary to realize that on the basis of the defeat of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, the centers of international imperialism advanced to the view that they could only hope for success if they managed to take advantage of the mass dissatisfaction of the workers, focusing their plans in practice on factories and plants... The current representatives of the anti-socialist forces who stand before the public, such as Lech Wałęsa for example, are not the main organizers. There exists in the background a driving center which so far cannot be revealed.”¹⁰ “What is happening in Poland is a great crime being committed against socialism and the Polish people. The blame lies both with the forces of counter-revolution and in those who have made it possible for imperialism to turn Poland into a detonator of socialist society.”¹¹

Above all, Czechoslovak representatives accused the Polish leadership of pursuing an incorrect economic policy, which had led to a high debt with the West; and of acting irresolutely in the resulting crisis, of being willing to compromise too much, and of being unable to regain the initiative. Such critical judgements were not leveled equally at all members of the Polish leadership. Full trust was still placed in PUWP Politburo members Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski. While Stanisław Kania was severely criticized, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski earned respect only when he declared martial law in December 1981.

The CPCz leaders constantly compared the developments in Poland with the unfolding of the 1968-1969 Czechoslovak crisis. They sought and found analogies, and tried to apply their own experience in renewing control over Czechoslovak society to the Polish situation. Repeated reminders of “Lessons from the Critical Development in the Party and in Society” (a basic Party document issued by the leaders of the CPCz at the end of 1970, which evaluated and interpreted the Czechoslovak crisis, which the CPCz adhered to like

gospel up to 1989) were obligatory in all meetings with Polish colleagues, with the main emphasis on the recommendation to act decisively, not to fear the risks, and to overthrow the counterrevolution. The resolute and violent repression of public protests on the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact intervention in August 1969 was often held up as a model.¹² Husák himself based his whole presentation at the Moscow meeting on 5 December 1980 on the exposition of the Czechoslovak crisis, and sought a parallel with the unfolding developments in Poland.

It is interesting that the Czechoslovak Communists sometimes spoke of their comrades in the PUWP leadership with a certain disrespect. It was not simply a matter of repeatedly stressing their disagreement with PUWP policies; in materials prepared for meetings of the CPCz CC Presidium there were a number of unflattering comments aimed at individual PUWP functionaries. It is extraordinary to see such material in the records of meetings with representatives of other Communist parties and in internal Party documents. For example, in the notes of a meeting of a Czechoslovak delegation led by CPCz CC Presidium member Karel Hoffmann in Warsaw in March 1981,¹³ we find the following comments on Stanisław Kania: “During Comrade Hoffmann's remarks one could notice Comrade Kania nervously shifting in his seat while his facial expressions betrayed his disagreement and dissatisfaction.” According to the report, “the exposition and certain further statements by Comrade Kania bear witness to the fact that he idealizes the situation and [they] also contain claims which are simply in conflict with reality.”¹⁴

Representatives of other Communist parties in the Soviet bloc spoke similarly about the Polish leaders in conversations with Czechoslovak representatives.¹⁵ In the Czechoslovak case however, the fact that the situation of 1968, which the CPCz representatives still remembered, now seemed to be reversed, played an important role. The events of 1968 had evidently lowered the prestige and worsened the standing of the CPCz inside the Soviet bloc.¹⁶ Now it was as if that dishonor had at last been erased. The Czechoslovak leaders now advised, instructed, made their own experience available, and offered their help. Revenge for 1968, malicious joy, and appeal to anti-Polish sentiments was also an unspoken, unconscious part of the regime's propaganda with a view of rallying support among Czechoslovak society. That Czechoslovaks should turn against Solidarity and the Poles because the Polish Army had taken part in the intervention of August 1968 certainly was a very perverse logic. Nevertheless the regime tried to imbue this idea in the units assembled for possible deployment on Polish territory at the end of 1980. The Czechoslovak leadership also tried to influence Polish developments and to aid the PUWP in its struggle against the opposition. Economic, propaganda, military and security measures were taken primarily within the framework of closer cooperation and coordination with

other countries of the Eastern bloc; above all with those countries most affected by the Polish events—the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

Given the growing economic crisis in the country, the Polish leadership turned to their allies with requests for extraordinary aid. The greater part of such aid came from the Soviet Union, but Czechoslovakia also contributed. It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the crisis the CPCz leadership was much less inclined to accede to Polish requests than they were later on. As early as the end of August 1980, the Poles had requested emergency assistance.¹⁷ The Czechoslovak leadership complied, but only on a significantly reduced scale: instead of the requested 20 thousand tons of meat they promised to provide 2 thousand tons; instead of 8 thousand tons of butter they offered 1 to 1.5 thousand tons in exchange for an equivalent quantity of cheese; instead of the requested 20 tons of sugar, they offered to lend 5 thousand tons; and instead of 3 thousand tons of newsprint paper they agreed to lend 500 to 800 tons.¹⁸ In November 1980, the CPCz CC Presidium agreed to Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's suggestion of a temporary reduction of Soviet deliveries of oil to Czechoslovakia.¹⁹ But only after the declaration of martial law, "as an expression of the attempt to help the normalization of life in the country," was much larger-scale assistance offered: goods valued at more than 800 million Czechoslovak crowns, partly as a gift, the rest not to be accounted for until after 1982.²⁰

The CPCz also tried to influence Polish developments through political contacts and propaganda. The exchange of delegations was intensified at various levels as were partnerships between towns, districts and regions. Every day Czechoslovak radio broadcast several hours of programs in Polish across the border (which were supposed to, according to Husák "comment on Polish events from our point of view")²¹. Posters and leaflets, printed on Czechoslovak territory, "were directed against Solidarity."²² This activity had, however, as Husák himself admitted, "relatively little effect."²³ The regime also prepared far more direct measures—as seen for instance in the frequently repeated instructions to find Czechoslovak citizens with Polish language skills, especially journalists and broadcasters.²⁴

The most important measures taken in response to the Polish crisis were of a military nature. Code-named "Exercise Krkonoše" [Krkonoše—or Giant mountains—are the frontier mountains between Poland and Czechoslovakia], these military measures reached their peak at the beginning of December 1980, when according to all indications, military intervention in Poland—with the Czechoslovak Army participating—seemed imminent. A lack of primary documents²⁵ permits only cautious assumptions about these events. In general, rather than talking about certainties, we can only talk about great probabilities, based on indirect evidence. On the other hand there are widely preserved and published East German documents,²⁶ which allow us to place

Czechoslovak events in a wider context, and to interpret them fairly confidently.

On 1 December 1980, the Chief of the Czechoslovak Army's General Staff, General Colonel Miloslav Blahník, participated in a quickly convened meeting in Moscow, in which the commanding officers of the East German and Polish Armies took part as well. The Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, acquainted them with the disposition of forces for a tactical and operational exercise. The ensuing preparations and actions were officially presented—at least as far as the Czechoslovak Army was concerned—as part of this common exercise. It is, however, probable, that the Poles (as well as the Czechoslovaks and East Germans) were not informed about the entire plan of operation, only acquainted with those parts which concerned them. After Blahník returned from Moscow, a meeting of the leading ministerial and Army functionaries took place on December 2, as a result of which plans were speedily prepared for the proposed exercise.

The ČSSR would provide two Czechoslovak tank divisions—the 1st and 9th—reinforced by two motor rifle regiments and other units, under the command of the officers and staff of the Western Military District. The 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces stationed in Czechoslovakia would also participate. According to the plan, these divisions would at first move up to the Polish border in Northern and Eastern Bohemia and later, in the second part of the exercise, move into Poland. The signal to cross the border was to be given by the General Staff of the Soviet Army. At this point the exercises were to continue, supposedly with the participation of Polish Army units. The target area for the movement of the 1st tank division was the territory north of Opole; the 9th division would advance to the space south of Katowice; and the 31st tank division of the Soviet Army to east of Cracow. The commencement of the exercise was set for 3 p.m. on December 6. In preparation, a special group led by General Major Jaroslav Gottwald, the deputy commander of the Western Military District, carried out a reconnaissance mission on Polish territory.²⁷

On December 6 at 5 p.m., "Exercise Krkonoše" commenced with the announcement of a military alert. During the night of December 6-7 troop movement began. It was completed in the evening (instead of the morning as originally planned) of December 8. The 1st division moved to its exercise ground in North Bohemia and the 9th division was moved into the area of the towns of Jaromer, Kolín, Cášlav and Pardubice and prepared for a further movement to Náchod, on the Polish border. On December 9, Minister of National Defense Martin Džúr suddenly terminated the exercise, and ordered all the formations to return to their peace-time positions. By December 11, all troops had returned to their barracks.

It is only possible to speculate about what this unfinished operation could mean. It is certain, however, that it was not a normal tactical-operational exercise

although the responsible ministerial and army functionaries of that time might have said otherwise. Moreover, the documents of the time do not speak of an “exercise”, but of an “action,” “operation,” or of “Special Task Krkonoše.” No exercises of such scale were ever prepared or planned in the short period of a few days. Much larger quantities of munitions, fuel, spare parts, and other supplies were made available than would have been necessary for the declared purpose of an exercise lasting a few days. Moreover, the assembled forces were fully war-capable and prepared to fulfill tasks in a tactical and operational depth covering the territory of Poland. Additionally, exceptional political and counter-intelligence measures were linked to “Exercise Krkonoše.” The political apparatus and the military counter-intelligence departments of participating units were brought up to wartime numbers. Soldiers with assumed “negative” political attitudes were removed from their units and left behind on their home bases. It is also noteworthy that units used in “Exercise Krkonoše” belonged to front-line units of the Czechoslovak Army, which formed more than one third of the border defense between Czechoslovakia and West Germany. Their sudden displacement to the North and the East left the Western border of Czechoslovakia, and therefore part of the Warsaw Pact, temporarily undefended. This too points to the unusual character of the whole operation.

Constituting a special chapter in this story are the activities of a group of Czechoslovak Army officers on Polish territory on December 4-5. A similar group of East German Army officers was operating in the northwestern part of Poland during this same time period.²⁸ These well-documented reconnaissance missions by the Czechoslovak and East German armies cast strong doubts on the claims by the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, General Anatoly Gribkov, that in December 1980 no plans existed for “allied” troops to enter Polish territory and that in no instance did a single foreign soldier cross the Polish frontier.²⁹ The official task of the group was to reconnoiter for the needs of the units on exercise, and to provide liaison with the Polish units meant to be participating in the exercise. In reality, however, its tasks were mainly of a military-political character. They reported on the professional and political character of selected officers in the Silesian military district of the Polish Army, as well as on their views about a resolution to the political crisis in Poland. Units of the Silesian military district supposed to be preparing for the joint exercises did not show up. The commander of the district, General Rapaczewicz, issued no instructions for bilateral meetings and his deputy, General Wilczynski, who waited to meet the Czechoslovak group at the border on December 4, was not informed as to the purpose of their visit.³⁰

That this was not just an ordinary exercise is also evident from the concurrently implemented measures by the Ministry of the Interior, which explicitly referred to “the events in Polish People’s Republic”³¹ or the possible

“critical deterioration of the situation in Poland.”³² These “extraordinary security measures of the third level” were managed by the Federal Minister of the Interior [Jaromír Obzina], from December 5 at 4 p.m., and extended on December 8 to 6 a.m. On December 9, however, they were down-graded, and on December 16 called off.³³ Lieutenant Colonel Šobán reported on December 11 at a meeting of the operational staff at the Regional Department of the Corps of National Security Ostrava: “The advance of the Warsaw Pact against Poland reached a halt; time was given for the PUWP CC to realize the conclusions of the 7th Plenum.”³⁴

It is clear that “Operation Krkonoše” could not have been a normal exercise. Whether it was the preparation for an intervention, an act of pressure on the Polish leadership, or an attempt to provide the Polish leadership with the means for sudden action against the opposition, is not possible to say for certain without access to Soviet documents. The number of units described in the Czechoslovak (and also East German)³⁵ documents—5-6 Soviet divisions, 2 reinforced Czechoslovak divisions, and 1 reinforced East German division—would certainly not have been sufficient for the first alternative. In that case, however, it is possible that the main tasks could have been carried out by troops of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts of the Soviet Army,³⁶ and that state leaders and army commanders (who would have played only a partial role) were not provided with complete information. In any case, the military operation was terminated before it was fully developed—and it was terminated from the place that the orders had come, that is, the military and political leadership of the USSR. The course and dynamics of the military and security operation in Czechoslovakia in December 1980 seem to indicate, however, that the principal decision to terminate the operation did not come on December 5, immediately after the summit in Moscow, as Gen. Jaruzelski,³⁷ or Stanisław Kania,³⁸ for example, have argued, but apparently some time later.³⁹

It is not easy to reconstruct precisely the position of the CPCz leadership in December 1980 regarding the possibility of military intervention. In the records of the CPCz CC Presidium, no material has survived concerning a debate on this problem. On December 2 it was decided to send a delegation to Moscow for a key meeting *per rollam*, without convening a session of the Presidium. The corresponding decision, included in the minutes of a meeting of the Presidium on December 8, only states the make-up of the Czechoslovak delegation.⁴⁰ The Presidium certainly discussed the Polish situation and the Czechoslovak point of view at the forthcoming summit; only indirect information, however, is contained in the record of conversation between East German Premier Willy Stoph, who was in Prague December 2 and 3, and Gustáv Husák.⁴¹ According to the SED minutes, Husák informed Stoph that the CPCz CC Presidium had discussed Poland and reached the same conclusions as the

SED Politburo. The December 2 SED Politburo meeting's conclusions sounded ominous, however: they authorized Erich Honecker to agree to whatever measures the situation called for. In other words, Honecker received a blank check to consent to anything, including eventual intervention.⁴² One can speculate only to a limited extent as to the position of the CPCz leadership. All things considered, however, it seems the CPCz leadership was less active and less decisive than that of the SED. It could also be significant that the Czechoslovak delegation at the Moscow meeting was comprised of only political functionaries—in contrast to the East German delegation, which also included the ministers of national defense and state security. Husák's speech in Moscow⁴³ was not as pointed as Honecker's.⁴⁴ Husák did not speak openly of a military solution (neither did anyone else). Nevertheless, according to the testimony of Stanisław Kania,⁴⁵ his awareness of the gravity of the situation even brought tears to Husák's eyes at one point in his speech. As the military and police measures carried out indicate, the CPCz leadership evidently would have complied with and was prepared to take part in an eventual decision to intervene. The plans for implementing "Operation Krkonoše," remained valid beyond December 1980, and the units assembled to carry it out were kept in a state of readiness until 1982.

The operations of the security apparatus were less striking, but just as long-term and important as the military operations. They were aimed not just at Poland, but also at the Czechoslovak population with the goal of eliminating potential public sympathies for the Polish developments. As early as 29 August 1980, the regional police commands had received circulars warning them that U.S. and West German special services were trying to encourage Czechoslovaks to act in solidarity with the striking workers in Poland. In the following days and weeks, frequent monitoring and analysis of the situation in Poland showed an attempt to evaluate the exact nature of the situation there. For example, on 3 September 1980 Czechoslovak police received instruction on how to secure contacts with agents of the State Security service in the event that they found themselves in a situation comparable to that of their Polish counterparts in which Polish agents were isolated in striking plants and had lost contact with their directing organs.⁴⁶ Other measures were concerned with: increasing the security of state borders; controlling opposition figures; controlling Czechoslovak citizens of Polish nationality, and Polish citizens working in Czechoslovakia; and limiting travel and tourism in Poland.

Particularly intense activity by the security units occurred twice during the "extraordinary third level security alert:" first, from the 5 to 6 December 1980; and second, during the period of martial law, specifically from 13 December 1981 to 4 January 1982, which the Czechoslovak security organs were informed of beforehand.⁴⁷ At that time various other measures were taken. High functionaries of the state security and the

police were "on call," special public order units were in operation, control of state borders increased (as did the control of Poles on Czechoslovak territory), movements of foreign diplomats were followed more intensely, and counter-intelligence provided protection for the Polish consulate in Ostrava. Special attention was paid in December 1980 to securing communication channels in connection with the movement of Czechoslovak Army units to the Polish border. In December 1981, Czechoslovak Security forces attempted to prevent any utterances of solidarity with Solidarity or the Polish opposition. The chief of the operational staff, Deputy Interior Minister Major General Hrušecký, emphasized, "pay attention to the activities of unfriendly persons (especially Chartists [members of Charter 77] and members of VONS [Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted]). Do not permit any kind of protest against the measures taken by the state organs of the Polish People's Republic to neutralize the counterrevolution. Immediately arrest anybody attempting to protest, or preparing to do so."⁴⁸ He also talked about "sending picked secret collaborators to Poland" and again about preparing linguistically qualified members of the Interior Ministry for deployment in Poland. All these measures were actually implemented, and further actions were also planned in the event the situation in Poland should worsen.

The Czechoslovak regime could not, however, completely obstruct acts of solidarity with Solidarity and the Polish opposition. Charter 77 reacted to developments in Poland by publishing a wide range of documents, which expressed solidarity with the Polish striking workers, criticized Czechoslovak media coverage of Polish events, raised concerns about the movement of Czechoslovak Army units to the Polish border, and protested against the imposition of martial law.⁴⁹

The wider public followed developments in Poland with interest and visible sympathy. It speaks to the success of the regime, however, that no important public manifestations of solidarity with the Polish opposition took place in Czechoslovakia in 1980-1981. Gustáv Husák was essentially right, when in talks in Moscow on 16 May 1981 he proudly declared that "there exists no danger that the masses [in Czechoslovakia] would support it [i.e. the Solidarity movement in Poland]... We are not

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afraid that the Polish events could have any influence in our country.” In the long-term view, however, Soviet Premier Nicolav Tikhonov demonstrated greater foresight, when he interrupted Husák with the observation that this situation could still change.⁵⁰

Selected Documents

As we have discussed, there are considerable gaps in the preserved (and now accessible) documents in the Czech archives regarding the Polish developments of 1980-1981. For example, no record has survived of the debates on the Polish situation in the leading CPCz bodies. It is therefore difficult to choose the one or two most important documents that would reflect this perspective in its entirety. In any case, most of the preceding text devoted to the reconstruction of the CPCz leadership’s position on the Polish developments and the Solidarity phenomenon has been drawn from a range of documents. The opinions of Czechoslovak representatives have been captured by two presentations delivered by Gustáv Husák in Moscow in December 1980 and May 1981, and in a CC CPCz letter to the Polish communist party from June 1981.

Most appropriate for publication seems to be the record of the Warsaw meeting in March 1981 (Document No. 3) between Stanisław Kania and Karel Hoffmann, the matador of the post-invasion Czechoslovak regime.⁵¹ This record presents the opinions of the Czechoslovak leadership in perhaps the most complete and most pointed form, while at the same time reflecting both the acquiescent as well as polemical arguments of the Polish leadership.

The report of Colonel General Miroslav Blahník, Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, to the Minister of National Defense Martin Džúr (Document No. 2) sums up the plan for the common Warsaw Pact army “exercises” on Polish territory in December 1980, or rather, that which the Soviet Army Command considered necessary to tell their Czechoslovak “allies.” Among other evidence, a comparison of this document with its East German equivalent confirms that the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks received from the Soviets only the information and directives directly concerning them, and were not necessarily fully aware of Soviet intentions.⁵² In the German document there is no mention of the 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces which was to operate on the Olomouc-Cracow route. Part of Blahník’s report is a map marked with the anticipated movements of “exercise” units in southern and western Poland.

The Czech archives also contain a whole series of documents which illustrate the positions and opinions of other East European leaderships. Though they do not provide any new information, they do confirm and supplement our knowledge. This can be said particularly with regard to two documents which outline the position of the Soviet leadership in the spring and fall of 1981. The first of these is a private speech given by Brezhnev while

in Prague for the CPCz’s 16th Congress⁵³ in April 1981 (Document No. 4), and the second, of slightly unclear origin, is located in a folder marked “Poland” in the yet un-archived materials of Gustáv Husák (Document No. 6). The record of the meeting between Husák and János Kádár in November 1980 nicely reflects the Hungarian position (Document No. 1). Although it does contain sharp criticism of the Polish leadership, Kádár also attempted to keep a certain distance—neither directly interfere in the Polish developments nor participate in economic assistance. In contrast, the interpretation given in the fall of 1981 by Günther Sieber, the head of the SED CC International Relations Department, is characteristic of the East German leadership’s approach, which apparently felt most threatened by the developments in Poland (Document No. 5). It is a systematic, comprehensive analysis comprising well thought-out, enterprising approaches to the problem.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMV	Archiv Ministerva vnitra (Archive of the Minister of the Interior)
A ÚV KSC	Archiv Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa (Archive of the CC CPCz), Prague, Czech Republic
Barch	Bundesarchiv
BND	<i>Bundesnachrichtendienst</i>
CC	Central Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPCz	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSPA	Czechoslovak People’s Army
ČSSR	<i>Československá Socialistická Republika</i> (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HPR	Hungarian People’s Republic
HSWP	Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
KOR	<i>Komitet obrony robotnikow</i> (Workers’ Defense Committee)
KS SNB	<i>Krajská správa Sboru národní bezpečnosti</i> (Regional Department of the Corps of National Security)
NVA	<i>Nationale Volksarmee</i> (National People’s Army of East Germany)
PPA	Polish People’s Army
PPR	Polish People’s Republic
PÚV	<i>Predsednictvo Ústředního výboru</i> (Presidium of the CC)
PUWP	Polish United Workers’ Party
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i> (Socialist Unity Part of Germany)
SÚA	<i>Státní ústřední archiv</i> (Central State Archive)
VI	<i>Vnitrostanická informace</i> (Internal Party Information)
VONS	Výbor na obranu nespravedlive stíhaných (Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted)

Document No. 1**Record of a Meeting between CPCz CC General Secretary Gustáv Husák and HSWP CC First Secretary János Kádár in Bratislava, 12 November 1980 (excerpt from Kádár)**

25 November 1980.

[...] Comrade Kádár laid out the position of the HPR [Hungarian People's Republic] on the developments in Poland. A serious, dangerous situation has emerged here, one which represents a serious problem. It concerns a socialist state which is a member of the Warsaw Pact. Its geographic location places it in a zone of great importance.

[Kádár continued:] One of the sources of this crisis is the economic situation. Our Polish Comrades have themselves spoken of the excessive tempo of economic development. Lacking the necessary base they set an economic tempo which they could not maintain, a statement which also holds true with regard to the increases in wages and debt. The steep rise in wages was impossible to cover with goods, and the rapidly rising level of indebtedness was not covered either by corresponding production nor, particularly, by funds from exports. The poorly resolved agricultural issue is also a serious problem.

The second source of this crisis can be found in the mistakes of the leadership. The information [we have] received is almost unbelievable to us. A serious situation already existed in the PPR [Polish People's Republic] in 1956. Serious tremors occurred in 1970, 1976, and now once again. It is not our role to evaluate the level of their work. The present leadership says that they had drawn apart from the masses and from reality. In our opinion there also was a large degree of carelessness on the part of the leadership. I [Kádár] spoke with Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev in the summer, at the end of July in the Crimea, just before the arrival of Polish party leader Comrade Edward Gierek.⁵⁴ Comrade Brezhnev was disturbed by the strikes taking place in Poland. I mentioned that Poland reminded me of a drunk who staggers from side to side, but thanks to the grip of his guardian angel doesn't actually fall. It seemed to me that the Polish leaders were thinking in a similar manner. They were very careless. Comrade Gierek arrived in the Crimea and in his discussions understated the seriousness of the situation. It was noted by our Hungarian comrades, on holiday in the USSR at the time, that the Polish leadership was calmly continuing their holidays while the situation in Poland was developing along very unfavorable lines.

In conversations with our Polish comrades we [Hungarians] pointed out the need to consider that neither the West, nor the Church nor any other anti-socialist force had yet decided on a full overthrow of the socialist system, but that if they wished, there was indeed an opportunity to do so. We regard the situation in Poland as very serious; the crisis is still a long way from being over.

Comrade Kádár recently spoke of the developments in Poland during the visit of the British Foreign Secretary [Lord Carrington], whom he cautioned that the situation had not yet climaxed, and warned that it would not be in the interest of Great Britain to attempt a reversal of relations. Responding to the Foreign Secretary's question, Comrade Kádár had stated that an attempt of that sort would be a threat to the entire policy of détente. He spoke of the Polish situation during his discussions with Yugoslav representatives as well. In answer to their question about the possibility of external assistance to Poland, Kádár responded that Yugoslavia would also have to help to prevent such assistance from becoming necessary.

The situation in Poland is exceptionally important, not just for the Polish People's Republic and the socialist community, but for all European states. The Hungarian People's Republic does not have any special concerns about these developments as there have not yet been any noticeable effects of the Polish events on Hungarian political life. The HPR long ago solved the problems which have led to the Polish crisis. They do not fully understand the situation in Poland and are disturbed by various reports that workers and in some places even "free elections" are implementing things which are taken for granted in the HPR.

They do not understand the approach of the Polish leadership in increasing prices in 1976. This serious action was taken without any preparations, and even the members of the Central Committee and the Government Presidium were not informed. In this situation it is obvious that Communists could not defend the implementation of the policy. The consequences of this step were not fully thought through and the whole approach was very lightly and carelessly conceived.

The opinions of the HPR were explained in detail to Comrade Demichev on his recent visit to Hungary.

Comrade Emil Wojtaszek,⁵⁵ who has kept the Hungarian leadership informed of the Polish situation expressed thanks for the help provided by the HPR to the Polish leadership. I [Kádár] told him that there was no need to mention solidarity, as we regard it as a given. We are also prepared to give immediate assistance. They do not have great means, but are prepared to give everything which is available. They can rush some deliveries etc. At the same time, I cautioned them that if these were ongoing deliveries within the framework of economic cooperation then it is necessary for both sides to act as partners for if the PPR does not deliver coal, honey, sulfur, etc. as agreed upon then we can not produce. Then, understandably, we cannot help you.

The HPR does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. They [the Hungarian leaders] have, however, pointed out in conversations that as long as the leadership is not united it cannot handle the situation. To achieve unity one condition must be met: a clear, concrete platform must be developed. So long as such a platform

does not exist it is impossible to speak of unity among the leadership or within the party itself. Were Hungary to find itself in such a situation we would not count the number of party members. We would attempt to set forward a clear platform and then count the number of people who could support that platform. There is not much point in talking about 3 million Communists if you do not know how they will react in a particular conflict situation. It is more important to have perhaps fewer people, but know that they will act resolutely for a commonly-accepted platform. We have clearly told our Polish comrades that the basic condition is to clarify the situation and develop a clear, concrete platform for resolving it in a socialist manner and on a socialist basis. In this manner a basis can be built for effective solidarity and assistance from the states of the socialist community.

In a conversation with Comrade Brezhnev three days before Comrade Gierek stepped down, I [János Kádár] stated that the situation was so unclear that from the outside it was impossible to reasonably suggest an appropriate solution. As long as positive forces act reasonably then the HPR will support them in full. However, in the midst of a critical situation the Polish leadership let a man fall whom the Hungarian party believed to be a reliable and strong worker. In such a situation it is difficult from the outside to take a firm position. The basic assumption is that the Polish leadership must develop a clear platform.

It is necessary to ask where these developments may lead. During the meeting between representatives of these [Hungarian and Polish] Ministries of the Interior, the Polish representative informed the meeting that the Politburo had long since decided that there was no longer anywhere to retreat to, and that it was thus necessary to take things firmly in hand and, if necessary, use administrative restrictions. This is indeed the correct position and was discussed at an internal meeting. They should, however, say so openly, including in the Central Committee. In that forum it needs to be firmly said that things can progress only within definite limits. At the present time it seems that there is complete confusion in Poland. Many people reject contemporary politics, yet many Poles support socialism. There are many wholesome forces who are aware of how serious and dangerous a situation has been created. [...]

[Source: *Státní ústřední archiv (SÚA), A ÚV KSC, PÚV 155/1980, 25 November 1980; translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 2
Report of the Chief of the General Staff of the
Czechoslovak Army, Colonel General Miroslav
Blahník, to Minister of National Defense Army General
Martin Dzúr, 3 December 1980

3 December 1980.

Respected Comrade,

Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. OGARKOV, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, with the participation of General Colonel ABOLINS, Vice-Chief of the General Staff and General Colonel TIERESHCHENKO, First Vice-Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, provided clarification of the planned exercise. Present were General Colonel [Horst] ŠTECHBART,⁵⁶ Commander of the NVA [National People's Army] Land Forces of the GDR, and Armed Forces General [Tadreuš] CHUPALOVSKI,⁵⁷ First Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the PPA [Polish People's Army]. The plans assume carrying out two exercises. The first is a divisional tactical exercise independently carried out on each division's home territory and on the territory of the Polish People's Republic [PPR] over a period of 5-6 days. The second is a command and control field exercise with communication equipment and partly-deployed forces on PPR territory. 4 to 5 divisions of the Soviet Army (of the Baltic, Belarussian and Carpathian Military District and the 31st tank division of the Central Group of Soviet Forces) will take part in both exercises. From the other armies: one division from the NVA of the GDR, four divisions of the PPA and two tank divisions of the CSPA [Czechoslovak People's Army].

Divisional tactical exercises will be carried out in two phases. The first phase will be carried out independently on each division's home territory over two to three days (see map). Following the completion of the divisional tactical exercises, both tank divisions of the CSPA shall gather together near the border with the Polish People's Republic.

An order from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces will set the date and time for crossing the state border into the territory of the PPR (the 1st tank division along one axis the 9th tank division along two axes—see map [not printed]).

The issuing of this order from the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces initiates the second phase of the tactical exercise. The CSPA in coordination with one division of the PPA (the 11th tank division) will operate in the Zagan exercise area, where both exercises will take place, under the control of the CSPA and in coordination with the Wrocław Military Circle's operational group.

Following the realization of the tactical exercise the CSPA and PPA divisions will move to the allotted places on the territory of the PPR (see map [not printed]).

Following a short rest (1 day), the second exercise will begin—a command and control field exercise with

communication equipment and partly-deployed forces.

[...]

More detailed preparations for the second exercise will likely take place between 8 and the 10 of December 1980.

In conclusion Marshal Ogarkov noted that at the present time the exercise is merely prepared. Its execution, including the timing of the exercise, will be decided by the political leadership. This allied action will probably be announced in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, though with less than the 21 days notice specified.

Respected Comrade, I am also including at this time a draft information bulletin for the CPCz CC General Secretary and President of the ČSSR and, provided that you have no objections to its content, I would like to ask you to sign it.

[*Ed. note: Map not printed*]

[*Source: Investigation Commission of the House of Representatives of the Czech Republic (copy in the possession of the author); translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 3

Information regarding the meeting between Karel Hoffmann, President of the Central Unions' Council and Member of the CPCz CC Presidium, and Stanisław Kania, PUWP CC First Secretary, Warsaw, 17 March 1981 (excerpt)

17 March 1981.

[...]

Comrade Hoffmann then pointed out that our Party and the public are also increasingly disturbed by the fact that the PUWP has not managed to achieve that which was discussed by Comrade Husák and Comrade Kania⁵⁸ and approved by the CC (i.e.—“we shall take the initiative into our own hands,” “we are developing an offensive and we shall suppress the antisocialist forces,” “the attitude of party members who have joined Solidarity has not changed,” etc.).

Comrade Hoffmann continued with his breakdown of the Czechoslovak experience in the fifties and sixties, and particularly of the crisis years to demonstrate the generally applicable preconditions by which one can determine when, and whether, unions can support the Party. He stated that union members in the ČSSR and functionaries in the branch unions do not understand why Solidarity is supported and preferred when it so sharply stands up to the Party. Nor do they understand why there is no support for the class unions (branch unions), which are the only ones actively supporting the Party and fighting for its policies. He emphasized the importance of unity and effective action that a renewal of the class unions' national body in

the PPR would have on both the internal and international level (without repressing the specificity of the unions or restricting their activity), and also mentioned the possibility of the unions publishing a daily newspaper, without which branch union activities are considerably restricted. This is particularly important now that Solidarity has been granted permission to put out its own publications.

At the end of his presentation Comrade Hoffmann mentioned that we regard as great mistakes of the ČSSR crisis period the fact that we did not call things and phenomena by their real names, that we did not speak specifically about the messengers of right-wing, anti-socialist expressions and tendencies, that we did not isolate enemy forces and, on the other hand, that we did not organize and unite the healthy forces, and that we permitted moral and political terror and the harassment of honest comrades. We were thus unable by means of our own internal forces to forestall the counter-revolutionaries. This experience is also generally applicable.

Comrade Hoffmann expressed once again the support and solidarity of the Czechoslovak Communists and wished the PUWP full success.

During Comrade Hoffmann's remarks one could notice Comrade Kania nervously shifting in his seat, his facial expressions betraying his disagreement and dissatisfaction.

Following Comrade Hoffmann's presentation, Comrade Kania gave the floor to Comrade Grabski, who very briefly and concretely spoke about the current problems, the efforts of the Party, and the question of the unions in the PPR and their international contacts.

Then Comrade Kania spoke. His first reaction was to state that the events in Poland could not be evaluated through Czechoslovak eyes, as the crisis in the ČSSR had a completely different character.

According to Comrade Kania, in comparison with that of the ČSSR in 1968/69, the Polish situation is worse in only two ways—in the ČSSR there had only been one crisis, whereas in Poland there had been a number of what could be termed mass crises, and further, “in Czechoslovakia the economic situation had been good and in Poland it was bad.”

He further stressed that the CPCz CC and the Presidium had adopted opportunistic slogans, whereas the PUWP had not, that here the CC and the Presidium were united and properly oriented; the PUWP had the media firmly under control; the Polish army and security services held firm, whereas in the ČSSR these institutions had fragmented; Czechoslovakia had been helped by the allied armies, while in the PPR we were solving the crisis on our own and we are succeeding in mobilizing the people. We have many allies—we are supported by youth, independent unions, other political parties etc. As proof of the improving situation he pointed out the reduced visibility of Solidarity symbols.

Comrade Kania openly stated that there is no danger that Marxism-Leninism or Russian [classes] will disappear from the universities, as in the agreement signed these aspects are to be decided upon by Faculty Councils (he did not, of course, mention that these Councils are, at the majority of universities, under the influence of Solidarity).

Comrade Kania also reacted rather irately to the comments regarding the unions. He stated that he was trying to get Solidarity to become a union organization, that the branch unions needed a dynamic program and that it was impossible to rush the creation of their central body. He objected to the idea that the unions should have their own daily paper, as they obviously already have *Głos prace*. Comrade Hoffmann stepped forward and asked Comrade Szyszka directly whether the unions really run *Głos prace* or not, and was answered that it had been taken from them and did not serve the class unions at all. Comrade Kania reacted sharply to this and stated that this did not matter as *Głos prace* was run by a department of the PUWP CC, and thus he did not see any reason why the branch unions should have a daily of their own.

Comrade Kania's presentation as outlined here, along with further comments made, testify to the fact that he has been idealizing the situation and made statements which are in total conflict with reality.

From Comrade Kania's remarks and arguments it is obvious that:

- a) he fears Solidarity, and that the party leadership takes account in its actions of how Solidarity will react,
- b) the PUWP leadership is taking into consideration its Western creditors (and has stated openly that we must understand that they are dependent on credit),
- c) there is no real presumption that the present leadership has set out on a resolute course of putting into practice the statements made by Comrade Kania during his conversations with our Soviet Comrades, his discussions with Comrade Husák, his presentations in the CC, in the Congress Commission and so on.

On the basis of the present situation in the PPR, the continuing tendency towards unfavorable development, the verified opinions of a broad Party gathering in the class unions (i.e. the Communists, who are the participants in the daily struggle for Party policy and the defense of socialism and who are being placed under higher and higher psychological pressure) and the conversation with Comrade Kania, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

- a) In both the Party and society of the PPR there are strong forces, which have, even outside of the Party, an organizational foundation (class unions, anti-fascist fighters' organizations). These forces, in the case of active, comprehensive, resolute action by the Party leadership, and gradually by the Party as a whole, are capable of ensuring the socialist evolution of the PPR during the process of bitter political struggle and essential intervention against anti-socialist forces. They need only an urging to the struggle and purposeful leadership of the

fight.

- b) This kind of stance from the party leadership would quicken the differentiation process in society as well as hasten the departure from Solidarity of honest, disorientated workers, with an inclination to the class unions (of their 5 million members, nearly 2 million are party members). If however, the party leadership continues in its present indecisive, defensive course of action there is a real danger that the anti-socialist forces will succeed in weakening the unions and other progressive organizations, break up their structure and fully control social life, and the socialist character of the country will come under threat.

- c) All of this leads to the conclusion that the leadership of the PUWP under Comrade Kania does not provide the guarantees of resolute action against the counterrevolution and in defense of socialism. The present course of the party leadership threatens the foundation and primary pillar of a socialist society in the PPR. (In private conversations the members of the PUWP—high functionaries of the class unions—term the present PUWP leadership the Dubček leadership.)

[Source: *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981, 19 March 1981; translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 4

Speech of CPSU General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev before the CPCz CC Presidium in Prague, 9 April 1981 (excerpt)

9 April 1981.

[...]

Now to the matter which is disturbing us all first and foremost—about the situation in Poland.

I will not speak here about the facts of the situation in that country, you know them as well as we do. The situation is—it can be said without exaggeration—critical. This concerns both politics and the economy. However the latter is the result of the former incorrect policies that have also brought the economy to the verge of collapse. The extent to which the actions of the opposition, that is “Solidarity,” and the counterrevolutionaries and enemies of socialism who inspire it, are active and well-thought out in terms of organization and propaganda, is the extent to which the actions of the PUWP leadership and Polish government are indecisive and powerless.

You know, comrades, that on March 4, after our congress ended, we met with representatives of the Polish leadership and once again we told them directly that the situation is becoming dangerous. We recommended quite emphatically that they finally take decisive action against counterrevolution.

After that I had several more talks with Comrade Kania by telephone during which I presented the same ideas, I pointed out the new facts arising from

developments. And also in recent days, in April, we had some contact with the Polish leadership.

We strongly recommended that the Polish authorities pursue an active and offensive course in internal policy; we directly, boldly, and plainly made clear to everyone the situation in the country, its causes, and ways out of the crisis proposed by the party and government in the interest of the people. At the same time it is especially important to show with actual examples the destructiveness of the actions of those who are sowing anarchy, aggravating strikes and undermining governmental authority.

We strongly recommended that the Polish comrades actively make use of valid legal norms and if necessary introduce new ones (by declaring a state of emergency) in an effort to isolate and suppress the evident counter-revolutionaries, leaders of the anti-socialist campaign who are directed by imperialist forces from abroad.

In our opinion all that does not have to mean bloodshed, which Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski fear. Rather on the contrary, continuing to make concessions to the hostile forces could lead to the shedding of the blood of Communists, honorable patriots of Socialist Poland.

That which has been said of course does not preclude, but rather on the contrary assumes contact and work with the working masses, which are currently in the ranks of "Solidarity." And also with a certain part of the leadership of that organization, since it is far from homogeneous both in the center and also especially in the localities. Our friends must above all endeavor to expand the mass basis of their policies and in support of these unite patriots on whose hearts lies the fate of Poland.

We are having talks with the Polish leadership roughly along these lines. I have been telling them that there is still a chance to act decisively against the forces of counterrevolution by gathering and mobilizing the healthy forces in the party and by making use of instruments of state power such as the public security forces and the army.

Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski have agreed in words that it is no longer possible to retreat, but in reality they continue to retreat and are not taking decisive measures against the enemies of socialism. Take for example developments after the provocation in Bydgoszcz,⁵⁹ which was provoked by Solidarity. Impressions are rather gloomy. Our friends succeeded in averting a general strike. But at what price? At the price of further capitulation. Kania himself now recognizes that they made great mistakes and he blames [Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław] Rakowski but the latter is losing control.

It is difficult to say now how events will develop further. Given the present tactics of the PUWP leadership it is hardly possible to expect that the pressure of the anti-socialist forces will diminish. Of course, that disturbs us all, all members of our community. The Polish comrades are preparing to undertake something at the upcoming session of the Sejm. We'll see what comes of that.

In my opinion our common obligation is to help the Polish Communists to take a stand against counterrevolution. They still have opportunities to do that if the leadership would only demonstrate sufficient political will.

As far as I know, comrades, we assess events in the same way and therefore we can influence the Polish comrades and so work in the same direction. It is not out of the question that developments will require a further meeting of the leaders of the fraternal countries on the Polish question. We will not decide on that now.

The crisis in Poland will of course have negative long-term consequences. We must all learn appropriate lessons from it.

For example such a fundamental question as this: how did it happen that within a few months a country was—in a word—thrown into chaos, with the economy on the verge of collapse and anarchy reigning? Whenever this question is addressed, what is usually mentioned is the continuation of private farming in the countryside, the activities of dissidents, the influence of the church, the diversions of Western intelligence agencies. That's without argument. But to be sure the forces hostile towards socialism were [present] in Poland even earlier. What has enabled them to emerge? It is obviously the erosion of relations between the party and the working class.

All socio-economic policies of the former leadership were basically calculated to achieve a leap forward with the aid of Western loans. Indeed they succeeded in some respects in modernizing industry. But what sense is there if the new factories are fully dependent on raw products, materials and assembled products which must then be obtained with hard currency?

Furthermore whole plants for prestigious production for example of color television sets, were bought from the West.

And when it was necessary to repay for the loans, they did not find any other way than to place this burden primarily on the working class. Living conditions of workers have worsened in recent years. The party began to lose its main societal support. And that enabled the enemies of socialism to engage in a struggle for power.

Capitalists will not voluntarily assist in the building of socialism—such is the truth that you all must be clearly aware of. If they provide us with loans, if they trade with us, then the best case is that they are applying market principles, and a worse case that they are pursuing purely political objectives.

When Polish representatives explain why it is difficult for them to take the offensive against counter-revolution, they openly say—we're dependent on the West.

That is the greatest lesson for socialist countries. All of them ought to once again assess the extent of their indebtedness abroad and do everything to prevent it from increasing and approaching a dangerous limit.

[...]

[Source: *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 2/1981, 16 April 1981; translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Document No. 5

**Record of a Meeting between Representatives of the
CPCz CC and SED CC International Relations
Department in East Germany, 8 October 1981
(excerpt)**

8 October 1981.

[...]

The Situation Inside the Party

The [PUWP] Party Congress has solved nothing. The change which took place at the highest party levels has led nowhere. Logically, it could not lead anywhere under the present conceptual conditions of maintaining dialogue with a class enemy. Following the end of the Solidarity Congress, however, a change in thinking has occurred, particularly amongst the party rank and file. Opinion groups are forming, representing different conceptualizations of the optimal solution in the Polish situation.

1. Particularly at the district level there is a group of honest comrades who had suffered illusions regarding the possibility of dialogue with Solidarity. Everyday reality, however, has shown them something quite different. The leaders of certain districts, with the exception of Poznan, Gdansk, and Cracow, have come to the conclusion that Kania's capitulationist policy has collapsed.

2. A crystallization of opinion is also taking place at the level of the CC. Recently even Kania and [Politburo member Kazimierz] Barczikowski have undergone a slight shift in position, particularly under pressure from their district comrades and from the Soviet leadership.

3. Definite changes in the positions of certain individuals can also be seen. Rakowski for example is turning from the right wing towards the center and is gradually acquiring a leftist flair. On the other hand, [hardline Politburo member Stefan] Olszowski is moving to the right. One can also note differences of opinion between Kania and Jaruzelski. This results from the fact that Rakowski is essentially the brains behind Jaruzelski and thus a change in Rakowski's position influences Jaruzelski's point of view, which then leads to his differences in opinion with Kania.

4. The CC apparatus is very strongly opposed to Kania. This emerges from conversations with PUWP CC members during both private and official visits to the GDR. The common thread of these changes in opinion is the realization that the tactic of dialogue, which permits the steady advance of the counterrevolution, is at an end. It is not known, though, how deep or expansive these differentiating changes are. Our Polish comrades themselves say that confrontation is unavoidable, as Kania's leadership, bereft of ideas, has failed to take steps

to mobilize the Party and is hostage to its own illusions regarding the last Party Congress. Kania and Barczikowski apparently fear more than anything else a general strike, a civil war, and the occupation of Polish territory by the Soviet Union. These are apparently the main reasons why they have chosen a tactic of dialogue. The district party committees are showing an increase in their own initiatives. Comrades are organizing their own actions against Solidarity with the goal of preventing illegality, maintaining the industrial process, organizing the supply of goods, and maintaining order at least at the district level. Yet this approach cannot be credited to all districts. It is dependent on two factors:

1. the personality of the district party secretary
2. the politico-ideological level of the membership base

For example, in Wrocław the First Secretary is good, but the membership base is bad. In Leszno, Jelenia Gora, and Zelenia Gora the membership base is average, but the leading secretaries are not worth much.

Discussion circles in Katowice, Poznan and other cities are increasing and are changing into Marxist-Leninist circles. These are increasing their influence. However, they have large conceptual problems (often leftist deviations), as well as organizational difficulties and poor material conditions. From all of this the question emerges—where to next? By all accounts the counterrevolution has its own objective laws. Under certain conditions it escapes from the hands of its organizers and takes on an uncontrollable character. The factors which have so far acted as a brake on the Polish counterrevolution (the influence of socialist society, moderate tendencies in the West, the Polish Church) will not continue to operate forever. The question emerges as to when this will all cease to function. American imperialism plays itself out in Polish events in two directions:

- a) rapidly escalating the situation in Poland, and in an attempt at system change creating a bonfire of international provocation,
- b) continuing the furtive process, institutionalizing and legalizing the achieved gains of the counterrevolution.

The Polish Church has been a supporter of the latter course, and under [Cardinal Stefan] Wysziński restrained the most radical wing of Solidarity, as the Church does not wish to lose what influence they have managed to gain within the country. The departure of Wysziński has thus meant a weakening of the Church's restraining role.

Increasing anarchy is proof that the counterrevolution's furtive phase is coming to an end. Destruction and the uncontrollable course of certain mass actions could change into an open stand-off. The spark could be provided by the emerging chaos in the supply of goods. The onset of winter will most likely speed up the mechanics of confrontation. This is not, however, in the interest of any of the parties. The question thus emerges of how to avoid the coming conflict.

In Poland a variety of solutions, at different levels, have been proposed:

I. Calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, at which Kania and the Polish delegation would be forced to sign a list of demands. Kania would, upon his return, have to carry out radical measures, for example declaring a state of emergency, during which it would be necessary to count on the occurrence of a general strike including armed confrontation. Both these clashes would definitely reduce the blood which would have to be spilled later in a larger confrontation. This point of view is prevalent in the Warsaw region.

II. Another prospect assumes intensively working on those Congress delegates who have a permanent mandate, gaining a majority, calling a new Congress, and electing a new leadership which would be capable of radical measures in both the Party and the state (purge the Party, make the state apparatus capable of action, declare a state of emergency, create an armed militia and partially arm party members). This is a perspective which is widely adhered to in the GDR border regions. [Tadeusz] Grabski is apparently also thinking along these lines.

III. A different opinion relies on the Soviet Union, the ČSSR and the GDR withholding military intervention against and hermetically sealing Poland inside its borders until the Poles solve their problems on their own. This would, however, mean an end to wholesome forces in the country.

IV. In the case of increasing anarchy we can presume that Kania and Jaruzelski, with the consent of Solidarity, will declare a state of emergency and put the army on alert, not, however, with the purpose of solving internal problems but in order to prevent the intervention of the Soviet Union and other countries. (This is the model of Polish history, of which Pilsudski once remarked, that "he got on the red tram and got off the white one.")

The opinion of the SED regarding these opinions is that it is worth discussing the first and second of them. The SED is working in 15 districts where it has cooperative contacts. It is sending the maximum possible number of delegates and also welcoming as many Polish party delegates as possible. It is trying to strengthen the confidence of healthy forces, but will send material support only where it can be sure that it will be properly utilized. The healthy forces need copying technology, communication technology, and propaganda and agitation materials. The GDR will send this by various channels and in varying quantities. It will send them perhaps to district committees, for example to Comrade [Tadeusz] Porembski⁶⁰ in Wrocław, to Marxist circles in Poznan, and so on. The SED is working with the Polish state apparatus and especially with its headquarters through old and new contacts. (The Minister of Education is, for example, an accessible and reasonable comrade.) The SED leadership adopted last week a resolution by which all members of the Politburo, Secretariat, and leading divisions of the CC

should seek out contacts with their Polish partners and as far as possible influence them in a Marxist-Leninist sense. Comrade [Konrad] Naumann, who is a member of the SED CC Politburo and First Secretary of the Berlin Municipal Party Committee, has begun a visit to Poland. A similar approach has been taken by the leadership of the GDR Army, Security Services and militia. These, however, are organizing themselves along their own lines. The SED has contacts with all the deputy ministers in the PPR Department of National Defense. Jaruzelski himself is avoiding all contact with the GDR. Contacts with the security apparatus are good and take place at various levels.

Recently, our Polish comrades have requested that the GDR accept those comrades from the PUWP party apparatus who are unemployed. The GDR is prepared to do so and is just waiting for a list of these people.

The SED CC, following the lead of the ČSSR, will begin radio broadcasts to Poland on October 12. There are, however, personnel, language, and other difficulties with this.

Contacts with our Polish comrades show that great attention is paid to the Czechoslovak broadcasts. The broadcasts are interesting and evaluated positively. This has encouraged the SED CC to begin a similar type of broadcast, though from a historical perspective this is more difficult for the GDR than for the ČSSR.

The evaluation of certain comrades, with whom it is necessary to cooperate, is approximately as follows: Grabski is a good comrade, brave, willing to get actively engaged, but he is not a strategist and does not think in a very forward-looking manner. The best impression has been made by [Warsaw voivodeship secretary Stanisław] Kociolek. Kania wished to eliminate him and send him (as ambassador) to the USSR. However, the Soviets rejected him, which has saved him for future political developments. It seems that Kociolek is prepared to fight.

Last week comrades from the CPSU CC consulted with comrades from the SED CC International Relations Department. Discussions with Comrades [CPSU CC Secretary Konstantin] Rusakov, [Deputy CC Department head Oleg B.] Rakhmaninov, and [Deputy CC Department head George] Shakhnazarov show that we and our Soviet comrades evaluate the Polish situation almost identically. Comrade Rusakov pointed out that while the large maneuvers embarked upon, the sending of delegates and discussions by telephone, are indeed useful, so far they have brought no returns. Comrade Rusakov regards the situation as very dangerous, and anticipates that October will show when and to what degree the operation will be carried out. For the time being, though, he does not know how this will take place. Our Soviet comrades are continuing to pressure the Poles intensively, as they do not see for the moment any other choice. The Poles must fight on their own, and no-one can fight for them against KOR and the enemies of socialism. Comrade Rusakov does not agree with the prevailing sentiment in Poland that the

Soviet Union should be in the front line of the fight against the enemies of socialism in Poland. The Soviet Ambassador Aristov visited Kania and protested against the sharp anti-Sovietism in Poland. Kania asked for this to be given to him in writing. This request was met. All of this has led to the realization that Kania's concern is to be able to show concrete proof that he is only doing what he has been forced to do by the Soviet Union.

According to our Soviet comrades, 1968 will not repeat itself in Poland. Polish comrades cannot simply acquire power by means of Soviet tanks. They must fight for that power on their own. Our Soviet comrades state that they did not choose Kania and thus they themselves cannot remove him. That must be done by the Poles.

The idea of calling a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee should be discussed. We should not let ourselves be influenced by Polish statements about the possibility of a general strike, a civil war or the like. The Polish leadership is using this to threaten and blackmail the USSR. The counterrevolution is horrible everywhere. Its street activity too is equally awful everywhere. It is necessary to remain calm and even more necessary to avoid losing patience.

The SED suggested to our Soviet [comrades] that due to the serious situation, closer contact should be maintained between the USSR, GDR, and the ČSSR. Rusakov expressed however, that this was too early, even though they do not rule the possibility out for the future. It is only necessary to coordinate on a bilateral basis.

The SED CC feels that our Soviet comrades are having difficulty determining an effective approach towards Poland. In addition to wanting to continue with the present mechanisms, they lack a concept. Their present evaluation of the Polish situation is one hundred percent identical to the evaluation of the SED, unlike their evaluation following the last PUWP Congress. Following the Congress our Soviet comrades acted upon an illusory hope of a possible consolidation of the situation in Poland. The SED very critically evaluated the course and results of the Congress, as Comrade Honecker told Comrade Brezhnev in the Crimea.

Comrade Sieber asked that the CPCz CC inform them about the assistance they were giving Poland, as the SED would like to share in some of the activities. For historical reasons Poles do not like to cooperate with Russians and Germans. This mostly concerns printers, paper and the like. [...]

[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents; translated by Oldřich Tůma.]

Document No. 6

Information on the Position of the CPSU Regarding the Polish Situation [n.d., late fall 1981]

Regarding the Polish crisis and our viewpoint

(Information)

For a long time developments in Poland have caused anxiety and concern in our country and in other countries of the socialist community.

The evaluation of events in Poland was presented by L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

The CPSU CC has always kept the party and its friends informed of the situation in Poland, of our steps and of help in stabilizing the situation.

In October and November this year the situation heated up further. The "Solidarity" congress revealed counterrevolutionary intentions to seize power to change the basis of socialism in Poland by:

- transforming socialist public ownership into group and gradually private ownership;
- gaining political power by taking over the Sejm;
- weakening Poland's ties to the countries of the socialist community with an appeal to the peoples of Eastern European countries.

In reality, "Solidarity" has been changing into a political party.

In Poland:

- 1) The leading role of the party has been weakened.
- 2) Deformation of economic and political life is continuing.
- 3) The take-over of plants and distribution of production by "Solidarity" is continuing.

In fact, two actual governments exist. The disruption of the economy is evident in the reduction of the volume of industrial production by 15%, of coal output by 40 million tons and in great inflation.

- 4) Continuing attacks on the PUWP and as a result of that the disintegration and gradual extinction of the party.

The causes of the crisis have their roots in the past:

- long-standing disquiet in the country, created by the strong position of the Church, where more than 85 % are believers.
- the reality of 74% of agricultural land in individual ownership;
- the influence of petit-bourgeois ideology through the opening of opportunities for the infliction of all contagions of petit-bourgeois ideology;
- voluntarism in economic policy—efforts to achieve a "great leap" in the economy of the country at the price of Western loans;
- in these circumstances a stream of bourgeois ideology arose, especially from the 12 million Poles living in Western countries;
- underestimation of the growth of consumer petit-bourgeois views among the people and members of the PUWP;
- severing of the party from the masses;
- violation of Lenin's principles of building the party. Quick acceptance [of new members] into the party in an effort to reach 3 million party members—they drew in everyone;
- we drew all these facts to the attention of the

Polish leadership and many times made them aware of them, including at the 7th Congress of the PUWP.

But the Polish comrades failed to take measures.

Nationalist smugness predominated. Many things were kept from us, particularly the economic relations with the West.

Nationalist forces joined with internal reaction—resulting in “Solidarity.”

The leadership of the party and state showed itself to be unprepared and unresponsive. Regarding the international situation, great circumspection is necessary.

After Kania took office we advised him (in September 1980) and emphasized that, with the legalization of the counterrevolutionary forces, it was necessary under the circumstances:

- to strengthen the party and its connection to the masses;
- to strengthen the army and security organs;
- to launch an open and decisive attack on counter-revolution.

Kania agreed with our recommendations but [only] in words, but pursued a policy of compromise with counter-revolution. This occurred out of unwillingness or disinterest. Instead of an attack—defensive tactics and retreat.

30 October 1980 meeting with Kania in Moscow. He agreed with our recommendations and criticisms, made promises but his deeds didn’t follow.

5 December 1980 meeting with the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow, where all participants made the Polish leaders aware of their responsibilities. They also agreed and made promises, but in reality they made concessions.

4 March 1981 meeting with a PUWP delegation after the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

April 1981 Comrades Andropov and Ustinov hold discussions in Warsaw.

May 1981 meeting between Comrades Suslov and Rusakov and Polish representatives.

June 1981 meeting between Comrades Gromyko and Kania.

5 June 1981 letter from the CC CPSU to Polish Communists, which caused a clear delineation between the compromisers and the healthy forces in the CC of the PUWP and in the party.

Telephone conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and Kania before the congress, informing [the latter] of the necessity to defend the healthy forces and revolutionary line, the work of comrades [Politburo member Victor Vasil’evich] Grishin and [Politburo member Arvid Yanovich] Pel’she during the congress.

The letter prevented the destruction of the party, but the leadership continued on its original path.

At the meeting in Crimea in August L.I. Brezhnev again underscored that the PUWP was continuing to make concessions. But even despite this, further concessions were made to “Solidarity.” The path of “renewal” through

compromise: “We Poles will come to an understanding.”

During that time 37 of 49 county council secretaries had to give up their leadership positions. Kania was the main hindrance in the struggle for socialism. The question arose of restoring the leadership to a sound footing. The Poles put forward Jaruzelski. The army and security forces stand behind him. The healthy forces supported this. Change in the leadership is a positive fact, assuming that the results of the 4th plenum of the PUWP CC⁶¹ are followed up on.

The difficulties in the PUWP as well as in the country remain, the situation is difficult.

Further developments will depend on how consistently the new leadership will work and struggle against Kania’s course without Kania.

A conversation took place between Jaruzelski and L.I. Brezhnev⁶² in which it was stressed that

- choosing reliable co-workers was the most important thing;
- it was time to take decisive measures against counter-revolution.

The PUWP CC, the Sejm and the PPR government are taking some measures, but so far the outcome of this has somehow not been clearly apparent. So far they are relying on discussions. They are considering solving [the situation] by means of a National Unity Front.

We are pointing out the possibility that the party may lose its leading role in a coalition with “Solidarity” and the church.

We are securing the supplies of goods in their original volumes and also in the future. But hereafter everything will depend on the character of the internal political situation in Poland. The support of the healthy forces— one of our tasks.

Overall our course lies in:

- preserving the PUWP as the leading force;
- preserving the Polish People’s Republic as an ally;
- saving socialism in the PPR.

The danger has not been eliminated, the struggle will continue.

Lessons from the crisis in Poland.

1. The successful building of socialism is [only] possible under conditions when general principles are consistently implemented in the building of a new society. Deviation from these [principles] leads to crises.

2. Maintaining high political vigilance. To see not only successes, but also errors and failures in time to analyze and eliminate [them].

3. We attach great importance to strengthening the party’s leading role and of the party’s connection to the masses, to the strengthening and development of socialist democracy, to internationalist education in the socialist spirit, to intensifying of the ideological struggle against bourgeois ideology.

4. The present international situation has become worse and the enemies would like to “feather their own nest” provoking us to become involved in Polish affairs,

hoping that our nerves will fail.

In this situation a special vigilance and self-control is essential so it will not lead to their [the enemies'] coming in the other countries, to the isolation of the socialist community and to an increasing danger of military conflict.

5. We are looking for ways to find a political solution. There is still a possibility to prevent disaster. The PUWP must find ways to alter developments.

The tasks facing our party:

1) To strengthen the connection with the working class, to lead a decisive struggle against failures.

2) To increase awareness, not to permit deviations from the policy of the party.

3) Our line towards Poland is correct. The support of the healthy forces and working with the leadership of the PUWP and the country.

4) The USSR will make use of its influence in the international arena so as not to allow an escalation of Polish events in other countries.

The plenary session of the CC fully approved the political line and the practical action of the Politburo of the CC CPSU relating to the crisis situation in Poland.

[Source: *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, file Gustáv Husák, unsorted documents, box "Poland;" translated by Oldřich Tůma.*]

Dr. Oldřich Tůma is the Director of the Institute of Contemporary History (Prague).

¹ Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

² *Státní ústřední archiv (SÚA), A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 10, VI 23* (12 August 1980), p. 10.

³ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 30* (12 December 1980), p. 3 and 31 (9 January 1981), p. 4.

⁴ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 31* (9 January 1981), p. 5 and VI 36 (1 April 1981), p. 6. One piece of data from November 1980 might perhaps, find a honorable place in any textbook of history of the labor movement: "... under the influence of events in the PRP [People's Republic of Poland] demands are appearing among the miners in the Sokolov mines in West Bohemia for new safety aids, because the old ones are worn out." *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, D-1, box 11, VI 29* (26 November 1980), p. 3.

⁵ E.g. *Rudé právo*, 22 and 28 October 1980; 5, 25, 28 and 29 November 1980; 2 and 15 December 1980; 3 and 29 January 1981; 9 February 1981; 10, 13, and 23 March 1981; 12 May 1981, and many others.

⁶ *Rudé právo*, 4 November 1980; 13, 27, and 31 January 1981; 17 March 1981. This type of interpretation is represented also in some subsequently published brochures, e.g., Milan Matouš, *Spiknutí proti Polsku* (Praha, 1982), and J. Kobr, *Vývoj Nemecké demokratické republiky a Polské lidové republiky v letech 1944-1984* (Praha: Svoboda, 1985), esp. pp. 137-221.

⁷ E.g. "The Problems of Polish Market", "Unfortunate Consequences of Strikes", "Conflicts That Will Not Multiply Bread", *Rudé právo*, 5 January, 18 February, 6 March 1981.

⁸ Preserved only in the archive of the SED in German, published in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds. "*Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen.*" *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung*, (Berlin: Akademie, 1995), pp. 178-187 and 280-282.

⁹ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 12/1981*, 19 June 1981.

¹⁰ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC*, record of 18th session of the CC CPCz, 7 to 9 October 1980, p. 55.

¹¹ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC*, record of 4th session of the CC CPCz, 28 and 29 October 1981, p. 33.

¹² *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 148/80*, 19 September 1980—Husák's speech in Moscow, *Hart und kompromisslos*, pp. 186-187; Husák argued in a similar way in an interview with Stefan Olszowski in Prague, 15 September 1980 (*SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 148/80*, 19 September 1980).

¹³ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981*, 19 March 1981 - see doc. 3 below.

¹⁴ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 164/1981*, 19 March 1981 - see doc. 3 below

¹⁵ For example János Kádár in an interview with Husák, 25 November 1980 (*SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 155/80*, 28 November 1980) or Günther Sieber during a meeting with Bilak, 8 October 1981 (*SÚA, A ÚV KSC*, unsorted materials file Husák) - see Doc. 1 and 5 below - the records of which are deposited in the CC CPCz archive.

¹⁶ General Jaruzelski also remembers awkward situations when his Czechoslovak comrades during the 70s always felt obliged to express their thanks for the "fraternal help" of 1968. Cf. Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dla czego...* (Warszawa: BGW, 1992), p. 110.

¹⁷ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 147/80*, 12 September 1980—letter of the chairman of the government of the PPR, Józef Pinkowsky, to Lubomir Strougal.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* According to the same document the leaders of the GDR behaved in a similar way. The Hungarian leaders, on the other hand, answered very evasively and promised no extraordinary aid.

¹⁹ The suggestion was for a reduction of 600 thousand tons in 1981. *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 154/80*, 14 November 1980. See also Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny*, p. 34.

²⁰ *SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 28/1982*, 8 January 1982.

²¹ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und kompromisslos*, p. 281.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ E.g. *A MV, Kanice*, 0, 1-1, Fund KS SNB Ostrava, Internal political situation in Poland, box 24, inventory unit 8.

²⁵ The bulk of the original documents concerning "Krkonoše" were liquidated in 1982!

²⁶ See Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und kompromisslos*, esp. doc. nos. 19-30.

²⁷ One member of this was also the later first post-November 1989 Minister of Defense, Gen. Miroslav Vacek.

²⁸ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und kompromisslos*, p. 207.

²⁹ Anatoli Gribkow, *Der Warschauer Pakt. Geschichte und Hintergründe des östlichen Militärbündnisses* (Berlin: edition 9 1995), pp. 181-5.

³⁰ This account of "Operation Krkonoše" is drawn from copies of some original documents assembled during the activities of the investigation commission of the House of Representatives of

the Czech Republic (notably the report of General Blahník on the meeting in Moscow – see doc. 2 below, the order of Minister of National Defense Džúr to conduct the “Krkonoše” exercise from December 5, the report of Gen. Gottwald on the reconnaissance mission to Poland, the minutes of the meeting of the Advisory Council of the Minister of National Defense on December 8), from expert reports for the use of the same commission (notably the report prepared by Lieut. Col. Antonín Kríz) and from several interviews conducted by the author in 1997 (with Lieut. Col. Antonín Kríz, Lieut. Col. Jirí Horák, and Gen. Stanislav Procházka).

³¹ A *MV, Praha*, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 46/80 pronouncing the extraordinary security alert of the third level (5 December 1980).

³² A *MV, Kanice*, 0 1-1, inventory unit 8, fund KS SNB Ostrava, Operational plan of the Regional Department of the Corps of National Security Ostrava in relation to the third level extraordinary security measures in response to the development of the situation in Poland, 1980. Emergency security measures were declared in various situations, if there were an imminent danger of so-called “mass anti-socialist behaviors.” In accordance with Decree no. 1/79 of the Minister of the Interior (A *MV, Praha*), a uniform system was set up of such measures that had earlier been declared on an *ad hoc* basis. The system included seven levels of emergency security measures. Levels five to seven presupposed an impending disturbance or one already in progress on a large scale and was never declared. Level four was declared only once, in January 1989 in anticipation of protests on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Jan Palach’s death by self-immolation. Level three (and the measures corresponding to it before the decree was issued in 1979) was declared in more than a dozen instances between 1970 and 1989, although prior to 1988 in the main as prevention. The third level involved a rather extensive activation of the security apparatus: the setting up of central and regional or local operational staffs, an emergency alert and the Availability of on duty members of the police force and of the Interior Ministry troops, the setting apart of special order units, etc., etc.

³³ A *MV, Praha*, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 46/80, his decision from 9 December and order no. 49/80 (16 December 1980).

³⁴ A *MV, Kanice*, 0 1-1, box 24, inventory unit 8, minutes of the operational staff. The CC PUWP held its 7th Plenum on 1-3 December 1980.

³⁵ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und Kompromisslos*, pp. 136-137.

³⁶ Contemporaneous Western sources spoke about 15 or even 30 divisions; see Wojciech Jaruzelski *Mein Leben für Polen* (München-Zürich: Piper, 1993), p. 235 and/or *Strategic Survey 1980-1981*, p. 74.

³⁷ Jaruzelski, *Mein Leben für Polen*, p. 239.

³⁸ Stanisław Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Wrocław: BGW: 1991), p. 91.

³⁹ On the general discussion concerning the threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Poland in 1980 see e.g., Mark Kramer, “Soviet

Policy during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126.

⁴⁰ SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 156/80, 8 December 1980.

⁴¹ *BArch, Abt. GDR*, Ministerrat DC 20, I/4-4684, 192. Sitzung, 10 December 1980.

⁴² Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und Kompromisslos*, p. 139.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 178-187.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-171.

⁴⁵ Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje*, pp. 88-89.

⁴⁶ A *MV, Kanice*, fund KS SNB Hradec Králové, bundle 15, Security situation in Poland.

⁴⁷ A *MV, Praha*, Order of the Minister of the Interior no. 29/81.

⁴⁸ A *MV, Kanice*, 0 1-1, fund KS SNB Ostrava, box 24, inventory unit 8. – Telegram from the Ministry of Interior from 31 December 1981.

⁴⁹ Documents from 8 August 1980, 14 December 1980, 10 January 1981, 7 and 30 January 1982. See V. Prečan, ed., *Charta 77 1977-1989* (Bratislava: Cs. stredisko nezaviste literatury: Archa, 1990), pp. 403-408.

⁵⁰ Wilke/Kubina, *Hart und Kompromisslos*, pp. 282-283.

⁵¹ He played an important role in safeguarding the intervention in August 1968, was a CPCz CC Presidium member from 1971 to 1989, and was head of the Czechoslovak trade unions from 1971 to 1989.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 136-138.

⁵³ Held 6 to 10 April 1981.

⁵⁴ Gierek, since late 1970 PUWP First Secretary, resigned in August 1980.

⁵⁵ Polish foreign minister from 1976 to August 1980, then CC Secretary. As CC emissary, he informed the Hungarian leadership on the Gdansk Agreement on 12 September 1980.

⁵⁶ Correctly Stechbarth.

⁵⁷ Correctly Hupalowski.

⁵⁸ During Kania’s visit to Prague, 15 February 1981. For the minutes see SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 162/1981, 19 February 1981.

⁵⁹ Editor’s note: Following the expulsion of Solidarity and other union leaders from the provincial assembly building in Bydgoszcz, beatings of Solidarity members by police and the security service occurred. Tensions between the regime and Solidarity rose dramatically.

⁶⁰ Editor’s note: In July 1981 Poremski became a member of the PUWP Politburo.

⁶¹ The 4th Plenum of the CC PUWP was held 16-18 October 1981.

⁶² Telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Jaruzelski, 19 October 1981.

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The Hungarian Party Leadership and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981

By János Tischler

The beginning of the 1980-1981 crisis in Poland coincided with the beginning of the decline of the Kádár regime in Hungary. János Kádár—who had come to power with the backing of Moscow by quelling the Hungarian Revolution in 1956—had long tried to preserve social law and order and to establish political legitimacy for himself, following the bloody repression after the revolution, by not interfering with people's private lives, by providing greater freedom within the framework of the existing political regime, and most importantly, by guaranteeing a constant increase in the living standard, thus creating an atmosphere of safety. From 1979 on, the Kádár regime subordinated other priorities to this latter aspect. Hoarding decreased to a minimum level and virtually all foreign loans served as subsidies of consumer prices and of unprofitable companies (which ensured full employment in return). However, an ever-growing part of the budget had to be spent on the repayment of loans and their interest.

While publicly emphasizing the solidarity of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) with Polish Communists and assuring Poland all possible economic and political assistance, Kádár believed from the very outset of the Polish crisis that the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) had to overcome its difficulties by political means and in a "socialist way." This latter phrase implied that Poland was expected to remain a socialist country and a member-state of the Warsaw Pact. In Kádár's opinion, the use of so-called "administrative means," that is, the deployment of the armed forces, would be acceptable only if no peaceful solution could be found or if the Communist regime itself were threatened. In this case, the challenge would have affected the whole socialist bloc and could have seriously endangered his (Kádár's) personal power as well. Nevertheless, he implied that even in such a case the crisis would best be dealt with by using internal Polish forces such as the state security organizations, the army, or the police. In Kádár's view, even in the event of a Soviet intervention as a final resort, Polish Communists would have to orchestrate the so-called "consolidation," that is, to "sort out all political and social difficulties," just as he and his Hungarian comrades had done after 1956. He knew all too well from his own experience how troublesome, or rather how much more troublesome, it was to seize power against the wishes of a nation, following a Soviet intervention.

Unlike other socialist countries which relentlessly attacked the PUWP and its leaders for their "opportunism," their chronic inability to act, and their backsliding, the HSWP tried to support its Polish counterpart by not interfering (either publicly or through

"inter-party channels") with any of the steps taken by the Polish leadership. After all, Kádár considered the Polish crisis to be a "family affair" relating exclusively to Soviet-bloc countries, a view he consistently upheld in the course of negotiations with various Western parties and politicians.

From the point of view of Hungarian internal affairs, events in Poland put Budapest in a simultaneously awkward and favorable position. Budapest could overtly claim how much better the situation was in Hungary compared with that in Poland, in terms of public order and the system of supplies. The efficacy of Kádár's policy could thus be neatly demonstrated, which was, in fact, what the HSWP leaders and the State-run media did. Besides approaching the 25th anniversary of the "counterrevolution," it was the "Polish affair" that offered Kádár an excellent opportunity to render a positive verdict on the HSWP's performance since 1956. He took pride in saying that he and his comrades had successfully avoided mistakes that were, alas, continuously and repeatedly being committed by the Polish leaders.

At the same time, the events in Poland evoked unease among the members of the HSWP leadership, for they constituted a kind of operational malfunction within the socialist bloc which later turned out to be a challenge to the internal state of affairs of other Soviet-bloc countries as well. Although Kádár publicly declared in September 1980 that HSWP policy would not get any stricter due to the events in Poland, the Hungarian party worried seriously about the Polish crisis even as it proclaimed the opposite. The HSWP asserted that the Polish example was not attractive to Hungarians since they had achieved a decent standard of living that they wished to preserve rather than imperil by allowing unrest comparable to that in Poland. (Nevertheless, the party leadership conceded that "there were—insignificantly few—people who supported 'Solidarity' and would gladly have seen the Polish example spread in Hungary.")

Hungarian government and party propaganda strongly condemned Solidarity and the strikes it organized. This propaganda emphasized that the mere existence of a free and independent trade union contradicted and undermined the power of the working class, furthermore, that strikes endangered the standard of living and socialist achievements. From the summer of 1981 on, this kind of propaganda expanded into a general anti-Polish campaign—lest the "Polish disease" spread to Hungary—and disseminated news about the alleged work-shyness, worthlessness, and parasitism of the Polish people. The Hungarian mass media used the fact that, when the living standard in Hungary first stagnated, then slowly began to decrease, a minor part of society was truly frightened

about the incessant news about strikes in Poland. The media increasingly encouraged such views in Hungarian public opinion as “the Polish situation costs us a lot of money;” “the Polish expect other socialist countries to provide for them;” “not strikes but more and better work can improve living and working conditions;” and “it is impossible to distribute more without work and to go on strike while the people of other socialist countries keep on working.”¹

In 1980-81 three members of the Polish leadership, among them PUWP Secretary Stanisław Kania, visited Budapest to discuss current events and hear the advice of the fraternal Hungarian party. From August 1980 on, the Polish leadership regarded Hungary as a model to be followed. Kania and his comrades listened to the opinion of the First Secretary of the Hungarian Party with keen interest since they would have liked to transplant the success of Kádár’s policy to the Polish situation. Kádár was, no doubt, widely popular in Poland, and the PUWP tried to capitalize on this politically. It was little wonder that both Kania, then Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski (right after imposing martial law), requested and received a detailed report on how the HSWP leadership had set about “consolidating” the situation in Hungary after 4 November 1956. (The Polish leadership tried to benefit from the living memories of the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary by showing at home the Hungarian documentary on the “Counterrevolution in 1956” under the title “So it happened,” evidently believing that the evocation of “the Hungarian scenario” would terrify the Polish people.) On every occasion, the Hungarian leadership urged its Polish guests to draft a brief but clear program on the basis of which party members could be activated and which could draw wide masses and ordinary followers of socialism “yearning for law and order.” They also underlined the need for unity in the party leadership which would then “manifest itself” in the rank-and-file as well, and that it was of prime importance for the Polish party to carry out an accurate analysis of the events.

The meeting of Warsaw Pact party and government leaders in Moscow on 5 December 1980 concentrated on one issue: the situation in Poland. The Hungarian delegation was led by János Kádár, whose speech differed markedly from those of the so-called “hardliners” from East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia (E. Honecker, T. Zhivkov and G. Husák respectively). While they seemed to urge an armed intervention, Kádár insisted on finding a political solution. He repeatedly stressed that Polish Communists were responsible for finding a way out of their own predicament. Integral to that aim, he added, was the preservation of the leading role of the party, the socialist constitutional order, the government’s authority, as well as control of the mass media. He also warned that it was vital to correct earlier mistakes and stressed they should not focus attention on the search for scapegoats. In this connection, he referred to the fact that ex-Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi—who had been deposed from

power in the summer of 1956—and his comrades “had been called to account [i.e., expelled from the HSWP] only in 1962.” He added that the platform that the PUWP was to work out should reflect firm determination. Finally, Kádár recalled the event of November 1956—throughout which he could rely only on Soviet arms and on members of the Rakosi regime’s apparatus—“when the Soviet comrades encouraged Hungarian Communists by telling them that they were stronger than they had ever thought,” and added that “the same applied to the Polish Communists.”²

When Kania visited Budapest in March 1981 the conflict between the Warsaw authorities and Solidarity was escalating quickly. Though Kádár confirmed the HSWP’s earlier stand and stated that he remained in favor of promoting contacts with the masses on the basis of mutual trust and open and sincere relations, he asserted that “if the class-enemy launches an attack there can be no clemency, for a fight like that is by no means to be fought on the basis of principles of humanism. We have to be prepared to deal with bouts of mass frenzy as well.” Kádár drew conclusions from the 1956 “counter-revolution,” then compared the evolution of the Hungarian and Polish state of affairs and pointed out their differing characteristics. He concluded that “the events in Hungary got at least 3 stages further and the extent of ‘purification’ was more profound and far-reaching than in Poland.” Finally, he suggested that the “fight had to be fought through to the end by the Polish comrades, first with political means or, if need be, by applying other means of main force.” The basic requirement was, above all, that Poland remain a socialist country.³

From September 1981 on, Kádár took an even more hard-line view on the Polish events, especially after the first Solidarity congress, at which the “Message” to East European workers was accepted by public acclamation. Solidarity’s “Message” encouraged those people “who made up their mind to fight for the free trade union movement” in the hope that their “representatives would soon have the opportunity to meet one another so as to be able to exchange their experiences on trade unions.” The “Message” provoked extreme fits of anger in the leaderships of all socialist countries. Authorities throughout the bloc, including Hungary, launched an all-out press campaign to reject Solidarity’s supposedly gross intervention—although, in an Orwellian touch, they took pains to prevent the text of the “Message” from becoming public and requested workers’ collectives to condemn the extremist and anti-communist Solidarity ringleaders for sending it. It was this “Message” that prompted the HSWP Central Committee to draft and send a letter in Kádár’s name to the PUWP CC and its First Secretary. This letter expressed all the worries that had so discomfited the HSWP leadership since the Solidarity congress.⁴

When General Jaruzelski became PUWP CC First Secretary in October 1981 (in addition to his former titles

of Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense) Kádár warmly congratulated him. A couple of days later the Hungarian leader declared that “polarization had increased in Poland and as a result, their long-established opinion and viewpoint had also grown stronger by virtue of which the launching of a more determined, proper and rational fight—that appeals to all honest people—would rapidly gain popularity against counterrevolution.” At any rate, in the autumn of 1981 the Hungarian Party, urged immediate action and was not only relieved by but also fully agreed with Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law in Poland on 13 December 1981, a step which in Hungary was somewhat euphemistically translated as a “state of emergency.” The HSWP Secretariat assembled the same day and passed a resolution to provide Poland with immediate economic relief in accordance with Jaruzelski’s request, endorsing “Comrade János Kádár’s telegram to Comrade W. Jaruzelski assuring him of Hungarian assistance.”⁵

Jaruzelski requested not only economic aid from Budapest but also his “Hungarian comrades” guidance concerning the struggle with “counterrevolutionary forces” 25 years earlier, and the experience obtained “in the field of socialist consolidation and the building of socialism in Hungary.” Upon Jaruzelski’s invitation, a three-person HSWP delegation led by Politburo member György Aczél went to Warsaw between 27 and 29 December 1981. Jaruzelski seemed to pay great attention to the representatives of the Hungarian fraternal party, who later noted in their official reports on the visit that “there had been an enormous and general interest shown in the Hungarian experience.” They added that the Polish comrades often took Hungarian achievements as “a basis and they seem to know little about the first steps of the hard-won consolidation. When they are about to introduce the introduction of harsh measures, they often refer to these results without proper knowledge of these experiences.” Jaruzelski’s and his team’s attention to the Hungarian lessons did not slacken in the years to come. Kádár, in turn, even in a private talk with Jaruzelski during his visit to Poland in October 1983, “warmly thanked the Polish leaders for having put a stop to counterrevolution and anarchy by way of relying on their own resources and thus rendering an enormous service to Poland and to the whole socialist community as well.”⁶

All that, however, had little influence on the fact that, as in Hungary in 1956, the Communist dictatorship in Poland in 1981 could be maintained solely with the help of armed forces. In the end, the oft-cited “Hungarian experience” could save none of the Communist regimes from ultimate downfall.

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János Tischler, formerly a research fellow at the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution

(Budapest), is the deputy director of the Hungarian Cultural Institute in Warsaw.

¹ Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives, MOL), Department of Hungarian Workers’ Party, 288. f 12/216-217; 11/4471; 11/4389.

² See Document No. 1 and the East German minutes of the Communist leaders’ summit on 5 December 1980 in this *Bulletin*.

³ MOL 288, f. 11/4397.

⁴ Népszabadság [HSWP central organ], 27 September 1981; see Document No. 3 (below).

⁵ MOL, 288, f. 4/181 and 7/641.

⁶ MOL 288, f. 5/844 and f. 5/895.

SELECTED HUNGARIAN DOCUMENTS

Document No. 1

Report to the Politburo by the Department of International relations of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 8 December 1980

CENTRAL COMMITTEE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party No. copies: 23
Department of International Relations Budapest, 8 Dec. 1980

REPORT to the Politburo

On the initiative of the Central Committee [CC] of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and on the basis of the Politburo’s resolution, a Hungarian delegation, led by Comrade János Kádár, took part in the Moscow meeting of top-level party leaders and high-ranking state officials of the Warsaw Pact countries on December 5. The Hungarian delegation included Comrade András Gyenes, Secretary of the CC and Comrade János Borbándi, Deputy Prime Minister.

The representatives of the member-states issued a joint statement on the meeting which was published in full in Hungarian daily papers on December 6.

The only issue on the agenda—relating to the international situation—was a discussion of the situation in Poland.

In his opening, Comrade Stanisław Kania outlined the Polish evaluation of the crisis and spoke about the work of the Polish United Workers’ Party [PUWP]. He emphasized that a very severe situation had arisen in Poland, which posed a threat to socialism and also carried elements of anarchy and counterrevolution. He added that the PUWP leadership was aware of its internationalist

responsibility, namely that it has to resolve the crisis on its own and that the party already had plans for its resolution. "The leadership is in constant contact with the CPSU with which it consults regularly and it is relying heavily on multi-lateral assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, on which it is counting in the future as well."

[Kania continued: "] The crisis has been made worse by the fact that it is the fourth one since 1956, that it is affecting the working class and other strata of society including the youth, that it looks likely to be prolonged, that strikes are making the situation more intense and that anti-socialist forces are trying to use the trade unions to their advantage.["]

["] In spite of present difficulties, it can be stated that the situation report of the [Polish] Party was correct: the cause of the crisis lies in the justified dissatisfaction of the working class. Ideologically, the Party did not prove equal to its task, it swept away the class-character of society and declared a 'developed socialist society' too soon in a situation where small-commodity production still existed in agriculture. Hostile forces took advantage of the dissatisfaction politically as well and provoked fierce class conflicts. When there were waves of strikes, it was correct to find a solution by political means, as only compromise was able to resolve the situation. ["]

["] The trade union 'Solidarity' was formed by opposition forces, but is popular with workers too. It has some 6 million members at present while sectoral trade unions comprise about 5 million members. The Church has become stronger also as a protector of the social rights of the masses. Hostile Western forces and reactionary émigrés have also been active and aggressive. ["]

["] In the present situation the Party has to strengthen itself on that basis in order to find a way out of the crisis by political means. It is very important to point out that it was neither socialism nor the Party that led the country into crisis but the mistakes committed in the course of its work and the violation of the norms of Leninism in party life. For this reason the Party devised the notion of renewal. This was accepted at the 6th plenary meeting, but, unfortunately, rather than the steps to be taken, invariably it has been the problems of the past that have come to fore. The membership of the Party is decreasing, yet, at the same time there are some 26 thousand new candidates for membership. The situation is getting worse in the coastal region (Pomerania), in Wrocław and Warsaw but positive processes have begun in Silesia, Katowice, Kraków, Poznań, and in Bydgoszcz. ["]

["] There are many calls for those who have committed mistakes to be brought to account. The Party delegated this matter to the party control bodies and people's control committees. ["]

["] A positive factor has been that, despite the enemy's active work in the universities, their efforts did not produce the results they hoped for. As a consequence of the correct decision taken by the Party, the conditions

are good for cooperation with the Peasants' Party. ["]

["] Lately anti-socialist forces have been taking advantage of workers' strike movements and using them for political purposes. Representatives of 'Solidarity' have even made statements against the state. Workers' protection commissions have become active, against which the Party is fighting by political means. A group of leaders of the 'Independent Confederation of Poland' movement has already been arrested, and lately more people are being taken into custody. (Due to these opposition activities it was necessary to set up the Committee for Administrative Measures).

["] There is an operational body working alongside the Prime Minister which is prepared for the introduction of a state of emergency. Combat-ready units are being set up by members of the Party and they will also be provided with arms. Today these number 19 thousand men, by the end of December their number will reach 30 thousand. In an emergency these units would launch surprise arrests of the main opposition elements, and would take control of the mass media, the railways and principal strategic points.

However, the Party intends to seek a solution by political means. The 7th plenary meeting created a more favorable atmosphere for this. Democratic centralism gained strength in the Party. The Party appealed to the Polish people more pointedly than before. This has been made necessary, in fact, by the demands of the crisis as well as those of society.

["] The Party holds a key position in the search for a solution, since it is important for the Party itself to escape the 'mutual settling of accounts.' The enemy also wants to break down organizational unity in the Party. The unified forces are putting up a consistent fight against factionalism and are taking measures to strengthen ideological unity. The convocation of the extraordinary Congress of the Party was scheduled between the first and second quarters of the next year. However, a potential danger has emerged, as circumstances are not right for the party organizations to elect Marxist delegates. It seems that the Congress would not be able to take place on the scheduled date. The leadership of the Party is currently dealing with the replacement of cadres, which is proceeding according to plan."

Comrade Kania admitted that the PUWP deserved criticism for the work of the organs of the mass media. Determined and conscious cadre work has been launched in this field as well, in order to radically change the character of the propaganda. The situation was adequate in the organizations of the CC, in the Warsaw and other voivodeship party newspapers, but they need to take proper control of all mass media organs.

As far as the trade unions were concerned, Comrade Kania added that they wanted to restore the class character of the movement and that sectoral trade unions were already functioning in line with this aim. "It is possible that a trade union federation will be formed. It is

necessary to force Solidarity to hold elections. Experience has proved that, through elections, counterrevolutionary forces are voted out of leading positions, while a number of honest Communists get in." He described Wałęsa as a "sly half-wit," stressing that his movement had leaders influenced by extremists (such as anarchists and terrorists). He added that it is necessary to prevent him from establishing closer relations with the workers' protection commissions.

[Kania continued: "] At the Polish Armed Forces everything is in order and the effective force follows the party line. However, political-educational work is important, as these forces too, are influenced by the events and one-quarter of the effective force has been replaced as a consequence of new recruits to the army. ["]

["] The situation of the Sejm and local councils is improving. Their work has to be made even more popular, so they will discuss certain issues in public and thus respect for them will grow among the masses. ["]

["] The country's economic situation is extremely grave, market supplies are insufficient and rationing has to be gradually introduced. Poland is striving to export more goods (e.g. color televisions) in order to be able to import food products. In 1981 the national income will decrease again. Coal production is expected to decrease, as miners are unwilling to work on Sundays. ["]

["] Poland is largely dependent on the West, above all on the German Federal Republic and the USA. Its capital debt stock is some 27 billion dollars. In 1981 Poland will have to take up another 10 billion dollar loan, since the value of its exports to capitalist markets does not cover the compulsory amortization installments. On the other hand imports will have to be financed from further credits. The USA and other capitalist countries have brought it to their attention that in the event of Poland joining the International Monetary Fund, more favorable credit terms would be granted. However, for reasons of principle, Poland rejects this proposal. ["]

["] According to the plan for economic stabilization, it will take about 3 years to surmount the present difficulties. They wish to rely on the assistance of financial experts of the Soviet Union and would also like to make use of the experiences of other socialist countries. ["]

["] On December 16 it will be the 10th anniversary of the events in Gdansk which will obviously be commemorated. The PUWP cannot completely isolate itself from this and cannot yield ground to the class enemy. Presumably, the anniversary will be dealt with by the 6th Party Congress and the 7th plenary meeting. ["]

Finally, Comrade Kania emphasized that the Polish Communists will do their utmost to defend socialism in their country.

After Comrade Kania and before Comrade T. Zhivkov, Comrade János Kádár rose to speak. Comrade Kádár emphasized the following in his speech. "The aim of the meeting is to coordinate our views, to encourage the supporters of socialism in Poland and around the world

and to give a warning to the class enemy. In the present complicated international situation, the events in Poland directly affect both Europe and the Warsaw Pact." Talking briefly about the current issues of the international situation, Comrade Kádár passed on to an analysis of the circumstances in Poland. He emphasized that the roots of the crisis ran deep and that its causes were to be found in agriculture, in the overdemanding pace of industrial development and investment, in the continuous increase in wages, in failing to meet the demand for goods and also in mistakes in state leadership. "All this has led to tensions, strikes and started the process of disintegration and erosion. The class enemy has learned more from past events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland than we have. Formally, for example, they agree with the leading role of the Party, with building socialism and with membership in the Warsaw Pact. However, in reality they want to drive socialist forces back in all areas. ["]

["] The imperialist forces assert that other socialist countries are afraid of the "Polish infection." From the point of view of internal affairs, we are less anxious about the events, we rather deal with the issue as a common, international one." To avoid misunderstandings, in his appeal to Comrade Kania, János Kádár clarified that it was the public feeling he was referring to. He added that during the events in Pomerania, the Hungarian public was of the opinion—in spite of the long-standing historic friendship between the two nations—that it was impossible to distribute more goods without work or to go on striking while other socialist countries worked normally. János Kádár said that they were also concerned with the issue of participation of a Polish delegation in the Congress of the Central Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions. He believed that the absence of the Polish delegation from the Congress would be regrettable, yet the composition of the delegation was of prime importance as Hungary was not willing to provide assistance to the international legalization of 'Solidarity.' Thus Comrade Kádár requested the leadership of the PUWP to take this into consideration when selecting the delegation.

Kádár stressed the solidarity of the Hungarian nation and pointed out that the socialist way out of the crisis was to be found by Polish Communists themselves. He said: "We are neither able to, nor do we want to determine this solution, nonetheless we would like to make some comradely remarks. The preservation of the leading role of the Party is absolutely necessary, as is the maintenance of socialist constitutional order and the preservation of national state power in which mass communication agencies play an important and integral role. Another important point in question is the protection provided by the Warsaw Pact. ["]

["] In international relations our Party has invariably emphasized the same position, when addressing either fraternal parties or the representatives of capitalist governments, that it is adopting now. We told our Yugoslav comrades, British Foreign Minister [Lord]

Carrington, [Hans-Jürgen] Wischnewsky, Vice President of the SPD, and others that Poland had never been and would never be for sale and that she cannot be torn out of the Warsaw Pact. There are powerful forces in Poland which believe the same and that the crisis has to be overcome by the Polish people themselves. It seems that these negotiating parties have understood this point. ["]

[“] We do not wish to give advice to the Polish comrades, however, we do have some revolutionary experience from which it would be useful to exchange our opinions. Yet, it should be taken into consideration that it is not advisable to copy anything. If we were in the same situation, we would strongly suggest that first of all the Party take a firm stand and then that it start a counter-attack. It is of prime importance to determine urgently—and more explicitly than before—the political platform of development. The emergency congress would then be able to carry out useful work only on the basis of such a political platform. In the case of examination and judgment of cadres, their actual activity should be taken into account. This work is to be started at the Central Committee and the Politburo. If the controlling organs form an integral whole this unity will manifest itself in the Party as well. [”]

[“]There is a unique situation in the Party now as it is events which are selecting the Party members. In this process the most important is not the number of members, but rather the number of those who support the Party’s platform. It is also important to distance oneself from the mistakes of the past, but attention should not be concentrated on the search for scapegoats. [”] (In this connection, Comrade Kádár referred to the fact that Rákosi and his clique had been called to account only in 1962.)

“A clear situation has to be created within the Party and others are not allowed to interfere with its decisions with democratic slogans. The same holds for the questions of state power. The Party’s platform has to reflect a kind of determination and it also has to make clear that the PUWP will not look for bloodshed in the future either; however, that it will ensure the protection of certain things by all possible means. A distinct, straightforward policy will be supported at least by half of the population of the country. In this they (i.e. the leadership of the PUWP) can count not only on the communist, but also on other progressive, patriotic forces, including even religious people.” Comrade Kádár recalled the events following 1956 when the Soviet comrades encouraged Hungarian Communists by telling them that they were stronger than they had ever thought. He added that the same applied now to Polish Communists.

Finally he emphasized that the existing situation was the PUWP’s and the Polish nation’s own affair, which was nevertheless inseparable from the socialist community and from European and international political questions. Comrade Kádár then declared: “With joint effort we shall overcome the difficulties. We stand by you. In finding

the way out you can rely on the progressive forces of the world and, in a sense, even on sensible capitalist circles which would rather avoid confrontation.”

Comrade Leonid Brezhnev requested permission to speak towards the end of the meeting. He underlined that the processes in Poland could have been prevented and that he had called Comrade Gierek’s attention to the mistakes several times, the last time during the meeting in the Crimea in 1980. Comrade Gierek, however, kept reassuring him that their Party had control over the situation. However, the events had serious consequences, which then affected the international state of affairs and the cause of peace as well.

Comrade Brezhnev also said: “It is completely inexplicable why the Party withdrew following the first attack. The PUWP should not be concerned with the past for it only provides the enemy with a weapon in this way. The hostile forces are working on the basis of a realistic evaluation of the present circumstances. However, despite unanimous evaluation just a month earlier by leaders of both the PUWP and the CPSU both of the situation and of the measures to be taken, things became worse. It was determined that further withdrawal was out of the question, that an offensive had to be launched and that the Party had to be made ready to strike. The basis for all this was prepared and the Party was able to rely on so-called ‘sound’ forces, the army, the police and on a section of the trade unions. At the same time the Party retreated again. Hostile forces became active and the class-conflict grew tense. The counterrevolutionary center accelerates processes: it seeks to form a party on the basis of the ‘Solidarity’ organization and it tries to win over the Peasants’ Party to its cause. On top of that a Christian Democratic Party is about to be formed, while the same counterrevolutionary center is working on the development of a bourgeois election system, is determined to split the Party, the intelligentsia and the youth apart, is cooperating with the Church, is gradually taking over the mass media apparatus, is becoming active even within the army, where it exerts its influence with the help of the Church. [”]

[“]The CPSU did agree with the idea of finding a political solution for the crisis. Today, however, the class enemy does not show restraint. It regards the work of the PUWP as its weakness and is increasing the pressure on it. In practical terms, there is dual power in Poland today. [”]

[“]To put it bluntly, the Party has to admit that socialism is in great danger in Poland. It has to be emphasized that the present situation is not merely the consequence of mistakes committed in the past, but also that of five months of strike movements. We must make it absolutely clear that we shall not take any steps backwards, that we support the further development of socialist democracy, the rights of the trade unions and that we will determinedly fight back anti-socialist forces. [”]

[“]The Soviet Union and the socialist countries support the Polish communists economically as well. We

have provided them with 2 billion dollars of aid, credits, transports of goods and collective sales of oil. We will be looking for opportunities for assistance in the future too, although Poland will also have to make efforts. [”]

[“]The execution of common resolutions is more pressing now than it was a month ago. The Party needs reinforcement. Party members have to be mobilized, the principle of democratic centralism and the Leninist norm of Party life have to be observed. The time to call ‘Solidarity’ to order has come, for it is already pursuing political objectives. The mass media apparatus has to be taken back.”

Comrade Brezhnev pointed out that progressive forces were able to exert influence even on moderate clerical elements. Comrade Brezhnev emphasized that imperialist forces were also carrying out considerable subversive work and that the situation in Poland was extraordinary, which accordingly required the adoption of extraordinary means. He considered it very important to have a definite plan in the case of the army taking over major strategic points, to organize the security system and to guarantee the safety of railway and public transport. He added that it was of importance not only to the economy but also to the security of the Warsaw Pact.

In his analysis of the period preceding the events in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, Comrade G. Husák dealt with the aspects of political settlement of the crisis in Poland in an indirect way, just as Comrade Kádár did. Touching on each topical issue in detail, and drawing on Czechoslovak experience, he examined the situation and tasks in a very humane and comradely manner. He pointed out that in the spring and early summer of 1968, the crisis in Czechoslovakia could have been settled from within, with their own resources. However, the Party was slow to act, had no clear-cut program, lost its initiative role and thus, by August, socialism could only be upheld in Czechoslovakia with help from outside.

Comrade N. Ceausescu pointed out the consequences of economic difficulties in his speech and stressed that socialist countries were not able to solve their economic problems satisfactorily, including, in particular their energy needs and the supply of raw materials, within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON]. In this connection, he underlined the need for further development of socialist economic integration and concluded that the Polish events served as a warning for other socialist countries to tighten cooperation, especially in economic and social fields. He also suggested that another meeting be held in the near future on the same topic and at the same level.

Comrade Ceausescu pointed out that Poland had to solve the problems on its own and by political means. In connection with this he repeatedly talked of the significance of the working class and stressed that, whatever the strength of the army and the police, the situation can be solved only with the support of the working class and the people. He added that it was also

necessary to take firm action against groups endangering the people’s power. Finally, Comrade Ceausescu stressed that a possible “intervention” from outside would entail very serious dangers.

Comrade T. Zhivkov’s evaluation of the situation tallied fully with those of the previous speakers. In the search for a solution, he, however, emphasized the simultaneous application of political and administrative measures, with a major stress on the latter. He explained this by stating that there was a real threat of change in Poland’s socialist order, since political means had been almost totally used up, while counterrevolutionary forces were gaining more and more ground. In his opinion the reason for the relative calm at the time was that the enemy felt it [was] still [too] early to reveal its real power. Comrade Zhivkov pointed out that the continual postponement of the open class confrontation was extremely dangerous and therefore firm action needed to be taken.

In Comrade E. Honecker’s opinion the first “capitulation” of the PUWP was a serious mistake and the Party had been continually backing down since then. “That kind of attitude disappoints even people loyal to socialism,” he said. He wondered why the Polish comrades failed to introduce measures that they had agreed upon with Comrade Brezhnev just a month before. He referred to the lesson learned from the events in Czechoslovakia and also to the experiences of the German Democratic Republic [GDR]. He pointed out emphatically that, besides political measures, administrative means had to be introduced. He talked of the particular situation of the GDR which formed a dividing line between the two existing social orders and added that capitalist countries wanted to smuggle the Polish events into the GDR as well. However, the German Socialist Unity Party [SED] made it clear that it would persist in its principles which had become clear through the restriction of tourism in East Germany.

Comrade Honecker emphasized that the PUWP was strong enough to restore order in the country and that the activity of counterrevolutionaries made it evident that, in order to defend the power of the people, the resources of worker-peasant power had to be deployed.

In our evaluation the meeting fulfilled its purpose: it served to coordinate the opinions of fraternal parties, supported the followers of socialism within Poland and beyond her borders and at the same time it gave a distinct warning to the internal and external forces of reaction.

The report was compiled by:
András Gyenes
Géza Kótai

Approved by:
János Kádár

[Source: *Hungarian National Archives (Budapest), Department of Documents on the Hungarian Workers’ Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 288, f. 5/815. ö.e., pp. 17-28.*]

Document No. 2**Report to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Politburo containing verbatim transcript of 21 July 1981 telephone conversation between Stanisław Kania and Leonid Brezhnev, 22 July 1981**

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Seen and approved, ad acta No. copies made: 2
Kádár
22 July [1981]

REPORT

Comrade János Kádár received Comrade Valeri Musatov, the chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, at his request on 22 July 1981. Comrade Musatov reported that Comrade Stanisław Kania phoned Comrade Leonid Brezhnev on July 21, while the latter was on holiday in the Crimea. The following conversation took place between them:

S. Kania: Good morning, Comrade Leonid Ilyich.
L. Brezhnev: Good morning, Stanisław.

First of all I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of your re-election to the post of First Secretary of the CC of PUWP.

I closely followed the work of the Congress. It was a difficult Congress. What is your assessment of it?

S. Kania: You are right, the Congress took place in a difficult situation. But after all, it created conditions for development. There can be no doubt about that. I wonder whether Comrades [V.V.] Grishin and [Konstantin V.] Rusakov informed you about the course of the Congress.
L. Brezhnev: I read all the reports coming from Warsaw during those days. I followed with interest the television coverage of the work of the Congress.

S. Kania: You probably know how the Congress received Comrade V.V. Grishin's speech. The delegates applauded every remark referring to the Soviet Union and supported the idea of friendship with your country and our solidarity in the struggle for the principles of socialism. It made the proper impression.

The Congress adopted good resolutions. This holds especially for the rules and regulations of the party which your comrades helped us with. In other documents, however, the wording may not be perfectly correct. Nevertheless, we hope that we will be able to amend them when they are put into practice. Unfortunately, some

comrades did not get in the Politburo whom we would have liked to see in it. I am thinking of Comrades [Andrzej] Żabiński and [Tadeusz] Grabski. Grabski obtained few votes in the secret ballot. In my opinion he had committed a number of mistakes and therefore he lost the votes not only of the revisionists but also those of the reliable comrades.

The present composition of the Politburo will ensure fully that we will work more effectively in the future. Comrade [Miroslaw] Milewski, Minister for Home Affairs, became a member of the Politburo. We plan to give him the post of administrative secretary of the Central Committee. You probably know him well.

L. Brezhnev: I have heard about him but I have never met him in person.

S. Kania: Foreign Minister J. Czyrek became a member of the Politburo and the secretary of the CC. We elected two comrades for the post of secretaries of the CC who had been previously doing lower-grade party work. These are Z. Michałek and M. Woźniak. The former will deal with agricultural issues and the latter with economic ones. We hope that Michałek, who used to work as the director of a major state farm, will be able to help us in reshaping the village-structure.

The composition of the Politburo is good all in all. It is made up of reliable people.

L. Brezhnev: If this is the case, then it is good.

S. Kania: We managed to elect all the people into the controlling organs, whom I had wanted. There were 18 candidates on the list of politburo members, of which 14 had to be elected. Those whom I did not consider suitable dropped out in the secret ballot.

Comrade Rusakov was quite afraid that [Mieczysław] Rakowski would get into the leadership. I promised him that this would not happen. It was not easy to fulfill this as they wanted to elect Rakowski even to the post of First Secretary of the CC of the PUWP. However, it all fell through and I am satisfied now.

Economic circumstances are, indeed, terrible in Poland. Due to the shortage of market supplies the possibility of rioting is most likely. We are short of a number of products, including even cigarettes. We spoke in detail of all this to your delegation which we met yesterday. We informed the delegates in detail about the economic situation of the country. They promised to report this to you.

L. Brezhnev: We are examining everything closely here in Moscow.

S. Kania: Comrade Jaruzelski and all members of the Politburo send you their best regards.

L. Brezhnev: Thank you. Give my best regards to Comrade Jaruzelski and the others.

S. Kania: Now we are going to draft a specific plan for our further action, which will have to be more offensive.

L. Brezhnev: That is right. Thank you for the information. I would like to give you my own opinion. We think that the Congress was a serious trial of strength

for both the Party and you personally. It clearly cast light on the extent of opportunism and the threat represented by opportunists. If they had been given a free hand they would have diverted the party from Leninism to social democracy. Besides, they behaved in a mean way and launched a campaign of slander.

In spite of this, the final outcome of the Congress and the fact that the highest party authority chose you for the post of First Secretary, create a reliable basis for resolute and consistent measures for the solution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation.

The most important thing is that we do not waste time. People must feel right away that the leadership is in reliable hands.

I was informed that Solidarity is threatening a strike which is to be organized at your airline company. You have to show them that times have changed. There will be no more capitulations. Don't you agree?

S. Kania: I absolutely agree.

L. Brezhnev: After all, the whole struggle is still ahead of you. It is not going to be an easy fight. The counterrevolution—the danger of which we have already talked about several times—does not intend to lay down its arms.

I would like to believe that, holding together the party *aktiv* and all the Communists, you and your comrades will be able to stop the course of events, fight back the enemies of socialism and defend the achievements of socialist Poland.

In such circumstances, Stanisław, be assured that you can rely on our solidarity and support.

The Soviet people express their pleasure on your election as leader of the Party and they will follow attentively further happenings in Poland. This is natural as everything that is going on in your country is close to the hearts of the Soviet people. The development of Soviet-Polish economic, political and other relations will develop according to the settlement of events in Poland.

Taking the opportunity of your phone call I invite you to visit us. You could have a rest and, naturally, we would then have the occasion for a more profound discussion.

I wish you, Stanisław, strength and health.

S. Kania: I thank you for all that you have said.

L. Brezhnev: I always say openly and sincerely what I think.

S. Kania: I know what you expect from us. You are absolutely right to say that we have to mobilize all our forces in order to take the offensive. We understand that. I assure you that I will do my best to eliminate difficulties. We shall seize the counterrevolution by its throat.

L. Brezhnev: I wish you and your comrades success in this.

S. Kania: Thank you for your invitation for a holiday. I have practically no time to rest. I have already told all my comrades that I would not go on holiday. Yet, I might travel to you for a couple of days so we could talk.

L. Brezhnev: I will meet Comrade Husák and Kádár in

the next few days.

S. Kania: If you agree, I would let you know the date of my arrival later, when I can see more clearly.

L. Brezhnev: I understand that you have got a lot of work to do. The resolutions of the congress have to be carried out.

S. Kania: Leonid Ilyich, I wish you a good rest and gathered strength. Not only Soviet Communists, but all of us need this.

L. Brezhnev: Thank you for your kindness. I cannot, however, free myself from work even during my holidays. Just before your call I was talking on the phone with the leaders of Georgia, Kazakhstan and the regional leaders of Rostov, Volgograd and Stavropol. And it is the same every day.

S. Kania: Nevertheless, you should find some time for a rest.

L. Brezhnev: Thank you. Again, I wish you success, Stanisław. Good bye."

Budapest, 22 July 1981

[Source: *Hungarian National Archives (Budapest), Department of Documents on the Hungarian Workers' Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*, 288. f. 5/832. ö.e., pp. 20-24.]

Document No. 3

Letter from the HSWP CC [signed by János Kádár] to the PUWP CC, attention Stanisław Kania, 17 September 1981

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST
WORKERS' PARTY

No. copies made: 210
Inf/434

Budapest, 17 September 1981

to the Central Committee of
the Polish United Workers Party
For the attention of Comrade Stanisław Kania
First Secretary
WARSAW

Dear Comrades:

The Hungarian Communists and our working people are paying close attention to the extraordinary events in the Polish People's Republic which have been going on for over a year now. Public opinion in our country has been very concerned with the work of the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP and people welcomed its resolutions on socialist development, the

necessity of the persistent fight against anti-socialist forces, and Poland's commitment and her responsibility towards our alliance system.

Despite justified expectations and hopes, the events of the period since the Party Congress have proved that it was not the followers of socialism, but its enemies who took the offensive and sought confrontation and the seizure of power. This fact has been stated and acknowledged by you, the leaders of the Polish Party and the Polish State, and by other factors concerned with the welfare of the country and the people.

The traditional friendship that binds the Hungarian and Polish people and also our Parties together, our common socialist goals, as well as the collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace and safety in our countries, prompt us to express repeatedly our deep anxiety for you in the present acute situation. We are also urged to do so as we are receiving questions from our own people—expressing sincere concern and sometimes even impatience—which we find more and more difficult to answer. These repeated questions tend to ask where Poland is heading, how long will it take for the escalation of forces and action to destroy the socialist system, what Polish Communists and Polish supporters of socialism are doing, when they are going to take resolute action to protect the real interests of the Polish working people and the common interests of our nations.

We were all astonished by the atmosphere of the congress of the trade union Solidarity: the series of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet statements, the unrestrained demagoguery of ringleaders by which they mislead and deceive masses of workers who want to remedy mistakes but not to do away with socialism. In fact, your Politburo and the communiqué of September 15 dealing with the character of the "Solidarity" congress came to the same conclusion. It is obvious that definite steps must be taken to repel an attack which disregards and imperils the achievements of the Polish people attained by blood and sweat, which, in the difficult situation in Poland, announces a program of devastation and anarchy instead of social reconciliation and constructive programs, which foully abuses the ideas of freedom and democracy, denies the principles of socialism and keeps on stirring up uncontrolled emotions, instead of enhancing common sense and a sense of responsibility.

Dear Polish Comrades:

The provocative message of the "Solidarity" congress directed to the workers of socialist countries is nothing other than the propagation of the same unrealistic, irresponsible demagoguery on an international level. It is evidently a step suggested by international reactionary forces to divide and set the people of socialist countries against one another.

The Hungarian people highly appreciate their socialist achievements obtained at the cost of painful experiences

and exhausting work. The ringleaders of Solidarity cherish vain hopes. The Hungarian workers flatly reject the blatant provocation and any undisguised effort to intervene in their domestic affairs.

The greatest concern of our Party and people now is the activity of counterrevolutionary forces in Poland which is directed not merely against the Polish working-class and the vital national interests of the Polish people, but towards a weakening of our friendly relations, our multilateral cooperation and the system of our alliance as well. Their continued activity would definitely have an influence on the security of the community of socialist countries. It is in our and all European nations' basic interest that Poland not be a source of an escalation of international tension but should rather stay a stabilizing factor in Europe in the future.

Comrades:

Since the outbreak of the crisis, the CC of the HSWP has several times expressed its opinion concerning the events in Poland, as it also did in the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP. While stressing the maintenance of our earlier standpoint, we think that an even more urgent task is to curb counterrevolution by way of joint action taken by forces of the Polish Communists, true Polish patriots and forces that are ready to act for the sake of development. Only action and consistent measures can create the conditions for the successful execution of tasks specified by the Congress.

We are certain that in Poland today the supporters of socialism are in a majority, that they can count on the Polish working class, the peasantry, the loyal youth of the intelligentsia and on realistically minded powers of the society. The protection of the achievements of socialism is the most fundamental national interest of the Polish people today, which is, at the same time the international interest of forces fighting for peace and social progress.

Hereby we declare our belief that if the leadership of the PUWP shows a definite sense of direction, being aware of its national and international responsibility, and if the PUWP calls for immediate action in the spirit of the PUWP Politburo declaration of September 15, then the union of Polish Communists and patriots and their active campaign will still be able to drive back the open attack of anti-socialist forces and to defend the achievements of socialism attained during a decade's work. Then Poland too, will have the opportunity to start out, having successfully resolved the present severe crisis, toward socialist development, that is, on the way to real social and national prosperity.

The supporters of socialism in Poland—amongst them the international powers of socialism and progress—can rely absolutely on the internationalist help of Hungarian communists and the fraternal Hungarian people in their fight to protect their people's power.

on behalf of the Central Committee of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
(signed) János Kádár

[Source: *Hungarian National Archives (Budapest),
Department of documents on the Hungarian Workers'
Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*, 288. f.
11/4400. ö.e., pp. 120 - 123.]

Document No. 4

**“Report to the [HSWP CC] Politburo,” from János
Berecz, Gyorgy Aczel, I Jenő Fock, 30 December 1981**

Department of Foreign Affairs
of the Central Committee STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
of the Hungarian Socialist
Workers' Party Seen and approved, can be sent!

J. Kádár, 30 December [1981]

REPORT
for the Politburo

On the invitation of Comrade Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the CC of the PUWP and leader of the Military Council for National Defense and following the decision of the Politburo of the HSWP, a delegation of the HSWP was sent to Warsaw between December 27 and 29. The delegation was led by György Aczél, member of the Politburo. He was accompanied by Jenő Fock and János Berecz, members of the CC of HSWP. István Pataki, associate of the Department of Foreign Affairs and József Garamvölgyi, our ambassador in Warsaw, took part in the discussions. At the request of the Polish comrades, the Hungarian delegation went to Warsaw in order to provide information on our experiences in our fight against counterrevolutionary forces and our experience in socialist consolidation and the building of socialism. The exchange of opinions also offered an opportunity to assess the political situation in Poland that has arisen since the introduction of martial law.

In the framework of a plenary meeting, our delegation met the members of an operational committee of 10 which was comprised of representatives of the Military Council for National Defense, the Politburo of the PUWP and the Polish government. The talks were led by Comrade W. Jaruzelski who analyzed the Polish situation thoroughly and pointed out those fields where they particularly needed Hungarian experience. The delegation held talks with Deputy Prime Minister M. Rakowski, member of the PUWP Politburo and Secretary of the CC, Stefan Olszowski, and with the Secretary of the CC of the PUWP, Marian Orzechowski. Comrade Jenő Fock had a talk with Deputy Prime Ministers Janusz Obodowski and Zbigniew Madej, furthermore with the Secretary of the CC of the

PUWP, Marian Woźniak. There were talks also between Comrade János Berecz and Włodzimierz Natorf, leader of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the PUWP CC. In the headquarters of the PUWP CC, Comrade György Aczél took part in a nearly 3-hour Party assembly where 120 people were present. At the dinner party hosted by Comrade Ambassador Garamvölgyi, we had an informal talk with Kazimierz Barcikowski and Józef Czyrek, members of the PUWP Politburo and secretaries of the CC, furthermore with Deputy Prime Minister Mieczysław Rakowski. At the end of the visit Comrade W. Jaruzelski and György Aczél had a one-hour discussion. This took place after the all-day meeting of first secretaries of the voivodships and military representatives, where, as Comrade Jaruzelski bitterly remarked, again only the military representatives were active.

I.

Comrade W. Jaruzelski expressed his thanks to the leadership of the HSWP and first of all to Comrade János Kádár for the opportunity that the Hungarian party delegation's visit to Warsaw provided for them. He said that although he was aware of the significant difference between Hungarian circumstances 25 years earlier and the present Polish situation, but as regards the political progress he recognized quite a lot of similarities and for that reason Hungarian experiences, proven by subsequent developments, were of great value to them. He spoke of the situation that came about after the introduction of martial law. In reference to the tasks and action to be carried out, he formulated his words in such a way that they took the shape of questions referring to the Hungarian experiences.

“Today, the most important task in Poland is to get out of the deep crisis, strengthen the people's power and create the conditions of further socialist development. The most decisive and at the same time the most problematic factor now is the situation of the Party. The PUWP, as it exists formally, has to be revived, however a number of difficulties lie ahead. In the course of three and a half decades the Party has experienced more crises and does not enjoy the confidence of society. Under extremely complex ideological, moral and political conditions, the Party must restore sincere and open relations with the masses as soon as possible.”

Comrade Jaruzelski suggested that, although martial law created favorable conditions and the forces of socialism had won the first battle, the present activity of the whole of the Party and of its organs was still alarming considering future potential developments. A section of the party members, especially in areas where strikes had to be stopped using military force, feels ill at ease, is inactive and lacks initiative. Others became far too self-assured as a consequence of the conditions and order imposed by the presence of the military. This too gave rise to unjustified self-confidence amongst those people and some of the

party members even had a tendency to take revenge. Taking into consideration Comrade Kádár's often repeated advice, they regard the drawing up of a statement, which could be suitable as a concise political program, to be one of the most important preconditions of political development. At present they are working on the establishment of a political platform which they would like to make public in the near future.

Counterrevolutionary forces were very well-organized within Solidarity. With the introduction of martial law they managed to break the leadership of Solidarity, to interrupt its activity, to paralyze its propaganda campaign and sometimes even to expose it. In practice, however, the several-million-strong base of the organization still exists. Solidarity is a unique organization in the world and it has demonstrated an indescribable destructive power both within the economy and the affairs of the state. It is a fact, that this organization has become a symbol of dynamism in the eyes of several million well-meaning workers. The real aspirations of the extremist counterrevolutionary leaders of Solidarity will have to be revealed by steadfast work, but this struggle is going to be hard one, for it is in fact a fight against myths.

Furthermore, an aggravating factor is that the majority of Solidarity supporters and the source of its dynamism are the youth, who joined Solidarity in order to knock down the obstacles that thwart and frustrate their aspirations for intellectual and material well-being. Their attitude may be characterized as nothing less than pro-Western and anti-Soviet. All that goes hand in hand with the intoxicating feeling of their hitherto often successful political fight against the authorities. Therefore they have to be offered attractive goals and suitable conditions in a political and economic situation which is by far the worse than ever.

The other main character of the Solidarity movement is clericalism. The Polish Catholic Church, unlike the Hungarian [Catholic Church], did not get exposed in the course of events. What is more, it has gained ground within Solidarity and reinforced its social position through it. While remaining realistic, the Polish leadership is still looking for possibilities of coexistence between the State and the Church. They are maintaining relations with the Church and trying to keep them from deteriorating beyond a minimum level.

Comrade Jaruzelski pointed out that in the fields of ideological work, propaganda and mass communication they are employing administrative measures first of all. Though there is a strict censorship they believe, based on Hungarian experience, that in the course of time they will be able to use more flexible and more efficient means in this field too.

Presently, the poor condition of the national economy is a major burden. Even without the destruction of the last 15 months the situation would be grave, but now economic conditions have become catastrophic. There is a general shortage of supplies, prices and wages are unrealistic, the supply of energy and raw materials for

industrial plants keeps breaking down. To make things worse, the USA has just imposed an economic blockade, thus badly affecting the economy which has developed a cooperative dependence on the economies of capitalist countries over the past 10 years. In spite of the extraordinary circumstances, economic reform is going to be implemented in a limited form at the beginning of the year. Poland is in great need of the economic assistance from the socialist countries and Comrade Jaruzelski repeatedly expressed his thanks for the prompt Hungarian economic aid. He also added that it was clear to them that this kind of assistance could be only provisional as the real solution, in the long run, is undoubtedly the transformation of the Polish economy into a viable economy.

As a summary of his comments, Comrade Jaruzelski underlined that the tasks ahead were huge and that there is presently no organized force in Poland, beyond the armed forces, which could provide reliable support. Only the multilateral assistance of the allied socialist countries could bring real support and clean sources. They wish to pursue the line they took when they introduced martial law; they are aware that they must pull back but have to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the exceptional circumstances.

II.

Our experience and impressions of intensive formal and informal discussions held with members of the Polish leadership can be summarized as follows:

1. The activity of the Military Council for National Defense is very well-organized, the armed forces and police authorities are carrying out their historic duties with commendable discipline. Their actions have stabilized the government institutions, eliminated open and organized resistance and apparently restored public law and order. The indispensable primary conditions thus are in place for socialist consolidation.

2. The favorable conditions created by the introduction of martial law and the stability attained so far are in danger mainly due to the lack of political power or rather its disintegration.

3. The Party is invariably divided and has become less active. Party leaders regard the situation created by the army's actions, that is, the so-called "conditions of artificial defense," as natural and this is delaying the development of the political offensive. Within the party there are heated debates amongst the various trends and tendencies and no determined political platform until now. It would seem that there is a mutual understanding that the Party must not return either to the position before August 1980, nor to the one preceding 13 December 1981. Consequently, there has to be concordance between the general principles of building socialism and Polish

national characteristics. However, in practice, differences of opinion are emerging even in the process of setting the specific tasks and direct objectives. According to representatives of one of the main trends, national characteristics—the role of the Catholic Church, the degree of Polish national consciousness, the situation of the agriculture and so forth—have to be given a decisive role, furthermore the past 35 years of the construction of socialism has to be fundamentally revised and reassessed. According to the other trend, which is less perceptible now amongst the topmost circles of the Party, due to the immediate counterrevolutionary threat and highly sensitive national feelings, the balance has to be restored by way of laying a larger emphasis on the general principles of building socialism and on the basic categories of Marxism-Leninism.

4. Hostile forces were successfully disabled, but not liquidated. The enemy's tactics could be now either of two kinds:

a/ To go underground and consistently hamper consolidation by staging terrorist actions and sabotages, or

b/ To call for the restoration of quiet and order, and so to emphasize the senselessness of continued maintenance of martial law, and then to demand its earliest possible cessation.

5. There was a keen and general interest in the Hungarian experience everywhere. We are of the opinion that in this respect they repeatedly took our previous results as a basis and they seem to know little about the initial steps of the hard-won consolidation. When they are about to announce the introduction of harsh measures, they often refer to these results without proper knowledge of these experiences.

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The delegation of the HSWP fulfilled its mission. The exchange of opinions was useful and we are convinced that our fraternal Polish Party needs all-embracing and concrete support in the future too. As far as we could tell, beyond their expudence, our suggestions provided first of all moral encouragement and support for the Polish leadership.

We suggest that, depending on the Polish comrades' needs, a similar discussion take place in Warsaw in the near future and that, at their request, a consultation be held in Budapest on the relevant issues.

Budapest, 30 December 1981

János Berecz

György Aczél

Jenő Fock

[Source: *Hungarian National Archives (Budapest), Department of Documents on the Hungarian Workers' Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party*, 288. f. 5/844. ö.e., pp. 14 - 20.]

NEW CWIHP FELLOWS

THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THE AWARD OF CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS FOR THE 1998-1999 ACADEMIC YEAR TO

MRS. LI DANHUI (doctoral candidate, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing), "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Vietnam War"

MR. KRZYSZTOF PERSAK (PhD candidate and junior fellow at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences), "The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland"

DR. JORDAN BAEV (Senior Fellow at the Institute of Military History, Sofia), "The Cold War and the Build-up of Military-Political Alliances in the Balkans, 1945-1990."

Moscow's Man in the SED Politburo and the Crisis in Poland in Autumn 1980

By Michael Kubina¹

By the late 1970s, Soviet-East German relations had become tense due to East German leader Erich Honecker's *Westpolitik* and the increasing economic dependence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Evidence of these strains can be found in minutes recorded by Gerhard Schürer, head of planning for the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), of a March 1979 conversation during the 24th convention of the GDR/USSR Parity Government Commission. According to Schürer's account, USSR Council of Ministers chairman N. A. Tikhonov, a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo, complained about the GDR's increasing co-operation with the West at Soviet expense. Schürer wrote: "Comrade Tikhonov had a five-page long document, which he under no circumstances was willing to hand over to me. I answered [sic] as follows: The material you are using was obviously created by someone who doesn't know anything about the co-operation between the GDR and the USSR or was one-sidedly searching for negative facts or unfounded insinuations."²

It remains unclear from whom Tikhonov had received his material. Moscow however, was not only informed through official channels about what was going on within the SED's most senior decision-making body, but had its own informants in the East German party politburo itself. One of them was Werner Krolkowski,³ a postwar cadre of the SED, who from 1973 to 1976 displaced Günter Mittag as the SED Central Committee (CC) secretary for economic affairs. Krolkowski became a personal enemy of Mittag and Honecker when Honecker in 1977 once again reinstated Mittag in his former position. Krolkowski in turn became first deputy to the head of the government, prime minister Willi Stoph, with responsibility for economic matters.

In the first half of the 1970's Krolkowski began to inform Moscow regularly about developments within the SED politburo which in any way could jeopardize Moscow's position in East Germany. As an ideological puritan, loyalty to Moscow was his first priority. Both ideological purity and the close alliance with Moscow were—in Krolkowski's view—being increasingly jeopardized by Honecker's and Mittag's policy towards Bonn.

Until the GDR's demise, Krolkowski remained a reliable informant for Moscow. His behavior in the SED politburo did not reflect his sharp criticism of Honecker and Mittag in his communications with Moscow. But he frequently warned the Soviets of the potentially disastrous

results Honecker's policy could have for Moscow's position in Germany. In 1984, for example, he urgently warned the Soviets about Honecker's cadre policy: "The cadre-political changes within the politburo carried out by the 8th CC Plenum of the SED,⁴ following the proposal and suggestion of EH [Erich Honecker]"—so the title of a report for Moscow dated 4 June 1984—served only "to strengthen the personal power of EH." One could count on the fact that, at Honecker's behest, all "comrades, [who were] old warriors and attached to the Soviet Union, will be systematically neutralized, dismissed from the politburo and replaced by other persons."⁵ Two years later Krolkowski tried in vain to win Moscow's support for Honecker's removal.⁶

Krolkowski kept detailed notes, which I utilize in this paper. They are often grammatically incorrect, and his handwritten corrections appear on many of the typewritten pages. His handwritten comments preceding each date are blotted out or indecipherable. These dates seem to indicate the date on which they were handed over to the Soviets rather than the day on which they were written. Erich Honecker and Günter Mittag are mentioned only by their initials (EH and GM).⁷

Krolkowski's reports provide new evidence on the question of whether Honecker really pressed for a Soviet invasion of Poland in autumn 1980. This issue, as well as the question of whether and when a serious military invasion by the Soviets might have occurred, is still a matter of controversy. There are good reasons to believe that the danger of a military invasion was rather small, at least after the Moscow summit on 5 December 1980.⁸ But one should not assume that, in the autumn 1980, Honecker was not convinced of the necessity of an invasion, and that the Soviet preparations for it were not to be taken seriously.⁹ Similar arguments have already been made in detail elsewhere and do not need to be restated here.¹⁰ Since some scholars still argue¹¹ that some "interpretational doubts"¹² remain, new evidence that seems to corroborate the thesis stated above is provided below.

Honecker's annual meeting with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev in the Crimea in August 1980 turned out to be a rather unpleasant experience for him. At this meeting Brezhnev sharply criticized Günter Mittag. Former Soviet diplomat Yuli Kvizinskij remembers Brezhnev at the airport telling Honecker straight to his face that "he had no trust in Günter Mittag. But Honecker ignored the remark."¹³ Immediately after Honecker's return from the Crimea, the strikes in Poland escalated to crisis proportions all over the country. Beginning on 12 August

1980, one day after the Crimea meeting, the SED leadership began receiving several telegrams per day from Warsaw on developments in Poland. On August 18, the State Security Ministry (MfS), began producing regular reports on the public mood within East Germany regarding the Polish events.¹⁴ At the same time the Intelligence Department (Verwaltung Aufklärung) of the East German National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee - NVA) began issuing regular reports on the situation in Poland. On August 19, for example it was reported that the situation would probably escalate further. The report also warned that the aim of the counterrevolutionary forces was the "elimination of the socialist state order", and that the intervention of "armed counterrevolutionary forces" should be reckoned with.¹⁵ Reports to the SED and NVA leadership usually revolved around the key question as to whether or not the Polish comrades were willing and able to destroy the strike movement using their own force on their own—and gave a rather skeptical appraisal.

Though the SED leadership feared the Polish developments and their possible effects¹⁶ on the GDR,¹⁷ the crisis temporarily provided Honecker with an opportunity to divert attention from internal problems. He skillfully tried to deflect Brezhnev's criticism that the SED lacked ideological steadfastness and loyalty to the Kremlin. Krolkowski later complained to Moscow that Honecker did not inform the Politburo about Brezhnev's harsh critique of Mittag's economic course and that he tried to "brush CPSU criticism of EH made at the Crimea by L.I. Brezhnev under the table."¹⁸

In light of what had happened, Krolkowski saw a chance to settle accounts with Honecker and Mittag and their "political mistakes." Before the 13th SED CC

Plenum¹⁹ in December 1980, he drew up a working paper in preparation of the forthcoming 10th SED Party Congress in spring 1981, claiming "to deal frankly and critically with the condemnable practice of ideological co-existence in the policy by EH and GM toward the imperialistic FRG. They are pursuing a policy of ideological appeasement [*Burgfrieden*] toward the FRG and the USA for stinking money."²⁰ Of course, Krolkowski did not put forth such demands, neither at the 13th CC Plenum nor at the 10th Party Congress. He only talked about them within a small group of Honecker critics, especially with Willi Stoph and with contacts in Moscow. Often informed of important decisions only afterwards and lacking clear signals from Moscow where nobody was interested in provoking another leadership crisis within the empire, no one within the SED Politburo was willing to attack Honecker. Honecker instead had made an ally in Mittag, who, according to Krolkowski, was ready "to be at Honecker's command in any mess."²¹

Honecker's "extremist" attitude towards Poland, as Krolkowski put it, served to divert attention from his own problems. In particular, Honecker wanted to prevent any parallels being drawn between himself and the ousted Polish party chief, Edward Gierek. Both had started a decade before as "reformers," and both had led their countries into tremendous indebtedness towards the West. Krolkowski complained to his Soviet comrades, "[h]e did everything entirely on his own, without [the] PB [Politburo], and then only after the fact cynically informed his dummies in the PB [...]. Every week EH and GM go hunting together—discussing and planning their further political doings."²²

While Honecker was on a state visit to Austria in

More Documents and Information on the Polish Crisis

Vojtech Mastny, *The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War: CWIHP Working Paper No. 23* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998)

Institute of Political Studies (ed.), *Zeszyt roboczy" generala Anoszkina 9-16 grudnia 1981 r.* (Warsaw: IPS, 1998)

Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, *On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission of Constitutional Oversight of the SEJM of the Republic of Poland: CWIHP Working Paper No 21* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998)

Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz, Christian Ostermann (eds.), *Poland 1980-82: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. A compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events* (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1997)

Russian and Eastern European Archival Documents Database (REEAD), sponsored by CWIHP and the National Security Archive (contact The National Security Archive at nsarchiv@gwu.edu or by phone: 202-994-7000).

Cold War International History Project's website at cwihip.si.edu.

Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke (eds.), *"Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." Die SED contra Polen 1980/81.*

Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995)

"Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis. Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), pp 116-117, 129-139.

November 1980, Stoph and MfS chief Erich Mielke had a brief conversation about which Stoph informed Krolkowski, who then made a note of it. Mielke was reported to have declared his determined opposition to Honecker's "unilateral actions."²³ Stoph said he had asked Mielke to "change his tactics," adding that "it was not sufficient to inform only EH. Whenever it was possible he was to inform the other PB members as well. Mielke said that this was quite difficult, since EH specified who was to be informed and who was not. [...] He plotted only with GM. He usually hunted only with GM. Mielke was only invited when [Soviet Ambassador P.A.] Abrasimov²⁴ was invited as well."²⁵ Concerning Poland, Mielke reportedly stated: "When EH makes super-demanding claims on the FRG, it is not due to Brezhnev's criticism at the Crimea, but rather because EH got frightened to the bones by the events in Poland. He fears that he could have similar problems in the GDR, and he is afraid of FRG influence!"²⁶ Mielke, best informed within the SED leadership about Honecker's intentions second only to Mittag, had no doubts "that EH reckoned on the Soviets marching into Poland." Mielke himself, he said, had "always pointed out the strong anti-Sovietism in Poland to the Soviet friends," which made it difficult, "to achieve the necessary changes."²⁷

The fact that Honecker, right before the December 1980 Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow—which had been initiated by him—wanted the SED Politburo to give him a blank check for a decision to intervene, is also confirmed by another politburo member, the head of the so-called Free Trade Union Federation (FDGB) of East Germany, Harry Tisch. After the collapse of SED rule, but before the party's documents became accessible, Tisch recalled the crucial "extraordinary politburo session" in Strausberg, the site of the GDR Defense Ministry near Berlin: "I believe that Honecker at that time had the idea to prevent Poland from breaking out militarily, meaning among other things, possibly intervening ... I know that today nobody wants to remember. But I remember that there was a politburo session in Strausberg—it was, I think, the Day of the People's Army—when we talked about the situation in Poland and Honecker asked for the authority to take all [necessary] steps so that nothing could happen and he wouldn't need to ask the Politburo again."²⁸ And he got the agreement. So he got the right to take all steps, including military steps."²⁹

When Egon Krenz, Honecker's short-time successor as SED General Secretary (18 October—3 December 1989) was asked about the special session in Strausberg, he professed to memory gaps: "I can't remember such a secret session of the politburo in Strausberg. And it would have been strange that we should have gone to Strausberg in order to have a politburo session there. In Strausberg the sessions of the National Defense Council, not those of the politburo, usually took place. Well, there was strong interest in resolving the situation in Poland, but I know of no case in which the GDR ever called for aggression

toward Poland. Who told you that joke?"³⁰ But, according to Politburo minutes No. 48/80, Krenz, as a candidate of the Politburo, did in fact join the "extraordinary session of the Politburo" on the 28 November 1980, in Strausberg.³¹ It is quite astonishing that Krenz could not remember this session, because it was indeed "strange" that a politburo session took place in Strausberg.

The reason, however, for transferring the session to Strausberg was not, as Tisch remembered, because it was the Day of the People's Army.³² The location for the session rather indicated that it was due to the growing military crisis. The only topic under discussion was what possible action might be taken toward Poland. After Brezhnev had given his long-awaited approval for a summit of Warsaw Pact leaders, the SED politburo authorized (even if only *ex post facto*!) Honecker's letter to Brezhnev of 26 November 1980. In his letter, Honecker had emphasized his urgent proposal "that we meet together in Moscow for a day right after the 7th Plenum of the PUWP [Polish United Workers' Party] CC [on 1-2 December 1980], the decisions of which, in our view, will not be able to change the course of events in Poland in any fundamental way." The summit should devise "measures of collective assistance for the Polish friends to permit them to overcome the crisis."³³ In Strausberg, Honecker was given authorization by his Politburo "to take necessary measures in agreement with the CC of the CPSU."³⁴

Today, even high-ranking NVA personnel assume that Honecker "recommended an intervention as a last way 'to stabilize socialism' in Poland."³⁵ As is evident from the documents, for Honecker, the crucial point had already been reached in the fall of 1980.³⁶ However, the summit on December 5 in Moscow gave the Polish leadership one more "chance." Honecker, after realizing that there was little likelihood of a military intervention, deleted the sharpest phrases from his speech manuscript.³⁷ But nevertheless, he was the only party chief who refrained from saying anything about the possible impact a military intervention could have on the process of détente.³⁸ Only the Romanian state and party chief, Nikolaie Ceausescu, dared to use the word "intervention," seriously warning of its consequences.³⁹

Back in Berlin, Honecker tried to sell his defeat in Moscow as a success. Krolkowski announced to Moscow, "EH's and GM's attitude towards Moscow is still bad, hypocritical and demagogic. EH learned nothing from the Crimea meeting. He takes the events in Poland as confirmation [handwritten: for the correctness of his policy and proof] for the mistakes of L.I. Brezhnev and the CPSU PB according to the evaluation of EH and GM [handwritten: during the Crimea meeting]. Cleverly, he tries to capitalize on the events in Poland. [...] EH and GM assume that the CPSU leadership, facing the crisis in Poland, highly value each positive word which EH utters about the Soviet Union and that their criticism at the Crimea meeting will be forgotten."⁴⁰ Hermann Axen,

SED CC secretary for international relations and member of the GDR delegation, briefed the SED politburo about the meeting in Moscow on December 9,⁴¹ emphasizing, “of primary importance: that the meeting occurred. Due to several initiatives of Comrade E. Honecker.” Axen’s report made clear what Honecker’s intentions in Moscow had been: “Impressive was the argumentation by [Czechoslovak] comrade [Gustáv] Husák on the basis of the CPCz [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] experience of 1968. Comrade Ceausescu repeated the Romanian objection against a military relief campaign.” Axen also stressed the SED’s skepticism with regard to an “inner Polish” solution. The “assistance” provided to the PUWP leadership in Moscow, he underlined, “will only be effective if (I stress ‘if’) it is used the way it has to be and was meant.” According to Axen, Polish party leader Stanisław Kania had indeed announced that “measures for introduction of the ‘martial law’ were in preparation. But [Kania’s] speech shows that no clear concept and program of action exists.” The meeting therefore told the “PUWP and the public: Up to here and no further! Sort things out, otherwise extreme measures must be taken! [...] However, nothing has been decided yet.”

To conclude, Krolikowski’s notes corroborate the thesis that SED leader Erich Honecker indeed sought a hardline—military—solution in the fall/winter of 1980 and—for one—very likely took initial Soviet preparations for an intervention seriously.

Document

Werner Krolikowski, “Comment on the Report of the PB to the 13th Plenum of the SED CC, which was prepared and submitted by Günther Mittag,” handwritten, 5 December 1980 [excerpt]

[...]

4. While a principled argument with FRG imperialism is missing, the assessment of the situation in the People’s Republic of Poland lasts for 20 pages. Indeed, the comrades and many workers watch the developments in Poland with great concern. They also expect a response by the party leadership, its assessment of the situation and of what is to be done in order to change the situation in favor of socialism.

However, it simply cannot be true that patronizing statements are made before the Plenum of the CC of our party, about what the PUWP must and must not do in order to smash the counterrevolution and guarantee the continued socialist development of Poland. Fraternal assistance and even advice for the solution of the extremely complicated crisis situation in Poland are necessary. There is no doubt about that. But the way this has been discussed on the CC Plenum, based on the report

by GM, is certainly wrong.

And though absolutely necessary, no conclusions are being drawn from the events in Poland for the policy of our party, concerning e.g.:

- the application of Leninist standards of party work;
- the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation and the consequences resulting from it;
- the acknowledgement of criticism and self-criticism from top to bottom;
- to take action against the ‘spin’ towards the West in the GDR;
- the fight against spreading nationalism here, which is also fed by the events in Poland;
- the penetration by bourgeois ideology via the Western mass media and visitors;
- measures to prevent further indebtedness of the GDR [to the West];
- overcoming the gaps between purchasing power and production.

These extremely important questions, however, are not mentioned in the report at all, much less treated in a profound way. The opposite is the case. The internal situation of the GDR is represented as if there are no difficulties, although changes are necessary and are ever more forcefully demanded within and outside of the party.

[...]

[Addition to point 4 - page 5]

What are the crucial motives behind EH’s and GM’s use of the events in Poland for their plans in such an extraordinary manner?

1. They use them in order to make others forget the CPSU critique, ventured at EH by L.I. Brezhnev in the Crimea; they pretend to be super-revolutionaries, the initiators of the current consultation among the General Secretaries and First Secretaries of the fraternal parties in Moscow. At the same time, they think, they are countering the unsatisfactory Soviet incapacity to act in the Polish question.

Their extraordinary handling of the Polish events pursues the domestic goal of defeating all attempts to draw parallels between EH and Gierek.

2. EH and GM use the Polish events to allow GDR achievements to appear still more beautiful and brighter, as an example of the almost sole intact socialist system in the world.

3. Their extreme condemnation of the events in Poland strike at the Soviet Union, and in an indirect way, accuse the Soviet Union of being unable to keep the socialist states in its realm, unable any longer to strengthen their unity and unanimity.

[Source: *Personal papers; document obtained by Michael Kubina and translated by Bernhard Streitwieser.*]

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¹ The author would like to thank Bernhard Streitwieser for assistance with the translation.

² Information on an internal talk between Comrade Tichonov and Comrade Schürer. Recorded by Schürer for Honecker's attention: 21.3.1979, Bundesarchiv Berlin [BArch-Bln] DE 1-56257.

³ Not to be mistaken for his brother, Herbert Krolkowski, who at that time was serving as Undersecretary and First Deputy of the GDR Foreign Minister, as well as General Secretary of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries.

⁴ Hermann Weber, *Geschichte der DDR* (München: dtv, 1985), pp. 475 ff.

⁵ "The cadre-political changes", handwritten, 4 June 1984.

⁶ See "Schmeichelei und Unterwürfigkeit," Interview mit Sowjetbotschafter Wjatscheslaw Kotschemassow, in *Der Spiegel* 47 (16 November 1992), pp. 148-149; Vjaczeslav Koczemasov, *Meine letzte Mission. Botschafter der UdSSR in der DDR von 1983 bis 1990* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994), pp. 56 ff., 69 ff.

⁷ For legal reasons the source of these notes cannot be disclosed. Some of Krolkowski's notes, also without their source specified, have already been published; however, in these publications no differentiation was made between typewritten and handwritten sections. See Peter Przybylski: *Tatort Politbüro* (vol. 1): *Die Akte Honecker* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991) and (vol. 2): *Honecker, Mittag, Schalck-Golodkowski* (Berlin, Rowohlt, 1992). Przybylski served for 25 years as press spokesman of the GDR, chief public prosecutor, and as such presented the educational crime film series, "The public prosecutor takes the floor," on GDR TV. It is interesting to note that after reunification, Przybylski was accused of plagiarism by former co-workers at the "Institute for Marxism-Leninism" at the SED CC. To avoid criticism of the book before its publication, Przybylski's publisher decided to advertise the book under an anonymous author. Immediately after its publication, Hans Modrow, the last SED Prime Minister of the GDR, vainly tried to take legal action against the circulation of the book. Erich

Honecker, *Zu dramatischen Ereignissen* (Hamburg n.d.: Runge, 1992), pp. 65 ff. The Krolkowski notes, both those published by Przybylski as well as those quoted here, appear authentic.

⁸ See the introduction in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." *Die SED contra Polen 1980/81. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), esp. pp. 24 ff.; Jerzy Holzer, "Drohte Polen 1980/81 eine sowjetische Intervention? Zur Verkündung des Kriegsrechts in Polen am 13.12.1981," *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte* 1(1997), pp. 197-230; see also the outstanding contemporary analysis by Richard D. Anderson, "Soviet decision-making and Poland," *Problems of Communism* 2:25 (1982) pp. 22-36; and Mark Kramer, "Poland 1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-139.

⁹ See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Conference on Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 229-232.

¹⁰ See Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 20 ff., and Michael Kubina, "Honecker wäre einmarschiert. Die Rolle der SED-Führung während der Krise in Polen 1980/81," *Eicholz Brief: Zeitschrift zur politischen Bildung* 2 (1996), pp. 40-47.

¹¹ See Holzer, "Sowjetische Intervention?" pp. 201 ff.; also Armin Mitter, "Ein Hauch von Freiheit. Akten der SED-Führung zur Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 August 1995.

¹² Jerzy Holzer, "Stan wojenny: dla Polski czy dla socjalizmu?" in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 June 1994, pp. 19-21, here p. 20. Holzer's argument here, among other things, is based on a falsely dated document, which, he quotes without marking his omissions. He incorrectly dates minutes of two talks between the CC Secretaries, Joachim Herrmann and M.V. Zimyanin, respectively, at the end of November, as occurring immediately before the crisis summit in Moscow on 5 December 1980, when in fact the talks took place at the end of October, a whole month earlier. See the discussion in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 96 ff.

¹³ Julij A. Kvicinskij, *Vor dem Sturm. Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten*. (o.O. [Berlin] Siedler, o.J. [1993]), p. 262. Günter Mittag, *Um jeden Preis. Im Spannungsfeld zweier Systeme* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1991), pp. 35 ff.

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Applicants should send a resume and statement of interest to Nancy L. Meyers, the CWIHP Project Administrator.

¹⁴ See Monika Tantzsch, "'Was in Polen geschieht, ist für die DDR eine Lebensfrage!'—Das MfS und die polnische Krise 1980/81," *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland" (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages)*, Deutscher Bundestag, vol. V/3: *Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), pp. 2601-2760, here p. 2616 ff.

¹⁵ "Information on the Situation in Poland," Militärisches Zwischenarchiv im Bundesarchiv (MZA-BArch) Strb AZN 28895, ll. 5-10. These files of the former Military Archive in Potsdam are now available in the Military Archive in Freiburg/Br. See, e.g. "Information on the Situation in Poland," 20 August 1980, MZA Strb AZN 28895, ll. 11-14.

¹⁶ For an analysis of the attitude of GDR workers toward the events in Poland see Burkhard Olschowsky, *Die Haltung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands und der DDR-Gesellschaft gegenüber den Ereignissen in Polen in den Jahren 1980-1983* Magisterarbeit (Ms.), Berlin, April 1997, pp. 53 ff.; and Olschowsky, "Die Haltung der Berliner Arbeitnehmer zu den Ereignissen in Polen 1980/81," in *Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat*, No. 6, to be published in Summer 1998.

¹⁷ See Kubina and Wilke, eds., *SED contra Polen*, pp. 17 ff.

¹⁸ See Krolikowski's note documented in the annex "Comment on the report of the PB to the 13th plenum of the SED CC, which was prepared and submitted by Guenther Mittag," handwritten, 5 December 1980; his "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13th November, 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980, also Przybylski vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

¹⁹ On the CC plenum on 11-12 December 1980 and the politburo report, see Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 126-134.

²⁰ Krolikowski, "The lessons for the X. Party Congress of the SED," handwritten, 12 November 1980.

²¹ Krolikowski, "On the relationship between EH und GM," handwritten, 12 November 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²² Krolikowski, "On the relationship between EH und GM," handwritten, 12 November 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²³ On the attitude of Stoph and Mielke toward Honecker see, "Byl li Chonekker igrushkoy v rukach Moskvyy," interview by Sergej Guky with Yury Andropov, *Izvestia*, 11 August 1992, p. 6; "Wir wechselten zum Du," *Der Spiegel*, 17, August 1992, pp. 20-22. According to Abrasimov, Mielke in Moscow often "dumped on him," whereby Honecker is to have been completely unsuspecting of Mielke's double role.

²⁴ P.A. Abrasimov was Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin from 1975 until 1983.

²⁵ See "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13th November 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980, also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²⁶ Mielke is talking here about Honecker's so-called "Gera Demands." After the SPD-FDP coalition in West Germany had won the elections, Honecker demanded that the FRG clear up some fundamental questions with the GDR before talks could resume on "humanitarian improvements." For further information, see the literature cited in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 11 (fn. 10).

²⁷ "Information on a talk between Willi Stoph and Erich Mielke on 13 November 1980," handwritten, 5 December 1980,

also in Przybylski, vol. 2, pp. 353-357.

²⁸ Tisch is not expressing himself here in a grammatically correct way, and this particular sentence, as it is in the source, is confusing. From the context, however, follows quite clearly what he wanted to say. The passage has been translated to reflect what he meant to say. The German original reads as follows: "... und wo Honecker um die Vollmacht gebeten hat, alle Schritte einzuleiten, daß da nichts passieren kann, ohne daß er das Politbüro noch mal fragen muß."

²⁹ Interview with Harry Tisch for the TV documentary *That was the GDR—a history of the other Germany*, broadcast on 3 October 1993 by German television (ARD). The quoted passage can be found in the book which was published under the same title by Wolfgang Kenntemich, Manfred Durniok, and Thomas Karlan (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1993). The omission in the quotation is in the source. Despite permission from the broadcasting corporation, MDR, to see the complete interview with Harry Tisch, Manfred Durniok, whose film company produced the documentary on behalf of the MDR, rejected the author's request to view the entire interview, "because we made the interviews with the contemporary witnesses only for the MDR." Letter to the author, 29 August 1996.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

³¹ See politburo minutes No. 48/80 of the extraordinary session from 28 November 1980 in Strausberg, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 123 ff.

³² *Editor's note*: On this day in 1956, all units of the National People's Army declared their combat readiness.

³³ Honecker to Brezhnev, 26 November 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 122 ff.; for an English translation, see *Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5* (Spring 1995), p. 127.

³⁴ See politburo minutes No. 48/80 of the extraordinary session of 28 November 1980, in Strausberg, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, p. 123 f.

³⁵ See "'Es war eine sowjetische Intervention.' Oberst a.D. Wolfgang Wünsche zur militärischen Erdrosselung des Prager Reformkurses 1968," interview with Karlen Vesper in *Neues Deutschland*, 21 August 1995, p. 12.

³⁶ See Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 17-31.

³⁷ See politburo minutes No. 49/80 of the session from 2 December 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 138 ff.

³⁸ See stenographic record of the meeting of leading representatives of Warsaw Pact states in Moscow on 5 December 1980 in Kubina and Wilke, *SED contra Polen*, pp. 140-195; for Honecker's speech see pp. 166-171. For an English translation, see this issue of the *Bulletin* (below).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-178.

⁴⁰ "Commentary," handwritten, 16 December 80, also in Przybylski, vol. 1, pp. 340-344.

⁴¹ See politburo minutes No. 50/80 of the session of 9 December 1980, in Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin G. Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, und Hans-Peter Mueller, eds., *SED-Politbüro und polnische Krise 1980-82. Aus den Protokollen des Politbüros des ZK der SED zu Polen, den innerdeutschen Beziehungen und der Wirtschaftskrise der DDR, vol. I: 1980*, Berlin, January 1993 (Arbeitspapiere des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat No. 3/1993), p. 533.

Bulgaria and the Political Crises in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980/81)

By Jordan Baev

In recent years, new evidence has come to light from Bulgarian archives concerning the position of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and state leadership on the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1980/81.¹

Bulgaria and the Prague Spring

In the fall 1993 issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*, Mark Kramer presented hypotheses on the role Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov played in the suppression of the “Prague Spring.”² The documents kept in the former BCP Central Committee (CC) archive clarify this matter unambiguously and definitely discredit the statements made by Živkov in his memoirs thirty years later, claiming that he had opposed the August 1968 Soviet invasion and had been sympathetic to the reform efforts.³ We now also have at our disposal clear evidence of the Bulgarian leadership’s attitude toward the Polish crisis of 1980/1981, which was presented at the Jachranka conference on “Poland 1980-82: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions” (in November 1997). Less information is available, however, concerning the Bulgarian society’s reaction to the political crises in the two East-European countries as well as to Bulgarian military participation in the Warsaw Pact “Danube ‘68” operation against Czechoslovakia.

In February 1968, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the February 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, Warsaw Pact leaders met in Prague. In the speeches delivered by the attending heads-of-state there was no hint whatsoever of any discord. The Bulgarian leader, Zhivkov, declared “full unity” with the “expert and wise” leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) and stated: “Between us there have never been and there are not any matters of difference.”⁴ A session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee took place ten days later, on 6-7 March 1968, in Sofia. The official communiqué regarding the “open exchange of opinions” did not even mention Czechoslovakia. Nor did it appear in the text of the declaration made at the joint session of the BCP CC and the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB) Council of Ministers which heard a report by first Deputy Prime Minister Živko about the PCC session in Sofia. In another, confidential report however, Živkov said: “During the session of the Political [Consultative] Committee of the Warsaw Pact we decided to share with the Soviet comrades our anxiety over the events in Czechoslovakia... We categorically declared to Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev and Comrade [Alexei] Kosygin that we had to be prepared to

put our armies in action.” The statement of Zhivkov is indirectly confirmed by documents from the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) archives in Moscow. At a CPSU CC Plenum on 21 March 1968 dedicated to the situation in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev remarked: “In Sofia and afterwards Com[rades] Živkov, [Polish Leader Władysław] Gomułka, [and Hungarian leader János] Kádár addressed us with requests to undertake some steps for regulation of the situation in Czechoslovakia.” Consequently, it was decided to convene a meeting of Soviet, East German, Polish, and Hungarian representatives with the Czechoslovak leadership in Dresden [on 23 March 1968]. At Živkov’s explicit insistence, a Bulgarian delegation was invited to take part in the meeting, too.⁵ Expressions such as the following are typical of those delivered to the BCP CC Politburo regarding the Dresden discussions: “The attention of the Czechoslovak comrades has been drawn to the necessity of looking more closely at their people, at those whose heads are not quite in order. . . so that the incipient counter-revolution will be cut down...” Should the Czechoslovak leadership fail to undertake the necessary measures for “smashing counterrevolutionary acts,” the remaining Warsaw Pact countries would not be able “to remain indifferent since they have bonds of unity with Czechoslovakia as well as common interests, and they cannot permit a counterrevolution in the heart of Europe.”⁶ At a special BCP CC Plenum on 29 March 1968, CC Secretary Stanko Todorov, delivered a detailed report (55 pages) on the Dresden meeting which lasted for 11 hours.⁷

The line marked out in BCP CC Politburo’s decision gives a perfectly clear idea of the direction which the reports of the Bulgarian Embassy in Prague were to follow and the way in which the Bulgarian mass media portrayed the Czechoslovak events. While previous reports of Rayko Nikolov, Political Counselor at the Bulgarian Embassy, attempted to analyze the “interesting processes” taking place in Czechoslovakia, the reports of Ambassador Stoyan Nedelchev after March 1968 put forward the idea of a “creeping counterrevolution” which was in full harmony with Sofia’s views. On June 30, Nedelchev sent a report couched in dark terms stating that the internal political crisis in Czechoslovakia could develop into an irrevocable process which would bring about important consequences unfavorable to “socialism” if “sound forces” in the CPCz did not immediately intervene.⁸

Todor Živkov headed the Bulgarian delegation at the meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Bulgaria, East

Germany, Poland and Hungary on 14-15 July 1968 in Warsaw. Several influential BCP Politburo members—Stanko Todorov, Boris Velchev, and Pencho Kubadinsky—also attended. In the letter to the CPCz CC adopted by the five parties at the meeting, the Brezhnev Doctrine's postulates of "limited sovereignty" of members of the Socialist Commonwealth were outlined.

After the Bulgarian delegation returned from Warsaw the BCP CC Politburo discussed the situation on July 16.⁹ At a special Party Plenum, Stanko Todorov delivered a detailed informational report on the results of the Warsaw meeting. Its content completely undermines later claims made in the West¹⁰ that Bulgaria took a special position against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. In compliance with the plenum's resolutions the Bulgarian press opened a "campaign of clarification" of the situation in Czechoslovakia in the spirit of the five Warsaw Pact Parties' letter. This activity provoked an official protest on the Czechoslovak side, expressed at the meeting of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiří Hájek with the Bulgarian Ambassador Nedelchev on 27 July 1968.¹¹

At 1 a.m. on August 21 the armed forces of the five Warsaw Pact countries taking part in Operation "Danube '68" entered Czechoslovak territory. Bulgarian participation consisted of military formations of two regiments of the Third Army numbering 2,164 troops. (The size of the Bulgarian contingent, compared with that of other Warsaw Pact forces sent into Czechoslovakia, shows that Bulgarian participation in the operation was mainly symbolic.) As early as mid-July the Bulgarian forces that were to take part in the Warsaw Pact military action were installed in field camps and started intensive military and psychological preparation. They trained in strict isolation from the civil population in order to preserve military secrecy. After a written battle order for "participation in a military exercise" on Soviet territory, on July 21 the formations of 12th "Elhovskiy" regiment under the command of Col. Alexander Genchev were transported to USSR by sea, where, according to the order, they came under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Odessa Military District. From there, they were transferred in mid-August to a location near Uzhgorod, close to the Soviet-Slovak border. On August 21 in accelerated battle march, the Elhovo regiment formations reached (via Košice) their assigned regions of Slovakia (Banska Bistrica, Zvolen, Brezno). Formations of the 22nd Harmanli regiment under the command of Col. Ivan Chavdarov were transported by air to Prague, in order to guard Czechoslovakia's primary airport, Ruzyně.

During their stay in Czechoslovakia, the Bulgarian military units did not participate directly in any military actions. The entire time they were on Czechoslovak territory (August 21—October 23) they were under direct Soviet command. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian soldiers also felt the hostility of Czechoslovak citizens who opposed the foreign military intervention on their territory. The field diaries of the Bulgarian military formations reported a

number of incidents during their two-month stay on Czechoslovak territory. In the only existing Bulgarian study on this matter, Maj. Gen. Dimiter Naidenov mentioned some of the armed incidents: "On August 22nd at 01.55 A.M. positions of two of our formations were fired on. Around 02.40 A.M. two shots were [fired] over the company of Captain Gochkov, and around 02.44 A.M. there was shooting at the battle row of Captain Valkov's company originating from nearby buildings. On August 24th by 01.07 A.M. an intensive round of firing from automatic guns towards Officer Sabi Dimitrov's formation was noted." At the end of August the Bulgarian newspapers published an account entitled, "A sentry at Ruzyně," in which it was stated: "On the night of August 26th to 27th shots were fired toward the position of Warrant-Officer Vassilev from the near-by houses...."¹²

There is no information on the participation of Bulgarian soldiers in military actions against Czechoslovak citizens, and Bulgarian military units in Czechoslovakia suffered only one casualty. On the evening of 9 September 1968, in a Prague suburb, Junior-Sergeant Nikolay Nikolov was kidnapped and shot with three bullets from a 7.65 mm gun.

During the "Prague Spring" and after the intervention of the five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, there were isolated acts of protest among Bulgarian intellectuals. Three History Department students at the University of Sofia were arrested and sentenced to varying prison terms; several of their professors were expelled from the Communist Party.¹³ The State Security services carefully observed any reactions among Czechoslovak youth vacationing in the Bulgarian Black Sea resorts at the time of the invasion.

The Bulgarian Embassy in Prague and General Consulate in Bratislava documented numerous protests of different strata of Czechoslovak society against the armed intervention. In the various reports from Czechoslovakia, opinions were quoted regarding the "great mistake" made by the Warsaw Pact countries, who with their action, had "hurt the feelings of national dignity of Czechs and Slovaks." Prior to the invasion, Gen. Koday, Commandant of the East Czechoslovak Military District, had supported a hard-line position, often stating that more decisive actions were required against the "anti-socialist forces." Yet, early in November 1968, Gen. Koday admitted to Stefan Velikov, Bulgarian General Consul in Bratislava: "The shock was too great." He told about the offense he suffered on the night of August 21st: "He was nearly arrested, his headquarters were surrounded and machine-guns rushed into his office." The Czechoslovak military leader underlined several times during the confidential talks there had been no need to send Warsaw Pact regiments. The Commander of the Bratislava Garrison backed this opinion, saying that "our countries have lost a lot with the invasion."¹⁴

The Bulgarian authorities, however, were explicit and unanimous in their statements concerning the necessity of

their actions which had saved the Czechoslovak people from a “counterrevolution” and had prevented an inevitable Western intervention. They firmly maintained this position in front of representatives of Western Communist Parties who had opposed the military action in Czechoslovakia as well. During the extremely controversial and long discussions with the head of the International Department of the Italian Communist Party, Carlo Galuzi, on 16 September 1968, the BCP leaders repeated many times: “We do not consider that our interference was a mistake. We believe that by our intervention undertaken in a timely manner, we terminated the dangerous process of counterrevolution which could have only ended with a victory of the counterrevolution and in no other way... That could have been a dreadful flaw in the defense of the Socialist camp in Europe...”¹⁵ Five years later Zhivkov maintained the same view in his talks with Italian CP leader Enrico Berlinguer.

The position of the Bulgarian Party and State leadership regarding the 1980-81 Polish Crisis

Until the beginning of August 1980 no particular concern with the Polish crisis was shown in Bulgaria, though reports of public discontent and incipient upheaval had begun circulating. On the eve of Bulgarian Prime Minister Stanko Todorov’s visit to Poland in July 1980 the usual memos and references were prepared, one of which stated: “The dissidents are now in fact an insignificant group of people isolated from society, they have lost their public influence, are people disunited from inward struggles... The people are in a state of sound moral and political unity... Poland is a strong socialist unit...” After his official visit on July 14-15, Todorov, in a report to the BCP CC Politburo, declared: “I believe that the Party and State leadership in Poland, with regard to their current economic problems, are approaching the complicated problems with a sense of realism and are taking active steps to overcome them, taking into consideration the working people’s feelings.”¹⁶ One would hardly assume that in such confidential documents propaganda clichés would be deliberately used in place of a real evaluation. Obviously, at the time Bulgarian ruling circles did not realize the real social and political situation in Poland. In August - September 1980, however, the Embassy in Warsaw sent several informational reports on the changes in the situation and the formation of the political opposition to the Communist regime. No doubt, such news should have reached Sofia from Moscow as well.

On 15 September 1980, Todor Živkov received Politburo member Kazimierz Barcikowski who was sent to Sofia to inform the Bulgarian leaders of the situation in his country. During that conversation, Živkov said: “We do not dramatize the events in Poland but they require all the socialist countries to draw certain conclusions for themselves, too.” He added that the Bulgarian leadership would “follow the development of the matters in Poland” and concluded: “We, the Socialist countries, work in a

hostile environment and we have to admit that our enemies won certain points. Your case, one could say, is a link in the chain of the total imperialistic offensive against us...”¹⁷ Soon after the meeting, Živkov prepared a special memo on the matter, and the Polish situation was discussed at two Politburo sessions, on October 21 and 25. Živkov also maintained the hard line of an “offensive against the anti-socialist forces” at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders on 5 December 1980 in Moscow. Following instructions, the State Security structures became more active in their “preventive” measures and in their periodic analyses of the Polish crisis which laid particular stress on its influence in Bulgaria.

In the first half of 1981, nearly all information coming from the Bulgarian Embassy in Warsaw referred to the development of the political crisis. In a memo regarding bilateral Bulgarian-Polish relations in May 1981, Mariy Ivanov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated to the BCP CC: “In the last ten months relations between the mass trade unions, youth, women’s and other public organizations [in both countries] have practically been cut off...”¹⁸ In a report to the Foreign Ministry, the Bulgarian ambassador in Poland, Ivan Nedev, related the reaction of a high ranking Polish army officer: “[We will put up with] anything rather than Soviet-style socialism!”¹⁹

The review of the political and diplomatic documents on the Polish crisis, compared to other important archival sources as well, prompts the following conclusions:

Though publicly not as active as his Czechoslovak and East German colleagues Gustáv Husák and Erich Honecker, the Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov was another firm supporter of the hard line of “decisive struggle” against the “counterrevolution” and the “anti-socialist forces” in Poland. In the spirit of the times, the expert evaluation and the diplomatic analyses usually accorded with Živkov’s and his entourage’s attitudes. The position of Foreign Minister Peter Mladenov, who often backed Živkov’s opinions, did not stray much. The Bulgarian leadership’s reaction demonstrated the unwillingness and incapability of the administration to draw even most general conclusions from the Polish events and to undertake political reforms even to the slightest degree.

As in previous decades, the development of the latest internal political crisis in the East European countries failed to provoke Bulgarian leaders to reconsider prevailing conceptions and attitudes, a rethinking which might have contributed to a transformation and modernization of the existing political regime. On the contrary, those crises induced a “hardening” of the Kremlin and East European rulers’ positions. Just as in the case of the 1956 and 1968 events, after those in Poland in 1980-1981 led to increased bitterness in Bulgarian party politics, resulting, e.g. in the dismissal of well-known figures in political and cultural circles, such as Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. This line of behavior fit very well with the general pattern of confrontation between Moscow and Washington in the early 1980s. At the same time, however it exposed an important feature of the

Bulgarian regime: its lack of adaptive mechanisms for overcoming the contradictions and crisis in the political elite under existing circumstances of a dictatorial personal rule. That, together with the no less important outside factors, such as U.S. policy, predetermined the unavoidable collapse of the system at the end of the decade without any choice of alternative paths.

¹ The author has also contributed newly declassified Bulgarian documents on the 1956 events in Hungary to the forthcoming National Security Archive reader on the crisis. I am grateful to Georgi Chernev, Chief of the Central State Archive; Avgustina Daskalova, Chief of the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Serafim Stoykov, Chief of the Archive of the Ministry of the Interior; and Danail Danailov, Division Head at the same archive, for their assistance in getting access to some confidential records. I would like to stress in particular that for the first time diplomatic and State Security confidential documents of the period are declassified especially for the *CWIHP Bulletin* and *CWIHP Electronic Bulletin*.

² Mark Kramer, "The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: New Interpretations (part 2)," *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 4-6.

³ T. Zhivkov, *Memoirs* (Sofia 1997) [in Bulgarian].

⁴ *Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Documents*, vol. II (Sofia, 1971), p. 422 (in Bulgarian).

⁵ R. Pichoya, "Czechoslovakia 1968: Vzgliad iz Moskvi. Po dokumentam CC CPSU," *Novaja I noveishaja istorija* No. 6 (1994), p. 11.

⁶ Central State Archive [CDA], Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 35, A. E. [File] 127, List 6-13.

⁷ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 58, A. E. 4, l. 2-57.

⁸ Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DA MVNR), Sofia, Opis 24-P, A. E. 2988.

⁹ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 35, A. E. 255, l. 1-2.

¹⁰ RFE Report, Open Society Archives, Budapest, Fond 300, Subfond 20, Folder 1, Box 89.

¹¹ DA MVNR, Opis 24-P, A. E. 3020, l. 202-203. Hájek delivered also a letter from Czechoslovak Prime Minister Cernik to Zhivkov regarding the additional measures taken with respect to the protection of the State border with West Germany.

¹² Main Political Department of Bulgarian People's Army. Classified. For official use only. Major-General D. Naidenov, *Internationalism in action: Socio-political and military-historic analysis on the struggle against the counterrevolution in CSSR-1968* (Sofia 1979), pp. 102, 117 (In Bulgarian).

¹³ *Homo Bohemicus* No. 3, (1994). One of the mentioned students, Valentin Radev, was a friend of mine. He was in jail for 18 months and later worked at the National History Museum in Sofia. He died from a heart attack at age 48 in 1995.

¹⁴ DA MVNR. Opis 24-P, A. E. 2987, l. 58-64.

¹⁵ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 60, A. E. 11, l. 1-39.

¹⁶ DA MVNR, Opis 36, A. E. 2308, l. 37-40.

¹⁷ CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 60, A. E. 272, l. 1-20.

¹⁸ DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2137, l. 7.

¹⁹ DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2192, l. 2-4.

Record of the Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Communist, Sofia, 29 March 1968 [excerpt]

TODOR ŽHIVKOV:¹ [...] The discussions have shown that no concluding speech is needed as it has turned out we are unanimous with regard to the evaluation of the situation in Czechoslovakia made by the fraternal [Communist] parties in Dresden [on 23 March 1968]. Let us hope that no extreme steps will be required but if the worst comes to worst we will use our armies.

MISHO MISHEV:² In what state is the Czechoslovak army?

ŽIVKO ŽIVKOV:³ It is in state of ineffectiveness.

TODOR ŽIVKOV: The situation is extremely difficult. What is the state of Politburo? The forces backing the Soviet Union and our policy are all now nearly driven out of the Politburo. You have the [Oldřich] Černík's statement. He is behind all this. Now, he is supposed to become the next prime minister. Other vacillating persons have been admitted to the leadership as well. [Alexander] Dubček himself has neither the experience nor the intellectual capacity and willpower to take the leadership of the party into his own hands. One can only hope that there will be forces in the Presidium and the Central Committee capable of moving things ahead firmly. The situation there is much more difficult than the one we had to face after the April Plenary Session⁴ here. Here, too, the situation could have turned very difficult but we immediately thought and found the support of our party members, our working class, of the sound forces within our intellectual circles. In our country the blow aimed at the army's leadership. It was repeated at the meeting of the Central Committee that those were [Stepan] Chervenkov's people, the DC [State Security] institutions were attacked. What did we do? We gave credit to the leaderships of the Army and the DC, we mobilized the Party's resources and the situation was saved. That is the thing they ought to do now in Czechoslovakia. Let us hope that inner strength can be found there to carry this out. If this is not done, the situation will get even more complicated. We should openly inform our party that there is a counterrevolutionary situation there. They are not yet out in the streets with arms but who can guarantee they will not do that tomorrow? It is quite possible that the counterrevolution could take a temporary hold and stabilize gradually. They have drawn their conclusions from the events in Hungary.

What does the present leadership have under its control? Nothing. It has no control over the army; it is demoralized, ineffective. They keep calling sessions, meetings, vote on resolutions to oust this or that person from his post in the army. The trade unions, the organized force of the working class, are crushed. Their official newspaper has turned into hotbed of the counterrevolution. The editorial staff of *Rude Pravo* is not under the Party's control. What does that mean? You do understand that the Dresden meeting was not called for

nothing. Obviously, one could not be fully open in front of the Czechoslovak comrades, but the situation is extremely grave.

During the sessions of the Political [Consultative] Committee of the Warsaw Pact [in Sofia], we decided to share with our Soviet comrades our anxiety over the events in Czechoslovakia. I had a special meeting with Comrade [Leonid I.] Brezhnev and Comrade [Alexei] Kosygin at which I expressed our concern with the situation, pointing out that we must do all we can, including taking even the ultimate risk, but we cannot permit counterrevolution to go into full swing in Czechoslovakia and to lose that country as a consequence. What is Czechoslovakia's significance? Czechoslovakia is in the middle of the socialist bloc; it is a state of relatively great importance in the socialist system, both politically and economically. We categorically declared to Comrade Brezhnev and Comrade Kosygin that we were prepared to mobilize our armies. We should act even with our cause at stake. Events confirm our assessment [of the situation]. We are very happy that the Soviet comrades took the initiative of calling the Dresden meeting. Let us hope that it will help. The most recent facts, though, do not show any reversal [of the situation]. They have postponed the debate on the program to Monday. We have no information about this program, what its appeal will be what it will aim at, whether it might or might not be a signal to activate the counterrevolution. At the Dresden meeting we were informed that the counterrevolutionaries had prepared a manifesto to the people and would make it public at the right time. Western intelligence services are operating there. As in Poland, Zionism plays an important role there. However, comrades, we should consider another aspect of this matter. The Yugoslav leadership has a part in these events too. They have been trying to use Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia to create their own coalition within our family. There is no need for us to use the Stalinist methods of the past but we are obligated to take measures to introduce order in Czechoslovakia as well as in Romania. Afterwards we will introduce order in Yugoslavia, too.

VOICES: Right [applause].

TODOR ŽIVKOV: The West will make use of this. We will be criticized but we will strengthen our position in the international Communist movement, we shall turn the correlation of forces in our favor.

What is the line followed by the Yugoslav leadership? Counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet! What is the line followed by the Romanian leadership? Counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet! In whose favor is such a political line? Who permits the heads of the Romanian leadership to play with the fate of the Romanian working class, with the interests of our system, which has been struggling for so many years? Who has permitted them that, who has given them such right?! If we allow all this we will bear great responsibility for our cause and fate before our generation. Indeed, we realize that nothing rash should be done but we must act. We are a revolutionary

organization which use revolutionary forces, our methods coincide with the interests of our cause. [...]

[Source: Central State Archive (CDA), fond 1-B, opis 58, a. e. 4, l. 96-99. Obtained by Jordan Baev.]

¹ Bulgarian party chief and prime minister.

² Member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP).

³ Member of Politburo CC BCP, First Deputy Prime Minister.

⁴ In 2-6 April 1956, a Plenum of the CC BCP removed former pro-Stalinist leader Chervenkov and strengthened Živkov's own position in the Party leadership.

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**Memorandum of Conversation between Bulgarian
foreign Minister P. Mladenov and Polish ambassador Vl.
Naperaj, 6 October 1981**

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

C-54-00-26/7.X.81

M E M O

On October 6th this year the Minister of the Foreign Affairs, P. Mladenov received at his request Vl. Naperaj, Polish Ambassador to this country.

1. The Ambassador confirmed that the visit of Stanisław Kania in our country would be held on October 15 as had been agreed so long as no extraordinary events occurred in Poland on that date. Stanisław Kania's flight is to arrive in Sofia at 10:00 a.m. and to fly back to Warsaw between 8 and 9 p.m. Stanisław Kania will be accompanied by 1-2 assistants only and it is possible that the talks will be held *tête a tête*. [...]

2. [Information regarding the celebration of the 1300th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bulgarian state on October 29]

3. The Ambassador expressed his view of the situation in Poland. He believed it had become more complicated. Their expectations that the second stage of the Solidarity Congress would change the line of aggressive behavior, adopted during the first stage, after the declaration by the Politburo of the Central Committee and the government of the P[olish] P[eople's] R[epublic], were not justified. The draft program and the resolutions voted, and especially that for referendum on the laws passed by the Sejm regarding self-government and the state enterprises, with the purpose to change them, strained the situation again, as did the negative reaction of the Congress to the decision of the government to increase the prices of cigarettes and tobacco products.

According to Naperaj confrontation is unavoidable. The issue "who gets the better of whom" is now being

resolved. The extremists and the Western saboteurs are staging new provocations—prisons are broken open, strikes or preparations for strikes are declared, state orders are boycotted, anti-socialist and anti-Soviet literature, pamphlets and leaflets are distributed, the union of the PPR with the Soviet Union is under attack, they demonstrate openly their aspiration to take over power. Urgent actions are, therefore, required. The army, the militia and the Party activists have been put on the alert, ready for action. It is quite possible all this might bring about the introduction of martial law. If this point is reached, all public organizations with the exception of the PUWP, UAP and DP are to be banned, and about 20,000 people will be detained. Solidarity might respond with strikes but the situation is different now—Solidarity is no longer as popular as it used to be. A lot of people have realized what position the country has been driven to as a result of the strikes, and appeals to go on strike will not again evoke an unanimous response.

Naperaj underlined that the Party held the key for solving the crisis. He expressed his admiration of the enormous achievements of our country after the April Plenum of the BCPCC in 1956, resulting from the right policy of our Party. These achievements can be seen in industry, agriculture and in the markets. In their country [Poland], the errors in Party policy brought about the events in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976. The present critical situation is due to their Party's loss of prestige due to its inability to draw the right conclusions from those events. The enemy now lays all fault at the communists' door. Therefore, the main task now is to strengthen the party and its reputation. Discussions were carried out with Communists, members of the Solidarity, and with members of Solidarity elected to the leading bodies of the PUWP in an attempt to persuade them to differ from the resolutions of the Gdansk Congress.

Naperaj underlined the difficult market situation. This year they produced 2.5 million tons grain more [than last year] but the state was able to buy only 50% of the quantity it had bought at the same time last year. The peasants, under the influence of Solidarity, refuse to sell meat, grains and other food products to the government, selling them instead on the black market for profit.

According to Naperaj, they are no longer in a position to make any more concessions. If the reactionary forces come to power, they will deal cruelly with the communists. In his speech delivered in Krakow, Bogdan Lis declared that all communists had to be hanged. Naperaj expected that Stanisław Kania would tell Com. T. Zhivkov about the situation in their country in full.

Com. P. Mladenov said that we were very much concerned with the development of the events in PPR. Poland is heading for an extremely difficult time. The issue "who will win" is being contested, the fate of Poland is at stake. This requires urgent and resolute actions. Any

further compromise will result in yielding power and the annihilation of the Communists. The counterrevolution will not miss the chance for savage reprisals. Lists of those who are to be physically destroyed have probably already been made up. It is known from experience that counterrevolution is very much the same everywhere. In Poland it is not any better than it was in Hungary in 1956. If steps for its suppression are not taken now, it might be too late later, especially when the newly recruited conscripts enter the army. A delay in delivering a blow [against the counterrevolution] will result in loss of power and the restoration of capitalism. It should be clear that if new elections were to be held, anti-socialist forces would take power.

Com. Mladenov drew attention to the fact that the West's speculations on a Soviet intervention in Poland were discontinued. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be indifferent towards the future developments in Poland, and Poland cannot go ahead without Soviet deliveries of petrol, gas, ores and other raw materials, [in short] without the comprehensive Soviet aid. That is why the Polish comrades must undertake the necessary steps for defeating the counter-revolution themselves, and the sooner it is done, the less bloodshed there will be. They should not fear strikes. If strikes are declared they will last a week or two, and then will be given up. This is not the worst that could be.

Comrade Mladenov told Naperaj that Com. Zhivkov will openly express our position on the events in PPR to Stanisław Kania.

Georgi Georgiev, deputy-chief of the Second Department [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was present on the meeting.

Sofia, 7 Oct[ober] 1981

signature: (illegible)

[Source: DA MVNR, Opis 38, A. E. 2192, l. 180-184. Obtained and translated by Jordan Baev.]

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Dr. Jordan Baev, a senior fellow at the Institute of Military History and Associate Professor at the University of National and World Economy (Sofia), is the Vice President of the Bulgarian Association of Military History. He is currently on research in the U.S. as a CWIHP Fellow.

“In Case Military Assistance Is Provided To Poland:” Soviet Preparations for Military Contingencies, August 1980

Introduction and translation by Mark Kramer

The strikes and unrest that engulfed Poland in July and August 1980, culminating in the formation of a “free, self-governing trade union, Solidarity,” sparked great concern among Soviet leaders. On 25 August 1980, the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) secretly established a special Commission on Poland under the supervision of Mikhail Suslov, a senior member of the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat.¹ One of the first actions taken by the Suslov Commission (as it was known informally) was the drafting of a one-page memorandum and a Politburo resolution that authorized the Soviet defense ministry to prepare for the mobilization of “up to 100,000 military reservists and 15,000 vehicles, [which] would have to be requisitioned from the national economy.” The rationale for this step, according to the Commission, was to ensure that a large “group of [Soviet] forces” would be at “full combat readiness . . . in case military assistance is provided to the Polish People’s Republic.”

The Suslov Commission’s memorandum and the draft Politburo resolution were given the classification of “Top Secret/Special Dossier,” which meant that the documents later on were stored in a highly secure part of the Politburo Archive. (In 1991 the Politburo Archive was transferred to the newly-formed Presidential Archive.) A photocopy of the Commission’s memorandum was obtained in 1993 by the late Russian military historian Dmitrii Volkogonov, whose family generously provided me with a copy. Unfortunately, the draft resolution was not included with the photocopy. If the draft resolution merely affirmed the content of the memorandum, the omission of it is not significant. But it is possible that the resolution, which evidently was two pages long, also provided a more specific timetable for the second stage of the mobilization.² Although the memorandum is extremely interesting in itself, one can only hope that the Russian Presidential Archive (which has full jurisdiction over its own holdings) will agree to release the draft resolution.

A sizable number of words and phrases in the translation are underlined. The underlining corresponds to blank portions of the typewritten text that were filled in by hand in the original document. This manner of composition was a standard practice used by Soviet leaders when they were dealing with highly classified and delicate matters.³ In some cases, the leaders themselves wrote out the documents (often in nearly illegible handwriting), but in other cases they relied on senior policy advisers or clerical staff. The handwriting on this memorandum appears to have been done by a clerical aide, who wrote neatly and clearly.

The Commission’s memorandum was signed by Suslov and four other senior members of the body: the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko; the head of the KGB, Yurii Andropov; the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov; and the head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin Chernenko. All were full members of the CPSU Politburo. Although only Suslov and Chernenko belonged to both the Politburo and the Secretariat, the other three wielded nearly as great authority, especially on questions of foreign policy and national security. The five men together constituted a core decision-making group (a sub-group of the Politburo) throughout the Polish crisis. The appearance of their signatures on this memorandum, and the special classification it was given, reflect the extraordinary importance attached to the document.

Even before this operational directive was declassified, there was abundant evidence that the Soviet Union made extensive preparations and drafted elaborate plans for military intervention in Poland in 1980-81. U.S. intelligence sources, both technical and human, picked up an enormous amount at the time about these preparations. (Most of that intelligence, unfortunately, is still classified, but some fascinating items have been released through Freedom of Information Act requests and first-hand accounts by retired U.S. and Polish officials.) Some aspects of Soviet preparations were conveyed in 1980-81 by U.S. officials to Western journalists covering the Polish crisis.⁴ Among topics widely reported in the Western press were the establishment of an integrated Warsaw Pact communications network, joint exercises by Soviet and East European troops, and practice landings by Soviet military units on the Lithuanian and Polish coasts. All these measures would have been of great use if Soviet troops had been called into action.

Declassified East-bloc documents and new first-hand accounts by former Soviet and East European officials have confirmed that extensive planning for military operations in Poland took place and that these plans were thoroughly tested. Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact’s Joint Armed Forces from 1976 to 1988, who was deeply involved in Soviet military planning vis-à-vis Poland, wrote in 1992:

Was there a viable plan to send allied troops into Poland? Yes, there was such a plan. What is more, reconnaissance of entry routes and of concentration points for allied forces was carried out with the active participation of Polish officials. . . . Recently, the view has been put forth that if martial law had not

been introduced in Poland on 13 December 1981, allied troops would have entered Poland. Let me emphasize that there were indeed such plans, and the Polish state and military leadership knew about them. But there was not, and could not have been, any final decision on whether to send in troops . . .⁵

Gribkov would have had no incentive to acknowledge the existence of these plans unless his motivation was simply to tell the truth. As a former high-ranking Soviet military officer who takes great pride in his many years of service, Gribkov might have been expected to deny that any plans for a Soviet invasion of Poland were ever drafted. His willingness to admit that full-fledged plans did exist lends a great deal of credibility to his account. Moreover, his remarks are borne out by a large number of newly declassified documents, including East German and Warsaw Pact maps, military charts, and mobilization orders that show entry routes into Poland and the specific allied units that were slated to take part in joint military operations.⁶ Even though a large number of crucial items in the former East-bloc archives (especially the Russian archives) are still off-limits, all evidence to date fully corroborates what Gribkov said.

The release of the Suslov Commission's memorandum not only adds to, but helps clarify what has already been known about Soviet and Warsaw Pact military planning in 1980-81. Several points are worth highlighting.

First, the date of the memorandum, 28 August 1980, is significant. Just three days after the Suslov Commission was formed on August 25, the five senior members of that body were seeking to authorize extensive military preparations "in case military assistance is provided to Poland." This suggests that military contingencies were taken very seriously by the CPSU Politburo, and that Soviet leaders were not just bluffing when they asked Polish leaders several times in 1980-81 whether it would help matters if Soviet and allied troops entered Poland to help impose martial law. (On each occasion when the two Polish leaders, Stanisław Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski, were asked about "fraternal assistance," they warned Soviet officials that the introduction of Soviet troops into Poland to help implement martial law would exacerbate the situation and lead to a "catastrophe."⁷ They insisted that if they were given more time to devise appropriate arrangements, they would be able to handle the situation on their own. New evidence suggests that Jaruzelski may have sharply changed his view of this matter in the final few days before martial law, but there is little doubt that earlier in the crisis, he, like Kania, had cautioned strongly against the entry of Warsaw Pact forces.⁸)

Second, the directive stipulates that the Soviet defense ministry should be able to bring the initial four divisions up to full combat strength by 6:00 p.m. on August 29, that is, just twenty-four hours after the memorandum was drafted. It is not entirely clear why such haste was deemed necessary. One possible explanation is

that Soviet leaders were preparing to send troops to Poland in the very near term. Presumably, this would have been a limited operation to help the Polish authorities crush the strikes and impose martial law. The most logical timing would have been at the end of August 1980, before the Polish government had signed any agreements with the Inter-Factory Strike Committee.

It is not yet known for certain whether this option was under serious consideration in Moscow on August 28. Soviet Politburo transcripts from the final week of August 1980 are still classified. Despite this limitation, enough other evidence is available to suggest that Soviet leaders might indeed have been contemplating a limited military intervention. U.S. intelligence sources at the time picked up evidence that the Soviet Army was mobilizing three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division in the western USSR.⁹ That in itself would not necessarily imply an intention to use the mobilized forces, but there is no doubt that by August 28 the Soviet Politburo was alarmed by the growing strength of the workers' movement in Poland. After refraining from public criticism in July and the first few weeks of August, the Soviet media on August 27 began denouncing the "subversive actions" of "anti-socialist forces" in Poland.¹⁰ That same day, the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov, secretly delivered a stern letter of warning from the CPSU Politburo to the then-First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), Edward Gierek.¹¹ The letter demanded tougher action to quell the unrest. Gierek, for his part, had been making overtures to Soviet leaders since mid-August about the possibility of sending Soviet troops to Poland on his behalf.¹² Soviet officials had not yet responded directly to Gierek's pleas, but that does not necessarily mean they had rejected the idea outright. Although they may not have wanted to keep Gierek in power, they might have been considering bringing in a hardline successor, such as Stefan Olszowski.

Another factor that could have induced Soviet leaders to contemplate the prospect of military intervention in Poland was a meeting of the PUWP Politburo that was due to take place the following day, on August 29. The session was being convened to decide whether to sign the agreements with Solidarity or, instead, to introduce martial law. A special task force, known as Lato-80 (Summer 80), had been set up at the Polish internal affairs ministry in mid-August 1980 to prepare for a sweeping crackdown.¹³ The head of the task force, General Bogusław Stachura, a deputy minister of internal affairs, was ready to assure the PUWP Politburo on 29 August that his troops would be able to "exterminate the counterrevolutionary nest in Gdańsk" if the PUWP leadership gave him the go-ahead.¹⁴ Soviet leaders clearly were aware of both Lato-80 and the forthcoming PUWP Politburo meeting, and they may have wanted to be ready to help out.

An intervention by the four mobilized Soviet divisions, perhaps supplemented by a Soviet airborne division and units from the USSR's Northern Group of Forces, would

have been designed to prop up Gierek or, more likely, to replace him with a more credible hardliner who would forcibly suppress the nascent Solidarity movement. The intervention thus would have been similar to the Soviet army's limited incursion into Hungary on 24 October 1956, which came in response to an urgent request from the Hungarian leader, Erno Gero.¹⁵ The intervention on 24 October 1956 was intended to help Gero impose a crackdown and put an end to the violent unrest that began the previous day. As it turned out, the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary, far from improving the situation, caused a sharp escalation of tension and violence. A full-scale revolution ensued, and the Soviet Union had to send a much larger contingent of troops to Hungary to crush the rebellion.

It is impossible to know whether anything comparable would have happened in Poland if the PZPR Politburo had decided on 29 August 1980 to pursue a crackdown. A few PZPR hardliners, such as Władysław Kruczek, did want to impose martial law, but a substantial majority of the Politburo members were convinced that, as Kania put it, it was a "fantasy" to expect that a large-scale crackdown could be carried out at such short notice.¹⁶ Hence, the Politburo authorized the Polish government to press ahead with the Gdańsk accords. No one on the Politburo welcomed this decision—Gierek insisted that "under threat of a general strike, we must choose the lesser evil and then find a way to get out of it"—but in the absence of a viable alternative, the Politburo reluctantly concluded that, for the time being, the strikers' demands would have to be fulfilled.¹⁷

Third, the Suslov Commission's directive specified two related but separate tasks. The first was the granting of authority to the Soviet defense ministry to mobilize "up to 25,000 military reservists and 6,000 vehicles" to flesh out three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division in the Belorussian, Baltic, and Transcarpathian Military Districts. As mentioned above, this task was carried out right away. The four divisions in question were all mobilized within a day or two, but they were not intended to remain that way indefinitely. Soon after the Soviet Politburo decided in late August 1980 that the time was not yet ripe to "provide military assistance" to Poland, these initial four divisions were brought back to a lower state of readiness and the mobilized reservists were released.

Even so, this did not mean that the first part of the August 28 directive ceased to be relevant. The scenario envisaged in the directive was largely preserved in the subsequent mobilization of Soviet troops in late 1980 and 1981. In the fall of 1980, after the initial four Soviet divisions had been demobilized, the Soviet Union gradually brought three motorized rifle divisions up to full troop strength and put them on high alert. In mid- to late December 1980, U.S. electronic intercepts and satellite reconnaissance were able to confirm that these three divisions could have joined an airborne division and the two divisions of the Soviet Union's Northern Group of

Forces to deal with military contingencies in Poland.¹⁸

The other task specified in the August 28 directive was the granting of authorization for the Soviet defense ministry to "*plan for* the call-up of as many as 75,000 additional military reservists and 9,000 additional vehicles" (emphasis added). The difference between this task and the initial one is that in this case the authorization covered only *planning* for a further mobilization, not the mobilization itself. Although this planning was retained (and updated) for future contingencies, there is no evidence that any of the second-stage forces were actually mobilized at any point. In early December 1980, when the clouds covering Poland and the western Soviet Union were still too dense to permit clear satellite reconnaissance, U.S. officials had expected to find that some 15 Soviet tank and motorized divisions near Poland's borders were fully combat-ready. When the clouds abated in the latter half of December 1980 and the satellites were able to home in on Soviet units, U.S. intelligence analysts were surprised to learn that only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were actually mobilized.¹⁹ There is no evidence that any further Soviet tank or motorized divisions in the USSR were brought up to full combat readiness over the next year. Although the Soviet defense ministry was authorized to plan and prepare for further mobilizations (of five to seven divisions), the ministry did not actually go beyond the initial mobilization of four divisions on August 28-29 (which were then soon demobilized) and the gradual mobilization of three motorized rifle divisions in the fall of 1980.

Fourth, the number of reservists to be mobilized for the hypothetical follow-on operation seems on the high side. Soviet tank divisions at full strength numbered some 10,500 troops, and Soviet motorized rifle divisions numbered 12,500. The divisions in the four Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe were normally maintained at full strength (a level of readiness designated as Category 1), but divisions in the western USSR were maintained at a much lower level of readiness. As of late 1980, roughly one-quarter of the 33 Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts were maintained at 50-75 percent of full strength (Category 2 readiness), and the other three-quarters were kept at only around 20 percent of full strength (Category 3).²⁰ The allocation of these units is shown in Table 1. (Other Category 2 divisions, it is worth noting, could have been brought in from elsewhere in the western USSR.) Curiously, even though both types of line divisions were *not* combat-ready, they were described in Soviet parlance as "constantly ready divisions" (*divizii postoyannoi gotovnosti*).²¹

The initial mobilization covered by the Suslov Commission's directive, encompassing three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, seems just about right in size. This mobilization would have had to involve four Category 2 divisions, which could be

mobilized very rapidly when necessary. Because Category 3 forces would have taken at least one to three months to bring up to full readiness, they obviously could not have been part of the initial mobilization on 28-29 August. Only Category 2 forces would have been mobilized at this stage. Using the lower figure of 50 percent as the manpower strength of the four Category 2 divisions, one can see that some 22,000 reservists would have been needed to bring the four up to full strength. The other 3,000 reservists presumably would have been allocated to various support and logistical roles. Hence, the total number of mobilized reservists in this initial phase on 28-29 August 1980—that is, 25,000—seems perfectly plausible.

Table 1.

Soviet Line Divisions in the Western USSR, Late 1980

<u>Readiness Category</u>	<u>Tank Divisions</u>	<u>Motorized Rifle Divisions</u>
Category 2	4	4
Category 3	10	15
Totals	14	19

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

Note: These forces potentially could have been supplemented by other forces in the western USSR outside the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts.

The authorized numbers for the hypothetical second phase, however, are somewhat less easy to reconcile. If the additional 75,000 reservists were designated to flesh out five to seven more Category 2 divisions, the number of reservists was considerably higher than it should have been. Even if one assumes that seven (rather than five) additional Category 2 divisions would have been mobilized and that all seven were motorized divisions (with higher troop strength), only 43,750 reservists would have been needed to bring the seven divisions up to full strength. Some of the remaining 31,250 reservists might have been assigned to support and logistical roles, but it is unlikely that this would have accounted for more than about 8,000 to 10,000. Hence, a gap of well over 20,000 remains.

Two possible factors may account for this gap.

First, it might be argued that some or all of the five to seven extra divisions would have been Category 3 forces (so-called “cadre divisions” or “inactive divisions”) rather than Category 2. If all seven were Category 3 motorized rifle divisions (of the fifteen that were available), roughly 70,000 reservists would have been needed to bring them up to full strength. The other 5,000 reservists could then have been assigned to support and logistical functions.²²

This explanation may seem plausible at first glance, but it actually is problematic. It is true that all three of the Soviet motorized rifle divisions that were brought up to full strength as of December 1980 were originally Category 3 divisions. The weeks that passed in the autumn of 1980 had permitted enough time for all the pre-mobilization training and preparations of those units to be completed. But there is no evidence that Category 3 forces were slated for a potential second stage of mobilization (whose planning was authorized by the 28 August directive). On the contrary, there is strong reason to believe that the “constantly ready divisions” designated for a hypothetical second stage were Category 2 forces (of which at least eight were available, as shown in Table 1) rather than Category 3. Soviet military commanders were willing to draw on Category 3 forces when they had ample time in the fall of 1980 to carry out pre-mobilization training and preparations for the projected Soyuz-80 “exercises” (scheduled for early December); but because they were not actually mobilizing any of the additional five to seven Soviet divisions needed for a possible second stage, they would have wanted to be able to mobilize the extra divisions very rapidly if circumstances so warranted. Hence, it is highly unlikely that they would have relied on anything other than Category 2 forces for a second-stage mobilization if such a mobilization had been deemed necessary. The much more numerous Category 3 forces were useful when sufficient lead-time was available to mobilize for the first stage of Soyuz-80, but if a second stage had been necessary at short notice, the Soviet Army would have wanted to rely on the eight Category 2 forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts, supplemented perhaps by Category 2 forces in other parts of the western USSR and by combat-ready units from the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe.

A more plausible explanation for the high number of reserves in the projected second phase is that Soviet military planners wanted a margin of safety in case they needed to mobilize more than seven extra divisions. Authorization to plan for the mobilization of just five to seven extra divisions, as stipulated in the directive, may have seemed enough for an initial request. But Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted leeway to proceed with a larger mobilization if circumstances so warranted. They could have mobilized at least eight Category 2 divisions in the western USSR (as shown in Table 1), and they might have wanted additional reservists to fill out Category 2 divisions that could have been brought in from elsewhere. Indeed, it seems likely that by December 1980 the Soviet Army was planning for the possible mobilization of another eleven divisions rather than just five to seven. East German military documents and the testimony of a former Polish General Staff officer, Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, both refer to a total of as many as fifteen Soviet divisions that would have taken part in a two-stage process.²³ (Four would have come in initially, and eleven could have served as reinforcements in a second stage.)

Clearly, the planning that began in late August 1980 for the possible mobilization of an additional 75,000 reservists — the level stipulated in the Suslov Commission's memorandum — enabled Soviet military officials to expand their efforts very quickly so that a second-stage mobilization might have covered as many as eleven extra divisions. Although some of the extra divisions might have come from the combat-ready divisions in the USSR's Northern Group of Forces (which had two) and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (which had nineteen), Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted to minimize their drawdown of the Groups of Soviet Forces. Hence, they would have wanted to be ready to rely on as many Category 2 divisions as possible.

Whatever the precise explanation may be, there is no doubt that the numbers in the memorandum pertaining to a second phase of troop mobilization were large enough to give Soviet military planners a substantial degree of latitude.

Fifth, the projected size of each of the two stages of mobilization, as laid out in the memorandum, sheds valuable light on Soviet military options vis-à-vis Poland. The initial mobilization, on 28-29 August, applied to four Soviet divisions in the western USSR: three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division. These four divisions were soon demobilized, but the scenario outlined in the 28 August directive, as noted above, was largely preserved. Top-secret East German military documents regarding units slated to take part in the Soyuz-80 "exercises" in Poland in early December 1980 mentioned four Soviet divisions.²⁴ According to the East German documents, the four Soviet divisions were supposed to join two Czechoslovak tank divisions, one East German tank division, and four Polish mechanized divisions in the first stage of "exercises." (The four Polish divisions were included only after Jaruzelski insisted on it.) Because the numbers of Soviet divisions cited in the East German documents are identical to figures in the Suslov Commission's directive, this implies that the option of a limited Soviet intervention in Poland, as envisaged in the directive for late August 1980, was basically the same option under consideration in early December.

The numbers in the East German materials and the Suslov Commission's directive are fully in line with evidence from U.S. photoreconnaissance satellites, which in mid- to late December 1980 revealed that three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were combat-ready. Even though the satellites detected only three mobilized Soviet divisions rather than four (the number specified in the East German documents and the initial number mobilized on August 28 under the Suslov Commission's directive), the difference is readily explained by East German military charts prepared for Soyuz-81.²⁵ These charts reveal that after four Soviet divisions were mobilized on August 28-29 and then demobilized, and after pre-mobilization training got under way in the fall of 1980 for three Category 3 motorized rifle

divisions, the complexion of the scenario was altered somewhat. Instead of three tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, the contingent of four Soviet divisions was supposed to include an airborne division to go with three motorized rifle divisions. Because Soviet airborne divisions were always maintained at full combat readiness, one of these divisions could have immediately joined the three full-strength Soviet motorized rifle divisions in early December 1980 to move into Poland under the guise of an "exercise." (U.S. intelligence sources at the time detected unusual preparations by a Soviet airborne division in the Baltic Military District, which presumably would have been the unit sent in.)

Thus, the fundamental scenario for the entry of Soviet forces into Poland, adjusted for the types of divisions included, is corroborated by evidence from all the newly available sources.

To the extent that this scenario was intended as a real option and not just a means of exerting pressure, these findings suggest that Soviet leaders in late November 1980 were seriously preparing to send troops to Poland in early December to help the authorities there impose martial law. It is crucial to note, however, that any such intervention would have been intended to support the regime, not to dislodge it. In that sense, the scenario was very different from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, which was intended to eliminate the reform-minded Communists led by Alexander Dubcek and bring in a hardline regime.

The reason that this option ultimately was not carried out is that by early December 1980 both Jaruzelski and Kania had made clear to Soviet leaders that they were not yet ready to impose martial law. Under those circumstances, they warned, the entry of Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak troops would greatly aggravate the situation. The result, according to Kania and Jaruzelski, might be large-scale violence, which could spiral out of control. The two Polish leaders promised that if they were given a bit more time, they could resolve the crisis without having to rely on intervention by Soviet troops. If Kania and Jaruzelski had instead been amenable to the entry of Soviet forces on December 8 (the scheduled starting date for the "exercises"), the scenario undoubtedly would have been carried out as planned. But because the Polish leaders were not yet ready to accept allied troops, Moscow's plans had to be put on hold.

The second stage of troop mobilizations, involving another five to seven Soviet divisions, would have been carried out only if "the situation in Poland deteriorates further" and "the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces." These rather vague formulations do not shed much light on the prospective timing of a second-phase mobilization, but even if the second phase were fully implemented, the numbers involved do not suggest that Soviet leaders were ever seriously planning to invade Poland in the same way they intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The numbers

in question were simply too small. Judging from the size of the invading force deployed in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it seems likely that Soviet leaders would have wanted to mobilize at least 30 Soviet divisions if they were contemplating an invasion of Poland that would have been aimed at neutralizing the Polish army, crushing all armed resistance, and establishing a pro-Soviet regime. Secret estimates by U.S. military intelligence analysts in the fall of 1980 predicted that Soviet leaders would want to mobilize at least 30 divisions for a full-scale invasion of Poland.²⁶ Some U.S. intelligence cables from Eastern Europe put the figure even higher, at around 45.²⁷ These numbers would have made sense if the Soviet Politburo had been contemplating an invasion of Poland similar to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the numbers given in the August 28 memorandum fall so far short of that level that they could not possibly be for the same type of contingency.

It is conceivable, of course, that the August 28 memorandum was superseded by other documents that authorized the Soviet defense ministry to plan for the mobilization of some 15 to 20 further divisions, making a total of at least 30. There is no evidence, however, that this was the case. Following the demobilization of the three Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions that were briefly mobilized on 28-29 August 1980, only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were fully mobilized during the crisis. The figures provided by East German military sources and by Ryszard Kukliński indicate that as many as fifteen Soviet divisions might eventually have been brought up to full combat readiness if the situation had deteriorated. However, that figure, which was never attained, was still vastly short of 30 (not to mention 45, a figure that many U.S. intelligence officials were wont to cite all through the crisis). No documentation or other evidence gives any reason to believe that the Soviet defense ministry at any time was planning for a Czechoslovak-style operation.

On the other hand, the new evidence does suggest that, at least for a while, Soviet leaders were seriously considering the option of a limited military intervention in Poland. This option loomed large in late August 1980 and again in early December 1980. The Soviet leadership's preference all along was to have the Polish authorities implement martial law on their own as soon as possible. But if that goal proved infeasible, the Soviet Politburo was willing to provide help, at least during the first several months of the crisis. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, emphasized this point when he spoke with Kania and Jaruzelski in Warsaw in early April 1981:

Our common goal should be to resolve the crisis without having to send allied armies into Poland. All socialist states should strive toward this end. Unless the Polish state security organs and Polish army are deployed, outside support cannot be expected, since it

would cause international complications. The Polish comrades must try first to solve their problems on their own. But if they cannot manage on their own and appeal for help, that type of situation would be very different from one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed in Poland from the outset.²⁸

It is far from clear that Soviet intervention under these circumstances would have made much sense. Polish officials had discreetly warned Kulikov that "it is even possible that if other Warsaw Pact troops move into Poland, certain units [of the Polish army] might rebel."²⁹ Because Soviet troops were already deeply embroiled in Afghanistan, the last thing the Soviet Politburo wanted was to provoke a large-scale conflict in Europe, which might drag on for months. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union went to such great lengths in 1980-81 to ensure that any prospective intervention by allied forces would be fully supported by Polish leaders.

Even though a good deal of new evidence shows that the Soviet Union made extensive plans and preparations for military intervention in Poland in 1980-81, this does not necessarily mean that there was ever a firm *intention* in Moscow to send in troops, especially if the Polish Communist regime was actively opposed to such a step. There is still not—and may never be—any way to know whether the Soviet Union would have invaded Poland if Polish leaders had openly refused to impose martial law or if the martial law operation in December 1981 had collapsed and widespread violence had broken out. None of the new evidence has resolved that question, and perhaps none ever will. Nevertheless, three things do now seem clear: first, that Soviet leaders for some time were willing to send in a limited number of Soviet divisions to help the Polish authorities impose martial law; second, that this option would have been pursued only if Polish leaders had supported and been willing to make good use of the incoming forces; and third, that Soviet leaders wanted to give themselves fall-back options for other military contingencies in case the situation in Poland took a disastrous turn.

Not until mid- to late 1981 did the situation in Poland change enough to permit Soviet leaders to deemphasize the military option. Once Kania was gone from the scene and Jaruzelski was ensconced in all the top posts, Soviet officials had much greater confidence that martial law could be introduced in Poland without outside help. Some form of military option was still present, but the scenarios that loomed so large in late August and early December 1980 had largely receded by late 1981. Even so, the Suslov Commission's operational directive of 28 August 1980 is a telling reminder of how close the Polish crisis came to escalating into a much wider conflict.

Document

SPECIAL DOSSIER
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CPSU CC

The situation in the PPR remains tense. The strike movement is operating on a countrywide scale.

Taking account of the emerging situation, the Ministry of Defense requests permission, in the first instance, to bring three tank divisions (1 in the Baltic MD, 2 in the Beloruss. MD) and one mechanized rifle division (Transcarp. MD) up to full combat readiness as of 6:00 p.m. on 29 August to form a group of forces in case military assistance is provided to the PPR.

To fill out these divisions, it will be necessary to requisition from the national economy up to 25 thous. military reservists and 6 thous. vehicles, including 3 thous. to replace the vehicles taken from these troops to help out with the harvest. Without the extra vehicles, the divisions cannot bring their mobile reserves up to full readiness. The necessity to fill out the divisions at the expense of resources from the national economy arises because they are maintained at a reduced level in peacetime. The successful fulfillment of tasks during the entry of these divisions into the territory of the PPR requires combat arrangements to be established some 5-7 days in advance.

If the situation in Poland deteriorates further, we will also have to fill out the constantly ready divisions of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts up to wartime level. If the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces, we must increase the group of our own forces by another five-seven divisions. To these ends, the Ministry of Defense should be permitted to plan the call-up of as many as 75 thous. additional military reservists and 9 thous. additional vehicles.

In this case, it would mean that a total of up to 100 thous. military reservists and 15 thous. vehicles would have to be requisitioned from the national economy.

The draft of a CPSU CC directive is attached.

(signed) (signed) (signed)
M. SUSLOV A. GROMYKO Yu. ANDROPOV D.

(signed) (signed)
USTINOV K. CHERNENKO

28 August 1980

No. 682-op (3 pp.)

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¹"Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," No. P210/II (Top Secret), 25 August 1980, in Tsentral'noye Khraneniye Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 1, List (L.) 1.

²The length of the draft resolution can be gauged from a handwritten notation at the bottom of the memorandum, which indicates that the document is a total of three pages.

³Among the countless other documents composed in this way were dozens of memoranda outlining the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles and other weaponry in Cuba in 1962 and the vast quantity of forms filled out by the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) to supply arms, intelligence equipment, and combat training to Communist and pro-Soviet guerrillas in the Third World. A good sample of these latter documents are available in Fond 89 of TsKhSD.

⁴Of particular relevance to this article is an item by Kevin Klose that appeared on 2 December 1980 in *The Washington Post* under the title "Soviet Reservists Activated Since August" (pp. A-1, A-14). Klose reported that "according to stories circulating here [in Moscow], reservists in the Carpathian Military District were activated in great haste in August [and will] remain on duty until the end of the year." The Suslov Commission memorandum corroborates this report. It is interesting to see that even a limited call-up of reservists eventually became known to well-situated observers.

⁵A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 55, 57.

⁶Several such maps are available from the former East German military archive, all of which deal with the same general scenario discussed below. Some of the relevant East German military documents, from the Militärisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam, are cited below.

⁷See, e.g., several clear-cut references to the Polish leaders' objections in the Soviet Politburo transcripts I have translated for publication by CWIHP. See also "Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübung 'SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in Militärisches Zwischenarchiv-Potsdam (MZA-P), Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54. See translation in this *Bulletin*.

⁸On Jaruzelski's change of heart, see my article, "Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland," in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

⁹U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), declassified in December 1998. I am grateful to Douglas J. MacEachin for providing me with a copy of this valuable document, which, among other things, contains a map showing the location of Soviet divisions in the western USSR.

¹⁰TASS dispatch, 27 August 1980, reprinted as "K sobytiyam v Pol'she," *Pravda* (Moscow), 28 August 1980, p. 4.

¹¹Gierek discussed this letter at the PUWP Politburo meeting on August 28. See "Protokół Nr. 27 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 28 sierpnia 1980 r.," 28 August 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Włodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarność" 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 78-82.

¹²See the account by Stanisław Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 33-34.

¹³"Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 29.VIII.1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Urzędu Ochrony Państwa (AUOP), Sygnatura (Sygn.) 2309/IV, Tom (T.) 2. See also the contributions by Janusz Krupski and Jarema Maciszewski in Kancelaria Sejmu, *O stanie wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 108-110 and 126-128, respectively.

¹⁴"Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 29. VIII. 1980r.," Stronica (S.)1.

¹⁵See Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 183-185.

¹⁶"Protokół Nr. 28 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 29 sierpnia 1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Secret), in Włodek, ed., *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, pp. 84-90.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸CIA, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 2-3. These preparations were first reported by the CIA in a "Special Analysis" on 24 December 1980.

¹⁹The problems posed by the cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. The Special Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980 marked the first solid determination since the cloud cover had receded over the western USSR that only three Soviet divisions were on full alert. For further information, see CIA "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 1-5.

²⁰CIA, "Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion," pp. 2-4. For further comments on the state of Soviet line divisions, see U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1986*, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1986), pp. 98-99, which indicates that 40 percent, not 25 percent, of Soviet forces in the "western USSR" were Category 2. The discrepancy presumably arises because of different definitions of what the "western USSR" comprises.

²¹All Soviet line divisions other than depot divisions were officially described as "constantly ready." In Soviet parlance, "constant readiness" was the lowest of four levels of combat readiness: constant, increased, "threat of war," and full.

²²This proportion of reservists for support and logistical roles may seem low, but two factors may account for that. First, the support requirements for "exercises," involving mainly rations and transportation, would have been lower than those for "war," which would entailed much more demanding requirements for ammunition and the like. Second, logistical preparations do not proceed in a strictly linear fashion. Once a certain threshold has been reached, it is possible to expand logistical/support effectiveness without a commensurate increase in the number of support personnel.

²³"Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or

2 December. The lengthy interview with Colonel Kukliński is in "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-55. Kukliński was one of the officers on the Polish General Staff responsible for drafting the martial law plans. He also had long been working for the CIA. He had to escape from Poland in November 1981. See my article in this *Bulletin*.

²⁴See, for example, "Erläuterungen," Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st). See also "Einweisung," Bl. 16.

²⁵See the two documents cited in the previous note.

²⁶Gates, *From the Shadows*, pp. 163-164.

²⁷U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Estimates on Polish Intervention Forces," Cable No. 14933, 7 November 1980, in National Security Archive, Flashpoints Collection, Polish Crisis 1980-1981. This cable evidently is based on comments by a high-ranking Romanian military officer.

²⁸"Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA," Bl. 54.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Bl. 55.

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More Documents on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1982

Editor's Note: The translations of the following documents were prepared for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," organized and sponsored by the National Security Archive (Washington), the Institute of Political Studies/Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw), and CWIHP. Copies of these and other documents (as well as translations) are accessible in the Archive/CWIHP "Russian and Eastern European Archival Documents Database." (For further information, contact: The National Security Archive; 2130 H St., NW; Gelman 701; Washington, DC 20037; tel: 202/994-7000.)

Stenographic Minutes of the Meeting of Leading Representatives of the Warsaw Pact Countries in Moscow, 5 December 1980

(Start: 11:00 a.m.)

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Dear Comrades! I warmly welcome you, our allies in the Warsaw Pact, our friends, in the name of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU and thank you for your speedy and positive response to the invitation for the meeting.

[...]

There are also events in Poland, difficult and alarming ones. This is the main question. We understand the great concerns of Comrade Kania and of all our political friends who are in a difficult situation.

The crisis in Poland concerns, of course, all of us. Various forces are mobilizing against socialism in Poland, from the so-called liberals to the fascists. They are dealing blows against socialist Poland. The objective, however, is the entire socialist community.

As we all know, the Polish comrades only recently held the 7th CC Plenum. Perhaps we will ask them to provide us with information about this work. They will probably not mind discussing, here in the circle of friends, measures, the implementation of which could result in overcoming the crisis situation, strengthening socialist Poland.

I think the comrades will agree with me that Comrade Kania will speak first. Then the other comrades will have the opportunity to speak.

We should agree on the procedure of our consultation. What proposals do we have regarding the chairman?

Todor Živkov:

I think we should not chair our meeting today in alphabetical order. Since our meeting will only have two sessions, I would propose that the Soviet delegation as hosts chair this meeting.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Are there objections?—Thank you, comrades, for your confidence. [...] Comrade Kania now has the floor.

Stanisław Kania:

Dearest Comrade Leonid Ilyich! Dearest Comrades! It is difficult for me to speak to you here today as a representative of the leadership of the Polish Party. This is not only difficult because it is the first time that I speak to you, the party leaders, in this circle, but it is also difficult for us as representatives of the Polish leadership to speak here and before our compatriots at home; it is difficult to speak to you here in particular because the main sources of the political crisis which has gripped our country are concentrated at the level of our Party. The crisis is also the topic of our meeting today which we interpret as an expression of the internationalist concerns about the situation in our country.

Our situation is indeed very complicated. There are great dangers to socialism. The dangers pose themselves in the economic field and bring anarchy and counterrevolution into our country.

We are quite conscious what responsibility we carry for our Party, for our workers' class, and for the Polish people in order to resolve this crisis effectively. We are also aware of the internationalist responsibility for the socialist camp and the international Communist movement.

We are an important and inseparable part of the socialist community of states, and we know that the situation in Poland is also causing various complications for our neighbors. We know very well that we ourselves must lead the country out of this difficult situation. This is our responsibility, and we are convinced that we have a real chance for the resolution of these tasks.

We keep in constant contact with the leadership of the CPSU and very much appreciate your views and advice, which you have given us, Comrade Leonid Ilyich. We realize the fundamental importance of your views of our difficulties, and it conforms to our opinion on the causes of the problems that are occurring in Poland.

For the second time, your name stands for sensitivity not only for a class-conscious assessment but also for the national peculiarities and for the situation in Poland. [...]

What are the causes of the crisis? This is not the first, but one of several profound crises in Poland. We had the year 1956 and the bloody events in Poznań, with the ensuing changes in the leadership of the Party and the great wave of revisionism in Poland. There was the year 1968, the well-known incidents by students, but there were dramatic, bloody events in 1970 as well, in December of that year, along the coast. In 1976, major incidents were

staged in Radom and Ursus in connection with the preparation for price increases.

Today's crisis affects the working class, but also other segments of the population, and the crisis is of a mass character. Young people prove to be particularly active, especially young workers, technicians, and engineers, and this crisis has lasted for a long time. The strike phase is behind us, but the crisis persists, and we are affected by the results on a daily basis. The situation has become demoralizing because one cannot hand out more than one produces.

The crisis also created new structures which are not of our making, in particular the new labor unions which create a lot of difficulties for us and pose an attempt by the enemy of socialism in Poland to test us.

There are various causes for [these] concerns, and questions can indeed be asked whether the estimate of the conflict in Poland is correct, whether we are on the right track to get out of this crisis.

We completely agree with Comrade Leonid Ilyich that it is necessary to analyze more thoroughly the anatomy of these occurrences which have led to the crisis, of all mechanisms which caused the undermining of the Party, the government, and even the economy of the country and which have allowed enemy forces, the forces of counterrevolution, to penetrate the working class.

Despite the various difficulties, we are of the opinion that our estimates accord with the reality of the situation. The main reason for the problems was dissatisfaction among the workers. There were, of course, real reasons for this dissatisfaction. That was the reason for the mass character of the strike movement. There were strikes in many major Polish plants, even in those which can look back to a long revolutionary tradition.

The Party proved to be extremely weak in the ideological field. We were faced with the results of policy which ignored the class character of society. The slogan of the achievement of modern socialist society was proclaimed much too early. This took place at a time when individual farmers in Poland still constituted the majority in the countryside, and in the 1970s, private enterprise spread over large parts of the trade business as well as other areas of the economy. [...]

Looking back today at these difficulties in the situation, we believe that the use of political measures for the resolution of the strike conflicts was a correct decision. Other solutions and other decisions could have provoked an avalanche of incidents and led to a bloody confrontation, the results of which would have affected the entire socialist world. Despite the difficult problems, it seems to us that there was no other resort than to compromise in the question of permitting the establishment of the new labor union. [...]

What is there to say about the period after the great wave of strikes? How should it be evaluated? It is a period of a very hard political battle, a difficult period for the Party. The new union "Solidarity" developed out of the

strike committees, not at the initiative of the workers but at the initiative of anti-socialist elements. But by and large, this organization was supported by the workers throughout the entire country, and it is popular nationwide since the workers achieved social benefits through the strikes. [...]

Foreign imperialist diversion centers have shown great activity and even aggressiveness towards Poland, in particular the radio station "[Radio] Free Europe," the centers of reactionary emigration, which have supported anti-socialist actions by means of propaganda and also by giving financial support to "Solidarity". We have protested sharply against this, and there are certain positive results, a certain retreat of the enemy forces.

[...]

We have, of course, lost some of our prestige in the eyes of party activists, due to these compromises. Even if a certain state of criticism has been reached, we nevertheless managed to isolate some of the anti-socialist elements. The public did not react too agreeably to this. A situation occurred in which it was necessary to put a number of repressive measures, including administrative measures, into effect.

Created by the Politburo, a group which operates under the direction of the premier, is preparing a series of different measures. This includes among other things the question of introducing martial law in Poland.—Actually, under our constitution we only have the option of declaring martial law.

It is also preparing an operation with the aim of arresting the most active functionaries of the counterrevolution.

It also developed guidelines for communications in the case of an emergency, and the same for the mass media, the newspapers, railroads and the (automobile) transport facilities in general.

We will also create special groups of particularly trustworthy party members which, if necessary, can be armed. We have already selected 19,000 such party members and are of the opinion that we will have about 30,000 by the end of December.

Information on these preparations has in part fallen into the hands of leading of the counterrevolution.

The assessment of the 7th Plenum has further toughened our policy. We think that it created a more favorable atmosphere for a counteroffensive than had previously existed.

[...]

We have to become active, on all fronts. Most important is the internal unity of the Party, its stamina, its influence on the working class. These are the main pre-conditions of taming the counterrevolutionary forces.

The course of events might naturally confront us with the necessity of implementing other measures, measures not limited to the political confrontation which we have expected, but measures of confrontation associated with repressive measures. Believe me, comrades, that in that case we will have sufficient determination with respect to

the counterrevolution, in order to defend socialism, the socialist position, in Poland.

Todor Živkov:

Dear Comrades! In consideration of the nature of our meeting, I would like to address some key questions and explain the views of our Party with regard to the situation in Poland. [...]

What is our estimate of the situation in Poland, our general estimate? For five months now, events have been shaking Poland, which causes us great concern. We all understand that what is happening there is above all a Polish question and concerns the development of socialism in Poland. But we also understand quite well that it is not solely a Polish question. The developments in Poland concern all socialist countries, the entire socialist community. [...]

The general estimate of the situation has two aspects, I think. The first one concerns the question of what is actually happening in Poland, of the character of the processes which are taking place there, what the causes are, and what forces are behind these events.

A second aspect is the answer to the question of what the situation in this country actually is, what the reality of the situation is, what the main danger is.

It is important, for example, if we take the first, and we have no chance and time to analyze this very thoroughly, we will be able to do that later, to give the first estimate now. This is even more important given that other political forces are actively trying to force their estimate on the public. The Eurocommunists, for example, talk about the historical events in Poland and about the necessity for all socialist countries to go through this development. Yugoslavia is massively spreading its own interpretation of the Polish events, as if they were new evidence of the correctness of the Yugoslav way and the Yugoslav brand of socialism. Not to mention the Western countries which attentively and actively watch and react to the Polish events. They are spreading the opinion that the Polish events have proved again that the political and economic system of socialism is not viable.

Our general opinion is that we are dealing with a very serious political and economic crisis in Poland which on the one hand was caused by flaws in the policy under the current leadership of the Polish Party and Government, on the other hand by the plans and activities of anti-socialist forces which without doubt have for quite some time been active inside and outside of Poland.

What concerns us is that there is no clear and reasonable estimate, and there is no program for a way out of the situation that has developed. Our opinion is that the lack of such a program is one of the reasons why change is only occurring very slowly here. Up to this point, there has now not been a mobilization of forces to the fullest extent possible. It is lacking! The defensive actions are continued. There are even certain steps back from the

political plan.

We understand the necessity for compromises but one should clearly look ahead and consider for what purpose one makes these compromises and where they might lead. As long as no major changes occur, until the party does not seize the initiative, we can not speak at all of a turn of events.

What is our opinion on the ways out of this situation? We think that the solution has to be found in the People's Republic of Poland itself. One should work out various options which are appropriate for the situation, and our Polish comrades should be ready to apply these options in the country by means of the Polish United Workers' Party and the People's Republic of Poland. Our estimate is that such possibilities exist at this very moment.

Secondly, in our opinion, the Polish Party should try and consistently pursue going on the offensive. Of course, the Polish comrades know best which possibilities and ways exist for such an offensive. But some aspects should also be viewed from our point of view. There is, for example, a certain degree of fatigue in view of the events of the last five months, which, of course, affects the social situation of the people. There is the prospect that the economic situation and the situation of the workers will further deteriorate. One should state very clearly who is to blame for this and who creates obstacles [to improvement]. One cannot strike endlessly, one cannot live endlessly on credit, and one cannot demand a better life without improving production. This should be stated quite clearly.

There are healthy forces—the army, security forces, and the larger part of Party and population. These are forces that the Party and the state organs can rely on. While it is indeed necessary in today's situation to be flexible, too, it is also right to defend the socialist position in the current situation with greater certainty and greater vigor. [...] I would like to address briefly the question of strategic goals the class enemy is pursuing and the eminently important strategic dangers which result from the events in Poland.

It seems that the West now hardly harbors any illusions of changing the social order in Poland in such a way that Poland would leave the Warsaw Pact and pull back to the extent that it would change the political landscape. Of course, the enemy has done and is doing everything to effect a change of the social system, the economic system in our countries, among them Poland. But now the strategic plan of the West is clearly to put a different system into practice in Poland which diverges from real socialism and heads into the direction of liberal socialism, a model which then could pose as an example and provoke changes in the social order in other countries of the socialist community.

Imperialism pursues its policy of interference in internal Polish affairs, and is accompanied by the massive propaganda drums about an alleged intervention by the Soviet Union and the other countries. Nationalist feelings

are stirred, attempts [are made] to hide the class character of the events, to cover up the counterrevolution, and to extol friends as foes and vice versa.

I want to state quite frankly: To our mind, there is at this moment a real chance of a change of the social order in Poland. We should not underestimate this! If we had to give a strict class-based estimate now, we would have to say that the possibilities of a political approach, which the Polish comrades have taken thus far, have been exhausted. In our opinion, the situation in Poland is clear and no further clarification is required.[...]

János Kádár:

Dear Comrades!

[...] For us, the views of the Polish comrades on the situation in their country are very important. Of course, we base our own evaluation of the political situation above all on the opinion of the Polish comrades and also on the publications in the Polish press, on the international press and on our own experience. [...]

How could one describe the Hungarian position in this question?

Before I address this question, I would like to make one more remark. I fully agree with Comrade Žhivkov and would like to express the view that the imperialist propaganda concerning Poland, which is also broadcast to Hungary, implies that the other European socialist countries are equally nervous and concerned about the Polish events, claiming that we feared, as they say, the Polish pest. They declare that this could also undermine our order, etc.

I would like to say the following about that in order to avoid any misunderstandings: for the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and for the Hungarian people, a number of concerns exist in the current period of socialist construction. We have our own problems and worries, we are struggling with them, and we will resolve them in the appropriate manner.

In consideration of this I would like to state nevertheless: As far as we are concerned, the Polish events are of little concern to us in terms of [our] domestic politics. We do not fear any great disruption in connection with them. But our Party, our Government, our entire people are particularly concerned about the Polish question in international terms, and this is of concern to us all. [...]

What do we have to be aware of? It will, to a certain degree, surely be helpful for the Polish comrades to know what the mood is in our countries. They should know.

When we got the first news about the strikes on the coast, there were certain reactions [in Hungary]. I am speaking now not about the party members and the party leadership but about the man in the street, thus *de facto* about the ideologically and politically less qualified masses. The first reaction was as follows: What do the Polish comrades think they are doing? To work less and

earn more? Then it was said: What do the Polish comrades think they are doing: they want to strike and we are supposed to do the work?—I must frankly state here that this is what the feeling was. These feelings were there though everybody knows that there exists a historical friendship between our two nations. [...]

Now further on our attitude. We are in complete solidarity with the Polish Communists, with the PUWP, with the Polish working class, and—in the traditional sense of the word—with the Polish nation. We would like for the Polish comrades to solve their problems by themselves, to find a socialist solution of the problem under the leadership of their party. This is our attitude, which we publicly announced in parliament.

We can not, of course, determine the tasks of the Polish comrades and have no intention of doing so. Nevertheless, I would like to state a few things. We think that, in their current struggle, the Polish comrades should focus on maintaining the leading role of the Party and the socialist, constitutionally-determined social order as well as the political system in Poland. This includes the mass media, radio and TV. These media are integrally linked to the question of power, and I welcome Comrade Kania's words on this subject.

The third, central task is, it seems to me, the defense, and the protection of the Warsaw Defense Pact.

I would like to address one other point here. As other fraternal parties represented here, we maintain very broad international contacts with organizations, parties etc. Practically every week we entertain visitors. In the course of the last week, representatives of a number of fraternal parties were with us; we had a meeting with the Yugoslavs; and in the context of peaceful coexistence we met last week with capitalists as well. What I state here as the Hungarian position is the same thing which we presented in our conversations with the respective partners, be it Latin American Communists or any imperialist representatives; everywhere we state the same thing as I am doing here.

About ten days ago, a meeting with the British foreign minister [Lord Carrington] took place, and last week, [Hans-Jürgen] Wischniewski, the deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party in West Germany, was here at the request of [West German Chancellor Helmut] Schmidt. I categorically told the Yugoslav comrades as well as Wischniewski and the British foreign minister the following: Our position is that this is an internal Polish question which has to be resolved by the Poles; that we were in solidarity with the Poles; but I also stated that there were certain limits to this, I could not put it any other way for the gentlemen. Poland is not for sale, and Poland can not be bought. Poland can't be detached from the Warsaw Pact. This is what I stated and I declared that I was deeply convinced that there were strong forces in Hungary which held the same opinion and would not permit this to happen. That's how I represented my point of view and that's how I told them, in order to let them know what they have to

expect.

The British asked: What does this mean? Is this the end of détente?—I said: No, but if these limits are reached, then détente would really be over. He said yes and then shut up. The West German representative reacted similarly.

Recently, we have used certain exchanges of opinion and consultations [sic], and we are asked: Well, if you had to give us advice, would you recommend that we act as you did. I would like to address this [issue] very frankly.

As far as the Hungarian Party is concerned, we have no authority and no ambitions as well, to give advice to anybody or to consider ourselves a model. But at the same time, we ascribe importance to the great revolutionary experiences of all fraternal parties. We think consultations such as today's are very important, and let me add:

You cannot copy or mechanically transfer revolutionary experience. This does not work. And whenever I am talking about our position, about our attitude, it is in friendship that I would like to state what the Polish fraternal party should do or what we would do if we were in its place.

To my mind it is now of decisive importance to maintain the position since retreat, the slippery slope downward, has not yet ended. One has to get one's act together and go on the offensive.

The second thing I would say is the following: The decisive thing is that there is an unequivocal, decisive socialist platform for future developments. And this has to happen right away. While you now have a program, it has to become more consistent.

Comrade Kania spoke of the plenum, of re-elections in the base organizations. I am glad to hear you say that the plenum would have to be postponed a bit further; because I think: without a precise platform one cannot conduct a good plenum; then one cannot elect good leading organs in the local organizations, since one does not know exactly which of the cadres are good and which are bad.

When we stewed in our own bitter juice in 1956, we dealt with this question in this way. When I asked people: Is this person still alive? Does he work?, I was often told: I have known him for 30 years. I responded: 30 years are not enough. Tell me how he acted last week. People change their behavior in such situations [as in 1956].

For this, you need a program, so that everybody can determine his attitude towards the Party and its program. You have to start at the top.

We do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish Party, but our own experiences tell us: in the critical times, the most important organ for the unity and action of the Party is the Central Committee, the highest organ. If there is a clear program and unity [of opinion] in this organ, everything is all set. But if there are 20 different opinions in the CC, nothing will come of it.[...]

As far as we know, the Polish Party now has 3.5 million members. I know that the situation there is somewhat odd.

One should probably not conduct purges now, but unfortunately the events themselves have resulted in such a purge. It is not important what the membership numbers are; it is instead important how many people participate in the struggle, how many adhere to your program.

Put the other way: there is no point in trying to achieve the unity of the Party based on compromises at any price. We need a clear platform, which will serve as a rallying point and a purge device. I think such a program could easily be used to set oneself apart from certain things, to distance oneself from the mistakes of the previous leadership very clearly and decisively, not just in words but also in deed and action.

This is one aspect. I will neither praise Gierek nor insult him. While one has to distance oneself, I would like to state, comrades, that the entire Party, the entire country, is now looking for scapegoats, and it will again lead you nowhere to spend most of your time calling people to account.

I am reminded again of 1956. Initially, we completely ignored Rákosi, we distanced ourselves from him and other comrades, quickly distanced ourselves politically from their policies, and we postponed the calling-into-account until 1962. I am not arguing that the Party Control Commission should not do its work now, but it should not be the primary focus of your work. It can't be that the entire Party now preoccupies itself with this. People will have to know: once we regain our strength, we will call those responsible into account. It is now important that the people's government builds a socialist Poland and protects the constitution.

The second thing we need is the following: We have to watch very carefully as to what are the limits up to which one can go in great [public] speeches. One should now be able to defend the fundamental order of the republic, even in party matters, and the party members will vote. What function they will serve within the Party is a matter for the Party, not for the entire nation. The Communists first need to establish order within their own ranks. We do not need some democratic forces for that. Therefore this has to be the limit.

For example, when people are arrested and then set free again, then there will again be discussions about militia work. Even in the Western press it has been stated that no country on earth could permit such things to happen at all. This is not a matter of ideological argument but a matter of the legal order, which has to be upheld throughout the country.

In order to make clear the limits of democraticism [sic], you have to have a program and be determined to do certain things.

Certain events, for example, took place without bloodshed. This is, of course, not a small matter. It has to be evident that the Polish Party and the Polish Government are not exactly looking for confrontation. They above all are not out to have people shot. But the defense of certain things has to be guaranteed—a defense by all means. And

this has to become evident. This is the best way to avoid bloodshed. Because if it is clear that every means possible will be employed, bloodshed will be avoided. This is the best solution. [...]

Finally, I would like to say the following: There are other effects in Hungary. I don't want to tell you what a depressed state of affairs we were in during the months from October to December 1956, thus during the decisive hours. We were very pessimistic but our foreign comrades supported us. Above all the Soviet comrades came to our help and told us—I well remember this, this is not just propaganda—you now need a reasonable policy. You are stronger than you think! And the Polish comrades should know this too: in reality, the forces of socialism in Poland are stronger than they appear at a first, superficial glance. Within a short time, positive decisions should be reached. Once again: you are stronger than you think. [...]

Erich Honecker:

Dear Comrades! [...]

These consultations were urgently necessary in view of the developments in the People's Republic of Poland. The events in our neighboring country Poland greatly worry the leadership of our Party, the Communists, the citizens of the German Democratic Republic. Nobody who cares for the cause of peace and socialism can be indifferent to what is happening in the PR Poland. [...]

We fully share the opinion that the survival of socialism in Poland is in acute danger. We recently spoke to comrades Kania, Żabiński, Olszowski and others about this and have pointed out that it was necessary to put an end to these developments. At the same time, we provided Poland in this difficult situation with major material support. [...] The citizens of our republic are also aware of the huge amount of aid for Poland from the Soviet Union, the CSSR and other socialist countries. Our people are well aware of this. But there are many questions as to what exactly has improved since the 6th Plenum of the CC of the PUPW. Workers, members of the intelligentsia and others have expressed their disappointment that the visit by comrades Kania and Pińkowski with Comrade Brezhnev has not lived up to their expectations.

We fully agreed with the results of this Moscow trip. Comrade Kania assured us on November 8 that the PUPW leadership would not withdraw one more step. But then there was the decision of the Supreme Court of the PR Poland which revised the decision of the Warsaw court. The Party and Government once more retreated from the counterrevolutionary forces. This resulted in a rapid escalation of counterrevolutionary activities and a massive deterioration of the situation. This was a major setback for all those who had hoped that the PUPW would master the problems. This is the main reason for the widespread discussions of the current situation in Poland within our Party and among our people and for the growing serious concerns about socialism in Poland which marks these

discussions.

There is obviously no disagreement among us about the fact that already the capitulation towards the strike committees in Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie was a mistake. But we don't want to judge this here. The fact is that following this capitulation, the enemy of the government sensed a chance to spread the strike and riots throughout the country. While weeks ago the strikes were confined above all to social demands, more recently political slogans have come increasingly to the fore.

The decision of the Supreme Court prevented a general strike, but "Solidarity" proved that it could initiate strikes at any time and thus blackmail the Party and Government. It even managed to force the liberation of people who had clearly been proved to have committed crimes. Yes, it even gained the assurance that it would be allowed to enter into negotiations on security matters. Such concessions inevitably will undermine the authority of the Party, other state and its organs. This has to worry everybody who is faithfully committed to the cause of socialism.

I was in Austria at the time of the Supreme Court deliberations. Kirchschräger and Kreisky asked my opinion about the events in Poland. We agreed, despite differing class positions, that Poland would be able to manage its affairs. Then, in the midst of a conversation with Kirchschräger, the news of the Supreme Court decision arrived. Honestly, I would never have been able to come up with such an idea: The Party becomes an appendix to the statute. I had gone to Vienna, basing my assumptions on what Comrade Kania had said. As many others, I never expected such a result.

As the current events show, the leadership of "Solidarity" and the forces behind it, especially KOR, consistently follow well-known counterrevolutionary strategy. Taking advantage of a wave of strikes, they established their organization in the shape of a union. Today they already have a legal political party. Their blackmail tactics have now resulted in a direct struggle for political power. The counterrevolutionary leaders—as Comrade Kania has stated—do not hide the fact that their objective is the elimination of the PUPW as the leading power [and] the elimination of socialist achievements. Initially, the strike organizations prevented anti-socialist and anti-Soviet slogans. Today they feel strong enough to pay homage to Piłsudski and to attack the Soviet Union, the GDR, the CSSR and the other fraternal socialist countries. As the facts prove, they are about to inflame a nationalist, anti-socialist hysteria.

Dear Comrades! One can hardly ignore that the events in Poland are for the main part the result of a coordinated plan of the internal and foreign counterrevolution. It is a part of the imperialist policy of confrontation and increased diversion against the socialist countries. It is important to recognize that the PUPW is confronted with an irreconcilable enemy. In order to defeat the counterrevolution, we think one needs an unambiguous

concept, an unambiguous policy of the Party, from top to the bottom.

You won't get anywhere with a boundless discussion of mistakes, to our mind. I would like to state that the damage of "propaganda of failures" is much higher than any "propaganda of success." In any case, you can't permit a situation in which the truth is suppressed in the public. This truth is that socialism, its shortcomings and mistakes notwithstanding, has brought the Polish nation great achievements, that not the Polish United Workers' Party but the leaders of "Solidarity" and the people who direct them are responsible for the current situation. Of course, one has to differentiate between a manipulated worker and the anti-socialist forces, but one also has to say clearly who the enemy is. [...]

Dear Comrades! We have to assume that, unfortunately, the situation in the PR Poland has developed to a point where administrative measures are necessary in addition to political measures, in order to destroy the counterrevolutionary conspiracy and stabilize the government. As you well know, we also had a difficult situation in the German Democratic Republic in 1953. Back then we still had an open border with the Federal Republic of Germany. The imperialists were instigating the fall of the workers-and-peasant power from without and counted on the counterrevolution from within. We therefore had to act quickly. We combined political with administrative measures. We made a public appeal to the party members and functionaries of our Party, to all who were committed to the defense and strengthening of the workers-and-peasants state. Within a short time we managed to isolate the counterrevolutionary forces from the workers and to defeat them.

It was stated here rightfully that the revolution could develop peacefully or in a non-peaceful manner, as we all know. As a Communist you have to be ready to consider both options as the situation demands and to act accordingly in the decisive moments. If the workers-and-peasants power, the government, is at risk, if it has to be protected from counterrevolutionary forces which are determined to go all the way, then there remains no other choice than to deploy the security organs of the workers-and-peasants state. This was our experience in 1953. This became evident in the events of 1956 in Hungary, about which Comrade Kádár spoke, and [in the events] of 1968 in the CSSR.

The representatives of the various groups, which now are mushrooming in Poland, state as a cover-up of their true intentions that their objective was the "democratic renewal of socialism" in Poland. But the opposite is the case. NATO and the EC declare quite frankly that this was a matter that falls under their protection.

I can remember quite well the conversation with Dubček on the occasion of the Dresden meeting in 1968 when I got him from the airport and took him to his residence. In the course of one hour Dubček tried to convince me what was happening in the CSSR was not a

counterrevolution but a "process of democratic renewal of socialism." What happened later, everybody knows. The Czechoslovak comrades under the leadership of Comrade Husák have composed a document about this that taught us a lot.

We are of the opinion that PUWP has enough healthy forces to solve the urgent tasks, based on the announcement of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, its directives and a clear plan. As we know, the PUWP has available reliable forces in its security organs, and we are convinced that the army as well will fulfill its patriotic and internationalist duty. This is how we understood the declaration of the Military Council of the Ministry for National Defense of the PR Poland, which was published after the 7th Plenum of the CC of the PUWP. In addition, there is the possibility of arming the healthy forces, about which Comrade Kania spoke here, within the Party and among the workers. We agree with Comrade Kania that there can be no further steps in retreat in the current situation. Only through the struggle against the counterrevolution can the Party unite its members and functionaries, [and] all class-conscious workers and lead them to success.

We in the German Democratic Republic are situated along the line that separates us from the Federal Republic and NATO. On a daily basis, we feel how the imperialist enemy tries to transfer counterrevolutionary activities from Poland to our country as well. The TV stations of the FRG, which can be received in our republic, have never previously reported so much about Poland and have never shown so much interest in the events in Polish factories. They have associated this for five months now with the call to do the same thing [in the GDR] as is now happening in Poland. They describe the developments in the PR Poland as an example of "democratic reform" and "necessary changes" in all socialist countries. That is why we were forced to tell our Party clearly what we thought of the developments in our socialist neighbor country. I stated in a speech before the party activists in Gera that insurmountable limits have been set on the counterrevolution west of the Elbe and Wera. This was not only understood well on our side [of the border]. Our Party takes a class-conscious view of the events in Poland. This also concerns the measures on the temporary limitation of the cross-border traffic.

Dear Comrades! We have gathered here in order to consult collectively on the possible support by the fraternal countries, which might be useful to Comrade Kania and all the comrades in the PUWP in strengthening the people's power in Poland. Our Party and our people have great expectations with regard to this meeting.

Never before has our Party felt so closely connected with the PUWP as in these difficult days and weeks. In this vein we have given orientation to the members of our Party. We remain in solidarity with the fraternal Polish people and its Party, the Polish United Workers' Party. And we are convinced: the cause of socialism will win.

Thank you for your attention.

Nicolae Ceaușescu:

Esteemed comrades! [...]

There are difficulties in some socialist countries. This is true for the events in Poland. This ought to give us cause to analyze the situation very seriously, to solve all problems, the problems of socialist and Communist construction, through collaboration among the socialist countries, based on our own strength. This is all the more important now that we approach the conclusion of the five-year plans and are passing to a new phase of economic and social development for the years 1981 to 1985.

I think I am not wrong in assuming: if we had analyzed the problems of the construction of socialism in our countries more frequently and thoroughly, we would have been able to avoid even the events in Poland. One has to assume that the cooperation of the socialist countries, the successful construction of socialism and Communism, is of special importance to our countries, but at the same time to the maintenance of socialist principles throughout the world, the entire international situation, the policy of détente, peace, and national independence. The socialist countries should demonstrate that they can indeed solve complex problems in the appropriate manner, that socialism provides a firm basis for economic development. One can say that socialism is quite capable of overcoming the appearances of an economic crisis situation and of giving the people greater independence and economic stability.

In the context of our discussions, it was emphasized that the events in Poland stand at the center of attention of the Communist parties and of the people of our community of states as well as all communist parties and progressive forces in the world. The entire international public also watches these events. There is no doubt that differing interpretations exist [as well as] different possibilities of analyzing the events.

But one can only say one thing: There is the concern and indeed the desire to have these problems resolved by the Poles themselves and to avoid their damaging the policy of détente, peace and cooperation. [...]

I would like to state initially that the Romanian Communist Party, our Central Committee and the Romanian people, are of the opinion that the problems in Poland should be solved by the PUWP, the Polish working class, the Polish people in complete unity and based on the assumption that it is necessary to assure the socialist development of Poland, to strengthen the economic base of Poland's independence and sovereignty and the material wealth of the Polish people, and to strengthen the cooperation between the socialist countries.

It is not the time now (and there is no reason) to have a thorough discussion about the reasons for this development. One thing is clear: economic difficulties

have exerted a strong influence on developments. As is evident from the decisions of the Plenum, today's state of crisis was also caused by some mistakes which happened in implementing socialist principles and the leading role of the Party, in securing the unity of the working class and the broad masses of the people. [...]

Comrade Kania has correctly stated that—and this is also evident from the Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party—attention has been called to the intensification the activities of the anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary elements in the country. To our mind, today's state of affairs could have been avoided if greater determination had been demonstrated previously. Even if there is dissatisfaction, you could have prevented the current dangerous course of events by greater determination. [...]

We do not want to interfere here in the internal events of Poland. The PUWP, the Polish working class and the Polish people as well as all the progressive forces in Poland know that they have to find the appropriate ways to overcome this situation, develop the economy, increase the standard of living, based on socialist construction and according to conditions in Poland.

Everything should be done to have an unambiguous orientation, to develop a program which makes it clear how the problems are to be solved—a program which the broad masses of the people will understand well and which then becomes the action program of above all the working class. One cannot imagine overcoming the current crisis situation without such a political program, which involves the working class and the people. [...]

We also do not understand how it was possible for so-called independent free unions to be established. But they are a reality today, and you indeed have to take them into consideration. One ought to act in [such] a way [so] that the unity of the workers and the unity of the unions—based on socialism—are regained. But for this purpose, you will need a clear policy and an unambiguous program even in this area, and that will take some time. [...]

I would like to underline again that the Polish comrades will have to do everything—it is their great international and national obligation—to assure socialist construction on their own. One also can not neglect the fact that the possibility of an external intervention would pose a great danger for socialism in general, for the policy of détente, and for the policy of peace. That's why we should give the Polish comrades all-out support to allow them to fulfill the tasks of securing the socialist construction of Poland on their own and in their own ways, which they indeed have. [...]

Gustáv Husák:

Dear Comrades! [...]

You can sense great concern about the current events in Poland in our Party and our people. This is not just because we are immediate neighbors—we have a common

border line of some 1,300 km, and this is, by the way, our longest border—but also because the threat to socialism in Poland constitutes a threat to our joint interests.

We in Czechoslovakia underwent a complicated process of development as well, when the counterrevolution went on the counteroffensive in our country, when the danger of civil war in the CSSR arose, and when there was a deadly danger to socialism. Comrade Kádár has reminded us of the events in Hungary in 1956, and Comrade Honecker has spoken about the events in the GDR.

The events which took place 12 years ago in Czechoslovakia still live in our memories, and in watching the events unfold in Poland today, we compare them to our own experience, even though we, of course, recognize the differences in time and circumstances.

But all these events in Hungary, in the GDR, in Czechoslovakia and now in Poland are characterized by a common goal on the part of the anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary forces of the forces which want to roll back socialism in Poland and detach these countries from the socialist camp. [...]

In our country, dissatisfaction also grew among the people, and we had to eliminate deformations, mistakes and shortcomings within the Party as well as within society.[...]

The imperialists quickly realized that an excellent opportunity had been given in Czechoslovakia to reach their long-term goal of destabilizing socialism. What took place there in those summer months in 1968 had long been prepared by imperialist circles and various reactionary, anti-socialist forces. This is also what has happened this summer in Poland.

The enemy has drawn conclusions from the events in Poland and in the CSSR. He proceeded differently in the CSSR than in Hungary, and he drew his conclusions from the events in the CSSR. He now acts differently in Poland than he did in the CSSR. He takes advantage of social dissatisfaction, of economic shortcomings, and tries to win over the masses by social demagoguery and to direct them towards anti-socialist actions, towards actions against the Party.

As it was, in the bourgeois propaganda, the CSSR became the best model of the democratic reform of socialism, that is, socialism with a human face. The CSSR was held up to all other socialist countries as a model. Even the Pope prayed for this process, for the rebirth of Czechoslovakia, and for Dubček as well, and if anything bad was done in the socialist countries, our country was pointed out as an example. As Comrade Honecker said, the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia. Now they would like to export Poland's crisis to the CSSR, the GDR and the other countries. We, of course, have introduced all necessary measures against this, and as far as we are concerned, there is no reason to be concerned.

[...]

The situation [in Czechoslovakia in 1968] culminated

to the point at which we could not fight off the attack of the counterrevolution by ourselves. In order to prevent a civil war and to defend socialism, the socialist fraternal countries were asked for internationalist support. This is our view of the situation back then. This support prevented the detachment of the CSSR from the socialist camp. It gave the Party the chance to solve the problems. The CSSR economy had been disrupted. The internal market, the economy and the entire structure of society had been shaken and shattered, and the Party had been torn apart.

It took great efforts to repair the damage that had been done. The CPCz managed to do this after 1969 thanks to the help by the other fraternal countries. I am not reminding you of our experience in order to argue for extreme and radical solutions, but I do this in order to demonstrate that due to the inconsistency of our previous leadership it was necessary to resort to an extreme solution in the interest of defending socialism.

Following the installation of the new leadership, it became clear that the enemy, which had maintained that it would completely support the people and the Party, actually had a petit-bourgeois attitude. We uncovered the counterrevolution and its representatives, precisely with the goal of showing the people what they had been after. We juxtaposed this with the progressive program of our Party. As a result, our people have completely supported the Marxist-Leninist program of our Party and have defeated the counterrevolution.

We know, dear comrades, that these problems of which I have spoken, were of a different sort. It seems to me that the PUWP has a better leadership today than we in the CSSR had back then. But the question of decisiveness and determination to solve the problems energetically remains acute.

With my contribution, dear comrades, I wanted to show the creeping manner that the counterrevolution acted in the CSSR and what experience our Party had. The development of recent years shows that you need a Marxist-Leninist party to defend socialism adequately and to defeat the opportunist, counterrevolutionary and revanchist forces. You need firm unity, courage, and determination for the solution of the most complicated problems and to avoid departing from the right point of view. One needs to have a clear, consistent program and on this basis mobilize the Communists.

[...]

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Permit me as well to make a few remarks. —Dear Comrades! [...]

The Polish events worry us in particular. We for the most part have talked about Poland. It pains us to see fraternal Poland going through a profound, difficult crisis. The crisis could have been avoided. It could have been suppressed and turned around in its initial phase, prior to the negative turn of events. But this did not happen.

In the course of the past four years, we have asked questions about the alarming tendencies in the People's Republic of Poland in our talks with Comrade Gierek. This summer in the Crimea, I emphasized again that a decisive political fight against the anti-socialist elements was necessary. In response, we were told that nothing of special concern was happening, that there was no opposition, and that the PPR and the Party were in control of the situation. —What had happened? Was it carelessness, hubris? Were certain ambitions the cause? —I don't know.

And now the crisis, as we can see, has developed into a difficult question not for Poland and its Communists alone. The crisis hurts the entire socialist community, the international Communist movement. It can have a negative impact on the general balance of power. [...]

The situation, which the comrades have described here, demands a different way of thinking and acting. One has to realize that the counterrevolution is oriented towards the real conditions as they exist today. It would not risk, and would not have risked, raising itself against the government, if the Polish United Workers' Party had been completely mobilized in the face of the events, if its actions had been characterized by determination and toughness.

This might sound too sharp or too harsh. But it would be completely justified to say that the crisis throughout the country accords with the crisis within the Party. [...]

One month ago we spoke at length with comrades Kania and Pińkowski. The topic of conversation was the situation as it had developed. We completely agreed in the evaluation of the situation and our determination of ways to overcome the crisis. We assumed that there was no room for retreat. We have to turn the course of events around and should not wait until the enemy has the Party with its back against the wall. In one word: the Polish comrades themselves must go on the offensive against the counterrevolution and its intellectual heads. The Polish comrades and we were of the opinion that the core of the matter and the most important thing was to restore the fighting spirit of the Party, to restore unity in its ranks and to mobilize all units of the Party. We were all of the opinion that the PUWP could rely on the healthy forces within the nation, the army, the militia, and the state security organs as well as on that part of the union that has remained faithful to the Party.

As far as I know, the comrades of the other fraternal parties share our point of view.

As you know, Comrade Kania has explained that the situation has gotten worse and could not be stabilized. [...]

The comrades here have emphasized that a bitter class struggle is occurring in Poland. What is lacking? The objective is clear: Socialism must be defended! It is also clear from where the danger is emanating. The enemy's scheme has become fairly evident, and it is clear which positions he intends to take next. There is most likely a center which directs the actions of the counterrevolution

and which coordinates the various departments' tactics and strategy within and outside of Poland. [...]

Particularly acute is the problem of the mass media. Unfortunately one has to admit that the situation most recently has not worked out in favor of the PUWP.

As far as the army is concerned, it would be wrong to assume that the events have not left any traces there. Through various channels, among others the Polish Church, obstinate attempts are being made to neutralize and subvert the armed forces.

We are not exaggerating at all concerning the question of responsibility, but instead are basing our views on the information from the Polish friends. During the entire crisis we have shown complete understanding for the Polish comrades' [desire] to solve the crisis by political means. We do not favor taking extreme measures without extreme circumstances, and we understand the caution. But this is certain: should the enemy assume power, he would not hold back like that. From experience we know that the enemy, once in power, immediately takes extreme measures in order to eliminate the Party and destroy socialism. He is, after all, no longer discreet in his choice of weapons: Unauthorized occupation of plants, of universities, administrative buildings, the nerve centers of transport and media, which affect the vital interests of the Warsaw Pact organization. Are these legitimate weapons? And the dishonoring of honest workers, of Communists by forcing them to join "Solidarity", the increasing incidents of ridiculing people in military uniforms, the incidents of sabotage in the distribution of food stuffs and consumer goods, in the transport of Polish newspapers, the cases of hiding of food which further worsen the situation, and the uncontrolled import of foreign currencies, typewriters and TVs into Poland, not to speak of the threat to life to which Communists and their families have been subjected. One can certainly not say that the opposition has held back, and hence the ongoing confrontation.

The reserve of the Polish Party is interpreted by the opposition as a sign of weakness and indetermination, as a loss of faith in the [Party's] own capabilities and power. The Supreme Court has annulled the decision of the Warsaw court and registered "Solidarity". Wałęsa has drawn the conclusion that one can press further. I brought Gierek to power and I deposed him, and I can also bring the new leadership down, if I want to, he declared in an interview. This is the tone in which such things are already discussed!

It would be unforgivable not to draw any basic conclusions from such a difficult text. It is our duty not to mince words. A terrible danger hovers over socialism in Poland. The enemy has managed to open up a rift between the Party and a major part of the workers.

The Polish comrades have thus far not found a method to open the eyes of the masses, showing them that the counterrevolution intends to throw out not only the Communists but also the best elements of the entire nation.

The strategic point is that the Polish comrades have to

state harshly and confidently: No step back, only ahead! Hence the lost positions have to be regained one after another. One has to secure the restoration of the leading role of the PUWP, one has to go on the offensive.

I have already mentioned our talks with Comrade Kania and Pińkowski. Unfortunately, by far not all the measures for a normalization of the situation in Poland, which we talked about, have been implemented. Today these measures are even more necessary and less avoidable. That is the conclusion one can draw from an analysis of the work of the Plenum of the CC of the PUWP. Based on the decisions of this Plenum, the Polish friends could do a lot to improve of the situation within the Party as well as within society.

The task of all tasks is to strengthen the Party organizationally, to enhance its fighting capabilities. It seems to us that one has to pose sharply the question of maintaining the norm of democratic socialism within the Party, the Leninist norms and methods of the Party. [...]

Our experience proves—and the CPSU has gone through many trials in its history: In extraordinary circumstances it can be helpful to establish a special commission of CC delegates who have full plenipotentiary power. They should be deployed wherever they can be helpful to the country, wherever vital areas are concerned.

[...]

Comrade Kania and others have talked about the Polish Church. Hence I will be brief. It is clear to us that a confrontation with the Church would only worsen the situation. But with this in mind we should influence as far as possible the moderate circles within the Catholic Church in our direction and keep them from closely allying themselves with the extreme anti-socialist forces and those who desire the fall of socialism in Poland and to take over power.

I repeat once again and once more: It is extremely important to restore control over the mass media. To let the mass media slip out of the control of the Party would mean to hand the enemy a very sharp weapon. We know that this is one of the greatest problems for the PUWP.

[...]

A lot of correct things have already been said here about the intentions and actions of the imperialist reaction. The West does not limit itself to watching the events in Poland unfold, it is directly involved. There are probably certain connections between the attempts of the international reactionary forces to launch an offensive on the position of the socialist system and an activation of the counterrevolution in Poland. I sense this in our contacts with the US and other capitalist countries. We have unequivocally warned them against interference in internal Polish affairs. We have made it clear to them that neither Poland's Communists nor the friends and allies of Poland would allow them to tear Poland out of the socialist community. It has been and will be an inseparable member of the political, economic and military system of socialism.

Comrades! Officially the situation in Poland is not termed an emergency situation [martial law]. But in reality it is! Of course, the formal act does not matter. Hence the Polish comrades are acting correctly when they prepare for extraordinary measures. Intermediate steps have to be taken immediately since there is no time left until the start of the counteroffensive. Tomorrow it will be more difficult than today to cope with the counterrevolution.

The situation at communication lines, especially in the railroads and harbors, merits extreme attention. An economic catastrophe threatens Poland in the event of the stoppage of transport facilities. It would constitute a blow against the economic interests of a number of socialist states. I repeat: In no case can we allow the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries to be endangered due to transportation difficulties. A precise plan has to be developed as to how army and security forces can secure control over the transportation facilities and main communication lines, and this plan has to be effectively implemented. Without declaring martial law it is useful to establish military command posts and introduce patrolling services along the railroads.

[Concluding remarks regarding public communiqué.]

End of the Meeting: 15:30

[Source: *SAPMO-BArch, J IV 2/2 A-2368. Published in Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." The SED contra Polen. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 140-195. Translated by Christian F. Ostermann]*

Report regarding a confidential discussion with the Supreme Commander of the Combined Military Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries on 7 April 1981 in LEGNICA (PR Poland) following the evaluation meeting of the Joint Operative-Strategic Command Staff Exercise "SOYUZ-81"

Top Secret
TS-No. A 142 888
1st copy, 12 pages

In accordance with the instructions of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED and the Chairman of the National Defense Council of the GDR, Comrade Erich Honecker, and on the basis of the tasks as given by the Minister for National Defense, Comrade Army General Hoffmann, Comrade Lieutenant General Keßler, and Comrade Lieutenant General Streletz, had a confidential discussion with the Supreme Commander of the United Military Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov on 7 April 1981, following the evaluation meeting by the Joint Operative-Strategic Command Staff Exercise "SOYUZ-81."

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov began with thanks for the greetings communicated from Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Minister Hoffmann and emphasized that he had obtained authorization for the discussion from Politburo member and Minister for Defense of the Soviet Union, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov.

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov continued:

He had been in the PR Poland now already a month and, due to personal cooperation with the leadership of the Polish party and government was able to obtain a picture of the situation in the PR Poland.

For the duration of his stay, he had been in constant contact with the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Comrade Kania, as well as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister for National Defense of the PR Poland, Comrade Army General Jaruzelski. Usually, the bilateral meetings took place without witnesses in an open, party-minded atmosphere. Due to this it was possible to explain openly and directly the point of view of the Soviet comrades to the leadership of party and government as well as to the army leadership of the PR Poland.

For the past four weeks, the Soviet side has placed an array of specialists in WARSAW, e.g. members of the State Planning Commission, the organs of committees for State Security, General Staff of the Military Forces and of the Department of Rearward Services [Bereich Rückwärtige Dienste] of the Soviet Army. They have all received instructions from Comrade Brezhnev to help the Polish comrades.

All of the work that Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov and the other Soviet comrades in WARSAW have conducted in the past weeks is based strictly on the results of the consultations with the General and First Secretaries of the fraternal parties in MOSCOW.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov has continually reported to Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov on the activities and the situation in the PR Poland, who in turn periodically has informed the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

The prolongation of the exercise "SOYUZ-81" came explicitly as a result of the requests of comrades Jaruzelski and Kania. They wanted to utilize the exercises to strengthen their position. Simultaneously they hoped to exert a positive influence on the progressive forces in Poland and to show "Solidarity" and "KOR," that the Warsaw Pact countries are prepared to render Poland help all around. Thereby a certain pressure should also be exerted upon the leadership of "Solidarity."

It was of great political significance that Comrade Minister Hoffmann and Comrade Minister Dzur [Czechoslovak defense minister] participated in the joint exercises "DRUSHBA-81" of the Soviet army and the

Polish army on the territory of the PR Poland. With that, proletarian internationalism was demonstrated in action for friend and enemy alike.

Overall, Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski correctly assess the situation. They view the causes for the crisis, however, in the political, ideological, and economic spheres, particularly in the mistakes that were made in the past; primarily in mistakes in party work, in the neglect of ideological work and in work among the youth, as well as in other spheres. A realistic evaluation of the counterrevolution in Poland from a class standpoint is unfortunately not to be found with either. They do not see the entire development in Poland as a socio-political process with profound class causes. They also do not see that "Solidarity" is increasingly gaining power, and has the goal of ending the leading role of the party. The counterrevolution in Poland is carefully planned, meticulously prepared, and supported in many ways both by the FRG and the USA. The goal of the counterrevolutionary machinations in Poland in particular is to bring the GDR, the CSSR, and the Soviet Union into a difficult situation so as to shake violently the entire socialist bloc.

Until the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP, the work proceeded more or less normally during every meeting of Comrade Kulikov with Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski. It was frankly explained to the Polish comrades how the work should continue to proceed, to which they all agreed.

Meetings with Comrades Erich Honecker, Gustav Husák, and János Kádár had made a lasting impression on Comrade Kania.

Before the 9th Plenum the Polish comrades were made aware that it was absolutely necessary to present clearly the general line of party work before the Central Committee, to define and fix the phases of the future work and the ways the Polish party and government leadership want to settle the situation. It should be made clear how the battle against "Solidarity" and "KOR" can be led offensively and how a proper relationship towards the Church could be produced.

The course and results of the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP prove, however, that these hints and suggestions that had been previously agreed upon, were not given the necessary attention. The 9th Plenum took the decision to arrive at a stabilization of the situation in the PR Poland through military means. The statements, however, lacked objective conditions.

There was no unity within the Politburo, although it still formally existed after the 9th Plenum. The Gdansk party organization demanded a report regarding the fulfillment of the decisions of the Central Committee. Since the decisions until then had not been fulfilled, the Party leadership was to be dismissed due to incompetence.

Negative forces were to establish a new Politburo. Consequently, Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Comrade Grabski spoke

up, emphasizing that the Politburo should not capitulate and he would not resign. His determined and positive appearance brought about a turning point in the meeting of the Central Committee. The Politburo then received a vote of confidence. There was, however, considerable criticism of the performance of the Politburo leadership.

One worker who came before the Plenum spoke better than all the leading party functionaries. He brought to attention the fact that everyone waits for instructions from above. Since the situation in every region is different, the lower party cadres must show more initiative, and not constantly wait for instructions from above.

The demand was once again stated at the 9th Plenum to convene a party conference within a short time, to begin with the electoral meetings in the local organizations, and to convene a meeting of the Sejm in the following days in any case.

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov had spoken with Comrade Kania for that reason, and he had to concede that the goal of the 9th Plenum had not been achieved.

After the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee Comrade Kania declared surprisingly that

- the party is too weak to lead an offensive against “Solidarity;”
- many party members are organized within “Solidarity”, and defend its ideas;
- an open confrontation, an open attack through the organs of the party, government, and instruments of force is not possible at this point;
- while it is true that there are a number of “bridgeheads,” they are, however, not sufficient for an open counterattack against “Solidarity” and “KOR.”
- While the balance of power has changed now in favor of “Solidarity,” three to four months ago it still seemed to be considerably more favorable, and that it would have been good had certain offensive measures been conducted at this time.

Comrade Kania further stated that the Polish army in the present circumstances can only fulfill its tasks in the interior of the country with great difficulties. The organs of state security would have little success fighting offensively either.

Until the 9th Plenum, Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski had always agreed with the estimate of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov that the Polish Army and the security organs were prepared to fulfill any assignment given to them by the party and state leadership.

Following the 9th Plenum, however, Comrade Kania took the position that they could not rely on the army and the security organs, and was not certain whether they would uphold the party and state leadership in a critical situation.

Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov tried to dissuade Comrade Kania from this view, showing him positive examples of the Polish army, and underlined that Soviet comrades were of the opinion that the army and

security organs were prepared to end the counterrevolution at the order of the party and government leadership. Comrade Kania did not share this opinion.

That had generally negative consequences. The very next day Comrade Jaruzelski also defended this view that the army and security forces were not prepared for internal deployment, and that one could not rely fully upon them. This position of Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski is their own invention. Comrade Kulikov said to Comrade Jaruzelski, “You have now broken off the branch upon which you sit. How will things go for you now?”

Due to the view of the Polish party, state, and army leadership, the subordinate generals and admirals up to division commanders immediately joined their superiors in their estimate. Even those commanders who had previously affirmed to Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov that they and their troops would follow any order of the party and state leadership, now swore that at once that they could not rely upon 50 to 60 percent of their soldiers and non-commissioned officers. Following the 9th Plenum, the commander of the air-land division in KRAKOW also advanced the view that he could only rely upon 50% of his personal forces.

It was also subtly brought to Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov’s attention that it could even be possible that, in the event of an invasion by other Warsaw Pact troops, certain units might rebel.

In this connection, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov emphasized and made clear that one could not lead an army or make policy with sharp appearances, boot-heels clicking, and a good posture, but that one rather needs a realistic evaluation of the situation and a clear class position.

The view of Comrade Jaruzelski that the Polish party and state leadership had won a strategic battle in BYDGOSZCZ was also incomprehensible to Comrade Kulikov. In order to correctly evaluate the situation, one must understand that Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski are personal friends and lay down the course of the party. Comrade Jaruzelski is the theoretical brain who lays the direction for the further work.

Regarding the health condition of Comrade Jaruzelski, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov called to attention the fact that he is currently stricken by the flu and is physically and mentally exhausted. The estimate by the Foreign Minister of the GDR, Comrade Fischer, was totally correct, even though there were some who did not want to admit it.

During the last conversations with Comrade Jaruzelski one could notice that he did not always have control over himself. He always wore darkened eyeglasses, even on official occasions, in order to conceal nervous eye movements.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov concluded that Comrade Jaruzelski is very self-confident, and that he is not expecting his eventual removal, for he assumes that the people trust him. Regarding how the situation should

develop after the 90 days agreed to by “Solidarity,” he did not say.

A part of the Politburo is for Comrade Jaruzelski and supports him completely. He acts extremely liberally and enjoys therefore a reputation through broad segments of society.

The Soviet comrades believe that Comrade Jaruzelski is not the man who can turn the course of events. Until now he has made great concessions in all areas, for instance with respect to:

- the events in BYDGOSZCZ
- the work among the youth
- Russian instructions in school as well as
- with respect to the Catholic Church.

He has very frequent discussions with the Polish Cardinal Wyszynski and hopes for the support of the Catholic Church. Wyszynski also holds Comrade Jaruzelski in high esteem, which is evident from many of his statements.

One must frankly admit that the Polish United Workers Party is currently weaker than the Catholic Church and “Solidarity.”

No one knows yet exactly how many members “Solidarity” has. One estimate is from 8 to 10 million, of which one million are supposed to be party members.

On 10 April 1981, a meeting of the Sejm is to be convened. One should not count on any fundamentally new questions. There are two papers on the economic situation provided by Comrades Jagielski and Kiesiel. Afterwards Comrade Jaruzelski wants to give an evaluation of the situation in Poland. The adoption of decisions regarding the limitation on the right to strike, censorship and the utilization of mass media is also on the agenda. In any case, it would be desirable if the Sejm were to make decisions that would set specific limits on the counterrevolution.

Leading Polish comrades unfortunately believe that they can solve all problems through political means—hoping especially that everything will clear up on its own. One cannot share such a view. It must frankly be stated that the moment to act was not taken by the Polish party and state leadership.

Altogether one has the impression that Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski do not wish to use force in order to remain “clean Poles.”

Both fear utilizing the power of the state (army and security organs) to restore order. They argue formally that the Polish constitution does not provide for a state of emergency, and that [Article 33](#) of the Polish constitution only refers to the national defense. Although Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov repeatedly called to their attention that in such a situation Article 33 on national defense could and had to be used, both remained unwilling to take such a decision.

The entire documentation for martial law was prepared

in close cooperation by Soviet and Polish comrades. This cooperation proceeded in an open and candid atmosphere. The Soviet comrades did not have the impression that the Polish generals and officers were concealing anything from them. Nevertheless, this documentation remains only on paper for it has not yet been implemented.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov tried to make it clear to Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski that they do not need to fear a strike. They should follow the example of the capitalists in reacting to strikes. Since “Solidarity” knows that the party and state leadership of the PR Poland fear a general strike, they utilize this to exert pressure and implement their demands.

A difficulty exists in the fact that a great part of the workers in Poland are also independent farmers and would not be greatly affected by the strikes, for they would be working in their own fields during this time. The size of the well-organized working class in Poland is small.

In the countryside, current production is limited to what is necessary for one’s own needs, which means that only private fields are cultivated. How national food supplies will develop no one knows.

Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski estimate that the greatest economic support by the capitalist countries comes from France and the FRG. The USA drags its feet when it comes to aid.

The sooner the phase of obliterating the counterrevolution would begin, the better for the development of Poland and for the stabilization of the socialist bloc collectively. Not only Comrade Kania, but also Comrade Jaruzelski, however, lack determination and resoluteness in their work.

Half a year ago, Comrade Jaruzelski had announced at the meetings of the commanders that he would not give any orders for the deployment of the army against the workers.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov made it clear to him that the army would not be deployed against the working class, but rather against the counterrevolution, against the enemies of the working class as well as violent criminals and bandits. He did not answer the question in a concrete manner. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov hopes that Comrade Jaruzelski will revise his position. Although Minister Jaruzelski holds all the power in his hands, he does not wield it decisively. Since the Poles, being devout Catholics, all pray on Saturday and Sunday, the weekend would present itself as an opportunity to take effective measures.

The Polish army remains at this time, however, in the barracks, and is not allowed on the exercise grounds and accordingly therefore does not conduct marches—for fear of the people (in reality of “Solidarity”).

Upon the suggestion by Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov that columns of the Polish army be permitted to drive through the big cities in particular as a demonstration of power, he was told that this would only unleash more criticism.

On 12 April 1981, 52,000 Polish soldiers were to be dismissed. The Soviet comrades suggested to the Polish army leadership postponing the dismissal until 27 April 1981. They did not agree and the dismissal took place on 12 April 1981. It was stated that five battalions comprised of 3,000 men were always ready to accomplish any mission. That would be sufficient. A suspension of the dismissal would only cause negative moods among the army.

Among the leading cadres of the army, currently the following things are notable:

The chief of the General Staff, General Siwicki, creates an impression of helplessness in decisive matters, and waits for orders from above.

He's always going around in circles. At first, he was proactive, but increasingly is showing an attitude of surrender.

General Melczyk, seen as a positive force, is always kept in the background by the Polish comrades.

The chief of the Head Political Administration, Division General Baryla is a loyal comrade, but does nothing, and hides behind the orders of Minister Jaruzelski.

The chiefs of the military districts SILESIA and POMORZE, Division General Rapacewicz and Division General Uzycki, follow in the wake of Minister Jaruzelski.

The most progressive soldier at this point is the chief of the Warsaw Military District, Division General Oliwa.

The chief of the Navy, Admiral Janczyszyn, first was in favor of "Solidarity," but suddenly, however, he is taking a different stand. This is not seen as honest. The leadership of the security organs confronts sizeable difficulties, since it receives no support from party and state leadership.

Within the rank and file, occurrences of resignation and capitulation are spreading in the face of difficulties.

The reported situation notwithstanding, the Soviet comrades are of the opinion that we should continue to support Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski, for there are no other alternatives at this point.

Comrades Grabski and Kiesiel are currently the most progressive forces within the Polish leadership. They do not, however, succeed with their demands.

Comrade Barcikowski, who is the Second Secretary within the Central Committee of the PUWP, is a comrade without a particular profile. His statements and his overall appearance during the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP prove this.

Comrade Olszowski also does not live up to expectations.

Comrade Pinkowski, the second-in-command to Comrade Jaruzelski, should be released from his duties, but remains in office.

Central Committee member and Minister of the Interior, Comrade Milewski, who possesses a clear position on all questions, and is prepared to shoulder responsibility, impressed Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov in a positive way.

The greatest share of the intelligentsia is reactionary and supports "Solidarity." For example, the director of the Institute for Marxism/Leninism, Werblan, should be dismissed due to his reactionary views but he still remains in his position.

Now more than ever we must exert influence upon the Polish comrades using any and all means and methods. The situation in Poland must be studied thoroughly and demands constant attention. An estimate must be based on the fact—and one has to face this truth—that a civil war is not out of the question.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov finally stressed once again that the common goal should be to solve the problems without the deployment of allied armies into Poland. All socialist states should exert their influence to this end.

The Soviet comrades assume that unless the Polish security organs and army would be deployed, outside support cannot be expected, for otherwise considerable international complications would result. Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov emphatically brought it to the attention of the Polish comrades that they have to try first to solve their problems by themselves. If they cannot do so alone and then ask for help, the situation is different from one in which troops had been deployed from the outset.

As far as a possible deployment of the NVA is concerned, there are no longer reservations among the Polish comrades. There were increasing public musings as to how long the Soviet staffs and troops would remain in Poland.

If the Polish comrades were prepared to solve their problems on their own, the Soviet leadership organs and troops could be withdrawn. Except for empty words, however, nothing concrete has been done. Presently the counterrevolutionary forces are regrouping.

He does not know how much longer Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov and parts of the staff of the Allied Military Forces as well as the other organs of the Soviet Union will remain in Poland. For now, an order to withdraw will not be given, since one should not relinquish the seized positions.

According to the wishes of Comrade Kania and Comrade Jaruzelski, the exercise "SOYUZ-81" should not be officially terminated on 7 April 1981, but rather continue for another few days or weeks. The Soviet comrades, however, took the point of view that this was not possible and would create international complications. It only proves that the Poles think that others should do their work for them.

Regarding international aid in the suppression of the counterrevolution, both Comrade Kania as well as Comrade Jaruzelski spoke with great caution.

Comrade Kulikov strongly emphasized again that this discussion took place with the approval of Comrade Minister Ustinov. He had told everything that was known to him as a Communist and as the Supreme Commander of

the Allied Military Forces, because he has complete faith in Comrade Lieutenant General Keßler and Comrade Lieutenant General Streletz, and is convinced that the substance of this conversation would only be conveyed to Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Minister Hoffmann.

At the end, he asked that his most heartfelt greetings be conveyed to the General Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the National Defense Council of the GDR, Comrade Erich Honecker, and to the Minister for National Defense, Comrade Army General Hoffmann. At the same time he extended his thanks for the generous support provided during the preparation and implementation of the joint operative-strategic commander's staff exercise "SOYUZ-81."

The conversation lasted two hours and was conducted in an open and friendly atmosphere.

[Source: *Militärisches Zwischenarchiv Potsdam, AZN 32642. Document provided by Tomasz Mianowicz (Munich) and translated by Christiaan Hetzner (National Security Archive/CWIHP).*]

Memorandum regarding the Meeting between Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Erich Honecker, and Gustav Husák in the Kremlin, 16 May 1981

Participating in the meeting on the Soviet side were Comrades [CPSU Politburo member and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Aleksandrovich] Tikhonov, [Foreign Minister, Andrei Andreivich] Gromyko, [Politburo member, Konstantin Ustinovich] Chernenko, [Defense Minister, Dmitri Fyodorovich] Ustinov, [KGB chief, Yuri Vladimirovich] Andropov, [CC Secretary, Konstantin Viktorovich] Rusakov, and [Deputy head of the CC Department, Georgi Khosroyevich] Shakhnazarov.

Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev opened the meeting with the remark that this gathering is being held at the suggestion of Comrade Erich [Honecker], to exchange mutual views, appraise the situation, and draw conclusions.

We must, as he said, proceed from the fact that the situation in Poland has further deteriorated. The party is not just being attacked by "Solidarity". It also finds itself in a process of dissolution, created by internal contradictions. At present this process is self-limiting due to the fear of external intervention.

The information before us, concerning the preparation for the party congress of the PUWP [to be held on 14-18 July 1981], is negative. With the election of delegates to the party congress, not only are new people becoming involved, but hostile forces as well. The 10th Plenum [held on 29-30 April 1981] approved a very weak draft for a [party] program. Thereupon, "Solidarity" published a document containing enemy nationalist positions, and Kania did not call them to order.

Kania spoke briefly before the party *aktiv* in Gdańsk, like Gierek back in those days, that Poles can always come to an agreement with fellow Poles. Consequently, the events in Otwock are a disgrace, which encourages new anti-socialist acts.

Recently, our Comrades Andropov and Ustinov met privately with Polish comrades in Brest, and gave them recommendations on a whole number of concrete matters. To prevent these matters from remaining in a narrow circle, Comrade Suslov traveled to Warsaw to talk things over with all the comrades from the Politburo one more time. We have delivered this information to you.

Verbally, they assented to our suggestions, but in reality the situation further deteriorated. The Polish leadership is panicking from fear, they stare—as if hypnotized—at "Solidarity," without taking any concrete action.

The PUWP can still rely on the Polish army, the security organs, and the party *aktiv*, but Kania continues to be indecisive and soft, they are not prepared to take a calculated risk. Some comrades believe that [Stefan] Olszowski and [Tadeusz] Grabski are men on whom one can rely. We must see, however, that a change of leadership can also have negative repercussions. We see no real personality who can assume command. We see the danger even that [Mieczysław] Rakowski could assume this position. For us there is no other way now than strengthening the present leadership and bringing pressure to bear on the healthy forces.

[Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union] Comrade Viktor Kulikov worked out plans for several options to be implemented in case of emergency. To strengthen our influence over the mass media, we have sent the Chairman of the Committee for Radio and Television, Comrade Lyapin, to Warsaw.

To stimulate party relations between the municipality and voivodeship committees, eleven delegations headed by the first municipal secretaries will travel to the voivodeships in May/June.

The youth organization is also intensifying its relations with the Polish youth, in order to exercise greater influence. For the time being, though, the opposition still wields its influence on the PUWP. That is why we must bolster our influence on the healthy forces. On the other side, imperialism is attempting also to exert influence on Poland economically, and to gain control of the economy, leading to a weakening of our community. Due to the absence of coal shipments from Poland, for example, the economies of the GDR and the ČSSR have fallen into a difficult position. We have provided the Poles with assistance amounting to four billion dollars.

The situation is at present so grave, that we must elaborate a number of options for a resolution. It would be useful to draft a joint analysis and in doing so spare nothing. We must deliberate on what has to be done. At stake is the fate of Poland.

Then Comrade Erich Honecker spoke.

Comrade E. Honecker agreed with the statements made by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and underlined the full agreement of our parties. Then he proceeded:

1. Recently the Politburo of the SED CC, with great attention, familiarized itself with the report on the result of the discussions between the delegation of the CPSU and the PUWP. The [CPSU] delegation, which was headed by Comrade Suslov, stopped in Warsaw. Our Politburo agreed fully and completely with the assessment of the situation in Poland and the conclusions drawn from it. It articulated its displeasure with the fact that the leadership of the PUWP was apparently not prepared to see matters as they really were, and then draw the necessary conclusions.

2. I would not like, with all due earnestness, to conceal our deep concern over the most recent developments in the People's [Republic of] Poland. From all discussions and material before us, it follows that that the PUWP finds itself in the stranglehold of the counterrevolution. Solidarity [members within the party] obviously took the renewal of the PUWP [sic!] propagated by Kania into their own hands. According to the information before us, over 60% of the elected delegates to the Extraordinary Party Congress at this point are members of Solidarity. Among them there are few workers. A large portion of the delegates is part of the scientific-technological intelligentsia. It is already foreseeable that the planned Party Congress implicates the danger of the PUWP being transformed into a social-democratic party that works closely together with the Church and the leadership of Solidarity with the sole goal of leading a renewal process, in the spirit of the goals of the counterrevolution, to its victory.

3. The CPSU, the CPCz, and the SED have given the PUWP leadership a lot of good advice. Comrade Kania and Jaruzelski have agreed with them. Unfortunately one must state that they not only have not implemented it [the good advice], but rather encouraged the enormous process of degeneration in the party and state apparatus through their actions. Now there are already statements in the Polish mass media demanding a democratization of the Polish Army and slandering the organs of the interior, party and state. One must look with open eyes at these things, and recognize that the fate of socialism in the People's Republic of Poland, with all its consequences for Poland and all of its allies, is at stake. Wałęsa declared publicly in Gdańsk on 7 May 1981 that Solidarity is prepared to take over the government's authority in Poland at a given time.

4. In weighing all the details, one can only doubt the sincerity of a large portion of the members of the state and party leadership vis-a-vis their alliance partners. The pressure exerted upon Poland by the imperialist powers, above all the USA and the FRG, is supposed to prevent the healthy forces from taking measures against the counterrevolutionary forces. Comrade Kania uses this for

his argument that all matters should be solved politically, repudiating Leninist principle that the party must be prepared to utilize all forms of combat to destroy the counterrevolution and guarantee the socialist development of the People's [Republic of] Poland.

5. At the Moscow conference, all realized that the developments in the People's [Republic of] Poland weren't just a matter for the People's Poland, but an affair of the entire socialist community. From all of this, no conclusions were drawn by the leadership of the People's [Republic of] Poland. What followed is a complicated situation, not just for Poland, but for the entire socialist community.

Let's take the middle and long-term consequences for the GDR.

Politically:

The GDR is located as you know in the center of Europe—we have German imperialism in front of us, and would possibly have a capitalist Poland behind us. The ČSSR would find itself in a similar position.

Today already we must wage the battle on two fronts—we have to deal with the FRG and Poland.

I would only like to mention the role of the West German mass media and the large stream of agitation and slander that pours in as a result. The West German television broadcasts its daily programs on Poland, most of all, to influence our people.

Economically:

As per [trade] agreements, we must receive from Peoples' [Republic of] Poland per year 1.9 million tons of bituminous [hard] coal by direct route and 3 million tons by diversion, hence 4.9 million tons altogether. In actuality we received 1.1 million tons in 1980, and in the first quarter of 1981, 1.2 million tons [less than the amount that had been set.—*Ed.'s note: Added in handwriting by E. Honecker.*]

A large portion of our imports and exports to and from the USSR is transported through Poland. That comes out to be 10 million tonnes of goods per year.

It must not be forgotten that Soviet Group of Forces in Germany communicate via Poland. But Comrade Ustinov is even a better judge of that [than I].

Now, regarding some information that our comrades recently received during talks with Polish comrades.

From May 12-14, a delegation from the Berlin district leadership was in Warsaw. They reported:

1. The situation in the party organization is not unified but very confused.

2. From the rank and file (science and production center for semiconductors "Cemi," housing construction collective combine) there is a pronounced hatred of the old and new party leadership. This concerns in particular the contradictory behavior and decisions of "Rural Solidarity."

3. Among all the comrades there are bitter words regarding the destructive information by the mass media. What the party secretaries defend is revoked, placed into question, and discredited in television programs and press publications. (Good comrades not only feel deserted in their struggle to implement the party line, but also

betrayed and even stabbed in the back.)

4. The base organizations [*Grundorganisationen*] are not familiar with the documents decreed at the 10th CC Plenum for the preparation of the Party Congress. In the election campaign, they occupy themselves primarily with “settling” the mistakes of the past and with the procedural matters regarding the nomination of candidates to the leadership, delegates to the municipal and city delegation conference as well as to the 9th Party Congress. (As a rule, the election assemblies last 8 to 10 hours, most of which is spent on procedural matters)

Among the cadres there is great uncertainty about the future and the coming work. No one knows whether he will be reelected or elected to the municipal or city delegation conference. On May 13, four of the seven First Municipal Secretaries were appointed as delegates to their own conference. About 50% of the secretaries of the municipal leaderships were not chosen to be delegates.

80% of the members of base organization leaderships are new cadres, chiefly young, inexperienced comrades. The number of Solidarity members in the party leadership has rapidly increased.

5. Our impression of the personnel:

The First Secretary of the Voivodeship Committee, Comrade Stanisław Kociołek, is an upstanding Communist, who realistically appraises the situation in the country and demonstrates an internationalist attitude. He repeatedly expressed clear positions on the CPSU, the SED, and the CPCz in public.

Unlike Politburo candidate and CC Secretary Jerzy Waszczuk, he stated repeatedly that he couldn't imagine the 9th Party Congress taking place without the participation of the fraternal parties. He repeatedly emphasized that the situation in Poland would only be mastered when the party was built up anew upon the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism.

Of the seven secretaries of the Warsaw Voivodship Committee, two so far have been chosen as delegates to the city conference (Kociołek, Bolesławski—2nd Secretary). Two secretaries have declared from the outset that there is no chance that they would be elected as delegates. (Com. J. Matuczewicz did not run as delegate for the conference from the concern “Rosa Luxembourg” on the 12 May 1981.) The chances of the three other secretaries are uncertain.

6. The talks with the First Secretaries of the municipal leaderships of [the Warsaw districts] Mokotów, Praga North, and Żoliborz reflected the lack of unity in the party.

While the First Secretary from Mokotów (graduate of the Party School of the CPSU) stated a clear position on the situation, its causes, and the activities of the counterrevolution, an unprincipled social-democratic attitude could be seen on the part of the first secretaries from Żoliborz and Praga North. Their main topics were the causes of the “mistakes” and the guarantees against future repetition. Based on the “feelings of the masses,” the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and the honesty of the party and of the whole society was to be guaranteed.

While visiting a construction site for a new bridge over the Vistula, we found the slogan “Down with the dictatorship of the CPSU—Long live Lech Wałęsa” on a barrel.

The First Secretary from Praga North did not say anything that was party line, when we addressed this anti-Soviet statement as well as the anti-socialist event at Katyn⁵. All in all, the cadres are becoming used to anti-socialist statements, writings, slogans and other machinations. No one thinks about measures to take against the counterrevolutionary intrigues.

7. The statements of the Politburo candidate and CC Secretary, Comrade Jerzy Waszczuk, in the presence of Comrade Kociołek (1 1/2 hours), were extremely vague. The fundamental political questions were not clearly addressed. An attempt was made to justify the capitulationist attitude of the leadership when we mentioned it. Questioned about the participation of foreign delegations to the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress, he answered evasively. Essentially it was answered in the negative. (We do not know how the Party Congress proceeded. There may be provocations, which would be very unpleasant for the fraternal parties.) Comrade Kociołek explicitly spoke out in favor of the participation of the fraternal parties. Otherwise, holding the party congress would be inconceivable. Comrade Kociołek repeatedly stressed that there cannot be a second 14th CPCz Party Congress in Poland. Therefore the remaining days must be used to guarantee a correct composition of the party congress. In relation to this he expressed his opinion on the creation of a clear personnel structure. It was clear from his remarks, that he knew of the statements made by Comrade Mikhail Suslov and supported the implementation of the recommendations given there.

8. Comrade Kociołek beseeched the Berlin District leadership of the SED to take thorough advantage of the various possibilities to influence the Warsaw party organization in the next 30 days, in order to consolidate the party and prepare the party congress in an internationalist spirit. A corresponding proposal of Comrade Kociołek was strictly rejected by Kania. It seems advisable to implement this offer to work with the Warsaw party organization, and to extend further the existing personal contacts with Comrade Kociołek.

– The head of the SED CC International Relations Department, Comrade [Günther] Sieber, had a discussion with his Polish counterpart, Comrade Waclaw Piątkowski, on May 14, in Berlin.

Comrade Piątkowski is a candidate member of the PUWP CC and since 1977 has held the position of head of the CC International Relations Department. Before he was the PPR's ambassador to the FRG for over 8 years. He is 60 years old and possesses a command of the German language without an accent. Piątkowski was a partisan during the Second World War in the area around Lublin, and, during the Soviet army's invasion of Poland, became a regular member of the 1st Polish Army, with which he

advanced to the Elbe River. During wartime he was employed as a scout in reconnaissance due to his language abilities. Through the cooperation between the GDR embassy in Warsaw and the PUWP CC International Relations Department, Piątkowski is known as a class-conscious comrade devoted to the party, who assumes internationalist positions and has an unambiguous relationship to the Soviet Union.

Responding to a question on the present situation in the PPR, he stated:

The situation is more dangerous and graver than is generally assumed. The Poles are in a state such that they not only betray their own interests and their own country but brought the socialist community of states the gravest difficulties, and endanger world peace.

The unprincipled degeneration of the party has progressed far, the contradictions are getting ever more critical. What is going on in Poland, and where the development is heading, cannot be read about in the party newspaper, but rather learned about most clearly from the broadcasters “[Radio] Free Europe” and “Deutschlandfunk [Radio Germany]” and other foreign centers.

What is the situation in the Central Committee *apparat*?

Answer:

I am actually no longer head of the International Relations Department. My retirement has been arranged. After the Party Congress in Kampuchea [Cambodia], to which I am still going, I must retire.

Was that your own decision?

Answer:

No. Although I am 60 years old, I feel intellectually and physically able to continue working for the party in these difficult times. But my opinions and my attitude do not agree with our present leadership, and so it came to retirement, which I however only see as temporary.

Is it the same for other comrades as well?

Answer:

Absolutely. In the CC a commission was formed which would make a through study of the entire *apparat* according to different criteria. Among others, [one would be] whether the comrade was a industrious worker in his development to this point, or not. Those who have ordered this (Kania), cannot so much as once correctly pronounce the word “industrious worker” and do not know at all what industrious work is. The main criterion is, however, the unconditional support of Kania’s policy. This policy I can no longer support or reconcile with my conscience. That is a betrayal of the party and of Poland. Kania is incompetent. He possesses neither political knowledge nor political stature. He is a spineless tool, who conforms to opinion polls, without political principles.

Jaruzelski is a hollow dummy, who mostly flatters himself, as he plays the Prime Minister. Nothing good can be expected from him.

What is the situation among the first secretaries?

Answer:

At the last meeting with the first secretaries and the CC department heads, more comrades came forward against the policies of Kania. Among them was Wrocław First Secretary, Comrade Porębski. He enumerated to Kania how many opportunities to change the situation have come and gone since August 1980. After this speech he no longer has a chance to run for his office again and now wants to resign. Other comrades came forward similarly, and face the same question.

How do you appraise the party program?

Answer:

It is possible to get something out of the party program, if it is interpreted in a Marxist-Leninist fashion. Given the current situation and the balance of power, however, it will become a program of revisionism and social democracy.

Would a new leadership in this position be able to change the revisionist-right course and put an end to the developments?

Answer:

I think so, but there is not much more time for that. I estimate that at most another 14 days remain before the opportunity for such a change has passed.

In your opinion, which people could assume the leadership of the state and the party?

Answer:

I believe absolutely that Olszowski is the man who can do that and who wants to. Grabski is also very strong, and the two of them are on very good terms with one another. The First Secretary of Warsaw, Comrade Kociołek, is a capable person too, with great political experience, whom one must keep in mind. I must, however, say once again, there is only little time left for such thoughts.

What went on at the 10th Plenum?

Answer:

In my opinion, Rakowski exposed himself as an overt traitor. He made a motion to demand the Soviet Union to publicly state their policy west of the Bug River. Kania remained silent on this. Olszowski replied sharply to that and brought about the motion’s collapse.

Comrade Piątkowski repeatedly indicated that the revisionist-right development in the party, state, and in the economy, had advanced much farther than the most negative formulations of the program show.

– Some time ago, the First Secretary of the Frankfurt/Oder SED district leadership met with the First Secretary of the Voivodship Committee of Gorzów. He reported that in the voivodship, according to instructions that the comrades should not participate in the warning strike (March 1981), everything was done in this direction. Hence 65% of the workers did not take part in the strike. Then, however, everything was called off. Those who went on strike received full wages. There was a very negative reaction coming from those who followed the call of the party and did not go on strike.

– From the head of the PUWP CC Security and State Organs Department [i.e. Michał Atlas] our comrades in

Warsaw learned that the deployment of the police in Bydgoszcz was envisaged timely in connection with the provocational demonstrations planned there [March 1981]. The nationwide warning strike announced by “Solidarity” immediately after the incident in Bydgoszcz so frightened the leadership that they were ready to concede everything. The government then also capitulated in the negotiations with Wałęsa, although at the 9th Plenum a mandate for negotiations had not been debated or decided upon. One result was that the deployment readiness of the police and the state security, which was relatively good beforehand, has been dealt a great blow since.

This appraisal is confirmed by information such as the following:

The “Solidarity” leadership in Białystok has announced a warning strike for the May 19, Polish radio reported. The decision was justified by the brutal actions of the militia against a disabled person. “Solidarity” demanded the immediate dismissal of those militia men who directly took part in the incident, as well as an investigation into the further members of the police organs. The local militia chief has already stated that both policemen are being relieved of their positions.

A further report stated: at a three-day national meeting of representatives of 16 large-scale combines, theses on a law on worker self-government were formulated. Among other things, it was suggested that a second chamber of the Sejm, a chamber for self-government, be created, whose members would be elected democratically.

During the envisaged new election of the Sejm, they want to depart from the previous practice and vote for lists—meaning the PUWP—“Solidarity”, National Front among others separately.

What are the resulting conclusions?

1. The role of the party must be fortified. That means
 - purging the party;
 - utilizing all means of combat and not allowing the enemy to gain further ground.
2. The present leadership of the PUWP is pulling the wool over our eyes. For us the question now is, who can take over the leadership?
 - Comrade Olszowski
 - Comrade Grabski
 - Comrade Kociołek
 - Comrade Żabiński
3. Comrade Jaruzelski has stated that he is prepared to relinquish his post. Accordingly we can comply with his request. The only thing that needs to be clarified is who should take over his office.
4. I am not for a military intervention, although the allies have that right as stipulated in the Warsaw Pact. It would be correct to create a leadership which is prepared to impose a state of emergency, and which takes decisive action against the counterrevolution.

Comrade Honecker handed over a list of the members of the PUWP CC, which shows their present position according to our information. The results are:

51.4% of the CC members might have a positive attitude

41.4% have a negative attitude

7.2% are wavering

Comrade Gustav Husák:

I agree with the statements made by Comrade Brezhnev and Honecker. We also are greatly concerned about the development in Poland, by the PUWP and socialism in Poland. There is plenty of evidence of negative developments, I need not repeat them.

It is a matter now of being able to aid the healthy forces in Poland. For that reason, the CPCz is publishing the documents from its party congress in Polish, and distributing them in Poland.

Tangentially, I would like to mention a tragicomic story: when Kania was with us in the ČSSR, he asked me to autograph a brochure on the conclusions of the events of 1968 before he departed.

We also publish a trade union brochure on the conclusions of the events in 1968. Comrade [Albin] Szyszka, head of the branch trade unions, but also other representatives of the branch trade unions have appeared well in principle. They are, however, supported only weakly by the party.

We are now also organizing 3 hours of Polish language radio programs every day, in which we comment on the Polish events from our perspective. At the same time we are strengthening our relationship as partners with the voidvodships, printing flyers and posters which criticize “Solidarity”. Unfortunately, though, our actions are not coordinated with others and therefore have a relatively scant effect.

It will be bad if the Polish Communists lose their perspective and do not know how to continue.

As for the comrades whom one can rely on, we also think of such comrades as Olszowski. We also have close relations with Grabski. Our ambassador is expanding his activities here as well. But these and other comrades have great difficulties in becoming elected as delegates to the party congress. With the exception of Kania and Jaruzelski, the possibility exists that others will be elected into the leadership.

It is absolutely possible that a stalemate could develop at the party congress, with neither the present leadership nor the Right achieving a victory.

The healthy forces think that it would be difficult to fight friends and former friends, but Kania and Jaruzelski are capable of being manipulated. Public order is disintegrating more and more, and it is possible that a social democratic or Christian democratic party may develop, disguised with socialist slogans. The Poles have drawn no conclusions from their conversation with Comrade Suslov.

In our estimation, “Rural Solidarity” is more dangerous than “Wałęsa-Solidarity”, because it is oriented to the West. The anti-Soviet currents are very strong,

which are restrained only out of fear of Soviet action.

Of the 3 million members of the PUWP, 1 million are estimated to be positively disposed, but poor or very little work is done with them, and more and more good Communists are leaving, or being forced out. They say openly that the politicians look to the left but go to the right, and thus the good Communists see no prospects.

Olszowski, himself, said that he did not know how to continue since the Politburo was giving ground to the increasingly stronger pressure from the right. Jaruzelski is incapable and gives ground.

There are already 7,000 civil servants in the army who are members of "Solidarity," and the influence of "Solidarity" grows in the organs of the Interior Ministry and in particular in the mass media.

Żabiński is losing the ground beneath his feet and fears not being elected, which would mean the end of his activity.

We will support every option:

A new [Warsaw Pact] consultative meeting, like that held in December [1980], would strengthen the healthy forces in Poland. Until now they have not brought much, they have only promised much. The main question remains how to successfully strengthen the healthy forces, which are not few.

At present a hysterical [historical?—Ed.] situation exists, difficult for the good comrades, and therefore we must aid them, we must support them.

We support the proposals by Comrades Brezhnev and Honecker, and have however no illusions of the selection of delegates to the party congress.

Comrade Kapek, First Secretary of the CPCz district leadership in Prague, who was with a delegation in Poland, said, however, that it has become impossible to approach the masses. It is only possible to speak to a narrow circle.

Once again, Kania is constantly disappointing [us]. As for the postponement of the party congress, that is very doubtful. Olszowski is afraid of the party congress, for whoever will come forth against the present leadership is thrown out of the CC [*fliegt aus dem ZK heraus*]. They are disappointed by Kania and Jaruzelski. Olszowski and Grabski take a positive position, but are they the people to lead Poland out of its present situation?

Have they enough courage, do they have sufficient experience—the question remains then, with whom to work, whom to support[?] There are a million good Communists, but they are scattered, they live like partisans.

If Kania can now carry out his policy of horizontal structures, the healthy forces should also formulate their tactics.

An advisory meeting could be the impetus for a change, but the elections, which are going on at present for the preparation of the party congress, are under the influence of "Solidarity," and it is very difficult to say how the party congress will turn out.

When Kania was in Prague, he stated that he supported convening the party congress, in order to call it

off shortly before the date. But you cannot trust Kania. Moreover, he already has his hands tied.

In a discussion with church leaders, they said that the Catholic Church in its history has found itself in different situations, but it has never allowed the condemnation of its own clergymen.

Comrade Brezhnev said that different options are being formulated as to how the positions of the good Communists can be strengthened. The enemy acts always with greater force. We, however, pay too much heed to diplomacy and protocol. The Polish comrades want contact with us, and we must fortify these contacts.

As for the ČSSR, it is true that the West intensifies its propaganda, however, it meets with no response. The Polish events arouse in our people dissatisfaction and anger. There is no danger that the masses support it.

At this point Comrade Tikhonov interjected the remark that this situation can change though.

Comrade Husák: The atmosphere in the ČSSR is good. We are preparing for elections, holding election assemblies, and we have no fear that the Polish events could have an effect on our country.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: What Erich said is correct—something must be done before the party congress. The appraisal of Kania, and of a necessary change in the leadership is also correct, though the main question is "how" to do so.

Comrade Gromyko: After the Poles had just arranged with Leonid Ilyich to postpone convening the party congress, they convened without consulting with us and merely informed us about their decision.

Comrade Erich Honecker asked the question whether the party congress could be postponed. I think that—although it would be good—it is not realistic. We cannot surely have any great hopes, since Kania and Jaruzelski exercise idle, unprincipled capitulation. We must therefore work with the healthy forces, though none can say how influential these people are.

Comrade Tikhonov: We all have the same appraisal, the facts correspond. We also have information. "Solidarity" has even now formed a militia. What is going to happen? An intervention in the present international situation is out of the question, so the opposition of the healthy forces must be actively supported, but these healthy forces have no outstanding leader.

The healthy forces must appear strong, they must meet in preparation of the party congress. If at present horizontal structures appear in the foreground, then the healthy forces must create their own structures. The healthy forces must be visible, since they are presently not active in the mass media. [The idea of postponing the party congress is not unrealistic. The Polish comrades told us as well, that the meeting of the Sejm could not be postponed. Afterwards they did exactly that.—*Ed. note: Added in handwriting by E. Honecker.*]

Comrade Andropov: It is surely not possible to find an array of decisive measures to resolve the problems.

Therefore we must act in several directions. The postponement of the date of the party congress is not realistic, there I have the same evaluation. They speak, promise, but do nothing. Comrade L.I. [Brezhnev] had a very thorough discussion with Kania. It is then a matter not only who to replace, but also how to do so. According to our information, the balance of power stands at roughly 50-50. But the question remains, who will seize the initiative, who will convene a plenum. In my opinion, this way is unrealistic.

The party congress is the crossroad, where either the party takes the Marxist-Leninist path or it disintegrates. Consequently the healthy forces must use the 11th Plenum to fight the battle.

Four or more good comrades also are well spirited, but we do not know whether it [leading the party into new directions] will work. We know that for example already 26 voivodship committee secretaries, members of the CC, were dismissed as secretaries.

Kociołek is a serious man.

Żabiński is distantly related to Gierek.

We must not forget also that there is a rivalry between the three.

On the June 10 we will have the names of all party congress delegates, then we will know more, see better.

Comrade Ustinov: I am in agreement with the statements made by Comrades Brezhnev, Honecker, and Husák. Everything points to the failure to formulate lengthy principled proposals. It is a matter now of fighting for every healthy man. We must all support the healthy forces.

It is certainly difficult to postpone the party congress, but one should remember that it also meant that the Sejm cannot be adjourned, then it will have worked though.

It was said correctly that Kania was not living up to our expectations, but who shall take over the leadership[?] There is the 11th Plenum on the daily agenda.

Perhaps a state of emergency should be imposed, if even just partly.

Comrade Rusakov: A postponement of the party congress is no longer possible. The delegates from the factories have already been elected. On the May 30, the delegates from the voivodships will be elected. Until then, nothing more can be done for the healthy forces.

We also have information that enraged anti-Soviet forces are appearing.

Rakowski wanted Olszowski and Grabski voted out of the Politburo, but we were able to achieve their remaining in the Politburo.

On the May 18 comrades from our Central Committee will travel to Warsaw to discuss with the comrades from the PUWP Politburo and bring them to Marxist-Leninist positions. The comrades from the SED are also exerting their influence on the party congress documents.

We are intensifying the criticism of the events in Poland in the press and radio. It is very important to come forward unambiguously because there are some, like

Rakowski for example, who try to hide behind the CPSU.

Our delegations, which have traveled to Poland, were well prepared and armed with well-composed information. That is the way we can usefully support the healthy forces.

At that point Comrade Erich Honecker began to speak. He stated his agreement with the observations of Comrade Ustinov, to consider precisely the possibility of a postponement of the party congress and throwing all force now into preparing for the 11th Plenum as well as possible, proceeding from what is known of the situation, to formulate all essential options.

To conclude the meeting Comrade Brezhnev determined that the exchange of opinions was useful, even if there is no light in sight in regards to a positive change. The comrades are right when they stress that it is essential to employ all levers of pressure. It would be undoubtedly better to postpone the party congress or cancel it shortly before its meeting, as Kania had promised at the time, but that is scarcely possible at this point.

The worst [scenario] would be if the party congress took an openly revisionist position. The central matter remains therefore that the present leadership cannot be depended upon, we see however on the other hand there are no real potential candidates to replace them. We must think of how we will find suitable people and prepare them for extraordinary situations.

For the time being we have the ability to exert economic pressure, since we are the main supplier of petroleum and other raw materials.

We must now task comrades to form operational contacts with comrades in the PUWP in Poland.

We will confidentially inform Comrades János Kádár, Todor Zhivkov, and Fidel Castro of this meeting.

Comrade Husák's question whether publication will follow, was answered negatively.

Should information reach the West, a possibility excluded by the Soviet comrades and Comrade Erich Honecker, it will be denied.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch ZPA, vorl.SED 41559. Published in Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen." Die SED contra Polen. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 270-285. Translated by Christiaan Hetzner (National Security Archive/CWIHP)]

Transcript of the Meeting between Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and Comrade E. Honecker at the Crimea on 3 August 1981 (excerpt)

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: [...] A tremendous concern to all of us naturally is the situation in Poland. Recently we spoke with you and Comrade Husák in detail about Polish affairs. We all have reason to say that the CPSU and the

SED follow a unified [political] line in the interests of overcoming the Polish crisis and of stabilizing the situation in that country. This applies as well to the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress of the PUWP. The work with the Poles in connection with the Party Congress was not futile. By implementing an entire system of measures—starting with my telephone conversation with Kania and Jaruzelski, to the dispatching of party delegations to the rank and file, and up to the CPSU CC's direct appeal to the PUWP CC—we were able to prevent the Polish leadership from becoming instruments of the revisionists. We kept the centrists from further slipping towards the right. The most important thing, however, consisted of the true Communists regaining their confidence, their seeing that they can firmly rely on us.

The Party Congress has naturally brought no radical change for the better in the situation in the party and in the country. But that could not be expected. The crisis in Poland has severely shaken society. The people are confused, with a significant number of them having fallen under the influence of demagogues and screamers [*Schreihälsen*] from the counterrevolutionary wing of "Solidarity."

At the same time there is reason to conclude that the Right has not succeeded in pushing the party onto a social-democratic path or in seizing the leadership. The Party Congress confirmed what was already shown at the 11th Plenum of the PUWP CC: the majority of the party supports Kania and Jaruzelski, to them there is no alternative at present. Their positions were solidified, which allowed them then to act more boldly and decisively.

I have sent you the notes of my telephone conversation with Kania after the Party Congress [on 21 July 1981]. Several days later, I sent him a telegram in which I posed sharply-pointed questions to him: concerning the disgraceful spread of anti-Soviet behavior; regarding the demand by "Solidarity" to introduce group ownership into socialist factories; about the danger of the formation of a new mass party—a so-called labor party, etc.

Surmounting the crisis in Poland obviously necessitates long-term efforts. We must all bring [our] influence to bear on the Polish leadership to urge them to take consistent offensive action against the forces of anarchy [in order] to end the counterrevolution.

We receive information that the situation is not improving. "Hunger marches," in which women and children participate, are taking place, for example. I think that I will have a very open conversation with Kania and Jaruzelski here in the Crimea [on 14 August 1981]. I plan to ask them there how [things in] Poland should evolve. As a socialist country—this is one thing, on the social-democratic path, that is something else entirely. I have also referred to these questions in the telegram to Kania.

The composition of a new Politburo in the PUWP CC is not yet definitively clear. But there are people there on whom one can rely. Therefore, Erich, let us be patient and steadfast in ensuring the necessary change in the

situation. To digress from the prepared text, I would like to say that the Poles will seek economic assistance, loan credits and food supplies. Naturally they will inform [us] of their Party Congress. One cannot help but see that for ourselves even the economic situation is very precarious. Problems weigh heavily on us. We have in our leadership a group—consisting of Comrades Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, [deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1980, Ivan Vasilyevich] Archipov, and Rusakov—who every day follow the situation in Poland very closely. If necessary, we will provide the Poles with certain assistance—depending on what they bring to the table.

The events in Poland are an eye-opener for a lot of things. What could earlier only be foreseen, now has been confirmed through harsh and bitter experience. [...]

Comrade E. Honecker: [...] We all agree that the Polish events help the U.S. course of confrontation. This was also confirmed by the recent debate in the U.S. House of Representatives. Regarding the development in the People's Republic of Poland, continual coordination between us is particularly important.

Our Politburo has just recently received the report by the SED delegation to the 9th Party Congress of the PUWP led by Comrade [SED Politburo member Werner] Felde. We came to the conclusion that the complicated situation at this Party Congress mirrored that in the PUWP and in the PR Poland. It is evident, in our judgment, that the Marxist-Leninist forces within the PUWP are in the minority, and are not in the position to prevent straying to the right. Apparently the healthy forces are presently still too weak politically and ideologically, as well as organizationally, to bring about a change for the better. The forces of the right were able to influence considerably the political opinions and the elections to the central party organs in a revisionist fashion.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: That is correct.

Comrade E. Honecker: Through the letter by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the stance of a number of fraternal parties of socialist countries the worst was prevented. In this sense—and here I agree with you—our common attitude led to certain consequences. The Party Congress, however, had debated and decided no concrete solutions through which Poland would be led out of its political and economic misery, and through which the advancing counterrevolution would be crushed.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: That's correct.

Comrade E. Honecker: Our delegation returned with the impression that the PUWP is torn from within and unfit for the struggle, a party which constantly loses its Marxist-Leninist character. As the analysis shows, the forces of the right have consolidated their positions in the Central

Committee, Politburo, and Central Committee Secretariat. More than 40% of the members and candidates of the Central Committee belong to "Solidarity," three are members of "KOR." Things have gone so far that an advisor to "KOR" (H. Kubiak) has been elected to the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Every day the counterrevolution under the leadership of "Solidarity" undertakes new campaigns for the subversion, destruction, and seizing of the state's power, for which they exploit the economic difficulties. Among these are the so-called "hunger marches" organized recently in Kutno, Łódź (with the participation of 10,000 women and children) and in other locations, which were held under anti-socialist slogans. Our citizens may see all of this on Western television.

The opportunity at the Party Congress to label "Solidarity" as the true culprit for the economic misery of Poland was not utilized. Instead the members of the former leadership exclusively were blamed for it. With that, the path to capitulation was justified and continued. That is also shown in the recent retreat in the case of the strike threat by [the Polish national airline] LOT.

The enemy is now trying to fan the flames of general dissatisfaction and, through pressure, to achieve further division of power, premature Sejm elections, and the strengthening of capitalist structures. The Party Congress produced neither clear short-term nor long-term programs. The revisionist forces speak openly of a new Polish model of socialism, that will have an international impact. We must not underestimate the possibility that the Polish disease will spread.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: That is a correct evaluation.

Comrade A.A. Gromyko: The evaluation is sober and correct.

Comrade E. Honecker: Clearly we must put up with Kania for a certain amount of time, as you have already determined. Perhaps it would be advisable to agree how we can integrate the Poles more firmly into our community. It would be possible to tie that to some of the correct statements at the Party Congress, for example the speech by Jaruzelski, in order to strengthen the people's power, to contain the enemy, and to tighten up our alliance.

I propose to you, Comrade Leonid Ilyich, that the CPSU, the CPCz, the SED, and possibly other fraternal parties, in close cooperation, further assist the PUPW to form a reliable, combat-ready Marxist-Leninist leadership. To this end we will make use of all our contacts.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: When were you, Erich, last in contact with Kania?

Comrade E. Honecker: That was just before the Polish Party Congress. Afterwards I was in touch with other Polish comrades. Comrades from our Politburo were in Poland (e.g. Comrade [Konrad] Naumann in Warsaw). We

were in close contact with at least 15 voivodships.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: Answer a delicate question for me please, Erich. Can Kania take control of the situation? Do you personally have confidence in him?

Comrade E. Honecker: No. I don't have any confidence in him. He has disappointed us, and he never kept his promises. Only recently, at an advisory session of the Politburo with the First Voivodship Secretaries, have most of them criticized Kania, because he has taken no decisive measures.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: Did this advisory session take place before the 9th Party Congress?

Comrade E. Honecker: No, afterwards. We know this from Polish comrades.

Poland is a cause for our entire movement. It would be good for our socialist community, good for the Communist movement and the restraint of opportunism, if we all gather in the near future to discuss political and theoretical matters which result from the development in Poland for the Communist world movement, for the convincing propagation of real socialism.

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: Are you thinking then of a meeting of the first secretaries of the fraternal parties of the socialist community?

Comrade E. Honecker: Yes. [...]

(Around 9 p.m., the conversation was briefly interrupted to watch the television broadcast of the meeting between Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and E. Honecker.)

Comrade L.I. Brezhnev: I would like once again return to your proposed meeting in Poland of general secretaries of the fraternal parties of the socialist community, Erich. It seems advisable to me to discuss these matters again later—in other words after our discussions with Kania and Jaruzelski and in consideration of the results of these talks. Let us see how Kania will behave after these discussions.

Dear Erich, I would like to express my satisfaction over my meeting with you, over the discussion of significant matters regarding our joint work. I hope that this will bring progress towards a resolution of important questions of our cooperation.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch ZPA, J IV 2/2/A-2419. Published in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und komprimiðlos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen. Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), pp. 331-336. Translated by Christiaan Hetzner (CWIHP/National Security Archive).]

New Evidence on Poland in the Early Cold War

Editor's Note: This Bulletin section features essays and documents which emerged as part of CWIHP's "Stalin Project," an international effort, inaugurated last year, that aims at a comprehensive (inasmuch as that is possible) compilation of archival and other materials on Josef Stalin's personal views in and impact on Soviet foreign relations during the early Cold War. Following a workshop in Budapest (3-4 October 1997) on "European Archival Evidence on 'Stalin and the Cold War'" (co-sponsored and hosted by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution), and a 19-20 March 1998 workshop in Moscow on "Stalin and the Cold War" (co-sponsored and hosted by the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences), CWIHP is currently seeking to establish a website database of all known and documented conversations between Stalin and foreign leaders. CWIHP is also planning further conferences on the subject. Key documents will be published in this and future issues of the Bulletin as well as on the CWIHP website (cwihp.si.edu). The following contributions by Andrzej Werblan, Andrzej Paczkowski and Krzysztof Persak focus on new evidence on Soviet-Polish relations in the Stalin era.

The Conversation between Władysław Gomułka and Josef Stalin on 14 November 1945

By Andrzej Werblan

In November 1945, Władysław Gomułka¹ was Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Worker's Party (PPR) (and had been since November 1943). Soon afterwards, in December 1945, during the first PPR congress, the post of General Secretary was created and entrusted to Gomułka. He held that post until August 1948. In his memoirs, written in the seventies after he retired, Gomułka writes that, after the creation of People's Poland at the end of World War II, PPR leaders frequently paid unofficial visits to Stalin.² Not many archival traces of these visits and conversations have survived. The Polish scholar Krzysztof Persak³ presented Polish archival information on this topic during a conference in Budapest, organized by the Cold War International History Project, on 3-4 October 1997.⁴ Some additional information about meetings between Stalin and Polish leaders in 1944-48 can be found in a recently published Russian documentary collection.⁵ Prof. Albina F. Noskowa, the co-editor of this collection, told me that many of the meetings between Stalin and the leaders of "people's democracies" and Communist parties were not recorded (no minutes were taken) during those years. As a rule, it appears, no minutes were taken of meetings conducted at the dachas in Sochi or the Crimea, where Stalin spent long fall and winter months.

The memorandum of conversation with Stalin published below was prepared by Władysław Gomułka and found in his private papers. Most probably Gomułka himself wrote the memorandum after the conversation took place. Two factors support that interpretation. First, the text with the handwritten (and, as it turns out, erroneous) note "third quarter of 1945" was found in his private papers; second, the style of the memo, is very characteristic of Gomułka. As was the case in his other reports of talks with Stalin which have survived, he only noted Stalin's statements and completely omitted his own.

By a fortunate coincidence, information about the

very same conversation can be found in the above-mentioned collection of Russian documents, in a letter dated 14 November 1945 written by Stalin to Molotov relating the conversation with Gomułka and Hilary Minc.⁶ The letter was meant for "The Four," that is, probably for the few closest associates of Stalin at the time. The memo is laconic, consisting of the list of questions asked by the Poles and short, thesis-like answers. When one compares their subjects, it is clear that both Gomułka's memo and Stalin's letter refer to the same conversation. Gomułka's description is more detailed, but the order in which he relates the topics of conversation differs from Stalin's note. By the end, Gomułka also writes in abbreviated form, using short sentences, including digressions and unrelated issues mentioned by Stalin during the conversation, as well as during the dinner which usually followed such conversations. From Stalin's memo we learn that the conversation took place on 14 November 1945 and that Minc participated in it as well, but no minutes were taken.

The content of both documents indicates that the reason for the conversation was the new situation in Poland following the Moscow Conference (17-21 June 1945) and the formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN — Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności). The main problems about which the Polish leaders consulted Stalin concerned relations with the Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), which was formed in September 1945 under the leadership of Stanisław Mikołajczyk⁷ and which appeared to be the first political party completely independent of the PPR, as well as the relations with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which also gained independence under those circumstances. Another important part of the conversation related to the approaching PPR Congress (6-12 December 1945) and the plans for parliamentary elections. International problems also consumed a relatively large

part of the conversation. These included the question of receiving loans from Western countries, the dispute with Czechoslovakia over Cieszyn [Těšín], reparations from Germany, and the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland. Interestingly enough, the PPR leadership did not heed all of Stalin's "advice" and apparently did not treat his suggestions as obligatory. For example, against Stalin's suggestion, parliamentary elections were postponed until January 1947. The change of premier did not take place either: Edward Osóbka-Morawski stayed on until the election. Contrary to Stalin's advice, Gomułka took the post of Minister of Regained [Western] Territories. The fact that this question was brought up proves that the conversation in question had to take place in the fourth quarter of 1945, since the plan to create a Ministry of Regained Territories emerged only in October.

Gomułka's memo and Stalin's letter are published without any changes, in the same exact form as the originals. The footnotes to Gomułka's memo were written by A. Werblan.

Document No. 1

Gomułka's memorandum of a conversation with Stalin

1. The political situation in Poland

third quarter of 1945⁸

On the PPS [Polish Socialist Party]. You are wrong if you think that Morawski⁹ is just naive. He is clever and follows the orders of others who teach him and give him orders. There are smarter people in the PPS than he. Morawski does not want to oppose them and fulfills their orders. Before he obeyed Bierut, and now he is obeying others. They, that is, the PPS, will leave you anyway.

On the PSL [Polish Peasants' Party]. He [Stalin] is in possession of absolutely reliable information that everything that the English ambassador does in Warsaw has been agreed upon with Mikołajczyk. Mikołajczyk is very careful, and although they are in possession of sufficient evidence of what he says to the English ambassador, that evidence is not good enough to compromise him in the eyes of the world. To the suggestion that there are political differences within the PSL, he declared that it is a fact that everybody listens to Mikołajczyk.

On the PPR [Polish Workers' Party]. You keep conducting defensive policy. You behave as if you were sitting in the dock. This is all caused by the fear that the bloc will break apart. Belonging to the bloc does not exclude party agitation. Your agitation is wrong. Your people are not ideologically armed. You need to have a clear program, written in striking terms, so that everybody will know what you want and what you are thinking about your coalition partners. You should clearly state your stance towards other parties. When talking about

Mikołajczyk, you should talk about the Warsaw uprising and that his policy is aimed at bringing back the big landowners and foreign capitalists. About the PPS you need to say that it is a party that has certain good points, but you also need to point out their shortcomings. You have to call the antagonistic elements by name. You don't need to worry so much about the bloc disintegrating. If you are strong they are going to come to you. They wanted to isolate the French party the same way and now they cannot not consider them. Thorez¹⁰ gave nothing to the nation, and you gave a lot. It is ridiculous that you are afraid of accusations that you are against independence. It is bad that on this issue you moved to defensive positions, that you are trying to explain yourselves. You are the ones who built independence. If there were no PPR, there would be no independence. You created the army, built the state structures, the financial system, the economy, the state. Mikołajczyk was abroad at the time, and Morawski was lagging behind somewhere on your tail. Instead of telling them all that, you are saying only that you support independence. The PPR turned the USSR into an ally of Poland. The arguments are right there at your feet and you don't know how to make use of them. Take the example of a manager of a factory who cried all the time that he couldn't get any materials. And Stalin walked around the factory for two days and found everything that was needed. A membership of 200,000 is a force which can overturn a whole country if it is well organized, well managed and controlled, and if it has instructions as to what to say and how to say it. Do not be so worried about the bloc, leave the inter-party diplomacy to Bierut, and fight for concrete issues: the question of independence, cooperatives, nationalization and state trade.

The issue of the premier. Morawski is not playing a positive role, he is only slowing things down at present. The paralysis of the authorities is a dangerous thing. Lange¹¹ will definitely be better. Morawski is a chicken compared to him. Lange was probably closely connected to [U.S. President Franklin D.] Roosevelt and belonged to the circle of his trustworthy professor-informants who come to a country and give a good estimate of the situation within a short time. Presently Lange, together with the whole Roosevelt entourage, fell out of favor. This is how the fact that he took Polish citizenship can be explained. Will he, as a socialist, not listen to the PPS? Ask [Wanda] Wasilewska's¹² opinion. She knows him well and has a good hunch about people. (Don't push Wasilewska away. She may still come back to Poland.) He [Stalin] did not exclude the possibility that the PPR might take over the [office of the] premier. If your influence is equal to that of the PPS, why can they have a premier and not you? He agreed, however, that if the PPR were to take the office of the premier there would be a great outcry about the single-party system and about Sovietization. He took the stance that it was needed and absolutely necessary to change the premier before the election. Morawski could be toppled over the question of

cooperatives.

The issue of the election. Why do you think that the election should be postponed as much as possible? It will not be better, but worse. The economic situation will not be better, people will drift back from England, they (the opponents) will organize better and they may even bring you down. Because they know that, the PPS is suggesting that the election be in a year. The election should take place in the spring of 1946. Your Congress should start the election campaign. The fact that the PPS is not responding to your suggestion of creating a bloc should be treated as a refusal. You should address them in writing in an [official] document and say that if you receive no concrete reply you will consider it a refusal. He [Stalin] was not against the [idea of the] bloc but he expressed doubts as to the possibility of forming it and suggested entering the election alone. He said that with good agitation and a proper attitude the party may win a considerable number of votes. You have to stop being diffident.

The issue of the Party Congress. It is necessary to break clearly with the past of the KPP, and state that the PPR is a new party formed in the heat of the battle against the German invaders. The KPP was lead by [Marshall Józef] Piłsudski's¹³ spies, who forced upon the party an unpopular policy, which isolated the party from the nation. He [Stalin] said he could show documents to prove it. [Those were] the testimony of Sosnowski,¹⁴ a close associate of [Feliks] Dzierzynski¹⁵ and a testimony of Dabal.¹⁶ Do not invite any foreign parties to the Congress. If somebody were to come from the CPSU, there would be a completely unnecessary ovation. The congress should be a starting point for an offensive [election] campaign of the party. The knot of the question of independence can be untied beginning with the Congress.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxons. Do not believe in divergences between the English and the Americans. They are closely connected to each other. Their intelligence conducts lively operations against us in all countries. In Poland, in the Balkans, and in China, everywhere their agents spread the information that the war with us will break out any day now. I am completely certain that there will be no war, it is rubbish. They are not capable of waging war against us. Their armies have been disarmed by agitation for peace and will not raise their weapons against us. Not atomic bombs, but armies decide the war. The goals of the intelligence activities are the following. First of all, they are trying to intimidate us and force us to yield in contentious issues concerning Japan, the Balkans, and the reparations. Secondly, [they want] to push us away from our allies—Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. I asked them directly when they were starting the war against us. And they said “What are you saying? What are you saying?” [Russian: “*Shto vy? Shto vy?*”]. Whether in thirty years or so they want to have another war is another issue. This would bring them great profit, particularly in the case of

America, which is beyond the oceans and couldn't care less about the effects of the war. Their policy of sparing Germany testifies to that. He who spares the aggressor wants another war. To the statement that there are rumors in America that soon there will be an agreement between America and the Soviet Union, he said, “It is possible.”

Intelligence Service. This part of the conversation took place because I informed him that the English keep alluding to my going to London. He declared: “I assure you that they are not inviting you for a good purpose. Do not refuse directly, but don't go.” There is a group of complete rascals and ruthless murderers in the Intelligence Service, who will fulfill any order given to them. They are the ones who killed [General Władysław] Sikorski.¹⁷ He [the one who gave the order for Sikorski's assassination] was Governor of Gibraltar at the time, the former head of the English Military Mission in the USSR, and a ruthless murderer. He prepared the crash of Sikorski's plane. When Stalin asked Churchill what happened to Sikorski, Churchill answered “I gave them strict orders that nothing like that was to happen again,” as if you could kill the same man twice. They killed Sikorski probably because he threatened the English that [Poland would move] to the American side. They tried to kill Tito three times. Once they incited the Germans against him. Tito was with his staff and there were about two hundred English and American officers there who left him one day before the attempted attack. The Germans performed a landing operation on Tito's headquarters. Tito was saved by a Soviet pilot who took him away to an island. Not long ago they organized a train crash, but Tito took the train a day earlier and his car on the train was empty. In 1942 when Molotov was in London, the English invited the people accompanying Molotov for a ride on a four-engine plane. The English officers and Molotov's people all died. When the English really care about [killing] someone, they sacrifice their own people as well. When we go to England, we use our own planes, our own fuel, and have our own guards by the plane to make sure that they don't add anything to the fuel. The Soviet pilots explained Sikorski's crash [by saying] that powder must have been added to the fuel. The English usually invite you to their country to find out what your weak spots are through either drunkenness or women. Whenever they can, they blackmail the chosen victim and try to recruit people. Unszlicht¹⁸ was also recruited this way by the czarist police.

Loans. If America wants to give, you should take, but without any conditions. You need to reject the open door policy, since they use this policy only towards colonial countries. You can give the Americans most-privileged-nation status. You cannot reject the proposal to permit trade representatives in [the country] because you don't officially have a monopoly on foreign trade, and private capital exists in your country. You can agree to having particular projects built in your country, in ports, in Warsaw, or other places, but you cannot agree to

concessions. We want to receive from them six billion at 2.5% [interest] for forty years; the payments would start in nine years. At first they were telling us about the open door policy as well, but they had to back out and suggested that we ask them for loans. We don't want to ask until we are sure that we are going to receive. They are already backing out, because they gave us four hundred million from lend-lease¹⁹ on our conditions. You will have to establish some customs tariffs. It provides state income and there is no state without tariffs. You also have to guard well the frontiers on the USSR side.

Nationalization. You need to carry it out. It would be good if it were the act of a new premier. The National Council [Polish: *Krajowa Rada*] should pass it. You should not tie your hands with a clause about damages. You could for example call it a "fair compensation." Check how Mexico did it with their industry so that you will always be able to say that you follow Mexico's, not Russia's, example.

Quotas. It will be difficult for you to keep the quotas for two to three years. The best way is for the state to have reserves and force the farmers to lower their prices by interfering in the market. This is what we did in Latvia and Estonia by throwing one hundred thousand tons of crops [on the market] and lowering the price of bread five times.

Inflation. It is impossible to avoid it. You should not fall into the extreme inflation like after World War I, but you cannot economize on production credits.

Western Territories. He [Stalin] expressed surprise that [Soviet Marshal] Zhukov doesn't want to accept the Germans [living in Poland]. You should create such conditions for the Germans that they want to escape themselves. Keep only the ones you need. Wiesław [Gomułka] should not take the Ministry of Western Territories, he should concentrate on the party and the election campaign. Somebody else needs to be found for that post. He [Gomułka] should not even take formal responsibility for Western Territories. You should learn from our experience and have a few vice-premiers, each watching over several ministries. You should not be afraid . . . [illegible] . . . you have twenty people and keep shuffling them around. It is impossible that during all this time you did not educate many good people. You should not pump the people out of the party although you were right to have taken the responsibility for the country. If the party gets stronger it will be easier to do the state work as well.

State domains in the Western Territories.²⁰ The idea is correct, but where are you going to get the labor force from? Because of the agricultural reforms, for a few years in Poland there will be no influx of people from the countryside to the cities. We are starting to implement a different policy in Soviet communes [Russian: *sovkhoz*]. We give the workers housing and some land, between half a hectare and one hectare for an accessory farm. We did the same with railroad workers. We have been attacked

"from the left" that we are creating a new petit bourgeoisie. This is incorrect and not Marxist. Great capital creates a craftsmen-and petit-bourgeois-focused environment as a reserve of labor force. America, the most capitalist of countries, can be taken as an example here. America's crafts and light industry are also the most developed [in the world]. A socialist farm also has to create such an environment as a reserve of labor force. Changes are occurring in the Soviet Union in the laws managing labor. In the past, the rule was that the most qualified metal industry workers earned the most. We suffer the "misfortune of no unemployment," and therefore people do not want to do hard labor, such as mining, for example. Therefore we pay more to unqualified workers performing hard labor, such as miners, than we pay metal industry workers.

Transportation. The most important issue. First he [Stalin] was against moving Minc into transportation, but later agreed to it, once he found out that we had no people in transportation. He stipulated that Minc should not leave industry. He promised to look into our proposals concerning transportation, particularly the question of moving transit onto the seaside line. He sees no possibilities for us to get locomotives and train cars with their help.

Reparations. He [Stalin] stated that they are beginning to implement a new system of reparations, namely instead of bringing in machines that would not start running until after a year, they are planning to start production in Germany within a few weeks. There are specialists—engineers—there, and a lot can be produced and reparations can be received in the form of finished products. This is even more necessary because for reasons relating to transportation, bringing in machines is very difficult. The Germans are very pleased with that. He was interested in our detailed needs and said that we can obtain a lot if we use that system.

Agricultural reform in Germany. The English and Americans are furious, but we are doing our thing. This way we are destroying the Junkers, a class which is economically most combative. Forests, of which there have been too many in Germany, are also getting divided.

About the conversation between Bierut and Molotov. He [Stalin] was notified by Lebedev²¹ that, on the basis of his conversation with Molotov, Bierut drew conclusions about a shift of the Soviet position towards Poland. He showed particular interest in the course of that conversation and concluded that there is no shift towards Poland whatsoever and that Molotov was probably in a bad mood at the time.

About the navy. Explain to me [Stalin] what happened concerning the navy. How could it have happened that you believed that we wanted to give you ships instead of machines as reparations. I explained to Bierut twice that it wasn't the case, and Bierut kept muttering something about gasoline. I had the impression that you simply did not want any Communist bunkers in

your country. You are ashamed of it. I scolded Bulganin for [passing on] inaccurate information that you will be getting ships at the cost of reparations. He is a clumsy and not very flexible man. The whole time Stalin thought that we will receive ships as an advance on the 15% of the one-third of the trophy German navy. [Stalin said] In Potsdam I promised to give [it] to you for free, but 15% of the navy ships is more than I had promised. It has been taken from the enemy, after all, and Bierut got angry with me that I am not giving things away for free. Such lack of trust spoils relations. In the meantime, Stalin called Wyszyński and Kuznetsov concerning this matter. He came back after the phone conversation and declared that the matter stood worse than he thought, and that the Soviet bureaucrats really wanted to cheat you [Poles] and count twenty-three ships as reparations and you are agreeing to it. It is all coming from Bulganin. If you think there are no stupid generals, you are wrong. Later Stalin declared that they will have to give us those ships for free. In the meantime, another phone call came from Moscow. It became clear that the 15% mentioned in the Polish-Soviet agreement refers to the commercial fleet, not the navy, and that apparently an agreement was reached in Moscow with a Polish delegation that the twenty-three ships are to be counted in exchange for the shipwrecks which the Soviet navy will raise from the bottom of the Polish sea and take. Stalin asked that the copy of the agreement be sent to him. He agreed to it unwillingly, as if it were a *fait accompli*.

The army. Concerning officers of the Red Army in the Polish Army taking Polish citizenship—many of them do not want to take it because they are afraid that the leadership will change. We don't want to force them. You should Polonize the army all the way through. You can let go of the Red Army generals and officers whenever you want, as soon as possible. If you need a released soldier's help, they should help you, but as an instructor. If it upsets Bulganin, that means he doesn't understand anything. You keep doing your thing and don't pay attention to that. Why did you approach Bulganin and not a military attaché in Poland? When he found out about the issue involving Rear-Admiral Abramov,²² he pointed out that we should not put Soviet people in uncomfortable positions, that is, inviting them to certain posts [only to] release them later.

The Red Army in Poland. There are no international circumstances that would require keeping large troops of the Red Army in Poland. Only small troops guarding the transit railroad line could be left. The only question is your domestic situation. The point is that they would not kill you. The situation is similar in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. They don't want us to leave before the election either. The number of Red Army soldiers in Poland is steadily diminishing and will continue to diminish. We will soon pull the last soldier out of Czechoslovakia under the condition that the Americans pull out as well. He [Stalin] generally spoke for localization but make no concrete promises concerning

that matter. He stated that after the war plundering instincts were awakened among the Red Army soldiers. In Berlin alone they took two hundred thousand watches. One of the reasons is that the command of the Red Army allowed the released soldiers to take some amount of spoils home. When the demobilization is over, marauding will end as well.

Grain for sowing. He was embarrassed when he found out that Molotov refused to lend [Poland] fifty thousand tons of grain for sowing. He was urging us to take thirty thousand although he wasn't sure whether it could still be done. He called Rokossovskii [and told him] to give the thirty thousand tons as a loan. He confirmed that order to Molotov by phone.

Zaolzie [Silesia]. You have coking coal, so economically your problem is solved. Nobody but us would support your claims. We would be risking defeat if we supported your claims. Why should you or we compromise ourselves? You should solve this situation by resettling the population. You need to organize some kind of Polish-Czech conference. We can help you with it if you want us to. It is no good that all the Slavic countries unite but two of them are arguing.

Yugoslavia. The picture of the partisan movement in Yugoslavia was not as pretty as it seemed from afar. During the take over of Białoogród [Belgrade] Tito was in Moscow. The partisans could not keep up an open battle with the Germans at all. However, Tito was much more ruthless towards the enemy than you. Of thirty-four thousand of Pavelicz's²³ captives [POW's — trans.] he had fourteen thousand shot. The English demanded that we influence Tito in order to postpone the election once Szubaszic²⁴ left the government. We answered that Tito's government is the only legally valid and universally recognized government of Yugoslavia and only that government can decide about the election. The English have already been silent for two weeks concerning this matter. The English were the ones who forced Szubaszic to leave the government.

Revkom.²⁵ Stalin was on the front line at the time. Dzierzynski dreamed of a Soviet Poland. Lenin unwillingly agreed to Revkom. We very quickly realized that creating Revkom was a mistake. In a country such as Poland, which for so many years was under foreign rule, choosing Soviet rule was a mistake. Lenin tried to explain it as prodding Poland with a bayonet just to see. But of course that is not a sufficient explanation.

XXX

1. Letter of a Swedish sailor-Communist to the Soviet Government concerning anti-Soviet agitation in Gdańsk and Gdynia.
2. The delay in the invitation was caused by the unexpected arrival of [U.S. Ambassador Averell] Harriman at Sochi.
3. Truman removed [former senior Roosevelt aide Harry]

Hopkins.

4. Freedom of the press—Lenin treated like a German spy by the bourgeois press.
5. Associated Press and Timoshenko²⁶—Stalin in Teheran and forcing the correspondent to publish a denial which was dictated to him under threat of expulsion from the Soviet Union.
6. Good-naturedly calling us “tolstoyniks” during dinner.
7. Benefits from power—Georgian deputy who bought oxen and built two houses.

[Source: *Gomułka papers, in possession of Gomułka Family, translated by Anna Elliot-Zielinska.*]

Document No. 2

Conversation of J.V. Stalin with W. Gomułka and G. Mintz regarding the situation in Poland

Distributed to V. Molotov, L. Beria, G. Malenkov, A. Mikoian, and A. Vyshinskii.

Moscow

14 November 1945

SECRET

To Com. MOLOTOV for *chetverka* [apparently, Stalin’s inner circle of four,²⁷ which probably consisted of the persons listed above except for Vyshinskii].

The discussion was not being transcribed (the Poles deemed it unnecessary to make a record of conversation), thus I am sending you the contents of the discussion in the form of questions and answers.

QUESTION FROM POLES. Has there been a change in the Soviet leaders’ attitude toward Poland and, in particular, toward [the] Polish Communists?

ANSWER FROM COM. STALIN. It has not changed and could not change. Our attitude toward Poles and Polish Communists is as friendly as before.

QUESTION. Should we adopt a law for nationalizing large industry and banks?

ANSWER. Following [Czechoslovak President Eduard] Beneš’ adoption of such a law, the time has come when such a law should be adopted in Poland as well.

QUESTION. Should we allow foreign capital to be brought to Poland in the form of concessions or in some other form?

ANSWER. This matter is very serious, and it must be carefully examined by the Poles themselves.

Note: The Poles have not said that they have rejected the Soviet proposal for joint enterprises. I have the impression that the Poles would not mind making concessions to foreign capital in this area as well.

QUESTION. Should we adopt the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] proposal for repealing grain procurement and announcing a free market without price regulations?

ANSWER. However regrettable it may be, sooner or later

the Poles will have to take this step, since, under a non-Soviet system and in the absence of war, it is not possible to maintain for long a system of grain procurement and price regulations.

QUESTION. Would I object if the Poles accepted a loan from the Americans or the English, and would I allow this loan to be accepted under the conditions that would more or less limit Poland’s utilization of the loan?

ANSWER. The loan can be accepted, but without any types of conditions that would limit Poland’s rights in the utilization of the loan.

QUESTION. Can we conclude a pact of mutual assistance with France?

ANSWER. You can, but it must fully conform to the spirit of the mutual assistance pact concluded between Poland and the USSR.

QUESTION. Should we pursue further the question of Těšín [Cieszyn] and can the USSR support Poland in the negotiations on Těšín with Czechoslovakia?

ANSWER. I don’t advise you to pursue this question further, since, after receiving Silesian coking coal, Poland no longer has an argument for the transfer of Těšín to the Poles, in light of which the USSR cannot support the Poles in this matter. It would be better to eliminate quickly this contentious issue with Czechoslovakia, limit the matter to the resettlement of Těšín Poles in Poland, and re-establish good relations with Czechoslovakia. On the question of resettling Těšín Poles in Poland, the USSR can support the Poles in the negotiations with Czechoslovakia.

QUESTION. Should representatives of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks] be invited to the PPR [Polish Workers Party] Congress that will be taking place in the near future?

ANSWER. It would be better not to invite them, so that opponents would not be able to say that the PPR Congress is taking place under the control of the VKP(b).

QUESTION. Can we announce at the PPR Congress that the PPR is a successor of the line and tradition of the Polish Communist Party, which had been liquidated even prior to the war?

ANSWER. This should not be done because the Polish Communist Party has in actuality become agents of Piłsudchiks, even though opponents have painted it as agents of the VKP(b). It would be better to announce at the PPR Congress that the PPR is a new party and that it is not tied to the line and traditions of the Polish Communist Party.

QUESTION. Are we correct in thinking that it would be expedient to postpone general elections in Poland for another year?

ANSWER. I think that it would be better to hold elections no later than spring of 1946, since further postponement of elections would be very difficult both due to internal and international reasons.

QUESTION. Osóbka-Morawski is acting badly. If he does not improve in the near future, we would like to replace him prior to the organization of the elections with Mr.

Lange (the current Polish ambassador to the USA, a moderate PPS-ist, and well disposed, in the Poles' opinion, toward Communists). What can you suggest?

ANSWER. If you have no other option and if it is impossible at present to put forth the candidacy of Bierut (the Poles believe this combination to be inexpedient), then you can make an attempt with Lange, with the goal of using Lange to dismantle the PPS. Consult with Wanda Lvovna, who is closely familiar with Lange.

The rest of the discussion dealt with questions regarding the shipment of 30 tons of seed grain from the Rokossowski reserves and fulfilling the Poles' request for railroad transport. But you already know about these matters.

STALIN

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond 45, opis 1, delo 355, listy 8-11; published in Vostochnaia Yevropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov [Eastern Europe in the Documents of the Russian Archives 1944-1953], vol. 1 (1944-48), ed. T.V. Volokitina et. al., (Moscow: Siberian Chronograph, 1997), pp. 301-303; translated by Daniel Rozas]*

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¹ Władysław Gomułka (1905-1966): pseudonym "Wiesław"; Polish Communist leader; General Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, 1943-1948; First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, 1956-1970.

² Władysław Gomułka, *Diaries*, edited by Andrzej Werblan (Warsaw, 1994), vol. II, p. 516.

³ Krzysztof Persak: Junior research fellow at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences. His current project deals with the Polish Communist Party Central Committee's organization and functioning as well as Polish Communist elite after 1944.

⁴ Krzysztof Persak, "Polish Sources On Stalin's Foreign Policy," Paper presented at the CWIHP workshop "European Archival Evidence on Stalin and the Cold War," Budapest, 3-4 October 1997.

⁵ *Vostochnaia Yevropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov 1944-53 gg.* [Eastern Europe in the documents of the Russian Archives], vol. I. 1944-48 gg. (Moscow-Novosibirsk: "Siberian Chronograph," 1997).

⁶ Hilary Minc (1905-1974): Communist politician; member of the PWP/PUWP Politburo, 1944-1956; deputy Prime Minister, responsible for the economy. At the time a member of the Politburo of the KCPPr and Minister of Industry in the TRJN.

⁷ Stanisław Mikołajczyk (1902-1966): Peasants' Party leader; Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, 1943-44;

leader of the opposition Polish Peasants' Party and deputy Prime Minister, 1945-47; 1947 emigration to the U.S.

⁸ Words "third quarter of 1945" added in hand on the original.

⁹ Edward Osóbka-Morawski, premier of TRJN (Temporary Government of National Unity).

¹⁰ Maurice Thorez, General Secretary of the Communist Party of France.

¹¹ Oskar Lange, a well-known economist, active in the PPS and PUWP, was a professor at the University of Chicago during the war.

¹² Wanda Wasilewska (1905-1964): Socialist and Communist politician and writer; leader of the Polish communist emigration in the Soviet Union during World War II—President of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR; Stalin's protégé. Did not return to Poland after 1945.

¹³ Marshall Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935): Polish national leader, architect of Polish independence in 1918, President 1918-1922 and Premier 1926-27, 1930.

¹⁴ Jan Sosnowski, active in SDKPiL, lived in the USSR after 1917. He died in the purges of 1937-38.

¹⁵ Feliks Dzierżyński (1877-1926): Polish and Russian communist politician; founder and President of the Cheka, 1917-1926; held various posts in the Soviet Government (Sovnarkom).

¹⁶ Tomasz Dąbal, one of the leaders of the KPP, died in the purges in 1938.

¹⁷ General Władysław Sikorski (1881-1943): eminent Polish military leader and statesman; Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, 1939-1943; died in air crash in Gibraltar.

¹⁸ Józef Unszlicht, active in SDKPiL, lived in the USSR after 1917, died in purges in 1937-38.

¹⁹ The Lend-Lease Act of 1941, on the basis of which the USSR received from the United States equipment and supplies worth 11 billion dollars during the war.

²⁰ State-run farms.

²¹ Viktor Lebedev, USSR Ambassador in Warsaw, 1945-52.

²² Nikolai Abramov, rear-admiral, a Russian officer who for five months (August-December 1945) was Chief of Staff of the Polish navy.

²³ Ante Pavelić, a Croatian politician and soldier who collaborated with the Germans during World War II.

²⁴ Ivan Šubašić, premier of the Yugoslavian emigration government in London in 1944. In 1945, after an agreement with Josip Broz Tito, he became a Minister of Internal Affairs in Tito's government. He resigned from that post after several months.

²⁵ The Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland, which was to become the Polish Soviet Government in case the Red Army won in 1920. It existed for a short period of time in the summer of 1920 on the territory seized by the Red Army. Julian Marchlewski was the Chairman; other members were Feliks Dzierżyński, Feliks Kon, Edward Próchniak and Józef Unszlicht.

²⁶ Semyon Timoshenko, a USSR marshal.

²⁷ For a discussion of the evolution of Stalin's inner circles of advisors see Iu. N. Zhukov "Bor'ba za vlast' v rukovodstve SSSR v 1945-1952 godakh," [The Struggle for Power in the Leadership of the USSR, 1945-52], *Voprosy Istorii* 1 (1995), pp. 23-39.

The Polish Contribution to the Victory of the “Prague Coup” in February 1948

By Andrzej Paczkowski

In the last phase of World War II, and during the first years after the war, Polish–Czechoslovak relations were, to use the euphemistic language of diplomacy, cool and sometimes even tense. The source of this tension was a conflict which had started in 1918 over part of Těšín (Cieszyn), Silesia (also known as Zaolzie) as well as the newly born territorial dispute over the division of German Lower Silesia, which eventually had fallen to Poland. The Polish and Czechoslovak Communists also became involved in these conflicts. Although both sides declared their internationalism, the communist parties were most unyielding in presenting their territorial demands; in part because of the necessity to strengthen their legitimacy as the defenders of national (or state) interests and in part to show themselves to be as good defenders as other political parties. This was particularly obvious in the case of the Polish Communists, who came to power by force. The Czechoslovak Communists, who traditionally had been quite influential, however also had to avoid being outmatched by the “Benešniks.” In the end, under pressure from Stalin, a compromise was reached and a treaty of “friendship and cooperation” was signed in March 1947.

Cool relations between the two countries did not mean that relations between the Communist parties were equally bad. Perhaps they lacked the spontaneous cordiality with which, for example, Yugoslav leader Josip Tito was treated in Poland, but Poles sincerely worried that Prague was “lagging behind” the rest of Central Europe in its march towards “people’s democracy.” They, of course, avoided public criticism of their Czech and Slovak comrades, but growing Polish impatience was expressed by some of the more orthodox activists in some internal documents. For example, the Polish consul in Moravská Ostrava stated with regret in a 1947 report that “the superstition of formal democracy is still deeply rooted in the heart of the [Czechoslovak] com-party [Communist Party].” However, he consoled himself by saying that “the growing consciousness and combative spirit of the working masses is producing more healthy trends.”¹ The fact that it was only in Czechoslovakia that the Communists had not yet gained full control over the situation was inconvenient for everybody, including Moscow.² However, Warsaw probably felt most directly what was happening on the other side of the Polish southern border. Among other reasons, this was because Czechoslovakia under President Edvard Beneš did not constitute a tight enough barrier between Poland and the West. Moreover, Polish Communists, who were more and more determined to achieve “organic unification” with, or,

in fact, absorption of, the Socialists, were concerned with the “bad example” being given by the Czechoslovak Social Democrats to their Polish counterparts. Particularly after the Brno congress of November 1947, activists who preferred to collaborate with non-Communist partners and President Beneš, rather than with Communist premier, Klement Gottwald, played an important role in the party leadership. In addition, Bohumil Laušman, the newly elected chairman of the Social Democratic Party, was allegedly a “centrist.” These trends could potentially have mobilized those Polish Socialists who were hesitant to fall into the open arms of Communist leaders Bolesław Bierut and Władysław Gomułka.

It is therefore not surprising that Warsaw was seriously interested in the elections planned in Czechoslovakia for May 1948. At the end of January 1948, during one of the meetings of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) Politburo, “it was decided to propose to the CPCz [Czechoslovak Communist Party] a meeting during the coming two weeks to discuss the question of the election.”³ On February 11, that is, when the government crisis in Prague began, the same body decided on the “guidelines” for talks with the Czechoslovak Communists. These concerned “a) [the question of] taking a tougher stance against reactionary and collaborationist forces; b) the question of approach to the Social Democrats and tactics towards the Socialist Left in Czechoslovakia; and c) the question of potential political aid in organizational and technical spheres [in the election campaign].”⁴ On February 14, after the meeting, Gomułka presented a report to members of the Politburo. The recorder did not mention whether he had raised the question of “taking the tougher stance against reactionary forces,” but the topic must have been discussed. One way or another, the Polish Communists intended to offer help. On February 13, as the situation in Prague intensified, the embassy sent a coded message suggesting that “due to the projected internal and political changes . . . [it would be] desirable for a delegation from Poland to participate in the Congress of Trade Unions [which was to take place] on February 22.”⁵ Three days later, however, Warsaw received a telegram saying that Gottwald “decided not to invite the delegation,” since “questions of internal politics will be discussed” during the Congress, “and the presence of foreigners could be interpreted as interfering in Czechoslovak internal affairs.”⁶ (As is well known, the Congress of Trade Unions became one of the main instruments of pressure on Beneš.)

Although the Czechoslovak Communists completely controlled the situation in the trade unions, the Social

Democrats were still their “weak point.” A lot depended on their stance, since it was only together with the Social Democrats that the CPCz had a majority in the Parliament. Without the collaboration of the Social Democrats, not just Zdeněk Fierlinger’s “Left,” but above all Laušman’s “center,” the chances for a quick and “peaceful” elimination of political opponents were close to zero. In this matter Polish comrades could help, since the leadership of the Polish Socialist Party consisted of conformists who were ready to go quite far in order to show their loyalty in the fight for the “unity of the workers’ movement,” and some of them were simply too dependant from the Communists. After receiving the news that Laušman was inclined to cooperate with Gottwald’s opponents, Gomułka immediately conducted the necessary dialogue with Józef Cyrankiewicz,⁷ the premier and unquestioned leader of the compliant Polish Socialists, and on the evening of the same day, February 20, the top leadership of the PPS decided to send a party delegation to Prague. Their goal was to “potentially influence” Czechoslovak colleagues “in the spirit of leftist-Socialist and revolutionary politics.”⁸ Also on February 20, the Polish Foreign Ministry ordered Aleksander Krajewski, chargé d’affaires in Prague, to “immediately go to Gottwald” and inform him about the planned departure for Prague of the four PPS delegates at noon the next day. An “immediate answer” was requested as to whether the “CPCz had any reservations with respect to this initiative, and the CPCz was asked to provide guidelines for talks with the Social Democrats.”⁹ This time, the answer from Prague was completely positive. Gottwald asked the Poles to meet with the Social Democrats (“particularly the left ones”) and to press “them and Laušman not to leave the government under any circumstances or to align with the reactionary forces.”¹⁰

In the late afternoon of February 21, four Polish politicians arrived in Prague. They belonged to the very top PPS leadership, although Cyrankiewicz, the “Number One” man, was not among them. It could have been impossible for Cyrankiewicz to come to Prague, since the arrival of the premier in office would give the delegation an official and government-level character. All the delegates were members of the Central Executive Committee (Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy, hereafter CKW), which was the highest executive organ of the party, corresponding more or less to the Politburo in Communist parties. Kazimierz Rusinek, head of the CKW (formally the Number Two man in the PPS), led the delegation. He was accompanied by Adam Rapacki, a member of the Political Commission of the CKW and Minister of Navigation in Cyrankiewicz’s government, who later became famous on the international scene as Poland’s foreign minister from 1956-1968. The other two members of the delegation were CKW members Stefan Arski and Henryk Jabłoński. There is no need to discuss their actions, since the extensive report published below relates it in great detail. It seems to be reliable, although it

is noticeable that in Czechoslovak sources known to me, there is no mention of the Poles’ stay in Prague or of the many talks they conducted with Social Democrats as well as with Communists.

After returning to Warsaw the delegation submitted the following report, copies of which are found in Polish Workers’ Party records as well as in those of the Foreign Ministry. Cyrankiewicz passed one copy to the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, and Ambassador Viktor Lebedev sent its shortened version to Moscow.¹¹ In the memo accompanying the note, Ambassador Lebedev “ironically pointed out that the PPS delegates strikingly (*javno*) overestimated the importance of their mission.”¹² I am not able to judge whether and to what degree the ambassador was right, but I hope the historians investigating the 1948 “Prague coup” will do that in time. It is beyond question, however, that the Poles genuinely wanted to help Gottwald and their Socialist comrades in the efficient elimination of the “reactionary forces.” It is also possible to think that it was important to Cyrankiewicz to present the report to the Soviet representative in Warsaw, since this was a way for the PPS to stress its loyalty to Stalin (and Communists in general) and prove that it could be useful. At the same time, the observation of the mechanics of the “Prague coup,” the ruthlessness and effectiveness of Gottwald’s actions, definitely influenced the way in which the Polish Socialists assessed their chances to resist the “unification” plan pushed by Gomułka. The PPS leadership realized that if they did not give up “willingly” they would be forced to surrender under worse conditions. Less than two weeks after the victory of the Czechoslovak Communists, Roman Zambrowski, one of the PPR leaders, said that, “new [developments] in Socialist parties in the West and in the countries of People’s Democracy . . . were the reason that we entered a new stage of relations between the PPR and PPS. We consider this period to be a period of accelerated ripening of organic unity. The international situation has changed so much in the last few days that in order not to be left behind [the events] we need to start moving faster as well.”¹³ Gomułka sent congratulations to Gottwald, and Cyrankiewicz and Rusinek sent a congratulatory letter to Laušman, expressing “a particular joy about the closing of the unified ranks of the Czechoslovak working class and consolidating the Social Democratic Party along the leftist-socialist, revolutionary political line.”¹⁴ By helping Gottwald and Fierlinger they were adding a brick to the Sovietization of Poland and signing the death sentence for their own party.

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¹ Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter called AMSZ), Warsaw, Group VI, file 183, packet 15, p.58.

² E.g., in January 1948 in the Central Committee [CC] Department of Foreign Policy of the All-Union Communist Party (b) [CPSU] a study was prepared in which reservations were expressed numerous times concerning the fact that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) “had not [yet] organized a decisive attack against the reactionary forces.” Quoted from G.N. Murashko et al., eds., *Vostochnaya Evropa v dokumentakh rossijskich archivov 1944-1953*, vol. 1, 1944-1948, p.742, n. 2.

³ *Archiwum Akt Nowych* (further on called AAN) of KC PZPR, 295/-5, p.7.

⁴ *Ibid.* p.17.

⁵ AMSZ, Telegram Section, file 153, packet 15, coded message no. 1693.

⁶ *Ibid.*, coded message no. 1817.

⁷ Murashko et al., *Vostochnaya Evropa*, doc. 261, p.769.

⁸ See the document published below. This document has been used by Stanisław Ciesielski in his article, “PPS wobec wydarzeń lutowych w Czechosłowacji w 1948 r. Delegacja PPS w Pradze” (“The PPS and the February events in Czechoslovakia in 1948: The PPS delegation in Prague”), in *Wrocławskie studia z dziejów najnowszych, Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis 1274* (Wrocław, 1992), pp. 237-251. However, Ciesielski did not get to other documents, either from the MSZ, PPR, or WKP (b).

⁹ AMSZ, Telegram Sections, file 154, packet 16, coded message no. 2132.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, file 153, coded message no. 2011.

¹¹ Published in Murashko et al., *Vostochnaya Evropa*, doc. no. 262, p. 770-775.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 775, n. 6.

¹³ AAN, KC PZPR, 295/VII-4 (protocol of the meeting of CC PPR Secretariat of 8 March 1948).

¹⁴ *Robotnik*, No. 57, 27 February 1948.

Document

Report of the Special Action of the Polish Socialist Party in Prague, 21-25 February 1948

In accordance with the resolution of the Political Commission and General Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee (CKW) of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), made late on the night of 20 February 1948, Com. Kazimierz Rusinek, Adam Rapacki, Henryk Jabłoński, and Stefan Arski were delegated to go to Prague. This decision was made after a thorough analysis of the political situation in Czechoslovakia brought on by a cabinet crisis there. The goal of the delegation was to inform the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (ČSD) about the basic stance of the PPS and possibly to influence the ČSD Central Committee in the spirit of leftist-socialist and revolutionary politics. The motive behind the decision of the Political Commission and General Secretariat was the fear that, from the leftist-socialist point of view, the situation at the heart of ČSD after the Brno Congress was taking an unfavorable shape. It was feared that the Czechoslovak Party, led by rightist elements, might easily be led astray during the present crisis to opportunism and be tempted to play the role of a

“third force.”

The PPS Central Executive Committee considered this turn of events in the heart of ČSD to be particularly dangerous because of the threat to people’s democracy in Poland’s immediate neighborhood. The political crisis in Czechoslovakia was unanimously judged to be an action provoked by local and international reactionary forces in order to transform Czechoslovakia into the object of direct attack by the American capitalist counteroffensive.

The delegation was given political instructions based on the above basic stance of the PPS Central Executive Committee and flew to Prague on Saturday, February 21.

After arriving in Prague, the delegation considered it necessary to conduct preliminary talks with factors [i.e., people—translator’s note] who could provide it [with] objective information about the present political situation. Since possible further active political measures depended on gaining an objective view of the state of affairs at the moment, a series of informational conversations were conducted that same day.

The general description of the situation was provided to the delegation first by Com. Krajewski, Chargé d’Affaires in Prague.

Subsequently, conversations were held with Com. Rudolf Slanský, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) and Jaromír Dolanský, the Minister of Finance and a member of the KSČ Central Committee. Finally, a long conversation with Com. Zdeněk Fierlinger also took place.

After these preliminary talks the delegation gained precise picture of the situation and the basic stances of the KSČ and the ČSD left.

In the general outline the situation was as follows:

The political crisis was directly caused by the resignation of the ministers of three right-wing parties: the National Socialists (Nar-Soc) [Ed.’s note: the original Polish document uses the unusual abbreviation Nar-Soc for the National Socialist Party: the Československá Strana Národně socialistická, henceforth ČSNS], People’s Party (Lid) [Ed.’s note: the original Polish document uses Lid for the Czechoslovak People’s Party: the Československá Strana Lidová, henceforth ČSL] and Slovak Democrats (DS). Twelve of these ministers, led by Vice-premier [Petr] Zenkl (ČSNS), resigned as a result of a conflict over the discharge of high National Socialist police officials and their replacement by Communists. This, of course, was only a pretext, which let into the open some conflicts that had been hidden for a long time. These conflicts had been growing for a while and became inflamed as the election date approached. They had a dual economic-social and political background. The right-wing parties clearly sabotaged the further social reforms envisioned in the NF [National Front] program, which involved expanding the nationalization of all industrial enterprises employing more than fifty workers, the nationalization of wholesale trade, the introduction of a state monopoly on foreign trade, and additional land reform. The right wing

was afraid that these reforms might undermine the existing social balance to the advantage of the working classes and cut at the economic base of the propertied classes. Politically, the following elements came into play: the question of reforming the constitution, the fear of the potential electoral success of the Communists (whose rallying cry was to win 51% of seats in the next parliament), and the international situation.

There is no doubt that in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, that is, in the zone of the people's democracies, Czechoslovakia was the last link on which American capitalism was counting. After the failure of [Stanisław] Mikołajczyk in Poland and [Imre] Nagy in Hungary, American pressure focused directly on Czechoslovakia. American diplomacy counted on the possibility of making a certain breach here, thanks to the legal existence of a group of right-wing parties which openly showed their inclination to a pro-American orientation. American as well as British agencies in Czechoslovakia were very active, and American propaganda (i.e., the Voice of America) conducted a special campaign in the Czech and Slovak languages aimed at mobilizing reactionary and conservative elements. The emphasis directed at ČSNS was particularly forceful.

The political crisis developed against this general background, and at the time of the delegation's arrival it entered into a decisive stage. What was in this situation was the position of particular political factors.

President [Edvard] Beneš tried to avoid a revolutionary solution of the crisis, but all the signs led us to assume that this step of the right wing parties was taken in agreement with him. At the end of last week (February 20-21), President Beneš was already aware of the unfortunate position of the right wing and tried to ward off the crisis through a return to the *status quo ante*. In practice, this meant his refusal to accept the resignations of the right-wing ministers and his attempt to induce Premier [Klement] Gottwald to keep working with them. President Beneš dragged his decision out over the days that followed, pressing the Communists to make concessions, his goal being to restore the pre-crisis situation. Thus

President Beneš's general tactic at the time was simple temporization. At the same time, President Beneš was preparing to make a solo appearance and appeal to the nation. The military authorities began putting together a special broadcast station in Hradčany [Ed.'s note: the Castle in Prague] for that purpose.

Led by Generals [Ludvík] Svoboda and [Bohumil] Boček, the army declared, after some initial hesitation, a kind of supportive neutrality toward Gottwald's government. At the time it seemed certain that the military forces, while declaring their loyalty to President Beneš, did not want to get involved in the game. In its further deliberations, the delegation, in accordance with the opinions of comrades from the KSČ, accepted the neutrality of the army as a virtual certainty.

The right wing—the ČSNS, ČSL, and DS—were ready after the opening blows to retreat to their initial positions and let Beneš know that they were ready to go to Canossa. Their price was a return to their initial position in the government and the NF. This "compliance" of the right wing inclined Beneš to stick to the *status quo ante*—his concept of getting through the crisis.

The KSČ, from the beginning, took the position of supporting a revolutionary resolution of the crisis. The KSČ considered the crisis to have been caused by the right wing, which tried to undermine the people's democracy in Czechoslovakia by taking advantage of the parliamentary system to sabotage social reforms and realize reactionary political and social postulates. At the same time the KSČ appreciated the right wing's links to a pro-American orientation, and so decided to take up the fight and play it out so that it could once and for all make it impossible for the right wing to take any political initiative and move the balance of political forces decidedly to the left. With this goal in mind, the KSČ decided to propose the following postulates as a way of going through the crisis:

- a) Immediate acceptance by President Beneš of the resignation of the ministers;
- b) Reconstruction of the government to include ČSNN, ČSL, and Slovak Democratic representatives other than those who had resigned;
- c) Reorganization of the NF by including in addition

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to the 6 political parties, trade unions, organizations of former political prisoners and former partisans, cultural associations, and social organizations;

d) Including in the future government representatives of some of those organizations, at least of trade unions;

e) Creation of NF Action Committees as its local executive organs and factors mobilizing the worker, peasant, and white-collar masses to direct political action;

f) Purging NF parties of reactionary and conservative elements by changing the leadership of those parties, and purging, too, the party structures and press;

g) Tightening collaboration with the ČSD, which was weakened after the Brno congress, rebuilding the practically non-existent unified front, expanding the participation of the ČSD in the new government under the condition of removing from the ČSD leadership rightist elements.

The ČSD, led by centrist-rightist elements ([Bohumil] Laušman, [Blažej] Vilín) but actually controlled by the right wing (Vilín, [Václav] Majer, Bernard), took an incredibly dangerous stance from the beginning of the crisis. Although the Social Democratic ministers did not actually resign, the party took a wait-and-see attitude and adopted a pseudo-neutral position. In reality this position really became beneficial to the right wing since it made the whole game possible. The right wing counted on such a position and was not disappointed. At that stage the position taken by ČSD meant that the party wanted to hold the balance. Maintaining this pseudo-neutral position for a while enabled the right wing to play its political game, until its success allowed the ČSD to openly support “parliamentary democracy.” Seen from the outside, ČSD tactics were not devoid of comical elements. This fact is worth mentioning since it is so characteristic of the whole picture of the situation.

To wit, just after the crisis began the ČSD pasted in the window of its headquarters a large poster with a map of Czechoslovakia and a picture of a cock-fight taking place above that map. The cock on the left, marked with a red star, symbolized the Communists (and the USSR); the cock on the right stood for the right wing parties (and the USA). The sign said “Jen Klid - Nic se ne stane,” or “Just keep cool and nothing will happen.” The line taken by the party press reflected the wisdom of this poster equally by explaining to the masses that the crisis will pass if only everybody will keep cool and entrust themselves to Beneš’s protection, who in turn will take care of everything and save the NF “democracy.” As a result of the PPS delegation’s strong criticism of this kind of action, the whole window, with the poster, was covered up the following day.

The Social Democratic attitude toward the Communists was at this stage even more relentless, since the ČSD presented the KSC with an ultimatum that it would not open any talks until the decision of Interior Minister [Václav] Nosek (KSC) regarding the discharge of sixty Social Democratic policemen [illegible] was

recanted.

In its simplest terms, the strategy of the ČSD could be described as playing the role of a *sui generis* “third power,” wanting to go back to the *status quo ante* using methods somewhat different than those used by the right wing.

The hopelessness of ČSD tactics and strategy was deepened even more by the actual development of the situation in the country. The crisis caused an undoubtedly revolutionary mood among the masses, who, under KSC leadership, clearly pushed for the correct solution. Without any reservations, the working class followed the path indicated by the KSC and accepted all of its postulates as its own. The rank-and-file of the ČSD created a unified front with the KSC masses. The Social Democratic Party was absolutely unaware of the situation, did not perceive its revolutionary character, and consoled itself thinking that it was just an ordinary little parliamentary incident that could be dealt with through hallway negotiations. The correct attitude was not considered at all. The best proof of this was their quibbling over the sixty policemen, which took place amidst the most serious crisis Czechoslovakia experienced since the liberation.

It is very telling that at the large “manifestation” in February (Saturday, February 21) at the Old Town Market Square in Prague, when Kousová-Petranková, a Social Democratic activist, appeared next to President Gottwald, she was greeted by the crowd with a great ovation for the Social Democratic and the unified front. This was the best testimony of the real mood of the Communist and Socialist masses. The rightist ČSD leadership reacted by immediately kicking Kousova and Dr. Nonec (the left-wing Social Democratic leader in the Prague ČSD organization) out of the Party.

The pivotal character of the ČSD’s political stance had to do with the fact that together with the KSC it held a 52% majority in the parliament for the workers’ parties and that [by changing] its stance it was capable of overcoming the crisis and bringing victory to the left wing. Had it taken a clear stance from the beginning, the right wing would not have dared to provoke the crisis, knowing that it had no chance even in the parliament. However, the right wing was correct in its judgment of the influence of the Brno congress on the ČSD’s evolution and politics.

Having recapitulated the situation, the delegation, in agreement with Com. Fierlinger and Com. Slánský and Dolanský (KSC), decided on a plan of action.

On Sunday, February 22, Com. Rusinek, the head of the delegation, officially communicated with the leadership of the ČSD and asked for a meeting with the decision-making people in the party. Com. Laušman invited the delegation to a conference with the executive department of the ČSD in the afternoon hours.

The conference took place in the building where the offices of the ČSD General Secretariat are located. It fell in two parts with a two-hour break. During the first part

Laušman, Vilín, and Bernard were present. During the second part, Vilín, Bernard, [Ludmila] Jankovcová and a few more comrades who were members of the Central Committee, mainly from the centrist and rightist wings, were present.

Com. Rusinek was the first one to speak at the conference. He explained the purpose of the delegation's visit and stressed the common interests of the people's democracies in defending the gains of the proletariat of those countries. Com. Rusinek pointed out the danger of dollar-diplomacy pressure on the people's democracies, and drew attention to the increased offensive of American capitalism, to the danger of the war camp's intrigues and the necessity of strengthening the collaborative ties between the left-wing socialists from the people's democracies and the Socialist left in the West. He mentioned the influence of the Czech crisis on the struggle of Western European workers, particularly in Italy. Com. Rusinek also pointed out the special connection between the interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia and to the negative results of the prolonged crisis, which could only negatively influence the effectiveness of resolutions reached during the Prague conference [between] the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Com. Arski followed by characterizing the international situation, its direct connection to the Czechoslovak crisis, and the negative repercussions of the rightist provocation. He stressed the role of the leftist Socialists in the struggle for a unified front on the international scale, and he also explained the goals and methods of American politics, the role of the USSR in creating a world peace front, and the necessity to overcome the Czechoslovak crisis in the spirit of revolutionary postulates of the Socialist left and the Communists. Com. Arski conducted a detailed analysis of the flaws of the official ČSD leadership position, and particularly of the dangerous results of "sitting on the fence" and playing "the third force." Com. Rapacki conducted a precise analysis of the current political situation in Czechoslovakia and indicated the Socialist possibilities of overcoming the crisis. During his speech, Com. Rapacki was very precise about what practical stance the ČSD should take in negotiations with the Communist Party and stressed the advantages the party might obtain in really increasing its influence in the government.

Com. Jabłonski added to the statements of other comrades from the PPS, analyzing the role of the right wing in the crisis and the danger of facilitating its games.

At that stage, the tactics of the delegation were designed to achieve the following postulates:

1. To induce the ČSD leadership to immediately start negotiations with KSČ;
2. [To induce the ČSD] to give up its neutral stance and move to the left side of the barricade;
3. [To induce the ČSD] clearly to threaten Beneš and the right wing that if they continue to resist, the ČSD will

unconditionally support the KSČ;

4. [To induce the ČSD] to relax repression against leftist Socialists;

5. [To induce the ČSD] to abandon its wait-and-see attitude and start actively to participate in the current conflict on the side of the mobilized working masses;

6. To induce the ČSD leadership to recognize the revolutionary character of the situation and draw the correct conclusions;

7. To undermine the self-confidence of the rightist activists of the ČSD, [illegible] them morally and threaten them with the repercussions of resisting the revolutionary wave; and

8. To put a wedge between the right wing and the center, pulling the hesitant elements over to the left.

These postulates have to a great degree since been realized:

1. During the conference Com. Jankovcová (Minister of Industry) clearly expressed support for the left;

2. Com. Vojta Erban subsequently moved to the left;

3. Com. Laušman kept his neutral attitude, not engaging himself on the side of Vilín and Bernard;

4. Some of the participants by the end of the meeting clearly separated themselves from the right and moved to the center;

5. During the meeting Vilín, Bernard and the people closest to them became clearly isolated from the rest of more or less undecided elements.

The conference was very important, as the following day the plenum of the ČSD Central Committee [CC] and the destruction of the center-right majority in its CC had a decisive influence on the further development of events at the heart of ČSD.

After the talks with the ČSD Central Committee, the delegation again contacted the representatives of KSČ and informed them about the situation at the heart of the ČSD. Then Com. Rusinek made personal contact with opposition elements in the heart of the ČSNS Party and was assured that they would immediately contact President Beneš and express opposition to Zenkl's directions during the internal party conference. The KSČ and the left wing of the ČSD were informed of this measure.

In the evening the delegation participated in the meeting of the leaders of the left wing ČSD faction, led by Com. Fierlinger. Com. Jankovcová, Jungvirtová, John, Evžen Erban, and [Jiří] Hájek, among others, participated in the meeting.

Tactics were established for the plenum the following day, rules for the Socialist-leftist way of overcoming the crisis were discussed, and the draft of a political declaration was discussed. The declaration was to be made by the left in case the rightist elements took control of the CC plenary meeting. After establishing this plan of action, the delegation got in touch with Warsaw and determined further guidelines for actions the following day.

On the day of the CC Plenum, Com. Rusinek conducted further talks with the National Socialists, and

during the luncheon hours a meeting with a group of ČSD members took place. The meeting was initiated by Bernard. Present were representatives of the extreme right, led by Majer and Bernard [illegible word]. In spite of that fact, after a lengthy discussion two participants assured the PPS delegation of their readiness to speak at the Plenum meeting in the spirit of our [the delegation's] postulates.

Thanks to the account of the Plenum given by our leftist friends, we were able to conceive of the meeting as a gradual tilting from an extreme right stance in the morning to a more conciliatory attitude later in the day, with a great many delegates moving to a center-left position. Already at noon Laušman decided that the repression of the left wing forced by Majer was a mistake. By the evening, the left was finally able to win a majority for a very important postulate: to send a party delegation to the reorganization meeting of National Front, where decisive resolutions were to be reached about how to solve the crisis. All day long the delegation's efforts were focused on trying to win over as many CC members as possible in order to win that decision, since we considered this decision to be a breakthrough in the overall attitude of the party leadership. Our judgment turned out to be the right one, since from that moment the disintegration of the right began. In spite of the right wing's votes, a majority could still be found to support the decision. Vojta Erban's move to the left played a major role in this.

The CC plenary meeting was postponed until the following day. The development of events had gained a sudden momentum by then. In response to the appeal of the Employee Council, a one-hour general strike took place. Demonstrations of right-wing students took place in the streets, that [line missing]. At the same time, National Front Action Committees began to take action all over the country, aiming at Communist as well as Social Democratic oriented workers.

From the morning of February 24 on, decisive events took place also in the leadership of Social Democratic organizations. Around 10 A.M. a group of leftist ČSNS representatives, led by the "expelled" Com. Němec, seized the offices of the General Secretariat on Příkopý. At noon the Prague organization turned itself over to the disposal of the party left led by Com. Fierlinger. The Brno organization did the same and similar news started coming during the day from other provinces as well.

Therefore the CC plenum continued in the light of *faits accomplis*. At the suggestion of Com. Gottwald, the ČSD Central Committee decided to open talks on the reconstruction of the government and the National Front. However, the representatives of the ČSD took a passive stance in these talks, registering the conditions presented by the KSČ to present them to their own Central Committee. The occupation of the offices of the Central Committee made it difficult for the normal functioning of the ČSD executive. Laušman presented Gottwald with a demand to have the building cleared out by the police,

which Gottwald did not want to do, explaining that it was an internal party matter. He agreed in the end, however, and the police removed the leftists [rightists?], returning the building [control over] to the party authorities. The CC Plenum restarted, but the balance had clearly moved to the left. In spite of that, the majority hesitated accepting the proposals of the KSČ. The proposals were aimed at: participation of ČSD as a whole in the new NF government, participation of the ČSD in Action Committees and the expanded NF, granting the ČSD an additional ministry portfolio in the government, and improving collaboration with the KSČ. However, one condition was to be the removal of Majer from the government. In light of the indecisiveness of the majority of the CC, the left departed before the meeting was over, published its political declaration, and delegated Fierlinger to talk directly to Gottwald.

An hour later, most of the CC was persuaded, and had completely isolated the right wing, including Majer and Vilím. Then it was Bernard and Laušman's turn to go to Gottwald to start negotiations on the platform suggested by the KSČ. In such a situation, Gottwald found himself face to face with two different ČSD factions and an actual split.

The PPS delegation spent all of Tuesday trying to influence the CC in order to save the unity of the Social Democratic Party by overthrowing the right and ensuring the acceptance of the KSČ proposals by the rest of the party. It should be noted here that at this stage a small tactical dissonance occurred between the delegation and Fierlinger's left.

Recognizing the situation and appreciating the interests of the socialist movement, the delegation wanted to lead the whole Social Democratic organization, cleared of rightist elements, onto the new political path. Therefore we wanted to keep Laušman as a symbol of party unity and organizational continuity. We realized that to overcome Beneš's obstinacy it was necessary for the Social Democratic Party under Laušman's leadership to follow hand in hand with the KSČ and Gottwald. Laušman's participation was very much needed. At the same time, Fierlinger seemed to perceive the situation somewhat differently and thought that he had gotten an opportunity to take revenge for Brno and Laušman's betrayal. He was counting on taking over the leadership of the party and on the full success of his group. There was a clear conflict between the political interests of the left and ČSD as a whole [on the one hand], and the interests of the individual leaders of the left [on the other]. The PPS delegation placed the overall interests higher, hence the small tactical discrepancy, which did not have any negative results on further collaboration, except for Laušman's momentary reserve. Hearing the news about the ČSD Central Committee majority resolution and the beginning of talks between Laušman and Gottwald, the delegation considered its mission to be over and decided to leave Prague.

Around 10:30 p.m., right before their departure, Com. Rusinek was asked over the telephone by the KSČ leadership if at least part of the delegation could stay for another 24 hours. The initiative came from Com. Gottwald and Slánský [illegible]. It was decided that Com. Rusinek and Arski would stay. The following morning both comrades were invited over, by Com. Gottwald. Even before that, Com. Slansky expressed thanks to the delegation on behalf of the KSČ Central Committee for its help during the crisis and its effective influence over the ČSD leadership.

Com. Gottwald described the situation at that stage of the crisis, the stance of the KSČ and related the course of the night talks with the Fierlinger and Laušman groups. Thanking the PPS delegation for their collaboration, he expressed the wish that the delegation make contact with both groups again and attempt to reconcile them in order to present a unified stance to the outside. Com. Gottwald shared the approach of the PPS delegation, which had tried to influence both ČSD groups in the same spirit. Com. Gottwald also expressed his positive opinion concerning the plan to initiate regular cooperation between the ČSD and the PPS in the future through the creation of a contact commission of both parties. Evaluating the course of the crisis, Com. Gottwald expressed the hope that on Wednesday afternoon President Beneš would sign the resignation [letters] of the former ministers and recognize the new National Front cabinet with eleven Czech and Slovak Communists, four representatives of the Social Democratic [Party], and two representatives from the National Socialist and Slovak Democratic left wings.

Com. Gottwald also expressed the opinion that under the influence of the PPS delegation, Laušman would accept the proposal of the party left to purge the party of rightist elements.

Immediately after this conversation, Com. Rusinek and Arski went to the ČSD Secretariat where they conducted talks with Coms. Němec, Laušman, and Vojta Erban in the spirit of postulates agreed upon with Com. Gottwald.

In the course of the day, the ČSD reorganized its party leadership, removing Majer, Vilím, Bernard, and other rightists, temporarily entrusting Com. Vojta Erban with

the duties of the General Secretary, and announcing a purge of the editorial staff of *Pravo lidu* and the whole organization structure. In his last conversation [with the delegation], Com. Vojta Erban promised to send to the PPS Central Executive Committee the details of the reorganization action in writing and agreed to initiate steady contacts between the ČSD and PPS in the near future.

At that point the delegation ended its activities and returned to Warsaw.

Recapitulating the results of the four-day action:

1. The delegation neutralized the influence of [French Socialist leader] Guy Mollet in the ČSD, who visited Prague a week earlier and tried to dispose the party in the spirit of the "third force;"
2. [The delegation] undermined the mood of the ČSD's extreme right wing;
3. [The delegation] influenced the undecided elements to move to the left;
4. [The delegation] made it easier for the left wing to push the Party on to the correct path;
5. [The delegation] facilitated the reaching of an agreement of the CC majority to start talks with Gottwald's KSČ;
6. [The delegation] contributed to preserving the party as a whole for the NF;
7. [The delegation] influenced the precipitation of the process of removing the rightists [from the party];
8. [The delegation] influenced the resumption of the unified front;
9. [The delegation] tightened collaboration with the ČSD;
10. [The delegation] established close contacts with the KSČ leadership. In the end it proved the correctness of the leftist-socialist propositions in the practical situation of the political crisis, where it was possible to reach a revolutionary solution, under the condition of achieving unified action by the two factions of the worker's movement.

[Source: *Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Warsaw), file 217, packet 16, pp. 1-11. Translated by Anna Elliot-Zielinska.*]

CWIHP is pleased to announce the publication of

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Stalin As Editor: The Soviet Dictator's Secret Changes to the Polish Constitution of 1952

By Krzysztof Persak

Stalin's post war policy towards Poland and the influence of the Moscow imperial center on Polish developments have not been hitherto satisfactorily explored by scholars. No monographic study on these questions has been written so far, and few documents have been published. The main reason for this is the lack of sources. Polish documents concerning relations between Stalin and Polish Communist authorities after 1944, as well as regarding Stalin's personal influence on the events in Poland, are unfortunately very scarce.¹ For instance, neither official transcripts nor minutes of meetings between Stalin and Polish Communist leaders have been found in Polish archives thus far, and it is most probable that they were never drawn up by the Polish side.² Thus, one of the main sources remain rare handwritten working notes taken by Polish participants of such meetings, most commonly by the leaders of the Polish Workers' Party (after 1948: Polish United Workers' Party [PUWP])—Władysław Gomułka and Bolesław Bierut.³

However, although sources which exemplify Stalin's direct personal influence on the course of events in Poland are rather rare in Polish archives, there does exist a document of a quite extraordinary nature. This is the Russian-language copy of a draft of the Polish constitution containing Stalin's handwritten amendments.⁴

The Communist-dominated government, installed in Poland in July 1944, did not seem very eager to set up a new constitution. In fact, Poland was the last of the European "People's Democracies" to adopt a constitution which followed the pattern of the Soviet ("Stalinist") constitution of 1936.⁵ One month after the first parliamentary elections were held in Poland, in January 1947, a provisional constitution was passed which gave the Sejm (parliament) five years to adopt a "full" constitution. Yet, two more years went by ineffectively before any preparations were started at all, and eventually, in December 1951, the Legislative Sejm was forced to prolong its own tenure for six months in order to finish its work on the constitution.⁶

First preparations to draw up the new constitution were initiated not by the Legislative Sejm but by the leading organs of the ruling Communist party. In June 1949, the Constitutional Commission consisting of leading party ideologists and lawyers was set up by the PUWP CC Secretariat. By September 1950 the Commission produced a preliminary draft which was handed over to the Politburo for further discussion.

Bierut's notes indicate that even this very early

version of the constitution had been cleared with Stalin. In a short Russian-language note from their conversation in November 1950, Bierut put down questions he was going to ask the Soviet leader.⁷ He wrote down an acronym PSR—which probably means: Polish Socialist Republic—as the proposed name of the state. He also asked Stalin: "should we retain the old emblems?" Bierut's questions also referred to issues of a particular political significance: the separation between the Catholic church and the state, the dominant role of the Communist party and whether other political parties might exist, and finally—sovereignty of the state and the alliance with the Soviet Union. An article of the draft constitution which dealt with the latter question was cited in full length in Bierut's note: "PSR is a sovereign state, a member of the family of socialist states which is led by the USSR. The inviolable alliance with the USSR, with the states of people's democracy and with all democratic forces of the world, is a condition of the development, progress and consolidation of the PSR, a condition of preservation of its lasting independence, sovereignty and security against the aggression of imperialist forces."⁸

Unfortunately, Bierut did not record comments made by the Soviet leader. Stalin's answers, however, can be deduced from the changes which were subsequently introduced to the draft constitution. On 16 November 1950—i.e., after Bierut's consultation with Stalin—the Politburo debated the preliminary draft of the constitution.⁹ One of the most important directives which, based on the results of this discussion, were given to the Constitutional Commission by the Politburo was to "emphasize more firmly the issue of sovereignty, in a manner that would raise no doubts" and to "take fully into account Polish national forms and progressive traditions."¹⁰ In accord with these instructions, the articles concerning the alliance with the Soviet Union and the leading role of the Communist party in the state were not included in the constitution.¹¹ The traditional Polish national emblem—the White Eagle—was not altered, and the official name of the state which was eventually adopted was the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*).¹² It is more than probable that it was Stalin who decided that.

A key role in formulating and writing the constitution was played by the members of the PUWP Politburo, very notably by the First Secretary Bolesław Bierut. After the party's Constitutional Commission fulfilled its task in June 1951 by composing a second version of the draft

constitution, this new version was again revised by the Politburo. Chapters one and two, which defined basic principles of the political and socio-economical system of the state, were rewritten, and changes were made in other parts as well. A draft of the first two chapters of the constitution written with Bierut's hand has been preserved in his papers.¹³ Bierut also wrote the preamble.

In the fall 1951, the final draft was presented to Stalin who made about fifty changes in the preamble and in twenty-two articles of the constitution. Bierut translated Stalin's amendments personally and then wrote them in a Polish-language copy of the draft. Thus Stalin's corrections were officially introduced to the constitution as Bierut's own ones. Only few members of the top leadership knew who their real author was.

Most of Stalin's amendments dealt with the political phraseology of the constitution, or were only minor editorial or even grammatical ones. For instance, in some cases he replaced "people" with "masses" or "working people" with "citizens." Some other changes, however, had more political and symbolic significance. In accordance with his own earlier recommendations that the national traditions and the sovereignty of the state were to be accentuated, Stalin introduced an attribute "national" in several places (e.g. "national culture", "national rebirth of Poland"). He also crossed out the phrase "under the leadership of the USSR" in the preamble, and openly specified the conquerors of Poland in 19th century – Russia included—which Bierut and other Polish authors of the constitution had not dared to do.

In his corrections, Stalin was quite "generous" with granting political freedoms and social rights to people. In article 70 he inserted freedom of the press and the citizens' right to have access to the radio. He also suggested that medical attention should be free. These changes, of course, had no real meaning to people as they had no possibility to exercise their nominal rights. With regard to article 5, which seemed to offer citizens at least minimum protection of their rights, Stalin was more restrictive: he specified that only "reasonable" proposals, complaints and wishes of citizens would be taken into consideration, and only "in accordance with the existing legislation."

Stalin's other important amendments to the constitution concerned principles of the socio-economical structure. In articles 9 and 58 Stalin highlighted the priority given to collective and cooperative farming (in the first case, by simply transforming "modern cultivation" into "collective cultivation"). Another of his changes sounded rather disquieting. Stalin replaced the declaration in article 3, which stated that the Polish People's Republic would abolish social relations which were based on exploitation, with the ominous formulation that the Polish People's Republic would abolish social classes which lived by exploiting workers and peasants. And there was, of course, a major difference between eliminating unwelcome social *relations* and eliminating the social *classes* themselves.

One of the most consequential corrections which had a considerable impact on legislation and jurisprudence in the domain of civil law was more a result of Bierut's mistranslation than Stalin's deliberate intention. In article 11 of the draft, which referred to the protection of private property of the means of production belonging to craftsmen and peasants, Stalin changed the expression "private property" (*chastnaia sobstvennost'*) into "personal property" (*lichnaia sobstvennost'*) despite the fact that even the constitutions of the USSR and other People's Democracies sanctioned the existence of this kind of private property. In this manner the same qualifier (i.e. "personal") was used in article 11 as in the following article which concerned the property of consumer goods. Bierut, however, while translating Stalin's corrections used a synonym "individual property," and by doing so unwittingly introduced to the constitution a new, previously unknown type of property. What is interesting, is that this change turned out to be quite troublesome for Polish lawyers who were forced to work out whole new theories in order to justify and explain the meaning of "individual" property which was a novelty even to Marxist jurisprudence.¹⁴ The amendment concerning private property was perhaps one of the most long-lasting consequences of Stalin's decisions on Polish affairs too: only recently, in 1997, the notion of private property was reintroduced to the constitution of Poland.

Before it was finally passed by the Polish Sejm on 22 July 1952, the constitution underwent some further modifications as a result of the parliamentary debate and the subsequent nationwide discussion. Most of these changes, however, were rather superficial, and did not affect the alterations that had been introduced by Stalin. His corrections were unquestionable and unalterable even if some of them—like the one concerning the elimination of undesirable social classes—raised doubts among high-ranking Polish officials.¹⁵ Although Stalin's amendments were in fact not fundamental nor did they have any direct impact on political developments in Poland, the mere fact of his correcting the Polish constitution is of exceptional significance due to its symbolic dimension. It was a manifest example of Poland's lack of sovereignty and subjugation to the Soviet Union.

The fact that Stalin corrected the Polish constitution was unknown to the public until the mid-eighties. It was revealed the first time by former Politburo member Jakub Berman in his interview with Teresa Toranska but Berman's account was on this point imprecise and not entirely reliable.¹⁶ The most crucial of Stalin's corrections were published in Polish by Andrzej Garlicki in 1990, after the archives of the Communist Party became accessible.¹⁷ This version was based on the Polish text of Stalin's amendments which slightly differed from the Russian one and included some of Bierut's own corrections too. The present version is based on the Russian-language copy of the draft of the constitution which was actually read by Stalin. It includes the full text

of the preamble and those sections of the constitution in which Stalin introduced his amendments. Seven articles of the constitution in which the amendments were so minor that in translation into English they would be negligible were omitted. Words deleted by Stalin are printed with strikethrough font and words added by Stalin in bold font.

Draft

Constitution of the Polish People's Republic

The Polish People's Republic **is a republic of the working people, carries on carrying on** the most glorious progressive traditions of the Polish Nation and **gives giving** effect to the liberation ideals of the Polish working **people masses**. The Polish working people, under the leadership of its heroic working class, and on the basis of the alliance between workers and peasants, fought for many years against the national enslavement **and oppression imposed by the Prussian, Austrian and Russian conquerors and colonizers** as well as, **just as** against exploitation by the **Polish** capitalists and landlords. During the occupation the Polish Nation waged an unflinching fight against the bloody Hitlerite captivity. The historic victory **of the USSR** over fascism, by liberating Polish soil, enabled the Polish working people to take power, and created conditions for the **national** re-birth of Poland within new and just frontiers. The Recovered Territories¹⁸ were restored to Poland forever.

By carrying out the memorable directives of the Manifesto of 22 July 1944,¹⁹ and by developing the principles laid down in the program of that Manifesto, the People's Authority—thanks to the selfless and creative efforts of the Polish working people in the fight against the bitter resistance of the remnants of the old capitalist-landlord system—has accomplished great social changes. As a result of revolutionary transformations the rule of the capitalists and landlords has been overthrown, a State of People's Democracy has been firmly established, and a new social system, in accord with the interests and aspirations of the great majority of the people, is taking shape and growing in strength.

The legal principles of this system are laid down by the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic.

The basis of the People's Authority **in Poland today** is the alliance between the working class and the working peasants. In this alliance, the leading role belongs to the working class — **as the most revolutionary class of the Polish society** — the class based on the revolutionary gains of the Polish and international working class movement, and on the historic experience of victorious socialist constructing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, the first State of workers and peasants.

Implementing the will of the Polish Nation, the Legislative Sejm²⁰ of the Republic of Poland,²¹ in accordance with its purpose, solemnly adopts the present

Constitution as the fundamental law by which the Polish Nation and all organs of authority of the Polish working people shall be guided, in order:

To consolidate the People's State as the fundamental power assuring to the Polish Nation the highest degree of prosperity, its independence and sovereignty.

To accelerate the further political, economic and cultural development of Poland, and **further** growth of its resources.

To strengthen the unity and solidarity of the Polish Nation in its struggle still further to ~~transform~~ **improve** social conditions, to eliminate completely the exploitation of man by man, and to put into effect the great ideals of socialism.

To strengthen friendship and cooperation between nations, on the basis of the principles of alliance and brotherhood which today link the Polish Nation with the **peace-loving** nations of the ~~peace-camp world~~ **in their common effort under the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics** to make aggression impossible and to consolidate world peace.

Article 3

The Polish People's Republic:

[...]

d) places restrictions on, gradually ejects and abolishes ~~social relations which are based on exploitation~~ **those classes of society which live by exploiting the workers and peasants**.

e) ensures a continual rise in the level of the prosperity and secures the development of **national** culture and of education ~~of the working people of town and country of the people~~.

Article 4

1. The laws of the Polish People's Republic express the will of the working people ~~and are a common good of the Polish Nation~~.

Article 5

All organs of State power and administration are supported in the exercise of their functions by the conscious and active cooperation of the broadest masses of the people, and they are bound:

a) to account **to the Nation** for their work;

b) to **examine carefully and** take into consideration, **in accordance with the existing legislation, reasonable** proposals, complaints and wishes of the citizens

Article 8

1. The Polish People's Republic develops, according to plan, the economic bond between town and country **founded on the brotherly cooperation between workers and peasants**.

Article 9

[...]

2. The Polish People's Republic gives special support and all-round aid to the cooperative farms set up, on the basis of voluntary membership, as forms of collective economy. By applying methods of the highly efficient **modern collective** cultivation and mechanized work, collective farming enables the working peasants to reach a turning point in **the rise of** production and contributes to the complete elimination of **backwardness exploitation** in the countryside and to a rapid and considerable improvement in the level of its prosperity and culture.

3. The principal form of State support and help for cooperative farms are the State machine stations, which make it possible to employ modern technology; **and State credits on easy terms.**

Article 11

1. The Polish People's Republic recognizes and protects **private individual**²² property and the right to inherit land, buildings and ~~all~~ **other** means of production belonging to peasants, craftsmen and persons engaged in domestic handicrafts.

2. This protection, as well as the right of inheritance, is guaranteed, ~~within the limits on the basis~~ **of** existing laws, ~~also to other spheres of private property.~~

Article 12

The Polish People's Republic guarantees to citizens full protection of personal property and the right to inherit such property.

Article 13

[...]

2. By their work, by the observance of work discipline, by work emulation and the perfecting of methods of work, the working people of town and country add to the strength and power of the Polish People's Republic, raise the level of prosperity of the people and expedite the full realization of the **socialist** system ~~of social justice.~~

[...]

Article 58

[...]

2. The right to work is ensured by the social ownership of the basic means of production, by the development of **a social and cooperative system in the countryside** ~~social relations~~, free from exploitation; by the planned growth of the productive forces; by the elimination of sources of **economic** crises and by the abolition of unemployment.

[...]

Article 60

1. Citizens of the Polish People's Republic have the right to health protection and to aid in the event of sickness or incapacity for work.

2. Effect is being given to this right on an increasing

scale through:

[...]

b) the development of State organized protection of the health of the population, the expansion of sanitation services and the raising of the health standards in town and country, a wide campaign for the prevention of and fighting disease, increasing access to **free**²³ medical attention, the development of hospitals, sanatoria, medical aid centers, rural health centers, and care for the disabled.

Article 68

1. Citizens of the Polish People's Republic, irrespective of nationality, race or religion, enjoy equal rights in all spheres of **public**, political, economic, social and cultural life. Infringement of this principle by any direct or indirect granting of privileges or restriction of rights, on account of nationality, race or religion, is punishable **by law.**

2. The spreading of **national** hatred or contempt, the provocation of strife or the humiliation of man on account of national, racial or religious differences are forbidden **and punishable.**

Article 69

1. Polish People's Republic guarantees freedom of conscience and religion to citizens. The Church and other religious unions ~~are free~~ **may freely exercise their religious functions.** It is forbidden to ~~prevent anybody from taking~~ **coerce citizens not to take** part in religious activities or rites. It is also forbidden to coerce anybody to participate in religious activities or rites.

2. The Church is separated from the State. The principles of the relationship between Church and State are, together with the legal and patrimonial position of religious bodies, determined by law.

3. The abuse of the freedom of conscience and religion for purposes prejudicial to the interests of the Polish People's Republic is ~~forbidden~~ **punishable by law.**

Article 70

1. The Polish People's Republic guarantees its citizens freedom of speech, **of the press**, of public meetings, of processions and demonstrations.

2. Making available to the working people and their organizations the use of printing shops, stocks of paper, public buildings and halls, means of communication, **the radio** and other indispensable material means, serves to give effect to this freedom.

Article 81

Every ~~adult~~ citizen **who has reached the age of eighteen**²⁴ has, irrespective of sex, nationality and race, religion, education, length of residence, social origin, profession or property, the right to vote.

Article 82

Every **one citizen** who has the right to vote is eligible for the election to the People's Councils²⁵, and to the Sejm – after having reached the age of twenty-one.

Article 86

Candidates are nominated by political and social organizations, uniting **working people citizens** of town and country.

[Source: AAN (Archive of Modern Records), KC PZPR, 2774, pp. 1-27. Obtained and translated by Krzysztof Persak.]

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¹ Fortunately, Russian sources have started emerging in recent years. Among the most important documentary collections on Polish-Soviet relations in the Stalin years are: *Polska - ZSRR: struktury podleglosci. Dokumenty KC WKP(b) 1944-1949* [Poland-USSR: The Structures of Subjection. Documents of VKP(b), 1944-1949], edited by Giennadii A. Bordiugov, Aleksander Kochanski, Adam Koseski, Giennadii F. Matveev and Andrzej Paczkowski (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995. A Russian edition of this volume, published in Moscow, exists as well); *NKVD i polskoe podpol'e 1944-1945 (Po "osobiim papkam" I. V. Stalina)*, ed. A. F. Noskova et al. (Moscow: Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1994); *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov 1944-1953 gg.*, Vol. 1: 1944-1948, ed. G. P. Murashko et al. (Moscow-Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1997).

² The first known official transcript of Polish-Soviet talks of the post-war period, prepared by the Polish side, is one of Gomulka's visit to Moscow in November 1956. A selection of Polish documents on Polish-Soviet relations in the years 1956-1970 which includes minutes of Gomulka's meetings with Khrushchev and Brezhnev has been just published: *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PRL-ZSRR, 1956-1970*, ed. Andrzej Paczkowski, (London: Aneks Publishers, 1998).

³ So far, I have been able to locate 17 sets of such published and unpublished notes, 13 of them are Bierut's notes. The

remainder were taken by Gomulka, Jakub Berman and Edward Osobka-Morawski. The results of my survey were presented in the paper "Polish Sources on Stalin's Foreign Policy" at the CWIHP workshop "European Archival Evidence on Stalin and the Cold War" in Budapest on 3-4 October 1997. The Hungarian language version of this paper is scheduled for publication in the yearbook of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

⁴ See: AAN [Archive of Modern Records], KC PZPR, 2774, pp. 1-27.

⁵ The two first countries of the Soviet bloc to adopt new "socialist" constitutions were Yugoslavia (31 January 1946) and Albania (14 March 1946). They were followed by the constitutions of Bulgaria (4 December 1947), Romania (13 April 1948), Czechoslovakia (9 May 1948), Hungary (20 August 1949), GDR (7 October 1949), another constitution by Albania (4 July 1950), and finally of Poland (22 July 1952). Shortly afterwards the new constitution of Romania was passed (27 September 1952).

⁶ The course of the 1949-1952 constitutional works was most fully analyzed by Marian Rybicki, "Geneza i tryb przygotowania Konstytucji PRL z 1952 r.", in: *Konstytucje Polski*, Vol. 2, ed. Marian Kallas, (Warsaw: PWN, 1990).

⁷ AAN, KC PZPR, 2609, p. 288. The note is not dated but from Bierut's other notes it can be inferred that this conversation took place on 3 November 1950.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

⁹ AAN, KC PZPR, 1636, p. 14. "Protokol nr 44 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dniu 16 listopada 1950 r".

¹⁰ Rybicki, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

¹¹ The questions of friendship with the USSR and PUWP's leading role in society would be introduced to the Polish constitution in 1976. This would become one of the impulses for the rise of democratic opposition in Poland.

¹² In Polish both *republika* and *rzeczpospolita* mean "republic" but only the Old Polish word *rzeczpospolita* is traditionally reserved to be used with regard to the name of the Polish state. Thus although in 1952 the Polish Republic became "People's", it still remained *rzeczpospolita*, not *republika*.

¹³ AAN, KC PZPR, 2772, pp. 82-90.

¹⁴ These explanations were usually very unconvincing. For example, an eminent Polish lawyer, Jan Wasilkowski, in conclusion of an article in which he discussed the new legislation on property contradicted all his previous argumentation and wrote that avoiding the term "private property" in the constitution was only a matter of style and the essence of "individual" and "private" property of means of production remained the same. (See Jan Wasilkowski, "Typy i formy wlasnosci w projekcie konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej," *Panstwo i Prawo*, 3, 1952, p. 436-437).

¹⁵ See: AAN, KC PZPR, 2737, p. 151, "Zestawienie tresci istotniejszych poprawek zgloszonych do Projektu Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej."

¹⁶ Teresa Toranska, *Oni* (London: Aneks Publishers, 1985), pp. 314-315. For the English edition see: Toranska, *Oni: Stalin's Polish Puppets*, trans. by Agnieszka Kolakowska (London: Collins, Harvill, 1987).

¹⁷ Andrzej Garlicki, "Zatwierdzenie Konstytucji PRL", *Polityka* 28 (1990). Reprinted in Garlicki's book: *Z tajnych archiwow* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993), pp. 187-194.

¹⁸ The provinces of Lower Silesia, Pomerania and a part of East Prussia, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, were handed over to Poland, concurrently with the Russian acquisition



of Eastern Poland.

¹⁹ The Manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation was treated as the founding deed of the new communist authority in Poland, and the day of its proclamation, July 22, was celebrated as the national holiday until 1989.

²⁰ *Sejm* is the proper name of Polish Parliament. The Legislative Sejm was elected in January 1947, and its main purpose was to establish the new constitution of People's Poland.

²¹ Until the adoption of this constitution, the official name of the state was the Republic of Poland (*Rzeczpospolita Polska*).

²² Originally, in the Russian copy of the draft, Stalin replaced the word "private" with "personal" but Bierut translated it as "individual".

²³ This amendment was not introduced by Stalin directly into the text of the constitution. He wrote a suggestion "Healthcare free?" on the margin of the draft, and the word "free" was added to the text of the constitution by Bierut when he re-wrote Stalin's corrections.

²⁴ Like in article 60, this correction probably was not introduced directly by Stalin. He underlined the word "adult" and wrote the question "How many years?" above it. The words "who has reached the age of eighteen" were written in Russian, most probably with Bierut's hand.

²⁵ People's Councils were organs of local government (equivalent to *Soviets* in the Soviet Union).

THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

WORKSHOP

"Recasting the International History of the Vietnam War"

26 March 1998

9:15-9:30 *Welcome and Introductions*

Christian F. Ostermann (CWIHP)

Mark Bradley (University of Chicago)

9:30-12:00 Session I "*New Perspectives on the Vietnam War from Russian, Chinese, Indian and Eastern European Archives*"

Chair: David Wolff (CWIHP)

Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale), "New Evidence from the Chinese Archives on the Vietnam War"

Qiang Zhai (Auburn University, Montgomery), "Local Chinese Sources on the Vietnam War"

Mari Olsen (Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, Oslo), "New Russian Evidence on Vietnam"

Leszek Gluchowski (Toronto), "New Evidence from the Polish Archives on the Vietnam War"

Francine Frankel (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), "Indian Archival Materials"

Comments: Ralph Smith (University of London) and Robert Boswell (Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars)

Discussion

1:30-4:30 Session II "*New Vietnamese Evidence on the War*" (Roundtable)

Chair: Mark Bradley (University of Chicago)

Oscar Salemink (Ford Foundation/Vietnam Program)

Ralph Smith (University of London)

Judy Stowe (London)

Jim Hershberg (George Washington University)

Comment: Chen Jian

Discussion

-For further information on the workshop, contact CWIHP at COLDWAR1@WWIC.SI.EDU-

New Evidence on Sino-Soviet Rapprochement

“All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos”

Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-69

Introduction and annotation by Chen Jian and David L. Wilson

In retrospect, the years 1968-1969 witnessed profound changes in both the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) external relations and the international history of the Cold War. In August 1968, the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. In the months following the invasion, long-accumulated tensions between China and the Soviet Union evolved into open confrontation. In March 1969, a bloody border conflict erupted between the two Communist giants, bringing them to the brink of a general war (Soviet leaders even reportedly considered using nuclear weapons).

With Sino-Soviet relations in deep crisis, Beijing's policy toward the United States began to change subtly. After two decades of total confrontation, the first signs of Beijing's changing attitude toward the United States came in autumn 1968, when the Chinese responded positively and with unprecedented speed to a U.S. proposal to resume the stagnant Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, and in early 1969, when, in a highly unusual manner, Mao Zedong ordered the publication of newly-elected U.S. President Richard M. Nixon's inaugural address in all major Chinese newspapers (see Document 3).¹ Three years later, Nixon would visit China and meet face to face with Mao in Beijing.

The Sino-Soviet border confrontation and Sino-American rapprochement represented two of the most important events in the international history of the Cold War. The great Sino-Soviet ideological and, now, military rivalry further drained both material and spiritual resources from international communism. Beijing's emergence as a dangerous enemy forced Moscow into an ever-worsening overextension of power. In the meantime, the Sino-American opening enormously enhanced Washington's strategic position in its global competition with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War did not occur until the late 1980s and early 1990s when both the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc collapsed, but one of the most crucial roots of that collapse certainly can be traced to 1968-1969.

Why did the Sino-Soviet border conflict erupt in March 1969? Did the border clashes relate to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia? Did the clash relate to

Beijing's changing attitude toward Washington—and if so, how? To answer these questions, we need to dig into Chinese documentation. The fifteen documents and extracts translated in the following pages do not offer complete answers to these questions. But they provide useful clues to help us understand the motive of Beijing's leaders, Mao Zedong in particular.

As shown in Mao's wide-ranging discussions with Albanian defense minister Baur Balluku and Australian Communist Party leader E. F. Hill, in October and November 1968, respectively, Mao was deeply concerned by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the Soviet action confirmed Mao's long-existing suspicions about Soviet expansionist ambitions, the Chinese leader tried hard to comprehend the meanings of Soviet behavior on deeper levels. Most importantly, he wondered out loud if the Soviet invasion should be interpreted as the prelude to a more general war, which, he believed, might trigger “revolution” and could only be prevented by “revolution.” In any case, China had to be prepared.

Against this background, Mao in January 1969 ordered the publication of Nixon's inaugural address in which the American president implied a willingness to improve relations with *all* countries in the world. When the Sino-Soviet border battles erupted in March, Mao further instructed four marshals (all of whom had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution but had long enjoyed reputations as being experienced in practical policymaking) to discuss the changing international situation and present proposals on how China should deal with new circumstances. The four marshals produced two insightful reports, providing powerful strategic justification for Beijing to improve relations with the United States (see Documents No. 9 and 11). The escalation of the Sino-Soviet confrontation did not provide a complete explanation for Beijing's rapprochement with Washington, but it represented one of the most important factors underlying the decision.

Reading Mao's talks, a striking feature is his sense of space. Several times Mao used the expression “all under the heaven is (was) great chaos” to describe China's domestic and international settings as he perceived them.

This important concept dominated Mao's vision. The chairman was China's single most important policymaker (much more so during the 1968-69 period), but he was also a philosopher. (Mao's desire to be regarded as such is clearly demonstrated in his discussion with Hill.) In his conceptual world, China's domestic and international policies were closely interrelated. This explains why in his various talks he freely jumped between domestic and international topics. But his vision certainly was China-centric. When Mao stated that the languages of the world should be unified one day, one must ask, what language would the human race then use? The answer is clear: it should be the language that the chairman speaks. That, of course, is Chinese, with terms and expressions incorporated from other languages, such as the chairman occasionally did during his talks with Hill.

All documents have been translated by Chen Jian from Chinese to English, with Li Di, a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Southern Illinois University, contributing to the translation of Documents No. 9 and 11. Material appearing in the text in brackets has been supplied to clarify meaning or to provide missing words. The notes include explanatory information to place key individuals and events in context or to provide additional background on the material being discussed.

Document No. 1
Conversation between Mao Zedong and Beqir Balluku,² 1 October 1968

Mao Zedong: We have not seen each other for quite a while. When did we meet the last time? Did Liu Shaoqi³ and Deng Xiaoping⁴ also attend one of our meetings?

Balluku: That was in 1964. The last time I met with you was in February 1967, that is, twenty months ago. I came together with Comrade Kapo.⁵

Mao Zedong: Oh, yes. At that time, all under the heaven was great chaos, and the working class had just been mobilized.

Balluku: Now you have realized your own strategic plans. At that time, you told me and Kapo that the Cultural Revolution was facing two possibilities, success or failure, and that the problem concerning which path [socialism or capitalism] would overwhelm the other had not been solved. But now this great revolution has achieved great victory.

Mao Zedong: Now the working class dominates everything in the major cities. In most areas in the countryside, the peasants occupy a dominant position too. In the past, until the first half of this year, the students were the vanguards of the revolutionary movement, but now they have lagged behind.

Balluku: Yesterday, our delegation visited the Beijing Textile Knitting Plant. There a cadre who had committed mistakes in the past used his personal experience to give us a vivid introduction, which for me was a good lesson of

class education. He had committed mistakes, and originally was not convinced by the criticism of the masses. But later he not only accepted the criticism of the masses, but also recognized and corrected his mistakes.

Mao Zedong: How is he now?

Balluku: He has been elected vice chairman of the factory's Revolutionary Committee.⁶ The revolutionary masses helped him with Marxist-Leninist patience. In our country, a Revolutionization Movement is now under way. We should educate our cadres and expose the bad elements. Some traitors and rich peasants have penetrated our state agencies. A revolutionization movement like this one will provide good education to the youth.

Mao Zedong: Many young people have not lived a bitter life. (Mao pointed to the interpreter) The Foreign Ministry has been divided into two factions. The one headed by Wang Zhongqi is an ultra-leftist faction, and has been strongly influenced by anarchism. (Pointing to the interpreter) He stood at the middle at that time and did not stand on the side of Wang Zhongqi's ultra-leftist faction. Even among that faction, ultra-leftists were only a small minority, and the majority can be won over to the correct side. The Foreign Ministry is a big department, with more than 3,000 people working there. Intellectuals are piled up there.

Balluku: The ministry should be downsized in the future.

Mao Zedong: Downsize it by ninety percent.

Balluku: In the Soviet Union there emerged the Khrushchev revisionism. This is a bad thing, but revolutionary communists in various countries have learned a lesson from it.

Mao Zedong: In a historical sense this is only a temporary phenomenon.

Balluku: During such turmoil, it is surprising that no significant [anti-revisionist] activities exist within the Soviet Union.

Mao Zedong: There are some small organizations, and they are secret organizations. It is true that the Soviet Union is bad, but it can still provide material supplies [to its people]. For example, it does not have enough food, but it can buy from abroad. Unless a famine erupts there, the people there will not rebel. Another example is France, a capitalist and imperialist country. Although a big rebellion movement emerged there in May this year, it did not stop providing material supplies to the people. It is difficult to try to overthrow a government under such circumstances.

Balluku: Will your Party soon convene a national congress?

Mao Zedong: Yes. We need to sum up our work and elect a new central leadership.

Balluku: The comrades at the Textile Knitting Plant also introduced us to the problem of rectifying the Party organizations.

Mao Zedong: All factories must go through reforms. All people's communes, schools, and party and government organs must go through reforms. We should

mobilize the masses. For a department as large as the Foreign Ministry, with 3,000 people working there, nothing can be done without mobilizing the masses. Among the ambassadors we dispatched to your country, two are bad. We did not know this in the past. One issued an anti-Communist statement in the newspaper, and the other, though no evidence to show that he had issued such a statement, surrendered to the enemy. They have not just committed mistakes; their problems belong to the category of the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy.

Balluku: As far as those who have committed mistakes are concerned, as you have taught us, we should save them by curing their disease. "Cure the disease and save the person." But we certainly should not do the same thing toward the enemy. When the masses have been mobilized, everything is easy to handle. This is your genius teaching: We must trust the masses.

Mao Zedong: We have no other choice. Because they will not listen to us, but they will have to listen to the masses. The Bulgarian news agency, in negating so-called "rumors," claimed that no [Soviet] foreign troops were stationed on Bulgarian territory. But our embassy has learned that foreign troops are there.

Balluku: We have intelligence reports to prove that Soviet troops are stationed on Bulgarian territory. The Italian ambassador to Bulgaria revealed to us that the Soviet Union has nine to ten airborne divisions in Bulgaria.

Mao: That many?

Balluku: Yes. Because these are airborne divisions, each with 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers, the total number of soldiers is between 35,000-40,000. They also have missile units stationed on Bulgaria's naval and air bases. The Soviet troops are wearing Bulgarian uniforms.

Mao Zedong: For what purposes does the Soviet Union send troops to Bulgaria?

Balluku: First, the situation in Bulgaria is not stable, and great chaos exists in Bulgaria. The Soviets know that Zhivkov⁷ is without authority. They thus are afraid that he will collapse, and that the leftists will take the power. They are also afraid that a pro-Western, Dubček-style⁸ revisionist may seize power. Second, they claim that they are there to prevent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from attacking Bulgaria. But now there is no sign for such an attack, and no such possibility exists.

Mao Zedong: Even Tito⁹ becomes quite nervous. Yugoslavia thus becomes our indirect ally. It has problems with the Soviet Union, and we must utilize the contradiction between them. If we include the Romanians and Dubček, East European countries are now divided into two groups. The Soviet Union occupied Czechoslovakia by using force, and many in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany are not satisfied with it. They do not support the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Balluku: Yes. Even among the [Soviet] occupation forces there are many problems. Between the commanding

officers and the soldiers there are problems. Now the Soviet Union sends soldiers from such Soviet republics as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who do not speak Russian to Czechoslovakia to take over defenses there. At present Yugoslavia is strengthening its border defense against Bulgaria, preventing the Soviet troops from attacking the territory of Yugoslavia from Macedonia.

[Source: Chinese Communist Party Central Archives (hereafter CCA).]

Document No. 2

Conversation between Mao Zedong and E. F. Hill,¹⁰ 28 November 1968

Mao Zedong: Did you visit China last year also at this time?

Hill: Yes, I came here last year around this time.

Mao Zedong: At that time, the working class in Beijing was not so united, and bad elements were stirring up trouble among the workers and dividing them into two factions in many factories.

Hill: Now the situation has improved tremendously.

Mao Zedong: Yes. When the bad elements have been exposed, things become better.

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: We have never cleaned up the factories in the past. Our schools had been dominated by bourgeois intellectuals. A large portion of the countryside had been controlled by bad elements. It seems to me that it is not so difficult for revisionism to prevail.

Hill: Indeed, it is not.

Mao Zedong: For example, in a People's Commune, some brigades have been composed of several hundred households, some have been composed of several thousand households. Let's say, 2000 households and 10,000 people, and they are under the leadership of a party branch committee. If the branch secretary is not a good person, the whole brigade will be in trouble. Have you visited two factories in Beijing?

Hill: Yes, I did.

Mao Zedong: Are the party secretaries at the factories bad elements?

Hill: I cannot remember exactly what they told me. But the leadership of the factories has been changed.

Mao Zedong: (Turning to Yao Wenyan¹¹) Have you been to the Xinhua Printing Plant?

Yao: Yes. Neither the plant manager nor the party secretary were good persons.

Mao Zedong: This plant has 3,000 workers. Together with family members, almost 10,000. It printed money during the Qing times, and served the Beiyang warlords during the Beiyang period.¹² When the Japanese took over, it served the Japanese. When the Guomindang took over, it served the Guomindang. During the ten-odd years since we took over the plant, it has served us. Many

workers have remained unchanged. The main body of the work force has not changed, still consisting those who had served during the late Qing period and the Beiyang period.

Zhou Enlai:¹³ Now we have added some workers. We have expanded the number of the workers.

Mao Zedong: I mean that those who are in charge have not changed. This is the social foundation for revisionism to prevail in China. Without mobilizing the masses, without thoroughly mobilizing the working class, these problems will never be solved. But if this is not enough, we should send in the People's Liberation Army, and only then can the problems be solved.

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: I want to ask you a question. Do you know what the imperialists will do? I mean, are they going to start a world war? Or maybe they will not start the war at this moment, but will start it after a while? According to your experience in your own country and in other countries, what do you feel?

Hill: In my opinion, they have not decided to start the war. They are facing tremendous difficulties now. And it seems to me that they will not start the war for a while. At least they do not have the strength to start a war on a global scale at the present time. This is the view held by the majority of people I know. However, viewing the situation from another angle, as they have lost the ability to make correct judgments, danger for military confrontation exists. But in an overall sense, they are not in a position to start a world war now.

Mao Zedong: Both the United States and the Soviet Union have the capacity to start a war. Next to them are such defeated countries as Japan, West Germany and Italy. Neither Britain nor France is much interested in fighting a war.

Zhou Enlai: [Charles] De Gaulle even has reduced (France's) military expenditure.

Mao Zedong: Even in Japan and West Germany, I cannot find signs to show that they are willing to fight a war. West Germany wants to annex East Germany so that Germany will be unified. Japan hopes to take back Okinawa. In actuality, Japan has not won its independence.

Zhou Enlai: The United States controls Japan militarily. There are so many American military bases there.

Mao Zedong: The situation after the end of the Second World War has been different from that after the end of the First World War. I do not know whether or not these of my opinions are correct. After World War II, the defeated countries have been unable to separate themselves from the victors. Not only in the field of finance and investment, but also in international and military affairs, they are unable to be independent from the victors. This is different from the situation after World War I. After World War I, Hitler emerged only after he had tried for a few short years.

Zhou Enlai: He did not recognize the Versailles Treaty.

Mao Zedong: He did not recognize the Versailles Treaty. At that time, the workers, intellectuals and the students in those [capitalist] countries were still willing to support the governments. The German Communist Party was such a big party, but it collapsed quickly.

Zhou Enlai: The Italian Communist Party collapsed even earlier.

Mao Zedong: The [German] Socialist Democratic Party also collapsed. The Nationalist Socialist Party and the Storm Troopers (*Sturmabteilung*) emerged in Germany. According to the rules of the two world wars, the United States always let other countries fight the war first, and it would take action to enter the war only after the war had been fought for two years. Now both in Korea and in Vietnam, the United States was the first to bear the brunt. It has stationed 200,000 troops in Europe, mainly in Germany. In Vietnam, there are half million. In Korea, two divisions, more than 70,000. There are also [American troops] in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Its military forces are scattered. It has extended two arms, one in Europe, one in Asia, involved in some small battles. Of course, the capitalists have their own calculations.

Zhou Enlai: They can make money.

Mao Zedong: The capitalists are not happy if there is no war for a long period. The capitalists in Australia are also included. They want to dispatch some troops [to Vietnam], but not many.

Kang Sheng:¹⁴ Only four battalions and 22 planes.

Zhou Enlai: They dispatch some troops, and the Americans will give them some money.

Mao Zedong: And they can also make some money.

Hill: Now the capitalists in Australia think that they have not made enough money, and they are not satisfied.

Mao Zedong: When they are not satisfied, they will quarrel with the Americans, hoping to get more money. How could [Harold] Holt¹⁵ have drowned during swimming.

Hill: In that area the seashore is somewhat dangerous, and many people have drowned there in the past. He went there to have fun by taking risk.

Mao Zedong: That is not bad.

Hill: This is a good way to finish them.

Mao Zedong: What is the name of your prime minister now?

Hill: [John] Gorton.¹⁶

Mao Zedong: This name sounds good, Gorton.

Hill: It only sounds good.

Mao Zedong: Your name also sounds good—Hill.

Hill: It only sounds good.

Mao Zedong: Indeed, it sounds good. Is it "Hill" (Mao pronounced it in English)?

Hill: Yes, it is Hill.

Mao Zedong: How about changing it to "Mountain" (Mao pronounced it in English)? I have read many articles you have written. I am not so diligent as you are. I am

lazy. I have not revised some of my own writings. Some of them should be revised. For example, when some of them are to be published in a second edition, I should revise them a little bit. When there is a third edition, I should revise a little bit once more. It is not necessary for some articles to be that long. Comrade Lin Biao¹⁷ has invented a new method, that is, to compile quotations.

Kang Sheng: The Greek language edition of *Chairman Mao's Quotations* is translated by them (pointing to Hill).

Mao Zedong: Oh, it is translated by them. Confucius' *Analects* is a collection of quotations. Buddhism also has collections of quotations.

Zhou Enlai: The *Adamantine*.

Mao Zedong: I am a very lazy person. I have never read the Bible. It does not attract me, and I do not know what is said there. Occasionally I will pick it up, but simply do not want to read it.

Hill: I fully understand what you mean as I often have the same feeling. I cannot read through it. But when I was a small boy, I was forced to read the Bible.

Mao Zedong: That is good. When you are forced to read something, that probably is good for you. Some say that I have never committed any mistake. As a matter of fact, I believed in Confucius' feudalism when I was a little boy. Later, when I entered school, I believed in capitalism, taking [George] Washington and Napoleon as great heroes, and looking upon [Oliver] Cromwell, [Duke of] Wellington, and Admiral [Horatio] Nelson as wonderful human beings. During [Nikita] Khrushchev's times, he often claimed that war was inevitable. But now they [the Soviet leaders] no longer make this kind of noise. To say that war is inevitable really means that war is avoidable. In recent years they no longer mention this issue. Isn't that they seldom touch upon this issue?

Kang Sheng: They never mention this issue now. They sent troops to Czechoslovakia. At the Polish Party's Fifth National Congress [Ed. note: 11-16 November 1968], this issue was not mentioned.

Mao Zedong: If that is the case, they, both the United States and the Soviet Union, and some other countries, are preparing to spread the war. As far as this is concerned, it seems that a war might begin. I am not quite sure about this question. Therefore I want to ask for your advice. But I can not force you to answer this question immediately. Can you reflect on this issue? We will come back to discuss this issue in one year's time. But we must take people's consciousness into our consideration. When the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam, American soldiers in Vietnam were very glad, and they even cheered. This indicates that their morale is not high. Is the morale of American soldiers high? Is the morale of Soviet soldiers high? Is the morale of the French, British, German, and Japanese soldiers high? The student strike is a new phenomenon in European history. Students in the capitalist countries usually do not strike. But now, all under the heaven is great chaos. Mainly in Europe, in the

United States, in Latin America, and in Japan, there are student strikes. Are there also student strikes in your country?

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: In another five years, our country, in a relative sense, will be in a better position to serve the revolutions of the people in various countries, the workers' movement, the students, and the development and expansion of real Marxist parties. Since Japan's surrender in 1945, 23 years have passed. In another five years, 28 years will have passed. Without a war in 28 years? In reality, all kinds of wars have occurred since the end of World War II. According to Lenin, capitalism is war, and capitalism cannot exist without war. There are two superpowers in the world today. They not only have conventional weapons, but also have nuclear weapons. This is something that is not easy to deal with. They themselves also know this. Khrushchev's theory was that if the atomic bomb were used the earth would be destroyed, and that no winner would emerge in the war. The United States also holds the same view. These two superpowers are nuclear powers. Our country, in a sense, is still a non-nuclear power. With this little nuclear weaponry, we cannot be counted as a nuclear country.¹⁸ If we are to fight a war, we must use conventional weapons. Since we are neither the chief of staff of the Americans nor the chief of staff of the Soviets, we have no idea what exactly they are going to do, and we can only make our judgment by observing the situation. The populations of these two countries are similar, if they are to fight a large war, they will feel shortage in manpower. Now, by fighting a middle-size war, such as the war in Vietnam, the United States already has difficulties with manpower, the shortage in pilots in particular.

(Mao Zedong turned to Chen Boda¹⁹ and Kang Sheng) What have you discussed with them?

Kang Sheng: We have discussed our Party's Twelfth Plenum and that we are planning to convene the Ninth Party Congress. We also have discussed the true Marxist parties and groups in the world, such as the Stalin Group in the Soviet Union and some new Marxist-Leninist groups in Czechoslovakia and Poland. We also have discussed the parliamentary election questions you have discussed with the Italian comrades. Comrade Hill is particularly interested in your opinions on the "thoroughly establish" issue and on the "absolute authority" issue. He says that this discussion has been particularly enlightening for him.

Mao Zedong: The so-called "thoroughly establish" issue was mainly put forward by our former acting chief of staff Yang Chengwu.²⁰ Actually he was to "thoroughly establish" the authority of himself, while at the same time pursuing polycentrism. So far as "absolute authority" is concerned, I do not believe that such a thing ever exists on the earth. Marx, Engels, and Lenin seldom mentioned absolute authority, they only talked about the absolute truth. The so-called "absolute truth" is nothing but the

total sum of various relative truths. This was what they had discussed, and this is what many philosophers have mentioned. I say that I have never seen “house” and I have never eaten “fruit.” What I have seen is the Great Hall of the People, or such things like the Beijing Hotel where you are staying. Except for these things, the so-called “house” is something that you cannot see. I have not eaten “fruit.” Probably you have, but I have not. I have not had peach, or pear, or apple. These are all very special names. All apples — big apples and small apples; apples produced in this province, and apples produced in that province; apples from this country, and apples from that country — are in the final analysis apples. “Fruit” is an abstract concept, although it is impossible to leave abstract concepts aside. Therefore, to follow people’s customs, we may still say that we eat fruit, or say that we live in houses. Lenin points out that the specific is one aspect or one part of the general. For example, Comrade Hill, you have a very common name, and there are people with the surname Hill everywhere. Where did the name come from?

Hill: According to the tradition in England, people often take the place where they live as their name. The name Hill probably came from people who lived on a hill. For another example, there is a name Mill, which probably comes from those whose work was related to the mill.

Mao Zedong: Do you have people with the surname Water in your country?

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: In China, there are the surnames *Sui* (water) and *Jin* (gold). But there is no such surname *Yin* (silver) in China, though Silver is a surname in foreign countries. In China there is also the surname *Tian* (field).

Zhou Enlai: Even the surname *Xi* (tin).

Hill: This is quite similar to tradition in England.

Mao Zedong: Is Stone a surname in your country?

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: The situations in China and in other countries are quite similar, and many surnames come from feudal states in ancient times. For example, my surname is Mao, which came from a small state about 2,000 years ago under the rule of a dynasty. It was the Zhou Dynasty, Comrade Zhou Enlai’s Zhou. (Pointing to Yao Wen Yuan) Your surname is Yao, and you are the descendent of Emperor Yao. You are a descendant of an Emperor. In reality, whether or not Emperor Yao ever existed is a question.

Yao: It was legendary.

Mao Zedong: There is no evidence for the existence of Emperor Yao, Emperor Shun, or Da Yu.²¹ Probably there were some tribes with those names at that time.

Zhou Enlai: And they have changed from legendary figures to historical figures.

Mao Zedong: It is said that the Zhou, which had only about 3,000 slaves, defeated the state ruled by King Zhou of the Yin,²² which had several hundred thousand slaves. You see, how did we shift our discussion from the war issue to historical issues?

Hill: It is a pleasure to discuss them anyway.

Mao Zedong: Have you been to the United States?

Hill: No. They do not welcome a person like me and refuse to issue me a visa.

Mao Zedong: How about Europe?

Hill: That is OK.

Mao Zedong: Do you need a visa to travel from Australia to Britain?

Hill: In the past we did not need a visa. But now permission is required mainly because of labor laws. This is a problem concerning labor. For example, if I want to travel to Britain, I must first go to the British consul’s office to have my passport stamped, proving what I am going to do in Britain.

Mao Zedong: What do you tell them?

Hill: During my last two visits, I had legitimate reasons. So long as you tell them that you are a tourist and that you will be staying there only for a limited time period, they will approve your application. However, the change indicates that Great Britain has been declining. In the past traveling [from Australia] to Britain was completely [dependent] upon one’s free will. But now procedures have changed.

Mao Zedong: I am told that this is for solving the problem of unemployment. Britain has been sending its people to Canada, and sometimes also sends its people to the United States. Do they also send people to your country?

Hill: Yes, there are many British residents immigrating to Australia.

Mao Zedong: I do not mean immigration. I mean whether or not they still send people to your country now.

Hill: Yes, there are still people moving from Britain to Australia now. But they are not sent by the government; they move there by themselves.

Mao Zedong: The British government allows them to do so?

Hill: Not just allow, but even encourage.

Mao Zedong: This is for reducing the pressure on employment in its own country. I am told that the population in your country has doubled in thirty years, from six million to twelve million.

Hill: That is correct.

Mao Zedong: How long does it take to fly from your country to Hong Kong?

Hill: More than ten hours by air. The distance between Australia and Hong Kong is about 4,500 miles, which is equal to more than 7,000 kilometers.

Mao Zedong: In my opinion, the world needs to be unified. There are miles, kilometers, and sea miles, and there are also so many different languages. It is difficult to unify the language immediately, but if the world is unified these problems can be solved. In the past, many, including the Mongols, the Romans in the West, Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and the British Empire, wanted to unify the world. Today, both the United States and the Soviet Union want to unify the world. Hitler wanted to unify the

world. The Japanese wanted to unify the Pacific area. But they all failed. It seems to me that the possibility to unify the world has not disappeared. The capitalist system is forcing the peoples in the world to accept capitalism, and this is a way by which to unify the world. Another way is that the peoples of the world will rise to make revolution and then unite together. In my view, the world can be unified. Now the United States is maneuvering the United Nations. I am afraid that it is not easy for either the imperialists or the revisionists to unify the world. Can they make a nuclear war, by which they will almost eliminate the population of the world, and then let the United States and the Soviet Union unify the world? But these two countries have too small a population, and they will not have enough manpower if it is dispersed. Further, they are also afraid of fighting a nuclear war. They are not afraid of eliminating population in other countries, but they are afraid of their own population being eliminated. Those countries located in the second intermediate zone, such as Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy, are secondary powers. I am afraid that they are unwilling to fight a war. After all, I am afraid that we still must go the path directed by Marxism, first let peoples in various countries make revolution, and then freely unite together. Why is it necessary to have all these differences at this time? At first, the Americans loved to talk about cosmopolitanism, but later they no longer talked so much about it. In fact, they favor unifying the world. I have read your articles. The intrusion of American capital into your country has caused discontent with the Americans. There is a difference between the Vietnam War and the Korean War, that is, the European countries are not there. Britain, France, Turkey, and Belgium all participated in the Korean War. Let me put forward a question, I will try to answer it, and you will try to answer it. I will consider it, and I ask you also to consider it. This is an issue with worldwide significance. This is the issue about war. The issue about war and peace. Will we see a war, or will we see a revolution? Will the war give rise to revolution, or will revolution prevent war? All in all, now there is neither war nor revolution. Such a situation will not last long. Is it about the time to finish the meeting?

Hill: Thank you very much.

Mao Zedong: I am told that you are leaving tomorrow?

Hill: Yes:

Mao Zedong: Have a safe journey.

Hill: Thank you very much. I thank the Chairman and the Chinese Communist Party for inviting us to visit China again. This visit is of great value for me, and it is also a great inspiration for my comrades.

Mao Zedong: Is it valuable?

Hill: Yes, extremely valuable. I fully agree with the Chairman's opinions on the "absolute authority" issue, and I also fully agree with the Chairman's opinion about the "thoroughly establish" question. But I also feel that we have a very important task, that is, we should go all out to

spread and to apply Chairman Mao's thoughts. In this regard, we had not anticipated the great developments that have been achieved as we see it now.

Mao Zedong: We are planning to compile a collection of quotations by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. (Pointing toward Chen Boda and others) You are compiling the collection. Do not make it too long. If it is too long, people will have no time to read it. But do not make it too short either, if it is too short their basic ideas cannot be reflected. For example, capitalism is war. It seems that this rule no longer works now.

Zhou Enlai: Certainly it still works. After the end of World War II, small wars have never ended.

Hill: Yes.

Mao Zedong: There were also big wars, such as China's War of Liberation.²³

Hill: I have debated with the revisionists in Australia on this issue.

Mao Zedong: After World War I, there were China's Northern Expedition and the ten-year Land Revolution War.²⁴ There was also the Spanish Civil War. (Pointing toward Zhou Enlai) Where did those five persons go?

Zhou Enlai: They were sent to Algeria by train.

Mao Zedong: We have five students in Morocco to study the language. The Moroccan government did not like these five students and expelled them. They were expelled to Algeria. Are they staying at our embassy?

Zhou Enlai: Yes, they are staying at our embassy. It (the Moroccan government) fears students.

Mao Zedong: Now some governments fear students very much. How can these five students be feared?

Yao Wenyuan: Somehow they also fear the Red Guards.

Mao Zedong: Let's stop here.

[Source: CCA.]

Document No. 3

Mao Zedong's Comments on an Article by Commentator of *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily) and *Hongqi* (Red Flag),²⁵ January 1969

Publish the article as it is. Nixon's [inaugural] speech should also be published in the paper.

[Source: *Wenhua dageming yanjiu ziliao [Research Materials on the Great Cultural Revolution]* (Beijing: National Defense University, 1988), vol. 2, p. 517.]

Document No. 4

Mao Zedong's Talk at a Meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (Excerpt),²⁶ 15 March 1969

Mao Zedong: Every county should establish a [militia] regiment, this should be done all over the country.

In a big county, three battalions should be established; in a middle-size county, two battalions; and in a small county, one battalion. During peacetime, they will stay in the locality; when the war breaks out, they will supplement the field army. When the war breaks out, it will not be enough to rely upon the annual conscription....

Mao Zedong: The northeast, the north, and the northwest should be prepared. Once we are prepared, if the enemy does not come, that does not matter. We are now confronted with a formidable enemy. It is advantageous to have the mobilization and the preparation. The Soviets know that we will not invade their country as it is so cold there. We will try to gain mastery by striking the enemy only after he has struck. Our nuclear bases should be prepared, be prepared for the enemy's air bombardment.

Lin Biao: The actions today [by the Soviet border forces]²⁷ were directed by Moscow. It was initiated [by the commanders] on the front.

Mao Zedong: We protest, but they will not listen to us. Both sides are competing to gain time. They try to save face.

[Source: *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu [A Factual History of the People's Republic of China] (Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1994), vol. 3, Part 1, pp. 467-469]*

Document No. 5
Zhou Enlai's Report to Mao Zedong and Mao's
Comments, 22 March 1969

Zhou Enlai's Report (main points)

During the evening of [March] 22 the Soviet side has inquired several times about Chairman [Mao]'s phone number. The Soviet embassy in China also has visited our foreign ministry several times, stating that "following the instructions of the Soviet Council of Ministers, [we] have messages to convey." In the meantime, our side discovered that the Soviet Army was moving in the Zhenbao Island area, and, through reconnaissance, we learned that superiors on the Soviet side had been pushing the [units on the] front-line to take action. It is estimated that it is possible for the enemy to occupy the Zhenbao Island by force today, and that what they have been doing is no more than making an empty gesture. After discussions with comrades in relevant positions, we have reached the decision to strengthen our troop and weapon deployment on the river bank, wait for the enemy's fatigue, and prepare to defeat the enemy by letting him initiate offensive action. In the meantime, we will present a formal diplomatic note to the Soviet side in a meeting with the Soviet charge d'affaires. The note will point out that considering the current status of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union, it is no longer proper for the two sides to maintain contact via telephone. If the Soviet government has something to say, it should present

its opinions to the Chinese government through formal diplomatic channels.²⁸

Mao Zedong's comments on Zhou Enlai's report:

[I] agree with the stand of the minute. Immediately prepare to hold diplomatic negotiations.

[Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987-1997), vol. 13, p. 21]*

Document No. 6
Mao Zedong's Addition to Lin Biao's Political Report
at the Party's Ninth Congress, April 1969²⁹

With regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibilities: that the war will give rise to revolution and that revolution will prevent the war.

[Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, p.32.*]

Document No. 7
Report, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao,
3 April 1969

Chairman [Mao] and Vice Chairman Lin:

It is estimated that the Soviet military border garrisons acted and put forward their demands to follow the instruction from the Soviet Party Center to respond to the public announcement of the opening of our Party's Ninth Congress. They intended to make an empty show of strength, a show that was designed for others to watch. Our proposals are: (1) Our border garrisons should not respond to the demands of the Soviet border garrisons. (2) We should adjust the positions of our cannons, aiming at the enemy's artillery posts and concealed concentration areas for T-62 tanks and armored vehicles. After the enemy artillery has fired for a few days, we should suddenly fire back, causing heavy casualties for them. We should then issue our protest statement. The timing [for taking this action] should be on the eve of the publication of Vice Chairman Lin's report. We are waiting for Chairman [Mao]'s instructions on whether or not this idea is appropriate.³⁰

Zhou Enlai

[Source: *Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan [Zhou Enlai's Military Papers] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1998), vol. 4, pp. 554-555.*]

Document No. 8

Mao Zedong's Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP's Ninth Central Committee, 28 April 1969³¹

What I am going to say is what I have said before, which you all know, and I am not going to say anything new. Simply I am going to talk about unity. The purpose of unity is to pursue even greater victory.

Now the Soviet revisionists attack us. Some broadcast reports by Tass, the materials prepared by Wang Ming,³² and the lengthy essay in *Kommunist* all attack us, claiming that our Party is no longer one of the proletariat and calling it a "petit-bourgeois party." They claim that what we are doing is the imposition of a monolithic order and that we have returned to the old years of the base areas. What they mean is that we have regressed. What is a monolithic order? According to them, it is a military-bureaucratic system. Using a Japanese term, this is a "system." In the words used by the Soviets, this is called "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." They look at our list of names, and find many military men, and they call it "military."³³ As for "bureaucratic," probably they mean a batch of "bureaucrats," including myself, [Zhou] Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda.³⁴ All in all, those of you who do not belong to the military belong to this "bureaucratic" system. Therefore it is called the "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." I say, let them talk, talk about all of this. Whatever they want to say, let them say it. But there is a characteristic in what they say, that is, they never scold us as a bourgeois party. They label us a "petit-bourgeois party." On our part, we call theirs a bourgeois dictatorship. They are restoring the bourgeois dictatorship.

We are talking about victory, this means that we must guarantee that we should unite the vast masses of the entire country to pursue victory under the leadership of the proletariat. The socialist revolution must continue. There are still unfinished tasks for this revolution to fulfill, such as to conduct struggle, to conduct criticism, and to conduct transformation. After a few years, we will probably need to carry out another revolution.

Several of our old comrades have been stationed in the factories for a period. I hope that when you have opportunities in the future you will go down to have a look again, and to study the problems existing in various factories. It seems to me that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution must be carried out. Our foundation was not solid and stable. According to my observation, not in all factories, not in an overwhelming majority of the factories, but in quite a large majority of the factories, the leadership is not controlled by true Marxists, or controlled by the masses of the workers. Among those who led the factories in the past, I cannot say that there were no good people. There were good people for sure. Among party committee secretaries, assistant secretaries, committee members, there were good people; and among party branch secretaries, there were good people. But they followed Liu Shaoqi's lines, which emphasized material incentives and

put making profits as the top priority, while at the same time failing to promote the proletarian politics, but instead pursued a system of bonuses. In some factories, they have been liberated now, and they have participated in the new leadership, combining the three elements.³⁵ But in some factories, this has not been done. There are indeed bad elements hiding in the factories. For example, the February Seventh Factory, which repairs railway locomotives and carriages at Changxindian, is a big factory, with 8,000 workers and, if you include them, several tens of thousands of workers' family members. In the past, there once existed nine Guomindang district branches, three *Sanmin zhuyi* Youth League³⁶ organs, and eight [Guomindang] secret service organs. Of course, a careful analysis of the situation is needed here. In those days, it wouldn't do if one refused to join such a thing called Guomindang. Some of them are old workers. Are we going to get rid of these old workers? We should not do that. We should make distinctions between those big and small cases. Some of them were only nominal members of the Guomindang, and they were forced to join it. They only need to talk [to clarify the situation]. Some of them were in relatively more responsible positions. A small minority of them were deeply involved and have done bad things. We must make distinctions between these different cases. Even for those who have done bad things, we should also make distinctions among them. Leniency to those who confess, and severity to those who resist. If they conduct a satisfactory self-criticism, we should let them keep their jobs. But, of course, we should not allow them to stay in the leadership. If we do not give these people jobs, what will they do at home? What will their children do? Further, old workers usually are skillful, although some of them are not so skillful.

I have brought up this example to point out that the revolution has not been completed. Therefore, all members of the Central Committee, including those alternate members, should pay attention to conducting your work in a very careful style. In dealing with things like this, you should be very careful. It is not good to be crude and careless, which often leads to mistakes. In some places, many people have been arrested. This is not right. You have arrested so many people, why did you do so? Have the arrested committed homicide, arson, or poisoning? It is my opinion that if someone has not committed any of these crimes, you should not arrest him. As for those who have mistakenly followed the capitalist path, it is even less necessary for you to arrest them. In the factories, they should be allowed to work, and should be allowed to participate in the mass movement. They have committed mistakes, and have committed the mistakes in the past. They either joined the Guomindang, or did some bad things, or have committed mistakes in the recent past, that is, have committed the mistake of following the capitalist path. You should allow them to be with the masses. If you do not allow them to be with the masses, that is not good. Some of them have been detained for two

years, detained in the “cattle pens.”³⁷ As a result, they know nothing about what is happening in the world. When they come out and listen to other people, they find the language the other people use is different. They are still talking in the language of two years ago. They have been separated from life for two years. We should help these people and should hold study sessions for them. We should tell them about history and tell them about the history of the advance of the Great Cultural Revolution in the past two years, so that they gradually will awaken.

We should unite together for one purpose, that is, to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship. This should be solidly carried out in every factory, every village, every office, and every school. In the beginning, we should not spread this out too widely. We may spread it out, but should not stop taking charge of it when it has been spread out. We should not just do this for half a year or a little bit longer, and then have no one take charge of it. The experiences must be summarized factory by factory, school by school, and office by office. Therefore, Comrade Lin Biao emphasizes in his report that this must be done factory by factory, school by school, commune by commune, party branch by party branch, and working unit by working unit. There is also the question of rectifying the [Communist] Youth League, which should be done League branch by League branch.

In addition, there is the question of being prepared for war, which I have mentioned in the past. We should be prepared for war year by year. People may ask: What if they do not come? No matter whether they come or not, we should be prepared. Do not wait for the Party Center to distribute materials even for manufacturing hand grenades. Hand grenades can be manufactured everywhere, can be manufactured in every province. Such things as rifles and light weapons can be manufactured in every province. I am talking here about being prepared in a material sense. But what is more important is to be prepared in a spiritual sense. To be prepared in a spiritual sense is to be prepared for war. Not only [members of] our Central Committee, but also the majority of the people of the whole country, should have such spiritual preparation. Here I do not mean to include the enemies of the [proletarian] dictatorship, such as landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, and bad elements. This is because these people are quite happy to see the imperialists and revisionists invade our country. They suppose that if the invasion occurred, the world would be turned upside down, and that they would come out on top. We should also be prepared for dealing with this situation. In carrying out the socialist revolution, we should also carry out this revolution.

When others invade our territory and attack us, we shall not invade others' territory. We must not invade others' territory. I say this because we should not be provoked. Even if they invited me to come out, I will not come out. But if they invade my territory and attack me, I will deal with them. My response depends on whether they come on a small scale or a large scale. If it is a small-

scale invasion the fighting will be waged on the border. If it is a large-scale invasion, I am in favor of giving up some land. China is not a small country. If there is no benefit waiting for them, they will not come. We must let the whole world see that when we are fighting the war we have both reason and advantage in our hands. If they do come, I think it is more advantageous to us, as we will have both reason and advantage in our hands. It is easy for us to fight [an invading enemy] since he will fall into the people's encirclement. As far as such things like planes, tanks, and armored vehicles are concerned, experiences everywhere prove that they are easy for us to deal with.

In order to achieve victory, we must have more people. Isn't this correct? [We must have] people from all backgrounds, no matter to which “mountain stronghold” they used to belong or in which province they used to work, either in the north or in the south. Is it better to unite with more people or to unite with fewer people? It is always better to unite with more people. Some people may have different opinions from ours, but that is not a relationship between us and the enemy. I simply do not believe, to take a specific example, that the relationship between Wang Xiaoyu³⁸ and Yang Dezhi³⁹ is, as some people say, one between us and the enemy. Is the relationship between you two one between us and the enemy, or is it one among the people? In my opinion, it is a quarrel among the people. The Central Committee has been somewhat bureaucratic, and has failed to pay enough attention to you. On your part, you never bring this matter to the Central Committee for discussion. Shandong is such a big province, and there are contradictions among the people. Would you two please take this opportunity to have a good discussion? In my opinion, there are such contradictions among the people in East China too. There is also the case of Shanxi province, which involves problems among the people too. You support one faction, and I will support another faction. But is this endless quarreling necessary? There are also problems in Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces. Every province has some problems, but, compared with the situation of last year or the year before last, things are already much better. You, comrade, isn't your name Xu Shiyu⁴⁰? When we were in Shanghai the year before last, during the three months from July to September, all under the heaven was great chaos. Now life is a bit better. What I am talking about is the whole situation. In Nanjing, where you are, there emerged a so-called “Red Headquarters.”⁴¹ You have worked on them and they became cooperative. In the end, the “August 27th”⁴² and the “Red Headquarters” are united together.

I believe that the main problem still lies in how we conduct our own work. Did I make two statements in the past? The problems of the localities lay in the army, and the problems of the army lay in its own work. You are not enemies of life and death, why should you treat each other like that? If personal gratitude or hatred is involved, it is not such a big matter and so much weight should not be

put on it. All in all, I find no injustice in your previous life or hatred in your present life [to make you unyielding enemies]. You simply encounter one another, and find some differences in your opinions. Others have either criticized you or opposed you, and you have attacked back. Consequently, contradictions emerge. Those who oppose you are not necessarily bad people. One person in Beijing whom many have wanted to overthrow is Xie Fuzhi.⁴³ He then adopted a method: he told all organizations which hoped to overthrow him that there was nothing wrong with them, and that the organizations which favored him were not necessarily good.

Therefore, what I want to say is what I have said in the past, that is, to unite together to achieve even greater victories. There is concrete content in this statement. It concerns what we are going to do, what kind of victory we are going to pursue, and how we should unite together.

I still have faith in those old comrades who have committed mistakes. Originally, we had a long list, including thirty-odd names, and we thought that it was good if all of them could be elected to the politburo. Later someone put forward a shorter list with less than twenty names, and we felt that that list was too short. The majority held a position in between. They oppose both the longer list and the shorter list, favoring a medium list with some twenty-odd names. So we can only elect representatives [from them]. This is not to say that all those alternate members of the Central Committee are not as good as full members of the Central Committee in terms of their political consciousness, working ability, virtue, talents and seniority. This is not the real question. There is unfairness involved here. Do you think that everything is so fair? In my view, there are many things that are not so fair. There are many things that are not so just.

Everyone of us should be prudent and cautious. No matter who one is, an alternate member of the Central Committee, a full member of the Central Committee, or a member of the Politburo, everyone should be prudent and cautious. We should not forget who we are when there is a sudden inspiration. Since the time of Marx [the Communists] never talk about who should take more or less credit. We are Communist Party members, and we belong to the part of the masses which is more conscious than others, and we belong to the part of the proletariat which is more conscious than others. So I am an advocate of this slogan, that is: "First we should not be scared by hard work; second we should not be scared by death." And I do not favor the slogan: "Even if I have not achieved anything, at least I have worked hard; even if I have not worked hard, at least I have made myself tired." This slogan is in opposition to "First we should not be scared by hard work; and second we should not be scared by death." You see, how many of us have died in the past? All the old comrades who remain here today are lucky survivors who have survived by chance. Comrade Pi Dingjun,⁴⁴ how many were with you when you worked in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area? How many survived?

There were many people there at that time, but not many alive today. At that time, in the Jiangxi Soviet Area, the Jinggang Mountain Soviet Area, the base areas in northeastern Jiangxi, western Fujian, western Hunan and Hubei, and northern Shaanxi, the wars resulted in tremendous sacrifices. Not many old comrades survived. This is what we call "first we should not be scared by hard work; second we should not be scared by death." For many years, we did not have any salary, and there was nothing like the eight-tier wage system. We had only a fixed amount of food. At best we could get three *qian* of cooking oil, five *qian* of salt, and one-and-a-half *jin* of rice.⁴⁵ How about vegetables? How could we get vegetables everywhere the troops passed through? Now we have entered the cities. It is a good thing for us to enter the cities. Without entering the cities, they would still be occupied by Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek].⁴⁶ But it is also a bad thing for us to enter the cities because it has made our Party no longer pure. Therefore, some foreigners and reporters say that our party is being rebuilt. Now, we ourselves have also put forward this slogan, that is, Party-rectification and Party-rebuilding. The Party needs to be rebuilt. Every Party branch needs to be rectified with the supervision of the masses. The whole thing must go through the masses. It should not just involve a few Party members. The masses outside the Party should attend the meetings and should participate in providing comments. A few individual Party members are really not good, and they should be advised to leave the Party. A very small number of Party members may need to be disciplined. This is included in the Party's constitution, isn't it? It also needs to be passed by the Party branch meeting and should be approved by the superior Party committee. All in all, we must adopt prudent methods. This should be done, and this must be done. However, this should be done in prudent ways.

It seems that this national congress is a very good one. In my opinion, it is a congress of unity and a congress of victory. We use the method of issuing communiqués [to announce the convening of the congress], and the foreigners cannot get our news. They say that we are holding a secret meeting. We are both open and secret. It seems to me that the reporters in Beijing are not so good. Probably we have uprooted almost all of the traitors and special agents who were hidden among us. In the past, when there was a meeting, its content were leaked out immediately, appearing in Red Guards papers. After the downfall of Wang [Li], Guan [Feng], and Qi [Benyu],⁴⁷ and Yang [Chengwu], Yu [Lijin],⁴⁸ and Fu [Chongbi],⁴⁹ they no longer know anything about the activities of our Central Committee.

More or less that is what I want to say. The meeting is adjourned.

[Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, pp. 35-41.]

Document No. 9**Report by Four Chinese Marshals—Chen Yi,⁵⁰ Ye Jianying,⁵¹ Xu Xiangqian,⁵² and Nie Rongzhen,⁵³—to the Central Committee, “A Preliminary Evaluation of the War Situation” (excerpt),⁵⁴ 11 July 1969**

I. The struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

The present struggle between these three powers is different from the ones between the “seven powers” before World War II or the American-Soviet confrontation in the early post-war era.

(1) China represents the fundamental interests of the world proletariat class. The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party declared that China and the true Marxists-Leninists and the revolutionary people all over the world should fight resolutely side by side until “the system of man exploiting man is eliminated on the earth and that the whole of mankind is emancipated.”

(2) The U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are two “brands” of representatives of the international bourgeoisie class. On the one hand, they both take China as the enemy; on the other, they take each other as the enemy. U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists are hostile toward China, spreading slanderous rumors about China’s “expansionist ambition.” In fact, socialist China does not have even a single soldier stationed abroad.⁵⁵ China’s behavior during the last twenty years, especially during the war against the Indian invaders⁵⁶ and the war to resist U.S. aggression and assist Vietnam, has fully proven that China has no expansionist intentions. In fact, the imperialists, the revisionists, and the counterrevolutionaries are not really scared by China’s so-called military aggression. What scares them most is the prospect that people’s revolutions of all nations, under the guidance of the invincible Mao Zedong Thought, will send them to the grave. Therefore, the U.S. imperialists’ and the Soviet revisionists’ hostility toward China, in the final analysis, is hostility toward the Mao Zedong Thought, toward the revolutions in their own countries as well as the world revolution, and toward the people of their own countries and the people all over the world. However, it should be noted that Nixon takes China as a “potential threat,” rather than a real threat.⁵⁷

For the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists, the real threat is the one existing between themselves. For all other countries, the real threat comes from U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists. Covered by the banner of opposing China, U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists collaborate with each other while at the same time fighting against each other. The contradictions between them, however, are not reduced because of the collaboration between them; rather, their hostilities toward each other are more fierce than ever before.

(3) The other countries, controlled by either the United States or the Soviet Union, have yet to become a force to contend with them. While only a few of them follow the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists to

carry out an anti-China policy, the majority of them maintain a different attitude toward China. Some adopt a dual stand toward China; some maintain an onlooker’s position; some use friendship with China to resist the attempts by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists to control them; some resent U.S. and Soviet plots to re-divide the world and openly challenge them. As China becomes more and more powerful and the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists become weaker and weaker, this situation will develop further, making it more difficult for them to form an anti-China united front, let alone to find hatchet men to use against China in military affairs.

II. Our opinions on the war against China.

We believe that in the foreseeable future it is unlikely that U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists will launch a large-scale war against China, either jointly or separately.

(1) The U.S. imperialists do not dare to attack China rashly. The main reasons are as follows:

(a) The United States and China are separated by the vast Pacific Ocean. The U.S. imperialists’ defeats in the Korean War and the Vietnam War have taught them a bitter lesson causing a deeper crisis both at home and abroad, thus forcing them to claim that they would never again be involved in wars similar to the ones in Korea and Vietnam. China is different from Korea and Vietnam, and the U.S. imperialists must be even more careful while dealing with China.

(b) The strategic emphasis of the U.S. imperialists lies in the West. The U.S. imperialists have been bogged down in South Vietnam, which has seriously weakened their position in the West. If they were to enter a war against China, it would last longer and the result would be more miserable for them. The last thing the U.S. imperialists want to see is involvement in a war against China, allowing the Soviet revisionists to take advantage of it.

(c) The U.S. imperialists wish to push Asian countries to the front in a war against China, especially by using Japan as the vanguard. Japan, however, does not dare to take reckless actions, not only because it suffered seriously in the defeat of its aggression against China, but also because the strength of the new China today is much stronger than that of the old China. Japan’s strength is becoming full-fledged. Although Sato Eisaku⁵⁸ and his like raise an anti-China hullabaloo, their actual intentions are to make money through anti-China war propaganda, to recover Japan’s lost territory occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union, to expand southward, to pursue a leadership role in Asia, and to contend with the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan is unwilling to serve as the scapegoat in a war against China, and the U.S. imperialists are even less willing to do so.

Therefore, it is unlikely that the U.S. imperialists will rashly launch or enter a war against China.

(2) The Soviet revisionists have made China their main enemy, imposing a more serious threat to our

security than the U.S. imperialists. The Soviet revisionists are creating tensions along the long Sino-Soviet border, concentrating troops in the border area and making military intrusions. They are creating anti-China public opinion [in the Soviet Union], creating chaos on the international scene, while at the same time forcing some Asian countries to join an anti-China ring of encirclement with a "carrot-and-stick" method. All these are serious steps that the Soviet revisionists are taking in preparation for a war of aggression against China. However, before they can enter a major war with China, the Soviet revisionists still must deal with many concerns and difficulties.

(a) Both China and the United States take the Soviet Union as their enemy thus the Soviet revisionists do not dare to fight a two-front war. In appearance, the U.S. imperialists are taking a hands-off policy toward the Sino-Soviet dispute, claiming that they will neither take sides nor intervene. In reality, however, they are relaxing their relationship with the Soviet revisionists in the West, and pushing the Soviet revisionists to stand on the first front of a major war against China. By "sitting on top of the mountain to watch a fight between two tigers," they will see the weakening of both China and the Soviet Union. They may even use this opportunity to take over Eastern Europe, or even press forward to the heart area of the Soviet revisionists.

(b) If the Soviet revisionists decide to launch a large-scale attack on China, they will try to fight a quick war. Or they may follow the example of Japan's aggression against China, adopting a strategy of encroaching on China piece by piece, so that they will have time for rectification, as well as to observe the reactions of the U.S. imperialists and other countries. But, once they start a major war against us, we certainly will not allow them to fight a quick war and achieve quick results. We will not give them any breathing spell or freedom of action, and will act in accordance with Chairman Mao's teaching to "fight to the end." We will change the war into a protracted ground war. This will create great difficulties for the Soviet revisionists:

First, the Soviet revisionists' anti-China policy is without any popular support. As of now, they have used defensive excuses to deceive the people. If they are to launch an all-out offensive against China, they will arouse the people's opposition. In addition, the Soviet revisionists have carried out propaganda emphasizing the terror of war for many years, which may produce a negative impact upon their effort to start a war.

Second, the main industry of the Soviet Union is distributed in its European part. It is difficult for the Soviet revisionists to get supplies in Siberia, and everything must be transported from Europe. There is only one railroad. An exhausted army on a long expedition cannot last long. At present the revisionist Soviet Union already faces great shortages of daily necessities. It would be even more difficult for it to hold on in a war.

Third, in order to win a war, a consolidated rear is indispensable. The rear area of the Soviet revisionists is far from consolidated, where domestic class and national contradictions have been intensifying. A war of aggression against China inevitably would be a long-lasting one, and changes are inevitable over a long period, the worst of which will be troubles emerging in the rear area. When the problems on the front have not been solved, troubles at home break out. If American military forces penetrate the Soviet revisionists' spheres of influence in Europe, they will be bogged down there.

(c) We believe that, like the U.S. imperialists, when the Soviet revisionists are moving their troops eastward, it does not mean that their strategic emphasis is also moving eastward. The strategic emphasis of the Soviet revisionists remains in Europe. Eastern Europe is the Soviet Union's main market and defensive barrier, on which it will never let down its guard. To be sure, the Soviet revisionists indeed are preparing for a war against China. But their main purpose is to use military mobilization to consolidate their political control and to suppress resistance to them at home and in Eastern Europe. They are making a show of readiness to fight. This is designed, on the one hand, to serve their attempt to occupy a strong position to negotiate with us, and, on the other hand, to convince the U.S. imperialists that they really intend to fight a major war against China. They hope that this will bring stability to them on the western front, and that the U.S. imperialists will endorse their action of establishing an anti-China ring of encirclement. Consequently, they, with their expansionist attempts in Southeast Asia and other areas being covered, will be able to put their hands into the pockets of the Americans and the British and to redivide the world. The U.S. imperialists, on their part, are pushing the Soviet revisionists to attack China so that they may use this opportunity to take over the Soviet revisionists' spheres of influence.

(3) Will the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists launch a surprise nuclear attack on us? We must be fully prepared for this. However, it is not an easy matter to use a nuclear weapon. When a country uses nuclear weapons to threaten another country, it places itself under the threat of other country's nuclear weapons, and will thus inevitably face the strong opposition of its own people. Even the use of nuclear weapons cannot conquer an unbending people. In the final analysis, the outcome of a war will be determined by the continuous fighting of the ground forces. Therefore, nuclear weapons cannot save the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists.

(4) According to the current situation, it is difficult for U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists to attack China, either jointly or independently, or by gathering [on their side] such countries as Japan and India. In fact, when they argue for the need to attack China, either jointly or independently, they have other purposes in mind. In reality, they know that it is not easy to bully China, and

once they are bogged down in China, it is not easy to get out. Both the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists want others to take the lead, allowing them to take advantage by hiding in the back. We are ready in full battle array. No matter how the aggressors will come, jointly or independently, they will be thoroughly defeated.

III. Analyzing the American-Soviet contradiction

(1) The Soviet revisionists have adopted a “one-leg” policy in the construction of their country. They first pursued partial development in heavy industry, and then pursued a deformed development in advanced military industry. This provided them with the capacity for expansion. The U.S. imperialists have been trapped in South Vietnam, and the British imperialists have decided to withdraw from areas east of the Suez Canal, which has created a new opportunity for Soviet expansion. The Soviet revisionists also carry out expansion in the name of anti-imperialism or under the cover of opposing China. They often begin with the vulnerable spots, occupying grounds in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. They even have extended their hands into the U.S. Imperialists’ backyard: Latin America. One of the most conspicuous indications of Soviet expansionism is the all-out effort to develop a navy. The ocean was controlled by the United States and Britain in the past, and the Soviet revisionists are vigorously expanding in the ocean, causing conflicts with the capitalist-imperialists.

(2) The expansion by the Soviet revisionists has been conducted for the purpose of squeezing out the U.S. imperialists. The Soviet revisionists hope to divide the world equally with the U.S. imperialists, as well as take charge of world affairs together with the U.S. imperialists. The U.S. imperialists are determined to maintain their superior position, and are unwilling to give up their hegemony and the world hegemon’s position. The U.S. imperialists will not allow the Soviet revisionists to consolidate their position in the Middle East. The U.S. imperialists do not believe that the Soviet revisionists will really enter a major war against China, and they thus will not allow the Soviet revisionists to expand at will.

(3) Both the Soviet revisionists and the U.S. imperialists are making plans for action now. The Soviet revisionists want to extend their influence into Western Europe, and the U.S. imperialists hope to put a leg into Eastern Europe. They give tit for tat, competing to seize what is possessed by the other side. What exists between them is a real and concrete conflict of interests. The struggles between them are both constant and severe.

(4) Both the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists face crises at home and abroad, but they will not shrink back simply because they are facing difficulties. The Soviet revisionists are making active preparations in the East, not relaxing efforts in the West, and hoping to develop in the South. The U.S. imperialists also want to pursue a path of expansion. It is necessary that the contradictions between them will intensify.

(5) The contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union concentrate on Europe and the Middle East. The unification of Germany is the core of the European problem. The strength of West Germany has been increasing. Eastern Europe was Germany’s traditional market, and at present, the influence of France has reduced to a certain extent. In the Middle East, the conflict between Arabic countries and Israel has been characterized by an indirect confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Europe, if the contradictions develop further, the possibility cannot be excluded that a conflict might happen between the United States and the Soviet Union. We must pay close attention to this development.

We have made full preparations, and we are ready to defeat any enemy who dares to invade our territory. However, it is more beneficial to us to postpone the war. We should make full use of time and strengthen preparations in all respects, “making revolution, while promoting production, promoting our work, and promoting war preparation.” We must promote the continuous great leap forward of our industrial and agricultural production, build China into an unshakable proletarian country with stronger economic power and stronger land, naval and air forces. In the struggle against the enemy, we should adopt a military strategy of active defense and a political strategy of active offense. We should continue to expose and criticize the Soviet revisionists and the U.S. imperialists. We should enhance our embassies and consulates in other countries, and actively carry out diplomatic activities. We should expand the international united front of anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism. We should strive for greater victory in the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists.

[Source: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao [CCP Party History Materials], no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 70-75.]

Document No. 10

The CCP Central Committee’s Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and Regions,⁵⁹ 28 August 1969

The borders of our great motherland are sacred and inviolable. To defend the motherland is the sacred obligation of the people of the whole country. In this regard, the soldiers and people in the border areas in particular have direct responsibility. In order to defend the motherland, to defend our borders, to defend the great achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship, to prepare to smash the armed provocations by the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists at any time, and to prevent them from launching sudden attacks [against our motherland], the Party Central Committee orders:

(1) Chairman Mao's great instructions on "raising our vigilance and defending our motherland" and "preparing for fighting a war" must be followed resolutely, and a high alertness to the presence of the enemy must be established. You should overcome the status of lacking alertness because of peace, and should not look down upon the enemy. You should be fully prepared to fight a war against aggression, should strengthen unity between the army and the people, and should be prepared to eliminate any enemy who dares to invade our territory.

(2) In face of a formidable enemy, the whole army and the whole people should unite together as one person, confronting the enemy with one stand. The unity within the army should be enhanced; the unity between the army and the people, as well as the unity between the army and the government, should be enhanced; and the unity among the revolutionary people of all nationalities should be enhanced. The leadership role of the revolutionary committees at all levels should be consolidated. All activities to divide our own strength should be opposed. Any actions against unity should be opposed. Bourgeois factionalism should be opposed. Class enemies who provoke others to damage the unity between the army and the people and the unity between different nationalities should be cracked down upon without mercy. The main culprits should be punished in accordance with the law.

3. The commanders and soldiers of army units stationed on the border area must stick to their fighting posts, must carry out all orders resolutely, must obey orders and be strictly disciplined, and must be combat-ready in all aspects and pay close attention to the enemy's movement, so that they will be able immediately to take action when they are ordered to do so. For members of the army, no action damaging discipline will be tolerated. Members of the army must not leave their posts without approval, and are not allowed to establish liaison with other units by traveling there. Those who fail to correct wrongdoings after education will be severely punished.

4. All revolutionary mass organizations should follow the great leader Chairman Mao's teaching to realize the "great revolutionary unification" in accordance with their working systems, professions, working branches, and working units. All mass organizations that are established across professions will be dissolved immediately. Any attempt to establish a separate organization or to reestablish an organization is illegal, and organizations of this kind should be ordered to dissolve.

5. The Party Central Committee's "July 23 Order"⁶⁰ should be carried out resolutely. All factional struggle by violent means should be stopped unconditionally and immediately. All professional teams for struggle by violent means should be dissolved. All strongholds for struggle by violent means should be eliminated. All weapons should be handed back. If any team for struggle by violent means continues to occupy a stronghold and stubbornly refuses to surrender, the People's Liberation Army can surround the stronghold by force, launch a

political offensive toward it, and confiscate the weapons [held by the team] by force.

6. In no circumstance should anyone be allowed to attack the People's Liberation Army. In no circumstance should anyone be allowed to seize the Army's weapons, equipment, and vehicles. In no circumstance should anyone hinder the Army's war preparations, or expose and steal military intelligence. Any violation of the above will be treated as current reactionary behavior. Key military positions and war preparation facilities must be protected resolutely. The secrets of national defense must be carefully maintained. The People's Liberation Army's preparations for war should be aided and supported.

7. Transportation must be protected, and the working condition of the communication system must be guaranteed. Any actions damaging railway, highway, and water transportation, damaging the communication liaison system, and of cutting off electricity lines will be regarded as counter-revolution activities, and must be investigated and severely punished.

8. The revolution must be carried out resolutely, and production must be promoted vigorously, so that extensive support can be given to the front-line. Laboring disciplines should be observed, production posts should be maintained, and the industrial and agricultural production should be carried out smoothly. Anyone who has left his production or work post must return to his work unit to take part in "making revolution, promoting production, promoting work, and promoting war preparation." Anyone who fails to return to his own unit on time will not get salary as a worker or clerk, or will not get workpoints as a peasant. He will be disciplined in accordance with the seriousness of the violation, and can be expelled from the work force. Those who provoke or threaten the workers and peasants to leave their production and work posts must be punished severely in accordance with the law.

9. The counterrevolutionary elements must be suppressed without mercy. Those counterrevolutionaries who have connections with foreign countries or plan to escape abroad, who sabotage social safety and stability, who plunder state property, who sabotage production, who conduct homicide, arson, poisoning, and who utilize feudal superstition to provoke rebellion, must be suppressed without mercy. Landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements, and rightists who have not been transformed must be placed under tight supervision of the revolutionary masses and accept transformation through labor.

[Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, vol. 13, pp. 59-61.]

Document No. 11**Report by Four Chinese Marshals—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian—to the CCP Central Committee, “Our Views about the Current Situation” (Excerpt), 17 September 1969**

The international class struggle is intricate and complex, and its core is the struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. At present a question of overwhelming importance is whether or not the Soviet revisionists will launch a large-scale attack on China. Just at the time when the Soviet revisionists have daggers drawn, the U.S. imperialists are fanning the flames, and China is making war preparations, Kosygin⁶¹ suddenly made a detour to Beijing, expressing to us a willingness to relax border tensions, as well as to improve the relations between our two countries.⁶² What is his purpose? This is a question worth analyzing.

1. The Soviet revisionists indeed intend to wage a war of aggression against China. Their strategic goal is to re-divide the world with the U.S. imperialists. They vainly hope to bring China into the orbit of social-imperialism. Recently the Soviet revisionists have intensified whipping up public opinion for a war against China, openly threatening us with a nuclear strike, and conspiring to launch a surprise attack on our nuclear facilities. The Cultural Revolution in our country is still under way, our nuclear weapons are still under development, and the Vietnam War has not ended. A group of adventurers in the Soviet revisionist leadership want to seize this opportunity to use missiles and tanks to launch a quick war against China and thoroughly destroy China, so that a “mortal danger” for them will be removed.

2. Although the Soviet revisionists intend to wage a war of aggression against China and, accordingly, have made war deployments, they cannot reach a final decision because of political considerations. Launching a war against China is a matter of life and death importance, and the Soviet revisionists are not certain that they can win the war. To a large extent, the Soviet revisionists’ decision to launch a war of aggression against China depends on the attitude of the U.S. imperialists, which is far from satisfactory to them so far, and is their utmost worry in a strategic sense. The last thing the U.S. imperialists are willing to see is a victory by the Soviet revisionists in a Sino-Soviet war, as this would [allow the Soviets] to build up a big empire more powerful than the American empire in resources and manpower. Several times the U.S. imperialists have expressed a willingness to improve relations with China, which reached a peak during Nixon’s recent trip to Asia.⁶³ The Soviet revisionists are scared by the prospect that we might ally ourselves with the U.S. imperialists to confront them. On July 26, the first day of Nixon’s trip to Asia, the Soviet revisionists hurriedly handed to our side the statement issued by the Soviet Council of Ministers to our government. This move fully revealed the anxiousness on the part of the Soviet

revisionists. The Soviet revisionists’ fears about possible Sino-American unity makes it more difficult for them to launch an all-out attack on China. Considering several other factors, it can be concluded that the Soviet revisionists dare not start a major war against China.

3. Kosygin’s trip to Beijing reflected [the Soviet revisionists’] reactionary pragmatism. The Soviet revisionists want to get out of difficulties at home and abroad by attempting to modify a brink-of-war policy toward China and hoisting the banner of peace. It was also aimed at exploring our intentions to provide the Soviet revisionists with a basis for their decision-making. It is estimated that the Soviet revisionists might enter negotiations with us, and to ask us to adopt their stand to either maintain the status quo of the border or solve the border problem. While maintaining an anti-China policy, the Soviet revisionists hope to relax, or to improve, the state-to-state relations with our country in order to gain a respite to stabilize their domestic situation and the situation in East Europe, while at the same time consolidating and expanding their interests in the Middle East, Asia, and other areas. They especially hope to take advantage through adopting a reactionary two-faced policy toward China, thus gaining strength and winning initiative in the conflict with the U.S. imperialists.

4. Premier Zhou Enlai’s meeting with Kosygin has shocked the whole world, and has caused confusion in the strategic thinking of the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, and the reactionaries in other countries. Though we have never retreated from the stand of beating down U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, Kosygin still visited Beijing in person. All of this is China’s great victory. In the struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, the United States hopes to utilize China and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union hopes to exploit China and the United States, so that one of them will gain the utmost strategic advantages. We must wage a tit-for-tat struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union, including using negotiation as a means of fighting against them. We should be firm on principles and flexible on tactics. The Soviet revisionists have requested holding negotiations on the border issue, to which we have agreed. The U.S. imperialists have suggested resuming the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, to which we should respond positively when the timing is proper. Such tactical actions may bring about results of strategic significance.

[Source: *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 84-86.]

Document No. 12**Further Thoughts by Marshal Chen Yi on Sino-American Relations**

This report [the report by the four marshals] mainly deals with Kosygin’s trip to China and the possibility for the Soviet revisionists to launch a large-scale attack on

China, and it thus fails to provide a detailed analysis of whether or not the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw should be resumed. I have considered for a long time on how to achieve a breakthrough in Sino-American relations. The talks in Warsaw have been conducted for more than ten years without producing anything. Even if the talks are resumed now, they will not bring about breakthrough in Sino-American relations. I have read relevant reference materials. On 27 October 1955, we suggested that China and the United States hold talks at the foreign minister's level to relax and eliminate tension in the Taiwan region. On 18 and 24 January 1956, our Foreign Ministry spokesman issued two statements, pointing out that the Taiwan problem had proven too serious to be solved by the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and that only talks at the foreign minister's level could relax and eliminate tension in the Taiwan region. This suggestion, though with great significance, was rejected by the United States. The situation has changed today. Because of the strategic need for dealing with the Soviet revisionists, Nixon hopes to win over China. It is necessary for us to utilize the contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union in a strategic sense, and pursue a breakthrough in the Sino-American relations. Thus, we must adopt due measures, about which I have some "wild" ideas. First, when the meetings in Warsaw are resumed, we may take the initiative in proposing to hold Sino-American talks at the ministerial or even higher levels, so that basic and related problems in Sino-American relations can be solved. We should only make suggestion about at which level and on which topics talks should be held. In my judgment, the Americans may accept the suggestion. It is possible that if we do not take the initiative, the Americans may make such a suggestion. If that is the case, we should accept it. Second, a Sino-American meeting at higher levels holds strategic significance. We should not raise any prerequisite, which does not mean that we have departed from our previous stand on the Taiwan question. The Taiwan question can be gradually solved by talks at higher levels. Furthermore, we may discuss with the Americans other questions of strategic significance. These tasks cannot be fulfilled with talks at the ambassadorial level. Third, when the talks in Warsaw are resumed, we do not need to use the meeting place provided by the Polish government. To keep the meetings secret, the talks should be held at the Chinese embassy.

[Source: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 86-87.]

Document No. 13
Letter, Zhou Enlai to Alexei Kosygin,
18 September 1969

Chairman Alexei Kosygin
The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

On 11 September 1969, our two sides agreed during our meeting at the Beijing airport: that the long-existing Sino-Soviet border disputes should be settled through peaceful negotiation without threats of any kind; and that before the settlement has been reached the two sides should take temporary measures to maintain the status quo of the borders and to avoid armed conflict. The two sides have also exchanged opinions upon the measures that should be taken. They are as follows:

I. The two sides agree that until the border dispute is settled, the status quo of the border should be strictly maintained.

1. Taking the maps exchanged in the 1964 Sino-Soviet border negotiations as the basis, in the sections of the border where the two sides have identical opinions on the maps, the two sides promise to observe strictly the border line as set up by the treaty, and will not cross the border line.

2. In the sections of the border where the two sides have different opinions on the map, that is, the areas under dispute, the two sides promise: the residents of the two sides should live, conduct productive activity (including plowing, digging irrigation ditches, grazing, cutting grass, and cutting firewood both on land and on island, and fishing in the river), and pass through, only in the area where they used to live, conduct productive activity, and pass through. Neither side should advance into the other side's area, or should interfere with each other. In the area where no one lived, conducted productive activity, or passed through in the past, neither side should enter now.

The coverage of the above (1) and (2) areas should be defined by the border administrations of the two sides through discussion and negotiation, and should be defined in one decision, saving the need to inform the other side repeatedly in the future. This agreement will be in effect until the border dispute is settled.

II. The two sides agree to avoid armed conflict.

1. The two sides promise that the armed forces of each side, including nuclear forces, will not attack and open fire on the other side.

2. The two sides promise that the planes of each side will not violate the air space of the other side.

3. The two sides promise that the military ships and vessels and other ships and vessels, while navigating in the main channel of a border river, should strictly observe the existing navigation rules, and should not hinder the normal navigation of the ships of the other side and menace the safety of the ships of the other side.

III. The armed forces of the two sides should be separated from direct contact in the border area under dispute.

1. All armed forces of the two sides should withdraw from, or should not enter, all border areas under dispute, so that they will be separated from direct contact.

2. In the areas where the armed forces of the two sides have been separated from direct dispute, if there are existing places of residence, necessary unarmed civil

service personnel may be maintained.

IV. The two sides agree that in case a dispute occurs on the border, the relative agencies of the two sides should follow a spirit of equality and mutual respect to pursue reasonable solution through discussion. If a solution cannot be reached, each side should report to its superior to pursue solution by discussion through diplomatic channels.

V. The two sides agree that the above temporary measures are designed to maintain the status quo of the border and to avoid armed conflict, and that they do not change each side's stand toward the border, as well as toward the sovereignty of the area under dispute.

If you confirm the above temporary measures in writing, I will treat them as the agreement between the governments of China and the Soviet Union. These measures thus will be effective immediately, and should be put into execution.

It is my belief that this agreement, if it can be reached, will contribute to the relaxation of the situation on the border between our two countries, as well as the convening of Sino-Soviet border negotiations.⁶⁴

With Respect
Zhou Enlai
Premier of the State Council
The People's Republic of China

[Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [*Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai*], (Beijing: *The Central Press of Historical Documents*, 1990), pp. 462-464]

Document No. 14

Mao Zedong's Conversation with North Korean Official Choi Yong Kun⁶⁵ (Excerpt), 1 October 1969, at the Tiananmen Gate

Mao Zedong: The relations between our two countries are special, and we should improve our relations. Our aims are identical. During the years of resistance against Japan, the Korean comrades fought against the enemy together with us for a long time. During the war against the Americans, we also fought side by side with the Korean comrades. In the future, it is possible that we will do the same thing again. In opposing Khrushchev's revisionism, we stood together on the same side! Toward the Soviet revisionists, we may not condemn them every day. It does not necessarily work if we condemn them every day. But we will continuously condemn them.... We have been old friends. We both opposed de-Stalinization, and we reached a consensus on this issue a long time ago. Stalin did commit mistakes, I cannot say that he did not commit any mistakes, but basically he was a good person. Stalin made big contributions to the revolution in the Soviet Union and to world revolution. Opposing Stalin was in fact for the purpose of refusing to carry out the Leninist policy line

after the October Revolution.... The United States is happy to see the split between China and the Soviet Union. In the past ten days or so, there has been no fighting along the Chinese-Soviet borders. So long as there is no fighting, we are anxious to see it. We do not want to fight a war.

[Source: *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu*, vol. 3, part 1, p. 522]

Document No. 15

Zhou Enlai's talk at a Meeting of the Chinese Delegation Attending the Sino-Soviet Border Negotiation (Excerpt), 7 October 1969

Zhou Enlai: The governments of China and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement to begin negotiations on the border dispute on October 20.

(Zhou Enlai then announced the composition of the Chinese governmental delegation with Qiao Guanhua⁶⁶ as the head, and Yu Zhan⁶⁷ and Chai Chengwen⁶⁸ as the deputy heads.)

Zhou Enlai: During the meeting of the heads of the two governments on September 11, the two sides agreed that they should not go to war because of the border dispute. I told Kosygin seriously and sincerely that we do not want to fight a war. We even cannot fully take care of our own business now, why should we go to a war? But we will never be scared by war threats, including nuclear war threats. In the statement issued by our government today, we publicly announced this attitude to the whole world. The negotiation can only be carried out smoothly without being placed under any threat. This is also one of the lessons we have learned from the 1964 negotiations. The understandings that were reached at the meeting at the airport were clearly defined and should be put into execution. However, when we followed the procedures that had been agreed upon by the two sides to list the understandings in writing on September 18 to get their confirmation,⁶⁹ in their letter of reply, they only mentioned that they had issued the order to their border forces, without mentioning the mutual understandings that had been reached. Therefore, the number one task for this delegation is to reach an agreement on the temporary measures [to relax the border tension]. Otherwise, it is impossible for the situation to be relaxed.

(Concerning the Soviet government's statement on June 13) We have made it clear during the meeting by the heads of the two governments [on September 11] that we will respond to that statement. But, before beginning the border negotiation, we do not want to let this issue jeopardize the already tense atmosphere. Therefore, together with the Foreign Ministry, we have decided that the statement will be issued as a Foreign Ministry document, rather than a statement by the [Chinese] government. From a diplomatic perspective, this response is not made on an equal level; but from a political perspective, this is more reasonable and advantageous.

(Concerning the leadership of the negotiation delegation) It should be divided into the first, the second, and third lines. Qiao Guanhua and Chai Chengwen belong to the first line Ji Pengfei,⁷⁰ Huang Yongsheng⁷¹ belong to the second line. The third line is the Party's Central Committee.

(Concerning the preparations for the negotiation:) All members of the delegation should put down all other work and be concentrated, and should go all out to prepare for the negotiation. They should first get familiar with the statements of, as well as notes, between the two governments. They should also get familiar with the history and current status of the [Sino-Soviet] border. The temporary measures, which should be solved as the first step in handling the negotiation, are closely related to the whole situation. You are not just negotiating to settle the border dispute; you are negotiating about the relationship between the two countries.⁷²

[Source: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 523-524]

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¹ [Editor's note: See John H. Holdrige, *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p.25. Thanks to William Burr (National Security Archive) for drawing attention to this source.]

² Beqir Balluku was defense minister of the Albanian People's Republic and a Politburo member of the Albanian Labor Party. Later the Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha charged Balluku as a "Chinese spy" and ordered his execution.

³ Liu Shaoqi was the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) second most important leader from 1949 to 1966. Labeled as China's "largest Khrushchev" during the Cultural Revolution, he was purged and died in disgrace in 1969.

⁴ Deng Xiaoping served as Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) general secretary from 1956 to 1966, but was then purged and labeled as China's "second largest Khrushchev" during the Cultural Revolution. However, he reemerged in China's political scene in the 1970s. For a discussion of Deng's purge and his reemergence, see Chen Jian, "Deng Xiaoping, Mao's 'Continuous Revolution,' and the Sino-Soviet Split," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 162-165.

⁵ Hysni Kapo was a member of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat of the Albanian Labor Party.

⁶ During the Cultural Revolution, a process of "seizing the power" by the revolutionaries swept across the country between

early 1967 and late 1968. During this process, the "old" Party and administrative authorities were replaced by new Revolutionary Committees in China's cities and countryside. The composition of the Revolutionary Committee usually adopted a "three-in-one" formula, meaning that it should include representatives of the revolutionary masses, the leading revolutionary cadres, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

⁷ Todor Zhivkov served as first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party from 1954 to 1989.

⁸ Alexander Dubček, first secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in 1968, initiated a wide-ranging program to liberalize and democratize all aspects of communism in Czechoslovakia. This reform effort ended abruptly when Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968.

⁹ Joseph Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia from 1944 until his death in 1980, was famous for his independent stand against Soviet domination.

¹⁰ E. F. Hill, chairman of the Australian Communist Party (Marxism-Leninism) Central Committee (CC), frequently visited China during the Cultural Revolution.

¹¹ Yao Wenyuan was then a member of the Central Cultural Group. He would be elected a member of the CCP Politburo at the Party's Ninth Congress in April 1969. As one of the "Gang of Four" (together with Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's wife), he was arrested in October 1976.

¹² Mao Zedong alluded to the period from 1912 to 1928.

¹³ Zhou Enlai was the premier of the PRC State Council and, then, a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.

¹⁴ Kang Sheng was then a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and an advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group. He had been in charge of the CCP's external liaison affairs, as well as the Party's secret service for many years.

¹⁵ Harold Holt was Australia's prime minister from January 1966 to December 1967. On 17 December 1967, while swimming at Portsea, Victoria, he disappeared and was presumed to have drowned.

¹⁶ John Gorton was Australia's prime minister from December 1967 to March 1971.

¹⁷ Lin Biao was then vice chairman of the CCP CC, defense minister, and Mao Zedong's designated successor. In September 1971, after the failure of an alleged coup attempt aimed at assassinating Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, together with his wife and son, escaped by plane from China. They all died, however, when the plane crashed in Outer Mongolia after failing to make an emergency landing.

¹⁸ China tested its first atomic (fission) bomb in October 1964 and the first hydrogen bomb in May 1967.

¹⁹ Chen Boda was then a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and head of the Cultural Revolution Group. He would be purged by Mao Zedong in 1970 and disappeared from China's political arena.

²⁰ Yang Chengwu, acting PLA chief of staff from early 1966 to March 1968, was purged in March 1968 for alleged involvement in activities against Lin Biao. After Lin Biao's death, he was "rehabilitated" in the 1970s. Mao Zedong here referred to an article, published in Yang Chengwu's name, entitled "Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao and His Great Thought." For an English translation, see *Peking Review*, 10 November 1967, pp. 17-24.

²¹ Yao, Shun, and Da Yu were all legendary figures in pre-dawn Chinese history.

²² King Zhou, an infamous tyrant, was the last king of the Yin

dynasty, which existed in the middle-reach of the Yellow River from around the 17th to 11th centuries BC.

²³ Mao refers to the Chinese civil war between the CCP and the Guomindang in 1946-1949, ending with the CCP's victory.

²⁴ The Northern Expedition occurred in 1926-1927, and the Land Revolution War lasted from 1927 to 1936.

²⁵ On 20 January 1969, Richard M. Nixon delivered his inaugural address, in which he suggested American willingness to develop relations with *all* countries in the world. When *Renmin ribao* and *Hongqi*, both CCP's mouthpieces, planned to publish a commentator's article, entitled "Confession in an Impasse — A Comment on Nixon's Inaugural Address and the Contemptible Applause by the Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique," and sent it to Mao for approval for publication, Mao wrote down these comments. Following Mao's instructions, all major Chinese newspapers published the complete text of Nixon's speech. For Nixon's speech see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 1-4.

²⁶ On 2 March 1969, a bloody armed conflict occurred between Chinese and Soviet border garrison forces on Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island in Russian), a small island located near the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River on the Chinese-Soviet border. According to the Xinhua News Agency: "At 9:17 AM on March 2, large numbers of fully armed soldiers, together with four armored vehicles and cars, dispatched by the Soviet border authorities, flagrantly intruded into the area of Zhenbao Island, which is indisputably China's territory, to carry out blatant provocation against the Chinese border garrisons on normal patrol duty. They first opened cannon and gun fire, killing and wounding many Chinese soldiers. The Chinese border garrisons were compelled to fight back in self-defense when they reached the end of their tolerance. The grave incident was entirely and solely created by the Soviet authorities." (See *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], 3 March 1969). [Editor's note: For the Soviet version of the 2 March 1969 incident as related to the East German leadership, see Christian F. Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 189-90.]

²⁷ On March 15, a second bloody battle occurred between Chinese and Soviet troops on Zhenbao Island.

²⁸ [Editor's Note: For more information on the refusal to receive phone calls from the Soviet side, see Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71," pp. 190-91 (Telegram from GDR Ambassador to PRC to East German Foreign Ministry, 2 April 1969).]

²⁹ Mao Zedong added these sentences to the text of Lin Biao's political report to the CCP's Ninth Congress. Lin Biao's report was published by *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily] on 28 April 1969.

³⁰ Mao Zedong commented on the report: "This is fine."

³¹ Based on a different version of the Chinese original of the speech, Stuart Schram translated the speech into English and included it in his *Chairman Mao Talks to the People* (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 282-289.

³² Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) was one of the leaders of the "international section" within the CCP in the 1930s. Since 1956, he had lived in the Soviet Union and frequently published books and articles criticizing Mao Zedong. He died in Moscow in 1974.

³³ Mao Zedong refers to the new Central Committee elected at the CCP's Ninth National Congress, held from 1 April to 24 April 1969.

³⁴ All of them were members of the CCP's Politburo Standing Committee.

³⁵ The three elements were revolutionary masses, revolutionary cadres, and PLA representatives. Please refer to note 5 for explanations of the "three-in-one" combination.

³⁶ The Sanmin Zhuyi Youth League was the Guomindang's youth organization. Sanmin zhuyi was Sun Yat-sen's political ideology and philosophy, sometimes translated as the "Three Principles of the People."

³⁷ The "cattle pens," unofficial prisons created by the "revolutionary masses" to detain "bad elements," widely existed during the Cultural Revolution, especially between 1966-1969.

³⁸ Wang Xiaoyu was then chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Shandong province and a member of the CCP CC.

³⁹ Yang Dezhi was then vice chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Shandong province, commander of the PLA's Jinan Military Region, and a member of the CCP CC.

⁴⁰ Xu Shiyu commanded the PLA's Nanjing Military Region and served as chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Jiangsu Province. At the Party's Ninth Congress, he was elected a member of the Politburo.

⁴¹ The "Red Headquarters" was a "revolutionary rebel organization" in Jiangsu Province.

⁴² The "August 27th" was another "revolutionary rebel organization" in Jiangsu Province, opposed to the "Red Headquarters."

⁴³ Xie Fuzhi, then chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Beijing City, was elected a member of the Politburo at the CCP's Ninth Congress. He died in 1973 of cancer.

⁴⁴ Pi Dingjun, then vice chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Fujian province, vice commander of the PLA's Fuzhou Military Region, was a member of the CCP CC.

⁴⁵ One *jin* is equal to half kilogram and is composed of sixteen *qian*.

⁴⁶ Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] ruled the Chinese mainland from 1927-1949 as the leader of Nationalist China.

⁴⁷ Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu were all members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. Wang and Guan were arrested in August 1967, and Qi was arrested in February 1968.

⁴⁸ Yu Lijin was political commissar of the Chinese air force until his purge, together with Yang Chengwu and Fu Chongbi, in March 1968. He would be rehabilitated after Lin Biao's death.

⁴⁹ Fu Chongbi was commander of the People's Liberation Army's Beijing garrison headquarters until his purge, together with Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin, in March 1968. He would be rehabilitated after Lin Biao's death.

⁵⁰ Chen Yi was one of China's ten marshals in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1969, he was China's foreign minister and a member of the CCP CC. He had been a member of the CCP Politburo from 1956 to 1969. During the Cultural Revolution, he was repeatedly criticized for his "rightist tendencies and mistakes," and, after summer 1967, his position as China's foreign minister became no more than nominal.

⁵¹ Ye Jianying, a member of the CCP Politburo and vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (which did not have a single meeting between March 1968 and early 1972), was another one of the ten marshals. During the Cultural Revolution, he was also criticized, especially for the leading role he played in challenging the Central Cultural Revolution Group in February 1967, known as the "February Counter Current" (*eryue niliu*).

⁵² Xu Xiangqian, another one of the ten marshals, was then a member of the CCP CC and vice chairman of the CCP Central

Military Commission. During the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, he was appointed the head of the PLA's Cultural Revolution Leading Group, but lost the position in late 1967.

⁵³ Nie Rongzhen, also one of the ten marshals, was then a member of the CCP CC and vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission. He had been in charge of China's national defense industry (including the building of China's A bomb and H bomb) and, during the Cultural Revolution, was the least criticized of the four marshals.

⁵⁴ After the CCP's Ninth Congress in April 1969, Mao Zedong instructed the four marshals to study the international situation together and to present to the Party's central leadership a written report. Zhou Enlai then assigned Xiong Xianghui, one of his long-time top aids, to assist the four marshals in preparing the report. From June 7 to July 10, the four marshals held six meetings for a total of 19 hours. On July 11, they completed this report and presented it to Zhou Enlai. Xiong Xianghui took detailed notes at these meetings. The excerpt of the report translated here is based on the material released in his memoir, "The Prelude to the Opening of Sino-American Relations," *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao* (CCP History Materials), no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 56-96.

⁵⁵ We now know, however, that China dispatched a total of 320,000 engineering and anti-aircraft artillery troops to Vietnam in 1965-1969. For a discussion, see Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," *China Quarterly* 142 (June 1995), pp. 357-386.

⁵⁶ This refers to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.

⁵⁷ The four marshals are probably alluding to Nixon's press conference remark of 14 March 1969. Nixon's reference to "a potential Chinese Communist threat" is cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 246, citing *Presidential Documents*, vol. 5 (March 17, 1969), p. 404. The context for Nixon's statement was the new administration's announcement that it would proceed with an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, which had been justified by the Johnson Administration by the need to be prepared for a potential Chinese danger, and the implication that the Soviets, too, had an interest in containing the Chinese threat: "I would imagine," Nixon said, "that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat." We thank William Burr (National Security Archive) for alerting us to this quotation.

⁵⁸ Sato Eisaku served as Japan's prime minister from 1964 to 1972.

⁵⁹ The CCP CC issued the order on 28 August 1969. The order, primarily intended to bring about a general mobilization in border provinces and regions, especially Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Helongjiang, was also widely carried out in other parts of China. The order thus resulted in a nationwide mobilization in China late in 1969.

⁶⁰ On 23 July 1969, using Shanxi province as a case, the CCP CC ordered that all mass organizations should end "struggle with violent means," that the PLA should take resolute measures to restore order, that transportation and communication systems should be unconditionally restored, that all counter-revolutionaries should be severely punished, and that production should be unconditionally resumed. See *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, vol. 13, pp. 54-55.

⁶¹ Alexei Kosygin was a member of the Soviet Party Politburo and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

⁶² On 11 September 1969, Kosygin, after attending Ho Chi Minh's funeral in Hanoi, made a short stop in Beijing and met with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai at the Beijing airport. The meeting lasted for 3 hours and 40 minutes. According to the Chinese records, the two sides reached four tentative agreements at the meeting: (1) The two sides agree to maintain the status quo of the border; (2) the two sides agree to avoid military conflict on the border; (3) the two sides agree that their military forces should avoid contact in disputed areas; and (4) the two sides agree to let their border authorities consult and negotiate with each in case a dispute emerges. Zhou Enlai and Kosygin also agreed that, after reporting the results of the meeting to the two Party's central leadership, they would confirm these results by exchanging formal letters. (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 510-511.) For Zhou Enlai's letter to Kosygin dated 18 September 1969, see Document 13. [Editor's Note: for English translations of Soviet records pertaining to the meeting see Ostermann, "New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71," pp. 191-193; and *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 197-199.]

⁶³ Richard Nixon made a round-the-world journey in July-August 1969, and spent time in Asia. During a stop in Guam, Nixon announced at a news conference that while in the past Asian nations had received both men and money from the United States to fight communist threats, in the future, to receive American military and financial support, they would have to furnish their own troops. This notion of a new American Asian policy became the "Nixon Doctrine." In China, *Caokao xiaoxi* (Reference news), an internally circulated daily newspaper, immediately reported Nixon's remarks.

⁶⁴ Following his agreement with Kosygin reached at their 11 September 1969 meeting at the Beijing airport, Zhou Enlai wrote the letter to Kosygin with the expectation that he would receive a letter with the same content from Kosygin. However, Kosygin did not reply positively to Zhou because of opposition from other Soviet leaders, especially those from the military.

⁶⁵ Choi Yong Kun was a member of the Presidium of the Political Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and chairman of the supreme People's Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He headed a North Korean party and governmental delegation sent to attend the celebrations for the 20th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. This visit substantially improved Sino-North Korean relations, which reached a low ebb during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, paving the way for Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to lead a high-ranking Chinese Party and Governmental delegation to visit North Korea in April 1970 (the first such visit by Chinese leaders since 1966).

⁶⁶ Qiao Guanhua, China's vice foreign minister, later served as China's foreign minister from 1975 to 1976.

⁶⁷ Yu Zhan headed the Soviet-East European Section of Chinese Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁸ Chai Chengwen headed the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of Defense.

⁶⁹ Please refer to Document 13.

⁷⁰ Ji Pengfei was China's vice foreign minister.

⁷¹ Huang Yongsheng was PLA chief of staff and a member of the CCP Politburo. He was purged and disappeared from China's political scene after Lin Biao's death in September 1971.

⁷² The Sino-Soviet border negotiations began on 20 October 1969, without producing any concrete results. Tensions along Sino-Soviet borders did not relax until the late 1980s.

New Evidence on the Korean War

Editor's note: The documents featured in this section of the Bulletin present new evidence on the allegations that the United States used bacteriological weapons during the Korean War. In the accompanying commentaries, historian Kathryn Weathersby and scientist Milton Leitenberg (University of Maryland) provide analysis, context and interpretation of these documents. Unlike other documents published in the Bulletin, these documents, first obtained and published (in Japanese) by the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun, have not been authenticated by access to the archival originals (or even photocopies thereof). The documents were copied by hand in the Russian Presidential Archive in Moscow, then typed. Though both commentators believe them to be genuine based on textual analysis, questions about the authenticity of the documents, as the commentators note, will remain until the original documents become available in the archives. Copies of the typed transcription (in Russian) have been deposited at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and repository of declassified documents based at George Washington University (Gelman Library, Suite 701; 2130 H St., NW; Washington, DC 20037; tel: 202/994-7000; fax: 202/994-7005) and are accessible to researchers. CWIHP welcomes the discussion of these new findings and encourages the release of the originals and additional materials on the issue from Russian, Chinese, Korean and U.S. archives.

Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea

By Kathryn Weathersby

In January 1998 the Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* published excerpts from a collection of documents purportedly obtained from the Russian Presidential Archive (known formally as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) by its Moscow-based reporter, Yasuo Naito. These remarkable documents provide the first Soviet evidence yet to emerge regarding the longstanding allegations that the United States employed bacteriological weapons during the Korean War. *Sankei Shimbun* subsequently agreed to make the documents available to scholars; a translation of the complete texts is presented below.

The circumstances under which these documents were obtained are unusual. Because the Presidential Archive does not allow researchers to make photocopies, the texts were copied by hand and subsequently re-typed. We therefore do not have such tell-tale signs of authenticity as seals, stamps or signatures that a photocopy can provide. Furthermore, since the documents have not been formally released, we do not have their archival citations. Nor do we know the selection criteria of the person who collected them.

In these regrettable circumstances, how do we evaluate the authenticity of the new evidence? Until the Presidential Archive begins granting access to its important holdings through regular channels rather than through the *ad hoc* arrangements it has used thus far, we must rely on textual analysis and our experience working in other Russian archives. Are the contents of the documents persuasive enough to overcome the skepticism

raised by their irregular provenance? Their style and form do not raise suspicion. The specifics of persons, dates and events are consistent with evidence available from a wide array of other sources.¹ As is apparent from the translations below, their contents are so complex and interwoven that it would have been extremely difficult to forge them. In short, the sources are credible.

They are, however, fragmentary. The contents address—and appear to answer—the key question of the veracity of the allegations, but far more documentation, particularly from China, is needed to give a full account of this massive propaganda campaign. In an accompanying article, Milton Leitenberg discusses the history of the allegations and analyzes the disclosures made in these new sources. This commentary examines the context in which these documents originated, discussing not only what they reveal about the Soviet/Chinese/North Korean campaign falsely to accuse the U.S. of using bacteriological weapons in Korea, but also about the power struggle within the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death, the determination of the new leadership to distance itself from Stalin's foreign policy, and the impact of these developments on Moscow's relations with China and North Korea.

Except for the first brief excerpt from a Mao to Stalin telegram of 21 February 1952 [**Document No. 1**], the context of these documents is the byzantine power struggle within the Soviet leadership in the first months after Stalin's death in March 1953, and the attempt by that leadership to alter those policies of their predecessor which they regarded as most harmful to Soviet and/or their

personal interests. An important part of this succession struggle and policy realignment was the successful effort by Lavrentii P. Beria, the former NKVD head and a possible successor to Stalin, to remove Semen D. Ignatiev, a Khrushchev protégé, from his post as Minister of State Security. Ignatiev was a rival for control of the security services and had also overseen the “Doctor’s Plot,” the deadly new purge Stalin had begun in the weeks before he died. With the entire leadership determined to end the purge so as not to become its victims, Beria was able to arrest M.D. Riumin, the subordinate of Ignatiev who was directly responsible for carrying out the “Doctor’s Plot.” The security chief himself, however, was only removed from his post and then expelled from the party. He was not arrested, presumably because his patron provided sufficient protection. *Pravda* explained on 6 April 1953 that Ignatiev had been removed because of “blindness and gullibility,” relatively mild charges in that environment. After Khrushchev succeeded in arresting Beria in June of that year, he reinstated Ignatiev in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s Central Committee (CPSU CC).

The documents below show that Beria prepared two formal charges against Ignatiev. The second charge has long been assumed—his participation in the Doctor’s Plot. This is the meaning of the Party Control Commission’s claim [Document No. 12] that he was guilty of “gross violations of Soviet legality and the falsification of investigative materials” according to which “Soviet citizens were subjected to groundless arrests and charged with false accusations of committing serious state crimes.” The first charge, however, has not been known. The Commission declared that during his tenure as minister of state security of the USSR he “received a document of special political importance in April 1952” but did not report it to the government, with the result that “the prestige of the Soviet Union, [and of] the camp of peace and democracy suffered real political damage.”

The documents below indicate that the information Ignatiev allegedly concealed from the government was the falsity of the Chinese allegations that the Americans were using bacteriological weapons in the Korean War, claims which formed the basis of a massive international political campaign the Soviet Union had conducted over the previous year. To support his case against Ignatiev, Beria obtained testimony from three Soviet officials who had dealt with this matter while they served in North Korea—two former advisers and the current Soviet ambassador to the DPRK. The statements of these three describe in detail [Documents Nos. 2, 3, 4] remarkable measures taken by the North Koreans and Chinese, with the assistance of Soviet advisers, to create false evidence to corroborate their charges against the United States.

Since it had long been standard operating procedure in the Soviet Union for security services officials to obtain false confessions from an accused person or false incriminating testimony from the associates of the accused, it is possible that these blandly stated accounts of

outrageous activities have as little relation to reality as the countless coerced “confessions” collected during Stalin’s reign. In this case, however, the censure of Ignatiev for allegedly hiding knowledge of the baselessness of the Chinese claims against the U.S. was accompanied by a decision of the entire leadership to cease the campaign on this issue, apparently because of the risk of embarrassment to the Soviet Union should the claims be revealed as fabrications. The Central Committee Presidium ordered the Soviet delegation in the United Nations not “to show interest in discussing this question or even more in ‘fanning the flames’ of this question” [Document No. 6]. It also commissioned Molotov to present within a week a proposal on the position the Soviet government would take on the issue in the future [Document No. 7]. Even more significantly, the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers dispatched an emissary to Beijing and Pyongyang with the harsh message that the Soviet government was now aware that it had been misled regarding the claims that the U.S. was using bacteriological weapons and that it “recommended” that the Chinese and North Korean governments cease their accusations [Documents Nos. 8, 9, 11]. Beijing and Pyongyang followed the Moscow’s instructions; all three states ceased their campaign regarding these allegations in April 1953. The post-Stalin leadership therefore took significant action on the basis that the allegations of American use of bacteriological weapons were false and consequently potentially damaging to the Soviet Union.

While the testimony contained in these documents regarding the fabrication of evidence of bacteriological weapons use are credible, the claim that Ignatiev and V.N. Razuvaev, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, removed from his post for the same alleged offense, kept this information from the Soviet leadership seems disingenuous. Documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (available through normal research procedures) indicate that Soviet officials at many levels, from embassy advisers to Stalin himself, were involved in managing the North Korean propaganda campaign about American use of bacteriological weapons so as to prevent the falsity of the claims from being revealed. For example, in March 1952, the month after the Chinese and North Koreans first made their allegation, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko ordered Korea specialist G.I. Tunkin² and two other officers then serving with him in the Foreign Ministry’s First Far Eastern Department, to inform him immediately about the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1929 [sic] and 1949 regarding investigations of claims alleging violations of rules of warfare. Gromyko’s order was prompted by alarm over U.S. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson’s request to the chairman of the International Committee of the Red Cross that the ICRC investigate the charge that bacteriological weapons were being used in Korea. Gromyko anticipated that the ICRC might soon ask permission from the DPRK to conduct such an

investigation and he therefore needed to prepare a strategy to fend off such a request. Tunkin and his associates informed him that since the Geneva Convention specified that the parties participating in the armed conflict would themselves investigate the facts of any alleged violation of the convention, the DPRK could refuse a proposal from the ICRC to conduct an investigation. It is worth noting that Gromyko's order was issued before Moscow received a request from Pyongyang for assistance in formulating a reply to the ICRC. And it is all but certain that the initiative on such a matter involving the United States came from Vyshinsky or Stalin, not from the deputy foreign minister. The Soviet leadership was concerned enough about the potential ramifications of Acheson's proposal that it began preparing a response even before receiving a request for advice from Pyongyang or Beijing. Tunkin recommended that the Foreign Ministry ask its ambassadors in the PRC and DPRK "what they know regarding the position the Chinese and Korean friends propose to take in connection with Acheson's appeal."³

A month later the highest levels of the Soviet government approved advice to Pyongyang regarding how to avoid a visit by an international team of medical professionals who would be able to report accurately on evidence of the use of bacteriological weapons in Korea. Vyshinsky requested Stalin's approval of an answer drafted by Ambassador Razuvaev for the DPRK to make to U.N. Secretary General Trygvie Lie's proposal that the World Health Organization provide assistance in combating the spread of epidemics in North Korea. Razuvaev explained that Lie had sent telegrams with this proposal to Pyongyang on March 20 and March 29, but "the Korean friends considered it inadvisable to answer these telegrams." However, after the DPRK received a third telegram from Lie on April 6, the North Korean government appealed to Razuvaev for advice regarding whether it should continue to ignore these communications. Razuvaev recommended that the DPRK answer Lie, to which the Soviet Foreign Ministry agreed, but with changes to his proposed text. The draft answer sent for Stalin's approval—with copies to Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin and Khrushchev—stated that the proposal could not be accepted because the World Health Organization did not have proper international authority. Furthermore, apparently as an additional pretext to fend off such a visit, the DPRK should state that "the USA continues to refuse to discuss the use of bacteriological weapons, which are forbidden by the Geneva Protocol of 1925."⁴

Later that month Vyshinsky was again asked to

approve advice to the DPRK regarding statements it should make in relation to the use of bacteriological weapons. Ambassador Razuvaev suggested that the Soviet government recommend to "the Korean friends" that they make a statement about their adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 forbidding the use of bacteriological weapons, since the World Peace Council, a Soviet front organization, had called on all governments to sign, ratify and observe the Geneva Convention. The Foreign Ministry's First Far Eastern Department reported to Vyshinsky that they considered Razuvaev's proposal unacceptable for two reasons. First, for the DPRK to issue such a statement now, after war had been going on in Korea for two years and the DPRK had protested against the use of bacteriological weapons by the Americans, would "give a strange impression and elicit bewilderment." Second, since "social opinion accuses the USA, not the DPRK, of violation of the Protocol" the North Korean position on the question "will remain strong regardless of whether it makes a statement of adherence to the Protocol."⁵

Numerous other records from the Russian archives, including documents published in Issue 6/7 of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, make it clear that the Soviet Union exercised extremely close supervision over the actions of the North Korean government, and that decision-making within the Soviet foreign policy apparatus was very highly centralized. Even minor questions, such as whether the DPRK could temporarily use a Soviet steam shovel located in a Manchurian port,⁶ were decided at the level of foreign minister or deputy foreign minister. It is therefore not credible that Soviet advisers in Korea could have engaged in the falsification of evidence on this important matter without the knowledge and approval of the highest levels of the Soviet government.

Why then did Stalin conduct this risky propaganda campaign? It appears that the initiative for the allegations came from the Chinese. As Milton Leitenberg notes, Japan had used bacteriological weapons in China, the U.S. had shielded the Japanese officers responsible for their development, and epidemic diseases were widespread in Manchuria. Memoir and documentary sources from China cited by Shu Guang Zhang⁷ indicate that, as Mao claimed in **Document No. 9**, the allegations were first made by Chinese commanders in the field. Not wishing to be guilty of a lack of vigilance, particularly after Soviet advisers had warned the Chinese officers that the Americans might use bacteriological, chemical or nuclear weapons in Korea, the field commanders nervously concluded that the

American planes that dominated the skies over North Korea and occasionally overflew Chinese territory were responsible for the outbreak of cholera, plague and other infectious diseases in early 1952. After receiving the reports,

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Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai ordered a laboratory investigation of the evidence and dispatched epidemic prevention teams to Korea. However, they also denounced the United States for engaging in bacteriological warfare, apparently before the laboratory tests were completed. The evidence presented below suggests that once Mao learned that his commanders' reports were inaccurate, he decided to continue the propaganda campaign anyway. Since one of his main reasons for fighting the Americans in Korea was to maintain revolutionary momentum within China, as Chen Jian has persuasively argued,⁸ he was apparently unwilling to forfeit the domestic benefits of charging the United States with using heinous weapons against Chinese soldiers, not to mention the propaganda value internationally. The North Koreans were similarly disposed both to believe the allegations and to find it worthwhile to fabricate evidence, a contradiction that the passions generated by this war could well have sustained.

Stalin's allies thus presented him with an opportunity for a dramatic version of what the Bolsheviks called "agitation and propaganda." The ferocity of the American bombing of North Korea, which elicited considerable international criticism, enhanced this opportunity. As I have discussed elsewhere,⁹ from the fall of 1951 until his death, Stalin encouraged the Chinese and North Koreans to take a hard line in the armistice negotiations in Korea because he concluded that prolonging the war benefitted the Soviet Union. From his point of view, so long as it safely remained a stalemate, the war drained U.S. resources, exacerbated tensions among the Western allies and provided the Soviet Union with an excellent opportunity to gather intelligence on American military technology and organization. To this list should now be added the propaganda value of charging the United States with war crimes.

In this instance, as in so many others, Stalin's reasoning was decidedly shortsighted. Having little understanding of "capitalist" economies, he could not see that the drain on American resources caused by the war was more than offset by the increased military spending it prompted. Similarly, blind to the actual bonds between the Western allies, he exaggerated the tensions the war caused and underestimated the extent to which Soviet actions in Korea solidified the Western alliance, particularly with regard to the controversial issue of rearming (West) Germany. Unaccountable to anyone within his own country, he was unable to perceive that false charges of war crimes could work to the detriment of the accuser.

It is therefore all the more striking that the new leaders in Moscow moved so decisively to distance themselves from Stalin's foreign policy. Not only did they immediately resolve to end the war in Korea,¹⁰ but they also stopped the propaganda campaign of false allegations against the Americans, on the grounds that it damaged Soviet prestige. For the same reason, they renounced the

territorial claims Stalin had made against Turkey in 1945 and restored diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, Greece, and Israel. At the same time, however, they implemented the decision to end the bacteriological warfare allegations in a way that was highly insulting to their Chinese allies. Moscow instructed the Soviet ambassador to Beijing, V.V. Kuznetsov, to inform Mao Zedong in blunt language that the Soviet government and the CPSU CC had been misled: The information the Chinese had supplied about the Americans' use of bacteriological weapons in Korea was false [**Document No. 8**]. According to Kuznetsov's account of his ensuing conversation with Mao, the Chinese leader understandably refused to take responsibility for the false reports, the falsity of which had been well-known to the Soviet government. Instead, he simply said that the claims had been based on reports from Chinese military officers in the field and that the reliability of those reports would again be investigated. During the conversation, Kuznetsov reported, Mao displayed "some nervousness"—"he smoked a lot, crushed cigarettes and drank a lot of tea," though he calmed down by the end of the conversation. Zhou Enlai, moreover, "behaved with intent seriousness and some uneasiness" [**Document No. 9**].

One can only speculate about why the Soviet leadership treated its important Chinese ally in a manner virtually guaranteed to worsen relations between Moscow and Beijing. Perhaps it was just a manifestation of the durability of Stalinist practices, despite the new leadership's desire to improve on their predecessor's record. It may also, however, have been Beria's initiative, as reckless as his reported proposal to abandon "building socialism" in the GDR for the present or his attempt to persuade the Yugoslavs to cooperate in security services.¹¹ If Beria initiated the directive to Kuznetsov (and managed to push it through the Council of Ministers), this could explain why the Chinese did not, so far as we know, include this episode in their later complaints of ill-treatment by Moscow. Since Beria was arrested a little over a month after this conversation, the remaining leadership could claim that while this action was indeed improper, they had taken care of the problem. But why would Beria have wanted to insult Mao? Perhaps, considering himself Stalin's successor, he was attempting to demonstrate to the most powerful of the foreign Communist leaders just who was in charge. In 1938, after Beria was named head of the NKVD, Stalin called him in to his office and brought up the old charge that he had spied against the Bolsheviks in 1919.¹² The Soviet godfather did not intend to remove Beria; he just wanted to make sure the new security chief, always a potentially dangerous person, understood who was in charge. It would have been natural for Stalin's protégé to use comparable methods against Mao. If so, Khrushchev's accusations of dangerous adventurism on Beria's part were even more well-founded than previously known.

How did the DPRK leadership view Moscow's

sudden disavowal of the bacteriological warfare allegations? The message was delivered to Pak Chang-ok, the secretary of the Central Committee of the North Korean Communist Party, because Kim Il Sung was allegedly ill [**Document No. 11**]. We thus do not have a record of Kim Il Sung's response and no other mention of the affair has come to light. We do know, however, that after Stalin's death Kim Il Sung took remarkably insubordinate actions. Beginning in 1956 he purged his government of the "Soviet-Koreans"—Soviet citizens of Korean nationality placed in high positions in North Korea in 1945-46 in order to serve as liaisons between Pyongyang and Moscow. He also developed his own version of Marxist ideology ("juche") emphasizing the importance of national "self-reliance." Kim's assertiveness was particularly striking given his complete subordination to the Soviet Union during Stalin's time. From 1945-53 the Soviet Union created, supported, and closely supervised its client state in Korea. Throughout this process, the role of the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang was key. First Shtykov and then Razuvaev had virtually daily contact with the top Korean leader; it was through the ambassador that Kim dispatched his countless requests and received Moscow's constant "recommendations." What effect must it therefore have had on Kim for Stalin's successors, only weeks after the supreme leader's death, suddenly to remove their ambassador and chief military adviser to North Korea, abruptly stop the enormous and important campaign charging the United States with using bacteriological weapons, blame the Chinese ally for the falsity of the accusations, and claim that the ambassador withheld from the Soviet government information he clearly had long discussed with his superiors in Moscow? Such actions must have signaled to Kim that he would both be capable of and justified in redefining his relations with Moscow.

In conclusion, this new evidence is important not only for finally laying to rest the longstanding allegations—never withdrawn by the Soviet, Chinese or North Korean governments—that the United States used bacteriological weapons in Korea, but also for the light it sheds on the ways in which the distinctive nature of the Soviet regime shaped its foreign policy. The routine, pervasive mendacity that distinguished Soviet deceptiveness from the more episodic variety practiced by other governments, clearly corroded the regime's domestic legitimacy. This evidence suggests that the impact on foreign relations was similar but perhaps more immediate. Renouncing as "bourgeois morality" any standards other than expediency made it difficult for Moscow to offer its allies the predictability and reciprocity they required, despite their shared ideology. With adversaries and neutral nations, the perception that the Soviet regime was not playing by the same rules as other states was an insurmountable barrier to normal relations. Indeed, the Soviet Union's difficulty in maintaining mutually satisfactory relations with any state, with the possible exception of India, is one of the more

striking aspects of the Cold War. These remarkable documents make it clearer why this was the case.

Documents

Translation by Kathryn Weathersby

1. Telegram from Mao Zedong to I.V. Stalin (Filippov) about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in North Korea, 21 February 1952 (Excerpt)

—In the period from 28 January to 17 February 1952 the Americans used bacteriological weapons 8 times, [dropped] from planes and through artillery shells.

—The Americans are equal to Japanese criminals from the 731st detachment: Isii Siro [Lt. Gen. Shiro Ishii], Vakamatsu Iudziro [Lt. Gen. Yujiro Wakamatsu], Kitano Masadzo [Lt. Gen. Kitano Masaji].

2. Explanatory Note from Glukhov, Deputy Chief of the Department of Counterespionage of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Urals Military District and former adviser to the Ministry of Public Security of the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], to L.P. Beria, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers 13 April 1953

In February 1952 the government of the DPRK received information from Beijing that the Americans were using bacteriological weapons in Korea and China and that they [the Chinese] intended to publish their statement about this. At the insistence of the North Korean government, [the] MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the] DPRK decided to publish its own statement first. The Russian text of this statement of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK, which corresponds to the one which the Chinese government put forward, was made by Petukhov, adviser at the Soviet embassy in North Korea.

The Koreans stated that the Americans had supposedly repeatedly exposed several areas of their country to plague and cholera. To prove these facts, the North Koreans, with the assistance of our advisers, created false areas of exposure. In June-July 1952 a delegation of specialists in bacteriology from the World Peace Council arrived in North Korea. Two false areas of exposure were prepared. In connection with this, the Koreans insisted on obtaining cholera bacteria from corpses which they would get from China. During the period of the work of the delegation, which included academician N. Zhukov, who was an agent of the MGB [Ministry of State Security], an unworkable situation was created for them, with the help of our advisers, in order to frighten them and force them to leave. In this connection, under the leadership of Lt. Petrov,

adviser to the Engineering Department of the KPA [Korean People's Army], explosions were set off near the place where the delegation was staying, and while they were in Pyongyang false air raid alarms were sounded.

Glukhov

3. Explanatory Note from Lieutenant of the Medical Service Selivanov, student at the S.M. Kirov Military-Medical Academy and former adviser to the Military-Medical Department of the KPA, to L.P. Beria 14 April 1953

In February 1952 the press published a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK regarding the alleged use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea and China. In the opinion of the North Korean government, this was necessary in order to compromise the Americans in this war. However, to all outward appearances, they seriously believed the information about this that they received from the Chinese. Kim Il Sung even feared that bacteriological weapons would be used regularly.

In March 1952 I gave the reply from Shtemenko [Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces] to the inquiry from the General Staff of the SA [Soviet Army], that there are not and have not been instances of plague or cholera in the PRC, there are no examples of bacteriological weapons, [and] if any are discovered they will be immediately sent to Moscow.

Earlier, already in 1951, I helped Korean doctors compose a statement about the spread by the Americans of smallpox among the population of North Korea.

Before the arrival in Korea of the delegation of jurists, the North Korean representatives were seriously worried that they had not succeeded in creating sites of infection and constantly asked the advisers at MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], the Ministry of Health and the Military-Medical Administration of the KPA—advisers Smirnov, Malov and myself—what to do in such a situation.

At the end of April 1952, I left the DPRK.

Selivanov

4. Explanatory Note from Lt. Gen. V.N. Razuvaev, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK and Chief Military Adviser to the KPA, to L.P. Beria 18 April 1953

In the spring of 1952 the government of China gave the government of the DPRK the text of a statement about the use of bacteriological means of warfare by the Americans. Kim Il Sung and the minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK requested consultation with me, [making the appeal] through Petukhov, the secretary of our embassy.

Publications about this had already appeared in the press, but our advisers and the organs of power of the DPRK, upon checking, had not confirmed these facts. The publications occasionally contained crude reports. For example, they indicated that the Americans were spreading infected ants, [but ants] cannot be carriers of disease since they contain "spirt" [a venom which counteracts disease-causing agents]. I gave Kim Il Sung our conclusions, with statistical proof, and advised him to ask Beijing for explanation. But several days later the North Koreans published a statement. They did this quickly, since the Chinese wanted to publish their own statement. And exactly two days later the statement of Zhou Enlai followed. I was presented with the North Korean statement beforehand. Shtemenko also did not elucidate this matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since he feared revealing reports by technical personnel. Photos were received from the Chinese of anti-epidemiological detachments and of insects they found which the Americans were allegedly spreading in Manchuria. However, such insects exist in Korea but not in China. One commander of the epidemiological detachment of Chinese volunteers showed on a map the zone of infection. This was all of North Korea and Manchuria. At the end of February 1952, Kim Il Sung and his secretary Mun Il declared at the KG KPA that a massive American bombing with bacteriological bombs had been recorded—what is to be done? On 27 February 1952 a meeting was held of the Military Cabinet of the DPRK and a decision was adopted to draft a Military Cabinet resolution about measures for fighting against epidemiological disease on the territory of the DPRK. Later Kim Il Sung and the minister of foreign affairs communicated to me that an international delegation was coming—what is to be done? With the cooperation of Soviet advisers a plan was worked out for action by the Ministry of Health. False plague regions were created, burials of bodies of those who died and their disclosure were organized, measures were taken to receive the plague and cholera bacillus. The adviser of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] DPRK proposed to infect with the cholera and plague bacilli persons sentenced to execution, in order to prepare the corresponding [pharmaceutical] preparations after their death. Before the arrival of the delegation of jurists, materials were sent to Beijing for exhibit. Before the arrival of the second delegation, the minister of health was sent to Beijing for the bacillus. However, they didn't give him anything there, but they gave [it to him] later in Mukden. Moreover, a pure culture of cholera bacillus was received in Pyongyang from bodies of families who died from using poor quality meat.

The second international delegation was in China, it didn't come to the areas of North Korea since the North Korean exhibition was set up in Beijing. In the region the delegation visited landmines [fougasse] had not exploded. By the end of the year propaganda in the press about the American use of bacteriological weapons in Korea and

China increased, since the Chinese received information from American prisoners of war about their participation in spreading bacteriological means of warfare. From 8 to 14 December 1952, a quarantine was established at the Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-Korean borders. From January 1953 on, the publication of materials about the Americans' use of bacteriological weapons ceased in the DPRK. In February 1953 the Chinese again appealed to the Koreans regarding the question of unmasking the Americans in bacteriological war. The Koreans did not accept this proposal.

Moreover, the Chinese also wrote that the Americans were using poison gas in the course of the war. However, my examinations into this question did not give positive results. For example, on 10 April 1953 the general commanding the Eastern Front reported to Kim Il Sung that 10-12 persons were poisoned in a tunnel by an American chemical missile. Our investigation established that these deaths were caused by poisoning from carbonic acid gas [released into] the tunnel, which had no ventilation, after the explosion of an ordinary large caliber shell.

Razuvaev

5. Memorandum from L.P. Beria to G.M. Malenkov and to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], 21 April 1953

In March 1952 before the arrival in Korea of a delegation of the International Association of Democratic Jurists, the Minister of State Security of the USSR, Ignatiev S.D., received a memorandum (to "Denisov") from Glukhov—former adviser of the Ministry of State Security of the DPRK and Smirnov—former adviser of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] DPRK about the fact that with the help of the ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK, Chief Military Adviser to the KPA Razuvaev V.N., two false regions of infection were simulated for the purpose of accusing the Americans of using bacteriological weapons in Korea and China. Two Koreans who had been sentenced to death and were being held in a hut were infected. One of them was later poisoned.

Ignatiev did not report this memorandum, which had special political importance, to anyone. As a result, the Soviet Union suffered real political damage in the international arena. I discovered this document in the archive of the MGB USSR upon receiving the matter at the beginning of April 1953.

I ask your decision regarding [the question of] investigating the circumstances of this question and naming the guilty parties.

Beria

6. Memorandum from V.M. Molotov to Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev), 21 April 1953, with Attached Note from V.N. Razuvaev of 21 April 1953

—On 22 February 1952 the DPRK received an intentionally false statement from the Chinese about the use of bacteriological weapons by the Americans.

—The Koreans were thus presented with a fait accompli and almost simultaneously published in the press their own statement on this question.

—On 22 August 1952 the embassy of the USSR in the DPRK reported to [USSR Foreign Minister Andrei] Vyshinsky that the Chinese presented the Koreans with a fait accompli regarding "the alleged use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea and China" (report "Political and Economic Relations between the Korean People's Democratic Republic and China as of August 1952.")

—Beginning on 27 March 1952 the USA raised the question in the Political Committee and then placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly [the question] "On the dispassionate investigation of accusations of the use of bacteriological weapons by the armed forces of the UN."

—In June 1952 the USA also raised the question of investigating the accusation regarding this in the UN Security Council, and in connection with this refused to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which forbids the use of bacteriological weapons.

—It is proposed (to Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan) to confirm an order to Vyshinsky, sent to the session of the General Assembly of the UN, regarding the question of bacteriological war in Korea, which will recommend that "it is inadvisable to show interest in discussing this question or even more in 'fanning the flames' of this question."

7. Protocol No. 6 of the Meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU about the MVD Note on the Results of the Investigations into the Reports of Former Advisers to the Ministry of State Security and DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, comrades Glukhov and Smirnov, 24 April 1953 (Excerpt)

1. For unauthorized actions of a provocalional character which caused significant damage to the interests of the state, to remove V.N. Razuvaev from the post of Ambassador of the USSR to the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the post of Main Military Adviser, to deprive him of the rank of general and to prosecute him.

2. To commission Comrades Molotov and Bulganin to prepare a proposal about candidates for the post of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK and for the post of military attache.

3. To commission Comrade Molotov:

a) within a week to present a proposal regarding the

future position of the Government of the Soviet Union on the question "On the use of bacteriological weapons by the American troops in Korea;"

b) to prepare the text of a report which will be handed, by workers of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] who will be sent to Beijing and Pyongyang, to Comrades Kuznetsov and Suzdalev so that they can inform Comrades Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung about this matter.

4. To introduce for confirmation by the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee the following proposal of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee:

"In connection with the incorrect and dishonest conduct, revealed by the new circumstances, of the former minister of State Security of the USSR Comrade Ignatiev, of concealing from the government a number of important state documents, to remove S.D. Ignatiev from the membership of the CPSU Central Committee."

5. To commission the Party Control Commission of the CPSU Central Committee to review the question of the party responsibility of S.D. Ignatiev.

8. Resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers about letters to the Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC, V.V. Kuznetsov, and to the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in the DPRK, S.P. Suzdalev, 2 May 1953

For Mao Zedong

"The Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the CPSU were misled. The spread in the press of information about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea was based on false information. The accusations against the Americans were fictitious."

To give recommendations:

To cease publication in the press of materials accusing the Americans of using bacteriological weapons in Korea and China.

To consider it desirable that the Government of the PRC (DPRK) declare in the UN that the resolution of the General Assembly of 23 April about investigating the facts of the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons on the territory of China (Korea) cannot be legal, since it was made without the participation of representatives of the PRC (DPRK). Since there is no use of bacteriological weapons, there is no reason to conduct an investigation.

In a tactical way to recommend that the question of bacteriological warfare in China (Korea) be removed from discussion in international organizations and organs of the UN.

Soviet workers responsible for participation in the fabrication of the so-called "proof" of the use of bacteriological weapons will receive severe punishment.

9. Telegram to V.M. Molotov from Beijing from the Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC, V.V. Kuznetsov, about the Results of a Conversation with Mao Zedong on 12 May 1953 [not dated]

Copies to:

Malenkov	Kaganovich
Khrushchev	Mikoyan
Bulganin	Saburov
Beria	Pervukhin
Molotov	Gromyko
Voroshilov	

In accordance with the resolution confirmed by the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1212 487 of 7 May 1953, the adviser of the embassy of the USSR to the PRC Vas'kov was sent to Beijing and Pyongyang with instructions from the Soviet government.

On 11 May 1953 at 24:00 Kuznetsov and Likhachev were received by Mao Zedong. Zhou Enlai was also present.

After listening to the recommendation of the Soviet government and the CPSU Central Committee about the desirability of curtailing the campaign for unmasking the Americans' use of bacteriological weapons in Korea and China, Mao Zedong said that the campaign was begun on the basis of reports from the command of Chinese volunteers in Korea and in Manchuria. It is difficult to establish now the authenticity of these reports. However, we have studied this question and will return to it once more. If falsification is discovered, then these reports from below should not be believed. In his turn, Mao said that in the struggle against counterrevolution, 650,000 persons were executed in the country, [and] it is true that one should not think that all those killed were guilty. Some number of innocent people apparently suffered.

In the course of the conversation some nervousness was noticed on the part of Mao Zedong, he smoked a lot, crushed cigarettes and drank a lot of tea. Towards the end of the conversation he laughed and joked, and calmed down. Zhou Enlai behaved with intent seriousness and some uneasiness.

Kuznetsov

10. Memorandum from the Chairman of the Party Control Commission of the CPSU CC Shkiriakov to G.M. Malenkov about the Results of the Party Investigation of the Actions of the Former Minister of State Security of the USSR S.D. Ignatiev, in Connection with the Report of Former Advisers to MOB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs of the] DPRK Comrades Glukhov and Smirnov, 17 May 1953

The note from Glukhov and Smirnov stayed with Ignatiev S.D. from 2 April until 3 November 1952. After

this time he passed it to Goglidze and told him that when the declarants [Glukhov and Smirnov] return from Korea he should tell them that they had not written notes on this question. Even after handing over the affair he did not say anything to anyone about it, and the note was discovered by L.P. Beria in the archival materials of the Ministry of State Security. A verification was conducted. In regard to this Ignatiev explained that he was under the impression of the published materials and did not attach any significance to the note. He did not believe in the authenticity of the information contained in it. He said that in July or in August 1952 he was called to Stalin on an official question and showed him this note. It is not possible to verify this. He must suffer political punishment.

Decision of the CPC of CC CPSU [Party Control Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]:

For violation of state discipline and dishonest conduct to exclude Ignatiev S.D. from membership in the CPSU.

(Stricken)

11. Telegram from the USSR Charge d’Affaires in the DPRK, S.P. Suzdalev, to V.M. Molotov 1 June 1953

Copies to:

Malenkov	Kaganovich
Khrushchev	Mikoyan
Bulganin	Saburov
Beria	Pervukhin
Molotov	Gromyko
Voroshilov	

In connection with the illness of Kim Il Sung, I was received by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Korea, Pak Chang-ok. After listening to the recommendation of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU for Kim Il Sung about the desirability of curtailing the campaign for unmasking the Americans’ use of bacteriological weapons in Korea and China, Pak Chang-ok expressed great surprise at the actions and positions of [Soviet ambassador] V.N. Razuvaev. Pak Chang-ok stated the following: “We were convinced that everything was known in Moscow. We thought that setting off this campaign would give great assistance to the cause of the struggle against American imperialism.” In his turn, Pak Chang-ok did not exclude the possibility that the bombs and containers were thrown from Chinese planes, and [that] there were no infections.

At the end of the conversation, Pak Chang-ok expressed gratitude for the information presented and assured [me] that as soon as Kim Il Sung’s health situation improves, he will inform him of the recommendation of the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Suzdalev

12. Decision of the Party Control Commission of the CPSU CC regarding Comrade S.D. Ignatiev, 2 June 1953

Copies to:

Molotov
Khrushchev
Beria

Ignatiev S.D., during his tenure as minister of State Security of the USSR, having received in April 1952 a document of special political importance, did not report it to the government, as a result of which the prestige of the Soviet Union, [and of] the camp of peace and democracy, suffered real political damage.

In elucidating this question, Ignatiev gave false explanations. Moreover, verification of investigative work in the former Ministry of State Security of the USSR established that Ignatiev, being under the thumb of the adventurist and secret enemy of the Soviet people, the former chief of the Investigative Section for specially important matters of the USSR MGB, Riumin, allowed gross violations of Soviet legality and the falsification of investigative materials. According to these materials Soviet citizens were subjected to groundless arrests and charged with false accusations of committing serious state crimes.

Perverted methods of investigation and measures of physical coercion were used against those arrested according to the materials fabricated in this way. Through the files fabricated in the former Ministry of State Security, Ignatiev presented to governing organs knowingly false information.

For deception of the party and government, gross violations of Soviet legality, state discipline and dishonest conduct to exclude S.D. Ignatiev from membership in the CPSU.

Molotov—for
Khrushchev—for
Beria—for

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Dr. Kathryn Weathersby, an independent scholar based in Washington, D.C., has published widely on the history of the Korean War. She has edited and translated numerous Russian documents for past issues of the Bulletin. Her publications include a forthcoming article “Stalin, Mao and the End of the War in Korea,” in Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Cold War International History Project Book Series No. 1; Stanford UP/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

¹ E.g. Amy Knight, *Beria, Stalin’s First Lieutenant* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1993); William Stueck *The Korean*

War, An International History (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1995); Shu Guang Zhang *Mao's Military Romanticism, China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (University of Kansas Press, 1995) as well as files this author has read from the Foreign Ministry and Presidential Archive, some of which have been published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 ("New Russian Documents on the Korean War").

²As political officer of the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, Tunkin played a key role in Moscow's Korea policy prior to the war.

³Memorandum to A. Gromyko from G.I.Tunkin, V.Bazykin and A. Shugaev, 13 March 1952. AVPRF, Fond 0102, Opis 8, Delo 17, Papka 36, List 27.

⁴Memorandum from Vyshinsky to Stalin, with attached draft answers, 12 April 1952. AVPRF Fond 07, Opis 25, Delo 233, Papka 19, Listy 1-14.

⁵S.Golunsky and G.Tunkin to Vyshinsky, 26 April 1952. AVPRF, F. 07, Op. 27, D. 226, Pap. 46, L. 3-4.

⁶In November 1949 the DPRK's request that the Soviet Union temporarily transfer to a Korean port two steam shovels located in the Manchurian port of Dalny was handled by deputy foreign minister Gromyko. AVPRF, F. 0102, Op. 5, D. 39, Inv.

326, Pap. 13, L. 1-4, 6-7.

⁷Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, 181-187. In an interview on August 26 Zhang added to his published account the information that Soviet advisers had warned Chinese commanders to be prepared for US use of weapons of mass destruction.

⁸Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War, The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

⁹Kathryn Weathersby, "Stalin, Mao and the End of the Korean War," in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 90-116.

¹⁰For the text of the decision of the Council of Ministers to reach a negotiated settlement in Korea, adopted 19 March 1953, see Issue No. 6/7 of the *Bulletin*, pp. 80-82.

¹¹For a discussion of Beria's foreign policy initiatives after Stalin's death see Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 171-190.

¹²Knight, *Beria*, p. 92.

New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis

"For Mao Zedong

The Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the CPSU were misled. The spread in the press of information about the use by the Americans of bacteriological weapons in Korea was based on false information. The accusations against the Americans were fictitious."

-Resolution of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR about letters to the Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC, V.V. Kuznetsov, and to the Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in the DPRK, S.P. Suzdalev, 2 May 1953.

By Milton Leitenberg

The major allegation of the use of biological weapons—one of the three categories of weapons of mass destruction, along with nuclear and chemical weapons—in the Cold War was made during the Korean War against the United States. In 1951 and again in 1952, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and the Soviet Union charged that the United States had used a wide range of biological warfare (BW) agents, bacterial and viral pathogens and insect vectors of disease, against China and North Korea. They alleged the use of BW agents against humans, plants, and animals. The charges were organized into a worldwide campaign and pressed at the United Nations; it was scarcely a matter simply of "the spread of press information..." US government officials denied the charges, but it has never before been possible to establish definitively whether the charges were true or false.

In January 1998, however, a reporter for the Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* published findings from twelve documents from former Soviet archives that

provide explicit and detailed evidence that the charges were contrived and fraudulent.¹ One document (a fragment of it) is dated 21 February 1952, while the remaining eleven date from 13 April to 2 June 1953, in the four months following Stalin's death on 5 March 1953. While it is clear that the twelve documents are far from a complete history of the events, they nevertheless describe, at least in part, how the allegations were contrived by Chinese officials and Soviet advisors, and identify several of the individuals involved in the process. This paper provides a brief history of the allegations and a summary of the documents' major disclosures.

The Charges

On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Chinese military forces—the "Chinese People's Volunteers" (CPV)—crossed the Yalu River and entered combat beginning in October 1950. In the spring of 1951, Chinese media repeatedly stated that the United States was using chemical weapons ("poison gas") against Chinese

forces. (Communist media had already claimed that the US had shipped mustard gas to Korea.) At the same time, China also carried on what can be considered a preparatory campaign to the major allegations that followed, charging that the United States was preparing to use biological weapons. (These two campaigns will both be discussed in more detail below.) The first charge filed of actual BW use came on 8 May 1951. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) sent a cable to the President of the United Nations Security Council alleging the use of bacteriological weapons by US forces in Korea during the period of December 1950 to January 1951 and that the United States had spread smallpox. After several weeks, the issue then essentially lapsed until early 1952.

On 22 February 1952, Bak Hun Yung, North Korea's Foreign Minister, again issued an official statement addressed to the UN Secretariat alleging that Washington had conducted biological warfare. (It was apparently forwarded to the UN only on 29 March 1952.) It charged that the US had carried out air drops of infected insects of several kinds bearing plague, cholera and other diseases over North Korean territory on January 28 and 29, and February 11, 13, 15, 16, and 17. Two days later, on February 24, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, publicly supported the North Korean charges. On March 8, Zhou Enlai enlarged the accusations against the United States by charging that the U.S. had sent 448 aircraft on no less than 68 occasions between February 29 and March 5 into Northeast China to airdrop germ-carrying insects. The human diseases alleged to have been spread included plague, anthrax, cholera, encephalitis and a form of meningitis. Zhou Enlai also alleged that Washington had spread animal and plant diseases—fowl septicemia, and eleven incidents involving four different plant diseases—using 18 different species of insects and arachnids (spiders and ticks), as well as some small rodents as the vectors. He identified infected clams, paper packets, cloth receptacles as well as various kinds of earthenware and metallic sectioned “leaflet bombs” as dispersion media.²

The Chinese and North Korean governments attempted to buttress their allegations through the use of two “international commissions” of their own selection which operated under highly constrained procedures. In September 1951, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers decided to send a commission to Korea to investigate various “violations of international law.” The commission visited North Korea between 5 March and 19 March 1952, immediately after the main BW accusations were made, and then went to China for the following weeks. It issued two reports in Beijing on 31 March and 2 April 1952: *Report on U.S. Crimes in Korea*, which contained a major emphasis on allegations of chemical weapons use as well as bacterial weapons, and *Report on the Use of Bacterial Weapons in Chinese Territory By the Armed Forces of the United States*.³ These reports seem rather clearly intended as a formal war

crimes indictment. The second report charged violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Genocide Convention of 1948, concluding:

We consider that the facts reported above constitute an act of aggression committed by the United States, an act of genocide, and a particularly odious crime against humanity. It indeed hangs over the whole world as an extremely grave menace, the limits and consequences of which cannot be foreseen.

On 7 April 1952, the Chinese government's own investigating commission issued a report with an even more explicit war crimes accusation:

The U.S. Government, in carrying out savage and vile aggression against the People's Republic of China, has committed not only the crime of aggression but also crimes against humanity and crimes in violation of international conventions and laws and the laws and customs of war... We demand that those responsible in the U.S. Government and the U.S. Armed Forces and the degenerate elements in American scientific circles be branded as war criminals to be tried by the people throughout the world and severely punished.

That same Chinese government commission was reported as having begun its studies on 15 March 1952, and it was presumed to have been the group which gathered the “evidence,” the materials and testimony displayed to the second international group convened by the Communist-oriented World Peace Council, the “International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China,” referred to as the ISC. The Chinese representative to the World Peace Council

...declared that the governments of China and [North] Korea did not consider the International Red Cross Committee sufficiently free from political influence to be capable of instituting an unbiased enquiry in the field. This objection was later extended to the World Health Organization, as a specialized agency of the United Nations.

The ISC was chaired by Dr. Joseph Needham, a well-known British biochemist who had headed the British Scientific Mission in China from 1942 to 1946. In that period, he had served as an advisor to the (Nationalist) Chinese Army Medical Administration, and had participated in an investigation of Japanese use of BW in China during World War II. Needham was also an avowed Marxist. After visiting North Korea and China from 23 June to 31 August 1952, the ISC also produced a *Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China*, published in Beijing in 1952. The massive volume contained 669 pages with extensive

background information on entomology, vectors, pathogens, epidemiology, and so forth, little of which the Commission would have been likely to have been able to draw up themselves given their location and the amount of time available. The ISC report documents fewer incidents, and fewer types of incidents, than were reported by the jurists, which in turn were fewer than reported by Chinese media statements.

The “investigations” of both commissions were very similar. They did *no* field investigations or analyses of their own. They received testimony which they duly accepted and reported as fact. They had no independent corroboration of any of the artifacts and materials presented to them.⁴ These elements were explicitly brought out in some of the early discussions which followed the release of the *Report of the ISC*. The Swedish representative on the Commission

...told the press in September 1952, after returning from China: “The scientific foundation of the Commission’s work consisted of the fact that the delegates implicitly believed the Chinese and North Korean accusations and evidence.” Dr. Needham himself was asked at a press conference what proof he had that the samples of plague bacillus he was shown actually came, as the Chinese said, from an unusual swarm of voles, and he replied, as reported in the *Daily Herald*: “None. We accepted the word of the Chinese scientists. It is possible to maintain that the whole thing was a kind of patriotic conspiracy. I prefer to believe the Chinese were not acting parts...”⁵

During the Korean War, units of the CPV and the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) routinely suffered from typhus, cholera, and dysentery. In addition, en route to North Korea, the CPV forces had transited Manchuria, an area with endemic plague at the time. United Nations forces, as well as Koreans and Chinese combatants, also suffered from Korean Hemorrhagic Fever. In the late winter of 1950 and the early spring of 1951, smallpox and typhus were reported throughout Korea, north and south. The UN command responded with mass inoculations and heavy applications of DDT to individuals, and DDT aerial spraying to the countryside at large. In the north, thousands of Chinese health care workers were dispatched to the area behind the front lines, and Hungarian and East German volunteer hospital units were also sent to Korea. What subsequently became known as Korean Hemorrhagic Fever had not been known in Korea before, but it was endemic in areas in Manchuria through which CPV forces had passed, and in which those North Korean contingents that had been parts of the PLA before 1949 and formed the shock troops of the North Korean invasion force had been stationed. It was precisely in a strip in central Korea in which these North Korean troops had been engaged in combat and which was subsequently reoccupied by UN forces that Korean Hemorrhagic Fever then remained endemic.

On no occasion did the Chinese or North Korean governments claim to have shot down a US aircraft containing the means of delivery of biological agents or the agents themselves, despite an eventual Chinese claim of 955 sorties by 175 groups of US aircraft over Northeast China to drop BW between 29 February and 31 March 1952 alone. As for Korea, the Chinese claimed that the US had spread BW over “70 cities and counties of Korea...on 804 occasions, according to incomplete statistics.” The Chinese did obtain the confessions of some 25 captured US pilots. Many of the confessions included voluminous detail about the alleged delivery of BW: the kinds of bombs and other containers dropped, the types of insects, the diseases they carried, and so forth. Interspersed with the enormous technical detail was a great deal of Communist rhetoric identical to that which appeared in the standard Chinese press reports at the time, with references to “imperialists” and “capitalistic Wall Street war monger[s],” etc., which led nearly all observers to doubt that any of the confessions had been written by those supposedly testifying to them. All the confessions were renounced when the US airmen returned to the United States. Prisoners who had been ground troops “admitted” to the ISC that they had delivered BW by artillery—“epidemic germ shells”—in Korea.

The Historical Context of the Chinese and North Korean BW Allegations

There are several important pieces of historical background that are highly relevant to the Korean War BW charges which must be recounted, as they form a chain leading up to the allegations. The first of these is that Japan carried out a substantial biological warfare program within China during World War II. It consisted of an extensive series of BW research facilities throughout occupied Chinese territory, as well as the operational use of BW in China. The most well-known portion of the Japanese program was Unit 731, based in Manchuria and commanded by Gen. Shiro Ishii.⁶ However, there were three additional BW organizations, Unit 100, Unit Ei 1644, and one more, each acting independently and each under its own commanding officers. Most of the senior military officers and officials of these units made their way back to Japan in the final days of the war in the Pacific. Their most senior officers were subsequently interrogated in Japan by US military intelligence, and a crucial and extremely unfortunate decision was made which may have done much to enhance the credibility of the subsequent Korean War BW allegations: The US government granted immunity to Gen. Ishii, all of his subordinates, and members of the other Japanese BW units in exchange for the technical information obtained by the Japanese in the course of their wartime BW R&D program.⁷ Even before the Korean War began, Chinese media carried stories recounting Japanese BW in World War II and accusing the US and Japan of preparing for biological warfare. These charges usually were included

in protests against the “remilitarization” of Japan.

The second important point is that as they occupied portions of Manchuria, Soviet military forces captured some members of Unit 731. After requesting that the US turn over additional senior officials from that organization and being denied, the USSR tried twelve former members of Unit 731 in a war crimes trial in December 1949 in the city of Khabarovsk. The USSR then requested that the United States release Gen. Ishii, together with Emperor Hirohito, to be put on trial as well, a request that the US government also rejected. At the time of the trial, on two occasions Gen. MacArthur’s command falsely denied any knowledge of Japanese BW operations in China during the war. In reporting on the Khabarovsk trial, *Pravda* stated that the United States was “preparing for new crimes against humanity,” i.e., bacteriological warfare.⁸ In the spring of 1950, before the outbreak of the war in Korea, there followed a series of Soviet media reports charging that the US was preparing for “bacteriological warfare.” The proceedings of the trial were published in English.⁹ The evidence obtained from those put on trial provided Soviet (and Chinese) officials with detailed technical descriptions of the BW delivery systems and methods that the Japanese had developed in China during the war. Three years later, these were precisely the methods that they alleged the United States to have used during the Korean War. The opening substantive chapter of the 1952 ISC Report is titled, “The Relevance of Japanese Bacterial Warfare in World War II.”

The third link in the chain is that in the first five months of 1951, the Chinese press and radio made repeated references to Gen. Ishii and the Japanese wartime BW programs, the Khabarovsk trial, Gen. Ishii’s subsequent employment by the United States, and the claim that the United States was preparing to use BW in the Korean War:¹⁰

- On 9 January 1951, that MacArthur and his command had protected Japanese war criminals, particularly Ishii, and employed him and his colleagues;
- On 7 March 1951, that Ishii had been hired by the American government “to supervise the manufacture of germ warfare weapons in America;”
- On 22 March 1951, that “MacArthur is now engaged in large-scale production of bacteriological weapons for use against the Korean Army and people,” and specifying the amount of money that MacArthur’s headquarters had allegedly spent for their bacteria growth media;
- On 30 April 1951, that “the American forces are using Chinese People’s Volunteers as guinea pigs for their bacteriological experiments,” and identifying a site near Kyoto where the BW agents were allegedly being produced. (The Kyoto site was a Japanese vaccine production facility that had survived World War II; during the Korean War, the United States did

in fact purchase Japanese-made vaccines for public-health use in South Korea.) In the North Korean government’s charges, the United States was also accused of using KPA and CPV prisoners of war for bacteriological warfare experimentation on “Kochzheko” island in collaboration with Japanese “bacteriological warfare criminals” (United Nations Security Council document S/2684; the reference is presumably to Koje Island).

This sequence culminated in the 8 May 1951 statement by the North Korean Foreign Minister that the United States was spreading smallpox in North Korea. There were further Chinese statements on May 19, May 24, and May 25, saying that the United States was “preparing to use germ warfare,” and repeating in particular the charges that the US used POWs (in this case Korean) for BW “laboratory tests” and as “guinea pigs.” After one last statement on 22 June 1951, the Chinese campaign ended, although some North Korean statements continued into July, and then they too ceased.

The last of these aspects is that concurrent with the above propaganda campaign in the spring of 1951, the Chinese government also initiated a campaign between 5 March and 13 May 1951 charging the United States with using poison gas in the Korean War.¹¹ In addition to a series of media reports, this included an “Appeal” by Dr. Li Teh-Chuan, the director of the Red Cross Society of China, to the Executive Committee of the International League of Red Cross Societies meeting on 14 March 1951, formally accusing the United States of having used both bacterial weapons and poison gas:

After suffering repeated defeats in Korea . . . the American invaders have ignored world opinion and have openly violated international law by using poison gas on the Korean front . . . In the name of the Red Cross Society of China, I firmly protest to American authorities and all 100 million members of the Red Cross Societies in 68 countries throughout the world to raise their voices for justice and to take action to prevent the atrocity of using poison gas by the American imperialists in their war of aggression in Korea.¹²

The Chinese alleged the use of “poison gas artillery shells” in addition to presumed delivery by aircraft, and announced that “poisonous shells have been collected and photographed.” Radio Moscow and the New China News Agency reported that “Lt. Love Moss of the 24th Division, artillery, had admitted that the US was using gas.” The only gas mentioned by name in the charges was chlorine gas. Chlorine is the least useful for military purposes as it is rarely lethal at the concentrations that can be achieved on the battlefield.

It was already noted that the charge of having used chemical weapons was stressed in the “Report on U.S. Crimes in Korea,” produced by the International

Association of Democratic Lawyers. This report, however, states that chemical weapon use took place between 6 May 1951 and 9 January 1952. However, the Chinese campaign first began charging the US with CW use on *March 5*, and did so on ten occasions before 6 May 1951. In February 1952, the Soviet delegate to the UN, Jacob Malik, also accused the US of using chemical weapons in Korea. Chinese charges of US use of chemical weapons continued sporadically until May 1953. However, when the report of the second group, the International Scientific Commission, appeared only six months after the jurists' report, it did not contain any mention of alleged uses of chemical weapons. It also contained no mention whatsoever of alleged use of Chinese or Korean POWs for BW experiments.

There was never much question that there was no validity to the 1951 charges of chemical weapons use, and they were not repeated during the period of the major BW allegations in 1952. Those in the West who professed to believe the BW allegations into the 1960s and 1970s never mentioned the early accompanying allegations of chemical weapon use.

Two final points remain to be noted. In the late spring and early summer of 1950, just prior to the start of the war in Korea, there was also a campaign of allegations that the United States was dropping Colorado beetles in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, and Czechoslovakia in order to destroy their potato crops, "starve" their people, and induce the "economic collapse" of the countries. As biological warfare includes the use of disease agents or vectors that affect man, animals or crops, this too was a charge of the use of biological weapons. East German authorities released a report submitted on 15 June 1950, by Paul Merker, State Secretary in the GDR Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, alleging that US aircraft had dropped Colorado potato beetles from May to June of 1950. No evidence was offered, but it was stated that the beetles had been found under the routes taken by US aircraft. Eastern European media printed photographs of "potato bug containers" allegedly attached to parachutes and balloons. In May 1951, the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture charged that "Western imperialists this year again are spreading the Colorado beetle in our fields, this time as far east as Slovakia." And in May 1952, Moscow claimed that one of the pilots from whom a confession had been obtained in Korea had also admitted to dropping Colorado beetles over East Germany in 1950. In the years that followed, Polish and GDR school children were regularly sent on excursions to Baltic beaches to search for the beetles.

In 1950, the USSR and the East European Communist parties also launched the Stockholm Appeal (or Stockholm Peace Petition) which demanded the "unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression." The Appeal, which also linked nuclear weapons with the two other categories of weapons of mass destruction—biological and chemical weapons—obtained

millions of signatures in Western Europe as well as in other parts of the world. During the 1952 campaign an "Appeal Against Bacteriological Warfare" modeled on it was issued on April 1.

Neither the People's Republic of China nor North Korea belonged to the United Nations. It therefore fell to the USSR to press the allegations in the UN, and it seems evident that it was the USSR that arranged for the international protests through Communist parties, the World Peace Council, and other front organizations. There also seems to have been substantial media coordination between the USSR and China, as well as coordination of a more instrumental sort.¹³ The propaganda campaign also combined with others going on concurrently: In early 1951, the Director of the USSR's Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute had launched a domestic "Hate the Americans" (or "Hate America") campaign, and the 22 February 1952 announcement of the BW allegations followed a day after the celebration of an "international day of the fight against colonialism." In the four weeks between mid-March and mid-April 1952, the Soviet press devoted one-quarter of its coverage to the BW allegations. In China, in roughly the same period, newspaper treatment of germ warfare was more extensive than that previously devoted to the entire Korean War. Notably, the U.S.-Japanese peace treaty was due for ratification on 28 April 1952.

U.S. Denials and U.N. Disputes

The first official US denial came on 4 March 1952, in response to the February 22 accusations by the North Korean Foreign Minister. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson said, "I would . . . like to state categorically and unequivocally that these charges are entirely false; the UN forces have not used, are not using, any sort of bacteriological warfare."¹⁴ Acheson repeated the denials on March 26 and on other occasions. General Matthew Ridgeway, Commander of the UN forces in Korea, denied the charges by mid-March, adding, "These charges are evidently designed to conceal the Communists' inability to cope with the spread of epidemics which occur annually throughout China and North Korea and to care properly for the many victims."¹⁵ And in an address to the US Congress on 22 May 1952, Ridgeway stated that "no element of the United Nations Command has employed either germ or gas warfare in any form at any time."¹⁶ UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie also denied the allegations. On 14 March 1953, after Soviet representative to the UN Malik introduced the bacterial warfare charges into the work of the UN Disarmament Commission, the US delegate, Benjamin Cohen, repeated the American denials. When the Soviet delegation distributed the "confessions" of captured US pilots in the UN General Assembly's First Committee, Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted a denial (on 25 March 1953), as did the commanding officers of the Marine Air Wings to which the pilots had belonged.¹⁷

Of equal importance to the official US denials is the

fact that relevant US policy at the time was promulgated in NSC 62, approved on 17 February 1950, prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. NSC 62 stated that “[c]hemical, biological and radiological weapons will not be used by the United States except in retaliation.”¹⁸ In NSC 147 (“Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea”) on 2 April 1953, the exact same sentence appears under the caption, “At present the following restrictions apply to UN operations.”¹⁹ The policy was only changed on 15 March 1956, long after the end of the Korea War, in NSC 5062/1. The relevant provision in effect permitted US first use:

To the extent that the military effectiveness of the armed forces will be enhanced by their use, the United States will be prepared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.²⁰

As others have noted, this represented a dramatic reversal. There was still a caveat in the phrase “in general war,” but US military operations in Vietnam made use of both herbicides and tear gases.²¹

The second portion of the US government’s response to the allegations was as important as the denials, or even more so. It was to request immediately in the United Nations an on-site investigation by a competent international organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or the World Health Organization (WHO). In his very first statement on March 4, Acheson asked the accusing nations to permit an investigation by the ICRC. Exactly one week later, Acheson sent a request directly to the ICRC, asking them to conduct an investigation in the areas involved. During World War II, China had appealed to the ICRC to investigate its charges that Japan was employing BW in China, and in 1952 the Red Cross societies of virtually all the Soviet-bloc states had sent direct appeals to the ICRC asking it to “take action against the US atrocities.” Within 24 hours, on March 12, the ICRC had applied to China and North Korea to obtain their necessary cooperation. The government of India offered to assist in an investigation, and the ICRC proposed to send a small team composed of three Swiss members, two Indians, and a Pakistani. The ICRC sent the same message again on March 28 and on March 31, and finally, for the last time, on April 10, adding that if they received no reply by April 20, they would consider their proposal to have been rejected. On April 30, the ICRC explicitly terminated its effort.²² Neither China nor North Korea ever replied directly to the ICRC. The only reply in a UN forum came on March 26, from Soviet delegate Malik, rejecting the ICRC offer. China did respond in New China News Agency broadcasts in March and April, by heaping invective on the ICRC:

The Committee’s actions brand it as a most vicious and shameless accomplice and lackey of American imperialism. The purpose behind its eagerness to

investigate is obviously to find out the effectiveness of the American aggressors’ unparalleled, brutal crime and to try to whitewash the perpetrators of the crime with a worthless report.²³

China charged that the only purpose of an ICRC or WHO investigation would be the collection of intelligence to be used in evaluating the effectiveness of germ warfare. (But the ICRC was still acceptable as a propaganda platform: on 27 July 1952, Chinese delegates at an ICRC meeting in Canada put forward a motion against “the cruelties in Korea.”) China and North Korea also rejected a proposal by the WHO to send assistance into epidemic areas.

In July 1952, the US took the issue of an ICRC investigation to the UN Security Council. It submitted a draft resolution calling for the ICRC to carry out an investigation and to report to the UN.²⁴ The Security Council vote was ten in favor and one—the Soviet veto—against. The US then submitted a second draft resolution which stated that “the Security Council would conclude, from the refusal of the governments and authorities making the charges to permit impartial investigation, that these charges must be presumed to be without substance and false; and would condemn the practice of fabricating and disseminating such false charges.” The vote was nine in favor, one abstention, and again, a Soviet veto. There was also extensive debate in the UN General Assembly and in the UN Disarmament Commissions in 1952 and 1953, with various governments proffering their opinions.²⁵ In some cases, e.g. Australia, governments submitted the documentation in the ISC report to teams of their own scientists and in all cases, they reported that such assessments came to the conclusion that BW had not been used—or even that, based on the evidence, the charges appeared to these observers to be ludicrous.

Throughout the UN debate in 1952 and 1953 dealing with the BW allegations, the USSR kept pressing the point that the United States had never ratified the Geneva Protocol (which prohibits the use of biological weapons and which the US did not ratify until 1975), and repeatedly called on the US to do so. The US pushed one last attempt at the UN to obtain an investigation: On 8 April 1953, the Political Committee of the UN approved a US proposal to institute a commission of investigation. The vote was 52 in favor, 5 against, and 3 abstentions. A day earlier, the USSR had suddenly and unexpectedly offered to withdraw its allegations of bacteriological warfare “as proof of its sincere striving for peace,” on the condition that the United States withdraw its proposal that the United Nations launch an investigation into the allegations.²⁶ Senior US officials apparently viewed the startling Soviet about-face as merely part of a “whole ‘be pleasant’ campaign” that the USSR was pursuing following Stalin’s death the previous month.²⁷ On April 23, the UN General Assembly accepted the US proposal by a vote of 51 for, 5 against and 4 abstaining. On July 28, the President of the General Assembly of the UN

reported that the commission was unable to accomplish its task, due to the refusal of assistance from the PRC and North Korea.

Moscow's Subsequent Positions

Despite the evidence in the newly-discovered documents that Soviet officials have understood at least since 1953 that the BW allegations were fraudulent, neither Soviet officials *nor Russian* ones have to this day ever stated that the Korean War BW allegations were false. In fact, in 1982 and 1983 the Soviet press continued to repeat the charges that the United States had used biological weapons during the Korean War.²⁸ In many other instances as well, the USSR utilized false allegations against the United States of preparations to use or the use of biological warfare. These were alleged in numerous separate, smaller incidents involving almost every continent on the globe until 1986-1987.²⁹

There were, however, scattered apparent admissions by omission, or indirection. When the report of the UN Secretary General on chemical and biological weapons was published in 1969, it carried the following statement: "Since the Second World War . . . there is no military experience of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents as weapons of war."³⁰ The UN report was a unanimous document signed by the representatives of fourteen governments, including the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Without specifically referring to the Korean War BW allegations, the sentence implicitly admitted that no such events had ever occurred.³¹ However, virtually no one drew attention to those few relevant lines or noticed their implications, except for a few specialists.

Two years earlier, in 1967, the Soviet Military Publishing House had printed a technical manual used in the training of its armed forces, *Bacteriological Weapons and How to Defend Against Them*. It contained a historical review of BW which had no reference at all to Korea. In the manual the Japanese use of BW in China during World War II in China is followed directly by a description of the use of defoliants by the United States in the war in Vietnam.³² A more popular Soviet history of World War II published in 1985 also followed this pattern.³³ Perhaps most significant of all in this group, in 1988 Gen. E. I. Smirnov, a Soviet era Minister of Health who was for many years also directly involved with the USSR's biological weapons program, published a book entitled *Wars and Epidemics*. It makes no mention whatsoever of the Korean War BW allegations, and the only entry in the book on Korea discusses the affliction of UN forces by Korean Hemorrhagic Fever.³⁴

Depending on how one interprets the single line, there is a slight possibility that in one instance Chinese officials also considered indicating the same thing by indirection. In September 1984, when China suggested that it might sign the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention, a Chinese government spokesman noted that "China *once*

was the victim of bacteriological and toxin warfare." (Emphasis added.) Press accounts at the time understood this to be a reference to the Japanese use of biological weapons in China during World War II. *If* that interpretation were correct, it functionally omitted the charge of alleged US use of BW during the Korean War.³⁵ For the most part, however, China and North Korea have maintained the Korean War BW allegations until the present day, repeating the charges in numerous publications. There was no official change upon the death of Mao Zedong, or at the peak of closer relations with the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Many others printed repetitions of the standard Korean War BW charges.

Chinese Sources

In 1989 and 1992, Chinese authorities published two documents dealing with the Korean War BW allegations, one by Nie Rongzhen, head of the Central Staff Department of the PLA, and a reply by Mao Zedong to a related message sent by Nie ten days earlier. Additional material was also contained in a Chinese history of the Korean War published in 1988, as well as in the memoirs of several senior Chinese military commanders of the CPV forces.³⁶ These refer to and quote from the materials mentioned above as well as other documents. Finally, the materials were discussed in 1994 and 1996 in monographs by two Chinese-born historians currently teaching in the United States.³⁷

On 28 January 1952, CPV headquarters reported that enemy aircraft had spread smallpox virus, and further reports followed in February. Chen Jian describes this January 28 CPV report as "the first time" that US forces were reported to be using biological weapons in Korea.³⁸ On February 18, Nie Rongzhen sent a message to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai:

Other than sending [bacteriological] specialists [to Korea], for further investigations, we have asked [the CPV headquarters] to send back to Beijing all insect vectors found [in the battlefield] for laboratory tests so as to verify exactly what disease germs these insects carry. Laboratory tests won't be ready for two days, but our specialists estimate the four disease germs such as cholera, typhoid, the plague and scarlet fever are the most likely . . . The first priority would be to strengthen epidemic prevention and treatment [for the CPV]. . . . we must ask the Soviet Union to help us out with their bacteriological specialists and materials.³⁹

Zhang states that Nie had already ordered the health division of the PLA General Logistical Department to make preparations. This is three days before date of the first Soviet document obtained, the fragment of a message from Mao Zedong to Stalin on February 21.

The first of the two (officially) published Chinese documents is Mao's reply on 19 February 1952, in which

Mao instructed Zhou Enlai in a single line to “pay attention to this matter and take necessary measures to deal with it.”⁴⁰

Some time during this period, Zhou Enlai outlined to Mao Zedong six urgent measures of anti-bacteriological warfare:

1. Speeding up the laboratory tests of the insect vectors sent back from the front . . . so as to identify all these disease germs.
2. Dispatching epidemic prevention groups [to Korea] immediately along with vaccine, powder, and other equipment.
3. Issuing a public statement to the world to denounce U.S. bacteriological warfare as war crimes and use news media to pressure the United States to be responsible for the consequences of its biological warfare.
4. Instructing the National Association of Resisting America and Aiding Korea to lodge complaints with the Convention of World Peace and request that the convention launch a campaign against U.S. bacteriological warfare.
5. Sending a cable to the CPV headquarters to request that [the rank and file] be mobilized for epidemic prevention and meanwhile ordering the Northeastern Military Command to get prepared [for possible spread of disease germs in the Northeast] as well.
6. Sending a telegram to the Soviet government asking for its assistance.⁴¹

On February 28, Nie sent another message to Mao and Zhou, which is the second of the two officially published Chinese documents. It stated that the United States was “still introducing insect bacteria” over “the 38th and 50th Group Armies. . . . we have mobilized 44 Chinese scientific experts—11 entomologists, 15 bacteriologists, 6 epidemiologists, 4 toxicologists, 7 pathologists and a nutritionist,”—and that they would leave by air the next day, February 29, for the front lines.⁴²

Three points can be noted. This is all nearly a year after the “short” campaign in the spring of 1951 which had alleged that the U.S. was using BW. Second, if internal Chinese sources claim to show that CPV forces reported U.S. BW use “for the first time” in January 1952, then the spring 1951 allegations must be fraudulent. Finally, a few days between Nie Rongzhen’s cable to Mao on February 18 and Mao’s cable to Stalin on February 21 seems much too brief a period of time to have allowed for planning and laying the groundwork for the allegations; even the period from January 28 to February 20 or 21 seems insufficient time for that. Zhou’s memorandum was presumably written well after disease had become a serious problem for CPV forces.

Previously available sources had identified China’s own “investigative commission” chaired by Li Teh-chuan,

director of the China Red Cross, but had claimed that it had not been called into existence prior to March 12 by the China Peace Committee, with an adjunct staff of 25 in addition to the aforementioned experts, and that it had only left for Manchuria and North Korea on March 19.⁴³ By then, the Democratic Lawyers group had already been in North Korea for two weeks. However, Nie Rongzhen’s message makes it clear that the experts group must have been organized well in advance of the date of his message on February 28, and that they left for North Korea well before the lawyers group arrived there on March 4. Presumably not by coincidence, the report of the lawyers group listed the allegations of BW use taking place in North Korea as beginning on 28 January 1952, and continuing through March 4, the day of their arrival in North Korea. In public statements, Chinese authorities alleged that BW began over Chinese territory, in Manchuria, not earlier than February 29, which is apparently also contradicted by Nie Rongzhen’s message.

A book on the Korean War authored in 1988 by Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings includes a photograph of an audience of the International Scientific Commission with Mao Zedong in Beijing in the summer of 1952. The photograph’s caption states that “Mao greeted the delegates [sic] with two sallies: ‘Don’t make too much of all this! They’ve tried using biochemical warfare, but it hasn’t been too successful,’ and ‘What are all these uninfected insects they are dropping.’”⁴⁴ Mao’s first statement was apt, because although Chinese authorities eventually claimed that US aircraft had made nearly a thousand airdrops of BW agents and vectors over China, the two commissions were told that the number of people allegedly sickened through such an enormous effort was quite trivial. The second statement is incredible: the reports of both commissions, the official Chinese charges to international agencies, the massive propaganda campaign, etc., *all* claimed that the insects *were* infected with pathogens. Mao’s remarks would have effectively aborted any real “scientific” commission and sent them home.

Several Decades of Analysis and Guesswork

In 1952, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie ridiculed the BW allegations. Dr. Brock Chisholm, who at the time was the head of the World Health Organization, but who had been involved in the World War II joint UK-US-Canadian BW R&D program, stated that if BW had been waged, it would have been quickly known since millions of people would have died.⁴⁵ Theodor Rosebury, a major figure in the US wartime BW R&D program, who had authored two books on the subject in 1947 and in 1949, wrote in 1960 in commenting on the ISC report that he could not tell “[w]hether it be read as a work of imaginative fiction, or a study in abnormal epidemiology, and in the latter event whether its conclusions [can] be accepted in any degree or not.”⁴⁶

The RAND report by A.M. Halpern was published in

April 1952, very early and virtually in the midst of the major BW allegations, but it is an extremely detailed account of their evolution. Its major conclusion as to motive was that “The timing and content of the poison gas and BW campaigns suggest that they were initiated in response to specific situations and carried out with attention to objectives of a tactical rather than a strategic nature.”⁴⁷ Halpern judged these tactical objectives to be primarily leverage in the Korean War truce talks. A report of the US State Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research was also published quite early, on 16 June 1952, but saw somewhat larger motives for the allegations:

The threefold nature of the bacteriological warfare charges—atrocities, international law and disarmament—and their sponsorship on a world scale by the World Peace Council, reflect their value to Moscow as a new propaganda theme. Each year, the self-styled “peace” movement has made some issue the basis for a world-wide campaign: in 1950 it was the Stockholm Appeal, in 1951 the Five Power Peace Pact.⁴⁸

In 1957, Maarten Schneider, in the Netherlands, also came to the conclusion that the allegations were purely propaganda; in other words, a fabrication.⁴⁹

Aside from the two commissions, both organized by international Communist support organizations, there were two principal Western supporters of the BW allegations. Both men had long associations with China, where they had spent much of their lives, including the World War II years, and were very sympathetic to China. Dr. James Endicott, a Canadian minister, was born in China, the son of a missionary, and had himself been a missionary in that country from 1925 until the late 1940s. He was the Chairman of the Canadian Peace Commission and went to China in 1952 at the invitation of the Chinese government to attest to the allegations in the same manner as the two commissions had. He was the only person to claim that the US had carried out BW aerosol spraying, allegedly for a period of three weeks, on the basis of information provided to him by Chinese officials. His son, Stephen Endicott, a historian, has continued his father’s defense of the allegations.⁵⁰

The second individual, John W. Powell, was also born in China. His father had founded *The China Weekly Review* (CWR) in the 1920s. Powell spent the World War II years in China, and in 1945, at age 25, became the editor and publisher of the CWR. The paper’s position during the Korean War was that South Korea had invaded North Korea. Powell remained in China until June 1953, when he returned to the United States.⁵¹

In 1971, the first major academic study of the allegations was published in the set of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute volumes on chemical and biological warfare. In that context, the purpose of the analysis was “not . . . to try to reach a

conclusion one way or another, but to recount the history . . . and to illustrate the very difficult problems of verifying allegations of use” of BW.⁵² It therefore focused entirely on an examination of the two commission reports, their mode of operation and their descriptions of “evidence.” The result was to state that one could draw *no* conclusions at all from the materials presented in either report—and therefore certainly not the one both commissions had chosen—because neither group had any independent knowledge of the provenance of what was shown or told to them. They had simply accepted everything on faith—or more accurately speaking, according to their political preferences. Cookson and Nottingham, in a briefer examination, had used a somewhat similar method of analysis and wrote, “as to whether BW was or was not used, it is impossible to say definitively. The present writer’s opinion is that it was not,” and “[t]he whole thing has been written off almost unanimously as Communist propaganda.”⁵³

But it was simply too difficult for many people to accept exactly what that meant. When a Dutch Marxist wrote a paper in 1977 essentially summarizing and reiterating all the material in the two commission reports and accepting their conclusions entirely, he too noted that “[t]he mainstream of Western public opinion has up to now considered the Sino-Korean claims as mere propaganda,” but then added: “However, few commentators have gone through the pains of formulating what this means.” He did then outline in a few brief lines what that would mean, operationally, but could not accept the implications.⁵⁴ Halliday and Cumings in their 1988 book on the Korean War found themselves in the same dilemma:

If one is to believe the Western case, it is also necessary to take it through to its logical conclusion, which is that the North Koreans and the Chinese mounted a spectacular piece of fraudulent theatre, involving the mobilization of thousands (probably tens of thousands) of people in China and Korea; getting scores of Chinese doctors and scientists and myriad lesser personnel, as well as Zhou Enlai and other senior Chinese figures, to fake evidence, lie and invent at least one extremely *recherché* medical fraud. Needham himself acknowledged at the time that “a patriotic conspiracy”—that is, a gigantic fraud—was a possibility.⁵⁵

However, in later private communications in 1979 and 1986, Needham maintained his initial position that the United States had used BW in Korea; in 1986 he wrote that “everything that has been published in the last few years has shaken the very 3 percent of doubt which I had before and has instead abolished it. So now I am 100 percent sure.”⁵⁶ Halliday and Cumings concluded that “[a]s the evidence stands, the issue is open.” In a much longer chapter on the Korean War BW allegations in their 1989 book on Unit 731, Williams and Wallace also

accepted the validity of the allegations.⁵⁷

Three additional serious analyses appeared, in 1984, 1989, and 1992. The first was published by a US military historian, Charles Cowdrey. Cowdrey did not believe that the US had used BW, but he interpreted the purpose of the allegations in a different way. He mentioned the international and negotiating utilities of the allegations, but he emphasized the public-health requirements of the war in the rear areas adjacent to the battlefield, both in North Korea and in China, with:

thousands of soldiers marched out to collect insects. For days, police shepherded civilians on similar hunts. Germ warfare charges apparently proved themselves in practice as a way of getting things done. . . . Internally . . . the germ warfare appeals served a practical purpose in a mass campaign of preventive medicine aimed at forestalling any recurrence of the conditions of 1951.⁵⁸

Cowdrey felt that the primary purpose of the allegations had been domestic, to mobilize the Chinese population in a large-scale anti-epidemic public health campaign. It was an argument that senior US government officials had made in 1952 in denying the BW allegations.

In 1989, Mark Ryan included a section on the BW and CW allegations in a book on China's anticipation of nuclear weapon use by the United States during the Korean War. Ryan's main concern was to consider whether the Chinese charges were an indirect way of deterring the US from using nuclear weapons in that conflict. This argument had been summarily proposed in 1957 and in 1962 by Henry Kissinger and Alice L. Hsieh. In 1957, Kissinger wrote:

The Communist skill in psychological matters is also demonstrated by the Chinese Communist charge during the Korean War that we were engaging in bacteriological warfare. This was probably a device to keep us from using atomic weapons or from bombing Chinese territory.⁵⁹

In 1962, Hsieh again argued essentially the same motive, acknowledging the hypothesis to A.M. Halpern:

In 1952, Chinese Communist references to the atom bomb were incidental to the propaganda campaign against bacteriological warfare, thus suggesting that this campaign was designed to inhibit even further any possible American plan for use of the atom bomb, to allay domestic anxiety with respect to the bomb, and to maintain the spirit of resistance.⁶⁰

Ryan was convinced that Chinese military officials took the BW charges "seriously," although he notes regarding the CW allegations that "at no point did this alleged chemical weapons use become the subject of a high visibility, coordinated media campaign, as in the case of biological weapons." Ryan too was perplexed by the

operational implications of the allegations being false:

...if the BW charges were concocted by the Chinese from start to finish, it would seem at first appearance to represent a conspiratorial project of enormous proportions, involving the coordinated preparation and submission of knowingly false physical evidence and testimony from hundreds of Chinese scientists and technicians. Particularly problematical is how the teams of scores of prominent Chinese experts in pathology, entomology, zoology, epidemiology, etc. (most of whom had received their education and training in leading European and American universities) sent to Korea and north China to document and battle BW could have been led or induced to fabricate the many and detailed reports and statements they produced. Even if this had been done, why have not any of the individuals involved ever subsequently disclosed, either purposefully or inadvertently, aspects of such a fabricated campaign? Also, if the charges were falsely concocted, it seems to imply an additional conscious deception (mainly in the form of planting evidence, securing depositions, etc.) of thousands of more ordinary soldiers, farmers, and townspeople, and then continued efforts to deceive hundreds of foreign travelers, delegations, and correspondents who visited the affected areas and viewed the collected evidence and depositions.⁶¹

Ryan then put forth the following conclusion:

It seems that the Chinese BW campaign, regardless of whether it was totally or partially fabricated or whether it sprang from a reaction to real or imaginary phenomena, must be considered a success, or even a masterstroke, in the realm of international politics and psychology. Given the nature of the weapons, the problem of the proof or disproof of allegations, and the not unreasonable grounds for suspicion of actual or imminent US use of BW, the campaign was both a direct and practical means to help forestall or terminate any experimental use of BW, and a way to reinforce international condemnation of these and other weapons of mass destruction.⁶²

The most recent analysis was written by a historian, John Ellis van Courtland Moon. Like Ryan, he made extensive use of declassified US documents dealing with the state of preparedness and executive-level decision-making on the utilization of chemical or biological weapons by the United States after 1945, but came to markedly different conclusions. Moon was absolutely convinced that the United States had not used BW in the Korean War. Moon emphasized the denials by senior US officials, the US requests for an investigation of the charges by the ICRC or WHO, and the fact that NSC 62, the policy statement that the United States would not use chemical, biological or radiological weapons except in retaliation, was in effect from 17 February 1950 until 15 March 1956 when it was superseded by NSC 1562/1.

Moon also noted, however, that:

[l]ike all allegations, they have never been completely exorcised; doubts persist to today. . . . What this case reveals . . . is that allegations live on. . . . Once an allegation is made, it is impossible to disprove it completely, since the nature of the weapon makes it almost invisible. If it is difficult to prove that it has been used, it is impossible to prove that it has not been used. Doubt is never totally exorcised.⁶³

The Soviet Documents

Twelve Soviet-era documents (or excerpts from them) on the BW controversy have become available. The first, dated 21 February 1952, appears to be no more than a fragment. All the rest date from 13 April 1953 to 2 June 1953, in the months following Stalin's death. Obviously all the rest—decisions and communications relating to the BW allegations between 21 February 1952 (or earlier) and April 1953—is still missing. It is also evident that other relevant documents dating from late April are missing from the available material.

The first document (21 February 1952), a message from Mao to Stalin, states that the US has used BW, delivered by aircraft and artillery.

The second document (13 April 1953) is a memo to Lavrenti Beria from Glukhov of the MVD, formerly a Soviet advisor to the DPRK Ministry of Public Security. It states that the Chinese government informed the North Korean government in February 1952 that the US was using BW in Korea and in China, and that China would publicize this. The North Koreans insisted on being the first to make a statement, and “the North Koreans, with the assistance of our advisors, created false areas of exposure.” In advance of the ISC's arrival, “[t]wo false areas of exposure were prepared.” Cholera bacteria were obtained from corpses in China. So that the ISC delegation would not remain on site overly long, “an unworkable situation was created for them in order to frighten them and force them to leave.” This was achieved by Soviet advisors with the KPA setting off explosions near the location of the ISC.

The third document (14 April 1953) is a memo to Beria from Lt. Selivanov, an advisor to the Military-Medical Department of the Korean People's Army until April 1952. He informs Beria that he had been the one to help North Korean medical personnel to compose the statement in 1951 alleging that the US had spread smallpox. He says that the North Koreans felt that the BW allegations were necessary to compromise the Americans, and that they had asked three Soviet advisors, Smirnov, Malov, and himself, to help in “creating sites of infection,” which they feared they had not succeeded in doing before the arrival of the lawyer's commission. (No mention is made of the Chinese “Commission” which should be present in North Korea at this time.) Selivanov also reports that he responded in March 1952 to a query from Gen. Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed

Forces, and from the Soviet General Staff, that he reported that there have been no outbreaks of plague and cholera in China, *no* examples of bacteriological weapons, and that if any were found, they would be sent to Moscow immediately.

The fourth document (18 April 1953) is a memo to Beria from Lt. Gen. Razuvaev, the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK and Chief Soviet Military Advisor to the KPA. Razuvaev claims that when the North Korean government consulted him about the BW allegation information they had received from China, Soviet advisors had been unable to confirm the information and that he informed Kim Il-Sung of this, but nevertheless the North Koreans and Chinese went ahead with their public statements. He says that General Shtemenko did not inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry of the information that he received. Despite Razuvaev's skepticism about the Chinese material, the North Koreans pressed him for advice, and with the cooperation of Soviet advisers a plan was worked out for action by the Ministry of Health. False plague regions were created, burials of bodies of those who died and their disclosure were organized, measures were taken to receive the plague and cholera bacillus. The adviser of the DPRK MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] proposed to infect with the cholera and plague bacilli persons sentenced to execution.

Further details are provided as to what was done in advance of the arrival of the commission of jurists and the ISC. Razuvaev also adds that a Soviet investigation of Chinese allegations that the US was using poison gas disproved the charges.

The fifth document (21 April 1953) is a memo from Beria to Malenkov and to the CPSU CC Presidium. It states that Smirnov and Glukhov had reported in March 1952 to USSR Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev “that with the help of General . . . Razuvaev two false regions of infection were simulated for the purpose of accusing the Americans of using bacteriological weapons in Korea and China,” and that “Ignatiev did not report this memorandum, which had special political importance, to anyone. As a result, the Soviet Union suffered real political damage in the international arena. I discovered this document in the archive of the MGB USSR...at the beginning of April 1953.”

The sixth document (21 April 1953) is from V. Molotov to the CPSU CC Presidium and is identifiably incomplete. It begins with the opening line: “[On] 22 February 1952, the DPRK received an intentionally false statement from the Chinese about the use of bacteriological weapons by the Americans.” It further suggests that the Soviet embassy in North Korea may have informed Vyshinsky that the BW allegations were not true. Molotov proposes that the Central Committee direct Vyshinsky, now in late April 1953, that “it is inadvisable to show interest in discussing this question or even more in ‘fanning the flames’ of this question” at the ongoing session of the UN General Assembly. (This is, however,

after the USSR had already offered to withdraw their BW allegations in the UN Political Committee on 7 April 1953, a date that *preceeds* any of the documents in this latter group.)

The seventh document (2 May 1953) is the message to Mao Zedong, brusquely informing the Chinese leader that the USSR and CPSU had been “misled” (implicitly by the Chinese themselves) about the “false” and “fictitious” charges of BW use that had been lodged against the Americans, and recommending that the international anti-American campaign on the subject be immediately dropped.

The eighth document (undated, but subsequent to reports by Glukhov and Smirnov indicated as having been given on April 24) is a protocol of the CPSU CC Presidium, recommending that “for unauthorized actions of a provocatory character which caused significant damage to the interests of the state,” Gen. Razuvaev be relieved of his ambassadorship, stripped of rank, and prosecuted; Ignatiev to be dropped from the CPSU CC and investigated; the USSR to draft its subsequent position on the allegations of BW use by the US, and to prepare a report on the subject to be sent to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung.

The ninth document is a telegram to Molotov reporting on the conversation of the Soviet ambassador in Beijing with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on 12 May 1953. Mao blames the allegations on reports from Chinese front line commanders in Korea, whose authenticity it would now be difficult to verify, and says that “[i]f falsification is discovered, then these reports from below should not be believed.” (The suggestion that the elaborate preparations and falsification—a BW “Potemkin village”—the extraordinary media campaign, the international commissions, etc. could have been organized “from below” in *either* the China or the USSR governed by Mao and by Stalin is highly implausible.)

The tenth document (17 May 1953) concerns the CPSU’s internal investigations of Ignatiev. Ignatiev claims that he showed the message from Glukhov and Smirnov to Stalin in July or August 1952, and that since he believed “the published material,” he did not believe the information contained in their message and “did not attach any significance” to it.

The eleventh document (1 June 1953) is the telegram to Molotov from the Soviet ambassador in North Korea on the discussions with the Secretary of the DPRK Central Committee, Pak Chang-ok, who “expressed great surprise at the actions and positions of V.N. Razuvaev. . . . We were convinced that everything was known in Moscow. We thought that setting off this campaign would give great assistance to the cause of the struggle against American imperialism. In his turn, Pak Chang-ok did not exclude the possibility that the bombs and containers were thrown from Chinese planes, and [that] there were no infections.”

The twelfth document (2 June 1953) indicts Ignatiev, the former Minister of State Security of the USSR.

What Remains to be Disclosed?

A great deal still remains to be revealed, including:

1. All of the Chinese documentation, which would demonstrate just how the entire affair was decided upon, organized, and carried out.

2. The Soviet documentation between 21 February 1952 and 13 April 1953, and even before the February 21 cable from Mao to Stalin. These documents would establish exactly whose idea the false allegations were—the USSR’s or China’s—and provide a more detailed understanding of the nature and degree of the technical assistance that Soviet advisers contributed to the entire process.

The available documents imply a Chinese and then North Korean initiative, with Soviet personnel as collaborators. This should remain an open question until it is possible to understand the operations of the USSR Ministry of State Security at the time, its collaboration with analogous Chinese government organs, their elaboration of “active measures” and so forth. It is clear that there is a chain in the allegations that even preceded the onset of the Korean War, although the decision to charge the U.S. with using BW could only have been made in the context of the war. The all-important question is the degree of consultation and cooperation in the area of propaganda between the USSR and China in the period not covered by the documents—between February 1952 and April 1953, and while Stalin was alive.

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¹Yasuro Naito, “The Use of Bacteriological Weapons by US Forces During the Korean War Was Fabrication by China and Korea: Uncovered by Classified Documents of the Former Soviet Union” [in Japanese], *Sankei Shimbun*, 8 January 1998; translation in *FBIS-EAS-98-011* (11 January 1998). The Japanese newspaper printed additional excerpts from seven documents which FBIS did not translate.

²These charges and the events related to them were summarized in two separate sections of the six volume study, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell and New York: Humanities Press) in 1971:

—Milton Leitenberg, “Allegations of the Biological Warfare in China and Korea: 1951-1952,” pp. 238-258, appendix 4, vol. 5, *The Prevention of CBW*; and

—Jozef Goldblat, “Allegations of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons in Korea and China,” pp. 196-223, vol. 4, *CB Disarmament Negotiations, 1920-1970*.

³“Letter From the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, President of the Security Council, Dated 30 June 1952; Annexes I, II and III, International

Association of Democratic Lawyers,” United Nations Security Council, S/2684/Add. 1, 30 June 1952.

⁴The reports of the two commissions are analyzed in detail in Leitenberg, “Allegations of the Biological Warfare in China and Korea: 1951-1952.”

⁵G.P. Thompson, Letter to the Editor, “Germ Warfare,” *New Statesman and Nation*, 5 December 1953. In a 1984 interview with a Japanese academic, Needham said: “Of course, it is entirely true that the members of the Commission never actually saw any incident. What we did see were specimens of the containers that had been used and of the vectors as well as victims of the attacks. I must say that I did not gain the impression that the methods being used were very successful. . . . My judgement was never based on anything which the downed airmen had said, but rather entirely on the circumstantial evidence.” Quoted in Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731: The Japanese Army’s Secret of Secrets* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), p. 255. Despite Needham’s statement, the confessions of the US pilots comprise 117 pages of the 667 page ISC report, 18 percent of the total.

⁶Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-Up* (London: Routledge, 1994). See also Williams and Wallace, *Unit 731: The Japanese Army’s Secret of Secrets*.

⁷In addition to Harris’s book, see two shorter accounts that stress in particular Washington’s postwar role in covering up Japan’s BW program in China and obtaining its research results:

—John W. Powell, “A Hidden Chapter in History,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 37:8 (October 1981), pp. 44-52, and

—John W. Powell, “Japan’s Germ Warfare: The US Cover-Up of a War Crime,” *Bulletin of the Concerned Asian Scholars* 12:4 (October-December 1980), pp. 2-17.

The decision by US intelligence agencies was also one that made very little sense—or none whatsoever. The information derived from the Japanese program, particularly on human pathology, which was the only aspect otherwise unavailable, was of *no* use to the US BW program. The joint US-UK-Canadian World War II BW R&D program had already taken a different path, and it was that path on which the postwar US BW program continued. Powell was a fervent and persistent believer in the Chinese and North Korean BW allegations, and the logic of his position required him to assume great benefit to the US BW R&D effort for having protected Ishii and his collaborators. That was not the case, but it was something that Powell’s argumentation could never comprehend.

⁸“Russians Accuse US of Ready to Start Germ War,” Associated Press dispatch, Moscow, 29 December 1949.

⁹*Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950).

¹⁰The best summary of the Chinese charges in the spring of 1951, as well as of the simultaneous campaign that charged the United States with using chemical weapons in the Korean War, appears in A.M. Halpern, “Bacteriological Warfare Accusations in Two Asian Communist Propaganda Campaigns,” RAND RM-796, 25 April 1952.

¹¹The dates of the statements charging the US with chemical warfare were March 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, April 7, and May 13. See Halpern, “Bacteriological Warfare Accusations,” pp. 1-7.

¹²Quoted in Halpern, “Bacteriological Warfare Accusations,” pp. 6-7.

¹³A report prepared by the U.S. Department of State in June 1952 stated, “[i]n the beginning of May, . . . the Soviet representatives in Korea reprimanded in severe terms the north Koreans and Chinese Communists for failing to produce a better propaganda case on bacteriological warfare. This occurred after the north Koreans and Chinese communists were unable to produce enough ‘evidence’ for the international jurists commission ‘investigating’ the charges. Reportedly, all the north Koreans and Chinese did was to conduct the standard tours of bombed areas in Pyongyang and give the jurists the standard propaganda photos of women and children killed in air raids. As as a consequence of the Soviet reprimand, a conference was called of the interested parties in Sop’o. At that time the Russians instructed the north Koreans and Chinese Communists to provide propaganda material for meetings of the national ‘peace councils’ scheduled during the summer of this year.” Communist Bacteriological Warfare Propaganda, OIR/CPI Special Paper no. 4, 16 June 1952, Unclassified.

¹⁴“Statement by Secretary Dean Acheson, March 4, 1952,” *Department of State Bulletin* (DoSB), 26:664 (1952), pp. 427-428.

¹⁵Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, “Report of the U.N. Command Operations in Korea: Forty-first Report, For the Period March 1-15, 1952,” *DoSB* 26:679 (1952), p. 1040.

¹⁶Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, “A Report on the Far East,” *DoSB* 26:676 (1952), p. 926.

¹⁷In noting official U.S. denials of the charges, the historian should address the issue of relevant American covert operations during the Korean War. There were unquestionably covert, “black,” operations during the Korean War as there have been in every other war, and it is important to attempt to establish that none of these might have involved BW. In the early 1980s, an American reporter was told by former US military service personnel that a “Joint Technical Advisory Group” had been stationed at Atsugi Air Force Base until some time in 1951 or 1952, and that Gen. Ishii had been affiliated with it in some way. After the signing of the US-Japanese Peace Treaty, the group had allegedly been moved to Okinawa and renamed the “US Army Composite Services Group,” and in some way operated together with the US Central Intelligence Agency. These informants stated that the work of this unit was in some way related to BW, and possibly in relation to plant diseases. (Communications to another by William Triplett, 1989.) A series of Freedom of Information Act declassification requests failed to yield any information whatsoever about the above. Two small items marginally relevant to the Korean War BW story, however, can be explained. US covert operations were mounted behind Chinese and North Korean lines to obtain prisoners in order to ascertain what diseases they were suffering from. The motive for these operations was reportedly to be able to mount preventive measures against the respective diseases for US and other UN forces. These operations were known to the Chinese and used as part of the “proof” of the allegations: Beijing claimed that the US had mounted the operations to determine the efficacy of their BW efforts. There was also large-scale aerial pesticide spraying over the positions of UN combat forces to suppress disease vectors. Although herbicides ready for use were not approved for use by the President during the Korean War, there was apparently experimental defoliation of small tracts in Korea in 1951-1952. See William M. Leary, chap. 8, “The Korean War,” and chap. 9, “Covert Operations,” *Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 113-153; Ed Evanhoe,

Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Arthur W. Galston, "Science and Social Responsibility: A Case Study," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 196:4 (1972), pp. 223-35; and Arthur W. Galston, personal communication to author.

¹⁸U.S. Department of State, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. 15, *Korea*, part I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 844.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Quoted in John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, "Biological Warfare Allegations: The Korean War Case," *The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security*, R.A. Zilinskas, ed., *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 666 (1992): 53-83.1992, p. 69.

²¹See *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, vol. 1: *The Rise of CB Weapons*, (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1971), esp. pp. 162 and 210; vol. 2: *CB Weapons Today* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1973); *The Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam: Part A: Summary and Conclusions* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1974); Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress (1st Session), ed., *Report: 1st Session, 8 August 1969* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969); J.B. Nieland et al., *Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Vietnam and Cambodia* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

²²"Le Comité International de la Croix Rouge et le Conflit de Corée," *Recueil de Documents*, vol. II: January 1-June 30, 1952 (Geneva: ICRC, 1952), pp. 84-109.

²³Quoted in Moon, "Biological Warfare Allegations," p. 69.

²⁴The resolution "requested the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the aid of such scientists of international reputation and such other experts as it may select, to investigate the charges and to report the results to the Security Council as soon as possible; called upon all governments and authorities concerned to accord to the International Committee of the Red Cross full cooperation, including the right of entry to, and free movement in, such areas as the Committee may deem necessary in the performance of its task; requested the Secretary-General to furnish the Committee with such assistance and facilities as it might require." Goldblatt "Allegations of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons in Korea and China," p. 214.

²⁵These are summarized in some detail in the Goldblatt, "Allegations of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons in Korea and China."

²⁶Maarten Schneider, "Bacteria As Propaganda Weapon," *International Spectator* (Netherlands Institute of International Affairs), 8 May 1957.

²⁷Mose Harvey, "Briefing on Soviet Developments Following the Death of Stalin (April 24, 1953)," p. 459, in US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1952-56*, vol. 14 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980).

²⁸Novosti Press Agency and *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 13 September 1982 and 12 February 1983.

²⁹Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons, International Sanctions, and Proliferation," *Asian Perspective* 21:3 (Winter 1997), pp. 7-39, especially pp. 23-27; Milton Leitenberg, "The Desirability of International Sanctions Against False Allegations of Use of Biological Weapons," *The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization, and Arms Control*, 3:4/4:1 (Fall/Winter 1997-

1998), pp. 39-46.

³⁰Report of the [United Nations] Secretary General, *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (New York: United Nations, 1969).

³¹A problem of judgment is introduced, however, by the fact that even official Soviet government statements at the very highest level exist that run counter to unquestionable fact regarding instances of CBW use: In an official Soviet comment on President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations on 8 December 1953, the Soviet government drew attention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol by stating: "The fact that not a single Government engaged in the Second World War dared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons proves that the aforesaid agreement of the States against chemical and bacteriological weapons had positive significance." US Department of State, ed., *Documents on Disarmament: 1945-1959*, vol. I: 1945-1956 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960) p. 402. That contention was unquestionably wrong: Japan had used both chemical and biological weapons in China during World War II, which the USSR knew, not least through the trial it had held in Khabarovsk in 1949.

³²A.M. Arkhangel'skiy et al., *Bacteriological Weapons and How to Defend Against Them* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1967), JPRS Translation #42,361, 28 August 1967.

³³In 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Novosti Press Agency published a small book, *Recalling the Past for the Sake of the Future: The Causes, Results and Lessons of World War II*. Pages 112-113 of the book reviews Japan's wartime BW program and the use of BW by Japan "in China and Mongolia." No mention is made of the Korean War at all.

³⁴E.I.Smirnov et al., *Voini i epidemii* [Wars and Epidemics] (Moscow: Moscow-Medicine, 1988).

³⁵"China Mulls Toxic Arms Ban," *Washington Times*, 20 September 1984, p. 5.

³⁶Chen Jian, "China's Strategies to End the Korean War," conference paper, CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia, University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996, quoting from Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohai, *A History of the Chinese People's Volunteers' War to Resist America and Assist Korea* (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1988), p. 7, and Qi Dexue, *Chaoxian Zhanzheng Neimu* [The Inside Story of the Korean War], p. 280 —no source or date. The author would like to thank Hang Zhou for the translation of the Chinese documents.

³⁷Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War 1950-1953* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995); Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

³⁸Telegram, CPV Headquarters to the CMC, 28 January 1952, cited in *Yang Dezhi Memoirs*, p. 101, and in *Jiang Yonghui Memoirs*, p. 465; quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, p. 181.

³⁹Memorandum, Nie Rongzhen to Mao and Zhou Enlai, 18 February 1952, cited in Qi Dexue, *Chaoxian Zhanzheng Neimu*, pp. 280-282; quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, p. 182.

⁴⁰"Mao Zedong Comments on Nie Rongzhen's Report About the Large-Scale Airdropping of Insects Carrying Bacteria by the Enemy in the Korean Battlefield," 19 February 1952, *Jianquo Yilai Mao Zedong* [Anthology of Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the 1949 Founding of the People's Republic], vol. 3 [1/1952 to 12/1952] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1989), p. 239.

⁴¹Memorandum, Zhou Enlai to Mao, 20 January 1952, cited in Qi Dexue, *Chaixian Zhanzheng Neimu*, p. 282. Quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, pp. 182-183.

⁴²Nie Rongzhen, "Report on American Invaders Using Bacteria Weapons and Our Responsive Actions," *Nie Rongzhen junshi wen xuan* [Selected Military Papers of Nie Rongzhen], (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1992), pp. 365-366.

Most of the memorandum actually deals with other issues, such as pre-planned vaccines and gas defense for Chinese troops, anticipation of nuclear weapons use by the United States.

⁴³Halpern, "Bacteriological Warfare Accusations," p. 43.

⁴⁴Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 184-185.

⁴⁵Quoted in Cookson and Nottingham, *A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, p. 62.

⁴⁶Theodor Rosebury, "Biological Warfare: Some Historical Considerations," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 16:6 (June 1960), pp. 227-236.

⁴⁷Halpern, "Bacteriological Warfare Accusations," pp. iv, 26-30, 71-79.

⁴⁸Communist Bacteriological Warfare Propaganda, OIR/CPI Special Paper No. 4, June 16, 1952, Unclassified, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁹Schneider, "Bacteria as Propaganda-Weapon."

⁵⁰Stephen L. Endicott, "Germ Warfare and 'Plausible Denial': The Korean War, 1952-1953," *Modern China* 5:1 (January 1979), pp. 79-104. Rev. Endicott's judgment was that his "Personal investigations reveal undeniable evidence [of] large-scale continuing American germ warfare on [the] Chinese Mainland," and that "[t]he evidence can readily convince any impartial and unbiased person."

⁵¹Descriptions of both men appear in Chapter 17, "Korean War," in Williams and Wallace, *Unit 731*, esp. pp. 255-263.

⁵²Leitenberg, "Allegations of the Biological Warfare in China and Korea: 1951-1952," p. 258.

⁵³Cookson and Nottingham, *A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, pp. 307 and 62.

⁵⁴Jaap van Ginneken, "Bacteriological Warfare," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7:2 (1977), pp. 130-152.

⁵⁵Halliday and Cumings, *Korea*, p. 185.

⁵⁶Letter from Joseph Needham to Jeanne McDermott, quoted in *The Killing Winds: The Menace of Biological Warfare* (New York: Arbor House, 1986), p. 169. In a letter to Stephen Endicott in 1979 (Endicott, "Germ Warfare and 'Plausible Denial,'" p. 86), Needham also repeated that he maintained his earlier position on the allegations.

⁵⁷Williams and Wallace, *Unit 731*, pp. 235-285.

⁵⁸Albert E. Cowdrey, "'Germ Warfare' and Public Health in the Korean Conflict," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 39 (April 1984), pp. 153-172.


⁵⁹Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Bros 1957), p. 376.

⁶⁰Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 4.

⁶¹Mark A. Ryan, "Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Allegations of Chemical and Biological Warfare," *Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the Korean War* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), pp. 104-138. Ryan probably exaggerated the number of individuals in China that need to have been involved in the deception in the field (and was so advised by this author in 1988 after reading his manuscript).

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁶³Van Courtland Moon, "Biological Warfare Allegations: The Korean War Case," pp. 53-83.



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New Evidence on the Berlin Crisis 1958-1962

Khrushchev's November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives

Introduction, translation, and annotation by Douglas Selvage¹

It was on 10 November 1958, at a Soviet-Polish friendship rally to cap off the visit of Polish leader Władysław Gomułka to Moscow, that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev first publicly announced his intention to turn over the Soviet Union's control functions in Berlin to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Khrushchev's speech was the prelude to his letter of November 27 to the Western powers, in which he demanded that they enter into negotiations for a German peace treaty and on the issue of transforming West Berlin into a demilitarized, "free" city. If sufficient progress were not made within six months, Khrushchev threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to grant it control over the transit routes to Berlin.²

Recently-declassified minutes of a meeting between Gomułka and Khrushchev on November 10, the day of the Soviet leader's speech, shed light on the immediate prelude to the ultimatum of November 27. They tend to confirm Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok's main assertions in their recent studies about Khrushchev's goals in provoking the crisis: to differentiate himself from his ousted opponents, to counter the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) expanding role in NATO, and—above all else—to gain international recognition of the GDR.³ The minutes highlight in particular the key role of the shifting nuclear balance in Khrushchev's thinking and provide insight into the evolving relationship between Khrushchev and Gomułka.

Khrushchev's Goals

On the weekend of 8 November 1958, Gomułka received a draft of Khrushchev's proposed speech for the friendship rally on Monday. He was reportedly shocked. Although the GDR and the Soviet Union had sent notes to the Federal Republic and the Western powers in September calling for a German peace treaty and inter-German talks on reunification, there had been no mention of Berlin. Only days before had the Polish foreign minister, Adam Rapacki, renewed his proposal for a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Europe to embrace both German states, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.⁴ The underlying goals of the initiative, the "Rapacki Plan," were to prevent West German access to nuclear weapons and to provide the basis for *détente* and disarmament in Europe. A relaxation of tensions between the two blocs would have allowed Poland more room for maneuver in its

domestic and foreign policies, especially with regard to trade and cultural relations with the West.⁵ In contrast, Khrushchev's Berlin gambit presaged an increase in tensions between East and West. Although it might have been aimed indirectly at preventing West German access to nuclear weapons, the central goal was to gain Western recognition of the GDR.⁶ Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum meant, in effect, that the struggle within the Eastern bloc between Poland and the GDR over what was to come first in Soviet-bloc foreign policy—regional disarmament or recognition of the GDR—had been decided in the East Germans' favor.⁷

In the session on November 10, Gomułka let Khrushchev do the talking. When the Soviet leader asked Gomułka if he had read Moscow's latest "suggestions" regarding Berlin, he said that he had. "We understand," Gomułka said, "that they are aimed towards liquidating the western part of Berlin." Khrushchev quickly countered, "It is not that simple." The announcement on Berlin was only the "beginning of the struggle." Moscow intended to hand over its control functions in Berlin to the East Germans, and this would force the West to speak directly with the GDR—leading, in effect, to its recognition. The Soviet leader also suggested other possible reasons for his gambit. He tried to differentiate himself from his former opponents in the struggle to succeed Stalin by citing their policy towards the German question. Both KGB Chief Lavrentii Beria and the Soviet's Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Georgi Malenkov, Khrushchev declared, had favored a Soviet withdrawal from Berlin and the GDR in 1953.⁸ In the same year, Khrushchev had justified Beria's removal and execution by pointing to his German policy. Similarly, in June 1957, he had vindicated his purge of the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich from the Soviet leadership by citing their opposition to credits for the GDR.⁹ To help assure Gomułka's support, Khrushchev now alleged that his former opponents had even wanted to alter Poland's western border, the Oder-Neisse Line. Having differentiated himself from his opponents, he also brought up the issue of the FRG's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance "clearly directed against us." Bonn's membership in NATO, he declared, violated the Potsdam Agreement. It thus provided Moscow with a justification to renounce the existing arrangements for Berlin, agreed

upon at Potsdam, especially since the West was using West Berlin as an “attack base” against the Soviet Union.

Nuclear Brinkmanship and the West’s Reaction

Khrushchev sought to calm the Polish delegation’s fears about the possibility of war over Berlin by underlining the altered strategic balance since 1953. The West would not risk a war over Berlin, he suggested, because the Soviet Union had the hydrogen bomb and the means to hit the U.S. As Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov point out, Khrushchev believed that the Soviet threat to use nuclear weapons during the Suez Crisis exactly two years earlier had played a crucial role in forcing Great Britain and France to back down. His “nuclear-missile romanticism”¹⁰ also led him to believe that in order to avoid nuclear confrontation, the Western powers would have to acquiesce in East German control over the transit routes to Berlin. (In his meeting with Gomułka, Khrushchev did not mention the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the West over Berlin or a peace treaty.) “If a conflict results,” Khrushchev told Gomułka, “they [the West] know full well that we are in a position to raze West Germany to the ground. The first minutes of war will decide.... Their territory is small—West Germany, England, France—literally several bombs will suffice...” Although a war “might drag on for years,” the Soviet Union could also launch a nuclear strike against the U.S. “Today, America has moved closer to us,” Khrushchev told Gomułka, “our missiles can hit them directly.”

Since war was no longer a possibility for the West, Khrushchev predicted, they would resort to some form of economic blockade against the GDR and Berlin. This time, however, unlike 1948-49, it would be the Soviet Union that would provide the residents of West Berlin with food. Since France and Great Britain—Khrushchev and Gomułka agreed—did not really favor German unification, they would not necessarily put up much resistance. Indeed, Khrushchev predicted—falsely—that French President Charles de Gaulle would not actively support West Germany during a crisis over Berlin.¹¹ De Gaulle, he said, feared the Germans; if they attacked any country in the future, it would be France, not the Soviet Union. “De Gaulle,” Khrushchev adjudged, “is a realist, a military man; he completely understands the danger to France.”

Khrushchev, it seems, had not yet decided to leave open the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Western powers over Berlin. When Gomułka brought up the option of talks with the West, Khrushchev replied that Moscow was not planning a diplomatic approach to the Western powers. It would simply withdraw its representative from the Allied Control Commission, recall its military commander from Berlin, and hand over control of the access routes to the East Germans. By the time of his “ultimatum” on November 27, however, Khrushchev decided to leave open the possibility of a negotiated

settlement on Berlin and a peace treaty, so as long as sufficient progress was made within six months.¹² He rescinded and renewed the deadline two more times before he finally abandoned it in October 1961, two months after the construction of the Berlin Wall.

The Polish-Soviet Relationship

The minutes also provide insight into the evolving relationship between Khrushchev and Gomułka. Only two years before, in October 1956, Khrushchev had flown to Warsaw on the eve of the Polish United Workers’ Party [PUWP]’s 8th Plenum to confront the Polish leadership about Gomułka’s return to power.¹³ In contrast, in November 1958, he talked openly with Gomułka about the ostensible differences within the Soviet leadership over Poland’s western border, the Oder-Neisse Line. Not surprisingly, he suggested that he, Khrushchev, had always supported the Oder-Neisse Line and it was others—Beria and the “feeble” Malenkov—who had committed the “stupidity” of refusing to recognize it. Khrushchev’s statement was particularly ironic because it was he who made veiled threats against the Oder-Neisse Line in two meetings with Gomułka in 1957. At the first meeting, in May 1957 in Moscow, Khrushchev had used the border issue to force Gomułka to renounce his demands for compensation for Moscow’s economic exploitation of Poland during the Stalin era.¹⁴ At the second meeting, in August 1957, he had pressured Gomułka to curb the reforms in Poland and combat “anti-Sovietism.”¹⁵ Gomułka had responded in October 1957 with a crackdown in Poland. He had ordered the closure of the Warsaw student newspaper, *Po prostu*, the leading organ of the Polish reform movement.¹⁶ When students protested the decision, they were brutally rebuffed by Poland’s internal security forces. Then, in November 1957, Gomułka had ordered a purge (“review”) of the PUWP’s membership, which led to the dismissal of leading “revisionists.”¹⁷ By the time of his meeting with Khrushchev in November 1958, Gomułka publicly supported Khrushchev’s Berlin gambit, despite his private reservations. In return, the Soviet leader sanctioned—both in his speech on November 10 and more importantly, during a visit to Poland in July 1959—Poland’s right to follow its own path to socialism.¹⁸

The excerpt below comes from the former Polish party archives, now a part of *Archiwum Akt Nowych* (AAN), or the Archive for Contemporary Documents, in Warsaw.¹⁹

Minutes from the Discussion between the Delegation of the PRL [People’s Republic of Poland] and the Government of the USSR,” 25 October - 10 November 1958

[Excerpt from session on 10 November 1958.]

Khrushchev: He turns to the German question and quotes the recent statement of [U.S. Secretary of State John Foster]

Dulles on the matter of Berlin.²⁰

If a conflict results, they know full well that we are in a position to raze West Germany to the ground. The first minutes of war will decide. There the losses will naturally be the greatest. After that, the war might drag on for years. Their territory is small—West Germany, England, France—literally several bombs will suffice, they will decide in the first minutes of the war. We recently conducted tests, and we have such [delivery] vehicles that at the same strength they use ten times less fuel, so in the same space we can produce ten times as many bombs.

There were some among us who believed that we would have to withdraw from Berlin. Beria proposed this, and he was supported by “feeble” Malenkov. They believed that we should give up the GDR and Berlin. That was in 1953. What would we have accomplished after that? They did not even recognize the border on the Oder and Neisse, so that would have been complete stupidity. They would not have even recognized the Western border of Poland, but had pretensions to Gdynia and Gdańsk. We have to defend the border on the Elbe. Are we supposed to give up a population of 18 million in the GDR for nothing, without a fight? That’s stupidity. We should fully support Ulbricht and Grotewohl. The FRG simply offered us gold, dollars, so that we would not support the GDR. They simply asked - how much do you want [?] Of course we rejected this, we do not negotiate on such questions.

You know about our latest suggestions with regard to Berlin.

Gomułka: We know. We understand that they are aimed towards liquidating the western part of Berlin.

Khrushchev: It is not that simple. I am only announcing that matter. That is the beginning of the struggle. Our announcement in our presentations is only the beginning of the action. Undoubtedly it is an exacerbation. The GDR will aggravate the issue of transport, especially military, and they will have to turn to them on matters of transport. Of course an exacerbation will result.

Gomułka: It is understood that in the longer term a situation cannot continue in which in the interior of one state, the GDR, stands another state—West Berlin. It would be different if the unification of Germany were a close prospect—and that was possible at the time of Potsdam, when it was considered a temporary status—until the unification of Germany. But currently the situation is different and such a prospect is lacking. Such a state of things cannot be maintained. There is not even a single state in the West that would support the unification of Germany. Even France and England do not wish that upon themselves.

Khrushchev: And France and England are afraid themselves of whether we might not give in on this issue. In 1956, they were full of happiness, they thought that Poland had perished as a socialist state. They were mistaken, but even if it had come to pass, even if we had

had some difficulties in Poland, it would not have saved them. We would have gone through Czechoslovakia, through the Baltic Sea, but we would have never withdrawn from the GDR. We would not allow the GDR to be swallowed up.

Gomułka: Do you intend to address the three states [i.e., Western powers] about liquidating the status of Berlin?

Khrushchev: No. My declaration today should be understood in such a fashion, that we are unilaterally ceasing to observe the agreement on Berlin’s status, that we are discontinuing to fulfill the functions deriving from our participation in the Control Commission. Next, we will recall our military commander in West Berlin and our [military] mission. [East German Premier Otto] Grotewohl will ask the English and Americans to leave, along with their missions. Our military, however, will remain in the GDR on the basis of our participation in the Warsaw Treaty. Then the capitalist states will have to turn to the GDR on matters relating to Berlin, transit, and transport. They will have to turn to Grotewohl, and he is firm. And that’s when the tension begins. Some form of blockade will result, but we have enough foodstuffs. We will also have to feed West Berlin. We do not want to, but the population will suffer from it.

Ignar:²¹ That political stance is of course right, as long as you say that it will not cause a war. If not, then it is correct and I, in any case, think so.

Khrushchev: War will not result from it. There will be tensions, of course, there will be a blockade. They might test to see our reaction. In any case we will have to show a great deal of cold blood in this matter.

Gomułka: They might try different forms of blockade. That might play a part in the summit meeting.

Khrushchev: According to the Potsdam agreement, the FRG should not join any alliance against the countries with which Germany fought. But they joined NATO, which is clearly directed against us. That is clearly in conflict with the Potsdam agreement. West Berlin is there to be used as an attack base against us. They are turning to blackmail. Five years ago—that was different. Then, we did not have the hydrogen bomb; now, the balance of forces is different. Then, we could not reach the USA. The USA built its policies upon the bases surrounding us. Today, America has moved closer to us—our missiles can hit them directly.

Gomułka: What about de Gaulle?

Khrushchev: He will not actively support them. De Gaulle fears the Germans. During a meeting in Moscow with the French (Guy Mollet), we said to them: Why would the Germans attack to the east? There they will meet the greatest resistance, there it will be difficult for them. Hence, they will certainly attack to the west. De Gaulle understands that if the Germans start looking for weak spots they will attack France, because if they want to attack the USSR, they will have to go through Poland. De Gaulle is a realist, a military man, he understands

completely the danger to France.

On the matters relating to West Berlin, we consulted with the comrades from the GDR. They fully support these steps.

Gomułka: We have our trade agreements with the FRG. We ship goods to West Berlin.

Khrushchev: You can keep those agreements, but you should speak with the GDR about transport. The GDR also trades with them. They supply them with briquettes, and they receive coke, which they give to Poland....

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, p. 113, t. 27. Translated by Douglas Selvage]

Douglas Selvage recently submitted his dissertation, 'Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the German Question, 1955-1967,' at Yale University and will be receiving his Ph.D. in December.

¹ Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information Agency, and the US Department of State, which administers the Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research Program (Title VIII).

² See the general background in Hope M. Harrison, "New Evidence on Khrushchev's 1958 Berlin Ultimatum," *Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 35-36.

³ Hope Harrison, *CWIHP Working Paper No.5: Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61*, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), 12-16; Vladislav Zubok, *CWIHP Working Paper No.6: Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-62)*, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), 3-9. On the role of the domestic power struggle in the Soviet Union, also see Robert Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June - November 1961* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), *passim*.

⁴ Hansjakob Stehle, *The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland Since 1945*, transl. D.J.S. Thompson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 38-40. On the East German and Soviet notes from September, see Harrison, *Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose'*, 8-12.

⁵ On the Rapacki Plan, see Stehle, *Independent Satellite*, 230-37; and the most recent study, which makes use of Polish archives: Piotr Wandycz, "Adam Rapacki and the Search for European Security," Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim eds., in *The Diplomats, 1939-1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 289-317.

⁶ Hope Harrison, "The Bargaining Power of Weaker Allies in Bipolarity and Crisis: The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1993), 144.

⁷ When Poland first announced the Rapacki Plan in October 1957, the East Germans had responded with their own proposal,

the "Grotewohl Plan." The major difference between the two initiatives had been the GDR's insistence that the two German states first sign an agreement on their own, which would have signified Bonn's recognition of the GDR. The Poles, in contrast, had been willing to settle for a series of unilateral declarations by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two German states not to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory—a solution that would not have forced Bonn to recognize the GDR. Stehle, *Independent Satellite*, 225-26. On GDR interference with the Rapacki Plan see, e.g., Dept. IV, MSZ, "Notatka," 28 February 1958, and MSZ, "Wyciąg z raportu politycznego Ambasady Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej w Berlinie za okres od 1.IX.1957 r. do 28.II.1958 r.," n.d., both in AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 17.

⁸ On the 1953 events, see Christian F. Ostermann, "This Is Not A Politburo But A Madhouse," *CWIHP Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 61-72.

⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 131; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 197-98.

¹⁰ Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 190-94.

¹¹ Among the Western powers, De Gaulle's France, it turned out, took "the most uncompromising line" towards Khrushchev's ultimatum. Ann Tusa, *The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945-1989* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 117.

¹² Harrison, "New Evidence," 35-36.

¹³ On the confrontation in Warsaw, see L.W. Głuchowski, "Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomułka, and the 'Polish October,'" *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 1, 38-49.

¹⁴ Andrzej Korzon, "Rozmowy polsko-radzieckie w maju 1957 roku," *Dzieje najnowsze* 25 (1993), 121-30.

¹⁵ Andrzej Werblan, "Nieznana rozmowa Władysława Gomułka z Nikitą S. Chruszczowem," *Dziś* 4 (May 1993), 75-84, esp. 82.

¹⁶ In an address to party journalists in November 1957, Gomułka justified the closing of *Po Prostu* by pointing to Poland's geopolitical situation. He stressed the need to combat anti-Sovietism in Poland; otherwise, given the Germans' revisionist aims, Poland would become a truncated "Duchy of Warsaw." "Słowo końcowe tow. Wiesława na spotkaniu z dziennikarzami dnia 5.X. 57," 5 October 1957, in AAN, KC PZPR, 237/V-255.

¹⁷ Andrzej Albert [Wojciech Roszkowski], *Najnowsza historia Polski, 1914-1993*, 5th ed., vol.2 (London: Puls Publications, 1994), 368-71.

¹⁸ Stehle, *Independent Satellite*, 39-42.

¹⁹ A Polish transcript of the talks from October 11 to November 11, 1958, has recently been published in *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PRL-ZSSR 1956-1970*, introduction by Andrzej Paczkowski (London: "Aneks," 1998), 191-120. The relevant section can be found on pp. 112-14.

²⁰ In a speech in October 1958, Dulles had drawn a parallel between the U.S. commitment to Taiwan during the Taiwan Straits Crisis and its commitment to Berlin. In talks with the Soviet ambassador to the GDR, M. Pervukhin, Ulbricht interpreted Dulles' statement as a warning that as soon as the crisis in the Far East was resolved, the "imperialists" would turn their attention to Berlin. Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 198-99.

²¹ Stefan Ignar, Vice Chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers.

The Berlin Crisis and the Khrushchev-Ulbricht Summits in Moscow, 9 and 18 June 1959

“If you have thrown the enemy to the ground, you don’t need to then kneel on his chest”

Introduction, translation, and annotation by Hope M. Harrison

These two summit meetings, between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and East German leader and Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) First Secretary Walter Ulbricht, took place in June 1959 during the second Berlin Crisis (1958-61) while the Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the U.S., Soviet Union, England, and France (with the two Germanys sitting in as observers for the first time) was occurring in Geneva, Switzerland.¹ The CFM met from May 11-June 19 and July 13-August 5 to discuss Germany.² Much of the discussion at the two Soviet-East German summits in June was about strategy towards the Western Powers concerning Berlin and Germany at the CFM. A top-level East German delegation was in the Soviet Union from June 8-20, visiting Moscow, Riga, Kiev and Gorki and holding these two summit meetings with the Soviet leadership as well as learning much about Soviet economic, cultural, and other institutions.

The Geneva CFM was convened in response to Khrushchev’s ultimatum of 27 November 1958 to the Western Powers about Berlin and Germany. In the ultimatum, Khrushchev demanded that a peace treaty be signed by the four powers with both Germanys or with a united Germany and that West Berlin be transformed into a “free city” within six months or he would sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) and turn over to the GDR control of access routes between West Germany and West Berlin.³ The six-month deadline was to expire on 27 May 1959. The Western Powers relented beforehand, agreeing not yet for a summit of the heads of state (which is what Khrushchev really wanted), but proposing a meeting of the foreign ministers to discuss the issues raised in Khrushchev’s ultimatum, as well as other topics. If progress was made at the CFM, then there might be a summit of heads of state. The Western proposal for the CFM on Germany, with the Four Powers and German representatives, was sent to Moscow on 16 February 1959. The Soviets responded on March 2 saying that they really thought a summit of the heads of state would be the most appropriate forum for discussing the German question, but if the West refused, they would agree to a CFM, with Czech and Polish, as well as East and West German, observers. In a note on March 26, Washington held to its position, supporting initially only a CFM and only with observers from the two Germanys. The Soviets accepted on March 30 the plans for the Geneva CFM to convene on

May 11 to discuss a German peace treaty and Berlin.

Thus, in less than six months, Khrushchev achieved two major objectives: negotiations with the West on Berlin and Germany, and *de facto* recognition of the GDR. Khrushchev made it clear to Ulbricht at their June 1959 summits that he had used the threat of a separate peace treaty threat as a “Damocles’ sword” to force the West to the negotiating table. On June 18, he told Ulbricht: “I don’t know whether we will bring this issue of the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR to realization; however, such a prospect acts in a sobering way on the Western powers and West Germany. This, if you will, is pressure on them, Damocles’ sword, which we must hold over them.” Presidium member Anastas Mikoian agreed: “Before they didn’t want to talk about Berlin at all, but now they are forced to carry out negotiations with us on it.”

Now that Khrushchev had actually gotten the West to the negotiating table, however, it was not clear how hard he really wanted to push his adversaries. As he told Ulbricht on June 9, “Earlier we said that in the event of the Western powers’ refusal to sign a peace treaty with the two German governments, we would sign a peace treaty with the GDR. But now it is necessary to create a safety valve. Therefore we are proposing the creation of an all-German committee,” which he imagined would spend “one or one and a half years, until 1961,” working out a plan for unification. In fact, Khrushchev told Ulbricht on June 18, “Let’s not set a time limit. . . . Let’s act more flexibly on this issue. . . .” Paul Scholz⁴ agreed with this idea for a very different reason. He pointed out that due to Khrushchev’s 27 November 1958 ultimatum, on 27 May 1959, “is well known, on that day everyone in the GDR expected that something would happen. Therefore, it is better not to decree a concrete date, but to preserve freedom of movement for oneself.” He did not want the GDR to be in the embarrassing position again of not reaping the gains that Khrushchev had publicly promised it.

Khrushchev did not expect much from the CFM itself. On June 9, he said to Ulbricht that the conference “won’t have any tangible results . . . since the situation itself still doesn’t have a basis for positive resolutions.” Besides, “not one self-respecting prime minister will allow his foreign minister, due to prestige considerations, to sign an agreement on concrete issues.” They would save this honor only for themselves. Thus, “Geneva—it’s a test of

strength, it's a sounding out of positions."

Aside from forcing the West to the negotiating table by his ultimatum, and using the CFM for a "sounding out of positions," Khrushchev saw the CFM as a way to buy time during which to improve the GDR economy and its competitiveness with West Germany and West Berlin. Khrushchev believed that after one to one and a half years, "They will be weaker and we will be stronger." "In 1961 the GDR will start to surpass the FRG in standard of living. This will have very great political significance. This will be a bomb for them. Therefore, our position is to gain time." Ulbricht agreed that "it's clear that the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would exacerbate the situation, for which we are not now prepared. Economically we still cannot exert influence on the West; therefore, we must win time." GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl reminded those at the meeting that "in our conditions economic problems turn into political ones." The final communiqué of the meetings, published in *Pravda* on June 20, stated: "The delegations emphasize that the main influence on the situation in Germany and also to a significant extent in Europe, in the sense of the consolidation of peace and democracy, is exerted under the current circumstances by the successes of the workers of the German Democratic Republic in answering the economic tasks which were determined by the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany." The Soviets and East Germans understood how important an improvement in the East German economic situation was.

Khrushchev wanted some sort of agreement with the Western Powers which would help legitimize the GDR regime in the international arena and thus also help stabilize the situation within the GDR by reducing the number of refugees fleeing the country for West Berlin and West Germany. Having both West Germany and East Germany participate at the CFM as observers was seen as a big step forward for the GDR and for Khrushchev's strategy. Khrushchev told Ulbricht at their meeting on June 9 that the West's "invitation of the GDR to the conference, which signifies *de facto* recognition of the GDR," was an indication that the Western strategy of "rollback" had been "unrealistic" and that the West now realized that its "efforts to subvert the countries of Eastern Europe from the socialist path of development had completely failed."

Now that Khrushchev had achieved what he called Western "de facto recognition of the GDR," however, he was not going to push for *de jure* recognition. As he told Ulbricht on June 9, "We don't think it's worth it now to push the West to the wall, so we won't give the impression that we are seeking the recognition of the GDR. The Americans don't want to recognize the GDR. They can't do this for prestige reasons. That, and we would be offended. They didn't recognize us for 16 years, and you want them to recognize you after 10 years. You need to wait at least 17 years. In any case, such a stating of the

issue, such an intention from our side would hinder the relaxation of tensions." One wishes for a tape recording of this meeting to hear the tone of Khrushchev's voice as he said this to Ulbricht! Khrushchev keeps playing both sides in these summits with Ulbricht; on the one hand standing up for GDR interests, yet on the other hand, not wanting to place decent relations with the West too much in jeopardy.

Similarly, on June 9 Khrushchev recounted a Russian expression to Ulbricht: "If you have thrown your adversary to the ground, you don't need to then kneel on his chest. We don't need to show that we won." But on June 18, he declared: "we must always understand with whom we are dealing. They are bandits. If we were weak, they would long ago have resolved the German question to their advantage. . . we must not forget that if we let down our guard, they will swallow us up." Thus, he blustered, "The more the Western powers know that there is a balance in the area of atomic weapons and rockets, the better it is for us." Perhaps emboldened by the USSR's 1957 achievements in orbiting a satellite (Sputnik) and testing long-range ballistic missiles to exaggerate Soviet nuclear strength, Khrushchev vacillated between pressuring the West and then pulling back.

Ulbricht, for his part, seemed more subdued than he became in meetings later in the Berlin Crisis. He did, however, as usual, push for more Soviet economic aid. At a certain point in the meeting on June 9, when Khrushchev seemed to think he has just ended the meeting by "summing up the exchange of views" and "expressing his sincere gratitude" for the "complete unity of views" between the East Germans and the Soviets, Ulbricht then went on "to speak more about the situation in the GDR" and the economic difficulties, which were particularly problematic, since the East Germans "compare the standard of living in the GDR with West Germany and West Berlin." Khrushchev promised to consider the GDR's requests, but clearly worried about how much the Soviets could afford to help the GDR. "We must reckon with our real capabilities. I would like to remind you that we began the competition with capitalism naked and with bare feet. The people believed us not only due to the promises of sausage and beer, but also due to the teachings of Marx and Lenin."

Beyond fishing for more economic aid, however, in these summits, Ulbricht was not really more militant than Khrushchev on the peace treaty or West Berlin. Instead, he seemed to agree that the GDR needed to "buy time" until it was in a better economic position to risk Western retaliation against a more hard-line strategy, such as signing a separate peace treaty and turning over to the GDR control of the West Berlin access routes.

In terms of reaching a settlement on Germany and/or Berlin among the Four Powers at the Geneva CFM, no real progress was made. Both sides talked of an interim agreement on Berlin and a reduction of Western troops in West Berlin, but the Soviets continued to insist that if no final agreement were made to change the status of West

Berlin, after the interim period of a year or a year-and-a-half, the Western troops would have to leave West Berlin and the latter must be transformed into a demilitarized international "free city" with no subversive and propaganda activities directed against the GDR or the Communist bloc. The West would not agree to most of this. The Soviets also continued to insist that a peace treaty be signed with both Germans or a united Germany and called for an all-German committee, made up equally of East and West German representatives, to draw up plans for German unification. The West put forward a package deal of stages toward German unification (which would ultimately include free elections throughout Germany) which was incompatible with Soviet proposals. The West insisted on Four Power rights in Berlin, as guaranteed in the 1945 Potsdam agreements, and the Soviets insisted that those were no longer just.

After Gromyko announced on June 9 that the Western powers could maintain their rights in Berlin for one more year and Khrushchev announced on June 19 that an all-German commission could have a year-and-a-half to come up with plans for reunification and a peace treaty, the West, feeling these were deadline threats, called a recess to the CFM. Given that the East German delegation was in the Soviet Union at this very time, as Michael Lemke points out, there was reason for the West to believe that they were meeting to plan "new measures in case there was no agreement on West Berlin at Geneva. One should increase the 'pressure' on the Western Powers, urged Valerian Zorin, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR."⁵ As the transcripts from the two summit conversations indicate, Khrushchev was clearly following a strategy of keeping up pressure on the West on West Berlin and a German peace treaty, although his feeling of "not wanting to set a deadline" and wanting to be "more flexible" clearly was momentarily forgotten when he and Gromyko set renewed deadlines in June. And the final communiqué of the Soviet-East German meetings states, in the usual threatening way, that if no agreement is reached on a peaceful resolution on the German question, the Soviet Union and other interested countries will sign a peace treaty with the GDR.⁶

In the meantime, in spite of President Eisenhower's vow that he would plan a summit meeting with Khrushchev only in the event of significant progress at the Geneva CFM, due to an apparent misunderstanding within the U.S. bureaucracy, an invitation for a summit meeting was issued to Khrushchev on July 11, and on August 3 it was announced that Khrushchev would visit the United States. Thus, when the CFM reassembled from July 13-August 3, it was not surprising that no progress was made. Khrushchev had already received his invitation to the U.S., something far more important to him than a CFM.

Document No. 1

"Short Summary of the Talks with the GDR Party-Governmental Delegation on 9 June 1959"

Secret. 4 July 1959.

Soviet officials taking part in the talks: N.S.

Khrushchev [First Secretary, Presidium member, and head of delegation], A.I. Kirichenko [Presidium member and Central Committee Secretary], F.R. Kozlov [Presidium member and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers], A.I. Mikoian [Presidium member and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers], V.V. Kuznetsov [First Deputy Foreign Minister], V.C. Semenov [Deputy Foreign Minister], M.G. Pervukhin [Ambassador to the GDR].

The following assisted in the talks: Deputy Head of the CPSU CC Dept. N.T. Vinogradov, [and] heads of departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N.M. Lun'kov, and A.Ya. Popov.

Taking part in the talks from the German side: the GDR party-governmental delegation. [The document does not list who was in the East German delegation. Minister President Grotewohl's files,⁷ the published communiqué,⁸ and the records of the summits indicate that the delegation included W. Ulbricht (First Secretary, Politburo member and head of the delegation), O. Grotewohl (Minister President and Politburo member), F. Ebert (Mayor of Berlin and Politburo member), B. Leuschner (Politburo member, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission), E. Correns (President of the National Council of the National Front), H. Loch (Deputy President of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany), J. König (Ambassador to the USSR), H. Homann (Vice President of the Volkskammer and Deputy Chairman of the National Democratic Party of Germany), A. Bach (Vice President of the Volkskammer and Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union, P. Scholz (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany), and R. Korb (Stasi official, Head of Central Information Groups).]

Assisting in the talks was also GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Collegium member A. Kunderman [who was also the head of the Foreign Ministry's Department on the Soviet Union].

Khrushchev: Let me welcome the GDR party-governmental delegation and give the first word to the guests.

Ulbricht: There is a series of issues which it is imperative for us to discuss.

I would like to start with the conference in Geneva. As is well known, the Soviet Union's proposal about a peace treaty at the Geneva conference was opposed by the Western powers' package of proposals. In sum, its core comes down to liquidating us not immediately, but step by step, in three stages.

Also in connection with the Geneva conference, the question is: what can our delegation do for the further development of initiatives[?] We would like to exchange views with you on this. We think that an important step for developing this initiative was Gromyko's proposal to create a commission of the representatives of the two German states. However, neither the West nor the Bonn government has responded to this proposal. Therefore, we should think about what we should undertake in this regard in the future.

Moreover, I would like to note that the proposals of the Western powers completely ignore the question of the prohibition of West German nuclear arms. Thus, our delegation in Geneva first of all raised the question of the prohibition of atomic arms and rocket installations in West Germany. This is the first issue which, in our view, must occupy the commission.

We also proposed to the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] to conclude a non-aggression pact, a treaty on the renunciation of the use of force between the two German states. Adenauer refused this proposal, but it met with support among the West German population (in particular from the FDP [Free Democratic Party] and SPD [Social Democratic Party]). Our proposal was understood by all and accepted, because it demands that both sides renounce something. We gave you the draft of this treaty and would like to know your view on this issue.

However, in any case, the question of a peace treaty remains at the center of attention. As regards us, proceeding from the above considerations, we emphasize especially one part—the prohibition of West German nuclear arms, [a position] which has the understanding of the FRG population.

The second issue about which we would like to exchange views is West Berlin. As is well known, the Americans are raising the question of preserving their rights in West Berlin. But we think that the issue of the preservation of occupation rights can't be raised now. We think that since 14 years have passed since the end of the war, it is time for a peace treaty.

The USSR proposed keeping a symbolic force in West Berlin. For our part, we are prepared to give a guarantee of access to West Berlin.

So where are the disagreements?

In the fact that the Western powers don't want to carry out negotiations on guarantees with the GDR, although we already control them [i.e., guarantees of Western access to West Berlin] about 95%. Thus, the issue is the following: we must give a guarantee in the name of the GDR separately from four power agreements. Although in fact this will be an agreement of five powers. Gromyko is trying to achieve this at the conference [in Geneva]. But the West is not agreeing to it.

If an agreement of the four powers is reached at a summit on this question, we are prepared to publish a declaration on guarantees separately.

We also need to decide which tactics to follow on the

issue of reunification. Our delegation in Geneva raised the question of whether we should publish in Geneva our declaration concerning a confederation. This question was discussed in the Politburo. But doubts arose among us about the utility of such a step at the current moment, since the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is not especially suitable for this.

Maybe it would be better to do this at a summit conference?

At the conference in Geneva, Gromyko raised the question of having an all-German committee study the questions of the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty and the reunification of the country. If the Soviet comrades don't object, maybe we could discuss with the Soviet side how an all-German committee could study the peaceful resolution of the German question, and could give an instruction to our [Foreign] Minister [Lothar] Bolz to make corresponding proposals in Geneva and announce that we are also ready to discuss the question of reunification in this commission.

The next issue is a summit conference. If at a summit conference the positions move closer together and if some sort of agreement is reached, we would welcome all this, because we think that this would facilitate a return to a discussion of the issue of a peace treaty. However, the details of this can be dealt with later.

This, in short, is what I wanted to say.

Khrushchev: We have discussed all of these questions and believe that Geneva has given good results. It showed the unrealistic policy of [U.S. Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles which is aimed at the so-called "liberation" of Eastern Europe. This policy, which is directed at a blockade of Eastern Europe, the subversion of these countries from within, etc., is completely bankrupt. And it was clearly shown that efforts to subvert the countries of Eastern Europe from the socialist path of development completely failed.

Instead of this, they came to the conference in Geneva [and] agreed to the invitation of the GDR to the conference, which signifies de facto recognition of the GDR. Thus, the situation as a whole has turned out favorably for us. As regards the question of the unification of Germany, this problem is now used by the West only for propagandistic goals. The information which we have completely supports this. When our responsible comrades spoke about this question with representatives of the West, the latter directly said that the reunification of Germany is impossible.

De Gaulle, for example, said: "We are not for two Germanys, but really for three and even four." Eisenhower implied to Gromyko that the USA considers unification impossible at the present time, remarking that, in his view, it is a long process.

Macmillan and Adenauer also think this way. The latter is especially afraid of German unification and as long as he is alive—there won't be reunification.

We correctly announced in Geneva that we are for

German reunification, but that this issue must be resolved by the Germans themselves, that is the main thing, that is the essence of our position.

Now we have prepared new proposals, which Gromyko will put forward today. These proposals don't change anything, but tactically it is advantageous for us to make them. The essence of these proposals is that we propose creating an all-German committee from the two German states on an equal basis (with a proportion of 1:1). This committee must be occupied with issues of bringing together the two German governments, developing contacts between them, and preparing a peace treaty. The four great powers have no responsibility for the activity of this committee and will not give them any instructions. The Germans themselves must resolve all issues connected with the activity of this committee.

Aside from this, we don't think it's worth it now to push the West to the wall, so that we will not give the impression that we are seeking the recognition of the GDR.

The Americans don't want to recognize the GDR. They can't do this for prestige reasons. That, and we would be offended. They didn't recognize us for 16 years [until 1933—ed.], and you want them to recognize you after 10 years. You need to wait at least 17 years. (p. 5) In any case, such a stating of the issue, such an intention from our side would hinder the relaxation of tensions.

You know that there is a demagogic system in the USA, there are 2 parties, but both are charlatans. They have said so much against the socialist camp, that they can't now recognize the GDR. And if [Christian] Herter [new U.S. Secretary of State] agreed to it, he would quickly be fired. So we have to reckon with such a situation. In such a situation, we must work out our tactics carefully. We need not Bolz but the Western representatives themselves to put forward proposals advantageous to us. We must make our proposals in such a way that they move them forward like their own, and we will support them. We don't need to rush, we must wait. We cannot show that we are in a hurry to get acceptance of our proposals in rough form.

Regarding the future of the Geneva conference, we can already say now that it won't have any tangible results. We spoke about this earlier also, since the situation itself still doesn't have a basis for positive resolutions.

In addition, in my opinion, not one self-respecting prime minister will allow his minister of foreign affairs, due to prestige considerations, to sign an agreement on concrete issues. You don't think de Gaulle will allow his minister to sign an important decision? Neither Eisenhower nor Macmillan would allow this either.

Geneva—it's a test of strength, it's a sounding out of positions.

Therefore, our proposals must be put in such a form that they will be attractive to the population.

However, on the whole we must notice that the situation now has become so difficult that the Americans

must find a way out. But prestige considerations strongly pin them down. The USA recognizes that the situation in West Berlin is abnormal, and that it is necessary to normalize it. They are talking, for example, about an agreement now on reducing the number of their troops in West Berlin from 10,000 to 7,500. But the issue of the number of troops in Berlin has no significance for the correlation of forces. We even spoke about this with Macmillan during his visit to Moscow. We told him: send 100,000 troops to West Berlin, but this will be worse only for you, and for us it will be easier, since in the event of an aggravation of the situation, these troops actually would find themselves surrounded, in a trap.

Currently the USA is also proposing to agree on the liquidation of espionage centers and radio stations, the cessation of propaganda, [and] the liquidation of subversive activities on the condition that we guarantee their rights in West Berlin.

We told them that we can't do that, since already more than 14 years have passed since the end of the war. However, we don't want to make an ultimatum, but we want to show that we are looking for real possibilities for the resolution of these problems.

They also proposed freezing the number of forces in West Berlin [and] agreeing that there won't be any rocket or atomic weapons there before German unification. And Gromyko is currently waiting for instructions from us on this issue.

Now the question of the peace treaty. Earlier we said that in the event of the Western powers' refusal to sign a peace treaty with the two German governments, we would sign a peace treaty with the GDR. But now it is necessary to create a safety-valve. Therefore we are proposing the creation of an all-German committee. Without us, but on our recommendation, the committee would deal with the issue of the preparation of a peace treaty and the reunification of the country. We are proposing a concrete period of activity for this committee—for example, 1-1 1/2 years, that is, until 1961. If the Germans don't come to an agreement among themselves in this period, we will be free from any obligations and we will look for the possibility of concluding a peace treaty with the two German governments or with one German government.

But during this period, that is, until 1961, they must reduce their forces in West Berlin, stop subversive activity [and] propaganda, [and] liquidate espionage centers. This is the main thing. We agree to the temporary preservation of the occupation regime until 1961.

Why are we doing this? It would be very attractive to all pacifists, since we will show them that we are acting without an ultimatum, but searching for a way for the resolution of these issues.

On the other hand, it is necessary to allow time so that the Western powers can move away from their old position.

The situation in this case is complicated in the following way: we are giving the Germans time to find a

way out, but if they can't find it, then how can we help?

This is a very advantageous position. And what will we lose? Nothing. The resolution of the issue is only put off for a year or a year-and-a-half. And what will happen in this time? They will be weaker, and we will be stronger. Therefore, I think that we don't need to force the pace of events on this issue, since then the neutral states and many proponents of peace in the whole world won't understand us. We must not alienate our friends and neutral states.

The fact of the GDR's existence and development has already been recognized by Eisenhower and Macmillan, and public opinion understands and supports the GDR even more.

There is also a process of evolution among the German people. The progressive forces support the GDR and this process will be strengthened in the future. This is why Adenauer is enraged. And so, he doesn't want the liquidation of the "cold war."

The question is: will they accept our new proposals? One can say with 70% certainty that they won't.

So then it will be even more necessary to have a summit meeting.

Speaking as a whole, the essence of our differences of opinion on this question are that they want to drag out the occupation regime, and we want to limit it. Therefore, on the one hand, we will allegedly concede to them, but at the same limit their time, giving them the possibility to reform.

Last year, we raised these issues [i.e., the 27 November 1958 ultimatum]. Now already almost a year has gone by, but in this time we have already turned around the core of public opinion. Therefore I would like to recall here a Russian saying, which says that if you have thrown the adversary to the ground, you don't need to then kneel on his chest. We don't need to show that we won. We should give the impression that both sides won. Let them yell about their victory, but we will say that it was also our victory.

In 1961 the GDR will start to surpass the FRG in standard of living. This will have very great political significance. This will be a bomb for them. Therefore, our position is to gain time.

Grotewohl: We could hardly reckon that they would agree with our proposals in Geneva. At the current time, the conference is in a decisive stage. It is possible that the Soviet proposals will be rejected. But this can't mean that there won't be a summit conference. Our goal is to win time. Any time which we win for negotiations, any negotiations is better than a "cold war." Precisely from this position, we must come to an appreciation of the world-wide historical scene, including the German question, which has subordinate significance.

Sometimes among us Germans, it seems that for us only Germany exists. But as a whole in international politics, the German question must take up only as much space as it merits.

We, as representatives of Germany, must have the

possibility of freely appearing before the whole German people on issues which are of vital importance to them.

In reference to Comrade Khrushchev, the Soviet proposals don't have any limitations for us in this regard, therefore I support these proposals.

If it is possible to reach some sort of compromise, that is, if the Germans will be forced to carry out negotiations between them, then this already will be an enormous step forward, it will mean recognition of the GDR. If West Germany refuses this, then this too will be a big plus for us, it will give us the opportunity to activate our work in the West. But the strength of this influence on the West will depend on taking some sort of positive step. For example, the renunciation of arming the German government with atomic weapons. We think that we must achieve this. This will give a new impetus.

Other positive steps would be the liquidation of all subversive centers.

The situation for us is clear, and if the subversive centers aren't liquidated, then we ourselves will undertake measures for the guarantee of our security.

The main thing is that people in the whole world see that a step forward has been made in the safeguarding of peace. And this step could be the prohibition of atomic weapons in Germany. From the point of view of German policy [*Deutschlandpolitik*], these proposals are acceptable.

We must discuss together the situation in Geneva. And it would be desirable if the representatives of the National Front and other parties who are present here would express their point of view on these questions.

Khrushchev: Our proposals are not connected with an initiative of the German comrades. The proposals which have been made by the German comrades are very good. But I think that you shouldn't appeal directly to the West.

Ulbricht: (rejoinder) They still aren't used to us.

Khrushchev: We are ready to listen to the opinions of all comrades who want to speak here on the issues we have touched upon.

Bach: I am certain that the new proposals of the Soviet government will find a positive response among the German people, because they correspond not only to the wishes of the GDR but also to the interests of the peace-loving forces of the FRG. Those sections of the population of West Germany who have been afraid until now to enter into contact with representatives of the GDR will now be activated. We must bear in mind that if the proposal for the creation of an all-German committee is accepted, it will help to encourage those forces in West Germany which have shown indecisiveness until now. In my opinion, it is also important that the work of the committee will be for a limited time.

Among the population, there has been a growing view that the conference didn't deal much with the issue of German unification. Insofar as the entire package of the Western Powers skirted around the question of the

unification of Germany, our new proposals in which the issue of unification is raised will allow us to take back the initiative.

Homann: I support what has been said here by the comrades. The question of ensuring security and peace is also the primary one for us. All other issues are derived from and subordinate to this question. Therefore I think that the proposals made here are correct. Negotiations in an all-German committee which must be carried out before 1961, will give us the opportunity to lay out broadly our position, to show that from our side the national question is decided on a path of peace and peaceful coexistence with other countries, and to show that the development of the GDR guarantees a happy future of Germany. We can also demonstrate that the policy carried out in the GDR under the leadership of the working class is really a national policy.

Loch: Adenauer represents himself as a fighter for democracy and unification, but Adenauer's decision to withdraw his candidacy for president called forth a wave of protest and opened the eyes of many to the real state of affairs in the FRG.

Therefore, Khrushchev's proposals will have great significance. An all-German committee which will decide the fate of Germany, this is of course a step forward. The creation of this committee could activate the opposition forces in West Germany. The strengthening contacts between West German and GDR parties will gain new impetus.

In conclusion, I would like to express my certainty that we will return with good results to the GDR, which will allow us to strengthen our struggle for realizing the tasks which are before us.

Scholz: If we want peace, we can only agree with your proposals.

During Geneva we tried to explain things to the farmers and at every meeting, the question was asked: will there be war after Geneva[?] This testifies to the fact that people are thirsting for peace. However, some have lost heart, they don't see the real possibility to reach agreement. Therefore, the formation of the committee would be an important step in this direction which would inspire many. Thus I entirely agree with the proposals of the Soviet comrades.

Correns: There has already been a lot said here about Khrushchev's proposals. I think that these proposals will be well accepted in West Germany, since they are intelligent.

The propaganda in the FRG tries to present everything as if the USSR always says no. The new Soviet proposals cut the ground out from under this propaganda. This will give us great help in our all-German work and will give us the opportunity to start a conversation with the population of the FRG.

Khrushchev: If there aren't more people who want to speak, I would like to elaborate on one issue. The Western Powers are not accepting our proposals for a free

city. But psychologically they are already prepared that a treaty with the GDR will be signed. Therefore, they are now especially worried about the situation in West Berlin. They are asking us, they are defining precisely, what the situation in Berlin will be. From their side, they have put forward the formulation that the GDR exercises control over the communications of the Western Powers with West Berlin "as agents of" the Soviet Union. We immediately answered them that this is unacceptable to us. But there is one question of theirs we must answer. They are saying: what will happen if the GDR one day takes the initiative and closes communications between West Berlin and the West?

And so on this issue there must be clear agreement. This has vital significance, even in relations between friends. We can imagine two forms of such guarantees:

1) The GDR together with the Western powers signs an agreement on guarantees. But the West probably won't agree to this. And we don't really need to achieve this.

2) The GDR guarantees it by a unilateral declaration.

However, in this case the Western powers want us to make the guarantee for your guarantee.

Ulbricht: Please. [i.e., okay]

Khrushchev: This would not be right. We can't do this. Therefore, we must sign an agreement with the Western powers which will be registered at the UN, in which it is foreseen that in the event that the GDR violates its obligations regarding guarantees, then the great powers together will seek measures to bring pressures to bear on the GDR.

In our view, this is the only possible path right now. Do you have other proposals on this issue?

Ulbricht: Will this point of view be proposed at Geneva or at a summit?

Khrushchev: Yes, in Geneva. If we don't do this at the Geneva conference, a vacuum might be created at Geneva and there won't be any sense of a future at the conference.

We don't know whether Eisenhower will agree to this. But it is necessary for world opinion to know about these positive proposals by our side.

Ulbricht: The remarks by Comrade Khrushchev are very important. The time is really ripe for this. We must find a way out. But it is clear that we can't solve all issues in one stroke. Therefore I discussed the peace treaty very carefully, since it's clear that the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would exacerbate the situation, for which we are not now prepared. Economically, we still cannot exert influence on the West; therefore, we must win time. This also concerns our policy with regard to the Social Democrats [SED] and the opposition circles of the West through which to isolate Adenauer. The signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would complicate the situation. In all regards, Khrushchev's proposals correspond to the real situation and our domestic political situation.

But we are interested that the issue of nuclear disarmament remain on the agenda. We must constantly

discuss this, since only by this path can we isolate Adenauer. Therefore we will put special stress on all issues which are understood by the majority of the German people. Our opinions in this regard concur completely. All parties in the GDR support these proposals. Accordingly, we will give corresponding instructions to our delegation in Geneva.

And in the future we will declare our support for a non-aggression pact between the two German states and for the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. But from the point of view of the development of the situation in Berlin, we also need to gain time, since Western propaganda is now maintaining that the dependence of West Berlin on the East would mean the lowering of the standard of living in it.

Khrushchev: I would like to quickly sum up the exchange of views on these issues. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the German friends for the fact that you correctly understand us and between us there is a complete unity of views that the German people support us.

This inspires certainty in us, this attests to us that our policy is right. If all the parties in the GDR approve of it, that means that world public opinion will correctly perceive it also. This understanding is a great victory of our peace-loving policy.

Ulbricht: I would like to speak some more about the situation in the GDR. The first months of fulfilling the plan of this year speak to the fact that we are quickly moving forward. We have been thoroughly occupied with certain branches [of the economy], especially chemical [industry and] construction, therefore we have achieved well-known successes. In construction, business has also gotten better now. Currently we are occupied with light industry and trade where we have well-known lags.

The main issue for us now is the increase of work productivity and the reconstruction of industry. In the chemical industry, the corresponding plan has already been worked out. For other branches, we are discussing [the plans]. It is also a new development that cooperation between the workers and intelligentsia is developing and growing. Brigades of socialist labor have been formed. There are about 10,000 of these brigades. The stimulus for this was an initiative of the Soviet comrades in creating brigades of communist labor. It is true that we have them at a lower level than you do, but it is occurring without any kind of propaganda or pressure from above. Thus we highly value this development.

In this connection, we have a request—to bureaucratize and broaden the cooperation and ties between large enterprises of our countries. Until now, too many functionaries [and] trade-union workers, but not direct representatives of industry have travelled [to us]. We should develop connections between exemplary industrial factory workers.

Until August, we are mainly working on a plan for developing agriculture for the period up to 1965. But we

have tasks which we cannot resolve with our own forces by 1961. It is a question of acquiring some foodstuffs and consumer goods, such as wool, coffee, cocoa, and southern [tropical] fruits.

Khrushchev: We will give you oil instead of cocoa.

Ulbricht: Of course we can survive even without cocoa. But the question here is about comparing the standard of living in the GDR with West Germany and West Berlin. At the current time, the population still goes to West Berlin to buy some of these goods, which has, of course, negative political consequences.

We have a list of goods which we need, and we ask you to familiarize yourself with it and to see how you can help us. We are prepared to pay for everything you want in 1963. This is a proposal of the Politburo and planning commission. We aren't presenting these lists for negotiations. We would only like your specialists to look them over and tell us how they could help us. Concretely, the question is of a credit of 700 million rubles over 2 years, 1961-1962.

Khrushchev: Let [Bruno] Leuschner [Head of the GDR State Planning Committee and Politburo member] and Mikeoian study this question.

Ulbricht: I would also like to inform you about the situation in agriculture. The development of our agricultural production is proceeding normally on the whole. At the current time, SKhPK's [Agricultural Production Cooperatives] occupy 49% of land space. We want to strengthen the weak SKhPK's now, and give agricultural technology to the strong cooperatives. We are not planning to speed up the tempo of the cooperativization of the farmers.

In the area of cattle-breeding, we have well-known difficulties. But we are studying these problems now so as to overcome the shortcomings we have here. On the whole, I would like to emphasize again that our agricultural situation is not bad.

We have another request. It has to do with broadening the scientific-technical cooperation between our countries. In several areas we have already achieved world standards. In other areas we are strongly lacking. Therefore we would request that you help us in the development of the chemical industry and in several other areas. I have in mind giving us help in the matter of mastering the technology of new machines. We will give you our best machines, the organization of technological processes for producing these machines, the blueprints for these machines, etc., and you will give us yours. In addition, we ask you to familiarize us with the models of those machines which you buy in America and other capitalist countries. For example, we now produce beautiful artificial fibers, but we are very backward in the production of weaving machines. Our research council worked out a concrete plan and proposal on this issue. And we already gave an order to stop the production of old machines. We are in a good position, for example, in heavy machine building and in the chemical industry

where you exerted certain pressure on us.

But we can only surpass West Germany by carrying out a quick reconstruction of industry. Without this we cannot resolve our main economic task. Besides, our intelligentsia compares not only our standard of living with the level of West Germany, but also the level of production. Therefore, it would have great significance also for the resolution of the question about the intelligentsia.

In sum, the issue is to strengthen [our] exchange and cooperation.

Your delegation which was in the GDR already gave us significant help in this regard. We hope that this cooperation will strengthen even more in the future.

We also think that it is time to broaden the cooperation between our countries in the area of schools, including in the preparation of textbooks.

Until recently, this matter was going badly here. But it has improved in the past year. It is true that we have some different forms and methods of work, but the principles are the same. The same basic problems face you and face us. We are now preparing new school laws which will be implemented shortly. The main direction in which we are going is the introduction of polytechnical education in the schools.

But we are particularly behind in the development of new textbooks and in this regard we need more significant help.

Khrushchev: We agree with you. And we will give you help where we can. But these issues are difficult. Therefore let's wrestle [with them] together. The question of schools, of course, is easier than the question of reconstructing industry. And what you need, what you find good for you [from us], take it. If something isn't suitable for you, don't take it. Here we must have a free exchange of views.

It's harder with machines. And the issue here isn't with secrecy, but with the fact that we have very many machines, and we ourselves often don't know whether we make them worse or better than other countries.

In this connection I would like to say that I really liked your [trade] fair. It gives an idea of a level of achievement of world technology. It even served as a stimulus for the CPSU CC plenum which will meet this month.

On the whole we want to say—let your engineers look at what is suitable for you, and what is suitable, take. We buy a lot of machines abroad. You can also get the blueprints of these machines, and your engineers can assist in their assembling.

Thank you for the information on the situation in your country.

Ulbricht: We need to agree on working out the text of the communique. From our side, comrades Leuschner, Kundermann and Korb could participate in its preparation.

Khrushchev: From our side, comrades [V.V.] Kuznetsov [First Deputy Foreign Minister], [Mikhail]

Pervukhin [Soviet Ambassador to the GDR], [and] [Vladimir] Semenov [Deputy Foreign Minister] will participate.

Grotewohl: I have one concern. Ulbricht already expressed our ideas, our points of view on economic issues. We agreed that Leuschner will discuss this with comrade Patolichev. But we already ran into this problem in the past. If comrades approach this question from the point of view of foreign trade, then the whole matter will be reduced "to a pencil." But in our conditions economic problems turn into political ones.

If we obtain the creation of an all-German committee, but then we have to retreat, our position will be deplorable. Therefore, I really ask you to take this situation into account. We need credits for 1961 and 1962, and I would ask that the Soviet comrades approach this issue from the perspective of what I have said.

Khrushchev: We will look at all of this. We must reckon with our real capabilities.

I would like to remind you that we began the competition with capitalism naked and with bare feet. The people believed us not only due to the promises of sausage and beer, but also due to the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

The Americans are placing great hopes now in the organization of their exhibit in Moscow. They are reckoning that the Soviet people, looking at their [the American] achievements, will turn away from their [Soviet] government. But the Americans don't understand our people. We want to turn the exhibit against the Americans. We will tell our people: look, this is what the richest country of capitalism has achieved in one hundred years. Socialism will give us the opportunity to achieve this significantly faster.

Therefore, we won't raise the issue of socialism or coffee. Socialism—first, but coffee must be delivered, today maybe not the whole cup, but tomorrow the whole cup.

We aren't tradesmen, we are friends. Therefore, we approach all issues politically. But before giving an answer, we must consider, we must look at our capabilities [to help you economically].

Notes taken by: comrades Beletskii, Kotomkin, Myal'dizin

Document No. 2

"Summary of the Talks with the GDR Party-Governmental Delegation on 18 June 1959. On the Soviet side, the same people took part as in the previous meeting, and also A.N. Kosygin and N.S. Patolichev," 4 July 1959

Secret. Notes taken by Beletskii, Kotomkin, Mial'dizin.

Ulbricht: Let me express the gratitude of our delegation for the warm welcome we received in Moscow,

Riga, Kiev and Gorki. Our meetings were a significant event in the development of friendship between the Soviet Union and the GDR. We are all very pleased with the trip, including the students who were also in our delegation. We are very grateful to you for everything, including also for the well-composed program. Regarding the visit to the Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR (VDNKh), it is completely clear that we could only become acquainted with it in general outline. But already after that, it became clear to us that at home we have an entire series of unresolved problems [economically]. At home we are discussing things, but sometimes they aren't applied quite right. Thus, we ask you to accept a group of our specialists for a more detailed study of your achievements which were shown in the Exhibition. This is particularly so with regard to electronics and chemistry. This will have great political significance also, because it will give our intelligentsia the opportunity to be convinced of the superiority of Soviet science and technology over the West, especially over the Americans and West Germans.

Khrushchev: We will welcome everyone who comes to us with the goal of becoming acquainted with our achievements.

Ulbricht: Maybe we should listen to the report on the prepared communiqué.

Khrushchev: They gave us the text of the communiqué late, and we didn't have the opportunity to study it in detail. Thus I propose studying in more detail the draft communiqué we received and giving our views through our representatives.

Ulbricht: Agreed.

Khrushchev: Now I would like to say a few words on one important question, namely: on a peace treaty.

Or perhaps [should I] acquaint you with the latest information on Geneva?

We recently received a letter from Eisenhower and yesterday we gave an answer.⁹ I would like to emphasize that in accordance with our agreement, the exchange of letters took place confidentially.

From Eisenhower's letter, it is clear that we can't expect any great results from the Geneva conference. The Western powers bring everything back to the question of the period of time. They say that our proposal about a time period of 1 year is an ultimatum, although in principle the issue of a time period was put forward by them themselves in the overall plan.

They want to have a meeting with Adenauer, to wreck the agreement on the committee, proposing the principle of proportional representation on the committee. They know, of course, that if they go for the creation of the committee, this would be recognition of the GDR. However, refusing our recent proposals, they at the same time made a series of concessions and proposed limiting the number of troops in West Berlin [and] stopping subversive activity on its territory. But for this they want us to confirm their rights to maintain their occupation in

West Berlin forever and to renounce signing a peace treaty.

They are trying to represent our latest proposal as a threat. But that isn't what is a threat to them, the threat to them is our will for peace and [our] readiness to have a partial resolution of issues.

When we speak about the conclusion of a peace treaty, we have in mind the conclusion of a peace treaty with two or with one German state.

I don't know whether we will bring this issue of the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR to realization[;] however, such a prospect acts in a sobering way on the Western powers and West Germany. This, if you will, is pressure on them, Damocles' sword, which we must hold over them.

Why? Because by the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR they will lose all their rights to West Berlin which come from the fact of the military defeat and the unconditional surrender of Germany. The threat of war from their side is nonsense, it is blackmail, since it is clear that [merely] because of the two and a half-million inhabitants of West Berlin, it would be unreasonable to place under threat the lives of a hundred million people. The more the Western powers know that there is a balance in the area of atomic weapons and rockets, the better it is for us.

Therefore we must directly establish our point of view on a peace treaty in the communiqué. If we didn't do this, it would be a gift to Adenauer; then they would say: the representatives of the USSR and GDR assembled and were afraid to move away from their old positions. Thus I think that we must continue our line on this issue and reflect our position in the communiqué. Furthermore, this must be strengthened by new arguments in our speeches also.

Ulbricht: We are in full agreement with you. I would just like to direct your attention to one issue in connection with the communiqué. Where the recent Soviet proposals are discussed, it says that the Soviet government agrees to the temporary maintenance of the well-known occupation rights of the Western powers in West Berlin. We exchanged opinions on this issue in the delegation. We propose to start not with West Berlin but with the transitional time period (let's say—1 year) during which the commission must agree on a series of questions, that is, to lay special stress on the fact that the Western powers have recommended a limited transition period. This stating of the issue corresponds to the Soviet proposals and at the same time alleviates for the Western powers the transition to this new position. And this facilitates our argumentation.

Khrushchev: Let's not give a time period. A year or a year-and-a-half—this isn't a key issue for us. We are agreed on different time periods, but we aren't agreed on endlessness. Let us act more flexibly on this issue, using a sliding scale of time periods. They are proposing two-and-a-half years, we [are proposing] one year. Maybe we will agree on something in between.

Ulbricht: For us, the main thing now is not to drive them into a corner, but to give them the possibility to change their position.

Khrushchev: Maybe I will acquaint you with the contents of Eisenhower's letter and our answer to it. (The text of the letters is read.)

As you see, in principle there is nothing new, only a repetition and elaboration of what has been said earlier. The new thing is just that we are agreed to make a compromise on the issue of a time period. And this we must emphasize in the communiqué.

I would like to emphasize again that the Western powers aren't interested in a peace treaty, because otherwise they would weaken the threads which are connected with NATO. The present position already weakens NATO, but signing a peace treaty with Germany, this would mean normalizing the situation in Europe. But then how could the Americans keep Denmark, Luxembourg [and] Greece in NATO?

And even the seemingly strong tie of de Gaulle with Adenauer—this is a relative understanding. In France the issue of the removal of American bombers from their country was raised.

Now a few more words on the peace treaty. When the Western powers want to sign any sort of treaty, they don't think about anything. This was how it was, for example, with the conclusion of the treaty with Japan [which the U.S. signed with Japan in 1951 and didn't include the Soviets]. And they weren't blamed by us for the signing of separate peace treaty. Therefore, in order to unmask them, we must write directly in the communiqué: we will achieve the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. But if the reactionary forces will hinder this, then we agree to conclude a peace treaty with two German states. And if the Western powers don't want this, then we will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR.

In concluding a peace treaty with 2 German states or with the GDR, all agreements on the occupation will cease their operation. There is no point in discussing West Berlin separately from the issue of the peace treaty, since this doesn't have equivalent value. These aren't two questions but one question. Berlin is an issue derived from the problem of a peace treaty. But we must clearly speak in the communiqué about the status of the free city of West Berlin[:] otherwise we will be accused of agreeing to swallow up West Berlin. Clearly we must also speak about guarantees.

Ulbricht: We agree.

We also heard that [U.S. Secretary of State Christian] Herter wants to exclude the German question and agree only on the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. He is looking here for a path to a summit conference. As for us, we think that without any reduction of tensions, we cannot move forward including on the German question. Thus, if the Western powers want to talk about disarmament, it wouldn't be bad, because then we would again come to the question of a peace treaty, but from the

other side.

I would also like to note that only a part of the German people understand the slogans about a peace treaty. Thus we will put on the main plan those issues of the peace treaty which are more understood by all, such as for example the liquidation of rocket bases and the prohibition of atomic arms in West Germany. Proceeding from this, it is in our interests that the summit conference will be successful on the issue of atomic disarmament.

Khrushchev: That is correct. But the main thing is to fulfill the resolutions of the [SED] 5th congress [of July 1958], to raise the standard of living. Then it will be clear to each German where there is freedom and where there isn't freedom.

Grotewohl: From a general estimation, I agree with what has been said here. I just have one reservation. It seems to me that the comparison with Japan appears a bit formal. Signing a peace treaty with Germany and with Japan are two different things. Japan was a single state at the moment of the signing of the treaty, but Germany is divided. If we sign a peace treaty, the good conditions will be complicated. However, in the West, they will try to present the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR as the deepening of the division of the country. If there is a peace treaty signed with the GDR, this would mean that there would be written into it something about the acceleration of militarism in the GDR, whereas the problem lies in the acceleration of militarism in West Germany. Since at the current time we can't count on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany or with two German states, then, obviously, this national problem—stopping the arming of (p. 7) West Germany must be resolved now by other means, by the fulfillment of the resolutions of the 5th Congress. We cannot separate these issues.

What we need to study now, what we need to resolve is to determine our relations to the occupying powers and to the occupying authorities. The Western powers currently are formulating their entire policy on the principle that they are allegedly defending freedom and Western culture. They declare that for the defense of this freedom they must maintain the occupation of West Berlin. This explains the fact that they are fighting persistently for their formulation of preserving their rights of occupation.

Thus N.S. Khrushchev's proposal not to give a concrete time period in the communiqué is correct. This will make our position more flexible. Proceeding from this, we must find such a formulation in the communiqué which will present the liquidation of the occupation regime as a necessary process of development in order to make that understandable to everyone.

The most decisive thing in all the negotiations is to win time, and time can be won only through negotiations. So, I agree with you.

Ebert: I would like to speak about the issue of a peace treaty and about Berlin. I agree that a peace treaty and Berlin are one issue. But for our activity in Berlin, it is

important to emphasize that by preserving the current situation, we can find a way to normalize the situation in Berlin (pushing off from their concessions to bring about the stopping of subversive activity, propaganda, etc.). Their proposals on this are already a step towards the normalization of the situation. I must emphasize that normalization is possible not only on technical issues (connections, transport, etc.) but also in political relations. The normalization of life in the city is the basis of our proposals on Berlin. Thus we must obtain such a normalization more persistently and as soon as possible, since this will be understood by the whole population.

Khrushchev: I think that the comments made by Comrade Ebert are correct and they must be taken into account in preparing the communiqué.

Bach: We were very surprised that the last proposal of the Soviet Union in Geneva¹⁰ was seen as an ultimatum by the Western powers. What Comrade Khrushchev said regarding the answer to Eisenhower is a question of diplomatic tactics. We all agree with these tactics. Comrade Khrushchev emphasized that even if we don't speak of time periods, the main issues remain in force.

Khrushchev: Yes.

Bach: We take this into account in our communiqué. If I understood correctly, we should write [in the communiqué] that, in case at Geneva there is no principled agreement reached regarding the signing of a peace treaty with Germany, the USSR is ready to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR.

Khrushchev: We will not call that treaty separate. We must show that not only the USSR, but all countries which are ready for it can sign a peace treaty with the GDR. A number of countries have already declared their agreement to sign such a treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

Homann: On the question of the methods of the realization of our principles, we are ready to compromise, but on the main issues we must remain unbending. The main thing is that what we have said here must be reflected in the communiqué, since this will strengthen the certainty of those who are fighting for peace in Germany.

It is important to write this down, since we evaluated here developments in Germany and the progress of the conference in Geneva. And a basis would be established for further movement forward on the German question.

Scholz: I would like to emphasize that a peace treaty with the GDR is not only a means of pressure on the Western powers, but it also has great significance for the domestic political situation in the GDR. For a long time, we have mobilized the people of the Republic under this slogan. We made a series of concessions, but we must now emphasize that our position remains unchanged on basic issues.

However, it is necessary to emphasize this in the communiqué, but without naming a concrete time period. We already have experience with the date May 27 [the deadline for Khrushchev's 27 November 1958 ultimatum].

As is well-known, on that day everyone in the GDR expected that something would happen. Therefore, it is better not to decree a concrete date, but to preserve freedom of movement for oneself. It will alleviate our political work, although it may also seem that we are not consistent.

Mikoian: I would like to respond to Comrade Grotewohl regarding the analogy between the peace treaty with Germany and the peace treaty with Japan. Of course, there is a difference between a peace treaty with Germany and a peace treaty with Japan. But in this case, the issue is different. The analogy with Japan helps us. The Western powers fought against Japan together with us and signed an act on its capitulation. And we all should have signed a peace treaty with Japan together. But they themselves violated that principle. It is a very serious argument in our hands against them.

They think that so long as there isn't a peace treaty, all conditions connected with the capitulation are still active, and the occupation rights remain in force. When we proposed concluding a peace treaty with Germany, it was a correct and strong approach from our side. This proposal cut the ground out from under their feet. Before they didn't want to talk about Berlin at all, but now they are forced to carry out negotiations with us on it.

We would like to sign a peace treaty with a united Germany. We propose to give a certain time period for achieving agreement on this issue between the German states. If such an agreement is not reached, then we are ready to conclude a peace treaty with two German states. If the Western powers won't agree to this either, then we will sign a treaty with the GDR.

But they don't want the signing of a peace treaty at all. Therefore, if they will be afraid that there will be a peace treaty signed with the GDR, which would deprive them of their occupation rights, then they will be forced to find a new path for agreement. The threat of signing a peace treaty will force them to carry out negotiations with us.

I think that Comrade Scholz was right when he talked about the great significance of a peace treaty also for the GDR. It is important for the GDR, because it would raise its significance in the eyes of world public opinion.

Khrushchev: We could take examples from history. When, for example, the revolution occurred in Russia and the Soviet representatives carried out negotiations with Germany in Brest in early 1918, the German government signed a peace treaty with [Simon] Petliura and turned their troops on Ukraine, and not only on Ukraine, but all the way to Rostov. And Russia waged war with Germany being a united state.

Or take the example of Vietnam. In Geneva in 1954 the great powers agreed on the carrying out of free elections in Vietnam [after] a two year period. Were there elections? There weren't. Who fought against holding these elections? Mainly, the USA fought against this. It wasn't advantageous to them, and so they didn't even

think about elections.

It appears that capitalistic morals go like the wind blows—they do what is advantageous for them. When it is advantageous to them, they find the necessary arguments.

Now about proportional representation. They say, for example, that the GDR is one-third of Germany, and the FRG is two-thirds. But if we take China, 600 million people live in the PRC [People's Republic of China], and 10 million people live on Taiwan. And who do the Americans recognize, whose representative sits in the UN?

Such are the morals of a blockhead.

Or Guatemala. With the help of rough forces, the USA expelled the democratic government [of Jacob Arbenz in 1954] which they didn't like, because it was advantageous to them [to do so].

Furthermore, the Americans maintain, for example, that Franco's Spain is a free country, and they want to accept it in NATO.

Therefore we must always understand with whom we are dealing. They are bandits. If we were weak, they would long ago have resolved the German question to their advantage.

Adenauer decided to remain chancellor in order to carry out a "policy of strength" better than Dulles himself did.

So we must not forget that if we let down our guard, they will swallow us up.

However, we have the means to scratch them slightly on the throat.

Our cause is just. They will not start a war, and we all the more [won't].

Developments are going in our favor. This is true not only for the USSR, but all for the socialist countries, including also the GDR. The GDR must exert socialist influence on the entire West. We have everything we need to do this.

Look at how the situation changed in 1956. They didn't want to shake hands with us. And now Macmillan himself came to us. And soon [U.S. Vice President] Nixon and [Averell] Harriman will come travel around our country. And it is because a difficult situation has been created for them, and it will become more difficult.

If they accused us earlier of resolving social problems by force, now everyone can be convinced that we decide these issues by the force of the example of socialist organization.

Thus our communiqué will have great significance. It will also reflect our peace-loving firmness.

Ulbricht: Thank you very much for your explanation.

Khrushchev: We are very glad that our points of views coincide. This is especially important for such a pointed issue as the German one. Speaking of our united views, I have in mind the representatives of all the parties of the National Front of Democratic Germany.

Ulbricht: Comrade Khrushchev emphasized that the most decisive issue for us is the issue of the fulfillment of

the main economic tasks. We, on our side, are doing all to realize these tasks. Therefore we have set ourselves the goal of surpassing the FRG. This will have great significance also for the resolution of the Berlin issue. It isn't accidental therefore that [Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt recently said that the question of the struggle for Berlin is a question of the struggle of two systems.

However, for realizing the tasks before us, we ask you to give us help. Comrade Leuschner informed us about the talks which took place on this issue. We thank you for giving us help.

Khrushchev: Are we finished with the question of the communiqué? Let the responsible officials definitively edit the text of the communiqué keeping in mind also the comments of Comrade Ebert about how we are ready to eliminate in parts the phenomena which are interfering with the reduction of tensions, although it can't be done immediately. This would be a good beginning on the matter of the reduction of tensions, [and] it would lay the way for reaching agreement on the German question.

If there aren't other comments, let us move to economic issues.

Maybe the comrades who carried out negotiations on economic issues could inform us of the results.

Ulbricht: Maybe we could listen to Comrade Leuschner.

Leuschner: We conducted the negotiations on the basis of the lists which were presented by the German side. During the negotiations, Comrade [N.] Patolichev [Minister of Foreign Trade] noted that the Soviet Union acquires a series of goods for us which we need from the capitalist market.

We understood Comrade Patolichev such that the Soviet Union is prepared to grant us credit in 1960 in the amount of 250 million rubles, for which will be acquired wool, cocoa, coffee, southern fruits, leather, etc. (we asked for 400 million rubles); 200 million rubles in 1961 for the same goods (we asked for 400 million rubles); and in 1962 120 million rubles (we asked for 300 million rubles).

Regarding the payment for this, Comrade Patolichev suggested to fix that in the annual talks. We agreed with this proposal.

Now we can return to working on the seven-year plan. In September, Comrade Ulbricht submitted the draft seven-year plan to the Volkskammer [the GDR parliament], and we will have the opportunity to work with a clear perspective. Now all issues which were open for us have been resolved.

It is true that we didn't completely reach the level of demand in the FRG in certain goods. But that isn't the main thing. Our plan is strained, but we will apply all our forces to fulfill it.

Khrushchev: We already have some experience with talks with the union republics on the composition of plans. Usually they always ask for two-three times more.

Leuschner: We didn't have in mind giving lists for negotiations, and we haven't raised too high demands.

Khrushchev: I had in mind here our workers. Aside from this, you must bear in mind that developments sometimes go better than we plan. Thus you must keep in mind that as for us, you can open additional possibilities which will facilitate the resolution of the problems before us.

Mikoian: The comrades pointed here to the necessity of buying southern fruits. These products could be acquired for the GDR from the lesser developed states of the East in exchange for their products, all the more since these countries are experiencing difficulties in selling fruits. This would also improve the political weight of the GDR in these countries.

Khrushchev: The GDR must study these markets and adapt to them.

Mikoian: From our side, we can help you with your foreign trade apparatus, and Yugoslavia can also give you this help.

I would like to make another proposal, if there aren't objections from your side, namely: to prepare in the next one-two months a plan of foreign trade exchange for seven years between our countries.

Ulbricht: That is a very good proposal. It would be desirable to sign an agreement on it before the meeting of the Volkskammer, that is, in August. Maybe Leuschner and Patolichev could agree on the basic conditions of this treaty still before the departure of the delegation?

Khrushchev: Good.

Ulbricht: In the name of the delegation, I would like to express great satisfaction with the results of the talks which have shown complete agreement on all questions. The business discussion during the negotiations showed that cooperation between our countries deepens more and more. We heartily thank you.

Khrushchev: And we would like to thank you and also express the hope that our meeting will serve the deepening friendship not only between our governments, but also with the entire German people. On the issue of how relations are turning out between the USSR and the GDR, not only are our countries interested, but all peace-loving peoples are also.

[Source: *Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, Fond 0742, Opis 4, Portfel' 33, Papka 31, ll. 71-87 for June 9 and ll. 88-102 for June 18; obtained and translated from Russian by Hope M. Harrison.]*

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¹ The foreign ministers representing the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, East Germany, and West Germany were, respectively Christian Herter, Andrei Gromyko, Selwyn Lloyd, Maurice Couve de Murville, Lothar Bolz (State Secretary and First Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer was there too as the real political head of the delegation), and Heinrich von Brentano (Brentano refused to sit in same room as Bolz, so Wilhelm Grewe, the West German Ambassador to the U.S., sat there representing West Germany). On Brentano and Grewe, see Ann Tusa, *The Last Division* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), p. 168.

² For detailed U.S. documentation on the Geneva CFM, see U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. VIII, Berlin Crisis, 1958-1959* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993); and for useful summaries of the CFM from the Western perspective, see Jack Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 71-96; and Tusa, *The Last Division*, pp. 163-177. From the Soviet perspective, see Oleg Grinevskij, *Tauwetter* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1996), pp. 157-168.

³ For the text of the ultimatum and other related documents, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 9446, n.d.), pp. 552-559. For background information on the ultimatum and Khrushchev's personal role therein, see Hope M. Harrison, "New Evidence on Khrushchev's 1958 Berlin Ultimatum," *Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin*, Issue 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 35-39. On the Berlin Crisis of 1958-61 more generally, see Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961," CWIHP Working Paper No. 5 (May 1993), and Vladislav Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)," CWIHP Working Paper No. 6 (May 1993).

⁴ Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Farmer's Party of Germany.

⁵ Michael Lemke, *Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), p. 130.

⁶ *Pravda*, 20 June 1959, p. 1.

⁷ Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR – Bundesarchiv, ZPA, NL 90/472.

⁸ *Pravda*, 20 June 1959, p. 1.

⁹ For Eisenhower's letter to Khrushchev dated 15 June 1959 and Khrushchev's response of June 17, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. VIII*, pp. 901-903 and 913-917, respectively.

¹⁰ At which time the Soviet Union gave the all-German commission 18 months to work things out.

The End of the Berlin Crisis: New Evidence From the Polish and East German Archives

Introduction, translation, and annotation by Douglas Selvage¹

Why did Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev not keep his promise to sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961? Most scholars agree that after the construction of the wall, he was concerned in part that a transfer of Soviet control functions in and around Berlin to the GDR might spark a military conflict with the West.² Hope Harrison's work points to a second factor: a desire on Khrushchev's part to free himself from the leverage that the East Germans had achieved during the crisis by threatening to collapse. He saw the Berlin Wall, she writes, "not only as a way to save the GDR by stemming the refugee exodus, but also as a way to wall in Ulbricht in East Berlin so that he could not grab West Berlin by gradually usurping the Soviet border control functions."³

A third factor in Khrushchev's decision not to sign a separate peace treaty, I will argue, was his fear of a Western economic embargo against the GDR and the Soviet bloc in general. All scholars agree that Khrushchev approved the construction of the Berlin Wall first and foremost to stem the flow of refugees and prevent the immediate economic collapse of the GDR. Recently-declassified documents from the Polish and East German archives suggest that his decision not to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR arose in part from a similar fear. A peace treaty with the GDR, he declared in private meetings after the construction of the wall, would most likely spark a Western economic embargo against the socialist bloc. Such an embargo, he worried, would undermine the stability not only of the GDR, but also of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other Soviet-bloc countries. This group of states, dependent on trade with the West, had already demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to provide the GDR with the level of economic support that East Berlin had been demanding. In the wake of a Western embargo, they would have had difficulty providing for their own needs, let alone the GDR's. Even Soviet officials complained about the undue burden placed upon the Soviet economy by the GDR's endless demands. In February 1962, Khrushchev effectively ordered Ulbricht to end the GDR's campaign for a separate peace treaty and to focus instead on the GDR's economic difficulties, especially in agriculture. Ulbricht became the target of growing criticism in Moscow for his seeming inability to improve the GDR's economic situation.

Khrushchev's "Economic Romanticism"

Khrushchev's economic fears in 1961-62 stood in

stark contrast to his optimism of 1958-60 regarding the ability of the GDR and the Soviet bloc to withstand a Western embargo. On 10 November 1958, he had predicted in talks with Poland's communist leader, Władysław Gomułka, that the West might respond to his Berlin gambit with an economic blockade. This did not matter, he then contended, because the Soviet bloc had sufficient foodstuffs to supply both the GDR and West Berlin.⁴ Even in November 1960, after a flood of refugees had left the GDR for West Berlin, Khrushchev reassured Ulbricht that if the West responded to a separate peace treaty with an embargo against the GDR, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states would give the GDR the necessary support to survive.⁵ The Soviet leader overestimated not only the economic capabilities of the Soviet bloc, but also the willingness of the other socialist states to provide additional economic assistance to the GDR.

Khrushchev's miscalculations originated in a certain romanticism about the economic prospects of socialism—a complement to his "nuclear-missile romanticism" in the military field. According to Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, "Khrushchev's belief that the Communist system would prevail over capitalism made him reluctant to acknowledge the obvious: that economically the GDR was lagging behind prosperous West Germany and depended on the Soviet Union's subsidies."⁶ The same Khrushchev who declared that the Soviet Union would catch up and surpass the United States in the economic field within ten years seemed to believe Ulbricht's claim in 1958 that with the economic support of the socialist camp, the GDR could meet or even surpass the FRG's standard of living within several years.⁷ By the time of his meeting with Ulbricht in November 1960, it was clear that this would not be the case. In fact, the GDR's economy, it turned out, was dependent upon West Germany for steel and other essential goods. On September 30, Bonn had announced its plans to terminate the inter-German trade agreement at the end of the year. Bonn was retaliating against the GDR's growing restrictions on travel to and from West Berlin—restrictions that had not been cleared by the Soviets. Nevertheless, Khrushchev reassured Ulbricht that the Soviet Union and the other socialist states could and would provide the GDR with the necessary economic aid to survive an embargo—"East German needs are our needs." On that note, Ulbricht agreed to a renewal of Moscow's offer to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR—this time, by the end of 1961.⁸

Poland, the Soviet Bloc and the Berlin Crisis

Khrushchev had clearly not consulted in advance with the other socialist states about his offer of increased economic assistance. Even while Ulbricht and Khrushchev discussed economic preparations for a peace treaty in July 1961, Poland rejected an East German request for additional aid. It would not grant the GDR an additional 150,000 tons of coal in 1961 unless it received raw materials in return. It also refused to lower the price of coal or to forego an increase in transit costs between the GDR and the Soviet Union.⁹ Not only Poland, but also Czechoslovakia and Romania were apparently resisting the GDR's economic demands.¹⁰ The growing opposition to the GDR's beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies most likely played a role in the somewhat cryptic report to Ulbricht on July 15 that despite his ongoing talks with Khrushchev, he should be prepared to discuss "political-economic" and military issues at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow from 3-5 August 1961.¹¹

Hope Harrison's analysis suggests that Khrushchev, under pressure from Ulbricht, agreed to the construction of the Berlin Wall some time by 26 July 1961.¹² New evidence from the Polish archives confirms that Ulbricht was pushing for a wall and Khrushchev was hesitating. Also pushing for the construction of a wall was Poland's Communist leader, Władysław Gomułka. The Polish leader later complained on at least two different occasions about Khrushchev's failure to act quickly. The flood of refugees through Berlin was creating a drain not only on the East German economy, but also on the economies of its allies, which felt compelled to assist the GDR (see Document # 1). In a speech before the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) on 22 November 1961, Gomułka justified the Soviet bloc's Berlin policy and the construction of the Wall. Gomułka declared: "Looking at things realistically, what was decisive for us in putting forth the matter of a peace treaty and Berlin, what was the deciding factor? Decisive was the fact was that they [the West] have been continually creating diversions in the German Democratic Republic for years, that they were continually drawing people out of Berlin and doing whatever they wanted to do. By the way, we were saying among ourselves here long before the Moscow meeting [of the Warsaw Pact in August] ... why not put an end to it? Close off, wall off Berlin. And later we made such a decision in Moscow."¹³ Gomułka's call for speed in establishing "border controls" in Berlin at the August meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow was thus not part of an orchestrated campaign of support for the GDR.¹⁴ Rather, it was an expression of concern that Khrushchev might continue to hesitate on constructing a wall.

The same economic concerns that made Gomułka into an early supporter of the Berlin Wall also led him to oppose the idea of increased assistance for the GDR at the Moscow meeting. He agreed that the other socialist states needed to support the GDR's campaign to free itself from

dependence on West Germany (*Störfreimachung*), but the GDR, he warned, should achieve its goal through closer economic cooperation with its allies, rather than through demands for increased assistance. If the West decided to institute an embargo, Gomułka argued, it would be an embargo against the entire socialist bloc, not just the GDR. (Indeed, representatives of the Western powers and the FRG had agreed only one day before the Warsaw Pact meeting to institute an economic embargo against the entire Eastern Bloc if the Soviets or East Germans cut off Western Berlin.¹⁵) The other socialist states, he concluded, could assist the GDR, but not at the expense of their own economic development. Antonín Novotný of Czechoslovakia and Janos Kádár of Hungary supported Gomułka's arguments. Thirty percent of Hungary's trade, Kádár pointed out, was with the West; and of that trade, 25% was with West Germany. In general, the other socialist states were willing to sign a separate peace treaty, but were opposed to bankrupting themselves in order to assist the GDR.¹⁶

Khrushchev was taken aback by the attitudes of Gomułka and the other leaders. He criticized the socialist states for having so many economic contacts with the West. All socialist states, he declared, had a responsibility to support the GDR. If the GDR did not receive additional assistance, he warned, it would be overrun by West Germany; then, the *Bundeswehr* would be sitting on the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Unless the GDR's standard of living were stabilized, he said, Ulbricht would fall from power.¹⁷

Despite Khrushchev's admonitions, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania continued to refuse the GDR the level of assistance that it was demanding. On September 12, the SED Politburo complained—somewhat hypocritically—that the GDR could "no longer accept the one-sided character of its economic relations" with Poland.¹⁸

Khrushchev's Flip-Flop on a Separate Peace Treaty

After the construction of the Berlin Wall, Khrushchev—despite his earlier criticisms—increasingly adopted the arguments of Gomułka and the other socialist leaders. At the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow in October 1961, he retracted the December 31 deadline for concluding a separate peace treaty, contingent upon progress in negotiations with the West on the German question. Although Ulbricht was visibly disappointed—his applause at the party congress died down after Khrushchev's announcement¹⁹—he had apparently been informed of Khrushchev's decision a month before. On September 23, Ulbricht had written a letter to Gomułka inviting him to attend the GDR's 12th anniversary celebrations at the beginning of October. "The participation of representative party and state delegations from the socialist states," the East German leader wrote, "will underline their determination to conclude a German peace treaty

sometime yet in this century [my emphasis].”²⁰

In contrast to Ulbricht, Gomułka voiced his full support at the CPSU party congress for Khrushchev’s decision to withdraw the December 31 deadline.²¹ This most likely reflected his own concerns about the effects of an economic embargo on Poland. During his stay in Moscow, Gomułka met with Khrushchev and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to discuss developments since August 13 (see Document #2 below). Gromyko summarized Moscow’s talks with the West since mid-August, and Khrushchev drew his own conclusions. The United States, Gromyko reported, had voiced a willingness “to recognize the borders of Germany *de facto* and *de jure* (the border on the Oder-Neisse)” and “the border between the GDR and West Germany *de facto*.” Rusk, Khrushchev added, had suggested that the U.S. might also support a non-aggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact and NATO—a staple of Khrushchev’s diplomacy—and, more importantly, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to both German states. Khrushchev justified his decision to postpone a peace treaty by pointing, on the one hand, to the potential concessions that could be won by continuing talks with the West and, on the other hand, to the potential damage that an economic embargo might cause to Poland, the GDR, and the other socialist states. He told Gomułka: “The situation is favorable to us... The USA requested that we not force the issue of a peace treaty with Germany, that we wait 4-6 weeks so that it can work out its own position... There will not be a war, but signing a peace treaty with the GDR might exacerbate the situation... We must continue our game... What will we gain and what will we lose by concluding a separate peace treaty with the GDR [?] We will lose: The Americans, the English, the French might declare an economic blockade against the USSR and the socialist countries. Regarding the USSR, these are empty platitudes, but the other countries—the GDR, Poland, Hungary and to a lesser extent, Romania—might suffer if they do that. We should wait for 4-6 weeks, like they [the Americans] asked, to conclude a treaty... We should not pass any resolutions. The game continues, we must keep applying pressure. We should coordinate our position with Comrade Ulbricht. We should carry on salami tactics with regard to the rights of the Western countries... We have to pick our way through, divide them, exploit all the possibilities.”

Based on the U.S. documents declassified to date, Khrushchev and Gromyko—at best—exaggerated Rusk’s expressed willingness to make concessions. To the consternation of the West Germans, Rusk had suggested to Gromyko that the U.S. would be willing to negotiate about issues relating to “European security” as soon as the Western powers’ right to access to West Berlin were insured and reaffirmed by the Soviet Union (i.e., the U.S. was unwilling to enter into negotiations with the GDR). The U.S. Secretary of State had mentioned specifically a reduction of armaments in Central Europe (but no

“disengagement”), the establishment of safeguards against surprise attacks, and an exchange of “assurances” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact “that they could live peacefully.” He has also declared that it was in the interest of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to prevent the “spread of national nuclear weapons.” Rusk did not, however, ask the Soviets for “4-6 weeks” to formulate a position, as Khrushchev implied to Gomułka, nor did he suggest that the U.S. was prepared to recognize Germany’s borders—let alone the inner-German demarcation line—*de facto* or *de jure*. It was Gromyko, not Rusk, who kept bringing up in their talks Western recognition of the existing borders and of the “sovereignty” of the GDR.²²

Although Khrushchev and Gromyko embellished Rusk’s comments, they were not lying to Gomułka to the extent that there were serious differences among the Western powers and the FRG regarding European Security and a Berlin settlement. Privately, the U.S. State Department was contemplating broader negotiations with the USSR over Berlin—a fact reflected in Rusk’s guarded comments to Gromyko. Specifically, the State Department was considering a more general settlement in Central Europe: a four-power declaration (U.S., USSR, Great Britain, and France) calling for the establishment of mixed commissions between the two German states to discuss personal, economic, and cultural exchange; a four power commitment to recognize the existing borders of Germany in any peace settlement (i.e. *de facto* recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line); a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO; a four power declaration on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to third states; and a reaffirmation by Bonn of its 1954 commitment not to produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.²³ When Adenauer visited Washington in November 1961, Kennedy probed him with regard to all three matters: inter-German commissions; recognition of the existing frontiers, especially the Oder-Neisse Line; and a renewed West German commitment forswearing weapons of mass destruction. Adenauer was opposed to concessions in all three areas. A renewed declaration on weapons of mass destruction would “discriminate” against the FRG; the Oder-Neisse Line remained at the very least a bargaining chip in any future peace settlement; and inter-German commissions would have to be limited to *ad hoc* discussion of technical matters, lest they lead to *de facto* recognition of the GDR.²⁴ The divisions within NATO between the U.S. and Great Britain, on the one hand, which were willing to discuss matters beyond a Berlin settlement with the Soviet Union, and France and the FRG, on the other hand, which opposed any linkage between Berlin and other issues, seemed to provide an ideal opportunity for Moscow to play the Western allies against each other.²⁵ This explains in part Khrushchev’s optimism—and embellishments—during his talks with Gomułka.

Although Khrushchev justified his decision to

Gomułka only in terms of the West's alleged willingness to make concessions and a possible economic embargo against the socialist bloc, one should not discount the role of other factors in his decision. Moscow's worsening relations with China or a fear of Ulbricht's growing influence might still have played the key role; Khrushchev would not have necessarily informed Gomułka about such ulterior motives.²⁶ The concerns that he expressed about an embargo, which openly contradicted his earlier statements on the subject, were clearly meant to appeal to the Polish leader's own interests and gain his support. Nevertheless, Khrushchev would use a possible embargo as an excuse for avoiding a peace treaty once again, during Ulbricht's visit to Moscow at the end of February 1962.

Ulbricht's Visit to Moscow, February 1962

By the time of Ulbricht's visit to Moscow in February 1962, the talks between Gromyko and the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Llewellyn S. Thompson, had reached an impasse. The West had quickly retreated on the issue of recognizing Germany's borders—specially the inter-German border—and was focusing first and foremost on guaranteeing access to West Berlin (see documents #3-4 below). Nevertheless, Khrushchev had clearly decided by this point to abandon a separate peace treaty with the GDR, while Ulbricht still wanted to force the issue.

Ulbricht brought up the issue of a separate peace treaty during his first session with Khrushchev on February 26. The failure to conclude such an agreement, he told Khrushchev, had undermined the authority of the SED and the Soviet Union inside the GDR. "In wide circles of the population," he said, "the opinion has arisen that the Soviet Union and the GDR have overreached themselves in the struggle for a peace treaty." Ulbricht pleaded with Khrushchev to conclude a separate peace treaty by the end of the summer. It would assist the SED in the upcoming election campaign to the East German parliament, the *Volkskammer*, and help restore the party's tarnished image. The conclusion of a peace treaty, he suggested, need not exacerbate relations with the West; the GDR was willing to sign a peace treaty that left open matters relating to transit to West Berlin. If the West proved recalcitrant, the Soviet bloc could still use access to West Berlin as a lever to compel the Western powers' acceptance of the separate agreement.

Khrushchev rejected Ulbricht's plea. Although the Thompson-Gromyko talks were a "step back" from the West's earlier statements, the Warsaw Pact could not afford to exacerbate the situation by signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR—at least for the time being. Khrushchev cited two major reasons. First, there was a possibility of war with the West if the Soviet Union turned over control of the access routes to West Berlin to the GDR. Second, there was the threat of an embargo against the socialist bloc. He explained:

One must see things the way they are. We are

disturbing the USA's air traffic [to and from Berlin]. It has to defend itself. The imperialist forces will always be against us. One must see that West Berlin is not in Adenauer's hands. *On August 13, we achieved the maximum of what was possible* [my emphasis]. I have the same impression as before that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR need not lead to war. But one must consider the situation realistically. You want to give your signature, and we are supposed to give economically, because one must see the possibility that after the conclusion of a peace treaty, there will be an economic boycott. Adenauer will carry out an economic boycott, and we will have to give [the GDR] everything that is lacking....

The signing of a peace treaty would lead to a normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The main question, however, is not the peace treaty, but a consolidation of the economic situation [in the GDR]. That is what we have to concentrate on. I say once again with regard to a peace treaty, that I believe there would be no war, but who can guarantee that? What is pushing us to a peace treaty? Nothing. Until August 13, we were racking our brains over how to move forward. Now the borders are closed. One must always proceed from the idea that the conclusion of a peace treaty must serve us, that we will conclude it when we need it.... We support the GDR's measures, but we do not agree that it is absolutely necessary to use the peace treaty as a slogan for the elections to the *Volkskammer*."

Khrushchev even expressed understanding for Kennedy's position. He openly voiced his concern—already posited by Hope Harrison—about what Ulbricht might do if the Soviet Union granted him control over the access routes to West Berlin.²⁷ "The Thompson-Gromyko talks are a step backwards in comparison to the earlier talks. The USA wants to raise its price. We have said openly that these are no foundations for negotiations. Previously, [U.S. President John F.] Kennedy presented his viewpoint on the borders of Poland and the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. Of course he cannot ratify the German border between the GDR and West Germany. One cannot expect that of him. He is trying to reach an agreement—for example, on an international [border] control. In one interview, he posed the question himself of what one can do and to whom one can turn if, for example, Ulbricht infringes upon the [existing] order regarding access routes to Berlin. To whom can one turn in such a situation?" In case Ulbricht was hoping for assistance from the Chinese, Khrushchev dispelled his illusions. "The Albanians and the Chinese," he said, "are criticizing us with regard to the peace treaty and West Berlin. What are they doing themselves? (Portuguese colonies in India, Hong Kong, etc.)."

In effect, Khrushchev ordered Ulbricht to give up his campaign for a separate peace treaty and to focus instead on strengthening the GDR's economy, seriously weakened by the crisis over Berlin. The Soviet leader remained committed to granting the GDR more assistance than his

planning chief, Alexei Kosygin, thought was wise. (“In response to an objection by Comrade Kosygin,” the report on the February 26 meeting reads, “Comrade Khrushchev replied that we cannot act like petty traders.”) Nevertheless, in contrast to the meeting with Ulbricht in November 1960,²⁸ he now gave Kosygin free rein to criticize the GDR’s economic policies. Khrushchev himself chided Ulbricht for importing potatoes from Poland — a particularly pointed comment, given Ulbricht’s frequent criticisms of Poland’s failure to collectivize agriculture²⁹ — and Kosygin noted that the GDR, a former exporter of sugar, was now importing it. The East Germans, Khrushchev and Kosygin argued, were devoting great resources to building modern city centers when they needed to invest more in agriculture. In a final blow, the Soviets ordered Ulbricht to “activate trade with Bonn to the maximum extent” in order to help overcome the GDR’s economic difficulties. The subtext was clear: neither the GDR nor its allies could economically afford a separate peace treaty. Although the Soviet bloc, Khrushchev told Ulbricht on February 27, would “aggressively pursue” a campaign for a separate peace treaty, “we [the Soviet Union] will decide at what point to conclude it.” The Soviet Union, of course, never found the right moment to conclude such an agreement.

Conclusions

Khrushchev’s decision to provoke the Berlin Crisis in November 1958 was the product of economic, as well as military-political, miscalculation. The Soviet leader overestimated not only the potential of the changing strategic balance to squeeze concessions out of the West, but also the economic ability of the GDR and the entire Soviet bloc to withstand the economic pressures — both potential and real — arising from a prolonged conflict with the West over Berlin and the German question. By 1961, East Germany’s socialist-bloc allies were no longer willing to sacrifice their own economic development for the sake of the GDR. Even if their fears of a Western economic embargo were not the deciding factor in Khrushchev’s decision to renege on a separate peace treaty with the GDR, they did provide him with a useful excuse to justify his decision. The irritation of the GDR’s allies — including the Soviet Union — with Ulbricht’s never-ending economic demands was quite apparent in 1961-62.

The economic weaknesses revealed during the Berlin Crisis would help spark a flurry of reform proposals in Eastern Europe during the early 1960’s: Khrushchev’s plans to reform the Comecon and institute a “socialist division of labor”; Gomulka’s project for closer economic cooperation within the “northern triangle” of Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia; and Ulbricht’s “New Economic System” for the GDR. Of the three initiatives, only the New Economic System would make it to the implementation stage.³⁰ Conflicts would continue between the GDR and its allies over economic questions. Khrushchev grew increasingly critical of the GDR’s

failings in agriculture — in particular, Ulbricht’s rejection of his pet project of introducing corn to East European agriculture.³¹ Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, editor-in-chief of *Izvestiya*, vocally criticized Ulbricht at a gathering of Soviet-bloc journalists in May 1962. In his interview with the East German leader, Adzhubei declared, Ulbricht had not expressed “a single fresh thought.” He was still blaming all the GDR’s economic difficulties on “militarism in the FRG.” “We got the impression,” Adzhubei continued, “that Ulbricht is unable to deal with the fundamental question: how to achieve results in agriculture — they should work on it. Phrases cannot replace potatoes, which the GDR does not have.”³² Adzhubei, of course, would make even harsher remarks about Ulbricht during his “mission” to Bonn in July-August 1964.³³ The tensions between Ulbricht and Khrushchev in 1964, the recently-declassified documents make clear, had their origins in the differences of 1961-62 over the East German economy and a separate peace treaty.

Document No. 1 (Excerpt)

Transcript of a meeting between the delegations of the PZPR and the SED in Moscow, 2 December 1969

... [Polish Premier Józef] Cyrankiewicz: Earlier you spoke about closing the border [to West Berlin]; I would like to remind you of how many times the Poles [i.e., the Polish communists] proposed that it be closed.

Gomułka: And how much earlier!

Ulbricht: We know about this and have not forgotten. We were always of the same opinion as you. Even then, when something was hurting us — I have in mind the matter of the open border.

Gomułka: I would have shut it far earlier. How many times I told Khrushchev about it!

Ulbricht: We know about that, but Khrushchev believed after all that he could conclude a treaty with the FRG modeled after Rapallo....

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 16.]

Document No. 2

Rough Notes from a Conversation (Gromyko, Khrushchev, and Gomulka) on the International Situation, n.d. [October 1961]

Comrade Gromyko: In talks with [U.S. Secretary of State Dean] Rusk, [U.K. Foreign Minister Lord Alec] Home, [U.S. President John F.] Kennedy and [U.K. Prime Minister Harold] Macmillan, it struck me above all else how they conducted them in a friendly tone, which has not always been the case. We concluded that they are trying to find ways to achieve an understanding on the question of Germany and West Berlin. During the exchange of

views, every major issue was touched upon. Nevertheless, it was stressed in the conversations that this is only a preliminary exchange of views before official talks.

From the very beginning, Rusk³⁴, Macmillan and Kennedy declared that we should discuss on the basis of the actual situation what would be acceptable to the Western countries. It has to do with access to West Berlin. Rusk emphasized that we should guarantee free access to West Berlin. We utilized Comrade Khrushchev's discussion with [Belgian Premier Paul-Henri] Spaak³⁵ and tried to justify ourselves by emphasizing that the GDR and the USSR have declared that they will respect the general order of the people of West Berlin. Our position was very understandable to them.

The question of access to West Berlin: Regarding this question, there have not been any statements. They are of the opinion that some new legal changes will have to be introduced or else the occupation regime will have to be maintained. Regarding Germany's borders: Rusk declared with Kennedy's approval that the government of the USA is prepared to recognize the borders of Germany *de facto* and *de jure* (the border on the Oder-Neisse). With regard to Czechoslovakia's borders, they are thinking over some form of commitment to recognize that country's borders. They are prepared to recognize the border between the GDR and West Germany *de facto*.

Comrade Khrushchev: Everything that we say here must remain top secret because our position corresponds to their position.

The West Germans are afraid that the USA will say more than it should about Germany's borders.

In the third discussion, Rusk also touched upon the following questions: security in Europe —(1) the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Home also spoke about this. (2) Rusk declared that the USA is in favor [of the idea] that the GDR and West Germany should not produce nuclear weapons and that other countries should not supply these countries with such weapons. (3) The USA declared itself in favor of reducing the size of armies on both sides of the front in the heart of Europe.

The first two matters should be resolved simultaneously. With regard to the other matter, the prevention of sudden aggression — that matter will have

to be resolved at a later date.

Conclusion: They consider the question of security in Europe a concession to our advantage.

With regard to the sovereignty of the GDR, there were no statements. They did ask us, however, how we understand [the issue of] respecting the GDR's sovereignty.

The situation is favorable for us.

The USA proposed that we continue the exchange of views. We voiced our approval.

The exchange of views will be continued with the USA's ambassador in Moscow.

The basis for further discussions is not bad.

Comrade Khrushchev: The USA requested that we not force the issue of a peace treaty with Germany, that we wait 4-6 weeks so that it can work out its own position. Comrade Khrushchev spoke further about the incidents on the border to West Berlin, about how access was suspended to West Berlin, which has become an island.

He spoke further about the incident with the tanks [i.e., the tank standoff at Checkpoint Charlie on October 27] and how the police are checking every route leading to Berlin.

In a conversation with Comrade Khrushchev, Kennedy always stressed that we are a great country and that we should respect each other.

There will not be a war, but signing a peace treaty with the GDR might exacerbate the situation.

Berlin is a closed city, without prospects /statement of American journalists/.

Although there will be no war, we should not exacerbate the situation. We must continue our game.

We are not afraid, but we do not want war. We can agree with Kennedy: What's Berlin to you? — before you there are enormous possibilities, history is working to your advantage.

What will we gain and what will we lose by concluding a peace treaty with the GDR[?]

We will lose: The Americans, the English, the French might declare an economic blockade against the USSR and the socialist countries. Regarding the USSR, these are empty platitudes, but the other countries — the GDR, Poland, Hungary and to a lesser extent, Romania — might suffer if they do that. We should wait for 4-6 weeks, like

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MILTON LEITENBERG, KATHRYN WEATHERSBY, AND SHU GUANG ZHANG, "NEW EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DURING THE KOREAN WAR" (NOVEMBER 10, 1998)

HOPE HARRISON AND DAVID MURPHY, "REASSESSING THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958-62" CO-SPONSORED BY THE KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES (DECEMBER 4, 1998)

they asked, to conclude a treaty.

We are of the opinion that we should continue with our [current] line, should keep applying pressure and exploit the weaknesses of the enemy. We should strive to remove the official representatives from West Berlin and liquidate Adenauer's pretensions to West Berlin....

The economic situation of the USSR is outstanding, We should not force the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, but continue to move forward....

We should not pass any resolutions. The game continues, we should keep applying pressure. We should coordinate our position with Comrade Ulbricht. We should carry on salami tactics with regard to the rights of the Western countries....

We have to pick our way through, divide them, exploit all the possibilities.

Our situation is good, but if we do not apply pressure, then we will have to give up on signing a peace treaty with the GDR.

We cannot permit the reunification of Germany.

Why does [Konrad] Adenauer want to remain [West German] Chancellor? Because, he says, if we want to make contacts in the future with the Soviet Union, I can do it best.

Nobody supports West Germany in its desire for reunification.

I think that Adenauer is better than [West Berlin Mayor Willy] Brandt.

West Germany's ambassador [Hans Kroll] thinks that Adenauer should meet with Comrade Khrushchev.

We should set a meeting place....

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, p. 115, t. 39, pp. 318-23.]

Document No. 3

Note on the Discussion between Khrushchev and Ulbricht in Moscow, 26 February 1962 (Excerpts)

... Comrade Ulbricht pointed out that everything that the German side proposed to discuss had been fixed in writing.

Comrade Khrushchev stated that the declaration on the future of Germany can be designated as good; the responsible divisions in the foreign ministry and central committee have studied this statement and have several minor remarks, which one can accept or not. He did not yet have time to read the other documents. It would be useful, however, to talk over the economic problems in Gosplan, work out a position, and then discuss it. The German side agreed.

Comrade Ulbricht then pointed out that the documents were prepared on the basis of the last plenum of the CC [Central Committee of the] SED.

Since then, Adenauer has brought up the question of a change in the GDR's government. That means that Bonn

is realizing a decision reached a year ago. Adenauer is turning directly to the population of the GDR and calling for diversion and sabotage (radio). We have begun to do this as well, we are turning directly to the West German population with corresponding demands. It is, so to say, a period of unpeaceful coexistence. A campaign is being officially organized by Bonn for reunification through so-called free elections. The implication is that it would be possible to speak with the "Soviet zone" if it had a different government. In the last few days, it has been suggested that with such a change, help could be given to raise the standard of living [in the GDR], which is allegedly 20% lower than in West Germany.

The document before you about the historical role of the GDR, which was prepared by the appropriate authorities in the GDR, reflects the current situation. It shows with which forces an opening for the German nation can be found. It is to be approved at the congress of the National Front. One cannot fail to recognize that a certain difficulty has arisen due to the postponement of a peace treaty. In wide circles of the population the opinion has arisen that the Soviet Union and the GDR have overreached themselves in the struggle for a peace treaty. This is connected to a large campaign that is currently being organized in and through West Berlin. It also has to do with the mobilization of the revanchist organizations. The task stands before us to strengthen the GDR; the way has been worked out and certain circles of the workers are being won over to it. Currently, there is broad discussion of how even better results can be achieved in the mobilization of production [*Produktionsaufgebot*]. Now, the question arises of how to move forward with regard to a peace treaty and West Berlin.

In the Thompson-Gromyko talks, the respective standpoints are being tested. One has to see that the USA has raised its demands — e.g., with regard to controls on the autobahn. Kennedy is doing what Adenauer has proposed, but with more skillful methods.

It is a matter of clarifying prospects for the future. The document before you deals with the historical role of the GDR. It is of the greatest importance for the strengthening and future development of the GDR. It must be considered whether the GDR will make its own proposals regarding the problems of disarmament and the Geneva Conference. Perhaps with regard to the stance of the two German states towards disarmament. A broad campaign could be unfolded over what it means [to recognize] the results of the Second World War and gradually to eliminate its remnants. It must be examined, whether a conference of the consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact states or the foreign ministers with regard to changing the anomalous status of West Berlin would be useful, or whether a declaration should be published by both press bureaus.

Up to now, we have been silent on a number of questions because we do not want to come under suspicion of seeking to disturb the talks that are being held at the

highest level. We are in favor of a continuation of the talks between Thompson and Gromyko, but it must be weighed whether or not we should keep in sight the conclusion of a peace treaty near the end of summer. A commission would be necessary for this. What will come of it, if we go too fast? Crudely put, a bad peace treaty. That is, the questions of the borders and the capital would be regulated, and a number of the war's remnants would be eliminated. [The question of] air traffic would remain open, while the general traffic would remain as it has been. All of this would mean a strengthening of the German Democratic Republic. We are of the opinion that the USA would not have any formal reason to exacerbate the situation. One must consider the possibility of continuing to use the tactic used up to now of exploiting West Berlin as a means of pressure.

Hence, there is the proposal to conclude a peace treaty, including a protocol that expresses the matters in which the Soviet Union and the Western Powers stand in unanimity and that also states what still remains open.

In terms of strengthening the GDR, such a step would be greeted warmly; the conclusion of a peace treaty would be expedient for the elections to the *Volkskammer*. From Berlin, of course, one cannot perceive the entire situation, but simple propaganda for a peace treaty will not meet with the acceptance of the population.

In recent weeks, the enemy has greatly strengthened its attack. Many of the measures taken by the Soviet Union have been exploited against the GDR because they were carried out without any political justification — e.g., the trip of the Soviet garrison commander to West Berlin, the exercises by Soviet planes in the air corridors.

Comrade Khrushchev: One must see things the way they are. We are disturbing the USA's air traffic.³⁶ It has to defend itself. The imperialist forces will always be against us. One must see that West Berlin is not in Adenauer's hands. On August 13, we achieved the maximum of what was possible. I have the same impression as before that the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR need not lead to war. But one must consider the situation realistically. You want to give your signature and we are supposed to give economic [support], because one must see the possibility that after the conclusion of a peace treaty, there will be an economic boycott. Adenauer will carry out an economic boycott, and we will have to give [the GDR] everything that is lacking. I am proceeding on the basis of the interests of my country and from the interests of the entire socialist camp. One should not assume that the West has it easy. Why does it want guarantees for access? Because the West does not trust the people of West Berlin. They believe that West Berlin cannot hold out for more than ten years.

The signing of a peace treaty would lead to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The main question, however, is not the peace treaty, but a consolidation of the economic situation. That is what we

have to concentrate on. I say once again with regard to a peace treaty, that I believe there would be no war, but who can guarantee that? What is pushing us to a peace treaty? Nothing. Until August 13, we were racking our brains over how to move forward. Now, the borders are closed. One must always proceed from the idea that the conclusion of a peace treaty must serve us, that we will conclude it when we need it. The measures worked out by Comrade Ulbricht are correct. Of course the German people are affected by Western propaganda. It affects us less. We support the GDR's measures, but we do not agree that it is absolutely necessary to use the peace treaty as a slogan for the elections to the *Volkskammer*.

Comrade Ulbricht: The economic questions are naturally the most important. For us, they do not necessarily coincide with our political tasks. In previous years, we campaigned for the conclusion of a peace treaty, but then came the withdrawal of the deadline, and the impressions from that are still present in the population. It is necessary to conduct the propaganda about a peace treaty more carefully. Our population sometimes thinks differently. It links the peace treaty to national illusions.

The document before you is, so to speak, the expression of a new phase in our politics. We have thoroughly discussed it with the other parties, and it is correct that with regard to a peace treaty, one must be more careful.

Comrade Khrushchev returned to the peace treaty. What do we see? The Thompson-Gromyko talks are a step backwards in comparison to the earlier talks. The USA wants to raise its price. We have said openly that these are no foundation for negotiations. Previously, Kennedy presented his standpoint on the borders of Poland and the CSSR. Of course he cannot ratify the German border between the GDR and West Germany. One cannot expect that of him. He is trying to reach an agreement — for example, on an international [border] control. In one interview, he posed the question himself of what one can do and to whom one can turn if, for example, Ulbricht infringes upon the [existing] order regarding access routes to Berlin. To whom can one turn in such a situation?³⁷ One has to see that on August 13, we disturbed the stability of West Berlin. The GDR must be made invulnerable in economic terms. One must also discuss this with the Poles and the Czechoslovaks. The Albanians and the Chinese criticize us with regard to the peace treaty and West Berlin. What are they doing themselves? (Portuguese colonies in India, Hong Kong, etc.)³⁸ I think that our policy is correct, nothing disturbs us, and as long as imperialism exists, we will have to operate in this fashion.

Comrade Ulbricht interjected that the EEC [European Economic Community] is also becoming effective.

Comrade Khrushchev referred to the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and started to speak in this regard about agricultural matters.

Comrade Ulbricht referred to the GDR's economic

situation. The preparations for the 1962 plan foresee a 7% increase in investments, and the growth in production will amount to around 6%. Overall, the standard of living remains the same as it was. Wage increases of around 1% will follow.

We want to try to carry out a mobilization of production for the conclusion of a peace treaty by this fall. One should not forget, however, that often the material incentive is missing. We are currently working with large savings measures, including a reduction in higher wages; the incomes must be cut. That means domestically a certain political risk.

We are having difficulties with investments because the investments in part are in areas with little economic return — e.g., metals [*Buntmetalle*] and coal. For us, the costs of production in these areas cost many times the world-market price. The plan for 1961 was not achieved. The workforce is lacking. We have a long-term agreement with the Soviet Union, but it cannot be completely fulfilled. It is necessary to develop further the specialization and the deliveries of raw materials. In the trade treaty with the Soviet Union, there are a number of quotas that cannot be met.

In terms of carrying out the plan, there is a greater orientation towards those branches of production that are profitable. A higher worker productivity absolutely has to be achieved by using the best machines, which are now going in part for export. A reorientation of industry in this way is necessary. Then the GDR will be in a situation to repay its credits.

In response to an objection by Comrade Kosygin, Comrade Khrushchev replied that we cannot act like petty traders. It has to do with creating a profitable economy in the GDR.

Comrade Kosygin is in agreement with the plans as they were presented. He pointed out that in the GDR there is, in part, higher consumption than in West Germany. A great deal is paid out in the form of social support, but the German only sees what passes through his fingers. He believes that the reduction in investment in agriculture is incorrect. Unprofitable branches of industry must be cut. The plan for 1962 is not yet ready; it will be necessary to work out the material in 1-2 days in order to reach an acceptable decision.

Comrade Ulbricht referred to the necessity of rebuilding several city centers. It is a political, not an economic, question.

In the construction of housing, a reduction in costs absolutely must be achieved, but he is of the opinion that for the time being, construction should not be touched.

Comrade Khrushchev referred to the difficulties in agriculture and asked whether it is true that the GDR bought potatoes from Poland.

Comrade Kosygin interjected that the GDR is importing sugar and before, it was exporting it.

Comrade Khrushchev pointed out that the transformation of agriculture is a protracted process —

e.g., the development of combines.

A long conversation evolved over the development of agricultural machinery.

At the end of the discussions, it was decided to carry out the next discussion on the afternoon of the 27th around 1600 hours. In the meantime, talks were to be held between [Chairman of the State Planning Commission] Comrade [Bruno] Leuschner and Comrade Kosygin.

[Source: Dölling, *Ambassador*, "Note of the Discussion on 26.2.1962," 7 March 1962. *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Außenstelle Berlin, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (MfAA)*,³⁹ *Ministerbüro (Winzer), G-A476.*]

Document No. 4

Note on the Discussion between Khrushchev and Ulbricht in Moscow on 27 February 1962 (Excerpts)

Comrade Kosygin reported on the discussion that had taken place between him and Comrade Leuschner; as the first problem, he dealt with the prospective plans for 1963-65. He touched upon the following questions: control numbers, 1963-1965; investment questions; balancing of industrial branches; coordination and reorganization of individual branches of industry.

He reported that the consultations had concluded in a decision to appoint groups of experts, who will prepare the appropriate materials and come to the negotiations without binding directives. These preparations should provide a basis for the 7-Year-Plan. Deadline for the work of the groups of experts: one month.

Comrade Khrushchev stressed that it is necessary to see the new bases for economic relations between the two states. It has to do with the unification of the economies of both states and the harmonizing of their plans. Whatever is decided upon must be maintained by both sides. The economies of both countries must be treated as a united whole, and all possibilities must be considered. He proposed that relations with the GDR be governed in the same way as, for example, the plan and settlement with the Ukraine are binding. He illustrated this strive-worthy condition by referring to a discussion that [Klement] Gottwald⁴⁰ had once led.

Comrade Ulbricht pointed out that until 1954, there had already been closer economic relations than is currently the case.

Comrade Khrushchev countered that the cooperation then was different, it was a mutual agreement. He is of the opinion, for example, that the question of investments in copper and potash must be agreed upon in the mutual plans, which [each side] must be obliged to keep.

Meeting the quantities agreed upon must be an obligation. Comrade Ulbricht voiced his agreement. He then made several supplementary remarks regarding economic-technical cooperation and suggested that a

direct cooperation of the [Party] secretaries working in this area should take place. Currently, things are not in order because very many matters regarding the transfer of patents and experience are being regulated by state security. He is of the opinion that the exchange and transfer of such things should take place through the "Committee for Coordination." He proposed that suitable guarantees be made for such cooperation.

Comrade Kosygin then reported on his conceptions for the plan in 1962, at which point he stressed that deliveries to the GDR have been fully agreed upon, but that the balance is still 215,000,000 rubles short.

He then drew attention to the following particulars:
Activation of trade with Bonn to the maximum extent.
Scrutiny of military expenditures.

The establishment of technically-based norms, esp. the alteration of norms.

The alignment of investments in crucial areas.

The standard of living in the GDR in comparison to the Federal Republic.

From the latest numbers he reached the conclusion that there are good possibilities for real propaganda in the GDR. He further stressed that great possibilities still exist to balance the plan in 1962, though with a larger credit from the Soviet Union. He suggested that it is better to discharge an investment with 6% than with 7%, but also to fulfill and surpass the plan. By all means, that is politically better. With regard to the standard of living, he drew attention to the fact that it seems expedient to give more in the form of direct wage increases and less through the social funds, because the latter is barely taken into account by the population.

Comrade Khrushchev interjected that after the 20th Plenum, the Soviet Union also went over to presenting the plan in such a fashion that a larger surplus [*Übererfüllung*] was guaranteed. That is of political consequence. Regarding the credit, he proposed that a suitable agreement be made and then signed in Leipzig.

Comrade Ulbricht expressed his agreement to the proposals and drew attention to the situation that had developed in terms of the individual matters in the most recent time period.

With regard to military expenditures, he referred in particular to the fact that it had become necessary to equip the army with new rail and radio equipment.

Comrade Khrushchev interjected that it cannot be that such an increase could arise on these grounds. One must check. It has to do with limiting the non-productive expenditures.

Comrade Ulbricht referred to the need to achieve an increase in production through additional material stimuli and reported on the struggle being waged to create technically-grounded work norms.

He pointed out that an acceleration of this struggle [to create technically-based work norms] is impossible.

Comrade Kosygin pointed out that the GDR is among those [states] with the highest norms in housing. In

discarding ruins and constructing new city centers one cannot proceed from the desirable shape of the city centers; instead, money must be placed first of all at the disposal of factories. In the GDR there are accommodations, city centers, etc., that are not planned for the Soviet Union until 1970. One must make reasonable use of the funds available. The main thing is to use these means for production.

Comrade Khrushchev said that he is upset that little is being invested in agriculture. We cannot accept special circumstances with regard to the large number of *kulaks*. If a decision [has to be made], whether city centers are to be built or investments made in agriculture, then the latter. One must promote production with all means and not simply pay more for the work units in the agriculture. In general, agriculture is the sore point of all the people's democracies. He then referred to the reorganization of the administration of agriculture in the Soviet Union that had been discussed at the March plenum.

In response to Comrade Ulbricht's letter, he said that the campaign for a peace treaty is settled. We will pursue the campaign aggressively, for the signing of a peace treaty. We will exploit every possibility for negotiations, but we will decide at what point to conclude it.

He is in agreement with a joint protest against the Western states' discrimination against the GDR. It would be incorrect, however, to strive, for example, for a general boycott in the field of sports. Stalin did that. One must make reasonable policy and not declare a boycott as a principle. That would only be to the advantage of the reactionary forces....

Comrade Ulbricht then referred to the articles being printed in the press about comrades who perished in the period of the Stalin-cult and stressed that this is of a certain importance to the GDR. Until now, nothing has been done in this direction, and there is no intention to do so. It is nevertheless necessary to agree upon the tactics in these cases.

There are cases in which the Soviet comrades do not understand our tactics — e.g., a delegation of writers who expressed the opinion that there is not enough freedom [in the GDR]. That was expressed at a writers' congress. The GDR is not publishing materials about Stalin's victims, and such books and publications will be refused by us — e.g., a book about the events in 1953 and the case of [Lavrentii] Beria.⁴¹

He voiced a request that in exchanges on the state level a certain order be created, so that — for example — writers cannot be used against the policies of the GDR. To this end, it is necessary that the party get involved.

Comrade Khrushchev agreed to speak with Comrade [Mikhail] Suslov and Comrade [Leonid] Il'ichev⁴² about it.

[Source: Dölling, *Ambassador in Moscow*, "Note of a Discussion on 27 February 1962," 5 March 1962.

Marked, "For personal use only." PA/AA, Außenstelle

Berlin, MfAA, Ministerbüro (Winzer), G-A476.]

Douglas Selvage recently submitted his dissertation, 'Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the German Question, 1955-1967,' at Yale University and will be receiving his Ph.D. in December.

¹ The author would like to thank Hope Harrison for her advice and support during his research in the Polish and East German archives. Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Information Agency, and the US Department of State, which administers the Russian, Eurasian, and East European Research Program (Title VIII).

² John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 149; Vladislav M. Zubok, *Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 6, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), 22; Hope Millard Harrison, "The Bargaining Power of Weaker Allies in Bipolarity and Crisis: The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-61," Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1993, 239-40 and fn #625.

³ Hope M. Harrison, *Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-61*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 5, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), 55.

⁴ See Douglas Selvage, "Khrushchev's Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives," in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

⁵ Harrison, *Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose'*, 28-9.

⁶ Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 190-94, 197.

⁷ Harrison, *Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose'*, 16.

⁸ Harrison, *Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose'*, 28-30. On the inter-German trade agreement, see Robert W. Dean, *West German Trade with the East: The Political Dimension* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 56-9; Ann Tusa, *The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945-1989* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1997), 219-20.

⁹ "Maßnahmen zu den Analysen über den Warenaustausch mit den volksdemokratischen Ländern: Anlage Nr. 1 zum Protokoll Nr. 37 vom 25.7.61," Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO BA), Berlin, J IV 2/2-778, pp. 26-7.

¹⁰ "Protokoll Nr. 48/61 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees," 12 September 1961. SAPMO BA, J IV 2/2-790, p. 7.

¹¹ Harrison, *Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose'*, 45-6.

¹² *Ibid.*, 47.

¹³ "Stenogram IX plenarnego posiedzenia Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej," 22 November 1961. Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), KC PZPR, sygn. 1240, p. 408.

¹⁴ Cf. Harrison, *Ulbricht and the 'Concrete Rose'*, 48.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63*, vol. XIV, 267-68. In the end there was no

embargo because the Soviets and East Germans did not block off access to West Berlin, and the other NATO allies opposed such a measure. See the "Memorandum of Conversation," 15 September 1961, in *ibid.*, 412.

¹⁶ "Notatka z zapisu spotkania przywódców partii państw obozu socjalistycznego w Moskwie," in Jan Ptasinski, "Moje rozmowy z Władysławem Gomułką w latach 1960-1970," 1992, cz. II. Instytut Dokumentacji Historycznej Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej (IDH-PRL), P II / 7b, k. 194, pp. 51-4; Zubok, *Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis*, 19-25. I have based my account of the Moscow meeting on notes that the Polish ambassador to Moscow from 1968-70, Jan Ptasinski, allegedly made from a transcript of the meeting that he found in the safe of the Polish embassy in Moscow. Ptasinski's notes compare favorably to the Soviet transcript cited by Vladislav Zubok in his work, and I have found Ptasinski's papers to be reliable in other instances by comparing them with documents in the former Central Committee Archives, now part of Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive for Contemporary Documents) in Warsaw. IDH-PRL was set up as a private foundation by Polish scholars in the early 1990's to collect documentation and interviews from former communist officials who did not want to contribute their papers to the state archives.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ "Protokoll Nr. 48/61 der Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees," 12 September 1961. SAPMO BA, J IV 2/2-790, p. 7.

¹⁹ Robert M. Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June - November 1961* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 358-60.

²⁰ Letter, Ulbricht to Gomułka, 23 September 1961. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 110, t. 15.

²¹ Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961*, 346.

²² "Memorandum of Conversation," 30 September 1961 (talks between Gromyko and Rusk), in NARA RG 59, "Conference Files, 1949-1963," Box 262, File "CF 1957, 16th United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 1961, Memcons." Also see: "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France," 28 September 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, Vol. XIV, 439-41; and "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France," 2 October 1961, in *ibid.*, 456-460. On Bonn's opposition to discussion of matters relating to "European security" in the context of a Berlin settlement, see the attachment to the State Department's briefing book for

MASTNY NAMED SENIOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR

CWIHP is pleased to announce the recent appointment of Dr. Vojtech Mastny as a "Senior Research Scholar" at the Cold War International History Project. Following his award-winning book on "The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years," Dr. Mastny is currently working on a parallel history of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Concurrently he is heading a larger documentation project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, jointly sponsored by CWIHP, the National Security Archive at The George Washington University, and the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Zurich).

Adenauer's visit to Washington from 20-22 November 1961, entitled, "Position Paper: Arms Control in Relation to Berlin," 17 November 1961, in NARA, RG 59, "Conference Files, 1949-1963," Box 269, File "CF 1993—Adenauer Visit, Washington, 11/20-22/61.

²³ "Memorandum: Four Power Declaration," in the briefing book, "Adenauer Visit: Washington, D.C., November 20-22, 1961," in NARA, RG 59, "Conference Files, 1949-1963," Box 269, Files "CF 1993—Adenauer Visit, Washington, 11/20-22/61."

²⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation" (Kennedy-Adenauer Meeting), 22 November 1961, in *FRUS, 1961-63*, Vol. XIV, 620-27. Also see Letter, Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan, 22 November 1961, in *ibid.*, 632-634.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, "Quadripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, Paris, 10-12 December, 1961," National Security Archive, File "Berlin Crisis—DOS FOIAs."

²⁶ On curtailing Ulbricht's influence, see Harrison, *Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose'*, 55. On China's possible role, see Zubok, *Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis*, 24-5.

²⁷ Harrison, *Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose'*, 55.

²⁸ Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 249.

²⁹ See, e.g., Erwin Weit, *Ostblock intern: 13 Jahre Dolmetscher für die polnische Partei- und Staatsführung* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1970), 45-6.

³⁰ On Khrushchev's Comecon reform proposals and Gomulka's "triangle," see "Relacja Władysława Tykocinskiego: zdradzone tajemnice," *Na antenie* 41 (21 August 1966), I; Henryk Różanski, *Spojrzenie na RWPG: Wspomnienia, dokumenty, refleksje 1949-1988* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990); Jan Ptasinski, *Drugi zwrot: Gomulka w szczytu powodzenia* (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1988), 169-72; Beate Ihme-Tuchel, *Das 'nördliche Dreieck': Die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR, der Tschechoslowakei und Polen in den Jahren 1954 bis 1962* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994), 305-6, 344-46. For the latest on the New Economic System, see Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

³¹ See the letter from Walter Ulbricht to Hans Rodenberg, 23 October 1971, reprinted in Peter Przybylski, *Tatort Politbüro*, Vol. II (Berlin: Rowohlt Verlag, 1991), 351-52. Ulbricht wrote: "When Khrushchev came to the GDR, he criticized me all the way to Magdeburg because I was not a sufficiently obedient corn boy [*Mais-Jünger*]."

³² L. Cieslik, Moscow, "Notatka z rozmowy z A. Adzubem," 7 May 1962. AAN, KC PZPR, p. 116, t. 40.

³³ Adzhubei claimed in the course of several conversations in Germany that Ulbricht would not live much longer; he had cancer. Adzhubei's statement, Ulbricht later wrote to Hans Rodenberg, "had not improved" his relations with Khrushchev (see footnote #25 above). For the latest on Adzhubei's visit to West Germany, see Daniel Kosthorst, "Sowjetische Geheimpolitik in Deutschland? Chruschtschow und die Adschubej-Mission 1964," *Vierteljahrshefte zur Zeitgeschichte* 44 (1996), 257-293.

³⁴ From this point forth in the document, Rusk's name was rendered as "Rask."

³⁵ Spaak visited Moscow on September 19. Khrushchev apparently suggested that he had never "placed a deadline on Western acceptance of Soviet demands for a German peace treaty and free-city status for West Berlin." Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961*, 229-30.

³⁶ In February 1962, the Soviets "demanded exclusive use of the air corridors, ... buzzed allied aircraft and dropped metallic chaff to

interfere with Western radar and air traffic control." Tusa, *The Last Division*, 347.

³⁷ Although it is unclear to which interview Khrushchev was referring, Kennedy did write to Khrushchev through a confidential channel on 16 October 1961: "This area [Berlin] would also be rendered less peaceful if the maintenance of the West's vital interests were to become dependent on the whims of the East German regime. Some of Mr. Ulbricht's statements on this subject have not been consistent with your reassurances or even his own — and I do not believe that either of us wants a constant state of doubt, tension and emergency in this area, which would require an even larger military build-up on both sides." Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, Hyannis Port, 16 October 1961, U.S. Department of State, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63, Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 41.

³⁸ On Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's failure to conclude a peace treaty, see Harrison, *Ulbricht and his Concrete 'Rose'*, 53.

³⁹ Although the archives of the former East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten*) remain in Berlin, they are now part of the FRG's Foreign Office Archives.

⁴⁰ Former General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

⁴¹ Lavrentii Beria, head of the NKVD/KGB and heir-apparent to Stalin, executed in 1953. After his arrest in late June 1953, Beria was accused of having been willing to give up the socialist GDR in favor of a neutral, reunified, bourgeois, and demilitarized Germany in return for substantial reparations from the FRG. Khrushchev and his other rivals in the Soviet leadership had justified his arrest and execution in part on these grounds. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 136.

⁴² Both Suslov and Il'ichev were Central Committee secretaries with responsibilities in the fields of ideology and propaganda.

Research Notes and Conference Reports

“We Are in a Bind”: Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969

By **Vojtech Mastny**

The internal documents on the Warsaw Pact that are becoming available from the archives of its former Central and Eastern European members (hardly any are yet open from the former Soviet ones) reveal how misconceived the Western disposition to regard the Communist alliance as the functional counterpart of NATO was. Yet equally mistaken was the supposition that Moscow’s allies uniformly resented their membership in the organization, and consequently strove to loosen or even abolish it. As evident from the diverse attempts at reforming the Warsaw Pact, the reality was not so straightforward, nor was it the same at different times. The documents printed below, which have never been published in English before, show that Polish generals in 1956 and their Czechoslovak counterparts in 1968 sought to preserve the alliance but to alter it in unexpected ways.

The attempts at reforming the Warsaw Pact must be measured against the overwhelming dependence of Central and Eastern European countries on Moscow at the time of the launching of the alliance in 1955 and consider that initially its purpose was very different from what it became later. The establishment of the Communist alliance six years after the creation of NATO has always been something of a puzzle. It occurred when the Soviet Union under the leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev was actively pursuing détente with the West and seeking to demilitarize the Cold War.¹

Only recently has archival evidence from the defunct Soviet bloc allowed us to place the signing of the Warsaw Pact firmly within the context of Khrushchev’s effort to bring about a new European security system, dominated by the Soviet Union.² The effort, prompted by the prospective admission of West Germany into NATO in accordance with the October 1954 Paris agreements, was aimed at radically reshaping the European security environment formed by the Cold War. It rested on the fallacious assumption that the Western powers could be maneuvered by political means into a position in which they would have no choice but to acquiesce against their will in changes they considered incompatible with their vital interests.

According to the scenario initiated by Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav M. Molotov but elaborated and increasingly masterminded by Khrushchev, the feat was to

be accomplished by staging an all-European security conference from which the United States would be excluded and the agenda of which would be set and controlled by Moscow posing as the main guarantor of European security. The Soviet-sponsored gathering of Communist chiefs in the Polish capital in May 1955, at which the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was formally inaugurated, had initially been intended as a step toward such a conference. The text of the treaty, intended for publication, was drafted by Molotov’s assistants at the Foreign Ministry in December 1954.³ It was only a month before the originally scheduled date of April 25 that the Soviet leadership decided to give the Warsaw meeting a military character by instructing Minister of Defense Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov at short notice to draft the appropriate documents.⁴ By the time they were forwarded to the East European party secretaries for information on May 2, the inauguration of the alliance had been moved to May 11-14.⁵

At the founding session, which amounted to little more than a ritual consecration of the project prepared in Moscow, the alliance treaty was passed with but minor amendments. These were proposed by some of the Central and Eastern European participants but—judging from the exceedingly orderly minutes of the session—had probably been commissioned in advance by Molotov for the sole purpose of providing the appearance of a “discussion.”⁶ Similarly perfunctory was the acceptance of the secret provisions specifying the size of the army, navy, and air force contingents the Soviet Union made its dependencies contribute for the supposedly common cause.⁷ Polish general Tadeusz Pióro, who as a young colonel was given the task of taking minutes at the meeting where Zhukov made the assignments, has recalled how the originally comprehensive record had to be repeatedly whittled down until nothing of substance was left on paper, thus allowing the Soviet managers to set the quotas as they pleased.⁸

The important omission at the Warsaw gathering was the statute of the unified command, the draft of which was only sent to the Eastern European leaders by Khrushchev four months later and was approved at the first meeting of the alliance’s political consultative committee in Prague on 27-28 January 1956.⁹ It was this top secret document [**Document No. 1**], classified during the entire existence

of the Warsaw Pact, that later became a major cause of dissatisfaction among its members. The statute, which gave its military chief extensive prerogatives in controlling their armed forces, grew in importance once the original purpose of the alliance—Khrushchev's promotion of a new European security system—foundered on Western resistance. Moscow's latitude in running the Warsaw Pact through its Soviet supreme commander and Soviet chief of staff then became all the greater since its supposedly collective institutions, namely, a permanent secretariat and a standing commission on foreign affairs envisaged at the Prague meeting, were in fact not created.¹⁰ Still, in view of the bilateral "mutual defense" treaties that had already before put Eastern European armed forces at Soviet disposal, the added chain of command was largely superfluous. This justified a contemporary NATO assessment of the Warsaw Pact as "a cardboard castle . . . carefully erected over what most observers considered an already perfectly adequate blockhouse, . . . intended to be advertised as being capable of being dismantled, piece by piece, in return for corresponding segments of NATO."¹¹

The lack of substance would not have mattered if the unexpected crises in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 had not compelled the Soviet Union to take its allies more seriously. Its declaration on relations among socialist states, issued on October 30 in a vain attempt to stem the tide of revolution in Hungary by political means, signaled a willingness to revise the arbitrary provisions of the Warsaw Pact, regulate the presence of Soviet forces on the territory of its members states, and recall the unwanted Soviet military advisers there.¹² The Polish proposals printed below [**Document No. 2**] were prepared on November 3 in direct response to the declaration. They show how much the self-confidence of the Soviet empire's largest nation had increased after the Kremlin's reluctant acceptance of its new national communist leadership under party secretary Władysław Gomułka, followed by the dismissal of the widely resented Soviet marshal Konstantin K. Rokossovskii as defense minister.

The Poles prepared their proposals regardless of the progressing Soviet military intervention in Hungary, which Moscow defended as being allegedly justified under the provisions of the Warsaw Pact.¹³ Gomułka disapproved of the intervention, being understandably concerned about its possible effect upon Soviet intentions towards his own regime which, as we know today, the Kremlin leaders had only provisionally decided to tolerate under Chinese pressure.¹⁴ He let the Polish general staff form a special commission to elaborate proposals for a reform of the Warsaw Pact and Poland's future role in it.

On behalf of the commission, deputy chief of staff Gen. Jan Drzewiecki prepared not only a biting commentary on the secret May 1955 statute on the powers of the supreme commander but also a "legal analysis" of the "agreements" about the ten-year plan for the development of Poland's armed forces, imposed by Moscow before and after the Warsaw Pact was signed.¹⁵

He argued that the two agreements lacked proper legal basis and were not truly bilateral because they consisted of Polish obligations only. Referring to the secret military annexes to the Warsaw treaty, Drzewiecki noted that not even his country's foreign minister had been informed about them.

The final text of Drzewiecki's proposal, sent to Gomułka on 7 November 1956, summed up the Polish case for the reform of the alliance and spelled out the country's proposed obligations within it.¹⁶ Taking into account the international situation—meaning NATO member West Germany's pending claim to the German territories annexed by Poland after World War II—the document did not question the desirability of the Warsaw Pact to bolster Poland's national security but found its military provisions in need of a thorough revision. The author took exception to the status of the supreme commander and his chief of staff as supranational officials with prerogatives incompatible with the maintenance of Polish independence and sovereignty, to the signatories' "purely formal" representation on the unified command, to the arbitrary assignment of national contingents to the alliance, and—most topically in view of the Soviet intervention in Hungary—to the lack of regulations concerning Soviet military deployments on the territories of the other member states.¹⁷

As the Soviet intervention in Hungary became an accomplished fact (which caused Gomułka to abandon his opposition to it)¹⁸ the Poles found it preferable to separate their radical critique of the Warsaw Pact from their demand for the regulation of Soviet military presence on their territory. This had been maintained since the end of World War II mainly to facilitate Moscow's communication with its occupation troops in East Germany. Invoking the status of foreign forces within NATO territory as an example and alluding even to the manner in which American military presence was made acceptable in such countries as the Philippines, Libya, and Ethiopia, the Polish demand proved fortunate in its timing.¹⁹ Still defensive about the crackdown in Hungary, the Soviet Union on December 17 granted Poland a more favorable status-of-forces agreement than any other country. It provided for Polish jurisdiction in case of violations of Polish law by Soviet military personnel and for advance notice to the Polish government of any movement of Soviet troops. Although the former provision was subsequently evaded in practice, the latter was generally honored—the exception being the surreptitious stationing of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Poland without the knowledge of its government.²⁰

Having thus made one concession granting Poland special status within the Soviet empire, Moscow was not in a mood to entertain in addition a proposal for revamping the Warsaw Pact. When Polish Defense Minister Marian Spychalski brought up the subject during his visit to the Soviet capital in January 1957, the alliance's supreme commander Marshal Ivan S. Konev felt

personally offended. He was aghast at the idea that his office should be filled by rotation. "What do you imagine," he exploded, "that we will make some NATO here?"²¹ As a result, the proposal was shelved,²² leaving the Warsaw Pact unreformed for another decade. Although Khrushchev did relieve the East Europeans' military burden as part of his overall reduction of expenditures on conventional forces, he had no incentive to further develop the Warsaw Pact. In the years that followed, he instead tried to use it mainly as a platform for launching his assorted diplomatic initiatives during irregular meetings of the alliance's political consultative committee.

* * * *

When the idea of reform re-emerged ten years later, the circumstances were altogether different. Khrushchev's innovative attempt to reduce the Soviet Union's dependence on military power by cutting its conventional forces had failed. The Soviet military had succeeded in instilling the Warsaw Pact with more substance in 1961 by instituting the annual practice of joint maneuvers that imitated both nuclear and conventional warfare in an increasingly realistic fashion. Three years later Khrushchev was replaced as party general secretary by Leonid I. Brezhnev, who was dedicated to reversing his predecessor's reductions of conventional forces while accelerating the expansion of the nuclear ones as well. Still, the growing utilization of the Warsaw Pact for military purposes proceeded without building up its structure. And when the initiative in this direction was finally taken in January 1966, it originated with the Soviet Union rather than its junior partners.²³

Seeking to compensate by expanded military competition for the increasingly palpable Soviet deficiencies in other fields, Brezhnev opened the drive for a reform of the Warsaw Pact to make it into a genuine, rather than merely formal, counterpart of NATO. The Soviet Union envisaged strengthening the alliance's original statute and establishing additional institutions along the lines already decided in 1956. This meant particularly the clarification of the powers of the supreme commander and the creation of a unified military staff, a standing commission on foreign policy, a committee on technology, and a permanent secretariat. Recognizing how much Moscow's relationship with its Central and Eastern European dependencies had changed since the Stalin and early Khrushchev years, Brezhnev invited their input rather than attempting merely to dictate what was to be done and how.

Responding to the invitation, Poland immediately prepared two substantive memoranda. In the first [Document No. 3], Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki outlined how the alliance's highest political organ, the political consultative committee, ought to be transformed from an inconsequential entity given to holding "irregular summit meetings, usually ill-prepared, and adopting spectacular agreements," into a forum for systematic consultation about not only general matters but also

specific issues of current policy—something on the order of the North Atlantic Council.²⁴ The second memorandum [Document No. 4] proposed measures aimed at ensuring the Warsaw Pact's smaller members real rather than merely ritual input into decisions of military importance, such as the Soviet Union's deployment of its nuclear weapons.²⁵ The document called for the creation of a multinational military council that would dilute the overwhelming authority of the Soviet supreme commander—another allusion to the NATO model—and recommended his detachment from the structure of the Soviet armed forces. It proposed proportional representation of all its member states on the alliance's military staff except for the Soviet Union, which would be represented there by 31 per cent.

In deference to Soviet wishes, the Poles deleted the most radical of these ideas, particularly the transformation of the political consultative committee into a deliberative and decision-making body akin to the North Atlantic Council, before the Warsaw Pact's deputy foreign ministers convened under Moscow's auspices in February 1966 to push the reform forward.²⁶ The more radical initiative came instead from the Romanian representative Mircea Malița who, pleading insufficient authority to agree to anything, shocked the other participants by what some of them rightly perceived as trying to paralyze the alliance by transforming it into a noncommittal discussion club.²⁷ Unlike the Poles, who wanted expanded room for action as partners in a revitalized Warsaw Pact, the Romanians tried to achieve their freedom of action by minimizing Soviet role in its functioning.

It was *with* rather than *against* Moscow that Poland under Gomułka, who had since 1956 deteriorated from Eastern Europe's foremost champion of reform to a political reactionary, became the most enthusiastic supporter of the Soviet-sponsored reorganization of the alliance into an institutional counterpart of NATO. While Polish officials again sought to alleviate their country's recently increased defense burden, they no longer clamored for doing so at the expense of the alliance's cohesion; that role had meanwhile been adopted by the Romanians.

Bucharest steadfastly resisted the establishment of any organs that would make it easier for Moscow to use and abuse the Warsaw Pact for its own purposes, especially in wartime. While the brush with a nuclear disaster during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis had thoroughly frightened Moscow's allies, only the Romanians had gone so far as to betray their alliance commitments by secretly offering the United States assurances of neutrality in case of a nuclear conflict between the two blocs.²⁸ Afterward, they consistently pursued the policy of limiting their obligations within the Warsaw Pact and loosening it as best as they could.

The cause of transforming the alliance to make it both stronger and more acceptable to all its members, including the Soviet Union, was embraced in 1968 by the

Czechoslovak communist reformers. Their desire to change the Warsaw Pact was broadly known at the time, particularly from the candid interview given on 15 July 1968 by the Czechoslovak army's chief political officer, Gen. Václav Prchlík, and contributed to the Soviet decision to crush the reform movement by force of arms.²⁹ Yet the extent of their efforts, as well as its limitations remained obscure until the recent publication in Prague of selected documents on the military aspects of the 1968 crisis,³⁰ which can now be supplemented by extensive additional sources from the Czech Military Historical Archives.

Of the two documents printed below, the rambling exposé by the Czechoslovak chief of general staff, Gen. Otakar Rytíř, [**Document No. 5**] gives a vivid account of the “great bind” in which the Warsaw Pact countries found themselves by the late nineteen-sixties. This was the result of the Soviet-dictated resumption of high military spending aimed at the expansion and modernization of their conventional armed forces. The policy was in part an attempt to respond in kind to NATO's strategy of flexible response, formally adopted in 1967 but anticipated for at least six years before.³¹ Rytíř's remarks were suggestive of the resulting tensions within the Soviet-led alliance, the full extent of which can be gleaned from many other archival documents.³² The often acrimonious negotiations with Moscow about the military budget paralleled the perennial disputes between Washington and its NATO allies about burden-sharing. Unlike its Communist counterpart, however, the Western alliance was able to develop effective institutions and procedures which, besides its members' dedication to the democratic bargaining process, ensured NATO's continued viability.

For all his lack of sophistication and crudeness of expression, the Czech general grasped better than the Soviet marshals and their political mentors the heart of the problem that in the fullness of time would critically contribute to the collapse of the communist alliance—its inability to keep up with its capitalist rival in economic and technological competition. He neither desired nor anticipated this outcome but did not see any good way out of the bind either. Rather than solving the essential problem, he could only demand for his country an equal position in the alliance.

The question of how such a position would make the Warsaw Pact more viable is addressed in **Document No. 6**, which originated with the staff of the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy—the institution designed to supply the ideological underpinning of the Czechoslovak military establishment. The text, misleadingly referred to in earlier Western literature as the “Gottwald memorandum”³³ (as if it had been composed by the deceased Stalinist chief of the Czechoslovak Communist Party after whom the school was named), was published in a Prague newspaper in 1968,³⁴ but never received abroad the attention it deserves. This has been no doubt in part because of its often awkward prose, mixing Marxist-

Leninist jargon with the phraseology of Western “defense intellectuals.” Yet amid some pontificating and belaboring the obvious, there are remarkably fresh ideas that put the document way ahead of its time.

If Rytíř's remarks sometimes read like wisecracks of the Good Soldier Schweik³⁵ in a general's uniform, the memorandum is dead-serious. Its stands out for its utter lack of illusions about the small Central European nations' chances of physical survival in a general war between the two alliances and for its commendably level-headed rejection of the concept of mutual deterrence on which Europe's security was often believed to be resting. While attracted to the then-fashionable systems analysis approach to military affairs, the authors of the document in fact puncture the pretensions of both the Western proponents of mutual deterrence, who tried to use it to prop up the intensely ambiguous strategy of flexible response,³⁶ and of their Soviet imitators, who were vainly searching for a way to defeat NATO without provoking a nuclear war.³⁷

The memorandum offers revealing insights into the thinking that motivated Moscow's military posture in the early years of the Cold War. It maintains retrospectively that under Stalin the Soviet and East European armies under his control were being prepared to respond to an expected Western attack by launching a counteroffensive aimed at establishing complete Soviet hegemony in Europe. Although such a plan has not been corroborated by contemporary Soviet evidence it would have been consistent with the prevailing Western fears at the time. For their part, the authors of the memorandum, while paying the customary obeisance to the vision of a final victory of “socialism,” scarcely hide their preference for a Europe whose ideological divisions have been gradually erased by common security concerns.

In deriding attempts at “directing an army's development in accordance with simple logic, empiricism, and historical analogy,” the memorandum dismisses as fallacy Moscow's insistence on the alleged Western military threat. That fallacy, nourished by the Soviet memory of a narrow escape from defeat after the Nazi surprise attack in 1941, was not shared by any of Moscow's Warsaw Pact partners, who had not experienced the same trauma of their regime tottering under enemy assault. The Czech authors' criticism of the “naively pragmatic realist approach [that] analyzes relations among sovereign states from the point of view of either war or peace” foreshadowed the frame of mind that would eventually bring the Cold War to an end. Once a later generation of Soviet leaders would divest themselves from the notion that their state was being threatened from the outside, they would defy the realist mantra by declining to defend its supposedly vital interests, and allow their empire to disintegrate.

Free from the security preconceptions weighing on both superpowers, the Czechoslovak theorists sensed that the very feasibility and acceptability of war had radically

changed, at least in the European context, thus anticipating the post-Cold War era better than most of their contemporaries. Yet the conditions of their time, besides their residual Marxist thinking, prevented them from drawing any substantive conclusions. Instead, fascinated by the Israeli feats in the 1967 Six Days' War, in their conclusion they focused instead merely on the desirability of replacing the outdated concept of an offensive *á* *outrance* by one aiming at the destruction of the enemy's vital vulnerability.

Otherwise, no practical consequences for the development of a Czechoslovak military doctrine were spelled out with any clarity. Nor did the reformers' plea for the formulation of an overall Warsaw Pact military doctrine and a restructuring of the alliance find an expression in specific proposals—a significant difference from the action taken by their Polish counterparts in 1956 and again ten years later. During meetings in February and March 1968, when the Soviet-proposed reform of the Warsaw Pact was successively discussed by its deputy foreign ministers in Berlin, its chiefs of staff in Prague, and finally the party chiefs convened as its political consultative committee in Sofia, the Czechoslovak representatives remained passive.³⁸

It was again the contentious Romanians who lambasted the Soviet concept of "unified armed forces," included in the obnoxious secret annex to the Warsaw treaty but not in its published main text. Demanding the limitation of the powers of the supreme commander and the national governments' right of veto over any deployment of foreign troops or armaments on their territories, Bucharest even tried to renege on the agreements concerning the creation of a military council, joint staff, and committee on technology, that it had already consented to in May 1966.³⁹ At the same time, the Romanian party chief Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to derail the Warsaw Pact's accession to the nearly finished nonproliferation treaty, which he condemned as allegedly giving the superpowers license at the expense of their smaller allies.⁴⁰ During his Prague visit in February 1968, he minced no words in privately describing the proposed document as even "worse and more dangerous than the Soviet-German treaty of 1939."⁴¹

Although none of the other Warsaw Pact members joined Romania's efforts to derail what on balance was to prove a generally beneficial treaty, Polish foreign minister Rapacki and his Czechoslovak counterpart Václav David met in Prague on 29 February-1 March 1968, to discuss without Soviet supervision the possible freezing and subsequent removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of the states that had no control over them—or at least from their own countries and the two German states. The initiative was Rapacki's: Having already discussed the idea with Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel—the author of the celebrated report advocating the simultaneous strengthening of NATO and its promotion of détente with its Eastern counterpart—the

Pole agreed with him to try to make the denuclearization acceptable to the Warsaw Pact. The Czechoslovaks, however, hesitated. The Prague general staff noted timorously that, even though Moscow had not yet expressed its view, the proposal was presumably disadvantageous for its alliance system and should not, in any case, be considered in Czechoslovakia's current political climate.⁴²

In that climate, the authors of the memorandum did not find enough support for their ideas among their superiors. At the beginning of June, they sent copies of the document to the higher authorities in the hope of contributing to the preparation of the "action program" for the development of the country's armed forces. No response came from party general secretary Alexander Dubček while his newly appointed minister of defense, Martin Džúr, took a distinctly reserved position.⁴³ This was not the case with Soviet defense minister Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, who, even before the memorandum was officially submitted to the Prague leadership, had evidently gotten wind of it, and proceeded to extract from Džúr the promise to dismantle the academy that had produced it.⁴⁴ And when one of the reform-minded officers, Gen. Egd Pepich, tried to explain to the marshal that loyalty to the alliance was not in question, Grechko disrupted his presentation by noisily banging on his desk with a spoon.⁴⁵

Then followed Gen. Prchlík's July 15 interview with Prague journalists which, though not intended for publication, nevertheless became public, bringing Moscow to a rage because of his demand for the rectification of the Warsaw Pact's inequities. In a protest letter to Dubček, Warsaw Pact supreme commander Marshal Ivan I. Iakubovskii disingenuously accused Prchlík of insulting Soviet officers besides revealing military secrets, namely, the contents of the unpublished 1955 annex to the Warsaw treaty.⁴⁶ Significantly, Iakubovskii's protest was received approvingly by the conservative majority of the Czechoslovak officer corps who, concerned more about their jobs than about reform, remained unreservedly loyal to the Soviet alliance. These notably included defense minister Džúr, who subsequently earned Moscow's gratitude for having on his own responsibility ordered the army not to resist the Soviet invasion. For this accomplishment he was subsequently rewarded by being allowed to keep his job for another sixteen years.⁴⁷

Soviet criticism of Prchlík's remarks was seconded in an anonymous "official" statement publicly disseminated by the national press agency on July 28 and secretly endorsed by the minister's military council.⁴⁸ Such circumstances did not augur well for the report drafted by the general for the planned party congress and including many of the ideas of the reformist memorandum. The report went even farther in its unorthodox description of Czechoslovakia's desirable defense policy as striving "to be a policy of European security, a policy that helps ease international tensions, and a policy of friendly cooperation

with all who have a direct interest in this.”⁴⁹ Although the document did not question the country’s alliance obligations and did not specifically demand any changes in the Warsaw Pact, it was guaranteed to infuriate Moscow when it was leaked to the Soviet embassy in Prague about the middle of August. Yet although it was forwarded to the top Soviet leaders by Ambassador Stepan V. Chervonenko, with the remark that it had originated with the “infamous Gen. Prchlík,” it came too late to make a difference in influencing their decision to invade.

Moscow may have been right in suspecting that some of the reformers wanted Czechoslovakia to leave the Warsaw Pact. They reportedly considered the following options for their country: staying in the alliance but reconsidering membership in another 10 to 15 years, preparing to defend Central Europe without the Soviet Union through another “Little Entente” concluded without regard to ideological boundaries, and neutralization or neutrality providing for defense by national means along the Yugoslav model.⁵⁰ However plausible, these suggestions have not been reliably documented; the only source of information about them is the hostile polemics published in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion.⁵¹

Because of the lack of support within the conservative Czechoslovak military and even the reformist party establishment, it is hardly surprising that none of the proposals included in the memorandum was acted upon; what is surprising is that its authors continued to pursue them despite the country’s occupation by Soviet forces. They organized the first major discussion of their document at the already formally dissolved political academy as late as 18 April 1969 — eight months after the invasion.⁵² But the first discussion was also the last, ending both the project and soon afterward also the careers of those of its architects who did not quickly repent.

The month before, the Warsaw Pact had at last been reformed, largely in accordance with Soviet wishes, at the Budapest session of its political consultative committee. Following agreements among its member states concluded in the fall of 1968 under the impact of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, even the Romanians went along with the reorganization, although they continued to dissent on a host of issues pertaining to the actual functioning of the alliance. The public communiqué of the Budapest meeting, at which Moscow also stepped up in earnest its campaign for the convocation of an European security conference that would lead six years later to the conclusion of the Helsinki agreements, could only be adopted after a heated discussion and painstaking revision of nearly every item.⁵³

The resulting institutionalization of the Warsaw Pact as a true military alliance, soon to be recognized by NATO as its effective counterpart, influenced the course of the Cold War in important ways for its remaining twenty years. The restructuring facilitated a continued arms race and fostered the development of increasingly realistic military plans rehearsed during more frequent Warsaw Pact maneuvers imitating conventional war in Europe, the

progress of East-West détente notwithstanding. It further gave the non-Soviet officers, who became more extensively involved in the alliance’s mushrooming agencies, a greater stake in its existence—a critical development that made possible the resolution of the 1980-81 Polish crisis by Poland’s own military.⁵⁴ In the long run, however, the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into an extended arm of the Moscow defense ministry, rather than of the foreign ministry or the central committee, made its eventual fate more dependent on the fate of Soviet security doctrine. This dependence made the alliance’s collapse a foregone conclusion as soon as that doctrine was changed in the late nineteen-eighties—by effectively adopting the views of the 1968 Czechoslovak reformers about the non-existence of Western military threat and consequently allowing the reluctant allies to go their own ways.

Document No. 1

“Statute of the Unified Command of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty,” [7 September 1955]

Draft

Strictly confidential

GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ARMED FORCES JOINT COMMAND

PART I.

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The Supreme Commander chairs the joint armed forces of the members of the Warsaw Treaty agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid adopted on 14 May 1955.

The responsibilities of the Supreme Commander are:

To carry out resolutions of the Political Consultative Committee, which deal directly with the joint armed forces.

To supervise and direct operational and combat preparation of the joint armed forces and to organize the joint exercises of troops, fleets and staff under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

To have a comprehensive knowledge of the state of troops and fleets under the command of the Joint Armed Forces, and to take all necessary measures in cooperation with the Governments and Ministers of Defense of the respective countries in order to ensure permanent combat readiness of the forces.

To work out and present the Political Consultative Committee with constructive proposals on further improvement of the qualitative and quantitative state of the available staff.

The rights of the Chief-of-Staff:

To evaluate the fighting trim, strategic and fighting readiness of the Joint Armed Forces and to give orders and recommendations based on the results of the evaluations;

To address the Political Consultative Committee and the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries with any questions regarding his activities;

To call for meetings with his deputies representing their governments within the Armed Forces, in order to discuss and solve the occurring problems.

PART II

The Deputies of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

The Deputies to the Supreme Commander carry the full responsibility for:

Combat and mobilization readiness, as well as operational, combat, and political preparation of the troops under the command of the Joint Military Forces;

For making of troops and fleets under the supervision of the Joint Military Forces; for the available personnel; for supplying armaments, technical equipment and other military items; as well as for the accommodation arrangements and service of troops;

The Deputies to the Supreme Commander are obliged to report the state of the military and mobilizing readiness as well as the state of the political, strategic and combat instruction of troops and fleets at the disposition of the Joint Command.

PART III

The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces

The Chief of Staff supervises the activities of the Staff subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the Joint Armed Forces.

The composition of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces:

Permanent representatives of General Staff from the Warsaw Treaty countries;

Special bodies responsible for the strategic, tactical and organizational issues;

Inspectors of arms of service;

3. The responsibilities of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces:

a) to possess comprehensive knowledge of the state and conditions within the troops and fleets, to take necessary measures in cooperation with the General Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries to ensure permanent combat readiness of the Armed Forces;

b) to work out plans for further qualitative and quantitative improvement of the Joint Armed Forces; to evaluate the technical and military property needs of the troops who are under the command of the Joint Armed

Forces.

The Chief of Staff has a right to:

- discuss his activities with the Deputies of the Supreme Commander and with the Chiefs of the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries;
- determine information about the state and conditions of troops and fleets who are under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

PART IV

The relationships between the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries

The activities of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces must be carried out in cooperation with General Army Staff of the member countries.

The General Army Staff of the member-countries are obliged to:

Inform the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces about the combat and quantitative composition of troops, about their mobilizing and fighting readiness; military and political training of troops and fleets under the command of the Joint Armed Forces;

Coordinate deployment of troops, fleets and Staff with the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

PART V

Communications

The Supreme Commander and the Chief of the Staff can use the diplomatic mail and other means of communication provided by the member countries for their communication with the Deputies to the Supreme Commander and the Chiefs of the General Army Staff of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

[Source: "Polozhenie ob obendinennom komandovanii vooruzhennykh sil gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora Varshavskogo soveshchaniia," undated [7 September 1955], KC PZPR 2661/16-19, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw. Translated by Lena Sirota, CWIHP.]

Document No. 2

"Memorandum on the Warsaw Treaty and the Development of the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Poland," 10 January 1957

MEMORANDUM

"The Warsaw Treaty and the Development of the Armed Forces of People's Republic of Poland"

The Warsaw Treaty agreement, adopted in May 1955 (especially its military provisions), as well as different bilateral agreements signed by the representatives of the USSR and the People's Republic of Poland prior to the Warsaw Treaty and ratified after the adoption of the Treaty require a thorough analysis and revision. This mostly concerns Polish obligations regarding organizational, quantitative and technical supplies of the Armed Forces, in the production of military equipment and the strategic positioning of the country.

The need to revise earlier agreements is caused by the political and economic conditions of our country. The earlier agreements and the ensuing obligations do not correspond to the policy of independence and sovereignty of our country pronounced by the Party and the Government of the People's Republic of Poland. Despite the constant changes of obligations acquired by Poland on the basis of the bilateral agreements, their implementation would not be feasible without considerable financial expenditures assigned to the Armed Forces and military industry. Such a policy would be inconsistent with the course of the Party and the Government aimed on constant improvement of the living standards of the Polish people.

Taking into consideration above-mentioned situation, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has analyzed the obligations and provisions deriving from bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union as well as the Warsaw Treaty and our obligations deriving from them. Our proposals are listed below:

Military obligations originating from the Warsaw Treaty.

The present balance of power in the world, our strategic position as well as our ideological ties with the socialist camp prove the importance of the Warsaw Treaty and of the unification of the military efforts of the member countries for the further protection of our common interests.

Nevertheless, we believe that the military protocols originating from the Treaty require radical revision. The organizational concept of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces foresees the allocation of the part of the member countries' Armies under a Joint Command.

The above-mentioned concept is similar to the structural concept of NATO. Some parts of the Armies of the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries are placed under the Joint Command. Nevertheless, the structural position of the NATO countries is somewhat different from the position of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The only exception to the rule is the Soviet Union.

The strategic interest of the major participants of NATO is applied to the numerous theaters of war operations, therefore the specific theater of war would require only part of the Armed forces of the respective

countries, with the remainder of the forces allocated to different pacts, the Baghdad Pact, for instance.

The conditions under which the Warsaw Treaty was created are completely different. Our interest is in the European War Theater that involves all the participants of the Treaty, excluding the Soviet Union (the interests of the latter only partly lie in Europe). Therefore we believe that the total composition of our Armed forces should participate in our common defense initiative in Europe.

The above-mentioned facts illustrate the superficiality of the partitioning of the Armed forces by the participants of the Warsaw Treaty; namely, the structure in which one part of the armed forces is under the joint command and other part is under the command of the national armed forces. In the current situation, Poland cannot allot one part of the Armed forces under the joint command due to the unrealistically large number of divisions required (see part II of the memorandum). Despite the recent reduction of 5 divisions in Polish Armed forces, the number of required divisions for the joint command was only reduced by 1.

The organizational structure of the Joint Command of the armed forces is based on a single authority. The collective decision-making process bears only a formal character (it is not mentioned in a treaty). The process of the Supreme Commander's subordination to the international political body is not clear.

The above-mentioned determines the supranational character of the Supreme Commander and his Staff, which does not correspond to the idea of independence and sovereignty of the Warsaw Treaty participating countries. The supranational positioning of the Supreme Commander and of his Staff is illustrated in the "Statute" in the chapters dealing with the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and his Staff.

The authority of the Supreme Commander in questions of leadership in combat and strategic training is incompatible with the national character of the armies of the corresponding states. This imposes the introduction of common rules and regulations determining the order and conditions of military life (for example, the Garrison Duty Regulations, Drill Regulations, Disciplinary regulations, etc)

The Supreme Commander has widespread rights in the sphere of control. The volume of the report information required from the General Staff is tremendous. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is not an international body in a full sense. The rights and responsibilities of the representatives of the corresponding armies are not stated clearly. The existing practice demonstrates the formal character of their functions.

The relations between the Staff of the Joint Command and the General Staff are based on the complete subordination of the latter to the former.

Current events prove continuously the unilateral character of the obligations acquired by the People's Republic of Poland. No international agreement dealt with

the judicial state of troops located or passing through the territory of Warsaw Treaty country.

The above listed questions should be regulated in the spirit of the Declaration of the Soviet Government issued on 30 October 1956.

In order to correct the above-mentioned organizational and structural concepts, we suggest the following changes to the military articles of the Warsaw Treaty agreement.

- a) the Warsaw Treaty countries are interested in using all their armed forces for defense purposes; the Soviet Union would agree with other member countries on the quantity of Soviet troops to be allotted to the Warsaw Treaty common actions in Europe;
- b) the involvement of troops of any of the Warsaw Treaty countries in military operations would require the prior approval by the appropriate body in its home country according to the Constitution;
- c) in peace-time the armed forces of each of the countries are subordinated to their national command.
- d) we recognize the need for close cooperation of all Warsaw Treaty countries in the following areas:
 - in strategic plans and tactical issues;
 - in logistics prior to tactical moves;
 - in standardization of the major types of weapons;
 - in regulations of military production and deliveries in times of war and peace;
 - in joint strategic training on the territory of one of the countries.
- e) we recognize the need to create a "Military Consultative Committee" for the implementation of the above mentioned proposals. The Military Consultative Committee would consist of the Ministers of National Defense and the Chairmen of the General Staffs of the Warsaw Treaty Countries. The Chairman of the Committee would be one of the members of the Committee elected once a year.
- f) the working body of the Military Consultative Committee would be the Permanent Staff Committee. It would consist of the officers and generals of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Supreme International Political Body would stipulate the number of the officers allotted to the Permanent Staff Committee by each country.
- g) the Supreme International Political Body would determine location of the Military Consultative Committee.
- h) all proposals concerning the issues listed in part b) must be approved by the Supreme Political Body. They become compulsory to all Warsaw Treaty countries if approved.
- i) the Permanent Staff Committee can present its recommendations regarding the issues in part d) to the General Staff.

The implementation of these recommendations depends on the decisions of the responsible parties of the national governments of Warsaw Treaty countries.

In the situation of war the International Political Body can appoint the Supreme Command of the Joint Armed

Forces.

The Staff of the Supreme Command will consist of officers and generals of the respective states, and their appointments will be confirmed by the Supreme International Political Body.

[...]

[Source: "Memorandum w sprawie Układu Warszawskiego oraz planu rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych PRL" and Russian translation entitled, "Memorandum o Varshavskom Dogovore i plane razvitiia Vooruzhenykh Sil PNR," microfilm (o) 96/6398, reel W-25, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Translated by Lena Sirota.]

Document No. 3
Memorandum by Polish Foreign Minister Adam
Rapacki, 21 January 1966

Secret

57/Rap./66 21 January 1966

AN URGENT NOTE
Exclusively to the person concerned

-/ Majchrzak⁵⁵

Addressees:

Comr. Gomułka	Comr. Szyr
Comr. Cyrankiewicz	Comr. Waniołka
Comr. Gierek	Comr. Jagielski
Comr. Jędrzychowski	Comr. Jaroszewicz
Comr. Kliszko	Comr. Jaszczuk
Comr. Loga-Sowiński	Comr. Jarosiński
Comr. Ochab	Comr. Starewicz
Comr. Rapacki	Comr. Tejchma
Comr. Spychalski	Comr. Wicha
Comr. Strzelecki	Comr. Czesak

In connection with a letter of Comrade Brezhnev to Comrade Gomułka dealing with the provision of a better elasticity and efficiency for the Warsaw Pact organization, I am hereby presenting some remarks and conclusions:

I. The Warsaw Pact organization comprises two sets of questions that require separate treatment:

1) Improvement of operating instruments in the military area, which relates to the proposal of holding a meeting of defense ministers. Improvement in coordination is required particularly in this area, where the chief responsibility rests overwhelmingly upon the Soviet Union.

2) Coordination in the area of political activities of the Pact, which requires a steady consultative effort, an

exchange of views in order to reach common grounds not only on major issues, but often also on current policy matters.

II. We appraise the USSR's initiative positively. It meets the basic need to define and improve the organization of the Warsaw Pact. So far the Warsaw Pact organization has not been precisely defined, its forms of work were volatile and dependent on extemporaneous initiatives, mostly by the USSR. This situation has created loopholes in the coordination of policies and actions of Pact members with regard to the Pact itself, as well as in relations among its members. It also did not ensure the proper system of consultations, which would enable to take into consideration the positions of all member states. This condition was shaped at a time when the Warsaw Pact Treaty was concluded and when its forms of operation were just emerging. It does not meet its current needs.

III. The Soviet initiative to improve the instruments of the Pact's operation is coming at the right time, when a greater need to strengthen the unity of actions of the member states is emerging. In the present circumstances elaboration of a common political line of the Pact, which would take into account positions of all interested parties calls for systematic and frequent consultations and contacts.

IV. The Warsaw Pact Treaty has created a Political Consultative Committee for consultations among member states and for consideration of questions arising from the Pact's operation. According to the Pact's provisions each state is to be represented in the Consultative Committee by a government's member or another especially appointed representative. The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as are deemed necessary. In practice, however, that Committee has been transformed into summit meetings, called up sporadically, generally not properly prepared, which adopt spectacular resolutions (declarations, communiqués).

In fact, this is inconsistent with either the consultative tasks of the Committee, or with its originally intended composition (Government members), or with its name (to whom a gathering of top party and government leaders is to be advisory?). In such circumstances meetings of the Political Consultative Committee cannot be held with proper frequency, as meetings of the Party and Government leaders by their very nature are held when there are very important matters to be considered or decided upon (reminder: a resolution of the Committee from January 1956 was calling for meetings of the Committee at least twice a year, not counting extraordinary meetings).

Thus, as the Committee has transformed itself into a Council, there is no body which would ensure the opportunity for systematic and frequent consultations

among member countries, despite the fact that they were suggesting such need.

V. To improve and rationalize the operation of the Pact consistent with the existing needs, it would be proper to specify the decision-making organs, as well as consultative and advisory bodies.

1. This objective could be achieved by setting up a Pact's Council, which would take over functions heretofore exercised by the Political Consultative Committee. The Council would be holding meetings at a summit level; it would decide on key issues, with the rule of unanimity. It would be hearing and approving reports of the Unified Command. It would be meeting whenever needed.

2. The Political Consultative Committee should be restored to its original character provided for in the Pact. It could thus become an elastic forum for consultations of foreign ministers. In some cases, when needed, with the participation of defense ministers. In particular cases the ministers might delegate their deputies. This Committee would become a consultative and advisory body, preparing positions for the governments, or the Council. The Committee should be meeting at least 2-3 times a year. In this way consultations which are now difficult to hold or which are held only as a result of arduous procedures, would obtain an institutional character.

3. A Permanent Secretariat of the Pact should be set up at a proper level and with a proper composition. It is necessary to properly prepare meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee, to ensure regular liaison among member countries during the intersession periods, for providing continuity of coordination and information on matters related to the decisions adopted, or the ones that should be submitted for discussion. The shortcomings resulting from the lack of such body have been felt frequently. To be sure, according to the Resolution adopted by the Political Consultative Committee in 1956 (Prague), a United Secretariat of the Committee, composed of a General Secretary and his deputies, one from each country, has been set up. This Secretariat, according to the Resolution, is functioning only during the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee. In practice, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR served as Secretary General. His activity as a Secretary General was limited to organizational functions and only during the sessions of the Political Consultative Committee. During the inter-session periods neither the Secretary General nor the Secretariat are in practice performing any functions. The fact that up to now the Secretary General was not disconnected from state functions in his own country was in some situations causing even political difficulties (e.g. in case of inviting Albania to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw in January 1964, Poland took over functions which should have normally belonged to the Secretary General). To satisfy the needs mentioned earlier

in pt. 3, the institution of the Secretary General and the Permanent Secretariat should be organized and set to be able to:

- a) provide a steady organizational link among member countries during the inter-session periods;
- b) perform functions connected with the preparation and servicing of meetings of the Council and the Political Consultative Committee;
- c) provide current information to the member states on the implementation of adopted resolutions and decisions, as well as on matters calling for consideration. Circulate documents relating to the activities of the Pact;
- d) submit to the member governments motions regarding consultations, convening meetings of the Consultative Committee and in exceptional cases also the Council;
- e) submit proposals for consultations on working levels regarding matters of lesser importance (e.g. preparations for U.N. sessions, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, etc.);
- f) organize an exchange of information among foreign ministries of the member states regarding the assessment of political situation, in the area of analytical and research work carried out by the foreign ministries of member states.

The position of the Secretary General should be situated in such a way that he would be able to stay in touch with member governments at the highest levels (prime ministers, foreign ministers) and obtain the necessary information. He should not be combining this function with any other state function in his own country. He should be nominated by a resolution of the Council for a period of 2-3 years. The headquarters of the Permanent Secretariat should be in Moscow. The Permanent Secretariat should be staffed by representatives from all member states, including the country of the Secretary General. They would be cooperating and fulfilling the role of liaison officers between the Secretariat and member governments (foreign ministries) and the Secretary General. Such representatives could be responsible employees of member countries' embassies. The Permanent Secretariat should also have its own small, but indispensable and qualified staff.

VI. In our opinion the new measures in the area of organizational improvement of the Pact should be made public (published). It would emphasize the political vitality of the of the Warsaw Pact.

On the other hand, similar measures undertaken in the military area should be published at the proper time and in the proper form, so as not to be exploited by NATO states, interested in counteracting the current process of NATO's disintegration, but quite the contrary, they should evoke a desired effect in the given political situation.

/-/ A. RAPACKI

[Source: KC PZPR 2948/48-53, *Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.*]

Document No. 4
Memorandum by the Polish Ministry of National
Defense, 26 January 1966

Ministry of National Defense

Secret of special significance

Copy No. 3

A NOTE

In connection with a letter by Comrade Brezhnev to Comrade Gomułka regarding the improving and ameliorating the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact and proposing to call up a conference of defense ministers on the reorganization of the command and general staff, it is known to us that the Soviet side—unwilling to impose its proposals upon the leadership of other countries—does not intend to put forward any preliminary proposals on the organization of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, but instead expects such proposals from the countries concerned.

From unofficial talks with Soviet comrades it looks that their position can be outlined as follows:

1. There is no intention to either change or amend the Warsaw Pact provisions, but rather to base [any changes] on its art. 5 and 6.
2. The intention is to set up a command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the prerogatives and real possibilities of coordinating defense efforts of member states relating to forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces in the operational, training, organization and technical area.

It is intended to position more properly than up to now the status of the Supreme Commander and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces, and to define the place of commanders of troops assigned to these forces. A need is also seen for a different, more independent positioning of defense ministers of member countries vis-à-vis the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

3. It is also expected that a Military Advisory Council is to be established within the Political Consultative Committee—as an advisory body to the Committee.

Such Council would be composed of defense ministers and the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, on equal footing. Secretary of the Council would be the chief of staff of the Unified Forces. Chairmanship of the Council meetings will be rotated consecutively among all its members. The Council would be considering general questions of development and readiness of the Unified Armed Forces, preparing

proposals for the Political Committee and recommendations for the national military commands. The issues will be dealt with according to the rule of full equality.

4. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces would coordinate operational-training preparedness of the Unified Armed Forces, as well as matters relating to the enhancement of their development and military readiness.

The Supreme Commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces would be relieved of their functions in the Soviet Army.

5. Strategic weapons will not be included in the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, and operational plans will be developed by the General Staff of the Soviet Army, as well as by general staffs of member countries in the areas of concern to them.

6. It is envisaged that in peacetime the staff of the Unified Armed Forces, employing about 600 people, will be in charge of coordinating preparations of the military to the realization of tasks assigned to them.

However, the position of the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces as a command organ in war time is still a matter too premature to be considered, as there is, among other things, a need to maintain the current procedure of working out strategic and operational plans, the rules for using strategic weapons, as well as to maneuver forces and equipment from one war theater to another.

7. The general staff of the Unified Armed Forces will be composed of the representatives of all armies in proportion to the number of forces assigned to them. It is assumed that Soviet participation in the staff will be percentage-wise smaller than their actual contribution to the Pact.

8. The following are projections of a new percentage share in the command budget of the Unified Armed Forces:

C o u n t r i e s	Percentage share in the budget	
	currently	Proposed
Bulgaria	7 %	9 %
Czechoslovakia	13 %	13.5 %
GDR	6 %	10 %
Poland	13.5 %	16.5 %
Romania	10 %	11 %
Hungary	6 %	9 %
USSR	44.5 %	31 %
	100 %	100 %

9. In the organizational structure of the command and general staff the following positions are envisaged: supreme commander, first deputy, chief of staff, air force commander, two deputies for naval operations (for the Baltic and the Black Seas), deputy chief of air force, an inspector and a quartermaster in the rank of deputies, a

deputy for technical questions and chiefs of military formations: rocket and artillery, engineering and chemical. Also included into the command as deputies to the supreme commander would be commanders of assigned forces of member countries.

Key positions, such as supreme commander, chief of staff, chief of air defense, deputy chief of air force, quartermaster, deputy for technical questions, would be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.

In view of this purely tentative recognition, one can state the following:

The Soviet side, initiating the question of improvement of the bodies set up by the Warsaw Pact, has not presented so far any specific and official preliminary materials in this regard.

Therefore, during the forthcoming conference of ministers of national defense it would be useful to obtain in the first place the Soviet position on the following questions:

- a) Defining the role and competence of chief command of the Unified Armed Forces for a threat of war and war period;
- b) The scope of participation of member countries' political-military leadership in drawing up strategic-operational plans for particular war theaters;
- c) The subordination of the supreme commander of the Unified Armed Forces.

It is now difficult to foresee what kind of position will the Soviet side and other interested countries take on the above questions. Nevertheless, the Ministry of National Defense is presenting the following point of view, which, if accepted, might be the basis for our position at the conference of Defense Ministers and for further works on proposals for detailed solutions:

1. It is proposed to set up an Advisory Committee for Defense as a body of the Council, which is the top organ of the party and government leadership.

The Advisory Committee should be composed of ministers of national defense of the Pact members, the supreme commander and the chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces as its secretary.

The rule of rotation should be introduced in chairing Committee meetings.

In addition, it would also be advisable to set up a Consultative Commission of the Chiefs of Staff, which would deal with operational planning and the resulting tasks for preparing the armed forces.

2. The Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, his deputies and the chief of staff should be appointed by the Pact's Council, with the Supreme Commander and the chief of staff being relieved of their duties in the armed forces of their country.

The Supreme Commander is to be subordinated to the Council and carries out its decisions. In the intersession periods he personally coordinates with members of the Council basic questions requiring joint decisions, or does this within the Advisory Committee for Defense.

In peace time, the command and chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces should play the role of a coordinating body, preparing the designated military forces, while in a war time they should take command of those forces on the European War Theater. The Supreme Commander and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should participate, based on a common defense strategy of Pact members and jointly with their general staffs, in developing plans for the particular strategic directions of the European War Theater. On the basis of such plans the Supreme Commander is coordinating and preparing the staff of the Unified Armed Forces and the designated forces to the execution of tasks faced by them. Thus, he is carrying on proper operational and training activities, as well as coordinating organizational, technical-manufacturing and scientific-research activities.

The internal structure of the command and general staff should correspond to the needs of directing activities in the particular strategic areas. The position of Polish representatives in the chain of command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces on the Western front should correspond with the place and tasks of the Polish armed forces scheduled to be deployed in that area.

Organizational structure of the staff of the Unified Armed Forces should ensure realization of the above tasks in peace time and constitute a nucleus of proper organs envisioned for a period of war. A preliminary assumption is that these tasks could be tackled by a staff of approximately 200 professional workers. But, it should be assumed that most of the key positions will be staffed by representatives of the Soviet Army.

Development of the command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces for a war period should be carried out through the inclusion of the proper chains from the general staff and other institutions of the Soviet Army, provided for in the operational plan for use in the European War Theater. It is also assumed that the backup and support units for the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should be assigned from the Soviet Army within their peacetime activities and consistent with a plan of their deployment in case of war. The command and the general staff of the Unified Armed Forces should continue to be headquartered in Moscow.

3. There is a need in all Warsaw Pact countries, without exception, for a clear-cut definition of commands being in charge of forces assigned to the Unified Armed Forces, as well to define both the formations and size of those forces.

The strategic assault forces are still to be at the disposal of the Soviet Army. Their use is being planned by the general staff of the Soviet Army. However, commander of the Unified Armed Forces should be inducted in planning their use in favor of forces entrusted to his command. It also seems necessary to define an obligatory scope and method for use of the strategic assault forces for the common defense of the Pact members.

Ministers of national defense and the general staffs of the Warsaw Pact countries are to fully exercise their superior command and leadership role with regard to formations assigned to the Unified Armed Forces. They are to be held responsible for their moral-political condition, their mobilization and fighting readiness, for their operational and tactical preparedness and completeness in terms of numbers, arms and equipment.

4. Together with establishing broader tasks and new organizational structures of the command and general staff of the Unified Armed Forces there is a need to fix the size and percentage share of contributions borne by the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.

It is suggested that this question should be considered in terms of proportional efforts resulting from a threat that we face the European War Theater.

The population, economic and military potential of the NATO countries in Europe is, in comparison with the potential of the people's democracies, clearly unfavorable to us. Creation of the indispensable superiority for defense and defeat of the enemy—can be ensured by the engagement in this theater of the proper Soviet forces in the dimension of approximately two-thirds of the total Warsaw Pact potential.

The above indicator of indispensable USSR's share corresponds with the real place and potential of that country. It reflects both a probable size of its armed forces provided for the European war theater, as well as its population potential (counted for the European area of the USSR) and its share in the production of basic raw materials and strategic materials. The share of the above factors can roughly be estimated at 65-90 % in relation to the total potential of all other Warsaw Pact countries.

Besides, the relative weight of the USSR is determined by its strategic assault power on behalf of the whole Warsaw Pact.

In view of the above statements it does not seem feasible to accept unofficial suggestions regarding the percentage share of the USSR in the budget of the command of the Unified Armed Forces (merely about 31%).

In the opinion of the Ministry of National Defense the share of member countries in the command of the Unified Armed Forces should:

- correspond percentage-wise to the share of positions held in the command and the general staff the Unified Armed Forces (this indicator with regard to the Soviet Army representatives should be 50 % as a minimum);
- remain basically within the actual percentage share kept in the budget up to now;
- take into consideration national income per capita in the particular countries;
- take into consideration a particular country's effort in the development of its territorial defense and its contribution to securing the redeployment of allied forces and thus bringing a relief to operational forces.

Taking into consideration these premises, Poland's

share should not exceed the present 13.5 %, and we should be trying to obtain from our point of view more justified numbers—e.g. a minimum of 50 % for the Soviet Union, and for the remaining Pact members also about 50 %. With this assumption our share would amount to 1/5 of the share of all people's democracies, which would be about 10 % of the total budget.

However, this proposal may encounter strong opposition, based, among other things, on current membership contributions to the CMEA⁵⁶, which for the USSR amounts to only 32.25 %.

Independently of the ultimate settlement of percentage shares, one should assume that that budget of the Unified Armed Forces should cover exclusively the costs of the staff and accommodation facilities, administrative expenses of the staff, participation of employees in joint exercises and partial defraying of their remuneration, etc. This budget, however, should not be designed to cover expenses related to preparations for military operations, building up inventories, constructing facilities, etc.

5. Besides the above mentioned problems there is also a need is to clarify and then to decide in the forthcoming talks on the following questions:

the rules for party and political activism within the general staff and a possible creation of a political body of the Unified Armed Forces;

the legal status of the staff employees (duration of service, mode of rotation, remuneration, promotion, etc.);

defining the scope of cooperation of the reorganized staff of the Unified Armed Forces with the proper bodies of the CMEA in the area of armaments and military equipment, research and experimental-construction activities.

x x x

According to the present orientation, the conference of the Ministers of National Defense is to be held in the first days of February of this year. The conference is to set up a working body with a task of developing within the next two-three weeks a specific draft of organizational structure of the command and the staff of the Unified Armed Forces.

Submitting for approval the setting up of the above working body, the Ministry of National Defense considers it advisable that the guidelines for our representatives in that body should be the proposals set out in this note.

In case that in the course of further works a situation arises where other proposals will need to be considered, the Ministry of National Defense will submit to the leadership additional motions.

Warsaw, 26 January 1966.

[Source: KC PZPR 2948/27-36, *Archiwum Akt Nowych*,

Warsaw. Translated by Jan Chowaniec.]

Document No. 5

Informal remarks by Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, Gen. Otakar Rytůf, at a Confidential Meeting of General Staff Officials, Prague, 13 March 1968

. . . Finally, there is our foreign policy. It has been said that while staying loyal to our friendship with the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism we must show greater independence. This also concerns our armed forces, and quite considerably so. I am going to spend some time on this, because it is at the root of the problem that you, too, have touched upon in your presentations.

What is it about, comrades? The thing is, to tell you the truth, we are in a bind today, we have no room, no material means, no people. We've got into a situation when our task, as it has been set, is beyond the means of our state—both human and economic. What's the reason, comrades? The reason is, I think, at the heart of the Warsaw Treaty. We've been talking for ten years and can't agree about creating an organ, a military organ of the Warsaw Treaty, the staff and the military council that is, which would work out the military concept of the Warsaw Treaty as its top priority.

We can't do without a concept. But the concept must not only come out of the General Staff of the Soviet army. Since it is a coalition concept it must come out of the coalition. This means that the members of the Warsaw Treaty must take part. It's a fundamental question, comrades. I'm sorry I can't talk much about it in any great detail, it would lead me too far; it would get me into the area of strategic operational plans, and this I can't do no matter how much I am trying, and believe me I am sincerely trying, to make the complexity of this problem clearer to you.

This is the thing, comrades. If there were an organ we could agree on this matter. Through that organ, we would be able to make our voice heard, so that we would be listened to. Today our voice comes through as our views or opinions but certainly not as pressure. That's because we have no legal grounds for being effective. And so we are getting the assignment for our army in case of war from the joint command, which does not really exist except as some transmission office. I have no doubt, of course, that, as far as the Soviet army is concerned, this assignment is backed by the economic and human potential of the Soviet Union. But it does not reflect our economic and human possibilities. And this applies not only to us but to our neighbors as well.

This is a situation we can't tolerate any longer; we have to act on it. We have called it to the attention of both our leaders and the Soviet leaders, but so far we've had no solution. Just take the following question, comrades. Look, once there used to be a doctrine—maybe for some of you, comrades, this will sound a bit complicated, but allow me

to say it. Under Khrushchev, there used to be a doctrine: if there is a war, seven strikes at Germany, and Germany is liquidated. Eight, not seven, they said; I made a mistake. Count another number of strikes to destroy America. Comrades, it's hard to say it was bad, hard to say. Just look, comrades, maybe I'm wrong, but I would characterize the situation like this: thank God we have nuclear weapons. In my view, thanks to them there has been no World War III. I think—and here, mind you, I am telling you my opinion, and I have told this opinion to our Soviet comrades, too—that this point has also been noticed over there, by our potential enemies. And what have they done? They came up with the theory of limited war.⁵⁷ Because for them the threat of a nuclear strike was a real threat. They were really scared. There was panic. Not only among the public. There was panic in the staffs. And they realized what it meant, they took Khrushchev at his word; maybe what Khrushchev was saying was eighty-nine per cent propaganda, but they took him at his word, and said: Well, if you do this to us, we shall go at you another way—with the theory of limited war. The limited war theory allows for the possibility of conducting war without nuclear weapons. And with this theory, it seems to me, they a little bit, to put it plainly, cheated and misled our Soviet comrades, who took the bait—the limited war theory, that is. Maybe the theory suits the Soviet Union from its point of view. But from the point of view of our republic, it doesn't suit us. Why doesn't it suit us, comrades? Because the limited war theory means—what? Orientation toward classical warfare. And classical warfare means—what? It means saturating the troops with high technology and high manpower. In today's situation, in today's economic situation of the capitalist and the socialist camps, this is something that the capitalist system can afford. Because its economy, like it or not, is superior, has greater possibilities. That's today. Maybe ten years from now it will be different. But today, that's the way it is. This means that we have agreed to—what, comrades? If we have accepted the limited war theory we have agreed to arming our units in competition with the West. Well, comrades, such a competition we can't win. Because their economy is vastly more powerful than ours. Today we say: careful, we must not stay behind. Of course, we can use the slogan: catch up and overtake the West in technology. But if we try to do that, comrades, we would be walking in *lapti* [Russian peasant footwear], or else barefooted.

Because we are not capable of keeping up in this competition. This, comrades, is the most vital question if you take the position of our republic. And we, the general staff and the ministry of defense, we must defend the interests of our army, even if we acknowledge our duties to international friendship under the Warsaw Treaty. But we must defend our interests.

I don't want to scare you, comrades, but we have made calculations, of course, what would happen in a possible conflict in a normal, classical war. This is not

advantageous for us. I myself, comrades, am not for any kind of war, also not for nuclear war—it's clear to me, that would mean destruction of the world, destruction of mankind, even though the threat worked, it really did, under Khrushchev. Now, because of that threat—and this is my opinion but I can prove it—our Soviet comrades are going to push us to speed up the arming and buildup of our units; this was proved last year in the signing of the protocol.⁵⁸ I had sharp clashes with the unified command when they came up with the demand to increase the number of our divisions. It took two days, two days it took, before I managed to convince one army general what is the economic and human potential of our republic. Unfortunately, comrades, I have to say that our political representatives do not pay enough attention to these questions. And yet these are fundamental questions. And this point, that is, more independence in foreign policy, I see, in a way, as being relevant to the Warsaw Treaty politics, not only in relation to the West, to West Germany.

We have to struggle to get a position of equality within the Warsaw Treaty.

[Source: Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., *Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967-1968)* [*Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis*], (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), pp. 78-80. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

Document No. 6

Memorandum by Thirty Scholarly Associates of the Military Political Academy and Military Technical Academy for the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, 4 June 1968

Formulation and Constitution of Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Area

The draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak People's Army poses with a particular urgency the question of elaborating the state military doctrine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In our opinion, the point of departure ought to be the state interests of Czechoslovakia in the military area which, however, have not yet been formulated and constituted.

The signatories of this memorandum, who are scholarly associates working for the Czechoslovak armed forces, wish to contribute to the scientific examination and formulation of those state interests. In sections 1 and 2, they express their position concerning the present state of our military doctrine and military policy. In sections 3 and 4, they outline the procedure for a theoretical examination of the data aimed at the formulation of doctrinal conclusions. In section 5, they justify the necessity of

using scientific methods to solve these problems.

They are sending this memorandum to provide the basis for an exchange of opinion. They consider a dialogue necessary for the development of scientific research.

Prague, May 1968

1. Political and Military Doctrine

1.1. The political doctrine of a socialist state is primarily influenced by the choice of wider goals within the international community and its relationship with the diverse forces representative of social progress.

The principle of socialist internationalism is organically linked with the national responsibility of a sovereign state. This is normally the more important as well as more difficult the smaller is the physical power of the state. The choice cannot solely depend on "national interest," which cannot be defined in a pure form—neither as an interest of one's own state, nor as an interest of the leading state of a coalition. Decisive is the interest of the societal movement, of which sovereign states are part, specifically the interest of European socialism and its dynamic development. Mere defense of what has been accomplished fosters stagnation and degeneration; wrong choice of an offensive strategy has destructive effect on the progress of the whole societal movement.

1.2. Military policy as an aggregate of actions in military matters implements military interests and needs through a chosen strategy. In regard to national interest, the military doctrine of the state can be described as a comprehensive formulation of its military interests and needs.

The doctrine is a binding theoretical and ideological base for the formulation of military policy and the resulting measures as well as for negotiations with the alliance partners. It amounts to a compromise between the maximum requirements and actual resources, between the dynamics of the evolving military knowledge and the findings of the social sciences, between the development of technology and the requirement of an effective defense system corresponding to the military circumstances at any given time.

1.3. The formulation of the state's military doctrine influences retroactively its political doctrine and strategy. It substantially affects its capability to project itself internationally by nonmilitary means. Giving up one's own military doctrine means giving up responsibility for one's own national and international action. A surrender to spontaneity, this entails depoliticization of military thought, which in turn leads to a paralysis of the army. It is the fundamental source of crisis of the army organism by tearing it out of society. It disrupts the metabolism between the army and the society. It deprives the army of its *raison d'être* for the national community by limiting the interaction between national goals and the goals of the socialist community.

2. The Past, Present, and Future of Czechoslovakia's Military Policy

2.1. The foundations of Czechoslovakia's present defense systems were laid at the beginning of the nineteen-fifties, at which time the responsible political actors of the socialist countries assumed that a military conflict in Europe was imminent. It was a strategy based on the slogan of defense against imperialist aggression, but at the same time assuming the possibility of transition to strategic offensive with the goal of achieving complete Soviet hegemony in Europe. No explicit reassessment of this coalition strategy by taking into account the potential of nuclear missiles has ever taken place.

2.2. The Czechoslovak army, created with great urgency and extraordinary exertion, became a substantial strategic force by the time when Europe's political and military situation had fundamentally changed. Although in 1953 we noted a relaxation of international tension and in 1956 introduced the new strategy of peaceful coexistence, no formulation of Czechoslovakia's own military doctrine or reform of its army took place. Invoking the threat of German aggression, the alliance continued to be tightened up. Increasingly the threat of German aggression has taken on the role of an extraneous factor employed with the intent to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist community. Once the original notions about the applicability of a universal economic and political model had to be revised, military cooperation was supposed to compensate for insufficient economic cooperation and the inadequacy of other relationships among the socialist countries.

2.3. In politics, there is a lack of clarity about the probable trends of development in the progressive movement to which we belong. There is a prevailing tendency to cling to the obsolete notions that have become part of the ideological legacy of the socialist countries. There is a prevailing tendency to try to influence all the segments of the movement, regardless of the sharply growing differences in their respective needs resulting from social and economic development.

In 1956 and 1961⁵⁹ we proved by our deeds that we were ready to bear any global risks without claiming a share of responsibility for the political decisions and their implementation. By doing so, we proved that we did not understand even the European situation and were guided not by sober analysis but by political and ideological stereotypes. (Hence also the surprise with regard to Hungary in 1956 and the inadequate response in 1961.)

2.4. Our military policy did not rest on an analysis of our own national needs and interests. It did not rest on our own military doctrine. Instead it was a reflection of the former sectarian party leadership, which prevented the party from conducting a realistic policy of harmonizing the interests of different groups with national and international interests for the benefit of socialism. The development of the army was deprived of both rational criteria and an institutionalized opposition. Military policy

was reduced to the search for optimally matching our resources with the demands of the alliance. Devoid of principles, it was bound to create contradictions and crises within the army.

Inevitably the twenty years of deformed development affected the ability, or rather inability, of the cadres to overcome the deformations. Theoretical backwardness in military theory and the formulation of a military doctrine has been a great obstacle to the overcoming of the past errors.

2.5. Czechoslovakia's military policy will continue being built upon the alliance with other Warsaw Treaty partners, above all the U.S.S.R. At the same time, however, it will be a policy based on state sovereignty, and designed to provide our input into developing the alliance's common positions. A modern conception of the Warsaw Treaty can only have one meaning: increased external security of its member states to foster the development of both the socialist states and the states of Western Europe. Our military policy will not shun global risks, but only in the role of a partner rather than of a victim of a development that it cannot influence.

It will essentially be an European security policy, supportive of international détente in Europe, all-European cooperation, and Europe's progressive forces. It will serve as an instrument of a broader, but not self-serving policy. A military policy that needs to construe and exaggerate an enemy threat fosters conservative tendencies in both socialism and capitalism. While in the short run it may seem to "strengthen" socialism, in the long run it weakens it.

2.6. Czechoslovakia's military policy must rest on a scientific analysis of a whole range of possible war situations in Europe, formulate its own sovereign interests and needs accordingly, estimate its military capabilities in particular situations within the framework of the coalition, and act on its own scientifically elaborated strategic doctrine.

3. The Contemporary War-Peace Situation

3.1. The naively pragmatic realist approach considers relations among sovereign states from the point of view of either war or peace. In actuality there is a whole range of situations whose common denominator is the availability of instruments of armed violence but which differ in the manner of their use. As a result of substantive social and political changes and the scientific-technological revolution in military affairs, such a range of situations is considerably more complex and diverse not only in comparison with the situation before World War II but also with the situation in the early fifties.

Yet, at this very time of incipient gigantic transformations of social and political as well as scientific and technological nature, our military policy and doctrine applied the Soviet model as universally valid.

3.2. The above-mentioned range of possible situations may be summarized as follows:

- absolute war (in different variations),
- limited wars (of several types),
- situation between war and peace resulting from the long-term legalization of an originally temporary armistice as a result of which the adversaries are no longer fighting but peace treaties have not been concluded either,
- potential war, i.e. indirect use of instruments of armed violence as means of foreign policy,
- peace among potential adversaries,
- peace among allied sovereign states,
- peace among neutrals,
- absolute peace through general and complete disarmament.

This description is a distillation of specific situations, which are in turn combinations of an indefinite number of possible situations that make sovereign states and military coalitions implement their foreign and military policies.

3.3. The stereotype of class struggle, with its dichotomy of friends and foes, has reduced substantive political distinctions among sovereign states to basic class antagonism, with pernicious consequences for our political strategy and tactics. Yet the Leninist postulate of specific analysis of a concrete situation differentiates according to actual distinctions.

At the very least, the typology should consider:

- actual and potential allies,
- neutrals,
- potential adversaries,
- actual adversaries,
- war enemies.

Czechoslovakia's state interests and needs require giving justice to different situational variants while rejecting illusions and dangerous simplifications.

4. Possible Formulation of Czechoslovakia's Military Interests and Needs Related to the War-Peace Situation in Contemporary Europe

The doctrinal formulation and constitution of Czechoslovak military interests and needs first requires a substantive analysis of particular war-peace situations, especially in Europe. Our own military interests and needs should then be formulated accordingly. This should be the point of departure for practical measures in accordance with the doctrine. Following is a brief outline of how one might proceed in some of the basic situations.

4.1. Absolute war in Europe

Given the accumulation of nuclear missiles by both major military coalitions, the possible outbreak of such a war in Europe is wrought with catastrophic consequences for most of its European participants. At the same time, the permanent lead time in the offensive rather than the defensive deployment of nuclear missiles, as well our unfavorable geographical position, make it impossible to substantially limit the destructiveness of enemy first strikes against our territory to an extent compatible with the preservation of our national and state existence. It must

be said openly that the outbreak and conduct of a global nuclear war in the European theater would be tantamount to the national extinction and demise of state sovereignty especially of the frontline states, including Czechoslovakia. The futility of such a war as a means of settling European disputes, as demonstrated by the development of the so-called Berlin crisis of 1961, of course does not exclude its possibility.

In such a situation, we consider it appropriate to formulate Czechoslovakia's military interests and needs as a matter of primary existential importance:

- preventing the conduct of a nuclear war on our territory is a fundamental existential need of our society;
- Czechoslovakia has a strategic interest in actively contributing to the reduction of the real possibility of absolute war in Europe.

Our fundamental needs and interests in the event of such a war should determine a foreign policy aimed at limiting the possibility of a nuclear attack against Czechoslovakia. The appropriate measures are, for example, the conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and supplementary guarantees of the status quo in Europe.

4.2. Limited war in Europe

The analysis of the possible scenarios in Europe obviously starts with the recognition of a growing danger of such a war and its growing strategic and political significance.

In recognizing the futility of limited war as a means of Czechoslovak foreign policy and in emphasizing our interest in eliminating it as a means of settlement of European disputes, we assume the necessity of purposefully waging war against an attack in a fashion conducive to limiting its destructive effects on our territory and population.

The formulation and constitution of Czechoslovakia's particular interests and needs will determine the practical measures to be taken:

- Preparation of Czechoslovakia's armed forces and its entire defense system within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty for the different variants of enemy attack with the goal of repelling it, defeating the adversary, and compelling him to settle peacefully.
- Reduction of the real possibility of war by reciprocal military and political acts of peaceful coexistence aimed at eliminating the use of force as a means of the settlement of disputes.

4.3. Situation between war and peace in Europe

This is the situation resulting from the failure to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and from the great-power status of Berlin inside the territory of the GDR. Herein is the possibility of a sudden deterioration leading to severe military and political crisis. At the present time, such a crisis would have catastrophic consequences for our economy, as had happened during the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises. This would substantially worsen our

strained economic situation, with too negative consequences for our development in a progressive direction.

These characteristics determine our approach to the formulation of Czechoslovakia's interests and needs, namely:

- our primary strategic and political need to prevent such a military and political crisis at the present time,
- our interest in reducing the possibility of a transition from the absence of war to a limited war while searching for a solution of the German question as the key question of contemporary Europe.

This further postulates measures to be taken in both military and foreign policy, above all through the Warsaw Pact, with the goal of normalizing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.4. Potential war in Europe

At issue is the indirect use of the potential for armed violence as an instrument of foreign policy, as implied in the policy of deterrence, practiced especially by the nuclear powers. Czechoslovakia cannot use deterrence against the Western powers. Its deterrence posture is declaratory and politically ineffective if it is not supported by strategic measures against potential adversaries geographically distant from us. At the same time, the use of deterrence against Czechoslovakia by some of its potential adversaries forces us to respond in kind.

These characteristics determine the formulation of Czechoslovakia's needs and interests, namely:

- our temporary need to use the potential for armed violence against the adversary that uses it against us,
- our lack of interest in using it as a matter of equivalent reciprocity, i.e. our interest in its exclusion as an instrument of foreign policy.

In this situation, we aim at the conclusion of legally binding agreements with potential adversaries that would ban the use of the threat of force in mutual relations. This can be realized in the relations between Czechoslovakia and Austria, Czechoslovakia and France, and Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

4.5. Peace among potential adversaries in Europe

This is the situation obtaining in Europe among potential adversaries who have no mutually exclusive interests and do not apply the policy of deterrence against one another.

Here Czechoslovakia's interests and needs lay in the legal codification of the state of peace with a growing number of potential adversaries.

Our practical goals should be the conclusion with such partners of non-aggression treaties and arms limitation agreements. In this way, we can contribute to the reduction of tensions between potential adversaries, the growth of peace in Europe, and the reciprocal gradual neutralization of instruments of armed violence.

4.6. In other possible peace situations in Europe, as enumerated earlier, military interests and needs represent a share in Czechoslovakia's overall interests and needs. The

closer the peace, of course, the lower the share. Absolute peace entails the abolition of the material and technological base for war, and thus also of the base for the military interests and needs.

In view of Czechoslovakia's current foreign and military policy predicament, our main task is the formulation and constitution of its military interests and needs pertinent to the situations referred to in points 4.2 through 4.5.

If the formulation of Czechoslovak military doctrine is to be more scientific, the main question is that of choosing the right approach and avoiding the wrong ones.

5. Systems Analysis and the Use of Modern Research Methods

5.1. In constituting a Czechoslovak military doctrine, the most dangerous and precarious approach is the one-sided use of simple logic and old-fashioned working habits.

If Czechoslovakia is to be preserved as an entity, giving absolute priority to the possibility of a general war in Europe that involves the massive use of nuclear weapons makes no sense, for this entails a high probability of our country's physical liquidation regardless of how much money and resources are spent on its armed forces and regardless even of the final outcome of the war.

5.2. For each of the variants under 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, systems analysis and other modern methods of research allow us to determine the correlation between, on the one hand, the material, financial, and personnel expenditures on the armed forces (assuming perfect rationality of their development) and, on the other hand, the degree of risk of the state's physical destruction and the loss of its sovereignty, while taking into account the chances of a further advance of socialism, or even the elimination of the threat of war.

At issue is the attainment of pragmatic stability in national defense and army development, corresponding to political needs and related to foreign policy by striving to avert war by increasing the risks for the potential adversary while preserving the sovereign existence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, thus giving substance to its contribution to the coalition in fulfillment of its internationalist duty.

Managing the development of our armed forces solely on the basis of simple logic, empiricism, and historical analogy, perhaps solely in the interest of the coalition without regard to one's own sovereign interests, is in its final effect inappropriate and contradicts the coalition's interests.

Besides the reconciliation of our own and the coalition's interests in our military doctrine, we consider it necessary to utilize systems analysis and all other available methods of scientific prognosis, including model-building. Thus the preparedness of our armed forces in different variants can be assessed and related to the evolving political needs and economic possibilities. This concerns

not so much tactical, operational, and organizational issues as the confrontation of political and doctrinal problems with the reality.

We regard systems analysis as the new quality that can raise the effectiveness of our armed forces above the current level.

5.3. At the most general level, we can see two possible ways of managing our army's development:—The first way is proceeding from the recognition of the personnel, technological, and financial limitations imposed by society upon the armed forces toward the evaluation of the risks resulting from the failure to achieve desirable political goals under the different variants of European development described in the preceding section. The decision about the extent of acceptable risk must be made by the supreme political organ of the state.

—The second way is proceeding from the recognition of the acceptable risk as set by the political leadership toward the provision of the necessary personnel, technological, and financial means corresponding to the different variants of European development.

Either of these ways presupposes elaboration of less than optimal models of army development for each of the variants, applying the requirements of national defense regardless of the existing structure of the system. Confrontation of the model with the available resources should then determine the specific measures to be taken in managing the development of the armed forces and their components.

The proposed procedure would not make sense if we were to keep the non-systemic, compartmentalized approach to building our armed forces without being able to prove to the political leadership that the available personnel, financial, and technological means are being used with maximum effectiveness to prepare our armed forces for any of the different variants of European development rather than merely show their apparent preparedness at parades and exercises organized according to a prepared scenario.

5.4. Increasingly strategic thought has been shifting away from seeking the overall destruction of all enemy assets to the disruption of the enemy defense system by destroying its selected elements, thus leading to its collapse. In some cases, such as in the Israeli-Arab war, the theory proved its superiority in practice as well. Its application in developing our army, elaborating our strategy, and designing our operational plans can result not only in substantial military savings but also increased effectiveness of our defense system. In case of a relative (but scientifically arrived at and justified) decrease of those expenditures, it may help limit the consequences of the exponential growth of the prices of the new combat and management technology. Most importantly, it may help impress on the armed forces command and the political leadership the best way of discharging their responsibilities toward both the state and the coalition.

5.5. The proposed procedures and methods toward the constitution of Czechoslovak military doctrine can of course be implemented only through a qualitatively new utilization of our state's scientific potential. We regard science as being critically conducive to working methods that practitioners are inhibited from using because of their particular way of thinking, their time limitations, and for reasons of expediency. We regard science as a counterweight that could block and balance arbitrary tendencies in the conduct of the armed forces command and the political leadership. In this we see the fundamental prerequisite for a qualitatively new Czechoslovak military doctrine and the corresponding management of our armed forces.

[Source: Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulík, ed., *Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967-1968) [Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis]*, (Brno: Doplněk, 1996), pp. 137-44. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

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¹ Matthew Evangelista, "Why Keep Such an Army?": *Khrushchev's Troop Reductions*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 19 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1997).

² Vojtech Mastny, "The Origins of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Quest for Security," in *Socio-Economic Dimensions of the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World*, ed. Shugo Minagawa and Osamu Ieda (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 1996), pp. 355-84.

³ Draft of mutual defense treaty by Gromyko, Zorin, and Semenov, 31 December 1954, Sekretariat Ministra/14/12/1/1-6, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation], Moscow [AVP RF].

⁴ Decision by Central Committee, 1 April 1955, Sekretariat Ministra 14/54/4/39, AVP RF.

⁵ Khrushchev to Ulbricht, 2 May 1955, J IV 2/202/-244 Bd 1, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin [SAPMO].

⁶ Stenographical record of meeting, 12 May 1955, Varshavskoe soveshchanie 1/1/1, AVP RF. The creation of the Warsaw Pact under Khrushchev was thus even more tightly controlled than the creation of the Cominform in 1948 had been under Stalin. At that time, the participants had not been told in advance what to expect, prompting some of them to express

opinions of their own. See Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 32, and *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1047/1948/1949*, ed. Giuliano Procacci (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

⁷ "Protokoll über die Schaffung eines Vereinigten Kommandos der bewaffneten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten am Vertrag über Freundschaft, Zusammenarbeit und gegenseitige Hilfe," 14 May 1955, AZN 32437, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg.

⁸ Tadeusz Pióro, *Armia ze skazą: W Wojsku Polskim 1945-1968 (wspomnienia i refleksje)* [The Defective Army: In the Polish Army, 1945-1968 (Memories and Reflections)] (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1994), pp. 210-13; copy of the minutes provided by Gen. Pióro.

⁹ Khrushchev to Bierut, 7 September 1955, KC PZPR, 2661/2, 16-19, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Modern Records Archives], Warsaw [AAN].

¹⁰ Records of the meeting, 26-28 January 1956, A 14696, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin.

¹¹ Robert Spencer, "Alliance Perceptions of the Soviet Threat, 1950-1988," in *The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat*, ed. Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 9-48, at p. 19.

¹² Declaration of 30 October 1956, J.P. Jain, *Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1973), pp. 168-71.

¹³ Arkadii Sobolev at the UN Security Council meeting, 4 November 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. 25, p. 388.

¹⁴ Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," paper presented at the conference "The Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War," Beijing, 22-25 October 1997, pp. 7-9.

¹⁵ "Uwagi i propozycje odnośnie dokumentu p.n. 'Polozhenie ob obedinennom komandovanii vooruzhennymi silami gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora'," [Reflections and Proposals Concerning the Document Entitled "Statute of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty"], and "Analiza strony prawnej dokumentu p.n. 'Protokol soveshchaniia po planu razvitiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Polskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na 1955-65 gg.' oraz następnych protokółów wnoszących do niego zmiany," [Analysis of the Legal Aspects of the Document Entitled "Protocol on the Consultation about the Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic in 1955-65" and Its Subsequent Amendments], 3 November 1956, microfilm (o) 96/6398, reel W-15, Library of Congress, Washington [LC].

¹⁶ Vice Minister of Defense Bordziłowski to Gomułka, 7 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/53, AAN; "Memorandum w sprawie Układu Warszawskiego oraz planu rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych PRL" [Memorandum Concerning the Warsaw Treaty and the Plan for the Development of Poland's Armed Forces], microfilm (o) 96/6398, reel W-25, LofC.

¹⁷ Cf. "Wykaz zagadnień wojskowych wymagających omówienia i uregulowania na nowych zasadach" [An Outline of Military Problems Requiring Discussion and Regulation according to New Principles], by Drzewiecki, 8 November 1956, KC PZPR 2661/137-38, AAN.

¹⁸ Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," *Journal of Contemporary History* 33 (1998): 163-214, at p. 203.

¹⁹ Commentary by Drzewiecki, undated (November-December

1956), KC PZPR 2661/124, AAN.

²⁰ Pióro, *Armia ze skazą*, pp. 277-80.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 280-82.

²² Marginal note on Document No. 2.

²³ Brezhnev to Ulbricht, 7 January 1966, J IV 2/202-248, SAPMO.

²⁴ Memorandum by Rapacki, 21 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/48-53, AAN.

²⁵ Memorandum by Polish Ministry of National Defense, 26 January 1966, KC PZPR 2948/27-36, AAN.

²⁶ Memorandum by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, 31 May 1966, KC PZPR 2948/54-57, AAN.

²⁷ Record of the Berlin meeting of deputy foreign ministers, 10-12 February 1966, J IV 2/202-257 Bd 9, SAPMO; report by Naszkowski, 17 February 1966, KC PZPR 2948/64-69, AAN.

²⁸ Raymond L. Garthoff, "When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (1995): 111.

²⁹ Gerard Holden, *The Warsaw Pact: The WTO and Soviet Security Policy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 43.

³⁰ Antonín Benčík, Jaromír Navrátil, and Jan Paulfík, ed., *Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 1967-1970: Vojenská varianta řešení čs. krize (1967-1968)* [Military Problems of the Czechoslovak Reform, 1967-1970: The Military Option in the Solution of the Czechoslovak Crisis], (Brno: Doplněk, 1996).

³¹ Jane Stromseth, *The Origins of Flexible Response* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 69-95.

³² For example, Černík to Novotný, 20 May 1966, in Benčík, *Vojenské otázky*, pp. 314-16.

³³ Christopher Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 95-97, attributes to the memorandum unsubstantiated features claimed by its later pro-Soviet critics. Cf. footnotes 47 and 48 below.

³⁴ *Lidová armáda*, 2 July 1968.

³⁵ The comical hero of Jaroslav Hašek's antiwar novel of 1920.

³⁶ John D. Duffield, D., *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 151-93.

³⁷ Michael McCgwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1987), pp. 381-405; Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 58-92.

³⁸ The assertion in the 6 March 1968, commentary on Prague radio by Luboš Dobrovský (later minister of defense in postcommunist Czechoslovakia), according to which a Czechoslovak delegate at the Sofia meeting joined Romania in expressing his doubts about the credibility of the Soviet nuclear umbrella for Eastern Europe and alluded approvingly to De Gaulle's decision to leave NATO's integrated command because of his similar doubts about U.S. protection (cited in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970], p. 489), cannot be substantiated from the records of the Sofia meeting in Polish, Czech, and former East German archives: KC PZPR 2663/381-411, AAN; MNO/sekr. min., 1968/boxes 4 and 5, VHA; J IV 2/202-263 Bd 15, SAPMO.

³⁹ "Notatka o wynikach narady szefów sztabów generalnych armii państw-członków Układu Warszawskiego" [Note about the Results of the Consultation of the Chiefs of Staffs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty], undated [March 1968], KC PZPR

2663/366-80, AAN.

⁴⁰ Speech by Ceaușescu and rejoinder by Gomulka at the Sofia meeting, 7 March 1968, KC PZPR 2663/389-411, AAN; Soviet party central committee to Romanian party central committee, undated (early 1968), KC PZPR 2663/359-61, AAN.

⁴¹ Information by the international department of the Czechoslovak party central committee, 22 February 1968, in *Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967-1970: Prosinec 1967-červenec 1968* [International Implications of the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1967-1970: December 1967-July 1968], ed. Jitka Vondrová, Jaromír Navrátil et al. (Brno: Doplněk, 1995), pp. 54-61, at pp. 59-60.

⁴² Report for cabinet meeting, 12 March 1968, MNO/sekr. min. 1968/10, Vojenský historický archív [Military Historical Archives], Prague, VHA.

⁴³ Speech by Džúr in Bratislava, 9-11 July 1968, and Džúr to Dubček, 2 August 1968, in Benčík, *Vojenské otázky*, pp. 202-27 and 249.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁴⁵ Antonín Benčík, *Operace "Dunaj": Vojáci a Pražské jaro 1968* [Operation Danube: The Military and the Prague Spring of 1968] (Prague: Institute for Contemporary History, 1994), p. 38.

⁴⁶ Iakubovskii to Dubček, 18 July 1968, in Benčík, *Vojenské otázky*, pp. 236-37.

⁴⁷ Anatoli Gribkow, *Der Warschauer Pakt: Geschichte und Hintergründe des östlichen Militärbündnisses* (Berlin: Edition Q, 1995), p. 153.

⁴⁸ Statement by ČTK press agency, July 28, and "Stanovisko vojenské rady ministra národní obrany" [The Position of the Military Council of the Minister of Defense], 13 August 1968, in Benčík, *Vojenské otázky*, pp. 241-43, 253-56.

⁴⁹ "Problems with the Policy of Safeguarding the Internal and External Security of the State, Their Status at Present, the Basic Ways to Resolve Them," July 1968, Jaromír Navrátil et al., ed., *The Prague Spring '68: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), pp. 268-76, at p. 275.

⁵⁰ Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe*, pp. 95-97.

⁵¹ Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 640-42.

⁵² Milan Ždímal, *Memorandum: 1968-1990* (Bratislava: Vysoká pedagogická škola, katedra politologie, 1992), pp. 3-5. The author was one of the signatories of the memorandum.

⁵³ Successive drafts of the appeal for the convocation of European security conference, 17 March 1969, J IV 2/202-264 Bd 16, SAPMO.

⁵⁴ Vojtech Mastny, *The Soviet Non-invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 23 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998).

⁵⁵ Ryszard Majchrzak, at the time Director of Minister Rapacki's Secretariat.

⁵⁶ Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet bloc's organization for economic cooperation.

⁵⁷ In the original, the term "local war" is used.

⁵⁸ Three-year agreement on the development of the Czechoslovak armed forces, signed in 1967.

⁵⁹ The Hungarian and Berlin crises.

New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev, Nuclear Weapons, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Editor's Note: With the following essay and documents, CWIHP continues its efforts to document the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. At our request, Raymond L. Garthoff has prepared new, full translations of the memoranda of 6 and 8 September 1962, which were featured in CWIHP Bulletin 10, following the article by Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko on "The Pitsunda Decision." He has also translated, at our request, several additional memoranda from May, June, and October 1962. All of these are photocopies from the General Staff archives now in the Volkogonov papers, Reel 6 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division). In some cases these copies contain passages difficult or impossible to read, not only because the originals are handwritten but also because Volkogonov's photocopies in some cases do not fully reproduce the original pages. Nonetheless, the texts are nearly complete, and the documents are of considerable interest and value to research on this important subject.

By **Raymond L. Garthoff**

My colleagues Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have advanced new information and new insights in their *CWIHP Bulletin 10* (March 1998) article on "The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons."¹ Based on two Soviet Defense Ministry documents from September 1962, it is an interesting and provocative account, building on their important earlier study *One Hell of a Gamble*.² These documents are among others related to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Volkogonov Papers, a collection gathered by the late Colonel General Dmitry Volkogonov and now held by the Library of Congress. Partial translations of these two documents are appended to their article.

Each new tranche of revelations about the Cuban missile crisis helps to answer some old questions about it, but also raises new ones. It is clear from these materials (and some others earlier addressed in *One Hell of a Gamble*) that Khrushchev made certain adjustments in Operation Anadyr, his plan for military deployments in Cuba, in September 1962, evidently in reaction to President Kennedy's public warning of September 4. It is less certain, much less certain, that Khrushchev saw Kennedy's warning as a "signal" that he knew about the planned deployment of missiles, as suggested by Fursenko and Naftali. Khrushchev may simply have become less confident that the deployment could be kept secret. It is also not clear that Khrushchev had, in any meaningful sense, "a chance to stop the operation" on September 5, when he learned of Kennedy's warning. True, as the authors state, on that date "there were no missiles or nuclear warheads in Cuba." But the first missiles were already en route. Khrushchev theoretically could have "terminated the deployment" at that time, but in practical (and political) terms he could hardly have done so. Instead, these documents show, he sought to expedite the dispatch of weaponry already underway, and also to send some additional tactical nuclear weapons (6 bombs for an additional squadron of 9 specially fitted IL-28 bombers, and 12 warheads for 12 *Luna* (FROG) short-range tactical

rockets). According to Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's response to Kennedy's warning was thus "to ratchet up the incipient crisis by *introducing* tactical nuclear weapons into the picture."

Although it is true that Khrushchev sought to expedite the remaining planned shipments, and on September 7 added the *Lunas* and nuclear-equipped IL-28s, he also rejected a Ministry of Defense proposal to add a brigade of 18 R-11M nuclear-armed missiles—the SCUD B (SS-1c) missile with an 80 mile range (for nuclear delivery). And the augmentation did *not* "introduce" tactical nuclear weapons; the original General Staff *Anadyr* plan of 24 May 1962, finally approved by Khrushchev and the Presidium on June 10, had provided for 80 nuclear-armed tactical cruise missiles (with 16 launchers), with a range of 90 miles. Moreover, not mentioned by Fursenko and Naftali in their article, although noted in their book, two weeks later, on September 25, Khrushchev canceled the planned deployment to Cuba of the major part of the Soviet Navy surface and submarine fleet previously planned for deployment. This included canceling the planned deployment of seven missile-launching submarines, as well as two cruisers, two missile-armed destroyers, and two conventionally armed destroyers.

In sum, in September Khrushchev added 6 IL-28 nuclear bombs and 12 short-range *Luna* tactical nuclear rockets to the 80 tactical cruise missile warheads previously authorized, but rejected addition of 18 longer-range tactical ballistic missiles. And he canceled most of the Navy deployment, including 7 missile-launching submarines with 21 nuclear ballistic missiles. In short, I do not believe it is correct to conclude, as do the authors, that Khrushchev "chose to put the maximum reliance on nuclear weapons."

In their article, Fursenko and Naftali have misread the second document, reporting that Khrushchev approved an order to arm Soviet attack submarines with nuclear torpedoes to be prepared, upon receipt of specific orders from Moscow, "to launch nuclear torpedo attacks on U.S.

coastal targets,” the list of targets being appended to the revised mission statement (but regrettably missing from the copy available in the Volkogonov Papers). As the authors had previously reported in their book, the four Soviet *Foxtrot*-class diesel attack submarines sent on patrol to the area in October were each equipped with one nuclear-armed torpedo in addition to conventionally armed torpedoes.³ These nuclear torpedoes were, however, as we know from other sources, intended for use against U.S. Navy ships, in particular aircraft carriers, in case of confirmed U.S. Navy attacks on the submarines.⁴ The submarine-launched nuclear attacks against “the most important coastal targets in the USA” mentioned in the September 8 document were explicitly identified as strikes by “nuclear-missile equipped submarines,” still scheduled for deployment to Cuba until that deployment was canceled on September 25. Incidentally, the seven missile submarines planned for deployment in Cuba until September 25 were the diesel-powered *Golf*-class, not the nuclear-powered *Hotel*-class (as misidentified in *One Hell of a Gamble*), and they each carried three relatively short-range ballistic missiles (325 mile R-13, SS-N-4, missiles), not “intermediate-range” missiles.⁵

I agree fully with the conclusion by Fursenko and Naftali that “Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on the [potential] battlefield without any analysis of the threshold between limited and general nuclear war.” I am less certain that an “inescapable” further conclusion is that “Khrushchev sent the tactical weapons to Cuba for use in battle, not as a deterrent.” That may well be, but I do not believe it is that clear that the Soviet leadership necessarily “intended to use” the nuclear weapons in Cuba, although it clearly did deploy the weapons for possible use against an invading force. In all, I believe it goes too far to see Khrushchev’s decision on dispatch of additional tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba as “embrace of a nuclear warfighting strategy in September 1962.” We know that as the crisis arose in October Khrushchev clearly reiterated that no use of *any* nuclear weapons was authorized without explicit approval from Moscow, that is, by himself.

I do, however, agree with what I believe to be the main thrust of the argument by Fursenko and Naftali, that Khrushchev had no conception of the risks of escalation in any use of tactical nuclear weapons against a U.S. invading force. Moreover, the fact that the maximum range of some systems meant they conceivably could have been fired at southern Florida (the IL-28s and the FKR-1 cruise missiles), even though their designated role was to attack an invasion force on or around Cuba, was unnecessarily dangerous. The fact that the four F-class diesel attack submarines each carried a nuclear torpedo for use against attacking U.S. Navy ships on the high seas was particularly provocative, inasmuch as their use would not only have escalated to nuclear warfare but also geographically extended beyond Cuba to war at sea. These are the submarines that the U.S. Navy repeatedly

forced to surface during the crisis, sometimes by dropping small depth charges!

Perhaps additional documents will be found that further clarify these issues.

It is very helpful to have the texts of key documents made available in translation, as the Cold War International History Project has sought to do in connection with the article by Fursenko and Naftali. In this case, however, there are extensive unacknowledged omissions and errors in the translations. In the September 6 document, several paragraphs have been omitted with no ellipses or other indication of that fact. And the second, September 8, document should probably be identified as “Extracts,” inasmuch as over half the document has been omitted, again without indication. Moreover, while much of the omitted material may be of little interest to most readers, it does include such things as unit identifications and a number of other new data. One interesting disclosure in the September 8 document, not included in the translated extracts, is the fact that one of the nuclear-armed cruise missile regiments had as its designated target the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.

It is also of interest that the full text of the September 8 guidance to the Soviet commander in Cuba gives as a mission for the four Army ground force regiments not only protection of other Soviet forces and assistance to the Cuban armed forces in combating invading forces, but also assistance in liquidating “counterrevolutionary groups” in Cuba.

Another interesting fact not noted in the article or included in the translated extracts is that the separate IL-28 squadron for nuclear bomb delivery (comprising 9 aircraft) was a Soviet Air Force unit and was located at Holguin airbase in eastern Cuba (at the time of the September 8 document it was postulated as “10-12 aircraft,” and was designated for Santa Clara airfield). The IL-28 regiment originally assigned under *Anadyr* in May-June was a Navy unit (comprising 30 light torpedo bombers and 3 training aircraft) and was located in the far west of Cuba at San Julian airfield. After the climax of the missile crisis on October 28, it was observed that uncrating of IL-28s at San Julian continued in early November while the issue of withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers was thrashed out in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations (and between Mikoyan and Castro in Havana). At that time, observers in Washington were perplexed by the fact that IL-28s at San Julian continued to be uncrated and assembled, while no effort was made to uncrate or assemble the nine crated IL-28s at Holguin. In retrospect, it seems clear that the Soviet command in Cuba was uncertain about the future of the nuclear-armed bomber squadron, but assumed the conventionally armed coastal defense torpedo-bomber regiment would remain. Thus one minor mystery of the crisis denouement is clarified by these details in the September 8 document. It also is clear that the failure during the crisis even to begin the assembly of the nuclear-capable IL-28s shows that these tactical nuclear systems

were not given any priority, as one would expect if Khrushchev's decision in September had meant greater reliance on nuclear warfighting.

To note but one other item of interest in the untranslated portions of the document of September 8, the instructions on employment in combat of the air defense forces assigned responsibility to the Commander of the Group of Forces in Cuba, in contrast to the guidance on employment of the nuclear MRBM and IRBM missile forces (and the planned Naval submarine nuclear missile forces) which was specifically reserved for a signal from Moscow. The employment of Army (*Luna*) and Air Force (cruise missile FKR-1 and IL-28) tactical nuclear forces was *not* specifically limited to advance approval from Moscow, with one interesting exception: the employment of nuclear cruise missiles against the U.S. base at Guantanamo was reserved for a "signal from the General Staff." This relative laxity in the general guidance for most tactical nuclear forces tends to support the general argument by Fursenko and Naftali, although they do not note it and incorrectly state that the September 8 document revised the original *Anadyr* plan to provide that any use of nuclear weapons required direct orders from Moscow. Nonetheless, while the original and revised plans are ambiguous on possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in meeting an invasion of Cuba, as Fursenko and Naftali acknowledge at the outset of the crisis on October 22, and again on October 27, Khrushchev clearly reaffirmed a requirement for advance approval by Moscow for use of *any* nuclear weapon.

In addition to omissions in the appended documents, there are many infelicities and downright errors in the translation. For example, the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba is variously translated as "Soviet armed force group", "Soviet Military Group", "group of Soviet troops", but never by the standard translation which would have indicated it was considered a major expeditionary force equivalent to the Groups of Soviet Forces in Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The term *divizion* is translated throughout as "division," which is inaccurate. For artillery and missile units the standard translation is battalion. The air defense missile units in Cuba comprised two divisions (*divizii*), with 24 subordinate battalions (*diviziony*). Similarly, *boevye chasti* is translated throughout literally as "battle parts," when it should be "warheads." The phrase translated as "one squadron of IL-28 bombers in a group of 10-12 aircraft including cargo [sic] and guard (countermeasures) planes, with PRTB (?) of the automobile kind" should read "one squadron of IL-28 bombers comprising 10-12 aircraft, including delivery and countermeasures aircraft, with a mobile field missile-technical base (PRTB)." Reference to "successful onland firing tests of C-75 [sic] anti-aircraft installations in flat areas. For distances of 24 kilometers, [they were] exact within 100-120 meters" is incomprehensible; it should refer to "successful firing tests of the S-75 anti-aircraft system against surface targets on

level terrain; at distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved." Admittedly, some of the terminology is specialized, but greater accuracy is required to make such documentation reliable and, indeed, usable.

There are also a few errors of detail in the article. Fursenko and Naftali, in addition to misidentifying the R-11M as a cruise missile rather than the *Scud* ballistic missile, follow the translation in using divisions, rather than battalions, for *divizion*. They also state that the *Indigirka* carried 45 warheads for the R-12 MRBMs; the correct figure is 36. Finally, in a footnote they refer to the Ilyushin (IL-)114, referred to as "the workhorse of the Soviet air force," as unsuitable for carrying missiles and nuclear weapons. There was no IL-114; the aircraft in question is the Tupolev (Tu-)114, and it was not used in the Soviet Air Force at all—it was configured as a civilian passenger liner, and for that reason was not suitable for loading and carrying the missiles or warheads (as indicated in the full text of the document).

Again, these corrections are noted only because the article and documents are so important, and the *Bulletin* is the only available reference for those who are not able to personally research the Volkogonov Papers.

In concluding, I would like to note that there are a couple dozen other documents on the missile crisis in the Volkogonov Papers. Among them are the original Ministry of Defense military deployment plan for *Anadyr* (dated 24 May 1962), and a one page summary of meetings of May 24, May 25, and June 10 with the decisions to proceed, and a diagram of the whole deployment prepared by the General Staff on June 20. These documents are translated below. Not translated here are others, including Instructions from Defense Minister Malinovsky to the chief of the advance military group sent to Cuba (issued July 4), and the list of the 161 members of that group (including a change noted in pen, naming General of the Army Issa Pliyev as commander in place of Lt. General of Aviation Pavel Dankevich of the Strategic Missile Forces).

There are also a number of Defense Ministry documents on preparations for the dispatch of the forces, instructions on loading and transporting them, and the like. One of the most interesting of these documents is a revised instruction to ship captains and troop leaders ordering that in the event of "a clear threat of seizure of our ship by foreign ships" the ship is to be scuttled. This change appears, although undated, to represent another response to Kennedy's warning of September 4. Other documents from mid-September describe the arming of these merchant ships with 23 mm. anti-aircraft guns.

Also of interest are draft instructions to the commander of the Soviet forces in Cuba prepared in August stressing the need for all personnel in Cuba to be "examples of the Soviet socialist ideology" (and not to visit "restaurants, cabarets and beaches" or take walks unaccompanied or "become acquainted with any unknown

person”).

Finally, Marshal Malinovsky’s laconic one page report to Khrushchev on the shooting down of the American U-2 aircraft on October 27 (signed on October 28 nearly 15 hours after the incident) makes no excuses. It simply states as a fact that the plane was shot down “in order not to permit the photography to reach the United States.” As we know from other sources, Khrushchev rightly took a very different view of this unauthorized action. (This document is translated below.)

In sum, these documents are of interest on many aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. Certainly one of the most important is the subject of Khrushchev’s views on nuclear weapons, raised by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali in their article, which I have sought also to address in this discussion.

¹ In *CWHIP Bulletin No. 10* (March 1998), pp. 223-25.

² Fursenko and Naftali, “*One Hell of a Gamble*”: *Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: Norton & Co., 1997).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁴ See Aleksandr Mozgovi, “Order: In Case of Firing, Use Nuclear Weapons,” *Komsomol’skaya pravda*, 27 June 1995, an account by the commander of one of the submarines.

⁵ “*One Hell of a Gamble*,” p. 213.

Document No. 1

R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov, Memorandum on Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba, 24 May 1962

**Top Secret
Special Importance
One Copy**

To the Chairman of the Defense Council

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

In accordance with your instructions the Ministry of Defense proposes:

1. To deploy on the island of Cuba a Group of Soviet Forces comprising all branches of the Armed Forces, under a single integrated staff of the Group of Forces headed by a Commander in Chief of Soviet forces in Cuba.

2. To send to Cuba the 43rd Missile Division (commander of the division Major General Statsenko) comprising five missile regiments:

—The 79th, 181st and 664th R-12 [SS-4] missile regiments with eight launchers each, in all 24 launchers.

—The 665th and 668th R-14 [SS-5] missile regiments

with eight launchers each, in all 16 launchers.

—In all, 40 R-12 and R-14 launchers.

With the missile units to send 1.5 missiles and 1.5 warheads per each launcher (in all 60 missiles and 60 warheads), with one field missile technical base (PRTB) per regiment for equipping the warheads and rocket fuel in mobile tanks with 1.75 loadings per R-12 missile and 1.5 per R-14 missile at each launcher.

Deployment of the R-12 missiles is planned in the [illegible] variant with the use of SP-6. Prepared assembly-disassembly elements of the SP-6 for equipping the missile pads will be prepared at construction enterprises of the Ministry of Defense by 20 June and shipped together with the regiments. Upon arrival at the designated locations, personnel of the missile regiments will within ten days equip the launch positions by their own efforts, and will be ready to launch missiles.

For deployment of the missile units armed with R-14 missiles, construction on site will last about four months. This work can be handled by the personnel of the units, but it will be necessary to augment them with a group of 25 engineer-construction personnel and 100 construction personnel of basic specialties and up to 100 construction fitters from State Committees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for defense technology and radioelectronics.

For accomplishing the work it is necessary to send:

—16 complete sets of earth equipment for the R-14 produced by [the machine] industry in the current year;

—machinery and vehicles:

Mobile cranes (5 ton)	—10
Bulldozers	—20
Mobile graders	—10
Excavators	—10
Dump trucks	—120
Cement mixers (GVSU)	—6

Special technical equipment for [illegible] and testing apparatuses

—Basic materials

Cement	—2,000 tons
Reinforced concrete	—15,000 sq. meters (not counting access roads)
Metal	—2,000 tons
SP-6 sets	—30
GR-2 Barracks	—20
Prefabricated wooden houses	—10
Cable, equipment and other materials.	

Further accumulation of missile fuel, missiles, and warheads for the units is possible depending on the creation of reserve space and storage in Cuba, inasmuch as it would be possible to include in each missile regiment a third battalion with four launchers.

The staff of the Group and of the missile division can expediently be sent from the Soviet Union in the first days of July 1962 in two echelons: the 1st echelon (R-12 regiments) and the 2nd (R-14 regiments).

3. For air defense of the island of Cuba and protection of the Group of Forces to send 2 anti-aircraft

divisions, including in their composition 6 anti-aircraft missile regiments (24 battalions), 6 technical battalions, one fighter air regiment with MiG-21 F-13 (three squadrons—40 aircraft), and two radar battalions.

With the divisions to ship 4 missiles per launcher, in all 576 [SAM] missiles.

To send the anti-aircraft divisions: one in July, and one in August, 1962.

4. For defense of coasts and bases in the sectors of probable enemy attack on the island of Cuba to send one regiment of *Sopka* ["little volcano"] comprising three battalions (6 launchers) with three missiles per launcher
—on the coast in the vicinity of Havana, one regiment (4 launchers)

—on the coast in the vicinity of Banes, one battalion (2 launchers)

On the southern coast in the vicinity of Cienfuegos to locate one battalion (2 launchers), [already] planned for delivery to Cuba in 1962.

The *Sopka* complex is capable of destroying surface ships at a range of up to 80 km.

5. To send to Cuba as part of the Group of Forces:

—a brigade of missile patrol boats of the class Project 183-R, comprising two units with 6 patrol boats in each (in all 12 patrol boats), each armed with two P-15 [trans: NATO SS-N-2 *Styx*] missiles with a range up to 40 km.;

—a detachment of support ships comprising: 1 tanker, 2 dry cargo transports, and 4 repair afloat ships;

—fuel for missiles: fuel for the R-13 [trans: NATO SS-N-4 *Sark*] and P-15—70 tons, oxidizer for the R-13—180 tons, oxidizer for the P-15—20 tons, kerosene for the S-2 and KSShCh [trans: probably NATO SA-N-1 *Goa*]—60 tons;

—two combat sets of the P-15 missile (24 missiles) and one for the R-13 (21 missiles).

Shipment of the missile patrol boats Project 183-R class, the battalions of *Sopka*, technical equipment for the missile patrol boats and technical batteries for the *Sopka* battalions, and also the missiles, missile fuel, and other equipment for communications to be carried on ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

Shipment of the warheads, in readiness state 4, will be handled by ships of the Navy.

6. To send as part of the Group of Forces in Cuba in July-August:

—Two regiments of FKR (16 launchers) with PRTB, with their missiles and 5 special [Trans: nuclear] warheads for each launcher. Range of the FKR is up to 180 km.;

—A mine-torpedo aviation regiment with IL-28 aircraft, comprising three squadrons (33 aircraft) with RAT-52 jet torpedoes (150 torpedoes), and air dropped mines (150 mines) for destruction of surface ships;

—An Mi-4 helicopter regiment, two squadrons, 33 helicopters;

—A separate communications [liaison] air squadron (two IL-14, five Li-2, four Yak-12, and two An-2 aircraft).

7. With the objective of combat security of our technical troops, to send to Cuba four separate motorized rifle regiments, with a tank battalion in each, at the expense of the 64th Guards Motorized Rifle Division in the Leningrad Military District, with an overall personnel strength of 7300. The regiments to be sent in June-July 1962.

8. Upon completion of the concentration of Soviet troops planned for Cuba, or in case of necessity, to send to Cuba on a friendly visit, tentatively in September:

A) A squadron of surface ships of the Navy under the command of Vice Admiral G.S. Abashvili (deputy commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet) comprising:

—two cruisers, *Mikhail Kutuzov* (Black Sea Fleet) and *Sverdlov* (Red Banner Baltic Fleet);

—two missile destroyers of the Project 57-bis class, the *Boikii* and *Gnevny* (Black Sea Fleet);

—two destroyers of the Project 76 class, the *Skromnyi* and *Svedushchii* (Northern Fleet);

Along with the squadron to send one refueling tanker. On the ships to send one full combat set of standard ammunition (including one combat set of KSShch missiles—24 missiles) and standard equipment.

Sailing time of the ships 15 days.

B) A squadron of submarines, comprising:

—18th Division of missile submarines of the Project 629 class [Trans: NATO *Golf* or G-class] (7 submarines each with 3 R-13 [SS-N-4] missiles with range of 540 km.);

—a brigade of torpedo submarines of Project 641 class [NATO: *Foxtrot* or F-class] (4 submarines with torpedo armament);

—two submarine tenders.

Sailing time for the submarines, 20-22 days.

If necessary, the squadrons can be sent separately.

Time for preparation to depart, after 1 July, is 10 days.

Upon arrival of the squadrons in Cuba, they would be incorporated into the Group of Soviet Forces.

9. For rear area security of the Group of Forces in Cuba to send:

—three hospitals (200 beds each);

—one anti-epidemic sanitary detachment;

—seven warehouses (2 for food, 1 for general storage, 4 for fuel, including two for automotive and aviation fuel and two for liquid fuel for the Navy);

—one company for servicing a trans-shipping base;

—one field bakery factory;

Create reserves:

—in the Group—fuel and provisions for routine maintenance of the troops for three months;

—in the troops—mobile (fuel, ammunition, provisions) by established norms;

—for follow-up secure provisions for 25 days.

10. The overall number of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be about 44,000 military personnel and 1300 workers and civilians. For transport of the troops and combat equipment in summertime a simultaneous lift of about 70-80 ships of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR will be required.

11. To establish a staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba to command the Soviet troops. To form the staff of the Group convert the staff of the 49th Missile Army from Vinnitsa, which has a well qualified integrated apparatus with support and service elements.

To incorporate into the staff of the Group a naval section, an air force section, and an air defense section. The Commander in Chief of the Group to have four deputies—one for general matters, one for the Navy (VMF), one for Air Defense (PVO), and one for the Air Force (VVS).

12. The form of dress envisioned for the troops sent to Cuba, except for the Navy, is one set of civilian clothes and one tropical uniform (as for troops in the Turkestan Military District).

13. Food for the personnel of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will be arranged from the USSR.

14. Financial support will be paid on the same general basis as for other troops located abroad.

15. Measures for creation of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba will proceed under the codename Anadyr.

We request your review.

[signature]
R. Malinovsky

24 May 1962

[signature]
M. Zakharov

Prepared in one copy
on seven pages, no draft
Attested Colonel General S.P. Ivanov
[signature]

[The memorandum translated above and dated 24 May 1962, was the first general plan for the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba prepared by the General Staff, in response to a request by Khrushchev after a May 21 meeting of the Defense Council. It was discussed at a CPSU Presidium (Politburo) meeting on May 24 and

unanimously approved; see the translation that follows of the only record of that meeting, and of a follow-on meeting of 25 May, both entered in a hasty scrawl by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff and Secretary of the Defense Council, on the back of the May 24 memorandum. As noted, the decision of the Presidium was to approve the planned deployment, subject to Castro's agreement. After the Soviet delegation returned from Havana, another Presidium meeting was held on June 10, and finally approved the General Staff memorandum. This approval was also noted briefly by General Ivanov on the same back page of the original (and only) copy of the May 24 memorandum. In addition, on June 10 all members of the Presidium signed this original memorandum, writing across the first page on top of the text (not all of the signatures are legible, but it does indeed appear to be the entire membership of the Presidium).

Ivanov's notations are not fully readable, not only because of illegibility, but also because General Volkogonov's photocopy of the document from the General Staff Archive was askew and the right side of the page was not reproduced. This is, however, the only copy available at this time. It is translated below.

*There also follows below a chart prepared by the General Staff, showing the organization of the Group of Forces as of June 20 and identifying the units designated to be sent. (Several of the unit members were subsequently changed to enhance security.) It is not known for whom the chart was prepared, probably the General Staff itself. It was made in only one copy and was found in the General Staff archive. It has previously been available, but only in the Institute of Military History 1994 study of the crisis, Na krayu propasti [*On the Brink*], published in only thirty copies.—R.G.]*

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Document No. 2

S.P. Ivanov, Untitled notes on the back of the May 24 Memorandum to Khrushchev

24.5.62

The question of aid to Cuba was discussed by the Presidium of the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU. N.S. Khrushchev presented a report. Statements were made by Kozlov, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Voronov, Polyansky and all other members of the Presidium and [illegible] approval of the decision.

The Decision

1. The measures in *Anadyr* are approved entirely and unanimously. The document was approved subject to receiving agreement by F. Castro.

2. A commission is to be sent to [Castro, or Cuba; this copy of the text cut off] for negotiation. Comrade

Biryuzov [Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, recently named commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces], Comrade Ivanov [Colonel General Semyon P. Ivanov, deputy chief of the General Staff and head of its Main Operations Directorate] [illegible]

[Translator's Note: R. Rashidov, head of the planned agricultural delegation chosen as cover, and A. Alekseyev, selected to be the new ambassador in Havana, were also named but are not indicated in the visible text available]

25.5.62 11:00 AM

1. N.S. Khrushchev [met with] Malinovsky, Gromyko, Andropov, Troyanovsky, Rashidov, Alekseyev [Translator's Note: text partly missing on available copy, probably included Biryuzov and Ivanov, although by this time it had been decided Ivanov would remain in Moscow. Portion of text here was not readable.] [signed:] S.P. Ivanov

[The sheet at this point bears a notation made after the original notes of the meeting on Many 24. It reads:] Executed in one copy, on seven pages, no draft. Attested: Colonel General S.P. Ivanov [signature] 24.5.62

[A formal classification stamp by the Operations Directorate of the General Staff dated 26.5.62 gives the classification "Special Importance" and a record number 394-illegible]

[There then follows on the same page a third notation by General Ivanov entered on June 10:]

10.6.62 11:00 AM

Presidium of the CC CPSU meeting, with participation also of Gromyko, Malinovsky, [Zakharov], Yepishev, Biryuzov, and Chuikov [all deputy ministers of Defense].

Rashidov and Biryuzov reported [on their mission]. [Remainder of the notation, four lines of script, is truncated and illegible on the Volkogonov copy.]

[Translator's Note: An account of this Presidium meeting, based on reading this same document in the General Staff archive, is provided by Aleksandr Fursenko, in Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, pp. 187-89. He also summarizes a presentation to that meeting by Malinovsky reading from the basic May 24 *Anadyr* plan which, as earlier noted, was then signed by all Presidium members and Party Secretaries present.]

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Document No. 3
Text of General Staff summary diagram of *Anadyr*,
20 June 1962:

Top Secret
Special Importance
In One Copy

Diagram
Of the Organization of the Group of Soviet Forces
for "Anadyr"

Commander of the
Group of Soviet Forces
General of the Army I.A. Pliyev

<u>Staff</u>	<u>Deputies</u>
(133 pers.)	
Lt. Gen. V.V. Akhindinov	<u>First-Deputy</u> —Lt. Gen. Of Av. P.B. Dankevich
<u>Section</u>	<u>For Naval Affairs</u> --Vice
<u>Operational Directorate</u>	Adm. G.S. Abashvili
(22 pers.)	<u>For Air Defense</u> —Lt.
Col. N.A. Ivanov	Gen Av. S.N. Grechko
<u>Intelligence</u>	<u>For the Air Forces</u> --Col.
(11 pers.)	Gen. Av. V.I. Davidkov
<u>Communications</u>	<u>For Special [nuclear]</u>
(11 pers.)	<u>Armaments</u> —[blank]
<u>Ballistics</u>	<u>For Combat Training</u> --
(6 pers.)	Maj. Gen. L.S. Garbuz
<u>Cartographic and Geodosy</u>	<u>For the Rear Services</u> --
(9 pers.)	Maj. Gen.N.R. Pilipenko
<u>Meteorological Service</u>	<u>Deputy</u> —Maj. Gen.
(8 pers.)	Tech. Trps. A.A.
<u>Sixth Section</u> [unidentified]	Dement'ev
(4 pers.)	
<u>Personnel and Records</u>	
(7 pers.)	
<u>Eighth Section</u> [unidentified]	
(13 pers.)	

Missile Forces (RV)

- 43rd Missile Division
 - 665th Missile Regiment (R-14 with PRTB)
 - 668th Missile Regiment (R-14 with PRTB)
 - 79th Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB)
 - 181st Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB)
 - 664th Missile Regiment (R-12 with PRTB)
 - (Eight launchers per regiment)

Air Defense Forces (PVO)

- 11th Antiaircraft Division
- 16th Antiaircraft Regiment
- 276th Antiaircraft Regiment
- 500th Antiaircraft Regiment
- 4 battalions in each AA Regiment
- [Trans: 6 launchers in each battalion]

Separate Radar Battalion
 10th Antiaircraft Division
 294th Antiaircraft Regiment
 318th Antiaircraft Regiment
 466th Antiaircraft Regiment
 32nd Fighter Aviation Regiment
 40 MiG-21s
 Separate Radar Battalion

Air Forces (VVS)

561st FKR (Frontal Cruise Missile) Regiment
 584th FKR Regiment
 Each regiment with 8 launchers and PRTB
 437th Separate Helicopter Regiment
 33 Mi-4 helicopters
 134 Separate Aviation Communications Squadron
 11 aircraft

Ground Forces (SV)

302nd Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
 314th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
 400th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment
 496th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment

Naval Forces (VMF)

Submarine Squadron
 18th Missile Submarine Division
 7 submarines
 211th Submarine Brigade
 4 submarines
 Two submarine tenders (floating support bases)
 Surface Ship Squadron
 2 cruisers, 2 missile destroyers, 2 destroyers
 Missile Patrol Boat Brigade
 12 missile patrol boats (cutters)
Sopka Missile Regiment [coastal defense cruise missile]
 6 launchers
 Aviation Mine-Torpedo Regiment
 33 IL-28 aircraft
 [Trans: Includes 3 trainers]
 Detachment of Support Ships
 2 tankers
 2 dry cargo ships
 1 floating repair ship

Rear Services

Field Bakery Factory
 Hospitals (3 at 200 beds each)
 Sanitary-antiepistemological detachment
 Company to service entry to the bases
 Food storage stocks (2)
 Warehouse
 Missile and aviation fuel stations (2)
 Fuel oil for the Navy (2)

Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General

Staff

Colonel General S.P. Ivanov [signature]

20 June 1962

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Document No. 4
Memorandum from R. Malinovsky to N.S.
Khrushchev, 6 September 1962

Top Secret (Sovershenno sekretno)
Special Importance (Osoboi vazhnosti)
Sole Copy (ekz. edinstven.)

To the Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR,
Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

I am reporting

I. On the Possibility of Reinforcing Cuba by Air.

1. About the transport by air of special warheads [*spetsial'nye boevye chasti*; nuclear warheads] for the Luna [FROG] and R-11M [SCUD-B] missiles. Tests have been conducted at the test range and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of special warheads for R-11M missiles, two on AN-8 aircraft, and four on AN-12 aircraft.

The alternatives for transport of warheads for the Luna missile are analogous to those for the R-11M.

The transport of special warheads by Tu-114 is not possible owing to the absence of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by air of R-11M and Luna missiles.

Practice loading, securing and transport of training R-11M and Luna missiles has been carried out on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft, with 2 Luna or 1 R-11M missiles on AN-8 or AN-12 aircraft.

3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launchers, special earth moving machines, and field missile-technical bases (PRTB) for the R-11M and Luna missiles.

The Tu-114 aircraft, notwithstanding its large loading capacity (up to 30 tons) and long range (up to 8,000 km.), is not suitable for transport of missile equipment as it is not adapted in a transport mode.

II. Proposals of the Ministry of Defense for Reinforcing Forces of the Group in Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group of Forces in Cuba, send:

1) One squadron of IL-28 bombers, comprising 10-12 aircraft including delivery and countermeasures aircraft, with a mobile PRTB and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 8-12 kilotons;

[In Khrushchev's handwriting on top of "II.1" above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads [three words illegible] [signed] N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M missile brigade made up of three battalions (total: 1221 men, 18 R-11M missiles) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special warheads, which the PRTB is capable of storing;

3) Two-three battalions of Luna for inclusion in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba.

[Overwritten:] Three Luna battalions. N.S. Khrushchev 7.IX.62

Each Luna battalion will have two launchers and 102 men.

With the Luna battalions, send 8-12 missiles and 8-12 special warheads.

For the preparation and custody of special warheads for the Luna missiles, send one PRTB (150 men).

The indicated squadron of IL-28s, one R-11M missile brigade with PRTB, and two-three Luna battalions with PRTB, and the missiles are to be sent to Cuba in the first half of October.

Atom bombs (6), special warheads for the R-11M missiles (18) and for the Luna missiles (8-12) are to be sent on the transport *Indigirka* on 15 September.

The Defense Ministry has just conducted successful firing tests of the S-75 anti-aircraft system against surface targets on level terrain. At distances of 24 kilometers, accuracy of plus or minus 100-120 meters was achieved.

The results of computer calculations indicate the possibility also of successful use against naval targets.

In order to fire against land or sea targets using S-75 complexes with the troops [in Cuba], small modifications in the missile guidance stations will be required by factory brigades together with some additional equipment prepared by industry.

Marshal of the Soviet Union R.
Malinovsky [signature]

6 September 1962

[Translator's Note: A detailed two-page informational addendum provides specifications of the Luna and R-11M missiles (diameter, length, width, height, and weight); the

full range of possible transport aircraft (range, loading capacity, doors and hatches) of the AN-8, AN-12, IL-18, Tu-104, Tu-114, and the not yet available larger AN-22 aircraft; and bomber aircraft (the Tu-95 [Bear], Mya-4 [Bison], Tu-16 [Badger], and IL-28 [Beagle] bombers), although none were suitable for transporting the rockets both for technical and political-strategic routing reasons. This informational annex was signed on the same date, 6 September 1962, by Colonel General S.P. Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. It is not translated here.]

Document No. 5

**Memorandum, R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov to
Commander of Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba,
8 September 1962**

**Top Secret
Special Importance
Copy #1**

Personally

**To the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces
in Cuba**

The temporary deployment of Soviet Armed forces on the island of Cuba is necessary to insure joint defense against possible aggression toward the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.

A decision on employment of the Soviet Armed Forces in combat actions in order to repel aggression and reinstatement [of the situation] will be made by the Soviet Government.

1. The task of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba is not to permit an enemy landing on Cuban territory from the sea or from the air. The island of Cuba must be turned into an impenetrable fortress.

Forces and means: Soviet troops together with the Cuban Armed forces.

2. In carrying out this task, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces on the island of Cuba will be guided by the following considerations:

a) With Respect to Missile Forces

The missile forces, constituting the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow, to deal a nuclear missile strike on the most important targets in the United States of America (list of targets included in Attachment #1)

[Translator's Note: This attachment was not included in the Volkogonov Papers].

Upon arrival of the missile division in Cuba, two R-12 [SS-4] regiments (539th and 546th) and one R-14 [SS-5] regiment (564th) will deploy in the western region, and one R-12 regiment (the 514th) and one R-14 regiment (the 657th) in the central region of Cuba.

The missile units will deploy to the positional areas and take up their launch positions; for R-12 missiles, not later than [illegible] days; for the R-14 missiles with fixed launch facilities [illegible] period.

With the establishment of launchers on combat duty, [illegible—all?] regiments will maintain Readiness No.4 [Translator's Note: The lowest level of combat readiness, and the least provocative.].

b) With Respect to Air Defense (PVO) Forces

PVO forces of the Group will not permit incursion of foreign aircraft into the air space of the Republic of Cuba [illegible words] and strikes by enemy air against the Group, the most important administrative political [and industrial] centers, naval bases, ports [illegible]. Combat use of PVO forces will be activated by the Commander of the Group of Forces.

The PVO divisions will be deployed:

—12th Division [surface to air missiles]—the Western region of Cuban territory [illegible]

—27th Division [surface to air missiles]—the Eastern region of Cuban territory [illegible]

213th Fighter Air Division will be deployed at Santa Clara airfield.

After unloading in Cuba of the surface-to-air missiles and fighter aviation will be deployed [illegible] and organization of combat readiness.

c) With Respect to the Ground Forces

Ground forces troops will protect the missile and other technical troops and the Group command center, and be prepared to provide assistance to the Cuban Armed Forces in liquidating [illegible] enemy landings and counterrevolutionary groups on the territory of the Republic of Cuba

The independent motorized rifle regiments (OMSP) will deploy:

—The 74th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the Western part of Cuba in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [trans: in the San Cristobal and Guanajay areas] and to operate in the sectors Havana and Pinar del Rio;

—The 43rd OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the vicinity of Santiago de las Vegas in readiness to protect the Command of the Group of Forces and to operate in the sectors Havana, Artemisa, Batabano, and Matanzas;

—The 146th OMSP, with a battalion of Lunas, in the area Camajuani, Placetas, Sulu...[illegible], in readiness to protect the Missile Forces [Translator's Note: in the Sagua la Grande and Remedios areas] and to operate in the sectors: Caibarien, Colon, Cienfeugos, Fomento;

—The 106th OMSP in the eastern part of Cuba in the vicinity of Holguin in readiness to operate in the sectors

Banes, Victoria de las Tunas, Manzanillo, and Santiago de Cuba.

d) With Respect to the Navy

The Naval element of the Group must not permit combat ships and transports of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, and provide cover for our transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.

Missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, nuclear missile strikes on the most important coastal targets in the USA (List of targets in Attachment #1).

The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One detachment of the brigade of missile patrol boats should be located in the vicinity of Banes.

The battalions of Sopka [coastal defense cruise missiles] should be deployed on the coast:

—One battalion east of Havana in the region of Santa Cruz del Norte;

—One battalion southeast of Cienfuegos in the vicinity of Gavilan;

—One battalion northeast of Banes in the vicinity of Cape Mulas;

—One battalion on the island Piños [Isle of Pines] in the vicinity of Cape Buenavista.

The torpedo-mine air regiment [IL-28s] will deploy at the airfield San Julian Asiento, and plan and instruct in destroying combat ships and enemy landings from the sea.

e) With Respect to the Air Force

The squadron of IL-28 delivery aircraft will be based on Santa Clara airfield in readiness to operate in the directions of Havana, Guantanamo, and the Isle of Pines. [Translator's Note: This deployment was later changed to Holguin airfield]

The independent aviation engineering regiments [OAIP] (FKR) [cruise missiles] [trans. note - The OAIP designation was a cover; the real designation was FKR regiments] will deploy:

—231st OAIP—in the western region of Cuba, designated as the main means to fire on the coast in the northeastern and northern sectors, and as a secondary mission in the direction of the Isle of Pines.

—222nd OAIP—in the eastern part of the island. This regiment must be prepared, upon signal from the General Staff, in the main sector of the southeastern direction to strike the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. Secondary firing sectors in the northeastern and southwestern directions.

The fighter aviation regiment armed with MiG-21 F-13 aircraft is included as a PVO [air defense] division, but crews of all fighters will train also for operations in support of the Ground Forces and Navy.

3. Organize security and economy of missiles, warheads, and special technical equipment, and all combat equipment in the armament of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba.

4. Carry out daily cooperation and combat collaboration with the armed forces of the Republic of Cuba, and work together in instructing the personnel of the Cuban armed forces in maintaining the arms and combat equipment being transferred by the Soviet Union to the Republic of Cuba.

5. Deploy the rear units and offices and organize all-round material, technical, and medical support of the troops.

Rear area bases will be located in the regions as follows:

—Main Base—comprising: the 758th command base, separate service companies, the 3rd automotive platoon, 784th POL fuel station, the 860th food supply depot, the 964th warehouse, the 71st bakery factory, the 176th field technical medical detachment—Mariel, Artemisa, Guira de Melena, Rincon;

—Separate rear base—comprising: 782nd POL station, 883rd food supply depot, a detachment of the 964th warehouse, [the 1st] field medical detachment, a detachment of the 71st bakery factory—Caibarien, Camajuani, Placetas;

—Separate rear base—comprising: separate detachments of the 784th POL station, the 883rd food supply depot, the 964th warehouse, [the 71st bakery unit, and the 1st field medical detachment—Gibara, Holguin, Camasan.

Fuel stocks for the Navy will be:

Depot No. 4472—Mariel, a branch at Guanabacoa, Depot No. 4465—vicinity of Banes.

Hospitals will be set up in the regions: Field hospitals No. 965 with blood transfusion unit—Guanajay; No. 121—Camajuani, Placetas; No. 50—Holguin.

The transport of material to be organized by troop transport means, and also do not use local rail or water transport.

6. The operational plan for the employment of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba should be worked out by 01 November 1962. [Translator's Note: Date filled in by a different hand; probably omitted for security reasons or for later decision by a higher authority.]

Attachments:

1. List of targets for missile forces and missile submarines for working out flight missions—attached separately.
2. List of the order of battle of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba in 3 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164
3. List of launchers, missiles and nuclear warheads

possessed by the Group of Forces, on 2 pages r[ecord] r/t #164.

[Translator's Note: All the Attachments are missing.]

USSR Minister of Defense [signature]
Marshal of the Soviet Union

R. Malinovsky

Chief of the General Staff [signature]
Marshal of the Soviet Union

M. Zakharov

8 September 1962 [Translator's Note: 8 September is written over the original version of "____ July 1962," suggesting that this document was drafted in July]

No. 76438

Send in cipher

[Various illegible signatures dated July 9, and one noting it was read by General V.I. Davidkov on 3 October 1962]

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Document No. 6
Handwritten Note for the Record by Colonel General
S.P. Ivanov, 5 October 1962

By VCh [secure telephone]

17:20 hours 5 October 1962

N.S. Khrushchev telephoned from [illegible] and inquired how the shipment [of nuclear weapons] was going.

Ivanov reported: The *Indigirka* arrived 4 October. No overflights [by U.S. surveillance aircraft]. [word illegible] shipment 22 [unclear reference]. In transit 20 [days].

Transport with special [nuclear] munitions *Aleksandrovsk* is loaded and ready for dispatch. Permission requested to send it.

N.S. Khrushchev: Send the *Aleksandrovsk*. Where are the Lunas and IL-28s?

I responded: en route.

[NSK:] Everything is clear. Thanks. [two words illegible]

Written by S.P. Ivanov [signature]

Executed in one copy,

on one sheet, without a draft

Major General G. Yeliseyev [later stamped:]
4 [sic; should be 5] October 1962 Top Secret
No. 746-1
Yeliseyev

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Document No. 7

R. Malinovsky to N.S. Khrushchev, 28 October 1962

**Top Secret
Copy No.2**

CC CPSU

To Comrade N.S. Khrushchev

I am reporting:

27 October 1962 a U-2 aircraft entered the territory of Cuba at an altitude of 16,000 meters at 1700 hours Moscow time with the objective of photographing the combat disposition of troops, and in the course of 1 hour 21 minutes proceeded along a flight route over Yaguajay—Ciego de Avila—Camagney—Manzanillo—San Luis—Guantanamo—Preston.

With the aim of not permitting the photographs to fall into U.S. hands, at 1820 Moscow time this aircraft was shot down by two anti-aircraft missiles of the 507th Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment at an altitude of 21,000 meters. The aircraft fell in the vicinity of Antilla; a search has been organized.

On the same day there were 8 violations of Cuban airspace by U.S. aircraft.

R Malinovsky

28 October 1962
10:45

No. 80819

Attested: Colonel General

[signature]
S.P. Ivanov

28 October 1962

[illegible notation and additional signatures]

[Translator's Note: The text of a subsequent message from Marshal Malinovsky to General Pliyev has not been released, but several Russian sources who are familiar

with it note that the Defense Minister only mildly rebuked Pliyev, saying, "You were too hasty," and that political negotiations for a settlement of the crisis were underway. For one account, including quotation of the sentence cited here, see *Na krayu propasti (Karibskii krizis 1962 goda) [On the Brink: The Caribbean Crisis of 1962]*, published in 30 copies by the Institute of Military History, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 1994, p.113.]

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Raymond L. Garthoff is a retired Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and author of many works, including *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (rev. ed. 1994), and *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (1994).



Soviet Moldavia and the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis: A Report on the Political “Spill-Over”

Introduction and translation by Mark Kramer

This brief memorandum to the CPSU Secretariat was prepared by the Second Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party, Yurii Mel'kov, on 1 August 1968. As a rule, the Communist Party in each of the union republics in the USSR was headed by an official whose ethnic background was that of the titular nationality, while the Second Secretary was an ethnic Russian. Often the Second Secretary carried as much weight in Moscow as the republic's First Secretary did. (The main exception was when the First Secretary was also a member or candidate member of the CPSU Politburo.) In this particular case, Mel'kov did indeed seem as influential as the Moldavian CP's First Secretary, Ivan Bodiul. Although Bodiul was one of several union-republic First Secretaries who delivered speeches at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in April 1968—a plenum that focused on the situation in Czechoslovakia—he played little discernible role after that.

It has long been known that Soviet officials in both Moscow and Kyiv were worried about the political spill-over from Czechoslovakia into neighboring Ukraine (see, for example, the passages from Shelest's diary in issue No.10 of the *Bulletin*), but new archival materials show that official concerns about the spill-over extended well beyond Ukraine. This document reveals the effects that the crisis was having in Moldavia, a small republic abutting Romania and southern Ukraine. Other newly declassified materials indicate similar concerns about Soviet Georgia and the three Baltic states. (See, for example, the top-secret memorandum No. 13995, “TsK KPSS,” 23 May 1968, from V. Mzhavanadze, First Secretary of the Georgian CP CC, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 22, Ll. 5-9.) All materials about a possible spill-over from Czechoslovakia were closely reviewed by Mikhail Suslov, one of the most powerful members of the CPSU Politburo who was also the CPSU Secretary responsible for ideological affairs. He often wrote comments and instructions in the margins of these documents. The materials were then routed to other members of the CPSU Secretariat and to top officials in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus.

Mel'kov's cable notes that “certain individuals” in Moldavia failed to “comprehend the essence of events in Czechoslovakia” and had “expressed support for the KSC's course toward ‘liberalization.’” He reported with dismay that publications, letters, and other materials casting a positive light on the Prague Spring were pouring into Moldavia from Czechoslovakia. Mel'kov assured the CPSU Secretariat that the Moldavian party was carrying out “increased political work” and related measures to

counteract the adverse effects of the Czechoslovak crisis. Nevertheless, the very fact that his memorandum concentrated so heavily on the problems that were arising, rather than on the “absolute majority of the republic's population [that] wholeheartedly supports the policy of the CPSU,” suggests that the spill-over was even worse than he let on.

1 August 1968 (Secret)

From Kishinev
22132

TO THE CC CPSU INFORMATION

In connection with the events in the CSSR, the party aktiv in Moldavia, including lecturers, political workers, and agitators, are conducting necessary explanatory work among blue-collar workers. An absolute majority of the republic's population wholeheartedly supports the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government aimed at strengthening the positions of socialism and consolidating the unity of the world socialist commonwealth. At present, all blue-collar workers are awaiting the conclusion of the negotiations at Cierna nad Tisou with great hope.

At the same time, certain individuals have shown that they do not comprehend the essence of events occurring in Czechoslovakia, and some express support for the course of the KSC toward so-called “liberalization.” Individual explanatory work is being undertaken with these people.

Recently it has been noted that some Soviet citizens who have relatives or friends in the CSSR have been receiving letters with articles enclosed from Czechoslovak newspapers and magazines. The director of the Czechoslovak public-relations firm “Mercur” in Prague, Jiri Donda, sent to the Moscow directorate of advertising of the State Committee on the Press of the USSR Council of Ministers a letter appealing to Soviet citizens, which attempts to convince the Soviet people that the policy conducted by the KSC leadership is correct. This letter is signed by the secretary of the firm's party organization and by other people.

The party organizations are taking measures aimed at further increasing political work among the population.

CC Secretary of the CP of Moldavia — Mel'kov

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 2, L. 30. Obtained and translated by Mark Kramer.]

Microfilm Projects in East European Military Archives

By Ronald D. Landa

A U.S. Government initiative has been quietly opening new avenues of research. In 1996 the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Library of Congress (LC) inaugurated a program to microfilm military records and inventories in former Soviet-bloc countries focusing primarily on World War II and the early Cold War years. Expected to continue at least through the year 2000, the program has so far generated more than 300 reels of microfilm.

Projects are now underway at three institutions: the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe) outside Warsaw, the National Defense Ministry Archives (Arhivele Militarie ale Ministerului Apararii Nationale) in Bucharest, and the Archive for Military History (Hadtortenelemi Leveltar) in Budapest. The projects are designed to assist these archives with their records preservation programs, to make their records more accessible to scholars in the United States, and to promote closer contacts between former Cold War adversaries. Alfred Goldberg, Historian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, coordinates the program, with assistance from historians in the military services and the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Several non-governmental specialists render advice and assistance.

Under the terms of formal agreements, DoD provides the military archives with microfilm cameras on a long-term loan basis, along with other equipment, film, and supplies. DoD also pays the cost of processing the microfilm. The archives furnish the labor to do the filming. Records are selected for filming by mutual consent. One copy of the processed microfilm is given to the Library of Congress, where it is available to researchers in the European Division's Reading Room in the Jefferson Building. The archives retain both a positive and negative copy for themselves.

The program involves the reproduction of records inventories as well as records themselves. The intention is not only to facilitate research by American scholars at a centralized location in the United States, but also to allow them to prepare for and more knowledgeably plan their visits to the East European military archives.

Consideration is being given to starting similar projects with the Slovak Military History Institute in Bratislava and the Russian Central Naval Archive at Gatchina near St. Petersburg.¹ Earlier attempts to establish microfilm projects in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria and with other Russian archives did not yield results.

The Library of Congress and the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) are planning a conference on the theme, "Early Cold War

Military History," with the presentation of papers utilizing the microfilmed records from the East European military archives.

Origins of the Program

The microfilm program has its roots in two developments growing out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loosening of its hold over countries in Eastern Europe.

First, the opening of formerly closed Soviet-bloc archives, for the most part, made available to researchers diplomatic and Communist party records. Military and intelligence records remained less accessible. In 1991, for example, an American scholar noted that little was known about records at the Polish Central Military Archive, which is located in Rembertow just east of Warsaw. Military documents here, he observed, were "still considered to be 'top secret'—even for the 1940s and 1950s." Researchers were allowed access to the records only by special permission of the Ministry of Defense, but apparently no one had yet received such permission.² Thus, the need became apparent to encourage the opening of military records, not only in Poland, but also throughout the former Soviet bloc.

Second, the end of the Cold War allowed greatly increased contacts and communication between Department of Defense historical offices and their counterparts in Russia and Eastern Europe. During the late eighties and early nineties a series of bilateral visits kindled a new spirit of cooperation among them.³ A key milestone was the April 1990 address to a standing-room only audience in the Pentagon auditorium by the former director of the Russian Military History Institute, General Dmitri A. Volkogonov, about the research and writing of his biography of Josef Stalin.

Out of this new atmosphere emerged plans by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to hold a conference in Washington, D.C., in March 1994 on the military history and records of the Cold War. Nearly 140 representatives from 17 countries, including former Warsaw Pact nations, attended the conference, which was hosted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.⁴ Military archivists from Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Hungary presented papers describing their holdings.⁵ Participants also discussed a number of ways to continue their collaboration, including bilateral research visits, publication of a newsletter on Cold War history, joint publications, and the microfilming of archival materials.

Following the conference a Department of Defense Cold War Historical Committee, chaired by John Greenwood of the U.S. Army Center of Military History,

was established to promote the exchange of information between the historical offices of DoD and various U.S. government agencies and other countries' official history programs. In August and September 1994, the committee sponsored the visits to the United States of 15 military historians and archivists from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria, Romania, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada to conduct short-term research on Cold War topics. That winter the first issue of the committee's *Cold War History Newsletter* was published.⁶

Although several private commercial ventures had been undertaken to microfilm materials in former Soviet-bloc countries, a model program existed close at hand within the U.S. Government. In 1992 the Department of Defense and the Library of Congress had begun collaborating to microfilm rare books, manuscripts, and pamphlets in libraries in Moscow and St. Petersburg,⁷ and subsequently in Vilnius. Building on the experience gained from this program, the DoD historical offices approached several military archives in 1995 with formal proposals to begin joint microfilm projects.

Polish Central Military Archive

Since filming began in May 1996, 69 reels—on selected topics primarily from the Cold War years—have been filmed at the Polish Central Military Archive.⁸

They cover such subjects as "Operation Vistula" (the suppression of underground resistance in the period 1946-48); General Staff organizational and planning files, directives, and instructions, 1945-60; and records of the Polish representative on the Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission and Korean Repatriation Commission, 1953-54. Some World War II records have also been microfilmed, including files of General Zygmunt Berling, Commander of the 1st Polish Army, relating to the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, and records of the Polish General Staff in London, 2nd Bureau, on support for the Home Army in Poland. A list of the contents of the first 55 Polish reels is on LC's website at lcweb.loc.gov/rr/european/archiwum/archiwum.html.

For 1998-99 agreement has been reached to film (1) additional World War II records concerning the outbreak of war in 1939 and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, (2) records relating to Operation "Dunaj"—the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, (3) portions of the previously classified 30-volume (11,000-page) internal history, "Development of the Polish People's Armed Forces, 1945-1980," written during the mid-1980s, (4) selected reports of Polish military attaches in Washington, 1945-50, and (5) records relating to the reduction of Polish armed forces after the Korean War.

Two comments are in order about the Polish records scheduled for filming. First, while the heavy ideological slant to the 30-volume internal history diminishes its value as a scholarly work, its numerous footnotes make it an indispensable guide to the location of important

documents in the archive. Second, the relatively small collection of attache reports held by the Central Military Archive generally deal with routine meetings and ceremonial and administrative matters (the main body of substantive reports are held by another archive), but there are bits of information in these reports useful to scholars.

The Library of Congress has also received records inventories from the Polish Central Military Archive. Reels 63 and 64 contain inventories for 15 collections of Cold War records, including the Office of the Minister of National Defense, 1945-49; the Finance-Budget Department, 1945-49; the Finance Department, 1950-56; the Organization and Planning Department, 1944-50; and most of the 2,200-page inventory for the General Staff records, 1945-50. In addition, LC has received duplicate printed copies of the 1961 *Inwentarz Akt Ludowego Wojska Polskiego z lat 1943-45: Jednostki Bojowe* [*Inventory of the Records of the Polish People's Army, 1943-45: Fighting Units*] (3 parts, 780 pages).

Finally, the Central Military Archive published in 1996 a comprehensive guide (154 pages) to its holdings, thought to be the first such publication issued by a former Soviet-bloc military archive, entitled *Informator o Zasobie* [*Informational Guide to the Holdings*]. A copy of the informational guide, as well as a 28-page supplement, *Zimna Wojna w Wojskowym Zasobie Archiwalnym* [*The Cold War in Military Archival Holdings*], have been given to the Library of Congress.

Romanian National Defense Ministry Archive

Since work began in February 1997, the Romanian National Defense Ministry Archive has produced 234 microfilm reels. They focus exclusively on records of military elements connected with the Romanian Commission for the Terms of the Armistice and the Peace Treaty, 1942-47. The reels are being catalogued and soon will be available to researchers. LC intends to post a list of the contents of the Romanian microfilm on its website.⁹

Future microfilming will include selected records of the information, i.e. intelligence, section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1944-48, and the records of the Superior Directorate of the Armed Forces, 1945-65. The Library of Congress has received photocopies of two major inventories: the 90-page inventory to the fond Marele Stat Major, Sectia 2—Informatii (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Section 2—Information), 1944-49, and the 306-page inventory to the fond Consiliul Politic Superior al Armitei (Superior Directorate of the Armed Forces), 1945-48.

Hungarian Archive for Military History

The last of the three archives to begin filming, the Archive for Military History in Budapest, since August 1997 has filmed 44 reels of records from the Ministry of Defense Central Files for the year 1949. The 1949 records cover the Ministry of Defense Secretariat, the Ministry's Chief Directorate for Political Matters, and the General Staff's Organizational and Mobilization Section,

Directorate for Materiel Planning, and 2nd Directorate. The Hungarian reels at LC are still being processed and are not yet open for research. LC also intends to post a list of the contents of the Hungarian microfilm on its website.

The plan is to continue filming selected portions of files for the period 1949-56, to be followed by documents and reminiscences related to the 1956 Revolution (about 9,300 pages) and the Ministry of Defense's Presidential Directorate register books for 1945-49 (about 8,300 pages). Time and resources permitting, records of the Hungarian Royal Chief of Staff and of the Presidential Section of the Royal Ministry of Defense for the period 1938-45 will be filmed last.

At present there are no plans to film inventories in the Hungarian Archive for Military History.

Further information regarding the microfilm from the three archives can be obtained from LC's European Division specialists: Ron Bachman (Poland), 202-707-8484, Grant Harris (Romania), 202-707-5859, and Ken Nyirady (Hungary), 202-707-8493.

Since 1987 Ronald D. Landa has been a member of the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. From 1973 to 1987 he worked as a historian at the Department of State, where he was one of the editors of the documentary series, Foreign Relations of the United States.

¹ Regarding the holdings of the Slovak Military Historical Archive at Trnava, which administratively is under the Military History Institute, see Pavel Vimmer, "Miesto a hlavne ulohy VHA v systeme vojenskeho archivnictva" [The Place and Main Tasks of the VHA (Military Historical Archive) in the Slovak Military Archival Structure], *Vojenska Historia*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1997), pp. 74-81. A short description of the Russian Central Naval Archive is in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted et al, eds., *Archives in Russia, 1993: A Brief Directory* (Washington, DC: International Research & Exchanges Board, 1992), p. C-5.

² P. J. Simmons, "Report from Eastern Europe," *Cold War International History Project [CWIHP] Bulletin*, no. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 12. The article is condensed from Simmons' longer paper, "Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw," CWIHP Working Paper No. 2, May 1992.

³ Brooke Nihart, "Soviet Military Museum Leaders Tour Historical Center," *Fortitudine*, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (Winter 1988-89), pp. 9-11, and "Military Museum Heads Visit Russian Counterparts," *ibid.*, vol. XVIII, no. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 16, 23; Henry I. Shaw, Jr., "Hungarian Military Historians Visit Center," *ibid.*, vol. XIX, no. 2 (Fall 1989), p. 21; Burton Wright III, "International Military History Exchanges: The Hungarian People's Army Visits Washington, D.C.," *Army History*, no. 14 (April 1990), pp. 17-18, and "International Military History Exchanges: Soviet Military Historians Visit Washington, D.C.," *ibid.*, no. 15 (Summer 1990), p. 28; Henry I. Shaw, Jr., "U.S.

Military Historians Find Warm Welcome in Poland," *Fortitudine*, vol. XX, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 15-18; Frank N. Schubert, "The Exchange Program with the Hungarian Military Institute and Museum," *Army History*, no. 18 (Spring 1991), p. 17. See also Daniel R. Mortensen, "Downed Aircrew over Europe: Revival of Polish Affection at the End of the Cold War," *Air Power History*, vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 44-51, and Richard A. Russell, "A Return to Russian Naval History," *Pull Together*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1995), pp. 4-6.

⁴ See Judith Bellafaire, "The Cold War Military Records and History Conference," *Army History*, no. 31 (Summer 1994), p. 36. An account of the conference by a Slovak participant, Miloslav Pucik, is in his "The Cold War International History Projekt," *Vojenska Historia*, vol. I, no. 1 (1997), pp. 142-44.

⁵ For the papers presented at the conference, see William W. Epley, ed., *International Cold War Military Records and History: Proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War Military Records and History Held in Washington, D.C., 21-26 March 1994* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996). Papers that describe former Soviet-bloc archives and their holdings include V. V. Mukhin, "The Military Archives of Russia," pp. 185-92; N. P. Brilev, "The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation," pp. 193-202; Vladimir Pilat, "Cold War Military Records in Czech Military Archives and Possibilities of Their Study," 213-17; Adam Marcinkowski and Andrzej Bartnik, "Polish Military Records of the Cold War: Organization, Collections, Use, and Assessment," pp. 219-31; Andras Horvath, "The System of Distrust: The 'Top Secret' Document Management System in the Hungarian People's Army, 1949-1956," pp. 233-45; and Alexandru Osca, "The Romanian Military Archives: An Important Source for the Detailed Study of the Cold War," pp. 247-54. The U.S. Army Center of Military History is considering placing the conference proceedings on its website at <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg>.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense Cold War Historical Committee *Cold War History Newsletter*, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1995). A description of the program that brought the 15 researchers to the United States in the summer of 1994 is on pp. 2-3.

⁷ James H. Billington, "Bear and Eagle," *Civilization*, April/May 1998, p. 90.

⁸ A brief description of the Polish project and the 20 May 1996 inaugural ceremony held at the Central Military Archive, attended by U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Rey, is in Zdzislaw G. Kowalski, "Wspolpraca archiwistow wojskowych [Cooperation of Military Archivists]," *Polska Zbrojna*, 18 June 1996.

⁹ Working as a volunteer for the Library of Congress, a retired Foreign Service officer, Ernest Latham, prepared a detailed finding aid to the first 96 reels of Romanian microfilm. See Donna Urschel, "Romanian Specialist Creates Finding Aid in English," *Library of Congress Gazette*, vol. 9, no. 18 (8 May 1998), p. 10.

“Pacifistic Blowback”?

By Nigel Gould-Davies

It has been argued by Columbia University political scientist Jack Snyder and others that imperial powers can suffer from ideological “blowback:” an excessive belief among a population in the imperial propaganda disseminated by political elites. The following document, dating from the Soviet peace campaign of the early 1950s, suggests that the opposite can occur: that peace propaganda directed at the outside world can take root, even within so regulated a society as the Soviet Union, to a degree that evokes alarm among the leadership.

By the end of the 1940s Soviet foreign policy had suffered a series of reverses as relations with the West hardened into a pattern of Cold War confrontation. Neither Soviet diplomacy nor the use of “class” relations between communist parties had succeeded in halting the consolidation of unity and purpose within the Western camp, culminating in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. The Soviet Union responded to the failure of both arms of its traditional “dual foreign policy” by fashioning a third: it organized a massive peace campaign to exert the pressure of broad, non-communist public opinion on Western governments against rearmament. The first World Peace Congress was held in Paris in April 1949, and the first mass signature campaign, the Stockholm appeal, was launched in March 1950. Its organizers subsequently claimed the signature of 15 million French and 17 million Italians, as well as those of the entire Soviet adult population, among the 500 million collected world-wide. While the use of peace propaganda and front organizations was by no means new to Soviet foreign policy, the scale of these efforts distinguished them from earlier attempts to mobilize Western opinion.

However, apparently not only Western opinion was affected. The draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (CC VKP(b)) printed below sharply criticized Soviet media that “inadequately mobilize Soviet people to raise their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors” with “pacifist arguments,” that ignore the “aggressive measures and plans” of imperialism, and neglect “Marxism-Leninist teaching on the character, sources and causes of war.” It is shot through with a concern that by emphasizing the common danger of war, the peace campaign distracts attention from the true nature of the struggle between ideological systems—exactly the intended effect of this campaign in capitalist countries. A letter dated 16 September 1952 proposing this resolution, addressed to Mikhail Suslov, the CC VKP(b) Secretary responsible for supervising the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, is even more explicit and cites several examples of “superficial and even harmful materials.”

Special hostility is reserved for those in which “the magic power of the white dove, as the savior of the world, is glorified.” One author of an article about such doves is accused of coming out “as a pacifist, against war in general . . . He argues as if ‘not one war has benefited a single people.’” (Rossiski Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumtov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI), Moscow, fond 17, op. 132, d. 507, ll. 13-17.)

It is a familiar argument that the Soviet Union enjoyed an asymmetric advantage during the Cold War in being able to disseminate propaganda among the more open societies of its adversaries without having to worry about internal public opinion. This document, however, suggests the existence of “pacifistic blowback” of such propaganda, sufficient to concern the leadership, within the Soviet Union itself; it also points to flaws and limitations in ideological control over the mass media, even under Stalinism, that made this possible.

Document

[September 1952]

DRAFT

RESOLUTION OF THE CC VKP(b)

On shortcomings in the treatment of the struggle for peace by the press

The CC VKP(b) notes that serious shortcomings and mistakes have been permitted of late in the coverage of the struggle for peace in a series of central and local newspapers and journals.

Comprehensive and thorough propaganda of the struggle for peace and of the successes of the movement of supporters of peace is frequently substituted in the press by the publication of superficial materials full of pacifist arguments. The movement of supporters of peace is often portrayed in these materials as an organization of people who hate all war, and not as a force that is capable of averting imperialist war and of giving a decisive rebuff to imperialist aggressors. Certain newspapers and journals, in explaining the peaceful character of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, inadequately mobilize Soviet people to raise their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors, weakly link the struggle for peace with the might of the Soviet Union, and are carried away by outward symbols, publishing images of doves, primitive drawings and pacifistic stories and poems that have little value.

In the press the basic theses of Leninism on the origin and character of wars under imperialism are explained in insufficient depth, the designs of the Americo-English imperialists who are conducting an aggressive policy of unleashing a new war are poorly unmasked, and the profound contradictions in the camp of the imperialist aggressors are not properly reflected.

The CC VKP(b) resolves:

1. To oblige the editorial staff of the central and local newspapers, and also the staff of social-political and literary-artistic journals, to eliminate the shortcomings in the propaganda of the struggle for peace noted in this resolution.
2. To require the editorial staff of newspapers and journals to improve the coverage of the struggle for peace, bearing in mind the necessity of raising the political and labor activity of the masses and their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors, and of mobilizing the workers to selfless labor, overfulfilment of production plans, and improvement of work in all spheres of economic and cultural construction. In the press it is necessary to unmask the criminal machinations of the war hawks – their mendacious, ostensible peacefulness in word, their aggressive measures and plans in deed. The successes of the movement of supporters of peace and the growth of the forces of the international camp of peace, democracy and socialism should be fully reflected in the pages of newspapers and journals. It is necessary to explain that the Soviet peace-loving foreign policy relies on the might of the Soviet state and, that reinforcing its might with their creative labor, Soviet people are strengthening the security of the people of our country and the cause of peace in the whole world, and that a new world war, if it is unleashed by the imperialist aggressors, can lead only to the collapse of the capitalist system and its replacement by the socialist system.
3. To instruct the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC VKP(b) and the Foreign Policy Commission of the CC VKP (b) to carry out the following measures:
 - a) to conduct a meeting of editors of central newspapers and of social-political and literary-artistic journals, to discuss measures for eliminating shortcomings in the coverage in

the press of the struggle for peace.

- b) jointly with the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge to organize the reading of lectures explaining the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the character, sources and causes of wars, on the significance of an organized front of peace in the struggle for the preservation of peace against those who seek to ignite a new war, on the sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism in the post-war period, and on other subjects.
4. To oblige Gospolitdat in the next one to two months to publish in mass editions works of Lenin and Stalin devoted to Marxist-Leninist teachings on wars, on the defence of the fatherland and on the struggle for peace.

[Source: *Rossiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI), Fond 17, op.132, d.507, ll.18-19; obtained and translated by Nigel Gould-Davies.*]

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NEW CWIHP FELLOWS

THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THE AWARD OF CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS FOR THE 1998-1999 ACADEMIC YEAR TO

MRS. LI DANHUI (doctoral candidate, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing), "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Vietnam War"

MR. KRZYSZTOF PERSAK (PhD candidate and junior fellow at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences), "The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland"

DR. JORDAN BAEV (Senior Fellow at the Institute of Military History, Sofia), "The Cold War and the Build-up of Military-Political Alliances in the Balkans, 1945-1990."

Between Solidarity and Neutrality: The Nordic Countries and the Cold War 1945-1991

By Valur Ingimundarson

Any attempt to point out the similarities in the Nordic experience during the Cold War is futile without taking into account the differences. For one thing, Sweden and Finland (despite its treaty obligations with the Soviet Union) opted for neutrality in the East-West struggle, but Denmark, Norway, and Iceland for NATO membership. Some saw this diversity as a unifying strand, arguing that what became euphemistically known as the “Nordic Balance” gave the Nordic countries some freedom of action within the sphere of low politics and mitigated Cold War tensions in Northern Europe. The Nordics were reluctant Cold Warriors and tried, with varying degrees of success, to assume some sort of a “bridgebuilding” function in the Cold War. But there were many things that set the Nordic countries apart. All efforts to create a Nordic bloc in the military, economic, and political field were doomed to fail. Despite shared cultural values, the Nordic countries were simply too small, too diverse, and too weak to offer a credible alternative. Yet the only way to grasp their importance in the Cold War is to put them in a broader Nordic framework—to pay attention to common characteristics, as expressed in interlocking relationships, interactions, and mutual influences.

In recent years a major scholarly reassessment has been undertaken over the role of the Nordic countries in the Cold War. Numerous books and articles have attracted much scholarly and public attention. The Cold War International History Project, the London School of Economics, and the Historical Institute of the University of Iceland brought together about 30 scholars and officials, in Reykjavik, to discuss these new findings at an international conference 24-27 June 1998. To put the topic in a broader international context, the Reykjavik conference began with a lively roundtable on the “New Cold War History” with the participation of John Lewis Gaddis (Yale University), Geir Lundestad (Norwegian Nobel Institute), Odd Arne Westad (London School of Economics), James Hershberg (George Washington University), and Krister Wahlbäck (Swedish Foreign Ministry). Gaddis’s *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* has stirred up the scholarly community, and the roundtable centered—to a large degree—on his argument about the role of Soviet conduct and ideology in the origins of the Cold War. Taking issue with Gaddis’s line of reasoning, Lundestad argued that the “New Cold War History” is too moralistic and too much preoccupied with questions of guilt and Communist ideology. Odd Arne Westad stressed, however, that ideology was an important element in Soviet foreign policy, as evidenced by Stalin’s

belief, in the 1940s, that the Chinese nationalists were better suited to rule the country than the Communists because of the historical-developmental state of China. To James Hershberg, the verdict is still out on the question of ideology in Soviet (and particularly Stalin’s) foreign policy until more archival evidence is uncovered.

Within the Nordic context, most participants at the Reykjavik conference seemed to agree that Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Nordic countries was determined by a mixture of *Realpolitik* and ideology. On the basis of the evidence presented, one can detect several strands in Soviet foreign policy during the early Cold War. First, the Soviets pursued a cautious, if erratic course in the Nordic region. An “expansionist tendency” was curbed by “one that was soberly pragmatic,” as Alexei Komarov (Russian Academy of Sciences) put it.¹ While the Soviets never saw Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden as belonging to their sphere of influence, they showed considerable interest in the Nordic area based on their historical experience and ideological outlook. They made, for example, territorial demands on Norway and Finland. Buoyed by the imminent defeat of Nazism, in 1944, they insisted on a joint Norwegian-Soviet condominium over the Norwegian archipelago of Spitzbergen. According to the armistice agreement, the Finns had to cede the Petsamo region to the Soviets and to accept a 50-year Soviet lease on a naval base at Porrkala. At the same time, the Soviets made conciliatory moves by withdrawing their military forces from Northern Norway in 1945 and the Danish island of Bornholm in 1946. And when the Norwegian rejected the Soviet claim to Spitzbergen, the Soviets abandoned it in 1947.

The Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (FCMA) of 1948 was, of course, concluded under strong Soviet pressure. Kimmo Rentola (University of Helsinki) showed, however, that after encouraging the Finnish Communist Party to go on the offensive in the spring of 1948, the Soviets suddenly changed course after the FCMA was signed.² Whether the Finnish Communists were, in fact, prepared to go as far as staging a coup from above (as om Czechoslovakia shortly before) is a matter of debate among Finnish historians. Yet the Communist Party was clearly intent on raising the stakes in its efforts to assume a predominant role in Finnish political life.

Rentola and Maxim L. Korobochkin (Russian Academic of Sciences) credited skillful Finnish “diplomacy of consent” with achieving semi-neutral status for Finland in the late 1940s.³ The Soviets initially wanted to conclude a military treaty with Finland akin to those signed by Hungary and Romania that would reaffirm

Soviet hegemony in these countries. In the end, the FCMA gave the Soviets less than they bargained for and recognized the limits of Soviet influence in Finland. By offering Stalin the necessary minimum in terms of military security, the Finns managed to prevent the Sovietization of the country. This does not mean that no costs were involved: Finland always had to take into account Soviet foreign policy priorities—a fact which did not go unnoticed in the other Nordic countries. Soviet pressure on Finland and the Friendship Treaty gave strong impetus to Norway's insistence on establishing a formal military relationship with the West in the spring of 1948. According to Korobochkin no evidence has been found to confirm Norwegian fears that a similar Soviet treaty offer to Norway was in the works. Yet the Finnish case showed how a superpower's hard-line approach toward one Nordic country could affect threat perceptions in another.

The Soviets reacted with diplomatic threats against Norway's NATO membership and extracted, in 1949, a promise from the Norwegians not to allow foreign military bases on their soil. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union spared Denmark, even as it stressed in Soviet propaganda that the political leaders of the Nordic members of the Western alliance had sold out to American "imperialists." It was not until 1953 that the Danes under Soviet pressure prohibited foreign bases in Denmark.⁴ The policy prohibiting nuclear weapons on Danish and Norwegian soil also reflected a desire not to provoke the Soviets. Iceland, however, did not adopt such a policy, even if it shared Norwegian and Danish anxieties about the role of nuclear weapons in Western military strategy.

The Soviets gradually came to see the Nordic countries in less threatening terms than other members of the Western Bloc. Since the attitude of the Nordic countries was friendlier, they had the potential of becoming what a leading former Soviet official, Georgi Arbatov (Director Emeritus of the then-Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of USA and Canada) termed "a weaker link in the chain of the enemies of the Soviet Union."⁵ Thus by returning the Porkkala military base and allowing Finnish membership in the Nordic Council in 1955, the Soviets wanted to strengthen anti-NATO elements in Denmark and Norway as well as to elevate Sweden's neutral position. The Soviets scored some propaganda points in these efforts, but did not succeed in splitting NATO. And although less suspicious of the Nordic countries than other NATO-members, they did not treat them more leniently in their military planning. According to K.G.H. Hillingsø (Royal Danish Defense College), the Soviets consistently overestimated NATO forces, underrated effects of NATO nuclear weapons, and planned to use nuclear weapons as heavy artillery.⁶ What was surprising from the Western perspective was the planning for the early and massive Soviet use of nuclear weapons, if war broke out in Northern Europe.

Secondly, during the early Cold War, the Soviets took an inflexible attitude toward the Nordic Communist parties

and displayed—on ideological grounds—unmitigated hostility toward Social Democracy in the Nordic region. One can argue that the relationship between the Soviet Communist Party and those of the Nordic countries was problematic from the beginning. Having adopted National Front tactics in 1945 (promoting Communist participation in mixed governments) the Soviets changed course in 1947, partly in response to the Marshall Plan. By forming the Cominform, the Kremlin sought to keep the emerging Communist parties as pure as possible and rejected any cooperation with Social Democrats. This position would, of course, allow the Soviets to exert more influence on these parties' policies, but deprived them of tactical flexibility and tended to reinforce their marginal status.

Only the Finnish Communist Party and the Icelandic Socialist Party maintained substantial electoral strength throughout the early Cold War. This did not, however, translate into tangible power gains. After its electoral defeat and removal from the Finnish Government in 1948, the Finnish Communist Party did not hold ministerial posts until the 1960s. The Icelandic Socialist Party had a similar experience, even if the circumstances were different. In contrast to the ouster of the Communists from coalition governments in Europe in 1947-1948, the Icelandic Socialist Party itself had been responsible for the downfall of a Left-to-Right coalition government in 1946 by opposing a treaty on landing rights for American military aircraft. After a 10-year exclusion, it managed briefly to join a coalition government from 1956 to 1958 as part of an electoral alliance with the non-Communist Left. After that sobering experience, they were left out in the cold for another 12 years.

There was a marked tendency within the Nordic Communist Parties to rely on nationalism to maintain political viability. Jón Ólafsson (Columbia University) emphasized that the Soviets could never accept the nationalistic agenda of the Icelandic Socialist Party, even if they knew that it was politically effective, especially in the struggle against U.S. military interests in Iceland.⁷ When the head of the Danish Communist Party, Aksel Larsen, decided to renounce Soviet ties and to form a new party in Denmark, the Soviets did nothing to repair the damage and turned down an offer by Einar Olgeirsson, the chairman of the Icelandic Socialist Party, to act as a mediator between the Danish Communist factions.⁸ The Soviets were, of course, fully aware of the limited influence of the Nordic Communist parties, especially after their electoral defeats in 1947-1948. But during the late 1940s and early 1950s, they relied to a large extent on local Communist parties for information. Only slowly did the Soviets begin to establish contacts with center parties, particularly farmers' parties in Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. The close relationship with Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, the leader of the Agrarian Party, was in a special category. But the Soviets also cultivated influential members of the Icelandic agrarian Progressive Party and the Danish Liberal-Agrarian Party (*Venstre*).

The Bulgarian Communist Party did the same thing, as Jordan Baev (Bulgarian Defense Ministry) pointed out.⁹ The relationship did not result in any political victories for the Soviets, but it gave them greater access to the political elite in these countries.

Conference participants stressed the negative Soviet position towards Nordic Social Democracy in the early Cold War. The Social Democratic parties dominated political life in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, and were not prepared to give ground to the Communist Parties in these countries. As governing parties, however, they sought to avoid a confrontational course in international affairs and hoped to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. The Finnish and Icelandic Social Democratic parties, in contrast, were far smaller and much more anti-Soviet than their other Nordic counterparts. As Mikko Majander (University of Helsinki) showed, the Finnish Social Democratic Party was extremely hostile toward the Communists at home and played an important role in keeping them out of power during the crucial years 1948-1949. A similar scenario was played out in Iceland, where there was a sharp divide between the Social Democrats and the Socialists.

With some justification, the Soviets blamed right-wing Social Democrats for the decision by Sweden, Norway, Denmark to join the Marshall Plan and for the integration of the Nordic countries into Western economic structures. As it turned out, only Iceland and Finland came close to dependence on barter trade with the Soviet Union during the 1950s. In the former case, the trade volume with the East Bloc reached a record of 35% of the total trade volume in 1957. But this trade was conducted for political rather than economic advantage. For a while in the early 1950s, the Soviet Bloc trade was approximately 18-20% of Finland's total trade. There is more than a touch of irony in the statistics. The Nordic country with the closest military and economic ties with the United States proved to be more dependent on the Soviet Bloc than the country with the closest political ties with the Soviet Union!

Third, the Soviets were, at the outset, suspicious of any attempts to promote Nordic cooperation or neutrality in the region. In the 1940s, the Soviet Union considered Nordic cooperation only a prelude to Western integration. It opposed, for example, the creation of a Scandinavian Defense Union in 1948-1949 and it prevented Finland from joining the Nordic Council until 1955, four years after its foundation. This policy could be criticized on the grounds that the Scandinavian Defense Union served the function of weakening Western solidarity in the crucial months leading up to the formation of NATO. Similar arguments could be made with respect to the initial Soviet opposition to Swedish neutrality policies. In the 1950s, the Soviets finally reversed course and began to support Nordic cooperation and neutrality schemes. What was more, they began to prod—with no success, it turned out—the Nordic members of NATO to leave the Western

Alliance and to revert to their traditional policy of neutrality. In the end, Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution effectively scuttled Moscow's neutralist offensive in the Nordic countries. These twists and turns—so characteristic of Soviet policies vis-a-vis the Nordic countries—pointed to a sense of improvisation and probing rather than extensive planning in the postwar period. The Soviets realized that they would not be able to reverse the Western integration of Denmark, Norway, and Iceland in the 1950s. By playing the neutralist card, however, they managed to weaken it.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Reykjavik conference was how intertwined were the seemingly disparate security issues in the Nordic region. Self-interest certainly constituted the overriding foreign policy guide. But the Nordic countries were extremely sensitive to the impact of great power politics as well as of their own actions on each other during the East-West struggle. The question of military bases in Greenland, Bornholm, and Iceland is a case in point. In 1945, the Danes were reluctant to allow the Americans to maintain the military presence in Greenland established during World War II, because they were afraid that the Soviets would insist on analogous military rights in Bornholm. For the same reason, the Danes did not welcome the American request for a long-term lease of military bases in Iceland in 1945. This view was shared by the Norwegians, who feared that U.S. base rights in Iceland would strengthen the Soviet demand for joint control over Spitzbergen.

The story of how the Americans achieved their military goals in Greenland and Iceland is another example of these interlocking relationships. During the early postwar period, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores a military base area of primary importance. But when they sought military rights in these areas, they quickly ran into opposition. The Danes wanted to terminate the U.S. military presence in Greenland in the early postwar period, even if they did not press the issue. But to the surprise of the Danish Government—and in stark contrast to their anti-colonial public posture—the Americans went so far as to offer to buy Greenland in 1947! As Thorsten B. Olesen (University of Aarhus) showed, the war scare triggered by the Korean War neutralized Danish resistance to continued U.S. pressure, paving the way for the Danish-American base treaty in 1951.¹⁰ What transpired in Iceland was very similar: Because of Icelandic domestic political opposition, the Americans obtained only landing rights in 1946, but no military rights. Iceland even made the non-stationing of foreign troops a precondition for its NATO membership in 1949. Yet, in the wake of the Korean War, it abandoned this principle and concluded a bilateral defense treaty with the United States in 1951. These actions showed that the need for an American defense umbrella overrode, in the end, any qualms about the risks of being drawn into an East-West conflict and about the potential offensive use of Greenland and Iceland.

The process leading to NATO membership for Denmark, Norway, and Iceland is also illustrative of how the action of one Nordic country influenced the foreign policies of the others. If the Norwegians had not decided to join the Western Alliance for their own security reasons in 1949, the Danes—who had been the most enthusiastic supporters of the failed Scandinavian Defense Union—and the Icelanders undoubtedly would have rejected NATO membership. This display of interdependence was not limited to Nordic governments. The British and Americans often used Nordic contacts to influence the foreign policies of other Nordic countries. In 1950, the Norwegian foreign minister, Halvard Lange, agreed to press the Icelandic government to beef up military security in Iceland. When a left-wing government in Iceland threatened to close down the U.S. military base in 1956, the Norwegians tried to have the decision reversed. These Norwegian efforts were never decisive in influencing Icelandic policy. But the Americans and British got what they wanted in both cases.

The question of why the Norwegians played such a role cannot be explained solely in terms of Western military solidarity. There was an important element of self-interest at play here. Rolf Tamnes (Norwegian Defense Institute) demonstrated that the Norwegians placed much emphasis on a strong U.S. military presence in Iceland.¹¹ During the tenure of another left-wing government in Iceland from 1971 to 1974, which promised to abrogate the defense agreement with the United States, the Norwegian government feared that a reduced U.S. military activity in Iceland would result in added American pressure on Norway in the military field. As it turned out, the Keflavik Base played a very important role in this area during the 1970s and 1980s. As Albert Jónsson (Office of the Icelandic Prime Ministry) pointed out, the U.S. Air Force aircraft intercepted more Soviet military aircraft near Iceland than anywhere in the world in the early 1980s.¹²

A central point made by many participants at the Reykjavik conference was the influence of domestic political opinion on foreign policy. Specific policies—such as the Danish and Norwegian decisions to exclude foreign bases or the stationing of nuclear weapons in Denmark and Norway—reflected public unease about the military costs and dangers of the Cold War. In some areas, the Americans seemed to have taken into account these preferences. According to Mats Berdal (Oxford University), there was hardly any U.S. pressure to reverse the Norwegian policy on military bases and nuclear weapons.¹³ To be sure, these declared policies amounted to little in practice, because NATO was a nuclear alliance. But the crux of the matter is that the political elites in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland always had to take one thing into account: that public sentiments were heavily influenced by a tradition of neutrality. Indeed, cabinet ministers in all the Nordic countries strove to refrain from taking any steps that could be interpreted by the Soviets as

being provocative. In the words of Bent Jensen (University of Odense), the Danes often behaved as if they were “semi-aligned” after having “half-heartedly joined the Western Alliance.”¹⁴ Poul Villaume (University of Copenhagen) stressed the aversion of the Danes to crude American Cold War propaganda and showed how the United States increasingly relied on local organizations in Denmark to do the work for them, albeit with mixed results.¹⁵

The downside of this political timidity was a government tendency in all the Nordic countries to minimize public debate about security issues—a tendency that, in some cases, came dangerously close to being a concerted effort to deceive the public. This has, for example, led to a major reassessment of key factors in Finnish, Swedish, and Danish foreign policies during the Cold War, one that has received much media attention in the Nordic countries in the last few years. Iceland was, to some degree, in a special category because of the U.S. military presence and because of its status as an unarmed country in NATO. This author argued that compared to other NATO-members, Iceland was in an inferior role in the Western Alliance from the beginning.¹⁶ It was considered a security risk, because it had no adequate system for protecting classified information during the 1940s and 1950s. It was NATO policy not to send any military documents classified above “confidential” or any important strategic-military plans to Iceland. The frequent tensions in U.S./NATO-Icelandic relations during the 1950s can no doubt be explained in part by this lack of communication.

The revelation, in 1995, that contrary to official policy, Danish Prime Minister H.C. Hansen gave the Americans a “green light” to station nuclear weapons in Greenland in 1957 has been widely debated in Denmark. In his presentation, Svend Aage Christensen—who was among the authors of a highly publicized Danish government report on the issue in 1997—made it clear that Hansen’s concession was made under conditions of secrecy.¹⁷ In this way, the Soviet Union was not only prevented from exploiting this issue in the Cold War but also from exerting pressure on the Danes. Even more important, Hansen avoided a public debate about the new nuclear policy at a time when it did not have full backing at home or abroad. This policy put much strain on the Danish decision-making system. On the one hand, very few people had direct knowledge of the American storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland or of nuclear overflights over the island. On the other hand, many in government circles suspected what was going on. From 1959 to 1965, the Americans stationed NIKE surface-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads in Greenland. Interestingly enough, they also planned to store such weapons in Iceland during this period, but decided against it in the end, because they were needed in elsewhere.¹⁸ The Danes abandoned their dual nuclear policy in 1968 after a SAC B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons crashed in Thule. From then on,

the Danes prohibited the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland.

The Danes were not the only ones who decided to appoint a government commission to study a controversial aspect of their foreign policy during the Cold War. During this decade, a major debate has taken place in Sweden over its role in the Cold War. One reason was the attempt to keep security policy out of the public domain. It has been argued that Swedish parliamentary debates were well-orchestrated performances with little informative value designed to calm public opinion. What sparked the debate in Sweden was the publication, in the early 1990s, of a number of highly critical revisionist books and articles on the record of Sweden's foreign policy during the Cold War. A double standard — the argument went — guided Swedish foreign policy over the previous decades, when officially neutral Sweden almost seemed like a NATO member. In 1992, the Swedish government set up the Commission on Swedish Policy to study Sweden's military contacts with the Western Powers during the Cold War. In its 1994 report, the Commission revealed that extensive planning and preparatory work had been conducted in Sweden to facilitate wartime cooperation with NATO in the case of a Soviet attack. It concluded, however, that these contacts were not as extensive as the revisionists had claimed. Moreover, it argued that the Swedish government did not overstep the basic self-imposed boundaries of peacetime non-alignment. The Swedes did not enter into any binding military commitments with the Western Powers. In that sense, Sweden remained "neutral," even if the public was not informed of the country's preparations for different contingencies.

All the conference participants in Reykjavik who dealt with Sweden touched on this debate in one way or another. Juhana Aunesluoma (Oxford University) argued that the British played a pivotal role in establishing contacts between the West and Sweden in the early Cold War.¹⁹ The British Government showed understanding for Sweden's neutrality policy and influenced the evolution of U.S. thinking on the issue. Having taken a very critical attitude toward Swedish neutrality policies in 1948, the Americans gradually accepted it for geopolitical reasons, albeit without enthusiasm. While taking note of the discrepancy between what was officially said and tacitly done, Mikael af Malmborg (University of Lund) argued that the West and Sweden struck a good deal.²⁰ Through Sweden's significant military resources, the United States and NATO assured a satisfactory defense along the long northern European Flank without any costs and binding commitments. An overt agreement would have meant a mutual pledge of automatic support in a future war.

Despite its concessions to NATO, Sweden maintained its policy of non-confrontation towards the Soviet Union, which was regarded as important as a strong military defense. This raises important questions of interdependence. Ingemar Dörfer (Swedish Institute for

Defense Studies) disagreed with Malmborg, arguing that Sweden was totally dependent on the Western Alliance militarily and economically. For this reason, he argues, it should have made a formal commitment to the West by taking sides in the Cold War.²¹ Jaakko Iloniemi (former Finnish Ambassador to the United States) went even so far as to argue that despite the 1948 Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union Finland was, in fact, more neutral than Sweden during the Cold War, since it did not enter into any informal military arrangements with the Soviets.

There was always a strong undercurrent in Swedish society on the center-right to abandon non-alignment under the Social Democrats based on Sweden's Western democratic traditions and ideology. Thus Sune Persson (University of Gothenburg)—co-director of a major research project on Sweden during the Cold War—argued that Swedish security policy was a "consensus under disagreement."²² Domestic contradictions as well as the dramatic change in the implementation of Sweden's security policy during the Cold War was rooted in a failed effort to bridge idealism and Realpolitik. This was reflected in the tension between national sovereignty and international dependence, between ideological pro-Western orientation and non-alignment, and between a democratic open society and military demands for secrecy.

This is another indication of the important role of public opinion in the calculations of Nordic policymakers. As Krister Wahlbäck (Swedish Foreign Ministry) pointed out, the Swedish Social Democrats always had to take the left-wing of the party into account in the implementation of Sweden's neutrality policy and make sure that leftist voters did not defect to the Communists. This dilemma of juggling Realpolitik and idealism resulted in excessive secrecy and efforts by political leaders to conceal military contacts with the West from their own party members and the public.

The impact of the Cold War on Nordic culture remains an understudied field. One need not dwell on the pervasive influence of American culture in the Nordic countries. Jussi Hanhimäki (London School of Economics) argued, however, that no major cultural conflicts existed between Scandinavia and the United States during this period.²³ There were certainly tensions in some areas, reaching a climax with the near breakdown in Swedish-American relations during the Vietnam War. And the presence of U.S. forces in Iceland was so unpopular that it led to a ban on off-base movements of soldiers. Indeed, as Ólafur Hardarsson (University of Iceland) pointed out, a large majority of the Icelanders wanted to close down the base in Keflavik in 1955 on cultural grounds, according to a secret public opinion poll sponsored by the U.S. Government.²⁴ There were also persistent Nordic criticisms of McCarthyism and the reputedly excessive role of religion, racism, and poverty in American society. Conversely, the Americans found fault with "the godless Middle Way" as expressed—stereotypically—in "sin, suicide, socialism, and

smorgasbord.” Yet, Hanhimäki maintained that there were many more factors drawing the countries together than apart and that the Scandinavians thought of themselves as part of the same Western value system as the Americans.

Soviet cultural influence was, of course, far less pronounced in the Nordic countries. Again, Finland and Iceland seem to have provided the most fertile ground. Given the proximity and close political relations with the Soviet Union, this was logical in the Finnish case. In Iceland, the Soviets were surprisingly active, not least because of the strong position of the Icelandic Socialist Party, because of the high level of trade between the two countries, and because of the U.S. military presence. Apart from funding the activities of the Soviet-Icelandic Friendship Society, the Soviets sponsored lavish cultural events in Iceland. Americans realized that they could do not sit idly by, and what followed was a sort of a *Kulturkampf*: in the 1950s, both superpowers spent large sums of money to influence the hearts and minds of the Icelanders in the political-cultural sphere. As it turned out, this worked both ways. As Árni Bergmann (University of Iceland) argued, the Soviets began to project an image of Iceland that was far more positive than of Western societies in general.²⁵ To be sure, the Nordic countries in general got much credit for their cultural achievement—and Finland and Sweden some extra bonus for their neutrality policies in the late 1950s. But Iceland was somehow put in a special category in terms of the level of Soviet praise heaped upon its culture.

Given the divergent paths taken by the Nordic countries in the Cold War, one is reluctant to lump them together in a geopolitical sense. Pan-Nordic interests were never allowed to determine the direction of the foreign policies of the states involved. Indeed, the Cold War tended to underscore Nordic disunity rather than harmony. That the Nordic countries belonged to the West, and—with the exception of Finland—were closely integrated into Western economic structures is, of course, a well known fact. Yet, they all had to take into account the policies of the Soviet Union for political, economic, or security reasons. As reluctant participants in the Cold War, they were striving for an imaginary middle ground designed to lessen (or remain aloof from) East-West tensions. For this reason, they could never be taken for granted by the Great Powers. Whether “non-aligned” (Sweden and Finland) or “aligned” (Denmark, Norway, and Iceland), they were dressed in gray—and they adopted a foreign policy stance that closely matched the color, laying somewhere between solidarity and neutrality.

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Dr. Valur Ingimundarson teaches at the University of Iceland in Reykjavik. He was the main organizer and host of the CWIHP-sponsored conference “The Nordic Countries and the Cold War.” He has published extensively on Iceland’s and East Germany’s role in the Cold War.

¹ Alexei A. Komarov, “From World War II to the Cold War: Soviet Interests in Finland and Norway, 1944-47.”

² Kimmo Rentola, “The Spring of 1948: Which Way Finland?”

³ Maxim L. Korobochkin, “Soviet Policies toward Finland and Norway, 1947-1953.”

⁴ Bent Jensen, “The Soviet Union and Denmark, 1945-1965: Perceptions and Policies.”

⁵ Georgi Arbatov, “The Cold War and the Nordic Countries.”

⁶ K.G.H. Hillingsø, “The Role of Denmark in Warsaw Pact War Plans.”

⁷ Jón Ólafsson, “The Icelandic Socialists in the Fifties: Resisting Petit-Bourgeois Degeneration — The Reasoning Process.”

⁸ Memorandum, “Information über ein Gespräch mit Genossen Einar Olgeirsson,” 28 September 1961, Nachlaß Walter Ulbricht, 182/1279, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Berlin).

⁹ Jordan Baev, “Two Poles of the Cold War Confrontation in Europe: Bulgaria and the Nordic Countries.”

¹⁰ Thorsten Boring Olesen, “‘The Jewel in the Crown’: Denmark, the United States, and Greenland, 1941-1951.”

¹¹ Rolf Tamnes, “Military Buildup and Nordic Stability in the 1970s.”

¹² Albert Jónsson, “Iceland and Soviet Military Activity During the Second Cold War.”

¹³ Mats Berdal, “Norway and U.S. Maritime Strategy in the 1950s.”

¹⁴ Bent Jensen, “The Soviet Union and Denmark, 1945-1965: Perceptions and Policies.”

¹⁵ Poul Villume, “Reluctant Ideological Cold Warrior: Denmark and U.S./NATO Propaganda Warfare, 1948-1954.”

¹⁶ Valur Ingimundarson, “The Illogic of Passivity: The Role of Iceland in NATO and U.S. Strategic Thinking, 1945-1965.”

¹⁷ Svend Aage Christensen *et al.*: “Greenland in Danish and American Nuclear Policy, 1951-1968.”

¹⁸ Valur Ingimundarson, “The Illogic of Passivity.”

¹⁹ Juhana Aunesluoma, “Limits of Neutrality: Sweden and the Western Powers in the Early Cold War, 1945-54.”

²⁰ Mikael af Malmberg, “Neutrality as Political Identity: Sweden in the Cold War.”

²¹ Ingemar Dörfer, “Swedish Neutrality and the Second Cold War.”

²² Sune Persson, “Sweden: The Reluctant Peacekeeper.”

²³ Jussi Hanhimäki, “A Culture Clash? The United States and Scandinavia during the Cold War.”

²⁴ Ólafur Th. Hardarsson, “Public Opinion and Iceland’s Western Integration.”

²⁵ Árni Bergmann, “Soviet Perceptions of Icelandic Culture.”

News from Hanoi Archives: Summer 1998

By David Wolff

In July 1998 I visited Hanoi to attend the first International Conference of Vietnamese Studies on behalf of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). The conference, sponsored by two of Vietnam's most prestigious academic units, the National Centre for Social and Human Sciences and Vietnam National University, was a big success. A projected attendance of 300 mushroomed to 700, drawing attention from governmental top brass. Not only were the proceedings opened by the Prime Minister and a meeting arranged with the Party General Secretary (as described in *Vietnam News* coverage), but when the conference outgrew the International Convention Center Facilities, it was moved to the National Assembly building, an appropriate setting for what was probably Vietnam's largest and most open exchange of views to date between foreign and Vietnamese academics and specialists in a wide range of fields.

The conference's multiple sections met simultaneously, so I alternated between "Contemporary History" and "Archives." In the former session, papers by Stein Tønnesson, Amer Ramses, and Pierre Asselin highlighted such key Cold War Vietnam subjects as the 1946 Constitution, the expulsion of the Chinese minority, and the life of Le Duan, respectively. David Elliott noted the as yet insufficient answers to the most basic questions about the Southern revolutionary movement, the 1959 decision for armed struggle, and the roots of the Tet offensive. Unfortunately, none of the Vietnamese participants seemed to be in a position to shed new light on any of these issues.

The Archives session, chaired by the general director of the archival administration, Dr. Duong Van Kham, covered matters from antiquity to the present. Of greatest interest was the paper by the director of National Archives Center No. 3, Nguyen Thi Man, describing the holdings of her repository. These materials cover the governmental files of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (later, Socialist Republic of Vietnam) from 1945 until 10 October 1995, the founding date of Archives No. 3. Nguyen expressed the wish that "cooperative relation[s] between Archives of the [foreign] countries would be broadened," while assuring that Archives No. 3 was "ready to serve all kinds of readers who come to us to do research about Vietnam."

Although it should be mentioned that Archives 3 does not contain documents from the Communist Party (Lao Dong; Vietnamese Workers' Party), the Army or the Foreign Ministry, materials from the National Assembly, Government Council and Premier's Office may add to our knowledge of Cold War topics related to Southeast Asia.

In the hopes that the recent opening of Archives No. 3 will inspire scholars to try to make use of this new resource for contemporary history, I will conclude this brief note with a rough translation of the rough, handwritten finding aid as provided in the archive's reading room. Please forward updates on holdings that you may receive to CWIHP. In 1999-2000, CWIHP will be preparing a special *Bulletin* issue on the Cold War in Southeast Asia and the Indochina and Vietnam Wars. All those with new documents or other suggested contributions are invited to contact the CWIHP.

National Archives Center No. 3 – Finding Aid (Excerpt)

1. Industry Ministry
2. Finance Ministry
3. Heavy Industry
4. Light Industry
- [. . .]
6. Ministry of Food and Food Processing
7. Labor
8. Communications
9. Water Resources
10. Public Works
11. Water Resources
12. Water Resources and Construction
13. Veterans Affairs
14. Economics
15. Commerce
- 16, 18, 27, 31 Communications
- [. . .]
19. Statistics
20. Food
- 20b Prime Minister
- 21 Land/Water Transport
22. Commerce Commission
23. State Planning
24. American Imperialist Crimes in Vietnam
25. Denunciations of American and Puppet Crimes
26. Committee to Protect Mothers and Children
28. NW Autonomous Region Communications Office
29. Railroad Bureau
30. Nha Cong chinh
32. Water Resources
33. Central Statistical Office
34. Minerals
- 35-41. Resistance and Administration in Nambo

(1945-54)
 42-47 Interzone 3 (Various Admin)
 48-52 Interzone 4
 53-56 Interzone 3
 57-74 Viet Bac Region
 75-80, 88-90 Tay Bac Region
 81-84 Ta Ngan
 85-86 Salt Office
 87 School for Agriculture and Industry
 91 Central Area
 [. . .]
 97-99 Thai-Hmong Autonomous Region
 100 Office of Cultural Exchange with Foreign
 Countries
 101 Local Industry
 102 Construction
 103 Water Transport
 104 Land Transport
 105 Construction
 106 Machine Production
 107 Food Resources
 108 Tools and Implements
 109 General Statistical Institute
 110 Development Bank
 111 Chuong Duong Bridge
 112 Ben Thuy Bridge
 113 Specialist Office
 114 Ministry of Industry and Commerce
 115 Sports Office
 116 Culture and Arts
 117 Interior Ministry
 118 Government Commerce Commission
 119 Prime Minister's Office
 120 Films
 121 Files transmitted by Ngo Dau on 26 March 1980
 122 Documents with [Chairman] Ho's signature
 [. . .]
 124 Interzone 5 Resistance and Administration
 Committee

A 1998 addendum to this list includes:

1. Viet Bac Autonomous Region Administration
Comm. (1950-75)
2. Viet Bac Autonomous Region Party Comm. (1950-
75)
- 3-4. Finance Ministry
5. Health Ministry
6. Meterology Office
7. Water Measurement
8. Communications
9. Viet Bac Interzone Land Reform
10. Commodity organizations
11. Equipment office
12. Tay Bac Autonomous Region
13. The Long Bridge

It should also be mentioned that the Ministry of Culture collection also includes more than 30 personal archives for important Vietnamese cultural figures. Furthermore, a brief perusal of the catalog for f. 113 revealed files on the Soviet contribution to the construction of the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum and on the withdrawal of the Chinese experts in 1978 as well as the daily business of hosting socialist-camp specialists in North Vietnam.

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First Conference on Understanding the End of the Cold War

[Editor's note: The following is the first report on the conference, "Understanding the End of the Cold War," held at Brown University, Providence, RI, 7-10 May 1998. Co-organized with the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, the conference was the first in a series of four oral history conferences that will reexamine key turning points leading to the end of the Cold War. The collaborating institutions include the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the University of Munich. The conference was made possible by the financial support of the Carnegie Corporation. The efforts of Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive), particularly in assembling Russian participants and documents, made a major contribution to its success. Subsequent conferences of the project will be held in Columbus (OH), Bavaria, and Moscow. For further information on the conference, contact Nina Tannenwald, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (tel: 401-863-7428; fax: 401-863-1270; Email: ninat@brown.edu).]

By Nina Tannenwald

On 7-10 May 1998, a dozen former Soviet and Reagan administration high-ranking officials convened at Brown University in Providence, RI, for a three-and-a-half-day conference reexamining key issues and events leading to the end of the Cold War, focusing on the years 1980-87. The conference, the first in a series of four conferences that will probe key causes of the end of the Cold War, was sponsored by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, and the Mershon Center at Ohio State University. Participants included both former policymakers of the Reagan administration and the Gorbachev government, as well as academic experts in Soviet and post-Soviet studies and international relations. A briefing book of newly declassified documents from Russian and U.S. archives, assembled by the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project, provided the documentary basis for the discussions. Especially noteworthy were extensive excerpts of the diary notes of Anatoly Chernyaev, senior foreign policy adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, on Politburo sessions. A number of newly declassified U.S. documents, including the background materials for the 1986 Reykjavik summit, were also made available.

The U.S. side was represented by Michael Guhin, counselor in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Douglas MacEachin, Soviet analyst at the CIA during the early 1980s; Jack Matlock, Jr., the Soviet specialist on President Reagan's National Security Council and then U.S. Ambassador to Moscow from 1987-1991; Robert McFarlane, National Security Adviser 1983-86; General Edward Rowne, chief U.S. negotiator on the START talks; and John Whitehead, deputy to Secretary of State George Shultz.

The former Soviet participants included the senior foreign policy advisers to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Anatoly Chernyaev and Georgy Shakhnazarov; Sergei Tarasenko, chief foreign policy adviser to Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze; Oleg Grinevsky, ambassador and head of the Soviet delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) arms control negotiations in Stockholm from 1983-86; General Nikolai Detinov, arms control expert in

the Soviet Ministry of Defense; and Gen. Vladimir Slipchenko, a military scientist who served on the general staff. Yegor Ligachev, secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and the "number two" man in the Soviet government, was expected but had to cancel at the last minute for health reasons.

Absent from the conference were the hardliners within the Soviet leadership, those who had disagreed with Gorbachev's reformist course. Four conservatives who declined to attend (Oleg Baklanov, Central Committee secretary of defense and a key figure resisting Gorbachev's reforms; Army Gen. Valentin Varennikov, and top KGB officials Vladimir Kryuchkov and Nicolai Leonov) stated in a joint letter to the organizers that they were very interested in the project in principle and pleased to be invited, but had two objections: they were offended by being asked to sit at the same table as close associates of Gorbachev (who they feel "lost" the Soviet Union), and they felt that the Cold War was not over yet. In their view, what needed to be explored were links between the end of the Cold War and current US-Russian relations - an issue which came up near the end of the conference.

The conference began by examining the initial mindsets on both sides at the beginning of the 1980s and the rise of Gorbachev. A fair amount is already known about this early period, and the session covered a certain amount of familiar terrain, as participants easily fell into their old roles and found themselves arguing old debates about who was ahead or behind in the arms race in the early 1980s and about measures of the strategic balance.

The most revealing new information emerged on the Soviet side. The conference filled in gaps in several areas, particularly on the national security decisions were made in the Soviet Union. We learned some interesting details about the role of Marshal Akhromeev, Chief of the General Staff, and the origins of Soviet arms control policies. For example, Sergei Tarasenko recounted for the first time the origins of Gorbachev's proposal to abolish all nuclear weapons. He and a colleague originally came up with the idea in April 1985, but it later surfaced as an official proposal from Akhromeev in December 1985. It was thus "planted" in the military, contradicting Akhromeev's account in his memoirs, that this was the

military's idea. Oleg Grinevsky expressed his surprise at hearing this story for the first time, commenting, "We had a suspicion that Marshal Akhromeev did not personally pen the program of the general non-nuclear world." According to Grinevsky, during a meeting of the "small five" on 6 January 1986, Akhromeev had burst in the door to announce that the proposal to abolish nuclear weapons would replace the less radical arms control proposal the group had been working on. Few in the meeting believed Akhromeev's explanation that the general staff had been working secretly on this. Participants suggested that Georgy Kornienko, First Deputy Head of Foreign Affairs, had likely played a key role in persuading Akhromeev to accept the more radical proposal.

Ironically, in contrast to what many outside observers perceived at the time—that the Reagan administration thought this proposal to abolish nuclear weapons was just

another piece of Soviet propaganda—top U.S. officials, including Reagan himself, seem to have taken it seriously. Thus what started as propaganda, or at least appeared that way to those Soviet officials assigned to develop it, ended up being taken seriously by top leaders on both sides.

Grinevsky also recounted how inspections were finally accepted on the Soviet side in 1986 as part of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe. The military strongly opposed inspections, viewing them as spying. The Politburo decided to accept inspections but had Akhromeev present the decision at the Geneva talks as if it came from the military, even though Akhromeev had bitterly opposed it in a key Politburo meeting. In describing how this came about, Grinevsky offered a very interesting account of real disagreements within a Politburo meeting.

A more puzzling and unresolved discussion

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concerned the Soviet decision to finally delink INF from SDI, eliminating a major obstacle to concluding an INF agreement. According to Chernyaev's notes, the proposal to de-link INF seems to have come from—of all people—Andrei Gromyko, with support from Ligachev and Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov, all known for their conservative viewpoints in a Politburo meeting in February 1987. Gorbachev, on the other hand, seemed to hesitate. Chernyaev explained that Gromyko, who by that point was no longer foreign minister and had been “promoted” to a position of little influence, was no longer taken seriously. He could thus argue in favor of positions he had earlier strongly opposed (including withdrawal from Afghanistan). It remained unclear, however, why Ligachev was persistently urging the de-linking while Gorbachev seemingly played devil's advocate, or why Shevardnadze was apparently not part of the discussion.

While less new information came out on the American side—not surprising since the major transformations of the end of the Cold War occurred on the Soviet side, and also because we know more about the American decision-making process, thanks in part to many high-quality memoirs—we did learn more about the nature of threat perceptions on both sides in the 1980s, particularly the period 1983-86. McFarlane challenged arguments from the Russians that they had been thinking about reform for a long time, provoking Chernyaev to ask, “Did you really think we were going to attack you?” There was often as much disagreement within the sides as between them, especially on the American side, providing a useful reminder of the complex array of domestic actors involved on each side. An interesting exchange came near the end when CIA Soviet specialist Doug MacEachin raised the issue of the Able Archer of NATO military exercises November 1983, and scholar Raymond Garthoff pointed to the highly provocative movements of U.S. fleets in Soviet waters, explicitly challenging Jack Matlock's depiction of U.S. policy as relatively benign and defensive.

In addition to providing new empirical information about specific decisions and events, the discussions provided more general contextual insights that will be valuable in interpreting the large numbers of documents now coming out of the archives. Other issues the sessions illuminated were the importance of personal relationships in building trust between the two sides, and the degree of misperception and miscommunication on each side. A recurring theme was the failure of the other side to perceive what each regarded as major shifts in its own position. During a discussion of the causes of the U.S. adoption of the “four-point agenda” in January 1984, which marked a shift by the Reagan administration to a much more accommodating stance toward the Soviet Union, Chernyaev confessed that he had been completely unaware of this agenda. A stunned Matlock expressed amazement that this could be the case, since it formed the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan remained an area of clear disagreement. Soviet participants clearly believed that the U.S. was trying to tie down the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, while U.S. participants said there was nothing they would have wanted more than an early Soviet withdrawal. They saw little evidence that the Soviets were preparing to leave.

Those looking to support or disconfirm arguments about whether “power” or “ideas” mattered more in explaining the end of the Cold War will, alas, find no final answers here. The conference provided evidence for both. Discussions illuminated the perception of domestic decline as the main driving factor for reform on the Soviet side. They also provided insight on the reaction of various Soviet bureaucracies to Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), suggesting that SDI did indeed affect Soviet thinking on the need for reform, especially Gorbachev's. At the same time, it was clear from the exchanges that ongoing U.S. and Western diplomatic pressure in favor of human rights and freedoms, exerted both publicly and privately, played a key role in shaping the direction and content of change. Tarasenko emphasized that Shevardnadze's conversations with Shultz on topics other than arms control had an important influence on changing his views. Constant Western pressure on behalf of Sakharov and other dissidents, while irritating initially to the Soviets, eventually fostered a genuine change in thinking. Chernyaev described how Gorbachev and his advisers complied initially with Western requests to improve human rights for purely for instrumental reasons (to promote the arms control process), but then began to think of them as something fundamentally important for the reform of Soviet society. Chernyaev said at the conference, “these kinds of reminders [on human rights] that we got, they really worked, they affected us.”

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